Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic: Selected Writings of Islamist, Turkist, and Westernist Intellectuals 9780755602209, 9780755602216, 9780755602223

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Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic

Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic Selected Writings of Islamist, Turkist, and Westernist Intellectuals Ahmet Seyhun

I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2021 This edition published in 2022 Copyright © Ahmet Şeyhun, 2021 Ahmet Şeyhun has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgments on p. vii constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover design: Adriana Brioso Cover image: [top left] Namik Kemal © Military PCF/Alamy Stock Photo; [top right] Ahmed Riza © Rykoff Collection/Corbis via Getty Images; [bottom left] Ziya Gykalp © Historic Collection/Alamy Stock Photo; [bottom right] Prince Said Halim © Bain News Service/ Library of Congress All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-0-7556-0220-9 PB: 978-0-7556-3721-8 ePDF: 978-0-7556-0222-3 eBook: 978-0-7556-0223-0 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

Contents Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction 1 Part I  Young Ottoman Thinkers

1

2

Namık Kemal (1840–88) 17 Selections from Makalat-i Siyasiye ve Edebiye Hayreddin Pasha (1823–90) Selections from Réformes Nécessaires aux États Musulmans

39

Part II  The Turkists 3

Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 55 Selections from Kitaplar

4

Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) Selections from Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset

87

Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) Selections from Üç Medeniyet

99



5

Part III  The Westernists 6 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 127 Selections from Türk İnkilabı

7

Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932) “Wake Up, Wake Up” from Uyanınız, uyanınız

147

Part IV  The Liberals 8

Prince Sabaheddin (1878–1948) 155 Selections from Gönüllü sürgünden Zorunlu Sürgüne—bütün eserleri

Part V  The Positivists 9

Ahmed Riza (1858–1930) 167 Selections from La Crise de l’Orient: Ses causes et ses remedes

Contents

vi

10 Lütfi Fikri (1872–1934)

184

Selections from Hükümdarlik Karşısında Milliyet ve Mesuliyet ve Tefrik-I Kuvai Mesaili

Part VI  The Islamists 11 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) 193 Selections from Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane

12 Ahmed Naim Baban (1872–1934)

211

Selections from İslam’da Dava-yı Kavmiyet

Notes Bibliography Index

217 222 227

Acknowledgments This book has been envisioned as a continuation of my previous publications. It is a part of an ongoing research project that aims to shed light on late Ottoman intellectual history. My first book concerned the life as well as the political and social thought of Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921), a prominent Islamist thinker and Ottoman statesman. My second book focused on the political and social ideas of Islamist thinkers in the late Ottoman Empire and early Republican Turkey. The current book is more comprehensive than the previous two books. It not only contains the works of important Islamist thinkers but also presents the writings of intellectuals who represented rival ideologies that competed with Islamism in the political arena of the late Ottoman Empire and early Republican Turkey. Here I would like to express my gratitude to those who supported me during the research and writing process of this book. In particular, I would like to thank my colleagues in the History Department of the University of Winnipeg. Enriching conversations with my friends and colleagues, Robert Byrnes in Winnipeg and Ared Mısırlıyan in Montreal, inspired me a lot during the writing of this book. In life, I consider myself particularly blessed by the undying and continuous support of my family. I owe a debt of gratitude to them, especially to my mother Sevin Orhon-Şeyhun, who has always sustained me with her prayers. I also would like to thank my dear sister Yeşim Çorluhan and my dear nephew Ömer Çorluhan; the emotional support I receive from each of them is very valuable to me. This book would never have reached this stage without the guidance and assistance of Rory Gormley of Bloomsbury, who helped me navigate through the final stages of my work. I also thank to Joseph Gautham for his valuable suggestions during the copy editing of my book and to Yasmin Garcha. I would also especially like to thank Cynthia Col, who painstakingly and carefully edited my manuscript. Last but not the least, my thanks go to Shokoufeh Ahmadi for her undying loving support throughout the writing of this book.

Introduction

The Tanzimat edict proclaimed on November 3, 1839, by Mustafa Reşid Pasha ushered in a new era in the Ottoman Empire. The charter introduced novel rules and ideas to the Ottoman political system. Ottoman rulers and statesmen drew on these ideas to consolidate the empire by modernizing and Westernizing its political structure. The Tanzimat edict mostly reflects the ideas of Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–39) and his Western-minded bureaucrats. Indeed, it could be considered as the continuation of reforms he had already introduced. Mahmud sincerely believed that only a fundamental change in the Ottoman system could save the empire and prevent its dissolution at the hands of autonomous Ayans. By destroying the institutions of the ancient regime, or Old Order, and removing its checks and balances, Mahmud wanted to create a centralized sultanate modeled on the French administration. Nevertheless, his untimely death at a relatively early age provided an opportunity to his bureaucrats to appropriate the state apparatus and establish their control over the empire. The newly formed powerful bureaucracy was called the Porte. One of the main principles of the Tanzimat edict was the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects before the law. This was an unprecedented novel idea in the Islamic world and contradicted the sharia. Tanzimat opened the door for the introduction of many European ideas into the empire. In short, it was the beginning of Westernization. During the Tanzimat era (1839–76), political ideas such as nationalism and secularism began to influence the educated class of the Ottoman Empire; eventually, this paved the way for unintended and undesired consequences such as the rise of ethnic nationalism among the Christian peoples in the Balkans. The political ideology of the Tanzimat statesmen was cosmopolitan Ottomanism. That is, it aimed to create a new political identity by bringing together the various ethnic and religious entities of the empire and fusing them into a nation on the basis of living in a common homeland. The ideas of Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau as well as concepts from the French Revolution of 1789 such as patriotism definitely shaped the policies of the Tanzimat statesmen. Ottomanist policies of the Porte intensified after the edict of Islahat promulgated on February 18, 1856, and a common Ottoman citizenship was introduced by a law in 1869. All these policies were designed and introduced to curb the rise of ethnic nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and to prevent the secession of the Christian provinces from the state. Nevertheless, despite the efforts of the Porte, Christian subjects of the empire rejected Ottomanism as a policy of identity. These subjects preferred to adopt the idea of ethnic nationalism and wanted to establish their nation-states by abandoning the Ottoman union. On the other hand, the ideology of Ottomanism united the various Muslim ethnicities of the empire and gave them a common goal and identity: İttihad-i Islam (Islamic Union). Thus, the reforms and

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Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic

the policies of Tanzimat eventually gave birth to conflicting ideologies in the Ottoman Empire. Islamism emerged out of Ottomanism. It was first advocated by Young Ottoman thinkers such as Namık Kemal (1840–88) and Ali Suavi (1839–78). Later, Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) adopted this ideology. Moreover, he made it the pillar of his regime. He effected this consolidation by drawing on an ancient but long-disused institution: the caliphate. Sultan Abdülhamid II revived the caliphate and used it as a political instrument. The new and revived caliphate became the basis of the sultan’s pan-Islamism. At home, Abdülhamid used Islamism to cement the multiple Muslim communities of the empire and create a new nation out of them: the Muslim nation. On the other hand, he used his pan-Islamism to enhance his prestige among the world’s Muslims, and exerted his spiritual authority over the millions of Muslims who lived in the European colonies to keep Western colonial powers at bay. After the end of the Hamidian regime, Islamism continued to be one of the most important ideological currents. The Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period (1908–20) shifted Islamist ideology from the traditional institutions of the sultanate and caliphate to the institutions of the representative regime like parliament. During this period, almost all Islamist thinkers were constitutionalist and defended the parliamentary system. After the reestablishment of the Constitution on July 24, 1908, various political currents started to emerge that had been proscribed and hidden under the Hamidian regime. Under the new regime, many newspapers and journals were founded. Many of these papers were established as the mouthpieces of various ideological movements that were now competing to dominate the new political arena. The most prominent of these ideologies was Islamism. Other currents were Ottomanism, Turkism, Westernism, and liberalism. Islamism represented the politicization of Islam. Islamism is a political ideology that advocates the shaping of the state and society according to the rules of Islam. It is a modern movement that aims to regenerate Muslim societies by implementing the principles of Islam in every aspect of life. For political and social models, the Islamist thinkers turned to pristine Islam as practiced during the time of the Prophet and his immediate successors. Islamism of the Second Constitutional Period was definitely not a traditionalist understanding of politics grounded on the ancient institutions of the sultanate and caliphate. Although it was rooted in the past and had the goal of returning society to the golden age of early Islam, Islamism was really a modern ideology that was born as a response to the Western imperialist threat to the Muslim world during the nineteenth century. According to Bassam Tibi, Islamism “is an expression of a defensive culture. A cultural self-assertion vis a vis the intrusion of the West into the abode of Islam.”1 Islamism is rooted in the activities of the grassroot Sufi organizations and influenced by the ideas of the Muslim revivalist thinkers of the eighteenth century like Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92), the purist and Hanbali legist of central Arabia.2 Islamism was the most important political movement of the Second Constitutional Period. It was represented in intellectual debates by several thinkers who wrote profusely in many Islamist journals on numerous issues. The topics these scholars wrote on ranged from family law and foreign policy to women’s rights and education. These Islamist thinkers expressed their concerns about the gradual Westernization and secularization of Ottoman society.

 Introduction 3 Islamist thinkers considered the Westernization of the state and society to be more dangerous and threatening than a foreign military invasion. In their writings, Islamist thinkers discussed the social, economic, and political problems of the empire and offered solutions. Although representing different viewpoints within Islamist ideology, they all agreed that Islamization was the only solution to the ills that plagued Ottoman society. Islamist intellectuals of the Second Constitutional Period were deeply influenced by the ideas of the Young Ottoman thinkers. Islamic modernism was born in the Ottoman Empire. In the 1860s and 1870s, the Young Ottoman thinkers were the first Islamic modernists to expound the ideas of Islamic modernism. They were highly critical of the Westernizing and centralizing reforms of the Tanzimat era that had been introduced by reformist sultans and their Western-looking statesmen. The Young Ottoman movement began as a protest against the autocracy of the Porte’s bureaucrats and their failure to solve the political and economic problems of the Ottoman Empire. They accused the Porte of allowing European powers to control the empire’s destiny. Unlike the Islamist-revivalist thinkers of the eighteenth century such as the Wahhabis, Islamic modernist intellectuals were in favor of adopting European ideas, concepts, and institutions, and they tried to adapt them to the realities of Muslim societies. They advocated European social and political ideas couched in an Islamic discourse. The most prominent of the Young Ottoman thinkers were Namık Kemal (1840–88), Ziya Pasha (1825–80), and Ali Suavi (1839–78). Namık Kemal directly influenced the Islamist writers of the Second Constitutional Period; he adopted European liberal ideas and expressed them in an Islamic discourse. He introduced two new concepts in Islamic political thought, by attributing Western connotations of homeland and liberty to the words vatan and hürriyet. Namık Kemal strongly believed that the Ottoman Empire could only be regenerated through a constitutional regime. According to Kemal, the early reforms of Tanzimat (1839) and Islahat (1856) were insufficient for a civilized state like the Ottoman Empire. In his opinion, a constitutional regime was necessary not only to assure a fair administration for Ottoman subjects but also to prevent Russia from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Of particular concern was the possibility of Russia’s using the pretext of protecting the sultan’s Orthodox Christian subjects. A constitutional regime would also prove to Europe that the Ottoman administration was based on fairness. Kemal’s patriotism was manifested in pan-Ottomanism and his loyalty to Islamic heritage. For Kemal, the idea of homeland was larger than the Ottoman Empire and embraced all Muslim lands that were united by the memory of a common and glorious past of a golden age. Namık Kemal’s vision of homeland is imbued with nostalgia and steeped in romanticism. He describes it as “not composed of the vague lines traced by the sword of a conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a sacred idea resulting from the combination of various noble concepts and principles such as the people, liberty, brotherhood, interest, sovereignty, respect for one’s ancestors, love of family, and childhood memories.”3 Nevertheless, despite his strong emphasis on Islam as the basis of his patriotism, Namık Kemal did not exclude non-Muslim citizens of the Ottoman Empire from his definition of homeland. He was strongly committed to the viability of a pan-Ottoman union that would embrace the empire’s non-Muslim communities. According to Namık Kemal, the different religions, languages, and ethnicities that existed in the Ottoman Empire

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Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic

would not form an obstacle to the formation of an Ottoman nation. He wrote that a proper education would be the key to reducing cultural differences among the various elements of the empire. This policy would include a uniform program that would inculcate patriotism in the minds of the new generation. The preceding summary indicates the ambivalent nature of Namık Kemal’s ideas on Ottoman nationality. While asserting the equality of all Ottomans regardless of their ethnicity or religion and upholding the idea of Ottoman citizenship as a secular concept, he nevertheless considered Islam to be the cement that would hold the empire and its diverse ethnicities together. Namık Kemal was the first Muslim thinker in Islamic history to advocate a parliamentary regime. His political ideas were inspired by the liberal ideas of European thinkers of the Enlightenment era, such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau; nevertheless, he couched and presented his ideas within an Islamic discourse. According to Kemal, the concept of representative government had already found its expression in the Qur’an and had found its application in the formative period of Islam. The same observation could also be made for the political system of the Ottoman Empire before the centralizing reforms of Mahmud II (r. 1808–39).4 Namık Kemal considered the classical Ottoman political system as an ancient form of the modern democratic regime. The separation of powers that Montesquieu explained in his Spirit of the Laws was already practiced in the traditional Ottoman system where there was a system of checks and balances; for example, the sultan’s authority was controlled by the ulema and the Janissaries.5 Kemal tried to explain the concept of popular sovereignty—a product of the Enlightenment thinkers— with the principles of the sharia (Islamic law). According to Kemal, democratic values are already imbedded in Islam, which favors a representative political regime. Kemal expounded his political ideas in a series of articles entitled Usul-u Meşveret Hakkında Mektuplar (Letters on the Constitutional Regime). These appeared in his newspaper Hürriyet, which was established in London between 1868 and 1869. In these articles, Kemal advocates that a legitimate government is one that is freely elected by citizens; in Islamic political theory, he says people elect their ruler (imam) by pledging their allegiance to him (baya). Through this practice, the ruler is vested with authority. He states, “If the people of a town would congregate and elect a person for the sultanate and pay their homage to him, that person would be nominated as a sultan.”6 This is based on ijmaa (consensus), which is one of the main pillars of Islamic law. Another Young Ottoman thinker who took an Islamist approach was Ziya  Pasha (1825–80). Like Namık Kemal, he started his administrative career in the Translation Bureau. It was here that he came in contact with the ideas of the Enlightenment. Although a product of the same intellectual milieu, Ziya Pasha differed from Namık Kemal in many aspects. Unlike Kemal, who spent most of his life in exile, Ziya Pasha occupied important positions during his long administrative career. Besides, he was closely connected with the palace and identified himself with the imperial administration. These characteristics had an undeniable impact on his political thought, which is conservative in nature in comparison to Kemal’s ideology. One of the most striking divergences between these two Young Ottoman thinkers lies in Ziya Pasha’s aloofness to the concept of liberty (hürriyet). Notwithstanding Ziya Pasha’s being convinced of the necessity of establishing a constitutional government in the Ottoman Empire, he

 Introduction 5 expressed caution toward the preservation of the imperial prerogatives of the sultan.7 In his opinion, the causes of Ottoman decline had been to a large extent generated by the diminution of the sultan’s power vis-à-vis the grand vizierate. Ali Suavi (1839–78) is also an important thinker of the Young Ottoman group. Suavi was born in Istanbul. After graduating from the Rüşdiye (Ottoman secondary school), he pursued his education in religious sciences and became quite knowledgeable in this field. Unlike Namık Kemal (1840–88), who advocated a representative regime based on popular sovereignty, Ali Suavi maintained that sovereignty had to be divine—it belonged only to God. He believed that it would be ridiculous to replace God’s sovereignty with that of the people. Like Kemal, Ali Suavi subscribed to the political ideas of the French thinker Montesquieu. According to Suavi, rather than despotism, the political regime of Islam perfectly represented the monarchy described by Montesquieu in his De l’esprit des lois. He argued that in Islam the sultan or caliph rules according to sacred sharia law and is bound by it; thus, rulers are not above the law. Although he accepted the notion of the separation of powers, he believed that this separation already existed in the classical Ottoman system, and he pointed to the examples of the vali (governor) and qadi (judge). Unlike Kemal, Suavi rejected the system of checks and balances. By basing his arguments on Kınalızade’s theory, Suavi stated that “The counter-action of different powers such as the judiciary and administrative”8 would not benefit the state, since it is against the notion of the “unity of the imamate.”9 In one sense, Suavi’s ideas are reminiscent of those of Said Halim Pasha. This is because both thinkers stated that sovereignty belonged only to God. Hayreddin Pasha of Tunis (1821–90) was another Muslim modernist thinker. Hayreddin Pasha expounded his social and political ideas in a work published in Tunis in 1867, Aqwam al-Masalik fi Ma‘rifat Amwal al Mamalik (The surest path to knowledge concerning the conditions of countries). This work was partially translated into French and published in Paris as Réformes nécessaires aux États musulmans. In his work, Hayreddin Pasha compares Islamic and Western civilizations and praises the latter for its progress. According to Hayreddin, Muslim states should take Europe as a model in their modernization efforts. He also asserts that the Tanzimat reforms were beneficial for the Ottoman Empire. According to Hayreddin, establishing some control and checks over the acts and deeds of the sultan’s government was necessary to curb the sultan’s despotism. However, he felt giving power to the ulema and certain other important sectors of the society would be sufficient.10 The Islamist intellectuals of the Second Constitutional Period can be divided into two groups: conservative-traditionalists and modernists. The former was composed mainly of members of the ulema who had connections with the Hamidian regime in the past. After the proclamation of the constitution, members of this group established a society, Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i İslamiye (Society of Islamic Scholars). The society was founded in September 1908 and started to disseminate their version of Islamist ideas through a monthly periodical entitled Beyan-ül Hak (The Statement of Truth). The modernist Islamist group established their own periodical Sırat-ı Müstakim. This journal served as the mouthpiece for the modernist Islamist intellectuals of the empire. Writers and thinkers such as Mehmed Şemseddin (Günaltay) (1883–1961) expounded

6

Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic

their views there. Compared to other conservative Islamist thinkers, Günaltay appeared to be perhaps the most progressive Islamist intellectual of this period. According to the Islamist thinkers of the Second Constitutional Period, rulers and statesmen wrongly believed that the adoption of European laws and institutions would not only stop the decline of the Ottoman Empire but also ensure its welfare and progress. In contrast, these later thinkers believed that the adopted laws were designed for nations that are socially and culturally very different from the Ottomans; therefore, far from benefiting the Ottoman society, adopted laws would harm it. These ideas were first voiced by Young Ottoman thinkers such as Namık Kemal (1840–88), Ziya Pasha (1825–80), and Ali Suavi (1839–78); these thinkers severely criticized the Tanzimat reforms. This view reflected the ideas of the French thinker Montesquieu, who wrote in his famous Spirit of the Laws that “successful laws and institutions are the ones created according to the social and cultural conditions of the societies in which they are going to be applied.”11 Without doubt the Islamist writers of the Second Constitutional Period, like their Young Ottoman predecessors, were familiar with the ideas of the French Enlightenment thinkers. After stating that the Westernizing reforms of the Tanzimat Period (1839–76) completely undermined the traditional Ottoman system and actually accelerated the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the Islamist thinkers instead advocated a thorough and complete Islamization of the Ottoman state and society. According to these writers, such a thorough and complete change would be the only way to empower the state and cure society’s ills. To them, Islamization meant constructing the Ottoman state according to the pristine and genuine principles of Islam and applying these rules to society. According to the Islamist thinkers, Islam is a rational religion; the precepts of the Qur’an are rational and have to be interpreted in light of science. For them, the principles enshrined in the Qur’an are not immutable but ought to be interpreted according to the needs of modern society. They maintained that there is no place in Islam for superstitions. Islam, they asserted, is also revolutionary; it is against the oppression of the people by despotic rulers. An Islamic regime does not accept caste or class structure. Islamic society is not divided into hereditary social classes like Western society. Every individual has equal rights before the law. That is why in the Islamic world people did not experience bloody social revolutions like those that shaped European history. An Islamic regime is based on equality, fraternity, and liberty. These principles were adopted in the West more than a 1,000 years after Islam and at the cost of devastating and murderous civil wars and revolutions. The principles of the French Revolution of 1789 had already been preached by Islam, when Europe was still living in the Dark Ages. According to the Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period, Islam is also a social religion. It not only preaches religious precepts but also lays down social principles to construct a just, equal, prosperous, and peaceful society. In Islam, religion and politics are intertwined; unlike in the West, there is no division between the spiritual and the temporal. Meşveret (consultation in a council or assembly) was central to the Islamic political conditions of the Ottoman Empire (theory), therefore, Islamist intellectuals considered it crucial. Nevertheless, most of the Islamist thinkers were opposed to the Constitution of 1876; they considered it a bad copy of European constitutions and

 Introduction 7 unsuitable for the Ottoman Empire. Said Halim Pasha also criticized political parties and the Constitution of 1876. According to Said Halim, “This constitution was designed by the dignitaries of the Porte as a means to check the power of the sultan and to curb his absolutism.”12 To Said, the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 provides extensive rights to the people of the Ottoman Empire. This empire stretches out to the deserts of Arabia, and the majority of its population lives a primitive life under the absolute authority of religious or tribal leaders. The constitution provides rights that are even more extensive than those possessed by citizens of the most advanced nations of our time.13

Said Halim’s argument has little validity. This is because there is a quasi-complete consensus among scholars that the Constitution of 1876 was far from being liberal. In reality, many of the provisions of this constitution conferred large powers on the sultan and left parliament with only limited rights that were also subject to sanction by the monarch. On this issue, Mehmed Akif (1873–1936) agreed with Said Halim Pasha; he stated that the Constitution of 1876 as well as the political parties did not suit the realities of the Ottoman Empire. In Said Halim’s view, the role of political parties in Islamic societies was bound to be different from that played by political parties in the Western world. He argued that parties in the West served the interests of different social classes and had as their goal the establishment of the domination of one social class over another, thereby subverting the existing social order. In contrast, in Islamic societies, their function was to preserve the social institutions created by Islam. Thus, he asserted, political parties in Muslim countries do not play a significant role in political life like their counterparts in Western countries. According to Said Halim, this characteristic of the Muslim regime constituted a clear indication of its superiority over Western political models. This is because, with no need to challenge or alter established social principles, the role of political parties would consequently be minimal. In Said Halim’s opinion, political institutions should be in harmony with the social and ethical principles that prevailed in a particular society. Therefore, Said Halim reflected that Islam advocated egalitarianism, solidarity, and social justice—concepts that he believed represented a true democracy; in contrast, Western political principles advocated the defense of personal and group interests—concerns that Said Halim believed to be less mature. Said Halim, therefore, concluded that in an ideal Islamic society, if they wanted to be successful, political parties would have to be different from their counterparts in the West. Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) was one of the most prolific scholars of the Islamists. He was the grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha (r. 1805–48), the founder of modern Egypt. Educated in Europe, Said Halim joined the Young Turk movement and was later nominated as the minister of foreign affairs and then grand vizier in the cabinets of the Committee of Union and Progress. Besides being a prominent statesman, Said Halim Pasha also wrote extensively on political and social issues. In his writings between 1910 and 1921, Said Halim Pasha advocated a thorough and radical Islamization of the Muslim world in order to halt its decline and to ensure its progress. Said Halim Pasha rigorously defended his ideas against Turkist and Westernist writers.

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Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic

Traditional Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period (1908–20) were mainly members of the ulema who had in the past had connections with the Abdülhamid’s regime. In the aftermath of the revolution, they formed a society called Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i İslamiye (Society of Islamic Scholars). The Islamist thinkers of the Second Constitutional Period do not present a united monolithic bloc; rather, they had different approaches to the problems of the late Ottoman society. These thinkers expounded their views in various newspapers and journals. The traditionalist Islamist thinkers who rallied around Beyan-ül Hak defended a more conservative view of Islam. One leading writer of that journal, Mustafa Sabri (1869–1954), presents ambiguous opinions on the interpretation of Islam. While openly declaring that women are not equal to men in Islam, he welcomes the constitutional regime and wrote in favor of a parliamentary system in Islam, saying that the real Islamic regime could only be parliamentary.14 Ahmed Naim Baban (1872–1934) was an Ottoman intellectual of Kurdish descent. In his writings Naim fiercely criticizes ethnic nationalism, whether Turkish, Kurdish, Albanian, or Arab. He considered ethnic nationalism a fatal disease that could destroy Muslim unity; as such, it is extremely dangerous for the Islamic world. To defend Islamic unity against ethnic nationalism, he wrote a well-known treatise entitled İslamda-Dava-yı Kavmiye (Ethnic Nationalism in Islam).15 To Ahmed Naim, the Turkist Ahmed Ağaoğlu responded with a critical article that appeared in Türk Yurdu. In his article entitled “İslamda Dava-yi Milliye” (The Nationalist Cause in Islam), Ağaoğlu refuted Naim’s arguments and declares that nationalism is not against Islamic tenets; on the contrary, he argues that it benefits Islam. Ağaoğlu criticizes Naim of confusing nationalism with the tribalism (asabiyet), which Islam condemns. Moreover, Ağaoğlu argues that Arab national unity was desired by Prophet Muhammad to create a solid base for the newly emerging Islam. Arab national consciousness, according to Ağaoğlu, benefited Islam and made it stronger in its initial phase. Ottoman Islamist intellectuals were mostly modernist. They wanted to adopt only the material aspects of Western civilization and leave aside the cultural aspects. The Islamist thinkers of the Second Constitutional Period were certainly influenced and inspired by the ideas of their precursors, the Young Ottoman thinkers of the 1860s and 1870s, but they were also influenced by non-Ottoman Islamist modernist thinkers such as Jamal ad Din al-Afghani (1839–97), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935). A renowned pan-Islamist who urged Muslims to unite against Western imperialism, al-Afghani also encouraged Muslims to study the modern exact sciences and to reform their educational system. His friend and pupil Muhammad Abduh continued the legacy of his master by focusing on education. Abduh proposed different methods of emancipation from his mentor. Instead of al-Afghani’s revolutionary activism, Abduh advocated gradual reform in order to heal the ills of Muslim societies and reverse their inner decay. According to Abduh, Islam is a rational religion; indeed, the Qur’an urges man to investigate Allah’s creation by using his intellect. For Abduh, the real Muslim is one who thinks and acts according to reason.16 The writings of these Islamist intellectuals are crucial not only for students of Ottoman and Middle Eastern history but also for political scientists studying the

 Introduction 9 current politics of modern Turkey. This is because the ideas expounded by these intellectuals constitute the blueprint for the Islamist-oriented political movements and parties that have been present in the Turkish political life since the 1950s. The Islamic-oriented conservative political movements and parties in modern Turkey are directly inspired by the ideas of these writers. They consider Islamization as a viable social and political alternative to the secular regime that dominated Turkish politics after 1925. The second important ideology of the Second Constitutional Period was Turkism. The Turkist writers grounded their ideology on ethnicity and advocated an ethnic nationalism. They advocated a complete Turkification of the Turkish-speaking Ottomans. Turkist ideology began to influence the Ottoman writers toward the end of the Hamidian regime. One of the earliest exponents of Turkist ideas was the poet Mehmed Emin Yurdakul (1869–1944). Yurdakul devoted his pen to the Turkist cause. In 1899, he published his poems under the title Türkçe Şiirler (Poems in Turkish). In his poems, he continued to extol Turkic ethnic pride by exalting the ancient Turkic history and by emphasizing Turanian unity. He wrote: O Turk wake up! O my nation! When you were living in the Altays, just five thousand years ago. God said to you: O Turkish race, fly from that place as an eagle who glides to the sunrise. Your hands that subjugate every force will sprinkle thunderbolts upon proud heads. To you will open their arms, The thrones of China, Iran, India, and Egypt. ... If you want, from the source of the Danube up to China: Altay, Qiptchak, Siberia, Azerbaijan, Khwarezm, Ghazni, Khiva, Boukhara, Every place will enter into the realm of the new Turan. ... In every place you sang the songs of conquest Qara Khans, Oghuzs, Attillas, Genghis, Timurlenks, Yavuzs are your ancestors who make you proud.17

Turkist thinkers such as Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) and Yusuf Akçura (1875–1935) encouraged the rise of ethnic consciousness among Turks and emphasized the Turkish identity of the Ottoman state. The works of European scholars on the ancient history of the pre-Islamic Turks had a crucial impact on the rise of Turkism as a cultural and then political movement. One of the earliest examples of this literature was a book entitled Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols et des autres Tartares occidentaux. It was written by French orientalist Joseph de Guignes and published in Paris between 1756 and 1758. During the nineteenth century, many other scholars studied ancient Turkish history. Among them were A. de Sacy, W. Radloff, and V. Thomsen. Thomsen rendered an invaluable service to the study of the pre-Islamic ancient Turkish history by deciphering the runic inscriptions of Orhon in 1893.

10 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic Ziya Gökalp was a well-known Turkist and probably the main theoretician of Turkish nationalism. He summarized his ideology with the maxim of Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak (Turkification, Islamization, and modernization). In his view, these concepts complemented each other. Gökalp explained his theory by saying, “We are of Turkish nationality (millet), we belong to the Islamic religious community (ümmet), and to the Western sphere of civilization (medeniyet).” For Gökalp, these three elements of the Turkish nation were both complementary and distinct from each other: complementary because each constituted an aspect of Turkish society and distinct because they were not necessarily related. Adhering to the Islamic faith did not mean that Turks belonged to the sphere of Islamic civilization that Gökalp called Oriental civilization. Gökalp perceived Islam as a religion (din), not as a civilization (medeniyet), which he considered to be a combination of the Sasanian and Byzantine civilizations. According to Gökalp, over time the Turks moved from an East Asian (Chinese) to an Islamic (Oriental) civilization through their conversion to Islam; however, in doing so, they did not change their national culture. Thus, he asserted, Turks could adopt European civilization and still preserve their religion and national culture—just as the Japanese had. Gökalp divides the material and intellectual development of societies into two: (a) medeniyet (civilization) and (b) hars (national culture). Medeniyet is international but hars is national. Western or Islamic civilizations have been embraced by many different nations, each with its own national culture.18 According to Gökalp, by ignoring Turkism and Islamism and instead by promoting the cosmopolitan Ottomanism, Tanzimat undermined the foundations of the Ottoman state.19 Gökalp also argued that the Tanzimat statesmen committed “a fatal mistake” by adopting the national mores of the European nations; in his view, they wrongly considered those cultural norms as the components of European civilization.20 Gökalp also argued that nations that had a strong ethnic culture without having an advanced civilization would prevail over highly civilized nations. He reasons that advanced civilizations would usually undermine the popular and ethnic culture of those nations.21 Gökalp’s ideas were criticized by Kemal Karpat who argued that Gökalp misunderstood the historical formation of the Turkish nation because of his superficial knowledge of the Ottoman history.22 Karpat also rejected the clear-cut separation envisaged by Gökalp between high and low Turkish/Ottoman cultures. According to Karpat, throughout history, there was always an interaction between Ottoman high culture and popular Turkish culture.23 Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) was another main ideologue of Turkism. Akçura was a prominent pan-Turkist. Pan-Turkism was born in Russia and then was introduced to Ottoman intellectual circles by Tatar and Azeri Turk thinkers who emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. Berkes categorizes the pan-Turkist thinkers separately from the Ottoman Turkist thinkers such as Ziya Gökalp. For Gökalp, says Berkes, the essence of the Turkish nation is culture, whereas for the pan-Turkists like Akçura, it is the race.24 In fact, Gökalp was also a pan-Turkist. In his writings, he expressed his desire for the realization of the Turan union. Nevertheless, Yusuf Akçura was the main exponent of pan-Turkist ideas. In his famous article “Üç-Tarz-ı Siyaset” (The Three Types of Politics), Akçura compares Turkism with Islamism and Ottomanism; of these three ideologies, he found Turkism the most viable. According to him, Ottomanism was an artificial construct inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution; it was modeled on

 Introduction 11 the examples of Italian and German unifications and designed by Tanzimat pashas, such as Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, to keep the empire together by giving its various ethnic components a common identity. According to Akçura, the defeat of France by Germany in 1870 discredited the idea of Ottomanism. When it comes to a purely Islamist policy, Akçura finds it unachievable for the time being. He explained this by pointing out that many Muslim lands were currently occupied and ruled by the European colonial powers. These powers would consider a pan-Islamist policy a major threat to their hegemony over Muslim lands and would try to prevent it. On the other hand, Akçura asserts that Muslims belong to various ethnicities. Therefore, it would not be easy to unite them as a single bloc. Moreover, he argues that an Islamist policy would alienate the non-Muslim subjects of the empire from the Ottoman government. Nevertheless, Akçura considered Islam as an important political and social component and as a catalyzer of the various Turkic ethnicities, since most Turks are Muslim. Unlike Gökalp who considered hars to be an element of strength and enrichment for Muslim Turks, Said Halim Pasha considered it an undermining effect that would hinder the progress of the Muslim Turks. According to Said Halim, the major cause of the Muslim decline lay in the misunderstanding of the true meaning of the Prophet’s message and its subsequent distortion by later practices in Islamic history. Said Halim explained the decline of Muslim societies with reference to their failure to renounce their pre-Islamic heritage. He argued that since the nations that adopted Islam were heirs to old and distinct civilizations, it was inevitable that their respective ancient heritage would still exert a strong influence over them. He believed that this phenomenon prevented Muslim nations from fully understanding and implementing the religious tenets of their faith, thus depriving them of the blessings of Islam. This situation, continued Said Halim, had led to a paralysis, which left Muslim societies trapped between their pre-Islamic legacy and pristine Islamic doctrine; this position constituted a continuous hindrance to their development. For Said Halim, the only way to achieve progress was for Muslims to swing the pendulum in favor of a pristine interpretation of Islam. Ahmed Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) is another important Turkist intellectual of the late Ottoman and early Turkish Republican era. In his study entitled the Three Civilizations, Ağaoğlu describes and compares three different world civilizations: Islamic, Western, and Buddhist-Brahman. He finds Western civilization superior to the others in many aspects. According to him, “civilizations are indivisible entities, whole, compact but composed of various manifestations of life brought together in the most inclusive and comprehensive form, with all spiritual and material events combined.” To Ağaoğlu, “The term civilization should cover all the events of life from the way of thinking to the dressing habits.”25 Ağaoğlu criticized the view which advocates of filtering the Western civilization before borrowing its useful and beneficial aspects and rejecting its vices. This view was defended by modernist Islamist thinkers such as Mehmed Akif. According to Ağaoğlu, this selective adoption of Western technology, ideas, and institutions is impossible. He explained that civilizations are whole entities; if you decided to adopt them, you have to take its good and bad sides together.26 Although both are Turkists, the ideas of Ağaoğlu differ in many aspects from those of Ziya Gökalp.27 Hilmi Ziya Ülken wrote that in his seminal work, the Three Civilizations, Ağaoğlu fundamentally

12 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic criticized Gökalp for his understanding of Westernization.28 First, for Ağaoğlu, the Western political system was based on liberalism—an idea that was not accepted by Gökalp. Second, in his well-known book the Three Civilization, Ağaoğlu advocated for total Westernization, whereas for Gökalp, Westernization was a part of his tripartite ideology (Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization). Finally, for Ağaoğlu, the culture of a nation could change in history, but Gökalp considered culture as static.29 Westernism (Batıcılık or Garbcılık) is the third ideological current.30 Unlike their reformist predecessors of the Tanzimat era, partisans of Westernism during the Second Constitutional Period were not content with modernizing the military and bureaucracy—nor did they limit the range of their reforms to commercial and criminal law. As correctly pointed out by Niyazi Berkes, Westernist thinkers of the Second Constitutional Period wanted “to cast aside the old system of values in order to develop a new morality based upon the Western system of values.”31 Westernists attacked the very core of Muslim life: the family and the role of women in society. To them, the main reason for the decay of Muslim civilization was the degraded status of women in Islam. One of the most prominent spokesmen of Westernism, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932), wrote in his journal İçtihad that “women should have exactly the same rights as men concerning family affairs, inheritance, and other matters.” He also advocated the unveiling of Muslim Ottoman women. According to Cevdet, veiling makes women an object and would naturally cause the spread of polygamy.32 Abdullah Cevdet also felt that the decline was due to decaying institutions, backward traditions, and an Asiatic mentality.33 He believed that if Muslims stubbornly clung to their old ways and did not adopt European manners, they would soon be wiped from the face of the earth. Writing in 1912, after the defeat of the Ottoman armies during the Balkan wars, he explained that the recent Turkish defeats were caused by the military’s aversion to anything Western and by its resistance to espousing European civilization.34 According to Abdullah Cevdet, the societies that did not accept Darwin’s evolution theory continued to live in the Middle Ages; in his view, such societies have no right to exist in the modern world of the twentieth century.35 Moreover Abdullah Cevdet suggested that modern scientific and materialist ideas should be couched in Islamic discourse before being presented to a Muslim audience. This is because Muslims reject ideas coming from the West and only accept those that originate from Islamic sources.36 Celal Nuri İleri was another prolific pen of the Westernist movement. İleri’s position differed from that of Abdullah Cevdet, who always took a hardline and held a purely Westernist point of view. In the early period of his intellectual life, İleri defended some Islamist and pan-Islamist ideas. In an article on İleri and his ideas, Tufan Buzpınar successfully depicts İleri’s thought process and rightfully calls him a “partial Westernist” for the period before the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Like the modernist Islamist intellectuals, he advocated the adoption of Western science and technology, but for keeping traditional Turkish and Muslim culture.37 Particularly during and after the Ottoman-Italian War in 1911 in Libya, the Balkan wars of 1912–13, and the First World War, Celal Nuri İleri adopted an anti-Western attitude and severely criticized European colonialism.38 Celal Nuri expounded his ideas about the European imperialism in his book entitled İttihad-i Islam (The Islamic

 Introduction 13 Union) published in 1914.39 Celal Nuri and Said Halim Pasha share similar ideas on the causes of the Muslim decline.40 Celal Nuri argued that if Muslim states were governed according to Islamic principles and the rules of the sharia, they would not fall into decline.41 Therefore, according to Celal Nuri Ileri, in order for the Islamic world to progress, Muslim states should return to their former Islamic political rules and practices.42 İleri also advocated for women’s rights. According to Celal Nuri, veiling isolated women and preventing them from actively participating in social life must be banned. He is one of the earliest Ottoman writers who wrote on gender and women’s issues. Labeling him as an early feminist would not be an exaggeration. According to Celal Nuri İleri, throughout the ages women were oppressed and viewed solely as sexual objects. Education and work, he wrote, are two channels for women’s emancipation. İleri admired and acknowledged the advanced social position of women in the West; nevertheless, he criticized the Napoleonic Code as a conservative legal text that limited women’s rights. İleri argued that sharia (Islamic law) gives more rights to women than the Napoleonic Code. He compared the ownership rights of women in both legal systems. In French civil law, he notes, a woman loses her property rights after her husband dies; in contrast, under sharia, women continue to own and control their property after marriage. In 1923, Celal Nuri İleri published his Taç Giyen Millet (The Nation Crowned). In his book, İleri discusses various topics including the idea of nation, nationality, democracy, constitutional regime, the evolution of the Muslim and European societies, the impact of the scientific revolution, the European geographical discoveries, Reform and Renaissance, the findings of Newton, Darwin, Wallace, and so on. According to İleri, Tanzimat was just an administrative reform to consolidate the power of the government. In contrast, the Meşrutiyet (the first constitutional regime of 1876) was far from being democratic. İleri observed that the parliament assembled in 1876 had no power against the sultan; rather, according to the Constitution, he had the authority to abolish the laws enacted by that parliament. The sultan could even close the parliament—and he did. As İleri argued, the first parliamentarian experience in the Ottoman Empire was doomed to failure from its inception.43 In his book Harbden Sonra Türkleri Yükseltelim (Let’s Elevate the Turks after the War) İleri proposes a series of social reforms to be implemented to advance the social and economic conditions of the Turks.44 Finally, we will also briefly look at the ideas of the liberal intellectuals in the late Ottoman Empire. In particular, we will consider the ideas of Ahmed Rıza Bey (1859–1930) and Prince Sabaheddin (1877–1948). A disciple of August Comte, Ahmed Rıza Bey was a Young Turk leader and a torchbearer of the opposition against the Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) and his absolutist regime. Rıza was a staunch positivist and Ottoman patriot. While in Paris, he established the journal Meşveret with its French supplement Mechveret in 1895. In his journal, Ahmed Rıza wrote many articles criticizing the autocratic regime of Abdülhamid II. Besides that, he expounded his positivist and liberal ideas such as the reestablishment of a constitutional regime in the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Ahmed Rıza wrote many books and articles defending Islam and criticizing the West—something that could be considered surprising and inconsistent with his positivist beliefs. Nevertheless, Ahmed Rıza

14 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic regarded Islam as an important social factor among the Muslim societies. Ahmed Rıza perceived the Crusaders as more moral than modern imperialists. According to Ahmed Rıza, during the Crusades, Europe attacked Islam in the name of the cross. At that time, Europeans were motivated by religious zeal. Today, financial interests predominate in Europe’s agenda. The bank, says Rıza, has become the real temple of today’s Europeans, and their religion is the cult of the golden calf.45 In Ahmed Rıza’s view, despite the ideas of the French Revolution of 1789, even the most anticlerical and so-called liberal Europeans nurture anti-Islamic feelings, and their actions contradict their liberal ideas.46 The atavism of the Europeans, says Ahmed Rıza, caused them to cling to their anti-Muslim and anti-Turk prejudices throughout the ages since the Crusades. Nevertheless, Ahmed Rıza also declares that “his patriotism would not prevent him from being a citizen of the world.”47 He proclaims that he loves his county just as he loves all of humanity. Prince Sabaheddin was a member of the Ottoman imperial family. He was the nephew of the Sultan Abdülhamid and the son of this latter’s sister, Seniha Sultan. Sabaheddin also fled to Paris with his father and brother. In Paris, he established his journal Terakki and quickly became a respected Young Turk leader, rivalling Ahmed Rıza. In his writings, Sabaheddin advocates the political decentralization and private enterprise. In his view, the Ottoman Empire could only progress by adopting these two principles. According to Sabaheddin, the real problem undermining the Ottoman Empire is not political but institutional. By merely adopting European laws like the Tanzimat, statesmen would not be able to save the Ottoman Empire. Sabaheddin established a link between the autocratic regimes and collectivist societies: all ills of Ottoman society derive from its collectivist nature. According to him, reforms could only be successful if the collectivist society were replaced by an individualist one.48 The salvation of the empire could only be assured by establishing new institutions that encouraged private initiative and decentralization. To support his argument, he points to the difference between countries in North and South America. Although countries in both continents are ruled by similar republican regimes, North American countries progressed and became wealthy because the Anglo-Saxon political and economic system is based on private initiatives. In contrast, South American countries lagged behind and remained underdeveloped due to the centralizing and communalist system they inherited from the Spaniards.49 In this book I aimed to bring together the selected writings of the various intellectual and political figures who represented diverse political currents that competed in the political arena of the late Ottoman Empire and early Ottoman Empire. This reader constitutes an important contribution to the study of Late Ottoman intellectual history and to the field of Islamic and Ottoman studies in particular by making available important primary sources to scholars and students who are unable to read the Ottoman and Turkish languages. All translations are provided by the author.

Part I 

Young Ottoman Thinkers

1

Namık Kemal (1840–88)

Biography Namık Kemal was born in Tekirdağ on December 21, 1840. His father was Mustafa Asım Bey who was employed as an astrologer at the court. At a young age, he lost his mother, Fatma Zehra Hanım, and was raised by his grandfather, Abdüllatif Pasha. His grandfather was appointed as governor to several provinces of the empire; in his youth, Namık Kemal toured Anatolia and the Balkans with him. Throughout these years, he was privately tutored. He learned Arabic and Persian. For a few months, he studied at the middle school (Rüşdiye) of Beyazid and Valide. He lived in Kars and then in Sofia, when his grandfather received appointments in each of these cities. In Sofia, he married Nesime Hanım and had three children with her. In 1857, Namık Kemal returned to Istanbul and entered the Translation Bureau (Tercüme Odası). Later he worked at the Customs Administration. Meanwhile, Kemal became involved with classical Ottoman poetry. He met and was influenced by a famous classical poet, Leskofcalı Galib. In Istanbul, Kemal also started to attend a poetry circle (Encümen-i Şuara). In 1863, Kemal resumed his work at the Translation Bureau. There he met Westernized Ottoman intellectuals like Sinasi Bey whose influence on Kemal was crucial. At the Translation Bureau he started to learn French and began contributing articles to the newspaper Tasfir-i Efkar. In 1865, when Sinasi left for Paris, Kemal assumed the administration of the newspaper. In Tasfir-i Efkar, Kemal began publishing work that severely criticized the government. As a result of his fierce political opposition, his journal was closed, and Kemal was sent to Erzurum as an aide to the governor. Instead of going to Erzurum, Namık Kemal fled to Paris and continued his intellectual and political activities there. In Paris he was financed by the Egyptian prince Mustafa Fazil Pasha who supported liberal movements in the Ottoman Empire. Then Kemal traveled to London; there, he began the journal Muhbir. Later, due to his disagreement with Ali Suavi, another Young Ottoman thinker, he left Muhbir and returned to Paris. As a consequence of Sultan Abdülaziz’s official visit to France, the French government asked Kemal and other Young Ottomans to leave the city. Afterwards Kemal returned to London and began the newspaper Hürriyet (Freedom). Meanwhile, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha reached an agreement with the Ottoman sultan and ceased financing Hürriyet. As a result, Kemal and his friend Ziya Pasha, another Young Ottoman intellectual, tried to restart the newspaper on their own. Later, Kemal became embroiled in arguments with his colleagues and decided to return to Istanbul after receiving assurances from the authorities about his safety.

18 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic Upon returning to the Ottoman Empire, Kemal promised the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha that he would not engage in any political opposition and only would write for the satirical journal Diyojen. Nevertheless, after the death of Ali Pasha in September 1871, the Young Ottomans resumed their political and journalistic activities. In 1872, Namık Kemal began established another newspaper, İbret. When the newspaper started publishing articles criticizing the government, it was closed. Subsequently, Kemal was appointed as an administrator to Gelibolu. In Gelibolu, he continued to write and finished his famous play Vatan Yahut Silistre (The Homeland or Silistre). In 1872 he was dismissed from his administrative position and again assumed the editorship of İbret. On April 1, his play Vatan Yahut Silistre was staged at the Ottoman theater, Gedik Paşa, and caused big patriotic demonstrations. As a consequence, Namık Kemal was exiled to Magosa, Cyprus. In Magosa, Kemal was very prolific and wrote many plays. In 1876, upon the accession of the Sultan Murad V (May 30 to August 31, 1876) to the throne, Kemal was pardoned and returned to Istanbul. Later on, because of his popularity, Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) appointed him to the Şura-yi Devlet (Council of State). Kemal was also appointed to the commission for drafting the Constitution. When the Ottoman Parliament was closed during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78, the sultan exiled Kemal and many other deputies to the island of Midilli in the Aegean Sea. In 1879, the sultan appointed him as the mutasarrif (chief administrator) of that island. In 1887, he was appointed as the mutasarrif of Rodos, and in 1887, he became the mutasarrif of Sakız. Namık Kemal died in Sakız on December 2, 1887. By his will, he was buried in Bolayır on the Gallipoli peninsula. The following passages are taken from Namık Kemal, Makalât-i Siyasiye ve Edebiye (İstanbul: Selanik Matbaası, 1909?), 241–7. The same passages were published as Namık Kemal, Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri. Bütün Makaleler I, Kemal, edited by Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğdu and İsmail Kara (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2005).

“The Fssusion of Nations”* If the ethnic composition of the Ottoman Empire is examined, it becomes apparent that Ottoman society was formed by a combination of a multitude of diverse ethnic elements that are equal before law and share the same common interest but are different from each other in language and race. Therefore, it is impossible to find a uniform society that can safely guarantee its continuity. Such a thing did not occur in history and does not exist today. Nevertheless, throughout history, having societies that were uniform never secured their survival either. Consequently, since our state managed to survive 600 years despite all the calamities that it endured, it is obvious that we will, therefore, survive and last also in this age of progress that brings order and security to the world. If we look to the situation of the world from a larger perspective, we would see that language and race could be uniting factors but can never be obstacles   Namık Kemal wrote this article in order to defend the idea of Ottomanism.

*

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 19 against  the unity of nation. A solid example of that can be found in countries like England, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Germany, Austria, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Despite the fact that the citizens of  these countries follow different religions, belong to different races, and speak different languages, they consider these countries as their homeland. The borders of these homelands are determined not by natural events. Rather, political and military forces and circumstances determine them, and nobody is able to prevent their occurrence. The people living in these countries consider themselves as an inseparable part of the latter. This is because, in theory, the idea of homeland is an abstract construct; in reality, it is the most solid guarantee for the preservation of the common interest and the equal rights of the citizens. It is much more efficient than a massive and well-built iron and stone fortification for the defense of the nation. And yet one can ask the question: Do we not have a homeland? On the contrary, without denying reality, nobody can say that we do not have a homeland. Or, is it true that we are not equal before law in this homeland? On the contrary, we are so equal that almost all books on the sharia law pertaining to the politics and imperial sultanic orders (fermans) confirm the equality of the citizens. Moreover, despite being considered nonexistent by the legal experts because they do not derive from an independent body, “political rights” do actually exist in our country. Each member of all distinct religious communities is equal before law. Because we know that, it used to be that for appointment to certain positions in the bureaucracy being a Muslim, Christian, or Jew was a necessary qualification; being Arab, Kurd, Albanian, Greek, Bulgarian, or Armenian was required as a precondition. But we also know that no one’s religion was an obstacle for his appointment to a government office. If we look to the ethnic and religious composition of our bureaucracy, we would see that our bureaucrats belong to different religions and ethnicities. This fact cannot be denied by any Muslim who is acquainted properly with the sharia laws. Since a bureaucrat is the servant of the people and not its master, the only required qualification for his appointment should be his merits and his professional qualities—not his ethnicity or his religion. This matter is also confirmed in detail in the Ahkam al Sultaniyya of Imam Mawardi. Do our interests conflict with each other? Not at all. Actually, our interests converge to such a degree that if any of us would act against the common good he would be doomed. If we examine the different social classes of our society, we would see that all these various classes are intertwined with other. Each member of our society constitutes a guarantee for the whole community and vice versa the whole society constitutes a guarantee for every individual person. Is it possible that one of the members of this society could separate himself from the community and could survive completely on his own? Since we live equal (before law) in our society and share the same interests, why would we want to separate from each other merely for linguistic and religious reasons? When all the civilized nations in the world wanted to form political unions and unite themselves under new names to create new political formations, why should we try to search for new names for the newly created political formations (states) to divide our country? How can the existence of different languages in a society undermine its unity, if the individuals forming this society are tied to each other by a common interest? Who

20 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic could know our real ethnic roots unless they have been divulged by God from His sacred and secret tablets? Therefore, nobody can claim preeminence over others by asserting his ethnic origins. Except for Arabia, where in our empire we can find people who are ethnically homogenous and speak only one language. Today, some wrongly argue that the cosmopolitan nature of our empire is a source for an internal conflict. Actually, the various ethnic groups living in our empire should realize that they have preserved their languages, ethnic cultures, and religions thanks to the protection of the Ottoman Empire? In the future they will benefit from the same protection if they stay within the empire. How many little nations have remained independent after they seceded from their original homeland? And how many of the independent ones provide happy states for their citizens? When it is an incontestable reality that remaining united is the real factor for a powerful and successful existence and the assurance of happy lives, then, in  seeking  good fortune and prosperity for ourselves in the process of disintegration, must we invent a new government?

Islamic Unity When the brightness of knowledge started to enlighten some places with the deflection of its blessing, it is normal that brilliant ideas appeared in peoples’ minds and great desires came to their hearts. One has to pay attention to the fact that—even though we are still at the beginning of this idea of union—the general public has become more aware and has become attached to these high and sacred goals. The perfection of European civilization and its higher level of achievement in many areas started to be known here (in the Ottoman lands). And it soon became obvious that for the Ottoman state to resist such an overwhelming and superior force would be impossible. It is natural for every nation to aspire to a respectable place in this world that is no less than that of others. In our country, too, such desires have started to emerge. Therefore, we see that the idea of Islamic unity that has preoccupied the minds of some of our statesmen since the foundation of the Ottoman state now has become a popular wish and a common goal for the masses. Once this goal became a reality, the population of 2 million will work united with brotherly fervor in order to educate each other’s minds and protect each other’s interests. Obviously, this will usher in a great period of prosperity and progress for Asia. We actually are the loyal followers and admirers of those who advocate this sacred ideal. We also express our gratitude to the newspaper Basiret, which is one of the defenders and flag-bearers of the idea of the Islamic Union. It is common knowledge that increasing power is assured by the development of mutual assistance. Actually, not only the order of humanity but also the order of the cosmos is assured by a harmonious union. When the least important machine in a factory breaks down, the whole factory would shut down. If the smallest satellite of Saturn changes course that would throw our whole planetary system, which is enlightened by the sun, into total chaos. We then understand from these introductory remarks that the failure of the Muslims to maintain their high level of civilization was caused by their disunity. The discord among the Muslims is becoming one of the main causes of their current deplorable

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 21 political situation; it is also directly responsible for our (low) level of education. Once upon a time, Caliph Mamun’s (r. 813–33) palace was the university of the world. Its physicians came from the edge of the Crystal Mountain; its jurists came from the coast of the Great Western Ocean; its astronomers came from the shores of the Ceyhun (Oxus) river; and its theologians were originally from the Sind region in India. When it comes to us, we do not even know the intellectual discoveries that have taken place in Tehran, and we cannot communicate our name to Kashgar—let alone our knowledge. How we can attain the intellectual maturity of the ancients, our ancestors? With our current conduct, how we can reach the level of progress attained by Europe in industry and commerce? Despite their ideological disunity, the 150 million people in Europe are united in working hard. It is well known that paucity can never equal abundance. Isn’t it true that, according to us, a nation that is more advanced than other nations in this age of progress is considered as a big brother by the others? Doesn’t the big brother have the duty to encourage its younger brothers to reach the same level of perfection he has attained? Since thanks to our geographical location we acquired the sciences and arts of Europe earlier than other Muslim nations, we are obliged to benefit our brethren in Asia of that advantage. Otherwise we would commit a major wrongdoing. If we continue to be accused of this misdeed, how we can take pride in our religion and our humanity. Since we are aware of the high morality and the virtues of the Ottomans, we never think that this negligence is intentional or something we desire. It occurs only by our inaction. As expressed in an article appeared in the Basiret newspaper, if the whole province of Arabia was brought under a new and efficient administration and if the authority of the caliphate was established over sultan’s African realms, there is no doubt that the Ottoman Empire would become a major military power and would compete with the great European powers in numbers of soldiers. This would guarantee our success and prosperity and assure our future. Because when the goal becomes Islamic unity, it would not be limited by the Ottoman frontiers. The realization of such a broad project necessitates solving all the sectarian and political problems. Hasn’t history shown us that in the past many extraordinary rulers like Timur, Selim the first, Nadir Shah—whom nature only raises up every three or four centuries—have tried to realize this goal? Meanwhile, blood runs like torrents and entire armies have been slaughtered. But, this has been in vain. In the end, none of them have succeeded in achieving their aim. Because the task of the sword is to separate two realms not to unite them. Unification can only be realized with skill and talent. Therefore, if we trust our hopes in such mighty ideal we can be sure of their realization. When the elements of education and the principles of religion have been provided and taught to the people of Asia, sharia or Islamic law would never allow their division on the basis of their race or language. Any Islamic school of legal thought or theology, be it Hanafi or Shafii or Maliki or Hanbali or Jafari, would never encourage the division or the breakup of the Islamic community. Therefore, Muslims should seek their unification not by engaging in political or sectarian strives but by reading and learning. We are extremely pleased to learn that a new organization called “The Islamic Revival” was recently formed, and that it calls for the willing to join them. We also read some news about it in the Basiret newspaper. We hope and wish that this organization of union will not just remain as it is now but will spread nationwide and encompass all members of our nation.

22 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic

Progress Imagine what it would be like for an intelligent extraterrestrial creature that has come to earth in order to examine human life. He would see that in China, the wise men deduce their belief from the existence of creatures that they say the Creator (God) has created. They believe that God is self-existent. They put forward thousands of proofs in order to prove their belief. At the same time, these wise men demonstrate their foolishness by worshipping a piece of wood or stone (idol) as the God. Suppose the same extraterrestrial also meets scientists in Europe who are calculating the depths of rivers on the surface of the moon; at the same time, this same being is not being aware of the existence of the Meriç (Evros) river in Europe. After observing these facts the extraterrestrial would come to the conclusion that human intelligence—besides being unable to understand every reality—also suffers from the shortcoming of having an excess of judgments. But if this creature sees the great monuments built by humans and visits in particular the advanced countries and observes their civilization, then this creature would understand the greatness of the humans and how miraculous they are. The visiting extraterrestrial would also be amazed by the power of the Creator (God) who created such a creature like a human being—a being who is superior to other creations of God. Actually, our extraterrestrial visitor would not need to visit every civilized and advanced country in order to understand the level of civilization reached in the world. He just needs to see London. In London one can see the whole world in a single place. London is like a photographic image of the modern world, no place on the earth can demonstrate the progress of modern civilization better than London. That is why we chose London as an example. This country (England) is surrounded by a black cloud, like the prosperity and success of the humanity that is also veiled by clouds of suspicion. Even the houses of this country are submerged in blackness as an indication that the progress of modern civilization permeated everything there—even its stones and trees. Nevertheless, when one manages to see beyond this veil of darkness, a magnificent civilization begins to appear before our eyes. Then it is impossible for the heart not to be delighted by this marvelously beautiful scene. If any person in London would like to see the administration of justice, the first place he would come across is the giant parliament building that is the center of the legislative activity in this country. The English parliament serves as a model for many political systems in the world. The size of this imposing building alone suffices to demonstrate the power of public opinion that stands against the government. This huge stone building is actually the manifestation of power. Having entered inside, you would encounter 300 or 400 parliamentarians representing one of the most advanced nations in the world. These deputies are the most distinguished members of a powerful nation of 180 million citizens and they are its most eloquent and efficient representatives of popular aspirations. By their hard work they provide justice to the citizens, which is an essential condition for the progress of the country. This distinguished assembly derives its power from the political committees formed from 40 or 50,000 members— sometimes even from 100 to 150,000 members. When these large committees congregate, their deliberations are conducted in an absolutely disciplined way and

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 23 in quietness. When one speaker gives a speech, the rest listen to him quietly. When they present a request to their government they do this in a correct procedure. Ninety percent of their request was accepted because they conformed to justice and were backed by a strong political force. In particular, the judges at the courts that apply the laws and decrees adopted by the parliament are completely trusted by the people. If you were to ask the parties at the court, they would say they have more confidence in these judges than in their own fathers. Here there are lawyers who represent the poor people for free. These lawyers are extremely well versed in jurisprudence and prefer to win a just case solely for the purpose of justice rather than to earn handfuls of gold. At the court even a vile murderer is addressed as “sir.” Nobody including court officials can use violence against others and consider it as a part of their prerogative. That is how the justice system works in England. Education is even in a better condition. When observing the schools, you would find young students of the age of ten or twelve behaving in a very mature way—like twenty- or thirty-year-old adults. There are high schools where students study three or four languages. In the curricula of their primary schools, where the majority of the students are not older than six and seven, basic courses like learning reading and writing, basic arithmetic, fundamentals of religion, and so on do not exist. When asked the reason, the instructor said, “Since fifteen or even eighteen years, students starting their first year, come to school already knowing these subjects.” Again I see students of the age of ten or twelve reading newspapers during recreation hours. Aboard their ships, crewmen spend their free time reading books on physics, in the stores one could encounter clerks discussing the theories of the German philosophers. If a person uses the telescopes found in their observatories, he could see all the movements of the planets. Their libraries contain two or three million books of every language and hundreds of extremely knowledgeable librarians serve the people there. If anybody wants to learn about the latest scientific achievements and attends one of their universities, academies of sciences, or the private saloons where scientific discussions take place, this person would also witness in total amazement that today it is possible to disseminate by means of print every word expressed by these scholars. Liberty makes it possible even for beggars to become kings in their realms and equality ensures happiness for everybody by preventing anyone from being condemned to live in an inferior status. And the concept of division of labor makes the hands of a weak child as useful as the arms of twenty strong and well-built wrestlers. Steam power enables humankind to swim on land and to travel on sea and also increases the capacity of production and lifespan of the people; electricity and gas not only illuminates and enlightens the world at night like a full moon but also provides power for hundreds of thousands of other scientific and useful inventions that are discovered by thousands of eminent scientists who place their inventions at the service of humanity. All these elements of scientific progress are obtained by the hard work and the arduous effort of the savants, who sacrifice their sleep at night and their comfort during the day for many years. Especially the wealth of the country (England) is so immense that it would be difficult to describe. The important buildings that are found in the city (of London) alone would be worth millions of gold pieces and would be equivalent to the whole city of Istanbul. When you see the precious minerals and objects of fine art in their markets, you would think

24 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic that all the treasures of the world had been looted and brought here. When one sees the amount of gold in their banks that weighs in hundreds of pounds, one might fear that the island of (Britain) would sink because of its weight. Commercial transactions are carried out with an extraordinary safety. The capital of the companies and the commercial houses, which amounts to millions of gold pounds, is trusted to the hands of the clerks with salaries of 300 or 500 piasters. Besides their records, nobody needs to have any written statement even a piece of paper to prove the balance of his account in the banks. Here (in England) one’s financial assets are constantly changing due to the fluctuating nature of the stock market. Whereas in our country (the Ottoman Empire), since most of our income is from agriculture, the value of our assets changes only twice a year. In London, bills of exchange are constantly changing hands. London is an extremely bustling city with a busy traffic of vehicles and people. Indeed, every street turns into a big whirlpool because of that circulation. A continuous and flow of people and tens of thousands of private and public (street) cars circulate incessantly inside the city.

Tanzimat As for those who witness (the social and economic) transformation and progress of our era with a romantic and emotional outlook, if such persons would also bear in mind the unjustly shed blood, confiscated properties, and despoiled honors in our country in the last 300 years and would also consider the importance of the Tanzimat Charter, then such persons would accept this document as a miracle of justice drafted for the preservation of the human rights. But, for those who try to see the state of world by isolating it from ostentatious representations, this imperial charter is viewed as something that does not pertain to the law but is just a political statement. From an external point of view, it looks like this charter is proclaimed to preserve the lives, properties, and honor of the empire’s population; in reality, it is proclaimed to ensure the existence of the state. It is a well-known fact that forty or forty-five years ago the political system of the Ottoman Empire was already in a ruined state and totally subjected to the predominance of the European powers. As a result, the Ottoman province of Egypt has started to challenge the authority of the Porte. This situation became so aggravated that the Ottoman government asked Russia to send troops to protect Istanbul and the empire’s existence from the Egyptian threat. Although the continuation of the Ottoman Empire was desired in every corner of the civilized world, its partition also was contemplated by many powerful states. But this has to occur without the least damage to the interests of these states. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire was quite fortunate that such a great statesman like Mustafa Reşid Pasha served the state in these hazardous years. He saved the Ottoman Empire by promulgating the Tanzimat Charter. This charter was not a constitutional document as some people thought. It only confirmed the provisions of the sharia as our main constitutional and legal system; plus, it also contained some administrative measures representing European ideas. Suppose the provisions of the Gülhane Charter were

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 25 not limited to the protection of the life, property, and honor and to the protection of personal freedom by these principles; instead, suppose that it also covered public freedom and the sovereignty of the people. If this were so, then it could properly be accepted as a basic charter for the Islamic caliphate. There are people who actually argued that Reşid Pasha promulgated this charter to ensure his personal safety. This statement is actually irrelevant because the person of such a great man who dared to promulgate the Gülhane Charter in such a perilous time of course deserved to be protected. One of the most criticized aspects of the Tanzimat Charter was that it was guaranteed by the European powers. Nowadays public concern and hostility (toward European intervention) seem to justify these allusions. Today the senile fathers of the sons of our fatherland consider the Tanzimat Charter as a harmful act to the future of our state. But before its proclamation, the same people considered each word of that charter a magic formula designed to destroy the sharia. It would have jeopardized the very existence of the Tanzimat Charter if it had been trusted back then to the guardianship of the people. Besides public opinion, what kind of internal force could be found to guarantee the existence of the Tanzimat Charter? Would it be the sharia? Well if the sharia was observed and applied properly there would be no need to promulgate the Tanzimat Charter. Would it be the ulema? If the ulema protected the sharia instead of issuing fatwas for the execution of the people without any trial there would be no need to issue such a charter and place its application under the protection and the guarantee of the European powers. Now we understand that Reşid Pasha, like nations that were compelled to keep the executioners to ensure their safety, was forced to have recourse to an unnatural force for safeguarding his work. Thanks to Reşid Pasha’s protective measures to safeguard the Tanzimat, the Ottoman state was able to solve many problems. Important issues like the Egyptian Question and other issues like those of the Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia), Montenegro, and Serbia were solved with the help of Tanzimat. Equally, we managed to safeguard our independence during the crises of Jiddah, Syria, and Crete. If we examine closely we will see that from the time of Reşid Pasha to the death of Ali Pasha all statesmen who controlled the administration of the Ottoman state followed a stable path like the Milky Way. Stable but troubled here and there by dark spots. Nevertheless, the path that was followed was the same. The unity of this path although created some difficulties for us, overall benefited the Ottoman state. After guaranteeing our political sovereignty, Europe also considered the Ottoman state as a European Power. Especially after the French War (Franco-Prussian War of 1870), our alliance was so much sought after by the European states that being an ally of the Porte was considered an important political success by them. This aspect of the Tanzimat could not be hidden. Regardless, the Tanzimat was promulgated by Reşid Pasha either to protect himself or for the benefit of the Ottoman state, he always tried to get the support of the public opinion. Reşid Pasha opened schools and raised many statesmen; he also protected those who advocated the idea of opposition (to the sultanic power). His pupils only cared about satisfying Europe by adding some trivial and irrelevant regulations and making some superficial changes. It is a well-known story that Fuad Pasha, who became famous by being humorous and witty to the point of harming his father’s good reputation, said one day:

26 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic In a state there exist two powers. One comes from above and the other derives from below. In our country the force coming from above oppresses us and for us it is impossible to get any force from below to encounter that. Therefore, we are obliged to use force coming from the sides like the shoemaker’s tools, and these forces are the foreign embassies.

But according to us, if Fuad Pasha had lived today and witnessed all of the turbulent times of today, he would probably admit that our country does not need unnatural forces (like embassies). It is a well-known fact that those who opposed authoritarian rule during the grand vizierate of Mahmud Nedim Pasha that lasted eleven months were not children of five to sixteen years; rather, it was the whole nation. This policy did not cause oppression. But it deprived people of the orderly and efficient administration that was put into practice by Reşid Pasha. Those who did not want to say anything good for Ali Pasha at his funeral, three or five months later visited his tomb and expressed their regret and acknowledged their mistake. The most unfortunate event happened during the eleventh month that succeeded the administration of Ali Pasha; a lot of damage was done to the Tanzimat, including depriving the citizens of the empire of their basic rights like personal freedom. Moreover, the European guarantee for the Ottoman state that was instituted by the Gülhane Charter in 1839 was nearly invalidated. Two years ago, we were in such a difficult position that rescuing the state from that situation in two years would have been considered a great achievement. Now we are in a worse situation such that restoring the empire to its former state of two years ago could only be done by a Mahdi (super-human religious reformer). Nevertheless, we can only maintain our independence by a general (international) guarantee instituted by the Tanzimat. This can only be assured by delivering those who violate the principles of the Tanzimat to the judicial system of the Tanzimat.

