Comparative and Private International Law: Essays in Honor of John Henry Merryman on his Seventieth Birthday [1 ed.] 9783428468386, 9783428068388
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Comparative and Private International Law
Comparative and Private International Law Essays in Honor of John Henry Merryman on bis Seventieth Birthday
Edited by David S. Clark
Duncker & Humblot · Berlin
CIP-Titelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek
Comparative and private international law: essays in honor of John Henry Merryman on his seventieth birthday I ed. by David S. Clark. - Duncker u. Humblot, 1990 ISBN 3-428-06838-6 NE: Clark, David S. [Hrsg,]; Merryman, John Henry: Festschrift
Alle Rechte, .auch die des ausz~gsweisen Nachdrucks, der fotomechanischen Wiedergabe und der Übersetzung, für sämtliche Beiträge vorbehalten © 1990 Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin 41 Druck: Druckerei Gerike GmbH, Berlin 36 Printed in Germany ISBN 3-428-06838-6
John Henry Merryman Festschrift Committee Mauro Cappelletti Lewis Talbot and Nadine Hearn Shelton Professor of International Legal Studies, Stanford University; Professor of Law, University of Florence. Sabino Cassese Professor of Law, University of Rome. David S. Clark Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Colorado (1989). Rene David Honorary Professor at the Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of AixMarseille III (Law, Economics, and Science). Ulrich Drobnig Professor ofLaw, University ofHamburg; Director, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law. Louis Favoreu Professor at the Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Aix-Marseille III ·(Law, Economics, and Science); Honorary President of the University. Hector Fix-Zamudio Investigator Emeritus, Institute of Legal Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). John G. Fleming Shannon Cecil Turner Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. Mary Ann Giendon Professor of Law, Harvard University. Gino Gorla Professor of Comparative Law Emeritus, University of Rome. Jan Hellner Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Stockholm. J. A. Jolowicz Professor of Comparative Law in the University of Cambridge; Fellow of Trinity College. Hein Kötz Professor ofLaw, University ofHamburg; Director, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law. Barry Niebolas The Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford University. 29*
Preface The Festschrift Committee takes great pleasure in presenting to our esteemed friend and colleague, John Henry Merryman, this volume of essays. The occasion for celebration is John's seventieth birthday, February 24, 1990. The authors who have prepared essays for this book are dispersed over four continents and reside in thirteen countries. North to Finland, south to Venezuela, east to Japan, this variety illustrates the wide influence John Merryman has exerted over his long and distinguished career. The 26 essays in this volume discuss important issues in comparative law and private internationallaw. They are organized into four parts, as shown in the Summary of Contents. Part I considers ways comparative law has developed, especially those ways influenced by the writings of John Henry Merryman. Prime legacies include the idea of the civil law tradition and the use of the concept of legal culture. Part II reveals the diversity of contemporary comparative law studies. Authors draw from several fields in making comparisons of laws and legal institutions: artistic patrimony, codification, contracts, constitutional justice, criminal justice, doctrine in courts, experts in courts, evidence, water law, and trusts. Some show the borrowing or transplantation of ideas about law across the divide of different traditions, which can be characterized by what Gino Gorla calls a civil law-common law dialogue. The full breadth of history is also explored here, from Roman law to the currently unfolding events within socialist countries suggesting a nascent rule of law. Part III Iooks at developments in western Europe, particularly for judicial review and for public administration, but also in the EEC since the Single European Act - as for product liability - that demoostrate the convergence and integration of legal systems. Part IV focuses on private internationallaw, considering internationalism in this field, transnational bankruptcies, and the return of cultural property expropriated abroad. Part V, in conclusion, lists the publications of John Henry Merryman. Certain features in this book may help to guide the reader into the interstices of the essays and to their intellectual foundations. First, the Table of Contents provides an outline for each article. This serves as an ersatz index. Second, most articles begin with an asterisk footnote that lists the primary and secondary source material heavily relied upon in that particular article. Other features of citation style are adapted from usages in the Rabels Zeitschrift for ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht. This volume was from the beginning a collaborative effort, most importantly by the members of the organizing Festschrift Committee and by the authors.
VIII
Preface
The editor would in particular, however, wish to thank Mauro Cappelletti, Ulrich Drobnig, and Hein Kötz for their early encouragement and support. In the production of the book, a great debt of gratitude is owed to the secretarial staff- headed by Ann Hail and assisted by Kathy Cooper and Shirley Rossand the library staff - especially Kathy Kane, Chuck McKnight, Melanie Nelson, and Katherine Tooley- at The University of Tulsa College of Law. Rudy T. Rivas, a 1990 graduate from the College, helped in editing the Spanish language essays. Finally, Norbert Simon, Helmut Appelt, and their staff at Duncker & Humblot expertly finished the volume. To all, many thanks. Tulsa, May 1989
David S. Clark
Summary of Contents Table of Contents
XIII
In Honor of John Henry Merryman By Mauro Cappel/etti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Part I John Henry Merryman and Comparadve Law
David S. C/ark
Professor ofLaw, The University ofTulsa; Visiting Professor ofLaw, University of Colorado (1989) The ldea of the Civil Law Tradition
11
Hector Fix-Zamudio
Investigator Emeritus, Institute of Legal Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) John Henry Merryman and the Modemization of Comparative Legal Studies
25
Lawrence M. Friedman
Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford University Some Thoughts on Comparative Legal Culture
49
Part II Comparisons of Legal Systems
Hans W. Baade
Hugh Lamar Stone Professor of Civil Law, The University of Texas Springs, Creeks, and Groundwater in Nineteenth-Century German Roman-Law Jurisprudence with a Twentieth-Century Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61
Mirjan Damaika
Ford Foundation Professor of Law, Yale University
Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence: A Comparative View
91
Summary of Contents
X
Louis Favoreu Professor at the Faculty ofLaw and Political Science, University of Aix-Marseille III (Law, Economics, and Science); Honorary President of the University American and European Models of Constitutional Justice
105
Gino Gor/a Professor of Comparative Law Emeritus, University of Rome Samuel Livermore (1786-1833): An American Forerunner to the Modern "Civil Law-Common Law Dialogue" 121 0
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Car/os lose Gutie"ez Professor at the University of Costa Rica; Professor of Constitutional Law, University ofCosta Rica Law Faculty; CostaRicanErnbassadar at the United Nations La Constituci6n Norteamericana como Ley lmportada en Costa Rica
139
Jan Hellner Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Stockholm Interpretation of Contracts under the Influence of Statutory Law
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Hein Kötz Professor of Law, University of Hamburg; Director, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law Schalarship and the Courts: A Comparative Survey
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Dietrich Andre Loeber Professor ofLaw, University ofKiel; Director, Institute for the Study ofthe Law of Socialist Countries (University of Kiel) Latvia's 1937 Civil Code: A Quest for Cultural Identity
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lnga Markovits Morris and Rita Atlas Family Centennial Professor of Law, The University of Texas Socialism and the Rule of Law: Some Speculations and Predictions
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Barry Nicho/as The Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford University Certainty of Price
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Rogelio Perez Perdomo Professor of Law, Central University of Venezuela School of Law La justicia penal en Ia investigaci6n socio-juridica de America Latina
257
Giovanni Pugliese Professor of Comparative Law, University of Rome Ius Honorarium and English Equity
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XI
Summary of Contents
Denis Talion Professor at the University of Law, Economics and Social Seiences (Paris Director, Institute of Comparative Law, University of Paris
10;
The Notion of Contract: A French Jurist's Naive Look at Common Law Contract 283
Yasuhei Taniguchi Professor of Law, Kyoto University Civil Liability of Experts in Court: A Comparative Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Justin P. Thorens Professor of Law, University of Geneva: Avocat, Bar Association of Geneva The Common Law Trust and the Civil Law Lawyer
309
Carlos Vi/adds Professor at the University ofBarcelona Law Faculty; Abogado, Offices ofRam6n Viladas - Uria & Menendez Obras de arte y Patrimonio Hist6rico en Espaiia: Una reforma legislativa 317 reciente
Partm The Convergence and Integration of Legal Systems within Europe
George A. Bermann Professor ofLaw, Columbia University School ofLaw; Eason-Weinmann Visiting Professor of Comparative Law, Tulane University Law School (1988-1989) EEC Community-Building under the Single European Act
333
Mauro Cappel/etti Lewis Talbot and Nadine Hearn Shelton Professor oflntemational Legal Studies, Stanford University; Professor of Law, University of Florence Balance of Powers, Human Rights, and Legal Integration: New Challenges for European Judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
Sabino Cassese Professor of Law, University of Rome Toward a European Model of Public Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 J. A. Jolowicz
Professor ofComparative Law in the University ofCambridge; Fellow ofTrinity College Product Liability in the EEC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
XII
Summary of Contents
Part IV Private International Law Heikki Joke/a Professor Emeritus, University of Helsinki Law Faculty
395
Internationalism in Private International Law Stefan A. Riesenfeld Emanuel S. Heller Professor ofLaw Emeritus, University ofCalifornia at Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Professor ofLaw, University ofCalifornia, Hastings College ofthe Law
Transnational Bankruptcies in the Late Eighties: A Tale of Evolution and Atavisrn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409 Kurt Siehr Professor ofLaw, University of Zürich; Research Associate, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law
The Return of Cultural Property Expropriated Abroad
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
Part V Bibliography List of Publications of John Henry Merryman
445
Table of Contents In Honor of John Henry Merryman By Mauro Cappelletti ............................................... .
Part I
John Henry Merryman and Comparative Law
David S. C/ark The Idea of the Civil Law Tradition
11
I. Origins of the Idea of the Civil Law Tradition
II. Legal Tradition versus Legal System
......................
12
..............................
16
III. The Atypicality of France and Germany within the Civil Law Tradition
18
N. The Western Legal Tradition
21
Hector Fix-Zamudio John Henry Merryman and the Modernization of Comparative Legal Studies
25
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25
II. The Concept and Nature of "Comparative Law"
....................
III. The Goals of Comparative Law
26 28
A. Reach an Authentie Scientific Level in Legal Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28
B. Increase Understanding of National Law
.......................
28
.......... ............................
29
C. Perfeet Legal Language
...................
29
E. UnifY or Harmonize Legal Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Promote International Understanding of Law
29
F. Understand Legal Systems as Dynamic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30
N. The Extension of Comparative Law
30
V. Comparative Law and National Law
31
34
VI. Comparative Law and Foreign Law VII. Legal Nationalism and Foreign Law Borrowing
.....................
35
VIII. The Traditional and Contemporary Teaching of Comparative Law . . . . .
36
XIV
Table of Contents
IX. The Influence of John Henry Merryman's Modemizing Ideas
40
X. The Need to Update Comparative Legal Studiesand Teaching in the Mexican Legal System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42
XI. Conclusions
...................................................
45
Lawrence M. Friedman Some Thoughts on Comparative Legal Culture
49
......................................
49
II. Classification of Legal Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
I. Standard Comparative Law
111. Comparative Legal Culture
52
IV. A Concrete Example
55
Part n Comparisions of Legal Systems
Hans W. Baade Springs, Creeks, and Groundwater in Nineteenth-Century German Roman-Law Jurisprudence with a Twentieth-Century Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Introduction
...................................................
II. The Nineteenth-Century Decisions
61 61 65
A. Source and Scope .......................................... .
65
B. Guiding Principles: Public and Private Waters .................. .
66
................................................ .
66
C. Servitudes
............................. .
70
....................................... .
72
D. Riparian Rights to Public Waters
III. The Millers Go to Court
72
A. Four Cases
B. Summary ................................................. .
76
C. The Usus Modemus
77
....................................... .
D. Questions of Policy
80
IV. ''Vested" Water Rights and Modem Ground Water Management ..... .
82
A. Civil-Law Codification ...................................... .
82
B. ''Vested" Rights and Twentieth-Century Water Management
83
C. The Federal Constitutional Court Speaks ...................... .
84
V. Conclusion ................................................... .
87
Table of Contents
XV
Mirjan Damaska Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence: a Comparative View I. Atomistic and Holistic Tendencies Surveyed
A. Anglo-American Systems
...................... .
................................... .
91 92 92 94
B. Continental Systems II. Sources of Atomistic and Holistic Tendencies A. Organization of Adjudicatory Authority
B. Differing Objectives of Justice
............................... .
98 98 99
111. Anglo-American and Continental Systems Revisited ................ . 101
Louis Favoreu American and European Models of Constitutional Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 I. lntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
II. Why Europe Did Not Adopt the American System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 A. Substantive Factors
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B. lnstitutional Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 C. A Political Factor
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
D. The Situationafter World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
111 111 B. Jurisdictional Monopoly in a Constitutional Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 C. Constitutional Court Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
III. How the European Model Differs from the American Model
A. Separation of Constitutional Litigation from Ordinary Litigation
D. Referral to a Constitutional Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 E. The Nature of Constitutional Litigation
113
F. Effects of Constitutional Court Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 lV. Common Elements in the Two Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 A. The United States Supreme Court and Constitutional Courts . . . . . . 115
B. Less Obvious Common Elements
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Gino Gorla Samuel Livermore (1786-1833): An American Forerunner to the Modern "Civil Law-Common Law Dialogue" ........................................ 121 I. The Civil Law-Common Law Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 A. Introduction
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
B. "Diritto comparato delle differenze" and "Diritto comparato delle concordanze" during the Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Table of Contents
XVI
C. "Diritto comparato delle concordanze" during the Formative Era of American Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 D. The Anglo-Scottish-American Comparatists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 II. Samuel Livermore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 A. A Short Biography
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B. Livermore's Library
127
III. Livermore's Attitudes as Reflected in His Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 A. An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 B. Provide Order and System to American Case Law with Textbooks . . 129 C. Use of a Scholarly Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 D. Use ofComparisons with the Civil Law ........................ 131 E. Use of the lus Commune
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
N. Livermore's lnfluence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 A. The Fortunes of Livermore's Books
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B. Livermore's Success in Court: Whiston v. Stodder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 V. The History of Comparative Law of Concordances and the "Civil Law Tradition" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
La Constituci6n Norteamericana como Ley Importada en Costa Rica
139
I. lntroducci6n ............. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 II. El Regimen Presidencial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 A. El Modelo
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B. Las Altemativas Iniciales Latinoamericanas C. La Situaci6n Costarricense CH. Conclusiones
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
III. El Control de Constitucionalidad
153
A. La Gran lnvenci6n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
B. La Evoluci6n Costarricense en las Disposiciones Constitucionales . . 156 C. La Jurisdicci6n Compartida entre los Tres Poderes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 CH. Actuaciones Judiciales
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
D. El Sistema Actual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 E. Evaluaci6n del Sistema N. Las Constituciones en Derecho Comparado
166 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
English Summary: The Constitution of the United States as lmported Law in Costa Rica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
XVII
Table of Contents
Jan Hel/ner Interpretation of Contracts under the lnfluence of Statutory Law
173
I. The Use of Statutory Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 II. Interpretation of Special Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 III. Facultative Rules
176
IV. Mandatory Rules
181 182
V. Conclusion
Hein Kötz Schalarship and the Courts: A Comparative Survey
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 II. Legal Scholarship in French Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 III. Legal Schalarship in British Courts
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
IV. Legal Schalarship in American Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 V. Legal Schalarship in German Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 VI. The Need for Further Research
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Dietrich Andre Loeber Latvia's 1937 Civil Code: A Quest for Cultural ldentity
197
I. Significance of the Latvian Civil Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 199
II. The Civil Code as a Reform Act
III. History of Drafting the Civil Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 IV. The Civil Code of Latvia Today
202
Inga Markovits Socialism and the Rule of Law: Some Speculations and Predictions I. Socialist Administrative Legality: Past and Present
205
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
II. Capitalist Administrative Legality: ldeological lmplications of Our System of Judicial Review .............................................. 210 A. The Protection of Private Interests
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
B. The Individual against the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 C. Blurring the PubliefPrivate Distinction
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
III. Capitalist Reservations about Judicial Review: When Do We Limit Court Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 A. Citizens in Close Affiliation with Specific State Institutions
B. Complex Planning Decisions
217
................................. 219
C. Children and Welfare Clients ................................. 221
XVIII
Table of Contents
IV. Obstades to the Success of Judicial Review Procedures in Socialist Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. First Obstacle: The Socialist State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. Second Obstacle: Socialist Judiciaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. Third Obstacle: Socialist Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
223 224 228 232
V. Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. The Future of Socialist Law Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. The Limits of Law Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
238 238 243 245
Harry Nicholas Certainty of Price
247
I. The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 247 II. The Roman Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 III. Modem National Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Roge/io Perez Perdomo La justicia penal en Ia investigaci6n socio-juridica de Arnerica Latina
257
I. Introducci6n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 II. EI proceso penal: duraci6n y disfunciones III. Justicia penal y desigualdad social
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
IV. Justicia penal y represi6n politica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 V. Un balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 English Summary: Criminal Justice in Latin Arnerican Sociolegal Research
272
Giovanni Pug/iese lus Honorarium and English Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 I. lus Honorarium and Equity in Legal History
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
II. The Distinctiveness of the Two Bodies of Rules
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
III. The Powers of the Praetor and the Chancellor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 IV. Social Forces lnfluencing the Two Bodies of Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 V. Similarities and Differences between lus Honorarium and Equity
280
VI. Dualism and Merger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281 Denis Talion The Notion of Contract: A French Jurist's Naive Look at Common Law Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Table of Contents
XIX
I. Uncertain Frontiers: What is a Contract?
284
A. The Rigid Framework of French Law
284
B. The Nebula of the Common Law
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
II. Ambiguous Contents: Contract as a Promise ....................... 286 A. Contract and Promise
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
B. The Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 111. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
Yasuhei Taniguchi Civil Liability of Experts in Court: A Comparative Overview
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
I. lntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 II. The French Expert
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
A. The Negligent Conduct of Expertise
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
B. Error in the Expert's Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 111. The German Expert
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
IV. The American Expert ........................................... 301 V. The Japanese Expert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 VI. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Justin P. Thorens The Common Law Trust and the Civil Law Lawyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 I. lntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 II. Basic Common Law Property Principles
........................... 310
A. No Clear Distinction between Real Rights and Personal Rights
.... 310
B. Rejection of a Numerus Clausus for Real Rights ................. 310 C. Fragmentalion of Property Ownership D. Tenure
......................... 310
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 311
E. Estate
III. Trust Characteristics from a Civilian Point ofView .................. 314 IV. Conclusion
315
Carlos Vi/adas Obras de arte y Patrimonio Hist6rico en Espafia: Una reforma legislativa reciente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 I. Dos casos ilustrativos de Ia situaci6n anterior a Ia reforma A. ''Viaje a Ia Iuna en el fondo del mar"
B. "La Marquesa de Santa Cruz"
. . . . . . . . . . . 317
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 318
XX
Table of Contents C. EI marco legal espaiiol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318 II. La Ley del Patrimonio Hist6rico Espaiiol
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
A. EI mandato constitucional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 B. EI Patrimonio Hist6rico Espaiiol
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
C. Medidas de tutela y protecci6n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 D. Algunas medidas de especial interes
........................... 322
E. Incentivos fiscales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 F. Propiedad privada versus interes publico
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
G. Distribuci6n de competencias en materia de Patrimonio Hist6rico . . 327 English Summary: Worlcs of Art and the Historical Patrimony in Spain: ARecent Legislative Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
Partm The Convergence and Integration of Legal Systems within Europe
George A. Bermann
EEC Community-Building under the Single European Act
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
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Balance of Powers, Human Rights, and Legal Integration: New Challenges for European Judges ................................................... 341 I. The Expansion of European Judicial Review of Legislation
. . . . . . . . . . . 341
II. Nationaland Transnational Developments in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 A. National Constitutional Tribunals
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
B. Transnational European Judicial Review ........................ 347
III. A Judicial Review Revolution in Europe
352
Sabino Cassese
Toward a European Model of Public Administration I. The Possibility of Comparing Different Administrative Systems II. The Origins of ltalian Public Administration
353 . . . . . . . 353
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
111. The French-Napoleonic Administrative Model in ltaly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 A. Democratic or Oligarchie Foundations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
B. The Adoption of Droit Administratif
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
C. Administrative Uniformity D. The Administrative Elite E. The Council of State
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 359
XXI
Table of Contents F. Prefects
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
G. The Efficacy of Legal Transplants
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
N. The Convergence of Administrative Systems in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363 A. Democracy and Social Demands
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
B. Droit Administratif and English Administrative Law
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
C. Multi-Organizational Public Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 D. General Administrative Procedure Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 E. The Finance Sector's Leading RoJe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366 F. The Underlying Causes of Convergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 J. A. Jo/owicz
Product Liability in the EEC
369
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 II. A Liability for Producing or a Liability for Selling? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 A. Product Liability as Liability for Producing
B. Product Liability as Liability for Selling III. The Proposal for a Directive
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
N. The Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379 V. The Etfect of the Directive
381
A. The Survival of National Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 B. Implementation of the Directive
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
VI. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
Part IV Private International Law Heikki Joke/a
Internationalism in Private International Law I. Doctrinal Antecedents
395 395
II. Recent Developments: The New Factors
397
III. International Instruments as a Manifestation of Universal Legal Policy . . 399 A. Uniform Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 B. Establishment of Legal Standards
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
C. Legal Aspects of International Instruments N. Conclusions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
XXII
Table of Contents
Stefan A. Riesel!{e/d
Transnational Bankruptcies in the Late Eighties: A Tale of Evolution and Atavism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409 I. France: Societe Kleber c. societe anonyme de droit danois Friis Hansen et autre 410 II. Germany: P.N. KG u. a. v. RA 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
III. United K.ingdom: Felix!!towe Dock and Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, Inc. 415
N. Recent Developments in United States Law Goveming Transnational Bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 428
V. Conclusion Kurt Siehr
431
The Return of Cultural Property Expropriated Abroad
431
I. The Fact Situation A. The East German Background and Case History
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
............................... 432
B. West German Court Procedure II. Legal Problems A. Conflict of Laws Issues
432 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
B. The East German Transaction
.................................. 434
C. West German Public Policy
D. East German Law on Bona Fide Purchases
..................... 435
E. The Property Claim under the West German Civil Code III. Critical Remarks and Comments
......... 436
436
A. A New Specimen of Art Trade
436
B. The Clash of Different Policies
436
C. Taxation and Expropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 D. Bona Fide Purchases
........................................ 439
N. Review by the Bundesgerichtshof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
Part V Bibliography
List of Publications of John Henry Merryman
445
In Honor of John Henry Merryman Mauro Cappelletti* Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; . . . honour to whom honour. Romans 13:7 Writing about Professor John Henry Merryman means forme, first of all, to write about a collaboration that started over a quarter of a century ago, when we first met in Florence. The Law School of the University of Florence had just offered me the chair in comparative law, at that time the only such chair in the School (there are now five) and one of the then only two or three such chairs in the whole country (there are now dozens). In his turn, Merryman, as he wrote to mein a letter dated August 21, 1962, a few months after we first met, was just "beginning comparative work" at that time. It was indeed a case oflove at first sight! He had already spent several weeks in Florence, but his contacts had been limited to some colleagues whom I used to define as "thin-air thinkers"-speculating about law as "pure norm," applying a typically anti-realistic, ifnot pre-realistic approach. That was old and, at times, irritating stuffto me; it was simply incomprehensible to John. We met almost by chance, on the eve of his return to Stanford. Nancy and John, Mimma and myself dined in a typical small restaurant next to Ponte Vecchio. There, the magic encounter. He discovered that there existed after all a younger generation of Italian students of the law who were eager to repudiate and fight against certain features ofthe "ltalian style" (and not only Italian, as I shall indicate in a moment): its reliance on statutory law as the only relevant source of the law; its "Montesquieuian" conception of the interpretive function Gudicial and otherwise) as being a purely passive, noncreative, essentially mechanical reading and application ofthat law; its glorification of the normative element as the only factor worthy of study and teaching by the legal scholar-the "legal scientist"leaving to "nonscientific sociologism" or "politologism" everything else. Thus, there was no room for the study ofthe producers as weil as the consumers oflaw
* Lewis Talbot and Nadine Hearn Shelton Professor of International Legal Studies, Stanford University; Professor of Law, University of Florence. Copyright 1987 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Reprinted by permission of the Stanford Law Review and the Fred B. Rothman Company. This essay, with a few modifications, first appeared as John Henry Merryman the Comparativist: Stan. L. Rev. 39 (1987) 1079-86. I Menyman Festschrift
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and justice, of the processes and institutions, and, generally, of the themes and problems concerning the relationship between law and society. My youthful fury against this approach prevailing in the "legal academe" of Italy-but also, to a !arge extent, of other countries of Contineotal Europe and Latin America, that is, ofthe civillaw world-met a sympathetic reception from that Stanford law professor in his early forties, imbued with American realism. He lent legitimacy to my reaction; also, and most importantly, he gave to it a dialectic expression and a cultural background. In turn, as I was soon to learn, my own fight had its counterpart in John's attempt to open up to transnational and comparative interests his own school, Stanford Law School, which in precisely those years was successfully struggling to rise to the Ievel of one of the greatest schools in the United States and the world. It was that night, in the Buca deli'Orafo restaurant, that our monograph, The Italian Legal System, in which Joseph M. Perillo also was to participate, was first conceived-as a critical analysis of the Italian system as it really is, not as it appears in the books. And, of course, the method to be used, explicitly or at least implicitly, was that of comparative analysis. This meant that much ofwhat was to be said had to be seen in the light of problems shared by both Italy and the United States. John and I were perfectly aware of the fact that, although a country's legal system is an essential part of its cultural heritage-indeed a fundamental expression of the country's political and social philosophy-the study and teaching ofthe law in national universities tended tobe too rigidly nationalistic and narrowly norm-oriented-or, as was the case for the United States, "judicial doctrine oriented"-largely neglecting the sociological, econornic, political, and more generally functional, cultural, and humanistic aspects oflaw and the legal system. We were also convinced that comparative analysisbad an important roJe to play in counteracting that tendency, for it is a highly effective means of arriving at a perception of the purposes and functions of law within a society. Our book was nottobe a detached, "neutral" description of data; rather, it wastobe a battlecry for reform in thinking about and teaching the law. Tobe sure, the immediate targets of our criticism were to be the many obsolete elements of a system, the Italian, which was still very deeply rooted in and marked by the characteristics of an agricultural, pre-industrial, nonegalitarian, indeed essentially nonliberal society, even though such featureswerein stark contrast with a modern, civil-libertarian, socially minded Constitution that had just emerged from the ruins of dictatorship and war. (It should be remernbered that, although the Constitution has been formally in force since 1948, it is only since 1956 that Italy has had an effective system of adjudication to enforce the Constitution, and, most particularly, the Constitution's liberal bill of rights.) Beyond such immediate targets, however, was the feit need for an overall attack against the traditionalism, the dogmatism, the sheer normativism or doctrinalism of the method of legal education then prevailing in Italy-a method not
In Honor of John Henry Merryman
3
without impact, albeit under different aspects, in America as weil. Thus, John's choice of ltaly as the focus for "beginning work in comparative law" was amply justified: for, on the one band, those features oflegal education were particularly accentuated in that country; on the other band, ltaly represented a typical case of a juxtaposition of "conflicting legal systems within a legal system"-the modern Constitution against the resistance of a sticky body of preconstitutionallaw, approaches, and institutions. There were, however, other very good reasons for John's choice. One of bis great and Iasting merits as a master comparativist has been his prompt understanding of the fact that, even in those rare American law schools then already offering some courses on comparative law, there was a gap, and indeed perhaps a basic error, in their usual approach to the study and teaching ofthat law. With one or two exceptions mainly limited to the law of the socialist countries (or some of them}, comparative law teaching was not only Eurocentric, but centered exclusively on France or Germany, or both, as if those countries were adequately representative ofthe civillaw tradition. As John and others have by now amply demonstrated, this was mistaken both historicaily and culturaily. lt was mistaken because most of the creative eras of the civillaw tradition found their focal point in the Mediterranean peninsula: Roman law with its grandiose miilennium of evolution and proliferation; the renaissance of Roman law with the jus commune of the late Middle Ages; the jus canonicum; the jus mercatorium developed by the practices and institutions of the merchants; and, last but not least, the powerful integrational impact ofteaching and learning in the universities modeled after the Bolognese Law School archetype of the Glossatorsand Commentators. A basic feature of ail these layers of the civilian tradition was their "universal" character: Roman law, jus commune, jus canonicum,jus mercatorium, and university teaching ail affirmed themselves as of universal, and not purely local or national, validity. lt was only with the emergence of the nation states that law was conceived, more and more, as the legal order of a particular nation, and the state was seen as, essentiaily, the sole, omnipotent, arbitrary producerofthat "positive law." This gradual transformation ofthe concepts oflaw and the legal order found its early proponents in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in some of the humanists as weil as the first theoreticians ofthe idea ofthe nation state-led by such towering ltalian, indeed Florentine, figures as Politian (the master humanist) and Machiaveili, the founder of the modern theory of the state, "the philosopher who bad broken away from ail scholastic methods and tried to study politics according to empirical methods." 1 There has been, of course, a further layer in the civillaw tradition, one that was anticipated by the humanists and the early politologists, but which found its 1
I*
Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (1946) 119.
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crowning only several centuries Iater: the great national codifications, especiaily the French one under Napoleon in the early nineteenth century and, under the influence ofthe Pandectists, the German BGB at the end ofthat century. True, at that point the leadership had passed to France and Germany. The leading proponent of a universal conception of the Iaw, ltaly, politically divided and mastered by foreign rulers, had become silent, or virtually so, when law wastobe seen as the product of a particular state-the "monopoly" of state powerrather than the expression of a universal idea, or of a natural (innate) feeling, of justice. Tobesure Merryman knew perfectly weilthat France and Germany, not Italy, had become the bearers ofthe torch in this latest phase ofthe evolution of the civil law. And, of course, even though he began comparative work focusing on ltaly and the Mediterranean area-for, shortly after ltaly, he went to Greece where he spent some time at the Athenian Center of Planning and Economic Research, next door to his Stanford colleague and friend Kenneth Arrow-he soon expanded his interests to the legal systems of those two (and other) countries as weiL He dedicated one ofhis sabbaticals, for instance, to research at the Max Planck Institute ofForeign and International Private Law at Hamburg, perhaps the greatest center of comparative law in Europe if not in the world. But he always remairred convinced of the fact that, as he wrote in the preface to the 1969 edition of The Civil Law Tradition, there is a peculiar problern posed by France and Germany. Each of these nations has made a major contribution to the civil law tradition, and each still occupies a position of intellectualleadership in the civillaw world. At the same time, neither is a "typical" civil law system. lndeed, both are in a sense the least typical of all. The French revolutionary ideology and the French style of codification had only a limited impact on German law. German legal science has never really caught on in France. Elsewhere in the civillaw world, however, there has been a strong tendency to receive and fuse both influences. This is particularly true in Mediterranean Europe and Latin America, but it also applies to some extent to most other parts of the civillaw world. A French or German reader may find much in this book that is not representative ofhis legal system. The reason is that his system is atypical. The civillaw world includes a great number of nationallegal systems in Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. This book is about the legal tradition they share, not about French or German law.2
Whether or not one shares such a conviction, the fact remains that Merryman's impact on the Italian and other "Latin" systems of Europe and America has been remarkable. This is particularly true for ltaly, where today a number oflegal scholars, some of them now prominent in politics as weil, would not hesitate to recognize the deep and Iasting influence that John's writings, widely read in ltaly (but also elsewhere in Europe and in Latin America), have exercised upon them. A stream of young scholars and students who now hold 2 lohn Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (1969) vii-viii.
In Honor of John Henry Merryman
5
leading acadernic, professional, andjudicial positions has spent time at Stanford as pupils or collaborators of Professor Merryman; for example, to name only those now holding chairs in distinguished schools: Cassese, Crespi-Reghizzi, Rodota, Corapi, Oe Vita, Scaparone, Trocker, Varano, Vigoriti-not to mention that leading figure of Italian comparative law, Gino Gorla. As for myself, I owe primarily to John a majorturn in my academic career, starting with my first regular teaching at Stanford Law School in 1968. Indeed, for many Italians, but also Spaniards and Latin Americans, Stanford Law School has a name at its top: that of John Henry Merryman. And deservedly so. Hiscapacity to reach a contextual understanding of the law, his power of synthesis and his concise style (his ability to put into one incisive phrase what others would dilute into pages) has immediately attracted many ofus. His first few months in Italy some twenty-five years ago were to become more fruitful to so many ofus than years spent in Italy by many others, Americans or not. The tremendous growth of comparative law teaching and research in ltaly, as weil as the progressive abandonment of the traditional dogrnatic, purist, legalistic approach, owe much to him. Some of his books and many of his articles, reports, comments, and book reviews have been made accessible in Italian, in Spanish, and in other languages. His significance has been feit even in France-not a country easily open to foreign influence, especially Americanas witnessed by the doctorate honoris causa granted to him by the University of Aix-Marseille. Merryman's influence has also been significant the other way round. It is reflected, for instance, in those American textbooks and monographs in which his sophisticated concept ofthe "legal tradition" has become central. Let me also mention the fact that he has been the promoter of a varied and successful externship program of Stanford law students in Florence, Hamburg, Paris, Mexico City, and elsewhere. Some of those students are now teaching comparative law in American universities: Professors Robert Bush (at Hofstra University), David Clark (his co-author in Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systems), and Bryant Garth (now Dean of the Law School at Indiana University at Bloomington) are only three of this group. There isanother aspect of John's activity as a comparativist that I consider of lasting importance; although in some way implied in what I have already said, this aspect has represented an expansion and a major development of his original approach. Many comparativists still think that only similar systems can be the subject of comparative analysis. I remember, for instance, that, at the early stagesofthat gigantic enterprise initiated in the sixties by the Max Planck Institute at Hamburg-the launehing of a worldwide International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law-a meeting oflegal scholars from many countrieswas convened in that Hanseatic town. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss whether the Encyclopedia's volume on property-the chiefeditorship of which was later
6
Mauro Cappelletti
offered to, but not accepted by, Merryrnan---could encornpass the socialist countries as weil, or whether a separate treatrnent should be given to such countries. A similar rneeting was held at Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss the analogous problern concerning the administration of justice in developing nations. But John Merryrnan's writings have shown no hesitation on this point. Even "radically different" societies do have problerns-political, econornic, cultural, environmental, and so on-that they share in common: the problerns, for instance, of regulating property or successions, of controlling public power, or of protecting consurners. The tertium comparationis forthelegal cornparativist is not the legal solution given to a problern of societallife; such a solution might be a very different one in each of the countries exarnined. What rnust be sirnilar to provide the proper basis for valuable cornparative research is only the problern itselfthat dernands a solution in terms oflaw. Indeed, it is the fascination and the challenge of cornparative analysis to find out in what way the solutions differ; why they differ-for instance, whether the country's tradition, its governrnent organization, or its ideological approach or sociological structure play a roJe; and, finally to evaluate such solutions in light oftheir effectiveness in solving the given problern in that particular country and situation. Thus, Merryman's approach, far frorn being rnerely Eurocentric, has spread even into those areas of the world that before bad been rnainly the resort of anthropologists. No wonder he was quick to see the naivete of certain approaches such as those involved in rnost of the idealistic, but largely unsuccessful, "law and developrnent rnovernent." "Solutions" cannot be transplanted frorn, say, the United States to Colornbia, Chile, or Brazil. All problerns of life, even those rnost basic to society, such as that of personal freedorn or dernocratic legitirnacy, rnust be seen in their context; a solution that rnight be perfectly efficient in one society rnight be irrelevant, even harmful, in another. And, of course, the rnore cornparative analysis expands its reach, the rnore sopbisticated its instrurnents rnust be, including such instrurnents as those provided by statistical analysis of data, one recurring instrurnent in Professor Merryman's research. I have spoken of Merryrnan the cornparativist. I will not touch upon bis "second soul" as a legal scholar, for I arn an arnateur at best in that other area in which he has gained worldwide recognition: the arts and the law. But I cannot conclude tbis tribute without a few words about John the colleague and friend. As a colleague, what struck rne frorn the very beginning was bis fullloyalty and dedication to bis University, bis School, and bis colleagues. Corning frorn a country where the divisions in politics were but a tenuous reflection ofthe splits in academic life, I soon learned to appreciate the deeply feit sense of cornrnunity prevailing at Stanford, where the dieturn by C.C. Colton-"[e]xpect not praise without envy until you are dead" 3 -is not true, because the greatness and the
In Honor of John Henry Merryman
7
achievements of one colleague, far from being looked upon withjealousy, even resentment, are part of the "greatness" and achievements of all the members of the same institution. I understand that even in America things have not been so all the time and that such loyalty and feeling of community are values that must be vindicated day after day, for they can easily be lost. Yet, with colleagues such as John, I think no such danger would ever exist at Stanford. One expression of his sense of collegiality is the fact that he has been a magnificent promoter of collaboration with a nurober of scholars, most frequently chosen within the Stanford community: Albert Elsen of the Art Department is of coursebis co-author in Law, Ethics and the Visua/ Arts; John Barton and Victor Li ofthe Law School and James Gibbs ofthe Anthropology Department arebis co-authors in Law in Radical/y Different Cultures; and, with Lawrence Friedman of the Law School and David Clark, a Stanford Law School alumnus, Merryman directed the project on "Law and Social Change in Mediterranean Europe and Latin America." Also, it was under bis impulse and editorship that Stanford Law School, on the eighty-second year since its founding, celebrated "the completion and occupation of the Crown Quadrangle" with that splendid collection, Stanford Legal Essays,4 in which twentyfour members of the law faculty participated-an impressive group of contributors, from, in alphabetical order, Tony Amsterdam and Barbara Babcock to Bill Warren and Howard Williams. As a friend, John comes to my mind as John andNancy. I could not count the times I tumed to them for help and advice. Let me recall two episodes only, both connected with my first visit to Stanford. Some time before starting my coursein comparative law, I expressed to John and Nancy fears caused by my foreign accent. Nancy looked at me with a smile and said, "Students will Iove your accent!" (I don't know if she was right, yet her reassurance was so genuine and refreshing, and I knew she was speaking also for John.) And the morning my wife, our six-year-old daughter, and I arrived at the San Francisco airport, who was there to greet us? lt was J ohn, of course; and he chose the panoramic road to take us to Palo Alto, stopping on the way to show us the unique beauty of the region. lt was from that moment that Stanford became "my home away from home."
3 C.C. Co/ton, Lacon: Or, Many Things in Few Words; Addressed to Those Who Think (1858) ccxlv. 4 Stanford Legal Essays, ed. by John Henry Merryman (1975).
Part I
John Henry Merryman and Comparative Law
The ldea of the Civil Law Tradition David S. Clark* John Henry Merryman's The Civil Law Tradition, 1 first published in 1969, has achieved that rare combination for books about law: to be both a commercial and a scholarly success. lt has been read by thousands of law students and lawyers as an introduction to comparative law or to the legal systems of continental Europe, Latin America, and Japan. lt has been translated into ltalian, Spanish, and Chinese (both a capitalist and a socialist edition). Andin 1985 a second edition appeared, with a number of additions to the text and with a new chapter entitled: "The Future of the Civil Law Tradition." 2 The Civil Law Tradition 's commercial success is undoubtedly due to what Rene David called "beaucoup de perspicacite et beaucoup de clarte. " 3 Although insight and clarity do not guarantee academic acceptance and influence, Professor Merryman's book remains one of the most frequently cited in the foreign and comparative law literature. 4 This is true despite bis modest disclaimer in the preface to the first edition: "My professional colleagues in foreign and comparative law, however, are likely to find the work too elementary and too general to engage their interest." 5 For educating new
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Colorado (1989). Literature cited in abbreviatedform: Mauro Cappelletti/ John Henry Merryman/ Joseph M. Perillo, The Italian Legal System: An Introduction (1967); Rene DavidjJohn E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (3d ed. 1985) (1st ed. 1968 cited: David/ Brierley 1st); John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985) (cited: Merryman, Tradition; 1st ed. 1969 cited: Merryman, Tradition 1st); Konrad Zweigert /Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law: The Framework, trans. by Tony Weir I (2d ed. 1987). Additional abbreviation: RabelsZ = Raheis Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht. 1 Merryman, Tradition 1st. 2 Merryman, Tradition eh. 20. 3 David, Book Review: RabelsZ 34 (1970) 360-362 (360). 4 See, e.g., Alan Watson, TheMaking ofthe Civil Law (1981) 3 n. 3, 150 n. 17, 180 n. 2. Merryman, Tradition 1st is listed at the front ofWatson's book under "Abbreviations." 5 Merryman, Tradition 1st vii. One reviewer put it: "The Louisiana lawyer or Iaw student who concludes from Merryman's preface that he has nothing to leam will probably be overestimating hislegal training and underestimating Merryman." Robert 0. Hornes, Jr., Book Review: Loyola L. Rev. 16 (1969/70) 247-251 (247). A. M. Honore
12
David S. Clark
generations of American lawyers about comparative law, moreover, the concept of legal traditions and especially that of a civillaw tradition has found a place and substantially influenced two "casebooks" 6 and an introductory outshelL 7 In this essay I trace the development ofthe idea ofthe civillaw tradition and investigate some of the issues it raises for comparative legal studies. Centrat to this inquiry is the task of dividing the generat in comparative law from the particular. In focusing on the particular, Merryman has used the concept of a legal system. Since a tradition includes more than one legal system, a major point of controversy has been to identify those systems that are more important or more typical in illustrating the generat features of a tradition. Finally, there is the even grander notion of a Western legal tradition, which if it has increasing validity implies a convergence of the civillaw and the common law.
I. Origins of the Idea of the Civil Law Tradition The first sense in which a "civil law" had wide applicability was ius civile developed by the praetor urbanus, applicable to actions between citizens, from the time of the Roman Republic. Another moment appeared with the great revival of legal studies in Bologna at the end of the eleventh century. Over succeeding centuries, teachers at scores of universities throughout Europe taught a universal "civil" (that is, Roman, non-religious) law based on Justinian's Corpus juris civilis. "Civilians" studied and practiced this juris "civilis." 8 Together with law universal in the spiritual realm, also taught at universities, the two common laws formed ajus commune that in varying degrees influenced the body of legal norms in most parts of continental Europe. 9 Jus commune was exported by the Spanish and the Portuguese to America in the sixteenth century, where it was effectively disseminated through the universities established in the New World. The wide dispersion ofjus commune over several centuries and its firm hold on legal norms explains its usefulness today in understanding the national legal systems of a large number of countries. But notice that jus commune refers to both of the laws taught, in Latin, at the university: Roman civillaw and canon concluded: "Generality need not be andin this case is not superficiality." Honore, Book Review: Law Q. Rev. 86 (1970) 552-555 (553). 6 John Henry MerrymanfDavid S. Clark, Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systems, Cases and Materials (1978); Mary Ann Glendonf Michael Wallace Gordon f Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions: Text, Materialsand Cases ... (1985). 7 Mary Ann Giendon/Michael Wallace Gordonf Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions in a Nutshell (1982). 8 See Davidf Brierley 23 n. 19. 9 David S. Clark, The Medieval Origins of Modern Legal Education, Between Church and State: Am. J. Comp. L. 35 (1987) 653-719 (672f., 717).
The Idea of the Civil Law Tradition
13
law. Scholars currently disagree about the relative importance of these two elements for categorizing modern legal systems. Alan Watson, on the one hand, defines a civil law system as one in which parts or the whole of Justinian's Corpusjuris civilis have been in the past or are at present treated as the law of the land or, at the very least, are of direct and highly persuasive force; or eise it derives from any such system} 0
Merryman, on the other hand, considers both Roman civillaw and canon law to be major subtraditions (out of a total of five) that comprise the civil law tradition. 11 A further difficulty in understanding the Iabel "civillaw" to classify national legal systems is that European and Latin American comparativists do not themselves generally use it to describe their own legal systems. 12 For instance, the two most widely used comparative law treatises in Europe adopt the terminology "Romano-Germanie family" 13 and "Romanistic" and "Germanic" legal farnilies 14 for European legal systems. The term civillaw ordinarily appears in English language commentary. 15 Consider the title given to Merryman's book in Spanish (La Tradicion Juridica Romano-Canonica) 16 and in Italian (La tradizione di Civil Law nell'analisi di un giurista di Common Law) . 17 The Spanish language translator converted "civil law" into "Romano-canonical law." Europeans and Latin Americans are undoubtedly reticent to adopt the term civil 10 Watson (supra n. 4) 4; see F. H. Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law (1955) 2. 11 Merryman, Tradition 6-12. 12 See, e.g., Max Rheinstein, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung, ed. by Reimer von Borries (1974) 77f.; Gino Gorla, II diritto comparato in Italia e nel "mondo occidentale" e una introduzione al "dialogo civillaw-common law" (1983) (the term "civillaw" remains untranslated). 13 David/Brierley 22-24, 35-154. 14 Zweigert / Kötz 69-186. 15 E.g., Lawson (supra n. 10). The Oxford English Dictionary II (1933) 447 traces usage of "civil law" and "civilian" back to the fourteenth century. These terms referred to Roman civil law as taught and practiced in continental Europe (and England) and originally were used to distinguish canon law and later common law. See, e.g., William Fulbecke, A Parallele, or Conference of the Civill Law, the Cannon Law and the Common Law 1-11 (1601 /02, reprinted 1981); George Bowyer, Commentaries on the Modern Civil Law (1848). In America see, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Readings in Roman Law and the Civil Law and Modern Codes as Developments Thereof: An Introduction to Comparative Law (2d ed. 1914). Rudolf Schlesinger, in the first edition of his path-breaking casebook, noted the propensity for Americans to equate modern civillaw to Roman law: "There appears tobe a widespread belief among American lawyers that the law systems of all non-AngloAmerican countries are fundamentally the same as Roman law and, therefore, more or less alike." Schlesinger, Comparative Law: Cases and Materials (1950) 18. 16 Trans. by Carlos Serra (1971). 17 Trans. by Anna De Vita (1973).
14
David S. Clark
law for their entire legal systems since it already serves to identify the core of their private law norms, distinguishing the core from commerciallaw and setting it apart from the traditional public law category of criminallaw. The Age of Enlightenment brought the end of jus commune in Europe and Latin America. Fervent nationalism, often flavored by Romanticism, supressed the universal and emphasized the particular in culture and in peoples. In the nineteenth century there was, for instance, a romantic quest for a French history based on the supposition of a unique French spirit. 18 In the German area influential scholars rejected universal naturallaw and pointed to a positive law that grew with the Volk it served. 19 Many disciplines discussed the search for a Volksseele.w The unity of Spanish America was shattered by the wars of independence, asover 20 nations were created. Everywhere private law, criminal law, and procedurallaw were codified on anational basis in the vernacular. The universallanguage oflaw, Latin, lost its preeminence and was no Ionger used to instruct at university law faculties. Each of a large number of countries in the nineteenth century starteddown its own unique road of destiny. In 1928 Munroe Smith, Bryce Professor of European Legal History at Columbia University, wrote The Development of European Law. 21 In the introduction he explained: I have been sketching the development of law in westem Europe as a single great movement. Oddly enough, there is no book in any language that treats this development as a European movement. There are good histories of and systematic treatises on canon law. There are good books on the history and institutions offeudallaw. There are many treatises on commerciallaw, and there are good histories of Roman law in the middle ages. Beside this specialliterature wehaveseparate histories ofSpanish law, French law, German law, ltalian law, etc., in aß ofwhich a great deal of European development has tobe noted, but aU of wbich are written from a purely national viewpoint. Yet if we compare tbese different histories we can see in every case how very new is really national law. To a !arge extent, thesenational histories lay chief stress on the development of local customs, because the various systems of European law are dealt with in other treatises. Books dealing with the history of European continentallaw as a whole do not exist in any language. 22
Smith returned to the tradition of describing what was general about the European legal systems. Some comparative lawyers provided a taxonomic basis See, e.g., Jules MicN!let, History of France, trans. by G. H. Smith 1-11 (1892). See, e.g~ G.ustQJJ Hugo, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts als einer Philosophie des positiven Rechts {4th ed. 1819). 20 David S. Clark, Tracing the Roots of American Legal Education A NineteenthCentury German Connection: RabelsZ 51 (1987) 313-333 (322). 21 Smith, The Development of European Law (1928). Smith listed European university law degrees f;rom Göttingen and Louvain. 22 Id. at xxv-xxvi. 18 19
The ldea of the Civil Law Tradition
15
for this effort. Henri Levy-Ullmann, for instance, in 1922 divided legal systems into the Continental family, the family of English-speaking countries, and the Islamic family, based on differences in sources of law. 23 F.H. Lawson, the first Professor ofComparative Law at Oxford University, took a similar perspective in his 1953 Cooley Lectures, later published as A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law. 24 Lawson began his first lecture. Among the many gaps in the Iiterature of comparative law, there is one that I have long thought needs most urgently tobe filled. Common lawyers recognize that some of the most useful comparisons that can be made are between the Common Law and what they call the Civil Law .... What is the Civil Law? It must be said at the outset that the term has many meanings and that thesensein which I shall use it is one that is familiar only to common lawyers or to other lawyers who have been in contact with common lawyers and have learned to follow their usage .... I shall use it to represent the group oflaws which are the concern ofjurists who have long been known to common lawyers as "civilians;" that is to say, a group of laws which have been so greatly influenced by Roman Law that the classical method of approaching them has been through Roman Law. 25
For Lawson the most important components of the civil law were: (1) medieval customary law; (2) Roman law transmitted to medieval and modern times via Justinian's Corpusjuris civilis; (3) naturallaw; and (4) canon law. 26 "[W]hen we speak of the Civil Law we are speaking of something which has more or less the same uniformity and coherence that is possessed by the Common Law." 27 Of course, Lawson recognized that substantial variability existed among civil law countries. "The places where the Civil Law systems most resemble each other are where Roman Law was received, and the greatest dissimilarities are where the old customary laws survived more or less unchanged. " 28 23 Observationsgenerales sur !es communications relativesau droit prive dans !es pays etrangers, in: Les transformations du droit dans !es principaux pays depuis cinquante ans I (1922) 81, as cited and discussed in ZweigertiKötz 63f. Esmain earlier had split the Continent into Romanistic and Germanie legal families, a classification still popular today among some European comparativists. A. Esmein, Le droit compare et l'enseignement du droit: Bulletin de Ia Societe de Ugislation Comparee 29 (1900) 397 = Congres international de droit compare, Proces-verbaux des seances et documents I (1905) 445; see Pierre Arminjon I Boris Nolde I Martin Wolff, Traite de droit compare I (1950) 42-53 (three legal families on the Continent: French, German, and Scandinavian). For an interesting sociological perspective on the classification of legal systems into farnilies, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development: Law & Soc'y Rev. 4 (1969) 29. 24 Supra n. 10. The lectures were delivered at the University of Michigan. 25 Id. at 1f. 26 Id. at 9f. See id. 10-34. 27 Id. at 5. 28 Id. at 7.
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David S. Clark
The idea of treating the laws of continental Europe as a single unit continued with the 1964 publication of Rene David's Iandmark treatise, Les grands systemes de droit contemporains. Translated into English in 1968, 29 David argued for three major legal families in the contemporary world: the RomanoGermanic, the common law, and the socialist law. 30 Within the RomanoGermanie family, David discussed the Latin American variant to an extent unusual for most European law books. 31 The stagewas now set for John Henry Merryman's The Civil Law Tradition.
II. Legal Tradition versus Legal System In The Civil Law Tradition Merryman immediately sets out to distinguish between a tradition and a system and then to define his terms. The readerwill observe that the term used is "legal tradition," not "legal system." The purpose is to distinguish between two quite different ideas. A legal system, as that term is here used, is an operating set oflegal institutions, procedures, and rules .... In a world organized into sovereign states and organizations of states, there are as many legal systems as there are such states and organizations. Nationallegalsystems are frequently classified into groups or families .... France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland have their own legal systems, as do Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It is true that they are all frequently spoken of as "civillaw" nations, and we will try in this book to explain why it makes sense to group them together in this way. But it is important to recognize that there are great differences between the operating legal systems in these countries. They have quite different legal rules, legal procedures, and legal institutions .... But the fact that different legal systems are grouped together under such a rubric as "civillaw," for example, indicates that they have something in common, something that distinguished them from legal systems classified as "common law" or "socialist law .... A legal tradition ... is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the roJe of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught. The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system into cultural perspective. 32
The concept of a legal system for Merryman is tied to political units, such as Santa Clara County, Califomia, France, or the European Economic Community. Each political unit has its own particular Operatingset oflegal institutions, procedures, and rules. In reviewing Civil Procedure in Italy, by Mauro Cappelletti and Joseph Perillo, 33 Merryman wrote in 1965 that it was 29 David f Brierley 1st. This was Brierley's translation of David's second French edition (1966), with some changes in the text as weil as additions to the footnotes. David's French version, with Camille Jauffret-Spinosi, is now in its ninth edition (1988). 30 Id. at 14-18. 31 E.g., id. at 21f., 59, 70f., 99, 108, 111, 114. 32 Merryman, Tradition 1f.
The Idea of the Civil Law Tradition
17
an example of a healthy tendency toward differentiation. By focusing our professional attention on the "civillaw system" we have required an undeniably important shared legal tradition to bear too great a burden. As a result the staggering fiction is at !arge that Belgian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Luxembourgeois, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swiss law are the same, with minor variations. This misconception, which is only slightly more respectable than that which suggests the existence of "Latin-American law," ... will persist until we move from generalities (valuable as they are for certain purposes) about the civillaw to studies in depth of concrete legal orders in important nations outside the common law tradition. 34
Two years later Merryman joined Professors Cappelletti and Perillo in a collaborative effort to illustrate their concept of a legal system in The Italian Legal System. 35 Luini del Russo charaterized this book as "the first complete analysis of the ltalian legal system, [which] chose to depart from the traditionally static approach in favor of viewing the legal order of I taly in action, mainly through the spectrum of its procedure and interpretative processes." 36 After providing a history of ltalian law, this approach described important elements of the legal system. First, it looked at the constitution and the structure of government in its three branches, including along the way a discussion of political parties, local government, and the progress of democracy. Second, it described the several legal professions in ltaly and how all these types of jurists are educated at university law faculties. These materials then provided the context necessary to understand procedural and substantive rules and the way in which they operate in practice. After a chapter on civil procedure, Professor Merryman's primary contribution appeared in three chapters entitled "The ltalian Style," with the subtitles: "Doctrine," "Law," and "Interpretation." Influenced by Konrad Zweigert's notion of "style" 37 - that which strikes a foreign observer as significantly different 38 - Merryman's variant of style seems to be related to tradition as the peculiar is related to the general. 39 Both take a cultural perspective, focusing on values, attitudes, and ideology. J. A. Jolowicz found (1965). Merryman, Book Review: Am. J. Comp. L. 14 (1965/66) 507-511 (508f.). 35 Cappelletti/ Merrymanf Perillo. 36 Book Review: UCLA L. Rev. 15 (1967/68) 707-713 (708). 37 Zweigert, Zur lehre von den Rechtskreisen, in: XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law, Legal Essays in Honor of Hesse! E. Yntema (1961) 42-55, cited in Cappelletti/ Merrymanf Perillo 164 n. 1. Zweigert and Kötz use the notion ofjuristic style for their taxonomy oflegal families. Five factors "are crucial for the style of a legal system or legal family: (1) its historical background and development, (2) its predominant and characteristic mode of thought in legal matters, (3) especially distinctive institutions, (4) the kind oflegal sources it acknowledges and the way it handles them, and (5) its ideology." Zweigert/Kötz 68f.; see id. 69-75. 38 Cappelletti/ Merrymanf Perillo 164 n. 1. 39 "To some extent the Italian legal outlook is peculiarly Italian; there is an Italian style." Id. at 165. 33
34
2 Merryman Festschrift
18
David S. Clark
Merryman's analysis to be "the most distinctive and the most illuminating. [It] deserves to become a classic." 40 Robert Pascal added: "On the whole I do not hesitate to characterize Professor Merryman's success as brilliant." 41 The concept of a legal system was further elaborated with teaching materials published in 1978, co-authored with David Clark, entitled Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systems. 42 In a note on "law," the authors explain: Legal rules are what most people think of as law, and a good deal of the work of comparative lawyers is devoted to the description and evaluation of such rules. Much of the concem about differences in legal systems is phrased in terms of rules .... To speak of the comparison of legal systems implies that there are significant differences between them. A focus on rules Iimits the attention to only one kind of difference and equates "legal system" with "legal rules." A more adequate definition of a legal system, however, would include a number of additional components: legal extension, legal penetration, legal culture, legal structures, legal actors, and legal processes. Theseare highly interrelated concepts, and each of them is further related to the form and content ofthe rules oflaw in the system. Like other social systems, the legal system has boundaries, and its components are interrelated by an intemallogic. Legal extension and legal penetration help to define the boundaries of the legal system; the legal culture is its intemal logic; legal structures, actors and processes describe its component parts and the way they function. 43
This comprehensive vision of a legal system deemphasizes the place of legal rules and promotes consideration ofthe political, social, and cultural elements in law.
111. The Atypicality of France and Germany within the Civil Law Tradition Since comparative law research and teaching in the United States bad been dominated up through the 1960s by comparisons to the law of France and Germany, no aspect of Merryman's The Civil Law Tradition raised as much controversy as bis statement in the preface about the "typicality" ofFrench and German law. Although I have tried to make it clear in the text that this book does not attempt to describe any specific nationallegal system, a special word should be said here about the peculiar problern posed by France and Germany. Each of these nations has made a major contribution to the civil law tradition, and each still occupies a position of intellectualleadership in the civillaw world. At the same time, neither is a "typical'' civil law system. Indeed, both are in a sense the least typical of all. The French revolutionary 40 41 42
43
Book Review: Cambridge L.J. 27 (1969) 136-139 (138). Book Review: Am. J. Comp. L. 15 (1966/67) 829-832 (830). MerrymanfClark (supra n. 6). Id. at 27 f.
The Idea of the Civil Law Tradition
19
ideology and the French style of codification had only a lirnited impact on German law. German legal science has never really caught on in France. Elsewhere in the civillaw world, however, there has been a strong tendency to receive and fuse both influences. This is particularly true in Mediterranean Europe and Latin America, but it also applies to some extent to most other parts of the civillaw world. A French or German reader may find much in this book that is not representative ofhis legal system. The reason is that his system is atypical. 44
The notion that the "ltalian legal style . . . prorninently displays those characteristics that, to common lawyers, typify the civillaw," 45 and by inference that the French and German styles are atypical - what Hein Kötz calls Merryman's Lieblingsidee46 - already could be seen in 1967. 47 Rene David protested Merryman's characterization of French and German law, and accepted the challenge of having a Frenchman write a review of The Civil Law Tradition in a German journal. 48 David found that Merryman in bis general treatment of the civillaw attached too much importance to Italian law and to the influence of legal science. For David the civillaw farnily combines both unity and diversity. "[N]os amis italiens seront les prerniers a rejeter une opinion selon laquelle droits allemand ou fran~ais devraient etre consideres comme 'atypiques' dans Ia famille de Ia civillaw. " 49 Regarding legal science: "La civillaw tradition est moins que jamais celle des dogmatistes du XIXe siede; ... nous parait etre caracteristique de notre epoque meme au prix de considerer comme 'atypique' de nos jours non pas le droit italien, mais Ia doctrine italienne avec tout le dogmatisme." 50 What explanatory power does Merryman's description of the civil law tradition carry in today's Europe and Latin America?S 1 The issue was again raised by the publication ofthe second edition. In a book notice John Fleming put it as follows: But at least in France and the Germanie countries, the myth seems nowadays to be fostered only among a dwindling coterie of nostalgic scholars rather than among practitioners and judges who view the legal process in much the same way as do lawyers of the Common Law.... 44
4s 46
n. 6).
Merryman, Tradition 1st vii-viii. Cappellettif Merrymanf Perillo 166. Book Review: RabelsZ 44 (1980) 538-542 (539) (review of MerrymanfC/ark, supra
Cappellettif Merrymanf Perillo 165/ David (supra n. 3) 361. 49 Id.; see H.R. Hah/o, Book Review: Canadian B. Rev. 48 (1970) 810-813 (812). so David (supra n. 3) 362. SI "Is the enterprise of distilling from all these countries [in Western Europe and Latin America] a common tradition a viable one? ... (I]t convinces me that a sharp division of systems into two groups ... would be misleadingly abrupt for the civillaw." A. M. Honore, Book Review: Law Q. Rev. 86 (1970) 552f. (552f.); see Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Book Review: Harv. L. Rev. 83 (1970) 1954-1957 (1956). 47
48
2*
David S. Clark
20
One clue to this skewed perspective ... is his heavy focus on Italy and South America, whose legal systems remain largely mired in formalism and inertia. 52
John Merryman responded in a Ietter to the editor that although he and his colleague "may deplore some aspects of the traditional civillaw model of the legal process (while admiring others), ... that does not make it go away. It is certifiably, undeniably, empirically there, a reality that informs civillaw systems and makes them intelligible." 53 Even though the folklore may be weak in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, it still has force in France and "Jives strongly" in Mediterranean Europe and Latin America. 54 To understand a contemporary civillaw system you have to know where it comes from and what its image of itself is, and that begins with the paradigmatic civil law tradition. In most of the civillaw world legal professionals believe in that image. Even those who do not believe in it often feel compelled to act as though they do. 55
The differences in perspective from David, Fleming, and Merryman are matters of degree. All of them agree that there is diversity within the civillaw tradition. All of them agree that France and Germany are special, although David would prefer that they not be Jabeled atypical. Fleming admits that Italy and Latin America have a more formalistic style, what David calls dogmatic legal science in Italy. One suspects that Merryman's purpose in deemphasizing France and Germany within the civillaw traditionwas to shift comparative law research and teaching more toward the legal systems of Mediterranean Europe and Latin America. The two Jeading European treatises on comparative Jaw, both translated into English, clearly provide a French and German flavor to the civil Jaw family or families. First, Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, opt for three legal families, with distinctive styles (based on five criteria) within the civillaw sphere. There is the Romanistic legal family- "France and all the systems which adopted the French Civil Code, along with Spain, Portugal, and South America," 56 the Germanie legal family, and the Nordic (Scandinavian) legal familyY Mediterranean Europe and Latin America are discussed as part of the Romanistic legal family for about ten pages. Second, David and Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the Wor/d Today, have settled on three principallegal families, including the Romano-Germanie family. 58 "The term Romano-Germanie is selected to acknowledge the joint effort of the universities of both Latin and Germanie countries" in developing juridical 52
53 54 55
56 57 58
J.F., Book Notice: Am. J. Comp. L. 34 (1986) 821 (821). Letter to the Editor: Am. J. Comp. L. 35 (1987) 438-441 (441). Id. at 439. Id. Zweigert j Kötz 69. ld. at 69 f. Davidf Brierley 22.
The ldea of the Civil Law Tradition
21
science. 59 Originally written in 1964 60 to permit French students "to situate French law in the greater context of contemporary systems oflaw," 61 there are many references to the law and institutions of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the countries of Latin America.
IV. The Western Legal Tradition As one moves away from the particularity of nationallegal systems and the debate about categorizing countries in Europe and Latin America into legal families, the concept of a Western legal tradition may serve other interesting ends. John Merryman, together with three colleagues, undertook to test this concept using the comparative method in Law in Radically Different Cultures. 62 Combining the civillaw and common law traditions as part ofWestern culture, the book asked: "what do legal systems Iook like in radically different cultures?" and "[w]hat kinds of social differences are correlated with significant differences in legal systems?" 63 The authors selected four cultures, each with one example: Western (California); Eastern (People's Republic of China); religious (Egypt, Muslim); and traditional (Botswana). Four common social problems were investigated in each legal system: (1) someone with property, who holds office and has social status, dies: who gets the property, the office, and the status? (2) a crime is committed: what process does the society use to identify and deal with the criminal? (3) promises are made and relied on but not kept: how does the society deal with "breach of contract"? (4) at a time when there is world-wide concern for population control, in what ways does a society's legal system affect family size? 64
The idea of opening comparative law research and teaching to non-Western legal systems is not new. Zweigert and Kötz devote a chapter to "other legal families," including Far Eastern, Islamic, and Hindu law. 65 David and Brierley entitle the last part oftheir book "other conceptions oflaw and the social order," where they discuss the law of Muslims, Hindus (lndia), the Far East, and Africa. 66 But Radically Different Cultures is different. First, it is a book of cases and materials in the mos americanus. Second, it represents collaboration between an anthropologist (James Gibbs, Jr.) and law professors in the tradition Id. at 23. See supra textat n. 29. 6l David/ Brierley 1st v. 62 lohn H. Bartonflames Lowell Gibbs, lr.fVictor Hao Li/lohn Henry Merryman, Law in Radically Different Cultures (1983). 63 Id. at xv. 64 Id. at xvi. 65 Zweigert f Kötz eh. 6. 66 Davidf Brierley pt. 4. 59
60
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David S. Clark
ofE. Adamson Hoebel and Karl Llewellyn. 67 Third, it takes an anthropological approach to law: "law cannot be understood simply as a set of independent rules; it must be understood in relation to the social context and cultural milieu in which it is produced." 68 One of the major lessons in Radical/y Different Cultures is that our view of a legal system will largely depend on our perspective. If one stands in China, Egypt, or Botswana and observes the law of France and England, his looking glass likely reveals more important similarities than differences. David originally took this approach in 1950 when he combined the civillaw and common law into one Western system. 69 Äke Malmström agreed that legal systems that are European in origin have so many common features that the civil law and common law should be classed together in a Euro-American group. 70 Geoffrey Sawer, in the influential International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, took a similar view. 71 More recently Harold Berman developed this theme historically by tracing in great depth the formation of the Western legal tradition. 72 In particular one must pause to think of the systematization of the church and canon law in the eleventh and twelfth centuries as the first "modern" Western legal system. 73 Mary Ann Glendon, Michael Gordon, and Christopher Osakwe have used the concept of the Western legal tradition to organize teaching materials. 74 Like Berman and others, they also argue for the inclusion of socialist law within the family of Western law. 75 John Merryman treated the issue of the convergence of the civillaw and the common law in a thought-provoking 1978 article. 76 Strategies of convergence The Cheyenne Way: Confliet and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudenee (1941). Katherine S. Newman, Book Review: Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 22 (1983/84) 413-417 (414). 69 Rene David, Traite e!ementaire de droit eivil eompare (1950) 222-226; see Davidf Brierley 25, 106 f; David, Existe-t-il un droit occidental?, in: XXth Century Comparative and Confliets Law, Legal Essays in Honor ofHessel E. Yntema (1961) 5665. 70 The System of Legal Systems, Notes on a Problem of Classifieation in Comparative Law: Seand. Stud. L. 13 (1969) 127-149 (145-149). But see Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Civil Law, Common Law and the Seandinavians: ibid. 179-205 (182-198). 71 Sawer, The Western Coneeption of Law, in: Int'l Eney. Comp. L. II (The Legal Systems ofthe World, Their Comparison and Unifieation) eh. 1, ed. by Rene David(1975) 14-48 (14-16, 45-48). 72 Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation ofthe Western Legal Tradition (1983); see J.C. Smith/ David N. Weisstub, The Western Idea of Law (1983). 73 Berman (supra n. 72) eh. 5. 74 See GlendonjGordonjOsakwe (supra n. 6) 14-38. 75 Id. at 15; see Gyula Eörsi, On the Problem of the Division of Legal Systems, in: Buts et methodes du droit eompare, ed. by Mario Rotondi (1973) 179-209 (185-190). Contra David/ Brier/ey 26-27; Sawer (supra n. 71) 48; Zweigert j Kötz 73f. 67 68
The ldea of the Civil Law Tradition
23
include programs for the unification oflaw, transplantation oflegal institutions, and a sort ofnatural convergence when nations with similar political, economic, and social features develop similar legal systems. At the same time that convergence may be occurring, however, political and cultural forces may also be pushing at different Ievels toward diversity and decentralization. 77 Nevertheless, since the admission of the United Kingdom and Ireland to the European Communities, the process of legal integration on that continent has acted as a major force in the convergence of the civil law and common law. 78 This convergence has accelerated since July 1987 when the Single European Act came into effect, legislating a 1992 deadline to smooth the way for the movement of goods, services, and people from one country to another within the 12-nation European Community. To give Professor Merryman the last word: a more convincing measure of convergence is the extent to which legal systems in Civil Law and Common Law nations play out the fundamental values of Western culture. The increasing emphasis on legal protection of human rights and the increasingly sensitive legal recognition of particular regional and social interests within legal systems in both families indicate that the Common Law and the Civil Law are moving along parallel roads, toward the same destination. 79
76 M erryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, in: New Perspectives for a Common Law ofEurope, ed. by Mauro Cappelletti (1978) 195-233, reprinted in: Stan. J. lnt'l L. 17 (1981) 357. 77 ld. at 205-217. 78 See Merryman, Tradition 157f. 79 Merryman, Convergence (supra n. 76) 233. Recent political events in the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe might justify building the socialist law tradition its own parallel road. Mikhail Gorbachev remarked at his 1989 summit with Deng Xiaoping that all communist countries are moving toward democracy, free expression, and individual rights. "These processes are painful, but they are necessary." Watson, Upheaval in China: Newsweck 113 (May 29, 1989) 15-28 (20).
John Henry Merryman and the Modernization of Comparative Legal Studies Hector Fix-Zamudio*
I. Introduction On the occasion of this very deserved homage to the outstanding North American legal scholar, John Henry Merryman, I consider it convenient to highlight an aspect ofhis magnificent work. I am referring to his teachings on the nature of comparative legal studies, which have had an undeniable influence upon the modernization of the field, as Professor Mauro Cappelletti, 1 another outstanding comparative law scholar, has pointed out. Merryman's teachings and research activities arenot lirnited to the field of comparative legal studies, where they are quite extensive. They also cover various other areas of legal science, including the doctrinal area - rarely analyzed - dealing with the relations between law and cultural products, particularly those of an artistic nature, where he has made very important contributions. 2 These have earned him recognition as the founder ofwhat can be called "art law," 3 which is a field of tremendous importance for the Mexican
* Investigator Emeritus, Institute of Legal Research at the National Autonomaus University of Mexico (UNAM). I thank the Institute researcher Francisco Jose de Andrea Sanchez for the English translation of this essay. Literature cited in abbreviatedform: John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, An Introduction totheLegal Systems ofWestem Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985) (cited: Merryman, Tradition); id., Modemizaci6n de Ia cienciajuridica comparada: Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. 16 (1983) 67-85 (cited: Merryman, Modemizaci6n); id., Fines, objeto y metodo del derecho comparado (trans. by Fausto E. Rodriguez Garcia): Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. 9 (1976) 65-92 (cited: Merryman, Fines); Buts et methodes du droit compare, ed. by Mario Rotondi (1973) (cited: Rotondz). Additional abbreviations: Bol. Inst. Mex. = Boletin del Instituto de Derecho Comparado de Mexico; Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. = Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado; Rev. int. dr. comp. = Revue internationale de droit compare. 1 Cappelletti, John Henry Merryman the Comparativist: Stan. L. Rev. 39 (1987) 10791086. 2 John Henry Merryman, Thinking about the Elgin Marbles: Mich. L. Rev. 83 (1985) 1881-1923; id., Two Ways ofThinking about Cultural Property: Am. J. Int'l L. 80 (1986) 831 -853; John Henry Merryman /Albert Elsen, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, Cases and Materials (1979). 3 AlbertE. Elsen, J ohn Henry Merryman, Founding the Field of Art Law: Stan. L. Rev. 39 (1987) 1086- 1096.
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Hector Fix-Zamudio
legal system. Only recently have scholars taken seriously the study of the legal protection of Mexico's very rich artistic, historical, and cultural heritage, of which Professor Merryman is a profound connoisseur. 4 Mexican jurists are in debt to Merryman for his teachings on the new comparative legal studies, which have reached us through two very important works appearing inSpanishin the Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado as a result of his collaboration with the National Autonomous University of Mexico's (UNAM) Legal Research Institute. 5 In addition, Merryman's major work, The Civil Law Tradition 6 appearing under the title La tradicion juridica romano canonica, 7 already considered a classic, was published in Mexico and has been further translated into Italian 8 and Chinese. 9 Since it would be highly complicated to carry out an analysis of Professor Merryman's profound reflexions on comparative legal studies, I seek- in this short essay - to deal with some basic aspects of the discipline known as "comparative law," pointing out some of the contributions made by the distinguished comparative law scholar from Stanford University, which are related to the experience that Mexican law has undergone in this field.
II. The Concept and Nature of "Comparative Law" Notwithstanding the fact that- at least regarding the Romance languagesthe use of the expression derecho comparado (or diritto comparato, droit compare, or direito comparato), as weil as the English expression "comparative law," has firmly established itself as the branch of knowledge that studies the comparison of legal systems, it should be pointed out that these expressions are not correct in a strict sense. The terminology used by German scholars, Rechtsvergleichung (literally, comparison oflaw, comparacion juridica), is closer to the reality of our field. 10 Modem doctrine emphasizes that the old controversy- which created heated debates - of whether comparative law should be considered a scientific discipline or simply a legal method, 11 is now a thing of the past. The Arqueologia y derecho (1980). See Merryman, Modernizacion; id., Fines. 6 Merryman, Tradition. The firsteditionwas published in 1969. 7 Trans. by Carlos Serra (Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico 1971). 8 Merryman, La tradizione di Civil Law nell'analisi di un giurista di Common Law (Giuffre, Milan 1973). 9 Taiwan (1978) and Shanghai (1984). 10 See Hans Dölle, Der Beitrag der Rechtsvergleichung zum deutschen Recht, in: Rotondi 123- 171. 11 See Mare Arcel, Quelques considerations sur !es buts et !es methodes de Ia recherche juridique comparative, in: Rotondi 1 ff. (27 ff.) 4
5
Merryman and Modernization of Comparative Legal Studies
27
predominant view today sees comparative law methodologically, because in a strict sense one should speak of a "comparative legal method," of "legal comparison," or of a "comparative study of the law." 12 In this fashion, even though I shall use the term comparative law, because of its more general use, I nevertheless make it clear that we should be fully aware of its equivocal meaning. I agree with John Merryman's thoughts that the expression comparative law comprises diverse aspects of legal comparison. He correctly points out there are three types of comparative law: professional, cultura/, and scientific. These are not usually correctly distinguished. 13 In fact, diverse activities are carried out under the term scientific comparative law, especially- among others- the description of foreign legal orders or systems that are not analyzed under a strictly comparative criterion. 14 I do not say that the ideas of scientific discipline and of legal method are incompatible. Even though comparative law is a helpful instrument in the study of legal systems, and in this light is a legal method, 15 its systematization is necessary. It is a delicate instrument that should not be used in an indiscriminate fashion. To achieve this end some scholars have elaborated systematic studies to integrate what can be called "comparative legal science," in other words, a discipline that analyzes the legal comparative method and establishes guidelines for its correct use in the vast field of the law. 16 We are thus confronted with a methodological discipline, which has a functional character according to the very precise conception developed by the German scholar Konrad Zweigert, 17 a function that has an instrumental nature as correctly sustained by the well-known Italian legal scholar Alessandro Pizzorusso. 18 In this sense, as a methodological discipline, legal comparison has similarities with fields such as legal history, legal philosophy, legal logic, and legal research techniques, all of which have been considered as formative (or molding or developing). This may be contrasted with "informative" subjects, which make up the specific branches of the legal order, 19 taking into account that some North American scholars define formative subjects, in so far as their teaching is concemed, as perspective courses. 20 See Alberto Tripiccione, La comparazione guiridica (1961). Merryman, Modernizaci6n 67f. 14 Merryman, Fines 65-68. 15 Hector Fix-Zamudio, En torno a los problemas de Ia metodologia del derecho, in: Metodologia de Ia enseiianza y Ia investigaci6n juridicas (2d ed. 1984) 27-30. 16 Rene David, Les grands systemes de droit contemporains (7th ed. 1978) (cited: David, Les grands systemes). 17 Methodological Problems in Comparative Law: Israel L. Rev. (1972) 465-474. 18 Curso de derecho comparado, trans. by Juan Bignozzi (1987) 79-84. 19 Hector Fix-Zamudio, La docencia en las Facultades de Derecho, in: Metodologia de Ia enseiianza y Ia investigaci6n juridicas (2d ed. 1984) 139-163. 12
13
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Hector Fix-Zamudio
111. The Goals of Comparative Law One aspect in which Professor Merryman is in agreement with traditional comparative legal science is related to the goals sought for legal comparison. As he points out comparative law scholars, referring to these goals, speak of the reasons or bases of comparative law. 21 The objectives, goals, or bases of comparative legal science have gradually been taking shape since the basic propositions were put forth during the First International Comparative Law Congress held in Paris in 1900. 22 Among the most important goals are the following: A. Reach an Authentie Scientific Level in Legal Studies
As correctly stated by the outstanding French comparative law scholar, Rene David, the essential task of comparative law lies in giving back to law the universal nature of all sciences. Among all the scientific disciplines, only the legal field has falsely believed that it could be purely national. 23 This aspect of comparative law has evolved slowly. Merryman hirnself points out that, because of the French Revolution, Contineutal European law leaned toward the creation of nationallegal systems. These were the result of national ideals and of national cultural unity, all of which were translated into the establishment of legal doctrines, also of a national scope. 24 Legal scholars of the most varied tendencies are firmly convinced that legal sturlies cannot attain an authentic scientific level without the use of the comparative method. This belief is reflected in the gradual closing of gaps between different legal traditions, families, and systems, eroding differences and seeking a greater understanding among legal scholars. 25 B. lncrease Understanding of National Law
This goal is constantly reiterated by the most distinguished comparative law scholars, who have argued that it is more difficult to understand nationallaw without the use of comparative methods. 26 20 Hugh J. Ault / M ary Ann Glendon, The Importance of Comparative Law in Legal Education, in: Law in the United States of America in Social and Technological Revolution, ed. by John N. Hazard/ Wenceslas J. Wagner (1974) 67-80. 21 Merryman, Fines 72-74. 22 See H. C. Gutteridge, Le droit compare, trans. by Rene David (1953) 38f. 23 Rene David, Tratado de derecho civil comparado, trans. by Javier Osset (1953) 93 f. (cited: David, Tratado). 24 Merryman, Tradition 17f. 25 Hector Fix-Zamudio, Derecho comparado y derecho de amparo: Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. no. 8 (1970) 346.
Merryman and Modemization of Comparative Legal Studies
29
Without the aid of legal comparison a jurist becomes accustomed to considering the legislative, doctrinal, and jurisprudential solutions of his country as the only possible ones. He will have a limited and narrow conception ofhis own legal system. But ifhe aids himselfby contrasting his own legal system with diverse legal systems, he can then widen his cultural horizons and understand more precisely the scope of legal problems. In this fashion he can obtain a finer sensitivity in solving his problems. He improves the instruments that have been put at his disposal through the use of experience and knowledge derived from other legal systems. 27 C. Perfeet Legal Language
Legallanguage may be perfected gradually when legal scholars pay attention to the exact meaning of foreign terms discovered through the analysis of varied legal systems. This slowly willlead to the formation of an international legal language, which still is in a formative stage, but is indispensable. Such a language exists in other branches of knowledge, but it is virtually non-existent in legal science, thus making it considerably more difficult to understand and master the law. 28 D. Promote International Understanding of Law In the modern world gaps are closing between the social, political, and economic spheres. There is thus no excuse for the isolation of legal systems, which are also subject to continuing reciprocal influences from these other fields. Rene David pointed out correctly that it is necessary for jurists to cooperate to understand alien points ofview. They then may be able to expound to others the comparative point of view regarding their own law in such a manner that one could obtain in the field oflegal science what has already been achieved in other spheres of knowledge, that is, a peaceful and, if possible, harmonious coexistence as an indispensable instrument to achieve and conserve progress in our civilization. 29 E. Unify or Harmonize Legal Systems Unification has always been one of the highest aspirations of comparative legal studies. Long ago, albeit in a naive and romantic fashion, it was thought Id. at 345. See David, Tratado (supra n. 23) 78-111. 28 See lsaac Kirsch, Droit compare et terminologie juridique, in: Rotondi 407 -423; Tullio Ascarelli, Studi di diritto comparato e in tema di interpretazione (1952) 5ff. (Premesse allo studio del diritto comparato). 29 David, Les grandes systemes (supra n. 16) 9f. 26
27
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Hector Fix-Zamudio
that legal systems could become universal, 30 but scholars gradually reduced their pretensions to finally arrive at the goal ofunification or harmonization of a regional character. 31 This has slowly given shape to a real community law, developed in a vigorous fashion among the European communities, particularly through the important work of their Court of Justice domiciled in Luxembourg. 32 Community law has, in an incipient fashion, also developed in Latin America in the smaller context of the five Andean countries united by the Cartagena Accord, which has created a community court located in Quito. 33 lt can be found internally in federal countries with a diversity of locallegislation, where one can observe a growing tendency, if not toward unification, at least toward the creation of model laws. 34 F. Understand Legal Systems as Dynamic
Only scholars who use the comparative method possess the sensitivity and understanding, given the diverse legal professions (judges, legislators, prosecutors, lawyers, teachers, and scholars), 35 necessary to reach the timely and adequate adaptation of their own legal system to constant social changes. Otherwise, there is the risk of contemplating a static, rigid, and petrified system, which will become an obstacle to the progress and social evolution that legal science should further. The task for jurists, especially in developing countries, should be to promote progress and not regression, as the latter is frequently attributed to them. 36
IV. The Extension of Comparative Law It is also difficult to establish the extension, that is to say the range or object, to be studied by comparative legal work. One must first take into account the material aspects of this field by reducing the approach to the formal guidelines of Mario Rotondi, Diritto comparato, in: Novissimo digesto italiano V (1964) 824f. Jean Limpens, La evoluci6n de Ia unificaci6n del derecho: Revista del Instituto de Derecho Comparado (1960) 9 -18; id., Relations entre l'unification au niveauregional et l'unification au niveau universal: Rev. int. dr. comp. 16 (1964) 13-31. 32 Maurice Lagrange, The Court of Justice as a Factor in European Integration: Am. J. Comp. L. 15 (1966 I 67) 709-725. 33 Luis Carlos Sachica, Introducci6n al derecho comunitario andino (1985); Hector Fix-Zamudio I Hector Cuadra, Problemes actuels d'armonisation et de l'unification des droits nationaux en Amerique Latine: Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 41 supp. 1 (1971) 1-5. 34 J. A. C. Grant, EI sistema federal de los Estados Unidos de Norteamerica (trans. by Jorge Velazco), in: Los sistemas federales en el Continente Americano (1972) 422-435. 35 Merryman, Modernizaci6n 69f. 36 Id. at 68-70. 30
31
Merryman and Modernization of Comparative Legal Studies
31
comparison itself. Thus, we can pointout that most comparative legal studies cover, in general terms, three principal areas. First, the presentation of foreign law. This is frequently confused with comparative analysis, but following the insightful concept expounded by Merryman, it has a purely descriptive sense. In any case, the analysis offoreign legal systems is the necessary antecedent for legal comparison, which cannot be carried out without the previous description of these systems, excluding the socalled "rnicro-comparison" of intemal factors. 37 Second, the analysis of methodological problems in legal comparison should be considered as an object for study in comparative legal science in a strict sense. 38 Third, one may exarnine specific legal institutions through the concrete use of the comparative method: comparative private law; 39 comparative constitutional law; 40 comparative socialist law; 41 comparative public corporations; 42 comparative civil procedure;43 comparative constitutional justice; 44 and so on.
V. Comparative Law and National Law Nationallaw must be the starting point for comparative legal studies, even though it is necessary to distinguish between a national legal system and the studies about it. Only in a formal sense can we classify these studies as "national," because when we speak of"nationallegal doctrine" or of"national legal science," in reality we are dealing with studies carried out by the scholars of a country on their own law. However, it is not possible to sustain the existence of a real legal science that has an exclusively local nature. 45
Arcel (supra n. 11) 8. Viktor Knapp, Sciencejuridique (1972) 73-82; seesupra textat nn. 17-20. 39 E.g., David, Tratado (supra n. 23) 3-35. 40 E.g., Paolo Bisearetri di Ruffia, Introduzione al diritto costituzionalecomparato (5th ed. 1984) 3-33; Giussepe De Vergottini, Diritto costituzionale comparato (1981). 41 E.g., Knapp (supra n. 38) 77f. 42 E.g., Felipe de Sofa Cafiizares, Tratado de sociedades por acciones en el derecho comparado 1-111 (1957). 43 E.g., Mauro Cappelletti, EI proceso civil en el derecho comparado, trans. by Santiago Sentis Melendo (1973). 44 E.g., Hector Fix-Zamudio, Veinticinco aiios de justicia constitucional (1940-1965) (1968); Annuaire international de justice constitutionnel compare, 1985, ed. by Louis Favoreu (1987). 45 Hesse/ E. Yntema, Los estudios comparativos de derecho a la luz de Ia unificaci6n legislativa: La Ley 29 (Buenos Aires, Jan.-Mar. 1943) 813-818. Yntema stated that: "A national legal science is, although common, as preposterous as a national biology or something similar." 37
38
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Hector Fix-Zamudio
lt may be a paradox to consider internal or national law as the basis for comparative studies, since one ofthe essential objectives oflegal confrontation is precisely to improve one's understanding ofhis own law. 46 However,just as the understanding of foreign legal systems constitutes the antecedent for this confrontation, the internal or national legal system is the basis for the comparison.
This statement is clear from a formal point of view, but it is complicated considerably when one seeks to identify the material content of the legal system that should be considered "national." The contributions made by contemporary legal scholars are significant. At the beginning of comparative law sturlies during the first years of this century, only legislation was considered as the basis for confrontation. This conformed to ideas emanating from the French Revolution, which awarded parliamentary bodies preeminence as "representative of the general will," at least in the European legal tradition. 47 1t also gave rise to a very limited type of comparative legal studies known as "comparative legislation. " 48 The evolution of comparative legal sturlies expanded the narrow concept of national law to include, gradually within the local system, other normative sectors, especially case law, which has always been an essential element in the systems belonging to the Anglo-American legal tradition known as the common law. 49 Currently the scope ofwhat is understood as nationallaw, as well as factors that should be taken into account in legal comparison, has opened up considerably. Thus, as far as legal systems are concerned, they are no Ionger limited to legislation andjudicial precedent that form part ofwhat we can define as positive "substantive law," 50 but should also include normsthat regulate the production of other norms, organizational norms, and procedural norms, which coupled with the substantive ones compose what can be defined as the "legal system." 51 John Henry Merryman's reflexions on the subject of legal systems are very important. He supports the distinction made by the notable English philosopher of law, H.L.A. Hart, between primary and secondary norms. 52 Merryman See supra text at n. 26. Juan Jacobo Rousseau, EI contrato social, trans. by Enrique de Ia Rosa (1961) 177182; see Merryman, Tradition 19-25. 48 This is the first step in the evolution of comparative law. It is reflected in early comparative law journals, such as Bulletin de Ia Societe de legislation comparee (Paris, since 1869), Annuaire de legislation etrangere (Paris, since 1872), and the Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law (London, since 1896). 49 See, e.g., Kar! H. Neumayer, Law in Books, Law in Action, et les methodes du droit compare, in: Rotondi 507- 521. 50 Pizzorusso (supra n. 18) 11-20. 51 Santi Romano, L'ordinamento giuridico (2d ed. 1961) 27ff. 52 The Concept of Law (1961) 77-96. 46
47
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pointsout that the former (which could be identified with the substantive norms of a legislative nature) have a limited explanatory value since they constitute but a partial and static aspect of the national legal system. Their incorporation generaily occurs without consciously paying attention to political and sociolegal implications. Thus they should not serve as the exclusive basis for comparison since there are countries that are sociaily, politicaily, and economicaily very different, which can, however, share primary bodies ofnorms that are praticaily identical. 53 As Merryman himselfhas correctly pointed out, to achieve a real comparison among diverse systems or legal orders, in addition to primary norms (which in the Contineotal European or civil law traditions have a predominantly legislative nature), secondary norms must also be studiedas weil as other factors such as legal culture, legal institutions, legal actors, and the forms taken by legal life. 54 Precisely because the essential base of comparison is found in nationallaws, this procedure has been foilowed in diverse international law congresses organized by the International Association of Legal Science, aided by the International Committee ofComparative Law. Thesemeetings have taken place periodicaily and uninterruptedly since 1948 in several places, the latest being the Twelfth Congress in Sidney, Australia in 1986. In ail of these congresses, lectures drafted on the basis of national reports on diverse legal subjects and institutions are discussed and then analyzed by the general reporter on the basis of comparisons. These general reports are then published by the organizing commissions of the congresses, while national reports are edited in most cases by national comparative law organizations. This technique has been foilowed in other international comparative law reunions. F or instance, it was used for the coiloquy carried out in Florence on 59 September 1971 on the subject "Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation," under the auspices of the International Association of Legal Science and the University ofFlorence's Comparative Law Institute. 55 A similar although not identical technique was foilowed in another important comparative law reunion: the coiloquy that took place in Aix-en-Provence on 19-21 February 1981 to discuss European constitutional courts and their work in the protection of human rights. In this reunion several nationallectures on diverse aspects ofthe constitutional courts in France, the Federal Republic ofGermany, ltaly, and Austria were analyzed, as weil as some regional reports on the European Community's Court. 56 Merryman, Fines 77f. Id. at 78. 55 Fundamental Guaranlies ofthe Parties in Civil Litigation, Les garanties fondamentaux des parties dans Je proces civil, ed. by Mauro Cappelletti/ Denis Talion (1973). 56 Cours constitutionnelles europeennes et droits fondamentaux, ed. by Louis Favoreu (1982). 53
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VI. Comparative Law and Foreign Law Theorists have not agreed on whether or not foreign law should be considered as an aspect of comparative legal science. 57 This depends on whether one takes a strict or flexible conception of the comparative method. However, there is consensus regarding the need to understand foreign legal systems, since they are the elements used in the confrontation with nationallaw. As Merryman has stated, the difference between "comparative law" and "foreign law" is unclear. Although it is true that the analysis of foreign law is essentially descriptive, and although comparative law strictly requires two or more legal systems or some of their aspects, it is very hard to describe anything without the explicit or implicit use of comparison. 58 The study of nationallaw is difficult in comparative terms, since it does not suffice to examine strictly its legal aspects. lt is also necessary to take into account other factors from the social context in which law operates and develops. A similar conception of foreign legal systems is even more complicated, due to the obstacles in gathering the necessary materials, the diversity oflegaljargon, as weil as the Iack ofthe direct live contact that one has with one's own law, which is hard to duplicate when a legal system is analyzed at a distance. 59 These problems are reduced considerably when comparison is carried out within one of the great traditions, families, or legal systems, such as the Continental European, the Anglo-American, or the socialist order, none of which, by the way, is monolithic. This is especially true when we are dealing with legal systems that belong to countries possessing points of contact in their history, traditions, and social and economic development (as is the case with the Latin American nations). But problems are multiplied when the foreign law, which is the object of study in the contrasting process, belongs to a very different tradition (classified as macro-comparison). This demands efforts proportional to the distance existing between the foreign legal system and the national system, for example, between Latin American law and the oriental legal orders, or between India and the Moslemic Arab countries, and so on. 60 One might object that ifthere are so many obstacles to understanding foreign law it is impractical to insist on the use of the comparative legal method. But obstacles can be overcome through the use of contemporary techniques like the ones already pointed out that employ information from national reports. This is all the more so when research is aided by specialists from diverse social sciences, but coordinated by legal scholars. Take, for instance, the monumental work Ancel (supra n. 11) 8-13. Merryman, Modemizaci6n 68f. 59 Merryman, Tradition 142-150; seesupra textat nn. 52-54. 60 Viktor Knapp, Quelques problemes methodologiques dans Ia science du droit compare, in: Rotondi 427-441. 57 58
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promoted by Professor Mauro Cappelletti on "Access to Justice," which included in addition to national reports drafted by legal scholars, other studies on diverse legal orders and institutions carried out by sociologists, economists, and anthropologists. 61 The study of foreign legal systems with a comparative aim should not be evaluated as merely speculative activity, but rather as analysis carried out to correctly apply the normative precepts of our times, in so far as one can see a growing reciprocal influence and understanding among legal systems. This is true both within one legal tradition or family as between traditions, so that the distance separating families is decreasing. One can even notice a tendency toward regional harmonization through the formation of community systems. 62 This narrowing ofthe gulfbetween different legal traditions can also be seen for those far apart, such as the systems belonging to Anglo-Saxon (common law) and Contineotal European (civillaw) countries, where there exist converging points. 63
VII. Legal Nationalism and Foreign Law Borrowing Legal nationalism and foreign law borrowing can be considered deviations from the employment ofthe comparative legal method. They are important for Mexican legal doctrine (in addition to their repercussion upon comparative legal science) since a group ofnationalist scholars has recently emerged, responding to the influence of the N orth American legal system in the public law fieldas weil as to the French and Spanish legal systems in the private law sphere, including commercial Iaw institutions. 64 This movement gained strength with the renovation brought on by the enactment of the 1917 Federal Mexican Constitution, which was the first to introduce precepts protecting marginal social groups (farmers and workers). 65 Its influence created a type ofsociolegal study with its own characteristics, 66 which still can be seen in the work of some 61 Cappe/letti, Acceso a Ia guistizia, Conclusione di un progetto internazionale di richerca guiridico-sociologica: I! Foro 102 (1979) 2; seesupra textat nn. 55-56. 62 See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The Role of Comparative Law in Regional Organizations, in: Law in the United States of America in Social and Technological Revolution, ed. by John N. Hazard I Wenceslas J. Wagner (1974) 49- 65; seealso supra text at nn. 30-34. 63 John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) ofthe Civil Law and the Common Law, in: New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, Nouvelles perspectives d'un droit commun de L'Europe, ed. by Mauro Cappe/letti (1978) 195-233. 64 Hector Fix-Zamudio, Derecho comparado y Ia ciencia juridica en Mexico, in: Memoria de EI Colegio Nacional, 1974 (1975) 244-251. 65 Hector Fix Zamudio, EI Estado Social de Derecho y Ia Constituci6n Mexicana, in: La Constituci6n Mexicana, Rectoria del Estado y economia mixta (1985) 77-120. 66 Hector Fix-Zamudio I Eugenio Hurtado Marquez, La ciencia del Derechoen el ultimo Siglo, Mexico, in: La scienze del diritto nell'ultimo secolo, ed. by Mario Rotondi (1976) 470-474.
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authors who do not follow comparative law. This is especially true for some institutions that are considered predominantly national, such as the writ of amparo. 67 Legal nationalism is a methodological deviation that implies an isolated normative system, which does not take into account the evolution of doctrine, legislation, and jurisprudence from other legal orders with which it might be related. On the other band, one can speak of foreign borrowing or influence ( extranjerizacibn) when there is automatic and reflexive use ofinstitutions from foreign systems. The national legal order may be relegated to excessive dependency due to the absence of solutions that are adequate for the regime itself. As the comparative law scholar Hesse] E. Yntema pointed out, it is much easier to imitate a foreign model than to invent a new one. 68 The problern is not, as stated earlier, ignorance of other systems, but rather their inadequate use. As brilliantly stated by John Henry Merryman, from one point of view, Iaw is an historically determined process through which certain social problems are discovered, formulated, and resolved. 69 On the other hand, alllegal systems have been formulated under the influence of other legal systems with which they are in permanent contact, in such a fashion that the principal elements of law overflow political frontiers. 70 One discovers a constant flux of opposing forces that in a given moment tend to concentrate on national Iaw, and in others tend to approach foreign legal systems. This constant movement can perhaps explain the predominance of legal positivism during certain periods and the renaissance at other times of diverse naturallaw tendencies. 71
VIII. The Traditional and Contemporary Teaching of Comparative Law One of the essential aspects in the evolution of comparative legal sturlies is its teaching. Although confrontation can be carried out through the evaluation of two or morelegal systems, it is only fruitful if the techniques used in comparison are well-identified and improved gradually on the basis of comparative legislation studies. There has been a continuing concern on the part of comparative law scholars to improve law school study plans, where there still exists uncertainty regarding the treatment of comparative law. Courses on See lgnacio Burgoa Orihue/a, EI juicio de amparo (21st ed. 1984) 21-23. Comparative Law and Humanism: Am. J. Comp. L. 7 (1958) 493-499 (498). 69 Merryman, Tradition 149f. 70 Giorgio Dei Vecchio, Le basi del diritto comparato e i principii generali del diritto, in: Rotondi 115-122; id., La unidad del espiritu humano como base de Ia comparaci6n juridica (trans. by Julio Ayasta Gonzalez): Revista Juridica del Peru (1951) 6f. 71 Eduardo Garcia Maynez, Positivismo juridico, pluralismo sociol6gico y iusnaturalismo (1968). 67
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comparative law in some places are taught sporadically without systematization for different classes on the subject. 72 Thus in several international reunions, especially at comparative law congresses, one hears with insistence the need to establish in alllaw schools the teaching of comparative law, in addition to specialized courses on different legal systems. For example, at the Third Conference of the International Bar Association, which took place in London in July 1950 and was heldjointly with the International Committee of Comparative Law meeting, several recommendations proposed by Professor C.J. Hamson from the University ofCambridge were approved, among them those seeking to promote the teaching of comparative legal methods. 73 Shortly before that reunion, the International Committee of Comparative Law was founded in Cambridge, England. It grew out of a meeting held there on 28-30 December 1949 under the auspices ofUNESCO. Rene David became its first secretary general. Articles 3 and 5 of the Committee's statutes established that the organization would encourage understanding and mutual toleration among different nations through the study of foreign legal systems and the use of the comparative method in the social sciences, promote the development of institutions dedicated to the study of foreign legal systems and comparative law, and sponsor their creation where they did not exist. 74 During the Third International Congress of Comparative Law held in London on 1-7 August 1950, comparative law was considered exclusively from the unification point of view. 75 Nevertheless, Hesse! Yntema presented abrief report on comparative legal sturlies in the United States, specifically at the U niversity of Michigan. 76 The teaching of comparative law was once again considered during the Fourth International Congress ofComparative Law, held in Paris on 1-7 August 1954, under the topic "Appropriate Means to Make Comparative Law a Useful Element in Legal Education." Among the approved recommendations was the point that comparative legal studies should not Iimit itselfto the study oflegal precepts, but rather should have a historical basis and include sociological and ethnological viewpoints. Great universities should organize specialized courses and conferences on the principal foreign legal systems, as weil as promote exchanges among professors and students. 77 72 Hector Fix-Zamudio, L'importance du droit compare dans l'enseignementjuridique, in: Rapports generaux au IX Congn!s International de Droit Compare (1977) 146-155. 73 International Bar Association, Third Conference Report, London, July 1950 (1952) 167. 74 C. J. Hamson, Droit compare et l'enseignement du droit: Rev. int. dr. comp. 2 (1950) 671-681; UNESCO et Je droit compare: ibid. (1950) 328-333, 526-530. 75 /stituto Italiano di Studi Legislativi, Memoires de I' Academie Internationale de Droit Compare 3 (1953) cxviii-cxix. 76 Comparative Legal Studies in the U.S., Research in Interamerican Law in the University of Michigan, in: /stituto ltaliano (supra n. 75) 101-110.
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Two years later the subject of comparative law teaching was debated at a comparative law congress organized by the International Association of Legal Science in Barcelona on 10-17 September 1956. Felipe Sohi Canizares and Andre Bertrand recommended that comparative law and the comparative method should be taught if possible as an obligatory course and at different Ievels in law schools. Introductory courses on nationallaw for foreign students should also be initiated in countries where such courses were not yet organized. 78 In the Fifth International Congress of Comparative Law held in Brussels on 4-9 August 1958, an important topic was "The Study and Teaching of Comparative Law and Its U nification. " 79 In the following congresses, the Sixth in Harnburgon 30 July- 4 August 1962, 80 the Seventh in Uppsala, Sweden on 613 August 1966; 81 and the Eighth in Pescara, Italy on 29 August- 5 September 1970, 82 the subject of comparative law, its methods, and the unification of the law were still on the agenda, but analysis focused on legal unification and reception of foreign law without a concrete reference to the teaching of comparative law in a strict sense. Two other academic reunions considered comparative legal teaching. First, the Seventh International Colloquium of Comparative Law, organized by the Canadian Center of Comparative Law in Ottawa on 27-29 August 1969 examined "Comparative Law and Its Teachingin Modem Society." 83 Second, a conference held in New York on 29-30 January 1971, under the auspices ofthe Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, centered exclusively on the teaching of comparative law. 84 However, the reunion where very important contributions were made to the field of comparative law teaching was the Ninth International Congress of Comparative Law, held in Teheran on 27 September- 4 October 1974, where one of the subjects debated was the "Importance of Comparative Law in the Teaching of the Law." The general report, drawing on the many national reports, considered that notwithstanding the efforts carried out, the time was, still not ripe to mark the progress made in the field of comparative legal studies"' as satisfactory. With the exception of France, a country in which comparative , legal sturlies has an established tradition, the courses on comparative legaJ:., studies, even in highly developed countries like Italy and the Federal Republic o( Bol. Inst. Mex. no. 23 0955) 344. Id. no. 28 (1957) 350f. 79 Id. no. 33 (1958) 245. 80 Id. no. 40 (1961) 266. 81 Id. no. 50 (1964) 536. 82 Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. no. 4 (1969) 268; id. no. 9 (1970) 797-810. 83 Centre Canadien de Droit Compare, Travaux du septieme Colloque International de Droit Compare (1970). 84 Willis L. M. Reese, The Next Thirty Years ofForeign and Comparative Law: Am. J. Comp. L. 19 (1971) 615 and following articles on teaching comparative law, id. at 616-699. 77
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Germany, are optional both for the normal curriculum and at the postgraduate Ievel. 85 The situation is even more desperate in Latin American law schools, despite recommendations made in the Latin American conferences of law schools, organized by the Union of Latin American Universities. However, in Mexico I can observe, as of late, a relative improvement in this situation. 86 One ofthe causes that has limited the establishment of obligatory courses on the comparative legal method is related to the absence of adequate and modern didactic materials. This has produced two negative effects: first, a restriction on analysis, which is predominantly limited to the study of national and foreign legal legislation (primary norms in the terminology used by Merryman); and second, student resistance to take comparative law courses, which they consider exotic and hard to learn. A major exception to the general absence of teaching materials is the very important book designed to aid in teaching comparative law, Rene David's outstanding work entitled Les grands systemes de droit contemporains (9th ed. with Camille Jauffret-Spinosi 1988), which has been translated into severallanguages and adapted to teaching in many countries. Les grands systemes has been published in English, 87 German, 88 ltalian, 89 and Spanish 90 versions. The major comparative law reviews, some with a great tradition, are another important contribution to the field of comparative legal studies. I cite: Revue internationale de droit compare, which has appeared every four months since 1949 and is the continuation of the dassie Bulletin de Ia Societe de legislation comparee (1869-1948); International and Comparative Law Quarterly, since 1952, a continuation of another classic, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law (1896-1951); American Journal of Comparative Law, since 1952; Raheis Zeitschrift for ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, since 1927; Zeitschriftfor ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, since 1927; and in Spanish, Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, since 1968, a continuation of Boletin del Institutode Derecho Comparado de Mexico (founded in 1948 and published until 1967). 91 But even with all this information, there is still a Iack of materials that are accessible to and serve as an aid to students who seek to follow courses on comparative law at various teaching Ievels. Fix-Zarnudio, L'importance (supra n. 72) 144-146. Fix-Zarnudio, La docencia (supra n. 19) 147 -149; seeinfra text at nn. 102-107. 87 DavidjJohn E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (3d ed. 1985). 88 DavidjGünter Grasmann et al., Einführung in die großen Rechtssysteme der Gegenwart (2d ed. 1988). 89 David, I grandi sistemi giuridichi contemporanei (1967). 90 David, Losgrandes sistemas de derecho del mundo contemporaneo (1968). 91 Hector Fix-Zarnudio, Breves reflexions sur l'objet et Ia nature des Revues de Droit Compare (trans. by Monique Lions): Rev. int. dr. comp. 27 (1975) 85-96. 85
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IX. The Inßuence of John Henry Merryman's Modernizing Ideas As correctly pointed out by Mauro Cappelletti, who knows Merryman's work well, the propositions put forth by this outstanding North Americanjurist have crossed U.S. borders into Europe and Latin America in two important ways: first, by replacing dassie and purely legalist and dogmatic conceptions in the field of comparative legal studies; and second, through many of his pupils, some of whom worked directly under him at Stanford University. 92 Regarding the first point, Professor Merryman has made essential contributions to the methodological aspects of the so-called science of comparative law. We can point to his concept of a "legal tradition," which is indispensable to comprehend the many legal systems of our times. Of particular usefulness is the distinction he makes between a legal tradition and legal systems. The latter, as Merryman points out, are operative sets of institutions, procedures, and legal norms, and because ofthis they arediverse in nature. A legal tradition can be characterized as: a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature oflaw, about the roJe of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught. The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system into cultural perspective.
Merryman considers that there are three principallegal traditions: common law (Anglo-American); civillaw (Roman-canonic); and socialist law. 93 Another major idea for modernizing comparative legal studies espoused by Merryman (taken from the philosophy of science) isthat ofthe paradigm. This is considered as the set of attitudes or ideas that are the basis for and give shape and direction to the work of a community of scholars in a given field of knowledge at a particular moment. He uses this concept to point out that the Contineotal European scientific tradition, which sprang from the French Revolution and was consolidated with German legal studies during the second half of the nineteenth century, is an outdated paradigm. It seeks to carry out legal comparison mainly through the use of "primary" norms, that is, norms of a purely legislative and doctrinal nature. This paradigm should be replaced by one that also compares "secondary" norms. 94 To build this new paradigm, Merryman argues that a "legal system," as a specific aspect of any tradition, includes the societal and cultural elements related to law, comprising three dimensions: extension, penetration, and legal culture. These three notions, which are interrelated, form part of a set of external 92 93 94
Cappelletti (supra n. 1) 1081-1084. Merryman, Tradition 1f. Merryman, Fines 85-92; seesupra textat nn. 52-53.
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restrictive dimensions ofthelegal system that is the object of study. U nderstanding them gives us information on the context ofthelegal system itself, which is in turn composed of three other factors: legal institutions, actors, and processes. Only when these factors are taken into account is it possible to really understand a given legal system and to be in a position to carry out comparison with other systems, whether they be from the same tradition or from a different one, but always with an analysis that uses these dimensions and factors. 95 Mauro Cappelletti informs us about John Henry Merryman's disciples, several of whom took courses at Stanford University and currently occupy comparative law teaching positions in Europe, particularly in Italy, andin the United States. A partial list would include the names of such well-known comparative legal scholars as Cassese, Crespi-Reghessi, Rodota, Corapi, Oe Vita, Scaparone, Trocker, Varano, Vigoriti and the outstanding figure of Gino Gorla, andin the United States, Robert Bush, David Clark and Bryant Garth, all of them authors of comparative legal studies of great importance. 96 But I must also highlight Merryman's great interest in the understanding of Latin American legal systems, shown by the formation of a group of scholarsjurists and sociologists - from seven nations, directed by John Henry Merryman, who collaborated in a research project called SLADE (Studies in Law and Development). 97 The results of this project, which included several Latin Americans, were published in an excellent book containing materials that can serve as a solid basis for further comparative research. 98 His concem regarding Latin American legal systems can be seen in another work that is fundamental for the teaching of comparative law, drafted with the participation ofDavid S. Clark: Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systems, Cases and Materials. 99 Even though it is true that interest has risen in U.S. universities regarding the legal, political, and social institutions in Latin American nations, books with materials on these matters that will help in carrying out comparative studies are scarce. There are very few didactic books to aid in teaching. Among those available are the important compilations of materials, translated into English, by Professor Kenneth L. Karst, 100 and by Karst with the help of Professor Keith S. Rosenn. 101 Merryman, Modemizaci6n 78-85. Cappelletti (supra n. 1) 1083. 97 The scholars who participated were: Edmundo Fuenzalida Faivovich (Chile); Carlos Jose Gutierrez and Ricardo Harbottle (Costa Rica); Femando Rojas Hurtado (Colombia); Sabino Cassese and Stefano Rodotä (Italy); Lorenzo Zolezzi lbarcena (Peru); Jose Juan Toharia (Spain); and David S. Clark, Lawrence M. Friedman, and John Henry Merryman (U.S.A.). Two Mexicans- Miguel Wionczek and Maria Luisa Leal Dukparticipated in the beginning, but later withdrew. 98 John Henry Merryman I David S. Clark I Lawrence M. Friedman, Law and Social Change in Mediterranean Europe and Latin America (1979). 99 (1978). 95
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X. The Need to Update Comparative LegalStudiesand Teaching in the Mexican Legal System This brief examination of some aspects of John Henry Merryman's thinking leads me to reflect on the state of comparative legal research and studies in Mexico, which I earlier assessed over ten years ago. 102 On that occasion I pointed out that comparative law teaching had been limited almost exclusively to the Law School at the National Autonomous U niversity ofMexico (UNAM), and sporadically to some other Mexican higher education institutions. 103 Due to the extraordinary work done by the distinguished legal scholar Felipe Sanchez Roman, who founded the Mexican Institute of Comparative Law, a professorship for comparative law was established in 1940 as part of the licenciatura program at the National School of Jurisprudence at UNAM. Professor Sanchez Roman occupied this chair until1949, when he together with the Mexican Professors Agustin Garcia L6pez and Eduardo Trigueros taught the course on comparative law in the recently established doctorate program, which prompted the transformation of the school into the Law Faculty. 104 Since the licenciatura introductory coursein comparative law was optional, offered in the last semester of the study plan, it was withdrawn several years ago because it attracted very few students due to the difficulties already mentioned, including lack of pedagogical materials. At the graduate level the course was also introductory, where it was taught for a couple of years until cancelled in 1969. lt was recently reestablished in a more adequate fashion, that is, as a prerequisite without credit value that must be taken by those who aspire to complete graduate law studies. However, professors that teach the graduate course encounter difficulties in gathering materials, because even essential texts, such as the dassie book written by Rene David, in its Spanish versionLos grandes sistemas de derecho del mundo contemporimeo (Barcelona, 1968), has been out of print for several years. Fortunately, we can count on Professor Merryman's excellent book, La tradiciimjuridica romano canonica (Mexico, 1971), the Spanish version ofThe Civil Law Tradition, but there are very few copies remaining. Since an obligatory Latin American Legal Institutions, Problems for Comparative Study (1966). Law and Development in Latin America, A Casebook (1975). 102 Fix-Zamudio, Setenta y cinco aiios de evoluci6n del derecho comparado en Ia ciencia juridica mexicana, in: LXXV aiios de evoluci6n juridica en el mundo, Historiadel derecho y derecho comparado II (1977) 166- 179. 103 Occasionally Professor Walter Frisch taught an introductory coursein comparative law at the private Anähuac University School of Law in the Federal DistrieL 104 See Niceto Alcala-Zamora y Castil/o, Creaci6n del doctorado en derecho: Revista de Ia Escuela Nacional de Jurisprudencia no. 44 (1949) 235-315; id., Datos y antecedentes relativos a Ia implantaci6n en Mexico del doctorado en derecho: Revista de Ia Facultad de Derecho de Mexico (1959) 9-39; seeinfra textat nn. 105-107. 100 101
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course on comparative law has been taught for only a few years at the graduate Ievel in UNAM's Law Faculty, we still do not have a textbook with doctrinal commentaries, legislative texts, and foreign jurisprudence with which to carry out comparisons. We find a much more encouraging picture in the comparative research field, which is also almost entirely concentrated at UNAM. Research has developed more fully than teaching due to the creation in 1940 of the Mexican Institute of Comparative Law by the illustrios Spanish legal scholar Felipe Sanchez Roman. 105 In 1948 he, together with the outstandingjurist Joaquin Rodriguez y Rodriguez (who died prematurely}, founded the Boletin del Institutode Derecho Comparado de M exico, which was published uninterruptedly until 1967. 106 In 1968 it was replaced by the Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado as a result of the Institute's name change to Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas. 107 Research institutes do not report directly to their respective schools or faculties, but rather are organized in an autonomous fashion under the surveillance of two coordinating offices, one for science and the other for humanities. These are staffed by academic personnel, who have a duty to carry out teaching activities although most of their time is dedicated to research. 108 Even though the work carried out by the Legal Research Institute has not been oriented primarily toward comparative legal studies, as was its predecessor, it nonetheless has published three times a year since 1968 the Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado. This Boletin and the Institute's earlier Boletin published numerous studies of both Mexican and foreign legal scholars with a predominantly comparative focus. 109 Furthermore, the Institute itself participated in international congresses of comparative law through the Mexican Committee of Comparative Law, which began its academic activities in July 1953 under the auspices of the International Committee of Comparative Law. The national Committee has directly aligned itselfwith the Institute, so that its presidency is occupied by the director of the Institute. The Committee coordinated the participation of Mexican legal scholars in the international congresses of comparative law and published through the Institute several volumes of Mexican national reports, including: the Fifth in Brussels (1958); the Sixthin Harnburg (1966); the Seventh in Uppsala (1966); the Eighth in Peseara (1970); 105 Javier Elola, Venticinco aiios del Institutode Derecho Comparado de Mexico, in: XXV Aniversario del Institutode Derecho Comparado de Mexico, 1940-1965 (1965). 106 Inventario y balance del Boletin del Instituto de Derecho Comparado de Mexico durante sus primeros dieciocho aiios de vida: Bol. lnst. Mex. no. 53 (1965) 401-464. 107 Francisco Arturo Schroeder, Breve reseiia hist6rica del Instituto, in: XL Aniversario del lnstituto de Investigaciones Juridicas (1980) 9-18. 108 Ley Organica de Ia Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico art. 12; Estatuto General de Ia UNAM arts. 9, 51-54. 109 Fix-Zamudio, Setenta y cinco aiios (supra n. 102) 171-178; see supra text at 105107.
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the Ninth in Teheran (1974); the Tenth in Burlapest (1978); anrl the Eleventh in Caracas (1982). The Institute has publisherl numerous other works with a comparative focus, frequently referring to the Latin American area, especially in the fielrl of comparative constitutionallaw. 11° For instance, they publisherl two volumes of constitutional texts currently in force in Latin America, 111 a work necessary for comparative legal sturlies in the region. Prior compilations harl been renrlererl obsolete by the rlynamic legal anrl political changes of our times. The Institute has contributerl to the fielrl of methorlological issues encountererl by comparative legal science, such as the sturlies preparerl by Javier Elola, 112 Luis Recasens Siebes, 113 Fausto E. Rorlriguez Garcia, 114 Roberto Molina Pasquel, 115 anrl Hector Fix-Zamurlio. 116 The Institute anrl its prerlecessor also publisherl several translations on methorlological questions, written by foreign comparative law scholars. This task began with the publication ofthe Spanish version of a brief but dassie essay by Mario Sarfatti, Introduccion a/ estudio del derecho comparado (1945) anrl has continuerl with articles written by F. H. Lawson, 117 Konrarl Zweigert, 118 Giorgio Dei Vecchio, 119 Mario Sarfatti, 120 Angelo Piero Sereni, 121 Milton Katz, 122 Jaro Mayrla, 123 J.A. Jolowicz, 124 anrl two sturlies by John Henry Merrynian. 125 Id. at 175f. EI constitucionalismo en las postrimerlas del siglo XX. These volumes also include doctrinal studies. 112 EI estudio del derecho comparado, Instrumento de Ia unificaciön juridica internacional: Bol. Inst. Mex. no. 32 (1958) 19-33. 113 Nuevas perspectivas del derecho comparado: Revista de Ia Facultad de Derecho de Mexico no. 10 (1953) 227 -253; id., Los metodos de Ia investigaciön sociolögica en derecho comparado, in: Comunicaciones mexicanas al VIII Congreso Internadonai de Derecho Comparado (1971) 75-91. 114 Los principios generales del derecho y el derecho comparado, in: Comunicaciones mexicanas al VI Congreso Internacional de Derecho Comparado (1962) 15- 27; id., Notas en torno a Ia cientificidad del derecho comparado: Bol. Inst. Mex. no. 31 (1958) 71-82. 115 Veinticinco aiios de evoluciön del derecho comparado, 1940-1965: Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. no. 4 (1969) 57-68. 116 See supra nn. 25, 64, 72, 102. 117 EI campo del derecho comparado (trans. by Helena Perefia de Malagon): Bol. Inst. Mex. no. 9 (1950) 9-28. 118 EI derecho comparado al servicio de Ia unificaciön juridica: Bol. Inst. Mex. no. 25 (1956) 53- 65; id., EIderecho comparado como metodo universal de interpretaciön (trans. by Hector Perezamador): ibid. no. 31 (1958) 31-69. 119 Las bases del derecho comparado y los principios generales del derecho (trans. by Luis Dorantes Tamayo: Bol. Inst. Mex. no. 40 (1961) 29-36. 120 Losprimeros pasos del derecho comparado (trans. by M onique Lions Signoret): Bol. Inst. Mex. no. 40 (1961) 65-69. 121 Funciön y metodo del derecho comparado (trans. by Javier Elola): Bol. Inst. Mex. no. 41 (1961) 333-345. 110 111
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Notwithstanding these activities, greater emphasis needs tobe put on teaching in this field. lt is necessary to prepare compilations oflegislative, doctrinal, and jurisprudential materials following the model of those made by Mauro Cappellettil26 and John Henry Merryman. 127 lt is also necessary to augment empirical analysis in Mexico, which is useful for the study of the secondary norms referred to by Merryman to overcome the traditional tendency of concentrating comparisons primarily on legislative norms. Sociological sturlies are lacking both on Mexico and on foreign systems in the area of the judiciary and about the instruments available to solve legal conflicts. 128 lt would be highly convenient, for example, to replicate the judicial sociological analysis prepared on the Spanish legal system by Jose Juan Toharia. 129 In Mexico we have only one micro-comparative empirical study. lt examines the legal systems of the Federal District and the state of Nayarit, including an analysis of the habits, customs, and legal culture of the Indian communities. 130 Prepared by the Germanjurist and sociologist Volkmar Gessner, he analyzes through sociological techniques the use of procedures for the solution of legal conflicts in urban populations and in farm communities. 131
XI. Conclusions From these brief reflections I reach the following conclusions: 1. lt is convenient in this deserved homage to the distinguished comparative law scholar, John Henry Merryman, to summarize comparative law's principal concepts. This highlights his contributions made toward modernizing tra122 Perspectivas del derecho comparado en Mexico y Estados Unidos: Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. no. 4 (1969) 33-41. 123 Algunas reflexiones criticas sobre el derecho comparado contemporaneo: Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. no. 9 (1970) 637-666. 124 Reflexiones sobre el estudio comparado del derecho procesal (trans. by Francisco lose de Andrea S.): Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. no. 44 (1982) 503-527. 125 See supra n. 5. 126 Cappelletti/ Wil/iam Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law, Cases and Materials (1979). 127 Merrymanj Clark (supra textat n. 99). 128 See Hector Fix-Zamudio, Los problemas contemporaneos del poder judicial (1986); see supra text at nn. 52- 54. 129 EI juez espaiiol, Un analisis sociologico (1975). Toharia collaborated with Merryman on the SLADE project: seesupra n. 97. 130 Volkmar Gessner, EI derecho privado en Mexico, Investigaciones de caracter antropolögico y sociolögico sobre Ia realidad juridica (trans. by Hector Fix Fierro): Bol. Mex. Der. Comp. no. 43 (1982) 121-137. 131 Los conflictos sociales y Ia administracion de justicia en Mexico, trans. by Renate Marsiske (1984). Originally published as Recht und Konflikt, Eine soziologische Untersuchung privatrechtlicher Konflikte in Mexiko (1976).
