Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922–67 9781526102331

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STUDIES IN IMPERIALISM

Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922–67 Daniel Owen Spence

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General editor: Andrew S. Thompson Founding editor: John M. MacKenzie When the ‘Studies in Imperialism’ series was founded more than twenty-five years ago, emphasis was laid upon the conviction that ‘imperialism as a cultural phenomenon had as significant an effect on the dominant as on the subordinate societies’. With well over a hundred titles now published, this remains the prime concern of the series. Cross-disciplinary work has indeed appeared covering the full spectrum of cultural phenomena, as well as examining aspects of gender and sex, frontiers and law, science and the environment, language and literature, migration and patriotic societies, and much else. Moreover, the series has always wished to present comparative work on European and American imperialism, and particularly welcomes the submission of books in these areas. The fascination with imperialism, in all its aspects, shows no sign of abating, and this series will continue to lead the way in encouraging the widest possible range of studies in the field. ‘Studies in Imperialism’ is fully organic in its development, always seeking to be at the cutting edge, responding to the latest interests of scholars and the needs of this ever-expanding area of scholarship.

Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922–67

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SELECTED TITLES AVAILABLE IN THE SERIES OCEANIA UNDER STEAM Sea transport and the cultures of colonialism, c.1870–1914 Frances Steel

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THE VICTORIAN SOLDIER IN AFRICA Edward M. Spiers EMPIRE CAREERS Working for the Chinese Customs Service, 1854–1949 Catherine Ladds FROM JACK TAR TO UNION JACK Representing naval manhood in the British Empire, 1870–1918 Mary A. Conley

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IMPERIAL SPACES Placing the Irish and Scots in colonial Australia Lindsay Proudfoot and Dianne Hall

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Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922–67 Daniel Owen Spence

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Copyright © Daniel Owen Spence 2015 The right of Daniel Owen Spence to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS OXFORD ROAD, MANCHESTER M13 9NR, UK www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for ISBN 978 0 7190 9177 3  hardback First published 2015 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by 4word Ltd, Bristol

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For my grandparents and others who fought and lived through the Second World War

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C ONT E NTS

List of figures — viii List of maps — x List of tables — xi Founding editor’s introduction — xii Acknowledgements — xv List of abbreviations — xvi

Introduction

page 1

1 The origins of colonial naval development

13

Part I – The Caribbean 2 Trinidad29 3 The Cayman Islands 55 Part II – East Africa 4 Kenya and Zanzibar, pre-1945 5 Post-war East Africa

79 112

Part III – Southeast Asia 6 The Straits Settlements and Malaya

151

Part IV – East Asia 7 Hong Kong, pre-1945 8 Post-war Hong Kong

179 215



Conclusion247 Bibliography — 252 Index — 268

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FIGURES

1

TRNVR ratings at gun drill aboard a motor launch (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Members_of_the_ Trinidad_Royal_Naval_Volunteer_Reserve_at_gun_drill_ with_a_light_machine_gun_on_board_a_Motor_Launch,_ September_1944._K7527.jpg) page 37

2

Cricket practice at the TRNVR training establishment, Staubles Bay (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: The_Trinidad_Royal_Naval_Volunteer_Reserve_(trnvr),_ September_1944_K7512.jpg)39

3

TRNVR ratings operating a depth charge thrower (http:// commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:West_Indian_ratings_ of_the_Trinidad_Royal_Naval_Volunteer_Reserve_operating_ a_depth_charge_thrower,_September_1944._K7524.jpg)40

4

Commodore-in-Charge, Trinidad, inspecting the TRNVR at Staubles (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: The_Trinidad_Royal_Naval_Volunteer_Reserve_(trnvr),_ September_1944_K7520.jpg)41

5

TRNVR helmsman keeping forenoon watch (http://commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Trinidad_Royal_Naval_ Volunteer_Reserve,_September_1944_K7540.jpg)41

6

HMS Kenya (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: HMS_Kenya_FL9253.jpg)90

7

European and African crew of the KRNVR ‘working with the Royal Navy’ (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: The_National_Archives_UK_-_CO_1069-139-3.jpg)94

8 ‘African seamen drawn from four different inland tribes foregather over a mug of tea.’ (http://commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:The_National_Archives_UK_-_CO_1069-1 39-41.jpg)95

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FI G U RE S

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9

Petty Officer Ramazan Hassan, lecturing an African audience (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sailor_Linguist_ Lectures_To_African_Audiences._Petty_Officer_Ramazan_ Hassan,_of_the_Kenya_Royal_Naval_Volunteer_Reserve,_ Now_Serving_With_the_East_Africa_Commands%27_ Mobile_Propaganda_Unit,_Speaks_7_Languages,_ Hindustani,_A27262.jpg)97

10 Rear-Admiral Tennant and Sheikh Mbarak Ali Hinway, Liwali for Mombasa, aboard HMS Warspite (http://commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Royal_Navy_during_the_ Second_World_War_A10072.jpg)101 11 Elliot-inspired HKNVF crest and motto (author’s reproduction)189

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MAPS

1

Colonial naval forces in the British Empire, c.1941

2

British West Indies, c.1939

28

3

British East Africa, c.1939

78

4

Malaya and the Straits Settlements, c.1939

150

5

Hong Kong, c.1939

178

6

East Asia, c.1949

214

page xviii

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TAB L ES

1

Imperial defence expenditure, 1908–10 (Avner Offer, ‘The British Empire, 1870–1914: A Waste of Money?’, Economic History Review, Vol. 46, No.2 (1993), p. 215–238, 227) page 16

2

Colonial naval force complements (TNA, CO968/145/2, Future of Colonial Naval Forces, 1945; CO968/24/2, Gov. to Sec.-of-State for Colonies, 18 March 1942; CO129/584/8, HKRNVR Report, 1940; ADM1/23215, SNO, Trinidad, to C-in-C, America and West Indies, 12 April 1940; ADM1/ 23215, ‘Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, Appendix “A”; TLDM Museum, Malacca, 2 July 2009)

21

TRNVR ratings per West Indian colony, April–June 1945 (TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, Appendix “A”)

34

Apportionment of colonial personnel and finance for Royal West Indian Navy (TNA, ADM1/23215, Meeting at Royal Naval Camp, Trinidad, 4 January 1946, p. 5)

47

Regional intake of African REAN ratings (ZNA, BF15/4-6, Reports: REAN, 1957–59)

124

3

4

5 6

Sample of HKRNVR vessels and dud ammunition fired during hostilities, 8–19 December 1941 (PROHK, HKRS61-1706, J.C. McDouall to A. Sommerfelt, 5 April 1961, p. 1) 205

7

RHKDF Membership by ‘races’, 31 December 1956 (PROHK, HKRS369-11-9, Manpower Statement of the Auxiliary 231 Defence Services, 31 December 1956)

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founding E DIT OR’S IN TRO D U CTIO N

In 1923–24, the Royal Navy indulged in what was probably the most dramatic piece of imperial ‘naval theatre’ in its history. A Special Service Squadron comprising two battle cruisers, Hood and Repulse, and four light cruisers (often augmented to five en route) spent nine months sailing around the Empire. The ships called at Sierra Leone, major ports in South Africa, Zanzibar, Kenya, Ceylon, Malaya, Singapore, Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria, Tasmania, New South Wales, Queensland, several ports in New Zealand, Fiji, Western Samoa, British Columbia, Jamaica, Nova Scotia, and Quebec, with additional calls at various ports outside the British Empire, including Honolulu and several in South America. The object of this extraordinary global display of naval might was described as being to meet ‘our kinsmen overseas’, emphasise the ties that bound them to Britain, as well as express renewed hope after the First World War and the depression that had followed it. The ‘kinsmen overseas’ seemed overjoyed to be visited, judging by the vast crowds that turned out everywhere to greet the ships, the festivities that occurred in every port, the ceremonies that accompanied the visits, as well as the large processions of sailors and marines (often more than a thousand men) that were hailed in the streets, together with lavish hospitality and seemingly endless sporting events. The speeches of governors, colonial prime ministers and the Vice-Admiral in command were redolent of imperial patriotism and efforts to reconcile it with a new sense of Dominions’ nationalism. Astonishingly, it was claimed that no fewer than 1,936,717 people visited the ships in the ports of call, in some places including indigenous chiefs and sultans. Of the total, 1,423,157 were Australians and New Zealanders. For their part, the crews showed their allegiance to empire by deserting in considerable numbers – 151 in the first six months, of whom 141 decided to be illegal immigrants to Australia and New Zealand!1 In British Columbia, the newspaper the Vancouver Sun astutely put a number of questions to the commanding Vice-Admiral including enquiring about British expenditure on the navy, its continuing cost and commitment, the extent to which the empire should help, and the guarantees that might be given that colonies and Dominions could expect the Royal Navy to protect them in any future conflict.2 Western Canada, like territories elsewhere, must have been well aware that this ‘Empire Cruise’ had come in the wake of the Washington Naval [ xii ]

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FO U N D I N G ED I TO R’ S IN T R O D U C T IO N

agreement, which had destroyed both the British navy’s ‘two power standard’ and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. The Admiral’s answers were reassuring enough, but politicians and the public must also have been well aware of the fact that this display of might actually masked considerable weaknesses that were likely to be exacerbated in the future. In any case, these big ships, as lauded by Kipling and others, served to obscure the fact that empire had actually invariably been about small ships – the gunboats which had established British authority in African rivers, on the Persian Gulf, on the coasts of Southeast Asia and the Far East. Small ships had been important in port protection, in minesweeping and in many other of the offensive and defensive precautions of wartime. The First World War had actually seen naval campaigns against the Germans on the East African lakes, campaigns that had not been unimportant in the securing of the German colonies that were subsequently transformed into League of Nations mandated territories.3 The ‘Empire Cruise’ had, however, revealed the importance which politicians and naval authorities attached to propaganda and to what might be called the ‘social and cultural outreach’ that the navy could achieve in the maintenance of imperial sentiment. They were also alert to the ways in which this considerable flotilla could overawe indigenous peoples in West and East Africa, as well as in Asia and the Pacific, where ‘native’ rulers and members of the elite were welcomed on board. This book by Daniel Owen Spence does indeed adopt a social, cultural and racial approach to the founding of naval reserve units in various colonies when ‘overstretch’ and apparent weakness became more obvious during these inter-war years. Such reserve forces were founded in some of the colonies which the Special Services Squadron included in its ‘Empire Cruise’ – in Trinidad and the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean (although only the larger units of the flotilla visited Jamaica with the light cruisers circling South America), in East Africa in Zanzibar and Kenya, in Ceylon, in the Straits Settlements and Malaya, and also, importantly, in Hong Kong (which the squadron did not visit). The creation and continuing history of these units has never been fully explored and Spence acutely examines the cultural and racial perspectives and tensions that went into their founding and organisational histories. He also demonstrates the manner in which these units contributed to what I once called ‘invented traditions of ethnic specialism’, while his interesting exploration of the concept of seafaring or maritime races or nations would repay further study to match the extensive work that has been done on martial races.4 He additionally examines both the performance of these units in war time and the ways in which they were transformed in the post-war [ xiii ]

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 FO U N D I N G ED I TO R ’ S IN T R O D U C T IO N

era. In some cases they contributed to the foundation of modern small navies. In others, they were ultimately laid down because the political units upon which they were based emerged in different formations in the decolonisation era. He pays particular attention to the case of Hong Kong, both because of the invasion and occupation by Japan, and also because of the manner in which the focus shifted to the People’s Republic of China in the aftermath of the Communist revolution. The fate of Hong Kong was, of course, ultimately to be handed back to mainland China, whereas elsewhere the various territories became part of independent, post-colonial countries. Spence’s study is grounded in extensive archival research in the United Kingdom, in the Caribbean, East Africa, Australia, and Hong Kong. He has also used oral history collections and his work is further illuminated by interviews conducted by himself. This is indeed a landmark book, innovative in the range of its field, in its research, in its cultural perspectives, and in its breadth of vision. It represents a further significant contribution to the ‘cultural turn’ in naval studies.5 John M. MacKenzie

Notes  1  V.C. Scott O’Connor, The Empire Cruise (London 1925). For the purposes of the cruise, see pp. 13–14. For the numbers visiting the ships, see p. 275. And for the desertions, see p. 228.  2  The interview between the newspaper and the Admiral can be found in O’Connor, Empire Cruise, pp. 248–9.  3  John MacKenzie, ‘The Tanganyika Naval Expedition of 1915-16’ in The Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 70, no. 4 (November 1984), pp. 397–410; John MacKenzie, ‘The Naval Campaigns on Lakes Victoria and Nyasa, 1914–18’ in The Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 71, no. 2 (May 1985), pp. 169–183.  4  John M. MacKenzie, ‘Lakes, rivers and oceans: Technology, ethnicity and the shipping of empire in the late nineteenth century’ in David Killingray, Margarette Lincoln and Nigel Rigby (eds.), Maritime Empires; British Imperial Maritime Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Woodbridge 2004), pp. 111–127, particularly p. 125.  5  In this series, see also Mary A. Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack: Representing naval manhood in the British Empire, 1870–1918 (Manchester 2009) and, for the merchant marine, Frances Steel, Oceania under steam: Sea transport and the cultures of colonialism, c. 1870–1914 (Manchester 2011).

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ACK NOWL E DG EMEN TS

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to a number of people who have contributed to the making of this monograph. First, those at Manchester University Press; ‘Studies in Imperialism’ editors John M. MacKenzie and Andrew Thompson, Emma Brennan, and the reviewers, for agreeing to publish my work, their constructive evaluations, and making the production process a smooth one. The overseas primary research fundamental to this project would not have been possible without generous funding from Sheffield Hallam University, the University of the Free State, the Royal Historical Society, and the National Research Foundation of South Africa. I am hugely indebted to my PhD supervisors Bruce Collins and Clare Midgley, who first gave me the opportunity to become a historian, and devoted countless hours to drafts, meetings, and feedback; Peter Cain and Ashley Jackson, for doing me the honour of examining my thesis (upon which this book is based), and providing such inspiring academic examples to aspire to; Ian Phimister, for having the faith to provide me with an opportunity when others did not, and whose support continues to be hugely valuable and appreciated; Jan-Bart Gewald and Leiden University’s African Studies Centre for sponsoring the Visiting Fellowship in which I finished the book; I express deep and heartfelt thanks to my interviewees, Chitharanjan Kuttan, William Harvey Ebanks, Carley Ebanks (may they rest in peace), Tan Sri Thanabalasingam, Jaswant Singh Gill, Peter Fosten, Thomas Ewart Ebanks, Karu Selvaratnam, C.S. Nathan, and Neville Tan, for their warmth and openness in sharing their life stories with me to bring the history alive; Mudzaffar Alfian Bin Mustafa, Datuk Hamid Ibrahim, Jerome Lee, C. Charles Adams, Dale Banks, Mishka Chisholm, and Tricia Bodden, for facilitating my overseas research; academic colleagues Barbara Bush, Kate Law, Andy Cohen, Merv Lewis, Miles Larmer, Roger Lloyd-Jones, Nir Arielli, Matthew Roberts, Robbie Aitken, Chris Corker, Clement Masakure, Rosa Williams, Juanita Cox Westmaas, Bridget Brereton, Moses Mwangi, and Jacob Stoil, for their collegiality and helping refine my ideas with their expertise; and lastly, to those friends and family who have supported, encouraged, believed in me and my work, and continue to do so.

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A B B R E V I ATIO N S

A/S Anti-submarine ASP Afro-Shirazi Party BRNC Britannia Royal Naval College C-in-C Commander-in-Chief CID Committee of Imperial Defence CNDA Colonial Naval Defence Act CO Commanding Officer CRNVR Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve DC District Commissioner EACLA East Africa Central Legislative Assembly EAHC East Africa High Commission EANF East African Naval Force HKNVF Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force HKRNR Hong Kong Royal Naval Reserve HKRNVR Hong Kong Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve HKVDC Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps HMEAS His/Her Majesty’s East African Ship(s) HMS His/Her Majesty’s Ship(s) HQ Headquarters KAR King’s African Rifles KRNVR Kenya Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve ML Motor Launch MNF Malayan Naval Force MOI Ministry of Information MRNVR Malayan Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve MTB Motor Torpedo Boat NVF Naval Volunteer Force Overseas Defence Committee ODC OPV Offshore Patrol Vessel PC Provincial Commissioner PRC People’s Republic of China POW Prisoner of War REAN Royal East African Navy RHKDF Royal Hong Kong Defence Force RHKYC Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club RMN Royal Malayan Navy RNO Resident Naval Officer RNR Royal Naval Reserve [ xvi ]

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A BBREV I AT IO N S

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RNVR RWIN SNO SSRNVR SSS TNVF TRNVR ZNP ZNVF

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Royal West Indian Navy Senior Naval Officer Straits Settlements Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Special Service Squadron Trinidad Naval Volunteer Force Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Zanzibar Nationalist Party Zanzibar Naval Volunteer Force

Archives CINA IWM KNA NAA NMM OHC PROHK SPC TLDM TNA UWI ZNA

Cayman Islands National Archive Imperial War Museum, London Kenya National Archives, Nairobi National Archives of Australia, Canberra National Maritime Museum, London Oral History Centre, Singapore Public Records Office, Hong Kong Sea Power Centre, Canberra Royal Malaysian Navy Museum The National Archives, London University of the West Indies, Trinidad Zanzibar National Archives

[ xvii ]

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Hong Kong RNVR

Gambia NVF Trinidad RNVR

Ceylon NVF

Sierra Leone NVF Gold Coast NDF Nigeria NDF

RNVR NVF NDF

0

_

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve

_

Naval Volunteer Force

_

Naval Defence Force km

Kenya RNVR

Burma RNVR Malayan RNVR Straits Settlements RNVR

Zanzibar NVF Tanganyika NVF Mauritius Coast Defence Squadron

1000

(a t Eq u a to r)

Map 1  Colonial naval forces in the British Empire, c.1941

Fiji RNVR

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Introduction

During the Second World War, over 9,000 men from fifteen colonies, protectorates and mandate territories fought for the British Empire in locally raised naval forces. These were established in Trinidad, Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Mauritius, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong and Fiji, between 1933 and 1941. Their relatively small size has meant that up to now they have remained a footnote within the historiography of that conflict, despite being present at many notable flashpoints, particularly in Asia. Yet, if examined beyond naval strategy and more in relation to the cultural turn, they provide an important new lens for understanding the dynamics of imperial power and colonial relations at the twilight of the British Empire. Created within a period of just eight years, these forces represented a significant shift in naval policy towards the recruitment of colonial manpower at a time of distinct internal and external pressures on British imperialism. This prompts a reconsideration of ‘imperial overstretch’ as a concern for naval and colonial officials in the interwar years, and how it forced a cultural change in British attitudes towards colonial subjects and their ‘racial’ suitability for naval service. Through a transnational and comparative analysis of ‘official’ and ‘subaltern’ sources in the United Kingdom, the Caribbean, East Africa, Southeast Asia and Hong Kong, this book examines for the first time the political, social and cultural impact of colonial naval forces. It explores their emergence in a climate of ‘imperial overstretch’ and geopolitical tensions, as bulwarks for preserving British prestige against rival imperialisms and anti-colonial nationalisms; the importance of ‘men on the spot’,1 ‘collaboration’, ‘naval theatre’,2 ‘invented traditions’,3 and propaganda in mobilising colonial navalism; the role of naval paternalism and training within the ‘civilising mission’, and its social and economic development of colonial ‘character’; and how racial ideology [ 1 ]

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I N TRO D U C T IO N 4 and discourses of power fostered a ‘seafaring race’ theory, influencing naval recruitment, strategy and management, and affecting imperial sentiment, ethnic relations, colonial identities, customs and order. It is commonly acknowledged that naval history has been relatively late in engaging with the cultural turn in historical scholarship. While some notable exceptions successfully situated the senior service’s significance to broader society,5 education and the history of ideas,6 many traditional practitioners of the discipline adopted ‘top-down’ approaches, focused on strategy and technology, which emphasised the Navy’s importance to international diplomacy, national politics and economics. As late as 2002, Quintin Colville concluded that ‘the overriding concern of most of the existing academic literature on the Royal Navy in the twentieth century, has been to assess the organisation’s performance of its stated duties: the protection of British interests and sovereignty in peace and war’.7 While naval historians may have traditionally exhibited a reluctance to engage with cultural history’s methodology and themes, cultural historians were equally guilty of not applying their conceptual frameworks to the Navy. Max Jones observed that ‘practitioners of the “new cultural history” have devoted surprisingly little attention to maritime life after 1850’; in surveying over 650 publications between January 2003 and October 2007 under the heading of Naval Forces in the Royal Historical Society Bibliography of British and Irish History he found that fewer than twenty texts deployed cultural-historical method.8 In the wake of Jan Rüger’s pathfinding The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (2007), more culturally informed naval historians have redressed this historiographical oversight. One of Rüger’s most novel contributions is the concept of ‘naval theatre’, where public rituals surrounding the ‘cult of the Navy’, such as fleet reviews and warship launches, contributed to identity and power politics at the turn of the twentieth century. While focusing on pre-1914 Anglo-German rivalry, he notes that the Royal Navy was ‘one of the principal factors in promoting and maintaining the unity of Empire’, with the Admiralty ‘adamant that the naval theatre should be 9 exploited for the fostering of imperial sentiment’. This book will build on his idea by analysing the effects of naval theatre within Britain’s colonies, showing that it was still deployed to these ends during the 1930s and 1950s, and played an important role in cultivating colonial navalism in support of indigenous naval forces. Since Rüger, other cultural-naval historians have emerged from the woodwork, injecting dynamism and fresh ideas into a field undergoing a renaissance. This should not be surprising considering how the Royal Navy interacted with almost every aspect of British imperial life, and

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I N TRO D U CT IO N

the multi-disciplinary avenues this opens up for research. Explorations 10 of maritime history and identity have flourished. Duncan Redford has developed the fleet review motif to explore the cultural impact of the submarine service upon British national identity in the twentieth century.11 Studies of material culture have inspired both James Davey’s assessment of the naval heroic influence in early eighteenth-century British identity12 and Quintin Colville’s examinations of how male social class was projected through naval uniforms and officers’ quarters.13 Mary Conley has developed these connections between heroism, masculinity, gender and naval identity at the height of the British Empire,14 while Cindy McCreery’s visual and discourse analysis has elucidated imperial relations and identities through the Navy’s Royal connections.15 Mediterranean Studies has been enriched by the naval lens Robert Holland has applied to the development of colonial societies and cultures within that sea.16 Jonathan Rayner has analysed the impact of the naval war film on cinema and popular culture,17 while documentary films of naval shipyards shape Victoria Carolan’s examination of regional and national identities.18 Despite imperial identity appearing prominently within these new cultural analyses of the Royal Navy, the majority of studies are still Euro-centrically focused on the British Navy and, to a lesser extent, the Dominions, with John C. Mitcham arguing that ‘Navalism, like other “sacred” privileges and responsibilities of imperial leadership, was to be a whites-only affair’.19 Britain’s Caribbean, African and Asian colonies have consequently been ignored. It took the postcolonial and subaltern studies movements before a better understanding of colonial military contributions emerged, led by David Killingray20 and Timothy Parsons’s work on African regiments.21 A volume on Colonial Armies (2006) edited by Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig has compared different imperial experiences in Southeast Asia,22 but still with a military rather than naval focus. While the operational presence of colonial naval forces has been acknowledged by Ashley Jackson for the 23 Second World War, and James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie in postwar Southeast Asia,24 their cultural influence upon colonial society and British imperialism continues to be overlooked by academics. While commemorative commercial histories of contemporary navies examine their colonial roots, they serve a self-celebratory agenda, bearing jingoistic titles like Honour and Sacrifice (1994),25 and Serving the Nation (2004),26 and act as nationalistic propaganda for projecting national unity, as Chief Petty Officer Radiman proclaims in the latter: I want the Malaysian Navy to be an example to the nation and to the whole world where unity is concerned. As Malaysia constitutes races

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I N TRO D U C T IO N

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of different religions and nationalities that have always lived in peace and harmony, we should extend this harmonic state of affairs more effectively whilst serving in … a Malaysian Navy that would consist of officers and men who possess a sense of loyalty and patriotism.27

Such books are too subjective, lack academic rigour, and do not engage with larger historical, theoretical or comparative issues. This monograph takes up a challenge laid down by Barry Gough in 1999. In the Oxford History of the British Empire (Volume V), he argued that ‘far from being an old-fashioned field of inquiry, naval and Imperial themes are rich in possibilities for studying the interface of societies, systems, and states’, and might be explored through ‘a study of how the Royal Navy influenced the course of the early history of 28 colonial and Commonwealth navies’. This book finally addresses this by taking the new cultural approaches to naval historiography beyond the metropole and into the multi-cultural dynamics of Britain’s global empire, demonstrating that the development of colonial navalism was far from a ‘whites-only affair’,29 and was inextricably linked to British preoccupations about their imperial status.