The Eastern Question For two centuries, one of the political calamities that is feared might erupt like a flaming volcano and alter the shape of the earth is actually the Eastern Question. This idea originated in Europe. European writers who wanted to compare all the parts of the world with their countries studied these foreign lands and published works on them. In their studies, European writers expressed the view that the diversity of the ethnic and religious composition of the Ottoman Empire would be a natural cause for intercommunal conflicts; moreover, they considered Islam to be incompatible with European civilization. European public opinion believes that any kind of religious and sectarian strife in the Ottoman realms would violate the rights of the people living in these lands. This convinces them to support the people whom they think are victims. Nevertheless, were it possible to have access to secret documents in the European Ministries and were it possible for us to listen to discussions in closed chambers, we would then clearly see that the Eastern Question actually derives from conflicting interests and political competition among the great powers. It is clear that

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 27 the Ottoman Empire is composed of various ethnicities and that each group is further divided into many religious sects that are hostile to each other; in particular, Bulgarian committees and Greek organizations are at the odds with each other. Nevertheless, these various ethnic groups and nationalities are intertwined with each other as we already mentioned in our article entitled “The Fusion of Nations.” Therefore, these nationalities have already lost their desire and capacity of becoming independent by separating themselves from the Ottoman state. In our age, humans are elevating themselves above nature by their scientific inventions and by cooperating with each other. This cooperation among peoples prevents them from establishing separate and independent societies. The force of European public opinion divided Germany into several parts and separated Belgium from the Netherlands. At the same time, Italy and Germany each realized their national unions by spilling rivers of blood. Therefore, by considering the secession of Serbia and Greece from us (Ottoman Empire), we should not believe that Crete and Egypt would leave our motherland and become independent. This would mean ignoring the realities of our time. It would not be difficult to disprove the ideas of the Europeans who believe that Islam is incompatible with modern civilization. When we initiated our relations with Western countries, some ignorant people who were completely unaware of the basic principles of education were given the task of writing down some memorandums and dispatches that were falsely called “new laws and regulations.” These legislative activities were seen as the beginning of the separation of the state and the religion in the Ottoman Empire. This was believed to ensure the entry of the Ottoman state to realm of the modern civilization. In reality the sharia is much superior to these Western laws. If instead of adopting the French Criminal Code the criminal parts of the sharia (uqubat) would be codified the Europeans could not argue that there exists a contradiction between Islam and the modern civilization. Now if again the sharia would be adapted to the realities of our time, under the light of the fiqh, Europe could only applaud this achievement. When a pistol is fired in a distant corner of the East, its echo creates a clamor in the West and causes a huge outcry among public opinion. Nevertheless, it is well known by those who analyze public consciousness that the feelings of the public can never be as efficient as public interests determining the policy of administrators. Therefore, in any country the people who would actually take action against a domestic injustice would be only one-tenth of those who would verbally protest the same injustice. In case of an injustice happening in a foreign country this ratio would be one in 10,000. In England and France people would naturally oppose their government solely for its domestic policy but not for its foreign policy toward the crises of Hungary, Poland, and India. We can also say that if today the Ottoman state would administer any of its province (by exerting oppression) like Russia administers Poland, the reaction of the European public opinion would be no more than the noise of turbulent waters heard from a distance. Nevertheless, we should not cause Western public opinion to turn against us. This is because we need European material and moral support and, from time to time, depend on Europeans for the preservation of our independence. Thus, because the Ottoman Empire’s ethnic composition is not homogenous, Europeans have erroneous ideas about Islam; also, the Ottoman state needs a point of support to rely upon in case of crisis. In short, the Porte is obliged to have good relations with the Western

28 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic powers. Nevertheless, it would be clearly understood by those who are familiar with political affairs that these considerations cannot be accepted as a legitimate cause for the creation and continuation of a huge “Eastern Question” in the world. In order to completely understand the nature of the Eastern Question, it is necessary to know the history of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and foreign states. It is obvious that we formed our empire by the force of our sword and we maintained it by our sword. From the foundation of our state until the end of the Sokollu’s grand vizierate, our relationship with the neighboring non-Muslim states was jihad (holy war) and mütareke (truce). During the campaigns and wars of Hungary, Poland and Crete continued to fight. This was after the end of our age of expansion and during the beginning of our age of stagnation; although the Ottoman sword was not totally efficient as in the past, led by Köprülü and his son, we did not lose our former prestige and did not suffer any important losses. Even during the campaign and the siege of Vienna, when we were treacherously and despicably attacked by the Poles who acted in violation of a truce, we lost some territory, but nevertheless our prestige and honor was saved. This era in the history of our state was closed by the event of Prut. With this event we became part of the European politics. At Prut, a mighty emperor of Russia was compelled by a simple vizier of the Ottoman state, who started his career as a baltacı (halberdier), to petition for the safeguarding of his well-being. Again at Prut, the same vizier forced Charles XII of Sweden, the so-called world conqueror, to plead for protection. But unfortunately these resounding triumphs and brilliant successes that honored the beginning of the reign of Ahmed III would soon be nullified by countless factors; toward the end of this period, the positive results obtained from the victory of Prut battle were ultimately lost by a fallacious foreign policy. Moreover, the Hungarian lands that we acquired at great cost and guarded for almost 200 years were also lost during that period. During the reign of Mahmud I (r. 1730–54), the fortune of the Ottomans was again promising, and we successfully defended our eastern borders by defeating a world conqueror named Nadir Shah. We forced Austria to cede Belgrade to us and acquired the Azak fortress from Russia. Actually, these successes were the last flickering flames of a torch that was about to be extinguished. Unfortunately, afterwards, the might of our state was turned into pride and its skill into illusion. With this our cautious policy that always assured the dignity of the Ottomans also entered the grave with Ragıp Pasha. After that—from the last years of the reign of the Sultan Mustafa III (r. 1757–74) to the early years of the reign of the Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–39)—we fought four times with Russia. We faced cannons with rifles, rifles with a sabre, bayonets with clubs, plans with tricks, logic with poetry, progress with stagnation, order with rebellion, union with division, f thought with turbans. As a result, we suffered countless defeats to an unprecedented degree. These defeats presented a complete contrast with the victories won by the Ottomans in their golden age. No other nation in history suffered such a setback. As a consequence, we lost more than half of our territory in Europe. The following passages are taken from Namık Kemal’s Makalat-i Siyasiye ve Edebiye (İstanbul: Selanik Matbaası, [1909?]), 166–225.

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 29 Wa shāwirhum fi’l-‘amr]-Usulu Meşveret Hakkında Mektuplar (Letters on the Constitutional Regime) Man is created free by God and is obliged to benefit from that divine attribute. But freedom could only be preserved within society. This is because society has the capacity to provide an effective force to protect individuals from the aggression of other people. Therefore, in this world, society is needed to protect freedom; moreover, the future of humanity depends on that protection. For humans, inventing the societal form was necessary. The elements that constitute sovereignty are those forces that are united to prevent injustice. Therefore, as every individual in society has the natural right to exercise force, the collective force of individuals forms the sovereignty that belongs to the people. If the inhabitants of a town come together and elect a kadı (judge) to administer justice/litigate for a case among them, the verdict/judgment of that judge would not be legally binding. Only a judge appointed by the sultan or his government would have the authority to issue a legal verdict. Nonetheless, if the people of a town would congregate and elect a person for the sultanate and pay homage to him, that person would be nominated as a sultan. With this new election and designation, the previous sultan would lose his authority. This is because election and nomination to the sultanate is a right belonging to the ummah (Muslim community). Since an imam cannot exercise all his administrative duties personally, it becomes necessary to form a government. This is nothing other than society delegating its authority to a representative. Therefore, the only legitimate authority is the one entrusted/delegated to the sultans by the ummah in form of biat (bayah). Sultans, in turn, delegate this authority to their viziers and ministers. Every ummah has possessed this right according to the realities and needs of the particular time. A government must exercise its authority by limiting people’s rights in as minimal a way as possible. No ummah could violate the rights of its members by appointing a ruler with autocratic powers. This is because the society has no right to violate individual rights. To keep a government within the circle of justice requires two things: First, ending the secrecy of the administrative laws and regulations and making them accessible to the public. Only this open policy can prevent abuses committed by the government. The second would be a representative government that deprives government officials of their legislative authority. The state is a moral person, and lawmaking constitutes an expression of its will. When the legislative and executive powers were united in one hand, the government becomes autocratic. What are the essential statutes of our state? Currently, we have imperial edicts of Gülhane (1839) and Islahat (1856) as well as the recent Speech of the Crown. Indeed, if we examine these texts closely, it is possible to deduce from them some principles and rules that could be considered as pertaining to the constitutional law. Nonetheless, none of these documents contain detailed and explicit rules needed for the effective functioning and general administration of a state. Some of these texts contain the expression “Without reaching free status”; this expression could seriously limit the freedom of the people. If the Laws of Man/Human Rights were determined by reason and science and the

30 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic state of our civilization is evident, it is then necessary to amend essential parts of these imperial edicts in such way that makes them conform and to incorporate them into a newly promulgated charter of fundamental rights. When the sovereignty belongs to the people who can establish control over the actions of the state, it is only then that one can be convinced that the administration of the Ottoman state is really based on freedom and justice. That can only be assured by a representative regime. First of all, let’s think about the famous Eastern Question that is so popular among many circles. It is well known that Russia has always wanted to destroy the Ottoman Empire, and Western powers are trying to prevent that from happening. Whereas Russia tries to obtain her goal by inciting the Christian subjects of the Ottoman state to revolt, European powers help the dissidents/rebels who rise up in response to Russian encouragement. At first glance, these actions seem to represent a great contrast. But in reality, it is our government that forces the Europeans powers to act the way they do. When the Russians sent Mencikof to Istanbul to protect their coreligionist Orthodox subjects of the sultan, the Western powers sided with us and resisted Russian intervention. For that, they sacrificed their lives and their property. Afterward they proposed ways for us to reform our despotic administration. Then, in order to obtain guarantees from the European for its sovereignty and to be accepted to the concert of European nations as a state endowed with a representative system, the Porte accepted their proposals. But instead of introducing reforms for all Ottoman subjects, the Ottoman government chose to grant some further privileges only to its Christian subjects. Moreover, they included these privileges in the Paris Peace Treaty (1856) and declared them in the form of a sultanic edict (Islahat Fermanı). Now the Ottoman Christians have gained whatever rights they wish to have. Because the administration is corrupt, the bureaucrats are free and unchecked; there is no representation, no supervision by the nation (ummah). Because of that Europeans actually do not believe that Christians in the Ottoman Empire are living comfortably and gaining all these rights. Since Europeans live in free societies, they do not believe that people in a country could be free without having the right to question and hold the ministers of the government responsible for their actions or without the existence of a parliamentarian body to examine the laws of the country and scrutinize the acts and deeds of the government. There is no doubt that the Ottoman state will collapse if it will not change its current despotic regime. In fact, Western powers have protected us until now; they will probably continue to do that to safeguard their economic and commercial interests in our country and to defend the European political balance from the onslaught of the Northern Barbarians. Nevertheless, as long as non-Muslims in the empire continue to complain about their situation by saying that they are being oppressed, Western governments would not be able to ignore their pleas and would support their cause. They also would do that in order not to leave an initiative for intervention open to Russia. Nowadays, no one can resist the wishes the general public or ignore the pleas of public opinion. The idea of giving autonomy to each of the nations that compose the Ottoman Empire and creating a confederation like Germany is an idea that has been favored in Europe for a long time.

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 31 Nonetheless, it is clear that this form of confederation would cause the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. European governments also know very well that a decentralized form of the Ottoman Empire would not be able to form as effective a bulwark against Russia as would a centralized Ottoman state. However, every wise person would accept that as long as the Ottoman state would be governed by despotic rule, it would be almost impossible to prevent foreign intervention into its affairs. The result of the foreign (European) intervention can cause financial bankruptcy for our state. To realize this, we just need to remember the financial loss caused to the treasury by the Cretan revolt alone. It was 3,000 to 4,000 kise (purses) of money. Now it becomes clear that the Porte cannot even afford financially to participate in a military coalition formed together by European states against possible Russian aggression. The only solution to prevent such ills is the establishment of a representative government/ regime. Then it would become clear that everyone was free and Europe would treat us as a civilized nation—not like an ineffective scarecrow against Russia. Then if the people in a province of the Ottoman Europe would rebel against the government while they were represented in the Ottoman Parliament by their deputies, Europe would not sympathize with them and support their cause. This would totally undermine the efforts of our enemies. Today even the ministers in the cabinet accept that our financial situation is deplorable. The major cause for that is the nonexistence of a budget control in our administration. State expenditures are not subject to any control. That situation would be different if a representative regime was in place. Would it be possible to increase our internal debt from 22 million liras to 40 million liras and to declare the value of the debt bonds as 29 million liras—whereas in reality (the value of debt bonds) it is less than 26 million liras? Equally, would it be possible to introduce new and arbitrary regulations to tax our salt and tobacco production heavily? How could we be confident that in the future the situation of our state of administration would improve? Second, we should bear in mind that our people have a high level of distrust and even hatred of the current government. Whatever the Porte says, it is considered a way to deceive people. The high level of mistrustis illustrated in the following story: Due to the increasing demand for raw cotton in the West that has been growing since the beginning of the American Civil War, the government tried to distribute free cotton seeds to farmers to encourage cotton production. But the farmers rejected that offer, because they could not believe that the government was acting genuinely. They expected a ruse. The mistrust of the people toward the government is totally understandable. This is because until now a hundred thousand things were done but none of them actually benefited the people. On the contrary, these government actions harmed the people. On the other hand, many civil servants and officials who were initially supported and trusted by the people obtained important positions in the administration; but all failed to solve the problems. They could not achieve anything. As a result, how could people trust the government unless they supervise and oversee the administration? Sometime ago the emperor of France suggested to the Porte that the Ottoman government should seek the opinion of the people of Turkey on the issue of the reforms to solve the Cretan Problem. The Porte vehemently rejected that proposal and said, “We should not kill ourselves by drinking such a lethal poison like seeking public

32 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic opinion.” But in reality, public opinion is not a poison; rather, it is the source of all remedies. Just as the health of a person needs various natural elements and just as a physician obtains his medicine from the nature, similarly the necessary reforms of the government must be derived from the traditions and customs of its population. It is only by adopting a representative regime that we can end the current despotism and wasting of resources. Some opponents of the representative regime argue that it can violate sultanic rights. We already explained that the right of the sultan is to govern according to the general will of the nation. The sultan is the heir of a dynasty established to protect the religion and it is only thanks to that sacred goal that sultans became the central authority and caliph of Islam. Islamic religion rejects despotism. Those who are opposed to the representative regime also point out the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Ottoman Empire and argue that that might be an important obstacle for that regime. They also indicate the high level of the illiteracy in the empire. According to them, how is it possible for people who speak seventy-two different languages to meet and communicate in an assembly, and what would happen if, for example, the Greek representatives were to oppose sending troops to Greece? However, in every province of the empire there is a provincial assembly and in these assemblies the negotiations are carried out in the official language. Then, how can we talk about the language problem? Does a National Assembly mean a lawless association made up of seditious and totally free members? After the promulgation of the parliament regulations and the constitutional rules, who would dare to protect those who would like to secede from our empire? Who would object to a polity that has united various nationalities and ethnicities in its body? When it comes to the question of illiteracy and ignorance, countries like Montenegro, Serbia, and Egypt already have national assemblies. When ignorance is not an obstacle for the existence of an assembly in those countries, why should it be in our country? Are we less civilized than the savages of Montenegro? Brother, who gave this letter to you. He wants to oppose that article. If I abandon the representative regime, then in which system should I look for liberty? Is it not true that all good things and the modern civilization in this world have occurred thanks to the representative regime? According to our opponent, “In the world, the states are not formed by the union of the various elements.” To him “the union of the husband and the wife first forms the family, then, the multiplication of the families causes conflict among them.” After that he says, “The victor establishes his dominance over others; that is the creation of the government.” Yes, that is true, but what does it mean? To me, the legitimacy of the government is essential. For example, if a man sees another man and tells him that he beat up the owner of a house and appropriated his property, would any judge accept that fact as legitimate? In the famous and authoritative manual of Islamic law, it is asserted that if the law of victory permits it, the people could seize power from the government; but if not, the people must refrain from doing that. That person never thinks that if the right to rule or law of sovereignty was built solely on the mere military victory and naked force, then Lefter would have the right to govern the sanjak of İzmir, and Zambir Ağa would be the sultan in the Esfakya mountains, and Russia would have the right to occupy Istanbul. If the people’s right of

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 33 sovereignty was recognized, then they must also have the right to establish a republic. No one in the world can deny that right to them. Anyhow, wasn’t Islam a republic in its early days when it just emerged? Nevertheless, it is also undeniable that the republican regime would be very detrimental for us. In our country no one would like to institute a republic. But still, that does not mean that this option is totally null and void forever. It is said that the Greeks would like to institute a republic. Some argue that defending the popular sovereignty would accept that argument. But who are the Greeks? In the Ottoman Empire, Greeks form a tiny minority only noticed on a map by using microscope. In any case there could be no more than hundreds of thousands of souls among them asking for a republic. They were not able to institute a republic in Greece. Do they not know that in our empire where the Muslims formed the majority, people are so attached to the House of Osman and people are ready to sacrifice their lives to defend even a single hair of the sultan? Our opponent is still not convinced that the regime of popular sovereignty conforms to the sharia. By God, has he read the question discussed in the article on its conformity to the Islamic law? When Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (r. 632–4) was appointed as caliph and Imam Ali opposed that appointment, Umar al-Faruq (r. 634–44) said to him: “You are worthy, but the people elected Abu Bakr and wanted him to be a caliph.” Isn’t the government built of forces emanating from me, you, and others? Who can have authority other than what is delegated by the majority? Such a person doubts the conformity of a representative regime to the sharia. Since their arrival in Europe, the Young Ottomans explained that issue in detail. I am not going to repeat that information here. You must have copies of our newspapers Hürriyet (Liberty) and Muhbir. You can consult them yourself. If such a person is still not convinced, then he is entitled to believe what he chooses to believe. But in his letter, there is one issue raised, and we have to answer that. That issue is this: our opponents say that the establishment of a representative regime in our country could only be possible with the adoption of the European parliamentary system. Yes, exactly, that is true. Actually, the Ottoman Empire in the past was also governed by a sort of representative regime. The people used to exercise the right of supervision by themselves instead of delegating them to the deputies in a parliamentary regime. Every Janissary barrack was a kind of armed National Assembly. It is well known that as a result of that system a lot of blood has been shed. In order to avenge a despotic rule, there was time when Janissaries transgressed and abused their right of supervision. When they tried to suppress the oppression, they became oppressors. In order to end the chaotic situation, the government had to extend its authority and became an absolutist regime. This demonstrates that the general public could not on its own directly exercise the right of sovereignty; moreover, it cannot even supervise the exercise of power (by a ruler). In the latter case, many revolts and mutinies have taken place and many lives have been lost. Therefore, supervision of authority must be trusted to an elected body. They say that the National Assembly that we desire would constitute a bidat (innovation) in Islam. What can we do? In Andalus (Spain) when Malik Jawhar formed an assembly, did not he think that it was a bidat (innovation)? Today we are purchasing steamships for our navy. Is not that bidat too? Should we let the Greeks with their lemon boats conquer Crete? Should we not also use innovation to strengthen our army and

34 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic allow Greek forces to capture Istanbul? In the world there exist so many innovations that deserve to be called not simply good innovation but beautiful innovations. If the parliamentary regime is permissible according to the sharia as a principle, the details of that regime are determined by the ijmā of the umma (consensus of the nation), also an essential rule of the sharia. The Ottoman nation asks for freedom. But if this nation forgets that freedom is a God-given essence and would ask for it from mortal men, then he would cause great harm to himself. If I have been born free, why should I accept being freed by anyone? Why should I accept the legitimacy of a regime that wants to enslave me and take away my freedom? When the sharia (Islamic law) already protects my freedom, why should I seek my freedom in the man-made laws? According to the newspaper Muhbir, “The existence and the honor of the Constitution is guaranteed and given protection by the very name of God, even the irreligious ones ask for an oath for the protection of their legislation.” I totally agree with that statement. To draft a new constitution, first of all, I would take as an example one of the constitutions of a country ruled by a representative regime. Then I would take the Gülhane Charter, Islahat Edict, and the Speech of the Crown. Then, to enact our new Constitution, I would adopt and utilize the useful parts of these documents, which conform to our national customs and mores. For example, the most advanced of the great powers are the United States of America, England, Germany, and France. The United States is a republic; in England and Germany the aristocracy rules; none of these can be an example for us. Only France remains as an example for us. Do we have the capability of adopting the system of the French who a century ago came out as a nation to declare human rights to the world and present these ideas to the nations who live in the modern era? Yes, we have that capability. Although anyone who wishes to deny that fact might consider my statement an exaggeration, today we are ruled by a freer regime then the French. Despite their education and patriotism, the French people have a fiery and passionate temperament and always want to try new things. As a consequence, they can suddenly destroy a regime that was the outcome of many years of political experience. Although they are totally free, they never accept any control by the government. After the Great Revolution (French Revolution of 1789), they established thirty or forty governments and they destroyed them all. In their wars they lost a couple of million compatriots. They never could properly benefit from any of their victories. Actually, they were harmed by them. Finally, Napoleon III came to power and limited their freedom by introducing some regulations that conformed to their national customs and mores. Today, they have reached their current level of progress and happiness thanks to these regulations. On the other hand, the people of the Ottoman nation—in contrast to the French—are naturally calm, obedient, and respectful of authority. Therefore, in our actions, we never reach to extremes. In our 600 years of history, we have had a hundred revolutions. As a result of these revolutions, only the ruling persons have changed, but the system itself has remained the same. Now, in order to be more convincing, I will explain to you the political system of France. According to its constitution, France is governed by an emperor with the assistance of a council of ministers and three assemblies. The ministers are responsible

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 35 to the emperor for their actions only. For the political actions of the government, the emperor is solely responsible to the people. Actually, when an emperor assumes all the responsibility for the government’s actions, it is a political subterfuge to lessen the responsibility of the administration. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, how would it be possible to hold our mighty sultan responsible civilly and criminally for the actions of the administration? However, we cannot also declare our sultan totally irresponsible and give all the responsibility to the ministers. This is because, according to the sharia (Islamic law), the sultan is personally responsible for the implementation of justice. But if a minister or a state official commits embezzlement, would it be just to hold the sultan responsible for the wrongdoing of that minister? In my previous letter, I discussed the issue of responsibility of the ruler and the ministers. Now let’s talk about the issue  of  assemblies. The first of these assemblies is the Council of State (Şûrâ-yı  Devlet)  in French,  Conseil d’Etat. This council is formed by forty to fifty members. These members are appointed and dismissed by the emperor. The task of this council is to prepare the governmental laws, decrees,  and administrative regulations. It also has the authority to offer solutions for administrative problems. When the prepared regulations are submitted to the Senate or to the National Assembly, the proposal is made and defended by a member of that council. This member is appointed by the emperor. The ministers have the right to participate in the voting process and to use their vote. Recently we created such a council. The creation of that council is the most problematic. The main reason France became the university of the world should be sought in the quality of its Council of State members. In France, each of the members of the Conseil d’Etat could be considered an expert in law. Moreover, without having graduated from a law school, nobody would be allowed even to enter the library of the parliament. My question is, are we able to form such a council that would be capable of performing such a task (drafting the laws)? Personally, I expect that in order to please Europe we will search these members in the provinces among the people of different religions. In contrast, instead of doing that, if we limit our search to Istanbul (the capital) and other privileged provinces, we could easily find enough well-educated candidates  who could perfectly perform this task and draft our legislation. Their numbers might be no more than forty or fifty; but that would be sufficient. Thanks to God, the intelligence of the people and the dearth of able men in our country did not yet reach the level desired by the government. Let me also express my modest opinion on this issue: when the Conseil d’Etat was reinstituted in France during the reign of Napoleon III, the French people had not yet totally freed themselves from the excessive desire of freedom introduced after the Revolution of 1789. Therefore, the members of the Council of State should not be exclusively and arbitrarily appointed by the government. But instead they should be elected according to their merit and some criteria mentioned in a special regulation. The second one is the Legislative Assembly (Cour Legislative). The task of that assembly is to review the bills of laws prepared by the Counsel of State and adopt or reject them. The members of that assembly are directly elected by the people for six years. The assembly remained open for three months. Sometimes it could be extended. Any person could attend and listen to the discussions/deliberations. Nevertheless, if required by more than five

36 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic members of the assembly, the discussions could be carried out in close session. The president of the assembly orders recording the discussions in the minutes. The president of the assembly was appointed by the emperor among its members. The duration of his mandate is one year. The ministers could not be members of the parliament. Nobody can submit a petition to the assembly. The emperor has the right to convene and to dissolve the assembly. In the latter case, after the dissolution of the assembly the emperor has the obligation to convene a new assembly. Now should assembly of the nation wanted by us be exactly the same? No. According to my humble opinion, our assembly must be more liberal than its French counterpart. The author of the letter wondered, how could our peasants elect suitable candidates since they were mostly ignorant? As such, according to that person, our peasants could be easily influenced and manipulated by the government. It seems this person thinks that all peasants in Europe are very well informed and educated and they would be able to differentiate the right from the wrong, the unwise from the wise and educated from the ignorant. Actually, this is not true. The Europeans in general are similar to us. The only difference between them and us is that they have an efficient government that allows people to accumulate wealth. How do Europeans elect their parliaments? In Europe, governments use partisan newspapers to promote their propaganda campaigns, disseminate their ideas, and make promises. At the same time, by using other newspapers that support its views, the opposition also criticizes the government’s claims, tries to refute and discredit them, and expound its own ideas. Those who are satisfied by the government’s actions vote for its members; those who are not satisfied vote for the members representing the opposition. Our opponents argue that in our country that system could not work, because most of our people cannot read newspapers. Well in this world there are other means to disseminate ideas. The assembly remained open for three months. Sometimes it could be extended. Any person could attend and listen to the discussions and deliberations. Nevertheless, if more than five members of the assembly require, the discussions could be carried out in a closed session. The president of the assembly orders the recording of the discussions in the minutes. Let’s suppose that the government by using veiled threats and continuous tricks managed to get most of its supporters appointed to the assembly and, in this way, obtained the majority of the seats in the parliament. Even in that case, the mandate of each of these deputies was restricted to only two years. Everybody should understand that no person would be executed without a trial. If the government would use such illegal methods to control the parliament, the number of people supporting the opposition would increase and every able person would start to enlighten the people about the wrongdoings of the government. Then, if the government would not correct its policy, increasing opposition would force it to do that. Now since it became clear from the detailed information, according to my humble opinion the first article of the French Constitution would be applicable in our country. It is not contradictory with the sharia. When it comes to the second article, in our case the members of the assembly should not be elected for six years like in France; but for a shorter time period. Because here, since the parliamentary experience would be new,

 Namık Kemal (1840–88) 37 the deputies could abuse their power and not carry their duties properly. Therefore, the people should not be deprived of their rights to control the assembly by voting out the deputies who were not doing their jobs. Yes, the balancing of the accounting books must be reviewed and audited by the National Assembly; then, everybody would know where their money went. This control mechanism would prevent the theft and the squandering of the state funds. Actually, for my opponent this is a fundamental issue. Nevertheless, he also argues that, in our country, it would be almost impossible to find honest and intelligent people for that task. I personally do not agree with him. Now let’s suppose that the sultan, by deriving the principles of the government from the sharia, borrows the details of the administration from elsewhere, mostly from the practices of the other countries and by incorporating all of these elements into his speech and declare. “In my jurisdiction everybody should be equal and free and their life, property and honor would be safe.” Moreover, nobody’s domicile should be searched unless necessary. The press must be free, and people need to control and supervise the government by electing deputies to the National Assembly. Courts should be kept open and the judges should have the security and not be arbitrarily dismissed, the budget must be examined and audited by the members of the parliament, and so on. Of course, every province will send its notables or eminent peoples. They definitely must be literate people. The deputies were required to read the text of the Imperial Speech and understand its content. Then the Counsel of State has to draft the bill of law and would submit it to the consideration of the deputies. The deputies could ask for amendments. For example, if the bill would suggest: whoever suspected by the police could be arrested and jailed. Then deputies could say: no, that person first has to be put into trial and then if convicted must be jailed. They could point out to the Imperial Speech that guaranteed the personal freedom of every subject of the sultan and placed each person’s life, honor, and property under the protection of the government. Here, the deputies could also oppose that bill of law by stating that these kinds of arbitrary arrests or detentions would harm the person since he would be prevented from earning money in prison and his honor would be affected. When the auditing reports of the Ministry of Finance would be submitted to the parliament for approval, the deputies would see the indemnities paid to the foreign nationals. They would definitely object to these payments. If the government would argue that these payments were made in lieu of compensation for the bureaucratic mistakes committed by the Porte’s officials in the matters concerning the foreign nationals, the deputies would reply, “We do not accept being fleeced continuously by foreigners. If the latter have a solid case in their claim, let them initiate court cases against the government.” Let’s continue our discussion. Our opponent asks: Would the National Assembly review the actions of the cabinet concerning the government’s actions on the internal administration, military matters, and the external (foreign) affairs? If they do, then the question is: Are these members of the Assembly, who were actually big landowners or medrese graduates, more knowledgeable than the expert bureaucrats of the government? First of all, let’s understand the essence of the problem. According to my knowledge the interior administration has two branches: (a) the implementation of justice and

38 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic (b) the production and assuring progress. The National Assembly would, of course, review the policy of the cabinet and hold ministers responsible for their actions. For example, if despite the law that guaranteed that “no person could be punished without any trial,” the grand vizier would arrest and jail a person without any trial; such a law guaranteeing the rights of the persons would be useless. Unless the newspapers would publicize the event; moreover, as a result of that, the National Assembly would have to ask the sultan to correct the situation.

2

Hayreddin Pasha (1823–90)

Biography Hayreddin Pasha was born in Circassia in the Caucasus. He was enslaved during a raid and sold to Tahsin Bey of Cyprus. He was raised and educated by Tahsin Bey and later sold to the Bey (Governor) of Tunis, Ahmed Pasha. He continued his education in the Bardo Palace in Tunis. He learned Islamic law (sharia), history, mathematics, and military science. In 1850, Hayreddin was appointed to the rank of mirliva (general) and became the head of the cavalry in the army of the Tunisian Beylik (autonomous principality). In 1855, he was further promoted and entered Tunisian bureaucracy. In 1857–58 Hayreddin Pasha was sent to various European capitals for diplomatic missions. He was also enrolled in many commissions established to introduce reforms to the Beylik. In 1861, Hayreddin Pasha was nominated as the president of the Tunisian Parliament. In 1864, he was sent to Istanbul on a political mission. Hayreddin Pasha expounded his social and political ideas in a work published in Tunis in 1867 under the title Aqwam al-Masalik fµ Ma‘rifat Awal al Mawalik (The surest path to knowledge concerning the conditions of countries). This book has been partially translated into French and published in Paris as Réformes nécessaires aux États musulmans. In his work, Hayreddin Pasha leveled criticism at the Islamic civilization and compared it with the West, whose progress had aroused his admiration. Muslim countries, advocated Hayreddin Pasha, should emulate Europe in their modernization. He thoroughly supported the reforms of the Tanzimat, which in his view benefited the Ottoman Empire. Hayreddin declared that the Tanzimat reforms had been opposed by those who did not wish the Ottoman Empire to become a strong state. Between 1873 and 1877, Hayreddin was appointed as the Vezir-i Ekber (prime minister) of Tunis. Later, due a disagreement with the bey (ruler) of Tunis he resigned from his position. In 1877, Hayreddin traveled around Europe. He visited France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium. In 1878, he was invited to Istanbul by Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909). In the Ottoman Empire he was appointed to the Ayan Meclisi (Senate) and later was appointed as the president of the Finance Commission with the rank of vizier (minister). He gained the appreciation of the sultan and became a member of the sultan’s close ruling group. On December 8, 1878, Abdülhamid appointed Hayreddin Pasha as the grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire. He tried to reform the administration by restructuring it. Moreover, he wanted to curb the influence of palace officials and courtiers over the bureaucracy. Some officials and bureaucrats did not like these reforms, and they undermined his influence on the

40 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic sultan. As a result of these palace intrigues, he submitted his resignation in July 1879. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid did not allow the pasha to leave Istanbul. Hayreddin Pasha died in Istanbul in 1890. The following passages are taken from Hayreddin Pasha, Réformes Nécessaires aux États Musulmans. (Paris: Imprimerie Administrative de Paul Dupont, 1868). In his work Hayreddin Pasha encourages Muslims to reform their state and society by borrowing the useful and beneficial institutions from the European states. He asserts that by rejecting the adoption of modern ideas and institutions of the West, Muslims are actually harming themselves. First of all, I want to awaken the patriotism of the ulema and of the Muslim statesmen. I want to encourage them to help each other in the most intelligent manner  and to follow the most effective ways to improve the situation of the Muslim nation, to increase and heighten the level of its civilization, to enlarge the circle of the sciences and knowledge, to augment its public wealth by developing its agriculture, its commerce, and its industry, as well as to establish before all a solid base for a good system of government. The latter gives birth to an environment of confidence where all efforts for the development need to be successful. That situation today exists in Europe. Second, I wrote my work to enlighten some Muslims who were misled. These latter closed their eyes to everything originating from a different religion—even if it is praiseworthy and conforms to the teachings of our religious law. Due to a fatal prejudice, these Muslims wrongly believe that they have the obligation to despise and not even mention anything like institutions or political systems that exist in non-Muslim societies. This attitude is very wrong. This is because if ideas and institutions coming from non-Muslim lands are good and beneficial to Muslims, there is no reason to reject these importations; on the contrary, we have the obligation to adopt them and benefit from them. We admit that every man attached to his religion would consider the members of the other religions as having gone astray. But this should not prevent one from imitating them concerning mundane matters. That is exactly what Europeans are doing; they adopt ideas from others without any distinction regarding race and religion. The result of this conduct is clear: the Europeans are prospering. Every intelligent individual must judge each innovation with impartiality. If he finds a particular innovation beneficial to his interests, then he should immediately adopt it—whether the inventor is a believer or not. We have to adopt science wherever we find it. The Caliph Ali (r. 656–61) has said: “If things are useful to them, men should adopt them without searching for their origins.” To the early Muslims, it was permissible to borrow many things from the Greeks, including their logic. Our great jurist al-Ghazali has said: “Anyone who did not know logic could not be recognized and followed as a scholar.” What then prevents us today from borrowing useful and important knowledge from people who follow a different religion? El Mouak, a doctor from the Maliki school of law, has said: “It is forbidden for us to follow ideas that are against the fundamentals of our religious law. But if what they do

 Hayreddin Pasha (1823–90) 41 or say is permissible by our law? Then, should we not reject [what they do or say] just because of its origins? This is because religion does not prohibit imitating what God has ordered.” Moreover, we find in the commentary of a famous jurist the following statement: it is not prohibited to imitate the foreigners when the outcome is beneficial to God’s creatures. However, although these Muslims refuse to adopt useful institutions from foreign countries, with respect to products manufactured in foreign countries, they do not consider it impermissible to import and use such products in excessive quantities— although these imports would actually harm our national economy. Countless products, including clothing, furniture, and arms and weapons, are imported from abroad. For Muslim countries, it is now very clear that such an economic dependency is not only humiliating but also economically and politically harmful. It is humiliating because depending on foreign countries even for the most basic products actually demonstrates the backward and underdeveloped state of industry in Muslim countries. It is economically harmful not only because it benefits foreign and mostly European economies, but also because it helps foreign economies develop at the expense of the local economies of Muslim countries. Due to this dependency, local Muslim industry would be unable to develop and process their country’s own raw materials and turn these into manufactured goods. It is politically harmful, because such an economic dependency would also create a political dependency and would prevent the Muslim countries to be fully independent. This dependency would be particularly dangerous in times of war. This is because, if it is still possible to import these products in times of peace, it would not be the same when there is a war; this would particularly affect arms and weapons. In our country cattle breeders, cotton producers, and raw silk producers devote an entire year to hard labor to obtain the fruit of their labor; but in the end, they have been forced to sell their harvests or their crops to European merchants at a very low price. The Europeans transform these raw materials into products that they sell back to us at a rate that makes them ten times more expensive. There is no other explanation for this other than the scientific superiority of European countries over Muslim ones. The development of European countries to that extent was made possible by their having political institutions that were based on justice and liberty. How could an intelligent person allow himself to be deprived of what is beneficial and useful to him just because of some imaginary reasons? And again, how could that person give up fundamental things necessary for his own existence just for a whim? In their work on politics and war, European writers have explained very clearly that peoples who did not adopt the advanced military technology of their neighbors eventually end up being conquered. Actually, borrowing useful things from more advanced peoples should not be limited only to military technology; rather, it must encompass all aspects of civilized life that would ensure the progress and the development of the nation. These ideas are perfectly in accordance with the instructions given by the first caliph Abu Bakr (r. 632–4) to his famous general Khaled bin Waled, who was appointed as the commander in chief of the Muslim army. The caliph has said: “I recommend this to you: once you are in the enemy territory and when you face their army face them, fight them with them means, the same weapons that they use against you; bow against bow, spear against spear, sword against sword.” And if this took place today, the caliph

42 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic probably would mention the utility of artillery, rifles, and the iron-clad warships. This is because, among the duties imposed by the sharia regarding the defense of the nation (ummah), one of the most important is to figure out the position, numbers, and weapons of the enemy forces in order to increase the chances of victory and to fight the enemy with success. Can we implement this principle today without being technologically advanced? Is it possible to reach a high level of material civilization without having strong political institutions based on the principles of justice and liberty? These principles are the bases of our religious law, the sharia. Our goal can be reached only by knowing the advanced social and political level of the European nations. Here our task is to benefit Muslim society from that knowledge. First of all, we have to know that the current advanced situation of the European nations does not have roots in their ancient history. This is because, after the barbarian invasions and the collapse of the Roman Empire in 476, Europe entered into a dark period. It started to decline because of the ignorance and the arbitrary rule of its rulers. Actually, decline occurs more easily than progress. Europe stayed under the despotic rule of kings and princes until 768, the year Emperor Charlemagne ascended to the throne. This ruler made great efforts to improve the level of scientific knowledge and to spread useful arts and crafts. But after the death of this emperor, Europe fell again into darkness and ignorance under the despotism of its rulers. It would be wrong to believe that the Europeans achieved the success and prosperity that they enjoy today thanks to the fertility of their soil and the mildness of their climate. This is because other places in the world had better climates. We should also not believe that their success was a result of their religion. This is because, although Christianity advocates justice and equality, Western political institutions do not have a theocratic base; this contrasts with Islamic ones that do. Jesus forbade his apostles from becoming involved in worldly affairs. In fact, the dominion of his religion is concerned only with souls. Moreover, the confusion and anarchy reigning in the Papal States provide very valid proof for our thesis. Nevertheless, we have to admit that the Europeans reached their current level of civilization only by their progress in the arts and sciences and thanks to their institutions that facilitated the spread of public wealth. By pursuing an enlightened policy that gives protection to agriculture, trade, and industry and encourages their development, Europeans managed to harvest the treasures of the land. Their policy is based on justice and liberty, which actually became second nature for them. The rest concerns natural law, justice, good administration, and good institutions; these are what causes the increase of the wealth, population, and general welfare of the people. Any policy contrary to these principles would cause the decline of society and deterioration in every field of life. Actually, our religious law (sharia) has clearly emphasized this reality to us. Our Prophet has declared, “Justice is the glory of the faith; in it the ruler finds his majesty and the nation its force.” In the book entitled Admonitions to Rulers, it states that “the ruler must have thousands of good qualities.” All of these are actually found in two basic principles that the ruler must follow: the first one is “ensuring the prosperity of the country”; the second one is “providing security for its inhabitants.” Those who have read the third chapter of the first book of Ibn Khaldun can see the evidence of how, throughout history, injustice and arbitrary rule caused the ruin

 Hayreddin Pasha (1823–90) 43 of many states. Actually, it is a natural consequence of human nature that, if the ruler is given complete freedom of action without any checks and balances, an arbitrary government would be established; today, that is the prevalent regime in Muslim countries. That arbitrary regime existed in the past in European monarchies where the kings ruled over their subjects without being checked by any institutions. This type of regime was against the law of Jesus, who, in fact, advised his followers to follow a contemplative life and to remain alienated from worldly affairs. In the past, many European states had totally disintegrated and collapsed and lost their independence, due to the bad administration of their government. In contrast to their neighbors, the Muslim states were governed in a perfect way because their rulers applied sharia (Islamic law) perfectly in every aspects of life. The sharia prohibits individuals from acting according to their personal instincts, and it insures the protection of individual rights; any person, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, is protected under the sharia. The sharia is applied to every case according to the time and circumstances. The rules of the sharia give priority to the prevention of the harm rather than introducing a beneficial solution for any problem. One of the rules of sharia is to seek counsel before any decision. That rule was imposed by God on the Prophet Muhammad. Although Muhammad was infallible and his actions were inspired by God, he was still required to seek counsel. Besides the Prophet, all other Muslim leaders—including the early caliphs—were obliged to observe that rule. Ibn al-Arabi has said: “Seeking counsel is the base of our religious law and rule to be observed by every person without any distinction from the Prophet Muhammad to the last man.” The Caliph Ali has said: “No counsel, no wisdom.” Another principle that is also crucially important and considered as one of the fundamental principles of the sharia is to oppose evil and prevent harm under any circumstances. Every adult Muslim who is in full possession of his faculties is under obligation to obey that order. Al-Ghazali whose surname is “the proof of Islam” has said: “The caliphs and the other rulers in the Islamic world always liked their decisions to be deliberated before being applied.” One day, Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–44) got into the pulpit in the mosque and said to the audience, “O those who listen to me, if you perceive any deviation in my conduct, please correct me immediately; then one of the attendants in the audience got up and said: ‘Indeed we will correct you, with our swords.’” The caliph Umar far from being upset by that statement has said, “Thanks to God that there are people here, ready to correct Umar’s conduct with their swords.” Al-Ghazali wrote in his famous work enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. When the Caliph Muawiya I (r. 661–80) delayed to make some payment from the state treasury to some receivers, Abu Muslim al-Khaulani got up and said to the caliph: “The funds of the state treasury belongs neither to your father nor to your mother.” Upon hearing that Muawiya responded by saying: “Muslim has it right. This money does not belong to me; neither does it belong to my father nor to my mother. Therefore, come and take whatever sum you are owed.” I deduce from these stories that without a reasonable opposition that controls the ruler’s actions there would be no real government. The existence of a governing power is an undeniable political necessity for every society. But if the invested ruler would govern without any checks and balances, and according to his whims the result would be chaos. It is necessary

44 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic that every ruler must submit to a certain kind of supervision, based on a law—either religious law or purely political law. Every enlightened citizen of the society has the duty to protect that law that is the ultimate moderating force. In Muslim societies the citizens have the collective duty to perform that obligation of supervision; in Europe, parliaments and the press carry this out. If this duty is well understood, the Muslim rulers, like their counterparts in Europe, have to reckon with that supervision. Here the goal is the same: controlling the government’s action and correcting them if they deviate from the straight path. What are we proposing is actually confirmed by Ibn Khaldun in the introduction of his famous work, “Of the Ruler.” According to Ibn Khaldun: “The power of the ruler is based on a social necessity that is a guarantee mutually provided by every member of the society against the arbitrary rule of the monarch. Excessive and uncontrolled power easily corrupts rulers, since human nature is imperfect.” It is exactly because of that imperfection that the rulers ruled according to their whims and burdened and oppressed people with heavy taxes— instead of acting with justice. In order to prevent such oppressive rule and disorder, people need to unite and form the necessary political institutions. These political institutions must be based on law, as instituted by the ancient Persians and many other peoples in history. Any government that is not instituted according to law would eventually collapse, and the country would lose its independence. In history institutions of this kind were established by great and distinguished figures. They have rational bases. Other types of political institutions were based on religious law and are called theocratic. We also have to make clear that unless these institutions were respected and protected by the people, they would not last. We are not denying the possibility that a wise prince possessing all necessary beneficial qualities might rule justly and effectively without having supervision or being controlled. Such a ruler, because of his love of justice, would surround himself with wise and efficient administrators and choose competent and qualified ministers. These men would assist the prince in the government and would give wise and beneficial counsels concerning the administration of the country. But such a case is extremely rare. This is because it is very difficult to find  an ideal prince possessing all these good virtues and qualities. For that reason, it becomes very clear that political control and supervision by institutions representing the will of the nation is the best and most solid guarantee for the existence of a good government. All the assistance and counsels provided by the ministers to the ruler and the supervision of the people in general would not create an obstacle for the ruler to introduce beneficial rules and govern rightfully. On the contrary, these advisers and ministers will help and assist the ruler to carry out the heavy burden of administration and will provide him with good and useful counsel in his governing task. They also will help the royal succession to happen smoothly by assisting the ruler to choose the right successor. Their intervention in that matter will prevent royal power from falling into the hands of an incapable candidate. The establishment of an effective political control and supervision is the only way to insure a stable, lasting, and efficient government even if the ruler has a weak personality. Mr. Dupont, relying on a translation of the work of Stuart Mill, pointed out that England went through a very difficult time period under the reign of King George III; although George III was a mad man, England

 Hayreddin Pasha (1823–90) 45 still managed successfully to rise and become a great power thanks to its solid political institutions. Despite the madness of the ruler, the administration of the country remained in safe hands thanks to the intervention of the nation in politics through their representatives in Parliament and by the control exerted by the ministers and counselors on the king. Actually, what we have proposed for the control of the monarchs is also applicable to the ministers. Since the ministers and counselors are often chosen and appointed by the king, could we expect that the king would choose an able and a wise person as his minister? In fact, that minister, despite all of his good qualities, had to manage a crazy monarch who is a slave to his whims and passions. In order to keep his position, the minister could encourage the king in his fancies. The result of such a policy would be disastrous for the nation. Or the minister would do the contrary and would have the courage to do the right thing and order his subalterns do whatever necessary and good for the country. In that latter case what would be the legitimacy of the minister’s power who opposed to the king’s will, in particular when the necessary political institutions to check and balance the king’s will were not in place? The ministers have also to struggle against the intrigues of the royal-court attendants like courtiers. These courtiers would do anything to discredit the minister in the eyes on the public. They would ignore his good qualities and publicize his smallest mistakes. On this issue we have to remember the famous prayer of the Caliph Ali, who said: “O God, protect me from the enemy who always observes me and would try to conceal my good qualities but announce loudly my mistakes to others.” Nevertheless, by his self-control, faithfulness, and kindness, he might manage to outwit the intrigues of his adversaries, and these latter would become his fierce enemies and would do anything to harm him and to discredit him before the king. They would not hesitate to tarnish his reputation and provoke the king’s wrath by spreading rumors that the minister is in fact seeing himself like a king or even has started to overshadow the king by gaining more power. All these slanders would eventually manage to succeed to have an effect on the feeble spirit of the king who would become increasingly suspicious of his minister. This happens very often in Oriental governments. Under such conditions, how is it possible for a minister, even if quite capable, to administer the country in an efficient way? All these forces against him would eventually prevail and will eventually subject him to the whims of a despotic king and his entourage. When totally rendered powerless by these intrigues, some ministers would resign and retire from political life. Otherwise, they would become a docile instrument at the hands of the ruler and his corrupt courtiers and would end up joining them. To do so would mean participating in the destruction of the state, and he would refuse to do that. A noble minister can sacrifice his life for the survival of the nation, but he would not sacrifice his honor. The wellbeing and the misfortune of the states that do not possess any political institutions solely depend on the character and the personnel qualities of the rulers. Evidence for this is provided to us by the history of European states before their adoption of the constitutional system in past centuries. In different times, there were some powerful ministers whose name is recorded in history, but even those could not always prevent the damage resulting from the unchecked rule of the despotic monarchs. Nevertheless, one should not think that we are against the sovereignty of the rulers and their

46 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic monarchical rights. No Muslim would support the undermining of the foundation of ruler’s authority by the representatives of the nation. We already explained in our work that the fundamentals of political power must be based on the principles of our religion. In fact, all Muslim scholars and jurists who wrote on this legal and political issue unanimously agree that even when the monarch delegates a large part of his prerogatives and powers to a deputy, this would not constitute a limitation of his sovereignty; on the contrary, this is one of his prerogatives that is actually condoned by the sharia. Al-Mawardi, who is considered one of the greatest of the Muslim jurists, wrote in his work that the nomination of a minister by the ruler (imam) as his alter ego in fact finds its legal legitimacy in the Qur’an. To justify his idea, al-Mawardi cites the Qur’anic verse in which the Prophet Moise said to God: “Give me a counselor from my family to compensate my weakness and share my duties.” According al-Mawardi, if it is permissible for a prophet to delegate his powers to an assistant, it would be even more so for a ruler to delegate his powers to a deputy. Again, we emphasize that the delegation of his sovereign powers to a minister would not constitute a limitation on the ruler’s sovereignty—even if this power is delegated to the representatives of the nation. Here we have also to mention that, by basing his ideas on legal texts, the famous Muslim jurist al-Taftazani wrote that “it is permissible for the state officials to assist the ruler in his exercise of sovereign power.” On the other hand, he says, “It is totally non-permissible and illegal for more than one ruler to exercise their sovereign powers in a single state.” Al-Taftazani wrote in his famous work the Explanation of the Convictions that “what is not acceptable by the sharia is the co-existence of two rulers who are completely independent from each other and both obeyed by the people.” “The inadmissibility of this situation” he says, “would be explained by the fear of chaos in a society when more than one ruler would oppose each other.” Then he concludes, “That would cause a civil strife in the society and the collapse of the state.”  Regardless of the number of the individuals exercising the sovereign power, this latter would not be affected or weakened by that fact. Here we should take into consideration that Saad was followed and supported by the most famous commentators such as al-Khayali, Aisam al-Din, and Abd al Aqim, in his jurisprudence and political ideas. This is to condone the principle of the nation’s intervention in the administration within certain limits. This is because the nation’s intervention would not go so far as to interfere into the executive’s domain. Furthermore, the assistance of the nation to the administration should not pose an obstacle for the ruler to exercise his sovereign power. It is only after being sanctioned by the executive power that the decisions adopted in these consultative councils could be put into force within the limits of the fundamental law of the state. On the issue of the checks and balances, Mr. Thiers, who was the prime minister of King Louis Phillipe and is currently a deputy in the French Parliament, wrote that “A government in which all powers is accumulated at the hands of a single person is always dangerous regardless the quality of the ruler.” After depicting Napoleon I as a great ruler, the author added to his conclusion that even the greatest and wisest statesmen and leaders should not rule singlehandedly. This idea is already mentioned in the hadith related by al-Muslim, a hadith collected by Mastour in a conversation that took place in a meeting at the house of Amr bin al-Ass. According to al-Muslim,

 Hayreddin Pasha (1823–90) 47 one of the participants had said that he heard Prophet Muhammad said: “In the later days the Westerners will be the most populous nation.” After being questioned about the veracity of this statement, [the participant] said: “I am just repeating what I heard.” Then Amr bin al-Ass told him: Indeed, what you reported is a reality, because Westerners have three good principal qualities: 1) they are very good soldiers and fighters, 2) they do not easily accept defeat but fight until the very end, 3) they are very stubborn and persistent in the defense, 4) they are very charitable and beneficent towards the weak, orphans, and the poor; but they also have a fifth quality that is better than the rest: they hate the despotism of their rulers. Under the wise administration of their able rulers, Islamic societies in the past also implemented these principles and became rich and strong by following the sharia that applies to justice. It is only by such a conduct of affairs that a successful policy could be achieved. God has created an infallible system well balanced and based on justice. The happiness of humankind could only be assured by applying these divine principles.”

The author of the book entitled The Revealed Opinions wrote that “If men would know how it would be pleasing to God to fertilize and revitalize the land, it would not be possible to find a single non-cultivated parcel of waste land on earth.” On the wealth of the Islamic empire under the Abbasid dynasty (750–1258), the historian Makdisi wrote that Caliph al-Mamun (r. 813–33) visited Egypt, which was one of the provinces of his empire. During that trip, he stayed twenty-four hours in each town that he visited. When passing a village named Taa el-Nemel without halting, the inhabitants of the village petitioned and pleaded with the caliph to stay there. During his stay, he was hosted sumptuously by an elderly Coptic woman, who gave him a donation of ten sacs of gold coins—all minted in the same year. The caliph first refused to accept that gift and exclaimed in amazement by saying: “Who knows if our state treasury contained the same amount of coins minted in the same year.” But when the old women insisted by saying, “I became rich and prosperous thanks to the fertile soil of this country and thanks to your wise and efficient administration, please accept my gift.” In the end, the caliph consented to accept the money; in return, he compensated the old woman by donating large estates to her. This anecdote demonstrates how rich the Islamic lands were at the time. Al-Makdisi also wrote that the Egyptian poll-tax during the reign of the early caliphs amounted to a total of 14 million gold dinars, which is equivalent to 700 million francs. This sum was actually only a portion of the revenues from the province. That was the result of a good and just administration. Moreover,  Ibn Khaldoun wrote in his famous book the Muqaddimah that the precious metals brought to the state treasury during the reign of Caliph Haroun al-Rashid (r. 786–809) were worth 7,500 gold hundredweight or a quintal, which is the equivalent of 1,000,400,000 francs. The astonishing series of conquests of the Muslims, which were related by the Muslim and European historians, and the consequences (of these conquests) demonstrate the greatness of the Islamic power founded on the justice of their law and the union of their nation. On this subject, the historians wrote that early Muslim leaders conquered in eighty years what Romans conquered in 800 years. It is almost

48 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic impossible for any impartial person not to recognize that in Muslim societies, in the past, the prosperity, wealth, and the military might are the result of the justice and harmony on which these societies had built their system. The superiority of the Islamic societies was based on the integrity and incorruptibility of their judges, and the protection provided by the state to the literature, arts, and sciences. All these good and superior qualities were later borrowed from us by the Europeans. This fact has been accepted by impartial and unbiased European historians too. Another author, M. Duruy, in his book, Histoire de France et de moyen age du Ve au XIV e siecle, wrote the following on this subject. After the period of splendor, the Muslim empire entered into decline and was divided into three kingdoms: the Abbasids of Baghdad, the Fatimids of Egypt, and the Umayyads of Spain. Later, he continues, as a result of the civil wars, these kingdoms were further divided into smaller states; in particular the caliphate of the Umayyads of Spain were totally disintegrated—nearly every province had become an independent principality. The cause of this dismemberment was the rivalry and jealousy among the military commanders and chiefs aided and encouraged in their rebellion by other ambitious figures. Actually, none of these leaders had foreseen the danger of these divisions, which ultimately caused the collapse of Muslim power and the end of Islamic rule in Spain. In general, the Muslim world entered a period of total chaos, and total calamity would befall on the Islamic world. If, by the grace of God, the sultans of the Ottoman dynasty, founded in 699 AH, would by their force unite these divided Muslim states under their glorious rule, then the Islamic empire would find its former resplendence and splendor thanks to the good administration, wise policies, and respect for the law of the Ottoman sultans. The speed of the Ottoman conquests could only be compared to the military expansion of the early Muslim caliphs. Ottoman sultans also put their empire in the path of progress—particularly, Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66), son of the Selim I (r. 1512–20). In the tenth century AH, he assured the stability of his regime by promulgating his political code, which proved to be fundamentally beneficial for the empire. During the preparation of this code, the sultan cooperated and received the assistance of the most enlightened and experienced statesmen of his empire. Here are the main elements of this code: “The administration of the empire is placed under the supervision of the ulema and the ministers whose duty was to make admonitions to the sultan when he strayed away from the true path; because the sovereignty is based on the political and religious law which as we have seen before orders the ruler to take counsel before acting. The law also formally prescribes preventing legally forbidden actions.” These actions are defined by the ulema and statesmen, because they have the necessary legal knowledge and political experience. If the ulema and the ministers find anything in the actions of the ruler anything against the sharia (religious and political law) or against the sultanic code which encapsulates the religious law, then they have to implement the prescriptions of their religion which orders the prevention of the harmful actions. Then the ulema and the ministers must warn the sultan to take the necessary measures. If the ruler takes this warning into consideration and takes action, then the goal was reached. If not, the ulema and the ministers then have to inform the military leaders that their request to the sultan remained without effect. Finally, the same code indicates an extreme measure: if the sultan persists in ignoring the multiple warnings of the ulema,

 Hayreddin Pasha (1823–90) 49 statesmen, and the military leaders and continues to violate the sacred law, then, as a last resort, he could be deposed and replaced on the throne by another member of the reigning dynasty. Then, according to prescripts and the spirit of this code, the role played by the ulema and the ministers to check and balance the executive power is the same that is performed today by the chambers of the representatives of the constitutional governments of the European countries. We can even say that the role played by the ulema and ministers is even more important, since it takes its legitimacy from both temporal and spiritual forces. Under the beneficial effect of this code, the government continued its progress. Nevertheless, later on the government officials began to neglect the implementation of this code and that caused the decline of the empire. In the past the bureaucrats were chosen and selected after a serious and a meticulous process. Later on that system became degenerated and as a result of that the state administration fell at the hands of the bureaucrats who consider their private interest before the interest of the state. On the other hand, the Janissaries introduced some deplorable and harmful practices that weakened their military organization and caused it to degenerate. Their unconditional obedience to the sultans was replaced by their unruly and rebellious behavior and they started to arbitrarily interfere in the political affairs and often upset public security with all sorts of violence. This situation would encourage the provincial notables not to respect the orders of the central government and thus behave as they wish. All these disorders induced the non-Muslim subjects of the sultan to seek protection from the foreign governments. This is because anybody who loses his trust to the laws of the country for his personal protection including the guarantee of his property rights and honor would seek protection from someone he believes capable of protecting him. Moreover, these people would also look for an occasion of taking revenge from those who govern them, especially if they do not belong to the race and religion of their rulers. These disorders derived from an administration that does not have any sort of control over the society; also the lack of solid political and religious institutions provided a pretext to the foreign powers to interfere into the political affairs of the empire. As a result of these debilitating interferences, if the imperial government is reduced for much of the time; such a situation would serve the interest of the meddling foreign powers instead of their own national agenda. Then the misadministration of the empire reached such a point that rebellions and civil unrest started to plague many provinces. On the other hand, in the course of these events, many provinces would secede from the empire. In the provinces that remained under the authority of the central government, the authority of the central government would also collapse without the timely and active measures and reforms introduced by the Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–39) and his successors Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–61) and Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–76) khans. The first important and effective measure taken by Sultan Mahmud II was the destruction of the Janissary corps and their replacement by the regular troops. Moreover, the same sultan centralized the administration and ended the autonomous rule of the ambitious and corrupt provincial notables (derebeys) in the provinces. The second important measure was introduced by Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–61) who promulgated the reform edicts of Hatt-ı Şerifi Gülhane (1839) and Hatt-ı Hümayun. These edicts introduced liberal reforms and became the base of the current

50 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic administration of the empire. The third important measure was taken  by Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–76) who decided to implement the reforms introduced by the two previous sultans and supported and facilitated their application by various imperial decrees and regulations. At the beginning of the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid some people were against the new political institutions introduced in accordance with the Tanzimat Charter of Gülhane. In many provinces revolts broke out fomented by the governors and their partisans who wanted to continue to administer their provinces without any control from the government. These governors knew very well the new measures of the government would put an end to their arbitrary rule. In order to discredit the Tanzimat Charter, the opponents spread the rumors that the new regulations were against the sharia. The opponents of the Tanzimat reforms were actually supported by some foreign governments whose interest lied in the failure of this reform movement. These governments knew very well that the success of these reforms would benefit the Ottoman Empire by improving its administration. But, instead of using these criticisms to reestablish an arbitrary and autocratic regime in the country, the government decided to continue in the path of progress and discredited the calumnious ideas of the opponents of the Tanzimat. In order to explain the benefits of the new reforms, enlighten the people, and persuade them to cease their opposition to the new regime Şeyhülislam Arif Bey, one of the most eminent jurists of his time, was sent to the rebellious provinces. This great scholar fulfilled his task and explained to the people from the pulpit that Tanzimat reforms, far from being against the sharia, was actually consolidating the application of the religious law of Islam. The only aim of these reforms, declared Arif Bey, was to improve the general situation of the country, and protect the rights of the individuals by establishing a guarantee on their lives, properties, and honor. According to Arif Bey, this edict was also promulgated to prevent the arbitrary acts of the government. After being convinced of what they heard of that prominent scholar, the populace calmed and ceased the opposition to the reforms. Consequently, the Tanzimat reforms were able to be implemented easily throughout the empire. Arif Bey was a great jurist and scholar who enjoyed worldwide reputation and whose erudition, knowledge, and piety have been acknowledged by most of our own scholars and jurists in particular by Sidi Ibrahim al-Riahi. If such a great scholar was not convinced of the conformity of the Tanzimat reforms to the sharia (religious law of Islam), he would never support or defend their application from the holy pulpits. There is no doubt that these reforms benefited the people and provided them with many opportunities. But on the other hand, they also equally consolidated the position of the government and prepared the ground for its rejuvenation. The liberal and progressive path adopted by these three Ottoman rulers drastically improved the administration of the empire and increased the happiness of the subjects of the sultan to the point that anybody who compared the current state of affairs in the empire with previous situation would acknowledge the clear improvement. Nevertheless, in accordance with some Christian subjects of the sultan, some Muslims in the empire considered these reforms insufficient. These people wanted more liberty to control the acts of the government. For that purpose, they advocated the establishment of an assembly whose members were elected by the entire nation. Lately, according to the newspapers, those who are in favor of such a parliamentary regime have increased their activities.

 Hayreddin Pasha (1823–90) 51 We are not in the position to judge the exact correctness of these claims, since we are not part of the administration of the empire and, in particular, we are not the ones who implement the Tanzimat reforms. Nevertheless, as a principle we support their ideas of establishing an assembly to control the actions of the government. There is no doubt that by asking for these reforms, the Muslims aspire nothing but to invigorate the strength of their government and the general welfare of the population. But we are also asking these reformers whether they are convinced that the non-Muslim subjects of the empire desire these reforms without any ulterior motive. Do the non-Muslim Ottomans deserve our full trust? In our opinion there is some evidence that the majority of these non-Muslims desire to become independent of the Ottoman Empire. This is because after obtaining their current freedom from the previous reforms, they showed no proof of attachment and sympathy for the empire. On the contrary, they showed a tendency to connect with peoples that have the same race and religion as theirs. To attain their objective of obtaining independence, they foment revolts by proclaiming that they were oppressed by the Ottoman government. In these revolts they were encouraged and assisted by some foreign governments that have an interest in gaining their sympathy and incite them to rebel against the Ottomans. Granting such a freedom as demanded by these Muslim reformers (Young Ottomans) before calculating its consequences could encourage the secret aspirations of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire. In that case, complete freedom could only be granted to the subjects of the sultan if all desire to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire—regardless of the divergence of their political views. Actually, many European governments refused to give such total liberty to their citizens, because it can cause the fall of the reigning dynasty and its replacement by a new one. Here we also have to bear in mind that the subjects of the Ottoman government belong to various ethnicities that also have different religions, languages, and customs. The majority of the Ottoman subjects do not know the Ottoman Turkish language, which is the official language of the empire. Therefore, in the National Assembly, the deputies belonging to different ethnicities would not be able to communicate with others or engage in discussions. That situation would cause a major obstacle for the implementation of the proposed reforms. Therefore, under these circumstances any reasonable person would not accuse the Ottoman government of not granting complete liberty to its subjects and not establishing a parliament. Despite all the obstacles that we mention here, it is incumbent on the government to persist in its efforts to assure more liberty to its subjects, by establishing a close cooperation between the ulema and the bureaucrats. The intervention of European countries is a major obstacle preventing reforms in Muslim countries. Western governments are vehemently opposed to the principle that their citizens residing in Muslim countries have to be placed under the jurisdiction of these Muslim governments. This attitude is motivated by the desire to obtain more juridical rights by applying the principle of extra-territoriality. The Europeans blame Muslim judges for acting with religious bias against non-Muslim foreigners when adjudicating legal cases. It would not be fair to blame all our judges of being hostile and partial to nonMuslim Europeans in their cases. This is because our judges belong to the class of ulema who have the most complete and profound religious and legal knowledge.

52

Part II

The Turkists

3

Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924)

Biography Mehmed Ziya Gökalp was born on March 23, 1876, in Diyarbakır. He started his education in his hometown. In 1890, he finished the Military Rüşdiye, and in 1894 he graduated from the İdadi of Diyarbakir. He received instruction in Islamic studies from his uncle. At the age of eighteen he attempted to commit suicide but survived. In 1895, the young Ziya traveled to Istanbul and entered veterinary school. In Istanbul, he met İbrahim Temo and İshak Sukuti, who were both among the founders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). He also became a member of the CUP. In 1898, due to his political activities he was arrested and sent to jail for a year. After his release, he was sent to his hometown Diyarbakir. Until 1908, he lived in Diyarbakir and worked in administration. After the declaration of the constitution in 1908, he intensified his political activities. In 1909, he participated in the CUP congress in Selanik as a representative of Diyarbakır. In 1910, he began teaching sociology at the İdadi. At the same time, he began writing articles on Turkism in various journals. In the Ottoman Empire, Turkist ideology first developed within a literary school called Yeni Hayat (New Life). Ziya Gökalp was one of the most prominent figures of Yeni Hayat. In 1912, Gökalp was elected to the Ottoman Parliament and became one of the founders of the Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti (Association of Turkish Homeland). While he continued to write and publish his articles, he also taught sociology at the Darülfunun (university). In 1919, after the First World War, he was arrested by the British occupation authorities and exiled to Malta. In 1921, he was released. Upon his return to Turkey, he resumed his intellectual activities and continued to work. In Diyarbakir he started the Küçük Mecmua (The Little Journal). In 1923, he began working at the Ministry of Education. This same year, he was elected to the Turkish Parliament as a deputy of Diyarbakır. On October 25, 1924, Ziya Gökalp died in Istanbul after a short illness. After his death, he was recognized as the father of Turkish nationalism.1 Gökalp’s ideas profoundly influenced the political thought of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the new Turkish Republic in 1923. According to Gökalp, the rise of nationalism, particularly in Eastern countries, occurred in three successive stages. First, it began as a cultural revival; second, it expressed itself as a political movement; and third, it helped to determine its economic policy.2 Gökalp summarized his ideology with the slogan Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak (Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization). These concepts did not contradict each other; they instead complemented each other.3 He explained his maxim as “we are of Turkish nationality (millet), we belong to the Islamic religious community (ümmet) and to the Western sphere of civilization (medeniyet).”4

56 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic For Gökalp these three components of the Turkish nation were both complementary and distinct from each other: complementary because each of them constituted an aspect of Turkish society; distinct because they were not necessarily related. Adhering to the Islamic faith did not mean that Turks belonged to the sphere of Islamic civilization that Gökalp called Oriental civilization. Gökalp perceived Islam as a religion (din)—not as a civilization (medeniyet), which he considered to be a combination of Sasanian and Byzantine civilizations. According to Gökalp, historically, nations evolve and change their civilizations but keep their national culture (hars).5 Over the course of their history, the Turks evolved from an East Asian (Chinese) to an Islamic (Oriental) civilization by means of their conversion to Islam. But in doing so, they did not change their national culture. Thus, he asserted, Turks could adopt European civilization and still preserve their religion and national culture, just as the Japanese had. Gökalp divides the material and intellectual development of societies into two: (a) medeniyet (civilization) and (b) hars (national culture). Medeniyet is international but hars is national. Western or Islamic civilizations have been embraced by many different nations, each with its own national culture.6 Gökalp expounded his opinions on social, political, and religious matters in many articles that appeared in several periodicals during the Second Constitutional Period, including Türk Yurdu, Genç Kalemler, Yeni Mecmua, and İslam Mecmuası.” This last publication was founded in February 1914 by the CUP in order to disseminate its views on Islam in response to those advocated by traditionalist Muslim circles represented by the Cemiyet-i İlmiye (Association of Muslim Scholars). According to Gökalp, şeriat was based on two sources, nass (the sacred texts of the Qur’an and the Sunna) and örf (local custom). Unlike nass, which is immutable, örf constantly changes in response to the needs of the society which created it. From the early days of Islam, declared Gökalp, Muslim jurists interpreted Qur’anic principles and the Sunna in the light of örf; therefore, it always played a major role in the development of Islamic law. The following passages are taken from Ziya Gökalp: Kitaplar (books) edited by Mustafa Koç, Sabri Koz (Istanbul: YKY, 2007).

The Three Currents: Turkification, Islamization, and Westernization* In our country there exist three intellectual currents. When examining the history of these currents one can see that our intellectuals first felt the need for modernization. The desire for modernization first appeared during the reign of Sultan Selim III (r.  1789–1807); later another intellectual current, the Islamism, also appeared; and   In this article Ziya Gökalp compares three distinct ideologies: Turkism, Islamism, and Westernism and concludes that the Turks need to adopt all of them at the same time. By Turkifying their culture, the Turks would return to their ancestral ethnic norms. By Islamization, they declare their loyalty to their religion, Islam. Moreover, the author argues that their nationality and their religion would not prevent the Turks to be a part of the Western civilization.