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diti.onal comparative legal studies, which have concentrated on the comparison of legislative norms. 2. The discussion that occupied comparative legal scholars a few years ago on the nature of comparative legal studies has quieted. Even though some scholars consider these studies as part of a scientific discipline, others consider them as techniques or methods of analysis of normative systems. In reality these concepts are not incompatible since comparative law is a scientific discipline with a methodological nature. It examines the procedures through which it is feasible to obtain the best results from a comparison of two or morelegal orders. It thus assumes a functional or instrumental character. 3. One of the most cornplex issues concems the object or raw material used in cornparati.ve legal studies, since there exist several points of view regarding the subject matter appropriate for confrontation. Merryman maintains that the legal system should not be identified with the dassie concept of primary norms, asdefmed by the notabJe H.L.A. Hart. These norms are identified primarily with legislative precepts and their doctrinal cornmentaries, without paying attention to their political and sociolegal implications. This is dernonstrated by the existence of countries that are socially, politically, and economically very different but that, nevertheless, can have bodies of primary norms that are practically identical. 4. Our distinguished North American scholar has correctly sustained, that to carry outa real comparison between diverse legal orders, in addition to primary norms, one must understand secondary norms as weil. These encompass those societal and cultural elements that are specifically related to law, which should be contemp!ated through three basic and interrelated dimensions: extension, penetration, and legal culture. 5. Other contributions made by Professor Merryman include bis ideas on paradigms (taken from the philosophy of science) and on legal traditions. The first he understands to be a set of attitudes and ideas that constitute the base, form, and direction ofwork carried out by the community of academicians in a specific field of scientific knowledge. A legal tradition, alternatively, is a set of attitudes :tbat are deepiy rooted and historically conditioned regarding the nature of norm~ the role of law in society, the form of govemment, the appropriate organ.iz.ation and operation of a legal system, and the way law shmdd be crea:te:d, applied, studied, improved, and taught. With these two fundamental ideas Merryman points out that the dassie paradigm of comparative legal science, especially the one developed in Germany during the second half oftbe la.stcentury, is nowexhausted. Itshould be replaced by a new one in which lega1 familiesandlegal systems are the bases for oomparison, understood to include not only primary and secondary norms, but also the institutions, actors, proresses, and cesources of a legal nature.
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6. The fruitful concept oflegal traditions created by Merryrnan constitutes a major contribution that improves on the idea of legal families developed by Rene David. Merryman considers that there exist three great traditions, that of the common law, the civillaw, and the socialist law. 7. Merryman's innovative thought has also influenced comparative legal science in Mexico, since in addition to The Civil Law Tradition translated into Spanish and published in Mexico, the Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado published two ofhis articles in a collaboration with the Legal Research Institute at UNAM. 8. Comparative law education in Mexico is still at an incipient stagein regard to teaching. Until very recently courses on the comparative legal method were only sporadically taught at our law schools and law faculties, which even at UNAM were created as optional courses attracting a meager number of students. Lately a course on comparative law wasinstitutedas a prerequisite for graduate students at the UNAM Law Faculty. However, there still is no didactic compilation oflegislative texts, doctrinal opinions, andjudicial cases to serve as support for such a course, even though models have been prepared under the direction of Merryman and Mauro Cappelletti. 9. Comparative legal research is in a much more developed stage than teaching. lt is concentrated in the Legal Research Institute ofUNAM, founded as the Comparative Law Institute in 1940, first as a department of the Law Faculty and since 1948 as an autonomousentity. In 1948 the Boletin del Instituto de Derecho Comparado de Mexico began to appear regularly until1968, when it was replaced by the current Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado. Both journals have published numerous essays on national as well as foreign legal systems with a comparative focus. Several of them were dedicated to the examination ofthe method of comparative legal science. Furthermore, since the Fifth International Congress of Comparative Law held in Brussels in 1958, the Institute participated in all the congresses since then through the Mexican Committee of Comparative Law, which published volumes that contain the Mexican national reports sent to the congresses. 10. Comparative sturlies on secondary norms following Merryman's criterion regarding social, political, and cultural factors are just beginning in Mexico. An important example is the sociological micro-comparative study carried out by the Germanjurist and sociologist Volkmar Gessner. This focused on procedures for the solution oflegal conflicts in the legal systems ofthe Federal District and the state ofNayarit, and took into account the legal customs and culture ofthe Indian communities.
Some Thoughts on Comparative Legal Colture Lawrence M. Friedman* A collection of essays in honor of a distinguished comparativist is a good occasion to ask some searching questions about the enterprise of comparison. Exactly what is it that comparativists compare? Mostly, they compare formal legal materials: doctrines, rules, procedures, and institutions. A few brave and exceptional souls, venturing into uncharted territory, attempt something subtler and more difficult, the comparison oflegal cultures. This volume is dedicated to one of those brave souls.
I. Standard Comparative Law Standard comparative law has many virtues; in the hands of insightful scholars, it has produced extremely useful work. Legal systems are no Ionger isolated, if they ever were; more and more lawyers face problems of transnationallaw as part oftheir regular practice. This is especially true, perhaps, for lawyers in the EEC countries; but it is also a world-wide phenomenon. Transnational activity generates a need for cross-national comparison - for research and materials that aid the transnational lawyer. This is one task of comparative law, and one it does fairly well. Comparative law, in the traditional sense, is concerned, above all, with issues of translation, as it were. lt is a search for equivalences, or contrariwise, it is a "display of diversity." 1 lt has the virtues and the faults of a dictionary. A dictionary is an essential reference tool; but nobody can learn a foreign language, or grasp its essential genius, from a dictionary alone. A dictionary is basically lifeless; it shatters a language into thousands oftiny units, and destroys its overall coherence. The vital core of a language is not to be found in the dictionary, but in the mouths of real people, using a language in their daily lives. People who already know a language, more or less, and want to go further, will use a dictionary, especially when they face some practical need- translating a letter or a document, for example. Comparative law is similarly geared to practical goals. But from the Standpoint ofbasic research, or for understanding
* Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford University.
Wilbert E. MoorefJoyce Sterling, The Comparison of Legal Systems, A Critique: Quaderni fiorentini per Ia storia del pensiero giuridico moderno 14 (1985) 77. 1
4 Mell)'man Festschrift
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a legal system in its social setting, comparative law seems clearly inadequate. A living body oflaw is not a collection of doctrines, rules, terms, and phrases. lt is not a dictionary, but a culture; and it has to be approached as such. In comparative law, the basic units of analysis are (formal) legal rules and institutions. At least we know what these are, and how to get at them. To study legal systems as cultures is a more elusive quest, and requires more elusive units of analysis; the materials of study also become more problematic. I will illustrate the point by discussing the classification of legal systems.
II. Classification of Legal Systems Comparative law approaches the taxonomy oflegal systems in a Straightforward and workable way. It lumps systems together into "families" that, like human beings, trace their descent to some common ancestor. Common law systems are therefore related; they have a common ancestor, the English legal system. This makes Australia and Jamaica sisters or cousins or what-have-you. Similarly, the vast civillaw family falls together; it is made up of systems which have the "reception" ofRoman law as part oftheir heritage. 2 lt is possible to link Ecuador and Belgium as members of this group; Japan and Turkey have come into the family, by way of adoption. There are, tobe sure, systems that do not quite fit in- India and Israel; China; the Scandinavian countries; the Sodalist bloc. But the general approach is weil known; and has found general acceptance. This classification system is not free of values and assumptions; and it has consequences for comparative research. lt tends to assume that legal systems are, essentially, autonomous; otherwise, the notion that a country can adopt a new system, swallow it whole, so to speak, would make no sense. The question of autonomy (or relative autonomy) is a serious one, much discussed in the literature, 3 and we cannot do it justice here. In comparative perspective, this is more than a philosophical or jurisprudential quibble. lt relates directly to the issue of transfer or transplanting oflegal systems; and how officiallegal systems relate to their "mother" cultures. The idea of a "family" of legal systems also implies that the traits of a system cohere; that they are something more than a bag of isolated rules or institutions. Thus civillaw and common law have some inner nature or structure; they hang together and persist over time; their traits are deep-seated and fundamental, and they color everything about the legal system. Thus, the traditional mode of classifying legal systems contains within it a certain conflict or contradiction. At 2 lohn H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, An Introduction totheLegal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985). 3 Thereis a !arge literature. See, e.g., Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology ofLaw (1984) 8790; Richard Lempert f Joseph Sanders, An Invitation to Law and Social Science: Desert, Disputes, and Distribution (1986) 401-427.
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the same time, legal systems are seen as mere technologies, which can be exported, imported, "received" or rejected; and simultaneously, they are treated as tough, enduring entities, with character and definition. If this latter view makes sense at all, it is because it sees legal systems as in fact cultural systems. Comparativists do not deny this; but the culture they study or discuss is an internal culture, a lawyer's culture, ajurist's culture, not a general or social culture, or even the culture ofliving law. It is the broader sense of culture that casts doubt on the adequacy of comparison in traditional terms. The traits which anchor classification come out of technical, lawyerly branches of law. Nobody bases a classification on income tax regulations; or, forthat matter, on divorce law and practice. Taxonomists Iook for those bits of doctrine or habit that law schools stress, whether these matter much in the living law or in legal culture. The classification implies some cultural basis, but never delivers one, except in an internal sense; ifbased on culture at all, it is the marginal and arcane culture of lawyers in their formal training. Of course, there is a common law tradition; and it is important to know that lawyers (and lay people) in Minnesota or Barbados in some ways live and learn within this tradition. Certainly there are aspects of the law of Minnesota or Barbados that would be incomprehensible except in terms of the common law tradition. Similarly, ofthe civillaw tradition, and the members ofthis family. It is, however, easy to exaggerate the purely historical element in any legal system. Legal systems are not museums; they are tools, instruments, mechanisms; and those who use them are living people and living entities, grimly determined to float bonds, collect damages for auto accidents, merge with another company, avoid or minimize taxes, avoid or minimize prison, start or end a marriage, vindicate a reputation, go bankrupt, adopt a baby, or do any of the thousand things that people and institutions do by and through the law. Hence one has to begin with the functioning legal system; and whether the functioning legal system is "common law" or "civillaw," or something eise, is an empirical question, even ifwe assume this isarelevant and meaningful question. Hence we have to investigate or explore, not "traits," or formal membership in this or that system, but operational behavior and legal culture. Belgium and Englandare supposed to belong to different "families," and tobe fundamentally dissimilar in legal arrangements. In fact, how different are they? They may be actually quite close, in living law and living legal culture- closer, perhaps, than Belgium is to Zaire, which is supposed to be a near relative, or, forthat matter, Japan. To put the matter another way: suppose an English lawyer, in the 1980s, were to meet with a modern French lawyer, and at the sametime also with an English lawyer of 1600, magically come back to life. With which of these two could she talk and share notes more easily? She would have, I am sure, more in common with her friend from across the Channel, even though his country belongs to a different "family," than with the Elizabethan lawyer, who belongs to her own "family." 4*
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And why should this be true? lt is because the English and French lawyers have a Iot in common. They can talk about land use planning, the income tax, cartellaw, social security provisions, corporate mergers- all ofwhich would be quite mysterious to the older lawyer, whose own vocabulary and armamentarium of concepts the modern lawyer would find equally incomprehensible. There is nothing strange about the kinship between the two modern lawyers. France and England are parliamentary democracies and dose commercial neighbors: they share traits with each other, and with other welfare-regulatory states. They have an enormous amount of law in common, because they have so much socially in common; membership in different "families" makes no difference in these regards.
111. Comparative Legal Colture The conventional taxonomy fudges the question ofwhat is living and dead in a system; what is important and what is trivial. The fact that lawyers study something, or spend hours on it in dass, does not make what is studied central to living law. Comparative legal culture is interested primarily in living law. Conventional taxonomy ignores living law, and dodges, by and !arge, issues of legal pluralism. lt ignores everything but officiallaw. But it is frequently the case that many legal systems coexist within a single "jurisdiction." There are many examples of stubborn and persistent formal pluralism. Unrecognized pluralism is even more common. As examples, one might mention Nigeria in the colonial period (and colonial states in general), Eugen Ehrlich's dassie descriptions of "living law" in the Austro-Hungarian empire, 4 or Turkish villages after Ataturk stuffed European law down the throats of his citizens. There are other forms of pluralism that are even less obvious- for example the subtle pluralism of competing normative systems, as in Macaulay's famous description of the law-ways of Wisconsin businessmen. 5 The "penetration" of borrowed law, or of officiallaw- indeed, the impact of rules oflaw in general- cannot be taken for granted; it is an empirical question in every case. Traditional comparative law, however, turns a blind eye to everything but surfaces.
So far, we have been talking about the shortcomings of traditional comparative law. That critique, in a way, has been easy. lt is easy, too, to make a theoretical case for comparative legal culture. But the practical problems are enormous. To begin with, legal culture is a slippery term; it contains the weasel word, culture, which perhaps should be avoided, but is probably too deeply entrenched. In one sense, "culture" has a distinct anthropological flavor; a Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1936). Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, A Preliminary Study: Am. Soc. Rev. 28 (1963) 55. 4
5
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"culture" is a complex of behavior patterns, customs, and ways of life that cohere, that can be generalized and described in some meaningful way. Culture, then, is the glue that binds together discrete bits ofbehavior in some community or society. "Legal culture" is a related concept; it has been defined less in terms of behavior patterns than in terms of consciousness: the ideas, attitudes, values, and opinions about law, the legal system, and legal institutions in some given population. 6 At the risk of a certain amount of inconsistency, we can use "comparative legal culture" in a mixed sense, that is, as including both "culture" broadly, including behavior patterns, along with the notion ofthat specific consciousness which relates to law and the legal system. But in whatever sense or senses one uses these terms, they are difficult to pin down precisely; and they are extraordinarily difficult to measure. The centrality ofthelegal culture, in the legal system, is reasonably clear. We can revert here to our dictionary analogy. A dictionary is full of obsolete, archaic words, alternative forms, unused and common words, all jumbled together. Only the person who actually speaks the language is a safe guide to usage; some words sound rude, some sound excessively polite; some are too literary, or quaint; some strike the ear as slang. The dictionary gives some hints, but not enough. There is no substitute for a native speaker. Similarly, for legal systems: they are very different in reallife, from the way they appear in formal texts. Study oflegal culture must begin with the living law. Even studies of "internal" legal culture cannot ignore living law, since it is difficult to see how one can deal realistically with legal rhetoric, legallogic, legal reasoning, and the like, without knowing which of these are habits, traditions, internal artifacts; which are found only in law schools and the exercises ofjurists; which are impelled by inexorable practical needs. This is yet another reason to take the trendy emphasis on legal "autonomy" with a grain of salt. Legal "discourse" may be interesting, and worth some attention; but it can hardly matter much, if this subject is divorced from the issue of who talks to whom, and when, and who listens, and who cares, and what all the "discourse" means to the thoughts and actions of some part or all of some public. No doubt the renewed interest in the legal world and its internal habits comes about as a reaction, perhaps a justified reaction, to the excesses of legal realism. Carried to an extreme, the realist frame of mind disrnisses legal rules, ideas, and styles as sham and trumpery, as rationalization, as empty posturing. Research should focus on what the system does, not only what it says. The point is certainly valid, but perhaps overdone at times; if every part of a culture has meaning, then so too of the lawyer's precious corner. The true issue is one of scale, scope, extent, and significance. 6
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System, A Social Science Perspective (1975) 15f.
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Defining culture and legal culture are only the beginning, however. Standard comparative law at least knows where to look for its subject, and has a clear-cut idea of its units of analysis. Its materials are familiar, and its techniques useful to practitioners; these are tremendous advantages. If we drop the emphasis on formal rules and institutions, what do we replace them with? A nothing is no substitute for a definite something. In principle, one replaces the study of rules and institutions with the study of functions, social norms, and institutional behavior. Formal rules and institutions then become simply carriers or vessels to express these functions, norms, and behavior patterns. But all this is easier said than done. Functions are abstractions; nobody has ever seen one, felt one, smelled one. Social norms are underlying ideas and principles, within some society, about right and wrong behavior. They are equally invisible. They can be measured (more or less) by survey research, but this is hardly practical in most cases. Unlike formal rules, they arenot written down in some convenient code or book. They have to be inferred, in short. Hence any attempt to get at legal culture, let alone comparative legal culture, faces tremendous problems of method. Some scholars have tried to replace the classificatory tools of conventional comparative law with other measuring rods. 7 These attempts have been halting, tentative, and (frankly) not terribly successful, in the main. We can, of course, try to deduce social norms from legal norms. Social norms often coincide with legal norms; social norms about unlawful killing runparallel with norms against murder in the penal code. But this rough correspondence is hardly universal in complex systems. Legal pluralism is one reason (there are others). A society rnight have (for example) a strict rule in its code against polygamy, while an ethnic minority practices polygamy, in accordance with its own religious beliefs. Indeed, the study oflegal culture takes as an axiom the fact that two societies can have similar "legal systems" in some formal sense; and yet different systems in terms of living law or actual practice. Contrariwise, two systems can look quite different on paper; and yet coincide in practice. This axiom can be restated as follows: living legalsystemswill closely resemble each other, to the extent they are embedded in societies with sirnilar social structures, institutions, and (general) social codes, even though their legal systems stem from different traditions. The reverse is also true. Yet a comparativist who tries to travel this difficult road will often use formal law as evidence ofliving law, or of social norms, simply because that is all she can lay her hands on. The best evidence of legal culture would mix behavioral 7 See Adam Podgorecki, Social Systems and Legal Systems, Criteria for Classification, in: Legal Systems and Social Systems, ed. by Adam Podgorecki/ Christopher J. Whe/an( Dinesh Khosla (1985) 1; Samuel Krislov, The Concept ofFamilies ofLaw, ibid. 25; Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems ofthe World, An Introductory Guide to Classifications, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographical Resources, in: Law and the Social Sciences, ed. by Leon Lipson( Stanton Wheeler (1986) 11.
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indicators with careful surveys of attitudes. Most of us will have to settle for much less- for various make-shifts. If we stay inside the library, we have to learn to read between the lines oftegal texts. A few brave and well-funded souls will go out into the community and take a Iook at what is happening. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Eugen Ehrlich preached the study of living law; and practiced what he preached. He followed two strategies: first, rigorous examination of actuallegal documents- the contracts, wills, and mortgages in use in business life- and second, anthropological study of the legallife of the population. Ehrlich was a comparativist almost by necessity; he worked within the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, with its jumble and clutter of nationalities and folkways. Another tool of the comparativist is history. The historian is after all a comparativist by nature; her units of comparison arenot two or more societies in the present, but the "same" society at various points in the past, which means the society is not the same at all. The comparativist wants to measure and explain similarities and differences; the historian wants to measure and explain continuities and changes; the two themes are reducible to each other. The historical record, then, can illuminate the comparative enterprise. Still another tool is comparative sociology. Our postulateisthat differences and similarities in legal systems must be explained not in legal but in social terms. What happens in the larger society determines the shape and process oflaw. If so, then the materials of the larger society suggest hypotheses to account for legal culture and legal systems. This, however, is easier said than done. In the light ofthe enormous difficulties that stand in the way, it is no surprise that the Iiterature on comparative legal culture is a Iiterature of gaps and of hopes. Still, some notable attempts have been made that should not go unmentioned. Max Weber is part of the grand tradition; Weber's ideas and schemes have had great influence among law and society scholars, though not, unless I am badly mistaken, among comparativists. Nobody since Weber has been able to match his overpowering, perhaps stifling erudition; but there is a slowly growing literature; and even occasional attempts to compare whole systems, using legal culture and other variables. John Merryman's SLADE project was one of these ambitious attempts. 8
IV. A Concrete Example What would a study of comparative legal culture Iook like? And what would it accomplish? Comparative legal culture, like conventional comparative law, 8 John H. Merrymanf David S. Clark/ Lawrence M. Friedman, Law and Social Change in Mediterranean Europe and Latin America, A Handbook of Legaland Social Indicators for Comparative Study (1979) setsout some ofthe data gathered for the SLADE (Stanford Studies in Law and Development) project.
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searches for similarities and differences; but the basis of the search is located "outside" the legal system. Its findings, then, rarely coincide with the lines drawn between "families." These findings, however, have much greater explanatory power. Take, for example, a rather special trait of American law- the vast expansion oftort liability in modern times. Other legal systems seem much more reluctant to allow promiscuous use of lawsuits, or to award staggering damages, which occasionally happens in the American system. After the recent disaster in Bhopal, commentators repeatedly pointed out contrasts between American law and the law of India- it was generally agreed that if victims could gain the right to sue in the United States, their recoveries would be much, much higher. 9 Sturlies of jury behavior and legal doctrine in personal injury cases in England and Australia also show marked deviation from the American pattern. (All these countries are affiliated, more or less, with the common law.) Cultural determinants thus seem tobe crucial, even dominant in explaining these differences; just as legal differences between Westerncountries and Japan are supposed to be rooted in culture- in attitudes toward litigation and the use oflegal process in general. (Whether this is so isanother issue). To measure such differences and explain them is completely beyond the technical equipment of standard comparative law. On the other side, differences in style and outcome among modern legal systems may conceal fundamental similarities. For example, Western countries - and Japan as well - assume that victims of disaster will receive some form of compensation. How much, and in what manner: that varies considerably. In Europe, compensation is primarily a responsibility of central governments; welfare law has largely replaced tort law. In the United States, the courts and, very notably, private insurance schemes form what is in effect a diffuse, hydra-headed system of regulation and compensation; this private system supplements or substitutes for welfare provisions. In many cultures, however, assumptions of compensation, whether public or private, do not or did not hold. The assumptions would be invalid, for example, for early nineteenth century Europe; the state and the courts played little or no role in relief of suffering. Compensation systems in the East bloc are examples of still another pattern. 10 The term "culture" suggests, perhaps unfortunately, great toughness and persistence over time. In this regard it is not much of an improvement on traditional comparative law, which assumes enormous historical continuity, and at the sametime transferability oflegal systems with no loss ofpower to all sorts of exotic places. The actual facts of persistence and mutability, and of transfer, are more subtle and complex. Judicial review, for example, is supposed tobe 9 See Mare Galanter, When Legal Worlds Collide, Reflections on Bhopal, The Good Lawyer, and the American Law School: J. Legal Educ. 36 (1986) 292. 10 Inga Markovits, Pursuing One's Rights Under Socialism: Stan. L. Rev. 38 (1986) 689.
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distinctively American; in any event, foreign to the theory and practice of civil law countries- a matter of deep-rooted legal culture. Yet the institution spread quite remarkably following World War II; West Germany is a notable example, though ltaly, Japan, and a number of other countries can also be mentioned. 11 What is more remarkable is how well the institution "took" in some countries, despite its "alien" nature. The fact is, the connection between judicial review and the common law family was never very strong. England, the mother country, never had judicial review in the American sense; and still does without it. The relationship between judicial review and internallegal culture is easy to exaggerate. Judicial review, in its modern form, is related no doubt to aspects of American culture; but, arguably, the cultural traits that feed and nurture judicial review are now common to the whole Western world - individualism, rights-consciousness, and dissolution of traditional authority. 12 Thus, when the right historical moment comes, a nudge and a push are sufficient to establish judicial review even in "inhospitable" soils. The latest convert to the cause is Canada. I have said enough, I hope, to suggest the enormous complexities and difficulties, but also the promise, latent in careful study of comparative legal culture. The promise, to be sure, has not yet been fulfilled. When it is, scholars willlookback on John Merryman as one of the great pioneers.
11 12
Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (1971). Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice (1985).
Part li
Comparisons of Legal Systems
Springs, Creeks, and Groundwater in Nineteenth-Century German Roman-Law Jurisprudence with a Twentieth-Century Postscript Hans W. Baade*
I. Introduction In his commentary on the Praetorian Edict, Ulpian (d. 223 A.D.) said that one who pollutes another's weil by putting something into it is liable under the interdict against force or stealth to make restitution: "for percolating (live) water is tobe viewed as part of the land." 1 This apparent appurtenance (or accession) of groundwater to the land has drastic consequences for what we would now call water rights. As Pomponius put it: 2 If water which has its sources on your land bursts onto my land and you cut off those sources with the result that the water ceases to reach my land, you will not be considered to have acted with force, provided that no servitude was owed tomein this connection, nor will you be liable under the interdict against force or stealth.
The rule as to flowing water (aqua projluens) is quite different. The waters of perennial and quasi-perennial watercourses are public. 3 If such watercourses are navigable, they are also open to navigation by the generat public (including the reasonable use ofthe river banks for this purpose). 4 Riparian Iaudowners may not, in particular, obstruct navigability by diversions, works, and the like. 5
* Hugh Lamar Stone Professor of Civil Law, The University of Texas. The author is responsible for all translations herein, but there is a convenient English translation of the Roman-law sources: Eugene F. Ware, Roman Water Law, Translated from the Pandects of Justinian (1905), which despite its title includes the Code as weil as the Digests ( = Pandects). A more recent translation ofthe latter is The Digest of J ustinian, trans. by Alan Watson I-IV (1985). The most recent English translation ofthe Institutes is: Justinian's Institutes, trans. by Peter Birks/Grant McLeod (1987). Literature cited in abbreviated form: Hans W. Baade, The Historical Background of Texas Water Law- A Tribute to Jack Pope: St. Mary's L. J. 18 (1986) 1-98 (33). Additional abbreviations: BGHZ = Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen; BVerfGE = Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts; RGZ = Die Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts auf dem Gebiete des Zivilrechts; SeuffA = Seuffert's Archiv für Entscheidungen der obersten Gerichte in den deutschen Staaten. 1 Dig. 43, 24, 1, pr. 2 Dig. 39, 3, 21. 3 Dig. 43, 12, 1, 2 & 3. 4 Dig. 43, 14, pr. Navigation includes rafting: id.; Dig. 43, 12, 1, 14.
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The rules just summarized have been in effect for some two milennia wherever, and to the extent that, Roman law was applicable directly, as suppletory law, or as "written reason." Even in the present decade, the public right of navigation is being litigated in Roman-law terms by canoers against Scottish lairds and South African Boers. 6 In the United States, navigability is preempted by the judicially developed federal easement of navigation, 7 and in any event, Roman law is applicable only as suppletory law or (more probably) as "written reason" to Spanish and Mexican land grants in the Southwest. 8 The area of contest and the battle lines are therefore quite different. Landowners assert proprietary irrigation rights to waters claimed tobe "private," while the state seeks to regulate and to allocate the same waters because they are "public." One major facet in this contest has been the status of streams, creeks, and arroyos with well-defined banks and beds but non-perennial ("torrential") flows of water. At one extreme, it seems clear that the waters of a mighty but nonperennial stream (a river aestimatione circumcolentium even in classical Roman law 9 ) are public even ifits flow ceases regularly for substantial periods oftime. A dassie example is the Nazas, which rises in the Sierra Madre and furnishes much ofthe livelihood ofthe Laguna district in north-central Mexico, but which flows only in the rainy season and the snow melt. lt is the source of much Mexican water legislation and jurisprudence, 10 and no riparian landowner has seriously asserted exclusive proprietary rights to its flow. At the other extreme, few would dispute that the fortunate rancher or hacendado who managed to capture a major rainfall by a quickly erected earthen dam on his own land was the exclusive owner of the gift from heaven thus impounded. 11 The question remained, however, whether a landowner had Dig. 43, 13, 1, pr.; id. § 12. Burton's Trs. v. Scottish Sports Council, 1983 The Scots Law Times [= S.L.T.]418; Scammel v. Scottish Sports Council, 1983 S. L. T. 462; Transvaal Canoe Union v. Butgereit, 1986(4) The South African Law Reports [= S.A.L.R.] 207 (T.). The leading case in Scotland is Wills' Trustees v. Cairngorm Canoeing and Sailing School, Ltd., 1976 Session Cases [ = S.C.] (H.L.) 30. 7 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); cf. most recently Phillips Petroleum Company v. Mississippi, 108 S.Ct. 791 (1988). 8 See 1 Sala Mexicano 159 (1845), English translation quoted in Baade 33; seealso id. 31-33. 9 Dig. 43, 12, 1, 1. 10 See Clifton B. Kroeber, Man, Land, and Water, Mexico's Farmland Irrigation Policies, 1885-1911 (1983) 91-110, 195-217; Meyers, Politics, Vested Rights, and Economic Growth in Porfirian Mexico: The Company Tlahualilo in the Comarce Laguna, 1885-1911: Hisp. Am. Hist. Rev. 57 (1977) 425. 11 Although rain waters belonged to "all creatures on earth" and could be appropriated by everyone (Part. 3, 28, 3), it was established Spanish jurisprudence that the proprietors ofupper estates could impound and appropriate "their" rainfall before it drained to lower estates. Herrero v. Herrero, 1860 Decisiones del Tribunal de Justicia 597, 598f. For Mexico, see e.g., A. Molina Enriquez, quoted in Baade 74f. 5
6
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the same right as to the waters of a non-perennia] creek or arroyo flowing through his property during the rainy season in a wel1-defined bed that also entered, traversed, or bounded upon the properties of others. Since there is little doubt as to the proper solution in terms of common sense, this question presented few difficulties where (as in South Africa) Roman law was a living corpus of "common" law capable of judicial improvement, and where, in any event, no constitutional ossifications of "vested" property rights obstructed legislative intervention if necessary. As e1oquent1y stated by Chief Justice Innes in Van Niekerk & Union Gov't (Minister of Lands) v. CarterY The elasticity of the civil and the Roman-Dutch systems has enabled South African Courts to develop our law ofwater rights along lines specially suited to the requirements ofthe country. The result has been a body ofjudicial decisions, which, though eminently favourable to our local circumstances, could hardly be reconciled in its entirety with the law either of Holland or of Rome. To take a point bearing upon the present inquirythe definition of a public stream has been extended far beyond its original Iimits. And the Legislature hasset its seal upon the work of the Courts. Every stream is now public, the water of which is capable of being applied to common riparian use, no matter how frequently it may run dry. The union, therefore, though practically without navigable rivers, is covered with a network of public streams, the majority of quite smaii size.
In Texas, however, such judicial creativity and legislative intervention were not feasible. Spanish and Mexican land grants and water rights, as defined by the law of the appropriate sovereign at the time of the grant, are vested property rights. Texascourts cannot, at this late stage, undertake to "develop" a system of law that has been preserved in amber, as it were, for the limited purpose of adjudicating historical land titles. lt was necessary, therefore, to determine whether the owners of Spanish or Mexican land grants had a vested property right in and to the waters of non-perennial streams rising in or traversing their Iands under Spanish or Mexican law in force at the time of the original grant. This questionwas overshadowed to some extent by prior authority. McCurdy v. Morgan, 13 applying classical Roman law in the absence of any more directly relevant rules of Spanish or Mexican law, 14 had held that the bed of a nonperennial (torrential) creek was private, and had passed with a grant of the surrounding land. A few years later, it was decided in Valmont 15 that riparians of the Rio Grande had no implied irrigation water rights because, under the law of the Indies as applicable in New Spain, all water rights had to derive from an express grant of the sovereign. Since the Rio Grande was a public river (and a 1917 A.D. 359, 377 (South Africa). 265 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1954), writ refd. 14 The court had before it opinions on Roman Iaw by Professors F. Sanchez Roman and Roman Martinez Lopez. See Baade 66, 66 n. 358. 15 State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1961), opinion adopted, 355 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.Sup. 1962). 12 13
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navigable one) at the times material, this decision was, however, also compatible with Roman-law authority. 16 In the Medina River Adjudication, 17 finally, it had tobe decided whether the owner of a Mexican land grant could impound the waters of a non-perennial creek that traversed his land. The portion of the creek bed encompassed by the grant had clearly passed with the grantunder McCurdy, but ifthe pertinent law of the lndies had been summarized correctly in Valmont, 18 there could be no right to the waters flowing in that bed without an express grant to that effect. Happy to relate, the Supreme Court of Texas unanimously decided to follow Valmont, with the result that Spanish and Mexican land grants in Texas now quite generally carry only express water rights, but not implied ones. 19 lt is thus no Ionger open to question that even torrential flows in a welldefined bed of a Texas stream, creek, or arroyo are public, and subject to state administration and allocation. We might note, in passing, that the same rule prevails wherever there is a manifest need for rationing a limited supply of irrigation water furnished in good part by non-perennial streams, creeks, or arroyos dependent on seasonal snow melts or rainfalls: for instance, in Spain, in Mexico, and in South Africa. 20 As Andres Molina Enriques put it in a dassie passage quoted with approval by the Supreme Court ofTexas, "the accession of the waters of a creek to the land in which it rises or to the Iands through which it passes, is an absurdity rejected by common sense." 21
There remains, however, one question of considerable practical current significance, which is not as yet concluded by contemporary civil-law authority. At what stage do the waters of aspring become public, and no Ionger subject to the exclusive appropriation of the landowner on whose property the spring rises? Portio enim agri videtur aqua viva, says Ulpian, and there is ground for contending that in theIndies as well,fuentes and manantiales passed with grants of the surface estate "como partes y como frutos." 22 Nevertheless, just as the 16 Baade 71. No water could be drawn from navigable rivers so as to endanger their navigability: Dig. 43, 12, 1, 15. 17 Medina River Adjudication = In re Adjudication ofWater Rights in the Medina River Watershed of the San Antonio River Basin, 670 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Sup. 1980). 18 See supra text at nn. 13-16. 19 See Baade 72-75. The present author served asthelegal expert ofthe State ofTexas in that Iitigation. A summary of our opinion is given in 645 S.W.2d 596, 612f. (Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 670 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Sup. 1984). 20 Spanish Water Law of19 June 1879, art. 4(2); Mexican Federal Water Law of30 Dec. 1971, art. 5 VI inconjunction with art. 4 II; South African Water Actof12June 1956, art.1 ("public stream" and "public water"). As to prior South African law, seesupra text and quotation at n. 12. 21 Medina River Adjudication (supra n. 17) 254. Foramore extensive quotationofthat passagein English translation, and for further references, see Baade 74f. 22 Dig. 43, 24, 1, pr.; D. Lassode Ia Vega, Reglamento General de las medidas de las aguas (1761), in: Ordenanzas de Tierras y Aguas, ed. by Mariano Galvan (2d ed. 1844) 155,
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lifeblood of springs, so to speak, is groundwater, springs are, in turn, the lifeblood of perennial rivers. At some stage, surely, their waters become public by forming, or entering into, a well-defined bed of a stream, creek, or arroyo, or by commingling with its waters. More or less by accident, the present author has chanced to come across a series of nineteenth-century German water law cases relevant to this issue. 23 All of these were decided by application of modern Roman law (usus modernus pandectarum) prevailing in much of Germany at the time. Reflecting the values and needs of times past but still remembered, these decisions stand in marked contrast to a 1981 judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court upholding the constitutionality of a comprehensive water management system based on compulsory licensing in the public interest. 24 It is hoped that a summary of the nineteenth-century decisions, followed by a discussion ofthat judgment, will shed some light on a question of considerable importance in the southwestern United States.
II. The Nineteenth-Century Decisions A. Source and Scope
The following account is based on sixteen water law cases appearing in the first fifty-two volumes of Seuffert's Archiv, and on five such cases in the first thirty-six volumes of official reports of the Supreme Court of Germany in civil cases. The inclusive dates ofthese decisions (May 5, 1840 to October 10, 1895) correspond almost exactly to the golden age of German Pandektistik. 25 Water law controversies appear to have been litigated in all parts of Germany, from Holstein to Bavaria and from Hessen-Nassauto Saxony, but the three Hessian principalities are most heavily represented. 26 Reporting is frequently terse and abstract, and sometimes in oblique narration. Nevertheless, a number of decisions (especially those of the Darmstadt Court of Appeals 27 ) contain detailed statements of facts, including - refreshingly - the names of the 158, 158 n. 6. Note, however, that the distinction between private and public waters was not recognized in the Indies, so that percolating waters, too, passed only by express royal grant. Medina River Adjudication (supra n. 17) 253. 23 Some of the decisions tobe discussed herein were cited in E. Vogt, Die Rechte der Eigentümer von Quellen gegenüber von Staaten und Privaten (1872), a litigious consultation by a Berne professor found in the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History in Frankfurt. 24 58 BVerfGE 300 (1981), discussed infratextat nn. 149-167. 25 F or Pandektistik, seeinfra textat nn. 102-127. Seuffert's Archiv für Entscheidungen der obersten Gerichte der deutschen Staaten ( = SeuffA) commenced publication in 1847. 26 Theseare Hessen-Darmstadt, Hessen-Kassel, and Nassau. 27 See, e.g., infra text at nn. 29-30. 5 Merryman Festschrift
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parties. All ofthe decisions here discussed are based on Roman law, frequently quoting in the original from Justinian's Institutes, Digests, and Code. 28 B. Goiding Principles: Public and Private Waters
The ground rules as to public and private waters are weil stated by the Darmstadt Court of Appeals in Oberkainsbach v. Court of Erbach-Erbach: 29 It is the constant jurisprudence of this Court that under Roman law, all water permanently flowing in a bed between banks (aqua profluens et perennis) is ajlumen pub/icum. There is no difference in law, but only one offact, between !arger and smaller rivers (streams and creeks). Nobody can acquire private ownership in public rivers, as these areresquasi usui publico designatae and, in any event, there can be in the nature of things no ownership offlowing water. German law is substantially in accord with these principles of Roman law.
As to private waters, the court went on to say: 30 Private waters are ponds, wells, and springs. The waters caught in these are capable of genuine private ownership, which vests in the landowner. Rights ofthird parties in such waters are genuine servitudes.
Thus, under modern Roman law, all waters flowing perennially between banks in defined beds were classified, on the one hand, as "public" and incapable of private ownership, irrespective of the size or the navigability of the watercourse. Ponds, wells, and springs, on the other hand, were "private" and the ownership of their waters went with the land. No distinction was drawn between "still" waters in wells and percolating waters in springs, 31 and all courts accepted the Roman-law rule that springs were part of the surface estate. 32 Rain waters, too, were regarded as private, and reducible to ownership and consumption wherever they feil and could be impounded. 33 The reported cases, however, concerned almost exclusively the overflow of springs. C. Servitudes
As mentioned in the Erbach-Erbach case, third parties (typically neighbors) could have rights in or to the waters of springs by virtue of "genuine servitudes." 34 The choice of terms was deliberate, and designed to prevent 28 There are no citations to the Novellae Constitutiones. The more important references are reproduced infra in the footnotes. 29 18 SeuffA 13, 13f. (1864). 30 Id. at 14. 31 E.g., 2 SeuffA 8 (Dresden, 27 Aug. 1845). 32 See, e.g., 34 SeuffA 140, 140 (Bavaria, 18 May 1878); 12 RGZ 183 (1883), quoted infra at n. 133. 33 E.g., Verdenhalven v. Hermeling, 10 SeuffA 377 (Celle 1841). 34 Quoted supra text at n. 30.
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confusion with a "natural" servitude literally flowing in the other direction: the "right of the superior proprietor to throw natural water on the lower land." 35 As explained by Lord Dunedin in Gibbons v. Lefenstey et al.: 36 Where two contiguous fields, one ofwhich stands upon higher ground than the other, belong to different proprietors, nature itself may be said to constitute a servitude on the inferior tenement, by which it is obliged to receive the water which falls from the superior. Ifthe water, which would otherwise fall from the higher grounds insensibly, without hurting the inferior tenement, should be collected into one body by the owner of the superior in the natural use ofhis property for draining or otherwise improving it, the owner of the inferior is, without the positive constitution of any servitude, bound to receive that body of water on his property.
This "natural" servitude of Roman law was routinely enforced in nineteenthcentury Germany.37 A legal (or "genuine") entitlement of a lower property to the flow (or overflow) of a springthat rose on higher ground in different ownership was, however, an entirely different matter. First, the upper proprietor could impound and consume the waters of "his" springs in whole or in part. 38 Second, he could Iet their waters (or their surplus waters) drain naturally or in a drainage ditch to lower ground. Third, he could (presumably) vary impounding and consumption. In the absence of an express contractual undertaking, 39 a lower proprietor could therefore lay claim to the waters of a spring rising on higher ground in different ownership only through a form of acquisitive prescription, aptly termed by the Darmstadtcourt as a "genuine" servitude. 40 The reported decisions were in conflict as to the prerequisites for such servitudes. An early decision of the Kassel Court of Appeals took the position that even the unimpeded flow of rain water from an upper property to a lower one was "insufficient for the establishment of a right to the further continuance thereof." What was required, the court went on to say, was a further indication that the status quo was in the nature of"legal possession" and had the "character of the exercise of a right." The mere channeling of water to the lower property through a ditch or furrow was held not to be sufficient for that purpose. 41 Five years later, the Dresden Court of Appeals declined to adopt this narrow approach with respect to spring waters. The court accepted the "basic principle" 35 Gibbons v. Lefenstey et al., [1915] Law Journal Reports [= L.J.R.] (P.C.) 158, 160 (applying Guernsey law). 36 Id. at 160. 37 10 SeufTA 375 (Kassel, 8 Jan. 1855), citing Dig. 39, 3, 1, 22 and Dig. 39, 3, 2; 17 RGZ 119, 120 (1888). 38 E.g., 21 SeufTA 22 (Stuttgart, 31 Jan. 1865). 39 One such undertaking was at issue in König v. Viilage of Wolfenborn, 23 SeuffA 328 (Darmstadt, 13 July 1869), discussed infratextat nn. 81-86. 40 Oberkainsbach (supra n. 29) quoted supra text at n. 30. 41 1 SeufTA 8 (Kassel, 2 May 1840). 5*
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that the "simple, unregulated flow of spring water in accordance with local topography, without defined banks and bed" was incapable of impairing the proprietary rights of the spring owner. 42 Nevertheless, it went on to say: 43 If, however, the spring water rising on a private estate has flowed for a long time in artificial channels or at least in a defined ditch formed gradually by the force of the water and between and through the properties of other landowners and has been used by these to a greater or a lesser extent, it is tobe assumed that the uniform observance of this situation gave expansion to the intentions of all interested parties, so that the status quo itself now forms a rule oflaw which cannot be varied by the owner ofthe source to the disadvantage of the riparians.
Still another ten years later, the Dresden court characterized this holding as expressing a view "followed and adhered to many times in its judgments," adding, however, that the exclusive right ofthe spring owner to dispose ofthe spring waters as he wished was only lost "if the water has flowed regularly in an artificial or a natural ditch or bed through the properties of other owners during the prescriptive period, and is used by these to a greater or a lesser extent. " 44 Thus, while it was generally accepted that lower riparians might acquire prescriptive rights in the continued flow of springs rising on an upper estate, there was controversy as to the prerequisites of acquisitive prescription in waterflows originating in private sources. In the Kingdom of Saxony, we have seen, it was conclusively presumed that a tacit contractual servitude had been concluded by the spring owner and the lower riparians whenever the water had flowed in a natural bed or in a ditch from the upper estate, and had been used in the lower estates, for the prescriptive period. 45 This presumption (or perhaps more accurately: this fiction) was expressly rejected by the Supreme Tribunal of Württemberg. That court took the view that a landowner who had for a considerable time abstained from using up all of the waters of his spring "certainly did not thereby necessarily declare his intention to grant the riparians a perpetual right to the overflow." 46 The Stuttgart tribunal went on to hold that lower riparians only had a prescriptive right ifthey had quasi possession 47 for the prescriptive period. This required, on the part ofthe lower riparian, either affirmative acts on the servient 2 SeuffA 8, 9 (Dresden, 27 Aug. 1845). Id. at 9. 44 10 SeuffA 328 (Dresden, 26 Apr. 1855). 45 Supra text at n. 44. 46 22 SeuffA 16, 17 (Stuttgart, 26 Oct. 1855), with citation toDresden (supra n. 42) 9. 47 The Roman-law authorities for this requirement are Dig. 8, 5, 10, pr. and Dig. 41, 3, 25. See also Jordaan v. Winkelman & Colonial Government, 9 Buch. 79, 86 (Cape Colony 1879), where Chief Justice de Villiers said that under Cape Colony law, "such a negative servitude cannot be acquired by prescription, unless there has intervened some act by which the person claiming it has asserted it, and the opposing party has yielded to that assertion." 42 43
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estate itself (the installation, cleaning, or maintenance of water ducts by the lower proprietor), or the successful vindication of a claim to the continued flow ofwater, for the prescriptive period. 48 It would appear that outside of Saxony, the affirmative assertion of quasi possession by lower riparians to the actual detriment of the upper estate was generally regarded as a prerequisite for the establishment of servitudes to the flow or overflow of spring waters in natural beds. 49 As to spring waters flowing to and through lower riparian land in man-made channels or ditches, however, there was protracted controversy. In the early case of Verdenhalven v. Hermeling, 50 the court found as a fact that rain and spring waters impounded in a pond on the appellant's premises had been led by him into a ditch that supplied the flow for the plaintiffs mills. The trial court put the plaintiff mill operator to his proof of servitude by immemorial custom. In reversing this decision, the Celle Court of Appeals emphasized the defendant's rights of ownership of the waters impounded on his property, and regarded his conduct (the draining ofhis own land) "merely as a discretionary act for his own benefit." Such an act, it held, was not sufficient under Roman law to give rise to a servitude even by immemorial prescription. 51 Some two decades later, the Darmstadt Court of Appeals faced substantially the same facts. In Schaefer v. Fisc of Hessen-Darmstadt, it held that the owner of spring waters, which "had been led since times immemorial by a drainage ditch to the property of others," could not interfere with the future flow of these waters. 52 Relying on its own reading of the same Roman-law sources, the court ruled that the leading of waters in a particular direction and for the benefit of specific estates for times immemorial gave rise to a servitude without need of proof of the requisites of acquisitive prescription 53 (that is, without proof of quasi possession through acts detrimental to the spring owner's estate). 54 Still another two decades thereafter, in 1886, the Supreme Court of Germany brought this matter to a Solomonic conclusion. After reviewing prior jurisStuttgart (supra n. 46) 18. Cf. Müller, Spiess et al. v. Königstein Municipality, 10 SeuffA 49 (Wiesbaden 1849), bolding tbat wbile tbe act of cleaning tbe springs on tbe upper estate was sufficient to establisb quasi possession, no preliminary injunction would issue pending resolution oftbe substantive controversy wbere tbe defendant municipality bad already made major investments in its water system. 50 10 SeuffA 377 (Celle, 27 Aug. 1841). 51 Id. at 378. In Holleüfer v. Hartmann (Celle, 9 Apr. 1842), noted in Celle (supra n. 50) 378 f., tbe same court upbeld a lower-court decision permitting defendant to prove tbat be and bis predecessors bad led a ditcb from bis mill to tbe waters accumulating on tbe plaintiff's estate. 52 19 SeuffA 185, 191 f. (Darmstadt, 10 Sept. 1861). 53 Id. at 192. Tbe Roman-law sources relied on were Code 3, 34, 7 (Diocletian & Maximian, 286 A.D.) and Dig. 43, 20, 3, 4. 54 See supra textat nn. 47-48 and n. 47. 48
49
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prudence, tbe Roman-law sources, and learned comment, tbe Court conceded tbat lower riparians migbt, und er "pure" Roman law, bave acquired rigbts to tbe continued flow of spring waters in artificial cbannels by use for times immemorial. 55 "Contemporary common law," bowever, was beld to be different: Influenced by canon law, Germanie law, and legislation of tbe German Empire, Roman law as applied in nineteentb-century Germany followed tbe rule tbat "circumstances which manifest tbemselves as tbe exercise of rigbts" were an essential element of acquisitive prescription, tbrougb use for times immemorial. 56 In tbe end, lower riparians of artificial spring-fed watercourses acquired no higber rigbts to tbese waters tban did tbe riparians of natural springred runoffs: Botb could impress servitudes on tbe spring owner only tbrougb acts of quasi possession. 57 D. Riparian Rights to Public Waters
Tbus, outside of Saxony, a lower riparian irrigator or mill operator bad a legally protected interest in tbe continued flow of tbe waters of private springs only ifbe was able to impose a servitude on tbese waters by contract, or by quasi possession at source for tbe prescriptive period. Since contractual servitudes were costly, 58 and legal servitudes difficult to prove, tbere was a natural incentive to claim water flows not by reliance on special title, but by assertion of rigbt in public waters. In tbe cases bere discussed, tbe continued and undiminisbed flow of creek waters was claimed typically by downstream mill operators. In a country with (usually) ample or even over-abundant rainfall, this is not surprising. Our survey includes, bowever, one prominent decision on tbe rigbts of lower as against upper riparian irrigators under modern Roman law prevailing in late nineteentb-century Germany. In 1883, tbe Supreme Court bad to decide tbe question wbetber (as put by tbe beadnote) "tbe lower riparian is entitled to demand tbat tbe upper riparian return tbe waters not used up by him to tbe stream or creek." 59 Tbe facts were as follows: Tbe defendant was tbe upper riparian of tbe Krumbeck, a creek in eastern Holstein. He bad used creek waters to irrigate bis meadow, leading tbe return flow back to tbe creek. He subsequently cbanged tbe course of drainage, so tbat tbe surplus waters were no Ionger returned, but flowed into anotber 17 RGZ 119,121-123 (1887). Id. at 123. 57 Id. at 120, 123. 58 In König v. Viilage of Wolfenborn (supra n. 39), discussed infra at nn. 81-86, such a servitude had been purchased by the appellant mill Operator for 10,000 florin. 59 8 RGZ 134 (1883), also reported in excerpt in 38 SeufTA 389 with the headnote: "May the upper riparian completely use up the irrigation waters?" 55
56
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watershed. The plaintiff was a lower riparian who had formerly used the defendant's retum flow to water his own meadow. He now sought an order directing the defendant to "retum the water diverted by him from his meadow ... to the Krumbeck before that creek touches the bank of anyone else's property. " 60 The Supreme Court proceeded from the premise that under Roman law the waters of streams and creeks were res cummunis irrespective of navigability and that riparians of creeksbad the same water rights as riparians of streams. 61 After referring to various authorities reproduced in Justinian's Digests and Code, 62 the Court concluded that "every upper riparian may exercise his right to divert and to use the water only subject to safeguarding the same right of the lower riparian. " 63 From this, it followed that upper riparians did not acquire absolute property in, and an unlimited power to dispose of, waters diverted by them: "Otherwise, there would be no usufructuary right of lower riparians, but the higher riparian could decide freely whether to deprive them entirely ofthe use of the waters, even by altering the natural course of the stream." The Court accordingly decided that "subject to special acquired rights, the upper riparian must, in view of his lirnited usufruct, and in the interest of the lower riparian, retum the unused water diverted by him to the stream or creek. " 64 The rule thus announced was fortified by reference to the majority of authors on water law (including Roman as weil as Germanie law), by a line of decisions of former German courts oflast resort, and by legislation in the most important German states. 65 As indicated by the Supreme Court's qualifying reference to "special acquired rights," the (in American terms) rights of "reasonable use" of riparians 66 were, however, subject to displacement or modification by individualized entitlements of greater priority. Chief among thesewas the so-called Mühlengerechtigkeit. A decision ofthe Prussian Supreme Tribunal defined this as "the right, acquired by grant from the state or by immemorial possession, to a specific water flow power for motive mechanisms" (mills). 67 It emanated from the sovereign's overlord-
60 8 RGZ 134f., 140. In prior proceedings not presently before the Court, the plaintiff had failed to establish a servitude in his favor as to the waters ofthe Krumbeck. Id. at 135. 61 Id. at 137f. 62 The Court quoted Dig. 43, 13, 5, 4; Dig. 43, 13, 1, 3. It cited Dig. 39, 3, 1, 4; Dig. 43, 12, 1, 12; Code 3, 35, 2; Code 3, 34, 7; Code 11, 42, 4. 63 8 RGZ 138. This rule was stated to be common to Germanie and to Roman law. 64 8 RGZ 138f. 65 Id. at 139f., 139 nn. 1 & 2. 66 See, e.g., Powell on Real Property, ed. by Patrick J. Rohan V (1987) § 709[2]. 67 Esch v. City ofWiesbaden, 34 SeufTA 392 (Prussian Supreme Tribunal, 28 Nov. 1878). That tribunalwas abolished shortly thereafter through the reorganization of the Germany judiciary.
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ship (or rega/ium 68 ) in public waterways, which was superimposed by the early modern territorial state on pre-existing rights of public use. 69 As explained by the Prussian Supreme Tribunal, the Müh/engerechtigkeit, being a subspecies of the sovereign's overlordship, could extend "only as far as the State's own water regalium." In Nassau (where the controversy arose) andin other states, it attached "only to the flowing public waters (rivers and creeks) but not to springs or to diversions thereof on land where they rise. " 70 In other words, even a duly licensed mill owner, who found hirnself threatened with the loss of a water flow sufficient to operate his mill, had to establish the public nature of the flow at the point of upstream diversion. On a public watercourse, the motive water flow required for the operation of a regalian mill could not be diminished by subsequent upstream diversions. 71 For eminently practical reasons, then, Roman-law based German water jurisprudence in the second half of the nineteenth century was largely a reflection of the struggle between millers asserting ancient privilege to public watercourses, and upstream diverters relying on private rights to headwaters and tributary flows rising on their estates. In the following, a few of these cases will be described in somewhat greater detail.
111. The Millers Go to Court A. Four Cases
Our survey may start conveniently with Esch v. City of Wiesbaden, which has already been mentioned in connection with milling rega/ia. 72 The plaintiffs mill was powered by the flow of the Truttenbach, a spring-fed creek. That flow had been diminished when the defendant city tapped the spring waters by opening "water galleries" on municipal property. (Apparently, the spring rose on Iands not belonging to the city and the tapping was subterraneous.) The Prussian Supreme Tribunal held that under the "common law" (that is, modern Roman law) prevailing in Nassau, springs were portio agri and as such subject to the free disposal ofthe landowner. However, again under Roptan law, ownership ofthe surface estate included the right to search for, and to open, new wells even if these tapped neighboring water veins. 73 Since, as already mentioned, Esch's Mühlengerechtigkeit extended only to public waters, 74 he 68 For general historical background, see H. R. Hahlo, The Great South-West African Diamond Case, A Discourse: South African Law Journal 76 (1959) 151-186 (163 -166). 69 See D. Werkmüller, Mühle, Mühlenrecht, in: Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, ed. by Adalbert Er/er I Ekkehard Kaufmann III (1984) 716-722 (717). 70 Prussian Supreme Tribunal (supra n. 67) 392. 71 See also 18 RGZ 256 (1887), discussed infra text at nn. 130-131. 72 Supra n. 67 and accompanying text. 73 Prussian Supreme Tribunal (supra n. 67) 396, citing Dig. 43, 24, 11[1], pr.; Dig. 39, 3, 1, 12; Dig. 39, 2, 26[24], 12. See infra n. 173.
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could not complain of defendant's tapping, on its own lands, springs rising on higher ground. His milling privilege extended only to "the waters actually flowing in the creek bed." 75 The same reasoning appears in Schaefer v. Fisc of Hessen-Darmstadt, discussed above in connection with servitudes by custom immemorial. 76 The plaintiffs operated their mills on the Göhringerbach, a perennial creek flowing along the defendant's meadow. There was a pond on that meadow, which contained several springs. The waters of the pond, and those of some other springs, were led through a ditch into a swamp, and flowed from the swamp into the creek through another man-made ditch. The defendant Grand Dutchy now made some new installations on the meadow that (presumably by diverting the waters of the pond) diminished the flow of swamp drainage into the Göhringerbach. The plaintiffs contended that the waters collecting in the defendant's meadow "legally appertained to" the creek, which was concededly a public one. 77 The Darmstadt Court of Appeals rejected this argument. lt drew a sharp distinction between "spring waters impounded on the estate of the owner of the spring, and waters that flow permanently in their free and natural course through one or more properties." Under Roman law, waters in the former category belonged to the spring owner who had reduced them to possession by impounding. Hence the waters in the pond, 78 as well as those in the swamp, were fiscal (private) property of the Grand Dutchy. 79 As already mentioned, however, the plaintiffs were given leave to establish a servitude by custom immemorial as to the waters flowing from the swamp into the creek through an artificial channel. 80 Some eight years later, in König v. Viilage of Wolfenborn 81 the Darmstadt Court of Appeals faced a somewhat unusual situation. The defendant, who operated a "hammer mill" along the Siemensbach, had actually purchased a water servitude from the defendant village for the amount of 10,000 florin. The agreement specified that the village authorities would continue to give free run to the spring waters of their community well, and would not sell rights to these waters to others. When sued for the purchase price, the defendant sought reformation of the contract, claiming that the spring waters were by virtue of their volume a flumen publicum and aqua profluens et perennis, and as such subject neither to sale nor to diversion. 82 Supra text at n. 70. Prussian Supreme Tribunal (supra n. 67) 393. 76 Supra text at nn. 52- 54. 77 Darmstadt (supra n. 52) 185, 188. 78 Note that in English, "pond" is directly derived from "impounding." In some parts of England, "pond" even now refers only to artificial impoundments of water. 79 Darmstadt (supra n. 52) 188 f. 80 Id. at 191f.; see supra text at nn. 52- 54. 81 Supra n. 39. 74
75
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The waters here at issue flowed out of the four pipes of the village weil, and came from a near-by spring (a rather large one), which had been impounded artificaily. Both the spring and the weil were on communal property, and the waters flowed (again through communallands) into the creek through a twentypace ditch about two or three feet wide. These waters were a significant augmentation of the flow of the Siemensbach, which passed through the village. 83 The court of appeals proceeded from the premise ("frequently recognized" in its own jurisprudence) that under modern Roman law, a land owner could, absent speciaily acquired third party rights, freely dispose of the flow of spring waters rising on his own property. Law teachers had, however, sought to limit this rule in two situations: (1) where the spring water was so strong that it formed a creek running through several properties, and (2) where it was the tributary flow of the spring into an existing creek that, so to say, transformed the latter into a public creek. 84 After remarking that neither of these two exceptions was based on a specific legal text, the Darmstadt Court of Appeals nevertheless addressed their potential applicability to the case at hand. The former, it said, could be sustained only where aspring rose at the property line and was thus not subject to arbitrary interference by the land owner. The latter exception, on the other hand, could apply "only where both waters have tobe regarded as a legal unit, and where in view of these special circumstances the jlumen publicum formed by their confluence could no Iongerbe deprived of this quality." 85 In the instant case, the first exception did not apply because the land owner had already impounded the spring, thus exercising its right of ownership. The second exception, too, was held to be inapplicable because the waters of the Siemensbach were also used in miils located above the defendant village. Thus, it was a public creek even before its confluence with the spring waters here at issue. 86 The last case to be discussed, and the most recent in our series, is a decision of the Supreme Court of Germany in a Hannover appeal, dated October 11, 1895. 87 The plaintiff (a religious foundation) was the owner of a large landed estate. A spring rising on that estate formed a creek, still within its confines. Again within those confines, the plaintiffused the spring waters to feed ponds, to run a rniil, to irrigate meadows, and for other purposes. It now sought a judgment declaring that it had an unlimited right to consume, to impound, or to 82
83 84
85
86 87
Id. Id. at 329. Id. at 329 f. Id. at 330. Id. at 330 f. 36 RGZ 185 (1895).
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let run off the waters of the creek without interference by the defendants (apparently lower riparians). The intermediate appellate court upheld the dismissal of the declaratory action. As summarized by the Supreme Court, it distinguished between "smaller" springs not flowing beyond the estate on which they arose, and "larger" springs forming the headwaters of a creek or jlumen perenne. The form er were completely at the disposal of the land owner of origin, but the latter were subject to riparian rights: Riparians could demand from all other riparians (including the owner ofthe surface estate at the headwater) that waters diverted by them be returned to the spring or creek. 88 The Supreme Court reversed, holdingthat a land owner can freely dispose of the waters of a spring arising on his property, "at least until the private creek becomes a public stream." In the instant case, it noted, there had been no finding (and no factual basis for asserting) "that the creek already became a public stream on the plaintiffs estate." The Court quoted extensively from one of its former decisions, which had rejected the notion that the strength ofthe spring or the length of its flow within the estate of origin was decisive as to its public nature. 89 It also refused to abandon this prior jurisprudence despite the "opinions to the contrary of some professors of law." In this latter connection, the Court noted that its views were in harmony with prior decisions of other German courts of last resort. 90 There was thus no basis for assuming that a rule contrary to the one here adhered to had developed in Germany. 91 Yet the Supreme Court appears to have stopped short of adopting a general rule to the effect that surface ownership of the headwaters of a perennial creek encompasses water rights of such quality and priority that lower riparians are, in the absence of specific entitlements based on servitude, mere users at will, subject to dispossession at any time. Such a rule would have been in direct contradiction to the doctrine of "reasonable use" riparian water rights in perennial creeks, announced hy the Court some twelve years earlier. 92 A more careful reading ofthis case leads to the conclusion that it is limited to its specific and (for a densely settled country, rather unusual) facts: the actual impoundment and consumptive use of the waters of a powerful spring forming a creek on a large estate before the waters are allowed to flow outside of the confines ofthat estate. The Supreme Court was careful to note that there could Id. at 187. Id. at 188; see id. at 188f., quoting from a decision of 10 Nov. 1891. 90 Id. at 187. One ofthe decisions cited, 34 SeuffA 140, 141 (Bavarian Supreme Court, 18 May 1878), expressly rejected the notion that aspring forming the headwaters of a creek was part of the creek by virtue ofthat fact. 91 36 RGZ 187. 92 8 RGZ 134 (1883), discussed supra text at nn. 59-65. See also 15 RGZ 182, 184 (1886). 88
89
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have been proofthat the creek became a public one on the plaintiffs premises. 93 In an earlier case cited with approval, the Court had said that the question as to when a private creek became a public stream should be determined "in accordance with the factual circumstances of each individual case. " 94 A passage in another prior decision in point, quoted with approval and at length, states the rule tobe the following: 95 [A]s long as it does not leave the terrain ofthe owner, (spring) water running in a natural or in an artificial channel is at his free disposition. Without being concerned whether the water would later become a public stream subject to joint use by lower riparians, he can impound it, divert it, or Iet it flow ofT. Only if and to the extent that he has done the latter, the waters can become a public stream.
Thus, once a perennial creek had actually come into existence through the uninterrupted flow of aspring rising on private ground, the land owner could no Ionger unravel the creek from the top by impounding its headwaters, or by diverting them for nonriparian disposition. lt may be helpful to refer, in this connection, to Union Government v. Marais, 96 a South African case decided under Roman-Dutch law some twentyfive years later. Referring to a "spring from which there was a strong perennial flow through adefinite river," Chief Justice Iones characterized that spring as "not only the source but portion of the bed of a perennial stream ... [:] the spot at which the bed started." In consequence, he went on to say, "water which has once entered the channel and thus formed part of such a stream, must, while it remains therein, be subject to the laws which regulate its use by riparian owners." 97
B. Summary
The above survey has shown that in the nineteenth century Germancourts applied the following rules of modern Roman water law in relation to springs and creeks: 1. All waters of springs rising on private ground, regardless of the strength of their flow, were in the absence of servitudes in favor of third parties subject to the free disposition of the land owner. He could, in particular, impound some or all of these waters on his own property, or divert them in whole or in part for non-riparian uses. 98 2. Lower land was subject to a servitude to receive the spring and rain water runofT of higher land, flowing in natural channels or in drainage ditches. Flows in natural channels gave rise to servitudes in favor oflower riparian properties only by contract or 93 !»
95 96 97
98
36 RGZ 186. 12 RGZ 183, 183 f. (1884), cited at 36 RGZ 186. Decision of 10 Nov. 1891, quoted at 36 RGZ 186f. 1920 S.A.L.R. (supra n. 6) 240 (C.). Id. at 252. Supratextat nn. 1-2, 30-33.
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by affirmative acts of lower riparians constituting quasi possession of such waters at source for the prescriptive period. In Saxony, flows in man-made channels, accompanied by lower riparian user for the prescriptive period, were conclusively presumed to evidence contractual servitudes in favor of the lower riparians. U nder "pure" Roman law, such flows gave rise to servitudes in favor of lower riparians if they had been used by them for times immemorial, but modern Roman law as received in Germany required acts of quasi possession as to such waters as weil. 99 3. Any perennially flowing creek, regardless of size, was a public stream. All riparians had a usufruct in the waters of such creeks, which included use for irrigation purposes. Riparians could not, however, divert creek waters for non-riparian use, and retum flows had to be led back to the creek before it left their properties. 100 4. Anybody could diminish the flow of springs on other Iands, including the headwaters of streams, by opening springs or wells on his own land. Land owners could also impound or divert the waters of springs rising on their own properties before these reached (or formed) the beds ofperennial creeks. The owner of aspringthat had already formed a perennial creek could not, however, subsequently destroy the creek by impounding, or diverting for non-riparian use, the waters of that spring. 101
C. The Usus Modernos
Before attempting to put the above summary into a twentieth-century focus, it seems appropriate to make a few observations about the sources oflaw applied in the judgments here surveyed. All courts were applying the "common law" (gemeines Recht) of nineteenth-century Germany: modern Roman law as received in and after the Renaissance. 102 They never questioned the applicability of clear rules found in Justinian's codification, which here reflected almost exclusively early third-century juristic comment on the Praetorian Edict and late third-century imperial decrees. 103 There were, however, some rules of "pure" Roman law that did not apply in Germany because, as judicially deterrnined, they had been displaced by German "common law," which later was influenced by canon law, Germanie law, and principles of German imperiallegislation. 104Wherever these Roman-law sources (the "laws" in the sense of Ieges or Gesetze)1° 5 gave no direct answers, the courts resorted, at first instance, to their Supratextat nn. 34-57. Supratextat nn. 59-65. 101 Supratextat nn. 72-95. 102 See, e.g., 17 RGZ 119, 123 (1887), discussed supratextat nn. 55-57. 103 Ulpian died in 223 A.D.; Cod. 3, 34, 7, e.g., is an imperial constitution dating from 286 A.D. See supra n. 62 and accompanying text. Although Justinian's codification formally dates from 533 A.D., there were (but for an occasional reference to the Institutes) no citations to intervening authority. 104 17 RGZ 119, 123 (1887), discussed supratextat n. 56. 105 Enacted law is called Iex, ley, loi, Gesetz, zakon, and kanun in Latin, Spanish, French, German, Russian, and Turkish; the corresponding terms for law in generat are ius, 99
100
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own prior decisions, referred to as "constant jurisprudence," prior jurisprudence, or views previously adhered to in several decisions. 106 Constant jurisprudence (ständige Rechtsprechung) was thus a source of law (or an auxiliary device for its ascertainment), second only to the Roman-law texts themselves. It should be added that publication of decisions was somewhat haphazard, and that references to prior jurisprudence encompassed unpublished prior decisions. At least some of these, however, were known to the parties. 107 There was also some reference to the opinions of other tribonals of comparable standing. In one instance, an appellate tribunal of last resort expressly rejected a view adopted by another. 108 More frequently, decisions of courts oflast resort were cited as establishing a rule 109 or, in one Supreme Court opinion, as justification for adhering to the Court's own prior jurisprudence in the face of academic opinion to the contrary. no Thus, the "common-law" jurisprudence ofGerman tribonals in generalwas viewed as an auxiliary device for the ascertainment of rules of Roman law, superior in quality to leamed opinion. Since the period here covered coincides almost exactly with the flowering of German Pantlektistik, 111 this relegation of contemporary juristic authors 112 to derecho, droit, Recht, pravo, and hukuk. All of these latter have ethical or moral connotationi; the former generally do not. 106 See, e.g., supratextat nn. 29, 44, 90; seealso 18 RGZ 256, 258 (1887). 107 23 RGZ 147, 155 {1889) cites a prior unpublished decision of the same panel, on which both parties had relied. The same (Third) Senate (panel) of the Supreme Court was assigned virtuaily aH water law contmversies tobe decided under Roman law, and the Supr.emc: Glurt lcept a repertory (there cited) in order to avoid inconsistent decisions. The ( small) Supreme Court bar apparently had access to that repertory if needed. The present Supreme Court publishes its repertory (or perhaps more accurately, facilitiates that publication).. 108 Stuttgart {supra n. 46), disagreeing with Dresden (supra n. 44). 109 In 8 RGZ 134, 139 n. 2(1'S83), nine decisions offormercourts oflast resort are cited in support of the obligation of upper riparians to Iead the return flow back into the same watershed. In 12 RGZ 183, 184 (1884), there is a reference (without citation) to the "jurisprudence of f()nner oourts of last resort in the common-law ( = Roman-law) territories" in support of the proposition that Roman-law rules as to rights in spring waters bad applied without modification in Gennany. In 17 RGZ 119, 121 (1886), the Court citod decisions of twD "common law" courts of last resort in favor of a proposition (the acquisitioo. of a servitude in a man-made ditch by ~H>e for time immemorial), and decisions of four others a_gainst. It sided with the latter. 110 Supr.a textat nn. 90-91. 111 Pmtdektistik (or Pandektenwissenschaft) describes nineteenth-century academic treatise Iiterature on modern Roman law in Germ.any. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger I Hans W Baade I Mirjan R. Damaska I Peter E. Herzog, Comparative Law, Cases - Text Materials (5th ed. 19&8) 275_ 112 Savigny, Pucb.ta, R~rger, Windscheid, and Demburgare the mostprominent authors of Pandekten(= German for Digests); cf. id. 268 n. 4. lhering (also listed there) does not belo1tg to tb:is group. See infra n. t 18.
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the Ievel of (at best) secondary authority seems rather puzzling. A closer Iook is therefore in order. The scarcity of citations to Savigny, on the one band, is readily explained. His System appeared in eight volumes between 1840 and 1849, 113 but in terms ofthe division of civil law adopted by Pandectists and indeed proposed by him, 114 these cover only the "general part" (or first) of five parts. Since he next dealt with "obligations" but not with "things" (or property), 115 even a close reading ofhis published work yielded nothing for water law jurisprudence beyond a reference on the subject of prescription by use for times immemorial. 116 Windscheid's Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, on the other band, appeared in no less than seven editions between 1862 and 1891, and even two posthumous ones in 1900 and 1906. 117 lt is thus both the prototype and the Glossa ordinaria of nineteenth-century German Pandektistik, and it contains a fairly detailed discussion ofwater rights. 118 Why was this leading treatise, regularly referred to in other Supreme Court opinions, cited only once in the decisions here surveyed? 119 One answer is suggested by Windscheid's championship of a fundamental proposition totally at variance with nineteenth-century German water jurisprudence and the weight of learned opinion. Roman law, according to him, distinguished between rivers and creeks. The former were public, and the latter private. Accordingly, there were rights of common use in rivers but not in creeks. 120 In a footnote to this passagein the seventh (1891) edition, he blithely noted: "By the way, this is a controversial point," citing four authors and no less than twelve decisions to the contrary. These included four judgments of the 113 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts I-VIII (18401849). 114 Savigny (id. at I 389) outlined the plan of his civil-law treatise to consist of: (1) a general part; (2) the law ofproperty; (3) the law of obligations; (4) family law; and (5) the law of succession. This became the traditional scheme ofPandectist treatise-writing. 115 After finishing his eight-volume "General Part," Savigny produced two volumes on Obligations in 1851 and 1853. See Archibald Brown, An Epitome and Analysis ofSavigny's Treatise on Obligations in Roman Law (1872). 116 Savigny (supra n. 113) IV 487 ff., 502 n. 7 (1841), cited in 22 SeufTA 16, 17 (Stuttgart, 26 Oct. 1855); 17 RGZ 119, 122 (1886). 117 Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, ed. by Theodor Kipp I-III (8th ed. 1900); see Windscheid, id. I-IV preface, for prior editions. The eighth edition is the one cited here, but a ninth (1906), likewise edited by T. Kipp, has also been consulted. 118 Windscheid (supra n. 117) § 146 (3) = vol. I 630-633 (8th ed.). 119 Stuttgart (supra n. 38) 22 n. 1. Windscheid's was the treatise most frequently cited in the first twenty volumes (1879-1888) of official reports of German Supreme Court opinions. Hans-Georg Mertens, Untersuchungen zur zivilrechtliehen Judikatur des Reichsgerichts vor dem lokrafttreten des BGB: Archiv für die civilistische Praxis [ = AcP] 174 (1974) 333-380 (338). 120 Windscheid (supra n. 117) I 631 f.
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Supreme Court, rendered within walking distance of his study but manifestly without effect on his academic theory. 121 Windscheid was cited, therefore, not on points on water law, but as a general authority on German "common law." 122 Such citations, however, were few in number. Courts were of course familiar with the general teachings of modern Roman law, including those relating to flowing waters. 123 When dealing with specific problems, they referred to specialist writings. There was a substantial body of nineteenth-century Germany water law literature, starting with the articles by Funke and by Kori, which appeared in the leading civil-law periodical in 1829 and 1835, respectively. 124 lt seems worth noting that Funke (who was the first author to discuss riparian rights to the waters of creeks)1 25 was an advocate in Dresden, and that Kori was a member ofthe Saxony Supreme Court of Appeals, which sat in that city. Water law authors were thus not necessarily law professors, and courts preferred to cite works directly relating to the matter at hand. 126 They did not, as we have seen, submit unquestioningly to scholarly authority. 127 D. Questions of Policy
With few exceptions, nineteenth-century German courts did not articulate policy reasons for their water law decisions. It will hardly have escaped notice, however, that millers were usually (but not always) the Iosers. Indeed, in 1884, the German Supreme Court pointedly remarked that former courts oflast resort "repeatedly" had to irrform mill owners as to their Iack of entitlement to the continued flow of spring water by mere use, even for long periods of time. 128 lt might be thought, therefore, that the nineteenth-century Germanjudiciary was, on the whole, not in sympathy with water mill owners who, after all, represented 121 Id. at 631 n. 7. This count does not include subsequent authorities contrary to Windscheid's view, added by the editor in brackets. Bernhard Windscheid was a professor at Leipzig, where the Supreme Court sat from 1879 to 1945. 122 See supra n. 119. In 8 RGZ 134, 139 (1883), the Supreme Court stated that "according to the correct view ... Roman law did not distinguish between rivers and creeks as regards the use of flowing water (aqua profluens) by riparians." It cited four authors (including two on water law) in favor of this proposition, but none against. 123 Windscheid's expression that no private ownership rights can attach to the "flowing wave of water" was frequently reiterated by courts, but without citation. E.g., 36 RGZ 185, 187 (1895); 12 RGZ 183, 183 (1884). See Windscheid (supra n. 117) I 631. 124 Gottlob L. Funke, Beiträge zum Wasser-Recht: AcP (supra n. 119) 12 (1829) 274, 432; August Siegmund Kori, Über das Wasserrecht AcP 18 (1835) 37. 125 Funke (supra n. 124) 285-287. 126 8 RGZ 134, 139 n. 1 (1883) cites six authoritative treatises on Germanie law (to support a pointnot directly at issue), and eleven writings on Roman law, at least six of which deal directly with water law. There is no citation to a Pandectist treatise. 127 See supra textat n. 90. Another example is Stuttgart (supra n. 38) 23, declining to follow Funke (supra n. 124). 128 12 RGZ 183, 184 (1884).
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a moribund trade and sought to enforce monopoly rights of feudal origin. Such an unsympathetic attitude may have received additional support from a longstanding tradition of grist mill regulation designed to curb what came to be called the "proverbial dishonesty" of that trade. 129 There is, however, no trace of such reasoning, or even of free-trade, proindustry orientation in any of the decisions here surveyed. In the one reported case of a conflict between an established water mill and an upstream sugar factory, the Supreme Court favored the former over the latter. Stressing "undeniable practical needs," the Court said: 130 One who in reliance of permission by the appropriate authorities to use the water has established a business enterprise must not be exposed to the danger of having the basis of his business ruined by the later establishment of another business enterprise which preempts the waters of the stream.
This passage underlines the dominant motive of nineteenth-century German water law jurisprudence: protection of vested rights. In the case last cited, the Supreme Court expressly left open the question whether a miller's franchisebased entitlement to a sufficient motive water flow had priority over pre-existing upper riparian irrigation rights, 131 presumably for the reason that these, too, were "vested." While the jurisprudence ofthat Court reflected its determination to protect lower riparians of public watercourses against upstream diversions into different watersheds, 132 the main object of nineteenth-century judicial solicitude was the owner of landed property. A property owner's right to the free disposition of spring waters rising on his land is central to the cases here surveyed. Indeed, by 1884, the Supreme Court had turned Ulpian's simile into an absolute rule: "Under Roman law, the spring rising above ground is, like the subterraneous water vein, pars agri, and is in the ownership (Eigentum) of the land owner." 133 In part IV we will see how this "rule" fared in twentieth-century Germany.
129 Werkmüller (supra n. 69) 718f. Regulations included price schedules, the prohibition of sacking moist (fraudulently heavy) flour, and even restrictions on the number of cattle kept by millers (so as to inhibit "embezzlement" of corn for feeding). 130 18 RGZ 256, 259f. (1887). 131 Id. at 259. 132 See especially 8 RGZ 134 (1883), discussed supra textat nn. 59-65. 133 12 RGZ 183 (1883).
6 Merryman Festschrift
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IV. "Vested" Water Rights and Modern Ground Water Management A. Civil-Law Codification
The German Civil Code was enacted on August 18, 1896, and became effective on January 1, 1900.1ts section 905, unamended since that time, reads as follows: 134 [Extent of ownership] The right of the owner of a piece of land extends to the space above the surface and to the terrestrial body under the surface. The owner may not, however, prohibit interferences which are performed at such height or depth that he has no interest in their exclusion.
Until about a decade ago, Germancourts and commentators were "almost unanimously" agreed that, on the one hand, the term "terrestrial body" (Erdkörper) as used in section 905(1) encompassed ground water, with the result that "the ownership of real property includes the groundwater as well." 135 On the other hand, it was also well established that ground and spring water not reduced to actual possession by impounding was not a "corporeal object," and thus not a "thing ... in the legal sense." 136 A property owner who drained away his neighbor's unimpounded ground or spring water was therefore not guilty of larceny. 137 Quite the contrary, he was exercising his own rights of ownership on his own property. Pursuant to section 903, these rights are limited only by statute or by the rights of third parties. 138 lt should be kept in mind (but was frequently overlooked) that the scheme just described has to be viewed against the background of German public law. The German Empire of 1871 was a federation of states, with limited central legislative powers. As enlarged by constitutional amendent in 1873, these included "private (civil) law" but not water law. The Introductory Law of 1896 expressly provided, therefore, that the Civil Code left "unaffected" state laws relating to waters, including mill operations, irrigation, and drainage. 139 German water law thus continued tobe state law.
Although the constitutional system and the political map of Germany underwent major changes in subsequent decades, and despite the temporary 134 This translation follows The German Civil Code, trans. by !an S. Farrester j Sirnon L. Goren/Hans-Michael IIgen (1975) 150. The German expression translated with
"terrestrial body" is Erdkörper "Soil" might be an equally acceptable term. 135 69 BGHZ 1, 3f. (1976), with several further references. Seetext infra at n. 163. 136 Id. at 4. 137 Id. at 4; Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1965) 973, 974 (Bavarian Supreme Court, 22 Jan. 1965). 138 Bavarian Supreme Court (supra n. 137) 974. 139 Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch art. 65. The view here taken follows that ofthe Federal Constitutional Court in 58 BVerfGE 300,332-34 (1981). See infratextat nn. 150, 163-164.
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disappearance of states during the Hitler years, 140 this dichotomy between federal (central) civillaw and state water law continued after 1945. Some ofthe new states then created inherited as many as four different water law systems from their territorial predecessors. 141 B. "Vested" Rights and 1\ventieth-Century Water Management
Under the Basic Law (Constitution) ofthe Federal Republic ofGermany, the federal Parliament is now competent to enact "skeleton" or "framework" legislation on "water management." The (federal) Water Management Act, which became effective on March 1, 1960, expressly covers surface waters (defined as including springs, stagnant waters, and torrential as weil as perennial surface flows in channels), coastal waters, and ground waters. 142 As amended in 1976, its stated objective is "water management in the public interest and also, in harmony therewith, for the benefit of individuals, avoiding ail necessary restrictions." 143 Another statutory amendment (also of 1976) speilsout in so many words that the ownership of a surface estate does not carry with it water rights that are contingent upon administrative license or grant. 144 Govemmental approval is required, in particular, for "the taking or diversion" of surface waters, and for the "taking, Iifting or leading to the surface, or draining" of ground water. 145 Prior "rights granted or upheld by state water law" were grandfathered if they had been exercised by lawful instailations as of a date certain. 14() As construed judiciaily, however, such prior "rights" include only water rights expressly granted or adjudicated upon application in individual cases. The (otherwise timely) sinking of a weil in reliance on water rights implicit in surface ownership under prior state law washeldnot to have given rise to a prior "right" entitled to confirmation as a matter of law. 147 Even confirmed licenses were subject to discretionary renewal after the expiration of a substantial grace period. 148
140 See Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F .Supp. 829, 853 (E.D.N. Y. 1981 ), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982). 141 58 BVerfGE at 302. 142 Water Management Act, § 1(1) 1-2, [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt I 3017. 143 Id. § 1(a)(1), [1976] Bundesgesetzblatt I 1109. 144 Id. § 1(a)(3)1. 145 Id. § 3(1) and (6). 146 Id. § 15(1). 147 20 BVerwGE 220, 223f. (1965); 47 BGHZ 1, 12 (1966). 148 Water Management Act § 17 in conjunction with § 6. Compensation was paid where the prior right was not subject to modification without compensation under prior law.
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C. The Federal Constitutional Court Speaks
In a carefully reasoned, unanimous decision dated July 15, 1981, the Federal Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the Water Management Act as applied to rights based on prior law. 149 At the outset, the Court pointed out that the prevailing interpretation ofthe Civil Code's section 905 was in error. For the reasons already mentioned, ground water did not become part of the surface estate in 1900, but "the legal regulation of the ground waters flowing through the terrestrial body continued to be reserved to the States." 150 The Court went on to point out that private law governed property between persons, such as the transfer and mortgaging of real property, neighboring rights, and liability fortrespass to land, while the interests ofthe public had tobe vindicated mainly by rules ofpublic law. Sofaras the constitutional protection of property was concerned, private-law rules of property law occupied no higher status than public-law rules relating thereto. Property rights were to be ascertained, at any given point of time, by a "comprehensive view of alllaws then regulating the position of ownership." 151 While acknowledging some constitutional constraints on the statutory definition of the contents and the limitation of ownership rights inherent in the constitutional recognition ofprivate property, the Court found that the Water Management Act did not exceed these bounds. In this connection, it emphasized the need for public regulation of the water supply because of industrialization and the establishment of public water distribution systems then serving 96 percent ofthe population. While the overalllevel ofwater supply in the Federal Republic was satisfactory, some difficulties were encountered in population centers. 152 More importantly, there was the problern of water quality. This applied especially to the supply of drinking water, which "deserves absolute priority." Ground water, being least polluted, was best for this purpose. In this connection, the Court made the following observation: 153 Since ground water flows through the earth like a stream, both the taking of water and the infusion of substances have effects which cannot be limited to a particular plot of land. Ground water takenon one plot ofland will not be available to properties located further down the ground water stream. Pollution occurring on one piece of land can render the water useless for other purposes, especially as drinking water, for long stretches. Interference with ground water thus has an intensive effect on the environment.
149 150 151 152 153
58 BVerfGE 300 (1981). Id. at 333; see id. 332-334. Id. at 335 f. ld. at 338-342. Id. at 342; see id. 343.
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Emphallizing once more the paramount importance of ground water for the general public, especially for an adequate public water supply, the Court concluded that the "mastering of such a comprehensive task of serving the public at large is a typical concern ofpublic law, which can hardly be achieved with private-law devices." 154 The Court then addressed the question of the constitutional rights of property owners who had previously extracted ground water in reliance on the law then prevailing but were now required, after a substantial transitory period, to seek new permits. As already mentioned, such permits were available as of right only where there had been an express administrative grant or adjudication of water rights under prior law. Otherwise, they were discretionary. 155 In the instant case, the plaintiff land owner had made use of the ground waters under his property for the purpose of extracting and cleaning gravel, as he was entitled to do without permit under prior law. He now needed a license, which had been denied by administrative decision. 156 The Federal Constitutional Court proceeded from the prernise that the constitutional guarantee ofthe right ofproperty protected against the "abrupt" termination by the state of a property use permitted by prior law and actually exercised at substantial investment expenditure. 157 Nevertheless, andin line with its prior jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that when re-structuring a legislative scheme, Parliament was not faced with "the alternative between preserving older legal entitlements or abolishing them against compensation." The legislature could, consistently with the Constitution, "re-structure individuallegal entitlements through appropriate and acceptable transitory rules if considerations of public welfare are entitled to preference over the - constitutionally secured justified expectation of the continued existence of acquired rights. " 158 Applied to the instant case, the Court held: 159 The necessity of subjecting prior uses by owners to the permit and licensing procedure of the public-law regulative scheme followed from the objective ofthe Water Management Act to assure, for the future, the orderly management of available water resources and to diminish the dangers to which the waters were exposed. This objective is a vital one for the population as weil as the economy. It could hardly have been achieved if land owners' actions in regard to ground water, which until then had neither been registered nor examined as to their compatibility with sound water management, had been permitted to continue indefinitely on that basis. Indeed, these critical conditions fumished a decisive reason for legislative intervention.
154
155 156 157 158 159
Id. at 344. Supratext at nn. 144-148. 58 BVerfGE at 309, 349. Id. at 349. Id. at 350f., citing further authority. Id. at 351.
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Having thus determined that Parliament could re-structure the acquired rights here involved, the Court finally turned to the question whether the transitory rules were acceptable. This question all but answered itself: The Water Management Act had been put into effect thirty-one months after its enactment, and had additionally provided a five-year transitory period for the continued exercise of prior water rights before requiring revalidation by license. 160 lt is worth noting that the Federal Constitutional Court was concerned only with the constitutionality of requiring land owners to seek revalidation, pursuant to new public-interest standards, of prior water use entitlements that had actually been exercised at some expense to the land owner. The Court was well aware that in areas governed in this regard by "common law" (modern Roman law), land owners acting without malice were entitled to the free use of the ground water under their estates. 161 This entitlement had been abolished, with immediate effect, by the Water Management Act amendments of 1976, as was noted without adverse judicial comment. 162 The Court extended constitutional protection not to reliance on prior law as such, but only to investments actually made pursuant thereto.
This approach presupposes, of course, that ground water rights basedonland ownership were not part of a constitutionally protected "core" notion of property and of property rights. 163 The Court dealt with this issue on two Ievels. First, as already mentioned, it spelled out that ground water is not part of the surface estate under the Civil Code but follows its own rules. 164 Remarkably enough, this clarification was readily accepted with seeming unanimity by civillaw authorities, who had previously taken the opposite view just as unanimously. 165 Second, the Court laid stress on the public-law elements of modern water law, all but holdingthat it had become public by nature. 166 A decisive element in this classification was supplied by modern notions ofhydrology. Ground water was said to "flow through the earth like a stream," and lower surface estates were Id. at 351 f. Id. at 302. 162 Id. at 305; supra text at n. 144. 163 Id. at 329. 164 Id. at 332-334; supratextat nn. 138, 149. 165 This is illustrated most dramatically by the change from Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, ed. by Kurt Rebmannf Franz-Jürgen Säcker IV (1981) § 905 n. 2 at 481 to the second edition, id. IV§ 905 n. 2 at 539f. n. 6 (1986). Professor Säcker, the annotator in both cases, stated laconically in 1981 that ground water was part of the Erdkörper; in 1986, he followed the reasoning of the Federal Constitutional Court to the contrary without comment or criticism. Other commentaries teil the same story. See, e.g., Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ed. by Otto Pa/andt f Peter Bassenge et al. (pre- and postdecision editions). 166 58 BVerfGE at 344; supratextat n. 154. 160 161
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referred to as lower "ground water stream" riparians. 167 Although the Court consistently laid stress on the needs of modern society rather than on traditional notions, the use of such terminology was surely intended to build a bridge to the past. Surface streams were public even under Roman law. Ground water, too (the Court seemed to be saying), is essentially aqua profluens, and can be regulated as such.
V. Conclusion In his comm,entary on the Praetorian Edict, Ulpian casually refers to persons drawing water from the same watercourse (riva) as "rivals." 168 The main task of Roman water law, since its inception, has been to regulate this rivalry. Rivals have, in the main, relied on two potentially conflicting notions: common rights to running waters, and private rights in the waters of springs and wells. The latter ultimately derive from another, more famous remark by Ulpian in the same commentary: portio ... agri videtur aqua viva. 169 Wehaveseen that in nineteenth-century Germany, water rights batdes were fought mainly between downstream mill operators and land owners who tapped, impounded, or diverted the waters of upstream springs. Courts favored the latter over the former, but stopped short of accepting the notion that an existing creek could be dried up at its source by the owner of the headwater spring. It seems likely (but it is not certain) that they would have accepted the sensible view ofthe South Africanjudiciary (also based on the same Roman-law sources) that a spring at the head of a creek is part of the creek by definition, and hence public. 170 To the extent that Roman-law authority is relevant today as the ratio scripta of historic water rights in the Hispanic Southwest of the United States, South Africanjurisprudence deserves preference on this point (and on others 171 ), for unlike Germany, South Africa is an arid country. This is not to say, however, that the German experience here described is wholly without interest to American courts. Twentieth-century developments, in particular, have demonstrated that nineteenth-century lawyers have not read Ulpian correctly. He said, in so many words, that for purposes oftrespass to land, water in a well is to be viewed as part of the land. Such water could, under Roman law, be tapped 167 Id. at 343, quoted supra textat n. 153. See also id. at 333, where the Court speaks of ground water as "flowing through the terrestrial body" ( = soil). 168 Dig. 43, 20, 1, 26. 169 Dig. 43, 24, 1, pr. 170 Union Government v. Marais (supra n. 96); seesupra text at nn. 96-97. 171 Especially the characterization ofthe waters ofnon-perennial streams as "public": Van Niekerk and Union Gov't (Minister of Lands) v. Carter (supra n. 12); seesupra textat n. 12.
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practically at will by a neighbor on his own land. 172 The notion that it was part of the land (which land?) would have seemed as strange to Ulpian then as it did to the Federal Constitutional Court in 1981. 173 As the judgment ofthat Court so amply demonstrates, ground water "flow(s) through the soil," and is neither part of the soil nor of real property, nor a necessary appurtenance of either. 174 It follows rules of water law, not of real property law, and like other running waters, it can be regulated in the public interest. Constitutional protection of ground water "rights" is appropriate (if at all) where these have been adjudicated according to modern principles ofwater management, and (to a lesser extent) where major investments in ground water facilities have been made in reliance on prior law. We should note, in conclusion, that the Supreme Court of Arizona applied substantially the same principles in upholding the 1980 Groundwater Management Act ofthat state. 175 Disregarding earlier jurisprudence to the contrary, it held that "there is no right of ownership of groundwater in Arizona prior to its capture and withdrawal from the common supply," and that "the right of the owner of the overlying land is simply to the usufruct of the water. " 176 It then affirmed the Groundwater Management Act, observing that the overdraft of groundwater in Arizona had created a "serious problem" incapable of selfcorrection, thus giving rise to a necessity "for comprehensive legislation to both Iimit groundwater use and allocate its use among competing interests." 177 This result was reached, one might say, without resort to Roman-law authorities or civil-law jurisprudence. Ulpian, if called upon to respond, would surely point to his discussion of usufruct, prominently reproduced three centuries later in the Digests. 178 Having dealt with it in reference to mines and Supra text at n. 73 and sources cited at n. 73. In Dig. 39, 3, 1, 12, Ulpian approves a statement ofMarcellus to the effect that one who diverts his neighbor's spring by digging on his own land commits no actionable wrong, adding, however, that this applies only in the absence ofintent to injure. In Dig. 39, 2, 24, 12, he quotes Trebatius for the proposition that one who opens a weil on his land, thereby cutting offthe sources ofhis neighbor's weil, is not liable therefor. These passages are from books 53 and 81 of Ulpian's commentaries on the Edict; the famous passage quoted supra text at n. 169 is from book 71 of the same work. 174 Supra n. 167. 175 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-401 to 45-637 (1987). See Jon L. Kyl, The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act, From Inception to Current Constitutional Challenge: Colo. L. Rev. 53 (1982) 471. 176 Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 82 = 638 P.2d 1324, 1328 (1981), appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982). 177 Id.: 131 Ariz. at 83 = 638 P.2d at 1329. See also to the same effect Cherry v. Steiner, 716 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984); and most recently Aikens v. Ariz. Dept. of Water Resources, 743 P.2d 946, 950f. (Ariz.App. 1987). 178 See the many passages, mainly from books 17 and 18 on Sabinus but also from his commentaries on the Edict, in Dig. 7, titles 1-6. 172 173
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fisheries, 179 he might even entertain the notion of a usufruct in waters, but always subject to the reservation that they are different. Waters might be viewed as part of the soil, he would remind us, but things are not always what they appear to be on first sight.
179 Dig. 7, 1, 9, §§ 2-3, 7. Fora consultation ofUlpian on a fiduciary bequest ofwaters "in Africa or possibly Egypt ... where waters are sold," see Dig. 33, 1, 14, 3. Acknowledgrnent for the latter reference is due to Tony Honore, Ulpian (1982) 17.
Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence: A Comparative View Mirjan Damaska * Western legal tradition displays two contrasting schemata for ascertaining facts in adjudication. 1 According to an "atomistic" view, mental processes employed in "finding" facts can be decomposed into independent parts. Probative force is attributed to distinct items of evidence and discrete inferential sequences, and the final determination is made by aggregating theseseparate probative values through some sort of additive process. 2 Because such mental operations are heavily propositional, the factfinder's state ofmind produced by this atomistic process is relatively free of volitional components. The proof sufficiency standard for finding a particular fact can be expressed in graded probability terms. 3 U nder a second view, sometimes termed "holistic," the probative force of any item of information arises from interaction among elements of the total informational input. In this vision, separate weights of individual items of evidence cannot be disentangled from global judgments. Factfinding thus depends on schemes ofthought not yet articulated and on volitional factors; and a proof sufficiency standard defies expression in probability terms. 4
* Ford Foundation Professor of Law, Yale University. This essay focuses on individual thought processes and largely ignores interpersonal arguments about evidence among triers of fact. The analysis also is artificially limited to the factual segment of adjudication. 2 See William Twining, Theories of Evidence, Bentham and Wigmore (1985) 3. 3 The probability involved need not be objective: the crucial assumption is that separately weighted evidence can be integrated. Thus Bayes' theorem proceeds from atomistic assumptions, although it integrates subjective hunches about the weight of evidence. Fora description of the theorem see Richard Lempert, ModeHing Relevance: Mich. L. Rev. 75 (1976/77) 1021-1057. On the difficulty of expressing subjective belief in graded terms see Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (1986) 324ff. 4 A good exposition ofholistic approaches is in Twining (supra n. 2) 183-185. Observe that a holistic facttinder may also embrace methods that dissect evidence, but only as a propaedeutic or help in arguments about how factual issues should be resolved. It has been argued persuasively that thought about evidence shifts from atomistic to holistic patterns depending on the character of the factual question or the particular procedural stage. See Peter Ti//ers, Mapping Inferential Domains: B.U. L. Rev. 66 (1986) 883-937. 1
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The implications of these two models of cognition for the law of evidence are clear and immediate. It stands to reason that a law of evidence undergirded by atomistic assumptions interferes with the factfinder's processes of belief formation much more than a law of evidence resting on holistic premises. For example, under an atomistic approach, it makes sense to require of a facttinder that he pay no attention to a specified informational item, or attribute to it a designated weight, while under a holistic view these demands imply asking the facttinder to do the impossible. The two models of cognition also are reflected in divergent criteria that justify the facttinder in taking a factual proposition as proven: holistic proof systems tend to invoke inner persuasion, or similar mental states, while atomistic systems usually refer to external yardsticks, such as the viewpoint of a reasonable person exposed to the same information. It would be transparently naive to expect that Anglo-American and Contineotal evidentiary arrangementsarepure versions of either an atomistic or holistic approach. Yet, at the trial stage, Anglo-American adjudicative systems intrude in the factfinder's processes ofbeliefformation more than is the case on the Continent. Anglo-American jurisdictions also use a different rhetoric in describing standards of proof sufficiency. And as the comparativist surveys these differences, he begins to suspect that the divergencies in the treatment of evidence in the two Western legal traditions reflect somewhat discrepant assumptions about the mental processes used to make factual inquiries.
The structure of this essay is simple. I first seek to substantiate the contention that Anglo-American and Contineotal laws of evidence require partially discrepant assumptions about how individuals find facts in adjudication. I then explore the sources of this disparity and conclude that the divergence has roots deeper than the rhetorical strategies of lawyers.
I. Atomistic and Holistic Tendencies Surveyed A. Anglo-American Systems
An affinity for atomistic conceptions underpins the relentless attempts by lawyers to filter the information that can be used in decisionmaking. Let us begin by considering the way in which luxuriant admissibility rules are invoked. Invocation of admissibility rules does not in and of itself lead to interference with the ways in which the facttinder makes up his mind: admissibility rules shape the legitimate database for a decision, and have nothing necessarily to say on its processing. Nevertheless, admissibility rules do lead to such interference whenever the facttinder cannot be insulated from forbidden evidence and is not disqualified from decisionmaking after exposure to it. In Anglo-American systems the frequent reaction to such exposure is the law's mandate to the decisionmaker to disregard inadmissible information in toto or to use it only for some inferential purposes (for example, to assess only the credibility of a party-
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witness and not the merits of his case). Clearly some variant of an atomistic model offactfinding must be posited ifthis mandate is to make sense as guidance to the facttinder on how to make up his mind: only if processes of proof can be fragmented, and their constituent parts isolated, can hebe required to neglect a specified part. 5 Thementaloperations involved require detached reasoning; the factfinder's actual credal state becomes irrelevant and he may have to decide contre coeur. Even the decision to exclude evidence may be based on atomistic assumptions. As an example, consider the American practice for rulings on several hearsay exceptions: the judge, prior to hearing all the evidence in the case, is expected to weigh whether a particular hearsay item nevertheless possesses sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be admissible. Under a holistic model such indicia of reliability can be established only in interaction with all other evidence in the case, suggesting that the typical Anglo-American ruling on admissibility is premature. The atomistic model's influence on processes ofbeliefformation is not limited to the context of practical enforcement of rules governing what evidence can be presented to the trier of facts. The comparatively complex manner in which evidence is developed by opposing lawyers dramatically segregates information that actually may sway the factfinder's mind from permissible evidence. A vast new tield for exclusion opens up. For example, if a proper form of question is not observed, the typical sanction is that the answer - if obtained - must be stricken from the record and disregarded in deciding the facts. Rules of weight and some rules of quantum also rest on atomistic assumptions. Whenever the law determines the probative weight of a particular item of information in advance, it assumes that the weight of isolated evidence remains unchanged in contact with other evidence and information; it also presupposes that the weight tixed in advance somehow can be added to the rest of the informational input. (Notice how the metaphors of"weight" and of"quantum" suggest that evidentiary items are additive!) Most Anglo-American rules oftbis sort are "corroboration rules": they assess the weight of evidence taken out of context as so low that a tinding of fact cannot rest on such evidence alone. Even when the rules ofweight are "negative," however, the facttinder still is asked to resist global assessments. He also must disregard his possible persuasion that a fact in issue exists ifthis persuasion arises from the legally insufficient database. For example, although the facttinder may be persuaded on the victim's testimony alone that a rape occurred, he may still be prevented from converting his conviction into a decision by reason of a rule requiring corroboration of the victim's story. 5 And only if factfinding involves adding and subtracting can the decisionmaker be asked to determine whether the residue of evidence remaining after forbidden information has been disregarded meets the standard of proof sufficiency.
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It should cause no surprise that a system of adjudication attempting so regularly to affect the thinking processes of factfinders downplays subjective conviction as a decisional criterion. Where triers of fact routinely are invited to depart from their actual states of credence, it is unrealistic to expect them fully to be persuaded by evidence, especially as to the complete accuracy or truth of facts in issue. This tendency to downplay inner acceptance of a decision is in fact reflected in Anglo-American formulae for proof sufficiency.
In civil matters, these standards are couched in the language of pure cognition and in graded probability terms: a preponderance of the evidence often is enough. 6 More surprisingly, even in criminal cases the proof standard is seldom formulated as a matter offull persuasion as to the existence offacts that support the defendant's guilt. The law invites the decisionmaker in close cases to decide as a reasonable person, even ifthis entails a divorce from his actual credal state. Thus, even if he is not fully convinced of the defendant's guilt because of some doubts he actually entertains, such doubts should preclude conviction only if they are reasonable. The comparativist must not overlook a futher consideration: the standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" does not apply to the totality of guilt-supporting facts if these facts must include - as in most Continentaljurisdictions- facts supporting all prerequisites for the imposition of punishment. For example, the facttinder may reasonably suspect the possibility of duress, insanity, or even self-defense, and yet be instructed to convict because the burden of persuasion on these isolated issues can be shifted to the defendant. 7 The event tobe proven is bifurcated, and only the "torso" of the global criminal occurrence is subjected to the stringent proof requirement. B. Contineotal Systems
Generalizations regarding the Contineotal administration of justice are more hazardous, because disparities between civil and criminal modes of inquiry Ioom larger than in Anglo-American jurisdictions, and variation among countries is more pronounced. 8 Nevertheless, for the purpose of comparison with the common-law style offactfinding, at least one generalization can safely be made: legal instruments preventing the trier of fact from following his own cognitive path are fewer in number and are much less frequently invoked than in AngloAmerican systems of adjudication. Cf. infra n. 17 and accompanying text. Recently the United States Supreme Court has decided that it is not a violation ofthe U .S. Constitution to place the burden of proving self-defense on the defendant. See M artin v. Ohio, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (1987). Of course, the very idea of distributing the burden of persuasion conceming isolated facts between the parties is atomistic. 8 Fora sense of the range of internal variation on the theme of judicial evaluation of evidence in civil cases, see Heinrich Nagel, Die Grunzüge des Beweisrechts im europäischen Zivilprozess (1967) 72- 85; Vittorio Denti, Un progetto per la giustizia civile (1982) 79-83. See also infratextat n. 27. 6
7
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Although it is frequently asserted, it is not true that Contineotal countries ignore admissibility rules. 9 But the common Jawyer will search in vain for those admissibility rules that are predicated on the idea that some information, albeit probative, can so easily be overvalued or is otherwise so volatile that it should not be presented to the facttinder (for example, gruesome evidence, hearsay, and so on). 10 Also exceedingly rare or absent are rules and practices requiring the facttinder to use some evidence only for certain surgically limited purposes. And it is precisely these two types of rules that- in their practical implementationIead to demands that information actually received be neglected in ascertaining fact. This is because such rules seldom Iead to complete exclusion of evidence and come into play mostly as evidentiary sources are being examined in the course of the trial. Most important for our purposes are ramitications of the Contineotal mode of developing evidence in which the presiding judge assumes most of the responsibility for tapping informational sources. The judge, who is also the facttinder, strives to build a "unitary" case according to his own cognitive needs; information is not generated by outside agents proceeding from contrary viewpoints. This manner of examining evidence is relatively informal, and avoids the many complexities associated with a bilateral, lawyer-driven technique for eliciting information. Facttindingjudges do upon occasion breach the simpler rules for the development of evidence (for example, they ask improperly suggestive questions), but these rules are not as easily invoked against the ultimate decisionmaker as they are against an opposing lawyer. In this setting, the examination of evidence does not give rise to incessant challenges to the propriety ofinformation-eliciting behavior, while in the partydriven Anglo-American system these challenges generate frequent dernands that improperly imparted information be disregarded by the trier of fact. Even when a party is successful in alleging a violation of an evidence rule, the exclusion ofinformation obtained injudge-driven examination is an infrequent sanction in Continental courts. Thedemand to exclude probative information to 9 Rules rejecting evidence on grounds extraneous to. truth-finding (e.g., excluding illegally obtained evidence) are found in many Contineotal oountries.ln most Contineotal systems, privileges ofwitnesses to refuse to testify are more generous than in common-law jurisdictions. For West Germany, see Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozeßordnung) §§ 383-384; and Code ofCriminal Procerlure (Strafprozeßordnung) §§52-53. Very similar provisionsexist in some Swiss cantons (e.g., Zurich, Code of Civil Procedure art. 159), Austria, and Yugoslavia. For Italy, see Eugenio F/orian, Delle prove penali (1961) 385412. 10 It would be an exaggeration, however, to believe that all logically relevant evidence is ipso facto admissible in Contineotal proceedings. For example, a mild exclusionary effect is occasioned by an expressed preference for original overderivative evidence (the so-called "principle ofimmediacy"). F or the civil process, see Nagel (supra n. &) 57- 66. F or criminal procedure, see Mirjan Damaika, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure, A Comparative Study: U. Pa. L. Rev. 121 (1973)' 506-5S9 (517f.) (cited: Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers).
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which the facttinder already has been exposed is criticized as conducive to undesirable, artificial decisionmaking. One cannot unbite the apple of knowledge:factum infectumfieri nequit. Especially in criminal trials, the rejection of reliable evidence is disfavored: it interferes with the truth-seeking process and should be permitted only in exceptional situations. 11 Very few Contineotal countries adopted rules requiring that the decisionmaker disregard credible evidence if improperly obtained, although such rules often have been advocated by academic lawyers. Typical is the rule banning the use of statements obtained from the defendant by threats, deceit, fatigue, or similar methods, a rule quite obviously contemplating the gathering of information during pretrial investigation rather than the development of evidence in the course of the trial. The potential of such rules to interfere with the freedom ofbeliefformation at trial is quite limited: they seldom if ever require that information derived from illegally obtained evidence also be excluded. Since only such derivative information usually is presented, most decisionmakers rarely come into contact with evidence that should not be used, and accordingly need not be cautioned to disregard it. 12 Modern Contineotal legislation displays a strong dislike for rules assessing ·the probative force of evidence. Even corroboration rules are anathema to legislators. The approach to evidence underlying this antipathy is holistic: since the probative force of particular evidence arises in interaction with the total informational input, it can never properly be deterrnined in advance. Notwithstanding this legislative animosity, sporadic rules of weight can still be found, especially in the civil procedure of some Contineotal countries. Most of these rules, however, are creatures of court practice, and this descent makes them palatable to Continentallegal ideology: judicial precedent is proclaimed here as not binding, so that rules of weight - although actually followed - can be treated as flexible guidelines rather than unbinding rules intervening in processes of belief formation. 13 As professional and lay Continentaljudges sit and deliberate together, there is no need for professionals to instruct their lay colleagues, in advance of 11 See, e.g., Jürgen Baumann, Grundbegriffe und Verfahrensprinzipien des Strafprozessrechts (2d ed. 1972) 38 -40; Tibor Kiraly, Criminal Procedure, Truth and Probability (1979) 81. 12 I say "most decisionmakers" because the presiding judge may learn about the original illegal evidence from the file. What should be done if decisionmakers nevertheless come into contact with forbidden information is discussed for West German law in Friedrich Dencker, Verwertungsverbote im Strafprozess (1977) 140fT. 13 An example of such rules are those according conclusive weight to blood tests excluding a finding of paternity. A comparativist must recognize, of course, that most Anglo-American rules of evidence are also flexible and that trial judges have great discretionary powers in applying them. If the rigid Contineotal concept ofbinding rules were applied here, there would be very little Anglo-American law of evidence left.
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deliberations, in abstract form, and in isolation from the total pool of information, about proper inferences tobe drawn from specific evidence. Thus, for example, if the law creates a presumption, the inference that inheres in the presumption is conveyed to lay judges in the light of all the evidence in the case. In contrast to Anglo-American practice, presumptions can thus be interpreted and experienced as comments on evidence rather than as attempts by the legal system to regulate inferences from evidence adduced. 14 In defining proof sufficiency standards, most Continentallegislation places a comparatively striking emphasis on the subjective conviction of the factfinder. Striking also is the tendency to require conviction as to the truth of factual propositions, rather than conviction as to the existence of a particular degree of probability. According to an older, rapidly receding view, the factfinder's state of subjective persuasion was both a necessary and a sufficient condition to support the factual basis of a judgment. 15 U nder the dominant current view, this purely subjective conviction intime no Ionger suffices; findings of fact must now also be supported by a high degree of objective (or inter-subjective) probability. N onetheless, the old subjective standard continues to have practical importance, at least in the mandatory drafting of reasons supporting the factual basis of a judgment: unless the trial court explicitly expresses its "conviction" that facts ascertained are true, the appellate court may reverse the decision. 16 To the astonishment of common lawyers, this demanding rhetoric for proof sufficiency often is found in the area of civil procedure. And although broad legislative pronouncements embracing this rhetoric are riddled with numerous exceptions, the discrepancy with Anglo-American standards of proof sufficiency in civil cases is still noteworthy. 17 Even in criminal cases, where differences between Anglo-American and Continental proof sufficiency standards are much more subtle, the contrasts are not negligible. This is largely because the criminal law of most Continental countries refuses to shift the burden of proof of various justifications and excuses onto the defendant: the maxim in dubio pro reo usually applies to all ingredients of a crime rather than, as the reasonable doubt standard in the common-law tradition, to its torso alone. 18 14 On American practice, see Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases, A Unilied Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices: Harv. L. Rev. 94 (1980) 321-368 (336-338, 365). 15 On this original understanding of"moral proof," see Massimo Nobili, II principio del Iibero convincimento del giudice (1974) 147ff. 16 For a West German example of reversal for absence of the talismanic phrase "conviction," see Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 29 Apr. 1987, reprinted in Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 10 (1987) 476f. The development of the dominant current view is described in Gerhard Walter, Freie Beweiswürdigung (1979) 71 ff. 17 On the numerous exceptions from the demanding West German standard, see Walter (supra n. 16) 88, 132-147, 173-189. Fora broader overview, see Nagel (supra n. 8) 83-85. Cf. infra n. 26.
7 Merryman Festschrift
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The greater organic unity offactfinding is further accentuated by the structure of Contineotal criminal trials in which issues regarding liability and those concerning the sentence are jointly decided. Readers with litigational experience will suspect, of course, that the demanding formulae of Contineotal law are not the criteria actually employed in reaching decisions on facts. 19 But even if the main difference between AngloAmerican and Contineotal trials is, on this issue, one of official rhetorical strategy, it is intriguing nonetheless and calls for an explanation.
II. Sources of Atomistic and Holistic Tendencies A. Organization of Adjudicatory Authority
Distinctive traits of Anglo-American and Contineotal laws of evidence usually are explained as stemming from fundamental differences in the structure ofthe official apparatus ofjustice. While the paradigmatic decisionmaker in the Anglo-American tradition is the lay jury, Contineotal courts are dominated by professional judges; Anglo-American law allocates responsibilities between judge and jury, while Contineotal law has a unitary process. And while the existence of an official investigative apparatus is part of the Contineotal tradition, the common-law world is characterized by the absence of a comparable investigative machinery. Many peculiarities of evidentiary arrangements in the two braliches of Western legal tradition can indeed be linked to these structural factors. Wehave just observed, for example, how the commonlaw system requires advance judicial instruction to the jury and how the need for such instruction suggests systematic interference with the factfinder's processes of belief formation. 20 This is not to say, however, that jury participation favors an atomistic law of evidence, while the dominance of professional judges necessarily commends a holistic approach. In fact, the opposite seems more likely. More than trained and case-hardened professionals, laymen find it difficult to focus on a specified informational input and disregard data and impressions they would otherwise use in arriving at a decision; they can more easily be swayed by "tacit 18 Only a small number of Continental jurisdictions follow the French example and place on the defendant the burden of proof concerning certain justifications and excuses, or create presumptions to the detriment of the defendant. See Roger Merle/ Andre Vitu, Traite de droit criminel II (1973) 134-137. 19 On the discrepancy between the law's proclamations and actual adjudicative standards in the criminal process, see Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, (supra n. 10) 542544. 20 Observe also that where the jury is used without an official investigative apparatus, there is no official file to organize and influence the examination of evidence. It is also less necessary to insist on "laying a foundation" that evidence about to be presented is admissible.
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knowledge" and sentiment. F ollowing an atomistic presentation of evidence, the Anglo-Americanjury returns an enigmatic verdict without indicating facts that have been found or reasons therefor; after a more holistic treatment of evidence, Continental judges render a judgment in which factual findings are identified and explained. In other words, an atomistic law of evidence produces a "global" decision, while a more holistic law Ieads to ajudgment in an atornistic mode. At least on the Anglo-American side, then, the peculiar law of evidence can be understood as an attempt to curb the natural inclinations oflay decisionmakers rather than to release their cognitive propensities. B. Differing Objectives of Justice
lt passes largely unnoticed that the law of evidence responds to factors beyond variance in the composition of the adjudicative body and other structural variables. One such factor, on which I shall concentrate in the rest ofthis essay, is a divergence in the objectives of legal proceedings, which in turn engenders distinct views about the tasks of the factfinder. Proceedings can be devoted to conflict resolution, as in the garden variety civil suit; alternatively, the process may be aimed at an independent policy objective, such as suppression of crime. While the first objective favors party control over procedural action, including factfinding, the second objective favors court control and a nonpartisanstyle of factfinding. 21 These varying pictures of adjudication relate to atomistic and holistic treatment of evidence.
The dispute-resolving process begins with the selection of facts to be proven: only facts "in issue" between the parties are subject to factfinding activity. Admissionsand stipulations of the parties compel the adjudicator to take facts as ascertained even if he is not convinced of their existence and even if proof concerning closely related facts produces serious doubts about the accuracy of admissions and stipulations. Obviously, an artifical "chopping-up" of natural sequences inheres in this arrangement: discrepancies between what is "found" and what is believed often result. In the dispute-resolving process, the parties also decide what evidence should be used, and the facttinder cannot demand all informational sources his cognitive needs may require. Since parties (through their lawyers) also are in charge of adducing evidence, the manner of presentation produces a dramatic decomposition ofwhat otherwise would be natural "wholes" to the factfinder. In this arena each evidentiary source "belongs" to one ofthe disputants ("He is my witness!") and is used in a partisan fashion to elucidate only information favorable to that disputant. Rehearsals of witnesses and other partisan use of 21 For an extensive argument supporting this contention, see Mirjan Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority, A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (1986) 77-80, 84-88 (cited: Damaska, Faces). Policy-implementing objectives vary greatly and the variance may affect the foundations of the law of evidence.
7*
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evidentiary sources arenot always viewed askance and may, as in America, be regarded as necessary. In dispute resolution, the law of evidence gradually embraces constraints on the spontaneous flow ofinformation and on commonsense inferences, irrespective ofwhether the trier offact is lay or professional.lt may now seem unfair for the facttinder to use his disbelief in the story of a witness for one side as evidentiary support for his adversary's case. 22 Evidence proffered by one side may be excluded if- although probative- it tends to support the case of the profferor's opponent: when judged from the profferor's perspective, such evidence does not make his case more likely and is irrelevant. I t also seems unfair to Iet a party gain an advantage by conveying some information improperly: the .excltusion of such information seems mandated and requires tinkering with spontaneous mechanisms of belief formation. Even mere reprimands of a party's attorney convey a message that there is a difference between everyday information gathering and the formal procedures by which factual inquiries are governed. 23 And as each party has to prove his case, the burden of proof with respect to isolated issues has tobe allocated- an atomistic tendency indeed. The resulting impediments to the facttinder's native learning processes arenot unduly troubling in a case devoted to the resolution of a narrow interpersonal dispute. Conflict-resolvers arenot so much interested in accurately reconstructing what really happened as they are in deciding which disputant has made a better factual and legal argument. And this decision need not be based on belief in the truth of facts in issue: greater probability that one case is true often suffices. The different objective of policy-implementation requires a different facttinding posture. An example of a policy-implementing process is criminal prosecution, where the facttinder's task is to ascertain whether factual preconditions exist for the imposition of blame and punishment. The selection of facts to be proven is subjected here to outside limitations much less than in civillitigation: at least initially, the investigator is relatively free to fashion factual hypotheses as he likes, and is not limited to using only those informational sources that are suggested by the parties. Moreover, all evidence is "bis" evidence as he strives to build a unitary case with it. Narratives of witnesses are not filtered through partisan examination, and commonsense inferences can be drawn from the testimony (or demeanour) of witnesses, regardless of whether they relate information favorable or detrimental to the defendant. And if the facttinder gains the impression that the defendant lies, this impression can be used as 22 On the problern of whether a party can win with little or no affirmative proof just because witnesses ofhis Opponentare disbelieved, see, e.g., Fleming James, Jr. f Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure (3d ed. 1985) 344f. In a system where parties make their own cases, it also may become difficult to let the party attack the credibility ofhis own witness. 23 See Damaska, Faces (supra n. 21) 122.
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evidence against him even as his testimony contains protestations of innocence. 24 The potential imposition of the criminal sanction makes it difficult to invite the adjudicator to disregard his personal conviction, since the consequences of his findings are grave. Furthermore, that the factfinder actually will reach a state of personal conviction is more likely where he hirnself is shaping the factual inquiry rather than merely evaluating a database developed by warring adversaries. Of course, the degree to which these features surface in criminal trials depends on the degree to which proceedings are adapted to the policyimplementing objective. 25
111. Anglo-American and Contineotal Systems Revisited The preceding discussion would Iead one to expect that civil evidence everywhere is treated atomistically and that the approach to criminal evidence everywhere is more holistic. In fact, in both legal traditions factfinding in garden variety civil cases does tend to be somewhat more atomistic. This is especially clear on the Continent, where forms of civil procedure interfere with free belief formation more than criminal procedure tolerates and, rhetoric notwithstanding, civil decisions regularly are based on standards suggesting an atomistic approach to evidence. 26 Even in Anglo-American jurisdictions, where differences between civil and criminal evidence are much less pronounced, holistic approaches may be somewhat moreprominent in criminal than in civil cases. 27 24 Observe that Contineutal systems generally do not require criminal defendants to testify under oath: they expect that the guilty defendant may lie. But they hope that useful - indeed crucial- information can be obtained from the defendant's demeanor and from the unpersuasiveness of his exculpating story. In contrast, Anglo-American judges are more reluctant to allow the prosecution to prove an element of crime solely on the basis of negative impressions generated by the defendant's protestation of innocence. It is thus easier for Contineutal systems to accord the defendant the "right to lie." See Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers (supra n. 10) 528. 25 One adaptation that preserves the policy-implementing nature of proceedings quite weil is to organize the trial as a review of the investigator's work. Of course, if there is no official investigation generating a dossier, or if evidentiary material gathered during the investigation is effectively excluded, conflict-resolving forms emerge at the trial and affect the character of factfinding. 26 See supra n. 17. In a minority of Contineutal systems it is openly admitted that the law can Iimit the civil judge to ascertaining only the "formal" truth, because so many constraints are placed on the investigation offacts. See, e.g., the French system, described in Merle I Vitu (supra n. 18) 15, 129. Although French civil procedure underwent significant changes in 1972, the situation remains basically unaltered. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger I Hans W. Baade I Mirjan R. Damaskal Peter E. Herzog, Comparative Law, Cases- Text- Materials (5th ed. 1988) 426. 27 It is symptomatic that those Anglo-American theorists who favor the probabilistic expression offactfinders' reasoning find it much easier to apply their "atomistic" models to civil rather than criminallitigation. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of
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Nevertheless, the more holistic treatment of evidence in modern Continental legal culture and the more atomistic approach in Anglo-American jurisdictions cannot be denied. How can this divergence be explained? An important part of the answer may be that the objectives of justice arenot identically perceived on the Continent and in Anglo-American Iands and that the two farnilies of legal systems are not equally ready to adapt the treatment of evidence to procedural tasks. On the Continent, the realization is very old that civil and criminal justice serve different goals and call for divergent evidentiary regulation, including greater party control and lower proof requirements in civil than in criminal cases. 28 Significantly too, the theory of legal proof, borne between the vellum sheets of medieval manuscripts, was far more atornistic in civil than in crirninal cases. 29 Under the influence of the Church, however, the development of evidence came to be regarded early on as an inalienable attribute of judicial office: just as the expiation of a wrong was not to be left in the discretion of a private party so the "ventilation of the truth" was not to be surrendered to the litigants. Thus, even as Continental civil judges came to be bound by litigants' offers of proof and even suggestions for what witnesses should be asked, the examination of evidence remained in the hands of the judge. It remained in judicial hands even in those countries that adopted - many centuries later Civil Trials: B.U. L. Rev. 66 (1986) 401-437 (436). Of course, the relation of civil to criminal evidence may be different in those common-law jurisdictions that have retained the criminal but virtually abolished the civil jury: with pressures toward atomism generated by jury trials gone, civil evidence may lose an important source of its atomistic character. On the other hand, where, as in the United States, civil cases are increasingly thought of as implicating the public interest rather than the resolution of "narrow" disputes, civil evidence may be increasingly imagined in policy-implementing terms. 28 Fora thirteenth century example, sec Bernardus Dorna, Summa Libellorum CXCIII, in: Ludwig Wahrmund, Quellen zur Geschichte des Römisch-Kanonischen Processes im Mitelalter, Band I, Heft I (1905) 96. For a good overview of authorities, sec Walter Ullmann, Medieval Principles of Evidence: Law Q. Rev. 62 (1946) 77ff. 29 The degree to which rules oflegal proofinterfered with free beliefformation is greatly exaggerated. In criminal matters, these rules had so much free play that they seldom, if ever, compelled the judge to convict juridice sed non natura/iter, i.e., against his better judgment. For example, conflict among legal proofs was to be resolved by the judge ex motu animi sui. See Tancredus in Friedrich Bergmann, Pillii, Tancredi, Gratiae Libri de Iudiciorum Ordine (1842) 246. More importantly, "full" legal proofcalled for a finding that witnesses were above all objection (omni exceptione maiores), and this finding inevitably entailed subjective evaluations. The main effect of the system in criminal matters was negative: it sometimes prevented imposition of the most serious corporal punishments in the absence oflegally specified evidence. See Friedrich K. von Savigny, Die Prinzipien in Beziehung auf eine neue Strafprozessordnung: Archiv für Preussisches Strafrecht 6 (1858) 488f. It must also be remernbered that a dispute-resolving concept of justice prevailed at the time when legal-proof theories were developed. Inquisitorlai criminal proceedings were treated at the time as a necessary aberration, a forma processus extraordinaria. See Damaska, Faces (supra n. 21) 188.
