Frontline Syria: From Revolution to Proxy War 9780755602568, 9780755602605, 9780755602582

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Frontline Syria

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Frontline Syria From Revolution to Proxy War David L. Phillips

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I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2021 Copyright © David L. Phillips, 2021 David L. Phillips has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. Cover design: danileighdesign.com Cover image © BULENT KILIC / Getty Images All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-0-7556-0256-8 ePDF: 978-0-7556-0258-2 eBook: 978-0-7556-0259-9 Typeset by Newgen KnowledgeWorks Pvt. Ltd., Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

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To Sarah H. Costa, a tireless advocate for Syria’s victims and a voice for women and children affected by violent conflict worldwide. With appreciation to Christine Caldera, Prusha Hasan, and Huseyin Tunc for their research assistance.

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Contents List of Abbreviations Timeline of Critical Events in Syria About the Author Preface

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Part I  Legacy of Repression

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1 Hama Rules

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2 The Damascus Spring

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3 Cradle of the Revolution

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Part II  Radicalization

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4 The Free Syrian Army

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5 Security Assistance

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6 Displacement Crisis

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7 The Geneva Peace Process

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Part III  International Stakeholders

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8 Russia

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9 The Shiite Crescent

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10 Turkey

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Part IV  Minorities and Women

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11 Kurds

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12 Armenians and Christians

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Contents

13 Syrian Women

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14 Alawites

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Part V  Grinding War

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15 Idlib

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16 Diminished America

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17 United Nations Mediation

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18 Betrayal

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Epilogue

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Notes Glossary of Personalities Further Reading

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Index

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Abbreviations AAA AJACS AKP APCs BoI BSF CBMs CCMC CEDAW

Armenian Assembly of America Access to Justice and Community Service Justice and Development Party (Turkey) Armored Personnel Carriers Board of Inquiry Border Security Force Confidence Building Measures Central Crisis Management Cell Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CENTCOM United States Central Command CIA Central Intelligence Agency (United States) CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CW Chemical Weapons DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DEA US Drug Enforcement Agency DMZ Demilitarized Zone DoD US Department of Defense DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations DSC Democratic Syrian Council EU European Union FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association FOM Free Officers Movement FSA Free Syrian Army FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization GBV Gender-Based Violence GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GID General Intelligence Directorate HDP People’s Democratic Party (Pro-Kurdish party in Turkey) HTS Hayat Tahrir al-Sham IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICC International Criminal Court IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IED Improvised Explosive Device IHL International Humanitarian Law IIIM International Impartial Investigative Mechanism

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x IOs IOM IRC IRGC ISAF ISIS ISIL ISSG JCPOA JIM KDP KNC KRG KRI KSC LAS MB MBS MFA MHS MIT MOC MoI MREs MSF NAC NAP NATO NEA NES NFL NGOs NIOC NOREF NSA NSB NSC NSF OCHA OIC OPCW PHR PJAK PKK PLO

Abbreviations International organizations International Organization for Migration International Rescue Committee Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps International Security Assistance Force Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant International Syria Support Group Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Joint Investigative Mechanism Kurdistan Democratic Party Kurdish National Council Kurdistan Regional Government Kurdistan Region of Iraq Kurdish Supreme Committee League of Arab States Muslim Brotherhood Mohammad Bin Salman Al Saud Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mutually Hurting Stalemate National Intelligence Agency (Turkey) Military Operations Command Ministry of Interior Meals Ready-to-Eat Médecins Sans Frontières North Atlantic Council National Action Plan North Atlantic Treaty Organization Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs North and East Syria National Front for Liberation of Syria Non-Governmental Organizations National Iranian Oil Company Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution National Security Adviser National Security Bureau US National Security Council National Salvation Front Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs Organization of Islamic Cooperation Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Physicians for Human Rights Party for Free Life in Kurdistan Kurdistan Workers’ Party Palestine Liberation Organization

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Abbreviations PMCs POTUS PUK PYD P5 RSO R2P SAA SAMs SDC SDF SIF SIPRI SMC SNC SOCOM SSR SYC TCs TEV-DEM TGNA TIP TSK UAR UN UNDP UNESCO UNGA UNHCR UNICEF UNSC UNSMIS USSR VBIEDs VPRS WAB WFP WMD YPG YPJ

Provincial Military Councils President of the United States Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Democratic Union Party Permanent Members of the UN Security Council Regional Security Officer Responsibility to Protect Syrian Arab Army Surface-to-Air Missiles Syrian Democratic Council Syrian Democratic Forces Syrian Islamic Front Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Supreme Joint Military Command Syrian National Council US Special Operations Command Security Sector Reform Syrian Yazidi Council Truth Commissions Movement for a Democratic Society Turkish Grand National Assembly Turkistan Islamic Party Turkish Armed Forces United Arab Republic United Nations United Nations Development Program United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Security Council United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme Syrian Women’s Advisory Board World Food Program Weapons of Mass Destruction People’s Protection Units Women’s Protection Units

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Timeline of Critical Events in Syria September 1936  France dissolves the autonomous regions of Syria paving the path toward independence. April 1947  Arab Socialist Baath Party is established. March 1963  Baathist military officers seize control in a coup. February 1966  The traditional leaders of the Baath Party are toppled in a second coup. A radical military faction led by Salah Jadid is brought to power. June 1967  Israeli forces seize the Golan Heights from Syria during the Six-Day War. Much of Syria’s air force is destroyed. November 1970  Hafez al-Assad overthrows President Nur al-Din al-Atasi in a coup and imprisons Salah Jadid. June 1976  The Syrian army intervenes in the Lebanese civil war, supporting Maronite Christian allies. February 1980  The Islamic Revolution occurs in Iran, leading to uprisings in Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. September 1980  The Iran–Iraq war begins; Syria backs Iran. December 1981  Israel formally annexes the Golan Heights. February 1982  The Syrian army, under President Assad’s orders, brutally suppresses the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama, killing tens of thousands. June 1982  Israel invades Lebanon and attacks the Syrian army, forcing it to withdraw from several areas. Israel attacks the PLO base in Beirut. May 1983 Lebanon and Israel declare the end of hostilities. Syrian armed forces remain in Lebanon. February 1987  Hafez al-Assad sends the Syrian army to Lebanon a second time to enforce a ceasefire in Beirut. January 1994  Basil al-Assad, President Assad’s son and likely successor, killed in a car accident. Late 1998  Bashar al-Assad was put in charge of the Lebanon portfolio, arguably the most important file in the administration. June 2000  President Hafez al-Assad dies. Bashar al-Assad becomes the president. November 2000  President Assad orders the release of six hundred political prisoners, demonstrating a more conciliatory approach. April 2001  The Muslim Brotherhood announces it will resume political activity, two decades after its leaders were forced to flee. June 2001  Lebanon criticizes the continued presence of the Syrian military on its territory, leading to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Beirut and redeployment to other regions in Lebanon. September 2001  The regime detains MPs and other pro-democracy reform activists. Despite occasional amnesties, arrests continued over the following decade.

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Timeline of Critical Events in Syria

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January 2002  Syria is included as one of the states in the “axis of evil” by President George W. Bush. Then undersecretary for state, John Bolton asserts that Damascus is seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD). January 2004  President Assad makes a historic visit to Turkey. He is the first Syrian leader to visit Turkey, marking the end of years of bitter relations between the two countries. Relations between Turkey and Syria would sour again after Syria’s popular uprising in 2011. May 2004  The United States enacts economic sanctions on Syria, maintaining that Syria is supporting terrorism and failing to prevent militants from entering Iraq. February–April 2005  Tensions with the United States escalate after former Lebanese prime minister Hariri was assassinated in Beirut. US officials advise Syria to withdraw its military from Lebanon, which it does in April. Hariri’s death incited anti-Syrian protests in Beirut. November 2006  Iraq and Syria reestablish diplomatic relations. July 2008 President Assad met with French president Nicolas Sarkozy, indicating Syria’s diplomatic isolation from the West following Hariri’s assassination. March 2009  Senior US officials visit Damascus to meet with Foreign Minister Walid Muallem. It was the first high-level US diplomatic mission to Syria for approximately four years. May 2010  The US renewed sanctions against Syria, accusing Damascus of supporting terrorist groups, seeking WMD, and providing Hezbollah with Scud missiles in violation of UN Resolutions. March 2011  Syrian police arrested adolescents for pro-democracy graffiti in Daraa. Syrian security forces shoot dead at least one hundred demonstrators, who are demanding the release of political prisoners. This event triggered unrest across the country. President Assad announced conciliatory measures. Dozens of political prisoners are released, government officials are dismissed, and the 48-year-old state of emergency is lifted. May 2011  The Syrian army conducted raids in Daraa, Banyas, Homs, and suburbs of Damascus, aiming to quell anti-regime protests. As a result, the United States and EU tighten sanctions against the regime. July 2011  More than 100,000 people participated in protests against Assad across the country. Seven military officers defected and created the Free Syrian Army (FSA). President Assad fired the governor of Hama after mass demonstrations and defections, eventually sending in troops to restore order. August 2011  The Syrian National Council was established in Istanbul, claiming to be the official representative of the Syrian opposition. November 2011 The Arab League suspended Syria’s membership and imposed sanctions, accusing Damascus of failing to institute an Arab peace plan. The FSA launched attacks on government intelligence offices in Damascus and Aleppo. January 2012  Abu Mohammad al-Julani, a member of al-Qaeda in Iraq, declared the formation of the Nusra Front in Syria. He posted a video online, declaring war against Assad and called for the establishment of an Islamic State in Syria. February 2012  The Syrian government initiated an assault against Homs and other cities in Syria. More than two hundred people were killed on the first day of the

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Timeline of Critical Events in Syria

attack. Fighting would continue in Homs until December 2015. Security forces also assaulted the city of Hama. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, posted a video statement supporting the anti-Assad uprising in Syria. More than seventy nations and international organizations participated in the Friends of Syria meeting on February 24. The group recognized the Syrian National Council as a “legitimate representation of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change.” The group requested the Assad regime permit the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians. March 2012  UN Security Council (UNSC) endorses the six-point peace plan drafted by UN Envoy Kofi Annan. The UNSC backed the plan on March 21, and the Syrian government accepted it on March 27. April 2012  A UN brokered cease-fire between the rebels and the regime broke down immediately after its implementation. June 2012 Representative from the UN, United States, Russia, the Arab League, and other international stakeholders met in Geneva and demanded a transitional governing body to oversee elections.   Turkey changed its rules of engagement after Syria shot down a Turkish plane. Turkey announced that if Syrian troops approach its borders, then they will be deemed a military threat. July 2012  Rebels captured the eastern half of Aleppo. The regime dropped barrel bombs on urban areas held by rebels. Approximately one million civilians fled and another half million were displaced. Bombing at Damascus killed senior security officials. August 2012  Kofi Annan resigned as the UN and Arab League Envoy for Syria and was replaced by Lakhdar Brahimi on August 17. Prime Minister Riad Hijab defected from the regime. Obama warned that the use of chemical weapons would be a “red line” that would change his calculus. November 2012  The Syrian National Council joined other opposition groups to form the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, excluding Islamist militias. The Arab League stops short of full recognition. December 2012  The United States, Britain, France, Turkey, and Gulf states recognize the National Coalition as “legitimate representative” of Syrian people. Rebels captured important military base in Aleppo. Commercial flights were suspended. January 2013  Syria accused Israel of bombing a military base near Damascus, where Hezbollah was assembling anti-aircraft missiles. March 2013  Rebel groups captured Raqqa. April 2013  Baghdadi asserted that the Islamic State in Iraq had merged with the Nusra Front, becoming the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, Nusra Front leader Julani denied the alliance and pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda. June 2013  The White House confirmed that the Assad regime had used chemical weapon (CW) against the opposition. President Obama authorizes security assistance to Syrian rebels. August 2013  Hundreds of people were killed in a CW attack in Ghouta. On August 29, the British Parliament denied a resolution for military action after this attack. On August 31, President Obama said the United States should act against Syria for its use of CW with Congressional authorization.

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Timeline of Critical Events in Syria

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September 2013  UN weapons inspectors determined that chemical weapons were used in Ghouta. The UNSC adopted a resolution demanding the elimination of Syria’s CWs. Obama aimed to win support from Congress with Senate Joint Resolution 21, which included the authorization for the use of military force against the Syrian government. The resolution was never introduced.   On September 9, Assad agreed to destroy or hand over his stockpile of CWs after negotiations with Russia. This process was ostensibly completed by June 2014. November 2013 Seven Sunni Islamist groups united to create the Islamic Front, seeking to overthrow Assad and replace the Baathist regime with an Islamic government. The groups were Ahrar al-Sham, Jaish al-Islam, Suqour al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Liwa al-Haqq, Ansar al-Sham, and the Kurdish Islamic Front. January–February 2014  The UN-brokered peace talks in Geneva fail, primarily due to Syrian officials who refused to discuss a transitional government. February 2014  Al-Qaeda released a statement disavowing any relationship to ISIS. May 2014  Lakhdar Brahimi resigns as the UN Envoy for Syria. June 2014  ISIS seized control of Deir ez-Zor and three towns in Iraq, securing a strategic border crossing. On June 29, Baghdadi declared himself the leader of ISIS and announced a “caliphate” from Aleppo to Diyala, an eastern province in Iraq. Days later, ISIS seized two major oil fields in Syria. July 2014  Staffan de Mistura was appointed as the new Special Envoy for Syria. August 2014  ISIS released a video of the beheading of James Foley, an American journalist who was kidnapped in Syria in 2012. ISIS also sent a message to President Obama: if the United States would not end their military operations in Iraq, then the militant group would kill Steven Sotloff, also an American journalist held in Syria. On September 2, ISIS released a video showing the killing of Sotloff. September 2014 ISIS attacked Kobani, a town on the Syrian-Turkish border. Thousands of residents fled, which contributed to the growing refugee population. Later in the month, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that more than three million Syrians became refugees since the start of the war. The United States launched its first air strike against ISIS in Syria. Obama promised the United States would destroy ISIS. Five Arab countries launched air strikes against ISIS in Aleppo and Raqqa. November 2014  The Nusra Front captured Idlib and pushed the FSA brigades out from their stronghold. January 2015 Senior US officials met with the FSA to discuss a train-and-equip program. Kurdish forces pushed ISIS out of Kobani after four months of fighting. May 2015  Islamic State fighters seize the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria and destroyed many monuments at the World Heritage site. Idlib province was overtaken by Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) Islamist rebel alliance, and pressured Assad’s stronghold on Latakia. July 2015  The first cohort of FSA members, trained by the United States, entered Syria. September 2015  Russia conducted its first air strike in Syria, stating they targeted ISIS. However, the West and opposition groups in Syria assert Russia predominately targeted anti-Assad groups.

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November 2015  The International Syria Support Group (ISSG) met in Vienna to determine conditions for a cease-fire and negotiations between the Assad regime and the opposition. Seventeen countries participated, including Iran, the UN, EU, and the members of the Arab League. December 2015  The government regained control of Homs, Syria’s third largest city, after allowing rebels to evacuate. UNSC Resolution 2254 called for a transition to “credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance” within six months. It determined a schedule for drafting a new constitution and elections for a new government within eighteen months. February 2016  The United States and Russia brokered a nationwide cease-fire, which the UN described as the “best hope for peace in five years of civil war.” The ceasefire collapsed within two months. March 2016 With Russian airstrikes, the Syrian government regained control of Palmyra from ISIS. April 2016  The UN hosted a fourth series of peace talks in Geneva. Due to increased violence and the humanitarian crisis in Syria, the opposition present at the talks walked out in protest. August 2016  The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pushed back ISIS from Manbij, which had been controlled by ISIS since 2014.   Turkish military entered Syria to support the FSA in their fight against ISIS in Jarabulus. Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield aimed to contain Kurdish groups, primarily the PYD and its militia, the YPG. September 2016  The United States and Russia brokered an additional cease-fire, yet, their efforts failed a second time. December 2016  Government forces, supported by Russian air power and Iraniansponsored militias, recaptured Aleppo from the rebels, a major loss for the rebels. On December 30, Russia and Turkey enforced a cease-fire between rebel groups and the government. January 2017  After the peace talks in Kazakhstan, Russia, Iran, and Turkey agree to enforce a cease-fire between the government and non-Islamist rebels. The UN special envoy participated. The United States attended the talks as an observer. Russia, Iran, and Turkey decided to establish a trilateral monitoring body to enforce the December 30 cease-fire. Subsequent talks were held in 2017 and 2018 as part of the Astana process. January 2018 The Nusra Front combined with four smaller militant groups and rebranded itself as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) after internal divisions over relations with al-Qaeda. As a result of the merger, HTS had approximately thirtyone thousand fighters and increased its presence in Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo in the north and Daraa in the south. February 2017  The Iraqi Air Force targeted ISIS in Syria for the first time. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi stated the air strikes were coordinated with Damascus and benefitted from US intelligence. April 2017  More than eighty civilians were killed in a CW attack on Khan Sheikhoun, in Idlib province. Two days later, President Trump ordered a missile attack on a Syrian airfield from which warplanes had staged the attack. This marked the first

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direct attack against the Syrian government by the United States. On April 24, the Trump administration enforced sanctions against 271 people implicated in Syria’s weapon development. May 2017  The Astana group held a fourth round of talks, agreeing to de-escalation zones and cease-fires in four opposition-held areas:  Idlib, Eastern Ghouta, Northern Homs, and Daraa and Quneitra. Later in the year, they agreed to establish de-escalation zones in Eastern Ghouta, Idlib, Homs, Latakia, Aleppo, and Hama for a minimum of six months. May 2017  The Trump administration decides to arm the SDF to help recapture Raqqa from ISIS, despite Turkish objections. On May 18, US jets hit a convoy of Iranianbacked militiamen near the town of al-Tanf. This marked the first US strike on Iranian proxies in Syria. August 2017 The Lebanese army and Hezbollah declared a joint assault on ISIS territory along Lebanon’s northeastern border with Syria. Hezbollah targeted ISIS from the Syrian side. The Lebanese army targeted ISIS from its side of the border. October 2017  The SDF defeated ISIS in Raqqa after a fourth-month campaign that killed about six thousand ISIS members. Raqqa was largely demolished during the fighting. November 2017  Assad met with Putin to discuss a political settlement. Putin said Russia’s military operations were drawing down. December 2017  Russia extended the lease of its naval base in Tartus for forty-nine years. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu declared Russia’s plans to expand the base to accommodate eleven Russian warships. January 2018  Turkey launched an assault on northern Syria to oust Kurds in Afrin. This assault culminated in the takeover of Afrin in March. A  committee was established during a peace conference held in Sochi to rewrite the constitution. De Mistura said he would select about fifty people from government, opposition, and independent groups to serve on the committee. February 2018 Armed forces backing the Syrian government, including Russian private military contractors, attacked the SDF in eastern Syria. US Special Forces were also present in the area. In response, the United States launched artillery and air strikes. April 2018  Claims of a new CW attack in Eastern Ghouta’s main town of Douma prompted punitive strikes by the United States, Britain, and France. May 2018 Iranian forces in Syria launched around twenty rockets toward Israeli military points in the Golan Heights. In response, Israel hit dozens of Iranian targets in Syria, marking Israel’s largest military engagement in Syria since the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. June 2018 De Mistura met representatives of Russia, Iran, and Turkey to discuss the formation of the Syrian Constitutional Committee. He said “some common ground” was beginning to emerge. August 2018  James Jeffrey was appointed the new US Special Representative for Syria engagement. The Trump administration terminated approximately $230 million in aid for stabilization projects in Syria.

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September 2018  James Jeffrey said the United States no longer planned to leave Syria by the end of 2018. The announcement meant “we’re not in a hurry to pull out,” Jeffrey told journalists. “We’re going to stay in until we have an enduring defeat” of ISIS. Russia and Turkey agreed to form a demilitarized safe zone in Idlib. Turkish troops and Russian military police would be in charge of security in the area. On September 28, Russia delivered the S-300 anti-air missile system to Syria’s military. The SDF launched several offensives reducing ISIS-controlled territory to a sliver on the Iraqi border by December 2018. October 2018  De Mistura resigns as UN envoy for Syria. November 2018  The US Treasury sanctioned six individuals and three entities for providing millions of barrels of oil to Syria. December 2018  President Trump announced plans to withdraw the two thousand US forces from Syria via Twitter. January 2019  President Trump threatened to impose sanctions on Turkey if it pursued an attack against US-Kurdish allies in northern Syria. February 2019  The US officials announced that four hundred US troops would stay in Syria to prevent the resurgence of ISIS. Geir Pedersen appointed as UN Envoy for Syria. April 2019  Members of the Astana group initiated detainee swaps between the Assad regime and opposition groups in November 2018, February 2019, and April 2019.   The Syrian armed forces and Russia intensified air strikes in northwest Syria, breaking the de-escalation zone deal. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced. June 2019  The UN questioned Russia’s role in bombing twenty-three hospitals since the Idlib offensive began in April. August 2019  The Syrian government agreed to a cease-fire in Idlib on the condition that the Turkish-Russian safe zone is implemented.   The United States and Turkey agreed to establish a new demilitarized zone in North and East Syria in order to prevent a possible Turkish invasion against SDF territory. A Turkish military convoy traveling through Idlib is attacked by Syrian warplanes. Turkey claimed the convoy was carrying supplies to observation posts whereas Syria accused it of transporting weapons and ammunition to rebel groups. September 2019  Erdogan, Putin, and Rouhani meet in Ankara for talks on Syria. They announced that the Syrian constitutional committee is ready. Erdogan suggested that three million refugees return to Syria and stay in the safe zone along the border. October 2019  Turkey attacks the SDF following a call between president Erdogan and Trump. Turkey occupies the area between Tal Abyad and Ras al Ain (Serekaniye).

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About the Author David L.  Phillips is director of the Program on Peace-building and Human Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He served at a senior adviser and foreign affairs expert to the US Department of State during the administrations of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama. Phillips also served as a senior adviser to the UN Secretariat. Phillips has held a number of other positions as visiting scholar with Harvard University’s Center for Middle East Studies and with the Council on Foreign Relations. His previous publications include The Great Betrayal: How America Abandoned the Kurds and Lost the Middle East; An Uncertain Ally:  Turkey under Erdogan’s Dictatorship; The Kurdish Spring:  A new Map for the Middle East; Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and US Intervention; From Bullets to Ballots:  Violent Muslim Movements in Transition; Unsilencing the Past:  Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation; and Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco. He has contributed to leading publications such as The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, and Foreign Affairs.

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Preface Almost a decade has passed since students in Daraa painted graffiti on their school wall, criticizing President Bashar al-Assad and calling for his removal. The Syrian regime made an example of them, arresting, incarcerating, and torturing the students. Enraged Daraans took to the streets in protest. Demonstrations spread across the country, catalyzing a broader conflict that engulfed Syria in civil war. The carnage, which started in 2011, took a terrible toll. As of this writing, more than a half million people have been killed and at least twelve million rendered homeless. War crimes and crimes against humanity have been widespread. The regime used chemical weapons (CW) and chlorine and barrel bombs on civilians, which caused many casualties. Sustainable peace and reconciliation are simply slogans to Syrians who survived the war. Rebels were closing in on Damascus when Russia intervened in 2015. Russian air power, combined with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah, turned the tide. Moderate Sunni pro-democracy groups became increasingly Islamist and militant. Washington feared supporting the wrong groups by providing weapons that might be used against the United States. The unwillingness of both the Obama and Trump administrations to train and equip Syrian rebels contributed to their radicalization and the rise of militant Islamist militias. The crisis in Syria became a proxy war for foreign powers, with the notable exception of the United States, which was reluctant to get involved. Arab states and Turkey supported the rebels, with Russia and Iran standing by the government. The United States failed to act, despite President Barack Obama’s call for Assad to step down and his declaration of a redline regarding the use of CW. The gap created by America’s inaction was filled by bad actors hostile to the West. This book traces the trajectory of violent conflict from 1982 to the present. It starts with the attack on Hama when President Hafez al-Assad leveled the city to eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood. It recounts the country’s descent into civil war after the events in Daraa. It describes failed mediation by the international community and enmity between the United States and Russia, which paralyzed the UN Security Council and prolonged Syria’s tragedy. ***** I made my first trip to Syria in mid-1980 and have visited several times since. My views are informed by work as a scholar, activist, and human rights advocate. I was a UN official with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), served as president of the Congressional Human Rights Foundation, and worked with the US Department of State in several regional bureaus including the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs that focused on the Middle East. My research for this book draws on primary,

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secondary, and media sources. Primary sources include interviews with senior US officials involved in US–Syria policy, as well as past and present Syrian officials. Iraq’s political transition in 2003 has parallels to what happened in Syria. In 2002 and 2003, I served as a senior adviser to the US government’s Democratic Principles Working Group, a part of the Future of Iraq Project, which Iraqis called the “mother of all working groups.” The project convened members of the Iraqi opposition to envision their country after the removal of Saddam Hussein. My work for the US government also encompassed frontline states such as Turkey. Full disclosure: I strongly support the Kurdish cause and have bore witness to their suffering in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey for more than thirty years. My support for the Kurds started in 1988 after attacks during the Anfal campaign, using mustard gas and unidentified nerve agents in Halabja. I am a strong critic of Turkey for fomenting violence in the region, and spreading its Islamist doctrine. Turkey played a negative role in Syria by supporting Islamist extremists who contributed to internal displacement and a mass migration of refugees, fueling nativism and the rise of nationalist politicians in Europe. Though critical of Russia and Iran, I am a proponent of international cooperation to prevent conflict and stabilize war-torn societies. Rather than an adversarial relationship, Russia and the United States can advance peace and security by working together. The failure of international diplomacy in Syria was compounded by President Donald J. Trump, who bent over backward to prove he was not kowtowing to Moscow, after accusations that Russia’s malign activities influenced the 2016 US presidential election in favor of Trump. While the Trump administration has demonized Iran, Tehran’s nefarious role might have been different if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) had been implemented. The JCPOA promised to lift sanctions in exchange for a verifiable commitment by Iran to abandon its nuclear program. The United States and Iran might have grown to become allies in world affairs, except for Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and Iran’s intensified support for terror groups committed to Israel’s destruction. The United Nations played a critical role, focusing on the formation of a constitutional committee to bridge the gap between Syrians and provide powersharing between Damascus and Syria’s regions. Syria will not be the world’s last civil war, pitting ethnic and sectarian groups against each other with regional and global implications. It is, therefore, important to study the Syria case and derive lessons that can inform peacemaking in the future. ***** Frontline Syria serves as an “after-action report.” It analyzes Washington’s role in Syria at the outset of the civil war, considers US support for diplomacy, and assesses US relations with the rebels and international stakeholders. Significantly, this book evaluates the impact of Syria’s tragedy not only on Syrians but also on Washington’s ability to influence events in the world. Among Syrians, Kurds are the big losers. Trump’s decision to abandon the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a predominantly Kurdish force that sacrificed more than

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eleven thousand men and women fighting ISIS, is a bloodstain on America’s reputation. Trump’s announcement that US forces would fully and immediately withdraw from Syria came after a phone conversation with Turkey’s president Tayyip Erdoğan on October 6, 2019. Not only the Kurds, but also the countries in the global coalition to counter ISIS felt betrayed. Among NATO members with troops on the ground, France was most indignant. America’s withdrawal occurred long before the Trump–Erdogan phone call on October 6.  Washington’s abdication of leadership allowed other international stakeholders to advance their strategic objectives in Syria. In exchange for rescuing Assad, Russia secured long-term leases for its base in Latakia and a warm water port in Tartus on the Mediterranean. Iran consolidated control over a corridor across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon through which it delivers missiles to Hamas and Hezbollah. Turkey was able to establish a “safe zone” in northern Syria, compelling the SDF’s withdrawal; purging the area of Kurdish civilians; and, in the wake of its ethnic cleansing, resettling Syrian Arab refugees from Turkey to northern Syria. No script exists to guide US policy in the future. However, the United States must learn from history and its mistakes. According to former deputy secretary of state William J. Burns, “We misaligned ends and means, promising too much, on the one hand—declaring ‘Assad must go,’ setting red lines—and applying tactical tools too grudgingly and incrementally on the other.”1 There is plenty of blame to go around. The combatants are most responsible for Syria’s suffering. In addition, US actions—or the lack thereof—exacerbated the conflict and allowed the spiral of deadly violence. As the world’s indispensable nation, the United States could have played a decisive peacemaking and mediation role in the Syrian conflict. The United States failed, and Syrians paid a steep price. The Trump administration is not suited to conduct an after-action report. Trump’s aversion for Obama and his foreign policies would color its analysis. Absent a formal review, this book serves as an interim assessment with lessons learned and recommendations. It is relevant to policy-makers, practitioners, instructors, and students interested in Syria and the Middle East, as well as the Syrian people who have shown great resilience in the face of catastrophe. New York City January 1, 2020

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Part One

Legacy of Repression

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2

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1

Hama Rules

He levelled it, pounding the fundamentalist neighborhood with artillery for days. Once the guns fell silent, he plowed up the rubble and bulldozed it flat, into vast parking lots.1 —Thomas L. Friedman ***** Hafez al-Assad was born with a chip on his shoulder. He was the ninth of eleven sons, and the fourth from his father’s second marriage. Hafez came from Qardaha, a poor rural village in Latakia Province. He was an Alawite, a minority Islamic sect, which comprised less than 15  percent of Syria’s total population. Qardaha was in a Sunni region where discrimination against Alawites was widespread. Hafez had to struggle to advance in life. He learned survival skills that would serve him well in the rough and tumble world of the Syrian military and Baath Party. Hafez al-Assad enlisted in the air force; he became an air force pilot and air force commander after the Baathists took power in 1963. Hafez and a group of officers launched a coup against the Baathist civilian leadership in 1966. After the coup, Hafez was appointed defense minister. Hafez earned a reputation for cunning and ruthlessness. He was notorious for arresting, torturing, and executing opponents. Hafez even turned on his mentor, chief of the armed forces Salah al-Jadid, blaming him for Syria’s botched effort to support Palestinians fighting King Hussein in Jordan. Jadid was arrested and given a life sentence. With Jadid out of the way, the path to political leadership swung wide open for Hafez. He became prime minister in November 1970 and president the following year. Hafez made many enemies, not only domestically but also regionally. Hafez was committed to Israel’s destruction, using his support for the Palestinian national movement to burnish his credentials with the Arab League. However, he was humiliated when Syrian troops were driven from the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War with Israel in June 1967. He loathed Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat for kowtowing to the West, criticizing Syria’s defeat in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, and making peace with the “Zionist entity.” Heads of the Baath parties in Syria and Iraq, Hafez al-Assad and President Saddam Hussein, respectively, vied for leadership of the Baath

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movement. As an Alawite, Hafez had affinities for Iran, which he supported in the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. Syria used terrorism to advance its strategic objectives in the region. It established a network of jihadist groups, including Al-Saiqa in 1966. Al-Saiqa was an extremist Palestinian group that targeted Israel and more moderate Palestinian factions such as Yasser Arafat’s Fatah Organization. Syria developed close ties with several other militant Palestinian organizations, which posed a threat to Israel such as the Islamic Jihad Organization, the Islamic Movement in Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Hamas. Consistent with his use of militant groups to advance foreign policy goals, Assad sponsored the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a vehicle for pressuring Turkey. He supported Hezbollah to leverage Syria’s role in Lebanon’s civil war. In addition to working through proxies, Assad deployed Syrian forces and secured a permanent presence in the Beqaa Valley. The Syrian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed following the 1963 Baathist coup and subsequently scorned by the sectarian Syrian regime. Banning the Brotherhood contributed to its radicalization, leading to a series of strikes and mass protests. Under pressure from the regime, the Brotherhood went underground. It divided into two factions in 1972. Issam Attar led the more moderate Damascus faction, and Abdu-l-Fattaah Aboo Ghuddah led hardliners in Aleppo and Hama where Sunnis are traditionally more conservative and militant. Marwan Hadeed, an agricultural entrepreneur from Hama, tried to reconcile the Brotherhood movement. He established an independent organization named the Fighting Vanguard (Al-Talia Al-Muqatila), which attracted support from both sides and functioned as the armed wing of the Brotherhood. Hadeed was arrested in 1975 and killed by Syrian security forces. On May 31, 1976, Syrian armed forces intervened in Lebanon’s civil war at the request of its Christian Maronite-led government. Assad acted in the national interest. He believed that events in Lebanon were a direct risk to Syria. Assad feared that sectarian strife could spill over the border, exacerbating Syria’s own Christian–Muslim tensions. A  civil war could also provide a pretense for Israel’s intervention, directly challenging Syria’s role in the region. Victory by the Lebanese National Movement risked turning Lebanon into a radical, left-wing Muslim state. Assad sent Syrian forces into Lebanon in order to stabilize the situation. He intervened to prevent what happened in Lebanon from happening in Syria.2 Despite Assad’s efforts, the Islamic uprising was launched in Syria with clandestine operations. It came out of the shadows in the spring of 1979, when an artillery school was attacked, killing eighty-three cadets. Government buildings, police stations, and Baath Party institutions were attacked in June of that year. The Fighting Vanguard also tried to assassinate senior Baath Party officials, including Hafez al-Assad. Assad viewed the Fighting Vanguard, which became the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, as the most serious security threat to his rule. He tried to suppress it, arresting and killing thousands of Brothers and sympathizers.3 ***** No incident defined Hafez al-Assad more than his annihilation of Hama in 1982. Hama, which had become the Muslim Brotherhood’s stronghold, is Syria’s fourth-largest

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Hama Rules

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city, behind Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs. According to the 2009 census, the Hama Governorate had a population of 854,000, of which about one-third lived in the Hama municipality.4 Like Hama, Syria is a country composed of diverse ethnic and religious groups. Syria is made up of 85 percent Arabs, including some 500,000 Palestinians. Kurds represent 10  percent. Ethnic minorities such as the Turkmen, Armenians, Circassians, and Assyrians are about 5 percent. Approximately 87 percent of Syrians are Muslims. Of these, 74 percent are Sunnis and 13 percent are Shiites, Alawi, and Ismaili. Christians are 10  percent and Druze are 3  percent of the total population. Yazidis and Jews also live in Syria.5 Assad’s tyranny maintained some semblance of national unity between Syria’s disparate groups. Hama sits along a scenic stretch of the River Orontes about 300 kilometers north of the capital, Damascus. The vast majority of Hama residents are socially conservative Sunni Muslims and tribal members.6 Hama has a rich history. It was settled in the Neolithic Age on the edge of the Syrian Desert and became a commercial center for nomadic people and nearby villagers. Hama is known for its wooden waterwheels (norias), which are up to 10 meters in diameter. The norias were built in the fourteenth century to lift water from the Orontes to aqueducts. The water was used for human and livestock consumption, as well as irrigating farmlands. Water from the Orontes also supplied the gardens of Hama, which date back to 1100 BC. Hama had long been an abundant agricultural market, producing cotton, cereals, fruit, and vegetables. Small-scale manufacturing and agricultural processing were also predominant in Hama.7 Other economic activities included leather working, tobacco processing, sugar refining, flour milling, wool and textile weaving, tanning, and cement manufacturing. In the 1970s census, 31.5 percent of the population of Hama identified as self-employed.8 Mosques adorn Hama’s landscape, as places of worship for the pious. Hama was also a tourist destination, celebrated for its architecture and historical sites. Hama’s main Christian church was turned into a great mosque after Hama was captured by the Arabs in AD 637.9 Built by Nur al-Din, the al-Nuri mosque was finished in 1163. The eighth century Great Mosque, Mamluk al-Izzi mosque, built in the fifteenth century, the Abu al-Fida mausoleum and mosque, built in 1326, the Al-Hasanain mosque, finished in 1163, and the Azm Palace, built in 1742, were spectacular architectural specimens. Ruins at Apamea, the former ancient Greek and Roman capital, with its vast amphitheater able to seat twenty thousand, date back to 300 BC. Mosques are a measure of devotion by Hama’s Sunni Arab majority. Other architectural sites include the Great Colonnade of Apamea, built in the second century AD, which is almost 2 kilometers long. The Masyaf Castle is the former center of Syrian Assassin sect. It protected trade routes to Banyas and cities further inland. Artifacts from the fifth millennium BC, the Syro-Hittite Kingdom, and the second millennium of the Byzantine period were found in the citadel and displayed in the Hama museum. Hama has a tradition of resistance. It was the hub of opposition to the French administration during the rebellion of 1925–7. Beginning in 1964, Hama was the center of a countrywide protest by the Sunni majority against the secular and socialist policies of the Baath Party. The Baathists had taken over in a coup the previous year amid demands for democratic reforms and the rule of law.10 When tensions intensified

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in the 1970s, Assad tried soft power and conciliatory gestures to quell the rebellion. The Syrian government increased the salaries of civil servants and took steps to crack down on corruption. It also offered food subsidies, reducing the cost of bread and other staples. Assad supported political reforms and a new constitution in 1973. However, confidence-building measures failed to mollify the Sunnis grievances against Assad’s Alawite administration. Not only did the constitution fail to decentralize power to different groups in Syria, it also infuriated the Sunni majority by specifically allowing an Alawite to serve as head of state. Sunnis preferred representation in government by one of their own. In response, Assad arranged for a prominent Shiite jurist to issue an edict (fatwa), asserting that Alawites were Shiite Muslims and not heretics. Sunnis were enraged, especially in Hama. In October 1980, the Brotherhood announced the formation of the Islamic Front in Syria, an umbrella organization for all of the Islamic groups working to “defend Islam.”11 While paying lip service to Sunni demands, Assad took steps to consolidate his power and enshrine the authority of Alawites. His Baath Party adopted a secularnationalist ideology, which further alienated the Brotherhood, Sunni elites, and members of the urban middle class. Sunnis openly opposed Assad’s proposed social, economic, political and cultural reforms. They also opposed Hafez’s support for Maronite Christians in Lebanon, rather than Palestinian organizations. Assad outlawed the Brotherhood and ordered its leaders arrested, reinforcing the state of emergency, which legally sanctioned his draconian policies.12 Opposition against Hafez al-Assad was not limited to the Muslim Brotherhood. The National Democratic Gathering, an alliance of nonmilitant professionals, was established in January 1980. The Alliance was an inclusive opposition group of Christians, communists, socialists, and liberals who opposed the regime.13 They sought governance reform, rather than to overthrow the government. As a peaceful alternative to the Brotherhood, the Alliance demanded freedom of political action, freedom of the press, civil law, withdrawing the state of emergency, and free parliamentary elections.14 It excluded contact with the Brotherhood to demonstrate its secularism and independence. The Brotherhood tried to assassinate Assad on June 26, 1980. In revenge, he ordered the execution of hundreds of Sunni prisoners in Tadmor Prison. The state’s “Defense Companies,” under control by Rifaat al-Assad, the president’s brother, also went to Palmyra Prison, where hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood members were held. Brothers were targeted and assassinated. According to Amnesty International, The soldiers were divided into groups of 10 and, once inside the prison, were ordered to kill the prisoners in their cells and dormitories. Some 600 to 1,000 prisoners are reported to have been killed … After the massacre, the bodies were removed and buried in a large common grave outside the prison.15

The regime passed Law 49 to bolster the legal credibility of their repressive campaign, which designated membership in the Muslim Brotherhood as a capital offense.16 Some Brothers chose to turn themselves in and receive clemency whereas others

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Hama Rules

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continued violent resistance.17 Death squads hunted for militants, sending a clear message: oppositionists would be captured and killed, while regime loyalists would be left alone.18 Hama had become a stronghold of the Brotherhood by late 1981. Its militia attacked state institutions and regime symbols, such as police stations and military installations. By 1982, the rebels controlled the entire city after a series of successful attacks.19 Assad grew tired of swatting flies and planned a major operation to crack down and show that he was in control. Assad understood that he faced a serious threat, which could be neutralized only by a determined and powerful response. The Alawites, the Baath party, the armed forces, and minorities rallied around him.20 At the same time, the Baath Party took steps to address the root causes of conflict. The party sought to bridge the gaps between rich and poor through a modified version of socialism, and between Muslims and minorities through a modified concept of Islam. Islam, in their view, needed to be considered politically not as a religion but as a manifestation of the Arab nation. Thus, the society they wished to create, they proclaimed, should be modern (with, among other things, equality for women), secular (with faith relegated to personal affairs), and defined by a culture of “Arabism” overriding the traditional concepts of ethnicity. In short, what they sought was the very antithesis of the objectives of the already-strong and growing Muslim Brotherhood.21

Assad concluded that conciliation was impossible in the face of an organized armed insurgency. Rifaat, a notorious hard-liner, demanded surrender. He warned that the rebels would be treated mercilessly if they refused to put down their weapons. Syrian armed forces attacked Hama on February 2, 1982. Artillery and aerial bombardment lasted twenty-seven days, laying waste to the city. Over twelve thousand members of the Syrian military were deployed. Bulldozers flattened neighborhoods so that armored divisions and infantry could penetrate their narrow streets. Hama’s Baroudiyeh neighborhood was the hardest hit.22 Suspected civilian sympathizers were rounded up, detained, and tortured;23 thousands were killed in mass executions.24 The military organized a pro-government rally in the city center. It was a ruse to identify oppositionists. Those who stayed at home were arrested and killed.25 Rifaat boasted about the number of casualties. Between twenty thousand and forty thousand people were killed in February 1982. At the time, Hama had 250,000 inhabitants. Almost every family lost a member.26 Assad applied “Hama rules”—the use of overwhelming force to confront opposition without regard for collateral damage or loss of civilian life. The crackdown continued following the Hama operation in February 1982 with Assad operating a brutal police state. Suspected Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers were arrested, tortured, and killed in detention. According to Amnesty International, “Some 60 men were killed before the security forces cut off their fingers and placed them along the mosque’s walls. For around two years after the massacre, no one dared remove the fingers. They were so frightened.”27 While Brothers fled to other Arab countries or Europe, underground cells remaining in Syria mobilized violent

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confrontation against the “heretical” Alawite regime.28 Economically aggrieved members of the Sunni middle class in northern cities of Hama and Aleppo remained in opposition. The Sunni populations of the countryside and smaller cities, as well as the Bedouin, rewarded the regime’s pro-rural development agenda with their loyalty. Sunni urban elite of Damascus were also co-opted.29 A  broad-based, peaceful opposition movement, the National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria, was established in March 1982.30 ***** The United States did not strongly object Hafez’s crushing of the rebellion in Hama. The Muslim Brotherhood was perceived by Washington was a radical Islamist group, which was anti-American and antidemocratic. On this issue at least, interests of the West and the Syrian regime were aligned. The concept of humanitarian intervention was still evolving. It was not until 2005 that the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the UN World Summit. R2P was a commitment by member states to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. R2P represents a lofty ideal, but its implementation is ultimately determined by political considerations. In 1982, there was no clamor for the United States to intervene in Syria. Assad, as a militant Arab nationalist, would have vigorously resisted and the Arab world would have joined him in rejecting an American-led intervention against the regime. Moreover, the United States was pursuing other interests in Syria. Its focus was on Syria’s foreign policy. The primary goal of the United States was to dissuade Syria from collaborating with radical Palestinian organizations. Its priority was to gain Hafez’s support for the Arab-Israeli peace process. Lebanon was Washington’s other priority in the region. As Lebanon’s civil war intensified, with Syria as major protagonist, the United States deployed marines to the war-torn country. The annihilation of Hama was barely noticed by the international community. Syria’s media blackout limited both international and domestic reporting. A more complete picture about the events in Hama did not emerge until Amnesty International published a report in November 1983, graphically describing the crackdown and estimating that between ten thousand and twenty-five thousand people had been killed. The horror of Hama did not become a byword for the brutality of Middle Eastern autocrats until the publication of Thomas Friedman’s From Beirut to Jerusalem in 1989. Friedman offered a blow-by-blow account of the massacre, coining the term “Hama rules.”31 ***** Hafez al-Assad had a small circle of trusted national security and political advisers. The Central Crisis Management Cell included the highest-ranking member of the Baath Party, as well as senior officials from government ministries, the military, and the intelligence agencies.32 Brother Rifaat was a prominent member of the Cell. Assad had three sons: Basil, Bashar, and Maher. Basil al-Assad was a young officer in the cavalry, who headed his father’s personal security detail. The oldest and favored son, Basil, often attended national security meetings. Basil was being groomed to take over the presidency on his fortieth birthday in accordance with the constitution. Syria

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Hama Rules

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is a country where cult of personality is critical to power. Basil’s photograph in the uniform of a Syrian army officer, with a beard and sunglasses, was ubiquitous. His image was displayed at the airport, on street corners, and in people’s cars and homes. Basil was following in his father’s footsteps—the heir-apparent. Succession and stability were thrown into doubt when Basil was killed in a car crash on July 21, 1994, at age 31. He was buried in the Assad family’s home village of Qardaha in the Alawite Mountains. Bashar al-Assad was next in line. Bashar was dramatically different from Basil. He was young, socially awkward, and Westernized. Bashar spoke fluent English and basic conversational French, having studied at the Franco-Arab al-Hurriyah school in Damascus. In 1988, Bashar al-Assad graduated from the medical school of Damascus University and was assigned as a doctor in the Syrian armed forces. He subsequently attended postgraduate studies at the Western Eye Hospital in London, studying ophthalmology. Hafez al-Assad recalled Bashar to Syria after his brother’s death, and he was enrolled in the military academy. Like his father, Bashar had a chip on his shoulder. He was always the second son who lacked credibility with his father’s inner circle. Lieutenant General Ali Duba, deputy chief of the General Staff and head of the Military Security Department, was skeptical about Bashar’s qualifications and temperament. The same goes for Shafiq Fayyadh, commander of the Syrian 3rd Division and close adviser to Hafez al-Assad, and Ibrahim Safi, another member of Hafez’s inner circle. Bashar was given control of Syria’s operations in Lebanon in 1998. The Lebanon file was previously held by Syria’s vice president, Abdul Halim Khaddam, and chief of staff, Hikmat al-Shihabi. It was the most strategically important portfolio in the administration.33 By the time Bashar assumed his role managing the Lebanon file, the situation had stabilized from the heyday of civil war in the 1980s. The 1989 Taif Accord established a power-sharing arrangement that ended Lebanon’s civil war. Hafez was skeptical of Taif and maintained a strong military presence and political influence over Lebanon. Syrian forces occupied large pockets of territory, including an expanse of the Beqaa Valley. Syria’s role was enshrined by the Taif Accord itself, which referred to Syria as “the guarantor of Lebanon’s security.”34 Hezbollah, a militant Shiite group supported by Syria and Iran, acted as Syria’s proxy in Southern Lebanon. Bashar al-Assad commended Hezbollah for “defending the honor of all Arabs.”35 Managing the Lebanon file was part of Bashar’s preparation to become president. Decision-making over such a critical area was retained by Hafez al-Assad with Bashar al-Assad nominally acting on his behalf. Bashar al-Assad received a hero’s welcome when he visited Beirut following elections that brought President Emile Lahoud and Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss to power in 1998. Lahoud was selected for the position based on his pro-Syrian credentials and his unflinching support for Hezbollah. Lebanon’s trade and smuggling routes, particularly the transport of opium from the Beqaa Valley, was a pivotal business interest of Syria’s families and clans who supported the Assad regime.36 By 2000, the number of Syrian troops in Lebanon peaked at about forty thousand.37 As his health deteriorated, Hafez al-Assad launched a series of purges to marginalize those who might challenge his son’s authority. Members of the old guard were removed and replaced with Bashar loyalists. Hafez al-Assad died of a heart attack on June 10,

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2000. Syrians lined the streets and wept during the funeral procession; many observed the forty-day mourning period. Bashar presided over the funeral rites, flanked by his uncle and members of Hafez’s inner circle. His coffin was carried through the streets of Damascus and transported to the local mosque in Qardaha. As president from 1971 to 2000, Hafez al-Assad consolidated its power and influence in the Middle East. The annihilation of Hama defined his legacy of strong-man rule and terror.

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The Damascus Spring

The right to freedom of expression is a sacred right, and to give it up is to give up one’s humanity. —Yasser al-’Eiti, 40, physician and poet1 ***** Syrians overwhelmingly supported Bashar al-Assad when a referendum was held in July 2000. The outcome was never in doubt. Bashar al-Assad ran unopposed. Hafez’s passing created a crisis of confidence, underlining the importance of stability and continuity especially for Alawites who had grown accustomed to their long-standing power and privileges. Hafez al-Assad was a larger-than-life personality who dominated Syria for twenty-nine years. Bashar had big shoes to fill as he readied himself for the presidency. Bashar al-Assad was contemplative after his father’s death. He reflected on his future role as president of the Syrian Arab Republic. Syria faced many challenges, including an ongoing insurgency by the Muslim Brotherhood and a collapsing economy. Hafez al-Assad had ruled with repression and through fear. Bashar appreciated his father’s tactics, but understood that Syria needed a leader to unite the country. Bashar was beholden to his father’s inner circle for support. However, he took tentative steps toward establishing a new balance between hard power, governing with an iron fist, and soft power in the form of economic and human development. Bashar al-Assad was conciliatory and statesmanlike in his inaugural speech on July 17, 2000. He spoke of the need for “creative thinking” to address the country’s myriad problems. Unlike his father who had zero tolerance for dissent, Bashar recognized “the desperate need for constructive criticism.”2 He embraced democracy: We have to have our democratic experience which is special to us, which stems from our history, culture, civilization and which is a response to the needs of our society and the requirements of our reality.3 We have to respect law because it guarantees the state’s respect for the citizen and the citizen’s respect for the state.

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The rule of law guarantees our freedom and the freedom of others. … Many people in Syria hoped that the human rights situation would improve.4

He focused on economic issues: It has become necessary to move in steady, though gradual, steps, towards performing economic changes through the modernization of laws, the erosion of bureaucratic obstacles standing in the way of internal and external investment flow, the recruitment of both private and public capital, and the activation of the private sector and granting it better opportunities to work.5 It is also necessary to bring the public sector to a competitive level in both domestic and external markets, the thing that leads to a balanced and comprehensive development in all provinces of the country and in rural as well as urban areas.6

He talked about “transparency” to address endemic corruption.7 Bashar endorsed national unity. “I would like to reiterate here that finding solutions is the responsibility of all of us in order to make these solutions complete and effective. You should not rely solely on the State nor should you let the State rely solely on you: let us work together as one team.”8 He opined on the role of women in Syrian society: Women are the ones who bring up both men and women and who prepare them to participate in building their country. Women play an important role in progress and development in various places of work. The appropriate ground for women’s participation should be well prepared so that they may become more effective in our society and more capable to play a role in its development.9

The content and tone of Bashar’s inauguration remarks differed dramatically form his father’s bellicose and divisive rhetoric. He did not excoriate Israel or focus on Syria’s involvement in Lebanon’s civil war. He spared the Muslim Brotherhood and other domestic opposition groups from intense criticism. Bashar al-Assad sought to usher in a new phase of Syria’s political, social, and economic development. ***** Bashar’s intention to build a better society and improve the lives of impoverished Syrians was tested almost immediately. Intellectuals, writers, journalists, and other civil society representatives gathered to discuss a reform agenda. The movement was called the “Damascus Spring.” Syrians institutionalized their dialogue through the creation of forums around the country. Riad Seif ’s National Dialogue Forum and Suhair al-Atassi’s Jamal al-Atassi Forum led to the establishment of the Committees for the Revival of Civil Society in Syria. Human rights organizations emerged to take advantage of Syria’s new, more permissive environment. They demanded freedom of expression and national legislation that would codify the protection and promotion of human rights. In September 2000, a statement signed by ninety-nine prominent intellectuals called for

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“political and intellectual pluralism.”10 The fervor for reform was irrepressible, and growing. In January 2001, a larger group of one thousand civil society representatives demanded multiparty democracy and a lifting of the state of emergency law. While the government turned a blind eye to their demands, it did not undertake mass arrests of dissidents. The authorities were prepared to tolerate civil society initiatives so long as they did not cross a redline by calling for regime change or challenge Bashar’s succession to the presidency. Rather than repression, Bashar al-Assad announced some modest reforms, including amnesties and the release of political prisoners. The regime also relaxed its grip on the press, allowing greater press freedoms, especially in the realm of social media. After decades of living in Hafez’s Syria, many individuals feared the omnipresent role of the Syrian security apparatus in their daily lives. They questioned Bashar’s motives and the false facade of tolerance. Syrians recalled crimes committed in Sednaya Prison and corruption of the Baath Party.11 Believing that the Damascus Spring was a loyalty test, many took a “wait-and-see” approach to activism. By August 2001, the government’s tolerance for dissent was waning. The state security apparatus was highly decentralized. Branches in every village across the country were tasked with enforcing emergency laws. The government took decisions arbitrarily without oversight or judicial review. Local security officials were empowered to act independently of Damascus. They abused their powers through security sweeps that led to mass arrests. When someone was detained, their relatives did not know who was responsible for issuing the arrest warrant, why they were detained, and where they were being held. The emergency laws were used by authorities to crack down on anyone deemed a risk to the state. The Baath Party used the laws to enforce its absolute control of society, exercising hegemonic power with no oversight. The rule of law was nonexistent.12 The emergency laws were used by Syrian authorities as justification for systematically closing the National Dialogue Forums. The crackdown was justified “in the name of national unity and stability.”13 Riad Seif attempted to create a new political party, “The Movement for Social Peace,” but it was disallowed.14 Habib Issa, an original member of the Human Rights Association, was sentenced to five years in prison for publicly criticizing the Baath Party’s corruption. Though the Damascus Spring was a fleeting moment, it spurred a broader reform movement with cells organized beneath the surface. US secretary of state Colin Powell visited Damascus in September 2003. The United States had invaded and occupied Iraq. Neoconservative ideologues in the administration of President George W.  Bush wanted to remake the Middle East by toppling anti-democratic governments and removing leaders who vowed to destroy Israel. After taking down Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party in Iraq, Syria was next on Bush’s agenda for regime change. Powell assured Bashar al-Assad that the United States was not seeking to remove him from power. Powell was a pragmatist, not a neoconservative ideologue and proponent of getting rid of Assad. He did, however, demand cooperation from Damascus in tracking Iraqi officials who fled Baghdad after the US invasion who had found sanctuary in Syria. Powell provided a list of people associated with Saddam’s

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regime that allegedly had taken refuge in Syria. He issued a stern warning to Bashar: do not harbor Iraqi officials or Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He also called on Syria to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty and withdraw its forces. Members of Bashar’s Central Crisis Management Cell (CCMC) were incredulous. The United States was hyping Lebanese sovereignty at the same time as it was occupying Iraq. While paying lip service to US concerns, the regime reacted to Powell’s admonitions by ratcheting up pressure on oppositionists. It invoked emergency laws, moving against the Al-Kawakibi Forum, one of the best known dialogue platforms. It systematically harassed Salam Kawakibi, who had served for many years as director of research at the Arab Reform Initiative in Paris and as director of the Institut Français du Proche Orient in Aleppo from 2000 to 2006. Kawakibi board members, Dr. Amr al-Azm and Ms. Rafif Jouejati, were also targeted. In the face of threats from security services, Dr.  Murhaf Jouejati, outgoing chair of the board, affirmed the “renewed intellectual vigor and energy to which we are committed in our continuous work to support democratic transition in Syria.”15 Other reformers were also at risk. In the middle of the night, the secret police raided the homes of Sa’if and Homsi, members of parliament who had demanded an investigation into corruption within the Baath Party. The regime would only tolerate reform that it could control. By adopting draconian measures, “fear returned to Syria.”16 Bashar al-Assad did not directly confront hard-liners in his administration. The powerful CCMC included the highest-ranking member of the Baath Party, as well as senior officials from various ministries, the military, and intelligence agencies were leading advocates for using an iron fist against the opposition.17 Bashar al-Assad did not want to get his hands dirty. He delegated authority for the crackdown to the CCMC and reliable hard-liners—Vice President Abdul Halim al-Khaddam, Interior Minister Ghazi Kanaan, former defense minister Mustapha Tlas, Tlas’s successor Hassan Turkemani, and Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara’a. He also relied on notorious intelligence officers, Ali Duba, Hassan Khalil, Bahjat Suleiman, and General Hikmat al-Shihabi. Assad’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, also played an active role.18 Bashar al-Assad treaded lightly. He wanted to control the Damascus Spring, without taking steps that would radicalize its members or spark a Sunni Islamist insurgency. The reform movement gradually lost steam due to pressure from the regime and threat from the security services. It was deflated, but not defeated. Civil society actors kept a lower profile, while continuing to advance a reform agenda. Their efforts culminated in the Damascus Declaration for Democratic and National Change on October 16, 2005.19 The five-page manifesto was signed by 250 major opposition figures and groups, including representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists, Arab and Kurdish nationalists, Syrian exiles, communists and leftists, and political prisoners like Riad Seif. Exiles in London were also involved.20 The initiative was launched by Michel Kilo, a Syrian journalist, and drafted by Abdulrazak Eid, a Syrian writer and thinker. The Damascus Declaration was a lofty statement of principles. It sought to build internal support for peaceful democratic change, calling for a new social contract between the government and Syrians, and endorsing democracy as the basis for reform. The Declaration denounced violence, emphasizing its support for a peaceful

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transition of power. It endorsed the rule of law in Syria, supported lifting the state of emergency, and the release of all political prisoners. It pointedly demanded an end to repression based on religious or political beliefs. The Damascus Declaration called for the protection of ethnic and religious minorities, which was significant for the Kurds. It also demanded abolition of Law No. 49, which makes membership in the Muslim Brotherhood a capital offense punishable by death.21 The signatories envisioned a national conference to endorse these principles and establish a consensus on the way forward, enshrining democratic governance. Syrians lacked an implementing body to actualize the Damascus Declaration. A series of initiatives ensued, both private and public, that sought to operationalize the reform movement. The National Salvation Front (NSF) was launched in December 2005, as an exiled opposition coalition aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. It was named after a statement by opposition groups, which demanded multiparty democracy in Syria and called for resignation of the country’s leaders. The opposition movement was evolving. Its next incarnation was the National Council established at a meeting attended by 163 Syrians on December 1, 2007. The assembly elected Dr. Feda’ al-Hurani as president. She was a physician and daughter of Akram al-Hurani, who was active in Syrian politics from the beginning of the 1940s until his exile in 1963. ***** On December 9, days after the establishment of the National Council, security services started arresting individuals who attended the meeting. Though the regime did not resume repression at the same level as the 1980s, the government arbitrarily jailed democratic activists, held bogus trials, and used torture during interrogations. State security forces held activists incommunicado; many were beaten in detention; others simply disappeared. Charges included “weakening national sentiment” and “spreading false or exaggerated news which would affect the morale of the country.”22 Detainees were also forced to sign false statements, “confessing” that they were financed by foreign counties or were acting to break up Syria and give the Kurds a separate state. The show trial was a guise to legitimize repression. Charges were brought in violation of Article 38 of Syria’s Constitution, which guarantees the right of every citizen to “freely and openly express his views in words, in writing, and through all other means of expression.”23 Prosecution for exercising freedom of expression also violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Syria is signatory. The state of emergency was used to derogate certain rights. Moreover, the regime ignored international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as rights enumerated through domestic legislation. According to a dissident, “In the 1980s, we went to jail without trial. Now, we get a trial, but we still go to jail.”24 Other dissidents reacted to their arrests at a hearing on September 24: “I am not optimistic for the judgment … as I think that we are not being tried by this court, but from a power that relies on the state of emergency and the security services.” (Riad Seif, 61, former member of parliament)25

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Frontline Syria “To end the state of emergency and the martial courts and to improve public freedoms  – especially freedom of expression  – are necessary conditions to improve the living situation of the Syrian citizen.” (Dr.  Feda’ al-Hurani, 51, physician)26 “I was tried for political reasons before. But this trial is different, because it is a trial of individuals who wanted to exercise their right to express their mind.” (Akram al-Bunni, 51, writer)27 “Our arrest and trial is the best indication of the authorities’ refusal of any peaceful and gradual reforms required to resolve Syria’s problems.” (Ali al-’Abdullah, 58, writer)28 “The right to freedom of expression is a sacred right, and to give it up is to give up one’s humanity, and I defend my right and the right of any Syrian citizen in his freedom of expression” (Yasser al-’Eiti, 40, physician and poet)29 “The heart of this case is whether the authorities will accept the culture of dialogue and recognize different opinions.” (Jabr al-Shufi, 60, Arabic-literature teacher)30 “It is difficult today to judge someone for his thoughts after democracy has become the way to determine people’s opinions and ideas.” (Ahmad To’meh, 51, dentist)31 “Getting into the details of my defense is useless, but I will ask what is the basis of the accusations.” (Walid al-Bunni, 44, physician)32 “This is a trial of thoughts and concepts more than a trial of individuals. I don’t see that this court is trying me. Rather it is trying every free mind in this country.” (Talal Abu Dan, 55, artist and sculptor)33 “Even though I know that the court is not neutral, I say any judgment is akin to a medal on my chest that I gift to my sons. Therefore, I do not ask for clemency but for justice.” (Muhammad Hajji Darwish, 48, businessman)34

According to a defendant, “membership in the Damascus Declaration is now criminalized.”35 So were other forms of dissent. On May 13, 2007, the Second Damascus Criminal Court sentenced Michel Kilo and Mahmud Issa to prison for “weakening national sentiment” after they signed a declaration calling for improved LebaneseSyrian relations. Syria’s system of repression was institutionalized, as the country turned into a gulag where torture was widely practiced and disappearances became routine. Torture was documented by an official military-police photographer in Damascus, codenamed “Caesar.” He was not political, just doing his job taking pictures. However, the task was too much for him. He recorded fifty-five thousand photos on a flash drive that was smuggled out of country. He, too, fled Syria in 2013 and is living under a witness protection program somewhere in Europe. The first victims of Bashar’s crackdown were protesters from Daraa, many of them teenagers who were tortured beyond recognition. The regime conducted sham trials, which always resulted in conviction. According to Caesar, “Before the Revolution, the

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regime would torture people to extract information. Now they were simply torturing people to death. I  saw the candle burns … Some people had deep knife wounds, eyeballs ripped out, broken teeth, whip marks … There were bruises filled with pus … Sometimes, the bodies were covered in blood, and the blood was still fresh.”36 Hospitals were turned into torture centers. Victims were deprived of food and water. People were starved to break their will. A former prisoner affirmed, Assad wants not only “to kill his people … by eliminating them physically, he wants to dehumanize them.”37 Bashar al-Assad denied culpability, refuting the credibility of Caesar’s archive. “Who took the pictures? Who said this is done by the government, not by the rebels? Who said this is a Syrian victim, not someone else?” Assad called the images “just propaganda”, alleging they had been photo-shopped.38 The regime operated with a sense of impunity. Like the Nazis in the Second World War and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, it kept careful records of its atrocities. In August 2019, the United Nations (UN) released a report documenting the detention, abduction, and disappearance of more than 100,000 people since the beginning of the civil war.39 ***** Basil’s fiery death in a car crash changed the course of Bashar’s life. He was called to Damascus by his father and introduced to members of the security establishment. Hafez made clear that Bashar al-Assad was now his heir-apparent. Bashar al-Assad was ill-equipped to succeed his father. He was shy, awkward, insecure, and conflict averse. He had a people-pleasing nature. His romance with Asma Akhras in London was a wellkept secret until Asma returned to Damascus where they married in December 2000. Asma was not the prototypical wife of an Alawite president. She was raised in Acton, west London as a Sunni Muslim, the daughter of a Syrian-British cardiologist father and a Syrian diplomat mother. She went to a Church of England school where she adopted an Anglicized name, Emma. She graduated from King’s College London in 1996 with a bachelor’s degree in computer science and French literature before becoming an investment banker in London. The romance in London was simple compared to the challenges of a relationship in Syria where Bashar was being groomed for the presidency. Former US ambassador Robert S. Ford remarked that Asma was “not a traditional Syrian woman.”40 She was too modern for the society and especially for Anissa Assad, Bashar’s mother. According to Ford, Anissa “did not like her.”41 Ford met Asma for the first time at a reception for alumnae of Harvard University. She was the guest of honor and addressed the audience. “Asma was so polished,”42 Ford reflected. “Someone [in the audience] gingerly asked about protests across the country. She replied, ‘We have to improve.’ ” Her chief of staff came running up to Ford after Asma’s remarks and asked his impression. Ford felt “he really cared what America thought.”43 As First Lady, Asma was open and approachable. She was modern, Westernized, and a positive influence on her husband. She held progressive views on women’s rights and education for all, which influenced Bashar. Asma assumed a leading role in the charity sector. She headed the Syrian Trust for Development, working on rural

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microcredit, promoting business skills for youth, cultural development, and helping Syrians with disabilities. According to Ford, while Asma was focused on her charitable work, she was more interested in “clothes and redesigning the presidential residence, than the revolution.”44 Unlike Hafez al-Assad, who only saw his children at official events or in the office, Asma and Bashar al-Assad were deeply involved in the lives of their sons, Hafez and Karim, and daughter Zein. Asma was caring toward her husband, whom she called “my little duck.” She insisted that their children learn about the world outside of Syria and emphasized the study of foreign languages. Hafez learned Russian, Zein Spanish, and Karim Chinese. Bashar, Asma, and their children were skilled at using the internet and social media. Bashar al-Assad was also an enthusiast of modern communications technology and maintained an active presence on social media, including an official Instagram account. The son reportedly said, “My father is trying to save the country.”45 There were great hopes that Bashar al-Assad, a young, Western-educated doctor and his British-born wife would initiate an era of freedom and human rights for Syrians. Indeed, the first years of Bashar’s presidency were marked by greater openness. Bashar al-Assad was, however, surrounded by officials who had served in his father’s securityintelligence apparatus. Bashar tried to assert his authority, shuffling his cabinet several times after becoming president in 2000, but the make-up of the security establishment changed minimally. Many of the personnel who worked for Hafez al-Assad remained to monitor Bashar al-Assad and make sure the new, young president did not deviate dramatically from the Baath Party line. Ford reflected on his meetings with Bashar. “He just wanted to avoid an argument. He was such a weak personality.” When Ford arrived in Damascus, he asked Assad to prevent jihadis from transiting across the border into Iraq. Assad flatly denied it was happening “even though we both knew he was lying.”46 According to Ford, “This is a guy who just lies to your face. He knew we knew he was lying, but he lied anyhow. [Assad] didn’t particularly care about his credibility.”47 Ford was unsure whether Bashar al-Assad wanted reforms or was captive of his security establishment. Ford reflected, “If you say something often enough, you start to believe it.”48 When Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke was negotiating with Slobodan Milosevic, he knew that violent conflict was inevitable when “Slobo started to believe his own propaganda.”49 Bashar al-Assad fell into the same trap. ***** Most security officials were Alawites. They serve as the regime’s nucleus, guaranteeing stability and order in the country. They also helped coordinate the government and security bureaucracy, which played a pivotal role in preserving the regime. “Employment in the military and intelligence services became a primary vehicle for upward social mobility” and was “inextricably woven into the fabric of Alawite society.”16 The Baath Party developed an elaborate security structure to maintain social control. The National Security Directorate was the largest security agency, employing about twenty-five thousand personnel in the 1980s. A  myriad of other security agencies associated with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) engaged in covert activities

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to identify, apprehend, and neutralize political opponents. The National Security Bureau (NSB) includes the heads of the four main intelligence and security agencies, as well as the Baath Party. They are the Political Security Directorate, under the MoI; the General Security (or Intelligence) Directorate, and the Military and Air Force Intelligence agencies. The MoI controls the four police branches:  the emergency police, riot police, neighborhood police, and the traffic police.50 The branches operate independently, giving rise to factionalism between security officials. There is no accountability for activities that illegally monitor citizens and repress dissent. The tentacles of the state security apparatus extended into every community across the country. The CCMC met regularly in an office on the first floor of the Baath Party’s Regional Command, in central Damascus. At meetings of the CCMC, intelligence agents and representatives of security committees from rebellious provinces would report on activities in their sector, including the activities and identities of opposition leaders. Intelligence assessments were informed by double agents who worked with both the government and the opposition. Each branch of the security apparatus had its own detention cells and interrogation centers, located throughout the country.51 The CCMC focused on identifying opposition figures and taking the necessary steps to crush dissent. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) conducts surveillance of the Syrian population at large, directs foreign intelligence, and monitors activities in Lebanon. The NSB coordinates the work of Syria’s intelligence agencies, including the GID.52 CCMC members agreed on a plan at the end of each meeting. The minutes were sent via courier to Bashar al-Assad at the Presidential palace. Assad typically approved and signed the proposals, then returned them to the CCMC for implementation. Bashar al-Assad acted as a rubber stamp. He rarely made revisions, changed directives, or added new instructions. Many personalities populated Syria’s intelligence and security agencies. Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother, commanded the Republican Guard and the army’s elite Fourth Armored Division. As a leader of Syria’s secret police, Maher had responsibility over the core of the country’s security forces. Maher is also a member of the Central Committee of the Syrian Regional Branch of the Baath Party. The European Union called Maher the “principal overseer of violence against demonstrators.”53 Mohammed Said Bekheitan was assistant secretary of the Baath Party and the head of the CCMC from March to September 2011.54 His career started in the police force and he eventually became a general in the criminal security branch of the MoI. From 1993 to 2000, he served as governor of Hama, where draconian policies were aimed at preventing a resurgent rebellion. He also served as director of NSB and assistant secretary of the Syrian Regional Command of the Baath Party, which is the secondhighest position in the Baath Party after the Syrian president. Bekheitan was an old guard Baathist and a strident opponent of reform. Mohammad al-Shaar joined the armed forces in 1971. He held a number of security positions including chief of the military security in Tartus, chief of military security in Aleppo, and the commander of the Syrian military police. Shaar was minister of interior from April 2011 to November 2018. Before that, he was Commander of the Syrian Military Police.55 Like Maher and Bekheitan, Shaar adamantly rejected reform.

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Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar was another notorious hard-liner. He directed the GID from December 2001 until June 2005, when he was appointed as director of the Baath Party Regional Command, NSB. General Ali Duba was the former head of the Syrian military intelligence who played an important role suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. However, Duba was forced to retire when he questioned why the president’s successor needed to be a member of the Assad family. Punished for his heresy, Duba was scandalized for his involvement in the trafficking of religious relics between Lebanon and Canada. Duba’s “retirement” was attributed to his alleged involvement in financial scandals.56 Hassan Khalil replaced Duba as the head of military intelligence in 2000. In turn, he was replaced in 2005 by Assef Shawkat, Bashar’s brother-in-law who served as deputy chief of staff from 2009 to 2011. Shawkat was implicated by a UN report for planning the assassination of Lebanon’s prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. Mohammad Nassif Kheyrbek was appointed as the deputy director of the General Security Directorate in 1999 and became the deputy vice president for security affairs in 2005. In 2007, he was given responsibility over the Lebanon portfolio. Rustum Ghazali managed Syria’s security and military presence in Lebanon beginning in 2002. Farouk al-Shara was the foreign minister from 1984 to 2006 before ascending to the post of vice president in charge of foreign affairs. Abdel Halim Khaddam is the former vice president who served from 1984 to 2005. Shafiq Fayyadh was the commander of the Syrian Third Division and close adviser to Hafez. He retired in 2005 as part of Bashar’s effort to bring the Syrian Army under his control.57 The coterie of security officials existed to prevent the opposition from challenging the state. Bashar al-Assad initially turned a blind eye to the Damascus Declaration. However, he became more opposed as dissidents organized and demanded a change in leadership. The closer Bashar al-Assad got to members of the government’s security cell, the less tolerant he became. ***** US actions in the region helped strengthen hard-liners around Bashar al-Assad. The US invasion and occupation of Iraq was perceived as a direct threat to Baathism. Though Syria and Iraq are different states, they shared a Baathist ideology. Neoconservatives viewed Baathism as a fascistic form of Arab exceptionalism. They believed that regime change in Syria and Iraq would catalyze democratic, pro-Western revolutions across the Middle East, which were friendly to Israel. Members of the CCMC believed that a Zionist-American project supported the breakup of Iraq and was working toward the establishment of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurds in the Syrian governorates of Hasakah, Kobani, and Jazeera looked across the border at their Kurdish brethren in Iraq and wanted a similar degree of autonomy. Kurds in Turkey also aspired to democratic federalism, which would enhance local powers. Syrian Kurds actively participated in the Damascus Declaration and others, demanding the protection and promotion of minority rights. Fearing punishment from the state, Kurds were silent on the matter of independence. They preferred greater rights as citizens of a democratic Syria.

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The US Department of State listed Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism on December 29, 1979. Syria earned its designation by supporting Palestinian terror groups and through its close cooperation with Iran. Resulting sanctions limited Syria’s access to international financial markets and imposed travel restrictions on senior Syrian officials.58 Bashar al-Assad believed that the United States would use its designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism to justify military action or covert operations aimed at eliminating regime figures. Despite the paranoia of CCMC members, US pressure on Syria actually decreased as Washington sought cooperation from Damascus to manage the insurrection in Iraq. In his meeting with Bashar, Colin Powell sought to gauge Syria’s seriousness about clamping down on cross-border support for extremists in Iraq. He tested Bashar’s willingness to engage in a broader US-led counterterrorism operation, assessing Syria’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Powell also wanted to assess Assad’s willingness to engage in a peace track between Syria and Israel. The National Progressive Front, a political group led by the Baath Party, nominated Bashar al-Assad for a second term as president. Bashar al-Assad was triumphant before voters could go to the polls. Banners praised “our Bashar” as the defender of sovereignty and stability. Other banners exclaiming, “We love you,” were festooned on Damascus street corners.59 Bashar al-Assad ran unopposed in the referendum on May 27, 2007. Campaign rallies were cult-like, “renewing the pledge of allegiance.” Members of the armed forces and public sector employees were bused to the polls to make sure there was an overwhelming display of support. In a democracy, voters choose whether to cast a ballot and whom to vote for. Not in Bashar’s Syria. Voting was viewed as a national obligation, and the authorities kept tabs on eligible voters. The Damascus Spring instilled hopes for democracy. By 2007, however, expectations were dashed. Emergency laws remained in force, curtailing basic freedoms and undermining the aspiration of reformers for a free and fair election. A growing number of domestic opponents were imprisoned. For example, Kamal Labwani was given a sentence of twelve years just prior to the referendum. His crime: meeting US officials. When Syrians went to the polls, they focused on pocketbook issues. Economic reform and liberalization were higher priorities than human rights. They welcomed new private banks and universities as demonstrations of progress, which created a sense of opportunity. While welcoming new regulations that opened most sectors of the economy to local and foreign investment, Syrians grumbled about the state’s bureaucracy that discouraged investment and the equitable distribution of benefits. There was widespread concern about the corrosive effect of corruption on economic development. Bashar al-Assad had favorable numbers in public opinion polls and was admired and respected by the overwhelming majority of Syrians.60 Voters were prepared to overlook Syria’s democracy deficit and economic distress. They also turned a blind eye to the debacles in Lebanon and Iraq. Syrian occupation forces had been forced out of Lebanon in 2005 after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Moreover, the UN launched an international tribunal to investigate the circumstances of Hariri’s

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assassination and bring his killers to justice. The investigation could potentially implicate Bashar al-Assad and his senior security officials. Iraq was a fiasco. The sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites was intensifying, with the United States surging more troops into the country. Many of Iraq’s Baathists who were Sunnis fled to Syria, which became the hub of Iraq’s insurgency. As Iraq’s sectarian civil war intensified, Iraqi Kurdistan refused to cooperate with Baghdad. Syrians celebrated Bashar’s broader accomplishments. In the 2000 referendum, Bashar al-Assad received 97.3 percent vote in favor of his election. Syria seemed stable and peaceful compared to its neighbor, Iraq, which was wracked by sectarian divisions and Kurdish separatism. In 2007, Bashar’s margin of victory was even greater. He was re-elected with 99.82 percent of the vote. The tally was supposed to demonstrate to Syrians and the world that Bashar al-Assad was a strong and legitimate ruler with broad-based popular support. However, the election was criticized by Western countries for failing to meet international standards. The US officials called elections for the 250-seat national assembly “a meaningless exercise.”61 After the referendum in 2007, “the personality cult surrounding the Syrian leader had returned in full glory … there were parades, there were concerts, there were banners and posters of Bashar Assad all over the place … at that point he had … drunk the aphrodisiac of power.”62 The pomp and ceremony of Bashar’s election victory could not mask the dissatisfaction of many Syrians. The election was a sham. Beginning in October 2010, popular protest swept across the Middle East and North Africa. Syrians joined the Arab Spring to demand reform, catalyzing a sequence of events that would plunge Syria into civil war.

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“With our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice to you Daraa.” Most Syrians welcomed Bashar al-Assad’s efforts to foster stability. However, resentment by the Sunni majority and the impoverished underclass simmered beneath the surface. Despite the vise grip of its security services, Syria became embroiled in tumultuous change that swept across the Arab world. As people demanded more accountable government and improved economic conditions, Tunisia was the first country rocked by uprisings that spread across the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 and 2011. Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor in the provincial town of Sidi Bouzid, protested the arbitrary seizure of his vegetable stand by police because he failed to obtain a permit. He set himself on fire, sparking mass protests across the country. Anger escalated, which culminated in President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s resignation and flight after twenty-three years in power. Tunisia was an unlikely candidate for revolution. Ali was entrenched in power with the state’s security apparatus protecting him. His unexpected demise inspired a wave of other popular uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Not all countries were favorably affected by the Arab Spring. In Egypt, coordinated protests in Tahrir Square led to President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, 2011. Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi overthrew the democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and imposed security measures exceeding those of the ousted President Mubarak. In Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in October 2011, leading to a violent civil war. Gaddafi was dragged through the streets and executed. Yemen’s ruler, Ali Abdullah Saleh, entered into a power-sharing agreement with Iranian-backed Houthis. The deal did not placate his adversaries who demanded he step down. He resigned in February 2012, and was killed in 2017. Saleh’s allegiance with the US-led war on terror could not save him from the angry mob. In Syria, the security services responded to protests with a brutal crackdown, which led to civil war. Al-Jazeera broadcasted the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, which inspired many Syrians to challenge the regime.1 Oppression and economic woes were among the root causes of discontent. Protesters wanted freedom from the police state’s brutality, accountability, and an end to corruption. They staged “Days of Rage” in February 2011, demanding democratic reforms.

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While Bashar was concerned by regional developments, he did not believe that the Arab Spring would spread to Syria. Nonetheless, the regime took precautions against civil unrest. General Jameh Jameh, head of Deir ez-Zor’s military intelligence branch, sent a message to his subordinates highlighting the risk of conflict escalation. According to Jameh, the protests in Syria were influenced by “some Arab countries witnessing youth revolutions calling for change, democracy, freedoms, and reforms aimed at creating job opportunities, improving living standards, and fighting corruption.”2 When protests broke out in February 2011, Jameh systematically gathered information on demonstrators through widespread surveillance. He provided cameras to local police in order to film the protesters so they could be identified and arrested. Daraa is a predominantly tribal Sunni city near the border with Jordan. On March 15, teenage boys painted revolutionary slogans on their school wall. “Al-Shaab / Yoreed / Eskaat el nizam!”: “The people / want / to topple the regime!”3 Omar, a 13-year-old, wrote “Your turn doctor”4 (referring to Bashar). Their graffiti was an act by rebellious teenagers, rather than an organized effort to overthrow the government. The government could have turned a blind eye, but it decided to make an example of the boys. General Atef Najeeb, Bashar’s cousin, led the crackdown. The secret police arrested fifteen boys between the ages of 10 and 15. The security services refused the parent’s demands to know the whereabouts of their children. The children were held in an interrogation room where they were beaten and burned with cigarettes. Omar was tortured and died in custody. Daraa is a close-knit community where people know one another. The arrested boys were from prominent families: the Baiazids, the Gawabras, the Masalmas, and the Zoubis. Hundreds of family members marched to the governor’s office to demand release of the boys. Instead of meeting with the tribal leaders to hear their concerns, security forces opened fire on the families. Then security forces sealed the streets preventing ambulances from retrieving injured people and bringing them to the hospital. Unable to get proper medical care, the injured were taken to a makeshift medical clinic at the Omari Mosque. Furious Daraans rampaged through the streets and set fire to the local offices of the Baath Party. Bashar’s response to the events in Daraa vacillated between conciliation and enhanced security measures. Conflict averse, he tried to defuse anger in response to the actions of local police. He sent high-ranking officials to Daraa to reassure community leaders that he would not tolerate wanton acts of aggression by police who had fired on the crowd. Instead of making a personal appearance, Bashar stayed home. Security forces attacked the Omari mosque on March 23 using stun guns and firing at civilians. Five people were killed. A doctor treating the injured from the previous protest was one of the victims. Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother, commanded the army’s Fourth Division, which was responsible for the Omari Mosque operation. The attack was apparently undertaken without Bashar’s knowledge. In Syria’s highly decentralized security system, Bashar had lost control. Maher may have used the moment to discredit Bashar and advance a coup aimed at seizing power from his brother. Bashar responded by removing the Daraa governor and police chief, but their dismissals did little to mollify local anger. To placate the protesters, the government announced economic reforms on March 24. It cut taxes and raised state salaries by

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1,500 Syrian pounds, about $32/month. Bashar indicated that “we will start now” to implement reforms. He acknowledged “mistakes” managing the Daraa crisis.5 Bashar ordered the release of up to fifteen children after two weeks in jail. They emerged from detention scarred with cigarette burns and other evidence of torture. The families and local tribal leaders were incensed at the treatment of the boys. Hard-liners admonished Bashar not to make concessions. They reminded him of his father’s hard-line response to the Hama rebellion in 1982. They warned that concessions would be seen as weakness and propel protests. It was too late to mollify the protesters. Mourners joined the funeral processions, rejecting the government’s appeasement. Funerals were a lightning rod for rage and community mobilization. With each funeral, the protests swelled. They shouted, “We do not want your bread, we want dignity.”6 According to a protester, They think we want new roads or a new hospital. No! We want to lift the state of emergency, release all political prisoners and allow our relatives who live in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other countries to return to Syria. We want to buy and sell our land without permission from security.7

Rage increased with each funeral. Protesters toppled a statue of Hafez al-Assad in Daraa, reminiscent of US-led protests in Baghdad that brought down the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square. Banners with Bashar’s image were ripped down and burned. Protests quickly spread beyond the Daraa governorate. Syrians rallied in solidarity, chanting, “With our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice to you Daraa.”8 Daarans demanded that Bashar visit the families and apologize personally. For weeks on end, they gathered after Friday prayers to vent their fury. Protests spread from Daraa to Damascus. Girls and educated urban young women from Damascus gathered on March 16. They objected to the treatment of detained Daraans and demanded their release. According to a Syrian activist, “Police dragged [female] protesters by the hair and beat them. This built on the gathering outrage over the Daraa children who are prisoners.”9 The rough treatment of women was taboo in Syria’s conservative society. The activist explained, “Security forces opened fire, killing at least four protesters and within days, the protests grew into rallies that gathered thousands of people.”10 Use of force merely hardened the people’s resolve. Families were outraged that the government was beating and torturing their children in prison. They approached the authorities to plead for the release of their sons. However, their defiant appeals were scorned; parents were shunned and ridiculed by local officials. The army’s actions inflamed the public’s anger and radicalized the protest movement. Daraa was “the cradle of the revolution.”11 Hundreds of Syrians marched in the old city of Damascus on March 25, chanting: “Daraa is Syria” and “We will sacrifice ourselves for Syria.”12 Weekly anti-government protests intensified. Calls for reform became demands for Bashar’s resignation. Unrest spread from Daraa to Hama and other cities across the country. After serving in Iraq and Algeria, Ambassador Robert Ford was posted to Damascus in 2010. Ford noted, “Syrians are nice but the government is awful.”13

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Ford had developed an expertise in conflict-prone Arab countries. “Syria was so much more repressive than Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain or Tunisia. People we knew were getting arrested, beaten up and tortured. The regime thought it could intimidate people.”14 No one was exempt from recrimination. Syria’s military intelligence picked up an employee of the Embassy in Daraa during the protests who was held incommunicado for a week. Ford intervened directly with Foreign Minister Walid Muallem to secure the employee’s release. When he was freed a week later, the employee showed signs of torture. An incident in Daraa was the harbinger of unrest across the country. According to Ford, “a traffic cop beat up a motorist. There was a spontaneous gathering of a people. They started chanting ‘The Syrian people will not be humiliated.’ The incident on 16 February 2011 was recorded on someone’s cell phone who uploaded it on YouTube.” When a staffer showed Ford the film, he was incredulous. Ford asked, “Did this really happen?”15 He was struck by popular resolve to resist police brutality. “The Interior Minister went to Daraa and promised that the perpetrators would be punished,”16 which mollified the people. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Ford reflected: “We don’t know if we’re going to have a full scale uprising, but we do know that the timber is very dry.”17 “It was pure serendipity, but I had an appointment with the Interior Minister the following day.”18 Ford proposed cooperation with the authorities to interdict. He indicated that the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was prepared to work with the government. The minister was joined by a notetaker and two intelligence officers who didn’t identify themselves. “We walked to the elevator followed by the two goons. I complimented his handling of the incident [in Daraa]. The elevator closed before he could respond. I planned it that way so I wouldn’t put him on the spot.”19 Soon after meeting the interior minister, Ford had a discussion with General Abu Wael, otherwise known as General Mohammed Nassif Khayrbek, the vice president for security affairs. In May 2011, Ford, the British and French ambassadors met Foreign Minister Muallem. They asked him to stop the government violence and Muallem asked for help organizing dialogue with the opposition. “I was so shocked,” recalls Ford.20 Senior Syrian officials knew there was a problem and sought international cooperation to address it. Not everyone in the intelligence services was so forthcoming. As protests were spreading across the country, Assad gave a speech in late March. “It was all fire and brimstone. He was surrounded by some bad types”21 who were pushing for a crackdown. Ratcheting up tensions, two dozen protesters were killed on April 9. Ford queried, “Is Assad hemmed-in and unable” to make reforms or is he really a hard-liner?22 Syrian officials were thin-skinned and averse to criticism. Victoria Nuland, the State Department spokesperson, answered a question about Syria during the daily press briefing. According to Muallem, her response “was very blunt.”23 When Muallem objected to Nuland’s comments, Ford told him: “It is not America’s intention to bring down the government. We want stability but if the President doesn’t get ahead of this and reign in the security, it’ll get worse and there will be a real war.”24 Ford warned there would be a spiral of deadly violence. When asked to stabilize the situation, Assad responded: “I can’t.” It was not clear to Ford from his reply if “he could not take the action or if it wouldn’t do any good.”25 Ford visited Hama at the end of June.

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Hundreds of thousands of people were protesting in the streets after Friday prayers. I wanted to send a message, “No violence.” People were releasing doves and carrying olive branches. The army had surrounded the city. We knew the history of Hama and were concerned about what might happen. I sent the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] a note telling them we were going, but of course no one responded.26

Ford had written Jeff Feltman, assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. “I’ll be our eyes and ears on the ground.”27 Ford also gave a heads-up to Daniel Shapiro, the senior director for the Middle East at the NSC. Ford knew his visit to Hama could be interpreted as inflammatory. He wanted senior US officials to be informed in advance. When Ford arrived at the outskirts of Hama, the streets were jammed with protesters. There was a flour truck in front of us. I told the driver to follow the truck. They waved us through. There were gangs of youths at a checkpoint who were maybe 15 or 16 years old. None of the kids was older than 18. They didn’t have weapons. But each had a cell phone. Their job was to warn people if the Mukhabarat showed up.28

As Ford entered Hama, it was clear that “the Syrian state was not in control of their own streets. We went through a second and a third checkpoint. We had no map to get to the hotel on Orantes Square so we stopped the car to ask.”29 The Regional Security Officer (RSO) was apoplectic. “Don’t get out of the car,” he implored. Ford was confident he would be safe. “These people like Americans. They were happy we’re here.”30 A general strike was underway; Ford stayed in the only hotel that was open. Fifty people showed up. They didn’t believe I was the Ambassador of the United States. I showed them my business card with English on one side and Arabic on the other. They asked me to transmit their grievances [to the government and to Washington]. By this time, we were surrounded by hundreds of people and they were all cheering, “Long live the revolution,” and throwing flowers and olive branches. Then the crowd started chanting “Bring down the regime.”31

This made Ford nervous. He was there to convey a message of nonviolence and he did not want his presence to be misunderstood as an endorsement of regime change. Some prominent street notables were sitting outside the hotel in “ubiquitous white plastic chairs and sipping tea.” Ford noted, “There was a coordinating committee and everything was well organized.”32 France’s Ambassador Eric Chevalier happened to show up in the Hama central square when Ford was there. After Chevalier departed, two motor bikes arrived from the coordinating committee. The bikes helped Ford’s vehicle make its way through the crowd. Ford reflected, “[the Hama demonstration] was peaceful, well-organized. The protesters had good intentions. They were proAmerican. There was no violence.”33 Ford could not participate in an anti-government demonstration and immediately returned to Damascus. “Three weeks later, the

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government responded harshly. It physically occupied Hama. The Mukhabarat was going after people who met with me.”34 Most of the people with whom Ford met were probably “jailed or killed.”35 Syrian media widely reported on Ford’s trip to Hama. It accused him of inciting the crowd and appeasing violent protesters. Thugs showed up from Latakia in a convoy of buses. Embassy security recorded their license plates. Ford recounted, “We only had 6 marines and 3 RSOs. The thugs were well trained. They scaled the ‘no climb fence’ and got on the roof of the Chancellory. They pulled down the American flag and hoisted a Syrian flag on top of the Chancellory.” Ford elaborated, “I was watching on closed circuit TV. A dead bolt door was all that prevented them from entering the embassy. The marines threatened to shoot but I told them not to, only if they go through the door and after a warning. We were one block from the President’s residence. The police waited for 3 hours and did nothing.” The police could have intervened to calm the protesters, but the incident was condoned by the authorities to send a message. After ransacking parts of the US Embassy, the mob stormed the French embassy. Ford visited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to lodge an official complaint about the incident. He told the MFA, “Some countries are more civilized. We chose not to destroy your flag. It was neatly folded and I  gave it to him.”36 The United States and Russia cosponsored a UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution condemning the embassy attacks. Violence was escalating across the country. Minarets in Deir ez-Zor were destroyed by tank fire. Protests in Homs were put down. Turkey’s foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Damascus on August 9, 2011. “He thought he had a deal whereby the Syrian armed forces would withdraw from major cities. There was no deal and Davutoğlu was humiliated.”37 Numerous factors contributed to the escalation of violence. Oppression riled people who felt disenfranchised and abused over four decades of Baathist rule. Since 1971, power had been concentrated in the hands of the Assad family, Alawite elite, and the Baath Party. Without political recourse to express their grievances, people were radicalized and turned to violence. The overthrow of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt inspired Syrians to take matters into their own hands and demand greater freedoms and opportunities. The protests were initially nonsectarian. However, violence exacerbated deep sectarian divisions in the country. Most of the protesters were Sunni, while senior security officials were Alawite. Fearing a repeat of the Hama revolution in 1982, the Syrian government responded to the protests by killing and imprisoning protesters.38 Torture, extrajudicial killing, and disappearances became routine. Sunnis, who represented 70 percent of the country’s population, had been systematically marginalized under the Baath. Their seething resentment boiled over after the events in Daraa. The Syrian Baath Party was supposed to be the source of national unity. Reflecting the Baath ideology, Hafez presented himself as the founder of “Arab socialism” and the father of the nation. He sought to galvanize support through Pan-Arab nationalism with Syria, taking a leading role. However, the concept of Arab unity was notional and unrealistic.