*

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 57 finally a third one, the Turkism, joined their ranks. Since the idea of modernization was accepted by the intellectuals as an original idea, it has no specific proponent. Almost every journal or newspaper defends and advocates this idea. The supporters of the idea of Islamization are the journals Sirat-ı Müstakim and Sebil-ür Reşat; the exponent of the idea of Turkism is the Türk Yurdu periodical. When carefully examined we can notice that all of these three ideologies were actually the outcome of certain real necessities. According to Tarde, the idea of nationality has been introduced by the newspapers. On this issue he wrote that “the newspaper creates a public by unifying the people speaking the same language and by giving them a common conscience.” Besides this effect that the newspaper exerts unconsciously and without being aware of its outcome, it is obliged to flatter the pride and nurture the patriotic feelings of its readers to increase its publication. Therefore, it has to revive the national traditions and bring to mind the past glories. The feeling of nationality, once awakened in an ethnic group, easily spreads to the adjacent ethnicities. Because once the feeling of nationality is awakened, it boosts the sentiments of mutual assistance, sacrifice, and combat among the people where it arose. It also creates the high ethical, linguistic, literary, economic, and political values for the society. Then the neighboring peoples who envy their success would naturally adopt the idea of nationality. The ideal of nationalism first emerges among the non-Muslims, then among the Albanians and the Arabs, and finally among the Turks. The adoption of the nationalism by the Turks that late is not without a reason. The Ottoman state was established by the Turks. The state is the institutionalized form of a nation and the ideal of the nationality is the base for the formation of a nation built on consensus. With an instinctive precaution, the Turks avoid jeopardizing a real situation for an ideal. Therefore, the Turkish intellectuals always advocated Ottomanism instead of Turkism. Those who advocated the idea of modernization believed that it would be possible to create a nation based on will and consensus out of different ethnicities, and religious and sectarian groups. Then they gave a new connotation to the term of “Osmanli” (Ottoman). This new meaning was totally devoid of national and ethnic colors. Nevertheless, the unfortunate historical events have shown us that nobody in the empire has accepted this new connotation of the Ottoman term except the Tanzimatist Turks. The invention of this new connotation was not only useless but also created extremely harmful consequences for the state and ethnicities, in particular caused damaging results for the Turks. Today both the Western and Eastern parts of the world have clearly shown to us: our century today is the century of nationalism. The strongest effect on the hearts and minds of today’s people is exerted by the idea of nationalism. Any state that has to rule over the social conscience of a nation would fail to succeed, if it does not take into consideration this important social factor. The leaders of the political parties and the statesmen would not be able to govern successfully over the various elements forming the Ottoman unity, if they do not subscribe to this ideology. Four years of experience has shown us this: Turks are finally understanding that denying their Turkish identity and holding onto Ottomanism will not convince other ethnicities to remain part of the Ottoman union. Only those who feel the sentiment of nationalism deeply in their hearts would be able to govern an empire where this

58 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic sentiment of nationalism prevails. The Turks’ avoidance of the idea of nationalism was actually harmful to the state and vexatious to other ethnicities. Moreover, it was destructive for the very existence of the Turkish people. Since the Turks considered nationality as equivalent to the state, they did not realize that their social and economic life was deteriorating. The Turks did not realize that they were losing their predominance when the economic and social supremacy was acquired by the other ethnic groups. This is because, in their opinion, only certain classes constitute the Ottoman nation. For the Turks, their exclusion from certain classes of the society was not important, even though these classes form today the most important ones in the society. For the Turks, the existence of the professional and economic classes in society would be enough for the continuity of the state. They did not see the harm in being excluded from these economic sectors. As a result of that policy, Turks gradually lost their dominant position in Anatolia. They remained only farmers and administrators. Since administrators are a kind of mental farmers, the Turks overwhelmingly became a nation of farmers. Since farmers and shepherds live by the creative force of nature, they could not be considered as creative themselves. Sheep multiply according to their natural instinct, and grain grows by germinating seeds. Bureaucrats are not productive. In contrast, the development of intellectual faculties of the will and of strong character all result from preoccupations like industry, manufacturing, commerce, and liberal professions. Consequently, creating a political organization (state) based on a nation of peasants and bureaucrats would be very difficult. The ineptitude of our government, our failure of properly supplying our troops, and our inability our dispatching enough number of soldiers to the front which are the main factors of our defeat in the Balkan wars derive from that cause. The reason for the failure to establish a strong government in our country is mainly due to the absence of the Turks in the industrial and commercial classes. If the government of a country is supported by the economic classes (industrialists and merchants) this government would be strong. This is because merchants, artisans, and businessmen want a strong and efficient government for their interests. In contrast, if the government is supported by bureaucrats, such a government would be weak. This is because dismissed bureaucrats and officials always want governments to fall in order to regain their position, and those who work in the administration always want to be promoted to higher positions. In order to realize their aims, all bureaucrats desire a weak government. The absence of nationalism among Turks prevented them from developing a national economy. Moreover, it also created an obstacle for the reform in the language and the development of the national forms and styles in fine arts. Besides that, the absence of a national ideal caused the Turkish ethics to remain individual and familial. Therefore, the sentiments of solidarity, patriotism, and sacrifice did not expand beyond the borders of the family, village, and town environment. Since the ideal of the ummah is too large and the ideal of the family to limited, the Turkish spirit remains alien to the mentality that is based on a vigorous and energetic ethical and spiritual life. That is the reason for the disintegration of our economic, religious, and political institutions. Actually, aside from being the opponent of the Ottomanism, Turkism is its strong supporter. Nevertheless, like every new political current, Turkism also has some extremist young adherents whose ideas cause some erroneous interpretations and some misunderstandings. Turkism is the real

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 59 bulwark of Islam, and Ottomanism is opposed to cosmopolitanism. According to Tarde, the sentiment of internationalism derives from books. Since newspapers address the feelings of the people, they use the living vocabulary of the colloquial spoken language. In contrast, books address to the thought of the intellectuals. Therefore, they need scholarly terms rather than draw on living vocabulary. Scholarly terms are not coined from popular colloquial vocabulary, which is natural and alive. Rather, scholarly terms are artificial creations and dead words. Since the vocabulary of popular language has live and emotional meanings, it could not be used to express artificial and abstract ideas. Thus, every nation draws its scholarly terms from the language of its holy book. Since European nations found the New Testament written in Greek, they acquired their scholarly and scientific terminology from the Greek language. Also, since the Latin was used as a secondary language, Germanic and Slavic nations borrowed many vocabulary terms from Latin. Muslim nations acquired their scholarly and scientific terminology mainly from Arabic and then from Persian. Even today when we translate the modern scientific works to our language we coin Arabic and Persian terms instead of Greek and Latin words. In every nation, first the religious books were written, then, when the different disciplines like ethics, law, literature, science, and philosophy derive from the religion, books started to be written in these domains also. Therefore, newspapers are responsible for the rise of nationalism by using a colorful style to depict the social and local feelings of the people. In contrast, books prepare the ground for the formation of the idea of internationalism—values accepted by every nation. Books do this by precisely and abstractly defining and phrasing scientific and scholarly principles and rules that derive from religion. It would not be a correct assessment to think that the idea of internationalism affected all of humanity in the early ages of history such as in antiquity. During the Middle Ages, a feeling of internationalism existed in Europe. Nevertheless, if we examine this feeling, we will see that the feelings of compassion and mutual help that existed in Europe at that time were actually totally limited to their Christian brethren. Likewise, the international law was exclusively protected by the Christian nations and states. The Balkan wars proved to us that even today the European conscience is nothing else than a Christian conscience. On the other hand, if we also examine the conscience of the Turks, we will see that a Turk will consent to betroth his daughter to an Arab, or to an Albanian, to a Kurd or a to a Circassian, but he would refuse to marry his daughter to a Finn or to a Christian Hungarian. Equally, he would not marry the daughter of a Buddhist Mongol or a Shamanistic Tungus before converting her to Islam. During the Tripolitanian and Balkan wars those who shared the agony of the Turks were not Hungarians, Mongols, or Manchus. On the contrary, those who shared our misery and supported us morally were the Muslim ethnic groups of China, India, Java, and Sudan whose names are unknown to us. That is why, the Turks although a part of the Uralo-Altaic linguistic group, consider themselves as a Muslim nation. From the anthropological point of view, people belonging to the same anatomical types constitute a race, but in sociology nations adhering to civilization take an international form. Like the Turkish ethnic group, Turkish language also has transformed and took an Islamic form after Turks entered Islamic civilization. Therefore, the factor which creates the spirit of internationality and consequently create a common language for a shared civilization would be the

60 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic book. Therefore, there would be no contradiction between Turkism and Islam, since one represents nationality and other the internationality. When the Turkish intellectuals imagined a multi-confessional Ottomanism, they did not feel the need of Islamization. In contrast, as soon as the idea of Turkism was born, the necessity for Islamization also became a reality. However, as the nationality derives from the newspaper and the internationalism is created by the book, the modernism is originated from technology. The contemporary society means that whose members are capable to produce and to utilize the most modern machinery of the age. According to us, the modernization is the equivalent of manufacturing of dreadnoughts, cars, and planes like the Europeans. Nevertheless, modernization does not mean to be like Europeans in lifestyle. We can only consider ourselves a modern and contemporary nation when we do not need to borrow science and technology from the Europeans. Since there is no contradiction between the ideals of Turkification and Islamization, there is also no conflict between these two ideals and the modernization. In order to be modernized we need to borrow from Europe only science and technological instruments and machines. There are some spiritual needs for every nation. Those must be searched in the nation’s own culture and religion. Unlike the science and technology, cultural and spiritual elements should not be borrowed from the West. Therefore, first of all we have to determine the sphere of action of every ideal, like Turkism, Islamism, and modernism. Then we must accept all of these three ideals combined as an entity. This is what we need for a contemporary, modern Islamic Turkish world. Nevertheless lately, as a result of the development in technology an international modern global civilization was in the process of forming. Gradually, a new globalism based on science and technology was replacing the old international system based on religion. Japan and Turkey are entering into the community of European nations which is increasingly gaining a secular character. Consequently, globalism and ummah are separating from each other. Today, the Turkish nation is a part of the Uralo-Altaic linguistic group, the Islamic ummah and European unity.

Customs and Formalism Whenever we look to any aspect of our social life we see two currents clashing with each other. One of these currents is modernism and the other is conservatism. In reality, these two conflicting currents are united in one principle: formalism. The conservatives accept the existing rules as immutable sacrosanct realities and consider their change as a blasphemy. On the other hand, the modernists consider the reasonable rules as absolute principles and accuse those who want to change them as reactionaries. Actually, none of these groups feel the necessity of inquiring about the origins and the development of these rules and their adaptations to the new environments in different times. This is because both conservatives and modernists consider the rule as a timeless and placeless self-existing reality. They do not consider it as a temporary stage in the continuous evolution of a society. Both of these groups regard it as an eternal reality rooted in the essence of existence beyond time and space. Old people are usually conservative, since they repeatedly conform to the same rules to

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 61 the point that they end up becoming habitual. In contrast, young people attribute the progress of the advanced nations to a shining civilization, to the correctness of their rules applied by these nations. Therefore, they aspire to emulate them. Consequently, they become radical revolutionaries. The rule is always the same thing, whether it is called custom or fashion, whether named manners or etiquette or manifested as a rule of the sharia or as maxim of secular law. When the rule is considered as a frozen and fixed matter and not a phase in the evolution it becomes a lifeless corpse reduced to bone and skin. The essence of life is a creative evolution. Entities that do not evolve are only inanimate objects. According to formalists, the result is the cause. The rule is the temporary result of the evolution. Formalists consider the rule as the cause of the evolution. Since the cause is known, they do not see the necessity of examining the process of evolution. Those who have this mentality consider the rule as an absolute sovereign. Then when seeing that the application of the rule does not generate any benefit they blame all the causes of failure to the rule. In response, radicals immediately accused the formalists and silenced them. For the radicals the solution is quite simple: annul the old rule and replace it with the new ones. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of the new rules does last long. This is because new problems began to arise. Then traditionalist raised their heads and invited imitators to vacate the scene. If the history of the Turkish people is studied, one will see clearly that it consisted of stages isolated from each other. There was no continuity in our historical tradition. Our institutions are like the treasuries of the states built on conquest, suddenly filled with the plundered loot, but then very soon emptied because not based on a national economy. Instead of transforming our institutions, which were developed and evolved throughout history, to the living traditions, we have chosen to discard them and borrowed foreign institutions from different countries. We adopted these institutions without understanding their historical evolution. The English are a nation without rules. Nevertheless, they have a very strong tradition which evolved continuously throughout history. The factor that caused the progress of the English nation is their attachment to their traditions. We Turks are a formalist nation, but we are devoid of traditions. We do not search for the historical chains of our traditions concerning Islam and Turkism. We also do not consider it necessary to search for the source and to examine the development of the factors that caused the progress in our age. For us, only the result matters. In our zeitgeist, Turkism and Islam left some sedimentary deposits after some of its ebbing and flowing. European civilization appears to us as the manifestation of some scientific and practical principles that were formed after some evolutions and revolutions in the society. Some of us make use of these sentiments and some of us plunder these principles as booty. The principle is devoid of creation and progress—be it customary or imitative. Because separate and disconnected borrowings could not be blend together and form a unity and they do not have a past. These principles that were an independent and absolute entity remained motionless and fixed and cannot create a future. In contrast, the tradition means creation and progress. This is because the tradition possesses a past in which various phases were fused together, and it owns a current that pushes from behind as a driving force. Therefore, it can always create new discoveries and take new and different directions. Actually, the tradition by itself is creative and

62 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic originative. Moreover, the new alien innovations that were inoculated or grafted to it are revitalized and invigorated by the essence found in its veins. Consequently, these foreign innovations remained alive and do not decay and become destroyed like in the case of the ordinary borrowing. According to Bergson, the soul of a person is formed by the collection of his memories, and his corpse is formed by the sum of his habits. The memory of a nation is its traditions and its habits are its rules and its principles. Therefore, memories form the soul of a nation and the principles form its body. A traditionalist nation searches for its support base in its soul, but a formalist nation searches its body. The first one— the traditionalist nation—lives in a historical freedom, the second one—the formalist nation—exists in a geographical captivity. During the Balkan wars, when we were fighting with the Bulgarians, we were inspired by our cold principles, whereas the Bulgarians got the inspiration from their fervent and passionate traditions. The outcome was the victory of the history over the geography. Therefore, until now, we followed both paths; but conservatism and radicalism proved to be dead ends. In our new life, we have to abandon both of these paths. First of all, we have to study the traditions and the historical evolution of our ethnic Turkic institutions. Turkish literature does not begin with Aşık Pasha, nor does it begin with Nevai. We have searched the sources of our literature; one source is, in engraved inscriptions on stone and on deer skins, and another source is in the folk poems, folk tales, legends, and epics. Our national poetic form is syllabic meter, our national language must be structured by Turkish grammar. Our national literature must be inspired by the Turkish life, Turkish social structure and by Turkish mythology. We have to cleanse our language of foreign conjunctions, our poetry of foreign meters, and our literature of foreign themes. We have to revive the history of Turkish law by studying customs, rules, and usages. Turkish architecture and painting could be searched in the works of the ummah period. Moreover, Turkish music like Turkish poetry and literature must be searched in the oral traditions of the Turkish people. The Turkish nation has a national ideal that still exists in their words, tales, myths, and epics. This ideal must be found and brought to light. Actually, it is our greatest duty and mission to locate this ideal under the scattered wreckage of history and discover in it the pre-history of the Turkish nation. Second, we have to investigate the history and the traditions of our Islamic institutions. We have to know the histories of Islamic theology (kalam), Sufism, and Islamic jurisprudence. If we understand how these institutions evolved and adapted themselves to different milieu and times, then we can also easily understand which aspects of modern civilization could be internalized by these institutions. Moreover, we could also see their path of evolution in the future. Besides establishing contiguity and harmony between various forms of institutions in different time periods, the tradition also demonstrates how all of these originated from the same root. Moreover, it combines all of these various forms together. According to Durkheim, the disciplines like ethics, law, politics, logic, aesthetics, and economics derive from religion. By having their roots in a religious source, they acquire a vital fertility and a flourishing liveliness. Because the tradition needs harmony and continuity, it is possible to constitute an Islamic Turkish philosophy of history by attaching the pre-history of the Turkish people to the metaphysics of religion. Third, in order to benefit from the progress and sciences, methodology, and

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 63 the philosophy of our age, we have to examine their historical evolution and understand their adaptation to the historical and social conditions. The history of civilization shows us that when industry starts to develop in a country, the sciences also develop. The sciences derive from the industry destined to organize it. In our country the study of sciences is not a means but a goal. Our scientists only know how to discuss pure science. They are unable to work on its application. Therefore, in our country there are no real scientists nor is there real scientific study. The sciences derive from the technology and philosophy is a product of methodology. The philosophers are not the ones who just piece together and construct the realities discovered by others. Real philosophers understand methodologies for searching for the truth and are capable of applying appropriate approaches. Today, philosophy cannot be understood as merely a grand summation of information already discovered. Philosophy consists of the methods which continuously discover and re-adapt this information. Therefore, on the one hand, we have to try to become a nation endowed with an historical tradition; on the other hand, we have to develop the sciences that are directly based on industry. Moreover, we must create philosophies that are continuously inspired and sustained by new methods. When we successfully adapt and blend the sciences, philosophy, and methodology of our age to our national and religious traditions, as we have explained earlier, a modern and contemporary Islamic Turkish civilization would be created. We will only be culturally free and acquire an independent civilization in the real sense when we reach this promised land that was called a red apple in ethnic Turkish culture.

Nationalism and Islam The Ottoman Empire, which was the last hope of the Islamic world, has been disintegrated in the last hundred years by a spiritual microbe. Until now, this germ was the enemy of the Ottomanism, and it inflicted great harm on the Islamic world. But today, it has begun to favor Muslims and try to repair the damage that it caused in the past. This microbe is the idea of nationalism. Yes, this is the terrible idea that caused the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire in every quarter of a century by creating Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria, Samos, and Crete. This idea was not a pathological germ but a social catalytic agent, a transformer. Unfortunately, until now, we were not able to understand its character. This idea always caused some linguistic, literary, economic, and finally, political agitations and turmoil against us. In vain, we tried to contain these vital creations, by arrangements, organizations, establishments. We did not realize that this century is the century of nationalities. We could not think to use this social force for the benefit of Ottomanism and Islam. Then the idea of nationalism caused every possible harm to Islam. But now, it is the turn of the Islamic world to adopt and use this weapon. Until now, the only dominant idea among Muslims was: on earth the only legitimate state is the Islamic state. Therefore, regardless under which government they found, the only legitimate sovereign of the Muslims is the Islamic caliph. To them, their actual nationality is an accidental and temporary condition. They believe that very soon a newly emerged leader, a rightly guided ruler, will appear and deliver them from this

64 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic heinous slavery. The Friday and holiday (bayram) sermons read in the name of the caliphs and the gatherings in the Arafat near Mecca are the religious harbingers of this political future. This mentality is no doubt a state of mind that fills our hearts with religious excitement and lofty emotions. This goal would be accepted by us if it were sufficient for hypothetical happiness and for the life of the humanity of 400 million souls. If it were necessary for this goal to acquire a practical form, first of all we would have to gradually reach all the required levels one by one. Muslim nations although aiming for a happy life in the future, accept for the time being to have a humble existence in the countries where they live. They agree to be represented by the government under which they live first linguistically and economically and then ideologically and ethically. Expecting a total liberation is good, but some small and gradual liberations also exist. And without gaining these lesser liberations, it is against the Sunna of the Prophet to obtain the major and final one. Yes, let’s expect the coming of a global Mahdi for all Muslims; but this should not prevent us also to expect the emergence of national and local leaders and aim for our linguistic, educational, economic, ethical liberations under their guidance. This is also mentioned in the Qur’an (Rad 13/7): “For every nation there is a guide.” We have seen how the Christian nations liberated themselves. These nations began their independence movement first by nationalizing their language. This was a linguistic independence to prepare the path for political independence. A nation obtains the promise of liberation, after it begins loving its national language and starts building its national literature on this language. After the language comes the history. If a nation ascends to the earliest sources of its history and feel the first movements of development, it will rediscover its long-lost spirit. A nation would constitute totally its national spirituality after it added the myths and epics which it draws out from the depths of its folk culture to the vitality coming from its history. Then the nation would give a peculiar character to its literature and fine arts by borrowing and adopting the themes of its poetry and arts from its national culture. Religious education and the economy are next. An independent national education is first based on a national language and national history, then on economic independence, and it derives all its spiritual forces from the religion. The followers of the Nakshibendi order have a maxim, they say: if a man is a simple soldier, he should first aim to become a corporal, not a general. On the other hand, we still tolerate the tribal warfare in our country among Muslims, when these tribes attack and plunder each other in the name of Islam (gaza). It is quite strange to assume that the Islamic union would materialize by itself as soon as we wished for it. Islam condemned and forbade tribalism and considered it as misguided zeal. What was meant by this tribalism is the hostility among tribes and this fact still exists among us. Names such as Banu Kahtan and Banu Adnan are reminiscent of this inter-tribal hostility and this was prohibited by our religion. The religion of Islam, as we mentioned earlier by citing a Qur’anic verse, permitted nationalism among Muslims. Moreover, Islam also allowed the sub-divisions of the nations on the condition that these ethnic groups recognize and respect each other’s existence. The Qur’an says: “We created you in groups and in tribes, thus you know and recognize each other.” It is still possible to expect that one day in a distant future the political union of all Muslims would be realized. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this ideal, this goal would remain unachievable for

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 65 long time. Therefore, during this long period of time, should the Muslim ethnicities not realize their national revival and not attain their social independence? We already have mentioned that the weapon of nationalism now could only be used for the benefit of the Muslims. This is because the idea of nationalism is a weapon used to liberate subjugated people from its subjection. Today, there are no non-Muslim nations living under Islamic governments, but most of the Muslim nations are now living in bondage under colonial rule. Since there are no Muslims dominating other Muslims, the idea of nationalism would not be a dividing factor among Muslims. On the contrary, with the rise of the idea of nationalism among the Muslims, the idea of the Islamic union would be even stronger. This is because the ummah would get its support from the national culture of the Muslim nations.

What Is Turkism? Turkism is to elevate the Turkish nation. Therefore, before understanding the character of Turkism, we have first to understand the character of a group of people called nation. Now, let’s examine the diverse definitions of a nation: 1) According to racial Turkists, a nation is a race. Actually, the term “race” derives from the “stockbreeding.” Every animal belongs to a certain category according to its biological characteristics. These characteristics are called race. For example, the horse species is divided into various races. These various horse races are: Arabian, English, and Magyar (Hungarian). Since early times, the human race is divided into four main races: white, black, yellow, and red. Although this classification is quite elementary, it is still considered valid. The science of anthropology divided the Europeans into three races, according to the shape of their skull, the color of their hair and eyes: with long skull brown hair, with long skull black hair, and flat skull. However, in Europe no nation is formed only by one of these racial types. Every nation includes individuals belonging to all of these three racial types. Even within the same family, one sibling could belong to a long skull and brown hair type and other sibling could have black hair or even flat skull. In the past some anthropologists argued that there was a connection between these types and social characteristics. Today, this theory is completely undermined and refuted, thanks to the scientific studies of anthropologists. In particular, the meticulous research by the eminent anthropologist Manouvrier proved that racial types have no effect whatsoever on the social characteristics of humans. Since race has no relation whatsoever with the social characteristics, naturally it should not have any relation to the nationality which is formed by a sum of social characteristics. Therefore, we should search for nation’s origins in other areas. 2) Ethnic Turkists also wrongly identify the nation with the race. An ethnic group is a human society formed by individuals derived from the same ancestors and attached to each other by blood ties. The ancient societies claimed to belong to a pure ethnicity unmixed by the foreigners. In reality, no society is pure and

66 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic ethnically totally homogenous. Taking captives during wars, ravishing girls from other groups, asylum taken by political dissidents in other societies, marriages, and immigration have always caused the mixing of the nations. According to the French scholars Camille Julian and Meillet, nations having a pure race did not even exist in the earliest times. Wouldn’t it be absurd to look for a pure ethnicity when such a thing did not even exist in the prehistoric times, especially after the intermixing of the ethnic groups during the tumultuous and chaotic times of history? Moreover, according to the science of sociology, at birth, individuals are devoid of social characteristics and values. They are not born with linguistic, religious, ethical, aesthetic, political, legal, and economic values. They were not born with linguistics, religious, ethical, aesthetical, political, legal and economic values. They acquire all of these values later on from the society in which they live by way of education. Therefore, humans do not inherit social characteristics genetically but acquire them later through education. Then the ethnicity plays no role for the formation of the national characteristics. Although racial purity did not exist in any society in history, the ancient societies embraced the ideal of tribalism. The reason for that was the religion. This is because in these societies their god (divinity) was the oldest ancestor of the society. This god wanted to be worshiped only by his descendants. This god did not wish the foreigners to enter its temple, and participate in the worshipping ritual ceremonies in its honor. Also, it did not want the foreigners to be put into trial according to its laws. Although there were some individuals who had been adopted into the society, the whole society was considered to have descended from that god. We see that artificial tribalism in many ancient peoples including ancient Greeks, pre-Islamic Arabs, and ancient Turks. Although this kind of tribalism was acceptable for those ancient peoples in the early stages of their evolution, today it is pathological. In early societies social solidarity was limited only to members of the same religion and only existed when religious affiliation was based on kinship; for this reason, naturally social solidarity was based on kinship. From the modern point of view, social solidarity is based on members of the society sharing the same ethnic culture (hars). Since ethnic culture is transmitted by education, it has no relation whatsoever with the kinship. According to geographical Turkists, the nation is the sum of the people inhabiting a country. For example, to them, there is an Iranian nation, a Swiss nation, a Belgian nation, and a British nation. In contrast, in Iran there are three distinct nationalities, which are Persians, Kurds, and Turks. Also, in Switzerland, there are three different nationalities: Germans, French, and Italians all live there. In Belgium, there are two nationalities: the Wallons who were originally French and the Flemish who were originally Germanic live there. In Great Britain, there are four different nationalities: Anglo-Saxons, Scots, Welsh, and Irish. It would not be correct to call these ethnicities nations, since each group speaks a different language, and they each have different national cultures. Sometimes there are different nations in one country, and sometimes one nation is spread to different countries. For example, today the Oghuz Turks live in four different countries: Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Kharezm. The language and the national culture of these Oghuz societies are one unit; therefore, they should be considered as a single nation.

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 67 According to Ottomanists, a nation is comprised of all Ottoman subjects. However, it would be a great mistake to consider all Ottoman subjects as one nation, because within the Ottoman medley there were various nationalities that had different national cultures. According to Islamists, a nation is the sum of all Muslims. The total of all people belonging to the same religion is called ummah. Therefore, the total of all Muslims is called ummah too. Nation is formed by the individuals who shared the same language and the same national culture. According to individualists, nation is a community formed by the individuals who wish to belong to that community. To them an individual has the freedom to choose to belong to any society. In reality the individuals do not have such a freedom. This is because a person’s psyche is formed by feelings and ideas. According to the new spiritualists, our spiritual life is the essential one and our intellectual life is attached to it. Therefore, in order for our psyche to be in a good state, our feelings and our ideas must be in accord/in harmony with each other. A person whose feelings are not in agreement with each other is an ill person. Such a person cannot be happy in life. For example, if a young religious person considers himself an atheist, his mental state would not be balanced. As far as his feelings are concerned, every individual belongs to a particular nation. This nation is the nation in which he is raised and in which he would receive his education. The individual would be raised within a certain nation and would be shaped by its culture. Any person can only be happy if he lives in the society where he grows up. If he lives in another society, he would suffer from homesickness. He would become nostalgic. Therefore, it is not up to any person to change his nationality whenever he wishes to do so. This is because nationality is a reality. He cannot adopt it merely by making a decision in the same way that he joins a political party. Then what is a nation? What kind of bond do we have that prevails over racial, ethnic, geographical, political, and voluntary factors? The science of sociology demonstrates that this bond is the participation in a common ethnic culture that is gained by education. A person gains his most natural and genuine feelings and emotions during his first stage of education at the earliest age of his life. He remains attached to his mother tongue that he has heard in the cradle. That is why the language we love the most is our mother tongue. We have received all the feelings that form our spirit through the medium of this language. Essentially, our social feelings are nothing but a sum of these religious, ethical, and aesthetical values. We want to live in the society where we acquire these values. While it might be possible to be wealthy in a foreign society, we would prefer to live in poverty in our native society. This is because poverty among friends is preferable to us over a wealthy and prosperous life among strangers. Our pleasure, our consciousness, and our desires are all those of the society in which we live and we acquire our culture. We can only hear their echoes in that society in which we belong. A great obstacle prevents us from leaving our native society and joining a new one. This obstacle is the impossibility of getting rid of the culture that we received in our childhood. We are condemned to live in our native society because we cannot change that reality. Now we understand that a nation is not a community based on race, ethnicity, geography, politics, or something we choose by our free will. A nation is a community formed

68 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic by the individuals who share the same language, same religion, same ethical values, and the same aesthetics. In sum, people who have received the same culture. The Turkish peasant describes that as “the one which I share the same language and same religion.” A person would like to live with the people with whom he shares the same language and religion—rather than with people of the same ethnicity or race. This is because our human character is not in our body but in our spirit. Our physical characteristics derive from our race, whereas our spiritual characteristics derive from the society that gave us our culture. Alexander the Great said: my real father is not Philip but Aristotle, because the first one engendered my body and the second one my soul.” Our spirit is more important than our body. Therefore, to determine our nationality we should not search for our genetic roots but to make sure that our education and our culture is national. A normal person can only espouse the ideal of the nation that molded him by its culture. The ideal is the source of our happiness; that is why we always look for it. Whereas the ideals of the society in which we did not grow up would not give us any joy; rather, only the ideals of our native society can make us happy. That is why people can sacrifice their lives for their native societies. In contrast, for a foreign society, we would not make even the least sacrifice. In sum, a person would be unhappy, if he lives in a society whose culture is alien to him. From these observations, we can safely come to a conclusion: in our country we have fellow citizens whose ancestors came from Albania or from Arabia; because these people received Turkish education and Turkish culture and adopted the Turkish ideal, we cannot discriminate them. How can we exclude from our nationality those people who not only share our happiness but also our sorrow in our disastrous days? In particular, some of these people rendered great service to the Turkish nation. Then, how can we not consider these people to be Turkish? In fact, we can search for the pedigree of horses. This is because genealogy is very important for animals. However, for humans, race has no effect on social characteristics and qualities; therefore, it is not correct to search for pedigree or genealogy in humans.

Turkism and Turanism In order to understand the difference between the Turkism and the Turanism, first of all we have to determine the limits of these associations. Turk is the name of a nation and a nation is an association which owns a peculiar culture. Therefore, the Turk has only one language and one culture. Nevertheless, some of the Turkic subgroups try to create different cultures and languages from those of the Anatolian Turks. For example, a group of Northern Turks are creating a Tatar language and culture. This movement will eventually cause the emergence of two nations: one Turkish and another Tatar. Because of our geographical distance to them, we do not know what kind of path the Kirghiz and Uzbeks will follow. If the latter also would create different national languages and cultures, the boundaries of the Turkish nation would be further limited. For now, because of the distance, it seems difficult to include Yakuts and the Altai Turks into the cultural orbit of Turkey’s Turks. Today, the Turks who can form a cultural union are the Oghuz Turks or Turkmens. Like

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 69 Turkey’s Turks, the Turkmens of Azerbaijan, Iran, and Kharazm belong to the Oghuz ethnic groups. Therefore, our first goal for the realization of a pan-Turkic ideal must be an Oghuz or a Turkmen union. What is our purpose of such a union? Is it to form a political union? For now, it is not. We cannot decide for the future, but our current ideal is the cultural union of the Oghuz Turks. Although divided into four different countries, Oghuz Turks are ethnically related to each other. In each of four countries we find Turkmen tribes of the same names. For example, in Khwarazm there are Tekes, Sari, and Karakalpaks. In our country the Tekes are so numerous to form a district (sanjak). In the past some of them were deported to Rumeli. In Turkey, the Sari are mainly live in Rumkale. The Karakalpaks are settled in the areas of Sivas, Kars, and Azerbaijan and known by the names of Karapapak and Terekeme. In Khwarazm, there are Salur and Imrali clans of the Oghuz and Cavda and Göklen tribes. We find these names in various parts of Anatolia. In the Van province of Turkey, the Göklen tribe gave its name to a village; now called Gökoğlan. The Bayat and Afshar clans of Oghuz are found in Turkey, Iran, and Azerbaijan. The Akkoyunlus and Karakoyunlus Turkmen confederations are spread into these three countries. Therefore, in Turkish ethnography, the countries of Khwarazm, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkey are the homelands of the same tribe. As such, the total area of these four countries can be called Oghuzistan. The first goal of Turkism is the dominance of a one national culture in this vast area. The Oghuz Turks are generally descended from Oghuz Khan. Until a couple of centuries ago, Oghuz Turks used to live a communal life. Fuzuli is a poet known to all Oghuz tribes. The Book of Korkud Ata is the official book of the Oguz Turks. Besides the works of Shah Ismail, the Âşık Kerem Köroğlu are very popular among Oghuzs. The distant goal of the Turkism is Turan. Actually, Turan is not a community of ethnicities comprising besides Turks other ethnic groups like Mongols, Tunguses, Finns, and Magyars (Hungarians) as assumed by some people. In the scientific language this linguistic group is called Uralo-Altaic group. Nevertheless, it has not been definitely proven that there exists an affiliation between the languages of the latter group. Some linguists consider the Uralic and Altaic peoples as separate linguistic groups from each other. According to these scholars, Turks, Mongols, and Tunguses form the Altaic group and Finns and the Magyars formed the Uralic group. Moreover, it has not been yet proved that Turks has the linguistic affinity with the Mongols and the Tunguses. Nevertheless, we know for sure that all Turkish-speaking peoples like Yakut, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Kipchak (Tatar), and Oghuz form a linguistic and ethnic unity. Since the word Turlar (Turs) means Turks, it is the name of the union of the Turkish peoples. Therefore, the name Turan must be given to the great Turkistan, a land that is comprised of all Turkish peoples. Today, the name Turk is only given to the Turks of Turkey. Besides the Turks of Turkey, all Oghuz peoples will unite in a near future under the name of Turan. Nevertheless, if the Tatars, Uzbeks, and Kirghiz peoples form different national cultures, then they would be separate nations. Then again, we would need a name uniting all these affiliated nations under one name. This common name would be Turan. The ultimate aim of the Turkists is to unite the Oghuz, Tatar, Kirghiz, Uzbek, and Yakut peoples in language, literature, and culture. Is this ideal realizable or

70 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic not? We can expect this for the nearer aims, but not for the distant goals. This is because having distant goals is attractive to the imagination and can be used to elevate intense emotions and zeal in the soul. For example, for Lenin, collectivism was the nearer aim, and communism was the distant goal. To those who asked about the realization of the communist ideal, Lenin answered: “It is not yet possible to predict when Communism could be realized.” This is like the paradise of our Prophet Muhammad, an ideal place or event. The ideal of Turan is likewise; the union of hundreds of millions of Turks is the strongest source of motivation for the Turkists. Without the goal of Turan, Turkism could not be developed so fast. But, who knows? Maybe in the future, the realization of the Turan ideal could be possible. This is the ideal; the creative force to be reached for and realized in the future. The national state that existed in the past is merely a dream that the Turks now can hope will became a reality. Then we can divide Turkism into three stages: Turkeyism (union of the Turks within Turkey) Oghuzism or Turmenism (union of the Oghuz peoples) Turanism (union of the all Turkic peoples)

Today only the union of the Turks within the border of Turkey is realizable. Nevertheless, the ideal of the red apple sought by the souls by zeal is not yet realizable, but still a dream. When the Turkish peasant dreamt of the red apple, he imagined the ancient Turkish İlkhanid states. In the past, the ideal of Turan was not a dream but a reality. When in 210 BC the Kun (Hun) ruler Mete united all Turkish peoples under his reign, the ideal of Turan was already realized. After the Huns the ideal of Turan continued to be a reality under the Avars, then under the Gokturks, then under the Oghuz and Kirghiz, then under Kur Khan, then under Genghis Khan and finally Timur (Tamerlane) realized this union. Once the meaning of the Turan was determined, the Hungarians, Finns, Mongols, and Tunguz would not have any kind of relation with the Turan. Turan is the great homeland of all the Turks in the past and may be in the future. The Turanians are solely the Turkish-speaking nations. If the Uralo-Altaic language family really exists, then it has its own name and this is not Turan. Some European writers call all the non-Semitic and non-Indo-European peoples of Western Asia as Turanian. The scholars do not aim to establish an affiliation between the Turks and these peoples. Their aim is to emphasize that these peoples are not Semitic and not Indo-European but belong to a different race. Besides that, some scholars consider Turan as a part of Iran by basing their argument on the Shah-nameh that mentions that Tur and Irec are siblings. Nevertheless, according to Shah-nameh Tur and Irec also had a third sibling: Selem. Selem is not Iranian but the common ancestor of all Semites. These three brothers who were the sons of Feridun are named like the sons of Noah according to an ancient division. Then we can safely affirm that Turan is not a part of Iran, but the name of the pan-Turkish community which comprises all Turkish lands.

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 71

National Culture and Civilization Between the national culture and civilization, there exist common points and divergences. The common point between the national culture and civilization is that both cover all social lives. The social lives are religious, ethical, legal, contractual, aesthetical, economic, linguistic, and scientific lives. The sum of these eight sorts of social lives is called national culture; but these eight are also called civilization. This is the common point between the national culture and the civilization. Now, let’s look for the differences and divergences between the national culture and the civilization. First of all, national culture is national and civilization is international. National culture is only the harmonious combination of religious, ethical, legal, contractual, aesthetical, economic, linguistic, and scientific lives. In contrast, civilization is the joint form/association of the social lives of the different nations belonging to a community. For example, all European and American nations share a common Western civilization. But, within this civilization there exist different and distinct national cultures, like English culture, German culture, and French culture. Second, the civilization is formed according to a plan and program and design by individual initiatives. For example, all rules and knowledge related to religion were created by the humans; equally, all knowledge and the theories concerning aesthetics, law, fine arts, economics, contracts, linguistics, and science are developed by the individuals according to a plan and method. Therefore, the sum of all knowledge, sciences, and concepts created within a civilized community is called “civilization.” As the elements found in the national cultures were not created by the individuals, they were not artificial. As the lives of the plants and animals grow naturally, the things belonging to the national culture develop likewise. For example, the language is not something created and designed by certain individuals according to a plan and method. We cannot change a word of one language and artificially replace it with another word. The vocabulary and the grammatical rules of a language change and evolve naturally. We can only be a spectator to that change. Individuals can only add some technical terms to the language. Nevertheless, even these terms cannot be part of the language unless accepted by the members of the professional group to which the inventor belong. Later, it was accepted by members of a particular profession. The new word remains a professional or technical term solely used within this group. Then, later it can be accepted by the whole nation. But this is not within the power of the inventors. In the old Ottoman language since Sinasi Bey, millions of terms have been invented, but only a small portion of them were accepted as professional terms. Those were accepted by the whole nation can be only a handful of words. Then we encounter the first specimen of the national culture in the vocabulary of a language and the first specimen of the civilization in the invented or coined words. The words are the social institutions and the new terms are individual creations. A term coined by an individual can be suddenly adopted by the people and diffused. But the force behind the diffusion is not the person who coined the word. This force derives from a secret force of the society. Fifteen years ago, there were two co-existing languages in our country. One of these languages was official, and it was the only recognized form of written language. This language was called Ottoman. The second one was solely spoken by the popular

72 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic classes of the society. It was called Turkish and was considered a popular colloquial language. In reality that was our real and original language. The Ottoman language was an artificial combination of the grammar, conjugation, and vocabulary of the three languages: Turkish, Arabic, and Persian. The Turkish language was formed and evolved naturally and it was our national language. In contrast, the Ottoman language was created artificially by the individuals according to some methods and rules. This artificial mixture had some Turkish vocabulary and grammatical rules too. Nevertheless, the Ottoman language was not the language of our culture (hars), but was the language of our civilization (medeniyet). In our country also two poetic meters coexisted. The Turkish meter used by the common people was not created according to a method. The bards or popular poets used to write lyric poetry without knowing any meter. Of course, these poems were composed by inspiration—not by a certain method. This popular meter developed naturally out of the national cultural. In contrast, the Ottoman meter was borrowed and adopted from Persian poets. The Ottoman poets who wrote poems according to that Persian style were composing their poems according to a certain method. This meter was called aruz. Aruz was not adopted by the people in Anatolia. In the Ottoman Empire, those who wrote poetry according to aruz learned that style in the medreses by studying Persian literature. In contrast, in Iran, even the peasants compose poems with aruz, because aruz style belongs to the Persian national culture. Besides that, in our country there are two kinds of music. The first one is the popular Turkish music which developed naturally among the people. The second one is the Ottoman music which was adopted by al-Farabi (d. 950) from the Byzantines and then later borrowed by the Ottomans. The popular Turkish music evolved naturally by inspiration and not adopted from a foreign source. Nevertheless, the Ottoman music was borrowed from outside. Turkish popular music is the music of our national culture (hars), whereas the Ottoman music is the music of our civilization (medeniyet). The civilization is the sum of concepts and techniques created according to an established method and it can spread from one nation to another, whereas the national culture (hars) is the sum of the feelings and the spirit of a nation which evolved naturally within that nation and is peculiar to it. Consequently, the Ottoman music is formed by the canons and rules, whereas the Turkish music has no rules but just formed of melodies coming out of the heart of the Turk. On the other hand, the roots of Byzantine music that were adopted by the Ottomans are found in ancient Greek music, which is a part of their national culture. Equally, in our literature also we find the same duality. The Turkish literature is formed by the folk tales, proverbs, riddles, anecdotes, folk epics, legends, heroic stories, hymns and chants of the mystical convents, and popular jokes. The proverbs reflect popular wisdom; the riddles and the folk tales are anonymous creations. These tales are originated in the mythic period of the Turkish history. They survived until today in the form of traditional narratives and include the fables, fairy tales, and the stories of the giants. The tales of the Dede Korkut are one of the most well-known examples of these stories. They were transmitted throughout the ages from bard to bard and finally put into writing a few centuries ago. The works of Shah Ismail, Aşık Kerem, Aşık Galip, and Köroğlu, all created anonymously by the common people and later recorded.

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 73 Moreover, the myths and the legends of the Turkish ethnography also are part of the Turkish literature. The heroic stories of the war exploits are the products of the Islamic period of the Turkish history. The epic poems and epic songs of the bards also are the original creations of the Turkish people. Poets like Aşık Ömer, Dertli, and Karacaoğlan are very popular and much loved among the Anatolian people. On the other hand, the Sufi convents (tekkes) are the temples of the people. The hymns composed here are also part of the Turkish literature. Poets like Yunus Emre and Kaygusuz Abdal belong to that category. However, Ottoman literature is composed of individual stories and novels rather than tales and fables and lyric poems rather than epic poetry. The Ottoman court poets were always inspired from foreign poets. In the classical period (1300–1800), they emulated the Persian poets, and in the modern period (1800–1900), they emulated French poets. Even the Fuzuli and Nedim are no exceptions to that fact. Therefore, among the Ottoman poets and writers, none is original. All of them are imitators. Their works were not created by a genuine inspiration but by an intellectual skill. For example, let’s compare these two kinds of literature in satire: Nasreddin Hoca, İncili Çavus, Bekri Mustafa, and Bektaşi elders (babas) are the witty satirist poets of the common people, whereas Kani and Sururi are the satirists of Ottoman palace literature. When we compare these two groups, we will see the difference between genuine popular satire and artificial ones. On the other hand, the Karagöz and Hacivat are popular spectacle and shows. They are the original forms of the Turkish theater. Quarrels between the Karagöz and Hacivat in their shows demonstrate very well the contradiction between our national culture (hars) and our civilization (medeniyet). We encounter the same duality in the field of ethics. Turkish ethical values are the opposite of Ottoman ones. Mahmud Kaşgari describes the character of the Turks in his famous Divan ul Lugat al Turk. According to Kaşgari, Turks are ignorant of vanity and boasting, and they never self-glorify. When Turks commit heroic acts or perform a sacrifice, they never mention it. The famous Arab poet al-Jahiz also describes Turks in a similar way. In contrast, Ottoman palace literature is full of self-gratification. The period of Servet-i Funun is the most brilliant period of the Ottoman literature. The writers and the poets of that literary school always portray pessimistic, skeptical, hopeless, and pathological characters. Nevertheless, the real Turkish character is strong, optimist, and determined. We also see that duality among our religious and legal scholars (ulema). The traditional title of the Ottoman ulema was ulema-yi rusum. In contrast, the ulema in Anatolia was called the people’s ulema. The first category of ulema had recognized ranks, but they were not very knowledgeable. The Anatolia ulema, on the other hand, were not given ranks but they were very knowledgeable. The famous Iranian ruler Nadir Shah of Afshar sent delegation to Istanbul for a project to unite all Sunni Muslims under the authority of the Ottoman sultan-caliph. In Istanbul, the Iranian delegation first carried out negotiations with the official ulema (ulema-yi rusum); but on seeing that they were not able to communicate with the Ottoman ulema due to the latter’s snobbism, they wanted to continue their negotiations with the simple provincial ulema of Anatolia. This event was mentioned in the Raghıb Pasha’s book Tahkik ve Tevfik. The military victories and political successes of the Ottomans in their golden age were also due to the genius of the ignorant pashas born and raised among the people of

74 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic Anatolia. Nevertheless, this social duality existed only in the intellectual activities. Besides that, all kind of artisanal activities were carried out by the common people. Therefore, the arts and handicrafts such as architecture, calligraphy, engraving, book binding, book decoration, carpentry, iron working, dying, carpet weaving, painting, and miniature making had only one style and that was the popular Turkish one. We can name all these arts practiced by the common people as Turkish art. These arts did not belong to the Ottoman civilization but to the Turkish national culture (hars). Today Europeans are collecting these products of our ancient art by spending billions of lira. The halls of the European and American museums are now filled with these Turkish masterpieces. In Europe, the interest for the Turkish art and culture is called Turquerie. Famous European intellectuals and artists like Lamartine, Auguste Comte, Pierre Lafayette, Mesmer, and Pierre Loti appreciate and prize the original art of the Turks as well as our simple ethics and deep and liberal religious understanding. In sum they love our simple but vigorous and happy life. The Europeans do not appreciate the imitative works of the Ottoman civilization but they admire the original works of the Turkish culture. What is the reason for this strange situation that is peculiar to our country? Why is it that the two kinds of ideals—Turkish and Ottoman—are so opposed to each other? Why is it that everything associated with the Turkish ideal considered beautiful, but everything associated with Ottoman ideal is represented as ugly? This is because the Ottoman ideal became associated with the field of imperialism, which is detrimental to the Turkish culture and life. The Ottoman ideal became cosmopolitan and favored the upper classes at the expense of the popular classes. Class interest was considered more important than national interest. As the Ottoman Empire expanded and brought hundreds of ethnicities and nations under its rule, the administrators and the subject peoples became two separate classes. The ruling class was cosmopolitan and Turks were one of the subject peoples. Turks did not like the Ottoman cosmopolitan class. Equally, Ottomans looked down on the Turks and considered them a subject nation. Ottoman officials referred to Turks as “donkey Turks.” When Ottoman officials came to Turkish villages, everyone would run away shouting “the Ottomans are coming.” Such animosity can explain the rise of Alevism among the Turks. Shah Ismail’s grandfather, Sheikh Juneyd, was spreading his ideas among the Oghuz tribes by asking, “Which comes first, the child or companions (of the Prophet)?” The Oghuz tribes were the children of Oghuz Khan and the cousins of the Kayıs, who were the founding tribe of the Ottoman dynasty. Therefore, how did it happen that the converts (devshirme) of the Palace School of Enderun gained priority over the Oghuz? The tribal sheikhs of that period compared the injustices and the oppression of the Turkmen tribes by the Ottomans to the persecution of the Ahl-al Bayt (the family of the Prophet Muhammad) during the early period of Islam. Then some of Turkmen subscribed to that analogy and left their ancestral creed. They created a different literature, a different philosophy, and a different religion. Nevertheless, the Sunni Turks who remained attached to the Ottoman religious establishment did not join the Ottoman imperialism. They formed their peculiar culture and remained aloof to the Ottoman civilization. In our country there existed two categories of elites. The Ottoman elites were called havas. But the popular Turkish classes also had their own poets,

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 75 bards, and masters. The Ottoman elites represented the palace and were supported by the sultan. Their livelihoods were provided by the government. The Ottoman musicians also received their incomes from the palace. Equally, the Ottoman ulema including judges (kadis) also received high salaries, provided by the government. Only the popular religious leaders were supported by the people. What separates the national culture (hars) from the civilization (medeniyet) is this: the national culture is formed of feelings, whereas the civilization is formed of knowledge. The feelings of the human beings are the subjected to any kind of method or will power. A nation cannot emulate the religious, ethical, and aesthetical feelings of another nation. For example, in the pre-Islamic Turkish religion the main god, the Sky God, is the god of rewarding. He does not punish. The god of punishment is Erlik Khan. This is because god in pre-Islamic Turkish religion appears only in his beautiful aspect. The ancient Turks only felt love toward this god. They would not fear God. This is the reason Turks always imagined God as a loving god, and even after their conversion to Islam there is the continuation of that belief among them. The image of a fearful god is very rare among the Turks. The experience of the preachers shows to us that the audience of the preachers who always mention about the beauty and the goodness (of God) increases. In contrast, those who always preach about hell and its demons are decreasing. In the ancient religion of the Turks, there were no ascetic practices, but graceful and joyful religious ceremonies. That is why the Turks after their conversion to Islam, continued to possess a strong faith and a genuine religious understanding. They never practiced the religious fanaticism. We have just to read the works of Yunus Emre in order to understand Turkish Islam. That the Turks love to recite hymns in the mosques and read poetry and sing songs in the religious convents is a very clear demonstration of their joyful and liberal religious understanding. In the ancient pre-Islamic Turkish religion, the national god was the god of peace. According to Mahmud Kaşgari, the word il, which shows nature of the ancient Turkish religion, meant peace. The title ilkhan means the khan of peace. The Turkish rulers (ilhans) were nothing but renovators who established a perpetual peace from Manchuria to Hungary. I already wrote in Yeni Mecmua the highly ethical and the peaceful character of Mete who was the founder of the oldest Turkish state. Thanks to their old peaceful traditions the Turkish rulers always treated the vanquished and conquered people with kindness and always presented themselves as the keeper of peace on earth. The Turkish history is full of examples to prove that reality. Even the Hunnic leader Atilla whom the Europeans accuse always accepted the pleas of the vanquished nations. This is because Atilla also was an ilkhan, a renovator who wishes to establish global peace. The Europeans have committed a grave sin by translating Atilla’s title Tanrı kutu (the good omen of God) as the “scourge of God.” The most important characteristics of the Turkish art are its being natural, simple, graceful, and original. These aesthetical characteristics could be seen in Turkish carpets, tiles, architecture, and calligraphy. This example demonstrates very well that there exists a genuine cooperation and a deep harmony among the various social lives which constitute the national culture. The religious, aesthetical, political, economic, and familial lives of the Turks are as simple as their language. Simplicity and originality are the central characteristics of

76 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic the Turkish life. Nevertheless, it would not be correct to assume that the civilization of the Turks also was composed of the harmonious elements like Turkish culture. The Ottoman civilization is a combination composed of Turkish, Persian, and Arabic cultures, in addition to some elements of Islamic and Western institutions. This institution never became a harmonious union by successfully blending the various elements which composed it. A civilization can only be a harmonious union when the national culture was instilled in it. For example, the English culture was instilled in the English civilization. That is why there exists a harmony between the various elements of the English civilization. Another relation/connection between the national culture and the civilization is that every ethnic group had first an ethnic culture, and as this culture developed, that ethnicity also would politically rise and form a state. On the other hand, a civilization would begin to be formed. Initially a civilization derives from the national culture, but later on it would borrow many institutions from the civilizations of the neighboring nations. Nevertheless, if the civilization of nation would develop fast and excessively it could cause some detrimental effects for that nation. It would corrupt its characteristics. According to Ribot, if the intellect of a person would develop excessively it would harm his character. A similar thing happens in a society as well. The culture of a nation is like the intellect of a person. Nations that have a corrupt national culture would be called “a degenerated nation.” Finally, the last relation between the national culture and the civilization is this: during a struggle between a nation which has a weak culture and a strong civilization and a nation which has a low civilization and a strong culture, the latter always prevails. For example, when the civilization of the ancient Egyptians began to rise, their national culture started to decay. Then, the newly established Persian state which had a strong national culture, but a little civilization, defeated the Egyptians. A few centuries later Persian developed a great civilization, and their culture started to decay. Then the Persians were defeated by the Greeks which had a vigorous national culture at that time. Later on, when the Greek national culture has started to decay, both Greeks and Persians were defeated by the uncivilized Macedonians. After that, this time Macedonian national culture had started to deteriorate and the latter were in turn defeated by the Romans in the West and Parthians and Sasanians in the East. Finally, the Arabs who were totally uncivilized but who had a very strong national culture emerged and were victorious over both the Sasanians and the Romans. Nevertheless, again later on, this time Arab nation started to become civilized and consequently lost their national culture. The decline of the Arab political power coincided with the coming of the Seljuk Turks who had freshly migrated to the Middle East. The Seljuk Turks had a very strong national culture, and they soon established their dominion over the Islamic lands. Tore was nothing but the national culture of the Turks. This is because of their strong national culture that Turkish nation remained independent until now. Equally, it was thanks to their national culture that Turks defeated and drove away the British and French out of the Dardanelles. Again, after the end of the First World War, it was thanks to their national culture that Turks and the Armistice managed to defeat the British armed Greeks and Armenians and to prevail over the British. After establishing a relationship between the national culture and the

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 77 civilization, we can explain the meaning of the Turkism and what kind of services it can provide to a country. The Ottoman civilization was condemned to collapse for two reasons: First of all, the Ottoman Empire, like all other empires, was composed of a temporary community. In contrast, the social groups that have an eternal life are not communities but societies. The societies are formed of nations. The vanquished nations can only forget their national identity temporarily. One day these subject nations would definitely wake up from their slumber and demand their cultural freedom and political independence. In Europe, this process was continuing for five centuries. Therefore, the Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman empires that were not affected by this movement would eventually disintegrate. The second reason is this: Western civilization would increasingly destroy Oriental civilization. In Russia and the Balkan countries Western civilization replaced Oriental civilization. The same event would also occur in the Ottoman Empire. Oriental civilization is not Islamic civilization as is believed by some people. Actually, Oriental civilization is derived from the civilization of the Eastern Roman Empire. Likewise, Western civilization is also not Christian civilization; rather, it originated from the civilization of the Western Roman Empire. The Ottomans did not adopt Eastern Roman civilization directly from Byzantium. They borrowed it through the medium of the Arabs and the Persians after their conversion to Islam. Some intellectuals and scholars wrongly considered Oriental civilization to be Islamic civilization. In my previous article, I tried to demonstrate by submitting historical evidence that Oriental civilization is actually Eastern Roman civilization. The evidence on this issue is so voluminous that it could be collected in a book of many volumes. Now, it became an established fact that the Oriental civilization was replaced everywhere by the Western civilization. In Turkey, this phenomenon now is bound to happen. Therefore, the Ottoman civilization which is found within the circle of the Oriental civilization would disappear and it would be replaced by the Western civilization and Turkish culture. The mission of the Turkism is to rediscover the Turkish culture which lives among the popular classes and invigorate it by inculcating into that culture the Western civilization. The Tanzimatists statesmen and intellectuals have tried to reconcile the Ottoman civilization with the Western civilization. However, these two opposite civilizations could not coexist side by side. They would negate and harm each other since their systems were irremediably opposed to each other. For example, the Western musical tradition cannot be reconciled and combined with the Oriental musical tradition. The Western philosophy and logics based on the experimental method cannot be reconciled with the Oriental philosophy and logics based on scholasticism. A nation can be either Western or Oriental. Just as there cannot be an individual with two religions, there also cannot be a nation with two civilizations. The Tanzimatists have failed in their reform movement, because they did not grasp that reality. In contrast, the Turkists would be successful in their quest, because they want to abandon Oriental civilization, which in reality is Byzantine civilization, and adopt Western civilization instead. The Turkists are the ones who wish to become definitely and permanently part of Western civilization by completely remaining Turk and Muslim. But, before entering Western civilization, we have to discover our own national culture.

78 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic

Toward the People One of the primary principles of Turkism is the ideal of “toward the people.” Previously in order to implement that ideal we published a periodical in Istanbul, called Towards the people. What is the meaning of towards the people? Who are the ones to go towards the people? The intellectuals and the thinkers of a nation are called the elite of that nation. The elite due to their education are actually isolated from the common people. Therefore, the elite have to go to the people. But, why do the elite have to go to the people? Some writers answered the question as follows: “The elite have to go to the people in order to bring the national culture to them.” But, as we have demonstrated in previous articles, in our country, national culture is only found among the common people. The elite are not acquainted with the national culture. Then, how could the elite who were deprived of the national culture bring it to the people who are the living monument of that culture? In order to solve that problem, first we have to answer to these questions: What do the elite and the people have? The elite have civilization and the people have national culture. Therefore, there could be two reasons for the elite to go towards the people: to receive a cultural education from the people or to bring civilization to the people.7 Ziya Gökalp: Kitaplar (books) edited by Mustafa Koç, Sabri Koz (Istanbul: YKY, 2007), 199

Indeed, the reasons for the elite to go to the people are for the realization of these two objectives. The elite can find the national culture only among the people. They cannot find it elsewhere. Therefore, to go toward the people means to go toward the national culture. This is because the common people provide a living depositary of the national culture. The elites do not receive national culture during their childhood education. Because the schools which they studied were neither popular schools nor national schools. That is why the elite of our nation were formed without receiving national culture. Their education denationalized them. Now they want to compensate this deficiency. What should they do? They have to mingle with the common people, live with them, and pay attention to the vocabulary and sentences used by the people. They have to listen and learn the proverbs and popular wisdom of the people. They have to adopt their way of thinking and feelings. They have to listen to their poetry and traditional music and watch their dance. They have to penetrate into their religious life, and adopt their ethical values. They have to appreciate the beauty in the simplicity of the architecture of their houses and furniture. Moreover, they should read the popular books, folk tales, jokes, anecdotes, myths, epics, and popular beliefs which are found in the old ethnic customs (tore) called Tandırname. They also have to read the poetry books of the old bards, starting from Korkud Ata and the religious hymns of the Sufi convents, starting with Yunus Emre. Moreover, they also have to read the popular jokes of Nasreddin Hoca. They have to search for shadow plays of Karagöz and popular theatrical representation (orta oyunu). We have to revive the tradition of the old coffee-houses where the heroic epics were read; we have to bring to live

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 79 the Ramadan nights of the old times, the Friday communal ceremonies, and the religious feasts and holidays that are anticipated by children with impatience. We have to form the national museums by collecting popular art works. Then, the elite of the Turkish nation can only become “national,” after experiencing a national life among the common people and imbibe and absorb totally the Turkish national culture. The great Russian poet Pushkin could only become a national poet after receiving such a national formation. Great poets like Dante, Petrarch, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Goethe, Schiller, D’Annunzio all became geniuses of the arts thanks to the inspiration that they received from the people. Sociology shows us that the real genius is actually found among the common people. An artist can only be a genius if he can manifest the aesthetic values of the people. The reason our country has no great artists is because our artists are unwilling to draw on the living culture and customs of the people for inspiration. In our country, has anyone appreciated the artistic values of the people until now? The Ottoman elites insulted the peasants as “donkey Turks.” The town people of Anatolia were scorned and derided as outsiders. The common people were referred to as “rabble.” The exclusive ones were the elite who were slaves of the palace. Since they held the common people in contempt, the language, poetry, literature, music, philosophy, ethics, politics, and economics of that elite group have not survived (their demise). The Turkish nation had no choice but to start from scratch—at the beginning. This nation has not even had a name until recently. The Tanzimatists told them: you are merely Ottoman. Never ask for a national name by emulating other nations. Then, you can cause the disintegration and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the unfortunate Turk was forced to deny his nationality and said: indeed, I am not a Turk, but only an Ottoman. We had deputies repeating this to Bosho. But the thought that the Ottomanists could not understand was: whatever they did the non-Turkish ethnicities would secede from the Ottoman union. Because, it was then impossible for the artificial political unions composed of hundreds of nationalities to survive. From now on every nation would constitute a separate state and would live a homogenous, original, and natural social life. It was doubtless that, this social phenomenon which originated in the western part of Europe, would soon affect its eastern part too. The collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires during the First World War has shown that this calamity was very close. What the Turks would do if they would not realize that they too were a nation, and they too had a particular homeland and national rights within the Ottoman Empire? Would they say, since the Ottoman Empire has collapsed, we then renounce all our national aims and political aspirations? When the principles of US president Wilson were declared, some alert Ottomanists had realized what Turkism had shown them—the existence of a particular, national and independent Turkish homeland having boundaries which were determined by ethnography and a national right to live independently in this land. They realized that their situation would be hopeless and inviable without hope and aspirations that the ideas and tenets of Turkism instilled in their minds. Therefore, it was only one word: the sacred word of Turk caused us to see the right direction to follow amid this turmoil. The Turkists had not only taught the elite the name of their nation but also the beautiful language of that language. As it was the given name, the language also was

80 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic taken from the nation, because both had been found among the people. The class of elites had lived until now a noctambulist life. Like noctambulists, they had two personalities. Although their real personality was Turkish, they considered themselves Ottoman in their reveries. Although their real language was Turkish, they invented sentences borrowed from the Persians. Turkism like a psychiatrist diagnosed the problem and managed to convince them that they were not Ottoman but Turkish, and that their real language and poetry was Turkish. Besides convincing them, they also proved their view with scientific and scholarly evidence. Thanks to the Turkish efforts, the elite were freed from their noctambulism and started to live a normal life. Nevertheless, today we have to admit that, so far, the elite had only managed to take only one step toward the people. In order to go completely toward the people, they have to live among the common people and take the national culture from them. For the Turkish youth, there is only one way to obtain that culture: to go to the villages as teachers. The elderly ones too must at least go to the towns in the interior of Anatolia. The Ottoman elite would become national elites only after acquiring the popular folk culture from the people. The second purpose of going toward the people is to bring civilization to them. This is because the people are devoid of civilization, and the elite have the keys to the civilization. But those elite, as a gift to the people, should not bring them Oriental civilization—or Ottoman civilization, which is a branch of it; rather, they should bring them Western civilization.

Toward the West An old Turkish proverb says: know your work, your food, and your spouse. From the sociological point of view this would be: know your nation, know your religious community (ummet/ummah), know your civilization. The Turkish press and our national disasters have shown us what our religious community is. On this issue, almost everybody is unanimous. But on the issue of which civilizational group we belong to, there still exists disagreement among us. Therefore, before starting to tackle the national issue, we have to first try to solve that problem. One of the reasons why civilization remains ambiguous is the confusion that exists between concepts of the civilization and what it means to be civilized. In the past, societies were considered to belong to three divisions: savagery, nomadism (barbarism), and civilization. Today the term of “savagery” has been completely relinquished by the scientific world. This is because today it has been discovered that those primitive societies called savage previously had their own particular civilization. Now, it is even understood that these societies go through the stages of evolutions. Therefore, some scientists even object the use of the term “primitive societies” for these groups. When it is accepted that civilization is found in all human societies, then the question of whether it exists in animal societies arises. The civilization is the totality of some institutions and ways of thinking and acting. Animal societies are governed by instincts that they inherit through their genes. Among animals even the division of labor work specialization is hereditary. Members of the ruling classes, workers, and soldiers in animal societies are

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 81 born with some specific organs necessary for their functions. In the animal societies there exist no institutions inherited through cultural traditions and education. Therefore, civilization does not exist among animals. Therefore, on the issue of civilization we accept two principles: (a) Civilization exists in all human societies. (b) Civilization exclusively belongs to human civilizations. We already stated that civilization is the sum total of institutions. Nevertheless, the sum of the institutions belonging to a particular nation is called national culture (hars). As the sum of the institutions belonging to a religious community is called religion (din), where the civilization stands in relation to these two concepts? According to sociology a civilization could be the sum of the institutions shared commonly by various societies having different cultures and religions. Then, the societies that have different cultures and religions could belong to the same civilization. As the differences in culture could not prevent people adhering to a common religion, the difference in culture and religion cannot form also an obstacle of being the member of a certain civilization. For example, although the Jews and the Japanese do not have the same culture and religion with the Europeans, they both belong to Western civilization. One of the reasons for the issue of civilization to remain indefinite is the assumption that there exists only a single civilization. On the contrary, there exist various civilizations. For example, today, the Australian Aborigines, North American Indians, African tribes, and the peoples of the Pacific (Oceania), all form different spheres of civilizations. During antiquity, there was a particular civilization among the nations living around the Mediterranean Sea: that was Mediterranean civilization. Greek civilization originated from that civilization as Roman civilization originated from the Greek one. Later on, the Roman civilization engendered both to the Oriental and Western civilizations. In East Asia there was another civilization and Chinese, Mongols, Tunguses, and Tibetans still belong to that civilization. Archaeologists can even find and excavate the remains of the ancient civilizations. On the other hand, the ethnologists have discovered that the folk tales, myths, epics, and anecdotes are found in various spheres of civilizations. All this information demonstrates that various spheres of civilization emerged on particular geographical areas and have physical boundaries. For example, a folk tale or a tool is disseminated in a certain geographical area. Because each civilization belongs to a particular system, each civilization has a peculiar logic, a peculiar aesthetics, a peculiar way of life. That is why the civilizations do not mix. Again, for the same reason, if there is a group that does not accept a civilization entirely as a complete system, it cannot adopt some of its aspects. If they do (adopt some aspects), they will not be able to absorb and assimilate them. Just like religion, a civilization must be adopted from inside—not from outside. Civilization is like religion; it is necessary to believe in it totally without any reservation. That is why, the efforts of our Tanzimat reformers failed when they wanted to introduce us to the European civilization. They failed because they only imitated the external aspects of that civilization. Just as the geographical limits of the civilizations are different, so is their historical evolution. These evolutions have a beginning and an end. Nevertheless, the lifespans of the civilizations are longer than those of the national cultures, because their areas are larger. Moreover, when a nation attains the highest stages of its evolution, it is compelled to change its civilization. For example, the Japanese in the last century abandoned East Asian civilization and

82 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic adopted Western civilization. On this issue, we see the most definite evidence in the case of the Turks. During their historical evolution, the Turks successively adopted and lived in three different civilizations. When the Turks were living a stage of ethnic state they belonged to the East Asian civilization. Then in their sultanic period they moved and became part of the Oriental civilization. Today when they entered the age of the nation-state, there exists among them a strong tendency toward adopting Western civilization. We can find the traces of the East Asian civilization among the illiterate people who are still attached to their oral traditions. The Tandırname tradition that continues to live among these people is the remnant of the beliefs that originated from East Asian civilization. The folk tales are the remains of old myths and epics. The comparison between the ancient pre-Islamic Turkish religion and the religion of the East Asian nations would demonstrate the similarity between them. Moreover the influence of the East Asian religions could be seen in our folk tales like Tandırname. These comparative studies would demonstrate the relation between the Turks and the peoples of the Altai or Mongol race. Affiliating the Turks, who were more beautiful and fairer than the Aryans, to the peoples of the yellow race has no scientific base. On the other hand, the linguistic union among the community of nations called Altai race is not yet scientifically proven. Therefore, these ethnic groups which were considered vaguely to form a certain race must belong to the East Asian civilization. Our only connection with the Finno Ugrian, Tungusic, and Mongolian peoples is to have a common history with them in the sphere of East Asian civilization. Moreover, these East Asian peoples lived for a long period of time under our sovereignty. Probably, because of this common history we borrowed vocabulary from each other and have similar words. The Turks entered into the sphere of the Oriental civilization when they adopted Islam as their religion. Because of that many of us consider Oriental civilization as Islamic civilization. As we explained earlier, societies with different religions could become part of the same civilization. Civilization and religion are different systems. Otherwise, there would be no common institutions shared by the nations of different religions. Since religion is constituted by the sacred institutions, creeds, and worship practices, all non-religious institutions like scientific concepts, technical instruments, and aesthetic norms form a separate system. Positive sciences like mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, sociology, and technical skills and fine arts are not related to the religion. No civilization can be affiliated to a religion. As no Christian civilization exists, there is also no Islamic civilization. As we cannot consider the Western civilization a Christian civilization, it is also not correct to label the Oriental civilization as Islamic civilization. Thus, it is necessary to search the origins of the Oriental and Western civilizations elsewhere. Mediterranean civilization was formed in antiquity with the contribution of the ancient Egyptians, Sumerians, Hittites, Assyrians, Phoenicians, and some other ancient peoples. This civilization was perfected by the Greeks and then passed to the Romans. Romans introduced this civilization to the subject peoples of their empire. Afterwards, the Roman Empire was divided into two parts as Western and Eastern Roman empires. This partition was not merely political; it also divided the Mediterranean civilization into two areas as Western and Oriental. Since the Europeans inherited the legacy of the Western Roman Empire, they built their

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 83 civilization on the foundation of Western Rome. On the other hand, Muslim Arabs became the political heirs of the Eastern Roman Empire. When the Eastern Roman civilization was appropriated by the Muslims it took the name of Oriental civilization. In order to prove our theory, let’s now consider briefly the main elements of the Oriental civilization. The earliest forms of Arab architecture are borrowed from the Byzantine architecture. Actually, the Turkish architecture is a fusion of these two architectures. Nevertheless, the Arabs and the Turks did not merely copy the models which they borrowed from other nations. They developed their own peculiar architecture by adding to those foreign styles some new original forms inspired by their religion. This process of indigenization took place under the influence of the piety and national culture of the Arabs and the Turks. Nevertheless, the historians of art agree that early Arabic and Turkish architecture was largely influenced by the Byzantine art. In the East there exists a type of Oriental music that is played by the elite social classes. Farabi borrowed this music from the Byzantines and adapted it to Arabic. This music was liked and adopted by the upper classes of the Arab, Persian, and Turkish peoples, but it did not penetrate to the lower segments of the people. It only remained among the elite. Why Muslim nations failed to achieve any accomplishment in the field of music is similar to what happened in architecture. The popular classes of the Turks created their popular music based on melodies derived from the ancient East Asian civilization. Therefore, Oriental music did not become the national music of any of the people in the Middle East. There is another reason that we cannot call this music Islamic: this music is played equally in the temples of non-Muslim nations like Orthodox nations as well as by Armenians and Jews. As Arabs borrowed the logics, philosophy, natural sciences, and mathematics from Byzantium, they also based their linguistic disciplines such as rhetoric, poetry, grammar, and aesthetical forms on Byzantine examples. Medicine was borrowed from the teachings of Hippocrates and Galen. In sum, the Arabs borrowed all sciences and philosophy from the Byzantines. Then, later on, the Turks—just like the Persians had done—borrowed this knowledge from the Arabs. The independent Arab philosophers were divided into two schools: (a) Peripatetics and (b) Pythagoreans. The first ones were adherents of Aristotle; the second ones followed Plato’s views on philosophy. On the other hand, Muslim religious thinkers also were divided into two schools: the Mutakallimun (theologians) and the Mutasavvıfs (mystics). The Mutekallimun adhered to the atomic philosophies of Democritus and Epicurus; the Mutasavvifs adopted the philosophy of the Alexandrian philosopher Plotin who advocated Neo-Platonism. There were also the disciples and translators of Pythagoras and Zenon. The latter’s adherents were called Riwakiyun (Stoics). Actually, Muhyiddin al-Arabi’s Ayan-i Sabite (Latent Realities) derived from Plato’s philosophy. Moreover metaphysics, ethics, and politics were borrowed from Aristotle’s theories. Books like Ahlak-i Nasiri, Ahlak-i Celali, and Ahlak-i Alai deal with subjects on ethics and politics. These books were totally based on Aristotle’s works. The civilizations of the Eastern Roman Empire and the Western Roman Empire were not much different from each other. During medieval times, as Muslims were not able to transform the Oriental (Eastern Roman) civilization, the Christians also were not able to develop the civilization of the Western Roman Empire.