Seafaring race theory In developing the cultural interaction between imperial and naval identities, this book explores for the first time the influence of a ‘seafaring race’ theory upon colonial naval officials. Imperial discourses of power underpinned racial hierarchies that shaped colonial naval culture; Anglo-Saxonism and Orientalism delineated a chain-of-command where paternalistic British officers instructed ‘native’ ratings as part of their ‘civilising mission’ to develop the character of a ‘modern’ navy. Martial race theory heavily influenced the recruitment and management of colonial armies from the nineteenth into the twentieth century. It too was a discourse of power that contributed to a ‘colonisation of 30 the mind’, and legitimised British imperialism by giving them ‘just as much right to rule in India as any other of the conquering races that form the martial classes, in view of her own conquests’.31 The theory’s prominence in the subcontinent post–1857, when martial became synonymous for loyalty during the Mutiny/Rebellion, has fuelled Killingray’s argument that the belief ‘certain peoples or societies had a special capacity for military service – was largely a colonial construct’.32 Yet, Douglas Peers has shown these representations pre-dated the uprising as early as the 1830s.33 Officers such as George MacMunn, who wrote The Martial Races of India (1933) following lengthy service in the Indian Army, were ‘invested in the truth of the martial race ideology’.34 [ 4 ]

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For MacMunn, it was not a colonial fabrication for dividing and ruling ‘natives’, but knowledge gained by personal experience. Rather than simply being an imperial imagining, which ascribes a passive role on the colonised and overlooks their own agency, martial race identity, though manipulated and distorted, nevertheless held some element of empirical reality. David Omissi supports this by highlighting the ‘customs and self-image of Indian communities who had 35 a martial tradition quite independent of the colonial encounter’. In many instances, the people documented in colonial, anthropological and military surveys believed in their own martiality, having been personally involved in combat or had that group identity reinforced through the commemoration of ancestral battles, wearing it as a badge of honour for social or economic gain. Cynthia Enloe has termed this ‘Gurkha syndrome’, where poorer rural groups embraced martial identity to access military employment, and were ‘amenable to discipline’ because their community’s livelihood depended upon it.36 It represented a form of imperial ‘collaboration’,37 being mutually beneficial for both coloniser and colonised to cultivate that identity. This could produce ‘a circular, self-replicating effect’ whereby ‘supposed martial races became more warlike precisely because it was expected of them’.38 These social pressures came from the community as well as the colonial power, reflected by Jaswant Singh Gill, the first Punjabi Sikh in the Malayan Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (MRNVR) and commander of Singapore’s independent navy: I’m from the Punjab … My grandfather was the ADC [Aide-de-camp] to King George V, my grandfather fought in the First World War, my uncles fought in the Second World War … as a community, we are a martial race … it comes naturally to us … Our community says you are a martial race, you know, you are a soldier, you fight … The British never said ‘you are a martial race’ and therefore you become a martial race, no no, we were already a martial race, the only thing the British realised was that we were a martial race … soldiering comes to us naturally.39

Heather Streets has confronted why martial race theory continues to provoke historical debate, concluding that, ‘the power of martial race ideology stemmed from its very flexibility and ambiguity: it was adaptable to a variety of historical and geographical situations and functioned alternatively to inspire, intimidate, exclude, and include’.40 As Gill demonstrates, this geographical flexibility extended beyond land across the sea, so how did this military discourse affect colonial naval forces? In 2004, reflecting upon the ethnic specialisation of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company and Straits Steamship Company, John M. MacKenzie [ 5 ]

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postulated that ‘we are all familiar in imperial history with the theory 41 of martial races, but what of the notion of maritime races?’ This question has been left unaddressed, though work on Kru naval recruitment in West Africa42 and South Asian lascars43 indicates that the theory holds some water. Frances Steel, in her pioneering study of Pacific maritime labour, has argued that in 1903: Stokers who ‘belonged to the northern and warlike races’ impressed the [Mercantile Marine] Committee ‘with their manly character’ … As mercantile ships were likely to be requisitioned for fighting forces, questions of loyalty and strength were paramount … This created a tenuous position for Indian sailors: the traits that made them superior, favoured for their ‘submissive’ nature, also made them inferior, derided for lack of courage and tenacity under fire.44

Such attitudes were reflected in 1934, when the auxiliary Royal Indian Marine became the Royal Indian Navy. Whereas Ratnagiri Muslims from the Konkan Coast were previously recruited, being fishermen descended from Indian Ocean traders who possessed an ‘old seafaring instinct’,45 there was a shift after to more martial Punjabi Muslims, for ‘as a gunnery signal or any other kind of specialist the Punjabi Mussalman was way ahead of the Ratnagiri’.46 Although they were acknowledged as ‘good seamen’, Ratnagiris were considered ‘of a low standard of education and with few natural martial qualities’,47 and it was the Punjabi’s ‘better I.Q. plus guts which count[ed]’.48 This was important for the Indian Navy’s combatant role, and its acquisition of more complex warships. India will not feature prominently in this book as its navy had roots in the seventeenth century49 and the country’s unique political and legislative position within the British Empire meant that the 1931 Colonial Naval Defence Act (CNDA) did not apply there. Other examples will be presented, however, that indicate a theory of seafaring races did influence naval officials involved in recruiting and managing colonial personnel, suggesting it was an imperial trend rather than a local anomaly. Though similarities existed in the racial stereotyping and discourses used by colonial officials, naval recruiters did not automatically seek out the, predominantly rural, martial races. Logically, the Navy preferred to target coastal or riverine peoples who had nautical traditions in fishing and maritime trade. Not only did they already possess knowledge of seamanship and navigation, but it was also believed this elemental outlet for their energies gave them a healthier constitution and fortified their character. Environmental factors thus influenced racial identities, with these groups possessing a ‘call of the sea’ that [ 6 ]

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beckoned them to life on the waves and made them willing naval volunteers. When martial races were recruited by the Navy, such as Punjabis and Kenya’s Kamba, while they offered redeeming qualities such as courage, they were primarily selected because the educational standard of local maritime communities disqualified them from operating technically sophisticated naval equipment. Therefore, just as ‘precolonial prowess was no guarantee of martial status under British 50 rule’, nor did colonial fishermen automatically represent ‘seafaring races’. Like martial race theory, naval recruits had to be disciplined, follow orders unquestioningly and, most importantly, be relied upon to support the colonial regime against internal as well as external enemies. Seafaring race theory was therefore used to strengthen British power by promoting imperially loyal groups at the expense of potentially anti-colonial ones, justified on grounds of ‘racial’ suitability for naval service.

Structure The book’s first chapter contextualises the study by examining the nineteenth-century origins of naval volunteerism, the power of ‘prestige’, and how the Washington Naval Treaty and geopolitical tensions of the interwar years led to the formation of fifteen colonial naval reserves in rapid succession. In considering these developments, the long-running debates surrounding British imperial overstretch are reassessed. The book then explores different colonial naval experiences across four major regions of the Empire. Part I focuses on the Caribbean. Britain’s West Indian colonies were an increasingly costly legacy of early imperial expansion as their value declined with market demand for traditional cash crops, a situation exacerbated by the Great Depression. Economic exploitation and poor social and working conditions fuelled labour unrest and nationalist agitation in the 1930s, raising internal defence costs. Yet the region was strategically important for containing the only oil-producing territory in the formal Empire, and Britain’s primary source in the western hemisphere: the island of Trinidad. Since the First World War, the Royal Navy had moved from coal powered to oil fired ships, making the security of Trinidad in the service’s direct interest.51 The Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (TRNVR) was formed to defend this supply, whilst also serving a political purpose as a bulwark for British imperial prestige in the Caribbean. The latter was threatened not so much by Nazi Germany, as by anti-colonial nationalism and Britain’s ‘ally’ the United States, which acquired bases throughout the region. The Caribbean therefore provides an important case for [ 7 ]

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analysing British responses to declining imperial influence before decolonisation. Chapter Two considers the key colonial concerns of oil and labour in Trinidad, tensions of imperial versus local defence, and issues raised by naval recruitment and expansion. It analyses the social and cultural effects of the American ‘invasion’ following the 1940 Destroyersfor-Bases Agreement; the significance of calypso warriorhood and masculinity to naval volunteering and culture; the role of wartime propaganda in reinforcing imperial hierarchies; and debates regarding the post-war imperial mission of the local Navy, centring on issues of Caribbean politics, prestige and prejudice. When the TRNVR extended recruitment across the Caribbean, it raised issues around the status of different West Indian groups, with 52 the British exhibiting particular preference for Cayman Islanders. Chapter Three therefore provides a point of ethnic comparison by examining the experience of the Cayman Islanders who volunteered to serve in the TRNVR. It explores the ideological motivations for volunteers and the naval recruiters selecting them; the impact of colonial prejudice and cross-cultural interactions; the causes and effects of service discontent and protest; the role of seafaring identity in cultivating imperial and naval loyalty, and its effects on historical memory. Part II provides the African case study, focusing on Kenya and Zanzibar before and after the Second World War. Kenya was the first colony in the Empire to establish its own naval force following the 1931 CNDA, though the scheme was mooted a decade earlier in local response to the Washington Naval Treaty. Local naval forces would also be formed in Zanzibar and Tanganyika, while Uganda contributed men and money to Kenya. During the Second World War, these units faced the Italians in East Africa and were deployed to the Middle East, while Mombasa became the headquarters for the Eastern Fleet’s campaign against the Japanese following its retreat from Singapore and Ceylon. It provides a unique case for analysing the close deployment of naval forces from a colony, protectorate and mandate territory; the legal, political and operational ramifications of such distinctions; and the ongoing importance of collaborating local elites to the navy and empire when faced with competing forms of African and Arab nationalism. Chapter Four examines traditions of Royal Navy recruitment in the region, and the influence of racial theory and naval theatre on colonial control; the nexus between imperial and local politics and strategy in establishing naval forces in East Africa; the economic and symbolic significance of collaborating indigenous elites in recruitment [ 8 ]

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and propaganda; the ceremonial role of the Navy and imperial naming rituals in cultivating colonial navalism; the support of business and women; cultural, political and legal obstacles to naval amalgamation; and the effects of manpower shortages and compulsory service upon the Navy’s racial management. Chapter Five examines the influence of colonial development discourse on naval and imperial strategy in post-war East Africa; issues regarding ethnic recruitment and management, ethnic preferences, racial prejudice, indigenous customs, and pay; how colonial navalism was nurtured through warship visits, royalty, propaganda, trade fairs and youth organisations; the role of naval welfare schemes in social, economic and character development; the Navy’s aid to the civil power during the Mau Mau Emergency; Britain’s declining influence and the Navy’s attempts to secure the continued support of the Zanzibar Sultanate; and the impact of divergent Tanganyikan and Kenyan nationalist ideologies upon naval and political federation. Part III moves the analysis to Southeast Asia. Much has been written on Singapore’s naval base, constructed between 1923 and 1938 at great expense, which did little to prevent the fall of Malaya and the Straits Settlements to Japan on 15 February 1942 after just eight days of 53 fighting. Yet, local naval defence did not rest solely on this imperial white elephant, and the largest contingent of colonial naval personnel outside of India was raised in Southeast Asia. Malaya was the only dependency to form a full-time naval force in the 1930s, the Royal Navy (Malay Section), colloquially known as the ‘Malay Navy’, while reserves were established in Singapore and Penang. Following defeat at Singapore, the survivors of these forces continued to fight until the end of the war, mainly from Ceylon but also Australia, East Africa, and in the clandestine Force 136. The Malayan Emergency of 1948 to 1960 and the Indonesian Confrontation between 1962 and 1966 meant that Southeast Asian naval forces continued to have a post-war relevance. The Cold War and regional decolonisation meant that, rather than dying with British colonialism in 1957, the colonial naval force became the foundation for an independent Malayan/Malaysian Navy. It thus provides a valuable study for analysing imperial transition and nationalisation. Chapter Six examines the origins of Southeast Asia’s naval forces; the influence of racial ideology upon naval recruitment and local ethnic politics; the cultural impact of the Second World War, and the effects of evacuation and exile upon imperial and service unity; the re-establishment of Britain’s imperial and naval presence in Malaya, and issues of force expansion and nationalisation, or ‘Malaysianisation’, during the Emergency and decolonisation. [ 9 ]

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Part IV presents the final case in East Asia. The primary threat that preoccupied British naval thinking for most of the interwar period was Japan, with colonial naval development largely a response to this. The danger loomed larger for one colony situated virtually on Japan’s doorstep: Hong Kong. This section focuses on the Hong Kong Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (HKRNVR), and how it developed in response to internal and external political and strategic pressures. Chapter Six shows that the Navy were initially reluctant to recruit Chinese into the Southeast Asian forces because of racialised fears concerning their social and political allegiances. With an overwhelming Chinese majority in Hong Kong, their enlistment in the HKRNVR was unavoidable, yet prejudices remained that would influence and inhibit the force into the 1960s as Britain adjusted to a different threat posed by Mao’s People’s Republic of China (PRC). Naval recruitment and management in Hong Kong thus came to reflect deeper imperial anxieties about British prestige shaken by the Second World War and how to maintain Britain’s isolated position in that small enclave surrounded by over half a billion ‘Chinamen’. Chapter Seven analyses Hong Kong’s naval development in relation to Japanese expansionism and the local impact of the European war. It examines the influence of Orientalist discourse on local naval politics; the cultivation of colonial navalism through naval theatre; how the colony’s socio-economic heritage as an entrepôt fostered cultural prejudices regarding the reliability and loyalty of its transient population, creating problems for wartime mobilisation and compulsory service; the causes and impact of naval desertions following Japanese nd invasion in December 1941; the ‘heroic myth’ of the 2 Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) Flotilla’s escape, Confucian influences on Chinese naval culture, and the collaborative role of Admiral Chan Chak. Chapter Eight examines the post-war evolution of Hong Kong’s naval force as it adjusted to the changing geopolitical landscape of the Cold War; Communist China’s emergence, Britain’s declining world role and European insecurities on the edge of empire. It explores the Navy’s role in restoring imperial ‘face’ in East Asia; the effects of racial grouping and compulsory service on naval reconstitution; the impact of rioting and unrest within the colony and the Navy; and the political and strategic impulses behind colonial naval disbandment. The concluding chapter draws out common and contrasting themes to demonstrate the wider cultural, social and political significance of colonial naval forces to British imperialism during the endgame of empire.

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Notes  1  First coined by John S. Galbraith, ‘The “Turbulent Frontier” as a Factor in British Expansion’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January, 1960), pp. 150–168.  2  Jan Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, 2007).  3  Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983).  4  A distinctly naval variation on martial race theory.  5  N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649– 1815 (London, 2004).  6  Andrew Lambert, ‘History as Process and Record: The Royal Navy and Officer Education’, in G.C. Kennedy & K. Neilsen (eds.), Military Education: Past, Present and Future (Westport, 2002); Andrew Lambert, ‘The Development of Education in the Royal Navy: 1854–1914’, in G. Till (ed.), The Development of British Naval Thinking: Essays in memory of Bryan Ranft (Abingdon, 2006) pp. 34–59.  7  Quintin Colville, ‘Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer: The Role of Uniform in Shaping the Class – and Gender-Related Identities of British Naval Personnel, 1930– 1939’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th series, Vol. 13 (2003), p. 105.  8  Max Jones, ‘“The Surest Safeguard of Peace”: Technology, the Navy and the Nation in Boys’ Papers, c. 1905–1907’, in Andrew Lambert, Jan Rüger and Robert J. Blyth (eds.), The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age (Surrey, 2011), p. 109.  9  George Sydenham Clarke, quoted in Rüger, The Great Naval Game, pp. 175–176. 10  Duncan Redford (ed.), Maritime History and Identity: The Sea and Culture in the Modern World (London, 2013). 11  Duncan Redford, The Submarine: A Cultural History from the Great War to Nuclear Combat (London, 2010). 12  James Davey, ‘The Naval Hero and British National Identity, 1707–1750’, in Redford (ed.), Maritime History and Identity, pp. 13–37. 13  Quintin Colville, ‘Corporate Domesticity and Idealised Masculinity: Royal Naval Officers and their Shipboard Homes, 1918–39’, Gender and History, Vol. 21, No. 3 (November, 2009), pp. 499–519. 14  Mary A. Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack: Representing naval manhood in the British Empire, 1870–1918 (Manchester, 2009). 15  Cindy McCreery, ‘Telling the Story: HMS Galatea’s Voyage to South Africa, 1867’, South African Historical Journal, Vol. 61, No.4 (2009), pp. 817–837. 16  Robert Holland, Blue-Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean since 1800 (London, 2012). 17  Jonathan Rayner, The Naval War Film: Genre, History and National Cinema (Manchester, 2007). 18  Victoria Carolan, ‘The Shipyard Worker on Screen, 1930–1945’, in Redford (ed.), Maritime History and Identity, pp. 142–159. 19  John C. Mitcham, ‘Navalism and Greater Britain’, in Redford (ed.), Maritime History and Identity, p. 288. 20  David Killingray, Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War (Woodbridge, 2010). 21  Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King’s African Rifles, 1902–1964 (Oxford, 1999). 22  Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig (eds.), Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia (London, 2006). 23  Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London, 2006). 24  James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia: A comparative study (Abingdon, 2013). 25  Dato’ Yusof Nordin and Abdul Razak Abdullah Baginda, Honour and Sacrifice: The Malaysian Armed Forces (Kuala Lumpur, 1994). 26  Royal Malaysian Navy (ed.), Serving the Nation (Kuala Lumpur, 2004).

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I N TRO D U C T IO N 27  My italics; ethnic rioting in Singapore in July 1964 and Kuala Lumpur in May 1969 would contradict this view. Chief Petty Officer Radiman, quoted in ibid., p. 8. 28  Barry M. Gough, ‘The Royal Navy and the British Empire’, in Robin W. Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume V Historiography (Oxford, 1999), p. 340. 29  Mitcham, ‘Navalism and Greater Britain’, p. 288. 30  First coined by Ngu˜gı˜ wa Thiong›o, Decolonising the mind: the politics of language in African literature (London, 1986). 31  George MacMunn, The Martial Races of India (London, 1933), p. 353. 32  David Killingray, ‘Guardians of Empire’, in Killingray and David Omissi (eds.), Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c.1700–1964 (Manchester, 1999), p. 15. 33  Douglas M. Peers, ‘“Those Noble Exemplars of the True Military Tradition”; Constructions of the Indian Army in the Mid-Victorian Press’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1997), pp. 109–142. 34  Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914 (Manchester, 2004), p. 2. 35  David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860–1940 (London, 1998), pp. 24–25. 36  Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in a Divided Society (Athens, 1980), p. 25. 37  Ronald Robinson, ‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration’, in E.R.J. Owen and R.B. Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972), pp. 117–142. 38  John M. MacKenzie, in Streets, Martial Races, pp. viii–ix. 39  Interview by author with Jaswant Singh Gill, 10 July 2009, Singapore. 40 Streets, Martial Races, p. 4. 41  John M. MacKenzie, ‘Lakes, rivers and oceans: technology, ethnicity and the shipping empire in the late nineteenth century’, in David Killingray, Margarette Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby (eds.), Maritime Empires: British Imperial Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2004), p. 125. 42  See George E. Brooks, The Kru Mariner in the Nineteenth Century: A Historical Compendium (Newark, 1972); Diane Frost, Work and Community among West African Migrant Workers since the Nineteenth Century (Liverpool, 1999). 43  See G. Balachandran, Globalizing Labour? Indian Seafarers and World Shipping, c.1870–1945 (Oxford, 2002); Georgie Wemyss, The Invisible Empire: White Discourse, Tolerance and Belonging (Farnham, 2009); Rozina Visram, Ayahs, Lascars and Princes: Indians in Britain, 1700–1947 (London, 1986). 44  Frances Steel, Oceania under Steam: Sea Transport and the Cultures of Colonialism, c.1870–1914 (Manchester, 2011), pp. 109–110. 45  The National Archives (hereafter TNA), ADM205/88, ‘India and the Sea’, 1953, p. 1. 46  National Maritime Museum (hereafter NMM), GOD/34, MS 80/073, James Wilfred Jefford, para. 34. 47  Godfrey quoted in Patrick Beesley, Very Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral J. H. Godfrey (London, 1980), p. 266. 48  NMM, GOD/34, MS 80/073, James Wilfred Jefford, para. 34. 49  Charles Rathbone Low, The Indian Navy, 1613–1863 (London, 1877). 50  Timothy Parsons, ‘“Wakamba Warriors Are Soldiers of the Queen”: The Evolution of the Kamba as a Martial Race, 1890–1970’, Ethnohistory, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1999), p. 672. 51  TNA, ADM1/10969, Minute Sheet No. 1, M.05222/39. 52  TNA, ADM1/23215, C-in-C America and West Indies to Captain-in-Charge Port of Spain, 4 March 1941. 53  See James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919–1941 (Oxford, 1981); Ian Hamill, The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia and New Zealand, 1919–1942 (Singapore, 1981); and W. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919–1942 (London, 1979).

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CHA P T E R O N E

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The origins of colonial naval development

The second half of the nineteenth century was already one of uncertainty for the British Empire and its collective security. The Crimean War and Indian Mutiny ‘illustrated the danger involved in undue dispersion of the armed forces of the Crown, and the necessity for taking steps whereby the overseas people of the Empire would provide, at least in part, for their own security’.1 The Volunteer movement emerging in Britain in response to possible French invasion ‘gave a stimulus and an example to the Colonies in the direction of self-defence’.2 The nautical nature of the British Empire meant imperial defence was invariably seaward in orientation, and the first CNDA was passed in 1865 to allow the white settler colonies to raise volunteer bodies for their local maritime protection. New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand formed small auxiliary naval units over the succeeding decades, though they were legislatively restricted to territorial waters.3 Imperial expansion and technological advances increased the cost of the Royal Navy for British taxpayers. The colonial empire, which derived defensive and economic benefits from a strong navy, contributed nothing. This drain on British finance and manpower led Liberal statesman Charles Dilke to argue in 1872 that ‘colonies are a source of military weakness to us, and our “protection” of them is a source of 4 danger to the colonists’. His argument for economic pragmatism was balanced by paternalistic concerns for colonial development, sentiments which would be echoed by later navalists: In war-time we defend ourselves: we defend the colonies only during peace. In war-time they are ever left to shift for themselves, and they would undoubtedly be better to do so were they in the habit of maintaining their military establishments in times of peace. The present system weakens us and them – us, by taxes and by the withdrawal of our

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men and ships; the colonies, by preventing the development of that selfreliance which is requisite to form a nation’s greatness.5

Later that decade, the issue of imperial defence expenditure provoked public debate between William Gladstone and noted journalist Edward Dicey. Dicey argued in 1877 that ‘greatness depends in no small measure upon the estimate formed of our power by foreign countries. Prestige is to a nation very much what credit is to an individual’.6 It subsidised defence expenditure, as ‘no thinking man can compare the immensity of our transactions with the smallness of the forces at our disposal without being conscious of how much we owe to prestige’,7 but it needed maintaining by extending the Empire when threatened by capricious rivals. Gladstone warned that this risked overcommitting Britain administratively, financially, and strategically, but the 1878 Russian war scare impelled the creation of the Carnarvon Commission the following year, ‘to enquire into the defence of British possessions and commerce abroad’, which reported back in 1882 that ‘the time, in our opinion, has arrived when the Colonies may reasonably be expected to take upon themselves some share of that defence’.8 A colonial conference was subsequently convened in 1887, where it was agreed that Australia’s colonies and New Zealand would contribute £122,597 annually towards the maintenance of a local Royal Navy squadron. For Colonial Secretary Sir Henry Holland, this was a token gesture ‘trifling in comparison’ to Britain’s peacetime naval expenditure of over £13,000,000.9 The impending naval arms race with Germany exacerbated this disparity, as Britain tried to maintain a twopower standard established by the 1889 Naval Defence Act, whereby the Royal Navy would match its two largest rivals combined. The British Navy League emerged in 1895 out of anxieties about the state of the Royal Navy and imperial defence, and established branches throughout the Empire. The League’s campaigning whippedup navalism and prompted the formation of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) in 1903. Unlike the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) formed in 1859 from the ranks of the merchant navy, the RNVR was 10 open to civilians. Across the North Sea, the rapidly expanding Imperial German Navy forced the Admiralty to recall warships from overseas stations. This was partly offset by the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which left the defence of Britain’s Australasian territories to the Imperial Japanese Navy. More significantly, this represented a point when the Royal Navy was unable to meet its imperial commitments singlehandedly. At the Colonial Conference that same year, Joseph Chamberlain appealed to the ‘white’ empire for help: [ 14 ]

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TH E O RI G I N S O F C O LO N I A L N AVA L D E V E L O P M E N T

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We do require your assistance in the administration of the vast empire which is yours as well as ours. The weary Titan staggers under the too vast orb of its fate. We have borne the burden for many years. We think it is time that our children should assist us.11

The Royal Navy’s withdrawal to European waters brought home the reality that the metropole’s defence would take priority over the colonies’, something borne out in both World Wars. This was emphasised in 1910 by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), which admitted that more remote parts of the Empire might have to be sacrificed for Britain’s security: To avoid exposing our fleets to the risk of suffering defeat in detail, naval action in remote waters might therefore have to be postponed until by clearing of the situation in home waters adequate naval force could be brought to bear.12

Chamberlain’s ‘weary Titan’ analogy has led some to argue that Britain had faced imperial overstretch, or strategic overextension, from the turn of the century. Paul Kennedy has posited that as nations ascend they expand beyond their natural borders, acquiring territories and additional strategic responsibilities. This continues until the defensive cost of empire exceeds its economic benefits, at which point the nation declines and is eclipsed by others who have not yet acquired those burdens.13 Kennedy argues that this happened to Britain at the turn of the twentieth century, as it faced increased defence expenditure with relative industrial and economic decline.14 Corelli Barnett15, Bernard Porter16, and Patrick O’Brien17, have also argued that the costs of administering and defending the Empire effectively stifled Britain’s economy prior to 1914, with Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback asserting that ‘of all the subsidies enjoyed by the colonies, none was more lucrative than that for defence’.18 This is demonstrated by Table 1, which shows that the colonies contributed nothing towards naval expenditure. Historians, including P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, have contested the claim that imperial defence expenditure caused irreparable domestic damage, and present Britain as ‘formidably strong’ at the outbreak of the First World War due to her extensive financial interests, particularly in the informal or ‘invisible empire’.19 In 1991, Gordon Martel and colleagues challenged the imperial overstretch and decline theory.20 Martel argues that, rather than drain resources, ‘for the first time, Great Britain was able to use military power drawn from the empire to enable her to act as a terrene power on the Continent’ during the First World War.21 He adds that, in the interwar period, Britain ‘was more powerful that she had been for the 150 years that preceded the [ 15 ]

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Table 1  Imperial defence expenditure, 1908–10

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Year

Country

1909–10 1907–8 1907–8 1907–8 1908 1908 1908–9

UK Canada Newfoundland Australia New Zealand South Africa India Colonies Total Empire

Population Military Naval Total (million) expenditure expenditure expenditure (£million) (£million) (£million) 44.539 6.154 0.234 4.222 1.021 5.474 294.317 38.871 394.83

27.459 1.359 0.000 1.025 0.193 1.258 20.071 1.155 52.522

35.143 0.099 0.003 0.272 0.100 0.085 0.482 0.000 36.184

62.602 1.458 0.003 1.297 0.293 1.343 20.553 1.155 88.704

Second World War’, not merely ‘the pre-eminent world power’ but ‘the 22 only world power’. Avner Offer also supports this notion, suggesting that ‘over and above the private returns, Britain also acquired a strategic asset’ that ‘extended considerably Britain’s capacity to wage war, by adding to its military, demographic, and economic resources’.23 Furthermore, the logistical benefits that the colonies provided as naval bases and ‘links in the chain of steam-coal navigation and undersea cables’ offset their financial contributions.24 These claims have been taken forward by Ashley Jackson, who attests to the logistical strength of the Empire, a ‘global network’ facilitating ‘Britain’s capacity to move food, goods, munitions and troops from one side of the world to the other’, and offering vast manpower resources which could be mobilised for ‘total war’.25 Yet Jackson admits that this capability was neglected until after the Second World War broke out, with strategic planning failing to keep pace with technological and geopolitical developments; though the Navy’s prominence within imperial defence strategy was unquestioned, by 1939 ‘the gap between theory and actuality was now enormous … It was a classic case of imperial overstretch’.26 As the First World War showed, victory against Germany in the North Sea and Atlantic tied down almost every Royal Navy vessel, and was achieved only after extraordinary effort.27 Poor defensive preparations in the interwar years came for reasons of economy, domestic politics and international stability: A sated power, recovering from the First World War and the effects of the depression, with a population that would not hear of another war … elected governments only too pleased to translate this into cost-cutting