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***** Uprisings were fueled by a perfect storm of problems. The state and its centralized economy failed to deliver material benefits to the people, many of whom lived in poverty and had a subsistence lifestyle. Syria’s economy was underdeveloped with high unemployment. The government’s decision to allow private investment led to a boom in consumerism among the urban upper-middle classes and Alawites. However, it contributed to financial inequality and sharpened differences between Alawites and Sunnis. As in many countries transitioning from a centrally planned economy, privatization led to the concentration of wealth by families with government connections. Living costs increased and jobs were few, especially outside Damascus in the Sunni heartland. The lavish lifestyle of the Assad family angered Syrians struggling to make ends meet. Widespread corruption, propelled by privatization, compounded resentment. Corruption permeated daily life from obtaining a business license to securing vehicle registration. The regime coexisted with black markets and smuggling rings, which benefitted friends and the Baath inner circle. No matter how hard they worked, the middle class did not advance. Poverty and lack of opportunity fueled disaffection with the government. State violence also compounded popular anger. Economic challenges were worsened by Syria’s booming population. The UN ranked Syria ninth in population growth between 2005 and 2010.39 Economic development did not keep pace with the population explosion. The state lacked the resources to subsidize food, create jobs, and provide adequate education. Syria was also victim to a revolution of rising expectations. After 2000, youth had greater access to the internet, mobile phones, and satellite television. With time on their hands, they used social media as a tool for expressing grievances and grassroots mobilization. The Baath Party burnished its credentials by demonizing others. Syria’s failed occupation of Lebanon and conflict with Israel stirred doubt in the population at-large and undermined the regime’s credibility. The influx of more than 1 million Iraqi refugees strained Syria’s capacity to deliver services. They settled in Syrian cities taking jobs and housing away from citizens. Most Iraqi refugees were Sunni, which exacerbated sectarian and social tensions in Syria. Iraqi refugees initially arrived with money, which boosted the economy. Over time, however, their resources were spent and they became a burden to the government and their host communities.40 Global warming also contributed to the uprising. Syria experienced extreme drought from 2007 to 2010, which caused a nationwide collapse of the farming and agricultural sectors. According to the United Nations, 75 percent of farms failed and 86 percent of the livestock died between 2006 and 2011.41As a result, up to 1.5 million people migrated from rural areas to towns and cities. Many of the displaced settled in the outskirts of cities, such as Damascus and Homs, which were already suffering from inadequate infrastructure, depleting water and electricity supplies. The arrival of numerous rural families came on the heels of Iraqi refugees and caused a “population shock.”42

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Syria’s temperature had risen by nearly 2 degrees Fahrenheit since 1900. The temperature increase contributed to water evaporation and desertification. Decreased winter rainfall and warmer temperatures made the drought more severe. Also, conditions worsened as a result of greenhouse gas emissions. Unsustainable agricultural policies and farming practices depleted groundwater, crucial for irrigating land. The government should have anticipated the environmental crisis. Three of the four worst multi-year droughts in Syria’s history occurred since 1990. The government’s failure to prepare for drought exacerbated other tensions related to the economic situation, ranging from unemployment to corruption and inequality.43 US defense secretary Chuck Hagel drew a link between drought and population flows. According to a Pentagon report, “Droughts and crop failures can leave millions of people without any lifeline, and trigger waves of mass migration.”44 The Nobel Peace Prize–winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded:  “Human security will be progressively threatened as the climate changes.”45 According to Columbia University researchers, “[Drought] was a contributing factor to the social unraveling that occurred that eventually led to the civil war.”46 The link between Syria’s drought and conflict is relevant beyond Syria’s borders. It sounded an alarm that climate change and environmental insecurity can lead to violent conflict in other countries or resource-scarce regions. Yemen is a case in point with water scarcities, contributing to civil war. Drought conditions have also given rise to “climate refugees,” people who are forced to flee from their homes due to desertification, natural disasters, environmental degradation, and other environmental shocks related to climate change. ***** Bashar addressed the nation on March 30, as protests intensified. The speech in parliament was delayed by about a week, as Bashar gathered the facts and took counsel on the substance and tone of his remarks. The speech was an opportunity for Bashar to heal the nation and publicly commit to far-reaching reforms, especially the elimination of the emergency laws. People hoped that he would also lift restraints on media outlets, which are government-controlled. They wanted Bashar to show empathy for the victims of state violence and apologize to the families, dignifying those who died by calling them “martyrs.” Bashar might have announced the creation of a special commission to consider the events, investigate officials responsible for crimes against the people, and hold them accountable. Contrition could have included the establishment of a compensation fund, or student scholarships for Daraans and other youth across the country. But rather than take responsibility and show regret, Bashar blamed the uprising on a “foreign plot.”47 He accused Western countries and Israel of an international conspiracy to overthrow him. He accused protesters of causing “chaos in the country under the pretext of reform.”48 Bashar’s speech was long and rambling. At times, his remarks were incoherent and confused. In a display of twisted logic, he commended those killed in Daraa for sacrificing their lives in service of national stability. Bashar talked about sedition:

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Most of the Syrian people call for reform, and you are all reformers. Most of the Syrian people have unmet needs; and we all discuss, criticize, and have our disagreements because we have not met many of the needs of the Syrian people. But sedition has become part of the issue and started to lead the other two factors and take cover under them. That is why it was easy to mislead many people who demonstrated in the beginning with good intensions. We cannot say that all those who demonstrated are conspirators. This is not true, and we want to be clear and realistic. The conspirators are few in number, this is natural. Even we, in the government, did not know, like everybody else, and did not understand what was happening until acts of sabotage started to emerge. In principle, we support reform and meeting people’s needs. This is the duty of the state. But we cannot be with sedition.49

He accused the protesters of playing the sectarian card: In the beginning they started with incitement, many weeks before trouble started in Syria. They used the satellite TV stations and the internet but did not achieve anything. And then, using sedition, started to produce fake information, voices, images, etc. they forged everything. Then they started to use the sectarian element. They sent SMSs to members of a certain sect alerting them that another sect will attack them. And in order to be credible, they sent masked people to neighborhoods with different sects living in them, knocking on people’s doors and telling each that the other sect has already attacked and are on the streets, in order to get a reaction. And it worked for a while. But we were able to nip the sedition in the bud by getting community leaders to meet and diffuse the situation. Then they used weapons. They started killing people at random; because they knew when there is blood it becomes more difficult to solve the problem.50

He described a vast conspiracy, suggesting that foreign powers were behind the protests: We have not yet discovered the whole structure of this conspiracy. We have discovered part of it but it is highly organized. There are support groups in more than one governorate linked to some countries abroad. There are media groups, forgery groups and groups of “eye-witnesses.”51

He emphasized accountability not of the perpetrators but of the victims: The blood that was spilled on the streets is Syrian blood, and we are all concerned because the victims are our brothers and their families are our families. It is important to look for the causes and those behind these events. We need to investigate and bring the people responsible to account.52

Bashar reverted to a hackneyed message of Arab nationalism. He talked about the Israel–Gaza war of 2008, calling on Syrians to support “Arab resistance when there is occupation.”53

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Out of touch, Bashar’s remarks ignored the grief of families who lost loved ones. People hoped that Bashar would ask members of parliament to stand and observe a minute of silence to commemorate the victims. He made no such gesture. Bashar’s remarks received a standing ovation by lawmakers. On the street, however, many Syrians who supported the regime were appalled at Bashar’s dismissive and derogatory tone. “The speech was nonsense and has given security forces the green light to continue its oppression on our people,”54 said one man. “Assad is using fear of sectarianism as a tool to incite Syrians’ anger against the people here.”55 ***** Daraa school children and their families were the first casualties in the Syrian civil war. Daraa lit a match and became a rallying cry for an unprecedented rural and provincialdriven uprising. The people of Daraa broke the people’s “wall of fear” by defying the police and taking to the street. On April 25, the government launched a full-scale siege of Daraa. Security forces gunned down approximately one hundred protesters across the country.56 The following day, they fired on mourners at funerals. Their brutality ignited demonstrations across the country. By July, protests had spread to Homs. The protest movement grew and morphed into an organized opposition. Opposition supporters took up arms to defend themselves and expel security forces from their communities. Rebel brigades were established to fight for control of towns and cities, and as self-defense forces. In July 2011, military defectors formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a rebel group aiming to overthrow the government. Syria began to slide into civil war.57 The Central Crisis Management Cell (CCMC) met at the Baath Party Regional Command on August 5, 2011. In five months of revolution, the protests had spread to other provinces, which members of the committee attributed to “the laxness in handling the crisis.”58 They blamed “weak coordination and cooperation among security bodies”59 and devised a plan to target specific categories of people. Security branches were instructed to launch daily raids against protest organizers and “those who tarnish the image of Syria in foreign media. Once each sector has been cleansed of wanted people,”60 security agents would coordinate with Baathist loyalists, neighborhood militias, and community leaders to ensure that opposition activists could not return to those areas. They would “establish a joint investigation committee at the province level,”61 made up of representatives from all of the security branches to interrogate detainees. The results “shall be sent to all security branches, so that they can be used in the identification of new targets that need to be prosecuted.”62 Hisham Ikhtiyar, the head of the National Security Bureau (NSB), sent the instructions to regional secretaries of the Baath Party, who chaired each province’s security committee, with orders to “implement what is requested of you, so as to speed up putting an end to the crisis.”63 *****

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The CCMC moved its meetings from the Baath Party Regional Command to the heavily guarded NSB in the Rawda Square of Damascus.64 A bomb exploded inside the meeting on July 18, 2012. The blast killed the government’s top military and security officials including Minister of Defense General Dawoud Rajiha, director of the NSB General Hisham Ikhtiyar, and assistant to the vice president and former defense minister General Hasan Turkmani. Head of Investigations at the Syrian Intelligence Agency Hafez Makhlouf and Assef Shawkat, the new deputy minister of defense and Bashar’s brother-in-law, were killed. In the bombing’s aftermath, the fate of Interior Minister Mohammad al-Shaar was unclear. General Mohammed Saeed Bekheitan, assistant national secretary of the Baath Party and former head of the NSB, was wounded. According to a rumor, General Maher al-Assad was seriously injured and lost both legs in the bombing. An official source dismissed the rumor, saying that Maher did not attend the meeting. Initial reports indicated that a suicide bomber, a bodyguard to one of the meeting’s participants, was responsible for the attack. He allegedly used 25 pounds of TNT and C-4 explosives. Liwa al-Islam (“Brigade of Islam”) and the FSA claimed responsibility for the bombing. Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat, blamed Iran.65 It was also speculated that Bashar himself was responsible for the attack to prevent a coup by security officials who opposed the war.66 According to Robert Ford, “I don’t think we know how it was done.”67 Amid rumors that Bashar was also killed in the attack, he appeared on national television at the swearing-in ceremony of the new defense minister. Dressed in a blue suit, Bashar seemed calm and in control. The country’s armed forces said in a statement: [Syria is] “determined to confront all forms of terrorism and chop off any hand that harms national security.”68 Violent conflict had occurred mostly in governorates removed from the capitol. The bombing brought the war to the heart of Damascus. The fact that the attackers could penetrate one of the country’s most secure facilities caused deep consternation, heightening fears as Syria’s civil war escalated.

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Part Two

Radicalization

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The Free Syrian Army

Militants started as revolutionaries but became employees of their financial backers.1 —Bassam Barabandi ***** Syria’s opposition movement was initially defined by democratic and pluralistic principles. It consisted of civilians with limited prior military experience. As the security situation disintegrated, an increasing number of defectors from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) joined the rebels. Secular and pro-democracy protests against Bashar’s tyranny morphed into a violent radical Islamist movement involving a myriad of jihadi groups.2 The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was created as a loose-knit consortium of rebel groups and fighters on July 29, 2011. It was founded by army defectors who refused to turn weapons on the people.3 Their goals were to protect peaceful protesters and overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad.4 Colonel Riyad al-Asaad, the FSA founder, declared: “As of now, the security forces that kill civilians and besiege cities will be treated as legitimate targets. We will target them in all parts of Syria’s territories without exception.”5 The FSA would, “work hand in hand with the people to achieve freedom and dignity to bring this regime down, protect the revolution and the country’s resources, and stand in the face of the irresponsible military machine that protects the regime.”6 Colonel Ammar al-Wawi, commander of the FSA’s Ababeel battalion, indicated: “We carry out military operations against anyone who targets the peaceful protesters.”7 Picking up guns was not what we had in mind when we first took to the streets. But we were being slaughtered like lambs simply for peacefully protesting, what choice did we have? I myself saw two children no older than six die in front of my eyes. First, we had to protect our people and second, we realized the regime was not backing down. We had to commit to the next step.8

Riyad al-Asaad encouraged soldiers to defect and join the FSA’s ranks. What started as a trickle turned into a deluge of volunteers. Individuals were increasingly ready to mobilize as repression intensified in Homs, Daraa, and Hama during the spring and

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summer of 2011. Jist al-Shughur was also a flash point. Opponents of the regime had grown disenchanted with nonviolent civil resistance. According to an FSA leader in northern Syria, For many Syrians, the events in Jisr al-Shughour and the regime’s subsequent escalation and retaliation in places like Homs confirmed the viability and necessity of armed resistance for sustaining Syria’s revolution.9

The number of defectors increased in response to attacks.10 Revolutionary fervor was driven by the regime’s intensified repression. Defectors were drawn to the FSA’s message, as well as its battlefield prowess. The FSA used guerilla tactics, effectively targeting the army’s command and control, and logistics.11 Between March and June 2011, it killed approximately one thousand members of the security forces.12 In November 2011, the FSA launched a spectacular raid against an air force base located in the suburbs of Damascus and an air force intelligence complex on the outskirts of Aleppo.13 “Guerilla-style raids and ambushes more than doubled between January and April 2012, while the frequency of IED (improvised explosive devices) attacks rose by more than 100 percent.”14 As violent conflict escalated, “Everyone who believed in the revolution, believed in the FSA as a force to protect and to further the revolution’s cause.”15 Idlib, a town in the northwest of Syria near the border with Turkey, is known for its conservatism. The Idlib governorate offered many sons to the FSA.16 The FSA established a base of operations across the border in Hatay province from where it launched hit-and-run operations against assets in Syria. The Turkish government justified sheltering the FSA on humanitarian grounds.17 Recruits came from across the country. “The mountains of Jabal al-Zawiyeh— along with areas of Homs and Daraa—had been the early hot-beds of armed resistance to the Assad regime.”18 Army units defected at Jisr al-Shughur on June 5, and ex-soldiers used their government-issued weapons to defend civilians. The government was losing control of its forces, as well as the propaganda war. Damascus denied the mutiny, claiming that FSA fighters were “armed gangs” attired in stolen military uniforms.19 Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Harmoush announced his defection from the 11th Battalion in the village of Bdama in Idlib on June 9.  Proclaiming the Free Officers Movement (FOM), he was joined by 150 soldiers who pledged their allegiance to the FSA. In a dramatic display, Harmoush burned his uniform and vowed to stand with the people against state-sponsored terrorism. He and his men relocated to Turkey. However, Harmoush was apprehended by Syrian intelligence operatives and brought back to Syria. He was imprisoned in Sednaya Prison and executed. Other high-ranking officers defected, including Lieutenant Ibrahim Ayoub, Captain Yousuf al-Hamoud and two brothers, Major Ahmed Bahboh, and Captain Abdullah Bahboh. In Daraa, Captain Qais al-Qahtaneh led defectors.20 Colonel Rashid Hammoud Arafat and Colonel Ghassan Hleihel, senior members of the Republican Guard, also joined the opposition.21 Many rank-and-file soldiers were inspired by the

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passion for resistance of their commanding officers and joined the rebellion. Volunteers came from communities where the resistance enjoyed widespread popular support.22 The Institute for the Study of War put out the most accurate and comprehensive reports on the early armed movement, which was often used as a reference by US officials.23 The FSA started as a decentralized rebel movement. By December 2011, it included thousands of fighters divided over twenty-two battalions across the country.24 FSA operations, including recruitment, remained highly decentralized. By the spring of 2012, “shaping groups” had been established and were led by Alwiyat al-Omari in Daraa; Liwa Khaled Bin Walid, and Kataib al-Farouq in Homs; Kataib Harmoush and Kataib Jebel al-Zawiyeh in Idlib; and Kataib Abu al-Fid’a and Kataib Osama Bin Zaid in Hama. However, the inability to enact a national-level strategy was a major flaw of the armed opposition movement. Riyad al-Asaad envisioned himself as the overall authority of a disciplined “centrally-commanded insurgent organization.”25 Asaad’s organization was more aspirational than realistic. While Asaad was responsible for strategy and planning, FSA field commanders made day-to-day decisions and took responsibility for the provision and deployment of their men. The FSA communicated using email and satellite phones provided by Syrian expatriates in the United States, Europe, and the Persian Gulf.26 Though FSA members were united in common purpose, factionalism and internal disagreements became more pronounced over time.27 ***** The Syrian insurgency included secular nationalists, jihadists, and Salafists. Despite deep ideological divisions and separate organizations, they set aside differences to pursue the common goal of regime change. The armed opposition was complemented by foreign fighters who were revolutionary zealots animated by the Arab Spring to join the fight in Syria. The competition for financial resources also accentuated differences.

Secular Nationalists Secular nationalists took up arms to overthrow the regime and establish a rights-based democratic order. They had a world view that was compatible with modern democratic principles, convinced that democracy could coexist with political Islam. Secular nationalists were linked to revolutionary councils in communities across the country. Secular nationalists did not deny the essential role of Islam to the identity of Syrians. However, they believed that Islam was compatible with democratic institutions and practices, such as constitutionalism, elections, and a multiparty system. They sought an inclusive popular movement comprising Arabs and Syria’s minorities—Alawites, Kurds, Armenians, Christians, and others. Members of the Syrian insurgency who came from conservative provinces in the northwest such as Homs and Idlib viewed armed struggle as a manifestation of jihad. But their support for jihad did not necessarily mean that they subscribed to a global jihadist or Islamist ideology. Religious nationalists often aligned with secular

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nationalists. Both groups were part of a popular resistance movement, patriots fighting for the Syrian nation against a corrupt and authoritarian dictator.

Islamists The Syrian insurgency was increasingly influenced by Islamism, resulting from the enduring conflict and mounting atrocities. Unlike secularists, Sunni Islamists and Salafists reject constitutional democracy. Subtle yet important differences distinguish Islamists from Salafists. Islamists believe that political power should reflect Islamic principles. “To be or become an Islamist, however, is a conscious act of political affirmation.”28 The Quran is the bedrock of a political ideology, inspiring politics and serving as the foundation of society in all its aspects. The purpose of Islamism is “to advocate for a privileged social and political role for Islamic belief.”29 There are diverse Islamist groups based on these broad characteristics, encompassing both extremist groups and mainstream parties. Mainstream Islamist groups welcome parliamentary politics and are willing to collaborate with existing state institutions.30 Hamid and Dar write, “The basic project of mainstream Islamism, if it can be summed up in a sentence, is to reconcile pre-modern Islamic law with the modern nation-state.”31 Extremist groups that employ terror and violence, such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), are considered Islamists.

Salafists Salafism is a traditional belief system, enshrining the original Islamic community (Salaf) as the model for Islamic practice. Salafists believe that deviating from this original model and literal truths of the Quran is forbidden. To Salafists, Sharia is absolute. They have deep disdain toward heretical Islamic sects, including Alawites and Shiites. Salafis are “ultraconservatives”32 who believe Salafism is the purest Islam.33 “Salafis believe not just in the ‘spirit’ but in the ‘letter’ of the law, which is what sets them apart from their mainstream counterparts.”34 Generally, Salafists utilize a “quietist” perspective toward religious education and political engagement.35 Salafi-jihadists maintain the centrality of militant jihad in achieving their vision of an Islamic state, also called “the Caliphate.” Most importantly, Salafi-jihadists are unequivocally opposed to the modern state. Salafi-jihadists assert that their approach to Islam is the only authentic one. They practice militant jihad to destroy the modern state and establish the Caliphate. Salafi-jihadists are a minority of Salafis.36 Disdaining dialogue, Salafists believe that political objectives can only be achieved through violent means. Salafi-jihadists bear symbols of their piety and devotion in the form of a long beard that must not be shaved. Within Salafism, a reform movement arose that supported working within the existing political system in order to realize the Caliphate. Reformers promote religious education (Dawa) as the vehicle for transforming society. Unlike traditional Salafists,

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they believe that Sharia can conform to civil or state law and that the two are not mutually exclusive.

Foreign Fighters Local revolutionaries were joined by foreign fighters from countries in the region and the greater worldwide Islamic community. As many as eighty thousand foreign fighters from more than one hundred countries joined the battle.37 Many were young revolutionaries, inspired by the Arab Spring. They participated in movements in their own countries and later joined Syrians in a regional struggle against tyranny and corruption. They came to Syria with a sense of duty to fight alongside their brethren. Some foreign fighters were caught up in a revolutionary spirit. They did not want to dismantle the state system, but reform it. Most foreign fighters were Islamic-inspired and Salafi-jihadists who rejected the Baath ideology and a secular state in Syria. They were devoted to establishing the Caliphate through violence. These foreign fighters were notorious for their battlefield prowess and merciless treatment of Alawite soldiers in the SAA. Bashar emphasized the role of foreign-backed terrorists to discredit the indigenous protest movement. He accused a “foreign-backed conspiracy” of trying to topple his government. “Many people were misled in the beginning, thinking that what is happening is a state of excitement, a wave of the ‘Arab Spring’ … [But it] isn’t a revolution or a spring; it is terrorist acts in the full meaning of the word.”38 Bashar’s use of overwhelming force united opposition groups in common purpose to overthrow him. Draconian policies contributed to a blurring of the line between peaceful reform and armed struggle. Bashar launched an information campaign demonizing the opposition. Impugning foreign fighters helped shore up support among Syria’s Alawite and Christian communities. It also discouraged middle- and upper-class Sunnis from joining the opposition. Bashar’s Russian and Iranian backers would use the growing presence of Sunni jihadi fighters to justify their involvement on behalf of the regime. ***** There were innumerable groups and subgroups in the armed opposition. The Sunni rebellion comprised between 100,000 and 150,000 fighters at its peak. Some of the groups were highly localized, operating at the village level. Only al-Qaeda and ISIS were national in the scope of their operations. The trajectory of the armed opposition occurred in three phases. The period from 2011 to 2013 was marked by total chaos and the influx of foreign fighters. More than one thousand armed opposition groups emerged, as Syria’s civil war intensified and the rebel advanced on Damascus. Between 2013 and 2015, the overall number of groups narrowed to about two hundred. This centralization was the result of events on the ground and enabled by the CIA’s vetting, which distinguished credible groups from those lacking capacity. From 2016 to 2019, the armed opposition dwindled as the

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international community became fatigued with the Syrian crisis.39 The narrowing of the number of groups was a product first and foremost of a competition over resources; second, survival of the fittest; and third, dwindling manpower over time. In March 2016, the Institute for the Study of War identified twenty-three rebel groups as the main “powerbrokers” and “potential powerbrokers.”40 By November 2016, the Brookings Institution listed almost eighty different factions. Jabhat al-Nusra had the greatest capacity. Ahrar al-Sham was also very capable, with operations mostly in northern Syria. Beginning in 2018, about eighty thousand of these fighters were concentrated in the northwest with Idlib as a hub. As the armed opposition lost more territory and fled to a pocket of territory in Syria’s northwest and along the border with Turkey, about 20  percent of Syria’s population became concentrated in 3  percent of its territory.41 External support for insurgency groups waned over time. Assistance to the regime from Russia and Iran also fluctuated. Jabhat al-Nusra came from al-Qaeda in Iraq during the autumn of 2011. It received operational assistance from the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Fatah al-Islam, and Jordanian Salafi-jihadists. Jabhat Nusra’s Salafi-jihadist ideology resonated with conservative Syrians. In 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra became Tahrir al-Sham and pioneered the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). As a home-grown organization, its popular appeal was especially threatening to the regime. Hassan Abboud founded Ahrar al-Sham after he was freed from prison in late 2011. Ahrar al-Sham, also known as Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the Levant, was composed of conservative Islamists and Salafists. It was initially based in the Idlib governorate, but expanded to become a nationwide militia. Ahrar al-Sham united opposition forces and led the formation of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) in 2012 and cocreated the Islamic Front in 2013, which had forty thousand to seventy thousand fighters and was Syria’s largest opposition umbrella group.42 Its militant ideology bore similarities to the Fighting Vanguard, the Muslim Brotherhood’s armed wing that tried to bring Brotherhood factions together in 1981. Suqour al-Sham, the Umma Brigade, and the Nusra Front were also prominent power brokers. Suqour al-Sham is an Islamist and religious nationalist militia founded in 2011. Also known as the Sham Falcons Brigades, it was associated with the FSA and the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. Ahmad Issa al-Sheikh, Abu Hussein al-Dik, and Ahmad Sarhan were its commanders. Suqour cooperated with the Sham Legion, the Syrian Liberation Front, the Farouq Brigades, and the Army of the Mujahadeen with areas of operation in the Idlib and Aleppo governorates. It was moderate compared to other groups, espousing a brand of political Islam that is compatible with democracy. The Umma Brigade or “Banner of the Nation” (Liwa al-Ummah) is an Islamist and religious nationalist group established by Abd al-Mahdi al-Harati, an Irish-Libyan who fought in the Battle for Tripoli. After Harati stepped down in September 2012, Umma aligned with the FSA and joined Liwa al-Haqq and Jund al-Aqsa to form a Salafi coalition in Hama governorate in January 2014. The Nusra Front had regular bouts of fighting with the FSA over ammunition and resources in 2014 and 2015. It destroyed 2 FSA groups that had CIA backing in Idlib in November 2014. Nusra controlled the border crossings from Turkey and levied taxes on truck traffic, which enabled to to pay its fighters more than the FSA. Nusra distanced

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itself from al-Qaeda publicly in July 201643 and renamed itself Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.44 The Nusra Front attacked the FSA in January 2017. Several FSA groups responded by aligning with Ahrar al-Sham, which demonstrated the FSA’s growing radicalization.45 US officials feared that Jabhat Nusra’s fighting effectiveness would overshadow other groups and enable it to hijack the armed opposition movement.

Idlib Each region was dominated by different insurgent groups when the war started. Hizb al-Islam al-Turkistani, Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Shamiya, Faylaq al-Sham, Fawk al-Awi, Jaish al-Mujahideen, Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Jaish al-Naser, and Firqa 13th Division were groups concentrated around Idlib in the northwest.

Aleppo Some of these groups formed regional coalitions and were also present in Aleppo (e.g., Jabhat al-Shamiya, Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Firqat Sultan Murad, Jaish al-Naser, and Firqa 13th Division), and in Homs and the northeast (e.g., Harakat al-Naser).

Daraa Jaish al-Islam, Ajnad al-Sham, Jaish al-Awl, Thalaf Suquour al-Janoub, Usud al-Harb. Failaq al-Awl, and Seif al-Sham were present near Daraa and along the Jordanian border. Jaish al-Naser, a secular group, was also active in this region.

Damascus Some groups, such as Jaysh al-Islam, Ajnad al-Sham, Faylaq al-Rahman, Aliwya Ahmed Abdou, and Jabhat al-Tanmya, concentrated their resources in the Damascus suburbs. They occupied Ghouta, a Damascus suburb in November 2012. Twenty-six other groups, with hundreds of fighters each, were linked to al-Qaeda. These included Jund al-Aqsa, Harakat Fajr al-Sham al-Islamiya, Imarat al-Qawqaz fi al-Sham, and a brigade called “Ajnad Kavkaq.” There were also hundreds of small groups with a few dozen fighters each, who drew manpower from local clans. Their main objective was to protect their neighborhood or village.46 Local revolutionaries are not Islamists; their political views do not depend upon Islamic principles although they demonstrate different degrees of personal religious fervor. Moderate Islamists include rebel groups like Suqour al-Sham and the Umma Brigade, who subscribe to an interpretation of political Islam that is compatible with democracy.47

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The Syrian government supported foreign fighters who traveled through Syria to join the Iraqi insurgency. They also provided sanctuary to Baathists fleeing Iraq. With the outbreak of Syria’s civil war in 2011, the jihadi highway to Iraq turned into a twoway street with battle-hardened fighters from Iraq and others from around the world returning to Syria to fight the Assad regime. The Umma Brigade, which fought in Libya’s civil war, and the Chechen-led Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar are examples of prominent foreign militias that fought in Syria. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was affiliated with the Abdullah Azzam Brigades led by a Saudi national, Majid bin Muhammad al-Majid. Many of its fighters have family ties in Syria. The majority of Fatah al-Islam’s members blamed the Syrian government for their 2007 defeat in Lebanon. They turned on Bashar, carrying out a car bombing in Damascus on September 27, 2008. The FSA initially welcomed foreign fighters. Relations grew increasingly strained, as demonstrated by the case of Fatah al-Islam’s Walid al-Boustani. In March 2012, without the FSA’s approval, Boustani declared the “Islamic Emirate of Homs.” Forces under Boustani’s command kidnapped and killed Syrian citizens, committing war crimes and violating the Geneva Conventions. The FSA condemned Boustani’s actions and rejected his Salafi-jihadi ideology. The local FSA battalion established a court to try Boustani. He was convicted and executed.48 ***** The FSA established provincial military councils (PMCs) to coordinate operations at the grass roots and between regions. Its members were only equipped with light weapons seized in battle or taken from slain members of the SAA. Defectors also provided weapons. Other weapons were procured on the black market, often from sources in the Syrian Army, or assembled from spare parts.49 Riyad al-Asaad appealed for assistance. “We ask the international community to provide us with weapons so that we, as an army, the Free Syrian Army, can protect the people of Syria.”50 Asad explained, “We are an army, we are in the opposition, and we are prepared for military operations. If the international community provides weapons, we can topple the regime in a very, very short time.”51 FSA leaders created PMCs in early 2012. PMCs professionalized the FSA, enhancing coordination. Nonetheless, ideological differences continued to limit the FSA’s effectiveness.52 To bridge differences between groups, the FSA military council adopted a “Proclamation of Principles” in July 2012. Over the objection of Islamists, the proclamation pledged to “respect democracy, multi-ethnic and sectarian pluralism, and the authority of Syria’s future, elected, civilian leadership.”53 The statement affirmed, We believe in a free and democratic Syria where all Syrian citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, creed, religion or class shall enjoy equal rights and live in liberty, justice and peace. We will do our utmost to uphold international humanitarian law and norms, including by treating prisoners humanely, even as the Assad regime engages in crimes against humanity.54

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The FSA reorganized in December 2012 at a gathering in Antalya, Turkey. It established the Supreme Joint Military Command (SMC), as a unified command structure with 30 members.55 The Antalya meeting focused more on structure and operations than ideology. Financing accentuated differences between insurgent groups. Competition encouraged Syrian groups to align their ideologies with the views of potential sponsors in an effort to curry favor and gain financial support. Foreign financiers, both governments and wealthy individuals from Arab States of the Persian Gulf, were motivated by the desire to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. They also sought to leverage jihadists for strategic purposes, enhancing their influence in Syria and elsewhere in Mesopotamia. Vetted insurgent factions received contributions from Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.56 On April 2, 2012, Saudi Arabia and Qatar signed an agreement to fund FSA salaries and receive logistical support from Turkey to help encourage defections from the Syrian Army, organize the FSA, and prevent extremism within its ranks. Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia established a process to coordinate their support of rebel groups in Syria.57 Insurgent groups received chaotic and disorganized support from these regional states. Sponsors acted independently through multiple channels that relied on personal contacts, which had an adverse effect on the FSA’s unity and capacity.58 Other countries also sponsored the FSA. Bassam Barabandi, the first counselor at Syria’s Embassy in Washington, DC, after the start of the war said, “Militants started as revolutionaries but became employees of their financial backers.”59 Countries supported groups who acted as clients, advancing their interests. Israel backed rebel groups operating near the Golan Heights and the southern Druze region.60 Jordan provided training and weapons through its intelligence agencies to proxies operating near its border with Syria.61 Saudi Arabia sponsored Salafists while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) supported secular liberals. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE expanded assistance after Russia deployed forces in October 2015. Turkey and Qatar supported groups with a Muslim Brotherhood orientation. As US officials dithered on providing assistance, regional actors initiated operations to fill the gap. “We cannot depend on the Americans,” a senior Qatari source said.62 Additionally, European governments supported the rebels. Beginning in 2012, the United Kingdom provided assistance to the FSA and vetted moderate rebel groups through the Access to Justice and Community Security (AJACS) program.63 That year, France emerged as the most prominent opposition supporter by providing nonlethal military aid, humanitarian aid in rebel-held areas of Syria, and cash stipends to rebel commanders. French government agents delivered significant sums of cash across the Turkish border to rebel commanders to purchase weapons and fund armed operations.64 A diplomatic, multilateral grouping known as “Friends of Syria,” established in early 2012, including UK, the United States, UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Italy, Germany, France, Egypt, the African Union, the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the United Nations.65 The SMC was established to shore up political support, rather than as a tool for mobilizing financial and military assistance. Ambassador Frederic C.  Hof, who

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served as Special Adviser for Syrian Political Transition from May 2011 to September 2012, discounted the role played by the Friends of Syria and regional actors. “I don’t think that there is any potential source of support for nationalist Syrian rebels beyond the United States. Without the United States, they’re basically finished.”66 After the SMC was established, the US State Department started to provide nonlethal support to civilians and local coordination committees.67 Nonlethal support included electronic equipment, including phones and computers, and medical supplies. At the time, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated that the government was providing “communications equipment that will help activists organize, evade attacks by the regime and connect to the outside world.”68 Rather than providing weapons, the United States focused on support for civil society organizations and humanitarian assistance. In addition to nonlethal support, the CIA utilized SMC networks to provide small-scale, lethal weapons from former Warsaw Pact countries.69 The Obama administration initially declined to support the FSA. Washington’s decision exacerbated tensions within the group. Failing to resolve differences between factions undermined the creation of a cohesive FSA brand. US officials theorized that providing assistance through a unified channel would discipline opposition factions, bringing them under the FSA’s control. It was thought that a unified channel would send a clear signal of US resolve to the Syrian government, thereby accelerating political transition.70 In February 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry got approval to provide non-lethal supplies to the FSA—rations, communications, and medical supplies. This was the first direct US aid to the FSA. Both the Pentagon and the CIA were involved in separate train-and-equip programs. The CIA received permission to begin a secret vetting process of armed opposition groups in the summer of 2012. Vetting aimed to determine the most reliable and effective groups to receive support. There was, however, no mailing address for the FSA as a whole. The FSA was so decentralized, it risked becoming inconsequential as a battlefield entity.71

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The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.1 —President Barack Obama (August 8, 2011) ***** Obama was a reluctant warrior with no appetite for deploying US forces to Syria. As a candidate, he pledged to disengage the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan and avoid other foreign military entanglements. A  senior Obama administration official stated, “President Assad has a clear choice:  it’s either to lead this transition to democracy or leave.”2 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton maintained, “The country cannot go back to the way it was before.”3 The Obama administration sought to pressure the regime through financial sanctions after the crackdown in Daraa. As the rebels advanced and their victory looked increasingly likely, Obama wanted to be on the right side of history.4 He called for Bashar al-Assad to resign: I have indicated repeatedly that President al-Assad has lost legitimacy, that he needs to step down. So far, he hasn’t gotten the message, and instead has doubled downed in violence on his own people. The international community has sent a clear message that rather than drag his country into civil war he should move in the direction of a political transition.5

Ambassador Robert Ford was barely given notice of Obama’s statement. Dennis McDonough, the President’s chief of staff, called to alert Ford that the statement was coming. However, the secure communications system did not work so McDonough called on an open line. All of Syria’s intelligence agencies were listening. McDonough said, “You know that issue we’ve been talking about. We’re going to do it very soon. We want you to know. Is it ok?” Ford was concerned that Obama’s statement would create the impression that the United States was behind the protests, but the decision was made and he supported the

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White House. France was the most aggressive country, calling for Assad’s ouster. To further multilateralize the call for Assad’s resignation, French officials reached out to Britain, Germany, Spain, and Italy so they would issue similar statements, echoing the message. So did the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, except for Oman and Kuwait. The US focused on negotiations through a transition governing body. By mid-August, “the Syrian people thought we had their backs, but that was never the case.” According to Ford, “People believe what they want to believe.”6 US support for the opposition wavered as extremists infiltrated the Syrian insurgency. The Obama administration was hesitant to back Islamist groups with lethal weapons and training. It feared a recurrence of the US experience in Afghanistan where state-of-the-art technology, such as Stinger missiles, were provided to the Taliban to fight the Soviet Union only to be turned against the United States and its allies. Links between the armed Syrian opposition and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) also caused concern that the opposition would abandon pluralistic and democratic principles. Secular and Islamic nationalists inevitably found common cause with more radical Islamist and Salafist elements. Their alliance fundamentally changed the nature of Syria’s liberation movement. Facing a shrinking pool of potential partners, the United States developed a process to identify secular and moderate opposition groups that were compatible with its strategic interests.7 US officials were realistic about the potential impact of assistance to the opposition. They knew that supporting the rebels would not ensure victory. “It was about trying to demonstrate to Assad and his outside backers that he couldn’t win militarily, and that his political options were going to narrow the longer the fighting continued.”8 A member of Ford’s team kept a bulletin board plastered with the names of opposition groups and their commanders. These groups and the myriad of subgroups in the armed Syrian opposition’s highly decentralized system were clustered by ideology, operational capacity, and region of activity within Syria. The bulletin board, next to a map of Syria’s tribal groups, was a bewildering mosaic.9 Providing security assistance to the opposition was like “herding cats.”10 US officials were threading the needle. They sought to advance the goal of regime change without supporting groups with ties to FTOs. If the United States completely ignored Islamist groups, it risked alienating the broader opposition. If it sponsored radical groups, Bashar al-Assad would use it to discredit opponents. In a worst case, Assad might be replaced by rabid Islamists who were virulently anti-American. US officials delayed the decision on providing lethal support to the opposition. According to Frederic C. Hof, the special adviser for Syrian Political Transition to the Secretary of State, “The vetting process was very time consuming.” The administration “wanted to avoid problems with Congress or a front-page story in the Washington Post that the U.S. was supporting terrorists.”11 Syria was no place for ideological purists. Hof conceded that “tactical collaboration with Islamists might be necessary when facing an overwhelming threat from the regime.”12 Despite Hof ’s pragmatism, Washington was reflexively averse to collaborating with the extremists. The dilemma was dramatized when a video surfaced of a member of the Omar al-Farouq Brigade carving out the heart and liver of a Syrian soldier and eating the heart while it was still pounding. The rebel fighter exclaimed, “I swear to

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God, we will eat your hearts out, you soldiers of Bashar. You dogs. God is greater.”13 The government distributed the video to make its case about the heinous nature of Islamist jihadists. Another video surfaced of Free Syrian Army (FSA) Colonel Abdul Jabar Aikidi arm-in-arm with an al-Nusra commander outside a Syrian military airport in the north.14 Credible or not, Bashar used the videos to herald his secular regime as the bulwark against violent sectarianism. During the early days of the conflict, US policy fell victim to paralysis through analysis. Discussion within the national security interagency process about arming the Syrian opposition was interminable. Proponents argued that a more ambitious trainand-equip program might give the United States greater leverage over Assad and his international backers, thereby increasing the prospect of a negotiated solution. Burns warned that, “It was in many ways another lesson in the risks of incrementalism.”15 Hof criticized the Obama administration for its passivity and failure to draw on the interagency to identify strategic objectives and then draft a plan to achieve them. Bureaucratizing the process did not reflect favorably on US leadership either with Syrians or with countries in the region. In Libya, the United States adopted an approach that the National Security Council (NSC) staff called “leading from behind.” Without more robust engagement by the United States, Libya collapsed into civil war, which led to more violence and instability. The United States faced a similar conundrum in Syria where it had no clear local partner. It participated in a multilateral group, “The Friends of the Syrian People.” This informal group of many countries met from time to time in the region. After gatherings in Tunis and Ankara, it became clear that the Friends of the Syrian People was merely a discussion forum with no decision-making power. The absence of a contact group to coordinate international cooperation handicapped the administration’s efforts. ***** US intelligence satellites observed Syrian forces readying to fire artillery and surfaceto-surface missiles tipped with chemical weapons (CW). At a press conference on August 20, 2012, Obama warned: I have, at this point, not ordered military engagement in the situation. But the point that you made about chemical and biological weapons is critical. That’s an issue that doesn’t just concern Syria; it concerns our close allies in the region, including Israel. It concerns us. We cannot have a situation where chemical or biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people.16

He continued, “We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.”17 The Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAA) failed to dislodge armed groups from the Damascus suburbs using conventional weapons. Jaysh al-Islam, Faylaq al-Rahman, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Harakat Ahrar fought tenaciously, as Turkey and Saudi Arabia poured more weapons and money into the battle.18 With rebels advancing

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closer to the city center and putting Damascus at risk, the regime used CW to dislodge the rebels and punish citizens who sheltered them. At 2:45 p.m. on August 21, 2013, the first salvo hit Ain Tarma, in Ghouta just six kilometers east of central Damascus. A  CW-tipped artillery shell exploded in Zamalka two minutes later. Soon after, a surface-to-surface missile landed on Moadamiyah Street in western Ghouta, sixteen kilometers west of Damascus. The effect of CW was horrific. Victims had foaming mouths and burning eyes, convulsing, they died of asphyxiation. At least 1,400 civilians were killed, including 426 children on August 21.19 The Ghouta attack was not an isolated incident. Rebels claimed fourteen other attacks with CW, which included sarin, mustard gas, and other chemicals. The first documented instance of CW use was in Khan al-Assal near Aleppo on March 19, 2013. The United States was aware that the Syrian regime had used CW prior to Ghouta. Deputy Secretary of State William J.  Burns “called Walid Muallem a couple of times before Ghouta. [I told him], we know what you have done.”20 Muallem responded, “We’re not responsible. Maybe it was one of your Islamist friends.”21 Syria’s opposition hoped that Obama’s threat would be a game changer. However, his warning was intended to deter Syria’s use of CW. It was not a threat of military action in the event that Syria actually used CW. Obama lamented, “People always say never again, but they never want to do anything.”22 US Secretary of State John Kerry expressed outrage. “The indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, the killing of women and children and innocent bystanders by chemical weapons is a moral obscenity.” UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned the use of CW, which he called a crime against humanity.23 A UN report described it as the “most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein used them in Halabja in 1988.”24 The CW attack challenged Obama to enforce his redline. Hof said that the United States could have brought “the hammer down on Assad’s head.”25 It could have announced that “the U.S. will take military steps at a time and place of our choosing in order to punish Assad for his crimes.”26 A counterattack would have made “a major dent in Assad’s ability to kill people on a wholesale basis.”27 The regime denied its use of CW in the face of overwhelming evidence. Syrian officials said it was a false flag attack by rebels who had fired on civilians to garner international sympathy and support. UN investigators gained access to the sites in the Damascus suburbs and traced the trajectory and delivery systems used in the attacks. The missiles were Russian-made 140-mm rockets and 330-mm Syrian surface-tosurface missiles. Only the Syrian Army possessed these systems. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, cited “massive evidence” that “the highest levels of the Syrian government” were responsible for war crimes.28 The use of CW should have galvanized the international community with leadership from the United States. However, America’s response languished while Obama deliberated on a suitable response. Some advisers maintained that the administration needed congressional authorization for military action. Others cited “The Authorization for Use of Military Force,” which was adopted on September 14, 2001. The bill empowered the President to use force against al-Qaeda and other terror groups. It contained no time limit or geographic constraints.

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Senator John McCain (R-AZ) demanded a response to the CW attacks of August 21. At a minimum, he proposed that the United States provide anti-tank and antiaircraft missiles to the rebels. He also floated the idea of a no-fly zone or enforcing safe areas. Syria had a sophisticated air defense system, equipped with Russian surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Bassam Barabandi, a former political counselor at Syria’s embassy in DC, claimed: “Syria’s so-called sophisticated air defense system was a joke.”29 Destroying the Syrian air force, artillery, and SCUDs could have been done with cruise missiles, without putting a single American pilot at-risk. Launching a reprisal was significantly less difficult than enforcing a no-fly-zone in Syrian air space. According to Bill Burns, “I understand the practical argument against safe zones”, but failing to establish a safe zone for civilians cost many lives. “We did not demonstrate there were instances when we’d use force. You can fairly criticize all of us for the red line incident. The red line was not a scripted interagency thing.”30 Early on, Obama was unsure about the way forward. Independent of the interagency process, he sought advice from Dennis McDonough, his chief of staff. They took a walk on the South Lawn of the White House to discuss options for a correct and proportional response. Vice President Joe Biden, National Security Adviser Susan Rice, and John Kerry warned the President not to bluff and get caught. Bluffing would affect America’s credibility in Syria and worldwide. They warned that Assad might retaliate, intensifying conflict and putting the United States on a slippery slope that would require a more intense military response. McDonough emphasized the importance of coordination with US allies, especially Britain and France. The British parliament had rejected a resolution authorizing the use of force. France was ready to intervene, but Obama refused to proceed with only the French on board. According to Hof, “French mirage fighter bombers were warmed up and ready to join the U.S. in a raid. [France’s president] Hollande learned on TV that the reprisals were off.”31 US officials were involved in secret talks with Iran over its nuclear program. A military strike risked upending these negotiations. Bill Burns, who was the point person negotiating with Iran, refutes this allegation. “I never once heard the president voice that concern.”32 Congress was debating Senate Joint Resolution 21, authorizing the use of force in response to the Ghouta attack, but the resolution never reached the floor for a vote. Kerry made an off-cuff comment, suggesting UN weapons inspections. Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov pounced on the idea. He understood that the initiative would put Russia in a position to influence the international community’s response to events in Syria. The United States and Russia cosponsored a resolution mandating the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to lead inspections. As part of the deal, Syria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and allowed IAEA inspectors on its territory.33 Involving the IAEA was a tactical victory for Syria. It avoided a Chapter VII Resolution by the UN Security Council (UNSC), authorizing “all necessary measures” to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The UN plan to identify, transport, and

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destroy Syria’s WMD actually strengthened the regime. Bashar al-Assad became indispensable to disarmament. He created a problem that only he could solve. Involving the UN Security Council (UNSC) also strengthened Russia’s role as Syria’s protector. Russia is a permanent member of the UNSC with veto power. Thus, it was able to prevent measures to punish or put additional pressure on the regime. Failure to act in response to the Ghouta attacks all but ended talk of military intervention and regime change. Up to 90 percent of Syria’s stockpiles had been removed at the end of the WMD disposal project. Syria’s strategy of cheat and retreat feigned compliance, while it retained CW precursors and weaponized chlorine bombs. Syrian rebels hoped that the United States would intervene after Ghouta. Members of Ford’s team were arguing for intervention. State Department staff drafted a memo from Secretary of State John Kerry to Obama (President of the United States (POTUS)), making the case for more robust action and suggesting dire consequences if the United States did not respond. Even facing the most horrific evidence of war crimes, Washington’s inaction at the time showed that the United States was not prepared to fight on behalf of the rebels. Burns admonished, “Whatever you do, do it in a decisive way rather than begrudgingly and intermittently.”34 Moreover, the United States remained reluctant to provide the insurgents with heavy and offensive weapons to deter future attacks. Obama was a consensus-driven decision-maker. In between doing nothing and military intervention, he envisioned a middle way defined by incremental steps. In response to demands from Syrians and the international community, the United States decided against intervention choosing to simply expand its nonlethal assistance.35 According to Burns, “A punitive strike in Washington. We don’t know if that would have enhanced our leverage with Assad and Russia, which was backing the regime.”36 Hesitation was interpreted as weakness by Russia’s president Vladimir Putin. PostGhouta, Russia was far more aggressive not only in Syria but also worldwide. Russia seized Crimea between February and March 2014. It also supported separatists in Donetsk, eastern Ukraine. Russian MIGs confronted NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) fighter planes in mid-air. Putin measured Obama’s resolve, and found him wanting. Critics of Obama connected Russia’s resurgence with Obama’s tepid response to the use of CW. However, Burns did not see “a direct line between our failure to enforce the red line on CW and Russia’s decision to take Crimea. Who knows what considerations Putin may have drawn from our failure to act”?37 ***** During the summer of 2012, Obama reluctantly agreed to endorse the secret vetting process of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to determine the most reliable and effective FSA groups. The State Department expanded its nonlethal assistance. It recycled Meals Ready-to-Eat (MREs) from Iraq and Afghanistan. It also provided medical supplies, vehicles, and night vision goggles.38 Communications gear included cameras, shortwave radios, and media and online training. As the crisis worsened, US officials argued over whether to provide lethal support. Failing to provide lethal assistance meant that the United States was inadvertently, but decisively, supporting Assad’s message that his government was the bulwark against extremism. The

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interagency debate led to a stalemate, rather than resolution. Arming the rebels was not ruled in, nor was it ruled out. Robert Ford warned of consequences from not helping the rebels. Without US involvement, he argued that Syria would slide into anarchy and become “another Somalia/Yemen.”39 Moreover, malign foreign powers would fill the breach by giving weapons and money to shape the loyalties of rebel groups. Ford warned that the humanitarian crisis would worsen. He predicted that population flows would affect neighboring states, as well as European countries. Ford was prescient. The time to arm the rebels was 2012 when the opposition was still becoming a military force and had not yet been strongly influenced by al-Qaeda. Obama disparaged the FSA, calling them “doctors, farmers, and pharmacists.”40 Detractors of arming the opposition argued, “ ‘We don’t know them very well.’ When the U.S. got to know them better, the detractors maintained: ‘they don’t have very good backgrounds.’ ”41 In the words of former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, “as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.”42 An “Arms for Rebels” group sprung up in Washington. It included CIA director David Petraeus, Hillary Clinton, and most of the foreign-policy establishment in Washington. Sending weapons would satisfy the need to “do something.” Though the rebels had arms from Libya, the gray market, and weapons they seized from the regime, they still needed more weapons. Some US officials argued for military intervention and the use of air power, not just sending weapons. However, deepening US involvement could lead to an escalatory war with Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. There was also concern about the unintended consequences of intervention. If Assad was removed, who would come next? Rather than liberal democrats, the Assad regime could be replaced by something worse, a violent Islamist government that was inimitable to US and Israeli interests. Burns warned, “Do not underestimate the overhang of Iraq [and Libya].” US officials recalled Colin Powell’s warning about an open-ended commitment in Iraq. According to the pottery barn rule: “You break it, you buy it.” Obama was wary of repeating Bush’s mistake in Syria. As the Obama administration prevaricated, SAA atrocities against civilians intensified. Barrel bombs launched from fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters were used to attack population centers sympathetic to the rebels.43 A barrel bomb is an airborne improvised explosive device (IED), loaded with explosives, shrapnel, oil, or chemicals. Dropped from a plane or helicopter, barrel bombs were intended to inflict maximum casualties on civilians. Indiscriminate attacks using barrel bombs and CW fueled the debate about intervention, making a compelling case for assisting the rebels. Though US officials were outraged by butchery of the regime, they were not certain that intervention would change the lethality of the conflict. Many felt there was no need for the United States to intervene. They were convinced that Assad was on the ropes and, by the summer of 2012, concluded he would be gone by Christmas. The opposition had momentum. The United States did not want to discredit them by putting its fingerprints on regime change.

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US officials were so convinced that Assad would be deposed, the White House insisted on contingency plans for the day after he was removed from power. Planning focused on post-Assad stabilization, especially infrastructure, health, de-mining, and local governance. However, Steve Simon, then director for the Middle East and North Africa of the NSC, disbanded the planning group. He announced that the State Department would take the lead in conducting a comprehensive study on Syria after the fall of Assad. The day-after study would focus on making Syria a functioning entity, including transitional justice and de-Baathification. “The Syria Transition Planning Working Group” set up eight task forces to consider the range of transition issues from humanitarian action to security sector reform and transitional justice. The initiative was reminiscent of the “Future of Iraq Project,” which undertook planning for Iraq post-Saddam. McCain led a Congressional hearing on whether the United States should provide “weapons to the resistance in Syria.”44 He questioned witnesses, including Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin E. Dempsey. The plan to arm the rebels had been publicly endorsed by CIA Director David H. Petraeus and Hillary Clinton. Panetta also supported the plan. McCain was “very pleased” to learn of their support, but was deeply critical of Obama for blocking arms shipments and “overruling senior leaders of his own national security team.”45 Obama was cautious at his core. He called arming the rebels a “fool’s errand.”46 When he asked national security officials for a detailed plan, Obama said they replied with a “bunch of mumbo jumbo.”47 In March 2012, the administration relented and started to expand its nonlethal assistance. The CIA used intermediaries to provide small-caliber, Soviet-era weapons. The US Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control granted a waiver to the Syrian Support Group in July 2012, allowing it to provide the FSA with logistical and financial support.48 ***** Early on, the moderate opposition, cooperated tactically with al-Nusra. It also cooperated with al-Qaeda against Assad and the Kurds. As the war dragged on, opposition operations were triangulated. It was fighting in three directions, against the SAA, the al-Qaeda-influenced Nusra Front, and ISIS. The emergence of ISIS complicated the battlefield and decision-making about US assistance. Daesh was a nihilistic violent movement. It rejected the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, which was the basis for new states in the Middle East, such as Syria and Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became Daesh’s leader in April 2010. A year later, in July 2011, he sent an envoy, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, to Syria. Daesh coopted Syrian jihadi groups and Julani became the leader of the Nusra Front six months later. Unlike al-Qaeda, Daesh sought to control and administer territory. Baghdadi announced the creation of a Caliphate stretching from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq. When Raqqa fell to the Syrian opposition on March 4, 2013, Baghdadi moved his headquarters to Syria and merged with the Nusra Front. ISIS rejected the secular opposition, as well as al-Qaeda, for being too moderate. ISIS won a series of battlefield victories against its rivals and declared Raqqa as the capital of its caliphate. Julani was

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ostracized for lacking ideological fervor. On February 3, 2014, al-Qaeda officially severed ties with ISIS. Daesh’s presence in Syria changed the dynamics of the movement, as well as Washington’s calculus on getting more involved. Since 2011, the United States had vacillated in its support for groups fighting the regime. The horrific tactics of ISIS galvanized action. On August 19, 2014, ISIS killed James Foley, an American journalist. His beheading was broadcast on ISIS television and social media for dissemination worldwide. In response to Foley’s execution, Obama called on “governments and peoples across the Middle East [to] launch a common effort to extract this cancer, so that it does not spread.”49 ISIS beheaded another journalist, Steven Sotloff, on September 2, 2014, and posted the execution of a British aid worker, David Haines, on September 13. ISIS was not only executing Westerners. It was also targeting secular opposition groups in Syria. After a meeting in Atareb with Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS attacked Harakat Hazm, a moderate rebel group. On April 5, 2015, Daesh seized the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk near Damascus. On October 9, it overwhelmed six villages near Aleppo and executed the defenders. ISIS occupied the Shaer gas field near Palmyra, ransacking the town and destroying its ancient Roman ruins. ISIS was rolling up territory and consolidating its caliphate. When Susan Rice became National Security Adviser (NSA) in 2013, she immediately arranged to meet Colin Powell and Brent Scowcroft, former NSAs, to get their advice on how to harmonize seemingly irreconcilable goals—simultaneously fighting ISIS and hastening the regime’s demise. The Obama administration concluded that ISIS was the greatest threat and focused on groups opposing Daesh. On October 15, 2014, the United States launched “Operation Inherent Resolve,” conducting more than eight thousand airstrikes in Iraq and Syria over the coming year.50 By March 2019, more than thirty-four thousand airstrikes had been launched in Syria and Iraq.51 ISIS could not be defeated from thirty thousand feet. Only boots on the ground could find and fight them. Attempts to oust Assad were overtaken by events. By failing to support moderate opposition groups early in the conflict, the United States opened the door for Syrian groups to forge an alliance with more radical groups including ISIS. Rather than focus on regime change in Damascus, the priority became support to moderate Muslim militias who opposed Daesh.52 The United States found itself increasingly isolated in Syria. In a cable leaked by WikiLeaks, Hillary Clinton alleged that the governments of Saudi Arabia and Qatar were “providing financial and logistic support to ISIL and other radical Sunni groups.”53 Heretofore, the United States had acknowledged that wealthy Saudis were supporting Daesh, while sparing Riyadh of culpability. Through its National Intelligence Agency (MIT), Turkey, a NATO ally, was financed by the Saudis and Emiratis to provide Daesh with materials and logistical assistance.54 Clinton lamented Turkey’s “new, more serious Islamic reality.”55 The leaked cables complicated US relations with its counterterrorism allies in the region. Another WikiLeaks cable from Clinton outlined the US view of groups in Syria: “We should return to plans to provide the Free Syrian Army, or some group of

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moderate forces, with equipment that will allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against the Syrian regime.”56 She turned a blind eye to the fact that some insurgent groups were just bandits, calling themselves a brigade. Many were involved in criminal activity—smuggling; weapons trafficking; dealing drugs, especially amphetamines. These activities complicated the question of who the United States should support. The Obama administration wavered between priorities: defeating ISIS or supporting moderate Syrian forces to get rid of Bashar al-Assad. It considered a range of security strategies, including the creation of “Safe Zones” in Syria and the imposition of a no-fly zone that could save lives and hasten the end of the conflict.57 Proponents of simultaneously fighting the SAA and Daesh believed that delaying the decision to train and equip rebels sent a signal to the regime that it could commit war crimes against the moderate opposition without repercussions. Rebels also interpreted Washington’s ambiguous stance as a signal that they could operate with impunity, which allowed them to strengthen their power in the country. A member of Ford’s team commented:  “No opposition group in the world had more support than the Syrians. But they were no match for ISIS.”58 Barabandi points out that “after the FSA liberated half of Syrian lands, they were coopted by foreign countries who offered them a salary.” He elaborated, “Groups became servants of special interests. They were revolutionaries until they became employees of whoever was paying.”59 Social divisions highlighted what Barabandi calls, “an identity problem. Were they Arabs, Baathists Islamists, or something else?” The Obama administration found several reasons not to get more involved. After supporting democracy and human rights during the Arab Spring, US officials worried that military intervention could undermine their goal of democracy promotion. Obama wanted to thwart Iran’s influence in Syria and the region. He feared blowback from US military intervention would enhance Tehran’s influence in Syria. Israel had extensive covert operations in Syria, especially along its border on the Golan Heights, and conflict escalation could pose problems for Israel. In addition, Washington wanted to limit Russia’s influence in Syria and deny it access to the Mediterranean. Obama was convinced that getting into a war in Syria would be much easier than getting out. Burns said, “We underestimated Assad’s sheer and brutal determination to keep power. Assad was losing ground, losing altitude. An opportunity was missed.”60 ***** Obama authorized a CIA program to train rebels through a joint Arab–American Military Operations Command (MOC) in early 2013. Rebels were provided limited amounts of weapons and money for specific missions.61 The United States set up a training site in Turkey, where “enablers” would be vetted and taught operational methods.62 In 2014, the Obama administration finally settled on an overt train-andequip program run by US Special Forces. Its goal was to train about five thousand rebels in Turkey. Armed groups were supported to fight ISIS, rather than to counter the regime. Though the United States spent $500  million on the Pentagon’s train-and-equip program, it fell far short of expectations. Army General Lloyd Austin testified before

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the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16, 2015. Asked by McCain to assess the program’s impact, Austin indicated:  “We’re talking four or five [rebels are combat-ready].”63 McCain and other senators from both sides of the aisle were incredulous. Congressional appropriators could not justify a huge expenditure, which delivered so little. Austin admitted, “the new Syrian Force Program has gotten off to slow start.”64 The CIA launched a clandestine program, which came at a time when moderate US-backed militias were rapidly losing ground. CIA-backed rebels were aimed against Assad. The Obama administration faced significant lobbying from foreign leaders— Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, King Abdullah II of Jordan and Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu—to increase its involvement in the conflict.65 The Department of Defense (DoD) followed the CIA’s efforts about a year later. It trained about 170 Syrians at a secret base in Reyhanli, Turkey. In mid-July, a group of fifty-four trained and equipped fighters entered Syria in a convoy of Humvees and pickup trucks at the Bab al-Salama border crossing. They were dressed in crisp new uniforms and flak vests, armed with M16 rifles and mortars. The men had just completed a two-month training course. It was Ramadan and they had not seen their families so they elected to take a break before heading back to base and joining other opposition forces with Division 30. On July 28, 2015, the United States launched air strikes against the Nusra Front and other veteran al-Qaeda operatives that were part of a new formation called the Khorasan Group. In revenge, al-Nusra ambushed and routed the men. The DoD’s efforts were well-intended, but functionally flawed. Morale among Syrians was low. They were paid a $450 stipend for two months of training, but they were not given any funds to cover their expenses. They were provided meager rations, only enough rice and beans for a week or two, and certainly not enough for their families. There was a high degree of tension between the American and Turkish trainers. The training occurred on Turkish soil but was led by Americans. Turkish intelligence was flabbergasted that their American counterparts were so disassociated from facts on the ground. Moreover, the Syrian recruits were not motivated to fight ISIS. A  soldier said, “We are Syrians. Our problem is with the regime. Help us to get rid of the regime.”66 Mahmoud, a trainee, said:  “We told them that ISIS is bad, but the regime is worse. If you want to get rid of ISIS, get rid of the regime.”67 The Nusra Front attacked the Division 30 on July 31. It took several hours for the United States to counterattack with airstrikes. US officials persisted, though the training curriculum did not adequately address battlefield requirements. ISIS was relying on vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). However, there was no training on TOW anti-tank missiles, the most effective defense against bomb-laden cars and trucks. US air power was pivotal to fighting ISIS. However, only a couple of Syrians were trained as spotters to call in airstrikes. Loyalty concerns plagued the program. A second group of trainees handed over their weapons to the Nusra Front. The train-and-equip program was headed by General Mike Nagata, who led US Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Nagata

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had a sterling reputation as a “can do” officer. However, train and equip was a disaster and it was canceled on October 9, 2015.68 The program graduated only 180 trainees at a cost of $384  million. Of that amount, $325 million was used to buy four thousand weapons, one thousand vehicles, communications gear, and ammunition. The balance was used for infrastructure improvements, airlifts, and other operational expenses. Only $160,000 was spent on salaries for recruits. When the program was disbanded, only 145 of the 180 original trainees remained active and only 95 were operating in Syria.69 The Pentagon was urgently seeking a reliable security partner. It focused on standing-up a hybrid force of Syrian Arabs and Kurds, called the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in October 2015. The People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Kurdish female fighters with the Women’s Defense Forces (YPJ) were highly motivated and capable. Unspent funds and equipment from the train-and-equip program were redirected toward the SDF. Syrian Kurds had proven their mettle in the battle for Kobani, a small city in Syria on the Turkish border. ISIS seized villages around Kobani, beheading their defenders. Eighty percent of Kobani was occupied by ISIS when the United States decided to intervene in the fall of 2014. Air power and the delivery of weapons to the YPG and YPJ proved decisive. Medical supplies and rations were also provided. Re-armed and re-fortified, the Kurds counterattacked, fighting effectively to expel ISIS from Kobani. The YPG and YPJ became America’s most reliable security partner in Syria. Assistance to the SDF was managed by General Joseph Votel, head of the US Central Command (CENTCOM). After Kobani was liberated from ISIS in January 2014, Kurdish fighters pivoted to the east and advanced on Tal Abyad, a border crossing at Akcakale under ISIS control. In June 2015, the YPG defeated ISIS to liberate the Tal Abyad border crossing from ISIS control. Seizing Tal Abyad allowed the Kurds to link the cantons of Kobani and Jazira, a big step toward establishing a contiguous territory under Kurdish control. Kurds called the entity “Rojava.” Close security cooperation with the SDF infuriated Erdoğan. He maintained that Kurdish groups in Syria were an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), armed Kurds in Turkey who were demanding greater political and cultural rights. Erdoğan accused the United States of supporting terrorists. Though the PKK was listed as an FTO, Kurdish groups in Syria were not on the FTO list. Providing weapons and air support was anathema to Erdoğan. The establishment of Rojava in Syria on the border with Turkey was an existential threat to Turkey. Just as the United States had provided security guarantees to Iraqi Kurdistan, putting it on the path to independence, Erdoğan seethed at a US-led conspiracy to create an autonomous Kurdish entity in Syria. He challenged the United States to choose between Turkey, its NATO ally, and the Kurds whom he called “terrorists.” Other supporters of the Syrian opposition were also upset by Washington’s decision to back the YPG and YPJ. The SDF was supposed to be a combined force of Kurds and Arabs. At the time, the SDF was merely a fig leaf that was dominated by Kurds. Proopposition Syrian Arabs distrusted the Kurds who they claimed collaborated with the

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regime to secure their interests and self-preservation. They also resented the apparent preference of US trainers for the Kurds. According to a senior State Department official, who chose not to be identified, Arab insurgent groups complained that the YPG was given better weapons and more modern equipment. The United States selected a site near the largely Kurdish city of Afrin as the FSA base, which the Arabs believed was evidence of pro-Kurdish bias.70 Intense debate over the direction of US policy toward Syria occurred within the administration. In response to mass homicide committed by the regime, fifty-one mid-to-high-level State Department officials involved in formulating or carrying out Syria policy signed a dissent channel cable. According to the American Foreign Service Association, the dissent channel is “a serious policy channel reserved only for consideration of responsible dissenting and alternative views on substantive foreign policy issues that cannot be communicated in a full and timely manner through regular operating channels and procedures [of the State Department].” The cable criticized Obama’s focus on Daesh and called for renewed efforts to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Signatories maintained that the, “failure to stem Assad’s flagrant abuses will only bolster the ideological appeal of groups such as Daesh, even as they endure tactical setbacks on the battlefield.” They called on the United States to place greater emphasis on removing Assad by arming Syria’s moderate opposition. The cable said that this would “turn the tide of the conflict against the regime [to] increase the chances for peace by sending a clear signal to the regime and its backers that there will be no military solution to the conflict.”71 Not all US officials involved in Syria policy signed the dissent channel cable. Those who chose not to participate indicated that the cable was poorly written. They believed it was an ineffectual publicity stunt that would be leaked to the media. Did the interagency process fail to define US objectives in Syria and, flowing from that, strategies to achieve objectives? Hof maintained that during his seventeenmonth tenure, “There never was a systematic attempt to draw on the national security interagency to identify coherent objectives and then draft a strategy to achieve them.”72 High-ranking government officials—Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, former ambassador to Syria Robert Ford, and Hof—resigned in part because the United States failed to act decisively. Ford explained, “Many people working on Syria for the State Department have long urged a tougher policy with the Assad government as a means of facilitating arrival at a negotiated political deal to set up a new Syrian government.”73 Hagel stated in February 2013, “We’ve made mistakes. We’ll continue to make mistakes. But we are a force for good.”74 Hagel’s frustration with the lack of a coherent strategy escalated in September 2014. He sent a memo he sent to Rice and Kerry, copying the President. “We’re not getting to where we need to be,” he said. “I’m getting this from all of my colleagues around the world. All of my counterparts are coming up to me at NATO meetings and everywhere, saying, ‘What are you doing? Where is this going?’ ”75 Allies felt the United States was unwilling to take decisive action. The slow pace of vetting Syrian opposition figures was also concerning. Delaying decisions on support to opposition was tragic for Syrian civilians. By the end of 2013,

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126,000 were killed, more than a third were civilians,76 and more than 1.5 million had been displaced,77 with no end in sight to Syria’s grinding civil war. While Syria desperately needed a political and security solution, international efforts focused on the urgent humanitarian situation. Providing for displaced persons and managing the flow of refugees treated a symptom of the war, not its root causes.

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A tragedy of this scale demands solidarity beyond funding. Put simply, we need more countries to share the load by taking a greater share of refugees from what has become the biggest displacement crisis of a generation.1 —Filippo Grandi, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ***** During the peak of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994, the United States and the international community announced a plan to parachute food supplies into the city of Sarajevo. The Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdžić responded cynically: “We want them to drop bombs and they’re dropping sandwiches.”2 Humanitarian action can help save lives, but it does not deal with the security situation that caused displacement in the first place. As Syria’s civil war escalated, conflict-affected populations fled their homes in search of safety and support. Of Syria’s twenty-two million people, more than half were displaced through violent conflict. As of July 4, 2019, there was an official total of 5,625,871 registered Syrian refugees who had crossed an international border and were subject to protection under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international refugee law. The actual number is higher, as not all Syrians who entered another country participated in the UN’s registration process.3 The balance, about 6.7  million, were internally displaced persons (IDPs).4 They were uprooted but remained in Syria, going from place to place in search of aid and safety. International aid agencies have no access to IDPs. It is Syria’s responsibility as a sovereign state to provide them with services and protection. If Syria is unwilling or unable to provide relief, the UN Security Council (UNSC) can demand access. The UNSC adopted Resolution 2165 in July 2014, which authorized cross-border humanitarian aid to besieged communities. UN agencies surrendered significant leverage to the Assad regime.5 Syrian IDPs were left at the mercy of the regime. The IDPs, some of whom were driven from their homes and shelters on multiple occasions, demonstrated extraordinary resilience. According to UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Filippo Grandi, “Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time, a continuing

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cause of suffering for millions which should be garnering a groundswell of support around the world.”6 Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt were primary destinations of refugees from Syria. Others fled the region and resettled in Europe with Germany and Scandinavian countries as the primary destination. The massive influx of refugees to these countries caused enormous strain on their economies, infrastructure, and societies. It also affected their stability, as well as the stability of neighboring states. A wave of ultranationalism swept the European continent in response to the xenophobia and nativism that was caused by the refugee crisis.

The United Nations The UN was established to maintain international peace and security. Its Charter codifies the major principles of international relations, from sovereign equality of states to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. One purpose of the UN, as stated in its Charter, is “to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.”7 An organized system for managing population flows evolved after World War II, rooted in moral obligation after the Nazi Holocaust and the refusal of many countries, including the United States, to permit entry of Jews fleeing persecution. The St. Louis, loaded with more than one thousand Jews fleeing Germany, was denied entry to the United States. After repeatedly seeking safe harbor in several countries, the ship returned to Europe where passengers disembarked and were loaded onto cattle cars destined for Nazi extermination camps. According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), refugee resettlement has become a cornerstone of the global order. Resettlement also serves strategic interests of the international community. “Poorly managed refugee crises beget greater regional instability.”8 Consistent with its Charter obligations, the world body had primary responsibility for addressing Syria’s humanitarian emergency. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of the UN Secretariat managed the international response to Syria’s emergency. OCHA mobilized the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, whose members include the UN entities responsible for providing emergency relief. The key UN bodies providing aid and development assistance are the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the UN Development Program (UNDP). Confronting Syria’s humanitarian crisis, Secretary General Kofi Annan asked:  “Is ours an international community that will act in defense of the most vulnerable of our world and make the necessary sacrifices to help?”9 The situation in Syria gave rise to a stark question:  How can the UN fulfill its humanitarian mandate when the Syrian state is causing the humanitarian emergency? Syria’s Permanent Representative to the UN Bashar al-Jaafari is a vehement champion of state sovereignty. In an address to the UNSC on December 14, 2018, Jaafari highlighted

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“the sovereignty and independence of states as well as the role of the relevant state in supervising the distribution of the humanitarian assistance inside its territories.”10 He accused the UN of politicizing humanitarian assistance, rejected the UN doctrine on the responsibility to protect (R2P), and insisted instead that the international community help the Syrian government combat the remnants of the terrorist groups. Jaafari himself was politicizing humanitarian aid by weighing-in on the debate between the rights of states and the rights of people within states. Distrustful of the UN system, he views humanitarian intervention as a Trojan horse for military action. Annan, who would become UN Special Envoy for Syria in 2012, threw down the gauntlet by calling for a new balance between the rights of sovereign states and individual rights. He said, State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. These changes in the world … oblige us to think anew about such questions as how the UN responds to humanitarian crises.11

The UNSC and its permanent members (the United States, United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation, and China) are primarily focused on international peace and security. The UN Secretariat and UN agencies have developed a system for burden sharing on humanitarian issues. For example, the WFP provided food, water, and shelter to IDPs. The UNHCR registered Syrian refugees and managed their resettlement and asylum applications. In 2016, donors pledged $5.9 billion for humanitarian and development aid benefitting Syrians. In 2017, donors pledged $6 billion, $6.97 billion in 2018, and $7 billion in 2019. The United States was consistently the largest donor to UN agencies providing humanitarian assistance. Though these are significant sums, they fell short of the UN’s 2019 target of $8.8 billion.12 Moreover, not all pledges were deposited. The shortfall forced UN agencies to renew their appeals to donor countries. When they ran out of funds, they curtailed or suspended services. Filippo Grandi indicated, “A tragedy of this scale demands solidarity beyond funding. Put simply, we need more countries to share the load by taking a greater share of refugees from what has become the biggest displacement crisis of a generation.”13 He called on host countries to expand access to livelihoods and education. He challenged member states to adopt more open asylum systems and provide greater opportunity for Syrians to move to third countries through organized channels. IHL and refugee law provide a legal framework for refugee policy, but ultimately governments make a political decision about delivering services and protection to those displaced by conflict.

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Turkey Of Syria’s neighbors, Turkey was most affected having received 3,614,108 refugees, as of July 2019.14 About 90 percent of refugees resettled in urban environments with extended family, friends, or in makeshift and rental shelters.15 Though camp settings provide basic services, many Syrians outside of camps struggled to secure housing, health care, and education. Some lived in abject poverty, often in unsanitary and dangerous conditions.16 Stuck in Turkey for years, refugees ultimately lost hope and boarded rafts and small boats for Greece, embarking on dangerous journeys to Europe. Facing financial hardship, they also resorted to risky survival strategies such as child labor and early marriage. Many women and girls were subject to sexual exploitation. Erdoğan was one of the first to call for Bashar al-Assad’s removal. After the CW attacks in Ghouta, he hoped that Obama would lead an international coalition to remove Bashar or, at a minimum, give Syrian rebels weapons to overthrow the regime. Erdoğan was deeply disappointed by Obama’s response and took it on himself to support the rebels. Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT) established the jihadi highway from Sanliurfa in Turkey to Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State’s Caliphate. With financing from Arab States of the Persian Gulf and other sources of support, Turkey provided weapons, money, and logistical assistance to tens of thousands of foreign fighters transiting through Turkey to Syria. Turkey initially welcomed Syrian refugees on its territory. Erdoğan proudly called Istanbul the new “Arab capital.”17 He announced special services for Syrian refugees, such as free health care and education. Turkey became the base of the Syrian opposition and other Sunni dissidents, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Syrian National Council (SNC) set up offices in Istanbul. Erdoğan never imagined that the refugee population in Turkey would become so large or stay for so long, going on eight years as of this writing. While the Turkish Red Crescent received some funds from donor countries, assistance did not come close to covering the total costs for humanitarian aid to such a large refugee population. Turkey was prepared to bear the expense, until its chronic recession in 2017. The Turkish lira was devalued and foreign direct investment evaporated, leading to a debt crisis. Turkey suffered 19  percent inflation and nearly 15  percent unemployment. Few Syrians were permitted formal employment. However, nearly one million Syrians worked in Turkey’s informal labor sector. Syrian refugees were initially given temporary protected status. Later, Erdoğan proposed granting citizenship to Syrian refugees, presuming they would support his Justice and Development Party (AKP). He suggested a system whereby Syrians who invested more than $250,000 in the Turkish economy could become citizens. At least 430,000 Syrian children who were born in Turkey were considered stateless and had little chance of acquiring Turkish citizenship, as the tide of public opinion turned against them. Meeting the needs of Syrian refugees became an enormous financial burden, fueling nativism. A  resentful Erdoğan complained, “The West’s attitude over the refugee problem is disgraceful in the name of humanity.”18 He believed that Christian Europe had a moral obligation to accept more refugees, since its inaction was responsible for

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Bashar staying in power.19 If the West would not accept more refugees, according to Erdoğan, wealthy Western countries should at least pay for them. The European Union (EU) and Turkey reached a deal concerning Syrian refugees on March 18, 2016. Turkey was promised €6 billion in financial aid for projects and humanitarian assistance. In exchange, Turkey agreed to increase border patrols intended to keep migrants from entering Europe. Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel heralded the EU deal with Turkey as a “breakthrough.”20 The deal envisioned returning migrants and refugees from Greece to Turkey. For every Syrian sent back to Turkey, EU member states will resettle one Syrian refugee from Turkey. In addition to the refugee swap, Turkey insisted on fast-track consideration of its EU membership application. The deal was never fully implemented. It was “ethically, politically, and practically flawed.”21 Moreover, it violated international law that forbids “refoulement” (the forcible return) of refugees. Persons who cross an international border have the right to protection and cannot be returned against their will to a country where they are persecuted or have a reason to feel threatened. Enshrined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the principle of non-refoulement is at the core of international refugee law and the rule of customary international law. It was inspired by the collective failure of European countries during World War II to provide sanctuary to refugees fleeing the Nazis. Non-refoulement was enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status, and Article 3 of the 1984 Convention against Torture. Article 33 affirms: “No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened.”22 Filippo Grandi was critical of the EU–Turkey deal, “[I am] concerned about any agreement that involves blanket return of all individuals from one country to another without sufficiently spelled-out refugee protection safeguards.”23 He demanded legal safeguards for any mechanism transferring responsibility for asylum claims. Turkey was an unprincipled and opportunistic partner. Erdoğan threatened to push even more refugees from Turkey onto boats in the Aegean. EU member states were concerned that Turkey used the crisis to extort financial gains and EU privileges. The deal was never fully implemented and, as a result, Greece became a warehouse for refugees seeking asylum in northern Europe.24 At its peak in October 2015, more than 210,000 refugees entered Turkey in a month’s period.25 Turks tired of the refugees. They demanded an end to tax exempt status for Syrian-owned business and employment preferences for Syrians. Strained relations between Turks and Syrians led to protests and violent incidents. In June 2019, a Turkish mob vandalized Syrian stores in the Küçükçekmece district in Istanbul in response to a false rumor that a Syrian male had harassed a local girl. A growing clamor on social media demanded “Syrians get out.”26 Partly in response to Erdoğan’s policies in Syria, the AKP was repudiated by many voters in local elections of March 2019. In response, Turkey announced that it would deport Arabs involved in violent crimes and end free health care for refugees.27 Erdoğan proposed a “safe zone” in northern Syria, enforced by Turkey’s armed forces, as part of a strategy to repatriate Syrian refugees. However, the Pentagon declined Turkey’s offer to enforce the security belt, continuing

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its cooperation with Syrian Kurds. Washington’s rejection of Erdoğan’s proposal was deeply humiliating to the Turkish president. A Syrian government airstrike on a Turkish convoy killed three people on August 19, 2019. The Turkish authorities responded by giving unregistered Syrian migrants a deadline to leave Istanbul or be expelled. Places of employment were being inspected “to prevent unregistered employment.” Migrants were asked to sign voluntary return documents, which they did not understand due to language barriers and legal jargon. At least half a million migrants reside in Istanbul without registration, having made their way from border provinces to Turkey’s largest city in search of work and shelter. Spot checks on city streets and at bus stations were being used to identify and round up the migrants, who were subsequently incarcerated in centers maintained by Turkey’s Justice Department. Erdoğan threatened to deport up to 1.5  million refugees to northern Syria where they would be resettled in his proposed buffer zone.28 Erdoğan maintained: “Either this happens or otherwise we will have to open the gates.”29 In September 2019, a new wave of refugees across the Aegean Sea arrived in Lesbos, a Greek island near the Turkish coast. The influx was orchestrated by Turkish authorities, which turned a blind eye to human smugglers. Turkey’s Coast Guard took no steps to prevent the refugee flow, giving rise to allegations of Turkish state complicity. Syrians either left Turkey because the authorities made conditions untenable for them or pushed them out. As Erdoğan started to deport refugees, many were sent to war-torn Idlib in Syria’s northwest across the border from Turkey where the Syrian government with the support of Russian air power had launched a major offensive. Sending them to Idlib violated the customary international law of “non-refoulement.” Syrian migrants were enraged and accused the Turkish authorities of racism. Public opinion in Turkey had turned against Syrian migrants, contributing to a decline in support for Erdoğan’s AKP.30

Greece Turkey was the epicenter of the refugee crisis, which spilled into Greece. The Balkan Human Corridor started as the portal for refugees to enter Europe. Syrian refugees made daily attempts to cross the Aegean between the Turkish resort of Bodrum and Kos, a Greek island just four kilometers from the Turkish coast. Migrants from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and East Africa also attempted the journey. Europe faced an unprecedented influx of refugees and migrants with more than one million people arriving via land and sea routes. The tragic plight of refugees crossing the Aegean was dramatized in September 2015 by the death of Alan Kurdi, a 3-year-old Kurdish child from Kobani, whose tiny body was found lying face down on a beach in Bodrum. The toddler, wearing a bright-red T-shirt and shorts, washed up on the beach. His 5-year old brother and twelve other youth also drowned during the perilous journey. Alan’s death inspired a temporary shift in the political discourse and policies of several European countries. Germany consented to admit thousands of refugees stranded in Hungary.31 UK prime minister David Cameron agreed to admit four thousand refugees annually until 2020.32 European leaders created a process to relocate

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120,000 refugees from Greece and Italy to other European countries; conservative media outlets used a more conciliatory tone.33 Yet, the shift toward a more humane refugee policy was short-lived, as borders began to close and populism spread across the continent. Greece was ill-equipped to manage the spike in refugees. Syrian refugees were denied asylum, detained by Greece’s coast guard, and summarily deported by Greek immigration authorities. The influx occurred at the height of Greece’s financial crisis with international financial institutions demanding extreme austerity measures in return for a bailout. The Greek government could not afford a social safety net for pensioners and its own people, no less cover the costs of services for refugees. In January 2018, over 43 percent of Greek youth were unemployed and the overall unemployment rate was above 20 percent.34 As of 2019, the refugee population in Greece was approximately fifty thousand, of whom thirty-eight thousand were on the mainland and twelve thousand on the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Kos, Samos, and Leros.35 Over half were women and children. Women, many traveling alone with children, needed protection from sexual violence and trafficking. Unaccompanied children, numbering about three thousand, fell victim to exploitation. In addition to the problem of unaccompanied children, many youth had severe mental health issues or suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, and needed counseling. Refugees lived in overcrowded and dangerous conditions often waiting months for their asylum cases to be heard. They needed reliable information about their asylum prospects and available services. Greece processed 13,390 asylum applications in 2018. Even this small number overwhelmed its limited capacity.36 Moria camp on the island of Lesbos was inundated with misery. It was built for 3,100 refugees, but its population ballooned to eight thousand. Lacking water and sanitation, Moria was flooded with human waste. Its residents lived in squalor and despair. The EU gave Greece $1.9 billion to support the costs of its refugee services. However, the Greek government refused to upgrade Moria out of fear that it could turn into a permanent camp. Spyros Galinos, the Lesbos mayor, compared facilities on Lesbos to “concentration camps, where all human dignity is denied.”37 Greek residents of Lesbos showed great compassion, taking private initiatives to help refugees. But they were only able to make a small dent in the expansive humanitarian emergency. In Lesbos and other Greek islands, Greece became a holding pen for people seeking asylum. Refugees were stuck in Greece with borders closed to northern Europe. Their presence fueled support for Golden Dawn, the Greek neo-Nazi party. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras lost reelection to the center-right candidate Kyriakos Mitsotakis in July 2019. Greek voters were disenchanted with the government’s austerity measures and its handling of the refugee crisis.

Lebanon The frontline states of Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, which share a border with Syria, were hard-hit. Lebanon received 1.5 million refugees38 with 70 percent living below the

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poverty line.39 In 2017, the Lebanese government sought $10–12 billion, double their existing budget for refugee relief.40 In 2019, the UNHCR requested $562  million for its work in Lebanon. Only a fraction of the humanitarian appeal was funded.41 Adding to the population of preexisting Palestinian refugees, the influx of Syrians made Lebanon the highest per capita rate of refugees worldwide.42 In less than five years, from 2012 to 2017, the population of Lebanon increased 28  percent.43 Many refugees lived in substandard shelters—garages, worksites, or unfinished buildings. The surge in Beirut’s population worsened water and electricity shortages, as well as the garbage crisis. Waste went uncollected for long periods with Lebanese blaming Syrians for disposal difficulties. Between 2012 and 2015, Lebanon’s GDP dropped by 8.3  percent.44 Lebanon’s debt continues to rise since 2015, as economic crisis and labor market unrest destabilize the country. The 1989 Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s sectarian civil war, established a system of power-sharing between the country’s religious communities. The arrival of nearly one million refugees, mostly Sunnis, jeopardized that delicate balance and risked the resumption of conflict between ethnic and religious groups. The loyalty of Hezbollah to Syria’s Alawite government was an added source of tension. Popular frustrations boiled over in the fall of 2019 when the Lebanese government tried to tax WhatsApp messaging. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese crowded the streets of Beirut, protesting corruption and ineffective government. Protests were led by women and youth. The presence of so many Syrian refugees exacerbated problems, deepening social divisions and stressing power-sharing arrangements at the core of the Taif Accord.

Jordan Jordan received 662,010 refugees by 2019.45 Of these, 93 percent lived below Jordan’s poverty line of $96/month.46 Jordan already faced serious economic difficulties before the war in Syria. Refugee spending cost the government just under 2.25 percent of its GDP annually, excluding costs associated with unregistered refugees.47 The Jordanian government estimated the annual cost of Syria’s refugees at $10 billion.48 Only 10  percent of Syrian refugees live in camps with the rest living in urban and rural areas across the country.49 About half of all registered Syrian refugees were under the age of 18.50 Many were unaccompanied minors who needed education and psychosocial counseling to deal with the trauma of their displacement. Nearly 140,000 Syrians live in the Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps.51 A sprawling complex of tents teaming with masses of people, the camps lacked water and sanitation. Just using a latrine can be hazardous with many women and girls victimized by sexual violence. Two million Palestinians reside in refugee camps. Overall, about 70  percent of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin. Palestinians are generally well-integrated into Jordanian society. Respected figures such as Queen Rania are of Palestinian origin. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the notorious ISIS leader in Iraq, who standardized the

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beheading of Shiites and Westerners, was believed to be Palestinian, but turned out to be from a Jordanian tribe. The spasm of Syrian arrivals risked radicalizing Jordanian society, and Palestinians in particular. Jordan’s intelligence agencies kept a close tab on new arrivals and society in general.

Iraq The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), with its five million inhabitants, welcomed nearly two million refugees and displaced people by 2018.52 The KRI was a safe haven not only for Kurds from Syria and parts of Iraqi Kurdistan but also for Arabs who fled sectarian violence across the country. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) bore the cost of its humanitarian role. Most of the displaced were women and children who were the families of deceased ISIS fighters. Kurdistan hosts many unaccompanied minors. The KRG believes that meeting their basic human needs and helping them heal from the mental and physical wounds of war is both a moral responsibility and in its security interest. Refugees are vulnerable to radicalization, particularly when terror groups promise basic resources the KRG cannot provide on its own. The estimated cost of reconstruction in war-torn Iraqi Kurdistan is $100 billion. Kurdish solidarity is a strong impulse. However, Iraqi Kurds and Syrian Kurds are deeply divided by culture and politics. Most speak different dialects, Sorani and Kurmanji. Kurds who support the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) are loyal to the Barzani clan and are fundamentally more conservative. Supporters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are more cosmopolitan and liberal. Syrian Kurds, who support the PKK’s Abdullah Ocalan and the PUK, have a natural affinity. They are more progressive and egalitarian than the KDP. For more than thirty years, Turkey and the PKK have fought over Kurdish demands for greater political and cultural rights. The Syrian conflict exacerbated differences between Kurdish groups, with Turkey prodding dissent.

Egypt Nearly 250,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers live in Egypt, more than half of them Syrian. Others are Sudanese and Ethiopians. Most Syrians resettled in 2012, when the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi became president. Syrians and Egyptians have a shared history. The United Arab Republic was a political union between Egypt and Syria from 1958 until the Syrian coup in 1961, when Syria withdrew. Syrian refugees are clustered in Cairo, working in coffee shops or as tuk tuk drivers. Their economic conditions are dire. About 77 percent of Syrian families in Egypt were in debt in 2017, up from 73 percent the year before. Nearly 93 percent of families were unable to repay their loans in 2017, up from 81 percent in 2016.53 There is a growing antipathy of Egyptians toward Syrians who occupy housing and absorb government services.