84 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic We see that during medieval times only two new institutions emerged in Europe. Opera began to be composed in the feudal castles. Whereas in the southern parts of Western Europe, chivalrous knightly love—a novel aesthetics of salon and womencentered artistic fashion—comes into being. The first innovation caused the development of the music which later took the name of the Western (European) music. The quarter tones found in ancient Greek music were abandoned since they were not suitable for opera. At the same time, under the influence of opera, monotonous melodies were abandoned and harmony was introduced into the music. The second reform enabled women to participate in social life without losing their honor and venerability. When Muslims were borrowing customs like seclusion, harems, and wearing a veil from the Christian Byzantium and Zoroastrian Iran, women in Western Europe were entering social life. Thus, during the Middle Ages, there existed such a correlation between Western and Oriental (Eastern) civilizations, except for some differences. For example, in the East there was medieval Islamic architecture; in Europe, a religious architecture called Gothic developed. Moreover, in contradiction to the rational philosophy of the Muslims, scholastic philosophy was taught in European universities. According to free philosophy, the truth is unknown. The task of the philosopher is to discover that unknown truth without depending on tradition. The philosopher would not care even if the truth he discovered was in contradiction with the social norms and traditions. This is because for the philosopher, the truth is more important and useful than anything. In contrast, according to the rational philosophers (hakims), truths were known; this is because the traditions were transmitted and determined truths. The task of a rational philosopher (hakim) is to prove and confirm these already known truths by using rational proofs. Because of this basic difference, rational philosophers did not want to be called as philosophers (feylesof). They considered philosophers to be unbelievers. Equally the church philosophers of the medieval Europe also had the same opinion. In the history of philosophy this system was called “scholastic.” Like Muslim rational philosophers, European scholastic scholars also considered Aristotle as their first master. Both Western and Muslim philosophers considered the aim of rational philosophy as the reconciliation of religion with Aristotelian philosophy. In Europe, the medieval times were ended by the ethical, religious, scientific, and aesthetic revolutions like the Renaissance, Reformation, philosophical innovations, and romanticism. Since these revolutions did not take place in the Islamic world, we still live in the Middle Ages. Therefore, although in Europe the scholastic philosophy has ended, in the Islamic world we are still under the influence of that philosophy. What is the reason for the separation of the paths followed by the Eastern and Western worlds, although for many centuries they followed the same path? On this issue, the historians point out many reasons. But since we strongly believed in the accuracy of the sociology, we would base our argument on sociology: The rise of the population in the European cities engendered the multiplication of the division of labor and social functions. Specialized professions and specialists came into being. With the specialization individualism has emerged among the people. The nature of the souls has changed. That fundamental revolution created a new people who had different soul, had different ideologies and logics. The old frames could not contain the new life emerging from the souls of these new people. Then, they were

 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) 85 broken and smashed. Thus, the new soul now freed and liberated spread its renovating force everywhere. As a result of that great achievements and progress came into being. The great industry was born, and it became the trademark of contemporary civilization. In contrast, in the East, none of cities had high social cohesion. The big cities were not homogenous. They lacked the necessary means of communication and did not possess spiritual cohesion. As a result of these deprivations, no division of labor, no specialization, no individual character, and no great industry could emerge in the East. Since they do not possess a new soul and a new life, Oriental nations could not carry their civilization beyond its medieval stage. This is due to the law of immobility; that is, when a reason does not exert an impact, the object remains unchanged. However, while Western and Central Europe had freed themselves from the Middle Ages, the Orthodox nations in Eastern Europe were still under the influence of the medieval civilization. Until the reign of the Peter the Mad (Great) (r. 1682–1725), the Russians remained within Oriental civilization. Peter the Great experienced many difficulties in taking the Russians from a medieval civilization and introducing them to Western civilization. In order to understand what kind of methods must be applied for a nation to move from Oriental to Western civilization, it is necessary and sufficient to study the history of Peter the Great’s reforms. Although the Russian nation appeared to be incapable of making the change, it was radically transformed and progressed after Peter’s forcible reforms. There is not enough evidence to show that Oriental civilization prevents progress; in contrast, Western civilization encourages the advancement. We already affirmed that the division of labor is the foundation of European civilization. The division of labor not only created separate professions in Europe but also created the division of the individual disciplines and branches in the field of science and caused the specialization of the scientists in their area. In the fine arts also, the division took place, and different arts exercised previously by one artist now became the different specializations. As political forces are divided into three functions—legislative, judiciary, and executive—political and religious organizations also are divided into three categories. The implementation of the labor division benefited the administration of justice. Moreover economic, scientific, and artistic activities also have improved. Therefore, the Muslim nations that were militarily and economically on even ground with the European powers or even more advanced than the latter gradually began to lose their power. That situation was due to the progress achieved by the Europeans thanks to their division of labor. To be able to enter into a military and political struggle both societies must be equipped with the similar weapons. Europeans, thanks to their progress in industry, were able to manufacture powerful and formidable war instruments like tanks, armored vehicles, planes, dreadnought, and submarines. In contrast, to fight them, we were able to use only old type artillery and rifles. Thus, the Islamic world would not be able to resist against Europe. How would we be able to defend our religion and the independence of our homeland? In the face of these dangers which threaten our religion and our homeland, there is only one way of salvation. That way is the advancement in science and industry and catching up with the Europeans in these fields. Moreover, we should also improve our military and justice systems and reach the level of the European states in these areas; thus, we would be equal to them in civilization. To achieve that goal, there is only one way: that is to

86 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic adopt totally the European civilization. The Tanzimatists understood the necessity of that measure and attempted to adopt the European civilization. But, they only partially adopted the European institutions. That is why they did not succeed in establishing a real university nor were they able to form a compact judicial organization. This is because the Tanzimatists changed our consumer culture—including our food choices and dress habits—and they Europeanized the architecture and furniture before modernizing national production. That is why our national arts have disappeared. Despite that, not even a nucleus of a European model industry was formed. This happened due to having started the reforms before sufficiently examining Western models and not having an established ideal and a well-determined plan. This resulted in taking half-measures in every task. The greatest mistake of the Tanzimatists was to create a combination of culture by mixing Oriental and Western civilizations. They could not imagine that these two civilizations that are opposed to each other and whose systems are based on totally different ideals could not be amalgamated. The duality that still exists in our political corpus is a consequence of this misguided project: two types of courts, two types of education, two types of taxation, two types of types, two types of laws. These dualities are countless. Although the medrese (theological school) and secular school constitute a duality, in every school there also existed further dualities. An exclusively European type of education existed only in the Harbiye (military school) and Tıbbiye (medical school). Thanks to that, today we have great military leaders, who saved the life of our nation and our independence, and we have great medical doctors, who saved our individual lives. The reason that these two schools were able to produce specialists who were equivalent to their European counterparts was that no dual system existed in the Harbiye and Tıbbiye. Would we have today’s glorious commanders and famous doctors if the military science of the Janissaries and the medical science of the Hekimbaşı (the chief physician of the sultan) had been taught in these schools?

4

Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935)

Biography Yusuf Akçura was born on December 2, 1876, in Simbir (Ulyanovsk), Russia. He belonged to an aristocratic and wealthy Tatar family. His father, Hasan Bey, owned a textile factory. His mother was Bibi Kamer Banu Hanım. The young Yusuf lost his father at the age of two. In 1883, the family moved to Istanbul. His mother married Dağıstanlı Osman Bey. His stepfather showed particular interest in Yusuf ’s upbringing and education and wanted him to become a soldier. Akçura went to Kuleli İdadi (Military High School). In 1895, he entered the military academy. In that institution, Akçura was influenced by the writings of the Turkist and nationalist intellectuals like Necib Asım Yazıksız, Veled Celebi, Bursalı Tahir, and most importantly by the articles of İsmail Gaspıralı that appeared in the Tercüman newspaper published in Crimea, Russia. In 1897, his first article was published in the Turkish journal Malumat. Later, Akçura was exiled to Fizan in southern Libya as a result of his intellectual and political activities. In 1899, he arrived at Tripoli and was jailed there. After spending some time in prison, he was released but confined to remain in the city. In the same year Akçura escaped to France together with his friend Ahmed Ferit Bey. After arriving at France, he entered the School of Political Science in Paris. In 1903, Yusuf Akçura graduated from that school. His graduation thesis was on “The Institutions of the Ottoman State.” Later, he traveled to Kazan, Russia, and stayed with his uncle there. In Kazan, he taught history, geography, and Ottoman Turkish literature for four years. Meanwhile, his anonymous articles were published in the newspapers such as Meşveret and Şura yi Ümmet. Around that time, Yusuf Akçura had already expounded his views on Turkism vis-à-vis Ottomanism and Islamism in a long article called “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Political Systems). It was published in the April–May 1904 issue of the Egyptian journal Türk. Akçura compared Turkism with Ottomanism and Islamism and came to the conclusion that the only viable ideology for the Ottoman Empire was Turkism. According to Akçura, the efforts of the Tanzimat statesmen to create an Ottoman nation had failed because both Muslim and non-Muslim elements of the empire had rejected the idea. He did not completely reject Islamism, but he considered it less appropriate for the rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire than Turkism.1 The success of Islamism, declared Akçura, was limited because of the hostility of the Western powers to this ideology. Indeed, since most of these European imperialists had Muslim colonial subjects and most of the existing Muslim states were under their control, Western nations would strongly oppose the adoption of an Islamist policy by the Ottoman Empire which, as

88 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic a major Muslim power, could affect the loyalty of their colonial Muslim subjects. In 1905, together with some other Turkist intellectuals like Ismail Gaspiralı, Ali Merdan Bey, and Abdürreşid Kadı İbrahimof, he founded a political association in Kazan called the Union of Russia’s Muslims. After the declaration of the constitution in the Ottoman Empire, Yusuf Akçura went to Istanbul. Here, he started a newspaper called Kazan Muhbiri. He also taught history in Darülfünun (university) and the Mülkiye. On December 25, 1908, he participated in the setting up of the Türk Derneği (Turkish Association) and after the closure of that association, he was among those who founded the Türk Yurdu association. In 1916, Akçura traveled to many European countries to campaign for the rights of the Turkic peoples in Russia. In 1918, as a representative of the Red Crescent he traveled to Russia for the release of the Ottoman prisoners of war there. In 1919, after returning to Istanbul he again became politically active and joined the Turkish National Party. As a result, he was arrested by the British. In 1920, after his release from the prison he got married to Selma Hanim, who was the sister-in-law of his friend Ahmed Ferid. He later traveled to Ankara and joined the National Liberation Movement. In Ankara, he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1923 he was elected to the Parliament as the deputy of Istanbul. Between April 8, 1932, and March 11, 1935, he served as the president of the Turkish Historical Association. Also, in 1933, he was appointed as the professor of political history at Istanbul University. Yusuf Akçura died in Istanbul on March 11, 1935, following a heart attack. The following passages are taken from Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Type of Policies) published by Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society) (Istanbul: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1998).

Three Types of Policies In the Ottoman Empire, different political paths were considered, since the desire for progress and development was inspired by the West. The first one was to form an Ottoman nation by uniting diverse nationalities found under the authority of the Ottoman government. The second one was to unite all Muslims under the authority of the Ottoman government, since the caliphate is represented by the Ottoman sultans. Finally, the third one was to form a Turkish nation based on racial unity. The first and second of these ideas played important roles in the general policy of the Ottoman Empire. The third idea was only encountered in the writings of some intellectuals. The idea of constituting an Ottoman nation was not inspired by lofty aims and high expectations. The real objective was to form an Ottoman nation like the American nation of the United States of America by an intermingling of various nationalities despite their religious and racial differences and to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. In order to realize this objective, it was necessary to grant the same rights and a complete religious freedom to the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples living in the Ottoman Empire and establish a full equality among them. Although such an ideology would unite all nationalities and, therefore, strengthen the Ottoman state

 Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) 89 where Muslims and Turks formed the majority, it was not particularly appealing for all Muslims and Turks worldwide. Muslims and Turks living outside of the empire were not really interested in this idea. The policy of creating an Ottoman nation was first considered during the reign of Mahmud II (r. 1808–39). This sultan has said: “I want to recognize the religious differences among my people only in their places of worship.” In the nineteenth century, it was totally natural for this policy to be considered plausible and applicable in the Ottoman Empire. The French Revolution brought new ideas on nationalism. According to these ideas, a nation should be based on political will rather than on race and ethnicity. Sultan Mahmud II and his successors believed in that idea, but they did not fully grasp it. They thought that it would be possible to form a single nation by granting equal rights and freedom to various peoples of the empire belonging to different races and religions. Some examples found in Europe further increased their faith in this model. The French nation was formed by a fusion of Germanic, Celtic, Latin, and Greek and some other ethnic groups. The Slavic element was absorbed into the German nation. Switzerland became a nation despite its differences in race and religion. The same Ottoman rulers and statesmen were encouraged by the national unification movements of the Germans and Italians. The creation of the German and Italian national states convinced the Ottoman reformers of the validity of the Ottomanist ideology. The idea of Ottomanism became prevalent during the times of the Ali and Fuad Pashas. Napoleon III (the emperor of France) was the chief advocate of the idea of forming nations by plebiscite, and he was the utmost supporter of these Westernized pashas. The French-inspired reform movements during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–76) and the establishment of the Lycée de Galatasaray (Mekteb-i Sultani) were the results of this policy. The idea of Ottomanism lost its strongest supporter when France and its emperor, Napoleon III, were defeated by the Germans in 1870. The German victory has shown that the idea of nationality based on the racial unity was a more successful model than the French system. Actually, Midhat Pasha was, to a certain extent, the follower of Ali and Fuad Pashas. But Midhat Pasha’s program was more temporary and complicated. The program of the Young Ottomans, whose ideas are closer to those of Midhat Pasha, was vague and indefinite. I think that the dream of constituting an Ottoman nation is now defunct, just as the French empire. They may both be resurrected in the future. After the failure of the policy of Ottomanism, the idea of Islamism gained currency. This idea, which is called pan-Islamism by the Europeans, is derived from the ideas of the Young Ottoman thinkers. Initially, the Young Ottoman thinkers centered their ideology on the concepts of vatan (homeland) and Osmanlılık (Ottomanism). Subsequently, they increasingly shifted their position toward Islamism. They stayed in Europe and studied Western political ideas thoroughly. That had an important influence over their views. Those Young Ottoman thinkers had already studied the works of the French Enlightenment thinkers of the late eighteenth century when they returned home in the East. Nevertheless, they were not able to comprehend the importance of the race and religion here. Moreover, they failed to understand that nationalities living under Ottoman rule do not wish to form such a union as an Ottoman nation. The time has passed to constitute such a commonwealth, and the French theory of the nationalism was not applicable to the East. In Europe, they

90 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic had a better view and understanding of their country’s problems, looked at from a distance. Finally, they understood the importance of race and religion in the East and the uselessness of creating an Ottoman nation. Subsequently, their objectives changed. Now they put all their energy first to uniting the Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire; as a second step, they would extend this union to all Muslims of the world. Their motto had become, “Religion and nationality is the same thing.” Their aim was to create a single nation out of the all Muslims. This policy would inevitably create divisions among the Ottoman citizens. This is because this policy excluded Christian Ottoman subjects from that union. The Christians living in the Ottoman Empire would not be considered as Ottomans anymore. On the other hand, it would create another union and fusion of the world’s Muslims. This policy was larger than the previous one. It was global. This idea was first expressed in the press. Then its exponents wanted to implement it. In the last years of Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–76), the word “pan-Islamism” was frequently heard in diplomatic conversations. The Porte tried to establish diplomatic relations with some Muslim Asian rulers. After the fall of Midhat Pasha, when the idea of forming an Ottoman nation was finally abandoned, pan-Islamist policy continued to be implemented by Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909). Although this sultan was a fierce opponent of the Young Ottomans, he was, to a certain extent, their political follower. The Young Ottoman intellectuals had already taken a hostile attitude toward the Christian subjects of the Porte, after understanding that the latter would not stay under Ottoman rule—even if full equality and political freedom were granted to them. Sultan Abdülhamid II’s current policy was very similar to that of the Young Ottomans after they shifted their policy to Islamism. The current Ottoman ruler prefers to use the title of “caliph” rather than “padişah” (sultan). Islamic religion plays a very important role in his general policy. In the official schools program, the hours reserved for religious education was increased. The whole educational program needed to be Islamized. Piousness became a very important factor for gaining favor from the caliph-sultan. The Yıldız Palace became the abode of religious teachers (hocas), Muslim clerics (imam), descendants of the Prophet (seyyids), and holy men (serifs). Some of these religious men with turban were appointed to the administrative positions. Preachers were sent everywhere to instruct people to be religious as well as to obey the sultan and to hate the non-Muslims. Mosques and religious convents (tekkes) were built everywhere. Dilapidated ones were repaired. Pilgrims (hacıs) gained importance. In every pilgrimage season, those who traveled to Mecca on pilgrimage were hosted in the caliph-sultan’s palace, received financial aid, and were honored by the sultan. Recently, some political and religious envoys were sent to the interior of Africa and China to visit Muslims in these places. The government has started to build the Hijaz railway as the most important instrument of that policy. With this policy, the Ottoman state had become a theocratic state—a regime which the Porte abandoned during the Tanzimat Period (1839–76). Then the Ottoman state was obliged to abandon freedom of thought, political freedom, and equality: equality between races and religious groups, political equality, and civil equality. Ending European-style constitutional government would necessarily encourage hostilities and animosities between various nationalities living under Ottoman rule. These hostilities

 Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) 91 between different religious and ethnic groups naturally caused the increase of the rebellions against the Porte and also contributed to the rise of the enmity against the Turks and Muslims in Europe. The idea of forming a Turkish political nationality based on race is actually quite recent. I do not think that this idea ever existed in the Ottoman state or in any other previous Turkish states. The historian Leon Cahun, who is sympathetic to the Mongols, argued that Genghis Khan, who conquered all of Asia, had the aim of uniting all Turkic peoples; however, this idea cannot be proved. Moreover, in the Tanzimat and Young Ottoman ideologies, I have not encountered any reason to believe that the idea of uniting all Turks ever existed. It is possible that the late Vefik Pasha had some fantasy about that issue by using pure Turkish in his writings. On the one hand, rather than forming a political movement, recently the idea of forming a distinct Turkish nationality is cherished in some intellectual circles. The development of OttomanGerman relations and the study of the German language and history by the Turkish youth have definitely played a decisive role in the development of intellectual circles that nurtured Turkism. This is because in these intellectual circles a new approach exists that is rather different from the French one. Participants in these new circles adopt a meticulous scientific approach to study the issues, which contrasts with the eloquent and pompous French literary style. Şemseddin Sami and Mehmet Emin, who wrote the Poems in Turkish, along with Necib Asım, Veled Celebi, and Hasan Tahsin, are the most well-known members of that circle. To a certain extent, the journal İkdam also supports their ideas. Since the current government does not condone their ideas, this movement is progressing very slowly. I do not know if there are other supporters of this ideology in the Ottoman Empire outside Istanbul. The ideology of Turkism is also spread worldwide, like Islamism; it is not confined within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, we also have to consider the parts of the planet inhabited by the Turkic peoples. I think the idea of a Turkic union is quite popular among the Turks of Russia. The newly born Idil literature is more Turkish than Islamic. If there is no pressure outside of Turkist ideology, it would develop more easily in Turkistan and in the Idil and Yayık regions, rather than in the Ottoman lands. This idea is also present among the Turks of Caucasus. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is under influences coming from the Caucasus. But I do not know to what extent the view of pan-Turkism is supported by the Turks of northern Iran. The idea of forming a nation based on a racial unity is still very young. Now, let’s examine which one of these three ideologies would be the most beneficial and applicable. We said beneficial, but beneficial for whom and for what? First of all, what is beneficial for all of humanity? Here we have to describe all the political systems beneficial for humanity. Then it is necessary to prove that the application of a particular system would benefit all humanity. We have to demonstrate the similarity between these three ideologies (Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism) and some future ideologies that could serve the interests of all of humanity. Today this is something impossible to achieve, because this kind of ideology has yet to be discovered. Instead of following that method, if we apply one of these three ideologies exclusively to the Turks and Muslims, the result would not be satisfactory. This is because the rest of the humanity would not benefit from that choice. We have to limit

92 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic the problem to a group of people, a particular society. Again, we encounter a universal problem. What are the interests of a particular society? Unless we answer that question, we cannot determine for certain which political ideology would be beneficial for which society. Determining the interests of a particular society is a political problem. Because this is so, it is one of the important issues of an incomplete science whose subject and methods have yet to be clearly determined. Scholars are divided regarding which method to apply in order to solve the problems of political science. One group is in favor of the deductive method; the other group argues for the inductive method. According to the former group, political principles are formed from ideas and are like mathematical axioms. For this group, statesmen and bureaucrats only have to apply these principles to the society in the same way that an architect applies geometrical rules. Those in the latter group argue that societies are continuously developing and that societies create the rules and principles that they obey during their evolution. Therefore, they say, political science without setting an imaginary aim for human activities must deduce historical and social principles from historical events, and it should not overlook geographical factors, social conditions, and the ambitions of a particular society. This fundamental conflict in the methodology of political science actually prevents finding a categorical solution to problems related to that science. Although much debated by the sociologists, identifying the real interests of particular human societies remains undecided. Despite this uncertainty, every society undergoes constant change in order to obtain its own goals. The social issue mentioned above has actually been solved all the time in every place. What is created during this period of constant change as the primary interest is in fact life. Since life continues with the force, the existence of the life depends on the existence of the force. Therefore, every society finds its interest in life, or in increasing its force or gaining more power. That is why there exists a constant fight or struggle among societies—just like there is among all elements of the cosmos. Then, we have to accept that form of solution. The interest of every society is actually being able to exist and consequently being strong. However, for which society’s interests should we be working for? There is no a logical answer to that question. Actually, we have to work for the interests of the Turks and Muslims but not for those of Slavs or Orthodox peoples. Since the interests of one nation are obtained at the expense of other nations, how we can justify the rightfulness of our theory when we would be harming a portion of the rest of humanity? This question can only be answered by our emotions. We can say, since I am an Ottoman Turkish Muslim, I only want to serve the interests of the Ottoman state, Muslims, and Turks. However, do these three groups (Ottomans, Muslims, and Turks) share the same interests? Does strengthening one of these three groups benefit the other two? The interests of the Ottoman state are not against the interests of all Muslims and Turks. If the Ottoman Empire became more powerful, its Muslim subjects would benefit from that. Moreover, other non-Ottoman Muslims and Turks would also benefit from that since they would find in the Ottoman state a powerful protector. Nevertheless, the interests of Islam are not totally the same as the interests of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkic world. Since the time Islam gained power inside the Ottoman Empire, some of Ottoman subjects— the non-Muslims—would secede from the empire; thus, the Ottoman Empire would

 Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) 93 lose some of its territory. On the other hand, the interests of the Turkic world also would not be completely the same as those of the Ottoman state—nor with the Islamic world. This is because the development of the Turkic world would prepare the ground for the division of the Ottoman Empire into Turk and non-Turk parts and thus weaken the empire. Therefore, a person belonging to these three groups (Ottoman, Muslim, and Turkish) should work for the interest of the Ottoman state. Nevertheless, which one of these three policies (Ottomanism, Turkism, and Islamism) would ensure the strengthening and the development of the Ottoman Empire? And which one of these ideologiesis applicable in the Ottoman Empire? The formation of an Ottoman nation is the only solution for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire within its current boundaries. But is maintaining its current geographical position the real interest of the Ottoman Empire? When the Ottoman nation would be formed, a mixed nation with the equal rights would come into being. With the idea of a common homeland, the nationalities living under Ottoman rule would be fused with each other. This would put an end to the fights and conflicts among them; but in that process, Turks and Arabs would lose their identities like the Greeks and Armenians had; eventually, all these ethnic groups would be assimilated and cease to exist as independent ethnicities. For the Ottoman Turks who were the founders of the Ottoman state, to make them content, it would be enough for them to see that the empire that was established and expanded by the efforts of their ancestors at least had remained intact and had not been dismembered. They might even stay away from the Ottoman name. Eventually—when the old subject peoples gain political power in that new state—even the Ottoman name would be removed from the official name of the state. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Turks could continue to exert power for some time in the near future. When it comes to the Muslims of the Ottoman nation, they may acquire political power since they form the majority in the new state and are able to establish hegemony over the other religious groups. However, since a full religious equality would not have been established and diverse groups living in that state would not yet be fully fused and amalgamated, their hegemony could engender new religious and political tensions and conflicts between the Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of that new state. Even the influence and power of the Muslims and Turks would remain limited within the new state, and the Ottoman state would still remain powerful. Our real issue is the strength and power of the state. That power would surely increase. Unlike a disintegrated state whose population consisted of diverse ethnicities that were constantly in conflict with each other, the population of that new state would be united as a bloc and that would assure the continuity of that state. Nevertheless, the most important issue concerns whether or not it would be possible to bring together and amalgamate ethnic groups that have been in constant conflict and warfare until now. As discussed earlier, that experience (in the form of Ottomanism) has resulted in failure. In order to understand whether or not in the future such a fusion could be successful or not, first we have to understand the reasons for failure in the past. The first reason is that the Muslims and particularly the Ottoman Turks did not wish such a fusion and integration. Because then their hegemony of 600 years would end and they would be considered equal with those reaya (subject peoples) whom they were accustomed to considering as inferior. One result of that equality would be to

94 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic accept the non-Muslim peoples into the military and bureaucracy. In contrast, in the past these professions were exclusively reserved to Muslims. Then, the Muslims would also be merchants and craftsmen, something that the latter have always despised in the past. Second, the Muslims do not want this. This is because this religion is deeply concerned with the welfare of its adherents; from the spiritual and material point of view, it does not accept complete legal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Islam considers non-Muslims as second-class citizens. When it comes to freedom, Islam is the most liberal and freedom-loving of all religions. Since it is a religion and its origins are not human but divine, it can only accept absolute realities. That is, Islam cannot accept any other rules and principles unless they are supported by its religious principles. Therefore, Islam cannot accept complete freedom of thought and religious freedom. Third, non-Muslim communities also do not wish such a fusion because all of these communities have glorious pasts. They have had independent states and governments. Recently, these communities achieved important progress in many fields. Muslims— particularly Turks—curtailed their freedom and destroyed their states. According to non-Muslims, under Ottoman rule they experienced mostly oppression rather than justice; insult and offence rather than equality; and harshness and torment rather than comfort and tranquility. They say that even their honor has also been violated. During the nineteenth century, on the one hand, the non-Muslim nations had learned about their past, their current situation, their rights, and differences between nationalities; on the other hand, the master of these non-Muslim nations, the Ottoman Empire, became weaker. As a result, some of these nations have gained their independence. During that time their weakened sovereign, the Ottoman government, offered a peaceful solution to them. The Porte proposed to share political power with its non-Muslim subjects and also declared to give full legal equality to that latter group. The non-Muslim subject nations that have now become stronger now knew very well that the intention of the Ottoman government was sincere. Nevertheless, they also knew very well that these concessions were given to them partially under the pressure of the Western powers. However, the interest of some of the non-Muslims was actually the formation of the Ottoman nation. But they were mostly under the influence of their emotions rather than following their logical thinking. None of these were non-Muslim groups, but none of them actually wanted to form a new nation by fusing with a people that had conquered them in the past. Fourth, Russia, which is the greatest enemy of the Ottomans and its satellites—the small Balkan states—also did not want the formation of such a fusion. This is because Russia wanted to possess the Straits, Anatolia, Iraq, Istanbul, and the Balkans and also the Holy Land (Palestine). Thus, Russia wanted to reach its political, economic, national, and religious goals. By controlling the Straits, Russia would secure a safe harbor for its navy and would have free access to the Mediterranean Sea, which is one of the most important international commercial waterways. Subsequently, from that fortified position, Russian forces could threaten British trade routes to India by attacking British trade vessels and warships. By doing that, Russia would be able to encircle and blockade India, which it has coveted for a long time because of its western flank. By possessing Anatolia, Russia would control the most fertile and bountiful land

 Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) 95 in the world. By descending on Iraq, it would control all of western Asia and be a presence at the gates of India. Then, Russia would upset the balance in its favor for having hegemony over the Islamic world including Islam’s holy lands. By controlling the Straits and acquiring most of the Ottoman territories in Asia, Russia would obtain a lot of political and economic gains. By annexing the Balkans to its empire, Russia would unite the northern and southern Slavs. The ultimate aim of the tsar is to erect the Orthodox cross on the dome of Hagia Sophia and control the Church of the Holy Sepulcher where their religion was born. These achievements would also enable Russia to attain religious aims of its pious Orthodox population. The realization of these goals depends on the weakening of the Ottoman state and the continuation of a constant conflict among the various ethnic groups living in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Russia would never consent to the formation of an Ottoman nation. On the other hand, Serbian and Greek states would like to increase their territory at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and its population by bringing more of their kinfolk under their rule. To realize that, the Ottoman Empire would need to be in a state of disintegration. Finally, some Europeans also do not desire the formation of such a nation. This is because the Europeans still have a Crusader mentality and see things from the perspective of Muslim-Christian religious conflict. The ultimate goal of these Christian Europeans is to liberate the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire from Muslim rule and to drive the infidels out of Holy Christian lands (Jerusalem). Some Europeans consider this issue from a scientific and humanitarian point of view; they want to expel the Turanian people from Europe and send them to the steppes of Asia, where they are from. By doing so, they would be liberating talented and progressive European nations from the yoke of these semi-barbarians. Due to these five reasons, the Ottoman nation would be formed despite the opposition of all ethnic groups living in the Ottoman Empire and despite the hostility expressed to such an idea by the European public. The supporters of such a project were a limited group of Ottoman statesmen. They were mostly supported by French Emperor Napoleon III and his government. Nevertheless, the realization of that project was quite difficult. Consequently, it ended with failure. Meanwhile, foreign opposition has increased. The policies of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) have exacerbated the hostility and opposition among the Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans. Russia gained power and became more dangerous for the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan nations of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro became stronger. European public opinion turned against the Turks. France, which was the greater supporter of the policy of Ottoman nation, lost its previous power and prestige from the time of the Paris Treaty of 1856 and entered into the Russian orbit. Consequently, both inside and outside the country, general opposition to this idea rose up. Therefore, in my view, trying to form an Ottoman nation is now a useless and futile endeavor. Now, let’s answer the question whether the idea of an Islamic union is beneficial or not to the Ottoman Empire. As mentioned earlier, the implementation of this policy would cause increased hostility among the various ethno-religious group of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire could lose the territory inhabited by its non-Muslim subjects and would lose its former strength. Even the Turks could be divided into two groups as Muslims and non-Muslims. Nevertheless, despite these

96 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic inconveniences, all Muslims including Turks—because they are Muslims—would be united by a strong bond and would form a powerful community within the Ottoman Empire. That religious union would put them in a stronger position vis-à-vis the other non-Muslim Ottomans—despite Muslims’ economic weakness. More importantly, the formation of such a pan-Muslim union would create a powerful cultural bloc similar to those of the Germanic, Slavic, and Latin peoples and perhaps similar to the one formed by the yellow race. But, this goal is still far away, and its realization requires time. Today, Muslims can start to lay the foundations of that bloc by establishing mutual relations on religious basis among various Muslim nations. Eventually a very powerful global power would come into being in a spiritual and religious bloc encompassing most of the Asia and half of Africa. However, is it possible to implement such a policy within the Ottoman Empire with success? Islam is a religion that also regulates political and social issues. One of the fundamental principles of Islam is: “Religion and nation are one.” Islam would aim to erase the ethnic origins and the nationalities of its followers. It aims to eliminate their language and destroy their ethnic traditions and banish their past into oblivion. Islam is such a strong mortar that it cements the peoples of various nationalities and races together to form a uniform Muslim having equal rights with his coreligionists. When Islam came into being, it already had a strong political organization. The constitution of that policy was the Qur’an. The official language was Arabic. It had an elected leader and holy political center (capital). However, the changes that occurred in other religions could also have taken place in Islam. Under some ethnic and racial factors and due to some historical events, the political union of Islam partially came to an end. Barely a century after the Hijra of the Prophet Muhammad to Medina in 622 AD, Islamic unity was broken as a result of the antagonism between the Arabs and the Persians and the enmity between the Hashimiyya and Umayyad dynasties. That enmity created the deep rift between the Sunnis and the Shias. Later on, Turks, Berbers, and some other ethnicities also caused more division in Islam. This is because they also kept alive their ethnic culture and had national ambitions. In the East as well as in the West, the Islamic empire was dismembered into various small states. Although the caliphate survived as a religious leadership, in every part of the Islamic world, many small sultanates, emirates, and principalities emerged as the Islamic political unity was utterly shattered. Later on, a second and then a third caliphate were established. The unity of language ended when Persian became as important as Arabic. With the passing of time, the power of Islam descended to its nadir, and an important part of the Islamic world came under the rule of the Christian states. Islamic unity was destroyed. Recently, under the influence of Western ideologies, the extreme ethnic sentiments that Islam could not totally eradicate emerged among the Muslim peoples. Nevertheless, despite all these events, Islam is still very strong. The lack of religiosity did not yet affect Muslim lands; most Muslims are still very devout and zealous believers who are ready for every sacrifice to defend their religion. Although the new legislations of some Muslim states are no longer totally derived from the sharia, the essence of their laws is still based on Islamic principles. In these states Arabic is the only religious language. Besides that, Arabic is also the literary and scientific language of many countries. In many places, Arabic education still continues. Thus today, Islamic civilization still maintains its unity.

 Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) 97 Today, every Muslim, before saying “I am a Turk or Iranian,” first says, “Thank God I am a Muslim.” Today, the majority of Muslims in the world still recognize the Ottoman ruler (hakan) as the caliph. Today, all Muslims turn their faces to holy Mecca five times per day for prayer. They also travel to Mecca to rub their faces against Kaaba and to kiss Hajar el-Esved (the holy black stone). Without hesitation, we can affirm that Islam is still very strong. The internal obstacles for the policy of Islamic union could easily be surmounted. However, external obstacles are very strong. Indeed, on the one hand, almost all Muslim countries are under European influence; on the other hand, many Christian states, with some exceptions, have Muslim colonial subjects. These Western Christian states would try to prevent at all cost the attachment of their Muslim subjects to some political centers outside their borders. They consider that attachment against their interest. These states can do that, thanks to their influence over Muslims states. Therefore, because of these European interventions, even the Ottoman Empire, which is the strongest of the Muslim states today, is not able to implement a pan-Islamist policy. When it comes to the benefits found in the policy of Turkic union, the Turks living in the Ottoman lands would unite not only with strong racial but also with religious bonds, and other non-Turkish ethnicities that were Turkified to a certain extent would also consider themselves as Turkish and join that union. That policy could also Turkify other non-Turkish ethnic groups. But the most important achievement of this policy would be the unification of all Turkic peoples who inhabited most of the Asian continent and Eastern Europe. This ethnic union would create a powerful political force and nationality. Because the Turks of the Ottoman Empire are the most developed and progressive of the Turks in the world, their state would play a leading role in that pan-Turkic union. Thus, a new Turkic world would emerge between the worlds of the white and yellow races, and the Ottoman Empire would assume the role that Japan has among the yellow race. Besides its benefits, the Turkist policy can also create some detrimental and undesired effects for the Ottoman Empire. This policy can further alienate the non-Turkish ethnicities and cause their secession from the empire. It can also divide the Muslims of the empire as Turks and non-Turks and weaken the political unity of the state. The internal difficulties of the pan-Turkic policy are greater than the pan-Islamist policy. However, under Western influence nationalist ideas have started to diffuse among the Turks. This idea (Turkism) is still in its infancy in the Ottoman Empire. The ideas of Turkism, Turkish literature, and the pan-Turkism have just been born. The idea of Turkism is not nurtured by all these feelings and emotions and an already existing organization that has existed in Islam. Today, most Turks have forgotten their past. However, we should also take into consideration that almost all Turks who are united today are Muslim. Therefore, Islam can serve as an important catalyzer to constitute a greater Turkic nationality. Today, those who describe nationality consider religion as a very important constituent factor. In order to prepare the ground for the formation of a united Turkic nation, Islam should transform itself like Christianity did. The historical evolution of the Christian religion eventually allowed the formation of independent nations within the Christian community. Today, this change became an absolute necessity. The current political ideas of our times are based on the races. Religions are increasingly losing their political and social importance and becoming personal. In modern societies, freedom of

98 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic religion is replacing the idea of religious solidarity. The religions abandoned their secondary functions and have become the guides of the hearts and souls. They have become a spiritual link between the Creator and the creature. Therefore, religions can only maintain their political and social importance by uniting themselves with the races and serving the races. In the realization of the pan-Turkic policy, external obstacles are less strong in comparison to ones that stand against the Islamist policy. Because of the Christian states, only Russia has Turkish Muslim subjects. Therefore, Russia is the only state that would try to prevent the realization of a Turkic union. When it comes to the other Christian states, they would even support a pan-Turkic policy to weaken Russia. From these considerations, we can reach the following conclusion: although it could have some benefits for the Ottoman state, the creation of an Ottoman nation is practically impossible. On the other hand, the policies that aim for the unification of the Turks and Muslims have some advantages but also some disadvantages. Given this situation, which policy should we opt for? When I first looked at the Türk newspaper, I hoped that I could answer to that question. I also thought that my answer would be, we should opt for the policy of Turkism. Nevertheless, I saw that the “Turk,” whose rights must be defended and whose ideas must be cherished, is actually the Western Turk who is the subject in Ottoman Empire. The members of the great racial group that inhabited an important part of Asia, Europe, and Africa—from Beijing to Montenegro and from the Timur peninsula to Africa—are not counted as Turk. Turks only know the Turks of the Ottoman Empire, and they only know (about them) since the fourteenth century through French sources. The Turk wants to defend the rights of his fellow citizens who belong to various ethnic groups and religions, Muslims and non-Muslims. He wants to defend his fellow citizens against foreign states. For the Turk, the military, political, and cultural past of the Turkish nation is limited to the acts and deeds of Sultan Murad I the Hüdevandigar (1362–89), Sultan Mehmed II Fatih (r. 1451–81), Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20), and to Ibn Kemal (1468–1536), Nefi (1575–1635), Baki (1526–1600), Evliya Celebi (1611–82), and Namık Kemal (1840–88). His vision of Turkism does not include Oghuz Khan (mythic figure), Genghis Khan (r. 1206–27), Timur (r. 1369–1406), Uluğ Beg (1394–1449), Farabi (878–950), İbn Sina (980–1037), Taftazani (1322–90), and Ali Şir Nevai (1441–1501). Once in a while, Islamism follows the policy of the caliphate. Since all Turks who would be united are Muslims, one would think that the Turks would support both Islamist and Turkist policies. Nevertheless, the Turks remain indecisive. Consequently, the question still remains unanswered: Is Turkism or Islamism better, more applicable, and more beneficial for the Ottoman Empire?

5

Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939)

Biography Ahmed Ağaoğlu was born in 1869 in the town of Susa, Karabagh, Azerbaijan, which was a part of the Russian Empire. In 1884, after finishing middle school, he continued his studies at the Russian high school in Susa. Later, he went to Tiflis to finish his gymnasium. In 1887, Ağaoğlu traveled to Saint Petersburg and was admitted to the Polytechnic Institute there. At the Polytechnic, the young Ağaoğlu experienced some discrimination from a teacher and decided to leave Russia for Europe. At the same time, an affliction that affected his eyes might have contributed to his decision to end his studies at the Polytechnic. In January 1888, Ağaoğlu arrived in Paris. At first, his lack of French language skill was a handicap. Nevertheless, that did not discourage him. He started to learn French and began to devour French books to improve his knowledge. In Paris, Ağaoğlu studied at École Pratiques des Hautes Études and came under the influence of the famous French thinker Ernest Renan. He also wrote many articles under the title “La Societe Persane” for the periodical La Nouvelle Revue that was published from 1891 to 1893. Later, in 1894 after completing his studies in France and upon hearing of the death of his father, Ahmed Ağaoğlu returned to Caucasus. First, he taught French at a gymnasium. Later, he worked in the government offices in Baku. In the meantime, he wrote articles for the periodical Kavkaz (The Caucasus). In 1896, he traveled to his home town Susa and obtained a position teaching French in the high school. In Susa, he married Sitare Hanim, who was the daughter of Abdurrahman Vezirov, a wealthy notable. The next year, Ağaoğlu returned to Baku and started to teach French at the High School of Commerce. In the meantime, he also wrote articles for the journal Kaspii (The Caspian). In 1901, he published a work in Russian entitled Women According to Islam and in the Islamic World. In 1904, he wrote a play in Persian, Islam wa Akhund. After the 1905 Revolution, Ağaoğlu became very prolific and wrote many articles in various Azeri language newspapers in Baku. At the same time, he was involved in local politics and was elected as a deputy of the Duma of Baku. In 1909, Ahmed Ağaoğlu and his family migrated to Istanbul. In 1911, together with some other Turkist intellectuals and some Turks from Russia such as Yusuf Akçura, Ağaoğlu founded the Turkist journal Turk Yurdu. He contributed many articles defending Turkism. In Türk Yurdu, among other publications, he wrote his famous article “Islamda Dava-yi Milliyet” (Nationalism in Islam) in response to the article of the Islamist Ahmed Naim, who compared nationalism to the tribalism of the Pre-Islamic

100 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic Jahiliyya period in Arabia. Türk Yurdu became the mouthpiece of the Turkist Association Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti (Turkish Homeland Association). In 1912, Ahmed Ağaoğlu joined the CUP and was elected to the Ottoman Parliament. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia formed a federation of Trans-Caucasian states. In late 1918, Ahmed Agaoglu was given the task of representing Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference, together with Ali Merdan Topcubaşı, the president of the Azerbaijan Parliament. However, in March 1919, while on his way to Paris, he was arrested in Istanbul by the Ottoman government acting upon the request of the British. Ağaoğlu was accused of committing atrocities against the Armenians during the First World War. First, he was sent to the island of Limni in the Aegean; then, he was deported to Malta. In 1921, Ağaoğlu was released from Malta after the agreement between the British and Turkish nationalist government. He arrived in Istanbul in late May 1921 and then traveled to Ankara where he joined the Turkish National Liberation Movement. As a result of his successful service as an agent of nationalist propaganda, on October 29, 1921, the Ankara government appointed him as the director general of Press and Information. After the Turkish nationalist victory and the foundation of the Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923, Ağaogğu was elected to the Turkish Parliament. In 1924, Ağaoğlu contributed to the writing of the new Constitution. Later, he taught law at the Ankara Law School. Meanwhile, Ağaoğlu wrote a report criticizing the policies of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and accusing the government of inefficiency and corruption. The report presented to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk angered Ismet Inonu, who was the prime minister at that time. In 1927, Ağaoğlu published his seminal work Üç Medeniyet. In this work, he compares Western (European), Islamic, and Buddhist-Brahman civilizations and finds Western civilization superior. In his work, Ağaoğlu emphasizes the totality of each civilization within itself—all their spiritual and material aspects merge into one. According to Shissler, in his Üç Medeniyet, Ağaoğlu “laid particular stress on the interconnectedness of progress and liberalism and trenchantly averred that there was one path to modernity and it lay through Western civilization.”1 Moreover, according to Shissler, Ağaoğlu “rejects the solace of culture-civilization dichotomy that was common in the period notably in the work of Ziya Gökalp. Rather Ağaoğlu insist upon the indivisibility of civilization.”2 Later on in August 1930, upon the request of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), he participated in the foundation of the Republican Free Party (RFP, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) and became an ideologue of that party, although at first he was reluctant.3 After the establishment of the RFP, his articles were published in the newspapers Yarın (Tomorrow) and Son Posta (Last Mail). In his articles, Ağaoğlu expounded liberal and democratic views and praised leftist ideas.4 He criticized the policies of the RPP (Republican People’s Party), particularly when the ruling party took an authoritarian stand in the 1930s. During the fall of 1930, the Free Party came under attack by the staunch Kemalist writers who accused the RFP of being an instrument of the Islamists and communists and also for defending the rights of the non-Muslims against the government.5 After the dissolution of the Free Party, Ağaoğlu remained active in politics and continued to be an independent deputy in the parliament. Later, he taught law at the Darülfunun in Istanbul. In 1933, an academic purge took place at the Darülfunun when it was transformed into a university. As a result, Ağaoğlu lost his position and retired. Ahmed Ağaoğlu died in Istanbul on May 19, 1939.

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 101 The following passages are taken from Ahmed Ağaoğlu (Agayef), Üç Medeniyet. Istanbul: Türk Ocakları Matbaası, 1927. Republished in 2013 by Doğu Kitabevi. In this book written in 1927, Ağaoğlu compares Western (European), Islamic, and Buddhist-Brahman civilizations and finds Western civilization superior. According to Ağaoğlu, each civilization has a combined totality within itself—all their spiritual and material aspects merge into one.

The Three Civilizations This work was written in Malta during my captivity in 1919. What is civilization? There is Islamic civilization, European or Western civilization, and Buddhist-Brahman civilization. The common issues shared by different ethnicities belong to different civilizations. This is the path vanquished civilizations must follow. If the meanings of the terms defining the abstract concepts cannot be clearly determined, then everyone can interpret these concepts according to their own understanding. Then the issue would become complicated. In order to prevent the confusion and give our lectors a clear view, we have decided to clearly indicate our understanding of the term “civilization.” The term “civilization” has been defined in various forms. We understand this term with a broad meaning that includes all its definitions. According to us, civilization is a “way of life.” Nevertheless, here we have to accept the term “life” in its broadest and most inclusive form. All manifestations of life, all its spiritual and material events must be included in that concept. Then the civilization would embrace all the events of life from the way of thinking to the dressing habits. Despite this, we see that the human civilization is divided into three main groups or into three different civilizations. Naturally, this division is not absolute. We cannot imagine the existence of a Chinese wall between these three civilizations. There exist many interactions and mutual influences between them. A strict categorization of a civilization can only be made in its main lines, core values. The most important of these three civilizations is the Buddhist-Brahman civilization. It comprises a population of 800 million and covered India, Indochina, China, Korea, and Japan. The second most important civilization is the Western or European civilization. It comprises all of Europe, North America, and Australia. Finally, the third one is Islamic civilization; its area covers almost all of Africa and parts of Asia and Europe. When we carefully examine the area of one of these civilizations, we can immediately notice some common aspects in the culture of the peoples living there. Despite their differences in race, color, and language, the various ethnicities living in the area zone of this culture share common cultural elements. These common elements form the basis, essence, and soul of this civilization. These elements would separate this civilization from the others. For example, when an ordinary man from Istanbul visited Marrakesh, Mesopotamia, Cairo, Mecca, Damascus, Baku, Shiraz, Kabul, Lahore, Calcutta, or Samarkand, he would feel at home in these cities. Whereas in the much closer cities of Sofia and Athens, he would not have the same feelings; on the contrary, he would feel that he was in an unfamiliar environment. In those Muslim cities, the traveler from Istanbul would immediately

102 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic notice the familiar street signs and familiar behaviors and ways of acting. The dress of the people in these cities, their professions, their customs, and manners would be very similar to those he is accustomed to. The same turbans, same traditional coats, same veils for women, same mosques, same ways of worship, same (ezan) calls for prayers, same religious ceremonies, same prayers, and so on would be evident. These similarities were not limited only to appearances; commonality would also include mentality, spirit, and the subjects that people like to discuss. An ordinary person from Istanbul considers the inhabitants of Marrakesh, Kabul, and Calcutta to be like himself. The same phenomenon also happens among peoples belonging to the same sphere of civilization. For example, a Roman considers himself at home in Paris, Vienna, Berlin, London, and Washington. Likewise, a Japanese person would feel at home in Korea, Beijing, and Tibet. Thus, these common aspects shared by those who belong to the same sphere of civilization are the indicators of that civilization. As we noticed earlier, some of these characteristics are actually spiritual. The material aspects are forms of dress, architectural types of the buildings, ways of worship, and so on. The spiritual aspect covers a wider area; this is because it affects thought, mentality, and feeling. We can safely affirm that each civilization has a distinct way of thinking, a peculiar wisdom. It practically possesses a peculiar intellect. Equally, every civilization possesses a heart and a way of feeling. Therefore, every civilization has peculiar ethics and values—a shared understanding of good and bad, beautiful and ugly. When you travel in Muslim lands, you would encounter many strange things. You would immediately notice that individuals in these countries have the same mentality and have the same opinions on particular issues—despite their differences in race, language, and color and despite the distance of thousands of kilometers separating them. The people living in Muslim counties have the same understanding of what is good and bad and what is beautiful and ugly. This situation came into being as a result of having common intellectual activity and under the influence of shared values. This is because religion is the most important factor in the Islamic world; besides that, in the heydays of Islam, there also was a common intellectual heritage. In the old days, a scientific or scholarly work written in one corner of the Islamic world would be reproduced quickly—despite the nonexistence of a printing press—by handwritten manuscripts, this work reached the four corners of the Islamic world with astonishing speed. Today it is almost impossible to be surprised when we examine the intensity of the correspondence between the various scholars living in the different parts of the Islamic world. These scholars often became immediately aware of their colleagues’ works and would engage in heated debates with them through correspondence. The works written by Ibn Sina sparked a passionate discussion among the learned people in North Africa. Ibn Sabah was born in Morocco and received his education in Nishapur (Eastern Iran), and he worked in Syria and Khurasan (Eastern Iran). The courts of the caliphs Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), al-Mamun (r. 813–33), Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (r. 998–1030), Sultan Melikshah (r. 1063–92), Hülegu Khan (r. 1256–1265), and later Timur (r. 1370–1405) became the meeting place of various scholars and scientists from every part of the Islamic world. The courts of these rulers became like scientific academies. Equally, many scientists and scholars coming from the most remote parts of the Islamic world were congregating at the palaces and courts of the Ottoman sultans. A

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 103 person born in Khiva (Central Asia) was appointed as qadi (Islamic judge) and became mufti (legal adviser in Islamic law) in Anatolia. Works written in Persian and Arabic quickly circulated. Many Muslim scholars belonging to various ethnicities translated, interpreted, and imitated each other’s works. It would have been impossible to encounter a Muslim intellectual who did not know the works of Hafiz, Khayyam, Mevlana, Akbar Shah, and Abul Ula. This common religion, common mind, and common sentiments united the mentality, way of thinking, and feelings of the entire Muslim world. Wherever you might go in this world, you would encounter the same mentality and the same sentiments. The same phenomenon is valid for European or Western civilization; today we cannot find a serious European scholar who had not mastered at least three European languages: French, English, and German. They had already learned Greek and Latin in their childhood as a part of their early education. In the past, these two languages were the common scientific and literary mediums in the West—like Arabic and Persian are in the Islamic world. All scholars wrote in Latin. The first writers who used their national languages instead of Latin were Montaigne in France, Dante in Italy and Luther in Germany. In the nineteenth century, when printing techniques and communication means became more advanced, Europe became almost a family of nations. Italian, English, German, and Russian writers were able to follow the scholarly activities of their counterparts on a daily basis. The works of Tolstoy were immediately translated into English, French, and German. The musical compositions of Wagner were performed in the other European capitals before they were played in Germany. If you read Darwin’s works like On the Origin of Species and Descent of Man, you might be surprised to see how much information has been borrowed by this great scholar from his European counterparts. French, German, Italian, Danish, and Dutch scientists were actually following Darwin’s activities day by day and providing him with necessary information. Here again, the same common mind, common way of thinking and feeling, nurture the same mentality and sentiments. Besides this, in Europe there were many international organizations like international workers associations, international scholars’ associations, various trusts, and so on. These organizations created common goals and ideals among the European nations. The heart and mind of Western civilization came into being as a result of these common factors. Consequently, we see that a distinct entity of civilization like the Western one thinks and feels with the same mind and same heart and equipped with the same spiritual forces. Now we see that Western civilization is the victor, and the two others, Islamic and Buddhist-Brahman civilizations, have been vanquished. Yes, we are sad to admit that these two civilizations have been vanquished. But we have to confess and express that in an open and clear way. Here, in our country, by playing with words, we still have some blind people who try to deny that reality. It would be foolishness not to recognize a fact which is clear and real as the sun. Now, it is time for them to abandon this foolish thought. The defeat actually can manifest in two ways: material and spiritual. The material defeat is very explicit. We all have accepted that. The material defeat already started three hundred years ago. Islamic societies were defeated one after the other. Today, almost all Muslim states have been conquered by the West. None of them could defend themselves against Western powers. The Ottoman Empire, which stood as the last bastion of Islam, also has fallen. How can we further deny this decline

104 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic and the fall of the Islamic power? Without any doubt, this decline is the result of Islam’s confrontation with the West. When it comes to spiritual defeat, it is also equally important, although it may not be as explicit as the material one. What is a defeat? A defeat is to submit to someone else and accept his authority. This submission—whether voluntary or under duress—is nothing but a defeat. Therefore, both Islamic and Buddhist-Brahman civilizations are now considered vanquished by the West. These two defeated civilizations have now accepted the characteristics of Western civilization and have to accept its superiority. Today, both Muslims and the people of yellow race (East Asians) have started to emulate European models for material things like the decoration of their houses and in their clothing. But they also adopt Western thought including its literary forms and music. In social, political, and technical areas as well as in institutions, the Asians have totally become the loyal pupils of the West. Emulating the West was sometimes voluntary and at other times was imposed. Japan went through many political and social upheavals before adopting Western culture. When it comes to China and the Ottoman Empire, Westernization had a strong destabilizing effect on them. Although Europe was not directly imposing its models, Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals understood very well that without initiating a Western-type reform, the empire could not survive. Therefore, at the cost of total destabilization, they opted for reform. What else could this be except defeat? Actually, this is the heaviest of the defeats. Today, when you look at Asian societies, you would see an ongoing struggle: the struggle of two ideologies, of two civilizations. The old traditional civilization is battling with the newly introduced Western/European civilization. This is a fight for death and life. One side of the society is trying to preserve and conserve the traditional lifestyle and old values; the other side equates this conservatism with self-destruction and opts for Western-based reform. According to these Westernists, adopting European values and their way of life is the only option for survival. The daily realities of life support the Westernist view. We clearly see that those societies who oppose to the Western civilization are gradually perishing and passing away. This phenomenon is particularly visible in Muslim societies. On the other hand, those societies that adopted the Western values and way of life have thrived. The most successful example is that of Japan. This is an undeniable fact. Today, European civilization runs like a strong flood current and carries away everything that opposes it. Therefore, the only remaining option is to join that current, that civilization. Nevertheless, Western civilization must be adopted wholly, without excluding some aspects of it. Today in our country, almost everyone accepts the superiority of the West. However, some want to adopt only the technology of the West and want to reject its cultural aspects. According to these people, Western civilization must be filtered before receiving it. To them, Muslims must not adopt the libertine and decadent aspects of the West. Actually, this view is the result of a total ignorance. The advocates of such a view do not understand at all what a civilization is. All the thoughts expressed by us since the beginning of this article demonstrate very clearly that civilization is an indivisible concept. It cannot be divided and cannot be filtered. Its superiority derives from its totality. If science has developed only in Europe and nowhere else, we have to examine European civilization in its entirety if we want to find why this is the case. Today’s European civilization is the fruit of the all existing conditions in Europe. Civilizations are like plants. In order to thrive,

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 105 they need particular conditions. Therefore, if European civilization vanquished other civilization, its victory is assured—not only by its scientific and technical superiority but also by all of its characteristics. Therefore, those who want to protect themselves against this current by using its means must accept it in its entirety. Adopting only some aspects of the European civilization without taking the rest would not benefit its borrowers. In the past it did not and still it would not. This would be like establishing a European-style industry without implementing the socialist ideas; or it would be like wanting to have freedom of speech but at the same time limiting it. That would not work. Actually, we understand the ideas of those people who want to reject the civilization and want to protect themselves against its harmful effects. Great minds like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Leo Tolstoy consider civilization as a calamity. Rousseau, who loved nature to the point of worshipping it, considered civilization a corrupting and harmful factor that has vices. According to him, the early humans who were closer to natural life were not only nobler, unspoiled, and virtuous but also happier than modern, civilized people. Likewise, the Russian novelist Tolstoy considered large cities where millions of people live and industrial centers to be catastrophic. According to Tolstoy, not only science and technology but also literature and philosophy cause harmful effects for humanity. In his book What Men Live By, Tolstoy writes, “The entire works of all European thinkers and scientists do not match the value of one single sentence of the Bible.” According to Tolstoy, the only way for people to find happiness would be to leave cities, move to villages, and return to nature. This is a fundamentalist view. Everyone can understand that view. They may like and accept it or dislike and reject it. But borrowing only some aspects of civilization by dividing it into parts and then only taking some parts and leaving the rest cannot be explained by any logical thinking. A particular civilization is indivisible; those who do not wish to adopt it in its entirety can only clash with it and destroy it. Actually, this is the reason why we have not been able to obtain any good results for hundred years. We wanted to borrow parts of Western civilization according to our wishes, and we failed. First of all, we have to be sincere. Do we accept the superiority of Western civilization or not? If we accept it as superior, we cannot explain its success either by pointing to its science and technology or by pointing to its political and social institutions. We can only explain the success of European civilization by the totality of its aspects—including its mentality, spirit, mind, and heart. Western civilization vanquished us by using all of its aspects and characteristics. Therefore, if we wish to recover from that defeat and survive and maintain our existence, then we have to change not only our institutions and how we dress but also our mentality and way of thinking. Otherwise, there is no salvation for us. Here we are touching an important issue: What would happen to our national characteristics? Wouldn’t we risk losing our national identity if we totally were to adopt the culture of other nations? First of all, we have to determine the meaning of the characteristic. Those who talk about the characteristics always argue that it is composed of ethics, law, and language. Nevertheless, a brief look at the history of nations would show us that these elements (ethics, law, and language) are not immutable and eternal. In history, which nation has not changed their religion? For example, the Turks’ first religion was shamanism; after that, they adopted some other religions and finally accepted Islam. Arabs also had other religions before Islam. In

106 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic history, there is not a single nation that did not change its religion. When it comes to ethics and law, these concepts and institutions also are subject to change as their nature requires. The notions about what are good and bad or beautiful and ugly change with time. Parliaments and legislative assemblies are established all over the world in order to create new laws that best fit the best to the needs of the evolving societies. The nations that consider their laws immutable are the ones that are fossilized. Language may be the system that is the least subject to change. Nevertheless, even this is not an absolute fact. For example, today the Bulgarians speak a Slavic language and abandoned their ancient Turkic language. Or, what are the linguistic roots of today’s English. Nonetheless, still the language remains as the most permanent and constant cultural element in the life of a nation. Languages evolve without losing their essence. Therefore, the cultural identity of a nation is formed around its language. Every material being has a peculiar set of characteristics. These characteristics separate it from the other material beings. This is a reality for everything existing in the cosmos. There is no dissimilarity in the cosmos; since there is no dissimilarity, things need to have peculiar characteristics. For example, two parts of the same stone are not identical. Definitely, there is a difference between them in form and composition. Then, this difference shows their peculiarities. Likewise, the members of the same nation are not identical to each other. Equally a nation also has a particular character, and this particular character separates that nation from other nations. But, this character is limited to certain kinds of ethics, law, music, and architecture. Actually, the nation has the capacity to understand and adopt different kinds of ethics, law, music, and architecture. This situation is explained by the Latin proverb: Homo sum nihil humanum mihi alienim est. It means: I am a human and no human thing is stranger to me.” Indeed, for a human being, no human thing could be considered alien. Today the “frozen race” theory of Gustave Le Bon is not accepted anymore. Although this theory was accepted in the past, today it has been rejected by the latest scientific research. Many ethnicities and races that were considered doomed and incapable of evolution have proved to be the opposite today. For example, the Japanese, who belong to the yellow race, proved to be more apt than the Russians, who belong to the white race. In the past the black race was considered half-human half animal. But today blacks have quickly adopted modern lifestyles, now that their living conditions have changed. American blacks are successfully adopting modern civilization. This demonstrates to us that a human is a human wherever he lives. Every human symptom belongs to him and he can appropriate all things that he deems useful for himself. By doing that, he would not use his character. On the contrary, these new adoptions and acquisitions would make his character richer and stronger. New horizons would open and opportunities would be gained. Since character is not limited by any condition, every nation would naturally give its character to its acquisitions and would make them part of its own existing culture. It is just like sunlight that passes through a crystal prism and appears in many colors. Various institutions and different aspects of the same civilization take different forms and colors when they go through the spirit of different nations. Every nation reflects its colors onto them. Actually we can see this phenomenon in our daily observations. Here the issue is not a matter of similarity but of differences. For example, Russians, Germans, French, English, and Italians are all of Indo-European stock and all belong to Western civilizations.

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 107 Nevertheless, these nations have fundamental differences that distinguish them from each other. French character is very different from English and German characters. When we apply the same principle within Islamic civilizations, we will also see important differences between North Africans, Turks, Kurds, and Arabs. The lights of the same civilization have reflected different colors while passing through the spirits of these nations. The original essence is one, but its forms are various. This variety of forms is actually nothing but national character. This character is innate and not voluntary. No borrowings would jeopardize its existence. On the contrary, they can make it stronger and open new horizons for it. Actually, the enemy of national character is immobility and lack of action/inactivity. Both in individuals and nations, a strong and active life would engender a strong character. Societies who cannot express the feelings of their heart, cannot contribute to the welfare of humanity with their material and intellectual creations; they are unable to market their products and are totally devoid of national character. In our case, we have not even succeeded in teaching our language to our peasants, let alone to foreigners; aside from a primitive agriculture, we have no other economic activity, our intellectual activity is quite limited, and the beatings of our heart is weak. Nevertheless, thanks to our historical heritage, we can still manage. On the other hand, without Gustave Le Bon, Durkheim, Bergson, and some other thinkers, our intellectual production would have remained limited by our old mysticism. Without the influence of French literature, our collective soul would have been suffocated under the influence of our old harabat literature. Our defeat in the area of civilization is definite and absolute. We have no other choice but to adopt the victorious civilization. Although very difficult to do, we have to admit that reality and take the necessary measures. We should not deceive ourselves by trying to implement temporary measures. All sorts of tumult, turmoil, and upheavals are wreaking havoc around us. The world’s current situation was clearly and correctly described at the Peace Conference by South African Delegate General Smith. The delegate said: “Humanity once again untied the ropes of their tents and started a new journey towards an unknown destination.” Unfortunately, today we are very far even from the location where the rest of the humanity started on their journey. The tumultuous situation around us is totally upsetting and changing social, economic, and political foundations as well as humanity’s intellectual and spiritual values. Today humanity is searching for new, better, and more advanced ideals. In contrast, we are still far behind even from the starting point of many other societies.

Religion In the matter of religion, we are still living in the Middle Ages. We consider religion as the total sum of the rules and principles regulating our lives rather than as a link between us and the Creator or as an ethical force. Religion totally dominates our life from the cradle to the grave. It not only satisfies our spiritual needs but also organizes our daily life. Religion controls and shapes our ways of dressing, our house decoration, and also our schools, education system, and our social and political institutions. Today,

108 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic contemporary modern civilizations have long passed this stage of religious mentality. Four hundred years ago, they were in this situation. At that time, religion used to control everything in their societies and dominated all aspects of their lives. In the world, we cannot find a single society that did not pass through these stages. Everywhere, the authorities representing religion had the same state of mind and the same desire to control society. They wanted to organize society by transgressing the limits of spiritual power that had become the strongest political power. Even though the Holy Scriptures on which they based their authority did not allow this transgression, these ecclesiastic authorities continued to dominate the worldly life of the people. As an example, we can look at Christianity. As everybody knows, the New Testament consists of the biography of Jesus Christ and some prayers. People even asked him about the taxes levied by Caesar (the emperor). Jesus separated spiritual and temporal worlds by stating, “Give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and give to God what belongs to God.” Despite this clear message from Jesus, Christian clergymen never hesitated to interfere in temporal affairs by regulating the daily life of the people and the establishment of governments. Here I have to clarify an issue. Some have explained the current problems of the Muslim world by the nature of Islam to not separate spiritual life from temporal life. In contrast, they say Christianity clearly acknowledges the separation of these two spheres. According to our view, such a consideration has no basis. It is true that in the Qur’an there are verses organizing worldly life, and nothing similar is found in the Bible. Nevertheless, neither Christianity nor Islam consists of their holy books of the Bible and the Qur’an. Besides their sacred books, the corpus of both of these two religions consists of religious traditions, prophetic hadiths, and the ideas of religious authorities. The New Testament did not organize the worldly life. This is because Jesus neither had the time nor the power to do so. Jesus never became the head of a community. Therefore, he never felt the need to organize a community. Nevertheless, his heirs, the first popes, organized the community as soon as they became the leaders of this community. The difference between the Qur’an and the New Testament is that the Prophet Muhammad lived to the age of sixty-three, and later in his life he became the leader of a particular community (ummah). In contrast, Jesus died young, at the age of thirty-one (sic), and in the later part of his life, he was severely persecuted by the authorities. He was followed only by five or ten disciples and almost all of them belonged to the lower class of the society. In Mecca, when the Prophet Muhammad was in the same situation as Jesus—severely persecuted by the Pagan Meccans—the Qur’an did not speak of worldly affairs. All the verses that relate to worldly affairs—including the ones organizing the society—actually were revealed to him after he migrated to Medina in 622 AD and found himself as the leader of a large community (ummah). All the verses before the Hijra (migration to Medina) were about prayers, beliefs, and worship. Therefore, if the Prophet Muhammad passed away before the Hijra, today we would not be able to find a single Qur’anic verse related to worldly affairs. We can say the same things about Jesus. If that prophet had lived long enough and had become the leader of a particular community, there is no doubt that the New Testament would contain passages about worldly affairs as well as social and political issues. Therefore, in order to make a valid and correct assessment and a proper evaluation between Muhammad and Jesus and between the Qur’an and the New

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 109 Testament, we always have to consider the facts that we mentioned earlier. Now, it is well understood that the clergy had always wanted to interfere in worldly affairs by transgressing the limits of their spiritual authority. Today this interference is no longer taking place. But throughout Middle Ages, the church dominated not only people’s souls but also their bodies. The maxim of the Christian church was Hors de l’Eglise point de salut (No salvation outside the church). At the hands of the popes, there was a formidable weapon called “excommunication” that even frightened emperors. By issuing excommunication orders, the popes were able to separate fathers from their sons, annul marriages, or free vassals from their obligations to their lords. With this powerful weapon the Pope Hildebrand forced the Holy German Emperor Henry IV to come to Canossa in the dead of winter—with an uncovered head and bare feet—to beg for pardon and confess his sins. The decisions of the councils and the papal decrees were considered as divine orders, and the least opposition to them was punished by excommunication. In those times, this situation was considered normal. This is because the division of labor did not exist yet in Europe. When the church wanted to unite all authority under its hands, no institution or any other political or social force could oppose it. The political and social environment of these ages favored the church. Actually, after the collapse of the Roman Empire, the only institution that survived the general political chaos of the time was the Catholic Church. The church was able to continue its existence by building its structure on the Roman administrative model. On the other hand, the church became a place of refuge from situations that were dominated by violence in those times. Weak and oppressed people sought the protection of the church. In turn, the church would use this to increase its authority. Actually, in medieval times, the papacy successfully augmented its power because feudalism—the dominant political and social regime of the Middle Ages—was very suitable to that sort of power. The church sometimes sided with the common people against the feudal lords and despots and sometimes sided with the powerful and despotic rulers against the people. In both cases, it received its power from the religion and managed to submit everyone to its will and authority. Eventually the church became a global power that controlled people’s lives and afterlives. It became the master of paradise and hell. Although the Bible did not condone the church’s transgressions, the clergy never faced serious opposition in controlling the masses. Eventually the teachings of the Bible were replaced by customs and traditions; that is, by the acts and deeds of the church fathers, the decisions of the councils, and the papal encyclicals (official letters of the pope). These documents were as holy as the New Testament, and their authority was as binding as divine orders. Moreover, every sentence of the Gospel became the subject of countless interpretations. In any case, in those times, the prosecutor and the judge was the same person. What kind of insolent and impertinent person would dare to challenge the authority of the church that was so deeply venerated by the common people? Who could face terrible punishments like being excluded from the church community, excommunication, and damnation by the people? Armed with so many powerful weapons, the church considered itself as the Vicar of God and assumed the right of legislation. Nevertheless, mentalities were changing as time passed. Eventually, new social and political forces emerged, and these forces opposed the absolute hegemony of the church. At first, monarchs and their governments started

110 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic to oppose the authority of the church. Lay monarchs wanted to put an end to the church’s intervention in political affairs. At first, these monarchs were severely punished by religious authorities. Nevertheless, with the passing of time, resistance to the church became stronger. On the other hand, while lay monarchs and grandees were gaining consciousness and as a result of their becoming bolder in the opposition to the papacy, the religious establishment itself was decaying. The rampant corruption and suffocating despotism of the church alienated the people and the grandees. Dante’s Inferno provides a very good example to show how the people mocked the corrupt and decadent character of the clergy in the Middle Ages. In this period, the clergy could only maintain its domination over society by using physical compulsion. This is because it had already lost its spiritual and moral force. Faced with increasing opposition from various segments of the society, the church tried to oppress the dissidence by torturing and killing members of the movement. Jan Huss was hanged, Bruno was burned alive, and old and blind Galileo repented under torture. But the ideological currents could not be stopped by fire and the sword. Consequently, the opposition continued in different ways. On the other hand, Luther and Calvin also started a movement of protest and rebelled against the ignorance, abuses, and hypocrisy of the clergy. These reformists criticized the conduct of the church by drawing their ideas directly from the Bible. Luther was the first person to translate the text of the Bible into the German language. His language was clear, and anybody could read and understand what was written. Luther liberated the Christian religion from the enigmatic cover of the Latin language and made the Bible accessible to German peasants and merchants. Now, without having to depend on the deceitful and false interpretations of hypocritical priests, everybody could read and understand the Bible on his own. Around the same time, Erasmus and Melanchthon stormed the minds of the Europeans with their writings and sermons. Their ideas spread all over Europe—to France, to Switzerland, and to the other states. Naturally, Rome (the papacy) could not remain silent when faced with this growing dissension. The Church of Rome attacked its opponents with all its force. The papacy issued excommunication decrees and the monarchs, kings, and emperors were invited to join the holy war. Moreover, the people were urged to attack and kill the godless ones. Nevertheless, the times had changed. Although millions of Christians answered Rome’s call, there were also millions of people who were ready to fight against the Church of Rome. These events started the bloody wars of religion that would divide Europe for generations to come. Members of the same nation and citizens of the same state fought against each other. All Western European states became involved in that religious war. Even families were divided. People on both sides fought relentlessly. Neither the massacres of Saint Bartholomew, nor the inquisition, nor the burning of the books could put an end to this movement. In Germany and some other countries, the new reformist movement gained success and totally undermined Rome’s authority. On the other hand, wherever they were defeated, members of the reformist movement preferred exile to submission. They left their homes and migrated to the other lands. Later clergymen like Savonarola and Ignatius Loyola, who founded the Jesuit order, continued to fight against reformminded Christians, but they could not prevent the reforms from gaining more strength. Today the struggle continues. But the current struggle is not a fight between Catholicism

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 111 and Protestantism. This latter denomination has now gained acceptance and has become a major religious sect. The actual struggle is between the clergy who represent the old and established Christian denominations and newly emerging materialist Christian groups. Today these materialist Christian communities are struggling against the domination of the spiritualist powers. This is because the Protestant Church, which initially fought against Rome for its independence, later wanted to establish its dominance over the other new denominations. The most important intellectual struggle in Europe for the past two hundred years actually is the struggle between clericalism that wanted to organize the spiritual and material lives of the people and the secular ideology that strives to free human societies from the hegemony of religion. Since the eighteenth century, European societies have been divided between these two currents—namely between the clericalism and liberalism. Actually, that struggle covers all areas of life—including politics, literature, philosophy, and even industry and economics. In politics, the conservatives and traditionalists support the old and established views. The old dynasties already had abandoned their struggle with the church. This is because they realized that attacking the church could be dangerous for them. Then these old and established families rallied with the church and acknowledged it as the sole source of spiritual and material power. Then the papacy rewarded the loyalty of these dynasties by declaring them holy and bestowing on them the title of “shadow of God.” Then an alliance was forged between these royal families and the papacy against the common enemy. The church had dominated the spiritual and intellectual world for centuries; it had always prevented the development of the exact sciences and had rejected all philosophical schools of thought outside the traditions of Aristotle and Plato. After losing its dominance over thinkers, the church tried to undermine modern thought by establishing some religious colleges. Later on, when the struggle became economic, the church invented the idea of “Christian Socialism” and tried to win the support of the working class. Nevertheless, all its efforts were in vain. Christian societies were continuously developing and progressing. In non-Muslim societies, when religion controlled daily life, a balance existed between these societies and Muslim societies. An equal situation existed. But in nonMuslim societies today, religion has lost its former importance. People in these societies have gained complete freedom to organize their lives. As a result, they have started to progress and have reached an advanced level of civilization. With the passing of time, the gap between the Muslim and non-Muslim societies has widened. Today, we have a clear picture of that situation: On one side, there is a society that has complete freedom of thought and rationalism dominates. On the other side, there is a stagnated society that is attached to its past traditions. The outcome is obvious; the former society will progress, and the latter will stagnate at best. What is law? Isn’t law the institution that regulates relations between individuals? Then, according to its nature, law must be something changeable and adaptable. This is because, with the passing of time, life conditions change, and the nature of relations between individuals also must change. Consequently, the norms defining and regulating these relations also have to change. The parts of the Qur’an regulating the worldly affairs are the product of such a change. When we read the works written on the revelations of the sacred verses, for example, the work of Imam Suyuti entitled

112 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic Esbab-i Nuzul, we would see that all verses regulating worldly affairs were revealed to solve a particular problem that arose from the needs of the people. The principle “the rules change with the time” is also accepted by our religion. But this principle has not been properly implemented. In our country, reforms are obstructed and rejected in the name of religion. Opposition to the reforms was justified not only by referring to the verses of the Qur’an or hadith but also by referring to invented traditions. Religion is used to stop the development and the evolution of the society. Those who consider themselves representatives of religion interfere in scientific, technological, social, financial, and educational areas. These clerics try to block the progress of the society by inciting the fanaticism of the ignorant masses against all kinds of innovations. Let’s take the example of education methodology. What is the relation of this discipline to religion? Despite that relation, it was only after considerable effort that new methods of education could be introduced into curricula. Reformist teachers were accused of being irreligious and unbelievers. Meanwhile, in the areas of law, economics, and politics, the reformers were facing the same fierce resistance. The ulema who consider themselves representatives of religion want to regulate all of these areas of life and reject the authority of all others.