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action … To achieve their several aims, Britain’s naval power had to be crippled, and its Empire fundamentally weakened.28

Having fought a short-distance war, the Royal Navy ‘had to think again in terms of global strategy and to reconsider factors such as bases, endurance, and sea-keeping qualities in this light’.29 The Admiralty hoped to create an Imperial Fleet, bringing together all the Empire’s naval elements under a unified command. It was hoped the Dominions would partly fund this, but again they baulked at the cost, preferring to develop their own navies.30 The First World War left Great Britain, the United States and Japan as the three major naval powers in the world, all with vested interests in the Pacific. Wartime alliances quickly deteriorated into tension and suspicion, as the US and Japan embarked on naval construction programmes. In Britain, there was no longer the political or public support, the economic leverage or industrial capacity to compete with America in warship production, as Lloyd George admitted to the CID: [W]e could not fight the United States for economical as well as for military reasons … If the Committee were to decide now that Great Britain must enter into competition with the United States in naval shipbuilding … We should be up against the greatest resources of the world. We should be up against a growing and intensely virile population … No British statesman, therefore, could commit his country to what might be a disastrous rivalry.31

The solution was a policy of naval arms limitation, agreed at the Washington Conference of 1921–22; a ten-year restriction on capital ships by a ratio of 5:5:3, with Britain and the US allowed tonnage of 525,000 each, and Japan 315,000 tons.32 To ensure American acquiescence, Britain had to terminate its alliance with Japan. Though the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty preserved good relations and maintained naval parity with the US, it decreased Britain’s security in the Asia-Pacific by turning Japan into a potential enemy. It meant increased responsibilities for the Royal Navy, as Britain’s possessions in the region had been guarded by Japan. This prompted the construction of the Singapore naval base between 1923 and 1938 at four times its estimated £13 million cost,33 adding further financial strain despite subsidies from the Straits Settlements, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and the Federated Malay States. The strategic imperative given to Singapore was why the British withheld it from article XIX of the Treaty, which established that the ‘status quo … with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained’ east of the meridian of 110° east longitude.34 This encompassed Hong Kong [ 17 ]

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and Fiji, meaning naval forces needed to play an even more fundamental role in the defence of those colonies, and the long-established 35 policy of not tying warships to bases would have to be revised. On 14 December 1922, the CID suggested establishing a RNVR in Hong Kong to compensate for its physical defence restriction.36 The idea of colonies contributing to imperial defence by raising local RNVRs was suggested to the Imperial Cabinet the previous year. The Washington restrictions forced a new one-power standard, whereby local forces would plug strategic gaps until the Royal Navy could respond: The requirements of a one-Power standard are satisfied if … arrangements are made from time to time in different parts of the world … to enable the local forces to maintain the situation against vital and irreparable damage pending the arrival of the Main Fleet.37

Under this doctrine, ‘local superiority was not required, and local naval forces could be inferior in strength until the arrival of the main battle fleet’.38 Despite the disadvantage, the Royal Navy believed that ‘British material and superior training would produce decisive results against Japan’.39 Such arrogance was born out of imperial discourses of power, particularly Anglo-Saxonism and Orientalism,40 which established a racial hierarchy justifying British leadership over the ‘backward’ East, with Japan having ‘modernised’ its navy after the Meiji Restoration by following the Royal Navy’s paternalistic example. Racial prejudice also influenced the opinion that naval reserves were only viable in colonies possessing sizeable European communities: Difficulty may exist in raising local forces of the RNVR in India and in those Colonies where coloured races predominate … this should not prevent the formation of local detachments composed entirely of Europeans, for it will probably be found at large and prosperous ports, where a considerable proportion of the white community are connected with shipping, and where yachting may be indulged in, that service in a naval corps would be attractive.41

In 1923–24, the Special Service Squadron (SSS), led by the battlecruisers HMS Hood and Repulse, toured the Empire in the hope they ‘would undoubtedly arouse much interest and enthusiasm and would facilitate the successful adoption of any schemes for the successful co-operation in the Naval defence of the Empire’.42 Though the Dominions remained the primary focus, elements of the SSS visited several dependencies where naval volunteer forces would later emerge, notably Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanganyika, Malaya, the Straits Settlements of Penang and Singapore, and Fiji. [ 18 ]

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The economic problems of the interwar years took their toll on the Navy, which had already had its better than two-to-one budgetary superiority over the army reversed, while its percentage of national expenditure dropped dramatically.43 Yet the battleship remained central to the Admiralty’s strategic doctrine into the 1930s,44 meaning auxiliary fleet operations such as anti-submarine (A/S) warfare, minesweeping and local patrolling were neglected, despite the security of colonial harbours being vital to a roving fleet strategy. Brassey’s Naval and Shipping Annual in 1931 painted a bleak assessment of the Royal Navy, as ‘less money is spent on it; there are fewer ships in hand; [and] replacements are not being provided for as they become due’.45 This sentiment was echoed to the Committee on Disarmament in April that year, with Britain having disarmed the most whilst investing least in modernising its ships, coastal defences, and maintaining auxiliary services, it was considered that ‘both absolutely and relatively the strength of the Royal Navy had declined’.46 By 1933, British naval spending was well under the record low set in 1924, at just 6% of Government expenditure.47 In response, the Admiralty increasingly looked to devolve the Royal Navy’s colonial responsibilities to local reserve units. Lower colonial wages, subsidised by their legislatures, presented potential relief to its strategic, financial, and manpower deficits. Director of Plans Captain W.G. Egerton argued at the Overseas Defence Committee (ODC) meeting of 23 May 1927, that the best way the: British Colonies could co-operate in the naval defence of the Empire … was by the organisation of local minesweeping forces, manned by local branches of the Royal Naval Reserve or Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve ... The most important aspect of this question was the organisation of local minesweeping services to ensure that sporadic minelaying would not bring the overseas trade of the Colonies to a standstill, and thereby dislocate the steady flow of shipping on which the empire depended for its very existence.48

Having learnt from past difficulties with the Dominions, the Admiralty had ‘no intention of plunging into the old controversy of direct money contributions versus local defence forces’,49 and a new CNDA was passed in 1931. In looking to relinquish these responsibilities, the Admiralty admitted its resources were too stretched to secure colonial trade, as its own minesweepers ‘would be required elsewhere … for keeping the approaches to the Fleet anchorages clear and for safeguarding the approaches to the home ports’.50 The metropole’s defence was thus again placed above that of the colonies, despite rising tensions in the East. [ 19 ]

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Japanese expansionism was finding expression with the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931. More worrying was the short war from January to March 1932 between Japanese and Chinese Nationalist armies in Shanghai, which threatened Britain’s economic interests in China and stirred fears of imperial retreat: Preliminary measures could be adopted – such as rupture of diplomatic and economic relations – but in the end Japan can only be checked by force. Ultimately we will be faced with the alternatives of going to war with Japan or retiring from the Far East. A retirement from the Far East might be the prelude to a retirement from India.51

As in Dicey’s day, ‘Britain’s prestige had to be maintained, for it was on this national asset that possibilities for profitable trade and financial gain depended’.52 Yet, in this regard, Britain ‘lived on illusion. She was conscious of being over-extended and felt vulnerable in the face of actions from restless powers’.53 By the Tientsin crisis of June 1939 British prestige had diminished to the point where Japan publicly demanded Britain renounce the Chinese Nationalists, leading Lord Chatfield to comment that Japan ‘trading on our relatively weak naval position, was insulting British nationals in Tientsin, in a manner that would have made a Georgian or Victorian statesman issue violent ultimatums’.54 The Manchurian, Shanghai and Tientsin crises demonstrated Britain’s unreadiness for an Asian war, and a review of military expenditure in September 1933 gave short-term priority to improving the defence of possessions there.55 It would be short-term as threats emerged closer to home. In 1930, France and Italy refused to limit their fleets, threatening Britain’s position in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the 1933 Defence Requirements Committee identified Germany as a potential enemy.56 At the London Naval Conference of 1935–36, First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Monsell admitted that the Royal Navy could not uphold its ‘world-wide responsibilities … for that would mean 57 denuding its home waters of naval defence’. Realities of naval overstretch and its limits on British power came to the fore during the Abyssinian Crisis of 1935. Britain’s pusillanimity towards imposing sanctions on Italy came from a fear that Japan would take advantage of any British distraction in the Mediterranean. In 1937 the Chiefs of Staff Committee acknowledged that, ‘we cannot foresee the time when our defence forces will be strong enough to safeguard our territory, trade and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously’.58 Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield reaffirmed this bleak forecast for colonial naval defence the following year: [ 20 ]

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Table 2  Colonial naval force complements

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Colonial Naval Force

Kenya RNVR Hong Kong RNVR Straits Settlements/   Malayan RNVR Ceylon RNVR Gold Coast NDF Gambia NVF Zanzibar NVF Trinidad RNVR Nigeria NDF Sierra Leone NVF Tanganyika NVF Fiji RNVR RN (Malay Section) Burma RNVR Mauritius CDS Total

Year Formed

Strength Mobilised in 1939

Greatest Known Strength

Officers

Men

Officers

Men

1933 1933

7 97

102 119

45 167

724 600

1934/1938

158

650

158

650

1934 1936 1938 1938 1939 1939 1939 1939 1939 1939 1940 1941

22 17 8 6 15 N/A N/A 11 4 N/A N/A N/A 345

142 53 32 52 110 N/A N/A 154 26 400 N/A N/A 1840

61 15 5 6 75 55 8 15 30 N/A 139 12 791

1127 40 63 52 1215 600 40 160 476 1450 1317 108 8622

Imperially we are exceedingly weak. If at the present time, and for many years to come, we had to send a Fleet to the Far East, even in conjunction with the United States, we should be left so weak in Europe that we should be liable to blackmail or worse.59

These geopolitical pressures forced Britain to abandon its racially prejudiced reservations regarding non-European colonial manpower. Between 1933 and 1936, indigenous naval units were established in Kenya, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Gold Coast, and Ceylon, while in 1934 the Royal Indian Marine became the Royal Indian Navy. In June 1938 the ODC conceded that British forces were ‘barely sufficient to meet the numerous threats which confront the Empire in all quarters of the world’, and beseeched that ‘every single Dependency, from the smallest and least well-endowed to the largest and most wealthy, has its 60 own part to play in Imperial Defence’. It was argued that the colonies could contribute to Empire security as a whole by taking responsibility for their own local naval defence, allowing the Royal Navy’s limited resources to be redeployed to meet greater threats elsewhere: At every defended port local naval forces have to be maintained for minesweeping and other local defence duties. For these purposes Naval

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Volunteer Reserve units are particularly valuable, since they enable a corresponding economy to be made in regular naval personnel, who can be more profitably employed in other duties requiring a higher standard of technical training.61

By the end of 1938, Gambia and Zanzibar had also formed their own Naval Volunteer Forces,62 while Penang hosted a Malayan branch of the RNVR. They were joined by Trinidad, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika and Fiji in 1939, Burma in 1940 and Mauritius in 1941. A full-time Royal Navy (Malay Section) was also formed at the start of the Second World War to provide Malay seamen for Royal Navy vessels deployed east, relieving Royal Navy regulars for duty in Europe. Together these forces contributed over nine thousand men to the Second World War. Yet, British naval and imperial power relied on psychological as well as physical fortification. Ged Martin has argued that the Empire was able to sustain itself by perpetuating ‘the convenient belief held by non-British people that armed forces could be summoned up at will for immediate deployment in any part of the world’.63 Ashley Jackson has also attested to the power that prestige continued to carry as a substitute for material strength, as Dicey had argued in the 1870s: Few people appreciated the yawning gap between defence theory on the one hand, and actual power on the other. Although this gap had been widening since the late nineteenth century, the illusion of Pax Britannica and the grey guardians roaming the sea lanes of the world was still etched on the British national consciousness, and on that of its Empire.64

Local naval units reinforced this illusion to colonial subjects, assuring them that British power was undiminished and mitigating the prospect of having to combat internal dissension at the same time as external aggression. Rüger has suggested that naval theatre could mask such gaps between theoretical and actual power by projecting ‘an image 65 of imperial strength that belied the strategic realities’. Though his comments were aimed at Britain and Germany in the years preceding the First World War, this book will show that naval theatre continued to be deployed in support of colonial naval forces and imperial prestige until decolonisation.

Conclusion Though the time and nature of imperial overstretch has been heavily debated, the interwar period was certainly one of relative decline for [ 22 ]

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the Royal Navy. The First World War galvanised aspiring naval powers in America and Japan, whilst leaving Britain politically and financially reluctant to pursue a new policy of navalism at home. The Washington Naval Treaty prevented another arms race and meant the Royal Navy was not eclipsed, retaining joint paramountcy with the US, but it forced the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, removing a layer of security in Asia. When Japan asserted itself more aggressively in the 1930s, it coincided with a more bellicose Italy and a resurgent Germany, thus Britain was faced with three major naval threats not one. In this scenario, Europe and the Mediterranean were always going to take priority over East Asia and other imperial ‘peripheries’. As a result, the Admiralty acknowledged it could no longer guarantee the Empire’s security, and pressured the colonies to raise men and money for their own naval forces. While they reinforced British prestige, this credit would be pushed to its limit by the Second World War and belied the strategic weaknesses that brought about the devolution of naval responsibility. The following cases will analyse colonial responses in more detail, assessing whether the physical and ideological role played by these naval forces fortified the Empire or whether the inherent inequalities and prejudices of the imperial system inhibited naval development, undermined British hegemony and contributed to postwar decolonisation.

Notes  1  Sir Charles Lucas (ed.), The Empire At War, Vol. I (Oxford, 1921), p. 77.  2  Ibid.  3  Bob Nicholls, ‘Colonial Naval Forces before Federation’, in David Stevens and John Reeve (eds.), Southern Trident: Strategy, History and the Rise of Australian Naval Power (Crows Nest, 2001), pp. 125–139.  4  Charles Dilke, ‘Greater Britain’, in Peter Cain (ed.), Empire and Imperialism: The Debate of the 1870s (South Bend, Indiana, 1999), p. 23.  5  Ibid.  6  Edward, Dicey ‘Mr Gladstone and Our Empire’, in ibid., p. 217.  7  Ibid.  8  Quoted in Richard Harding, ‘Review of Donald M. Shurman, Imperial Defence 1868–1887’, Journal for Maritime Research, Vol. 5 (2003).  9  Richard Jebb, The Imperial Conference, Vol. I (London, 1911), pp. 41–42. 10 Conley, Jack Tar to Union Jack, pp. 123–138. 11  Phillips Payson O’Brien, ‘The Titan Refreshed: Imperial Overstretch and the British Navy before the First World War’, Past and Present, No. 172 (August, 2001), p. 146. 12  Ibid., p. 155. 13  Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000 (London, 1988), pp. xv–xvi. 14  Ibid., pp. 224–232. 15  Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972), p. 120. 16  Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850– 1995 (London, 1996), p. 37.

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Colon i a l n ava l c u ltu re a n d B r it is h im p e r ia l is m , 1 9 2 2 – 6 7 17  Patrick K. O’Brien, ‘The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism, 1846–1914’, Past and Present, No. 120 (August, 1988), p. 200. 18  Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism (Cambridge, 1986), p. 145. 19  P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688–2000 (London, 2002), pp. 395, 405. 20  Gordon Martel et al., ‘The Decline of Great Britain’, The International History Review, Vol. 13, No. 4 (November, 1991), pp. 662–783. 21  Gordon Martel, ‘The Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great Britain’, in ibid., p. 687. 22  Ibid., p. 692. 23  Avner Offer, ‘The British Empire, 1870–1914: A Waste of Money?’, Economic History Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1993), pp. 234–236. 24  Ibid., p. 228. 25 Jackson, The British Empire, pp. 1–4. 26  Ibid., p. 14. 27  O’Brien, ‘The Titan Refreshed’, p. 153. 28 Jackson, The British Empire, p. 11. 29  The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J.H. Godfrey, iii, pp. 11–12, MSS. Churchill College, Cambridge, cited in Paul Haggie, Britannia At Bay: The Defence of the British Empire against Japan, 1931–1941 (Oxford, 1981), p. 1. 30  Nicholas Tracy (ed.), The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, 1900–1940, Publications of the Navy Records Society, Vol. 136 (Aldershot, 1997), p. ix. 31  TNA, CAB2/3, Committee of Imperial Defence, 134th Meeting, 14 December 1920. 32  United States Department of State, ‘Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1922’, Vol. 1, pp. 252–253, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pre-war/1922/ nav_lim.html. 33  TNA, ADM1/8715/189, Admiralty to the Colonial Office, 22 July 1927, p. 2. 34  United States Department of State, ‘Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1922’, p. 253. 35  TNA, ADM116/3125, ‘Remarks on Paragraphs in Detail, Part II’, p. 5. 36  TNA, CO323/902, Item 121, Committee of Imperial Defence to Admiralty, 21 March 1923. 37  CID, 1925, quoted in Haggie, Britannia At Bay, p. 7. 38  Andrew Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939: Preparing for War against Japan (London, 2004), p. 11. 39  Ibid. 40  Edward Said, Orientalism (London, 2003). 41  TNA, CAB21/187, Empire Naval Policy and Cooperation, February 1921, p. 44. 42  TNA, ADM116/2219, to Secretary, Treasury, 4 August 1923. 43  Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922 (Chicago, 1976), p. 109. 44 Field, Royal Navy Strategy, p. 14. 45  C. Robinson and H.M. Ross (eds.), Brassey’s Naval and Shipping Annual (London, 1931). 46  Quoted in Haggie, Britannia at Bay, p. 9. 47  Quoted in Field, Royal Navy Strategy, p. 43. 48  TNA, ADM1/8715/189, ‘Extract from 278th Minutes of the O.D.C. 23.5.27’, p. 1. 49  Original underlining. TNA, ADM1/8715/189, ‘Contributions by Colonies towards cost of Naval Defence’, 12 August 1927, p. 2. 50  TNA, ADM1/8715/189, ‘Extract from 278th Minutes of the O.D.C. 23.5.27’, pp. 1–2. 51  Documents on British Foreign Policy, Ser. 2, Vol. IX, No. 238, note by Sir J. Pratt, 1 February 1932, quoted in Ian Nish, ‘Japan in Britain’s View of the International System, 1919–37’, in Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919–1952: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 43–44.

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TH E O RI G I N S O F C O LO N I A L N AVA L D E V E L O P M E N T 52  Stephen Lyon Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933– 1937 (Manchester, 1975), p. 184. 53  Nish, ‘Japan in Britain’s View’, pp. 43–44. 54  Quoted in Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Strategic Illusions, 1936–1941 (Oxford, 1981), p. 35. 55  Nish, ‘Japan in Britain’s View’, p. 53. 56 Field, Royal Navy Strategy, pp. 43, 99. 57  Lord Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1936, cited in Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, p. 11. 58  Chiefs of Staff, 12 November 1937, quoted in ibid., p. 26. 59  Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield to Sir Thomas Inskip (Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence), 28 January 1938, quoted in ibid., p. 26. 60  Item 340: Memorandum ‘The Co-operation of the Colonial Empire in Imperial Defence’, signed by V. Sykes, Secretary, ODC, 8 June 1938, in Tracy, The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, pp. 587–593. 61  Ibid. 62  Nomenclature varied between colonial naval units. Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve status was granted once the force was offered to the Admiralty for general service by the colony’s Governor. 63  Ged Martin, ‘Was there a British Empire?’, Historical Journal, Vol. 15 (1972), pp. 562–569, cited in Keith Jeffrey, ‘The Second World War’, in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), p. 306. 64 Jackson, The British Empire, p. 15. 65 Rüger, The Great Naval Game, p. 241.

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PART I

The Caribbean

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A t l a n t i c

G u l f o f M e x i c o

O c e a n

Turks & Caicos (Jamaica)

Cayman Islands (Jamaica)

Montserrat Jamaica

C a r i b b e a n

Saint Christopher-Nevis Anguilla

S e a

Saint Lucia Saint Vincent Grenada

Antigua and Barbuda Dominica Barbados

Trinidad and Tobago 0

km

1000

Map 2  British West Indies, c.1939 03/09/2014 14:37

C HAP T E R TWO

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Trinidad

Oil and labour A detachment of petty officers and seamen from Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados served in the Royal Navy during the First World War,1 yet it was not until 1939 that serious discussion took place towards forming an indigenous naval unit in the British West Indies. Trinidad’s geographic position provided favourable currents into the western Atlantic Ocean, meaning that if the island fell into German hands the deployment of U-boats would pose a significant menace to British shipping by opening up a second Atlantic front. The Admiralty was in ‘no doubt that in war the safeguarding of oil supplies from Trinidad is one of the greatest importance … this is essentially an Imperial interest’.2 The island occupied a special place within the ‘official mind’3 due to it being the largest oil producer in the British Empire,4 supplying 38% of its consumption in 1938.5 That year the CID, on recommendation by the Oil Board, ranked the colony higher in strategic importance than Rangoon and Bahrain, due to its location west of the Suez/Mediterranean route.6 Any foreign occupation would also provide access to the vast oil fields of Venezuela. Furthermore, Trinidad possessed the world’s largest asphalt lake and it was strategically situated to protect the shipping of bauxite from British Guiana, a key component in radio and aircraft production. Business interests also pressed for stronger defences, but were primarily concerned with internal threats. Trinidadian nationalism had grown throughout the 1930s, evincing itself in labour protest and culminating in the bloody Butler riots of June 1937. There were fears this reflected a rising anti-colonial movement across the region, as economic deprivation and closed political channels in Jamaica caused island-wide demonstrations of striking, looting and violence in May and June the following year.7 During a Colonial Office meeting on 8 [ 29 ]

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TH E C A R IB B E A N 8 May 1939, the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ Ashley Cooper, Chairman of Trinidad Leaseholds Limited, raised the issue of labour agitation on the island. Construction of an iso-octane plant meant a ‘considerable amount’ of labour would have to be imported from other areas within and outside of Trinidad and Cooper feared these ‘explosive elements’ would ‘provide a good opportunity for agitators to raise trouble’.9 Twice in the preceding months they had sabotaged tanks at Kern Oilfields, and organised three strikes at Guayaguayare, two at Apex, and one at Pitch Lake. An expensive consequence was ‘insurance with Lloyds involved higher premiums for Trinidad than in most other parts of the world’.10 Cooper argued that ‘the situation would never get out of hand if half a Company of white troops were permanently stationed’.11 He believed that using black or ‘coloured’ troops would merely stoke the political flames of the labour movement. Though Governor Sir Hubert Young refused to admit Trinidad had a particular problem, he accepted that ‘it might be a good plan to have a local unit stationed near the oilfields’, as ‘the danger of internal trouble would be increased if external attack came’.12 It was suggested that HMS Terror, an Erebus-class monitor and guardship at Singapore, might serve this purpose. Yet the Admiralty dismissed the idea as impractical, as a floating battery would require a ‘considerable’ amount of A/S protection, and could only protect one of the two refineries.13 In July 1939, it dispatched Captain Charles Woodhouse in HMS Ajax to review Trinidad’s naval defence requirements, and create a concrete proposal for raising a naval volunteer reserve that the Colonial Office could take to the Governor.14 Once war broke out, it became ‘essential that the force should come into being without delay’,15 and the Trinidad Naval Volunteer Force (TNVF) was inaugurated in October 1939.

Legality Under the Naval Volunteer Ordinance passed by Trinidad’s Legislative 16 Council: 1. The colony may maintain and use ‘vessels of war’. 2. The Governor may offer to place said vessels at His Majesty’s disposal for general service in the Royal Navy. 3. Officers and men of the Force are liable to service and training outside the territorial limits of the colony. 4. Royal Navy regulations for the enforcement of discipline shall apply to the officers and men of the Force. 5. Officers and men may be entered into general service with the Royal Navy in emergency. [ 30 ]

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TRI N I D AD

Local ordinances were subject to the 1931 CNDA, in which naval forces raised within colonies were limited to ‘territorial waters’ unless placed by the Governor at ‘His Majesty’s disposal’; at this point the Admiralty would take over the naval force’s administration and could deploy it anywhere on the globe. There was an important political consideration behind this provision, as ‘upon the High Seas, in reference to other States and the Governments of other countries, it would be impossible for the Imperial Government to divest itself of the responsibility which might be incurred by the acts of Colonial 17 officers’. Such acts could contravene international maritime law, branding these ‘naval militia’ as privateers with captures ‘condemned as prizes’.18 Moreover, if a colony were able to project naval power independently beyond its territorial waters, it could enforce its own foreign policy and diminish its political reliance on Britain, strengthening colonial nationalism. Wartime expenditure on the TNVF greatly exceeded the peacetime estimate of $24,000 per year, prompting Governor Young’s offer to place the TNVF at ‘His Majesty’s disposal’.19 The Admiralty initially refused to take on the additional costs and administrative responsibilities,20 as they had hoped to reduce these through devolution to colonial units. Its rebuttal negatively affected force morale, causing ‘extreme disappointment’ amongst its members,21 whilst financial wrangling between the Governor and Admiralty inhibited the TNVF’s need for expansion to meet growing wartime commitments. This led the Commander-in-Chief of the America and West Indies Station to comment in December 1940 that ‘local Government has lost interest in [the] force and regards it as an incubus’, causing a ‘depressing effect on prestige and esprit de corps’.22 That the TNVF was administered by the ‘officer I/C [in command of] local forces who is an army officer’, was ‘undesirable in view of increasing importance of naval service in Trinidad’, with inter-service rivalry causing ‘administrative delays and disputes as to liability for certain expenditures’.23 Once it was agreed that the Trinidadian Government would provide a fixed annual defence contribution of $1.25 million to cover military and naval expenditure, the Admiralty finally accepted responsibility for the TNVF on 26 May 24 1941, granting it RNVR status.