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Europe The EU was founded on a commitment to international law and human rights. However, the massive influx of Syrian refugees in 2015 tested European values. Some EU member states adopted border restrictions preventing people from entering Europe, which has placed a disproportionate burden on Greece and Italy. A proposal for more equitable sharing of refugee responsibilities was considered by EU member states. The quota system was rejected by countries like Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland, headed by nationalist parties. These governments also opposed the EU deal with Turkey, which provided funds in exchange for Turkey’s commitment to manage the flow of refugees. Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed Syrian refugees. Between 2011 and 2017, more than 500,000 Syrians applied for asylum in Germany with 47,606 Syrians admitted under resettlement and humanitarian admission programs since 2013.54 The refugees were generally well-educated and industrious, a useful supplement to Germany’s aging work force. When criticized for letting in too many refugees, Merkel explained that Germany’s refugee policy was a “humane” response to an emergency situation. Merkel’s open door served as a magnet for additional refugees. By 2015, Germany had received 890,000 people displaced by conflict.55 Sweden is traditionally progressive, egalitarian, and welcoming. It accepted more refugees per capita than any other European country, starting with the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s. In 2015, Sweden accepted 163,000 asylum seekers, mostly from Syria, but also from Afghanistan and Somalia.56 Swedes typically subscribe to the egalitarian idea of “folkhemmet,” which means the people’s home, whereby the country is a family and people take care of each other. However, these egalitarian values have been challenged by the sheer scale of Sweden’s immigration crisis and the related costs of its social safety net, which have overwhelmed the capacity of the government. Today about 20  percent of Sweden’s population is foreign-born. A  large number of women wear hijabs or burqas. Critics of Sweden’s immigration policy say that multiculturalism is a failure. The Sweden Democrats, a party with neo-Nazi roots, maintains that immigrants are invading the homeland. In the September 2018 elections, the Sweden Democrats got nearly 18 percent of the vote. Its popular support is surging. Nativism is fueled by websites, trafficking in Islamophobia, with advertising revenue from Russian sources. The far-right influence campaign is working with a growing number of Swedes who demand that the government adopt policies to preserve the country’s culture and identity.57 Even Norway was not immune from nativism and xenophobia spreading across Scandinavia. Norway typically sets the standard for tolerance and inclusion. However, a thwarted mosque attack near Oslo in August 2019 contributed to a polarizing debate about Norway’s immigration policy. Of Norway’s five million citizens, about 200,000 are Muslim. Many came from the Balkans, and others from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. In response to the attempted mosque attack, Prime Minister Erna Solberg said: “This is not supposed to happen in Norway. Norway should be safe. All places of worship shall be safe.” Despite Solberg’s affirmative statements, her coalition government includes

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the far-right, anti-immigration Progress Party that believes Norway’s generous safety net and social services should only benefit native Norwegians. Support for the Progress Party has been growing. Some Norwegians have been radicalized by the internet, which is transnational and spreads anti-immigrant propaganda. Far-right websites foment radical views that can explode in violence. Solberg said the mosque shooting was “an attack on Norway” and an attack on the principle of religious freedom. Even Europe’s wealthiest counties and most tolerant societies are not immune from nativism and xenophobia.58 Denmark has the most restrictive immigration policies in Scandinavia. It received only 35,770 Syrian refugees between 2014 and 2019,59 which included 18,518 asylum applications.60 Denmark’s border security limited movement through migrant travel routes and enforced the country’s anti-immigrant policies. The majority of Syrian refugees in the UK have been resettled directly from refugee camps rather than applying for asylum in the country. There were 13,388 asylum applications between 2011 and 2018.61 Beginning in 2014, the UK resettled Syrians under the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS). The current number resettled in the UK is around 15,000. Austria, a haven for refugees from states in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, processed 50,000 asylum seekers. Spain processed 2,897.62 ***** Population flows from Syria had a huge impact on the domestic politics of frontline and European states. The rise of the Alternative for Deutschland, a far-right antiimmigrant party, and 2017 electoral losses by Chancellor Angela Merkel in Bavaria and Hesse, can be attributed to Germany’s permissive policy toward refugees and migrants. The Syrian refugee crisis influenced UK voters to support “Brexit,” and propelled the rise of Boris Johnson to prime minister. Hungary’s Victor Orban appealed to voters by imposing Europe’s harshest anti-immigration laws and building 109-mile-long fence along its southern border to curb crossings from Serbia and Croatia. Italy’s coalition government, influenced by its hard-line interior minister, Matteo Salvini, sealed its coastline and refused to let aid ships carrying rescued migrants land on its shores. Even the United States, a land of immigrants, adopted anti-immigrant policies. The United States has historically had a well-regulated process for managing refugees. The flow peaked in 1980 with 200,000 refugees resettled that year. America’s welcoming posture toward refugees set a global standard, pushing European countries to admit them and distributing the responsibility for resettlement among wealthy Western countries best able to accommodate. The United States has historically been the world’s leader in resettlement. Since World War II, between one-third and a half of all refugees have come to the United States. The Trump administration has been slashing the number of refugee admissions, which averaged ninety-six thousand since the Refugee Act was signed into law in 1980.63 Trump reduced the refugee ceiling to forty-five thousand in 2018 and to thirty thousand in 2019, which is the lowest ceiling for refugee admissions in four decades.64 As a candidate, Trump promised “extreme vetting” of asylum applicants and refugees despite the significant vetting process already in place. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo

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provided an economic rationale for the deep cuts. “This year’s refugee ceiling reflects the substantial increase in the number of individuals seeking asylum in our country, contributing to a massive backlog of outstanding asylum cases and greater public expense.”65 As a measure of its hostility towards norms governing the treatment of refugees, the United States withdrew from the Global Compact on Refugees in 2017. Donald J. Trump capitalized on fear of foreigners to become president. In office, Trump tried to restrict most migrants from claiming political asylum in the United States, requiring claims be made in other countries first. The United States subsequently established an annual ceiling for refugee admittances, designating which countries are eligible and how many people may be admitted from eligible countries. The total cap was typically about seventy thousand. US policy prioritizes keeping families together and resettling refugees in communities that are most able to handle the influx. After 9/11, security concerns caused the vetting process for admitting refugees because of even more stringent, delaying admissions.66 Trump’s hostility toward Ilhan Omar, a Somali refugee and Minnesota congresswoman, kindled chants to “send her back.” Anti-immigrant feelings are consistent with Trump’s “America First” doctrine. Nativism is not just a European phenomenon. Domestic extremism has spiked in the United States, with violent outbursts and deadly consequences. Trump’s incendiary language, warning of an “invasion” and bashing asylum seekers from Central America, has fueled right-wing extremism and mass murder, such as the killing of Hispanics in El Paso, Texas, on August 3, 2019. In September 2019, the Trump administration floated a proposal to disallow all refugees from entering the country without a special presidential waiver. Since Washington adopted more restrictive immigration and asylum policies, the flow of Syrians has been a trickle. A  combination of factors has contributed to increased incidents of domestic terrorism. The Department of Homeland Security issued a report in 2009 indicating that the economic downturn, rise of social media, and the election of Barack Obama, the first African-American president, represented a perfect storm of factors contributing to “race-driven extremism.”67 Since 9/11, the “altright” and its ideological affiliates have carried out nearly three times as many attacks against Americans in the United States as Islamic extremists.68 Far from being contained, white supremacists and fringe movements are on the rise. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) arrested almost as many domestic terrorists as foreign terrorists in 2018. Trump is disassociated from the problem, which he helped create with his remarks and racial insensitivity. After the racist and antiSemitic violence in Charlottesville in 2017, Trump said: “[There] were very fine people on both sides. There are good people on both sides.”69 His moral equivalency served to condone extremism and exacerbate social divisions. Speaking from a teleprompter after the mass killing in El Paso, Trump condemned “racism, bigotry, and white supremacy.”70 Are these Trump’s heartfelt words, or those of a speech writer reflecting public opinion polls? Despite its mistakes and flaws, the United States has traditionally been a force for good in the world. Not today. Rightwing extremists worldwide and immigration antagonists in Europe find comfort in Trump’s words and actions. They believe he shares their racist world view, turning a blind eye to racial radicalism and condoning violence.

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***** The displacement of Syrians occurred in waves, as a reaction to violence. The regime’s attacks on Idlib caused many Syrians, including those who had already been displaced several times, to seek safety with rebel fighters. Many Idlib residents fled Syria to Turkey where they augmented the population of Syrian Arabs who had sought refuge in Turkey over the course of the war. Erdoğan threatened to invade and occupy parts of Syria, creating so-called safe zones for refugees to return. When the United States announced the creation of a Border Security Force made up of forty thousand Syrian Kurdish fighters (YPG) to patrol the Turkish-Syrian border and guard against ISIS, Erdoğan vowed to attack Afrin, an oasis of tranquility in northwestern Syria, and then pivot east to create a security belt along Turkey’s border with Syria as far as Iraq. On January 20, 2018, Turkish war planes started their bombardment of Afrin, launching an ethnic cleansing campaign aimed at expelling Kurds from their homes and replacing them with Arab refugees in Turkey. Turkish armed forces were joined by the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which Turkey had transformed into a jihadist militia to serve as its boots on the ground. Turkey’s aerial assault intensified over fifty-eight days killing hundreds of civilians— Kurds, Christians, and Yezidis—and displacing more than 300,000 people. The Afrin operation, cynically called “Operation Olive Branch,” was a systematic campaign, aiming at ethnic cleansing and changing Afrin’s demography. According to the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), 157 civilians were killed by Turkish forces and their jihadi affiliates, including 56 women and 46 children. Among the 448 civilians injured were 104 women and 155 children. According to Ilham Ahmed, copresident of the SDC’s executive committee, the campaign sought to both “Turkify” and “Arabize” Afrin. Students were forced to carry a Turkish flag and the FSA forced children to appear in videos thanking Erdoğan. Kefer Cenê district was completely Arabized through the settlement of gang members and four thousand families. At least three hundred families of FSA members were relocated to the village of Kefer Sefrê. Other JFA members and their families were settled in the Ikbis and Moska villages, in the district of Shiyê and Cindirêsê, respectively. Plundering of private homes was widespread. Street names were translated into Turkish and Arabic. Civilians who remained in Afrin were forced into madrasas offering radical religious education and women were required to wear a veil. Yazidi people were forcibly Islamicized and required to attend religious services. Those who resisted were beheaded. Yezidi women and children were subjected to harassment and rape. More than 300,000 civilians fled Afrin for Til Rifat and Shehba regions, where they received aid from the Kurdish Red Crescent.71 Some of these people were displaced again when Turkey attacked northern Syria on October 9, 2019. Another 300,000 people were displaced in “Operation Peace Spring.” Many of the displaced went south to avoid attacks by Turkey and the FSA. They were sheltered in 810 schools and makeshift camps in Deir ez-Zor province. Initially, about fifteen thousand fled across the Little Zab River to Iraqi Kurdistan where the KRG established facilities to provide for Syrian Kurds.72 International and domestic aid agencies and their field staff deserve huge credit for delivering emergency supplies and saving lives. The Kurdish Red Crescent is

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a humanitarian nonprofit organization based in Kobani on the border of Syria and Turkey. It was established to assist victims of attacks by ISIS and the Syrian government. It emerged as the primary provider of services to Kurds and other northerners fleeing assaults by Turkey. Information is critical for protection of persons displaced by conflict. The Syrian government has not only limited humanitarian access, but it also has imposed a total blackout on information, making it difficult to keep abreast of current conditions. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights is a UK-based organization run by Syrian expats. The Observatory works with an extensive network of monitors in Syria to document domestic conditions. It provides accurate reports on bombings and casualty counts. Without the Observatory, the proverbial tree would fall and no one would be there to know it. The “White Helmets,” also known as the Syrian Civil Defense, is another local group doing extraordinary work. Active mostly in rebel-held areas, they are the first responders when there is an attack. “When the bombs rain down, the White Helmets rush in. In a place where public services no longer function, these humanitarian volunteers risk their lives to help anyone in need—regardless of their religion or politics.” Known for their distinctive headwear, the rescue workers have saved more than 100,000 lives over the past five years. Rescue and relief activities are performed by Syrian volunteers from all walks of life—former bakers, tailors, engineers, pharmacists, painters, carpenters, students, and many more professions. Many have paid the ultimate price for their compassion—252 have been killed while saving others.73 As long as violent conflict continues in Syria, people will flee the country in search of protection and services. Syria’s civil war is the cause of displacement, which will continue until there is a political solution. First and foremost, refugees need security and stability in order to go home. They also need livelihoods, education, and health services, including psychological counseling. The international community has been wringing its hands insisting that member states “do something.” Humanitarian assistance is needed to save lives, but it is a poor excuse for the world’s inaction in the face of violent aggression. Echoing the cynicism of Bosnia’s Haris Silajdžić, Mohammed Ghanem, who headed the Syrian American Council, criticized the focus on humanitarian action. “You can’t stop barrel bombs with fruit baskets.”74 Ghanem appealed for more robust diplomatic engagement, insisting on a political settlement to stop the humanitarian crisis.

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The Geneva Peace Process

The Geneva communique was one of Kofi’s greatest achievements.1 —Frederic C. Hof (Special Adviser for Syrian Political Transition in the State Department) ***** Reports from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights painted a dire picture of the carnage and suffering. Though the international community was horrified by the escalating violence in Syria, it was not moved to action through compassion or a moral imperative. Syria’s violent conflict had practical ramifications, creating a humanitarian crisis that affected frontline states and roiled the politics of European countries. The costs of sheltering and feeding Syrian refugees increased as the displaced population grew. Syrian refugees were in limbo. Security conditions did not allow their safe and dignified return to Syria. Compounding the crisis, UN humanitarian agencies were stonewalled by the Syrian government and denied access to provide aid. To the regime, every opponent was a “terrorist.” Slaughtering civilians was “counterterrorism.” Damascus hid behind claims of sovereignty to prevent the international community from bearing witness to the atrocities and taking action. On September 20, 1999, Kofi Annan addressed the UN General Assembly (UNGA). He spoke powerfully about the need for “unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights—wherever they may take place—should not be allowed to stand.”2 He also sounded a note of caution. “Is there not a danger of such interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents, and in what circumstances?”3Annan sought to balance principle with pragmatism. Abusing the ideals of humanitarian intervention risked undermining international order. Annan’s commitment to saving lives through humanitarian intervention was codified through the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P was unanimously adopted by the UNGA at the 2005 UN World Summit. By endorsing R2P, states pledged to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

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The scourge of global terrorism presented a new challenge. After 9/11, the United States rallied international support for attacking the Taliban as an act of self-defense. The UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to establish the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support Afghanistan’s government. ISAF sought to bolster the Afghan government by assisting security and building new Afghan security forces.4 However, international solidarity after 9/11 was short-lived when the United States invaded and occupied Iraq under false pretenses and in violation of international law. Many countries objected to America’s egregious violation of territorial integrity and Iraqi sovereignty. ***** The UNGA passed Resolution 66/253, which endorsed an inclusive, credible, sustainable, Syrian-led political solution to the civil war. Adopted on February 16, 2012, the resolution proposed a partnership between the UN and the League of Arab States to advance Syria’s political transition and requested the UN Secretary General name a special envoy for Syria. Kofi Annan was appointed joint Special Envoy of the UN and the League of Arab States. Annan brought gravitas and experience to the task. He started his work as Special Envoy by compiling a blue-ribbon team of advisers. Robert Mood, a Norwegian major general, was named the chief military observer and head of Mission of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS). Mood had national experience as chief of staff of Norway’s armed forces and international experience with the UN missions in Lebanon and Kosovo. Annan’s next step was a listening tour, starting with meetings in Damascus. He and his team also met the opposition and visited the capitals of frontline states and permanent members of the UNSC, the P5. Based on these discussions, Annan presented a six-point plan to the UNSC on March 15, 2012. The plan was a blueprint for addressing the humanitarian emergency and ending Syria’s civil war. It enumerated obligations of the Syrian government, calling on Damascus and rebel groups to 1. work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy; 2. stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilize the country. To this end, the Syrian government should immediately cease troop movements toward, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centers, and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers. As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism. Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to

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4.

5. 6.

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bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism; ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily twohour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level; intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons; ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a nondiscriminatory visa policy for them; respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.5

Annan presented the six-point peace plan to Bashar al-Assad on March 27, 2012. The plan was notionally accepted by the Syrian government as a road map for ending the conflict. US ambassador Robert Ford was never convinced that the Syrian government wanted a negotiated solution. Even facing setbacks on the battlefield, he doubted whether Assad was serious about negotiations.6 A peace agreement was unlikely unless Russia compelled the government to compromise. The United States and opposition supporters vouched for the opposition side, while Russia vouched for the regime. ***** The UNSC endorsed Annan’s six-point plan, adopting Resolutions 2042 and 2043. The resolutions also called for the establishment of UNSMIS to support implementation of the six-point plan. The international community had a mechanism for coordinating its diplomatic and security engagement. In ex-Yugoslavia, for example, a “Contact Group” was established to coordinate policy among directly affected international stakeholders. Annan established the Action Group on Syria and chaired a ministerial meeting of the Action Group in Geneva on June 30, 2012. Invitees included the foreign ministers of the P5 and Turkey; the secretaries-general of the UN, the League of Arab States, and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; as well as the foreign ministers of Iraq (as chair of the Summit of the League of Arab States), Kuwait (as chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States), and Qatar (as chair of the Follow-up Committee on Syria of the League of Arab States). The Chinese delegation was disengaged, demurring to the Russians. Iran attended but was not heavily involved in deliberations. The conference issued a statement, “The Geneva Communique,” which elaborated on the six-point plan. Its most important element concerned a Transitional Governing Body. Drawing on the text of the Communique itself, its central themes are summarized.

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Principles The Communique affirmed respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria. It affirmed that negotiations can be facilitated by the international community, but a Syrian-led process is the best way for Syrians to independently and democratically determine their own future. Peaceful dialogue and negotiation would end the conflict and achieve sustainable peace.

Cessation of Hostilities Ending the bloodshed was the priority. Conflict will cease when all parties recommit themselves to the six-point plan and engage in an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire. Militarization of the conflict must end. Credible and visible actions are needed to implement items (2)–(6) of the six-point plan.

Protection of Civilians Members of the Action Group strongly condemned the continued and escalating killing, destruction, human rights abuses, and failure to protect civilians. They expressed concern about the intensification of violence, the potential for even more catastrophic conflict in the country, and the regional dimensions of the problem. All parties must adhere to their obligations under international law, including the protection of civilians.

Access Civilians who are trapped in cities that are under siege must be allowed to leave, and the wounded must be evacuated to safe areas where they would receive protection and services. Immediate and full access for humanitarian organizations is needed in all areas affected by the fighting. Freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a nondiscriminatory visa policy are essential to help normalize the situation.

Security Security can be achieved through the withdrawal of armed forces from conflict-affected areas. As Syria transitions from violent conflict, it will require a process for security sector reform (SSR) as well as the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups. All military forces and security and intelligence services have to abide by international humanitarian and human rights law, as well as professional standards, under the control of a transitional governing body.

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Political Prisoners Persons detained for peaceful political activities must be released expeditiously, and international organizations should have access to detention centers for an assessment of conditions. This cannot be a bureaucratic process. Releasing arbitrarily detained persons goes beyond confidence-building, by enabling them to go home and rejoin their families. It is necessary to transition from violence to peace-building, whereby combatants lay down their arms and rejoin civil society.

Dialogue All groups and segments of society in Syria shall participate in a National Dialogue process. The parties must put forward effective interlocutors to work expeditiously toward a Syrian-led settlement that meets the people’s legitimate aspirations of the people. The process must be fully inclusive to ensure that the views of all segments of Syrian society are heard in shaping the political settlement and transition. The National Dialogue must not only be inclusive, it must also be meaningful—that is to say, its key outcomes must be implemented.

Negotiations Action Group members underscored the need for an effective interlocutor to coordinate commitments by the government of Syria, and help implementing the six-point plan and the Geneva Communiqué. They emphasized that steps are also required of the opposition, which should increase cohesion between rebel groups in order to enhance more effective representation.

Democracy A wide range of Syrians was consulted and they expressed an overwhelming desire for a Syrian state that is genuinely democratic and pluralistic. They want a political process that gives space to both established and newly emerging political actors to compete fairly and equally in elections. The commitment to multiparty democracy must be institutionalized, beyond an initial round of elections.

Political Transition The conflict will only end when all sides see a peaceful path toward a common future. The process of political transition starts with agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition that benefits all Syrians. Clear steps and a firm timetable for a political transition require a climate of safety, stability, buy-in, and calm. To this end,

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a transitional governing body with full executive powers would establish a neutral environment for transition. The new regime could include members of the present government and the opposition, as well as other groups based on mutual consent. All parties must cooperate with the transitional governing body to ensure the permanent cessation of violence.

Governance Syrians want politics to evolve, giving space to both established and newly emerging political actors so that they can compete fairly and equally in elections. Commitments are needed to ensure equal opportunities for all. The constitutional order and the legal system will be developed during the political transition, with the results subject to popular approval. Free and fair multiparty elections will be conducted for offices created by the new constitution.

Human Rights The Syrian government must comply with international human rights standards, such as an independent judiciary, accountability of those in government, and the rule of law. There is no room in postwar Syria for sectarianism or discrimination on ethnic, religious, linguistic, or any other grounds. The Alawites and numerically smaller communities need assurance that their rights will be respected. Women must be fully represented and respected in all aspects of the transition.

Transitional Justice Sustainable peace requires a commitment to accountability for acts committed during the present conflict. Accountability, in the form of truth-telling and dialogue mechanisms drawing from communities, is one strategy for national reconciliation. A  comprehensive package for transitional justice measures would include compensation or rehabilitation for victims of the present conflict, and measures to advance forgiveness between members of the society.

International Cooperation The egregious nature and magnitude of the crisis demand a common position and joint international action. This can be achieved through genuine and constructive engagement with the Joint Special Envoy and by cooperating with and respecting the safety and security of UNSMIS personnel. The Joint Special Envoy will keep the UN and Arab League fully informed. The organized international community, including the members of the Action Group, are ready to offer significant funds for

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reconstruction and rehabilitation, as well as other incentives to implement political transition. Consultations will include the broad array of Syrian society, as well as other international actors, to develop the way forward. ***** The Geneva Communique was a diplomatic masterpiece. As a roadmap for future negotiations, it touched on all the elements required for a comprehensive peace agreement. According to Frederic Hof, the Secretary of State’s special adviser for Syria, “the communique was one of Kofi’s greatest achievements.”7 Though the Syrian government participated in discussions, it never trusted international mediation. Government officials objected when Annan asserted that the successor state should not include “Syrians with blood on their hands.” Bashar was not mentioned by name but, according to Hof, “everyone knew this referenced him.”8 Annan hoped that Moscow would convince Bashar al-Assad to step down, but Hof doubted whether “Russia really wanted a transition.”9 US officials tried to convince the Russian delegation to sell the transition plan to Bashar al-Assad. However, a Russian official cautioned, “You overestimate what we can do with the Assad family. Do not think we can dictate the terms.”10 UNSC Resolution 2042 (April 14, 2012) focused on the security situation. It called on the Syrian government to suspend troop movements that threatened population centers and cease using heavy weapons. It also called upon all parties in Syria, including the opposition, to stop armed violence in order to create conditions for UNSMIS to monitor a cessation of hostilities. The resolution further called upon the Syrian government to ensure the effective operation of the mission, including its advance team, by facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deployment of its personnel; guaranteeing full, unimpeded, and immediate freedom of movement; and allowing unobstructed communications. The resolution further demanded that the Syrian authorities allow immediate humanitarian access, in accordance with international law and guiding principles on humanitarian assistance. General Mood was ready to deploy monitors to Syria. However, the deployment was agonizingly slow with the Syrian government negotiating every detail and delaying visas. It took six weeks to deploy three hundred monitors. According to the UNSMIS mandate, they could monitor mass homicide but were not authorized to use force in order to stop the killing. Monitoring peace implementation was impossible with no peace to keep. The UNGA adopted Resolution 66/253-B in August and the UNSC adopted Resolution 2118 in September 2012. The resolutions were a half-hearted attempt to revive the six-point plan. However, the government of Syria refused to cooperate. Amidst increasing violence on the ground, the UNSC decided against renewing the UNSMIS mandate beyond August 2012. The Syrian government saw the Geneva Communique as a blueprint for regime change and rejected it. Without its agreement, the plan was dead on arrival. No country was prepared to go to war to end Syria’s conflict. Kofi Annan lamented the “destructive competition” between world powers and stepped down on August 2, 2012. In his resignation remarks, Annan asserted:  “I

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accepted this task, which some called ‘Mission: Impossible,’ for I believed it was a sacred duty to do whatever was in my power to help the Syrian people find a peaceful solution to this bloody conflict.”11 He accused the international community of rivalries, which undermined his mediation. He also regretted the militarization of the government and rebel groups who were involved in a pitched battle for Aleppo. Annan lamented, “At a time when we need—when the Syrian people desperately need—action there continues to be finger-pointing and name-calling in the Security Council.”12 Annan was a dignified civil servant who spent his career working on behalf of the UN Charter. However, his reputation was compromised by a series of setbacks. He headed the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) during the Rwanda genocide of 1994. He was in charge of DPKO when thousands of Muslim men and boys were massacred in the Bosnia’s Srebrenica safe area in 1995. The failure to bring peace to Syria was another monumental setback. The Syrian government rejected Annan’s six-point plan, ignoring pleas for a ceasefire and refusing to withdraw its forces from urban areas. It declined to release prisoners, while limiting humanitarian and media access. Annan explained, “As an envoy, I can’t want peace more than the protagonists, more than the Security Council or the international community for that matter. My central concern from the start has been the welfare of the Syrian people. Syria can still be saved from the worst calamity— if the international community can show the courage and leadership necessary to compromise.”13 Diplomacy failed because Russia was unwilling or unable to pressure the regime. Both Russia and China vetoed a series of UNSC Resolutions intended to ratchet-up the pressure on Damascus. The Obama administration and UK officials condemned Russia’s reluctance to end the “appalling bloodshed.”14 The six-point plan and Geneva Communique were statements of intent, which could not compel cooperation. The Syrian government was never serious about compromise or political transition. Paying lip service to Annan’s initiative was a stall tactic by the regime, which feigned interest in negotiations while pursuing a military solution to the rebellion. ***** In between Geneva I and Geneva II, there were months of excruciating negotiations over the agenda, the participants, and the shape of the table. The parties even haggled over the language of the invitation. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman led negotiations for the United States. Gennady Gatilov was her Russian counterpart. Brahimi was the other partner in the trilateral negotiation. Despite the collapse of Annan’s efforts, diplomats insisted that the international community redouble its efforts. Hugh Robertson, the British minister of state for foreign affairs, said:  “If Geneva fails, we stop, we understand why, we regroup and we try again.”15Annan hinted at a replacement. “Let me say that the world is full of crazy people like me, so don’t be surprised if someone else decides to take it on.”16 Ban Ki-moon indicated that he would appoint a replacement when Annan’s mandate ended in August. Syria’s civil war would end one of two ways: either Bashar-al Assad would be deposed or the Syrian armed forces would defeat the rebels and achieve a military solution.

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Lakhdar Brahimi, Algeria’s former foreign minister, succeeded Annan as Joint Special Envoy on January 1, 2014. Brahimi enjoyed immense respect at the UN and the Arab League where he served as Under-Secretary-General from 1984 to 1991, before becoming foreign minister of Algeria. Brahimi was best known for his role mediating the Taif Accord, a power-sharing arrangement that ended Lebanon’s civil war. He worked extensively in Afghanistan and other hot spots on conflict prevention and conflict resolution. In 2000, he led an independent UN panel on shortcomings in prevention and peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report set the stage for a broader debate about R2P. Brahimi used the six-point plan and the Geneva Communique as points of departure for his work in Syria. However, he broke with Annan by refusing to call on Assad to resign. Brahimi was under no illusions. Reflecting on his new role, Brahimi said: “Civil war is the cruelest kind of conflict, when a neighbor kills his neighbor and sometimes his brother. What’s necessary is to stop the civil war and that is not going to be easy.”17 His first step was to organize an international conference, known as “Geneva II.” However, neither the government of Syria nor the Syrian opposition was keen to sit at the table for discussions. Damascus finally relented and agreed to attend with the caveat that it would not “hand over power to anyone.”18 The foreign ministry said its delegation would focus “first and foremost on eliminating terrorism.”19 Syria’s national reconciliation minister Ali Haidar said: “Don’t expect anything from Geneva II. Neither Geneva II, not Geneva III nor Geneva X will solve the Syrian crisis. The solution has begun and will continue through the military triumph of the state.”20 Foreign Minister Walid Muallem blasted the United Kingdom and France for stating that the president had no role to play in Syria’s future. Divisions between the opposition played into the government’s hands. The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces initially resisted attending the conference, but relented under pressure from the international community. Robert Ford and his team played a key role securing their participation. US officials spent hours smoking shisha, a water pipe used for tobacco, debating the merits of attending and cajoling their participation. The opposition had great difficulty sitting at the table with regime representatives who slaughtered their families. A  third of the National Opposition Coalition’s members boycotted the vote on whether to join the conference. Of those who voted, less than half were in favor. The Coalition and the Syrian National Council insisted that Bashar step down. The National Coordination Committee, an internal opposition alliance tolerated by the regime, refused to attend as part of a unified delegation of opposition groups. The Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which was backed by the West at the time, indicated that it would only attend if the invitation indicated that the purpose of talks was to get rid of Bashar al-Assad. The United States would not allow the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurdish bloc, to participate unless it joined the delegation of the Syrian Opposition Council. Washington acquiesced to Turkey’s demands by placing conditions on the PYD’s attendance. The regime and the opposition were at loggerheads. The government adamantly ruled out Bashar’s departure, while the opposition insisted that he be excluded from the transitional governing body proposed in the Geneva Communique.

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A chasm existed between Syrians in-country and those in exile. Armed opposition groups deeply resented the exiles for their opulent lifestyle. While political groups stayed at five-star hotels in Europe, attending conferences and working from offices in Istanbul, Syrians were being attacked with barrel bombs, artillery, and chemical weapons (CW). Syrians in-country were adamantly opposed to Geneva II. The Islamic Front accused conference-goers of “treason” and suggested “putting the participants of both parties in Geneva II on a wanted list.”21 Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, asserted:  “Those taking part in the conference do not represent the people who sacrificed and shed blood. … We cannot allow the Geneva II game to fool the nation.”22 Hassan Abboud, commander of Ahrar al-Sham rebels, said: “We see Geneva as a tool of manipulation.”23 Ban Ki-moon scolded the opposition for succumbing to extremists, saying it would be “unforgivable not to seize this opportunity.”24 Attempts to convene the conference were further complicated by Ban’s unexpected invitation to Iran. The Syrian Opposition Coalition balked at Iran’s participation. So did the United States, which objected to the deployment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria and the role of its proxy, Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia Islamist movement. Though the Iranian government pledged a “positive and constructive role”25 at Geneva II, the Obama administration insisted that Ban’s invitation should be “conditioned on Iran’s explicit and public support for the full implementation of the Geneva Communique.”26 When Iran refused to endorse a transitional government, Ban withdrew his invitation. Brahimi focused on convincing the United States and Russia to leverage the participation of Syrians. US Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Moscow in May 2013. He met President Vladimir Putin and then held a midnight press conference with his counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Both pledged to work together on a conference to end Syria’s civil war. Kerry strongly urged the opposition to attend the conference, maintaining it was their best opportunity to realize the goals of the revolution. The regime’s use of CW in Ghouta on August 21, 2013, created a sense of urgency. UNSC Resolution 2118 (September 27, 2013), cosponsored by the United States and Russia, was adopted unanimously. The resolution condemned the use of CW and proposed a process for eliminating Syria’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The resolution also called for “convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on Syria to implement the Geneva Communique,”27 and for “all Syrian parties to engage seriously and constructively” and be committed to the “achievement of stability and reconciliation.”28 Brahimi was finally able to convene negotiations in Switzerland on January 22, 2014. He framed the meeting as an opportunity for Syrians to discuss the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué, which the Government of Syria had already rejected. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning advocates of regime change and telling them to “wake up from their dreams.”29 Rather than political transition, the government insisted that Geneva II focus on “the fight against terrorism” and ending support for the “armed terrorist groups.”30 The Syrian government’s delegation was led by Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, an inveterate Assad loyalist. It also included Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal al-Moqdad, presidential adviser Bouthaina Shaaban, and Syria’s hard-line UN Envoy Bashar Jaafari. Brahimi invited thirty countries to

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participate. These invited guests joined the opening ceremony in Montreux before the American, Russian, and Syrian delegations moved to Geneva and went into executive session. Ahmad Jarba, head of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Its members bickered over conditions for joining the conference. The Council demanded the release of political prisoners and humanitarian access to besieged areas. The Syrian government showed surprising flexibility, indicating its willingness to swap prisoners and to improve the delivery of humanitarian aid. Brahimi conducted shuttle diplomacy between opposition groups and between the opposition and regime representatives. During much back-and-forth, they discussed the conference agenda, the role of a transitional governing body, national institutions, and reconciliation. The regime wanted to focus on counterterrorism. The announcement that Bashar al-Assad would seek a third term in June’s elections upended the opposition’s demands for his resignation. Geneva II was a fiasco. It was months in the making, but achieved almost nothing. The fact that the meeting occurred was a small accomplishment, but participants failed to agree on details of a peace agreement. Ban Ki-moon criticized the international community for being “hopelessly divided.”31 Ban called it a “tragedy for the Syrian people” and a “failure” of the UN.32 Brahimi submitted his resignation effective from May 31. He was contrite and apologized to the Syrian people for his failure to bring peace. Brahimi said he was “very, very sad to leave Syria in such a bad state.” He reflected, “I’m sure the crisis will end, but all [stakeholders] should consider how much more death, how much more destruction will occur … before Syria can become a new Syria.”33 Staffan de Mistura succeeded Brahimi as Joint Special Envoy Syria in July 2014. He assumed the post while Russia was expanding its military deployment. The growing role of Iran also changed the battlefield dynamics. Russia, Iran, and Turkey were using Syria to wage a proxy war in service of their national interests. The involvement of these external actors added a new wrinkle to international diplomacy aiming to end Syria’s civil war.

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Part Three

International Stakeholders

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Russia

[The Russian people] deserve to have their voices heard and their votes counted, and that means they deserve fair, free transparent elections and leaders who are accountable to them.1 —Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ***** Relations between Syria and the Soviet Union (USSR) date back to 1936 when France and Syria negotiated a treaty of independence, and Moscow sought closer ties with Damascus. Rapprochement between Syria and Russia deepened after Syria became officially independent in 1946, and continued during the Cold War. Close ties advanced the strategic objectives of both countries. The Soviet Union wanted a deep-water port in the Mediterranean, to counter US influence in the Middle East and serve as a check on Israel. To these ends, Hafez al-Assad was a willing partner of the Soviet Union. In October 1980, Syria and the Soviet Union signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Moscow pledged to defend Syria in the event it was attacked.2 Beyond security issues, political cooperation included links between the Baath Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Six-Day War provided an opportunity for the USSR to demonstrate solidarity with Syria and the Arab World. When Israel launched a preemptive strike against Arab countries on June 5, 1967, Moscow immediately issued a statement denouncing Israel’s aggression. Moscow deployed Russia’s Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean. In addition, Russia helped Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser interdict Israeli shipping in the Red Sea and demanded the removal of UN forces from Sinai. The Russians planned to land one thousand troops in Haifa, despite the risk of armed conflict between the Soviet Navy and the US Sixth Fleet. Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin used the hotline to warn Washington: “A very crucial moment has now arrived which forces us, if military actions are not stopped in the next few hours, which forces us [to take] necessary actions, including military.”3 Moscow demanded that Israel cease military activities, abandon the Sinai, and withdraw from the Golan Heights to positions it controlled before the war. The war ended suddenly, locking positions in place. Syria lost the Golan Heights and Moscow broke off diplomatic relations with Israel.4

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In 1971, Hafez al-Assad authorized the Soviet Union to open a naval base in Tartus on the Mediterranean, as a permanent naval air station for Russia in the Middle East. Russia’s ports in Arkhangelsk, on its northern coast, and St. Petersburg, were closed during winter months because of ice and extreme cold. Tartus gave the Soviet Union access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. It could also be a launch point against Israel in the event of another confrontation. Hafez al-Assad was a willing collaborator, but no lackey of the Russians. Moscow was taken by surprise when Syria intervened in Lebanon’s civil war in 1976. It disapproved of enmity between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, Russia’s ally in Baghdad. Despite contentious issues in Syria–Soviet bilateral relations, Moscow expanded security cooperation with Damascus through arms transfers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the USSR supplied the Syrian armed forces with a steady stream of sophisticated weapons, which included Strela-l (SA-7) portable anti-aircraft missiles and radar-guided surface-to-air missiles (S-300 and S-400 systems). More than one thousand Soviet MIG fighter aircraft and attack helicopters were transferred. To complement its position in Tartus, the USSR provided seventy warships, as well as patrol boats, and mobile coastal missile systems capable of targeting ships at sea. By 1992, it supplied Syria with about five thousand T-62 tanks, four thousand artillery pieces and mortars, and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). Weapons transfers peaked in 1973, which coincided with the Yom Kippur war. Subsequently, the USSR replenished Syrian losses with additional arms transfers.5 Between 1982 and 1986, Syria was the second-largest recipient of conventional weapons from the Soviet Union.6 Additionally, Moscow offered training and capacity building. About sixteen thousand Soviet military advisers were deployed alongside Russian weapons systems on Syrian territory. Syrian military personnel were also trained in the USSR. Russian engineers, scientists and machinery helped develop Syria’s industries, including its hydrocarbon sector, and helped Syria build hydropower facilities harnessing the Euphrates River.7 As many as forty thousand Syrian students attended Moscow State University and other Russian centers of learning and excellence. Marriage between Syrians and Russians was widespread. Gennadiy Selezynov, president of the Russian Duma, attended Hafez’s funeral on June 13, 2000. Other countries sent presidents or heads of government. It was surprising that Russia was represented by a legislator. The United States was represented by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Her presence was not indicative of warming relations. US–Syria relations were adversely affected by Syria’s support for terror groups and its close ties to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Yaser Arafat, one of the “world leaders” attending Hafez’s funeral, was treated like a head of state. In 2004, Congressman Eliot L. Engel and other pro-Israel members of the US House of Representatives sponsored the Syria Accountability Act, imposing comprehensive economic sanctions in response to Syria’s support for terror groups. Estrangement between the United States and Syria pushed Moscow and Damascus closer together. Syria owed $13 billion to Russia in 2005. Though Russia could ill-afford debt forgiveness, 80 percent of Syria’s obligation was written-off.8

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The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Russia, the successor state, was weak and impoverished. According to Vladimir Putin, a mid-ranking officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) from St. Petersburg, “The breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.”9 Putin sought to restore Russia’s power, prestige, and influence after ascending to the presidency in 2000. Syria was an ideal proving ground for Russia’s revival, which involved projecting power beyond its borders. “Putin used a modest military deployment to maximum political effect.”10 US officials were wary of Putin’s intentions. CIA director general David Petraeus claimed he was trying to “resurrect the Russian empire.”11 Prominent senators chimed in, blaming President Barack Obama for Russia’s resurgence. Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) blamed Obama for “retreating from the world.”12 Tom Cotton (R-AR) maintained that Russia’s actions were the result of inaction in US foreign policy.13 Marco Rubio (R-FL) accused Putin of trying to destroy NATO. “He is exploiting a vacuum that this administration has left in the Middle East.”14 Criticism was bipartisan. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “We have to stand up to his bullying, and specifically in Syria.”15 ***** Russia had substantial economic ties to Syria, with investments totaling $19.4 billion by 2009 and exports estimated at $1.1 billion the following year.16 Under the guise of fighting terrorism, Russia strongly supported Bashar al-Assad when the Syrian crisis erupted in 2011.17 Russia expanded military aid and reinforced its naval air station in Tartus, which had fallen into disrepair. In 2012, Russia set up the largest electronic intelligence post in Latakia, Bashar’s ancestral homeland.18 Russian bases in Tartus and Latakia gave Moscow a strong strategic and operational foothold in Syria. Russia was Syria’s main supplier of weapons, which it used against the opposition. In 2011, Syria received 8  percent of Russia’s foreign weapons sales, which included nearly $960 million in jet fighter upgrades, anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles, and anti-tank weapons. In 2012, Syria was one of Russia’s top five purchasers of weapons with contracts worth $4 billion. The two countries also signed letters of intent to transfer an additional $2 billion.19 These arms sales represented 10 percent of Russia’s global arms business in 2012. In 2018, Russia delivered three long-range air defense systems to Syria, its first high-value arms export in five years.20 Some Western and Arab nations criticized Russia for transferring weapons and fueling Syria’s civil war.21 Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, stated:  “It is glaringly obvious that transferring weapons into a volatile and violent situation is irresponsible and will only fuel the bloodshed.”22 Moscow rejected criticism, claiming it was merely meeting existing contracts. It also accused Western countries of a double standard: facilitating arms supplies to the rebels while criticizing Russia for selling weapons to the regime. To Russia, Bashar’s survival was a national security priority. If jihadists won, they would strengthen the worldwide network of violent Islamists, including militants in Chechnya and Dagestan that were a threat to Russia. Alternatively, Bashar’s victory would preserve a key Russian ally, thereby ensuring Moscow’s influence in Syria and the Middle East.23 Putin viewed Syria as a competition between Great Powers and

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sought to discredit America’s involvement. Russia was primarily concerned with stability rather than regime preservation in Damascus. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov asserted that Russia was not “wedded to Assad, but would not push him out.”24 Putin addressed the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 28, 2015. “It seems that some people continue to export revolutions, only now these are ‘democratic’ revolutions. Just look at the situation in the Middle East and North Africa.”25 Putin was reflexively wary of popular movements, embodying the Arab Spring. Events in Libya were especially concerning. Libya’s president Muammar Gaddafi pledged to attack the opposition stronghold of Benghazi and go house-to-house to find and kill the rebels. The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, that endorsed a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” against regime forces.26 The resolution was intended as a warning to deter Gaddafi’s attack against Benghazi. Both Russia and China opposed the resolution, but did not use their veto to block it. As violence in Libya intensified, a US drone struck Gaddafi’s motorcade. Opposition militia dragged Gaddafi from his hiding place in a water pipe by the side of the road – and executed him. A  cell phone recorded his killing, which was broadcast for all Libyans and the world to see. Russian officials protested the “assassination.” They pointed out that Gaddafi’s slaying violated the Geneva Conventions, prohibiting the killing of prisoners of war. Moscow accused the United States of orchestrating Gaddafi’s murder, using the UNSC Resolution as cover. Russian officials saw Gaddafi’s killing as an abuse of power. It was an example of the Arab Spring run amok. Putin questioned who was behind popular uprisings against Arab dictators. In Putin’s mindset, which was shaped by decades in the KGB, the Arab Spring was not an indigenous grassroots movement. Putin believed that the United States and Israel orchestrated the revolutions. When Syrians protested in Daara, which marked the start of Syria’s conflict, Putin maintained that the conflict was instigated and supported by the United States. He also accused the United States of manipulating events in Libya. International military action in Libya opened a wound for Russia over Kosovo. In 1999, NATO bombed Serbia without explicit authorization from the UNSC; Washington ignored Russia’s objections. Moscow pointed to the Kosovo precedent to justify its 2008 takeover of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Republic of Georgia, an independent and sovereign state bordering Russia. Morocco, a UNSC member, tabled Resolution 10534, which endorsed an Arab peace plan and called on Bashar al-Assad to step down. Russia opposed the draft. Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, said the resolution was “unbalanced,” and criticized Western countries for undermining negotiations through their demands for regime change. According to Churkin, the resolution imposed obligations on the Syrian government, but none on the opposition. The resolution linked the mandate of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), a body Russia supported, with sanctions, which Russia opposed. Churkin declared Russia’s commitment to finding a solution and ending the bloodshed. To this end, Lavrov led a high-level delegation to meet Assad on February 7, 2012. Churkin was dissembling the facts. The resolution was not unbalanced; it

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condemned “all violence, irrespective of where it comes from.”27 It demanded Syria protect its population, release all persons detained arbitrarily, withdraw all military and armed forces from cities and towns, and guarantee the freedom to hold peaceful demonstrations. It also called for “an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation ad extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people.”28 The resolution demanded that the Syrian government implement, “without delay,” the peace plan set out by the League of Arab States on January 22, 2012.29 Though thirteen UNSC members voted in favor of Res. 10534, Russia and China vetoed it. They claimed that the resolution was a violation of Syria’s sovereignty and could be used as a pretext for military action. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reacted with anger and disgust: “What more do we need to know to act decisively in the Security Council? To block this resolution is to bear responsibility for the horrors that are occurring on the ground in Syria.”30 She condemned the Syrian government’s “horrific campaign” in Homs and called on the international community to end the “abhorrent brutality [of] a craven tyrant.”31 Clinton lamented the UNSC’s failure to defend the Syrian people. “In the absence of us acting together as the international community, I fear civil war.”32 Syria’s permanent representative Bashar Jaafari is a Syrian nationalist and Baathist at his core. He cleverly framed his remarks about the resolution, noting Syria’s longstanding commitment to Arab liberation from colonial domination in the region. In a veiled criticism of the United States, he said that the resolution revealed the “true hostile intentions” of some countries that “fan the flames” of conflict.33 He accused the United States of being an “instrument of war” and creating a “manufactured” crisis.34 Russia sought to ensure continuity of the regime and Bashar’s role as president. “Moscow’s long-standing position is that both the government and opposition in Syria are equally to blame for the violence and that the solution lies in bringing the two sides together for talks.”35 Russia insisted that Syria did not pose a threat to international peace and security and opposed international involvement in Syria’s domestic affairs. The United States hoped that Russia would expedite Assad’s removal. However, Bill Burns doubted whether “the Russians were ever serious about pressuring Assad to leave, and they lacked the leverage to accomplish that unless the Iranians agreed, which was never going to happen.”36 Russia demonstrated a pattern of obstructionism, supporting international diplomacy only when it served Russia’s national and strategic interests. For example, Moscow welcomed Kofi Annan’s appointment as Joint Special Envoy of the UN and League of Arab States and initially facilitated Annan’s dialogue with Syrian officials and opposition figures. When it was crunch time, however, Russian officials did not pressure Bashar al-Assad sufficiently to compel his acceptance of Annan’s six-point plan or the Geneva Communique. In similar fashion Moscow endorsed Geneva II, the next phase of diplomacy following Annan’s resignation. According to Ambassador Robert Ford, Lakhdar Brahimi expected the United States to deliver the opposition and show flexibility on political transition issues. Brahimi also expected the Russians to be flexible on security, but the Russians were either unwilling or unable to get the regime to compromise. Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman met with her Russian counterpart at the

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Palais des Nations in Geneva. She reviewed the understanding that Kerry and Lavrov had reached during their last meeting, but the Russian deputy foreign minister replied, “We will not pressure the government.”37 Once again, Sherman reviewed the agreement that Kerry and Lavrov had reached and once again the Russian repeated, “We will not pressure the Syrians.”38 Moscow had made a decision and the deputy foreign minister was tasked with conveying it. Sherman replied, “Then we have nothing to talk about.”39 She, Ford, and members of the US delegation left the Palais des Nations and headed back to the hotel. The next morning, they flew out of Geneva to Washington. Brahimi’s mediation had ended in failure. Ford recalls, “Brahimi was crushed.”40 Russia was proactive diplomatically after the Ghouta chemical weapons (CW) attacks in August 2013. Kerry was convinced by the Russians to endorse a UNSC Resolution calling on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to identify and destroy Syria’s stockpiles of CW. At the time of the Ghouta attacks, the regime was under siege and there was real risk that it might fall to the rebels. By engaging the UNSC in Syria’s disarmament, Russia succeeded in saving the regime by placing it under the international community’s protection. Russia’s commitment to international diplomacy was shallow and short-lived. The deputy head of the Russian parliament’s foreign affairs committee warned that Russia’s foreign policy would change, “If and when we understand that the conditions for any political dialogue are exhausted, we will definitely stop preventing any further actions in the Security Council.”41 Russia, with support from China, went on a binge vetoing twelve UNSC Resolutions concerning Syria between October 2011 and April 2018. ***** Russia’s defense of the Syrian government did not occur in a vacuum. Russia had other security and foreign-policy priorities. In February and March 2014, Russia responded to the removal of Russia’s proxy president in Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovytch, by annexing Crimea. Russian army units and special forces without insignia, known as “little green men,” supported pro-independence militias in the Dombass region of Eastern Ukraine against Ukraine’s overmatched armed forces. The Syrian armed forces were on their heels in the spring and early summer of 2015. ISIS, the Nusra Front, and the US-backed opposition groups inflicted a series of losses to the regime in the West, which threatened the Russian base at Tartus. Bashar al-Assad was on the ropes with the Syrian armed forces facing a monumental defeat. They had been beaten in Idlib province and Aleppo. Without a Russian-led rescue, Putin feared that Damascus could fall and Syria would become a jihadi state. Russia was prepared to deepen its military commitment to rescue the regime. It also had a national security interest. Up to 2,400 Russian citizens had joined ISIS.42 Putin delivered a speech to the UNGA on September 27, 2015. It was the first time in ten years that Putin attended. He called for an international coalition to fight global terrorism, likening cooperation against ISIS to global efforts to defeat the Nazis in the Second World War. It is not about Russia’s ambitions, dear colleagues, but about the recognition of the fact that we can no longer tolerate the current state of affairs in the world. What we

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actually propose is to be guided by common values and common interests rather than by ambitions. Relying on international law, we must join efforts to address the problems that all of us are facing, and create a genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism. Similar to the anti-Hitler coalition, it could unite a broad range of parties willing to stand firm against those who, just like the Nazis, sow evil and hatred of humankind.43

Putin described a counter-terrorism strategy with three elements: (1) air strikes against ISIS and other “terrorists,” (2)  assistance to the Kurds and Assad’s forces who were fighting terrorists, and (3) a peace process that would restore order and stability with Assad remaining in power. In his UNGA address, Putin maintained that “Moscow’s long-standing position is that both the government and opposition in Syria are equally to blame for the violence and that the solution lies in bringing the two sides together for talks.”44 Despite Putin’s feigned equanimity, Russia was squarely on Assad’s side. Putin and Obama met on the margins of the UNGA. Putin criticized the United States for supporting armed opposition groups. He suggested that the United States had exaggerated the ISIS crisis in order to justify its military intervention in Syria. Putin maintained that Russia would only deploy its armed forces in conformity with international law and upon request from the government of Syria. Pressed on war crimes, Putin absolved Bashar al-Assad of responsibility for the violence and resulting refugee crisis, declaring: “People are not fleeing from the Bashar al-Assad regime— they are fleeing from the Islamic State, which has occupied vast territories in Syria and Iraq and is committing atrocities there.”45 The speech and subsequent events were carefully choreographed to pave the way for military action. Following Putin’s remarks, Bashar al-Assad formally and officially requested Russia’s involvement to help fight rebel groups. Putin flew home and, in accordance with Russia’s constitution, he requested authorization from the Duma to deploy Russian troops out of the country. The resolution passed unanimously. Russia launched air strikes on September 30. Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu said Moscow was responding to a request from Assad for help. He asserted that the difference between air strikes conducted by the United States and other countries is that “they do not comply with international law, but we do.”46 Initial strikes targeted al-Rastan, Talbeisa, al-Zaafran, al-Tolol al-Humr, Aydon, Deir Fol, and Salmia in central Syria. Russia’s ministry of defense indicated that Russian air strikes were delivered only on the ISIS infrastructure. However, satellite imagery confirmed that many of Russia’s air strikes were in areas where ISIS was not present. The United States, UK, France, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey issued a joint statement on October 2: We express our deep concern with regard to the Russian military build-up in Syria and especially the attacks by the Russian Air Force on Hama, Homs and Idlib which led to civilian casualties and did not target Da’esh. These military actions constitute a further escalation and will only fuel more extremism and radicalization. We call on the Russian Federation to immediately cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians and to focus its efforts on fighting [ISIS].47

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On October 7, State Department Spokesman John Kirby indicated that 90 percent of Russia’s strikes had targeted neither ISIS nor al-Qaeda affiliates. NATO also questioned Russia’s actions, calling for it to “promote a solution to the conflict through a political transition.”48 Putin gave a television address to the Russian people on October 11, 2015. For rationale, he explained that Russian forces were being deployed to Syria in order to defeat “international terrorism.”49 Russia had a well-founded fear of violent Islamist extremism. Between 1999 and 2000, Putin led a brutal counterterrorism campaign in Chechnya that leveled Grozny. According to unofficial sources, between twentyfive thousand and fifty thousand Chechens were dead or missing.50 The operation was reminiscent of Hafez al-Assad’s scorched earth response to Hama in 1982. While the Chechnya campaign ultimately restored Russian federal control, it radicalized a generation in the North Caucasus. In August 1999, Islamist fighters from Chechnya infiltrated Russia’s Dagestan region, declaring an independent state and calling for jihad. In October 2002, terrorists seized the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow taking more than nine hundred prisoners. As many as 174 people died when counterterrorism police raided the theater. The Beslan school attack in North Ossetia in September 2004 resulted in the deaths of 330 people, mostly children. On April 15, 2009, Russia claimed victory against Chechen separatists and officially ended military operations. Grozny was leveled with few structures left intact and standing. The government quickly rebuilt parts of the city and surrounding areas as part of its peace-building strategy. The outbreak of violence in Syria rekindled Russian fears about radicalization of the broader Muslim community. At least 2,400 Russian citizens had joined ISIS. Putin vowed to attack the terrorists in Syria before they returned to undertake operations against the homeland. Putin originally envisioned limited operations in Syria. He insisted, “There is no talk and there can’t be any talk about involvement of Russian military units in ground operations.”51 Shoygu echoed Putin’s message. He insisted that Moscow is not sending ground troops to Syria, but will only use its air force “in order to support the Syrian government forces in their fight against the Islamic State.”52 Either Russia found itself on a slippery slope, escalating its deployment, or Putin was lying and Russia’s occupation was envisioned all along. “The hallmark of the Russian campaign was disinformation. It accompanied the launch of the campaign; it covered the targets chosen and the weapons used to strike them; it masked the real purpose of the campaign, and the strategic effect that it achieved.”53 Well before Putin addressed the UNGA, Russia’s intervention was meticulously planned with the stated purpose to “stabilize the legitimate power in Syria and create the conditions for political compromise.”54 Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia was the hub of Russia’s air operations. Russia put assets in place so it could quickly ramp up operations. Before the aerial bombardment started on September 30, satellite images of Khmeimim showed twenty-eight jets, including Su-30 multirole fighters, Su-25 ground attack jets, Su-24 bombers, and possibly Ka-52 helicopter gunships.55 Khmeimim and Tartus served as beachheads for Russia’s growing deployment. Russian warships were sent to the Eastern Mediterranean to protect Russian war planes coming to Tartus. At a minimum, Russia needed ground forces to service its aerial

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operations. In August 2015, Russia began to send T-90 tanks, artillery, and combat troops to Khmeimim.56 In addition to Russian Special Forces with insignia, private militias and mercenaries were also deployed. These “little green men” were redeployed from Ukraine to Syria. Russia’s military engagement was deepest from September 2015 to March 2016. Russia and Syria signed a treaty regulating Russia’s use of Khmeimim on August 26, 2015. The agreement allowed Russia to use the facility free of charge. It imposed no time limit and provided diplomatic immunity to Russian personnel and their families in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.57 Russia’s ministry of defense built infrastructure to consolidate its deployment. Large dormitories were set up adjoining Khmeimim as residence for combat troops, their spouses and children. Schools, medical facilities, and cafeterias were also built. A total of sixtythree thousand soldiers58 “gained combat experience″ in Syria.59 Putin believed that making a major dent in the capacity of the opposition militias would galvanize moribund peace talks. Reflecting on his assignment, US ambassador to Syria Robert Ford queried whether Bashar al-Assad ever intended to compromise or whether he was seeking a military solution all along.60 Moderate rebels, including those backed by the West, bore the brunt of Russia’s air assault. Russian strikes had little impact on the more radical Nusra Front that intensified attacks on moderate forces. Russia’s engagement benefitted the regime, which regained control of areas in and around Latakia and Aleppo. By the end of 2017, Russia’s intervention had enabled the Syrian government to regain significant territory. The regime recaptured Palmyra from ISIS in March 2016, Aleppo in December 2016, and Deir ez-Zor in November 2017. Instead of a drawdown schedule, the Russian government announced in December 2017 that its troops would be based in Syria permanently. Russia’s muscular foreign policy burnished Putin’s credibility as a leader who could restore respect for Russia in the world. However, the annexation of Crimea and operations in Eastern Ukraine occurred against the backdrop of Russia’s economic difficulties and the decline of living standards. Most of Russia’s 143 million people live on stagnant incomes, many below the poverty line. They suffer from inadequate health care, housing, crumbling roads, and infrastructure.61 Putin pursued a nationalist agenda abroad to distract Russians from their deteriorating living conditions at home. Russia’s economic woes were exacerbated by US-led international sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea. ***** Russia’s military resurgence came at a time when Obama decided to cut US losses in Syria “and leave Vladimir Putin holding the bag.”62 Colin Powell invoked the Pottery Barn rule for Iraq: “You break it, you buy it.”63 The same principle applied to Russia’s role in Syria. Russia would have to bear the burden of rebuilding. It is highly unlikely that the World Bank and IMF, where the United States has a large voting share, will finance the country’s reconstruction. Russia also has to bear responsibility for its war crimes against Syrian civilians, which started in 2015. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International confirmed Russia’s use of cluster munitions in December 2015, which devastated communities and killed scores of

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civilians. The Russian media outlet, Sputnik, showed photographs of cluster bombs on jets and at the Khmeimim Air Base. Other photos surfaced of cluster bombs on the runway ready to be loaded onto Russian planes. In addition, Russia targeted mosques, hospitals, and water treatment plants. For example, Russian bombs destroyed facilities of the international aid group, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), in Aleppo and Idlib on February 15, 2016, in violation of international humanitarian law. Russia played a double game. Its bombardment devastated moderate opposition groups that were assisted by the United States. At the same time, it sought to foster cooperation between the Syrian armed forces and moderate insurgent groups. In December 2015, Putin admitted that Russia provided a small contingent of moderate insurgents with “air cover, arms, and ammunition in joint operations with Syrian troops against Islamist militants.”64 Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov did not deny Russian collaboration.65In the fog of Syria’s civil war, alliances were murky; loyalties opaque. ISIS was under attack on two fronts: by the regime in Aleppo and by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed militia with Kurds at its core, in the northeast. The SDF was fighting ISIS in Kobani and Tal Abyad, liberating territory and reducing the size of its caliphate. It would become the point of the spear working hand in glove with US Special Forces to liberate Raqqa and purge ISIS from lands adjoining the Iraqi border. The SDF had battlefield success against the Free Syrian Army (FSA), an opposition group formerly supported by the United States, which Turkey transformed into a Salafist force. The two-pronged offensive caused a new influx of refugees into Turkey, exacerbating the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and further straining the capacity of Turkey and Europe to manage the population flow. Russia was not concerned about the refugee crisis. In fact, it welcomed it. The influx of refugees further strained EU countries and advanced Russia’s goal of undermining the EU, which had imposed sanctions on Russia for its seizure of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine. Moscow blamed the United States for the refugee crisis, suggesting that the humanitarian crisis was a result of America’s support for the insurgency. On March 14, 2016, Putin announced that Russia had achieved its objectives in Syria and, having turned the tide in favor of the regime, would withdraw. Putin boasted: With participation by Russian troops and Russian military grouping, the Syrian troops and Syrian patriotic forces, we were able to radically change the situation in fighting international terrorism and take initiative in nearly all areas to create the conditions for the start of a peace process … I feel that the objective set before the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces is generally fulfilled, so I order the Defense Ministry to begin withdrawing the main part of our military group from the Syrian Arab Republic.66

Putin knew it was premature to declare “mission accomplished.”67 Announcing the withdrawal of Russian forces was a propaganda ploy to get the West to lift economic sanctions in exchange for Russia’s reduced role.

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After significant investments of time, money, and military effort, Russia sought to recoup its losses. Its continued involvement was motivated by economic self-interest. It wanted to capture internationally financed reconstruction contracts that would benefit Russian business.68 Sergey Katyrin, the president of Russia’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, insisted that Russian businesses would have “first priority” in the allotment of reconstruction funds that Syria receives.69 Moscow and Damascus signed a bilateral agreement in January 2018 that gave Russia sole rights to extract oil and gas from government-controlled parts of Syria. Russian energy minister Alexander Novak announced that the two countries signed a “roadmap” concerning the “restoration of oil fields and the development of new deposits.”70 In March 2018, Russian companies secured advance contracts for power-generation projects in Homs, a rail line linking Damascus International Airport to the city center, and a collection of industrial plants.71 President Donald J. Trump announced that he would withdraw all US troops from northeast Syria in October 2019, then abruptly changed course. Trump declared that the US troops would be staying in Syria with a new mission: to secure the oil fields in Deir ez-Zor. He ignored Syria’s sovereign claims over the oil and its preexisting agreements with Russia. Trump also ignored an understanding with the Kurds that they would be the sole beneficiaries of oil sales from the facilities they control in NES. Trump’s energy grab further muddied US intentions. ***** In 2015, the skies over Syria were crowded with Russian, Turkish, Syrian, Israeli, and US war planes. The Pentagon was concerned that Russian and US jets could clash inadvertently, leading to an accidental war. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and Shoygu established a communications channel to “de-conflict” their military forces.72 Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu also visited Moscow to discuss a coordination mechanism to prevent confrontation between Israeli and Russian forces in Syria. The de-confliction channel failed to prevent a clash between Russian and Turkish aircraft on November 24, 2015. A Turkish F-16 shot down a Russian Sukhoi 24, which crashed four kilometers from the Russian-Syrian border in Latakia. The pilot, as well as a marine sent on a rescue mission, were killed by Turkmen tribesmen. Turkey said it issued ten warnings, but Captain Konstantin Murakhtin insisted there was no warning before being shot down by an air-to-air missile. Putin reacted furiously, calling it “a stab in the back.”73 Russian officials said it was an “ambush.”74 Short of going to war, Russia had few options to punish Turkey except travel sanctions and a boycott of Turkish products. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu responded defiantly, “Everyone must know that it is our international right and national duty to take any measure against whoever violates our air or land borders. Turkey will not hesitate to take all steps to protect the country’s security.”75 Turkey asked the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the Charter, which states that an attack against one NATO member shall be considered an attack against them all. Though members of the Council expressed solidarity with Turkey, NATO refused to take tangible steps. It did not want to get embroiled in a dispute with Russia.76

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The civil war in Syria pitted Turkey, who backed the rebels, against Russia and Iran who supported Assad. Russia, Iran, and Turkey established an alliance of convenience. Though the troika was bound by the fight against terrorism, there was a huge gap in perception. They could not agree, for example, on a definition of terrorism or who was a terrorist. For Turks, fighting terrorism meant killing Kurds.77 Beginning in 2013, Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT) operated the “jihadi highway” from Sanliurfa to Raqqa. MIT provided weapons, money, and logistical support to extremists from eighty countries traveling through Turkey to Syria. Turkey’s engagement in Syria was a pretext for fighting the Syrian Kurds, whom it viewed as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). After the United States discontinued its train-andequip program, the FSA became Turkey’s primary proxy. Russia and Iran also had an uneasy relationship. In July 2015, Major General Qassem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), visited Moscow to discuss the situation in Syria. His trip violated a UN travel ban and economic sanctions, which were imposed on Soleimani in 2007 for his role supporting international terrorism. The trip occurred during sensitive negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, which offered sanctions relief in exchange for a verifiable suspension of nuclear activities. Opponents of the Iran nuclear deal pointed to Soleimani’s Russia trip as evidence that Iran could not be trusted. They accused Soleimani of having blood on his hands, as the overseer of Tehran’s support for Shiite militias in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.78 In 1984, the United States labeled Iran a State Sponsor of Terrorism for its support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terror groups committed to Israel’s destruction. Sergey Shoygu and Soleimani set aside differences between Russia and Iran in order to develop a military plan for Syria. Russia could control the skies, but it needed foot soldiers. For this purpose, Shoygu proposed battlefield coordination with the IRGC and Hezbollah. A long-time beneficiary of Iranian assistance, Hezbollah had thousands of fighters in Syria who played a critical role buttressing the defense of Damascus and preventing other advances by the Sunni rebels. Hezbollah paid a steep price for its heroics. By 2015, it had lost up to 1,500 fighters in combat.79 Shoygu’s military plan envisioned Russian air power complemented by on-the-ground IRGC and Hezbollah forces. Syria’s civil war made strange bedfellows. Fiona Hill, who moved from the Brookings Institution to become the senior director for Russia in Trump’s National Security Council, believes that the Kremlin maintained a close relationship with Iran as a counterweight to Sunni powers. Turkey and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council inspired Sunni groups with ties to the South Caucasus, which potentially threatened Russia.80 Hill would later emerge as a key witness in the impeachment proceedings against President Trump. Anti-Americanism was a unifying force between Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Putin was convinced that the UN-led and US-backed Geneva Peace Process was a failure and that diplomacy needed a new format. A  conference was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan, in January 2017. It launched the “Astana Process,” which focused on ceasefires and humanitarian access, whereas Geneva was about political talks. Conveners of the Astana Process marginalized the UN and Western countries; only low-ranking US

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and UN officials were invited. While Russian officials maintained that Astana would complement the Geneva Peace Process, it was actually intended to sideline it and burnish Putin’s international diplomatic credentials. The Astana Process brought the Syrian army and rebels together for proximity talks, which led to the creation of four “de-escalation zones.” The de-escalation zones were intended to shore up local cease-fires with monitoring by guarantor countries. De-escalation was a misnomer. After a lull in fighting, Russia and the Syrian government pounded the de-escalation zones with air power and artillery. Three zones surrendered to government forces. Eastern Ghouta fell in April 2018, after a brutal two-month offensive. The southern provinces of Daraa and Quneitra also succumbed. Only Idlib in the northwest remained outside of government control. Idlib was a cauldron, teeming with displaced people and fighters who had evacuated from other areas. It was overcrowded with little shelter, water, and sanitation. Idlib was the Alamo, the last stronghold. ***** Vladimir Putin hates Mrs. Clinton. His actions in Syria were partly motivated by personal spite. Russia’s engagement was not only intended to rescue Assad. It also sought to discredit both the United States and Hillary Clinton, the chief advocate of America’s robust role in Syria. Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential elections was intended to prevent Clinton from becoming president. As leader of the free world, she would have been further empowered as Putin’s nemesis. Putin left the presidency in 2008, abiding by term limits in Russia’s constitution. After a hiatus as prime minister, he was reelected president in 2012. Official results gave Putin a victory with 63.6 percent of the vote. Protesters accused Putin of rigging the elections and organized a series of demonstrations. In her role then as secretary of state, Hillary Clinton strongly criticized Russia’s elections:  “[The Russian people] deserve to have their voices heard and their votes counted, and that means they deserve fair, free transparent elections and leaders who are accountable to them.”81 Putin fumed. He accused Clinton of giving “a signal” to demonstrators who were supported by the State Department. With a combination of scorn and respect, Russian officials referred to Clinton as “a lady with balls.”82 Animosity between Putin and Clinton dates back to 2008. President George W.  Bush said that he had gotten a sense of Putin’s “soul” by looking into his eyes. Clinton responded that Putin was a KGB agent and “by definition doesn’t have a soul.”83 Clinton was skeptical about the proposed “reset” in US–Russia relations, and proposed a readjustment to the reset. When Russia invaded Georgia, Clinton criticized Russia’s description of Georgia and Ukraine as Russian “zones of influence,” labeling the Crimea take-over an “occupation.”84 She pledged “steadfast” US commitment to Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Putin retorted, “Some believe that it has been occupied, but others think that it has been liberated.”85 Clinton reaffirmed support for the NATO-Ukraine Commission to deepen relations. She told Ukrainians they could “count on the support and friendship of the United States” as they “chart your own course toward your own future.”86 She reaffirmed the commitment from the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine would join NATO. She also initiated negotiations with Poland, a former Warsaw Pact member, over a missile defense deal.

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Clinton stepped down as secretary of state to prepare her campaign for president. As a private citizen, she condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The claims by President Putin and other Russians that they had to go into Crimea and maybe further into eastern Ukraine because they had to protect the Russian minorities, that is reminiscent of claims that were made back in the 1930s when Germany under the Nazis kept talking about how they had to protect German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia and elsewhere throughout Europe.87

Putin deeply resented the comparison to Adolf Hitler. In March 2014, Clinton directly confronted Putin by comparing his actions “to what Hitler did back in the ’30s.”88 Michael McFaul, who served as US ambassador to Russia from 2011 to 2014, believes that Russia’s interference in America’s 2016 election was payback. When Special Counsel Robert Mueller testified before Congressional committees in July 2019, he was asked: “Would you agree that it was not a hoax that the Russians were engaged in trying to impact our election?” Mueller responded, “Absolutely. That was not a hoax. The indictments we returned against the Russians … were substantial in their scope.”89 Mueller’s report describes the extensive involvement of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), cybersecurity experts based in St. Petersburg with close ties to the Kremlin and to Putin personally. The IRA was headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, an oligarch with a troll factory designed to influence US public opinion. Mueller explained that the IRA was part of the Russian government’s “sweeping and systematic” interference campaign. Prigozhin was also active in Syria through his firm, the Wagner Group. Prigozhin, known as “the chef,” is an oligarch and close associate of Putin. Wagner mercenaries operated without oversight or accountability. Their involvement in Syria was more than a quasi-military force to prop up the regime. It was an effort to humiliate the United States for supporting the “moderate opposition.” Wagner is a covert arm of Russian security that worked for Russia, in service of Assad. It is compensated for training and fighting alongside Syrian armed forces by taking a cut of oil and natural gas fields. In February 2017, Russian media reported that up to two hundred Wagner mercenaries guarding an oil field were wiped out in a deadly barrage from a US helicopter gunship near Deir ez-Zor. Wagner is a covert arm of the Russian security forces modeled on the US private security firm “Blackwater.” In January 2017, Erik Prince met a Russian banker, Kirill Dmitriev, who heads the Russian Direct Investment Fund, and has close ties to Putin, and Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates. Prince was interviewed by Special Counsel Robert Mueller about possible ties between Russia and the Trump campaign, which he supported during the 2016 election. Prigozhin and Dmitriev are the link between Putin’s role in Syria and his efforts to influence US presidential elections. Was Russia’s robust engagement motivated by strategic goals, a desire to embarrass Clinton, or both? Was Russia’s election interference against Hillary or pro-Trump? Answers to these questions not only have bearing on the situation in Syria. They also explain Trump’s obsequious fawning over Vladimir Putin.

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The Shiite Crescent

The Islamic Republic of Iran aims to strengthen its relations with Syria and will stand by it in facing all challenges. The deep, strategic and historic relations between the people of Syria and Iran will not be shaken by any force in the world.1 —President Hassan Rouhani ***** Iran sought a corridor from Tehran to Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut through which it can supply weapons to Hezbollah, Hamas, and other radical Palestinian groups committed to destroying Israel. The corridor ran along a Shiite crescent that also allows the Islamic Republic of Iran to export its ideology across the Middle East to the Mediterranean. The term “Shiite Crescent” was coined in 2004 by Jordan’s King Abdullah who warned that Iran’s support for Shiite forces in the Middle East sought to “alter the traditional balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and pose new challenges to US interests and allies.”2 Syria is a portal, giving Iran strategic depth and helping Iran to project power and influence. Syria is also a counterweight to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s chief regional rival, and a springboard for Iran into the Arab world. As a bulwark against Sunni influence in Syria and the Middle East, Bashar al-Assad’s government is critical to Iran’s security and strategic interests. During Syria’s civil war, Syria became the front line between Sunni Islamist militia and Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah and the Islamic Republican Guard Corps (IRGC). A deep rift exists between Shiites and Sunnis in the worldwide Muslim community. While Sunnis represent about 85 percent of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims, and are the majority in forty Muslim majority countries,3 Shiites predominate in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, and are a plurality in Lebanon. Tensions between Shiites and Sunnis have been exploited by both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Their competition spurred violence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, while heightening tensions in Gulf countries such as Bahrain. It was also a driver of conflict between Syria’s communities. Though Sunnis are 74 percent of Syria’s population, power is controlled by Alawites, a sect of Shiism, who represent up to 18 percent of Syrians.4

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Commonalities between Islamic sects are greater than their differences. Muslims share a holy book, the Quran, and religious teachings of the Sunnas and the Hadith. However, conflict between Shiites and Sunnis dates back to the seventh century. The Prophet Muhammad died in AD 632, leading to a struggle over succession. On one side of the debate were those who believed that leadership should be handed down through Mohammed’s bloodline. On the other were proponents of a more merit-based system, whereby the most qualified and respected person would lead the Ummah, the collective community of Islamic people. Abu Bakr was a companion and, through his daughter Aisha, the father-in-law of Mohammed. He was selected by a group of elders to lead the Ummah over Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law. The term “Shiite” has its origin in Shi’atu Ali, which means “Ali partisans.” Sunnis follow “the way” or Sunna, rejecting succession based on bloodline. Ali became caliph, the chief Muslim civil and religious ruler, in AD 656. However, he was assassinated five years later. The Islamic state, or Caliphate, was based in the Arabian Peninsula at the time, but it was shifted to Damascus and then Baghdad. Ḥussein ibn Ali was a grandson of Muhammad, the son of Ali ibn Abi Talib and Muhammad’s daughter, Fatima. Hussein espoused a more egalitarian worldview, refusing allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph. Hussein was ambushed by Sunni tribesmen in Karbala, in present-day Iraq, and beheaded. His death on October 10, AD 680 is commemorated each year by a holy festival called Ashura. The Shiite faithful parade on Ashura, beating and bloodying themselves while recalling Hussein’s murder, self-sacrifice, and suffering. Inspired by Hussein’s martyrdom, Shiites recommit to opposing oppression and injustice on Ashura. Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution ushered in a new era of conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini conflated political and religious leadership under the auspices of the so-called Islamic revival. Saudi Arabia rejected Khomeini and sought to expand its leadership of the worldwide Ummah through a variety of means, including support for Madrasas that teach Wahhabism, a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam. It also sponsored militant Islamist groups, which morphed into terror organizations including Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Iraq, then controlled by a Sunni minority, fought a brutal war with Iran between 1980 and 1988. Though hundreds of thousands were killed and wounded, nothing changed. The cease-fire line approximated the territorial boundaries that existed before the war. There were also proxy wars. Saudi Arabia supported Afghans fighting the Soviet Union, while Iran supported Shiite groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Pakistan. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, rejected Khomeini. They revile Shiites as heretics and apostates. In 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, denounced Shiite “snakes” and called on Sunnis to cut off their heads.5 He scorned Hezbollah and Alawites who believe in the divinity of Ali and revere him.6 In the aftermath of Iraq’s sectarian civil war, Syria became ground zero for conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. Iran devoted troops and treasure to defend the Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad. Both geostrategic considerations and religious motivation

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inspired Iran. The IRGC and its Quds force were joined by Hezbollah and Shiite militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Backed by Turkey, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and the worldwide network of Sunni jihadists, Sunnis rebelled against Alawite rule and Assad’s corrupt administration. Syria’s civil war was more than a battle between the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Sunni opposition militias. It was also a fight between competing Muslim ideologies. Syria became a proxy war between countries seeking influence and economic advantage in the region. Shiites disparaged Sunni Islamists for apostasy. For Shiites, the Syrian war turned into an apocalyptic showdown between Shiites and Sunnis. They also saw it as an extension of the struggle against the United States and Israel. Hatred of the United States animates Iranian policy in Syria and elsewhere. Yet, US-Iranian relations improved during President Barack Obama’s second term. US officials muted their criticism of Iran’s support for terror groups so as not to disrupt sensitive negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Despite Washington’s effort to tone down its criticism, anti-American fervor remained high in Iran. Propaganda since the 1979 Iranian Revolution demonized the United States as the “Great Satan.”7 Iranians still chant “Death to America.”8 The JCPOA could have marked a new era in US–Iran relations. However, enmity and distrust die hard. When Washington withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, old adversaries were pitted against each other. The Trump administration was vilified by Iranians for torpedoing the JCPOA. The United States remained Iran’s nemesis, imposing new biting sanctions and undermining the normalization of Iran’s relations with the international community. ***** Deep religious, economic, and security ties bind Iran and Syria, with Iranian leaders calling Syria the “35th province.”9 Iranian forces had a strong presence in Syria well before the outbreak of Syria’s civil war. Iran provided technical guidance on Syria’s intelligence monitoring techniques, sharing expertise it developed during the 2009 and 2010 crackdown against the Green Movement when many Iranians joined street demonstrations to protest election fraud and demand President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s resignation. Iran also established a sophisticated “cyber army” to monitor the Green Movement protesters. Iranian intelligence agencies developed stateof-the-art capabilities to monitor dissent online and technology to surveille email, cell phones, and social media. The Basij militia, a branch of the IRGC known as “morality police,” terrorized protesters. When Syria’s revolution started in 2011, Iran responded by providing training and weapons to the SAA, such as assault rifles, machine guns, explosives, detonators, as well as 60-mm and 120-mm mortar shells. Iran also provided rubber bullets, truncheons, and riot control equipment. The selection and sophistication of weapons increased as the fighting intensified. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta accused Iran of arming and training pro-government militias. According to Panetta, “It is obvious that Iran has been playing a larger role in Syria in many ways.”10 He accused the IRGC of “trying to develop, trying to train a militia within Syria to be able to fight on behalf of the

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regime.”11 According to Panetta, the growing presence of Iran in Syria was dangerous and “of deep concern to us. The Syrian people ought to determine their future, not Iran.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, echoed Panetta’s message. He compared the Alawite force to the Mahdi Army of the Iraqi Shiite leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, which killed many Americans. Ahmad Vahidi, Iran’s defense minister, warned foreign forces not to intervene in Syria, which would create a “major crisis.” He accused Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey of arming the opposition, alleging collusion with the United States and Israel. “It is ugly that countries … have flooded Syria with arms, equipping terrorist groups. It will have very bad implications in the region. The losers of such a crisis will be the Westerners and pro-Zionist countries.” UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called the Syrian conflict a “proxy war, with regional and international players arming one side or the other.”12 As atrocities intensified, the fifty-seven-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) met in Jeddah and agreed in a symbolic move to suspend Syria’s membership.13 The IRGC’s deployment kept growing. Beyond training and acting as military advisers, IRGC members were actively fighting on the side of the regime. Some wore insignias, while others were involved in covert operations. Farsi was heard on the battlefield with a growing number of SAA units under Iranian command. Iranians wearing Syrian military uniforms and bearing local identification cards were deployed to Tartus and Latakia, alongside an elite Syrian Air Force intelligence unit. Iran’s involvement was limited and did not make an appreciable difference during the early years of the war. The Syrian government lost Idlib province to the rebels by the middle of 2015, causing grave concern about the regime’s survival. Syria’s main backers—Russia and Iran—discussed a security strategy and coordinated military action. When Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met in May 2015, they agreed to a joint Iranian-Russian military operation to rescue Assad. They also agreed on a broader counterterrorism strategy to counter the rise of ISIS. As follow-up to the KhameneiLavrov meeting, Iranian and Russian officials negotiated a political agreement defining their responsibilities.14 As of that time, Russia had only supplied weapons to the regime and Iran had dispatched only some IRGC members and small numbers of other Shiite paramilitary formations. Their modest support did not prevent Syria from losing about 80 percent of its territory. Moscow required a formal request from Assad before military intervention. Assad visited Moscow to brief Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu on his country’s urgent needs, which he characterized as a “manpower problem.” Khamenei sent a senior envoy to Moscow. Putin told him:  “Okay we will intervene. Send Qassem Soleimani.”15 Soleimani commands the Quds Force, IRGC elite Special Forces in charge of extraterritorial operations. He earned notoriety in Iraq for shaping the battlefield with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which killed many Americans. Soleimani was tasked with working out the details of military cooperation between Syria, Iran, and Russia. He visited Moscow on July 24, 2015. In a meeting with Shoygu, Soleimani unfurled a map of Syria. He highlighted rebel advances to the coast, which

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posed a danger to Russian bases. The Russians were very alarmed, but Soleimani assured them that “there is still the possibility to reclaim the initiative.” According to Soleimani, “We haven’t lost all the cards.”16 Soleimani and Shoygu agreed that Russia would supply air power, while the IRGC and Hezbollah engaged Sunni militias on the ground. Russia would upgrade its supply of weapons to the SAA. Furthermore, Russia and Iran agreed to establish a joint operations command in Damascus and Baghdad. Soleimani became a fixture in Damascus. He was also a frequent visitor to the front line of military operations.17 New IRGC attachments started arriving in Tartus and Latakia by mid-September 2015. Members of the Basij were also deployed. Basij were known for their sacrifice and martyrdom during the Iran–Iraq war. Many were cannon fodder, charging across the minefields into battle. In addition, about three thousand fighters from the Iranian-backed Lebanese group, Hezbollah, were mobilized for a major offensive in the west and northwest of Syria. By October 2015, some seven thousand IRGC members and paramilitaries were fighting in Syria. With support from the Quds Force, the SAA gained ground in Aleppo, Daraa, Qusayr, and the al-Ghab plains, turning the tide of battle. ***** Hezbollah, the Party of God, was a by-product of the Iranian revolution that arose during Lebanon’s civil war. Hezbollah’s charter calls for an Iran-style Islamic republic in Lebanon. It appeals to the Shiite underclass, exploiting grievances and sense of persecution. Shiites resented the US-led Multinational Force in Lebanon, which was established in 1982 to oversee the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from the country. Jeffrey Feltman, a former US and UN official, writes: The Iranian mullahs thus had a perfect stage on which to export their revolutionary drama: an increasingly disliked Western coalition on the ground; a brutal Israeli occupation and victimized Palestinians in squalid camps; the distracting chaos of an on-going civil war; and—most importantly—an alienated and despised Shiite population desperate for political and economic salvation and security.18

As many as one thousand IRGC were deployed to Lebanon in the 1980s where they set up training camps for Hezbollah fighters in the Beqaa Valley. Iran paid Hezbollah salaries, which professionalized operations. Hezbollah proved effective on the battlefield in Lebanon. Iran provided a lethal arsenal that Hezbollah used against Sunni, Druze, and Maronite Christian opponents in Lebanon’s civil war. Hezbollah contributed to the defeat of US and French forces, who withdrew in 1984. It also took credit for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Beirut the following year. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and the Iranian mullahs share a devotion to destroying Israel. In addition to kidnapping, hostage-taking, and suicide bombings, Hezbollah conducted political assassinations at Iran’s behest. Its operatives

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were implicated in the IED explosion that killed Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005.19 Iran provided rockets that Hezbollah used in the war with Israel in the summer of 2006. Hezbollah was a force multiplier for Iran. It advanced Iran’s interests, while establishing its bona fides as a Lebanese political party and military actor in the region. The model of Iranian support to Hezbollah was replicated in Iraq with Iranian assistance to Shiite militias. When Iran intensified its Syrian involvement in 2012, it summoned Hezbollah’s battle-tested and disciplined fighters. Hezbollah initially entered the fray to defend the Sayeda Zainab mosque, a historic and revered Shiite shrine on the outskirts of Damascus. Hezbollah also defended Shiite villages along the border with Lebanon. The area had been militarized by weapons and manpower flowing to the armed opposition via Lebanon’s northeast Beqaa Valley, which has a large Sunni population. Hezbollah’s first major action was in al-Qusayr in western Syria’s Homs Governorate on the border with Lebanon. Qusayr also has strategic value. The M5 highway between Damascus and Tartus runs between Homs and Qusayr. Hezbollah fighters played a critical role in the battle for Qusayr, which started on May 19, 2013, and lasted seventeen days. Sunni defenders of Qusayr were local residents and villagers, forming the Farouq Battalion, a component of the Syria Islamic Liberation Front. In addition, the Khaled bin Walid Brigades and Jabhat al-Nusra also operated in Qusayr. Up to 1,700 battlehardened Hezbollah fighters also joined the fight. Most of them were combat veterans and members of Hezbollah’s Special Forces. Hezbollah assumed tactical control of the Qusayr offensive, with Syrian officers under its command. The SAA launched artillery and air strikes softening rebel positions in Qusayr. Hezbollah fighters, wearing headbands inscribed with “O Hussein,” seized 60 percent of Qusayr on the first day.20 Occupying all of Qusayr proved more challenging with Hezbollah encountering an extensive network of booby traps and IEDs. According to a Hezbollah fighter, “[We were fighting] centimeter by centimeter.”21 Hezbollah lost many fighters: 112 killed and hundreds wounded. The casualty rate exceeded losses from Hezbollah’s thirty-four-day war with Israel in 2006. Qusayr marked a turning point in the war, as the SAA started to regain territory seized by the opposition. Hassan Nasrallah consistently denied Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria’s civil war. In April 2013, however, Nasrallah revealed Hezbollah’s role. He urged supporters not to “let Syria fall into the hands of America, Israel, or Takfiri groups.”22 The Qusayr victory consolidated Hezbollah control over the northern Qalamoun region, as well as border gates between Syria and Lebanon. Hezbollah’s operations in Syria expanded after Qusayr, with engagement in Qalamoun and Zabadani; the northern provinces of Daraa, Idlib, and Aleppo; as well as the Damascus suburbs.23 Nasrallah announced the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from the border of Syria and Lebanon in May 2017. Instead of returning to Beirut, Hezbollah penetrated deeper into Syria to secure the borders with Iraq and Jordan, and establish missile bases in Qusayr and Qalamoun to protect against Israeli air strikes. Between twenty thousand and thirty thousand other Shiite foreign fighters were sponsored by Iran to fight in Syria. Iran drew from Hashd al-Shabi, the Popular

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Mobilization Forces, an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organization composed of some forty Shiite militia groups. About three thousand Afghan paramilitaries, comprising the Liwa Fatemiyoun Division, also fought in Syria, as did approximately one thousand Pakistanis in the Liwa Zainebiyoun Brigade, an elite assault force trained by the IRGC in Mashad. These organizations functioned like a Foreign Legion. Recruits were paid on average $500/month with salaries on a sliding scale based on the recruit’s country of origin and level of military training. Beyond the stipend, recruits were given residency papers for Iran. They were motivated by self-interest and religious devotion to the memory of Hussein. About 900 Afghans and 150 Pakistanis died.24 Iran paid to send family members of fallen fighters on pilgrimages to Shiite shrines and holy places in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. It also provided the families of “martyrs” a bonus to cover the costs of their children’s education. Iran’s involvement in Syria’s civil war came at a great cost, measured in monetary terms and by the casualty count. Between January 2013 and December 2018, the IRGC and Iranian military lost more than 2,300 soldiers. Many were generals and high-ranking officers. For example, Brigadier General Hossein Hamadani, Soleimani’s deputy, was killed on October 8, 2015. IRGC senior commanders Hamid Mokhtarband and Farshad Hassounizadeh died on October 12. The Sayyeda Zainab shrine in south Damascus is a special place for prayer and pilgrimage. Posters of fallen fighters have their image with its iconic golden dome in the background. The United States excluded Iran from the UN-led Geneva Peace talks. Iran chided the United States for lacking flexibility. According to Iran’s deputy foreign minister Abbas Araqchi, “Everyone knows that without Iran the chances of a real solution to Syria are not that great.”25 The United States reversed its position, inviting Iran to peace talks in Vienna on October 30, 2015. The Vienna meeting was the first time that the United States formally engaged with Iran diplomatically on the Syria issue. The Vienna meeting also brought Iran and Saudi Arabia to the same table for the first time. Vienna came three months after Iran signed the JCPOA, signaling a thaw in diplomatic relations.26 ***** Iran’s economic support helped forestall the collapse of the Assad regime. Its economic assistance increased markedly beginning in 2012, as conflict intensified. According to UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura, the Iranian government spent at least $6 billion annually, with estimates ranging up to $15 billion/year.27 These figures include economic and military aid, but do not count the costs of Iran’s own military operations. According to the US Department of State, Iran spent around $21 billion between 2012 and mid-2018. This figure includes $16 billion in military aid to paramilitary groups, and a $6.6 billion line of credit to the Syrian government. The BBC estimated that $2.8 billion was spent on civilian medical supplies, medical equipment, food, and other consumables.28 According to The Economist, as of February 2012, Iran provided $9 billion to help the Syrian government withstand Western sanctions.29 It also provided oil and petroleum products. Bilateral trade between Iran and Syria increased from $545 annually before the war to over $1 billion annually in 2017.30 Estimates vary,

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but Iran may have spent more than $100 billion between 2011 and 2018 on military and economic assistance.31 Iran used its credits to pay for goods sold to Syria. The line of credit helped keep the Syrian economy afloat. Tehran also signed cooperation agreements to invest in a port in Tartus, develop five thousand hectares of agricultural land, explore phosphate mines south of Palmyra, and license mobile phone operators. In addition, Iran expanded its presence in Syria by acquiring real estate, including a significant property at the entrance of Damascus, close to the Iranian embassy on the Mezzeh Highway. Iran provided Syria with diesel fuel in exchange for gasoline. Britain seized an Iranian tanker, the Grace 1, off the coast of Gibraltar in July 2019, asserting that the ship was transporting oil to Syria in violation of EU sanctions.32 Iran called it an act of piracy and retaliated, detaining the British flagged tanker, Stena Impero, near the Strait of Hormuz, accusing it of violating international travel regulations.33 In September 2019, the Adrian Darya (formerly the Grace 1) was spotted two nautical miles off the coast of Syria near Tartus. It went dark after leaving Gibraltar by turning off its tracking transponder. Iran had given a written promise that it would not deliver its 2.1 million barrels of oil to Syria. National Security Adviser John R. Bolton scorned Iran’s business with the Assad regime. “Tehran thinks it’s more important to fund the murderous Assad regime than provide for its own people. We can talk but Iran’s not getting any sanctions relief until it stops lying and spreading terror.”34 Iran tried to recoup its expenses in Syria, which led to an economic competition between Iran and Russia. Security cooperation between Iran and Russia was born out of necessity, but did not endure. Financial self-interest got in the way. Syria has deposits of oil, gas, and phosphate. In January 2017, the Iranian government and the IRGC signed a major mining and telecommunications agreement with the Syrian government. In September, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) announced plans for an oil refinery in Homs. A consortium involving NIOC, Syrian, and Venezuelan companies sought $1 billion for the project, which aimed to refine 140,000 barrels per day.35 Also in September, Iran signed agreements to rebuild Syria’s power grid. Russia was also looking after its economic interests. It signed contracts to build power plants, set up four grain mills in Homs at a cost of €70 million, pump gas near the River Tigris, and explore oil at the cost of $100 million over a period of twenty-five years.36 Iran and Russia inevitably clashed over the spoils of war. Iranian officials thought they had a deal with Damascus to develop the phosphate industry. Instead, the Syrian government awarded a major fifty-year phosphate deal to the Russians. Russian firms also locked up gas exploration contracts before they were published and ready for competitive bidding. Tehran suspected Russian interference when the award of mobile telecommunications contract to an Iranian concern was delayed. In February 2018, Iran accused Russian competitors of blocking Iranian participation in reconstruction and real estate contracts. Members of President Hassan Rouhani’s inner circle publicly blamed Russia for blocking lucrative reconstruction deals.37 Iran was able to realize its security goals, despite disputes with Russia that limited its economic benefits in Syria. The Assad regime gained control of the al-Tanf and Abu

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Kamal border, strengthening an essential link in the land corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean. ***** The JCPOA was a gamble. It included sunset periods after which Iran could resume its nuclear activities. Negotiators assumed that the benefits would be so significant that Iran’s leadership would choose to stick with the deal. Candidate Donald J. Trump opposed the JCPOA, saying “The Iran Deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.”38 Trump exaggerated the benefits to Iran, saying: “We gave them $150 billion … and we got nothing.” In fact, the United States did release about $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets, but that sum did not go to Iran. After Iran fulfilled its debt obligations, only about $35 billion remained.39 According to Trump, “At the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction that a murderous regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program.”40 On May 8, 2018, Trump announced that the United States was withdrawing from the JCPOA. Launching a campaign of maximum pressure, he condemned Iran as the leading state sponsor of terror. It exports dangerous missiles, fuels conflicts across the Middle East, and supports terrorist proxies and militias such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al Qaeda. [The JCPOA] imposed no limits at all on its other malign behavior, including its sinister activities in Syria, Yemen, and other places all around the world.41

Despite the economic hardship caused by the reimposition of sanctions, Iranian hardliners felt vindicated. They asserted all along that the United States could not be trusted, and accused Washington of negotiating in bad faith. According to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, “We accepted the JCPOA but they continued their enmity with the Islamic Republic.”42 Major General Mohamad Ali Jafari, commander of the IRGC, said: “The withdrawal of America is a good omen. It was clear that the Americans cannot be trusted and that they will never act on their commitments.”43 Rouhani responded by announcing plans to bypass the United States and cooperate with other signatories of the JCPOA, who wanted to rescue the deal. French president Emmanuel Macron indicated, “France, Germany and the UK regret the US decision to leave the JCPOA. We will work collectively on a broader framework, covering nuclear activity, the post-2025 period, ballistic activity, and stability in the Middle East, notably Syria, Yemen and Iraq.”44 Britain’s foreign minister Boris Johnson asserted, “[The] UK remains strongly committed to the JCPOA, and will work with E3 partners and the other parties to maintain it.”45 The EU’s Federica Mogherini affirmed that, “The EU will remain committed to the continued full and effective implementation of the nuclear deal. The lifting of nuclear-related sanctions is an essential part of the agreement.”46 China’s representative said, “Having a deal is better than no deal. Dialogue is better than confrontation.”47 Germany was similarly critical of Washington’s action. Despite almost universal condemnation of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, US secondary sanctions on banks doing

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business with Iran successfully imposed a deep chill on Iran’s trade and international relations. Iran restarted more advanced and rapid centrifuges as a diplomatic device to give it negotiating leverage rather than as a serious effort to further its development of nuclear weapons. International consensus started to erode as Russia and China increased their efforts to help Iran sell oil. Trump floated the idea of meeting Rouhani at the UNGA in September 2019. But the political cost to a Trump–Rouhani meeting far exceeded the uncertain benefits of a bilateral. ***** Volatile US–Iran relations were exacerbated by Trump’s fawning over Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Emboldened by Assad’s success in Syria, the IRGC expanded its malign activities in the region, baiting MBS increasing the prospect of armed confrontation with Saudi Arabia, which could potentially involve the United States. Iran downed an American RQ4A Global Hawk drone over the Strait of Hormuz in June 2019. Trump ordered missile strikes, but, fearing escalatory conflict, called them off at the last minute. Convinced that Trump was a paper tiger, Iranian drones and cruise missiles attacked Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khutais oil and gas processing facility on September 15, 2019. The strike, which occurred shortly after John Bolton was fired as NSA, temporarily removed up to 50 percent of Saudi oil from world energy markets, causing a dramatic spike in prices. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called the attack an “act of war.”48 Tough talk from Trump administration officials came just as Congress was ramping up impeachment proceedings. Critics said the confrontation with Iran was a “ ‘wag the dog’ syndrome” designed to distract the American public from revelations of presidential malfeasance. Trump was a mercurial interlocutor. One day, he was threatening military action. The next, downplaying talk of war. MBS incited US officials and Trump was easily manipulated. He warned that the United States was “locked and loaded,” but then backed off his threat of war. Members of Congress criticized Trump for letting Riyadh dictate US foreign policy. Trump suggested that the United States might fight Iran and get the Saudis to pay for it. According to former secretary of defense Robert M. Gates, “The Saudis always want to fight the Iranians to the last American.”49 Iranian officials fueled tensions by gloating over the Abqaiq and Khutais attacks. General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC’s air force warned, “Everyone should know that all American bases and their aircraft carriers in a distance of up to 2,000 kilometers around Iran are within range of our missiles.” He asserted that Iran was ready for a “full-fledged war” with the United States.50 Trump floated the idea of an international coalition to counter Iran’s aggression, but the initiative fell flat. Intelligence findings were far from concrete. Moreover, European countries were wary of Trump’s bellicose approach. They believed that Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA put in motion events that led to the attack. In response to Trump’s policy of maximum pressure, Iran announced it would not abide by the terms of the JCPOA and started to increase its uranium enrichment. Wendy Sherman, who

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helped negotiate the JCPOA, blamed Trump for “hyperbole and outright fabrications [that left] little credibility with Congress, allies and partners, let alone the American people.”51 Trump acted beholden and submissive to MBS. He cited Saudi Arabia’s pledge to buy more than $100 billion in US weapons for his fealty. He also announced that the United States would deploy an additional fifteen thousand troops to the Kingdom and that Saudi Arabia had agreed to cover the costs. Members of Congress criticized Trump for acting in mercenary fashion and allowing MBS to dictate US foreign policy. MBS succeeded in putting the United States and Iran on a collision course. Sanctions, corruption, and ineffective government riled Iranians who took to the streets, protesting the regime. Protests were sparked by the government’s decision to cut gas subsidies, which sent energy prices soaring. Consumers were hardest hit. Taking a page from Assad’s playbook, Khameini showed zero tolerance for dissent and launched a violent crackdown. Iran shut down the internet and targeted protesters, making it impossible to know the scale of reprisals. Citing credible reports, Amnesty International estimated that at least 208 protesters had been killed in twenty-one cities over a four-day period beginning November 15, 2019. Unrest in Iran occurred as popular protests swept the region. Iraqis also took to the streets, precipitating a government crackdown, which killed hundreds. Lebanon was also wracked by protests when the government tried to impose a tax on what’s app messaging. Economic conditions, corruption, and environmental distress further fueled protests. Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu was indicted on corruption charges as government formation floundered after repeated parliamentary elections in Israel. ***** Israel was the only country to endorse Trump’s confrontational approach with Iran and decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. Netanyahu vigorously campaigned against the deal for years. Even after the deal was made, he continued to disparage it, insisting that the signatories either upgrade the agreement or cancel it. He praised Trump’s “brave decision” to withdraw from the JCPOA.52 Not only did scuttling the JCPOA put the United States and Iran on a collision course, it also intensified hostilities between Israel and Iran, with ramifications in Syria. Iran’s relations with Israel were not always adversarial. Israel’s founding prime minister David Ben Gurion developed the “Periphery Doctrine,” cultivating relations with non-Arab states: Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia, as well as the Maronite Christians in Lebanon and the Kurds in Iraq. Iran felt threatened by pan-Arab nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, and aligned with the United States. However, Iran abruptly broke off diplomatic relations with the United States and Israel after the 1979 Revolution, joining the Arab axis that extolled driving Israel into the sea. Iran vowed to destroy Israel. It established a regional network of anti-Israel and anti-American proxies, which included the Syrian Alawite government, Shiite militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. Establishing a decentralized network deterred air strikes against Iran. Bombing Iran would precipitate reprisals by sleeper cells across the region and beyond.