The State Since the earliest times, the concept of the state has been misunderstood in the East. The terms “state” and “government” were interchangeably used. The Turks, in particular, considered the government and the state the same institution. The Turks not only confused the Turks with the state but also named states that they established after the names of persons and families. For a thousand years, the states established by Turkish tribes were named after various founding dynasties. The Ghaznevids, Seljukids, Kharazm-Shahs, and the Ottomans continued the same tradition. However, there are important differences between the three concepts of government, the state, and dynasty. But in the East, the people have confused these concepts and have considered every dynasty a different state. Every dynasty considered the previous dynasties as a foreign state. This has gone on to the extent that one of our famous poets has said, “We are the noble Ottoman dynasty and we created a world-conqueror state from a tribe.” This verse, which makes every Turk proud, can only be understood as a historical metaphor. This can only be achieved as a miracle. Naturally, it would be impossible to create a world-conquering state from a tribe of six hundred families. The worldconquering Ottoman state was not established by a single tribe. Actually, the founders of that state were millions of Turks—including members of that tribe who lived in Asia Minor. These Turks were wrongly called the Seljukids. England has changed its dynasty four times. During its last dynasty, England’s dominions stretched from the North Pole to the South Pole. Nevertheless, during its history, England has never been identified by the name of its ruling dynasties. Likewise, France has had several ruling dynasties. Napoleon invaded the whole Europe; nonetheless, France was not called the Napoleonic state nor was the foundation of the French state attributed to him. The only perpetual

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 113 and living element in a state is the nation that engenders that state. Therefore, every state must be named after the nation that establishes that state. A good example is that the Europeans never adopted the usage of the term “Ottoman state”; instead, they always used the term “Turkey.” In reality the state is the area occupied by an independent nation and refers to the totality of the political, social, and economic institutions of that nation. The government is only one of these institutions, and the dynasty constitutes a small part of these institutions. A nation can exist as long as it does not lose its independence. A nation can exist without a dynasty. Today, most of the countries in the world are governed by the republican system. When it comes to the government; by its nature, this institution is always changeable. Therefore, naming a state by the name of its ruling dynasty or after the head of its government should be considered utter ignorance. At the same time, such a consideration unmistakably points out to a dangerous mentality. Naming a state after its dynasty would be nothing but reducing that state to a mere dynasty. That would imply the fact that if the dynasty collapsed, that would also entail the collapse of the state. But in reality, even when a dynasty comes to an end, the nation would continue to exist. What creates a state is not the dynasty but the nation itself. After the collapse of any dynasty, the nation would rally around a new and more successful leader and rejuvenate the foundations of its state. States must be named after the nations that established them. Considering every dynasty as a newly established state would cause a discontinuity in the history of a nation. It would also undermine the unity of the nation. This strange phenomenon could be observed not only in the case of the history of Iran but also in Ottoman history. In Iran, the factor behind the establishment of dynasties of Safavids, Afshars, and Qajars was the same force same ethnic element. Nevertheless, each of those dynasties considered themselves a new state. They considered their predecessors as their enemies and usually destroyed the cultural heritage and monuments they had built. In the countries where the dynasties are considered as states, the state is considered to have ended with the collapse of the dynasty. That was the case in India. On the other hand, those who consider their state as inseparable from the nation would never lose their hope to resuscitate their fallen state even if they lose their independence. For example, consider countries like Poland and Italy—whose areas are 10 percent of that of India—or countries like Greece and Serbia—whose areas make up only 1 percent of that of India. Is the Ottoman state a community of nations or a united entity? England (Britain) is a community of nations. This is because it was formed by three different nations and each of these nations has a distinct national character, autonomy, and political institutions. These three nations became united by multilateral treaties with each other and formed a union and a state. Nonetheless, later on these founding treaties were not respected and the Anglo-Saxon ethnic element, which belonged to only one of the founding groups, established hegemony over the others. That is why, even today, there are severe struggles between those three nations. Nevertheless, during the foundation of the English (British) state, the Scots and Irish also played important roles just as the Anglo-Saxons had. These three nations became attached to each other by their free will. Nevertheless, neither in the history of France nor in that of the Ottoman Empire, did such a phenomenon exist. The nations that came under Ottoman rule did not join the empire by their free will; instead they were conquered. Most of these nations were

114 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic not even independent during the time of the Ottoman conquest. They lived under the rule of other empires. The Muslims in the conquered lands would acquire all the rights of the founding nation of the state. When it comes to the Christian peoples, as we mentioned earlier, they were incorporated into the state as a result of conquest. According to the rules of those times, the conquered non-Muslim nations could only plead for the protection and mercy of the conqueror. They did not have equal rights with the members of the founding nation and could not be part of the ruling elite. In those times, the conqueror had absolute power over the conquered nations. When the Ottomans were conquering non-Muslim nations, the Spaniards were also vanquishing Muslims in Spain. The Spaniards totally eliminated Muslims in the territories they conquered. They massacred them and expropriated their lands and properties. Ottomans, on the contrary, showed great tolerance and magnanimity to the Christian nations that they conquered. They allowed the non-Muslims to keep their religious and national institutions. But that was not a bilateral pact concluded between the victor and the vanquished. It was a Muslim practice and a privilege accorded by the victors to the vanquished and conquered nation. The Ottoman state was not a commonwealth of nations like Britain. It was a centralized state and had established rules and practices. When we examine the history of the Ottoman state we would see that, in its early stages, the Ottoman state was a unitary state; but with the passing of time, due to the neglect of the statesmen and their ignorance of the state of affairs, the state became decentralized and became a commonwealth of nations. Then all the rights and privileges granted to the non-Muslims at the conquest were then considered as rights obtained by bilateral agreements. That conception undermined the foundation of the state and put an end to its unity. Every community started to consider itself a state within the state and asked for autonomy within the state. These developments prepared the ground for the collapse of the Ottoman state. Here the founding fathers of the Ottoman nation have committed a grave error. Their first mistake was to believe that a state could be established and maintained solely by the sword—by brute force. The lands conquered by the sword could only be ruled by wisdom and intelligence. What I mean by intelligence is not good administration. This is because we all know that until the mid-seventeenth century the Ottoman administration was the best in the world. Gaining the conquered lands does not mean necessarily administering them well. It could only establish peace and order in these lands and, therefore, encourage the development of trade and industry in those countries. Actually, that is what it means to gain the minds and hearts of the people living in those lands. That is the most important thing that the statesmen had to achieve. Their principal task is to gain the genuine trust of the various conquered nations and fused them into a single community. Achieving this unity is the most important success of any government. On this issue, the Arab and Persian rulers were much more successful than the Turkish ones. In a little space of time, the Arabs managed to unify all the peoples whom they conquered. The Ottoman rulers, on the contrary, maintained and even encouraged division among the nations that they conquered. They granted more rights and privileges to the conquered Christian nations and thus preserved their national characteristics. At the same time, by excluding them from the administration of the state, the Ottoman rulers further alienated their non-Muslim subjects. That discrimination caused polarization within

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 115 the Ottoman society and pitted Christians against Muslims. Christians became educated in their own community schools and developed their national characteristics. For long time, they could not enter the state schools, could not be civil servants in the bureaucracy, and could not serve in the army. Thus, instead of merging and fusing the various ethnicities and religious groups living in the empire, the Ottoman state did exactly the opposite. It kept those nations separate from each other by legal barriers. This policy prepared the ground for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Then later on the Ottoman statesmen realized their mistake and tried to correct that during the Tanzimat reforms. But the foundations of the state were already damaged and its structure was weakened. Now, because of the previous policy of separation, various communities have preserved their ethnic and religious identities and have become almost autonomous entities within the state. Their national consciousness has developed. Eventually, they rose against the Ottoman state and sought support from foreign governments. The second and gravest mistake of the Ottoman statesmen was not giving enough importance and priority to the founding element of their state. In most of the multiethnic states, two different forces always have existed. The first gravitated toward the center, the other force gravitated toward the periphery, away from the center. In the Ottoman Empire, the centralist force was the Turkish element, the other one was the non-Turkish ethnicities. The Ottoman statesmen had to take this very important factor into consideration when they designed their policy. They had to give importance to the Turkish element, empower it, and establish its economic, political, and cultural hegemony over the other ethnicities. But in reality—especially after the Mehmed II, the conqueror (r. 1451–81), they did exactly the opposite. Instead of making Anatolia the center of their power, they ignored that region. In fact, Istanbul, the Ottoman capital, had always been supported by Anatolia, but the sultans neglected that region. The Turkish peasants of Anatolia sacrificed their lives and economic resources to support the Ottoman state, but this sacrifice was not valued and acknowledged. As a result, as the founding race of the Ottoman state, the Turks were exploited and they became weak. Their weakening also caused the weakening of the state and prepared the decline and ultimate collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The neglect of Anatolia is due to that state policy. This is very normal in a country in which a state is considered no more than a ruler or a dynasty. In such a state, the importance of the founding nation is nullified and the ruler treats his subjects according to his whims and caprices. He elevates some and punishes others. In a state like that, the only required quality for obtaining a high position in the administration would not be knowledge, ability, or experience; rather, it would be slavish fidelity and obedience to the ruler.

Individuality Imagine a child raised by an ignorant woman who knows that she is a slave and who is resigned to her fate and has submitted herself totally to the mastery of her husband. Throughout his or her childhood, that child observes that his father, rightly or wrongly

116 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic dominates the household; moreover, that child would be isolated in a house with high walls surrounding its courtyard and constantly seeing his mother clad in veil, with very little contact with the outside world. Such a lifestyle would radically affect the child and would nurture negative aspects of individualism in his character. We should seek the origins of our psychological deficiencies in our childhood. Our family values exert an undeniable impact on our character and shape it in our tender years. Childhood is a period during which growing individuals need more love, more encouragement, and more social activities than at any other phase in their lives. However, in our culture, childhood is the most stressful and boring time of our life. In our society, families live isolated from their environment, almost like on an island in an ocean. As such, children also are isolated and alone. They never experience common plays and common entertainment. Besides this, we as a nation have very few national holidays. Compared with the religious holidays in the West, ours are insignificant. In the West, religious holidays are celebrated by families; this creates shared memories for the children. Thus, the spiritual bases of the common life became rooted in the society. Whereas in our society the low condition of the women and the rarity of the holidays totally deprives us of the spiritual factors. Our cold and formal religious ceremonies usually do not exert any lasting impact on our soul. When it comes to our schools, until very recently these institutions were like torture chambers. There was bastinado, the sullen face of the teacher, rote memorizing, standing in front of the blackboard, cold buildings and classrooms without pictures, without music, without play, and toys. This atmosphere was producing children with pale faces and making them depressed. The children who grow up in such environment would eventually lose their joie de vivre and would become depressed. A person growing up under such conditions would naturally become suspicious, cold toward others, selfish, lonely, and aloof. If his character would not get mellowed later by religion and literature that person would become even more isolated. But in our society our religion and literature instead of mollifying these conditions make them worse. Besides that our political history also played a very detrimental effect on our character. After our family institution, our political regime became the oppressor of our souls. For centuries the Ottoman government became the worst enemy of the virtue. The rulers and the statesmen were always fearful of the virtue. They did everything in order to eliminate the virtue. Ottoman regime always acted arbitrarily and prevented the rise of the important and strong families in the society. They always opposed to the rightfulness, decency, and integrity. Ottoman rulers always prevented the rise of the honest and rightful statesmen, poets, and writers. Individual initiative and personal advancement based on talent were not allowed. Those factors together with the terrible blows inflicted by the government made almost impossible the development of the civil virtues among the individuals. Those people who were already oppressed by their family and at the school and deprived by the positive aspects of the religion and literature face the suffocative and lethal regime of the state as soon as they enter the social life. How can those individuals develop social skills under these conditions? Rather, they hide like turtles that retreat into their shells. In such an oppressive and despotic society every individual only tries to save himself. Expecting individual prowess from these people would be in vain. This is because the source of individual and private initiative and prowess is self-respect and self-confidence.

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 117 Self-confidence is born only in a safe environment where virtue is encouraged and respected. Actually, among selfish people, the acceptance of the oppression is higher than it is by others. We observed this phenomenon during the last crisis. Moral virtues develop in a society where free enterprise, free commercial partnership, and competition are allowed and encouraged. Those principles were first introduced by the French Revolution in 1789. Afterward, all social institutions in the West became modeled after them. The main principle is that an individual acquires rights when he fulfills his duties toward the society. In Western societies, a right without a duty and a duty without a right cannot exist. Thus, all the aptitude, ability, and confidence of individuals would be freed from restrictions and would thrive successfully, and every man in the West would become the master of his own destiny rather than depending on the goodwill of others. A large sphere of opportunities was created for hardworking, intelligent, and entrepreneurial individuals. As a consequence, all social, political, and administrative structures in Western countries transformed to adapt themselves to those changes. That adaptation was a profound transformation. The meaning of that freedom was not to destroy others and prevent them from also rising. The use of naked force, violence, and special privileges were not permitted. Only hard work and aptitude would determine success. That (recognition) encouraged people to outdo others and to advance in scientific, intellectual, literary, and political fields. In order to succeed in his profession and get more clients, a merchant would have to be reliable and produce endurable and high-quality products. Likewise, in order for politicians to be successful, they must know their country and have good reputations as honest and dependable persons. They should have the ability to find appropriate solutions to the citizens’ problems and must be good communicators. In order for a writer to become a popular, a person must love the art of writing more than others do. He must gain the support and the sympathy of the people by disseminating knowledge in society. For scholars and scientists to prove their theories and gain good reputations, they must possess vast knowledge and deep intelligence. In brief, the acceptance of free competition enabled the people to increase their productivity to an unprecedented level. Nevertheless, free competition not only increases productivity by encouraging honesty, fidelity, order, and persistence but also engenders other virtues like private initiative, courage, solidarity, and mutual social assistance. All of this develops as a result of this principle.

Nationalism After our literary discussions with the honorable Suleyman Nazif Bey, we thought that the misunderstandings on the Turkists had come to an end. Since the goals and the objectives of the Turkists are clear, we did not expect to encounter any doubts and confusion on this matter. Unfortunately, we were too optimistic. Those who criticize us, and discredit Turkist ideology do not really want to understand our real ideas. All criticisms are based on hearsay. The well-known and honorable Ahmed Naim Baban took the same path to criticize us. He published a lengthy article to refute the nationalist currents—particularly the Turkist ideology. Nonetheless, he was not able

118 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic to substantiate his claims against the Turkists. Today, many journals and newspapers are published by the Turkists. In his general accusations, Naim Bey cannot point out that any article in these publications is detrimental or against Islam. At the beginning of his article, Naim Bey separates Turkists into two main categories: He names the first category the pure Turkists and the second one Turkist-Islamists. According to Naim, the pure Turkists are openly irreligious and even atheists. The Turkists-Islamists are in between. From what source did Naim Bey borrow this division? On which documents did he base his ideas? In order to make such categorization one must have some solid documentary evidence. I wonder, which Turkists wanted to promote atheism? Which Turkists would say that he is uncertain between Islam and atheism? An agnostic? Unless these accusations are clearly answered and supported with documents, this categorization is bound to stay subjective and fictitious. Since we are more familiar with Turkist ideology than we are with Naim Bey, we can clearly argue that there is no element in Turkist ideology that advocates irreligious ideas or atheism. Individuals who adhere to these ideas have always existed in history. But it would be unfair to accuse the entire Turkist movement of being irreligious. Actually, the ones who have followed the Turkist current closely see that an increase in religiosity took place after the rise of Turkism brought a new ideology. Turkish youth who were indifferent to their religion five years ago, now are becoming pious. This observation clearly demonstrates that religion is one of the most important components of nationality. For the adherents of the nationalist movement, abandoning religion is not an option. In light of this, dividing the Turkists in two categories like those of Naim Bey (i.e., those who adopt atheism and those who are in between) is simply untrue and devoid of any foundation. Turkism is a whole and indivisible ideology. Its path is toward one goal and cannot be divided. Individual aspirations are not important in this ideology. Those who deviate from the true path of Turkism would be excluded from that movement. Now, let’s look at the main criticism of Naim Bey. This is refutation of Turkism that was published in the journal Sebil-ürReşad; it amounted to fifteen pages and can be summarized in three main points: 1) The religion of Islam disapproves of racism and tribalism (kavmiyet). These kinds of ideologies are against the essence and tenets of Islam. 2) The nationalist currents are detrimental and harmful. 3) The nationalist movement was first born in Europe and then adopted by the Muslims. Therefore, it is unnatural for us. Now, let’s examine all these points one by one. In order to prove his first argument— that Islam condemns nationalism—Naim Bey cites various hadiths (prophetic reports), rivayets (reported hearsays), and even Qur’anic ayahs (verses). He seems to spend a lot of time and energy on collecting this textual evidence. Since our view on Islam differs from that of Naim Bey, we also examined his textual material. Nevertheless, in these holy texts, we did not find any evidence to substantiate Naim’s argument. Here, the most important thing is the following: none of the sacred texts presented by Naim contain the word qawm (race, people). Only the term asabiyah/asabiyet is used in these texts. As far as we understand, Naim Bey interpreted the word asabiya as nationality.

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 119 Here, of course, we would not pretend to have a better knowledge of Arabic than he does. Nevertheless, we disagree on the meaning of the word qawmiyah/kavmiyet. If he understands what we mean by that term, our problem would be solved. According to sociology, a nation is a group of individuals who have similar feelings. These shared feelings derive from two factors: language and religion. After these come race, history, tradition, customs, literature, and so on. These secondary elements are actually the result of language and religion. There is no nation in the world whose customs, literature, and history was not influenced by its religion. The basis of all of these elements is language. Sociologists define a nation as shared culture and mentality: “la nation c’est la culture-la nation c’est la mentalite.” This confirms our understanding of nationality. It is clear that nationality (milliyet) and tribal solidarity (asabiyet) are two different things. Moreover, there is a conflict between these two terms. Asabiyet attaches a person to his family; in contrast, nationality is a much larger entity. Nationality attaches a person to a common spiritual group. Asabiyet occurs among peoples who are still living in tribal stage. In contrast, nationality is created by a common consciousness. Before Islam, Arabs lived in tribal societies, and asabiyet played a focal role in their life. Their identity was tribal. Tribes fought over camels and horses. During the rise of Islam, tribalism was the strongest challenge faced by Prophet Muhammad. When we examine Islamic history, we would see that asabiyet (tribalism) became the strongest enemy of Islam. The Qur’an condemns the tribalism of the Bedouin tribes (Tevbe 9/97). The foremost and primary goal of Islam is to eliminate tribalism and tribal Arabism and unite Arabs by giving them a new faith, a common conscious and goal. The Prophet Muhammad and his companions built a new Arab unity that was formed by Islam. That unity would be the base of the new faith. Until the coming of Islam, Arab tribes remained isolated and marginalized in a remote corner of the world. That was because of their tribalism. Because they lacked national consciousness, they did not have a national unity. The Qur’an condemns tribalism but endorses the pre-Islamic Arab institutions that would help to preserve the national unity of the Arabs. When the qibla was switched from Jerusalem to Mecca, some believers criticized Prophet Muhammad. The Qur’an responded to these rebukes with a verse: “The East and the West belong to Allah. To whichever direction you turn, you will be turning to Allah. Allah is All-Embracing, All-Knowing” (Baqara 115). This means that you are not a better Muslim because you pray toward the East or the West. Isn’t the sublime language of the Qur’an the greatest miracle of our Prophet? This is proved not only by faith but also by history. The clarity and the beauty of Qur’anic language impressed all Arab poets. Arabic language would then serve to unite all Arabs not only in tribal circles but also on a national scale. The Qur’an united all Arabs by its miracles and eliminated obstacles of communication between different Arab tribes. Today, thanks to the language of the Qur’an, the speakers of various Arab dialects from Marrakesh (in Morocco) to Iraq can communicate with each other and form a linguistic unity. Now let’s look at the political scene. Here, we encounter a similar situation. As soon as the first Islamic government was established in Medina, all efforts of the Messenger of God (Prophet Muhammad) and his companions were exerted to unite all Arabs under the authority of that government. Arabs must be united ideologically and sentimentally, and they must have one goal. The new principle was in Arabia—there

120 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic would be only Muslim Arabs. The natural result of this policy was to exclude all other religions and nationalities from the Arabian Peninsula. The members of other religions would not be able to live in Arabia even by paying a poll-tax (jizya) and by accepting Muslim rule. All previously Pagan, Christian, and Jewish Arabs had to convert to Islam. The Jews, who had inhabited Arabia since the immemorial times, now had to either convert or leave the continent. Outside Arabia, various nationalities would be able to live under Muslim rule by paying their poll-tax—but not in Arabia. This policy was designed to create a solid national base for the Arabs in their homeland. Therefore, the Qur’anic verse and principle (La ikrahe fi-din; no compulsion in religion, Baqara 2:256) was not implemented inside Arabia, but outside. The unprecedented tolerance of Islam to other religions and cultures was practiced only outside the Arabian Peninsula. The Caliphate of Medina under the Rashidun caliphs followed the same policy: unite all Arabs living in Arabia under its authority and give them the same spirit and the same goal, thus forming an Arab national unity. As soon as that state in Medina was established divers expeditions to the four corners of Arabia, from the most remote parts of Yemen to the Iranian border or to the Roman border in Syria were carried out to bring all semi-independent Arab tribes like Banu Munzir and Banu Ghassan under the authority of the caliphate. These expeditions were quite different from the other military incursions outside Arabia which were done to obtain taxes. For the Arabs of Arabia, the option of paying taxes to keep their previous religion simply did not exist. All various Arab tribes participated to the common Arab national counsciousness and formed a national unity. In the Qur’an, Muellefetul-Qulub (the winning of hearts) defined eight categories of people who could receive alms (zakat). The goal of the Qur’an was to form an Arab unity and to build Islam on that foundation. Therefore, after the victory of Islam in Uhud and the capture of Mecca, the Prophet spared the Pagan enemy Arab leaders. Those leaders of the Jahiliyya (Paganism) who wanted to destroy Islam were pardoned by the Prophet Muhammad, and their hearts were won. That policy of reconciliation was implemented for the sake of Arab national unity. Pagan Arab leaders like Abu Sufyan, Ikrima, and Khalid bin Walid benefited from that policy and received the favors of the Prophet. Outside Arabia, we do not find such a policy. Prophet Muhammad and his companions knew very well the social standing and the political importance of these leaders and wanted to win them to their cause. At that time, these leaders would use their exceptional genius for the elevation of Islam. That is why, right after the conquest of Mecca, when the military genius Khalid bin Walid surrendered after a fierce resistance to the Muslims, Prophet Muhammad pardoned him and appointed him to the high command of the Muslim forces. Moreover, he ordered Abu Bakr, a very early convert and the first caliph, to work with Khalid. Once these crucial decisions were taken, Arab national unity was formed and found its course. For thousands of years, Arabs were the prisoners of their tribal system, which prevented them from forming a unity to play a role in history. Once Islam broke the shackles of that system and liberated them, Arabs entered into a new era and changed the course of history by creating miracles. The real factor behind the success of the Arabs was their national unity. Islam did not undermine and destroy the national character of the Arabs. On the contrary, it made it even stronger. Thus, by taking force and by basing itself on Arab nationality, Islam began its ascension and

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 121 expansion. Asabiyet (tribalism) was an obstacle for Arab unity. Islam forbade it. Prophet Muhammad and his companions worked for the realization of Arab unity. The Qur’an condemns tribalism. Confusing tribalism with nationalism would be a great error. This is because tribalism is the mortal enemy of Islam; in contrast, nationalism supports it. For a while, Islam vanquished tribalism and united Arabs around their national conscious. Nevertheless, it was not able to completely eradicate that harmful system. The Prophet Muhammad and his companions fought against tribalism with two means: persuasion was first and force second. First, Muhammad would quote Qur’anic verses to explain to Muslims why tribalism was bad and detrimental; second, he would try to suppress tribalism by force. In spite of his efforts, this social disease was so deeply rooted in Arab society that unfortunately the Prophet was not able to completely eliminate it. After the death of the Prophet, tribalism was revived. Even before the burial of Muhammad, Muhajirun (emigres) and the Ansar (Medinan hosts) began to fight. That was nothing but a revival of the old tribal enmities. The Prophet Muhammad was the founder and the representative of that new national spirit of the Arabs. His demise gave hope to those who wanted to restore the old habits. But now Islam has been presided over by energetic and powerful leaders like the caliphs Abu Bakr (r. 632–4) and Umar (r. 634–44), who succeeded the Prophet; thus, the head of the snake of tribalism was crushed again. The military genius of the Arabs, which was dormant for thousands of years, was revived, and Arab conquests spread from one corner of the world to another. During the reign of Umar, Islamic conquest reached almost as far as today’s borders of Islam. Nevertheless, the dragon of tribalism was not dead yet. It was hidden in the various corners of the Arab world. During the reign of the Caliph Uthman (r. 644–56), a schism divided the Muslims whose tribes of Banu Umayya and Banu Hashim began to fight for supremacy. Unfortunately, Uthman did not have the courage and the determination of Umar to crush the dragon of tribalism. Subsequently, the old demon of tribalism was revived again. As a result, Arab national unity was broken, and a bloody period of anarchy and civil was begun. The martyrdom of the Caliph Uthman (d. 656), the battles of Jamal (656), Siffin (658), and Nahrawan (659), the martyrdom of the Caliph Ali (d. 661), the ten companions who were promised paradise during their lifetimes, the massacre of Kerbela in 680, all of these resulted from that tribalism. Muslims killed Muslims, Arabs killed Arabs. Muslim leaders turned against each other. But now the times had changed; the old tribalism regained its force and again dominated the Arab world. Eventually the Banu Umayya (Umayyads) and their successors, the Ali-Abbas (Abbasids), understood the danger posed by tribalism and began taking the necessary measures to eliminate it. Famous commanders like Hajjaj bin Yusuf and Ziyad bin Umaya did not hesitate even to bombard the Kaaba with a catapult and to sack Medina. They also killed many companions and threw some of them into prison to reestablish the unity of the Islamic caliphate. But in the end, they were not able to succeed. The anarchy turned into a popular insurrection and ended the Arab dominion. The civil strife was even brought to the borders where various tribes were fighting against each other. In his famous work, Mukaddima, the famous historian Ibn Khaldun (d.1406), who was well known for his deep knowledge and correct analysis of social issues, explained in detail the problem of tribalism and its detrimental effects upon Arabs and Muslims. It is obvious

122 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic that, if the Arabs remained loyal to the principle of national unity introduced by Islam, the course of Islamic history would be different. Now, we think that Naim Bey would not try to reject our ideas based on undeniable historical events. The issue is very clear: when the Muslim Arabs maintained their national unity, a great order and harmony ruled their world. But when this unity became broken, they became deprived of the bounty of that golden age. They went into decline. At the beginning of Islamic history, Arab unity was achieved, and a wonderful progress took place. Subsequently, tribalism reared its head and decline began. The Qur’anic verses and the hadith reports used by Naim Bey to support his argument actually work against his ideas. None of these verses and reports contains the word “qawm” (nation). Instead they use the word asabiya (tribalism) and condemned it. Naim Bey confused these two terms. The passages of the sacred texts mention that Muslims are bound to each other with religious brotherhood. Nevertheless, none of these texts condemns nationality. The religion of Islam never denies the importance of nationality, which was always a reality. Islam also recognized the rights of the non-Muslims. They were free to practice their own religion and speak their own language. When Islam recognized the national rights of the non-Muslims, it would be unthinkable that it will deny those rights to the Muslims. Nowhere in the sharia, is there any mention that people who converted to Islam must renounce their native language and national customs. There is no Qur’anic verse or hadith stating that the Persians and the Turks had to abandon their languages and their national cultures. If such a thing had existed, Naim Bey should show it to us. Islam demands Muslims remain loyal to their religion and be attached to the religious brotherhood. Nevertheless, it does not ask them to give up their national customs. Now, we have to answer Naim Bey’s second claim. According to him, the idea of nationality is against the Muslim brotherhood. This is because such an idea would undermine Muslim unity and divide ummah. In order to justify his argument, he again uses Qur’anic verses and hadith reports. We do not agree with his interpretation of those texts. Naim Bey cannot prove that the nationalist currents in the Muslim world undermined an already existing unity among various Muslim societies. As he should know very well, Islamic unity actually is a goal. Throughout history, the realization of this goal remained quite limited. For example, the idea and feeling of Islamic brotherhood exist among many Muslims all around the world, such as when Muslims in China were saddened by the French invasion of Morocco. Nevertheless, this is not strong enough to cause a Chinese Muslim to fight against the French to defend Morocco. Suleyman, who killed Caliph Uthman, knew those verses, and he reports on Islamic brotherhood better than we do. Likewise, Aisha, Talha, Zubayr, Muawiya, and Amr bin Ass who led armies into the battles of Jamal, Siffin, Nahrawan, and Kerbela knew the sacred texts very well. Nevertheless, that did not prevent them from fighting against other Muslims. In history Muslim peoples and governments fought with each other. Almost all Muslim states made war with other Muslim states. Therefore, the principle and goal is one thing and the reality of life is something else. Therefore, asserting that Islamic unity was undermined by nationalist currents would not be a correct statement. On the contrary, we believe that the true nationalist currents play a crucial role for strengthening and consolidating the Islamic unity. As we have explained before: a nation is a community of people who feel the same way. The most important factor of the nationality is the

 Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939) 123 common language and religion. Today the world population could be divided into three civilizational entities: Islamic, Christian, and Buddhist-Confucian civilizations. The most important factor that separates each of these civilizations from the others is religion. A Frenchmen can argue that he is an atheist. Nevertheless, culturally he is marked and influenced by Christianity. Two thousand years of Christian culture would shape his character. We have to take into consideration all these factors that create nationality. Islam is the religion of the Turk. It is his national religion. Turks accepted Islam not as a defeated and vanquished people. On the contrary, Turks converted to Islam when they were victorious. For a thousand years, the Turks carried the heaviest burden of Islam. For the sake of Islam, the Turks have forgotten everything. They have forgotten their language, their literature, their economy, and even their very existence. In the darkest days of Islam, the Turks came to the rescue of this religion, all the way from the mountains of Altay (their homeland). We think that Turks performed their sacred duty perfectly. When Turks begin to mention pre-Islamic Turkish history, our opponents start to accuse them of practicing ancient Shamanist religion. This is a loathsome calumny, a horrible slander. Why would any Turk revert to shamanism, when the most glorious pages in their history were after their conversion to Islam?

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Part III

The Westernists

6

Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938)

Biography Celal Nuri İleri was born on August 15, 1881, in Gelibolu. His father, Mustafa Nuri Efendi, served as governor in many provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Celal Nuri’s mother was Nefise Hanim, the daughter of Abidin Pasha, a notable from southern Albania. In his childhood, Celal Nuri received a good education at home and learned French. In Istanbul, he continued his education at the Lycée de Galatasaray (Mekteb-i Sultani). Later, Celal Nuri entered law school and worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the events of March 31 (April 13, 1909), together with Ebu Ziya Tevfik, Celal Nuri began writing for the French-language newspaper of Istanbul, Courrier d’Orient. At the same time, his articles appeared in newspapers such as Tanin and Hak and in the journal Ijtihad. During 1912–13, Celal Nuri traveled in Europe. He visited many countries, including Russia and several Scandinavian countries. He also went up to the North Pole. In 1914, after a disagreement with Abdullah Cevdet, he ceased writing for Ijtihad and began the journal Hürriyet-i Fikriye (Freedom of Opinion) with Kılıçzade Hakkı. The same year he traveled to America for two months and visited the North Pole. In 1916, he became the chief editor of the newspaper İkdam. At the same time, he started the journal Edebiyat-i Umumiye (General Literature). On January 1, 1918, Celal Nuri began his famous newspaper Ati. In this newspaper, he expounded his social and political views. After the closure of his newspaper, on February 10, 1919, by the Ottoman government, which was acting upon the request of the Occupation forces, Celal Nuri began another newspaper entitled İleri (Forward). Besides his journalistic and intellectual activities, Celal Nuri was also politically very active. He served in the last Ottoman and early Republican Turkish parliaments as a deputy. After the First World War, Celal Nuri was exiled to Malta by the British Occupation authorities. After his release from Malta Prison, he arrived in Ankara on November 26, 1922. On November 22, 1922, Celal Nuri was elected to the post of president of the Commission for the Promulgation of the Constitution. In 1926, Celal Nuri published his famous work The Turkish Revolution (Türk Inkılabı). Until 1935, Celal Nuri served in the Turkish parliament as a deputy and continued his journalistic activities. Celal Nuri İleri died in Istanbul on November 2, 1938. The following passages are taken from Celal Nuri İleri’s Türk İnkilabı. Istanbul: Ahmed Kamil Matbaası 1926. Reprinted as Türk İnkilabı, edited by Recep Durmaz. İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2000.

128 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic

Civilization Today, world civilization is not homogenous. In terms of mentality, way of life, and also, to a certain extent, concerning religion, Europe and America and their colonies belong to civilization that is wrongly called Christian civilization. “European civilization,” although an imperfect term and not comprehensive enough, is more representative for defining that civilization. Those who belong to that civilization actually form only an important minority of the world’s population. The majority of the world’s population is formed by members of religions that do not possess a holy book. This includes the greater part of India, Indochina, and China. In most of Africa, Japan, and the lesser parts of the Indian Ocean islands including Indonesia, Muslims form a minority. Today European civilization is superior and is progressing; meanwhile, the civilizations of the rest of the world have stagnated and are dependent on the West. Japan has successfully borrowed the advanced technology of Europe, but it has not yet adopted the West’s culture, social order, and other aspects. Digression: The only Christian society that did not adopt European civilization is Abyssinia (Ethiopia). That is due to its geographical location and its race. The main characteristic of advanced civilizations is their dynamism, and the main characteristics of stagnated civilizations are their inaction and idleness. We see that every nation belonging to the European civilization and attached to that civilization is advancing; meanwhile, other nations have stagnated and have been defeated by the advanced nations. Only Turkey is an exception to that rule. At the end of our article, we will examine that. These summarized descriptions are vague. Here we have to further explain our aim: in Europe, despite having a population that belongs to various nations and that lives in different states, there exist a people that we could call European. Americans also are part of this category. The dress, living style, legal systems, ethical values, way of thinking, sciences and education, and even their religions are common. Their differences and dissimilarities are rather few and are mostly in private issues. Nevertheless, the differences between those who belong to the European civilization and those who do not are quite important and fundamental. Nonetheless, there exist also important differences between those nations which do not belong to the European civilization. For example, the differences between Chinese, Indians, Pagan Africans, and Muslims are quite important. These kinds of differences do not exist among European nations. Before entering to the subject of difference between the Europeans, Americans, and the others, let’s first try to find out what is the cause of the similarity and likeness between the various European nations. To me, this similarity has two causes. As we mentioned before, Europe is a small continent. It is not even a continent but a peninsula situated in the extreme west of Asia. Geographically, this part of the world is located in a very suitable position. In Europe, the seas, the rivers, and other natural avenues have increased the communication between the people. Therefore, none of these nations could be immune to the influence of other nations. On the other hand, the progress in the means of transport has increasingly intensified the communication. Whereas other parts of the world have evolved more independently, America is directly a creation of Europe. Most of its population is formed by the European immigrants. When it comes to the native or indigenous peoples of that

 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 129 continent, they are either totally exterminated or assimilated to the European culture like in Mexico. This observation is also valid for the other colonies. There is also another factor which unites the peoples of Europe. This is the Christian religion regardless of its sectarian divisions. Here we are not entering  into the theological discussions about the nature of Christianity. Our point is the religious unity of Europe. Christianity was transformed in Europe by adopting itself to the energetic and constantly changing character of the Europeans. It abandoned its original stagnated nature. Today, there is little resemblance between the religion preached by Jesus Christ and the current Christianity in Europe. We can safely argue that the current modern Christianity is quite different from the original Nazarene religion. The Europeans in the last 1,700 years have created a new religion on the basis of the Jesus’s story. This religion despite the interpretations of the church fathers adopted itself to the reality of every age. When Europe was struggling in the Dark Ages of the medieval times, Christianity presented a very ugly image. But later, around 400 years ago, a radical transformation occurred in the religion. Many nations have seceded from the main Catholic Church. After that, the Catholic Church also started a reform movement within itself. In short, this religion did not succeed to impose the old Christian dogma to these nations. On the contrary, the new interpretation gave a new color to that religion. Afterwards the main function of the Christian religion was to maintain the unity of its followers. The European morality is based on that religion which became transformed throughout the ages. In contrast, among Muslims and Pagans such a unity does not exist. Non-European peoples live scattered across many parts of the world. Their connection with each other is quite casual and rare. These religions remained stagnated. But on the other hand, without any doubt these religions have many virtues. Nevertheless, since our aim is not to write a book of comparative religions we will not enter into detail on that issue. We have to take notice that Islam, which is based on lofty and high values and principles, entered into stagnation in the last few hundred years. This stagnation is due to the domination of Islam by the conservative ulema. Today, if a Christian were asked to organize his life according to the rules and principles of the time when Jesus lived, he would realize that his life would take quite an archaic form. Christianity preserved only the spirit of Jesus’s original religion. Later rules and principles are the fruits of the last 1,900 years of intellectual activities. Especially in modern times, Christianity had to relinquish its control over worldly affairs. As a result, politics became free from the church’s interference. In contrast, Muslim jurists did not follow that path and closed the gates of ijtihad by wrongly believing that Islamic legal sources do not need to be interpreted according to the changing needs of the time. Muslim jurists considered faith and worldly affairs as one. As a result, Islam remained stagnated and civil transactions continued to be interpreted according to ancient Islamic jurisprudence—according to fatwas issued hundreds of years ago. If Muslim legal scholars had accepted the need for reform in law, the Islamic world today would not be in such a deplorable situation. The Muslim ulema and scholars of the early times of Islam were actually more innovative, rational, and intellectually advanced than their predecessors. For example, not much later than the era of Prophet Muhammad (570–632) and the Rashidun caliphs (632–61), Imam Abu Hanifa (d.767) and some others laid down some new laws; they did this because the law in force did

130 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic not respond to the needs of their time. Although the era of Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors was simple, plain, and natural, people knew about commercial transactions and different types of sale. Nevertheless, the contracts of rent, hiring, and lease were not very well known. That is why the Qur’an contains explanatory information about this type of commercial transaction. Afterwards, when Islamic empire expanded and Muslim rule extended beyond Hijaz (western Arabia) to the other lands, different communities—some more advanced and civilized than the Arabs—were brought under Islamic rule. Consequently, the four Sunni imams were obliged to legally address various issues that had not been of concern to Muslims until then. Although some of their legal solutions appeared to be against the principles of the Qur’an and Sunna, later on the promulgations of these imams were adopted and became part of the Islamic jurisprudence. If Muslim jurists had followed that path and continued to expand the Islamic jurisprudence according to the changing needs of time, Islamic law would have been a modern legal system today. But that did not happen. Today if Imam Azam were alive he would laugh but at the same time be angry with these jurists who emulate his jurisprudence without taking into consideration the changing conditions of time. Normally, the jurists have to introduce new law by staying in the legal school of their masters. They base their legal opinion on their predecessors but always add new interpretation according to the changing circumstances of the time. But the Muslim jurists in the preceding centuries did not do that. They slavishly repeated the legal opinions of the past. They did not understand that the promulgation of the ancient jurists was written for that ancient time, and, with the passing of time, the law must adopt itself to the new realities of the modern times. Otherwise, there would be no progress in that society. The stagnated societies are condemned to be conquered and dominated by the advanced societies. In Islam the commercial transactions (muamelat) were regulated by religion. Religion encompasses both faith (akide) and muamelat. But equally in Islam the juristic interpretation of the sacred texts is an absolute requirement for the jurists. Our jurists adopted the first rule which includes muamelat into the religion but neglected their duties of exercising ijtihad. The consensus of the community (ijma-i ummah) is a requirement in Islamic public law; but that aspect was totally forgotten. What we mean by the consensus of the community is nothing but the legislative force in every modern and constitutional state, the parliament. Consequently, we can safely argue that the spirit of Islam was debilitated. The path followed by the jurists of the last two or three centuries is not suitable to Islam. Their apathy and imitation are the main cause for the Islam’s current crisis and backwardness of the Muslim society. Although the Islamic law is very elastic and permissible in the field of muamalat (private and commercial transactions), the conservative ulema interpreted the law in a very restrictive way and prevented the commerce to flourish. Now, let’s have a look at the Western world. In Europe during the Dark Ages the situation was equally bad. The church imposed many restrictions. Nevertheless, this situation has changed. For Europe, the sixteenth century was a very important period; at this time, a radical transformation of the state and society took place. Greek and Roman culture and knowledge, which were not restricted by any limitations, passed onto Europe after the conquest of the Byzantium by the Turks. Although the church immediately took a hostile attitude to that phenomenon,

 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 131 eventually it was defeated and accepted the superiority of the science which symbolizes the new civilization. For example, the papacy condemned Galileo who argued that the earth is rotating (around the sun), because church dogma argues that the earth is not rotating but is immobile. Today, is the papacy still insisting in its former position? Ironically, today one of the most important observatories in the world is located in the Vatican. The Western world including the church immediately benefited from the new innovations and inventions and from the modern science, astronomy, and medicine, and made use of the newspapers and compass. Did the non-European societies also benefit from these innovations? Since the sixteenth century and may be even before, the West progressed and advanced in great leaps, whereas Asia stagnated and eventually was defeated and enslaved by the West. Of all civilizations, the Western one is the civilization of progress and the other, the Eastern (Oriental) one, is the civilization of stagnation and idleness. One cannot give up his right to survive for the preservation of some customs and traditions. Those who give up their right for survival preferred instead to preserve their ancestral traditions. Is this survival or tradition? In order to answer that question, we do not need even to think for as long as a second. Survival is elementary; tradition is merely an accessory—a decoration. Some customs and traditions may be very dear and important, but their value is dependent on their usefulness. If these traditions are harmful and detrimental for us, insisting for their preservation would be realistic and wise. Is it possible to keep all of these traditions without renouncing our right for survival? Suppose we borrow European sciences but not its cultural values or way of thinking. These two are intertwined with other. Is it possible to separate them from each other? In particular, what we are focused on is the general way of thinking of Europeans. If it is possible not to take the thorn together with the rose, then picking the European rose alone would be possible. If this is not possible, we should not be willing to take the depraved sides of the European civilization for the sole purpose of adopting that civilization. The European way of thinking is based on liberal interpretation and scientific research. In the West, adhering wholeheartedly and without question to the views of a spiritual master is not acceptable. Today, in this current year of 1926, a local sheikh in the town of Qairouan in order to determine his actions always would consult an ancient religious text. No matter the level of his intelligence, that sheikh would always follow the instructions of the sacred text. In case his actions might differ a little from those recommended in the text, he would think that he had committed a sin. The sheikh’s belief is actually rooted in a tradition that started centuries ago, and it became natural for him to act like that. That is why in the Muslim world, everything including politics, civilization, way of life, dress code, and dietary rules are based on religion. For example, in order to determine if a pool of water is clean, potable, or not, that sheikh instead of using his common sense would immediately consult his legal manual based on the ancient sources. According to the Islamic jurisprudence that the sheikh was using, if that pool of water covers an area of 10 × 10 ritl or 60 cm × 60 cm, or 206 liter of water or more, then that water would be considered potable—even if that water contains living or dead frogs and is covered with moss and algae. Then the sheikh will issue his fatwa (legal opinion): yes, that water is clean and potable. In contrast, before any European, whether religious or not, layman or a cleric, would drink from such a muddy source, he would use his

132 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic common sense and examine it. If not satisfied, he would test it according to chemical methods. In politics and law, the sheikh would follow the same procedure. He would consult the legal manuals written by the Islamic jurists who died 1,000 years ago. Nevertheless, every rule of sharia is bounded by maslaha (public good). Actually, most of the old fatwas are incompatible with the essentials of Islam. In the past, the sultans manipulated the muftis (legal scholars who deliver fatwas) and forced them to issue fatwas to support their policies. The fatwas became thus political and supported the autocracy of the sultans. The tradition in religion prevented the Muslim world to progress. Then, gradually that situation also affected the spirituality and morality of the Muslims and corrupted them. In many Muslim countries the original and pristine aspect of the religion was forgotten, and fanaticism became a plague. An intellectually progressive Muslim no longer appreciates the religious traditions of his community. Nevertheless, progressive Christians despite their liberal ideas remained attached to their church. The reason for that is the neglect of the moral aspects of the Islam by the fanatical ulema. In contrast, in Europe, particularly in England and in America, in order not to lose their position in the society, the clergy did not act like their ancient counterparts who had opposed progress in the past. Today the clergy in those countries support modern ideas that benefit spirituality and morality. For centuries, polygamy has been one of the most hated and despised social practices. Europeans—and Americans in particular—who condemn the Mormons would tolerate almost anything except their polygamy. European mentality cannot accept that, although advocates of polygamy exist everywhere. Despite that, Europeans maintained their ideas on this issue. Although like Islam the Christianity and Judaism could not really prevent polygamy, the church by adapting itself to the European culture did not favor polygamy. When the priests want to attack Turkey, the first thing they point out is the practice of polygamy among the Turks. But on the other hand, all those Christian priests accept the ancient Hebrew prophets of the Old Testament who were polygamists as genuine prophets. Moreover, the Old Testament which they venerate contains hundreds of passages allowing the polygamy. Did the Islamic world adapt itself to the general consideration of the modern age? Neither the subsequent jurists accepted the necessary innovations nor did a revolt take place against them. In Europe and in the Christian world until Luther, the church was opposed to such innovations. Then the struggle between those conservative clergy and the reformists was important and quite violent. In contrast, in Islamic history, we do not find Muslims opposing a dogmatist and reactionary ulema—nor do we find them being accused of infidelity. Thus, the Muslim ulema did not feel any pressure to adapt themselves to the modern age. Then we can safely argue that tradition made Muslims numb and insensitive. The first Muslim people to awaken from that torpor are the Turks. Since the Islamic and Zoroastrian worlds remained in a state of isolation and seclusion, they did not play a role in creating the civilization and education which came into being in Europe, nor were they influenced by the understanding that led to its creation. With the passing of centuries, the gap between the West and the East became larger and these two worlds became increasingly stranger to each other. Almost every European nation played a role in the civilization of Europe. Only the Eastern Christians are exempted from that phenomenon. Which nation can claim a

 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 133 monopoly over those scientific discoveries? For example, one of the founders of the modern astronomy is Copernicus, who is Polish; another, Galileo, is Italian; Kepler is German; Tycho Brahe is Danish; Laplace is French. It is the same in the field of medicine. In chemistry and physics, we also encounter the names of several scientists belonging to various nations who contributed to the development of these sciences and made important discoveries. On these subjects it is difficult to find the names of any Muslim, Chinese, and Hindu (Indian). In literature, the major figures of the European literature, regardless of their ethnic origins or whether they criticize other nations or not, are first considered as eminent European men of letters and belong to the common European civilization. Among men, we can mention the names of Kant, who was German, Descartes, who was French, Cervantes, who was Spanish, and Tolstoy, who was Russian. These writers had a profound influence not only on their own fellow countrymen but also on all Europeans. Thus, they became international. The modern European literature prepared the ground for the rise of the modern European thought. Nevertheless, these European thinkers did not exert any influence on any nonEuropean culture and civilization. For example, Shakespeare was the greatest English writer and Pasteur was a great French scientist whose discoveries opened a new era in the world. Pasteur is very well known in America. But did Victor Hugo play any role or exert any influence on the current Islamic literature (Turkey excepted)? What kind of influence did the Chinese poet Kiya-Tseung Ming have in Germany? While esthetics had a national origin, it inspired an international sentimental education in Germany. For example, there is a Flemish School of painting. That has a particular style and peculiar characteristic. On the other hand, Italian art is different from the others. Nevertheless, all of these peculiar national arts created a common European esthetics and have similar artistic features. But they did not exert any influence on nonEuropean civilizations. In the past, Arabic architecture had some influence in Europe. But this influence never became a mutual interaction between the European and nonEuropean civilizations. In contrast, between the various European nations, there exists an increasing mutual interaction in literary, scientific, and aesthetic areas. Today most of the European scientific discoveries are not considered solely national. They became the property of all the humanity. Otherwise, science and technology would never reach its current advanced level. The progress achieved by the West in science and technology was realized not only for itself but for all humanity. In the world, there are some local and national cultural aspects and arts. Those were colored by their national and regional character, such as Chinese education. But the European civilization became international and today we have no other choice but to adopt it. Perhaps we do not need to adopt the Chinese educational system or Shia sectarian law; but definitely need the science of Europe. Countries like Germany and Romania do not need to borrow Eastern cultural aspects but India desperately needs the medical discoveries of Pasteur; otherwise its population of 375 million could get rabies. In the old days, our ulema were very knowledgeable and their science was beneficial to the people. Our ulema had a vast knowledge in the fields of tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis), hadith (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), fikih (Islamic jurisprudence), bedii (rhetoric), and mantik (logic). They were deeply studying these subjects. Nonetheless, a person does not necessarily need to be familiar with those subjects to be a scholar

134 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic or a scientist. For example, an old and respectable Moroccan scholar in Marrakesh who is very well versed on the Islamic studies has no idea about modern sciences like astronomy, biology, zoology, world history, sociology, and modern technology like electricity. Today, in our age that person cannot be considered a learned man in the modern sense. Therefore, the science and scholarship of the East (Orient) are not international and now mostly obsolete. Likewise, Eastern philosophy now also has become obsolete and passé. Our argument is this: today, a person even by mastering all the Oriental knowledge, including the Islamic sciences, cannot be considered as a modern scholar or scientist. Our question is if those obsolete knowledge and sciences of the East were beneficial and would cause progress of the society, could the humanity benefit from that? No. In the Middle Ages, Europe had a scholarly method called the scholasticism. It was considered as a science then. But in reality, it had no theoretical basis. Many scholars in medieval times studied scholasticism in vain. Finally, in modern times it was understood that it was no more than a boundless sea. In the West, with the rise of the modern science, the scholastic philosophy became obsolete and abandoned. Its disuse caused no harm in the West. In contrast, in the Middle Ages, scholastic knowledge was a requirement for all scholars. Today the Islamic sciences are the same. The modern Western scholarship is based on reality and is not compatible with fables and legends. The whole Western scientific method is based on criticism and nobody would accept a proposed theory without questioning it. In contrast, in the East, knowledge is considered as an absolute reality that is immutable and bound to be transmitted intact to posterity. In Islam reason (akl) is considered inferior to transmitted revelation (nakl), which is superior. Reason is submitted to transmitted knowledge. In the East, all sciences were built on the principle of transmission. In contrast, today in the West, such a thing cannot be accepted; rather, all knowledge is acquired by scientific experience. Thus, none of these sciences are subjective and speculative. In Europe not only the exact sciences but also other disciplines like history, politics, and even things related to daily life are based on experimental scientific method. In the East, the situation is just the contrary. The intellectual activity according to Western methods requires the existence of freedom in society. In the West the intellect is based on logic. In contrast, in the East the logic is not free. It always needs to be supported by the transmitted knowledge. When forced to think freely it becomes like a fish out of water. Actually, in Europe too there exist people who still believe to the legends and myths. Even some prominent people are superstitious. Nevertheless, those beliefs are absorbed and became insignificant in the general pool of ideas. Most of the people in those countries have espoused a rational way of thinking and are not affected by these superstitions. The East (Orient), Asia, and primarily Africa are almost in a deep torpor. This torpor made them stagnant. In contrast, Europe is rational and awake. Europe appreciates the real value of things. There every kind of superstition and irrational act is countered by the scientific reality. Asian nations are also not realistic and rational in politics. Let’s give an example: Is it possible to resist soldiers equipped with machine-guns merely with sticks. To us even this question appears to be absurd. Nevertheless, in India, according to the Hindu belief, it is a great sin to kill any kind of living creature including snakes. In India consuming the meat of an animal is not allowed by the Hindu religion. This is because,

 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 135 according to their religion, some of these animals are actually divine. For example, cows are considered divine. Consequently, according to Hinduism it is not permissible to kill any of the British soldiers who occupy their country as the colonizers or as the enemy. But for them, an enemy must not be killed. Only a boycott could be used as a form of resistance. Here, despite his British education, Gandhi believed in that idea. If Gandhi had not built his thought on a religious myth, but had instead opted for armed resistance against the English, then the British government would not have been able to dominate a hundred million Indians only by keeping a battalion there. But the problem is not only arming the people. Arms and weapons can be used when two armed hosts face each other. In order to win a war, the parties must equip themselves in every aspect of life. A nation that is not developed economically and culturally could never succeed—even if it had the strongest army. That is the real issue, and that is why the East could not be a part of Western civilization. As Turks, we are the first people in Asia who have awakened from that torpor.

Criticism of Western Civilization In our history, currently, we are entering into a new phase that could be annulled and abandoned in the future. This is a deviation from the course of our history. Now let’s ask some simple question on the nature of the European civilization. Is this civilization good or bad? Is it worth to adopt it or not? Is this civilization based on strong foundations? What would be its future? Does this civilization have some critics and opponents in the West? What do adherents of other civilizations think about the West? Yes, today the Turkish nation for some reasons is abandoning its own ancient civilizational sphere and joining the European civilization. Was this revolution inevitable? If that issue is explained by these paradigms, our deviation must not be considered unnecessary. There exist some legitimate grounds to oppose to the European civilization. Those who oppose the Western civilization are found among Muslims and non-Muslims. But the opponents of the Western ways of life did not express their ideas according to a well-defined method. Actually, those who criticize the fundamentals of the European civilization are mostly Westerners. On this issue to support our argument we can cite Friedrich Nietzsche and Dr. Max Nordau. The latter argues that the European society is founded on some speculative and unreal bases. Nevertheless, criticism of those thinkers would not be considered as a scientific one. The most scientific criticism on that issue was actually was done by Karl Marx and his disciples. According to the Marxists, the fundamental values of European society are derived from the capitalism. This cannot be accepted as legitimate. These thinkers consider the capitalist society as a phase in the general process of social evolution. To the Marxist thinkers the capitalist system is established for the protection of the ownership rights. For them all social institutions emanating from the ownership like marriage, inheritance, all kinds of other social institutions, state organization, diplomacy, and war are illegitimate because their foundations are not scientific. According to the Marxist ideology, the creation of world built on equality can only

136 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic take place when the right of private ownership is abolished. All kinds of socialist groups have subscribed to that idea. Here we have to make it clear that those thinkers are criticizing are the economic, political, and the social system of Europe but not its science and scholarship. Only some great statesmen and scholars who see things from a transcendent angle like Henri Poincare and Einstein, who developed his theory of relativity, express their skepticism on some established scientific rules, including mathematics. Nevertheless, all of these doubts cannot change the absolute truth of the science. Is the socialist system a good one? The only application of that system is in Russia, and it has not proved to be really successful. Each social situation and every civilization is distinct. Ideas are always ahead of reality. Actually, a social situation or a civilization is the product of historical factors. A social condition can never be instituted by a theoretical framework. If that was possible the sociopolitical models like Republic of Plato and Utopia of Thomas More would be the real entities. Like European civilization, Islamic, Indian, and Chinese civilizations are founded on various historical principles and followed different peculiar paths of evolution and finally reached their current stage. Since humanity is weak and has many shortcomings and weaknesses besides its qualities and virtues, the civilizations established by humans also have deficiencies. Therefore, it is not really difficult to criticize any civilization. We can even foresee the future of these civilizations. Thus, when we examine a civilization the main issue must be its adoptability to the present time rather than its goodness or badness. Besides its many evil aspects, European civilization is a civilization of freedom. The people in Europe are not the prisoners of 1,000-yearold social norms and were not prevented from action by these ancient rules. The sciences in Europe are pure sciences and are not subjective and speculative. There is no doubt that today the superstitious beliefs still exist in the West. But these superstitions cannot dominate the life there. Today the Western world mostly liberated itself from those legends and spiritual shackles. Life in the West today is organized according to positivist thought and reason. In contrast, in India the situation is completely different. In the subcontinent, leaving eating and drinking aside, even breathing is done according to ancient rules written in old manuscripts. There, those archaic rules organize all aspects of life. Is it better to deviate from a path that has proved to be not suitable for the human development and follow another path? Maybe in the future European civilization might also degenerate and decay. Since the decline really does not have a starting date, it is most probable that the Western civilization has already started to decline since its beginnings. Moreover, the Great War (the First World War) has actually accelerated that decline. If our nation had stayed within the Oriental civilization, would it be better for us? Our ancient civilization was a weak one. The Oriental civilization is based on the Arab and Persian cultures. This civilization is not something new for the Turks. The civilizations of the Arabs and Persians had entered into stagnation many centuries ago and nowadays are in the stage of total decline. How can we benefit from them in our age? Language is another important issue. Language is one of the main components of any civilization. The ideas of that civilization are expressed by a particular language and the science is expounded by a language. If in the Arab and Persian worlds the civilization had progressed, the language also would have developed in parallel with it. Then we would

 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 137 benefit from it and entirely adopt their linguistic development. This is because the Turkish language has always borrowed from the Arabic and Persian languages. Those borrowings also do not create a problem in the pronunciation. But what would be the situation in the fields of modern scholarship and science. The Turks at the beginning of the last century found the Arab and Persian civilizations insufficient and inadequate for progress. Then they started to adopt the elements of the Western civilization haphazardly and without following any method. The Islamic civilization was then not adequate for their life. For example, during the drafting of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, I myself many times consulted the Ahkam-i Sultaniya of the Muslim scholar al-Mawardi (d. 1058). But in the end, I mostly benefited from the works of the European jurists and scholars like Boutmy, Duguis, Orlando, Esmein, and Brais. For many centuries the Oriental civilization is in stagnation. If the Turks still continue to be part of that civilization, they would decline. Since the Western civilization has many vices and the Oriental civilization prevents our progress, could we adopt any other civilization? Actually, even we posed that hypothetical question, in reality that is impossible. Another hypothetical question: Since we do not find the Western civilization perfect, could we invent or create a new and original civilization? The response would be: the civilizations cannot be invented. Ancient or modern every civilization and even every religion were not born in a vacuum. Every civilization even the most brilliant ones are the continuation of the previous civilization. It is actually the refined, purified form of the previous one. Therefore, even if we are able to invent a totally new civilization, still we have to build that one on an already existing civilization. Nothing is born out of noting. Therefore, we have to adopt the strongest and the most advanced civilization which is European civilization. Since we strongly believe that the Turkish nation is a talented one and has aptitude for various tasks, we hope that Turks would enter into the path of progress by adopting the European civilization. Moreover, we are also confident that Turkish nation would protect itself from the vices and harmful aspects of the West. Some people argue that Europe entered into a phase of decline; especially after the Great War that decline became accelerated and its fall is almost imminent. According to those who oppose the West, totally adopting Western civilization could create a danger for the survival of our race. Because they say, Asia is awakening and the German emperor Kaiser II mentioned previously the “Yellow Peril.” In the near future all of Europe—including England, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Romania—could be defeated by invading hordes coming out of Asia in successive waves. To them, if Turkey places itself in the West, it also could be invaded by emerging Asian powers. Nevertheless, the victory of Asia over Europe can only be possible if Asia adopts Europe’s science and technology and even European thought. When Europe has such a strong education and such methodical and positivist thought, China or India with their current civilizations can never vanquish Europe. For China and India, salvation would be to accept modern international civilization. That is the path the Turks have started to follow. And that is the correct path? Adoption of Western civilization by our nation would end Europe’s dominance on the rest of the world. Victory of Asia over Europe could be assured by the Turks’ borrowing European methods.

138 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic

Ottomanism between the West and the East Until the end of the Great War (the First World War) there was an ideology called Ottomanism. By confirming our aforementioned information, we can safely affirm that Ottomanism did not constitute a nation from the ethnological point of view. The Ottoman nation is a political and official term and quite different from the Italian, Hungarian, Swedish, and French nations. The Ottoman nation has three characteristics: Turkish, Ottoman, and Muslim. Now we understand that all of those three characteristics were actually in contradiction with each other. The official language of the state was Turkish. Nevertheless, only a portion of the empire’s subjects spoke that language. Although the official religion was Islam, an important part of the Ottomans were non-Muslims. The term “Ottoman” that was originally given to the ruling dynasty later became the name of the whole nation. At the same time, every Ottoman was not loyal to that community. The capitals like Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade attracted Greek, Bulgarian, and Serb subjects of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the Arabs, Albanians, and Armenians who were not gravitating around a foreign political pole came in search of such a political center. The Ottomanism was a conservative ideology since it considers any change a threat to its existence. The best representative of this movement is beyond doubt the Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909), who was possessed by an intuitive groundless fear. That monarch was afraid of every move, every agitation, and every novelty, but he refused to accept any responsibility for this. Therefore, he strongly believed in pursuing a conservative policy for the preservation of the Ottoman dynasty. But, since the Ottoman Empire is located at the junction of Europe and Asia and its territories extend on both continents and it has long shores on the Mediterranean Sea, it cannot have an isolated life like Tibet. In particular, it cannot prevent European influences. Nevertheless, the empire has been drawn both to its past and to Europe. But it was not bound to either of them by strong ties. Naturally, this situation would constitute an obstacle to every kind of development. If Ottomanism would continue to be our official policy, we would lose a lot from our identity. Moreover, our existence could be jeopardized. When we study Ottoman history we see that Ottomanism has caused a loss for us every century— even every year. The right of existence can only be gained by progress. During the era of conquests, the Ottoman state was expanding by acquiring new lands. That was then considered a progress. Stagnating societies cannot continue to exist. In order to predict the future of such a stagnating empire, one should not necessarily be an oracle. In any way, most of the Ottomans did not want the Ottomanism. Only a minority of palace officials and government bureaucrats who benefited from that situation wished the continuation of that policy. But, how long can a minority impose its will on the majority? Was the point of supporting the Ottoman sultanate the Turks? Or, was the sultanate the reason for the support of the Turks? The sultanate convinced the Turks that it was a protective bulwark for their existence. That was a feeling that the Turks adopted and no sound reason could vanquish this feeling. As a result, all Turks wanted Ottomanism. In reality the Turks were the main support of the sultanate, the empire. The Turks mistakenly thought that their best interest was to stay within the empire. But in reality,

 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 139 their interest was to leave the empire. What kind of union was the Ottomanism? We can answer that question by using some scientific and technical terms. In the matter the union or composition is either chemical or mechanical. In the first case the molecules form a substance and it is quite difficult to analyze that formation. In the second case the parts are assembled or attached together with the help of screws and nails. In that case it is quite easy to disassemble or dismantle the constructed thing. The parts of the Ottoman union were not united chemically but mechanically. The Turks who ruled the Ottoman Empire had to become enlightened like every other nation in order to progress. For that they had to cut their link to the past, separate themselves from the stagnated communities and must join the progressive world community. Either the Turks would succeed in this or would lose their right of existence and remain attached to their ancestral traditions like China and abandon the path progress. In that case, they would be destroyed and absorbed by a successful and victorious nation. Ottomanism opposed to every progressive move. The preservation of both Ottoman and Turkish identity would be very difficult in an Ottoman union. The Turks of the Ottoman Empire would not be able to preserve their Turkish identity forever. The partisans of the Ottomanism did not grasp that reality. Because of their inability to understand that reality all the efforts made by the Ottoman rulers and statesmen to rejuvenate the Ottoman Empire had failed. Even the sincerest of the Ottoman bureaucrats could not understand the impossibility of the success of the Ottomanism. Today we are quite confident that those statesmen were sincere in their hope and only understood the reality when the selfishness of the Ottomanism manifested itself in the person of the last sultan, Mehmed VI, Vahideddin (r. 1918–22). The liberation of the Turkish nation from the Ottomanism is the central idea of the Turkish Revolution. In our revolution we see some fundamental factors: 1) Time eventually convinced the Turkish nation that the new path that they adopted is the correct one. 2) The development of the Turkish nation since the Tanzimat, actually since the abolition of the Janissary corps and their adoption of the idea of nationalism. 3) The rise of a great person who became the leader of that nationalist movement when the time and place is suitable. The Turkish Revolution is born out of the combination of these three basic factors. Our revolution is born in the battlefields amid blood and smoke. It is exactly like the birth of a child with pain; it was born at the end of our defeats during the moments of despair. Therefore, our revolution is extremely dear to us. The hardships and difficulties which came out in the afterwards of the Great War must not intimidate us. If the greatest of our ideal is considered as realisable we are just at the beginning of a major highway.