Recruitment and deployment The TNVF started with a complement of 15 officers and 110 ratings under the command of Lieutenant-Commander D.S.G. Lindsay, former Commanding Officer (CO) of the Royal Canadian Navy minesweeper HMCS Festubert. Commissions were given to white, rural police [ 31 ]

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officers, colonial authority figures with experience of commanding black subordinates and preserving internal order, but possessing only 25 26 ‘average ability’, and little seagoing experience. Ratings came from the island’s black and East Indian communities. As Trinidadians were seen to lack natural ‘sea-mindedness’, the Royal Navy sent two retired chief petty officers to instruct the TNVF technically and ‘breathe naval atmosphere over it’.27 There were, however, ‘no syllabuses of instruction for officers or men, and recruit training, when given, never exceeded ten days’,28 with the legislative tug of war between the Admiralty and Trinidadian Government leaving the force understrength and ill-equipped to carry out its duties. The ‘fleet’ was initially comprised of just four motor launches (MLs) running ‘practically continuously’, the Lady Hollis, Berwind, Bin, and Lobilia, the last of which caused great ‘excitement’ amongst the men due to her ‘predilection for catching fire’.29 They were not armed to directly engage the enemy and resorted to filling the Bocas del Dragón (Dragon’s Mouth) with smoke should a raider approach. When Lady Hollis’ Lieutenant-Commander Blakeney warned a civilian vessel to stop for inspection, ‘or I will put one up your stern’, he drew only the dismissive response, ‘do not make so much noise or you will wake the passengers and if you get impudent I will drop a barrel of cement on you and sink you’.30 When the Italian freighter Alrinira Lights sank off Trinidad on 18 May 1940, it was ironically claimed that upon seeing ‘the formidable TNVF fleet she promptly scuttled herself!’31 Having not received any signal rockets, a local ‘expert’ was called in to trial his wares, but instead of going skywards, ‘Lindsay had to run for his life as the rocket chased him along the beach’.32 Poor accommodation meant cooking was done outside under palm trees, an exceedingly difficult task during the wet season. Once a signal station was built on Chacachacare Island in 1940 two donkeys had to be bought to keep the station supplied, and were named Ajax and Dundee after the visiting Royal Navy 33 warships. Local youth organisations were targeted to fill these gaps, with signalling duties performed voluntarily by senior Sea Scouts who were later absorbed into the communications branch.34 Amongst them was the future celebrated writer Samuel Selvon. Selvon left school in 1939 at sixteen, with his sole qualification being Boy Scout first aid. He initially worked in a garage, then as an oil field safety inspector, before volunteering for the TRNVR. Selvon admits, ‘I don’t think we had any idea of serving our country or defending our home island, no thought of fighting for humanity. To tell the truth our interest in the war was only casual and only the adventurous urge of youth [ 32 ]

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35 led us to volunteer’. Despite British doubts towards Trinidadian seamindedness, the strongest pull-factor for Selvon and his friend ‘B’ was the call of the sea:

May 1940 found me restless and eager to go to sea I used to talk of ships all day, and never a schooner or steamer or tanker pulled in at the jetty without our knowing … In San Fernando, where we lived, every spare hour was spent on the sea, and our parents were often scared to death when we were becalmed for hours in the Gulf and nightfall found us still at sea. Any mention of work on a ship was drowned with protests, and we decided we had to work out some scheme if our lust for sea life was to be satisfied.36

They were initially turned away at HMS Benbow, the Royal Navy shore establishment at Port of Spain, though they ‘pleaded in vain – even got patriotic’.37 If patriotism was merely deployed as a last gasp tactic to curry favour, the fact that ‘in the town, naval ratings looked especially smart in their khaki uniforms and peaked hats’,38 was a greater incentive. It represented camaraderie, status, and social acceptance, for without group membership sailors ‘looked indifferently to us, and laughed and joked among themselves. How we envied them!’39 Having been advised to try the TRNVR’s headquarters at Staubles Bay, they were told they would have to join the Communications Division as no additional seamen were required. Selvon served as a wireless operator on minesweepers and MTBs until the end of the war, from which he acquired the pen name Ack-Ack, being a signal code to identify unknown ships.40 His time in the Navy was a formative one for his literary career, as he used the long watches to write poetry and short stories,41 winning several prizes and leading the editor of the Naval Bulletin to commend ‘his style and ability as a coming journalist’.42 In 1942 Germany launched Operation Neuland, deploying 27 U-boats in the Caribbean by June, and sinking 385 merchant vessels that year 43 alone. The need for naval expansion to combat the submarine threat came when Trinidadians were being drawn to higher-paid construction work following the 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases agreement.44 The TRNVR already included British, Canadian, and South African officers, and Norwegians from the requisitioned minesweeping trawlers Ornen III and Thorvard.45 Additional recruits had to be sourced from Britain’s other West Indian colonies, with the first Guyanese and Caymanian volunteers arriving from July 1941.46 By 1945, the TRNVR had grown to 75 officers and 1,215 ratings, representing 12 different Caribbean territories.47 While the majority of ratings were classed as ‘coloured’, only 12 officers were non-white.48 [ 33 ]

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Table 3  TRNVR ratings per West Indian colony, April–June 1945

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Colony

Complement

Trinidad Barbados Caymans Grenada British Guiana Tobago St.Vincent St.Lucia Antigua St. Kitts Dominica Montserrat Total

501 349 124 56 53 39 36 33 13 3 3 1 1,211

American ‘invasion’ and calypso warriorhood The Destroyers-for-Bases agreement was signed on 2 September 1940, exchanging 50 antiquated US destroyers for military base rights on Britain’s West Indian territories. There was no consultation with the islanders over the lease, which ran for 99 years. In Trinidad, the main US naval base was built at Chaguaramas, adjoining the TRNVR’s Staubles headquarters. As with the TRNVR’s formation, strategic merits were bolstered by political arguments. Island elites saw the bases as ‘bulwarks of capitalism, miraculously at hand to help them in strangling at the birth, any post-war upsurgings of labour … “bastions against the infiltration of subversive doctrines” which they 49 had suspected of being at the core of the upheavals in the thirties’. Though ‘prominent leaders of various sections of the community’ in Trinidad, welcomed ‘greater affinity and understanding between the United States and Britain, we should certainly not wish to be alienated 50 from British sovereignty’. The Colonial Office also reported: a marked fear on the part of the West Indians that the establishment of the bases will affect British sovereignty in these ancient Colonies and derogate from their cherished British nationality … West Indians, in spite of their present poverty and their clear realisation of the financial benefits which will certainly accrue from the establishment of United States bases, are yet most apprehensive of the arrival of United States forces. This is due partly to a deep-seated loyalty and attachment to British traditions, and not less to the fear that American treatment of the Negro and coloured population will follow the lines notorious in the Southern United States.51

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To assuage fears, the April 1941 edition of the local Royal Navy journal, The Goshawk, carried a cover article titled ‘Our American Cousins’. There it was emphasised, with Anglo-Saxonist rhetoric, that ‘this is a British island and we are hosts to our American guests … we have a common cause, the liberating of the World from the contagious disease of totalitarian power … we stand for the progress of civilisation based on freedom’, which did not extend to colonial self-determination, as it 52 was asserted that ‘what Great Britain has she holds’. The influx of over 20,000 American servicemen had a profound effect on the political, economic and social dynamics of an island population of 510,000. American motives were ideological, strategic and economic, an extension of the Monroe Doctrine and assertion of US primacy in the Americas to protect the vital artery of the Panama Canal. Oil combustion engine aircraft and submarines ‘threatened to shrink considerably the degree of security that, until then, oceans such as the Atlantic and Pacific afforded to the United States’.53 This produced a raft of reports on America’s need for Caribbean, Atlantic and Pacific bases, with members of the US Congress and Navy Department lobbying for the country to purchase Europe’s Caribbean colonies as part settlement for First World War debts.54 This prompted an approach for the Cayman Islands in 1934.55 Until the 1970s, the US primarily imported oil from the circum-Caribbean,56 while 50% of its bauxite requirements came from the British and Dutch Guianas in 1939.57 Safeguarding the channels to these strategic raw materials was of extreme importance. Despite protests from Governor Young and local nationalists, 2,484 black American servicemen were stationed on Trinidad, creating a significant gender imbalance and increased competition for the island’s women. In their favour the Americans had ‘the attractiveness of their uniform, the possession of more money and time to enjoy it, and the novelty of being foreigners’.58 Prostitution rose exponentially, recorded in calypsos like Rum and Coca Cola, which told of ‘both mother and daughter/Working for the Yankee dollar’. Young women of Trinidad were ‘defying tradition, custom and authority for the generous rewards for sexual favours which the black Americans were willing to pay’, and 59 in doing so ‘threatened the social fabric of the community’. It caused acute resentment amongst local black males. Furthermore, ‘the unrelieved tension and inactivity in the Caribbean war theatre aggravated the ill feelings’, leading to ‘numerous incidents of trigger-happy [US] soldiers using the local inhabitants for target practice’.60 Emasculated Trinidadian men sought to reassert their masculinity through acts of crime and violence. Others drew on the tradition of the calypso warriors, defining their masculinity through military service in local volunteer forces such as the TRNVR, in pursuit of their own heroic deeds. [ 35 ]

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Though the travelling British journalist Arthur Calder-Marshall reported in the 1930s that ‘among the coloured people of Trinidad, I 61 met no one who felt loyalty to the Empire’, those who volunteered for the TRNVR audibly expressed their patriotism in musical form. As sea shanties have been synonymous with sailors for centuries, songs were also an important part of Trinidadian naval life. They carried added cultural currency through their manifestation in calypso, a musical form native to and deeply engrained within Trinidadian society, where calypsonians acted as social and political commentators. Sailors in the TRNVR adopted this mantle, the chorus of one original composition being: Commander Lindsay say Cheer boys cheer With unity and the TNV We gonna conquer Germany.62 Naval songs for Trinidadians were more than ditties sung to relieve boredom and pass the time. They were expressions of national identity. In this instance, traditional cultural forms were used not as anticolonial nationalistic expressions, but to reaffirm Trinidadian identity with the imperial cause, united by a common wartime enemy. This does not reflect Calder-Marshall’s observation, or Annette Palmer’s assessment that the situation did not improve once war began.63 There was clearly a degree of loyalty to Britain amongst those in the TRNVR, who chose to vocalise this unity in an indigenous manner. The above chorus was a pastiche of a famous patriotic calypso from the First World War by Henry Forbes: Run you run, Kaiser William, run you run Hear what Kitchener say: cheer, boys, cheer With surety and sincerity We going conquer Germany64 Another contemporary naval-themed calypso written by ‘Attila the Hun’, celebrated the destruction of the German pocket battleship Graf Spee, which had sunk nine merchantmen carrying food supplies to Trinidad: The sinking of the Admiral Graf Spee Must remain incontestably A monumental testimony To Britain’s naval supremacy.65 [ 36 ]

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Figure 1  TRNVR ratings at gun drill aboard a motor launch

These songs drew on calypso’s rooted association with battles and warrior deeds, providing a deeper cultural interpretation as to why Trinidadians enlisted in the armed forces. Modern calypso emerged from nineteenth-century calinda chants which accompanied stickfighter [ 37 ]

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duels, and had roots further back to the djeli, West African singers who would praise the heroic exploits of the village’s warriors and revile 66 its enemies. Calypso was overwhelmingly a male discourse, and the connection between masculinity and warriorhood was prominent in the formation of Trinidadian identity after emancipation.67 The stickfight itself was a crude metaphor for manliness, with the pointed sticks carved in the shape of phalluses. When Trinidadians enlisted for naval and military service they were doing so for more than just financial betterment, imperial patriotism and national honour; they were responding to the calypso warrior’s call. War allowed them to prove themselves as men and, more significantly, as Trinidadian men, an identity engrained through songs and traditions passed down through the island’s cultural heritage. When men of the TRNVR sang calypsos, they framed their own wartime exploits within this warrior tradition, in the process reaffirming their own masculinity which had been affronted by the American servicemen.

Imperial propaganda The Ministry of Information (MOI) and Colonial Office wanted to raise awareness in Britain of colonial naval forces, which had done ‘a most useful job of work and we feel that far more should be published about them in the Press’.68 It was not simply a case of giving colonial sailors the recognition they deserved; strategic, economic and political factors also influenced this attitude. One was the Admiralty’s: policy to encourage the establishment of local Naval Forces in as many Colonies and territories as possible … at the expense of the Colonial Governments concerned [for which interest] should not be allowed to falter ... If these Forces are to be maintained and if they are to be of the fullest value it is essential that a spirit of ‘esprit de corps’ should be fostered … we should display as much interest in them as possible, particularly in view of the fact mentioned by the Colonial Office that very satisfactory publicity has been given to Colonial personnel in the Army and RAF.69

Inter-service rivalry for colonial manpower was thus also a concern for the Admiralty, and a call was put out for ‘anything, in short, which would lend colour to a broadcast or published account of the work of these forces’.70 The most enthusiastic response came from the TRNVR, which had already been promoted in the local press. The Trinidad Guardian carried an article on 5 November 1939 celebrating ‘Trinidad’s Jack Tars’, stating that ‘all of them love the sea and most of them know the [ 38 ]

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71

waters they patrol as well as they know the streets of Port of Spain’, though this contradicted the Admiralty’s private assessment of Trinidadian sea-mindedness. Beneath the public plaudits designed to inspire colonial pride and support, lay an underlying sense of otherness and inferiority. On being asked how he liked the TRNVR, one signaller replied, ‘I love it’, with the reporter adding, ‘there was not much of the Silent Service in that crisp confession. It came straight from the heart. A smiling young Negro in three words spoke volumes.’72 Here British colonial authority was endorsed by projecting the eagerness of the ‘happy-go-lucky’ West Indian to serve the Navy. The MOI article, aimed at a different audience, attempted to relate the TRNVR to the British public. Trinidad was described as ‘an island a little larger that the County of Sussex’, where ‘cricket is their main recreation, but they also enjoy football’, while ‘American baseball is beginning to become popular’73 as a consequence of the cultural influence from the American base. Sport illustrated the paternalistic teachings of western civilisation, gratefully accepted by colonial peoples.

Figure 2  Cricket practice at the TRNVR training establishment, Staubles Bay

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Parts of the article read like a tourist brochure: ‘swimming always helps to keep the heat of the tropical sun from becoming duly oppressive’, while in Port of Spain ‘cinemas and clubs provide an assortment of entertainments’, without mention of its crime, violence, and poverty. No great sense of war or danger is conveyed. Instead, the TRNVR’s duties are described as ‘dull work’ which ‘in some small way’ will help bring about British victory: Their jobs in the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve are not exciting, and carry few thrills, and few thanks, but it is a job that has to be done, and they do it with a will, knowing that by so doing, they will assist in some way to shorten the war and allow them to get back to their jobs as fishermen, as cotton growers, sugar workers, and the numerous interesting West Indian industries.74

This allusion to West Indian industries evokes the imperial division of labour, likening the provision of naval manpower to raw materials. This was not an equal relationship; in both cases the colonies supplied their resources for the benefit of the metropole. The final paragraph emphasises that ‘the work that the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer

Figure 3  TRNVR ratings operating a depth charge thrower

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Figure 4  Commodore-in-Charge, Trinidad, inspecting the TRNVR at Staubles

Figure 5  TRNVR helmsman keeping forenoon watch

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TH E C A R IB B E A N 75 Reserve does has to be done by someone’, inferring that it was considered of low status, but suitable for colonials. The piece is less recognition of the TRNVR’s naval contribution and more propaganda for the imperial status quo, designed to reassure those in Britain whose confidence had been shaken that the Empire and their world status was not about to crumble. The photographs which accompanied the MOI’s piece visually emphasised this racial ordering, with white officers inspecting darker-skinned subordinates, who deferentially stood at attention and carried out duties under paternalistic British naval instruction.

Discrimination and disorder This implicit prejudice evinced itself in more overt racial discrimination towards TRNVR ratings at home and overseas. When the unit’s deployment to other theatres was under discussion, the Captain-inCharge at Port of Spain advised that ‘coloured and black ratings be considered for “tropical climates only”’, and with ‘forces already employing such persons’.76 The ‘professional ability’ of West Indians was only considered ‘sufficient for “second line” service’,77 and it was believed that ‘if ratings have to qualify in accordance with [Royal] naval standards, that the standard of intellect will debar practically all coloured and black ratings from general service in the Royal Navy’.78 Blaming their unsuitability on alleged racial deficiencies covered-up Britain’s own culpability in having provided inadequate facilities, equipment and training when the TNVF was formed. To highlight this failure in imperial leadership would have undermined their own supposed racial and moral authority, while it was tacitly admitted that TRNVR ratings could have been brought in line with those of the Royal Navy ‘provided that additional instructional staff and gear is made available, and colour is not a bar’.79 Racial prejudice also excluded non-white personnel from commissioned officer positions. Deemed ‘useful material if well led’, it was believed a ‘lack of imagination’ rendered them innately more ‘suitable for monotonous work, such as mine sweeping and local patrols’. Though it was reported that the West Indian ‘European’ had by and large made a ‘disappointing officer’, and required ‘considerable training 80 in an environment other than the West Indies’, this was instead attributed to the morally-sapping climate he inhabited. Enlightenment philosophers such as Hume, Montesquieu and Kant had believed northern Europeans possessed greater industry, discipline and intelligence because of their temperate climate, whereas the hot and humid tropics sapped energy and incited uncontrollable passions. From the [ 42 ]

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mid-nineteenth century such discourses evolved to highlight the climatic suitability of different ‘races’ and emphasise British superi81 ority to justify colonial rule, notions which still resonated for naval officials into the 1940s. The policy of awarding local officer commissions according to colour and social status rather than professional ability instilled a lack of respect towards the chain-of-command for men like Selvon: Clerks and businessmen who had no business in the Navy got commissions and spoke harshly to ratings to hide their inabilities. They shouted commands at you because they weren’t sure of what they were doing. They wore their uniforms smartly because that was one of the ways you knew they were officers. And they kept harping on at you to do this and do that, pull up your stockings, straighten your cap, and ‘wipe that grin off your face’.82

These opinions were shared by Caymanian ratings, who also considered that ‘some of the officers, especially the Trinidad officers or the rest of the Caribbean officers … actually didn’t know anything’ regarding the service.83 They had more respect for professional officers seconded from the Royal Navy, epitomised by a tall, blue-eyed Lieutenant known as G.P.: I’d trust him blindly, do anything he ordered. Out of the scores of men who wore officers’ uniforms, he was the only one who made us like being under his command. But for all that, I never thought of him as an officer so much as a rational human being. He was one who put ideals and high thoughts above everything. He was a thinker, then a gentlemen, then an officer … He was stern, but understanding. He was an officer, but he didn’t think it below his dignity to greet you with a good morning and a smile. He’d come and yarn when you were on duty, for he knew how difficult it was to keep awake when you were tired and sleep was just an eye-blink away … Other officers we feared or hated, but G.P. won our respect and admiration.84

This stemmed from the officer taking a genuine interest in the men under his command, their local culture and customs, and he was one of the first people to encourage Selvon’s writings:85 He ate ‘khaja’, ‘mitai’, and ‘mahambhog’ (Indian sweetmeats) and enjoyed them. After the meeting we had a chat with the Pundit, and he showed great interest in the Hindu religion. Afterwards he told me that he had learned a lot. On duty nights, I told him all I could of Trinidad. He wanted to know of our culture, our ways of living, our political trends.86

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Unfortunately this kind of cultural understanding was not commonly experienced, which is what makes G.P. so well remembered. During a port visit by a TRNVR vessel to Durban, South Africa, violent disturbances broke out after the local bars refused to serve TRNVR ratings. It had to be emphasised in the local papers the next day that they were 87 West Indians not Africans, and could share European facilities. Yet in Trinidad, if a black or ‘coloured’ rating committed an offence he was sent to the Royal Gaol amongst ordinary criminals, while ‘owing to no white warders being available, it was considered unsuitable’ for white ratings and officers,88 who were detained in the barracks instead. This discrimination led to racial disturbances on 14 and 15 May 1943 at the TRNVR headquarters in Staubles Bay. Two ‘coloured’ ratings, Ordinary Seamen Harrington and Thomas, had been arrested for disobeying orders, prompting a number of escape attempts and violent exchanges. Several guards refused to apprehend Thomas after he appealed that ‘they, as coloured men, should be his friend and not arrest him’,89 after which a white naval guard had to be sent from HMS Benbow. Meanwhile, four deserters took the opportunity to cause trouble on the base. The subsequent Board of Inquiry heard from one rating that: The coloured boys are under-rated to such an extent and maltreated that in every one of their faces you can just see discontent, hatred and even fear … they are being treated like slaves … we are volunteer soldiers of the Admiralty – we ought to have white rights … then you hear some fancified speeches about democracy.90

Service disenchantment was etched on the prison wall in the words, ‘God bless Hitler, God bless Uncle Sam and fook the TRNVR Navy’.91 Commander Wilkinson, the CO at Staubles, attracted criticism from both the men and naval officials. Nicknamed The Dragon, on account of his fiery personality and the dragon tattoos adorning each arm,92 thrice weekly he would intimidate the men by reading them the Articles of War, for which ‘Any man who shall desert in the face of 93 the Enemy – the Penalty is Death’. Unlike G.P., Wilkinson had come out of naval retirement, and was considered ‘unsympathetic as regards the interests of the men’. The Senior Naval Officer (SNO) Trinidad stressed that ‘the West Indian man … responds very readily to encouragement’, and ‘Wilkinson has failed in so far as he has not instilled this outlook in the officers’.94 The Board of Inquiry into the disturbances concurred that the ratings’ ‘ample cause for discontent’ had arisen from the ‘complete absence of sympathy for the men shown by the officers’.95 Wilkinson remained in his position, while the First Lieutenant, J.C. Anderson, was scapegoated and transferred out. [ 44 ]

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Discrimination also manifested itself in the rates of pay for TRNVR ratings, which ‘compared very unfavourably with the local military 96 forces’ and their British counterparts, and with no family allowance. This was revised after the disturbances, with ‘an increase to full British rates of pay for all personnel and the introduction of family allowances at full British rates for officers and 2/3 British rates for other ranks’.97 Feelings of discontent were not confined to prisoners, deserters or non-white personnel. On 5 July 1942, the white Guyanese Ordinary Seaman Edgar Mittelholzer, who like Selvon would become a renowned Caribbean literary figure after the war, submitted his letter of resignation after only ten months in the force. ‘Deeming it my duty to give some service to the Empire’,98 he had joined the TRNVR in what became ‘one of the blackest and most unpleasant interludes in his life’,99 and which caused him to lose ‘my spirit and enthusiasm for everything’.100 His resignation came after he was transferred from HMS Benbow to Staubles for able-bodied seaman training. Even if he passed the AB test, he would have received $17–$18 less victualling allowance there than if stationed in Port of Spain as an ordinary seaman. He was concerned about supporting his wife, whom he had married four months earlier, and having enlisted on the understanding that wives of naval men would be provided for. Upon taking his problem to Wilkinson, he was bluntly told, ‘you should have thought of that before you got married!’101 Mittelholzer added: I have a commanding officer who is harsh and unsympathetic and even indifferent and contemptuous of my domestic affairs … there isn’t a single man on this base who has a good word for Lt. Commander Wilkinson. Not ten minutes pass – and I mean this literally – without somebody uttering a resentful statement against this monstrous tyrant, and every day the grumblings of the men rise.102

The disregard for Mittelholzer’s domestic affairs contradicted official assertions that ‘one of the things we are supposed to be fighting for is 103 the protection of our homes’. Inflation from the influx of US dollars meant colonial servicemen struggled to provide for wives they feared might abandon them, as many did for Americans. Mittelholzer’s concerns thus reflected larger social and economic pressures, as the Admiralty recognised when it revised the marriage allowances after the mini-mutiny in Staubles the following year.104 Mittelholzer’s resignation was turned down and to get discharged he ‘had to feign madness and perform the works of a madman … storming into an officer’s room and carrying on in some outlandish manner’.105 Members of the force, including Selvon, believed that Mittelholzer [ 45 ]

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was genuinely mad, as his writing placed him outside the norms of colonial society:

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When I had left home in 1950, people who wrote poems or stories were definitely mad, only fit for the madhouse up in St. Ann’s. I can remember before I began to write seriously, seeing the Guyanese novelist Edgar Mittelholzer strolling around the Savannah in Port of Spain, and thinking to myself that this was the man that everybody said was crazy, that he wrote books, whoever heard of a thing like that?106

Post-war politics, prestige, and prejudice From mid-1944 – with Operation Neuland quelled, thanks largely to the US Navy – discussions began regarding the TRNVR’s future. Despite no obvious threat, a colonial naval presence was considered important to ‘keep the White Ensign flying permanently in areas which the Royal Navy could visit only occasionally, and where the presence of other flags (e.g. in the West Indies) makes the need so much greater’.107 The ‘other flags’ alluded to here were specifically the ‘stars and stripes’ of the United States. Since its signing, there had been widespread fears that the Destroyers-for-Bases agreement might lead to American colonisation of the British West Indies. These were flamed in April 1944 by the House of Representatives Naval Sub-Committee, who recommended permanent possession of the leased bases.108 ‘For political rather than Naval reasons’,109 it was suggested that a full-time colonial navy might provide a bulwark against any American designs, and ‘greatly assist in the task of keeping the Empire as a whole together and of upholding the prestige of His Majesty’s Forces overseas’:110 The presence of British Island possessions in what may be a permanent American sphere of influence requires a British Naval Force in being to assert sovereignty and keep intact the maritime rights and facilities required by British Sea Power … West Indian Governments, particularly those with American Bases in their midst, are sensitive to the indirect political pressure which the presence of U.S. Armed Forces exerts … they will press to have at least token British Forces in this area to act as a political counter balance.111

It was emphasised that ‘the necessity of encouraging citizenship and Empire responsibility amongst West Indians applies with equal force to local youth, and it is accentuated by the incidence of American occupation of bases in the West Indies’, which could be achieved through ‘the training and moral standards taught by the Navy’.112 [ 46 ]