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In 2008, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called Israel “a stinking corpse” and called for its “annihilation.”53 He also denied the Holocaust, calling it a “lie and a mythical claim.”54 Aligning himself with the Palestinians, he added:  “I can see that genocide is happening now under the pretext of an event that happened 60 years ago. Why should the Palestinian people make up for it”?55 Netanyahu was infuriated by Ahmadinejad’s comments, but Israel was content to sit on the sideline at the outset of Syria’s civil war and as conflict escalated. Netanyahu viewed Sunnis killing Shiites and Shiites killing Sunnis as a twofer, a pox on both their houses. As Assad’s regime prevailed and the IRGC became entrenched, however, Israel grew increasingly nervous about Iran assuming a permanent position in Syria. Israel did not strike Hezbollah in Lebanon, lest it provoke a renewal of the 2006 Israel–Lebanon war. Israel also decided to stay out of Syria’s civil war, avoiding a direct confrontation with Iran. However, Israel’s security calculation changed when Iran opened a new Syrian front against Israel in the Golan Heights. From early 2017 to September of 2019, Israel carried out more than two hundred air strikes on convoys delivering weapons to its adversaries.56 Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah were the backbone of the “axis of the resistance,” an alliance of regional forces in Iran’s network that were committed to destroying Israel and countering Western influence.57 Netanyahu insisted that Israel had no choice but to respond when Qassem Soleimani broadened the military theater, testing Israel’s patience. On February 10, 2018, Iran launched a drone into Israel’s air space. Israeli surfaceto-air missiles shot down the drone, and Israeli war planes attacked the base from which the drone had been launched. When Iran shot down an F-16, it was the first time that Iran targeted and successfully destroyed an Israeli war plane. The downing of the F-16 was a psychological blow to Israel. No Israeli fighter jet had been shot down in decades.58 Israel responded to Soleimani’s brinksmanship with a counterattack against a broad set of Iranian targets, including a base of the Quds Force, an Iranian intelligence site, an Iranian military training camp, and a large weapons storage facility in the Damascus International Airport. Netanyahu vowed to pay back Israel’s aggressors, warning Soleimani: “Be careful with your words and even more so with your actions.” Israel established a Persian language twitter account to discredit Soleimani with the Iranian public. Netanyahu’s tough talk preceded Israel’s national elections on September 17, 2019, to strengthen his national security credentials as Israel’s defender.59 Iran responded in a tit-for-tat military exchange. It launched a surface-to-surface missile from a facility near Damascus, which landed near a ski resort in the northern part of the Golan. In May 2018, Quds Forces launched twenty rockets on Israel. Israeli aircraft bombed both Syrian and Iranian military sites. Netanyahu reiterated Israel’s zero tolerance for military action by Iranian forces. “We have a permanent policy, to strike at the Iranian entrenchment in Syria and hurt whoever tries to hurt us.”60 Breaking precedent, Netanyahu acknowledged Israel’s responsibility. “Last night, the air force strongly attacked Iranian targets in Syria after Iran launched a missile from there at our territory. We will not ignore such acts of aggression as Iran attempts to entrench itself militarily in Syria.”61 Israeli officials also carried out hundreds of air strikes against Iranian convoys in Syria that were delivering missiles and other weapons to Hezbollah.

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Israel escalated the conflict by targeting Iranian-backed forces across the Middle East. In August 2019, Israel bombed a site in Syria where Iranian drones were being readied to attack it. Israel also used drones to attack the Beirut offices of Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Drones carried out a targeted killing of an Iranian-backed Shiite leader in Western Iraq and bombed an ammunition depot in Qaim, destroying several vehicles. The volatile shadow war between Israel and Iran risked coming out in the open and becoming a direct and more dangerous conflict with regional implications.62 The Golan Heights was taken by Israel in June 1967. Israel annexed the Golan in 1981, though its annexation was not recognized internationally. According to the UN and international law, the Golan was sovereign Syrian territory under Israeli occupation. Trump reversed US policy by signing an executive order on March 25, 2019, that recognized Israel’s annexation. Syria’s Foreign Ministry condemned Trump for holding international law in “contempt.” It maintained that Trump’s declaration would not change “the reality that the Golan was and will remain Syrian, Arab.” According to Syria’s Foreign Ministry, “The Syrian nation is more determined to liberate this precious piece of Syrian national land through all available means.”63 Trump’s recognition of Israel’s Golan annexation brought swift condemnation from Tehran and the international community. The EU said its position on the issue “has not changed” and it did not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan. Russia said changing the Golan’s status was a direct violation of the UN’s position. Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit called it “completely beyond international law.” Shiite militias mobilized to fight Israel, as tensions escalated. Harakat al-Nujaba, an offshoot of Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, established the Golan Brigade to liberate the Syrian territory. It sought to establish a base on the Syrian side of the Golan, which could be used by Hezbollah for missile attacks against Haifa and other targets in northern Israel. Hezbollah possessed more than 100,000 katyushas, highly inaccurate rockets without a capable radar system. Hezbollah’s sought to acquire SCUD and Yakhont antiship missiles, which would represent a significant upgrade of its arsenal. Hezbollah was also allegedly seeking chemical weapons (CW). Should Hezbollah acquire these weapons, it would pose an urgent threat to Israel. Iran also threatened the United States. It conducted a missile strike against ISIS fighters that landed within three miles of US forces in October 2018.64 Trump took steps to boost Netanyahu politically. In addition to recognizing Israel’s sovereignty of the Golan Heights, he moved the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and listed the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). According to Erdoğan, “[Recognizing Israel’s sovereignty of the Golan] brought the region to the brink of a new crisis.”65 Turkey was a wild card. US–Turkey relations deteriorated dramatically when Turkey joined the Astana Process. Its acquisition of Russian S-400 surface to air missiles cast doubt on Turkey’s NATO membership. With a green light from Trump, Turkey invaded and occupied northern Syria on October 9, 2019. Trump’s acquiescence confused both the battlefield in Syria and international diplomacy aimed at ending Syria’s civil war.

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No country can tolerate the presence of a terrorist organization just across its borders which threatens its security, stability and territorial integrity.1 —Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ***** Relations between Turkey and Syria are closely connected to Turkey’s fight with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK has engaged in an armed struggle for greater political and cultural rights since the 1980s. The conflict resulted in the deaths of about forty thousand people and the displacement of millions. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insists that the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the dominant pro-Kurdish party in Syria and its military wings, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) are extensions of the PKK. Syria’s civil war provided a pretext for Erdoğan to target the Syrian Kurds under the guise of fighting terrorism. To Erdoğan, fighting terrorism means killing Kurds. Erdoğan also targeted Bashar al-Assad, a regional rival, supporting Sunni armed groups that evolved into Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Many of the PKK’s rank and file, between 20 and 40 percent, are Kurds from Syria. Kurdish solidarity dates back to the Sevres Treaty of August 10, 1920, imposed by the Allied Powers on the Ottoman Empire. Sevres required autonomy for Kurds and promised a referendum within one year on whether the Kurds would seek their own independent state. The referendum was never held. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk launched the war of independence, asserting Turkish sovereignty over territories occupied by the great powers. Sevres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923. Lausanne did not mention the word “Kurdistan” or “Kurd” anywhere in its text. According to Atatürk, “This treaty is a document declaring that all efforts, prepared over centuries, and thought to have been accomplished through the Sevres Treaty to crush the Turkish nation have been in vain. It is a diplomatic victory unheard of in Ottoman history.”2 Lausanne gave Turkey control over most Ottoman Kurdish territory, with the rest divided between France and Great Britain. The French Mandate encompassed

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today’s Syria and the British Mandate covered modern-day Iraq. French territory was divided into six administrative entities: Greater Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo, Alawites, Jabal al-Druze, and the autonomous Sanjak in Alexandretta, which was annexed by Turkey in 1939 and became Hatay Province. Kurds in Syria resided on a patchwork of noncontiguous territories. Kurds in Turkey and Syria both speak the same dialect, Kurmanji, and share tribal affiliations. Betrayed by Lausanne, Sheikh Said Piran launched the Azadi Rebellion in February 1925. Superior Turkish forces put down the insurgency using air power. Many Kurds from Turkey resettled in Syria after Sheikh Said’s failed rebellion. In Syria, Kurds enjoyed considerable rights through an autonomy arrangement provided by the French administration. The French Mandate lasted until 1943, when two independent countries emerged, Syria and Lebanon. Conditions for Kurds in Syria were far preferable than conditions in Turkey. Atatürk, whose name means “the father of Turks,” institutionalized a policy of Turkification— “Kemalism.” The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) passed the Resettlement Law on June 14, 1934, which authorized local authorities to collect taxes, seize land, and resettle Kurds that were deemed a security risk.3 The existence of Kurdish identity in Turkey was denied; Kurdish language and geographical place names were banned; Kurds were officially called “Mountain Turks.”4 Kurds launched the Dersim rebellion in 1937, during which up to seventy thousand Kurds were killed.5 Armed conflict between Kurds and the Turkish state was constant. The Siverek and Hilvan rebellions were launched in Sanliurfa province on the border with Syria in 1979. They targeted feudal landlords who were exploiting the peasants and collaborating with the Turkish state against the Kurdish people. In the aftermath of the Siverek and Hilvan rebellions, the PKK was established at a congress of Kurds in the village of Fis, in Lice District, on November 27–8, 1978. Headed by Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK was a product of the revolutionary left. Its ideology was a mix of radical Marxist-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. The PKK declared itself a “workerpeasant alliance” and the vanguard of the global socialist movement.6 The PKK was under constant pressure from Turkish authorities. After the Maras Massacre in December 1978, Öcalan decided to leave Turkey and establish the PKK’s headquarters in the Syrian-controlled Beqaa Valley in Lebanon. His PKK cadres were welcomed by Hafez al-Assad, who thought he could use the PKK to destabilize the Turkey–Syrian border and reclaim Hatay Province. The PKK founded the Mahsum Korkmaz Academy in Beqaa Valley, which offered ideological instruction and training in guerilla techniques. It also served as a base of operation for hit-and-run crossborder attacks against Turkey. Syria’s then foreign minister Faruk al-Shara lauded the PKK as a credible “resistance movement.”7 As conflict intensified in the 1990s, Turkey demanded that Assad hand over Öcalan. Turkey threatened to disrupt the supply of water to Syria from the Euphrates River, which was vital for agriculture and electricity generation. When Turkey massed troops on the border, Hafez al-Assad signed the Adana Agreement on October 20, 1998. Under the terms of the accord, Syria designated the PKK a terrorist organization, banned its activities, and took steps to interdict the flow of weapons, money, and logistical support to the PKK. The Syrian government went above and beyond requirements of

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the accord. On its own and in concert with Turkey, the Syrian government launched military operations against the PKK, arresting its members and sending them to Turkey. PKK cadres with Turkish citizenship living in Syria were rounded up and deported. Syria also tightened its border with Turkey to prevent infiltrations and allowed hot pursuit operations by Turkish troops on Syrian soil.8 Öcalan fled Syria on October 9, 1998. After an international manhunt, he was captured in Nairobi on February 15, 1999. Imprisoning Öcalan did not solve Turkey’s Kurdish question. The root causes of the insurgency, Turkish chauvinism and the denial of Kurdish rights, persisted. After Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) was elected in November 2002, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu articulated his “zero problems with neighbors” policy, ushering in a new phase in relations between Turkey and Syria.9 Erdoğan cultivated a cordial relationship with Bashar al-Assad, emphasizing personal relations and economic diplomacy. In a landmark visit, Assad traveled to Istanbul for a three-day trip in 2004. He was accompanied by his wife, Asma. They socialized with Erdoğan and his wife, Emine, while Assad also conducted official business. Assad negotiated several agreements including reduced trade barriers with his counterpart, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. The countries had symbiotic interests. Syria was Turkey’s portal to markets in Arab countries and Turkey was the route for Syrian goods to Europe. Removing a major irritant in bilateral relations, Assad abandoned Syria’s historic claims to Alexandretta and accepted Turkish sovereignty over Hatay Province. Erdoğan visited Damascus in April 2007. He and Bashar al-Assad took in a soccer match between Fenerbahce, Erdoğan’s favorite team, and Al-Ittihad. Bilateral talks focused on trade and energy issues. Assad and Asma made a four-day visit to Ankara in April 2007 and later vacationed in Bodrum, an Aegean resort community, in August 2008. Erdoğan and Assad discussed Turkey’s efforts to mediate an agreement between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights. They also agreed to implement visa-free travel, which was announced on September 7, 2009. After the first-ever joint military exercises, Davutoğlu declared: “[Turkey and Syria share a] common fate, history, and future.”10 Assad described Turkey as Syria’s “best friend.”11 With the outbreak of violence in Daraa, Erdoğan tried to use his close personal relationship with Assad to dissuade further aggression. Erdoğan warned, “We do not want to see another Hama massacre.”12 With Syria’s unrelenting aggression, Erdoğan signaled support for the protesters. He said, “It is impossible to remain silent” and praised their “fight for freedom.” After Muammar Gaddafi was executed, Erdoğan admonished Assad to avoid the “painful events” of Libya. Erdoğan ratcheted up the rhetoric when his appeals were rejected, calling on Assad to resign. “Just remove yourself from that seat before shedding more blood, before torturing more and for the welfare of your country, as well as the region.” Erdoğan admonished, “It is not heroism to fight against your own people.” He warned, “While a nation—especially one that is our kin and relative—is being tormented, we have absolutely no intention to turn a blind eye, to turn our backs on Syria.”13 Assad felt personally betrayed by Erdoğan. He believed that if any country could empathize with Syria’s fight against terrorism, it would be Turkey, which had waged a

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decade-long struggle against the PKK. Staged by the Syrian government, demonstrators stormed Turkish missions in Damascus, Aleppo, and Latakia, burning Turkish flags in protest. Eight years of confidence-building unraveled quickly. As Syria’s civil war worsened, Erdoğan emerged as Assad’s most vocal critic and supported the rebels. He invited the Syrian National Council, a coalition of opposition groups, to set up its headquarters in Istanbul. Erdoğan welcomed Obama’s call for Assad to step down, and asked the United States to protect Syria’s Sunnis. Erdoğan was incensed when Obama refused to enforce his redline after chemical weapons (CW) were used in Ghouta on August 21, 2013. Turkey and countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called on Obama to expand US lethal support for the armed opposition, but Obama demurred. He feared that Islamist extremists would fill the power vacuum created by Assad’s fall. ***** Turkey was a critical ally of the United States during the Cold War. Turkish and US troops fought side by side in the Korean conflict. Turkey was the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), serving as an essential deterrent to Soviet aggression and hosting Jupiter nuclear weapons as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy. Turkey helped contain Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and provided sanctuary for up to one million Kurds who fled Saddam’s reprisals after the Kurdish uprising. Post 9/11, Turkey led the International Security Assistance for Afghanistan. However, the US–Turkey strategic partnership started to unravel when George W.  Bush rejected Erdoğan’s entreaties and attacked Iraq. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad met Turkish officials to discuss Turkey’s security concerns. As a result of the “Ankara process,” they agreed that Turkey would establish a twenty-kilometer buffer zone along its border inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey had always aspired to a security buffer along its borders. The agreement was, however, overtaken by events when the United States pulled the trigger and invaded Iraq from the south. Distrust between Turkey and the United States peaked on March 1, 2003, when the TGNA failed to approve transit of the US Army’s Fourth Infantry Division through Turkey to Northern Iraq. It worsened on July 4 when US troops from the Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade arrested three Turkish officers and eight noncommissioned officers, accusing them of a plot to assassinate the Governor of Kirkuk. The Turkish Special Forces were detained, hooded, and deported. Chairman of the Turkish General Staff Yaşar Güler called it “the biggest crisis of trust between Turkish and U.S. forces” and a “major stain on the nation’s honor.”14 Many Turks believed that the United States had a hidden agenda to establish “Greater Kurdistan.” According to Turkish officials, up to three thousand PKK members operated from sixty-five bases in Iraqi Kurdistan with their headquarters in the Qandil Mountains, fifty kilometers from the Turkish border. US forces in Iraq could have expelled them, but they had other priorities dealing with a major insurgency. Erdoğan insisted, “No country can tolerate the presence of a terrorist organization just across its border that threatens its stability and territorial integrity.”15 The buffer zone concept for Iraqi Kurdistan served as model to Turkey, which demanded a similar arrangement inside Syria. The establishment of a contiguous

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Kurdish-controlled territory encompassing territory in the Hasakah, Kobani, and Afrin governorates posed an existential threat to Turkey, which strongly opposed US support for Syrian Kurds. Turkish officials feared that the creation of an autonomous entity in Syria, alongside a semi-independent Iraqi Kurdistan, would inspire Kurds in Turkey to demand something similar. For Syria, Kurds use the term Western Kurdistan or “Rojava,” which means where the sun sets.16 After Ghouta, Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT) established infrastructure for supporting jihadists in Syria. Assistance ranged from military cooperation and weapons transfers to logistical support, financial assistance, and the provision of medical services to wounded warriors. Vice President Joe Biden confirmed Turkey’s involvement at Harvard University on October 3, 2014. Biden said, Our allies in the region were our largest problem in Syria. The Turks … the Saudis, the Emiratis … were so determined to take down Assad and essentially have a Sunni-Shia proxy war, they poured hundreds of millions of dollars, thousands of tons of weapons to anyone who would fight against Assad … The people that were being supplied were Al Nusra and Al Qaeda and the extremist elements of jihadis coming from other parts of the world.17

Biden elaborated, “We could not convince our colleagues to stop supplying them … President Erdogan told me, he’s an old friend. ‘You were right. We let too many people through.’ ”18 Erdoğan denied he made the statement, demanding a retraction and apology from Biden. The vice president’s candid off-the-cuff remark risked a major falling out at a time when the United States wanted more help from Turkey countering ISIS. Biden’s Office issued a statement reaffirming both countries’ commitment to countering violent extremism. He did not retract or apologize for what he said, but was contrite about having said it. Turkey assisted ISIS in plain sight.19 On May 29, 2015, the journalists Can Dündar, editor in chief of Cumhuriyet, and Erdem Gül, the Ankara representative, reported on trucks laden with weapons crossing the border. Dündar and Gül write, “Here are the weapons Erdoğan claims to not exist,” which documented the MIT’s military assistance to Syrian rebels. Cumhuriyet also published a video and photos supporting its report. Dündar and Gul were arrested and charged with espionage (Article 337 Turkish Penal Code), divulging state secrets (Article 329) and membership of a terrorist organization. Dündar told prosecutors, “We are not traitors, spies or heroes: we are journalists.”20 He was convicted for “disclosing documents concerning the security of the State” and given a five-year sentence. When Turkey’s constitutional court ordered his release, Dündar fled the country and filed for political asylum in Germany.21 It is unclear whether Turkey acted on its own; briefed the US government; or whether MIT and the United States jointly undertook a covert operation to arm Islamists. The Pentagon’s train-and-equip program was a fiasco. In response to the debacle, the Pentagon shifted its remaining funds to train the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF), which included Syrian Kurds of the YPG and the YPJ. *****

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The battle for Kobani was a turning point in the fight against ISIS. In September 2014, ISIS overran villages surrounding Kobani, a medium-sized city on the Turkish-Syrian border populated by mainly Kurds. ISIS beheaded villagers and raped women before progressing toward the city center. Turkish tanks were parked on the hills behind Kobani while the battle unfolded. Representatives of the international media were also stationed behind Kobani, reporting on Kobani’s valiant defenders. The YPG and YPJ fought bravely, but they were no match for ISIS armor, artillery, and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs). ISIS occupied 80  percent of Kobani and was poised to overrun the city and wipe out its Kurdish defenders. As the fight unfolded, Turkey took no action to prevent the imminent slaughter. It also obstructed Kurds from Turkey and Iran who tried to cross its border and help their brethren in Kobani. Riots erupted across Turkey as Kurds protested the government’s inaction and complicity. Up to this point, the Pentagon had kept the YPG at arms-length. US officials initially determined that Kobani had no strategic value. However, the Obama administration reversed its position after deciding that Kobani’s fall would be a major public relations victory for ISIS. Images and videos of beheaded Kurdish fighters would be broadcast on ISIS websites as a recruitment tool. At the 11th hour, but just in time to save Kobani from falling, US warplanes bombed ISIS positions. When the YPG was about to run out of ammunition, C-130 transport planes dropped twenty-four tons of small arms and ten tons of medical supplies. Erdoğan strongly criticized the Obama administration for supporting terrorists. However, US officials overruled his concerns. John Kerry explained, “Let me say very respectfully to our allies the Turks that we understand the fundamentals of their opposition and ours to any kind of terrorist group and particularly obviously the challenges they face with respect [to] the PKK, but we have undertaken a coalition effort to degrade and destroy ISIL.”22 Kerry commended the YPG for “valiantly fighting ISIL and we cannot take our eye off the prize.”23 Erdoğan blamed the Obama administration for “a sea of blood” in Syria. “The PYD is a terrorist organization like the PKK and they work together. We cannot speak of good terrorists versus bad terrorists. Daesh is a terrorist organization and so are the PYD and the PKK.”24 Erdoğan asked rhetorically, “Are you with us or are you with the terrorist organization?”25 While the United States includes the PKK on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), Syrian Kurdish formations are not on the FTO list. US law prohibits political and security cooperation with foreign terror groups. Instead of being banned, the YPG/YPJ became America’s closest allies against ISIS in Syria. The Pentagon expanded assistance to forty thousand disciplined and battlehardened Kurdish fighters, over Erdoğan’s objection. With US air support, the YPG seized the border crossing at Tal Abyad. The crossing was a critical supply route for fighters and supplies transiting from Turkey to Raqqa, the ISIS capital in eastern Syria. Ambassador Brett McGurk, who served as the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) until December 2018, met Syrian Kurds in Kobani and was presented a plaque by the YPG. Erdoğan was indignant. “How can we trust you? Is it me who is your partner or the terrorists in Kobani? Do you accept the PKK as a terrorist organization? Then why don’t you list the

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PYD as a terrorist organization too?”26 US coordination with the PYD was tactical, not political. Its co-chair, Salih Muslim, was not issued a visa to visit the United States and the PYD was excluded from peace talks in Geneva. Turkey was an increasingly reluctant member of the coalition. The head of US Central Command, General Lloyd Austin, and US coordinator for the anti-ISIL coalition, General John Allen, met repeatedly with Turkish officials to negotiate the use of Incirlik Air Base, a major NATO facility in Adana, near Turkey’s border with Syria. Erdoğan refused to allow the coalition to use Incirlik. He insisted that US warplanes attack regime forces, not just ISIS. After Tal Abyad, the YPG seized the main road to Raqqa in June 2015. It moved west of the Euphrates, taking steps to consolidate Kurdish-controlled lands and establish a contiguous territory along Syria’s border with Turkey. Ankara proposed a joint ground offensive with US and Turkish troops against the SDF. However, the United States refused. The YPG was the coalition’s best ally in Syria. Turkish Special Forces, tanks, and FSA fighters launched Operation Euphrates Shield on August 24, 2016. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was initially supported through the US train-and-equip program, before Turkey helped transform it into a criminal gang committing crimes against the Syrian people. Bassam Barabandi, the former political counselor at the Syria’s embassy in DC, said the FSA were “thieves” acting at Turkey’s behest.27 Erdoğan said the cross-border action was against ISIS, but it really targeted the YPG. Erdoğan admitted that Turkey was targeting the YPG and “terror groups that threaten our country.”28 Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu vowed that Turkey would do “whatever is necessary” to push the YPG east of the Euphrates and secure Turkey’s border from alleged infiltration by Kurdish fighters. Turkey announced plans for a safe zone ninety kilometers long and forty kilometers wide, stretching from Jarabulus to Marea, deep into Kurdish-controlled territory. When the FSA entered Jarabulus, it liberated the city without a shot. Turkey made a deal with ISIS to rescue them from the YPG’s advance. ISIS preferred cooperation with its Turkish benefactors than Syrian Kurds. A senior Pentagon official told CNN, “The Turks never cared about Jarabulus until the Kurds wanted to go there.”29 McGurk said Turkey’s targeting of the YPG was “unacceptable and a source of deep concern.”30 Bashar al-Assad was defiant, vowing to retake “every inch” of Syrian territory.31 He blasted Turkey for infringing on Syria’s sovereignty and promised retaliation. A Syrian air strike killed three Turkish troops and wounded ten on November 24, 2016. Turkey threatened to retaliate, risking escalation. Turkey demanded that the UN exclude Kurds from Geneva II. The Kurds represent approximately 10 percent of Syria’s population and controlled as much as 30 percent of Syrian territory. US officials understood the importance of the PYD’s participation, but acquiesced to Turkey’s demands. ***** Rogue Turkish officers, with participation from the air force, allegedly launched a coup against Erdoğan’s government on July 15, 2016. The conspirators bungled the operation. Their performance was so poorly executed that some called it a “false-coup,” which Erdoğan organized in order to justify a crackdown against oppositionists.32 More

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likely, the coup was infiltrated by MIT or Russia tipped off the government. Erdoğan allowed the coup to progress just far enough so it was credible and he could justify a crackdown in its aftermath. There are many instances when a military tried to remove the civilian head of government. Case studies can help evaluate the coup in Turkey. When conducting a coup, the first priority of putschists is to capture or kill the head of government, in this instance Erdoğan. Loyal military and security units are immobilized to prevent them from obstructing the coup. Public information is critical. The putschists typically seize control of conventional media, television, and radio, as well as new media, which includes social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. A head of the putsch presents himself so the public can attach a face to the events. If the public protests the coup, mutinous soldiers use all necessary measures to preserve order. The events in Turkey did not follow this script. Erdoğan was vacationing in Marmaris on July 15. When mutinous soldiers arrived at his hotel to arrest him, he had checked out and was on his way to Dalaman Airport. The first inkling of the coup occurred in the early evening when mechanized units used tanks to block the Bosphorus Bridge and the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge crossings from the Asian side to the European side of Istanbul. Land forces on the bridge were joined by the gendarmerie. They only stopped traffic heading in one direction. Prominent members of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were arrested. Chairman of the general staff General Hulusi Akar, and deputy chief of staff Yasar Guler were imprisoned at the Akincilar Air Base on the outskirts of Ankara. Commander of the Land Forces General Salih Zeki Colak, Gendarmerie Commander Galip Mendi, commander of the Air Force General Abidin Unal, and commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Bulent Bostanoglu were also taken into custody. Hakan Fidan, head of the National Intelligence Agency, was rushed to a secure location. TRT, Turkish Public Broadcaster, was taken off the air and soldiers also seized control of CNN Turk, interrupting a live broadcast, but no private television channels were affected. Erdoğan disappeared during the coup. In the early hours of the morning, he surfaced to address the nation using FaceTime. He called on followers to take to the streets in defense of Turkey’s democracy. Imams echoed Erdoğan’s appeal. The chant “Allahu akbar”—God is great— reverberated from the muezzins of mosques. Many thousands of supporters went to Atatürk Airport and Taksim Square in Istanbul. They also gathered outside the presidential palace in Ankara. F-16s allegedly bombed the army headquarters and the TGNA. Though Turkey’s military has a reputation for efficiency, its actions were poorly considered and badly executed. The coup fell far short of best practices for military takeovers. How could mutinous soldiers have been unaware of Erdoğan’s plans to leave the hotel? Failing to find him was a major gaff that undermined the coup from the outset. Why wasn’t Erdoğan apprehended on his way to the airport before his presidential plane took off? The coup plotters possessed F-16 fighter jets. Why didn’t they intercept or shoot down the plane?

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Members of the Turkish general staff representing major branches of the TSK were detained. Was their arrest part of the coup design or was it intended to prevent them from joining the ranks of mutineers? MIT’s Hakan Fidan went free. Of all the members of Turkey’s national security establishment, Fidan is closest to Erdoğan and best positioned to protect the president. Erdoğan once called him his “sır küpü,” which means “jar of secrets.”33 The putschists never presented themselves to the public, explaining events and offering reassurance. Why did the coup plotters fail to take over major private networks that most Turks actually watch? Both TRT and CNN Turk have relatively small viewing audiences. And why did the coup plotters allow social media to function? They could have jammed coverage, but didn’t. It is ironic that Erdoğan addressed the nation using FaceTime, a form of social media he vowed to eliminate after cracking down on pro-democracy demonstrators. While imams called Erdoğan’s supporters to the streets, the putschists issued instructions for people to stay indoors, which allowed Erdoğan supporters free reign and created a groundswell of popular support for the president. The TGNA was reportedly bombed. However, structural damage was minimal. Crater analysis suggested that explosives inside the building were used rather than high-impact ordinance of fighter jets. In his first public remarks during the early morning of July 16, Erdoğan issued a chilling threat:  “This latest action is an act of treason. This attempt, this move, is a great gift from God for us. Why? Because the move will allow us to clean up the armed forces, which needs to be completely cleaned.”34 He vowed to purge all state institutions of “the virus” spread by supporters of Fethullah Gulen. The Turkish government had already prepared lists of oppositionists, and moved immediately to arrest them. About 50,000 members of the security services and civil servants were arrested and another 150,000 dismissed from their jobs. Approximately 150 journalists were jailed, more than any other country according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. Members of parliament, judges, and educators were also dismissed or arrested. Erdoğan arrested more people on the one-year anniversary of the coup, and promised to approve a bill reinstating the death penalty.35 To preempt challenges, Erdoğan pushed through constitutional reforms affecting the Kemalist judiciary. Pro-government prosecutors conjured fantastical plots, Ergenekon and Operation Sledgehammer, which were used to crackdown on retired and current military officers. Arrests sent shock waves through Turkey’s security establishment. Erdoğan feared that what happened in Egypt would happen to him. He identified closely with Egypt’s president Mohamed Morsi as a kindred spirit and fraternal political ally. Morsi was a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and a known Islamist. When Morsi was overthrown by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2013, Erdoğan feared a similar fate. He accused the United States and Israel of masterminding his removal. US officials did not comment immediately on the unfolding events. They wanted to see what direction the coup would take before publicly announcing a position. According to US Secretary of State John Kerry, “[The coup in Turkey] does not appear

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to be a very brilliantly planned or executed event.”36 The slow and ambivalent response of the US, European, and NATO officials fueled speculation that the United States was either informed or behind the coup. Putin was the first to call; he was constantly communicating with Erdoğan during the evening of July 15. Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif was the first foreign official to visit Erdoğan.37 Iran’s solidarity cemented cooperation on Syria and other issues. In contrast, celebratory gunfire was heard in Damascus and other government-held cities; Syrians welcomed rumors of Erdoğan’s overthrow. ***** Bashar al-Assad accused Erdoğan of exploiting the failed coup to “implement his own extremist agenda, the Muslim Brotherhood agenda, within Turkey, and that is dangerous for Turkey and for the neighboring countries, including Syria.”38 US lawmakers were also critical. According to Congressman David Cicilline (D-RI) at a hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats on April 5, 2017: I am greatly concerned by Erdoğan’s government’s use of mass arrests of civil servants, critics, journalists, academics, and anyone he perceives as an opponent. The government’s use of a state of emergency to carry out a sweeping crackdown against anyone who dissents with his views is counter to democratic values.39

Cicilline criticized the planned referendum “that would give him sweeping authority and jeopardize the Turkish democratic system.” He disparaged an effort to rewrite Turkey’s constitution. According to Cicilline, “The new amendments to the Turkish Constitution will cement in law much of the power President Erdoğan has already seized for himself.” Turkey’s new constitution, which was approved in a referendum on April 16, 2017, converted Turkey from a parliamentary into a presidential system, combining the head of state, head of government, and head of the ruling party all into a single powerful office. It eliminated the prime minister’s leading position and drastically curtailed the parliament’s oversight of the executive branch. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, an advisory body of constitutional experts, criticized the constitutional amendments as “a dangerous step backwards,” putting Turkey on the path to authoritarianism.40 Turkey suffered a worsening democracy deficit. US officials objected to mass arrests and the detention of tens of thousands of political prisoners. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, an evangelical, was deeply concerned about the detention of US pastor Andrew Brunson for more than two years. Erdoğan wanted to use him as a bargaining chip for the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, whom the Turkish government accused of plotting the 2016 coup attempt. Several US citizens and consular officials were also imprisoned on bogus politically motivated charges. The course of events in Turkey should be no surprise. Erdoğan was always antidemocratic. When the AKP won elections in 2002, Erdoğan said:  “Democracy is like a streetcar. You get off when you’ve reached your destination.”41 Erdoğan’s drift toward Islamism was also foreseeable. In 1998, he read a poem, “The mosques are

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our barracks, the domes are helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful are soldiers.”42 After the AKP won a resounding electoral victory in July 2007, Erdoğan introduced legislation to permit the wearing of a hijab in public institutions rather than address human rights concerns more broadly or the Kurdish question. Women were subsequently allowed to wear the hijab in the military. When Turks gathered in Gezi Park in May 2013 to protest plans to build a shopping mall in a green space, they were attacked by riot police. People gathered in sixty cities, protesting police brutality. There was scant media coverage. Turkish national television chose to broadcast a documentary about the migration of penguins instead. Protesters were tracked after Gezi. MIT gathered personal data without a court order. On Twitter’s transparency report, Turkey ranks high for cracking down on social media. Erdoğan called imprisoned journalists terrorists, child molesters, and murderers. His harsh words confirmed Erdoğan’s deep disrespect for independent media. Serious concerns exist about freedom of expression and assembly. The 1991 law on the fight against terrorism is used to silence critics. Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Act applies selectively to restrict freedom of expression. Article 301 of the penal code, which makes it a crime to denigrate Turkishness, is used against political opponents. Corruption is rampant. On December 17, 2013, Erdoğan was recorded speaking to his son about how to dispose of tens of millions of dollars of ill-gotten assets, including plans to buy luxury apartments on the Bosporus. Many WikiLeaks documents reported that his son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, colluding to sell oil from Syria, the proceeds of which, at its peak, was generating $3 million a day for ISIS.43 Turkey became an outlier in Europe. The European Parliament voted to suspend talks with Turkey over its EU membership on November 24, 2016. When the AKP wanted to send ministers to campaign for the referendum in Germany and in the Netherlands, they were disallowed because of security concerns. Erdoğan responded by calling Chancellor Merkel a “Nazi,” and described the Dutch government as Nazi remnants and fascists. A minister in the Erdoğan government said that Turkey would launch jihad in Europe and release fifteen thousand refugees each week if the AKP was not allowed to campaign.44 Erdoğan’s “controlled coup” was intended to eliminate opposition and generate widespread fear in society and among the professional ranks. An open-ended state of emergency was used by Erdoğan to eliminate the rule of law and systematize repression. Close to two million people rallied in the Maltepe District of Istanbul on July 8, 2017. They demanded “adalet”―justice and the rule of law.45 The AKP was repudiated in local elections on March 31, 2019. The AKP called for a rerun of the Istanbul election and lost again in a landslide by 10 percent.46 ***** Erdoğan was furious when then secretary of state Rex W.  Tillerson announced the creation of a Border Security Force (BSF), including forty thousand YPG members to guard against incursions by ISIS. In a fit of pique, Erdoğan vowed to attack Afrin, an oasis of tranquility west of the Euphrates in northwestern Syria, and then pivot east to create a security belt along Turkey’s border with Syria as far as Iraq. Erdoğan was true to his word.

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On January 20, 2018, Turkish war planes started bombing Afrin, initiating an ethnic cleansing campaign aimed at expelling Kurds from their homes and replacing them with Arab refugees in Turkey. Joined by the FSA, a jihadist militia with al-Qaeda and al-Nusra affiliations, attacks intensified over fifty-eight days. The assault killed scores of Kurds, Christians, and Yezidis. Turkey’s campaign was aimed at changing Afrin’s demography. Turkish forces and the FSA committed genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined by the Geneva Convention (August 12, 1949). Turkey also violated the Geneva Convention of January 12, 1951, which makes collective punishment a crime (Article 1)  and criminalizes violence against national, denominational, and religious communities (Article 2). According to the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), 157 civilians were killed in Afrin by Turkish forces and their jihadi affiliates, including 56 women and 46 children. 104 women and 155 children were among the 448 civilians injured. The YPG tried to defend the people but were overwhelmed by air power, losing 525 fighters. More than 300,000 civilians fled Afrin for Til Rifat and Shehba regions further east. Beyond statistics, Turkey’s assault impacted individual lives. For example, a mother was fleeing Afrin hand-in-hand with her daughter. A missile obliterated the girl; the traumatized mother was left holding her hand with the arm completely disconnected from the girl’s body.47 A surgeon described routine amputations of limbs. The SDC confirms that the Turkish state has targeted groups in violation of Article 7 of the 1998 Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC). Its jihadist proxies issued summary judgments leading to execution; committed torture and murder, booty and plunder; killed prisoners of war and mutilated bodies; violated women’s rights through sexual violence; and abducted children and took hostages. The attackers also burned books, documents, historical artifacts, and destroyed sacred places, such as the historic temple of Eyn Dara. Turkish-backed FSA destroyed the Yazidi Union Center, as well as water treatment and storage facilities. Journalists and medical workers were targeted in violation of international human rights and humanitarian law. The Afrin campaign served no strategic purpose. Few if any YPG were present in Afrin before Turkey’s attack. The ethnic cleansing campaign tended to “Turkify” and “Arabize” Afrin. In addition to forcibly displacing people from their homes, students were forced to carry Turkish flags and children were forced to appear in videos thanking Erdoğan. Kefer Cenê District was completely Arabized through the settlement of FSA members and four thousand families. At least three hundred families of FSA members were relocated to the village of Kefer Sefrê.48 Others were settled in the Ikbis and Moska villages, in the district of Shiyê and Cindirêsê. Plundering of private homes was widespread. Street names were translated into Turkish and Arabic. Civilians who remained in Afrin were forced into madrasas for radical religious education. Women were required to wear a veil; Yezidi people were forcibly Islamicized and required to attend religious services. Those who resisted were beheaded. Yezidi women and children were subjected to harassment and rape. James Jeffrey, the US Special Envoy for Syria, testified to Congress that it is “unacceptable” for Turkey to attack Kurds in Syria. Jeffrey, the former US ambassador to Ankara, was close to Turkish officials. His words rung hollow without a credible threat of force.

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The Rome Statute is clear on the matter of state responsibility. It affirms that, “It is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”49 Bashar al-Assad sent Shi’ite militias to confront the FSA. However, Russia intervened to delay the entry of Syrian troops and Shi’ite militias. Russia and Turkey colluded on the Afrin offensive. Turkey sent a delegation to Moscow to tell Russian officials about its plan to bomb Afrin from air space controlled by the Russians. Therefore, the Afrin assault could not have occurred without Russia’s agreement. Victims insisted that the perpetrators, including the Turkish state, its terror proxies, and Russian coconspirators, should be held accountable by the ICC. ***** Turkey’s 2015 downing of a Sukhoi-24 warplane in Syrian air space led to a momentary setback of Turkey–Russia relations. However, sanctions lasted only about eleven months. Russia’s 2015 decision to launch air strikes against the rebels, and coordinate military action with Iran, was another bump in the road. Turkey and Russia were on opposite sides of Syria’s civil war. Russia strongly supported the regime, while Erdoğan called for its overthrow. No incident poisoned US–Turkey relations more than Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia over US objections. Buying missiles from Russia violated the core NATO principle of interoperability between weapons systems of its members. US officials put on a full court press to dissuade Turkey from acquiring the S-400s. They offered Patriot missiles, a better surface-to-air missile at a lower cost. However, Erdoğan insisted on doing the deal with Russia. The S-400 came with Russian technicians, which risked compromising sensitive technology. The United States canceled Turkey’s participation in the F-35 stealth bomber training program. As a result, dozens of Turkish pilots and military personnel participating in the training were forced to return home from the United States. Applying a strategy called the “Kremlin Playbook,” Russia increased its political support in Turkey through a web of economic and security cooperation, as well as people-to-people contacts. Putin sought to drive a wedge between Turkey and Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU). Russia welcomed Western sanctions against Turkey. Estrangement with the West drove Turkey and Russia closer together. Beyond its purchase of the S-400 missiles, Turkey and Russia cooperated on maritime security issues, with Turkey arranging free passage for Russian warships in its Black Sea fleet through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Russia made investments in Turkey’s energy, banking, and telecommunications sectors. Over US objections, Gazprom, a Russian energy company, convinced Turkish officials in the late 1990s to sign the BlueStream gas pipeline deal that bypassed transit countries. Gazprom and Turkey are building Turkstream, another pipeline across the Black Sea, which will allow Russia to cut out Ukraine and establish a southern corridor exporting gas to Europe. With two lines of 15.75 billion cubic meters each, TurkStream will both deliver Russian gas to Turkish consumers while sending supplies to southern and central Europe. BlueStream and TurkStream advance Turkey’s status as a regional energy hub.

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Russia’s state-owned Rosatom is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, near Mersin on Turkey’s southeast coast. Akkuyu will have a total capacity of 4,800 megawatts. The plant is scheduled to go online in 2023, the centenary of the Republic of Turkey. Production will meet 10 percent of Turkey’s energy demand. As part of the deal, Russia will also own and operate a port near Mersin.50 Sberbank, run by a Putin ally, bought Turkey’s Deniz Bank, and used it to evade financial sanctions. In 2019, Turkey and Russia agreed to form a joint $1billion investment fund, further solidifying economic ties and trade in consumer goods.51 The construction business between Turkey and Russia expanded dramatically. Turkish contractors played a large role in building facilities for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, as well as stadiums and infrastructure for the FIFA World Cup in 2018. Construction contracts valued at $70 billion were a windfall for Turkish engineering and construction firms. Putin heralded mutual interest in Syria’s reconstruction in 2014, asserting:  “We clearly share a desire to resolve acute global conflicts.”52 Trade, including consumer goods, increased by 16  percent to reach almost $26 billion in 2018.53 Mutual investments increased to $20 billion. Plans exist to expand the trade value to $100 billion. In April 2019, Russia’s Direct Investment Fund and Turkey’s Sovereign Wealth Fund signed an agreement on a $1 billion investment platform to facilitate implementation of their joint projects. According to Putin, “I believe, with such investment capital, our business communities will be able to raise at least $5 billion for miscellaneous projects.”54 The Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation held its 16th session on July 24–6, 2019 in Antalya. Putin praised the Commission, which “plays a big role in organizing our economic cooperation and helps to develop direct contacts between entrepreneurs of the two countries, including those representing small and medium-sized businesses.”55 Ties in science, education, literature and the arts, and tourism also advanced bilateral relations. In 2018, six million Russian tourists visited Turkey.56 Turkey and Russia were diplomatic partners through the Astana Process, which was launched in 2017. In September 2018, they reached the Sochi Agreement that envisaged a demilitarized zone of 15–20 kilometers between the warring parties in Idlib, and evacuation of heavy weapons and jihadi groups. The Agreement was supposed to suspend Russian and Syrian operations, thereby preventing the flight of more Syrians to Turkey. Erdoğan painted a rosy picture. “In order to prevent the regime’s massacres in Idlib, like it has already done in various provinces, we’ve come up with a trilateral structure with Russia and Iran.” He heralded “cooperation with Russia on the ground” and “stability in Idlib.” According to Erdoğan, “although the regime continues to violate the cease-fire, we continue to have unity with Russia over providing security in Idlib.”57 The Sochi Agreement of September 2018 permitted Turkey to establish twelve observation post and deploy troops in Idlib. The deal fell apart. Turkey failed to dissolve Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an active jihadist militant organization that gained full control of Idlib. Russia and Syria intensified their attacks when the cease-fire broke down in April 2019. Turkey and

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Russia almost went to war when Syrian and Russian war planes attacked a Turkish convoy south of Idlib city on February 27, 2020. Chastened by the death of at least fifty Turkish troops, Erdoğan rushed to Moscow. After six hours of talks, Erdoğan and Putin agreed to reinstate the 2018 Sochi Agreement and establish joint patrols. War between Turkey and Russia was narrowly averted. ***** Secular Turkey was challenged by the theocratic nature of the Iranian regime after the 1979 revolution. Turkey experienced a Sunni revival under the AKP, developing close ties to the MB in Egypt and MB chapters across the Middle East. Despite sectarian differences, Turkey’s governing ideology is not unlike Islamic jurisprudence in Iran. Under Erdoğan, Turkey aligned its governance structure closer to the Iranian model by conflating religion and politics. Pragmatism has been the hallmark of Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey remained neutral during the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s, finding opportunity to expand economic contacts with both countries. Turkey developed an extensive barter trade system that swapped Iranian oil products for Turkish manufactured and consumer goods. Economic cooperation emerged from the shadows after the war and expanded. Turkey and Iran signed an agreement in 1996 to export Iranian natural gas to Turkey and onward via the Port of Ceyhan on Turkey’s eastern Mediterranean coast. Turkey traditionally opposed sanctions, claiming that UN sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf War cost it more than one hundred billion dollars. Sanctions were not all bad; they provided lucrative smuggling opportunities, especially for oil trade. Against Washington’s wishes, Turkey and Brazil launched a failed diplomatic initiative at the UN Security Council in 2010 to resolve differences over Iran’s nuclear activities. Turkey and Iran colluded in a money-laundering scheme that culminated in criminal charges and a hefty fine for Halkbank. As a neighbor of Iran, sharing a border of 499 kilometers, and a major consumer of Iranian hydrocarbon products, Turkey stood to benefit from the 2015 nuclear deal. Similarly, it was hugely impacted when the Trump administration withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and implemented sanctions on Iran in 2019. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the goal was to drive Iranian income from oil exports to zero. According to Pompeo, “We are going to zero. How long we remain there, at zero, depends solely on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s senior leaders. We’ve made our demands very clear to the ayatollah and his cronies.”58 The Treasury Department initially provided Turkey with a waiver to continue buying oil from Iran. However, the waiver expired in May 2019, forcing Turkey to decide between illicit trade and abiding by US sanctions. Violating Washington’s edict could lead to secondary sanctions on Turkish banks and other enterprises. Business between Turkey and Iran has been going on for centuries. Bilateral trade grew from $1.2 billion to $16 billion during 2001–10. Turkey removed visa restrictions for Iranian nationals to travel to Turkey, which enhanced people-to-people contacts and tourism. Less than 330,000 Iranians visited Turkey in 2001. By 2011, the number increased to almost 1.9 million and to 2.5 million in 2017. Iranian tourists boosted trade.

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Iran consolidated its influence in Syria with Russian air power in 2015, and the increased role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Though Turkey strongly objected, Russia intensified attacks on Idlib in 2019. While Turkey and Iran held opposite views on Idlib and support opposite sides of Syria’s civil war, they worked together through the Astana Process to advance a cease-fire and humanitarian access for besieged residents of Idlib. The two countries also collaborated against the Kurds. The PKK has close ideological and fraternal ties with armed Kurdish militias in Iran, the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). Turkey and Iran coordinated attacks against the PKK and PJAK, which served the security interests of both countries. They signed an intelligence sharing and military cooperation agreement in 2008, aimed at enhancing operations against the PKK and PJAK. Opposing Kurdish interests forged unity between Turkey and Iran. When Iraqi Kurdistan conducted an independence referendum in September 2017 and 93 percent voted to leave Iraq, Turkey and Iran coordinated efforts to undermine the independence bid by closing Iraqi Kurdistan’s air space and threatening sanctions on oil and gas exports.59 Kurdish democratic aspirations threatened both Turkey and Iran, which are led by autocratic, anti-democratic, and Islamist regimes.

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Minorities and Women

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Kurds

The Syrian regime has always thought it could control the situation by force, like Ghouta and Daraa, but for our region, things are different.1 —Salih Muslim, former co-president of the Syrian Democratic Union Party ***** Approximately forty million Kurds live in Kurdistan, a geographic area consisting of Syria (West Kurdistan), Turkey (North Kurdistan), Iraq (South Kurdistan), and Iran (East Kurdistan). Kurds are the largest stateless people in the world. Between 20 and 25 million Kurds reside in Turkey; 10 to 12 million in Iran; 4 to 5 million in Iraq; and about 2.5 million in Syria.2 The 1920 Treaty of Sevres promised the Kurds a referendum on independence that was never held. Kurds found themselves a captive nation, abused by Arabs, Ottomans, and Persians throughout the twentieth century. Because of the lack of international support for the Kurdish statehood, Kurds came to believe that “Kurds have no friend but the mountains.” Disunity among the Kurds also undermined Kurdish national aspirations. The founding charter of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) called for the establishment of a “Greater Kurdistan” on all lands inhabited by Kurds. Kurds in Syria and Turkey share Kurmanji as a common language, while Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran speak either Badini or the Sorani dialect.3 Abdullah Öcalan, who founded the PKK, initially sought independence. However, his aspirations evolved toward greater political and cultural rights. Öcalan was a progressive leader who concluded that “democratic autonomy” could resolve differences between the center and the periphery, the majority and minority, and between the powerful and the powerless. Images of Öcalan are illegal in Turkey. In the North and East of Syria (NES) where Kurds controlled local administration, Öcalan posters were ubiquitous. His mustached face and prominent brow adorned posters on almost every street corner. Kurds in Turkey and Syria revere Öcalan for confronting the Turkish state and, through struggle for a cause and community, for giving them dignity. Similar instruments of oppression repressed Kurds across Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Kurdish identity was denied, political participation was curtailed, and economic opportunities were limited. When Kurds rebelled demanding greater rights,

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including the right to self-determination, states applied draconian counter-insurgency measures against them. Conflict increased solidarity between Kurds in Turkey and Syria, who rebelled against their respective regimes. A  Kurdish term in Kurmanji, “Serhildan” means rising up against the oppressors. Serhildan affirms the constant struggle of Kurds in the region. Many Kurds fled to Syria after Sheikh Said Piran’s 1925 rebellion was brutally suppressed in Turkey. The border between Turkey and Syria was a porous membrane. Tribes and clans traveled and traded across the frontier, and celebrated Kurdish cultural festivals such as Newroz. Kurdish members of Syria’s constituent assembly proposed autonomy in 1928. However, French authorities rejected the proposal because Kurds were not living in a contiguous territory. Kurds feared that independence from France would bring an Arab nationalist government to power, further marginalizing them. Kurds preferred French rule to Arab domination. Relations between Syria and Turkey have been tense dating back to 1938, when the League of Nations allowed Turkey to annex Hatay province, removing it from French administration. Turkey and Syria were ideological opponents during the Cold War. Turkey acted as the Eastern flank of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Syria was Moscow’s closest Arab ally. The Syrian government conducted a census in 1962. Syrians had to prove they lived in Syria prior to 1945, or lose their citizenship. As a result of the census, about 120,000 Kurds living in Jazira governorate were registered as aliens and stripped of their Syrian citizenship.4 Many Kurds did not understand the census and, therefore, did not participate. In addition, 300,000 Kurds who did not participate were listed as “unrecorded” and denied national identification cards.5 Syrian authorities prevented stateless Kurds from securing employment, getting married, or owning property. They were denied school admissions, degrees, or entrance to universities. Aliens and unrecorded Kurds could not vote in elections, run for public office, or get jobs in the civil service. They were prevented from receiving medical care at state hospitals. Without passports, they could not travel or resettle in another country. Their properties were seized and given to Arab settlers.6 Kurds were subject to an Emergency Law in 1963. The Emergency Law imposed restrictions on their cultural rights, such as the use of the Kurdish language. Kurdish was barred in official proceedings. Kurdish street names were changed to Arabic and village names were Arabized. Kurdish language media and books were banned. Businesses were forced to use Arabic or lose their registrations. Kurds were even prevented from giving their children Kurdish names. The wholesale assault on Kurdish culture was intended to eliminate Kurdishness. In 1973, Syrian authorities created an Arab belt that was 300 kilometers long and 10 to 15 kilometers wide. It stretched from the western town of Ras al-Ain to Syria’s border with Iraq in the East. The government also conducted ethnic cleansing through a population transfer. As many as 140,000 Kurds were deported from their villages in the desolate southern desert of NES.7 Arabs and Bedouins occupied their abandoned homes. The crackdown against Kurds coincided with the rise of Syria’s Baath Party, which embodied Arab chauvinism. While overtly secular, the Baath used Islamism of Syria’s Sunni majority to galvanize opposition to Christians and ethnic minorities. Baathists

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controlled the government, intelligence agencies, armed forces, and trade unions.8 The constitution of March 13, 1973 embraced a wider Arab revolution with Syria as the leader of a pan-Arab movement. It asserted: “The Arab revolution is an integral part of the wider world liberation movement for freedom.”9 Article 4 made Arabic the official language of the Syrian Arab Republic. Article 8 established the Baath Party “as the leading party in the society and the state.”10 Article 21 stipulated that, “The educational and cultural system aims at creating a socialist nationalist Arab generation.”11 The constitution made no mention of Kurds or minority rights. ***** Two events at the turn of the twentieth century significantly impacted Kurds in the region. The first was Öcalan’s capture in February 1999. Though Ocalan was known as defiant, he cooperated with his captors, offering to play a helpful role bringing peaceful resolution to the conflict. He was given a life sentence and jailed in Turkey’s Imrali maximum security prison on an island in the Sea of Marmara. The second impactful event was the invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003. Kurds celebrated when US forces vanquished Iraq’s vaunted Republican Guards and deposed Saddam Hussein. The US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued order No. 1 on May 16, 2003 banning the Baath Party and beginning the process of “de-Baathification,” by which all party members were removed from their positions and barred from future employment within the government. Another CPA order dismantled the Iraqi army, as well as other branches of its security services and intelligence agencies. Both events had a dramatic effect on the Kurds in Syria. Kurds were deprived of their iconic and inspirational leader when Öcalan was detained. After Saddam was deposed, Kurdish political gains in Iraqi Kurdistan inspired Kurds across the region. The Qamishli football club, whose supporters are mostly Kurdish, hosted a match with Deir ez-Zor on March 12, 2004. Arabs from Deir ez-Zor chanted slogans in support of Saddam. Kurds responded with chants of “Long Live Kurdistan” and praised the United States for getting rid of him.12 When violent clashes broke out in the stands, police used tear gas and water cannon to subdue the crowd. Nine Kurdish youths were killed before the match even started.13 When Kurds gathered for the funeral the following day, police declared it an illegal gathering and fired live ammunition into the crowd, killing eight people. “The Great Uprising” spread across the Kurdish regions of Syria. Kurds tore down flags from government buildings and replaced them with the flag of Kurdistan. They stormed the central bank, city hall, police station, and Baath Party headquarters. Street battles spread from Qamishli to Afrin in the west. The demonstrations were broadcast on Roj-TV, a Kurdish network based in Copenhagen, and Kurds across Europe rallied in support. They occupied Syrian embassies in Switzerland and Belgium. They also stormed the Syrian embassy in London, painting the tricolor Kurdish flag on the embassy walls. Thirty-two Kurds were killed, hundreds wounded, and two thousand were arrested during the Great Uprising.14 The Mukhabarat, Syria’s state intelligence agency, targeted officials of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) for arrest. The PYD was the vanguard of

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a pro-Kurdish movement in Syria with broad support among Kurds in the NES, Jazira, Kobani, and the Afrin region. Security forces identified Kurdish students involved in the demonstrations and expelled them from the university. Kurdish businesses were burned and ransacked. Despite state-sponsored recrimination against the Kurds, many Sunni Arabs, Assyrians, Christians, and tribal sheikhs showed solidarity with their Kurdish neighbors. A  broad group of Syrians signed the Damascus Declaration of March 16, 2004, calling for an end to the violence. Daraa is in the south of Syria, close to the border with Jordan, far away from the Kurdish NES. As we have seen, the arrest and torture of students in Daraa was the spark that lit the revolution. Before the uprising started in Daraa in March 2011, unrest was already growing in the NES. Sometime between the 26th and 28th of January 2011, the exact date is unknown, a Kurd in Hasakah named Hasan Ali Akleh doused himself with petrol and lit a match as an act of protest against the Syrian government. He was inspired by Mohamed Bouzazi who had self-immolated in Tunisia a month before. Hundreds of Kurds took to the streets in a spontaneous mass demonstration to demand an end to the emergency law, political reform, and Assad’s resignation. Dozens of Kurds were arrested. Syria’s justice minister justified the state of emergency, referencing hostilities with Israel.15 On March 7, thirteen political prisoners went on a hunger strike to protest “political detentions and oppression.”16 Three days later, dozens of Kurdish detainees from the PYD and Yakiti Party launched a hunger strike in solidarity with the political prisoners. On March 12, the anniversary of the football match in Qamishli—“The Day of Martyrs”—thousands of Kurds demonstrated in Qamishli and Hasakah. Later in March, protests spread to Iraqi Kurdistan as Iraqi Kurds demanded reform of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). There were concurrent protests of Kurds across the region in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, as well as the general uprising in Syria. To appease the Kurds, Bashar al-Assad promised to investigate the 1962 census that rendered Hasakah Kurds stateless and, on April 7, the government granted 220,000 Kurds “Syrian Arab Nationality.”17 Soon thereafter, Assad lifted the state of emergency, but it failed to mollify the people. The authorities continued their crackdown, as protests surged. Violence spread across the country with students mobilizing at universities in Damascus, Aleppo, and Daraa. Assad sought to make an example of Daraa and, at the end of April, launched an attack on the city with tanks and heavy armor. Though the Kurds were sympathetic with the protesters, they did not join demonstrations in Arab-majority cities. Facing a nationwide conflagration, the Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAA) took steps to concentrate its manpower, withdrawing from bases in the NES to focus on suppressing protests in Damascus and other parts of the country. The PYD has been accused of negotiating with the regime and coming to an understanding that it would not join national protests if the SAA withdrew. Salih Muslim, former co-president of the PYD, flatly denies this allegation. He insists that the PYD opposed the regime all along. At the same time, however, the PYD refused to join the Islamist rebellion. According to Muslim, “The Syrian regime has always thought it could control the situation by force, like Ghouta and Daraa, but for our region, things are different.”18 The Kurds were neutral in the intensifying armed confrontation. Kurds

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did not support the regime, nor were they aligned with Sunni Arab militias fighting the government. However, Turkey’s invasion and the withdrawal of US forces left the Kurds without protection, and the PYD turned to the regime in search of a protector. Seeking support from the regime was bitter pill to swallow, given long-standing animosities between the Kurds and Damascus. In March 2011, PYD issued a political statement, which lamented “Arab chauvinistic trends within the Syrian state” and called for reforms. “With the changes taking place in the Middle East, and the rebellion of peoples against tyranny and totalitarian rule in many countries, each country has to reconsider its policies and work to meet the democratic demands of its society.” The statement identified objectives, urging the government to: ●●

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Release political prisoners and prisoners of conscience and expression, especially Kurdish activists, and issue a general amnesty for those sentenced. Repeal martial law and the state of emergency, annulling verdicts of exceptional courts and rehabilitating affected persons. Abolish the intelligence services that commit crimes and practice repression. Liberalize laws governing political parties and civil society. Abolish the current People’s Assembly and replace it with a national council independent of the ruling party. Recognize the existence of the Kurdish people, with its rights and duties, as an essential component of Syrian society. To realize these goals, the PYD proposed to:

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Form a committee to prepare a constitution, which advances the needs of Syrian society and changes the name from the Syrian Arab Republic. Separate the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, creating accountability through the balance of powers. Guarantee group rights, including language rights, cultural development, and the establishment of cooperative and economic associations that serve society and protect the environment. Implement economic laws and policies that provide equal opportunity and the equitable distribution of the nation’s wealth. Provide for the rights of all segments of society, especially women, children, and the elderly.

The PYD statement called for constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity and use of the Kurdish language in education and local administration. It demanded the restoration of citizenship and abolition of the 1962 census, as well as compensation for affected persons. The PYD also demanded withdrawal of all “secret decrees, laws and circulars issued against the Kurds.” With Syria’s spiral of deadly conflict intensifying in the spring of 2011, Assad withdrew forces from the NES to fight Sunni Arab insurgents in Ghouta, Aleppo, and elsewhere in the country. As a result, Kurdish cities in NES were largely unscathed during the initial phase of Syria’s civil war.

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After Turkey’s invasion in October 2019, the Kurds were compelled to relinquish territory to Turkey, Russia, and regime forces. Lands in northern Syria, heretofore an island of stability in Syria’s civil war, were engulfed in violent conflict. Kurdish leaders stopped using the term “Rojava,” which means West Kurdistan in Kurdish. They believed that referring to their homeland as the Administrative Area of NES more accurately reflected the region’s multiethnic character, as well as the PYD’s commitment to pluralism and inclusivity. Kurds are the majority group in regions of Jazeera (Qamishli and Hasakah cantons), Kobani, and Afrin. Kurds are also present in Arab majority cities—Raqqa, Tabqa, Manbij, and Deir ez-Zor. The NES is a progressive self-administration, unique in Syria and the Middle East. Grass-roots democracy is its defining characteristic. Local councils are composed of diverse ethnic and sectarian communities, including Kurds, Arabs, Yezidis, and Christians. Gender equity is emphasized at all levels of local administration and civil society. A copresidency system ensures that leadership positions are shared by men and women. Equal representation is required across the government. Women have conspicuous roles in the security apparatus with close cooperation between the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). Ecology is another pillar of the NES project. The Baath regime focused on maximizing resource exploitation and agriculture at the expense of environmental protection, which led to deforestation and forced Kurdish farmers to migrate to cities with jobs as laborers. NES policies on environmental sustainability sought to correct this problem. Beyond a geographic region and a system of governance, NES is a state of mind. Residents of NES have a strong sense of community, reminiscent of the kibbutz system in Israel after independence in 1948. The diverse peoples of NES come together to advance the goal of a peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious society. The PYD believes in a system of government that Öcalan calls “democratic federalism.” Kurds in both Syria and Turkey reject the notion of a unitary state, governed by a strong central government that exercises final authority. Subnational units may exist in a unitary state, but they only have powers that are allocated by the central government. In a unitary state, subnational units are created and abolished, and their powers may be broadened or narrowed unilaterally by the central government. A unitary state can delegate power through devolution to local government. However, the central government can take back what it has given by revoking or amending devolved powers. In a federal system, the central government usually has paramount power, retaining responsibility for defense, foreign policy, and fiscal affairs. In federal states, sovereignty is shared between the central government and subnational units. Federalism is noncentralized, which means that units at each level have final authority and can be self-governing. Citizens have rights secured by both the central government and subnational authorities. The status of states in a federal arrangement cannot be unilaterally changed by the central government. Federalism can be symmetrical or

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asymmetrical. Symmetrical federalism allocates the same power to all subnational units. In asymmetrical arrangements, regions vary in their power and status. A confederation is the union of autonomous or semiautonomous political units, which band together because their individual interests are enhanced through common action. Confederation members have equal status. Looser confederations resemble intergovernmental organizations. More integrated confederations resemble federations. The PYD espouses democratic federalism enhanced by autonomy, which devolves authority in the areas of governance, economy, and culture. Democratic autonomy would involve a local executive, legislature, and judiciary, and a localized system for the administration of justice, including police recruited from the communities they serve. Economic power-sharing includes localized decision-making on the development of natural resources, taxes, revenue, trade, employment, hiring practices, and land ownership. Cultural autonomy typically encompasses minority language use; local control of education; and the display of a flag, insignia, a seal, and emblems, as well as unfettered celebration of cultural holidays.19 Democratic federalism, in concept and practice, is responsive to grass-roots movements and thereby a threat to a centralized and unitary state.20 Through UN-mediated talks, Syrians agreed to set up a constitutional commission to discuss future governance. Post-conflict Syria requires resolution of competing claims that preserves both the identity of aggrieved groups, as well as the existing state structure. Transitional justice is a process of redress for states emerging from violent conflict or a history of human rights abuses. It can incorporate a mechanism for truthtelling or emphasize accountability for crimes. NES believes in the power of ideas and progressive government. However, it is no Shangri-La. NES is a new democracy, with room for improvement. For example, it needs to be more tolerant of political dissent and to improve its neighborly relations with Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan. The PYD has clashed repeatedly with the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria (KDP-S), the Syrian affiliate of Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The PYD and KDP-S both call for a secular, democratic, decentralized Syria; the recognition of Kurdish rights; and Kurdish self-determination. However, the two parties diverge over important ideological and governance issues. Whereas the PYD endorses extensive autonomy for NES, the KDP-S supports administrative decentralization, which is more acceptable to Turkey and Syria’s Arab opposition. The KDP-S is driven by its opposition to the PYD and discrediting Öcalan’s ideal of democratic federalism. Central to understanding hostilities between PYD and the KDP-S is the unique relationship of Turkey’s leadership with the KRG and specifically the Barzani family, which leads the KRG. Turkey has remained staunchly opposed to political development of the Kurds, but cooperates with the Barzanis deriving mutual benefit through oil export. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq holds an estimated 40 billion barrels of oil reserves. When the KRG faced a financial crisis in 2016, a KRG minister offered Turkey “significant interest” in oil and gas fields in return for a $3.7 billion bailout, according to leaked emails of Turkey’s energy minister, Berat Albayrak. Turkey and the KRG also cooperated to facilitate military action by Turkey’s military against the PKK base in the Qandil Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan.21

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The PYD and KDP-S set-up competing structures. The KDP-S was a leading force behind the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which was founded at a conference in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan on October 26, 2011. The KNC enjoyed support from the KRG, as well as the Turkish government. Due to the KNC’s pro-Turkish orientation, the PYD called it “an enemy of the peoples of Syria.”22 Some KNC leaders fled to Duhok in Iraqi Kurdistan, accusing the PYD of authoritarian tendencies. In July 2012, the PYD joined the KNC and other Kurdish factions to form the Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC). Though it set an ambitious agenda on collective security, human development, and political power-sharing, the KSC was shortlived. Before the KSC could begin work, the PYD withdrew, alleging that the KNC collaborating with Turkey and allying with Turkish-backed Syrian rebels that were attacking Kurdish communities. They accused KNC leaders of spying on behalf of the Turkish government, as well as corruption and money-laundering. Rumors spread of a KNC plot to assassinate Kurds that were hostile to Turkey’s interests.23 The KNC joined the Syrian National Council (SNC), an umbrella group of Turkish-backed Syrian opposition parties based in Istanbul dominated by Arabs. SNC members clashed over federalism and autonomy. The SNC accused the KNC of harboring a secret plan to split Syria, drawing on the autonomy model of the KRG in Iraqi Kurdistan. Political disagreements boiled over in 2016 when the KDP-S sought Turkey’s intervention against the YPG.24 Kurds created a new body when the existing structure outlived its usefulness. For example, the PYD established a multiethnic grouping called the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), which contributed to the confusing alphabet soup of acronyms. The KNC was invited to Geneva for peace talks in March 2016. However, it declined because TEV-DEM was excluded.25 In addition, tensions increased between the Syrian Yazidi Council (SYC) and the SNC over the lack of Yezidi representation. The SYC criticized the SNC for being Arabist and Islamist.26 ***** NES is protected by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which was established to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in October 2015. At its founding, SDF members were entirely drawn from the YPG and the YPJ who were highly motivated to defend Kurdish lands and create conditions for a secular, democratic, and decentralized Syria. The Pentagon re-branded the SDF as a joint Kurdish-Arab force. Including Arabs was intended to assuage Turkey’s concern. Kurdish combatants showed great resilience defending Kobani in the fall of 2014. The YPG had previously played a pivotal fight against ISIS in the Iraqi city of Sinjar, securing a corridor into Syria to evacuate refugees. It also trained and equipped the Yezidi Shengal Resistance Units that participated in the offensive against ISIS.27 The US Department of Defense realized that the SDF could be a formidable force with better training and equipment. It coordinated air strikes during the fight for Tal Abyad on the Syrian-Turkish border. After Tal Abyad, the SDF went on a roll. In November 2015, it liberated Hawl and the villages of Kan and Suwy to its south, and initiated operations against the larger and more strategic ISIS stronghold of Shadaddi. The operation was a spectacular success. By February 1, 2016, the SDF liberated about

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1,000 square kilometers and coordinated 142 air strikes with coalition forces.28 The offensive killed hundreds of ISIS fighters and destroyed ISIS fighting positions, vehicles, and checkpoints. According to Army Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, the commander of Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve, “The Syrian Democratic Forces have made dramatic gains against the enemy in northern and eastern Syria, while the vetted Syrian opposition and other groups are holding the enemy back along what we call the Mara line in northwest Syria.” He added: “[The SDF] would not have been able to do any of that without coalition air support. They know that … They owe their existence really to the support that we are providing and that’s why they continue to work with us.” Close cooperation with the United States dissuaded the SDF from turning to the Russians.29 The YPG was accused of committing crimes, purging Arabs and Turkmen from liberated territories, driving residents from their homes, and demolishing whole villages that had been havens for ISIS. Roy Gutman of McClatchy reported that the YPG received support from Assad and Iran, and accused the YPG of trying to “Kurdify” traditionally Arab towns. While the YPG is a sworn enemy of ISIS, Gutman alleges that they worked in tandem against moderate rebel groups. He also reported a pattern of collaboration between the YPG, ISIS, and the Assad regime with the purpose of expelling moderate rebel forces from key border-crossings and major cities across the NES.30 The YPG denied wrongdoing. According to PYD spokesman Sihanouk Dibo, “Expulsions never happened in the past and they will not happen in the future.”31 SDF and US Special Forces were too embedded for atrocities to occur without the knowledge of the Americans. He admitted, however, that villages were sometimes caught in the cross fire.32 Salih Muslim acknowledged isolated incidents of violence against villagers, but insists that the PYD did not have a policy of forced expulsions. To the contrary, he insists that the PYD bent over backward to be inclusive and gain the confidence of minorities.33 A spokesman for the US Central Command (CENTCOM) said he had “no specific knowledge” of PYD expulsions.34 Ambassador Robert Ford testified, “In some cases, Syrian refugees don’t go towards the Kurdish areas; they run away from them and into Islamic State territory.”35 If draining the swamp of support for ISIS was a goal, the SDF’s alleged war crimes did not help win hearts and minds. Near Aleppo, anti-Assad rebel groups, some backed by the United States, clashed with the SDF, which was helped by the Russians. A  rebel group affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) released a video of its fighters executing YPG officials. Crosspurpose and overlapping alliances complicated the battlefield and contributed to the fog of war. Turkish interests further complicated the fight in NES. During the summer of 2016, the SDF retook Manbij, a city of Kurds, Arabs, and other ethnic groups just west of the Euphrates River. The Pentagon institutionalized assistance to the SDF, setting up a training facility in Manbij and deploying two thousand Special Forces to NES. They not only worked alongside the SDF as spotters to coordinate air strikes, but also fought alongside the SDF on the frontline. Ankara objected to US–SDF cooperation in Manbij because it was too far west and too close to the Turkish border. The grumbling of Turkish officials, which included threats of attack, became a constant refrain. Erdoğan

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threatened an assault on Al-Bab to prevent the unification of northern governorates. After Al-Bab, he vowed to liberate Manbij. Erdoğan became increasingly hostile and bellicose, as US Special Forces deepened their cooperation with the SDF. He demanded that US troops withdraw, warning that US troops could become collateral damage in Turkey’s attack on Manbij. He also threatened to deny access to Incirlik Air Force Base, which was the hub for operations against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The Pentagon was forced to draw up contingency plans at facilities in Jordan, Iraq, Cyprus, and from a carrier group in the Persian Gulf. To underscore Erdoğan’s warning, Turkey massed troops on the border including the Sultan Murad militia and the FSA, which it had transformed into a jihadi force. Pentagon planners resented Erdoğan’s incendiary remarks. They were concerned when Erdoğan intimated that Turkey might seize fifty US tactical nuclear weapons at Incirlik. In addition, they were wary of Russian troops, which were sent to patrol near Manbij. The United States started vehicle and foot patrols in Manbij to act as a buffer between the SDF and the potential incursion of Turkish-backed or Russian forces. Vehicles flew the American flag, as a visible sign of reassurance to the SDF. US officials were not deaf to Turkey’s concerns. They negotiated with the SDF-backed Manbij Military Council to reduce the presence of Kurds on the Council. Joint US– Turkey patrols were instituted in the fall of 2018.36 When the SDF launched operations to liberate Raqqa, the capital of the ISIS caliphate, it had as many as forty thousand men and women under arms. The SDF was ably led by General Mazlum Kobani Abdi who held “mil-to-mil” talks with General Kenneth McKenzie, the CENTCOM commander in August 2019. Mazloum tweeted, “Several important issues including proposed safe zone, future cooperation between the SDF and anti-ISIS coalition, and the situation of jihadists and their families were discussed.”37 Commander Nesrin Abdullah of the YPJ has a diminutive appearance that masks her large leadership and steely resolve. She, too, strongly supports deepening cooperation with US forces.38 After Raqqa, the SDF liberated the last ISIS stronghold of Baghuz on the border of Syria and Iraq. Almost all the Syrian fighters fled Baghuz, pretending to be civilians and blending in with the local population. Those who stayed in Baghuz were foreign fighters with no place to go and nothing to lose. They fought hard with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and an extensive network of tunnels and booby traps, until almost all of Baghuz was leveled by coalition air strikes and overrun by the SDF. As people climbed out of the rubble, the SDF rescued thousands of civilians from ISIS, including many Yezidi women and children who had been kidnapped from Shengal in 2014. After the final battle in Baghuz, the SDF controlled one-third of Syrian territory. While the SDF addressed the security situation, including managing ISIS remnants, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the SDF’s political wing, set up local administration managing humanitarian assistance and providing security in wartorn areas. In January 2019, Ilham Ahmed, cochair of the SDC, visited Washington to encourage continued cooperation between the United States and Syrian Kurds. Despite her lack of English language skills, she was coherent and compelling. Ilham emphasized a strategic partnership between the United States and NES. She described

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the marginalization and disenfranchisement of Kurds under Hafez and Bashar. Ilham also discussed regional issues. She affirmed that NES, as a secular state, was a bulwark against Iranian influence in Syria. She also described relations with Turkey, which had threatened to invade and asset up a buffer zone within Syria on its border. Ilham addressed an audience at the National Press Club and met a group of US senators at a roundtable organized by the Washington Kurdish Institute. Senator Chris Van Hollen (Democrat, Maryland) chaired the meeting. He was joined by a bipartisan group of senators, including Richard Blumenthal (Democrat, Connecticut), Ron Johnson (Republican, Wisconsin), Tim Kaine (Democrat, Virginia), Jeff Merkley (Democrat, Oregon), Rick Scott (Republican, Florida), Mark Rubio (Republican, Florida), and Tom Udall (Democrat, New Mexico). Van Hollen welcomed colleagues and led the discussion, emphasizing the importance of bipartisanship. He heralded the meeting, for setting aside partisan disagreements. According to the Washington Kurdish Institute, which helped organize the meeting, Van Hollen affirmed, “We are on the side and on the same page for the Syrian Kurds.” Participants echoed his sentiment.39 The senators agreed to introduce a bipartisan resolution calling for US support and protection of the Syrian Kurds. They agreed to lobby the administration to seek endorsement at the UN Security Council (UNSC). Despite pledges by the senators, the UNSC never expressed its commitment to protect the Kurds. Tim Kaine proposed a humanitarian safe zone guarded by the SDF with a no-fly zone enforced by American warplanes. He suggested that UN agencies and international organizations, working in tandem with the NES, would be responsible for taking care of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the refugees. Ilham agreed that the Syrian Kurds would secure the safe zone and assist with humanitarian relief. Ron Johnson, who serves on the Homeland Security Committee, emphasized the threat of jihadi groups and the importance of supporting Syrian Kurds who are moderate, secular, and pro-American. Ilham confirmed the Iranian threat, highlighting Iran’s efforts to change the demography of NES and monopolize the oil fields in Deir ez-Zor. Marco Rubio also discussed threats from Iran in Syria and Iraq, including the risk to Americans from Shiite militias. Ilham noted that more than eleven thousand Kurds had died and about twentythree thousand were wounded fighting ISIS, which had been supported by Turkey. Rick Scott reminded his colleagues that, as a NATO member, Turkey was due special consideration. He expressed doubts about America’s staying power and commitment to the Kurds.40 Scott’s concerns were prescient. Ilham returned to Washington and New York in November, soon after Trump had given Turkey a green light to invade. ***** Erdoğan is profoundly hostile to Syrian Kurds and the PYD, which he says is a branch of the PKK. For sure, the PKK and Kurds in Syria have a strong intellectual and spiritual connection. The NES project is largely inspired by Öcalan’s progressive political views. Öcalan envisions a society that is organized horizontally, as opposed to the hierarchical system that exists in Turkey, Iran, and Iraqi Kurdistan. The events in Turkey and Syria were connected. When the situation with Kurds in Turkey worsened, Erdoğan lashed out against the Kurds in Syria. Conversely, when Kurds in Syria advanced, Erdoğan

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acted aggressively toward Kurds in Turkey. Domestic Turkish politics was always a factor affecting the Kurds in Syria. Given the importance of the YPG and YPJ to the global coalition against ISIS, the United States did not list them as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Being listed as an FTO would trigger sanctions and prevent security cooperation. Nor did the State Department classify the PYD as an FTO. US officials found that the YPG and YPJ were operationally and financially distinct from the PKK. As a concession to Turkey, however, it refused to give Salih Muslim a visa or include the PYD in Geneva peace talks. Washington had a difficult balancing act. It did not want to alienate Turkey—a NATO member—or Kurds in the NES, who served as a bulwark against Islamism and extremism. Parallel to Syria’s civil war, Turkey and the PKK entered into a cease-fire and held secret talks. Concurrent with talks with the PKK, Turkey hosted Salih Muslim and other PYD leaders in Ankara to discuss border security. Information about the talks leaked and the cease-fire collapsed in mid-2015. The June 2015 elections saw the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) win eighty seats in Parliament, denying the AKP an absolute majority. When the Kurdish youth set up barricades in some cities of Turkey’s southeast and declared autonomous areas, the Turkish Armed Forces attacked with overwhelming force, killing more than 4,000 people and displacing some 350,000 civilians. Large parts of majority-Kurdish cities were leveled by aerial bombardment, artillery, and tanks. Erdoğan accused the Syrian Kurds of fomenting unrest and condemned the United States for sponsoring terrorism. After the so-called coup on July 15, 2016, Erdoğan intensified pressure on the proKurdish Party (HDP) in Turkey, arresting HDP coleaders Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ in November 2016. They were among the thirteen deputies detained on bogus terrorism charges. In addition, some six thousand HDP members and elected officials were jailed for a variety of charges related to terrorism and political speech. Erdoğan slandered the HDP, calling them “terror lovers.”41 The AKP suffered a major political setback in March 2019, losing control of the local government in many municipalities. The tally in Istanbul was conducted a second time, which confirmed the AKP’s crushing defeat. Erdoğan ratcheted up his anti-American rhetoric. He repeatedly threatened to carry out an offensive in SDFheld territory to eliminate the “terror corridor” and create a sweeping security zone along Turkey’s 500-mile frontier with Syria.42 By 2019, Turkish-controlled areas of Syria consisted of more than 3,000 square kilometers, encompassing hundreds of communities including Afrin, Jarabulus, al-Bab, Dabiq, Jindires, Rajo, and Shaykh al-Hadid. Turkey massed troops along its border with Syria beginning in the summer of 2019. It threatened military intervention unless the United States agreed to allow Turkish troops to secure military control over an area 400 kilometers wide and 32 kilometers deep (250 by 20 miles). According to Brett McGurk, the former US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Erdoğan has ambitions to extend Turkey’s borders, “which he feels were unfairly drawn by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.”43

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James Jeffrey, the US Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, made several trips to Ankara to negotiate the details of a safe zone. Though Jeffrey and Turkish officials agreed to a joint operations center to oversee implementation of the safe zone, Jeffrey was slow-walking the negotiations. He told Turkish officials what they wanted to hear, without making commitments that would betray the Kurds. He became an intermediary engaged in shuttle diplomacy to broker a deal that would be acceptable to both. An SDF official said, “The United States is currently speaking to Ankara on behalf of the SDF, voicing Kurdish demands, and that’s actually quite amazing.”44 According to the SDF, Jeffrey’s balancing act convinced Turkey “to accept a YPG presence in northeastern Syria in the long term. A modus vivendi seems within reach.”45 Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu insisted that Turkey would not “tolerate” any “delaying tactics.”46 He repeated Turkey’s inflexible demand for a safe zone with a depth of 32 kilometers (20 miles). He also insisted that the safe zone exclude YPG and PKK “terrorists” in line with “a promise” from President Donald Trump.47 Erdoğan grew impatient and irritated as talks dragged on, admonishing, “Patience has its limits.”48 The size of the safe zone was a sticking point. General Mazloum said that the Kurds would not accept a zone deeper than 5 kilometers. He also rejected the presence of Turkish troops except in joint patrols with US forces that were coordinated with the SDF. He insisted that the 5-kilometer safe zone run the full length of territory between the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. An SDF representative explained, “The reason the agreement needs to encompass the whole border is because otherwise Turkey will continue to threaten unilateral action against the territories that fall outside it. We have no reason to believe that Turkey’s fundamental hostility toward us has changed.”49 Mazloum conceded to a wider zone between Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad, a region dotted with Arab villages, to create a space for the return of refugees. Trump spoke with Erdoğan on December 14, 2018. In a surprise move, he announced the complete and immediate withdrawal of all US forces from Syria. The prospect of US withdrawal encouraged flexibility from the Kurds. Without the United States to protect them, the SDF risked suffering the same fate as Afrin’s residents. The Kurds were put in a position where they had to accept the least bad option. A limited buffer zone was better than a full-scale Turkish invasion, which would result in a massive expulsion and the death of thousands. Turkey had already shown a willingness to launch cross-border operations, attacking Afrin and Jarabulus west of the Euphrates. Just as the Armenians were deported in 1915, the deportation and ethnic cleansing of Kurds would be a disaster for the NES and Kurds in the region. Drawing on the model for joint patrols developed in Manbij, the United States and Turkey agreed to procedures for establishing a safe zone in Syria on the Turkish-Syrian border. The safe zone would extend 75 miles from Tell Abyad to Ras al-Ayn. The SDF agreed to withdraw 5 to 14 kilometers from the border and to remove heavy weapons to a distance of at least 20 kilometers from the border. The deal, which was mediated by James Jeffrey, sought to address Turkish concerns about border security. Before the ink was dry, both sides claimed violations by the other. Mazloum accused the Turks of using drones to conduct unauthorized surveillance flights; Turkey said the Kurds were expanding fortifications in the zone. Erdoğan complained, “It seems

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Turkey’s ally [the U.S.] is after a safe zone in northern Syria not for Turkey but for the terrorist group. We reject such an approach.”50 Instead of a security buffer, Erdoğan refashioned the safe zone as sanctuary so that Syrian Arabs could return from Turkey to Syria or as a place where IDPs could go. The Defense Department resisted coercive resettlement. A Pentagon spokesman asserted, “The United States opposes any forced or coerced relocations of refugees or IDPs. If and when conditions allow, any returns must be to a destination of the individual’s choosing, and must be voluntary, safe and dignified.”51 To staff the operation, the United States announced plans to deploy 150 soldiers that would participate in joint patrols with Turkish troops. It was not clear whether the deployment would be in addition to the one thousand US troops that remained in Syria or if it would be drawn from the existing force. Command details were also unclear. The United States released a photo of the joint patrol with US vehicles in the lead, while Turkey released photos with Turkish armored vehicles in the foreground. The Turks wanted to show they were in charge. Erdoğan does not like to be challenged. Taking the Pentagon spokesman to task, Erdoğan warned: “There are differences between what is said and what has been done. We must resolve this.” Syria rejected the presence of both US and Turkish troops on its territory, which was a violation of its sovereignty. Assad voiced his opposition to Turkey’s presence, vowing to reclaim “every inch.”52Russia also balked at the deal, which violated Syria’s territorial integrity. Brett McGurk, the former special envoy, praised the diplomatic initiative but doubted the deal’s durability. “As with most things in Syria these days, we seem to have increasing policy goals under a president that wants to cut the resources and leave. Where ends and means don’t align, failure often follows.”53 The agreement may prove to be temporary if Trump changes his mind, as he’s likely to do, or if Turkey decides to reinvent the terms of the accord and take unilateral military action, as it has repeatedly threatened. Trump’s phone call with Erdoğan on October 6, 2019 led to the dismantling of US observation posts on the border, which was construed as a green light for Turkey’s attack and occupation of the NES. When Erdoğan proposed returning millions of Syrian Arabs to northern Syria, Trump endorsed plans to “clean” Kurds from their villages and historic homeland. Trump’s endorsement was totally ignorant of international humanitarian law, which requires that refugees return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity.54

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Armenians and Christians

Our weapon is the prayer, the spreading of spirit of love, brotherhood and tolerance.1 —Omar, Administrator of the Protestant Church in Kobani ***** The historic homeland of Armenians encompasses territory in what is today the Republic of Armenia, as well as lands incorporated into the Republic of Turkey that Armenian nationalists refer to as Western Armenia. Beginning in 1915, the Ottoman Empire deported ethnic Armenians from Anatolia. As many as 1.5 million Armenians died between 1915 and 1923 in what is known as the Armenian Genocide. A  mass grave of Armenian victims is located outside of Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria. Human bones protrude from the ground with remains scattered across a barren desert.2 Up to 100,000 survivors of the Armenian Genocide resettled in Syria, seeking sanctuary for their Church and civilization. Faith is fundamental to Armenians, with victimization at the core of their collective identity. The principles of self-sacrifice and martyrdom are foundational not only to Armenians but also to all Christians. Christianity teaches that those who are willing to suffer and die for their faith are saved through their devotion to Jesus Christ. It is written in Galatians, “Jesus gave his life for our sins, just as God our Father planned, in order to rescue us from this evil world in which we live.”3 Devotees believe in the power of prayer and bestowing loving kindness even toward an aggressor. Jesus spent some of His ministry in Syria and made Peter the first Pope while in Syria.4 When the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) stormed across the Iraqi border in June 2014, it targeted apostates—Shiites, Kurds, Yezidis, and Christians. Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, was overrun by ISIS. Its sixty thousand Christians were executed, displaced, or trafficked as sex slaves. The same fate befell Christians in the Nineveh Plains and North and East Syria (NES). ISIS seized ancient churches, some nearly 2,000 years old, and converted them into mosques, madrassas, and prisons. They tore down crosses from the churches and used chisels to deface tombstones in church graveyards. Syria’s Christian population was 250,000 in 2011. Only thirty thousand remained in Syria by the end of 2016.5

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ISIS envisioned a worldwide jihad against Christians. The ISIS magazine, Dabiq, displayed images of crucified Christians as “a message in blood written to the Nation of the Cross.”6 Dabiq featured a picture of St. Peter’s Square with an ISIS flag superimposed atop its holy obelisk. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the ISIS founder and selfdeclared caliph, said his fighters would march “all the way to Rome,” and along the way, “break the crosses [and] trade and sell their women.”7 When ISIS occupied a Christian community, it offered residents a stark choice: forced conversion, slavery, extortion, or execution. Some Muslims opposed Baghdadi’s harsh terror tactics and deemed these tactics as un-Islamic. They pointed out that the Prophet Muhammad taught mercy and humanitarian action. The term “Jihad’ was not meant to legitimize the carnage of nonbelievers. Rather, it described an act of self-improvement for devotees on a spiritual path. King Abdullah II of Jordan affirmed, “It is our duty, rather than a favor” to protect Christians in the Middle East.8 Islam and Christianity share common values. Paul wrote in Corinthians, “If one member of the body suffers; all suffer together.”9 King Solomon spoke of a Biblical obligation to “rescue those being led away to death.”10 Syrian Armenians, Syriacs, and Arab Christians represented about 10  percent of Syria’s total population before the war. Armenians coexisted with their Alawite and Sunni neighbors and established good relations with Kurds, who allegedly killed Armenians during the Genocide while acting on the instruction of Ottoman commanders. Armenians and Syriacs, another ancient Orthodox people who suffered genocide by the Ottomans, share a special bond based on their common faith and shared suffering. The French used their mandate in Syria to provide a safe haven for victims of the Armenian Genocide. The Baath Party tolerated Syria’s Christian minority and made special arrangements on their behalf. State schools provided Muslim and Christian religious education classes in separate classrooms; Christians were allowed broad leeway in certain areas of family law; and, state holidays included Western Christmas, as well as Orthodox and Western Easter.11 Armenians had the right to teach the Armenian language in their schools and to hold Mass in their churches. Two-thirds of Armenians lived in Aleppo, with the rest in the Hay al-Arman district of Damascus, the Jazira governorate and other parts of the Kurdish-majority northeast.12 Most Armenian Christians belong to the Armenian Apostolic or Orthodox Gregorian Church; some are members of the Armenian Catholic Church or the Evangelical Church.13 Having the largest membership, the Armenian Apostolic Church served as the representative of the Armenian people to the Syrian state. Syrian Armenians functioned as a self-contained community, defined by their distinct cultural and religious identity. They coexisted with their neighbors, but they did not assimilate into Syrian society.14 Armenians maintained their unique way of life, building dozens of churches, schools, and cultural centers, which made Syria a locus of the global Armenian diaspora. Armenians were initially ambivalent about Syria’s revolution. They empathized with the moderate Sunni majority, but Syrian Armenians remained neutral in the conflict for the sake of peace and stability. Most concluded that Bashar al-Assad was better than the alternative. Others felt the threat posed by Islamists was exaggerated and

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supported political reform.15 They feared reprisals for publicly associating with Assad. The Armenian Weekly warned that individuals of the Syrian-Armenian community would face recrimination for supporting the opposition. Dissenters would be labeled “traitors” and fall victim to a “witch hunt.”16 Syrian Armenians feared a repeat of events in Iraq where regime change unleashed religious extremism and a spasm of violence against Iraq’s Christians. The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution on February 26, 2015, affirming that ISIS was responsible for “thousands of crimes and abuses against people from all faiths, ethnicities and nationalities.”17 On February 3, 2016, the European Union declared the persecution of Christians by ISIS amounted to genocide. The US government subsequently accused ISIS of genocide in March 2016 and the British Parliament denounced ISIS atrocities as genocide in April 2016. John Kerry indicated:  “[The Islamic State] is genocidal by self-proclamation, by ideology and by actions, in what it says, what it believes and what it does. Naming these crimes is important, but what is essential is to stop them.”18 His successor, Rex W. Tillerson, concurred. In the preface to the 2016 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Tillerson wrote: “ISIS is clearly responsible for genocide against Yazidis, Christians and Shia Muslims in areas it controlled.” He added, ISIS is responsible for “rape, kidnapping, enslavement and death” of targeted religions and ethnicities.19 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide asserts that use of the term “genocide” carries with it a legal obligation to prevent acts of genocide from occurring. The Convention obligates State Parties to take measures to prevent and punish the crime of genocide as well as try persons charged with genocide before a competent tribunal. In light of its inherent legal obligation, US officials debated whether to describe ISIS atrocities as genocide. They preferred to focus on defeating ISIS rather than holding Baghdadi and his lieutenants accountable, which could require US military action. ISIS harassed and persecuted Armenians who refused to join their cause. According to a Syrian Armenian, “In the past, we used to travel at night throughout the country without any fear, even in cities considered fanatically Islamic. Now, people are afraid to come out in their own cities.”20 In July 2012, Armenians in Aleppo were attacked and approximately 170 were killed. More than one hundred were taken hostage and forced to pay a ransom for their release; seven disappeared.21 Ten of the seventeen Armenian churches in Aleppo were destroyed.22 Aleppo’s Karen Jeppe Armenian School was ransacked and 1,300 students were displaced.23 Kessab, an Armenian Christian town in the northwest, was attacked by rebels associated with the Nusra Front, Sham al-Islam and Ansar al-Sham on March 21, 2014. Rebels called the offensive “Anfal,” while the Supreme Military Council of rebel groups referred to it as “The Martyrs Mothers.” Jihadists advanced from the village of Gözlekçiler on Turkish territory, with support from the Turkish military. Thousands of jihadists used five different border crossings to cross from Turkey. Many cars with Syrian license plates were observed ferrying fighters from the Turkish base at Kayapinar. The border crossings were a two-way street with injured rebel fighters sent to medical centers in Turkey for care.