Earlier Civilization and Later Civilization The years from the destruction of the Janissary Corps by Mahmud II to the accession of Mehmed VI to the throne could be considered as a period of reforms and efforts

140 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic of progress. During that period the Ottoman people became exhausted as a result of these reform movements. In that period the Ottoman system was afflicted by some internal problems and weaknesses. Then the republic was born. The republic is the child of a war and a revolution. All movements of reforms before the republic were ambiguous and unclear. Then the fog cleared and we were able to see the ultimate objective clearly. That showed us that previously we were not following a straight and safe path. Nevertheless, since the National Liberation Struggle our movements are totally clear-cut, explicit, and straightforward. The Turkish nation was born after the defeat and the ejection of the enemies: the Greeks who attacked Anatolia and Thrace, the French who tried to occupy Adana (Cilicia) with the help of the Armenians, and the Allies who occupied Istanbul. Afterwards, the Turkish nation was awakened from a long torpor. The nation shook off and cut off all ties that attached her to the past and to the old Ottoman sultanate. Then, it was as if the Turkish lands stretching from the Maritza (Meric) river to Iran and Armenia became disconnected from Asia by a geological event and became united with Europe. Characteristically, this revolution is not partial but complete. That is to say, we have not adopted European civilization by only abandoning some Asian aspects of life. Rather, our goal is to fully adopt European civilization. Then we understand that our revolution is not a primary one but an advanced one. Now let’s explain the two terms that we used. Yes, this revolution is an original one; it is original based on the Arabic meaning of that term, which is ibtidai or primary. Here, the Turks are not inventing an original system of values, a way of thinking, a system of government and education. The revolutions can be borrowed. Then by our revolution we are adopting new ways of thinking, of new etiquettes, new social codes, new systems of education, and new forms of government. We are saying farewell to the Oriental thought and political system which prevented our progress in the last 300 years. Therefore, our duty is nothing but to adopt these new values and forms. In order to progress we should not always invent new methods and innovate. In front of us we have the tested and well-known methods. Then, we adopt and implement them. If we had preferred the opposite of that, our experience would take us to dangerous paths and uncharted waters. An original revolution can only be experimented in a developing and progressive community. So far as we are concerned, we did not progress on that issue until the Great War (the First World War). We had a deficient civilization. The new medical experiments are not implemented on the curable patients. Is it right to make comparisons in history? Most historical facts are actually the consequences of unexpected events. Since their causes are not the same, we cannot really draw comparisons between different historical events. Since humanity is always evolving, it would not be correct to assess or judge past events from today’s perspective. Historical comparisons aside, even history itself has been censured and distorted— even by thinkers and intellectuals. It is not possible to resuscitate or restore history in a correct way. Therefore, many historians argue that judging history may not be an acceptable practice. For example, Doctor Nordau totally distorted not only historical methods but also history in his book The Meaning of History. Let’s travel in history. Which revolution is similar to the Turkish Revolution? When we mention the “revolution,” immediately the Great French Revolution of 1789 comes

 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 141 to mind. Here we have to give some information on that 1789 revolution so readers can understand the comparisons we are making here. This revolution had started a new phase in European history. A new European society was engendered as a result of that revolution. Therefore, the Revolution of 1789 is a landmark in history. This revolution happened as a result of the new ideas expounded by the Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century. Without the intellectual debates and the writings of those philosophers, public opinion would have taken a much slower pace to change and the revolution would not have happened in 1789 but much later. We also have given credit to the professors of economics on the coming of the French Revolution. The political institutions on the eve of the Revolution were the institutions of the past (ancien régime) and had become obsolete for the developing needs of the society. There was no need for their continuation. At that time the French society was divided into three classes: the nobility, the clergy, and the people (commoners). These classes were not equal before the law. The nobility had its roots in the Middle Ages and in those times their rights and legal privileges could make sense. In the medieval times the nobles and the aristocrats protected the people. That was a need because in those ages, the states were not able to protect yet the rights of their subjects. Nevertheless, gradually the French monarchy managed to defeat these feudal lords in a series of wars and imposed the royal sovereignty over them. They became absorbed into the kingdom of France. Then the royal absolutism replaced those feudal sovereignties. Nevertheless, the feudal lords still existed and had all their former privileges. Unfortunately, the kings of France who now had all the powers at their hands failed to serve the interests of the people. They continued to allow the aristocracy to oppress and exploit the common people. The nobility and the clergy were exempt from taxation. All fiscal burdens were placed on the common people. Until the year of 1789, the system of taxation had great injustice. There was no equality, and freedom did not exist. The government ruled without any checks and balances. We should not forget that in countries where the people were not awakened, those kinds of inequalities and injustices were not noticed. But in France, the people were awakened, and everybody saw those abuses and wanted a good government. Actually, the ministers of King Louis XVI saw the danger and wanted to implement reforms to satisfy people’s demands. But the aristocracy and the clergy categorically and fiercely opposed those reforms. As such, the only way to end such a regime based on the exploitation of the popular classes by the privileged class remained rebellion and insurgency. The États-Généraux, which is the assembly formed by the elected members of the aristocracy, clergy, and the common people, convened at Versailles on May 5, 1789. On June 17, 1789, that assembly took the name Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly). After ten days, the deputies took solemn oath. On July 14, 1789, people stormed the castle-prison, Bastille, and liberated the political prisoners held there by the despotic government. On August 4, the National Assembly abolished the feudal rights and privileges. Afterwards the Declaration of Man and the Citizen was issued. In 1791, the new constitution was promulgated, and all French citizens became equal before the law. On September 30, 1789, the National Assembly was dissolved and was replaced with the Legislative Assembly. The new assembly had tried to govern together with the King Louis XVI. Nevertheless, that was not successful. The king was forced by the assembly

142 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic to declare war to Austria. In fact, Louis XVI wanted to escape abroad. Before the king could escape the French armies won the Battle of Valmi. On September 22, 1792, the republic was proclaimed. During the Directoire, France organized military expeditions to Germany, Italy, and Egypt. A young general, Bonaparte, became distinguished in the battles and known by the French people as the liberator. That person established the consulate under his leadership after a coup was engineered on November 9, 1799. He assumed the title of the First Consul. That was a kingship without a royal title. On August 2, 1802, Napoleon was declared the first consul for life. On May 18, 1804, he was elected as the emperor and secured the throne for his descendants after his death. That day the French Revolution came to an end. In order not to leave our story unfinished, we have to add that in 1830 the monarchy was again restored in France as a result of another revolution. Later on, the republic was proclaimed with the Revolution of 1848. In 1851, a nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte reestablished the empire. Then, finally after the Revolution of 1871 (the Paris Commune) the republic was reestablished for the third time. If we compare French and Turkish Revolutions we will see that they have no relation with each other whatsoever. In France of the ancien régime, there existed a huge gap of legal inequality between the various social classes. In the Ottoman Empire—except for the area inhabited by the Kurds and the Arabs—there was never an inequality like what existed in France. In the Ottoman Empire, the masses did not complain about inequality but of misadministration. France was divided between two social blocs: the king, the nobles, and the churchmen constituted the minority, and the common people formed the majority. These two social blocs constantly struggled. Since the Turkish society was always democratic, it never had aristocratic titles. Thus, it is a real anomaly that the Turks were ruled by a monarchy—despite the nonexistence of an aristocratic class. In our history the administrative and intellectual titles were not aristocratic titles. They could not be inherited. The bureaucrats and scholars had several ranks, but they did not have legal privileges like their counterparts in France. In Ottoman history, our timar beys (lords of the military fiefs) are similar in appearance to their European feudal counterparts; however, they were actually fundamentally different from them. The timar institution was borrowed from the Byzantines but did not last long in our history. Unlike in Europe, in the Ottoman Empire these pseudofeudal forces never succeeded in establishing continuous powerful local dynasties. The Turkish Revolution is the consequence of the victory of the principle of nationality. In contrast, the French nationality was fully and definitely formed before the French Revolution of 1789. The French Revolution is the manifestation of the concepts of freedom and constitutionalism. In Turkey, these two concepts were  first mentioned in the Tanzimat (Gülhane) Charter of 1839 and later confirmed in the text of the 1876 Constitution (Kanun-u Esasi). The General Law part of that Constitution is actually similar in form to the Declaration of the Rights of Men and the Citizen. Our Revolution of July 10 (July 24, 1908) resembles the French Revolution only on this aspect. We already have said that our revolution is more of an adaptation than it is original. The French Revolution is original. When closely analyzed, it becomes clear that the Revolution of 1789 evolved over many steps. Nevertheless, the revolutionary movement in France has changed the nature of the state and that new form of state was also adopted by other European states.

 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 143 It is undeniable that in the fields of liberty and constitutionalism the French have borrowed from the English. Nevertheless, the English impact on the French was not direct. The declarations of human rights and constitutions of various countries including the American Constitution and political texts were borrowed from the French documents, not from the English versions. The influence of Montesquieu on the English constitutionalism is certain. Nevertheless, it cannot be asserted that that form of constitutionalism was accepted by other nations as it is. Even the United States, which was engendered  by Great Britain, did not adopt the latter’s political system. England is not a land of revolutions but a land of political evolution. The consequences of the revolutions that took place in France, Russia, and even our country also emerged in England. But in Britain political and social development occurs very slowly; thus, no one would notice it. That kind of political change did not form a landmark in British history. Nevertheless, this rule had an exception in the past. In 1648, the English nation rebelled against the king and the notables in the parliament. This rebellion was successful, and the King Charles I was executed. Afterwards, the republic was proclaimed under the protection of Cromwell. In 1660, the Stuart dynasty was restored. The political agitations in England continued until in 1688. In that year, William III ascended to the throne as a real constitutional monarch. After that, no sudden political movement or coup has taken place in England. The Turkish Revolution also does not demonstrate  any similarities with the Bolshevik Revolution of Russia. After the collapse of the Tsarist rule and the weak Kerensky government, the Russians embarked into not only a political but also a social experiment. This sociopolitical experiment was actually quite different from the 1789 French Revolution. Underdeveloped Turkey in order to progress adopted the Western methods. However, Russia, which was more advanced than Turkey but less advanced than the Western Europe, never demonstrated such an orientation. The new Russian rulers believed that the society built on the rights of ownership and the capitalism turned Europe and even the world into an inferno. Then they endeavor to create  a new society based on the principles of Karl Marx. This new experiment is totally original. In a period when the Turks adopted the ideal of nationalism for their salvation, the Russians completely rejected nationalism and opted for the total opposite of that ideology. They chose internationalism. Since our goal is not the study the Bolshevik ideology, here we will not explain how, in Russia, this political movement became alienated from its original ideas and the implementation of the Bolshevism failed there and instead created an autocratic and reactionary regime in Russia. Our point of view is as follows: there were two revolutions—the first occurred during the Great War (the First World War) and the second took place immediately after it. For a while they were allies. But this rapprochement did occur not because of their ideologies but because they became allied against a common enemy. The Russian Revolution is built on the denial of ownership rights. However, article 75 of our new Constitution recognizes this right which was not mentioned in the old Ottoman Constitution. The goal of the Turkish Revolution is to adapt the Turkish nation to the Western world. After the collapse of the Ottoman sultanate and the caliphate, our nation wanted to become part of a political community that it considered to be closer to itself. Again, we affirm that instead of trying new political and social experiments, it is much safer to join

144 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic a political and civilizational bloc whose success is already assured. We cannot attribute the French Revolution to an individual person. We have already said that the persons who prepared the ground for the advent of that revolution were the Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the revolutionary movement had started after the death of these thinkers and even some revolutionary leaders died during and before the end of the revolution. However, one person ended the revolution and again reverted to a monarchy: Napoleon Bonaparte. In the Russian Revolution, if Lenin is understood as the champion of that revolution, the whole Bolshevik movement is not his work. Whereas even the Turkish Revolution is the consequence of many factors and historical events, it nevertheless took place under the guidance of a single person: Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk). With all his virtues, Mustafa Kemal is the organizer and the commander of this revolution. He clearly understood that no help would come from the past. Moreover, he was naturally endowed with important virtues such as not being afraid of the past, totally abandoning historical tradition, not hesitating to implement his ideas, and inexhaustible energy and determination.

Our Women A suffocating absolutism and as a result of that a deep ignorance put  Islamic and Turkish worlds in an extremely difficult situation. Straying away from the fundamental principles of Islam, banning the intellectual freedom, and closing the gates of Ijtihad put us in a real deplorable situation. Our mind is almost completely atrophied and has became stupefied. Our character, our ethics, and our understanding reduced us to be dumb and dull in the arena of world civilizations. The Turks and Muslims in general were reduced to a position where they cannot see the causes of their destruction. The absolutist regime did not allow any criticism. Any criticism of the old meaningless traditions and customs were met with severe punishment by the authorities. This oppression is not very different from the injustice of the times of Galileo and Tycho Brahe. But thank God since a couple of years we see an awakening. As recently as five years ago, if I had discussed the issues that I now mention in my newly published book History of the Decline of the Ottoman Empire, I would probably have been stoned to death. How can one mention the word “decline” when our empire is in an eternal state (devlet-ı ebed müddet) and when our ruler is the benefactor of the seven different kings? How can we question and criticize our previous rulers, statesmen, scholars (ulema), and Sufi organizations? How can we tackle the issue of the women in our country and criticize women’s condition in Islam? Naturally, those issues were never discussed before. Not even toward the end of the Hamidian absolutism but even during the relatively more tolerant reign of the Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–76), the public could not tolerate such discussions. Shortly after the publication of my book, the Balkan wars broke out. Then I had to make an addition to my already published book Historical Destiny. I continued to write even more freely on the issues of our social and national ills and dysfunctions including the situation of women in our society. Let alone being humiliated, I was praised by many for my writings. Now after being encouraged by

 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938) 145 this social awakening and open-mindedness, I am presenting this more detailed study on the women issue for the consideration of our readers and especially for the consideration of our honorable scholars of Islamic studies from whom we always expect great services for the transformation and advancement of Islam.

The Women Issue If today the Islamic world is not awakened, would it be possible to talk about this issue? But thanks to God, today’s Muslims and Turks are no longer last century’s Turks and Muslims. With the abolition of the absolutist regime and censorship that have no relation whatsoever with Islam, a general movement of political and social awakening took place in Turkey. During the early period of Islam, every kind of idea could be freely discussed and debated. Now we are at the dawn of a new period reminiscent of the early caliphate of Islam. In this book, we will tackle the issue on the social condition of the female population that consists of half of the Muslim nation of our country. We will try to solve the women issue by referring to Islam’s well-disposed and favorable attitude to women which is demonstrated by a series of beneficial legal rules in that issue. As we mentioned before, the shackles of the absolutism regime and the ignorant fanaticism prevented us from carrying out serious studies on the gender issue. Before the revolution, during the longest nights and darkest days of ignorance when the reform and progress were desired, reactionary riots would occur. The absolutist government would provoke the conservative ulema to revolt and as a result of these civil disturbances all reform initiatives would be shelved. But today the situation is totally different. One of our eminent scholars, the Sheik-ul-Islam Pirizade Sahib Molla, wrote legal opinions in Turkish, Persian, and Arabic. Those were printed and distributed all around the Islamic world. In his writings, Pirizade successfully argued that Constitutional Revolution of 1908 is not actually borrowed from the Europeans but inspired by the practices of the early Rashidun Caliphs of Medina who ruled by consulting the learned and prominent Muslims. Our liberal-minded modernist religious scholars discuss and debate every philosophical issue. Today, it was well understood that the ideas could not be banned by using violence. Moreover, we now know that a blind opposition to any reform and novelty does not make any sense. We are publishing our study in order to justify and spread those new liberal ideas. Islam is declining. Islamic scholars must study this phenomenon in detail and meticulously. Since the sharia (Islamic law) is the most perfect legal system on earth, it should not be debased. Since Islam is declining, it means that the Muslims are not properly implementing the essentials of their religion. They actually have strayed away from the principles of Islam. Our argument is very clear and simple. Indeed, we have searched for the causes of our ruin. We examined this issue in many of our works including our book entitled The Pan-Islam, and we expressed our opinion about it. One of the most elemental reasons for our decline and ruin is actually the women’s issue. A nation whose women are not completely free and advanced cannot be a free and an advanced nation. Women are not slaves. Their legal incapacity is not permanent. They are not property. The natural force has created woman to be a match and a partner, and a compassionate friend of man. It was totally and completely accepted by Islam for women to have

146 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic such characteristics. A religion based on reason, logic, knowledge, education, and progress cannot perceive this issue otherwise. Damned absolutism and ignorance did not see all the rights bestowed upon women by Islam generously. The despotic regime did not understand the real point of view of the Prophet Muhammad on that issue. The former absolutist regime degraded women to the lowest position; a result of that was the destruction of the Muslim nation by undermining and isolating the family, children, and the whole society. The advancement and rise of the Muslim nations can only be assured by education. By whom would this education be provided? Who would raise the nations, other than the women? Besides that, are the female members of population insignificant? Are they not human too? In the true sense, women are complete partners of men. That is why according to sharia women are equal to men in rights and obligations. However, our customs and traditions based on oppression have restrained women’s rights. By taking advantage of the women’s natural weakness, men are compelling women to be under their control and domination. Consequently, first women lose their character; second, humanity as a whole is harmed. When women became subjugated, all the characteristics demanded by conservative-minded men also disappear. The pressure is always to fire back. Women must be virtuous not because of the pressure to which she is exposed, but because of the education that she receives. Chastity and virtue preserved out of the fear of being punished are not real. This is imposed, insincere, and useless. A girl must be honest, chaste, and virtuous, and this should be due to her sincere adoption of these values—not because she has been kept locked in a harem under the supervision of ignorant harem aghas (eunuchs). This cannot be assured by enforced measures like the seclusion of women. Women must be the guardians of their own chastity and honor. Otherwise, any woman would expose herself to a stranger on every occasion. That kind of woman would harm the society and the nation. We should search for the idea of honor and chastity in the high moral character of a person. Any other way would not be useful. We can ensure the nation’s progress and advancement due to the virtuous and honorable women who are proud of their womanhood and who know very well their role in shaping society. Does a man jeopardize his life like woman for the continuation of the human species? For that, man does no more than partake in a pleasurable act. But women pay a heavy price for a moment of her pleasure. To compensate her hardship (labor and raising child), what do men do? What did our ancestors do? They kept the women confined in the large harems of the magnificent palaces, ready for their pleasure. Herds of women were kept to satisfy men’s sexual desires. In the old days, men completely incapacitated women’s intelligence. Women were rendered powerless, and men enjoyed it. Islam would not allow women to be debased. Like men, women also have rights and obligations. One of the main goals of the Prophet Muhammad was to end the injustices and oppression against women. According to sharia, women are never considered slaves. If in Islam women were considered to be at the service of men to satisfy their desires, today Islamic law would be different. In the laws and customs of some primitive peoples, the woman was considered as the property of man. He could buy her, sell her, and use her. He could lend her, rent her, or donate her to someone else. We should honor the sharia and give credit to it. If sharia were followed, women would not have been in the situation they are today. Their status would have been much higher than it currently is.

7

Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932)

Biography Abdullah Cevdet was born on September 9, 1869, in Arapkir. His father was Omer Vasfi Bey who was a military clerk. Abdullah Cevdet received his early education in Arapkir and Hozat. Afterwards, he studied at the Military Rüşdiye (Middle School) of Mamuret ul Aziz (modern Elazig). Then he went to Istanbul and graduated from the Kuleli Idadi (Military High School). He continued his education at the Mekteb-i Tıbbiye (Imperial Medical School). At the Medical School, he participated in the setting up of the Society of Ottoman Union (İttihad-ı Osmani), which later would become İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyet-i (The Committee of Union and Progress). Meanwhile, he was arrested several times because of his political activities. In 1894, Abdullah Cevdet graduated from the medical school and was appointed to serve at Haydarpaşa Hospital. Later, he was appointed to a position in Diyarbekir. In that provincial city, he met Ziya Gökalp who had joined the CUP. After returning to Istanbul, Abdullah Cevdet continued his political activities; as a result, he was exiled to Tripolitania (Libya) and was appointed as the chief ophthalmologist in the Central Hospital in Tripoli. In that remote North African province, Abdullah Cevdet continued his political activities. In Libya, he started to write articles under the name of “a Kurd” and wrote the articles in the newspapers Mizan and Meşveret. He was exiled to southern Libya (Fizan). He managed to escape first to Tunisia, then to Paris. In 1897, he traveled to Geneva and joined other Young Turks in exile. He was elected to the Central Committee of the CUP. He continued to write under pseudonyms. In 1899, Abdullah Cevdet was appointed by the Porte as the official physician of the Ottoman Embassy in Vienna, after he agreed that he would not write political articles to criticize the sultan and the Ottoman government. Nevertheless, in 1903 he insulted the ambassador and was involved in a fight with him. As a result, Cevdet was deported from Vienna by the Austrian authorities. After that incident, Cevdet returned to Geneva; he started a printing press and began publishing the journal Ijtihad. In 1904, he and other Young Turks founded the Ottoman Society of Union and Revolution. He continued to publish his writings in various newspapers. When he attacked the Sultan Abdülhamid II and some ministers in his articles, he was deported by the Swiss government. He moved the Ijtihad Press to Egypt and continued his political activities there. He translated Dozy’s History of Islam into Turkish. In 1910, Abdullah Cevdet returned to Istanbul. He continued to publish the journal Ijtihad. He participated in the foundation of the Ottoman Democratic Party. Later this party

148 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic merged with the Party of the Freedom and Entente. He joined the Kurdish nationalist movement. On November 1, 1918, he reopened Ijtihad, which had been previously closed. He participated in the setting up of the Society of the Friends of England (İngiliz Muhipler Cemiyeti) and played an important role in the Kurd Teali Cemiyeti (The Society for the Elevation of the Kurds). After the War of National Liberation and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, he continued to publish articles in Ijtihad. He supported the secularism of the new Republican regime. Dr. Abdullah Cevdet died on November 29, 1932. He was the most prominent spokesmen of Westernism; concerning Ottoman women, he wrote in his journal İjtihad that “women should have the exact same rights as men.” 1 Abdullah Cevdet also felt that the decline was due to decaying institutions, backward traditions, and an Asiatic mentality. He believed that if Muslims stubbornly clung to their old ways and did not adopt European manners, they would soon be wiped from the face of the earth. Writing in 1912, after the defeat of the Ottoman armies during the Balkan Wars, he explained that recent Turkish reverses were caused by the military’s aversion to anything Western and by its resistance to espousing European civilization. The following passages are taken from Şükrü Hanioğlu’s, Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 309. We lost İşkodra, Manastır, Selanik, and Tripolitania because of our weakness, ignorance, and poverty. They were taken (from us) by power, scientific advancement, and wealth. Yes, Europe is superior. Europe is our instructor; to love her means to love science, progress, material, and moral strength. To be an assiduous and grateful apprentice of Europe, here is our task. If we do not become their friend by our own will, they will obtain this friendship forcibly. To claim that the whole world is hostile to us and that the non-Muslim countries are against us is an indication of a mental disease called “folie de persécution.” Around 1840, Europe slapped Japan. Consequently, Japan awakened and has tried to understand the origins of this force which struck her. For this purpose she sent to Europe and America 25,000 of her youth. If Europe slapped us thousand times and if we do not awake, is this Europe’s fault? We have so much contempt for non-Muslim nations that we do not even consider important their most brilliant victories over us. Because we are Muslims, the world of the hereafter (kisver-i ahret) belongs to us, Paradise is ours. As far as non-Muslims are concerned, whatever their success and position be in this world, their place in the next world is hell. If we go on with this mentality, our fate is obvious. Enough seeing ourselves under a magnifying glass. Our greatest enemy is ourselves, our own mentality. The relationship between foreigners (Westerners) and us is the relationship between strong and weak, learned and ignorant, rich and indigent. There is no other civilization, and that civilization is European civilization. We should accept it with its roses and its thorns.2 The following passages are taken from Abdullah Cevdet’s Uyanınız, uyanınız (Cairo: Matbaa-i Ijtihad, 1908).

 Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932) 149

Wake Up, Wake Up Our homeland is Turkey. Turkey belongs to the citizens of Turkey. Please pay attention. We do not say the subjects of Turkey. We say citizens. This is because being a subject is passé now. The time when people were subjects and masters of the other people has passed. Now is the time for people to be under the rule of a just law, that they have promulgated themselves. Sovereignty belongs solely to the law. We do not recognize any other sovereign. To accept any other master or sovereign is to accept slavery, to return to the state of animalism. Enough! Enough being the victims of the arbitrary rule and despotism of a single dynasty and of a single man. We Muslims, non-Muslims, men, women all were born in Turkey. Our ancestors are buried here. Their memory is found here. We were fed and raised with the bread, water, and air of Turkey. The blood and sweat of our ancestors have watered these fertile lands of Turkey. Thus, Turkey is a shared land by all of us. It is a sacred land dear to all of us. A person who lives in his homeland cannot be considered a slave. He is like a son living in his father’s house. In contrast, in our country we are like prisoners thrown into prison. They seize our property. There is no law, no justice, no education, no trade or commerce—there is not even agriculture. There is only one thing: “Long Live the Sultan.” But who is that sultan? Why we are praying for his long life? In the space of a quarter of a century, this sultan totally dismembered our homeland. He ordered thousands of people to slaughter the other thousands. Today hundreds of thousands of orphans live in misery because of that oppressor whom we wish long life. No, we cannot anymore remain indifferent, silent, and watch as our fellow citizens are fleeced, sheared, milked, and slaughtered like a flock of sheep. It is our duty to preserve that sacred land—our homeland—and to care about the well-being and happiness of our fellow citizens. If we do not wish to lose our homes and have to live in rented houses, we have to defend and preserve our common homeland. Our own dilapidated house is much better for us than the well-built and magnificent palaces of the others. Every mother is a woman, but every woman is not our mother. According to a saying, “a person’s homeland is where he earns money.” This is a shameful statement. Their money is deposited in the banks, but Turkey is an unhappy land. In Turkey there is only misery, oppression, darkness, blood, fire, mourning, cemeteries, and agonizing sounds. Those are the reality of our homeland. Yes, only those things. But are our citizens able to understand that? Are they able to open their eyes and compare their living conditions with those of free, happy, and advanced nations? What is the cause of that difference between our country and the advanced ones? Actually, the prayer for the long life of the sultan constitutes for our citizens a great error, a big mistake. We try to explain that to the people with all our means. We feel that responsibility on our shoulders. We can only shout “Long Live the Sultan,” and when we elect our sultan, our sovereign is the worthiest man among us. When we choose the most virtuous, zealous, courageous, and intelligent candidate for that position, we can wish that person a long life. That elected person would be our official, our representative for the exact and just application and the implementation of the laws legislated and

150 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic enacted by the elected representatives of all citizens of Turkey. If the sultan fails to perform his duties he would be deposed and another sultan would be elected and appointed. The sultan is the representative of the nation’s sovereignty toward the external world. His authority is bounded by the sharia and the current laws. We can also say “Long Live Sultan” when such a sultan is elected to the Ottoman throne. Except five or six of them almost all Ottoman sultans are disgraceful persons. They were drunk, indecisive, and miserable beings and never respected the law. Nevertheless, in terms of cruelty, cowardice, dishonesty, indecency, and treason and by being the enemy of virtue, none of them could match the current sultan, Abdülhamid II. In his thirtytwo years of ominous reign, he ruined our morality, despoiled our honor, and destroyed our country. In short, he totally devastated us. The law would punish anyone who kills a single person. Sultan Abdülhamid killed hundreds of thousands of people. Because of him, we lost a quarter of a century of our life. Our last lost territory is the island of Crete. Where is our Crete? He must answer to that question. He should also give account of the money which was robbed from us by his cruel governors. Our soldiers are dying in Yemen. The miserable condition of our soldiers passing from the Suez Canal makes even the foreigners cry. Where our taxes are going? Our sheep tax, our tithes. The monthly salaries of our soldiers and civil servants are irregularly paid. Three—or at most five—times per year. All our military officers and civil servants are left hungry and miserable. They are forced to resort to illegal gains. Our peasants are compelled to sell their most necessary kitchen utensils like the cooking pots or their blankets and quilts to pay their taxes. Again, our young and orphan girls’ silver earrings are taken, our farmers’ cattle, oxen, and fields are confiscated by tax collectors. You should ask that cruel sultan and his cruel governors and cruel local administrators, where is all this money going? This money is going to pay for the jewelry of the sultan’s 3,000 Circassian and Georgian concubines and pay for regular salaries as well as the clothing of 80,000 court attendants and palace officials. This money is deposited in the sultan’s account in the foreign banks. This money is spent to tyrannize and oppress the intellectuals of our country, Arab, Armenian, Turkish, Kurdish, Albanian, Circassian, Laz, Chaldean, and so on. The sultan uses these funds to suppress and oppress Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of our country. Our money is wasted for these purposes. We should understand that if we do not chase away these cruel sultans and their wicked officials from our country, we would be finished. Our country would be occupied by the foreigners. You might say so what? Yes, if our country is occupied by a foreign government, the taxes would not be levied more than once per year. The foreign government would appoint honest administrators and officials. They would build an efficient road system and construct railways. Our cities would be lit by electricity. We could have telephones in our houses. We would have an effective postal system. We can travel to Europe whenever we wish. We can go anywhere. We can establish printing presses. No police, not even a ruler, king, or emperor can enter our house without a court order. Under the foreign rule nobody like that debauched and immoral Fehim Pasha can harass and assault the wives and the daughters of the equally immoral and base gentlemen of Istanbul. Yes, under foreign rule we could have a better, more comfortable, and even a happier life. Nevertheless, we would not be in our own home. We would be the guests of those who conquered and administered our country. We

 Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932) 151 would be like refugees in a foreign land. Under foreign rule we cannot do anything that benefits us but does not benefit them. Now under our own rule, we are a poor master; under foreign rule, we would be a rich servant. O my dear citizens are you willing to become servants? I do not think so. So, what are you waiting for? Get up and fight for your freedom and for justice. There might be among you some rich people who because of their fortune and comfortable life would be unwilling to participate in that struggle against the despotic government. Such rich people cannot see reality. They must know that without freedom and without a good education and without a security for commerce they cannot protect their wealth. Moreover, their wealth could be easily wasted by their heirs, their sons if they have not received a good education. The fortune you accumulated in thirty years would be spent in thirty seconds by your gambler son. Again, I repeat we should take back our rights and freedom from the cruel Sultan Abdülhamid. Otherwise, we should submit our throat to him to be slaughtered like a sheep. But are we sheep and not men? Then why are we afraid to fight and die for freedom like real heroes? We do not wish anyone to get harmed. In addition, we do not want anyone to be slaughtered. We want to live with our honor and dignity. If the horses of a firefighter’s chariot going to extinguish a great fire must trample some people, no one would be responsible for that. Today, there is a big fire in our country. This fire has been deliberately started by the cruel sultan and his wicked courtiers. One day firefighters’ horses will trample the traitors who benefit from the continuation of this despotic regime and will crush their heads under their hooves. O oppressed, destitute, and ignorant citizens of Turkey. You are taken as soldiers, you pay taxes, you are sent to prison. Actually, the wicked bureaucrats of the cruel sultan are ten times more criminal than the murderers and thieves who languish in the prisons. Chase away these wicked officials from your provinces, your districts, your towns. Show your wounds to the people, show who are your most vital enemy. Show the bloody hands of the sultan. O people, you should open your eyes and see the world. This is our sacred but difficult task imposed on us by our conscience. There is no force, no power that can prevent you from fulfilling this task. When our bosoms are filled with sincerity and genuine love, no bullet, no dagger can pierce it. Nothing can touch it. In front of our force of sincerity the despotism would disappear like a ghost. Therefore, O Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Turkey, rich and poor, strong and weak, men and women, young and old, you should unite. We should follow the example of our brave brethren of the cities of Trabzon, Erzurum, and Kastamonu (who rebelled against the government). Take the example of Russia; look at Iran and Japan. We must wrestle our rights out of the hands of the cruel rulers, of the thieves. But right cannot be taken back without using force. To find a force we should not go too far. Force would come out of our union, created by our cooperation. Turkey is the common homeland of all of us. The current Ottoman government is our common enemy. The moment we realize that and we, Arabian, Albanian, Circassian, Kurdish, Armenian, Greek, Jewish, Chaldean, Assyrian, Turkish, Laz, Georgian, in sum men and women who are all citizens of Turkey, must unite and rise; at that moment, a necessary force would be formed and justice would prevail over the oppression. O citizens of Turkey, you should rescue those patriotic heroes from the prison. They are heroes who struggle for the happiness and the salvation of the whole nation. You

152 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic should liberate those self-sacrificing fighters of freedom. Unshackle them and hit the wicked spies of the sultan with those chains. O lions, do not afraid of the dogs. The servants of the cruel sultan have a dog’s character. Those who do not join us in that struggle, those who do not fight for justice, sharia, freedom, equality, and fraternity are the enemies of the nation. Just as it is allowed to shoot a thief or a burglar who broke into our house, it is also allowed to kill those traitors who do not join our struggle and who try to stop it. If we do not succeed in our fight, we would continue to live as slaves, as animals in a deplorable condition, and die later. O miserable and oppressed and unaware citizens of Turkey, you must know that we are sinking; we are dying and will not be revived again. Rise and get up! Unite your hearts and your hands! Only traitors must not join us. Our fight is our struggle for justice, for freedom. Long live our Turkey—our common homeland. Long live those who are ready to die for freedom, for justice! Do not be afraid of dying to live free!

Part IV

The Liberals

8

Prince Sabaheddin (1878–1948)

Biography Prince Sabaheddin was born in Istanbul in 1878. His mother was Seniha Sultan, the daughter of Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–61). His father was Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha who served as the minister of justice. He grew up in his mother’s palace on the Bosphorus. His father was particularly interested in the education of his sons. At an early age Sabaheddin learned French and studied many other subjects with tutors at home. In 1899, as a result of his disagreement with the sultan on some political issues Mahmud Celaleeddin Pasha and his sons, Sabaheddin and his brother Lutfullah, fled to France. After his arrival in Paris, Sabaheddin joined the opposition to the sultan and became an important figure in the Young Turk movement. Sabaheddin’s activities caused a split within the Young Turks when he decided to challenge the leadership of Ahmed Riza Bey. Unlike the latter, who believed in a strongly centralized country and the necessity of state intervention to boost economic development, Prince Sabaheddin argued that only a policy of de-centcentralization coupled with a liberal economy would rejuvenate the empire. Prince Sabaheddin was heavily influenced by Le Play’s social theories and by the epochmaking work of his disciple, Édmond Demolins, “À quoi tient la supériorité des AngloSaxons?” Sabaheddin argued that societies based on individualism prosper, whereas those having a communal system are doomed to stagnation. The former condition was, according to him, characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries, the latter of Ottoman society. Therefore, said Sabaheddin, to regenerate the empire, the government should adopt an individualistic system, encourage free enterprise, and establish a political system based on decentralization whereby every province would be administered by its local government.1 Sabaheddin’s advocacy of self-rule was strongly supported by non-Turkish groups of the anti-Hamidian coalition, especially by Armenian organizations which also advocated recourse to foreign intervention in order to depose the sultan.2 Fearing the potential dismemberment of the empire, Ahmed Riza categorically opposed such a scheme. These dissenting views finally resulted in a deadlock in the 1902 Young Turk Congress. Opposition was divided between two main branches, the first revolving around Ahmed Riza and the second around Sabaheddin. In 1906, in order to disseminate his ideas, Sabaheddin started a journal, Terakki (Progress), and established an association known as the Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi-ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyet-i (League for Administrative Decentralization and Private Initiative). On December 27–29, 1907, various Young Turk associations held a congress in Paris, the second since 1902,

156 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic in order to resolve their differences and decide upon a strategy against the common foe, the Hamidian regime. This time, unlike the first Young Turk Congress, Prince Sabaheddin’s group and the Armenian revolutionaries managed to gain the upper hand: they obtained approval for several violent measures designed to overthrow the Hamidian regime and to restore the Constitution.3 After the Young Turk Revolution of July 23, 1908, and the reestablishment of the constitution, Sabaheddin returned to Istanbul. He established a political party called Ahrar. After the suppression of the March 31 Rebellion, Sabaheddin was arrested but later released. Later on in June 1913 his name was involved in the assassination of the Grand Vizier Mahmud Sevket Pasha. Sabaheddin again fled to France. After the end of the First World War he returned to Turkey and continued to write and publish his views. In 1920, he again went to Europe. After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Prince Sabaheddin, as a member of the Ottoman imperial family, was not allowed to return to Turkey. Sabaheddin spent the rest of his life in exile and died in Switzerland in 1948. The following passages are taken from Prens Sabaheddin, Gönüllü sürgünden Zorunlu Sürgüne—bütün eserleri, edited by Mehmet Ö Alkan (Istanbul: YKY, 2007). It has been nine years since we left our homeland to establish a constitutional regime. During that time, we together with our colleagues worked mostly for the realization of three main principles: 1) We wish to demonstrate that the despotic rule against the Turks as well as against Muslim Ottomans in general occurs not because of the rule of a single person, but because of our deficient social system and our way of living. We also wish to gain the support of the public for the education of our nation, to try to overthrow the absolutist regime that prevents the realization of those goals, and to establish in various parts of our country many groups of resistance. 2) To explain to our Christian citizens the necessity of establishing a sincere alliance with their Muslim countrymen. Moreover, we want to convince our Greek, Armenian, and Bulgarian citizens that seeking political autonomy or independence would not serve their interests. 3) We want to explain and demonstrate to the outside world that our nation does not deserve the oppressive and despotic rule of the previous Hamidian regime. Further, we want to introduce our patriots and nationalists, who languished in the prisons of the ancient regime for thirty years in order to gain the support of some of the Western public opinion, to our cause. In the last thirty years not only the preservation but also the consolidation of the Ottoman political unity was the main goal of our political activity expressed clearly in our publications. We always supported that ideal and never advocated for the political and administrative autonomy of our provinces when we presented our program on decentralization. The real meaning of decentralization is continuously distorted by the members of the Hamidian regime although we already had clearly explained it. The system of decentralization we propose has nothing to do with political autonomy or privileged administration.

 Prince Sabaheddin (1878–1948) 157 Nevertheless, this injustice against us cannot be covered up for ever. In order to answer to that accusation, which is not based on any proof, we have to quote from one of our previous articles appeared in the Times newspaper on January 2, 1907, under the title “The Solution of the Eastern Problem.” Now let’s explain our view on decentralization and the establishment of local authorities. If we understand the constitutional regime as establishing a system of control and supervision by the National Assembly, then decentralization would establish the same system of control supervision in the provinces. In countries where the government is highly centralized like ours, this is particularly helpful if anything like a bridge, road, school, or hospital is needed in the smallest administrative district like a sanjak. First the administrator of that sanjak needs to propose the plan to the governor of the province in which the particular sanjak is attached to; next they must approach the Ministry of Interior, then the Ministry of Construction, then the grand vizierate, then finally the palace. That is the established process. Completing this process not only necessitates an enormous amount of red tape and bureaucratic effort but also entails a subsequent loss of time that is costly to the administration and causes delays in all kinds of infrastructure project. All of this undermines the economic vitality of the country. A respected bureaucrat once told me about his experience. When he was the administrator of the Sanjak of Bolu, after trying for six years to construct a short road of three hours distance, he eventually had to give up. Meanwhile people in that area suffered. Sometimes because of the lack of roads the entire economy of a district or even a province would collapse. This situation would be the same for other infrastructures too. As long as the country is administrated by a centralized system the private initiative and free enterprise would never take root and progress. Without a decentralized administrative system, the provinces cannot be developed and thus the whole country would continue to languish in misery. South American countries provide obvious examples. Many of these countries are ruled by bandits. If their political system were efficient then people’s lives would be well protected as they are in countries that are endowed by parliaments and that possess the most liberal laws. On the contrary, in republics like Mexico, Uruguay, and Guatemala the people’s rights are no more valuable than flies’ rights. The president of the republic in those countries, together with the bandits sitting in the parliament, can kill and punish anyone without impunity. In such countries, instead of benefiting free enterprise education destroys it; as a result, the defenseless people are forced to seek the protection of bandits. Under such conditions, such countries are ruled by the worst type of despotism. Tomorrow when our National Assembly is inaugurated, what would be its main task? Today, all of our provinces are in a miserable condition. A responsible assembly, of course, would try to improve the administration of those provinces by introducing changes and reforms. But those changes must not contribute to further deteriorating the situation by maintaining the current centralized administration. Would the provincial officials and the provincial assemblies remain tightly attached to the central government? If their ties to the central government were dissolved, then they would gain more authority and responsibility; as such the administration of our provinces would be decentralized. This is absolutely necessary. Without a decentralized system, we cannot develop our country and build the necessary infrastructure. It is impossible to apply

158 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic the same administrative method to all of our provinces. For example, there exist enormous differences between the lifestyle and the culture of the inhabitants of Selanik (Salonica) and Yemen, both of them our provinces. Those who would understand the best and assess the needs of the people living in these two provinces are not actually the bureaucrats of the central government living in Istanbul but the provincial officials living in those provinces. Therefore, the reform desired by us under the name of the decentralization is mainly to increase the authority of the local administrators like the governors and others. Moreover, we also campaigned for the opening of the General National Assembly to audit and control the fiscal revenues of the state since these revenues are provided by the people’s taxes. In our publications about the necessity of decentralization, we always emphasize article 108 of the Constitution, which regulates these issues. We gladly accepted the related article of the program of the Committee and Union and Progress. Then the decentralization is nothing but to assign authority to local administrators and establish a division of tasks between the provincial and central government.

Private Enterprise (Free Initiative) Actually, the Holy Qur’an encouraged the need for free and private initiatives taken by the ayats of “aleykum enfusekum” and “leyse lil insani illa man sea.” Taking a free initiative means existing and living by one’s own efforts instead of relying on one’s family, kinsmen, and government and seeking success in life based on one’s own initiative. These men who were forced to work every day by facing many obstacles and difficulties eventually see their social capabilities increased. In contrast, our capabilities decline. For them confronting the obstacles is nothing but a fun and pleasure. For us, it is torture. For them their private interest is equal to their public interest. In contrast, our private interest is the opposite of our public interest. Because for us, our private interests derive from the exploitation of others rather than deriving from the wealth produced by agriculture, industry, and commerce. In order to live off of the income of your private enterprise and eventually enrich yourself, you have to possess some credentials like knowledge, experience, persistence, and caution. We are generally deprived of those qualities. Because since our childhood we are accustomed to live without earning our life and get rich without working. That is why all of us desire to become the government official. In order to enter a bureaucracy which already employs hundred times more officials than necessary, the only way is not merit but despotism and protection. Thus, when we first enter professional life, we do that under the protection of others. We then must abandon our dignity. Now, in order to advance in our career, we need further protection from our superiors. Every step of promotion needs a support. Could a person develop a strong character if he solely depends on the favoritism of others for advancing in his career? Of course, he cannot. This is because that person’s character has not grown according to his own principles and values; rather his character has been molded according to his patron or protector’s wishes. Then he has to adopt the values completely opposite of his. These officials who are used to worship their superiors would also expect to be worshiped by their subalterns. Then our whole bureaucracy is formed by these kinds of people who

 Prince Sabaheddin (1878–1948) 159 are devoid of character and integrity. Nevertheless, in every country the bureaucrats tend to become the instruments of autocracy. But nowhere is the influence of autocracy over the bureaucracy greater than it is in our country. Because in our country there is no intermediary class of entrepreneurs which can moderate the effects of despotism. The only class of the society which can exert some control over the administration is bureaucracy. Under the protection of the government a class of consumers was formed. The producers are the peasant farmers, artisans, and small merchants. This class was not able to expand their business due to their lack of major capital and know-how and being oppressed under the increasing despotism of the government. If the national education program would not be implemented on a proper basis all of the political reform projects would be condemned to stay on paper. It is obvious that our misery of today derives from the miserable condition of our system of education. Like every country the salvation and the future of Turkey depends on the reform of its educational system. Sadly, the main pillar of the education, family, and school, cannot satisfy the objectives expected from them. The three main essentials of education are as follows: (a) physical training, (b) intellectual education, and (c) ethics. The goal is to perfect these three aspects of education. Unfortunately, in our country physical training and gymnastics are totally inexistent. First of all, success in life requires a well-developed and healthy body. Instead of developing students’ bodies, our schools actually deteriorate them. What about intellectual development? That also is in quite a poor state. A really successful education must be based on the teachings of applied and practical sciences. Just as it is not possible to learn language by memorizing grammatical rules, it is also not possible to learn science only by studying theory. During the nineteenth century, the natural sciences owed their magnificent progress to the implementation of the experimental method. However, in the social sciences it is not possible to use the experimental method. The implementation of the scientific observance has created a science of sociology that is as strong as the sciences of physics and chemistry. Thus, technology is always created by the methods of observation and experimental sciences. In contrast, our educational system is totally based on theoretical knowledge. Of course, if theory derives from experience, its importance would be undeniable. But the basis of the education must be experimental. Therefore, since in our schools the languages and the sciences are taught only in a purely theoretical way, our educational system fails to be productive. When it comes to our mores and social life, these need to be totally reformed. As a result of the traditional education our children are raised as slaves totally lacking of free initiative and free spirit. This spiritual and social suicide became the guiding principle in our schools. The main goal of the government is to eliminate and suffocate the independent character and raise a herd of wretched subjects. The shameless people who control the government viciously attack every expression of high character. This continues until it becomes impossible for anyone to raise their head and until the severe blows of the despotism have leveled everyone to the ground. Nevertheless, these monsters were raised by this detrimental traditional education. Therefore, today oppression is the result of our educational system. It is an expression of inability and incapacity. Weak members of the nation who are totally incapable of achieving anything individually seek the support of their families, communities, and government; thus, they consolidate the power of those institutions and make them autocratic. In such a society the individual—though originally decent and

160 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic virtuous—eventually also becomes corrupt under the continuous blows of oppression. After enduring so much injustice he would yield to it. This is the worst phenomenon that threatens our future. A nation invaded by the foreign powers could regain its rights if its morality did not become corrupt. But a nation penetrated by the immorality is doomed. Worldwide, commercial competition has been increasing quickly under the impact of economic progress. The old ways of life of getting by with an easy livelihood is fast disappearing. Now we are facing a modern world, with a new people and modern needs. Now we have to overcome the obstacles created by this new world. Benefiting from this new world’s science and knowledge, we have steel claws that we can use to create modern technology. We need to have modern thinkers equipped with modern ideas. Those can only be achieved with private enterprise and personal initiative. For that we need two elements: skill and objective. When are we going to join this new world? Our parents and our schools provide us with the means of livelihood. Nevertheless, these means do not give us a complete freedom. Complete freedom can only be obtained by free enterprise. What we have been provided in the current system is like alms put in a beggar’s cup by inhuman autocrats for their miserable subjects.

Centralization and Decentralization One of our friends whom we respect a lot reproaches us the other day of unnecessarily introducing a new concept to the Ottoman political literature. We were surprised, because actually the principle of decentralization is mentioned in article 108 of the 1876 Constitution which states, “The administration of the provinces would be based on the distribution of authority and the division of tasks.” The degree of that distribution and division would be determined by special regulations. It is an astonishing fact that the most vital point of the Constitution is being ignored by its most ardent supporters. There is a huge difference between the decentralized form of government that is now the most preferred administrative system in Europe and a centralized form of government. The difference between these two systems is actually the difference between freedom and despotism. Unfortunately, some people accuse us of betraying our homeland by merely mentioning this administrative system. A constitutional regime can be based on a centralized or the decentralized form of government. In England the system of decentralization was established by the development of the ideas of free initiative and individual freedom introduced by the Anglo-Saxons. When the other European nations decided to adopt the constitutional regime, they imitated the English system. Nevertheless, most countries did not apply the basic principles of the constitutional regime. Therefore, they cannot control the absolute and arbitrary rule of the monarchs. As a result, in some countries despotism of the parliaments has replaced the despotism of the monarchs. In Europe, the governments cannot interfere much in the private life of their citizens. Therefore, they do not become despotic like in our country where the level of interference is very high. Despite this, the most enlightened class of the society keep asking for more reforms. In European countries, people have formed various committees in order to have more self-government and a decentralized administration. This tendency is spreading to every part of Europe. In

 Prince Sabaheddin (1878–1948) 161 countries ruled by a centralized government, inspections are initiated from the center and move toward the periphery, the provinces. Centralized forms of government tend to be autocratic regardless of the power exercised by a monarch or by the parliament. However, in countries administered by a decentralized system, the inspections always start in the provinces and then move toward the center. In those provinces people elect their own representatives whose qualities are known to them. Therefore, most of the elected provincial representatives work for the benefit of their provinces; this is because their actions are scrutinized by the local people there. Such local officials, of course, have a better grasp of the needs and problems of their provinces than do officials who have been sent by the government from the capital and who have never been there before. If his majesty’s apprehension and constant fear were not without limit, he could still keep the parliament and rule autocratically by relying on a centralized administration. Manipulating a few hundreds of deputies would be a very easy task for a man who can shape the character of countless civil servants and make them obedient to his wishes. Centralized government is the heart of absolutism. The main reasons for all our social ills are the lack of private initiative of our people and our centralized form of government. Our social life and national character would be degenerated and decadent and become corrupt if a huge empire extended over three continents would be governed from one city and all reins of power would be at the hands of one person. We have decided to establish an association after seeing that our people are not informed about the detrimental aspects of the current administrative and political regime and of the social ills it creates.

Let’s Introduce Ourselves to Our Age (April 1906) An ill person on his deathbed delays his last breath, although keeping his breath would not give him additional life force. Similarly, every breath of civilized life accelerates our demise. Foreign powers seeing that the nation remains totally inactive against the attacks of the YIldiz Palace which became a nest of bandits, to its life, now want to take advantage of that helpless situation. Until recently, the world’s public opinion was totally unaware of the Turks’ aptitude and desire for progress and civilization. The Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and even the Arabs and the Albanians informed the Western public opinion about desire for progress and about their sufferings. All of these nations found supporters and continue to gain more support for their cause. For us, only the Turks are considered the enemy of the civilization due to our inactivity. We are constantly oppressed under the rising pyramid of accusations against us. Without a doubt, we have our shortcomings and mistakes—just as others. Although it seems dark and gloomy, we still have a future. We have millions of poor but magnanimous, noblehearted, and generous peasants who managed to keep their integrity in these dark/ inauspicious days. We have people whose children are forcibly taken from school and are sent to places of exile and to their graves. Those are our hope, and they assure the essence of our life and our progress. Those people prepare a high civilization for their homeland. Just because we keep our silence, we should not be known as the enemy of civilization and progress. The waves of civilization from the dark depths of the centuries

162 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic are like the rolling waves from the horizons of the oceans. This civilization is moving forward by the efforts of all humanity. No single nation, no single century can claim ownership on the whole world civilization. Every nation contributed to it. Some of us argue that the Europeans will never like us and will always be our enemy. They do not realize that these men saved us from a certain disaster only half a century ago. If today the situation has totally changed, whose fault is it? In the last thirty years, we have tried to deceive the world with our policies. But actually, we were deceived. That reality angers us. The independence of the Turks can only be assured when they respect the interests of the non-Turkish elements of the empire. The East and West actually have common interests. The intervention of foreign powers in favor of particular nationalities of the empire actually harms the interests of other nationalities. Such interferences by the European powers actually increase tension not only within the Ottoman Empire but also among the European countries. Such interventions have a harmful effect on the presesrvation of international peace. Social balance can only be assured by friendship between the Turks and the other nationalities. Such a balance provides the best solution to the Eastern Question in favor of the civilized world. In order to present this reality to the world we have to use every possible means of communication. Lately there is a positive change in the French press which was previously against us. The most brilliant pens of France who until very recently advocated our ejection from Europe, now praise our national characteristics. Various journals and daily newspapers of different ideologies have started to publish articles in our favor. These ideas must be circulated more in Europe. We can only build a spiritual bulwark against the foreign invasion if we can explain our cause to the civilized world and get the support of their public opinion. A well-organized and effective press campaign can achieve a lot in an age where the different ideas voyage all around the world with the speed of lightening. We do not intend to spend time by merely opposing the government and others. A ruler cannot create a happy or unhappy society that is formed by millions of people. The causes of the happiness and misery of the nation should not be sought in the personal character of the ruler; rather these causes are located in the social life of that nation. A hardworking nation would not submit itself to any kind of oppression, be it coming from inside or outside. Our inability of working effectively is the main reason of our misery. Since we are aware of our social deficiencies, we have been searching for a guide that will make our work productive. We have identified this guide as the science of sociology; the science of sociology holds the key to success in a civilized life. Advice (August 1906)* Our respectable writer explains in his article that an absolute form of government coupled with a centralizing administration caused ruins in the past of ancient Greece, Rome, and the Spanish Empire. In the second part of his article, the author examines the causes of the decline of France and argues that France’s decline was caused by a centralized administration. In his work, Demolins successfully demonstrates that a   This article by Edmond Demolins was published in the last issue of The Terakki (Progress) journal. The title of this article is, “Is there any benefit from seizing power?”

*

 Prince Sabaheddin (1878–1948) 163 centralized form of government—be it an absolute regime, a constitutional regime, or a republic—is the cause of the decline. Once a centralized government is in place, the type of regime does not make much difference. The result is always ruin and demise. This is because, just as in natural sciences, in social life also, the same causes engender the same result. How can we expect that a form of administration that destroyed mighty empires of the past such as the states of ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, the Spanish Empire, old and new France, to be only successful in Turkey? Arguing such a thing is to deny historical realities. Absolute facts cannot be denied, although perhaps they could be forgotten for a certain time. When reality emerges, we should accept it. We would be yet another historical example. We should not become a forgotten name by joining the list of demised empires. Our main objective is to submit to the consideration of our citizens that important reality in a time when our country is struggling amid a deep crisis. They are, no doubt, familiar with the political principles here. I have to remind them about the main focus of my work and inform them about my research methods.

164

Part V

The Positivists

9

Ahmed Riza (1858–1930)

Biography Ahmed Rıza was born in Istanbul in 1859. His father was Ali Riza Bey, who was known as Ingiliz (English) Ali Bey because of his close friendship with the British in Istanbul. Because of his knowledge of foreign languages, Ali Riza Bey served in the Ottoman embassies of Vienna and Berlin. Ahmed Rıza’s mother was Austrian and was from a noble family. Later, she converted to Islam and took the name Naile Hanim. Ahmed Riza graduated from Beylerbeyi Rüşdiyesi (Middle School) and then studied at the Lycée de Galatasaray (Sultani). After graduating, Ahmed Riza started to work at the Translation Bureau (Tercüme Odası) of the Porte. Eventually, he resigned from his position and went to Konya to see his father who had been exiled there by the government. In Anatolia, the young Ahmed Riza directly observed the misery of the Turkish peasantry and decided to study agriculture in order to improve the condition of farmers in the Ottoman Empire. In 1883 he went to France to study agriculture. After completing his studies in Grignon College of Agriculture he returned home after the death of his father. Ahmed Riza first tried to establish a model farm but his enterprise has failed. Unable to find a work at the Ministry of Agriculture, he accepted a position at the Ministry of Education. There he was appointed as the director of a High School (İdadi) in Bursa. Here he also taught chemistry. After eight months he was promoted and became the director of Education of Bursa. But the young and ambitious Ahmed Riza was not satisfied by these administrative jobs and again left for France in 1889 with the intention of seeing the Paris Exhibition celebrating the hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution. In Paris, he became translator at the court and began attending lectures at the Sorbonne. At the same time, he became a loyal disciple of Pierre Lafitte. Although asked by the Ottoman government to return to Istanbul, Ahmed Riza stayed in Paris and continued his intellectual activities. In 1893, he began sending a series of reform projects to Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1908). At first, the sultan encouraged him, but later he gave Ahmed Rıza a cold shoulder. From Paris, Ahmed Rıza sent six reform proposals to the sultan and tried to convince him to adopt the constitutional regime. Disappointed with the sultan, Ahmed Riza decided to publish his reform proposals. At the same time, he began writing articles for the journal La Jeune Turquie published by Halil Ganem. In 1889, Ahmed Riza began establishing relations with the Association of the Ottoman Union (İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti). When this secret association was discovered by the Hamidian police, some of its members managed to avoid arrest and escaped to Paris. Ahmed Riza became very popular among

168 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic these dissident intellectuals and later joined the group. After hearing Ahmed Rıza’s political activities, the sultan tried to convince him to return to Istanbul by promising money and high position. Ahmed Riza refused to accept this offer. In 1895, he established a journal called Meşveret. This journal was first published in Turkish but soon after a French supplement was added to it. Ahmed Riza remained intransigent in his fight against the Hamidian autocracy and continued to serve as the torchbearer of Young Turk ideology by disseminating his ideas through his journal Mechveret.  By late 1899, the tables began to turn. At that time, a prominent member of the imperial family, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha (1853–1903), husband of the sultan’s sister, arrived in Paris with his two sons Sabaheddin and Lutfullah to join the Young Turk opposition. This constituted a severe blow to Abdülhamid’s prestige. In reaction to the slight, he intensified his grip on the top bureaucracy and his immediate entourage. In Paris, the Young Turk movement was experiencing an internal crisis. Prince Sabaheddin (1877–1948), the elder son of Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, had decided to challenge the leadership of Ahmed Riza Bey. Unlike the latter, who believed in a strongly centralized country and the necessity of state intervention in order to encourage economic development, Prince Sabaheddin argued that only a policy of decentralization coupled with a liberal economy would rejuvenate the empire. During the summer of 1899, Ahmed Riza Bey came to an understanding with the Young Turks based in Geneva. The same year, he attended the Peace Conference for demilitarization at The Hague. On February 4–5, 1902, the First Young Turk Congress convened in Paris. Various groups including the representatives of the Arab, Albanian, Armenian, Greek, and Bulgarian nationalist organizations also participated in that congress. The Armenians expressed their intention to pursue an armed struggle against the Hamidian regime and wanted Russian intervention against the sultan. These views were supported by Prince Sabaheddin and his followers. Nevertheless, Ahmed Riza Bey fiercely opposed to the foreign intervention. As a result of these political disagreements, Ahmed Riza decided to establish the Committee of Progress and Union. Prince Sabaheddin established the Association of Private Enterprise and Decentralization. Thus, the Young Turk movement was divided into two. In 1907, Ahmed Riza’s group became united with the Ottoman Freedom Association established in Selanik by Talat Bey, İsmail Canbolat, and Midhat Şükrü. Two months after, the Young Turk Revolution, Ahmed Riza returned to Istanbul on September 25, 1908, and was greeted with ostentatious ceremonies. On October 16, 1908, he was admitted into an audience before Sultan Abdülhamid II. The two exchanged compliments. That was the beginning of a new era. On December 8, 1908, Ahmed Rıza was elected as a member of the parliament; on December 16, 1908, he was appointed as president of the parliament with a unanimous vote. On December 31, 1908, he was invited to Yıldız Palace by the sultan to a lavish dinner given in honor of the deputies. At the banquet, he gave a speech praising Abdülhamid for his role in the establishment of the constitutional regime. After the suppression of the March 31 Rebellion, Ahmed Riza was again nominated to the presidency of the parliament. On January 23, 1912, Sultan Mehmed V, (r. 1909–18) appointed him as the president of the senate. After the First World War, Ahmed Riza went to Paris on September 19, 1919, to work for the nationalist cause. Ahmed Rıza returned to Turkey in 1926 and retired to his farm to write his memoirs and the history of the CUP. On February 26,

 Ahmed Riza (1858–1930) 169 1930, he fell and broke his hipbone. He died the same day in the Şişli Etfal Hospital in Istanbul. The following passages are taken from Ahmed Rıza’s La Crise de l’Orient: Ses causes et ses remedes (Paris: Comite Ottoman d’Union et de Progres, 1907).

La Crise de l’Orient In order to find the truth, first we have to listen to all of the testimony of the witnesses without any distinction. Whoever hears a bell, hears a sound? Those who want to understand the situation in Turkey clearly would probably agree to listen to the explanations of a Turk. Actually, when they visit places where atrocities have taken place, it is rare to find a European traveler who would question the members of different nationalities concerning a particular crisis. They usually are more sympathetic to one party whom they support. Therefore, it is rare for them to grasp the situation in its entirety and be able to analyze the social and religious mores and institutions of the people in those countries. Most of the foreigners who visit the East actually have incomplete information. They always converse with the natives through the interpreters. In the East, the individual plays a minor role. In the Islamic world, it is not the individual but the family and society that form the basic unit. Therefore, in the East, instead of improving the social situation of the individuals, attention should be given to collectivities such as family units. It is important to study such collectivities in detail in order to understand society in the Muslim world. For Europeans, the social life and the mentality of the Turks still remain unknown. Therefore, Europeans criticize the Turkish society without understanding its essentials and its dynamics. It is easy for them to do that. Nevertheless, nothing positive comes out of these criticisms. Their rhetoric demonstrates the vagueness of their conceptions. Their conceptions are far from reality. By focusing on some isolated cases, a handful of unscrupulous writers have drawn some vague pictures and spread their erroneous ideas throughout Europe. If you give me, said Fontelle, four people who are convinced of the reality of the most absurd ideas, I can use them to convince another 4 million people of those ideas. Our falsifiers do not even have sincerity. They believe in nothing. They write just to satisfy certain circles who pay them to circulate these ideas. The Eastern Question, which was already complex, has become even more confused, since some writers have started to mislead the public opinion with their lies. Because of this wrong information, many well-intentioned efforts have failed. In many cases, while trying to help a particular group or a segment of the society, the philanthropic humanitarians unintentionally cause the ruin of the whole society. Many misfortunes would be prevented and lost energies saved and better used, if Western writers would try to find the roots of the ills plaguing the Islamic world rather than exclusively criticizing the Muslims. Making Turkish politics an eternal problem by using some trivial and imaginary descriptions of the issue and just presenting some futile remedies as grand reforms has totally complicated the state of affairs and has harmed the peoples of the Orient. Prince Bulow was right when he stated: “It is rare that humanity

170 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic engenders great artists capable of building temples; however it is always easy to find masses similar to Erostrates, who are ready to reduce these constructions to ashes.” For hundreds of years now, diplomats have been floating like empty bottles on the murky waters of the Eastern Question. Actually, in order to solve that problem, one has to dive to the bottom of the issue and study the needs, aspirations and desires of these peoples. It is only then that one can discover the scale and depth of the issue. Various reforms introduced after 1839 did not improve the situation. In that case, we have to look for the causes of that failure. Then we should not continue to harm the Ottoman Empire and undermine its unity and jeopardize its future. Reform is not a complete change. It does not require totally destroying the existing system. Reform concerns improvements. In Turkey it would be useless to introduce new reforms before studying the obstacles against them. In every serious undertaking, it is necessary first of all to assess all the benefits and the risks morally and materially. In Turkey, there is a very important potential for progress. Nevertheless, this potential has to be worked out. Progress, says August Comte, is the development of order. In order to be successful, such an undertaking must safeguard first the interest of Turkey—and not Europe. Such a reform must cover the totality of the country and not a portion of it. All reform, regardless of its size, must be a part of a general plan. The reforms must be continuous but slow like the life in the East. A fast and accelerated reform would jeopardize its application. Examples from the past remind us of that reality. In the past, some nations paid dearly for the inadequate application of reforms. Today, Turkey is an underdeveloped country, half a century behind certain civilized countries. There is no doubt about that. But that is no reason for jumping ahead toward the unknown by cutting corners and trying to make rapid progress. That would be the revolutionary thesis of the sophists and necessarily wise. In the history of the human development, half a century is negligible. There are periods in history when Christian Europe had been falling behind the Islamic world for many centuries. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Turks were more advanced than the West in many aspects. During the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, Germany and even France have started to initiate reforms that were already implemented in England. I am not aware of the existence of a natural law—a rule of evolution—forcing all the inhabitants of the earth to march side by side in the path of progress. On the contrary, the history of civilization has already shown that to make progress in any way, a general rule and tremendous efforts were carried out to realize it. It is undeniable that, says Sir H. Maine, the majority of the peoples did not demonstrate the slightest desire to see their institutions improved. For those who lack firmness, perseverance, and patience, those who wanted to enjoy the benefits of the change immediately, those who did not want to take any risk or take any responsibility, a destructive revolution appears to be the shortest way to progress. I hope that none of my citizens would opt for such a selfish and dangerous path. Any government that is concerned about the future of its country would not destabilize the administrative machinery of its institutions in order to satisfy a horde of troublemakers. Any reform which causes a rupture in the continuity of the human development, any reform which is merely material and does not affect the feelings cannot be considered as progress. It can only be a despoilment, a decline and a degeneration of society, and a degradation of morality. Real reform must contain three

 Ahmed Riza (1858–1930) 171 sorts of improvement: (a) material, (b) intellectual, and (c) moral. Material progress— which is the most important—must never be an obstacle to moral development— which is the final goal of the human development. There can be no intellectual progress that does not amount to progress in goodness and courage. I ask my readers to forgive me for repeating the moral and political principles herewith which they are no doubt familiar. I have to remind them about the main focus of my work and inform them about my research methods. One can accuse me of giving too much place to Islam in a political study. This is because the name of Islam horrifies even those who claim to be free thinkers. On the contrary, I criticize myself for not being able to present a general picture of Islamic doctrine in my work. This is because Islamic doctrine constitutes to the foundation of every Muslim society. In every Muslim society Islamic doctrine is the only force for moralization. Again, progressive or reactionary this doctrine forms the base of the Ottoman legislation. Actually, Islam is not merely a religion in a strict sense. Islam covers all aspects of the Muslim life including the material and spiritual needs, the intelligence, and the energy. On earth, there are three hundred million people who follow and practice that faith. Therefore, Islam deserves to be well understood with all its elements. It should also be used to solve social problems by adapting it to the necessities of the modern life. It could be the spirit of an enlightened and practical legislation. Such a legislation could bring about miracles in improving the social and political conditions of a people who live under the yoke of the reactionary ulema and despotic rulers. Here, in order to justify my point of view, I will refer to the ancient history of the Turks. It is necessary to establish a link—a continuity between the past and the present. I praise the Ottoman past not to mitigate the present errors. My aim is to consolidate the future by using the force of the past. Human progress is similar to a vehicle moving by a force pushing it from behind—not by pulling it. The obstacles could be surmounted by taking force from a glorious past. The soul of the nation dwells/reside in that golden age. One of the most vital forces of Islam is the glorification of the great intellectual works of antiquity regardless their origins. The entire history of the Turks has remained unknown to the political absolute and empirical synthesis of the European diplomats. That was the main reason for their failure. According to Renan, a deep intuition of the past is the best way to understand the present. The memorandums and the projects presented to the Porte by the foreign powers were prepared with full knowledge and wittingly. Nevertheless, even the most complete of those documents lack two essential elements: the Turkish spirit and sympathy. It is because of those deficiencies that I decided to write this modest work for the public. Knowledge is not sufficient. It is necessary also to feel and to love too. Few tears are better than unnecessary bloodbaths. If I can express myself well in that reform project. An Englishman cannot feel like an Arab. The conscious and mentality of a Russian can never replace those of a Turk. Every nation has a different past and their social structure would not be suitable to each other. The reforms must be developed according to the spirit and the nature of every nation separately. These reforms must not only respond to the material, spiritual and moral needs of a particular nation but must also be suitable to the spirit of its administrators who would implement these reforms. The law, declares the Declaration of the Rights of Men, is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to contribute to its formation either

172 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic personally or by their representatives. The law must be same for all. I want to see this principle applied and respected in my country for the implemented reforms to assume a national character. By national, I mean exclusively Turkish. I am a Turk and proud to be. But I would renounce my Turkish citizenship if my race prospers at the cost of others’ misfortunes. The common destiny of all nations is my greatest concern. The unity of those various nations is called humanity. The main flaw/shortcoming of this work, which is difficult for me to correct, is my frankness. The feeling of duty made me to write things that may not always please my fellow citizens and might please European politicians even less. In order to reach an agreement on the nature of the reforms, first the Ottomans and then those latter and the European powers have to accept each other and not try to deceive each other. Progress would be possible only by the sincere contributions of all parties.

The Current Situation The recent history of Turkey begins with the Turkish-Russian war of 1877–78. Politically and morally that was an important landmark. After that war, Turkey became quite different from the past. It began oscillating between regression and anarchy. Its political regime regressed and anarchy began to reign because of the non-application of laws and non-observance of rules and traditional customs. The outcome of that situation could be interpreted in different ways: for the Europeans it is a question of upholding Christian values and financial interests. To Europeans, the Ottoman government is flawed because it persecutes and massacres Christians. The Porte does not assure their security and does not implement the letter of the law that proclaims equality between and the non-Muslims. Moreover, the Ottoman government does not implement the clauses of the international treaties which it signed. The economic and financial system of the Ottoman Empire is disastrous. Its economy is quite mediocre and reduced to some exchanges with Europe. In addition, the despotic rule of the sultan is deplorable. That picture drawn by the Europeans is not false, but is incomplete. The atrocities of the government are not exclusively directed against the Christians. Actually, the Muslims are equally or even more affected by the misrule and constantly persecuted, despoiled, and deprived of their rights. The local authorities everywhere in the empire persecute the Muslim populations. The justice became a myth both for the Muslims and Christians. The arbitrary rule of the authorities affects everybody. The taxes levied are exorbitant. The citizens are unjustly and illegally arrested. The banditry is everywhere. In the course of the last fifteen years more than five thousand Young Turk militants disappeared. No one’s life or property is secure. Nevertheless, it is certain that the Christians suffered less than the Muslims. This is because the Christians are not without defense. Between them and the government, there stood their clergy and the representatives of the great powers. The privileges granted to their spiritual leaders constitute in fact co-representatives of the European states. Nobody protects them or cares about them. They live under no guarantee. The non-Muslim subjects of the empire are exempted from the military service, whereas the Muslims—and particularly the Turks—spend half of their lives under arms guarding the frontiers. After seven

 Ahmed Riza (1858–1930) 173 years of service they return to their home almost naked, starving, and ill. They find their fields uncultivated, their business ruined. Completely exhausted, they lose all their courage and energy to the arbitrary power of the government. On the other hand, the Muslims have no protection against the tyranny of the officials or against the partial interventions of the representatives of the European states. Nobody protects or care about them. They live under no guarantee. Muslim peasants cannot complain of their situation, because the freedom of press, of meeting, of communications and even postal, all freedoms enjoyed before or during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861– 76) is now totally abolished. The Ottoman Empire became prey to the intriguers and adventurers. It was completely in an utter confusion by a combination of anarchy and arbitrary rule. The domestic policy has no correlation with the foreign policy. If one of them improves a little, it is always at the expense of the other. There is no common point between social and political life. The traditional order of the society is completely undermined. The traditional ties that attached the various social classes of the society to each other are totally severed. The condition of women deteriorated. The fundamental civil and religious laws have to use force. They were replaced by the imperial edicts or governmental decrees. All public virtues are under threat. The appropriations of the country’s resources by foreign powers and by the local grandees totally paralyzed the economic, social, and intellectual development of the people. The people’s rights and obligations totally disappeared under the limitless despotism of the sultan, who became the sole dispenser of functions, awards, and economic concessions. Suffering from a persecution mania since the age of thirty, he is a virtual and voluntary prisoner in his magnificent palace. In that den of corruption, he is surrounded by a camarilla composed of the most perverted men of all nations. Another major crime of the current regime is its forcible confinement of the imperial princes. Those who would tomorrow assume power and would govern the country found themselves kept in prison and totally isolated from friends and advisers. That proves how much Abdülhamid cares about the future of his empire: Apres moi le deluge. Big businessmen and shady financiers benefit from the situation that is extremely favorably to them. Our national resources are appropriated and squandered by international bankers. The most lucrative concessions, huge investments, and other economic assets are exploited by an international gang whose leader is Sultan Abdülhamid. The agriculture, industry, and commerce of the country decline. Everywhere vast territories lay uncultivated, lacking funds, security, and the necessary means of transport. No one works, because no one has the guarantee to enjoy the fruits of his labor. According to Montesquieu, lands produce less not due to their lack of fertility but due to the lack of liberty of the people. The unfortunate cultivators groan under the weight of their debts. The fruits of their labor are destined to fill the coffers of the usurers and the fraudulent concessionaries who devastate the country. Their cattle, their plowing, and their implements—their sole source of income—mostly are confiscated by unjust court decisions. This means no appointments for officials, no work for workers, and no business for merchants. Everything is sold to assure the availability of daily bread. Nevertheless, men do not live solely from bread. Embezzlement of public monies, wasting of the national resources, corrupt practices, and misappropriations of the public funds are beyond imagination. Debts and misery have appallingly increased. There is no correlation or

174 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic proportion between the wealth of the people and the expenses of the state. The palace absorbs almost all available revenues of the country. The bureaucracy already was large; nevertheless, during the reign of Abdulaziz, it expanded considerably. The rest of the revenues were used to pay off the public debt, for the payment of the interests and loans and various indemnities. Only a minor part of the revenues are spent for the real needs of the country. Among them the public instruction is the most neglected. The most regrettable fact is that all teaching that could cultivate and stimulate noble feelings—like patriotic love—are callously excluded from the curriculum of our schools. Hunger is a bad adviser. Misery is an element of corruption and discord precisely because corruption, hate, spying, and contempt for the law are overtly encouraged by the current regime. Living an honest life has become almost impossible. Spying inside and outside the country has reached an unprecedented scale. It became the only lucrative business. Vices, including drunkenness, are spreading to all levels of society. A lack of empathy—even among the people of the same religion—is on the rise. Currently, the Ottomans form various categories. The ones influenced by a strange exaltation work for ruining Turkey and their own lives. Totally dumbfounded, others are watching this phenomenon passively. The fact that such moral anarchy spread among not only Muslims as well as non-Muslims is not horrifying to the Europeans. However, when they pretend to serve humanity, Europeans should not be content to protect the interests of just a few Christians. In the face of general suffering, the suffering of the minority must be kept quiet.