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TRI N I D AD

Mr Archer, representative of the Leeward Islands, expressed that he ‘would like to see training carried on in the Colony – if only from a prestige stand-point …. the White Ensign could be hoisted, or perhaps a Club or some other focal point established where a naval atmos113 phere could be fostered’. It was also considered ‘most important that British prestige should be promoted in Windward Islands’, and the West Indian governors agreed sub-stations might be established at Castries, St. Lucia, or St. Georges, Grenada.114 St. Lucia was ‘not only one of the poorest areas of the West Indies but was regarded as one of the slums of the Commonwealth and among the most poverty stricken areas of the new world’.115 The island had depended on the coaling trade, in decline since the Navy and others moved to oil. The unemployment this created was ‘aggravated by the existence of an economy of “notorious artificiality”, associated with the availability of high-paying, short-term employment opportunities’ created by US military bases in the south of the island.116 A British naval station was considered a way of addressing this economic and political imbalance. Although most West Indian colonies contributed men to the TRNVR, the same could not be said of finance, which remained the responsibility of Trinidad’s Legislative Council, subsidised by the Admiralty during wartime. It was therefore suggested that personnel and monetary contributions towards a Royal West Indian Navy (RWIN) be shared between all colonies on a per capita basis. Despite general support for the RWIN in principle, few colonial representatives could commit to this expense. The old issue of whether control should rest locally or with the Admiralty continued to be a stumbling block. The Admiralty wanted the colonies to take on operational responsibility for the RWIN, so they would be morally obliged to accept financial Table 4  Apportionment of colonial personnel and finance for Royal West Indian Navy Colony

Personnel

Finance

200 100

£44,000 £22,000

100

£22,000

20 25 20 10 475

£4,400 £5,500 £4,400 £2,200 £104,500

Trinidad Barbados Jamaica (including British Honduras and Cayman Islands) British Guiana Windward Islands Bahamas Leeward Islands Total

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responsibility also. It feared a repeat of the TRNVR, whereby it had to 117 foot additional costs after the force was placed at its disposal. Another problem was that while contributions would be organised on ‘a Federal basis and not a Colonial one’, a single Governor had to act as Commander-in-Chief, inevitably that of the headquarters, which was nominally Trinidad.118 Discussions were thus hampered by colonial parochialism, with Jamaica’s representative, Mr Lindo, stating ‘if his colony voted money … there would be a feeling in some quarters that Jamaica had a claim to establishment of headquarters’. He also pointed out the difficulty in eight separate political bodies passing the requisite legislation.119 When the question was considered in Jamaica’s Executive Council at the start of 1946, it decided that ‘in view of the heavy programme of essential works … it is not possible to justify a contribution from Jamaican funds for defence purposes other than a contribution of the annual grant of £25,000 towards Imperial defence’.120 That year, Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones announced that a conference would be held on 11–19 September 1947 at Montego Bay to discuss the Federation of the West Indies. The Jamaican leader, Alexander Bustamante, resisted the federation idea, in part because his political rival Norman Manley had supported it, and accused Britain of ‘shirking its responsibilities’.121 This encompassed defence, entangling the RWIN scheme in national and regional politics, with Jamaica unwilling to commit to a defensive partnership that might force it into a ‘federation of paupers’122 later on. Barbados’s representative, W.R.M. Wynne, believed that in order for it to work, local control required ‘Trinidad or some other Colony to have charge of the Force with the functions of the other participating Colonies limited to making contributions of money and personnel’, but in this instance, ‘such a force could scarcely be said to be a “Royal West Indian Navy” and such an arrangement is unlikely to be acceptable to the Legislature of this Island’.123 Like Jamaica, Barbados was not willing to exceed its existing imperial defence contribution of 124 125 £6,000, and the other colonies followed a similar pattern. Nor were problems restricted to colonial politics or finance, as naval authorities themselves disagreed about personnel. While the SNO Trinidad believed that the TRNVR was ‘a loyal, well-disciplined and efficient force and a considerable asset to the British West Indies’,126 the Senior Intelligence Officer thought that with the ‘exception of a few officers they are a useless lot and it would be better to start again from the beginning’.127 As well as keeping ‘alive the Naval tradition’ and forming ‘a nucleus for naval expansion in the West Indies in the event of a future war’, it was hoped that a continued naval presence would ‘encourage “sea-mindedness” in a population which, although [ 48 ]

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utterly dependent on sea communication for its very existence, is 128 singularly lacking in interest in sea-faring matters’. The war had seemingly done little to change this perception, with only 13 officers and 277 ratings, roughly a fifth of the TRNVR, indicating in December 1944 a definite willingness to stay on after the war.129 Racial prejudice continued to influence British naval attitudes. The Senior Operations Officer equated lack of ‘sea-mindedness’ with the perception that black ratings ‘are not intelligent’, for while ‘as infantry men or Artillerymen they might be of great value … they could not man the ship properly’, though to add white technical ratings into the mix ‘would confuse the messing and bathing arrangements’.130 Yet ‘a considerable number of European ratings possessing the higher technical qualifications’ were considered necessary for the RWIN because ‘experience has shown that the West Indian is not suitable for higher technical training in such specialist subjects as A/S, Gunnery, Radar, Torpedo etc., being naturally unimaginative and generally unable to concentrate for long periods of time’.131 It was reiterated that ‘the West Indian negro, although of excellent physique, is mentally underdeveloped. He is not necessarily stupid but emotional and lacking in self-restraint and responsibility’, consequently, ‘a strict but paternal discipline is necessary and … it is therefore imperative that officers be of the highest quality’.132 Poor leadership had fermented indiscipline in the TRNVR, while the debilitating climate meant officers would have to ‘be appointed from the United Kingdom, and relieved after a normal commission period of two and a half years’ to ‘ensure that the organisation shall not become dormant through permanent senior appointments being held by persons who by long residence in the tropics lose their energy and efficiency’.133 Britain had its ‘own manpower shortage’,134 however, something colonial naval forces were meant to relieve not exacerbate. Lack of colonial financial support and misgivings about West Indian manpower meant the Admiralty was forced to concede that the RWIN’s ‘establishment 135 appears neither practical nor economical’.

Conclusion Though formed at the outbreak of the Second World War, it was not fear of Germany that was the main impetus behind the TRNVR. Imperial overstretch affected not just Britain’s ability to defend the Empire against external threats, but also internal dissidents who threatened the colonial status quo. Unable to spare imperial troops for internal security duties, colonial and naval officials, pressured by commercial interests, hoped that raising a local naval unit would [ 49 ]

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improve Trinidad’s civil order, lower insurance premiums and secure oil supplies in the face of labour nationalism. The TRNVR was meant to be a symbol of Britain’s prestige, but suffered from inadequate training and equipment from financial wrangling between the Imperial and colonial governments. Though the force did foster imperial patriotism, expressed through jingoistic naval calypsos, which reaffirmed Trinidadian masculinity, the TRNVR’s operational ineffectiveness was demonstrated by the successes German U-boats enjoyed in the Caribbean until the US took over A/S operations. Imperial hierarchy was reinforced through propaganda. Racial prejudices influenced the operational management of the TRNVR, with non-white members barred from officer commissions and general service elsewhere in the Royal Navy on account of alleged mental deficiencies. Non-racial colonial prejudice also permeated, with West Indian Europeans considered inferior to British personnel because of the debilitating effects of climate upon character. There was a clear distinction between the quality of professional Royal Navy officers seconded to the force and part-time reservists granted wartime commissions; the former expressed more sympathy, interest and respect towards indigenous customs and cultures, whereas those commissioned in the colonies carried local prejudices with them. TRNVR ratings also received inferior pay and no family allowances, until this institutionalised discrimination and poor leadership combined to erode patriotism and respect for the chain-of-command, causing indiscipline and protest. After the war, the force’s raison d’être was again defined more by domestic political and social concerns within the colonies, than external naval threats to imperial defence. The plan to form a permanent RWIN, to fortify British prestige and imperial authority in the face of America’s growing hegemony, encountered the same obstructive problems of finance and manpower as the TRNVR. Without the galvanising stimulus of war, imperial and colonial consensus could not be found to offset competing metropole, regional and local interests. Ultimately this parochialism would not only scupper plans for the region’s navy, but also for a West Indian Federation.

Notes  1  H.C. Ferraby, The Imperial British Navy: How the Colonies Began to think Imperially Upon the Future of the Navy (London, 1918), p. 95.  2  TNA, ADM1/10969, Minute Sheet No. 1, M.05222/39.  3  Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 1961).  4  Howard Johnson, ‘Oil, Imperial Policy and the Trinidad Disturbances, 1937’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1975), pp. 29–54.

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TRI N I D AD  5  Vernon C. Mulchansingh, ‘The Oil Industry in the Economy of Trinidad’, Caribbean Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (April, 1971), p. 73.  6  Cited in Fitzroy A. Baptiste, ‘The European possessions in the Caribbean in World War II: dimensions of great power co-operation and conflict’, Ph.D. thesis (University of the West Indies, Trinidad, 1981), p. 21.  7  Maurice St. Pierre, ‘The 1938 Jamaica Disturbances. A Portrait of Mass Reaction against Colonialism’, Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June, 1978), pp. 171–196.  8  P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850–1945’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 (February, 1987), pp. 1–26.  9  TNA, ADM1/10969, ‘Defence of Trinidad Oil Refineries’, Meeting at Colonial Office, 8 May 1939, pp. 2–3. 10  Ibid., p. 4. 11  Ibid., p. 2. 12  Ibid., p. 4. 13  Ibid., pp. 5–6. 14  TNA, ADM1/10969, Director of L.D., 18 September 1939. 15  Ibid. 16  TNA, ADM1/10969, ‘Naval Volunteer and Defence Ordinance, 1940’, p. 3. 17  TNA, ADM116/2396, Item 48, 14 December 1928. 18  Ibid. 19  TNA, CO537/1891, Trinidad RNVR: Finance, Item 7. 20  TNA, ADM1/23215, Admiralty to C-in-C America and West Indies, 15 December 1940. 21  TNA, ADM1/23215, Captain-in-Charge Trinidad, to C-in-C America and West Indies, 19 November 1940, p. 4. 22  TNA, ADM1/23215, C-in-C America and West Indies to Admiralty, 19 December 1940. 23  Ibid. 24  TNA, CO537/1891, Trinidad RNVR, Items 6–7. 25  TNA, ADM1/23215, SNO, Trinidad, to SNO, Western Atlantic, 17 July 1944, p. 3. 26  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Story of the Trinidad Royal Naval Reserve’, p. 1. 27  Ibid., p. 2. 28  TNA, CO537/1891, Trinidad RNVR: Training, Item 8. 29  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Story of the Trinidad Royal Naval Reserve’, pp. 2–3. 30  Ibid. 31  Ibid. 32  Ibid. 33  Ibid. 34  TNA, CO537/1891, Trinidad RNVR: Training, Item 9. 35  University of the West Indies, Trinidad (hereafter UWI), Sam Selvon, ‘We Join the Navy’, Guardian Weekly, 14 December 1946, Item 549, Sam Selvon Collection. 36  Ibid. 37  Ibid. 38  Ibid. 39  Ibid. 40  Sam Selvon, Foreday Morning: Selected Prose 1946–1986 (Essex, 1989), p. vii. 41  UWI, Marilyn Geofroy, A Guide to the Samuel Selvon Collection, p. 4. 42  UWI, Sam Selvon Collection, Box 7, Folder 627, Communications Officer, HMS Benbow, 21 September 1945. 43  Gaylord T.M. Kelshall, The U-Boat War in the Caribbean (Annapolis, 1994), pp. foreword–1. 44  TNA, CO537/1891, ‘Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve’, 1946, p. 2. 45  TNA, ADM1/23215, SNO Trinidad’s communication, 3 August 1940. 46  Oliver Marshall (ed.), The Caribbean at War, British West Indians in World War II (London, 1992), p. 25.

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TH E C A R IB B E A N 47  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, Appendix “A”. 48  TNA, ADM1/23215, C-in-C America and West Indies to Admiralty, 2 November 1951. 49  ‘A native Trinidadian in July–August 1941, of European descent’, Appendix “O” to Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, quoted in Annette Palmer, ‘The United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean, 1940–45’, Ph.D. thesis (Fordham University, 1979), pp. 76–77. 50  Director of Geo. F. Huggins and Co., Trinidad Guardian, 8 September 1940, p. 13. 51  TNA, CAB66/14, ‘United States Activities in the West Indies and Other British Dependencies’, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 December 1940. 52  Editorial, ‘Our American Cousins’, The Goshawk, Journal of the Royal Naval Air Station, Trinidad, Vol. 1, No. 4 (April, 1941), p. 1. 53  Fitzroy Baptiste, ‘United States-Caribbean Relations from World War II to the Present: The Social Nexus’, in Ransford W. Palmer (ed.), U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Their Impact on Peoples and Culture (Westport, 1998), p. 14. 54  Ibid., p. 13. 55  Neville Williams, A History of the Cayman Islands (Grand Cayman, 1970), p. 79. 56  Baptiste, ‘United States-Caribbean Relations from World War II to the Present’, p. 16. 57  Ibid., pp. 15–16. 58  Annette Palmer, ‘The Politics of Race and War: Black American Soldiers in the Caribbean Theater During the Second World War’, Military Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2 (April, 1983), p. 59. 59  Ibid., p. 60. 60  Palmer, ‘The United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean’, p. 251. 61  Arthur C. Marshall, ‘Trinidad wants to be American’, Living, December 1938, pp. 322–323, quoted in Palmer, ‘The United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean’, p. 55. 62  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Story of the Trinidad Royal Naval Reserve’, pp. 3–4. 63  Annette Palmer, ‘Rum and Coca Cola: The United States in the British Caribbean 1940–1945’, The Americas, Vol. 43, No. 4 (April, 1987), pp. 441–442. 64  Quoted in Errol G. Hill, ‘Calypso and War’, Black American Literature Forum, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring, 1989), p. 68. 65  Ibid., p. 74. 66  Ibid., pp. 61–62. 67  Gordon Rohlehr, ‘I Lawa: The Construction of Masculinity in Trinidad and Tobago Calypso’, in Rhoda E. Reddock, Interrogating Caribbean Masculinities: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses (West Indies, 2004), pp. 326–328. 68  TNA, ADM1/13014, Downing Street to Admiralty, 18 November 1943. 69  TNA, ADM1/13014, ‘Publicity in United Kingdom for Colonial Naval Forces’, 24 December 1943. 70  TNA, ADM1/13014, A.R. Thomas, Deputy Public Relations Officer, to Information Officers, Fiji, Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Ceylon, Trinidad, 21 January 1944. 71  Trinidad Guardian, 5 November 1939, p. 2. 72  Ibid. 73  TNA, ADM1/13014, ‘Publicity in United Kingdom for Colonial Naval Forces’, 1944. 74  Ibid. 75  Ibid. 76  TNA, ADM1/23215, Captain-in-Charge, Port of Spain to C-in-C American and West Indies, 12 February 1941, pp. 2–3. 77  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Future of the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve’, 17 July 1944, p. 1. 78  TNA, ADM1/23215, Captain-in-Charge, Port of Spain to C-in-C American and West Indies, 12 February 1941, pp. 2–3.

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TRI N I D AD  79  Ibid., p. 3.  80  Ibid.  81  George C.D. Adamson, ‘“The languor of the hot weather”: Everyday Perspectives on Weather and Climate in Colonial Bombay, 1819–1828’, Journal of Historical Geography, Vol. 38 (2012), pp. 144–145.  82  UWI, Sam Selvon Collection, Item 579, Michael Wentworth (Sam Selvon pen name), ‘A Man I Remember’, Evening News, 27 March 1948, p. 3.  83  Interview by author with Carley Ebanks and Thomas Ewart Ebanks, 7 July 2010, Grand Cayman. Deposited in the Cayman Islands National Archive (henceforth CINA).  84  Wentworth/Selvon, ‘A Man I Remember’.  85 Selvon, Foreday Morning, p. xii.  86  Wentworth/Selvon, ‘A Man I Remember’.  87  Lionel Straker, ‘A Stoker in the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve’, The Building Exploratory, 31 January 2006, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ ww2peopleswar/stories/75/a9020675.shtml [15 March 2012].  88  TNA, ADM1/11057, Trinidad – Report, 1 January–31 March 1941, p. 1.  89  TNA, CO968/80/7, ‘Disturbances at TRNVRHQ’, 9 October 1943, p. 1.  90  TNA, ADM178/301, Appendix to Board of Inquiry Proceedings, 1943.  91  Ibid.  92  Interview by author with Carley Ebanks and Thomas Ewart Ebanks.  93  Robin Austin, ‘Wartime Memoirs of Robin Austin’, Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society, Vol. 46 (2000), pp. 161–186.  94  TNA, ADM178/301, SNO Trinidad, to SNO Western Atlantic, 9 June 1943, p. 3.  95  TNA, ADM178/301, ‘Disturbances at Staubles’, letter 26 May 1943.  96  TNA, CO968/145/1, Sabben-Clare to Commodore Dick, January 1944.  97  TNA, CO968/80/4, Colonial Naval Forces – Trinidad, 1943, p. 36.  98  Mittelholzer to Captain C.C. Denison, 5 July 1942, Michael Gilkes collection.  99  A.J. Seymour, Edgar Mittelholzer: the Man and his Work, Being the Text of the 1967 Edgar Mittelholzer Memorial Lectures (Georgetown, 1968), p. 12. 100  Mittelholzer to Captain C.C. Denison, 5 July 1942, Michael Gilkes collection. 101  Ibid. 102  Ibid. 103  Ibid. 104  TNA, CO968/80/7, ‘Disturbances at TRNVRHQ’, 9 October 1943, p. 3. 105 Seymour, Mittelholzer, p. 13. Unofficially it has been reported that: ‘1) He was given instructions, but when he refused to carry out the task he was told by his commander that he did not have an option so long as he was wearing the Kings uniform. Mittelholzer thus took off all his clothes and stood stark naked before wandering off to his quarters; 2) Mittelholzer was under surveillance according to one person because he kept writing letters in support of the communists and according to another person because he kept writing letters in support of the fascists; 3) One of the ships captains was murdered and Mittelholzer was accused because other naval ratings informed the police that there had been strange goings-on between them. When interrogated Mittelholzer explained that he and the captain believed in astral projection and he had been trying to see if they could send telepathic messages to one another. The police called in a psychologist and Mittelholzer was branded a mad man. With the help of his wife’s friends, Mittelholzer was released from custody but he found the experience humiliating. 4) Mittelholzer had often helped out the English members of the navy by writing letters homes to their loved ones so was stunned that they continued to treat him as an inferior despite the evident fact that he was more intelligent than them’. Email of 24 November 2009 to author from Dr Juanita Cox Westmaas, author of ‘Edgar Mittelholzer and the Shaping of his Novels’, Ph.D. thesis (University of Birmingham, 2013). 106  UWI, Sam Selvon Collection, Item 90, p. 10. 107  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Naval Forces of the Colonial Empire’, p. 3.

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TH E C A R IB B E A N 108  Palmer, ‘The United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean’, pp. 254–255. 109  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Naval Organisation in the West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p. 2. 110  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Naval Forces of the Colonial Empire’, p. 4. 111  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Future of the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve’, SNO, Trinidad, to SNO, Western Atlantic, 17 July 1944, p. 2. 112  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Naval Organisation in the West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p. 5. 113  TNA, ADM1/23215, Meeting at Royal Naval Camp, Trinidad, 4 January 1946, p. 3. 114  TNA, ADM1/23215, Fom Governor Windward Islands to Secretary of State, 26 January 1946. 115  Tennyson S. D. Joseph, Decolonization in St. Lucia: Politics and Global Neoliberalism, 1945–2010 (Mississippi, 2011), p. 21. 116  Ibid. 117  TNA, ADM1/23215, G.H. Hall to Colonial Office, 4 November 1945. 118  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Naval Organisation in the West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, Appendix “A”, p. 8. 119  TNA, ADM1/23215, Meeting at Royal Naval Camp, Trinidad, 4 January 1946, pp. 2–3. 120  TNA, ADM1/23215, Governor, Jamaica, to A/Governor, Bermuda, 12 February 1946. 121  Jason Parker, ‘Remapping the Cold War in the Tropics: Race, Communism, and National Security in the West Indies’, The International History Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June, 2002), pp. 318–347. 122  Ibid. 123  TNA, ADM1/23215, Governor Grattan Bushe, Barbados, to G.H. Hall, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 January 1946, p. 2. 124  Ibid., p. 3. 125  TNA, ADM1/23215, Governor Gordon Lethem, British Guiana, to G.H. Hall, 11 December 1945; Meeting at Royal Naval Camp, Trinidad, 4 January 1946; Governor Windward Islands to Secretary of State, 26 January 1946. 126  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Naval Organisation in the West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p. 1 127  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘West Indian Naval Force’, Senior Officer (Intelligence), 2 8 March 1947. 128  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Naval Organisation in the West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p. 5. 129  Ibid., p. 3. 130  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘West Indian Naval Force’, Senior Officer (Operations), 31 March 1947. 131  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Naval Organisation in the West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p. 3. 132  Ibid. 133  Ibid., Appendix “A”, p. 8. 134  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Royal West Indian Navy’, 11 October 1946. 135  TNA, ADM1/23215, ‘Naval Organisation in the West Indies’, SNO, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p. 5.

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CHA P T E R TH REE

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The Cayman Islands

During the Second World War, out of a population of just over 6,500, around 800 Caymanians served in the British Merchant Navy with another 201 in the TRNVR.1 This constituted two-thirds of the adult male population2 and was believed to be the highest contribution per capita of any country in that conflict.3 The level and nature of this participation is explained by an intrinsic connection to the sea that permeated every facet of Caymanian society. Whereas other West Indian islanders ‘remained tied to the land even in postslavery times and … viewed their coastlines as boundaries or barriers’, the Caymans’ lack of terrestrial resources meant that they always ‘depended on the sea as a resource and an avenue for survival’.4 Many of its early settlers had been British mariners wrecked on the Islands, and the local economy was dominated by turtling, sharking, ropemaking and boatbuilding.5 These traditional industries were also mobilised during wartime, with the Caymanian master shipwright, Captain Rayal Bodden, commissioned to construct two wooden minesweepers for the Royal Navy.6 Such maritime traditions were passed down through generations, and it was considered that in Cayman, ‘every able-bodied man is, or has been, a seafarer’.7 As soon as they could walk, boys would start sailing model boats, and ‘by the time they are in their teens [they could] handle the local cat boats, 8 craft about 20 feet long, pointed at each end and built of island timber’. The 1934 census recorded 50% of the Islands’ manpower between 18 and 60 years of age as being engaged in the seafaring industry9 and the biggest event of the year was the annual sailing regatta.

Motivations Typically, both group and personal motivations inspired volunteering. Peer pressure and lack of domestic employment opportunities drove some to sign up, with Roosevelt Rankine saying ‘I thought everybody [ 55 ]

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else could go and I could do the same … Twenty-four and no special 10 job, I just wanted to get off the island’. The relatively poor state of the local economy acted as a key motivator for many:

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It came up that we had want [sic] people to go to Trinidad in the Navy … So I say that’s a good chance … time for me, now, to make some money … a dollar a day … $30 to the month.11

Although those who chose to join the Merchant Navy could earn higher wages, some volunteers saw greater prestige and significance in service in the Royal Navy, an attraction which overrode the desire for pure monetary gain: Sometimes I felt I would rather have been in the Merchant Marine, the Merchant Navy, but I guess that was because you would make more money … but it wasn’t altogether that … in the Navy you know you had the feeling you was [sic] doing a more important job.12

Imperial patriotism was a very powerful driving force for Caymanians. This was exhibited on the eve of the Second World War, when ‘large numbers of people of all classes of the community anxious to serve their KING and COUNTRY in the present crisis’ stepped forward, despite there being ‘no plans for recruiting nor any need for such generously afforded services’ at that time.13 This zeal had not diminished by the time the TRNVR began recruiting there in early 1941, as one volunteer later recounted: The old and young alike from Cayman offered their services to go and fight for their mother country, including myself … I was a young boy, still in my teens, proud to go and fight for my country.14

To Caymanians, despite never having seen it for themselves, Britain still represented ‘my country’; her conflict was their own. They exhibited a shared sense of ‘island nationalism’, which Alex Law argues ‘derives its force … from the imaginary relationship of the collective group to the sea’ who ‘are caught up in an open tension between the strong centripetal pull of settlement and rootedness and the centrifugal 15 push of mobility and migration’. As with Law’s study of Great Britain, this ‘call of the sea’ meant Caymanians, despite being descended from island settlers, continued to feel that ‘all they had in their life … on their mind, is to go to sea’, leading them to join the TRNVR.16 As with martial race theory, anthropological studies set Caymanians apart from other West Indians in several physical and moral respects, which made them more appealing to prospective naval recruiters: [ 56 ]

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The average Caymanian is probably of better physique, is healthier, and has a better intelligence than the average American or the inhabitants of any other island in the West Indies and the countries bordering the Caribbean. This is attributable primarily to his energetic life. Other factors are his higher moral standards and the absence on the island of the usual tropical diseases.17

The reference to the Caymanians’ ‘energetic life’ is particularly illuminating since the British typically depicted those native to tropical climates as lethargic. Caymanians were considered ‘hard-working’,18 and ‘honest’,19 on account of their religiosity, and therefore complemented the Admiralty’s desire that ‘special consideration should be given to providing men who can stand a tropical climate, and who can be relied on to work without constant supervision’.20 Exhibiting ‘but little feeblemindedness’, the ‘average Caymanian possesses an unusually good intellect’,21 seen as connected to skin colour. Significantly, the majority of the Cayman population was white or mixed race, with a comparatively small ex-slave community: Most of the people are hardy and healthy, tall, and wiry, like their seafaring forefathers from the east coasts of England and Scotland … The proportion of whites and mixed to blacks is considerably higher than in most of the other islands of the West Indies. Roughly, whites and mixed form about 40 per cent each, blacks 20 percent.22

Caymanians possessed a hereditary link back to Britain, a connection visibly reinforced by their lighter physical complexion compared to other West Indians. ‘Noticeably fair’, and possessing even ‘strong traces of Scandinavian origin’,23 the connection drawn between fairer skin colour and naval aptitude echoes the nineteenth-century martial race theory preoccupation with Aryanism. Certain Indian groups were said to have retained ‘old Aryan stock’ passed down from the fair-skinned peoples of central Asia who conquered northern India in ancient times. It was assumed that the descendants of those Aryan invaders, most notably Punjabis and Dogras, thus inherited their 24 ‘superior military capabilities’. In a similar manner, a natural nautical talent was believed to have been passed down from Britain to Cayman, at a time when Churchill was invoking ‘a quasi-biological British “island race” discourse’ to galvanise wartime patriotism.25 In the eyes of the Caymanian seamen, their sense of collective identity became bound more by their shared seafaring skill than their skin colour; as one recruit, James Robinson, put it: ‘The Cayman Islands seamen was recommended as the best seamen in the world … it was no difference between white and black’.26 [ 57 ]