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the jury trial for the disposition of certain narrow classes of crimes. Accordingly, potent pressures toward an atomistic viewpoint generated by party-driven development of evidence never were released in the mainstream of Continental justice administration, be it in civil or in criminal matters. Decisive for the development of contemporary Continental approaches to evidence was the strong reaction in the eighteenth century agairrst the then regnant system of legal proof. This opposition was focused on criminal justice, where legal proof was blamed for the rise of judicial torture and for miscarriages of justice. After the French Revolution, the principle of free evaluation of evidence was enthusiastically embraced, and factfinders were invited to Iisten to an inner voice of intimate conviction in deciding on guilt or innocence. 30 This apotheosis of free proof also influenced civil justice, although - in most countries - the primary spillover was the rhetorical adornment of civil adjudications. In reality, civil procedure emerged from the Revolution with few changes and continued to contain a wide repertoire of constraints on the free pursuit of truth by the judge. 31 In short, the rhetoric of free belief formation springing from criminaljustice reforms came to permeate the entire Continental system of adjudication. On the Anglo-American side, the absence of an official investigating apparatus combined with forms of private prosecution to impart even to the criminal justice system a pronounced conflict-solving flavor. When the jury emerged from its Angevin chrysalis and proofhad tobe presented in court, there was no official investigator to supply the facttinder with systematically structured evidence; even in criminal trials there was no comprehensive holistic investigation to penetrate or seep into the trial. The task of collecting and developing evidence feil upon the victim and the defendant, who conveyed information through spirited altercations. Even if there was no jury and even if the judge wanted to imitate the active Roman-canonjudex, he could not take over the examination of evidence: there was no investigative file to irrform him of the Iineaments of the case and to enable him to interrogate effectively. And when lawyers were admitted to felony trials in the eighteenth century, it was natural that "atomistic" evidentiary practices, first developed in civil cases, were transferred to the domain of criminal justice. Small wonder, then, that the Anglo-American administration of justice as a whole came to be viewed as an engagement in dispute resolution and that an approach to evidence congenial to this single objective prevailed.
See Aldemar Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure (1913) 402fT. The French Code of Civil Procedure of 1806 was an adaptation of the Ordinance of 1667. See Raoul van Caenegem, History of European Civil Procedure, in: Int'l Ency. Comp. L. XVI (Civil Procedure) eh. 2, ed. by Mauro Cappelletti (1972) 88. In Germany, legal proof rules for civillitigation remained in force until the second part ofthe nineteenth century. See Walter (supra n. 16) 82. 30 31
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Because the policy-implementing tasks of modern criminal justice cannot be repressed, the demands of contemporary criminallaw often chafe and strain against traditional evidentiary arrangements. 32 Much as Continental thinking on civil evidence for "private" disputes must in some countries be liberated from a rhetoric suited to the disposition of criminal cases, so authentic criminal evidence in Anglo-American jurisdictions has yet to emerge from the complex layering of traditionallaw suited to the adjudiciation of interpersonal disputes. An understanding of the atomistic and holistic approaches to the evaluation of evidence should inform development and reform in both Anglo-American and Continental evidence law.
32 Martin v. Ohio (supra n. 7) illustrates the tension between a conception that the factfinder's task is fully to establish the criminal character of an event and a conception that his task consists in deciding on two evidentiary cases presented by the litigants. See also Damaska, Faces (supra n. 21) 234-237. In America, of late, the view seems to be gaining ground that the objective of criminal trials differs from that of civil proceedings. The task in the former is not to choose among "stories ofthe parties," but to find "a plausible explanation ofan event." See Allen (supra n. 27) 436. Implications for the law of evidence are obvious.
American and European Models of Constitutional Justice Louis Favoreu*
I. Introducdon In hisdassie work The Civil Law Tradition, 1 John Henry Merryman shows how the civillaw countries have turned toward a system of constitutionaljustice different from that ofthe United States. It seems appropriate, in this volume of tributes, to reexamine the distinction between what one may call the American and European models of constitutional justice. 2 I will focus on the European model, for the American model is well-known and needs no introduction; however, comparing it with a different system may bring out aspects heretofore unrecognized, or at least cast them in a new light. For a long period there was only one model of constitutional justice, that offered by the United States; the institution became identified with this model to the point that the expression- untranslatable - "judicial review" sufficed to characterize the entire idea. This is no Ionger so; today judicial review is recognized as but one of the forms or types of constitutional justice: a distinction is usually made between judicial review along the American model, and what is sometimes called - for Iack of a better term - "constitutional review" characterizing the European model. But the identification of constitutional review and constitutional justice with the American model has been so strong that even today there are many (in the United States as well as in Europe) who continue to believe that only judicial review exists, and that all systems of constitutionaljustice found in the world (approximately one hundred) belong to the judicial review farnily. This is, however, far from being the case, for if the American model has been much irnitated in Latin America, it has not been
* Professor at the Faculty ofLaw and Political Science, University of Aix-Marseille III (Law, Economics, and Science); Honorary President of the University. I thank Cynthia Vroom, Maitre de conferences, University of Aix-Marseille III, for the English translation of this essay. Abbreviations: A.I.J.C. = Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle; R.D.P. = Revue du droit public et de Ia science politique en France et a l'etranger. 1 The Civil Law Tradition, An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985). 2 This had been donein 1942 in a masterful fashion by Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation, A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American Constitution: Journal of Politics 4 (1942) 183.
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systematically followed in Europe and Africa, where the European model has also been influential. In addition, the American model is not easily exportable: if many countries have theoretically adopted this system, we shall see that it is in factoperative in very few. The European model did not emerge until the 1920s. Three variations appeared between the two World Wars: 3 Austria (1920-1938), Czechoslovakia (1920-1938), and Republican Spain (1931-1939). lt is sometimes referred to as the "Austrian model," partly because the High Constitutional Court of Austria was one of its first illustrations, but above all because its first theoretician was the Austrian Hans Kelsen. Today, however, it is called the "European model" because after World War II it was adopted in the constitutions of several West European countries (Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, ltaly in 1948, Francein 1958, Cypressin 1960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1976, Spainin 1978, and Belgium in 1984) and even in Bastern Europe (Yugoslavia in 1963, Hungary in 1984, and Polandin 1985). 4 Notallsystems of constitutional justice fit into one or the other of the two categories described above: there are also "mixed systems" in which judicial review and constitutional review are combined; but the mixed systems that actually work are rare, and where they do function, they evolve toward one or the other of the two principal models. To explain as clearly as possible the originality of the European model compared to the American model (part 111 of this essay), and what the two models have in common (part IV), we must first understand why the Europeans did not adopt the American system.
II. Why Europe Did Not Adopt the American System At the outset it must be noted that certain European countries do have a system of constitutional justice similar to that of the United States: Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, 5 and also Greece (with certain modifications). 6 But in general, these systems are not very effective. Efforts to transplant the American model were not infrequent, especially between the two world wars: there was a very strong movement in favor of adopting the system of judicial review in France, 7 in the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 and even in Switzerland. 9 3 For an excellent discussion of these three experiments, see Pedro Cruz Villa/on, La formaci6n del sistema europeo de control de constitucionalidad (1918-1939) (1987). 4 Concerning the extension ofthe Austrian model throughout Europe, see Le contröle juridictionnel des lois, ed. by Louis Favoreuj J.A. Jolowicz (1986). 5 Concerning these systems, see E. Smith, Les pays scandinaves, in: Favoreu I Jolowicz (supra n. 4) 225. 6 Epaminodas Spiliotopoulos, Judicial Review of Legislative Acts in Greece: Temple L. Rev. 56 (1983) 463-502.
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This movement failed, for reasons that are not entirely clear, but that we will attempt to discern by distinguishing those factors that touch on the substance of law from those that are institutional, and by taking into account situational or political factors. A. Substantive Factors These are factors arising from the very nature of the legal order in various European countries: the "sanctification" of statutes (Ia loi), the corresponding concept ofthe separation ofpowers, and the principle of equality before the law. 1. "Sanctification" of statutes. This was a quasi-general phenomenon in Europe until World War II. Whether it rests on the British tradition or on the heritage of the French Revolution, the sovereignty of Parliament and thus of legislation is a central element of the European legal and political order. According to the formula borrowed from Jean Jacques Rousseau and set forth in article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789: "The law (loi) is the expression ofthe general will." As a result, it cannot be harmful to those citizens whose right "to participate, personally or through their representatives, in its formation" is affirmed. 10 Under the ancien regime it was said that "the king can do no wrong;" following the Revolution it would be said that "the legislator can do no wrong."
In the United States control oflaws was conceived from the beginning (at the end of the eighteenth century) as a way of limiting the authority of the colonial power (England). In Europe, on the contrary, it was the Iack of control over the law (the expression ofthe general will) that was seen as a victory for democracy over royal power. 2. Separation of powers. This concept in Europe was very different from that established in the United States during the same period. Indeed, because the law was sacred and parlements (local courts) had abused their powers at the end ofthe ancien regime, 11 the revolutionaries of 1789 forbad courts from reviewing not only statutes but also acts of the executive power. 12 7 The movement was at first doctrinal, then political. Launched by an initiative of the Societe de legislation comparee in 1902, it was taken up by the great writers on public law (Duguit, Hauriou and Jeze) and appeared in political debates after 1920. 8 See Jean-Claude Beguin, Le contröle de constitutionnalite des lois en R.F.A. (1982). 9 See Andreas Auer, La juridiction constitutionnelle en Suisse, Helhinget Lichtenhahn (1983). 10 We will come back to the brilliant exposition of this idea by the author who best synthesized it: Raymond Carre de Malberg, La loi expression de Ia volonte generale (1933, reissued 1984). 11 See Merryman (supra n. 1) 15: "In France thejudicial aristocracy were targets ofthe Revolution ... because oftheir failure to distinguish very clearly between applying law and making law."
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Executive acts would be reviewed, but by a special tribunal, the Conseil d'Etat, which was progressively developing an effective review of executive acts. To the revolutionaries and their descendants the dangeraus power under the ancien regime was the executive (which represented arbitrary power) and not the legislative power, which represented the triumph of democracy. But how could this be reconciled with the existence of a constitution, the supreme law of the state? As explained by Carre de Malberg: 13 it is up to the legislator, at the very moment of enactment, to examine whether the law being deliberated is in conformity with the Constitution and to resolve any difficulties that may arise on this point. The Legislature will interpret, through popular representation, constitutional provisions that control difficulties of this sort. Finally, when the Legislature has adopted a law, the very fact ofits enactment puts the law above all questions regarding its constitutionality. As a result, no authority, and especially no judge, can intervene to retum to the question of constitutionality. The sovereignhirnself has, through the Legislature, solved and exhausted the problem. All this means that interpretation of the Constitution belongs to Parliament: it alone, because it exercises the powers ofthe sovereign, is judge ofthe constitutionality of its own laws. The result is that the courts do not interpret the Constitution; as soon as a law has been properly enacted, they must apply it to facts falling within its terms, and they cannot go back beyond its enactment: the judge thus applies only ordinary laws, it is not up to him to apply the Constitution.
Respect for the Constitution is, therefore, achieved through the self-restraint of the legislator. 3. Equality before the law. To the first two factors I add another fundamental idea, which helps explain the reluctance to adopt the American system: the principle of equality before the law. The Revolution of 1789 was first and foremost the affirmation of the equality of all citizens, in reaction against an ancien regime society dominated by the idea of inequality and privilege. As article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man affirms, "the law must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes." In European societies the memory of inequalities perpetuated by the monarchy and aristocracy led to a rejection of any unequal application ofthe law. In the system ofjudicial review, however, the same law would not be applied to an individual if he could persuade a judge to declare it unconstitutional, but it would be applied to another individual if he could not obtain this declaration. Even today, this would seem to be an injustice.
12 Id.: "The purpose was to prevent intrusion of the judiciary into areas -lawmaking and the execution of the laws- reserved to the other two powers." 13 (Supra n. 10) 131.
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8. Institutional Factors
The first question is whether a parliamentary regime (of the British type) is less favorable than a presidential regime (of the American type) to the implementation of judicial review. Most European regimes are parliamentary or semiparliamentary. Judicial review does function in states with a parliamentary regime, but doubtless without the same efficiency or effectiveness as in the United States. lt is often said that the federal structure ofthe United States has facilitated or justified the implementation of judicial review. But some European countries bad federal structures, and still did notadopt judicial review.
More determinative seems the consideration developed by Mauro Cappelletti, according to which Contineotal European judges are not apt to exercise this type of control, both because they do not have sufficient authority to do so, and because they are not technically trained to do so. 14 I would add that they also Iack the "legitimacy" necessary to the exercise of this function. American judges are either elected or appointed with the agreement of elected political authorities. Contineotal European judges are "career judges" andin a sense bureaucrats. Before an all-powerful parliament they do not dareinsist on their conception ofthe law. This is especially true in view of the fact that, unlike American judges who mostly pass on the constitutionality of state laws, European judges would have to verify- above all and even sometimes exclusively - the constitutionality of national laws, emanating from the representatives of the whole of the nation. That is why Contineotal Europeanjudges have never dared tostartdown the path to judicial rev1ew. An additional explanation may be found in the absence ofunity between the legal order and the judicial apparatus found in most West European countries. The system of judicial review functions weil only where there is a unity of jurisdictions, such as in common law countries: "in these countries there is no division of Iitigation, and the constitutional dimension can be addressed at all stages, with no need for a separate procedure and no risk of conflicting opinions on the constitutionality offundamental texts." 15 In Greece, where there aredual jurisdictions, a very complicated mechanism was required creating a special High Court, a sort of committee with equal representation responsible for deciding between the administrative and judicial supreme courts in case of differing opinions on the constitutionality of a law. Greece thus rejoins, in a certain sense, the European model.
14 See in particular Cappelletti, Rapport general, in: Cours constitutionnelles europ{:ennes et droits fondamentaux, ed. by Louis Favoreu (1982) 461. 15 Louis Favoreu, Les Cours constitutionnelles (1986).
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C. A Political Factor
This last factor was originally linked to the political climate. In 1921 a work was published that would have a profound impact in Europe: Edouard Lambert's Gouvernement des juges et Ia Iutte contre Ia Legislation sociale aux Etats-Unis. This work gave credence to the idea that judicial review is a conservative instrument permitting obstruction of all social progress by blocking legislative reform, an idea reinforced by the conflict between Roosevelt and the Supreme Court during the New Deal era. This system of judicial review was thus perceived as favorable to the political right, and as such rejected by the parties of the left, especially European socialists and communists. Judicial review, thus identified with a "govemment of judges," is seennot only as an attack on the sovereignty of statutes, but also as an instrument of social conservatism, in the sense that it gives magistrates the power to oppose the general will. D. 1be Situation after World War II
After World War II certain obstacles to the institution of judicial review disappeared, but others remained. This explains why the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, for example, would notadopt the American system, unlike Japan where the victorious Americans imposed their system. The "sanctification" of statutes diminished with the awareness (due to the excesses ofthe Nazi and Fascist regimes) that a parliament can be as dangerous to the rights and liberties of the individual as courts. In conformity with the American model, recourse to the protection of a constitution was sanctified in place of statutes. But the factors suggested above persist, and it is thus the model developed by Kelsen that has been adopted on a wide scale. It does in any case present a considerable advantage over the American system: that is, the possibility of being rapidly and effectively implemented. Indeed, in countries ernerging from periods of dictatorship or authoritarianism, it is impossible to imagine how a true system of judicial review can be created without prior renewal of the judicial corps. How could an American system function in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, or Portugal, with judges from the preceding period of dictatorship named to the courts? Adopting judicial review in these countries would require "purification" on a massive scale of the corps of magistrates, while one could immediately find a dozen or so constitutional judges with no prior culpability during those periods, capable of carrying out their duties without mental reservations. Those who regret that Poland did not adopt the American system of judicial review would do weil to meditate on the possibility of making this system work: with judges appointed by the current government and dependent on it. These considerations explain the massive presence of law
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professors on European constitutional courts. 16 It was mostly from among their ranksthat independent and competent men could be found, easily and rapidly.
111. How the European Model Differs from the American Model Six essential traits emerge: the existence of constitutional Iitigation distinct from other types of Iitigation; the vesting of this type of judgment in the single jurisdiction of a constitutional court or tribunal; the uniqueness of this court; the conditions for referral to the court; the nature of constitutionallitigation; and the consequences of decisions or judgments handed down by a constitutional court. A. Separation of Constitutional Litigation from Ordinary Litigation
In "diffuse control" ofthe American type, courts are called upon to decide all aspects ofthe same dispute without distinguishing between the civil, administrative, or constitutional questions raised in the affair: American courts have plenary jurisdiction. European courts, on the other hand, are obliged tosortout the questions raised and to set aside those touching on the constitutionality of a law whose application may determine the outcome of the case. They refer the question to the constitutional court, or simply refuse to examine the question because they are not competent to decide it. B. Jurisdictional Monopoly in a Constitutional Court
Questions concerning the constitutionality of laws constitute in and of themselves a suit whose resolution is exclusively attributed to the constitutional court. It has a monopoly: in its hands is concentrated the power to interpret the constitution, usually in first and last resort, but sometimes as a last resort only (as in the case of Portugal). The advantages of this concentration are obvious: unity of interpretation reinforces its cohesiveness, reduces inequality, and assuresjuridical certainty. The Supreme Court in the American system does the same, but it must harmonize or synthesize a whole series ofinterpretations, often contradictory, emanating from lower court judges. In Europe the first and only interpretation is in theory given directly by the constitutional court. C. Constitutional Court Uniqueness
The uniqueness of the constitutional court lies partly in the absence of Connections with the regular judicial apparatus. The constitutional court is not at the top of .the jurisdictional edifice: it is outside this edifice and has no 16 Already observed by Taylor Cole, Three Constitutional Courts, A Comparison: Am. Pol. Sei. Rev. (1959) 963-985.
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structural bond with it. 17 lts place is very particular in the legal and constitutional order. Indeed, it is not part of the judicial power. As the eminent Italian constitutionalist, Vezio Crisaffuli, emphasizes, the ltalian Constitutional Court: is outside not only the judicial order, but the jurisdictional structure in the broadest sense of the terrn: ... the Constitutional Court ... remains outside of the traditional powers of the state; it forms an independentpower whose rote is to assure respect of the Constitution in all areas. 18
This is true to the scheme established by Kelsen in 1928: "It is a body ... independent ... of all other state authority that must be charged with the nullification of unconstitutional acts - that is, a constitutional jurisdiction or tribunal." 19 This joins with the German conception, which makes the constitutional tribunal a "constitutional body," that is, more than a single tribunal. Unlike what happens in the United States, the constitutional jurisdiction is not integrated into the third power, the judicial power. It is outside the three powers (legislative, executive, andjudicial), charged with overseeing the respect by the judiciary to the constitution.
D. Referral to a Constitutional Court The fourth characteristic of the European model stems from the form of referral to constitutional courts. In the American system, individuals normally commence constitutional cases through an objection raised during an ordinary proceeding before any court. In the European system, however, individuals are not usually involved in the instigation of a constitutional procedure. Three classes of applicants are potentially involved. The first category of applicants is found in all systems arising from the European model (Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia). It includes most often political authorities such as chiefs ofstate (president ofthe republic) or ofthe government (prime minister), parliamentary assernblies or their presidents, parliamentary minorities determined either by proportion (one third of the deputies in Austria and Germany, one tenth in Portugal) or by a minimumnurober (60 deputies or senators in France, 50 deputies in Spain and Poland) - and regional or provincial executive heads or assemblies. Public authorities are sometimes 17 There are some mixed forrnulas in which one chamber ofthe supreme court assumes the rote ofthe constitutional chamber (as, e.g., in Morocco); but this is not a constitutional court and is outside the European model. 18 Vezio Crisafulli, Le systeme de contröle de Ia constitutionnalite des lois en Italie: R.D.P. 84 (1968) 83-132 (130). 19 Hans Kelsen, La garantie juridictionnelle de Ia Constitution (La Justice constitutionnelle): R.D.P. 44 (1928) 198-257 (223).
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permitted to refer laws to the constitutional courts: in Spain the ombudsman (I)efensor del Pueblo) or the attorney general (Ministerio Fiscal) andin Portugal the Provedm: da Justi{:a The second category of applicants, the courts themselves, is found in nearly all of the above countries, with almost identical mechanisms. In Spain, ltaly, and the Federal Republic of Germany, any jurisdiction may refer a question of constitutionality raised before it, during an ordinary procedure, to the constitutional court. In Austria, only the appellate and final instance courts may do so. In France this mechanism does not exist, but some French authorities are in favor of granting this option to the two supreme jurisdictions (Conseil d'Etat and Cour de cassation). 20 The third category of applicants- individuals- have only a small place in the European model, with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany. In that country, individuals may directly lodge a constitutional complaint against a law before the Federal Constitutional Court if the law threatens their fundamental rights and ifthey have exhausted all other avenues of appeal. Many such complaints are introduced each year, but the vast majority are dismissed by three-judge "filtering" commissions. Among the rare complaints judged by the Constitutional Court itself, only a few succeed. This type of individual recourse has also existed in Austria since 1975, but it is used much less frequently than in Germany. In Spain individuals may appeal directly to the Constitutional Tribunal by a procedure known as amparo, but this cannot be employed directly against a law. Only in cases where the Constitutional Tribunal, presented with an amparo against an administrative or judicial act, decides that it poses a question of the constitutionality of a law and that it is advisable to send it on to the Tribunal sitting en banc, does one arrive at an examination of the constitutionality of a law. But it is then the Tribunalthat refers the question to itself, and the "author" of the appeal is no Ionger the individual. This reduced place of the individual in general is explained by the nature of the Iitigation treated by constitutional courts. E. The Nature of Constitutional Litigation
In the American system Iitigation (in theory) is exclusively concrete: the existence of a "case or controversy" alone triggers examination of the constitutionality of a law. The European system, by contrast, is characterized by the existence of an abstract or objective question susceptible of submission to the constitutional courts: this control may be exercised a priori or a posteriori, with no concrete dispute involving individual situations. Of course, there is also concrete normative control in ltaly, Germany, Austria, and Spain. But it must be emphasized that, if the objection of unconstitution2° For the opinion of 15 French specialists on this question, see Commentaire 9 (1986/87) 682-687.
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ality is raised during an ordinary proceeding, the constitutional hearing that is grafted onto this ordinary proceeding will be judged by the constitutional court in a quasi-autonomaus manner and can result in a judgment having effect erga omnes (unlike the limited effects of a holding in the American system, as discussed below). The objection of unconstitutionality "European-style" must not be confused with the objection of unconstitutionality "American-style." Although some ltalian authors consider that the ltalian system is closely related to judicial review, this is not at all clear, for the Italian Constitutional Court, unlike the American Supreme Court, retains a monopoly in evaluation of the constitutionality of laws. As for direct recourse of the German type, it does presuppose a threat to the fundamental rights of an individual; but by the time it arrives at the Constitutional Court, the question of unconstitutionality has lost its original subjective or personal character and has assumed that of a decision of principle with an objective, if not abstract, nature. F. Effects of Constitutional Court Decisions According to the American model, the decision of a tribunal on the objection of unconstitutionality can have only "relative" effects, binding on the parties involved and on alllower courts in the jurisdiction. By contrast, the decisions of constitutional courts have an erga omnes effect, 21 not only if they declare unconstitutional the legislative provisions submitted, but- at least for certain courts 22 - even when they reject the appeal. This arises from the objective nature of constitutionallitigation before these courts, whatever the forms of referral. Even if at the outset there is an individual question or subjective interest, the decision eventually handed down by the court (as in Italy) has a general effect (not limited to the parties in the case), doubtless because the concern for juridical certainty and respect for the principle of equality require such a result. Considerations ofjuridical certainty and equality before the law have particular force in Europe. In the U.S., on the other hand, the multiplicity of judicial systems corresponding to each of the fifty American states doubtless explains the acceptance of inequality before the law and therefore of inconsistent application of a law according to the determination of its constitutionality in a particular jurisdiction. Constitutional courts have managed in a relatively short time (twenty years) to take root in Europe, while efforts over several decades to transplant the American model have been in vain. European countries have thus provided themselves with an instrument that is now indispensable in all modern 21 With the possible exception of the decisions on concrete control handed down by the Constitutional Tribunal of Portugal and the Court of Arbitration of Belgium. 22 This is the case, e.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, and Austria.
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constitutions; in taking a path different from that traced by the American model, they have arrived (or are in the process of arriving) at results similar to those achieved in a system of judicial review. Even certain American authors, in comparing the two models, have begun to question the qualities and defects of their own system 23 and to propose that, even in the United States, it must be understood that there are two systems, not just one: It is time that both American and European constitutional scholars conceive of constitutional control as the "genus," and the American modelas just one "species" (the
judicial variation) of constitutional control. This approach permits a more objective and instructive weighing of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different institutional approaches to implementing constitutional control. More importantly, it will facilitate a more sophisticated dialogue on the law-politics dialectic that inheres in any regime of constitutional control. 24
One can only agree with Frederick Morton; but to the extent that the two "species" belong to the same "genus," there are still a number of sirnilarities between them.
IV. Common Elements in the Two Models Betonging to the same farnily, the two systems cannot help but resemble each other. The first step was to distinguish them, for in the past there has been a tendency to confuse them. The next step is to bring out their "farnily traits," that is, their common elements. We should first, however, identify two levels of comparison: if one considers only the highest stage of the American model, that is, the U.S. Supreme Court, the similarities areeasy tobring out; if, on the other hand, we take into account the whole ofthe system, the elements of sirnilarity are less visible. A. The United States Supreme Court and Constitutional Courts
The sirnilarity between the U.S. Supreme Court and constitutional courts seems so evident that the two types of constitutional jurisdiction have long been confused. In France, there has been- since the Third Republic- a tradition of "false irnitation" ofthe American model: only the head ofthe American system -the U.S. Supreme Court-was retained, and all the rest forgotten, thatis, the ensemble of lower courts. And believing to irnitate the American system, a 23 For a comparison between the U.S. Supreme Court and the French Conseil constitutionnel, see Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States: N.Y.U.L. Rev. 57 (1982) 363-442; Michael H. Davis, The Law (Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and the U.S. Supreme Court: Am. J. Comp. L. 34 (1986) 45-92; F.L. Morton, Judicial Review in France, A Comparative Analysis: Am. J. Comp. L. 36 (1988) 89-110. 24 Morton (supra n. 23) 110.
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number of proposed reforms envisioned the creation of a Kelsen-type constitutional court, separate from ordinary courts and with a special jurisdiction (for constitutionallitigation). Leaving aside this situation in France, consider the following similarities. First, the composition of the two institutions. In both cases, the number of judges is relatively small (between nine and sixteen), and these judges are appointed by elected political authorities (the president, gouvernement, or legislative assemblies) based on their political affiliation, but without implying dependence, once appointed, on the political authorities or parties to which they owe their position. 25 In this respect, we can compare the recent nominations to the United States Supreme Court (and the rejection of two judges deemed too conservative by the Senate) to nominations in Germany, Italy, and France. 26 The influence ofpolitical parties, far from being abnormal, is on the contrary a condition of the smooth functioning of these institutions, for it endows them with democratic legitimacy. It is true, however, that this similarity is valid mainly for the American Supreme Court: it would be more difficult to document for other supreme cou~ts, such ts that of Canada or of Japan. Second, there is some convergence in procedural matters. Although there is a clear theoretical difference between the two systems on this point, as noted above, recent American practices (such astest cases and dass actions) visibly reduce this Fap, as do the evolution of the notion of standing 27 and the developmept of the declaratory judgment. 28 Third, if theoretically constitutional courts do not have the possibility of choosing the cases they decide, as does the U.S. Supreme Court, a similar result is achieved through the system of "filtering commissions" implemented in Germany, Italy, and Spain. It is true that there remains an evident disproportion in the volume of cases judged directly by the Supreme Court and by constitutional courts (especially the Italian Court) in the area of constitutionality. In any case, in both models the end result is that the function of constitutional review oflaws is less to resolve particular individual cases than to resolve a !arger question in the general interest. It is thus a question- in either system- of an "objective function," permitting the "constitutional judge, each timehe deems it useful ... to assure the 'updating' and systematic development of constitutionallaw." 29
See Favoreu (supra n. 15) 18 f. See A.I.J.C. 2 (1986) 464 (for France), 466 (for Ita1y). 27 See Garlicki/ Zakrewski, La protection juridictionnelle de Ia Constitution dans Je monde contemporain: A.I.J.C. 1 (1985) 29. 28 Davis (supra n. 23) 82. 29 Beguin (supra n. 8) 123. 25
26
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B. Less Obvious Common Elements Here we consider the American model as a whole - not only the U.S. Supreme Court- and the European systemstaken globally, that is, with the constitutional courts inserted into the judicial and political order. 1. Constitutional justice and the legal order. The American and European models are sometimes seen as opposites with regard to their respective influence on the legal order. The American model assures the Supreme Court control over the total ensemble of courts, and thus direction of the legal order, thanks to its general competence and status as the Supreme Court. On the other side, the European model- to the extent that constitutional courtsarehigh courts with no hierarchical relationship to other jurisdictions - does not attribute as preeminent a role to these courts.
In fact, the reality is more subtle.lt appears, for one thing, that the American Supreme Court perhaps does not direct, as clearly as is usually said, the legal order: To pretend that the U.S. Supreme Court constitutes a "court oflast resort" for all other American jurisdictions is seriously to misstate American constitutionallaw. Not only do common law techniques allow lower courtseither to avoid Supreme Court precedent or to narrow it far beyond its intended scope, but the federal system as weil as the multiple, and increasing, number of Federal Courts of Appeal severely restriet the impact of the Supreme Court as the final court. There are potentially 51 different positions on almost all constitutional questions. 30
For another thing, European constitutional courts, although they Iack the status and authority of supreme jurisdictions, have more and more influence over the legal order to the extent that the German, Italian, or Spanish courts behave increasingly as supreme courts and appear as a fourth Ievel of jurisdiction. 31 These constitutional courts have progressively moved toward overseeing the decisions of ordinary jurisdictions, for the procedures of amparo (Spain) or ofindividual recourse (Federal Republic ofGermany) are more and more frequently directed against judgments or decisions. As for the ltalian Court, it is forced each year to direct the resolution of hundreds of proceedings before ordinary jurisdictions during which objections ofunconstitutionality are raised. The impregnation of the legal order by norms and constitutional jurisprudence is observable even in France: for several years the Conseil d'Etat and Cour de cassation have been willing to diffuse the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel throughout the legal order. 32
30 31
32
Davis (supra n. 23) 84 f. See Favoreu (supra n. 15) 30 f. See Louis Favoreu, La Cour de cassation, Je Conseil constitutionnel...L'application
des decisions du Conseil constitutionnel par le Conseil d'Etat et le Tribunal des conflits: Revue fran~aise de droit administratif (1987) 264.
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The difference between the two modelsisthat "constitutional impregnation" ofthelegal order is much less advanced in Europe than in the United States. This is understandable in light of the fact that the European experience has only existed for a few decades (in some cases just for a few years). As a result, in comparing the two models from this point ofview we must take into account the duration of the American experience, which began in 1803, and that of the European countries, which is much more recent. In this respect, to underline the weak constitutionalization of French criminal law as compared to American criminallaw does not make much sense, for the process of constitutionalization in France began only a dozen years ago. Another point of convergence may be observed: the development of judicial protection of fundamental rights. In this area there is an undeniable similarity between the American and European solutions, the former influencing the latter, at least when the American solution is known to the judges, which is not always the case. Beyond the procedural differences, the similarity in substantive solutions is incontestable and it is not necessary to give numerous illustrations: it will suffice to mention decriminalization of abortion, when over a dozen years (from 1973 to 1988) convergent decisions were handed down by the American, German, Austrian, French, Italian, Spanish, Portugese, and Canadian high courts. 33 2. Constitutionaljustice and the political order. In both models, constitutional justice plays an essential roJe in the heart of the political and constitutional system. This has been true in the United States since the firsthalf ofthe twentieth century, and in European countries since the end of World War II. The functions of constitutional justice described by American specialists a dozen years ago are found today in European countries 34 and also in Canada. 35 The movement toward judicialization of political life can be observed in the European democracies endowed with a system of constitutional justice; it has been particularly noticeable in the Federal Republic of Germany, and has developed in France over the past several years in circumstances very similar to those of the American model. 36 On this last point, after several convulsive starts, the French political dass has admitted that it can no Ionger contest the regularizing influence of the Conseil constitutionnel on political life: doubtless because public opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of the moderating action of 33 See, e.g., Lesjurisprudences constitutionnelles compan!es en matiere d'avortement: A.I.J.C. 2 (1986) 80. 34 See Louis Favoreu, Actualite et legitimite du contröle juridictionnel des lois en Europe occidentale: R.D.P. 100 (1984) 1147. 35 See F.L. Morton, The Impact of the Charter of Rights, The Judicialization of Canadian Politics: Canadian J. Pol. Sei. 20 (1987) 31-35. 36 See Louis Favoreu, La politique saisie par le droit (1988); J. Keeler, Confrontation · juridico-politique, Le Conseil constitutionnel face au gouvemement socialiste compare ä Ia Cour supreme face au New Deal: Pouvoirs 35 (1985) 133-148.
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constitutional justice 37 and because politicians, educated by successive periods of changes in political majority (alternance), appreciate the protection assured by constitutional judges when they find themselves in the opposition. 38 Just as a profound transformation in the legal order has taken place, or is in the process of taking place, under the influence of constitutional justice, European democracies arealso undergoing a fundamental change in political life. Extreme political positions can no Ionger be sustained, and changes in political majority can no Ionger bring about violent ruptures provoked by radical reforms adopted by a new majority coming into power.
V. Conclusion In forty years the legal and politicallandscape of the European democracies has profoundly changed under the influence of constitutional justice. The constitution, traditionally considered to be a symbolic text, or at best a charter governing the organization and operation of public powers, has become a rule oflaw 39 (what is more, the supreme rule oflaw) to which the legislator, the executive power, and the courts must submit. Constitutional norms are progressively impregnating all branches of law, thanks to the increasingly important jurisprudence of fundamental rights. Constitutionallaw is no Ionger just institutionallaw: it is also substantive law whose application has a direct effect on individuals. In this, the European systems incontestably approach the American system in breaking with the "civillaw tradition." But as comparative law teaches us, each country or society adapts legal or political mechanisms and institutions to its particular needs. As the effort to transplant the American model in Europe demonstrates, one system - no matter how well perfected, or perhaps because of this - is not necessarily transposable into different societies than the one from which it springs. Further, even within a model, there can be variations in addition to common traits: thus in Europe, the German system is characterized by the direct recourse of unconstitutionality, the Spanish system by the amparo, the ltalian system by the deferral of ordinary jurisdictions to the Constitutional Court, the French system by abstract a priori control upon parliamentary referral, and so on. But each system fulfills its function and cannot be classified according to criteria developed within the framework ofjudicial review, for the latter is merely one of 37 A pol! taken in 1983, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Constitution, revealed that after direct election of the President of the Republic, the Conseil constitutionnel as protector of fundamental rights was the most popular institution (80% favorable opinion). SOFRES Poil, September 1983, in: L'etat de l'opinion, cles pour 1984 (Le Seuil, Paris 1984). 38 SeeLe Conseil constitutionnel et les partis politiques, ed. by Louis Favoreu (1988). 39 See the important study of Eduardo Garcia de Enterria, La Constituci6n como norma y el Tribunal Constitutional (3d ed. 1984).
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the two principal models, not the universal measuring standard, and the internal criteria of the European model are different. The problern is knowing what will become ofthe European legal and political systems when the full transformation wrought by the development of constitutional justice has taken effect. Already, certain features characteristic of the civillaw tradition have faded, even in a country like France, which has long resisted such a transformation. But it is unlikely that we will see a standardization of legal systems joining the United States and Europe, for the European systems are engaged in a different process of harmonization, that of the European Community and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Samuel Livermore (1786 -1833): An American Forerunner to the Modern "Civil Law-Common Law Dialogue" Gino Gorla*
I. The Civil Law-Common Law Dialogue A. Introduction
The phrase "civil law-common law dialogue" was first used by the great Italian comparative law scholar, Tullio Ascarelli, during the 1950s. I then, following him, adopted it on various occasions. 1 The term "dialogue" is used, inter alia, to indicate a kind of doctrinalliterature dealing with problems by an imaginary discussion between (more or less imaginary) personages. In the field of law there are some examples of such dialogues, among which it might be interesting to recall Christopher St. Germain's Two Dialogues between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student ofthe Common Law (1523 in Latin, 1530 and 1532 in English). In this work a comparison is made between the canon law (involving also the civillaw) and the common law, especially with regard to naked promise
* Professor of Comparative Law Emeritus, University of Rome. Literature cited in abbreviated form: Paola Carlini, A proposito dell'uso del diritto continentale europeo (o Civil Law) durante Ia cosiddetta Formative era del diritto statunitense: Foro italiano 103 (1980) pt. V, 1-16; Gino Gorla, I! dirittocomparato in Italia e nel "mondo occidentale" e una introduzione al "dialogo civillaw-common law" (1983) (cited: Gorla, II diritto comparato ); Gino GorlaI Luigi Moccia, A Short Historical Account ofComparative Law in Europe andin Italy during Modern Times (16th to 19th Century), in: Italian National Reports to the Xllth International Congress of Comparative Law (1986) 67-86 (cited: GorlaI Moccia, Historical Account); Samuel Livermore, A Treatise on the Law of Principal and Agent and of Sales by Auction I-II (1818) (cited: Livermore, Principal and Agent); id., Dissertations on the Questions Which Arise from the Contrariety of the Positive Laws of Different States and Nations (two dissertations appearing in one volume, 1828) (cited: Livermore, Contrariety of Laws); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law ofBailments, with Illustrations from the Civil and the Foreign Law (1832)(cited: Story, Bailments); id., Commentaries on the Law of Agency as a Branch ofCommercial and Maritime Jurisprudence, with Occasional Illustrations from the Civil and Foreign Law (1839) (cited: Story, Agency). 1 See Gino Gorla, Diritto comparato e diritto comune europeo (1981) 12, 82 f., 88 f. (cited: Gorla, Diritto comune europeo ), reviewed by John Henry Merryman: Am. J. Comp. L. 31 (1983) 358-361; Gorla, I! diritto comparato, reviewed by Luigi Moccia: Am. J. Comp. L. 33 (1985) 533-535; Gorla, II diritto comune alle nazioni e l'emblema UNIDROIT, in: Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rendiconti delle adunanze solenni VIII (1985) (forthcoming in English in the Uniform Law Review) (cited: Gorla, UNIDROIT).
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(nudum pactum) and the connected problems of consideration and form. Those dialogues were often cited by Joseph Story in his commentaries on the law of bailments. 2
In this essay I see the civillaw and the common law as abstract personages in an imaginary dialogue discussing the traits of each of the two systems. In a broader sense the phrase civil law-common law dialogue would mean any discussion comparing the two legal systems. 3 8. "Diritto comparato deUe differenze" and "Diritto comparato deUe concordanze" during the Twentieth Century This article involves some aspects of the history of comparative law, especially the comparison between the civillaw and the common law, a history I wish to trace starting from our times and going back to the period in which Samuel Livermore was active. 4 During our century there has been a kind of revival or renewal of comparative law with apreeminent interest in the comparison between the civillaw and the common law. It is important to observe that until around the end ofthe 1950s the main interest (or curiosity) of comparatists was focused on differences rather than on similarities between those two legal systems or families of systems. Then a trend gradually prevailed toward what I have called diritto comparato delle concordanze. 5 The search for these concordances, similarities, or the "common core" must occur even behind the facade of differences of techniques, concepts, or forms. This trend toward the search for the common core shows a deep connection with the interests ofinternational trade and the search for the so-called "general principles oflaw recognized by civilized nations" mentioned in article 38 ofthe Statute of the International Court of Justice. Moreover, these "general Story, Bailments. For the meaning of "civillaw" in this dialogue, see infra n. 46. 4 On the history of comparative law, see Gorla, II diritto comparato v-vi and §§ 1-II; Gorlai Moccia, Historical Account. For the specific history of comparison between the civil law and the common law, see Gino Gorlai Luigi Moccia, A "Revisiting" of the Comparison between "Continental Law" and "English Law" (16th to 19th Century): Journal ofLegal History 2 (1981) 143 (cited: Gorlai Moccia, A "Revisiting") (emphasizing comparative law of similarities between the two systems during the sixteenth to eighteenth cen turies). 5 See Gorla, II diritto comparato § Il. See also Rudolf B. Schlesinger, General Introduction, in: Formation of Contracts, A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems, ed. by Schlesinger (1968) 2-3, n. 1, where he says: "Traditionally, comparative legal writings have tended to dwell more heavily on differences than on similarities. There is no justification for such a one-sided approach, even though differences perhaps are more easily discovered and stated than similarities. A sure knowledge ofboth is required in the light of the purposes to be furthered by comparative legal research." 2
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principles" (which, instead of being "general" and thus vague, are rather detailed and casuistic) are referred to, directly or indirectly, in several cases of arbitration clauses contained in international contracts and in international conventions providing for arbitration. 6 This trend also constitutes the background for UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL and other organizations working for the international unification of law or for the so-called "uniform laws." Even ifthe tasks ofUNIDROIT and UNCITRAL have acquired a planetary dimension (involving legalsystemsdifferent from the civillaw and the common law), the civillaw-common law dialogue is still at stake, so that a great deal ofthe work of those organizations occurs in searching for the background of a common core between these two major legal systems or families. 7 It is also known that UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL have worked and arestill working for a uniform law on agency in the international sale of goods. As we shall see, the first systematic search for a common core between the civil law and the common law on agency was made by Livermore. 8 C. "Diritto comparato delle concordanze" durlog the Formative Era of American Law
Samuel Livermore may be considered an American forerunner to the diritto comparato delle concordanze during the first part of the nineteenth century, the "formative era" of American law. He should be considered together with a group of American lawyers: Joseph Story, James Kent, and others. 9 However, he deserves the special title of "forerunner," because he was the author of the first systematic American treatise on agency (and related commercial transactions), which was the first comparative law study in the world on that subject. 10 Also Livermore's Dissertations on the Contrariety ofLaws may, in some respects, be considered the first comparative study in conflict of laws. 11 This diritto comparato delle concordanze may be emblematically represented by the dieturn closing Story's work on agency: "Upon reviewing the whole subject, it cannot escape the observation ofthe diligent reader, how many ofthe general principles which regulate it are common to the Roman law, to the law of continental Europe and Scotland, and to the commercial jurisprudence of England." 12 See Schlesinger (supra n. 5) 12-16. See Gorla, 11 diritto comparato §IX; Gorla, UNIDROIT (supra n. 1). 8 See infratextat nn. 33-37,40-43. 9 See the valuable essay, with particular attention to Livermore, by Carlini. Dr. Paola Carlini, now a research assistantat the Institute ofComparative Law ofthe University of Rome, wrote this essay while visiting the law schools at Harvard and Tulane. From that visit she provided me with many of the materials that I have relied upon to write this article, for which I am grateful. 10 Livermore, Principal and Agent. 11 Livermore, Contrariety of Laws. 6
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This attitude of American jurists of the formative era has been defined as either reception, attraction, or influence of the civillaw in the United States. 13 Paola Carlini has proposed the neutral term "use" to describe the impact ofthe civillaw on the law of the United States during the formative era. 14 However, I think that it is better to leave aside the neutral term, and to adopt the proper term or concept, which is "comparison" (between the civillaw and the common law) and, moreover, a comparison in search of concordances or of general principles common to the various legal systems mentioned in Story's dictum. On this point it is interesting to observe that Livermore clearly spoke of comparison and undertook comparison. 15 Of course, the diritto comparato delle concordanze elaborated by Livermore and the other American lawyers mentioned from those times must be considered with a warning or caution. Our present diritto comparato del/e concordanze must face different historical situations, with different techniques and goals; that is, we have to use the Latin phrase mutatis mutandis. With this caution, however, Livermore and those other American jurists remain instructive examples of the diritto comparato delle concordanze. D. Tbe Anglo-Scottisb-American Comparatists
At this point a very important fact must be emphasized to understand the historical course of comparison between the civillaw and the common law, the related diritto comparato delle concordanze, and the roJe and merits ofLivermore and the other American comparatists mentioned earlier. That fact is the following. 16 During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the field of private law (including commercial law) and the related areas of remedies and procedure, comparison between the civillaw and the common law was made only by jurists of England, of Scotland, 17 and for the pertinent period, of the 12
17.
Story, Agency. Regarding Story's mention ofScotland, see my discussion infra at n.
See Carlini 1-2, nn. 1, 6, 7. Id. at 1 and 1, n. 1. 15 See infratextat nn. 40-43. 16 For illustrations, see Gorla, Il diritto comparato §§I, III. See also Gorlai Moccia, Historical Account; Gorlai Moccia, A "Revisiting" (supra n. 4). 17 For Scotland, besides Stair, Erskine, and others, the eminent author was Joseph Bell (1770-1843), Commentaries on the Law ofScotland and on the Principles of Mercantile Jurisprudence (1810), followed by hisown editions in 1816,1821, and 1826. Bell had a wide and deep knowledge of Continental jurisprudence (including Casaregis, see infra n. 60 and text). He too, by a kind of diritto comparato delle concordanze, searched for concordances with English law and built a common law merchant, calling it the "jurisprudence of Europe." Gorla, Bell, One of the Founding Fathers of the "Common and Comparative Law of Europe" during the 19th Century: Juridical Review (1982) 121-138. Bell was frequently cited by Story, Agency for matters concerning Scottish law and the 13
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U.S.A.. For the sake of brevity, I have indicated this group of jurists with the Iabel "ASA," where "A" stands for "Anglo," "S" for "Scottish," and "A" for American." The ASA comparatists had a basic knowledge ofthe civil law, which enabled them to make the comparison mentioned above. On the other side, that is with European Contineotal jurists during this period, no similar efforts of comparison were made in these fields of private law, procedure, or remedies. This failure was due to the fact that Continentaljurists (with a few exceptions Iimited to certain matters) had no knowledge, or at least no adequate knowledge, of English, Scottish, and American private law, including commercial law and related matters. Their knowledge was restricted to some aspects of public law, that is constitutional Iaw, criminal Iaw, and criminal procedure. Therefore, they were not in a position to make comparisons with the ASA legal systems in the field of private law. After the American formative era (that is after the middle of the nineteenth century), the interests of Americanjurists in the comparison ofthe civil law and the research of concordances underwent a certain process of relaxation. 18 In any case, the trend of researching and emphasizing the differences of foreign law prevailed. An analogous trend may be found in England (but not in Scotland) and on the Continent after the revival, in the twentieth century, of the comparison between the civil law and the common law. This general trend should be considered a kind of nationalism of the Iaw or a "family pride," that is, the pride of the jurists of each of the two legal families. In another article, 19 I have given the Iabel of "separatists" to jurists of this trend, contrasting them with the "unionists" of the preceding period (but with no allusion to the Civil War!).
II. Samuel Livermore A. A Short Biography I have tried to draw some Iines of Livermore's Iife, gathering them, directly or indirectly, from various sources. 20 He was born in Concord (or Portsmouth?), civillaw in general. Bell and Story also corresponded with each other. Bell, however, had no knowledge of Livermore, Principal and Agent, published in 1818. Nevertheless, in the last edition of Bell, Commentaries (supra), edited by John McLaren in 1870, McLaren in his notes frequently cited Livermore, Principal and Agent, concerning the civil law, American law, and American law as it related to the civil law. Bell, Commentaries (supra) (1870 ed.) I, 513 f., 526, 530-534, 540. ts See Carlini 15-16. 19 Gorla, II diritto comparato § III at 524. 20 See Dictionary of American Biography, ed. by Allen Johnson XI (1964) 308, which also cites Charles Warren, A History ofthe American Bar (1911) 337, and other authors, for biographical data on Livermore. For indirect information, I have relied on the works of Livennore and Story, as well as the Louisiana Law Reports.
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New Hampshire, on August 26, 1786. His grandfather was Samuel Livermore, a famous chief justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The grandson, Samuel Livermore, in 1806 graduated from Harvard College, and was adrnitted to the Essex County Bar, the same Bar where Joseph Story had also gained admission. He then practiced law in Boston. During the War of 1812 between the U.S.A. and Great Britain (1812-1815), Livermore valorously fought on board the Chesapeake in the famous battle of June 1812 against the English ship Shannon, which seized the Chesapeake, bringing it to Halifax. 21 Livermore returned to Boston, where he continued practicing law. After the war, most likely at the end of 1815, he moved to Baltimore, where he practiced law and remained there probably until 1818; indeed, his preface to the Treatise on the Law of Principal and Agent is dated: Baltimore, June 2, 1818. Livermore moved to New Orleansmost likely in 1819. This may be deduced from the fact that he is present there as the advocate for one of the parties in the Louisana Supreme Court case Whiston v. Stodder, 22 and that he was already known there as an able lawyer. He practiced law in Louisiana until1833 but died in Florence, Alabama, on July 11, 1833, while he was going to New England to visit his relatives. It is important to observe that Livermore as a lawyer spent one half of his life in states belonging to the common law family, and the other half in Louisiana, a civillaw or rnixed law jurisdiction. He wrote A Treatise on the Law of Principal and Agent while in Baltimore. Although published in 1818, it had been preceded by another treatise on the same subject published in Boston in 1811.23 On the other side, while living in a civillaw state he wrote Dissertations on the Questions Which Arise from the Contrariety of the Positive Laws of Different States and Nations, published in New Orleans in 1828.
Another important fact in Livermore's life was his association with Joseph Story (1779-1845), based on reciprocal esteem. Story, in his Commentaries on Conflict of Laws, 24 while mentioning and appraising Livermore's Contrariety of 21 Liverrnore was on the ship Chesapeake as a volunteer chaplain, invited by Captain Lawrence. During the time when seamen from the Shannon were boarding the Chesapeake, only a few from the crew were on deck. Liverrnore tried to protect Lawrence, who was mortally wounded, and was hirnself seriously wounded in the arm. See Lossing, The Pietorlai Field-Book ofthe War of 1812 (1896). This episode is also narrated in an Italian translation of this book: Brackenbridge ,lstoria della Guerra fra gli Stati U niti d 'America e l'lnghilterra negli Anni 1812-1815, in four editions (Milano 1821; Napoli 1821, 1831; Firenze 1834). Thus Liverrnore was first known in Italy as a hero, and only later as a jurist. 22 Whiston v. Stodder, 8 Martin (O.S.) 95 (1820); seeinfra textat nn. 58-63. 23 Livermore, A Treatise on the Law Relative to Principals, Agents, Factors, Auctioneers, and Brokers (1811). 24 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in Regard to Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and Especially in Regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions, and Judgrnents (1834) (cited: Story, Conflict ofLaws) § 11.
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Laws, says of the author: "The late Mr. Livennore, whose Iamented death occurred in July, 1833, in his learned Dissertations on the Contrariety of Laws, printed at New Orleans in 1828, has enumerated the principal continental writers, who have discussed this subject at Iarge." Rodolfo Oe Nova gives a Iist of several places in Story's Conflict of Laws where he appraised in various ways Livermore's Contrariety of Laws. 25 In addition, Story, in his Commentaries on Agency, assesses Livermore's treatment of some basic problems of Roman law. 26 On the other side, Livennore shows great esteem for Story, as illustrated in the preface ofhis Treatise on the Law of Principa/ and Agent.
B. Livermore's Library Livermore left his library to Harvard U niversity as a bequest. His collection of law books was one of the largest in existence at the time of his death. Harvard University published in 1835 a supplement to the Catalogue of the Law Library of Harvard devoted to Livennore's library, with the addition of an appendix listing the books (about 20) given to the Harvard Law Library by Joseph Story, most of which were printed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Livermore's collection is composed of about 300 works, several of which consist of more than one volume (making in total around 400 volumes). lt is interesting to observe that of these 300 works only nine, printed in the first decades ofthe nineteenth century, concern the French Civil Code or, in general, French Iaw subsequent to the fall of the ancien regime, that is the fall of the ius commune. All the other works, mostly printed between 1500 and 1800, concern the ius commune or the law belonging to that 300 year period. This fact is very important, especially when one connects it with the contents of Livennore's Principa/ and Agent (1818) and Contrariety of Laws (1828), where all the authorities used belong to the period ofthe ius commune. 27 It is also interesting to note that several ofthe works listed in the Harvard Catalogue were written by ltalian authors of the ius commune period. lt would not be a mere curiosity to investigate (ifpossible!) how, where, and when Livennore bought these 300 or more old books printed in Europe during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, not forgetting the issue of whether he bought them, or part of them, before moving to New Orleans. lndeed, in bis treatise on agency, published in Baltimore in 1818, he cites several of these books. lmporting and collecting law books from countries having a different law system should be considered a sign of existing interest in the law of those 25 Rodo/fo De Nova, The First American Book on Conflict ofLaws: Am. J. Legal Rist. 8 (1964) 136-156. 26 Story, Agency § 1L 27 See infra text at nn. 44-49.
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countries. It would be an interesting chapter in the history of Arnerican law to know how and on whose initiative these old civillaw books carne to the U.S.A. An analogous problern arises ifwe consider the fact that during the firsthalf of the nineteenth century in the U.S.A. there were (in public and private libraries) civil law books printed in Europe in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, although Liverrnore's collection rnust be considered the largest one.
111. Livermore's Attitudes as Reflected in His Works A. An Overview
In sections III and IV I shall try to show why Livermore should be considered a forerunner in the effort of diritto comparato delle concordanze within the group of ASA jurists rnentioned earlier. 28 There is evidence that Livermore in 1811 published in Boston A Treatise on the Law Relative to Principals, Agents, Factors, Auctioneers, and Brokers. I have not seen that first treatise. At any rate, for the purpose of the present article, our interest is focused on the treatise Principal and Agent of 1818. 29 This decision is buttressed by the reason that Livermore hirnself in the preface to Principal and Agent of 1818 does not even rnention the treatise of 1811. This neglect seerns to be a sign that he is giving irnportance only to the treatise of 1818, and that he considers the other a secondary work not to be rnentioned. There rnay be another reason for taking into special consideration the treatise of1818: that is, Story, Kent, and other authors who wrote on agency, all ofthern writing after 1818, 30 obviously cite and take into consideration the treatise of 1818. Consequently, this was the treatise considered as an authority (arnong other authorities) by the Iegalliterature on agency. Given this prernise, I should say that the rnain features of Livermore's attitudes frorn his works rnay be outlined in the following way: 1. He feit the exigency of giving order and systern, by rneans of treatises on particular coherent branches of the law, to the scattered rnaterials of the case See supratextat nn. 9-19. Some years ago Professor Maurizio Lupoi kindly brought me from New York a photocopy of Livermore, Principal and Agent, which permitted me to complete this essay in Rome! Mycitations are to the original1818 edition. Fora reprint, seeinfra textat n. 57. Lupoi has written an interesting article: Lupoi, Elementi di "civillaw" nell'agency, La terminologia: Foro italiano 103 (1980) pt. V, 137. There hecites Livermore's 1818 treatise and shows that, contrary to most opinion, the terms "principal," "agent," and "factor" were not peculiar to the common law. They were also used on the Continent during the period of the ius commune by merchants, scholars, and judges. This communication of terms of language is a sign or "spy" that substance was also communicated. Lupoi, Agency, in: Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani I (1988) (special attention to Livermore). 30 See, e.g., the McLaren edition to Bell (supra n. 17). 28 29
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law, that is the main element ofthe common law. He thus initiated an influential American movement in that direction; what was called "the new style of legal literature. " 31 2. Notwithstanding some modest declaration of intent to write for the daily business of lawyers and merchants, his works have a prominent scholarly character. 3. He made and used comparison between the civillaw and the common law for the main purpose of searching for the concordances between the two systems oflaws and for completing the common law. He dwelt on differences only when they proved to be of substance, rather than of mere form or of techniques. 4. For the purposes indicated in point 3, he made a thorough study ofthe ius commune or the civillaw "at large," that is in all its factors. This was the ius commune that had developed on the European Continent before the period of codifications. Livermore, for these purposes, left aside the codes already in force in Europe and in Louisiana. 32 B. Provide Order and System to American Case Law with Textbooks In his preface to Principal and Agent, Livermore said: "In preparing the following work, my design has been to arrange and methodize the principles of law which govern the contract of agency." He noticed that those principles were "scattered," meaning "scattered" in the case law. 33 In this respect he assumed the task of abridging all the important English and American cases on agency, which he found in the law reports, and of placing them in the proper place resulting from the order, method, or system of a treatise. Indeed he concluded that preface by saying: "Much ofthe utility ofa work ofthisnature must depend upon a proper arrangement of its parts. Whether the method here adopted be the most natural one or not, the reader will be enabled to judge from the table of contents. " 34 See infra text at n. 35. See infra textat nn. 44-49. 33 The word and concept of "scattered" materials, to be arranged according to some system in a treatise, is found later in Story, Conflict of Laws (supra n. 24) preface, andin Story, Bailments preface (indirectly appearing). 34 Livermore, Principal and Agent preface. The plan used by Livennore to arrange his materials showsanoriginal character, even when compared to Pothier, Traite du contrat de mandat, frequently cited by Livermore. His plan also has the merit, ofbeing functional, taking into account his purposes (see infra text at nn. 40-43). It is interesting to compare, in this respect, Livermore's order with that of Story, Agency. In my opinion Livermore's order is more functional than that adopted by Story. Indeed, Livennore, although considering mainly the commercial agency, also dealt with the Roman law mandatum, which was essentially gratuitous. Story, wanting to deal exclusively with commercial agency (see his title and infra text at nn. 40-43), left the 31
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Theodore Plucknett, in his Concise History ofthe Common Law, at the end of the chapter "Professional Literature," 35 speaks of a new type or style of legal literature, which he characterizes as a "text-book [or treatise] upon some compact and coherent portion of the law, treated systematically, based upon principle." He observes that "works of this sort are still very rare in the eighteenth century in [England]. Possibly one of the most powerful influences making for the new style oflegalliterature came from America." Then Plucknett goes on by giving the example of the various commentaries (in fact, treatises) written by Story, inter alia on bailments (1832), conflict of laws (1834), and agency (1839). 36 As a matter of fact, the first American jurist initiating this movement toward the "new style of legal literature" was Livermore with his treatise on agency (1818) andin a way also with his Contrariety of Laws (1828), although the latter may leave some doubts as to its order and arrangement of cases. 37 C. Use of a Scholarly Style "No man was ever made a lawyer by the study oftreatises." Ifwe take this as Livermore's motto, inserted in the preface to Principa/ and Agent, it would represent the caution or experience of a common law lawyer. The motto is then followed by the proclamation of a modest purpose for treatises, and thus for his treatise, to be useful to the daily business of professional men in a hurry and to the liberal education of gentlemen: "Merchants, more than any other class of men, are interested in works of this nature." 38 The motto and this "declaration of intent" do not at all correspond to the real contents and features ofLivermore's agency treatise. Indeed, that treatise is full of citations and reproductions of passages from the Roman Corpus iuris in Latin, as well as from Continentaljurists in Latin, French, and even ltalian. The same is true for Contrariety of Laws. In any case, these passages are too difficult to be understood by merchants. Roman mundaturn aside and dealt with gratuitous ageney in Story, Bailments eh. 3. This separation seems somewhat arbitrary. lndeed, many rules eoneeming eommercial ageney were also drawn from Justinian's Digest by ius commune authors dealing with the law merehant (e.g., Casaregis, frequently eited by Livermore and Story, seeinfra textat n. 60). Story, in bis treatise on ageney, as weil as Livermore in faet often cited the Digest for rules also applieable to eommereial ageney. Therefore, a more funetional eomparison between the eivillaw and the eommon law would integrate in one treatise eommercial ageney and the Roman mandatum. 35 Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Coneise History ofthe Common Law (5th ed. 1956) eh. 14. 36 Id. at 288 f. 37 See infratextat nn. 50-57. 38 This sounds like an eeho from Wyndham Beawes, Lex Mereatoria Rediviva, or the Merehant's Direetory (1752), whieh Livermore frequently cited.
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In reality, therefore, Livermore's works have a prominent scholarly character, especially in regard to comparisons with the civillaw and its sources. lt may be assumed that in the "formative era of American Law" a rather numerous group of American judges and lawyers, because of their legal education or expectations, were receptive to this kind ofwork. They represented an audience for it, although not all of them knew Latin or other foreign languages, especially not ltalian. 39 On the other hand, as to languages the audience might have been larger in Louisiana, where Livermore was going to move after his treatise on agency was published and where he wrote and published his Contrariety of Laws. D. Use of Comparisons with the Civil Law
At the end ofhis preface in Principal and Agent, after saying that the materials for his work are drawn from English and American cases and "freely" from the civillaw, Livermore, as a kind of conclusion, wrote: I do not apprehend that any further observations are necessary to justify the course pursued in this treatise; in which I have attentively compared the doctrine of the two systems oflaws, in relation to thecontracts here treated of. I have stated the rules ofthe civillaw, to confirm and illustrate the principles of our own law; I have endeavoured to shew in what they agree and in what they differ; and in questions which appeared to be doubtful or undecided at common law, I have had recourse to the opinions ofthe great Roman jurists, as the surest guide to a correct solution.
In this conclusive passage the following traits must be pointed out: 1. The word and the concept of comparison. 2. The expression "two systems oflaws," referred respectively to the civillaw and to the common law. 3. The use of civillaw rules to confirm and to illustrate 40 the principles of his own law (that is, the common law when Livermore was writing his treatise in Baltimore, before moving to Louisiana). The use of "confirming" the common law, of course, referred to situations in which the two legal systems agreed. 4. The recourse to the civil law for questions "doubtful or undecided at common law" is a very important trait. 41 39 See Carlini 4 f., 11, where she mentions American translations of Contineutal jurists. Livermore and Story (and maybe other American lawyers) could read the works of Casaregis and other authors written in Italian. 40 The use of the word and the concept of "illustration" is found later in Story, Bailments and Story, Agency. The use of the verb "to confirm," however, seems peculiar to Livermore, as well as the idea involved in "confirmation." 41 This "recourse" ofLivermore to the civillaw is similar to what I have called elsewhere "an openlegal system," which refers to the recourse of ius commune authors, as recursus ad Iegern alius loci, for casus omissi vel duhii in the locallaw. Gorla, Diritto comune europeo
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The result of all these traits, connected together, was a study with the main purpose of searching concordances between the "two systems oflaws" to aim for a common law of nations, which should nevertheless also take in due account differences. By an attentive perusal of Livermore's treatise on agency one will realize that he dwells on differences only when they prove to be of substance, rather than of mere form or technique. In Livermore's Contrariety of Laws all these traits take another turn and are often only implied, rather than ernerging at the surface ofthat work. There he more extensively compared historical situations, including that of the Roman empire and of medieval and modern Europe (and the U.S.A.). 42 He also researched some general principles with recourse to Contineotal authors (the socalled "statutists") for a comparison with the theories found in certain English and American judicial decisions. As a matter of fact, Contrariety of Laws was based on a Livermore thesis contrary to the theory of "courtesy" or "comity" adopted by those decisions. His thesis, which he drew from those Contineotal authors, dictated the order or warp of his book and the method of comparison. It may have been this warp, dictated by Livermore's thesis, which led to a sometimes defective treatment. 43
E. Use of the ius commune Under the term "civillaw," and for the purposes of comparison and recourse discussed earlier, Livermore in his works (as well as in the case Whiston v. Stodder) used the following sources or authorities: 1. The Corpus iuris, and especially the Digest.
2. Statutes and customs from various states and cities in Europe in force, at various times, during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, concerning especially commercial and maritime laws and (directly or indirectly) the matter of conflict of laws. 44 (supra n. 1) 619, 685-690, reprinting Gor/a, Unificazione legislativa e unificazione giurisprudenziale: Foro italiano 100 (1977) pt. V, 91. See also Gorlai Moccia, Historical Account 74. An analogous recourse, limited to the Corpus iuris and to casus ornissi, is found in David Hoffrnan, A Course ofLegal Study Respectfully Addressed to the Students ofLaw in the United States (1817), commented on in Car/ini 4 f. Both Hoffman's book and Livermore's Principal and Agent were published in Baltimore; perhaps Livermore knew ofHoffman's work. At any rate, Livermore extended the recourse to the civillaw at !arge and to civilians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In Principal and Agent he made several applications of the recourse. Contrariety of Laws was based on such a recourse. And Livermore's involvement in Whiston v. Stadder (supra n. 22) was a practical application of a recourse. See infratextat nn. 58-63. 42 See Liverrnore, Contrariety of Laws, dissertation I, §§ 7-9, 26, 34. 43 See id. dissertation II; infratextat nn. 50-57.
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3. Authors, the so-called "civilians," and judicial decisions from those centuries, interpreting or developing the Corpus iuris and statutes or customs. 45 Thesesources or authorities correspond to what may be called the civillaw "at !arge," that is in the wide sense ofthis term. They also correspond, in a way, to the term and concept of ius commune "at !arge," in force during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, before the period of codifications. 46 At this point, it seems interesting to note that for the purposes of comparison and recourse Livermore in Principal and Agent (1818) and Contrariety of Laws (1828) used only the sources and authorities belonging to the period of the ius commune (in that wide sense) in force before the period of codifications. He does not cite the French Code civil nor Code de commerce, or their commentators; he does not even cite the Civil Code of Louisiana, although these codes were already in force when he wrote those two treatises and the codes contained articles on mandate, commercial and maritime law, and, in a way, also on conflict of laws. 47 The most that one finds is that in Contrariety of Laws Livermore cities en passant a few articles from the Louisiana Civil Code. 48 This omission or neglect seems surprising and requires some explanation. However, the question has not been examined, and I may only venture some 44 E.g., Livermore, Principal and Agent I 76, 99, 176, 179, 181, 186 cited Consolato del mare di Barcellona, the Ordinances of Louis XIV, and the so-called laws of Oleron, of Wisbuy, of the Hanseatic towns, of Rotterdam, and of Antwerp. The statutes and customs of Europe and their commentary were at the very heart of the purpose for Contrariety of Laws. 45 See infra n. 46 for the term "civilians." 46 The term "civillaw" as used by Livermore (as weil as by English and Americanjurists of his time, and even to the present) is rather ambiguous. It has various meanings according to the context in which it is used. In some contexts it refers to the Corpus iuris. In other contexts it means the Corpus iuris plus the sources and authorities mentioned in points (2) and (3) in the text. In a still wider meaning, ius commune at !arge comprehends the sources and authorities mentioned in points (1), (2), and (3), plus canon law and feudallaw. Gorla, II diritto comparato § II.A; Gorlai Moccia, Historical Account 72 f. During the nineteenth century until today, "civillaw" has been extended to encompass the codes in force in civillaw countries, together with their commentators and interpreters. See Moccia, Sull'uso del termine "civillaw": Foro italiano 103 (1980) pt. V, 254, citing lohn Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (1969). I use this widest meaning in my ti tle to this essa y. The term "civilians," as used by Livermore, Story, and other American and English authors ofthe nineteenth century, means (leaving aside English and Scottish civilians) the Continental jurists of the twelfth to nineteenth centuries working on the ius commune at !arge, including the law merchant. Thus, Roman jurists whose work had been inserted in the Digest were not within this meaning of civilians. 47 See French Code civil art. 3; Louisiana Civil Code arts. 9-10. 48 Louisiana Digest (1808) art. 24; Louisiana Civil Code (1825) art. 899 (succession), art. 1480 (capacity ofwomen), art. 1776 (conventional obligation). Cited in Livermore, Contrariety of Laws, dissertation II, 33, 59, 61.
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hypotheses. In Livermore's times the ius commune at large was still considered the main source of private law, a source still active, which the codes had, generally speaking, simply restated. 49 Of course, I leave aside that part ofthe ius commune representing the ancien regime, contrary to the "new times." In France and in other countries, where the French codes had been imitated, courts and lawyers interpreted code dispositions by the ius commune. Maybe Livermore followed that trend (in a somewhat extreme way). A moreprobable hypothesis is that, in Livermore's mind, the ius commune (in the wide sense) was the basis for the concordances between the common law and the civillaw, that is the basis for searching and building a "communion" or communicatio ofprinciples and rules between the two legal systems in certain fields of the law.
IV. Livermore's lnfluence A. The Fortunes of Livermore's Books
In comparing Livermore's two books, the treatise on agency shows better qualities than the volume on conflict of laws, for the following reasons. 1. Contrariety of Laws has more the character of a thesis than that of a treatise. Indeed, Livermore was prompted to write this book by the refusal of the Supreme Court of Louisiana (that is, of Judge Porter), in the case of Sau/ v. His Creditors, 50 to follow his thesis based on the Continental statutists. 51 Probably Contrariety ofLaws is a developed version ofLivermore's argument in that case: a long and learned argument, not reproduced in the Reports of Cases, which published only the opinion of Judge Porter. 2. The treatise on agency is more complete: it deals with all the problems or aspects ofthe subject matter, while Contrariety ofLaws Iacks such completeness. 3. The order or structure of the treatise on agency is functional, while Contrariety of Laws shows a certain disorder. 52 49 See, e.g., Story, Bailments, where there are several citations to the French Code civil and to the Louisiana Civil Code, but only two citations to the French Code de commerce (id. §§ 607, 610). However, these citations are given to show that these codes "have adopted," or "given positive sanctions" to civil law rules (in the wide sense of the ius commune). In several footnotes the codes are cited in a kind of melting pot together with ius commune authorities. These citations almost always draw from points (1), (2), and (3) described supra text at nn. 44-45. In Story, Conflict of Laws (supra n. 24), there are several citations made in the same manner to the French Code civil and to the Louisiana Civil Code. However, in Story, Agency, there are only two citations to the French Code civil (id. § 4), since for mandate (gratuitous agency) Story makes a renvoi to his volume on bailments. See supra n. 34. 50 5 Martin (N.S.) 569 (1827). 51 See De Nova (supra n. 25) 137 (citing Kurt Nadelmann). 52 Id. at 149, 156; seesupra n. 34.
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To sum up, Principal and Agent seems to correspond more to the model of a textbook described earlier. As a matter of fact, Livermore in Contrariety of Laws did not want to make a treatise or a textbook; he just wanted to make "dissertations." This criticism should not be taken to imply that Contrariety of Laws Iacks scholarly character, learned investigation, or acuteness. 53 Now, coming to our point of the different fortunes of the two books, it must be said that Principal and Agent, notwithstanding its better qualities, has not received any consideration in the history of agency or in that of comparative law. lt is simply mentioned by some authors, without examining its contents. On this point there are, to my knowledge, only two exceptions, both discussed in this essay. 54 On the other hand, Contrariety of Laws has been considered in various evaluations, by many authors, in the history of conflict of laws. 55 On May 2-3, 1986 aconferencewas heldin Salerno bearing the title "EuropaAmerica nel Diritto Internazionale Privato: Precedenti Storici e Problemi Attuali." The conference was organized by the University of Salerno, at the initiative of Professor Massimo Panebianco and myself. I also gave a short introduction mentioning Livermore's works on agency and conflict of laws). Kurt Siehr presented a report bearing the title "Da Livermore a Rabe!: tradizione americana e tradizione europea nel diritto internazionale privato." In his report Siehr adopted my terminology and the corresponding concepts, qualifying Livermore as a "unionist" and one of the first authors of the diritto comparato delle concordanze. 56 Meanwhile, William S. Hein & Co. reprinted Livermore's Principal and Agent in 1986. 57 This represents a new fortune, or privilege, for this treatise, with an opportunity for it to find its rightful place in the history of comparative law. B. Livermore's Success in Court: Whiston v. Stodder Livermore was a practical jurist as weil as a scholar. 58 I can discuss only one case here to illustrate the virtues of Livermore's dialogue between the civillaw See id. at 156. Carlini; Lupoi, Elementi (supra n. 29); Lupoi, Agency (supra n. 29). My essay is now the third exception. 55 DeNova (supra n. 25) mentions several authors who have examined and evaluated Contrariety of Laws. See Llewelyn/ Davies, The lnfluence of Huber "Oe Conflictu Legum" on English Private International Law: British Year Book oflnternational Law (1937) 9. 56 It is possible that a volume of the reports from the Salerno Conference will be published. Prof. Siehr's paper has been published in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 1 (1988) 17. 57 Editor's note: There are no present plans to reprint Contrariety of Laws (telephone conversation with Hein & Co., Feb. 8, 1989). 58 See supratextat nn. 38-39. 53
54
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and the common law. This was a case discussed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1820, where questions of conflict oflaws (and also of agency) were at stake. 59 Livermore, as advocate for the syndics of the estate of the bankrupt Stodder & Co., in a long argument (andin his leamed style), presented to the court the following theories: 1. The place of the contract, determining the applicable law, is where the offeree accepts the offer (or the agent executes the order): here that place was London.
2. The privilege of the seller on goods delivered to the buyer and not paid by him belongs to the law of contract (or "to the substance of the contract"), and not to the law ruling the remedy, which here was New Orleans, where the proceedings in bankruptcy were in course. English law did not establish that privilege, but it was established by the law of Louisiana. Livermore based these two theories on a decision of the Rota Fiorentina, in the case Cayrel er. Astruch (September 20, 1727), written for the Rota by Judge Calderoni. lt was fully reported by Casaregis (1670-1737) in his Discursus legales de commercio. 60 He also based his theories on the Contineotal ius commune as expounded, with all the pertinent authorities, by Casaregis and Calderoni. Livermore did not, however, give even a hint of the English case Adams v. Lindseil (1818), 61 which probably was not yet known in the Louisiana forum. Thus, on both theories, Livermore made a recourse of the kind mentioned earlier62 to the Contineotal ius commune and to a decision of a.foreign court, the Rota Fiorentina, as ajudicial precedent. Judge Matthew, in giving his opinion in Whiston v. Stodder, adopted Livermore's theories and decided the case on the basis of the precedent contained in the decision of the Rota Fiorentina. lt would be interesting to confront Livermore's argument in this case with his Contrariety of Laws, written seven or eight years later. In the book he examines only the question of what are the situations in which the law of the place of the 59 Whiston v. Stodder (supra n. 22). Cited by Siehr in his Salerno report (see supratextat n. 56). 60 Discursus 179, 1, 2 (contains an introduction by Casaregis). The editions containing Discursus 179 were edited in Venice in 1737 and 1740. See Gorla, A. G. Calderoni, giureconsulto faentino (secoli XVII-XVIII) e Ia giurisprudenza del suo tempo: Rivista di storia del diritto italiano (1987) 336 (§V, 5), where the cases Whiston v. Stodder and Cayrel er. Astruchare discussed. See also Pao/a Carlini, La formazione del contratto fra persone lontane, un aspetto della revisione della comparazione fra civil law e common law nel quadro del diritto comune: Rivista trimestale di diritto e procedura civile 13 (1984) 114, where the two cases (supra) are discussed along with the pertinent doctrinal and judicial authority of the ius commune. 61 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 English Reports 250 (K.B. 1818). 62 See supra n. 41.
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contract should prevail, but not the question of determining where the contract is made. 63 Livermore does not even cite the case Whiston v. Stodder, which is cited several times by Story in his commentaries on conflict of laws.
V. The History of Comparative Law of Concordances and the "Civil Law Tradition" The formative era of American law along with its personages, among them the reemerging Samuel Livermore, must be considered as an important part of the history of the comparative law of concordances. At the same time, this history must be considered as an American chapter revealing the influence and integration of the civillaw tradition. Livermore, in his preface to Principal and Agent, calls Kent and Story "civilians as weil as common lawyers." 64 This history parallels the English "civilians" ofthe sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, who were not mere civilians, and their allies (including Mansfield), who are also an integrating part of the civil law tradition. 65
63 6465
Livermore, Contrariety of Laws, dissertation II, § 42. Pp. x-xi. See Gor/a, Il diritto comparato §§ I, III app. 5.
La Constitucion Norteamericana como Ley Importada en Costa Rica Carlos Jose Gutierrez*
I. Introduccion En el aiio de 1987 se conmemor6 el bicentenario de Ia firma de Ia Constituci6n de los Estados U nidos de America y las celebraciones han seguido hasta el momento en que se cumplio el segundo centenario de su entrada en vigencia. La efemeride tiene una enorme importancia para el pueblo norteamericano, pero no puede limitarse a el. Desborda las fronteras del pais de su vigencia y debe ser objeto de Ia consideraci6n de los estudiosos del Derecho Constitucional en todo el mundo. Se trata de Ia Constituci6n Politica de mas larga vigencia en la historia de la humanidad, que, a la vez, es el primer ejemplo del regimen constitucional de los paises democraticos. Junto con Ia Constituci6n francesa de 1791 inicia Ia etapa contemporanea del Derecho Constitucional, aquella en la que los documentos escritos y rigidos adquieren carta de ciudadania universal y se transforman en parte bäsica e indispensable de todos los sistemas juridicos. EI documento norteamericano ha influenciado directa o indirectamente las instituciones politicas de gran nfunero de paises. Esel mas claro ejemplo de lo que creo debe llamarse "documento-faro". He utilizado ya algunos terminos que creo ameritan explicaci6n previa al desarrollo de Io que quiero decir. Cuando se habla de las normas juridicas se acostumbra seiialar su condici6n de modelos de conducta. Al prescribir una acci6n como obligatoria, Ie seiialan a los sujetos de Derecho un comportamiento que debe ser acatado, que debe realizarse por todo aquel colocado en Ia situaci6n prevista como supuesto por Ia norma. En ese sentido, toda norma, o grupo de normas que en su conjunto regulan un aspecto del comportamiento, es un modelo. Miguel Reale ha realizado un profundo estudio de las normas juridicas como modelos de conformidad con ese significado. 1
* Catedrätico, Universidad de Costa Rica; Profesor de Derecho Constitucional, Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Costa Rica; Embajador de Costa Rica ante las Naciones Unidas. Una versi6n mas amplia de este ensayo apareci6 en: Revista de Ciencias Juridicas no. 61 (1988) 13. 1 Miguel Reale, 0 Direito como Experiencia (1968); vease especialmente Estructuras e Modelos da Experiencia Juridica, 0 Problema das Fontes de Direito, en: id. 147-186 (Ensayo VII).
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EI presente trabajo tiene un enfoque totalmente diferente. EI conjunto de normas que forman una constitucion no se contempla como la regulacion de las estructuras fundamentales del Estado para el cual rige. Es visto como un ejemplo, que es utilizado por otros Estados, como fuente de estudio a la que se recurre para buscar en ella ideas que sirvan para la solucion de los problemas del pais que las adopta. Asume la constitucion un caräcter de lege ferenda, es tomada como modelo. Cualquier caso como este viene a ser un ejemplo del fenomeno de la "ley importada", sea de la copia o trasplante de instituciones juridicas a un medio distinto del que sirvio como nutriente de su creacion. En la medida en que la utilizacion del modelo no es un hecho aislado, que ocurre en un solo pais, que circunstancialmente, toma instituciones de otro sino que es tomado por una multiplicidad de estados, en una forma repetida y frecuente, estamos entonces frente a un documento-faro, sea una pieza importante para el progreso de una rama especifica del Derecho, que ilurnina y marca un hito fundamental en el avance de una disciplina. La ley importada es un fenomeno muy frecuente y significativo del Derecho latinoamericano. 2 Tal y como ha ocurrido a todos los pueblos que han estado sujetos a procesos coloniales, los pueblos del Continente Americano experimentaron una sustitucion de los sistemas juridicos de sus aborigenes por el Derecho traido por los conquistadores. EI cambio del periodo colonial, se prolongoluego durante el periodo de Independencia, cuando en el ejercicio de su propio destino las nuevas naciones rniraron al mundo y escogieron modelos que deseaban seguir. Ninguno de los conjuntos normativos que han sido usadas como modelos para el desarrollo juridico latinoamericano ha tenido mayor impacto en el Derecho Publico que la Constitucion de los Estados Unidas de America. Solo el Codigo Civil frances puede haber tenido, en el Derecho Privado, un efecto sirnilar. Oe ahi que, en forma totalmente iodependiente de los estudios que sobre su Constitucion hagan los norteamericanos, en ocasion del segundo centenario resulta obligatorio aprovechar el momento para considerar su influencia sobre America Latina, sea verla como documento-faro. Ello supone preguntarse cuäles fueron las instituciones creadas por la Constitucion de los Estados Unidas que fueron adaptadas o copiadas en America Latina, que modificaciones sufrieron al ser incorporadas a ellas, cual fue el periodo durante el cual tuvieron lugar esas influencias, y cual fue la efectividad de su funcionamiento en los paises de adopcion. Unestudio regional sobre el tema produciria resultados de enorme importancia para una mejor comprension de las instituciones juridicas latinoamericanas. Rebasa sin embargolas posibilidades de un investigador individual, que ademäs se ocupa de estas tareas con una dedicacion ocasional. Por ello, rni esfuerzo se 2
Jose Hurtado, La Ley Irnportada, Recepci6n del Derecho Penal en Peru (1979).
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limita a estudiar la relaci6n que pueda existir entre las estructuras constitucionales de los Estados Unidos y Costa Rica. Corno ejemplos para una tarea de Derecho Comparado, se dan profundas disimilitudes entre los objetos de comparaci6n. La naci6n mas poderosa de la epoca actual se compara con uno de los Estados mas pequeiios del Continente. Ambos Estados pertenecen, ademas, a familias diferentes del desarrollo juridico. Pero, en ambos, la forma de gobierno democratica ha adquirido permanencia, estabilidad y arraigo. Mientras los norteamericanos celebran los doscientos aiios de su segunda Constituci6n, los costarricenses nos aprestamos para festejar, en 1989, el centenario de los hechos que demostraron el legitimo arraigo del respeto a la voluntad popular, el nacimiento de la democracia. La comparaci6n se realiza, pues, entre dos Estados, de muy diferente tamaiio y familia juridica, pero que viven un sistema de gobierno comun. Realizo el presente estudio con la esperanza de que este esfuerzo pueda servir de ejemplo para una consideraci6n de mayor amplitud, en el cual, las instituciones trasplantadas se examinen en un mayor numero de paises, para apreciar su impacto total. Mientras ello ocurra, este es un estudio especifico de ley importada que facilita la comprensi6n de las instituciones costarricenses y el caracter de documento-faro de la Constituci6n norteamericana. La tarea se ha llevado a cabo dentro de la concepci6n del Derecho que considera el formalismo como un enfoque cientifico totalmente superado. Estudiar el Derecho tan solo en su vertiente normativa es ignorar sus aspectos mas importantes. Es un metodo tan esteril en el estudio del Derecho Comparado, como lo es en el Derecho interno de cualquier Estado especifico. Las normas juridicas son peces que se mueven entre dos aguas, las corrientes ideol6gicas que justifican elevar ciertas conductas a obligatorias y los fen6menos sociales que las originan y a los cuales se aplican. De ahi que, si lo realizado se ve como Derecho Comparado, debe verse como Derecho Comparado Social y, si se ve como Historia del Derecho, debe entenderse como Historia Social del Derecho. EI estudio va a considerar dos temas en forma particular. 3 EI primero es la forma de gobierno. Cada uno de los Estados en que se dividi6 la Republica 3 En otro estudio, he considerado Ia influencia de Ia Constituci6n norteamericana en Ia forma de Estado. Al adoptar su propio sistema de gobierno independiente, Centro America, despues del fracaso del Imperio de Agustin de Iturbide en Mexico, se organiz6 como una Republica federal. Los miembros de Ia Asamblea Constituyente declararon que habian tomado como base, el plan de Ia Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos de America. Ello hace necesario e importante comparar ambas Cartas fundamentales, para determinar el grado de similitud que existe entre ellas y ahondar en las circunstancias que hicieron de Ia Federaci6n centroamericana un fracaso, pese a seguir un modelo de exito. Centro America copi6 el federalismo norteamericano, pero no pudollegar a vivirlo de manera efectiva. Los localismos, las ambiciones personales, Ia falta de experiencia gubemativa, Ia seducci6n ejercida por las soluciones armadas, determinaron que no pudiera crearse un ambiente efectivo de convivencia e hicieron fracasar Ia Federaci6n. No puede hablarse de que el
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Federal de Centro America escogi6 el sistema presidencial, sea la f6rmula norteamericana de separaci6n de poderes. Es importante, por ello, comparar el sistema seguido en Centro America, el presidencialismo, que luego se desarroll6 en cada uno de los paises, en especial el caso de Costa Rica, con el desarrollo de Ia instituci6n en los Estados Unidosyen su Constituci6n. EI segundo tema tendra que ver con Ia instituci6n que se acostumbra considerar como tipica y especial del sistema constitucional norteamericano: el control de constitucionalidad por la Corte Suprema o judicial review. En el caso costarricense, esa instituci6n no aparece sino a principios del siglo XX. Para comprenderla es importante ver las influencias que sobre ella puede haber tenido Ia f6rmula norteamericana, apuntando las diferencias existentes entre esto y el sistema costarricense.
II. EI Regimen Presidencial A. EI Modelo La pregunta sobre cual es la instituci6n creada por Ia Carta Fundamental de los Estados Unidos que ha tenido mayor influencia sobre los documentos constitucionales y Ia realidad gubemamental de America Latina, tiene una sola e incontestable respuesta: Ia Presidencia de los Estados Unidos. Es una instituci6n que al momento de crearse fue objeto de un acalorado debate en el pais que le dio origen. Por otra parte, en America Latina, se presentaron inicialmente f6rmulas alternativas. En el curso del proceso, al trasplantarla al medio latinoamericano, surgieron variaciones en Ia instituci6n original, que no han disminuido, sino mäs bien aumentado, a traves de los afios. Sin embargo, cualesquiera sean las diferencias actuales o pasadas entre el modelo y las versiones derivadas, Ia figura del mandatario en America Latina se deriva de Ia del Presidente en la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos. Oe ahi Ia necesidad del analisis de Ia instituci6n y sus influencias, Ia que, despues de las referencias de orden general, se dedicara al caso costarricense. Hay que sefialar, de entrada, quese trat6 de una completa innovaci6n en materia de gobiemo. Se cre6 una figura diferente a todo lo que existia a finales del siglo XVIII. Los ingleses, para entonces ya habian desarrollado el sistema parlamentario en una forma amplia, aunque los reyes todavia mantenian parte de su poder, sin que el gabinete hubiera adquirido Ia condici6n de centro principal del gobiemo. Eso explica que, dada la hostilidad existente en los colonos contra el rey, y habiendo ademäs reaccionado en forma directa en contra del Parlamento, no hubieran copiado el sistema parlamentario ingles, en Io cual constituyen una excepci6n entre las antiguas colonias britänicas. 4 sistema federativo no funcionara; ni siquiera pudo probarse. No tuvo el menor asomo de realidad.
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En las constituciones estatales, anteriores a la Carta Federal, el Poder Ejecutivo estuvo subordinado a la Legislatura, la cual se veia como la unica fuente legitimada para el ejercicio del poder. Hubo una sola excepci6n, la del Estado de Nueva York, donde el Gobemador cont6 con poderes expresamente establecidos en la Constituci6n y se dispuso que se eligiera por periodos de tres aiios, con posibilidades ilimitadas de reelecci6n. EI exito de George Clinton, primer Gobemador del Estado, en lograr una administraci6n estable y eficiente, demostr6 las ventajas de unPoder Ejecutivo fuerte y fue uno de los ejemplos tomados en cuenta por los redactores de la Constituci6n. A la par de dicha experiencia se dio la de la Confederaci6n, donde la carencia de un Ejecutivo fuerte e independiente, que realizara las politicas decididas por el Congreso, pero que, al mismo tiempo, sirviera de balance y contrapeso a las acciones legislativas, qued6 en evidencia. 5 EI resultado, lo describe Sanchez Agesta, en los siguientes terminos: "Cuando los romanos expulsaron a sus reyes de Roma, no suprimieron en realidad la funci6n; crearon un consulado que instituia una especie de rey anual, empequefiecido por la corta duraci6n de su poder y la presencia de otro c6nsul con poderes iguales." Esta feliz evocaci6n de Bryce expresa exactamente el änimo que presidi6 Ia instituci6n deljefe del Ejecutivo Americano. EI Presidente refleja el monarca ingU:s, tal y como se Je concebia a traves de Blackstone y Montesquieu, pero coartado por Ia limitaci6n temporal de su cargo y Ia coparticipaci6n del Senado en ciertas funciones presidenciales. 6
EI Presidente concebido en la Constituci6n norteamericana es una versi6n modificada del rey ingles. Corno este es el Jefe de Estado, el comandante nacional de las fuerzas armadas, y el simbolo de la unidad del Estado, condici6n en la cual recibe a los representantes de los gobiemos extranjeros. Por otra parte, posee igualmente las funciones que en el sistema parlamentario corresponden al Primer Ministro o Presidente del Consejo de Ministros, dado que es el jefe del partido triunfador en las elecciones, es portavoz del pueblo y participa en el proceso de formulaci6n de nuevas leyes, tanto por su poder politico que le permite influenciar a los legisladores como por medio del control del veto. Un reflejo claro de que esos antecedentes estaban en la mente de los padres de la Constituci6n es el esfuerzo que hace Rarnilton en los Federalist Papers para negar que ello es asi. Apenas inicia el tratamiento del Poder Ejecutivo, se queja que: los escritores contra Ia Constituci6n, parecen haber realizado agotadores esfuerzos para demostrar su capacidad de distorsionar Ia realidad. Apostando a Ia aversi6n del pueblo contra Ia monarquia, han tratado de reclutar todos los celos y reservas para oponerlos a Winston Churchhi/1, The Age ofRevolution (1957) 166-199. Joseph M. Besette, The Presidency, en: Founding Principles of American Government, Two Hundred Years of Democracy on Trial, ed. por George J. Graham/ Scarlett G. Graham (1977) 193. 6 Luis Sanchez Agesta, Curso de Derecho Constitucional Comparado (1980) 193. 4
5
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la propuesta de creaci6n de unPresidente de los Estados Unidos, no meramente como un embri6n sino como el hijo crecido de tan detestado padre. Para establecer la afinidad pretendida, no han tenido escrupulos en obtener recursos aun de las regiones de Ia fantasia. La autoridad de un magistrado, en pocos casos mayor, en otras instancias menor, que las que tiene el gobemador de Nueva York, han sido aumentadas a mas que prerogativas reales. 7
Esa defensa seiiala bien a las claras las reservas de la epoca, asi como los ejemplos que se habian tenido presentes al momento de su creaci6n. La percepci6n de esas relaciones no impidi6 que se creara y apareci6 asi una figura de Jefe de Estado que, si bien recordaba a los reyes, se diferenciaba de ellos, por la circunstancia de ser resultado de una elecci6n popular, con poderes restringidos por la Constituci6n. En la präctica norteamericana se han dado periodos en cuales ha existido un predominio marcado del Congreso, seguidos de otros en los cuales, ya sea por las circunstancias, ya por la personalidad del Presidente en ejercicio, este ha asumido una preponderancia sobre el Congreso. 8 El que esas variaciones hayan podido ocurrir sin que se haya sentido la necesidad de modificar las normas escritas, ni actuar en contra de ellas, es el mejor indicador del adecuado equilibrio existente a nivel constitucional entre ambos poderes. Si bien no puede hablarse de un equilibrio perfecto, hay que seiialar la flexibilidad que hace posibles variaciones como las que se han presentado. Al momento de iniciar la redacci6n de este trabajo, asistimos a una nueva confrontaci6n entre el Congreso y el Presidente, de la cual pareciera haber salido debilitado el Presidente. B. Las Alternativas Iniciales Latinoamericanas Pasemos ahora a America Espaiiola: al momento de la lndependencia, nada inclinaba a los nuevos Estados de manera forzosa a la creaci6n de Republicas. Por el contrario, las sociedades coloniales se habian desarrollado dentro de un espiritu aristocrätico, que nunca existi6 en las colonias ingleses. He desarrollado en otro estudio mi tesis de que el periodo de dominaci6n espaiiola fue un "ejercicio de nostalgia", 9 dado que los conquistadores y sus descendientes buscaron crear una sociedad de privilegios, en la cual ellos disfrutaban de mayores prebendas que los nobles espaiioles de la epoca anterior a la Conquista. Caracteristica importante del sistema de gobierno espaiiol en America fue la concentraci6n de facultades y poderes en los mäximos jerarcas administrativos. El Virrey, o el Gobernador en las provincias, reunia en su persona facultades de gobierno, de administraci6n, de jefatura militar y hasta judiciales, dado que 7 Alexander Hamiltonj James Madison/ John Jay, The Federalist Papers (1961, Rossiter ed.) (citado: The Federalist Papers) No. 67, p. 407. 8 Besette (supra n. 5). 9 Carlos Jose Gutierrez, EI Sustrato Espafiol (manuscrito).
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impartia justicia en su condici6n personal, o actuaba como Presidente de la Audiencia, en las ciudades donde ellas tenian su sede; esas funciones judiciales solo fueron suprimidas al Gobernador a finales del siglo XVIII, para otorgarselas a un Regente de la Audiencia. 10 A esa concentraci6n de poderes hay que sumar la ausencia de entidades legislativas, dado que no puede reconocersele ese caräcter a los cabildos que tienen una definida naturaleza de gobiernos locales. Todo ello obliga a concluir que la experiencia en materia de gobierno de America Espafiola tenia muy poco o nada que ver con el principio de separaci6n de poderes, proclamado por Montesquieu y tomado por la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos, como base de la organizaci6n de su gobierno. Y hay que concluir que, si bien es posible improvisar en contra de la tradici6n, es dificil que esas improvisaciones produzcan resultados inmediatos. Por otro lado, el movimiento para mantener una organizaci6n monarquica en America Espafiola despues de la Independencia, no se limit6 al Plan de Iguala, proclamado por Agustin de Iturbide como medio para transformarse en Emperador. En 1825, el General Paez le escribi6 a Bolivar proponiendole la abolici6n de la Constituci6n republicana y la creaci6n del lmperio. Le dijo: Este pais se parece a Ia Francia de Ia epoca en que el Gran Napoleon estaba en Egipto y fue llamado por los personajes mäs famosos de Ia Revolucion para salvar a Francia. Vos debeis llegar a ser el Bonaparte de America del Sur, porque este no es el pais de Washington. 11
No puedo menos que sefialar a cual influencia le atribuia el General Paez la Constituci6n republicana. Lo importante para la historia es que Bolivar rechaz6 la oferta que se le hizo, por considerar que el titulo de Libertador que se le habia dado era la expresi6n maxima de gloria a que podia aspirar. 12 Sin embargo, en la Constituci6n propuesta en 1826 para el Estado que adopt6 su nombre, Bolivia, el cargo de Presidente de la Republica era vitalicio, y su titular designaha al Vicepresidente, que seria hereditario. 13 Hubo otros ejemplos, como lo menciona Heman Peralta, despues de referirse al caso de Bolivar y a las tesis de Alexander Rarnilton sobre la necesidad de un Ejecutivo fuerte: Monärquicos ocasionales o por conviccion, lo fueron San Martin, Belgrano, Rivadavia, y Rodriguez Peiia en Ia Argentina. Elio en el Uruguay, los cabildantes de Santiago de Chile de 1808, y algunos de los amigos y tenientes de Bolivar, como Sucre, Paez, Urdaneta, Bermudez, Nariiio, Montilla, Ibarra, Austria, Santander, Clement, Sarda, Espinar, Briceiio, Mosquera, Restrepo, Vergara, Flores, Valdes y otros. 14 10 Rodrigo Facio, La Federacion de Centro America: Sus Antecedentes, su Vida y su Disolucion, en: Obras Historicas, Politicas y Poeticas (1982) 420-422; Fernando Guier, La Funcion Presidencial en Centro America (1973). 11 Gerhard Masur, Sirnon Bolivar II (1980) 560 s. 12 Augusto Mijares, EI Liberador (1983) 177. 13 Masur (supra n. 11) 336. 14 Hernan Peralta, Agustin de Iturbide y Costa Rica (1968) 21.
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Corno ahi aparecen los mäs ilustres nombres de Ia Independencia hispanoamericana, solo basta para completar el cuadro recordar que en Brasil se cre6 un Imperio, que no se transform6 en Republica sino hasta 1889, que en Haiti, Desalines se proclam6 Emperador en 1804, y que los franceses trataron de imponer a Maximiliano de Habsburgo en Mexico. Con todos esos antecedentes, no puede caber duda que en Ia escogencia de Ia forma republicana y el titulo de Presidente de la Republica para el Jefe de Estado, priv6 el ejemplo dado por la Constituci6n de los Estados U nidos. Desde luego, el trasplante no se realiz6 al vacio. La separaci6n de poderes se hizo valer en una tradici6n de concentraci6n de ellos sobre la autoridad de mayor rango y en una realidad en que los modelos monärquicos despertaban reacciones favorables. Agreguense a esos factores - el importante papel que en la administraci6n colonial espaiiola jugaron los militares y la continuaci6n de ese papel durante las guerras de Independencia, y la inestabilidad posterior, que hizo aun mäs esencial el rol de los militares en la estabilidad gubemamental- se tendrän las bases para la condici6n de predominio presidencial que vino a caracterizar el regimen republicano en los paises latinoamericanos. 15 De ahi que la caracterizaci6n general de la forma de gobiemo latinoamericano, se haya denominado presidencialismo definiendola "como una aplicaci6n deformada del regimen presidencial cläsico, por debilitamiento de los poderes del parlamento e hipertrofia de los poderes del presidente," como lo hace Duverger, quien luego agrega: "Los presidentes iberoamericanos no han solido conformarse con disponer del Poder Ejecutivo sino que actuan e influyen en los otros poderes". 16 C. La Situaci6n Costarricense
Dentro del marco general indicado corresponde examinar la realidad costarricense. EI caso particular permite juzgar cuanta validez tiene la afirmaci6n generalquese ha hecho. Hay ademäs la circunstancia de ser Costa Rica el pais que ha logrado la mayor persistencia y solidez de las instituciones democräticas, lo que hace suponer que en ella se de una situaci6n de mayor balance entre los distintos poderes del Estado. 1. Caracteristicas Generales. La evoluci6n constitucional costarricense se caracteriza, a diferencia radical con el caso norteamericano, por el gran numero de constituciones; catorce en total, dado que Ia de Ia Republica Federal de Centro America de 1824 y Ia del Estado Libre de Costa Rica de 1825 deben ser vistas como partes de un mismo sistema. He seiialado en otro estudio que las constituciones pueden ser agrupadas en tres periodos: el primerode los cuales va desde 1821 a 1870, durante el cual se dieron once constituciones; el segundo se forma por Ia de 1871, con Ia interrupci6n de los dos aiios de vigencia de Ia de 1917; y el tercero por Ia de 1949, hoy vigenteY 15 16
S{mchez Agesta (supra n. 6) 194. Maurice Duverger, Instituciones Politicas y Derecho Constitucional (1970) 211,587.
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En el proceso evolutivo sobresalen cuatro caracteristicas. Primero, la influencia inicial de la Constituci6n de Cädiz. Segundo, el deseo de crear instituciones propias que obliga a mirar la continua experimentaci6n del primer periodo como expresi6n de la präctica de "prueba y error", para definir las instituciones que efectivamente lograron un funcionamiento adecuado y que puede caracterizarse con las expresiones usadas por los Constituyentes de 1847, quienes dijeron: Es preciso persuadirse que Ja Constituci6n debe tener un origen, no en las teorias de una libertad ex6tica y mal cultivada en nuestro suelo, sino en la constituci6n y organizaci6n de los pueblos. En una palabra, hija legitimadelas entraiias de Ia sociedad y no espuria o adoptiva, debe ser Ia ley que fundamente el edificio social. 18
Tercero, en esa tarea de creaci6n, sin embargo, el formato de la divisi6n de poderes de la Constituci6n norteamericana se utiliz6 como modelo, al que se busc6 ajustarse, como lo prueba el hecho de las repetidas instancias en que se quiso conformar un Poder Legislativo bicameral, del que finalmente se desisti6. Corno dijeron los mismos constituyentes de 1847, al confesar que habian tomado de la Constituci6n norteamericana algunos elementos: Sirvanos entretanto de norma esa naci6n que creimos imitar y en donde las libertades publicas son contemporäneas de Jas costumbres. Sin tocar instituciones que el tiempo ha robustecido, y adoptando las reformas que la necesidad exige no es fäcil que nos engaiiemos y que hagamos mal. 19
Cuarto, la linea de evoluci6n del balance entre el Poder Ejecutivo y el Legislativo caracterizada por Mario Alberto Jimenez como el "principio del pendulo", dado que supone el paso de un Legislativo fuerte y un Ejecutivo debil a un Legislativo debil y un Ejecutivo fuerte para orientarse luego hacia una mayor fortaleza para el Legislativo. 20 Debemos dejar de lado los tres primeros documentos constitucionales- EI Pacto Social Fundamental Interino de 1821, y los dos Estatutos Politicos de 1823- dado que en ellos no se ha incorporado el principio de la divisi6n de poderes, que hizo su aparici6n en la Constituci6n Federal de Centro America. Con esas exclusiones, el principio seiialado por Jimenez es välido, con la explicaci6n de que los esfuerzos para el debilitamiento del Poder Ejecutivo frente al Legislativo se han producido siempre, despues de la gesti6n de un gobernante quese distinguiera por la utilizaci6n plena de las oportunidades de ejercicio de los poderes que le fueron otorgados. EI pendulo constituye una 17 Carlos Jose Gutierrez, Sintesis del Proceso Constitucional, en: Derecho Constitucional Costarricense (1983) 15-34. 18 Cleto Gonzalez Viquez, EI Sufragio en Costa Rica, en: Obras Hist6ricas I (1973) 333, citado en Jorge Saenz, EI Despertar Constitucional de Costa Rica (1985) 409 s. 19 Saenz (supra n. 18) 410. 20 Mario Alberto Jimenez, Soberania Extema y Relaciones entre el Legislativo y el Ejecutivo en Nuestra Evoluci6n Constitucional, en: Obras Completas II (1962).
10*
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expresi6n del temor de los costarricenses a las dictaduras y es el resultado de sus esfuerzos por constituir un regimen verdaderamente democrätico. Por el contrario, las dificultades de operaci6n de un sistema de gobierno con un Ejecutivo debilitado o entrabado, han conducido luego a los movirnientos para fortalecer la figura del Presidente de la Republica, conformandose de manera directa con el postulado general latinoamericano. Veamos ahora los vaivenes ocurridos. 2. Ley Fundamental del Estado Libre de Costa Rica y el Decreto de Bases y Garantias. La Ley Fundamental del Estado Libre de Costa Rica (1825) es el desarrollo particular de la Constituci6n Federalpara este pais. Por ende, el Jefe de Estado, nombre del titular del Poder Ejecutivo, tenia las rnismas debilidades del Presidente Federal. Compartia la funci6n ejecutiva con el Poder Conservador, un Consejo compuesto de tres a cinco miembros, y a este le correspondia sancionar las leyes y convocar al Congreso a sesiones extraordinarias, proponer el nombrarniento de fundonarios importantes alPoder Ejecutivo y declarar que habia lugar a formaci6n de causa contra los altos runeionarios del Estado. 21 Se dio, eso si, una diferencia importante entre esta Ley y la Constituci6n Federal. La primera tuvo vigencia desde 1825 hasta 1838. En dicho aii.o, Braulio Carrillo dio un Golpe de Estado y se convirti6 en dictador por un periodo de tres aiios, que ha sido caracterizado por algunos como decisivo para la formaci6n del Estado en Costa Rica 22 y por otros como "el mas puro absolutismo de nuestra historia". 23 En 1841, Carrillo promulga un Decreto de Bases y Garantias, 24 en el cual todos los poderes se reunen en un Primer Jefe, que es de caräcter vitalicio. Corno dice Jimenez: "En su persona de Primer Magistrado se reunieron, con excepci6n del Judicial, todos los poderes del Estado, ejercidos como en las mäs autenticas epocas del absolutismo, sin lirnites ni responsabilidades de ninguna especie. Carrillo seria hastaPoder Constituyente". 25 Se ha querido ver en ese Decreto una influencia del absolutismo europeo. 26 Sorprendentemente, no se ha hecho la relaci6n con la Constituci6n que Sirnon Bolivar redact6 para Bolivia en 1826, en la cual se crea un sistema politico, dentro del cual: "EI Presidente debia ser el sol...Este funcionario debia ser nombrado con caracter vitalicio y tendria el privilegio de nombrar a su sucesor". 27 Constituci6n Federal de Centro America de 1824, arts. 60-75. Rodolfo Cerdas, Formaci6n del Estado en Costa Rica (2a ed. 1978); Rodrigo Facio, Don Braulio Carrillo, Figura Discutida, en: Obras Hist6ricas, Politicas y Poeticas (1982) 301-327. 23 Alberto Jimenez (supra n. 20) 65. 24 Decreto No. 2, 8 mar. 1841. 25 Alberto Jimenez (supra n. 20) 65. 26 Saenz (supra n. 18) 371. 27 Masur (supra n. 11) 551. Esta relaci6n es tanto mäs interesante, si sepiensa en Ia tesis sostenida por don Lorenzo Montllfar primero y con base en Cl, por muchos otros de que el 21
22
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3. Las Constituciones de Ia Decada de los Cuarenta. Corno obligada reaccion a los excesos de Carrillo en concentrar el poder y los intentos de Morazan, por ejercer poderes dictatoriales que le permitieran reconstruir la Federacion Centroamericana, la Constitucion de 1844 busc6 de nuevo debilitar al Poder Ejecutivo dandole al Legislativo una estructura bicameral, con el monopolio de la iniciativa legal para representantes y senadores. EI Senado, ademas de su participacion en el proceso legislativo tenia funciones de contralor constitucional y proponia ternas para el nombrarniento de Ministros y Primeros Jefes de los Ministerios. Ambas camaras debian autorizar alPoder Ejecutivo para que este pudiera actuar en el campo internacional. La consideracion de ser imposible para el Poder Ejecutivo trabajar dentro de los lirnites fijados y la falta de operatividad del sistema de sufragio escogido, motivaron que en 1846 se desconociera la Constitucion, se eligiera una Asamblea Constituyente y para 1847 se tuviera una nueva Carta Fundamental, que, a diferencia de la anterior, inicia de nuevo el fortalecirniento del Poder Ejecutivo, a quien se le otorg6 la iniciativa en materia legal. No se dio Ia capacidad de vetar leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, sino derendir un informe, el cual de ser desfavorable, obligaba a una nueva consideracion del proyecto. Por otra parte, podia suspender "el cumplirniento de una ley, cuya ejecucion cause graves dafi.os al Estado . . .dando cuenta inmediatamente al Poder Legislativo para su resolucion". Al rnismo tiempo, los Ministros poseian iniciativa en materia de leyes. 28 Tal y como ya se dijo, los Constituyentes de 1847 tomaron algunas instituciones de la Constitucion norteamericana, como el Vicepresidente de la Republica, y la condicion para este de Presidente del Poder Legislativo, el cual, sin embargo, se declar6 unicameral. Finalmente, se perrniti6 al Presidente aspirar a la reeleccion en forma inmediata. 29 Corno se estim6 que el fortalecirniento del Poder Ejecutivo todavia dejaba que desear, al afi.o siguiente, sea en 1848, con la excusa de romper totalmente los lazos con la antigua Federacion, se proclam6 a Costa Rica como Republica iodependiente y se reform6 en bastante detalle Ia Constitucion, para otorgarle al Poder Ejecutivo la facultad de sancionar las leyes, perrnitirle la direccion de las relaciones diplomaticas, convocar extraordinariamente al Congreso y "tomar por si todas las medidas que estime necesarias para defender al pais" en situaciones de emergencia. 30 C6digo General promulgado por Carrillo, en ese mismo aii.o de 1841, se fundamenta en los c6digos promulgados por el General Santa Cruz, primero para Bolivia y Juego para Ja Federaci6n formada por ese pais y Peru. Alberto Brenes Cordoba, Historiadel Derecho (1929) 880 s. 28 Constituci6n de 1847, arts. 69, 102, 103. 29 Id. arts. 80, 83, 84, 103, 11 0(2), 11 0(20). 3° Constituci6n de 1848, arts. 56-60, 77(3), 77(8), 77(19)-(20).
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4. Las Constituciones de 1859 y 1869. Los esfuerzos para otorgarle mayores atribuciones alPoder Ejecutivo en 1847 y 1848 fueron dados por el Dr. don Jose Maria Castro Madriz, pero, debido al corto periodo que Castro estuvo en el poder, en realidad tuvieron su efecto durante el gobierno de don Juan Rafael Mora, quien dirigi6 Costa Rica desde 1849 hasta 1859. Terminado el gobierno de Mora, se sinti6 nuevamente la necesidad de debilitar al Poder Ejecutivo, cosa quese hizo en la Constituci6n de 1859, en la cual se volvi6 al sistema bicameral, dändole a ambas cämaras iguales facultades legislativas, suprimiendole al Presidente los poderes extraordinarios en casos de emergencia y la facultad de suspender leyes. EI periodo presidencial se disminuy6 a tres aiios, sin posibilidad de reelecci6n inmediata pero si despues de un periodo. Se suprimi6 la Vicepresidencia, se aumentaron las causales de responsabilidad para los altos funcionarios, y se estableci6 con el nombre de Consejo de Estado una reuni6n obligatoria de los ahora Secretarios de Estado, antes Ministros. 31 Una decada despues, en 1869, para justificar un Golpe de Estado, se promulg6 una nueva Constituci6n, pero que en realidad no hacia ninguna variaci6n de sustancia. Las funciones del Ejecutivo y su balance con el Legislativo permanecieron iguales, sin cambios de importancia. 5. La Constitutifm de 1871. Fuera de suprimir el sistema bicameral y sustituirlo con una unica cämara, la Constituci6n de 1871 no tuvo variantes de importancia con las dos anteriores. Hubo, sin embargo, un cambio de actitud de extrema importancia: el General don Tomäs Guardia, bajo cuyo gobierno se habia promulgado, la suspendi6 en 1876 y no la reestableci6 sino en 1882, introduciendole modificaciones de tanta trascendencia como la eliminaci6n de la pena de muerte. Sin embargo, la Constituci6n, que no habia podido resistir su propio creador, sirvi6 para que gobernaran sus sucesores hasta 1948. Fue durante su vigencia cuando las instituciones democräticas adquirieron verdadera realidad y si bien fue objeto de algunas modificaciones, se adquiri6 conciencia de la necesidad de estabilidad y comenz6 a preferirse el sistema de enmiendas parciales. Durante ellargo periodo de vigencia de la Constituci6n de 1871, el Presidente de la Republica mantuvo la figura de centrode la acci6n gubernamental y ejerci6 un claro predominio sobre los otros dos poderes. No estaba sujeto a controles jurisdiccionales, poseia capacidad irrestricta de nombramiento y remoci6n de los fundonarios publicos, inclusive los electorales, lo cualle permiti6 desarrollar un control completo de los procesos politicos. Pero cualesquiera que fuera la distinta personalidad de los Presidentes, todos tuvieron la posibilidad de ejercer sus funciones dentro del marco seiialado por la Constituci6n. Al tener esta una condici6n estable, que acept6 modificaciones parciales- 19 en total, durante los 67 aiios de vigencia de la Constituci6n- se desarrollaron las instituciones, se consolid6 el sentido de juridicidad, y la democracia se transform6 en realidad. EI 31
Constituci6n de 1859, arts. 60-91, 103, 110, 120.
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liberalismo le otorg6 un marco ideo16gico suficientemente generalizado y el grado creciente de apertura que demostr6 la oligarquia cafetalera, la llev6 a buscar en forma cada vez mas acrecentada y directa el apoyo de las clases populares. No fue sino como resultado de la crisis politica de 1948, al tratar e1 gobierno de anular el resultado de unas elecciones presidenciales que le habian sido desfavorables, que se pens6 en sustituirla totalmente. Sin embargo, como el Cid Campeador, aun despues de derogada, gan6 una ultima batalla porque la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 1949, la utiliz6 como base de la nueva Carta Fundamental. 6. La Constitucü'm de 1949. En el Iargo proceso de variaci6n de textos constitucionales que ha vivido Costa Rica llegamos a la actualmente vigente, que con sus inviolados 40 afios es la que tiene el record de estabilidad y es la segunda en cuanto a tiempo total de vigencia. 32 Habia un consenso de que parte importante en los excesos que condujeron a la guerra civil de 1948 era responsabilidad de un Presidente de la Republica con demasiado poder, los miembros del Constituyente estuvieron de acuerdo en debilitarlo. Mario Alberto Jimenez pudo decir que: "EI Constituyente del49 se caracteriz6 por un animo de desconfianza hacia la extrema concepci6n presidencialista de la Constituci6n de 1871 ". 33 Para ello se le introdujeron una serie de limitaciones: se exigi6 una espera de dos periodos parapoder aspirar a la reelecci6n y luego, por reforma parcial, se prohibi6 totalmente esta; el Poder Ejecutivo se declar6 colegiado, ya quese dispuso que lo ejercen el Presidente de la Republica y los Ministros de Gobierno en calidad de obligados colaboradores. 34 Por otra parte, se elimin6 toda participaci6n del Presidente en los procesos electorales y se introdujo el Servicio Civil para el nombramiento de los fundonarios publicos. 35 Se restableci6 la Vicepresidencia de la Republica, pero estipulando que serian dos los Vicepresidentes. 36 Para exigirle responsabilidades al Presidente se crearon la Contraloria General de la Republica en el campo hacendario, 37 el recurso de amparo en la protecci6n de los derechos no protegidos por el habeas corpus, 38 el juicio contencioso-administrativo para vigilancia de los actos de la administraci6n, 39 y la jurisdicci6n constitucional para ejercer el control sobre leyes y actos del Ejecutivo. 40 Por ultimo, en previsi6n del crecimiento del Estado por su intervenci6n en la economia, se dio 32 Esto, por cuanto, en las tres suspensiones sufridas por Ia Constituci6n de 1871, nunca estuvo ella en vigencia ininterrumpida por 40 aiios. 33 Alberto Jimenez (supra n. 20) 257. 34 Constituci6n de 1949, art. 130. 35 Id. arts. 95, 191. 36 Id. art. 135. 37 Id. art. 183. 38 Id. art. 48. 39 Id. art. 10. 40 Id. art. 49.
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rango constitucional a las instituciones aut6nomas, "con independencia en materia de gobierno y administraci6n". 41 La conciencia de dichas limitaciones hizo que los Presidentes electos bajo Ia actual Constituci6n, hasta 1974, se quejaron en forma repetida de los limites impuestos para Ia acci6n del gobierno. 42 Sin embargo, con una simple modificaci6n en cuanto al regimen de las instituciones aut6nomas, 43 y mas como resultado del prop6sito presidencial de ejercer el poder, los gobiernos de 1974 a 1978 y de 1978 a 1982 fueron caracterizados, posteriormente, con las expresiones utilizadas en los Estados Unidos, para referirse a Ia Administraci6n Nixon, sea como "Ia Presidencia imperial". 44 Con lo cual, podria decirse que en cuanto a Ia figura del Presidente de Ia Republica, despues del tanteo y variaciones, hemos llegado a una situaci6n similar a Ia norteamericana, sea a un punto de equilibrio en cuanto a Ia relaci6n entre Legislativo y Ejecutivo, donde los enfasis e inclinaciones, dependen mas del momento y de las personalidades que de las figuras normativas. CH. Conclusiones
De lo dicho, creo que hay tres cosas que quedan suficientemente claras, a saber: Primero, el peso de Ia figura del Presidente de Ia Republica, dentro del sistema politico costarricense, si bien no ha mantenido una gravitaci6n exagerada durante Ia totalidad del desarrollo de las instituciones, si ha tenido un papel de mayor importancia que los otros dos poderes del Estado. Durante el primer periodo del desarrollo constitucional, los cambios fueron frecuentes y el texto de las constituciones se ajust6 en muchos casos a circunstancias de orden momentaneo. Sin embargo, Ia continuidad en Ia prueba y error permiti6 definir mejor las instituciones y crear, mediante una experiencia propia, un Estado s6lido y estable, pese a su pequefio tamafio. Segundo, dentro de ese proceso, Ia escogencia de formas o institutos provenientes de Ia Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos fue repetida. La organizaci6n del Poder Legislativo en forma bicameral y el otorgamiento al Senado de intervenci6n en asuntos del Poder Ejecutivo, fue una f6rmula repetida en varias constituciones, pero que, en definitiva no lleg6 a consolidarse. La figura del Vicepresidente fue igualmente intentada en varias constituciones, y en Ia actual de 1949 parece haber adquirido firme arraigo. La denominaci6n de los auxiliares directos del Presidente como Secretarios de Estado, si bien fue utilizada por todo ellargo periodo de Ia Constituci6n de 1871, fue abandonada Id. art. 188. Enrique Benavides, Nuestro Pensamiento Politico en sus Fuentes (1976). 43 Constituci6n de 1949, reforrna al art. 188, hecha por Ley No. 4123, 30 mayo 1968. 44 ANFE, EI Modelo Politico Costarricense (1984); vease especialmente artleulos de Fernando Guier, Carlos Jose Gutierrez, y Daniel Oduber, en: id. pp. 13-39. 41
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en la actual Carta Fundamental por la figura de los Ministros, co-participes y co-responsables del Poder Ejecutivo, que en la pnictica no ha alcanzado la extensiön limitante que pensaron para ella los Constituyentes de 1949, dada la circunstancia de tener el Presidente de la Republica facultades de libre nombramiento y remoci6n de ellos, lo cual los mantiene en realidad como subordinados de este. Pero como en todos los otros paises latinoamericanos que copiaron la estructura del gobierno de la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos, la figura del Presidente de la Republica como Iider determinante de las orientaciones politicas, pese al hecho de que la Asamblea Legislativa haga sentir algunas de sus atribuciones, se mantiene y hoy dia pareciera que el intento de reducirle su peso realizado en 1949 no logr6 realizar plenamente su objetivo. Tercero, existen algunas similitudes en la estructura del gobierno costarricense y el norteamericano, producto de la influencia constitucional vivida. Pero, como debe ocurrir cuando la importaci6n de instituciones juridicas no es simple copia sino base para la propia experimentaci6n, en su forma actual hay diferencias marcadas entre la Constituci6n costarricense y la norteamericana, pese al canicter claramente democratico de ambas.