The Causes The European Point of View There is no effect without a cause. In politics like in chemistry, facts are connected by various links. The ills that the Ottoman people are afflicted with also have their reasons. They are various and more complex than imagined. It is important to know where those ills come from. It is only then we can dry up its source. Thus, we can take the bull by its horns and act effectively. Europeans are only interested in the effects. They neglect to search for the causes of these ills—this is why they cannot fight the ills. According to Guizot, “one cannot fight vice by solely eliminating its effects without attacking its roots.” If the Europeans can only see the effects and not the causes, it is because they are not sufficiently equipped to understand the complete set of conditions and the circumstances that create the cause. They do not know the language of the country. They do not have enough knowledge about the dominant religion that determines the moral and social rules of the country. They are not familiar with the fundamental laws of the country. Moreover, they have never been subjected to that heavy atmosphere of prejudices that oppress the suffering people. If the Europeans are ignorant of Eastern affairs, this is because of the inaction of the Ottoman writers and statesmen. These latter did nothing to enlighten European public on their country. Also, Europeans do not consider Eastern affairs with an objective view. On the one hand, the partiality of their political passion causes them

 Ahmed Riza (1858–1930) 175 to neglect the most important aspects of the issue. On the other hand, religious and racial prejudices became an important factor to prevent them to make a healthy and fair judgment. The general ideas of Christians about Islam are usually wrong. This is because of the partial point of view adopted by Christianity.

Islam For Christians, Islam is the cause of all ills. It creates all calamities. This conviction renders all research on the Muslim world superfluous and useless. There are also welleducated, liberal Europeans who consider Islam to be an obstacle to progress. However, European scholars who have seriously studied Islam and the fundaments of the social order in Turkey see the absurdity of these erroneous views of Islam. At the end of the eighteenth century, D’Ohsson wrote: All the public and civil ills afflicted by the Ottomans have nothing to do with their religion or law. They derive from false popular beliefs and arbitrary decrees issued as a result of the whims (of the sultans). All of these are actually against the spirit of the Qur’an and the sharia.

On the other hand, M. Van den Berg, a scholar and professor of the Islamic law at Delft, has responded to those who criticize Islam: In the West people believe that all political abuses derive from the legislation of the Ottoman Empire. In Europe the general public knows nothing of Islamic law and the governments; they think that the policies in Turkey are the consequences of the doctrines of Muhammad.

All the progress achieved by the Muslims in the Middle Ages in almost every field clearly demonstrates that it is not the Qur’an that prevents progress in Turkey. Islam has accepted immediately and without any prejudices all previous civilizations including Greco-Roman, Persian, and Indian. After it inherited all these ancient civilizations, Islam perfected their heritage. Islam advises its followers to seek knowledge even in China. A maxim of Islam says: wherever you find the truth, take it; it belongs to Islam. Such a religion cannot prevent the spread of the rays of the intelligence. If political interests of Europe did not prevent Europe from recognizing the role played by the Muslims in the past in the material and moral development of the East and even the West, then humanity itself would not be ungrateful but would be increasingly able to acknowledge the contribution of Islam to its civilization. According to Auguste Comte, “By its honorable service of transmission of Greek science, the Arab civilization would be always among the main factors which prepared us during the Middle Ages.” The West avoids giving credit to Islamic civilization. Europeans fear that if the Muslims who were under their colonial rule would learn about their glorious history, they would become proud and would challenge European supremacy. Europe has many reasons to bury, conceal in oblivion, and silence that glorious civilization. This is because the Europeans suppressed the intellectual movement of the Arabs, destroyed

176 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic their works in Spain, and armed Charles Martel, Charlemagne, and the Crusaders against Islam when it was enjoying its golden age. Thus, the Europeans by those acts delayed the intellectual progress of the humanity for five centuries. Distinguished Western writers have declared that in the last three centuries all progress in Europe was accomplished despite Christianity and the church. Many people, particularly the irreligious ones, confirm that reality. Nevertheless, these people also believe that in the East, Islam plays a similar role and prevents progress. This comparison of Islam with Christianity is actually erroneous. We recently saw that the liberal regime in Iran was supported and established by the ulema of that country. Later in this book, we also will see the role played in Turkey by the ulema in supporting Midhat Pasha and his regenerating efforts. With respect to Islam, Europeans do not criticize its faith and worship; rather, they criticize its political and social institutions such as the caliphate, pan-Islam, holy war, intolerance, fanaticism, polygamy, the inequality of its citizens, etc. In my work, I will treat each of these issues in relation to each other and within the context of the current situation of Turkey. There is also a particular issue that I would like to mention here: fatalism.

Fatalism The Turk, in general, is a fatalist. He considers extraordinary events to have already been determined in advance by destiny. Fate (kismet) is written by the decree of God. That belief of the Turk has always been striking to foreigners, who believe that Turks are resigned to their fate without any objection and their fatalism constitutes an obstacle to progress. This is an inaccurate observation. First of all, the Turk is not a fatalist in the strict sense of the term. Moreover, the religion of Islam condemns passive resignation and absolute fatalism. In Turkish society, there is resignation to inevitable events like death and natural phenomena. Islam accepts free will and makes it an element of faith: whoever denies free will and attributes human actions to the divine would be committing a sin. Islam then criticizes absolute fatalism. In many verses of the Qur’an, complete predestination is condemned. A Muslim in all his acts must follow the precepts of the sharia, consult wise people, and use his reason and experience. After taking all these precautions, he then could submit himself to God when facing the unknown. Fatalism then has no relation whatsoever to the moral, civil, and political orders of Islam. The Prophet Muhammad said on this issue: “Entrust to God after you do whatever you can with your human capacity. God loves those who do his work well.” On the other hand, the Qur’an says: “We determine day as a working time and night as a time for resting. O people, act with all your strength. Goodness comes from God, but evil comes from you. God compensates every person according to his work. The people will have the fruit of their labor. His efforts are appreciated. Do not obey those who commit excesses and those who harm the earth instead of making it a better place.” Thus, instead of recommending passivity, the Qur’an places great importance on free will and encourages people to distinguish circumstances that could be achieved by their own efforts from those that they cannot change.

 Ahmed Riza (1858–1930) 177 It is when man begins to despair and lose hope because of his successive failures that the Qur’an intervenes to calm him: God alone knows his hidden thoughts. In every calamity Muslims should seek a lesson, a warning. The poet wrote: Who knows when destiny will strike us. The worst calamity actually benefits us.

From this point of view, the verses of the Qur’an become a powerful means at the hands of rulers and statesmen. They are used to console and comfort people and encourage them in their endeavors. In many circumstances, fatalism played a beneficial role—particularly in the spiritual domain. There is a need for an element to control the selfish tendencies of the people. It helps Muslims to stay calm and supports them during their most difficult ordeals. Currently, fatalism is still wrongly interpreted by some, which helps Turks face calamities and prevent them from entering into despair. It also averts political agitations and popular revolutions by calming spirits. I repeat, the inertness or apathy of the Turks has nothing to do with Islam. In the East—like in the West—fetishism has not vanished yet. To branches of trees around a holy spring that is known to have miraculous effects, Turkish, Greek, and Armenian women attach pieces of fabric. The amulets carried by them and by men are supposed to protect them from the evil spells. These things are excellent proof that the Turks have not completely submitted to divine decrees written by the hand of destiny. Everywhere in the East, physicians are highly respected. The Prophet Muhammad recommended them and distinguished them from quacks/charlatans. Moreover, he advised Muslims to stay away from infected areas during epidemics.

The Caliphate Among Islamic institutions, the caliphate is the most criticized; probably because if its importance. This criticism also extends to its various aspects. As a term, “caliph” means successor of the Prophet. It is also described as “the Shadow of God on Earth” or “the Commander of the Believers.” These titles might appear fantastic but they do not derive solely from the imagination of the Muslims. Neither of these titles exclusively belongs to the Oriental monarchs. Is not Bossuet who declares that the Roy (King) the representative of God, the living face of the Divinity on Earth? The king is the incarnation of the idea of divinity in the world, says Hegel. In England, the idea of the absolute power is advocated by Hobbes. For the Tory’s, the sovereign is the “delegate of the Heaven.” But one would argue that all those things belong to the past. Nevertheless, in Europe among the common people and especially their kings, there are some who still believe to these titles. Until very recently the king of France was called “the King the most Christian.” France was the elder daughter of the church. Today all Catholics and French royalists still believe in that. The emperor of Austria still bears the title “Apostolic Majesty” and “King of Jerusalem.” But oddest of all is the title of the king of England; he is considered the defender of the faith. As such, it is not only Muslim rulers who adopt these vain

178 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic titles. In Europe, there are still people who would prefer to die rather than give up their pompous but now old-fashioned titles. These titles are inconvenient. Non-Muslim subjects of the sultan do not like his titles. On the other hand, the colonial subjects of the French and British monarchs, the peoples of Africa and India, also disliked the titles of their European rulers. Nevertheless, good Christian kings find it difficult to give up those titles. The problem is, politically those titles exert a negative effect on the subjects of a state who do not belong to the official religion of the state. Since these titles are politically inconvenient, the king of England should be the first to renounce his titles. This is because most of his subjects are non-Christian. After that happens, the sultan can follow suit when his subjects become as educated as the British people.

The Twin Powers of the Sultan The sultan is invested with a double power. He is at the same time temporal and spiritual ruler. He is the representative of the Prophet. In a multi-confessional empire, the religious power of the head of the state can cause inequality among the subjects. It can also cause despotism. This statement might appear correct at the first instance. But it does not apply in the Islamic context. The role of the caliph and the political structure of Islam is still not well understood. Islam is not exclusively a heavenly/unearthly religion. The kingdom of Muhammad is not purely a spiritual religion like the religion of Christ. It also belongs to that world. The Qur’an does not only contain the verses on the religion. It also contains a positive legislation. It is apolitical and social document. The Muslim state is based on the combination of these two powers: temporal and spiritual. Both of these powers are represented by a distinct and independent body within its organization. The fukahas (the Islamic jurists) and the ulema (the scholars and doctors of law) compose the spiritual body of the Muslim state. This body is presided over by the sheik-ul-Islam (Seyhulislam). He functions like a link/intermediary between the caliph and the legislative body. The temporal body is composed of the high civil and military functionaries and officials. It is presided over by the grand vizier. These two bodies are united in the person of the caliph. He functions like a moderator. He presides over the clergy and the bureaucracy and unites them. The duty of the caliph is to supervise the just application of the laws and to defend them: to conciliate the interests of religion and politics, to maintain harmony and equilibrium between these two forces, to prevent one of these forces from encroaching upon the territory of the other, and finally serving as the supreme justice when a conflict takes place between the spiritual and the temporal. Unity plays a very important role in the spirit of Islam. It is everywhere, in the faith, in the state, and in the family. Two independent separate powers functioning independently from each other are not compatible with the concept of the unity of the state. Therefore, the caliph as a supreme commander unites these two forces in his person. Nevertheless, this chief is not an absolute sovereign. He can govern and take decisions, but his autocratic power is limited by the sharia (Islamic law). The caliph is not considered infallible like the pope. He can commit errors and can be held responsible for his actions and decisions. The Muslims do not

 Ahmed Riza (1858–1930) 179 say like Chateaubriand: “For his decisions and actions, the king is answerable only to God.” In Islam, on the contrary, the sultan is held accountable by the sharia. The caliph is the chief and the judge but not the master of the people. His powers have limits like a constitutional monarch. Moreover, he cannot take any politically important decision without consulting the representatives of the nation. So powerful is the implementation of the laws, he has no authority of changing them without conferring with the spiritual body. According to the Qur’an, the people have the right and the duty to control the actions of the head of the state. The people can even depose the ruler, if he violates the law (sharia). The believers have the obligation to obey him as long as he follows the precepts of Islam. It is rare that most of the Muslim princes have strictly observed the principles of Islam. That is true. But also, many Muslim despots died of a violent death. Are there any Christian monarchs who do not abuse their power? I will explain here the principles and the limits of power that Islam determines for the caliph. In the second part of this study, I will examine how these principles are violated and how there is a confusion of these two powers: combining the temporal and spiritual in the person of a ruler became detrimental to progress. Nevertheless, we should not confuse the abuse of the power with its principles and come up with the idea that the institution of the caliphate must be abolished. The great statesmen of Turkey always tried to establish a limit—a legal demarcation between those two powers. But they never contemplated abolishing the caliphate. They were right. Because two-thirds of the Turkey’s population is still Muslim, they are sincere believers, and they practice their religion. Religion is an important factor in society and has a great influence on the population. The spiritual power of the caliph over the world’s Muslim is still very important. The caliphate is a pivot for Muslims. The government must take this into consideration. Temporal power cannot expand beyond worldly life. It belongs to the worldly affairs. How could it be sufficient for a people who give so much importance to the afterlife? All great reformers understood the importance and the necessity of the spiritual power. Despite his skepticism, starting from Caesar, all great monarchs have assumed religious titles. In Russia the same necessity caused the tsar to declare himself the spiritual chief of the Orthodox Church and the head of the Saint-Synod. In Germany, as a result of the Lutherans and the Presbyterians, the emperor is the nominal chief of the Church formed in 1830. He constantly invokes divine force as a support of his policy. In its foreign policy, France, too, acts with a religious motive. The French ambassadors in Istanbul and in Beijing conduct religious ceremonies. All the rulers of this world agree to maintain an alliance between the Church and the State. Since all Christian powers use religion and the spiritual power why only Turkey should deprive itself of that power? The spiritual power (caliphate) exerts an enormous power over Muslims. It is because of the religious influence of Turkey over the world Muslims that Europe wants to abolish the caliphate. In the past, conquest required the concentration of these two powers. Today we need it as a defense. Especially in times of crises, spiritual unity would help. It would be a crime to end this unity. Currently, Turkey cannot abolish the caliphate, neither can it separate temporal power from spiritual power. These twin powers are indispensable for Turkey. A temporal power without the spiritual would be like a navigator without a compass in a stormy sea and a spiritual power without the support of a temporal power would have no effect. The

180 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic papacy itself acquired a part of its power because of its territories. Its effective authority began with its alliance with Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemagne.

Pan-Islam Islam is a large international family. All the believers are brothers. A community sharing feelings and faith brings Muslims closer and causes them to love and help each other. The common goal of your existence, says the Qur’an, is a brotherly society. Help each other mutually. The idea of unity appears here as human unity. All religions support the same notion. Nevertheless, the ties that unite Muslims to each other are more extensive and stronger than for other religions. Islam is wrongly called Mohammedanism. Islam encompasses all the previous virtues and truths taught in the past by other prophets. To Islam, Moses and Jesus Christ are also Muslims. The historical continuity constituted the base of the Islamic union. This base is actually larger than Islam; it has no homeland and makes no distinction between race and nationality. Moreover, for Muslims, religion is not only a religious bond, and form of worship, but also a social obligation. Property, family, government, and morality are all institutions of collective life that are part of the religion. The ties that unite Muslims are many. Any Muslim who fails to fulfill his responsibility to his community—and, in particular, neglects to help them—commits a sin. “Whoever sleeps with a full stomach when his neighbor suffers of hunger,” says Muhammad, “is not a Muslim.” Believers—both men and women—are each other’s friends and must help each other. If here I have presented some details on the Islamic principles, this is to show that Muslims are expected to help each other. According to Islam, Muslims must put all their available resources at the service of their community. It is the duty of the caliph to organize these inter-community relations and rally believers under the banner of Islam. Nevertheless, it is rare to find caliphs who fulfill those duties. The current sultan has tried, although in quite a clumsy way, to establish a cordial entente between the Muslims of the various countries. His attempts to create an international Muslim fraternity were wrongly interpreted and severely criticized by European statesmen. They saw in those efforts an awakening of the Muslim fanaticism and preparation for holy war. Others considered it a kind of competition with Christian missionary activities. Many confused pan-Islam with proselytism. In reality, the Turks have never tried to create religious propaganda; neither do they use religion to organize a struggle against Christianity. Actually, Islam spread through individual contacts and word of mouth. In a work entitled The Islamic Threat, Mr. Binger, director of the African Affairs in the French Ministry of the Colonies, writes: Among Muslims, there is no clergy and their followers. Everybody is a believer. Anybody can convert. For conversion the novice is taken to the mosque where he is taught how to make his ablutions and recite some prayers. That would be enough. He is now a convert, a new Muslim. In time he would improve his

 Ahmed Riza (1858–1930) 181 knowledge about his new religion. The greater his knowledge about Islam, the greater his social standing would rise in the eyes of his fellow Muslims.

It is obvious that Islam expanded quickly in Africa. According to Depont and Talayrach, “The political power of Islam declined but its religious power has increased.” In their view, “Everyday, Islam gains new converts.” In agreement with their view, E.  M. de Vogue of the Académie française states, “Of all the historical events of the nineteenth century, the most important is the revival and progress of Islam in the Dark Continent. This is a second Hijra. Muhammad gained in Africa, what he lost in Europe.” On that topic, M. Saint-Germain wrote, “After Asia, it is Africa that is awakening under the choke created by European infiltration. A mysterious movement is agitating the vast Black Continent. It is in vain that civilized nations are trying to scramble for Africa; the real conqueror is Islam, which expands irresistibly.” Mr. Hantoux, former minister, agrees with him and says, “Everywhere, Islam extends beyond its borders. It is the only religion in the world that still gains followers by massive conversions. Its proselytism is very efficient.” Among those conversions, the most worrisome to Europeans is the conversion of the fetishists (animists). Because once they converted to Islam, they became proud, haughty, and even dominating. In China, the Chinese are more sympathetic to those who convert to Islam, whereas they disdain Christian converts. There also, Muslims are proud. This pride and self-respect and courage among the natives who convert to Islam causes concern among the colonial powers, because they consider it a serious obstacle to their colonial conquests. Therefore, they viciously attack the pan-Islamist movement. All troubles and social ills in the East are attributed to Islam. On this issue, Mr. Saint-Germain has said, This simple, sensual and warlike religion is made for the primitive peoples. It transforms the man whom it converts. Islam raises the standard of living of its followers, by improving their health and morality and by increasing their energy. Nevertheless, it totally dominates their spirit by making them rebel against any kind of civilizing enterprise. The discipline of Islam fanaticizes the masses into a large, incessantly growing army; tomorrow, under the green banner of the Prophet, we will see these African forces attacking Europeans for extermination.

Here we find ourselves confronted by a sensitive issue. In order to serve the interests of some Europeans, should we prevent Islamic expansion and leave these animist peoples to share the fate of the Red-Skins (Native Americans) and disappear under the murderous effect of alcohol and other vices? Or in these faraway and distant lands, should we facilitate the civilizing role of Islam? No person who cares about the wellbeing of the humanity would hesitate in his choice.

Holy War Once united under the spiritual authority of the sultan, would the Islamic empire be dangerous for the Christian states? That would depend on the attitude of those

182 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic states vis-à-vis the Muslim world. The Qur’an does not tell Muslims to turn their left cheek, when the right cheek is slapped. In case of attack, it says, attack those who attack you with the same arms employed by your aggressors; but the Qur’an says if you forgive them, it is better for you. Nevertheless, today Muslims everywhere are on the defensive, and I think they would stay as they are. The conception of unity is naturally opposed to any division of the sovereignty, to any dismemberment of the Islamic empire. Dreadful wars—even the ones between the Muslims states—are fought to preserve the temporal and spiritual unity of Islam. A regenerated Turkey would gain its military power and preserve its unity. At the beginning of Islam, during its formative era, the Islamic leaders used force not only against the external enemies of Islam but also against Muslim rebels who challenged their authority. War was inevitable to maintain unity. It had a political use and socially it was even necessary. To protect the community, it was required by Islam as a holy duty. Many verses of the Qur’an encourage Muslims to wage holy war. That caused the enemies of Islam to label it as a “religion of the sword.” Nevertheless, the expansion of Islam into Asia and Africa nowadays is occurring peacefully. That proves that Islam has another force other than military. Where Attila has failed, the Muslim heroes have succeeded to win hearts. I repeat, Islam is not a heavenly religion. It also is comprised of politics. Which state in Europe was established without using a sword? Everybody knows that war was not invented by the Muslims. However, it is probably not well known in which cases Islamic law prescribes war. Islamic holy war is compared to barbarian invasions or to the Crusades—attacks that lacked any rules. Nevertheless, before deciding to declare war, the sultan is required to take the advice of the ulema. A fetva (fatwa) must be issued. Without this letter, the war is not legitimate and not considered holy, and soldiers who die would not be viewed as martyrs. Once his decision to declare war has been approved by the ulema, the sultan has to make a final demand to the enemy. Surprise attacks without a formal declaration of war are prohibited by Islamic law. Muslims have observed these rules and prescriptions long before modern international law was formulated in the West. Before starting hostilities, the sultan or the Muslim commander must invite the enemy to convert to Islam. If they accept, they become brothers. Then the sultan makes another proposal: the enemy must recognize his authority and pay a legal tax to the public treasury. Make war, says the Qur’an, against those who do not believe to God, until they accept paying tribute. If they accept these terms, they remain free and enjoy all their previous rights. According to the Qur’an, holy war must be declared only on idolaters (pagans). From Hebrews (Jews) and Christians, Muhammad only asked a payment of a legal tax. The Prophet of Islam sought an alliance with the Christians to fight the animists and eradicate their religion. If Muhammad would return to life today, he would witness a totally different situation. The anti-Islamism that has increased in Europe since the days of the Crusades would be staggering to him. On the other hand. he would be satisfied and happy to see that most of his disciples remained loyal to his teachings and are still tolerant toward Christians. In the first century of Islam, the function of the war had a political and philosophical goal: to unite the isolated and dispersed tribes under one rule. Moreover, it aimed to abolish the barbarous customs of the Jahiliyya and free

 Ahmed Riza (1858–1930) 183 people from its restrictions. The superiority of Islam as a political doctrine and for social organization is undisputable. Holy war then is prescribed in order to spread the truth and protect oppressed people. “Happy are those,” says Muhammad, “who advance in the path of truth.” “Those who become martyrs in fighting tyrants and usurping monarchs are considered blessed by God.” These two hadiths demonstrate clearly the real sense of the holy war.

10

Lütfi Fikri (1872–1934)

Biography Lütfi Fikri Bey was born in Istanbul in 1872. He was the son of Hüseyin Fikri Pasha. After graduating from the Mülkiye (School of Political Science) in 1890, he continued his studies abroad. He went to Paris where he studied law and political science. Lütfi Fikri returned to Istanbul in April 1894. Shortly after his return, he was arrested by the Hamidian authorities on the charge of being in contact with a political dissident, Mizancı Murad. As a result, he was imprisoned until April 1897. After he was released, he was appointed to a minor administrative position in the Sanjak of Isparta. Later, on April 28, 1898, the government moved him to the capital in Isparta. However, Fikri was unable to establish rapport with the local government and resigned from his new appointment. In 1899, Fikri was appointed as the district governor to Tortum. In 1901, he once again left this position and fled to Russia as a political refugee. Subsequently, he traveled to Europe. Later, he wanted to return to Istanbul, but his request was rejected by the Ottoman government. Although Lütfi Fikri claimed that he was an early member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), this has not been substantiated. After the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908, Lütfi Fikri returned to Istanbul and was elected to the parliament as the deputy of Dersim. Then, he began to criticize the policies of CUP. In 1909, Lütfi started to teach courses on criminal law at the Mülkiye. Meanwhile, he participated in the founding the Mutedil Hürriyetperveran Partisi (Moderate Liberal Party) and became one of the leaders of the liberal movement in the Ottoman Empire. He also began publishing several newspapers and journals. In 1911, he was one of the founders of the Hürriyet and İtilaf Fırkası (Liberal Entente Party). When the First World War began in 1915, Lütfi Fikri went to Europe. After the end of the war and the signing of the Armistice in 1918, Lütfi Fikri returned to the Ottoman Empire. In Istanbul, he founded Mustamelet İttifakı, an association that aimed to establish a dialogue between the Nationalist and Kemalist Ankara government and the Ottoman government. This effort bore no fruit. Lütfi Fikri was against the abolition of the sultanate and the caliphate. He wrote articles in Tanin to explain his views. The new Republican regime put him on trial for defending the caliphate. He was prosecuted and sentenced to five years in prison. However, the Great Turkish National Assembly pardoned him by issuing a special law. In 1925, Lütfi Fikri was once again brought to trial, this time in the İstiklal Mahkemesi (Independence courts). At this trial, he was acquitted. For the rest of his life, Fikri worked as a lawyer. Between 1920 and 1928, he was elected as the chairman of the Istanbul Bar. After traveling to Paris to receive medical treatment for an illness,

 Lütfi Fikri (1872–1934) 185 Lütfi Fikri died there on October 7, 1934. He was buried in Pere-Lachaise cemetery, but his remains were brought to Turkey eight years later and reburied in Edirnekapı Cemetery near the tombs of his parents. Fikri, Lütfi, Hükümdarlık Karşısında Milliyet ve Mesuliyet ve Tefriki Kuva Mesaili. İstanbul: Akşam-Teşebbüs Matbaası, 1338 AH/1922. According to various speeches by Refet Pasha, the institution of the sultanate prevented the development of the idea of nationalism in Turkey. To support his argument, Refet Pasha cites the confrontation and war between the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (r. 1512– 20) and the Safavid Shah Ismail I (r. 1501–24). “Despite both of them being Turkish,” says Refet Pasha, “they became enemies and fired bullets at each other—only because they belonged to rival dynasties.” As we all know, the most important requirement for a history is to be neutral and unbiased. It is possible that dynastic rivalry played an important role in the Iranian campaigns of Selim I. But that was not the only motivating factor. Religious concerns—and more specifically the sectarian issue of Sunnism versus the Shiism—were important factors in these wars as well. Moreover, the Turkish identity that Refet Pasha attributed to both Ottomans and Safavids is debatable. In that period of history, to what extent the entire population of Iran identified as Turkish would be another question. Regardless of how that is answered, even if we accept Refet Pasha’s argument on that issue, one cannot accuse Selim I (r. 1512–20) of not taking into consideration the ideal of nationalism. The idea of nationalism only emerged as a result of the French Revolution in 1789. During the age of Sultan Selim, nationalism was not yet acknowledged as a concept anywhere in the world. Given that Selim I was born in 1467 and died in 1520, it would have been unlikely for him to have adopted such an ideology. At that time, the whole world was in transformation. In France, feudalism was slowly ending and an absolute monarchy was beginning to take root. It is interesting to note that France freed itself from feudalism by adopting an absolutist government. French national unity would be achieved a century later than the reign of Sultan Suleyman (r. 1520–66) the Magnificent. This happened during the reign of Louis XVI (r. 1664–1715), who said, “L’etat c’est moi” (I am the state). England’s national unity was realized even later. England and Scotland became united in 1707—200 years after the reign of Sultan Suleyman. As for Russia, during the age of Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20), it lacked the concept of national unity. At that time, the Grand-Dukes of Moscovy were constantly at war with other neighboring Russian princes, and considerable Russian blood was shed as a result. The Grand Duke of Moscow Ivan IV, the terrible (r. 1530– 84), received the title of tsar in 1532. (sic) This was only twelve years after the death of Sultan Selim I in 1520. Actually, we do not need to look that far back in history, if we look at the Italian case. How many years ago did Italy achieve national unity? It was only a half a century ago. In light of this evidence, Sultan Selim’s ignorance of the ideal of Turkishness is perfectly explicable. The ideals of nationality are political concepts that developed much later than the time of Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20). Nevertheless, we are not going to argue here that the sentiments and ideas of nationalism emerged under the regime of political absolutism. We do remember that various measures were adopted during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) to prevent the development of nationalist feelings. Sometimes those measures took the form of poorly reasoned

186 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic practices. Nevertheless, we believe that in constitutional regimes the monarchs would rather play a beneficial role by enhancing national feeling rather than weakening it. In constitutional monarchies, rulers’ mistakes are counterbalanced, but their beneficial effects remain. The figure of the monarch constitutes a strong link to a nation’s past. We will not endorse the sentiment that asserts “Nations without history are happier.” On the contrary, in our view, nations that have a rich history are the strongest. Having a solid tie to its past could only make a nation more powerful. The English nation provides a perfect example to justify our view. England has a constitutional monarch that would never undermine national sovereignty. On the contrary, the English monarchy enhances its national sovereignty. In England, the monarchy probably is the most important institution for assuring national unity. We do not think that an English nation without a monarch would be greater. The monarch gives England vitality. More importantly, it gives it personality, identity, and force. Germany provides another example to confirm our argument. The German emperor (kaiser) was not purely a constitutional monarch. However, he had more authority than the English monarch. Despite this autonomy, the kaiser gave power and happiness to the Germans. For example, Kaiser Wilhelm II (r. 1888–1918) played a crucial role in the strong position of Germany before the First World War. Germany was clearly more united and stronger under a kaiser than it had been in the past. A German nation without a kaiser would be a disunited and an incongruous nation. However, having a sovereign is beneficial to nations only if such a person is an enlightened and a law-abiding ruler who abstains from violating the law. To return to the main question of this debate, can we identify the preferred form of government as a monarchy or not? The benefits and the ills of that institution would constitute another set of issues and would need to be evaluated in relation to the intellectual level of a particular society. Our consideration of the value of a monarchy rests on the assumption that a particular society is already advanced. Scientifically underdeveloped nations are condemned to be oppressed under despotic regimes. Such a regime could be a monarchy, but also could be a civilian or a military dictatorship. We will examine this issue later in this article. In an official banquet given by the mayor of Istanbul, Refet Pasha gave a speech in which he stated: We never considered establishing a republic. The idea of a republic will always remain alien to us. To me there is no difference between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. The only difference between these two is that in a monarchy the head of the state comes from an established dynasty. Our solution is the best for the nation. After all the troubles and calamities that the country has suffered, I think that we should not preoccupy the nation with the election of the president of a republic. The important thing is the will of the nation and the Grand National Assembly that represents that will. The government and the ministers should take their authority from that assembly.

Later, in another speech, Refet Pasha declared: “Who is going to be responsible for the executive branch?” Normally, this is the political body that nominates the government, right? But currently no. The entire responsibility falls on the shoulders of the executive power (government). If you wish, you can hold it responsible after all the damage

 Lütfi Fikri (1872–1934) 187 has been done, after the whole country was done. The issue of responsibility remains insignificant when compared with more important issues. Then, an administrative body without any responsibility could be formed where the sovereignty is vested in the nation. That is the case of the Great National Assembly established in Anatolia by the nation. There, the ministers could not be dismissed because they were not given the opportunity to make a mistake. This assembly, which governs on behalf of the nation, was not under the authority of a single person. It is a political body formed by the ministers of the elected representatives of the entire nation. It is the product of the nation’s will. You know that individuals commit errors, but the soul of the nation will always find the most correct path. It is noteworthy that Refet Pasha added another legal classification to Islamic law. Even today in Islamic law, republican regimes and constitutional monarchies are categorized as two distinct political institutions that have been considered normal. Refet Pasha does not follow this classification. In his understanding, political regimes function according to a new theory: either there is a head of the government or the regime does not exist at all. To us, this classification is problematic. We think that political regimes should be divided into two types: those with an executive organ and those without it. Governments can have an executive power without a presiding officer. However, as far as we can understand from his speeches, in Refet Pasha’s system all political authority is vested directly in the National Assembly. In his view, governments are divided into two categories: direct governments and indirect governments. In the first system, the nation forms a governing assembly and makes political decisions by itself. This form of government would be only possible in very small communities. In the second system, the nation elects its own representatives and entrusts political authority to them. The function of the government is twofold: its first function is to enact laws, and the second is to apply and implement these laws. According to the principles of constitutional law, the councils, assemblies, and the persons responsible for implementing those laws are considered the representatives of the national sovereignty. Monarchs are also considered to be similar representatives. From that perspective, the Belgian Constitution would be very important and noteworthy. Moreover, we should remember that the Turkish Constitution is modeled on the Belgian Constitution. Past experience has shown us that the performance of these executive and legislative functions by separate authorities should be accepted as an absolute necessity in politics. The origins of that rule were first expounded by the French thinker Montesquieu and were accepted worldwide after the French Revolution in 1789. According to Professor Nesmin, there would be no laws today if the authorities who issued the laws would also be allowed to implement them. If that was so, these authorities could modify and change the laws according to their own interest. According to Refet Pasha, the executive organ has to be abolished. This is because it lacks responsibility and thus could cause considerable harm to the nation. Therefore, he argues the executive organ (government) must be eliminated, and its role must be given to the National Assembly. In his view, the parliament must not only make all the political decisions but also apply them. This kind of governance is incorrect and cannot function. There is no example anywhere in the world that follows this system—even in today’s Russia. All transactions

188 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic in the world are based on trust and responsibility. We give thousands of liras to cashiers and treasurers for safekeeping, we entrust our lives to physicians—these actions are all based on trust and responsibility. If we eliminate trust and responsibility, none of us would go to see a doctor. One cannot accept going to a doctor for a cure for decaying bones if that doctor needs time to be responsible. Likewise, the members of the executive organs are understood to be politically responsible and could face criminal charges—including a capital sentence—for abusing their authority or neglecting their duties. How can we abolish the government on the basis of the non-application of such charges? To evoke a popular saying, that would be like “burning the quilt to kill the flea.” On the other hand, how can we be sure that a weak parliament that is unable to responsibly hold the government would be able to govern and apply laws directly? In such a case, we remember Montesquieu’s famous maxim: “Every nation gets the government that it deserves.” If a government is ineffective, then there is no benefit in entrusting affairs to the parliament. That would only further complicate matters. Once again, one of the maxims of the constitutional law is: “Deliberations are the task of many people, but the executive belongs to one person.” An assembly composed of hundreds of representatives could not be given the task of governing.” One can argue that the assembly would not govern directly, but entrust this task to its nominated delegates. But since those delegates always would need the approval of the assembly, they would then become no more than puppets deprived of all initiative and authority. In fact, Refet Pasha said that the delegates cannot be dismissed because they would not be given sufficient time to commit an error. We all remember the actions of the assembly of convention during the French Revolution. It became a rubber stamp assembly at the hands of two authoritarian leaders Robespierre and Saint Just. That convention, unfortunately, did not find the true path, as Refet Pasha would have wished. Rather, it condemned to death some of its own members and sent them to the guillotine. According to Montesquieu, “Political freedom can exist in a nation, when authority is not abused.” Unfortunately, history shows us that people are mostly inclined to abuse their power. Only checks and balances can prevent that (The Spirit of the Laws, Chapter 11, Section 4). If we accept this, what would be the function of an executive body that is independent from the legislative body? Should that executive body (government) be totally independent from the assembly? Or, would it be under the supervision of the assembly? Nevertheless, this issue is a minor one. The principle should be that sovereignty must belong to the assembly, and the government is linked to it. Therefore, it is wrong to consider the government as an independent organ that can oppose the authority of the parliament. The parliament that makes the law, the government that administers the public affairs, and the courts that apply justice are all manifestations of popular sovereignty in different fields. Here we will repeat what we said before: only a small community can directly govern itself. Large communities need representatives for governance. These representatives are: the members of the parliament who prepare laws; members of the government who run the administration; and, finally, the courts—including judges—that will apply the laws and punish wrongdoers. This sort of government is called representative government. After this explanation, the only

 Lütfi Fikri (1872–1934) 189 remaining issue is the appointment of the government. This can be done in various ways: In Switzerland, the government is appointed directly by the Federal Assembly. Next, a member of that government is elected as the prime minister by his peers. The prime minister as the head of the government represents the Swiss state, receives the foreign ambassadors, and so on.

190

Part VI

The Islamists

11

Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921)

Biography Said Halim was born in Cairo at the palace of Shubra on January 28, 1865. He was the grandson of Muhammad Ali, the founder of modern Egypt. In 1869, Said Halim’s father, Prince Halim Pasha, was forced to leave Egypt in the wake of a dispute with the ruling khedive, Ismail Pasha (r. 1863–79), over the matter of succession. In 1866, Prince Halim, the youngest son of Muhammad Ali, had been deprived of his right to assume the khedivate by a ferman (imperial edict) issued by the Ottoman sultan, Abdülaziz (r. 1861–76), suzerain of Egypt. The new law of succession was based on primogeniture, thereby depriving other male members of the khedive’s family of any claim to the throne. The real motive behind this exclusion was Khedive Ismail’s desire to secure the Egyptian throne for his own son Tawfiq (r. 1879–92). The khedive won the support of the sultan for his case by means of some fiscal concessions. Reacting to this change, which excluded him from the line of succession to the Egyptian throne, Prince Halim attempted a coup d’état in order to overthrow the khedive. The coup was aborted and Prince Halim was exiled.1 After leaving Egypt, Prince Halim and his four-year-old son, Said Halim, moved to Istanbul. Upon arriving in the Ottoman capital, Halim Pasha bought a yalı (seafront mansion) in Balta Limanı. Halim Pasha also erected a smaller residence on the edge of the forest facing his property. It was named Süngerli Köşk (Sponge Pavilion), because of the texture of its marble walls. Halim Pasha also constructed a hunting lodge in Alemdağ, a hill near the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. Sultan Abdülhamid immediately built a gendarme station just outside the boundaries of Halim Pasha’s property in order to watch him. In his father’s mansion, the young Said Halim learned Arabic, Persian, French, and English, among other subjects, from his tutors. In 1880, when he was fifteen, Said Halim was sent with his younger brother, Abbas Halim, to Geneva to further pursue his education. Said Halim remained in Switzerland for five years. While he was there, he studied political science.2 After returning to Istanbul in 1885, Said Halim and his brother Abbas Halim were presented by their father to the sultan with the words, “I have raised two slaves for your majesty.” On May 13, 1888, Sultan Abdülhamid decorated Said Halim with the second rank Mecidi Order and bestowed upon him the title of pasha. On May 21, 1888, he was appointed to the State Council. This was followed by a series of honors and decorations awarded by the sultan. In February 1889, he received the order of âli-i Osmani, second rank (ikinci rütbeden nişan-i âli-i Osmani); on April 23, 1892, the order of âli-i Osmani,

194 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic first rank (birinci rütbeden nişan-i-âli-i Osmani); and on November 17, 1899, the jeweled medal of Sultan Mecid (Murassa Mecidi nişan-i zi sani). On September 22, 1900, Said Halim Pasha was promoted to the rank of governor-general of the European provinces of the empire (Rumeli Beylerbeyi). All of these awards and honors were bestowed upon Said Halim by the sultan to assure the pasha’s loyalty and to prevent him from joining the opposition. In 1894, Said Halim’s father, Halim Pasha, died. The following year Said Halim Pasha married Princess Emine Tosun Hanım. From this marriage, Said Halim fathered two sons: Prince Mehmed Abdel Halim Bey Turkhan (1896–1960) and Prince Ömer Iḃ rahim Halim Bey (1898–1954). Disturbed by this suffocating atmosphere, Said Halim lost interest in public affairs and began to neglect his duties on the State Council and to withdraw to his mansion on the Bosphorus. There he devoted most of his time and energy to the study of Islamic history and institutions; he also began to reflect on the crisis that afflicted the contemporary Muslim world. Even these intellectual activities did not pass unnoticed by the vigilant censors of an autocratic regime, which was intolerant of any activity that raised the suspicions of the sultan. Consequently, upon a report by a journalist (an informant for Abdülhamid’s intelligence service), Said Halim’s residence was searched, and he was forced to leave the country. First, in the winter of 1905, Said Halim went to Paris, where he officially became a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Later on, he went to Egypt where he had a palace built on Champollion Street by the Italian architect Antonio Lasasciac. There he became the biggest shareholder of the Société Belgo-Egyptiénne de Ezbekié, founded in 1899 in Cairo’s Azbakeya district. He also established direct and close relations with the Young Turk movement and provided financial support for the journal Osmanlı. Said Halim took on the job of inspector of the CUP in 1906. Presumably, Said Halim had already been in contact with the Young Turks while living in Istanbul. After the restoration of the Constitution on July 24, 1908, Said Halim and other expatriates returned to Istanbul. Although he was in exile, Said Halim’s membership on the State Council had continued; it was only on September 3, 1908, following the restoration of the Constitution, that he was officially relieved of his position. In the same year, Said Halim was elected to public office as mayor of Yeniköy under the CUP banner. His re-entering politics after the restoration of the constitutional regime did not prevent him from severely criticizing the adoption of the 1876 Constitution as the political charter of the new regime. According to Said Halim, this Constitution did not suit the realities of the Ottoman Empire. In his article “Meşrutiyet” (Constitutional regime) Said Halim writes, “The Constitution was designed for a country whose political traditions and social fabric was totally different from those of the Ottoman Empire.”3 In March 1909, Said Halim Pasha was nominated to the board of directors of the National Bank of Turkey. This bank was founded by the British Foreign Office and was also encouraged by the CUP in order to counterbalance the influence of the Frenchdominated Ottoman Bank and to curb its predominance over the financial and economic life of the empire. On the same day that Mahmud Şevket was assassinated, several ministers formed a special committee and held an audience with the sultan. Their purpose was to recommend the nomination of Said Halim Pasha, minister of foreign affairs, to the grand

 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) 195 vizierate. However, Sultan Mehmed V (r. 1909–18) already had Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna, in mind for the position. Instead, he appointed Said Halim as deputy grand vizier until Hüseyin Hilmi returned from Austria to assume the post. This arrangement was not acceptable to the CUP, who insisted that Said Halim Pasha be appointed as grand vizier. Finally, the following day, June 12, 1913, the sultan yielded, and Said Halim was appointed by imperial decree (irade) to the grand vizierate.4 One of the most important events of Said Halim’s grand vizierate was the settlement of the Armenian Question by engaging multilateral negotiations between the great powers on the future of eastern Anatolia, which was inhabited by a sizable Armenian minority. On June 17, 1913, an international conference of the ambassadors of the six great powers convened in Istanbul to find a solution to the ongoing Armenian Question. During the conference, Michael De Giers, Russian ambassador to Istanbul, submitted to his colleagues a reform project prepared by André Mandelstamm, the first dragoman of the embassy. According to the terms of the project, the six Ottoman provinces in eastern Anatolia would form one administrative entity and be placed under the authority of a Christian Ottoman governor, appointed by the sultan, for five years. This governor would have under his command a gendarme force, composed half of Muslims and half of Christians. Equally, a half-and-half Muslim-Christian assembly would be formed to assist the governor.5 On July 1, Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha submitted the Ottoman counter-proposal to the conference. The document was based on a reform project already designed during the grand vizierate of Mahmud Şevket Pasha. According to the Ottoman proposal, the lands that fell under the eastern Anatolian reforms would also include the province of Trabzon and the sanjak of Samsun. The implementation of the reforms in this area would be entrusted to two general inspectors, both from a neutral country and between whom the task of supervision would be divided geographically. The general inspectors would be appointed by the sultan for the duration of five years. In the end the Ottoman project was dismissed as unsatisfactory by the Russian government. In order to break the deadlock, the parties agreed to submit their differences to an international commission that would hold another conference at the summer residence of the Austrian ambassador in Yeniköy. Eventually, Said Halim’s determined stance against the Russo-German scheme, which in his eyes posed a challenge to Ottoman sovereignty in eastern Anatolia, appeared to bear fruit. According to the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Louis Mallet (1864– 1936), Russian ambassador De Giers was forced to yield to the persistence of the grand vizier and to accept that the inspectors should be Ottoman subjects assisted by foreign advisors, as demanded in a note communicated by the Porte to the Russian embassy on November 7, 1914. The diplomatic maneuvering between the great powers and the Porte finally yielded the February 8, 1914, agreement on the reform project for the empire’s eastern provinces. Said Halim Pasha, the grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire, and Constantin Goulkevitch, chargé d’affaires of the Russian embassy in Istanbul, were the signatories of the agreement.6 Another important event during the grand vizierate of Said Halim Pasha was the signing of a mutual defense agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. This treaty was negotiated by Said Halim and the German Ambassador at the Porte, Hans

196 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic Von Wangenheim, and eventually prepared the legal ground for the Ottoman entry into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. Although he was in favor of that treaty, Said Halim was against an immediate entry to the war, preferring instead to wait for a suitable moment. In Said Halim’s opinion, the wisest policy for Turkey’s entry into the conflict would be to wait until the right moment came for the Porte to cast its lot with the victorious side. He felt that this moment had not yet come.7 On October 29, after Enver Pasha issued a specific order to the German Admiral Souchon, the Ottoman fleet, which included the Yavuz (Goeben) and the Midilli (Breslau), began to bombard Sebastopol, Novorossiysk, and Odessa, destroying these cities’ military and civil facilities and sinking several vessels. When informed of the situation, Said Halim Pasha was extremely distressed. He ordered an immediate end to these operations. But by the time the order had been issued, the fleet was already on its way back to Istanbul. The grand vizier was strongly opposed to Ottoman participation in the war and told Cemal Pasha that he would take no responsibility for the action. Furthermore, during the Kurban Bayramı festival the grand vizier declared that he would resign, since the attack meant a declaration of war. Nevertheless, the members of the cabinet reminded him that he himself had signed the treaty of alliance with Germany. Therefore, he, more than anyone, should be perfectly aware of the consequences of such a military alliance.8 After the Sarıkamış disaster in January 1915, the Ottoman government felt vulnerable along the eastern front, which had a sizable Armenian population. The Porte was highly suspicious about Armenian loyalty in the event of a renewed Russian offensive and an eventual occupation of the region by the Tsarist armies. On May 26, 1915, Talat Bey, minister of the interior, submitted a bill to the cabinet asking for the adoption of a special law regarding the deportation of the Armenian populations living in areas adjacent to the war zones.9 The proposed bill was adopted by the government on May 30, 1915, and issued on June 1, 1915, as the Temporary Law of Deportation. Although Said Halim had endorsed the law as head of cabinet, he later affirmed during his interrogation by the Post-War Inquiry Commission that “he did not know that the deportations would lead to the massacres and insisted that the plight of the Armenians was caused by the misapplication of the deportation orders.” Curiously, Said Halim Pasha also affirmed during the same hearings that “following the massacre of the Armenians, commissions were formed; these commissions carried out their duties well. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Interior prevented me from publicizing the results of the investigation despite my insistence. It then became evident that as long as Talat Pasha remained at the Ministry of Interior, nothing would come of these investigations.”10 Later in 1915, while the Ottoman armies were victoriously resisting enemy attack at Gallipoli, a government crisis was taking place in Istanbul. Using the successful military situation to consolidate their position in the government, Enver Pasha and Talat Bey were trying to isolate Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha and reduce his authority. In June 1915, Talat Bey began to put pressure on Said Halim in order to compel him to relinquish the foreign affairs portfolio. Talat Bey’s aim was to secure the appointment of his close friend and protégé, Halil Bey, as minister of foreign affairs, thus establishing his control over the cabinet.11 On June 5, 1916, the Bedouin troops of Sharif Husayn attacked the Ottoman garrison in Medina; the long-contrived Hejazi revolt had finally broken out. The effect of Husayn’s

 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) 197 revolt on Said Halim’s political career was fatal. When the amir of Mecca, a key symbolic figure in Islamic officialdom, joined forces with an enemy upon whom the empire had declared jihad, Islamic ideology was dealt a severe blow, and Said Halim, a leading proponent of this movement, was largely discredited in the cabinet. Consequently, he resigned from his position as grand vizier on February 3, 1917, and was replaced by Talat Pasha, who represented the Turcocentrist tendencies within the CUP.12 Before tendering his resignation, Said Halim Pasha sent a short note to his brother Abbas Halim informing him of his intention. After the end of the First World War, Said Halim was detained on Limni until September 22, 1919. Subsequently, he was deported to the island of Malta where he was confined as a prisoner of war at Camp Polverista. The former grand vizier stayed in Malta until April 29, 1921. His liberation was assured, among a number of other prominent Ottomans detained in Malta, by diplomatic pressure exerted by the government of Ankara on the British government and by subsequent negotiations. In an agreement signed by the British and Ankara governments on March 16, 1921, sixty-four of the prominent Ottomans detained in Malta were released in return for British prisoners held in Ankara. After being released from Malta, Said Halim Pasha went to Italy. Neither the Ottoman government nor the British would permit him to return to Istanbul; nor could he enter Egypt, equally under British occupation. In Italy, Said Halim Pasha established himself in Rome. On December 6, 1921, he was assassinated by Arshavir Shiragian, an Armenian militant and Dashanktsutiun member. His remains were brought to Istanbul on January 29, 1922, and buried ceremoniously in the garden of the Türbe (mausoleum) of Sultan Mahmud II, next to the tomb of his father. The following passages are taken from Said Halim’s works, Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane (Political institutions in the Muslim society) (Rome: Imprimerie Editrice Italia, 1921) and Essai sur les causes de la decadence des peuples musulmanes (An Essay on the Causes of the Decline of the Muslim Societies) (Istanbul: Imprimerie Loeffler, 1918). Nowadays we see with great satisfaction that the Muslim people have begun to awaken from their torpor and aspire to liberate themselves from foreign domination. Finally, Muslims have realized that their most sacred duty is to live freely. Without freedom there is neither happiness nor progress for humankind. Nevertheless, I must also admit that this satisfaction is not without some skepticism and apprehension. This is because I see that an overwhelming majority of Muslim intellectuals desire to adopt Western political institutions for their country, firmly believing that the social and political development and the progress of their country are possible only by adopting Western principles. This state of mind of the Muslim intellectual class is deeply distressing; it clearly shows that Muslim leaders have not realized that Islam is not just a religion but also a social and political system. The Muslim religion is the most humane religion. It represents the most complete and highest form of human civilization in its spirit and signification. It is the most genuine and most perfect religion—to such an extent that salvation can be assured by it alone. Our intellectuals seem to forget that for the Western world all roads lead to Rome; in contrast, for the Islamic world all roads lead to Mecca.13 In other words, each of these two different worlds and civilizations

198 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic follows a separate path and different direction, a different destiny, in order to fulfill different missions in the evolution of humanity. When comparing ideals and aspirations as well as moral and social conceptions, there is no doubt that Muslim and Western worlds are quite different. It would be a grave error to believe that the social and political institutions of the Western world would suit the needs of the Islamic worlds. Even modified and adapted versions of Western institutions would not be suitable for our society.14 The weakening of Islamic values among the Muslim intellectual class is the result of Western colonial domination over Muslim countries since the last century. The entire social system of Islam is based on the sovereignty of the sharia. The Muslim society should submit totally to the sovereignty of the sharia, which is the sum of the moral and social rules revealed by the Creator to our Prophet, Muhammad, and then communicated to us by him. Ultimate human happiness depends on the sharia. The sovereignty of the sharia derives from the fact that this divine law is in perfect accordance with the laws of nature. The consequence of the sovereignty of the sharia has been paramount for human history because it created a new society based on new foundations that were totally distinct from other societies.15 By instituting the sovereignty of the sharia, Islam established the genuine principles of liberty and solidarity for humanity—therefore, creating the highest ideal in the history of humankind. The Islamic social system is based on equality and liberty in the most natural and genuine sense of the term. Class rivalries and struggle never existed in this system; instead a real solidarity embracing the whole Muslim world unites the diverse nations living in different geographical regions. Thus, it created a great global Muslim family of 400 million people belonging to different races. It is considered liberal to declare that human beings are born with certain natural rights, including freedom. I would say that nothing is more erroneous and more anti-liberal than such an assertion. At the beginning of their lives, human beings have no natural rights. They acquire their rights by educating themselves and by adapting themselves to their social environment and by fulfilling the duties imposed on them by society. Although the advocates of Westernization in Muslim countries were always insignificant in number, this small minority represented the majority of the educated class; thereby, they exerted a strong influence on the decision-making process and determined the destiny of Muslim society. Its power derived mainly from support provided by the Western powers through the medium of their agents in Muslim lands. The main channel for the spread of Western ideas in Muslim countries was education. The Muslim elite became acquainted with Western ideas either by studying abroad or attending schools established by Western powers in Muslim countries. The main purpose of the latter was to impregnate Muslim minds with Western ideas and values. In this way, the West was able to extend its hegemony over Muslim countries by penetrating into their intellectual and cultural spheres. The result of Western cultural domination is the alienation of Muslim intellectuals from their own culture and society. This is because they soon found themselves incapable of understanding the real meaning of their religion. Indeed, some became completely indifferent or even hostile to it. In other words, they lost faith in the principles of their religion.16

 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) 199 Every nation has its own way of feeling, thinking, and acting, and every nation has a mentality that is peculiar to it. The fundamental dissimilarity between East and West is that Europe—even after being converted from paganism to Christianity—kept political and social institutions (e.g., feudalism); in contrast, after espousing the Muslim faith, the East abandoned its pre-Islamic political and social institutions. However, the problem of underdevelopment had nothing to do with religion itself but needed to be viewed as a sociological phenomenon. This paradigm was valid for the Muslim world as well as for the West. Religions are molded by the diverse customs and cultural characteristics of their adoptive lands. Just as historical and social developments in Christendom engendered Catholicism and later Protestantism, similar developments gave birth to the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam. Furthermore, within the same religious denomination one can detect different characteristics: for example, Catholicism in Germany is different from Catholicism in Spain or Italy. The same is true of Islam, where different schools adapted themselves to various local realities and developed distinct characteristics. Turkish Sunnism, for example, is distinct from its Arab variety, while Shi’ism in Iran differs from that in India.17 By suppressing all ancient superstitions and prejudices, Islam enabled man to use his intellectual capacities without hindrance; thus, the coming of Islam could be said to have paved the way for a scientific revolution to which, historically, Muslims made a considerable contribution. Although man has proven himself capable of discovering the laws of nature (physics and chemistry) and understanding them objectively, he has completely failed to discover moral and social laws through his own efforts. This was due to man’s inability to remain objective when examining and understanding the laws governing humanity. For this reason, the Prophet revealed these moral and social laws to humankind and urged Muslims to try to learn and discover scientific knowledge themselves—even if it meant traveling to China to obtain it.18 The real cause of Muslim decline lay in the misunderstanding of the Prophet’s sayings by conservative Muslim scholars in their study of ilm. These scholars reduced this concept to the level of religious and legal knowledge, thus leaving out natural and positive sciences. This led to the development of a certain scholasticism, which thereafter had a detrimental effect on the development of the Muslim world; indeed, it severely discouraged all intellectual activity other than in religious sciences. The anathema of natural and positive sciences and their exclusion from the curriculum of Muslim institutions of learning rendered Muslims completely incapable of acquiring the knowledge necessary to discover the secret forces of nature or of exploiting them for their economic welfare and material progress. Because of this the economic state of the Muslim world deteriorated and Muslim countries became weak and vulnerable to external threats. Ultimately, by showing a total disinterest in the natural and positive sciences, Muslim nations were themselves responsible for their own economic and political breakdown.19 Western social systems are in constant change, and these changes reflect the unstable nature of Western social structure. The source of this instability is the continual struggles that occur among the different social classes that make up Western societies—struggles that are caused by the differing needs and aspirations of these groups. These, in turn, are a direct consequence of that society’s material and technical

200 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic evolution. Therefore, unlike the Islamic world, the West has never had a constant and immutable social idea that is capable of inspiring and guiding its evolution. On the contrary, it’s continually changing; social ideas are generated and transformed by its social evolution, which in turn are shaped by its material development. Western society had not yet reached the ideal stage where its moral and social principles took on their final and immutable form.20 However, solidarity in Western society occurs only among members of a certain social class. In any society, simply by decreeing so-called liberal laws, it is impossible to change age-old values and mentalities that are laden with deep-rooted anti-liberal and anti-egalitarian prejudices. Change can only come with the implementation of proper moral education that is carried out with patience and intelligence over generations. The assiduous application of such a curriculum will liberate man from his traditional prejudices of class and caste and cause him to embrace the idea that all men are equal—regardless of their origins or social position—and understand that it is only by merit that they can distinguish themselves. Western democracy has its roots in the aristocratic regime of Europe. Since Muslim societies never had such an aristocracy in their past, it would be unrealistic for them to adopt Western democratic institutions.21 These Western thinkers, for lack of any other common quality among these backward (Muslim) nations, blamed their religion as the major cause of their backwardness compared to Christian nations. This superficial and erroneous assumption comforted orientalists and caused resentment among Muslims, a situation that undermined all possibility of dialogue between Islam and the West. The decline of Muslim societies could be explained by the influence of their preIslamic heritage. Since the nations that adopted Islam were heirs to old and distinct civilizations, it was inevitable that their respective ancient histories would still exert a strong influence during the Islamic period. This phenomenon prevented Muslim nations from fully understanding and implementing the religious tenets of their faith, thus depriving them of the blessings of Islam. The decline of the Muslim peoples was due to their failure to renounce their preIslamic legacy, a failure that shackled their progress. This same legacy prevented them from comprehending the maxims of their faith. Consequently, paralysis set in. This left Muslim societies stuck between this pre-Islamic legacy and a genuine Islamic ideology, a condition that formed a continuous hindrance to the development of these societies. The only way to achieve progress was for Muslims to swing the pendulum in favor of genuine Islamic principles. It was the mutual hostility between Islam and Christendom perpetuated throughout the centuries by long and frequent warfare, and the contempt that Muslims harbored against the Christian West that prevented them from becoming fully acquainted with and benefiting from the scientific and technological achievements of the West. While the Westernized elites of Muslim countries espoused the Western way of life and adapted it to their local Muslim environment, the masses continued to live according to the principles of their religion, acclimatized to their local culture—be it Egyptian, Turkish, or Persian. Being thus deprived of their elite’s intellectual and social guidance, Muslim populations lost their orientation and their evolution was interrupted.

 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) 201 The decline of religion proved to be fatally detrimental to Muslim societies because, unlike the Christian West, the social structures of Muslim countries are based on religious principles. Therefore, any attempt to reduce the role of religion in Muslim societies would unravel the social fabric and bring about their ruination. Islamization should cover every aspect of society, by infusing it with high, pristine Islamic values and by purifying it of any corruptive pagan elements inherited from a pre-Islamic past. Nationalism is one of the detrimental notions that, in a latent form, survived in Muslim societies centuries after their conversion to Islam. Spurred, however, by the injurious impact of Western ideas, nationalism constituted a fatal threat to Muslim polities. Nationalism is a destructive ideology and is considered as one of the major causes of the First World War. Each part of the Islamic world is a separate political unit. Each unit should be bound by the general principle of Islam but also responsive to its more specific reality. Once humanity has survived the catastrophic consequences of the First World War, it will adopt internationalism. In the West, socialism will create this internationalism, whereas in the East, Muslim lands will be united by Islamic internationalism.

The Islamic Political Regime The ideal political system is that which best corresponds to the social order found within a society. The ineptest political regime forces the society it governs to change its social regime. The ideal Muslim society is one that submits itself to the sovereignty of the sharia. In such a society it would be incumbent on every person to fulfill the obligations required of him/her by the rules of the sharia. Similarly, one is entitled to expect others to fulfill the same duties. As for the government, its main function is to assure the implementation of these rules. Indeed, every Muslim should require of his or her government the secure establishment of the authority of the sharia. The Islamic political regime is representative. Compared with Western societies, Muslim society has not experienced any of the classic rivalries typical of Western political systems. This is because all of its members hold to the same basic values and ideals that were sufficiently well developed and that are inclusive and broadly appealing to the Muslim masses. Consequently, the ideal Islamic parliament would be composed of members who unanimously share the same political conviction, which is to serve the sharia. The main function of this parliament would be the supervision of the deeds and actions of the government. The drafting and passing of legislation, which constitutes the major function of parliaments in the West, however, would not be the task of this body in an Islamic context and polity. Instead, promulgating legislation would be the duty of a special body of legists, the ulema or doctors of law. This corresponds to classical Islamic legal doctrine and practice. Authority in Muslim society should not be invested in an executive council where many people participate in the decision-making process; rather, it should be concentrated in the hands of one person. Dividing executive decisions among many people or groups who may be working at cross-purposes will paralyze the government. In a Muslim political system, supreme authority should be entrusted to one person

202 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic elected by adult suffrage. The authority must derive from the mandate obtained from the nation through general elections. Muslim societies should be governed by heads of state directly elected by the nation and these heads of state should have an exclusive right to hold the executive power. The role of political parties in Islamic societies is bound to be different from that of political parties in the Western world. Whereas in the West parties serve the interests of different social classes and have as their goal the establishment of the domination of one social class over another, thereby subverting the existing social order, in Islamic societies, their function is to preserve the social institutions created by Islam. Excessive party discipline imposed on government members deprives them of even the most basic freedom of action and strips them of their initiative. Thus, party discipline undermines individual talents such as problem solving. Ultimately, the strict adherence by government members to the party line can only result in mediocrity. A political regime may be considered imperfect when its values do not represent the characteristic values intrinsic to the society over which it rules. Political regimes are the product of societal and historical evolution and each political entity embodies the sociocultural values of its society. This constitution was designed by the dignitaries of the Porte as a means to check the power of the sultan and to curb his absolutism. The Ottoman Constitution of 1876 “provides to the people of the Ottoman Empire, which stretches out to the deserts of Arabia and the majority of whose population lives a primitive life under the absolute authority of a religious or tribal chief, such extensive rights that even the most advanced nations of our time do not possess.” The parliamentary regime that was reestablished by the Revolution of July 1908 proved itself to be unsuited to the realities of the Ottoman Empire. Far from being beneficial, this form of government disturbed the social peace and threatened the political existence of the empire. Any political regime that forces a society to change its social institutions is the worst; for unlike merchandise, such institutions are not items that can be easily imported from abroad. Instead, social and governmental institutions are the products of a long process of social evolution, which are developed by every nation and by every people; they evolve according to the needs and demands of their environment. What makes a government corrupt is the absence of a real and efficient control mechanism. Lack of accountability would cause even the most liberal regime to degenerate into tyranny. If the former Ottoman regime became arbitrary, it was because of the inability and unwillingness of Ottoman society to exert its control over the government despite the fact that this is the social and political duty of every Muslim.

The Senate The institution of the senate developed in the West as an aristocratic institution designed to defend the rights and privileges of the upper class. In Western political systems, the role of this institution was to moderate and restrain the “democratization” of society by preserving and defending aristocratic values, thus assuring social equilibrium.

 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) 203 Such an institution does not have a raison d’être in the Islamic political system, since Muslim society is based on legal and social egalitarianism. The evolution of Muslim society must, therefore, occur under the guidance of a national assembly assisted by a legislative corps; both are inspired and guided by the sharia. The role played by the senate was mostly a formal one, since the Constitution empowered the sultan with the right to veto any proposed legislation. Nevertheless, as the parliamentary system of the empire was modeled on those operating under the European monarchies, most of which had bicameral systems, the Ottoman Parliament also had an upper and a lower house. Western and Muslim societies had different social and political dynamics because of their historical backgrounds and religious systems. Consequently, it would be an error for Muslims to adopt Western models of development. Western political and social institutions such as aristocracy and democracy do not have exact equivalents in Islamic history and social consciousness. Indeed, social transformation in Islamdom has traditionally followed different patterns. Thus, while Christian Europe’s history has been marked by continual class struggle, such social upheavals were far less dramatic in Muslim societies. The apprehension felt by the European powers about their Muslim colonies was caused by their misconception of the nature and aims of this pan-Islamic revival. Contrary to what Europeans thought, this movement did not harbor a belligerent nature and certainly did not preach the rallying of Muslims around a despotic authority that would encourage supporters to commit massacres. Pan-Islamism did not represent a political union of peoples belonging to the same faith, nor was it an occult religious sect or secret political association; rather, it was the leading voice of progress and liberty in Muslim societies. The idea of pan-Islamism represented the desire of the intellectual elites of Muslim countries to ensure the salvation of the Islamic world through liberty and progress. Pan-Islamism represented the revival of an Islamic consciousness among Muslims all over the world who were determined to liberate themselves from the shackles of ignorance and servitude by improving their intellectual prowess, capacities, and material condition. The oppressors of the Muslim peoples were not only their Western colonizers but also their own despotic rulers, who were directly responsible for the present degradation of Muslims by keeping them, through coercion, in a state of ignorance and servility and hindering their development. Muslims had to unite not only against European colonialism but also against despotic potentates who ruled over them oppressively, even if one of these were the caliph himself. It was accepted that the revolutions that took place in European history were pursued in the name of liberty and progress; the West had no right to accuse the pan-Islamic movement of fanaticism when, like the revolutions in Europe, it aspired to establish the rules of liberty and progress in Muslim lands. The pan-Islamic revival would restore to the Islamic world its former might and splendor by emancipating it from the decay of its civilization. The Muslim ulema had come into contact with the scholastic ideas during the Crusades through their dealings with Christian European clergy. Eventually, this scholasticism began to dominate Islamic intellectual life and hinder its development.

204 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic The following passages are taken from Said Halim Pasha’s typescript work “La Crise Politique” (unpublished), provided to Ahmet Şeyhun by the author’s family in July 1997.

Political Crisis By trying to remedy the administrative weakness of the country we created a very serious political crisis that deeply troubled the country and threatened its social and national existence. The facts clearly showed that all hopes attached to the adoption of a parliamentarian regime proved deceitful. We soon learned that in thinking that we had achieved a great success we had in fact committed a great error. It is a well-known fact that the outcome of the 1908 Revolution was, in short, a radical change of the country. This change was thought to be beneficial because we believed that the ills with which the country was afflicted were the result of its political regime. A political regime is considered flawed when it does not correspond to the social system of the country that it represents, instead contradicting it. Because the political regime is an outcome of the historical evolution of a people, it represents the people’s mentality and morality, and their understanding of authority and power. The political regime reflects the people’s understanding of power relations. Therefore, a change in the political regime is in fact a very radical change. It must be fully justified with a parallel change in the society that it governs. Has the social situation of the Ottoman Empire really changed recently so as to require a new political regime? We do not believe it has. During the old regime all the complaints that came from every corner of the country were directed merely at the deplorable administration of the empire. Other than a small minority of intellectuals who were influenced by some extreme Western ideologies, nobody wanted a regime change. Those who did want a regime change hoped to put an end to the misadministration of the empire. They sincerely believed that such a measure would make the administration effective. In fact, replacing an existing political regime with a new one could only be justified if important changes took place in the social fabric of the country. A radical change in the political system of a country can only be justified by a similar change in the sociopolitical values of the society itself. Otherwise such a change can only be the outcome of an arbitrary decision that would do nothing but harm the society and bring trouble to the country. Such an arbitrary decision would be taken with total disregard for the customs, traditions, and culture of the country and with no consideration of its real situation. Such a political regime is condemned to be a regime of disorganization and dissolution. By changing the political regime of the country in the hope of improving its situation (the Young Turks) committed a grave error. The situation became even worse when a Latin constitution was adopted. The Constitution of 1876 was modeled on European constitutions; as such, it is unsuitable to the realities of our country unless we change our values and culture. Such a change is unthinkable since it would mean going against the natural course of the historical evolution of society according to social factors. In fact, the worst kind of political regime is that which forces a society to change its core values. Adopting Western social

 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) 205 norms and values would undermine the social fabric of Muslim society and cause its decline. Although accepted by the civilized nations of Europe, the principle of majority rule is far from being a wise and just principle. It represents only the naked force of the majority; it is merely the force of numbers, the power of the majority over the minority. Politicians do all in their power in order to obtain this majority of votes; it is obtained at the price of merciless fights between people and when obtained it becomes oppressive, partial, and despotic. It is obvious that a political authority based on majority rule cannot be an ideal one. Again, it would be an error to think that in the West the people adopted this regime of majority rule by choice. On the contrary, it was in fact imposed on them by their social situation and social necessities. The social system of Islam is not based on the inequalities between different social classes. The aristocratic system of Europe is unknown in Muslim countries. In the Islamic world, people are divided into upper, middle, and lower classes; however, this division is quite different from the European feudal and aristocratic system. The Ottoman social system differs from its Western counterpart in the lack of constant struggles and rivalries between socioeconomic classes. The nations who lost their independence suffer under foreign domination because the political (colonial) regime imposed upon them is totally different from their own political system, hence incompatible with their social values. The Westernization of society creates animosity and social tension between the different segments of that society, which until then had existed happily and harmoniously. Such a change would also undermine the fabric of Islamic society and erode its noble principles of equality and justice. Consequently, a political regime that forces a society to change and adopt foreign norms and values is the worst political regime, but also the most tyrannical. Moreover, if the new social system imposed on the Muslim society were inferior to its own Islamic system, such a change would be calamitous. Nowadays, it has become very popular to denigrate the old regime of Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909). Nonetheless, what people do not realize when condemning the era of the deposed sultan is that that the sultan and his absolutism were a historical and social product of this country. Nevertheless, this regime, which is now often severely criticized and despised, was for many decades perfectly suited to the realities of the country. It was in perfect harmony with the culture and belief system of its people and it best represented their traditions and their social and political understanding. The problems that existed during the Hamidian era did not emanate from the regime itself, which was suited to the social and cultural structure of the country, but from an absolutist government and a paranoid ruler. Therefore, it would be wrong to equate the ancien régime with the sultan’s government, because political regime and government are not necessarily one and the same. Today, despite that fact that the new parliamentary regime has checks and balances, it has proved to be unable to control the executive power. This is because the electors themselves are not interested enough in the political destiny of their country. Nevertheless, many centuries ago, when this country was ruled by an autocratic regime, this control existed through a system of checks and balances applied by some political and social groups on the executive power of the sultan to limit his authority. In the past, for many centuries our dignitaries, notables, scholars, and prominent members of society knew

206 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic how to perform their social and political duties and exert real and effective control over the executive (sultan’s government). The real cause of the problem was not the regime itself; rather, it was the citizens who were unable to pay their debt to the society by exercising control over the actions of the executive. The section of society best equipped to oversee the actions of the government is the country’s elite. This elite must assume their responsibility and form a responsible body to scrutinize the actions of the administration and hold the government to account. Since this is a task of primordial importance and has a national character, this body of elites must be elected by the citizens. This controlling body must represent the spirit and mind of the nation but must not be an exact image of the society that it represents. Our failure derives from the fact that our understanding and interpretation of the principles and ideas of the West are greatly flawed. Instead of adopting Western civilization and adapting ourselves to it, we have to adapt it to our realities, namely we have to acclimatize it. We can call this process “the orientalization of Western civilization.” In a country like ours where the individual has never fulfilled his political duties, it would be useless to give more rights to the people than those provided by the old regime. The best example for this situation is the complete lack of interest shown by the citizens of the empire in the Constitution of Midhat Pasha. The only way to ensure that people fulfill their political duties is to educate them about these duties. For that reason, the education of a people is a very delicate task that requires a great deal of knowledge and patience for those who undertake it. It would be naïve to believe that merely adopting a European constitution would be sufficient to convince people to fulfill their political duties.22 The following passages are taken from Said Halim Pasha’s work “Islamization” in typescript form (unpublished), provided to Ahmet Şeyhun by the author’s family in July 1997.