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Although within a colonial naval force such as the TRNVR Caymanians garnered more respect than their West Indian colleagues, they were still viewed as inferior to regular British sailors. Harry McCoy served aboard HMS Nigeria for a time as the sole Caymanian in a Royal Navy crew of over seven hundred. He had to overcome a degree of discrimination, though he did not consider this to be motivated by him not being white: There was, has always been, you know, a little bit of prejudice among English people and up to this day they always saw themselves superior to the Colonials … of whatever colour … you had to accept that, you see. But after you worked along with them and they saw that you were equal to them … I had no problems.27

Whereas McCoy was able to work to overcome any negative preconceptions and prove his worth, others were not given that same opportunity within the TRNVR. Preference for Caymanians acted to disbar other Caribbean groups from particular assignments within the force. Ratings came to be judged by officers not according to individual merit, but by their ethnicity and the assumptions of naval aptitude attached to it. In one instance, TRNVR personnel were assigned to relieve the British crew of HMS Corsair. All were Caymanian with the exception of one Barbadian, prompting the Captain to summarily ‘send him back’ having specifically requested an ‘all Cayman crew’.28 Such prejudices led to Caymanians gaining a monopoly in the seaman branch, where their seafaring skills could be put to best use: of those boats you could look for the majority of the seamen, the deck men, would be Caymanians … The vast majority of the deck department would be Caymanians, a few in the engine room, few in the galley or the steward department, but the actual working sailors the most was [sic] Caymanians.29

One branch’s overwhelming dependence on a single ethnic group created logistical problems when it came to managing leave, causing homesickness, discontent and disillusionment amongst the men: Every time, one of us mentioned the word vacation, the answer was that we could not be spared since ninety-six percent of the warships were manned by Cayman Naval Seamen … at the time it appeared as if we had become the forgotten men of the Navy.30

It took an impromptu inspection by the local admiral for this to be addressed, and all the Caymanian volunteers were subsequently sent home on leave in three staggered batches, but this was the only [ 58 ]

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time most got to return to the Caymans in over four years in the 31 TRNVR. On one ship, preconceptions about Caymanian seamen led to the whole group receiving preferential treatment:

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All the deck crew were Caymanians … The captain was so pleased with our performance that … he called us all up, all the Caymanians … and rated us Able-bodied Seamen from the day we had in our required time … that’s the only time I have heard about it being done.32

Individual merit, normally the key factor in determining promotion, was here subsumed by group identity. Contributing towards this was the fact that up to sixty-eight of the recruits shared the same characteristically Caymanian surname: ‘STEP FORWARD Ebanks,’ yelled the drill instructor, irate at a mistake by one of his squad of recruits. His temper rose when the whole squad stepped forward. ‘I only said for Ebanks to step forward, not everyone,’ he shouted. ‘We’re all Ebanks,’ came the chorus from the men in reply.33

As a consequence, the group was further de-individualised by British officers, who from then on referred to each Ebanks with a number, ‘starting with 1 and ending with 68’.34 Ethnic categorisation inevitably fostered stereotypes, even though it may have been a seemingly positive one regarding Caymanian seafaring ability. It led to negative assumptions about other groups within the force and meant that prejudice was not solely an expression of British imperial subjugation, but developed between colonial cultures themselves. Caymanians felt that ‘with Trinidadians, [it] was more hard to make friends … being one of the biggest islands in the Caribbean … they had an attitude that they were superior to you’.35 Yet, like colonial naval officials, Caymanians came to believe that ‘most Trinidadians do not like the sea’,36 despite the presence of men like Selvon who contradicted this stereotype (though with little social interaction, they would not realise this). This maritime elitism caused them to look down upon Trinidadian ratings for their apparent unprofessionalism: We used to have Trinidadians and different people mixed up in the watchman job … every Trinidadian you had they didn’t stay in the job very long. They went off and go home … they would catch them up and throw them in jail for going away … sometimes I had to stay on duty for nine days by myself.37

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This negative opinion was compounded by the fact that a Trinidadian was supposed to have been on watch when a revolver was stolen from the ship at Bridgetown, Barbados, and used to kill Caymanian William Harvey Smith. This distracted from the fact that it was one of their own, Harold Myles, who had fired the gun following a drunken altercation with Smith, and allowed the Caymanian ratings to retain their positive group identity by attributing such fractures to ‘certain individuals’, facilitated by a dereliction of duty by ethnic 38 ‘others’.

Discontent and protest Caymanians also had negative impressions of Trinidad as a place, conveyed in letters home: It was an anxious [time], we were all upset … my brother was upset, he wanted to come home, but … he wasn’t allowed to come home, you know, he had to stay there. And every letter that we got from him was a crying time, because he was very upset about being there … He wanted to go, but after a lot of them got up there, they found things that they didn’t like.39

Norman Rudolph McLoughlin was another who volunteered under an apparent misconception cultivated by colonial naval recruiters: The first group left for Trinidad in early May and arrived there within eight to ten days. Promising reports were sent back that made the rest of us very eager to join them. I regret to say that after I arrived in Trinidad, I discovered some of those promising reports to be false, and why they were sent back to Cayman was never explained. 40

Upon their arrival at the TRNVR base in Staubles Bay, Caymanians encountered a foreign environment, poor facilities, professional neglect, and lack of proper uniform and medical care, causing many to fall ill. Yet those like McLoughlin still retained their imperial patriotism: It was a ‘real dump and mud hole’. When it rained, the mud slid down from the hills, coming right across the highway on to the base and out to sea. It was common to be walking through six to eight inches of mud and water over most of the base … We were still wearing our own clothes, shoes, and socks, which were wet most of the time. As a result of this exposure, most of us came down with an awful flu or even pneumonia and lay sick in our bunks for days. The medical service was terrible, consisting of one old doctor from St. Lucia. He did not appear to be qualified to take care of the situation, nor did he care a damn about us … I felt

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so proud to fight for my King and Country, that come hell or high tide, I was determined to stick it out.41

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The health of the Caymanians was not helped by the standard of food they received, another cause for discontent. Here, cultural insularity meant that they were unfamiliar with foreign tastes and cooking methods in the multi-cultural force, and had a negative effect physically, financially and on morale: The food was awful and poorly cooked by the Trinidadian cooks. They either could not cook our Caymanian type of food or were simply poor cooks. There was plenty of food, but it was badly prepared and most of us could not eat it … [I] ate very little of the food prepared in the galley, and started buying biscuits, chocolates, soft drinks, etc. from the canteen. Of course, having very little money to spare, many nights I found myself going hungry.42

Such complaints did not garner popular sympathy, however, and served to ostracise the Caymanians from the local populace. The success of Operation Neuland took its toll on island shipping, causing extreme food shortages for civilians.43 Apparently privileged naval personnel became obvious targets for civilian blame as those responsible for the safety of the convoys, despite the difficulties they worked under with the poor equipment and training afforded them.44 Local resentment towards the Caymanian sailors meant that ‘in going ashore you had to go in gangs, we wasn’t allowed to go alone, because some time you’d meet some of them that want to fight you’.45 The Office of Naval Intelligence reported that by late 1942 there was ‘hooliganism in Trinidad – a wave of disorder and petty crime … directed at North Americans, British and other white persons’.46 Yet Caymanians were also ‘othered’ in this way by their lighter skin colour, as they had been by naval recruiters. With very little crime back home, the deeply religious Caymanians were shocked by the relative vice they witnessed on Trinidad: Trinidad was a wicked place, a lot of killing and shooting of people and the like used to go on … when you go to dance in the night, you coming back home, you can run over, you can walk over several dead man [sic] on the road.47

For some of the volunteers thrust into these transnational encounters, local abuse, ignorance and prejudice overrode their initial motivations for enlisting, spurring them to try to leave the force and return to the Cayman Islands: [ 61 ]

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After I stop the turtle business, I went to the war … and stayed there four years and six months … More went, but they got ‘fraid [sic] and come back home … It was bad business; it was mean set-up … the people there in Trinidad thought that we had come from nowhere.48

Being transnational volunteers, they were stranded on an island thousands of miles from their home, without the means to return themselves and completely dependent upon the will of the British authorities, whom many saw as responsible for their sufferings. Those men unable to cope faked illness in the hope they would be repatriated, as Rankine testifies: ‘so many performed, ‘formed [sic] like they were sick … and let them send them home’.49 W. Hewitt Rivers also witnessed this charade, but a stronger sense of patriotic duty drove him to remain: It was so cold that I wouldn’t want to relive that … the majority of boys that came back from Cayman, they just played sick and they didn’t want to stay … but I decided that if I was able to do something for … I would have to say for my country, I would stay, and I stayed all the time. It was four years and eight months that I was there.50

Civilian violence and hostility was not restricted to Trinidad, but was encountered during visits to other island ports, such as Kingston, Jamaica, known as the ‘mother colony’ of the Cayman Islands dependency. Despite this status, local economic problems meant that Jamaicans simmered with resentment over the relatively high naval wages their junior colonials were seen to receive: It was rugged then. Went shore there and they pelt the boys with bricks and all those kind of things … you know seaman meets it hard most of them places … any part you go to, they feel that the seaman has plenty of money.51

Wartime civil-military tensions might have fostered a greater sense of esprit de corps and unity within the multicultural TRNVR, with 52 the civilian population acting as its out-group. The reason it did not could be because the service was competing with a much stronger in-group identity, that of ethnicity, which united Trinidadians within both the force and the island community and overlapped civil-military boundaries. The issue of food continued to act as a source of contention and division within the TRNVR, when roles were reversed and Caymanians cooked for disgruntled Trinidadian consumers. In its most extreme case, this resulted in physical violence. Caymanian Lloyd Seymore was in the camp cooking breakfast when a Trinidadian rating asked him for fish. After being told fish was not on the menu, the [ 62 ]

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Trinidadian disappeared and came back with a wooden ‘beladen pin’, 53 which he ‘muntled’ Seymore over the head with. After a month in hospital Seymore was discharged, only to be re-admitted after haemorrhaging though his nose. He was put in the condemned ward, number eleven, where he developed a large abscess in his nostrils and was not cleaned or fed.54 It took the intervention of Petty Officer McLoughlin, one of the senior Caymanians, before Seymore was moved, given food and began to recover, finally being honourably discharged from the service. Not all Caymanians were as ‘lucky’ as Seymore, however: We learned that one of our Cayman boys had died … Before we could get over the shock of Johnson’s death, we were told that another person had passed away a few weeks before … By now, I had become very angry and had changed from the young, quiet, loyal man who had left Grand Cayman on the 29th of July, and had turned into a hardened, tough man who was ready to join the others in protest … regardless of the consequences.55

Within an hour the men had fallen in on the quarterdeck and demanded to see Commander Wilkinson, the base CO, from whom they requested their discharge from the TRNVR with the following demands: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Better medical service. Replace the cots in the barracks with proper double bunk beds. Pitch the base to prevent any mud holes or water from settling. Improve the cooking system in the galley. Change the behaviour of The First Lieutenant towards us which included screaming and threatening us and passing sarcastic remarks.56

Of these, Item 1 ‘was the principal reason why we were so angry and disappointed in the Navy. We felt that our two country service men died from the lack of proper medical aid’.57 Again, the in-group pull of ethnicity proved stronger than the service. This was an exclusively Caymanian protest, in which the other islanders in the TRNVR did not participate, despite the general nature of the grievances. Although discontent ran deep and stretched back to their initial arrival, it took strength in numbers and the death of two of their own to galvanise the Caymanian men into action and overcome the social pressure of the larger Trinidadian group, who occupied a dominant position within the force because of their local status: When the second and third batches of volunteers [from Cayman] arrived on the base, there already were quite a number of Trinidadians and even

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some from the other islands in addition to the first batch from The Cayman Islands. They [the first batch] all must have been scared to fight for better conditions on the base. I can understand their reluctance in protesting, since they might have been outnumbered by Trinidadians, and those from the other islands who appeared not to worry about anything; perhaps they might have been accustomed to that way of life.58

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Despite this external expression of Caymanian solidarity, members were internally conflicted between the pressure of group loyalty and their own personal desires. It also brought into focus imperial attitudes: I endured a restless night dreaming about the Navy and what the future held in store for me. Although I was still standing firm with the others about going home, I honestly did not want to. I was hoping that most of them would change their minds providing that the Commander would make good on his promises … there was one important question that was never asked: ‘is it true the British treated us so subordinately because they were still practising their colonial prejudice against all of us? If not, why did two of our men have to die before we were treated better?’59

Most of the complaints were taken care of within a matter of days, and the situation on the base began to slowly improve. Yet it could not displace the negative impression of the British authorities that had been implanted: I had spoken to an Irishman in the Navy who told me not to expect too much improvement on the base. Because we were all colonials, The British seemed to believe that we were inferior to them. He went on to say that even though he was an Irishman, he was not treated any better, and would have never volunteered to join were it not for the fact that he was about to be drafted anyway and did not want to end up in the army.60

Anti-imperial sentiment was fermented here by the transnational encounters that war brought about, with colonial volunteers like Clive Glidden no longer prepared to submit unquestioningly to their imperial ‘masters’: The Commander, he says, ‘You know what you call a forced man?’ I say, ‘No, I don’t think I do.’ He says, ‘Well, in the old days, you were told what to do.’ I say, ‘I think those days are past.’ So he never gave me no hard time.61

The war had created a growing realisation amongst Caymanians that ‘the British needed us more than we needed them’.62 When Harry McCoy experienced colonial prejudice aboard HMS Nigeria he was isolated. The deaths of Uline Eden and Seaman Johnson [ 64 ]

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brought home that sense of inferiority to the rest of the group, an act of paternal betrayal they would not forget:

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Those two naval men died in vain. I am still so bitter against the British naval authorities over their deaths. When we joined the Navy in July, 1941, we discovered that the medical standard for colonials was inferior compared to the standard of medical care for the British naval men. For instance, we, the colonials, were given one old local doctor to take care of us, while the British naval men at Royal Navy Camp had excellent qualified doctors to take care of them.63

In the end, as ‘most of our demands had been met, we were satisfied to stay. A small rebellious group held out however, and were eventually sent back home’.64 Even though it was felt that the ‘Mother Country’ had failed in her duty to them, the majority of Caymanians refused to break their commitment and continued to fight until the end of the war: There is no question in my mind that we were The Forgotten Men of the Navy. Speaking for myself, I am proud that I volunteered to go and fight for my Country, and if I were young enough and my services were required, I would not hesitate to do so again.65

This imperial patriotism was preserved by British officers appealing directly to the Caymanians’ sense of maritime worth, integral to their self-identity: Although we, the Cayman naval men, at times might have been mistreated or had to do more than our fair share, in the end, the top military brass bestowed a lot of praise on us and openly admitted that we were the cream of the naval crop.66

Rather than feeling aggrieved at having had to ‘do more than our fair share’, Caymanians adopted this as a badge of honour to reflect their indispensability. In this manner, Caymanian loyalty was preserved by fostering a sense of cultural pride in their seafaring superiority over other West Indian sailors in the TRNVR: We had good reputation up there, and the Commander … when we were coming home, he gived [sic] a speech, he say … ‘Unna Caymanians was the pride of the Navy’.67

That the Caymanians were publicly told they ‘were the backbone of that branch of the Navy’, to the visible chagrin of ‘Trinidadian officers there’,68 can be seen as a case of ‘divide and rule’, with Wilkinson [ 65 ]

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TH E C A R IB B E A N

maintaining British authority, in spite of poor treatment, by reinforcing the differences between colonial groups within the force. It meant that 69 Caymanians felt Wilkinson ‘was a fair man’, in striking contrast to the negative views expressed by Mittelholzer, Trinidadian protestors and naval officials. The fact that this identity was readily accepted by Caymanians also presents a naval example of Gurkha syndrome, to extend Cynthia Enloe’s concept. The Cayman Islands were poor prior to naval remunerations and the professional reputation of its sailors helped earn them employment with international shipping companies after the war, most notably National Bulk Carriers. It was in their economic interest to embrace their identification as a seafaring race and, once they did, like the Gurkhas they became more ‘amenable to discipline’.70

Identity and historical memory Assertions that Caymanians represented the ‘best seamen in the world’71 recur in several oral history accounts, yet T. Ewart Ebanks, for one, admits ‘I don’t know how they knew it’. The Islands’ relative isolation from the rest of the world provided little opportunity to draw such conclusions before the war. As a Caymanian cultural identifier, it has gained retrospective significance in emphasising the Islands’ wartime contribution, a historical distortion which has become engrained through popular commemoration and collective memory.72 Though Caymanian maritime heritage is indisputable, the conception of them as the best seamen in the world was, to extend Leroy Vail’s argument, a ‘consciously crafted ideological creation’, with the local commissioner acting as a ‘cultural broker’ serving imperial and naval ends.73 Allen Wolsey Cardinall, Commissioner of the Cayman Islands from 1934 to 1941, is accredited with drawing British attention to the colony’s seamen as potential recruits for the Navy.74 Described as an ‘efficient District Commissioner’, who ‘takes a great interest in the Native customs and habits’, he implemented several measures to improve the social and economic condition of ‘the islands that time 75 forgot’. Many of these drew on Cayman’s maritime strengths, with consequences for future naval recruitment. In January 1935, Cardinall founded the first annual Cayman Islands sailing regatta, drawing participants from across the Caribbean and the United States; he hoped to foster a greater sense of Caymanian unity by ‘bringing the islands and islanders together in friendly competition’.76 This coincided with the opening of the George Town radio station on 23 November 1935, where messages were exchanged with Australia, Ceylon, South Africa, Canada, the Falkland Islands, Britain and most West Indian colonies,77 [ 66 ]

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instilling Caymanians with a greater feeling of belonging to the imperial family. This world view instilled in the younger members of the population held sway a few years later when, with an appreciation of the global nature of the conflict, volunteering to serve in the TRNVR offered the rare chance to escape the quiet life of the Islands and seek adventure overseas: I don’t think anyone really got scared. In fact I know I was glad of it. As a youngster you know. I thought you know, that it was an opportunity to get out and get in some action, and see the world, and I think that this was the feeling of the young people.78

Wireless helped transcend the oceanic barrier to keep the Islands connected with their men and the fortunes of the World War they were fighting in. Few Caymanians could afford to own personal radios, however, meaning they ‘would walk all the way to West Bay, any time of the day or at the night till we get [sic] the news’.79 Each regatta would be honoured by a visiting Royal Navy warship, with two sailors from the vessel accompanying each schooner participating in the race, ‘largely to put a bit of prestige into the regatta’s sporting affairs’.80 The Admiralty was drawn by the recruitment possibilities such association offered, considering that ‘as a potential source of seamen for the Auxiliary Patrol Service, these ready-made sailors seem to justify every encouragement’.81 Subsequent visits reaffirmed the opinion that ‘the Cayman Islanders … would make fine material on which to draw in time of war, in the same way as the Newfoundland fishermen were in the last war’.82 The Admiralty acted on this by loaning a cup for the race winners, as ‘the presentation of such a prize would stimulate interest in the Royal Navy that might be invaluable in the event of hostilities’.83 Such efforts succeeded in raising enthusiasm for the Royal Navy on Cayman, and sentimental ties were formed between local inhabitants and visiting warships. One example was the cruiser, HMS Orion, which earned local affection for her role in retrieving the popular Caymanian schooner Goldfield after 84 a storm in September 1937: This created much interest in Cayman …. Caymanians enjoyed listening to the battle in South America, not only because of knowing the Orion when she attended Cayman’s 1938 regatta but also because we had great faith in the mother country’s naval fleet, the most formidable in the world.85

Orion’s visit and the public fervour it generated was also documented on film by Oxford University who, at Cardinall’s invitation, sent an [ 67 ]

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expedition to survey the Islands between 17 April and 27 August 1938, an example of colonial knowledge formation from networks of 86 government officials, scientists and the Navy. Warship visits helped inculcate Caymanians with a belief in British naval and imperial power, a greater sense of patriotic pride, and heightened the prestige of the service, all of which increased the appeal of naval volunteering when the opportunity presented itself: It had been grounded in us that, you know, ‘Britannia ruled the waves’, and ‘Britons never shall be slaves’. Well this extended all over the Empire; you know we just felt that Britain was invincible.87

One way this patriotic belief in Britain and the Royal Navy had been ‘grounded’ in young Caymanians was through the Trafalgar Day school essay competition, instigated by Cardinall in 1935. Echoing Harry McCoy’s reference to Rule Britannia, Linda Borden eulogised that ‘when we study the lives of such men as Lord Nelson, we are proud to know that we form a part of the British Empire, and with the spirit of Nelson we can truly sing: “Britons never shall be slaves”’. In his essay titled ‘Supremacy of the Seas’, Glendower McLoughlin expressed that ‘we should all aspire to have the same feeling towards our Country as Nelson had, and have as our watch-word Nelson’s great and noble words “England expects every man to do his duty”’. ‘Today Trafalgar seems to say we are a unit of the greatest nation on Earth, therefore we should make ourselves worthy of the greatest and best’, argued David McLaughlin, while Cecil Wood wrote that ‘[Nelson] has left us his mantle of inspiration which is inspiring thousands of youths of the British Empire today’.88 That ‘mantle’ would subsequently be carried by those Caymanians in the TRNVR. To organise the regatta, Cardinall created the Cayman Islands Yacht and Sailing Club, numbering 134 members by 1937. The Commissioner also helped form two troops of Sea Scouts in George Town and West Bay, totalling eighty-two boys in 1937, with another fifty-nine in two 89 cub packs. As in Trinidad, these organisations provided valuable pools of disciplined recruits for the TRNVR come wartime,90 such as Harry McCoy: I was there [in the Home Guard] for nineteen months … the day I took off my uniform, I left to join the Navy … that had been my life’s ambition as a boy … I was a Sea Scout, and being a Caymanian, I already had the salt water in my blood … so I volunteered when the opportunity came.91

When Royal Navy warships visited the Islands during the regatta, Sea Scouts were invited aboard, exposing them first-hand to British [ 68 ]

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naval culture. Together they helped lay vital foundations for post-war employment, where traditionally there had been few educational and professional opportunities:

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Between [the Sea Scouts] and the TRNVR, turned out some of our best sailors, best seamen. Well, some of them that weren’t Scouts had the sea in their blood anyway … with the limited education, basic education, that they had … the experience of those four years in Trinidad among those who were there, and went to sea afterwards, was amazing.92

Colonial authorities emphasised their active role in the production of Caymanian seamen, accrediting official measures as having ‘turned out’ the best. Although ‘some … had the sea in their blood anyway’,93 it was believed the natural talent of these Caymanians still needed developing and disciplining under British tutelage to advance colonial society. Naval paternalism thus perpetuated Britain’s ‘civilising mission’; while Caymanians may have been viewed more positively than other West Indians, they were still considered an infant that required the imperial motherland’s guidance to grow and prosper. As well as the schools, sailing club and scouts, other colonial institutions, such as the police and postal service, were enlisted to recruit Caymanians: Mr Roddy Watler, Chief Inspector of Police in them days, he came down to West Bay to see how many people he could get … There was [a public notice] in Capt. Hubert’s shop. The Post Office and everything else was in there … we would go over there, and he would sign us up, if we were at age … over one hundred people from West Bay.94

Another example was the local ministry. Caymanian society was strongly Presbyterian, and the connection between religious and maritime identity is engrained in the Islands’ motto, ‘He hath founded it upon the seas’, which comes from Psalm 24 and adorns its flag.95 Just as the paternalism of the ‘civilising mission’ prevailed, so Christianity continued to serve as its conduit. The colonial authorities were conscious of the powerful influence that religion had over the local population. When they put out the call to arms they did so in the setting of the Presbyterian Church, instilling their message with a religious symbolism that subconsciously appealed to recruits through that sacred setting, and framed the struggle against Hitler as a righteous and holy war in which God was on Britain’s side: It was difficult to leave home, but I had a mind to serve because as Commissioner Cardinall said in his speech at the Presbyterian Church

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in George Town, war was like a dark cloud hanging over the world and Hitler had to be stopped. I wanted to play my part too.96

The same month as the first Caymanian and Guyanese ratings were enlisted in the TRNVR, July 1941’s Goshawk carried a lead article reinforcing the threat German fascism posed to the Christian faith and other ‘civilising’ principles. Justifying the war effort alongside Britain’s ‘tolerant’ authority, it called on colonial personnel to respect its imperial leadership, within both the naval chain-of-command and the political and social hierarchies of the Empire: Intolerant authority is the essence of Nazism and has provided the most dangerous menace to Christianity and civilisation that the World has yet seen … if there must be tolerance in authority there must also be tolerance of authority. If it be true that man cries out for authority then man must be prepared to trust and believe in authority … the British, as a race, the most tolerant of men. Not only do we believe in toleration for ourselves but also for others. We are prepared to fight for that and, in fact, it is that for which we are fighting.97

Caymanian volunteers were left convinced that Hitler was the aggressor who had declared war,98 though in reality Britain issued the declaration. The rhetoric verged on crusading zealotry, with the prospect of killing another human being excused on account of them ‘fighting an enemy, an infidel, who didn’t share the same beliefs that they shared, that didn’t share the same notion of God that they had’; they saw it as their ‘religious duty, as well as a civil, civic, and national duty’ to ‘volunteer to fight, and if necessary, to make the ultimate sacrifice, to lose their lives themselves, or in the process, to kill the persons who they deemed their enemy’.99 Each batch of recruits that set sail for Trinidad did so under the charge of Reverend George Hicks, a veteran from the First World War and Presbyterian Minister for Grand Cayman,100 as if shepherded into battle under the Lord’s divine protection. As Bertram Ebanks proudly proclaimed: ‘I have taken Christ as my shield and defender so I’ve nothing to dread, and I’m willing to do anything I can to help bring an end to this great 101 conflict’. Though Caymanians had difficulties with Trinidadians, religion acted as a transnational unifier that helped them relate to Barbadian shipmates: The people in Barbados was any amount nicer than the people in Trinidad … Barbados, friendly people … Barbados remind me of Cayman … we all

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used to go to church there the same … any place in the world we used to go to church.102

Many church services were held on the Cayman Islands in honour of its volunteers, both before and after their departure, and also helped to unite the civilian population. While racial divisions were generally less stark there, ‘in the “old days” the “coloured people” sat on one side of the church’, until ‘this was changed during the war years when many Caymanian men travelled to serve in the TRNVR’.103 As with the sailors, the collective wartime experience at home strengthened Caymanian identity beyond skin colour, with the Islanders united in prayer for the safe return of their men.