111. EI Control de Constitucionalidad A. La Gran Invenci6n
La instituci6n propia del sistema norteamericano que constituye su mayor aporte a la ciencia del Derecho Constitucional es, sin duda alguna, la Iabor realizada por la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, en ejercicio de la funci6n de judicial review o control de constitucionalidad. Es gracias a esa tarea, que la Constituci6n norteamericana ha podido cumplir sus 200 aiios, dado que por la via interpretativa, se ha adaptado el texto a situaciones cambiantes y ha sido revivificada, en forma constante, llenandose ademas los silencios del texto y aclarandose las oscuridades. Lo occurido puede sintetizarse en los terminos en que lo hace Archibald Cox, al decir: EI genio del constitucionalismo norteamericano, que fundamenta el Estado de Derecho, reside, primero, en Ia Constituci6n, que provee base, tanto para el cambio como para Ia continuidad; segundo, en el metodo de interpretaci6njudicial; y tercero, en Ia destreza con Ia cual generaciones de Magistrados de Ia Corte, a pesar de unos pocos fallos err6neos, han sabido orientar su laborentre los extremos de los dilemas. 45
Para quien aprecie en su importancia actual el sistema de control de constitucionalidad norteamericano, siempre resulta una sorpresa darse cuenta de que no se encuentra establecido en el texto escrito de la Constituci6n sino que 45
Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution (1987) 27.
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es un resultado de la acci6n de los tribunales, con fundamento en la doctrina y la historia. 46 La Constituci6n, en su articulo 111, establece las funciones de la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos y nada dice sobre facultades para declarar nulas y sin ning(In valorlas leyes contrarias a la Constituci6n. Pero ya en los Federa/ist Papers, Alexander Hamilton seiial6 que dicha tarea debia tenerse como una clara atribuci6n de la Corte, pese a declarar que esta era "el mas debil de los tres departamentos de poder", citando a Montesquieu para quien el Poder Judicial era "lo siguiente a nada". Ello no fue 6bice para que, acto seguido, Hamilton estimara necesario decir que habia cierta perplejidad respecto al derecho de los tribunales de declarar nulos los actos legislativos contrarios a la Constituciön, resultado de imaginarse que esa doctrina implica una superioridad de la judicatura sobre el Poder Legislativo ... No hay una posiciön quese encuentre fundada en principios mas claros que lade que cualquier acto de una autoridad delegada, contrario a los terminos de la delegaciön bajo la cual se ejerce, es nula. Por lo tanto, ningun acto legislativo contrario a la Constituciön puede ser valido ... La interpretaciön de las leyes es la funciön propia y exclusiva de los tribunales. Una Constituciön es, de hecho, y debe ser tenida por los jueces, como una ley fundamental. Les pertenece por tanto a ellos determinar su significado, asi como el significado de cualquier ley dictada por el Poder Legislativo. Si llegara a suceder que exista una diferencia irreconciliable entre las dos, aquella que tiene validez y obligatoriedad de mayor rango debe, desde luego ser preferida, o en otras palabras, la Constituciön debe ser preferida a las leyes, la intenciön del pueblo a la intenciön de sus agentes. 47 La claridad de ese lenguaje no tuvo mayor consecuencia hasta una serie de hechos que tuvieron su inicio en 1800, aiio en el cual el Partido Federalista, del Presidente John Adams, fue derrotado en las elecciones por Thomas Jefferson y su Partido Republicano. Entre las acciones tomadas por Adams, en el periodo entre las elecciones y la entrega del poder a sus adversarios, estuvo el nombramiento de John Marshall, quien habia sido su Secretario de Estado, a la Presidencia de la Corte Suprema. Por otra parte, la mayoria del Congreso saliente procedi6 a establecer 16 jueces de primera instancia y 42 jueces de paz, cargos estos que el Presidente llen6 con Federalistas. En la ultima noche de su mandato, Adams firm6 muchos de los nombramientos, que fueron luego enviados al Departamento de Estado para que Marshalllos firmara y sellara. En la confusi6n causada por la urgencia, algunos de esos nombramientos no fueron entregarlos por el Departamento de Estado a los nuevos funcionarios, siendo uno de ellos, el de William Marbury como uno de los jueces de paz. Este, en diciembre de 1801, demand6 directamente ante la Corte Suprema de los Estados 46 Corno ejemplo de la perplejidad que dicha circunstancia produce, vease Thomas Buergenthal, Constituciön y Derechos Humanos, en: La Constituciön Norteamericana y Su Influencia en Latinoamerica, 1787-1987 (1987) 11-17. 47 The Federalist Papers (supra n. 7) No. 78, pp. 466 s.
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Unidos al nuevo Secretario de Estado, James Madison, pidiendo se le ordenara entregarte el acuerdo de su nombramiento. La Corte estuvo de acuerdo en conocer del caso, lo que motiv6 que el Congreso, ahora dominado por los Republicanos, pasara una ley que paraliz6la actividad de la Corte por catorce meses. No fue sino hasta en 1803 que pudo celebrarse el juicio. El 24 de febrero de ese afio, Marshall, cuya omisi6n de entrega habia motivado la demanda, anunci6 el veredicto de la Corte. En este adopt6 el criterio de evitar dar una orden al Secretario de Estado, afirmando, sin embargo, que Marbury habia sido bien nombrado, pero sosteniendo que la demanda habia sido planteada en el tribunal equivocado, por considerar que la ley que autorizaba a la Corte Suprema a actuar como tribunal de primera instancia para emitir mandatos a cualquier funcionario federal, era contraria a la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos. Ello oblig6 a la Corte a examinar su capacidad de pronunciarse sobre la constitucionalidad de las leyes emitidas por el Congreso, cosa que hizo la sentencia en terminos muy similares a los sostenidos por Rarniltonen los Federalist Papers, sin citarlos directamente: Es, enfaticamente, el ambito y la obligaci6n del6rgano judicial, declarar lo que la ley es. Aquellos que aplican una regla a casos particulares, estan en la necesidad de explicar e interpretar la regla. Si hay un conflicto entre dos normas, los tribunales deben decidir sobre la aplicabilidad de cada una de ellas. Asi, si una ley se opone a la Constituci6n y tanto la ley como la Constituci6n se aplican a un caso particular, de modo que el tribunal puede decidir el caso, de acuerdo con la ley dejando de lado la Constituci6n; o de acuerdo a la Constituci6n dejando de lado la ley; el tribunal debe determinar cual de esas reglas en conflicto rige el caso; esta es la esencia misma de la funci6n judicial. Si entonces, los tribunales deben respeto a la Constituci6n, y la Constituci6n es superior a una ley ordinaria dada por la legislatura, la Constituci6n y no dicha ley ordinaria, debe ser la que rige el caso al cual ambas se aplican. 48
El juicio Marbury vs. Madison no fue sino uno de los varios incidentes de la lucha entre el Presidente Jefferson y sus opositores Federalistas. 49 Pero John Marshall sirvi6 el cargo de Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de los Estados Unidos por 30 afios, lo que le permiti6lograr que sus puntos de vista sobre el papel de la Corte y su funci6n constitucional dejaran de ser tesis politicamente controversiales para convertirse en verdades juridicas de aceptaci6n universal. Las incidencias originales quedaron de recuerdos hist6ricos y la Corte Suprema adquiri6 la fisonomia que la ha distinguido desde entonces. Por eso, cuando Alexis de Tocqueville visit6 los Estados Unidos de 1832 a 1835 y reuni6 los materiales que le permitieron escribir La Democracia en America, sus observaciones le hicieron decir en ese libro: "En los Estados Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). El relato de las incidencias politicas que condujeron a Marbury vs. Madison aparece en multitud de libros. Vease, como ejemplos, Cox (supra n. 45) 44-62; The Foundation of the Federal Bar Association, Equal Justice under the Law: The Supreme Court of the United States (1965) 21-25. 48
49
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Unidos, el juez constituye una de las primeras potencias politicas", afirmaci6n que ampli6 con la siguiente explicaci6n: Los norteamericanos han reconocido a los jueces el derecho de fundamentar sus decisiones sobre Ia Constituci6n mas que sobre las leyes. En otros terminos, les han permitido dejar sin aplicar las leyes que !es parezcan inconstitucionales. Se que un derecho semejante ha sido reclamado algunas veces por los tribunales de otros paises, pero jamas les ha sido concedido. En Norteamerica ha sido reconocido por todos los poderes; no se encuentra un partido ni siquiera un hombre que lo discuta. En los Estados Unidos, Ia Constituci6n esta sobre los legisladores, tanto como sobre los simples ciudadanos... Constituye pues Ia primera de las leyes y no puede ser modificada por una ley. Resultajusto que los tribunales obedezcan a Ia Constituci6n, con preferencia a todas las leyes ... Esto afecta Ia esencia misma del Poder Judicial; escoger entre las disposiciones legales aquellas que le constrifien mas estrechamente constituye, de alguna manera, el derecho natural del Magistrado. 50
De ahi que, concluya: "los norteamericanos han confiado a sus tribunales un inmenso poder politico". 51 B. La Evolucion Costarricense en las Disposiciones Constitucionales
Una instituci6n resultado de un proceso tan particular era dificil que pudiera ser percibida e imitada en sus etapas iniciales. Si bien la experiencia de 200 aiios nos permite considerar dicho sistema de control de constitucionalidad, con todas sus modalidades, como el mäs adecuado, ello no era tan obvio paralos constituyentes latinoamericanos del siglo XIX, que por lo tanto se sintieron legitimados para tratar otras f6rmulas. Asi pues, los centroamericanos de 1824, en el articulo 99 seiialaron como funci6n del Senado, el cuidar de sosteuer la Constituci6n. Dentro de la rnisma linea, la Ley Fundamental del Estado Libre de Costa Rica de 1825, dispuso en su articulo 55, inciso 5, que era funci6n del Congreso "velar sobre el cumplirniento de la Constituci6n de 1824". De manera que rnientras fuimos, real o nominalmente, parte de la Republica Federal de Centroamerica, el control de constitucionalidad fue considerado como una atribuci6n legislativa. Ello se origin6 en la Constituci6n de Cädiz de 1812, cuyo articulo 372 seiialaba como obligaci6n de las Cortes, el considerar, en sus primeras sesiones, las infracciones que pudieran haberse cometido contra la Constituci6n. Es posible explicarse tal criterio si tomamos en cuenta el papel preponderante otorgado al 6rgano legislativo, en el momento de la independencia, que refleja en las limitaciones impuestas al Poder Ejecutivo en la Constituci6n de 1824. Por otra parte, no hay duda que de todos los sistemas posibles para el ejercicio del control constitucional, därselo al Poder Legislativo es el mäs malo y puede describirse como encargar a los ratones el cuidado del queso. 50 51
Alexis de Tocqueville, La Democracia en America (1971) 66 s. Id. p. 67.
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El controllegislativo se mantiene en la Constituci6n de 1847 (articulo 188), la de 1848 no dice nada, y en la de 1859 se produce un cambio de direcci6n. Se abandona el encargo de la funci6n a un 6rgano especifico y en su lugar, se enuncia el principio de la supremacia de la Constituci6n. Ello se hace en el articulo 11, que prescribe: "Toda ley, decreto y orden, ya emane del Poder Legislativo, ya del Ejectivo, es nula y de ningim valor, siempre quese oponga a la Constituci6n". Esta f6rmula se mantiene, con pequeiias variaciones, en las Constituciones de 1869 (articulo 12), de 1871 (articulo 17), y de 1917 (articulo 7), aunque en la primera de ellas reaparece el controllegislativo en el articulo 135. C. La Jurisdicciön Compartida entre los Tres Poderes
La ausencia de seiialamiento especifico de un 6rgano a quien correspondiera el ejercicio del control de constitucionalidad parece haberse entendido como el otorgamiento de una jurisdicci6n concurrente a los tres poderes del Estado, cada uno de los cuales se sinti6 autorizado para efectuar declaraciones de inconstitucionalidad. Asi, en 1920, el Congreso Constitucional electo, despues de la caida del gobierno de Federico Tinoco y del periodo provisional de don Franciso Aguilar Barquero, anul6 todo lo actuado durante la administraci6n del primero, derogando, entre otras disposiciones normativas vigentes, la Carta Politica de 1917. La llamada Ley de Nulidades fue vetada por el Presidente don Julio Acosta, y resellada por el Congreso, transformändose en el Decreto Legislativo 41 de 11 de agosto, que recibi6 el ejecutese el21 de ese mes. En los considerandos primero y segundo de dicha Ley se expresa el criterio motivante de la acci6n del Congreso: 1) Que el acto de sublevaci6n annada de127 de enero de 1917, encabezado por el entonces Secretario de Guerra, don Federico Tinoco Guardia, quien indujo a las fuerzas militares a desconocer el regimen constitucional y con su apoyo asumi6 los Poderes Publicos, constituye el delito de rebeli6n militar que no puede producir efectos legales ni constituir en ningün caso fuente de derecho; y 2) Que, por consecuencia de aquel golpe de Estado, Ia Constituci6n Politica del 7 de diciembre de 1917 y las leyes emitidas desde entonces fueron suspendidas y suplantadas por un regimen ilegitimo y arbitrario, que priv6 a los ciudadanos de todos sus derechos politicos bajo Ia Constituci6n y sus leyes. 52
Al igual que el Congreso, el Poder Ejecutivo se sinti6 autorizado para hacer declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad. Asi en 1911, el Presidente don Ricardo Jimenez, por Resoluci6n de 15 de marzo, declar6 inconstitucionales el articulo 46 del Reglamento Orgänico Personal Docente y los articulos 23 y 24 del Reglamento de Segunda Enseiianza. Dijo la mencionada Resoluci6n:
52
Ruhen Hernimdez, EI Control de Ia Constitucionalidad de las Leyes (1978) 87-89.
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Ricardo Jimenez, Presidente Constitucional de Ia Republiea de Costa Riea, Considerando:
1) Que el artleulo 102 de Ia Constituciön Politiea, al determinar las atribuciones del Poder Ejecutivo enumera en su inciso 1, Ia de "nombrar y remover libremente a los Secretarios de Estado y a eualquiera de los otros empleados de sus dependencias". 2) Que el artleulo 17 de Ia misma Carta expresa que "las disposiciones del Poder Legislativo ... que fueren eontrarias a Ia Constitueiön son nulas y de ningun valor, eualquiera que sea Ia forma en quese emitan". 3) Queen el easo del articulo citado, estän las disposieiones eseritas en el articulo 46 del Reglamento Orgänieo del Personal Docente, que estatuye Ia inamovilidad de los maestros, y las disposiciones de los artleulos 23 y 24 del Reglamento de Segunda Enseiianza, en euanto parecen limitar a determinadas eausas, Ia remoeiön de los profesores y exigir para ella, el eumplimiento de formalidades querestringen Ia faeultad del Poder Ejeeutivo, Ia eual ha de ser, eomo Ia Constituciön lo ordena, de modo !ihre ejereida. 4) Que el artleulo 47 de Ia Ley General de Educaeiön eonsidera garantlas suficientes de estabilidad en sus destinos en favor de los miembros del Personal Docente, euando dice: "los maestros permanecerän en sus puestos por todo el tiempo de su buen desempeiio, a juicio del Poder Ejeeutivo", prineipio del que no puede sustraerse, sin lesionar Ia Constitueiön, el profesorado de Segunda Enseiianza, Por Tanto: y en aplieaciön de Ia fracciön 4 del artleulo 102 de Ia Constitueiön, Dec/ara:
Que los artleulos 46 del Reglamento Orgänieo del Personal Docente, 23 y 24 del Reglamento de Segunda Enseiianza y todas las disposieiones que de alguna manera restrinjan o Iimiten Ia atribueiön que el artleulo 102 de Ia Constitueiön Politiea eonfiere al Poder Ejeeutivo para nombrar y remover libremente a los empleados de su dependencia, han sido y son nulos de pleno dereeho. Dado en Ia ciudad de San Jose, a 15 de marzo de 1911. Rieardo Jimenez. EI Seeretario de Estado en el Despaeho de Instrucciön Publiea: Nieoläs Oreamuno. 53
La constitucionalidad de la Ley de Nulidades y de la Resoluciön transcrita del Poder Ejecutivo no fue discutida ante los tribunales. Puede argumentarse que dada la falta de precisiön del sistemajuridico sobre cuäl era elörgano que podia, en forma definitiva, resolver los problemas de inconstitucionalidad, era legitimo aceptar la existencia de concurrencia de los poderes para actuar en este campo. En el Derecho Constitucional costarricense se mantiene todavia una situaciön de esta naturaleza, con referencia al poder de decretar una expropiaciön. EI articulo 45 de la Constituciön establece el derecho del Estado a expropiar, pero no dice cuäl es elörgano que debe actuar, lo que en Ia präctica ha significado que tanto el Poder Ejecutivo como el Legislativo decretan expropiaciones y que los tribunales han aceptado como legitimas las acciones de uno y de otro. 54 53 Francisco M orelli, J urisdicciön Constitueional: Revista de Cieneias J uridieo Sociales (1956) 258 s., eitado en Hemandez (supra n. 52) 90s.
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Por otro lado, es evidente el caracter eminenternenie politico de las actuaciones de Legislativo y Ejecutivo, en ambos casos, en los cuales la declaratoria de inconstitueionalidad juega un papel de justificante y no de rundante de las medidas tomadas. La actitud de los costarricenses, no solo del Congreso Constitucional, respecto del gobiemo de Tinoco, rue de absoluto repudio, motivado, no tanto por el Golpe de Estado de 1917, que inicialmente tuvo apoyo popular, sino por los actos represivos en que incurri6 para tratar de mantenerse en el poder. Dada esa situaci6n, pensar que alguien impugnara la accion del Congreso ante los tribunales costarricenses hubiera sido desconocer el ambiente politico. 55 Distinta rue la situaeion en el ambito intemaeional: el Royal Bank orCanada objeto la declaratoria de nulidad de los actos del gobiemo de Tinoco y logr6 el respaldo del gobiemo de la Gran Bretafia que promovio las correspondientes gestiones diplomaticas, habiendose convenido con el gobiemo de Costa Rica en un arbitraje ante el Presidente de los Estados Unidos, William H. Taft. EI pronunciamiento de este en 1923 declaro la invalidez de dicha nulidad y se transrormo en un hito importante del Derecho Intemacional, el ramoso "caso Tinoco". 56 Oe la Resolucion eitada dictada por don Ricardo Jimenez durante su primera administraeion quedan de manifiesto dos caracteristicas de dicho Presidente: la capaeidad juridica y politica que le fue reconocida por los costarricenses, que lo eligieron tres veces para la Jeratura del Estado; y su deseo de que no se le pusieran cortapisas alpoder de nombramiento de los runeionarios publicos. Los intereses de los maestros y educadores han contado siempre con gran apoyo en Costa Rica, pero en la epoca de esa Resolucion, el prineipio de que "los despojos pertenecen al vencedor" era el postulado basico para el reclutamiento de los runeionarios publicos. Aunque el Presidente Jimenez en ese momento se encontraba en el segundo afio de su administraci6n (habia sido electo en 1910), lo cierto es que se acercaban las elecciones de medio periodo para diputados y posiblemente queria contar con el apoyo de los servidores publicos, para obtener mayoria en el Congreso, como en erecto la obtuvo. 57 En ambos casos, pues, el interes politico era evidente y las actuaeiones de Legislativo y Ejecutivo pueden tenerse como un aprovechamiento inteligente de los sileneios constitueionales.
54 Vease resoluciones dictadas por la Corte Plena en sesioo extraordinaria No. 33 de 3 ago. 1972. 55 Sobre el gobiemo de Tinoco, vease Eduardo Oconitrillo, Los Tinoco (1980); Hugo Murillo, Tinoco y los Estados Unidos (1981). 56 18 American Journal oflntemational Law (1924) 147-174. 57 Eugenio Rodriguez, Los Dias de don Ricardo (1971) 49.
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CH. Actuaciones Judiciales
De mayor interes para el presente estudio es lo que ocurria en el Poder Judicial. En este, Ia situaci6n se habia definido por el articulo 8, inciso 1, de Ia Ley Orgänica de Tribunales de 1888, que prohibia a los funcionarios que administranjusticia "aplicar leyes, decretos o acuerdos gubemativos que fueran contrarios a Ia Constituci6n". Resulta dificil establecer una conexi6n directa entre dicho articulo y el sistema de control constitucional norteamericano. La Ley Orgänica de Tribunales fue producto del trabajo de una Comisi6n Codificadora que prepar6 el C6digo Civil, los C6digos de Procedimientos, tanto Civiles como Penales, y Ia Ley Orgänica. Las influencias predominantes fueron de origen espaiiol, dado que Ia base para el C6digo Civil fue el Proyecto de 1853, quese convirti6 en ley con posterioridad al costarricense. Los C6digos de Procedimientos se fundamentaron en una forma tan Iitera! en las Leyes de Enjuiciamiento espaiiolas, que las explicaciones de estas se utilizaban, tanto por los jueces como por los abogados litigantes para fundamentar su interpretaci6n de sus disposiciones. Dadas esas circunstancias, tomando en cuenta Ia redacci6n dada, no creo que pueda verse en Ia regla del articulo 8, una adopci6n del sistema norteamericano. Sin embargo, lo interesante es que produjo un sistema similar, dado que Ia negativa a aplicar regia para los tribunales, sin importar su categoria, y constituia un medio de determinar Ia existencia de una inconstitucionalidad. En el caso Chinchilla vs. Urefia, 58 el actor estableci6 una demanda civil para que se declarara una servidumbre de paso, en favor de un fundo enclavado. La sentencia de primera instancia rechaz6 Ia acci6n, por estimar inaplicable el articulo 392 del C6digo Civil, por oponerse al articulo 29 de Ia Constituci6n. La Sala de Apelaciones revoc6 y declar6 con lugar Ia demanda. Llevado el asunto en 1890 a Ia Sala de Casaci6n, esta, en el considerando I estim6: Que el articulo 395 del C6digo Civil que concede al propietario de un predio enclavado entre otros ajenos, sin salida o sin salida bastante a Ia via publica, el derecho de exigir paso por los predios vecinos para Ia explotaci6n del suyo pagando el valor del terreno y todo otro perjuicio, no es contrario al 29 de Ia Constituci6n, porque si bien este declara inviolable Ia propiedad y que nadie puede privarse de Ia suya, tambien exceptua el caso en que medie interes publico, y es evidente que lo hay en facilitar Ia explotaci6n de los predios para el aumento de Ia producci6n y consiguientemente de Ia riqueza general, lo cual no podria verificarse sin Ia salida a Ia via publica. 59
Con esa base, Casaci6n declar6 sin lugar el recurso y confirm6la demanda de Ia Sala de Apelaciones. 60 58 Sala de Casaci6n, sentencia de las 14:00, 10 mar. 1890. Debo el conocimiento de dicha sentencia al Prof. Lic. Jorge Säenz Carbonell y al estudiante Randall Viales Padilla. 59 Id. 60 Id.
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Con la brevedad de las sentencias de la epoca, el fallo dicho se refiere a un problema bastante com{m: la relaci6n entre un fundo enclavado y las vias de comunicaci6n, entonces bastante escasas. Por otra parte, se discute la aplicaci6n de un articulo del C6digo Civil, que habia entrado en vigencia dos afios antes, en 1888. Es frecuente que el inicio de toda legislaci6n importante sea motivo para que se discuta la constitucionalidad de sus disposiciones importantes. Ademäs, el tema de las limitaciones a la propierlad inmueble ha sido uno de los que mayor numero de controversias han producido en el Derecho costarricense. Pero lo que produce mayor interes es que la situaci6n presentada se trata en una forma exactamente igual al judicial review norteamericano. Es el ejercicio de la jurisdicci6n ordinaria, en la cual surge un problema de conflicto entre una norma constitucional y otra legal, que es resuelta por los tribunales como cualquier otra controversia planteada ante ellos. Posiblemente porque no se produjo una declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, el caso Chinchilla vs. Urefia no tuvo mayor impacto politico. Para que este se de es necesario esperar a 1914 cuando, durante la crisis que provoc6 en Costa Rica la Primera Guerra Mundial, se otorgaron alPresidente don Alfredo Gonzälez Flores facultades legislativas. Por Ley se dispuso: Autorizase al Poder Ejecutivo para que dicte todas las disposiciones economicas, financieras o de policia, que a su juicio fueren indispensables para evitar o contrarrestar cualquier crisis que a las instituciones de credito, al comercio, o a Ia agricultura, al Gobierno o al pais en general, pudieran sobrevenir como consecuencia del actual conflicto europeo. 61
Con base en dicha Ley, el Presidente Gonzälez Flores dict6 un Decreto que elev6 el impuesto de beneficencia, exigi6 una serie de requisitos en las escrituras publicas sujetas a inscripci6n en el Registro PUblico de la Propierlad y orden6 dejar constancia en ellas del interrogatorio sobre el parentesco existente entre las partes, para comprobar si procedia o no aplicar el impuesto. 62 Finalmente, la Ley derog6 las leyes que regulaban dicho impuesto con anterioridad. 63 Rolando Alfaro Corrales, al serle denegada la inscripci6n de un documento en el Registro Publico, por no cumplir con los requisitos del Decreto, present6 un ocurso que fue denegado por el Jefe del Registro Publico. 64 La Sala de Apelaciones confirm6 la resoluci6n del Registro. 65 El perjudicado present6 recurso de casaci6n, en el que aleg6la inconstitucionalidad de Decreto del Poder Ejecutivo. La Sala de Casaci6n acogi6 el recurso, diciendo lo siguiente: 2) Que alegandose como fundamento del recurso, Ia inconstitucionalidad del referido Decreto, el que por lo mismo no debi6 ser aplicado por Ia Sala para apoyar su 61 62
63 64
65
Ley No. 60, 8 ago. 1914. Decreto No. 2, 28 nov. 1914. Ley No. 60 (supra n. 61). Resolucion de las 8:00, 3 feb. 1915. Resolucion de las 15:35, 11 feb. 1915.
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resoluci6n, se hace preciso examinar el valor legal que, desde el punto de vista de nuestro Derecho Constitucional, tiene el citado Decreto porque, siendo la Carta Fundamental, la Suprema Ley de la Republica, no puede coexistir con ella, ninguna ley contraria, siendo nulas y de ningun valor cualesquier disposiciones del Poder Legislativo o del Ejecutivo que Ia contrarien, conforme lo estatuye el articulo 17 de la misma Constituci6n. 3) Que el citado Decreto, a Ia vez que establece un impuesto de beneficencia mas oneroso que el que existia por Decreto del Congreso de 6 de junio de 1900 y modifica el del mismo Congreso de fecha 13 de junio de 1902, declara resumidos en el y derogados los referidos Decretos, asi como cualquier otra ley que le sea contraria: de suerte que esa disposici6n gubemativa, por su alcance y trascendencia, tiene el caracter de una verdadera ley, pues llega hasta derogar las emitidas con anterioridad por el Poder Legislativo sobre las mismas materias. 4) Que siendo, segun lo establece el articulo 73 de Ia Constituci6n, inciso 13, atribuci6n exclusiva del Congreso, dar las leyes, reformarlas, interpretarlas y derogarlas, no cabe duda de que el referido Decreto de 28 de noviembre contraria el articulo constitucional, y, por lo mismo, no puede subsistir contra el, conforme lo dispone el citado articulo 17 de la misma Carta Fundamental. 5) Que, aunque porel Decreto del Congreso de fecha 8 de agosto de 1914, se autoriz6 ampliamente al Poder Ejecutivo para que dictara todas las disposiciones que creyera necesarias para contrarrestar cualquier crisis que pudiera sobrevenir con motivo del conflicto europeo, entiende este Tribunal que la autorizaci6n que tuvo en mira conferir el Congreso, se referia a las disposiciones de caracter puramente gubernativo o administrativo, pero no a las que entraiiaban funciones legislativas como las de quese trata, pues dentro del orden constitucional que nos rige, el mismo Congreso no podria desprenderse del ejercicio de esas funciones, que le corresponden a el exclusivamente, para delegarlas al Poder Ejecutivo. 6) Que el articulo 8 de Ia Ley Organica de Tribunales, prohibe a los funclonarios del ordenjudicial aplicar Leyes, Decretos o acuerdos gubemativos que sean contrarios a Ia Constituci6n; y en cumplimiento de esa prescripci6n legal, la Sala de instancia no pudo apoyarse en el referido Decreto para denegar Ia inscripci6n del documento a que se refieren esos autos.
7) Por tanto: De conformidad con lo expuesto, declarase con lugar Ia Casaci6n del autor recurrente de que se ha hecho merito, y que debe practicarse Ia inscripci6n del documento de que se trata, si algun otro motivo no lo impidiera. 66
Luis Carlos Abellan y Fabian Volio llaman a dicha sentencia "el equivalente al fallo Marbury vs. Madison de la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos de America". 67 Si bien no es cierto, como igualmente dicen, que sea "el primer recurso de inconstitucionalidad presentado en Costa Rica dentro de un litigio", 68 si conviene realizar una comparacion entre ambos casos. Sala de Casaci6n, sentencia de las 14:30, 2 mar. 1915. Luis Carlos Abel/(m / Fabi(m Volio, La Interpretaci6n Constitucional en el Recurso de Inconstitucionalidad (Tesis para optar al titulo de Licenciados en Derecho, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Costa Rica, 1986) 96. 68 Id. 66 67
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Hay que advertir en prirner termino, que no parece haber en el caso costarricense una influencia directa de Ia celebrada resoluciön nortearnericana, pensar que los jueces costarricenses estaban adoptando el sisterna de los Estados Unidos. Pero, corno queda dicho y se refleja en el caso Chinchilla vs. Urefia, Ia situaciön juridica tenia eierneotos parecidos. Por otra parte, el rnornento costarricense de 1914, corno el nortearnericano de 1803, estaba cargado de eierneotos politicos. Gonzalez Flores tenia Ia responsabilidad de hacerle frente a la crisis y corno esta habia producido la caida de las rentas principales gubernarnentales, las de Aduana, estaba en Ia necesidad de elevar irnpuestos, rnedida esta que no gozaba de ninguna popularidad. Trat6, en prirner termino, de elevar los irnpuestos indirectos y si lo hizo por via de Decreto Ejecutivo, fue por considerar que ello le permitia actuar con mucho rnayor rapidez y con rnenor resistencia. Luego trataria de establecer un irnpuesto sobre la renta, lo que motiv6 el Golpe de Estado de 1917 y Ia dictadura de Federico Tinoco. 69 Corno en el caso Marbury vs. Madison, Ia Corte costarricense evit6 hacer un pronunciamiento directo. Aqui no quiso incluir una declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad sino que le dio a la Ley de 1914 un sentido que diferia de la interpretaciön del Poder Ejecutivo. Que esta habia sido la intenciön del Congreso queda bien claro en el cornentario de Jose Maria Vargas Pacheco, quien dice: teniamos un Presidente de la Republica quien ademas era experto en asuntos de hacienda publica. Se estim6 entonces conveniente invertirlo con el caracter de legislador y asi lo hizo el Congreso Constitucional para que dictase con la prontitud y oportunidad necesarias las disposiciones que pudiesen contrarrestar aquella crisis. 70
La reacciön del Presidente Gonzalez Flores fue tan airada corno Ia del Presidente Jefferson al caso Marbury vs. Madison. Convoc6 inmediatamente al Congreso a sesiones extraordinarias y le present6 un rnensaje, en el cual decia: A pesar del parecer de la mayoria de la Corte de Casaci6n que impugna la constitucionalidad de la Ley de Sucesiones, el Poder Ejecutivo sigue creyendo que la referida ley, asi como cuantas han sido dictadas en virtud de las facultades extraordinarias conferidas en el Decreto numero 60 de que se ha venido haciendo merito, disfrutan desde su promulgaci6n del mas amplio amparo por partedel estatuto fundamental y han surtido y siguen surtiendo sus efectos de una a otra frontera. Ahora se hace preciso que vosotros, seiiores diputados confirmeis esta opini6n declarando la legitimidad y constitucionalidad de las leyes emitidas por el Poder Ejecutivo, dändoles vuestra ratificaci6n. Venga pues el Legislativo, como Suprema lnstancia Constitucional a desvanecer las dudas de la mayoria de la Corte de Casaci6n, con lo que desaparecerä una dificultad incidental en nuestra expedita vida republicana. Tiene la palabra el Soberano. 69
Vease A/fredo Gonzalez Flores, Su Pensamiento, ed. por Alberto Cafias (1980); supra
n. 55.
70 Jose Maria Vargas Pacheco, Puntos de Vista en cuanto a la Interpretaci6n de la Constituci6n: Revista del Colegio de Abogados 6 (set. 1950) 280.
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Vargas Pacheco relata el desenlace: EI Congreso se reuni6 y debati6 el asunto y opt6 por Ia f6rmula de aprobar las leyes. No hizo ninguna objeci6n acerca del caracter de suprema instancia constitucional o de arbitro soberano con que lo habia convocado el Ejecutivo para resolver sobre aquel caso tipico de Ia interpretaci6n de Ia Carta Politica. Qued6 asi flotando en nuestro ambiente institucional Ia idea de que el Congreso era el interprete supremo de las disposiciones constitucionales. 71
Desde luego, llaman Ia atenci6n dos cosas. En primer termino, que en el pronunciarniento del Congreso hubo un implicito reconocirniento de que Ia Sala de Casaci6n habia actuado dentro de sus funciones, al negarse a darle validez a Ia disposici6n con caracter de ley, dictada por el Poder Ejecutivo, al aprobarla por Ia Camara. Por otro lado, que el autor, uno de los jueces que dict6 el fallo, sefiale que Ia conclusi6n prevalente fue que se tuviera al Congreso como Ia suprema autoridad en materia constitucional, tesis que ei considera derivada de Ia doctrina francesa, totalmente divergente de Ia teoria del control constitucional norteamericana, que demuestra en su articulo, conocer. EI caso A/faro vs. Registrador produjo una tendencia restrictiva a Ia acci6n de los tribunales, dado que por Ley de 13 d~julio de 1922, se reform6 el articulo 967 del C6digo de Procedirnientos Civiles, para ampliar Ia competencia de Ia Sala de Casaci6n al conocimiento de recursos de este tipo, cuando Ia sentencia de los jueces de instancia, desconociera una ley vigente por interpretar que esta era contraria a Ia Constituci6n. Se otorg6 Ia posibilidad de interponer "para toda clase de juicios sin lirnitaci6n de cuantia cuando Ia sentencia deja de fallar con arreglo a leyes aplicables al caso, teniendose de un modo expreso o implicito por inconstitucionales o inoperativas, sin fundamento para ello". 72 D. EI Sistema Actual
EI control de constitucionalidad no vino a adquirir una fisonornia precisa en Costa Rica sino con las reformas efectuadas a Ia Ley Organica del Poder Judicial y los C6digos de Procedirnientos Civiles y Procedirnientos Penales, que se comenzaron a preparar en 1935 y se transformaron en leyes en 1937. Para dicho sistema se agreg6 al inciso primero del articulo 8 de Ia Ley Organica un parrafo paraquese leyera asi: "No podran los runeionarios que adrninistranjusticia: 1) Aplicar leyes, decretos, acuerdos o resoluciones gubernativas que sean contrarios a Ia Constituci6n, cuando Ia inaplicabilidad haya sido decretada por Ia Corte Plena". (Lo agregado es Ia partequese subraya.) Por aparte, en el C6digo de Procedimientos Civiles se incluy6 en el titulo I dellibro IV, "Recursos", un capitulo IX quese llam6 "Recurso de Inconstitucionalidad", que estableci6 el procedimiento para establecer y trarnitar Ia acci6n de inconstitucionalidad. Id. Antonio Picado, Explicaci6n de las Reformas a Ia Ley Organica del Poder Judicial (1937) 27. 71
72
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Los redactores de las reformas, Magistrados Luis Davila y Antonio Picado, explicaron la innovaci6n, diciendo que: tiene poca seriedad el procedimiento (actual) de permitir que jueces y tribunales inferiores hagan pronunciamientos de inconstitucionalidad, con evidente desprestigio para el Poder Legislativo y aun para el Ejecutivo ... Son bien conocidas las discusiones a que ha dado lugar Ia cuestion de si debe encomendarse a los Tribunales de Justicia Ia facultad de declarar inaplicables las leyes, decretos o acuerdos que sean contrarios a Ia Constitucion, o si debe negarseles esa facultad por constituir una intromision de funciones que rifie con el principio de independencia de Poderes. Dado lo anticuado de nuestra Carta Fundamental y Ia complicacion de Ia vida politica y economica del mundo que se refleja en Ia vida de nuestro pais, cree Ia Comision que probablemente habria sido preferible quitarle a los Tribunales de Justicia Ia facultad de negarle autoridad a las leyes, que solo conduce ahora a producir conflictos originados en lo absoluto de nuestros preceptos constitucionales y en Ia naturaleza de las nuevas leyes que tienden a darle a Ia Republica los rumbos que Je corresponden y a solucionar los serios problemas que amenazan su existencia; pero ante el articulo 17 de Ia Constitucion que establece que "las disposiciones del Poder Legislativo o del Ejecutivo que fueren contrarias a Ia Constitucion son nulas o de ningun valor, cualquiera que sea Ia forma en quese emitan", se ha inclinado por mantener Ia referida facultad, pero dandole una mayor seriedad al procedimiento para declarar Ia inaplicabilidad en terminos que proteja mejor, por un lado los intereses de los particulares que pueden obtener una declaracion pronta en amparo de sus derechos lesionados, y por otro, Ia majestad de Ia ley, que solo cuando sea evidentemente contraria al espiritu y a Ia letra de Ia Constitucion no debe encontrar acatamiento por parte de los Tribunales. 73
Con posterioridad al trabajo de la Comisi6n Redactora, esta celebr6 una serie de reuniones con una cornisi6n nombrada por el Congreso para estudiar la reforma y con asesores nombrados por el Colegio de Abogados de Costa Rica. En ellas se puso de manifiesto la resistencia de partedel gremio juridico al nuevo sistema, como puede verse del hecho de que en una de ellas, el Licenciado don Fabio Baudrit, uno de los delegados del Colegio, dijo "que el sistema adoptado, de que fuera la Corte la que ejerciera el control", precisamente por muy definido, pudiera crear conflictos de canicter politico entre los poderes supremos, a lo que contest6 que ellos "de todos modos surgiran, dada la posibilidad de que una autoridad cualquiera se oponga a la eficacia de una regla de caräcter legal, pero se gana si es la Corte Plena en respetabilidad y respaldo de Ia tesis, aunque la adverse otro Poder". 74 Para disrninuir esas reservas, en e1 articulo 967 del C6digo de Procedirnientos Civiles se incluy6 la regla de que, para que hubiera declaraci6n de inconstitucionalidad era necesario que el pronunciarniento fuera aprobado por dos tercios del total de los magistrados. Dicha regla fue originalmente propuesta por los Magistrados Dävila y Picado, redactores del plan de reformas. Luego, 73
ld.
Antonio Picado, Explicacion de las Reformas al Codigo de Procedimientos Civiles (1937) 418. 74
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fue eliminada por la Comisi6n del Congreso que actu6 conjuntamente con los representantes del Colegio de Abogarlos los redactores. Finalmente, en sesi6n del 13 de julio de 1937: EI Licenciado Gonzälez Viquez (don Cleto, dos veces Presidente de Ia Republica), por medio del sefior Baudrit, no pudiendo asistir a estas sesiones finales por hallarse operado, propone restablecer Ia mayoria de dos tercios, conforme a lo sugerido en el proyecto del Licenciado Picado. Le mueve Ia observacion del reciente conflicto sostenido en los Estados Unidosentre el Ejecutivo y el Senado y Ia conviccion de que es preferible abonar Ia resolucion que en tal recurso recaiga, para evitar conflictos de criterio, que pudieran revestir caracter politico y darse con mayor facilidad si se dejan a merced de Ia simple mayoria aconsejada en las sesiones iniciales para el caso. Se hizo debate en que el sefior Guardia (don Victor, luego Presidente de Ia Corte), mantuvo junto con el sefior Loria (don Roberto, luego Magistrado), el sistema de mayoria simple, y puesta a votacion Ia enmienda result6 aprobada por los demas asistentes. 75
En la Constituci6n de 1949, lo que se hizo fue agregar al articulo de la primacia constitucional de las anteriores constituciones, dos parrafos que dicen: Corresponde a Ia Corte Suprema de Justicia, por votacion no menor de dos tercios del total de sus miembros, declarar Ia inconstitucionalidad de las disposiciones del Poder Legislativo y de los decretos del Poder Ejecutivo. La ley indicarä los tribunales llamados a conocer de Ia inconstitucionalidad de otras disposiciones del Poder Ejecutivo. 76
E. Evaluaciön del Sistema
EI sistema judicial de control de constitucionalidad costarricense tiene ya 40 afios de funcionamiento. Me incluyo entre aquellos que sienten que no ha funcionado en una forma adecuada y que esta muy lejos de producir buenos resultados, tanto como medio de control de la acci6n de los poderes politicos, como en cuanto Iabor vivificante de la Constituci6n, para mantenerla en constante adaptaci6n a los cambios sociales. Mi objeci6n principal es lo que he llamado "los dados cargados". 77 No se trata de juzgar la constitucionalidad de los actos sometidos a control sino de dificultar Ia evaluaci6n de la conformidad de los actos con la Constituci6n, en Ia misma forma en que el fullero lanza los dados, seguro de que el resultado le sera favorable. Tal y como cita Ruhen Hemandez: "el recurso de inconstitucionalidad es Ia forma procesal de lograr que una norma obviamente inconstitucional sea declarada constitucionalmente legitima". 78 Id. p. 419. Constitucion de 1949, art. 10. 77 Carlos Jose Gutierrez, La Constitucionalidad del Apremio Corpora!, en: Derecho Constitucional Costarricense (1985) 365-367. 78 Hemandez (supra n. 52) 110. 75
76
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Ello es asi, por cuanto se ha creado el mito de Ia "presunci6n de constitucionalidad". Dijo don Antonio Picado: "Ia inaplicabilidad solo debe pronunciarse cuando la ley, decreto, acuerdo o resoluci6n sean evidentemente contrarios a Ia letra y al espiritu de la Constituci6n". 79 Dicho criterio ha sido repetido y mantenido por la Corte Suprema en una serie de casos. 80 Corno si ello no fuera poco, existe ademäs la regla de que para declarar con lugar una inconstitucionalidad es necesario el voto favorable de dos tercios del total de magistrados. La Corte Suprema tiene un total de 17 magistrados. Para que proceda una inconstitucionalidad es necesario el voto afirmativo de doce magistrados sea, y ha sucedido en varias ocasiones, que si once magistrados votan por la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad y seis lo hacen negativamente, son estos los que determinan el pronunciamiento, dado que la ley se tendrä por constitucional. 81 Finalmente, si no fueran suficientes los obstäculos mencionados, se encuentra la timidez con que los magistrados costarricenses han ejercido la funci6n constitucional. Tienen en sus manos como dijo de Tocqueville, "un inmenso poder politico". 82 Pero no lo ejercen con Ia debida frecuencia. Solo en los ultimos afios, han actuado con mayor conciencia del papel que deben desempefiar en la vida constitucional costarricense. 83 Ello ha tenido, como resultado, el aumento en el numero de los recursos de inconstitucionalidad. Corno dicha funci6n no constituye la actividad principal de la Corte, que tiene ademäs tareas administrativas como jerarca del Poder Judicial y, dividida en tres salas, de tribunales de casaci6n, se produce un mayor retraso de sus pronunciamientos. La insatisfacci6n con el regimen actual ha provocado un movimiento de reforma, que tiene expresi6n actualmente en una propuesta de reforma constitucional, que crearia una Sala Constitucional, dentro de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, compuesta de cinco magistrados. Ella asumiria la totalidad de Ia justicia constitucional - amparo, häbeas corpus, y control de constitucionalidad - ademäs de dirimir los conflictos entre los 6rganos fundamentales del Estado. La Sala actuaria por simple mayoria, por cual desapareceria la regla de los dos tercios. 84 La Asamblea Legislativa en 1989 aprob6 esta reforma, pero Picado, C6digo (supra n. 74) 419. Hemandez (supra n. 52) 111, donde cita las resoluciones de Corte Plena en sesiones No. 5 (25 ene. 1956) y No. 39 (12 jul. 1971). 81 Resoluci6n adoptada en Sesion de Corte Plena de 20 de nov. de 1961, por Ia cual se mantuvo Ia constitucionalidad del pago en bonos por expropiaci6n de bienes inmuebles destinados a Ia reforma agraria. La declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad tuvo once votos a favor y seis en contra. 82 De Tocqueville (supra n. 50) 67. 83 Particularmente, a partir del caso Beneficiadora Santa Elena, de 27 ene. 1983. 84 Asamblea Legislativa, Expediente 10.401, Proyecto de reforma a los arts. 10, 48, 105, 128 de Ia Constituci6n Politica y adici6n al art. 153. 79
80
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con una nueva Sala Constitutional de siete miembros. Ahora la Asamblea tendni que elegir a los nuevos Magistrados y aprobar la Ley de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional.
IV. Las Constituciones en Derecho Comparado Al examinar la relaci6n entre los sistemas de gobierno en la Constituci6n norteamericana y en las de Costa Rica, encontramos lo siguiente. Costa Rica tom6 de los Estados Unidos la forma de organizaci6n pero, dentro de los tres poderes, le otorg6 un predominio al Poder Ejecutivo, dando como resultado que en lugar del sistema presidencial Costa Rica tuvo un presidencialismo, en el cual afloraba la tradici6n politica espaiiola de concentraci6n de poder en el gobernador, bajo la organizaci6n juridica importada. Las diferencias que, a lo largo y ancho de America Latina, adquiri6 el presidencialismo tuvieron raz6n de ser en los fen6menos hist6ricos, propio de cada uno de los Estados en que se dividi6 la regi6n, y en el mayor o menor arraigo que pudieron lograr las instituciones democraticas. Dentro de ellas, la tarea de construir una democracia propia, autentica y efectiva, que cumplieron los costarricenses, tuvo caracteristicas muy especiales, que les permitieron conformar un Estado unitario, que por el sistema de prueba y error, cre6 un regimen constitucional, en el cual, el cambio frecuente de textos no signific6 otra cosa que el ajuste de las instituciones a los distintos giros de su proceso evolutivo. Cuando examinamos el proceso por el cuallos costarricenses adquirieron un sistema de control de constitucionalidad, la situaci6n es diferente. No hay ningun punto de arranque en el cual se hubiera dado alguna derivaci6n de la Constituci6n norteamericana. La f6rmula inicial de que la observancia de la Constituci6n y salvaguardia se efectue por el Poder Legislativo es, como tantas otras instituciones, una derivaci6n de la Constituci6n espaiiola. El principio de supremacia constitucional que aparece luego en los textos no tiene relaci6n con la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos, salvo en la medida de que este, como todos los regimenes de constituci6n rigida, acepta la diferencia de jerarquia entre la Constituci6n y las leyes ordinarias. La jurisdicci6n concurrente que se da luego en la acci6n de los tres poderes es tambien una modalidad completamente ajena a la experiencia norteamericana. Lo verdaderamente interesante es el desarrollo de la acci6n de los tribunales para realizar pronunciamientos de inconstitucionalidad, sin otra regla especifica de fundamento que la norma constitucional de primado o jerarquia superior de la Carta Fundamental. Se da una situaci6n similar a la norteamericana y, como en esta, el control de constitucionalidad final es ejercido por el tribunal de mayor categoria que asi prueba su efectividad para cumplir esa funci6n. Al tratarse de la aplicaci6n de normas juridicas a casos concretos y particulares, la condici6n de abogarlos de los juzgadores tiene que producir un mejor resultado de la funci6n de control, que la que puede ocasionalmente cumplir cualquiera de los
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poderes politicos. Por un camino diferente, llega al mismo resultado, como ocurre a veces en Derecho, dado lo limitado de las opciones posibles. Ese momento de encuentro, a partir de Ia Ley Organica de Tribunales de 1888 se lleva a cabo, dentro de culturas juridicas diferentes. Corno dice Archibald Cox: EI mayor volumen del Derecho angloamericano que establece los derechos y deberes de los propietarios, de las partes de los contratos, y de otras personas (inclusive las corporaciones), cuyas actividades afectan unos y otros, es Derecho hecho por los jueces, construido Jentarnente por siglos de decisiones judiciales y muy raramente modificado por legislaci6n. Nuestro Derecho Constitucional fue construido de manera similar, usando el documento como una base. 85
Nada mas alejado de esa tradici6n que el Derecho costarricense. En el momento en que se decide oficializar Ia adopci6n del sistema judicial de control de constitucionalidad, cuando podria haberse efectuado una mayor aproximaci6n al sistema norteamericano, por lo contrario se evidencia Ia enorme distancia que loseparabade el. Ello se ve claramente en Ia circunstancia de que, a 135 afios de Marbury vs. Madison, se discute si corresponde o no darle el control de constitucionalidad a Ia Corte Suprema. La preocupaci6n de los redactores de las reformas a Ia legislaci6n procesal es si de esa manera, Ia Corteseva a ver en necesidad de intervenir en conflictos de orden politico, cosa que un analisis de Ia situaci6n norteamericana les hubiera demostrado ser cierto y bueno al mismo tiempo. Vease ademas quese considera que "tiene poca seriedad" el permitir a todos los jueces hacer pronunciamientos sobre inconstitucionalidad, sea el sistema difuso norteamericano. Por otra parte, los autores de las reformas y los componentes de las comisiones de estudio demuestran tener un concepto del principio de separaci6n de poderes demasiado rigido, carente de cualquier posibilidad de cooperaci6n o interacci6n entre ellos, y totalmente negativo a Ia existencia de frenos y contrapesos entre los principales 6rganos del Estado. La percepci6n de esta circunstancia pareciera contradecir lo dicho sobre el papel preponderante del Ejecutivo. Sin embargo, esa contradicci6n es aparente, dado que como resultado de esa preponderancia, el Ejecutivo rechaza cualquier control que sobre el puedan ejercer los otros poderes. Al mismo tiempo, estos, al proclamar una separaci6n de poderes absoluto, lo hacen con Ia esperanza de que constituya un medio de defensa frente a Ia acci6n del Ejecutivo. En 1937, a 66 afios de promulgada Ia Constituci6n vigente, que habia tenido interrupciones de su vigencia por quince de ellos, Ia consideraci6n de los redactores de las reformas es que Ia Carta Fundamental es anticuada y que Ia tarea de innovaci6n es Iabor legislativa, en Ia cual, por consiguiente, no le corresponde papel alguno a Ia Corte, lo cual reproduce criterios imperantes dentro del sistema continental europeo y especialmente, en el Derecho frances, 85
Cox (supra n. 45) 180.
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de desconfianza hacia la Iabor de los tribunales y consideraci6n del Poder Legislativo como el motor del sistema juridico. Para demostrar que se trata de diferencias culturales y no de falta de informaci6n, se evidencia el hecho de que estaban perfectamente conscientes de enfrentamiento quese llevaba a cabo en los Estados Unidos con motivodelos pronunciamientos de inconstitucionalidad de la Corte Suprema de varias leyes importantes dictadas por el gobiemo de Franktin Delano Roosevelt, que llevaron a este a intentar una reforma constitucional para aumentar el numero de miembros de la Corte, proyecto conocido como el Court Packing Plan. 86 La reacci6n ante esa crisis es una nueva demostraci6n de lo poco convencidos que estaban los autores de reforma del sistema de control de constitucionalidad que proponian, pues ella produce el requerimiento de una mayoria calificada dentro de la Corte para lograr una declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad. Todo ello, como espero quede claro, no puede tenerse como ignorancia o menosprecio de la Iabor de la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, sino como resultado de una diferente cultura juridica, para la cual, aceptar que aquella tenia un papel politico que es casualmente la que la caracteriza como un poder, resultaba de muy dificil aceptaci6n. Y con eso hemos llegado al final de esta investigaci6n cuyo resultado podria resumirse diciendo que la influencia de la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos sobre la vida constitucional costarricense es innegable, permanenterneute presente, pero condicionada por las diferencias de cultura juridica que existen entre los dos paises.
English Summary The Constitution of the United States as Imported Law in Costa Rica The United States Constitution is an example of a "lighthouse" legal document, since it has directly or indirectly influenced the political institutions of a large number of countries. lmported law is a frequent occurrence in Latin America, encouraged in part by its transition from colonies to independent nations. This study focuses on the U.S. Constitution as imported law in Costa Rica. It sees legal norms as fish, moving between the waters of ideology and the currents of social phenomena. In particular the study considers two topics: (1) the structure of govemment, with an emphasis on the presidency; and (2) the control of the constitutionality of legal norms through judicial review. The legal institution from the U.S. Constitution that has had the greatest impact in Latin America is without question the presidency. lt was itself an innovation, representing a substantial break from the English parliamentary 86
Id. pp. 145-155.
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system. Over the years U.S. practice has established a rough equilibrium between presidential power and the power of Congress, of course with many variations. When we turn to Spanish America, however, we find that during the period of independence a strong aristocratic spirit existed that was not present in English colonies. Spanish govemment in America had concentrated power in an administrative hierarchy, backed by a strong military presence. Many descendants of the conquistadores at the time of independence desired to retain their privileges and establish national monarchies. Given these factors, when republican govemments were established, they had a marked tendency toward predominant presidential power, a feature known as presidencia/ismo. Taking the example of Costa Rica, we begin with the fact that it has had 14 constitutions, although 11 of them occurred between 1821 and 1870. Four characteristics colored the evolution toward the current Constitution of 1949: (1) the initial influence of the Cadiz Constitution; (2) the wish to create legal institutions appropriate to Costa Rican society through a process of trial and error; (3) the subsequent influence of the U.S. Constitution; and (4) repeated swings, according to a pendulum principle, between either a predominate executive or a predominate legislature. These characteristics are examined for a number of Costa Rican constitutions, beginning with the 1825 Fundamental Law of the Free State of Costa Rica and ending with the Constitution of 1949. For instance, it was with the Constitution of1871- in effect for 67 years- that the major legal institutions were developed, a sense oflegality was consolidated, and a real democracy appeared. With the 1949 Constitution, the presidency was weakened by dispersing power to two vice presidents, to govemmental ministers, to autonomous entities, and to a civil service. In addition, to improve presidential accountability the following were created: a comptroller general, the writ of amparo to extend the protection of habeas corpus, judicial review of administrative acts, and constitutional review of statutes and executive decrees. Considering the entire constitutional history of the presidency in Costa Rica, three points should be emphasized. First, the trial and error method of reaching a balance among the two political branches of govemment has led to a stable, democratic republic. Second, the U.S. Constitution has influenced this process in many details. Finally, however, the Costa Rican Constitution in its structure of govemment today differs in several respects from its U .S. model. The U .S. legal institution that has bad the greatest success on the science of constitutionallaw is the work of the U.S. Supreme Court in developing and elaborating the power of judicial review over legislation. Through this power a living constitution has been created. As early as 1835 de Tocqueville recognized that Americans had provided their courts with immense political power. In Costa Rica the function ofprotecting the constitution was given at first to the legislature. This idea, originating in the 1812 Cadiz Constitution, was
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brought into the 1824 Central American Constitution and carried over into the Costa Rican Fundamental Law of 1825 and the Constitution of 1847. In the Costa Rican Constitution of 1859, however, the drafters took an approach of declaring the supremacy of the constitution over ordinary law, but omitted mention of any governmental entity with the power to enforce this supremacy. Thereafter, each of the three branches of government felt that it had apower to declare laws unconstitutional. Forexample, the Constitutional Congress in 1920 annulled with its Law ofNullities all the laws enacted during the administration of Federico Aguilar. In 1911 President Ricardo Jimenez declared parts of two laws regulating teachers unconstitutional. Turning to the judiciary, explicit authority for constitutional review of legislation and executive acts came in the 1888 Organic Law ofCourts. Although utilized by the Costa Rican Cassation Chamber as early as 1890, the first finding of unconstitutionality of a legislative norm occurred in a 1914 case. The Cassation Chamber avoided a direct declaration of unconstitutionality by giving the law a different interpretation than that used by the executive. The president, nevertheless, reacted by immediately calling an extraordinary session of Congress. Congress debated the point and decided that the Court had the power to deny validity to a law contrary to the Constitution. In addition, the idea became popular, based on the influence of French doctrine, that Congress itself was the supreme interpreter of constitutional issues. The control of constitutionality became more firmly established in Costa Rica with the reform of several procedure laws in 1937. The power of constitutional review was placed in the plenary Supreme Court. Moreover, aware of the political nature ofthis power, and the experience ofthe U.S. Supreme Court in the 1930s, Congress decided that the Costa Rican Supreme Court would need a two-thirds majority to declare a statute or executive decree unconstitutional. This system of control has been inadequate for several reasons: (1) the presumption of constitutionality as a procedural rule is too strong; (2) the twothirds majority is too high a hurdle; and (3) Supreme Court justices have been too timid in confronting the political branches of government. Dissatisfaction with the current situation provoked areform movement that led in 1989 to the creation of a Constitutional Chamber (of seven justices) within the Supreme Court to specialize in constitutional review, amparo, habeas corpus, and disputes between branches of government. The Chamber will decide cases by a simple majority. The influence of U.S. constitutional practice on the structure of government and constitutional review in Costa Rica is undeniable. lt was always moderated, however, by important differences in legal culture. The impact on -the presidency, resulting in presidencialismo, was stronger than the impact on courts exercising constitutional review. Courts always surfered from a tendency, derived initially from the Spanish Constitution and later from French doctrine, toward legislative supremacy regarding legal norms.
Interpretation of Contracts under the lnfluence of Statutory Law Jan Hellner* The Iiterature on interpretation of statutes is enormous, and so is the Iiterature on interpretation of contracts. Yet comparatively little seems tobe concerned with the field where the two subjects intersect. Nevertheless, many important statutes deal with contracts, and many contract clauses deal with mattersthat arealso covered by statutory law. A reason why the subject is often neglected may be that those who write on the interpretation of statutes are generally experts on jurisprudence, while those who write on the interpretation of contracts are experts on contract law. It may be suitable in a Festschrift for J ohn Henry Merryman, who has always liked to deal with borderline questions, to present a few remarks on this subject. Being more of a contracts than a jurisprudence man myself, I will Iook at the matter mainly from the point of view of contracts. U sing statutory rules as a means for interpreting a contract may be justified on two different grounds. One is that, if statutory rules are supposed to correspond to the average intentions ofthe parties to a contract, interpreting a contract term with uncertain contents according to astatute may, ceteris paribus, be a good method for reaching results that agree with the intentions ofthe parties. Outside the range of statutory law, however, it is often difficult to ascertain whether a certain decision regarding a contract is based on an interpretation ofits terms or on non-statutory legal rules that are independent of the particular contract. This is less often the case when statutory rules can apply. Although the reason, as thus stated, may be an oversimplification, it nevertheless represents a major approach to the problem. A second reason for using statutory rules isthat the aim of astatute may be to exercise some kind of control over contracts. In what follows I shall attempt to sketch, in the first place, to what extent contracts may be interpreted in accordance with a statute, and in the second place, how the two reasons just discussed seem to operate in practice.
* Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Stockholm.
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I. The Use of Statutory Rules Relevant statutory rules are of several different kinds. One type consists of what I shall call the "ordinary" rules relating to contracts, which are rules dealing with specific contract matters. Among these rules some are mandatory, that is, they cannot be set aside by contract clauses. The element of control is thus apparent. Other rules are facultative; they will not be applied when the parties have agreed differently. Generally such rules do not aim at any control, but are stop-gap rules. They are to be applied when a contract does not deal with a special situation, but it is necessary to find some solution to a problern that arises. 1 From another point of view the aim offacultative rules obviates the need for detailed and exhaustive contracts. But even facultative rules may, depending on their character, express more or less clearly the legislature's wish to regulate matters in a certain way, representing a fair balance between contracting parties. 2 We thus cannot assume that control is wholly absent from the application of facultative rules. Another type of statutory rule aims in a more general way at instituting control, for instance, by empowering courtstoset aside or adjust contract terms. There are a number of different methods. Among them I shall confine myself to some special ones found in the American, British, German, and Swedish legal systems. The choice may seem somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it will demoostrate sufficiently the variety of approaches and attitudes.
II. Interpretation of Special Clanses The most obvious way in which a statutory rule may influence the interpretation of a contract clause is to state expressis verbis how the clause should be interpreted when nothing eise is indicated. The use of such rules differs considerably among statutes on contract law. The American Uniform Commercial Code may be taken as an example of a statute that contains a number of such rules. 3 Some of them clearly have the sole purpose of providing practical solutions regarding matters on which the legislature has no preference for either one or the other solution. The following 1 The Swedish legislature at one time believed that facultative rules might suffice to protect weaker parties, particu.larly consumers. Statutes were supposed to exercise an influence on superior parties regarding what was fair and just. However, this method soon proved insufficient. Strong parties often contracted out of the facultative rules that were intended kl favor weak parties. See Jan Hellner, Avtals- och köprätt under 1900-talet: Svensk Juristtidning (1984) 755-771 (764). 2 See, e.g., Arthur von Mehren, A General View of Contract, in: Int'l Ency. Comp. L. VII (Contracts in General) eh. 1, ed. by von Mehren (1982) 64fT. (on contractual justice). 3 Unifonn Commercial Code [ = UCC], 1978 Official Text. Some version of the Code has been enacted in every American state except Louisiana, which has adopted only apart of the UCC (not including the article on sales).
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illustrations may be mentioned: section 2-319 (on F.O.B. and F.A.S. terms), section 2-320 (on C.I.F. and C.& F. terms), and section 2-321 (on "net landed weights" and some other terms). Obviously there is no reason why the legislature should try to impose any kind of control on the special interpretation of such terms. A more debatable instance is section 2-316 (3)(a), which regulates the effects ofthe expressions "as is" and "with all faults" on implied warranties for goods. This provision reads: "Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or other langnage which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion ofwarranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty." The American rules may be compared to some Swedish ones. The present Swedish Sale of Goods Act, which dates from 1905, contains rules on F.O.B., C.& F. and C.I.F. clauses that, like the corresponding American ones, contain no element of control. 4 In a proposal for a new sale of goods act, these rules have been omitted because it was considered unnecessary to provide statutory rules on subjects that are treated more satisfactorily by "Incoterms,'' issued by the International Chamber of Commerce. 5 However, and this is an interesting point, the proposed statute contains a rule on the interpretation of a clause containing the Swedish equivalent of "as is." This rule deliberately attempts to limit the clause's effects, principally in cases where goods sold were substantially inferior in quality to what the buyer could assume on the basis of price and the general circumstances. 6 Such a rule of interpretation is already in force with regard to sales from merchants to consumers, according to section 9 of the Consumer Sales Act of 1973. 7 This latter statute has the definite aim of protecting consumer interests. The rule is to be extended to commercial contracts as well by the proposed new law. In this latter case a statutory rule regarding the interpretation of a clause is employed for purposes of control. It is a comparatively mild form of control, since it is possible for a seller to escape it by describing more precisely the real or possible defects from which he exempts hirnself from liability. The rule of interpretation thus functions principally as a means of forcing the seller to be more specific, which in turn may have the effect of making the buyer better aware of the nature of the goods' limitations. 4 Lagen om köp och byte av lös egendom [Sale ofGoods Act] of20 June 1905, Svensk författningssamling 1905, no. 38. The Sale of Goods Act deals with both civil, noncommercial sales as weil as commercial sales. 5 See Nordiska köplagar, Förslag av den nordiska arbetsgruppen för köplagstiftning: 5 Nordisk Utredningsserie (1984) 171ff.; Jan Hellner, The Draft of a New Swedish Sale of Goods Act: Scand. Stud. L. 22 (1978) 53-79. The abbreviation "Incoterms" refers to "international commercial terms." 6 Draft statute § 20; cf. Nordiska köplagar (supra n. 5) 234fT. 7 Konsumentköplag [Consumer Sales Act] of 1973, Svensk författningssamling 1973, no. 877.
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lt might be argued that even the American provision on the expression "as is" represents a policy decision. lt does permit a wide and unspecified exemption to take full effect. Such a view could be generalized to a statement that all rules on the interpretation of certain terms and expressions represent policy decisions, whether or not intended. However, this would be an exaggeration. Where there is a choice of expressions, or where standardform contracts are in common use, the policy effect may be absent. Yet it seems necessary to keep the issue in mind whenever a statute contains a rule relating to the interpretation of a certain clause.
111. Facultative Rules Rules explicitly regulating the interpretation of contract clauses are not common. What I call "ordinary" rules state the legal consequences stemming from the existence of certain facts. I now ask whether such rules should have any effect on unclear contract clauses dealing with the same subject. At present the discussion is confined to facultative rules. lt is impossible to generalize on such a subject, but an example might shed some light on it. The Swedish Sale of Goods Act contains a provision (section 24) on impossibility of performance. lt deals with the seller's liability to pay damages for delay in delivering goods, and in particular it contains the fundamental principle concerningforce majeure in the law of sales. It is, by analogy, employed in other parts of the law of contracts as weil. U nder the influence oftheGerman doctrine ofimpossibility, it exempts sellers from liability only under exceptional circumstances. 8 Since the First World War sellers have tried to exempt themselves from liability, in a number of cases, mostly on the basis of force majeure clauses. However, Swedish courts have been very reluctant to interpret these clauses in a way that exempts sellers to a greater extent than the statutory rule perrnits, even if a clause differs considerably in wording. There are several possible explanations for this situation. The one that I prefer is that the statutory rule has exercised an influence on the interpretation of the clauses. 9 An additional reason would be that the influential commentator on the Sale of Goods Act, Tore Almen, who hirnself had taken part in the preparation of the Sale of Goods Act, interpreted the clauses in this way. 10 Another reason may be that force majeure clauses, regarded as exemption clauses, are subject to the contra proferentem rule of interpretation. 11 8 See Jan Hel/ner, The Influence oftheGerman Doctrine of Impossibility on Swedish Sales Law, in: lus Privatum Gentium, Festschrift für Max Rheinstein (1969) 705-720. 9 See Jan Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt, Köprätt I (1982) 111-114. 10 See Tore Almen, Om köp och byte av lös egendom, Kommentar tilllagen den 20 juni 1905, ed. by Rudolf Eklund(4th ed. 1960) § 24 at nn. 92-102c. 11 Contra proferenlern is the principle that an ambiguous provision in a written document should be construed most strongly against the person who selected the language. Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) 296.
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I do not know to what extent the kind of interpretation now mentioned has any counterpart in other legal systems. My object in mentioning it is to draw attention to the possibility of such an interpretation and to the alternative method of interpreting the clause contra proferenlern. However, mentioning this alternative raises new questions: will not the principle of interpreting standard form contracts conlra proferenlern normally Iead to the same result as letting statutory rules influence the interpretation? Or, to go a step further, is not the method of attaching an interpretation to the statutory rule more Straightforward and more suitable than the simple reference to contra proferentern? My own answer to these two questions is on the whole affirmative, although I am aware that the subject is controversial. The reason is that, generally speaking, I object to the principle of conlra proferentern. In my opinion it offers courts too easy a way of solving interpretation problems without sufficient analysis. Furthermore, since it is generally admitted that most parties will not study standardform contracts very thoroughly, a method ofinterpretation that assumes that this is the practice rests on a fiction. Be this as it may; before proceeding it is necessary to clarify a number of points. For those matters that the legislature and courts have no wish to exercise control, the principle of interpreting a contract clause contra proferenfern has little practical importance. The rule is a mere stop-gap rule. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that an interpretation corresponding to a statutory norm is perfectly justifiable. It may correspond to the parties' intentions, it may be more foreseeable to the parties than any other interpretation, and it may also, circumstances permitting, be a practical solution. However, circumstances differ. In strictly commercial matters courts would probably often be mistaken in believing that the legislature had any special insight into the problem. A statutory rule is often old, and it is possible that societal circumstances have changed. Commercial usages and, where such are not found, the court's discretion may be a better guide. However, it is possible that the legislature was weil informed and clever in drafting. Here, as elsewhere, generalizations are dangerous. On other matters, the main problern will be whether or not courts should exercise any control. Opinions may differ, as is weil known. Those who favor a laissez-faire policy will prefer an interpretation that corresponds to the parties' intentions, occasionally tempered by the conlra proferenlern principle in order to ensure sufficient clarity. As is probably apparent, I do not belong to this group. Assurne that the opposite view is taken and that the law in general and a particular statute are based on a legislative policy to strike the right balance between the interests ofthe parties. Assurne also that the courts accept this view. Ifmy interpretation ofthe Swedish cases onforce rnajeure is correct, this is the philosophy underlying the decisions in these cases. However, even if we agree 12 Merryman Festschrift
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that control is justifiable in these cases, it does not follow that interpretation should be used for the purpose of control. Other methods may be preferable. Recent developments in the law relating to standard form contracts have brought this question into focus. The 1976 Act on Standard Form Contracts (AGB-Gesetz) in the Federal Republic ofGermany represents a concerted effort to deal with problems arising out of the widespread use of standard form contracts. 12 One method employed enumerates clauses that are stated to be void, either conditionally with the possibility of judging their fairness (section 10) or unconditionally without such a possibility (section 11 ). These two sections are not applicable to contracts between merchants. However, there is also a "general clause" (Genera/klausel, section 9), which empowers courts to set aside clauses that are contrary to good faith. In this way, principles ernerging out ofsections 10 and 11 can be applied to commercial contracts as weil. Moreover, section 9 states that a clause is generally considered tobe against good faith when it cannot be reconciled with the fundamental principles of a statutory rule with which it differs. German courts make ample use of this generat clause, which in fact confers a semimandatory character on a number of statutory rules that originally were entirely facultative. 13 The AGB-Gesetz also contains a provision on the interpretation of standard form contracts (section 5), which codifies the contra proferenfern principle. Doubts as to the interpretation of a standard form clause will, according to this provision, Iead to an application to the disadvantage of the party that introduced it into the contract. Considering the importance that is attached to deviations from statutory rules when deciding whether a contract clause should be set aside according to section 9, it rnight a priori seem possible to also apply section 5 in such a way that the clause would be interpreted in harmony with the statutory rules. However, this is not the way that section 5 is generally understood. Sometimes the wording of a contract clause lies close to the wording of a statutory rule; it is then interpreted in accordance with the statutory rule. 14 12 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen [AGBGesetz] of 9 December 1976. 13 The amount of case law is enormous. A Special series of reports, Hermann Josef Bunte, Entscheidungssammlung zum AGB-Gesetz (1982-1987), has recently been published in six volumes, covering the period 1977-1985. For the future at least one volume a year can be expected to appear. There are a nurober of commentaries on the AGB-Gesetz, e.g., Waller Löwe f Friedrich Graf von Weslphalen f Rheinhold Trinkner, Grosskommentar zum AGB-Gesetz, Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen II-III (2d ed. 1983, 1985); Peler Schlosser, AGB-Gesetz (Sonderausgabe aus Julius von Slaudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch) (1980); Peler Ulmer f Hans Erich Brandner f Horsl-Dielher Hensen, AGB-Gesetz, Kommentar zum Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (1987); Manfred Wolf, Norbert Horn/ Waller F. Lindacher, AGB-Gesetz, Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (1984). 14 See Schlosser (supra n. 13) § 5, no. 4; Wolf/ Horn/ Lindacher (supra n.13) § 5, no. 19.
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But in general sections 5 and 9 are considered to have different purposes. Section 5 is supposed to deal with Iack of clarity, and the contents of statutory rules are largely irrelevant. Interpretation should logically occur prior to an exarnination ofwhether a clause should be adjusted. 15 Control is thus governed by section 9. Before enactment of the AGB-Gesetz, German courts often employed interpretation principles to control the contents of standardform contracts. The methods introduced by the AGB-Gesetz make this practice superfluous. 16 However, it is possible that an interpretation according to section 5 will make a clause acceptable that, with another interpretation, would be subject to being set aside under sections 9 to 11. 17 I am, of course, not qualified to take any position on this application of the German AGB-Gesetz, but it should be noted how strongly it is connected with the generallegislative framework. Turning to the United Kingdom, we face a question about the impact of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 18 Fora civilian lawyer, an attempt to ascertain the position ofthis law within the legal order is rendered difficult by the statute's exterior form, which appears unsystematic. The Act deals mainly with exemptions from liability to pay damages and is thus more limited in scope than the German AGB-Gesetz, which deals with a far greater number of types of clauses. However, the Act is not generally limited to standardform contracts. 19 As apparent from the title, it takes as its starting point various unfair clauses, rather than the substantive issues with which the clauses deal. In this way its technique agrees with that of the German statute, and not with the technique of enacting mandatory rules that refer to factual situations that may or may not be the subject of contract terms in a particular contract. There are two main methods employed for dealing with terms that are subject to the Act. First, some terms are always void. For example, a clause that excludes or restricts liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence is void. 20 Second, for other terms mentioned in the Act, the test is whether the term "satisfies the requirement of reasonableness." 21 In Scotland another phrase is used: "it was not fair and reasonable to incorporate the term in 15 See U/mer(Brandner(Hensen (supra n. 13) § 5, nos. 3-6; Wolf(Horn(Lindacher (supra n. 13) § 5, no. 26. 16 The practice of interpreting unclear clauses in accordance with statutory principles was especially prominent with insurance contracts, but this tendency has been reversed by the AGB-Gesetz. Schlosser (supra n. 13) § 5, no. 2. 17 See Wolf(Horn(Lindacher (supra n. 13) § 5, no. 19. 18 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, eh. 50. 19 Section 3, id., applies between contracting parties where one of them deals as a consumer or takes the other's written standard terms of business. The status of being a consumer is thus sufficient under the Act. 20 Id. s. 2(1). 21 See id., e.g., s. 2(2).
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the contract." 22 Whethcr general rules of law - statutory or not - should influence the application of this reasonableness test does not appear from the statute. Whether a term that passes this test might in addition be subject to interpretation contra proferenfern is also a question to which no answer is given by the statute. However, one is left with the general impression that the drafters did not consider that interpretation should be prior to the application of the reasonableness test, in contrast to the German statute. In the United States the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), besides empowering courts to set aside "unconscionable" contracts and clauses (section 2-302), contains at least one provision that deals with the present problem. 23 This is section 1-1 02(3), which states: The effect of provisions of thls Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
There are, of course, numerous references in the Code to concepts enumerated in section 1-102(3), including section 1-203: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." One rnight conclude that freedom of contract is often lirnited by the necessity of keeping within the Iimits underlying reasonableness and good faith. The UCC then has an important impact on the interpretation of contract clauses. But it is also clear that the main purpose of the rule is to ensure freedom of contract. Obviously, it would be futile for a foreigner to try to ascertain what the influence of the Code and its special provisions has been on the application of contract clauses. However, situations where the Code refers to concepts mentioned in section 1-102(3) are largely those in which there is no explicit agreement, which means there is no contract clause to interpret. As an example section 2-305 concerning "open price terms" may be mentioned. If the price is not settled it will be "a reasonable price at the time for delivery. " 24 According to subsection (2) of section 2-305: "A price tobe fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith." None of these provisions can be applied when a price has been agreed upon in the contract, even ifthis is donein such a way as to leave some scope for interpretation. The importance of section 1-1 02(3) therefore remains somewhat uncertain for the foreign observer. Ifwe Iook for situations in which the Code could influence the interpretation of contract clauses, we can also observe some special provisions. Section 2719(3) prescribes inter alia: "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but 22 23 24
Id. s. 17(1). See supra n. 3. ucc § 2- 305(1).
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Iimitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not." Suppose that we face a clause limiting damages that implicates this provision. Would this be a question of interpreting the clause, while keeping the statutory rule in mind, or would it be a straight application of a statutory rule to the situation? In my opinion, such a question is meaningless. The consequence is that, partly because of the wording of this statutory text, the difference between interpretation of a statute and interpretation of a contract disappears. What occurs is the joint application of statute and contract.
IV. Mandatory Rules Turning now to mandatory rules, the problems are somewhat different. As mentioned before, mandatory rules prevail over contract terms while facultative rules do not. Ifthis distinction were applied strictly, the question ofinterpreting contracts would not arise. A statute must prevail over a contract clause, and there would be no space for interpretation. However, this is an oversimplification. There remains the possibility that a statutory rule should be interpreted in accordance with a contract. This problern can be illustrated by a Swedish case. The Consumer Insurance Act of 1980 prescribes that if an insured does not comply with duties imposed on him by the insurance contract, the insurance indemnity should be reduced according to what is reasonable (section 31 ). 25 In the insurance conditions issued on the basis ofthis statutory rule, Swedish insurers inserted a clause to the effect that insurance indemnities for Iosses caused by theft in a private house should be reduced by 100 percent- that is, the insured should receive nothing at all- if property was stolen when the insured failed to keep the doors locked and windows closed during his absence from the house. A case went to court in which an insurer had refused to pay any indemnity for a theft occurring under circumstances such as those described. The insured sued for 50 percent of his loss, arguing that a reduction by half the indemnity was the most that could be considered reasonable. The plaintiffs claim was accepted by the Swedish Supreme Court. 26 But suppose that the contract stipulated a reduction of 25 percent and that the insured claimed that a reduction by 10 percentwas the most that was reasonable. Assuming that a court found that both 25 percent and 10 percent would lie within the range of what was reasonable, should the court be compelled to make a decision on the point of which of these two figures was the most reasonable? In my opinion it should not; the test ofreasonableness should leave a certain amount of freedom of contract regarding even the application of a mandatory rule. The result as a practical matter would be similar to that of applying the rule stated in UCC section 1-102(3), referred to earlier. 25 Konsumentförsäkrings1ag [Consumer författningssamling 1980, no. 38. 26 See Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv (1984) 829.
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A somewhat different problern regarding the relationship between application of mandatory rules and contract interpretation also arises in insurance contract law, although it can be imagined to arise in other branches of contract law as weil. This problern concerns a contract clause that is formulated as an exclusion of risk - which lies outside the scope of most legal systems' mandatory rules- but in fact can be considered to impose a duty subject to a mandatory rule. Consider again a contract clause that excludes from insurance coverage the theft of property kept in a house where the door is unlocked. This clause apparently has the same meaning as one that imposes a duty of locking the door with the consequence of the insured losing his right to indemnity if he fails to fulfill the duty. There are early legal writings where it is argued that the outcome should depend on interpretation of the clause. 27 If the clause stated clearly that it was intended to be applied as an "exclusion of risk" rather than as imposing a duty, it should be upheld as an exclusion of risk. This view does not seem to be accepted any more, although there is still much controversy on how the line should be drawn. Outside the scope ofwhat is reasonable, interpretation of the clause should not be decisive, even where the language is clear.
V. Conclusion Problems connected with the simultaneous application of statutory interpretation and contract interpretation are complicated. They cannot be solved by a general formula, nor can they be solved for alllegal systems in the same way. Whether or not we accept the control of contract as a legitimate aim of contract law, there will always be reasons both for and against interpreting contract clauses in accordance with statutory rules. The main object, in my opinion, must be to make both the reasons and the available techniques clear. Developments in Germanstandard form contract law are particularly illustrative. Strengthened controls of standardform contracts have been accompanied by abolition of the use ofinterpretation methods for this control. Whether or not we approve ofthe results, we should observe what is happening.
27 See Jan He/lner, Exclusions of Risk and Duties lmposed on the lnsured [1955], reprinted in: He/lner, Selected Essays in lnsurance Law (1977) 27-95 (42fT.).
Scholarship and the Courts: A Comparative Survey Hein Kötz*
I. Introduction In recent years, Comparative Judicial Style has become an interesting field of study for comparative lawyers. 1 If it is true that a legal system or groups of such systems are characterized by a distinctive "style" 2 it may indeed be a promising idea to study the way in which judges justify their decisions and thereby shed some light on the "style" of the legal system or systems concerned. We all know, of course, that judgments reveal only part of what really goes on in judges' minds. But what judgments and their reasons do tell us is what judges think are legitimate and acceptable arguments likely to count as sound legal reasoning. Judicial opinions are therefore valuable evidence of the attitude of judges and lawyers in general, of the roles in which they see themselves, and of the notions they entertain about the law and the legal process at a given timeandin a given legal environment. Various characteristic features of a judicial opinion can be used as standards of comparison. One is simply to count pages and to study the differences in length of opinions rendered in different legal systems. Another is to ask whether and how a judge uses previous decisions handed down by other courts, and by the court of which he is a member, as the stuff from which his judgment is woven.
* Professor of Law, University of Hamburg; Director, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law. Abbreviation: Rev. int. dr. comp. = Revue internationale de droit compare. 1 See J. Gillis Wetter, The Style of Appellate Judicial Decisions, A Case Study in Comparative Law (1960); Falke Schmidt, The Ratio Decidendi, A Comparative Study ofa French, a German and an American Supreme Court Decision (1965); lohn P. Dawson, The Oracles ofthe Law (1968); Hein Kötz, Über den Stil höchstrichterlicher Entscheidungen: Raheis Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 37 (1973) 245-263 = Rivista di diritto civile (1978) I 773-792 (in Italian); Bernard Rudden, Courtsand Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia: Tu!. L. Rev. 48 (1974) 1010-1028; Jean-Louis Gouta/, Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain and the U.S.A.: Am. J. Comp. L. 24 (1976) 43-72; F.H. Lawson, Comparative Judicial Style: Am. J. Comp. L. 25 (1977) 364371. Fora perceptive discussion oftheGerman style of judgrnents, see B.S. Markesinis, Conceptualism, Pragrnatism and Courage, A Cornrnon Lawyer Looks at Some Judgrnents oftheGerman Federal Court: Am. J. Comp. L. 34 (1986) 349-367. 2 See Konrad Zweigert/ Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, transl. by Tony Weir I (2d ed. 1987) 68-75.
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The same question may be asked with respect to the treatment of statutory material; and one can perhaps say that any comparative study of the ways in which judges deal with prior cases or interpret and apply statutes is to some extent a study of Comparative Judicial Style. Many other interesting questions may be mentioned in passing: What are the recurring patterns of judicial reasoning? Is the style of argumentation inductive or deductive? Discursive or apodictic? Personal or impersonal? Is the judgment meant to persuade or to decree? Oliver Wendeli Holmes once said that "the secret root from which the law draws all the juices oflife ... [are] considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned." 3 While judges in many countries will find nothing basically wrong with this statement, it is another question to what extent, and in which type of case, they will be prepared, with or without an apology, to discuss such considerations openly and frankly in their opinions. In this study I will try to examine what use, if any, is made by courts in selected legal systems of legal doctrine as a source of arguments and ideas, as a restatement of the law as it stands, or as a rnine of proposals about how the law should be. This is not an easy task, and the diffidence with which I approach it is not diminished in the least by the fact that the scholar to whom this Festschrift is devoted has been a pioneer in the field himself. In a study published 35 years ago and entitled "The Authority of Authority," John H. Merryman analyzed the citation practices of the California Supreme Court. 4 A broader and more thorough empirical examination ofthat Court's citation practices followed in 1977. 5 These two seminal studies, and the availability in these days of electronically operated data banks, have led to a host of similar articles 6 presenting findings about opinion length, dissenting and concurring opinions, citations to prior cases and statutes, and citations to "secondary authorities," that is, treatises, legal encyclopedias, 7 law review articles, and the restatements Oliver Wendeli Holmes, The Common Law, ed. by Mark DeWolfe Howe (1968) 32. lohn Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority, What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950: Stan. L. Rev. 6 (1954) 613-673 (cited: Merryman, Authority). 5 lohn Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations, An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice ofthe California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960 and 1970: So. Ca!. L. Rev. 50 (1977) 381-428 (cited: Merryman, Theory). 6 See, e.g., Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material, 1965 Term: Geo. L. J. 57 (1968) 55-80; Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the LawReports," Secondary Source Citations in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940 and 1978: Law Libr. J. 76 (1983) 1-47; Lawrence M. FriedmanjRobert A. KaganjBliss Cartwright j Stanton Wheeler, State Supreme Courts, A Century of Style and Citation: Stan. L. Rev. 33 (1981) 773-818; Louis 1. Sirico, lr.jleffrey B. Margulies, T-be Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court, An Empirical Study: UCLA L. Rev. 34 (1986) 131147. 7 Fora description and a devastating critique of the "legal encyclopedia" as a special type of American legalliterature, see Merryman, Authority (supra n. 4) 634-646. 3
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produced under the auspices ofthe American Law Institute. 8 Most articles have studied the U.S. Supreme Court or one or more state supreme courts by analyzing citation practices in specific periods spaced apart in order to discern trends and shifts in judicial style. No quantitative information about the citation practices of non-American appellate courts seems to be available. 9 This is certainly to be regretted, but it does not mean that any further study of the problern ought to be shelved until hard data have been gathered. One reason is that if one compares citations by appellate courts of different countfies to "secondary authorities," information on the number of citations may be less important than an educated guess as to the weight given by the judge to the author whose work he has cited. Statistics showing the number of times books or articles have been cited by a judge in his opinion may be misleading since what is important, particularly in the context of a cross-cultural study, is the use judges actually make of juristic writings and not the acknowledgment they publicly record in their decisions.
II. Legal Schotarship in French Courts Max Weber has pointed out that the climate of a society's legal system is ultimately determined by the kind of people who dominate it, that is, as Weber called them, the honoratiores of the law (Rechtshonoratioren). 10 It would seem logical to conclude that the number of citations to legal authors, and the weight and influence granted them by the courts, are directly proportionate to the social prestige and public esteem of law professors and other legal writers. However, the opinions of the French Cour de cassation clearly demoostrate that this hypothesis is wrong. I am not sure whether French legal scholars are Rechtshonoratioren in the Weberian sense, but their influence on French legal culture is certainly not so marginal as to explain the fact that the highest French court does not cite them at all. While citations to legal writing and to previous decisions occasionally appear in the judgments of lower courts, the Cour de cassation will have none ofit. This stems from its endeavour to make the text of its opinions as dense, terse, pungent, and compact as possible. Asides, divagations, and efflorescences are rigorously avoided, nor are there references to the background of the case, legal history, or legal policy. I ts opinions shun the appearance ofbeing the work ofjudges offlesh and blood who ever indulged in 8 Fora sceptical evaluation of the restatements as authoritative Statements of the law in court opinions, see id. at 629-634. 9 But see Goutal (supra n. 1) 58, with data on the comparative length of English, French, and American opinions. 10 See Max Rheinstein, Legal Systems, Comparative Law and Legal Systems, in : Int'l Ency. Soc. Sei. IX (1968) 208; id., Die Rechtshonoratioren und ihr Einfluß auf Charakter und Funktion der Rechtsordnungen: Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 34 (1970) 1-13.
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the luxury of doubt; it seems to be required by the majeste de Ia loi that a judgment should appear as a kind of surgical operation leading to the result by way of "a simple, clean-cut deduction from premises stated in the form of an abstract principle, normally drawn from statute. " 11 There is no question that the judges ofthe Cour de cassation take noteoftegal writings 12 and of economic or social considerations. But they are always excluded from the text of the opinion and may be identified only in the rare cases in which a decision is published together with a fully referenced case note by the juge rapporteur or with the conclusions of the ministere puhlic. The reason for the Frenchjudicial style must be sought in history. Under the ancien regime law was administered by the parlements, whose judges were appointed by the king from what was called the nohlesse de rohe, that is, a group ofwell-regarded and powerful families whose members had often specialized in the practice of law for generations. Together with other institutions of the old feudal order, the parlements and the nohlesse de rohe were swept away by the Revolution. The new systemwas based on a strict enforcement ofthe principle of Separation of powers, and the new judges' task was seen as limited to the application of the law as laid down by the legislature. 13 Originally, if the judges found a statute to be ambiguous or to have a gap, they were forbidden to resolve the doubt by interpretation or to fill the lacuna; instead they had to refer the case to Parliament. Nowadays French judges do not only interpret legislation, but are as hold and innovative in developing the law as other European appellate courts. Nevertheless, the old stylistic conventions survive: [T]he principal function of a high court opinion is to demonstrate to the world at !arge that the high court in exercising its exceptional powers has arrogated nothing to itself and is merely enforcing the law .... And so the format of the 1790's continues unchanged. The majestic parade of whereas clauses is cast as an exercise in logic, working down inevitably from some provision of Code or statute. It is the law that speaks. The judges are merely its instrument although by now the whole process could better be described as extremely expert ventriloquism. 14 11 Goutal (supra n. 1) 45; Lawson (supra n. 1) 369f.; seeAndre Tune, La Cour judiciaire supreme, Synthese: Rev. int. dr. comp. 30 (1978) 5-83 (72-74); Pierre Bellet, La Cour de cassation: Rev. int. dr. comp. 30 (1978) 193-215 (213-215). 12 Adolphe Touffait, Conclusion d'un practicien: Rev. int. dr. comp. 30 (1978) 473-486 (484), has taken a dim view of the roJe played by legal scholars in the decision-making process of the Cour de cassation: "II n'y a que les noms de quelques professeurs, qu'on compte sur !es doigts d'une seule main, qui passent Ia rampe dans une discussion ä Ia Cour de cassation et aucun dont l'autorite serait invoquee dans un arret." Contra Philippe M alaurie, Les reactions de Ia doctrine ä Ia creation du droit par Ies juges, Rapport fran~ais: Travaux de l'Association Henri Capitant 31 (1980) 81-95 (90-93). 13 The full story is given by Dawson (supra n. 1) 374-431. 14 Dawson (supra n. 1) 410f. Fora trenchant criticism ofthe French style ofjudgments, see Andre Tune I Adolphe Touffait, Pour une motivation plus explicite des decision de justice, notamment de celles de Ia Cour de cassation: Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 72 (1974) 487-508. See also Raymond Lindon, La motivation des arrets de Ia Cour de
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111. Legal Schofarship in British Courts W. L. Twining once said that "the British academic lawyer, unlike his continental counterpart, has tended tobe a marginal man oflow visibility," and that this is "symbolized by the fact that he is largely conspicuous by his absence as a character in drama, novels, films or soap opera." 15 lt would be too rash to conclude that he must also be conspicuous by his absence as a source of useful ideas in judicial opinions. True, there are some older judicial statements reflecting a tendency to minimize the work oflegal writers and to lay down what has been called the "better read when dead" rule. Thus, in Union Bank v. Munster, 16 when counsel had referred to a passage in Fry on Specific Performance, Kekewich J. had this to say about textbooks: It is to my mind much tobe regretted, and it is a regret which I believe every judge on the
bench shares, that text-books are more and more quoted in Court- I mean of course text-books by living authors- and some Judges have gone so far as to say that they shall not be quoted.
And in Greenlands Ltd. v. Wilmshurst, 17 after reference had been made by counsel to Odgers on Libel and Slander, Vaughan Williams L. J. said: No doubt Mr. Odgers's book isamostadmirable work, which we all use, but I think we ought in this Court still to maintain the old idea that counsel are not entitled to quote living authors as authorities for a proposition they are putting forward, but they may adopt the author's statements as part of their argument.
lt is not always clear what the judges meant when they said that the work of a living author must not be quoted "as authority." If a lawyer uses the term "authority," he may simply refer to a statement by a legal writer without implying anything as to the degree of its weight and influence. But a writer's statement may also have "persuasive" or in exceptional cases "binding" authority.lt is "binding" authority that Lord Buckmaster seems to have had in mind when he spoke of "writers of authority" in Donoghue v. Stevenson: Now the common law [he said] must be found in lawbooks by writers of authority andin judgments of the judges entrusted with its administration. [In this case] the lawbooks give no assistance because the work of living authors, however deservedly eminent, cannot be used as authority though the opinions they express may demand attention; and the ancient books do not assist. I turn, therefore, to the decided cases. 18 cassation: Juris Classeur Periodique, La Semaine Juridique (1975) I 2681; Touffait (supra n. 12) 484-486. These proposals do not seem to have had any effect so far. Alllawyers know that forms die barder than substance. But this is an example of the longevity of a formal tradition that is truly astounding. 15 W.L. Twining, Goodbye to Lewis Elliott, The Academic Lawyer as Scholar: J. Soc'y Pub. Teachers of Law (1980) 2-19 (2). See also P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (The Hamlyn Lectures, no. 39, 1987). 16 (1887) 37 Law Reports, Chancery Division 51, 54. 17 (1913) 29 Times Law Reports 685, 687 (C.A.).
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"Writers of authority" in this sense are those few authors who, like Glanvill, Bracton, Littleton, or Coke, have acquired over time such an influence that they themselves may now be relied upon as evidence ofwhat the common law was at the time their works were published. References to such works are in modern practice seldom material and need not concern us here. Whatever English judges may have said about juristic writings in the past, there is no doubt that references to the views of academic writers both living and dead are now quite common. Nor does anybody question the propriety of citing an author on the ground that his statement has not been formally "adopted" by counsel "as part of his argument." There are indeed handsome compliments paid occasionally to the assistance rendered the courts by academic writers. Thus, in a review of the third edition of Winfield's A Text-Book of the Law of Tort, Lord Denning said that this work is the book which is called for whenever anyone is not certain of the law. The place which was first occupied by Pollock, and to which Salmond succeeded, is now filled by Winfield. The reason why such books are so useful in the Courts is that they are not digests of cases but repositories of principles. They are written by men who have studied the law as a science with more detachment than is possible to men engaged in busy practice. The influence of the academic lawyers is greater now than it hasever been and is greater than they themselves realise. Their influence is largely through their writings. The notion that their works arenot of authority except after the author's death has long been exploded. Indeed, the more recent the work, the more persuasive it is, expecially when it is a work of such an authority as Professor Winfield: because it considers and takes into account modern developments in case law and current literature. Winfield is now cited in place ofPollock; and Cheshire and Fifoot in place of Anson. The essays of Professor Goodhart have had a decisive influence in many important decisions. The vast tomes written and edited by practitioners for practitioners fulfill a different purpose. They are valuable as works of reference. They are cited not for principles but for detailed rules on special subjects. They are most important in day to day practice, but do not compare with books such as Winfield when it comes to fundamental principles. 19 The statistical evidence is perhaps notasimpressive as one might think. A spot check of the first volume of All England Law Reports for 1985 resulted in 72 citations to "secondary authority" in the 93 reported judgments of the High Court of J ustice and the Court of Appeal. 20 This is an average ofO. 77 citations to "secondary authority" per case. In evaluating this figure one must keep a number of things in mind. [1932] Law Reports, Appeal Cases 562, 567. Law Q. Rev. 63 (1947) 516-518 (516). 20 In marked contrast to American citation practices (see infratextat nn. 24- 34), there were hardly any references by English courts to law review articles. Of the 72 citations, 66 were to revised standard works and to recent books by living authors. There was one reference to a law review article, one to a case note, and four to various commission reports. 18
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On the one hand, judgments rendered by the High Court and the Court of Appealare published only ifthey are thought to contain a material contribution to the law. Accordingly, they are more likely than unpublished judgments to contain references to legal writings. On the other hand, the working style of English judges is not conducive to the more ample citation practices found in some civillaw countriesandin the United States. A fairly !arge share even of the reported judgments are delivered orally from the bench immediately after the close of argument or shortly thereafter. In this situation a judge will confine hirnself to refer to or discuss a specific argument advanced by counsel and backed up by a pertinent reference to a legal writer. But indiscriminate citing of material that adds nothing significant to the persuasive power of the judgment is out of the question. Even where the judgment is reserved and there is time for independentlegal research an Englishjudge will be highly reluctant to refer in his judgment to a case, Iet alone to "secondary authority," unless it has been cited by counsel and exposed to oral debate. There also seems tobe a somewhat skeptical and grudging attitude toward the weight to be given to textbooks and articles in legal periodicals. Speaking of decisions of the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce once admitted that "[l]es notes de certains commentateurs, par exemple le professeur Goodhart, ont exerce une influence considerable," 21 but went out ofhis way in a recent case to remind English lawyers ofthe great dangers inherent in the reliance by judges on textbook authority. Now it goes without saying that the weight to be given a view expressed by a legal writer depends on the cogency of the argument, the reputation ofthe author, and the honesty ofscholarship. Butthis is so obvious that one wonders why Lord Wilberforce, after quoting from a textbook, feit impelled to say: My Lords, this passage is almost a perfect illustration ofthe dangers, well perceived by our predecessors but tending to be neglected in modern times, of placing reliance on textbook authority for an analysis of judicial decisions. It is on the face of it a jumble of unclear propositions not logically related to each other. 22
Of course, not every academic writer has the caliber of a Pollock or Cheshire or Goodhart, and there is no doubt that judges must use textbooks with Lord Wilberforce, La Chambre des Lords: Rev. int. dr. comp. 30 (1978) 85-96 (95). Johnson v. Agnew [1980] Law Reports, Appeal Cases 367, 395 (H.L.). But see what seems to me the vox clamantis in deserto of Lord Goff, in Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. [1986] 3 All England Law Reports 843, 863 f.: I feel that I cannot conclude without paying tribute to the writings of jurists which have assisted me in the preparation of this opinion [citation of three law review articles omitted]. They will observe that I have not agreed with them on all points; but even when I have disagreed with them, I have found their work tobe of assistance. For jurists are pilgrims with us on the endless road ofunattainable perfection; and we have it on the excellent authority ofGeoffrey Chaucer that conversations among pilgrims can be most rewarding. 21
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discrimination not only because they may occasionally produce "a jumble of unclear propositions," but also because, in the words of Megarry J.: The process of authorship is entirely different from that of a judicial decision. The author, no doubt, has the benefit of a broad and comprehensive survey of his chosen subject as a whole, together with a lengthy period of gestation, and intermittent opportunities for reconsideration. But he is exposed to the peril of yielding to preconceptions, and he Iacks the advantage of that impact and sharpening of focus which the detailed facts of a particular case bring to the judge. Above all, he has to form his ideas without the aid of the purifying ordeal of skilled argument on the specific facts of a contested case. Argued law is tough law. 23
All this is not only true, but fairly obvious. A Continental outsider may be forgiven for adding that it is not only the academic writer who is exposed to the peril ofyielding to preconceptions. While an author does not have the advantage of oral argument on the specific facts of a case, it is the judge who sometimes has difficulty in seeing the woods of legal principle for the trees of precedent. Perhaps the best way to develop the law is by a joint effort of judges and academics acting in partnership.
IV. Legal Scholarship in American Courts The courts in the United States have always had a more open attitude toward legal writers. One reason is that in the early post-colonial decades the use of English cases as primary authority was regarded as questionable. There had, after all, been a revolution in America, and while there was no choice but to continue the reception of English common law to the extent to which it was appropriate in the American environment, it seemed more acceptable to do so by relying on treatises by American authors who, Iike Story and Kent, discussed not only English materials but also principles drawn from civilian sources, and tended to stress the American character of the law they were expounding. 24 Another reason for the courts' reliance on legal writing may be seen in the fact that the sheer number of reported cases in the United States makes it very difficult both for judges and practicing lawyers to keep up with the judicial output of their own jurisdictions, Iet alone handle the others. Courts may therefore be more inclined to consult and cite encyclopedias, textbooks, treatises, or other forms of "secondary authority," which help to canalize the endless stream of cases and to present them in a more orderly and accessible form. Finally, the growing prestige of American law professors in the twentieth century may have contributed to the increasing use of law review articles in
23
16f.
Cordeil v. Second Clanfield Properfies [1969] 2 Law Reports, Chancery Division 9,
24 See A. W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall oftheLegal Treatise, Legal Principles and the Form of Legal Literature: U. Chi. L. Rev. 48 (1981) 632-679 (668-674).
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judicial opinions. Already in 1931 Cardozo noted that the old prejudice against citing law reviews was vanishing and that the main reason for the change has been a dislocation of existing balances, a disturbance of the weights of authority and influence. Judges and advocates roay not relish the admission, but the sobering truth is that leadership in the roarch of legal thought has been passing in our day froro the benches of the court to the chairs of universities. 25
Other distinguished American judges have made similar statements, albeit only in speeches made to law faculties or in prefaces to legal publications. 26 One wonders therefore what the real impact of legal writing on judicial decisionmaking is. Some insight is provided by Merryman's seminal study ofthe citation practices of the Califomia Supreme Court. He found that there were 2.2 citations to "secondary authority" per case in 1950, 1.7 citationsin 1960, and 1.8 citations in 1970.27 "Secondary authority" includes law review articles, restatements, encyclopedias, annotations, and "other" authority (mainly treatises). What is interesting is that citations to encyclopedias, annotations, and restatements have drastically declined from 1950 to 1970, while legal periodical citations have risen considerably (from 0.4 citations per case in 1950 to 0.9 citations in 1970). Merryman gives two reasons for this trend. One isthat the Califomia Supreme Court may in the course of time have become more discriminating in its use of "secondary authority," by relying less frequently on the doubtful authority of mere finding aids like Corpus Juris Secundum or American Jurisprudence and by concentrating on the more ambitious and thoughtful scholarly work published in law reviews. Another explanationisthat the nurober of cases actually decided [by the California Supreroe Court] has significantly declined, while the nurober of cases potentially reviewable by the court has greatly expanded. Accordingly, each year the court has chosen its cases roore carefully, and, in doing so, it has naturally found it preferable to deal with the more iroportant ones. This Ieads to a concentration on new probleros- those of great social iroportance and those at the growing edge of the law, particularly criminal and constitutional questions. This is the sort of law the legal periodicals rejoice in, but it is alien to the Restateroent. The encyclopedias and annotations are notoriously weak sources of inspiration where iroagination and novelty are prized. 28
Since the United States Supreme Court deals with issues of even greater importance with determinative effects on the daily lives of a large number of 25 Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts from Aroerican and English Legal Periodicals, ed. by Association of American Schoo/s (1931) ix (preface). 26 See Stan/ey H. Fu/d, A Judge Looks at the Law Review: N.Y.U. L. Rev. 28 (1953) 915-921; Charles E. Hughes, Foreword: Yale L.J. 50 (1941) 737f.; Earl Warren, Comment on the 50th Anniversay ofthe Northwestern University Law Review: Nw. U.L. Rev. 51 (1956) 1; Julius H. Hoffman, Law Reviewsand the Bench: Nw. U.L. Rev. 51 (1956) 1721. 27 Merryman, Theory (supra n. 5) 405. 28 Id. at 406f. (footnotes omitted). See also the fmdings by Friedman et a/. (supra n. 6) 810- 817, which support a similar thesis that "law review citation rates roay be a rough index of a court's orientation toward an overt policy-roaking role." Id. at 815.
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Americans, one would expect an even higher number of citations to legal periodicals. This is indeed bome out by a recent report on "secondary source citations" in opinions ofthe United States Supreme Court in its 1900, 1940, and 1978 October terms. 29 According to this study the total number of secondary source citations per case was 0.65 in 1900, 1.37 in 1940, and 7.14 in 1978. Citations per case to law review articles rose from 0.2 in 1940 to 2. 7 in 1978, and citations per case to legal treatises grew from 0.5 in 1940 to 2.1 in 1978. 30 While the average number of citations to secondary sourceswas 7.14 per case in 1978, there were ten cases with more than 20 citations and one case 31 with no fewer than 50 such citations. Even more citations may be found in Smith v. Wade, decided by the Supreme Court in 1983. 32 In this case the main issue was that of the proper standard for an award of punitive damages under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now 42 V .S.C. § 1983). This issue was discussed in both the majority opinion by Justice Brennan and in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion by way of amassing and analyzing many dozens of court decisions and textbook sources of the late nineteenth century on several pages of footnotes that Iook like the scholarly work of a professional legal historian. Justice O'Connor, in dissent, took a dim view of this approach: Both opinions engage in exhaustive, but ultimately unilluminating, exegesis of the common law ofthe availability ofpunitive damages in 1871. Although both the Court and Justice Rehnquist displayadmirable skills in legal research and analysis of great numbers ofmusty cases, the results do not significantly further the goal of the enquiry . . . . The battle of string citations can have no winner. 33
Judge Rubin has also expressed some doubts as to whether it is desirable for a judge in his judicial opinion to don the gown of the scholar: Let me mention one other time-consuming task of judges that appears to me to be an obsessive preoccupation. It is our concern, particularly at the appellate Ievel, with trying to write the kind of opinion that we think law school teachers will consider scholarly. Americanjudicial opinions surpass in verbiage, in length andin citations those written anywhere eise in the world. Every judge should be required to give his reasons for a decision, and these reasons should be sufficient not only to explain the result to the Daniels (supra n. 6). Id. at 4-6. 31 Parharn v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). This was a case dealing with the constitutionality of the requirements under state law for commitment of rninors to state mental hospitals. Accordingly, many ofthe Supreme Court's secondary source citations are to non-legal sources, such as articles and treatises written for a non-legal audience by psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and sociologists. The use of social science material by American courts, particularly by the U .S. Supreme Court, has been the subject of a great deal of scrutiny and criticism in recent years. For detailed references see the articles by various authors in: School Desegregation, Lessons of the First Twenty-Five Years: Law & Contemp. Probs. 42 (1978) no. 4. 3 2 461 u.s. 30 (1983). 33 Id. at 93-94. 29
30
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litigants but also to enable other litigants to comprehend its precedential value and the Iimits to its authority. It would suffice to do this if we adopted a standard style of opinion, ifwe did not strive to cite authority for elementary propositions and ifwe did not try to emulate law review articles or impress our colleagues and the bar by our scholarship. Occasionally each of us may render a decision, perhaps in a highly significant case, that demands exposition ofthe full palette of our talents, but I fear that much of our time and the time of our clerks is spent merely in seeking felicitous expression, adding citations and attempting to produce works of art. 34
V. Legal Scholarship in German Courts I wonder what Judge Rubin would have said had he been familiar with German appellate judgments. In terms of the number of citations per case to "secondary authority," they probably hold a leading position in the world. Reactions by foreign lawyers have vacillated between amazement, envy, and amusement. Thus, in their Introduction au droit allemand, Professors Fromont and Rieg wrote that: L'influence de Ia doctrine sur Ia jurisprudence est particulil~rement apparente en Allemagne. On sait que !es jugements et arrets se presentent sous une forme qui, en France, serait qualifiee de 'dissertation'. Or, Ia plupart des decisions depuis celles des juges de premiere instance jusqu'ä celles des diverses Cours federales, comportent des references doctrinales a l'appui de leur argumentation ... on constate ainsi une profonde penetration de la doctrine dans Ia jurisprudence, qui laisse songeur tout juriste fran~ais. 35
Choosing at random volume 95 of Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen, with 41 judgments rendered in 1985, I found 533 citations to "secondary authority," that is, 13 such citations per case. There were on an average 6.2 citations percase to what is called "commentaries," 36 3.5 citations to law review articles, 2.5 citations to legal treatises, 0.4 citations to case notes, and 0.4 citations to other secondary material. lt admits of no doubt that doctrinal writing has a considerable influence on the decisions of German judges, but its precise nature and extent are hard to estimate. Many secondary source citations in the German cases are not 34 Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts, The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency: Notre Dame Law. 55 (1980) 648-659 (655). 35 Michel Fromont I Alfred Rieg, Introduction au droit allemand, Les fondements I (1977) 208. See also B.S. Markesinis (supra n. 1) 352f. 36 "Commentaries" appear to be a type of legal Iiterature found only in Germanspeaking countries. A "commentary" of a given statute (e.g., the Federal Constitution, the Civil Code, or the Act against Unfair Competition) follows the structure ofthe enactment by stating for each article or section the court decisions, legal writing, and other materials that are relevant to a proper interpretation of what the article or section says. Some commentaries will also discuss the cases and draw from them a body of coherent doctrine. They vary considerably in length, depth, and originality.
13 Merryman Festschrift
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authoritative in purpose, that is, their primary function is not to justify, or to give additional persuasive effect to, a given assertion of law. Sometimes the citation refers to a book or article that discusses a question the court raised, but explicitly refused to solve in any way. Sometimes the reference is made only to show the position of an identified person, and not put forth that position as correct or approved. Sometimes citations merely serve as a convenient guide to the further education of an interested reader by indicating where certain data, particularly further cases, can be found without implying that the data are conclusive or the consequences tobe derived from them are accurate. Sometimes the citation is used as a shorthand reference to the state of the settled law from which the court then proceeds. Citing primary authority, while possible, may in this situationberather tedious. However, citing a treatise or a commentary is not only quicker and easier, but may also show the settled law in a richer and fuller perspective. On the other hand, there are many secondary source citations whose purpose is not simply to educate a reader, to save the court the trouble of referring to primary authority, or merely to "pad" the judgment by having a law clerk, in support of a fairly evident proposition, unearth all the authors who take the same view. The court may wish to demoostrate that its position, while controversial, is shared by a majority of the writers or by those with a special reputation in the relevant field. The court may go a step further by stating and discussing specific arguments advanced by a certain author for or against a rule laid down in an earlier case or urged upon the court by a party to the Iitigation. lt is not at allrare that the courtwill in this way acknowledge the extent to which it feels indebted to ideas and arguments oflegal writers regardless ofwhether the arguments are finally accepted or not. lt would not be difficult to point out a number of judgments of the Federal Supreme Court in which secondary authority has significantly enriched the Court's discussion of a particular point or has directly influenced its holding. Nor would it be difficult to cite a few cases in which the Court, in the present writer's view, instead of getting entangled in doctrinal niceties, should have had the courage to follow its own views of the matter. What is lacking is a more systematic attempt to evaluate the contribution made by legal writers to the development ofthe law in a given field. One possible approach would be to select a number of leading cases in, say, the field of tort law, to analyze the secondary authority cited in support ofthe court's central holding in each case, and then to speculate on the role the cited authors have had in persuading the court to adopt it.
VI. The Need for Further Research This account seeks to stimulate further research, not to replace it. A thorough cross-national analysis of citation practices would require not only more reliable statistical data on the citation frequency of courts in civillaw jurisdictions, but
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also a more systematic attempt to demonstrate the extent to which the judicial development of case law in a given field has in fact been influenced by acadernic writing. 37 A great number of factors would have to be taken into consideration to explain national differences. One factor is certainly the social prestige of legal academics and their role in legal education. But another factor is the availability and quality of acadernic writing in general. If Englishjudges foilowed the "better read when dead" rule for so long, one reason may be that they could easily afford to do so since the legal treatises published until weil into the nineteenth century were written in the beliefthat what an author said mattered only to the extent to which it was supported by judicial authority. Oxford and Cambridge did not teach the common law until after William Blackstone's lectures on English law at Oxford in 1753, and books by academic writers ofthe caliber ofPoilock and Anson were not available before the 1870s. History plays a part, but there may also be a number of technical and organizational constraints that contribute to a better understanding of a given citation practice. U ndoubtedly, the total absence of citations in the judgments of the French Cour de cassation is rooted in historical tradition. But one must not forget that today the Court's 90 judges produce approximately 17,000 decisions per year and must therefore have perfectly good reasons not to lengthen their opinions by making fuil disclosure of ail relevant material. Appeilate courts both in the United States and in Germany now use more citations to "secondary authority" than a few decades ago. This may weil be attributable not (or not only) to a shift injudicial philosophy, or to a greater amount or better quality of academic writing, but to the fact that appeilate judges are now able to rely on weil-trained law clerks and weil-stocked court libraries. One wonders also whether some influence on citation practices may not be exercised by the accepted tradition ofthe common law to require counsel to ascertain the law and to inform the courtabout it by argument, while the civillaw, under the maxim iura novit curia, basicaily leaves it to the judge- without exception a universitytrained man or woman - to identify the applicable legal rules. Above ail, citation practices may be influenced by widely held beliefs on the nature ofthelegal process. Where positivism reigns and judges think that the law can be deduced from existing statutes or precedents, acadernic speculation on the interests and policies involved will be in lesser demand than where lawyers feel that legal rules must stand the test of functional adequacy in terms of contemporary values.
37 But see Professor Atiyah's study of the role played by academic writing on legal theory and political economy in shaping English twentieth century contract and tort law. Atiyah (supra n. 15) 165-180. He is of course interested in a more general kind of academic influence not likely to be revealed by the more pedestrian approach suggested here of evaluating citation practices.
13*
Latvia's 1937 Civil Code: A Quest for Coltoral Identity Dietrich Andre Loeber* January 28, 1987 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the promulgation of Latvia's 1937 Civil Code. 1 This Code was an important event in the life of the country. However, in Latvia, which was an independent state from 1918 to 1940, the Civil Code was fated to remain in force for only three years. 2 Forthis reason the Code has not attracted the attention that it deserves, which is unfortunate since it was one of the major European codifications in the twentieth century. In neighboring Baltic countries, as it turned out, the period of national independence was too short for civillaw reformtobe accomplished. Preparatory work was well advanced, but it was not possible to finish the projects. In Lithuania, which had been divided into four civillaw systems, work had been
* Professor ofLaw, University ofKiel; Director, Institute for the Study ofthe Law of Socialist Countries (University of Kiel). An earlier version of this article, in Latvian, appeared in Universitas (New York) 59 (1987) 42-46. I have arranged for reprints ofthe 1937 Latvian Civil Code (published by the Latvian Ministry of Justice in 1937), in Latvian and in German translation, on the occasion of the Code's fiftieth anniversary. Literature cited in abbreviated form: Es vinu pazistu, Latviesu biografiska vardnica (Riga 1939) (cited: Es vinu pazistu); Latvijas Universitate 1919-1939 II (Riga 1939) (cited: LU II); Tieslietu ministrijas un tiesu vesture 1918-1938 (Riga 1939) (cited: TM vesture); Karlis Ducmanis, No saskalditas pagatnes uz vienotu tagadni Latvijas civillikumos: TMV 19 (1938) 1-29; Osvalds Ozolins, Civiltiesibu reforma Latvija, in: Darbam un tiesibam (Riga 1939) 145 -167; Arveds Svabe, Jaunais civillikums latvju tiesibu vestures gaisma, TMV 18 (1937) 326-337; Karlis Ulmanis, Jauna Civillikuma valstiska un nacionala nozime, TMV 19 (1938) 301-308. Additional abbreviations: LE = Latvju enciklopedija (Stockholm); LJR = Latviesu juristu raksti; LKV = Latviesu konverzacijas vardnica (Riga); TMV = Tieslietu ministrijas vestnesis (Journal of the Ministry of Justice, Riga). 1 Valdibas vestnesis (1937) 41-47; Likumu krajums (1937) 29; Latvijas Civillikums (Riga, Codification Department ofthe Ministry of Justice, 1937). For pre-1940 Iiterature on the 1937 Civil Code, published in Latvian, see two books with the same title: Jauna Civillikuma apskats (Riga 1937 and Daugavpils 1937), both published in two editions. See also Prezidenta Ulmana Civillikums (Riga 1938); Raksti par Prezidenta K. Ulmana civillikumu (Riga 1939); and many articles in TMV, Jurists, and other legaljournals. For Iiterature in other languages, seeinfra n. 36. F or postwar Iiterature in Latvian, seeinfra n. 37. 2 The 1937 Civil Code of Czechoslovakia met a similar fate.
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underway on a new civil code since 1928. 3 In Estonia, a proposed civil code had already been submitted to parliament, when, in 1940, the Soviet ultimaturn changed the government and destroyed all plans for reform. 4
I. Significance of the Latvian Civil Code The 1937 Civil Code ofLatvia is significant for a number ofreasons. First, the Code brought Latvia a unified legal system. At the time when independence was won in 1918, Latvia was territorially divided into two legal systems. In Vidzeme, Zemgale, and Kurzeme, on the one hand, a collection oflocallaws, the Law of the Baltic Provinces (Provinzialrecht der Ostsee-Gouvernements), codified in 1864, was in force, along with the peasant laws of Vidzeme (Livonia) and Kurzeme (Courland). In Latgale, on the other hand, which was not part of the "Baltic Provinces," the Collected Laws of Russia (Svod zakonov) applied, while peasants were subject to the Russian Peasant Statutes. 5 When the new Civil Code came into force, the last barrier separating Latgale from the rest of Latvia was removed. Latgale melted, in the words ofLatvia's President Kadis Ulmanis, into "one legal union." 6 Second, the 1937 Civil Code removed certain territorial peculiarities. The previous civillaws formed part 3 of the Law of the Baltic Provinces, which was an amalgam of different types of legal rules. In addition to generallaws that governed Vidzeme, Zemgale, and Kurzeme, there were also laws that applied only to particular areas or classes of inhabitants of these territories. The determining factor was not just geography, but also social status, for example, whether a person was a peasant, a resident of an urban area, a clergyman, or a member ofthe nobility. Thus, an individual was subject to the rule of either the rural or the city laws ofVidzeme, the rural or the city laws of Kurzeme, the rural laws of Piltene, or - in the case of peasants - the peasant laws of Vidzeme or Kurzeme. 7 Distinguishing people by their social class had been abolished with independence in 1918, but these territorial peculiarities continued until 1938. 8 Third, the Civil Code succeeded in avoiding the casuistry prevalent under the old law. It was possible to reduce the number of articles from 4636 to 2400. The Codemade civillaw simpler, more understandable, and easier to apply. 9 3 Rackauskas, Teise (1936) 36, translated into German in Zeitschrift für osteuropäisches Recht 3 (1936/37) 719f. 4 V. Nöges, Oigus 21 (1940) 127-128, cited by Henn-Jüri Uibopuu, in: Sowjetsystem und Ostrecht, Festschrift für Boris Meissner (Berlin 1985) 407. With regard to the 1936 civil code project in Estonia, see Hermann von Nottbeck, Zeitschrift für osteuropäisches Recht 4 (1937 138) 269-282. 5 9 Svod zakonov, addendum. 6 Ulmanis 305. 7 Ducmanis 7; Ozolins 147. 8 Svabe 331.
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Fourth, the new codification developed legal terminology and structured civil law in a characteristically Latvian way. This was an important accomplishment, because until then the applicable civil statutes had not even been officially translated into Latvian. Rather an unofficial Latvian translation ofpart 3 ofthe Law ofthe Baltic Provinces (the Local Civil Laws), put together by Aleksandrs Bumanis, Herberts Elerss, and Janis Lauva, was published in 1935. Before that Bumanis and Lauva had made a translation in 1928. The very first translation was done by Juris Matecis in 1885. 10 Finally, the Code meant modernization, for it adapted the civillaw system to contemporary requirements. The Law of the Baltic Provinces had become antiquated - one could even say that it was already out of date when the Emperor of Russia confirmed it in 1864. The collection did not create new law, but merely amalgamated and systematized various sources then in force. This can be seen in the text itself: the applicable legal sources are cited at the bottom of each article.U
II. The Civil Code as a Reform Act In creating a new civil code it was necessary to give up the idea of resurrecting Latvian, Couronian, and Livonian customary laws. These customs were not documented. Only fragments of the Baltic legal civilization had been preserved in the language and folklore ofthe people. 12 Thus, the authors ofthe Civil Code had to decide between adopting a foreign legal code or undertaking areform of the existing civillaw. The formeravenuewas abandoned, for there was only one codification suitable for reception: the Civil Code of Switzerland. Butthat Code for the most part is based on Germanie civillaw, while the civillaw in Latvian territory had been thoroughly Romanized. About seventy percent of Baltic civil law was connected with Roman law. 13 Therefore, it was decided to take the reform route. 14 Formally, the Civil Code of 1937 is a new creation. In fact, it retains an organic link with the collection of locallaws that were used as the basis for the reform work. 15 The Civil Code has four sections: family law, inheritance law, property law, and contract law. There is no general part in the German style, but the Code is preceded by an introduction. 9
Ulmanis 307.