Islamization We have always stated that the salvation of the Muslim peoples was in their complete Islamization. Islam is the most complete religion. Its morality is based on its creed, and its sociology derives from these moral principles. Islam is the religion that is comprised of all the experimental knowledge and metaphysical beliefs. It represents the highest level of human consciousness. It is both idealism and positivism. In order to be Islamized, we have to conform to the moral, social, and political principles of this religion. The Islamic credo is the key to human happiness, as long as Muslims feel, think, and act according to the fundamental principles of this religion. A Muslim who believes in the morality of Kant or Spencer and adopts the French social ideal or English political ideal would be an individual without character despite his immense knowledge. What would we think of a German or Frenchman who adopted Chinese moral principles, Indian (Hindu) philosophy, or Mexican policy? From that moment, he would cease to feel, think, and act like a Frenchman or a German—despite expressing himself in French or German.22

 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) 207

Belief For the Muslim, the unity of his God is essential, and this is expressed in a very clear form. Islamic faith is our conception of immutable and absolute Wisdom and Justice expressed in the ninety-nine names of God. This faith assures the perpetual harmony and balance in the world. We believe in the Prophet because it is through him that God revealed to us the immutable principle of human happiness and felicity. This principle is expressed by the form of an Islamic trinity: liberty, equality, and solidarity.23

Our Intellectual Crisis Although born in the climate of Western intellectualism, the Ottoman intellectual elite individual is quite different from his Western counterpart. Our Westernized elite mostly can be identified by his unproductive criticism of his own cultural environment. This criticism is full of bitterness and merely expresses negative characteristics without offering any positive creative alternatives. However, we have entrusted all our hope in such elites. We expect such an elite individual to provide the realization of our ideals— including contributing to the progress of our society. But we ignore the reality that this elite individual is deeply pessimistic about the future of his country and does not have any faith in the development of our society. Indeed, our intellectual elite individual lacks any ideal for leading our society. This fatal incapacity derives from the character of our intellectuals as much as from their education. In our country, individuals are always vain and proud. The reason for that is the Ottoman political regime that dominated Ottoman society for so long that it makes the individual a docile instrument—he is obedient to authorities or passively accepts the whims of the government. This political regime isolates the individual. It detaches him from the collectivity either by satisfying his personal desires or by flattering him and by encouraging his individual sentiments. Then, this regime constantly weakens his communal feelings and collectivist aspirations. Consequently, in a society that lives under an absolutist and authoritarian regime, personal vanity always replaces national or racial pride. This is because this sentiment remains unknown to him. That is why in Ottoman society individuals always become vain and arrogant. An individual’s intellectual formation exacerbates his pride and eventually makes him a very selfish person, who becomes totally indifferent to the interests of the general public. He is only interested to his personal benefit. He considers even his relatives as his rivals. As a consequence, his artistic and scientific activities lose their impartial character and are insincere. He uses his qualities just to satisfy his personal ambitions, his selfishness, and his vanity. Our intellectuals do not live for their scholarship, art, or science; rather, they consider these activities as instruments to provide themselves with an easy and pleasant life. Coming from the ranks of the bureaucracy, the ultimate objective of our intellectual is to secure a lucrative sinecure. In reality, he is just a bureaucrat, a civil servant, more educated, and more enlightened than the others. He is also more selfish and more undisciplined than the rest of his colleagues and, therefore, lacks a guiding

208 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic ideal. His pessimism derives from his belief that everything in his country is so faulty and dysfunctional that improvements and reformations are impossible. He considers all efforts of reform as vain. He then sees that the only option for development is to make a clean sweep of all the traditional institutions and to replace them with new ones to create a new society from scratch. He advocates for a total change in politics, in morality, in society, and in political institutions. Our intellectuals spend their lives lamenting, bemoaning, and whining about their unfortunate fates and continuously pity themselves. This is just the opposite of being hopeful about the future and nurturing brilliant expectations. Confronted with such a mood and state of mind, one cannot resist asking the question: what kind of patriotic feelings do such intellectuals have, when they want everything traditional and national to be abandoned and then replaced by novel borrowings from foreign sources? Where is their attachment to their country, their homeland? This strange mentality of our intellectuals is reflected in every aspect of our social life. Elsewhere, when governments have wanted to improve a political or social institution, they reform it by eliminating its imperfections and by fixing its non-working and obsolete parts by adjusting to the new realities of their age. In our country, instead of reforming our old and traditional institutions, they totally destroy and abolish them. They replace traditional institutions with new ones that are expected to be better than the older ones. For us the desire to improve an old institution means abandoning it completely and replacing it with a new institution. Whereas in other countries, they preserve their traditional institutions and reform them in order to keep their cultural heritage. We destroy the whole structure in order to build a new one; whereas others try to restore it to preserve their heritage. The efforts of conservation are motivated by the desire of preservation; in contrast, building everything anew is done for innovation. Innovation does not mean improvement. These two are completely different from each other. The lights (of Western civilization) blind our intellectuals rather than enlightening them and prevent them from acting rationally. Thus, improving something by totally changing it actually is a new experience, and that new experience would deprive us of our already acquired experiences. Also, we would lose the precious time we have spent on acquiring previous experiences. Moreover, all changes are done in an authoritarian way. If these changes could not be properly explained and justified, they became arbitrary acts. If arbitrary acts dominate politics and the regime becomes arbitrary, it undermines good qualities like experience, wisdom, and moderation. Then, the reformer becomes an oppressor and his reforms become a calamity. Our reformers created anarchy and chaos by trying to introduce reforms to our country. The reforms introduced arbitrarily to our country and imposed in an authoritarian way on our society actually disregarded the wisdom of our people and despised our traditional values gained throughout the ages. By clearly acting in this way, our reformers indicated that they preferred the wisdom and the historical experience of the West over our own wisdom and experience. The case of our intellectuals is similar to an individual who indulges in reading medical books in order to protect himself against disease and to have a healthy life; however, he ends up believing that he has become afflicted by an incurable disease. In comparison, we can say that our intellectuals think that our society is afflicted by incurable social and political ills. All the light that he receives from abroad makes the situation worse in his

 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921) 209 country. The ties that attach our intellectual to his homeland are atavistic, which is also unconscious. These cases clearly demonstrate that acquiring knowledge haphazardly does not always prove to be beneficial and useful. If one acquires knowledge without any method and plan nor any objective, the acquisition will not benefit him. On the contrary, it could harm him and his society. This kind of acquisition of knowledge without any method or plan would create incomplete intellectuals who would also harm their country. Exactly like the amateur physician who is ignorant of the necessary methods to practice his profession, our intellectuals are also incapable of refraining from implementing the reforms that they acquired from abroad. The knowledge of our intellectuals in many fields like politics and social issues or morality is very superficial. Moreover, the knowledge those intellectuals have is mostly theoretical and not practical. They find solutions to problems in their imagination, but those solutions are inapplicable to the concrete problems of our country. Throughout these past centuries, the Ottoman Empire has created a wonderful civilization and played a fundamental role in world history. Its moral and intellectual values and principles, its social and political institutions and conceptions contributed greatly to the development of human civilization. Nevertheless, we only know about the military prowess of our empire and remain totally ignorant about its intellectual creations. This ignorance constitutes an enormous gap in our knowledge. Because of this ignorance, we feel inferior to the West. We doubt the greatness and the nobility of our ancestors and the magnificence of our past—to the point of denying our glorious past and imitating others. We are totally deprived of national pride and we try to compensate that with our personal vanity. Our intellectuals have become unconscious victims of their environment. Their abnormal political and social environment naturally has caused them to abandon their national values and adopt foreign values. Then, they become totally mentally confused. The knowledge they have acquired from Western sources might have individual value for them, but it would definitely not have any social value. Such knowledge is valuable and useful in a comparative context. Such knowledge provides comparison. We do not have a tradition of comparing our knowledge with the knowledge of other societies. Our civilization is self-centered. In order to assure progress, we have to compare our society with the most advanced societies and draw some logical conclusions from that comparison. Then we can better understand our deficiencies and our shortcomings. These comparisons and their outcome will allow us to see our failures more clearly and would help us to reform our society. Our understanding of our social environment needs to be corrected. We think that the institutions that we import from Western countries could be planted in our lands and would easily adapt to our climate. Our intellectuals think so. They also think that, by adopting European ideas, they could easily become Westernized thinkers. Rather, it is actually a distortion of their original character. It ends up of being a deterioration. Rather than becoming quietened and calmed, we have been deceived and become disappointed. Our borrowed ideas would be condemned to remain abstract theories, unless we take into consideration the social and the cultural realities and milieu of our country. They would remain ideals but not applicable ideas. They would lose all their practical value and positive utility. The outcome of this mental deformation that results from this situation could be seen in our literature as a characteristic part of it. Modern Ottoman literature is characterized

210 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic by a complete lack of sincerity and honesty. It is a product of our imagination and our soul, but it is mostly an artificial creation. It is formed by non-genuine and imported ideas. The original and real Ottoman soul is excluded from that construct. Instead it is replaced by a profusion of various non-connected encyclopedic knowledge from diverse sources. This modern literature is artificial and lacks personality. Thus, instead of presenting the consolidation of the Ottoman soul, it makes it weak; instead of supporting our trust in our culture, it undermines that trust and introduces skepticism to our society. This skepticism becomes a debilitating factor and undermines the fabric of our society. His silence is shocking in face of the praiseworthy heroism of the Ottomans against their foes. This is a perfect example of his artificial and fake character. More than anything, art needs the love of its homeland and a national soul for inspiration. Deprived of both of those, art would die in an exotic environment at the hands of artists who lack souls and inspiration. When the influence of our intellectuals on our society is detrimental and damaging, the influence exerted by European intellectuals over their own society is the opposite of revitalizing and creativity. The spirit and the character of our intellectual class are totally different from those of the Western intelligentsia. Unlike their European counterparts, our intellectuals are actually parasites on our society. Like parasites, they suck the blood of our society and weaken it. In the past the most important defect of our learned class was their absolute ignorance of Western civilization and their inherent hostility to it. Today, we see that our most educated and enlightened class has adopted a completely opposite position. Unlike their predecessors, they instead have alienated themselves from the popular culture of their country. Our contemporary intellectuals cut a pale figure in comparison to their ancient counterparts. The value of a society is determined by the value of its learned class. The primary task and duty of this class is to engage with the development of their society. In order to be more beneficial to the society of their predecessors of the classical Ottoman age, our intellectuals must study in detail and in depth the traditional social and political institutions of the Ottoman Empire as well as the evolution of these institutions since their origins. They also must study our traditional arts in order to comprehend our understanding and our concepts of esthetics. They must eradicate the mortal ignorance that reigns over our society by having employed the knowledge that they acquired from Western sources. Once the cultural richness of our past has come to light as a result of those studies, our current intellectual and spiritual confusion would eventually come to an end, and we will regain the lucidity of our thought. This is not going to be an easy task, and many of our intellectuals would be unwilling to engage in it. Nevertheless, it is crucial for our learned people to assume their responsibility in educating and enlightening their society. Then, our people would understand the meaning and importance of their traditional and national culture, and they will begin to live their lives according to those cultural norms and values. This would enable our society to evolve more and to progress in the path of civilization.

12

Ahmed Naim Baban (1872–1934)

Biography Ahmed Naim (Baban) was born in Baghdad in 1872. His father was Mustafa Zihni Pasha, a high-ranking Ottoman official in Iraq, serving as the chief secretary (Me-ktupçu) of the Baghdad province. After completing his studies in the Rüşdiye (high school) of his native city, the young Ahmed Naim went to Istanbul to pursue his higher education. In 1891, he entered Galatasaray Mekteb-i Sultanisi (Imperial High School of Galatasaray), and graduated from the Mülkiye (School of Civil Administration) in 1894. That same year, he was employed at the translation office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after which he pursued a bureaucratic career in the Ministry of Education, where he was appointed director of the Curriculum Department from 1911 to 1912. From 1912 to 1914, Ahmed Naim became a lecturer in Arabic at his alma mater, Galatasaray Mek- teb-i Sultanisi. In 1914, he was appointed as a member of the Ministry of Education’s translation committee and participated in the activities of the educational reform committee. A prolific scholar, Ahmed Naim made a great contribution to the philosophical and artistic compendia prepared and published by this committee. He wrote several works on ethics, philosophy, and religion. Naim also began to translate the hadith collection of al-Bukhari (d. 870). He was later appointed as a professor in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Istanbul (Darülfünûn), where he taught philosophy, psychology, ethics, logic, and metaphysics, also publishing the majority of his class notes. For a short time, he was also appointed rector of the university. In 1933, as a result of a government purge of academia, he was forced to accept retirement and died a year later, on August 13, 1934, in Istanbul.1 The following passages are taken from Ahmed Naim’s work İslam’da Dava-yı Kavmiyet (Ethnicity in Islam) (Istanbul: Tevzi-yi Tabiat Matbaası, 1332 AH [1916]). One of the pillars of Islam is the Muslim brotherhood. This has been clearly established by the Qur’anic verse that declares that all Muslims are brothers (and sisters). After emphasizing this important principle, Islam also imposes social and religious values and duties to ensure that this principle endures. These are: paying due alms to the needy; giving mutual assistance; and forbidding and preventing animosity, discord, and strife among Muslims. A nation can survive only if it protects itself from discord and strife. Otherwise, these social evils undermine the brotherhood and

212 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic destroy the unity of the nation. Thus, the reasons for the strict prohibition of racism and ethnic nationalism must be explicated.2 The idea of ethnic nationalism and racism penetrated the Muslim world only very recently. It was only after the revolution of 1908 that ethnic nationalism and racism began to spread among Muslims. Prior to this time, although (this idea) was put forward by intellectuals, it remained isolated. Ethnic nationalism is a harmful and alien ideology to Muslim culture and it poses a dangerous threat to the unity of Islam. Ethnic nationalism is like a deadly contagious disease that could cause the demise of Islam. Ethnic nationalism is an evil ideology whose roots extend to the period of Jahiliyyah, the age of darkness and ignorance that existed before the advent of Islam in Arabia. Identifying themselves as Turkish, Arabian, Kurdish, and Circassian would be madness for Muslims—especially at such a perilous time, when the foot of the enemy has penetrated our sacred homeland. We must take a lesson from the fate of Albania, a Muslim land that is now lost for Islam.3 Turkists come in two categories: the “pure Turkists” and the “Turkist-Is- lamists.” The “pure Turkists” aspire to forge a completely new ideology by using old (pre-Islamic Turkic) myths and legends. Their objective is to build a new nation with a new faith. Turkists argue that what caused them to adopt the ethnic nationalist cause was the plight of the Turks. They state that Turks are the main ethnic group within the Ottoman Empire to have carried the heaviest burden by defending the state with their blood and sweat for many years. As a result of this exertion, they are now in a situation of complete exhaustion. Their commerce, industry, and even their agriculture have been totally ruined. At the same time, none of the other Muslim or non-Muslim ethnic groups really acknowledge the value of the sacrifices made by the Turks in defending the Ottoman state. Now, the time has arrived for Turks to recover from centuries of exhaustion and impoverishment. Thus, Turks have to reduce the amount of sacrifice they make for other ethnic groups of the empire and devote more energy and resources to their own welfare and edification. This could be possible only under the guidance of a new idea, and this new idea is Turkism. The Turkists also argue that religiosity among the masses has become weakened, and that religion has lost its former importance as a social force. Nationalism is the new rising ideology in Europe, and if Turks want to be a part of Europe and keep up with its progress, they have to adopt nationalist ideals and abandon the old theocratic system. It is common knowledge that it is almost impossible to regain the territory occupied by the European powers. On the other hand, the Muslim populations of the empire are gradually losing their attachment to Islam as a political ideal. Therefore, say Turkist intellectuals, Turkism must be used to unite the various Turkic groups, consisting of 80 million people, which stretch from the Bosphorus to the Pacific Ocean.4 We consider this utopia to be a completely absurd dream. Muslim Turks of Anatolia would never take up arms for their heathen brethren of the same race living in faraway Kamchatka, just as they would not shed their blood for the Christian-Shamanistic Turkic Yakuts living in the ice- and snow-covered plains of Siberia.5 According to Turkist-Islamist intellectuals, Islam can be entirely compatible with ethnic nationalism—in their case, Turkism. This cannot be true. In a hadith reported by Abu Hureyra, God says to the believers, “I created you in tribes and in different peoples only to facilitate your recognition of each other; otherwise you are one people.”

 Ahmed Naim Baban (1872–1934) 213 I agree with the Turkist-Islamist intellectuals that Turkish groups within the Ottoman Empire need to recover after being overburdened with such a difficult task of sacrifice. However, it is the duty of all Muslims to participate in the rejuvenation of the Turks, because all Muslims, regardless of their ethnic origin, must assist each other. Since the Turks are an inseparable part of the Muslim ummah—by contributing to the strength and welfare of the Islamic world—the economic and cultural revival of Turks and the development of their industry, agriculture, and education can only be to the benefit of other Muslims. Therefore, Turkish development and success should be seen as Muslim development and success—not a separate ethnic one. Turkish identity can have significance only within the broader Muslim identity. Turkish history cannot be written independently from Islamic history. Therefore, one should not be called a “Turk” but a “Muslim.”6 The Turkish-speaking peoples of Anatolia and Rumeli (European lands of the Ottoman Empire) should not be labeled “Turks” since their adoption of the Turkish language does not necessarily make them Turkish. Language is an instrument of communication; it does not confer ethnicity upon its users. Since the Turkist-Islamists’ vision is not the same as that of the pure Turkists, this causes confusion for people who cannot clearly understand the political and social ideas of the former. To consider Turkic and Mongol mythical and historical figures, such as Kara Khan, Bozkurt Khan, Oghuz Khan, Genghis Khan, and Hülegü Khan, as the ancestors of today’s Ottoman Muslims would be extremely erroneous, and would confuse people still further. The Turkish-speaking Muslims of the Ottoman Empire long ago lost their racial purity by mixing with numerous other ethnic groups.7 The Turkists recently began to celebrate a new holiday called Ergenekon Liberation Day. Such innovations, which aim to revive mythologies that are thousands of years old, will not arouse any feeling in the hearts of the Turkish Muslim people. It is, therefore, a useless endeavor. Even the Easter celebrations are much more meaningful to us, since we are familiar with them from our Christian neighbors.8 Turkist-Islamist intellectuals should not associate themselves with pure Turkists, who are advocating shamanism and paganism. Furthermore, they must not try to impose double ideals on the people. The double ideal is that Turkist-Islamists cannot be understood by Muslim Turkish people. This will confuse them. Muslims should never give up Islamic ideals for any other ideals, be they Turkic or anything else, because Islamic ideals are the only ideals that can ensure their salvation. Turkist-Islamists should not try to invent a new Mecca, namely Turan, for the Turkish people. For more than a thousand years, the Muslim Turkish nation turned toward the holiest shrine of Islam, the Kaaba in Mecca. Therefore, how can one expect them to abandon the Kaaba for Turan, or revere both at the same time?9 It is futile to try to reconcile Islam with notions it radically rejects. Islam radically rejects ethnic nationalism and tribalism. Therefore, Muslims should not take pride in their ethnicity but in their religion, which provides them with their only identity. Being a Muslim means forgetting one’s pre-Islamic past and Pagan heritage. Islam cannot be fused or blended with these Pagan identities and cultures, because the fundamental teachings of Islam make this fusion impossible. We must try to enhance and exalt Islam, and not promote ideologies such as Turkism. Muslims do not need to know the Law of Genghis or the history of the Golden Horde, or to glorify

214 Competing Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic the exploits of the Ilkhans, but they do need to know Islamic history and to take pride in the acts and deeds of Muslim heroes.10 We should pay our respects to the Arab nationalists who refused to take pride in their pre-Islamic history, and did not celebrate their pre-Islamic holidays. Tribalism had a long-standing history among Arabs. In Medina, there was a deep animosity and fierce fighting between the Arab tribes of Aws and Khazraj in the Jahiliyyah times. These two rival tribes finally decided to a peace agreement after suffering significant losses at an extremely bloody battle at Buath. This peace was completed at Aqaba under the auspices of the Prophet Muhammad, just before his migration to Medina.11 According to an anecdote from the time of the Prophet Muhammad, a fight was provoked between the Ansar and Muhajirun over the watering of camels. The Prophet admonished both parties and ordered them to reconcile immediately. Regionalism and tribalism have no place in Islam. One of the earliest examples in which Islamic solidarity prevailed over Arab tribalism was the Battle of Badr, where members of the same tribes, clans, and even families fought against each other. At Badr, the Muslim army was formed of different tribes. Nevertheless, they were united as one nation, the ummah or Muslim nation, to fight their pagan kin.12 According to a hadith related by Jabir ibn Abdallah, the Prophet said during his farewell sermon: “O people, your God is one and your forefather is one. An Arab is not better than a non-Arab and a non-Arab is not better than an Arab, and a White person is not better than a Black person and a Black person is not better than a White person.” According to another hadith, the Prophet also said, “Anyone who adheres to tribalism by ascribing importance to his lineage cannot be considered Muslim.” The Qur’an states, “We have created you male and female and have divided you into nations and tribes so that you recognize each other; otherwise you are one people. God judges you only by your piety [tak-wa].” It is also stated in the Qur’an that all Muslims are brothers and sisters; they form a single unity. The unity of Muslims is essential in Islam. Therefore, said Ahmed Naim, “Muslims’ only loyalty should be to the Islamic community [um-mah] and that loyalty should supersede their loyalty to their family and kin.” In Islam, unlike in pre-Islamic Arab culture, neseb (lignagne) does not have any importance. Early Muslim sahaba (companions of the Prophet) condemned pride and vanity based on one’s lineage or ancestry. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855) related another hadith, which stated that anyone who prides himself on his (pagan) ancestry deserves to go to hell. The Turkists should not discriminate against non-Turkish Muslims. They should not forget that during the last disastrous wars, Ottomans received much help from Muslims all over the world, from Morocco to India. Therefore, it would be unjust to the millions of Muslims who supported the Ottomans during the Balkan wars to present these military setbacks as a calamity for the Turkish world. These setbacks were most certainly a calamity, and one that fell upon the entire Islamic world. The majority of the Ottoman ruling class were not Turkish in race but were non-Turkish devshirme (converts). However, their loyalty was to Islam and the House of Osman, themselves Turkish; they identified themselves as Muslims. Islam gives no importance to ethnicity.

 Ahmed Naim Baban (1872–1934) 215 In his famous work Muwatta, Imam Malik b. Anas (d. 795) wrote that the Prophet Muhammad once declared, “O people, Arabness is nothing but a language.” Nationalism could be possible in the West, but not in the Muslim world. In the West, the church and state evolved as separate entities, whereas in Islam, from the hour of its birth, religion and politics became inseparable due to the fact that Islam was born as a political power as well as a religion.

216

Notes Introduction 1 Bassam Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics (London: Palgrave, 2001), 2. Emphasis in original 2 The Politicization of Islam :Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002), 24–5 (hereafter cited as Karpat, Politicization). See also Ahmet Şeyhun, Said Halim Pasha, An Ottoman Statesman and Islamist Thinker 1865–1921 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2010), 17–18 (hereafter cited as Şeyhun, Said Halim). 3 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 327 (hereafter cited as Mardin, Genesis); see also Şeyhun, Said Halim, 27–9. 4 Şeyhun, Said Halim, 27. 5 Mardin, Genesis, 333. See also Ibid., 27–9. 6 Mardin, Genesis, 294. Also, Namık Kemal, Makalât-i Siyasiye ve Edebiye (Istanbul: Selanik Matbaası), 83–4. 7 Ibid., 340–4. 8 Mardin, Genesis, 367–8. See also Hüseyin Çelik, Ali Suavi ve Dönemi (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), 550. 9 Mardin, Genesis, 368. 10 For the political career and thought of Hayreddin Pasha, see Magali Morsy, Essai sur les réformes nécessaires aux états musulmans (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1987), annotated; see also Alaaddin A. Çetin, Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988) (hereafter cited as Morsy, Essai). See also Ibrahim AbuLughud, “The Islamic Influence on Khayr Al-Din of Tunis,” in Donald P. Little, ed., Essays on Islamic Civilization, Presented to Niyazi Berkes (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1976), 9–24 (hereafter cited as, Abu-Lughud, “Islamic Influence”). 11 Charles Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu; Victor Goldschmidt, De l’Esprit des Lois (Paris: Garnier Flammarion,1979), 128. 12 Said Halim Pasha, Buhranlarımız (Istanbul: Şems Matbaası, 1335–1338), 1 (hereafter cited as Pasha, Buhranlarımız). See also, Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri, ed. Ertuğrul Düzdağ (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1993). 13 Şeyhun, Said Halim, 59, Pasha, Buhranlarimiz, 9. 14 Mustafa Sabri, Dini Mücedditler, yahud Türkiye icin necat ve Itila yollarında bir rehber (İstanbul: Şehzadebası Evkaf Matbaası, 1338–1341), 81. 15 For Ahmed Naim Baban’s life see İsmail Kara, Türkiyede İslamcilik Düşüncesi, Metinler, Kişiler (İstanbul: Risale Yayınları, 1986), 275. See also Ahmet Şeyhun, “Ahmet Naim’s Criticism of the Turkists (İslamda-Dava-yı Kavmiye),” Archivum Ottomanicum 25 (2008): 245–53. 16 Şeyhun, Said Halim, 40. Charles C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt a Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad Abduh (New York: Russel and Russel, 1933), 130–1.

218

Notes

17 Mehmed Emin, Türk Yurduna: Ey Türk Uyan (İstanbul: n.p, 1914). The translation is mine. 18 For more on Gökalp’s social and political views, see Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp (London: Luzac, 1950) (hereafter cited as Heyd, Foundations). See also, Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985) (hereafter cited as Parla, Gökalp). Some of Gökalp’s works have been translated into English by Niyazi Berkes under the title Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959). 19 Parla, Gökalp, 29. See also Karpat, The Politicization, 375–88. 20 Parla, Gökalp, 29. 21 Ibid., 31. 22 Karpat, The Politicization, 384–6. 23 Ibid., 385. 24 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 338 (hereafter cited as Berkes, The Development). 25 Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Üç Medeniyet (İstanbul:Türk Ocakları Merkez Heyeti Matbaası, 1927), 3–4. See also Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Üç Medeniyet (İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi, 2013), 19–20 (hereafter cited as Ağaoğlu, Üç Medeniyet). For more on Ağaoğlu’s life and thought see, A. Holly Shissler, Between the Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey (London: Tauris, 2003) (hereafter cited as Shissler, Between the Two Empires); see also Fahri Sakal, Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999). 26 Ağaoğlu, Üç Medeniyet, 10–13. 27 H. Ozan Özavcı, Intellectual Origins of the Republic, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the Geneology of the Liberalism in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 194–5 (hereafter cited as Özavcı, Intellectual Origins). 28 Ibid., 194. 29 Ibid. 30 For the Westernist movement see Berkes, The Development, and Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic,” Studia Islamica (August 1997): 133–58 (hereafter cited as Hanioğlu, “Garbcılar”). 31 Berkes, The Development, 338. 32 Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 309 (hereafter cited as Hanioğlu, Abdullah Cevdet). 33 Berkes, The Development, 348. 34 Ibid., 356–7. Hanioğlu, Abdullah Cevdet, 364–5. 35 Hanioğlu, Abdullah Cevdet, 332–3. 36 Hanioğlu, “Garbcılar,” 135. 37 Ş.Tufan Buzpınar, “Celal Nuri’s Concept of Westernization and Religion,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 2 (March 2007): 247–58 (hereafter cited as Buzpınar, “Celal Nuri.”). 38 Ibid., 249. 39 Celal Nuri Ileri, Ittihad-i Islam (Istanbul: Yeni Osmanlı Matbaası, 1331 [1914]) (hereafter cited as Celal Nuri, Ittihad). 40 Ibid., 42,43, 61, 62. 41 Ibid., 59. 42 Ibid.

 Notes 219 43 Celal Nuri İleri, Taç Giyen Millet (İstanbul: Cihan Biraderler Matbaası, 1339 AH [1923]), 118–25. 44 Celal Nuri Ileri, Harbden Sonra Türkleri Yükseltelim (İstanbul: Cemiyet Kütüphanesi, 1917). 45 Ahmed Rıza, La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient (Paris: Picart, 1922), 1–2 (hereafter cited as Rıza, La Faillite). 46 Ibid., 7. 47 Ibid., 14. 48 Berkes, Development, 311. 49 Prens Sabahaddin, Gönüllü Sürgünden Zorunlu Sürgüne, Bütün Eserleri, ed. Mehmet Ö Alkan (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007), 341–2. See also Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Türkiyede Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları), 492–3 (hereafter cited as Ülken, Türkiyede).

Chapter 3 1 For Gökalp’s social and political thought, see Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp (London: Luzac, 1950) (hereafter cited as Heyd, Foundations) and Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985). Some of Gökalp’s works have been translated into English by Niyazi Berkes under the title Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959). 2 Heyd, Foundations, 104. 3 Ziya Gökalp, “Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, MuasIrlaşmak,” in Türk Yurdu, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye ve ŞürekasI, 1329), 336–7. Later it was published in Latin script, Ziya Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, MuasIrlaşmak (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1960), 10–11. 4 Ziya Gökalp, Türkçülüğün EsaslarI (Ankara: Serdengeçti Neşriyat, 1950), 50. 5 Ziya Gökalp, Hars ve Medeniyet (Ankara: DiyarbakIrI’ TanItma ve Turizm Derneği YayInlarI, 1972), 21. 6 Ibid., 10. 7 Ziya Gökalp, Kitaplar, edited by Şevket Baysanoğlu, Yusuf Çotuksöken, Fahrettin Kirzioğlu, Mustafa Koç, M. Sabri Koç (İstanbul: YKY, 2007) 2199.

Chapter 4 1 Yusuf Akçura see, François Georgeon, Aux Origines du Nationalism Turc, Yusuf

Akcura, Paris: Editions, ADPF, 1980. Fahri Sakal, Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey, İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999. Holly Shissler, Between Two Empires, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey, London: I.B Tauris, 2003 and H. Ozan Özavcı, Intellectual Origins of the Republic, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the Geneology of Liberalism in Turkey, Leiden: Brill, 2015; Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976), 31–3.

220

Notes

Chapter 5 1 Holly Shissler, Between the Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey (London: Tauris, 2003), 202. 2 Ibid. 3 H. Ozan Özavcı, Intellectual Origins of the Republic, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the Geneology of the Liberalism in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 136. 4 Ibid., 137. 5 Ibid.

Chapter 7 1 M Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir siyasal düşünür olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve dönemi (İstanbul: Uçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 309. 2 Ibid., 357–9. Translation is mine.

Chapter 8 1 Prens Sabaheddin, Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve tevsi-i mezuniyet hakkInda bir izah (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Kütüphane-i Cihan, no date), 2–5. 2 François Georgeon, “Le dernier sursaut (1878–1908),” in Robert Mantran, ed., Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman. (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 572 (hereafter cited as Georgeon, “Dernier sursaut”); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of The Ottoman Empire And Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 258; see also Ernest E. Ramsaur, Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 71 (hereafter cited as Ramsaur, Young Turks). 3 Ramsaur, Young Turks, 127.

Chapter 11 1 Ahmet Şeyhun, Said Halim Pasha: Ottoman Statesman Islamist Thinker (1865–1921) (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2003), 45 (hereafter cited as Şeyhun, Said Halim). 2 Ibid., 46. 3 Ibid., 48–59. 4 Ibid., 85. 5 Ibid., 91. 6 Ibid., 91–5. 7 Ibid., 98–106. 8 Ibid., 104–6. 9 Ibid., 111–12. 10 Ibid., 113. 11 Ibid., 111. 12 Ibid., 113–15.

 Notes 221 13 Said Halim Pasha, Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane (Rome: Imprimerie Editrice Italia), 2–3 (hereafter cited as Said Halim, Institutions). 14 Ibid., 4. 15 Ibid., 5. 16 Ibid., 18. 17 Mohamed (Said Halim), Essai sur les causes de la decadence des peuples musulmanes (Constantinople: Imprimerie Loeffler, 1918), 6–8 (hereafter cited as Said Halim, Essai). 18 Said Halim, Institutions, 8. 19 Ibid., 16–17. 20 Ibid., 22–4. 21 Ibid., 23–4. 22 Said Halim Pasha, Islamization (typescript). 23 Ibid.

Chapter 12 1 İsmail Kara, Türkiyede İslamcilik Dusincesi Metinler, Kişiler, (İstanbul:Risale Yayinlari), 363–4. On Ahmed Naim Baban’s life and ideas, see also Ahmet Şeyhun, “Ahmet Naim’s Criticism of the Turkists (İslamda-Dava-yı Kavmiye),” Archivum Ottomanicum 25, no. 9 (2008): 245–53. 2 Ahmed Naim (Baban), İslam’da Dava-yı Kavmiyet (Istanbul: Tevzi-yi Tabiat Matbaası, 1332 [1916]), 3–4 (hereafter cited as Naim, Kavmiyet). 3 Ibid., 4–6. 4 Ibid., 7–8. 5 Ibid., 8–9. 6 Ibid., 10–11. 7 Ibid., 12. 8 Ibid., 13–14. 9 Ibid., 15–16. 10 Ibid., 18. 11 Ibid., 22. 12 Ibid.

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Index Abbasid dynasty (750–1258)  47 Abbasids of Baghdad  48 Abd al Aqim  46 Abdülaziz, suzerain of Egypt (r. 1861– 76)  193 Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932)  12, 127 Abdürreşid Kadı İbrahimof  88 absolutism  7, 144–6, 161, 185 Abu Bakr (r. 632–4)  33, 41, 120, 121 Abu Hureyra  212 Abul Ula  103 Abu Muslim al-Khaulani  43 Abu Sufyan  120 administrative laws and regulations  29 Admonitions to Rulers  42 al-Afghani, Jamal ad Din (1839–97)  8 Africa  90, 96, 98, 128, 134, 178, 181, 182 Ağaoğlu, Ahmed (1869–1939)  8, 11, 12, 99–101 Ahkam al Sultaniyya (Imam Mawardi)  19, 137 Ahlak-i Alai  83 Ahlak-i Celali  83 Ahlak-i Nasiri  83 Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855)  214 Ahmed Ferit Bey  87 Ahmed III  28 Ahmed Naim Baban (1872–1934)  8, 99, 117, 211, 214 Ahmed Pasha  39 Ahmed Rıza (1858–1930)  13–14, 155, 167–9 Ahrar  156 Aisam al-Din  46 Akbar Shah  103 Akçura, Yusuf (1876–1935)  9–11, 87–8, 99 Alevism  74 Alexander the Great  68 Ali-Abbas  121 Ali Merdan Bey  88 Ali Merdan Topcubaşı  100

Ali Pasha  11, 18, 25, 26, 89 Ali Şir Nevai (1441–1501)  98 Altai race  82 American Civil War  31 Amr bin al-Ass  47, 48 Anatolia  17, 58, 69, 72–4, 79, 80, 94, 115, 167, 187, 195 animal societies  80–1 anti-Islamism  14, 182 Aqwam al-Masalik fi Ma‘rifat Amwal al Mamalik (The surest path to knowledge concerning the conditions of countries, Hayreddin Pasha)  5 Aqwam al-Masalik fμ Ma‘rifat Awal al Mawalik (Hayreddin Pasha)  39 Arab architecture  83 Arab civilization  175 al-Arabi, Muhyiddin  83 Arabic language  96, 119 Arabs  83, 114, 119–20, 122, 136 aristocracy  200, 203, 205 Aristotle  83, 84, 111 Armenian revolutionaries  156 Armenians  76, 83, 93, 100, 138, 140, 161, 168, 196 Arshavir Shiragian  197 aruz  72 asabiyet (tribalism)  8, 64, 66, 99, 118, 119, 121, 122, 213, 214 Asia  20, 21, 137 Aşık Galip  72 Aşık Kerem  72 Âşık Kerem Köroğlu  69 Aşık Ömer  73 Association of Private Enterprise and Decentralization  168 Association of the Ottoman Union (İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti)  167 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal  55, 100, 144

228

Index

Ati (newspaper)  127 Atilla  75 autocracy  3, 132, 159, 168 Ayan-i Sabite  83 Azeri Turk  10 Baki (1526–1600)  98 Balkan countries  77 Balkans  94, 95 Balkan wars  12, 58, 59, 62, 144, 148, 214 Banu Adnan  64 Banu Ghassan  120 Banu Hashim  121 Banu Kahtan  64 Banu Munzir  120 Banu Umayya  121 barbarism. See nomadism Basiret (newspaper)  20, 21 Battle of Badr  214 bayram  64 Bekri Mustafa  73 Bektaşi elders (babas)  73 Belgian Constitution  187 Bergson, Henri  62, 107 Berkes, Niyazi  10, 12 Beyan-ül Hak (The Statement of Truth)  5, 8 Bible  108–10 bidat (innovation)  33 bill of law  35, 37 Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi (Hanioğlu)  148 Bolshevik Revolution  143 Bolshevism  143, 144 Book of Korkud Ata, The  69, 78 Brahe, Tycho  133, 144 British Foreign Office  194 Buddhist-Brahman civilization  11, 100, 101, 103, 104 Buddhist-Confucian civilization  123 al-Bukhari (d. 870)  211 Bulow, Prince  169 bureaucracy/bureaucrats  19, 30, 37, 39, 49, 51, 58, 94, 115, 158, 159, 168, 174, 178, 207 Bursalı Tahir  87 Byzantine architecture  83

civilization  10, 77 music  72 Cahun, Leon  91 Caliph Ali (r. 656–61)  40, 43, 45, 121 Caliph al-Mamun (r. 813–33)  47, 102 caliphate  2, 21, 25, 48, 88, 96, 98, 120, 121, 143, 145, 176–8 Caliph Haroun al-Rashid (r. 786– 809)  47 Caliph Mamun palace  21 Caliph Muawiya I (r. 661–80)  43 Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634– 44)  43 Caliph Uthman (r. 644–56)  121, 122 Calvin, John  110 capitalism  135 Catholic Church  109–10, 129 Catholicism  110, 199 Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938)  12, 13, 127 Cemal Pasha  196 Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i İslamiye (Association of Muslim Scholars)  5, 8, 56 centralization and decentralization  14, 155–8, 160–1, 163 Cevdet, Abdullah (1869–1932)  147–8 Charlemagne (emperor)  42, 180 Charles I (king)  143 Charles Martel  180 Charles XII  28 China  22, 104, 122, 128, 137, 139, 175, 181, 199 Christendom  199, 200 Christian civilization  82, 123, 128 Christianity  42, 97, 108, 110, 123, 129, 132, 175, 176, 180 Christians  110, 114, 115, 132, 175, 182 Church of Rome  110 Church of the Holy Sepulcher  95 clericalism  111 collectivism  70 colonialism  12, 203 commercial transactions (muamelat)  130 Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)  7, 55, 56, 100, 147, 168, 184, 194, 195, 197

 Index 229 The Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyet-i). See Society of Ottoman Union (İttihad-ı Osmani) Communism  70 Comte, Auguste  13, 74, 170, 175 Conseil d’Etat (Council of State/Şûrâ-yı Devlet)  35, 37 conservatism  60, 62, 104, 138 constitutionalism  142, 143 Constitutional Revolution (1908)  2, 145, 204, 212 Constitution of the Turkish Republic  137, 156 article 108  158, 160 cosmopolitanism  59 cotton production  31 Courrier d’Orient (newspaper)  127 Crete, island of  150 cultural identity  106 cultural union  68–9 culture-civilization dichotomy  100 customs and traditions  60–3, 131 D’Annunzio, Gabriele  79 Dante, Alighieri  79 Danubian Principalities  25 Darwin, Charles  12, 13, 103 Declaration of the Rights of Men and the Citizen  141, 142, 171–2 Dede Korkut  72 De Giers, Michael  195 de Guignes, Joseph  9 De l’esprit des lois (Montesquieu)  5 democracy  7, 13, 200, 203 democratization  202 Democritus  83 Demolins, Édmond  155, 162 Dertli  73 de Sacy, A.  9 Descent of Man (Darwin)  103 despotism  5, 30–3, 42, 110, 151, 156, 158–60, 172, 173, 178, 203 de Vogue, E. M.  181 direct and indirect governments  187 Divan ul Lugat al Turk (Mahmud Kaşgari)  73 Diyojen (journal)  18 D’Ohsson, Ignatius Mouradgea  174

Durkheim, Emile  62, 107 Duruy, M.  48 dynasty  112–13 East Asian civilization  81–3 Eastern philosophy  134 Eastern Question  26–38, 162, 169, 170 Ebu Ziya Tevfik  127 École Pratiques des Hautes Études  99 economic dependency  41 economic development  155 Edebiyat-i Umumiye (General Literature, journal)  127 education  8, 21, 23, 27, 64, 66–8, 78, 86, 90, 112, 132, 146, 151, 156, 159, 198, 206 Egypt  7, 24, 27, 32, 47, 48, 142, 147, 193, 194, 197 England  34, 113, 143, 160, 170, 177, 186 English parliament  22–3 Enver Pasha  196 epic poetry  73 Epicurus  83 equality  1, 4, 19, 42, 88, 90, 172, 198 Erasmus, Desiderius  110 Ergenekon Liberation Day  213 Esbab-i Nuzul (Imam Suyuti)  112 Essai sur les causes de la decadence des peuples musulmanes (An Essay on the Causes of the Decline of the Muslim Societies , Said Halim)  197 États-Généraux  141 ethics and law  105, 106 ethnic groups  20, 27, 57, 58, 59, 65, 66, 76, 91, 93, 95, 97, 98 ethnicity  1, 4, 9, 19, 27, 32, 51, 57, 58, 65, 66, 68, 74, 76, 93, 96, 97, 101, 106, 115, 213, 214 ethnic nationalism  1, 8, 9, 212, 213 Europe  5, 14, 21, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 39, 40, 44, 59, 60, 77, 84, 85, 89, 103, 109–11, 128, 129, 132, 134, 137, 148, 150, 175–8, 182, 205, 212 European civilization. See Western civilization European countries  10, 41–3, 45, 49, 51, 60, 103, 128, 133, 160, 162

230 European literature  133 European parliamentary system  33 Europeans  14, 27, 30, 36, 40, 42, 48, 60, 65, 74, 82, 85, 95, 110, 113, 131, 162, 169, 172, 174–6, 203 European societies  111, 135, 141 European writers  26, 41, 70 Evliya Celebi (1611–82)  98 excommunication  109, 110 Explanation of the Convictions (al-Taftazani)  46 fanaticism  75, 112, 132, 145, 176, 180, 203 al-Farabi (d. 950)  72 fatalism  176–7 Fatimids of Egypt  48 fatwas  25, 129, 132, 182 Fazil Pasha, Mustafa  17 Fehim Pasha  150 feudalism  109, 185, 199 feylesof (philosophers)  84 financial bankruptcy  31 fine arts  58, 64, 85 First World War  12, 76, 79, 136–40, 143, 156, 168, 184, 186, 197, 201 “folie de persécution”  148 foreign economies  41 foreign policy  28 formalism  60–3 France  31, 34–6, 141–2, 162, 170, 179, 185 free and private initiatives  14, 155, 157–60 French Constitution  36 French Criminal Code  27 French Enlightenment  89, 141 French Revolution (1789)  1, 6, 10, 14, 34, 35, 89, 117, 140–4, 167, 185, 188 French War/Franco-Prussian War (1870)  25 “frozen race” theory  106 Fuad Pasha  11, 25–6, 89 fukahas (the Islamic jurists)  129, 130, 132, 178 fundamental rights  30 Fuzuli  69

Index Galileo  131, 144 Gandhi, Mahatma  135 Ganem, Halil  167 Genç Kalemler  56 Smith, Walter  107 Genghis Khan (r. 1206–27)  91, 98 George III (king)  44 Germany  11, 19, 27, 30, 34, 110, 133, 137, 142, 170, 179, 186, 195 al-Ghazali  40, 43 globalism  60 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von  79 Göklen tribe  69 Gönüllü sürgünden Zorunlu Sürgüne-bütün eserleri (Sabaheddin)  156 Gothic  84 Goulkevitch, Constantin  195 Grand National Assembly  186, 187 Great Britain  24, 66, 113, 143 Great Revolution. See French Revolution (1789) Great Turkish National Assembly  184 Great War. See First World War Greece  27, 32, 33 Greek civilization  81 Greek music  72, 84 Greeks  33, 40, 76, 82, 93, 140, 161 Guizot, Francois Pierre (1787–1874)  174 Gülhane Charter (1839)  24–6, 29, 34, 50 Hacivat  73 Hafiz  103 Hagia Sophia  95 Hajjaj bin Yusuf  121 Hak (newspaper)  127 Halim Pasha (prince)  193 Hamidian regime  2, 5, 9, 156, 167, 168, 205 Hanioğlu, Şükrü  148 Hantoux, Gabriel  181 Harbden Sonra Türkleri Yükseltelim (Let’s Elevate the Turks after the War, Celal Nuri İleri)  13 Harbiye (military school)  86 hars (national culture)  10, 56, 64–7, 69, 71–81 Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809)  102 Hasan Tahsin  91

 Index 231 Hatt-ı Hümayun  49 Hatt-ı Şerifi Gülhane  49 havas (Ottoman elites)  74, 75, 79–80 Hayreddin Pasha (1823–90)  5, 39–40 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich  177 hegemony  93, 95, 109, 111, 113, 115 Hejazi revolt (1916)  196 Henry IV (emperor)  109 Hijra (migration to Medina)  108 Hildebrand (pope)  109 Hilmi Ziya Ülken  11 Hinduism  134–5 Histoire de France et de moyen age du Ve au XIV e siecle (Duruy)  48 Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols et des autres Tartares occidentaux (de Guignes)  9 Historical Destiny (Celal Nuri İleri)  144 History of Islam (Dozy)  147 History of the Decline of the Ottoman Empire (Celal Nuri İleri)  144 Hobbes, Thomas  177 holy war  180, 181–3 Hülegu Khan (r. 1256–1265)  102 human development  136, 170–1 human intelligence  22 humanity  14, 20–3, 29, 59, 64, 91, 92, 105, 107, 133, 134, 140, 146, 162, 169, 172, 174–6, 198, 199, 201 human rights  24, 34, 143 Hürriyet  184 Hürriyet (Freedom, newspaper)  17, 33 Hürriyet-i Fikriye (Freedom of Opinion, journal)  127 Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha  195 Ibn al-Arabi  43 Ibn Kemal (1468–1536)  98 Ibn Khaldun (d.1406)  42, 44, 47, 121 Ibn Sabah  102 İbn Sina (980–1037)  98, 102 İbret (newspaper)  18 Ignatius Loyola  110 Ijtihad (journal)  127, 147, 148 İkdam (journal)  91 İkdam (newspaper)  127 Ikrima  120 İleri (Forward, newspaper)  127 ilkhan  75

illiteracy  32 Imam Abu Hanifa (d.767)  129 Imam Ali  33 Imam Azam  130 Imam Mawardi  19 Imam Suyuti  111 imperialism  8, 12, 74 Imperial Speech  37 İncili Çavus  73 India  94, 95, 128, 133, 134, 136, 137 individuality/individualism  84, 115–17, 155, 169 "Inferno" (Dante)  110 injustice  27, 29, 42, 74, 141, 144, 146, 157, 160 Inonu, Ismet  100 intellectual education  159 internationalism  59, 60, 143, 201 international law  59, 182 Iran  66, 69, 70, 91, 102, 113, 140, 151, 176, 185, 199 Irec  70 Islahat Edict (1856)  3, 29, 34 Islahat Fermanı  30 Islam  6, 8, 26, 27, 32, 33, 56, 59, 61, 63–5, 82, 90, 94, 96, 97, 102, 103, 105, 108, 118–23, 129, 130, 132, 134, 138, 175–83, 199, 205, 211, 212, 214, 215 doctrine  171, 201 Turkish  75 women’s condition in  13, 144–6 “Islamda Dava-yi Milliyet” (Nationalism in Islam, Ağaoğlu)  8, 99 İslamda-Dava-yı Kavmiye (Ethnic Nationalism in Islam, Ahmed Naim)  8, 211 Islamic architecture  84 Islamic civilization  5, 10, 11, 12, 39, 40, 56, 59, 63, 82, 96, 100, 101, 104, 107, 123, 137, 175 Islamic institutions  62, 76, 177 Islamic law. See sharia law Islamic modernism  3, 5, 11, 12 Islamic music  83 “The Islamic Revival”  21 Islamic society  6, 7, 47, 48, 103, 202, 205 Islamic Threat, The (Binger)  180 Islamic unity  8, 96, 122

232 Islamism  2, 10, 87, 89, 91, 92, 98, 200 Islamization  3, 6, 9, 10, 55–60, 201, 206–7 “Islamization” (Said Halim Pasha)  206 İslam Mecmuası  56 Islam wa Akhund (Ağaoğlu)  99 İsmail Canbolat  168 İsmail Gaspıralı  87, 88 Istanbul  24, 30, 34, 35, 39, 40, 55, 73, 88, 101, 115, 184 İtilaf Fırkası (Liberal Entente Party)  184 İttihad-i Islam (Islamic Union)  1, 12–13, 20–1, 180, 182, 214 Ivan IV  185 Jabir ibn Abdallah  214 Jahiliyyah (Paganism)  120, 182, 212–14 al-Jahiz  73 Jamal Battle (656)  121 Janissary corps  33, 49, 86, 139 Japan  60, 97, 104, 128, 148 Jawhar, Malik  33 Jesus Christ  42, 43, 108, 129, 180 jihad  28, 197 Judaism  132 Julian, Camille  66 justice  23, 29, 35, 37, 41, 42, 47, 48, 85, 151 kadı (judge)  29 Kaiser II (emperor)  137 Kaiser Wilhelm II  186 Kani  73 Kanun-u Esasi (1876). See Ottoman Constitution (1876) Karacaoğlan  73 Karagöz  73 Karakalpaks  69 Karpat, Kemal  10 Kaspii (The Caspian, journal)  99 Kavkaz (The Caucasus)  99 Kaygusuz Abdal  73 Kazan Muhbiri (newspaper)  88 Kemal, Namık (1840–88)  2–4, 6, 17–18, 98 Khaled bin Waled  41, 120 al-Khayali  46 Khayyam  103 Khedive Ismail  193

Index Kılıçzade Hakkı  127 Köprülü, Mehmed  28 Köroğlu  72 Küçük Mecmua (The Little Journal)  55 Kurd Teali Cemiyeti (The Society for the Elevation of the Kurds)  148 labor division  23, 80, 84, 85, 109 La Crise de l’Orient: Ses causes et ses remedes (Ahmed Rıza)  169–72 “La Crise Politique” (Said Halim Pasha)  204 Lafayette, Pierre  74, 167 La Jeune Turquie (journal)  167 Lamartine, Alphonso de  74 language  18–21, 32, 58, 59, 62, 64, 67–9, 71, 79, 96, 101, 102, 105, 106, 119, 136 La Nouvelle Revue  99 Lasascia, Antonio  194 “La Societe Persane”  99 Laws of Man/Human Rights  29 Le Bon, Gustave  106, 107 Legislative Assembly (Cour Legislative)  35 Lenin, Vladimir  70, 144 Le Play, Pierre Guillaume Frederic  155 Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane (Political institutions in the Muslim society, Said Halim)  197 Leskofcalı Galib  17 liberal economy  155, 168 liberalism  2, 12, 100, 111 liberty  3, 4, 6, 23, 41, 42, 50, 51, 143, 198, 203 London  4, 17, 22–4, 102 Loti, Pierre  74 Louis Phillipe (king)  46 Louis XVI (king, r. 1664–1715)  141–2, 185 Lütfi Fikri (1872–1934)  184–5 Luther, Martin  110 Lycée de Galatasaray (Mekteb-i Sultani)  89 Macedonians  76 Mahdi  26

 Index 233 Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha (1853– 1903)  155, 168 Mahmud I (r. 1730–54)  28 Mahmud II (r. 1808–39)  4, 139 Mahmud Kaşgari  73, 75 Mahmud Nedim Pasha  26 Mahmud Sevket Pasha  156, 194 Maine, H.  170 Makalât-i Siyasiye ve Edebiye (Kemal)  18, 28 al-Makdisi  47 Maliki school of law  40 Mallet, Louis (1864–1936)  195 Malumat (journal)  87 Mandelstamm, André  195 Manouvrier, Leonce  65 March 31 Rebellion  156, 168 Marx, Karl  135, 143 Marxist ideology  135 al-Mawardi (d. 1058)  46, 137 Meaning of History, The (Nordau)  140 medeniyet (civilization)  10, 11, 56, 71–7, 80–1, 101–7, 128–35, 139–44, 161–2, 175 medieval civilization  85 Medina  96, 108, 119, 120 Mediterranean civilization  81 medrese (theological school)  86 Mehmed Akif (1873–1936)  7, 11 Mehmed II (r. 1451–81)  115 Mehmed Pasha, Sokollu  28 Mehmed Şemseddin (1883–1961)  5–6 Mehmed VI (r. 1918–22)  139 Mehmed Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924)  9– 12, 55–6, 100, 147 Mehmet Emin  91 Meillet, Antoine  66 Melanchthon, Philip  110 “Meşrutiyet” (Constitutional regime, Said Halim)  194 Meşveret (journal)  13, 168 Meşveret (newspaper)  87, 147 Mete (ruler)  70, 75 Mevlana  103 Midhat Pasha  89, 176, 206 Midhat Şükrü  168 military power  21 military technology  41 Mill, Stuart  44

ministers and counselors  45 Ministry of Finance  37 Mesmer, Franz  74 Mizan (newspaper)  147 Mizancı Murad  184 modern civilization  27, 62, 108 modernism  3, 60, 100 Modernization. See Westernization modern technology  134, 160 Mohammedanism  180 Montesquieu Charles de Secondat, baron de  1, 4–6, 173, 187, 188 El Mouak  40 Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905)  8 Muhammad Ali Pasha (r. 1805–48)  7 Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92)  2 Muhbir (journal)  17, 33, 34 Muqaddimah (Ibn Khaldoun)  47, 121 music  72, 77, 83 al-Muslim  46–7 Muslim brotherhood  122, 211 Muslim-Christian religious conflict  95 Muslim countries  7, 21, 40, 41, 43, 51, 59, 64, 65, 83, 96, 97, 132, 146, 198–201, 205 Muslims  8, 11, 20, 21, 41, 51, 63–5, 67, 83, 84, 88–98, 104, 114, 115, 121, 122, 132, 135, 144, 145, 148, 172–5, 177, 179–82, 197, 203, 206, 211, 213 Muslim societies  2, 3, 8, 11, 14, 42, 44, 48, 104, 111, 122, 130, 171, 198, 200–3, 205 Mustafa Sabri (1869–1954)  8 Mustamelet İttifakı  184 Mutakallimun (theologians)  83 mütareke (truce)  28 Mutasavvıfs (mystics)  83 Mutedil Hürriyetperveran Partisi (Moderate Liberal Party)  184 Muwatta (Imam Malik b. Anas)  215 Nadir Shah  28, 73 Nahrawan Battle (659)  121 Naim Bey  122 Napoleon Bonaparte  142, 144 Napoleon I (ruler)  46 Napoleon III (emperor)  34, 35, 89, 95

234

Index

Nasreddin Hoca  73, 78 nass  56 National Assembly  33, 35, 37–8, 51, 141, 157, 158 National Bank of Turkey  194 national economy  58, 61 nationalism  1, 8, 10, 55, 57–60, 63–5, 89, 99, 117–23, 143, 185, 201, 212, 215 nationality  4, 13, 27, 32, 57, 58, 63, 65–8, 79, 89, 90, 91, 93, 96, 97, 120, 122, 142, 162 National Liberation Movement  88 National Liberation Struggle  140 National Liberation War  148 Necib Asım Yazıksız  87, 91 Nefi (1575–1635)  98 Neo-Platonism  83 Nesmin  187 “new laws and regulations”  27 New Testament  108–9 Nietzsche, Friedrich  135 noctambulist life  80 nomadism  80 non-Muslim countries  94, 114, 148 non-Muslims  92, 94, 95, 98, 100, 122, 135, 138, 172, 174 non-Muslim societies  40, 90, 111 non-Muslim subjects  1, 11, 49, 51, 172, 178 non-Turkish Muslims  214 Nordau, Max  135, 140 Of the Ruler (Ibn Khaldun)  44 Oghuzistan  69 Oghuz Khan  98 Oghuz Turks  68–9, 74 Old Testament  132 On the Origin of Species (Darwin)  103 opera  84 örf  56 Oriental civilization  10, 56, 77, 80, 82–6, 131, 136, 137 “the orientalization of Western civilization”  206 Orthodox Church  179 Osmanlı (journal)  194 Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri. Bütün Makaleler I (Kemal)  18

Ottoman civilization  74, 76, 77, 80 Ottoman Constitution (1876)  6, 7, 142, 202, 204 Ottoman Democratic Party  147 Ottoman Empire  1, 4–7, 13, 14, 17–22, 26–8, 33, 39, 48, 50, 51, 55, 63, 74, 77, 79, 87–9, 91–8, 103, 104, 113, 115, 138, 139, 142, 162, 167, 170, 173, 175, 184, 194, 195, 202, 204, 209, 210 Christians in  30, 90, 95, 172 foreign intervention  3, 31, 49, 97 people mistrust  31 political system of  24 Ottoman Freedom Association  168 Ottoman government  24, 30, 31, 51, 88, 94, 100, 116, 127, 147, 151, 167, 172, 184, 196 Ottoman intellectuals  207–10 Ottomanism  1, 2, 10, 11, 57–60, 63, 74, 87, 89, 91, 92, 138–9 Ottoman-Italian War (1911)  12 Ottoman language  71, 72 Ottoman literature  73, 209–10 Ottoman poets  73 Ottoman-Russian War (1877–78)  18 Ottoman society  6, 14, 18, 19, 115, 207 Ottoman Society of Union and Revolution  147 Ottoman Turks  93 Pan-Islam, The (Celal Nuri İleri)  145 pan-Islam/pan-Islamism  2, 89, 90, 97, 180–1, 203 pan-Ottomanism  3 pan-Turkism  10, 97, 98 Paris Commune (1871)  142 Paris Peace Conference (1918)  100 Paris Peace Treaty (1856)  30, 95 Party of the Freedom and Entente  148 patriotism  1, 3, 40 Pepin  180 Peripatetics school  83 Persian literature  72 Persians  76, 77, 80, 83, 136 personal freedom  25, 26, 37 Peter the Mad (Great, r. 1682–1725)  85 Petrarch, Francesco  79 physical training  159

 Index 235 Pirizade Sahib Molla, Sheik-ul-Islam  145 Plato  83, 111 Plotin  83 poems  72 political autonomy  156 political code  48–9 political crisis  204–6 political dependency  41 political formations  19 political freedom  90 political institutions  7, 41, 42, 44, 45, 50, 187, 197, 198 political law  48 political parties  7, 202 political regime  5, 201–2, 207 political rights  19 political science  92 political unity  19, 96, 156 poll-tax (jizya)  47, 120 polygamy  132 Porte  1, 3, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 90, 94, 171, 172, 195, 202 Post-War Inquiry Commission  196 pre-Islamic Turkish religion  75, 82, 123 primitive societies  80 Prophet Muhammad (570–632)  8, 43, 47, 70, 96, 108, 119–21, 129, 130, 146, 176–8, 180, 182, 183, 198, 199, 214 Protestant Church  111 Protestantism  111, 199 Prut event  28 public opinion  20, 22, 25–7, 30–2, 95, 156, 161, 169 pure Turkists  118, 212, 213 Pushkin  79 Pythagoras  83 Qur’an  4, 6, 8, 46, 64, 96, 108, 111, 112, 119–21, 130, 158, 175, 176–80, 182, 214 “rabble”  79 race  18, 19, 21, 51, 59, 65–6, 68, 70, 89–91, 96–8, 101, 102, 106, 128 racism  118, 212 radicalism  62 Radloff, W.  9 Raghıb Pasha  73

Ragıp Pasha  28 Rashid Rida (1865–1935)  8 Rashidun caliphs (632–61)  129, 145 rational philosophy  84 Refet Pasha  185, 186–8 Réformes Nécessaires aux États Musulmans (Hayreddin Pasha)  40 religion  4, 19–21, 27, 32, 45, 51, 56, 59, 60, 64, 66, 68, 71, 81, 85, 89, 90, 96–8, 102, 107–12, 116, 118–20, 122, 132, 178, 179, 199, 201 community  80 East Asian  82 equality  93 freedom  94 law  40, 42–4, 48 metaphysics  62 Renan, Ernest  99, 171 representative government  4, 188–9 representative regime  5, 30–4 Republican Free Party (RFP, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası)  100 Republican People’s Party (RPP)  100 republican regime  33 Reşid Pasha, Mustafa  1, 24–6 Revealed Opinions, The  47 Revolution of 1848  142 Revolution of July 1908  202 Ribot, Theodule Armand (1839–1916)  76 Riwakiyun (Stoics)  83 Robespierre, Maximilien  188 Roman civilization  77, 81, 83 Roman Empire  82, 109 Rome  110, 111 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques  1, 4, 79, 105 Russia  24, 28, 30, 31, 77, 85, 94–5, 98, 143, 179, 185 Russian Revolution (1917)  100, 143, 144 Russians  30, 85, 106, 143 Russo-German scheme  195 Saad  46 Sabaheddin (prince) (1878–1948)  13, 14, 155–6, 168 Safavid Shah Ismail I (r. 1501–24)  185 Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921)  5, 7, 11, 13, 193–7, 204 Saint-Germain, M.  181 Saint Just, Louis Antoine de  188

236 Sari  69 Sasanians  76 savagery  80 Savonarola  110 Schiller, Friedrich  79 scholasticism  84, 134, 199 science  62–3, 133, 134 scientific inventions  23, 27 scientific progress  22–4 Sebil-ür Reşat (journal)  57, 118 Second Constitutional Period (1908–20)  2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12 secularism  1, 111, 148 secular law  61 Selem  70 Selim I (r. 1512–20)  48, 185 Seljukids  76, 112 Şemseddin Sami  91 senate  202–4 Servet-i Funun  73 Şeyhülislam Arif Bey  50 Shah Ismail  69, 72, 74 Shah-nameh  70 shamanism  105, 123, 213 sharia law  4, 5, 13, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27, 32–5, 37, 42, 43, 46, 50, 56, 61, 96, 130, 132, 146, 150, 176, 178, 179, 182, 187, 198, 201 Sharif Husayn  196 Sheikh Juneyd  74 sheik-ul-Islam (Seyhulislam)  178 Shi’ism  185, 199 Shissler, A.  100 Sidi Ibrahim al-Riahi  50 Siffin Battle (658)  121 Sinasi Bey  17, 71 Sirat-ı Müstakim (journal)  5, 57 social characteristics  65, 66, 68 social class  6, 19, 173, 202 social duality  73–4, 86 socialism  111, 201 social lives  71, 75 social solidarity  66 social theories  155 Société Belgo-Egyptiénne de Ezbekié  194 Society of Ottoman Union (İttihad-ı Osmani)  147 Society of the Friends of England (İngiliz Muhipler Cemiyeti)  148

Index sociology  55, 59, 66, 67, 79, 81, 84, 119, 159, 162, 206 “The Solution of the Eastern Problem”  157 Son Posta (Last Mail, newspaper)  100 sovereignty  5, 25, 29, 30, 32–3, 45, 46, 48, 82, 149, 150, 186–8, 198, 201 Speech of the Crown  29, 34 Spirit of the Laws (Montesquieu)  4, 6 spirituality  64, 132 state, concept of  112–15 state funds  37 Suavi, Ali (1839–78)  2, 3, 5, 6, 17 Sufi convents (tekkes)  73, 78 Sukuti, İshak  55 Suleyman Nazif Bey  117, 118, 122 Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66)  48 sultan, twin powers of  178–80 Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–76)  17, 49, 50, 89, 90, 144, 173, 174 Sultan Abdülhamid  90, 173, 193 Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909)  2, 13, 18, 39–40, 95, 138, 147, 150, 151, 167, 168, 185, 205 Sultan Abdülmecid Khan (r. 1839– 61)  49, 50 sultanate  2, 29, 96, 138, 140, 143, 184, 185 Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–39)  1, 28, 49, 89 Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (r. 998– 1030)  102 Sultan Mehmed II Fatih (r. 1451–81)  98 Sultan Mehmed V (r. 1909–18)  168, 195 Sultan Melikshah (r. 1063–92)  102 Sultan Murad I (1362–89)  98 Sultan Murad V (May 30–August 31, 1876)  18 Sultan Mustafa III (r. 1757–74)  28 Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20)  98 Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807)  56 Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66)  185 Sunni Muslims  73, 74, 130 Sunnism  185, 199 Şura yi Ümmet (newspaper)  87 Sururi  73 Switzerland  189

 Index 237 Taç Giyen Millet (The Nation Crowned, Celal Nuri İleri)  13 al-Taftazani  46, 98 Tahkik ve Tevfik (Raghıb Pasha)  73 Talat Pasha  168, 196, 197 Tandırname  78, 82 Tanin (newspaper)  127 Tanrı kutu (the good omen of God)  75 Tanzimat Charter (1839)  1–3, 5, 6, 13, 24–6, 39, 50, 51, 115, 142 Tanzimatists  77, 79, 81, 86 Tanzimat Period (1839–76)  6, 90 Tarde, Gabriel  57, 59 Tasfir-i Efkar (newspaper)  17 Tatar  10, 68 taxes  150, 158, 172, 182 Tekes  69 Temo, İbrahim  55 Temporary Law of Deportation (1915)  196 Terakki (Progress, journal)  14, 155 Tercüman (newspaper)  87 Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi-ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyet-i (League for Administrative Decentralization and Private Initiative)  155 theocratic  44 Thiers, Adolphe  46 Thomsen, V.  9 Three Civilizations (Ağaoğlu)  11 Tibi, Bassam  2 Timur (r. 1369–1406)  98, 102 titles  177–8 Tıbbiye (medical school)  86 Tolstoy, Leo  103, 105, 133 Towards the people  78–80 traditional education  159 traditionalist nation  62 Translation Bureau (Tercüme Odası)  17 Tufan Buzpınar  12 Tur  70 Turanism  68–70 Türk (journal)  87, 98 Türkçe Şiirler (Poems in Turkish, Yurdakul)  9 Türk Derneği (Turkish Association)  88 Turkey  56, 60, 68, 70, 77, 79, 143, 149–52, 169–72, 175, 179, 185 Turkification  9, 10, 55–61

Turkish architecture  62, 83 Turkish art  74, 75 Turkish civilization  63, 76 Turkish Historical Association  88 Turkish language  51, 59, 71–2, 137, 213 Turkish literature  62, 64, 72, 73, 97 Turkish nation  56, 60, 62, 65, 68, 76, 79, 88, 98, 135, 137, 139, 140 Turkish National Liberation Movement  100 Turkish National Party  88 Turkish Revolution  139, 140, 142–4 Turkish Revolution, The (Türk Inkılabı, Celal Nuri)  127 Turkish-Russian war (1877–78)  172 Turkism  2, 9, 10, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 65–70, 77–80, 87, 91, 92, 97–9, 117, 118, 212, 213 Turkist-Islamists  118, 212–13 Turkmen  68, 69, 74 Turks  57–9, 61, 68, 70, 75, 82, 83, 89, 91, 92, 94–8, 112, 115, 123, 130, 132, 137, 138, 144, 145, 161, 172–3, 177, 212–13 Türk Yurdu (journal)  8, 56, 57, 99, 100 Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti (Association of Turkish Homeland)  55, 100 Turquerie  74 Üç Medeniyet (Ağaoğlu)  100, 101 “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Political Systems,Yusuf Akçura)  10, 87, 88 ulema  8, 73, 75, 112, 129, 130, 132, 133, 145, 176, 178, 182, 203 ulema-yi rusum  73 Uluğ Beg (1394–1449)  98 Umar al-Faruq (r. 634–44)  33, 121 Umayyads of Spain  48 ummah (Muslim community)  29, 58, 60, 62, 65, 67, 80, 108, 213, 214 Union of Russia’s Muslims  88 United States of America  34, 128–9, 143 unity of nation  8, 18–20, 113, 119–22, 185, 212 Uralo-Altaic group  59, 60, 69

238 Usul-u Meşveret Hakkında Mektuplar (Letters on the Constitutional Regime)  4 Uyanınız, uyanınız (Cevdet)  148 Van den Berg, M.  175 vatan (homeland)  3, 19, 20, 70, 85, 89, 120, 149, 151, 156, 209 Vatan Yahut Silistre (The Homeland)  18 Vefik Pasha  91 Veled Celebi  87, 91 Von Wangenheim, Hans  195–6 Wagner, Richard  103 Western civilization  5, 8, 10, 11, 20, 56, 61, 71, 77, 80–2, 84–6, 100, 101, 103–6, 128, 131, 133, 135–7, 140, 148, 206, 210 Westernism  2, 12, 148 Westernization  1–3, 10, 12, 39, 55–60, 104, 148, 198, 205 Western laws  27 Western models  86

Index Western music  84 Western societies  6, 199–201, 203 What Men Live By (Tolstoy)  105 Wilson, Woodrow  79 Women According to Islam and in the Islamic World (Ağaoğlu)  99 women in social life  13, 84 Yarın (Tomorrow, newspaper)  100 “Yellow Peril”  137 yellow race  82, 96, 97, 104, 106 Yeni Hayat (New Life)  55 Yeni Mecmua  56, 75 Yıldız Palace  161, 168 Young Turk Congress  155, 156, 168 Young Turk movement  7, 155, 168, 194 Young Turk Revolution (1908)  156, 168 Yunus Emre  73, 75, 78 Yurdakul, Mehmed Emin (1869–1944)  9 Zenon  83 Ziyad bin Umaya  121 Ziya Pasha (1825–80)  3, 4, 17

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