Conclusion Prior to the Second World War, Caymanian sailors were not conscious of their relative professional standing, it was a perception they had acquired by the time they returned to the Islands at the end of the war. A self-confident belief that they were the best seamen in the world has since become a central facet of Caymanian identity, key to the Islands’ post-war economic growth, and a source of cultural pride which has been elevated through historical memory to become engrained in the nation’s folklore. This is not to say that the Caymanian seafaring race was purely a colonial construction. As with martial race theory, this identity is anchored in a degree of empirical reality, but over time it became culturally and ideologically layered. The natural environment of the Cayman Islands, its resources, its settlers, and the local economy that developed from this, meant that nautical skills and traditions inevitably evolved amongst its people. Certainly, their seamanship made them attractive recruits for the Navy, but this did differentiate them from other coastal communities especially. It was under Commissioner Cardinall’s stewardship that Caymanian maritime culture was used to promote the Islands’ social and economic development. Seafaring heritage became institutionalised through organisations such as the Sea Scouts and sailing club, and ‘invented traditions’104 like the Trafalgar Day essay competition and the regatta, endeavours which the Admiralty supported with visiting warships and material assistance. This fostered imperial sentiment, interest in the Royal Navy and a belief in British power, which aided volunteerism during war. Cardinall was also driven by personal legacy and carving out his place in history, having vowed upon his arrival in the Cayman Islands that [ 71 ]

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105

‘when I leave you will remember me always’. By developing the local maritime infrastructure, ideologically as well as physically, and cultivating knowledge of its sailors through colonial networks to create new economic opportunities, he achieved his ambition to remain lauded in Caymanian collective memory. Caymanians were also marked out by their complexion, lighter than other West Indians, physically symbolising their supposed inheritance from early European mariners. Though Caymanians did not associate seafaring skill with skin colour themselves, the influence of martial race theory on colonial officials evinced itself in this link with Aryanism, and in anthropology legitimising racial preference through pseudoscientific deductions regarding intelligence and fitness. Transnational encounters with the British and other West Indians strengthened Caymanian group identity, though at the expense of force cohesion, and left them isolated when problems arose. Though Caymanians felt the victims of colonial rather than racial prejudice, this institutionalised discrimination still produced inferior naval conditions and caused deaths from poor medical treatment, prompting protest and eroding motivations to fight. To help retain the loyalty of the majority, British officers appealed to Caymanian pride by lauding their maritime worth, and instilling a belief that they were ‘the best seamen in the world’.106

Notes  1  James H.S. Billmyer, ‘The Cayman Islands’, Geographical Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1946), pp. 29–43.  2  Michael Craton, Founded Upon the Seas: A History of the Cayman Islands and Their People (Kingston, 2003), p. 291.  3  Captain Dale Banks, in ‘Poppy time here’, CayCompass.com, 27 October 2008, http://www.compasscayman.com/caycompass/2008/10/27/Poppy-time-here/ [30 January 2014].  4  Roger C. Smith, The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands (Florida, 2000), p. 51.  5  Billmyer, ‘The Cayman Islands’, p. 33.  6  The Northwester, March 1974, pp. 6–8.  7  A.J.A. Douglas, ‘The Cayman Islands’, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 95, No. 2 (February 1940), p. 128.  8  Ibid., pp. 128–129.  9  CINA, Colonial Report 1937, p. 13 10  CINA, Interview with Roosevelt Rankine (2), conducted by Heather McLoughlin, 15 January 1991, p. 2, 5. 11  CINA, Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), by Heather McLoughlin, 19 February 2003, p. 21. 12  CINA, Interview with Carley Ebanks, by Liz Scholefield, 31 May 1996, p. 18. 13  CINA, Government Notice, No. 98/39, 30 August 1939. 14  Norman Rudolph McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy (Miami, 2002), prelude. 15  Alex Law, ‘Of Navies and Navels: Britain as a Mental Island’, Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, Vol. 87, No. 4 (2005), pp. 267–277.

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16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24 

Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), p. 20. Billmyer, ‘The Cayman Islands’, p. 42. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. 41. TNA, ADM1/10969, p. 7 to ‘Enclosure to “AJAX’S” Letter’, 19 July 1939. Billmyer, ‘The Cayman Islands’, pp. 41–42. Ibid., pp. 34–35. Douglas, ‘The Cayman Islands’, p. 127. Thomas Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860– 1920 (London, 2007), p. 72. 25  Law, ‘Of Navies and Navels’, p. 269. 26  CINA, Interview with James Robinson, by Leonard Bodden, 11 June 1993, tape 2A, p. 10. 27  CINA, Interview with Harry McCoy, by Heather McLoughlin, 3 July 1991, tape 2B, transcript pp. 33–34. 28  Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), p. 41. 29  Interview with Carley Ebanks by Liz Scholefield, p. 19. 30 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, p. 87. 31  Ibid., p. 88. 32  CINA, Interview with Clive Glidden (2), by Heather McLoughlin, 6 June 1996, tape 2A, p. 10. 33  CINA, ‘When 40 Ebanks went to war’, The Northwester (November, 1972), pp. 46–47. 34  Sir Vassel Johnson, As I See It: How Cayman Became a Leading Financial Centre (Sussex, 2001), pp. 50–51. 35  Interview by author with Carley Ebanks and Thomas Ewart Ebanks, 7 July 2010. 36 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, prelude. 37  CINA, Interview with W. Hewitt Rivers, by Arthurlyn Pedley, 24 June 1991, p. 16. 38  Interview by author with Carley Ebanks and Thomas Ewart Ebanks. Myles was sentenced to death (Trinidad Guardian, 25 November 1944), but was released from prison shortly after the war and returned to the Cayman Islands. 39  CINA, Interview with Edith Ebanks, by Tricia Bodden, 19 March 2003, p. 15. 40 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, prelude. 41  Ibid., p. 4. 42  Ibid., pp. 5–6. 43 Kelshall, The U-Boat War In the Caribbean, pp. foreword–1. 44  Interview with Roosevelt Rankine (2), p. 15. 45  Ibid., p. 8. 46  Quoted in Palmer, ‘The United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean’, p. 244. 47  CINA, Interview with Armenthea Watler (2), by Elizabeth Ebanks, 19 August 1991, p. 25. 48  Interview with James Robinson, pp. 8–9. 49  Interview with Roosevelt Rankine (2), p. 19. 50  Interview with W. Hewitt Rivers, pp. 12–13. 51  Interview with Roosevelt Rankine (2), p. 6. 52  Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, ‘The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior’ in S. Worchel and W. Austin (eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Chicago, 1986), pp. 7–24. 53  A ‘beladen’, or belaying, pin is used for securing belaying rope. ‘Muntled’ means clubbed; a muntle is a heavy hand-carved wooden club used primarily for killing/ stunning sharks and large fish. Interview Armenthea Watler (2), p. 24. 54  Ibid. 55 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, p. 8. 56  Ibid., p. 13. 57  Ibid.

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TH E C A R IB B E A N 58  Ibid., p. 16. 59  Ibid., p. 15. 60  Ibid. 61  Interview with Clive Glidden (2), p. 3. 62 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, p. 16. 63  Ibid., p. 119. 64  Ibid., p. 16. 65  Ibid., p. 120. 66  Ibid. 67  Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), p. 41. 68  Interview by author with Carley Ebanks and Thomas Ewart Ebanks. 69  Ibid. 70 Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, p. 25. 71  Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), p. 41. 72  Since the late 1970s, a Memory Bank of oral histories, a National Museum and a National Archive were created to preserve Caymanian cultural heritage in the wake of social and economic changes from becoming an offshore financial centre. See Heather R. McLaughlin, ‘The Cayman Islands Memory Bank: Collecting and Preserving Oral History in Small Island Societies’, in John McIllwaine and Jean I. Whiffin (eds.), Collecting and Safeguarding the Oral Traditions: An International Conference (Munich, 2001), pp. 112–118. 73  Leroy Vail, The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkeley, 1989), p. 17. 74  CINA, Interview with Harold Banks, Carley Ebanks and Harvey Ebanks, by Liz Scolefield, 18 May 1996, p. 20. 75 Craton, Founded Upon the Seas, pp. 280, 253. 76  Ibid., p. 281. 77  Ibid., p. 286. 78  CINA, Interview with Harry McCoy, by Heather McLoughlin, 3 July 1991, tape 2A, p. 6. 79  Interview by author with Carley Ebanks and Thomas Ewart Ebanks. 80 Johnson, As I See It, p. 60. 81  TNA, ADM1/9749, ‘Commanding Officer, H.M.S. “DRAGON”, to Commander-inChief, America and West Indies’, 2 February 1937. 82  TNA, ADM1/9749, ‘H.M.S. “Dundee’s” No. 2/37’, 28 February 1938. 83  TNA, ADM1/9749, ‘Cayman Islands Regatta’, 4 May 1937. 84 Smith, The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands, p. 144. 85 Johnson, As I See It, p. 60. 86  Colonial Film: Moving Images of the British Empire, ‘Oxford University Cayman Islands Expedition’, BFI 8710, http://www.colonialfilm.org.uk/node/1275 [6 February 2014]. 87  Interview with Harry McCoy, tape 2A, p. 7. 88  CINA, ‘Trafalgar Day’, Central Registry File 706/35, 5 October 1935. 89 Craton, Founded Upon the Seas, p. 281. 90  CINA, Interview with former Commissioner Ernest Panton, by Iva Johnson-Good and Roger Good, 1979–1980, p. 2. 91  Interview with Harry McCoy, tape 2A, p. 10. 92  Interview with Ernest Panton, p. 5. 93  Ibid. 94  Interview with W. Hewitt Rivers, pp. 10–11. 95 Craton, Founded Upon the Seas, p. 406. 96  CINA, Conray Forbes, ‘An Experience of War’, Newstar, 52 (1995), p. 15. 97  Editorial, ‘Toleration’, The Goshawk, Vol. 1, No. 7 (July, 1941), p. 552. 98  Interview by author with William Harvey Ebanks, 7 July 2010, Grand Cayman. Desposited in the CINA. 99  Roy Bodden, local historian and chairman of University College Cayman Islands, in video Path to Life: Honouring the Cayman Islands Veterans, documentary broadcast from George Town, 8 November 2009.

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TH E C AYM A N IS L A N D S 100  101  102  103 

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CINA, XH/117/5, Government Notice 73/41, 2 June 1941. CINA, XH/117/5, Bertram Ebanks to Acting Commissioner, 6 July 1941. Interview with Roosevelt Rankine (2), pp. 7–8. Sybil McLoughlin, ‘Remembering Cayman’s Black History’, Cayman Net News, 3 March 2006, http://www.caymannetnews.com/2006/03/1042/black.shtml [8 January 2010]. 104  Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition. 105 Williams, A History of the Cayman Islands, p. 77. 106  Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), p. 41.

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PA RT II

East Africa

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ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

N A

ON

G

T OT

NU

TS

D

Lake Edward

Lake Rudolf

A

KENYA

Jinja Kisumu

U

C

Lake Victoria

on R ive r C

MA I Z E

CO F F E E

Nairobi

Mwanza M AI ZE

C OF F E E

o

Mombasa Pemba

g

Ujiji

C L OV E S

Zanzibar

NU

TS

TA N G A N Y I K A

Dar-es-Salaam

CO LH E

MP

TERRITORY

CO

Lake Tanganyika

SI

SA

In d ia n Oc e a n

N YA S A L A

Lake Nyasa

COF

N

FEE

D

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G Lake Albert

ND

S HE ISA M L P

N il e

CONGO

R i v er

BELGIAN

U RO

Blantyre

0

km

400

Map 3  British East Africa, c.1939

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C HAP T E R FO U R

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Kenya and Zanzibar, pre-1945

Naval heritage The first British colonial naval force in East Africa briefly appeared in the Central African Protectorate, present-day Malawi, at the end of the nineteenth century. In April 1895 the Government of the Protectorate took control of three gunboats from the Admiralty, including the Adventure. Lieutenant Percy Cullen, a RNR officer, was appointed as Commander, with ‘native sailors’ recruited locally. The force was utilised for survey and transport work and, like the naval brigades of the senior service, officers and men were landed with field guns to suppress Arab slavers, leading to the capture and execution in December 1895 of the self-styled Sultan Mlozi of the Northern Nyasa District for his ‘crimes and atrocities’.1 Such success prompted The Navy and Army Illustrated to speculate that ‘no doubt in a few years’ time the other great lakes, Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza, will also have British gunboats patrolling them’ and call for ‘the formation of an African Naval Service somewhat on the lines of the Australian Navies’.2 This did not materialise, however, and with the declining slave trade the Central African naval force disappeared as quickly as it emerged. It would be several decades before another colonial naval force would be established in Africa, as the War Office declared in 1901 that the ‘cardinal principle of British policy’ was that ‘African armies should not be used in “white men’s wars”’ and that the main burden of imperial defence ‘must be borne by the white subjects of the 3 King’. The use of black Africans by both sides in the South African war of 1899–1902 had aroused a fear of empowering ‘armed and disciplined blacks disabused of the sanctity and solidarity of the white man by their wartime experiences’ to rise up and challenge European dominance.4 [ 79 ]

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EA ST A F R IC A

This did not disbar certain African groups from serving within regular Royal Navy crews on local stations, under the leadership of Europeans. Since 1840, Zanzibaris played an essential role in the antislavery campaign by acting as Swahili interpreters. The Kru, for a long time recruited on the West African station, were also found aboard Royal Navy vessels along the East African coast. The expense and inconvenience of ferrying these Kroomen prompted the Admiralty to end their employment in East Africa on 7 April 1870, despite protests from Cape Station officers who feared a loss of efficiency. It was suggested they be replaced by Seedies, Muslim sailors from the Swahili coast and subjects of the Seyyid or Sultan of Zanzibar, though it was thought that eight Kroomen were equal to twelve Seedies. In 1881, 11.5% of Royal Navy personnel in the Indian Ocean were non-white, most Africans were Seedie and over 52% possessed Muslim names. A number of freedmen also served, liberated by the Navy or enlisted in 5 port. An ethnic division of labour existed, with the Navy assigning roles according to racial theory; Kroomen and Seedies were employed as seamen, while freed Africans were assigned below deck as stokers. Most Seedies were Muslim, and martial race theory evinced itself in the Navy’s acknowledgement that ‘Mohammedanism is … the finest fighting religion in the world’, though there were concerns that those qualities were diluted when ‘within a few hours of one of these boys joining the Navy he has to go directly against the dictates of his religion by being given a ration of tinned beef or salt pork’.6 Commanders attempted to mitigate this by observing ‘Mohammedan feast days’, including Ramadan, at the expense of Government holidays.7 Seedies also supposedly inherited nautical qualities from seafaring Arab ancestors, whilst formerly enslaved Africans were deemed physically better suited for heavier and hotter work shifting coal within the sweltering furnace of the ship’s engine room. There was no shortage of volunteers, with the work still considered easier than employment ashore: They look on the Navy as a very soft and well-paid job. When one realises that a native on a Shamba (farm) generally works from sunrise to sunset, perhaps getting off at 4 pm on Saturdays if he is lucky, it can easily be understood why recruiting for the Navy, with two-hour dinner hours, Thursday and Saturday afternoons off, and all the other luxuries they enjoy, is so easy.8

The 1907 abolition of slavery within the Zanzibar Sultanate and the introduction of Regulations for the Entry of Naval Cadets in 1906 stating ‘candidates must be of pure European descent’, meant East African recruitment ceased until the manpower shortages of the First World War. The ‘success General von Lettow had with them’ in that [ 80 ]

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KEN YA A N D ZA N ZIB A R , P R E - 1 9 4 5

conflict, most notably during the Battle of Tanga in November 1914, gave the Navy ‘a practical example of what can be done with these 9 men’. Discipline was seen as a problem though because of African racial stereotypes. It was considered ‘impossible to deal with natives relying solely on the same regulations which are drawn up for the white men’,10 as they were ‘little more than children mentally’.11 Sports like football, hockey and boat racing were encouraged ‘to keep their minds off women and gambling’ and expend ‘superfluous energy’.12 There were concerns, not just with controlling the crew but also with populations ashore, and inspiration was again drawn from German tactics in East Africa to produce what local naval commanders referred to as ‘show’: When a ship is lying off a port she should always seize the opportunity to burn search lights and should keep herself brilliantly illuminated all night. The Germans actually fitted electric lights in their ships scuttles so that they should shine outboard, thus making the natives think that they were wide awake, rich and powerful … a ship in a native port should never fail to fire a rifle at sunset and a gun at 9pm. This latter probably impresses the native more …13

This can be considered another example of naval theatre, and the more coercive elements of gunboat diplomacy. The SSS’s visit to Dar es Salaam in January 1924 stressed that ‘Tanganyika, although a mandate territory is a conquered territory and consequently’ there was a ‘necessity for imposing on the native mind by some visible means the strength of the British Empire and the means by which the Germans were defeated’ to solidify colonial rule and dissuade any rebellion.14 It was hoped that sensory displays such as these would garner imperial allegiance by impressing a perception of the King as ‘a sort of god of quite unknown quantity who could, if he wished, move mountains’, and the Captain as ‘their father, mother, high priest and personal friend all in one’.15 This was cultivated because ‘“The Admiralty” conveys nothing to their minds, except that they have a sort of suspicious idea that it is something not to be trusted’, whereas monarchical authority 16 was culturally familiar because of the Sultan. Most Seedies originated from Zanzibar, and being a protectorate rather than a formal colony, Britain relied on the Sultan’s ‘collaboration’ and the existing power structure of local officials to recruit its naval personnel there.17 Sultan Khalifa bin Harub ruled for almost fifty years from 9 December 1911, was himself a ‘great sailor and held the Royal Navy in the highest esteem’,18 having witnessed its bombardment of the palace on 27 August 1896 in a demonstration of ‘shock and awe’ that ended the shortest war in history after just 38 minutes, and which put Khalifa’s [ 81 ]

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EA ST A F R IC A 19 father-in-law on the throne. For Seedie subjects, ‘the King came first and was the be-all and end-all of their existence’, and to encourage their obedience Commander Shakespear would lead his crew to believe that ‘he sent me messages when he was pleased or displeased with them, rewarded them with gratuities, had heard that they were very poor and could not buy nice clothes, so gave them clothing allowance’, an omnipotent and benevolent ruler to be feared and loved.20 Word of the mutinies which gripped the Royal Navy in 1919 spread to East Africa, and ‘the Seedies and Kroomen hearing about the bluejackets’ method of enforcing their demands very naturally followed their example … and refused to work’.21 They were aggrieved that unlike their white counterparts they had not received a war gratuity, though they were willing to accept a racially inferior amount:

Master, you are our father and mother … we no want money all same like white man, we black man, we know we black man, we say ‘ …if white man get plenty money then black man get little money,’ not want white man gruity, we want somethings [sic].22

Shakespear emphasised the King’s global imperial power when appealing to the men: I tell King my boys fight for him in war. King says he knows boys fight for him in war. King say ‘thank you very much.’ King say plenty more people fight for him in war. Peoples belong England, Scotland, France, China; all over the world peoples fight for King. Hundred million thousand men all fight for King and then all say ‘Give me gruity’[sic]!23

After ‘about two hours’ hard talking’, not wanting to satisfy them ‘too soon, for the longer the palaver the more important it appears in their eyes’, Shakespear theatrically told the men he would send a telegram to ‘the King’ on their behalf. He then cabled the Admiralty who agreed to pay a gratuity but in time, and so Shakespear funded it from his own pocket, conscious of his role in a greater imperial mission: They had almost lost faith in the King, and unless I acted promptly they would not only lose complete faith in him, but in me … though it is true I lost slightly from a financial point of view, I retained their trust and loyalty … which once lost might have a most serious effect, not only amongst the boys serving in the Navy, but over the whole of the African continent.24

The designation Seedie was replaced on 14 May 1934 by the generalised term Somali, as recruitment migrated up the coast. It included men from beyond Somaliland, however, such as Aden25, and thus [ 82 ]

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KEN YA A N D ZA N ZIB A R , P R E - 1 9 4 5

the identity represented a fluid construct based upon non-white skin colour, Islamic religion, and low class. A tradition of Royal Navy recruitment was thus already embedded in East Africa and from 1919 this would be supplemented by an officer class. The 1926 census revealed that not one of the country’s white population over twenty-six had been born there. African unrest following the First World War made Kenya’s European community fearful of their minority position. They thus introduced the 1919 Soldier Settlement Scheme, increasing the area of white settlement by a third. This ‘human sea’ of settlers, as one newspaper put it, included retired naval officers, who reflected the maritime rhetoric of this 26 economic and social movement.

Imperial and local debates While the Admiralty and Colonial Office debated in the metropole how best to reorganise imperial naval defence following the Washington Naval Conference, steps were proactively taken locally by LieutenantCommander Whitehouse, a RNR officer in charge of the Mombasa Port and Marine Department. In April 1923 he wrote a report assessing the naval defence of Kenya Protectorate, in which he suggested establishing a naval reserve force of 40 men for minesweeping Mombasa’s channels. Here the local intersected with the global, with Whitehouse mobilised by the international diplomacy of the Washington Naval Treaty, the limitations it imposed upon the Royal Navy, and its implications for Kenya: The position of the isolated ports of the British Empire is rendered increasingly precarious … the two power standard maintained before the war having now diminished to no more or even less than a one power standard … The port of Mombasa, the gate-way of a vast productive territory and the one place of really vital importance to the prosperity of Kenya, through which her ever increasing volume of exports stream and through which are drawn indispensable supplies … are particularly capable of being mined … Observing the importance to the Royal Navy of keeping open in time of war the only safe and commodious British port on the whole coast of East Africa and the only one which could provide adequate shelter for a large fleet, it would not appear unreasonable to anticipate a contribution from the Admiralty.27

Whitehouse’s assumption was misguided, however, as the Admiralty referred to the 1865 CNDA which stated that ‘the expenses of such forces shall be borne by the Colonial Governments’.28 They suggested Kenya focus on ‘making a small start, and gradually developing’ a feasible unit.29 [ 83 ]

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EA ST A F R IC A

Japan was identified as a possible threat to Kenya, with the CID declaring that ‘in the event of war in the East, the risk of attack on 30 Kilindini [harbour] is likely to be much greater than in the late war’. In 1926 Rear-Admiral Walter Ellerton, Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Station, was dispatched to check on Kenya’s progress. His ‘enquiries locally at Mombasa confirmed the view that fear of the financial commitment involved in the creation of a Naval Reserve force had resulted in nothing being done’.31 Moreover, colonial parochialism outweighed imperial responsibility, as Kenya’s Governor Sir Edward Grigg demanded, ‘Uganda should be asked to contribute a share towards the maintenance of any Naval Force raised’ because they too depended upon Mombasa’s port.32 Ellerton wrote to the Governor of Uganda, but the scheme floundered as the CID formed the ODC to examine and coordinate local defence measures throughout the Empire. Though the Admiralty suggested there was no reason to delay forming the RNVR,33 Grigg decided to first ‘ascertain whether any scheme suggested for Kenya could be suitably embodied in any general plan for Overseas Defence’ by the Committee.34 Two years passed before the ODC reported that it endorsed Ellerton’s scheme.35 Meanwhile, the 1865 CNDA had not legislated for two colonies jointly raising a RNVR,36 and was not amended until 1931. That year ‘The Kenya Royal Naval Volunteer Ordinance, 1931’ was introduced to the Kenyan Legislative Council, though the Attorney-General recommended that the unit not be established ‘until the Colony’s financial position had clarified’.37 Ellerton was succeeded by Admiral Sir Martin Dunbar-Nasmith in 1932, and on 20 June he arrived in Kenya for a sixteen-day visit aboard HMS Effingham to take advantage of the ‘strong feeling in favour of the early formation of such a Unit’ in Mombasa.38 By ‘showing the flag’, ‘popular enthusiasm grew and a public meeting was convened by Mr A.M. Campbell, Agent of the Union-Castle Line in Mombasa, and a number of prominent citizens’, unanimously passing a resolution ‘strongly in favour of the immediate formation of a Royal Naval 39 Volunteer Reserve’. Public pressure on the legislature resulted in the Kenya Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (KRNVR) finally being established as part of the 1933 Kenya and Uganda Defence Scheme.40

Training Weekly parades began in March 1933 and were initially ‘well attended’, a cutter was imported from England for seamanship training,41 and Dunbar-Nasmith visited in HMS Hawkins on 30 June 1933 to inspect and carry out exercises with the force.42 The KRNVR’s duties were [ 84 ]

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initially restricted to the Kilindini naval base and consisted of providing a Naval Control Service, an Examination Service, Minesweeping and A/S Patrols. Though primarily intended for the colony’s external defence, there were plans to mobilise the force during internal distur43 bances, when it would patrol the harbour and land armed parties. Though Uganda and Zanzibar contributed over a third of the unit’s £539.10 annual expenditure,44 financial responsibility ultimately rested with the Kenyan Government. Being ‘a not over-wealthy Colony’,45 to avoid administration costs Kenya pressed for control to be vested in the Admiralty, while this only occurred in Trinidad after the increased financial pressures of wartime. This contradicted the Admiralty’s prime motive for naval devolution, to confer some of the costs of imperial naval defence onto the colonies, and so the RNVR was organised by a local amateur body ‘held together by the enthusiasm of its members rather than by a proper code of regulations’.46 This, and the fact that training was conducted two evenings a week, when ‘no native can be expected to be at his brightest … having worked as a stevedore for eight hours’, meant discipline was lax. The one hour of daylight remaining between five and six on parade nights left no time to train at sea.47 Facilities were basic, restricting instruction to elementary seamanship and small arms drill, with limited gunnery and signalling training, other than when a Royal Navy warship visited.48 Often classes had to be repeated as the men were ‘quite irresponsible, forgetting immediately small corrections, because they stand in no awe of discipline being enforced’.49 The Navy found it ‘difficult to obtain the better type of native as they are usually employed and therefore less disposed to devote their leisure to voluntary training in return for a remuneration of 50 cents per parade’, while those that did attend parades were ‘unemployed natives, not of the best type’.50 Initial keenness waned because of insufficient pay,51 while there was no way to enforce attendance without ‘impairing the voluntary spirit of the Unit’.52 To rectify this, a permanent nucleus of regular African ratings was introduced under similar conditions to askaris (soldiers) of the King’s 53 African Rifles (KAR), drawn mostly from the Kamba ethnic group. Somali ratings were considered, but dismissed because of the ‘racial and language difficulties’ they presented for other members of the KRNVR.54 Of the European officers and petty officers, a third hailed from Mombasa, the rest from the Highlands.55 They worked for private firms, which meant ‘the only opportunity afforded them for a fortnight’s training is during their fortnight’s leave’, when ‘they naturally prefer to get away from the Coast and upcountry’.56 The KRNVR strength varied considerably because of Mombasa’s floating population; few members remained in port for more than two or three years, [ 85 ]