° Karfis Ducmanis,
Par Latvijas Civillikuma valodu, terminologiju un sistematiku, TMV 17 (1936) 98-156 (99f.) 11 Ducmanis 4- 5; Ozolins 147; Svabe 329. 12 Svabe 327f. 13 Id. at 328, 335; Ducmanis 4. 14 Ulmanis 303. 15 Ozolins 145, 148; Svabe 329. 1
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The Code's first section sets out rules that determine relations between married people and between parents and children. The remaining sections then treat inheritance and property rights, legal relations between citizens, and employment relations. No other legal subject so closely affects the daily affairs of people as does civillaw. The Civil Code forms the setting of life, it is life itself. 16 With regard to family law, the codal reform releases women from beingunder their husbands' legal guardianship. However, a husband's overriding rights in regulating farnily affairs are upheld. The law of divorce is liberal. Among grounds for terrnination of a marriage is mutual agreement or three years of separation. Divorce is also perrnitted ifmaritallife is "destroyed," regardless of spousal fault. 17 A marriage breakup for objective reasons (Zerrüttungsprinzip) is thus recognized as sufficient. This novel solution antedates comparable developments in postwar codifications by many years. In regulating property relations between spouses, the Code decides in favor of a joint property system. 18 The Code's introduction has 25 articles, the majority of which are conflict rules that determine the applicability of domestic or foreign law. Latvian law in these matters proceeds from the principle of dornicile, holding that it is the place of dornicile that determines the law tobe applied (Iex domicilii), and not the law of nationality (Iex patriae). 19 The sources oflaw, according to the introduction, are statutes and customs but not judicial practice. 20 Article 1 ofthe Civil Code reads: "Rights aretobe exercised and duties are to be fulfilled in good faith." Putting this principle in the forefront, the Code holds that it is good faith that should underlie any legal system, facilitating honesty and cooperation in human relations. 21
111. History of Drafting the Civil Code Soon after Latvia gained independence in 1918 it became apparent that a new codification of the civil law was required that would be suitable to the circumstances of the times. In 1920 Minister of Justice Rudolfs Benuss invited Professor Vladirnirs Bukovskis to form a commission to draft a civil code. The commission accomplished much of the prelirninary work for such a code, and this served as the basis for various laws and amendments made in the field of civil law in the first 15 years of the life of the country. 16
17 18 19 20 21
Ducmanis 6; Ulmanis 302.
Art. 76.
Ozolins 149- 151. ld. at 163f. ld. at 165. ld. at 166f.
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In 1933 Minister of Justice Antons Ozols founded another commission, which in three years succeeded in creating the new Code. The commission consisted of the following members: Vladimirs Bukovskis, chairman (who died during independence); 22 Rudolfs Alksnis, supreme courtjustice (who diedas an emigre in the United States); 23 Aleksandrs Bumanis, president of the district court of Riga (who died during independence); 24 Voldemars Davids, legal counsel to the Ministry of Justice (who died as an emigre in the United States); 25 Herberts Elerss (Ehlers), head of the Ministry of Justice Codification Department (who diedas an emigre in West Germany); 26 Juris Kemans, attomey (who died during independence); 27 Augusts Lebers (Loeber), supreme court justice (who diedas an emigre in West Germany); 28 Karlis Ozolins, supreme courtjustice (who died during independence); 29 Osvalds Ozolins, supreme court justice (who diedas a deportee in Siberia); 30 Teodors Zvejnieks, head ofthe civil department, Court of Appeals (who diedas an emigre in Sweden). 31 Consultants to the commission on special questions were: Karlis Ducmanis, supreme court justice (who died as a deportee in Siberia)32 and Arveds Svabe, professor of history (who died as an emigre in Sweden). 33 22 Vladimirs Bukovskis (Bukovskii) (1867 -1937), lecturer at the University of Latvia (from 1922), professor (from 1932), and supreme courtjustice (from 1934). See LKV li (1928/29) 3231; TMV 18 (1937) 927-931; Jurists (1937) 113; Zakon i sud (1937) 3666; Latvijas Universitate 1919-1929 (Riga 1929) (cited: LU, 1929 ed.) 549f.; Es vinu pazistu; LU li 524f.; TM vesture 43-46, 70-72, 205; LJR 12 (1973) 22. 23 Rudolfs Alksnis (1888-1961), supreme court justice (1931-1940). See Es vinu pazistu; TM vesture 44, 70, 204; LJR 6 (1961) 28f. 24 Aleksandrs Bumanis (1881-1937), lecturer at the University of Latvia (from 1921) and professor (from 1934). See LKV II (1928/29) 3261f.; LU, 1929 ed. (supra n. 22) 551; TMV 18 (1937) 918 -926; Jurists (1937) 114-116; Es vinu pazistu; LU Il 525f.; TM vesture 44-46, 58, 71, 73f., 251f., 254-257; LEI (1950/51) 364. 25 Voldemars Davids (1900-1954). See Es vinu pazistu; TM vesture 40, 45, 56-58, 70, 72f., LEI 1950/51) 469; LJR 7/8 (1963) 92. 26 Herberts Elerss (Ehlers) (1882-1960). See TM vesture 42, 44, 71; Es vinu pazistu; cf. Album Livonorum (Lübeck 1972) 475, no. 1321. 27 Juris Kernans (1883 -1937). See TM vesture 44f., 71, 223; TMV 18 (1937) 931-937; Jurists (1937) 114; Es vinu pazistu; LE li (1952/ 53) 1186. 28 Augusts Lebers (Loeber) (1865 -1948), supreme court justice (1918 -1938), lecturer at the University of Latvia (1919-1930), professor (1930-1935). See LU, 1929 ed. (supra n. 22) 23, 558; LKV XII (1935) 22702- 22704; TMV 16 (1935) 782f.; Es vinu pazistu; LU li 529f.; TM vesture 44, 70, 192f., 195; Tiesibnieks 4 (1948) 70f.; LJR 12 (1973) 7f., 16, 18f.; Deutsch-Baltisches Biographisches Lexikon (Cologne 1970) 466; Latvju enciklopedija 1962-1982 li (Rockville, Maryland 1985) 461f. 29 Karlis Ozolins (1866-1933), supreme courtjustice (from 1919). See Es vinu pazistu; TM vesture 44, 199; LE li (1952/ 53) 1816. 30 Osvalds Ozolins (bom 1888, died as deportee in the 1950s), supreme court justice (1930-1940). See Es vinu pazistu; TM vesture 44, 58, 70f., 74, 204; LE li (1952/ 53) 1817; LJR 1 (1959) 41. 31 Teodors Zvejnieks (1884-1954). See Es vinu pazistu; TM vesture 44f., 58, 70, 72-74, 81,234, 236; LE III (1953/55) 2405; LJR 1 (1959) 37-40.
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This survey shows that none of the authors of the Civil Code, who were alive at the time of the incorporation of Latvia into the USSR in 1940, were able to live out their days in their home country. Commission meetings took place under the guidance of Minister of Justice Herrnanis Apsits (who diedas adeporteein Siberia). 34 The commission held 126 plenary sessions between 1933 and 1936. 35 The "Small Cabinet of Ministers" considered the Civil Code project in 40 of its meetings. Since the parliament, called Saeima, had been dissolved in 1934, the cabinet approved the Civil Code of Latvia on January 28, 1937 and determined that it would go into force on January 1, 1938. In connection with the new Civil Code, the cabinet in 1937 also approved amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure and to the Law on Notaries Public, and enacted a new Law on Authors' Rights.
IV. The Civil Code of Latvia Today Soon after Latvia's incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940, the Supreme Soviet in Moscow decreed that in the future the 1922 Civil Code ofthe Russian Federative Socialist Soviet Republic wastobe applied in Latvia. This Code was replaced 24 years later by the Civil Code of the Latvian Soviet Republic of 1964, which remains in force today. However, countries that do not recognize the Soviet incorporation of Latvia hold that under intemationallaw the 1937 Civil Code of Latvia is still in force and applicable. The United States, Canada, Australia, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic ofGermany are among these countries. The Civil Code should also have a place in the field of legal science. Comparative law specialists and legal historians outside of Latvia, however, have given little attention to the Civil Code. While some valuable articles in languages other than Latvian appeared shortly after the Civil Code's promulgation, 36 this codification has been almost totally ignored in the postwar 32 Karlis Ducmanis (1881-1943), diplomat, supreme court justice (1936-1940). See LKV III (1928/29) 6003-6005; Es vinu pazistu; TM vesture 58, 70, 207; LEI (1950/51) 520- 529; LJR 12 (1973) 23. 33 Arveds Svabe (1888-1959), Jecturer at the University of Latvia (from 1929), professor (1931-1940). See LU II 77 -81; TM vesture 58, 63, 70, 73; Es vinu pazistu; LKV XXI (1940) 41947-41951; LE III (1953/55) 2405; LJR 2 (1959) 39. 34 Herrnanis Apsits (bom 1893, diedas deportee), minister of justice (1934-1940). See TM vesture 57f., 73, 233; Es vinu pazistu; LEI (1950/51) 76. 3s TM vesture 43f., 58. 36 The authors writing on the Civil Code in other Janguages were for the most part Baltic-German or Baltic-Russian jurists. E.g., Benno Berent, an attomey in Riga and a former minister ofjustice, published articles on the 1937 Civil Code in Nouvelle revue de droit international prive 5 (1938) 493-511, in the Polish periodical Palestra (1939) 190198, and on influences of the Swiss Civil Code on the Latvian codification in Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 35 (1938/39) 311-313. Boris Baron Noltie wrote in the
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periodY Moreover, rarely is the Civil Code mentioned even in citations. The German Professor Franz Wieacker, in his textbook on the history of civillaw in Europe, devotes only four lines to the Civil Code of Latvia. 38 In postwar Latvia the Civil Code has been classified as a codification of capitalist private law, representing "class interests." 39 F or legal historians, the Code offers a special object of research, for Baltic civil law (together with the Greek Civil Code of 1946) are the last legal systems in Europe to be based on Roman law. This characteristic, as pointed out by Supreme Court Justice Osvalds Ozolins, brought the Baltic civillaw close tothat of Western Europe ..w Sociologists and political scientists would also find the Latvian Civil Code of value as a rich and untapped research source. By prohibiting the operation of enterprises endangering human health (article 1087), the Code deserves attention as an early example of environmentallegislation. Not only those who have a command of Latvian can make use of the Code, because in 1937 the Latvian Ministry of Justice issued a translation into German of the new Civil Code. 41 In a wider perspective, the 1937 Civil Code raises a question of the role of codification for nation-building and for the protection of national identity. Historically, the Law of the Baltic Provinces "protected our country from melting into the Slavic sea to the east." Supreme Court Justice Karlis Ducmanis Bulletin trimestriel de Ia socii:te de legislation comparee 67 (1938) 402-415. Kar/ von Schilling, a member of the court of Appeals in Riga, contributed to the Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 11 (1937) 484-527 and Zeitschrift für osteuropäisches Recht 4 (1937 /38) 219-240. A monograph on the Civil Code, published by the Herder Institute in Riga, Lettlands Zivilgesetzbuch in Einzeldarstellungen (Riga 1938, 2 vols. in 3 pts.), was repeatedly reviewed in Germany. 37 One exception is Alfred Bilmanis, Law and Courts in Latvia (Washington D.C. 1946) 42-47 (Bilmanis was Envoy Extraordinary of Latvia to the USA, 1935-1948). On marriage law in the Civil Code, see Karlis Vanags, Das Familienrecht Lettlands (Halle/Westfalen 1947) 4, 7, 11-22. For postwar Iiterature in Latvian on the 1937 Civil Codesee Karfis Vanags, Tevzeme no. 8 (25 Jan. 1947) 1; LJR 10/11 (1970) 42-47; D. Loebers, Civillikuma 15 gadi, Latvju zumals (New York) 6 (1952) 1f.; Adolfs Silde, Latvijas vesture 1914-1940 (Stockholm 1976) 620-623, 633f.; id., Pirma Republika (Brooklyn, N.Y. 1982) 280; Vasilijs Sinaiskis, Universitas (New York) 60 (1987) 10-12 (reprinted from Prezidenta Ulmana Civillikums, Riga 1938). For prewar Iiterature see supra n. 1; on reprints of the 1937 Civil Codesee supra n. *. 38 Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung (Göttingen 2d ed. 1967) 504. See Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neuereneuropäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, ed. by Helmut Coing III (Munich 1982) 2086, 2092, 2095 (does not cover codifications of the twentieth century and, consequently, mentions the 1937 Civil Code of Latvia only in passing). 39 Otto Grinbergs, in: R. Apsitis/ L. Birzinaf 0. Grinbergs, Latvijas PSR valsts un tiesibu vesture (Riga 1970) 79. 40 Ozo/ins 148. 41 Lettlands Zivilgesetzbuch vom 28. Januar 1937 (Riga, Ministry of Justice, 1937).
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voiced this idea on the occasion of the Latvian Civil Code's promulgation 50 years ago. Local Baltic laws had an autonomous character, clearly distinct from overall Russian law. This factor, wrote Ducmanis, "helped in protecting us from becoming part of the vast, amorphous mass to the east and southeast." But since the Baltic local laws were a "a code of privilege and of social and national inequality," this protection exacted a "harsh price," which was paid by the Latvian peasant. This was a "peculiar burden," which Latvian peasants "carried for the benefit of the future state of Latvia long before this state came into being." Ducmanis advanced the following reasoning: "If the entire country of the Latvians had had the fate of Latgale," where the overalllaws of Russia were in force, "then the birth of the state of Latvia would have been much more difficult, perhaps even impossible, just as the efforts to form an independent state have failed, for example, in the case of the Ukraine which was Russified and Polonized." 42 In 1940, two years after publication ofhis paper, Ducmanis was deported by the Soviet authorities. He died in the vast plains of the East. However, his provocative thesis - fifty years after it first appeared - has acquired burning topicality today. The movement for national rebirth in Estonia and Latvia is in search of and indeed finds the basis for regional identity in spiritual values inherited from the West (through the Reformation and the Enlightenment, for instance). lfthese values were not lost in the 200 years that Baltic provinces were part of the Empire of Russia, this is due, in no small measure, to the status of "autonomy" enjoyed by the Baltic provinces. One of its pillars was the autonomy of locallaw. The idea of autonomy is now again a central issue in the struggle for the future ofthe Baltic states. The historical context is obvious. An important step toward achieving regional identity was the codification of civillaw in Latvia in 1937.
42 Ducmanis 3. For the Baltic feudal order's effect on the preservation of the cultural identity ofthe Baltic people, see, e.g., M aksim M. Duhanovs, Baltijas muiznieciba laikmetu maina (Riga 1986) 55; Jürgen von Hehn, Zur Entwicklung der nationalen Verhältnisse in den Baltischen Sowjetrepubliken (Göttingen 1975) 5; Georg von Rauch, The Baltic States (London 1974) 2; Alexander von Tobien, Die Livländische Ritterschaft in ihrem Verhältnis zum Zarismus II (Berlin 1930) 165; Oscar Baron Buxhoeveden, Nachrichtenblatt der Baltischen Ritterscharten 20 (1978) 211; Michael Haltzel, in: Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton 1981) 180; Jürgen von Hehn, Nachrichtenblatt der Baltischen Ritterscharten 19 (1977) 37 (summary).
Socialism and the Rule of Law: Some Speculations and Predictions lnga Markovits* Right under our eyes, the legal and political landscape of Eastern Europe seems tobe changing. With each day, socialist governments are becorning more open; courts more self-confident; citizens bolder in the pursuit oftheir rights. No doubt, Mikhail Gorbachev's reform programs in the Soviet Union have much to do with these changes. But Polish law reform preceded Gorbachev's rise to power in March 1985, and even Soviet developments, however rniraculous now, echo and build upon earlier attempts to transform Russian society with the help oflaw. 1 Whatever their causes, events of the last few years defy our conventional understanding of socialism and socialist law. Up to now, we have been used to seeing socialist governments treat their subjects as people with needs rather than rights. Sodalist law, accordingly, had the task of protecting collective well-being rather than private autonomy. Unlike his capitalist cousin, socialist legal man was not seen as bent on maxirnizing his personal interests but instead was expected to merge his efforts with those of the collective, and thus, as in a family setting, serve his own good by advancing the good of society. In everyday socialist life, this wishful equation of individual and societal welfare had always been put into question by the selfserving behavior of socialist citizens and bureaucrats. But now, even the state seems no Ionger to cling to the fiction. Socialist governments have begun to adrnit that individual interests may not only be different from, but even run
* Copyright 1989 Inga Markovits, Morris and Rita Atlas Family Centennial Professor of Law, The University of Texas. Literature cited in abbreviated form: Klaus-fürgen Kuss, Die Rechtsprechung des polnischen Hauptverwaltungsgerichts, Eine Bilanz nach sechs Jahren: Osteuropa-Recht 33 (1987) 202-213 (cited: Kuss, Die Rechtsprechung); id., Verwaltungsrechtsschutz in Südosteuropa: Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 113 (1986) 414-439 (cited: Kuss, Verwaltungsrechtsschutz); id., Gerichtsverfahren zwischen Behörden und Bürgern in der Sowjetunion: Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 111 (1984) 128-161 (cited: Kuss, Gerichtsverfahren); lohn Quigley, The New Soviet Law on Appeals, Glasnost in the Soviet Courts: Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 37 (1988) 172-177. Additional abbreviations: JbOstR = Jahrbuch für Ostrecht; OER = Osteuropa-Recht; ROW = Recht in Ost und West; Statistisches Jahrbuch BRD = Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1986 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1986); StuR = Staat und Recht. 1 See Harold J. Berman, Gorbachev's Law Reforms in Historical Perspective: Emory J. Int'l Aff. 5 (1988) 1-10.
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counter to, the interests of society. Socialist citizens, encouraged by the Moscow Spring, have begun to act like people who believe they have rights: stage political demonstrations, 2 ask for uncensored newspapers, 3 form their own independent publishing companies, 4 and engage in many other manifestations of personal autonomy too numerous to keep count of.
I. Socialist Administrative Legality: Past and Present The new spirit of reform had to affect the area of law that deals with the citizen's protection against the executive. In the past, doctrines of the unity of power and of the necessary harmony of individual and societal interests under socialism provided convenient excuses for not allowing a socialist citizen to sue the govemment: if the branches of govemment were united under the purposeful leadership of the Party, courts had no business to function as supervisory tribunals; if individual and societal interests were inevitably aligned, there was no need for procedures to protect a socialist citizen against his administration. Accordingly, socialist countries never were very interested in providing for the judicial control of their bureaucracies. Some, like Rumania and Bulgaria, put laws on their books that ostensibly offered a citizen far-reaching rights to challenge administrative decisions in court. But these provisions were riddled with exceptions and, for all we know, rarely applied. 5 Others, like the Soviet Union or Hungary, granted citizens standing to sue the administration in a limited number of cases. But these cases were haphazardly chosen, often of no practical significance, and again, the chance to sue the state was rarely exploited in practice. 6 And some countries, like East Germany and Czechoslovakia, outright rejectedjudicial review. 7 All socialist legal systems, whatever the status of their black-letter law, preferred instead to enforce administrative legality through state-controlled institutions and procedures: public monitoring agencies, investigating misuses of public authority at the state's own initiative, and intemal administrative review procedures.
2 See N.Y. Times, 16 Mar.1988, at2: "lO,OOOin Budapest, Chanting 'Democrary', Call for New Freedoms." 3 See N.Y. Times, 23 Feh. 1988, at 7: "Czech Joumalists Seek New Freedom." 4 See N.Y. Times, 3 Feh. 1988, at 7: "Soviet Cooperatives Ordered to Stay Out of Puhlishing World." 5 Peter Leonhardt, Der Verwaltungsrechtsschutz in Rumänien, mit vergleichenden Hinweisen auf Bulgarien: JhOstR 25, no. 1/2 (1984) 81-103. 6 Kuss, Gerichtsverfahren 128-161; id., Historische Grundlagen und Nachkriegsentwicklung des Verwaltungsrechtsschutzes in der Tschechoslowakei und in Ungarn: JhOstR 25, no. 1/2 (1984) 105-128. 7 lnga Markovits, Rechtsstaat oder Beschwerdestaat? Verwaltungsrechtsschutz in der DDR: ROW 31 (1987) 265-281; Kuss, Historische Grundlagen (supra n. 6) 105-128.
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Up to now, only Yugoslavia did not fit the socialist pattem. Since 1952, Yugoslav citizens have been able to go to court against most administrative decisions allegedly interfering with their rights and they have done so in respectable numbers. 8 But Yugoslavia, for our present purposes, does not count: its political and economic system makes room for so much diversity and conflict that law, as a facilitator and mediator ofthis conflict, plays a far greater role here than elsewhere in the socialist block. All other East European countries conformed to the conventional socialist model: emphasized public needs over private entitlements, collective discipline over individual autonomy, and granted citizens only very limited rights to challenge executive authority in court but virtually unlimited rights to complain within the executive process itself. But unlike judicial proceedings, socialist complaint procedures are without bite. A citizen's grievance will simply be examined by the office complained about and, if rejected, will be reviewed by the next higher agency. lf the petitioner is still dissatisfied with a decision, he can try another complaint. But unlike in court, he has no right to a hearing, no access to the record, no possibility to challenge the evidence, and either no right to a lawyer or little use for him, since the procedure offers no forum or formal structure that a lawyer could exploit to bis client's advantage. To make up for the absence of private enforcement mechanisms, socialist legal systems have used public monitoring agencies like the Procuracy or the Workers- Peasants Inspection to investigate violations of administrative legality on the state's own initiative. These agencies, again, are easily accessible to individual citizens (whose complaints are needed to inform the authorities of breaches ofthe law), but offer a complainant no means to compel a decision in his favor. In this scheme of things, the petitioner plays the role of informant, collaborator, and eventual beneficiary of any corrective measures, but not that of an autonomous, self-serving agent. By removing investigations into the misuse of public authority from private initiative and control, socialist legal systems wanted to make sure that societal interests were not compromised by the inertia or greed of a private plaintiff and that every investigation remained firmly in the hands of the state. Administrative justice, under this approach, appeared not as a matter of private importance but as a public concern, calling for a public solution. If pressured by Western criticism, socialist lawyers might admit that their system's weakness lay in the identity of investigator and investigated, and thus in the absence of neutral controls. But they would also attack the belligerence and spontaneity of our system of private litigation and claim that socialist methods of ensuring administrative legality, whatever their faults, were more rational, 8 Kuss, Verwaltungsrechtsschutz 414-439. In 1986, 30,455 administrative law suits were brought in Yugoslavia. Litigationrates have remained relatively constant throughout the years. See Statistical Yearbook ofYugoslavia 1987, at 411.
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more principled, and better attuned to societal needs than our capitalist recourse to courts. Now all this appears tobe changing. In 1980, Po land became the first socialist country to establish a separate administrative court system: its High Administrative Court in Warsaw with six branch offices throughout the country adjudicates citizen grievances against the executive on the basis of a generous statutory catalogue of justiciable issues, which covers most areas of contact between citizen and administration. 9 In 1981, Hungary considerably enlarged its very limited list (dating from 1957) of justiciable administrative decisions: a disappointment for those who had pushed for separate administrative courts and for standing to sue the administration as a matter of courserather than as an exception, but progress nevertheless. 10 Both Poland and Hungary have since expanded their judicial review systems to cover also the constitutionality of legislation: the Poles with their Constitutional Tribunal established in 1986, the Hungarians with their Council of Constitutional Law of 1983. 11 In 1987, after a decade of foot-dragging, the Soviet Union fulfilled the promise it had made in its 1977 constitution by passing a law on the judicial review of administrative decisions; like Yugoslavia providing access to court on the basis of a general clause, with some exceptions. 12 And in December 1988, against the predictions of Western experts, 13 East Germany passed astatute on judicial review. 14 Meanwhile, the trend toward more legal controls over socialist executives is gaining momentum. In Poland, the number of citizen suits against the administration is steadily rising, 15 and the High Administrative Court (HAC) 9
Kuss, Die Rechtsprechung 202-213.
° Kuss, Verwaltungsrechtsschutz 429.
1
11 Klaus-Jürgen Kuss, New Institutions in Socialist Constitutional Law, The Polish Constitutional Tribunaland the Hungarian Constitutional Council: Rev. Sodalist L. 12 (1986) 343-366. 12 Quigley 172-177. 13 See Markovits (supra n. 7). 14 Gesetz über die Zuständigkeit und das Verfahren der Gerichte zur Nachprüfung von Verwaltungsentscheidungen of 14 Dec. 1988, Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik I no. 28 of23 Dec. 1988 at 327. The new law provides for judicial review ofthose administrative decisions specifically listed by statute and is followed by an appendix enumerating ten instances of administrative decision-making that are now subject to judicial review. The Iist includes mostly administrative decisions affecting a citizen's material interests (compensation claims for government torts or nationalization ofland, decisions involving housing and building matters, and so on) but-going beyond demands raised in the East German literature!-also contains three instances of politically touchy issues: the permission to hold assemblies, the recognition (and its withdrawal) of citizens' clubs and organizations, and the registration and Supervision of citizens "in danger of becoming criminals," including the imposition of educational tasks. 15 Administrative law suits in Po land, since the inception of the HAC's operations on September 1, 1980, have numbered:
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has increased its personnel in the first five years of its existence from nine to 67 judges. 16 HAC judges are using their new powers with confidence and determination, 17 while the new Polish Constitutional Tribunal came out in favor ofthe plaintiffin all ofits first nine decisions. 18 In the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet amended its original statute on judicial review, less than four months after passing it, to also allow for appeals. 19 In the summer of 1988, finally, the Soviet Communist Party's 19th Party Conference produced such a ringing endorsement of legal controls over Party and administration that one might expect socialist judicial review to grow at an even faster pace in the future. Already, Soviet authors are suggesting that the USSR Supreme Court be given the right to review legislation, 20 and H ungary has announced a sweeping reform of its system of judicial controls. 21 What are we to make of all this? Are we witnessing the birth of the socialist Rechtsstaat: a new kind of socialist state in which law does not primarily serve to direct individual behavior towards the realization of societal goals, but in which it also steers and controls the exercise of political power? Can socialist law be transformed from a tool ofthe state into an individual weapon against the state? In this essay, I will speculate about the likelihood of such a development. It is a risky time to engage in such speculation: events move fast, maybe too fast, and many of the reformers' hopes may be outpacing reality. Moreover, I will not have much factual evidence upon which to base my conjectures: most East European legislation expanding judicial review is new and barely tested in practice; court statistics are meager; judicial decisions are often inaccessible; and empirical research is almost non-existent. Nevertheless, present developments in the socialist world seem too momentous to patiently wait with an evaluation until the dust has settled. Nor do we lack the means to at leastengagein some educated guesswork about the likely course of affairs. While we do not know much about the socialist use of courts to control administrative behavior, we do know something about the socialist legal process in general, which can inform 1980 927 7,200 1981 8,829 1982 9,582 1983 1984 11,413 13,170 1985 Statistical Yearbook of Poland (1981 to 1986). 16 Kuss, Die Rechtsprechung 203. 17 See Hubert Izdebski, La jurisprudence de Ia Haute Cour Administrative Polonaise: Revue internationale de droit compare 36 (1984) 471-502. 18 Kazimierz Dzialocha, Der Verfassungsgerichtshof und die Garantien der Bürgerrechte in Polen: OER 33 (1987) 247-257 (254). 19 Quigley 174. 20 See the reports Chronik der Rechtsentwicklung in den sozialistischen Staaten: ROW 32 (1988) 47, 83. 21 See generally infra n. 94. 14 Merryman Festschrift
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our speculations. And we know a Iot about our own attitudes toward judicial review. I will try to make use of both these sources of information. First, I will investigate whether Western attitudes toward judicial review allow any inferences about the likely development of judicial review under socialism. I will ask whether the ideological premises implied in our review system might not clash with a socialist's view of the individual's place in society. Looking at instances where we, too, have misgivings about the involvement of courts in administrative decision-making, I will examine the fact situations that give rise to our doubts and will ask whether socialists are likely to find themselves in similar situations and thus to share similar reservations. Approaching my topic from the opposite direction, I will then ask what we know about socialist governments, socialist judges, and socialist citizens that can help us predict the likely future of socialist judicial review procedures. Combining the results of both surveys, I will try to draw a composite picture of a possible socialist rule of law: part glance at the crystal ball, part reflection in our own mirror. Almost everything I have to say about my topic will thus be based on guesswork and speculation. But a volume in honor of someone who always has looked for the decisive lines, the significant connections, the whole, which is more than the sum of its black-letter parts, seems as appropriate a place for such speculations as I am likely to find.
II. Capitalist Administrative Legality: ldeological lmplications of Our System of Judicial Review I begin with the ideological assumptions underlying our own approach to judicial review. Some of these assumptions, while still reflected in our doctrine and case law, today are either disputed or under attack. Critics challenge the traditional premises of capitalist procedural thinking: deny that modern legal man is as isolated and self-sufficient as our rules of standing might make him appear, or- if they do not deny it- want to change the law to make room for more community-oriented forms of dispute resolution. Such capitalist selfreassessments may be found particularly in the areas of welfare law and with respect to public interest Iitigation, both in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in Western Europe. But it seems to me that enough of the unspoken premises of our system of judicial review still hold, which presumably would be at odds with a socialist understanding of the proper function of courts. A. The Protection of Private Ioterests
Our first and decisive Supposition, often honored in form more than in substance - that courts are meant for the defense of private not societal interests- is accepted by alllegal systems providing for the judicial examination of administrative decisions. All require the allegation of an individual injury-
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some personal stake, some private harm - before they allow a citizen to challenge the administration in court. Standing thus presupposes the violation of an individual interest close enough to a plaintiffs personal life-sphere to single him out from the rest of the citizenry. Some legal systems are more generous than others in finding such an injury to be sufficiently burdensome to an individual plaintiff to allow him to sue: while West German administrative law, for instance, requires violation of a specific individual right or statutorily protected interest, American law allows complaints based on moral or aesthetic injuries as long as they are allegedly suiTered by the plaintiff himself. Alllegal systems, however, agree that a plaintiff must be personally affected by the administrative decision he wants to challenge: citizens who want to air "generalized grievances about the conduct of government" 22 have no access to court. Public interests, then, find judicial protection only if they can be disguised as private concerns: if, for instance, an opponent of nuclear energy can claim that a building permit authorizing construction of a reactor poses a threat to his own personal safety. There are statutory exceptions to this rule: if legislatures are worried that some public interests are too weak, too diffuse, or too faintly linked to private advantage to find individual sponsors in court, they may grant standing to a wider circle of plaintiffs, as some environmental or consumer protection legislation has donein this country. 23 But unless a citizen, by statute, is thus elevated to the role of an advocate for the public, our system of judicial reviewwill acknowledge him only in the role of the egotist. Capitalist courts, if you believe their rules of procedure, protect the bourgeois, not the citoyen. B. The Individual against the State
Our law's focus on the citizen as egotist rather than altruist reflects a second premise of judicial review: the confrontation of individual and state. The plaintiff, pursuing hisprivate benefit (or at least pretending to do so) challenges the state, pursuing the general welfare (or pretending to do so). The court becomes an arena in which the individual takes on the administration. Opposition between them seems natural and inevitable; language is hostile and confrontational; and the rules of due process try to assure an equality of weapons between the combatants. Courts thus become a "battleground of competing interests," 24 and the judicial methods for resolving the conflict reflect our legal system's initial U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974). See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 ("any person may file a petition for judicial review"); Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (standing for "consumers and consumer organizations"). 24 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing: Yale L.J. 96 (1987) 943-1005 (946). 22
23
14*
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noncommitment in each new confrontation between individual and state. The demands of due process - taking into account the plaintiffs private interests, the risk oftheir erroneous deprivation, and the government interests involved 25 - imply that every administrative decision may be potentially wrong, that there are two sides to each policy issue, and that in a clash between individual and society the outcome is by no means determined in advance. The techniques of balancing imply a horizontal understanding of justice: citizen and state are posed in a bipolar relationship, both of potentially equal importance, with no a priori ranking of societal over individual welfare. If weinsist that the imposition of burdens on the individual may not be out of proportion to their intended societal gains, 26 we suggest that state interference with individual rights needs Speciallegitimation and is not a matter of course. Our system of judicial review thus rejects the notion of a permanent bond between individual and collective: societal demands on the individual are the exception, not the rule. The law builds fences around us; safeguards the areas "beyond the power of the state to control;" 27 protects our "right to be left in peace." 28 Capitalistjudicial review is premised on the isolation ofman, not on his connectedness with others. One can see how all these assumptions might trouble a socialist. He would object to the isolation of an individual plaintiff in the courtroom: pursuing only his own interests apart from those of society. He should dislike the privatization of public interests implicit in judicial review: the acceptance of bargaining between individual and state, and the fact that public concerns arenot addressed for their own worth, but only if, by chance, they find a private sponsor sufficiently affected to have standing. A socialist also could be expected to disapprove of the techniques of capitalist judicial review: the agnosticism implied in our balancing procedures, taking for granted the conflicts between equally legitimate values; our readiness to accomodate, to comprornise, to hand out "small truths." 29 "What about the 'big truth'," we would expect him to ask: society's historical move toward communism, to which each judicial decision should owe allegiance? As someone concerned about managing social progress, a socialist also would have to be suspicious of the unpredictability and uncontrollability of judicial decision-making: the indeterrninacy of judicial Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970): the state may not impose an "undue burden," which is "excessive in relation to ... the benefits" intended. For the similar West German principle of Verhältnismässigkeit (state-imposed burden may not be out of proportion to the social benefits intended), see Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 16 Mar. 1971, 30 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts[= BVerfGE) 292, 315 (1971). 27 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 28 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 1 July 1969, 27 BVerfGE 1, 6 (1970). 29 Aleinikoff (supra n. 24) 961. 25
26
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concepts, the "creative freedom" 30 balancing techniques accord individual judges, the difficulty, under such circumstances, of using law as a social and political tool. C. Blurring the Public /Private Distinction One could argue, as some have done, that my description of capitalist litigation as an essentially private affair is outdated: 31 that in view of environmental litigation, school desegregation suits, prisoner rights cases and the like, judicial challenges of administrative decision-making no Ionger appear as one-time, past-oriented, bipolar contests aiming for the vindication of personal rights but as openended, future-oriented, "polycentric" 32 attempts to affect public policy, with the judge in the role of active managerrather than passive adjudicator 33 and the plaintiffs socially conscious public advocates rather than seif-eentered representatives of private interests. This blurring of the public I private distinction, 34 in turn, might make administrative litigation more palatable to socialist jurists, who always have rejected the juxtaposition of state and society and thus the polarization of public and private spheres of activity. In fact, one might claim that the modern capitalist "activist state" - at least with respect to its mingling of public and private affairs - is not all that different from its socialist counterpart, that socialist judges all along have engaged in what might be called "public interest" adjudication, and that judicial procedures acceptable to us therefore no Ionger should be anathema to socialists. If our modern practices of judicial review really implied the collectivization of formerly private concerns, socialists should indeed not object to them: since Lenin's famous instruction at the drafting ofthe first Soviet Civil Code- "all law is public" 35 - socialist law has emphasized the public importance of private rights and has devised many substantive and procedural mechanisms for infusing public considerations into the adjudication of private disputes. 36 But Id. at 958. See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, in: Access to Justice, ed. by Mauro Cappelletti / John Weisner II (1979) 860: "The traditional view of civillitigation as a merely private affair is no Ionger acceptable." 32 Bruce Ackerman, Foreword, Law in an Activist State: Yale L.J. 92 (1982/83) 10831128 (1091). 33 Abram Chayes, The RoJe of the Judge in Public Law Litigation: Harv. L. Rev. 89 (1976) 1281. 34 See the symposium on the publiefprivate distinction in: U. Pa. L. Rev. 130 (1982) 1289-1609. 35 Cited by John Hazard, Communists and Their Law (1975) 77. 36 See, e.g., socialist procedural practices such as the requirement of judicial approval of Settlements or of the withdrawal of claims, or the "review in supervisory instance," under which the procuracy or certain high courts can appeal a decision even after it has become final between the parties themselves. 30 31
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capitalist law has never been very serious about, nor very successful at, the collectivization of private Iitigation. Government agencies, given the task of enforcing consumer or welfare rights or of protecting the environment, have on the whole been far less effective and energetic in their use of the law than individual plaintiffs embracing the same public causes. 37 State attorneys, authorized to initiate or intervene in civil cases to protect public interests, have rarely and reluctantly used their participation rights. 38 If capitalist state representatives do get involved in private Iitigation, they will usually do so to protect the interests of plaintiffs too weak to fend for themselves - that is, to protect some individual interest. 39 And even if a state advocate interferes in a civil case to raise public concerns- if, for instance, the French ministere public attached to the Court ofCassation files a rare autonomous appeal "dans l'interet de la loi" - capitalist law will tend to respect the private parties' control over their own dispute; in this case, leaving a decision, even if it is overturned, still binding between the parties. 40 Under socialist law, where the procurator's right to appeal civil cases even when final is not only known but indeed widely exercised, such concern for individual autonomy would be seen as counterproductive to the establishment of the "objective truth." Given this capitalist reluctance to "socialize" private rights, it would be misleading, I believe, to view the recent capitalist phenomenon of "public law litigation" 41 as a "public" procedural takeover of formerly private affairs. Rather the opposite interpretation, I think, would be warranted: public interest Iitigation has "privatized" concerns we normally think of as public. While issues like pollution, public housing, the availability of abortions, and the like obviously are of great interest to the polity at large, "public law Iitigation" places the vindication of these interests at the mercy of an individual plaintiff: without his individualized stake, his procedural energies, his willingness to sue in the first place, the court, in most cases, would have no chance to scrutinize the legality of agency decisions. As the Germans say: "Wo kein Kläger ist, ist auch kein Richter"- where no individual plaintiff (or interest group) raises the alarm, the court will take no notice of the law's violation. Hence our attempts to attract private plaintiffs if, without their involvement, wrongs would be left unrighted: by lowering court costs, by raising incentives to sue with treble-damage awards, or by allowing !arge numbers of individuals to join in dass actions. But even class actions are not seen as truly collective endeavors but only as the sum total 37 Cappelletti (supra n. 31) 821: "Perhaps with the sole, but brief exception ofthe OEO Pro gram, no governmental agency has achieved the same degree of imagination, impetus, and promptness in dealing with welfare, consumer, environmental, or civil rights problems as have the individual and spontaneous organizations that have been encouraged to represent the public interest in court." 38 Id. at 788 ff. 39 Id. at 791. 40 Id. at 780. 41 The term was coined by Chayes (supra n. 33).
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of numerous individual concerns: hence our insistence on the homogeneity of the class and on the protection of absentee interests to ensure proper representation of each individual member. We therefore rely primarily on individual initiative, not on collective action, to ensure the judicial control over our bureaucracies. Not surprisingly, given our market culture, public interests seem to do much better in the hands of private litigators than in those rare instances where public agencies do sue to enforce the law. Perhaps also not surprisingly, individual victories in public interest Iitigation do not seem to affect administrative behavior all that much in the long run. But whatever the practical merits of our system ofjudicial review, socialists cannot be expected to gladly embrace judicial procedures that abdicate the enforcement of administrative legality to individual initiative and control. They would have to object to exposing public interests to the uncertainty ofwhether a particular plaintiffwill be found to champion their cause. Socialists would have to feel threatened ifindividual plaintiffs take it upon themselves to enforce their private definition of what "public interests" imply - agairrst the "public interest" as defined and ostensibly pursued by the state. And they should be offended by the bargairring between individual plaintiff and state (as if both could be equals!), which is so common to our public law litigation, 42 where public interests are subject to private deals, public values compromised by party concessions, and where consent decrees, falling short ofthe law's full demands, are the rule rather than the exception. 43 If, in the past, socialist governments have feit ambivalent about the judicial review of administrative decisions affecting only individual citizens, they thus should feelall the more hesitant about the introduction ofWestern-style public interest Iitigation. That would explain why the Soviets, when passing their new Law on Appeals in 1987, not only rejected suggestions to allow some form of popular action independent of whether a plaintiffs personal rights are concerned, 44 but also restricted judicial review to decisions reached by individual officials, thus excluding from court supervision the (presumably politically more sensitive) acts of collective bodies such as executive committees oflocal soviets. 45 The moreprivate the purpose of an administrative law suit, the more acceptable it seems to socialists - not because socialists approve of individual egotism but because individual assertiveness seems less threatening to political cohesion if it is preoccupied with the pursuit of mere personal interests than if it becomes presumptuous enough to want to affect collective decisions. Already existing socialist review procedures thus tend to focus on the protection 42 See Gerd Winter, Bartering Rationality in Regulation: Law & Soc'y Rev. 19 (1985) 219-250. 43 See Chayes (supra n. 33) 1299. 44 Klaus-fürgen Kuss, Gerichtliche Verwaltungskontrolle in der Sowjetunion, Eine überfallige Reform: JbOstR 28, no. 2 (1987) 271-293 (283). 45 Quigley 176.
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of material benefits, 46 and reform suggestions, pleading for the expansion of judicial review, equally aim for the safeguarding of property-like private possessions. 47 Socialist judicial review, as preached and practiced today, thus appears as a largely apolitical extension of private law protections. Most administrative law suits, to the extent that they are already permissible, deal with consumption rights. Even in Poland, "political" cases are said to make up no more than 5 to 6 percent of the HAC's caseload. 48 In line with this private approach to judicial review, the Court makes relatively little use of its right to address public issues with the help of court censure. 49 J ust as in the past, socialist law has been more willing to accord rights-status to civil or labor law rights than to political freedoms such as speech or assembly; socialist judicial review, too, seems more willing to protect a citizen's private than his public persona. If the prernises implied in our traditional approach to judicial review thus seem at odds with socialist notions of the proper relationship between individual and society, our present day public law litigation and its view of the citizen as private watchdog and ideological competitor to the state should be even less acceptable to socialist reformers.
111. Capitalist Reservations about Judicial Review: When Do We Limit Court Supervision? There are Situations in which we, too, have been reluctant to permit judicial review, or in which- if we do allow it - we at least feel the need to limit the intrusiveness of judicial scrutiny and to censure only egregious misuses of administrative discretion. Our reservations have been motivated by specific fact constellations: the characteristics of certain social settings, of types of decisions, or of the people involved. Examining these characteristics may help to predict whether socialists, in sirnilar situations, will have sirnilar rnisgivings. In all these situations, I want to argue, our rejection of judicial review mechanisms is motivated by "socialist" concerns, which real socialists, a fortiori, can be expected to share.
Kuss (supra n. 44) 284. See Ronald Brachmann I Karl-Heinz Christoph, Zur Vervollkommnung verfahrensrechtlicher Regelungen im Verwaltungsrecht StuR 37 (1988) 570-576 (574), suggesting that future East German reforms should allow judicial review of those administrative decisions "which either touch upon or resemble those subject matters which are now the business of courts: criminal law, civil law, family law, and Iabor law." 48 Estimate based on the 1985 HAC caseload reported by Kuss, Die Rechtsprechung 205. 49 Klaus-Jürgen Kuss, Der gerichtliche Rechtsschutz des Einzelnen gegenüber der Verwaltung in der Volksrepublik Polen (unpublished manuscript 1988) 25. 46 47
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A. Citizens in Close Affiliation with Specific State Institutions
One set of circumstances that capitalist law, traditionally, has exempted from court review involves what the Germans call besondere Gewaltverhältnisse: situations in which a citizen has a close affiliation with a specific state institution, is intimately involved in its rnission, owes specialloyalty to its goals, and thus finds hirnself in a position of "intensified dependency" 50 toward the state. The German doctrine ofthe besonderen Gewaltverhältnisse goes back to Otto Mayer. He distinguished between the external affairs of the state and its occasional, isolated contacts with citizens, on the one hand, and the state's internal domain, its domestic management, so-to-speak, on the other, under which Mayer included the internal organization of the bureaucracy and the rnilitary, whose members he saw as permanently linked with vital state tasks and thus functionally as part of the state. 51 While law, in Mayer's view, should regulate the external, ad hoc contacts between ordinary citizen and state, the more intimate relationships between the state and its vassals should not be subject to judicial review: in these areas, the citizen's usual distance from the state was transformed into a kind of symbiotic proxirnity. Mayer thus accepted the traditional capitalist distinction between state and society, and thus the need for judicial protection against the state, only as far as an ordinary citizen's everyday life was concerned. But he rejected it for "conditions of special dependency": like a socialist, he saw no room for law in a situation in which citizen and state were united in the pursuit of a common goal. Mayer's civil servants and soldiers -like socialist citizens- were seen only as citoyens, only as members of the body politic, and therefore - again like socialist citizens- were presumed to be in no need of judicial protection against a state of which they themselves were a part. Today, West German courts have largely rejected the doctrine of the
besonderen Gewaltverhältnisse and insist on the review of all areas of administra-
tive decision-making. 52 But the doctrine's underlying rationale is still valid: namely, that the rnissionary urgency of certain state functions, the disciplinarian structure of certain institutions, and the intimate involvement of citizens with their tasks may Iead to a lessening of judicial controls. 53 American law shows similar rnisgivings about judicial review, andin similar contexts: in relation to
50 Michael Ronellenfitsch, Das besondere Gewaltverhältnis, ein zu früh totgesagtes Rechtsinstitut: Die öffentliche Verwaltung 34 (1981) 933-941 (933). 51 Otto Mayer, Zur Lehre vom öffentlich-rechtlichen Verträge: Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 3 (1888) 1-86 (54). 52 See Ernst-Werner Fuss, Personale Kontaktverhältnisse zwischen Verwaltung und Bürger, Zum Abschied vom besonderen Gewaltverhältnis: Die öffentliche Verwaltung 25 (1972) 765-774. 53 See Ronellenfitsch (supra n. 50) 939.
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the military, to schools, or to prisons. Even today, military law may simply subordinate individual rights to state goals rather than balance, in the usual fashion, individual against state interests. 54 Even today, the military need for "habits of discipline and unity" 55 may outweigh the need for individual protection. Militaryreview procedures -like socialist complaint proceduresmay reject the "adversary mode of dispute resolution" in favor ofmore flexible procedures, showing "a high degree of informality and solicitude for the claimant." 56 Military judges - like socialist judges - have no life tenure, no constitutionally protected salaries, and as instruments of the executive are not shielded by separation-of-powers constraints. 57 And both American military law and socialist law have a history of distrusting lawyers, whose proclivity "to interrogate, to except, to plead, to teaze, perplex and embarrass by legal subtilties & abstract sophistical Distinctions" 58 is seen as a threat to their respective missionary causes. Capitalist school law, at least in its historical form, can serve as another example to demoostrate how notions of an institution's particular mission, of its indenture to !arger societal goals, can reduce the legal protection its members enjoy against the state. In West Germany, for instance, the relationship between pupil and state was seen a:s a besonderes Gewaltverhältnis, entitling the state to enforce its pedagogic authority without regard to due process concerns, and thus making it largely exempt fromjudicial review. With the demise ofthe doctrine of "special dependencies," student-state relationships have been increasingly legalized, 59 and schoollaw cases, by now, make up a significant percentage of West German administrative law Iitigation. In the United States, more of the doctrine's rationale seems to have survived. In 1988 the Supreme Court reaffirmed school authorities' control over students' free speech rights by pointing to the "special characteristics ofthe school environment" and its "basic educational mission. " 60 Due process protection against the administration of corporal punishment has been rejected because it presumes an "adverse 54 In Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S.Ct. 1310 (1986), a decision that dealt with whether Air Force regulations could prevent an Orthodox Jew from wearing a yarmulke, the majority opinion did not even address the issue of the appropriate Ievel of constitutional scrutiny, an approach that was criticized by Justice O'Connor: "No test for Free Exercise claims in the military context is even articulated, much less applied." Id. at 1324. 55 Id. at 1313. 56 Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180 (1985). 57 See Walter T. Cox, The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution, The Evolution of Military Justice: Mi!. L. Rev. 118 (1987) 1-30. 58 General Wilkinson at the 1809 court martial of Captain Wilson, cited in Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights, The Original Practice 1: Harv. L. Rev. 72 (1958) 1-49 (27). 59 See S. Staupe, Die "Verrechtlichung" der Schule, Erscheinungsformen, Ursachen und Folgen: Leviathan no. 2 (1982) 273. 60 Hazlewood School Dist. v. Kuh/meier, 108 S.Ct. 562, 567 (1988).
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atmosphere" between pupil and teacher, which would "hardly serve the interests of... those involved." 61 As socialists would claim for the relationship between their state and its citizens, the relationships between our schools and their pupils, at least by some, are seen as harmonious, not adversarial, with all participants' interests "essentially congruent," and with the state, like the "parental" socialist state, 62 in the role of "educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent substitute." 63 Accordingly, as under socialism, needs-talk tends to replace the language ofrights and, as under socialism, informal complaint procedures have to serve as substitutes for due process. The same point can be made with respect to prisons. While American law no Ionger insists on the state's parens patriae attitudes toward those it detains, 64 some of the old misgivings about due process protections remain, and for reasons that socialists might appreciate: because too many procedural niceties, like the insertion of counsel into prison disciplinary proceedings, would "tend to reduce their utility as a means to further correctional goals. " 65 One need not be a cynic, equating socialist countries with prisons, to accept the point: that procedural niceties may impede a state's educational goals and that informal complaint procedures may stand less in the way of creating the "new socialist man" than an effective system of judicial review. B. Complex PlanDing Decisions
The second group of administrative decisions that capitalist law traditionally has exempted from full judicial review involves complex and far-reaching planning decisions. Our classical model ofjudicial review is designed to deal with individual clashes between citizen and state authority, not with long-term policy debates affecting society at large. Ordinarily, a judge investigating the legality of a specific administrative decision willlook to the past to determine whether the challenged act interfered with an individual's rights- a typical instance of the judicial application of a priori standards to concrete, ascertainable facts. But if the administration's decision has far-reaching implications for the future- if it concerns not only the plaintiffs individual interests but also !arger issues of economic development or social control - our conventional paradigm of judicial review is put into question. We are no Ionger so confident that a judge is either able or authorized to fully review technically complicated policy choices. Not able, because he Iacks the administrator's expertise, his firstband exposure to the facts, his familiarity with the setting, and thus might not appreciate the 61 Whatley v. Pike County Bd. of Educ. (N.D. Ga. 1971), cited in Ingraham v. Wright 525 F.2d 909, 919 (1976). 62 See Harold Berman, Justice in the USSR (2d ed. 1963). 63 Justice Powell, dissenting in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 594 (1975). 64 Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 949 (1971), overruled, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 65 Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974).
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complexities of the issues. Not authorized, because judicial review in these instances cannot be confined to a judge's typical task: the legal evaluation of isolated events from the past. An administrative act concerned with the planning of road networks or the satisfaction offuture energy needs, for instance, not only affects individual interests but also sets the stage for future developments. If a court could review and quash such an act, it would not only undo an individual wrong inflicted in the past but would also, at one and the same time, frustrate policy choices made for the future. Such choices, we believe, properly belong under legislative or executive, but not under judicial, control. For these reasons, capitalist courts have shown much more deference toward administrative decisions involving policy and planning choices than toward other administrative acts. West German law, for instance, offers many examples of judicial reticence when courts are confronted with complex planning issues. Occasionally, statutory law simply exempts such issues fromjudicial review, as in German antitrust law, which provides that decisions of the Federal Cartel Agency, while reviewable for excess and misuse of discretion, cannot be reviewed to the extent that they are based on "the Agency's assessment of the macroeconomic situation and its likely development." 66 But even without such statutory constraints, West German courts, while ordinarily most aggressive in their readiness to censure administrative behavior, 67 show deference when faced with cases involving prognostic 68 and planning 69 decisions. In these instances, West Germancourts police only the outer boundaries of discretion: ask whether the administration's decision was based on a careful assessment of the facts, employed legitimate criteria, and respected due process requirements. But they do not preclude the executive's "freedom to plan and to shape events" by putting their own forecasts in place of the agency's decision. 70 These examples suggest a connection between faith in planning and a reluctance to subject such planning to the constraints ofjudicial review. Judicial review, in our eyes, above all should correct legal mistakes of the past, not preclude policy choices for the future. The more ready we are to believe in the effectiveness of planning, in the special expertise of administrators, or in the power ofthe state to shape and improve our future, the more unwilling we will be to allow judges to crosssuch plans in the name of individual rights. In American 66 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, version of 24 Sept. 1980, Bundesgesetzblatt I 1761 § 70 V. 67 See Fritz Ossenbühl, Vom unbestimmten Rechtsbegriff zur Jetztverbindlichen Verwaltungsentscheidung: Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 89 (1974) 309-313. 68 See Peter J. Tettinger, Überlegungen zu einem administrativen "Prognosespielraum": Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 97 (1982) 421-433. 69 See Martin Bullinger, Das Ermessen der öffentlichen Verwaltung: Juristenzeitung 39 (1984) 1001-1009 (1008). 70 Bundesverwaltungsgericht, decision of7 July 1978, 56 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 110, 116 (1978).
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legal history, judicial deference toward the administration thus decreased together with our beliefthat the state, through vigorous planning, could change our lives for the better. While during the can-do years of the New Deal, for instance, courts were willing to defer to the "bureaucratic specialization and professionalism" of administrative experts, our growing technological scepticism and increasing awareness of scientific uncertainties have led courts to be "uneasy about the old claims to deference to expertise." Hence, the resulting activism of more recent judical decisions. 71 Socialists, however, do not share our wariness of the marvels of progress. They still believe (or claim to believe) in the perfectability ofthe world: put their hope in "the scientific-technical revolution;" 72 strive to "impart a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism." 73 If our own reluctance to allow judicial interference with far-reaching government plans is any indication, we thus should expect socialist judges to show even greater deference to administrative expertise. Indeed, Rumanian law -probably because ofthe incompatibility between pastoriented adjudication and future-oriented planning- has simply exempted all "planning decisions" from judicial review. 74 But in a socialist society worth its name, alladministrative policy is meant to bring about the realization of future prognoses, and every administrative act is determined by some Plan. In virtually every situation, the reasons calling for deference toward the executive would thus be present. lt is hard to imagine how judicial review, under these circumstances, could ever fully emerge from the shadow ofthe Plan to become as non-deferential and aggressive toward administrative authority as it has become in the West. C. Children and Welfare Clients
The third group of cases in which Western courts, too, have been hesitant to award due process protection against the state concerns certain types of people: plaintiffs or defendants perceived as too weak or too dependent to oppose the state on an equal footing. Going to court, to us, seems an act of autonomy and strength, and we have been reluctant to Iisten to the legal argumentations of people too young to be autonomous -juveniles - or too weak to make it on their own - welfare recipients. Distinguishing between "rights" and "privileges," American law, for a long time, thus refused to apply due process strictures to the distribution of welfare 71 See Robert L. Rabin, Legitimacy, Discretion and the Concept ofRights: Yale L.J. 92 (1982/83) 1174-1188 (1182). 72 A term repeatedly used by the GDR Constitution of 1974, see arts. 17, 24-25. 73 USSR Constitution of 1977, art. 6 II. 74 Leonhardt (supra n. 5) 91.
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benefits. Until under the influence of "New Property" thinking, 75 the Supreme Court began to analogize welfare payments to common-law property rights, 76 we saw these payments not as a recipient's statutory due but as "charity," 77 as a "gratuity" 78 offered by the state, which a citizen might need to survive but to which he was still not entitled. Like socialist law, American benefits law rejected due process constraints with the best of intentions: it claimed to pursue "the welfare ofthe aid recipient" as its "primary objective." 79 But what constitutes a person's "welfare" (unlike his "entitlement") is something that is other-defined rather than self-defined, that protects not individual autonomy but some ulterior standard of well-being, and that is determined not by the taker of help but by its giver. Both socialism and capitalist welfare bureaucracies presume to know what is best for the people in their care. Neither the socialist state nor our pre-Goldberg welfare state thus likes or liked tobe bound by rules constricting its generosity. Neither sees nor saw any harm in conditioning the payment ofbenefits upon the recipient's good behavior, thus using the law as a means to reinforce conformity with the collective. Both our old welfare law and socialist law claim to be motivated by care and concern for the citizen with the state, so "we trust," in the role of "a friend to one in need," 80 and neither socialist nor capitalist law is (or was) too concerned with the question ofwhether that trust indeed was shared by the law's supposed beneficiaries. lt is thus the very claim to warmth and concern, the pretense of harmony between administration and citizen, which led our welfare law to reject the need for due process protections and which still does the same in socialist states as we know them. That the rejection of procedural safeguards may be based on the noblest of motives has also been demonstrated by the American juvenile court movement. lt proceeded from the assumption that delinquent children needed some better protection than the cold technicalities of procedural justice namely, help, attention, "care and solicitude;" 81 treatmentrather than punishment; a response generously attuned to the child's needs rather than meticulously measured by the severity ofhis offense. Hence the rejection of adversarial safeguards assuring the fairness of a bargain between juvenile defendent and state, and their replacement by informal, flexible, tailor-made attempts to do substantive justice.
75 76
77
78 79 8o
81
See Charles A. Reich, The New Property: Yale L.J. 73 (1963/64) 733. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), cites Reich at 262 n. 8 and 265 n. 13. Wilkie v. O'Connor, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (Sup. Ct. 1921). Justice Brandeis in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934). Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1970). Id. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
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The Supreme Court's decision, In re Gault, 82 marked the defeat of our hopes to eure rather than punish juvenile delinquency and prompted our return to more conventional notions of criminal justice. But in their heyday, American juvenile court reformers proceeded from the same optimistic assumptions about the nature of man as socialist law professes to do today: a belief in the essential goodness of man, in his perfectability through education, and in the capacity of the state to sustain a truly "parental relationship" 83 with its citizens. From these assumptions followed procedural conclusions that shaped our juvenile court rules and that still shape the way in which socialist courts operate today: their attempt to focus on the whole man rather than on isolated incidents ofthe past; their proclivity for flexible, informal procedures; their involvement of lay personnel; their distrust of lawyers and their general disrespect for procedural technicali ties.
IV. Obstades to the Success of Judicial Review Procedures in Socialist Countries My survey of situations in which capitalist law, too, denies or at least downplays a citizen's need for legal defenses against the state was meant to show the affinity between certain political beliefs and a disregard for due process. Ifwe view a citizen as intimately connected with the state and as indentured to its mission, if we believe in the goodness and efficaciousness of state planning, or if we perceive a citizen as dependent andin need of rehabilitation and reform, we will be much less likely to insist on his procedural protection against the administration than if we view him as separate from the state, in control of his own life, legitimately pursuing hisprivate interests. Judicial review, I want to argue, presupposes a certain image of man as self-sufficient, assertive, and strong that we, too, do not always embrace. But ifwe are "socialists" only on occasion, socialists themselves should be expected to show more consistency. After all, every East European government professes to believe in the missionary tasks of the state, in its power to move and transform society, and in the educability ofits people. To socialist officials, every citizen thus should need the discipline of the soldier, the loyalty of the civil servant, the compliance of the prisoner, and the application ofthe student. To them, alladministrative activity should be part of a comprehensive, scientific, and far-sighted Plan. And to them, every man and woman is the "dependent and growing youth" 84 of a parental legal tradition. Those reasons that occasionally move us to turn our backs on our Rechtsstaatideals should always be present for socialists. Does this suggest
82 83 84
Id. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). Berman (supra n. 62) 384.
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that socialist society, almost by definition, would have to remain inhospitable to judicial review and that present reform attempts are likely to fail? Legislation fundamentally at cross-purposes with the ideology upon which it supposedly builds can be successful only if it finds extra-ideological support. Turning from the theoretical underpinnings of judicial review to the actual political climate in which it would have to take root, I will investigate whether such support is likely to develop in Eastern Europe. If socialist governments (their professed ideological purposes aside) would push for judicial review, if socialistjudges (whatever their political constraints) would make aggressive use of their new powers to review, if socialist citizens (regardless of previous behavior patterns) would avail themselves ofthe possibility to sue the state, the rule oflaw might spread in socialist countries against all ideological odds. But if that should happen, it will take a very long time. A. First Obstacle: The Sodalist State When socialist governments enacted the new legislation, they seemed in part to respond to liberal demands in the literature: for years, intellectuals in Poland, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe bad asked, in increasingly audible voices, for more court protection against the executive. 85 But it seems unlikely that socialist governments were moved by the same rule-of-law concerns as their critics. From the government point of view, judicial reviewwas meant to serve more tangible purposes: the rationalization of an ineffective and unresponsive administration, and the appeasement of an increasingly dissatisfied citizenry. Of course, one set of motives need not exclude the other. Socialist governments might espouse rule-of-law techniques for philosophical and practical reasons: to protect the autonomy ofthe individual citizen and to keep a sluggish bureaucracy on its toes. But certain restrictions and inconsistencies accompanying the new legislation suggest that, at least up to now, utilitarian motives probably were decisive. Thesemotivesare likely to affect the impact of the reforms. Socialist governments began in the 1970s to enlist the law's help in their fight against official corruption and civic demoralization. The first phase of reform focussed on "legal propaganda": namely, the teaching oflegal rules ofbehavior to citizens and funtionaries alike on the optimistic assumption that greater knowledge of the law would Iead to better compliance. At least at this stage, socialist legality was clearly perceived as a means to achieve order rather than justice. 86 The second reform phase (there has always been some overlap) switched from admonitions to incentives: it saw the creation of a number of new rights, meant to motivate individuals to pursue interests oftheir own when doing Kuss, Verwaltungsrechtsschutz. See lnga Markovits, Law or Order, Constitutionalism and Legality in Eastern Europe: Stan. L. Rev. 34 (1982) 513-613. 85
86
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so would also advance the welfare of society. The 1977 Soviet Constitution, recent legislation expanding the right to engage in private enterprise, 87 policies providing more recognition for those lawyers helping to promote individual rights Gurisconsults and advocates), as well as legislation widening the scope of judicial review all can be interpreted in this light. But although the techniques associated with this second wave of reform are different from the techniques of the first, their justification need not be. In both phases, it seems to me, "legality" serves as a tool ofthe state: the new rights are seen as means rather than as ends. By encouraging citizens to insist on their rights and by providing mechanisms for their enforcement, socialist governments seek to prod managers and bureaucrats, until then a law unto themselves, into more responsible action. The East European governments' decision to provide for "more judicial review" thus cannot simply be interpreted as "more respect for the rule oflaw." That respect might come later, when one distant day legal argumentations might have so saturated the relationship between citizen and state as tobe accepted by all as a matter-of-fact. Today, law should ratherbe seen as a newly discovered medicine for socialist ills. During a recent debate in an East German law review about "perfecting the management of the socialist state," for instance, almost all contributors favored the introduction of rules and procedures that would make administrative decision-making more rational, more consistent, and easier to monitor. The contributors suggested two ways of achieving this end: giving law a greater role in the management of the state, and making more extensive use of computers. 88 Law, in this view, has a sirnilar social utility as electronics: it facilitates the management of complex technical tasks. But it need have no dignity of its own, no place above the state that it serves, other than that inviolability required to avoid defeating its own purposes. When they established new rights, socialist governments, at the same time, thus tried to make sure that these rights would not be used to defeat the purposes for which they were enacted. The new Soviet Law on Appeals, for instance, not only authorizes a citizen to sue the adrninistration but also penalizes those suits submitted "with libelous intent." 89 Recent official endorsements of the free speech rights of journalists exposing corruption, in a sirnilar vein, have been accompanied by warnings not to risk criminal penalties "by grossly distorting the materials." 90 The new Soviet statute on individual Iabor, legalizing family87 On the Soviet Law on Individual Labor, see Theodor Schweisfurth, Die Komplementarität persönlichenNutzensund gesellschaftlichen Interesses: OER 34 (1988) 1-18. 88 Vervollkommnung der Leitungstätigkeit des sozialistischen Staates (Umfrage): StuR 34 (1985) 619. 89 Law on Appeals of 30 June 1987, § 10. 90 Guarding the Law, USSR Procurator General Aleksandr Rekenkov Talks with a Zhurnalist Correspondent: Soviet Law and Government 26, no.1 (Summer 1987) 80-90 (88).
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style entrepreneurial activities, is counterbalanced by a number of decrees curbing the accumulation of "unearned income," 91 which in Soviet parlance means income derived from the private resale of goods (that is, from entrepreneurial activity). And recent Soviet policies to tolerate political demonstrations have been put into question by the decree of28 July 1988, which penalizes public gatherings without prior permission and which in numerous instances has been strictly enforced. 92 Legislation like this enables the Soviet state, if need be, to take with the one hand what it has just given with the other. Considering such official ambivalence about the blessings of perestroika, it seems unlikely that socialist governments will allow judicial review to seriously challenge the way their administrations are run. In many instances, of course, court review of legally faulty administrative decisions would reaffirm bureaucratic discipline and accountability and thus appear state-supportive. But, in some cases, judicial review could threaten crucial political tenets and, to keep the distinction between acceptable and nonacceptable forms of review under official control, socialist states will be tempted to restriet the power of courts in ways that are likely to compromise the reforms themselves. Take, for example, the issue of administrative discretion. The judicial review of discretion is a touchy subject not only for socialist courts. It affects the very fundamental question of who, in borderline disputes between the judiciary and administration, should have the final word: our principles or our pragmatism; the law or the demands ofpolitical expediency. Western courts, too, as we have seen, may show great deference toward the executive's better judgment, especially with respect to "socialist" forms of decision-making involving the management and planning of social. developments. But East European law, even after the recent reforms, seems far more restrictive than that. The new Soviet statute on judicial review, for instance, is said to apply only to "strict legislation"- that is, courts may review only those administrative decisions based on "precise statutory directions," not those in which indeterminate legal concepts or can formulas give the administrator some leeway for action. But the violation of strict legislation can play only a minor role even in capitalist administrative law. Most citizens' suits agairrst the executive complain of an agency's illegitimate use of discretion: faulty balancing procedures, violation of a statute's legislative purpose, improper agency motivations, consideration ofunacceptable criteria like race or sex, and the like. The review of administrative discretion is thus vital to a citizen's protection agairrst misuses of public authority. Indeed, since most decisions affecting a citizen's interests not only are based on fairly loose legal standards but take place See Schweisfurth (supra n. 87) 5. See The Times, 11 Nov. 1988, at 12: "Kremlin adopts a different tack to curb dissident activity." 91
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in a setting in which "front line bureaucrats" can themselves fashion the fact pattern to which legal criteria then are applied (through the management of their workload, the identification of clients, and so on), this pre-legal "informal discretion" may undermine even a capitalist citizen's legal protection in situations in which the court would review the misuse of an administrator's more visible "legal" discretion. 93 Judicial protection against the executive thus will be meaningful only in a legal system that thoroughly tackles the tricky issue of discretion. Considering that socialist legislation, to facilitate its adaptation to the policies of an activist state, tends to be especially vague, the problern of discretion is particularly crucial under socialist conditions. Until now, it has not been seriously addressed by the reformers. In the USSR, as we have seen, the issue is officially ignored. In Hungary, courts may review only the "legality" of administrative decisions, namely, their formal compliance with statutory language. 94 Rumanian and Bulgarian courts are reported to investigate whether the administration overstepped the boundaries of discretion, though not the exercise of discretion itself, 95 and whatever that may mean, there is no indication to suggest that Rumanian or Bulgarian courts use their powers to effectively curb the abuse of administrative authority. And finally, in the German Democratic Republic, review of administrative discretion is not even mentioned in the academic debate. The one exception in this lineup of deference and caution is Po land. Despite the fact that the 1980 Code of Administrative Procedure provided for review of only the "legality" of administrative decisions, Polish judges indirectly review the use of discretion by examining the decision's factual basis, the administration's interpretation of statutory law, its observance of procedural rules, and, at times, even its motives for action. 96 In the few years since its establishment, the Polish High Administrative Court (HAC) has indeed become an advocate of citizens' rights, prodding the administration to use its discretion, whenever possible, in favor of the citizen and trying to turn around the "bad traditions" of socialist bureaucrats by teaching them to replace their former knee-jerk "general no with a general yes." 97 93 Kuss, Gerichtliche Verwaltungskontrolle (supra n. 44) 289; Joel F. Hand/er, Dependent People, the State, and the Modem/Postmodem Search for the Dialogic Community: UCLA L. Rev. 35 (1988) 999-1113 (1020). 94 See Zsuffa, Neues Gesetz über die allgemeinen Regeln des Verwaltungsverfahrens: Acta Juridica (1983) 223. 95 See Leonhardt (supra n. 5) 91. 96 Zdzislaw K(!dziaf Theodor Schweisfurth, Grundrechtsschutz in Polen im Lichte der Rechtsprechung des Hauptverwaltungsgerichts: Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 14 (1987) 329-335 (333). 97 High Administrative Court Justice Z. Maiik, cited in Klaus-Jürgen Kuss, Polens Rückkehr zur Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit: JbOstR 22, no. 2 (1981) 263-303 (299).
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But Poland is atypical. Judicial review in Poland could build upon pre-war Rechtsstaat experience, 98 and could profit from the existence, since 1960, of a Polish Code of Administrative Procedure, which allOJNs judges to review the procedural underpinnings of discretionary decisions without trespassing upon the administration's substantive decision-making prerogatives. Soviet reformers, for instance, however zealous in their endorsement of judicial review, can build on neither foundation. And Czechoslovakia, to take another example, which shares with Po land the liberal Austrian procedural heritage, 99 seems in turn to Iack the openness and reformatory energy that would allow it, like Poland, to make use of its past. Moreover, Polish judges have been able to expand the impact of judicial review into the realm of discretion not only by drawing on their legal past but also on their nationalism, their Catholicism (it is interesting to note that most of the few HAC decisions restricting censorship favored the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny), 100 and (one assumes) their natural Polish contrariness. They have done so under legislation far more supportive of court control than that of other socialist countries. Most importantly, Polishjudges are operating under a government besieged and worn down by popular demands for political reform - and not, like their Soviet colleagues, under reforms that a central government tries to impress from above upon a bewildered bureaucracy. Without such a combination of forces propelling the expansion of judicial review, other socialist governments (already, as we have seen, mistrustful of the review of discretion) are very unlikely to tolerate Polish-style inroads into the exercise of state power. B. Second Obstacle: Socialist Judiciaries
That brings us to the second prerequisite for effective procedural reform: an energetic and supportive judiciary. All in all, socialist judges are not very likely to fill this role. Throughout their careers, jurists in socialist countries are far more dependent upon their governments than are their capitalist colleagues. They will not be admitted to law school unless considered politically reliableeven today, official Soviet planstoreform legal education stress the importance of an applicant's political activism. 101 Once in university, future judges will be exposed to thorough ideological training; 102 once in office, they will continue to 98 Andreas Bilinsky, Das sowjetische Verwaltungsverfahren vor dem Hintergrund des Verwaltungsverfahrens in den übrigen osteuropäischen Staaten: JbOstR 20, no. 2 (1979) 425-458 (428). 99 Id. 100 Kuss, Die Rechtsprechung 213. 101 Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, Mängel in der Juristenausbildung in der Sowjetunion: ROW 31 (1987) 256, 257. 102 See, e.g., for East Germany the report by Daniel Meador, Impressions of Law in East Germany (1986).
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be vulnerable to state interference. The election and re-election process, in practice subject to government and Party approval, impresses upon a judge the need to retain political favor and thus makes sure that only persons "loyally devoted to the people and their socialist state" 103 will remain on the bench. Beyond the selection process, a socialist judge's day-to-day work may be affected by various outside pressures. Phone calls from above may attempt to teil him how to decide a particular case: a practice that in the Soviet Union is known and now criticized as "telephone law." 104 Or a judge may be publicly faulted for having reached wrong decisions: "many" Soviet judges, for instance, have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings when their decisions were too mild or overturned on appeal, 105 or have been exposed to media derision for being "too liberal." 106 Even if, in the future, state and Party should refrain from interfering in specific court cases (and total abstention especially oflocal powerwielders is very unlikely), political practices such as the participation of government representatives in important court meetings, the influence of state officials on the drafting of court directives, or the supervision implied in the workings of democratic centralism will continue to insure that judges do not deviate from their state-supportive role. Note, in this context, the relatively high rate of Party membership among socialist judges. 107 But while demands on their political compliance are high, the social status of East European judges, again compared to their Western counterparts, is relatively low. Socialist legal education, largely obtained through evening and correspondence courses, 108 is often of poor intellectual quality and does not attract the best minds. Salaries, by Western standards, are modest, 109 and the 103 This is a requirement for election listed in the East German Constitution of 1974, art. 94 I. 104 Aloys Hastrich, Die Diskussion über "perestrojka" in der sowjetischen Rechtspflege: OER 34 (1988) 205-221 (215). 105 Thus the Soviet Minister of Justice, Kravcov, cited in Chronik der Rechtsentwicklung in den sozialistischen Staaten: ROW 32 (1988) 236, 239. 106 Hastrich (supra n. 104) 215. 107 Meador (supra n. 102) 136, reports that 70 to 75 percent ofEast Germanjudges are Party members. In the Soviet Union, Party membership of judges stands at 100 percent. George Ginsburgs, The Soviet Judicial Elite: Is It?: Rev. Socialist L. 11 (1985) 293-311 (300). In Yugoslavia, in 1979-1980, 84.7 percent of alllaw court judges were members of the League of Communists. Lenard J. Cohen, Judicial Elites in Yugoslavia, The Professionalization ofPolitical Justice: Rev. Socialist L. 11 (1985) 313-344 (336). 108 Schroeder (supra n. 101) reports that in the Soviet Union, 56 percent of all law students are enrolled in correspondence courses, 15 percent in evening courses, and that only 29 percent of alllaw students are engaged in full-time study. In East Germany, 39 percent of alllaw students are part-time students. Meador (supra n. 102) 113. 109 Peter H. Solomon, Jr., The Case ofthe Vanishing Acquittal: Soviet Studies 39 (1987) 531-555 (553 n. 76) reports that until the 1970s, salaries ofSoviet court workers were "too low to live on" and that most judges interviewed in his study of Soviet emigre lawyers "testified that the temptation for them to take bribes was great."
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physical equipment of socialist courts can be deplorable. no Accordingly, many more judges in socialist than in capitalist countries are women nt - a fact that under socialism as elsewhere reflects the low social esteem in which a profession is held. Perhaps, in the past, East Europeanjudges did not enjoy higher status because they neither occupied positions ofpolitical influence (like Party or govemment functionaries) nor possessed substantive skills (like scientists or engineers), which in a society without much legal conflict resolution could find an alternative market. But whatever the reason, the combination of low professional status and high political dependency is unlikely to produce socialist judges willing to take on their state. They have not done so in the past: Soviet crirninaljudges, for instance, when faced with harsh penalty demands from their higher-status colleagues in the Procuracy, have tended to comply and thus have contributed to the "accusatory tilt" ofSoviet criminaljustice, which is now being criticized by the reformers. 112 Nor can a socialist judge willing to stand up to the state always rely on help from the socialist bar: the few attorneys in socialist countries have learned to adopt low profiles and cautious techniques when defending their clients against the staten 3 and must themselves gain in status and influence before they can be expected to aggressively challenge authority. In view of all these constraints, especially lower court judges can thus be expected to err on the side of political caution when confronted with a citizen's suit against government authorities. In the past, Soviet local and regional courts, for instance, have often been reluctant to hear certain cases against housing authorities, even in situations in which Supreme Court case law consistently had affirmed the civil law character, and thus the justiciability, of the issues in questionY4 Such instinctive deference to the state cannot be easy to outgrow. With the Polish example probably the exception proving the rule, I thus think it very unlikely that judges in other socialist states will apply their newly 110 E.g., the Hungarian Under-Secretary of Justice, in a recent report to the Hungarian Parliament, criticized shortcomings such as the miserable quality of typewriters and carbon paper, the shortage of rooms to accommodate judges, and even the absence of running water in some Hungarian court houses. Chronik der Rechtsentwicklung in den sozialistischen Staaten: ROW 32 (1988) 290, 294. Ginsburgs describes the physicial condition of Soviet court houses as "lamentable" (supra n. 107) 310. 111 In 1985, 14.9 percentofall judges in West Germany were women (Statistisches Jahrbuch BRD 328), as were, in 1980, 13.3 percent of all U.S. federal judges and 7.9 percentofall statejudges in the U.S. (Barbara A. Curran, The Lawyer Statistical Report, A Statistical Profile ofthe U.S. Legal Profession in the 1980s (1985) 40). By contrast, 44.5 percentofall Soviet judges are women (Hastrich (supra n. 104) 216), as are 55 percentofall state court judges in the GDR. Meador (supra n. 102) 138. 112 See Hastrich (supra n. 104). 113 Eugene Huskey, The Politics ofthe Soviet Criminal Process, Expanding the Right to Counsel in Pre-Trial Proceedings: Am. J. Comp. L. 34 (1986) 93-112. 114 Carmen Schmidt, Gerichtliche Verwaltungskontrolle in der Sowjetunion auf dem Gebiet des Wohnrechts: OER 33 (1987) 1-21 (7).
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expanded powers of judicial review to seriously challenge the uses of government power. Even the Polish High Administrative Court has hesitated to censure government violations of constitutional rights at times when court intervention seemed more risky than usual (although the Court, even on these occasions, has insisted on its competence to review and, in this fashion, has kept a foot in the door for more effective review in the future).m Even in Poland, even in 1986, 25 percent of those questioned in a public opinion poll believed that judges took bribes, and 44 percent believed them to be subject to political pressures. 116 In the Soviet Union, a quarter of the judges polled in one study complained about pressures from above. 117 We know from our own (and from the Polish) experience thatjudicial review will curb governmental abuses only to the extent that judges are willing to energetically make use oftheir powers. West Germany would not have matured into a Rechtsstaat (and some even say a Justizstaat: astatenot only under the rule of law but under the rule of judges) without the courts' aggressive Supervision of the exercise of administrative discretion. In the United States, the scope of judicial review has always been determined by "the spirit or mood in which the judges ... approach their tasks," 118 with review wavering between judicial activism and passivity, between procedural and substantive surveillance, between "democratic" and "technocratic" traditions 119 depending upon the spirit of the times and the judges' trust or distrust of technological progress. But how can judges in socialist countries, who are so exposed to the authority of the state, sodependent upon its support, muster the energy to truly censor abuses of government power? Soviet reformers themselves worry about their judiciary's politicallimitations: the chairman ofthe Supreme Soviet's Legislative Proposal Commission, referring to the new Law on Appeals, thus stressed the need for "greater boldness, initiative, and principle" on the part of judges who will have to apply it. 120 Debates are currently under way about how to strengthenjudicial independence: through better pay, Ionger or possibly lifetime appointments, or the exclusion of local authorities from the appointment process. 121 A statute 115 See the censorship case decided by the HAC in May 1985, reported in Kuss, Die Rechtsprechung 212. 116 Stanislaw Frankowski, The Procuracy and the Regular Courts as the Palladium of Individual Rights and Liberties, The Case ofPoland: Tu!. L. Rev. 61 (1987) 1307-1338 (1334). 117 Id. at 1328 n. 84. 118 Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review, "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record": Harv. L. Rev. 64 (1951) 1233-1261 (1236). 119 See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion, The Next Stage: Yale L.J. 92 (1982/83) 1487-1522 (1496). 120 Quigley 177. 121 See John Quigley, Soviet Courts Undergoing Major Repairs: lnt'l Law. 22 (1988) 1; and the report on the Soviet conference on law and perestroika in May 1987: Chronik der Rechtsentwicklung in den sozialistischen Staaten: ROW 32 (1988) 46.
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penalizing interferences with judicial decision-making and the "denigration of courts" is at the drafting stage. 122 But all these calls for change come from above and may find little echo among a cautious and conservative judiciary. Soviet reformers themselves admit that the task of reeducating legal offleials will be "anything but easy." 123 lt thus remains to be seen how much of the new spirit of reform can survive its transmutations through severallayers of a complacent and conformist judicial bureaucracy. C. Third Obstacle: Sodalist Citizens
But even if socialist governments were to endorse judicial review without qualification, and even if socialist judges were eager to censure abuses of government power, I am not so sure that socialist citizens would make much use of the right to take their administrations to court. To the extent that suing the state is already possible under socialist law, comparisons ofEastern and Western Iitigation rates suggest that this possibility is rarely exploited. While in recent years, one West German citizen in 318 sued bis administration, only one in 3,578 did so in Hungary, one in 2,662 in Poland, and one in 1,176 in Yugoslavia. 124 Instead of suing, socialist citizens prefer to raise their objections to administrative decisions through complaints. Roughly 560,000 complaints involving citizens' personal interests were submitted in Rumania in 1981, 125 150,000 in Bulgaria, 126 and about 1.6 million in 1987 in East Germany. 127 Even in Poland, where supposedly 96 percent of all administrative decisions affecting individual rights could be contested in court, 128 only 9,582 administrative suits were brought in 1983, 129 compared to an estimated one million complaints. 130 Many 122
239.
Chronik der Rechtsentwicklung in den sozialistischen Staaten: ROW 32 (1988) 236,
Hastrich (supra n. 104) 221, citing a department head ofthe Soviet Supreme Court. My figures are based on the respective national statistical yearbooks: Statistisches Jahrbuch BRD 333; Statistical Yearbook ofHungary 1984, at 356; Statistical Yearbook of Poland 1985, at 506; Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia 1986, at 412. The West German figure also includes Iitigation before the finance courts, since tax matters, insofar as they were justiciable, have also been included in the East European data. Like most comparative Iitigation rates, my figures should be taken with a great deal of caution, since differences in procedural and Substantive law between the respective countries make the definition of exactly comparable categories of disputes impossible. 125 Kuss, Verwaltungsrechtsschutz 433. 126 Id. at 438. 127 My estimate is based on Wolfgang Bernet I Axel Schöwe I Richard Schüler, Für effektivere Verwirklichung des Eingabenrechts!: Neue Justiz 42 (1988) 282-284 (282), who in an empirical study of 16 East German local government bodies reported an average number of 12 registered complaints for 100 citizens above the age of 14. 128 Co/in T. Reid, The Polish Code of Administrative Procedure: Rev. Sodalist L. 13 (1987) 59-102 (91). 129 See supra n. 11. 123
124
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of these complaints will not concern individual rights, but mere preferences or needs (that is, will concern mattersthat capitalist citizens, too, could not raise in court). But many complaints will deal with justiciable issues. In the Soviet Union, for instance, objections to administrative fines (one of those issues subject to judicial review even before the 1987 statute) are often not raised in court but instead submitted to local executive councils, which handle them like complaints. 131 And although it has been possible for decades to litigate tort claims against the government, citizens nevertheless are reluctant to sue. 132 Compare this to the United States, where in 1983 roughly one out ofevery 300 federal officials was personally named in tort suits charging violations of constitutional rights. 133 Why are socialist citizens so hesitant to sue the state? As it turns out, they shun courtsnot only in matters involving administrative law. Civillitigation rates too (if available data are halfway reliable) are surprisingly low under socialism: while West Germancourts in 1984 handled 255 civil suits per 10,000 inhabitants, Polish courts handled 73, Hungarian courts 62, Soviet courts 34, and East German courts 32. Only Yugoslav courts, with 205 civil suits per 10,000 population, seem to have to deal with capitalist-style litigation rates. 134 Rather than going to court, socialist consumers, again, prefer to raise their civillaw grievances by way of complaint. In East Germany, for instance, tenant complaints about the bad upkeep of state-administered housing are eight to 15 times as likely tobe submitted to local government bodies than tobe litigated in court. 135 Employee claims against their employers arealso unlikely to be subject
° Frankowski (supra n.
116) 1322. Kuss, Gerichtsverfahren 153. 132 Id. at 136. 133 Peter Schuck, Suing Govemment, Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs (1983) 43. 134 My figures are very tentative. Since the sources do not always indicate what kinds of disputes are combined under headings like "civil suits," comparisons between different legal systems are extraordinarily difficult. I have based my calculations, to the extent possible, only on first instance suits and have excluded family, Iabor, and social security matters, as weil as those disputes recognizable as administrative law cases (which in Hungary, for instance, are listed under "civil actions"). My Yugoslav figure may also include family law cases (which in the Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook arenot registered separately) and thus may be grossly inflated. My calculations all relate to the year 1984, with the exception of the Soviet figure, which refers to the year 1977. The sources were: Statistisches Jahrbuch BRD 329; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1986 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (1986) 391; Statistical Yearbook ofPoland 1985, at 506; Statistical Yearbook ofHungary 1984, at 356; Statistical Yearbook ofYugoslavia 1986, at 412; Ger Pieter van den Berg, The Soviet System of Justice: Figures and Policy (1985) 144 f. 135 See He/ga Lieske 1Reinhard Nisse/, Beitrag der örtlichen Staatsorgane zur Verwirklichung des Zivilrechts durch Eingabenbearbeitung: Neue Justiz 38 (1984) 96-99 (97); id., Fragen der sozialistischen Gesetzlichkeit in den zivilen Versorgungsbeziehungen: StuR 31 (1982) 22-28 (26). 13
131
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to Iitigation: in 1982, one in 55 employees sued his employer in West Germany, but only one in 433 employees did so in the GDR. 136 In all areas of law involving personal claims against the state (as landlord, employer, purveyor of services, or sovereign), socialist citizens thus seem to avoid the confrontation implied in a judicial suit and instead seek redress through less assertive complaints. With respect to civil and Iabor law claims, such behavior makes sense. Capitalist claimants, too, will sue only if social ties to their opponents are broken (or not worth preserving) and if a successful suit will allow them to obtain real compensation (goods or services) for the injury or loss the defendant inflicted upon them. In socialist countries, where consumer and Iabor relationships can rarely be severed in practice and where, absent a market, a successful plaintiff cannot hope to replace his Iosses in exchange for the damages awarded in court, it is indeed more reasonable to try one's luck with informal complaints than with cumbersome and costly lawsuits. 137 But administrative law suits involve a different constellation of plaintiff and defendimt and seek different satisfaction. Such suits, as a rule, do not aim for monetary damages but for substantive goods: access to housing, a license, admission to a university. A plaintiffs prospective win will thus not, as in many civil law cases, be made worthless by the fact that money cannot buy much compensation in socialist economies. On the contrary, administrative law suits should provide successful plaintiffs with goods of great value to socialist citizens. Moreover, even in capitalist countries, administrative law suits cannot sever relationships between plaintiff and defendant: a citizen remains, as before, apart of his administration's constituency. Yet this fact does not seem to dissuade capitalist citizens from suing their governments. Does this suggest that the reasons that seem to keep socialist citizens from using their courts in civil and Iabor law matters - namely, the inevitable proximity between plaintiff and defendant and the low utility of socialist money - should not in the future keep them from suing the state? Might the present low Iitigation rates between citizens and socialist administrations be only a matter of habit, a question oftime, until citizens have adjusted to the new legislation and learned to make use of their rights? One could draw this conclusion if the continuous relationship between socialist and capitalist citizens and their respective states were indeed comparable. But they are not. A capitalist plaintiff suing an administrative agency will not be afraid that bis suit might have repercussions affecting his interactions with other government offices. His dependence upon government help is sufficiently compartmentalized, his contact with the state multifaceted and diffuse, and his civic status protected by numerous rules and conventions. While 136 See Inga M arkovits, Pursuing One's Rights U nder Socialism: Stan. L. Rev. 38 (1986) 689-761 (707). 137 Id. at 746.
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the basicrelationship between capitalist citizen and state continues beyond the suit, it is nevertheless formal, abstract, and mediated by many non-state institutions that shield the citizen against intrusions of government power. He will thus not be kept from suing the state for fear that- as, for instance, in civil cases against colleagues or friends- his suit might darnage personal bonds. His bond to the state is not personal and needs no protection. Not so under socialism. Socialist citizens are much more dependent upon their governments than their capitalist cousins are. The state provides for them as employer, landlord, and purveyor of goods and services, as teacher and disciplinarian, and in all these incarnations is guided by one set of principles: the Party's. The different segments of a citizen's life are thus interconnected and porous: his behavior in one area may affect his status in another. 138 As in a family setting, rights and obligations are blurred and interdependent. Relationships between citizen and state take on a personal character, and the adrninistration prides itself on its warmth and human touch. Like parents, administrators, for instance, may time certain services as "presents to the people" to coincide with national holidays; 139 like children, citizens will use occasions for public celebration to increase their demands upon the state. 1«~ Litigation does not flourish in such a political climate. Rights recede behind needs, and human langnage replaces the langnage of law. "Write a Ietter to Erich," was a typical responsein East Germany to my question what one should do if one found oneself at an impasse with the administration. "Erich" is not someone you take on in a lawsuit. Rather, he stands for the parental socialist state, which both guides and provides for a citizen's everyday life. Convinced of their all-pervasive dependency, even disgruntled socialist citizens will not think 138 Maybe a socialist citizen's pervasive experience of dependence can best be conveyed by an anecdote. A few years ago, a fellow passenger on an East German train told me about her difficulties to persuade local housing authorities of the need to repair her roof, which bad been leaking for almost ten years. At the end of her tether, she bad finally threatened the local representative ofthe National Front (the all-party socialist umbrella organization coordinating most civic activities) that she would not vote in the upcoming election unless repairs were under way by election day. She could not threaten to vote for an alternative candidate (there being none), but she knew that her abstention from going to the polls would mar the performance record of local officials who were expected to mastermind the usual socialist 99.99 percent voter tumout. The National Front man bad listened to her complaint and bad said: "Don't vote then. But you know as weil as I that there are other things you will be wanting from us in the future." And had she voted in the end? "Weil, yes," the wo man said with a ruefullittle smile. And bad the roofbeen repaired? "Not yet." 139 M. I. Piskotin, The Soviet Executive: Soviet Law and Government 26, no. 3 (1987 /88) 32, reports this "very common practice." 140 Heidrun PohlfGerhard Schulze, Wachsende Rolle des Verwaltungsrechts beim Schutz der Rechte der Bürger: StuR 30 (1981) 397-410 (401), report that East German citizens tend to increase their complaints at election times; thus, 140,000 complaints were submitted on the occasion ofthe election ofthe People's Chamber in 1976 and 63,000 on the occasion of the local elections in 1979.
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of themselves as bearers of rights but rather as supplicants. Hence the widespread socialist preference for administrative complaints over lawsuits. Socialist governments, I believe, have been successful, almost too successful, in imprinting upon their citizenries the image of a familial state. They now learn that, as in a farnily setting, connectedness and interdependence breed disinterest in formal rules. Not only are complainants reluctant to litigate against the state, but state officials, for their part, do not treat the relationship between citizen and administration as one that is governed by legal rules. Socialist administrators are thus just as likely to neglect the enforcement oflegal prohibitions as to ignore the legal safeguards of rights. In East Germany, for instance (probably the most law-abiding ofall East European countries), local authorities only rarely impose penalties for the violation of administrative regulations and virtually never enforce those penalties actually imposed. Socialist citizens, like unruly children, in turn do not seem to perceive administrative sanctions as legitimate responses to violations of civic discipline but as, they hope, avoidable risks tobe included, as one factor among others, into their private cost-benefit calculation ofwhether to engage in prohibited behavior. 141 In this climate of informality and license, legal niceties seem no Ionger important. The distinctions between a citizen's different means of asserting his rights are thus blurred and disregarded in practice: complaints are submitted not only to administrators but also to courts, 142 justiciable claims are handled like complaints, 143 and even statutory language, at times, confuses the distinction between suits and petitions. 144 It seems unlikely that in this atmosphere judicial review will be sufficiently utilized by prospective plaintiffs to do what socialist governments hope it will do: domesticate and help control their bureaucracies. Even in Poland, where Iitigation rates have steadily risen since the establishment of the HAC, administrative law suits still make up only a fraction of comparable West German caseloads. 145 If socialist citizens will sue their governments, it will most likely be about issues affecting their material well-being: social security payments and similar benefits. 146 As one would expect in a parental state, 141 Axel Schöwe, Gesetzlichkeit und verwaltungsrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit, in: Sozialistische Gesetzlichkeit, ed. by Wolfgang Bernet (1986) 97-107 (101, 106 n. 9). 142 See Frohmut Müller, Die Verwirklichung des Grundrechts auf Mitgestaltung in der Rechtsprechung: Der Schöffe 34 (1987) 240-243 (243). 143 See Kuss, Gerichtsverfahren 136. 144 Kuss draws attention to the fact that the Soviet Fundamentals on Administrative Offenses of 23 Oct. 1980, art. 39, uses the same word-zhaloba-to refer to complaints (addressed to the local executive council) and to suits (addressed to the people's court). Id. 145 Adjusting for population sizes, Polish administrative courts, in 1985, handled 15.8 percent of the caseload of their West German Counterparts. My calculation includes Iitigation before West German tax courts (since tax matters, in Poland, are handled by administrative courts), but not before West German social courts (since social insurance matters, in Po land, are handled by regular courts). See Statistisches Jahrbuch BRD 1988, at 334 f., 654; Statistical Yearbook of Poland 1986, at 513.
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socialist rights-consciousness seems most developed with respect to support claims, that is, with respect to claims reflecting a citizen's dependence upon the state. Suits which challenge the exercise of political power, even where possible, will continue to be rare. And all citizens' claims, for a long time to come, will more likely be raised by way of complaints than through suits. Socialist governments themselves seem to agree with this prediction: their most recent legislation on legal controls over the bureaucracy indirectly acknowledges their citizens' preference for informal mechanisms of redress. Four months after passing its statute on judicial review, the Soviet legislature thus amended it to abolish a previously mandatory, preliminary administrative review procedure: under the new law, a citizen can go straight to court to challenge an administrative decision. 147 While capitalist law needs to discourage citizens from engaging in unnecessary Iitigation - hence, for instance, the preliminary complaint procedure mandatory under West German law 148 socialist legislators presumably were worried that their citizens would never get beyond the preliminary internal review stage and therefore wanted to facilitate access to court. And Poland, in July 1987, despite the availability of judicial procedures, established an ombudsman's office to protect civic rights 149 again, an acknowledgment that complaints, with their admixture of informality, warmth, and dependency, come more naturally to socialist citizens than Iitigation. The new institution, accordingly, was an immediate success: in her first 13 days of office, the new ombudswoman 150 received more than 5,000 complaints. 151 Ironically, the largest group of complaints concerned the Polish administration of justice 152 - more liberal, more independent, and more open to Iitigation than any of its socialist Counterparts, yet still not a socialist citizen's natural refuge. While under capitalism, "it is to the courts ... that we ultimately turn for the implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement," 153 socialist citizens, even in Poland, still prefer to turn to a human being they trust. 146 While West German citizens are roughly six times as likely to sue administrative agencies than are their Polish neighbors (see supra n. 145), social insurance Iitigation rates in West Germany, in 1984, were only about twice as high as in Poland (adjusted for population size). Cf. Statistisches Jahrbuch BRD 332; Statistical Yearbook of Poland 1985, at 506. Since 1985, Polish social insurance commissions have been reintegrated into the regular court system. 147 See Quigley 174. 148 Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung of 21 Jan. 1960, §§ 68 ff. 149 Bulletin of Legal Developments 22, no. 19 (11 Nov. 1987) 200. 150 Professor Eva Letovska, elected by the Polish Parliament in N ov. 1987. Chronik der Rechtsentwicklung in den sozialistischen Staaten: ROW 32 (1988) 46, 48. 151 Cf.: The Swedish Ombudsman, in 1981, received 3,458 complaints; the French Ombudsman, in 1979, 4,316 complaints. All figures reported in id. 126, 132. 152 Id. 153
Justice Harlan, in Boddie v. Connecticut 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
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V. Outlook My survey has produced a disappointing prognosis for the future of judicial review procedures in socialist countries. Both from our own and from a socialist perspective, the outlook is not encouraging. Western misgivings about judicial review suggest that we, too, are reluctant to allow court review precisely in those situations in which we are "socialists," that is, where we believe in the activist role of the state and in the dependency of its citizens. Socialist experiences up to now suggest that socialist govemments feel ambivalent about recent reforms, that socialist judges are unlikely to actively push for them, and that socialist citizens will be slow to use their new rights. Theseobservations do not give rise to much optimism. F or many years to come, I believe, administrative law Iitigation will not significantly challenge the exercise of public authority under socialism. A. Tbe Future of Socialist Law Reform
That does not mean, however, that the present legal reform movements in the socialist world- the demands for better protection of civil rights, for fairer and more open distribution procedures, for more responsive officials - are inevitably destined to fail. It means only that if law is to assert a domesticating influence over socialist bureaucracies, it will probably have to beinother ways than through judicial review. Even with Gorbachev at its heim, it is hard to imagine a Soviet Union in which, American-style, two thirds of the republics' prison systems are under some kind of court order, 154 in which interest groups, industry and government wage "gladiatorial" court battles over issues of regulation, 155 or in which local communities can no Ionger afford their tort liability insurance. 156 But there are many ways other than through judicial review in which socialist law could cushion civic life against transgressions by public authority. Socialist govemments themselves are keen to strengthen the legal controls over their bureaucracies. They badly need more of what Lenin called "legal culture": 157 the uniform, consistent, and evenhanded application of the law. More than sixty years after Lenin's exhortations, "legal culture" still does not come naturally to socialist administrators. Arbitrary decisions arefrequent in all branches ofthe administration, but from a citizen's perspective, "legal culture" seems most needed in the area of distributive justice, where the perennial 154 .l&e! Grossman, Beyond the Willowbrook Wars, The Courtsand lndustrial Reform: Am. B. Found. Res. J. (1987) 249-259 (250). 155 John Braithwaite, Negotiation versus Litigation, Industry Regulation in Great Britain and the United States: Am. B. Found. Res. J. (1987) 559-574 (560). 156 Jethro Lieberman, The Litigious Society (1981) 157. 157 Vladimir I. Lenin, Dual Subordination and Legality, To Comrade Stalin for the Political Bureau, in: Collected Works XXXIII (1966) 363-367.
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socialist problern of public corruption is compounded by persistent shortages of desirable consumer goods. Socialist citizens depend on their state for the satisfaction of almost every need: housing, education, health care, leisure, to name only a few. Yet given their scarce public resources, socialist administrators must ration their handouts: rank applicants, restriet services, cut quality, and often deny even the most legitimate consumer request. After decades of deprivation, it now has become crucial for the socialist state to make restrictions Iook at least reasonable and fair if it is not to lose the support of its citizenry. Current procedures to protect a citizen against illegal administrative decisions have not been sufficient to convince socialist consumers of the evenhandedness and benevolence of their executives. The Procuracy - in theory responsible to censure all types of illegal behavior- is preoccupied with crime prevention and economic violations. Judicial review, if it is already available, has not yet taken root. And complaints, as we have seen the most common form of redress, come too late to affect the decision-making process itself, are too easily warded offby officials to promise much chance of success, and are handled in an internal review process unbound by precedent and so hidden from a petitioner's view that he will hardly be persuaded ofthe inevitability and justice of an unfavorable response. Hence the dissatisfaction and grumbling so common among socialist citizens and hence, I believe, the likelihood of some kind of reform: "After all, this isamatter affecting the trust between citizen and state." 158 In the end, only a significant rise in their standard ofliving will restore socialist citizens' confidence in their administrations. But short of such an economic solution, and even alongside it, what could the law do to increase civic faith in the socialist state? Judicial review of administrative decisions might not be the best answer anyway. Most cases in which a petitioner questions the legitimacy and fairness of an agency decision will involve needs rather than rights and thus issues that in the West, too, would not be subject to Iitigation: a bigger flat, a place in a nursing home, paint and cement to repair one's apartment. Most complaints will charge insensitivity and inefficiency rather than outright illegality of official decisions and thus, again, could not be raised in a lawsuitespecially if, as in most socialist legal systems, the exercize of discretion is still largely immune to court scrutiny. And, in most cases, socialist governments themselves will not want to depend on their citizens' unlikely litigiousness to hold their officials to account for illegal actions. Hence the need for other ways of strengthening the law's hold over socialist administrations. One way of improving administrative legality without having to rely on the courts would be to increase a citizen's due process protections before the agency's final decision is reached. An applicant might be given a hearing to explain his needs, might be permitted access to the records, or might be allowed tobe assisted by counsel when stating his case. In this fashion, administrative 158
Klaus Heuer, Zum XI. Parteitag der SED: StuR 35 (1986) 435-441 (439).
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decisions could be made more sensitive to a citizen's needs and could anticipate and possibly defuse his objections without the agency's losing control over its policy choices to an outside supervisory institution. To socialist bureaucracies fearing for their omnipotence, administrative due process thus should be less threatening than judicial review. lt would also better conform to the warm and familial picture socialists like to draw ofthe relationship between their state and its citizens: rather than fighting it out in court, applicant and agency together would strive for a commonly acceptable solution. As in a family setting, a decision-maker would Iisten to a citizen's objections (hearing), would openly explain the problern (access to the record), and would even consider the good word of a trusted friend (counsel). But, as in a family, the final decision would still rest with the pater familias, the state. In the past, the internal regulation of administrative behavior thus has come easier to socialist systems than external judicial review procedures. Poland, for instance, introduced a Code of Administrative Procerlure long before establishing administrative courts; 159 the Soviet Union allowed lawyers to represent clients in dealings with the administration before accepting their arguments in judicial proceedings; 160 and even East Germany began to strengthen citizen involvement in the administrative process itself before making first concessions to demands for judicial review. 161 Socialist citizens, well-accustomed to informal encounters with public offleials from their complaint procedures, might also be moreready to use participation rights in the administrative process itselfthan to risk a step further and take the state to court. lt thus seems possible that future reforms might increase a citizen's rights tobe involved in decisions affecting his interests- through hearings, participation in fact-finding, representation by counsel and the like- and that the resulting greater openness and sensitivity of socialist administrative decision-making might decrease a citizen's feelings of helplessness and alienation even without an effective system of court review. A second way of improving the legality of administrative decision-makingand again a way compatible with the self-characterization of socialist legal systems - would be to increase the input of public representatives and organizations into decisions affecting individual citizens. Socialist law has always stressed the importance of public participation in the administration of justice: hence, for instance, the widespread use of comrades' courts and other social tribunals, oflay assessors and social representatives in regular courts, or of social defenders and accusers in criminal trials. In the past, such public participation was mostly used to impress collective interests upon the individuals at court and to educate both parties and audiences about the importance 159 The Polish Code of Administrative Procerlure was passed in 1960. See Klaus-Jürgen Kuss, Rechtsstaatliche Wurzeln in den osteuropäischen Staaten: Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 34 (1985) 589-658 (624). 160 See Statute on the Colleges of Advocates of 30 Nov. 1979, §§ 6 II, 9 I. 1 6 1 Markovits (supra n. 7) 279.
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of obeying the law - that is, participation rights, looking more like participation duties, served to weaken individual independence and to strengthen the dominance of the state. But given the changes in the political climate, it seems possible that public involvement eventually might also be used to shelter a citizen against transgressions by public authority. Recent socialist reform legislation seems to use participation in this protective sense: as a way of strengthening an individual's input into decisions affecting his own welfare. The new Soviet statute on labor collectives, 162 however vague, thus seeks to increase workers' influence over their enterprise, and recent Soviet 163 and Polish 164legislation on the popular discussion of important social questions- again, still in ambivalent and unsatisfactory fashion- aims to do the same for citizens' influence over social developments in general. It is thus conceivable that socialist legal systems, in a similar vein, might use social organizations to represent citizens' interests in a nurober of administrative settings: involve house committees in landlord-tenant disputes, buyers' Aktivs in consumer affairs, parents' associations in decisions affecting schools, or citizen advisory panels in the adrnission processes of such state institutions as universities and old peoples' homes. In fact, numerous organizations already exist under socialism, many ofthem with tasks to participate in the distribution of scarce public resources, which could be used to monitor the legality of administrative decisions. In the past, social participation rights were too ambiguously structured, and participation duties too much of a political chore, for social institutions to be able or willing to function effectively as citizens' interest groups. But if the authority of such social organizations were strengthened and better defined, they might one day take on the role of safeguarding individual rights against arbitrary and illegal administrative decisions. After all, socialist unions, formerly little more than support organizations for enterprise managers, are now slowly evolving into institutions that at least also see it as their duty to represent members' interests against their employer. Socialist political deputies, until now essentially public relations representatives for their governments, may also gradually begin to function as real representatives of the people if recent socialist attempts to reform election procedures and to increase the power and diversity of parliamentary bodies should actually take root. As they slowly emerge from total government control and take on a life of their own, socialist collectives of all sorts could thus begin to shelter a socialist citizen - until now all on his own when facing the state against the cold wind of arbitrary government power. The growing pluralization 162 See Anders Fogelklou, Workers' Participation in the Management of Enterprises and Organizations in the USSR, The 1983 Law on Labour Collectives and Its Implementation: Rev. Socialist L. 12 (1986) 161-174. 163 See the Soviet Statute on the public discussion of important questions of public life of 30 June 1987, Germantranslation in: JbOstR 28, no. 2 (1987) 433. 164 See the Polish statute on social consultations and referenda of 6 May 1987, German translation in: JbOstR 28, no. 2 (1987) 445.
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of socialist societies that we are presently witnessing thus should not only affect their political climate but also the extent to which socialist administrations feel bound by the law. A third factor which could hasten the legalization of administrative decisionmaking in socialist countries would be the growth and the rise in status of the socialist legal profession. Up to now, lawyers - especially those lawyers associated with individual interests, attorneys- have bad only minor impact on everyday socialist life. Few attorneys are available to socialist clients, while American citizens will find one lawyer among 426 citizens 165 and West Germans still one among 1,232, 166 Soviet citizens can count on only one among 13,000 inhabitants, 167 and to East Germans, their one attorney among 29,412 citizens 168 must Iook more like the proverbial needle in the haystack. Those socialist lawyers who do engage in private practice must do much of their work free of charge (a reflection of the value placed on their efforts by the socialist state), must be careful not to seem too pushy on behalf of their clients, 169 and often must rely on payments under the counter to make an acceptable living. Official providers of legal advice - like the legal information hureaus often attached to socialist courts or like an enterprise jurisconsult holding office hours for the benefit of employees - may seem too closely linked to authority to inspire unguarded confidence and will have neither time nor energy to throw their weight behind a client's case. Socialist citizens who feel aggrieved by some administrative decision thus cannot naturally turn to a legalprofessionready to stand up for their rights. All this is unlikely to change over night. But the present wave of reforms may encourage the slow growth and strengthening of the socialist legal profession, which in turn might Iead to an increased willingness by officials to Iisten to legal argumentation and to observe legal rules. Socialist governments today are talking about the reform of their legal profession, and socialist lawyers are poshing for an extension of their numbers and rights. In the Soviet Union, for instance, the Ministry of Higher Education recently decided to improve the quality of legal education and to reduce the number of evening and correspondence students. 170 Work is under way to expand the rights of defense counsel. 171 In East Germany, a current revision of the Code of Criminal 165 My calculation is based on data cited by Mare Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society: UCLA L. Rev. 31 (1983) 4-71 (52, 54). 166 My calculation is basedonStatistisches Jahrbuch BRD 1988, 330, 654. 167 Hastrich (supra n. 104) 218. 168 My calculation is based on Brandt, Der Rechtsanwalt und der Anwaltsnotar in der DDR (1985) 166, who reports that as oflast count, 568 attomeys were practicing in East Germany. 169 See Huskey (supra n. 113). 170 See Schroeder (supra n. 101). 171 Solomon (supra n. 109) 546.
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Procerlure will also increase the rights of defense lawyers. 172 And in June 1988, the East German system of legal education, until then bifurcated into an "economics" curriculum (training future jurisconsults) and a "justice" curriculum (training judges and attomeys), was amended to allow for a "specialization in administrative law," designed to deepen and better focus the legal knowledge of future public servants. 173 While reforms like thesewill not give a citizen more claims on his administration, they should nevertheless increase respect for the law, legitimate law-talk, and thus bolster an individual's position who insists on fair treatment by administrative authorities. B. The Limits of Law Reform
Even without a full-fledged system of judicial review, without the vigorous judicial scrutiny of discretion, and certainly without dass actions, public interest Iitigation, and similar political uses of judicial review, socialist law thus might slowly begin to soften a citizen's dependence on the all-powerful state. Should this happen, it would still be too early to speak of a socialist "rule oflaw." Given the ambivalence ofthe recent statutory reforms, their apolitical nature, the likely reluctance of socialist judges to censure the state, and the unwillingness of socialist citizens to sue it, most ofthe blessings of socialist law reformwill have to work in indirect ways: through the gradual raising of official respect for a citizen's rights rather than through Iitigation. Ifwe define a Rechtsstaat as a state where power is limited by the law even against the will of the powerful, socialist states are still unlikely to deserve the description. Their law will only rarely be used to challenge state authority on behalf ofindividual self-determination. The state is still a parental authority, permitting itself tobe sued for pocket money, but otherwise using the law to further its own designs.
But for the ordinary socialist citizen not much may turn on whether his govemment's policies can be effectively challenged in court. No law, however cutting and powerful, could alter the fact that for most ofhis everyday needs he must continue to rely on the state. Our heroic model ofpublic law Iitigationthe autonomaus individual using the law to protect private prerogatives against transgressions by public authority- does not correspond to a socialist citizen's daily experience of all-pervasive dependence. The role of David, slinging his legal arguments at Goliath the state, does not fit him. lt may not fit many capitalist citizens either. We know that our law is more accessible to the strong than the weak, more useful for the have's than the have172 Karl-Heinz Beyer, Entwicklung des Strafverfahrensrechts und Neugestaltung der StPO: Neue Justiz 42 (1988) 335-337 (336). 173 Konzeption für die Gestaltung der Aus- und Weiterbildung der Juristen in der DDR. Beschluß des Politbureaus des Zentralkomitees der SED vom 31. Mai 1988 1 Beschluß des Ministerrates der DDR vom 8. Juni 1988: Neue Justiz 42 (1988) 320-323 (322).
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not's. 174 Hence our growing doubts about the effectiveness of our adversary model, our worries that Iitigation may in fact not achieve "the translation of rights into social reform" 175 at least in those settings in which prospective plaintiffs, like socialists, depend on the state for sustenance and support. Especially in the area of welfare law, capitalist scholars today are wondering whether the judicial enforcement of rights will be of much use to their clients; whether judicial review can ever effectively control administrative discretion; whether instead of celebrating an illusory legal autonomy, we should not acknowledge the reality of dependence, 176 and whether rather than trying to break this dependence through Iitigation, we should not try to soften and humanize it through participation, cooperation, and the establishment of a "dialogic community" between administrators and citizens. 177 All this, of course, is what socialists claimed to do all along in their administrative complaint procedures: allow an aggrieved citizen to raise his concerns in an informal, easily accessible process which would enable officials, often through personal talks, 178 to assess an applicant's needs and to work together with him, "in comradely cooperation," 179 for a solution acceptable to both sides. Yet, for all their supposed warmth and sensitivity, socialist complaint procedures have not successfully curbed the license and arrogance of socialist state officials. The complaint process failed in this respect, because without any real legal or political accountability to their constituencies, socialist administrators saw no need to enter into a meaningful dialogue with their clients. Socialist law, up to now, has not cast enough of a shadow in which individual and administration would effectively bargain with each other. lt is unlikely that the new legislation on judicial review, on its own, will very much change this imbalance of power between socialist citizen and administration. The mere availability, on paper, of a citizen's right to sue the state in a limited number of instances will not be enough of a bargaining chip to persuade socialist administrators of the need to Iisten to their clients. Like capitalist welfare clients, socialist citizens will be reluctant to sue, will often pursue claims, which because of their substantive nature, do not lend themselves easily to Iitigation, and will have difficulties finding judges willing to censure the misuse 174 Mare Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change: Law & Soc'y Rev. 9 (1974) 95. 175 Joel Grossman I Austin Sarat, Access to Justice and the Limits ofLaw: Law and Pub. Pol'y Q. 3 (1981) 125 ff. (136). 176 William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System: Stan. L. Rev. 38 (1986) 1431-1516. 177 Hand/er (supra n. 93). 178 Hans-Joachim Sem/er, Hohe Ansprüche an Eingabenbearbeitung: Neue Justiz 39 (1985) 233, reporting on the practice of some local government bodies in East Germany to deal with "the vast majority of complaints in personal talks with the complainants." 179 Wolfgang Bernet I Axel Schöwe I Richard Schüler, Funktion, Gestaltung und Wirksamkeit von Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht in der DDR: StuR 35 (1986) 612-622 (614).
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of administrative discretion. Judicial review alone cannot settle what one American welfare law scholar has called "the question of power," 180 Lenin's famous question "who-whom?," which needs to be addressed and resolved if administration and citizen are to deal with each other in open and cooperative fashion. But, unlike capitalist welfare clients, socialist citizens do have some hold over their state. Their support is essential if socialist systems are not only to survive but to flourish. The socialist state's desperate need for legitimacy and compliance (ofwhich the new statutes onjudicial review arejust one expression) may thus provide that bit of civic "power" that could persuade socialist administrations to Iisten to their constituencies and that, I believe, willlead to the slow and gradual permeation of socialist bureaucracies with more law and more lawyers. If, in the old days, totalitarian administrations could occasionally be mademorehuman with the help of corruption- "you'll find a Mensch ifyou find a bureauerat who takes bribes" 181 -modern socialist adrninistrations, I believe, will be increasingly humanized through the power oflaw. But it will be a slow and diffuse growth process and a long time before socialist citizens Iook to the law as their natural refuge against the state. C. Postscript
My survey of the likely future of a socialist rule of law until now has not questioned one essential assumption: the continued existence of socialism. These days, when each morning's newspaper brings astounding reports of events in the Soviet Union and ofthe ripples they cause throughout the socialist world, I find myself sometimes wondering whether that assumption is really unshakable. Why should any political system be immortal? When I was a little girl in the British Occupation Zone of Germany, I had a dress that my mother had made out of an old Nazi flag, exchanged for a few Lucky Strikes or some similar currency from someone who saw no further use for it. My mother removed the white circle with its black swastika and, I should think, cut with relish into the solid red cloth. Today, East European law reforms are cutting into a different kind of red cloth: the ideological fabric of socialism as we have come to know it over the decades. No one can foretell what garment will be fashioned from it in the end. Maybe the socialism of the future will renounce its claim to collective cohesiveness, forsake its efforts to educate the new man, give up its trust in central planning, and thus will no Iongerbeat odds with the ideological premises of judicial review. But then we will have to find a new name for it.
180 181
Hand/er (supra n. 93) 1020. Bertholt Brecht, Flüchtlingsgespräche (1988) 14.
Certainty of Price Barry Nicholas* I first met J ohn and N ancy Merryman at the Institute of Comparative Law in Romein 1964, when he was consolidating his enviable command of ltalian law and I was taking part in a seminar on the law of sale of goods. I offer as a small tribute to him, and as a mark of appreciation of the friendship that he and N ancy then showed me, some reflexions on one aspect of that subject.
I. The U .N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods A question which gave rise to much discussion and vigorous disagreement in the course of drafting the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and in the debates at Vienna before the final text was settled, was that ofwhether there can be a contract of sale which does not, in the words of article 55 of the Convention, "expressly or implicitly fix or make provision for determining the price". The outcome of the debate was two provisions (articles 14(1) and 55) which are, at least at first sight, in conflict and the reconciliation of which has already given rise to differing views. 1 It is to be feared that different national courts will interpret these articles differently, according to the view takenon the matter by their domestic law. My concern here, however, is not to re-enter the controversy on the interpretation ofthe two articles, but to Iook at the background to the differing national views and in particular at the related question ofthe extent to which the price can be fixed by one of the parties.
* The Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford University. Abbreviations: D. = Recueil Dalloz Sirey; Gaz. Pal. = Gazette du Palais; J.C.P. = Juris Classeur Periodique, La Semaine Juridique; Rev. trim. dr. civ. = Revue trimestrielle de droit civil. 1 A/Conf. 97/18, 10 Apr. 1980, reprinted in Int'l Legal Materials 19 (1980) 668-699 (cited: Convention); see John 0. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention (1982) 136 f.; Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1986) 50 f.; G. Eörsi, Article 55, Open-prlee Contracts, in: Commentary on the International Sales Law, ed. by C. M. Biancaf M. J. Boneil (1987) 401-409 (406 f.); Denis Talion, The Buyer's Obligations under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, in: International Sales, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, ed. by Nina M. Galstonf Hans Smit (1984) §§ 7.01-7.04 (§ 7.03).
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Insistence on a fixed (or determinable) price came from three different quarters. Some socialist states, and in particular the Soviet Union, were concerned that the absence of a fixed price would undermine the central control of state trading contracts. (The same concern led to the provision 2 allowing states to preserve a requirement that the contract, or its modification or termination, for example, should be in writing). Some developing countries feared that if there could be a contract without a fixed price, they might find themselves saddled willy nilly with the seller's price. For whereas, it was said, there is usually an ascertainable market price for the primary commodities which, on the whole, are sold by developing countries, this is not equally true of the manufactured goods which they buy. But there was a significant body of opinion which argued for a fixed (or determinable) price from a dogmatic standpoint. To put the matter in terms of eighteenth century naturallaw, a price was one of the essentials of a sale and therefore no sale could exist until the price was fixed or ascertainable. This, of course, in common with many such propositions, goes back to the ratio scripta of Roman law. I recall indeed that on more than one occasion at meetings of the Working Group which was drafting the text a distinguished Latin American representative declaimed in Latin the statement in the Institutes of Justinian that there can be no sale without a price and the price must be certain. Not that such an approach is confined to countries ofthe Roman tradition. Justice Story said 3 that the requirement of a fixed price was "the language of common sense" (which is no doubt the common lawyer's equivalent ofthe eighteenth century civilian's "right reason"). And the High Court of Australia 4 has described as "anomalous" the provision in the Australian (and English) Sale ofGoods Act that ifno price is fixed, a reasonable price is payable.
II. The Roman Rule The Roman rule is particularly strict, however, and the extent to which, if at all, modern civillaw systems agree with my Latin American colleague reflects the extent to which they have shaken off their Roman inheritance. The Roman rule was strict in that in an executory contract of sale the price, if not specified, had at least to be immediately ascertainable at the time of the making of the contract by reference to some existing measure (for example, today's market price, or what the seller bought the thing for). To this rule one exception was finally adrnitted by Justinian: that the price could be left to be fixed by a named third party (but if, in the event, the third party did not fix it, the contract failed). 2
3 4
Convention art. 12. Flagg v. Mann (1837) 2 Sumner's United States Circuit Court Reports 538. Hall v. Busst (1960) 104 Commonwealth Law Reports 206, 222, per Fullagar J.