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Kessab’s population was swollen with Armenians who fled violence in Yacubiye, Rakka, and Aleppo and were sheltered by fellow Armenians. In Kessab, 670 families were uprooted and 15 families taken hostage. Three Armenian churches in Kessab were desecrated by the jihadists. The Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) and the Armenian National Committee condemned the attack on Christian and minority populations in Syria, asserting Turkey’s involvement.24 The Armenian Genocide cast a long shadow. “[Syrian Armenians] worry about Turkey coming in, because of what Turkey did to their parents and grandparents 100 years ago.”25 By 2018, 70  percent of Syrian Armenians had fled the country. The AAA called on US assistance to include Armenia, which welcomed the third-largest number of refugees in Europe as a proportion of its population. “As a host country, Armenia has been absolutely exemplary in terms of the ratio of welcomed Syrian-Armenian refugees to the number of native inhabitants,” according to the representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Armenia. Armenia hosts six Syrian refugees per one thousand nationals—a ratio much higher than many European countries or the United States. The AAA statement called for protection and safeguarding of Armenians wherever they reside. “Armenians, having been targeted for annihilation in the twentieth century, are deeply troubled that some 100  years later descendants of genocide survivors in Iraq and Syria are facing similar genocidal atrocities today.”26 The worldwide Armenian diaspora rallied to provide for Armenians from Syria who fled the country. Some Syrian Armenians felt an obligation to return. “Their diaspora forms an important branch of Armenian civilization, and must be preserved.”27 Syria remained a dangerous place for Christians with returnees facing practical difficulties, as their homes and properties had been destroyed. Young children, who resettled in Armenia, did not speak Arabic making it a challenge should their families ever return to Syria. Many Armenians established roots outside of Syria and started businesses. Conditions did not exist to return to Syria and they had scant opportunity to sell their land and property at a reasonable price.28 Those who remained in Syria feared that the withdrawal of US Special Forces would tempt Turkey “to send troops and allied Syrian Arab forces into northern Syria, where they could attack ethnic and religious minority groups, including Yezidis, Kurds, and Syriac Christians.”29 An Armenian priest said, “Turkey is our historical enemy. They have always tried to kill us. That’s their policy.”30 Armenians fear that Turkey will complete the work that ISIS started. On October 11, 2019, Father Hovsep Bedoyan, Pastor of the Armenian Catholic community of Qamishli, and his father were executed in Deir el-Zor on their way to inspect the Armenian Catholic Church in the city. Bassam Ishak, president of the Syriac National Council of Syria warned of a “horrible situation” if the US pulled its troops from northern Syria. He warned, “As soon as people hear that Turkish forces or their Syrian rebel allies are coming, the Christians will start fleeing.”31 The conservative evangelist, Rev. Pat Robertson, stated, “As the U.S.  prepares to draw down, Syrian Christians fear they’ll be wiped out. It appears U.S.  policy has the potential to put 2,000  years of Christian tradition and history at risk.” *****

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Syriacs were the second-largest Christian community in Syria, after the Armenians. Assyrian civilization dates back to 2500 BC when Assyria was an ancient Mesopotamian kingdom spanning northern Iraq and the Nineveh plains. Assyrians, who pioneered the ancient Aramaic alphabet, self-identify as Syriacs, Arameans, and Chaldeans. They belong to the Syriac Ancient Church of the East and the Chaldean Catholic Church. Church members, called Suryanis, were primarily located in the Khabur Valley of Jazira governorate, Homs, Aleppo, and Damascus. The Syriac Orthodox Church, also known as the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East, traces its history to St. Peter and St. Paul in the first century AD. Its Metropolitan, or religious leader, is believed to be the successor of Christ’s apostles and Saint Peter. A  small number of Syriacs belong to the Syrian Catholic Church, founded in 1781. They live in Aleppo, Hasakah, and Damascus. There was division between the Eastern Orthodox Churches, which include the Russian Orthodox Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches, whose congregants are Armenians, Syriacs, and the Copts. The schism fully surfaced at the Council of Calcedon in AD 451. It was based on different interpretations of Jesus. Members of the Oriental Orthodox Church believed Jesus was a man, whereas the Eastern Orthodox Church believed he was God in a human form. The Syriac Orthodox Church enjoyed autonomy during the Ottoman Empire under the “millet system,” whereby ethnic and religious minorities could pay a tax and receive protection. Beginning in 1915, however, the Ottoman authorities killed and deported Syriacs from Anatolia, looting and appropriating their properties. Qamishli was founded by survivors of the Assyrian Genocide and, in 1924, the headquarters of the Syriac Orthodox Church was transferred to Homs. Members of the Oriental Orthodox Church feel comfortable as Christians within an Islamic culture. However, the outbreak of civil war in Syria changed their feelings of security. A series of incidents made Syriacs feel increasingly vulnerable. In February 2014, twenty Christian leaders in Raqqa were coerced into signing a document, pledging “submission to Islam” in exchange for protection from “physical harm or religious targeting.”32 Similar to the tariff under the Ottoman millet system, Islamic law allows Christians to pay a tax, “Jizya,” that obligates Muslims to protect them. ISIS used jizya to coerce Christians, demanding they convert, make payment, or be killed.33 According to the Canadian government, “Christians who lived in areas controlled by rebel groups, have largely fled. [Most Islamists] view Christians as second class citizens [who] must pay money for protection.”34 Between 2011 and 2015, hundreds of Syriacs were executed, thousands displaced, and scores of churches destroyed. Thirteen nuns were kidnapped by al-Nusra from Ma’aloula in December 2013, and held for ransom.35 In February 2015, ISIS launched attacks in thirty-five Assyrian Christian villages along the Khabour River. ISIS kidnapped 253 Assyrians, including women and children, causing 3,000 to flee. ISIS ransomed their Assyrian captives for $100,000 each. It offered a stark choice: convert and pay for protection, or die. ISIS captured al-Qaryatayn near Homs in August 2015, killing more than two hundred civilians. ISIS issued a decree for Qaryatain, drastically curtailing religious freedom and enforcing jizya.36 ISIS occupied thirty-five Christian villages on the

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outskirts of Hasakah in February 2015. Hundreds of inhabitants were killed or kidnapped. Christian churches and institutions, including schools and hospitals, were destroyed. The beheading of priests and community leaders was filmed in ISIS execution videos.37 The video included images of eleven desecrated churches. ISIS was not the only perpetrator of crimes against Syriacs. Bashar al-Assad’s Mukhabarat, the official intelligence agency, raided the headquarters of the Democratic Assyrian Organization in May 2011. Thirteen people were arrested for participating in a peaceful demonstration in solidarity with pro-democracy demonstrators.38 In 2014, at least 450 Christians, including 28 women, were arrested by the intelligence services.39 The Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAA) shelled Syriac churches, destroying forty of sixty-seven churches in the country.40 Syria’s Christians despaired “under threat from all sides,” including by the regime, opposition militant groups, and ISIS.41 According to a Syriac community leader, “There is no future for Christians in the Middle East.”42 ***** Though the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) primarily included Kurds and Arabs, Armenians and Assyrians also joined the SDF. In April 2019, the SDF established a new force made up of ethnic Armenians. Christians and Kurds fought in collaboration, but independently.43 Masis Mutanian, commander of the Armenian militia, shared the vision of decentralized government with the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Mutanian said, “We will follow the path of our martyrs and resist until all the [ethnic] components of the north and east of Syria are free and build a decentralized Syria.”44 The Syriac Military Council also aligned with the SDF, which it helped found in October 2015. Based in al-Malikiyah, a small city in Hasakah Province, the Syriac Military Council was the largest Christian militia in Syria with about two thousand fighters serving as a local protection force of the Assyrian Christian community in eastern Syria. According to the Council, In Iraq, in Turkey, in other places in the Middle East where the Syriac people exist, no one defended us, even though we got a lot of promises. In the end, each component, each people, each person defended themselves, and left the Syriac people alone. So we knew that we needed to have our own power in order to be able to defend ourselves.45

The Syriac Military Council joined the fight in Tell Hamis in 2013. It defended Christian villages from ISIS in Khabour in 2015. It cooperated with the YPG to liberate Hasakah from ISIS control and joined the Manbij operation in 2016. It fought to liberate Deir ez-Zor and other eastern communities in 2018.46 Fighters of the Syriac Military Council vowed “to protect and preserve the Assyrian national identity.”47 In addition to security cooperation, the Council subscribed to the PYD ideology of grassroots democracy, women’s empowerment, and environmental sustainability. The Syriac Military Council issued the following appeal:

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We, men and women who protect the oldest Christian community on earth, ask the global Christian community to stand up for us and give us political and moral support. Our people suffered under the genocide committed by ISIS. As we fight back we ask Christians in government and politics to ask their governments to send us the help we really need to finish what we have started.48

Christians from Western countries went to fight ISIS in Syria and Iraq.49 Some wanted to help Christians who were persecuted for their faith. Others were former marines who fought ISIS in Iraq and then went to Syria to finish the job, which was interrupted by America’s hasty withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. They were fighting for a cause not a country. Many were young idealists who romanticized the cause of fighting ISIS or defending human rights. Some women joined because of their feminist beliefs. The State Department discouraged nonofficial travel of Americans to the frontlines, advising US citizens against volunteering with US-allied Kurdish and Christian militias. There is, however, no US law that prevented individuals from going to fight in Syria. Evangelicals have a begrudging respect for Americans who fight for their faith. Their service was promoted by Western advocates to urge a deeper and more enduring commitment to support Assad’s opponents. Even Trump’s base of support was outraged when the United States turned a blind eye to Turkey’s targeting of Christians in Syria. The evangelist, Rev. Pat Robertson stated, “As the U.S.  prepares to draw down, Syrian Christians fear they’ll be wiped out. It appears U.S. policy has the potential to put 2,000 years of Christian tradition and history at-risk.”50 Tony Perkins, head of the Family Research Council noted that Turkey’s invasion “did shake the evangelical community.”51 According to the Southern Baptist Convention, “Kurdish Christians (and others among the brave Kurds) have stood up for the United States and for freedom and human dignity. What they are now facing from Erdogan’s authoritarian Turkey is horrifying beyond words.”52

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13

Syrian Women

The increasingly militarized violence is fostering more violence, segregation, sectarianism and exclusion – women are the most likely to be suffering long-term consequences as their struggle will not end with the conflict.1 —Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom ***** Mostly women are in the souk, a traditional bazaar in Syrian cities and towns. There are few men, as many husbands and sons have been killed, imprisoned, or disappeared. Grief is common ground between women of different ethnic and sectarian groups who share the terrible toll that war has taken on their families, communities, and country. Women have developed coping strategies. They survive in abysmal living conditions with many homes and entire neighborhoods reduced to rubble. Running water is intermittent or unavailable. Electricity comes from small generators, which have replaced a functioning utility system. Food is scarce and restaurants are almost nonexistent. Women grow tomatoes, cucumbers, radishes, and mint in makeshift kitchen gardens. Pita or khubz, a traditional bread cooked in a brick oven, is served when the local bakery is functioning. Lamb kabob, once a staple food, has become a rare delicacy. Um is an Arabic prefix that means “mother of.” Females in the Arab or Islamic world are usually defined in relation to men. Being defined as “mother of ” gives women social status. The term is an honorific for matriarchs who have traditionally played an important role in Syrian society. With so many male casualties, women lost their protection and found themselves vulnerable to exploitation and danger. Before the war, women constituted 49.4 percent of Syria’s total population.2 Given the war, the percentage of women has grown. As of July 2018, 65 percent of Syrians are now female, excluding male fighters and immigrants.3 Syria is a conservative country where women assume traditional roles, taking care of children, tending the kitchen, and rarely appearing in the workplace. Cultural barriers and social stigma were obstacles to equal opportunity for women under the Baath Party. Barriers were exacerbated by conservative Islamists who rebelled against

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the regime and used violence to advance their goal of social engineering through the application of Sharia law. In May 2017, the Bareeq Education and Development organization surveyed Syrian women over the age of 18 inside and outside the country. War changed the prevailing social norms and expectations of women. While women’s roles were traditionally focused on the home, the war affected their status and relations with men. Women became decision-makers and breadwinners in almost one in three households.4 The Syrian government pledged resources to the families of veterans and martyrs, promising them priority employment for government jobs. Other perks included waived university fees and automobile taxes. Despite promises, women were largely left on their own. The war tested their resilience in the face of overwhelming adversity. The self-perception of women also changed. According to the Bareeq survey, 81 percent of 1,006 women surveyed said “that the social norms in Syria truly impede women’s success”; 88.36 percent of Syrian women believe that the struggle for women’s rights is a legitimate struggle; and 96 percent indicated that women have roles both at home and in the workplace.5 The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy asserted, “Today, the woman is stronger and more responsible, and these seven years of war have proved that women can do anything.”6 Women are survivors; they are resilient. Although Syria’s cumulative GDP loss was approximately $226 billion from 2011 to 2016,7 women played a pivotal role in sustaining Syria’s weakened economy. Women took jobs working on farms, where 90 percent of the workforce is female. Women are involved in cottage industries and handicrafts. They are also engaged in traditional maledominated areas of work such as the manufacturing and service industries. Women have assumed both greater economic and social responsibilities. The ratio of female-headed households rose during the war from 4.4 percent in 2009 to 22.4 percent in 2017.8 The education of many adolescent girls was interrupted by the war, pushing them into the workplace where they assumed menial and low-income jobs. CARE, a major international humanitarian agency delivering emergency relief and longterm international development projects, concluded in 2016 that income in femaleled households “tends to be below that of male-headed households.”9 In Daraa, the monthly income of female-headed households is up to 32 percent less than households headed by men.10 Despite the changing norms concerning women’s roles in society and as breadwinners, discrimination against women persists. Sexual violence and gender-based violence (GBV) were exacerbated by the outbreak of armed conflict in 2011. According to a report by the Atlantic Council, Since the uprising, Syrian women faced oppression from one group to another:  under the Assad regime, and now with extremist groups that impose fundamentalist interpretations of religious rulings and texts. Additionally, Syrian women continue to deal with gender norms in the local culture; which marginalizes and limits women to stereotypical roles.11

Civil society responded to GBV by mobilizing women’s participation in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) providing services and advocacy.12 Since

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independence, Syrian civil society took steps to empower women. The Syrian Women’s League was established in 1948 to advocate for the reform of Syria’s family law. Syria adopted its civil and commercial codes in 1949, granting women the right to control their own assets, own property, and manage their own businesses. However, the penal code permitted husbands to forbid their wives from working outside the home. When the Baath Party took power in 1963, it declared full equality between men and women. It also encouraged women’s participation in the workforce. The General Union of Syrian Women was established in 1967, as a coalition of women’s welfare organizations, education associations, and councils working for gender equality and equal opportunity.13 The 1973 constitution stipulated that women are equal with men and called for the removal of obstacles to women’s development. Article 45 guarantees women “all the opportunities that enable them to participate fully in political, social, economic and cultural life.”14 The People’s Assembly of Syria approved amendments to more than sixty articles of the Personal Status Law on February 5, 2019.15 Reforms allowed spouses to include conditions in their marriage contract. Though the minimum age for marriage was raised from 17 to 18, this regulation was not enforced. Underage girls were still forced to marry due to poverty and cultural expectations. Similarly, other reforms included caveats. Despite reforms, the marriage contract was required to comply with Sharia or Syrian law. Girls as young as twelve were allowed to marry if they are “physically and mentally” ready.16 While Syrian women are forbidden from marrying non-Muslim men, Christian women are allowed to marry Muslims. Amendments to the Personal Status Law did not create accountability for domestic violence. Laws do not punish the perpetrators of domestic violence and Syria lacks domestic violence legislation, criminalizing marital rape.17 Honor killings—acts of vengeance, usually death, committed against female family members deemed to have brought dishonor upon the family—were widespread. When honor killings are prosecuted, the judge has the discretion to consider the circumstances of the honor killing and be lenient.18 ***** Both government forces and armed rebel groups are guilty of sexual violence and GBV, which amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.19 GBV has been used by the regime against opponents and their civilian relatives, both to impose punishment and as a tool to extract information. There were incidents when women and girls were stopped at checkpoints in government-controlled areas and raped.20 Women activists in detention were subject to travel bans and passport confiscation.21 Violent conflict and fear of rape are some of the primary reasons that women have fled the country. The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic reported that the Syrian regime forced adult and young women to undergo body searches, and some were raped during their imprisonment and interrogation.22 A  2013 study by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) found that a majority of displaced Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon fled because they feared rape. Additionally, 16 percent of women interviewed cited the absence of their former head of household as the primary reason for deciding to leave Syria. They are considered economic refugees. The majority of women interviewed experienced a

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constant struggle to find sufficient money to pay rent, buy food, or access health care. Furthermore, the study reported that 60 percent of women worried for their own or their children’s security.23 No place was safe for women in Syria. Not only did government forces commit crimes against women; jihadists practiced sexual slavery, subjecting women to beatings, forced marriages, and gang rape.24 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) restricted women’s movements, enforced a strict dress code, and prevented them from work and education.25 Sunni girls and women were forced to marry ISIS fighters, when their fighter-husband was killed in action.26 Women and girls accused of adultery were stoned to death by ISIS, or thrown off buildings. Women who violated the ISIS dress code were lashed or stoned. Public punishment in the central square of towns and villages burnished the credentials of ISIS for cruelty. ISIS actions reduced the effectiveness of women as bulwarks against extremism, which prevented women from identifying early signs of radicalization in their communities and taking preventive measures.27 According to the Council on Foreign Relations, “Wartime rape fuels displacement, weakens governance, and destabilizes communities, thereby inhibiting post conflict reconciliation and imperiling long-term stability.”28 Women were treated better in North and East Syria (NES). The Kurds have rules requiring women’s participation in local government and administration. Each NES agency is required to have a joint presidency of men and women. Female fighters in the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) are held in high esteem. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) heralds its record on women’s empowerment. However, a report by the Atlantic Council questioned the status of women in NES. The report, which was written by an opponent of the PYD, maintained that women lack real power despite rhetorical commitments from local authorities.29 According to interviews of locals, the PYD employed overly “aggressive” methods forcing women to take part in rallies and conferences or risk losing their salaries. The Atlantic Council also alleged that the YPJ used forced conscription, including coercive measures targeting youth.30 NES leaders and civil society adamantly refute these claims. The Kurdish-run displacement camp at al-Hol in Hasakah governorate expanded from nine thousand to seventy-two thousand displaced persons soon after ISIS was defeated in Baghouz.31 The NES denied the Atlantic Council’s claim that ISIS brides at al-Hol were subject to reprisals, including rape and sexual favors in exchange for aid. The NES administrators cite a variety of noncoercive techniques to dissuade al-Hol residents of the extremists’ ideology, including efforts to reintegrate Syrian women into civil society. ***** Displaced Syrian women were significantly and disproportionately affected by violence, both inside and outside of the country. They were threatened at every stage of displacement. In 2016, Amnesty International reported that women and girls faced violence from other refugees, police or security forces, and human smugglers. “After living through the horrors of the war … these women have risked everything to find safety for themselves and their children. But from the moment they begin this journey they are again exposed to violence and exploitation, with little support or

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protection.”32 Women were forced to sleep alongside hundreds of refugee men. They were required to use the same bathroom and shower facilities as men, where they are subject to abuse. Early marriage occurred in 69  percent of communities throughout Syria.33 Early marriage prevents girls from going to school and restricts their personal and professional development. According to a survey conducted in 2017 and 2018, around 3  percent of 15-year-olds in Syria were married before the war, while the number increased to 14 percent as a result of the war. According to Syrian statistics, 71 percent of women aged 20 were married during the war years, compared to 43 per cent in 2008. Twenty-two percent of all households are headed by women. The unemployment rate for displaced Syrian women is 46  percent, double the rate for men.34 Women were already disadvantaged before the war. Conflict further affected them. The international community was overstretched to meet the needs of refugees. Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon were primary destinations for Syrians fleeing conflict. Most refugees in Turkey lived in urban areas rather than refugee camps, with 91 percent in the southeastern provinces and cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Bursa.35 Urban refugees faced a number of problems and risks including, poverty, poor housing conditions, severe and exploitative working conditions, and limited access to basic services. The refugees also experience marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion by host communities who perceive them as a threat to society. In an effort to placate Turks who opposed Erdoğan’s Syria policy, Turkey started expelling refugees in August 2019.36 Some intergovernmental and regional projects and initiatives for refugee women uplifted their livelihoods. In Gaziantep, UN Women and the International Labor Organization run the “SADA Women-only Centre,” which trains women to run small businesses. It was funded by the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis and the Government of Japan.37 An additional initiative is Dar Zeytuna, which is managed by Syrian refugee women as a resource center for Syrian women and young girls in Reyhanli.38 Dar Zeytuna has bolstered the participation of Syrian women in democratic, economic, and reconstruction processes. Women are trained in international law, including human rights, women’s rights, child rights, and humanitarian law. They are also trained in project development and communication techniques. According to the UN Democracy Fund, “It’s courage and work like yours [Dar Zeytuna] that can transform a refugee from a statistic to a human being living in dignity.”39 The UN Development Program (UNDP) coleads the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).40 Started in February 2018, UNDP’s “Syria Crisis Response and Resilience Program” aims to bolster access to the labor market for women and youth resettled in Turkey.41 In Lebanon, 2,100 Syrian refugee women and Lebanese women and youth from conflict-affected communities learned vocational skills to increase their incomes as part of the “Strengthening Resilience and Protection of Women and Youth in Host Communities,” funded by the government of Japan. Between 2016 and 2018, UN Women provided technical support for Jordan’s first National Action Plan (NAP) to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. The NAP prioritized gender-sensitive security sector

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reform and sought to increase the knowledge of rights, access to justice, and services available to Syrian refugee women and Jordanian women who were survivors of violence.42 Geir O.  Pedersen, UN Special Envoy for Syria, made a special effort to engage women in his mediation. In June 2019, he met the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board to discuss how constitutional processes can protect and advance women’s rights. The Board emphasized the importance of participation by women in the constitutional committee, and demanded that the committee members include at least 30  percent women participants.43 ***** As Syria transitions from violent conflict to peace-building, women are mobilizing to play an important role in stabilizing the country and serving as change agents. The importance of women in peace processes and as peace-builders was codified in 2000 by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325. According to the US Institute of Peace: “1325 affirms that peace and security efforts are more sustainable when women are equal partners in the prevention of violent conflict, the delivery of relief and recovery efforts and in the forging of lasting peace”44 It was based on an international recognition of the changing nature of warfare, in which civilians are increasingly targeted, and the continued exclusion of women’s participation in peace processes. The four pillars of 1325 are: 1. Participation at all levels of decision-making, including in national, regional, and international institutions, as well as in mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, and in peace negotiations. 2. Protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, including in emergency and humanitarian situations, such as in refugee camps. 3. Prevention of violence against women, by prosecuting those responsible for violations of international law; strengthening women’s rights under national law; and supporting local women’s peace initiatives and conflict resolution. 4. Relief and recovery through a gender lens, especially to support the special needs of women and girls in humanitarian emergencies.45 Syria does not have an NAP for implementation of 1325.46 Nonetheless, advocates for Syrian women demand the application of International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), so that women’s concerns are integrated in the peace process and ongoing peace-building efforts.47 According to Insaf Hamad, a member of the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board, “We, the Syrian women, can—and may well be—the backbone of Syrian peace and reconciliation.”48 Syria ratified CEDAW in 2003, with reservations on Article 9(2)-nationality, Article 15(4)-domicile and residence, Article 16(1)(c)(d)(f)(g)-marriage and divorce, Article 16(2)-child marriage, and Article 29(1)-arbitration of disputes.49 A delegation of Syrian organizations held a dialogue with members of the CEDAW committee in July 2014.50 As of 2017, partly as a result of the war, Syria was ranked 142 of 144 countries in the

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Global Gender Gap index.51 Published by the World Economic Forum, the index ranks countries based on the gap between women and men in the area of health, education, economy, and politics. It is often used as a donor development tool, focusing official development assistance. Syria is regularly on the Security Council’s agenda, when considering women, peace, and security in global hot spots. No country wants the Security Council’s scrutiny, which can lead to various forms of intervention. Syrian women want to contribute to peace and prosperity in their homeland. “We can’t find any place better than Syria,” said a woman. “Syria is our country, our mother. Syria held us close. We lived in dignity.”52 Though they suffer disproportionately from the war, their survival has unintentionally empowered women to play a pivotal role as peace-builders when Syria’s conflict will finally come to an end.

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14

Alawites

France applied the principle of “divide and rule” to its Syrian mandate. It promoted sectarian divisions between Sunnis, Alawites, and Druze to counter nationalism and to prevent independence demands by the Sunni community. Alawites, numbering about two million, comprised up to 18 percent of Syria’s prewar population. They were a majority representing two-thirds of the population in Latakia province on Syria’s northwestern coast. Al-Qardaha in Latakia is the Assad family’s ancestral home. Alawites are disbursed across the country also residing in Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. Beyond Syria, the broader Alawite community lives in northern Lebanon and south and central Turkey.1 Founded by Ibn Nusayr in the ninth century, Alawism draws on elements in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Nusayr, a disciple of the tenth and eleventh Shi’ite Imams, was revered as “the gateway to truth” (Bab).2 When the 1920 Treaty of Sevres established the French Mandate in Syria, the French changed the name of “Nusayris” to “Alawites,” meaning the followers of Ali, the Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and sonin-law whom Alawites revere. Alawites were a persecuted minority in the ninth and tenth centuries, consistent with the Shiite principles of self-sacrifice and martyrdom. Taqī ad-Dīn Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, a Hanbali religious scholar representing one of the four traditional Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence, issued a religious edict (Fatwa) in the thirteenth century that declared Shiites, Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis as infidels. The fatwa led to a massacre of Alawites in Aleppo, forcing them to flee to the Latakia Mountains. Alawites were subsequently targeted by the Umayyad, Abbasid, Mamluk, and Ottoman states.3 They adopted a practice called “Taqiya,” obscuring their religious beliefs in order to avoid persecution. Rituals and sacred texts were restricted to a small group of leaders who preserved the secrets of Alawism. Alawites are incorrectly characterized as a Shi’ite faction. However, Alawites do not see themselves as either Sunni or Shia, but as a unique mix of religions.4 Alawites believe that Ali is a divine incarnation even more important than the Prophet Muhammad. They worship a divine Trinity composed of Ali, Muhammad, and a Persian mystic named Salman. Alawites proclaim: “There is no deity but Ali, no veil but Muhammad, and no bab but Salman.”5 Sunnis have a different prayer: “There is no deity but God and Muhammad is His prophet.”6

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Alawites are differentiated from Syria’s Sunnis by their religious practice. Alawites do not abide by the five pillars of Islam—Shahadah:  sincerely reciting the Muslim profession of faith; Salat: performing ritual prayers in the proper way five times each day; Zakat: giving alms or charity to benefit the poor and the needy; Sawm: fasting during the month of Ramadan; and Hajj: the pilgrimage to Mecca that each Muslim is supposed to take at least once in life. In addition, Alawites do not abide by Islamic dietary restrictions, religious rituals, or sanitary practices. Cultural norms are also different. Middle-class, educated, and urban Alawites are more socially liberal and are allowed to consume alcohol. Women are not required to wear a hijab. Alawites celebrate Muslim, Christian, and Persian festivals. Incorporating elements of other monotheistic traditions affirms the universality of Alawism. Alawites and Christians cooperated with the French administration during the mandate from 1920 to 1946, serving as a counterbalance against Sunni Arab nationalism.7 French policy strengthened the separate identities of Syrians by establishing four autonomous regions based upon ethnic and sectarian identities. Alawites were inspired by the Wilson’s Fourteen Points and support for selfdetermination to demand a state of their own. The French administration granted autonomy to Latakia by establishing the independent “State of Latakia” on July 1, 1922. Self-rule arrangements were validated by a court in September that year. Latakia had an independent legal personality with rights to govern its own affairs, provide security for its residents, and raise revenue through taxation. Latakia also benefitted from a significant subsidy provided by the French. During this time, Alawites made up more than half of Syria’s military, called les troupes spéciales du Levant.8 The Alawite region was geographically and strategically important because it enabled France to control the entire Levant coast. Independence for Latakia was short-lived. In December 1936, France started negotiations over its decolonization and departure from Syria. Latakia lost its independence, but it continued to benefit from a “special administrative and financial regime.”9 Syria was a deeply polarized society with intractable tensions between ethnic and religious groups. Reflecting the “the profound abyss” between Alawites and Sunni Syrians, many Alawites preferred autonomy and protection under French rule.10 While Alawites were divided about their future, they foresaw Syria’s independence from France and made plans for the inclusion of Alawites in a united Syria.11 French rule was preferred, but imperfect. The French Mandate neglected economic development of rural areas in Latakia, entrenching economic grievances and stagnation. Economic inequality gradually turned Alawites against French rule and toward Arab nationalism.12 ***** Sunnis dominated the social and political sphere when Syria became independent in 1946. The Sunni-led government limited Alawite representation in parliament and revoked autonomy and power-sharing arrangements. Alawites were subordinate to Syria’s Sunni majority, which fueled resentment and sectarian tensions. Sunnis rejected decentralization that was institutionalized under the French. To Sunnis, regionalism was a pit stop on the path to fragmentation and independence.

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Rather than alienate or oppress Alawites, the Sunni authorities took steps to integrate Alawites into society. Alawites pragmatically pursued their political interests within the Sunni-led system. They assumed prominent positions in Syria’s military, which provided job security and social status. By 1955, approximately 65  percent of noncommissioned officers in the Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAA) were Alawites. The Alawite officer corps grew after the collapse of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a political union between Sunnis in Egypt and Syria, in 1961. After Syria seceded from the UAR, the Alawites “were the strongest and most organized force in the muchweakened national organization.”13 Five out of fourteen members of the Military Committee were Alawites.14 The Baath Party, founded in 1947, was committed to a united and secular Arab society. Baathists were Arab nationalists who espoused socialism, secularism, and opposed imperialism. In April 1947, Dr. Wahib al-Ghanim led an Alawite party with similar ideas to the Baath and demanded the incorporation of socialist ideas into the Baathist charter. Akram al-Hawrani, the leader of the Arab Socialist Party, was supported by many rural Alawites and young Alawite officers. The two parties merged into the Arab Socialist Baath Party in September 1953. The Baathist movement gained strong support from Alawite officers and the Alawite community who embraced social justice as an antidote against Sunni dominance. Nonetheless, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) disparaged Alawites as nonbelievers (kuffars).15 The principle of social justice for Arabs was enshrined in the Baathist constitution of 1947. While heralding the rights of Arabs, the constitution denied rights of ethnic minority groups like the Kurds and the rights of religious minorities such as the Christians and Zoroastrian Yezidis. Hafez al-Assad participated in the coup on March 8, 1963, and became the de facto commander of the Syrian army in 1969. After the subsequent Baathist coup, he became the first Alawite president of the Syrian Arab Socialist Republic in February 1971. He consolidated his Alawite political base as a bulwark against the potentially rebellious Sunni majority, which had close ties to the MB. The Brotherhood was a socially conservative religious organization, with a large Sunni population in urban areas, which resented Alawite dominance in Syria’s government and business sector.16 Assad relied on the Alawite community to consolidate his power. He appointed trusted Alawites to senior positions within the state’s security apparatus. Assad spoke about improving the living conditions for urban and rural Alawites, and building infrastructure—electricity, water, roads. His government offered agricultural subsidies to Alawite farmers, intended to alleviate their poverty. Urban Alawites also benefited from greater employment opportunities, working as civil servants and in the armed forces.17 Assad also broadened his base of support outside of the Alawite community, building patronage networks with the Druze, Armenians, and Syriac Christians. Additionally, Assad reached out to Syria’s Sunnis. He built mosques, prayed, and fasted to earn their favor.18 He coopted Sunni elites, working closely with the prominent Makhlouf mercantile family and appointed a prominent Sunni general, Mustafa Tlass, as minister of defense. A national referendum confirmed Assad to a seven-year term as president in March 1971. Assad’s consolidation of power, the secular constitution, and his favoritism toward handpicked Sunnis fueled opposition among the populace. The MB launched a rebellion in Hama between 1976 and 1982 that, as we have seen, Assad

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brutally suppressed. Sunni resentment simmered until Assad passed away in 2000. His inner circle insisted on Alawite succession with strong preference for a member of the Assad family. Parliament amended the presidential age requirements and Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father as president. ***** Some Sunni leaders hoped to break the codependent relationship between the Assad regime and Alawites. The former Syrian MB leader, Ali Bayanouni reached out in 2006, stating: The Alawites in Syria are part of the Syrian people and comprise many national factions … [The] present regime has tried to hide behind this community and mobilize it against Syrian society. But I believe that many Alawite elements oppose the regime, and there are Alawites who are being repressed. Therefore, I believe that all national forces and all components of the Syrian society, including the sons of the Alawite community, must participate in any future change operation in Syria.19

Assad exploited deep-seated Alawite insecurity toward the Sunni majority.20 He staged violent episodes in the summer of 2008 to show Alawites that his regime would protect them from “Sunni fundamentalism and intolerance.”21 The “Shahiba,” a militia of Alawites and others, was formed in 1991. Its leaders drove Mercedes as a symbol of their wealth and power. Members of the Shabiha committed some of the most egregious abuses against civilians and anti-government protesters beginning in 2011 and during the civil war.22 The National Defense Force, a predominantly Alawite paramilitary group, was created in 2012 with assistance from Hezbollah and Iran.23 Alawites were uncomfortable with Iran’s sponsorship of these militias and the close cooperation between Assad and Iran. It was a practical alliance based on shared interests: to defeat Sunni rebels, limit Saudi influence, confront Western proxies, and deny Israeli interests. After the 1979 revolution, both Iran and Syria found themselves opposing the United States and Israel. In the Middle East, where “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” Alawites and Shiites in Iran found common cause. Fighting Sunni Islamists cemented relations. Not every Alawite supported the Assad regime. Moderate Alawites challenged Assad’s fear-based justifications for his authoritarian rule, and many progressive Alawites participated in the early protests against Assad. Like other Syrians, they were primarily concerned with corruption, economic troubles, and political violence. Many were afraid for their future if the regime fell and Sunnis gained control.24 Most Alawites do not perceive themselves as being well-connected to the regime, but rather fear for their survival. In fact, they have every reason to feel aggrieved with the regime. While Bashar Assad rules Syria with power and wealth, most rural Alawites are impoverished. People say, ‘We never asked for anything, we don’t want anything, we just want security.25

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Periodic sectarian fighting was a reminder of what it would be like if Assad was ousted. The ruling family cut itself off from the general Alawite community and manipulates sectarian fear as a form of social control.26 Support for Assad among Alawites waned as the war worsened. Sam Dagher wrote in The Wall Street Journal, “Some Alawites bemoaned the way they have been pushed by Mr. Assad and his regime down an irreversible path of confrontation with the country’s Sunnis. Many Alawites fear that their community has passed a point of no return and can survive only if Syria is partitioned into smaller chunks, including one for the Alawites.” A group of Alawite officers who defected from the SAA were called the “Free Alawites.” They opposed Assad’s tyranny and joined the armed opposition. Other Alawites participated in a demonstration at the Russian embassy, protesting Russia’s role in the war. Many Alawites feared that their community could only survive if they were given a state to govern and defend. In 2018, prominent civil society representatives and muftis issued a joint statement distancing themselves from the atrocities committed by the regime and vowing to advance secular and democratic ideals. The manifesto, called a “Declaration of Identity Reform,” described their hopes for Syria’s future as a pluralistic country with democratic institutions and a military accountable to civilian authority. The Alawite authors rejected fatwas that “consider Alawism as an integral part of Shiism.” They committed to “fight against sectarian strife.” Heralding “the values of equality, liberty and citizenship,” the manifesto envisioned a country where the believers in Islam, Christianity, and all other religions are equal. Assad’s legitimacy “can only be considered according to the criteria of democracy and fundamental rights.”27 Even as the regime came closer to winning the war, Alawites lived in fear about their future in Syria. They anticipated that various communities would seek revenge against Assad by targeting innocent Alawites. Bombings and assassinations became increasingly widespread. As a form of collective guilt, the entire Alawite community would be held responsible for Assad’s crimes and be at-risk of reprisals. “All Alawites— the ruling elite, soldiers, paramilitary thugs, and most importantly, commoners—are targets. Islamist rebels are clear on this:  Every Alawite killed is one Alawite killed because of Assad.”28

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Part Five

Grinding War

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Idlib

In Idlib, we will cleanse them. They can go back to the countries they came from. If they resist, they will be killed.1 —Bashar Jafaari (Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations) ***** Idlib was ground zero for the final phase of Syria’s civil war. On April 30, 2019, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), with its allies Russia and Iran, launched the Northwestern Syria offensive. This was also known as the Idlib offensive and codenamed “The Dawn of Idlib.” The offensive targeted Greater Idlib, which consists of northwest Hama, southern Idlib, and northeastern Latakia province. The primary strategic objective was the city of Idlib itself, where the opposition dug in for its last stand. Idlib, located in northwest Syria on the Syrian-Turkish border, was taken by the opposition in 2015. In subsequent years, its population swelled as rebel positions collapsed across the country and fighters retreated. Idlib’s prewar population was about 1.5 million. By the time of the SAA’s offensive in July 2019, the United Nations (UN) estimated that its population had doubled to three million, nearly half of whom were children and widows.2 Many internally displaced persons (IDPs) ended up in Idlib after fleeing Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, Homs, or Daraa. Some IDPs fled their homes multiple times before ending up in Idlib. The Syrian government alleged that civilians were used as human shields by the armed opposition. Bashar al-Assad sought to deliver a final military blow to the rebels in Idlib. Ambassador Bashar Jafaari, Syria’s permanent representative to the UN, warned: “In Idlib, we will cleanse them. They can go back to the countries they came from. If they resist, they will be killed.”3 Some thirty thousand opposition fighters regrouped in Idlib. According to the UN, one-third of them belonged to terror groups. Jan Egeland of the Norwegian Refugee Council noted:  “There are some very bad militants inside.”4 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was the largest armed opposition group in Idlib. HTS is an amalgam of Islamist rebels formed on January 28, 2017. Its members include the al-Nusra Front, Ansar al-Din, Jaysh al-Sunna, Liwa al-Haqq, and other extremist groups. Some have links to al-Qaeda and pushed for an Islamic emirate in Syria under al-Qaeda’s control. HTS was likened to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) because of its extremist views.

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The National Front for Liberation of Syria (NFL) was the second-largest rebel group in the greater Idlib region. The NFL was established in 2018 as part of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with backing from the Turkish government. The NFL was considered more moderate. However, minorities were wary after the FSA committed gruesome crimes against Kurds in Afrin. The NFL initially fought alongside the HTS against pro-government forces. However, the NFL and HTS clashed over ideological issues and fealty to Turkey. Overrun by the HTS early in 2019, the NFL was significantly weakened prior to the Idlib offensive.5 Jaysh al-Izza is a faction of the FSA. In contrast to other FSA factions, it differs over its ties to Turkey. It received weapons from the HTS, with which it shares an Islamist agenda. It was one of the few rebel groups to oppose the so-called de-confliction deal realized through the Astana Process. Rebels and pro-regime forces were supposed to withdraw and establish a demilitarized zone (DMZ) spanning the contact line between government- and rebel-held territory in Northern Syria. Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was a major proponent of the deal. The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) was the other major rebel group active in Idlib. The TIP is an extremist Islamic party founded by Uyghurs from the Xinjiang region of western China. The group is mostly based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also has a presence in Syria where it had close ties to the HTS. ***** Idlib became the center of human suffering in Syria. With violence intensifying and space for civilians shrinking, the calamitous situation worsened as the SAA advanced, squeezing Idlib and its desperate inhabitants. The UN warned that 800,000 people could be forced to flee if Idlib were overrun by regime forces.6 The UN proposed humanitarian corridors so that civilians could be evacuated to safe areas, but no place was safe; they had nowhere to go. Turkey, which was already hosting 3.5 million Syrian refugees, feared a new influx of refugees and sealed its border. IDPs fleeing to government-controlled territory risked being caught in a cross fire, detained, or imprisoned. The Syrian government claimed that Idlib’s civilian population was infiltrated by terrorists and prevented their movement. “This is our worst nightmare coming true,” said Jan Egeland. “There was no escape for three million civilians.”7 Turkey proposed a safe zone for the IDPs. Civilians were skeptical because of Turkey’s close cooperation with Russia and Iran through the Astana Process. Moreover, Turkey had closed its borders and, in violation of international humanitarian law, was forcibly preventing refugees from coming across. By this point in the war, the Syrian government was fully committed to a military solution and had rejected negotiations. According to Ambassador Jafaari, “We cannot negotiate peace when terrorists are shelling our cities and killing our people.” Jafaari accused Turkey of “violating our sovereignty” and disparaged its proposed buffer zone as “a declaration of war.” Erdoğan had become the chief antagonist of Assad. Syrian officials viewed Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Erdogan as the MB’s worldwide leader.8 The Geneva Peace Process focused on conflict resolution, seeking a negotiated end to Syria’s civil war. In contrast, the Astana Process highlighted conflict management,

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seeking to limit the negative consequences of violent conflict and build momentum for peace negotiations. In September 2018, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin hosted heads of state in the Astana Process in Sochi. The September 2018 Sochi de-escalation agreement was a defining achievement of the Astana Process. Article 1 of the Sochi Agreement stipulated that “Turkey’s observation points will be fortified and continue its activities.” According to Article 2, Russia will “take all precautions to avoid military operations and attacks in Idlib” and that “the current status quo in Idlib will be protected.” Article 3 called for a “15–20 kilometer-deep demilitarized zone in Idlib,” and Articles 5 and 6 required the “removal of all radical groups, as well as tanks and cannons.”9 As required by the Sochi Agreement, HTS would withdraw completely from the de-confliction zone. The NFL would relinquish its artillery and other heavy weapons but remain in the DMZ. The deal also required unrestricted access for civilians along the M-4 highway from Latakia to Saraqib and opened the M-5 international highway, which goes from north to south including a strategic stretch from Damascus to Homs, and then traversing the border onto Gaziantep in Turkey. As part of the de-escalation agreement, Turkey would establish twelve observation points in rebel-held territory of Idlib, western Aleppo, and northern Hama provinces, deploying up to 7,000 troops. Iran and Russia would also establish monitoring facilities on the government-held side of the zone.10 The de-escalation agreement was never implemented. HTS used the lull in fighting to resupply and then launch an offensive in February 2019, gaining control of almost all of Idlib province. Between February 14 and April 7, major cease-fire violations occurred on both sides, resulting in hundreds dead and wounded. As fighting intensified, Russia initiated air strikes along the M-5, targeting positions in Idlib city, al-Latiminah, Kafr Zita, and Kafraya. Syrian forces used Russian BM-30 rocket launchers to fire banned cluster munitions, which disburse thousands of pellets to maximize human harm. Cluster bombs were used on numerous occasions. For example, thirteen people were killed and twenty-five wounded in Karfanbel on April 5.11 In addition, barrel bombs were dropped on civilian centers. In addition to cluster and barrel bombs, Russian and Syrian warplanes used conventional munitions to bomb hospitals, schools, markets, bakeries, and water storage tanks. Bombing civilian infrastructure was intended to increase the populace’s sense of vulnerability and drive a wedge between Islamist militias and the people. These actions were a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law. Government forces bombed the Tarmala Maternity and Children’s Hospital in South Idlib on May 15. The facility, which serviced six thousand people each month, was completely destroyed. According to Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), Tarmala was the 19th health care facility bombed in Syria over just a few weeks.12 PHR reported 566 individual attacks on 350 health care facilities that killed 890 medical personnel between the outbreak of the war and May 2019. PHR and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were forced to suspend their operations due to the regime targeting aid workers. According to PHR, “These attacks are not unfortunate side effects of the war but have become crucial parts of the Syrian military’s strategy. In our

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assessment, over 90 percent of these incidents are attributable to the Syrian government and its affiliates, including militia and Russian allies.”13 HTS retaliated with synchronized suicide bombing attacks against the SAA and Iran-affiliated militias, killing twenty-two and injuring thirty people in Aleppo province on April 27. Russia declared that the rebel groups had broken the cease-fire agreement and, with the Syrian Air Force, intensified attacks using air power, artillery, and surface-to-surface missiles.14 After six days of airstrikes, the SAA launched a ground offensive against the HTS in Hama and Idlib provinces on May 6, targeting dozens of villages and towns along the Hama–Idlib axis and the western countryside of Aleppo. The offensive was led by the elite Syrian Army Tiger Forces. Assad ignored entreaties of the UN, vowing to retake all territory that remained outside of the Syrian government’s control. In 2013, the rebels controlled 80 percent of Syria. By the summer of 2019, only a few pockets of resistance remained. In over just three months, the regime’s Idlib offensive killed more than 2,000 people and displaced some 400,000. Eschewing negotiations, Assad pressed for a final military solution. Reinforcements from Hezbollah along with the SAA 4th Armored Division, headed by Maher al-Assad, began arriving in Hama on July 5 to bolster pro-government forces. SAA Tiger Forces needed respite after fighting nonstop since the middle of May.15 In August, Russian-backed Syrian forces captured al-Hobeit, which had been in rebel hands since 2014. The fall of al-Hobeit was a turning point, triggering the withdrawal of rebels from other towns in northern Hama that bordered Idlib to the south. Taking al-Hobeit, close to the town of Khan Sheikhoun, opened up southern approaches to Idlib. Al-Hobeit straddles the M-5, linking Damascus with Aleppo in the north.16 The rebels, almost completely surrounded by government forces, announced a tactical withdrawal from Khan Sheikhoun. They called it a “redeployment,” not a retreat. ***** Events on the ground threatened Turkey. Its ninth observation post in Morek was just 10 kilometers south of Khan Sheikhoun. If Khan Sheikhoun fell, Morek would be completely surrounded by regime forces, cutting off the escape route north. Turkey was trying to resupply its forces when a Turkish convoy of fifty vehicles and five tanks was attacked by Syrian warplanes on August 19, 2019.17 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights indicated that Russian and Syrian planes jointly carried out strikes on the convoy. The attack strained Turkey–Russia relations, as air strikes required Russia’s consent. Turkish officials said they had informed the Russians in advance about the convoy, though the attack violated de-confliction protocols in the Sochi Agreement. Tensions worsened when, just three days later, Syrian planes bombed a Turkish observation post in Idlib, according to the official Anadolu Agency. Turkey strongly condemned the air strikes. The Foreign Ministry issued an official protest: In the face of these ongoing operations in violation of all memorandums and agreements threatening the supply route to the Turkish Observation Point No. 9, a deployment of our forces was started on August 19, 2019 at 5.30 a.m. with advance

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information supplied to the Russian Federation, in order to keep the supply routes open, to ensure the safety of our observation post and to prevent further loss of civilian / innocent lives in the region.18

The Syrian government disputed these claims, insisting that the convoy was delivering weapons and ammunition. Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu warned Syria not to “play with fire.” He added, “We will do whatever is necessary to ensure the security of our soldiers and observation posts. We hope it will not come to this point.”19 Turkey–Russia relations were undergoing a stress test. It was the worst bilateral crisis since Turkey shot down a Russian jet over Syria in November 2015. Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT), and presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin traveled secretly to Moscow to meet their Russian counterparts after the convoy was attacked. Usually bombastic, Erdoğan described airstrikes on schools and hospitals as “inexplicable” but had little else to say.20 Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile defense system was pending. Security cooperation between Turkey and Russia was being strengthened simultaneously as the two countries were in deep disagreement over Idlib. Putin had Erdoğan over a barrel; Turkey cast its lot with Russia, alienating the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Erdogan tempered his criticism of Russia even when it attacked the convoy. A public disagreement risked their broad rapprochement. For all intents and purposes, the convoy bombing marked the demise of the Sochi Agreement. The Agreement was rendered notional, with all sides complaining about implementation. Turkey was unable to prevent the escalation of conflict that destabilized its border, and risked additional refugee flows. Under increasing duress from the regime and its allies, members of the armed opposition turned on one another. Syria’s multifaceted conflict pitted Turkish-backed groups like the FSA against the HTS. It also pitted Turkey against Russia, which took action against opposition fighters who attacked the Russian military base in Khmeimim.21 Erdoğan sought a meeting with Putin. He was invited to the 14th International Aviation and Space Salon MAKS-2019 on August 27. The trade fair was a showcase for Russian aviation technology. Putin and Erdoğan were jovial and friendly, sharing an ice cream. Erdoğan reflected, “Today we have taken a closer look at Russia’s defense industry. I would like to express satisfaction at the fact that today we also saw Russianmade engines for passenger airliners, combat aircraft, helicopters and other aviation equipment. We also watched the demonstration flights of combat aircraft, including the Su-34, Su-35 and Su-57. We have also been updated on Russia’s space activities and the measures you are taking to boost your space industry. Everyone knows that Russian researchers have reached very high standards in this sphere.”22 Putin offered Turkey the Su-35 fighter jet, in lieu of the Lockheed F-35 stealth fighter. Turkey was an original investor in the manufacturing consortium of the F-35, but was locked out by the United States after buying the S-400s. In addition to discussing the purchase of military equipment, Erdoğan sought concessions in Idlib as well as assurances regarding the safety of the FSA and other Turkish-backed Islamist groups. Putin and Erdoğan appeared together at a press conference. Putin conceded, “We know that Turkey is under tremendous pressure from refugees and we fully

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understand Turkey’s sensitivities. It needs to secure its southern borders. We think that creation of a buffer zone on Turkey’s southern border is a good idea in terms of securing Syria’s territorial integrity and we will continue working together to reduce tensions there.”23 The proposal for a buffer zone was vague, yet conciliatory. Erdoğan was somber. Putin held all the cards and could compel Erdoğan to do whatever he wanted. Russia used bunker buster bombs to attack a Turkish convoy on February 27, 2020, killing at least fifty Turkish troops. Erdoğan went to Moscow, imploring Putin to restore the buffer zone and abide by the terms of the Sochi Agreement. By this time, almost one million people from Idlib were driven from their homes. Erdoğan opened Turkey’s border with Greece and dumped migrants at the gate in a bid to gain security assistance from the West and extort more money from the EC. ***** The escalation of conflict in Idlib occurred while Turkey was threatening an incursion into North and East Syria (NES), which was controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite his threats, Erdoğan needed acquiescence from Washington to ramp up his campaign against the Kurds. He also needed for Putin to be on board and open Syria’s air space to Turkey’s warplanes. Erdoğan’s AKP was reeling on the domestic front. It suffered dramatic setbacks in local elections in the spring of 2019. Voters were reacting to the country’s economic difficulties. Through mismanagement and arrogance, Erdoğan’s standing was deeply diminished at home, in the region, and on the world stage. Russia was the big winner. Its air power was indispensable to the Idlib campaign. Moreover, Russia’s engagement proved pivotal to Assad’s victory. Russia assured its strategic interests by controlling bases in Latakia and Tartus. Capturing the M-4 and M-5 highways not only broke the rebels, but also assured security for Russia’s military installations.24 Russia also gained the upper hand on Iran, which was vying for influence over Assad and business opportunities in Syria. Iran was also a winner. Syria’s control over Idlib province assured Iran its corridor to supply Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terror groups committed to Israel’s destruction. In addition, Hezbollah proved its mettle in the ground war and earned praise from Assad. Israel’s air strikes against Hezbollah only served to burnish the group’s antiZionist and anti-American credentials. Of course, Assad was the biggest winner. Defeating the rebels in Idlib was a major milestone in securing a military victory in Syria’s civil war. In 2013, it seemed that Damascus would be overrun. Six years later, the Idlib campaign was the final battle. The biggest losers were Syria’s Sunnis and vanquished rebel groups. More than 500,000 people died and 12  million were displaced during the civil war. Syrians were caught up in the excitement of the Arab Spring. However, Assad’s state security apparatus was harsher than other regimes where people demanded reform and political transition. Bashar did in Idlib what Hafez had done in Hama. The brutality of his victory made reconciliation inconceivable in the short term. Though it was not directly engaged militarily, the United States was also a loser. Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, the State Department’s Special Envoy to Syria, tried all

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available diplomatic channels to pressure Russia to de-escalate in Idlib. However, Russia simply ignored his appeals. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo emphasized the importance of a “political track” to Sergey Lavrov, but was rebuffed. So was the Pentagon, which “repeatedly called on all parties, including Russia and the Syrian regime, to abide by their commitments to avoid large scale military offensives. Only a return to de-escalation will allow unhindered humanitarian access.”25 President Donald J. Trump also weighed-in, tweeting: “Hearing word that Russia, Syria and, to a lesser extent, Iran, are bombing the hell out of Idlib Province in Syria, and indiscriminately killing many innocent civilians. The World is watching this butchery. What is the purpose, what will it get you? STOP!”26 America was increasingly enfeebled and irrelevant. US influence in the region was undermined by the course of events in Syria, where Washington overpromised and underperformed. ***** The SDF drove ISIS out of its Baghouz stronghold in March 2019. From its interrogation of hard-core ISIS fighters, the SDF learned that Baghdadi had moved to Idlib in northwest Syria. Discovering Baghdadi in Idlib was a surprise to everyone who believed he was hiding in eastern Syria or western Iraq, near his ancestral village. Baghdadi ended up at a compound in Barisha just 5 kilometers from the Turkish border. The area around Barisha is controlled by the FSA with a series of Turkish military outposts near the border. A network of tunnels existed beneath Baghdadi’s Barisha compound. All the tunnels were sealed except for one. Since the tunnel network was destroyed by a US air strike, we do not know if the tunnel was an escape route leading to a nearby Turkish military base or to Turkey itself. In his national address announcing that US Special Forces killed Baghdadi, Trump commended Turkey. Trump also thanked “the Syrian Kurds for certain support they were able to give us.”27 He downplayed the importance of intelligence provided by the SDF, which was critical to the mission. US helicopters took off from Hareer Air Force Base outside Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. Incirlik Air Force Base is much closer, but the Pentagon did not trust the Turkish government to make them a partner. Turkey’s foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu exaggerated Turkey’s role. “Turkey and our US counterparts shared information, exchanged opinions before the operation to kill Daesh leader started. That’s why Trump thanked Turkey in his speech.”28 In fact, Turkey played no active role. According to a US official, “Turkey did not provide any assistance in this operation. [Baghdadi] was located right next to its border … That shows you how little they do on countering ISIS.”29 An Iraqi official indicated that Baghdadi was killed “after his hiding place was discovered when he tried to get his family out of Idlib toward the Turkish border.”30 The SDF’s General Mazloum heralded the “joint effort over more than 5 months between Military Intelligence of the SDF and US Forces.” He explained “[we] documented over the past months the presence of high ranking ISIS leaders including Baghdadi in areas under control of the Turkish state.” According to Mazloum, “The Operation was delayed for more than a month due to Turkish aggression in our region.”31

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Idlib was more than a redoubt for opposition forces. It became the hub for Islamist extremists, including Baghdadi himself. Questions arose after the raid on Baghdadi’s compound: Was Turkey providing protection to Baghdadi? Why did the United States exclude Turkey from direct knowledge of the operation? To what extent was US intelligence familiar with cooperation between Baghdadi and MIT?

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Remember, all these “freedom fighters” in Syria want to fly planes into our buildings.1 ***** The USS Porter and the USS Ross, destroyers in the Sixth Fleet, launched fifty-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles from their position in the eastern Mediterranean against the Shayrat Airbase near Homs on April 4, 2017. The missile strike was in response to a chemical weapons (CW) attack by the Syrian regime against Khan Sheikhoun, a rebel stronghold near Idlib. According to President Donald J. Trump, “Bashar al-Assad launched a horrible chemical weapons attack on innocent civilians. Using a deadly nerve agent, Assad choked out the lives of helpless men, women and children. It was a slow and brutal death for so many. Even beautiful babies were cruelly murdered in this very barbaric attack. No child of God should ever suffer such horror.”2 Eric Trump said that his father’s decision to send Tomahawks was influenced by his daughter, Ivanka, who was “heartbroken and outraged” by Assad’s use of CW. According to Eric Trump, his father was “deeply affected” by the pictures of children being “sprayed down by hoses to keep their skin from burning.” “It was horrible. These guys are savages.”3 Though Syria’s armed opposition welcomed US military intervention, the cruise missile strike was not part of a systematic or ongoing campaign against the Assad regime. Nor was it linked to a diplomatic initiative to revive the political track on peace negotiations. A Pentagon official admitted it was a “one-off,” targeting aircraft, hardened aircraft shelters, petroleum and logistical storage, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense systems, and radars. The strike did minimal damage to the tarmac, and Shayrat was fully operational within 24 hours. Trump said, “We are prepared to sustain this response until the Syrian regime stops its use of prohibited chemical agents.” Nikki Haley, the US ambassador to the United Nations, was told by the President that the military was “locked and loaded” if Syria launched another CW attack.4 Despite the pronouncement, Trump took no action to suggest a sustained effort to change the course of events in Syria. The Russian government called the missile strike a violation of international law. Russia’s deputy UN Envoy, Vladimir Safronkov, warned of “negative consequences”

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from an act of aggression against a sovereign state, recalling the negative consequences of intervention in Iraq and Libya.5 Syrian state television chastised “American aggression.”6 US allies, such as Australia and Canada, supported the missile strikes. According to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “Canada fully supports the United States’ limited, focused action to degrade the Assad regime’s ability to launch such attacks. We continue to support diplomatic efforts with our international partners to resolve the crisis in Syria.”7 Trump is the antithesis of Obama, both by nature and design. Trump did everything possible to differentiate himself from his predecessor. Efforts to discredit him started in 2011 with the birther movement. Trump used Twitter to promote a racist and unfounded theory that Obama was born in Kenya, rather than in Hawaii, and was thus ineligible to be president. Though Trump repeatedly called for Obama to release his birth certificate, there was no proof behind the birther movement. Trump used it to compromise Obama and aggrandize himself, bolstering his base of supporters. Obama’s foreign policy was a ripe target for Trump’s criticism. Trump admonished Obama against responding militarily when Assad used CW in August 2013. He tweeted: “Again, to our very foolish leader, do not attack syria—if you do many very bad things will happen & from that fight the U.S. gets nothing!”8 Trump is the master of mixed messages, motivated by political expediency and the desire to advance his political agenda. When Assad used CW in 2017, Trump called it a direct “consequence” of Obama’s failings. “These heinous actions by the Bashar al-Assad regime are a consequence of the last administration’s weakness and irresolution. President Obama said that he would establish a ‘red line’ against the use of chemical weapons and then did nothing.”9 Trump’s decision to launch the cruise missile attack after the use of CW in Khan Sheikhoun contrasted with Obama’s inaction after Ghouta was attacked with CW in August 2013. On no issue did Trump and Obama differ more dramatically than Iran. Obama viewed normalization with Iran as a strategic opportunity and potential legacy. He assigned Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns as a back channel to explore lifting sanctions in exchange for an end to Iran’s nuclear activities. Trump accused Obama of losing perspective in pursuit of a deal with Iran. Trump believed that Obama was so preoccupied with engaging Iran that he opted for regime preservation over regime change. When Trump was elected president, he scuttled the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and switched to coercive diplomacy and crippling sanctions. Trump spitefully sought to discredit Obama’s actions concerning Iran, Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan and reverse US policy. Despite their differences, Obama and Trump shared a reluctance to get involved in foreign military ventures. Obama ran on a platform to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. When Washington and Baghdad could not agree on a Status of Forces Agreement in 2011, Obama pulled US troops out of Iraq leaving a small residual force focused on counterterrorism and training Iraqis to fight on their own. Despite the temporary surge of military involvement in Afghanistan, Obama was working toward withdrawal. Neither he nor Trump could justify the toll on troops and treasure of foreign wars.

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Trump and Obama also disagreed on Russia. The Obama administration imposed sanctions and took steps to isolate Russia after its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Trump took a different tact, pledging to rejoin amity with Russia and restore its membership in the G-7, which was suspended because of Crimea. As we have seen, Putin took umbrage at Hillary Clinton’s criticism and sought to discredit her muscular approach in Syria. Trump invited Russia to hack Clinton’s emails. “I will tell you this, Russia: If you’re listening, I  hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I  think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.”10 Trump wanted to cooperate with Russia on Syria. However, Russia’s support for Assad was a conundrum. Trump’s push to normalize relations with Russia was undermined by allegations of collusion with Russia to influence the 2016 US presidential election and obstructed justice to impede an investigation into Russia’s role. ***** A sample of Trump’s tweets reveal a pattern of chaotic, confusing and often contradictory communications. In a tweet of 140 characters, Trump could not elaborate on the nuances of foreign policy or explain what he would do to change the course of events in Syria. Trump’s ill-informed and erratic tweets intensified after he announced his bid to become president, and continued after the election in 2016. There are hundreds of Trump tweets on Syria; following is an illustrative sample. As a candidate, Trump sent mixed messages on Syria. Was Trump criticizing Obama for advocating regime change or for not doing enough to achieve it? He was ambivalent about the extent of US engagement, advocating contradictory approaches by both supporting a more robust response and a non-interventionist path. Trump tweeted on June 15, 2013: “We should stay the hell out of Syria, the ‘rebels’ are just as bad as the current regime. What will we get for our lives and $ billions? Zero.”11 He warned that intervention would invite terrorists to attack the United States. “Remember, all these ‘freedom fighters’ in Syria want to fly planes into our buildings.”12 It was unclear from Trump’s tweets whether he would intervene using different tactics than Obama, or whether he flatly opposed intervention under any circumstances. Either Trump was intentionally ambiguous, or he lacked a carefully considered position on intervention. He warned, “If Obama attacks Syria and innocent civilians are hurt and killed, he and the U.S.  will look very bad!”13 He admonished Obama to stay out. “What will we get for bombing Syria besides more debt and a possible long term conflict?”14 “The President must get Congressional approval before attacking Syria-big mistake if he does not!”15 Trump never acknowledged the intense debate over arming the moderate opposition within the US government. Nor did he show an appreciation that trainand-equip program was part of a strategy to turn the tide against Assad, and thereby force negotiations. Washington’s diplomacy is most effective when there are carrots and sticks, including a credible threat of force. Oblivious of nuance, he posted dozens of tweets warning Obama to “stay out” of Syria and focus on domestic issues instead. His stream of conscience tweets reached a crescendo after Assad attacked Ghouta with CW. He blasted Obama for declaring a redline, publicly debating retaliation, and

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finally refusing to take action. He tweeted: “President Obama put himself in a very bad position when he talked about Syria crossing the RED LINE”—“very dumb.”16 “The only reason President Obama wants to attack Syria is to save face over his very dumb RED LINE statement. Do NOT attack Syria, fix U.S.A.”17 Trump not only opposed military action on strategic grounds. He maintained it would be a waste of money. Trump kept hammering on Obama’s redline statement. After Obama announced they would hold off on military action and work with the UN to disarm Syria, Trump complained: “Now Obama has set red line 2 with demand that Assad hands over Syria’s chemical weapons or it will face an attack.”18 He commented, “Bashar Assad is stronger today than he was before Obama threatened military action. Obama really bungled this.”19 In this instance at least, Trump was correct. Telegraphing intentions was another point of contention. Trump queried, “Why do we keep broadcasting when we are going to attack Syria. Why can’t we just be quiet and, if we attack at all, catch them by surprise?”20 He accused US officials of blurting “all over the media like fools.”21 “We have given Syria so much time and information-there has never been such an instance in wartime history. Syria is now fully prepared!”22 He was ignorant of critical issues. Unaware that countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council were already supporting the rebels, he tweeted:  “Let the Arab League take care of Syria. Why are these rich Arab countries not paying us for the tremendous cost of such an attack?”23 He criticized the UN, blaming Russia and China for blocking sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC). On October 6, 2011, he tweeted: “Why is the UN condemning @Israel and doing nothing about Syria? What a disgrace.”24 His views on Russia vacillated.25 Russia threatened reprisals against the United States after the Tomahawk cruise missile strike on Khan Sheikhoun. One day Russia was an ally; the next it was an adversary. When Russia threatened to shoot down US missiles fired at targets in Syria, Trump warned: “Get ready Russia, because they will be coming, nice and new and ‘smart!’ You shouldn’t be partners with a Gas Killing Animal who kills his people and enjoys it!”26 “If we are going to continue to be stupid and go into Syria … SHOOT FIRST AND TALK LATER!”27 For Trump, Syria boiled down to a fight against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); and he supported whoever opposed ISIS. Trump endorsed Russia’s support of Assad, whose regime was besieged by Islamists:  “You have Russia that’s now there. Russia’s on the side of Assad, and Russia wants to get rid of ISIS as much as we do, if not more, because they don’t want them coming into Russia,” Trump explained, “I don’t like Assad at all, but Assad is killing ISIS, Russia is killing ISIS and Iran is killing ISIS.”28 Trump stated, “Let Syria and ISIS fight. Why do we care?”29 As a presidential candidate, Trump pledged to restore cooperation with Russia. However, Trump learned that governing was far more complex than issuing statements on the campaign trail. “Our relationship with Russia is worse now than it has ever been, and that includes the Cold War,” acknowledged Trump. “There is no reason for this. Russia needs us to help with their economy, something that would be very easy to do, and we need all nations to work together. Stop the arms race?”30 Trump indicated that Russia was at a fork in the road. “Russia must decide if it will continue down this dark path, or if it will join with civilized nations as a force for stability and peace.”31 Once again, he blamed Obama for failing to enforce his redline. If Obama had taken

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action, “The Syrian disaster would have ended long ago! Animal Assad would have been history!”32 Throughout his presidential campaign, Trump showed disdain for migrants and refugees. He warned on November 17, 2015, “Refugees from Syria are now pouring into our great country. Who knows who they are – some could be ISIS. Is our president insane?”33 He fanned the flames of nativism in Europe, giving comfort to the Far Right. On March 24, 2016, he maintained:  “Europe and the U.S.  must immediately stop taking in people from Syria. This will be the destruction of civilization as we know it! So sad!”34 During the 2016 campaign, Trump zeroed in on Hillary Clinton’s record as Secretary of State and blamed her for making a disaster of US foreign policy.35 On October 4, 2016, one month before the election, he tweeted:  “CLINTON’S FLAILING SYRIA POLICY WAS JUDGED A FAILURE.”36 His criticisms were random, unfocused, and ill-informed. He strongly condemned Clinton and Obama for advocating “immediate regime change in Syria.” He also attacked her for denouncing Russia’s intervention and calling for a no fly zone. Trump asserted, “What we should do is focus on ISIS. We should not be focusing on Syria”. He warned, “You’re going to end up in World War Three over Syria if we listen to Hillary Clinton.” On November 23, 2016, after winning the election, Trump said:  “I think going in was a terrible, terrible mistake. Syria, we have to solve that problem because we are going to just keep fighting, fighting forever. I have a different view on Syria than everybody else.” He criticized everything Obama did, but ended up doing much of the same. Trump too had a tendency to telegraph his intentions, alerting Russia and Syria via tweet that the United States would launch a missile strike on Khan Sheikhoun.37 ***** The most coherent statement of US policy in Syria was offered by Secretary of State Rex W.  Tillerson during a speech at Stanford University on January 17, 2018, titled “The Way Forward in Syria.” He affirmed that the primary objective of the United States was to ensure that ISIS cannot reemerge. Tillerson asserted that, “Ungoverned spaces, especially in conflict zones, are breeding grounds for ISIS and other terrorist organizations.” He maintained that, “The fight against ISIS is not over [and] similarly, we must persist in Syria to thwart al-Qaida, which still has substantial presence and base operations in northwest Syria.” He also prioritized a stable, unified and independent Syria that can only be achieved by removing Assad. To these ends, the United States would maintain its military presence in Syria to foster stability and political transition. “The departure of Assad through a U.N.-led peace process,” said Tillerson, “will create the conditions for a durable peace within Syria and security along the borders.”38 Tillerson envisioned a patient series of steps, involving the normalization of economic relations between Syria and its neighbors. During this transition, the international community would be called upon to provide greater amounts of humanitarian assistance and aid for reconstruction. Tillerson promised assistance to the predominantly Kurdish region in North and East Syria (NES). Apparently, he had not cleared his remarks with the White House. Trump responded angrily to Tillerson’s pledge and, in a moment of pique, froze the entire US stabilization budget for Syria.

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Instead of the United States and other Western countries bearing the burden, Trump suggested that the Gulf oil kingdoms cover the costs. There was dissent within the administration. US officials have the opportunity to make their case through the interagency process. If they disapprove of the final decision, they have the option to protest through “the dissent channel.” There was always robust debate about America’s role in Syria, from providing weapons to the moderate opposition during the Obama administration, to consideration of an exit strategy and withdrawing forces from the NES. Iran was an area of agreement between US officials who agreed that Syria’s sovereignty must be protected from Iran and other spoilers.39 According to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, “As part of this overarching problem, we have to address Iran. Everywhere you go in the Middle East where there’s instability you will find Iran. So in terms of getting to the end state of the Geneva process, Iran, too, has a role to play, which is to stop fomenting trouble.”40 Trump was in a hurry. He insisted that US troops come home “as soon as possible.”41 Tillerson admonished Trump not to “make the same mistakes” that Obama made in 2011, when the United States withdrew its troops from an unstable Iraq and violence intensified. At its peak, thousands of Special Forces were based in the NES, as trainers, spotters, and to support efforts by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to liberate Raqqa and eliminate the vestiges of ISIS along the Iraq–Syria border. Pentagon and other foreign-policy professionals were wary of setting a deadline for US withdrawal. In other conflicts, the US government had set a schedule for drawing down US troops. The foreign-policy establishment understood that the exit strategy should be based on milestones rather than an arbitrary timetable. Mattis insisted that US actions should be determined by a clear vision of the end state.42 Optimally, what does victory in Syria look like? ISIS would not only be defeated, but destroyed. To drain the swamp of support for Islamist militants, Syria would be stable, sovereign and independent, at peace within its borders and with its neighbors. Stability would create conditions for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return home, and international donors would support efforts to clear the rubble and rebuild war-torn communities. James Jeffrey espoused a “fundamental change in the Syrian regime” and that a political transition should create “a regime that is not as toxic as the current one.”43 A less toxic regime would adhere to the rule of law. As Syria transitions from war to sustainable peace, a system of transitional justice would hold the perpetrators of gross human rights abuses accountable. They would either be tried in a domestic court or, if Syria was incapable or unwilling, an international tribunal would be established for a specific set of crimes over a defined period of time. The State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) convened a high-level panel to discuss justice strategies on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on September 25, 2019. Containing Iran was also a priority, as was ridding the country of Hezbollah and other groups that threaten Israel. National Security Adviser (NSA) John Bolton emphasized, “We’re not going to leave as long as Iranian troops are outside Iranian borders, and that includes Iranian proxies and militias”.44

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Both the Obama and Trump administrations assiduously avoided a major military commitment in Syria. Without boots on the ground, the United States lacked leverage over the course of events. Eliminating ISIS was the priority. To realize this goal, policy and program options are vetted through the interagency process. Once the President has decided on a course of action, the full capacity and resources of the US government are directed toward implementation. Policy-making under normal circumstances is a disciplined interagency process, involving a range of professionals at different agencies of the US government. This whole of government approach seeks input from a variety of sources inside and outside the government, and encourages debate. Policy and program recommendations are pushed up through the system to the Principals Committee of the National Security Council (NSC), a cabinet level senior inter-agency forum for considering national security issues. Chaired by the NSA, it includes Cabinet level officers: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the US Ambassador to the UN. Other senior officials such as the Director of National Intelligence, the Homeland Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House Chief of Staff, and others may also participate in this process. The NSC Deputies Committee is a subcabinet interagency forum that supports the Principals Committee as well as policy coordination committees. There is, however, nothing “normal” about policy-making in the Trump administration. Irascible and petulant, Trump often circumvented senior officials or ignored their advice. When he disagreed with members of his team, he replaced them with loyalists who served in an “acting” capacity, which means they were not confirmed by the US Senate for a variety of ideological and competency reasons. Policy-making and interaction with allies are supposed to be deliberative and carefully reasoned. When the President takes a meeting or conducts a phone call with another head of state, the NSA and his/her deputy coordinate input to formulate talking points for the President. Talking points have a clearly stated policy objective, and provide a path for achieving the goal. Trump disdained experts and professionals. Rather than a team of rivals, he surrounded himself with “yes men.” Trump dismissed opposing views and rarely took counsel. US ambassadors posted overseas were often marginalized and out of the loop. Mid-level foreign service officers were treated as irrelevant. Anyone who tried to restrain Trump’s impulses was marginalized or removed. NSA John Bolton was fired on September 9, 2019. ***** Trump’s foreign policy advisers were alarmed by Turkey’s repeated threats to attack Manbij, the home base to US Special Forces on the Euphrates River. Threats were repeated for more than a year. Erdoğan warned, “Manbij is a place where Arabs live, but they have surrendered the area to the terror organization. Now we are saying that you should cleanse, remove them.”45 The Pentagon assured Turkish counterparts that the SDF would withdraw to positions east of the Euphrates and promised to implement joint patrols with the Turks in Manbij. They were slow-walking commitments, trying

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to assuage Ankara without burning the Kurds, who had become the point of the spear fighting ISIS. Erdoğan warned, “We will no longer tolerate a single day of delay.”46 To clarify Turkey’s intentions, Pompeo arranged a call between Trump and Erdoğan on December 14, 2018. Pompeo, Mattis, and others prepared talking points for Trump to dissuade Turkey from launching a cross-border operation and attacking the SDF. During their call, Erdoğan told Trump that ISIS had largely been defeated. He reminded Trump that Washington’s primary reason for being in Syria had been accomplished and asked, “Why are you still there?” Erdoğan offered Turkish forces to finish the fight against ISIS. US officials, including Brett McGurk, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, confirmed that ISIS was cornered and only controlled one percent of Syrian territory at the time. During his phone conversation with Erdoğan, Trump was supposed to acknowledge Turkey’s concerns and offer a token concession, such as allowing Turkey to hold some small territory on the border in exchange for a pledge not to attack. However, Trump ignored his talking points and spoke off-the-cuff. He unexpectedly told Erdoğan that the United States would completely and immediately withdraw from Syria. Trump’s impulsive response shocked Bolton and members of the National Security Cabinet. The decision to withdraw US forces was made without any internal consultation, nor had the United States sought input from its allies or members of the US Congress. Syrian Kurds were left hanging. The SDF had done everything asked of it. More than eleven thousand SDF members had been killed fighting ISIS.47 Many displaced Kurds from Afrin ended up east of the Euphrates under SDF protection, moving into the homes of Christians who fled when ISIS attacked. US troops in Manbij and elsewhere in NES served as a tripwire, deterring Turkish troops and fifteen thousand jihadist proxies in the Free Syrian Army (FSA) from invading. Erdoğan had promised to cleanse the so-called terror corridor. As a result, Kurds feared a slaughter equivalent to the 1915 Armenian Genocide. Even Erdoğan was at a loss for words over Trump’s response. He did not expect Trump to acquiesce so quickly and completely. Turkish media reported that Erdoğan cautioned Trump against a chaotic and unplanned retreat. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had been depleted by the crackdown after the coup in July 2016 and lacked the manpower to occupy and hold significant territory in the NES. It would have to rely on the FSA, which was despised by the Kurds for committing war crimes in Afrin, such as decapitating prisoners and severing the breasts from the bodies of female fighters. An enduring defeat of ISIS would require holding territory to deprive it of a base for operations. Siding with Erdoğan over his own advisers was not in the script. Trump’s national security team was troubled by Trump’s pledge to Erdoğan, as well as his chaotic decisionmaking process. The decision to withdraw seemed whimsical, lacking analysis of its security and political implications. There was no plan for withdrawing two thousand troops, their supplies, and equipment, which was a time-consuming and complicated task that would put US personnel at risk. Mattis and others tried to convince Trump to reverse the decision or at least slow down its implementation so they could come up with a plan to limit the effects of the withdrawal and prepare to defend the Kurds.

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Mattis sought a meeting with Trump to revisit the decision to withdraw. He was told by outgoing chief of staff John Kelly and his successor Mick Mulvaney that Trump was adamant. Sarah Sanders scheduled a press briefing to announce Trump’s decision, but Mattis convinced the White House to wait until Congress and allies were notified. When the announcement was made, the White House said it would “re-engage” in the fight against ISIS but only if necessary. Trump tweeted that others would have to take the lead. “Time to focus on our Country & bring our youth back home where they belong!”48 Senator Lindsey Graham called Trump’s decision a “mistake.” He added:  “An American withdrawal at this time would be a big win for Daesh, Iran, Bashar Assad of Syria, and Russia. I  fear it will lead to devastating consequences for our nation, the region, and throughout the world.” According to Graham, “The withdrawal will complicate recruiting future partners willing to fight extremism. It will also be seen by Iran and other bad actors as a sign of American weakness in the efforts to contain Iranian expansion.”49 Russia welcomed Trump’s announcement. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had accused the United States of using the presence of ISIS to justify its “illegal” presence in Syria. Many US adversaries believe that the United States created ISIS as a pretext for expanding its war on terror, which was motivated by a desire to control oil reserves and subjugate Arabs. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said, “The illegal American presence in Syria is becoming a dangerous obstacle to the path to a settlement.”50 ***** James Mattis is a retired four-star general in the US Marine Corps who served as commander of the US Central Command, which includes all US forces in the Middle East, before becoming secretary of defense. He is the most revered living marine who embodies the attributes of a warrior statesman. In his own words, he “loves the constitution” and adheres strictly to the chain of command. Mattis invoked George Kennan’s phrase “the treacherous curtain of deference” to explain his reluctance to criticize Trump. Jeffrey Goldberg wrote in The Atlantic that “Mattis often seemed burdened in his role. His aides and friends say he found the president to be of limited cognitive ability, and of generally dubious character.” With the resignation of Rex Tillerson and imminent departure of John Kelly as chief of staff, Mattis was increasingly isolated as a check on Trump’s less prudent instincts. At a cabinet meeting that was staged as a love fest of Trump, cabinet members gushed over the president, fearing they would lose their jobs if they did not idolize Trump sufficiently. Mattis demurred from the Orwellian display of sycophantism, saying:  “It’s an honor to represent the men and women of the Department of Defense. We are grateful for the sacrifices our people are making in order to strengthen our military, so our diplomats always negotiate from a position of strength.”51 Sensing Mattis’ growing dissonance, Trump disparaged him publicly. He questioned his loyalty, suggesting that Mattis was actually a Democrat. Regarding North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Trump said:  “I think I  know more about it than he

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does.” Ironically, Trump avoided military service during the Vietnam War with a military exemption for flat feet. As a Marine General, Mattis served as the supreme allied commander in charge of NATO transformation. Nicknamed “Mad Dog,” Mattis maintained: “Few people are more reluctant to go to war than seasoned soldiers.” He recalled writing many “next of kin letters” to the families of the fallen.52 However much he may have disagreed with Trump, Mattis was profoundly loyal to the Office of the President. He viewed Trump as a temporary aberration. Mattis told soldiers in Jordan, “Our country right now, it’s got problems we don’t have in the military. You just hold the line until our country gets back to understanding and respecting each other and showing it.” He publicly opposed a retreat from Syria that would undermine the fight against ISIS at a critical moment when the United States was on the verge of victory. He worried it would put American troops at risk elsewhere in the region and would unravel the global anti-ISIS coalition, as countries in the seventy-four-member coalition felt betrayed and peel away. Trump and Mattis met in the Oval Office on December 20, 2018. Trump rejected Mattis’ argument for staying in Syria. Mattis anticipated Trump’s response and had prepared his letter of resignation. He presented it and told Trump, “You’re going to have to get the next secretary of defense to lose to ISIS. I’m not going to do it.”53 Resigning was an extremely difficult decision; Mattis said, “I was brought up, you don’t quit on anything.”54 His resignation letter confirmed his reverence for alliances and multilateralism. Dear Mr. President: I have been privileged to serve as our country’s 26th Secretary of Defense which has allowed me to serve alongside our men and women of the Department in defense of our citizens and our ideals. I am proud of the progress that has been made over the past two years on some of the key goals articulated in our National Defense Strategy: putting the Department on a more sound budgetary footing, improving readiness and lethality in our forces, and reforming the Department’s business practices for greater performance. Our troops continue to provide the capabilities needed to prevail in conflict and sustain strong US global influence. One core belief I have always held is that our strength as a nation is inextricably linked to the strength of our unique and comprehensive system of alliances and partnerships. While the US remains the indispensable nation in the free world, we cannot protect our interests or serve that role effectively without maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies. Like you, I have said from the beginning that the armed forces of the United States should not be the policeman of the world. Instead, we must use all tools of American power to provide for the common defense, including providing effective leadership to our alliances. NATO’s 29 democracies demonstrated that strength in their commitment to fighting alongside us following the 9–11 attack on America. The Defeat-ISIS coalition of 74 nations is further proof. Similarly, I  believe we must be resolute and unambiguous in our approach to those countries whose strategic interests are increasingly in tension with ours. It is clear that China and Russia, for example, want to shape a world consistent with

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their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions—to promote their own interests at the expense of their neighbors, America and our allies. That is why we must use all the tools of American power to provide for the common defense. My views on treating allies with respect and also being clear-eyed about both malign actors and strategic competitors are strongly held and informed by over four decades of immersion in these issues. We must do everything possible to advance an international order that is most conducive to our security, prosperity and values, and we are strengthened in this effort by the solidarity of our alliances. Because you have the right to a Secretary of Defense whose views are better aligned with yours on these and other subjects, I believe it is right for me to step down from my position. The end date for my tenure is February 28, 2019, a date that should allow sufficient time for a successor to be nominated and confirmed as well as to make sure the Department’s interests are properly articulated and protected at upcoming events to include Congressional posture hearings and the NATO Defense Ministerial meeting in February. Further, that a full transition to a new Secretary of Defense occurs well in advance of the transition of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September in order to ensure stability within the Department. I pledge my full effort to a smooth transition that ensures the needs and interests of the 2.15 million Service Members and 732,079 DoD civilians receive undistracted attention of the Department at all times so that they can fulfill their critical, roundthe-clock mission to protect the American people. I very much appreciate this opportunity to serve the nation and our men and women in uniform.

  James N. Mattis

Mattis did not specifically resign to protest Trump’s decision to pull out of Syria. It was widely understood, however, that he quit because of Trump’s Syria policy, as well as his erratic and ill-advised decision-making in world affairs. Mattis refused to answer the nagging question: Is Donald Trump fit for command? Instead, he talked about the duty of silence. If you leave an administration, you owe some silence. When you leave an administration over clear policy differences, you need to give the people who are still there as much opportunity as possible to defend the country. They still have the responsibility of protecting this great big experiment of ours. I know the malevolence some people feel for this country, and we have to give the people who are protecting us some time to carry out their duties without me adding my criticism to the cacophony that is right now so poisonous.55

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Mattis wrote a book, which emphasized respecting your troops, respecting each other, and respecting your allies. Those who expected a tell-all narrative were disappointed. Mattis said, “I don’t believe in kiss and tell. When you leave an administration over a matter of policy.”56 Mattis explained, “There is a period in which I owe my silence. It’s not eternal. It’s not going to be forever.”57 Mattis hinted at the reason behind his resignation during an address at the Council on Foreign Relations: “Democracy is an experiment. We must preserve it or it will be destroyed.” Taking a jab at Trump, he explained, “Elections are about dividing to get elected; governing is about uniting.” When politicians disappoint, he affirmed his absolute “faith in the American people.”58 Two days after Mattis’s resignation, Brett McGurk also resigned. McGurk planned to leave his post in February 2019, but accelerated his departure. He was briefing allies on Washington’s commitment to stay in Syria, fight ISIS, and counter Iran when he learned via Twitter of Trump’s call with Erdoğan and plans for a “full” and “rapid” withdrawal. McGurk emailed colleagues that Trump’s reckless decision “left our coalition partners confused and our fighting partners bewildered … I ultimately concluded that I could not carry out these new instructions and maintain my integrity.”59 Trump scornfully dismissed the importance of McGurk’s resignation, saying “I don’t know McGurk.”60 He insinuated that McGurk, who was appointed by Obama in 2015, would have been fired anyway. He called it a “nothing event” by a “grandstander.”61 McGurk’s position had become redundant. Without the United States, there was no leadership in global coalition to fight ISIS. Rather than partnership, countries were expected to replace, not complement, America’s presence in Syria. ***** Obama underestimated ISIS. He stated in January 2014, “The analogy we use around here sometimes, and I think is accurate, is if a JV team puts on Lakers uniforms, that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant.”62 The magnitude of the ISIS crisis became apparent when ISIS swept into Iraq eight months later. Its head, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared a caliphate, which grew to the size of Britain and controlled twelve million people. The Obama administration did not know what to do. Even after the beheading of the American journalist Foley, Obama announced “We don’t have a strategy yet.”63 Obama finally announced a campaign to “degrade and destroy” ISIS. He spoke to the American people from the Oval Office: My fellow Americans—tonight, I  want to speak to you about what the United States will do with our friends and allies to degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as Isil. This strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years. And it is consistent with the approach I outlined earlier this year: to use force against anyone who threatens America’s core interests, but to mobilize partners wherever possible to address broader challenges to international order.64

On September 23, 2014, US warplanes attacked Islamic state targets in Syria. By year’s end, the United States had launched thousands of air strikes in Iraq and Syria, and

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deployed ground forces in eastern Anbar province of Iraq. ISIS attacked civilians in Paris, underscoring the global threat and the need for patience, perseverance, and partnership to conduct the war on terror. Trump inherited Operation Inherent Resolve at its peak. The tide turned against ISIS with help from the Kurds in Iraq and Syria. US airpower and weapons were indispensable. Mosul was liberated from ISIS control in July 2017 and Raqqa in October 2017. These victories were the product of a long hard slog undertaken by Obama, and continued by Trump. ISIS was gradually deprived of territory and its caliphate destroyed. Trump boasted, “We knocked the hell out of them. ISIS never thought this would happen. They never got hit like this.”65 Trump repeated that ISIS was “100% defeated.” However, ISIS was more than the caliphate. Its nihilistic ideology resonates with impoverished and disenfranchised Muslims worldwide. Foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria went back to their home countries, retreated to Turkey, or blended in with the local population. Despite Trump’s declarations, ISIS was far from defeated. As of August 2019, about eighteen thousand ISIS fighters remained in Iraq and Syria.66 Sleeper cells were active carrying out attacks and assassinations. ISIS maintained a war chest of $400 million hidden in Iraq and Syria, or third countries. It continued to extort protection money from Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria. It took on the trappings of legitimacy, investing in businesses such as fish farming, cannabis production, and even a car dealership. ISIS sustained its guerilla campaign. Small groups of fighters in rural areas intimidated police and conducted assassinations. The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee reported that ISIS leaders are adapting, consolidating, and creating conditions for an eventual resurgence. Both UN and US officials confirmed that ISIS was recruiting new members and reengaging fighters who have left the battlefield. In January 2019, four Americans were killed in a suicide bombing at a restaurant in Manbij. The al-Hol refugee camp, administered by the NES, with at least seventy thousand people, became a breeding ground for extremism. The SDF held more than ten thousand ISIS fighters as prisoners, including two thousand foreigners. ISIS played a long game, waiting for the United States to tire of the fight, declare victory, and go home. In the first six months of 2019, ISIS conducted 139 attacks in Nineveh, Diyala, Anbar, and Kirkuk governorates of Iraq. By August 2019, Trump had reduced troop levels to 5,200 in Iraq and about 1,000 in Syria. Trump congratulated himself. “We did a great job. We have 100 percent of the caliphate and we’re rapidly pulling out of Syria. Let them handle their own problems.”67 The war was not won. ISIS is resurgent and plotting its comeback. Only soft power would drain the swamp of support for ISIS. The task of political dialogue fell to the UN.