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The Roman lawyers do not offer any justification for their strict rule, but it was relevant to determining not only when the contract became actionable but also when the risk passed (and it is not always clear which question is under consideration). In sofaras there was an underlying policy reason for the rule as to the passing of risk, it was probably that offered by the German commentators ofthe nineteenth century, 5 namely that the risk should pass to the buyer when he was entitled to take the goods (Abholungsprinzip). He could only be so entitled when the goods had been identified and, since payment and delivery are, to use traditional common law terms, concurrent conditions, the price must be ascertainable at that time also. lt is presumably this which accounts for a rule which has caused some difficulty. In the Digest 6 it is said that where the whole of a mass of goods is sold at so much a unit, the sale is conditional (and the risk does not therefore pass) until the goods have been measured or counted out. This is stated as having been the view of the Sabinian school. The view of the Proculian school is not given and has presumably been expunged by J ustinian, but it is not difficult to see what their argument would have been. The price, though not known, is just as ascertainable as in the case of a sale for what the seller paid for the goods (or the other, more far-fetched, example in the text 7 of a sale for whatever money the buyer has in his cash-box). All that is necessary in all these cases is a calculation or checking of existing facts. And yet, on the Abholungsprinzip, the Sabinian view is right. For if it is the seller who is to do the measuring or counting (as it usually will be and as the illustrations given in the Digesttext assume), the ability of the buyer to take the goods on tendering the price depends on an act of the seller's and therefore no risk should pass until the seller has acted.
Curiously, this controversy of the schools (if that is what it was) was unwittingly revived by Williston in the drafting of the Uniform Sales Act. The Sale ofGoods Act, in section 18, rule 3, adopts what had become established as the common law rule, which is identical with the Sabinian rule (except that it makes explicit the Iimitation to the case where it is the seller who is to do the measuring, and so on). 8 Williston, 9 noting that this was the same as the Roman rule, concluded that there was little doubt that it was a borrowing from Roman law and from Pothier, and excluded it from the Uniform Sales Act. In fact it does not seem that Lord Ellenborough, who, in Hanson v. Meyer, 10 established the 5 E.g., August Bechmann, Der Kauf nach gemeinem Recht 2 (1884) 340; Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts li (9th ed. 1906) § 321 at nn. 18, 19. 6 Dig. 18, 1, 35, 5. 7 Dig. 18, 1, 7, 1. 8 I pass over Williston's decision to omit the requirement that the buyer should have notice of the measuring, etc. 9 Samuel Williston, The Law Governing Sales ofGoods at Common Law and under the Uniform Sales Act (rev. ed. 1948) § 267. 10 (1805) 6 East's King's Bench Reports 614.
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rule, was borrowing from Roman law at all, either directly or through Pothier. He justified the rule by what amounts to the Abholungsprinzip and makes no reference to any civillaw authority.U Roman law, as we have seen, eventually allowed that the fixing of the price might be left, conditionally, to a named third party. Justinian's ruling on the matter does not extend this to the case where the fixing of the price is left to one ofthe parties themselves, and the only text in the Digest on the matter says that a contract in these terms is "imperfect". This is not, however, entirely clear, since the word can mean either "void" or "conditionally valid". Tothis weshall return.
111. Modern National Views The strict Roman rule was not unreasonable for the relatively simple commercial framework of the ancient world and it is only in the period since the industrial revolution that trade has broken out ofthat framework. It is therefore not surprising that it is in those systems which assumed their modern shape Iongest ago that the Roman rule remains strongest. lt has often been remarked that the society reflected in much ofthe French Civil Code as it was enacted is a predominantly pre-industrial rural society and this is particularly true of the part with which we are concerned. For it follows closely the lines of Pothier's treatise of more than forty years before, and that in turn was largely a restatement of Roman law. Moreover, the requirement of a fixed price is reinforced and made applicable mutatis mutandis, to all contracts, as the Cour de cassation has recently laid down, 12 by the requirement that every contract must have an objet and that the objet must inter alia be certain. To this also we shall return. It is French law therefore, and those systems which follow an unmodified version of the Code civil, which are most rigid in this matter. 13
The nineteenth century saw relaxations elsewhere. The German Pandectists, 14 by invoking a varying blend of obliquely relevant texts and the maid-of-all-work of the deemed intention of the parties, were able to include in what was ascertainable by express reference to an external standard, not merely a reference to a market price or a factory or catalogue price, but also a reference 11 Williston was also mistaken in thinking that the Roman rule owed its place to the need to determine "whether a particular bargain is properly called a sale". It owed its place to the logic of the rule as to risk. 12 Cass. civ., 11 Oct. 1978, D. 1979, 139 note Houin, J.C.P. 1979 II, 19034 note Loussouarn; cf. Yvon Loussouarn, Obligationsen general: Rev. trim. dr. civ. (1979) 126141 (129-138) (cited Loussouarn). 13 Fora comprehensive summary survey seeErnst Rabe/, Das Recht des Warenkaufs II (1956) 7-17. 14 E.g., Bechmann (supra n. 5) 351; Windscheid (supra n.5) II § 390.
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merely to what was fair or reasonable. And even beyond this, if there were no mention of a price (but an intention to be bound), they could find that it must have been intended that the seller should have a fair price. Sirnilarly, ifthe price were left to be fixed by a party, texts could be found to justify by analogy a presumption that the fixing should be according to the judgment of a fairminded man. 15 In consequence, when the German Civil Code was drafted all this could be subsumed in a few general provisions 16 on the content of all contracts. If the content of the performance required of a party is to be determined by a third party or by one of the parties themselves, there is a presumption that it is to be a fair estimate, rather than being left to his unfettered discretion. If no provision is made for deterrnining the content, there is a presumption that the deterrnination is to be made by the party who is entitled to the performance; and this determination itself is of course subject to the preceding presumption. In both cases if the estimate is not fair, the other party can ask a court to make a determination. The same rule applies ifthe third party delays the making ofthe estimate or, of course, a fortiori if he refuses to make it. It is only where the estimate lies in the free discretion ofthe third party that the contract is void ifhe fails to act. lt was only in the same period that the English courts first accepted that if no price was fixed or otherwise determinable, a reasonable price was payable, 17 and this was of course incorporated in the Sale of Goods Act (enacted between the first and the final drafts oftheGerman Civil Code), but otherwise neither that Act nor the Uniform Sales Act made any venture in the direction mapped by the German draftsmen. 18 lt was left to the Uniform Commercial Code to adopt in section 2- 305 a set of rules which are in substance not far from those of German law. For subsection (4), if expressed in German terms, creates a presumption that where the price is tobe fixed or agreed, the parties intend that, ifit is not so fixed or agreed, a reasonable price shall be payable. What is missing is the possibility of attacking a price fixed by a third party on the ground that it is not fair, and the presumption that ifno provision is made for deterrnining the price, the seller is to fix it. But since he must fix it fairly and since, in default, it will be fixed by the court, this difference is probably not very significant. In the meantime the draftsmen of the current ( 1942) version of the ltalian Civil Code had broken away from the French tradition and had adopted provisions 19 which were in substance even closer to the German. There are three principal differences. 15 16 17 18
19
Rechmann (supra n. 5) 355. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch§§ 314-319. Valpy v. Gibson (1847) 4 English Common Bench Reports 837. The Sale of Goods Act did not of course set out to be a reforming statute. Arts. 1346, 1349, 1473, 1474.
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1. If the price is not otherwise fixed and the thing sold is of a kind normally sold by the seller, there is a presumption that the price is to be that normally charged by the seller. But the courts have restricted this to cases in which the seller has an extensive trade in the things in question or in which he has had past dealings with the buyer. 20 2. Where the nominated third party fails to fix the price (or the parties fail to agree on a nomination) it falls to the president of the court of the place in which the contract was made, not to fix a price himself, but to nominate a third party who will. And, even more unusually, this is the solution applied to the case where no price is fixed or determinable. And yet where the Codedeals with the failure by a third party to determine the "object" of a contract 21 (of which the determination ofthe price would seem tobe a particular instance), the price is fixed by the trial judge. And the same solution is applied where, in a contract of appalto (hire of services), no price is fixed or determinable. 22 3. No reference is made to the determination ofthe price by one ofthe parties and the undisputed view seems tobethat a contract subject to such a provision is void. 23 French law has remained true to the strict tradition, however, and has indeed in one important respect become stricter. Wehaveseen that the Romantexts left tenuously open a possibility of maintaining that a contract which left the price to be fixed by one of the parties themselves was, like one which left it tobe fixed by a third party, conditionally valid. Some medieval commentators 24 exploited this possibility by invoking texts which, in the context of other contracts, construed a party's power to deterrnine one or more elements as being exercisable according to the judgment of a reasonable man (viri boni arbitratu). The German Pandectists 25 embraced this opinion and, as we have seen, it is incorporated in the German Civil Code, but not in the ltalian, which in this respect remains in the French tradition. For French law the matter is settled by an unquestioned and often followed decision of the Cour de cassation of 1925, 26 that the price is sufficiently "fixed and specified by the parties" (article 1591 Code civil) if the price "can be determined in virtue of the provisions of the contract by reference to elements which do not depend on the will of either of the parties." The seller's list price at the time of delivery is therefore not sufficient. On the other band a 2
° Corte di cassazione, decision of 8 Jan. 1966, no. 139, Giustizia civile 1966 I, 701.
Codice civile art. 1349. Id. art. 1657. 23 Domenico Rubino, La Compravendita (2d ed. 1962) 246. 24 See, e.g., Corpus Iuris Civilis cum D. Gothofredi et aliorum notis (1663), on Dig. 18, 1, 35, 1. 25 See, e.g., Windscheid (supra n. 5) II § 386 at n.6. 26 Cass. requetes, 7 Jan. 1925, Dalloz, Recueil hebdomadaire de jurisprudence (1925) 57. 21
22
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sale by a retailer at the manufacturer's Iist price at the time of delivery is valid, since the manufacturer is a third party. 27 The underlying rationale of this has been made clear in a flood of cases since 1978 relating to the farniliar type of contract in which one party, in return for assistance, financial or otherwise, provided by the other party, agrees to take his supplies of the relevant commodity (for example, beer or gasoline) exclusively from that other or from a supplier or suppliers specified by that other. In such contracts the price at which such future supplies will be made is commonly determined, in France as elsewhere, by reference in some form or other to the other party's standing rate at the time of delivery and therefore violates the principle laid down by the Cour de cassation in 1925. At first it seemed that it rnight be possible to bypass this difficulty, because, whatever the status of each individual order for supplies, the framework contract cannot usually be construed as a sale. In 1978, however, it was decided,28 in relation to a brewery's contracts with the retail outlets for its beer, that the principle laid down in 1925 applied also to the requirement in article 1129 Code civil that the objet of a contract (or, more precisely, of an obligation )29 must be deterrnined. The objet of the retail outlet's obligation is not sufficiently determined if one of its elements, namely the price at which it undertakes to take its supplies, depends on the will of the other party. Since then a long series of contracts relating to a variety of commodities has been struck down. 30 Suppliers have devised various formulae, but few have been upheld. A reference to the price habitually charged by the supplier for goods of the same quality supplied in the same area to customers ofthe same category has been held to embody "no precise and objective element of reference such as to make the price independent of the will" of the supplier, 31 though it seems that such a formula, if plainly referring to open market customers, as opposed to those covered by an exclusive dealing contract, may be acceptable. A clause leaving the price to be fixed by a third party is of course adrnissible, but very cumbersome. A more practical device is to fix the price by reference to the average of the prices of the supplier's main competitors, though to be beyond risk this formula should name the competitors. 32 lt is obvious that the insistence that the price (or, more widely, the objet of a party's obligation) must not be left to the will of either party is not founded on a Cass. civ., 30 Oct. 1979, D. 1980 Informations Rapides 569. See supra n. 12. 29 See Barry Nicholas, French Law of Contract (1982) 108 f. 30 SeeJacques Mestre, Obligationsen general: Rev. trim. dr. civ. (1987) 84-106 (94-98), with references. See also Gerard Farjat I Gilles J. Martin; Objet du contrat, in: Jurisclasseur civil (1985), arts. 1126-1130, fase.!; cases in D. 1988 Sommaire 20. 31 Cass. com., 25 Feb. 1986, cited by Mestre (supra n. 30) 96. 32 Cass. com., 21 June 1977, Gaz. Pa!. 1977 Panorama de Jurisprudence ( = Pan.) 331; Cass. com., 27 Apr. 1981, Gaz. Pa!. 1981 Pan. 343 note Philippe Je Tourneau. 27
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fear of arbitrariness in itself, since French law, unlike German or ltalian law, does not attempt to control the arbitrary fixing ofthe price or the objet by a third party (except perhaps under the general rules as to fraud). It is the giving of arbitrary power to one of the parties to fix the rights or duties of hirnself or the other party that is found tobe objectionable, regardless ofhow in the event that power is exercised. What is ostensibly a question of certainty of objet is treated as ifthe principle tobe applied were the quite different one that a promise is void if it is in the unrestricted power of the promisor to perform or not. As the ltalian Civil Code puts it (article 1355): "The alienation ofa right or the assumption ofa duty subject to a suspensive condition which makes it dependent on the mere will of the alienor or, as the case may be, the person under the duty, is void." The French Civil Code expresses the same principle in more traditional language, deriving from Roman law (article 1174): "An obligation contracted subject to a potestative condition on the part of the person obliged is void." Or, in the language of the common law, an illusory promise is no consideration. It is obviously true that if it is the buyer, to take the case of a simple sale, who has the power to fix the price, his duty to pay can be said to be subject to a potestative condition and the contract is therefore vitiated. Of course it is possible to escape from this conclusion by implying an obligation to act in good faith and thereby giving the power an objective character, as is donein the UCC and the German Civil Code, 33 but this would be inconsistent with the strict approach favoured by French law. In any event, however, in the practical situation with which we are concerned it is not the buyer who is to fix the price, but the seller and to that the rule on potestative conditions is irrelevant. It would seem that the reason why the courts have used the requirement of certainty of objet (or price) in this way in order to forestall even the possibility that the supplier may abuse his power, isthat the practical effect of the rule as to obligations subject to a potestative condition has been not to protect the conditional debtor from being compelled to perform his obligation, but to protect the creditor from abuse ofhis position by the debtor. 34 For in itselfthe statement in article 1174 of the French Civil Code, or article 1355 of the Italian, is a truism. 35 A promise to pay "ifl feellike it" is ofits nature unenforceable. The practical importance of article 1174lies in its effect on the creditor. The fact that a promise to repay a loan "if I sell my house" is void will enable the creditor to claim immediate repayment in quasi-contract. In a situation such as this, therefore, article 1174 protects the creditor from the arbitrary power of the debtor. And French courts in recent years, in applying the article, have looked to this underlying policy in finding their way through the tangle of distinctions Supra textat nn. 16-19. Jacques Ghestin, L'indetermination du prix de vente et Ia condition potestative: D. 1973 Chronique 293-298. 35 Cf. Nicholas (supra n. 29) 156 ff. 33
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which has grown up around the question whether a condition is to be construed as potestative within the meaning of the article or not. Having become accustomed to using the rule as to potestative conditions on the part of the debtor in order to protect the creditor, the courts have found it easy to apply the same policy to potestative conditions on the part of the creditor where these impinge on the analytically quite different requirement that the price (or the objet) be sufficiently certain. This requirement has thus been used as an instrument to protect the retailer against the possibility of abuse of economic power by the !arge supplier. But the instrument is a clumsy one. 36 It Iooks to the question whether the provision is capable of being abused, not to whether in the actual situation it is abused. lt does not inquire what the relative economic positions of the parties are; it simply Iooks at the words used. This has led to some (unsuccessful) resistance by lower courts, 37 on the ground that in fact in the particular context the small retailer is not being pushed around by the big supplier. The intensity of competition is sufficient to make sure of that. On the contrary, the retailer who has benefitted by the exclusive dealing arrangement is encouraged to take advantage of the loophole provided by the law when the balance of advantage seems to shift. Finally, since the ostensible issue is whether the contract is validly made, not whether an otherwise valid contract is vitiated by abuse, the effect of an adverse decision is to declare the contract absolutely, and not merely relatively, null, 38 as it should be ifthe ground ofnullity is abuse.
IV. Conclusion This article took as its starting-point the provisions as to certainty of price in the U.N. Convention on International Sales and the risk that the obscurity of those provisions might Iead to differing interpretations in different national courts. No doubt, as Talion has said, 39 "there are weaker parties in international sales and they need protection", but it will be a pity if French courts apply to international sales, under the guise of enforcing a requirement of certainty of price, such a clumsy device for the prevention of the abuse of economic power. 40 36 For criticisms see Loussouarn (supra n. 12) 129-138; Paul Pigassau, La distribution integree: Rev. trim. dr. commercial33 (1980) 473-544 (517 f.); Philippe Rhny, Contracts speciaux: Rev. trim. dr. civ. (1983) 351-357 (351f.). 37 See, e.g., Cass. com., 14 Jan. 1980, J.C.P. 1981 II, 1985 note Gross. 38 See Nicholas (supra n. 29) 74 f. 39 Supra n. 1. 40 Since the matter can be seen as concerning the certainty ofthe objet and therefore the validity ofthe contract, and since questions ofvalidity are excluded from the Convention, "except as otherwise expressly provided" (art. 4), theproblem is posed ofwhether recourse to the domestic law relating to the objet is permissible in the face ofthe express provisions ofthe Convention as to price. On the general question see Schiechtriern (supra n. 1) 33. On the defects of the doctrine of the objet see Gino Gorla, The Theory of the Object of Contract in Civil Law, A Critical Analysis by Means ofthe Comparative Method: Tu!. L. Rev. 28 (1954) 442-461.
La justicia penal en Ia investigaciön socio-juridica de America Latina Rogelio Perez Perdomo*
I. Introduccion En America Latina los estudios penales tienen dos vertientes principales, la juridica y la criminol6gica. Los estudios juridicos (derecho penal y procesal penal) estan referidos a las reglas contenidas en los c6digos penales y en los c6digos de procedimiento penal, o conforme al nombre mäs antiguo, de enjuiciamiento criminal. Los mäs tradicionales eran un comentario de los c6digos, los mäs modernos insisten sobre todo en los principios rectores del area penal y como esos principios deben llevarnos a reinterpretar los articulos de los c6digos e integrar las creaciones jurisprudenciales y doctrinarias. Hay estudios juridico-penales desde la segunda rnitad del siglo XIX y entre los ejemplos mas impresionantes del grado de erudici6n y nivel de abstracci6n en esta vertiente pueden mencionarse los tratados de Jimenez de Asua, Nufiez, y Soler. 1 La criminologia corresponde a una tradici6n intelectual distinta. Se present6 en el rnismo siglo XIX como un estudio more physico de los delincuentes y de las causas del delito. Del Olmo ha subrayado que la crirninologia tradicional de America Latina consisti6 fundamentalmente en la difusi6n de modelos desarrollados en Europa para el estudio del delito. 2 El tema del funcionamiento de la justicia penal queda fuera de las perspectivas tradicionales de estas disciplinas. No corresponde a un estudio de reglas y principios (salvo aquellas que la regulan en abstracto) ni de los delincuentes y causas del delito. Sin embargo, progresivamente se ha hecho unejede interes, en parte por haberse convertido lajusticia penal misma en un problema social y en parte porque las disciplinas penales se han transformado internamente y focalizan hacia ella su atenci6n. Comencemos por este segundo aspecto. La criminologia contemporanea se ha interesado en los procesos de criminalizaci6n y en la actividad de los
* Profesor de Derecho en Ja Escuela de Derecho de Ia Universidad Central de Venezuela. 1 Luis Jimenez de Asua, Tratado de derecho penal (2a. ed. 1958, 1a. ed. 1950); Ricardo Nufiez, Derecho penal argentino (1959); Sebastiim So/er, Derecho penal argentino (3a. reimpr. 1956). 2 Rosa Dei 0/mo, America Latina y su criminologia (3a. ed. 1987, 1a. ed. 1981). 17 Merryman Festschrift
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poderosos y de las fuerzas del orden como hechos criminales. Esto la ha llevado a interesarse directamente en el funcionarniento de los tribunales o en su incapacidad para castigar determinados tipos de delitos. Inclusive la criminologia se ha organizado en grupos regionales con un claro programa de transformar su disciplina. 3 El derecho penal ha sido mäs lento en su transformaci6n, pero varios penalistas latinoamericanos han realizado el anälisis de las regulaciones y teorias penales preguntändose si realmente contribuyen a la realizaci6n de una sociedad donde se respeten los derechos humanos y, en general, han vinculado los temas penales con las condiciones sociales de los paises latinoamericanos. Ejemplos de estas perspectivas convergentes son las obras dirigidas por Zaffaroni sobre los sistemas penales y los derechos humanos en America Latina 4 y una obra como la de Linares que muestra que los fraudes en los alimentos, verdaderos delitos con un efecto importante en la salud publica, no son penalmente perseguidos en Venezuela. 5 Aun cuando podriamos citar un cierto numero de estudios como estos, el anälisis del funcionamiento de los tribunales en si cuenta con un numero mucho mäs escaso de trabajos. Esta escasez estä particularmente explicada por los paradigmas cientificos que han dominado las disciplinas penales y que solo en las ultimas dos decadas han comenzado a cambiar. Pero debemos agregar que hay tambien explicaciones sociales: la inseguridad ciudadana y el incremento de la delincuencia son fen6menos relativamente nuevos. Tres decadas aträs no tenian la importancia que tienen ahora. La presi6n para que el sistema de justicia castigue los delincuentes de altos ingresos (por delitos de fraude, de peculado y de träfico de drogas) es tambien bastante reciente. Por otra parte, la carrera de 3 Lola Aniyar de Castro, Un Iargo editorial, La historia aun no contada de Ia criminologia latinoamericana: Capitulo Criminol6gico 9 I 10 (1981 I 82) 7-22. La tesis de Dei Olmo (supra n. 2) es Ia dependencia de Ia criminologia latinoamericana de los organismos internacionales controlados por los paises europeos y los Estados Unidos y funcionales para un orden mundial. Aniyar de Castro destaca que el trabajo sobre los nuevos temas como delincuencia-politica, delito econ6mico, delitodelas transnacionales, violencia, terrorismo de Estado, han sido escogidos por los latinoamericanos para sus reuniones, que son temas de especial relevancia para Ia regi6n y son generalmente criticos del orden establecido. Lo que aqui interesa destacar es que Ia transformaci6n de Ia criminologia, en America Latina y en otros continentes, esta llevando a interesarse en el funcionamiento de los tribunales y de lajusticia penal y que este interes coincide con el de Ia sociologia del derecho. Ver Emiro Sandoval Huertas, EI sistema penal colombiano desde Ia perspectiva de Ia criminologia critica, en: Criminologia critica (1984) 131-161; Alessandro Baratta, Criminologia critica y critica del derecho penal (1986); Juan Bustos Ramirez, Criminologia critica y derecho penallatinoamericano, en: Criminologia critica (1984) 163-176. 4 Insfitufo Inter-Americano de Derechos Humanos, Sistemas penales y derechos humanos en America Latina (bajo Ia direcci6n de Eugenio Rau! Zaffaroni, 1er informe 1984, informe final1986). 5 Myrla Linares Alemim, Los fraudes en los alimentos (1981).
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investigador no se ha institucionalizado realrnente en Ia Arnerica Latina. Los profesores tienden a ser pagados con salarios que los obligan a tener otra actividad rernunerada y Ia publicaci6n de obras rigurosas de investigaci6n no es, de hecho, estirnulada. EI acadernico es rnas un difusor del conocirniento producido que un productor el misrno. Existe tarnbien una dificultad real en publicar y rnuchos trabajos que se producen, bien sean aplicados o de investigaci6n basica, no llegan nunca a publicarse. EI nurnero de publicaciones es asi rnas bajo en Arnerica Latina que en Estados Unidos o Europa. En las paginas que siguen intentarnos presentar y cornentar algunos trabajos que nos parecen significativos sobre el funcionarniento de Ia justicia penal en distintos paises de Arnerica Latina. Corno las publicaciones de Arnerica Latina no estan incluidas en bancos de datos bibliograficos ni existen bibliograflas lo suficienternente cornpletas para estar razonablernente seguro que nada irnportante se queda fuera, este trabajo tiene un alcance rnerarnente tentativo. Corno, de todas rnaneras, las investigaciones que seran analizadas no son todas bien conocidas, este trabajo puede tener un cierto interes a este respecto.
II. EI proceso penal: duraciön y disfunciones Con frecuencia se describe al proceso penal de Ia tradici6n rornano-can6nica a Ia cual pertenece Arnerica Latina corno inquisitorio, rnientras que el de Ia cornrnon law se lo considera acusatorio. En el prirnero el juez actua corno buscador de Ia verdad, rnientras que en el segundo es rnas bien un arbitro. Esta dicotornia es segurarnente util en terminos hist6ricos, pues arnbos sisternas parecen estar acercandose en sus principios y procedirnientos. 6 Lo que conviene observar es que, en teoria, arnbos sisternas establecen en el proceso penallas garantias para que los derechos de libertad y en general los derechos individuales, sean respetados. EI viejo caräcter inquisitorio esta presente en el rasgo de Ia escritura: en Arnerica Latina lo que ocurra en un proceso penal debe ser minuciosarnente escrito. Esto lleva a que Ia actividad de los abogarlos sea sobre todo Ia de presentar escritos ante el juez y que las decisiones de este sean tarnbien escritos que eventualrnente son leidos al procesado. Este rasgo haria distante al juez de los actores del proceso y, en particular, del procesado. EI proceso misrno se burocratiza y tiende a hacerse rnas Iento. EI sisterna procesal penal es pues, frecuenternente criticado y Ia caracteristica rnas severarnente criticada es su excesiva lentitud. Estas criticas se han formulado desde el siglo XIX, pero los trabajos de investigaci6n en los cuales se haya rnedido Ia duraci6n de los juicios son rnas bien recientes. EI rnas antiguo de los trabajos que conocernos es el articulo de Dei Olrno, que analiza Ia duraci6n de los juicios penales en cinco tribunales de prirnera instancia 6 John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985) 124-132.
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de Caracas entre 1960 y 1969. 7 La autora limita su campo de investigacion a la primera instancia, que es una parte del proceso penal, pero tal vez la mayor limitacion para ellector es que este trabajo pionero no hace un analisis real de los datos que recoge. Ellector solo puede apreciar que la tendencia es que la mayor parte de los casos tienden a durar mas de un aiio y menos de tres. La autora produce tambien tablas de rendimiento de los tribunales. Tres de los cinco tribunales tienden a dictar entre siete y diez sentencias por mes, mientras uno no llega a tres y otro dicta mas de 20. La autora no hace la correlacion entre estos datos y los de duracion, pero la superposicion de estos parece sugerir que la demora puede relacionarse con un bajo rendimiento. En cambio, la autora destaca que la larga duracion del proceso y del periodo de detencion preventiva (para la epoca el procesado tenia pocas probabilidades de esperar su sentencia en libertad) hace irrelevante el tratamiento criminologico, que solo puede iniciarse cuando el procesado ha sido condenado. Tozzini y Arqueros realizan un trabajo elaborado con datos de los tribunales de Buenos Aires entre 1973 y 1975. EIestudio muestra que en primera instancia, en los delitos contra la vida, la duracion tiende a ser entre uno y dos aiios y medio. En los delitos contra la propiedad, la duracion tiende a ser entre seis meses y dos aiios. En la segunda instancia la duracion mäs frecuente esta entre los tres y los seis meses. 8 Estos autores relacionan la duracion de los procesos con las de las penas como medio para determinar la efectividad de las penas de encierro. Su conclusion es que en hurtos, estafas y hornicidios culposos la duracion de la pena tiende a ser menor o igual a la del proceso, aparte que un numero importante de los procesados en los ultimos delitos salen absueltos. En cambio, en el robo y en el homicidio doloso, la pena tiende a ser mayor que la duracion del proceso. La preocupacion criminologica de Tozzini y Arqueros los lleva a recomendar que el tratarniento en la prision cornience desde el momento de la detencion preventiva. Muiioz Gomez trabaja con una muestra grande de juicios (n = 700) iniciados en Bogota entre 1970 y 1979 que hubieran cumplido al menos la primera etapa del proceso (sumario). 9 EI interes del autor es comparar la duracion real del proceso con la legal y deterrninar aquellas variables vinculadas al mayor o menor retardo en la administracion de justicia. La duracion legal mäxima del proceso penal en Colombia es de 276 dias. EIestudio muestra que, en promedio, duran 836 dias. La primera variable analizada fue la permanencia del procesado como detenido por mas de la mitad del proceso, que es un factor de aceleracion. 7 Rosa Dei 0/mo, EI tratamiento del delincuente y los tribunales penales venezolanos, Duraci6n de los juicios en cinco tribunales penales: Anuario del Instituto de Ciencias Penales y Criminol6gicas 4 (1970/72) 127-144. 8 Carlos Tozzini j M. Arqueros, Los procesos y Ia efectividad de las penas de encierro (1978) 35-36. 9 Jesus Antonio Mufioz Gbmez, La duraci6n real del proceso penal: Derecho Penal y Criminologia 15 (1981) 198-222.
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Otra variable fue la existencia de una parte civil, que reclame dafios del procesado, que resulto no significativa. La variable de participacion de un jurado resulto ser muy importante, por la dificultad de reunir al jurado. Oe hecho los juicios con jurado resultaron dos veces mas Ientos que aquellos en los cuales no intervenia el jurado. Tarnbien resulto una variable importante el tipo de tribunal. Mientras mayor jerarquia tenga este mäs Iento es el tramite. En la partefinal de su trabajo, el autor afirma que la larga duracion deljuicio vulnera la garantia del debido proceso y sugiere que mantener por mas tiempo a las personas sometidas ajuicio penal podria resultar funcional como un instrumento de control social. Cosacov, Gorenc, y Nadelsticher trabajaron con detenidos de las cuatro prisiones de ciudad de Mexico. 10 EI caso de Mexico es particularmente interesante pues, ademas de una duracion legal cuyo maximo es de 180 dias, existe el Iimite constitucional de un afio para los delitos de mayor pena. Es importante observar que la interpretacion de la Suprema Corte de Mexico ha destruido tal Iimite como garantia para el procesado, pues interpreto que se refiere solo a la primera instancia y que su infraccion obliga aljuez aresolver el caso, cumpliendo los pasos procesales que falten. Segun esta interpretacion no ocasiona la libertad del procesado ni obliga al juez a dictar la sentencia de inmediato. En la parte empirica el trabajo muestra que de los detenidos estudiados que habian llegado a sentencia de primera instancia (n = 81), el55% excedia ellimite legal y el 26% ellimite constitucional. Corno parece razonable pensar, interpolando los resultados del trabajo de Muftoz Gomez que losjuicios con detenidos tienen un retardo menor y que aquellos que no han llegado a sentencia de primera instancia probablemente presenten mayor lentitud, la demora en la justicia mexicana se hace mayor que la mostrada en la cuantificacion. Los datos de Lachner y Kannisto confirman esta apreciacion al mostrar que para el periodo 1974-1975, solo el 44.2% de los juicios penales duraron menos de un afio en Mexico. 11 Es importante observar que Cosacov et al. descartan las maniobras del procesado como elemento de retardo del proceso. EI elemento que puede actuar como factor de demora es el congestionamiento. Giraldo, Reyes y Acevedo destacan como factores de ese congestionamiento el volumen muy elevado y creciente de casos que conocen los despachos judiciales, unido a un rendimiento muy bajo de estos, sobre todo por el arcaismo de la gestion. Asi, en Colombia ingresaron en 1979 mas de 270.000 asuntos penales y solo egresaron 64.000. EI total de negocios acumulados para 1986 superaha los dos millones. 12 10 Gustavo Cosacov Belaus I K. L. Gorenc I A. Nadelsticher, La duraci(m del proceso penal en Mexico (1983). 11 Luis Lachner I V. Kannisto, Analisis comparativo de las estadisticas criminales latinoamericanas y del Caribe (1981) 62. 12 Jaime Giraldo I Alfonso Reyes I Jorge Acevedo, Reforma de Ia justicia en Colombia (1987) 74 ss.
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La demora en los juicios penales es, pues, percibida como un problema de funcionamiento del sistema judicial y entre las consecuencias que parece acarrear estä el elevado numero de presos en espera de sentencia (en consecuencia, tecnicamente inocentes) en las cärceles latinoamericanas. Veremos esto de seguida. Acä conviene indicar que los trabajos mencionados se realizaron con un aparente desconocimiento de los trabajos anteriores, salvo el de Cosacov et al. Esto seria indicativo del aislamiento respecto a sus paises vecinos en el cual trabaja el investigador latinoamericano. Tarnbien conocemos varios trabajos realizados y no publicados en Costa Rica, Colombia y Venezuela y trabajos en vias de realizaci6n en EI Salvador y Chile. Varios de estos trabajos probablemente quedarän sin publicarse. Algunos son realizados en el interior del Poder Judicial y hay mecanismos internos de presi6n para que no se publiquen, al menos mientras los datos sean lo suficientemente recientes como para que puedan usarse criticamente. EI caräcter "democrätico" o no del regimen politico cuenta poco a este respecto. 13 Un estudio que ha tenido un impacto inusual en America Latina es el de Carranza et al., que aborda el tema del numero muy elevado de presos no condenados en las prisiones de America Latina, comparando los paises con sistema procesal romano-can6nico con los de tradici6n de la common law. 14 No es propiamente un estudio de sociologia del derecho, sino, como lo indica el subtitulo, "comparativo estadistico y legal de treinta paises". La obra se debe a un crimin6logo (Carranza) y a los juristas Houed, Mora, y Zaffaroni. A pesar del titulo general, la obra se refiere a los presos procesados judicialmente y no incluye a los sometidos a las distintas formas de detenci6n administrativa o arbitraria comunes en varios de los paises de la zona. Se trata, pues, de los 13 En Venezuela se han hecho varios trabajos de investigaci6n sobre duraci6n de los procesos en el cuadro del Ministerio de Justicia que no han sido nunca publicados. Rico trae datos sacados de un informe que L6pez-Rey de 1972 que no puede obtenerse en ninguna de las bibliotecas publicas de Caracas. Jose Maria Rico, Crimen y justicia en America Latina (3a. ed. 1985, 1a. ed. 1977) 269. Vethencourt Koifman produjo otro informe en 1983, que no ha sido tampoco publicado. Maria E. Vethencourt Koifman, Analisis de Ia administraci6n de justicia en el area penal, Dilaci6n procesal (M ultigrafo, Ministerio de Justicia, Caracas 1983). Mas recientemente, en el Consejo de Ia Judicatura se realiz6 un analisis muy cuidadoso de Ia situaci6n procesal de cada uno de los detenidos en el penal de Tocuyito (Region Central) que ha encontrado tales disfuncionamientos en los tribunales y ha sido tan polemico en el seno mismo del Consejo que los datos son manejados como confidenciales. En Costa Rica un trabajo sobre el sistema judicial, concluido in 1986, tiene una prepublicaci6n de circulaci6n restringida. Enrique Castillo Barrantes / Enrique Gutierrez Diermissen, Estudio Sectorial sobre Ia Administraci6n de Justicia en Costa Rica, Descripci6n y Analisis del Sector (Multigrafo, San Jose 1986). En Chile se ha venido realizando una investigaci6n sobre "Ia realidad del proceso" fundamentalmente estadistica desde 1982 y hay resultados prepublicados respecto al proceso civil. Carlos Cerda Fernandez, La realidad del proceso (Multigrafo, Santiago 1982). No se ha hecho Ia prepublicaci6n de los resultados respecto a Ia justicia penal. 14 Elias Carranzaj M. Houedj L. P. Mora/ E. R. Zaffaroni, EI preso sin condena en America Latina y el Caribe (1983).
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detenidos preventivamente a la orden de la autoridad judicial y constituye, en esa perspectiva, una evaluaci6n importante de los sistemas judiciales. La parte estadistica es la mas desarrollada. Los paises de tradici6n romanocan6nica van desde cerca del 50% de presos sin condena (Costa Rica, Antilias Neerlandesas), hasta un 90% (Bolivia y Paraguay), con un promedio ponderado, es decir que toma en cuenta el numero total de presos, del 68,5%. Los paises de tradici6n anglosajona van desde el 2.2% (Cayman) al 37.4% (Guyana). Lo caracteristico de la mayoria de estos paises es su tamaiio exiguo tanto en poblaci6n como en territorio, lo cual es una variable a tener en cuenta. Pero los paises "grandes", aparte de Guyana (J amaica y Puerto Rico) tienen un promedio algo superior al 20%. Oe hecho, el promedio ponderado para el conjunto de paises es de 22.6%. De entrada conviene decir que un porcentaje elevado de presos en prisi6n preventiva es visto como un rasgo indeseable de un sistema penal. Una limitaci6n fundamental del estudio es su falta de explicaci6n comparativa, pues no desarrolla los motivos que llevan en uno y otro caso al mayor o menor porcentaje de presos sin condena, es decir, un analisis de los rasgos especificos del procedimiento penallatinoamericano que lleva a un alto numero de detenidos en espera de sentencia. En particular no hace la comparaci6n entre las cifras de los paises altamente desarrollados de una y otra tradici6n. Si la diferencia es atribuible al sistema legal, la diferencia entre lnglaterra o los Estados Unidos, por una parte, y Francia y Espafia por la otra, deberian tener una proporci6n similar a la existente entre Puerto Rico o Jamaica y Martinica y Mexico. La otra limitaci6n es que no explica la variedad dentro de un mismo sistema. La diferencia entre Costa Rica (47.4%) y Argentina (51.1 %), por una parte, y Bolivia (89.7%) y Paraguay (94.3%), por la otra, es tan grande como la existente entre Jamaica y Argentina. i,Es entonces la variable sistema juridico general o sistema procesal penal el elemento mas importante? Carranza et al. enumeran ocho variables que podrian explicar la variedad en el grupo de paises de sistema romano-can6nico, pero no hay el anälisis de ninguna de ellas y de c6mo influyen en el fen6meno. 15 En cambio, el estudio desarrolla la critica de la situaci6n en la perspectiva de los derechos humanos. El proceso judicial, mecanismo que deberia garantizar los derechos humanos, actua en la präctica como un descarado violador de estos. Teoria y präctica andan en direcciones opuestas. En resumen, el libro llama la atenci6n sobre un problema fundamental en el funcionamiento de la justicia penal, pero su falta de anälisis socio-juridico disminuye su utilidad para la explicaci6n de los disfuncionamientos de la justicia penal en America Latina. El caso de Costa Rica, estudiado por Castillo Barrantes, tiene elementos importantes para considerar. 16 Conviene seiialar que Costa Rica es un pequeiio 15
Id. pp. 34-36.
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pais agricola de dos millones y medio de habitantes, con indices de desarrollo social entre los mas eievados de America Latina en salud y educaci6n. Tiene una larga tradici6n civilista y suprimi6 el ejercito en 1949. EI porcentaje del presupuesto nacional que por disposici6n constitucional dedica al Poder Judicial (6%) es el mas alto de Ia regi6n. En Ia decada de 1970 moderniz6 el sistema procesal penal. Abandon6 el sistema escrito para Ia fase plenaria del juicio, que se hizo oral, adopt6 Ia inmediatez de Ia prueba e hizo cambios administrativos y funcionales importantes en Ia administraci6n de justicia. Aun cuando Ia evaluaci6n de Castillo Barrantes es cuidadosa y matizada, podemos retener que Ia justicia penal se hizo mas eficiente y disminuy6 el circulante de casos. 17 La duraci6n de los juicios, conforme a datos de una investigaci6n posterior del mismo Castillo Barrantes y Gutierrez, todavia no publicada, se ha reducido a un afio, aproximadamente. 18 EI porcentaje de sujetos en prisi6n preventiva es el mas bajo de America Latina, pero Ia mayor eficiencia en Ia justicia penal no parece haberlo afectado mucho. En Ia percepci6n de los costarricenses mismos se mantiene muy elevado. La explicaci6n de Castillo Barrantes es que Ia reforma penal hizo tambien mas severas las reglas sobre prisi6n preventiva y excarcelaci6n. 19 EI efecto ha sido mantener un numero elevado de presos sin condena. Ademas de Ia variable legislativa, podria ser considerada Ia actitud de los mismos jueces ante Ia prisi6n preventiva y, en definitiva, su mayor o menor represividad. 20 ~Podra ser medida Ia parte que se debe al sistema procesal mismo, Ia parte debida al funcionamiento ineficientevoluntario o no del aparato de justicia, Ia partequese debe a Ia severidad de las reglas sobre excarcelaci6n y Ia debida a Ia mayor o menor represividad de los jueces? Este es un problema abierto y hay trabajos en curso que esperamos permitan acercarnos progresivamente a una respuesta. 21
16 Enrique Castillo Barrantes, EI funcionamiento de Ia administraci6n de Ia justicia penal en Costa Rica: Revista de Ciencias Juridicas 42 (1980) 194-216. 17 Id. p. 210. 18 Supra n. 13. 19 (Supra n. 16) 211. 20 Por entrevistas personales he podido comprobar que los jueces perciben un reclamo social de mayor severidad con los delincuentes, sobre todo cuando Ia colectividad es conmovida con noticias de crimenes espantosos, homicidios y asaltos a personas estimadas socialmente y grandes fraudes, y esto los lleva a usar mas Ia detenci6n preventiva. 21 En Costa Rica hay un proyecto de investigaci6n-acci6n, con Ia colaboraci6n de un grupo de jueces, que evalua el uso mas intensivo de Ia cauci6n juratoria para Ia libertad condicional. En Venezuela se esta iniciando un estudio del uso que hacen los jueces de Ia facultad para cambiar Ia prisi6n preventiva con medidas alternativas. En EI Salvador se adelantan trabajos sobre Ia situaci6n procesal de los detenidos y Ia duraci6n de los juicios penales. No hay resultados todavia en estas investigaciones.
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111. Justicia penal y desigualdad social Uno de los rasgos de las sociedades latinoamericanas es la desigualdad muy visible. Es una desigualdad econ6mica, que se manifiesta en una concentraci6n de la riqueza en un porcentaje reducido de la poblaci6n, mientras que la mayoria vive en condiciones muy dificiles. Inclusive, un alto porcentaje vive en la extrema pobreza. Existe una desigualdad social muy imbricada con la econ6mica: los grupos que controlan la riqueza y el poder tienden a ser blancos, de ascendencia europea y poseer una mayor educaci6n formal. EI resto de la poblaci6n tiende a ser mestiza, indigena o de ascendencia africana. En algunos paises, de inmigraci6n muy numerosa, las diferencias etnicas son poco perceptibles, y en otros el mestizaje ha alcanzado los grupos con poder econ6mico y politico, pero la desigualdad econ6mica y cultural sigue operando. EI contexto del funcionamiento de la justicia penal es pues, una sociedad marcadamente desigualitaria y es de esperar que este rasgo tenga un impacto en el funcionamiento de lo judicial. Castillo Barrantes analiza la "clientela" de la justicia penal de Costa Rica. 22 A partir de fuentes estadisticas y de entrevistas a procesados concluye que las personas procesadas penalmente son en su mayoria abrumadora, j6venes solteros, que vivende la pnictica de oficios manuales, con un nivel educativo limitado y que se reclutan entre los estratos mäs bajos y pobres. La percepci6n es similar paralos demäs paises latinoamericanos. Van Groningen estudia la desigualdad social en la aplicaci6n de la ley penal. 23 Decidi6 trabajar con una muestra de 142 expedientes completos en tribunales de Caracas, divididos por partes iguales entre reos de clase baja y de clase alta. La estrategia de localizaci6n de expedientes es reveladora: para los de clase baja pudo usar numeros aleatorios. Los de clase alta eran tan escasos que para localizarlos debi6 hablar conjueces y pedirles que recordaran alguno. La autora analiza tres dimensiones en el juicio: la calidad de la defensa, la duraci6n, y los resultados del proceso. En cuanto a la duraci6n promedio de los procesos (aproximadamente cinco aiios) no habia diferencia significativa, pero los extremos eran mucho mäs alejados (dos a ocho aiios), lo que permite suponer que la duraci6n se debia a estrategias de la defensa parademorar o apresurar el proceso. Los de clase baja son mäs homogeneos y parecen todos sometidos a una rutina negligente. La defensa result6 una variable muy importante. La autora analiz6 el nilmero de escritos y päginas presentados por los defensores (recordemos que el proceso es escrito) y el numero y calidad de los argumentos. Analiz6 tambien el numero y calidad de los defensores. No podriamos entrar aqui a la riqueza del anälisis pero la diferencia es abismaL Unestudio posterior de Torres analiza en particular la actividad de los defensores publicos de presos, cuyos clientes son de clase baja y 22 23
(Supra n. 16) 199 ss. Karin Van Groningen, Desigualdad social y aplicacion de Ia ley penal (1980).
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que defienden el 85% de los procesados de clase baja. 24 Encontr6 a los defensores con un numero enorme de casos (promedio = 179), con muy pocos mediosmateriales y, lo que es mäs grave, con muy poca motivacion y una actitud negativa ante sus "clientes".25 Debe sefialarse que los metodos frecuentemente brutales de la policia (74% de los detenidos entrevistadas indicaron que habian sido maltratados o torturados)26 y la ausenica de defensa causa una apariencia de culpabilidad de la cual es muy dificil librarse. EI resultado de los juicios es de esperarse. En los casos de reos de clase baja todos fueron condenados y la pena promedio por el delito de homicidio fue de 17 afios. En cambio los procesados de clase alta fueron absueltos en un 30% y la pena promedio fue de cinco afios y un mesP Gonzäles Amado realiza la investigacion del mismo tema en los tribunales de Bogotä siguiendo una estrategia totalmente distinta. 28 EI toma una muestra grande (3.159 expedientes) de juicios iniciados y los sigue hasta el final, bien sea por sentencia o por otra medida judicial. Establece un sistema de puntos para distinguir las clases sociales, con criterios similares a los de Van Groningen (residencia, ocupacion, instruccion), pero a diferencia de esta, el resultado es un continuum en el cual puede colocar a los distintos sujetos. A partir de los juicios iniciados examina las solidas del proceso penal, es decir, aquellos actos que permiten concluirlo: que no se dicte auto de detencion, que no se haga este efectivo, que se abandone el proceso en sumario, que se dicte sobreseimiento o auto de cesacion del procedimiento y que el procesado sea absuelto en sentencia. La investigacion comprob6 que en cada salida quienes se beneficiaban tenian un nivel mäs alto que los quese quedaban en prision. Solo la diferencia en materia de sentencias absolutorias no result6 significativa, pero esto se debi6 a que quedaban ya pocos procesados que tuvieran un puntaje elevado. Los resultados ratifican asi a los de Van Groningen (cuyo trabajo no cita, probablemente porque no conoce) y ratifica tambien un proverbio popular colombiano: "la ley es paralos de ruana", es decir, para personas de clase baja quese abrigan con el traje tipicodelas zonas frias de Colombia. Es interesante destacar que Gonzälez Amado, a pesar de la amplitud de la muestra, no encontr6 personas de clase alta, propiamente tal, y curiosamente tampoco personas totalmente depauperadas. Esto ultimo lo hace suponer que los mäs miserables son controlados a traves de la mendicidad o la accion policial directa.
24 Aristides Torres, Los pobres y lajusticia penal, en: Justicia y Pobreza en Venezuela, coord. por Rogelio Perez Perdomo (1987) 79-101; ver Van Groningen (supra n. 23) 58 ss. 25 Torres (supra n. 24) 93. 26 Id. p. 85. 27 Van Groningen (supra n. 23) 95-96. 28 lvtin Gonzalez Amado, Nivel social y proceso penal: Derecho Penal y Criminologia 22 (1984) 55-70.
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IV. Justicia penal y represiön politica En algunos trabajos criminologicos radicales se descarta la distincion entre delitos politicos y comunes, pues, conforme se argumenta, todo delito implica una reaccion contra un orden y puede considerarse politico. 29 Para nuestro proposito es preferible evitar tal polemica y usar la distincion tradicional, pues no hay duda que en America Latina ha habido distintos esfuerzos de cambiar el orden politico a traves de medios violentos. Estas acciones llevan a una reaccion de las autoridades politicas que reprimen estos intentos. l,Ha sido usada la justicia penal con tales propositos? l,Ha protegido los derechos humanos de aquellos acusados como subversivos? La respuesta a la primera pregunta es negativa: los distintos regimenes son renuentes a usar la justicia penal ordinaria con fines de represion politica. No conocemos estudios sobre esto, pero suponemos que la desconfianza ante los jueces y los legalismos de la justicia ordinaria ha llevado a intentar otras vias. La mas frecuente es lajusticia militar. Lo caracteristico de esta rama de lajusticia es el caracter breve 0 sumario de los juicios, las limitaciones del derecho de defensa, su dependencia del Poder Ejecutivo, y el hecho de que los jueces son militares activos que pueden suponerse sometidos a una mayor influencia de quienes combaten la subversion. Los trabajos sobre la justicia militar no han sido abundantes. En Colombia, Marroquin y Camacho estudiaron la duracion real del juicio militar (llamado "consejo verbal de guerra") comparandola con la duracion legal y con la del juicio penal ordinario. 30 Los juicios estudiados fueron aquellos iniciados en virtud de la declaracion de estado de sitio en 1976 que pasaron a la justicia ordinaria enjunio de 1982, al cesar el estado de sitio. EI trabajo se realizo con 155 expedientes seleccionados al azar, cuya representatividad del universo es dudosa, pues no se conoce ni fue estimado el tamaii.o de este. Sin embargo, el numero es lo suficientemente importante por si para que los resultados sean tomados en consideracion. En resumen, la investigacion muestra que la duracion legal mäxima de los procesos estudiados era de 44 dias y que la duracion real fue de 792 dias. Solo nueve de los 155 procesos habian concluido para la fecha del estudio, por lo cual la duraci6n real del proceso total es probablemente superior. Esta duraci6n real es apenas inferioren 44 dias a la del proceso ordinario, 31 y probablemente sea superior si se toma en cuenta que el 92.9% de los procesos no estaban concluidos. Este retardo es presentado por los autores en terminos estructurales de funcionamiento: la justicia militar ordinariamente funciona con un numero muy limitado de casos, cuando por una Ver Carlos Villa/ba, La justicia sobornada (1978). Germ{m Marroquin Grillo / J. Camacho, Informe de investigaci6n, La duraci6n real del consejo verbal de guerra: Derecho Penal y Criminologia 24 (1984) 97-112. 31 Ver supra texto en nn. 9-10 y n. 9. 29
30
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medida politica se le abruma con un numero muy superior, que no esta preparada para atender, el resultado tiene que ser la extrema lentitud. 32 Un trabajo que no ha sido publicado, pero que podemos citar por ser publico en el sentido de que fue presentado por la Comision Revisorade la Legislacion Salvadoreiia al Poder Legislativo de ese pais y reseiiado por la prensa local, es el estudio sobre el estado de excepcion. 33 EI trabajo socio-juridico es parte de uno mucho mas generat cuyo proposito es modificar el proceso penal aplicable al regimen de excepcion. En esta parte se trabajo sobre una muestra aleatoria simple de 89 expedientes (125 imputados) de un total de 1.460 expedientes que existian para 1986 en los tres juzgados militares de primera instancia de EI Salvador. La brevedad del juicio militar tampoco se cumple. Aun cuando la duracion legal maxima es de 159 dias (algo mas de cinco meses), la duracion promedio de los juicios estudiados era de 1.685 dias (mas de cmitro aiios y siete meses). 34 Lo mas notorio es que solo tres de los 125 procesados de la muestra habian sido sentenciados, lo cual hace suponer que el proceso va a ser todavia mas largo. 35 Al 69.8% de los procesados se le atribuian delitos cuyas penas maximas eran de cuatro aiios de prision, con lo cual puede suponerse que buena parte de los procesados habian cumplido la pena para la cual todavia no habian sido condenados. La conclusion que puede desprenderse es que no es la celeridad la virtud apreciada en los juicios militares. Tal celeridad existe solo en la legislacion, no en la practica. Puede inferirse que son las otras caracteristicas de lajusticia militar lo que constituye su encanto: el control mas directo del poder politico sobre los jueces militares y la marcha de los juicios y la limitacion del derecho de defensa. En el caso de EI Salvador, donde la situacion de guerra civil es muy clara, el observador analitico que relacione la lentitud de los juicios militares con las periodicas amnistias y canjes puede pensar que los procesados son verdaderos rehenes utiles para las negociaciones y para hacer convincentes medidas de apertura politica a traves de una amnistia. La represion politica no siempre ha usado los tribunales militares sino que en algunos paises los cuerpos represivos del Estado, incluidas las Fuerzas Armadas, han usado el secuestro (detenciones no reconocidas como tales o "desapariciones"), la tortura y el asesinato. 36 EI Poder Judicial tiene la obligacion de velar Marroquin/ Camacho (supra n. 30) 112. Comision Revisora de Ia Legislacion Salvadorefia, La situaci6n excepcional (Multigrado 1987). 34 Id. p. 597. 35 Id. p. 620. 36 Ver Rosa Dei Olmo, La detenci6n-desaparici6n en America Latina, i,Crimen o castigo?, en: Criminologia Critica 35-62 (1984); Rico (supra n. 13) 101 ss. Ademas de los analisis de Dei Olmo y Rico tiene interes por su riqueza te6rica, el breve artculo de Juan Bustos Ramirez, Estructura juridica y Estado en America Latina, en: Pena y estructura social, por Georg RuschelOtto Kirchheimer (1984) xlv-lvii. Ver tambien Sergio Politoff, 32 33
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por el cumplimiento de Ia Constituci6n y el respeto de los derechos consagrados en ella, y en particular Ia justicia penal debe juzgar los casos de represi6n abusiva y conocer de recursos como los de habeas corpus que intentan remediar, en este caso, Ia situaci6n del detenido no sometido a juicio. Es pues, importante preguntarse cuales han sido las acciones de Ia justicia penal ante los USOS abusivos del poder estatal y, en general, ante los estados autoritarios o terroristas de Ia America Latina. En esta materia, Ia investigaci6n socio-juridica ortodoxa es muy dificil, en parte porque no existen estadisticas ni pueden construirse estudios cuantitativos ni usar entrevistas. La observaci6n frecuentemente no puede realizarse y, en definitiva, Ia investigaci6n misma puede comportar peligros de represi6n fisica o en Ia carrera importantes para el investigador. Tal vez Ia literatura mas accesible sea Ia testimonial, a partir de Ia cual no es facil construir trabajos rigurosos. Dos estudios, que superan Ia dificultad al analizar decisiones judiciales y discursos de altos magistrados, en Argentina y Chile, caben ser destacados. Galin analiza las decisiones de Ia Corte Suprema argentina. Conforme a estas, Ia declaratoria de Ia autoridad militar que un "desaparecido" no estaba detenido era suficiente para rechazar el recurso de habeas corpus, aun cuando hubiere numerosos testigos de Ia detenci6n. 37 Respecto a otro tipo de casos, Ia Corte Suprema estableci6 Ia constitucionalidad de los detenidos sin juicio durante el estado de emergencia (estado de sitio). La afirmaci6n del Ejecutivo que el detenido estaba vinculado a Ia actividad subversiva se consideraba fundamentaci6n suficiente. La Corte Suprema tambien declar6 Ia constitucionalidad de los tribunales militares en los cuales el detenido no podia designar defensor sino que era defendido por un oficial designado por el mismo tribunal. 38 Frühling hace un analisis mas generat de Ia relaci6n politica-Poder Judicial en Chile. Muestra el surgimiento de las actitudes conservadoras en este en el Chile moderno y el cuestionamiento de Ia justicia como clasista en Ia decada de 1960. EI resultado practico de este debate fue Ia propuesta de un proyecto de ley de creaci6n de tribunales vecinales durante el regimen socialista de Allende. 39 La Corte Suprema se opuso a varias de las politicas de Allende, quebrando en varios puntos su esfuerzo de construcci6n de una revoluci6n dentro de Ia legalidad y, en Adecuaci6n social y terror en America Latina, EI papel de Ia justicia: Derecho Penal y Criminologia 22 (1984) 71-81. Hay ademas un buen numero de analisis politol6gicos, o donde se documentan aspectos diversos del llamado terrorismo de Estado, que ha sido particularmente intenso en los paises del Cono Sur, de Guatemala, EI Salvador y mas recientemente en Honduras. Ver, p. ej., Michael Klare 1N. Stein, Armas y poder en America Latina (1978) 66 ss. 37 Pedro Galin, La independencia del Poder Judicial argentina en Ia dictadura 19761980, en: La administraci6n de justicia en America Latina (1984) 20-32 (22 ss.). 38 Id. pp. 24-25. 39 Hugo Frühling, Poder judicial y politica en Chile, en: La administraci6n de justicia en America Latina (1984) 84-119 (107 ss.).
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particular, se opuso a la creaci6n de los tribunales vecinales, que por la elecci6n popular de sus miembros, su caracter de legos y sus posibilidades de decidir en equidad "invitaban a Ia arbitrariedad y a Ia falta de equilibrio y mesura en el ejercicio de sus atribuciones". 40 A la caida de Allende y la instauraci6n del regimen militar, el Presidente de la Corte Suprema resalta el respeto total del nuevo regimen hacia la Corte y da su respaldo politico en los discursos oficiales de inauguraci6n del afio judicial. La Corte se declara ademas incompetente para conocer de recursos contra los fallos de los tribunales militares por considerar que en tiempo de guerra estos no pueden ser conocidos por la Corte. Rechaza tambien la mayor parte de los recursos de habeas corpus que se interponen contra detenciones claramente ilegales. A partir de 1977, con la "institucionalizaci6n del orden autoritario", se comienza a abrir un cierto espacio politico para Ia oposici6n y los tribunales, incluida Ia Corte Suprema, empiezan a mostrar una timida independencia frente al poder militar. 41
V. Un balance Los trabajos que aca hemos presentado destacan Ia ineficiencia, lentitud y caracter discriminatorio de Ia justicia penal, su plegamiento ante las formas abusivas del ejercicio del poder y su falta de protecci6n a los derechos humanos de los perseguidos. Si se piensa Ia America Latina como un todo mas o menos unitario, se trata de problemas comunes en el sentido que lo que ocurre en El Salvador concierne a los argentinos y viceversa. Pero America Latina es tambien muy diversa y cada pais no vive directamente los problemas del otro. EI terrorismo de Estado del Cono Sur no ha tenido la misma intensidad en Venezuela o Mexico y es tal vez inexistente en Costa Rica. Tal vez para Ia mayor parte de los paises del Cono Sur sea ya un problema definitivamente superado. La duraci6n de los juicios penales es muy distinta en Chile y en Bolivia. Otros problemas como Ia aplicaci6n desigual de Ia ley son seguramente mas generales aunque tienen una raiz y una dimensi6n distinta en Guatemala, donde un elevado porcentaje de la poblaci6n es indigena y rural, y en el Uruguay, de poblaci6n mayoritariamente urbana y sin mayores diferencias etnicas. Pero tales particularismos no limitan el interes de las investigaciones sociales. La lentitud de los juicios y el arcaismo de Ia justicia tienden a ser generales, lo mismo que la indiferencia de Ia justicia penal por los derechos humanos de aquellos con baja capacidad de reclamo. EI terrorismo de Estado respecto al cual hemos mencionado estudios para dos paises, ha sido vivido en muchos otros y es percibido como una amenazante posibilidad en todos. La contribuci6n de Ia sociologia del derecho al destacar problemas importantes en la justicia penal en un pais o en una regi6n es pertinente para todos. 4{)
41
ld. p. 110. ld. p. 115 ss.
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Hay otros aspectos importantes del funcionamiento de lajusticia penal que no han sido tratados por los investigadores socio-juridicos latinoamericanos con Ia profundidad que merecen. Un ejemplo importante es el contenido de esa justicia: ~que casos trata tal vez con mäs intensidad que Ia debida y que tipos de casos deja afuera y, sobre todo, por que ocurre esto? Hay, por supuesto, trabajos que abren caminos, como los del Instituto Ser, Päsara, y Perez Perdomo. 42 Los crimin6logos, por su parte, han debatido estos temas bajo los rubros de descriminalizaci6n, despenalizaci6n y delincuencia econ6mica. Pero el anälisis es exterior al sistema judicial. Asi, el valioso trabajo de Linares llama Ia atenci6n sobre un tipo importante de delitos econ6micos que no son perseguidos judicialmente, pero Ia justicia penal aparece como una caja negra. 43 Losestudios que faltan son los que muestren que pasa dentro de ella. ~Quienes toman Ia decisi6n de no perseguir o de no aceptar o archivar las denuncias, quienes las de concluir tempranamente el proceso? ~Cuäntos son los procesos que no se inician o se detienen, cuändo, por que? Hay temas que conciernen a todo el sistema de justicia, como quienes son los jueces, cuäl es su posici6n social, cuäl ha sido su formaci6n, sobre los cuales existen estudios que no hemos analizado, pues hemos tomado una visi6n restrictiva de nuestro tema. Por el mismo motivo no hemos mencionado estudios sobre el tema de Ia corrupci6n judicial y el control politico de los jueces. Lo caracteristico de esta literatura socio-juridica, que contiene varias contribuciones importantes a Ia investigaci6n social, es su tendencia considerablemente critica. Paralelamente existe una literatura apologetica del Poder Judicial, que destaca Ia importancia social de los jueces, el sentido de su independencia y los progresos quese han venido haciendo en el establecimiento de una carrera y, en general, en el mejoramiento de los sistemas de justicia. Esta literatura apologetica no usa Ia aproximaci6n socio-juridica y lo frecuente es que venga de altos magistrados judiciales. Por nuestro tema no es pertinente analizarla, pero conviene seiialar que existe. Para concluir destaquemos dos puntos importantes. EI primero, es si hay salida a Ia situaci6n presente y cuäl puede ser Ia contribuci6n de Ia investigaci6n socio-juridica. Los ejercicios de prospectiva son arriesgados pero quien lea peri6dicos latinoamericanos podrä percibir que en Ia mayoria de los paises hay conciencia de una crisis de Ia administraci6n de justicia e interes en su reforma. Tal vez Ia literatura socio-juridica ha contribuido a hacer tomar conciencia de Ia situaci6n y es, en todo caso, un buen punto de apoyo para quienes abogan por el cambio.
42 Instituto Ser de Investigaciim, Juicio y reforma, Justicia penal (Contraloria General de Ia Republica, Bogota 1983); Luis Pasara, Jueces, justicia y poder en el Peru (1982); Rogelio Perez Perdomo, La administraci6n de justicia en Venezuela, Evaluaci6n y alternativas: Revista de Derecho Privado 2/4 (1985) 49-80. 43 Supra n. 5.
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En el segunrlo y ultimo punto deseariamos retomar lo destacado en Ia introducci6n sobre las dificultarles que ofrece el contexto de Ia investigaci6n socio-juridica en America Latina. Seiialemos algunas rlificultades adicionales. Los bancos de datos y las series estadisticas son generalmente inexistentes. Con frecuencia Ia obtenci6n de da tos encuentra graves obstaculos. La publicaci6n de resultados usualmente no tendra consecuencias significativas para una carrera academica y puede ser negativa o peligrosa para quien este vinculado al Poder Judicial. En este trabajo hemos realizarlo criticas a varios trabajos y tal vez pocos calificarian para ser publicados en una selectiva y rigurosa revista internacional rle sociologia rlel derecho. Pero Ia afirmaci6n con Ia cual deseo concluir es Ia rle mi admiraci6n por quienes realizan investigaci6n socio-jurirlica sobre temas altamente relevantes y polemicos, en condiciones muy desfavorables, sin mayores espectativas de gratificaci6n y aun a veces con riesgo para su carrera o su persona.
English Summary Criminal Justice in Latin American Sociolegal Research
Penal studies in Latin America are carried out in two principal fielrls: law and criminology. Penal law sturlies include criminallaw anrl criminal procedure; they trarlitionally commenterl on the codes and date from the nineteenth century. Criminological sturlies also began in the nineteenth century, but dealt with the control of delinquents and with the causes of crime. Recently criminology has turned to investigate the processes of criminalization anrl the activities of state entities of control. This has led to an interest in the functioning of courts and in their incapacity to punish certain types of crimes. At the same time some penallaw scholars have questioned whether criminallaw theory anrl rules really help to further a society based on respect for human rights and have linkerl these questions to social conrlitions existing in Latin America. In this article some of the current work on the functioning of criminal justice in various Latin American nations is discussed. The first area to consider deals with the excessive duration and other dysfunctions characteristic of the criminal process. In Latin America the process, growing out of an inquisitorial tradition, emphasizes written communications that rlistances the judge from the parties and promotes bureaucratization. The first studies to actually measure excessive delay in criminal cases were published in the 1970s. Most cases in first instance took between one and three years andin second instance took between three and six months. Few of the accused were released from preventative rletention pending a final judicial decision. Therefore for some crimes- theft, fraud, and felonious homicidethe punishment actually levied was less than or about equal to the time served, leaving asirle those founrl tobe innocent.
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Muii.oz G6mez found that the criminal process in Bogota lasted an average of 836 days, even though the legal maximum was 276 days. Factors promoting delay were the request for a jury trial, release of the accused, and use of a superior jurisdiction court with more complicated procedures. Studies in Mexico show that even a constitutionallimit of one year to process major crimes was violated in 26% of the cases. A principal cause of delay is the high number of penal cases filed compared to the smaller number decided. This has resulted in a huge number of prisoners without sentences waiting in Latin American prisons. An influential study by Carranza et al. of 30 countries in the region reveals that for civillaw nations the percentage of non-sentenced prisoners ranges between 50% (Costa Rica, Netherlands Antilles) and 90% (Bolivia, Paraguay), with a mean of 69%. For common law nations, alternatively, the percentage is between 2% (Cayman Islands) and 38% (Guyana), with an average of 23%. Much could be leamed from a comparative study of these data using sociolegal analysis. The second area to survey relates to criminaljustice and social inequality. A significant feature of Latin American societies is severe inequality, both economic and social. Studies show that the dientele for crirninal courts are primarily poor young single men with lirnited educational backgrounds. Van Groningen examined Venezuelan court files of convicts from the lower class and those few of upper class convicts. She found that the quality of defense counsel and their arguments for poor persons were abysmal. Public defenders were overwhelmed with a large number of cases, were poorly motivated, and had a negative attitude toward their clients, a majority of whom had been brutalized by the police. All poor defendants in the sample were convicted, with an average sentence of 17 years, while 30% of the upper dass defendants were absolved and the remainder received average sentences of five years. The samepatternwas discovered in Colombia, reflecting the proverb: "La ley es paralos de ruana." The third area concerns criminal justice and political repression. In Latin America most regimes are reluctant to use the ordinary penal courts for the goal ofrepressing political dissent. They find military courts more satisfactory, with their summary procedure, limits on defendants' rights, rnilitary judges, and dependence on the executive branch. Nevertheless, the limited sociolegal research finds that rnilitary courts suffer delay similar to that of ordinary penal courts, for example more than two years in Colombia and almost five years in EI Salvador. Authorities must prefer rnilitary courts for their other features. They may also use non-judicial procedures, some involving the armed forces, including unofficial detention, torture, and murder. In countries that have had rnilitary regimes, such as Argentina and Chile, the supreme courts have been reluctant to interfere with the operation of military courts. 18 Menyman Festschrift
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Overall criminal justice in Latin America suffers from inefficiency, delay, discrirninatory procedures, undue deference to executive branch abuses, and failure to protect human rights. But Latin America is diverse, and not all countries live with the problems of the others. State terrorism in the southern cone, for instance, is not as severe in Venezuela or in Mexico. There is much sociolegal research remaining tobe done. There are many obstacles, however, in its path. What is reported has helped tobring to the fore the crisis existing in the adrninistration of justice and to build support for its reform.
los Honorarium and English Equity Giovanni Pugliese*
I. los Honorarium and Equity in Legal History Giovanni Pacchioni, an Italian scholar of both Roman law and private law who lived in the first half of this century, was peculiarly interested in the British Empire and in its alleged similarities to the Roman Empire. In this respect, he followed the approach taken by James Bryce, from whose Studies in History and Jurisprudence (1901) 1 he translated four essays into Italian. Interestingly enough, he chose the title Imperialismo romano e britannico for this work. In Studies in History and Jurisprudence James Bryce carried out an analytical comparison of both the British and Roman empires and their respective legal systems. In fact, among the essays translated by Pacchioni, the fourteenth in Studies, under the heading "Methods ofLaw-making in Rome andin England," compared the tasks and powers of the Roman praetor with those of the British chancellor. 2 Insofar as the latter is concerned, he pointed out that in the period between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries he "was the organ of the prerogative of the Crown on its judicial side, and as that prerogative was then very wide, he was thus invested with an authority ... not unlike that of the Roman magistrate." 3 In a sense, Pacchioni adhered to these and similar views. However, he did not refer to them in his work, except for a passing mention of "something very similar to ius honorarium, which occured" in the course of the historical development of British law, 4 and for a more important remark in his Breve storia
* Professor of Comparative Law, University of Rome. This essay is a lecture that I delivered at the University ofGöttingen in May 1987, when the Faculty ofLaw awarded me the Doctorate h.c. I am very glad to dedicate it to John H. Merryman, whom with friendly Iove I have admired since we first met at Professor Gorla's seminar in Rome during the spring of 1963. For the translation into English I am greatly indebted to my young friend and appreciated researcher, Maurizio Delfino. A Ionger version appeared in Italian: "Ius honorarium" a Roma ed "equity" nei sistemi di "common law": Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 42 (1988) 1105-1126. 1 Bryce, 2 vols. 2 Id. II 669-744. 3 Id. 695. 4 Pacchioni, Corso di diritto romano I (1918) 176 n. 261. 18*
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dell'Impero romano. 5 In the latter work he clearly stated that "the hidden cause of the incremental perfection" typical of Roman law was its dualistic structure characterized by "a body of ius civile, based on judge-made law" and "a body of ius praetorium, based on the magistrates' edicts." He further stressed that "in the historical evolution of English private law, common law and equity provided an equivalent dualism."
On the other band, before Pacchioni's Breve storia was published, a distinguished Italian Romanist, Emilio Betti, maintained that the dualism between ius honorarium and ius civile was akin to the "dualism between equity and common law" and, perhaps influenced by Bryce and Pacchioni, drew the conclusion that "in this respect, the analogy of equity and praetorian law has been often times noticed by the English jurists." 6 Actually, at least since Blackstone and up to Tony Weir,7 including the most recent authors oftreatises on equity, Englishjurists were perfectly familiar with the comparison between equity and ius honorarium (or praetorian law). In fact the English jurists, besides of course being interested in their own law, have always bad some knowledge of Roman law (even though sometimes this occurred "second band"). Such a frequent occurrence also explains why the English Romanists (Sir Henry Maine, W. W. Buckland, and Peter Stein) were best equipped to make such a comparison. In this respect, Contineotal jurists and Romanists gave a lesser contribution, mostly because until the Second World War they did not know much about - nor were they interested in English or Anglo-American law. The exceptions to be noted are certain comparatists, such as Edouard Lambert and Mario Sarfatti, or specialists of English law, such as E. Heyman. 8 Of these, the most important exception is a well-known German Romanist, Fritz Pringsheim, who fled Nazi Germany, settled in England and, shortly thereafter, gave a speech at Cambridge ("The Inner Relationship between English and Roman Law") in which he compared equity and ius honorarium within the framework ofthe rapport between English law and Roman law. W. W. Buckland paralleled these views in the exordium to a later work, "Praetor and Chancellor: The Comparison of the Praetor with the Chancellor Has Become a Common Place." Such an assertion could only spring from within the English legal environment. From the point of view of a Contineotal jurist, although not novel, this comparison of equity and ius honorarium still bears some value, since it was Pacchioni, Breve storia dell'Impero romano narrata da un giurista (1936). Betti, La creazione del diritto nella "iurisdictio" del pretore romano (1927). 7 Weir, Structure and the Divisions of the Law, The Common Law System, in: Int'l Ency. Comp. L. II (The Legal Systems ofthe World, Their Comparison and Unification) eh. 2 § III, ed. by Rene David (1974). 8 E. Heyman, Überblick über das englische Privatrecht, in: Encyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft (Höltzendorffs Encyklopädie) (1890). 5
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never the object of such deep inquiry as to bring to light both differences and similarities between equity and ius honorarium. Of course, the search for differences as weil as similarities is part and parcel of comparative law.
II. The Distinctiveness of the Two Bodies of Rules One may wonder why legal scholars, and especially those interested in history, would choose to compare ius honorarium and equity. The answer isthat these are the only bodies of rules in the whole history of Western legal systems that (1) were exclusively enacted by authorities lacking normative powers but entrusted withjurisdictional power and (2) kept up a position oftheir own vis-a-vis all the laws resulting from other sources. There is no doubt that a form of judge-made law is to be found, more or less well-defined and more or less broad, in alllegal systems from antiquity up to the present times. Usually the judiciary alters existing law almost imperceptibly, since the alteration results from interpretation or from other means of application of existing laws or judicial precedents. Accordingly, any changes tend to Iook like the result of a quest for the true meaning of a rule or a precedent, up to then concealed from lawyers and judges. What is peculiar to both the Roman praetor (including also aediles curules and provincial governors) and the English chancellor is that they gave birth to new law. The chancellor did it by judging directly: the praetor did it indirectly, by appointing and appropriately instructing the judge who would decide the case at hand. Both in fact departed from the current law in force whenever in their view that law was unable to Iead to a fair solution of the case in issue. Maitland seemed to deny the existence of any conflict between law and equity and held that law and equity worked and work harmoniously together: "Equity had come not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it." However, that is true only to the extent that equity completed or supplemented the law; in so doing, equity had to resort to different principles from those followed by the common law in force at the time. The difference of course is greatest when equity, as it is sometimes the case, is used to prevent or repair injustice deriving from the strict application of law. In this respect, equity is a perfect counterpart to ius honorarium, which as Papinianus stated in a famous excerpt was established by praetors adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civilis gratia (that is, in order to aid, supplement, or correct ius civile). As I mentioned above, ius honorarium and equity were different from the usualjudge-made law in that (1) they differed clearly and openly from the law in force (as opposed to the almost imperceptible irreremental alterations typical of judge-made law), and (2) they resulted in bodies of rules separated from those deriving from the other sources (including the typical judge-made law). This is the meaning of the alleged "dualism" of both preclassic and dassie Roman law as weil as of English law from the fifteenth century onward. Of course, ius
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praetorium or honorarium was a form of ius, that is, law, as the name itself indicates. By the same token, equity although not commonly referred to as "law," unquestionably was and is a form of law: as Maitland put it "we may regard the equity ... as a recognized part of the law of the land." At the same time, both these forms oflaw were- and equity stillis-aseparate law from the ordinary law, and rested on quite different foundations.
111. The Powers of the Praetor and the Chancellor What is the source ofboth the Roman praetor's and the English chancellor's powers to either decide pending Iitigation or to take measures in accordance with principles different from those of the law in force at the time? As far as the praetor is concemed, the answer is often imperium, which we conceive as apower of command toward both soldiers and civilians, lacking a well-defined content and theoretically limitless. Still, one should point out that Ieges publicae could curb such power and in fact, within the legis actiones, confirmed or established by the Twelve Tables or other laws, the praetor at most only had the power to refuse to cooperate in a procedure he disapproved started by means of a legis actio (and even that is denied by certain Romanists). No law or other act with equivalent force hasever granted the praetor the power to decide legal disputes in accordance with principles different from those either set forthin the Twelve Tables or resulting from the jurists' interpretation. At some point the praetor acknowledged that society needed change and deemed that new needs could be better satisfied by means of a different way of administering the judicial powers entrusted to him. Thus, he acted in accordance with his perception of social needs: neither the Senate, nor the consuls, nor the tribunes of the plebs, each of which had the power to prevent such behavior, deemed it necessary to object. Later on, scholars regarded imperiumtobe the ultimate source for both the establishment of judicial criteria different from those of the law currently in force and, even more so, for the creation of a new type of procedure, which proved necessary to put into practice such new principles. The evolution of the chancellor's powers is to be interpreted differently: he worked in a monarchy and held the post of the king's first counsel. Perhaps, from a political viewpoint, the chancellor's authority was higher than that ofthe Roman praetor. However, as far as the administration ofjustice was concemed, his sole task was to issue writs or brevia, which gave plaintiffs access to the royal courts. Originally, such writs could be fashioned to meet new and diverse occurrences. However, in 1285 the Statute of Westminister II forbade the chancellor from further amending writs. The king himselfhad created the royal courts, hence he did not normally have the task ofrenderingjudgments. Nonetheless he retained extraordinary powers of intervention, which could apply to any Iitigation in both the fields of criminal
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law and private law. Litigants whose needs for justice could not be satisfied by the royal courts relied on such extraordinary powers of the king and petitioned him accordingly. Soon enough the king entrusted upon the chancellor the power to take the necessary measures concerning these petitions for the redress of private rights. The ensuing practice was sanctioned in 1349 under Edward 111 by an order in council. Once the chancellor's authority was basedonsolid grounds a special court presided over by him was also established: the Court of Chancery. Evidently, this latter court differed from the ordinary courts, which kept their prerogatives and competence in full. Thus, any individual seeking judicial protection could resort either to the ordinary courts (by a writ) or to the Court of Chancery (by a bill). Of course, resort to the Court of Chancery occurred whenever no writ existed that would meet the need of the petitioner, or if the judgment of any ordinary court was regarded as inadequate or otherwise unsatisfactory. One of the differences between the Roman praetor and the chancellor was rooted, as we have seen, in the different nature of the powers that enabled them to create new law. Another important difference was the unitary character of the jurisdictional power in Rome as opposed to the dualism within the jurisdictional power typical ofEngland and those countries influenced by its legal tradition. In fact, the praetor's decisions were based either on ius civile or on ius honorarium depending on the kind of action brought by the plaintiff and the kind of defense raised by the defendant. Instead, the chancellor's decisions were always based on equity. This dualism between courts of common law and courts of equity Iasted in England until the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, and beyond such date (sometimes until not long ago) in several states ofthe United States of America, in Australia, and in other jurisdictions.
IV. Social Forces Influencing the Two Bodies of Rules The Roman praetor was led to protect new interests, which the ius civile neglected, because they resulted from social and economic developments in the third to the first century B.C. Such interests, rights, and needs often involved foreigners, who were not protected under ius civile and could not bring suit before the praetor by means ofthe ordinary actions (the so-called legis actiones). Thus, the praetor admitted novel actions and extended them to foreigners. This process brought about the creation by the praetor of a novel procedure, which was at a later stage indicated as the procedure per formulas. The praetor availed hirnself of this procedure, among other things, to improve the defendant's protection whenever, because ofthe source ofthe plaintiffs rights or supervening events, he deemed that the plaintiffs victory was unfair. As a result, ius honorarium not only served the purpose of protecting the rights neglected by ius civile, but it also resulted in denying protection to some rights existing under ius civile.
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At first the praetor acted on a case-by-case basis, using ample discretion. Later on, he started to issue an edict at the beginning ofhis yearly term of office. In such edict he promised that, given certain allegations, he would grant a particular action or would allow the defendant to propose a certain defense to the plaintiff (exceptio). Thus, the measures previously adopted in individual cases became generally available remedies. How did the praetor choose which rights to protect? The choice appears to have been based on new social and ethical values. These materialized in appropriate guidelines and included values such as the respect of fides or promise, fairness and honesty in business practice, preference granted to substance over the formalism required under traditionallaw for the validity of contracts, and refusal to uphold fraud and duress. The classical jurists sometimes called aequitas the basis or the qualifying feature of praetorial measures (both those granted on a case-by-case basis and those promised in the edict). The English term equity derives from this Latin term. However, one should beware of any hasty inference: on the one hand, references to aequitas as the foundation or characteristic of either edictal clauses or praetorial remedies were neither frequent nor exclusive; on the other hand, the chancellor's equity did not derive directly from the aequitas ofRoman texts. Rather, it was linked to the meaning of the term in canon law and in the ecclesiastical texts of the Middle Ages. Actually, for over two centuries almost all the chancellors were clerics, sometimes at high Ievels ofthe ecclesiastical hierarchy. Accordingly, the equity that they followed partook of a religious nature and originated from their "conscience," which was considered the true interpreter of divine naturallaw. Once secularization came to hold sway under Elizabeth I the "conscience" became the queen's, although it was sometimes the chancellor's, so that the measure of equity was said by some lawyers tobe "the length of the chancellor's foot." In fact the rule of precedent did not apply in the Court ofChancery at that time nor did chancellors ever dare issue such a document as the edict of the Roman praetor, which was contrary to the case law approach typical ofEnglish legal culture. In the seventeenth century, however, precedent acquired more value in the Court of Chancery and began tobe followed by the chancellor in his judgments or decrees.
V. Similarities and Differences between los Honorarium and Equity Similarities between the main features of the chancellor's operations and the Roman ius honorarium are easily pinpointed. However, both the measures taken by the two courts and their practical results were different, because both the historical conditions and the perceived inadequacies of traditional law were different. Thus, for example, in the English system concern for good faith and
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promise led to the establishment of various types of trusts, having both extent and characteristics unknown to the Romans; moreover, the need to fill gaps in the ordinary law resulted in measures that were able to insure specific performance of contractual obligations and obedience in numerous injunctions, both unknown to the Roman praetor. Differences between the praetor and the chancellor are also noteworthy whenever the fields of law that each covered are taken into consideration. Broadly speaking, they both dealt with economic relations, especially so in the fields of property and contracts; however, the praetor also modernized the sources of inheritance rights and, on the other hand, the chancellor in his protection of individual rights paid more attention to their non-economic profiles. Last but not least, among the differences between equity and ius honorarium one should stress that equity, as the English jurists say, acts in personam (for instance, breach oftrust may not be used agairrst a purchaser for value without notice). Praetorial remedies, instead, also included actions in rem, such as the actio publiciana (which allowed the purchaser of a so-called res mancipi, without compliance with the formalities of ius civile, to bring suit agairrst any holder), or the actio quasi serviana (which gave rise to hypotheca, a guarantee similar to a mortgage).
VI. Dualism and Merger Notwithstanding these and several other differences between ius honorarium and equity, the essential similarity between the two cannot be denied. Such similarity, as explained above, boils down to their common origin from members ofthe judiciary, whose task was to fulfil their judicial function but who failed to apply the law in force at the time. Instead, in their decision-making process they adopted legal criteria deemed fairer or at least more adequate to the current socio-economic contingencies. Moreover, in the process, such members of the judiciary established a body of rules that were deemed separate and were kept distinct from any other body of rules. Although the final aim of such dualism was not a disruptive struggle of two bodies of rules agairrst each other, such dualism was clearly abnormal. Such abnormality explains the reason why it was pointed out as a peculiarity of Roman preclassical and classical law, on the one hand, and of English and similar legal systems, on the other. Instead, a number of distinguished English legal scholars have inferred from such abnormality that no dualism actually existed. Blackstone, for example, in his Commentaries on the Laws ofEngfandill (1768) deemed it untrue that equity's purposewas to mitigate the severity and rigidity ofthe common law, since many rigid and severe rules ofthe common law were left unchanged by equity. Furthermore, Maitland, in his lessons on equity, expressed the opinion that the courts of law were and are inspired by equity in many decisions, while not infrequently the Lord Chancellor was able to amend
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and modernize the writs by which common law rights could be asserted before the competent court. More recently, W. W. Buckland tried to show that in Rome ius civile and ius honorarium were neither so clearly distinguished nor so impermeable to one another as generally thought, arguing that in several occurrences the praetor could have modified the ius civile. Such remarks are justified by the uneasiness engendered in orthodox legal scholars by the above mentioned dualism and, as such, they appear more subtle and striking than actually valuable. Finally, it is worth remarking that this abnormality that, as such, one would imagine tobe short-lived, in fact endured at least five centuries in Rome and still exists in the English legal system and those akin to it. In the Roman world the unification process for the borlies of rules of ius civile and ius honorarium started in the classical period. However, it reached completion only during the third century, when the procedure per formu/as disappeared and the praetor became a local, unimportant magistrate of the city of Rome and, at a later stage, Constantinople. Only then was the so-called "merging" of ius honorarium and ius civile accomplished. No event of the same nature and importance has yet occurred in the AngloSaxon legal systems. The unification of the courts of common law and equity, which occurred in England with the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 and later on expanded progressively into the United States, Australia, and elsewhere, did not bring about the corresponding unification of substantive law. Once the Roman precedent is taken into account, this is not surprising; in Rome, the existence of a single magistrate did not bring about any obstacle to the creation of two separate borlies of rules. In England, most of the disputes formerly dealt with by the Court of Chancery have been entrusted to one of the divisions of the High Court of Justice. However, any ofthe judges of such a division, like any ofthe judges ofthe other superior courts, may choose to apply either ordinary law (meaning common law and statute law) or equity. For the most part they apply the well-established rules and approaches of equity, although new rules and approaches were introduced after the unification of the courts, and the system is still evolving. The above mentioned and enduring distinction should not conceal the trend to merge law and equity. An important symptom of this trend is the ease with which statutes have been and still are issued that apply to, expand, or create new equitable principles: an example is the Property Act of 1925, which defined as "equitable" all estates except those in feesimple and for years; another is the law on inheritance, which directed that the trust for sale had tobe resorted to for liquidating and distributing the assets among the heirs. The merger of equity and law is likely to be an attainable goal; however, only history will tell when and how such merger will take place.
The Notion of Contract: A French Jurist's Naive Look at Common Law Contract Denis Talion* lt is appropriate to dedicate to J ohn Merryman, who had such insight into the so-called civillaw system, the misgivings of a French lawyer trying to Iook at the common law theory of contract. In his naivety, he will first think that his task will be easy, since contract law would be nearly the same everywhere. But he will soon lose his illusions and feellost, 1 as the customary Iandmarks disappear, one after the other.
And it may be of some interest to reconstruct - mainly from personal experience 2 - the various steps a French jurist goes through. This study does not aim to get involved with the extraordinary effervescence of ideas about contract at the present time, in which American Iiterature has played an important part, but which may be also detected in France. 3 Contract may be dead but, as goes the French saying, "c'est un mort qui se porte bien." And there will not be any value judgment on the comparative merits of the civillaw and the common law, since I am not one of those "civillawyers [who] think of the common law as crude and underdeveloped" because of its Iack of "systematic jurisprudence. " 4
* Professor at the University of Law, Economics and Social Seiences (Paris II); Director, Institute of Comparative Law, University of Paris. Literature cited in abbreviated form: Le contrat aujourd'hui, Comparaisons francoanglaises, ed. by Denis Talion/ Donald Harris (1987) [published in English under the title: Contract Law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons (1989)] (cited: Le contrat aujourd'hui); Rene David/ David Pugsley, Les contrats en droit anglais (2d ed. 1985); E. Altan Farnsworth, Contracts (1982); Jacques Ghestin, Traite de droit civil, Le contrat I (1980); Philippe Malaurief Laurent Aynes, Cours de droit civil, Les obligations (1985); Barry Nicholas, French Law of Contract (1982). 1 Books of great help, nevertheless, would be David/ Pugsley and Nicholas. 2 E.g., in the Comrnission for European Law ofContract, the Unidroit working group on progressive codification of international trade law or the Anglo-French group on contract law, which led to the publication of Le contrat aujourd'hui. 3 See L'evolution contemporaine du Droit des contrats, ed. by Journees Rene Savatier (1986); Le droit contemporain des contrats, Bilan et perspectives, ed. by Löic Cadiet (1987); Le contrat aujourd'hui. 4 John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985) 63.
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But it may be profitable for the sake of a better mutual understanding, and as an incentive for a better explanation ofthe theory of contract for the outsider, to describe this process of discovery of a very different world. And it is best to begin at the very beginning, with the notion of contract. From the start, the French lawyer will find hirnself in strange territory: the notion of contract will appear to him to have both uncertain frontiers and ambiguous contents.
I. Uncertain Frontiers: What is a Contract? The French lawyer is accustomed to a clear-cut framework. Apart from some borderline discussions, he knows as a rule what is a contract and what is not; and he knows once a situation has been qualified as contractual, what will be its regime. He will then be somewhat disconcerted by the much "softer" concept of the common law, where situations are more or less contractual and only more or less governed by the rules of contract. To him, the common law of contract will appear as a nebula.
A. The Rigid Framework of French Law French contract law has a firm statutory support in its definition and the classifications given by the Civil Code. First, article 1101 provides a simple and all embracing definition: "une convention par laquelle une ou plusieurs personnes s'obligent, envers une ou plusieurs autres, ä donner, ä faire ou ä ne pas faire quelque chose." This definition is very generally accepted, 5 even though there may be some shadows (for instance, the obligations de donner, which has lost most ofits significance for historical reasons ), 6 some borderline cases (of which more later, especially with regard to the promesse de recompense), or theoretical discussions on the decline of autonomy of the will. 7 Moreover, quasi-contracts (articles 1371-1381), despite their name, are clearly separated from contract: it is obvious from Civil Code article 1370 that they are obligations formed without agreement. 8 In addition to its simple definition, French law offers well-established distinctions, most ofwhich are given by the Civil Code in articles 1102 to 1107 and some ofwhich have been elaborated by academic writers and taken up by case law. A contract may be unilateral or synallagmatic, commutative or aleatory, onerous or gratuitous, nominate or innominate. lts performance may 5 Ghestin no. 5 ff.; C. Jauffret-Spinosi, Le domaine du contrat, rapport fran~;ais, in: Le contrat aujourd'hui 92fT. 6 Nicholas 149 f. 7 Ghestin no. 53 ff. 8 On the notion of quasi-contrat, see Malaurie f Aynes no. 556 ff.
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be instantaneous or successive (contrat a execution successive); it may also be consensual, real, or "solemn. " 9 Once a situation is considered contractual according to the definition, it is possible to classify this contract according to these distinctions, each of which entails specific rules. Of course, everything is not always as clear-cut as this brief description may suggest - for instance, there are many hesitations about the category of "real contract." And French law Iacks the interesting distinction between executed and executory contracts, even though the idea that a wholly executory contract is morefragile has been more and more put forward recently. But on the whole, with all these pigeon holes, the French lawyer may play the game of successive qualification and find without too much trouble the rules that govern a particular contract. Without these props he would feellost; and this is precisely what he feels when confronted with the nebula that, to his eyes, constitutes the common law on contract(s). 10 B. The Nebula of the Common Law
Armed with his certainties, the French lawyer finds hirnself rather lost when confronted with what he would consider a very loose theory. First of all, he will not find a unique definition of contract nor a consensus given by case law. Every author has his own, even if there are, of course, similarities among them, which do not always clarify the matter. 11 And he is not likely to understand the various categories of contracts, which he may find here and there, without any systematization, such as unilateral and bilateral contracts (an insidious trap, as we shall see later) or executed or executory contracts, a very interesting and novel idea to him, but which have different connotations according to various authors. But his most serious misgivings will come from the basic issue itself, that is to say, what is contractual and what is not. The answer is clear in French law.lt is not clear in the common law, where there may be situations that are more or less contractual. And here appears the nebula image: there is a hard core of what is completely and certainly a contract, and this is the contract supported by consideration, the so-called simple contract. Around it are agreements that are not contracts, but borrow some or many rules from the theory of contract. To quote Calamari and Perillo: "The law gives effect to certain agreements other Fora description of all these categories, see Nicholas 37ff. In the singular (as is the rule in England) or in the plural (which seems to prevail in the U.S.). Hereisafirst cause ofbewilderment, as ifthere was a doubt about the existence ofa unified regime of contract law. 11 See infra text at nn. 17-25 (contract as a promise). David f Pugsley no. 78 find three main categories of definition in English Law. In the United States there is one in the Uniform Commercial Code§ 1-201(11), and another one in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981). 9
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than contracts. These include barters, gifts, sale of goods, conveyances of interests in real property, and the creation ofbailments." 12 And what about the contract under seal (deed)? And where should we place the trust? 13 Furthermore, the help our French lawyer hopes to find in some apparent similarities is sought in vain. For instance, the definition of contract as a bargain may suggest that the simple contract is the French synallagmatic contract. But this is not exact, as we shall see later on. Anyway, consideration cannot be assimilated to the cause in synallagmatic contracts. He will also find that bailment is very near the notion of"real contract," but when he goes deeper into the subject, he will soon discover many differences, even in the common contractual zone of the two notions. For instance, a lease is not considered a contrat reel in French law; don manuel is a contrat reel but certainly not a bailment, and so on. He may also be tempted to assimilate the contract under seal to his contrat solenne!, but here again it does not work: in French law, the condition of form is added to all the other conditions of formation; in the common law, it takes the place of one of these conditions. The French jurist will also have trouble with quasi-contracts, still often presented as part of the nebula of contract, while in French law 14 they are completely distinct. Our French lawyer will have to get accustomed to the idea ofblurred outlines, offlexible rules that may be used in not quite contractual situations, and he may even come to like it ifhe considers that such an approach may have advantages compared with a more rigid structure. But even if he concentrates on the hard core of the nebula, he will still have cause for astonishment, particularly as he confronts the ambiguous content of the notion itself, mainly due to the uncertain relationship between contract and promise.
II. Ambiguous Contents: Contract as a Promise 15 For one brought up on strict legal terminology, it is baffiing to discover the extensive use by the common law of the word "promise" in various contexts 16 and without any coherent explanation. What is the relationship between contract and promise? And what are the consequences of it? 12 John D. Calamari/ Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts (2d ed. 1977) 3f.; cf. B. Rudden, Le domaine du contrat, in: Le contrat aujourd'hui 125fT. 13 Rudden (supra n. 12) no. 137. 14 David 1Pugsley no. 468 ff. 15 This title is inspired, of course, by the major work of Charles Fried, Contract as Promise, A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981). 16 And sometimes in quite elaborate formulas: mutual executory promises, unilateral gratuitous promise, and so on.
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A. Cootract aod Promise
The French lawyer's first impression is that in English "contract" and "promise" are interchangeable words. If one Iooks at the table of contents of Allen Famsworth's standard book on contracts, 17 one finds such titles as enforceability of promises, where, in French, he would speak of contract. In his own law, the word promise (promesse) is rarely used by itself. 18 It is apart, at least today, of some special and well-known expressionssuch as: promesse de contrat, promesse de recompense, promesse pour autrui. And it may mean either something unilateral (promesse pour autruz) or on agreement (promesse de contrat). Moreover, there is a fine difference between promesse (to create an obligation on the passive side, a dette) 19 and Stipulation (to create an obligation on the credi t side, a creance). 20 This impression that contract and promise are synonymous is confirmed by the academic definitions of contract, which frequently derive from the Pollock definition: "Every agreement and promise enforceable by law is a contract. " 21 Consider, for instance, the Second Restatement of Contracts: "A contract is a promise or a set ofpromises for the breach ofwhich the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." 22 Here appears the compulsory aspect of contract, that is the obligations that it engenders. 23 In the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) definition, in section 1201(11), "'contract' means the totallegal obligation." Here the word promise is avoided, but what is a totallegal obligation, in the singular? And the perplexity of the foreign reader increases when he compares this definition with the UCC definition of an agreement. 24 He feels that behind this loose terminology, there is a rather confused, splintered notion. In French law, the word contract has a precise legal meaning, the word promise does not. But the connotation is that promise is something unilateraF 5 and different from a contract. The main sense is that of a unilateral act from which arises an obligation. And French lawyers speak ofpromisewhen there is Farnsworth vii. There is no word promesse by itself in the index of such standard books on contract as Gabrief Marty I Pierre Raynaud, Droit civil (1983); Ghestin; or Malaurie I Aynes; see the definitions given by Gerard Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique (2d ed. 1987). 19 Dette in French does not apply, as in English, only to monetary obligations. 20 Hence, the difference of stipulation pour autrui and promesse pour aulrui; see Code civil arts. 1119-1121. 21 Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract (4th ed. 1891) 79. 22 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981). 23 One can set a parallel between the seminal book of Georges Ripert, La regle morale dans !es obligations civiles (4th ed. 1949) and P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law (1981), even if the approach is rather different. See Fried (supra n. 15). 24 UCC § 1-201(3): "'Agreement' means tbe bargain of the parties in fact." 25 See Cornu (supra n. 18) entry "promesse." 17
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no contract, except, of course, in the expression promesse de contrat, that is, an option, where this promesse is an agreement. This "contract as promise" idea is baffling. The French jurist will find some help in the historical explanation given by David and Pugsley, according to which: "Le droit anglais des contrats demeure axe sur cette idee d'engagement pris par un contractant, plus que sur celle de contrat ... , l'idee d'engagement contractuel (promise) qui est l'idee centrale .... L'accent [est] ainsi mis sur l'engagement du defendeur plus que sur Je rapport unissant !es deux contractants. " 26 The interdependance between the obligations of a synallagmatic contract is not put forward, as it is in French law. This inheritance from history, based on the writ of assumpsit, is sometimes criticized. As Roy Goode puts it, "the essence of contract is not promise but bargain, the exchange of equivalents." 27 Our French jurist is then relieved: to learn that the promise theory is obsolete. The bargain is something he knows, the synallagmatic contract. But he will be soon disappointed. First, he will not find the well-known rules of synallagmatic contract: for instance, the basic option of Civil Code article 1184 between specific performance and resolution. He will discover that specific performance is an exceptional remedy and he will have trouble in finding "termination, " 28 which is not classified as a remedy for breach. 29 Second, he will be perturbed when he has to cope with this formidable and- to an outsideresoteric notion, consideration. And, to culminate, he will be once more amazed at the idea that a unilateral contract may be considered as a bargain. He is back at the starting point, the contract as a promise. B. The Consequences
The consequences of this strange relationship between contract and promise are many. Two will be examined as being particularly troublesome to an outsider: the use of strange examples, and the confusing distinction between unilateral and bilateral contract. In every English or American textbook on contract, the case of Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. Ltd. 30 is extensively discussed. Was the poor Iady who David/ Pugsley no. 77. R.M. Goode, Commercial Law (1982) 84; see P.S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law ofContract (3d ed. 1981) 29; seealso G. Rouhette, La force obligatoire du contrat, rapport fran~ais, in: Le contrat aujourd'hui 18, no. 2. 28 Here again he meets a problern of terminology: resolution (or resiliation) may be termination, cancellation, rescission, or even- in the Convention on International Sale of Goods - avoidance. And the definition of UCC § 2-106 will not be of great help. 29 He will have trouble also with the right to withhold performance, which does not have the same clear-cut feature as the exceptionon adimpleti contractus he is familiar with. 30 (1893) 1 Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division 256. The reproduction of the advertisement in the case even marle the cover of a well-known book: F.R. Davies, Contract (5th ed. 1986). 26 27
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had caught influenza despite the use of the smoke ball entitled to the f 100 reward advertised by the producer? Thousands of students have been asked this question, which involves many aspects in the formation of contract. An imaginary case is nearly as weil known, the "classroom favorite" ofthe Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical. If A promises me $ 100 if I walk across the Brooklyn Bridge, may he withdraw his offer when I am halfway across the bridge? 31 Neither ofthese cases would be considered as relevant in a French classroom because, at the start, they deal with situations that are borderline. Many authors do not Iook at these promises of reward as contractual. There is much academic controversy on this point, which turns around the theory of the engagement par volonte unilaterale and whether it may be a source of obligations. This indeed is the question of the promise in its pure state. The "contractual" theory of the promise of a reward is upheld by some: the promise of a reward may be considered as an offer, which is tacitly accepted, but requires prior knowledge of the offer. 32 For others, it is a fiction to speak of an agreement (andin the Carli/1 case, what would the so-called offeree consent to?), and anyway there cannot be an agreement when acceptance occurs at the same time as the performance. 33 This is not the place to discuss this question in French law. 34 Nevertheless, these two classical examples of contract law would not be classified in such a way in French law. Moreover, Carlill is presented as a typical example of an unilateral contract. Here, the French lawyer- once he has admitted the contractual explanationfeels on safer ground: he knows what a unilateral contract is. Civil Code article 1103 35 gives a definition that is not quite so different from that given by some common law authors, for example, Farnsworth: "In forming a unilateral contract only one party makes a promise." 36 And yet matters will not appear as simple as that if he Iooks a little further. He will have doubts about the coincidence of the notion in French law andin the common law. F or instance, he finds in Sudbrook Trading Ltd. v. Eggleton 37 that the unilateral contract is called by Lord Diplock an "if' contract. And he understands why Barry Nicholas 31 Farnsworth 177, presents it as the "most durable and influential hypothetical in American legal education." 32 Jacques Flour I Jean-Luc Aubert, Droit civil, Les obligations I (1986) no. 492fT. 33 Malaurie I Aynes no. 226; Jean Carbonnier, Obligations 13 (1988) no. 10. A consultation of Juridial (the unified French legal data bank) reveals no recent case on the question. 34 Or even to discuss it in American law. In French law, it would be difficult to classify the Brooklyn Bridge situation: perhaps as the promise of a gift under condition, which is not enforceable in French law. See Gabriel M arty I Pierre Raynaud, Droit civil, Succession et liberalites (1983) no. 500. 35 "II est unilateral lorsqu'une ou plusieurs personnes sont obligees envers une ou plusieurs autres, sans que deIapart de ces demieres il y ait d'engagement." 36 Farnsworth 109. 37 [1982] 3 Weekly Law Reports 315, 319.
19 Merryman Festschrift
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writes ofthe "several pitfalls" to the common lawyer presented by the distinction of bilateral contracts in French law. 38 There are the same pitfalls the other way round. And it will take a long time to understand that these two apparently similar distinctions between bilateral and unilateral contracts are actually very different. In English Law, it is closely linked with the distinction of executed and executory contract, 39 which is unknown to French law: the unilateral contract is a contract only if there is an executed consideration, a promise in return for an act. And here is the difference. The French distinction is one based on the content of the contract, that is to say on the obligations created by this contract either for each party or only for one of them, whether these Obligations have been executed or not. In the common law, the distinction is founded on the way the contract is formed: by express acceptance or by performance. The unilateral contract is the unilateral (and valueless) promise that becomes a contract by performance. At least, the faux ami is unmasked. Under French law, a unilateral contract (in the common law sense) would not be a contract, at least, in many cases. Conversely, a French cantrat unilateral would not be a contract und er the common law, since most of them are gratuitous contracts or bailments.
111. Conclusion Many English or American lawyers would be surprised by his French colleague's astonishment. But on both sides, lessons should be drawn from this reciprocal astonishment. The first is that one must beware of the apparently obvious: for instance, that the notion of contract is the same everywhere; that a unilateral contract is the same as a cantrat unilateral. Then, one must always be on the alert to try and detect the way his own concepts will be received by jurists from another system. Ifhe does not, it may lead to some serious misunderstandings. In the Anglo-French group working on a comparative study of contract, 40 the French participants often quoted the Code des marches publies-which was understood by the English participants as the Code of public markets- while in fact it is the Code of Administrative Contracts. The French participants were not even conscious ofthe possibility of a mistake, due to the fact that in French, marche means both market and bargain. lt took some time to clear up the ambiguity. With some complacency, Lord Diplock finds the "beauty of the Common Law" in the fact that "it is a maze and not a motorway." 41 This means that the civillawyer about to enter the maze ofthe common law of contract needs a lot of help from the common lawyer in order to find his way. 38 39 40
41
Nicholas 37. To the point that David/ Pugsley no. 85 assimilates the two categories. Which led to the publication of the often quoted Le contrat aujourd'hui. Morris v. Martins (C.W.) & Sons [1965]2 All England Law Reports 725, 734.
Civil Liability of Experts in Court: A Comparative Overview Yasuhei Taniguchi*
I. Introduction Modern judicial decision making is increasingly dependent on expert evidence. A host of experts - medical, technical, economic, accounting, and others- are commonly employed to help the decision maker betterunderstand and interpret the facts involved in the case. 1 Since an important issue may be highly technical and beyond the knowledge of ordinary persons, including the judge or any other decision maker, an expert's opinion is often decisively influencial on the final decision by the court. When an expert intentionally or inadvertently gives an erroneous opinion, the decision maker is likely to be misled and to reach a wrong conclusion. Can the losing party sue the expert for damages? That is the question posed in this essay. The answer to this simple question seems to vary to a considerable degree according to the procedural system involved. In the Iegalliterature of civillaw countries the problern is discussed and many court decisions are cited. But, strangely or not, in the Iiterature of common law countries there is not a single mention ofthe problern as far as I can determine. 2 What lies behind such a clear difference? In Japan, whose procedural system seems to fall somewhere in the middle between civil law and common law systems, the problern has not attracted any attention until recently. 3
* Professor of Law, Kyoto University. Literature cited in abbreviated form: Helmut Pieper I Leonie Breunung I Günther Stahlmann, Sachverständige im Zivilprozess, Theorie, Dogmatik und Realität des Sachverständigenbeweises (1982). Additional abbreviations: Gaz. Pa!. = Gazette du Palais; NJW = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift. 1 An expert is usually and traditionally concemed only with issues of facts. But an expert may be relied on to clarify a legal question. Whether such a person is also an expert in the real sense ofthe word is questionable, although an expert on a foreign law question should be treated as an expert on the point of facts. For an argument against a blanket prohibition of expert legal testimony, see Note, Expert Legal Testimony: Harv. L. Rev. 97 (1987) 797. 2 I was further encouraged to treat this problern comparatively by our celebrated Professor Merryman, when he said to me that he had not thought of it. 3 See infratextat nn. 59-66. 19*
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The way an "expert" works in the civil procedure of different systems varies considerably. The civilliability of experts seems to depend very much on the nature of the expert in each system. The common law world and the civillaw world are clearly divided: in the former an expert is generally retained by a party and called an expert "witness," while in the latter he is considered to be performing an official duty as ordered by the court and he is clearly distinguished from a witness. The nature of experts differs further within the civil law from one system to another. In the following sections I review the nature and function of the expert in civil Iitigation under French, German, American, and Japanese laws and practices. I then consider how the problern of an expert's civilliability is treated under each system and analyze the differences among the systems.
II. The French Expert In France the use of experts is very common. But the nature of a French expert differs very much from its counterpart not only in common law courts but also even in neighboring Germany. The present French Nouveau Code de procedure civile of 1975 recognizes three types of proof by an expert (par technicien): verification ( constatation), diagnosis ( consultation), and expert examination ( expertise). Constatation applies to a fact ascertainable by simple observation. Consultation is used when a more detailed determination of facts is necessary. Expertise is for those complex matters that require a thorough examination by an expert. 4 In any event, the court or a judge appointsanexpert upon a party's motion or by its own motion. 5 There is an official Iist of experts prepared every year according to law, 6 from which the court appoints its expert, although it is not legally required to do so. The expert submits a written report to the appointing court or judge, which constitutes apart ofthe record upon which the parties later present their respective oral arguments (plaidoiries) and the deciding court gives its final judgment. 4 This trifurcation of expert proof is new under the Nouveau Code. There used tobe only expertise under the old Code. The other two categories were introduced to make expert proof easier for simple matters. As a matter offact, constatation was and still is used to have a simple fact verified by a bailiff or huissier. Chapter 5 to title 7 of the Nouveau Code is organized as follows: general rules (arts. 232-248); /es constatations (arts. 249255); Ia consultation (arts. 256- 262); and l'expertise (arts. 263- 284). For these reforms, see Jean Vincent/Serge Guinchard, Procedure civile (20th ed. 1981) 1043. 5 Under French procedure, the three judge court that decides cases is not usually engaged directly with the procedure of proof. It is entrusted to a judge of the court as the preparatory judge (juge de Ia mise en etat). Moreover, the oral testimony of a witness ( enquete) is rarely used. James Beardsley, Proof ofFact in French Civil Procedure: Am. J. Comp. L. 34 (1986) 459-486 (478). 6 See Loi du 29 juin 1971 (no. 71-498), implemented by Decret du 31 dk 1974 (no. 741184).
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James Beardsley, a common law lawyer, has observed: French civil procedure is marked by a strong preference for written proof and by the tendency of French judges to avoid factual determinations that must be based on evidence which is complex or otherwise difficult to evaluate. Confronted with evidence of this kind the French judge will normally appoint a lay expert to carry out the factfinding task. When an expert is appointed, he will often pursue his investigation in a manner which attenuates the traditional distrust of oral evidence and which is functionally similar to the common law trial. The court may also delegate one of its own members to take oral evidence in the enquete procedure, but this is rarely done. 7
Thus, expertise is a widely used and very important fact-finding mechanism. Its use is not practically limited to those cases that require a special kind of knowledge, which professional judges typically Iack. Too much dependence on it and its rather easy use have been criticized, not only for making civillitigation more costly and slow, but also for risking the danger of delegating judicial power. Thus, a more proper division of roles between judge and expert has been sought. 8 It is against this background that French jurists discuss the problern of the civilliability of an expert in court (expert judiciaire). 9 It was once the rule of the Cour de cassation, that when an expert's report was adopted by the court and 7 Beardsley (supra n. 5) 459. Traditional formalism of proof in France is defended in Claude Giverdon, The Problem ofProofin French Civil Law: Tul. L. Rev. 31 (1956) 29-48. 8 A comparative study of expert evidence in European countries confirmed a too liberal use of expertise in France. Motulsky, Notions generales, in: L'expertise dans les principaux systemes juridiques d'Europe (Travaux et Recherehes de L'Institut de Droit Compare de Paris XXXII 1968) 13 (30). Expertise was officially condemned as being too liberally used and as costing too much in money and time. Circulaire de M. Je Premier President de Ia Courd'appel de Paris sur l'expertise civile, Gaz. Pal. 1967, 1 Legislation 281. See Alphanse Kohl, Romanist Legal Systems, in: Int'l Ency. Comp. L. XVI (Civil Procerlure) eh. 6-II, ed. by Mauro Cappelletti (1984) 57; Oppetit, Les röles respectifs dujuge et du technicien dans l'administration de Ia preuve en droit prive, in: Les röles respectifs du juge et du technicien dans l'administration de Ia preuve (Xe Colloque des Instituts d'Etudes Judiciares 1976) 53 (cited: Xe Colloque). The Nouveau Code tried to improve the situation. The adoption of constatation and consultation as simplified versions of expertisewas an answer to the problem. For the main vices of the former system and the new conception of a judicial expert, see Regine GeninMeric, Mesures d'instruction executees par un technicien, in: Juris Classeur de Procerlure Civile, Fase. 660 (1988) nos. 4ff. In regard to how the philosophy ofthe reform has been realized, a questionaire survey conducted shortly after the reform revealed no great changes. Syntheses desresultatsdes enquetes, in: Xe Colloque (supra) 185 ff. (expertise is overwhelmingly the most common method of proof). 9 In the Iiterature I found no discussion specifically on the Iiability of the technicien engaged in constatation and consultation, presumably because these devices are new and less frequently used. But the same rule as for expertise seems to apply. See Genin-Meric (supra n. 8) nos. 143ff. The expertjudiciaire appointed by the court or judge is different from the expert amiable, who is retained by the parties pursuant to an agreement to that effect made before or after a dispute arises. See Tony Moussa, Expertise, Matieres civile et penale (2d ed. 1988) 159.
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internalized in a final judgment, the losing party could pursue the expert's liability only on the same condition as applicable tothat ofthe judge. 10 But more recent Court decisions treat the expert's civilliability under the common rule of tort law as spelled out in article 1382 ofthe Code civil, whether or not the expert's opinion was adopted by a final judgment. 11 The authoritative treatise on responsabilite civile by Henri Mazeaud has long taken such a position, 12 which seems widely supported today, 13 although some reservation has been expressed in view of the need for the expert's freedom and independence, which could be endaugered by the fear of heavy liability. 14 Two situations are distinguished where the liability of experts comes into question: ( 1) the negligent conduct of expertise and (2) the erroneous opinion of an expert. In any event, according to Code civil article 1382, three requirements must be met for liability to be recognized: negligence (faute), darnage (prejudice), and causality ( causalite). A. The Negligent Conduct of Expertise The process of expertise can be tainted by some kind of irregularity. It may occur at different stages or in various aspects of expertise. An expert may assume a duty that his qualification would not permit, violate the duty of objectivity and impartiality, not follow the mission specified by the appointingjudge, and so on.
1° Cass. requetes, 26 oct. 1914, Dalloz, Jurisprudence general, Recueil p{:riodique et critique 1916, 1, 53 stated: "If the experts ordered by a court to proceed to verification are in principle subject to the ordinary rules of law, and accordingly responsible for the darnagethat is the direct result oftheirfaute, it is quite different when their reports have been approved by a final judgment; these documents, which until then are deprived by themselves of any authority and arenothing but simple advice subject to free discussion by the parties and to correction by the judges, become on the contrary one of the elements of the decision in which they are incorporated, when they have been sanctioned by the court; they share then the character of this decision and are unattackable as such when it has become final; they can consequently make their authors liable only on the same conditions for which the judgments could, as against the judges who have rendered them, and justify the exceptional action as allowed by the law." Such an exceptional actionwas allowed under art. 505 ofthe ancien Code de procedure civile only in the case of fraud or gross professional negligence. This Code has been superseded by the Nouveau Code, but theprovision is preserved ineffect in art. 11, Loi du 5 juillet 1972 (no. 72-626). 11 Cass. civ., 9 mars 1949, Recueil Dalloz de doctrine, de jurisprudence et de legislation, Hebdomadaire 1949, 331 = Juris Classeur Periodique, La Semaine Juridique 1949, Il, 4826, note by J.F.L.C. = Gaz. Pa!. 1949, 1, 244; Cass. civ., 8 oct. 1986, Gaz. Pa!. 1987,2, Sommaire 337, note by Guinchardf Moussa. 12 Henri Mazeaudf Andre Tune, Traite theorique et pratique de Ia responsabilite civile delictuelle et contractuelle I (6th ed. 1965) nos. 515-3, 522. 13 Moussa (supra n. 9) 362. 14 Louis Mallard, Traite complet de l'expertise judiciare (1947) 136.
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One recent case illustrates an important feature of expertise. 15 In this case an expert was charged with violation of the principle of contradictoire. This principle expresses the French version of procedural due process and is expressly declared in article 16 of the Nouveau Code. The conduct of proof must also comply with this principle. Thus, article 160 of the new Code provides, inter a/ia, that the parties must be given the notice of summons by the commissioned expert ( technicien). Even under the old Code, failure to give notice resulted in the nullity of expertise and, in fact, this principle has become recognized as governing the whole process of expertise. 16 In this particular Iitigation, involving the transfer of a building materials factory that allegedly did not function weil, an expert was commissioned by the court to verify its malfunctioning at a certain date and to give his opinion on the amount of money necessary to repair it. After an initial adversary session, the expert proceeded thereafter without the parties' presence, notwithstanding a written request by the parties to proceed in an adversarial manner ( contradictoirement). Only after his report had been drafted in final form for deposit with the court did he summon the parties. The court decided that the report was null and void and this decision was affirmed on appeal and became final. N ow the plaintiff sued the expert for damages. The court granted two kinds of damages: one for the cost of the former action, which bad been aborted because ofthe nullity of expertise (50,000 F.), and another for loss ofthe opportunity to use the expert's opinion, which could not be repeated in the same way because of the changed condition of the object to be examined (100,000 F.). In this case causality was found easily because the nullity of expertise had been previously established. Otherwise, it would have raised a difficult question offact finding. 17 B. Error in the Expert's Report
The expert's report may contain a wrong opinion. No problern arises if the opinion is not adopted by the court. 18 Theoretically the opinion is not binding on the court, but it is usually followed because of the technical overtone of its contents. An aggrieved party can sue the expert for damages, even if the judgment has become res judicata, when an error is by negligence. However, when an error is so simple and clear that it could have been easily discerned by the court and discussed by the parties, there is no liability of the expert. 19 Here 15 Tribunal de grande instance de Nantes, 6 mars 1985, Gaz. Pa!. 1985, 1, Jurisprudence 303, note by Caratini. 16 J. P. Rousse, Le respect du principe du contradictoire dans Je deroulement des operations d'expertise: Gaz. Pa!. 1978, 2, Doctrine 627-630. 17 Where the nullity of expertise has not been declared, proof of causality is admittedly very difficult. Moussa (supra n. 9) 366; Guide juridique Dalloz, Expertise III (1986) 245249. 18 Jacques Voulet, La pratique des expertisesjudiciares (9th ed. 1988) C-11.
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again is a subtle problern of causality, in addition to the finding of negligence that is often also difficult. Arecent decision ofthe Cour de cassation is illustrative ofthis kind of error. 20 In a personal injury case an expert's report stated, due to a clerical error, that the degree of permanent disability of a victim was 30 percent instead of three percent. Judgment was rendered on the basis of the 30 percent disability. The money was paid by the insurance company, which upon finding out the error sued the expert for damages equal to the difference. The first and second instance courts granted the relief as sought. The expert appealed to the Cour de cassation, arguing that his opinion had been adopted by the court, exonerating him from normal tort liability. The highest court did not agree and upheld the judgment below. This decision is in line with those precedents that reject the imrnunity of an expert from liability, even ifhis opinion has been incorporated in ajudgment. 21 Because ofthe simple nature ofthe error in this case, however, one can ask whether the party could have found it out if he had read the expert's report carefully. This point was also raised by the expert. But the Cour de cassation rejected this argument, too, by saying that the error had not been discernable upon reading. lt seems that this decision reflects the practice of expertise in France. There is too much reliance on experts both by the judge and by the parties. An emphasis on the principle of contradictoire means the guarantee of participation by the parties in the operation of expertise. One may wonder why this participation should not be accompanied by responsibility.
111. The German Expert Under the German Code ofCivil Procerlure (Zivilprozeßordnung = ZPO), expert evidence plays a vital role in Iitigation that requires special knowledge, scientific or otherwise. In practice, experts (Sachverständige) are used extensively.
A recent survey shows that cases with one or more experts outnurober those without. 22 The expert's role seems strictly limited to directly furnishing the deciding court with some sort of special knowledge or factual determination 19 0/ivier, Mesures d'instruction confiees ä un technicien, in: Encyclopedie Dalloz II (2d ed. 1979) 29, no. 486. 2° Cass. civ., 8 oct. 1986 (supra n. 11). 21 See supra n. 10. 22 Surveyed Landgerichte (generaljurisdiction first instance) processed 439 cases with one or more experts and 329 cases with no experts. Surveyed Amtsgerichte (limited jurisdiction first instance) had a ratio of 274 to 338 cases, with experts compared to no experts. Pieper I Breunung I Stahlmann 181. American observers have remarked: "German judges tend to overdo the calling of experts in fields that do not really !end themselves to expertness." Benjamin Kaplan I Arthur T. von Mehren I Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procerlure I: Harv. L. Rev. 71 (1958) 1193-1258 (1243).
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based on such knowledge required for proper decision by the court. 23 Experts may be appointed upon motion by one or both parties or by the court's own motion. 24 The court may request nomination of an expert by a partyandin fact it is bound by the parties' united nomination. 25 It has been observed, however, that in practice party nomination is not common practice and the court usually takes the initiative in nominating and selecting the expert. 26 What is emphasized in Germany isthat the expert is a "judge's aid" (Gehilfe des Richters) and must be neutral from the parties' interest. When an expert takes the oath, neutrality must be sworn. 27 An expert is expected to produce a written report, which can be challenged by the party. He may be called to testify to explain the report. If necessary another expert will be appointed. In the vast majority of cases, however, only one expert serves. 28 This seems to reflect the generalnature of the expert as a judge's neutral aid rather than as a partisan proponent. In Germany the problern of an expert's civilliability has been considered seriously and discussed actively in court decisions and in the literature. It is well settled that the expert's liability is not contractual, because the expert has no contractual relationship either with the parties or with the court. 29 The liability, if any, must be based on tort law included in the Civil Code (BGB). However, it has also been established by the decision of the Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof= BGH) that state liability arising from activities of public officials under BGB section 839 and the Constitution article 34 does not come 23 For the expert's role, see Leo Rosenberg j Kar/ Heinz Schwab, Zivilprozeßrecht (14th ed. 1986) 762. For the roles observed in practice, see Pieper j Breunung j Stahlmann 237. The principal role is to determine particular facts with the expert's special knowledge. Id. 24 Kurt Jessnitzer, Der gerichtliche Sachverständige, ein Handbuch für die Praxis (6th ed. 1976) 106; Adolf Baumbach I Wolfgang LauterbachjJan Albersj Peter Hartmann, Zivilprozeßordnung, mit Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz und anderen Nebengesetzen (46th ed. 1988) 1130, § 403(1). 25 ZPO § 404(3), (4). 26 For the practice of selecting an expert, see John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, U. Chi. L. Rev. 52 (1985) 823-866 (837). The survey (supra n. 22) showed the following: out of 538 experts appointed, 17 were by parties' joint nomination binding the court, and 46 were appointed from among 87 proposed by a party (so that 53 percent of single-party proposals were followed by the court). Pieper j Breunung I Stahlmann 229. 27 An expert is not required to take an oath, but when one does so, its language shall state that the duty will be performed "neutrally and with one's best knowledge and conscience." ZPO § 410(1). 28 Out of 439 Landgericht cases where an expert's service was obtained, 360 had only one, 66 had two, and nine had three experts. PieperjBreunungfStahlmann 181. 29 Friedrich Stein/ Martin Jonas, Kommentar zur Zivilprozeßordnung, ed. by Wolfgang Grunsky et al. (19th ed. 1972) text before § 402 V 1; Klaus Müller, Der Sachverständige im gerichtlichen Verfahren, Handbuch der Sachverständigenbeweise (3d ed. 1988) 631.