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Stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement.1 —Henry Kissinger ***** The United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, designated the experienced Norwegian diplomat, Geir O. Pedersen, the new Special Envoy for Syria on October 31, 2018. Pedersen assumed responsibilities in January, a critical moment for Syria and its people after eight years of violent conflict. Around half of Syria’s prewar population, more than twelve million people, have been displaced. About 80 percent of Syrians were living in poverty and half were unemployed; 11.7 million Syrians needed humanitarian assistance just to survive.2 Pedersen was preceded as Special Envoy by world-class diplomats and statesmen. Former secretary-general Kofi Annan served as the joint UN and Arab League Special Envoy for Syria from February 2012 to August 2012. Annan developed a six-point plan for resolving the conflict, accompanied by the Geneva Communique, elaborating on the issues and proposing a way forward. Despite Annan’s efforts for inclusive peace, Russia repeatedly vetoed UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions that aimed at pressuring the Syrian government. Annan resigned, complaining about lack of support from the Security Council. Algeria’s former foreign minister, Lakhdar Brahimi, a renowned troubleshooter and negotiator highly regarded by the League of Arab States (LAS), took over in September 2012. His mediation, known as Geneva II, succeeded to arrange face-to-face meetings between the government and opposition. Other than meeting, however, the sides could not even agree on the most basic confidence building measures (CBMs). When Brahimi resigned, he apologized to the Syrian people for not achieving more. Brahimi was replaced by Staffan de Mistura in September 2014. De Mistura had a distinguished forty-year career in various UN agencies, before becoming Italy’s undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. On the basis of UNSC Resolution 2254 (2015), he organized three rounds of indirect negotiations between the regime and opposition groups in Geneva in 2016. He convened the parties again for another five rounds in 2017. They agreed to twelve intra-Syrian principles intended to guide the

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future of Syria, proceeding from Resolution 2254. At meetings in Geneva and Vienna, the parties also agreed on an agenda consisting of governance issues, constitutional process issues, electoral issues, security/counterterrorism, and CBMs. However, de Mistura’s efforts were undermined by cease-fire violations and disagreements over Bashar al-Assad’s future role in the Syrian government. In December 2017, de Mistura accused Damascus of torpedoing his efforts. Following a special round of consultations in Vienna with the government and the opposition in early 2018, and the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue in Sochi, de Mistura laid out the creation of a constitutional committee for “drafting a constitutional reform as a contribution to the political settlement under the UN auspices in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2254.”3 On this basis, de Mistura focused on the creation of the committee, including arduous consultations to identify potential committee members. When the Syrian government rejected his list of committee members, he resigned. “I deeply regret what has not been achieved,” said de Mistura, “and I am sorry more was not possible.”4 Being appointed the Special Envoy for Syria was a graveyard for international mediators. It was a thankless job with little chance of success. Yet, Martti Ahtisaari, Finland’s former president and Nobel Peace Prize recipient maintained that no conflict is intractable if you are innovative, patient, and persevere. Ahtisaari’s mantra is: “every conflict can be solved.”5 The challenge of mediating peace and stability in Syria, agreed upon by both the international stakeholders and domestic actors, fell to Pedersen. ***** Geir O. Pedersen served in many positions with Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as within the UN system. He was a member of the Norwegian team that negotiated the Oslo Accord that led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles and the mutual recognition between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993. He was Norway’s Representative to the Palestinian Authority from 1998 to 2003 and Norway’s Permanent Representative to the UN from 2012 to 2017. He also served in various roles for the UN, including Personal Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Southern Lebanon from 2005 to 2007; Special Coordinator for Lebanon in 2007 and 2008; and director of the Asia and Pacific Division in the Department of Political Affairs. Pedersen is strong yet understated. Upon his appointment, he embarked on a listening tour, meeting with Syrian government officials in Damascus and the Syrian Negotiations Commission in Riyadh. Pedersen also engaged with international stakeholders, visiting Washington, Moscow, Cairo, Ankara, Tehran, Paris, Berlin, and Brussels. He discussed Syria at the Munich Security Forum and the World Economic Forum in Davos. Pedersen outlined strategic priorities in his first report to the UNSC on February 28, 2019:  (1) undertake sustained dialogue with the Syrian parties; (2)  scale up and prioritize action on the issue of detainees, abductees, and missing persons; (3) engage and involve Syrian civil society; (4) convene a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led constitutional committee; and (5) improve international dialogue and cooperation. He underscored, “There is no military solution for Syria.”6

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He deliberately lowered expectations. Pedersen made no grand pronouncements, posting a bland statement upon arrival in Damascus, “[I am] looking forward to productive meetings here.”7 The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a warning: “Syria will cooperate with the new UN Envoy, Geir Pedersen, provided he avoids the methods of his predecessor.”8 After four and a half years as Special Envoy, de Mistura had grown frustrated with the Syrian government’s obstruction and publicly blamed Foreign Minister Walid Muallem for undermining his efforts. In his fourth report to the UNSC on June 27, 2019, Pedersen framed guiding principles for the UN’s mediation. He emphasized respect for Syria’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. He called for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process, supported by the UN and a common forum of international stakeholders including Permanent Members of the UNSC, members of the so-called Small-Group, and participants in the Astana Process.9 He stressed his commitment to achieving meaningful progress on detainees, abductees, and missing persons. He supported unilateral releases, including a common forum involving the UN, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Pedersen applied lessons learned from his predecessors, drawing on the Geneva Communique (June 30, 2012) and the Vienna Statements of the International Syria Support Group (November 14, 2014), and in particular UNSC 2254 (December 18, 2015), which laid out the Special Envoy’s mandate as the Special Envoy regarding a UN-led facilitated political process. Resolution 2254 reiterated the need for support to the political process, as well as full implementation of previous resolutions such as 2139 (2014), which called for all parties to permit free access to humanitarian aid; 2165 (2014), which established that UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners can use four border crossings with notification to Syrian authorities; and 2191 (2014) and 2393 (2017), which renewed authorization for humanitarian access across Syrian borders. The Sochi Final Statement, adopted on January 30, 2018, also helped to guide Pedersen’s approach. It offered twelve principles to guide a political settlement. 1. Respect of and full commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of [Syria]. No part of the national territory shall be ceded. The people of Syria remain committed to the recovery of the occupied Syrian Golan by all lawful means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law; 2. Respect of and full commitment to Syria’s national sovereign equality and rights regarding non-intervention. Syria shall assume its role with the international community and in the region, as part of the Arab world, in conformity with the UN Charter; 3. The Syrian people alone shall determine the future of their country by democratic means, through the ballot box, and shall have the exclusive right to choose their own political, economic and social system without external pressure or interference; 4. [Syria] shall be a democratic and non-sectarian state based on political pluralism and equal citizenship irrespective of religion, ethnicity and gender, with full respect for and protection of the rule of law, the separation of powers and

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judicial independence. Syria’s government shall take effective measures to combat crime, corruption and mismanagement; 5. A  state committed to national unity, social peace, comprehensive and balanced development with fair representation in local administration; 6. Continuity and improved performance of state and public institutions, with reforms where necessary, including the protection of public infrastructure and property rights and the provision of public services to all citizens in accordance with the highest standards of good governance and gender equality; 7. A  strong, unified, meritocratic national army that carries out its duties in accordance with the constitution. Its functions are to protect the national boundaries and the people from external threats and terrorism, with intelligence and security institutions to maintain national security subject to the rule of law, acting according to the constitution and respecting human rights; 8. Unqualified rejection of and active commitment to combat terrorism, fanaticism, extremism and sectarianism in all its forms and to tackle conditions conducive to their spread; 9. Respect and protection of human rights and public freedoms, including nondiscrimination and equal rights and opportunities for all without regard to race, religion, ethnicity, cultural or linguistic identity, gender or any other distinction, with consideration to equal rights and opportunities for women; 10. A high value placed on Syria’s society and national identity, its history of diversity, and coexistence among its various components, along with the protection of the nation’s diverse national cultural heritage; 11. Combatting and eliminating poverty and providing support for the elderly and other vulnerable groups, including persons with special needs, orphans and victims of war, which shall include ensuring the safety and refuge of all displaced persons and refugees, as well as protecting their right to voluntary and safe return to their homes and lands; 12. Preservation and protection of national heritage and the natural environment for future generations in accordance with environmental treaties and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declaration concerning the intentional destruction of cultural heritage.10

He did not try to reinvent the wheel on substantive policy issues. Rather, he assumed a patient and low-key approach, aimed at building on previous agreements and the work of his predecessors. ***** Pedersen pursued multitrack diplomacy aimed at achieving a cease-fire, addressing the humanitarian emergency, and initiating a constitutional committee leading to national elections. On February 24, 2018, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2401 that demanded a cessation of hostilities. However, violent conflict intensified in northwest Syria between September 2018 and August 2019, especially in Idlib. During their meeting on August 27, 2019, Putin and Erdoğan discussed the situation in Idlib. Astana partners agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding in September,

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which established four “de-escalation areas.” Despite their agreement, violence in the northwest intensified. The Syrian government was unwilling to have a cease-fire while achieving its security objectives on the battlefield. Idlib was not the only flash point in Syria. There were also violent clashes in northern rural Aleppo, instability in the southwest, and uncertainty in the North and East Syria (NES). Guterres urged member states to intensify efforts aimed at achieving a ceasefire.11 Instead of waiting for the fighting to stop, Pedersen continued consultations with the parties to define his strategy for a cease-fire and monitoring mechanism. He urged the cessation of violence while calling publicly for the protection of civilians and the upholding of human rights and international humanitarian law by the regime as well as by groups that had been designated terrorist organization by the UNSC. Pedersen viewed a credible, balanced and inclusive, UN-facilitated constitutional committee as a “door-opener for the political process.” In his report to the UNSC on August 29, 2019, Pedersen drew on the results of direct engagement by the UN with the Syrian parties and consultations with other relevant international stakeholders. He stated, There is strong understanding on two equal co-chairs one nominated by the government and the other by the opposition; on UN facilitation through my good offices, on a 75% voting threshold while striving for consensus; and on a large body of 150 members and small body of 45 members; and on a clear commitment to guaranteeing the safety and security of the committee members and their relatives.12

Pedersen proposed that the constitutional committee should have cochairs representing the government and the opposition. It would include a large body of 150 members with one-third each from the government, the opposition, and civil society, and a small group or executive committee comprising forty-five persons. While striving for consensus, decisions could be taken with a 75 percent voting threshold. Pedersen hoped that the UN would announce creation of the constitutional committee before the start of the General Assembly in September 2019. Satisfying all of the Syrian and international stakeholders was a daunting task. In December 2018, Iran, Russia, and Turkey agreed on a list of fifty civil society representatives, which they believed reflected credibility and balance. By August 2019, however, Bashar Jaafari, who headed Syria’s negotiating team, explained that Damascus was ready, but the process was delayed by Turkey, which objected to one member of the government’s group and was blocking a decision.13 De Mistura created a female advisory body as third-party observers to the negotiations although women were still secondary actors in de Mistura’s mediation. By December 2017, women comprised 15 percent of negotiators at the Geneva peace talks.14 Pedersen continued his predecessor’s efforts to ensure greater participation by women. He met a broad cross-section of civil society networks both inside and outside Syria who affirmed their eagerness for a political solution. Pedersen was “convinced that a real peace process in Syria needs to be owned by the Syrians—including over half the population, Syrian women—for it to be sustainable.” He worked with members of

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the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board (WAB), comprising women from diverse political, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, to garner their advice on issues concerning women and gender as well as substantive aspects of the political settlement. Some supported the Assad regime; others were with the opposition.15 When Pedersen met the WAB on March 8, 2019, the WAB reiterated its demand that Syrian women should represent at least 30 percent in decision-making bodies.16 The constitutional committee faced a critical task. Constitutions in post-conflict countries should provide a basis for the rule of law, distributing governance responsibilities, defining the relationship of individuals and groups to one another and the state, as well as center–periphery relations. It must develop a system for constitutional power-sharing, involving the vertical separation of powers, as well as the horizontal distribution of responsibilities. The horizontal separation of powers involves the relationship between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, in order to prevent the abuse of power by any one branch or individual. The vertical separation involves national–subnational arrangements, which can be defined through confederation, federation, asymmetric federal arrangements, or provisions for regional or cultural autonomy. Power-sharing is most essential in societies with ethnic and sectarian divisions, or countries emerging from ethnic or religious conflict. Working with Swisspeace and the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), Pedersen met some two hundred Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) inside and outside of Syria to discuss ways of engaging civil society in CBMs. Seeking the engagement of Syrian civil society in the UN’s official mediation efforts was a device to enhance the Special Envoy’s capacity.17 Pedersen affirmed that, “Engaging Syrians from different walks of life reminds me of what is at stake for civilians in this conflict. It reminds me of Syrians’ resilience in responding to the overwhelming needs generated by this conflict, and of their stake in the political process.”18 After years of carnage, Syrians had a “deficit of faith” in each other, as well as the international community. Pedersen focused on detainees, abductees, and missing persons to help restore confidence. He prioritized the release of women, children, the sick, and elderly. He also sought lists from both sides of the conflict, identifying and disclosing the status of detainees to their families. Holding free and fair elections, administered under UN supervision, would be a CBM if the ballot met the highest international standards of transparency and accountability. Pedersen envisioned a ballot as soon as possible after an agreement on the new constitution, with participation of the Syrian Diaspora. ***** More lives were lost and Syrians suffered every day. The fighting in Idlib took a heavy toll. Mark Lowcock, the under-secretary-general for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the UNSC on the humanitarian crisis on August 29, 2019. In addition to Idlib, he described the vulnerable situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Rukban and the al-Hol camp. There were forty thousand desperate individuals in Rukban, a hard-to-access desert camp located on Syria’s southern border with Jordan. More than seventy thousand lived in al-Hol in the NES. Of these, 90 percent were women and children.

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The UN’s Commission of Inquiry monitored conditions in al-Hol. Limited access to food, water, and medicine created a health crisis. Weakened by malnutrition and dehydration, children increasingly fell victim to pneumonia and dysentery. Human Rights Watch described al-Hol as a “dustbowl inferno” where children with “emaciated limbs and swollen bellies sifted through mounds of stinking garbage under a scorched sun or lay limp on tent floors, their bodies dusted with dirt and flies.” Intolerable conditions exacerbated the security crisis. About eleven thousand al-Hol residents came from foreign countries. Some had been stripped of their nationality because of activities with ISIS.19 Lowcock also addressed the problem of extreme poverty, worsened by commodity shortages and rising prices. Food security was affected by fires, devastating the wheat fields in many parts of Syria. Lowcock made refugee returns a priority. However, the escalation of violence in Idlib deterred the return of refugees, who were wary about security conditions, as well as shelter, water, and sanitation. Livelihoods and incomegenerating activities were also criteria for voluntary and dignified returns.20 Pedersen and Lowcock envisioned simultaneous efforts, encompassing a cease-fire, political dialogue, and the return of displaced people to their homes. They emphasized conditions for safe, dignified, and voluntary return. Pedersen acknowledged, “I have heard some Syrians react with scorn at the notion of progress on the constitutional committee in Geneva while violence surges and no progress is made on other files.”21 But peace would not wait. On August 7, 2019, the UNSC had a briefing on detainees, abductees, and missing persons. It was the first time the Council heard directly from family members of the disappeared. The United States requested the meeting and was joined by Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, and the UK. The meeting was seen as an important CBM. Pedersen prioritized more concrete action on these issues.22 Though Pedersen did not focus on transitional justice, experts highlighted its importance to address the legacy of human rights abuses, while facilitating the transition from war to peace and from authoritarian rule to democracy. Transitional justice is not a boilerplate formula. Each situation requires a different balance between accountability—taking perpetrators to trial for their crimes—and truth-telling as the basis for reconciliation. The UN Human Rights Commission codified the right to truth in a 2005 resolution, which obligates the state authority to investigate human rights violations, provide information on official investigations, inform individuals of the fate of missing or forcibly displaced relatives, provide “mortal remains” of the victims, and disclose the identity of violators. Truth commissions (TCs) proliferated in the broader context of dealing with conflict or significant social trauma caused by conflict, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Studying relevant experience with TCs is critical to devising a transitional justice strategy for Syria. Official, semi-official, and civic TCs can document events, help establish the facts, and recognize the experience of victims. They typically consider the pattern of abuse over a specific period of time and in a specific geographic area, and often produce a final report with findings and recommendations.

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The terms “truth” and “reconciliation” do not necessarily go together. The goal of reconciliation can also be advanced through constitutional, electoral, and legal reforms or dialogue. A government of national unity incorporates losers into cabinet posts and legislative positions. Granting amnesties, commuting prison sentences, and reparations for survivors also contribute to healing in the society. Symbolic measures, such as monuments, are reminders of progress in war-torn societies and serve to memorialize victims of grave atrocities. Resolution 2254 did not reference transitional justice mechanisms or strategies to address the status of ex-combatants. Nor did it specifically address a plan for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) as part of the peace agreement. DDR is critical alongside the constitutional committee’s work. It is a process that seeks to remove weapons from the hands of combatants, remove combatants from military structures, and help them reintegrate socially and economically into society. The establishment of a DDR process is usually agreed to and defined within a cease-fire or peace accord, which provides a political and legal framework for the process. ●●

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Disarmament is the collection and destruction of weapons—not only weapons of combatants, but often also of the civilian population. Disarmament further includes the development of responsible arms management programs. The disarmament process is often followed by assembling ex-combatants in camps. Demobilization involves the dismantling of the command, control, and remobilization capacity of armed factions. As described by the Integrated DDR Standards of the United Nations, demobilization is both a physical and mental process—physical in terms of the separation of combatants from their military unit, and mental in terms of preparing the ex-combatant for life outside the structure of an armed group. Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.

The focus of DDR programs cannot be solely on ex-combatants, many of whom have committed acts of violence and violated national and international human rights laws. Victims and victimized communities must also have a stake in DDR, including access to justice and remunerations. Third parties like the UN, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), or a regional body such as the Arab League in the Syrian case, can play a leading role in DDR. A national body usually oversees the DDR process on behalf of the government. DDR alone cannot build peace. It needs to be part of a larger system of peacebuilding interventions, which include security sector reform (SSR), transitional justice, good governance, and broader socioeconomic development programs. DDR and SSR have a synergistic relationship and are mutually complementary. Signing a peace agreement occurs on a specific date. Peace-building is a process that occurs over time. *****

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US power was strongest in the 1990s when Russia was enfeebled from the Soviet Union’s collapse and China was still on the rise. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright heralded the unipolar moment at the end of the Cold War. She called the United States “the indispensable nation.” Speechwriter Sidney Blumenthal elaborated:  “Only the United States had the power to guarantee global security:  without our presence or support, multilateral endeavors would fail.”23 The 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq eroded America’s international standing. President George W. Bush deliberately marginalized the UN, scorning dialogue and international law. Understandably, the UN was a reluctant partner when called upon to help stabilize and rebuild Iraq. By the time Bush left office in 2008, America’s military was depleted from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Syria’s UN Ambassador Bashar Jaafari rejected American unilateralism, scorning Bush’s statement: “It’s my way or the highway.” Vladimir Putin took steps to restore Russia as a world power. Russia’s demonstrable resurgence started with the 2008 occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, territories of the Republic of Georgia. It continued with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and support for Ukrainian separatists in the Dombass region of eastern Ukraine. Putin felt his actions were validated by events in Kosovo. Without UNSC authorization, a US-led NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) bombing campaign bombed Serbia for seventy-eight days in 2009 and then helped coordinate its declaration of independence. Obama also viewed America was the indispensable nation. At a commencement address for West Point cadets in 2014, he asserted: When a typhoon hits the Philippines or schoolgirls are kidnapped in Nigeria or masked men occupy a building in Ukraine, it is America that the world looks to for help. So the United States is and remains the one indispensable nation. That has been true for the century past and it will be true for the century to come.24

His sentiment was echoed by Vice President Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, and Republican figures as well. Bipartisan consensus existed around America’s leading role in world affairs. Subcontracting the UN to disarm Syria in 2013 gave Russia a central role in Syria’s security and politics, further eroding America’s influence. The Syrian government welcomed a role for the UN. Damascus expected that Russia would shape both the UN’s disarmament efforts and political talks by exercising its authority as a Permanent Member of the UNSC. In late 2017, three Russian vetoes led to the termination of the UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). Following the demise of the JIM, discussions regarding accountability shifted to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In June 2018, the Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention mandated a new team within the OPCW to investigate events in Syria. The OPCW was concerned about the Syrian government’s limited cooperation in addressing gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies identified in the initial declaration of its CW stockpile. On March 6, 2019, the UNSC was briefed on the use of CW in Syria. The meeting focused on the report of the OPCW concerning the CW attack

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in Douma/Eastern Ghouta the previous year.25 The report concluded that molecular chlorine was used as a toxic weapon. Peace in Syria cannot be achieved without unity between UNSC members. UN facilitation is flawed, but essential to sustainable peace. Trump administration officials rejected a role as the world’s policeman. Regarding Syria, Secretary of Defense James Mattis acknowledged, “It’s the Geneva process and the Geneva process has got to come to a conclusion if we are to see this end.”26 The United States and Russia issued a joint statement following a meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in November 2017. Published on the Kremlin’s website, the joint statement affirmed that there was no military solution to the conflict. It confirmed Russia’s commitment to Syria’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and endorsed UN mediation.27 General Michael Flynn, Trump’s former national security adviser, cautioned: When it is said that Russia would make an ideal partner for fighting Radical Islam, it behooves us to remember that the Russians haven’t been very effective at fighting jihadis on their own territory, and are in cahoots with the Iranians. In Syria, the two allies have loudly proclaimed they are waging war against ISIS, but in reality the great bulk of their efforts are aimed at the opponents of the Assad regime.28

Despite the veneer of cooperation, the United States and Russia were at odds over Moscow’s unflinching support for Assad, its war crimes, and efforts to divide NATO by selling S-400 missiles to Turkey. Forging cooperation between the United States and Russia was a major challenge for Pedersen. In his presentation to the UNSC on August 29, 2019, Pedersen addressed the political track. He underlined “the importance of the support of this Council if we are to begin to shift the dynamics now.” Pedersen lamented tense US–Russia relations, as well as the failure of the RussianTurkish cease-fire in Idlib. He described the Russian-backed Syrian government offensive in graphic terms: Pro-government airstrikes, shelling, rockets and mortars continue. More civilians have been killed, as Mark just highlighted. Many more have fled their homes. More health facilities and other civilian infrastructure have been hit—even markets, schools, IDP camps, and water stations. Towns have been almost entirely depopulated as civilians, including women and children, flee shelling and are stranded without shelter, food or water.29

He was careful not to accuse Russia of war crimes. Russia’s cooperation was critical to a peace agreement. In July 2019, bombings increased in Idlib. In response to attacks on humanitarian infrastructure, ten UNSC members—Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, the UK, and the United States—met Guterres on July 27 to request a UN investigation. On August 1, the Secretariat

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announced the establishment of a UN Board of Inquiry (BoI) to investigate the “destruction of, or damage to facilities on the de-confliction list and UN-supported facilities” in northwestern Syria. The BoI would determine whether Russia and Syria used coordinates provided by the UN to target hospitals. Guterres told reporters, “I believe that this inquiry can produce an important result. I guarantee that everything will be done to make sure that this board of inquiry acts with full objectivity, not to prove anything, but to simply say what the truth is.”30 According to Pedersen, “International players have the responsibility to deepen their dialogue too, and to support the UN-facilitated process as we work directly with the Syrian parties.”31 Pedersen went to Washington on August 30 to consolidate the Trump administration’s support for a range of issues, especially the constitutional committee. “I continue to strongly urge the United States and the Russian Federation to deepen their own direct dialogue building on the efforts they have made during this year,” said Pedersen.32 He also visited Iran and called on Russia and Turkey to use the midSeptember meeting of the Astana Process to support the UN effort. Pedersen expressed concern about “troop concentrations on the Turkish side of the border” of the NES. He called for “a concrete political settlement … that respects Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; that takes into account legitimate Turkish security concerns; and provides for the well-being of the diverse Syrian population in that area and that their voices are heard.”33 Drawing on his experience with Israeli and Palestinian issues, Pedersen expressed alarm about rising tensions between Israel and Iran. Decrying escalatory violence, he urged all parties to refrain from “attacks and provocations, showing maximum restraint, both in action and in rhetoric.”34 ***** Guterres issued a statement on September 23, 2019, announcing the creation of a constitutional committee, a big step toward the realization of a peace agreement for Syria. I am pleased to announce the agreement of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Syrian Negotiations Commission for a credible, balanced and inclusive Constitutional Committee that will be facilitated by the United Nations in Geneva. I welcome the progress made by the Government and the opposition. My Special Envoy facilitated the agreement in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and will convene the Constitutional Committee in the coming weeks. I strongly believe that the launch of the Syrian-owned and Syrian-led Constitutional Committee can and must be the beginning of the political path out of the tragedy toward a solution in line with Resolution 2254 (2015) that meets the legitimate aspirations of all Syrians and is based on a strong commitment to the country’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity. The Constitutional Committee’s launch and work must be accompanied by concrete actions to build trust and confidence as my Special Envoy discharges his mandate to facilitate a broader political process forward.

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I appreciate the diplomatic engagement of the Governments of Russia, Turkey and Iran in supporting the conclusion of the agreement. I am also grateful for the support of the members of the Security Council and the members of the Small Group. I am thankful for the contributions my Special Envoy has received from a wide cross-section of Syrian society, women and men. My Special Envoy will continue to consult extensively in the discharge of his mandate.35

Pedersen was pleased with developments. He was celebratory in his remarks at the European Union Event on Syria: “It was quite an experience to be in Damascus yesterday where I shook hands with Foreign Minister Muallem and said, ‘we have an agreement.’ Immediately after that I called the head of the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) who was in New York, Dr. Hariri, to consult. I also told him how happy I was that we had an agreement on the Constitutional Committee … this is first time the UN has facilitated an agreement directly between the parties.”36 Not everyone was pleased with the outcome. The constitutional committee is intended to be an inclusive body with 150 representatives, including 50 from the Syrian regime, 50 from the opposition, and 50 individuals selected by the UN. The Autonomous Administration of NES disavowed the committee: “A constitution that we did not participate in its drafting will not represent us and we will not recognize its results.”37 Not all Kurds were excluded. The constitutional committee included members of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a body of the Turkish-backed opposition. It also included other Kurds in their individual capacity, rather than as political party representatives. The pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) rejected Pedersen’s efforts because it was not represented as a body. Ilham Ahmed, co-president of the SDC (Syrian Democratic Council) executive committee, questioned Pedersen’s decision to exclude the SDC, maintaining the SDC’s critical role in remarks at Columbia University on November 22, 2019. ***** There is a concept in international conflict resolution called the “ripeness theory.”38 It is based on the belief that warring parties will seek peace when they have exhausted unilateral measures. A mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) is another harbinger to the cessation of violence.39 In 1974, Henry Kissinger affirmed that “stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement.”40 Ripeness theory explains the circumstances under which warring parties turn from conflict to resolution through negotiation.41 After eight years of grinding civil war, a moment of ripeness in Syria was drawing near.

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You have given up on us. You are leaving us to be slaughtered. You have sold us. This is immoral. —SDF General Mazloum Kobani Abdi ***** The mere presence of US troops in North and East Syria (NES) helped prevent a Turkish invasion. It also deterred Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA), as well as Iranian and Russian troops, from seizing territory controlled by the Kurds, more than 30 percent of Syria’s landmass. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were indispensable to the fight against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), establishing an island of relative tranquility amid Syria’s chaos and conflict. Cooperation carried a huge cost. More than eleven thousand SDF members died and about twenty-three thousand were seriously wounded fighting ISIS at America’s behest. On October 6, 2019, Trump and Erdoğan had a phone call to discuss a US–Turkey trade deal and Turkey’s acquisition of S-400 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from Russia. Trump was unprepared for the conversation, ignoring his briefing book as usual. About halfway through the call, Erdoğan pivoted to his priority agenda. He criticized the safe-zone mechanism to which Turkey and the United States had agreed and repeated his threat to take unilateral action to invade and neutralize the SDF. Erdoğan insisted that the SDF was a terror group and that the SDF and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) were one in the same. Erdoğan was motivated by political and security factors. Picking a fight with Kurds plays well in Turkey’s domestic politics. His Justice and Development Party (AKP) had suffered stinging electoral defeats in local elections during the spring and summer of 2019. Fighting the Kurds was a distraction from local elections and Erdoğan’s mismanagement of Turkey’s economy, which was suffering from the collapse of foreign direct investment and the devaluation of the Turkish lira. Turkish voters resented Erdoğan’s Syria policy, which had caused millions of Syrian Arab refugees to seek sanctuary in Turkey. Turks were increasingly agitated by the cost of supporting Syrian refugees, blaming the AKP-led government for creating a

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crisis that was expensive and had discredited Turkey in the eyes of the international community. Erdoğan repeatedly threatened to flood Europe with refugees unless the European Union (EU) provided more funds to Turkey for refugee relief. He also wanted the European Council to fast-track Turkey’s membership negotiations, which were suspended by the European Parliament over human rights concerns in the aftermath of the 2016 “coup.” Erdoğan’s extortion backfired. Turkey remained an outlier in Europe with little prospect of membership. Erdoğan wanted a quick fix. He vowed to resettle 2.5 million refugees in a buffer zone, 20 miles deep in Syrian territory and hundreds of miles long from the Euphrates River to the Iraqi border. Never mind that forced repatriation violated customary international law, which requires safe, voluntary, and dignified returns. Erdoğan said that the 20-mile-wide buffer zone in Syria would protect against terrorist attacks by the SDF. His concerns were contrived. The SDF had never attacked Turkey. Trump was convinced that the United States was shouldering too much responsibility for stabilizing Syria, bearing inordinate costs and taking extraordinary risks. Trump believed that the safe-zone agreement negotiated between the US and Turkish militaries met Turkey’s security requirements, while giving the SDF a measure of protection so its forces could stay engaged in the fight against ISIS. But Erdoğan was not satisfied. He complained that the safe zone was too narrow and that implementation of the joint US–Turkey security mechanism was progressing too slowly. During the call on October 6, Erdoğan again threatened to take matters into his own hands and launch a unilateral cross-border attack. According to former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Votel, US efforts to “placate our Turkish allies” proved unsuccessful. Turkey “repeatedly reneged on agreements with the U.S.” during multiple rounds of negotiations on a security mechanism at the border.1 By the time Trump and Erdoğan got off the phone, Trump had made up his mind. According to an adviser who listened to the conversation, “The president has always professed to believe that Turkey and Erdoğan’s massive military capability can contain ISIS.” Trump also believed that Turkey would protect eastern Syria from Assad and his allies. According to the adviser, Trump “just wants out” of Syria. “He doesn’t want to be there. He doesn’t want to pay.”2 Trump acted precipitously, telling Erdoğan that the observation posts would be dismantled and US forces withdrawn. Though US troops in NES only numbered between fifty and one hundred, their presence had been an effective deterrent as a trip wire to prevent Turkey from attacking. Trump also gave a green light for Erdoğan to attack, pledging that US troops would get out of the way. He maintained, “We will not support or be involved in the operation.” Disregarding warnings of an all-out war between Turkey and the Kurds, Trump retorted:  “They’ve hated each other for many, many years.” As a candidate in 2016, Trump pledged to extricate the United States from “endless and ridiculous wars” inherited from the Obama administration. Trump tweeted:  “[It’s time] to bring our soldiers home.” Trump asserted on October 16, 2019, now was the time for Turkey, Russia, the Kurds, and Europe to “figure the situation out.”3 Bringing troops home was

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a false flag. The same week Trump ordered US forces out of Syria, he announced that the United States would send two thousand troops to Saudi Arabia. ***** Trump’s decision reversed years of US policy. It ignored advice from Pentagon and State Department officials as well as input from Congress and US allies. Cooperation between US forces and the Kurds dates back to the fall of 2014 when the Pentagon provided weapons and air support to help the Kurds defeat ISIS in Kobani. Since then, the Kurds liberated Tell Abyad, the border crossing used by Turkey to supply its jihadist proxies in Syria. Kurds were the point of the spear, fighting street-to-street to free Raqqa, the capital of the ISIS caliphate. In March 2019, the Kurds defeated ISIS in Baghouz, destroying its last sanctuary in Syria. US troops who worked with the SDF called Trump’s decision “sickening” and a “disgrace.” Abandoning the Kurds was a “dagger to the heart.”4 The SDF was taken off guard by Trump’s action. According to General Mazloum Kobani, “The United States asked us to dismantle our fortifications, block our tunnels, withdraw our heavy weapons and our forces as part of a safe zone agreement, and we did this because we were told it was the only way to keep the Turks out. Now they are being invited by America to come in.”5 Mazloum called for a general mobilization of all Kurds to defend their families and homeland. A similar occurrence happened when Trump and Erdoğan spoke in December 2018. Trump got off the phone and declared that the United States would immediately withdraw from northern Syria. Secretary of Defense James Mattis tried to dissuade Trump of his plan. When Mattis’s entreaties were rejected, he resigned. After Mattis stepped down, the Pentagon slow-walked Trump’s plan to withdraw US troops from northern Syria. Ten months later, Trump’s tweet on October 6, 2019, fulfilled his previous pledge to Erdoğan. As before, it was met with a chorus of bipartisan condemnation on Capitol Hill. Opponents called for a more deliberate and strategic approach. They warned that America’s retreat would create a void, benefitting Assad, Russia, Iran, and ISIS. Even Trump’s stalwart allies were aghast. They knew that Trump was impulsive and dismissive of expertise, ignorant of the unintended consequences of his actions. However, Trump’s decision crossed a line even for his most fervent supporters. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) broke with the president’s Syria decision. He warned that the withdrawal of US troops from Syria threatened a “strategic calamity” and warned of a “catastrophic outcome” for American interests. McConnell was “gravely concerned” by the repercussions of Trump’s decision. He demanded “American leadership” in Syria and the Middle East.6 Senator Lindsey Graham (Republican, South Carolina), a close ally of the president, ripped into Trump. Working with Senator Chris Van Hollen (Democrat, Maryland), he threatened bipartisan “veto-proof ” sanctions on Turkey. Furthermore, Graham warned that the Senate would recommend Turkey’s suspension from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) if it attacked Kurdish allies and threatened retaliation if US troops were targeted and put in harm’s way.7 Graham tweeted on October16, “I hope President Trump is right in his belief that Turkey’s invasion of

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Syria is of no concern to us, abandoning the Kurds won’t come back to haunt us, ISIS won’t reemerge, and Iran will not fill the vacuum created by this decision.” Graham added, “However, I firmly believe that if President Trump continues to make such statements this will be a disaster worse than President Obama’s decision to leave Iraq.”8 House Republican Conference Chairwoman Liz Cheney (Republican, Wyoming) and daughter of Vice President Dick Cheney, said the decision was a “catastrophic mistake that puts our gains against ISIS at risk and threatens America’s national security.” She warned, “Pulling out of northern Syria represents an abandonment of our Kurdish allies despite their vital contributions to the fight against ISIS, emboldens Iran, and serves as an undeserved gift to the Erdogan regime.” She strongly criticized Turkey’s security cooperation with Russia.9 Cheney was the primary sponsor of the “Countering Turkish Aggression Act of 2019,” which attracted more than seventy Republican sponsors. The sanctions targeted Turkey’s energy sector, barred arms sales, and imposed sanctions on Erdoğan, and other leaders such as the vice president, defense minister, and officials in the defense sector. On October 16, House Republicans joined Democrats in an overwhelming vote for a nonbinding legal resolution condemning Trump’s decision to abandon the Kurds. Facing newfound isolation, Trump appeared to have a meltdown during a meeting at the White House that ended abruptly and resulted in Democrats walking out. Speaker Nancy Pelosi told reporters that Trump appeared “very shaken up” by widespread criticism fueling the impeachment inquiry. Trump faced a bipartisan firestorm. Senator Robert Menendez (Democrat, New Jersey) and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, condemned the withdrawal of US troops. With this withdrawal, President Trump is further weakening the United States’ position on the global stage, actively weakening our national security and further undermining our credibility with partners and allies. This administration’s chaotic and haphazard approach to policy by tweet is endangering the lives of U.S. troops and civilians. The only beneficiaries of this action are ISIS, Iran and Russia.10

Trump’s decision to pullback US troops from Syria fulfilled a campaign promise. He believed that exiting Syria would play well with his base and would be convincing evidence in 2020 of his “America First” platform. Trump asked, “But what does that have to do with the United States of America if they’re fighting over Syria’s land?”11 Notoriously thin-skinned, Trump reacted to criticism by US lawmakers by lashing out at Erdoğan. If Turkey “does anything that I, in my great and unmatched wisdom, consider to be off limits, I will totally destroy and obliterate its economy.”12 Under withering criticism, Trump tried to placate critics who condemned his appeasement of Turkey. US officials denied that Trump had endorsed Turkey’s invasion. “We do not support this operation in any way, shape or form,” said the State Department. An administration official pointed out that Trump rejected an appeal from Erdoğan for military assistance. Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper insisted that the United States was still committed to making the “security mechanism” work.13 The

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security mechanism involved observation posts on the border and joint patrols, which were scuttled by Turkey’s invasion. To restrain Turkey’s offensive against the SDF, he suspended negotiations over a $100 billion trade deal with Turkey and instructed the Treasury Department to impose sanctions including a 50 percent tariff of Turkish steel. The United States also sanctioned three senior Turkish officials, as well as its defense and energy ministries. The Justice Department filed fraud and money laundering charges against HalkBank, Turkey’s second-largest financial institution, for violating US sanctions by illegally transferring gold and cash to Iran in exchange for oil and gas. Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and National Security Adviser Robert C. O’Brien were sent to Ankara to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. According to Pence, “President Trump communicated to him [Erdogan] very clearly that the United States of American wants Turkey to stop the invasion, implement an immediate ceasefire and to begin to negotiate with Kurdish forces in Syria to bring an end to the violence.”14 Pompeo asserted, “We need them to stand down, we need a cease-fire, at which point we can begin to put this all back together again.”15 Trump’s attempted equanimity was too little and too late. Erdoğan affirmed, “We are determined to take our operation to the end. We will finish what we started. A hoisted flag does not come down.”16 US allies, especially France, strongly criticized Trump. Macron said “We have spoken both with President Trump and with [Turkish] President Erdogan, and we sent the clear message of our common will that this offensive stops.”17 German defense minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer stated, “The Turks are a NATO partner, and NATO is an alliance based on values. If there are indications that Turkey is really planning to stay in northern Syria as a kind of occupying force, then there must be a clear answer from us. That will not do.”18 Twenty-eight member states of the EU passed a unanimous resolution to stop selling arms to Turkey. Saudi Arabia blasted Trump’s shortsighted decision. Not surprisingly, Russia was one of the few countries to praise Trump’s pullback. Trump wished the Russians and Syrians “a lot of luck.” “If Russia wants to get involved with Syria, that’s really up to them.”19 Putin was eager to fill the gap created by America’s withdrawal. Russia stood to gain from the collapse of America’s prestige and influence in the Middle East and around the world. ***** Erdoğan acted fast before Trump could succumb to pressure and change his mind. On October 8, he ordered Turkish warplanes and artillery to attack Kurdish positions across the border. Bombings and artillery barrages hit hundreds of targets in just the first few days. Firepower was concentrated on Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ain. Turkish troops with tanks and armor massed in Akcakala on the Turkish side of the border. They were joined by at least two thousand members of the Syrian National Army (SNA), formerly the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Though the FSA changed its name, it did not change its character as a criminal gang holding the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law in contempt. The NSA is a jihadist militia with ties to ISIS and other Islamist militants with a sordid history of atrocities. Turkey’s ties to terrorism became increasingly apparent. Turkey was the original backer of Islamist fighters in Syria. When Syria’s president Bashar

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al-Assad used chemical weapons (CW) to attack Ghouta in 2013, Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT) established the “jihadi highway” between Sanliurfa and Raqqa, providing weapons, money, and logistical support to forty thousand foreign fighters transiting through Turkey to join ISIS in Syria. Turkey took over after the US suspended its train-and-equip program, turning the FSA into a Turkish-controlled jihadi army that committed a series of war crimes. As we have seen, Turkey orchestrated the invasion of Kessab, an Armenian enclave in northwest Syria, by its jihadi proxies in March 2014. Hundreds of Armenians and other Christians were killed. Churches were desecrated and destroyed. When Turkey invaded Jarabulus in August 2016, the city fell without a shot. The Turks collaborated with ISIS fighters who changed out of their terror garb and joined brethren in the FSA ranks. The FSA invaded Afrin in December 2018. It beheaded Kurdish defenders, raped and mutilated the bodies of Kurdish women in the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), cutting off their breasts and posing for selfies with their body parts. The FSA coerced a young Syrian boy to decapitate a Syrian soldier and then used his head as a soccer ball. With Turkish air support, and backed by Turkish tanks and armor, the FSA penetrated deeper into Syrian territory, starting on October 9.  As it advanced, the FSA killed civilians and executed prisoners. The secretary-general of the Future Syria Party, Hevrin Khalaf, and ten Kurds were executed on the side of the M4 highway. Her executioners were a part of an Islamist jihadi group, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, under control of the Turkish military. A  video depicts the execution by FSA gangsters, shouting “Allahu Akbar.” One kicked Khalaf ’s body and said, “This is the corpse of pigs.” One of the victims, his hands tied behind his back, was forced to kneel and was shot in the back of his head. An FSA member fired repeatedly, crying out:  “Film me shooting him with a sniper rifle—pigs … kill them.”20 Other video footage showed the FSA executing three Kurdish fighters on the highway between Hasakah and Manbij. The FSA is composed of Arab and Turkmen, fueling concern over potential ethnic conflict. The UN called on Turkey to conduct an “impartial, transparent and independent investigation and to apprehend those responsible.”21 Turkey denied the allegation claiming that Khalaf was killed in an airstrike. In the first week of Turkey’s incursion into northern Syria, Erdoğan gloated: “490 terrorists have been neutralized thus far; 440 have been killed, 26 wounded, and 24 surrendered.”22 Turkey acted with impunity. On December 2, 2019, it shelled a courtyard in Tell Rifaat, killing eight children. Sinam Sherkany Mohamad, cochair of the US Mission of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) wrote Henrietta Fore, executive director of United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), demanding an investigation. UNICEF ignored her entreaties. Turkish artillery also knowingly attacked US forces, just 300 meters from the Security Mechanism Zone in Kobani. Artillery rounds were fired on both sides of the outpost, creating a “bracketing effect.” The Turkish Defense Ministry denied that its forces had fired on US troops, saying that Turkish troops were targeting Kurdish fighters nearby. The Pentagon scoffed at Turkey’s denial, saying it gave Turkey “explicit grid coordinate details.” According to former Special Envoy Brett McGurk, “This was not a mistake. Turkey knows all of our locations.”23

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The Pentagon was deeply concerned about the danger to American personnel. By seizing the M4 Highway, the Turks blocked their escape route. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley maintained, “We retain the right of self-defense,” raising the specter of an unprecedented armed confrontation between NATO allies.24 Pentagon planners explored an airlift to evacuate US troops. As US–Turkey relations became more contentious, the US Department of Defense (DoD) grew increasingly concerned about the control of approximately fifty tactical nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Force Base, about 250 miles from the Syrian border in southeastern Turkey. Without a plan to remove them, the nuclear weapons were held hostage by Erdoğan, who vowed to acquire a nuclear arsenal. The United States faced a quandary. Removing the weapons would mark the demise of the US–Turkey alliance. More importantly, however, nukes in Incirlik were vulnerable to seizure by the Turks. With US forces threatened in northeastern Syria, Trump doubled down by announcing that all two thousand soldiers in Syria would leave the country. In Trump’s original plan, only about 150 Special Operations forces would remain at the Tanf base in southern Syria near the Jordanian border, which borders the strategically important Baghdad-to-Damascus highway. Profoundly mercurial, Trump and Mazloum Kobani spoke on October 15. Trump indicated that residual US forces would remain in southeast of Manbij near the Tishreen Dam in order to deter attacks by the NSA against the SDF.25 Trump later suggested that a small number of US forces might remain in Syria’s east on the border with Iraq to secure the oil fields in Deir ez-Zor. Trump’s messages were confusing; Mazloum did not know what to believe. ***** Trump was quick to take credit after Baghouz in March 2019. Trump initially pronounced, “ISIS is 100% defeated.” He later recalibrated his message, indicating that the caliphate was defeated. The ISIS caliphate may be destroyed, but ISIS is still a force to be reckoned with. It still had up to eighteen thousand fighters across Iraq and Syria, with a war chest of $400  million. Many ISIS members and their families were detained by the Kurds in northeastern Syria. About ten thousand ISIS fighters from Syria and Iraq were detained at the al-Hol camp along with two thousand foreign fighters. Al-Hol’s total population of seventy-four thousand included ISIS brides and children, ripe for further radicalization and recruitment. Turkey’s attack on ISIS detention facilities caused widespread panic; ISIS detainees under Kurdish control escaped and augmented ISIS ranks. Trump sharply criticized Obama for America’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. “President Obama and Secretary Clinton created a vacuum the way they got out of Iraq. They shouldn’t have been in, but once they got in, the way they got out was a disaster. And ISIS was formed.”26 Trump’s criticism of Obama was an example of the pot calling the kettle black. Trump’s retreat from Syria was a windfall for ISIS. Prior to Turkey’s attack, Trump asserted that “if Turkey was to mount a major incursion, the problem would be all theirs.” Giving Turkey responsibility for ISIS detainees is equivalent to letting the wolf guard the chicken coop. Trump turned a blind eye to Turkey’s complicity with ISIS, even when it became increasingly apparent that Erdoğan’s Turkey was a terror state and the FSA its terror army.

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The SDF warned US officials about the risk of hard-core ISIS detainees escaping. The SDF warned that the escape of ISIS detainees would “destroy all that has been achieved in terms of stability over the last years.”27 Trump dismissed concerns. Instead he lambasted European governments for refusing to repatriate their citizens. Trump washed his hands of responsibility. If ISIS fighters escape, Trump said: “They will be escaping to Europe.”28 In the chaos caused by Turkey’s attack, US forces were unable to transfer about sixty “high-value” ISIS members from detention centers in the area controlled by the SDF. The Ayn Issa detention center contained about thirteen thousand ISIS women and children. When Turkish artillery shells struck near Ayn Issa on October 14, 2019, the ISIS families began to riot and attack the guards who had not returned to their villages or gone to the frontline. Out of thirteen thousand detainees at the Ayn Issa facility, the SDF reported that at least eight hundred successfully escaped from the section of the camp holding foreign nationals. Escapes continued in the fog of war. Turkish mortars hit a prison near Qamishli, allowing detainees to escape. ISIS escapees reactivated sleeper cells and launched suicide bombings against the SDF. Mazloum Kobani said guarding IS prisoners was a “second priority.” He explained, “All their families are located in the border area, so they are forced to defend their families.”29 Erdoğan downplayed the seriousness of ISIS jailbreaks. He cynically suggested that the Kurds might be releasing prisoners “to get us involved.” He dismissed accounts of the jailbreaks as “disinformation” designed to provoke a response from the United States.30 Turkey’s attack caused a huge humanitarian crisis. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said that at least 160,000 people fled their homes in the first week, including 70,000 children. Some panicked Kurds rushed to Fishkabour on the Zab River bordering Iraqi Kurdistan. Others fled south to Deir ez-Zor. Some from Kobani sought sanctuary in Manbij where Russian troops were patrolling between Turkish and Syrian troops. Mercy Corps evacuated staffers and suspended operations, describing the situation as a “nightmare scenario.” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) announced on October 15 the suspension of most of its activities in northeastern Syria and the evacuation of all its international staff. MSF emergency manager for Syria said, “The people in northeast Syria have already endured years of conflict and uncertainty. The latest developments have only increased the need for humanitarian assistance, yet it is impossible to deliver it with the current insecurity.”31 ***** “We would rather die honorably than allow Turkish troops to invade our lands,” said the PYD’s Salih Muslim.32 Without US protection and fearing a massacre, the SDF made a deal with its nemesis, the Syrian regime, and invited the SAA to enter its territories. The deal was allegedly brokered by Russian intermediaries. Kurds distrust the regime, which has abused their rights over decades and adamantly opposed Kurdish self-government. However, they feared criminal Turks and its mercenary gangs even more.33 The terms of the deal were unclear even to the parties involved. The SDF understood that the SAA would assume positions on the border while it continued to provide internal security and oversee local government. Damascus drew a different conclusion.

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It wanted the SDF to disband and integrate into the Fifth Division, a Russian-run structure, which had previously absorbed Arab rebel fighters. A volatile situation resulted, as the Turkish and Syrian armies rushed to seize territory. Turkey and the FSA descended from the north while Syrian forces came from the south, both aiming to fill the vacuum left by the SDF’s withdrawal. US troops were somewhere in the middle. Government forces seized Tel Tamer, Tabqa, and Ayn Issa. The United States bombed its base in Manbij, while making a hasty withdrawal. A  Russian flag was hoisted where the stars and stripes had flown. The love affair between Kurds and Americans was over. Kurds cursed US forces for evacuating their positions en route to Iraq, pelting them with fruit and rotten vegetables. As tensions worsened, Trump sent a confusing yet threatening letter to Erdoğan. He wrote, “Don’t be a tough guy. Don’t be a fool! Let’s work out a good deal! You don’t want to be responsible for slaughtering thousands of people, and I don’t want to be responsible for destroying the Turkish economy—and I will.” The letter ended with an informal salutation, “I’ll call you later.” Erdoğan was enraged that the letter violated diplomatic protocol and lacked “niceties.” The pro-Turkish government media reported, “President Erdogan received the letter, thoroughly rejected it and put it in the bin.”34 He returned another copy of the letter to Trump when they met in The White House on November 14, 2019. Trump sent Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Ankara in order to patch things up. Pence totally capitulated to Erdoğan’s list of demands. Trump tried to put lipstick on a pig, spinning the negotiation as a “great deal,” “good for everybody.” The deal was, in fact, a huge setback for the United States as well as the Kurds. The agreement gave Turkey almost everything it wanted. Turkey agreed to “pause” its military action for 120 hours, but rejected the term “cease-fire.” The agreement assigned control of a 22-mile buffer area on the Syria side of the border, 75 miles long. The text was not explicit, but Turkish officials indicated that the SDF would be required to lay down their arms. Turkey expected that all Kurds—not just the SDF—would be required to withdraw from the buffer area. Lavishing praise on Erdoğan as a “friend” and “hell of a leader,” Trump personally sanctioned ethnic cleansing of the Kurds. Parroting Erdoğan, Trump indicated the area needed to be “cleaned out.”35 Pence and Pompeo also adopted Turkey’s talking points, claiming that the SDF is worse than ISIS. Echoing Turkish propaganda, they blamed the Kurds for attacking Christians in northern Syrian when, in fact, the Kurds had been protecting them against the FSA. Since the onset of Syria’s civil war, Kurdish forces protected minorities, including the Yezidis and Chaldean Christians, targeted by ISIS and more recently FSA mercenaries. Attacks by Turkish warplanes slowed in the immediate aftermath of the deal, but artillery attacks continued. Ras al-Ayn was besieged on three sides, as fighting raged. Relief organizations tried to open a humanitarian corridor to evacuate the wounded, but they were rebuffed by FSA mercenaries who continued their killing spree. Though about three hundred thousand people were driven from their homes in northern Syria, no arrangement was made for their return. In addition, the deal was silent on the removal of fifty US nuclear weapons in a bunker at Incirlik Air Force Base in Southeast

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Turkey. Trump lifted all sanctions on Turkey, while Members of the US Congress vowed to press ahead with sanctions legislation. Erdoğan met Putin in Sochi on October 22, 2019. Putin acted like the puppeteer, manipulating events and treating Erdoğan like a schoolboy. As a loyal backer of Assad, Putin portrayed Russia as a worthy alternative and better friend than the United States. Russia consolidated its influence by facilitating talks between Damascus and the SDF, and brokering agreements on behalf of Turkey. Putin embraced the course of events, which weakened NATO and humiliated the United States. Erdoğan and Putin made a deal to carve up northern Syria, though Turkey and Russia back different factions in Syria’s civil war. Russia was available to all, but loyal to none. ***** Turkey’s invasion occurred soon after the UN announced formation of a constitutional committee to revive the peace process. Just when it seemed that calm would be restored, all hell broke loose with Turkey’s attack. Its invasion and occupation destabilized Syria and made peace prospects even less likely. The United States was already marginalized. Its relations with the Kurds represented America’s only influence in Syria. Abandoning the Kurds further marginalized the United States, which surrendered the battlefield to bad actors. As we have seen in Afrin, heroic and highly motivated Kurdish defenders are no match for Turkey’s air power, armor, and criminal proxy, the FSA (renamed the NSA). Hundreds of Kurdish civilians and SDF members were slaughtered by the Turks and their FSA mercenaries. The ISIS caliphate was defeated until Turkey invaded. As Kurdish fighters redeployed, ISIS detainees escaped and rejoined sleeper cells or found common cause with their Turkish compatriots. The flight of Kurds from Syria destabilized Iraq, which was struggling with domestic unrest. It placed an extraordinary burden on Iraqi Kurdistan, which already hosted hundreds of thousands of displaced persons from the war in Syria and sectarian conflict in Iraq. As we saw after Turkey’s attack in Kobani, Kurds worldwide protested the invasion and war crimes. Violence was concentrated in Turkey’s Southeast, where Kurds predominate, and Hatay Province along Turkey’s border with Syria. The powder keg risked igniting tensions in Istanbul, home to more than one million Kurds. Most Kurds in Turkey were cowed by Erdoğan’s security apparatus. A majority of Turks, however, including the opposition, supported Erdoğan’s decision to enter Syria. Violent conflict always has winners and losers. With an endgame to Syria’s civil war on the horizon, America’s standing was further delegitimized in the international arena. The Kurds were displaced and disenfranchised by US actions. Erdoğan affirmed his credentials as a thug and despot. The Syrian government took steps to restore its sovereignty across the country, but at great cost. Assad is servile to Putin, obligated to Iran, and in conflict with Turkey. Syria’s long national nightmare continues.

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Words Matter As a candidate in 2008, Obama said: “Don’t tell me words don’t matter. Don’t tell me ideals and inspiration don’t matter. Don’t tell me hope doesn’t matter.”1 Obama should have taken his own counsel. In Syria, he overpromised and underperformed. Some of Obama’s important foreign-policy decisions were guided by wishful thinking. He asserted that Bashar al-Assad should be removed from office, but had no plan for removing him. Obama wanted to be on the right side of history, but he lacked a plan for regime change or stabilizing Syria if Assad stepped down. His intentions were noble, but execution was lacking. US policy planners endlessly debated security assistance to the rebels as Syria’s spiral of deadly violence intensified. Obama surely has many regrets about Syria. One regret must be establishing a redline on the use of chemical weapons (CW) but failing to enforce it. Words matter and the US President cannot be caught bluffing. When adversaries call the President’s bluff and he/she fails to follow through, it emboldens the aggressor to act with impunity. It also discredits the United States and undermines America’s ability to influence events. Trump totally lacked self-discipline and strategic clarity. He often spoke impulsively, disregarding the advice of experts, and circumventing the process for evaluating policy options. Politicians are measured not only by what they say, but by what they do. Not only did Trump betray the Kurds by abandoning them to Turkey’s aggression, he also added insult to injury by disparaging them. While acknowledging that the Kurds are “good fighters,” Trump said “They are not angels.” Trump defended his decision to abandon the Kurds, explaining that they are “fighting for their land.” In a shocking display of ignorance, he maintained: “They didn’t help us in the Second World War, they didn’t help us with Normandy.” Trump’s ignorance and diplomatic narcissism comes at a fragile geopolitical moment. Trump’s erratic actions in Syria confused America’s allies and emboldened its adversaries. It eroded the coalitions shaped by the United States over decades and undermined public confidence in disciplined US leadership. Trump’s unpredictability invited antagonists to test the boundaries of what they can get away with. Until the United States responds, either militarily or through other forms of intervention, including effective diplomacy, adversaries will continue to push. No response is better than rhetorical bombast. Diplomacy based on weakness or without a credible threat of force is prone to failure.

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World Order The events in Syria highlighted how violence can spiral out of control without guidelines to address genocide and war crimes. When people are being slaughtered, a predictable decision-making process is needed to guide decisions concerning intervention. Inaction is not an adequate response to mass killings. America’s sudden withdrawal from Syria destabilized the country at the precise moment when UN mediation was making progress. Abandoning an ally, as Trump abandoned the Kurds, raises questions about America as a proponent of stability and world order. The damage is enduring; Trump’s retreat allowed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) detainees to escape, undermining efforts to prevent violent extremism in the Middle East and worldwide. When, how and with whom should the United States consider intervention? If military action is a last resort, what interventions should precede it to put pressure on the perpetrator of mass crimes? Should intervention be based solely on national security criteria or is there also a moral imperative? These questions arose in Syria, and will surely arise again. Containment defined America’s approach during the Cold War. It worked when confronting the Soviet Union, resulting in a stalemate between Great Powers. However, containment does not work when confronting ISIS and other jihadi groups who are committed to sensational violence, propagating their nihilistic ideology. “America First” is a flawed ideology. Bill Burns blasts Trump’s “demolition of diplomacy,” his “scorched-earth tactics and casual relationship with truth.”2 The United States needs to be engaged, lest bad actors fill the gap and establish new norms of behavior based on their narrow national interests rather than collective goals and lofty ethical standards. “Diplomacy first” is the best way to advance US national interests. However, Trump took a sledgehammer to statecraft. It will take years if not generations to restore America’s role as a force for good in the world. Loss of respect for America is the result of Washington’s consistent failings in Syria, climaxed by Trump’s betrayal of the Kurds. Of course, diplomacy does not preclude hard power when facing a threat. It is not possible to reason with someone who puts on a suicide vest to kill civilians. A democracy or conflict resolution workshop is useless when confronting imminent threats. Killing the attacker is the only recourse. Such targeted killings are legally and morally justified in order to save lives. However, a security response must always be the last resort when preventive measures are exhausted. A  more nuanced approach incorporating both hard and soft power is the best strategy to drain the swamp of support for radical jihadists. De-radicalization can be achieved through human development, which rests on education, inclusive economic development, and good government that enshrines human rights and democratic rule. Empowering women is a useful and necessary antidote to radicalization. For sure, these elements of soft power are no guarantee against radicalization. But combined with a security response, soft power can be effective in mitigating violence and extremism. Syria’s civil war was a by-product of the Arab Spring, during which people demanded accountability and good government after decades of authoritarian rule. Unrest was caused by a combination of factors, including environmental variables and

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Syria’s population boom. Global warming and drought caused population transfers from rural areas to Syria’s cities, compounding the social and economic crisis that led to conflict. Bill Burns explains, “Outside powers preyed on Syria’s divisions, from Iran and Russia to the Gulf States, settling scores and angling for advantage.”3 International order is based on a rules-based system that manages inter-state relations. Stable, structured patterns for constructive engagement between States evolved after the Second World War. The international architecture aims to promote security, peace and prosperity. It relies on rulemaking institutions and international political organizations, promoting dialogue to mitigate conflict and foster good neighborly relations. The United Nations was founded to advance peace, security, and human development. Bretton–Woods and international financial institutions were established to promote peace and prosperity. Defensive security alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) evolved to deter aggression. The emergence of new institutions, international law, and development of international human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) regulated relations in service of humankind and the common good. An inherent tension exists between the proponents of states’ rights and advocates of human rights. International organizations (IOs), like the UN, are a consortium of sovereign states. IOs struggle to reconcile the interests of their members with individual rights. The UN Charter asserts the primacy of states, while simultaneously affirming: “By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination, all peoples can determine their political status and pursue their own economic, social, and cultural development.”4 Kofi Annan, who served as UN Secretary General from January 1997 to December 2006 and Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, envisioned a new balance between the rights of states and human rights. He insisted on making people the focus of concern: The struggle for human rights resonates with our global constituency, and is deeply relevant to the lives of those most in need – the tortured, the oppressed, the silenced, and the victims of '“ethnic cleansing” and injustice. If, in the face of such abuses, we do not speak up and speak out, if we do not act in defense of human rights and advocate their lasting universality, how can we answer that global constituency? For in a world where globalization has limited the ability of states to control their economies, regulate their financial policies, and isolate themselves from environmental damage and human migration, the last right of states cannot and must not be the right to enslave, persecute or torture their own citizens.5

Annan was a maverick who broke new ground, articulating limits to sovereignty. For Annan, sovereignty cannot be an excuse for tyranny and egregious violations of human rights. He launched a debate about the balance between the rights of states and the rights of people within states. Trump joined this debate by siding with authoritarian leaders. He disparaged human rights as a primary goal of international relations. His world view is more closely aligned with ISIS than with America’s founding fathers. Annan condemned “outbursts of indiscriminate violence and organized mass killings” by ISIS, which presented a profound challenge to international order. ISIS was

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nihilistic, violently opposed to both states’ rights and individual rights. ISIS challenged conclusions of the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War, which created new states from the ashes of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. ISIS also violently opposed individual human rights, setting a standard for cruelty by torturing and killing those who opposed its interpretation of Sharia and the authority of its caliphate. ISIS rebuked the liberal and progressive values at the core of world order. Syria was a conundrum. It was due certain rights as a member state of the international community. However, it systematically abused the rights of its citizens thereby inviting conflict with extremists and jihadists from around the world. Concerned parties within the region and international community responded differently to Assad’s tyranny. Obama adopted realpolitik, opposing military intervention. Trump took disinterest to new heights. His actions were devoid of ideology. He turned a blind eye to Assad’s crimes and ignored the nefarious role of states both backing Assad and supporting the rebels. Precipitously withdrawing US forces was a manifestation of his disengagement, which gave ISIS a new lease on life. Trump ignored US obligations to the Kurds, its ally in Syria, undermining the notion of a principles-based approach to international relations. By abandoning the Kurds and ceding leadership to bad actors, America’s moral leadership was eroded with tragic effect in Syria and elsewhere.

Intervention Criteria The twentieth century was the bloodiest in human history. The Armenian Genocide, the Nazi Holocaust, Stalin’s purges, social engineering by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia—all focused the international community on crimes against humanity. A toolbox of interventions emerged from these experiences aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict and preventing ethnic and sectarian conflict. America’s approach to intervention was shaped by its experiences at the end of the twentieth century. US Army Rangers and Delta Special Forces launched an operation to seize top advisers to the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed on October 3, 1993. Eighteen US troops were killed and seventy-three wounded, their dead bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. The following year, in April 1994, eight hundred thousand people were hacked to death in Rwanda. Instead of increasing the peacekeepers in Rwanda, the United States sponsored a UNSC (UN Security Council) Resolution to withdraw the peacekeeping mission entirely. Poor information among US officials and lack of political will by the international community contributed to the slaughter. With deep regret, President Bill Clinton acknowledged that US officials were aware, but we “did not fully appreciate the depth and speed with which [Rwanda was] being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.”6 In March 1999, NATO launched a seventy-eight-day bombing campaign to prevent what had happened in Bosnia, where more than one hundred thousand Muslims were victims of ethnic cleansing, from happening in Kosovo. Addressing the Kosovo Assembly in November 2009, Clinton drew a parallel between Kosovo and Rwanda, reflecting on the appropriate use of force to prevent genocide or protect civilians in armed conflict.

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A new doctrine emerged from these tragedies. The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which inspired the creation of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court (ICC), reflected a system of supranational justice aimed at both holding perpetrators accountable and deterring future crimes. According to Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, “Decent people cannot sit back and watch systematic, state-directed massacres. Decent people cannot fail to come to the rescue if the rescue action is within their power.”7 Lakdhar Brahimi, who succeeded Annan as UN Special Envoy for Syria, also contributed to the emerging global consensus on intervention. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, published in 2000 and called the “Brahimi Report,” focused on ways to improve the gathering of information in conflict-prone countries identified by the UN’s High-Level Panel on Threat, as the basis for action. To follow up the Brahimi Report, the Canadian government launched the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in December 2001. It articulated the “Responsibility to Protect,” otherwise known as R2P. According to R2P, states are first and foremost responsible to protect persons on their territory. But when states are unwilling or unable to act—or when states themselves are the perpetrators— the report stipulated that the international community has a responsibility to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Endorsed by the UN General Assembly, R2P provided both moral authority and a legal basis for intervention. Despite evolving instruments, intervention is still fundamentally a political choice. Military intervention requires rules providing legal sanction consistent with international law. When coercive measures fail to change a regime’s egregious abuse of human rights, the UN can adopt a resolution endorsing “all necessary measures” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII allows the UNSC to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to take military and nonmilitary action to “restore international peace and security” despite sovereignty concerns.8 A Chapter VII resolution requires endorsement by the UNSC. Countries opposing intervention under any circumstances constitute the “Axis of sovereignty.” Russia, joined by China, repeatedly used its veto as a Permanent Member of the UNSC to block pressure on the Syrian regime. When the UNSC is unable or unwilling to act, regional bodies can authorize action. For example, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) took a principled position, authorizing intervention in Kosovo when the UNSC was paralyzed by Russia’s obstruction. The NAC lacks the legitimacy of the UN, but its resolution provided cover for intervention by Western countries in the Kosovo case. The 2003 unilateral US invasion and occupation of Iraq not only violated international law but also undermined decades of progress toward a new balance between intervention and sovereignty. ***** The United States is not the world’s policeman. Though it cannot intervene in each humanitarian emergency or mass killing, that does not mean it cannot intervene anywhere. At the memorial service for Richard C. Holbrooke in January 2011. Obama asked:

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Why would the United States get involved in a remote corner of the world? Why bother? Because we can make a difference. That is the story of American leadership in the world. America cannot retreat. Our moral leadership is at stake when men, women, and children are slaughtered by senseless violence. America has a unique responsibility in the cause of human rights.9

Criteria and an intervention toolbox evolved.

Last Resort Intervention should not be undertaken lightly given its serious legal, practical, and moral implications. Rules governing intervention must be guided by strategic and moral clarity. Intervention should only be considered after diplomatic options have been exhausted and in consort with other countries.

International Law Acting outside of international law can be misused to settle scores. Humanitarian concerns should not be used ex post facto to justify military action. Motives will be questioned if intervention is a guise for advancing US security, economic or ideological interests.

Authorization Options The UN is “flawed but indispensable.”10 Authorization from regional bodies should only be sought when UNSC rivalries and national interests prevent consensus. Multilateralism is preferable despite the opaque decision-making and strategic vagueness that are inherent limitations.11

Popular Support The case should be made to the US Congress so it can vote to authorize military action. The American people should also be involved. Using public diplomacy, the case for action can be made on the basis of either national security or humanitarian grounds, or a combination of the two. Obama insisted on Congressional authorization to launch retaliatory air strikes against the Assad regime after the CW attacks in Ghouta. However, Congress was reluctant and the resolution failed.

Work with Allies US allies should also take a deliberative approach, shaping public opinion in order to build legislative support for intervention. Post-Ghouta, Britain’s rushed and halfhearted effort to make the case for military intervention led to parliament’s rejection of a resolution authorizing the use of force. Britain’s participation was not a prerequisite for US action in Syria, but Obama was unwilling to act without his most loyal ally.

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Comprehensive Approach Without UNSC authorization, Obama was isolated and reluctant to “go it alone.”12 A  military strike in response to Ghouta needed to be part of a broader military engagement or negotiation strategy. Obama failed to make the case that a military response to Ghouta was proportional to the threat of Syria’s aggression against civilians or that it would be of sufficient magnitude to prevent more CW attacks.

Contingency Planning Intervention does not imply an open-ended commitment. It should be linked to an exit strategy with a clearly defined mission and benchmarks defining success. Contingency planning should consider the unintended consequences of intervention such as a wider conflagration of the conflict. Planning should also consider the impact on civilians and whether the intervention will prevent displaced persons from returning home.

Exit Strategy It is much easier to start a war than to end one. Post-conflict stability operations should be prepared before engaging militarily. Early in the Syria conflict, the State Department initiated working groups to plan for Syria’s political transition after Assad. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review identified agencies with complementary expertise and prioritized cooperation with international partners. As we saw with the Future of Iraq Project, however, planning can be overtaken by unforeseeable and fast-moving events in the fog of war. Bill Burns reflected on US decisions about intervention in Syria. Obama had “the discipline to avoid getting sucked into another military entanglement in the Middle East, which would likely only underscore the limits of our influence.”13

Realistic Relations Syria has been the largest Arab crisis of the twenty-first century. With the advent of the Astana format—consisting of Russia, Iran, and Turkey—there was zero Arab input into resolving the conflict. The United States also became a nonfactor, marginalized by its reluctance to get involved and acquiescence to Turkey’s invasion. America’s experience in Iraq cast a shadow. Obama did not want a long-term engagement in Syria. Paralysis led to a proxy war between states either aligned with the Syrian government or supporting the rebels. Rather than a reality-based approach, the United States sought to placate adversaries, which further eroded America’s influence in Syria and its standing in the world. Trump failed to act on principle, thereby affirming “Putin’s long-held conviction—shared by autocrats the world over—that Americans are just as venal and self-absorbed as they are, just more hypocritical about it. For dictators, Trump is the gift that keeps on giving, a non-stop advertisement for Western self-dealing.”14

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Russia Putin emerged as the kingmaker, managing Iran’s involvement and mediating between Damascus and Turkey. Putin acted as a go-between on critical issues such as Idlib, refugee returns from Turkey to Syria, and procedures for the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to reenter lands previously controlled by the Kurds. Russia’s enhanced mediation role filled the gap created by the lack of US leadership. Announcing the creation of a constitutional committee, Antonio Guterres thanked Russia, Iran, and Turkey, while making merely a passing reference to the United States as a member of the P5. The Trump administration had become increasingly irrelevant. Its irrelevance was compounded by Trump’s betrayal of the Kurds. Speculation about Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election handicapped Trump. On the one hand, Trump wanted to appear impervious to Russia’s influence. At the same time, he was acquiescent to Russian demands. The Trump administration vacillated between appeasement and confrontation. Trump fawned over Putin when they met in Singapore. He sided with Putin over the findings of the US intelligence community, which concluded that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. Placating Putin, Trump blocked arms sales to Ukraine. He invited Russia to rejoin the G-7 against the wishes of other members. Trump congratulated Putin for his tainted reelection victory, ignoring counsel from his advisers. Trump was mercurial, obsequious one moment and adopting a get-tough approach the next. He declared, “There’s never been a president as tough on Russia as I  have been.”15 This claim is not without merit. In 2018, Trump loosened rules of engagement for US forces in Syria, which led to clashes with Russian mercenaries, but did nothing to prevent the slaughter in Idlib. Sanctions were imposed on dozens of Russian oligarchs and government officials, and sixty Russian diplomats were evicted from the United States in retaliation for the poisoning of the ex-spy Sergei Skripal. When Turkey invaded northern Syria, Trump ceded leadership to Putin. Putin filled the gap left from Trump’s withdrawal with Russian troops literally occupying former US bases in, for example, Kobani. Putin gloated over the demise of US influence and capacity in the Middle East. Russia played a nefarious role in the Syria conflict, vetoing thirteen UNSC resolution intended to pressure the regime (as of this writing). In 2015, it rescued the Assad regime by deploying air power and coordinating ground forces with Iran. It participated in the assault on Idlib that killed thousands. Recent reports confirm that Russia systematically bombed hospitals, violating IHL. Russia’s primary motivation was not to save Assad, but to serve its strategic and economic interests. Russia expanded its military facilities in Tartus and Latakia. It captured reconstruction contracts and advanced its economic interests by establishing control over Syria’s phosphate industry. And it became the indispensable broker between the regime, the Kurds, and Turkey. Trump demonstrated an uncanny ability to simplify the bilateral US–Russia relationship. According to Trump, “If we could develop a relationship which is good for Russia, good for us, good for everybody, that would be great.”16 The need for improved US–Russia relations is indisputable. However, relations must be based on principles. Good relations are ill-served through surrender.

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Conditions in Syria worsened because the P5 could not agree on what to do. In Syria and future conflicts, Washington and Moscow will have to work together. Divisions between world powers risk direct conflict with potentially grave consequences for peace and security.

Iran General Qassem Soleimani’s trip to Moscow in July 2015 was a turning point in Syria’s civil war. On the brink of being overrun by the rebels, the deployment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), combined with Russian air power, turned the tide in Assad’s favor. Building on the IRGC’s battlefield prowess, Rouhani assumed a mediator’s role between the Syrian government and Turkey. He endorsed the 1998 Adana Agreement as a basis for security cooperation between Syria and Turkey. The Adana Agreement required concessions from Syria, including surrendering Abdullah Öcalan, in exchange for Turkey’s pledge to restrain from cross-border attacks and to stop diverting water from the Euphrates River. Usually reticent to participate in multilateral mediation, Iran assisted formation of the UN-facilitated constitutional committee. Deep distrust and enmity defines US–Iran relations, especially after Trump cancelled the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), whereby Iran suspended its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Iran’s continued support for terror groups, testing of ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC Resolutions, and assistance to terror proxies exacerbated tensions with Washington. Emboldened by Assad’s success in Syria, the IRGC expanded its malign activities and confrontation with the United States and Saudi Arabia. In June 2019, Iran downed a US surveillance drone. Trump ordered retaliatory strikes, but cancelled them at the last minute. Iran concluded that Trump was reluctant to enforce his threats and attacked tankers in the Persian Gulf. Trump condemned the threat to maritime shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, but took no action. The United States and Iran were on a war-footing when drones and cruise missiles attacked Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khuteis oil and gas energy processing facilities on September 15, 2019. Again, Trump was unpredictable. One day, he threatened military action. The next, he downplayed talk of war. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) had undue influence over Trump, who is weak and easily manipulated. Soleimani was the victim of a targeted killing in a US drone strike on January 3, 2020. Tensions with Iran were entirely avoidable. The JCPOA prevented Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon and started the process of normalizing Iran’s relations with the West. The JCPOA was a bet that Iran would modify its behavior and, abiding by international norms, integrate into the international system. Normalization could have changed Iran’s approach in Syria and hastened an end to Syria’s civil war, but we will never know what effect the JCPOA might have had. Trump’s incendiary rhetoric infuriated the mullahs. Iran doubled down when biting sanctions were imposed. The JCPOA was flawed, but the deal was working. Its potential was unrealized when Trump pulled the plug.

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Iran tried to divide the Trump administration from the international community. Other Western countries initially sought to salvage the JCPOA and preserve Iran’s compliance with terms of the agreement. However, the attack on Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khuteis brought the world together in opposition to Iran. The governments of Britain, France, and Germany issued a statement that blamed Iran for the attack even though the drones and missiles were not launched from its territory. The Aramco attack was an overreach. It unified the international community in opposition to Iran’s missile program, its nuclear program, and its support for nefarious proxies. Iran was ostracized; its outlier status restored.

Turkey Two falsehoods define US–Turkey relations. Turkey is often referred to as a secular democracy. It is neither secular nor is it a democracy. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has become Islamist, antidemocratic, and anti-American. Its reliability as an ally and future role in NATO are questionable. Nor is Turkey benign. Its attack and occupation of Kurdish lands confirmed Erdoğan’s sinister intent. Tensions between the United States and Turkey intensified over Erdoğan’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia. The Pentagon tried a combination of carrots and sticks to dissuade Turkey, but Ankara resisted pressure to take a Patriot missile system even though it is a superior weapons system that, paired with subsidies, is more affordable than the S-400s. Buying missiles from Russia not only raised questions about Turkey’s reliability as an ally. It also undermined the core NATO principle of interoperability. The Trump administration suspended delivery of the stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, in response to Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400s. Deploying the F-35s alongside S-400s, would be a potential intelligence breach. The F-35 has sophisticated stealth technology of interest to the Russians. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (Democrat, New Hampshire) applauded the administration’s decision “to delay the transfer of F-35 equipment to Turkey to help ensure US military technology and capabilities cannot fall into the hands of the Kremlin.”17 She added, “The Kremlin is an adversary of the United States and many of our NATO allies. The prospect of Russia having access to U.S. aircraft and technology in a NATO country, Turkey, is a serious national and global security risk.”18 Trump, however, sees it differently. Turkey’s human rights record is another sticking point. Erdoğan has turned Turkey into a giant gulag, jailing up to fifty thousand oppositionists under bogus terrorism charges and dismissing more than one hundred thousand civil servants from their jobs. In 2018, Turkey had more journalists in prison than any other country. Turkey detained US pastor Andrew Brunson for more than two years as a bargaining chip for the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, whom the Turkish government accuses of plotting the 2016 coup attempt. Though Brunson was released, several US citizens and consular officials remain in prison. Turkey’s support for jihadists also poisoned US–Turkey relations. Vice President Joe Biden accused Turkey of assisting jihadis in Syria, providing transport, logistics, money, and weapons. The jihadi highway from Şanlıurfa in Turkey to Raqqa, the

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self-declared caliphate of ISIS, was run by Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT). Erdoğan’s son, Bilal, and son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, benefitted from the sale of ISIS oil. Not only is Erdoğan’s reputation tarnished abroad, his standing in Turkey has also diminished. The defeat of his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2019 local elections demonstrated the dissatisfaction of voters with Erdoğan’s leadership and his stewardship of Turkey’s economy. The Turkish lira has plummeted and foreign direct investment has all but evaporated. After Turkey invaded Syria, the Trump administration imposed sanctions and extra tariffs on Turkey. These measures were largely symbolic. Casting blame rather than taking responsibility, Erdoğan accused the United States and the Jewish lobby for causing Turkey’s economic woes. US–Turkey relations were profoundly affected when Trump caved to Erdoğan’s demands and allowed Turkish troops to enter Syria and set up a safe zone. Not only did Trump evacuate observation posts in NES. He also gave Erdoğan a green light to attack the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Turkey, under Erdoğan, has gone rogue. NATO is more than a security alliance. It is a coalition of countries with shared values. If Turkey applied for NATO membership today, its application would not even be considered. Turkey’s security cooperation with Russia would also disqualify it from joining the alliance. Trump also has blood on his hands. Many Kurds, including friends and allies of the United States, were killed, displaced, or disappeared. Trump’s willingness to abandon an ally who fought and died alongside the United States sends an ominous sign to Israel as well as Gulf Arabs who rely on security cooperation with Washington. After Trump betrayed the Kurds, who will fight and die for the United States the next time we need an ally against ISIS or a strategic partner to confront challenges elsewhere in the world?

Winning? Obama faced only bad choices after the outbreak of Syria’s civil war. If the United States had intervened on behalf of the rebels, Sunni Islamists would have taken Damascus, targeting Alawites with bloody reprisals. Like Saddam Hussein or Moammar Qaddafi, the rebels would have executed Bashar al-Assad or conducted a sham trial leading to his hanging. Radical Islamists may have usurped the pro-democracy movement and turned Syria into an ISIS outpost. In this event, Russia and China would condemn the United States for reckless regime change that radicalized the region and exacerbated tensions in the Gulf between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Israel would be threatened. Obama believed that the rebels would vanquish the Assad regime without help from the United States. “Many in the region thought Assad’s demise was just a matter of time and that his political options were going to narrow the longer the fighting continued.19 Saudi Arabia’s King Abdallah believed that Assad was ‘finished.’ King Abdullah of Jordan shared this view. Hof said the Assad regime was a ‘dead man walking.’ ”20 Not everyone predicted Assad’s imminent demise. Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed believed that Assad was on the ropes but could “hang on for a long time.”21

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Assad was able to hang onto power by inviting Russia’s help, which was pivotal to repelling rebel advances. However valiant, the rebels were no match for Russian air power and backing from the IRGC and Hezbollah. While abandoning the rebel movement, Western countries focused on justice and accountability. According to US Special Envoy James Jeffrey, “The Syrian people are resilient. The world will not forget the regime waged war by targeting civilians. [The U.S.] is committed to real consequences for atrocities committed in Syria.”22 Joel Rayburn, deputy assistant secretary of state for Levant Affairs, maintained:  “Accountability takes a long time. It will be served. It must be served.”23 Martin Longden, the UK’s Special Envoy to Syria, bemoaned “the industrial scale of the Assad regime’s monstrous behavior.” He warned that “the world must not become numb. It must remain outraged.”24 Their words ring hollow to Syrians who have grown skeptical of the West’s intentions. In fact, Assad has won the war. With Russia’s help, he kept the armed opposition at bay. Additionally, Russia’s mediation between the regime and the Kurds paved the way for Syria to restore its control over parts of the country controlled by the Kurds. Defeating the rebels and reaching agreement with the Kurds were major milestones in restoring Syria’s sovereignty over all its territory. We do not know the terms of the agreement between the regime and Syrian Kurds. We can speculate, however, that the deal serves Syria’s goal to normalize relations with the international community. The SDF had many high-value ISIS foreign fighters under its control. Knowing that the SDF could not keep them, Damascus may have proposed a deal with the Kurds to transfer these detainees to Syrian government control. At that point, Assad’s envoys presented Europeans with a choice. If Syria released them, they would go back to their countries of origin. Alternatively, Syria could keep them in Sednaya Prison and European governments would agree to a process for normalizing relations with Damascus in exchange. Once Britain agrees to normalizing relations with Syria, France and the United States will likely follow. Normalizing relations would restore the status quo ante. The Syrian government predictably welcomed the formation of a UN-facilitated constitutional committee. The committee will prepare a constitution and pave the way for parliamentary elections in 2020. The Baath Party will win, of course, and Assad will have another seven-year term as president. It would be as though nothing had ever happened. Nonetheless, “Syria remains bloody and broken, its recovery a distant aspiration, its pathologies still threatening its neighborhood.”25 As of this writing, Syria’s grinding civil war is in its ninth year. Idlib has been transformed into a Gaza-like ghetto, the epicenter of human misery. Pro-democracy fighters have fled or been killed, as the movement was increasingly dominated by Islamists and jihadists. At last count, more than five hundred thousand people have been killed and more than twelve million driven from their homes. About one hundred thousand people have disappeared and tens of thousands were tortured.26 Sustainable peace will require stability, so displaced persons can go home and rebuild their lives. However, several factors hinder conditions for their return. Destroyed identity papers need to be replaced. Syria lacks a systematic process for property claims and compensation. Its heritage laws require a death certificate for

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survivors to take ownership of properties of deceased family members, but certificates that fail to identify the circumstances of death are often rejected by families. Returnees lacked protection. As of this writing, the regime is continuing its policy of siege, imprisonment, collective punishment, and the use of internationally prohibited weapons to murder the people of Syria. Despite the assurances of Western officials, accountability is simply a slogan. Russia blocked all efforts by the UNSC to refer war criminals to the ICC. To the proponents of “no peace without justice,” Russia’s obstruction and the resulting failure of the international community to hold perpetrators accountable undermined both peace prospects and the international rules-based system. Syrians have hope in the International Impartial Investigative Mechanism (IIIM), adopted by the UN General Assembly on February 27, 2017. The IIIM was established to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons who committed the most serious war crimes in Syria. It remains to be seen if the IIIM is a viable accountability mechanism or merely another layer of bureaucracy in the system of international justice. Desperate for accountability, Syrian civil society has been gathering forensic evidence and statements from victims documenting crimes against humanity that may be used someday. Lives were shattered and hearts broken as a result of Syria’s civil war. A  young Alawite woman described the bombing of her apartment building in Damascus and death of her fiancée. She rolled up her sleeve to show me burn scars up and down her arm, then broke down in tears. Syrians on all sides are embittered by tragedy and suffering. Reconciliation is unlikely. Dreams for democracy have been dashed. At best, peacebuilding will be an uncertain generational endeavor with Assad in power. Russia, Iran, and Turkey are emboldened, and the United States, as a force for good, is diminished. Despite the false horizon of short-term gains, there are no winners in Syria’s most uncivil war.

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Notes Preface 1 William J. Burns, The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal (New York, Penguin Random House, 2019), 323.

1  Hama Rules 1 Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs; Hama Rules,” New York Times, September 21, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/opinion/foreign-affairs-hama-rules.html (accessed September 5, 2019). 2 Benjamin Orbach and David Schenker, “The Rise of Bashar al-Asad,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 5, 1999, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ policy-analysis/view/the-rise-of-bashar-al-asad (accessed June 17, 2019). 3 Yasmina Allouche, “The 1982 Hama Massacre,” Middle East Monitor, February 12, 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180212-the-1982-hama-massacre/ (accessed June 14, 2019). 4 Hosam al-Jablawi, “Re-Enginering the Population: The Syrian Regime’s Policy to Eliminate the Opposition,” Atlantic Council, September 12, 2016, https://www. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/re-engineering-the-population-the-syrianregime-s-policy-to-eliminate-the-opposition (accessed June 17, 2019). 5 Rustum Mahmoud and Stephan Rosiny, “Opposition Visions for Preserving Syria’s Ethnic-Sectarian Mosaic,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, October 25, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2016.1246241 (accessed June 17, 2019). 6 “Profile: Syrian City of Hama,” BBC, April 27, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-17868325 (accessed June 17, 2019). 7 Dara Conduit, “The Patterns of Syrian Uprising: Comparing Hama in 1980–1982 to Homs 2011,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, May 13, 2016, https://doi.org/1 0.1080/13530194.2016.1182421 (accessed June 17, 2019). 8 Ibid. 9 Seth Kaplan, “Syria’s Ethnic and Religious Divisions,” Fragile States, February 20, 2012, https://www.fragilestates.org/2012/02/20/syrias-ethnic-and-religious-divides/ (accessed June 30, 2019). 10 “Profile: Syrian City of Hama.” 11 Yehuda U. Blanga, “The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian Civil War,” Middle East Policy Council, Fall 2017, https://www.mepc.org/journal/role-muslimbrotherhood-syrian-civil-war (accessed June 14, 2019). 12 Ibid. 13 Borzou Daragahi, “Hama in Regime’s Sights for Long,” Gulf News, August 15, 2011, https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/hama-in-regimes-sights-for-long-1.851574 (accessed June 14, 2019).

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14 Thomas Collelo, ed., Syria: A Country Study (Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987), http://countrystudies.us/syria/18.htm (accessed June 14, 2019). 15 Pierre Tristam, “What Are Hama Rules,” ThoughtCo, May 15, 2017 https://www. thoughtco.com/what-are-hama-rules-2353561 (accessed July 12, 2019). 16 Blanga, “The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian Civil War.” 17 Pierre Tristam, “What Are Hama Rules.” 18 Allouche, “The 1982 Hama Massacre.” 19 Blanga, “The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian Civil War.” Middle East Policy, vol. XXN, no. 3, Fall 2017. 20 Ibid. 21 William R. Polk, “Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil War to Post-Assad,” The Atlantic, December 10, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2013/12/understanding-syria-from-pre-civil-war-to-post-assad/281989/ (accessed July 12, 2019). 22 Jason Rodrigues, “1982: Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad Crushes Rebellion in Hama,” The Guardian, August 1, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/fromthe-archive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-syria-massacre-1982-archive (accessed June 14, 2019). 23 Basma Atassi, “Breaking the Silence over Hama Atrocities,” Al Jazeera, February 2, 2012, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/02/20122232155715210.html (accessed June 14, 2019). 24 Allouche, “The 1982 Hama Massacre.” 25 “Syria: 30 years on, Hama Survivors Recount the Horror,” Amnesty International, February 28, 2012, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/02/syria-yearshama-survivors-recount-horror/ (accessed June 14, 2019). 26 Atassi, “Breaking the Silence over Hama Atrocities.” 27 “Syria: 30 years on, Hama Survivors Recount the Horror.” 28 Blanga, “The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian Civil War.” 29 Heiko Wimmen, “Syria’s Path from Civic Uprising to Civil War,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 22, 2016, https://carnegieendowment. org/2016/11/22/syria-s-path-from-civic-uprising-to-civil-war-pub-66171 (accessed July 12, 2019). 30 Alasdair Drysdale, “The Assad Regime and Its Troubles,” MERIP Reports, January 11, 1982, 10.2307/3012278 (accessed July 23, 2019). 31 Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Doubleday, 1990). 32 Ben Taub, “The Assad Files,” New Yorker, April 18, 2016, https://www.newyorker. com/magazine/2016/04/18/bashar-al-assads-war-crimes-exposed (accessed June 25, 2019). 33 Orbach and Schenker, “The Rise of Bashar al-Asad.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 5, 1999, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ the-rise-of-bashar-al-asad (accessed March 9, 2020). 34 Esther Pan, “Lebanon: Election Results,” Council on Foreign Relations, 21 June 2005, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/lebanon-election-results (accessed 12 July 2019). 35 Orbach and Schenker, “The Rise of Bashar al-Asad.” 36 Ibid. 37 Esther Pan, Syria, Iran and the Middle East Conflict, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, July 18, 2006, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/syria-iran-andmideast-conflict (accessed March 13, 2020).

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2  The Damascus Spring 1 Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Harsh Sentences for Democratic Opposition.” October 30, 2008. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/10/30/syria-harsh-sentences-democraticopposition# (accessed March 9, 2020). 2 “Syria’s Decade of Repression,” Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2010, https://www.hrw. org/news/2010/07/16/syrias-decade-repression (accessed July 15, 2019). 3 Lara Keller, “Assad Is not Syria: Part 3: 2000 to 2010 a Wasted Decade of Chances to Avoid Disaster,” PARTNERship Blog, May 18, 2017, https://partnershipblog.wordpress. com/2017/02/10/assad-is-not-syria-part-3-2000-to-2010-wasting-chances-to-avoiddisaster/ (accessed July 15, 2019). 4 Human Rights Watch, “A Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s First Ten Years in Power,” Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2010, https://www. hrw.org/report/2010/07/16/wasted-decade/human-rights-syria-during-bashar-alasads-first-ten-years-power (accessed July 15, 2019). 5 Line Khatib, Islamic Revivalism in Syria: The Rise and Fall of Ba'thist Secularism. London: Routledge, 2011. 6 Rossanna Carne, Syria, the Power and the Revolt: From the Arab Springs to the state of terror of ISIS (Florence: Enigma Edizioni, 2016). 7 Human Rights Watch, “A Wasted Decade.” 8 “President Assad 2000 Inauguration Speech,” July 17, 2000, http://www.presidentassad. net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=438:president-assad-2000inauguration-speech-july-17-2000-3&catid=106&Itemid=496 (accessed July 17, 2019). 9 “The Syrian Woman,” n.d., http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=190:the-syrian-woman&catid=145&Itemid=470 (accessed July 15, 2019). 10 “The Damascus Spring,” Carnegie Middle East Center Diwan, April 1, 2012, https:// carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48516?lang=en (accessed July 15, 2019). 11 Farid N. Ghadry, “Syrian Reform: What Lies Beneath,” Middle East Forum, Winter 2005, 61–70, https://www.meforum.org/683/syrian-reform-what-lies-beneath (accessed July 15, 2019). 12 Ibid. 13 “The Damascus Spring.” 14 Ibid. 15 “Founders and Board Members,” The Day After, January 19, 2019, http://www.tda-sy. org/en/content/223/272/about-tda/board-of-directors (accessed July 13, 2019). 16 Ghadry, “Syrian Reform: What Lies Beneath.” 17 Ben Taub, “The Assad Files,” New Yorker, April 18, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2016/04/18/bashar-al-assads-war-crimes-exposed (accessed June 25, 2019). 18 Ghadry, “Syrian Reform: What Lies Beneath.” 19 “The Damascus Declaration,” Carnegie Middle East Center Diwan, March 1, 2012, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48514?lang=en (accessed July 15, 2019). 20 Katherine Zoepf, “Syria’s Opposition United behind a Call for Democratic Changes,” New York Times, October 20, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/20/world/ middleeast/syrias-opposition-unites-behind-a-call-for-democratic.html (accessed July 15, 2019). 21 Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Harsh Sentences for Democratic Opposition,” Refworld, October 30, 2008, https://www.refworld.org/publisher,HRW,,,490ac3f3c,0.html (accessed July 10, 2019).

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22 Ibid. 23 “The Syrian Constitution—1973–2012,” Carnegie Middle East Center Diwan, December 5, 2012, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en (accessed July 15, 2019). 24 Human Rights Watch, “A Wasted Decade.” 25 Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Harsh Sentences for Democratic Opposition.” October 30, 2008. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/10/30/syria-harsh-sentences-democraticopposition# (accessed March 9, 2020). 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Susan Linfield, “Syria’s Torture Photos: Witness to Atrocity,” New York Review of Books, February 2, 2019, https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/02/09/syrias-torturephotos-witness-to-atrocity/ (accessed August 8, 2019). 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Edith M. Lederer, “Over 100,000 People Have Been Detained or Gone Missing in Syria, U.N. Estimates,” Time, August 7, 2019, https://www.google.com/ search?q=Edith+M.+Lederer,+%E2%80%9COver+100,000+People+Have+ Been+Detained+or+Gone+Missing+in+Syria,+U.N.+Estimates,%E2%80%9D+ Time,+7+August+7,+2019&tbm=isch&source=univ&client=firefox-b-1-d&sa =X&ved=2ahUKEwilsv-vuojoAhXmm-AKHSWgDUsQsAR6BAgBEAE&biw= 1536&bih=722 (accessed August 8, 2019). 40 Interview by the author with Ambassador Robert Ford, August 2, 2019. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Interview by the author with Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, February 1999. 50 “Syria Intelligence & Security Agencies,” Global Security, n.d., https://www. globalsecurity.org/intell/world/syria/intro.htm (accessed June 26, 2019). 51 Ibid. 52 “Treasury Designates Two Syrian Officials,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 15, 2019, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp60. aspx (accessed July 17, 2019). 53 “Corrigendum to Council Implementing Decision 2013/185/CFSP of 22 April 2013 implementing Council Decision 2012/739/CFSP concerning restrictive measures

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against Syria,” Official Journal of the European Union, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_ impl/2013/185/corrigendum/2013-05-09/oj (accessed July 15, 2019). 54 Julian Borger, “Smuggled Syrian Documents Enough to Indict Bashar al-Assad, Say Investigators,” The Guardian, May 12, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2015/may/12/smuggled-syrian-documents-indict-assad-investigators (accessed July 17, 2019). 55 Kim Sengupta and Richard Hall, “Architects of Regime’s Brutal Crackdown Pay the Ultimate Price,” Independent, July 19, 2012, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ world/middle-east/architects-of-regimes-brutal-crackdown-pay-the-ultimateprice-7957144.html (accessed July 28, 2019). 56 “Syrian Purges Pave Way for Bashar,” Stratfor Worldview, February 25, 2000, https:// worldview.stratfor.com/article/syrian-purges-pave-way-bashar (accessed July 15, 2019). 57 Taub, “The Assad Files.” 58 United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – State Sponsors of Terrorism: Syria,” Refworld, September 19, 2018, https://www.refworld. org/docid/5bcf1f6dc.html (accessed July 14, 2019). 59 Ian Black, “Democracy Damascus Style: Assad the Only Choice in Referendum,” The Guardian, May 27, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/28/syria. ianblack (accessed July 15, 2019). 60 Ibid. 61 “White House Says Syrian Elections a ‘Meaningless Exercise,’ ” Voice of America, November 1, 2009, https://www.voanews.com/archive/white-house-says-syrianelections-meaningless-exercise (accessed July 15, 2019). 62 Sarah Burke, “How Syria’s ‘Geeky’ President Assad Went from Doctor to Dictator,” NBC News, October 30, 2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/syria-peacetalks/how-syrias-geeky-president-assad-went-doctor-dictator-n453871 (accessed July15, 2019).

3  Cradle of the Revolution 1 Primoz Manfreda, “10 Factors That Led to the Syrian Uprising,” ThoughtCo, https:// www.thoughtco.com/top-10-reasons-for-the-uprising-in-syria-2353571 (accessed July 14, 2019). 2 Ben Taub, “The Assad Files,” New Yorker, April 18, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2016/04/18/bashar-al-assads-war-crimes-exposed (accessed June 25, 2019). 3 Global Post, “How Schoolboys Began the Syrian Revolution,” CBS News, April 26, 2011, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-schoolboys-began-the-syrian-revolution/ (accessed July 17, 2019). 4 Andrew Tabler, “How Syria Came to This,” The Atlantic, April 15, 2018, https://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/syria-chemical-weapons/558065/ (accessed July 17, 2019). 5 Katherine March and Martin Chulov, “Assad Blames Conspirators for Syrian Protests,” The Guardian, March 30, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/30/ syrian-protests-assad-blames-conspirators (accessed July 17, 2019). 6 Ibid. 7 Global Post, “Syria: How It All Began,” Public Radio International, April 23, 2011, https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-04-23/syria-how-it-all-began (accessed July 16, 2019).

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8 Ibid. 9 “Authorizing the Limited and Specified Use of the United States Armed Forces against Syria—Motion to Proceed,” Congressional Record, September 10, 2013, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2013-09-10/html/CREC-2013-09-10-pt1-PgS6307-3. htm (accessed July 17, 2019). 10 Ibid. 11 Patrick Wintour, “Syrian Forces’ Push into East Daraa ‘Could Spark Humanitarian Crisis,’ ” The Guardian June 27, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/ jun/27/syria-assad-forces-eastern-daraa-humanitarian-crisis-un (accessed March 9, 2020). 12 Global Post, “Syria: How It All Began.” 13 Interview by the author with Ambassador Robert Ford, August 2, 2019. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Bassem Mroue, “Syrian Rights Group Says 42 Killed Nationwide.” Associated Press, April 29, 2011, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-syrian-rights-groupsays-42-killed-nationwide-2011apr29-story.html (accessed March 31, 2020). 39 Phil Sands, “Population Surge in Syria Hampers Country’s Progress,” The National, March 6, 2011, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/population-surge-in-syriahampers-country-s-progress-1.448497 (accessed July 17, 2019). 40 Manfreda, “10 Factors That Led to the Syrian Uprising.” 41 Ibid. 42 “Syria’s Civil War Explained from the Beginning,” Al Jazeera, April 14, 2018, https:// www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html (accessed July 14, 2019).

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43 Ian Sample, “Global Warming Contributed to Syria’s 2011 Uprising, Scientists Claim,” The Guardian, March 2, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/02/ global-warming-worsened-syria-drought-study (accessed July 14, 2019). 44 Coral Davenport, “Pentagon Signals Security Risks of Climate Change,” New York Times, October 13, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/us/pentagon-saysglobal-warming-presents-immediate-security-threat.html (accessed July 17, 2019). 45 W. N. Adger, J. M. Pulhin, J. Barnett, G. D. Dabelko, G. K. Hovelsrud, M. Levy, Ú. Oswald Spring, and C. H. Vogel, “Human Security,” in C. B. Field et al., eds., Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap12_FINAL. pdf (accessed July 17, 2019). 46 “Syria’s Civil War Linked, in Part, to Global Warming,” Al Jazeera America, March 2, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/3/2/syrias-civil-war-linked-partlyto-drought-global-warming.html (accessed July 14, 2019). 47 “Assad Blames Unrest on Foreign Plot in TV Speech,” France24, March 6, 2012, https://www.france24.com/en/20120603-assad-blames-foreign-plot-unrest-speechparliament-televised-syria-un-houla (accessed July 17, 2019). 48 March and Chulov, “Assad Blames Conspirators for Syrian Protests.” 49 “Bashar al-Assad Speech at Syrian People’s Assembly,” Voltaire Network, March 30, 2011, https://www.voltairenet.org/article169245.html (accessed July 23, 2019). 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 “Syria: Speech by Bashar al-Assad,” Al-Bab, March 30, 2011, https://al-bab.com/ albab-orig/albab/arab/docs/syria/bashar_assad_speech_110330.htm (accessed July 17, 2019). 53 Ibid. 54 March and Chulov, “Assad Blames Conspirators for Syrian Protests.” 55 Ibid. 56 “Syrian people outraged over government shootings in Daraa” The Guardian, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/24/syria-shootings-daraa-government (accessed March 31, 2020). 57 “Syria: The Story of the Conflict,” BBC, March 11, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-26116868 (accessed July 16, 2019). 58 Taub, “The Assad Files.” 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Aron Lund, “The Death of Rustum Ghazaleh,” Carnegie Middle East Center Diwan, April 30, 2015, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/59953 (accessed July 17, 2019). 65 Interview by the author with Bassem Barabandi, July 27, 2019. 66 Ibid. 67 Interview by the author with Ambassador Robert Ford, August 2, 2019. 68 Ian Black and Martin Chulov, “Syria Crisis: Three of Assad’s Top Chiefs Killed in Rebel Bbomb Strike,” The Guardian, July 18, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2012/jul/18/syria-rebels-kill-elite-damascus (accessed July 17, 2019).

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4  The Free Syrian Army 1 Interview by the author with Bassam Barabandi, former political counselor at Syria’s embassy in Washington, DC, September 5, 2019. 2 This chapter draws on interviews with a senior State Department official who asked not to be identified. 3 Charles Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand,” Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, November 2016, https://www. brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/iwr_20161123_free_syrian_army1.pdf (accessed July 18, 2019). 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Basma Atassi, “Free Syrian Army Grows in Influence,” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/11/20111116154829885782.html (accessed July 19, 2019). 8 Ibid. 9 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 10 Rania Abouzeid, “The Soldier Who Gave Up on Assad to Protect Syria’s People,” Time, June 13, 2011, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2077348,00.html (accessed July 18, 2019). 11 Project on Violent Conflict, “Free Syrian Army,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, April 2015, https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/ narratives/free-syrian-army (accessed July 18, 2019). 12 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 13 Atassi, “Free Syrian Army Grows in Influence.” 14 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Liam Stack, “In Slap at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters,” New York Times, October 27, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/world/europe/turkey-issheltering-antigovernment-syrian-militia.html?_r=0 (accessed July 18, 2019). 18 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 19 Abouzeid, “The Soldier Who Gave Up on Assad to Protect Syria’s People.” 20 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 21 Atassi, “Free Syrian Army Grows in Influence.” 22 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 23 Joseph Holliday, “Syria’s Armed Opposition,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/syrias-armed-opposition (accessed September 23, 2019). 24 Atassi, “Free Syrian Army Grows in Influence.” 25 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 26 Stack, “In Slap at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters.” 27 Mariya Petkova, “Syria’s ‘Moderate Rebels’ to Form a New Alliance,” Al Jazeera, April 6, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/syria-moderate-rebelsform-alliance-170403064144285.html (accessed July 18, 2019). 28 Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, “Islamism, Salafism, and Jihadism: A Primer,” Brookings Institution, July 15, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/ islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/ (accessed July 22, 2019).

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29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Joas Wagemakers, “Salafism or the Quest for Purity,” Oasis International Foundation, August 1, 2018, https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/what-is-salafism-quest-for-purity (accessed July 22, 2019). 34 Hamid and Dar, “Islamism, Salafism, and Jihadism: A Primer.” 35 Ibid. 36 Wagemakers, “Salafism or the Quest for Purity.” 37 Interview by the author with Ambassador Bashar Jafaari, Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations, August 21, 2019. 38 “President Bashar al-Assad Addounia TV Interview, August 29, 2012,” Syria Times, October 3, 2012, http://syriatimes.sy/index.php/interviews/174-president-bashar-alassad-s-addounia-tv-interview-august-29–2012 (accessed July 22, 2019). 39 Presentation by Charles Lister, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute at the conference, “Post-ISIS,” George Mason University, September 6, 2019. 40 Elizabeth O’Bagy, “The Free Syrian Army,” Institute for the Study of War, 2012, http:// www.understandingwar.org/report/free-syrian-army (accessed July 22, 2019). 41 Presentation by Charles Lister, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute at the conference, “Post-ISIS,” George Mason University, September 6, 2019. 42 “Ahrar al-Sham,” Stanford University, August 5, 2017, https://web.stanford.edu/group/ mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/523 (accessed July 21, 2019). 43 “Syria War: Who Are Jabhat Fateh al-Sham,” BBC, August 1, 2016, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-middle-east-36924000 (accessed July 22, 2019). 44 Tom Perry, Suleiman Al-Khalidi, John Walcott, “Exclusive: CIA-Backed Aid for Syrian Rebels Frozen after Islamist Attack—Sources,” Reuters, February 21, 2017, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels/exclusive-cia-backed-aid-for-syrianrebels-frozen-after-islamist-attack-sources-idUSKBN1601BD (accessed July 18, 2019). 45 Ibid. 46 Fabrice Balanche, “Status of the Syrian Rebellion: Numbers, Ideologies, and Prospects,” Washington Institute, November 22, 2016, https://www. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/status-of-the-syrian-rebellion-numbersideologies-and-prospects (accessed July 21, 2019). 47 Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Jihad in Syria,” Middle East Security Report 6, Institute for the Study of War, September 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ Jihad-In-Syria-17SEPT.pdf (accessed July 18, 2019). 48 Ibid. 49 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 50 Ibid. 51 Stack, “In Slap at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters.” 52 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 53 Laura Rozen, “US Authorizes Financial Support for the Free Syrian Army,” Al-Monitor, July 27, 2012, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/ al-monitor/us-authorizes-financial-support.html (accessed July 18, 2019). 54 Free Syrian Army, “Proclamation of Principles,” Al-Monitor, n.d., http://backchannel. al-monitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/FSAProclimationofPrinciples-Logo.pdf (accessed August 7, 2019). 55 O’Bagy, “The Free Syrian Army.”

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56 Perry, Al-Khalidi, Walcott, “Exclusive: CIA-Backed Aid for Syrian Rebels Frozen after Islamist Attack—Sources.” 57 Emma Graham-Harrison and Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Gulf States Plan Military Response as Putin Raises the Stakes in Syria,” The Guardian, October 3, 2015, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/04/russia-bombing-syria-affects-ousting-ofassad (accessed July 22, 2019). 58 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 59 Interview by the author with Bassam Barabandi, former political counselor at Syria’s embassy in Washington, DC, September 5, 2019. 60 Ian Black, “Syria Crisis: Where Do the Major Countries Stand?,” The Guardian, September 29, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/29/syria-crisiswhere-do-the-major-countries-stand (accessed July22, 2019). 61 Tzvi Joffre, “Syrian MP: Israel, Jordan behind Rebel Attacks on Syrian Army,” JPost, July 22, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Syrian-MP-Israel-Jordan-behindrebel-attacks-on-Syrian-army-596420 (accessed July 22, 2019). 62 Ian Black, “US Freezing of Syrian Rebel Training Scheme Shows Western Disarray,” The Guardian, October 9, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/ us-freezing-of-syrian-rebel-training-scheme-shows-western-disarray (accessed August 7, 2019). 63 Jessica Elgot, “Britain to Axe Funding for Scheme Supporting Syrian Opposition,” The Guardian, August 19, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/20/britainto-stop-funding-free-syria-opposition-as-assad-closes-in (accessed July 22, 2019). 64 Martin Chulov, “France Funding Syrian Rebels in New Push to Oust Assad,” The Guardian, December 7, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/07/ france-funding-syrian-rebels (accessed July 22, 2019). 65 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 66 Jamie Doran, “Syria: Arming the Rebels,” PBS Frontline, May 27, 2014, https://www. pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/syria-arming-the-rebels/transcript/ (accessed July 19, 2019). 67 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 68 “Saudi Arabia and Qatar Funding Syrian Rebels,” Reuters, June 23, 2012, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-saudi/saudi-arabia-and-qatar-funding-syrianrebels-idUSBRE85M07820120623 (accessed July 22, 2019). 69 Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand.” 70 Ibid. 71 Tom O’Connor, “U.S. Military Battles Syrian Rebels Once Supported by CIA, Now Backed by Turkey,” Newsweek, August 29, 2017, https://www.newsweek.com/ us-military-battles-syria-rebels-supported-cia-backed-turkey-656617 (accessed July 19, 2019).

5  Security Assistance 1 Scott Wilson and Joby Warrick, “Assad Must Go, Obama Says,” Washington Post, August 18, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/assad-must-go-obamasays/2011/08/18/gIQAelheOJ_story.html?utm_term=.c804ee2e670f (accessed July 27, 2019). 2 Ibid.

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3 Steven Lee Myers and Anthony Shadid, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Syrian Leader and 6 Aides,” New York Times, May 18, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/world/ middleeast/19syria.html (accessed July 25, 2019). 4 Interview with the author, July 27, 2019. 5 Ben Rhodes, “Inside the White House during the Syrian ‘Red Line’ Crisis,” The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/inside-thewhite-house-during-the-syrian-red-line-crisis/561887/ (accessed July 25, 2019). 6 Interview by the author with Ambassador Robert Ford, August 2, 2019. 7 Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Jihad in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jihad-In-Syria-17SEPT.pdf (accessed July 18, 2019). 8 William J. Burns, The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for its Renewal (New York, Penguin Random House, 2019), 327. 9 Interview with a senior State Department official who asked not to be identified. 10 Burns, The Back Channel, 327. 11 Interview with Frederic C. Hof by the author, July 27, 2019. 12 Ibid. 13 Salma Abdelaziz and Holly Yan, “Video: Syrian Rebel Cuts Out Soldier’s Heart, Eats It,” CNN, May 15, 2013, https://www.cnn.com/2013/05/15/world/meast/syria-eatenheart/index.html (accessed July 28, 2019). 14 Anne Barnard and Eric Schmitt, “As Foreign Fights Flood Syria, Fears of a New Extremist Haven,” New York Times, August 8, 2013, https://www.nytimes. com/2013/08/09/world/middleeast/as-foreign-fighters-flood-syria-fears-of-a-newextremist-haven.html?_r=0 (accessed December 9, 2019). 15 Burns, The Back Channel, 323. 16 Rhodes, “Inside the White House during the Syrian ‘Red Line’ Crisis.” 17 Ibid. 18 Wesley Dockery, “Which Rebel Groups Are Fighting in Syria’s Eastern Ghouta?,” DW, February 20, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/which-rebel-groups-are-fighting-insyrias-eastern-ghouta/a-42663501-0 (accessed July 25, 2019). 19 “More Than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, June 11, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-119611e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html (accessed July 25, 2019). 20 Interview by the author will Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns, August 13, 2019. 21 Burns, The Back Channel, 328. 22 Rhodes, “Inside the White House during the Syrian ‘Red Line’ Crisis.” 23 Yonette Joseph and Christina Caron, “Burning Eyes, Foaming Mouths: Years of Suspected Chemical Attacks in Syria,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/04/08/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attacks-assad.html (accessed July 23, 2019). 24 “Syria Crisis: UN Report Confirms Sarin ‘War Crime,’ ” BBC, September 16, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24113553 (accessed July 24, 2019). 25 Interview with Frederic C. Hof by the author, July 27, 2019. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Top U.N. Rights Official Links Assad to Crimes in Syria,” New York Times, December 2, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/03/world/

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middleeast/top-un-rights-official-links-assad-to-crimes-in-syria.html (accessed July 25, 2019). 29 Interview by the author with Bassam Barabandi, former Political Counsellor, Syrian Embassy to the United States, September 5, 2019. 30 Interview by the author will Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns, August 13, 2019. 31 Ibid. 32 Burns, The Back Channel, 331. 33 Bethan McKernan, “Ghouta Chemical Attack: Four Years Later, the World Looks on as Syria’s People Continue to Be Gassed,” August 20, 2017, https://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ghouta-chemical-attack-syria-assad-anniversary-nojustice-for-survivors-a7903506.html (accessed July 24, 2019). 34 Interview by the author with William J. Burns, Deputy Secretary of State, August 13, 2019. 35 Interview by the author with an anonymous US official, September 5, 2019. 36 Interview by the author with William J. Burns, Deputy Secretary of State, August 13, 2019. 37 Ibid. 38 Charles Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand,” Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, November 2016, https://www. brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/iwr_20161123_free_syrian_army1.pdf (accessed July 18, 2019). 39 Tara Mckelvey, “Arming Syrian Rebels: Where the US Went Wrong,” BBC, October 10, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33997408 (accessed July 22, 2019). 40 Interview with Frederic C. Hof by the author, July 27, 2019. 41 Mckelvey, “Arming Syrian Rebels.” 42 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 12, 2002, https://archive.defense.gov/ Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636. 43 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “The Assad Regime Has Dropped Nearly 70,000 Barrel Bombs on Syria - The Ruthless Bombing,” Relief Web, December 25, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/assad-regimehas-dropped-nearly-70000-barrel-bombs-syria-ruthless (accessed March 31, 2020). 44 Michael R. Gordon and Mark Landler, “Senate Hearing Draws Out a Rift in U.S. Policy on Syria,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/us/politics/ panetta-speaks-to-senate-panel-on-benghazi-attack.html (accessed July 25, 2019). 45 Ibid. 46 Mckelvey, “Arming Syrian Rebels: Where the US Went Wrong.” 47 Ibid. 48 Laura Rozen, “US Authorizes Financial Support for the Free Syrian Army,” Al-Monitor, July 27, 2012, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/ al-monitor/us-authorizes-financial-support.html (accessed July 18, 2019). 49 Spencer Ackerman, “Obama: Murder of James Foley ‘Shocks the Conscience of the Entire World,” The Guardian, August 20, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/aug/20/james-foley-isis-video-authenticated-us-government (accessed July 26, 2019). 50 Glenn A. Fine, “Operation Inherent Resolve: And Other Overseas Contingency Operations,” United States Congress, September 2018, https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/ default/files/2018-11/lig-oco-oir-0918.pdf (accessed July 26, 2019).

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51 The Associated Press, “US-Led Coalition: 1,257 Civilians Killed in Airstrikes against ISIS,” Air Force Times, March 28, 2019, https://www.airforcetimes.com/ flashpoints/2019/03/29/us-led-coalition-1257-civilians-killed-in-airstrikes-againstisis/ (accessed July 26, 2019). 52 “Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State,” Wilson Center, April 30, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-theislamic-state (accessed July 22, 2019). 53 Andrew C. McCarthy, “Hillary’s Leaked Memo Accuses Saudi Arabia and Qatar of Supporting Terror Groups,” National Review, October 12, 2016, https://www. nationalreview.com/2016/10/wikileaks-hillary-clinton-isis-memo-plan-arm-syrianrebels/ (accessed July 2, 2019). 54 David L. Phillips, “Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey Links,” docs.house.gov, April 5, 2017, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20170405/105842/HHRG-115-FA14Wstate-PhillipsD-20170405-SD001.pdf (accessed December 4, 2019). 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Daniel Marans, “Hillary Clinton Goes All-In On Syria No-Fly Zone,” HuffPost, October 20, 2016, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hillary-clinton-syria-no-flyzone-third-debate_n_58084280e4b0180a36e91a53?guccounter=1&guce_referrer= aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig= AQAAABpko6gTs1iaDGMM7XHKGV0e33x_lFj9M9Sa8q3IZg-eYCeTZft8PbU– ebPsjGhES5dx6xGr120C_llnP6UTAMJb1vXJXk2scvwtUKgo1JRm2zQHbPqlMBjeBy IDrFSlplr5ZONgljMmDe0iDKI5gkmcibyMnSTrPNiZ2FtNt3F (accessed July 22, 2019). 58 Interview by the author with an anonymous US official, September 5, 2019. 59 Interview by the author with Bassam Barabandi, former political counselor at Syria’s Embassy to the United States, September 5, 2019. 60 Interview by the author with Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns, August 13, 2019. 61 Tzvi Joffre, “Syrian MP: Israel, Jordan behind Rebel Attacks on Syrian Army,” Jerusalem Post, July 22, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Syrian-MP-IsraelJordan-behind-rebel-attacks-on-Syrian-army-596420 (accessed July 21, 2019). 62 Ian Black, “US Freezing of Syrian Rebel Training Scheme Shows Western Disarray,” The Guardian, October 9, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/ us-freezing-of-syrian-rebel-training-scheme-shows-western-disarray (accessed August 7, 2019). 63 David A. Graham, “Only ‘4 or 5’ U.S.-Trained Fighters Remain in Fight against ISIS,” The Atlantic, September 16, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/09/only-4or-5-us-trained-fighters-remain-in-fight-against-isis/405640/ (accessed July 26, 2019). 64 “User Clip: Just ‘4 or 5’ U.S. Trained Syrians Fighting Islamic State,” C-SPAN, September 16, 2015, https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4551254/4-5-us-trained-syriansfighting-islamic-state (accessed March 26, 2019). 65 Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman, and Michael S. Schmidt, “Behind the Sudden Death of a $1 Billion Secret CIA War in Syria,” New York Times, August 2, 2017, https://www. nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train-trump.html (accessed August 5, 2019). 66 Roy Gutman, “What Really Happened to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?” McClatchy DC Bureau, December 21, 2015, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/ news/nation-world/world/article50919765.html (accessed July 22, 2019).

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67 Ibid. 68 Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt, “Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS,” New York Times, October 9, 2015, https:// www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-statesyria.html (accessed July 29, 2019). 69 Gutman, “What Really Happened to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?.” 70 Read more here: Gutman, “What Really Happened to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?.” 71 Natasha Bertrand, “An ‘Embarrassing’ Break: Dozens of State Department Officials Just Revolted against Obama’s Syria Policy,” Business Insider, June 16, 2016, https:// www.businessinsider.com/state-department-officials-call-for-airstrikes-onassad-2016-6 (accessed July 29, 2019). 72 Interview with the author, July 27, 2019. 73 Bertrand, “An ‘Embarrassing’ Break: Dozens of State Department Officials Just Revolted against Obama’s Syria Policy.” 74 “Secretary of Defense Speech,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 27, 2013, https://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1755 (accessed July 29, 2019). 75 Dan de Luce, “Hagel: The White House Tried to ‘Destroy’ Me,” Foreign Policy, December 18, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/18/hagel-the-white-housetried-to-destroy-me/ (accessed July 29, 2019). 76 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights believed the real figure to be much higher, as many deaths are not documented sufficiently and number of rebels are difficult to pinpoint. Erika Solomon, “Syria Death Toll Hits Nearly 126,000: Monitoring Group,” Reuters, December 2, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-toll/syriadeath-toll-hits-nearly-126000-monitoring-group-idUSBRE9B10ES20131202 (accessed July 29, 2019). 77 Amir Taheri, “Has the Time Come for Military Intervention in Syria?” Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, August 9, 2013, https://doi.org/10.10 80/10803920.2013.822756 (accessed July 29, 2019).

6  Displacement Crisis 1 United Nations, “Syria Conflict at 5 Years: The Biggest Refugee and Displacement Crisis of Our Time Demands a Huge Surge in Solidarity,” UNHCR, March 15, 2016, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2016/3/56e6e3249/syria-conflict-5-yearsbiggest-refugee-displacement-crisis-time-demands.html (accessed July 24, 2019). 2 Interview with the author, Sarajevo, February 1994. 3 UN Data, “Total Persons of Concern,” Operational Portal Refugee Situations, July 4, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria (accessed July 30, 2019). 4 Rebecca Ratcliffe, “More Than 70 Million People Now Fleeing Conflict and Oppression Worldwide,” The Guardian, June 19, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/ global-development/2019/jun/19/more-than-70-million-people-fleeing-conflictoppression-worldwide (accessed July 24, 2019). 5 Annie Sparrow, “How UN Humanitarian Aid Has Propped up Assad,” Foreign Affairs, September 20, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2018-09-20/howun-humanitarian-aid-has-propped-assad (accessed July 29, 2019).

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6 United Nations, “Syria Conflict at 5 Years: The Biggest Refugee and Displacement Crisis of Our Time Demands a Huge Surge in Solidarity,” UNHCR, March 15, 2016, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2016/3/56e6e3249/syria-conflict-5-yearsbiggest-refugee-displacement-crisis-time-demands.html (accessed July 24, 2019). 7 United Nations, “Deliver Humanitarian Aid,” United Nations, n.d., https://www. un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/deliver-humanitarian-aid/index.html (accessed July 25, 2019). 8 “Trump Refugee Cuts Threaten Cornerstone of Global Order,” New York Times, September 12, 2019, p. A13. 9 Syria Justice and Accountability Center, “What Kofi Annan Understood about Syria,” Syria Justice and Accountability Center, August 22, 2018, https://syriaaccountability. org/updates/2018/08/22/what-kofi-annan-understood-about-syria/ (accessed July 29, 2019). 10 “Al-Jaafari Calls for Stopping the Politicization of Humanitarian Affair in Syria,” Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, December 14, 2018, https://www.un.int/syria/statements_speeches/al-jaafari-calls-stoppingpoliticization-humanitarian-affair-syria (accessed July 29, 2019). 11 Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” United Nations Secretary-General, September 18, 1999, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/1999-09-18/twoconcepts-sovereignty (accessed July 27, 2019). 12 Patrick Wintour, “Billions Pledged to Help Refugees inside Syria and on Borders,” The Guardian, March 14, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/14/ billions-pledged-to-help-refugees-inside-syria-and-on-borders (accessed July 29, 2019). 13 United Nations, “Syria Conflict at 5 Years: The Biggest Refugee and Displacement Crisis of Our Time Demands a Huge Surge in Solidarity,” UNHCR, March 15, 2016, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2016/3/56e6e3249/syria-conflict-5-yearsbiggest-refugee-displacement-crisis-time-demands.html (accessed July 24, 2019). 14 “Total Persons of Concern,” UNHCR, July 4, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/ situations/syria (accessed July 24, 2019). 15 UNHCR, “Evaluation of UNHCR’s Emergency Response to the Influx of Syrian Refugees into Turkey,” UNHCR, March 2016, https://www.unhcr.org/58a6bc1d7.pdf (accessed July 29, 2019). 16 Amnesty International USA, “Activist Toolkit for People on the Move: Syrian Refugee Crisis,” Amnesty International, November 2015, https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/ RefugeeToolkit_Nov2015.pdf (accessed July 29, 2019). 17 Mustafa Gurbuz, “Turkey’s Nativist Turn against Syrian Refugees and Other Arabs,” Arab Center Washington DC, July 23, 2019, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/ turkeys-nativist-turn-against-syrian-refugees-and-other-arabs/ (accessed July 24, 2019). 18 Ibid. 19 “Erdoğan Is Right: There Is Something Shameful about the Refugee Crisis,” Hurriyet Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/burak-bekdil/erdogan-isright-there-is-something-shameful-about-the-refugee-crisis-103736 (accessed July 24, 2019). 20 Raf Casert and Lorne Cook, “EU, Turkey Hope to Get Breakthrough Migrant Deal by March 17,” Daily Herald, March 7, 2016, https://www.dailyherald.com/ article/20160307/news/303079953 (accessed July 30, 2019).

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21 David L. Phillips, “Refoulement Violates International Law,” HuffPost, March 10, 2017, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/refoulement-violates-inte_b_9423778 (accessed July 24, 2019). 22 UNHCR, “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” July 1951, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10 (accessed July 30, 2019). 23 “UN Refugee Agency ‘Concerned’ about Proposed EU Deal to Send Migrants Back to Turkey,” UN News, March 8, 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/03/523792un-refugee-agency-concerned-about-proposed-eu-deal-send-migrants-back-turkey (accessed 30, July 2019). 24 Phillips, “Refoulement Violates International Law.” 25 Patrick Kingsley. “Migration to Greece Rises, and Erdogan Threatens ‘to Open the Gates,” New York Times, September 12, 2019, p. A12. 26 Sarah Dadouch, “ ‘They Want to Kill You’: Anger at Syrians Erupts in Istanbul,” Reuters, July 9, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-syria-refugees/theywant-to-kill-you-anger-at-syrians-erupts-in-istanbul-idUSKCN1U40X8 (accessed July 29, 2019). 27 Gurbuz, “Turkey’s Nativist Turn against Syrian Refugees and Other Arabs.” 28 “Turkey Plans to Return One Million Syrians and Warns of a New Wave of Immigration to Europe,” Reuters, September 5, 2019, https://ara.reuters.com/article/ topNews/idARAKCN1VQ14G (accessed September 7, 2019). 29 Kingsley. “Migration to Greece Rises, and Erdogan Threatens ‘to Open the Gates.’ ” 30 “Syrian Migrants in Turkey Face Deadline to Leave Istanbul,” BBC, August 20, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49404739 (accessed August 21, 2019). 31 Emma Graham-Harrison, Patrick Kingsley, Kevin Rawlinson, and Warren Murray, “First Refugees Arrive from Hungary after Austria and Germany Open Borders,” The Guardian, Septembe r 5, 2015, ttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/05/ refugees-travelling-from-hungary-can-enter-germany-and-austria (accessed July 30, 2019). 32 Patrick Wintour, “UK to Take Up to 20,000 Syrian Refugees over Five Years, David Cameron Confirms,” The Guardian, September 7, 2019, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2015/sep/07/uk-will-accept-up-to-20000-syrian-refugees-david-cameronconfirms (accessed December 5, 2019). 33 Patrick Kingsley, “The Death of Alan Kurdi: One Year On: Compassion towards Refugees Fades,” The Guardian, September 2, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/sep/01/alan-kurdi-death-one-year-on-compassion-towards-refugeesfades (accessed July 30, 2019). 34 OECD, “Youth Unemployment Rate (Indicator),” OECD Data, 2019, doi: 10.1787/ c3634df7-en (accessed July 30, 2019). 35 IRC, “Refugees in Limbo,” International Rescue Committee, 2019, https://www.rescue. org/country/greece (accessed July 30, 2019). 36 Greek Council for Refugees, “Statistics: Greece,” Asylum Information Database, March 26, 2019, https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/statistics (accessed July 24, 2019). 37 Sebastian Leape, “Greece Has the Means to Help Refugees on Lesbos – But Does It Have the Will?” The Guardian, September 13, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ global-development/2018/sep/13/greece-refugees-lesbos-moria-camp-funding-will (accessed July 30, 2019). 38 UNHCR, “Lebanon,” UNHCR Global Focus, January 7, 2019, http://reporting.unhcr. org/node/2520 (accessed July 30, 2019).

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39 Greek Council for Refugees, “Statistics: Greece.” 40 Jad Chaaban, “Should Lebanon Get More Funds for Hosting Refugees?” Al Jazeera, April 5, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/lebanon-fundshosting-refugees-170405082414586.html (accessed July 30, 2019). 41 UNHCR, “Lebanon,” UNHCR, February 2019, http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/ default/files/UNHCR%20Lebanon%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20February%202019.pdf (accessed July 30, 2019). 42 “About OCHA Lebanon,” OCHA, n.d., https://www.unocha.org/lebanon/about-ochalebanon (accessed July 30, 2019). 43 Ibid. 44 Dina Eldaway, “A Fragile Situation: Will the Syrian Refugee Swell Push Lebanon Over the Edge?,” MPI, February 21, 2019, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/syrianrefugee-swell-push-lebanon-over-edge (accessed July 30, 2019). 45 Greek Council for Refugees, “Statistics: Greece.” 46 Ibid. 47 Mark Plant, “Refugee Spending and the Macroeconomic Program in Jordan,” Center for Global Development, June 28, 2018, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/refugeespending-and-macroeconomic-program-jordan (accessed June 30, 2019). 48 Natasha Turak, “Jordan’s PM: We Need a More Sustainable Plan to Help Countries Hosting Refugees,” CNBC, January 24, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/24/ jordans-pm-we-need-a-more-sustainable-plan-to-help-countries-hosting-refugees. html (accessed July 30, 2019). 49 UNHCR, “Evaluation of UNHCR’s Emergency Response to the influx of Syrian Refugees into Turkey.” 50 Greek Council for Refugees, “Statistics: Greece.” 51 “Syria Refugee Crisis,” USA for UNHCR, 2018, https://www.unrefugees.org/ emergencies/syria/ (accessed July 24, 2019). 52 UNHCR, “Iraq Emergency,” UNHCR, May 14, 2018, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ iraq-emergency.html (accessed July 30, 2019). 53 Lena Masri, “Refugees in Egypt Struggle to Live as Economic Hardships Deepened,” Reuters, April 10, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-refugees/refugeesin-egypt-struggle-to-live-as-economic-hardships-deepen-idUSKCN1RM0P4 (accessed July 28, 2019). 54 “Country Update: Germany Q1 2018,” UNHCR, March 14, 2018, https://www.unhcr. org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2018/03/Factsheet_Germany_O1_2018.pdf (accessed July 24, 2019). 55 Jon Stone, “Angela Merkel Says She Wouldn’t Change the Way She Handled the Refugee Crisis,” Independent, August 29, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ world/europe/angela-merkel-syrian-refugees-crisis-million-repeat-do-the-sameagain-a7918811.html (accessed July 29, 2019). 56 Georgina Sturge, “Migration Statistics: How Many Asylum Seekers and Refugees Are There in the UK?” House of Commons Library, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/ insights/migration-statistics-how-many-asylum-seekers-and-refugees-are-there-inthe-uk/ (accessed July 24, 2019). 57 Jo Becker, “How Nationalism Found a Home in Sweden,” New York Times, August 11, 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/images/2019/08/11/nytfrontpage/scan.pdf (accessed August 12, 2019).

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58 Henrik Pryser Libell, “Thwarted Mosque Attack in Norway Will Be Investigated as Act of Terrorism,” New York Times, August 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/08/11/world/europe/norway-mosque-attack-terrorism.html (accessed August 12, 2019). 59 This number reflects the number of Syrian immigrants in Denmark, does not specify whether or not the individual is a refugee, asylum seeker, visa holder, citizen, etc., which is an important distinction from these other numbers. “Population at the First Day of the Quarter by Country of Origin, Ancestry, Region and Time,” Statistics Denmark, 2019, https://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/saveselections.asp (accessed July 24, 2019). 60 “Population Statistics,” UNHCR, 2019, https://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/ SelectVarVal/saveselections.asp (accessed July 24, 2019). 61 “Population Statistics,” UNHCR, 2019, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers (accessed July 24, 2019). 62 Accem, “Statistics: Spain,” Asylum Information Database, Winter 2018, https://www. asylumineurope.org/reports/country/spain/statistics (accessed July 24, 2019). 63 Gregrory Korte, “Trump Signs Order Cutting Refugee Quota to Lowest Level since 1980,” USA Today, September 29, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ politics/2017/09/29/trump-set-cut-refugee-quota-lowest-level-since-1980/713463001/ (accessed July 30, 2019). 64 Dara Lind, “Trump Slashed Refugee Levels This Year. For 2019, He’s Slashing Them Even Further,” Vox, September 18, 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/9/17/17871874/ refugee-news-record-history-asylum (accessed July 28, 2019). 65 Ibid. 66 “Trump Refugee Cuts Threaten Cornerstone of Global Order.” 67 Katie Benner, “Domestic Extremism Festered for a Decade as the U.S. Turned Its Back,” New York Times, August 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/us/ politics/domestic-terrorism.html (accessed August 12, 2019). 68 David Bier and Alex Nowrasteh, “Heritage Report Shows Refugees Are Not a Major Threat,” Cato Institute, July 13, 2017, https://www.cato.org/blog/heritage-reportshows-refugees-are-not-major-threat (accessed August 12, 2019). 69 Jack Shafer, “How Trump Changed after Charlottesville,” Politico, July 18, 2019, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/07/18/donald-trump-racistrally-227408 (accessed August 12, 2019). 70 Benner, “Domestic Extremism Festered for a Decade as the U.S. Turned Its Back.” 71 Interview by the author with Ilham Ahmed, copresident of the executive committee of the Syrian Democratic Council, November 22, 2019. 72 Ibid. 73 “The White Helmets: A Story of Hope,” https://www.whitehelmets.org/en/ (accessed July 28, 2019). 74 Tara McKelvey, “Arming Syrian Rebels: Where the US Went Wrong,” BBC News, October 10, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33997408 (accessed July 24, 2019).

7  The Geneva Peace Process 1 Interview with the author, July 26, 2019.

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2 “Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly,” United Nations, September 20, 1999, https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html (accessed July 29, 2019). 3 Ibid. 4 NATO, “ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001–2014) (Archived),” NATO, September 1, 2015, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 5 “Kofi Annan’s Six-Point Plan for Syria,” Al Jazeera, March 27, 2012, https://www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/03/2012327153111767387.html (accessed July 29, 2019). 6 Interview by the author with Ambassador Robert Ford, August 2, 2019. 7 Interview with the author, July 26, 2019. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 “Note to Correspondents—Transcript of a Press Conference by Kofi Annan, Joint Special Envoy for Syria,” United Nations Secretary-General, August 2, 2012, https:// www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2012-08-02/note-correspondentstranscript-press-conference-kofi-annan (accessed August 6, 2019). 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ian Black, “Kofi Annan Resigns as Syria Envoy,” The Guardian, August 2, 2012, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/02/kofi-annan-resigns-syria-envoy (accessed July 29, 2019). 15 Basma Atassi, “Explaining the Geneva II Peace Talks on Syria,” The Guardian, January 19, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/explaining-geneva-iipeace-talks-syria-2014118142853937726.html (accessed July 29, 2019). 16 Ibid. 17 Ian Black, “New UN Envoy to Syria Has Experience of Intractable Conflicts,” The Guardian, September 3, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/03/ un-envoy-syria-lakhdar-brahimi (accessed July 29, 2019). 18 “What Is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?” BBC, January 22, 2014, https://www. bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24628442 (accessed July 31, 2019). 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Atassi, “Explaining the Geneva II Peace Talks on Syria.” 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 “What Is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?.” 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Atassi, “Explaining the Geneva II Peace Talks on Syria.” 30 Ibid. 31 “Syria: UN-Arab League Envoy Brahimi Resigns,” UN News, May 13, 2014, https:// news.un.org/en/story/2014/05/468162-syria-un-arab-league-envoy-brahimi-resigns (accessed July 30, 2019). 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.

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8 Russia 1 Edward Klein, All Out War: The Plot to Destroy Trump (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017). 2 Carlo Jose Vicente Caro, “Moscow’s Historical Relationship with Damascus: Why It Matters Now,” HuffPost, January 26, 2016, https://www.huffpost.com/ entry/moscows-historical-relati_b_9065430?guccounter=1&guce_ referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAE 4KENZlk9SZAulSaL6kzt2rzUlPJkugJQ2l8lrXRkvpxIId4r5p2-zPucW5zueaN9cA XplmoqqNwBUPSUhRSAwOpw46ucBVAcP81SdCfJnD7fwPPr5hudgL10H5adZ_ edtmzM6xEMskvoaRDpQgqpAHtZOP3pnL7Z6DkCLniyfx (accessed July 31, 2019). 3 Isabella Ginor, “How Six Day War Almost Led to Armageddon,” The Guardian, June 9, 2000, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/10/israel1 (accessed August 1, 2019). 4 Vicente Caro, “Moscow’s Historical Relationship with Damascus: Why It Matters Now.” 5 Ian Anthony, ed., “Russia and the Arms Trade,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1998, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/ SIPRI98An/SIPRI98An.pdf (accessed July 31, 2019). 6 Ibid. 7 Sanu Kainikara, In the Bear’s Shadow: Russian Intervention in Syria, Air Power Development Centre, 2018, http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/ Contemporary%20AirPower/AP34-In-the-Bears-Shadow-Russian-Intervention-inSyria.pdf (accessed July 31, 2019). 8 Vicente Caro, “Moscow’s Historical Relationship with Damascus: Why It Matters Now.” 9 Katie Sanders, “Did Vladimir Putin Call the Breakup of the USSR ‘the Greatest Geopolitical Tragedy of the 20th Century?” PolitiFact, March 6, 2014, https://www. politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/mar/06/john-bolton/did-vladimir-putincall-breakup-ussr-greatest-geop/ (accessed August 1, 2019). 10 William J. Burns, The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for its Renewal (New York: Penguin Random House, 2019), 333. 11 “Petraeus Accuses Putin of Trying to Resurrect the Russian Empire in Syria,” Middle East Monitor, September 30, 2105, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150930petraeus-accuses-putin-of-trying-to-resurrect-the-russian-empire-in-syria/ (accessed August 5, 2019). 12 Jennifer Rubin, “Washington Post: Sen. Ted Cruz Goes Abroad,” Washington Post, May 29, 2014, https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=news&id=1303 (accessed August 5, 2019). 13 David A. Wemer, “US Sen. Tom Cotton’s Pitch for US Global Leadership: ‘We Don’t Want to Play Home Games,’ ” Atlantic Council, December 14, 2018, https://www. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-sen-tom-cotton-s-pitch-for-us-globalleadership-we-don-t-want-to-play-home-games (accessed August 5, 2019). 14 Rebecca Rubin, “Breaking the Feckless Meter on Syria,” Washington Post, October 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2015/10/01/breakingthe-feckless-meter-on-syria/ (accessed August 5, 2019). 15 Vicente Caro, “Moscow’s Historical Relationship with Damascus: Why It Matters Now.”

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16 Kainikara, In the Bear’s Shadow: Russian Intervention in Syria. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 The Moscow Times, “$6Bin in Weapons Sales a Factor in Syria,” Moscow Times, February 1, 2012, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2012/02/01/6bln-in-weaponssales-a-factor-in-syria-a12307 (accessed July 31, 2019). 20 Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, Nan Tian, and Alexandra Kuimova, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2019, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/201903/fs_1903_at_2018.pdf (accessed July 31, 2019). 21 Kainikara, In the Bear’s Shadow: Russian Intervention in Syria. 22 Richard Galpin, “Russian Arms Shipments Bolster Syria’s Embattled Assad,” BBC, January 30, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16797818 (accessed July 31, 2019). 23 Kainikara, In the Bear’s Shadow: Russian Intervention in Syria. 24 Burns, The Back Channel, 325. 25 Maks Czuperski, Eliot Higgins, Frederic Hof, Ben Nimmo, and John E. Herbst, “Distract, Deceive, Destroy: Putin at War in Syria,” Atlantic Council, 2016, https:// publications.atlanticcouncil.org/distract-deceive-destroy/ (accessed August 1, 2019). 26 “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” United Nations, March 17, 2011, https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm (accessed August 5, 2019). 27 “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan,” United Nations, February 4, 2012, https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10536.doc.htm (accessed August 2, 2019). 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ariel Cohen, “The Syria Wedge between the U.S. and Russia,” The Atlantic, February 6, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/the-syrian-wedgebetween-the-us-and-russia/252635/ (accessed July 5, 2019). 32 Paul Harris, Martin Chulov, David Batty, and Damien Pearse, “Syria Resolution Vetoed by Russia and China at United Nations,” The Guardian, February 4, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/04/assad-obama-resign-un-resolution (accessed August 1, 2019). 33 Security Council, “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan,” United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, February 4, 2012, https://www. un.org/press/en/2012/sc10536.doc.htm (accessed August 6, 2012). 34 Ibid. 35 Richard Galpin, “Russian Arms Shipments Bolster Syria’s Embattled Assad.” 36 Burns, The Back Channel, 327. 37 Interview by the author with Ambassador Robert Ford, August 1, 2019. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.

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41 Richard Galpin, “Russian Arms Shipments Bolster Syria’s Embattled Assad.” 42 Associated Press, “Russian Parliament Approves Military Intervention in Syria,” Mashable, September 30, 2015, https://mashable.com/2015/09/30/russia-approvesmilitary-intervention-syria/ (accessed August 3, 2019). 43 Remarks by H. E. Vladimir Putin to the United Nations General Assembly, September 27, 2015. 44 Galpin, “Russian Arms Shipments Bolster Syria’s Embattled Assad.” 45 Czuperski, Higgins, Hof, Nimmo, and Herbst, “Distract, Deceive, Destroy: Putin at War in Syria.” 46 “Russia Claims to Target ISIS in First Strikes in Syria,” CBS News, September 30, 2015, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-putin-military-syria-russian-fighter-jetsbombing/ (accessed August 5, 2019). 47 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Statement from the Governments of France, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Kingdom, and USA on Russian Military Action in Syria,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office Gov.UK, October 2, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-declaration-on-recent-military-actionsof-the-russian-federation-in-syria (accessed August 5, 2019). 48 Czuperski, Higgins, Hof, Nimmo, Herbst, “Distract, Deceive, Destroy: Putin at War in Syria.” 49 Steven Rosenberg, “Syria War: Putin’s Russian Mission Accomplished,” BBC, December 13, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42330551 (accessed August 5, 2019). 50 “Chechnya and the North Caucasus,” Alertnet, July 28, 2009, https://web.archive.org/ web/20100620001101/http:/www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/RU_WAR.htm?v=in_ detail (accessed August 5, 2019). 51 Associated Press, “Russian Parliament Approves Military Intervention in Syria.” 52 Ibid. 53 Czuperski, Higgins, Hof, Nimmo, Herbst, “Distract, Deceive, Destroy: Putin at War in Syria.” 54 “Syria Conflict: Putin Defends Russia’s Air Strikes,” BBC, October 12, 2015, https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34502286 (accessed August 5, 2019). 55 Associated Press, “Russian Parliament Approves Military Intervention in Syria.” 56 Ivan Safronov and Sergey Goryashko, “Russia in Syria: Top View,” Kommersant, October 3, 2015, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2836487 (accessed August 5, 2019). 57 “The Agreement in Placement of the Russian Air Group in the SAR Is Concluded for an Unlimited Period,” PNA HOBOCTN, January 14, 2016, https://ria. ru/20160114/1359734984.html (accessed August 5, 2019). 58 “Russia Says 63,000 Troops Have Seen Combat in Syria,” BBC, August 23, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45284121 (accessed December 5, 2019). 59 Expanded Board Meeting of the Ministry of Defence, Kremlin.ru, December 22, 2017, “More than 48 thousand Russian servicemen gained experience in Syria,” RossiyskayaGazeta (accessed August 5, 2019). 60 Interview by the author with Ambassador Robert Ford, August 1, 2019. 61 Neil MacFarquhar, “Kremlin Gears Up Machinery of Repression.” New York Times, August 3, 2019, p. A4. 62 Spencer Ackerman, “Russia’s Intervention in Syria Brings Obama’s Dilemma to the Fore,” The Guardian, September 30, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ sep/30/syria-russia-assad-obama-putin-analysis (accessed July 31, 2019).

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63 Kathy Gilsinan, “The Pottery Barn Rule: Syria Edition,” The Atlantic, September 30, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/the-pottery-barnrule-syria-edition/408193/ (accessed August 5, 2019). 64 Dmitry Solovyov and Jack Stubbs, “Putin Says Russia Backs Free Syrian Army alongside Assad Troops,” Reuters, December 11, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-putin/putin-says-russia-backs-free-syrian-armyalongside-assad-troops-idUSKBN0TU1B020151211 (accessed August 5, 2019). 65 Ibid. 66 “Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu,” Kremlin, March 14, 2016, http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51511 (accessed August 5, 2019). 67 Czuperski, Higgins, Hof, Nimmo, Herbst, “Distract, Deceive, Destroy: Putin at War in Syria.” 68 Samuel Ramani, “Russia’s Eye on Syrian Reconstruction,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Sada Middle East Analysis, January 31, 2019, https:// carnegieendowment.org/sada/78261 (accessed July 31, 2019). 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 “Russia Launches Air Strikes in Syria as Western Officials Doubt Goals,” RadioFreeEuropeRadioLiberty, October 1, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-syriaair-strikes/27279381.html (accessed August 5, 2019). 73 “Turkey’s Downing of a Russian Plane—What We Know,” BBC News, December 1, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581 (accessed August 5, 2019). 74 “Turkey’s Downing of a Russian Plane—What We Know.” 75 “World Leaders React to Turkey’s Downing of a Russian Jet,” Al Jazeera, November 24, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/russian-jet-shot-turkey-syria -reaction-151124210400768.html (accessed August 5, 2019). 76 Incorporates text from the author’s book titled An Uncertain Ally: Turkey under Erdogan’s Dictatorship (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2017). 77 Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Russia Says Syrian Government Should Control ‘US-Led Syrian territories,” Kurdistan 24, December 26, 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/ news/d4152904-2713-4a60-842d-34aed92033d5 (accessed July 31, 2019). 78 “Syria: The Astana Peace Process,” France24, May 9, 2018, https://www.france24.com/ en/20180905-syria-astana-peace-process (accessed August 4, 2019). 79 Brital, “Hizbullah’s Learning Curve: Deadly Experience,” The Economist, August 22, 2015, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/08/20/deadlyexperience (accessed August 5, 2019). 80 Fiona Hill, “The Real Reason Putin Supports Assad,” Brookings Institution, March 25, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-real-reason-putin-supports-assad/ (accessed August 5, 20190). 81 Edward Klein, All Out War: The Plot to Destroy Trump. 82 Michael Crowley and Julia Ioffe, “Why Putin Hates Hillary,” Politico, July 31, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/clinton-putin-226153 (accessed August 1, 2019). 83 Nicolai Petro, “Are We Reading Russia Right?” New Cold War: News and Analysis of the Multipolar World, June 20, 2018, https://www.newcoldwar.org/are-we-readingrussia-right/ (accessed August 5, 2019).

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84 “Clinton Concludes ‘Reassurance’ Tour of Russia’s Neighbors,” RadioFreeEuropeRadioLiberty, July 7, 2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Clinton_ Concludes_Reassurance_Tour_of_Russias_Neighbors/2092434.html (accessed August 5, 2019). 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Associated Press Washington, “Hillary Clinton Says Vladimir Putin’s Crimea Occupation Echoes Hitler,” The Guardian, March 6, 2014, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/mar/06/hillary-clinton-says-vladimir-putins-crimea-occupationechoes-hitler (accessed August 5, 2019). 88 Crowley and Ioffe, “Why Putin Hates Hillary.” 89 Jefferson Morley, “How Secrecy Undermines Mueller and the Defense of Democracy,” Just Security, August 1, 2019, https://www.justsecurity.org/65251/how-secrecyundermines-mueller-and-the-defense-of-democracy/ (accessed August 5, 2019).

9  The Shiite Crescent 1 Bassem Mroue, “New Iranian President Vows Support for Assad,” Associated Press, August 5, 2013, https://www.apnews.com/8470b1b1a9c34e48a34797536cacbe3b (accessed August 9, 2019). 2 David L. Phillips, “Unintended Consequences of Striking Syria,” RightsViews, September 16, 2013, https://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/rightsviews/tag/militaryintervention/ (accessed August 9, 2019). 3 “The Sunni-Shia Divide,” Council on Foreign Relations, n.d., https://www.cfr.org/ interactives/sunni-shia-divide#!/sunni-shia-divide (accessed August 5, 2019). 4 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Syria,” Central Intelligence Agency, August 6, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ sy.html (accessed August 12, 2019). 5 Associated Press, “Al-Zarqawi Tape Stokes Sunni-Shiite Hatred,” NBC News, June 2, 2006, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13098064/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/ al-zarqawi-tape-stokes-sunni-shiite-hatred/#.XU2EhpNKi9Y (accessed August 9, 2019). 6 Anton La Guardia, “Zarqawi Rails against Shia ‘Snakes,’ ” Telegraph, June 3, 2006, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1520211/Zarqawirails-against-Shia-snakes.html (accessed August 5, 2019). 7 Ramin Mostaghim and Shashank Bengali, “The U.S. May Be the ‘Great Satan’ in Iran, but Some Still Want to Win the U.S. Visa Lottery,” Los Angeles Times, October 19, 2016, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-03-10-mn-2922-story.html (accessed August 9, 2019). 8 Ibid. 9 Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, August 2013, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2013/08/ CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss88.pdf (accessed August 9, 2019). 10 “Iran Accused of Setting Up Pro-Assad Militias,” Al Jazeera, August 15, 2012, https:// www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012/08/20128154537913351.html (accessed August 6, 2019). 11 Ibid.

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12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Laila Bassam and Tom Perry, “How Iranian General Plotted Out Syrian Assault in Moscow,” Reuters, 6 October 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisissyria-soleimani-insigh/how-iranian-general-plotted-out-syrian-assault-in-moscowidUSKCN0S02BV20151006 (accessed 6 August 2019). 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Jeffrey Feltman, “Hezbollah: Revolutionary Iran’s Most Successful Export,” Brookings Institution, January 17, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollahrevolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/ (accessed August 6, 2019). 19 “UN Tribunal Releases Hariri Indictment,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2011, https://www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/08/201181773445852950.html (accessed August 9, 2019). 20 Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Hezbollah Aids Syrian Military in a Key Battle,” New York Times, May 19, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/world/ middleeast/syrian-army-moves-to-rebel-held-qusayr.html?hp&_r=0 (accessed August 6, 2019). 21 Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria.” 22 Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 23 Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria.” 24 Ali Alfoneh, “Foreign Shiite Combat Fatalities in Syria and Nationality since January 19, 2012.” Twitter, July 16, 2018, Ali lfoneh, @Alfoneh (accessed August 9, 2019). 25 “What Is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?” BBC, January 22, 2014, https://www. bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24628442 (accessed August 9, 2019). 26 Thomas Erdbrink, Sewell Chan, and David E. Sanger, “After a U.S. Shift, Iran Has a Seat at Talks on War in Syria,” New York Times, October 28, 2015, https://www. nytimes.com/2015/10/29/world/middleeast/syria-talks-vienna-iran.html (accessed August 8, 2019). 27 Eli Lake, “Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad,” Bloomberg Opinion, June 9, 2015, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-06-09/iran-spends-billions-toprop-up-assad (accessed August 9, 2019). 28 “Fact Check: How Much Does the Syrian War Cost Iran,” BBC News, March 7, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-features-43157803#Anchor4 (accessed August 9, 2019). 29 “The Long Road to Damascus,” The Economist, February 11, 2012, https://www. economist.com/briefing/2012/02/11/the-long-road-to-damascus (accessed August 9, 2019). 30 Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran Expands Its Economic Sphere of Influence in Syria,” Middle East Institute, September 13, 2017 ,https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-expandsits-economic-sphere-influence-syria (accessed August 9, 2019). 31 “From the Military Support to the Culture and Economy: Iran Controls Syria’s Entire Joints,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, July 17, 2019, http://www.syriahr.com/ en/?p=135020 (accessed August 9, 2019). 32 David D. Kirkpatrick, “U.K. Offers to Return Seized Iranian Oil Tanker,” New York Times, July 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/world/middleeast/britainiran-oil-tanker-syria.html (accessed August 9, 2019).

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33 Ibid. 34 Ben Hubbard. “Freed Iranian Tanker Is Seen Near Syria,” New York Times, September 8, 2019, p. A12. 35 Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran and Venezuela to Build $1 Billion Oil Refinery in Syria,” Middle East Institute, September 26, 2017, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iranand-venezuela-build-1-billion-oil-refinery-syria (accessed August 9, 2019). 36 Lina Sinjab, “Russia and Iran Are Increasingly Competitive in Syria,” Chatham House, February 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/russia-and-iran-areincreasingly-competitive-in-syria (accessed August 4, 2019). 37 Samuel Ramani, “Russia’s Eye on Syrian Reconstruction,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Sada Middle East Analysis, January 31, 2019, https:// carnegieendowment.org/sada/78261 (accessed July 31, 2019). 38 “Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy,” White House Briefings, October 13, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpiran-strategy/ (accessed August 9, 2019). 39 Linda Qiu. “Checking Trump’s Statements on China, Iran and Trade,” New York Times, August 27, 2019, p. A8. 40 “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” White House Briefings, May 8, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/ (accessed August 9, 2019). 41 Ibid. 42 Kay Armin Serjoie, “ ‘The Americans Cannot Be Trusted.’ How Iran Is Reacting to Trump’s Decision to Quit Nuclear Deal,” Time, May 9, 2018, https://time. com/5270821/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-ayatollah-khameini-hassan-rouhani/ (accessed August 9, 2019). 43 Ibid. 44 “World Reacts after Trump Pulls US Out of JCPOA,” DidPress Agency, May 9, 2018, https://www.didpress.com/en/2018/05/09/world-reacts-trump-pulls-us-jcpoa/ (accessed August 9, 2019). 45 Mohammed El-Said, “Trump’s Decision to Exit Iran Nuclear Deal Spurs International Rejections,” Daily News Egypt, May 9, 2018, https://ww.dailynewssegypt. com/2018/05/09/trumps-decision-exit-iran-nuclear-deal-spurs-internationalrejections/ (accessed August 9, 2019). 46 Ibid. 47 Hassan Rouhani, “World Leaders React to US Withdrawal from Iranian Nuclear Deal,” Al Jazeera, May 9, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/worldleaders-react-withdrawal-iranian-nuclear-deal-180508184130931.html (accessed August 9, 2019). 48 Ben Hubbard, David D. Kirkpatrick, Edward Wong, and Richard Perez-Pena, “Pompeo Calls Attacks on Saudi Arabia ‘Act of War,’ ” New York Times, September 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/world/middleeast/us-iran-saudi-arabia. html (accessed December 9, 2019). 49 Peter Baker and David E. Sanger. “With Oil under Attack, Trump’s Deferences to Saudis Return to the Fore,” New York Times, September 17, 2019, p. A10. 50 Eric Schmitt, Farnaz Fassihi,and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Focus on Iran in White House after Oil Strike,” New York Times, September 16, 2019, p. A1. 51 David E. Sanger. “In Confronting Iran, President May Find the World Is Wary,” New York Times, September 18, 2019, p. A1.

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52 Raphael Ahren, “Netanyahu: Either Change Iran Deal or Cancel It,” Times of Israel, September 12, 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-either-change-irandeal-or-cancel-it/ (accessed August 9, 2019). 53 News Agencies, “Ahmadinejad: Israel Is a ‘Stinking Corpse’ Doomed to Disappear,” Haaretz, May 8, 2008, https://www.haaretz.com/1.4978500 (accessed August 9, 2019). 54 Ibid. 55 Kevin Whitelaw, “Ahmadinejad: Holocaust ‘Opinion of Just a Few,” National Public Radio, September 25, 2009, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=113171156 (accessed August 8, 2019). 56 David M. Halbfinger, Ben Hubbard, and Ronen Bergman. “Israel Counters Iran in Flare-Up of Shadow War,” New York Times, August 29, 2019, p. A1. 57 Primoz Manfreda, “Why Iran Supports the Syrian Regime,” ThoughtCo, May 25, 2019, https://www.thoughtco.com/why-iran-supports-the-syrian-regime-2353082 (accessed August 9, 2019). 58 Mara Karlin, “Israel’s Coming War with Hezbollah,” Foreign Affairs, February 21, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2018-02-21/israels-coming-warhezbollah (accessed August 8, 2019). 59 Halbfinger, Hubbard, and Bergman. “Israel Counters Iran in Flare-Up of Shadow War.” 60 Isabel Kershner, “Israel Confirms Attacks on Iranian Targets in Syria,” New York Times, January 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/world/middleeast/ israel-attack-syria-iran.html (accessed August 8, 2019). 61 Ibid. 62 Ben Hubbard, “Lebanon Condemns Attacks,” New York Times, August 27, 2019, p. A6. 63 “Golan Heights: Syria Condemns Donald Trump’s Remarks,” BBC News, March 22, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47664529 (accessed August 8, 2019). 64 “Syria,” Iran Business Risk, n.d., https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/report/ syria (accessed August 7, 2019). 65 “Golan Heights: Syria Condemns Donald Trump’s Remarks.”

10 Turkey 1 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “A Conversation with Recep Tayyip Erdogan,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 27, 2007, https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-receptayyip-erdogan-0 (accessed August 12, 2019). 2 M. Kemal Atatürk, “The Great Speech of 1927,” Republic of Turkey Foreign Ministry f Affairs, 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty.en.mfa (accessed August 13, 2019). 3 Ahmet Icduygu, Sule Toktas, and B. Ali Soner, “The Politics of Population in a NationBuilding Process: Emigration of Non-Muslims from Turkey,” Ethnic and Racial Studies Journal, January 16, 2008, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870701491937 (accessed August 13, 2019). 4 Helen Chapin Metz, “Turkey a Country Study, Linguistic and Ethnic Groups,” U.S. Library of Congress, 1995, http://countrystudies.us/turkey/26.htm (accessed August 13, 2019).

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5 Varak Ketsemanian, “Dersim: A Facet of the Silent Revolution in Turkey,” Armenian Weekly, September 9, 2013, https://armenianweekly.com/2013/09/09/dersim-a-facetof-the-silent-revolution-in-turkey/ (accessed August 13, 2019). 6 Party program of the PKK adopted at the Fifth Victory Congress, January 1995. 7 Aytac Kadioglu, “Not Our War: Iraq, Iran and Syria’s Approaches towards the PKK,” CESRAN International, Winter 2019, http://cesran.org/not-our-war-iraq-iran-andsyrias-approaches-towards-the-pkk.html (accessed August 13, 2019). 8 David L. Phillips, “The Syrian Quagmire,” in An Uncertain Ally (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2017), 118. 9 Richard Falk, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Zero Problems with Neighbors Revisited,” Foreign Policy Journal, February 9, 2012, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal. com/2012/02/09/turkeys-foreign-policy-zero-problems-with-neighbors-revisited/ (accessed August 13, 2019). 10 David Schenker, “Turkey’s Shift on Syria Gives West Room to Get Tougher on Assad,” Washington Institute, June 9, 2011, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/turkeys-shift-on-syria-gives-west-room-to-get-tougher-on-assad (accessed August 13, 2019). 11 Chris Phillips, “Turkey, Syria’s New Best Friend,” The Guardian, October 1, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/oct/01/turkey-syria-friendship (accessed August 13, 2019). 12 “A Look Back at Syria’s 1982 Crackdown,” National Public Radio, May 11, 2011, https://www.npr.org/2011/05/11/136214343/a-look-back-at-syrias-1982-crackdown (accessed August 13, 2019). 13 Sebnem Arsu, “Turkish Premier Urges Assad to Quit in Syria,” Herald-Tribune, November 22, 2011, https://www.heraldtribune.com/article/LK/20111122/ News/605224479/SH/ (accessed August 13, 2019). 14 Jon Gorvett, “Turkey’s “Red Lines,” U.S. Raid in Northern Iraq Cause Further Strain in Relations,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September 2003, https:// www.wrmea.org/003-september/turkey-s-red-lines-u.s.-raid-in-northern-iraq-causefurther-strain-in-relations.html (accessed August 11, 2019). 15 Erdogan, “A Conversation with Recep Tayyip Erdogan.” 16 “The Kurds Are Creating a State of Their Own in Norther Syria,” The Economist, May 23, 2019, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/05/23/the-kurdsare-creating-a-state-of-their-own-in-northern-syria (accessed August 12, 2019). 17 “Vice President Biden Delivered Remarks on Foreign Policy,” Harvard University, October 3, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dcKVCtg5dxM (accessed August 12, 2019). 18 “Vice President Joe Biden Apologizes to Turkey, UAE,” CNN, October 6, 2014, https:// edition.cnn.com/2014/10/05/politics/isis-biden-erdogan-apology/ (accessed August 12, 2019). 19 David L. Phillips, “Testimony: Turkey’s Democracy under Challenge,” Institute for the Study of Human Rights, April 5, 2017. 20 “The Case of Can Dundar and Erdem Gul,” Global Freedom of Expression Columbia University, May 6, 2016, https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/casejournalists-can-dundar-erdem-gul/ (accessed August 10, 2019). 21 Ibid. 22 Matthew Lee and Robert Burns, “Refusing to Aid Kurds against Islamic State Group Would Be ‘Irresponsible,’ Says Kerry,” PBS, October 20, 2014, https://www.pbs.org/

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newshour/world/aiding-kurds-islamic-state-group-irresponsible-kerry-says (accessed August 13, 2019). 23 Ibid. 24 “Erdogan says PKK and PYD Both Terrorist Organisations,” TRTWorld, October 5, 2015, http://www.trtworld.com/turkey/erdogan-says-pkk-and-pyd-both-terroristorganisations-8918 (accessed June 23, 2016). 25 Greg Botelho, “Turkish Leader: U.S. Responsible for ‘Sea of Blood’ for Supporting Syrian Kurds,” CNN, February 10, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/10/ middleeast/turkey-erdogan-criticizes-us/index.html (accessed August 13, 2019). 26 “Erdogan Irate over US Envoy Meeting with YPG in Kobani,” Press TV, February 8, 2016, https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/02/08/449194/Turkey-Erdogan-US-BrettMcGurk/ (accessed August 13, 2019). 27 Interview by the author with Bassam Barabandi, former political counselor at Syria’s embassy in Washington, DC, September 5, 2019. 28 Tom Stevenson, “Turkey’s Syria Offensive Aimed at Kurdish YPG,” DW, August 24, 2016, https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-syria-offensive-aimed-at-kurdishypg/a-19497653-0 (accessed August 13, 2019). 29 Euan McKirdy, Jason Hanna, and Isil Sariyuce, “Turkey Sends Tanks into Syria against ISIS; Rebels Reportedly Capture Town,” CNN, August 24, 2016, https://www.cnn. com/2016/08/24/middleeast/turkish-troops-isis-syria-operation/index.html (accessed August 13, 2019). 30 Reuters, “U.S. Calls Turkey’s Syria Clashes ‘Unacceptable,’ Urges Focus on ISIS,”NBC News, August 29, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/u-s-callsturkey-s-syria-clashes-unacceptable-urges-focus-n639266 (accessed August 13, 2019). 31 David E. Sanger and Rick Gladstone, “Defiant Bashar al-Assad Vows to Retake ‘Every Inch’ of Syria,” New York Times, June 7, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/ world/middleeast/defiant-assad-vows-to-retake-every-inch-of-syria-from-his-foes. html (accessed August 13, 2019). 32 David L. Phillips, “Was Turkey’s Coup for Real?” HuffPost, July 17, 2017, https:// www.huffpost.com/entry/was-turkeys-coup-for-real_b_596cbc9ee4b06a2c8edb4815 (accessed July 18, 2017). 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 David L. Phillips, “Questions about the Coup in Turkey,” Politiko, August 13, 2019, https://politiko.al/questions-about-the-coup-in-turkey/ (accessed August 14, 2019). 36 Gardiner Harris, “U.S. Willing to Pursue Inquiries about Erdogan Rival,” New York Times, July 16, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/live/turkey-coup-erdogan/kerryexpresses-hope-for-stability-and-peace/ (accessed August 13, 2019). 37 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup,” VOA News, July 15, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/europe/turkey-looks-back-failed-coup (accessed August 11, 2019). 38 Staff Writers, “Syria’s Assad Says Turkey’s Erdogan Exploiting Coup,” Space Daily, July 21, 2016, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Syrias_Assad_says_Turkeys_Erdogan_ exploiting_coup_999.html (accessed August 11, 2019). 39 Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Democracy under Challenge,” Government Publishing Office, April 5, 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG115hhrg24917/html/CHRG-115hhrg24917.htm (accessed August 11, 2019). 40 Ibid.

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41 Christopher Caldwell, “The East in the West,” New York Times Magazine, September 25, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/25/magazine/the-east-in-the-west.html (accessed August 13, 2019). 42 “Turkey’s Charismatic Pro-Islamic Leader,” BBC News, November 4, 2002, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2270642.stm (accessed August 13, 2019). 43 Karen Leigh, “ISIS Makes up to $3Million a Day Selling Oil, Say Analysts,” ABC News, August 2, 2014, https://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-makes-million-day-sellingoil-analysts/story?id=24814359 (accessed December 9, 2019). 44 Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Democracy under Challenge.” 45 Phillips, “Was Turkey’s Coup For Real?.” 46 Carlotta Gall, “Turkey’s President Suffers Stinging Defeat in Istanbul Election Redo,” New York Times, June 23, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/world/europe/ istanbul-mayor-election-erdogan.html (accessed August 13, 2019). 47 Interview with the author in Qamishli, December 14, 2018. 48 Hasan Hasan, “Kurdish Afrian, a Plundered Settlement under the Reign of Terror and Jungle Law,” Human Rights Organization in Jazira and Afrin, September 2019, http:// www.kmmrojava.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Kurdish-Afrin-A-plunderedSettlement-under-the-Reign-of-Terror-and-Jungle-Law.pdf (accessed December 9, 2019). 49 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), July 17, 1998, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html (accessed August 13, 2019). 50 Borzou Daragahi, “Russia’s Affair with Turkey Has Been Blossoming for Decades – Why Has It Taken the West so Long to Pay Attention?” Independent, August 4, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/russia-turkey-nato-erdogan-putin-eu-syriaankara-a9038941.html (accessed August 2, 2019). 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 “Turkey’s Exports Hit Record $15.1 Billion in March: Economy Minister,” Reuters, April 1, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-economytradefigures/turkeys-exports-hit-record-15-1-billion-in-march-economy-ministeridUSKCN1H810H (accessed August 13, 2019). 54 Maria Beat, “The Turkey-Russia Cooperation Model,” Daily Sabah, May 8, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/08/05/the-turkey-russia-cooperation-model (accessed August 2, 2019). 55 Daragahi, “Russia’s Affair with Turkey Has Been Blossoming for Decades – Why Has It Taken the West so Long to Pay Attention?.” 56 Beat, “The Turkey-Russia Cooperation Model.” 57 Ibid. 58 Tom Di Christopher, “Trump Aims to Drive Iran’s Oil Exports to Zero by Ending Sanction Waivers,” CNBC, April 22, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/22/trumpexpected-to-end-iran-oil-waivers-try-to-drive-exports-to-zero.html (accessed August 12, 2019). 59 Kemal Kirisci, “Post-Revolutionary Iran and Turkey at 40: Pragmatism and Convergence,” Brookings Institution, 4, April 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/04/post-revolutionary-iran-and-turkey-at-40pragmatism-and-convergence/ (accessed August 12, 2019).

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11 Kurds 1 Helbast Shekhani, “Kurdish Leader Reveals Details of First Meeting with Syrian Government,” Kurdistan 24, July 30, 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/ news/54d92d6a-2f82-457f-a8da-5b5b579ef70c (accessed August 19, 2019). 2 “The Kurdish Population,” FondationInstitutKurde de Paris, January 12, 2017, https:// www.institutkurde.org/en/info/the-kurdish-population-1232551004 (accessed August 19, 2019). 3 Kurds have their own language called Kurdish. It consists of four main dialects: Kurmanji, Gorani, Zazaki, and Sorani. Kurmanji is the predominant dialect spoken among the Kurds, particularly by Kurds in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. 4 “Syria: The Silenced Kurds,” Human Rights Watch, October 1996, https://www.hrw. org/reports/1996/Syria.htm (accessed August 19, 2019). 5 “Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle within a Struggle,” International Crisis Group, January 22, 2013, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/510285552.pdf (accessed August 19, 2019). 6 Gary C. Gambill, “The Kurdish Reawakening in Syria,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, April 2005, https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0404_s1.htm (accessed August 19, 2019). 7 Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview (London: Routledge, 2005). 8 “Profile: Syria’s Ruling Baath Party,” BBC News, July 9, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-18582755 (accessed August 19, 2019). 9 “The Syrian Constitution,” Carnegie Middle East Center Diwan, December 5, 2012, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en (accessed August 19, 2019. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Chris Zambelis, “Unrest in Syria Inspires Kurdish Activism,” Asia Times, June 4, 2011, https://www.institutkurde.org/en/publications/bulletins/pdf/315.pdf. (accessed August 19, 2019). 13 “Group Denial: Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria,” Human Rights Watch, November 26, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/26/groupdenial/repression-kurdish-political-and-cultural-rights-syria (accessed August 19, 2019). 14 James Brandon, “The PKK and Syria’s Kurds,” Terrorism Monitor, February 15, 2007, https://web.archive.org/web/20080917223313/http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/ news/article.php?articleid=2370250 (accessed August 19, 2019). 15 Paul Iddon, “A Recap of the Syrian Crisis to Date,” Digital Journal, July 30, 2012 (accessed September 20, 2013). 16 “Syrian Prisoners Launch Hunger Strike,” JerusalemPost, Archived from the original on 8 March 2011 (accessed March 7, 2011). 17 “Stateless Kurds in Syria Granted Citizenship,” CNN, April 8, 2011, Archived from the original on February 29, 2012 (accessed April 14, 2014). 18 Shekhani, “Kurdish Leader Reveals Details of First Meeting with Syrian Government.” 19 David L. Phillips, The Kurdish Spring (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2015), 134–5. 20 Ibid., 127–8. 21 Craig Shaw, Efe Kerem Sozeri, and Zeynep Sentek, “Turkey Energy Deals Helped Open Door to Kurdish Independence,” Kurdistan 24, October 10, 2017, https://

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www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/76d157bc-83e6-4304-86ca-74da220a5d36) (https:// theblacksea.eu/stories/turkey-energy-deals-helped-open-door-to-kurdishindependence/ (accessed September 18, 2019). 22 “Kurdish National Council,” News Directory, n.d., http://dir.md/wiki/Kurdish_ National_Council?host=en.wikipedia.org (accessed August 19, 2019). 23 “KNC Leader Arrested after Increasing Tensions between Rival Kurdish Parties in Syria,” ARA News, August 14, 2016, http://aranews.net/files/2016/08/knc-leaderarrested-increasing-tensions-rival-kurdish-parties-syria/ (accessed August 14, 2016). 24 Rudaw Tarafindan, “ENKS’denAnkara’yaeleştiri,” Rudaw, June 25, 2016, https://www. rudaw.net/turkish/middleeast/250620161 (accessed March 4, 2017). 25 Hisham Arafat, “Syrian Kruds Fractured in Astana Peace Talks, PYD Excluded,” Kurdistan 24, January 18, 2017, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/76e660ac-cd264bfd-b535-04b0ed9432fc/syrian-kurds-fractured-in-astana-peace-talks–pyd-excluded (accessed August 19, 2019). 26 Paul Antonopoulos, “Ezidi National Council Resign from Turkey-Based Syrian National Council,”al-Masdar News, September 19, 2016, https://www.almasdarnews. com/article/ezidi-national-council-resign-from-turkey-based-syrian-nationalcouncil/ (accessed September 19, 2016). 27 “Middle East Updates/ Iran: Willing to Help with Islamic State—After Nuclear Talks Progress,” Haaretz, August 22, 2014, https://www.haaretz.com/iran-may-help-with-isafter-nuke-talks-1.5260335 (accessed September 23, 2019). 28 “Syrian Democratic Forces,” Global Security, n.d., https://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/para/sdf.htm (accessed August 16, 2019). 29 Ibid. 30 Roy Gutman, “Have the Syrian Kurds Committed War Crimes?,” The Nation, February 7, 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/have-the-syrian-kurdscommitted-war-crimes/ (accessed August 16, 2019). 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Interview with the author of Saleh Muslim, December 16, 2018. 34 Gutman, “Have the Syrian Kurds Committed War Crimes?.” 35 Richard Spencer, “Syrian Kurds Accused of Ethnic Cleansing and Killing Opponents,” Telegraph, May 18, 2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/18/syrian-kurdsaccused-of-ethnic-cleansing-and-killing-opponents/ (accessed August 16, 2019). 36 Luis Martinez, “Why Are US Troops in the Syrian City of Manbij?,” ABC News, January 16, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-troops-syrian-city-manbij/ story?id=60421763 (accessed August 16, 2019). 37 Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Top US Commander Visits SDF Leadership in Syria amid Turkish Threats,” Kurdistan 24, July 22, 2019, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/ news/ba1529aa-b4ab-40d4-99c8-698a15b1eb34 (accessed August 16, 2019). 38 Interview by the author with Nesrin Abdullah, December 16, 2018. 39 Email from Yousif Azad, director of the Washington Kurdish Institute, to the author, January 30, 2019. 40 Ibid. 41 Daren Butler and Ali Kucukgocmen, “Turkey’s Erdogan’s Struggles to Court Kurds in Battle for Istanbul,” Reuters, June 20, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkeyelection-kurds/turkeys-erdogans-struggles-to-court-kurds-in-battle-for-istanbulidUSKCN1TL2CA (accessed August 19, 2019).

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42 “Turkey Steps up Syria Shelling as Invasion of Afrin Looms,” BBC, January 19, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42747702 (accessed August 19, 2019). 43 Cengiz Candar, “What Does US-Turkey Military Deal Really Entail?,” Al-Monitor, August 13, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/turkey-unitedstates-syria-safe-zone-what-deal-really-entail.html#ixzz5whiQyjOD (accessed August 15, 2019). 44 Amberin Zaman, “Syrian Kurdish Commander Sets Conditions for Safe Zone Talks with Turkey,” Al-Monitor, August 15, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2019/08/syrian-kurdish-commander-conditions-us-turkey-safe-zone.html (accessed August 15, 2019). 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Candar, “What Does US-Turkey Military Deal Really Entail?.” 48 Ibid. 49 Zaman, “Syrian Kurdish Commander Sets Conditions for Safe Zone Talks with Turkey.” 50 Jack Detsch, “Pentagon Says It’s ‘On Time’ with Syria Safe Zone Despite Questions,” Al-Monitor, September 9, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/09/ pentagon-syria-safe-zone-turkey-patrols.html (accessed September 11, 2019). 51 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Is Poised to Send 150 Troops to Patrol Syria’s Northeast with Turks,” New York Times, September 13, 2019, p. A13. 52 Dakota Wood and James Phillips, “The Syria Safe Zone Will Cripple the Kurds,” National Interest, August 15, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-eastwatch/syria-safe-zone-will-cripple-kurds-73916 (accessed August 17, 2019). 53 Schmitt, “U.S. Is Poised to Send 150 Troops to Patrol Syria’s Northeast with Turks.” 54 Voluntary Repatriation, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, https://www.unhcr.org (accessed March 8, 2020).

12  Armenians and Christians 1 Yuliya Talmazan, “Life under ISIS Led These Muslims to Christianity,” NBC News, February 3, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/life-under-isis-led-thesemuslims-christ-n963281 (accessed August 18, 2019). 2 Visited by the author, August 1993. 3 Gal 1:4. 4 Matt 4:24. 5 Minority Rights Group International, “Christians, Armenians and Assyrians,” Minority Rights Group International, March 2018, https://minorityrights.org/ minorities/christians-armenians-and-assyrians/ (accessed July 26, 2019). 6 Talmazan, “Life under ISIS Led These Muslims to Christianity.” 7 Ibid. 8 “Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II at a Meeting with Participants in ‘the Challenges Facing Arab Christians’ Conference,” Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, September 3, 2013, http://www.jordanembassyus.org/speeches/remarkshis-majesty-king-abdullah-ii-meeting-participants-challenges-facing-arab-christians (accessed August 21, 2019). 9 Prov 24:11.

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10 Ibid. 11 Minority Rights Group International, “Christians, Armenians and Assyrians.” 12 Sirwan Kajjo, “US-Backed Syrian Forces Form Armenian Unit,” VOA, April 27, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/united-states/extremism-watch/us-backed-syrian-forcesform-armenian-unit (accessed July 26, 2019). 13 Minority Rights Group International, “Christians, Armenians and Assyrians.” 14 Ibid. 15 Sirwan Kajjo, “US-Backed Syrian Forces Form Armenian Unit.” 16 Nanore Barsoumian, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Armenians in Syria,” Armenian Weekly, February 16, 2012, https://armenianweekly.com/2012/02/16/17959/ (accessed August 1, 2019). 17 Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Syria: The situation of Christians, Including whether Christians Are Perceived to Be Loyal to President Assad; Treatment of Christians by the Regime and the Opposition Forces, Including Incidents of Violence against Them; State Protection, (2013-July 2015),” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, August 6, 2015, https://www.refworld.org/ docid/55deba764.html (accessed August 7, 2019). 18 Diamond Naga Siu, “ISIS Poses One of the Biggest Threats to Religious Freedom, State Report Says,” Politico, August 15, 2017, https://www.google.com/search?q= Diamond+Naga+Siu,+%E2%80%9CISIS+poses+one+of+the+biggest+threats+to+ religious+freedom,+State+report+says,%E2%80%9D+Politico,+15+August+15,+ 2017,.3&tbm=isch&source=univ&client=firefox-b-1-d&sa=X&ved= 2ahUKEwiD0vaO8oroAhXemHIEHU09C3gQ7Al6BAgDEBk&biw= 1536&bih=722&dpr=1.25 (accessed August 20, 2019). 19 Ibid. 20 Barsoumian, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Armenians in Syria.” 21 Zara Sarvarian, “70,000 Syrian Armenians Have Fled during the War, and Few Will Return,” World Watch Monitor, June 27, 2018, https://www.worldwatchmonitor. org/2018/06/70000-syrian-armenians-have-fled-during-the-war-and-few-will-return/ (accessed August 7, 2019). 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 “Reports Cite 80 Dead in Kessab; Churches Desecrated,” Asbarez, March 24, 2014, http://asbarez.com/121007/reports-cite-80-dead-in-kessab-churches-desecrated/ (accessed August 18, 2019). 25 Tom Gjelten, “U.S. Evangelicals Push Back against Trump’s Syria Pullout Plan,” NPR, January 16, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/01/16/685651799/evangelicals-dont-liketrumps-syria-pullout-plan (accessed August 18, 2019). 26 Armenian Assembly of America, “Testimony by Van Krikorian, Board of Trustees Co-Chair,” March 12, 2019, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/ AP04/20190312/108976/HHRG-116-AP04-Wstate-KrikorianV-20190312.pdf (accessed September 15, 2019). 27 Stoyan Zaimov, “Iraqi Christians Facing Extinction after 1,400 Years Forgive ISIS of Genocide ‘In the Name of Christ,’ ” Christian Post, February 20, 2018, https://www. christianpost.com/news/iraqi-christians-facing-extinction-after-1400-years-forgiveisis-genocide-in-the-name-of-christ.html (accessed July 26, 2019). 28 Sarvarian, “70,000 Syrian Armenians Have Fled during the War, and Few Will Return.” 29 Gjelten, “U.S. Evangelicals Push Back against Trump’s Syria Pullout Plan.”

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30 Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Syriac Christians Call on US Army to Stop Possible Turkish Invasion in Northeast Syria,” Kurdistan24, July 17, 2019, https://www. kurdistan24.net/en/news/158099de-fb53-4dd6-adee-96857342884a (accessed August 8, 2019). 31 Gjelten, “U.S. Evangelicals Push Back against Trump’s Syria Pullout Plan.” 32 Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Syria: The Situation of Christians, Including whether Christians Are Perceived to Be Loyal to President Assad; Treatment of Christians by the Regime and the Opposition Forces, Including Incidents of Violence against Them; State Protection, (2013-July 2015).” 33 “Syria’s beleaguered Christians,” BBC, 25 February 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-22270455 (accessed 7 August 2019). 34 Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Syria: The Situation of Christians, Including whether Christians Are Perceived to Be Loyal to President Assad; Treatment of Christians by the Regime and the Opposition Forces, Including Incidents of Violence against Them; State Protection, (2013-July 2015).” 35 Minority Rights Group International, “Christians, Armenians and Assyrians.” 36 Ibid. 37 Jordan Allott, “Kurds and Christians Fight Back against ISIS in Syria,” National Review, November 19, 2015, https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/11/christianmilitia-assyrian-kurds-alliance-isis/ (accessed August 20, 2019). 38 Syrian Network for Human Rights, “The Syrian Christian Detainees: Between the Government Forces’ Suppression and the Extremist Organizations’ Terrorism,” Syrian Network for Human Rights, December 28, 2014, http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/ pdf/english/The_Christian_Syrian_Detainees_between_the_Government_Forces_ Suppression_and_the_Extremist_Organizations_Terrorism_en.pdf (accessed August 8, 2019). 39 Ibid. 40 Minority Rights Group International, “Christians, Armenians and Assyrians.” 41 Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Syria: The Situation of Christians, Including whether Christians Are Perceived to Be Loyal to President Assad; Treatment of Christians by the Regime and the Opposition Forces, Including Incidents of Violence against Them; State Protection, (2013-July 2015).” 42 Stoyan Zaimov, “Iraqi Christians Facing Extinction after 1,400 Years Forgive ISIS of Genocide ‘In the Name of Christ.’ ” 43 Allott, “Kurds and Christians Fight Back against ISIS in Syria.” 44 Sirwan Kajjo, “US-Backed Syrian Forces Form Armenian Unit.” 45 Allott, “Kurds and Christians Fight Back against ISIS in Syria.” 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Johannes de Jong, “Brave Local Christians Fighting ISIS Need Guns and Bullets,” The Stream, June 26, 2016, https://stream.org/brave-local-christians-fighting-isis-needguns-bullets/ (accessed August 8, 2019). 49 Molly Hennessy-Fiske, “Confused by All Those Groups Fighting in Syria? We Break It Down with Arm Patches,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2017, https://www.latimes. com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-opposition-patches-2017-htmlstory.html (accessed August 8, 2019). 50 “Christian Groups Aren’t Happy with Trump over His Syria Pull-Out,” Relevant Magazine, January 17, 2019, https://relevantmagazine.com/current/christian-groupsarent-happy-with-trump-over-his-syria-pull-out/ (accessed December 9, 2019).

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51 Doug Bandow, “Why Christians Should Embrace Refugees and Not Politicians,” National Interest, November 6, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/whychristians-should-embrace-refugees-and-not-politicians-94341 (accessed December 9, 2019). 52 Russell Moore, Twitter post, October 2019, 9:51 a.m., https://twitter.com/drmoore/ status/1181930175359066113?lang=en.