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into play here, because the expert is not exercising any official power for the court. 30 As in France an expert can incur tort liability in two situations: namely (1) in the course of an investigation in forming an opinion and (2) by an erroneous report adopted by the court. The former liability may arise, for example, when a medical expert negligently injures someone in the course of performing an examination required by the court. This is the liability under Civil Code section 823(1)_31 More problematic is the second situation, where the principle of an expert's neutrality and independence and the need of a victim's relief collide. Discussion was renewed when the Supreme Court gave a clear-cut decision on the problern and later the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) reversed it as stepping over the Iimit of the judge's lawmaking power. The cause ce/ehre is the Weygand case, in which, simply stated, Weygand was ordered by the court to be confined in a mental institution as the result of an expert's report that stated he was mentally ill. Later, a second expert ascertained bis condition to be normal and he was released after three months. Weygand sued the firstexpert for damages. Two Ievels of lower courts dismissed the claim. The Supreme Court upheld the decision below with detailed reasoning. It held that the unsworn expert is not subject to any civil liability except for an intentional tort. The decision was based not only on a detailed analysis of possible Civil Code provisions from which liability could be derived, 32 but also from the following policy consideration: 30 BGH, decision of 5 Oct. 1972, 59 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen[= BGHZ] 310 = NJW (1973) 554. The case involved a public hospital doctor, that is a public official who served as an expert. State liability arises where official duty includes service as an expert. Stein/ Jonas (supra n. 29). 31 E.g., BGH, decision of5 Oct. 1972 (supra n. 30), involved such a situation. The Court denied state liability, but recognized the expert's personal liability. Richard Zöller, Kommentar zur Zivilprozeßordnung, mit Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, ed. by Reinhold Geimer et al. (14th ed. 1987) 1033, § 402(6). 32 To understand this judgment it is necessary to know the structure of Civil Code provisions on tort law ( Deliktsrecht), which is rather complex. Section 823 is the basic provision. Its first clause makes one who has intentionally or negligently infringed upon "life, body, health, freedom, property, or other right of another" liable for damages. The enumeration ofprotected interests here ("absolute rights") is interpreted narrowly, and a general loss of property interest (reine Vermögensschäden) is not protected. Thus, the darnage suiTered by a Iitigant due to a wrong expert opinion adopted by the court cannot be taken care ofunder this clause. Then comes the second clause, which supplementing the first clause, makes one who has violated the "law intended to protect another" (Schutzgesetz) liable. What is included in such a law isamatter of discussion. For the present purpose, the Penal Code provision for perjury admittedly comes within such a rule. Therefore, if an expert is sworn, liability can arise even from an unintentional false opinion under Civil Code § 823(2) in combination with the Penal Code provisions on perjury (StGB §§ 154, 163(1), etc.), which makes the sworn false testimony (or opinion) punishable. Another possible ground for liability is Civil Code § 826, which gives rise to liability when darnage is intentionally made in a manner contrary to good morals. This can
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The position of the expert as a judge's aid for decision making, as shown in the aforementioned decisions ofthe BGH, speaks against exposing the expert to such a farreaching risk. Although he performs no judicial function, he can still exert important influence on the judgment as an aid with special knowledge. Therefore, his inner independence is of special significance in order to secure the functioning of his activity injudicial proceedings. In view ofthe interest ofthe participants injudicial proceedings and also of the general public in the functioning of the administration of justice, he cannot be permitted to stand - perhaps unconsciously - under the pressure and the threat of a possible return attack from the party against whom a judgment of the court will be rendered on the basis ofhis opinion. In this connection, what matters is not only the fact that he may be sued later successfully. lt will affect him to a considerable degree already that heruns the risk that he may be involved for many years in a series of suitseven though they prove unsuccessful - which easily arouse public attention. Also for the reason oflegal certainty, it is unavoidable to Iimit and restriet objections that may Iead to alteration of the result created by a judicial judgment. If the liability of the expert is recognized, even when his unsworn violation of duty is not criminally punishable, a !arge number of lawsuits will follow where an effort will be made to effectively alter the result of the judicial decision in the former Iitigation (" Wiederaufrollung des Verfahrens"). 33
What is significant about this decision is that the Supreme Court sweepingly exonerated the unsworn expert and his unintentionally erroneous opinion without distinguishing between mere negligence and gross negligence, and did so without exception, that is to say, the rule is applicable even if an "absolute right" under Civil Code section 823(1) is infringed. This gave rise to severe criticism among commentators for creating "free land for gross negligence" and leaving the victim totally without any right. 34 As a result, the Commission for the Reform ofCivil Procerlure in its 1977 Report recommended an amendment to the Civil Code to make the grossly negligent expert liable. 35 apply only to intentional false opinions. Seegenerally B. S. Markesinis, A Comparative Introduction to the German Law of Tort (1986). 33 62 BGHZ 56 = NJW (1974) 312f. 34 Jessnitzer (supra n. 24) 106; Klaus Hopt, Anmerkung: Juristen Zeitung 29 (1974) 551555; Jürgen Blomeyer, Zur zivilrechtliehen Haftung des gerichtlichen Sachverständigen: Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 7 (1974) 214-221; Joachim Hellmer, Anmerkung: NJW 27 (1974) 556f.; Herbert Arndt, Der Kommentar: Deutsche Richterzeitung 52 (1974) 185f.; Theo Rasehorn, Zur Haftung für fehlerhafte Sachverständigengutachten: NJW 27 (1974) 1172-1174; Werner Speckmann, Haftungsfreiheit für gerichtliche Sachverständige auf Kosten des Geschädigten?: Monatsschrift für deutsches Recht 29 (1975) 461 f.; Reinhard Damm, Die zivilrechtliche Haftung des gerichtlichen Sachverständigen- BGHZ 62, 54: Juristische Schulung 16 (1976) 359-363. There had been extensive sturlies on the problern even before the Weygand decision. See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, Schadensersatz aus unberechtigter Verfahrenseinleitung (1968) 282ff.; Jürgen Blomeyer, Schadensersatzansprüche des im Prozeß Unterlegenen wegen Fehlverhaltens Dritter (1972) 117ff.; Jessnitzer (supra n. 24, 4th ed. 1973) 253ff. 35 The Commision also recommended an expansion to cover reine Vermögensschäden. Thus, the addition of § 839a to the Civil Code was recommended, which would read: "Whoever as an expert in court gives an erroneous opinion intentionally or by gross
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The aspect of the decision that the expert is free from liability, even if an infringement has been inflicted upon one of the protected "absolute rights" enumerated in the Civil Code section 823(1), namely life, body, health, freedom, and property, was taken to change the Civil Code to the extent that liability of experts was concerned. As a matter of fact, it was Weygand's freedom that was allegedly infringed by the court order of confinement. lt was this point with which the Constitutional Court took issue. Upon Weygand's constitutional appeal, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the Supreme Court in 1978. The Constitutional Court recognized the validity of the policy consideration expounded by the Supreme Court as quoted above and admitted room for lawmaking by the Court, but it said: In any event, the BGH overstepped the pennitted Iimit oflawmaking when it denied this kind of darnage claim, even in the case of the gross negligence of an expert. ... What is concerned herein this disputed darnage claim is notjust anormal money claim, but the violation of the right of personal freedom specifically protected by the Constitution. Guarantee of this constitutional right of freedom through article 2, clause 2 of the Constitution is embodied in tort law because it implies a sanction for its violation by another. 36
Since the Constitutional Court's ruling 37 dealt only with the constitutionally guaranteed absolute right, lower courts have been following the precedent ofthe Supreme Court in ordinary cases, limiting the expert's liability to intentional error in his opinion.38 There are still problems that can be solved only by the legislature. One concerns the differentiation between the sworn and unsworn expert. A sworn expert is liable even for mere negligence, while the unsworn one goes without liability even for gross negligence. Both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court admit that such a discrepancy is notjustified. In fact, experts are rarely sworn. 39 Another problern concerns the wisdom of excluding gross negligence as a ground of liability in normal cases where a constitutionally negligence is liable for compensation ofthe darnagethat is suffered by a party to Iitigation due to the final judgment based on such error." Bundesministerium der Justiz, Bericht der Kommission für das Zivilprozeßrecht (1977) 143, 358. See Deutsch, Zivilrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit psychiatrischer Sachverständiger: Versicherungsrecht (1987) 113 ff. (114 n. 3). 36 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 11 Oct. 1978, 49 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 304, 319 = NJW (1979) 305f. Grundgesetz art. 2 II provides in part: "Freedom of the person is inviolable (Die Freiheit der Person ist unverletzlich)." 37 The Weygand case was settled to the plaintitrs satisfaction after remand. Deutsch (supra n. 35) 115. 38 Some recent cases are: Oberlandesgericht [ = OLG] München, decision of 23 Feb. 1983, Versicherungsrecht [ = VersR] (1984) 590 (building expert); OLG Hamm, decision of 13 Apr. 1983, VersR (1985) 841 (building expert); OLG Düsseldorf, decision of 6 Aug. 1986, NJW (1986) 2891 (medical expert assessing loss of working ability). 39 Rosenberg I Schwab (supra n. 23) 762; see Pieper I Breunung I Stahlmann 237.
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protected right is not in question. 40 Some commentators even argue that state liability should be recognized. 41 The aforementioned Comrnission Report in 1977 recommended the abolition of the expert's oath and the creation of uniform liability for gross negligence by an expert, in addition to intention, as long as darnage results from the final judgment based on hisexpert opinion. 42 As of 1988, however, the reform does not seem to have been implemented.
IV. The American Expert Anglo-American civil procedure is characterized by its adversariness. Under the adversary system the parties, not the court, are entitled and responsible to furnish necessary information to the court as they see fit. Civillaw procedure is sometimes characterized as "inquisitorial" as opposed to adversarial. As often pointed out, this term is not accurate because the civillaw is also adversarial in its own sense. 43 The very nature of a civil dispute seems to require the adversary character of the process for its legitimate resolution. 44 What distinguishes the common law version of adversarial procedure from the civil law's is that the former, combined with the tradition of the jury trial, extends adversariness to the proof stage while keeping the judge's control at a rninimum. The result is an entirely partisan presentation of all kinds of proof. Parties not only present the means of proof, for example a witness, but also the information he carries, for example his testimony, as they like. The truth is not alooffrom the parties for the 40 For comments after Weygand was settled, see Helmut Pieper, Rechtsstellung des Sachverständigen und Haftung für fehlerhafte Gutachten, in: Gedächtnisschrift für Rudolf Bruns (1980) 167; Gert Wasner, Die Haftung des gerichtlichen Sachverständigen: NJW 39 (1986) 119f.; Deutsch (supra n. 35). 41 Pieper (supra n. 40) 175ff.; PieperfBreunungjStahlmann 46ff. 42 For the language of the proposed revision, see supra n. 35. 43 "Both [German and American procedure] are adversary systems of civil procedure." Langbein (supra n. 26) 824 "[T]he civil procedure systems of France, Germany and the United States were- and remain- adversarial." Arthur von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory ofthe Concentrated Trial, Comparative Remarks, in: Europäisches Rechtsdenken in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Festschrift für Helmut Coing zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. by Norbert Horn/ Klaus Luig j Alfred Söllner li (1982) 361 ff. (361 n. 3). Our celebrated Professor Merryman puts it in a somewhat different way but to the same effect: "In fact, the prevailing system in both the civillaw and the common law world is the "dispositive" system, according to which the determination ofwhat issues to raise, what evidence to introduce, and what arguments to make is left almost entirely to the parties." John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, An Introduction totheLegal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985) 114f. 44 Fuller's theory of adversarial adjudication as the tool for Iegitimation would be acceptable in the civillaw systems. Lon L. Fuller, The Formsand Limits of Adjudication: Harv. L. Rev. 92 (1978) 353; see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process, An Essay for Lon Fuller: ibid. 410; seealso Martin P. Go/ding, On the Adversary System and Justice, in: Philosophical Law: Authority, Equality, Adjudication, Privacy, ed. by Richard Bronaugh (1978) 122 and Summers's comment, ibid.
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court to find, but is so mething to be pressed on the court or the lay find er of fact, the jury. Hence comes the doctrine that the burden of proof is satisfied by the preponderance of evidence. Each party's role is to attack the opponent's version of the case, thereby making one's own version more plausible. Behind all this seems to exist an entrenched beliefthat if there can be any objective truth, it is formed firstinan adversarial process where the partisan interest of each party is fully represented. Thus, information provided by an expert is no exception to this as long as it fortifies the case of one of the parties. Each party hunts out an expert who can testify in his favor, places him in the witness stand, and tries to elicit from him the mostfavorable information. The opponentwill then want to cross- examine him to reduce the.value of such information from all conceivable points of view. In this adversarial context, there is no distinction between the ordinary witness and the expert, who is hence called an "expert witness," 45 both being dominated by what John Henry Wigmore called "the instincts of sportmanship."4ö The result is the familiar battle ofexperts and "clashes between experts paid to be partial, fiercely and interminably examined by lawyers with smatterings of contrived learning on the experts' specialties." 47 Experts are also said to be known as "saxophones" among the triallawyers, because "the lawyer plays the tune, manipulating the expert as though the expert were a musical instrument on which the lawyer sounds the desired notes." 48 All these criticisms have been made in comparison with the civil law expert. Common law lawyers are not unaware of the vices of partisan experts. 49 An effort to neutralize experts has brought about reforms introducing the institution of the "court appointed expert." 50 In introducing rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence ( 1975), 51 the Advi:sory Committee remarked: 45 The confusion of experts with witnesses has been pointed out as one of the failures of the rommon law adversary system. Jolm Basten, The Court Expert in Civil Trials - A Comparative Appraisal: Mod. L. Rev. 40 (1977) 174-191 (175, 190). Historically, however, the partisanexpert can only be traced back to an English case decided in 1782. Id. at 176. 46 Arthur Lenhoff, The Law of Evidence, A Comparative Study Based Essentially on Austrian and New York Law: Am. J. Comp. L. 3 (1954) 313-344. 47 Kaplanfvon MehrenfSchaefer (supra n. 22) 1243. 48 Langbein (supra n. 26) 835. 49 Charles T. McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony: Texas L. Rev. 23 (1945) 109-136 (130); id., Handbook ofthe Law ofEvidence (1954) 34f. 50 In 1952 New York startedanexperimental project with sorne success. Note, The New York Medical Expert Project, An Experiment in Securing lmpartial Testimony: Yale L.J. 63 (1954) 1023; Hans Zeisel, The New York Expert Testimony Project, Some Reflections on Legal Experiments (book: review): Stan. L. Rev. 8 (1956) 730. For English reforms, see Basten (supra n. 45) 177, 185. For Canadian reforms, see Report ofthe Federal I Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of Evidence (1982) 104.
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The practice of shopping for experts, the venality of some experts, and the reluctance of many reputable experts to involve themselves in Iitigation, have been matters of deep concem .... The ever-present possibility that the judge may appoint an expert in a given case must inevitably exert a sobering effect on the expert witness of a party and upon the person utilizing bis services.
Whether or not this rule has bad such a "sobering" effect, court appointed experts have been unfortunately, and probably predictably, rare in practice. "Free experts," who are neither officially appointed nor officially recognized but are presented by the parties, are "virtually universal in ordinary civil litigation." 52 Now, interestingly, there have been proposals to make the partisan system of experts more workable without making it less partisan, by compeling experts to testify, 53 by creating a contingent fee system for experts to enable indigents to receive the service, 54 and by discovery of the opponent's expert opinion. 55 U se of the diehard partisanexpert has been variously explained. I t is certainly, at least in part, due to the inertia of practice. But more substantive explanations include several arguments, namely that "there is no such thing as a neutral, impartial [expert] witness," 56 that court appointed experts will unduly dominate Fed. Rules Evid. rule 706 provides (as amended in 1987): "(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion ofany party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint witnesses ofits own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed ofthe witness' duties by the court in writing, a copy ofwhich shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling the witness. (b) Compensation .... (c) Disdosure of appointment. In the exercise ofits discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness. (d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule Iimits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection." 52 Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., U.S. National Report, in: The Technical Expert in Procedure /Der technische Sachverständige im Prozess, ed. by Fritz Nicklisch (1984) 207 ff. (211 ). 53 See the Advisory Committee's note, supra text following n. 51 (reputable experts are reluctant to serve). See also Comment, Compelling Experts to Testify, A Proposal: U. Chi. L. Rev. 44 (1977) 851. 54 Note, Contingent Fees for Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation: Yale L.J. 86 (1977) 1680-1714. 55 Despite Fed. Rules Civil Pro. rule 26(b)(4), a "Saturday Night" expert may be tactically retained on the eve of trial in order to avoid discovery. Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence, Insuring Adequate Assurance ofTrustworthiness: U. Ill. L. Rev. (1986) 43-90 (85). 51
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the technical issues in a controversy, and that there are different schools of thought among scientists, doctors, engineers, and other technical experts that can account for legitimate differences of opinion. 57 But it seems that the reason is more deeply rooted in the belief in the adversary system as it has been practiced for centuries. It has become the only way of life for common law lawyers, who would answer, if asked whether the adversary system is a dinosaur or phoenix, that it is simply both, that is, a phoenix with the power of a dinosaur. 58 One can hardly imagine under this system that an expert would be liable for erroneous testimony. Ifyour own expert testifies erroneously in your favor, you have no grounds on which to sue him. If your opponent's expert testifies erroneously and you lose the case, it is you who is to blame because you were given a full opportunity to cross-examine him or to otherwise discredit his testimony. lt may happen that your expert testifies erroneously and unexpectedly against your interest, contrary to your previous mutual understanding; probably you are to blame again. You are deemed under the rules ofthe game to have assumed such risk by retaining him. Whether this kind of analysis is correct or not is uncertain. In any event, no single mention of the problern has been found in the Anglo-American literature. lt is almost strange that one can find no case oftbis kind in the United States, where one can normally find any kind of case in the rieb wealth of precedents. The only answer seems to be that the lawyer's own belief in the adversary system has killed his ingenuity to otherwise create this kind of lawsuit.
V. The Japanese Expert Modern Japanese civil procedure was formed in the last century upon the German model. The J apanese Code of Civil Procedure of 1890 was derived from the German ZPO of 1877. lt was extensively amended in 1925 but its basic structure remained unchanged. More importantly, the Japanese procedural schotarship understandably adhered closely totheGerman counterpart in order to interpret the Code provisions. German procedural scholarship, which reached a stage of maturity by the end of the last century - a unique phenomenon in the world - naturally overwhelmed the nascent Japanese scholarship. This does not mean that Japanese law was identical with the German model. In fact, it was from the beginning considerably different. For 56 Bernard L. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert: Archives Crim. Psychodynamics (1959) 221, reprinted in: Cases and Materials on Pleading and Procedure, State and Federal, ed. by David W. Louiself I Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. I Colin C. Tait (5th ed. 1983) 842-847 (846). 57 Theodore /. Botter, The Court-Appointed lmpartial Expert, in: Using Experts in Civil Cases, ed. by Melvin D. Kraft (1977) 57ff. (63). 58 See Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System, Dinosaur or Phoenix: Minn. L. Rev. 69 (1984) 1-37.
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example, Japanese litigants were not (and arestill not) required to have lawyers represent them, while Germany bad compulsory representation by lawyers ( Anwaltszwang) in the courts of general jurisdiction. And if a lawyer was retained in Japan, the lawyer's fee must be borne by each party irrespective ofthe result in the lawsuit, while in Germany the lawyer's fee constituted a part of taxable court costs that was borne by the losing party. In addition, Japanese society and culture were vastly different from the occidental tradition. It was inevitable that the practice of civil procedure in Japan would become something of its own in many respects. With all this counted, however, it is still fair to say that Japanese civil procedure belonged to the civillaw farnily. This situation continued till the end ofthe Second World War when American procedural philosophy started to flow in. It was the policy of the American occupation authority to "democratize" Japan. The German styled "inquisitorial" civil procedure may have been slightly stigmatized as undemocratic. "Democratic" adversary devices were imposed by amending the Code and by enacting Rules of Civil Procerlure separate from the Code under the newly created rule-making power of the Supreme Court in accordance with the new Constitution of 1946. The Code was amended to elirninate the provision perrnitting a court to take evidence by its own motion and to adopt the system of witness examination by the parties, that is, first by the parties and then by the court supplementally. The new Rules required, furthermore, that witnesses were tobe exarnined first by the party who called the witness and then cross-examined by the opponent party. In order to make this effective, the Rules encouraged the parties to meet prospective witnesses in advance to prepare for exarnination in the courtroom. 59 The injection of effective adversary elements was limited to the above amendments. The Japanese version of ZPO section 139 for a judge's duty to clarify matters ( Aujklärungspflicht), that is article 127 of the Japanese Code, was left intact. Nevertheless, the philosophical impact of adversary procedure was strongly felt. Judges were told to sit back and let the parties fight as they liked. The Supreme Court decided that a judge's failure to intervene to clarify was not a reversible error. Japanese bar members gradually self-trained themselves to conduct exarnination of witnesses by themselves. In the rnid1950s, however, the Supreme Court changed its view of the judge's duty of clarification, and has since repeatedly decided that it is a judicial duty, which retreats from adversarial practice toward the original German model. But party initiative in the production of evidence has been firmly established in practice. 60 59 The 1948 amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure deleted art. 261 (taking evidence on the court's own motion) and added art. 294 (order for examination of a witness), supplemented by what later became rule 33 (details for the order of examination). See Rules of Civil Procedure rule 4 for preparation of a witness. 60 For the postwar developments till the late 1950s, see Kohji Tanabe, The Process of Litigation, An Experiment with the Adversary System, in: Law in Japan, ed. by Arthur von
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Even today the basic German color of Japanese civil procedure remains undeniable both in law and in practice. For example, intermittent "oral proceedings" (mündliche Verhandlung) still universally prevails instead of the "concentrated trial" provided for in the Rules, but never practiced successfully. American influence is only laid upon this German basis. Moreover, no one can deny that there is the Japanese legal culture behind the whole system. Thus, J apanese civil procedure today is an interesting mixture from the point of view of comparative law. lt ernborlies in certain ways three different procedural philosophies, German, American, and J apanese, all in one system. 61 In Japan, also, the expert ( kanteinin) is a commonly used means of evidence. Recent statistics show that at least one expert was examined in about eight percent of all civil cases before the first instance courts of general jurisdiction (district courts ). 62 But the procedure accompanying expert examination involves some uncertainty. As mentioned above, the postwar amendment abolished evidence taking by a court's own motion. As a result, the practice of retaining an expert by the party's initiative came to prevail. Usually the party in need of an expert's service searches for eligible candidates, approaches a suitable one to find out if he holds a favorable opinion and, if so, asks the court to officially appoint him an expert, a practice very similar to the American model. There is strong academic opinion that the court is always empowered to appoint by its own motion an expert, notwithstanding the silence of the law. But in actual practice the court waits for a motion by a party and, ifthere is none, the court exercises its power of clarification to suggest the necessity of an expert. Therefore, the court can in fact initiate the process if it wishes. But this happens infrequently. In any event, an expert is usually ordered by the courtunder oath to submit a written report and later, upon motion of a party, is examined and cross-examined by the parties in the courtroom. 63 Problems involved in this practice have been voiced. In those cases that attract much public attention, the press usually identifies and describes each expert as being on the plaintiffs side or on the defendant's. Many candidates to be an Mehren (1963) 73. For other postwar judicial reforms, see Yasuhei Taniguchi, The PostWar Court System as an Instrument for Social Change, in: Institutions for Change in Japanese Society, ed. by George DeVos (1984) 20. 61 For Japanese civil procedure in general see Dan Fenno Hendersonj Takaaki Hattori, Civil Procerlure in Japan (1983); Yasuhei Taniguchij Yoshikazu Sagami, Civil Litigation, in: Doing Business in Japan, ed. by Zentaro Kitagawa VII (1989) eh. 10. 62 Supreme Court, Annual Judicial Statistics for 1986 I (1987) 138 (in Japanese). A survey of 100 medical malpractice cases pending with the Tokyo District Court during 1985-1987 showed that an expert was appointed in 50 cases and that a medical personwas examined, not as an expert, but as a witness or as the party in the rest. Tatsuo Kuroyanagi, Medical Malpractice Litigation and the Expert, in: Scientific Litigation and the Expert, ed. by Teiichiro Nakano (1988) 167ff. (190) (in Japanese). 63 In 50 cases where an expert was appointed, 14 cases received only a written report, while in the rest the expert was also orally examined. Kuroyanagi (supra n. 62) 190.
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expert do not like this and often decline to serve as long as it is by partisan motion; they all think they are neutral. They also loathe cross-examination because they feel it is so degrading. All this makes it more difficult to obtain reputable experts, the same problern as under American practice. U oder this state of affairs there has been no case dealing with the civilliability of experts in civil Iitigation. The closest cases deal with allegedly defective appraiser services for the value of real property, where they are officially retained by the court in the course of civil execution proceedings under the Civil Execution Law. An appraiser is a kind of private practitioner licensed under law. After the appraisal by an officially appointed appraiser, the court fixes the lowest salable price. In these cases aggrieved plaintiffs sued the state under the State Liability Law of 1947. The courts held that an appraiser is not a public official exercising state power and thus is not covered by this law. 64 There is one case involving an expert in a criminal case. An ex-convict, who had had his 1953 murder conviction set aside in 1978, now sued the state under the State Liability Law for damages for negligence on the part of the police, prosecutor, expert, and judge who were involved in his conviction. He also relied on the Civil Codeprovision for employer's liability as an additional ground for the state's liability for the negligence ofthe expert who was a professor at a state medical school. The court disrnissed the action, holdingthat the expert was not a public official exercising state power under the State Liability Law. He was not under any employment relationship with the state for the purpose of his expert opinion, although he was employed by the state for an educational purpose. Thus, the Civil Code claim was also held unfounded. 65 In all these cases the plaintiff avoided suing the appraiser or the expert directly, probably because the state is always more solvent. One wonders about the possible result ifthey had been sued as defendants. Academic opinions have not yet usually been expressed actively in connection with these cases. One commentator, a crirninallaw specialist, for the last mentioned case favors state liability to exonerate the expert from liability for the sake of his independence and to free him from any threat of a later lawsuit. 66
VI. Conclusion The foregoing comparative survey reveals that the problern of expert liability depends on the nature of the expert in each system. In France liability is 64 Tokyo Dist. Court, decision of 13 Dec. 1983, Hanrei-Jiho [= Hanji]1109, 111; Nagoya Dist. Court, decision of 14 June 1984, Hanji 1140, 100; Kagoshima Dist. Court, decision of 26 Dec. 1984, Hanji 1145, 117; Kochi Dist. Court, decision of 23 June 1986, Hanji 1248, 108 (all in Japanese). 65 Tokyo Dist. Court, decision of 25 June 1984, Hanji 1122, 34 (in Japanese). 66 Tominobu Tagami, Comment, Hanji 1139, 210 (in Japanese).
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recognized without much question. This appears to reflect the "professional" nature of French experts. They form an independent professional group. The problern there tends to become one of professional responsibility. Because of this they could easily be covered by liability insurance. They are not subject, at least under traditional practice, to close supervision by the court while they exercise a wide range of authority. This double-decked structure of French civil procedure also offers a legitimate basis to make the expert independently liable. The German counterpart is different. A professional group of experts as such is less obvious. The availability of insurance would be more limited. Experts are much closer to the deciding court and are required to be strictly neutral. Thus, the courts are more sensitive about the independence of experts. American experts are far different from both of these civillaw counterparts. Their strong partisan character seems to have Iet lawyers forget about their possible liability. The Japanese expert is in an ambivalent area between a civillaw modeland an American model. lt is significant that the only case involving an expert's liability arose from a criminal case where the expert is expected to be less partisan. In each of the systems reviewed, the place of experts in court is undergoing reform and is under serious reconsideration. The reform ofthe system of experts in court may or may not affect the problern oftheir civilliability. Details ofthe correlation between the two matters is not entirely clear. This brief study has, if it has at all, only made clear the existence of such a co-relationship. Further comparative research is needed for a more thorough understanding about its nature.
The Common Law Trust and the Civil Law Lawyer Justin P. Thorens*
I. Introduction A civil law lawyer generally approaches the common law trust from the starting point in the law of property of the division into legal and equitable ownership. This starting point is logical, since in the common law the main characteristic ofthe trust, as far as estates and interests are concerned, lies in this division, as does its origin forthat matter. However, this same division applies precisely to the very concepts of estate and interest that are presupposed to be understood. Consequently, a civilian tackling the trust should, in the first place, have understood the basic principles of the law of property under the common law. Theseare very different from those found in the civillaw; however, the civil lawyer generally has no idea at all of these divergences. This explains the difficulty civillawyers have in grasping, on the one hand, the concept and, on the other hand, the scope of the common law trust. For historical reasons property law in countries where civil law pertains, derived as it is from Roman law and purged of feudal land law influences, is fundamentally different from common law property law, a system resulting from developments over several centuries in feudalland law that came to apply in England after the Battle of Hastings. When the civilian, from over-simplification and parallelism, incorrectly sees the trust as only an extension ofhis own law of property into concepts analogous to legal and equitable ownership, he disregards all that lies beneath any superficial similarity. He is therefore unable to grasp the richness and potential of the institution as it exists and as it is understood by the common lawyer. Similarly, to explain why the trust developed in common law countries, and why it did not do so naturally in civillaw countries, can only be done by reference to its underlying reason: that is, to the estate and today equally to the interest. The estate concept developed in England over the course of centuries and, with numerous changes resulting from the passage oftime and local differences, in the countriesthat received English law.
* Professor of Law, University of Geneva; Avocat, Bar Association of Geneva. I wish to thank Margret M. Talbot, LL.B., Dip. L.P., N.P., Solicitor, for collaboration in the English wording of this essay.
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The purpose of this short study is to highlight, in recognition ofthat most distinguished comparative lawyer, Professor John Henry Merryman, the fundamental common law concepts that have made possible the natural development of the trust. Their absence has never permitted and still does not permit the spontaneous reception of a similar institution by civillaw countries. Accordingly, I will first examine the basic principles of the law of property peculiar to the common law, which render the trust incompatible by nature with the civillaw concept of property. Second, I consider the characteristics of the common law trust itself before, finally, I conclude with a Iook at the modifications that civil law systems would have to undergo to be able to introduce an institution offering all the advantages of the common law trust.
II. Basic Common Law Property Principles A. No Clear Distinction between Real Rights and Personal Rights The very clear distinction between real rights and personal rights that exists in the civillaw, evidenced by the numerus clausus for real rights, does not exist to the same degree in the common law. Reasons of practice and procedure have precluded such a clear-cut division to occur. B. Rejection of a Numerus Clausus for Real Rights
Another fundamental difference between the common law and the civillaw is the existence in civillaw systems of a numerus clausus of real rights. The numerus clausus, on the one hand, defines the right of property itself and, on the other hand, contains certain real rights that are known as limited real rights, the number and nature ofwhich are strictly determined by law. This strict numerus clausus system, which varies considerably from one civilian country to another, does not exist in the common law. This rejection of a numerus clausus for real rights in common law countries gives considerable flexibility to the law ofproperty, as will be seen below, in the existence of estates and future interests, which can to some extent be "tailored" to suit certain requirements. C. Fragmentation of Property Ownership
As mentioned above, the existence and recognition of the trust in a civillaw system cannot be examined without recognizing the difference that exists between the civilian concept of property ownership, which in principle is unitary and absolute, derived from Roman law, and the common law multiple division or fragmentation in ownership, a fragmentation with its source in feudalland law. It might be stated here, for the sake of civil lawyers, that common law
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countries neither received Roman law nor have they formally abolished in a generat way the legal institutions derived from the development of feudalland law.
D. Tenore The primary division in ownership under the common law, which moreover forms the basis of all other divisions, stems from the notion of tenure, that is to say from the respective rights ofthe overlord (suzerain) and vassal in the feudal system. Although this concept still exists at law in certain common law countries, particularly in England, it no Ionger plays an active role and it will not be further referred to in this study. It is, however, important to rernind civil lawyers that it forms the basis of the division of property ownership in the common law and that more specifically it is the origin of the concept of the estate.
E. Estate Under the common law a physical personor an entity with legal personality is not the owner of a piece ofland, but rather is the owner of an estate. The estate is a purely conceptual notion, an abstraction introduced between a person and the land. The person possesses the estate, which is an interest in the land. It should be mentioned here for the sake of civillawyers that today the concept of the estate in fact applies very widely both in regard to real property and to personal property. The latter, moreover, usually constitutes nowadays the assets of a trust; the word "interest" is there typically employed instead of "estate," which, in principle, is used exclusively for an interest in land.
The concepts of estate and interest are fundamental principles in the law of property under the common law. Estates, in particular, are classified according to three characteristics that are specific to the common law: time, possession, and enjoyment. 1. Division according to time; freehold and non-freehold estates. The estate is ownership lirnited in time. Consequently, and contrary to the concept of ownership under the civillaw, which in principle is perpetual, und er the common law a person is owner ofan estate that is offinite or infinite, certain or uncertain, duration. For historical reasons, the common law distinguished between freehold and non-freehold estates. Freehold estates include the fee simple, the fee tail, and the estate for life. The fee simple is the complete estate that includes all others; it corresponds best to the concept of ownership under civillaw. The fee tail, which today has practically disappeared, is an estate that can only be inherited by descendants of the original title holder. In the case of the estate for life, its duration is limited to the life of its holder or possibly to the life of another person; the latter is called an estate "pur autre vie".
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The fee simple itself is divided into the fee simple absolute and the fee simple defeasible, the latter further being of several types. Such divisions also exist in other estates. I will not dwell on these distinctions here, despite their considerable practical importance, as I intend only to review the basic principles ofthe common law, which enable the trust to exist naturally, and not to make a detailed study of them. Non-freehold estates consist of all types of leases; under the common law the lease is regarded as an interest in land. lt pertains to the law ofproperty and not to the law of obligations, contrary to the position under the civillaw. Leases are considered to be chattels real. 2. Division according to possession; present and future interests. An estate is ownership limited in time and thus several estates can exist concurrently in the same item of property: for example, an estate for life in favor of A with the fee simple in favor of B. The consequence of this principle is that since only the holder of one ofthese estates, A in the example given, is in possession ofthe land or of the interest concerned, the owners of other estates or interests are thus not in possession of the item of property in which their estates or interests lie. A person who has an interest in an item of property but is not in possession of it is said to have a future interest. lt is important to stress for civillawyers that future interests are, in fact, present interests to the extent that they exist ab initio; they are future only as regards the enjoyment and possession of the item of property in which they lie. The concept of future interest is one of the most difficult for a civillawyer to grasp, for there is nothing similar to it in his own legal system.lt is notamatter that can be disregarded here, however, for future interests play a very considerable role in the trust and are certainly one of the underlying reasons for its success. Futureinterests are divided according to whether they belong to a grantor (or his heir), who has granted a limited interest to a third party, or they belong to that third person. Futureinterests that belong to a third party, that is not to the grantor or to his heirs, are themselves divided into vested and contingent interests. This distinction is fundamental and plays an essential role in the common law. Put very simply, a future interest can be said tobe vested when the person who holds it exists, and when he will enter into possession of the item of property in which his interest lies on the normal expiry of the estate presently in possession; in all other cases a future interest is contingent. 3. Division according to enjoyment; legal and equitable rights. As a result of a very long historical development classic common law divides, or more exactly permits the division of, each estate and interest capable of being in possession into legal and equitable estates and interests. The origin of this division is to be found in a device known as the "use," a fiduciary act extremely common in the Middle Ages. By means of the use a person could transfer property to a third party, who was charged with utilizing it in accordance with given instructions.
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As the third parties so charged did not always carry out their fiduciary duties the Chancellor, and later equity courts, intervened to enforce the right, originally purely personal, of the transferor of the property or of the beneficiary designated by him, against the third party. This protection was accorded in equity and not in law. Eventually, after the passage of several centuries, the beneficiary of the use was given a right - which civil lawyers classify as "real" by analogy known in the common law as an equitable right, since it derived from equity and not from the law of the king's courts in a narrow sense. The ownership of an estate or of an interest can thus be divided between a person known asthelegal owner, who hasthelegal title to the property, and the person who is the beneficiary and has equitable ownership. The division of an estate or interest into legal and equitable rights is not obligatory, but is possible; more precisely, it is possible in the majority of common law countries. But in England itself, for example, as a result ofthe Property Acts 1925, there is now only one freehold legal estate permitted, that is the fee simple absolute in possession, and only one non-freehold legal estate, the term ofyears absolute in possession. All other estates, that is interests in land, can today only be equitable in England. This division into legal and equitable rights is at the very origin of the trust and is its particular characteristic; for example, there will often be a trustee who is owner in fee simple absolute of the legal estate and a succession of beneficiaries who have equitable ownership. Thus one might have an estate for life belonging to a first beneficiary, with the fee simple absolute to another beneficiary, who will not enter into possession of the property concerned until the estate for life comes to an end.
111. Trust Characteristics from a Civilian Point of View From the perspective of a civil lawyer, the comrnon law trust has several salient characteristics. First, the trust is not a corporation, nor does it have legal personality. Second, a trust is a fiduciary relationship by virtue of which the trustee, who is the fiduciary, and the beneficiary, in favor of whom the trust is created, both have real rights. In general, the trustee has the legal right and the beneficiary the equitable right. Third, generally speaking, the trustee is charged with the administration of the trust while the beneficiary has the enjoyment of the assets belonging to the trust. Fourth, the assets owned by the trust, ofwhich the trustee is legal owner, are separate from and are not to be confused with those ofthe trustee personally. Fifth, the trust benefits from what is called "legal subrogation," meaning that assets acquired by means of the realization of trust assets or with trust income automatically become trust property. Sixth, subject to certain reservations, by virtue ofhis equitable ownership, the beneficiary has a right of suit ("tracing") on trust assets wrongfully alienated. Seventh, due to the existence of future interests, both vested and contingent, a trust can be
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constituted in favor of successive beneficiaries, and in particular in favor of beneficiaries who do not yet exist. At this point I must emphasize the major d.ifficulty in this subject for a civil law country - even if it has introduced an institution analogous to the trust, as in the case of Quebec- resulting from the absence of a concept similar to that of contingent future interests. In effect, in a situation similar tothat of a contingent future interest, if one considers that the beneficiary of the capital of the trust must be the owner of the trust property, then the trust cannot exist since the assets in question would be without an owner, even if a preceding beneficiary is hirnself in life and receives the income from the trust property by virtue of a life estate. I think that on this subject it could be useful to refer to the celebrated decision The Royal Trust Company v. Tucker 1 from the Supreme Court of Canada and the many questions it posed and, ifmy information is correct, still continues to pose today. Under the common law, on the other band, it is perfectly possible as a result of the combination of the division of ownership in time, represented by the interest or the estate, and the division of the interest or estate into legal and equitable rights, to constitute a trust in which the legal ownership belongs to the trustee while certain or all of the beneficiaries are not yet living.
IV. Conclusion The trust, as it is understood under the common law, does not exist naturally in any civil law country. lt could not be introduced into a civil law country without profound and fundamental modi(ication of its law. The Counterpart institutions that exist in the civil law, such as fondation, mandat, fiducie, Treuhand, contract for the benefit of a third party, usufruct, naked ownership, fideicommissary substitution, appointment of an heir or legatee subject to a condition ("charge"), testamentary execution, the Dutch bewind, certification, and others, do not, even in combination, permit the achievement of all of the purposes for which the common law trust can be used. The trust in fact is practically as flexible as the contract. The various civil law institutions can often be utilized only by way of testamentary disposition or, on the contrary, only by inter vivos disposition; the trust, altematively, can be constituted by either means. Furthermore, the common law concepts of estate and interest have as a necessary consequence contingent future interests, which do not exist in civillaw. The distinction in the common law between law and equity has resulted in the division of ownership of an asset into legal and equitable titles, both of which are rights in rem. This division cannot exist in the dassie civillaw, based on the Roman law concept of unitary and absolute ownership of property. 1
(1982) Supreme Court Reports 250.
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If a trust in the civillaw is to offer all the advantages of the common law trust the following, in one form or another, must be introduced: (1) the division of property ownership into real rights of a different but concomitant nature for, on the one hand, the trustee and, on the other hand, the beneficiary or beneficiaries; (2) the division of the rights of the beneficiary or beneficiaries into limited real rights of enjoyment and into subsequent rights of ownership corresponding on the basis oftime to the estates and interests of common law; (3) the possibility for the rights of the beneficiary or beneficiaries to be rights corresponding to the common law contingent future interests, that is, rights in favor of persons not ascertained or even conceived at the time of the creation of the trust; (4) the separation of the trust assets from those owned personally by the trustee; (5) real subrogation in respect to trust assets; (6) a right of suit ("tracing") in favor of the beneficiary on the trust assets; and (7) functions of Supervision and adrninistration of trusts by the judicial authorities. In effect, the trust can only play the role it does under the common law due to the recognized powers of the courts to intervene in the supervision and adrninistration of the trust, notably for example, to remove or to appoint trustees. Indeed, the purpose of a trust is not achieved by the simple fact that the beneficiary's rights are protected; the trust must be able to continue for the whole of its intended and legally perrnitted duration, even in the event of the breach by the trustee of his obligations or the event of his disappearance. Without the introduction of the seven modifications specified above, it is impossible, no matter what the institution created in the civillaw, to achieve all the possible purposes ofthe common law trust. The introduction ofthe trust into the civillaw does not, however, contrary to what has often been said elsewhere, require in principle, the suppression ofthe numerus clausus as such, but rather its extension to include the real rights created to permit the trust's introduction. In order to understand the workings and limitations ofthe trust under the civil law when it is introduced into such a legal system, it is without doubt useful to study by way of example, the trusts of, for instance, Louisiana and Quebec, and the way in which they operate. The greater or lesser ability of a civillaw system to assimilate the concepts, ideas, and judicial interpretation of the common law plays a significant role in the success ofthe trust, as the laws ofthese two rnixed jurisdictions, by their very differences, demonstrate.
Obras de arte y Patrimonio Histörico en Espaiia: Una reforma legislativa reciente Carlos Viladas*
I. Dos casos ilustrativos de Ia situacion anterior a Ia reforma A. "Viaje a Ia Iuna en el fondo del mar"
En 1962, el conocido escultor Pablo Serrano realiz6 por encargo del hotel "Tres Carabelas" (en Torremolinos, Espafia), una obra titulada "Viaje a Ia Iuna en el fondo del mar". Esta escultura, integrada con Ia escalera en el hall del hotel, fue desmontada por decisi6n de sus propietarios y supuestamente almacenada. Desde que tuvo conocimiento de Ia noticia, Pablo Serrano inst6 sucesivos procedimientos judiciales, invocando el derecho moral del artista sobre su obra y exigiendo la reconstrucci6n de la escultura, alternativamente su devoluci6n y, cuanto menos, su exhibici6n para comprobar que no habia sido destruida. Los propietarios del hotel y de la obra, se opusieron a las sucesivas demandas de Pablo Serrano alegando su derecho de propiedad. Los Tribunales espafioles, incluidos el Tribunal Supremo y el Tribunal Constitucional, desestimaron las sucesivas demandas de Pablo Serrano declarando que si bien Espafia habia firmado convenios internacionales que reconocian el derecho moral del artista sobre su obra, aquellos no constituian derecho interno; antes al contrario, a tenor de Ia Ley de Propiedad Intelectual de 1879 - vigente en Espafia hasta 1987 - y del C6digo Civil, los Tribunales espafioles entendieron que el derecho moral del artista no estaba reconocido por Ia legislaci6n espaii.ola y que, por ende, el derecho de propiedad sobre obras de arte era un derecho absoluto, sin perjuicio de las limitaciones relativas a la exportaci6n de obras de arte de determinadas caracteristicas. 1 Pablo Serrano falleci6 el26 de noviembre de 1985, pocos dias antes de que el Tribunal Supremo dictara sentencia sobre su pretensi6n. EI Tribunal Consti-
* Profesor Titular, Universidad de Barcelona, Faeultad de Derecho; Abogado, Despaeho Rarnon Viladäs- Uria Menendez (Barcelona and Madrid). 1 Vid. Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, 9 die. 1985 (Civil, A-6320; Senteneia del Tribunal Constitucional, 18 mar. 1987, STC 35 f 1987, Boletin J urisprudeneia Constitueional 72 (1987) 464. La prensa espaiiola di6 amplia eobertura informativaal easo expuesto. Vid., por todos, EI Pais: 16 ene. 1985, päg. 22; 20 ene. 1985, päg. 32: 9 feb. 1985, päg. 9; 22 nov. 1985, päg. 20; 27 nov. 1985, päg.10; 21 die. 1985, päg. 22; 25 mar. 1987.
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tucional se pronunci6 sobre el caso en 1987 en el marco de un recurso de amparo instado por Ia esposa de Pablo Serrano. 2 B. "La Marquesa de Santa Cruz"
En 1983, las autoridades espafiolas tienen noticia de que el cuadro de Goya titulado "La Marquesa de Santa Cruz" (1805) se halla en Londres (Reino Unido) tras haber sido exportado de Espafia, al parecer ilegalmente. EI Gobierno espafiol instara acciones judiciales primero en Espafia y mas tarde en el Reino Unido para intentar recuperar el lienzo. Estas acciones resultaran infructuosas, en parte por problemas de prueba, en parte por hallarse en desconocido paradero el presunto responsable de Ia exportacion ilicita y posterior venta, en parte tambien por Ia inadecuada legislacion espaiiola en materia de Patrimonio Historico Artistico. A principios de 1986, Ia galeria Christie's de Londres anuncia que subastara el cuadro. Ante las escasas posibilidades de recuperar Ia obra por via judicial, como obra exportada ilegalmente, el Gobierno espafiol decide comprar el cuadro a sus propietarios extranjeros y poder asi repatriar Ia obra a Espafia. La compra quese realiza por un importe de 882 millones de pesetas (6 millones de US dolares), resulta extraordinariamente polemica ya que hipoteca considerablemente el presupuesto del Estado asignado al Ministerio de Cultura y en particular al Patrimonio Historico Artistico, imposibilitando cualquier otra compra de obras de arte durante un Iargo periodo. 3 C. EI marco legal espaiiol
Los dos casos expuestos ilustran el marco legal espafiol relativo a las obras de arte; e ilustran tambien Ia politica que en materia artistica ha imperado en Espafia hasta fechas muy recientes. Acaso pueda completarse Ia descripcion aludiendo por una parte al pillaje y destruccion sistematicos a que han sido sometidos el patrimonio artistico de Ia Iglesia Catolica espafiola, los campos arqueologicos, tanto terrestres como maritimos; y por otra parte a Ia absoluta carencia de medidas de fomento y conservacion del arte en general y del arte contemporaneo en particular, o Ia radical falta de efectividad de tales medidas. Estas paginas estan dedicadas a exponer someramente los cambios sustanciales y las disposiciones mas sobresalientes que sobre estas materias se han verificado en fechas recientes, en Espafia, en el plano de lo normativo dedicando exclusiva atencion, en el marco de este trabajo a Ia Ley de Patrimonio Historico, Vid. supra nota 1. La versi6n periodistica de este caso puede consultarse en EI Pais: 10 sept. 1983, pag. 27; 23 nov. 1984, päg. 27; 28 ene. 1986, päg. 22; 29 ene. 1986, päg. 26; 30 ene. 1986, päg. 30; 2 feb. 1986, päg. 24s; 30 abr. 1986, päg. 30; 10 abr. 1986, päg. 28; 11 abr. 1986, päg. 30. 2
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aunque Ia nueva Ley de Propierlad lntelectual estä llamada a evitar casos como el de Pablo Serrano antes expuesto. Es de sobras conocido que las disposiciones legales no pueden por si solas alterar Ia realidad. Los Parlamentos y los Gobiemos fingen a menudo ignorar este fenomeno que no obstante se impone a cualquier observador aun poco avispado. La incidencia de las leyes sobre Ia realidad se instrumenta fundamentalmente mediante Ia aplicacion de las mismas y esta aplicacion exige crear los organos necesarios, asegurar Ia preparacion de las personas que vayan a integrarlos y dotarles del correspondiente presupuesto; en suma, el acto de creacion legislativa - vistoso y economico - requiere para resultar eficaz de unas medidas simultäneas cuya adopcion puede ser mas compleja, menos rentable desde un punto de vista politico e incluso impopular por sus implicaciones presupuestarias. Sin embargo, estas medidas no constituyen el objeto de esta exposicion que adolecera pues de parcialidad en este y por supuesto en otros sentidos; todo juicio sobre las mismas seria a nuestro entender prematuro. En efecto, Ia Ley del Patrimonio Historico Espaiiol (LPHE) es del25 de junio de 1985 y el primerode sus Reglamentos, el Real Decreto 111 I 1986, del1 0 de enero de 1986; y Ia Ley de Propierlad Intelectual es del 11 de noviembre de 1987 y el primero de sus Regtamentos del 25 de abril de 1988.
II. La Ley del Patrimonio Histörico Espaiiol Lo primero que merece destacarse de esta Ley es que viene a poner rernedio a una fragmentacion y a una dispersion legislativas, caracteristicas que por desgracia no son exclusivas de este sector del Ordenamiento Juridico espaiiol y que dificultan extraordinariamente Ia aplicacion de toda normativa sobre un determinado objeto. Esta dificultad arranca de Ia misma determinacion de las normas que deben considerarse vigentes pues Ia acumulacion de textos legales con identico objeto produce una superposicion de normas no siempre faciles de compatibilizar e incluso a veces contradictorias. Es de lamentar a este respecto que el desarrollo de Ia Ley del Patrimonio se haya iniciado con un Reglamento "de desarrollo parcial" que hace presagiar un renovado caos legislativo. Organizaremos Ia exposicion de las caracteristicas sobresalientes de Ia LPHE en atencion a las tres proyecciones esenciales de Ia Constitucion en dicha Ley que son las siguientes: (1) Ia LPHE responde y desarrolla el mandato del articulo 46 de Ia Constitucion; (2) instrumenta unas medidas congruentes con el mandado del articulo 44 de Ia Constitucion y con el concepto constitucional de Ia propierlad privada (funcion social y subordinacion de Ia propierlad a los fines de utilidad social) quese infiere del articulo 33 del propio texto constitucional; y (3) distribuye las competencias de aplicacion de Ia LPHE con arreglo al modelo de autonomlas territoriales tu teladas consagrado por Ia Constituciön, distribucion de Ia que Ia LPHE constituye un ejemplo präctico singularmente representativo.
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A. EI mandato constitucional La Constituci6n espaiiola, en su articulo 46, dispone: Los Poderes publicos garantizariin Ia conservaci6n y promoveriin el enriquecimiento del patrimonio hist6rico, cultural y artistico de los pueblos de Espaiia y de los bienes que lo integran, cualquiera que sea su regimenjuridico y su titularidad. La ley sancionarii los atentados contra este patrimonio.
La LPHE responde pues al principio sentado en Ia propia Constituci6n, abundando incluso en el mismo en su Preambulo al declarar que el Estado democratico debe poner los bienes del Patrimonio Hist6rico (PH) al servicio de Ia colectividad para facilitar el acceso a Ia cultura pues esta -Ia cultura - "es camino seguro hacia Ia libertad de los pueblos". 4 La LPHE no se enmarca en Ia segunda fase del proceso de reforma legislativa que es consecuencia de Ia reinstauraci6n en Espaiia de un regimen democratico; se enmarca en Ia fase de adecuaci6n de Ia legislaci6n espaiiola a los mandatos constitucionales, fase posterior a Ia que se inicia incluso antes de Ia promulgaci6n de Ia Constituci6n de 1978 y que tiene por objeto las disposiciones legales claramente incompatibles con el pluralismo politico y sus mas inmediatas consecuencias. En este, como en otros ambitos, existian en 1978 normas de protecci6n de determinados valores e intereses dignos de tutela. No obstante, se trata en muchos casos de normas dispersas y fragrnentadas, engarzadas en normas basicas antiguas. La legislaci6n espaiiola en materia de patrimonio hist6ricoartistico constituye un ejemplo de esta clase de normas pues su protecci6n estaba ya instrumentada en diversas disposiciones entre las que destacaba Ia Ley del13 de mayo de 1933. No obstante, e incluso segun el propio Preambulo de Ia LPHE, se trataha de un conjunto de normas que adolecia de dos defectos esenciales: se caracterizaba por Ia fragrnentaci6n y Ia disposici6n de sus mandatos en una pluralidad de disposiciones de diverso rasgo normativo; y no incorporaba los modemos criterios intemacionales de protecci6n y enriquecimiento del patrimonio hist6rico-artistico que se contienen en Convenciones y Recomendaciones que Espaiia habia suscrito sin incorporar no obstante a su ley intema. Ellegislador de 1986 no parece estar en Ia direcci6n adecuada para evitar que se reproduzcan con el paso del tiempo los defectos tecnicos por el mismo destacados: Ia primera norma dictada en relaci6n con Ia Ley de 1985 ha sido el Real Decreto 111 / 1986 de desarrollo parcial de dicha Ley, que anuncia pues en su propio titulo una sucesi6n de normas fragrnentarias.
4
Vid. Preiimbulo de Ia Ley del Patrimonio Histörico Espaiiol, 25 jun. 1985.
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B. EI Patrimonio Histörico Espaiiol
EI articulo 1,2 de la LPHE define su objeto y al tiempo los bienes que van a ser objeto de tutela por parte de todas aquellas normas del ordenamiento juridico que se refieran al Patrimonio Hist6rico: Integran el Patrimonio Hist6rico Espaiiollos inmuebles y objetos muebles de interes artistico, hist6rico, paleontol6gico, arqueol6gico, etnol6gico, cientifico o tecnico. Tarnbien forman parte del mismo el patrimonio documental, bibliogräfico, los yacimientos y zonas arqueol6gicas, asi como los sitios naturales, jardines y parques que tengan valor artistico, hist6rico o antropol6gico.
Esta es la categoria fundamental sobre la que se organiza la protecci6n. Es decir que a ella se refieren disposiciones restrictivas de derechos e incluso sancionadoras que mas adelante precisaremos, sin necesidad de que sobre los bienes que integran esta categoria recaiga declaraci6n alguna de la Administraci6n concretando la consideraci6n de un bien mueble o inmueble como integrante del Patrimonio Hist6rico Espaiiol (PHE). De ello seinfieren graves problemas de seguridad juridica, de garantias, tanto para los propietarios de tales bienes que deseen por ejemplo explotarlos, como tambien para aquellas personas que infieran algun daiio a los mismos cumpliendo asi algunos de los tipos del delito de daiios de los articulos 558- 5a, 559, 560 o 561 del C6digo Penal, unos tipos penales cuyo objeto material queda en la mayor de las indeterminaciones ya que la consideraci6n de un bien como integrante del PHE es - como insiste el Preämbulo de la LPHE independiente "de su propiedad, uso, antigüedad o valor econ6mico". Sobre esta categoria general acreedora de acerrimas y justificadas criticas, se engarzan otras categorias que requieren ya de una declaraci6n o cualificaci6n administrativa sobre los bienes que las integran: 1. Bienes incluidos en el "Inventario General": son los bienes muebles del PHE que no han sido declarados de interes cultural pero que tienen singular relevancia. Se trata pues de unos bienes que gozan de un regimen de protecci6n intermedio entre aquel aplicable a los bienes integrantes del PHE y los bienes declarados de interes cultural. 2. Bienes "de interes cultural": son aquellos bienes muebles e inmuebles que gozan de singular protecci6n y tutela y sobre los que ha recaido la declaraci6n correspondiente. C. Medidas de tutela y protecciön
Congruente con el doble mandato constitucional del articulo 46 de la Constituci6n, las medidas que se arbitran en la LPHE en vistas a la tutela y protecci6n de los bienes integrantes del Patrimonio Hist6rico Espaiiol y en particular de los bienes integrados en las dos categorias de especial protecci6n antes seiialadas, consisten por una parte en medidas restrictivas de derechos 21 Merryman Festschrift
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incluyendo medidas sancionadoras; y por otra parte, en medidas de fomento, de estimulo a la conservaci6n y al enriquecimiento del Patrimonio Hist6rico (PH). Entre las primeras, que son las mäs, se cuentan las limitaciones e incluso las prohibiciones a la exportaci6n, las sanciones anuladas a toda acci6n u omisi6n constitutiva de expoliaci6n (que cuando tienen naturaleza administrativa consisten en sanciones pecuniarias) e incluso la expropiaci6n; y entre las segundas, las partidas presupuestarias que deben incorporarse a ciertas obras publicas y que se destinan a conservaci6n y fomento del PH, asi como los incentivos fiscales a la inversi6n en adquisici6n o conservaci6n de bienes del PH. D. Algunas medidas de especial interes Las obras de autores vivos no pueden ser declaradas de interes cultural. Se trata de un principio que admite escasas excepciones- por ejemplo, cuando lo solicita el propietario de la obra- y por cuya mediaci6n se evita que las obras de artistas vivos sean inexportables, corolario de toda declaraci6n de interes cultural. Este principio tiene pues por finalidad el evitar una previsible retracci6n de la demanda de obras de arte realizadas por autores vivos de reconocido prestigio mundial. En el presupuesto de cada obra publica financiada total o parcialmente por el Estado se incluirä una partida equivalente al menos al uno por ciento de los fondos que sean de aportaci6n estatal, partida que destinarä a financiar trabajos de conservaci6n o enriquecimiento del PHE o a fomentar la creatividad artistica. Si la obra se realiza en virtud de concesi6n administrativa y sin la participaci6n financiera del Estado, el uno por ciento se aplicarä sobre su presupuesto total. Este magnifico principio sentado por el articulo 68 de la LPHE tiene dos excepciones, una de las cuales limita considerablemente su alcance: se exceptuan de esta medida aquellas obras que "afecten a la seguridad y defensa del Estado - previsiblemente las obras de presupuestos mäs considerables- asi como a la seguridad de los servicios publicos", alusi6n significativamente indeterminada y que se prestarä a multiples controversias interpretativas. Amen de asumir estas criticas generales a las limitaciones de esta medida de financiaci6n, diversas asociaciones de artistas han reclamado estar representadas en los organismos encargados de distribuir los fondosquese obtengan por el procedimiento arbitrado por la LPHE. La escasa - por no decir nula - efectividad de un mecanismo similar vigente en Espaiia desde 1978 asi como la complejidad de los mecanismos de aplicaci6n de los fondos y la indeterminaci6n de los porcentajes quese destinarän respectivamente a la conservaci6n de lo existente y al fomento de la creatividad, avalan la legitimidad de las criticas y de las pretensiones de las asociaciones de artistas.
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E. lncentivos fiscales
La LPHE y el Real Decreto de 1986 establecen unos beneficios fiscales en el marco del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Fisicas, del lmpuesto sobre Sociedades, del lmpuesto Extraordinario sobre el Patrimonio y del lmpuesto General sobre las Sucesiones, disposiciones que no afectan de manera principal y directa al autor de las obras sino al propietario de las mismas. Todas estas medidas tienen por objeto estimular, mediante la concesi6n de ciertas ventajas fiscales, la adquisici6n, conservaci6n, reparaci6n, restauraci6n, difusi6n o exposici6n de obras declaradas de Interes Cultural asi como la donaci6n de obras del PH en favor del Estado o de Entes PUblicos y tambien en favor de establecimientos, fundaciones o asociaciones declaradas beneficas o de utilidad publica. Asimismo, se arbitran exenciones o bonificaciones en tributos como la Contribuci6n Urbana, el Impuesto Extraordinario sobre el Patrimonio de las Personas Fisicas y en los impuestos locales que graven la propierlad o se exijan por disfrute o transmisi6n, cuando el objeto de tales derechos o actos lo constituyen bienes muebles o inmuebles incluidos en el Inventario General o declarados de Interes Cultural. La LPHE estableci6 ademas una especie de amnistia fiscal para los propietarios o poseedores de bienes de singular relevancia que fuesen declarados e inscritos como bienes de Interes Cultural en el plazo de un aiio contado a partir de la promulgaci6n de la LPHE. Esta exenci6n de cualquier impuesto o gravämen pendiente de pago, extensiva a toda responsabilidad por incumplimientos, sanciones, recargos o intereses de demora, permiti6 a los propietarios actualizar el valor fiscal de sus patrimonios; y a las autoridades la localizaci6n o incluso el "descubrimiento" de multiples obras de arte. EI Consejo del Patrimonio Hist6rico no dispone todavia de datos definitivos sobre el numero de declaraciones que se acogieron a la amnistia fiscal antes aludida. No obstante, pueden estimarse en cerca de 13.000 los bienes que han sido declarados al amparo de la misma aunque debe precisarse que con la denominaci6n "bien" se designan a veces colecciones enteras como por ejemplo una colecci6n de objetos arqueol6gicos declarada en Extremadura que incluiria unas 10.000 piezas. Estos da tos inducen a concluir que la amnistia fiscal no ha surtido los efectos apetecidos y que la mayoria de propietarios ha preferido seguir ocultando las piezas de arte poseidas, perpetuando asi la consideraci6n del arte como "valor refugio" y objeto por consiguiente de un mercado "sumergido", sustraido al control fiscal y a las posibilidades de intervenci6n del Estado tanto en las transacciones de las que el mismo sea objeto como en relaci6n a su conservaci6n, restauraci6n o exposici6n.
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F. Propiedad privada versus interes publico
Las medidas restrictivas o limitadoras de derechos que expondremos en este apartado encuentran un doble fundamento legitimador en la Constituci6n: por una parte en su articulo 46; por otra parte en su articulo 44,1 que reza: "Los poderes publicos promovenin y tutelanin el acceso a la cultura, a la que todos tienen derecho"; y finalmente en su articulo 33 que dispone: 1. Se reconoce el derecho a Ia propiedad privada y a la herencia. 2. La funci6n social de estos derechos delimitara su contenido, de acuerdo con las leyes. 3. Nadie podra ser privado de sus bienes y derechos sino por causa justificada de utilidad publica o interes social, mediante la correspondiente indemnizaci6n y de conformidad con lo dispuesto por las leyes.
Ellegislador ha entendido que el acceso a la cultura, la conservaci6n del PHE existente y el enriquecimiento del mismo, constituyen un valor, un interes general que debe primar sobre el derecho de propiedad. De ahi que las facultades de disposici6n absolutas que se anudaban al derecho de propierlad en su concepci6n tradicional, se encuentren limitadas en atenci6n a intereses prevalentes como por ejemplo los contemplados en la LPHE. De entre los diversos limites al derecho de propierlad establecidos por la LPHE destacaremos en sintesis los siguientes. 1. Limites a Ia exportacion. Los bienes declarados de interes cultural son inexportables. Los bienes incluidos en el Inventario General requieren una autorizaci6n expresa y previa de la Administraci6n para ser exportados, autorizaci6n que tambien se exige para todos los bienes integrantes del PH de mas de cien aiios de antigüedad. Finalmente, la Administraci6n puede declarar cualquier bien expresamente inexportable, como medida cautelar, hasta quese incoe expediente para incluir e1 bien en cuesti6n en una de las dos categorias especiales de protecci6n. Estas restricciones a la exportaci6n, amen de las dificultades que suscitan en relaci6n a la indeterminaci6n de los bienes simplemente integrantes del PH y a las que hemos aludido anteriormente, entraiian limitaciones a la libre transmisibilidad de un bien para su propietario. En efecto, la declaraci6n de valor que el propietario de un bien incluya en la solicitud de autorizaci6n para la exportaci6n, constituye una oferta de venta irrevocable en favor de la Administraci6n. No obstante, la Administraci6n puede denegar la autorizaci6n solicitada sin tener por ello que adquirir el bien de que se trate. Por consiguiente y con arreglo a la actuallegislaci6n, los propietarios de tales bienes pueden verse obligados a rechazar aquellas ofertas de compra condicionadas a la exportaci6n del bien que deseen enajenar y a continuar siendo propietarios del mismo en todos aquellos supuestos en los que la Administraci6n considere que el precio ofertado es demasiado elevado. EI propietario que necesite vender debera entonces aceptar ofertas mas bajas de la propia Administraci6n o de particulares que deseen adquirir e1 bien en cuesti6n sin
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pretenrler su exportaci6n. Se trata pues rle un mecanismo susceptible rle incirlir en los precios rle los objetos artisticos situados en Espafta. Sera sin durla interesante analizar cuäl va a ser el margen rle arbitrio que los Tribunales reconocerän a la Administraci6n en esta materia, con ocasi6n rle los recursos que a buen seguro algunos propietarios instarän contra decisiones rle la Administraci6n del tenor antes seftalrlo. La definici6n de la frontera entre la defensa del interes publico rle una parte y la arbitrariedad de otra es siempre tarea dificil pero en estos casos serä especialmente ärrlua pues la Adrninistraci6n, para no incurrir en una rlecisi6n criticable rlesde un punto rle vista rle justicia material, rleberia porler probar rlos hechos: que el interes hist6ricoartistico de la obra justifica la rlenegaci6n de autorizaci6n para la exportaci6n y que el valor rleclararlo supera con creces el valor de mercarlo. Si la doble motivaci6n rle la rlecisi6n que analizamos fuese otro - como por ejemplo la carencia del presupuesto necesario para la adquisici6n - los Tribunales deberian a mijuicio otorgar a la Administraci6n un nuevo plazo para optar a la adquisici6n, transcurrido el cual sin haber merliarlo esta, el bien rleberia ser rleclararlo exportable por el precio ofertado rlesrle el extranjero. 2. Limites al uso y disfrute. Los propietarios de bienes rle interes cultural o de bienes incluirlos en el Inventario General tienen ciertas obligaciones que limitan su uso y disfrute. Estas, en sintesis, son las siguientes: perrnitir y facilitar su inspecci6n por parte de los Organismos competentes; permitir y facilitar su estudio a los investigarlores, previa solicitud razonada rle estos; y permitir y facilitar su visita publica y en el caso de que sean muebles prestarlos, con las rlebidas garantias, para exposiciones temporales, por periodos no superiores a un mes por afto. La indeterminaci6n rle torlas estas obligaciones que pueden ser extraordinariamente gravosas para el propietario, es criticable. No obstante, rlestaca entre torlas ellas la relativa a la visita publica cuyo regimen merece detallarse. La visita debe facilitarse, como minimo, cuatro dias al mes rlurante cuatro horas por rlia y debe ser gratuita paralas personas que acrerliten la nacionalirlarl espaftola. Esta discriminaci6n, amen rle complicar extraorrlinariamente la gesti6n rle las visitas, es rlificilmente rlefendible. Pero mäs grave resulta el silencio rle la Ley y rlel Reglamento en relaci6n a la asunci6n rlel coste de estas visitas, tanto el coste relativo al personal que hay que rledicar a vigilancia como al incremento rlel importe de las primas rle las p6lizas rle seguro cuanrlo los bienes que estas amparan son bienes a los que el publico tiene acceso. Ley y Reglamento contemplan expresamente la rlispensa rle esta obligaci6n o bien su sustituci6n por la rle rlepositar el bien (siempre que sea mueble) en un lugar que reuna las arlecuarlas conrliciones de segurirlarl y exhibici6n rlurante cinco meses carla dos aftos. La Arlministraci6n debe acordar tal rlispensa cuanrlo el propietario rle un bien alegue con funrlamento que no puerle hacerse cargo de los costes rle esta obligaci6n, costes que son dificilmente compensables con las exenciones fiscales a las que ya he alurlido en un apartarlo anterior.
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3. EI regimen de transmision de Ia propiedad. Por disposici6n expresa de Ia LPHE, los bienes integrantes del PH son imprescriptibles, es decir que no puede adquirirse Ia propierlad de los mismos por prescripci6n adquisitiva con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el C6digo Civil. La Administraci6n PUblica no puede enajenar estos mismos bienes salvo en supuestos de permuta de bienes con otros Estados y de cesiones consiguientes a Ia recuperaci6n de bienes Begalmente exportados, realizados en favor de sus anteriores titulares que acreditaren perdida o sustracci6n. 5 Las Instituciones eclesiästicas tampoco pueden ceder los bienes muebles declarados de interes cultural ni los incluidos en el lnventario General que esten en su posesi6n sino es en favor del Estado, de Entidades de Derecho Publico o de otras Instituciones eclesiästicas. 6 EI Estado por su parte puede adquirir Ia propierlad de los bienes integrantes del Patrimonio Hist6rico Espaiiol por diversos procedimientos. Primero, el Estado adquiere tal propierlad ex lege cuando se trate de bienes exportados sin Ia autorizaci6n correspondiente. EI Estado debe realizar torlos los actos posibles conducentes a Ia total recuperaci6n de los bienes Begalmente exportados. 7 Segundo, el Estado puede ejercer el derecho de tanteo sobre los bienes de Inten!s Cultural o incluidos en el Inventario General que se transmitieren, por el mismo precio que declarasen el propietario o los subastadores en Ia notificaci6n que les incumbe con caräcter previo a Ia venta. EI Estado puede altemativamente ejercer el derecho de retracto en el caso de notificaci6n defectuosa, en el plazo de seis meses a partir de Ia fecha en que Ia Administraci6n tenga conocimiento fehaciente de Ia transmisi6n. Tercero, el Estado puede utilizar el procedimiento de expropiaci6n en aquellos casos en que el titular del bien de que se trate infringiere las obligaciones de conservaci6n, manutenci6n y custodia del mismo. En relaci6n a estas obligaciones merece destacarse que las unicas ayudas directas de Ia Administraci6n que Ia Ley contempla, consisten en credito oficial y anticipos reintegrables, lo que implica que Ia carga financiera inherente a aquellas obligaciones no resulta sustancialmente aliviada mediante ayudas estatales. Cuarto, el Estado admite bienes integrantes del PHE debidamente inscritos como tales en pago del lmpuesto sobre Sucesiones, del lmpuesto sobre Ia Renta 5 Resulta criticable que Ia presunci6n de buena fe en Ia declaraci6n de Ia perdida o sustracci6n opere solamente en favor de las entidades de Derecho Publico. 6 Esta disposici6n responde a Ia constataci6n de que el pillaje del patrimonio hist6ricoartistico de Ia Iglesia Cat6lica espaiiola, no ha sido exclusivamente un pillaje por terceros al que Ia Iglesia no se ha podido oponer por falta de medios; sino que ha contado en multiples ocasiones con Ia complicidad - de buena o de mala fe - de curas, parrocos, monjes e incluso de algun alto dignatario. 7 EI ejemplo de "La Marquesa de Santa Cruz" citado al principio de estas päginas, ilustra Ia dificultad inherente a Ia recuperaci6n de bienes ilegalmente exportados.
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de las Personas Fisicas y del Impuesto Extraordinario sobre el Patrimonio. 8 EI contribuyente que desee acogerse a esta formula debera obtener su valoracion por parte de la Junta de Calificaci6n, Valoracion y Exportaci6n de bienes del PHE y, caso de aceptarla, podra realizar el pago del impuesto debido al Estado mediante la cesi6n aludida. 9 G. Distribucion de competencias en materia de Patrimonio Historico
En meritos de los articulos 148,1,16a y 149,1,28a de la Constituci6n de 1978 y de sus relativos en los diversos estatutos de Autonomia de los que se han dotado determinados territorios de Espaiia (por ejemplo el articulo 9,5 del Estatuto de Autonomia de Catalunya de 1979), las competencias en materia de PH se han distribuido entre el Estado y las Comunidades Aut6nomas. Asi estas ultimas tienen competencias para arbitrar "las medidas conducentes a evitar la expoliaci6n" es decir "toda accion u omisi6n que ponga en peligro de perdida o destruccion todos o alguno de los valores de los bienes que integran el PHE o perturbe el cumplimiento de su funcion social." 10 Estas competencias son amplisimas pues se proyectan tanto en la valoraci6n del presupuesto - puesta en peligro - como en la adopcion de medidas - las que conduzcan a evitar la expoliacion. Ambos conceptos son indeterminados y por ende criticables, en particular el segundo. Las Comunidades Autonomas tienen asimismo, entre otras, la potestad de catalogar bienes, la posibilidad de ejercer el derecho de tanteo y adjudicarse los bienes que estimen oportuno (con excepci6n de algunos bienes sobre los que el Estado tiene derecho preferente); asi como la potestad de autorizar exportaciones. No obstante, el Estado se reserva el derecho de ejercer subsidiariamiente todas las facultades cuyo ejercicio se atribuye a las Comunidades Aut6nomas, siempre y cuando estas no tomen las medidas de protecci6n que el Estado juzgue oportunas. Se trata pues de una delegacion tutelada de facultades perfectamente compatible con la Constitucion aunque esta no sea opinion pacifica en el permanente debate politico y doctrinal que sobre las Autonomias tiene lugar en Espaiia.
8 LPHE art. 73; Reglamento art. 65. Es de reseiiar al respecto que el Impuesto sobre Sucesiones fue pagado por Ia familia del artista Joan Mir6 mediante Ia entrega de obras de arte al Estado, antes de que hubiese entrado en vigor Ia LPHE, cuando esta posibilidad no estaba todavia contemplada por Ia legislaci6n espaiiola. 9 La doctrina tributaria ha llamado Ia atenci6n sobre esta excepci6n a Ia noci6n de tributo y a su ratio essendi. En este supuesto, en vez de ingresar dinero en las arcas del Estado, el pago del tributo entraiia un incremento del patrimonio del Estado cuya conservaci6n generani un gasto publico. 10 LPHE art. 4.
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English Summary Works of Art and the Historical Patrimony in Spain: A Recent Legislative Reform
Two recent cases, one involving a scupture by Pablo Serrano and the other a painting by Goya, illustrate the legal environment existing in Spain prior to the mid-1980s relating to works of art. An inadequate body of norms has allowed the systematic destruction of the Spanish Catholic Church's artistic patrimony as weil as archeological sites and has failed to promote conservation of art in general and contemporary art in particular. In this essay I consider the legislative and administrative response to this situation through the Spanish Historical Patrimony Law (LPHE), enacted in 1985, with its first regulation, promulgated in 1986. The LPHE, in addition to ordering what were previously dispersed and fragmented norms three important features tied to the Constitution. First, it responds to and develops the command in article 46 of the Constitution, which guarantees that the government will conserve and promote the enrichment of the Spanish peoples' historical, cultural, and artistic patrimonies. Second, it implements certain measures und er article 44 of the Constitution granting rights for all to have access to culture, recognizing the social function of private property in the Constitution's article 33. And third, the LPHE will be applied according to the constitutional model of protected autonomous territories (articles 148, 149), which divides jurisdiction between the central government and the autonomous communities. Nevertheless, the LPHE has two major defects: (1) the multiplicity of norms needed for its implementation are still excessively fragmented, which is worsened by the mere partial development of these norms through the first regulation of 1986; and (2) it does not incorporate modern international criteria for the protection and enrichment of historical patrimony included in treaties that Spain has signed. Article 1 of the LPHE broadly defines the Spanish historical patrimony subject to protection. Both immovables and movables may be integrated into the patrimony, regardless oftheir ownership, use, age, or economic value. Some property may be included on a "general inventory," or may be declared of "cultural interest." The patrimony is variously protected by restrictions on exportation and by sanctions for waste, including fines and even expropriation. It is alsotobe promoted through public expenditures and fiscal incentives. For example, works ofliving artists may not be declared of "cultural interest," which allows them tobe exported. Article 68 ofthe LPHE calls for at least one percent of the funds that the state spends on public works to be directed toward the conservation or enrichment of the historical patrimony or toward artistic creativity. Lastly, several taxes now create incentives for individuals and corporations to acquire, repair, restore, or display works declared of cultural
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interest, or to donate the same to public entities or to private foundations serving the public interest. An interesting aspect ofthe LPHE isthat it implements the ideas in articles 44 and 46 of the Constitution- that the public should have access to culture and that the historical patrimony must be protected- and these values will have primacy over private property interests. The restrictions on ownership include: (1) prior authorization to export or refusal to allow export; (2) Iimits on use and enjoyment, including the opening of an item to the public; and (3) special rules on transfer, including a preferential right for the state to purchase ( tanteo) or to expropriate. Finally, the autonomaus communities have certain powers over the historical patrimony within their territory, including the right of tanteo.
Part 111
The Convergence and Integration of Legal Systems within Europe
EEC Community-Building under the Single European Act George A. Bermann* Among John Merryman's longstanding aspirations for the comparative law academy in the United States has been the progressive widening of its cultural horizons. He not only has urged that we overcome our perfectly understandable preoccupation with certain nationallegal traditions, but by his writings 1 has deprived us of an important excuse for continued ignorance of other such traditions. Though John's own interests within the civil law have taken him down different avenues, he doubtless would number the European Economic Community among the landscapes on which the finest traditions of comparative law inquiry still promise to yield their greatest fruit. With the adoption in 1987 of the Single European Act 2 - comprising the most far-reaching amendments to date of the Rome Treaty - the Community emerges from a period of prolonged self-examination. The shape ofthat reform stands to teil us something important about the convergence of legal systems and, more directly, about the limits of European integration through law. Though the latter subject has generated interest from the Community's very founding, and recently yielded a study that is unparalleled in its depth and detail, 3 adoption of the Single Act is in itself occasion for reflection on the dynamics of European integration.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law; Eason-Weinmann Visiting Professor of Comparative Law, Tulane University Law School (1988-1989). For further development of the themes in this essay, see George A. Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for the Community?: Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 27 (1989) 529. 1 I have chiefly in mind John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985); John H. Barton I James Lowe/1 Gibbs, Jr. I Victor Hao Li I John Henry Merryman, Law in Radically Different Cultures (1983); John Henry Merryman I David S. Clark, Comparative Law, Western European and Latin American Legal Systems, Cases and Materials (1978); Mauro Cappel/ettiiJohn Henry MerrymaniJoseph M. Perillo, The Italian Legal System, An Introduction (1967). 2 For the English text of the Act, see Bulletin of the European Communities (Supp. 21 1986). 3 Integration Through Law, Europe and the American Federal Experience, ed. by M auro Cappelletti IMonica Seccombe I Joseph Weiler I (Methods, Tools and Institutions) (1985).
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At first view, the architects of Community refonn appear in the Single European Act to have preferred incremental change on a variety of different fronts to any radical overhauling ofCommunity institutions in accordance with a particular vision of European union. In this respect, the Act stands in striking contrast to the European Parliamenfs Draft Treaty of European Union and other comprehensive proposals for consitutional change of the last fifteen to twenty years. 4 The tenor and wisdom of the Single Act's approach to Community refonn is the subject of these remarks. Among the Single European Act's several strategies of refonn is its apparent introduction of certain new fields into the Community's sphere of competence, including worker health and safety, environmental protection, monetary cooperation, regional policy, and research and technological development. These fields are relatively few in number but, more important, figure among those that the institutions, even before adoption of the Single Act, commonly regarded as of legitimate Community concern. So far as the extension of Community competence is concerned, the Single Act basically ratifies existing assumptions rather than breaks new ground, though it does serve to remove from the institutions any legal pretext for inaction in these spheres. In this respect, the Single Act is as much an agenda for political action as a constitutional document. Another aspect of reform under the Single European Act, and one widely anticipated in discussions that preceded that Act, was institutional change at the Community Ievel. From those discussions, the European Parliament and the Commission seemed in particular poised to gain stature and authority at the expense of the Council of Ministers, the Community's traditional forum for expression of identifiable member state interests. In fact, the European Parliament, which never possessed legislative authority in the true sense of the tenn, does gain in influence under the Single European Act, but the gain is uncertain in scope and significance. In a certain number of matters relating mostly to achievement of the common market, Parliament is called upon to "cooperate" in the legislative process. lts cooperation, however, takes a very particular form. Where the new procedure applies, no measure may be adopted in the Council of Ministers over parliamentary objection except by unanimous vote of the Council. Further, no measure as to which Parliament proposes amendments may be adopted without the Commission first having to reexamine and possibly reformwate its original proposal to the Council in light 4 Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, Bulletin of the European Communities (2/1984). The text of the treaty is found in Official Journal of the European Communities no. C77 /33 (Mar. 19, 1985). The other principal reform proposals include the 1975 Tindemans Report, the t979 report ofthe Three Wise Men, the t981 GenscherColombo proposal for European Union and, in the midst of the intergovemmental conference that gave rise to the Single European Act, a French proposal in the form of an Act of European Union. See Agence Europe, Bulletin (Nov. 21, 1985) 3-5.
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of parliamentary opinion. Thus, although the drafters of the Single Act brought Parliament into the legislative process on those matters subject to the cooperation procedure, they did so in a hedged and basically negative fashion. Under the cooperation procedure, as of course outside of it, passage of legislation still can proceed in the absence ofparliamentary assent- a situation that does not easily square with Parliament's unique status as an institutional eure for the Community's democratic deficit. All in all, the Single Act offers Parliament markedly less than other reform initiatives under consideration at the time would have afforded it. 5 The Commission too emerges from the Single European Act only partially strengthened. In so far as the Act replaces unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers with voting by qualified majority - and it does so on an important range of issues- it inevitably enhances the Commission's freedom of action. As proponent of Community legislation, the Commission understandably enjoys greater liberty knowing that a less than uniformly positive response among member states to its proposals will not necessarily mean their demise. The Single Act also strengthens the Commission's hand as Community executive. It directs (and no Ionger simply permits) the Council of Ministers in principle to confer specific implementing powers on the Commission, though this principle is also subject to sweeping reservations that will enable the Council to continue nearly the same pattern of delegation it has followed up to now. At the same timethat the extension ofmajority voting and the contemplated increase in delegations to the Commission raise that body's profile, they also should render the Community legislative and administrative processes more efficient. In sum, the Single Act no more transforms the Commission as an institution than it transforms the Community's legislative and administrative processes. Were the Commission to benefit from a generalized rule of majority voting within the Council of Ministers, were it to acquire a general rulemaking power not subject to the Council's right to reserveallpower of implementation to itself, or were it to see its members named from the majority party in Parliament as if a government under the parliamentary model, then both the institution and the Community legal process would have undergone more substantial change. Perhaps the finest illustration, though, of the Single Act's avoidance of real reform ofCommunity processes is its utter sidestepping ofthe question whether and to what extent the Luxembourg Accord on the member state political veto6 5 Parliament's Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union (supra n. 4), e.g., gave Parliament legislative authority, at least to the extent ofpermitting it toblock legislation voted by the other legislative chamber, the Council ofthe Union (the successor body to the Council of Ministers). 6 Bulletin of the European Communities (3 I 1966). The Luxembourg Accord essentially establishes that no measure will be adopted in the Council over the objections of one or more member states that consider it prejudicial to their vital national interest. Technically a mere press release, the Accord does not constitute Community law or internationallaw. It has been aptly described as a "gentlemen's agreement," mostly honored in practice
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remains viable. Forareform that setssuch store by the extension of qualified majority at the expense of unanimous voting to leave that matter open necessarily casts doubt on the integrity ofthat reform's apparent institutional strategy. Member state cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy represents the final element in the Single European Act's package of constitutional reform. The system of European political cooperation in effect among member states for nearly twenty years had come tobe viewed not only as a symbol ofthe European unity achieved to date, but also as a vehicle for possibly greater European unity still to come. The wisdom ofbuilding Europe's further political integration upon a system of cooperation in foreign policy may of course fairly be questioned. What is clear though is that the drafters of the Single European Act eventually chose to leave that system - both in its basic rules of operation and in its relation to the Community lawmaking process- essentially intact. The decision in particular to keep European political cooperation on a strictly intergovernmental footing, devoid of the supranational features that are the Community's principal hallmark, shows the unreadiness of Europe's Ieaders to accept direct political integration on that terrain. All in all, the Single European Act is a considerably less ambitious specimen of constitutional reform than one might have expected, judging by the vision of a European Union that had been advanced by the European Parliament's Draft Treaty and other recent reform proposals. 7 Significantly, the Act's most decisive and coherent institutional changes affect the Court of Justice rather than the Community's political branches, and they do so for purposes - principally relief ofthe Court's massive caseload and a resulting gain injudicial efficiencythat have little if anything directly to do with the Community's fundamental constitutional reform. Especially in view ofthe need feit at the timeforavisible strengthening of European political unity through expansion of the Community's competences and fundamental reform of its institutions, the Single Act was plausibly received with disappointment in many quarters. 8 In my judgment, the Single European Act merits a warmer reception. Viewed as a whole, the Act entails more than a prescription for change in Community though not binding as a matter oflaw. Note, The EEC Legislative Process: An Evolving Balance: Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 27 (1989) 679. 7 See supra n. 4. 8 Among the Single Act's first and foremost critics is a fonner justice of the European Court of Justice. See Pierre Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the "Single European Act": Common Market Law Review 24 (1987) 9. Judge Pescatore believes that the refonners committed a fundamental error in the first place by overriding the objections of Denmark, Greece, and the United Kingdom in order to convene the intergovemmental conference to revise the Treaty ofRome. Since any treaty revisions necessarily required the mutual consent of the member states, the dissenting states were well-positioned to see to it that the revisions did not bring about far-reaching reform. Id. at 14.
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competence and institutional affairs, plus continuity in the system of European political cooperation. The Act also expresses an engagement on the part of the member states and the Community institutions to a programmatic goal, namely completion by the end of 1992 of the common internal market. However, because the notion of such a market is not in itself entirely innovative, the Single Act's interest must lie chiefly in the originality and effectiveness of the means it contemplates for attaining that objective. On this score, the Single Act affords ground for optimism. Subject to certain escape devices that it makes available to member states for the assertion of their separate and overriding national needs- devices that have generated alarm, andin some cases undue alarm, among the Act's critics 9 - the Single Act opens up two quite different but equally promising avenues for creating a market without internal frontiers. On the one hand, the Act authorizes the Council of Ministers to adopt by qualified majority vote rather than the unanimity originally required virtually any harmonization measure it desires in the name of fostering the internal market. Particularly if one can reason that the Luxembourg Accord has no place under the amended Treaty of Rome, this development should avoid the necessity of securing a consensus within the Council before the harmonization measures that are so critical to the achievement of the internal market may be adopted. The other mechanism under the Single European Act for helping secure the common internal market is less transparent from the face ofthe Act, but no less promising. Article 100B of the Treaty of Rome, as amended by the Act, directs the Commission to draw up by 1992 an inventory of all measures whose harmonization would advance the internal market, but have not by then yet taken place. At that point, the Council, again acting by qualified majority rather than unanimity, will be entitled to require that the national provisions in force in each member state on one or more matters inventoried be treated by all the other member states as equivalent to their own. This means in effect that no state thereafter may raise barriers to Community trade on account of alleged noncompliance with domestic laws governing those matters. The ingeniousness of such "constructive harmonization" does not lie so much in the indirect opportunity it affords the Council ofMinisters to eliminate nontariffbarriers to trade, as in the incentive it gives member states to reach actual agreement within the Council on the harmonization of nationallegislation. Should member states fail to enact such measures, they may find themselves in the less comfortable position of having to regard the national standards of every other state on important matters of public policy as equivalent to their own, even when those standards in fact fall substantially short. 9 The most controversial and justly criticized feature of all is the provision in art. 100A(4) of the amended treaty. It permits member states under certain stated circumstances unilaterally to apply national provisions that derogate from Community harmonization measures.
22 Merryman Festschrift
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The political dynamics that these two developments were intended to launch are only now coming into operation and cannot yet be evaluated. But any notion that the Single Act from the start has given the European integration movement an inappropriately programmatic emphasis, at the expense of grand political reform, should be roundly rejected. To be sure, the notion of completing the internal market by 1992 has a distinctly anticlimactic ring, given the fact that attainment of the common market stood among the Treaty of Rome's original and most central objectives. Moreover, increased economic integration does Iook very much like the mere continuation of a process already underway rather than a new and different construction. These impressions are nevertheless misleading. In the first place, the failures of economic integration over the Community's first thirty years, particularly with respect to the elimination of non-tarrif barriers to trade among member states, were serious and thus of legitimate concern to European reformers. It would therefore be inappropriate to judge the Single Act simply by the scale of institutional reform it introduces, rather than also by the contribution it makes to helping the Community overcome certain chronic programmatic difficulties. More important, though, emphasis on the internal market was an advisable strategy even when judged strictly from an instrumental point of view and without regard to the inherent virtues of such a market. Although obscured by sundry institutional changes, the devotion of the Single European Act to dismantling the Community's remaining internal frontiers places the Act weil within the Community's neofunctional reform tradition. 10 By contrast, Parliament's Draft Treaty of European Union and like reforms sought, out of understandable impatience, to achieve political integration simply by declaring it. Predictably, they met with defeat at the hands of an equally understandable disquiet and unreadiness on the member states' part. This is not to say that debate in overtly political and constitutional terms was without value. On the contrary, such debate helperl frame the issues, expose the stakes, and also doubtless fuel the movement for reform without whose momentum even adoption of the Single European Act might not have been politically feasible. This is also not to say that the neofunctionalist strategy can succeed absent a greater readiness on the member states' part to respect their Community obligations in regard to the common market than they often have demonstrated in the past. But the Single Act's combination of modest 10 Neofunctionalism commonly refers to an integration strategy whereby states initially cooperate in particular sectors through delegation of decisional authority to collective institutions whose detenninations will be binding upon them. Such sectoral integration is expected to have a "spillover" effect, leading to broader economic integration and eventually to full political union. Neofunctionalist writings influential in shaping the Community include Ernst B. Baas, The Uniting ofEurope (1958); Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (1963).
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institutional reform, on the one hand, and advancement of centrally important programmatic goals, on the other, remains in my view the strategy best calculated under present circumstances to promote "an even closer union among the peoples of Europe." 11
11 Treaty (ofRome) Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, preamble.
22*
Balance of Powers, Human Rights, and Legal Integration: New Challenges for European Judges Mauro Cappelletti* Judicial review of governmental action and especially judicial review of legislation has developed in Europe as a new instrument for balancing and sharing power as well as for the protection ofhuman rights. I will discuss in this essay a new role for judges and its impact on both national and transnational forms of government and on legal integration. By integration I mean, first, integration of the law of the Common Market's twelve member states and second, legal integration of Western Europe generally, which includes all twenty-one member states of the Council of Europe. 1
I. The Expansion of European Judicial Review of Legislation It is well-known that, notwithstanding some historical antecedents, judicial review of legislative action was practically unknown in Europe until our century. 2 However, in the post-World War II years it has experienced a tremendous expansion, indeed a real explosion, both domestically within many ofthe states ofWestern Europe and transnationally within Europe's two major international organizations, the Common Market and the Council of Europe.
* Lewis Talbot and Nadine Hearn Shelton Professor of International Legal Studies, Stanford University; Professor of Law, University of Florence. This paper is adapted from a lecture delivered at the University ofCambridge and from a speech made to the 1987 National Conference of the Japanese Association of Comparative Law. I am pleased to dedicate it to my eminent colleague John Henry Merryman, as a token of my admiration and friendship. "Amicizia, tu sei Ia mia patria." Literature cited in abbreviated form: Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (1971) (cited: Cappe/letti, Judicial Review); Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience, ed. by Mauro CappellettijMonica Seccombe jJoseph Weiler I (3 books)( 1986); Le contröle juridictionnel des lois, ed. by Louis Favoreuj John Anthony Jolowicz (1986); lohn Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (2d. ed. 1985). Additional abbreviation: E.C.R. = Reports of the European Court of Justice. 1 For an elaborate discussion oflegal integration see Cappe/letti/SeccombejWeiler, especially the introduction by the general editors, Mauro Cappellettij Monica SeccombejJoseph Weiler, ibid. bk. 1, 3-68 (3, 24 ff.). 2 Seegenerally Cappelletti, Judicial Review, especially chs. 2-3; Mauro Cappelletti, Rapport GeneralfGeneral Report [to the 1984 Conference of the International Association of Legal Science], in: FavoreujJolowicz 285-314.
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I see three major reasons for this great expansion ofjudicial review in Europe today. The first is the emergence of a new form of government. The second is the new importance of human rights. And the third is what I would call transnational pluralism. Let me start with the first. The traditional form of government in Western Europe since the French Revolution has been characterized by what the French call separation des pouvoirs. The French understanding of separation of powers, moreover, is totally different from the American concept of "checks and balances." The French separation des pouvoirs in its original and proper meaning prohibits the judiciary from controlling or "interfering with" the political branches. 3 Judges were supposed to settle disputes between private persons and to deal with criminallitigation; they were not supposed to otherwise interfere in any way with governmental action. It took most of the nineteenth century to change, in part, this situation by introducing judicial review of administrative action. This happened through the development ofthe Conseil d'Etat and its transformation from a mere agency of the administration into a real court. Thus it took almost a century for separationdes pouvoirs as a form of government tobe modified with the introduction of a new branch of the judiciary, the juges administratifs. 4 This new type of judge in France, Germany, Belgium, ltaly, and elsewhere in Europe was given the power to "interfere" with activities of the executive branch -to control the "legitimacy" of administrative action -and, in this way, to enforce a "horizontal" sharing of powers between the executive and legislative branches. In Europe, this power-sharing arrangementwas called the "principle oflegality" (rule of law) of administrative action. 5 lt has taken much of our century for a further, analogous development to occur, a development that in French is called justice constitutionnel/e and in German Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. This development is the extension of judical control over the other political branch, the legislature, which is itself bound to respect the "higher legality" of the constitution. Hence a "vertical" sharing of power has developed. To implement this change a new type of court has once again been created, the constitutional court - the Conseil constitutionnel in France, the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany, the Corte costituzionale in Italy, and others. The constitutional court has the task of reviewing legislative action and providing special, differentiated protection for constitutionally entrenched rights. Thus, in Europe the point of departure was 3 See Merryman 15-16; Otto Kahn-Freund, Common Law and Civil Law- Imaginary and Real Obstacles to Assimilation, in: New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, ed. by Mauro Cappelletti (1978) 137-168 (159). 4 See, e.g., Merryman 87, 133 ff. 5 See, e.g., Mauro Cappe/letti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of "Constitutional Justice": Cath. U. L. Rev. 35 (1985) 1-32 (14 ff.) [Pope John XXIII Lecture].
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radically different from that in America where, unlike Europe, judicial review has been asserted since at least the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison. 6 What explains this gradual abandonment of the rigid separation des pouvoirs principle? I think the answer isthat Europeans became increasingly aware that there was an imbalance of power in their form of government. All through the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, Western Europe had systems of government characterized either by a strong executive but a weak parliament and a weakjudiciary, or by an all-commanding parliament but a weak executive and a weakjudiciary. For example, the Fourth Republic in France and the postWorld War II Italian Republic concentrated most power in legislative assemblies, while assigning very little power and stability to the executive and even less power to the judiciary. On the other hand, the French Fifth Republic (at least under General De Gaulle) and, even more emphatically, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had very strong executives, whereas the other branches were weak if not purely perfunctory. These conditions brought about interest in having a more balanced system of government, a system in which each of the three branches could be strong because it could control, or "interfere with," the others, but in which none of the three branches would be dominant and uncontrolled. That is why judicial review, first of administrative action, and then, during the last four decades or so, of legislative action as weil, emerged in the conscience of Western Europeans as a necessary element of a sound governmental system. A sound government is no longer a system of French-style separationdes pouvoirs, but rather one of checks and balances that act as safeguards against abuses by either ofthe political branches. One could speak ofthis system as "the crowning ofthe rule oflaw," because obedience to the law is imposed on both branches of political power. A second reason for the expansion of judicial review is connected with the first. The sad experience of dictatorial regimes and the horrors of two European "civil wars" in which the entire world became enmeshed, brought about an awareness of the importance of affirming and preserving certain fundamental values and rights. Here, too, another basic change from the original political philosophy of the French Revolution occurred. Although the French Revolution produced, of course, its own Declaration des droits de l'homme, the philosophy of the time viewed this bill of rights as a theoretical and political, rather than as a legal, affirmation of rights; it did not produce the legal machinery for their enforcement. This approach changed with the emergence of judicial review, for judicial review provided the missing enforcement machinery; judges of new constitutional courts are now responsible for the implementation of these funda6
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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mental rights vis-ä-vis political power. The central element of judical reviewan element that clearly emerged as a reaction against the abuses of dictatorial regimes and the tragedies of the "civil wars" - was what Germans called Grundrechtsgerichtsbarkeit or that part of constitutional adjudication dealing with human rights. Originally this was an essentially national development, influential in Germany especially since 1951, in Italy since 1956, andin France since 1971. Butthis development was soon destined to expand transnationally as weil, as we shall see in a moment. Thus there were two basic reasons for the emergence ofwhat I would call the new constitutionalism in Europe, based on constitutions and bills of rights made effective by means of judicial review. A further development of potentially equal or even greater importance has also emerged. I shall call it the new transnationalism. Like the new constitutionalism, the new transnationalism has been a major cause in the modern expansion of the role of courts, andin particular of judicial review, in Western Europe during the last thirty years or so. Pluralism, as I suggested at the beginning, is a third reason for such expansion. What I mean by pluralism is the abandonment of a monistic, monolithic conception of law as ordinary legislation (loi, Gesetz), a conception that long prevailed in Contineotal Europe after the French Revolution and the great national codifications. 7 A new conception recognizes pluralism oflegal sources, both internally and internationally. Internally this phenomenon is reflected both in regionalism (with the attribution of certain legislative powers to local governments) andin constitutionalism (with the constitution becoming a higher law of the land). Internationally, there is now the European Convention of Human Rights and a rather large and growing body ofCommunity law. Just as nationallaw, ifvalidly enacted, prevails over conflicting regional (local) law, and constitutional law prevails over conflicting local and national law, this new transnationallaw tends to affirm itself as "higher" vis-a-vis alllaws of anational (including local) nature. Of course, this pluralism ofhierarchically ordered legal sources inevitably brings a potentiality for conflicts of laws, and hence, a growing need for judicial review as the instrument for resolving such conflicts. Consider that judicial review, in its most peculiar significance, is but the settling of conflicts among various layers of normative sources. When conflicts occur at a transnational Ievel, the existence of a transnational adjudicator reflects further vertical expansion of checks and balances; judicial review becomes the instrument for enforcement of power-sharing between national and transnational organs. This is indeed the other major development that has been ernerging in Europe: the sharing of power between individual states and transnational organizations that are endowed with lawmaking competences. 7 See Rene David/ Henry P. de Vries, The French Legal System: An Introduction to Civil Law Systems (1958) 86; Fritz Baur, Introduction, trans. by Courtland H. Peterson, in: Bibliography of German Law, ed. by German Association of Comparative Law (1964) 1139 (8: "German law is statutory law"); cf. Merryman 22fT.
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There is thus also a need to enforce such a sharing ofnorrnative power anytime a conflict arises. That such a development should have brought about a tremendous increase in the importance of the judiciary in modern European societies is apparent. As long as droit was essentially identified with /oi, that is law in general with statutory law - mostly ordered systematically in the code- the role of a judge was limited to applying this monolithic statutory law. There was little need to solve conflicts among laws, expecially among hierarchically ordered laws. Now, with the new pluralism that I am going to discuss further, conflicts arise constantly. European judges no Ionger merely have to apply, for example, the Code Napoleon, the BGB, or the codice civile. First, they have to find out whether statutory rules relevant to a case are in conflict with higher law that stems from the constitution, a constitution that is no longer, as it was true for almost two centuries, merely a political proclamation. 8 Second, since the European Community (and to some extent, even the European Convention of Human Rights) affirrns its commandments as laws higher than those of member nations, this fact also gives rise to conflicts whose solution rests upon judges. Indeed, constitutionalism, transnationalism and regionalism -as weil as the new importance ofhuman rights- are several interconnected major forces that have brought about a profound transforrnation ofthe Iegallandscape ofEurope in the post-World War II years. And judicial review, being the instrument for enforcement of the sharing of power, both vertically and horizontally, both domestically and internationally, is the sine qua non for this fundamental transforrnation.
II. Nationaland Transnational Developments in Europe A. National Constitutional Tribunals Having outlined three major causes of the expansion of judicial review in Western Europe, I shall now present some data to indicate how widespread and meaningful this development has been bothat the national and transnational Ievels. Let me startat the national Ievel. Following the First World War, Austria, in 1920, became the first country to create a constitutional court endowed with power to strike down unconstitutionallegislation. Almost contemporaneously, Czechoslovakia also attempted to implement a constitutional court. Spain came third with its Republican Constitution of 1931, which included provisions for the creation of a constitutional tribunal. These events were short lived, however. Dictatonal regimes soon took over in these countries. Such regimes - of any 8 For useful precision on the meaning of "flexible" and "rigid" constitutions, see Merryman 134fT.
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kind, right or left- are in plain contradiction with the very idea of an effective system of judicial review of political power. The real explosion of judical review at the national Ievel occurred after the Second World War. Austria in 1945, Germany in 1949 and particularly in 1951, Italy in 1948 and particularly in 1956, Francein 1958, the Republic ofCyprus in 1960, Turkey in 1961, and Yugoslavia in 1963 - the first and only Eastern European country to successfully do so, except for an attempt in Poland that is too recent to assess - all introduced systems of judicial review of the constitutionality of their legislation. They entrusted the review power, as a rule, to newly established adjudicatory organs. 9 Czechoslovakia also tried to follow this path in 1968, but the attempt was crushed by the forced end of what was called the "Spring of Prague." I should add that, in the 1970s and early 1980s a new revival of judicial review occurred. Of special importance are developments in France since 1971, and especially since 1974, which have brought about a distinct expansion of the somewhat tentative system of review adopted in 1958. 10 Austria, too, with a constitutional amendment in 1975 introduced sweeping changesthat substantially enlarged the reach of its judicial review system. 11 Judicial review has also been adopted by three European nations that recently gained their political freedom: Greece introduced it in 1975; Portugal did so in 1976, and particularly in 1982; and, finally, Spain adopted a very elaborate system of judicial review in its 1978 constitution, which led to the establishment, in 1980, of a constitutional court that has already decided very important issues. 12 Lastly, Sweden too became a participant in this sweeping development; a constitutional amendment of 1979, in force since 1980, expressly established the power of judges to control the constitutionality of legislation. 13 The purpose of all these European developments is clearly the same as the purpose of judicial review elsewhere, and particularly in the United States, namely to enforce the superiority of "more permanent" law vis-a-vis ordinary legislation. With few exceptions, however---one such exception being Swedenthe structure of review systems established in Europe is quite different from the American model. In America, all judges have the power and duty not to apply unconstitutional enactments, a system that prevails in other countries of the common law world, such as Canada, and that has been adopted in 1apan as weil. See Cappelletti, Judieial Review eh. 3. See, e.g., Mauro Cappel/etti/ Williarn Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law (1979) eh. 3. 11 See, e.g., Louis Favoreu, Europe Occidentale (Rapport regional), in: FavoreufJolowicz 15-68 (20-21). 12 Id. at 21-24, 29-34. 13 See Eivind Srnith, Pays Seandinaves (Rapport regional), in: FavoreufJolowicz 225282 (225). 9
10
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The European system, on the contrary, is a centralized model.l4 In Europe constitutional courts have, to some extent at least, a monopoly over the power to determine the constitutionality of legislation. These developments parallel those that occurred earlier in Europe. As I have already mentioned, in the nineteenth century, to implement judicial review of administrative action, it was feit necessary to establish a new type of judge, the administrative judge, to whom review power was entrusted. In our century, another new type of judge was created- the constitutional judge. Altematively, in the United States the same judge who deals with ordinary civil and criminal cases may also review both administrative as weil as legislative acts. There are many reasons for this important structural difference between the European and American models; they are related to basic characteristics of the European civil law system. I have analyzed on other occasions these reasons, 15 and I do not intend to do so again here. Rather, I now want to concentrate on what I call the transnational dimension ofthis very important development, which as I said has been changing the face of Europe over the past few decades. 16 B. Transnational European Judicial Review There are two main lines of these changes. One is represented by the European Community, often called the Common Market, which includes twelve member states and over 300 million people. The other line of development is the Council of Europe, including all of the states of Western Europe except Finland, encompassing close to 400 million people. Of course, the Council of Europe is not as tightly organized as the Community. lts authority is much more limited. lts major product has been the European Convention of Human Rights. I shall start with the Community. Community law has two basic components. First there are treaties, the "primary" Community law. These include the treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The most important, of course, is the European Economic Community Treaty. Second, there are thousands ofregulations, directives, and decisions that have been enacted by Community organs -particularly the Council of Ministers and the Commission sitting in Brussels. These are called "secondary" or "derivative" Community law. This derivative law has branched 14 An analysis of this basic difference, of its historical, ideological, sociological, and structural reasons, and of significant converging trends, is given in Cappelletti, Judicial Review chs. 3-5. 15 See supra n. 14. 16 Foramoreelaborate and documented discussion, including a comparison between developments in Europe and America, I refer to Mauro Cappel/ettiiDavid Golay, The Judicial Branch in the Federaland Transnational Union: Its Impact on Integration, in: Cappel/etti I Seccombe I Weiler bk. 2, 261-351.
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out into more and more areas of human life, including consumer protection, environmental protection, antitrust, agriculture, and even social rights. For example, in Defrenne v. SABENA, 17 the European Court of Justice sitting in Luxembourg considered the question of equal pay formen and women. lt was a decision of sensational importance in the history of the "gender revolution" equalization of the rights of women and men. To understand how judicial review operates at the Community Ievel, we must keep in rnind two characteristics of Community law: its "direct effect," and its "preerninence" or "supremacy." Direct effect means that, in principle, Community law is automatically binding in all member states. lt does not need tobe incorporated into national legislation. Indeed, national legislation enacted to incorporate or nationalize it, is forbidden. Both primary and secondary Community law is automatically the law of the land in all twelve nations. The direct effect doctrine was established in a Iandmark decision of the European Court, Van Genden Loos, 18 in 1963. Since then, there has been a consistent body of European Court of Justice decisions confirming and indeed expanding the principle, which to a !arge extent has been accepted by courts of the member states. This has sweeping consequences, for it means that all of the many thousands of member state judges are at the same time also enforcers of Community law - they are, in some way, also Community judges. They are supposed to apply not only their own national law; they are also to apply Community law as if it were the law of the land. The second characteristic, preeminence, goes back to another Iandmark decision of the European Court, Costa v. ENEL, 19 in 1964. According to this decision, Community law is not only the law ofthe land; it is a higher law ofthe land, higher even than national constitutional law. (One can see here the emergence at the Community Ievel ofthat pluralism I mentioned before, which is actually a form of quasi-federalism.) The net result is that today French or German law, for instance, is not only the Code civil or the BGB and other French or German legislation; it is not only the French ortheGerman Constitution with some judicial machinery to enforce it. But it is also, on top of everything, Community law, along with judicial machinery to enforce it. This judicial machinery includes not only the European Court of Justice sitting in Luxembourg, but also all the many national judges of France and Germany who are expected to apply Community law as the higher law of the land. And this, of course, applies to the other ten countries as weil. lt was, perhaps, daring but not too difficult for the Court of Justice to affirm these two basic principles, direct effect and supremacy, in 1963 and 1964. The Case 43/75, Defrenne v. SABENA, [1976] E.C.R. 455. Case 26/62, Van Genden Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Belastingen, [1963] E.C.R. 1. 19 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585. 17 18
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difficulty was to have them accepted by the member states and their courts. How then, did the national courts react? Given the strong nationalistic pride that exists in most nations, and this certainly applies to judges, it is not surprising that it took several years before these two principles were fully understood and, by and large, accepted. Thus in 1971 the German Constitutional Court 20 and the Belgian Court of Cassation 21 accepted supremacy. It took two more years for the Italian Constitutional Court to follow (the Frontini decision 22 ) and another two years for the French Cour de cassation (the Cafes Jacques Vabre decision). 23 In Britain, the situation is still unclear. There has been a great debate going on. The question has not yet been decided by the House ofLords, and there are some ambivalent opinions at the Court of Appeal and in the lower courts. As one can see, although there has been some resistance, national courts in Europe have on the whole gradually accepted the basic premise of Community law supremacy, as weil as the judicial role of enforcing this prernise. Supremacy has been recognized as a necessary condition for the vital integrational function of the Community and its law. It might be interesting to consider briefly the structure of this system of transnational judicial review. There is a central court, the European Court of Justice, but no system of lower Community courts. Thousands of national courts exist, but there is only one Community court. This is a basic difference visa-vis the American Union, in which the federaljudicial system consists not only of one central court but also of a number of lower federal courts. In Europe, it was necessary to design a very imaginative coordination between the Community court and all the different national courts. In principle, the structure of European judicial review follows the American (decentralized) model: all European judges have the power and duty to enforce the "higher law"- Community law. However, there may be doubts as to the interpretation or even validity of the relevant Community law. A Community regulation, for instance, might have been enacted in an area where the treaty did not give legislative power to the Community; or the treaty itself might be ambiguous; or the text of the regulations rnight be unclear. In those cases, the national court may raise an issue of interpretation or of validity and ask the European Court of Justice to give a "preliminary ruling." If the national court is one of last resort, it must ask for such a preliminary ruling and cannot decide a Community law issue by itself. The ruling ofthe European Court of Justice will 20 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of9 June 1971, 31 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 145 = Europarecht (1972) 51. 21 Cour de cassation (Belgium), decision of27 May 1971, in: Cahiers de droit europeen (1971) 522. 22 Corte costituzionale, decision of 27 Dec. 1973, no. 183, 1973 Giurisprudenza costituzionale 2401. 23 Cour de cassation (France), decision of 24 May 1975, 1975 Recueil Dalloz Sirey, Jurisprudence 497.
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have a binding, precedential effect for all judges in the twelve member states. 24 Clearly the structure of this European system of judicial review is a mixed one, decentralized in part, but centralized whenever the ruling is requested from and given by the European court. An ingenious, yet paradoxical system has thus emerged in Europe. In Britain, for example, there is no judicial review of legislation. Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, supremacy of Parliament has been a basic principle, the country's Grundnorm. Judges cannot control the constitutionality oflegislation vis-a-vis the basic written or unwritten texts and principles of the British constitution. But vis-a-vis Community law, British judges have the power and indeed the duty to control nationallegislation's conformity to Community law. If they are courts oflast resort, judges are bound to ask for a binding ruling from the European Court of Justice. The tremendous innovation brought about by this development is apparent. The role of the European judiciary has become much more complex and, ultimately, has been greatly enhanced. One can also easily appreciate the powerful integrational impact of this system. To begirr with, since Community law is not only the law ofthe land but a higher law ofthe land, a common and growing body oflaw that shall be applied by all twelve member states and their judiciaries now exists. If one adds the duty ofnational courts oflast resort to turn for the interpretation ofCommunity law to one central Community court whose rulings will bind the national judges not only in a particular case, but in all future cases, it is apparent that a tremendous integrational potential has emerged. The Community has gradually developed as a quasi-federal system, notwithstanding all the crises it has endured. The transnational dimension of judicial review has another line of development. This, as I mentioned before, refers to the "larger Europe" of member states of the Council of Europe and to the European Convention of Human Rights, to which all those states have adhered. 25 The European Convention of Human Rights isatransnational bill of rights that has two outstanding characteristics. The firstisthat in many, but not all, of the twenty-one member states the Convention is the "law of the land." To be sure, unlike Community law that is proclaimed by its treaty (as interpreted by the European Court of Justice) to have direct effect, the European Convention of Human Rights is just an ordinary international agreement, an international treaty. As such, it is binding on those governments that have ratified it, but it does not necessarily have direct effect. This means that national legislation violative of the treaty is not, by force of the treaty, inapplicable in national 24 Cf. joined cases 28 to 30 I 62, Da Costa en Schaake NV v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, [1963] E.C.R. 31; see CappellettiiGolay (supra n.16) 325 n. 258, 328. 25 An in-depth study on this topic is Jochen Froweinl Stephen Schulhafer I Martin Shapiro, The Protection of Human Rights as a Vehicle for Integration, in: Cappelletti I Seccombe I Weiler bk. 3, 231 -344.
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courts. Intemationallaw sanctions may be adopted against a member state, but violative legislation remains valid under nationallaw. In some countries, however, nationallaw itself establishes that international treaties have direct efTect under certain circumstances. This is indeed the case for a majority ofthe twenty-one members ofthe European Convention (a majority, however, in which Great Britain, Ireland, and the Scandinavian countries are not included). Indeed, some of the majority countries - including France, Holland, Belgium, and Austria- consider the European Convention ofHuman Rights tobe a higher law ofthe land, perhaps at the same Ievel as or even at a higher Ievel than national constitutionallaw. There is, for instance, a decision by the French Cour de cassation, the supreme civil and criminal court ofFrance, in which that court quashed a lower appellate court judgment because it violated articles 6 and 13 ofthe European Convention ofHuman Rights. 26 Thus one can appreciate what a very special impact the Convention is already having, at least in some of the ratifying countries. There is a second extraordinary feature of the European bill of rights. This is the fact that all member states with the exception of Cyprus have accepted the optional clause of article 25 of the Convention. 27 This clause allows aggrieved individuals to file complaints with the European Commission of Human Rights against any kind of state action-legislative, administrative, and judicial-that violates the Convention. So we have a transnational declaratioo of rights and we also have a transnational adjudicator- the European Commission, and after it the European Court of Human Rights, both located in Strasbourg. This is an historically unprecedented development: the possibility for individuals who have exhausted efTective national remedies to go to Strasbourg to obtain protection against violation by national authorities of a transnational bill of rights. A further paradox emerges here. Great Britain, of course, is a member of the Convention and has accepted the optional clause. Thus British citizens, who do not have recourse against nationallegislation in their own country, can go to Strasbourg to complain about legislative violations of this transnational charter; and indeed they do so quite frequently and on several occasions with success. This creates an embarrassing situation for their govemment and has promoted a heated debate in the United Kingdom over whether a written bill of rights should be adopted by the British Parliament. But while the debate is still raging, there is already a written transnational bill of rights for the British citizen. And the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, even 26 Cour de cassation (France), decision of 5 Dec. 1978 (Baroum Cherif), 1979 Recueil Dalloz Sirey, Jurisprudence 50. 27 Malta was. the twentieth member state to accept the optional clause on Apnl 30, 1987. This followed Turkey' s January 28, 1987 acceptance, which was, however, subject to substantiallimitations and conditions.
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though not automatically binding, have generally been complied with by the British government and by the Parliament. Needless to add, this written transnational bill of rights has a mighty integrational potential, the impact of which is easy to foresee. It is an impact quite similar tothat which the 14th Amendment ofthe American Constitution had upon the process oflegal, social, and cultural integration among peoples in the member states of the American Union.
111. A Judicial Review Revolution in Europe Let me conclude. In the last several decades, there has been what I would not hesitate to call ajudicial review revolution in Western Europe. It has occurred on at least three Ievels- national, Community, and continental- the last one caused by the growing reach and impact ofthe Council ofEurope's Convention of Human Rights. Of course one might still raise the hard question: Is this revolution a legitimate one? My only answer here 28 is that this revolution has been triggered by very serious needs, including, as we have seen, the exigencies- which tend tobe feit worldwide, at least in the Western world- of implementing effective horizontal and vertical systems of checks and balances and of providing effective protection for human rights against governmental abuse. This revolution is also the expression of an important convergence of Western Europe with the United States, and indeed of a more general convergence within the Western world. The powerful integrational impact of judicial review, especially in its transnational dimension, seems obvious enough. We may wonder, of course, whether we demand too much of European judges when we ask them to apply and enforce a common fundamental standard to over 300 million people in the Community or to almost 400 million people in Western Europe. Can European judges be equal to this tremendous challenge? Judges in Europe, no less than in America, are devoid of political power, charisma, and political Iegitimation. Few Europeans would know even the names of the thirteen judges on the Luxembourg Courtorthose sitting in Strasbourg. Do we demand the impossible of this new type of judge and court? Or rather, is this exactly the road Europe should try to tread in a shrinking, increasingly interdependent and, one might hope, integrating world?
28 I have discussed this question extensively elsewhere; see Mauro Cappel/etti, Necessite et legitimite de lajustice constitutionnelle: Revue internationale de droit compare (1981) 625-657; id., The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis: S. Cal. L. Rev. 53 (1980) 409-445; id. (supra n. 5).
Toward a European Model of Public Administration Sabino Cassese*
I. The Possibility of Comparing Different Administrative Systems Public administrations and their systems of administrative Jaw have been seen as the last enclaves of nationalism. 1 Each is said tobe unique to the history and traditions of a society. Each is said to have been designed expressly for the society in which it operates. Comparisons are futile, because they would involve matehing disparate institutionsandlegal systems that have no commonality, do not belong to any "family," and Iack any sort of interconnection. In this view, therefore, administrative law stands in contrast to private Jaw. Administrative Jaw is an offspring of the individual history of each country. Private Jaw is the product of a common nature, a Volksgeist as it were that, apart from certain peculiarities and variations, features significant common factors and recurring institutions (such as the family, property, and contracts) in light of which differences can be discerned and ordered. Though this view may never have been expressed in such unequivocable terms, it nonetheless synthesizes a widely held notion concerning the extent to which different administrative systems can be compared and is to blame for the Iack of development in the field of comparative administration. 2 This is a glaring deficiency, considering the development of comparative sturlies in other fields,
* Professor of Law, University of Rome. Literature cited in abbreviated form: Andre de Lauhadere I Andre Mathiot I Jean RiveroiGeorges Vede/, Pages de doetrine II (1980) (eited: Pages de doetrine). 1 See Alain Plantey, Prospeetive de !'Etat (1975). 2 Regarding eomparative administrative law, see G. Braibant, Administration eompan': (1986); Sabino Cassese, II sistema amministrativo italiano (1983) eh. 13; Ferrel Ready, Publie Administration, A Comparative Perspeetive (3d ed. 1984); Papers in Comparative Publie Administration, ed. by Ferrel Ready I Sybil L. Stokes (1962); Yves Meny, Politique eomparee: Etats-Unis, Franee, Grande-Bretagne, Italie, R.F.A. (1987); Poul Meyer, Administrative Organization, A Comparative Study of the Organization of Publie Administration (1957), translated as Die Verwaltungsorganisation (1962); Henry Puget, Les institutions administratives etrangeres (1969); Readings in Comparative Publie Administration, ed. by Nimrod Raphaeli (1967). For bibliographies, see Ferrel Ready I Sybil L. Stokes, Comparative Publie Administration, A Seleetive Annotated Bibliography (2d ed. 1960) Mark W. Huddleston, Comparative Publie Administration, An Annotated Bibliography (1984). For journals, see Int'l Rev. Admin. Sei. (from 1928); J. Comp. Admin. (1969-1973). 23 Merryman Festschrift
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notably in the area of private law, but also- though to a more limited extentin the field of constitutional law. In this paper I attempt to demoostrate that different administrative systems carry on a much moreextensive "dialogue" than would at first appear to be the case, and that this dialogue brings a number of common elements to the surface. Using the Italian administrative system and its body of administrative law as a focal point, I first identify the system's native characteristics and then examine the degree to which these can be traced to "borrowings," "importations" or "transplants" from other systems, as weil as the extent to which these borrowings have been modified. The next step is to examine recent Italian developments, evaluating their similarity to analogous developments in other European administrative systems. In parts II and III of this paper, therefore, I analyze the extent to which one administrative system may have influenced another, while in part IV I deal with the way in which the play of reciprocal influences, as weil as the emergence of common needs, all spontaneously produced in various countries a European koine or "common system" in the field of public administration. In parts II and III, the analysis is limited to two countries, France and Italy, while in the fourth part it is broadened to include other European countries. What foilows is an attempt to answer two questions: Where did the Italian administrative system come from? Andin what direction is it moving? The first question relates to the origins of the system, the second to its current trends. Thus we are forced to jump the space of a century between the first question and the second without, however, losing the threads ofthe problems involved, a task that must be performed by anyone involved in comparative studies, a field with its own appropriate historical dimension.