13  Syrian Women 1 Gianluca, “Women in Conflict: A Close Look at Syria,” Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom, June 20, 2013, https://www.wilpf.org/women-in-conflict-aclose-look-at-syria/ (accessed August 26, 2019). 2 “Syria Population,” Country Meters, n.d., https://countrymeters.info/en/Syria (accessed August 26, 2019). 3 Maher Al-Mounes, “Syria’s ‘Era of Women’: War Leaves Streets Empty of Men,” Middle East Eye, July 23, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrias-era-women-warleaves-streets-empty-men (accessed August 26, 2019). 4 Daniel Hilton, “The Shifting Role of Women in Syria’s Economy,” Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, December 22, 2017, https://timep.org/syrias-women/economy/ the-shifting-role-of-women-in-syrias-economy/ (accessed August 20, 2019). 5 Bareeq Education, “Syrian Women’s Perceptions of Women’s Rights, Work, Education, and Vocational Skills.” May 5, 2017, bareeqeducation.org › study › syrian_women_ survey_2017 (accessed March 8, 2020). 6 Hilton, “The Shifting Role of Women in Syria’s Economy.” 7 “The World Bank in Syrian Arab Republic,” World Bank, April 1, 2019, https://www. worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview (accessed August 26, 2019). 8 Hilton, “The Shifting Role of Women in Syria’s Economy.” 9 Beatrix Buecher and James Rwampigi Aniyamuzaala, “Women, Work & War: Syrian Women and the Struggle to Survive Five Years of Conflict,” March 2016, https:// www.care.org/sites/default/files/documents/Syria_women_and_work_report_ logos_07032016_web.pdf (accessed August 26, 2019). 10 Ibid. 11 Feras Hanoush, “Tokenism or Empowerment? Syrian Women and the SDF,” Atlantic Council, March 12, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/ tokenism-or-empowerment-syrian-women-and-the-sdf (accessed August 20, 2019). 12 Hilton, “The Shifting Role of Women in Syria’s Economy.” 13 Herbert L. Bodman and Nayyirah Tawhidi, Women in Muslim Societies: Diversity Within Unity (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 14 Hilton, “The Shifting Role of Women in Syria’s Economy.” 15 The personal status law covers matters such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. 16 Sami Moubayed, “Syria Amends Civil Law Giving Women More Rights,” Gulf News, February 8, 2019, https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/syria-amends-civil-law-givingwomen-more-rights-1.61928813 (accessed August 20, 2019). 17 John Al Saddy and George Sadek, “Syria: Women’s Rights in Light of New Amendments to Syrian Personal Status Law,” Global Legal Monitor, April 8, 2019, https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/syria-womens-rights-in-light-of-newamendments-to-syrian-personal-status-law/ (accessed August 16, 2019).

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18 “Syria: Gender Justice & the Law,” UNFPA, 2019, https://syria.unfpa.org/sites/default/ files/pub-pdf/Syria%20Country%20Summary%20-%20English_1.pdf (accessed August 14, 2019). 19 “Syria: Events of 2018,” Human Rights Watch, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2019/country-chapters/syria (accessed August 16, 2019). 20 Jamille Bigio, Countering Sexual Violence in Conflict, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2017, https://www.cfr.org/report/countering-sexual-violence-conflict (accessed August 20, 2019). 21 “CEDAW Review on Syria: An (Un)Constructive Dialogue,” Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, May 9, 2014, https://www.wilpf.org/cedaw-reviewon-syria-an-un-constructive-dialogue/ (accessed August 16, 2019). (Note: The government denies allegations.) 22 Hanoush, “Tokenism or Empowerment? Syrian Women and the SDF.” 23 “Women Alone: The Fight for Survival by Syria’s Refugee Women,” UNHCR, n.d., https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/53be84aa4.pdf (accessed August 16, 2019). 24 Louisa Loveluck, “After Five Failed Attempts to Escape ISIS Slavery, She Tried One Last Time,” Washington Post, February 23, 2019, https://beta.washingtonpost. com/world/after-five-failed-attempts-to-escape-isis-slavery-she-tried-one-lasttime/2019/02/23/2137450c-3469-11e9-8375-e3dcf6b68558_story.html (accessed August 14, 2019). 25 Hanoush, “Tokenism or Empowerment? Syrian Women and the SDF.” 26 “UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Women, Girls, Men, and Boys a Devastating and Pervasive Feature of the Conflict and Must End Now,” United Nations Human Rights Council, March 15, 2018, https://www. ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=22833&LangID=E (accessed August 20, 2019). 27 Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein, Women and Terrorism: Hidden Threats, Forgotten Partners, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2019, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/ default/files/report_pdf/Discussion_Paper_Bigio_Vogelstein_Terrorism_OR.pdf (accessed August 20, 2019). 28 Jamille Bigio, Countering Sexual Violence in Conflict, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2017, https://www.cfr.org/report/countering-sexual-violence-conflict (accessed August 20, 2019). 29 Hanoush, “Tokenism or Empowerment? Syrian Women and the SDF.” 30 Ibid. 31 Ben Hubbard, “In a Crowded Syria Tent Camp, the Women and Children of ISIS Wait in Limbo,” New York Times, March 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/ world/middleeast/isis-syria-women-children.html (accessed August 20, 2019). 32 “Female Refugees Face Physical Assault, Exploitation and Sexual Harassment on Their Journey through Europe,” Amnesty International, January 18, 2016, https:// www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/female-refugees-face-physical-assaultexploitation-and-sexual-harassment-on-their-journey-through-europe/ (accessed August 16, 2019). 33 “Crisis Update: Women of Syria, Eight Years into the Crisis,” UN Women, August 13, 2018, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/8/feature-syria-humanitarianupdate (accessed August 16, 2019. 34 Government of Jordan, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, “The Living Conditions of Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Results from the 2017–2018 Survey of Syrian Refugees inside and outside of Camps,” Relief Web, February 10, 2019,

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https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/living-conditions-syrian-refugees-jordan-results2017-2018-survey-syrian-refugees (accessed August 16, 2019). 35 “EU and UNDP Initiate a New Project to Strengthen Syrians and Host Communities in Turkey,” UNDP, May 18, 2018, https://www.undp.org/content/brussels/en/home/ presscenter/pressreleases/2018/eu-and-undp-initiate-a-new-project-to-strengthensyrians-and-hos.html (accessed August 16, 2019). 36 Turkish Red Crescent and World Food Programme, “Refugees in Turkey: Livelihoods Survey Findings,” 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70508 (accessed August 16, 2019). 37 “One Woman’s Journey to Find Hope in Turkey, after Escaping Syria,” UN Women, June 19, 2018, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/6/feature-findinghope-in-turkey-after-escaping-syria (accessed August 20, 2019). 38 Hafsa Afailal, “Evaluation Report- House of Initiatives by and for Syrian Women in Reyhanli- Dar Zeytuna Turkey,” United Nations Democracy Fund, February 1, 2019, https://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/636ras_evaluation_report_0.pdf. 39 “A Pilot for Empowering Syrian Women Refugees,” United Nations Democracy Fund, n.d., https://www.un.org/democracyfund/news/pilot-empowering-syrian-womenrefugees (accessed August 20, 2019). 40 “EU and UNDP Initiate a New Project to Strengthen Syrians and Host Communities in Turkey.” 41 Ibid. 42 “Jordanian National Action Plan,” UN Women Jordan, 2018, https://jordan.unwomen. org/en/what-we-do/women-peace-and-security/jordanian-national-action-plan-onwomen-peace-and-security (accessed August 16, 2019). 43 UN Department of Public Information, “Briefing to the Security Council by Geir O. Pedersen, United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, 27 June 2019,” ReliefWeb, June 27, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/briefing-security-councilgeir-o-pedersen-united-nations-special-envoy-0 (accessed September 3, 2019). 44 What Is UNSCR 1325?” United States Institute of Peace, n.d., https://www.usip.org/ gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325 (accessed August 22, 2019). 45 Ibid. 46 “Country/Region Profile of: Syria,” Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, https://www.peacewomen.org/profile/country-region-profile-syria (accessed 22 August 2019). 47 Ibid. 48 “Syrian Women Came Together to Create a Common Framework for Their Movement,” UNDP, July 5, 2018, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/7/ news-syrian-women-come-together-to-create-a-common-framework-for-theirmovement (accessed August 20, 2019). 49 UNFPA, UNDP, UN Women, ESCWA, “Gender, Justice & the Law: Syria,” UNFPA, February 11, 2019, https://syria.unfpa.org/en/publications/gender-justice-law-syria-0 (accessed August 16, 2019). 50 “CEDAW Review on Syria: An (Un)Constructive Dialogue.” 51 “Jordanian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security,” UN Women Jordan, n.d., https://jordan.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/women-peace-and-security/jordaniannational-action-plan-on-women-peace-and-security (accessed August 20, 2019). 52 “Female Refugees Face Physical Assault, Exploitation and Sexual Harassment on Their Journey through Europe,” Amnesty International, January 18, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/

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female-refugees-face-physical-assault-exploitation-and-sexual-harassment-on-theirjourney-through-europe/ (accessed August 14, 2019).

14 Alawites 1 Ayse Baltacioglu-Brammer, “Alawites and the Fate of Syria,” Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective, January 2014, http://origins.osu.edu/article/alawites-and-fatesyria (accessed August 22, 2019). 2 Ibid. 3 Devin Trivedi, “Primer on the Alawites in Syria,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 1, 2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/12/primer-alawites-syria/ (accessed August 23, 2019). 4 Chris Gentry, “The Minor Sect Ruling Syria: Who Are the Alawites?” International Review, n.d., https://international-review.org/minor-sect-ruling-syria-alawites/ (accessed August 26, 2019). 5 Baltacioglu-Brammer, “Alawites and the Fate of Syria.” 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ayse Tekdal Fildis, “Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria,” Middle East Policy Council, Summer, https://www.mepc.org/roots-alawite-sunni-rivalry-syria (accessed August 26, 2019). 14 Trivedi, “Primer on the Alawites in Syria.” 15 Baltacioglu-Brammer, “Alawites and the Fate of Syria.” 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Joshua Landis, “Asad’s Alawi Dilemma,” Syria Comment, October 8, 2004, http:// joshualandis.oucreate.com//syriablog/2004/10/asads-alawi-dilemma.htm (accessed August 26, 2019). 19 Leon Goldsmith, Cycle of Fear: Syria’s Alawites in War and Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 20 Baltacioglu-Brammer, “Alawites and the Fate of Syria.” 21 Ibid. 22 “Syria Unrest: Who Are the Shabiha?” BBC News, May 29, 2012, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-middle-east-14482968 (accessed August 26, 2019). 23 Trivedi, “Primer on the Alawites in Syria.” 24 Mai Ngyun-Phuong-Mai, “Syrian Alawites: Their History, Their Future,” Islamic Monthly, October 28, 2015, https://www.theislamicmonthly.com/syrian-alawitestheir-history-their-future/ (accessed August 26, 2019). 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Caroline Wyatt, “Syria Alawites Distance Themselves from Assad,” BBC News, April 3, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35941679 (accessed September 2, 2019). 28 Ngyun-Phuong-Mai, “Syrian Alawites: Their History, Their Future.”

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15 Idlib 1 Interview by the author with Bashar Jafaari, permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, August 21, 2019. 2 People in Need, “10 Things You Need to Know about Idlib Province in Syria Today,” Relief Web, September 12, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/10things-you-need-know-about-idlib-province-syria-today (accessed August 25, 2019). 3 Interview by the author with Bashar Jafaari, permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, August 21, 2019. 4 “Syrian Civil War: ‘Three Killed’ in Attack on Turkish Convoy,” BBC News, August 19, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49394759 (accessed August 27, 2019). 5 News Desk, “Jihadists Claim New Advance in Southern Idlib after Launching Counter-Offensive,” Al Masdar News, August 17, 2019, https://www.almasdarnews. com/article/jihadists-claim-new-advance-in-southern-idlib-after-launching-counteroffensive/ (accessed August 28, 2019). 6 People in Need, “10 Things You Need to Know about Idlib Province in Syria Today.” 7 “Syrian Civil War: ‘Three Killed’ in Attack on Turkish Convoy.” 8 Interview by the author with Bashar Jafaari, permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, August 21, 2019. 9 Sedat Ergin, “Turkish-Russian Relations on a Stress Test in Idlib,” Hurriyet Daily News, August 21, 2019, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/sedat-ergin/turkishrussian-relations-on-a-stress-test-in-idlib-145922 (accessed August 27, 2019). 10 International Crisis Group, “Saving Idlib from Destruction,” Middle East Briefing, September 2, 2018, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b063-saving-idlib-fromdestruction%20(1).pdf (accessed August 28, 2019). 11 Trevor Mace, “Mapping Ceasefire Violations in Idlib,” Atlantic Council, April, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/mapping-ceasefire-violations-inidlib (accessed August 26, 2019). 12 Diane Cole, “In Syria, Reports of 19 Medical Facilities Bombed Since April 28,” NPR, May 17, 2019, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/05/17/724281900/ in-syria-reports-of-19-medical-facilities-bombed-since-april-28 (accessed August 26, 2019). 13 Ibid. 14 AFP, “Fighting Kills 43 in Syria’s Northwest: Monitor,” France 24, July 5, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190507-fighting-kills-43-syrias-northwest-monitor (accessed August 28, 2019). 15 “Syria News,” Syria Call, n.d., https://nedaa-sy.com/en/news/syria (accessed August 26, 2019). 16 “Syrian Army Captures Key Idlib Town from Rebels,” DW, August 11, 2019, https:// www.dw.com/en/syrian-army-captures-key-idlib-town-from-rebels/a-49984812 (accessed August 26, 2019). 17 “Syrian Civil War: ‘Three Killed’ in Attack on Turkish Convoy.” 18 “Turkey ‘Strongly’ Condemns Strike on Its Military Convoy in Syria,” Hurriyet Daily News, August 19, 2019, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-convoy-attackedin-syria-three-civilians-killed-defense-ministry-145891 (accessed August 27, 2019) 19 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey Questions Why Russia Didn’t Prevent Idlib Attack,” Al-Monitor, August 22, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/

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31

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turkey-russia-syria-is-idlib-cooperation-heading-to-collapse.html#ixzz5xqinIDEH (accessed August 27, 2019). Vivian Yee and Hwaida Saad, “Syrian Government Starts Campaign to Retake Last Opposition Stronghold of Idlib,” New York Times, May 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/05/20/world/middleeast/syria-retaking-idlib.html (accessed August 28, 2019). Gurcan, “Turkey Questions Why Russia Didn’t Prevent Idlib Attack.” Maxim A. Suchkov, “Will Putin’s ‘Ice Cream Diplomacy’ with Erdogan Help Resolve Idlib?” Al Monitor, August 27, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2019/08/putin-erdogan-syria-idlib-moscow.html#ixzz5xv6TLleU (accessed August 28, 2019). Amberin Zaman, “Putin Backs US-Brokered Security Zone in Syria during Erdogan’s Moscow Visit,” Al-Monitor, August 27, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2019/08/putin-proposes-buffer-zone-idlib.html#ixzz5xqFvj0rz (accessed August 27, 2019). Gurcan, “Turkey Questions Why Russia Didn’t Prevent Idlib Attack.” Zakaria Zakaria and Tamer El-Ghobashy, “Escalating Syrian and Russian Airstrikes in Rebel-Held Idlib Stoke Fears of a Final Showdown,” Washington Post, May 6, 2019, https://beta.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/escalating-syrian-and-russianairstrikes-in-rebel-held-idlib-stoke-fears-of-a-final-showdown/2019/05/06/d8582aa06ffe-11e9-9331-30bc5836f48e_story.html (accessed August 28, 2019). Donald Trump, Twitter Post, June 2, 2019, 7:49 p.m., https://twitter.com/ realdonaldtrump/status/1135332642851893250?lang=en. Aaron Blake, “Trump Mnimizes Kurds’ Role in Baghdadi Raid, Adding Insult to Injury,” Washington Post, October 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/2019/10/28/after-baghdadi-raid-trump-adds-insult-injury-kurds/ (accessed December 9, 2019). Ece Toksabay, “Turkey Says Shared Information with U.S. before Baghdadi Operation,” Reuters, October 28, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-baghdadi-turkey/turkey-says-shared-information-with-u-s-before-baghdadioperation-idUSKBN1X70ZY (accessed December 9, 2019). Lara Seligman, “Baghdadi Is Dead, but ISIS Remains Emboldened Since Trump’s Drawdown,” Foreign Policy, October 27, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/27/ isis-islamic-state-leader-baghdadi-killed/ (accessed December 9, 2019). Nauman Sadiq, “ISIS Chief Al-Baghdadi Killed on Turkish Border while Fleeing Idlib,” Center for Research on Globalization, October 28, 2019, https://www. globalresearch.ca/isis-chief-al-baghdadi-killed-turkish-border-fleeing-idlib/5693207 (accessed December 9, 2019). David Phillips, “Turkey’s Erdogan Protected ISIS Leader Baghdadi,” Ahval News, October 31, 2019, https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-isis/turkeys-erdogan-protected-isisleader-baghdadi (accessed December 9, 2019).

16  Diminished America 1 Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 28, 2013, 2:57 p.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/372795204710830080?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp% 5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E372795204710830080&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2

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6 7

8 9 10 11 12

13

14

15

Notes Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trumpsyria- twitter.html. Everett Rosenfeld, “Trump Launches Attack on Syria with 59 Tomahawk Missiles,” CNBC, April 7, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/06/us-military-has-launchedmore-50-than-missiles-aimed-at-syria-nbc-news.html (accessed August 28, 2019). “Eric Trump Says Syria Strike Was Swayed By ‘Heartbroken’ Ivanka,” NBC News, April 11, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/eric-trump-says-syria-strike-wasswayed-heartbroken-ivanka-n745021 (accessed August 28, 2019). Julie Pace, “Analysis: Trump Finds Leaving Syria Tougher Than He Thought,” AP News, April 15, 2018, https://apnews.com/c345612cabf44069bcb5722a85c50af8 (accessed August 28, 2019). AFP, “UN Divided over Syria Gas Attack Probe as US Launches Missile Strike,” Economic Times, April 7, 2017, https://archive.is/20170407030423/http:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/un-dividedover-syria-gas-attack-probe-as-us-launches-missile-strike/articleshow/58058642. cms#selection-1387.1–1455.31 (accessed August 28, 2019). Rosenfeld, “Trump Launches Attack on Syria with 59 Tomahawk Missiles.” Alex Boutilier and Alex Ballingall, “Canada Supports ‘Limited’ Attack on Syrian Airbase, Trudeau Says,” The Star, April 7, 2017, https://www.thestar.com/news/ canada/2017/04/07/canada-not-part-of-us-strike-on-syria-but-backs-efforts-to-stopatrocities.html (accessed September 3, 2019). Donald Trump, Twitter post, September 5, 2013, 9:20 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realdonaldtrump/status/375609403376144384?lang=en. Julian Borger, “Donald Trump’s Response to Syria Gas Attack: Blame Obama,” The Guardian, April 5, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/ syria-gas-attack-trump-us-foreign-policy (accessed August 28, 2019). Matthew Rozsa, “Donald Trump’s connections to Russia, explained,” Salon, 3 August 2019, https://www.salon.com/2019/08/03/donald-trumps-connections-torussia-explained/ (accessed 28 August 2019). Donald Trump, Twitter post, June 15, 2013, 8:33 p.m., https://twitter.com/ realdonaldtrump/status/346063000056254464. Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 28, 2013, 2:57 p.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/372795204710830080?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw %7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E372795204710830080&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics% 2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 30, 2013, 3:26 p.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/373527227935518720?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E373527227935518720&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2 Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 29, 2013, 2:14 p.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/373146637184401408?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E373146637184401408&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics% 2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 30, 2013, 7:02 p.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/373581528405905408?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E373581528405905408&ref_url=

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19

20

21

22

23

24 25 26

https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus% 2Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, September 5, 2013, 7:07a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/375575931009900544?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E375575931009900544&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics%2 Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, September 5, 2013, 7:13 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/375577511473983488?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E375577511473983488&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2 Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, September 9, 2013, 5:23 p.m., https://twitter. com/realDonaldTrump/status/377180513535946752?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E377180513535946752&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2 Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, September 16, 2013, 5:28 p.m., https://twitter. com/realDonaldTrump/status/379718342858117120?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E379718342858117120&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2 Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 29, 2013, 12:45 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/372943068267573249?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2018%2F04%2F11%2Fpolitics%2 Ftrump-syria-tweets-2013%2Findex.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 29, 2013, 8:09 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/373054743742275584?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E373054743742275584&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2 Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, September 1, 2013, 10:27 p.m., https://twitter. com/realDonaldTrump/status/374357806251794432?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E374357806251794432&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics% 2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 29, 2013, 8:25 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/373058887404228608?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E373058887404228608&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics% 2Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, October 6, 2011, 1:07 p.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/121994936701829121. Nicholas Fandos, “Trump’s View of Syria: How It Evolved, in 19 Tweets,” New York Times, April 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/ donald-trump-syria-twitter.html. Donald Trump, Twitter post, April 11, 2018, 6:57 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/984022625440747520.

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27 Donald Trump, Twitter post, August 29, 2013, 8:19 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/373057367321374720?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E373057367321374720&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics%2 Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. 28 Dexter Filkins, “Trump and Syria,” New Yorker, November 10, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/president-trumps-policy-on-syria (accessed August 28, 2019). 29 Erin Burnett, “Donald Trump: ‘Let Russia Fight ISIS,” CNN, September 28, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2015/09/28/donald-trump-on-syria-isis-russiaburnett-intv-erin.cnn. 30 Donald Trump, Twitter post, April 11, 2018, 7:37 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/984032798821568513?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E984032798821568513&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vox.com%2Fworld%2F2018%2F4%2F11%2F17223606%2 Fsyria-gas-attack-donald-trump-twitter. 31 “Joined by Allies, President Trump Takes Action to End Syria’s Chemical Weapons Attacks,” White House, April 14, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/joinedallies-president-trump-takes-action-end-syrias-chemical-weapons-attacks/ (accessed 28 August 2019). 32 Steven Benen, “Following Attack in Syria, Trump Turns Attention to Obama,” MSNBC, April 9, 2018, http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/followingattack-syria-trump-turns-attention-obama (accessed September 3, 2019). 33 Donald Trump, Twitter post, November 17, 2015, 8:54 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/666615398574530560?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E666615398574530560&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics%2 Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. 34 Donald Trump, Twitter post, March 24, 2016, 11:55 a.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/713031504415338497?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E713031504415338497&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics%2 Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. 35 Fandos, “Trump’s View of Syria: How It Evolved, in 19 Tweets.” 36 Donald Trump, Twitter post, October 4, 2016, 10:05 p.m., https://twitter.com/ realDonaldTrump/status/783488370110451712?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E783488370110451712&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F04%2F07%2Fus%2Fpolitics%2 Fdonald-trump-syria-twitter.html. 37 Alex Ward, “Trump Just Tweeted That a Strike on Syria Is Imminent,” Vox, April 11, 2018, https://www.vox.com/world/2018/4/11/17223606/syria-gas-attack-donaldtrump-twitter (accessed September 3, 2019). 38 Alex Shashkevich, “U.S. Wants Peace, Stability in Syria, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson Says in Policy Speech at Stanford,” Stanford News, January 18, 2018, https:// news.stanford.edu/2018/01/18/secretary-state-rex-tillerson-discusses-u-s-strategysyria-stanford/ (accessed September 3, 2019). 39 Paul Sonne and Karen DeYoung, “Trump Wants to Get the U.S. Out of Syria’s War, so He Asked the Saudi King for $4 Billion,” Washington Post, March 16, 2018, https://beta.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/

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trump-wants-to-get-the-us-out-of-syrias-war-so-he-asked-the-saudi-kingfor-4billion/2018/03/16/756bac90-2870-11e8-bc72-077aa4dab9ef_story. html?noredirect=on. 40 Joe Gould and Tara Copp, “Bolton: US Troops in Syria until Iran Leaves,” Defense News, September 24, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/global/theamericas/2018/09/24/bolton-us-troops-staying-in-syria-until-iran-leaves/ (accessed September 3, 2019). 41 Aron Lund, “The Making and Unmaking of Syria Strategy under Trump,” Century Foundation, November 29, 2018, https://tcf.org/content/report/making-unmakingsyria-strategy-trump/?session=1 (accessed September 3, 2019). 42 Comments by James Mattis at the Council on Foreign Relations, September 3, 2019. 43 Ibid. 44 Gould and Copp, “Bolton: US Troops in Syria until Iran Leaves.” 45 “Erdogan, Trump Discuss Syria as Turkey Warns of New Military Operation,” Hurriyet Daily News, December 14, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeywill-enter-syrias-manbij-if-us-fails-to-remove-ypg-erdogan-139715 (accessed August 29, 2019). 46 Ibid. 47 Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “SDF Says over 11,000 of Its Forces Killed in Fight against the Islamic State,” Kurdistan 24, March 23, 2019, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/ news/0dafe596-6536-49d7-8e23-e52821742ae9 (accessed December 9, 2019). 48 Mattthew Lee, Susannah George, “Trump Decided to Withdraw US Troops after Call with Turkish Prime Minister,” PBS News Hour, December 21, 2018, https://www. pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-decided-to-withdraw-u-s-troops-after-call-withturkish-prime-minister (accessed August 29, 2019). 49 “Erdogan-Trump Call Resulted in US Withdrawal from Syria,” Daily Sabah, December 19, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2018/12/19/erdogantrump-call-resulted-in-us-withdrawal-from-syria-us-official (accessed August 29, 2019). 50 Ibid. 51 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Man Who Couldn’t Take It Anymore,” The Atlantic, October 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/10/james-mattistrump/596665/ (accessed August 30, 2019). 52 Comments by James Mattis at the Council on Foreign Relations, September 3, 2019. 53 Tim Pearce, “I’m Not Going to Do It’: Mattis Told Trump That Next Pentagon Chief Would Have ‘to Lose to ISIS’, Washington Examiner, August 29, 2019, https://www. washingtonexaminer.com/news/im-not-going-to-do-it-mattis-told-trump-that-nextpentagon-chief-would-have-to-lose-to-isis (accessed September 3, 2019). 54 Comments by James Mattis at the Council on Foreign Relations, September 3, 2019. 55 Goldberg, “The Man Who Couldn’t Take It Anymore.” 56 Comments by James Mattis at the Council on Foreign Relations, September 3, 2019. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Matthew Lee and Susannah George, “Trump Loses US Envoy to Anti-IS Coalition over Syria Plan,” AP News, December 23, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/ a6be8c68c6b147549083da125d118446 (accessed September 3, 2019). 60 Donald Trump, Twitter post, December 22, 2018, 8:48 p.m., https://twitter. com/realDonaldTrump/status/1076655729820471296?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7 Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1076655729820471296&ref_url=

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https%3A%2F%2Fafterisis.com%2F2018%2F12%2F23%2Ftrump-says-henever-met-brett-mcgurk-says-he-gave-mattis-second-chance%2F. 61 Mary Papenfuss, “Trump Calls Envoy Brett McGurk’s Resignation a ‘Nothing Event’ by a ‘Grandstander’,” HuffPost, December 23, 2018, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ trump-on-brett-mcgurk-nothing-event-grandstander_n_5c1f0a81e4b08aaf7a898034 (accessed August 30, 2019). 62 Andy Mills, “Chapter 3: The Arrival,” New York Times, September 20, 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/podcasts/caliphate-transcript-chapter-three-thearrival.html (accessed September 3, 2019). 63 Chelsea J. Carter, Catherine E. Shoichet, and Hamdi Alkhshali, “Obama on ISIS: ‘We Don’t Have a Strategy Yet’,” CNN, September 4, 2014, https://www.cnn. com/2014/08/28/world/meast/isis-iraq-syria/index.html (accessed September 3, 2019). 64 “Statement by the President on ISIL,” White House, September 10, 2014, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1 (accessed September 3, 2019). 65 Paul Sonne and Karen DeYoung, “Trump Wants to Get the U.S. Out of Syria’s War, so He Asked the Saudi King for $4 Billion.” 66 Alissa J. Rubin, Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. “After ‘Defeat’ ISIS Rekindles in the Middle East,” New York Times, August 20, 2019. https://www.nytimes. com/2019/08/19/us/politics/isis-iraq-syria.html. 67 Ibid.

17  United Nations Mediation 1 Henry Kissinger, “Partial Transcript of an Interview with Kissinger on the State of Western World,” New York Times, October 13, 1974, https://www.nytimes. com/1974/10/13/archives/partial-transcript-of-an-interview-with-kissinger-on-thestate-of.html (accessed March 13, 2020). 2 Geir Pedersen, “Briefing to the Security Council by Geir O. Pedersen, United Nations Special Envoy for Syria,” United Nations Office at Geneva, February 28, 2019, https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_ en)/6CBC59E6E95EDE1CC12583AF005BCAD8?OpenDocument (accessed September 5, 2019). 3 “26 October 2018, Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Syria, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura,” UN, October 26, 2018, https://www.un.org/undpa/en/speechesstatements/26102018/syria (accessed September 26, 2019). 4 Staff Writer, “New UN Envoy for Syria Makes First Damascus Trip,” Defense Post, January 15, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/01/15/syria-un-envoy-geirpedersen-first-trip/ (accessed August 31, 2019). 5 Nobel Prize, “Interview with Martti Ahtisaari,” Nobel Media AB, October 10, 2008, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2008/ahtisaari/26199-interview-withmartti-ahtisaari/ (accessed (September 5, 2019). 6 Geir Pedersen, “Briefing to the Security Council by United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Geir O. Pedersen,” United Nations Office at Geneva, August 29, 2019, https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_ en)/2B72074721F49DEAC12584650054261A?OpenDocument (accessed September 5, 2019).

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7 Staff Writer, “New UN Envoy for Syria Makes First Damascus Trip.” 8 “New UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen Makes First Visit to Syria,” Al Jazeera, January 15, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/special-envoy-geir-pederson-visitsyria-190115110754731.html (accessed August 31, 2019). 9 UN Department of Public Information, “Briefing to the Security Council by Geir O. Pedersen, United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, 27 June 2019 [EN/ AR],” ReliefWeb, June 27, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/ briefing-security-council-geir-o-pedersen-united-nations-special-envoy-0 (accessed September 5, 2019). 10 “Final Statement of the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue, Sochi, January 30, 2018,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, January 30, 2018, http:// www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/ id/3046246 (accessed September 4, 2019). 11 “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing Road Map for Peace Process in Syria, Setting Timetable for Talks,” United Nations Press, 18 December 2015, https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm (accessed 31 August 2019) 12 Geir Pedersen, “Briefing to the Security Council by United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Geir O. Pedersen,” United Nations Office at Geneva, August 29, 2019, https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_ en)/2B72074721F49DEAC12584650054261A?OpenDocument (accessed September 5, 2019). 13 Interview by the author with Ambassador Bashar Jafaari, permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, August 21, 2019). 14 Alice Al Maleh, “Members of UN Female Advisory Body ‘Still Fighting’ for Direct Influence in Syrian Peace Talks,” Syria Direct, April 23, 2018, https://syriadirect.org/ news/members-of-un-female-advisory-body-%E2%80%98still-fighting%E2%80%99for-direct-influence-in-syrian-peace-talks/ (accessed August 31, 2019). 15 Zuhour Mahmoud, “Women’s Advisory Board in Geneva Sparks Controversy,” Syria Deeply, April 20, 2016, https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2016/04/20/ womens-advisory-board-in-geneva-sparks-controversy (accessed September 5, 2019). 16 “Note to Correspondents: Statement on Behalf of the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Geir O. Pedersen,” United Nations, March 8, 2019, https://www.un.org/sg/ en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2019-03-08/note-correspondents-statementbehalf-of-the-united-nations-special-envoy-for-syria-geir-o-pedersen (accessed September 5, 2019). 17 Sara Hellmuller and Marie-Joelle Zahar, “Against the Odds: Civil Society in the Intra-Syrian Talks,” International Peace Institute, March 2018, https://www.ipinst. org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/1803_Against-the-Odds.pdf (accessed September 5, 2019). 18 “Security Council Briefing on Syria, Special Envoy Geir O. Pedersen,” Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, February 28, 2019, https://dppa.un.org/en/security-councilbriefing-syria-special-envoy-geir-o-pedersen (accessed September 5, 2019). 19 Nick Cumming-Bruce, “ ‘Intolerable” Conditions Prevail in Camp Housing ISIS Refugees,” New York Times, September 12, 2019, p. A13. 20 “Statements by the ERC/USG,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, n.d., https://www.unocha.org/media-centre/statements-ercusg (accessed September 1, 2019).

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21 Pedersen, “Briefing to the Security Council by United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Geir O. Pedersen.” 22 “Syria: Briefing on Detainees, Abductees and Missing Persons,” What’s In Blue, August 6, 2019, https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/08/syria-briefing-on-detainees-abducteesand-missing-persons.php (accessed September 5, 2019). 23 Micah Zenko, “The Myth of the Indispensable Nation,” Foreign Policy, 6 November 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/the-myth-of-the-indispensable-nation/ (accessed 1 September 2019). 24 “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 28, 2014, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-presidentunited-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony (accessed September 5, 2019). 25 “Syria: Chemical Weapons Consultations,” What’s in Blue, March 5, 2019, https:// www.whatsinblue.org/2019/03/syria-chemical-weapons-consultations-2.php (accessed September 5, 2019). 26 Kyle Rempfer and Todd Smith, “The White House Has Revealed Massive Mission Creep in Syria. Here’s Why,” Military Times, September 25, 2018, https://www. militarytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/09/25/the-white-house-just-revealedmassive-mission-creep-in-syria-heres-why/ (accessed September 5, 2019). 27 Ibid. 28 Michael Crowley, “Trump’s Praise of Russia, Iran and Assad Regime Riles GOP Experts,” Politico, October 10, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/trumppraise-russia-iran-assad-criticism-229546 (accessed September 5, 2019). 29 Pedersen, “Briefing to the Security Council by United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Geir O. Pedersen.” 30 Margaret Besheer, “UN Chief Establishing Inquiry into Attacks on Civilian Targets in Syria’s Idlib,” VOA, August 1, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/un-chiefestablishing-inquiry-attacks-civilian-targets-syrias-idlib (accessed September 5, 2019). 31 Pedersen, “Briefing to the Security Council by United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Geir O. Pedersen.” 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 “Press Encounter: Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Press—on Syria,” UN Secretary General, September 23, 2019, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/pressencounter/2019-09-23/press-encounter-secretary-generals-remarks-the-press-syria (accessed September 23, 2019). 36 Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen’s remarks at the European Union Event on Syria, September 24, 2019. General information on the agreement to form a constitutional committee can be found at “UN chief announces creation of constitutional committee on Syria,” Agence France Presse, September 24, 2019, https://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/un-chief-announces-creationconstitutional-committee-syria (accessed March 8, 2020). 37 Washington Kurdish Institute, “Kurdistan’s Weekly Brief September 24, 2019,” Washington Kurdish Institute, September 24, 2019, https://dckurd.org/2019/09/24/ kurdistans-weekly-brief-september-24-2019/ (accessed September 25, 2019).

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38 William I. Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds., International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000). 39 William I. Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982). 40 Henry Kissinger, New York Times, October 12, 1974. 41 William I. Zartman, “ ‘Ripeness’: The Importance of Timing in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution,” E-International Relations, December 20, 2008, https://www.e-ir. info/2008/12/20/ripeness-the-importance-of-timing-in-negotiation-and-conflictresolution/ (accessed August 31, 2019).

18 Betrayal 1 Diana Stancy Correll, “Withdrawing from Northern Syria Could ‘Not Come at a Worse Time,’ Votel Says,” Military Times, October 9, 2019, https://www.militarytimes. com/flashpoints/2019/10/09/withdrawing-troops-from-northern-syria-could-notcome-at-a-worse-time-votel-says/ (accessed October 15, 2019). 2 Karen DeYoung, Missy Ryan, Kareem Fahim, and Sarah Dadouch, “Republicans Assail Trump’s Decision to Pull Troops from Northern Syria as Turkey Readies Offensive,” Washington Post, October 8, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/trump-administration-to-pull-troops-from-northern-syriaas-turkey-readies-offensive/2019/10/07/a965e466-e8b3-11e9-bafb-da248f8d5734_ story.html (accessed October 14, 2014). 3 Amberin Zaman, “Confusion Reigns as Trump Authorizes Troop Withdrawal from Turkish-Syrian Border Towns,” Al-Monitor, October 7, 2019, https://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/2019/10/turkey-syria-border-us-troop-withdrawal-trumpconfusion.html#ixzz61mnOlrEn (accessed October 14, 2014). 4 David Ignatius, “Trump’s Betrayal of the Kurds Is Sickening to U.S. Soldiers,” Washington Post, October 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/forus-soldiers-its-a-dagger-to-the-heart-to-abandon-the-kurds/2019/10/14/f0a1db60eecf-11e9-89eb-ec56cd414732_story.html (accessed October 15, 2019). 5 Zaman, “Confusion Reigns as Trump Authorizes Troop Withdrawal from TurkishSyrian Border Towns.” 6 Associated Press, “McConnell Warns about ‘Strategic Calamity’ in U.S. Pullout tin Syria,” PBS News Hour, October 14, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ mcconnell-warns-about-strategic-calamity-in-u-s-pullout-in-syria (accessed October 14, 2015). 7 “Republicans Call U.S. Pull-Back from Syria ‘Betrayal’ of Allies,” CBS News, October 7, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lindsey-graham-syria-troop-pullout-reactionrepublicans-call-trump-us-troop-pull-back-betrayal-of-allies-today (accessed October 14, 2019). 8 Lindsey Graham, Twitter post, October 16, 2019, 9:36 p.m., https://twitter.com/ LindseyGrahamSC/status/1184500999735709698 (accessed 17 October 2019). 9 JulieGrace Brufke, “Liz Cheney Calls Trump’s Syria Move ‘a Catastrophic Mistake,” The Hill, October 7, 2019, https://thehill.com/homenews/house/464671-liz-cheneycalls-trumps-syria-move-a-catastrophic-mistake (accessed October 14, 2019).

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10 Robin Wright, “Chaos in Syria: ISIS Detainees Escape as the U.S. Pulls Out,” New Yorker, October 13, 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/ chaos-in-syria-isis-detainees-escape-as-the-us-pulls-out (accessed October 15, 2019). 11 Peter Baker and Catie Edmondson, “Trump Lashes Out on Syria as Republicans Rebuke Him in House Vote.” New York Times, October 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/10/16/world/middleeast/trump-erdogan-turkey-syria-kurds.html (accessed March 8, 2020). 12 Zaman, “Confusion Reigns as Trump Authorizes Troop Withdrawal from TurkishSyrian Border Towns.” 13 DeYoung, Ryan, Fahim, and Dadouch, “Republicans Assail Trump’s Decision to Pull Troops from Northern Syria as Turkey Readies Offensive.” 14 Robert Burns, “Trump Orders Turkey Sanctions; US Scrambles for Syria Exit,” AP News, October 14, 2019, https://www.apnews. com/594ac1ca4c294c29b7a213ccf5d4dfad (accessed October 14, 2019). 15 Natasha Turak and Tucker Higgins, “Pompeo and Pence Will Meet with Erdogan after Turkish Leader Backs Off Refusal,” CNBC, October 16, 2019, https://www.cnbc. com/2019/10/16/pompeo-says-he-and-pence-expect-to-meet-turkeys-erdogandespite-refusal.html (accessed October 17, 2019). 16 Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, “Syrian Forces Rush Into U.S. Void,” New York Times, October 15, 2015, p. A1. 17 Michael Birnbaum, “European Leaders Criticize Turkish Offensive in Syria as U.S. Accelerates Pullout,” Washington Post, October 13, 2019 https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/europe/european-leaders-criticize-turkish-offensive-in-syria-as-usaccelerates-pullout/2019/10/13/f3e25df0-edd4-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story.html (accessed October 16, 2019). 18 Ibid. 19 Baker and Edmondson, “Trump Lashes Out on Syria as Republicans Rebuke Him in House Vote.” 20 Kareem Khadder, Jennifer Deaton, and Sharif Paget, “Kurdish Politician and 10 Others Killed by ‘Turkish-Backed Militia’ in Syria, SDF Claims,” CNN, October 13, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/13/middleeast/syria-turkey-kurdish-politicianintl/index.html (accessed October 15, 2019). 21 Mark Moore, “Turkey’s Invasion of Syria Is Causing a Refugee Crisis,” New York Post, October 15, 2019, https://nypost.com/2019/10/15/turkeys-invasion-of-syria-iscausing-a-refugee-crisis/ (accessed October 15, 2019). 22 Ibid. 23 Stancy Correll, “Withdrawing from Northern Syria Could ‘Not Come at a Worse Time,’ Votel Says.” 24 Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, “Pentagon Says US Forces Came under Turkish Artillery Fire in Syria,” CNN, October 12, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/11/ politics/turkey-artillery-fire-us-syria/index.html (accessed October 15, 2019). 25 Amberin Zaman, “Some US Forces to Remain in Northeastern Syria, SDF Sources Say,” Al-Monitor, October 15, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2019/10/us-forces-remain-northeast-syria-sdf-ypg-kobane-trump. html#ixzz62RsTAsAW (accessed October 15, 2019). 26 David E. Sanger. “From the President’s Gut Comes a Gut Punch,” New York Times, October 15, 2019, p. 1A. 27 Ben Hubbard. “American Pullback Is Viewed as Potential Boon to Assad and ISIS,” New York Times, October 8, 2019, p. A8.

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28 Zachary Basu, “Trump on Potential ISIS Escapees: “They Will Be Escaping to Europe,” Axios, October 9, 2019, https://www.axios.com/trump-isis-escapees-syria-turkeykurds-a74c803c-6b5b-4006-af45-6ff750b29a68.html (accessed October 14, 2019). 29 Courtney Kube and Mosheh Gains, “Top Kurdish General: Watching over ISIS Prisoners Now a ‘Second Priority,’ ” NBC News, October 7, 2019, https://www. nbcnews.com/news/mideast/top-kurdish-general-watching-over-isis-prisoners-nowsecond-priority-n1063496 (accessed October 17, 2019). 30 Natasha Turak, “Hundreds of ISIS Prisoners Are Escaping from Camps in Northern Syria amid Turkish Offensive,” CNBC, October 14, 2019, https://www.cnbc. com/2019/10/14/isis-prisoners-are-escaping-from-camps-in-syria-amid-turkishoffensive.html (accessed October 15, 2019). 31 “Northeastern Syria: MSF Forced to Evacuate,” Doctors without Borders, October 15, 2019, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/ northeastern-syria-msf-forced-evacuate (accessed October 16, 2019). 32 Amberin Zaman, “Confusion Reigns as Trump Authorizes Troop Withdrawal from Turkish-Syrian Border Towns,” Al-Monitor, October 7, 2019, https://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/2019/10/turkey-syria-border-us-troop-withdrawal-trumpconfusion.html (accessed December 7, 2019). 33 Ben Hubbard. “American Pullback Is Viewed as Potential Boon to Assad and ISIS.” 34 Jamie Ross, “Erdogan Threw Trump’s Bizarre ‘Tough Guy’ Letter in the Trash, Says Report,” Daily Beast, October 17, 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/erdoganthrew-trumps-bizarre-tough-guy-letter-in-the-trash-says-report (accessed October 20, 2019). 35 Mary Papenfuss, “In Chilling Echo of Ethnic Cleansing, Trump Says North Syria Needed to Be ‘Cleaned Out,’ ” HuffPost, October 17, 2019, https://www.huffpost.com/ entry/trump-erdogan-kurds-ethnic-cleansing-syria-ceasefire_n_5da8e1eae4b0bc92475 9b575?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_ referrer_sig=AQAAAKh3A5RmWLUQ3EqbHGCpjdv8oI_ tK9n0sL6gnwuj9LxiHaiZDr6xpAW0-LNCoHgNhyCMVkk DWo0j7KycDYLFoc80P8JVzWDd0Gu4tyYoCcLouj336vCB_ QhoqlwEVv0wVh8QXuxcHMr1jiXbR7clMtcbKS7Z4GBsndxTRwSJLFQ1 (accessed October 20, 2019).

Epilogue 1 James Hurford, “ ‘Don’t Tell Me Words Don’t Matter’—Barack Obama,” Biz Community, June 27, 2013, https://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/18/95587. html (accessed September 15, 2019). 2 William J. Burns, “The Demolition of U.S. Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, October 14, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2019-10-14/demolition-usdiplomacy (accessed October 15, 2015). 3 William J. Burns, The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for its Renewal (New York, Penguin Random House, 2019), 322. 4 Wolfgang, Dankspeckgruber and Anne-Marie Gardner, “Self Determination,” The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination, n.d., https://pesd.princeton. edu/?q=node/266 (accessed September 18, 2019). 5 Kofi A. Annan, “The Age of Human Rights,” Project Syndicate, September 26, 2000, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-age-of-human-rights (accessed September 15, 2019).

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6 Rory Carroll, “US Chose to Ignore Rwandan Genocide,” The Guardian, March 31, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/31/usa.rwanda (accessed September 18, 2019). 7 “Humanitarian Protection and Intervention,” Global Focus, n.d., http://globalfocus. org/GF-Intervention.htm (accessed September 18, 2019). 8 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Refworld, October 24, 1945, https:// www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html (accessed September 18, 2019). 9 “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Memorial Service for Richard C. Holbrooke,” White House, January 14, 2011 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/01/14/remarks-president-memorial-service-richard-holbrooke (accessed September 18, 2019). 10 Ban Ki-moon, “Memorial Service for Ambassador Richard Holbrooke,” United Nations Secretary-General, February 17, 2011, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/ speeches/2011-02-17/memorial-service-ambassador-richard-holbrooke (accessed September 18, 2019). 11 David Brooks, “The Problem with Partners,” New York Times, March 22, 2011, p. A27. 12 Michael D. Shear, “Obama Insists U.S. Will Not Get Drawn into Ground War in Iraq,” New York Times, September 17, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/world/ middleeast/obama-speech-central-command-isis-military-resolve.html (accessed September 18, 2019). 13 Burns, The Back Channel, 323. 14 Burns, “The Demolition of U.S. Diplomacy.” 15 Scott Horsley, “Is Trump the Toughest Ever on Russia?” NPR, July 20, 2018, https:// www.npr.org/2018/07/20/630659379/is-trump-the-toughest-ever-on-russia (accessed September 16, 2019) 16 Ibid. 17 Mike Stone and Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. Halts F-35 Equipment to Turkey, Protests Its Plans to Buy from Russia,” Reuters, April 1, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-usa-turkey-f35-exclusive/u-s-halts-f-35-equipment-to-turkey-protests-its-plansto-buy-from-russia-idUSKCN1RD316 (accessed September 18, 2019). 18 Rebecca Kheel, “Senate Bill Would Make Turkey Choose between US Fighter Jets, Russian Air Defense,” The Hill, March 28, 2019, https://thehill.com/policy/ defense/436333-senate-bill-would-block-f-35s-for-turkey-until-ankara-reverses-dealwith (accessed September 18, 2019). 19 Burns, The Back Channel, 327. 20 Ibid., 324–5. 21 Ibid. 22 Remarks by Special Envoy James F. Jeffrey. Panel on Justice and Accountability in Syria, 2019 United Nations General Assembly Side Event (September 25, 2019). 23 Remarks by Joel Rayburn, deputy assistant secretary of state for Levant Affairs. Panel on Justice and Accountability in Syria, 2019 United Nations General Assembly Side Event (September 25, 2019). 24 Remarks by UK Special Envoy for Syria Martin Longden, Panel on Justice and Accountability in Syria, 2019 United Nations General Assembly Side Event (September 25, 2019). 25 Burns, The Back Channel, 322. 26 Panel on Justice and Accountability in Syria, 2019 United Nations General Assembly Side Event (September 25, 2019).

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Glossary of Personalities • Ilham Ahmed is the cochair of the Syrian Democratic Council. She has been part of the Kurdish struggle for freedom since the 1990s, with a particular focus on women’s rights. • Kofi Annan was the UN Special Envoy to Syria from February 2012 to August 2012. Annan was the author of the six-point peace plan for Syria launched in March 2012. He was the UN Secretary General from January 1997 to December 2006. • Riad al-Asaad was a former colonel in the Syrian Air Force before he defected in July 2011. He was the founder and commander of the Free Syrian Army. • Bashar al-Assad is the 19th and current president of Syria, who has held office since 2000. He concurrently serves as the commander in chief of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. • Basil al-Assad was the eldest son in the Assad family, who was groomed as Hafez Assad’s successor. He died in a car crash in 1994. • Hafez al-Assad is the father of Bashar al-Assad. Hafez served as the president of Syria from 1971 to 2000, after he seized power in a 1970 coup. • Maher al-Assad is the youngest of Hafez Assad’s four sons. He is the commander of the Presidential Guard and a member of the Baath Party Central Committee. • Rifaat al-Assad, a younger brother of Hafez al-Assad, is the former vice president from 1984 to 1998. Rifaat served in the Syrian army. His unit, the Defense Companies, an elite security force, was instrumental in the 1982 Hama massacre. • Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi is the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since April 2013. He is a self-proclaimed caliph. • Bassam Barabandi worked in the diplomatic civil service of the Syrian government for fourteen years. He was the first secretary at the Embassy of Syria in Washington, DC. Barabandi cofounded People Demand Change Inc in 2013. • Ali al-Bayanoni is the leader of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood and is in exile in London. • Mohammed Said Bekheitan was the assistant secretary of the Baath Party and the head of the National Security Bureau from 2000 to 2005. • John Bolton served as a former US National Security Advisor in the Trump administration from April 2018 to September 2019. • Lakhdar Brahimi is an Algerian UN diplomat who served as the UN Special Envoy to Syria from September 2012 to May 2014, replacing Kofi Annan. • William J.  Burns is a former US Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014 during the Obama administration. • Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu is the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey from August 2014 to present.

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• Vitaly Churkin was a Russian diplomat and former ambassador of Russia to the UN from 2006 to 2017. • Hillary Clinton was the US secretary of state from 2009 to 2013 during the Obama administration. She unsuccessfully ran for president in 2016 against Donald Trump. • Ali Duba is a former head of the Syrian military intelligence who served as a close advisor to President Hafez al-Assad. • Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was a founder of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party and served as prime minister or president of Turkey from 2003 to present. • Jeffrey Feltman is a former UN under-secretary-general for political affairs and the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs from 2009 to 2012. He was appointed by the Obama administration. • Robert S. Ford is a former US diplomat. He served as the US ambassador to Syria from 2010 to 2014, during the Obama administration. • Filippo Grandi is a diplomat and current UN high commissioner for refugees from 2016 to present. • Antonio Guterres is the secretary general of the UN since January 2017 and formerly the UN high commissioner for refugees from 2005 to 2015. • Chuck Hagel was the US secretary of defense from 2013 to 2015. Hagel retired citing conflicts within the administration, particularly concerning ISIL. • Rafik Hariri was a former prime minister of Lebanon, who was assassinated in February 2005. A UN investigation implicated high-ranking Syrian officials in the assassination. • Ali Haydar was the former head of the Syrian Special Forces from 1968 to 1988 and 1990 to 1994 and a close friend of Hafez Assad. After questioning hereditary succession, Haydar was arrested and imprisoned. • Frederic C. Hof served as the special advisor for the Syrian Political Transition in the US Department of State from May 2011 to September 2012. • Hisham Ikhtiyar directed the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) from December 2001 until June 2005, when he was appointed as director of the Baath Party Regional Command National Security Bureau (NSB). • Bashar Jaafari is the permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the UN from July 2006 to present. • Salah Jadid was a Syrian military general and left-wing politician in the Arab Socialist Baath Party. Jadid was Syria’s president from 1966 to 1970, when he was ousted by Hafez al-Assad. • James F.  Jeffrey is a senior US diplomat and currently serves as the US Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy for the global coalition to defeat ISIL. • Boris Johnson is serving as prime minister of the United Kingdom and is the leader of the Conservative Party from July 2019 to present. • John Kerry was the US secretary of state from 2013 to 2017 during the Obama administration. • Ruhollah Khomeini, known in the Western world as Ayatollah Khomeini, was the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and leader of the Iranian Revolution in

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Glossary of Personalities

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1979. Following the Revolution, Khomeini became the supreme leader of Iran from 1979 to 1989. Abdul Halim Khaddam is the former vice president of Syria from 1984 to 2005 and was instrumental in exerting Syrian control over Lebanon. He resigned from his post in 2005, fled to Paris, and accused Bashar al-Assad of threatening Hariri months before his death. Ban Ki-moon is a South Korean politician and diplomat. He served as the UN secretary general from 2007 to 2016. Émile Lahoud was the president of Lebanon from 1998 to 2007. He was widely viewed as a Syrian puppet. Sergei Lavrov is the current minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation from March 2004 to present. Emmanuel Macron is the current president of France since May 2017. James Mattis is an American veteran, who served as secretary of defense from January 2017 to December 2018. John McCain was a prisoner of war during the Vietnam War and served as a US Republican congressman and senator from Arizona. Brett McGurk is a former US diplomat who served in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. McGurk was the Special Presidential Envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIL until his resignation in December 2018. Angela Merkel is the chancellor of Germany from 2005 to present. She has been regarded as the de facto leader of the EU. Staffan de Mistura is an Italian-Swedish diplomat and UN Special Envoy for Syria from 2014 to January 2019. Robert Mood, a Norwegian major general, was the former chief military observer and head of mission of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS). Walid al-Moualem is the Syrian minister of foreign affairs and expatriates. In 2011, he was sanctioned by the United States due to the regime’s crackdown against antigovernment protesters. Salih Muslim is the former cochairman of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which he helped found in 2003. Muslim stepped down as the head of the PYD in 2017 and has been a foreign representative of TEV-DEM. Benjamin Netanyahu is the current prime minister of Israel, serving from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2009 to present. Barack Obama was the 44th president of the United States, serving from 2009 to 2017. Victor Orban is the prime minister of Hungary from 2010 to present and from 1998 to 2002. Orban has imposed Europe’s harshest anti-immigration laws. Geir Pedersen is a Norwegian diplomat and the UN Special Envoy for Syria from January 2019 to present. Mike Pompeo, former CIA director, was the US secretary of state from April 2018 to present. Vladimir Putin is the current president of Russia, has served as both the prime minister of Russia and president of Russia since 1999.

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• Dawoud Rajiha is Syria’s minister of defense since 2011. He is a Greek Orthodox Christian, making him a rarity in the upper echelons of the predominately Alawite Syrian leadership. • Lisa Roman is the former director for Syria at the National Security Council. Prior to serving at the White House, she was senior advisor to the US Special Envoy for Syria at the Department of State, and an Outreach Officer on the Syria Desk. • Hassan Rouhani is an Iranian politician, serving as the president of Iran since August 2013. • Ferhat Abdi Şahin, better known by his noms de guerre Şahin Cilo, Mazlum Kobanê, and Mazlum Abdi, is a Syrian Kurdish military leader, serving as the commander in chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces. • Matteo Salvini served as Deputy Prime Minister of Italy and Minister of Interior from June 2018 to September 2019. • Daniel Shapiro is a former ambassador of the United States to Israel and the senior director for the Middle East and North Africa on the US National Security Council. He was appointed under the Obama administration and ordered to resign upon the inauguration of President Trump. • Assef Shawkat was a brother-in-law to the Assad family and the deputy minister of defense from September 2011 until his death in July 2012. Shawkat died during the bomb attack allegedly organized by the FSA. He was implicated in the UN investigation of Hariri’s assassination. • Sergey Shoygu has served as the minister of defense of the Russian Federation and as chairman of the Council of Ministers of Defense since 2012. • Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is the current president of Egypt and former director of military intelligence, former minister of defence, and former general. • Erna Solberg is the prime minister of Norway from 2013 to present. Solberg has been the leader of the Conservative Party since 2004. • Qassem Soleimani is an Iranian major general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Soleimani has been the commander of its Quds Force since 1998. • Rex W. Tillerson served as the US secretary of state from February 2017 to March 2018, under President Trump. • Donald J. Trump is the 45th president of the United States. • Chris Van Hollen is serving as the junior Democrat US senator for Maryland. From 2003 to 2017, he held the position of US representative for MD-8.

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Further Reading Al-Haj Saleh, Yassin. The Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian Tragedy. London: Hurst, 2017. Anderson, Tim. The Dirty War on Syria: Washington, Regime Change and Resistance. Stockton, CA: Global Research Publishers, 2016. Burns, Williams J. The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal. New York: Random House, 2019. Dagher, Sam. Assad or We Burn the Country: How One Family’s Lust for Power Destroyed Syria. New York: Little, Brown, 2019. Heydemann, Steven, and Leenders, Reinoud. Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran (Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures). Edited by Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013. Hokayem, Emile. Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. London: Routledge, 2017. Lesch, David W. Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012. Lynch, Mark. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2012. Rafizadeh, Majid. US Foreign Policy: Understanding ISIS, the Middle East and the Complexity of the Syrian Civil War. Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016. Seale, Patrick. Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Van Dam, Nikolaos. The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Assad and the Ba’ath Party. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011. Weiss, Michael, and Hassan, Hassan. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts, 2015. Yassin-Kassab, Robin, and Al-Shami, Leila. Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War. London: Pluto Press, 2016.

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Index Abboud, Hassan 42, 84 Abdi, Mazloum Kobani 144, 147, 179, 207, 209, 213 Abdullah Azzam Brigades 42, 44 Abkhazia 92 Aboo Ghuddah, Abdu-l-Fattaah 4 Abu al-Fida mausoleum 5 Access to Justice and Community Security (AJACS) program 45 Action Group on Syria 77 adalet 127 Adana Agreement, 1998 118 Adrian Darya 110 Afrin 73, 140, 146 agricultural policies 30 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 105 Ahmed, Ilham 73, 144, 206 Ahrar al-Sham 42, 43, 84 Ahrar al-Sharqiya 212 Aikidi, Abdul Jabar 49 Aisha 104 Ajnad al-Sham 43 Ajnad Kavkaq 43 Akhras, Asma (Bashar al-Assad’s wife) 17 Syrian Trust for Development, 17–18 Akleh, Hasan Ali 138 Alawites 104, 118, 165–169 bombings and assassinations 169 Latakia province 165 Shahadah (not abide by) 166 in Syria 168 al-Bab 146 Aleppo 4, 5, 8, 14, 19, 43, 94, 97, 118 Al-Hasanain mosque 5 Al-Hobeit 176 Ali, Zine El Abidine Ben 23 Ali ibn Abi Talib 104, 165 Aliwya Ahmed Abdou 43 Al-Jazeera 23 Al-Kawakibi Forum 14 Allen, John 123

al-Qaeda 42, 44, 96, 173 Al-Qardaha 165 Al-Qaryatayn 153 Al-Saiqa 4 American RQ-4A Global Hawk 112 Amnesty International 6, 7, 97, 160 Anadolu Agency 176 Anatolia 149 Anbar 193 Ankara process 49, 120 Annan, Kofi 62–63, 75, 76, 81–82, 93, 195, 219 destructive competition 81 setbacks for 82 Ansar al-Din 173 anti-Americanism 100 anti-immigrant party 71 anti-ISIS coalition 144 anti-tank and antiaircraft missiles 51 anti-Zionists 178 Arab League 3 Arab socialism 28–29 Arab Spring 23, 24 Arafat, Rashid Hammoud 38 Arkhangelsk 90 armed terrorist groups 84 Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) 151 Armenian Genocide, 1915 149–150, 152, 188 Armenians 5 in Aleppo 150 and Christians 149–155 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) 90 al-Asaad, Riyad 37–38, 44 Ashura 104 Asia and Pacific Division in the Department of Political Affairs 196 al-Assad, Bashar 9, 11, 45, 47–48, 58, 59, 81, 97, 126. see also al-Assad, Hafez; Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

290

290 Annan’s six-point peace plan 76–77 chemical weapons attack 181, 212 “creative thinking” need of 11–12 culpability, denied 17 economic issues 12 Erdoğan’s relationship with 119 family 18 fear of sectarianism 32 flagrant abuses 59 rebels in Idlib 173 referendum, 2007 21 resignation 47–48 about sedition 30–31 stability, efforts to foster 23 “transparency” 12 wife 17–18 women, role of 12 al-Assad, Basil 8–9, 17 al-Assad, Hafez Adana Agreement 118 air force pilot 3 Alawite 3 annihilation of Hama 4–5 “Arab socialism” 28–29 assassination attempts 6 defense minister 3 early life 3 “Hama rules” 7 political reforms and 6 prime minister 3 sons 8–9 Soviet Union, naval base in Tartus 90 and Soviet Union 89 al-Assad, Maher 18, 19, 24, 33, 176 al-Assad, Rifaat 6, 7, 14 Assyrians 5 Astana Process 100, 174–175 Small-Group 197 in Sochi 175 al-Atassi, Suhair 12 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 117 Attar, Issam 4 Austin, Lloyd 56 authoritarianism 125 Aydon, strike on 95 Ayn Issa detention center 214 Ayoub, Ibrahim 38 Azadi Rebellion 118

Index al-Azm, Amr 14 Azm Palace 5 Baathist civilian leadership 3 Baath Party 3, 4, 6, 7, 13, 28, 89, 136, 137 founded in 167 Badini 135 al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr 54, 150–151, 180 assassination 179 caliphate 192 Baghdad-to-Damascus highway 213 Bahboh, Abdullah 38 Bahboh, Ahmed 38 Bahrain 23, 103 Bakr, Abu 104 Banner of the Nation 42 Barabandi, Bassam 33, 37, 45, 51, 56 Bareeq Education and Development 158 barrel bombs 53 Barzani, Masoud 141 battle for Kobani 121 Bedoyan, Hovsep 152 Bekheitan, Saeed 19, 33 Beqaa Valley 4, 9, 118 Biden, Joe 51, 121 Bin Walid, Liwa Khaled 39 Bin Zaid, Kataib Osama 39 BlueStream 129 Blumenthal, Richard 144 Bolton, John R. 110, 186 bombast 217 bombing civilian infrastructure 175 Bosnia-Herzegovina war, 1994 61 Bouazizi, Mohamed 23, 138 Brahimi, Lakhdar 83, 84, 85, 93–94, 195, 221 Brahimi Report 221 brigade 56 Brunson, Andrew 125 Burns, Bill 219 Burns, William J. 50, 51, 52 Bush, George W. 101 Caliphate 104 CARE 158 Çavuşoğlu, Mevlüt 147, 177, 179 Central Command (CENTCOM) 58 Central Crisis Management Cell (CCMC) 8, 14, 19, 32

 291

Index Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 52 cessation of hostilities 78 Chaldean Christians 217 Chechen-led Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar 44 Chemical Weapons Convention 51 chemical weapons (CW) 49–51, 84, 94, 115, 120, 203, 217 attacks 181 Ghouta chemical attack 51, 120 Khan al-Assal chemical attack 50–51 Cheney, Dick 210 Cheney, Liz 210 Chios 67 Christians jihad against 149 in Nineveh Plains and North and East Syria (NES) 149 Syriacs 153 churches 212 Churkin, Vitaly 92 Cicilline, David 125 Circassians 5 civil society 158 climate refugees 30 Clinton, Hillary 46, 47, 53, 54, 55, 91, 93, 183 CNN Turk 124 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 137 Colak, Salih Zeki 124 Cold War 218 Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve 143 Committee for State Security (KGB) 91 Committees for the Revival of Civil Society in Syria 12 Communist Party of the Soviet Union 89 community mobilization 25 confederation 141 confidence building measures (CBMs) 195 Convention against Torture, 1984 65 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 162 corruption 29, 126 Cotton, Tom 91 Council on Foreign Relations 160 counterterrorism 75 crime against humanity 50 Croatia 71

291

cross-border humanitarian aid 61 Cruz, Ted 91 Cumhuriyet 121 cyber army 105 cybersecurity 102 Dabiq 146, 150 Daesh 54–56, 59, 122, 179, 189 Dagher, Sam 169 Damascus 5, 8, 25, 118 Davutoğlu visit to 28 Erdoğan visit to 119 Rawda Square of Damascus 33 Damascus Declaration for Democratic and National Change, 2004 14–15, 20, 138 Daraa 24, 101, 138 anti-government protests 25 Syrian civil war and 32 unrest in 24–25 Dar Zeytuna 161 Davutoğlu, Ahmet 28, 99 The Dawn of Idlib 173 Days of Rage 23 de-Baathification 137 Declaration of Identity Reform 169 de-confliction deal 174 de-escalation agreement 175 defectors 38 degrade and destroy ISIS 192 Deir ez-Zor incident 28, 97, 102, 137, 149, 152, 213 Deir Fol, strike on 95 demilitarized zone (DMZ) 174 Demirtaş, Selahattin 146 de Mistura, Staffan 195, 199 democracy 79 democratic autonomy 135, 141 democratic federalism 140, 141 Democratic Union Party (PYD) 83, 117, 137, 139, 154, 160, 206 Dempsey, Martin E. 54, 106 Denmark 71 Department of Defense (DoD) 57, 213 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 82 de-radicalization 218 Dersim rebellion, 1937 118 Dibo, Sihanouk 143 al-Dik, Abu Hussein 42

292

292

Index

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 78, 202 discrimination on ethnic 80 displacement crisis 61–62 Denmark 71 Egypt 69 Europe 70–74 Germany 70 Greece 66–67 Iraq 69 Jordan 68–69 Lebanon 67–68 Norway 70 Sweden 70 Turkey 64–66 United Nations 62–63, 195 wartime rapes 160 divide and rule 165 Diyala 193 Dmitriev, Kirill 102 drought 30 drug smuggling 26 Duba, Ali 14, 20 Dubrovka Theater 96 Dündar, Can 121 economic reform and liberalization 21 edict (fatwa) 6, 165, 169 Egeland, Jan 173 Egypt 23 displacement crisis 69 Tahrir Square protest 23 El Paso killings, 2019 72 el-Sisi, Abdel Fattah 23, 125 Emergency Law, 1963 136 Engel, Eliot L. 90 environmental degradation 30 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 57, 64, 66, 73, 117, 119, 122, 127, 144, 148, 177 meeting with Putin 207–208 Syria’s policy 207–208 Esper, Mark T. 210 Euphrates River 90 Europe 7, 16, 39, 62, 64, 65. see also specific countries displacement crisis 70–74 European Union (EU) 129 funds for refugee relief 65, 208 EU–Turkey deal 65, 208

Facebook 124 Failaq al-Awl 43 false-coup 123 al-Farouq, Kataib 39 Farouq Brigades 42 Fatah al-Islam 42, 44 Fatima 104 Fawk al-Awi 43 Faylaq al-Rahman 43, 49 Faylaq al-Sham 43 Fayyadh, Shafiq 9 Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) 72 Feltman, Dan 27 Feltman, Jeffrey 107 al-Fid’a, Kataib Abu 39 Fidan, Hakan 124 Fighting Vanguard (Al-Talia Al-Muqatila) 4 Firqa 13th Division 43 Firqat Sultan Murad 43 Foley, James, execution 55, 192 Ford, Robert 25–28, 47, 53, 59, 93 Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 77 foreign-backed conspiracy 41 Foreign financiers 45 foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) 48, 115, 122, 146 Fourth Infantry Division (US Army) 120 Free Alawites 169 Free Officers Movement (FOM) 38 Free Syrian Army (FSA) 32, 37–46, 49, 55, 73, 83, 98, 123, 143, 174, 188. see also National Front for Liberation of Syria (NFL) French Mandate 117–118 French territory 118 Friedman, Thomas L. 3, 8 Friends of Syria 45 From Beirut to Jerusalem (Friedman) 8 F-16s 124 Gaddafi, Muammar 23, 92, 119 Gates, Robert M. 112 Gatilov, Gennady 82 gender-based violence (GBV) 158 gender equity 140 General Intelligence Directorate (GID) 19 Geneva Communiqué 77–78, 79, 82, 83, 197 Geneva Convention 44, 92, 128

 293

Index Geneva II 83, 84, 85, 93, 123, 195 Geneva Peace process 75–77, 100, 109, 174 access 78 cessation of hostilities 78 democracy 79 dialogue 79 governance 80 human rights 80 international cooperation 80–85 negotiations 79 political prisoners 79 political transition 79–80 principles 78 protection of civilians 78 security 78 transitional justice 80 Germany 70 Ghanem, Mohammed 74 Ghazali, Rustum 20 Gheit, Ahmed Aboul 115 Ghouta 43 chemical attack 51, 183 Global Gender Gap index. 163 global terrorism 76 global warming 29–30 Golan Heights 3, 89, 115 Goldberg, Jeffrey 189 Grace 1 110 Graham, Lindsey 189, 209–210 Grandi, Filippo 61–62, 63, 65 Grant, Mark Lyall 91 Great Colonnade of Apamea 5 Greater Kurdistan 120, 135 Greater Lebanon 118 Great Satan (United States) 105 Greece denied asylum to Syrian refugees 67 displacement crisis 66–67 greenhouse gas emissions 30 Guerilla-style raids 38 Gül, Erdem 121 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 120 Guterres, António 195, 205, 224 Gutman, Roy 143 Hadeed, Marwan, assassination 4 Hadith 104 Hagel, Chuck 30, 59 Haidar, Ali 83

293

Haines, David, execution 55 Hajj 166 Haley, Nikki 181 Hama 4–10, 21 agricultural market 5 al-Nuri mosque 5 Baathists in 5 Ford’s visit 26–28 mosques in 5 self-employed population 5 small-scale manufacturing 5 stronghold of the Brotherhood 7 wooden waterwheels (norias) 5 Hamad, Insaf 162 Hamadani, Hossein 109 Hama demonstration 27 Hama rebellion 25 “Hama rules” 7 al-Hamoud, Yousuf 38 Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya 42, 49 Harakat al-Naser 43 Harakat Fajr al-Sham al-Islamiya 43 Harakat Hazm 55 al-Harati, Abd al-Mahdi 42 Hariri, Rafik 20, 108, 206 al-Hariri, Rafiq, assassination 21–22 Harmoush, Hussein 38 Harmoush, Kataib 39 Hasakah 121, 138 Hassounizadeh, Farshad 109 Hatay Province 118 Hay al-Arman 150 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) 49, 173 Hezbollah 4, 9, 21, 84, 103, 104, 108, 115, 228 Reinforcements from 176 Hitler, Adolf 102 Hizb al-Islam al-Turkistani 44 Hleihel, Ghassan 38 Hof, Frederic C. 45, 48, 59, 75, 81 criticism of Obama administration 49 Holbrooke, Richard C. 18, 221 al-Hol refugee camp 193, 200–201 Homs 5, 39 honor killings 159 hostage-taking 107 Houthis 23 Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator 200

294

294

Index

humanitarian intervention 8 human rights 80, 97 al-Hurani, Feda’ 15 Hussai, King (Jordan) 3 Hussein, Saddam 3, 13, 50, 90, 137 Ḥussein ibn Ali 104 Idlib 38, 39, 94, 173–180, 198–199 Baghdadi 174 civilian population 174 The Dawn of Idlib 173 geography 173 human suffering in Syria 174 offensive 173 population 173 Syria’s civil war 173 Tarmala Maternity and Children’s Hospital 175 IED (improvised explosive devices) attacks 38, 42, 53, 106, 122, 144 Ikhtiyar, Hisham 20, 33 Imarat al-Qawqaz fi al-Sham 43 IMF 97 Incirlik Air Base 123 Independent International Commission of Inquiry 159 Inter-Agency Standing Committee 62 internally displaced persons (IDPs) 61, 173, 186, 200 safe zone for 174 international aid agencies 61 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 51, 94 international cooperation 80–85 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 15 International Criminal Court (ICC) 128, 221 international humanitarian law (IHL) 61, 219 International Impartial Investigative Mechanism (IIIM) 229 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 62 International refugee law 61 International Rescue Committee (IRC) 62 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 76 international terrorism 96

Internet Research Agency (IRA) 102 intervention criteria 219–222 authorization options 222 comprehensive approach 223 contingency planning 223 exit strategy 223 international law 222 last resort 222 popular support 222 work with allies 222 Iran affiliated militias 176 Iranian mullahs 107 Iranian Revolution 105 1979 Islamic Revolution 104 paid Hezbollah salaries 107 Iran–Iraq War 4, 107, 131 Iraq displacement crisis 69 sectarian civil war 104 Iraqi Kurdistan 58 Ishak, Bassam 152 Islamic Emirate of Homs 44 Islamic Front in Syria 6 Islamic Jihad Organization 4 Islamic Movement in Palestine 4 Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the Levant 42 Islamic revival 104 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 84, 104, 106, 132, 225, 228 Islamic State 54 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 40, 49, 54–55, 74, 94, 96, 98, 104, 117, 142, 149, 173, 184, 207, 210, 218 al-Qaryatayn 153 Armenians, harassed and persecuted 151 caliphate, defeated 213 executing Westerners 55 global coalition against 146 Harakat Hazm attack 55 jihad against Christians 150 Turkey’s attack on 213 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 122 Islamist jihadists 49 Islamists 40, 157–158 Israel 3 Israel cease military 89

 295

Index Israel–Gaza war 32 Issa, Habib 13 Issa, Mahmud 16 Istanbul 64, 84 Küçükçekmece district 65 al-Jaafari, Bashar 62–63, 84 Jabal al-Druze 118 Jabal al-Zawiyeh 38 Jabhat al-Nusra 42 Jabhat al-Shamiya 43 Jabhat al-Tanmya 43 Jabhat Fateh al-Sham 42 al-Jadid, Salah 3 Jafaari, Bashar 173 Jaish al-Awl 43 Jaish al-Islam 43 Jaish al-Mujahideen 43 Jaish al-Nasr 43 Jamal al-Atassi Forum 12 Jameh, Jameh 24 Jarabulus 146 Jarba, Ahmad 84 Jaysh al-Islam 43, 49 Jaysh al-Izza 174 Jaysh al-Sunna 173 Jazeera (Qamishli and Hasakah cantons) 140 Jeffrey, James F. 147, 178 Jihad 150, 226 jihadi groups, threat of 144 jihadi highway 100 Jindires 146 Jisr al-Shughur 38 Johnson, Boris 71 Johnson, Ron 144 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 105, 111–113, 132, 182, 225 Jordan 23 displacement crisis 68–69 National Action Plan (NAP) 161–162 Jordanian Salafi -jihadists 42 Jouejati, Murhaf 14 Jouejati, Rafif 14 al-Julani, Abu Mohammad 54, 84 Jund al-Aqsa 42, 43 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 64, 119, 174, 207

295

Kaine, Tim 144 Kanaan, Ghazi 14 Karbala 104 Kawakibi, Salam 14 Kefer Cenê District 73, 128 Kelly, John 189 Kemalism 118 Kerry, John 50, 51, 52, 122, 151 al-Khaddam, Abdul Halim 9, 14, 20 Khalil, Hassan 14, 20 Khalilzad, Zalmay 120 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali 103, 104, 106, 111 Khan al-Assal chemical attack 50–51 Khan Sheikhoun 176, 181, 182 Kheyrbek, Mohammad Nassif 20 Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia 96–98 Khmer Rouge in Cambodia 17 Khomeini, Ruhollah 104 kidnapping 107 Kilo, Michel 16 Ki-moon, Ban 50, 82, 84, 85, 106 King Abdullah II of Jordan 57, 103 Kirkuk 193 Kissinger, Henry 195 Kobani, Mazloum 121, 140, 214 Kos 67 Kosovo precedent 92 Kosygin, Alexei 89 Kremlin Playbook 129 kuffars 167 Kurdish Christians 155 Kurdish language media and books, banning 136 Kurdish National Council (KNC) 142, 206 Kurdish-run displacement camp 160 Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC) 142 Kurdistan 135 Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria (KDP-S) 141 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 69, 141 Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 69, 138 Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) 69 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 4, 58, 100, 117, 118, 135, 207 Kurds 98, 135–148 Dersim rebellion 118 geography 135 language 135

296

296 in Syria 118 in Turkey 118 Kurmanji 118, 135 Labwani, Kamal 21 Lahoud, Emile 9 Latakia 166 Lavrov, Sergey 51, 84, 189 Law 49 6 League of Arab States (LAS) 76, 93, 195 Lebanese National Movement 4 Lebanese Shia Islamist movement 84 Lebanon civil war 4, 8, 90 displacement crisis 67–68 garbage crisis 68 Leros 67 Lesbos 67 les troupes spéciales du Levant 166 Libya 23, 42, 49, 53, 92, 119 civil war 44 Lice District 118 Liwa al-Haqq 42, 173 Liwa al-Islam (“Brigade of Islam”) 33 Liwa al-Ummah 42 Liwa Fatemiyoun Division 109 Liwa Zainebiyoun Brigade 109 MacFarland, Sean 143 Macron, Emmanuel 111, 211 Madrasas 104 Mahdi Army 106 Maher 19 Mahsum Korkmaz Academy 118 Majid bin Muhammad al-Majid 44 Makhlouf, Hafez 33 Mamluk al-Izzi mosque 5 manpower problem 106 Maronite Christians in Lebanon 6 Masyaf Castle 5 Mattis, James 186, 189–190, 209 resignation 190–191 Mazloum 209 McCain, John 52, 54, 57 McConnell, Mitch 209 McDonough, Dennis 47, 51 McFaul, Michael 102 McGurk, Brett 122, 146, 148, 212 Meals Ready-to-Eat (MREs) 52

Index Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 98, 214 Mendi, Galip 124 Menendez, Robert 210 Merkel, Angela 70, 71, 127 Merkley, Jeff 144 Mesopotamia 45 Military Operations Command (MOC) 56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 28 Mission: Impossible 82 Mokhtarband, Hamid 109 Mood, Robert 76 al-Moqdad, Faisal 84 morality police 105 Moria camp 67 Morsi, Mohamed 23, 69 Mosul 149, 193 Mountain Turks 118 Movement for Democratic Society (TEV-DEM) 142 Movement for Social Peace 13 Muallem, Walid 26, 50, 84, 197 Mubarak, Hosni 23 Mueller, Robert 102 Muhammad 165 Mukhabarat (intelligence agency) 26, 27, 137, 154 Mulvaney, Mick 189 Muqtada al-Sadr 106 Murakhtin, Konstantin 99 Muslim, Salih 143 Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 4–7, 11, 15, 125, 167 Assad assassination, attempts 6 Morsi, Mohamed 23, 69 radicalization 4 Mutanian, Masis 154 mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) 206 Nagata, Mike 57–58 Najeeb, Atef 24 Nasrallah, Hassan 107 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 89 National Council 15 National Defense Force 168 National Democratic Gathering 6 National Dialogue process 79 National Front for Liberation of Syria (NFL) 174

 297

Index National Intelligence Agency (MIT) 55, 121, 177 National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 110 National Opposition Coalition 83 National Salvation Front (NSF) 12, 13, 15 National Security Adviser (NSA) 55, 110 National Security Bureau (NSB) 19, 32 National Security Council (NSC) 26, 49, 54, 187 Nazi Holocaust 62 Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) 186 Netanyahu, Benjamin 57, 99, 113, 114, 115 Newroz 136 9/11 attacks 72, 76 Nineveh 193 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 158, 175, 200 norias 5 North and East Syria (NES) 135, 136, 138–140, 160, 178, 185, 199 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 52, 76, 120, 136, 177, 209, 218, 219, 226 bombed Serbia 92 nuclear sharing policy 120 Norway 70 Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF) 200 Norwegian Refugee Council 173 Nour al-Din al-Zinki 43 Nuland, Victoria 26 al-Nuri mosque 5 Nusayr, Ibn 165 al-Nusra, Jabhat 84 al-Nusra Front 42–43, 57, 94, 173 Obama, Barack 47–48, 56, 82, 95, 203 foreign-policy decisions 217 O’Brien, Robert C. 211 Öcalan, Abdullah 69, 118, 119, 135, 137 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 62, 214 Omar, Ilhan 72 Omar al-Farouq Brigade 48 al-Omari, Alwiyat 39 Omari Mosque operation 24 Operation Inherent Resolve 55 Operation Olive Branch 73

297

Operation Peace Spring 73 Orban, Victor 71 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 203 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 106 Orontes river 5 Ossetia 92 Ottoman Empire 117, 149 Ottoman Kurdish territory 117 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 90, 107, 196 Palmyra Prison 6 pan-Arab movement 28–29, 137 Panetta, Leon 54, 105–106 parachute food supplies to Sarajevo 61 Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) 132 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 69 peace-building strategy 96 Pedersen, Geir O. 162, 195, 196 Pence, Mike 211, 215 Pentagon 212–213 People’s Assembly of Syria 159 People’s Protection Units (YPG) 117, 140 Peskov, Dmitry 98 Petraeus, David H. 53, 54 Pillay, Navi 51 Piran, Sheikh Said 118 policy of Turkification 118 political and intellectual pluralism 13 political prisoners 79 political transition 79–80 Pompeo, Mike 211 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Hamas 4 Port of Ceyhan 132 potential powerbrokers 42 Powell, Colin 13–14, 21, 53, 55 powerbrokers 42 Prigozhin, Yevgeny 102 private investments 29 privatization 29 Progress Party 71 pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) 146 Prophet Muhammad 104, 165 protection of civilians 78 Protocol Relating to the Status, 1967 65

298

298 provincial military councils (PMCs) 44 Putin, Vladimir 52, 84, 95, 101, 102, 175, 203 al-Qahtaneh, Qais 38 Qalamoun 108 Qamishli 138, 214 Qandil Mountains 120 Qardaha 3 Qatar 45 Quds force 104, 107 Queen Rania 68 Quneitra 101 Qur’an 104 race-driven extremism 72 radicalization 4, 218 Rajiha, Dawoud 33 Rajo 146 Ras al-Ain 136 al-Rastan, strike on 95 Rawda Square of Damascus 33 realistic relations 223 Iran 225–226 Russia 224–225 Turkey 226–227 rebellious teenagers 24 torture 24–25 redeployment 176 RED LINE 184 Refugee Act 71 Refugee Convention, 1951 65 refugee resettlement 62 Regional Security Officer (RSO) 27 religious nationalists 39–40 resistance movement 118 responsibility to protect (R2P) 8, 63, 75 Reyhanli 161 Rice, Susan E. 51, 55 Rifaat, Brother 8 riots 122 ripeness theory 206 Robertson, Hugh 82 Rojava 58 Rome Statute 129 Rouhani, Hassan 103 Rubio, Marco 91, 144 Rumsfeld, Donald H. 53 Russia 89–102

Index Chamber of Commerce 99 Russian Direct Investment Fund 102 Russian Duma 90 Russian military resurgence 97 Russian Sukhoi 24 99 Rwanda genocide, 1994 82 al-Sadat, Anwar 3 SADA Women-only Centre 161 Saddam Hussein’s statue 25 “Safe Zones” in Syria 56, 148, 174 Safronkov, Vladimir 181 Salafi coalition 42 Salafi-jihadi ideology 44 Salafi-jihadists 40, 42 foreign fighters 41 Salafism 40–41 al-Salama, Bab 57 Salat 166 Saleh, Ali Abdullah 23 Salih Muslims 123, 214 Salman 165 bin Salman, Mohammed 112 Salmia, strike on 95 Salvini, Matteo 71 Samos 67 Sanjak in Alexandretta 118 Sanliurfa province 118 Sarhan, Ahmad 42 Saudi Arabia 23, 45, 49, 103, 104 Sawm 166 Sberbank 129 Scott, Rick 144 Scowcroft, Brent 55 sectarianism 80 secular nationalists 39–40 security 78 security sector reform (SSR) 78 Sednaya Prison 13 Seif, Riad 12 Seif al-Sham 43 Selezynov, Gennadiy 90 self-sacrifice and martyrdom 149 Senate Armed Services Committee 57 Serbia 71, 92, 203 Serhildan 136 Sevres Treaty, 1920 117 sexual slavery 160 sexual violence 158

 299

Index Sezer, Ahmet Necdet 119 Shaaban, Bouthaina 84 al-Shaar, Mohammad 19, 33 Shahiba 168 Sham Falcons Brigades. see Suqour al-Sham Sham Legion 42 Shapiro, Daniel 27 al-Shara, Faruk 14, 118 Sharia law 158 Shawkat, Assef 14, 33 Shaykh al-Hadid 146 Shayrat Airbase 181 al-Sheikh, Ahmad Issa 42 Sherman, Wendy 82, 93, 112–113 Shi’atu Ali 104 al-Shihabi, Hikmat 9, 14 Shiites 103 Crescent 103–115 militias 108 and Sunnis, rift 103 Shoygu, Sergey 106, 107 siege of Daraa 24, 32 Silajdžić, Haris 61, 74 Simon, Steve 26, 54 Sinai 89 Siverek and Hilvan rebellions 118 six-point peace plan 76–77, 82 Brahimi’s approach 83 Syria rejected 82 sleeper cells 193 S-400 missile defense system 177 Sochi Agreement 175, 176, 197 Sochi Final Statement 197–198 Solberg, Erna 70–71 Soleimani, Qassem 100, 107 Sorani dialect 135 Sotloff, Steven, execution 55 Soviet Union, collapse 91 Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 57–58 Sputnik 98 Srebrenica safe massacre 82 S-400 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 207 Stena Impero 110 Stinger missiles 48 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 90 Strela-l (SA-7) 90

suicide bombing 107–108, 193 Suleiman, Bahjat 14 Sunna 104 Sunni Islamists 40 militia 103 Sunni Muslims 4–5. see also Shiites conflict with Shias 22 in Daraa 24 decentralization 166 as demonstrators 28 execution of prisoners 6 girls and women, to marry ISIS fighters 160 grievances against Alawite administration 6 Islamist insurgency 14 and mosques 5 protesters 28 social and political sphere 166 urban elite of Damascus 8 Wahhabism 104 Sunni opposition militias 105 Supreme Joint Military Command (SMC) 44–45 Supreme Military Council 83 Suqour al-Sham 42, 43 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 51 Sweden 70 Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916 54 Syria 23 air defense system 51 anti-government protests 25 Arab Spring in 24 Christian–Muslim tensions 4 corruption 29 Damascus 5 economy 29 humanitarian emergency 62 killing demonstrators 28 myriad tribal groups 48 oil, gas, and phosphate 110 Orontes river 5 Pan-Arab nationalism 28–29 population 5 private investments 29 protests in 24 religion in 5 Russia, weapons supplier 91 “safe zone” 65, 73

299

300

300

Index

Secular and pro-democracy protests 37 and the Soviet Union (USSR) 89 terrorism 4 Turkish invasion 207 violence, escalation in 28 violent conflict 75 war crimes 51 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 51–52 withdrawal of US troops from 210 Syria Accountability Act 90 Syriac Military Council 154 Syriac Orthodox Church 153 Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch 153 Syria Democratic Forces (SDF) 121, 215 Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 37, 41, 44, 49–50, 54, 105, 108, 138, 173, 176, 207, 224 Syrian Arab Nationality 138 Syrian Armed forces 94 Syrian Armenians 151 Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) 73, 128, 144, 212 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 58, 98, 142, 143, 154, 186, 207, 226 Syrian IDP 61 Syrian insurgency 39, 48 foreign fighters 41–43 Islamists 40 Salafists 40–41 secular nationalists 39–40 Syrian Intelligence Agency 33 Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) 42 Syrian Islamic Liberation Front 42 Syrian Kurdish fighters (YPG) 73 Syrian Kurds 58, 117, 188 Syrian-led political process 76, 78 Syrian-led settlement 79 Syrian Liberation Front 42 Syrian military intelligence 3, 4, 20 Syrian National Council (SNC) 64, 83, 142, 206 Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 74, 75 Syrian Opposition Coalition 84 Syrian Opposition Council 83 Syrian Political Transition 45, 48 Syrian refugees 63, 75, 143 Syrian women 157–163

crimes against women 159–160 cultural barriers and social stigma 157 early marriages 161 grief 157 leaving country 159 marriage 159 peace and prosperity 163 public punishment 160 self-perception of 158 violent conflict and fear of rape 159 Syrian Women’s Advisory Board 162, 200 Syrian Yazidi Council (SYC) 142 Syria’s civil war 32, 61, 82, 85, 91, 100, 103, 105, 120, 139, 178, 229 Iran’s involvement in 109 Syria’s family law 159 Syria’s opposition movement 37 Syria–Soviet bilateral relations 90 Syria’s revolution 105 Syria Transition Planning Working Group 54 Syro-Hittite Kingdom 5 Tahrir Square protest, Egypt 23 Taif Accord, 1989 9, 68, 83 Tal Abyad 58, 122, 123, 142 Talbeisa, strike on 95 Taqiya 165 Tartus 94, 96–97 Tell Hamis 154 terror corridor 146 terrorism 4 terrorists 58–59 Thalaf Suquour al-Janoub 43 Tillerson, Rex W. 151, 185, 189 al-Tolol al-Humr, strike on 95 Tomahawks 181 train-and-equip programs 46, 57 transitional justice 80 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 89 treaty of independence 89 Treaty of Lausanne, 1923 117 TRT 124 Trudeau, Justin 181 Trump, Donald J. 71–72, 99, 111, 147 bipartisan firestorm 210 “demolition of diplomacy” 218 election campaign 185 erratic actions in Syria 217

 301

Index strategy for Syria 217 withdrawal of US troops from Syria 210 Trump, Eric 181 Truth commissions (TCs) 201 Tunis 49 Tunisia 23 Turkemani, Hassan 14 Turkey 4, 45, 49, 56, 117–132 corruption 126 displacement crisis 64–66 Images of Öcalan 135 National Intelligence Agency (MIT) 64, 100, 121 riots in 122 S-400 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 207 support for jihadists 226 Turkey–Russia relations 177 Turkey’s Justice Department 65 Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) 124, 146, 188 Turkish F-16 99 Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 118 Turkish Penal Code, 337 121 Turkish Red Crescent 64 Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) 174 Turkmen 5 TurkStream 129 Twitter 124 Udall, Tom 144 ultranationalism 62 Umayyad caliph 104 Umma Brigade 42, 43, 44 Ummah 104 Um (mother of) 157 UN Development Program (UNDP) 62, 161 UN General Assembly (UNGA) 75, 92 Resolution 66/253 76–77 Resolution 66/253-B 81 six-point peace plan 76–77 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 61, 62, 151 UN Human Rights Commission 201 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 45 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee 193 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 82

301

displacement crisis 62–63 mediation 195–206 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 62, 212 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 8, 186 United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) 76, 80, 81, 92 United States 177, 181–193 cooperation with Kurds 209 degrade and destroy ISIS 192–193 foreign policy 182 UN Security Council (UNSC) 28, 51, 76, 92, 151, 184 Resolution 1325 162 Resolution 2042 81 Resolution 2118 84 Resolution 2165 61 Resolution 2254 196, 202 US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 178 US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 26 US–Iran relations 112 USS Porter 181 USS Ross 181 US Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control 54 US–Turkey relations 213, 226 Usud al-Harb 43 Vahidi, Ahmad V 106 Van Hollen, Chris 144, 209 vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) 57 victimization 149 victims of state violence 30 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 97 Vienna Statements 197 Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS) 71 Wagner Group 102 ‘wag the dog’ syndrome 112 Wahhabism 104 Walid al-Boustani 44 al-Wawi, Ammar 37 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 14, 51

302

302 Western Armenia 149 “We will sacrifice ourselves for Syria” 25 White Helmets 74 Women’s Defense Forces (YPJ) 58 Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) 117, 160 World Bank 97 World Food Program (WFP) 62 Yasser Arafat’s Fatah Organization 4 Yazid 104 Yemen 23, 30 Yezidis 217 Yom Kippur War 3 YouTube 124 Yüksekdağ, Figen 146

Index al-Zaafran, strike on 95 Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps 68 Zabadani 108 Zab River 214 Zakat 166 Zakharova, Maria 189 Zamalka 50 Zarif, Javad 125 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab 68, 104 al-Zawiyeh, Kataib Jebel 39 Zayed, Mohamed bin 227 Zionist entity 3

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