II. The Origins of Italian Public Administration Roscoe Pound said: "The history of a given juridical system is largely the history of legislative material borrowed from other juridical systems." 3 However, it is true that the scope and ease of legal transplants is often overlooked. One often fails to realize the actual extent of imported materials (imposed or sought), penetrations, infiltrations, inoculations, or pseudoimportations. 4 The Italian public administration offers an ideal example of this phenomenon. Properly speaking, there was no Italian public administration until the country's political and administrative unification: in other words, until 1861. 3 Quoted in Alan Watson, II trapianto di norme giuridiche, Un "approccio" al diritto comparato (1984) 20. 4 Id. at 27, 88; see Jean Rivero, Les phenomenes d'imitation des modeles etrangers en droit administratif (1972), reprinted in: Pages de doctrine 459-473.
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This places the ltalian system- together with the German public administration - in the third generation of Western administrative systems, following those established during the Renaissance (in England, France, and Spain) and during the eighteenth century (in the United States).lt was therefore naturalthat the ltalian administration would be influenced by one of the systems that preceded it. Alan Watson, for instance, persuasively argues that grafted juridical normstend to be accepted with less resistance when the receiving society is much less advanced, both materially and culturally. 5 ltalian political-administrative unity was achieved by gathering four major entities (Lombardy-Venetia, the Duchy of Tuscany, the Pontifical Realm, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies) around the Kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont. Piedmont, which was culturally tied to France and in close geographic proximity, provided the basic model. France left significant direct traces from its Napoleonic occupation in the administrative institutions of other ltalian states existing before unification, in particular in the Two Sicilies. Following the achievement of administrative unity, for example, a prefect from Piedmont and a nobleman from Palermo would have spoken to each other in French, but certainly not in ltalian. Throughout much ofthe eighteenth century, memoirs ofltalian diplomats (natives ofPiedmont) were written in an ltalian so full of gallicisms that today certain passages are incomprehensible. In summary, four elements- delayed political unification, relative economic backwardness, the Napoleonic occupation, and the influence of Piedmont permitted the French model to play an important role in the initial development of the ltalian administrative system and its body of law. The theory that held sway in both historical and political writings following unification of Italy, and for quite some time afterward, portrayed the country as having adopted the French model of public administration. Others being more specific, pointed to the Napoleonic model. Upon further examination, however, it becomes clear that this inheritance involved nothing more than the centralized nature ofthe administrative system. Throughout the hundred year period between 1871 and 1970, the centralized French model, founded on the prefects, was continually contrasted to the English system of self-govemment. One keeps running across this same old story, which holds that the govemments ofPiedmont took their inspiration from France, and not from England.
111. The French-Napoleonic Administrative Model in Italy How true is the claim that ltaly adopted the French-Napoleonic model? Though by all indications France was the example tobe emulated, does it follow 5
23*
Watson (supra n. 3) 86.
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that this example was emulated immediately and in all aspects? Were the ltalian results faithful to the original model? 6 In order to answer these questions, the analysis must be broadened to include other elements beyond prefects and centralized organization. The factors I will examine include: (1) democratic or oligarchic foundations of public administration; (2) the existence of administrative law as a specialized legal branch apart from private law; (3) administrative uniformity; (4) an administrative elite; (5) the Consiglio di Stato; and (6) prefects. Many other elements can be found within the framework of an administrative system, and they characterize it as well, but the fact is that, "in a certain sense, a scholar engaged in comparative studies must adopt a superficial approach; (otherwise) he runs the risk oflosing hirnself in the quicksand of his material." 7 A. Democratic or Oligarchie Foundations
I begin with democratic foundations: that is, with the degree to which a political system is representative, a factor measured by the number of citizens who have the right to vote. This indicator points less to a specific aspect of a grafted institution or imported administrative organ than to the general characteristics ofthe donor or donee body. There exists, in truth, a fundamental difference between France and ltaly. In France, the National Assembly was elected by direct universal (male) suffrage as early as 1848. In ltaly, by contrast, the Parliament was not elected by direct universal (male) suffrage until1921, at which point the experiment with faseist authoritarianism began, so that elections were not actually held again until1948 (in other words, a century later than in France). In France, almost ten million people (out of a total population of 35 million) already had the right to vote in 1848. In ltaly, one half million citizens - chosen according to census considerations or on the basis of an individual's Ievel of education- out of a total population of 25 million had the right to vote in 1861.
6 On the Napoleonic influence, see Carlo Ghisalberti, Der Einfluss des napoleonischen Frankreich auf das italienische Rechts- und Verwaltungssystem, in: Deutschland und Italien im Zeitalter Napoleons, ed. by Armgard von Reden-Dohna ( 1979) 41 - 56; A. Taradel, Analogie e differenze tra Ia riorganizzazione dell'amministrazione centrale del regno di Belgio del1846 e Ia riforma dell'amministrazione centrale del regno di Sardegna del18531854: Rivista trimestrale di scienza dell'amministrazione 32, no. 2 (1985) 31-56 (the Napoleonic modelwas transferred to the Kingdom ofSardinia, and then to Italy, through the "mediation" of Belgium); see also P. Aimo, Introduction, Italia Napoleonica, in: L'amministrazione nella storia moderna, ed. by lstituto per Ia scienza della amministrazione pubblica I (1985) 542-573. 7 F. H. Lawson, The Field ofComparative Law: Juridical Rev. 61 (1949) 16-36 (16).
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B. The Adoption of Droit Administratif
The concept of droit administratifas a special body oflaw, one different from private law, isafundamental characteristic ofthe French legal system. Toward the turn of the century Albert Dicey contrasted droit administratif with the common law and its idea of the rule of law. Droit administratif, he contended, consists of a set of special rules and institutions that belong solely to a system of public administration, which thus can be considered a privileged body. Under a common law system, alternatively, the public administration must obey private law, to which it is subject on the same basis as any other entity or individual. lt is subject to the rule of law. 8 Subsequent studies, especially those carried out recently, have brought to the fore the fact that Dicey laid particular emphasis on this contrast between French administrative law and other systems of public administration - such as that in England - which had no corpus of administrative law. He was certainly correct in describing French administrative law as a special branch of law, one that differed from private law because it was founded on the concept of state supremacy and its administration vis a vis private citizens. 9 The ltalian administrative system did not immediately borrow this characteristic. For at least twenty years following the political-administrative unification of ltaly, private law and especially contractual rules prevailed, with public law elements remaining fragmented and playing a role of secondary importance. As a result, a public employment relationship was looked upon as a Ieasing contract, expropriation was seen in the same terms as a sale, and administrative acts were not considered to be imperative measures. In addition, the public administration was denied a general power of self-enforcement, while wide latitude was given to ordinary judges adjudicating disputes involving the state. 10 Beginning in 1880, however, and with particular intensity toward the end of the century, a change became noticeable. Private law- it was observed- stood in the way of the public administration's freedom of action and, in the final analysis, even extended privileges to the most powerful private citizens. As a result, there developed an emphasis on special considerations, which were public law oriented and unilateral in nature. lt was reasoned that if the state is a sovereign body, then its activities must be considered imperative, and not weighed on the same basis as those of private individuals. The state pursues "political ends," while individuals act according to considerations of "private 8 Albert Venn Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study ofthe Law ofthe Constitution (1885). 9 Spyridon Flogai"tis, Administrative Law et droit administratif(1986); Trowbridge H. Ford, Albert Venn Dicey, The Man and His Times (1985). 10 On the history ofthe Italian public administration, see L'amministrazione centrale, ed. by Sabino Cassese (1984); L'amministrazione nella societa modema, ed. by /stituto per Ia scienza della amministrazione pubblica II (1985).
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utility." 11 Concepts of responsibility, employment, contract, and property, when employed in reference to public administration, came to be governed according to rules different from those that held in private law, and began to constitute a body of administrative law. Two aspects of this French legal transplant to Italy are quite distinctive. For one, there was a delay. The Italian system of administrative law was neither an original development, since it was borrowed from the French droit administratif, nor did it originate with the public administration itself, since the borrowing began over twenty years after Italian political-administrative unification. In the second place, the public law configuration in Italy was set in motion prior to the establishment of the fourth section of the Consiglio di Stato, with its administrative jurisdiction. According to Dicey's masterly reconstruction, droit administratifand the Conseil d'Etat in France evolved at an identical pace, with the former representing a body oflaw created by ajudiciary, the Conseil d'Etat. Neither in France nor in Italy, therefore, was the creation of administrative law- understood to mean a special body of law- determined by laws then in force. In neither country did speciallaws provide sufficient justification for the existence of a distinct area of administrative law. In France the configuration of public law was the work of the Conseil d'Etat. Administrative law and special judges were able to develop at an identical pace. In ltaly the growth of administrative law was principally the product of scholarly doctrine, which laid the groundwork for activities of special judges. 12
C. Administrative Uniformity In mounting a defense for the rigidity ofhis administrative system, Napoleon observed in his diaries, dictated at Saint Helena, that: "[C]'est ä cette uniformite d'action sur un aussi grand terrain que sont dus ces immenses resultats." 13 Uniformity thus represented a guarantee for the effectiveness of the French administrative system, which would function as a fully integrated body only if each and every organ, including the prefects, moved in unison. 14 A similar idea gained widespread acceptance in Italy following its unification. One ofthe government's first acts was to abolish deputyships and to extend the G. Mantel/ini, Lo stato eil codice civile I (1880) 25. M. D'Alberti, Le concessioni amministrative, Aspetti della contrattualitä delle pubbliche amministrazioni (1981). 13 Emmanuel-Auguste-Dieudonne de las Cases, Memorial de Sainte Helene (Barba, Paris n.d.) 243. 14 On the history of the French public administration, see Jean Jacques Chevallier, Histoire des institutionsetdes regimes politiques de Ia France de 1789 a nosjours (1972) 120fT.; Pierre Legendre, Histoire de l'administration publique de 1750 a nosjours (1969); Guy Thuillier, Bureaucratie et bureaucrates en France au XIXe siecle (1980). 11
12
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rule of Piedmont law throughout the realm in substitution for the laws that had prevailed in individual states prior to unification. 15 But while the uniform nature of French administrative law was dictated by a desire for centralized government, uniformity of Italian administrative law served another purpose. The political, economic, and social backwardness of southern Italy, as weil as distressful conditions in certain areas of the northcentral region, in the Alpine arc, andin the Apennine mountains, were seen as a product of defective institutions. The uniform enforcement of Piedmont's more advanced institutionswas to guarantee development in these areas. This design soon proved erroneous and the concept of uniformity was abandoned with the adoption of special laws: for Naples (1885); for Sicily (1896 and 1905); for Sardinia (1897 and 1906); and for the Basilicata region (1904 and 1906). These laws introduced special institutions and procedures that pertained only to particular zones of the country. D. The Administrative Elite
Under Napoleon's rule interest in the management of an administrative elite first began. Napoleon's bent toward administrative matters led him to pay close attention to many details, from the training of executives in the auditoral or the grands corps schools, to the administration's organizational methods. 16 Nothing ofthis kind came to pass in Italy. For at least twenty years following unification, the ministerial organization was only rudimentary, with a total of nine ministries not divided into general directorates. There was no entity charged with general coordination and, at least initially, there was no procedure for recruiting and selecting an administrative elite. Access to top positions, which was granted to Piedmont functionaries on a somewhat privileged basis, eventually, and very gradually, became a simple matter of seniority, almost a mechanical process. E. The Council of State
"Un corps demi-administratif, demi-judiciaire, qui reglera l'emploi de cette portion d'arbitraire necessaire dans l'administration de l'Etat."17 This is how Napoleon defined the Conseil d'Etat in 1806 in a talk given before the Council 15 Sabino Cassese, Centro e periferia in Italia, I grandi tomanti della loro storia: Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 37 (1986) 594-612. 16 From the French Consulate (1799-1804) to the Empire (1804-1815), the number of ministries increased from seven to eleven. These were divided into general directorates, which the secretaire d'Etat oversaw. 17 Joseph Claramond Pelet de Ia Lozere, Opinions de Napoleon sur divers sujets de politique et d'administration (1833), quoted in: Le Conseil d'Etat, Son histoire a travers les documents d'epoque (1974) 134.
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itself: a body to which noble functions were assigned, such as preparing legislative proposals and administrative regulations, or resolving legal disputes between private citizens and the public administration (the commission du contentieux dates from 1806). Except for a briefhiatus between 1848 and 1852, the Council performed functions of justice retenue through 1872. Without a doubt the French modelwas emulated in ltaly, but at a Iater date, and with a number of important differences. The Consiglio di Stato functioned as an advisory organ up through 1889, at which time the fourth section was instituted and charged withjudicial functions. Thus, for a period ofthirty years, only ordinary judges were given any jurisdiction over the state, as with the English model. What is more, the Consiglio di Stato was destined never to gain the prestige and authority enjoyed by the French institution ofthe same name. 18 As already mentioned, in France special judges established and elaborated administrative law as a distinct body of law. In ltaly, these same judges did nothing more than provide a practical application of the principles and rules that had already been worked out by scholars. F. Prefects
French prefects were "empereurs au petit pied" (the words are still those of Napoleon). 19 Prefects were completely dependent on the central government, but they in turn exercised total control over administration at the local Ievel. The Constitution of Year VIII stated that "le prefet sera charge, seul, de I'administration." In the view ofMinister ofthe Interior Jean-Antoine Chaptal, "le prefet ne connait que Ie ministre, Ie ministre ne connait que Ie prefet. " 20 This autonomy for prefects allowed them to quickly overcome resistance by a number of groups, such as the forestry department, the police, and the military. In the provinces ofFrance the prefect remained the supreme public authority for many years. lt is the prefect, stated Chaptal, who guaranteed "Ia transmission des ordres et de Ia Ioi avec Ia rapidite du fluide electrique." 21 In this regard the ltalian administrative system initially followed the French model very closely. In ltaly the prefect had the same role, acting as the government's representative in the provinces. He was an interministerial functionary, because the few provincial offices run by other ministries in those 18 On administrative justice and its drawbacks, see Administration et administres, Protections juridictionnelles et nouvelles protections: Annuaire europeen d'administration publique 6 (1983) 11-27. 19 De las Cases (supra n. 13) 244. 20 Rapport de Chaptal sur Ia loi du 28 pluviöse An VIII, quoted in Pierre Legendre, L'administration, Du XVIIIe siede ä nos jours (1969) 42. 21 Id.
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years were also placed under his control. But in a system with a political foundation as fragileasthat in Italy, the prefect took on another function. He soon became a political instrument of the government, a role maintained right up until the faseist period, which used him to influence political and administrative elections. 22 However, the Italian prefect soon lost control of outlying state administration. He came to see his role as Iiaison between the central government (the ministries) and peripheral offices wither away. The original integrated system in which all focal points of central authority led to a prefect, who alone had the task oftransmitting orders to other offices, took on a dual nature. For instance, the revenue board quickly became independent, establishing direct ties with the Ministry of Finance. Local boards of education created direct ties to the Ministry of Education as did local offices with the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. While French prefects as late as 1987 still retained control of peripheral state administration, by the end of the last century their Italian counterparts had already given up all hope of controlling state peripheral offices. Italian prefects must be content with merely controlling local government agencies and corporations in municipalities and provinces. In 1970, following the establishment of regions as political units, they are destined to lose even this function. G. The Efficacy of Legal 'fransplants
Normsand legal institutions can easily be shifted from one country to another and "received" with very little difficulty. But several questions in this paper have been raised. When a transplant occurs between an advanced nation and one that is still in its developing stages- as with the French and Italian administrative systems and bodies of administrative law- what is the nature of the reception? Does the borrowing, for example, take place in an across-the-board fashion? Does it go into effect immediately, as soon as a new system has come into existence? Let us consider these and other general questions. In the first place, the Italian reception demonstrates that transplants can take place between administrative systems with very dissimilar constitutional foundations. The borrowing of many characteristics from the French model by Italy occurred despite the democratic nature of the French regime compared to the oligarchic nature of the Italian government. Second, despite many similarities produced by borrowing a large number of institutions, there are certain elements of the Italian system that remain totally untouched by the French system. Thus, in France the preparation of a haute fonction publique is carried out through the grandes eco/es and grands corps, 22
Cassese (supra n. 15) 594-612.
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which are both yesterday and today one of the characteristic features of that administrative system. Right from the beginning, the Italian system has ignored this process, and it continues to do so today. A third pointtobe gleaned from this analysis concerns the scope of grafts. The complex phenomenon known as the "rule of administrative law" cannot be understood without taking into account opinions of "learned doctors," that is, doctrine. This consideration points to the importance of studying specific cultural influences, for example the role of scholarly doctrine in creating administrative law in Italy. Fourth, we have seen that not all borrowed elements of an institution are transferred simultaneously, even when the transplant is similar to the original. This is true because some elements are delayed, as in the case of administrative law. One also finds abandoned elements, such as the concept of administrative uniformity. Even more interesting is the case of a grafted institution, but for a purpose different from its original function. As we have seen, uniformity was adopted in Italy, though for a very brief time, in imitation of the French example. In France the concept was meant to facilitate the flow of commands from the central government to outlying areas. In Italy, however, the point of uniformity was to throw a nurober of formerly different states into a common mold and to allow the more civilized institutions of the north, and especially those of Piedmont, to affect development of the south. Finally, the example of prefects shows how an institution, once it has been grafted, can still be subject to fundamental modifications. This occurred with the achievement of a political role for Italian prefects, who, at the same time, rapidly lost ground in the purely administrative area. In light ofwhat has been discussed, can the Italian administrativesystemstill be said to have adopted the French-Napoleonic model? The answer is both yes and no: yes, if one Iooks in general terms at the nurober and importance of the borrowed elements; no, if one Iooks at the transformations that took place in the course of the transplants. Students of the history of transplants are accustomed to these games of light and shadow. It is weil known that: Foreign law can exert an influence even when it is completely misunderstood .... There is much discussion over whether or not Montesquieu actually understood the English constitution, or ifhe was simply constructing an ideal constitution and using England as his source. Whatever the case, his views were offundamental importance for the framers ofthe American constitution, despite the fact that they themselves had no doubts as to the true nature of the English constitutionP
23
Watson (supra n. 3) 86f.
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IV. The Convergence of Administrative Systems in Europe Up to this point the analysis has focused on the relationship between French and Italian administrative systems during the last century, that is, during the period in which the Italian public administration was created. Now I ask what direction recent developments of the Italian administration have taken, and how much this direction coincides with movement taken by other European administrative systems. 24 Elements already reviewed will be given renewed attention, though from a different point of view. 25 A. Democracy and Social Demands
In all European countries universal suffrage (both male and female) has allowed "multi-dass" states to develop, meaning that all classes enjoy access to public power. 26 This has produced a number of consequences, two of which are quite important for administrative systems. In the first place, under the pressure of growing social demands public administrations have directly absorbed three essential services: education, health, and social security.27 Theseservices alone now account for about seventy percent of the public administration. The expenditure of enormous resources, amassed through taxation, has resulted in the rapid growth of two other state sectors: the revenue department (charged with collecting taxes) and the financial department (called upon to manage revenues and expenses), which manages the administration's roJe as a financial intermediary. The maturation of these five sectors - education, health, social security, revenue, and finance - took place within European public administrations in different ways, but on the whole they developed similarly between 1940 and 1970. Further growth took place in the 1970s and 1980s for public agencies involved in energy, the environment, and cultural patrimony. The expansion of public administrations in the number of functions and in size led to a second consequence, which is the importance assumed by the executive branch compared to the other governmental powers. Having once been a branch of secondary importance compared to the legislative power, the 24 On the Italian administration, see Sabino Cassese, L'amministrazione pubblica in Italia: Rivista trimestrale di scienza dell'amministrazione 32, no. 2 (1985) 3-28. 25 On the convergence of administrative law systems in individual European nations, see Jean Rivero, Vers un droit commun europeen, Nouvelles perspectives en droit administratif (1978), reprinted in: Pages de doctrine 489-502. 26 M. S. Giannini, I pubblici poteri negli Stati pluriclasse: Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 29 (1979) 389-404. 27 In a few cases this occurred indirectly, where public administrations provided financing but not management.
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public administration has becorne the dominant power because of its financial influence, the nurnber of its personnel (between a fourth and a third of the total work force is ernployed by the executive), and the influence it exerts through its expertise on the execution of various regulatory and legal rneasures.
B. Droit Administratif and English Administrative Law The extreme aspects ofboth the rule of administrative law as weil as the rule of English cornrnon law with relation to public administrative bodies have leveled off. As a result, the clear-cut distinction laid out by Dicey in his time has been blurred. The rule of administrative law is weakened by the frequent use of private law in public rnatters. For instance, the ltalian public administration, as weil as the French systern, owns shares in corporations regulated by private law, corporations which the executive adrninisters. In addition, the public adrninistrations in both countries rnake frequent use of contracts to regulate public ernployee salaries in accordance with agreernents reached with Iabor unions or to draw up accords with either public or private enterprises conceming cornrnon goals as weil as mutual obligations and rights. These are known as contrats de plan in France and accordi di programma in ltaly. As for the United Kingdorn, it has developed a fuil set of public sector instrurnents - such as rernedies against public administration organs - and structures, such as administrative tribunals. These developrnents have led to the growth of a specific area of scholarship and teaching cailed administrative law, sornething which would have been unthinkable at the beginning of the century. 28 C. Multi-Organizational Public Administration
Frorn having been uniform, rnonistic bodies, public adrninistrations of nearly every country have been transforrned into multi-polar, rnulti-organizational, diverse structures. For exarnple, today there are anarnolous rninistries such as the Dipartimenti in ltaly and the DATAR (delegation a l'amenagement du territoire et al'action regionale) in France. Furtherrnore, a large nurnber of other entities have grown up alongside traditional rninistries. Thus there are a large nurnber of publicly owned establishrnents that, in turn, are grouped into nurnerous subcategories. Arnong these, a particularly irnportant role is played by publicly owned econornic establishrnents. In France these are cailed etablissements publies a caractere industriel et commercial. In the United Kingdorn they are known as "public corporations" and are assigned 28 On recent developments in English administrative law, see John Bell, Droit public et droit prive, Une nouvelle distinction en droit anglais: Revue fran~aise de droit administratif 1 (1985) 399-409.
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public sector enterprises formerly managed directly by the state as weil as any newly established public initiatives. Certain administrative authorities are considered independent because their managements enjoy partial freedom from the executive. Thesemanagementsare not subject to government directives, even though their members are appointed by the government. In Italy examples include the Banca d'/talia, the Commissione per Ia societa e per Ia borsa and the Garante del/'editoria. In France the Iist includes the Commission des operations de bourse, the Commission de Ia concurrence, the Commission informatique et libertes, the Commission de Ia communication des documents administratifs, and the Commission informatique et libertes. In the United Kingdom, one can point to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the Commission for Racial Equalities, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Art Council, and to others. There arealso many private organizations under public control. Of particular importance are the enterprises placed under public agencies and corporations that combine to form public industrial groups, such as state financed enterprises in Italy and the filiales attached to French publicly owned enterprises. But it is not only central bodies of public powerthat are deconcentrating. The same thing is happening at a peripheral Ievel. Following the decision of the German Federal Republic to introduce a regional system, for example, similar decisions were made in the 1970s and 1980s in I taly, Belgium, Spain, and France. The creation of all these entities Ieads not just to the introduction of new types of organizations, each different from the other, but it also forges new, previously unknown relationships. Where the administrative system bad once taken its orders from the government, this is no Ionger true for independent administrative authorities. Where relations between different public sector organsbad once been govemed by public law, at least in the countries that bad a body of administrative law, this is no Ionger true for relations between public sector management groups and the corporations in which they have a controlling interest. Management groups now exercise the powers assigned to shareholders by the civil code. D. General Administrative Procedure Laws
An important consequence of multiplying public sector organizations is that laws have become necessary not only for regulating relations between the public administration and private citizens, but also for controlling the dealings of one public body with the next. In this way, law becomes a part of the relations between public administrations. The role for law has become more important because the nature of public interests assigned to the care of public entities makes it imperative that they cooperate with each other. However, since these entities are really no different from other social bodies, they enter into conflict
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and competition. In other words, they adopt behavioral modelsthat do not Iead to cooperation. The need to regulate relationships that were once considered internal matters produoes a new type oflaw, which focuses on administrative procedures. Most administrative rules and regulations lay down dictates about advice tobe asked, controls to be implemented, or other governmental offices to be consulted, among other matters. The need to simplify this thicket oflaw, to make it more easily understandable, more "buttoned up," has led to the creation of generat laws on administrative procedure, laws that have already been adopted by many countries. E. Tbe Finance Sector's Leading Role
The major role originally assigned to administrative judges and prefects has now been taken over by entities charged with allocating resources within the immense administrative systems. Following the creation of regions in ltaly, prefects, though they continue to exist, have lost almost every vestige of power. In France, where a 1982 law has transformed perfects into Commissaires de Ia Republique, they retain their powers. Looking ahead, however, it is reasonable to assume that as soon as the 22 regional governments become more established, these French officials will see their power start to erode. As for the Conseil d'Etat and the Consiglio di Stato, their power is more a product of their role as a pepiniere de grands commis than as a function of their judicial nature. Administrative justice has experienced significant growth wherever it is implemented by specialjudicial organs, as in France, ltaly, and the German Federal Republic. Indeed, the establishment of regional administrative tribunals in France (1953) andin Italy (1971) has produced a boom in lawsuits. There exists a substantial demand for justice that is stimulated by the growing supply of judges. Nevertheless, this "success" has overwhelmed administrative judges, so that law suits move at a very slow pace. This quantitative growth has been accompanied by a rise in minor internal conflicts, such as those relating to public employment, which distract administrative judges from "benchmark cases." Benchmark decisions represent not just application of justice in a concrete case, but the creation of a guideline or perhaps even a directive to be followed by different public administration bodies in resolving a large number of similar cases. The greatest gain in power among Europe's administrative systems, however, has occurred in the financial sector: from England's Treasury and France's lnspection desfUWJices to Italy's Ragioneria generale. Size plus centralization has increased the finance department's power along with its authority to allocate resources. Restrained by only partial controls by one or another office, the droit
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de regard exercised by a financial department amounts to a total, allencompassing power. F. The Underlying Causes of Convergence
Common paths can be traced for the development of administrative systems holding power in European countries and, perhaps, in Western industrialized countries in general. What is not clear is whether this administrative koine or common systemwas simply the product of a growing concentration of reciprocal influences, according to an anthropological model of convergent evolution, or whether it was born from a set of solutions that, although adopted spontaneously in individual countries, can all be traced back to the pressure of common demands. Under the first view, one should not underestimate the role of the European Community, which from the 1950s onward featured a forum where contacts could be developed, administrative systems could be examined in depth, and the groundwork could be laid for exchanges, borrowings, and transplants. Community institutions themselves, moreover, were the fruit of experience transferred from nationallevels. For instance,- the European Coal and Steel Community was broadly influenced by the French Commissariat au plan. The structure and duties of Euratom were borrowed from the French Commissariat de l'energie atomique. The organization of the European Community's Commission followed the example oftheGerman Bundeswirtschaftsministerium. The Accord of 1975, drawn up to institute the European Audit Court, followed the German tradition of assigning organizations such as their Bundesrechnungshof strictly administrative tasks and not the judicial duties common with the French and Italian audit courts. One should not exclude the possibility that institutions brought into the Community's administrative system from individual nations can later be grafted onto the public administration systems of other nations. This informal role played by the EEC in bringing a certain uniformity to different national administrative systems has not yet been studied. Under the second view mentioned earlier, one should not underestimate the incidence of spontaneous moves toward uniformity on the part of various administrative systems. Responding to social demands, there has been a certain parallelcoursein European social history. This phenomenon began in a small number of countries, initially in Germany and the United Kingdom, with the acceptance of institutions associated with the welfare state.
Product Liability in the EEC 1 J. A. Jolowicz*
I. Introduction During the last twenty years or so the phrase "product liability", an import from the United States, and its approximate translation into other European languages, have come into common use in Western Europe. Books and articles are devoted to the subject, the phrase itselfhas been described by a British Royal Commission as "an accepted term of art'',2 it has developed an extensive case law or jurisprudence in many countries, the Council of Europe opened a Convention on the matter for signaturein 1977, 3 andin July 1985 the Council of Ministers of the European Communities adopted a Directive4 "on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the *Professor of Comparative Law in the University of Cambridge; Fellow of Trinity College. This article was written in the light of information available up to the Spring of 1988. Literature cited in abbreviatedform: La responsabilite civile du fabricant dans !es Etats Membres du Marche Commun, ed. by Faculte de droit et de science politique d'Aix Marseille (1974) (cited: Aix); Securite des consommateurs et responsabilite du fait des produits defectueux, ed. by Jacques Ghestin (1987) (cited: Securite). Additional abbreviations: A.C. = Law Reports, Appeal Cases; Cmnd. = Command Papers; Directive = Directive ofthe Council ofthe European Communities, 25 July 1985, no. 85/374/ECC; Q.B. = Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division. 1 Only the principal features of the subject are treated here. Matters of relative detail such as the Iimitation of actions, joint and severalliability, and the problern of component manufacturers are mentioned, if at all, only incidentally. 2 Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, Cmnd. 7054 (1978) (cited: Pearson) I, para. 1193. The phrase is not, however, universally accepted. One English textbook on the law of tort still prefers, as a chapter heading, "Liability for Chattels": Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, ed. by W. V.H. Rogers (14th ed. 1984) eh. 10. In 1965 a well-known German lawyer criticised proposals for the creation of special rules for product-related darnage as an unjustified import of American ideas: Mohring, Verhandlung des 47. Deutscher Juristentages II (1968) M 69, cited in Spiro Similis, Products Liability, The West German Approach, in: Comparative Product Liability, ed. by C.J. Miller (1986) 99-125 (100). 3 Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Session of 20-29 September 1976. 4 EEC Treaty art. 189 para. 3: "a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shallleave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." 24 Merryman Festschrift
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Member States concerning liability for defective products". 5 Though a number ofmember states will not have met the dead-line, the Directive requires them to bring their law into line with its provisions by July 1988. This flurry of activity has not been accompanied by agreement on what "product liability" actually means. All that can be said with confidence isthat it does not include cases in which the sole cause ofthe darnage lies in the conduct of the product's user. No one regards as within "product liability" a simple traffic accident, for example, or a case in which a product is used as a weapon. Only products that are in some sense "defective" are considered to be capable of attracting "product liability": the idea has not been taken up that even a limited right to compensation, save through the social security system, should accrue to the victim of a product-related injury where the product in question is free of defect. 6 This Iack of consensus on the meaning of a phrase that is on everybody's lips is principally due to the fact that it is really no more than a convenient Iabel for certain areas ofthe law as they bear on the problems ofproduct-related damage. There was in the past no reason why writers should agree, for example, on whether the subject is concerned primarily with consumer protection or primarily with producer liability. lt is the fact, however, that it took nearly eleven years from the time when the Commission of the EEC began work on the Directive until it was adopted by the Council. Even then the necessary unanimity was achieved only by giving to the Directive quite restricted scope and, within that, by leaving member states free to make their own choices on a number of matters one, at least, of which involves a principle of fundamental importance. This paperwill consider some of the more important provisions of the Directive and their precursors in the Commission's proposals, but it also attempts to explain, sofaras possible, why such prolonged deliberation led finally to what is almost as much a failure to agree as an agreement.
II. A Liability for Producing or a Liability for Selling? A. Product Liability as Liability for Producing
The typical channel for the distribution of marketable goods uses a chain of contracts of sale, and it is rare that the person who buys something for his own use or consumption buys it directly from its producer. This being so, and given both the flexibility of the contract of sale and the relative ease with which its incidents can be adjusted by legislation aimed, for example, at consumer Directive. For practical purposes the Directive supersedes the Convention. Cf. Jeffrey O'Connell, Elective No-Fault lnsurance for Many Kinds of Accidents, A Proposaland an "Economic" Analysis: Tenn. L. Rev. 42 (1974) 145. The French law of21 July 1983 onconsumersafety, art. 1, carries the point. SeeLuc Bihl, Laloi du 21 juillet 1983 sur Ia securite des consommateurs, in: Securite 49-61 (54). 5
6
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protection, the traditional view almost everywhere has been that conflicts arising from the alleged defective quality of goods should be dealt with in the contractual context. It is to his seller that the dissatisfied buyer should Iook, and this is no less true when his complaint is that the goods caused physical darnage to his person or his property 7 than when it is that he suffered economic loss because they did not perform as well as he was entitled to expect. It is in line with this manner of thinking that those concerned with the improvement of consumer protection tend to Iook to the obligations imposed by law on sellers or on other contractual suppliers of goods: in England, for example, considerable effort has been devoted in recent years to legislation concerning the terms to be implied in contracts of sale 8 and to the control of clauses purporting to exclude the seller's liability. 9 In 1962, an English comrnittee on consumer protection defined "consumer" as a person who purchases (or hire-purchases) goods for private use or consumption and explicitly regretted the ignorance of the general public of the fact that the law imposes obligations on the retailer rather than on the manufacturer. 10
Since goods sold on the retail market will have reached their ultimate buyer through a chain of contracts, any liability incurred by the retail seller to his buyer may be passed up the chain and finally reach the manufacturer, but each action in the series is independent of the others and its outcome is determined by the contract between the parties to it. The loss incurred by the immediate victim of a product-related injury may or may not be transferred to the producer of the offending product, more or less as the parties decide in each case. This system, so to call it, provides adequate redress for the buyer of a defective product provided only that his seller is not bankrupt. It can do nothing, however, for the victim who did not hirnself buy the product in question from anyone - the famous "innocent bystander" - and it seems likely that development of extra-contractualliability for product-related darnage derives from the need to do something for him: certainly the pursuer in the great case of Donoghue v. Stevenson 11 did not herself buy the ginger beer of whose alleged defective quality she complained. Notwithstanding the frequency with which 7 See, e.g., Godley v. Perry [1960]1 Weekly Law Reports 9, where a little boy of six recovered damages from the shopkeeper from whom he had bought a toy catapult for sixpence. The catapult broke, causing injury to his eye, and he succeeded on the ground that it was not of "merchantable quality" as required by the Sale of Goods Act. 8 The Sale of Goods Act 1893 has been replaced by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and supplemented by the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. 9 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 1° Final Report ofthe Committee on Consumer Protection, Cmnd. 1781 (1962) paras. 2, 400. See also id. para. 417. 11 [1932] A.C. 562. It was not until this case was decided that the so-called "contract fallacy" of Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 Meeson & Welsby's Exchequer Reports 109 was finally disposed of.
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bystanders suffer darnage in the conditions ofmodem society, notwithstanding that the retail buyer may claim against the manufacturer on grounds similar to those which may be relied on by the bystander, the extra-contractualliability of the producer tends to be seen as something exceptional which should be brought into play only where the contractualliability ofthe seller fails to meet the need. It is not surprising, therefore, either that the producer's extra-contractualliability should be made dependent on his fault or that it should be limited to physical darnage to personor property. The person who has not bought the product from his chosen defendant, whether he bought it from someone eise or not, cannot be heard to complain against that defendant that he suiTered some purely economic loss such as a loss of profits simply because the product in question failed to function or because it caused darnage to property not his own but on which he was economically dependent. There can be little doubt that this way of thinking has largely informed English law up to the present time. It is true that there has been alleviation ofthe burden of proving the defendant producer's negligence which the law casts on the plaintiff, 12 and it is true also that there has been a tentative move, now apparently reversed, towards allowing recovery for pure economic loss in tort, 13 but, until compelled to do so by the Directive, the United Kingdom Parliament has consistently declined to pay serious regard to recommendations for the introduction of strict liability in tort for defective products. In contract, on the other hand, recovery for pure economic loss isamatter of routine and it has been made abundantly clear that the seller's liability is in no way dependent on his fault: in one important case the seller of a defective product which caused darnage to the plaintifrs property was held liable notwithstanding that, "in the then state of knowledge, scientific and commercial, no deliberate exercise of human skill or judgment" could have avoided the defect or averted the damage. 14 Infra text at nn. 61-69. The origin of the rule against recovery of economic loss in tort, accepted since its inception to be a rule of convenience rather than of principle, is in Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co. (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 453. Later cases are Iegion, but see in particular Margarine Union G.m.b.H. v. Cambay Prince Steamship Co. Ltd. [1969]1 Q.B. 219, 250, where Roskill J. said that "the law ofthis country is and always has been that an action for negligence in respect ofloss or darnage to goods cannot succeed unless the plaintiff is at the time of the tort complained of the owner of the goods or the person entitled to them." Since 1962, however, there has been both development and retrenchment on this aspect of the law, which as a result is now in a state of some confusion and uncertainty: Dutton v. Bognor Regis U.D.C. [1962]1 Q.B. 373; Anns v. Merton London Borough [1978] A.C. 728. The furthest point in the development is Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] A.C. 520, and the most important illustration of the retrenchment is Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. [1986] A.C. 785. In Germany also "economic loss" is, in general, irrecoverable in tort: e.g., Norbert Horn/ Hein Kötz f Hans G. Leser, German Private and Commercial Law, An Introduction, transl. by Tony Weir (1982) 149; B.S. Markesinis, The German Law ofTorts (1986) 29-32 and 112-143 (cases with annotation). 14 Chris. Hili Ltd. v. Ashington Piggeries [1972] A.C. 441, 498, per Lord Diplock. 12
13
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373
Subject to certain specialized exceptions of which the German Law on Pharmaceutical Products of 1976 15 is the prime example, the approach in many Contineotal countries, including Germany, has been much the same even though the contractual protection may sometimes be extended beyond the actual purchaser to members of his family, his employees, and so on. lt is of considerable importance for present purposes that the famous German "Fowlpest" case of 1968, 16 generally regarded as a most important advance in product liability law, achieved its purpose through adjustment ofthe rules about burden of proof in tort. The legal systems so far mentioned- most emphatically the English- thus see the liability of the producer of a defective product as falling squarely within the law oftort, and this means that they see it as a liability imposed in respect of some wrong that the producer has done - the production and marketing of defective goods. This Ieads to an almost instinctive sense that liability must depend on fault: why should a producer ofuseful goods be called upon to pay if no criticism can be legitimately levelled at his behaviour? That, of course, is not the whole story, but it does mean that those who argue that the liability of the producer of a defective product should be strict - by advancing the now familiar arguments of risk distribution, facility of insurance by the producer, proximity of producer to consumer through the advertising media, and so onface an uphill struggle; their task is made even harder when they are met, as they are, by arguments based not just on the inherent "unfairness" of imposing tortious liability on a person who is blameless, but also on the inhibiting effect that strict liability is supposed to involve on the introduction of new products. B. Product Liability as Liability for Selling
In France 17 a different understanding of the producer's position has emerged and has led to a different conception of "product liability". 18 That understanding, in short, takes as its starting point the fact that the producer of goods who is not also a seller of goods is rarissima avis. 19 Why, then, should he not be subjected to the liabilities that are appropriate to sellers even ifhe did not sell the Infra text at n. 96. Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 26 Nov. 1968, 51 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 91 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1969) 269. See infra text at n. 77. 17 In Belgium and in Luxembourg the law follows similar lines. 18 Having spoken in the past of "Ia responsabilite du vendeur-fabricant" or "Ia responsabilite des fabricants et distributeurs", the expression "Ia responsabilite du fait des produits defectueux" is now in common use. 19 Hence use of "vendeur-fabricant" as, in an early example, by Henri Mazeaud, La responsabilite civile du vendeur-fabricant: Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (1955) 611. French lawyers apparently find it difficult to understand that other systems should disregard the fact that a producer is a seller. See the exchange in: Aix 74. 15
16
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offending product directly to the victim of its defect? It is true that even the French have not been able toextend this to thecase ofthe bystanderwho did not himselfbuy the offending product from anyone, but in French law the ultimate purchaser has a direct action in contract against the producer and the producer's liability is strict. What is more, taking the view that the distinction between the retail purchaser and the bystander in the present context cannot withstand analysis save on technicallegal grounds, valiant and successful efforts have been made to give to the tortious or extra-contractual liability of the producer a content which, from a practical point ofview, is virtually indistinguishable from the contractual. The manner in which French law has arrived at these results is sufficiently striking to call for brief description here. Taken at face value, the relevant provisions of the French civil code are illadapted to the purposes to which they have been put. So far as contractual liability is concerned, contracts ordinarily bind only the parties to them. In the particular case of sale, the seller of goods is liable only for hidden defects under his so-called garantie, and then not for consequential darnage unless he actually knew of the defect at the time of sale; only the seller in bad faith is obliged to do more than repay the price against return ofthe defective goods or reimburse the buyer for their diminished value. 20 So far as tortious liability is concerned the principal provision imposes liability for fault alone; 21 though there is a provision imposing liability without fault for darnage done by things that one has sous sa garde, 22 once a producer has sold his product into the channels of distribution it is no Ionger sous sa garde, and the provision is inapplicable. 1. Contract. The problern of privity was overcome long ago in a context unconnected with product liability by recognition that a direct contractual action might be brought by the person at the end of a chain of contracts against any other person in the chain, 23 but that is barely half the battle. The essential problern was to provide the victim with a worthwhile remedy against the producer who does not actually know that his product is defective. After one 2
° Code civil arts. 1165, 1641 -1646.
Id. arts. 1382-1383. Id. art. 1384(1). The phrase is difficult to translate. Garde is generally understood to mean "l'usage, Ia direction et Je contröle". Cour de cassation, chambres n!unies, 2 dec. 1941, Dalloz, Recueil critique, Jurisprudence (1942) 25. 23 The earliest decision commonly cited appears tobe Cass. civ., 12 nov. 1884, Dalloz, Jurisprudence general, Recueil periodique et critique (1885) 1, 357. See, e.g., Jacques Ghestin, Conformite et garanties dans Ia vente (Produits mobiliers) (1983) (cited: Ghestin, Conformite) nos. 234fT.; Philippe Malinvaud, La responsabilite civile du fabricant en droit fran9ais, in: Aix 131, no. 14; Jacques Ghestin, La responsabilite civile du fabricant en droit fran9ais, in: La responsabilite des fabricants et distributeurs, ed. by Universite de Paris I (1975) 3, nos. 86 fT.; Genevieve Viney, L'indemnisation des atteintes ä Ia securite des consommateurs en droit fran9ais, in: Securite 71-89 (71, 75). Provided that the defective goods can be returned, the buyer may also exercise the actio redhibitoria "directly" against the producer: Ghestin, Conformite (supra) no. 342. 21
22
Product Liability in the EEC
375
false start, 24 the way was found through the idea that a seller who, because ofhis own inadequacies of skill or perforrnance, is ignorant of a defect should not on that account escape liability. This led to the introduction ofa kind ofrebuttable presumption of knowledge, but now, in the case of a "professional" seller, the presumption is irrebuttable and is essentially one oflaw: proofby the victim of a hidden defect and of consequential darnage is sufficient. 25 lt might have been thought that this was enough, but from the victim's point of view the action based on the garantie against hidden defects still has some disadvantages: the defect must be "hidden" and it must be such as torender the product unfit for use; 26 the plaintiff must prove that the defect existed, at the latest, when the product was delivered; the action must be brought within a "brief delay". 27 To overcome these difficulties, therefore, a plaintiff is now allowed to rely on the contention that the seller's generat contractualliabilityhis responsabilite contractuelle de droit commun- is engaged. Strictly speaking, once delivery has been effected, only the action on the garantie should be available for thereafter the buyer can demand neither the rescission of the contract nor damages for its breach. 28 But the courts do not always adhere to this and are prepared to award damages for any carelessness or negligence on the part of the producer in the design, the manufacture, or the commercialization, including failure to give adequate warnings or instructions, of the product. 29 24 In addition to diminution in value a seller may also have to compensate the buyer for "expenses occasioned by the sale". Code civil art. 1646. It was argued that darnage consequential on a hidden defect could be regarded as within that phrase. See, e.g., Cass. requetes, 21 oct. 1925, Dalloz, Recueil periodique et critique (1926) 1, 9, rapport du conseiller Celice, note Josserand; Cass. civ., 15 mars 1948, Recueil Dalloz de doctrine, de jurisprudence et de legislation, Hebdomadaire [ = D.] (1948) 346. This was finally rejected in 1965. Cass. civ.lere, 19 jan. 1965, D. 1965, 389. See also Ghestin, Conformite (supra n. 23) no. 255. 25 See decision of 19 jan. 1965 (supra n. 24). "II resulte ... des dispositions de l'art. 1645 du [code civil], que le vendeur qui connaissait ces vices, auquel il convient d'assimiler celui qui par sa profession ne pouvait !es ignorer, est tenu, outre Ia restitution du prix qu'il a re~u, de tous dommages- interets envers l'acheteur." (Emphasis added.) This is the same decision asthat in which the extensive interpretation of"expenses occasioned by the sale" was rejected. Id. In Belgium it is still open to the producer to rebut the presumption ofhis knowledge ifhe can. J. Limpens, La responsabilite du vendeur-fabricant en droit beige, in: Aix 75 ff. (7981). Cf. Thierry Bourgoignie, La securite des consommateurs et l'introduction de Ia directive communautaire du 25 juillet 1985 sur Ia responsabilite du fait des produits defectueux en droit beige, in: Securite 163-185 (181). The French development was criticised by, amongst others, H. Mazeaud (supra n. 19). 26 Quaere whether a defect-free product with inadequate warnings or instructions for use suffers from a hidden defect. 27 Code civil art. 1648. See, e.g., Ghestin, Conformite (supra n. 23) eh. 2. The period is not fixed by law but by the judge of fact in each case. It is normally taken to run for a few months from discovery of the defect: Viney (supra n. 23) 76. 28 Ghestin, Conformite (supra n. 23) no. 225. 29 Viney (supra n. 23) 76.
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2. Tort. Since it is only the bystander who rnust (or rnay 30 ) rely on the extracontractualliability ofthe producer, such liability plays a rnuch less irnportant role in the approach to product liability in Francethan elsewhere. In any case, as the French seern to be weil aware, a producer does not becorne any the less a seller sirnply because the victirn of his defective product did not hirnself buy it frorn any one. The result has been that the tortious liability of the producer is now, in its practical effect, virtually indistinguishable frorn the contractual. Two techniques, one principal and one subsidiary have been used to bring French law to this result. In the first place French courts have shown increased willingness to presurne the fault on which liability normally depends, and this has gone so far that proof of defect or, rather, proofthat the producer put a defective product on the rnarket, is itself sufficient. 31 This developrnent was assisted by a rnore general rnovernent towards the view that breach of a contractual obligation which causes darnage to a third party is normally tobe considered a "fault" for the purposes of extra-contractual liability. The consequence, as one French author 32 says, is that: En effet, gräce a cette evolution, toutes les Obligations qui ont ete mises a Ja charge du vendeur-fabricant quant aJa securite de son produit, tant au stade de Ia conception et de Ia fabrication qu'au moment de Ia livraison peuvent desormais etre invoquees par Jes tiers victimes pour fonder l'action en responsabilite delictuelle.
The second device was to rnake use of an adaptation - adrnittedly a controversial one- of the rule of strict liability for darnage done by a thing a person has sous sa garde: the French courts succeeded in dividing the concept of garde in such a way that the person who acquires a product acquires the garde only of its behaviour (comportement); garde of its structure rernains with the person best able to know its internal properlies and cornposition. 33 It follows, for exarnple, that in cases of explosion, of fire, or of poisoning it is sufficient for the victirn to prove that hisdarnage was caused by the "structure" ofthe thinghe need not even prove defect, Iet alone fault. 34
30 The so-called rule of non-cumul prevents the holder of a contractual cause of action from claiming in tort. For the application of the rule in product liability cases, see, e.g., Malinvaud (supra n. 23) no. 19. Cf. H. Mazeaud (supra n. 19). 31 Viney (supra n. 23) 80. Note that no similar presumption will be applied where the defendant is a "vendeur-non fabricant." 32 ld. 33 E.g., Andre Tune, Garde du comportement et garde de Ia structure dans Ia responsabilite du fait des choses inanimees: Juris Classeur Periodique, La Semaine Juridique (1957) I 1384; Viney (supra n. 23) 81. 34 lt may be that this division of gardewas originally introduced to enable the owner of, say, a bottle of Jemonade, to recover over from the producer if the bottle exploded and injured a third party, but the third party may make direct use of it himself.
Product Liability in the EEC
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111. The Proposal for a Directive As appears even from the brief description of French law given here, the producer in France is subjected to a more severe regime of liability than his counterpart in most other Western European countries. That regime applies, of course, as much where the victim of a product-related injury acquired the defective product for commercial purposes as where he acquired it for hisprivate use and consumption. He will normally find no difficulty in recovering for pure economic loss - economic loss arising otherwise than consequentially upon physical darnage to his person or property - as well as for physical darnage to his person or property. 35 What is more, because of the presumption of knowledge of the defect on which the producer's- the professional seller'sliability is commonly founded, the allocation of risk between commercial seller and commercial buyer by way of contractual exclusion clauses is difficult if not actually impossible. 36 The argument has been made, therefore, that French law places the French producer at a competitive disadvantage by comparison with producers in other countries. Be this as it may, it is commonly supposed that it was France which inspired the Commission of the EEC to begin preparation of a directive, 37 and certainly the ostensible legal basis for the Directive lies in article 100 of the Treaty of Rome. 38 That article provides for the issue of directives by the Council of Ministers to achieve "approximation" of the legal, regulatory, and administrative provisions of national law which "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market." The desire to eliminate the distortions or supposed distortions of competition within the Community which result from differences in the regimes for the liability ofproducers and also the French conception ofthat liability as based on the sale rather than on the production and distribution of defective products, are apparent in the first draft of the Directive of August 1974. 39 The producer, defined as any person by whom the defective article was manufactured and put into circulation in the form in which it was intended tobe used, was tobe liable without fault for darnage caused by the defective product and "damage", though exclusive of darnage to the product itself and of non-pecuniary loss, included both physical and pecuniary darnage such as loss of profits. No specific mention 35 F.H. Lawson / B.S. Markesinis, Tortious Liability for Unintentional Harm in the Common Law and the Civil Law I (1982) 88. The darnage must be "certain" and "direct". 36 See Malinvaud (supra n. 23) nos. 16 ff. 37 See, e.g., P. Bonassies, Rapport de synthese, in: Aix 237-246 (240). 38 Preamble, para. 1. The validity of this basis for the Directive was doubted by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (Session 1979-1980, 50th Report, 1980), but the United Kingdom has not persisted in the objection. See also Norbert Reich, L'introduction de Ia directive en RFA, in: Securite 149-161 (151). 39 The English text of this draft may be found in the English Law Commission's Working Paper No. 64 (Scottish Law Commission's Memorandum No. 20) on Liability for Defective Products (1975). For the French text, see La responsabilite des fabricants et distributeurs, ed. by Universire de Paris I (1975) (cited: Paris) 420.
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was made of possible defences, though it was contemplated that there might be an upper Iimit to liability in individual cases; no contractual exclusion or Iimitation ofliability wastobe allowed. A product was defined as defective ifit was "unfit for the use for which it was intended by the producer." Had something like this draft been ultimately adopted, the other member states would have been compelled tobring their law more or less into line with French law, and tothat extent the disparities in the competitive positions of producers in the different member states would have been ironed out. This did not happen. At the time when representatives ofthe member states began discussion ofthe Commission's first draft Directive, the Council of Europe had already made considerable progress in preparation of its Convention, and proposals for the introduction of strict liability in some form or other were under consideration in several countries. These, however, concentrated on the "consumer protection" aspect of the subject. Thus, the draft of the Convention and, indeed, the Convention itself as opened for signaturein 1977, deal only with liability for death and personal injury and they relate the concept of defect not to the product's fitness for use but to its safety. This directly influenced the deliberations in the Commission. The second draft ofthe Directive, produced in July 1975 after discussion between the Commission and the member states, 40 lays down that a product is defective "when it does not provide for persons or property the safety which a person is entitled to expect", language which follows closely that ofthe Convention save for the inclusion ofthe words "or property". The draft Directive, unlike the Convention, does, therefore, envisage liability for property darnage but this extends only to property that was neither acquired nor used by the claimant for the purposes ofhis trade, business, or profession. 41 The attempt to provide even a skeleton of a comprehensive law on product liability was abandoned, and it became necessary to include the provision that "claims in respect ofinjury or darnage caused by defective articles based on grounds other than that provided by this directive shall not be affected." These basic provisions were retained, in their essentials, in the final proposal for the Directive which was presented by the Commission to the Council in September 1976, 42 but while that versionwas much less extensive in scope than the first draft, it still contained the elements of a liability based on sale. In the first place, "producer" included not only the producer of the finished article and the producer of any material or component, but also the person who has For the French text, see Paris 423. Darnage to the product itself is excluded. According to the final text of the Directive (art. 9(b)), darnage to property is covered, subject to a "threshold" of500 ECUs (European Currency Units; one ECU is equivalent to approximately US $ 1.22), provided that the item of property (i) is of a type ordinarily intended for private use and consumption, and (ii) was used by the injured person mainly for his own private use or consumption. 42 Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 11 I 16. 40
41
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represented hirnself as the producer by placing his name or mark on the product, the person who has imported the product into the Community for the purposes of resale, and even the mere supplier if the producer cannot be identified and the supplier fails to reveal the producer's identity orthat ofhis own supplier. 43 More importantly, from the point ofview ofprinciple, the only defence contemplated as available to the producer was proof by him either that the product had not been put into circulation by him or that it was not defective when he did put it into circulation. Otherwise, if defect and causation were shown, the producer wastobe liable "whether or not he could have known ofthe defect"; to leave no room for doubt, it was stated in terms that the producerwas to be liable "even if the article could not have been regarded as defective in the light of the scientific and technological development at the time when he put the product into circulation."
IV. The Directive Almost nine years passed between presentation ofthe Comrnission's proposal for a Directive on 9 September 1976 and the final adoption of a Directive by the Council, a period long enough to Iead to the beliefthat the movement for reform in the field ofproduct liability had ground to a halt. 44 Eventually, however, a Directive was adopted on 25 July 1985 and notified to member states five days later. In several of its provisions the Directive reads as an elaborated version of the Commission's proposal. So, for example, a "defective product" is still defined as one which "does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect", but that definition is supplemented with the additional words "taking all the circumstances into account" and with examples of some such circumstances; it is now spelled out that a product is not "defective" solely because a better product has been subsequently put into circulation. 45 In similar fashion, while the proposal does not state in terms that the burden ofproving defect, darnage and causation rests with the plaintiff orthat his contributory negligence may reduce or even extinguish his right to damages but leaves these propositions to be inferred, they are made specific in the Directive itself. A nurober of substantive changes were, however, introduced, almost all of which have the effect of reducing the strictness of the producer's liability and thus of moving it further away from the idea of a liability based on sale. lt also proved necessary, to 43 This extended meaning of "producer" is carried over into the final version of the Directive. Its "consumer protection" motivation is obvious. 44 See, e.g., Jolowicz, Book Review: Legal Studies 7 (1987) 126; Ewoud Hondius, L'introduction de Ia directive aux Pays-Bas, in: Securite 187-193 (188). 45 This amounts to no more than clarification. The question whether a product is defective, that is, whether it provides the safety that a person is entitled to expect, is to be decided as at the time when the product was put into circulation. See, e.g., Hans Claudius Taschner, European Initiatives: The European Communities, in: Comparative Product Liability, ed. by C.J. Miller (1986) 1-14 (10f.).
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achieve the required unanimity on the Council, to leave member states free to make their own choices on three matters in particular as weil as on those on which the Directive is silent. 46 It is mainly in the article dealing with the defences that are to be open to producers that reductions in the strictness ofliability aretobe found, but before turning to these mention must be made of agricultural production where the farming Iobby gained a substantial success. In the proposal it was considered unnecessary to provide a definition of "product": in the Directive the word is made to cover all movables, 47 but "primary agricultural products and game" are specifically excluded: "primary agricultural products" is defined as "the products ofthe soil, ofstock farming and fisheries", which have not undergone "initial processing". It is true that this is one of the matters on which member states have a choice so that it is open to them to bring "primary agricultural products" within the new form ofliability, 48 and it is true also that the meaning of the provision is unclear - is the scrubbing and hagging of potatoes, for example, to subject them to "initial processing"? - but the general intent is plain.
So far as defences are concerned, the proposal contemplated, in effect, that the only defence open to the producer whose defective product causes darnage should be for him to prove that he did not actually put a defective product into circulation. Taken by itself, this does nothing to diminish the objective character of the liability as a liability based on the sale of a defective product: if the producer makes out this defence he proves that he did not in fact sell a defective product. The Directive, on the other hand, specifies no fewer than six distinct defences that are open to the producer. 49 It is, for example, now stated that the producer is not liable if the product was neither manufactured nor distributed by him for an economic purpose or in the course ofhis business. The two important defences for present purposes are, however, first, that the producer is not liable if "the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued by the public authorities" 50 and, second, "that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered." This too is a matter on which member states have a choice: they may exclude this "development risk" defence, but only under certain rather restrictive conditions. 51 Directive arts. 15-16. Id. art. 2. Movables incorporated into another movable or into an immovable are included. 48 Id. art. 15 l.(a). 49 Id. art. 7. 50 It may be presumed that this defence will not prevail ifthe defect is not so/ely due to compliance with regulations. Even so, the idea that the blameless producer should not be Iiable is evident. 46
47
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V. The Effect of the Directive A. The Survival of National Law
lt is not wholly cynical to say that frorn the practical point of view the rnost irnportant single provision of the Directive is the provision first found in the second draft proposal which, in its final version, reads: "This Directive shall not affect any rights which an injured person rnay have according to the rules ofthe law of contractual or non-contractualliability or a specialliability existing at the rnornent when the Directive is notified." 52
The extent to which, if at all, this provision freezes the relevant law of rnernber states as it was on 30 July 1985 is uncertain, 53 but there can be no doubt that nationallaw survives unless and until it is changed by the nationallegislator. To take a Straightforward exarnple, a clairn in respect of darnage to property used for the purposes of the plaintiff's business is not covered by the Directive and rnust be decided as if the Directive had not been adopted. The sarne goes for injury or darnage caused by defective "prirnary agricultural products" unless the state in question has opted to include such products in its irnplernentation ofthe Directive. Even where the Directive apparently applies, the previous law rnay still govern as, for example, where the injured person clairns in respect of darnage to a srnall itern ofpersonal property such as his clothing. Claims for darnage to property under the Directive are subject to a "lower threshold" of 500 ECUs, 54 but there seerns to be no reason why a claim in respect of darnage below that threshold should not succeed if the ingredients of liability independent of the Directive are established. The result, to all intents and purposes, is that the Directive provides a platform below which mernber states rnust not allow the liability of producers for defective products to fall. If in any given case the producer is liable in accordance with the provisions of the Directive then national law rnust not relieve hirn ofliability. But it does not follow that because the provisions ofthe Directive do not cover the case the producer is therefore not liable at the end of the day. What may be conveniently described as "Directive law" may be 51 The remaining matter on which a choice is left to member states is whether there should or should not be an overalllimit to the producer's liability. The Directive allows member states to provide for such a Iimit, which must not be less than 70 million ECUs, "for darnage resulting from death or personal injury and caused by identical items with the same defect." 52 Directive art. 13. 53 It seems likely that the introduction by any member state of a principle of liability which would relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving the existence of defect, damage, and causation, has become impossible. 54 Directive art. 9(b); seesupra n. 41. There is also the possibility that a claim which is extinguished under the Directive by lapse of time (art. 11) may nevertheless still be available independently of the Directive.
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incorporated into a major rewriting of the whole corpus of the law bearing on liability for darnage caused by defective products, but unless and until that is done the restofthat law will continue to exist alongside Directive law. 55 B. Implementation of tbe Directive
What practical changes in the liability of producers for darnage caused by defective products are likely to come, then, from implementation of the Directive? The answer for each member of the Community depends, of course, on the state of its law as it was before implementation, and only a few of the more salient points can be mentioned here. 1. Commercial Lasses. Since the Directive covers only death, personal injury, and darnage to purely private property, 56 its implementation will change nothing.lt will thus continue tobe the case that in some countries the producer's liability is strict and includes liability for pure economic loss, while in others it remains dependent on fault and does not include liability for such loss. 57 To the extent that there was distortion of competition as a result of differences in the law concerning product-related commercialloss, that distortion will continue to exist. 2. Measure of Damages. The Directive is silent on the subject of measure of damages, and actually specifies that the article defining darnage for the purposes of the Directive "shall be without prejudice to national provisions relating to non-material damage." 58 Once again, on this the Directive will change nothing. 3. The Basic Principle of Liability. Subject to the defences provided in the Directive, which must be proved by the producer, there is here, on the face of things, a major change of principle for those countries in which, formerly, liability was dependent on fault. No Ionger is the producer's liability for 55 The English legislation implementing the Directive Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 which came into force on 1 March 1988- sets up a new regime of liability for defective products in line with the requirements ofthe Directive and makes it clear that this is "without prejudice to any liability arising otherwise than by virtue ofthis Part" (s. 2(6)). The French draft legislation, on the other hand, contemplates wholesale rewriting ofthe relevant provisions ofthe civil code and apparently goes much further than the Directive itself. See Philippe Malinvaud, L'application de Ia directive communautaire sur Ia responsabilite du fait des produits d€:fectueux et le droit de Ia construction, ou Je casse-tete communautaire: Recueil Dalloz Sirey (1988) Chronique 85. 56 Supra n. 41. 57 An interesting case in point is provided by the English case of Muirheadv. Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd. [1986] Q.B. 507, where a manufacturer of electric motors which proved to be defective was held not liable for economic loss suffered by the plaintiff. The motors had been installed to drive pumps used by the plaintiff in his business and had become part of his installation by way of a chain of contracts. The producer would probably have been liable under French law on similar facts. 58 Directive art. 9, infine.
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defective products to be a mere example of a general principle of liability for negligence or fault: "The producershall be liable for darnage caused by a defect in bis product." 59 Where the idea that the producer is not liable without fault (except contractually to bis own buyer) has been maintained and the rule that it is for the plaintiffto prove the producer's fault is taken seriously, the introduction ofthe new. principle is, of course, capable ofhaving a substantial effect. Henceforward the producer is, at least prima facie, liable once the existence of a defect, damage, and the causal connection between the two have been established. The fact is, however, that in many countries, though with varying degrees of force, a presumption of fault is now admitted once the existence of a defect has been proved. 60 Where a presumption of fault is raised, the burden of proof passes to the defendant producer, and the practical result is generally the same as ifthere were a rule ofliability without fault but subject to defences. Two examples, that of England and that of Germany, are given by way of demonstration. a. England. In Donoghue v. Stevenson, 61 the original source of the modern principle of liability for negligence in generalas weil as forthat of producers in particular, the House of Lordsmade no suggestion that negligence rnight be presumed. On the contrary, Lord Macmillan made it clear that there was no presumption and no justification for the application of res ipsa loquitur. 62 Nothing turned in that case on the burden of proof, however, for the facts, including the negligence of the defendant, were presumed; 63 it was not long before relief came to the injured person with the realisation that it will be possible for him to point to specific negligent acts or ornissions in the process of manufacture only in the most exceptional cases. As Lord Wright said in Grant v. Australion Knitting Mills Ltd., 64 the plaintiff, "is not required to lay bis finger on the exact person in all the chain who was responsible, or to specify wliat he did wrong. Negligence is found as a matter of inference from the existence of the defects taken in connection with all the known circumstances." This means, essentially, that proof of defect will normally suffice provided that the circumstances are such that an inference is justified that the defect existed when the offending product left the hands of its producer. Id. art. 1. For England and the Federal Republic of Germany, see infra. For the position in some other countries, see the appropriate papers published in: Aix. See further, e.g., Guido Alpaj Mario Bessone, La responsibilita del produttore (3d ed. 1987) eh. 3; Guido Alpa, L'attuazione della direttiva comunitaria sulla responsabilita del fabbricante: Rivista delle Societä (1987) 867 (Italy); Hondius (supra n. 44) 187 (Netherlands). 61 [1932] A.C. 562. Though a Scottish case, its applicability in England has never been questioned. 62 Id. at 622. 63 The case came before the House ofLords under the Scottish procedure of achallenge to the relevancy of the plaintiffs averments. 64 [1936) A.C. 85, 101. 59
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No more is involved here than an inference of negligence, and it is therefore open to the defendant to attempt to displace it. This he will certainly succeed in doing if he establishes that in the prevailing state of knowledge no producer of similar goods could be expected to have discovered or avoided the defect. 65 But the obvious line of defence for a mass producer - that his system of manufacture and quality control is beyond criticism and that the defect was one in a million- is insufficient. In Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills itself, where the plaintiffhad contracted dermatitis because excess sulphites had been left in a pair ofunderpants produced by the defendants, it was proved that little short of five million such garments had been produced and sold without complaint but, as Lord Wright said, "if excess sulphites were left in the garment, that could only be because someone was at fault." 66 The upshot is, therefore, that in the great majority of cases proof of darnage caused by a defect in the product amounts to proof of negligence. lmplementation ofthe Directive, though it will bring a change ofprinciple and a change of language, is unlikely tobring much change in the result of cases that are actually litigated. 67 The one possibly significant changewill be that whereas, formerly, it was for the plaintiff to establish - by inference - that the defect existed when the product left the hands of its producer, 68 under the Directive it is for the producer to prove the contrary if he can. 69 b. Federal Republic of Germany. Although, as Professor Simitis has said, 70 "the Germans found glass splinters in salt packages at nearly the same time as Mr. Macpherson was thrown out ofhis collapsing Buick", the subject of product liability attracted little attention until comparatively recently and claims for darnage caused by defective products attracted little sympathy. 71 What is more, early attempts to develop this part of the law concentrated on the contractual approach not, it seems, as in France because the producer was envisaged as a seller but because ofthe difficulties that would be faced by a plaintiffin tort. Not 65 This may be called the "attenuated development risk defence". Fora clear example of its application, though not in a product liability case, see Roe v. Minister of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66. 66 Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. (supra n. 64) 101. See also, e.g., Mason v. Williams & Williams Ltd. [1955]1 Weekly Law Reports 549; Hillv. J. Crowe (Cases) Ltd. [1978]1 All England Law Reports [= All E.R.]812. The contrary decision in Daniels v. White & Sons [1938]4 All E.R. 258 is no Ionger good law. 67 It may, however, have an effect on the rate of settlements favourable to plaintiffs since the producer will no Ionger be able to use the plaintifrs theoretical need to prove negligence as an argument in the course of negotiations. 68 See, e.g., Evans v. Triplex Glass Co. Ltd. [1936]1 All E.R. 283, where the inference was not justified. 69 Directive art. 7(b ). 70 Simitis (supra n. 2) 99. 71 See the case cited in Markesinis (supra n. 13) 51 and Reich (supra n. 38) 151-153.
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only is the burden of proof of fault cast squarely on the plaintiff, 72 but there is no true principle ofvicarious liability in tort: 73 an employer is not liable in tort for the faults of his employees if he exercised due care in their selection and supervision. 74 Lord Wright's reasoning would not have been accepted by a Germancourt when Grant 's case itself was decided, and it is not surprising either that attempts should have been made to stretch the law of contractualliability or that the contractual approach to the problern should have been described as "fiction". 75 It is unnecessary to examine the various ideas that were used to support the contractual liability of the producer of defective products: 76 for all practical purposes they were rejected by the Supreme Court in 1968 in the "Fowlpest" case, 77 but at the sametime the Court laid the foundations for a more effective liability in tort.
The short facts of the case were that the plaintiffs chickens were inoculated against fowlpest by a veterinary surgeon who used vaccine produced by and acquired from the defendant. It was proved that the vaccine contained active virus and so caused an outbreak ofthe disease it was intended to prevent. Many of the plaintiff's chickens died and the remainder had to be destroyed. This sequence of causation was sufficient to suggest a fault in the defendant's organization and thus, in accordance with established case law, to cast a burden of exculpation upon him. The rule as it stood, however, was inadequate for cases of product liability: the defendant could discharge the burden by showing that the defect could have arisen without his fault by adducing evidence of the procedures used in his factory or plant, and that evidence the plaintiffwould be unable to rebut given his ignorance of those procedures. Consequently, it must be held that ifthe darnage is attributable to events that are within the "sphere of risk" of his plant, the manufacturer cannot escape liability by merely showing that it is possible that the defect in the goods was caused otherwise than by a fault committed "within the sphere of his organization". 78
The importance to this decision of the impossibility that the plaintiff can know as weil as the defendant the procedures ofthe defendant's factory is clear, and the reasoning is similar to that of Lord Wright; it has since been elaborated The rule in contract is different: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch § 282. Again, the rule in contract is different: id. § 278. 74 Id. § 831. 75 Simitis (supra n. 2) 100. 76 For briefaccounts, see id. 100-105; Markesinis (supra n. 13) 55-58. 77 Decision of 26 Nov. 1968 (supra n. 16); R.H. Mankiewicz, Products Liability- A Judicial Breakthrough in West Germany: Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 10 (1970) 99. For an annotated translation of extracts, see Lawson / M arkesinis (supra n. 35) II, 84-1 00; Markesinis (supra n. 13) 245-256. 78 Translation from Mankiewicz (supra n. 77). 72 73
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in later cases covering defects of manufacture, design defects, and defective instructions. It has also been made clear that a defendant producer does not discharge the burden cast upon him simply by showing that bis system of production and quality control is satisfactory. Although he is not "vicariously" liable if he exercised proper care in the selection and supervision of his employees, he will discharge the burden cast upon him only by identifying every employee involved and proving the exercise of care in relation to them all. 79 The result isthat German law, while retaining the principle ofliability only for fault, has arrived at a system under which fault, judged objectively, is quite readily presumed: "manufacturers must either comply with an objective standard, irrespective of their personal means and capacities, or abandon the intended economic activity". 80 Subject to the question ofthe "development risk" defence, introduction of the Directive, it is believed, will make little difference. 81 4. The Development Risk Defence. 82 From the point of view of principle, a member state's choice whether to include the development risk defence or not is perhaps the most telling indicator of its attitude to the nature ofproduct liability as a whole. The theoretical aspect of the problern is discussed below. F or present purposes it is sufficient to say that implementation of the Directive will give effect to the defence unless the state concerned takes positive action to exclude it 83 or unless it was, in effect, already excluded by the nationallaw in question. 84 It is true that the matter is due tobe reconsidered by the Council, on report from the Commission, ten years from notification ofthe Directive, 85 but for the time being it seems that while a number of states will exclude the development risk defence, those in which the principle of liability only for fault is most firmly entrenched will retain it. 86 In the United Kingdom, where legislation implement79 Bundesgerichtshof, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1973) 1602, cited in Markesinis (supra n. 13) 60. 80 Simitis (supra n. 2) 109. 81 Apparently, however, this does not rnean that the Directive is welcorne in Gerrnany. See Reich (supra n. 38) 149. It is noteworthy that the "Fowlpest" case concerned darnage to cornrnercial property and that in the case of personal injury the injured person rnay clairn only for such darnage as is not covered by social security: id. at 152. 82 For the forrnulation of the defence in the Directive, see supra text at n. 51. 83 Directive arts. 15 t.(b), 15 2. To exclude the defence a rnernber state rnust cornrnunicate the text of its proposed legislation to the Cornrnission and hold it in abeyance for a period the length ofwhich depends on the action taken by the Cornrnission. The provisions of arts. 15 2. and 15 3. are intended to secure the orderly developrnent of product liability within the Cornrnunity. 84 Id. arts. 13, 15 l.(b). 85 I.e., in the course of the year 1995: id. art. 15 3. 86 The intentions of all the rnernber states are not yet known. It seerns likely that, in addition to the United Kingdorn, the defence will be available in Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands and that the others will exclude it. See Jean-Luc Fagnart, La Directive du 25 juillet 1985 sur Ia responsabilite du fait des produits: Cahiers de droit europeen 23 (1987) 2-68 (no. 66); J. R. Bradgate/Nigel Savage, The Consurner Protection Act 1987:
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ing the Directive is already in force, the Act provides for a defence which is, apparently, moreextensive than that contained in the Directive. While the latter requires that the state ofknowledge be not such "as to enable the existence ofthe defect tobe discovered", the English Act requires only that it be not such "that a producer of products ofthe same description as the product in question might be expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his control." 87 From a practical point of view it is not thought that retention of the development risk defence, at least in the form in which it is found in the Directive, will affect the outcome of many cases that are actually litigated, though it does "leave a gap in the compensation cover through which, for example, the victims of another thalidomide disaster might easily slip. " 88 F or the vast majority of cases that, at least in England, never reach trial, however, availability of the development risk defence to the producer means that it is always possible for him to raise or threaten to raise the defence in negotiationsit helps his bargaining position- and, what is more, if the defence is persisted in to the point of litigation, then, even if it ultimately fails, the litigation itself cannot fail to be long drawn out and expensive.
New L.J. 137 (1987) 1049; Davies, Compensating the Victims of Defective Products: The Law Magazine (19 Feb. 1988) 28 (29). For Belgium, see Bourgoignie (supra n. 25) 182. For Germany, seeReich (supra n. 38) 150, and cf. infra textat n. 96. For Ireland, see the discussion document issued by the Consumer Protection Section of the Department of Industry and Commerce, 17 Aug. 1987, at 18. For the Netherlands, see Hondius (supra n. 44) 190. In France acodification of the existing law, as developed in the cases, is in prospect by way of a major addition to the civil code: Avant projet de loi sur la responsabilite du fait des produits defectueux of J anuary 1988. This, it is believed, willleave the substance of the law virtually unchanged, though in a more accessible and comprehensible form; in particular it retains the contractual direct action described above, but now based on "defect" rather than "hidden defect" and without resort to the fiction of presumed knowledge: id. arts. 1387-12, 138713, 1387-15. In a final section, which reproduces much of the Directive, the development risk defence makes an appearance, but the effect of this seems to be minimal. See Malinvaud (supra n. 55). 87 Consumer Protection Act 1987, s. 4(1)(e). See Hans Claudius Taschner, La future responsabilite du fait des produits defectueux dans la Communaute europeenne: Revue du March{: Commun (1986) 257-263 (no. 7). The English rule is equivalent to what was called above the "attenuated development risk defence". See supra n. 65 and text. The Commission has made formal complaint to the British Government concerning its formulation of the development risk defence: Bulletin of Legal Developments 5 (1988) 49; cf. Christopher Newdick, The Development Risk Defence of the Consumer Protection Act 1987: Cambridge L.J. 47 (1988) 455. 88 Pearson (supra n. 2) para. 1259. Both Pearson and the English and Scottish Law Commissions (Liability for Defective Products, Law Com. No. 82, Cmnd. 6831, 1977) recommended exclusion of the development risk defence. 25*
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VI. Conclusion The discussions between the Commission and representatives of the member states started with the Commission's first draft of August 1974 and ended after two years with the presentation to the Commission of a proposal for a Directive that was somewhat less ambitious: it linked the concept of defect to that of the safety that a person is entitled to expect and it excluded Iosses of a commercial nature. Within those Iimits, however, it postulated a system of liability wholly independent offault: ifa product which was defective when it left the producer's hands caused injury to the personor darnage to non-commercial property, the producer was to be liable without more. The essentially objective character of this system of liability would not have been altered by the exclusion of certain classes of producer such as producers of "primary agricultural products" or of products not manufactured or distributed for business purposes; 89 it would not have been altered by the fixing ofan upper Iimit to the quantum of a producer's monetary liability; 90 it would not have been altered by the specification of certain defences such as that the product was not defective when it left the hands of its producer. 91 All of these qualifications, included in the Directive as it was finally adopted, would have left intact the principle of strict liability for defective products. The same cannot be said, however, for the admission ofthe development risk defence. Once that defence is admitted the principle itself is changed; the liability ceases to be strict and becomes a liability for fault. In this context, as elsewhere, the criteria by which fault is judged may be lenient or severe. Fault may be measured by reference either to the understanding and abilities of the actual defendant who is before the court or, as is more usual, to some objective standard. Fault may also be presumed once other facts such as the defective condition of the product have been proved, and the force of the presumption may be great or small. What cannot be avoided, however, is that once a producer escapes liability by proving that he was not at fault, as by proving that the existence of the defect was due to compliance with regulations, 92 orthat the state of scientific and technical knowledge was not such as to enable the defect to be discovered, 93 then the liability imposed on him is no Ionger strict. 94 By leaving to member states the choice whether to include the development risk defence or not, the Directive leaves to them the choice on a fundamental matter of principle. Directive art. 7(c). Id. art. 16. 91 Id. art. 7(b ). 92 Id. art. 7(d). 93 Id. art. 7(e). 94 Afortioriifthe "attenuated development risk defence" (supra n. 65, and textat n. 87) is available to the producer. 89
90
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The arguments commonly advanced for and against the development risk defence have been so often rehearsed that they need no more than a mention here. On the one hand it is argued that exclusion of the defence secures fuller protection for the injured person- there is no reason why he should go without compensation simply because he is the victim of chance rather than of fault and it spreads the risk equitably over all the consumers of the producer's products. On the other hand it is argued that exclusion of the defence Ieads to excessive insurance premiums and so to high prices, that it places an unreasonable burden on industry and that it breeds a reluctance on the part of industry to introduce new products. The very fact that the member states of the Community were unable to reach agreement on this matter indicates that neither argument is totally convincing, but the point emerges with particular clarity from comparison of the English and the German attitudes to the special case ofpharmaceutical products. In England it was the paradigm example of such products which, more than any other, proved decisive against exclusion of the development risk defence in that country. 95 In Germany, by contrast, although the development risk defence is to be generally available once the Directive is implemented, this is not to be so in the case of pharmaceutical products. On the contrary, by article 84 of the Pharmaceutical Law of 1976, 96 which will continue in effect after implementation of the Directive, 97 the liability of pharmaceutical producers is strict. It is true that the law contains an upper Iimit to the producer's liability and provides for compulsory insurance, but in Germany the pharmaceutical industry is singled out as an industry which should not have the "protection" of the development risk defence. "The mere fact that the use of the drug caused injuries suffices to hold the producer's enterprise responsible. " 98 lt is, of course, an article of faith for a comparative lawyer that a principle or rule oflaw that is appropriate for one country is not necessarily so for another. The fact is, however, that in 1976 the expert legal representatives ofthe ten states 95 See, e.g., the debate in the House ofLords (20 Jan. 1987), especially the speeches of Lord Denning and, for the Government, Lord Lucas: H.L. Deb., vol. 485, cols. 825 ff. From the moment of its initial announcement of its intentions, the British Government made clear that it would retain the development risk defence: Department of Trade and lndustry Press Notice no. 86/498, 1 July 1986. 96 Arzneimittelgesetz. The law waspassedas a response to the thalidomide (contergan) tragedy and is largely concerned with the promotion of safety in medicines. See, e.g., John G. Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans: Am. J. Comp. L. 30 (1982) 297; Simitis (supra n. 2) 112 -115; Reich (supra n. 38) 159 f. 97 It was principally to preserve this law that art. 13 of the Directive refers to "a special liability system". 98 Simitis 114. Interestingly enough it appears that the Law of 1976 has led neither to greatly increased payments of compensation nor to great increases in the price of drugs: id.; seealso Jan Hellner, Products Liability in Swedish Law, in: Mil/er(supra n. 2) 127-141 (133 -135) on the Swedish pharmaceutical injuries insurance which amounts to a "voluntary no-fault insurance".
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then members ofthe European Community all agreed that the development risk defence had no place in the system of product liability propounded in the proposal for the Directive. There is something odd, therefore, in the fact that opposition to this aspect of the proposal forced the Council of Ministers to compromise by leaving the choice to member states, and in the choice of those who finally decided that the development risk defence should be retained. The case of the United Kingdom is, perhaps, the oddest of all: not only does its legislation implementing the Directive provide for a defence that is more extensive than that provided in the Directive, 99 butthat legislation runs counter to the recommendations oftwo important commissions whose remit concerned the law in the United Kingdom alone. 100 What is more, in England it is as clear as it can possibly be that the development risk does not avail the producer who is sued not as a producer but as a seller, 101 and this he may be ifthe original victim of product-related darnage sues his immediate seller and the producer is then brought in by a series of actions up the chain of contracts. It is thus little more than chance that deterrnines whether the defence is or is not of ultimate value to the producer: if the victim sues him directly he can avail hirnself of it, but if the victim sues his seller and the producer is sued as at the head of the chain of contracts through which the defective product reached the victim, he cannot. There can be little doubt that insufficient data exist in any country for it tobe said with confidence that exclusion of the development risk defence will or will not have the harmful results that are predicted by those who wish the defence to be retained, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the choices finally made were more the result of conditioned reflex than of anything eise. In countries such as France, where the producer's liability has now for some time been envisaged as a liability founded upon the sale of a defective product, the development risk defence is at best an afterthought. Elsewhere, however, and especially in England, no one thinks ofthe producer as a seller, except, of course, to hisimmediate buyer and that buyer is rarely the immediate victim of a defect in the product. The producer's liability to the victim of a product-related injury, if any, is seen as a liability in tort- the producer wrongfully produced and put on the market a product that was dangerously defective- and that is a liability based on fault. Certainly, a caring legal system will do much for the victim of product-related darnage where the question of the producer's fault is in doubt, and it will demand a high standard of care from all producers. But at the end of the day, if the producer shows affirmatively that neither he nor any person for whom he is responsible can have been guilty of fault of any kind, then to hold him liable can be seen as contrary to reason and to elementary justice. lt was not the legal experts representing member states who rescued the development risk defence from the oblivion to which the proposal for the Supra n. 87 and text. Supra n. 88. 101 Chris. Hili Ltd. v. Ashington Piggeries (supra n. 14); seesupra text at n. 14.
99
100
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Directive would have consigned it. Lobbied, no doubt, by a variety of interested parties, it was the Governments and legislators of the member states concerned - most notably those of the United Kingdom- who did so. They, it appears, were less able to escape from the shackles of traditional legal concepts and categories such as the dogma of privity of contract, than were the more perceptive of their legal advisers: perhaps they did not recognize their shackles for what they were. lt is the persistence ofhabits of thought more than anything which explains the failure ofthe members ofthe Community to reach agreement on even the limited scheme for product liability that was proposed by the Commission in 1976. 102
102 This is not to say that the Directive achieves nothing in practice. It is to say that the failure to agree on basic principle bodes i11 for future attempts to harmonise the law relating to liability for defective products on a wider scale.
Part IV
Private International Law
Internationalism in Private International Law Heikki Jokela*
I. Doctrinal Antecedents The developments since the second half of the nineteenth century concerning the nature of private internationallaw can be described as a search for guiding principles to elaborate comprehensive models or theories. Thus, there has been an oscillation between various standards, especially between internationalism and nationalism or between universalism and particularism. 1 The traditional concept of public international law as a system of rules governing the relationships between sovereign states has been, to a large extent, the starting point for the learned reasonings. One of the most important theories based on this starting point, representing
abstract universalism 2 from the period prior to the First World War, was the
attempt by Ernst Zitelmann to derive from public international law the principles determining the jurisdiction between various states in the field of private law. According to him there was in this area an international community of interests between states, which would make it feasible for them, while mutually recognizing state sovereignty on the basis of equality, to accept that the questions concerning the rights and duties between individuals should be governed by the law of the state that had, under public international law, legislative powers in that respect. 3
* Professor Emeritus, University of Helsinki Law Faculty. I would like to acknowledge my debt to Professor David S. Clark for his excellent editorial advice and help. Literature cited in abbreviated form: Milan Bulajil:, Principles of International Development Law (1986); Rene David, The International Unitication ofPrivate Law, in: Int'l Ency. Comp. L. II (The Legal Systems of the World, Their Comparison and Unification) eh. 5, ed. by David (1971); Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, The Changing Structure of International Economic Law (1981). 1 Henri Batiffol, Aspects philosophiques du droit international prive (1956) 9-18; Gerhard Kegel, Fundamental Approaches, in: Int'l Ency. Comp. L. III (Private International Law) eh. 3, ed. by Kurt Lipstein (1986) §§ 8-16; Christian von Bar, Internationales Privatrecht I, Allgemeine Lehren (1987) 400-432. 2 Henri Batiffol, L'etat du droit international prive en France et dans l'Europe continentale de l'Ouest: Clunet 100 (1973) 22-45 (23). 3 Ernst Zitelmann, Internationales Privatrecht I (1897) 71-82, 122-124.
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The principle of state sovereignty has gained weight also among particularistic theories. For example, it is weil known from the bases of the Local Law Theory that "no court can enforce any law butthat of its own sovereign." 4 However, sovereignty was not unanimously considered to be a fruitful explanatory element when elucidating the nature and method of private internationallaw. lt was especiaily Danii:I Josephus Jitta who presented in that sense an original contribution to the theory for the whole of internationallaw, mainly in his first major work in 1890 and subsequently in two of his works, completed during the First World War. 5 The starting point for Jitta was the idea that public international law, excluding the existing law of war (die positiven Normen des Kriegsrechts), and private internationallaw, taken together, were tantamount to public and private law from the angle of a community exceeding the frontiers of a single state. This community could be defined, according to Jitta, as a factual world community for the sociallife of mankind or the human species, requiring an order based on rational principles. The requirement of rational order constituted the basis from which the positive and negative duties of individuals toward the other members of the community as weil as toward the community itself were to be derived. Those duties would create, for the community, correlative rights tobe actuaily used by the states. This principle was suitable for judging the worldwide problems in the sociallife of the time. Hence Jitta's thinking was pragmatic and evolutionary in nature. For the implementation of rational principles within the world community there were, according to Jitta, three Ievels: (1) the individual states, (2) the unions of states exercising factual control beyond the sphere of one single state, and (3) the whole ofthe states (die Gesamtheit der Staaten), tobe distinquished from the community ofStates (die Gemeinschaft der Staaten). 6 Thus, individual persons and their world community, instead ofthe states, were kept in the foreground of Jitta's conception. 7 4 Guinness v. Miller 291 Federal Reporter 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), per Judge Learned Hand. Seegenerally Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942) 3-47. 5 D. Josephus Jitta, La methode du droit international prive (1890); id., Internationaal Privaatrecht (1916); id., Die Neugestaltung des Internationalen Rechts auf der Grundlage einer Rechtsgemeinschaft des menschlichen Geschlechts (1919). About Jitta see Max Gutzwiller, Der Einfluss Savignys auf die Entwicklung des Internationalprivatrechts (1923) 144 -146; J. Offerhaus, L'U niversite d' Amsterdam et Je droit international prive, in: Ius et Lex, Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag von Max Gutzwiller (1959) 283-302 (289-296); Max Keller/ Kurt Siehr, Allgemeine Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts (1986) 101, 181; von Bar (supra n. 1) 412-414. 6 Jitta, Die Neugestaltung (supra n. 5) 1-7, 175-178. 7 Id. 6f.
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Jitta was a realist in that the rational principles of international sociallife according to him were subordinate to the existing law (das positive Recht). However, those principles were important for legal policy both in interpreting the existing law and in planning law reforms. 8 In the presentation of his progressive views Jitta was ahead of his time, a fact of which he was certainly weil aware. 9
II. Recent Developments: The New Factors When considering the present premises of private international law, four decades after the Second World War, it is easy to realize that the economic, social, and political developments during our century have multiplied the number of private international relationships and created a wide range of new, complicated problems. 10 They cannot be resolved on the high Ievel of abstraction represented by a discussion concerning the hierarchy between public and private internationallaw in terms ofuniversalism and particularism. On the other band, there seem tobe horizontal contacts between those branches oflaw, indicating their interaction that may be of interest in explaining the role oflaw in this field. 11 lt is understood, therefore, that this new situation cails for a more pragmatic approach. So, it is of the utmost importance for research work in private internationallaw to deepen the problems so as to determine the objectives of particular conflicts rules and to ascertain the outcome of their application (as laid down by Henri Batiffol)1 2 and to identify the various interests involved (as established by Gerhard Kegel). 13
In this complex situation it is the common goal ofprivate internationallaw, when regulating private relationships with international elements, to strive for different legal systems to live together. 14 To achieve that goal, as weil as other Id. 2. Id. v, the last sentence of the preface (March 1919): "Indessen möchte ich hervorheben, dasz meine Arbeit keineswegs hinter den neuen Bestrebungen zurückgeblieben, vielmehr grösztenteils ihrer Zeit voraus ist." 10 Henri Batiffo/, L'avenir du droit international prive, in: Institut de Droit International, Livre du Centenaire 1873-1973 (1973) 162-182 (162-172). 11 Id. 166. 12 Id. 172-182. 13 Gerhard Kegel, Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz im Internationalen Privatrecht, in: Festschrift Hans Lewald (1953) 259-288. 14 Batiffo/, Aspects (supra n. 1) 16: "il s'agit de faire 'vivre ensemble' des systemes juridiques differents .... " According to Batiffol, the present state of development of private internationallaw implies the emergence ofan international society, still in embryo (311-335). In conformity with Jitta, Die Neugestaltung (supra n. 5) 6f., he asserts that the relationsdealt with in private internationallaw have been established between individuals, 8
9
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objectives derived from the common goal, one should take into account, in addition to national considerations, all the factors in international society influencing the legal control of private relations. There are among those factors a great variety of elements, both factual and legal, tobe taken into account when assessing the present state of law or when indicating the trends for future legal developments. 15 Since we can recognize from our experience so far many points of contact between public and private international law, it is reasonable tothinkthat one group of relevant factors may be identified by a realistic observation of the dynamism in the evolution and implementation of public internationallaw. A new phenomenon in this context is the role played by individuals when acting in the field that used tobe reserved to states only. It is particularly the widening of the scope of public internationallaw toward individuals 16 that also calls for attention from the point of view of private internationallaw. As for the new status of individuals in public internationallaw, it is not only their passive role as beneficiaries ofrights and duties that is tobe considered, but also their active role, especially as members of privately organized pressure groups with the intention to influence legal policy both nationally and internationally. 17 It may be fair to say that what will be gained by individuals in the sphere of public internationallaw will be lost by states, in regard to their role in developing that branch of law. The programs influenced and developed by different factors on the internationallevel, for the benefit of individuals within state jurisdictions, may be carried into effect by various means, particularly by establishing treaties or other not between states (333 f. ). In Batiffol's conception the role of states in regulating those relations is rnore accentuated (335). 15 See A. Ch. Kiss j D. Shelton, Systems Analysis oflntemational Law: A Methodological Inquiry: Netherlands Yearbook Int'l L. 17 (1986) 45-74 (68-74). According to the authors, there aremajorinternational problernsthat are "beyond the scope of single State jurisdiction and thus cannot be solved at that Ievel." They have rnade an interesting contribution to the cornprehension of law by adapting the systerns approach of modern physics to research on public internationallaw. For the purposes ofpublic international law the systern of Kiss and Shelton consists of an "interconnected web of relations" where there are, in addition to the relations between states, also relations in which individuals, various organizations, international public opinion, etc., are involved. The systems approach rnay also be helpful when trying to understand the developments in private international law. 16 Sir Robert Y. Jennings, Universal International Law in a Multicultural World, in: Liber Amicorum for The Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce, PC, CMG, OBE, QC, ed. by Maarten Bnsjlan Brownlie (1987) 39-51 (39), states that: "Perhaps the rnost irnportant changeisthat the old, classical orthodoxy that intemationallaw was concemed only with the relations of States, and by its very nature, could not be concemed with individuals or even with corporations, has simpl.y disappeared .... Nowadays, treaty-law affects the everyday life of people, and the more advanced the country, the rnore likely are people to find themselves subjected to intemationallaw in a rnyriad ways." 17 Kiss/Shelton (supra n. 15) 55.
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international instruments between states. Those instruments constitute an avenue from international society to the state Ievel to also influence the internal legal policy of states in the field of private law, for instance, concerning the law on the personal relations and property of individuals and the international commercial relations included therein. To demoostrate the interaction of the factors on the international and national Ievels in implementing the universalistic approach to law, Iet us take some examples ofthe different international instruments drafted tothat end. In this strict choice of suitable samples the focus of attention is on such instruments that are susceptible of influencing, directly or indirectly, developments in the field of private internationallaw.
III. International Instruments as a Manifestation of Universal Legal Policy A. Uniform Laws
The most adequate method to carry into effect the objectives of international legal policy regarding private law at the Ievel of the state is to strive for unification of law, particularly by concluding treaties to that end. 18 As for the unification ofprivate internationallaw the most representative effort so far has been made by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, established as an inter-governmental organization in 1955, with traditions dating back to 1893. 19 According to its Statute (article 1) the Conference is called upon to work for the progressive unification ofthe rules ofprivate international law. To implement this program the Conference has adopted the method of drafting international conventions containing conflicts rules for a judiciously limited area at a time. The member states of the Hague Conference are free to take or leave the prepared draft conventions. In case they ratify a convention they are bound to incorporate into their own legal systems the conflicts rules in question, without amendments. The same applies to non-rnernher states when adhering to a convention of the Conference. 20 See David §§ 218-246. See the Statute ofthe Hague Conference on Private International Law, 15 July 1955, U.N.T.S. 220 (123). For the history and functions oftheConference, see David§§ 372-386; Georges A.L. Droz, La Conference de La Haye de droit international prive en 1980, evolution et perspectives: Recueil des Cours 168 (1980 III) 127 -158; Georges A.L. Droz I Adair Dyer, The Hague Conference on Private International Law for the Eighties: Northwestern J. Int'l L. & Bus. 3 (1981) 155-210; J.H.A. van Loon, The Hague Conventions on Private International Law, in: The Effect ofTreaties in Domestic Law, ed. by Francis G. Jacobs I She/ley Roberts VII (1987). 2° For the methods of incorporation, see van Loon (supra n. 19) 228-232. 18
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The Hague Conference was initially a European institution, but it has succeeded in widening, step by step, its geographical scope so as to comprise, as of 1 September 1987, 36 members including 13 non-European states. 21 The current Iist of the conventions of the Hague Conference contains 29 international conventions, 17 ot which have entered into force among three or more states. 22 The significance of the Hague Conference in the unification of private international law cannot be evaluated only on the basis of the number of member states or on the ratifications of its conventions. The Conference in preparing a considerable number of conventions has also promoted legal research in the field of interest, and the solutions adopted in conventions have been reflected in various quarters outside the sphere of the Conference. For example, conventions have been used by non-rnernher states as modellaws when drafting their own law reforms. 23 Another example is the frequent referring, in international commercial arbitration and even in national courts oflaw, to the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods (1955), even in cases where there was no legal obligation for the arbitrators or judges to do so. 24 The policy of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, initiated in the seventies, to activate cooperation with other international organizations, particularly with UNCITRAL, has proved tobe successful. Thus, the decisions in the eighties on the wider openings of the Conference, as weil as the work accomplished tothat end, may be signs on the road toward universality. 25 It is not possible in this context to go to any lengths in dealing with the vast field of international unification of the ru/es of substantive private law. 26 However, one point must be made in regard to the unification ofthe substantive ru/es on international sale of goods, one of the central issues in the international development of commercial law. The latest achievement here is the U.N. 21 Information Conceming the Hague Conventions on Private International Law, Situation as of 1 September 1987: Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 34 (1987) 237-261 (237). The following states have accepted the Statute ofthe Conference and become members ofthe Organization: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany (F.R.G.), Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. 22 Id. 237-261. 23 Droz, La Conference (supra n. 19) 153; Droz j Dyer (supra n. 19) 179; van Loon (supra n. 19) 227f. 24 Oie Lando, The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, in: Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, ed. by Julian D.M. Lew (1987) 101-112 (109). 25 Drozj Dyer (supra n. 19) 209f. 26 See generally David.
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Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna 1980), prepared under the auspices of the UNCITRAL. 27 The historical development in the law of sale is a specimen of the Iex mercatoria, which may be understood as a continuing process within international commerce with a view to creating rules for trade.28 From the practical point of view, it is not so important to take one's stand as to whether the Iex mercatoria should be considered as binding law or not. What matters is the fact that the international practice of trade does strongly influence the development oflaw among all the nations of the world. Nowadays this development is clearly demonstrated by international arbitration, which has an important role in consolidating the practice of private law, as weil as in regard to conflicts rules. 29 Finally, the success of unification depends, to a large extent, upon the development of uniform interpretation techniques in the various states concerned. Therefore, this is a problern to be studied carefully in the international context. 30 27 Seegenerally John 0. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention (1982); Fritz Enderle in I Dietrich Maskow I Monika Stargardt, Kaufrechtskonvention der UNO (mit Verjährungskonvention), Kommentar (1985). The socialist countries have shown great interest in the unification of international trade law, bothin connection with international cooperation (esp. UNCITRAL) andin nationallegislation on a wide comparative basis: see Dietrich Maskow I Helmut Wagner I Dieter Zahn, Zum Erlass des Gesetzes über internationale Wirtschaftsverträge: Staat und Recht 25 (1976) 382-391 (386); P. Kalensky, Some Aspects of Sodalist Integration in International Sales Law, The CMEA Conditions and the Hague Uniform Laws: Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 26 (1979) 316-328; Ferenc Mild/, The Law of International Transactions (1982) 139f., 159f., 168f.; Jerzy Rajski, Les principes du droit commercial international de certain pays socialistes europeens: Recueil des Cours 174 (1982) 9-105; id., Grundsätze des Rechtes der wirtschaftlichen Ost-West-Beziehungen in bestimmten osteuropäischen Staaten: Juristische Blätter 110 (1988) 5-11. 28 One of the founders of the idea of the Iex mercatoria is Clive M. Schmitthoff See generally Law and International Trade - Recht und Internationaler Handel, Festschrift für Clive M. Schmitthoff zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. by Fritz Fabricius (1973), containing a bibliography of Schmitthoff (421-423). See also, e.g., Berthold Goldman, La Iex mercatoria dans Jes contrats et J'arbitrage internationaux, realite et perspectives: Clunet 106 (1979) 475-505, id., The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - the Iex mercatoria, in: Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, ed. by Julian D.M. Lew (1987) 113-125. For acritical approach see Paul Lagarde, Approche critique de Ja Iex mercatoria, in: Le droit des relations economiques internationales, Etudes offertes a Berthold Goldman (1982) 125-150. 29 Sampies from a rich Iiterature include: Heinz Strohbach, Towards an International Arbtral Award, in: The Art of Arbitration, Essays on International Arbitration, Liber Amicorum Pieter Sanders 12 September 1912-1982, ed. by Jan C. Schultsz I Albert Jan van den Berg (1982) 305-310; Lando (supra n. 24) 101-112; Bernd von Hoffmann, Grundsätzliches zur Anwendung der "Iex mercatoria" durch internationale Schiedsgerichte, in: Festschrift für Gerhard Kegel zum 75. Geburtstag 26. Juni 1987, ed. by HansJoachim Musielakl Klaus Schurig (1987) 215-233; Aron Broches, The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, An Exercise in International Legislation: Netherlands Yearbook Int'l L. 18 (1987) 3-67.
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B. Establishment of Legal Standards
The technical unification of law, dealt with above, is not the principal objective of international instruments concerning human rights and the new international economic order (NIEO), to be presented as examples in this section. Their main function is to strive for international standards for their implementation in both international and national policy, particularly in their legal context. 1. Human Rights. The basic document of the present movement for the international protection ofhuman rights is the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, adopted and proclaimed on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 31 Legally speaking the Declaration is itself not a treaty, but it has become an international standard that has been reflected in numerous treaties as weil as in national and internationallegislation and decisions of courts. Moreover, the status of the Declaration has been corroborated by various subsequent international instruments, such as the Prodarnation of Teheran (1968), approved by the International Conference on Human Rights, and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975). 32 From those developments Professor John P. Humphrey, former Director of the U.N. Division of Human Rights, has concluded that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is binding upon states as part of the law of nations, and further, that "the Declaration has become an authentic interpretation of the human rights provisions of the Charter" of the U.N. 33 International human rights advocates desire that their principles be reflected in state practice, including in connection with the legal relations between 30 David §§ 247- 326; Fritz Enderle in, Uniform Law and its Application by Judges and Arbitrators (General Report presented at the Third UNIDROIT International Congress on Private Law, "Uniform Law in Practice," Rome 7-10 September 1987), tobe published by UNIDROIT. 31 Seegenerally Human Rights: Thirty Years after the Universal Declaration, ed. by B.G. Ramcharan (1979). 32 14 Int'l Legal Materials (1975) 1292-1325. See the Final Act §VII, last para., which reads as follows: "In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles ofthe Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfil their obligations as setforthin the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound." For the changing attitude toward the Final Act as regards its legal implications and human rights program, see a rather cautious approach by F.A.M. Alting von Geusau, From Yalta to Helsinki: Developments in International Law: Netherlands Yearbook Int'l L. 8 (1977) 35-71, and three years later a trustful estimation by P. van Dijk, The Final Act of Helsinki- Basisfora Pan-European System: ibid. 11 (1980) 97-124. 33 John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in: Ramcharan (supra n. 31) 21-37 (36f.).
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individuals. This can be seen from the covenants implementing the policy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In illustration I refer, in the first place, to the interesting analysis by B.A. Wortley of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), in light of the general principles of private international law. After presentation of the provisions ofthe Convention, having an impact on private internationallaw, the learned author recommends that the European Court of Human Rights "may Iook to the conflict of laws for its authorities when interpreting the Convention for the benefit of individuals." He also characterizes the creation of the Court as "the most important step yet made for the furthering and realisation oftheideals enshrined, not only in the Declaration of Human Rights, but also in civilized systems of conflict of laws." 34 Other examples could be the U.N. Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962), 35 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofRacial Discrimination (1965), both with implications in the field ofprivate internationallaw. 36 2. The New International Economic Order and Related Matters. The Charter of Economic Duties of States, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 12 December 1974, 37 is considered tobe the first attempt in the codification and development of the legal principles of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This field of ernerging law constitutes one of the parts of a wider framework, namely that of international economic law. 38 34 B.A. Wortley, The General Principles of Private International Law: Recueil des Cours 94 (1958) 91-260 (104). 35 See Egon Schwelb, Marriage and Human Rights: Am. J. Comp. L. 12 (1963) 337383. 36 E.g., article 5 of the latter Convention (1965) provides as follows: "In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 ofthis Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment ofthe following rights:" among which there is mentioned in para. 5(d)(4) "the right to marriage and choice of spouse." This provision should be taken into account, e.g., when considering in State A (a party to the Convention) the requirements of ordre public as to the applicability of racial impediments to marriage, in the case where such an impediment is contained in the law of State B, applicable according to the conflicts rules of A. 37 U.N. General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX). For the Chartersee VerLoren van Themaat 261-314; Bulajii: 128-189. 38 F or the definition see Ver Loren van Themaat 9 -14, where international economic law has been defined, for the purposes of the author's study, as "the total range of norms (directly or indirectly based on treaties) of public international law with regard to transnational economic relations." Such relations and transactions between private persons and between states and private persons are included in this definition. See further Peter Behrens, Elemente eines Begriffs des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts: Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht ( = RabelsZ) 50 (1986) 483507.
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The Charter is not deemed tobe a system ofbinding law. However, important basic principles contained therein do constitute an incentive for future development ofthe law. 39 The present estimation regarding the implementation of those principles seems to be that there is a clear tendency to rely on U.N. General Assembly declarations and recommendations, instead of on treaties to be formally ratified. Such declarations and recommendations are recognized as one of the sources influencing considerably the development of international law. 40 Another line of implementation by way of recommendations is the drafting of international codes of conduct for various fields of economic relations. 41 It is indicated by the strong international opinion supporting implementation of the principles of the NIEO, that international economic law in this context will be developed, in the long run, toward a more concrete system of norms, affecting also the regulation ofprivate relations. However, it has been difficult so far to find such binding rules in the main body of principles created in connection with the NIEO. It seems, on the other hand, that some shoots of ernerging law aretobe found in that special corner ofthe NIEO where the Cultura/ Heritage of Mankindhas been placed, as one of the component parts of the wider category of the Common Heritage of Mankind. 42
The movement for the protection and allocation of world cultural property has led to the establishment of international instruments of major importance, such as the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 43 the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer ofOwnership of Cultural Property, 44 and the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 45 VerLoren van Themaat 292f. Bulaji{: 66-71. 41 For an analysis by a well-known expert on international commercial arbitration, see Pieter Sanders, The Implementation oflnternational Codes ofConduct for Multinational Enterprises: Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 28 (1981) 318-332, emphasizing, in his conclusions, that "the Codes may have, in practice, a considerable impact on the behaviour of the parties involved," and that the Codes will be developed further as regards their substance and implementation machinery (332). See also Bulajic 163-169. 42 For the principle ofthe Common Heritage ofMankind within the framework ofthe International Development Law, see Bulajic 139f., 305f. 43 249 U.N.T.S. 240. 44 10 Int'l Legal Materials (1971) 289-293. Forthis Convention and the 1954 Hague Convention, seelohn Henry Merryman, Thinking about the Elgin Marbles: Mich. L. Rev. 83 (1985) 1881-1923 (1888, 1892-1895, 1916); id., Two Ways ofThinking about Cultural Property: Am. J. Int'l L. 80 (1986) 831-853. For the 1970 UNESCO Convention, seealso James A.R. Nafziger, The New International Legal Framework for the Return, Restitution or Forfeiture ofCultural Property: N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. &Pol. 15 (1983) 789-812. 39
40
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The 1970 UNESCO Convention seems to contain direct implications for the field of private internationallaw. Thus, the Convention, particularly articles 7 and 13, may impose an obligation on state parties to arrange for the restitution of imported cultural property even in the event of its acquisition in good faith in another country, which, in turn, has been presented as one of the reasons why most major art market nations, especially in Europe, have not become parties to that Convention. 46 As convincingly shown by Professor John Henry Merryman, who is weil known for his pioneering research in this field, legislation in terms of the property rights developed in the 1970 UNESCO Convention may be characterized as an instance of cultural nationalism, notaproper way of resolving the problems involved. 47 Consequently, this conclusion might turn the focus of attention in cultural property law toward cultural internationalism to impose obligations on nations to protect cultural property, as illustrated by the above 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 48 lt is to be hoped that the wider objectives of the 1972 UNESCO Convention, and their implementation by the World Heritage Committee established by the Convention (article 8), would stimulate the world community to develop internationallaw and to control developments also within state jurisdictions. 49 C. Legal Aspects of International Instruments
A treaty or an equivalent instrument, duly signed and ratified by a state, "is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith," as expressed in article 26 on pacta sunt servanda of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). This basic rule, complemented by the rules of interpretation oftreaties, 50 indicates that it might be sensibletothink oftreaties 11 Int'l Legal Materials (1972) 1358-1366. Hans Hanisch, Internationalprivatrechtliche Fragen im Kunsthandel, in: Festschrift für Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, ed. by Albrecht Dieckmannj Rainer Frank/ Hans Hanischj Spiros Simitis (1986) 193-224 (198f.); Gerte Reiche/t, Kulturgüterschutz und Internationales Privatrecht: Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrenrechts 6 (1986) 73-75 (74). Fora general approach to the conflicts rules in this context, see, in addition to the preceding authors, Gerhard Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht (6th ed. 1987) 765f. (cited: Kegel, IPR). 47 Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking (supra n. 44). 48 Id. 844 n. 44, on the clear language of the Convention as regards imposing obligations on nations to protect cultural property. 49 See one ofthe conclusions of Merryman, Two Ways ofThinking (supra n. 44) 853: "A slighter emphasis on cultural nationalism is consistent with the relative decline of national sovereignty that characterizes modern internationallaw." 50 According to the general rule of interpretation of the Convention (article 31), the terms of a treaty shall be interpreted in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty, the context comprising, inter alia, the text including its preamble. 45
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as one of the main sources to be considered when trying to assess the trends prevailing in internationallegal policy. We are entitled to presuppose that the behavior of states in their international cooperation may be interpreted as rational activity .lt is not without significance in this context that states are repeatedly committing themselves, by their adherence to various treaties and to other international instruments, to the implementation of wide-ranging principles concerning the vital interests of mankind, such as those relating to human rights and to the NIEO, thus emphasizing their deliberate policy. Therefore, there can be no doubt about the firm objectives of state parties to those instruments and, consequently, about the obligations of states, under public internationallaw, to the implementation in the practice of those objectives. Any survey of existing international instruments may indicate that there is a huge amount of materials with possible relevance in the legal context, including in regard to private relations. As may have been apparent above, it is not only the formal category of treaties, aiming at the unification of law, that must be taken into account; there is also a large majority of instruments with indirect implication in the creation of legal standards that should be considered when dealing with relations between individuals at the state Ievel. 51 The ever increasing quantity ofinternationallegal materials makes it difficult, if not impossible, for courts and other state organs, as well as for private individuals and even scholars, to take their stand when it is required in connection with legal matters, especially in the field ofprivate law. Therefore, it would be of utmost importance in this field to have its problems elucidated within the framework of large-scale research programs. 52
IV. Conclusions As a result of developments within the community of states, more and more attention to internationallegislation will be required. These developments are also important for nationallegal policy and, to a very large extent, in connection with private law relations. lt seems that those requirements have not been sufficiently reflected in the thinking of the various schools of private internationallaw. 53 lt is submitted, therefore, that more attention should be paid to the contacts between public and private internationallaw. See Bulajii: 66-71. Comparable research models may be found in the field of the NIEO. See, e.g., the comprehensive study by VerLoren van Themaat. 53 For a well-balanced analysis, see Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, Übernationales Ziel und nationale Kodifikation internationalen Privatrechts heute (insbesondere in Österreich und Schweiz), in: Festschrift für Frank Vischer zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. by Peter Böckli I Kurt Eichenherger I Hans HinderUng I Hans Peter Tschudil Felix Thomann (1983) 223-255 (227-235). Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws, A Critique of Interest 51
52
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My starting point would be the present conception of public international law. "Internationallaw is no Ionger a rnatteressentially for foreign offices; it also depends increasingly upon the possibility of achieving sorne degree of consonance in the decisions of dornestic courts in international questions." This is the conclusion drawn by Sir Robert Jennings frorn the penetration of dornestic law and courts by the internationallegal problems of our era. 54 At this point I would like to reconsider the model of thinking presented by Daniel Josephus Jitta over three generations ago. 55 To find a solution to legal problems with international elernents, Jitta confronted his rational principles with existing law so as to ascertain the possible differences between the two Ievels. In the event of a difference, when an evolution of law at that point was needed according to these principles, then the present evolutionary factors and obstacles to the evolution should be studied. 56 I would like to describe such an approach as one of pragmatic universalism. In sofaras states have committed themselves to supportuniversal objectives, expressed particularly by legally binding or standard-formulating instruments, Jitta's way of thinking, as adapted to present circumstances, constitutes a fruitful approach when implementing "governmental interests" in the states concerned. 57 Analysis: Am. J. Comp. L. 32 (1984) 1-50 (50), concludes that the governmental interests approach in the U .S. has led conflict of laws into a dead-end alley where help may not be possible without a change oflegallanguage. Fora discussion between U.S. and European methods, see Kegel, Approaches (supra n. 1) §§ 43-45; Kurt Siehr, Der Einfluss moderner amerikanischer !PR-Theorien auf das europäische Kollisionsrecht RabelsZ 45 (1981) 803 f. Kegel, IPR (supra n. 46) 133 recommends a cautious development of the law, taking into account the objectives of conflicts rules, instead of a revolution. 54 Jennings (supra n. 16) 40f. Stressing the universality in public internationallaw, he continues that "it be recognized as a valid and applicable law in all countries, whatever their cultural, economic, socio-political, or religious histories and traditions. International law must now develop and change to make it more suited to the new and truly global community of States." 55 See supra nn. 6-9 and text. 56 At the time of Jitta the development of international Standards for the legal assessment of private relations was just beginning. Thus his "rational principles" were mainly a product of strict speculation based on ernerging progressive ideas of the time. Thinking and decision making in our time, on various Ievels ofpublic and private life, has the privilege of resorting totherich arsenal oflegal rules, standards, and principles already created in the international community, which should be understood as a dynamic system of various factors, including both states and private actors, such as individuals, legal scholars, organizations, and enterprises. At the present time Jitta's vision ofinternationallaw as public and private law for the world community of mankind seems to be, to a !arge extent, in conformity with the modern conception ofinternationallaw as presented, e.g., by Jennings (supra n. 16). Hence there are, in Jitta's model, two essential qualities of a good theory, namely: validity in a vast field of application, and adaptability to a system under development. Cf. Offerhaus (supra n. 5) 295.
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As far as I can see, such an approach can be applied within the framework of the various methods of private international law. It is true that the way recommended by Jitta may not always Iead directly to the solution of concrete problems. 58 The point is, however, that we need in our dealing with international problems, and also for the purposes of education, basic guiding principles as criteria for our thinking. Such principles cannot be too specific. Along these lines the existing methods and solutions of private international law can be further refined. 59 In this sense, it is submitted, Jitta's thinking has preserved its value for further elaboration in the legal doctrine of the present day. To conclude, the necessity of our discipline's development toward internationalization was accentuated by Ernst Rabel who, after having recommended "a radical turn of choice of law rules from provincial to world-wide thinking," concluded that: "The new trend can be summarized in the three-fold effort toward realism, comparative method, and international understanding." 60
57 Cf. Drainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict ofLaws (1963) 188-282 (eh. 5 on "The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Govemmental Interests and the Judicial Function"). Fora European view of"Staatsinteressen," see Kegel, IPR (supra N. 46) 717766. 58 Keller f Siehr (supra n. 5) 181. 59 Cf. Müller-Freienfels (supra n. 53) 232f. 60 Ernst Rabe/, The Conflict ofLaws, A Comparative Study I (1945) 97 f.; id., 2nd ed. by Ulrich Drobnig (1958) 105.
Transnational Bankruptcies in the Late Eighties: A Tale of Evolution and Atavism Stefan A. Riesenfeld* The transnational aspects of bankruptcy have been a subject of concern and perplexity as old as the institution of bankruptcy itself. The specter of the insolvent debtor absconding with the remaining assets 1 has haunted the rosy vision ofthe world ofinternational trade since its halcyon days. The suppression of this bane has prompted draconic legislative measures by the monarchs and legislatures in Europe since the fourteenth century, ifnot earlier. Ordinances and statutes enacted in France, 2 Germany, Spain and the Spanish Netherlands, 3 and England 4 bear witness to the international efforts. The Iiterature on this subject is immense and any attempted bibliography would be arbitrary and incomplete. 5 The emergence of the corporate enterprise
* Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Literature cited in abbreviatedform: Stefan Riesenfeld, Transnational Bankruptcy Law: Recent Developments in Argentina and the United States, in: Festschrift für Gerhard Kegel zum 75. Geburtstag 26. Juni 1987, ed. by Hans-Joachim Musielakj Klaus Schurig (1987) 483 (cited: Riesenfeld, Transnational Bankruptcy Law). Additional Abbreviations: B.R. = Bankruptcy Reporter; Bkrtcy = Bankruptcy Court. 1 See Alessandro Lattes, II diritto commerciale nella legislazione statutaria delle citta italiane (1884) 308; Umberto Santare/li Per Ia storia del fallimento nelle legislazioni italiane dell' eta intermedia (1964). 2 See Claude Dupouy, Le droit des faillites en France avant Je Code de commerce (1960). 3 See Juan A. Garcia, La quiebra en el Derecho Hist6rico Espaii.ol anterior a Ia Codificaci6n (1970). Especially significant were the host of ordinances enacted by Emperor Charles V for his Netherlandic homelands commencing in 1518. 4 Statute against absconding Lombards, 25 Edw. III eh. 23 (1350). 5 See F. Meili, Lehrbuch des internationalen Konkursrechts (1909); Werner Nussbaum, Das internationale Konkursrecht der Schweiz, De lege lata et ferenda (1980); Jürgen Schmidt, System des deutschen internationalen Konkursrechts (1972); Michel Trochu, Conflits de lois et conflits de juridictions en matiere de faillite (1967); Günther Jahr, Internationales Konkursrecht, in: Ernst Jaeger, Konkursordnung mit Einführungsgesetzen, ed. by Friedrich Lent et al. II/2 (8th ed. 1973) §§ 237, 238. For further bibliographical references, see Gerhard Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht, ein Studienbuch (6th ed. 1987) 677f.; Georg Kuhnf Wilhelm Uhlenbruck, Konkursordnung, Kommentar (10th ed. 1986) 1950f.; see also Christian Gavalda, Etat actuel du droit international de Ia faillite, in: Travaux du Comite fran~ais de droit international prive, 1962-1964 (1965) 213. For my own previous writings on U.S.law relating to this subject, see Stefan Riesenfeld, Domestic Effects of Foreign Liquidation and Rehabilitation Proceedings in the Light of
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and modern intensification of international commerce and credit with its network of transnational intercorporate relations has heightened the actuality and importance ofthe subject. 6 In view ofthe world-wide attention to failures of business with global scope, my study must inevitably be limited and sketchy. It is hoped, however, that the scholar in whose honor this essay is written will not consider its scope and depth as a measure of my admiration of his own contributions. What I try to chronicle are only recent decisions and other legal measures that have gained a certain notoriety and indicate the current state of the law in various countries. Even so, the tale is of causes for hope as weil as despair, tracing a trail of encouraging evolution and dismal atavism, duplicating the convoluted path of a procession at Echternach.
I. France: Societe Kleber c. societe anonyme de droit danois Friis Hansen et autre France has been traditionally liberal in her recognition of foreign insolvencies and in her willingness to extend the effects of a foreign insolvency proceeding to assets located in her territory. Generally speaking, however, these effects depended on and dated from the judgrnent of recognition and enforceability (exequatur) issued by a French court. The judgment of the Cour de cassation in the case of Kleber v. Sociere Friis Hansen 1 constitutes an important development in the protection of rights of a foreign estate in insolvency proceedings. In that case the Danish firm Friis Hansen was declared to be in bankruptcy by the maritime and commercial court of Copenhagen on May 29, 1981. The court dated the debtor's insolvency as of May 12, 1981. The Danish firm was the distributor in Denmark of tires manufactured by the French firm Societe Kleber. Societe Kleber claimed that the Danish firm was in arrears with payrnents in excess of 5 million francs and filed a claim in that amount in the Danish proceedings. Kleber also, on July 27, 1981, obtained an order from the Comparative Law, in: Internationales Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung im Ausgang des 20. Jahrhunderts, Bewahrung oder Wende?, Festschrift für Gerhard Kegel, ed. by Alexander Lüderitz/lochen Sehröder (1977) 433; id., Probleme des internationalen Insolvenzrechts aus der Sicht des neuen Konkursreformgesetzes der Vereinigten Staaten, in: Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung 113 (Gesellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung 1982) 39; id., Transnational Bankruptcy Law. 6 See, e.g., the papers and discussion at the meeting on Problems of International Insolvency Law reported in: Section on Comparative Commercial and Economic Law ofthe German Society of International Camparalive Law, Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung no. 113 (1982), including the general report of Hans Hanisch, id. 9- 36; lnsol '85, International Insolvency Conference, ed. by Sheldon Lowe (1985); Le probl