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with periodical breaks for local and overseas leave, and thus ‘training 57 lacked continuity for the individual’. These factors were seen to justify the Navy’s ‘civilising mission’, with Kenya’s naval development requiring long-term British tutelage, as ‘under the present scheme it is not believed that a native can be disciplined or instructed to make him a reliable and efficient seaman in three or thirty years’.58 During its visit to Zanzibar in January 1924, the Vice-Admiral Commanding the SSS, Sir Frederick Field, had met with Sultan Khalifa bin Harub and the Chamber of Commerce and encouraged them to take greater responsibility for the islands’ naval defence: While the Navy would in the event of outbreak of war, do all in its power to protect the trade routes, its first duty was to contain the enemy’s main fleet, and I therefore suggested that the inhabitants of Zanzibar, instead of depending entirely on the protection of the Navy, might be well advised to consider whether some steps could not be taken locally by the institution of a RNVR force.59

The Zanzibar Government preferred to pay 14% of the KRNVR’s annual £1,300 costs60 until 1938, when it formed its own Naval Volunteer Force (ZNVF), raising the Government’s estimated expenditure on Coastal Defence in 1939 to £886.61 C.G. Somers, Zanzibar’s Port and Customs Officer, was appointed to command the force, which consisted of three European Officers and twenty ‘native’ ratings, including a permanent nucleus of six employed on Harbour Police duties.62 Somers convinced the local authorities to award him the rank of Lieutenant-Commander, arguing that otherwise ‘he and his unit will in all probability be compelled to accept orders by officers with no interest in Zanzibar’.63 Though personal status likely motivated Somers’s request, it emphasises that, unlike the KRNVR, the ZNVF was intended to provide the protectorate with a degree of local naval autonomy and not just be subordinate to the Admiralty and imperial defence strategy. This was also expressed by the Government’s desire to ‘incorporate some symbol which would identity the wearer of the uniform as an officer in the service of His Highness’, and it was decided that the naval buttons should bear the design of the Sultan’s personal 64 cipher. The police provided musketry lessons, while the officers and permanent nucleus underwent training in Mombasa to help Somers instruct the other ratings in minesweeping, signalling, gunnery and seamanship.65 The Government vessel Al Hathera was converted for use by the ZNVF as a minesweeper, with a second smaller vessel, the Al Nasr, acquired to act as an additional minesweeper and examination vessel.66 The force’s headquarters was in the Cooper’s Royal Naval Institute in Mnasi Moja,67 named after Lieutenant Cooper of HMS [ 86 ]

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Griffon, who was killed during a raid on a slaving dhow in 1888. The British Government levied a fine on the Arabs of Pemba for his murder and used the proceeds by 1891 to build a recreation house for sailors 68 visiting Zanzibar. Despite the generalised imperial discourse, ‘native ratings’ were defined differently to those in Kenya. With Zanzibar having been a traditional recruiting ground for the Royal Navy, Government departments were requested to submit lists of any ‘Seedie boys’ under their employment for consideration by the ZNVF.69 In spite of this, the KRNVR’s Commander Blunt was ‘not very favourably impressed with the type of recruit sent from Zanzibar’, though ‘he hopes that with a little more training, he will be able to make something like sailormen out of them’.70 Thus, despite the racial stereotype cultivated over decades by the Navy, not all Seedies were seen as natural seamen. Blunt’s negative opinion could, however, have been influenced by the fact that the ratings secretly sent a letter to Zanzibar complaining that they lacked both food and money, despite him having advanced them pay from his own pocket, which they then expended without settling their debt to a local food store.71

Collaboration Inadequate government funding led the KRNVR to seek financial support elsewhere. Just as British imperialism was reliant upon collaborating ruling elites, so too the Admiralty depended upon local allies. One of Britain’s and the Navy’s biggest supporters in Mombasa was Sir Ali bin Salim, representative for Arab interests on Kenya’s Legislative Council, and the Sultan of Zanzibar’s Liwali (Governor) for the Coast until 1931. Dunbar-Nasmith met with him during his visit on 21 June 1932,72 and in 1934 Sir Ali funded the construction of a headquarters for the KRNVR in Mombasa. He regularly threw large parties for visiting Royal Navy vessels to foster closer relations between the local community and the senior service. On 24 June 1938, after Blunt complained to him about the heat in his existing offices, Sir Ali offered to ‘hand over his house and grounds at Peleleza on the mainland opposite to Mombasa as a gift to the Admiralty for the use of the British Navy’.73 Ethnic tensions within the colony influenced his decision, with Sir Ali ‘frightened that eventually it will fall into Indian hands and he considers that if it was given to the Navy … it would be in the best hands and safe for ever’.74 Thus the collaborative relationship between British and Arabs worked to preserve their mutual interests and privileged positions within colonial society at the expense of other groups. [ 87 ]

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Commodore Poland, Acting C-in-C East Indies, suggested the gift would provide valuable accommodation not only for visiting crews, 75 but also the local yacht club , an important source of naval volunteers, and for the KRNVR’s training.76 To publicise this example of colonial acquiescence that affirmed Britain’s legitimacy, it was deemed ‘important that early action should be taken to mark our appreciation of his generous gifts and loyal service in a suitable manner’.77 Fearing Sir Ali ‘has not long to live’, Admiralty and Colonial officials did not want to miss the positive propaganda offered by ‘a most loyal Arab subject who has the highest regard for the Navy and sets an example which is of real national value in East Africa’.78 Most importantly it was considered by the Governor, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, that despite finding Sir Ali ‘a little tiresome at times’, some public recognition would be ‘valuable in helping us to stop any anti-British movement that might arise amongst the Arab population on the Coast – a reaction of course, from Palestine’.79 Therefore, following consultation with Sultan Khalifa, the Admiralty granted Sir Ali bin Salim the honorary rank of Captain in the RNVR.80 This message of colonial unity was emphasised during a ceremony held for Sir Ali at the Goan Institute, where it was declared: ‘This great distinction has brought honour through your noble self not only to Kenya but to the whole of British Africa. Your noble actions and undoubted munificence have endeared you to the hearts of all communities of whatever caste or creed’.81

Colonial navalism and HMS Kenya Though the KRNVR attempted to draw the Arab and Asian communities closer to the colonial state, it also divided the European community. The wave of popular enthusiasm that campaigned for the force’s formation had waned by August 1939 once the financial expense hit home when, despite rising global tensions, ‘many people completely ignorant of Naval Matters criticise the RNVR saying that 82 it is no use to the country and an unnecessary expense’. Naval officials like Lieutenant-Commander H.F. Littledale used the local press to try to educate the population of the force’s strategic importance: In the event of hostilities it is necessary to the life of Kenya that the harbour should always be available and therefore the channel must be kept clear of mines … it should therefore be the sporting thing to help and encourage them instead of hindering them and making feeble and ill-mannered jokes.83

Just three days earlier, the first Royal Navy vessel to bear the name Kenya was launched. The Crown Colony-class cruisers followed a [ 88 ]

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tradition of naming warships after parts of the Empire to cultivate imperial unity. Early examples include the cruiser HMS Good Hope, originally christened Africa, but renamed when launched in February 1901 towards the end of the Boer War. Its name was a public show of appreciation to Britain’s Cape Colonists, and the vessel was chosen to carry Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain to South Africa to sign 84 the peace treaty. In the spirit of reciprocity, Cape Colony provided a financial contribution to the Royal Navy’s upkeep, as did Natal, which then also had a cruiser named after it in 1905.85 With the introduction of the King Edward VII-class to the fleet between 1903 and 1905, it became ‘desirable’ that ‘the Imperial idea … runs through the naming of this class of battleships’:86 The idea of the class was to group round the ‘Sovereign’ the component parts of the Empire. We began with those two great colonies that had done so much for us fighting side by side in South Africa – the ‘Dominion’ [of Canada] and the ‘Commonwealth’ [of Australia]. We then passed on to that wonderful colony, smaller than the other two, which sent no fewer than ten separate contingents of men … ‘New Zealand’; and then to the gem of the British Empire … ‘Hindustan’. The last three ships of the class would be the ‘Africa’, and then, coming home, they would have the ‘Hibernia’ and the ‘Britannia’.87

Telegrams were exchanged between colony and Britain at the launch of such vessels, publicising through local press and ‘creating a sense of simultaneity in the celebration of the new ship and the imperial bond it was intended to symbolize’. Public donations were also raised for the presentation of gifts,88 so that a part of the colony would reside aboard the ship carrying its name. This tradition continued for HMS Kenya. Blunt sent three pictures from his personal collection of big game to decorate the Wardroom Mess, while the Eastern African Dependencies Trade and Information Office provided photographs of the East African Railway.89 Brooke-Popham appealed for donations through the East African Standard newspaper, raising £560 to purchase a silver ship’s bell, twenty tampions bearing the ship’s badge in silver, three silver bugles, ten silver boat badges, ten electric clocks, a wooden scroll, a silver lion centrepiece, two White Ensigns, a leather-bound book containing the names of all subscribers, plus a welfare fund of £200. Each gift was engraved with the statement ‘Presented by the Colony of Kenya’.90 The Presentation Committee, which included Sir Ali, suggested the Kenyan lion be adopted as the ship’s crest.91 Another custom was for the presentation to be made by a representative of the colony,92 and Princess Alice, Duchess of Gloucester, was chosen, having spent time in Kenya. [ 89 ]

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Brooke-Popham used Kenya’s launch as an opportunity to pull together the strands of Kenyan society divided in their attitude towards the KRNVR. His message, recited at the launching cere93 mony, emphasised not just the material benefits of trade that the Navy secured, but also connected it with the loftier imperial ideal of the ‘civilising mission’ that Kenya’s European settlers were charged with undertaking: The maintenance of a powerful fleet is a vital factor in the peace and security of Great Britain and her Dependencies. Its existence enables us to carry out our task of pioneering and developing the ideals of British civilisation in the distant lands of the Empire … the association of the Colony’s name with so fine a vessel will afford the greatest pleasure to all races of the community.94

Though Brooke-Popham professed that the Navy benefitted ‘all races’, ultimately the unity he sought to reinforce was that between the ruling white settlers, by reminding them that they could not afford to be divided amongst themselves or their racially privileged position might be threatened by the disenfranchised African majority.

Figure 6 HMS Kenya

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Wartime rivalry and colonial status

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Another threat to European status was the issue of poor whites. The outbreak of the Second World War meant the likelihood of casualties, yet no provision was in place for death or disability awards to the wives of colonial naval personnel. A minimum pension of £80 was initially suggested, but this was considered insufficient to maintain the lifestyle expected of a ‘lady’ in Kenya, and would: give rise to a number of women who could only be classed as poor white and who would have become so because … their husbands had given their lives for their King and Country ... In the United Kingdom, a widow from Mayfair who finds herself badly off could live in Bermondsey, and although the change would be a hardship, it could hardly have any serious consequences. Kenya is a country of mixed races, and it is necessary that a European woman should maintain a certain standard of life and prestige for racial reasons. Undesirable as a poor white population would be, a population of poor white women would, in my opinion, be even more undesirable.95

This mimicked South Africa, where Neil Roos argues a fear of poor whites ‘blurring the racial boundaries of colonial society’ produced an ‘enlightened form of paternalism’ to combat this social problem.96 Kenya consequently introduced a minimum rate of £140 for officers, and £100 for other ranks. To preserve racial distinctions and white authority further, a colour bar was enforced for KRNVR personnel, forbidding European officers and ratings from socialising in hotels and bars not ‘under European management’, or any ‘Asiatic and African locations … premises and houses with the exception of bona fide shops, garages and cinemas’.97 The situation was charged by the wartime influx of human traffic caused by Mombasa’s status as East Africa’s preeminent port, which destabilised the colony’s racial order. There was a sharp increase in European prisoners, ‘composed mostly of Soldiers and Merchant Service Seamen’,98 and including ‘vicious characters who have served sentences previously in South Africa’.99 To maintain an impression of white prestige meant they could only be overseen by European disciplinary officers, of which there was a shortage because of volunteering for military and naval service. Despite Government pressure, the KRNVR prioritised their interests and refused to release the Chief Officer of the Prisons Department, Able Seaman C.G.M. Phillips, from his duties.100 Brooke-Popham’s attempts to appeal to common white interests were immaterial as competition between rival departments for the limited pool of European manpower intensified under wartime pressure. The [ 91 ]

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KRNVR resorted to underhand tactics to acquire personnel, with Mr Rushworth, Assistant Town Clerk in Mombasa, allowed to join as a reserve officer on the assurance ‘he would only be called out in case of real emergency and that it was unlikely that his services would be required for more than a short period’. Yet, Lieutenant-Commander Buckley later admitted that ‘in point of fact there is more than one emergency with which we have to compete and no sooner does one terminate than it is succeeded by another’, leading the Director of Manpower to conclude that ‘the Naval authorities have been guilty of a breach of faith with the Municipal Board’, and Rushworth should be 101 ‘returned forthwith’. The Navy were themselves frustrated that Petty Officer R.H. James was totally exempted from duty because ‘the teaching of Arabs takes priority over war service’:102 Arab Education needs a great deal of improvement. Out of a population of approximately 6,600 Arab children of all ages in Mombasa, only 420 attend the Government Arab school. The rest only receive a very elementary education provided by the Koran schools.103

Colonial officials recognised the importance of maintaining a sympathetic Arab population through British education, while the Navy benefitted from offers of material support from the Arab community, in contrast to self-interested European bodies. Hassanali Suleman Verjee of the Kenya Fish and Supply Company placed the MV Kenya Fish at the KRNVR’s disposal for the war’s duration free-of-charge, though it was found to be unsuitable for naval service.104 Sir Ali bin Salim also donated a cheque for 4,000 shillings to the Admiralty so that Christmas presents could be purchased for the children of naval personnel who lost their lives in the war.105

African recruitment and propaganda By the end of 1939, the KRNVR possessed two minesweepers, HMS Ndovu and Nguvu, and four inland harbour patrol MLs, operated by 32 European officers, 8 European ratings, 4 Asian and 44 African seamen.106 In September 1940, the force was supplemented by the minesweeper Lindi, while Nguvu was replaced by HMS Oryx (later renamed Gemsbuck). The force played an important role in the Italian Somaliland campaign, with its three minesweepers clearing channels, transporting troops and supporting raids on Italian positions, while three MLs, Baleka, Alma and Joan patrolled for dhows, and signalmen monitored the stations at Kismayu and Mogadishu. To conduct these additional tasks, another 23 European officers, 28 European ratings, [ 92 ]

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and 55 African ratings were recruited, with one African promoted to petty officer. In June 1941, Alma and Baleka were redeployed to Basra, Iraq, while a whale-catcher was sent with a KRNVR crew to Bombay for fitting out as HMS Impala, and served in the Persian Gulf under Lieutenant-Commander N.H. Lee until 1943, when all KRNVR personnel were recalled to Mombasa.107 African manpower was the backbone of the service, and chiefs played a vital role in their recruitment. This was stressed in a message prepared earlier in 1939 in case of war: TO ALL CHIEFS I am sorry to have to inform you that war has broken out between Great Britain and [insert name]. This war is not of our seeking since the English have tried to live in peace and friendship with all other nations and peoples. Now that the war has come everyone must be ready to do his utmost to ensure victory … Please send in recruits of every kind.108

It was clearly considered crucial to retain the chiefs’ support by presenting Britain as the innocent victim of foreign aggression, as the same message was to be sent regardless of cause, adding only the belligerent’s name. The chiefs and elders organised war collections from their provinces, including special ones for Navy Week.109 As thanks for their continued efforts and ‘for purposes of propaganda in the Reserves’, twenty-one chiefs and headmen from the Coast, Central, Rift Valley, and Nyanza provinces were invited to visit the fleet in Mombasa on 14 October 1942.110 They were shown around the Old Port, talked with naval members from their communities, and given a tour of the battleship HMS Resolution by the Admiral, which included firings of the ship’s 15-inch, secondary and anti-aircraft guns. This demonstration of technological might and modernity was again part of the naval theatre performed to awe and assure the chiefs that Britain’s imperial power was undiminished and to secure their continued support for the colonial regime, in spite of the wave of Japanese victories which had prompted the Eastern Fleet’s retreat to Mombasa. What impressed Chief Sila Karima of Fort Hall most though was the attitude of the British naval officers: The most great event which is hard to describe is that we witnessed in the man-of-war that guards the land. We did not expect to be shown so great respect … We were more surprised of the European gentlemen to have carried Chief Muriranja who had a leg complaint, up to board the man-of-war. We were surprised to see the civilised people to have more respect and a great zeal in conducting their work and in welcoming strangers.111

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Figure 7  European and African crew of the KRNVR ‘working with the Royal Navy’

It is telling that Karima repeats his surprise at the naval officers acting so deferentially to their African guests. He recognises British sailors as a more ‘civilised people’ than Kenya’s European settlers because of their respectful behaviour. White Kenyans would never have carried an African chief as, both physically and symbolically, it would have inverted the racial hierarchy of settler society and undermined their own position of colonial authority. Even though a more egalitarian relationship was projected, for some the visit reinforced a sense of inferiority. While Chief Ndungu, also from Fort Hall, was ‘very much impressed by the way the [British] crews so speedily handled shells’, he considered it ‘in striking contrast 112 to the average native carrying a load somewhat similar in weight’. A visit by headmen from the Northern Frontier District in April the following year left them, like Karima, ‘appreciative’ and ‘astonished at what they saw’, particularly ‘the fact that the Captain of the battleship has drunk to their health’, yet they also ‘returned with a feeling that they knew nothing and were more foolish than all other people’.113 In response ‘some of the younger members were already [ 94 ]

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Figure 8  ‘African seamen drawn from four different inland tribes foregather over a mug of tea’.

trying to rectify this on their way back when they endeavoured to get 114 books with which to increase their knowledge’. The visits thus also served a paternalistic purpose, with chiefs acknowledging that British training had ‘efficiently turned our capable men to fight and defend their country and people’.115 It strengthened the patriotism of these collaborative local rulers, who were ‘pleased about the work done … particularly of how you conquered the Italians in East Africa’, secured their assistance in disciplining ‘those men in service to be more punctual in returning and reporting to their respective officers after their days of holiday’, and encouraged support for the colonial regime with the chiefs’ ‘greatest wish for our Africans under you is that they remain loyal to the Government and obedient to you’.116 This endorsement was publicised through the press, including Baraza,117 which had been set up in 1939 after the MOI Empire Division pressured the Kenyan Government to establish an African newspaper. Published in Swahili by the East African Standard, Baraza carried articles and pictures by the Kenya Information Office to a readership of around 18,000 in 1943.118 Interviews with the chiefs were [ 95 ]

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also broadcast on the radio. To overcome African illiteracy, a wireless station had been set up in Nairobi which transmitted war news, talks and entertainment in English and local languages, while community wirelesses were set up at district headquarters, missions and listening 119 points, with 65 rural units in Kenya by 1943. Propaganda was also spread directly by qualified naval personnel such as Petty Officer Ramazan Hassan, who had served in the Royal Navy for 24 years, and hawked vegetables and fruit to passenger liners at Dar es Salaam before joining the Tanganyika Naval Volunteer Force (NVF).120 He spoke seven languages – Hindustani, Gujarati, Arabic, Swahili, Zulu, Afrikaans, and English – and was assigned to East Africa Command’s Mobile Propaganda Unit, ‘a kind of military circus, an Africanised version of the Edinburgh tattoo’,121 giving public lectures across East Africa explaining the Royal Navy’s important role in the war.122 Captain Dickson, the Propaganda Unit’s officer-in-charge, believed that ‘the African is in the “copying” stage’, and by providing them ‘with models worth copying’ they were contributing to the economic and social development of East Africa.123 This paternalistic sentiment was echoed by the Petauke District Commissioner: The Mobile Propaganda Unit will help arouse the rural African from his primeval torpor: in this manner it is even now paving the way for postwar progress. It is seldom that the arts of peace can have a common aim, but the Propaganda Unit has shown how a spear for freedom may easily be beaten into a ploughshare … Its emphasis, now on the destruction of the Axis, may later be on the reconstruction of the African.124

The Navy’s role in colonial development would also be promoted on the big screen in Father and Son, part of the ‘Focus on Empire’ series distributed by the MOI. Set in Zanzibar and the fictional village of Tukumbu, near Mombasa, it tells the story of Kamal, a KRNVR petty officer returning to his village on leave, where he is reunited with his father, an elder. While there his young nephew is injured and, against his father’s advice, Kamal takes the boy to a British hospital, instead of the ‘witch doctor’, where he is healed. He gives his father the gift of a compass, and the father sets sail for Zanzibar but encounters a fierce storm. He survives believing that the compass did help him, not as a navigational aid but as a good luck charm worn around his neck. Filmed as an educational ethnographic piece and played in schools and youth clubs in Britain and other parts of the Empire, Father and Son ‘intended to show how we as British people are helping the East African peoples’, by highlighting the ‘battle between modern medicine and old magic, compass and chart as opposed to hoping for the best’.125 The narrator contrasts the ignorant superstition of the village [ 96 ]

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Figure 9  Petty Officer Ramazan Hassan, lecturing an African audience

elder with the scientific reason of the British-educated petty officer. To the elder, the schoolhouse is ‘a strange white building. Like all new things it disturbs him’, he does not understand what it is for and while at the hospital ‘curiously he looked to see what witch craft the white man used’. That the predominantly British audience understands these [ 97 ]

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things better than the elder reinforces his otherness and cultural inferiority. Having been trained by the Navy, the son recognises that ‘old fears and superstitions … still haunt his people’, and in doing so he aligns himself with Britain and the audience, demonstrated by his greater trust in the British doctor than the village’s traditional healer. The narrator emphasises that ‘Petty Officer Kamal … is proud of his knowledge and efficiency’ acquired under British instruction, qualities often echoed in the Navy’s annual reports, and thus he has come to judge himself by their cultural standards. This is visually emphasised in the film by his stark white naval uniform next to the naked villagers. The Hegelian notion of Africa as a timeless and unchanging continent with ‘no movement or development to exhibit … the Unhistorical, 126 Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature’, is evoked by the narrator’s description of it as a place ‘where people live as they have for centuries’. Though Kamal is submitted as evidence of the ‘progress’ made by the Navy and Britain’s ‘civilising mission’, ‘the failure of his father to change emphasises that this process – ultimately towards independence – is gradual and ongoing’, as is East Africa’s need for Britain’s paternal leadership, with the KRNVR’s development providing a microcosm for the region.127 Instead of being an imperial ally, the elder here is depicted as an impediment to progress, a relic of Lugardian notions of ‘trusteeship’ and indirect rule, which ‘framed African societies and cultures as static, essentially ahistorical entities, with the British as benevolent guardians’.128 The film thus endorses the more ‘progressive’ ideas of colonial governance and ‘modernisation’ that accompanied the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act.

Wartime society and support in Zanzibar In Zanzibar, the British Resident reported that the islands were overwhelmingly behind Britain, so long as wartime service remained voluntary and assigned to local defence: I have received assurances of fervent loyalty and support on behalf of all sections of the population. I anticipate no lack of solidarity on part of any section of population so long as there is no conscription for service overseas. Ruthless recruitment of carriers during last war and the heavy mortality on mainland has not been forgotten, and fear of repetition is causing apprehension.129

As Zanzibar was a protectorate it was not covered by the CNDA, and thus the ZNVF could not legally be deployed for general service outside of the islands’ territorial waters, though this would not stop the Admiralty from attempting to as the war progressed. [ 98 ]

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As in Kenya, rival European interests not indigenous inhabitants posed a greater impediment to Zanzibar’s naval defence and war effort. Mr Morgan, local manager of African Wharfage Ltd., had his naval application blocked by his Head Office, despite the ZNVF’s assurance that arrangements ‘would be made to ensure that service … did not 130 seriously interfere with Morgan’s work’. The force ‘need[ed] Morgan rather badly’ as ‘with the exception of Somers and Scotchman (who is at present doubling the posts of Port Officer and Senior Customs Officer) we have no one here with marine experience’,131 while ‘to turn a landsman into anything resembling a sailor requires infinite patience, skill and a very long time’.132 The ZNVF garnered little sympathy from a marine company that should have known ‘the length of the channels which we have to keep swept’ but refused to appreciate that ‘we are protecting your ships and your merchandise’.133 Government departments also complained of ‘troubles and difficulties’ from being ‘deprived of the services of Officers necessary for the efficient maintenance of the minesweeper unit’.134 Another officer was lost to the ZNVF after he was ‘employed in the work of colouring oranges’ to make them appear more mature,135 a consequence of wartime shortages but not vital to the campaign. Therefore, in reality there was not ‘fervent support’ from ‘all sections of the population’ as the British Resident claimed,136 or it quickly waned once the war put pressure on limited European manpower. The problems the private and public sectors imposed on the ZNVF meant the C-in-C East Indies was forced to assign one of his RNR Officers, Lieutenant Hall, to keep the force operational.137 While the Royal Navy appreciated the bigger picture, East Africa’s other colonial naval forces prioritised their own local defence ahead of the region’s. As the largest, most senior unit operating out of the major port, the KRNVR provided more for prospective recruits, and it was not above poaching personnel from the ZNVF to fill its own requirements. One case was Sub-Lieutenant Rutter, sent to Durban for six and a half weeks training with the South African RNVR, but instead of returning to Zanzibar he joined the KRNVR, leaving Somers ‘with feelings that a good deal of 138 money and a great deal of … time had been wasted’. Again, more support for the ZNVF came from Zanzibar’s indigenous community, particularly its female members. Material assistance was provided by the Zanzibar Women Workers who offered to knit stocking caps for the crew of the Al Hathera after Crown Agents failed to supply them.139 Women also provided a psychological endorsement of the Navy, which left an imprint upon Zanzibar’s social and cultural landscape; Taarab, an indigenous Swahili musical form, was the most popular leisure activity for urban Zanzibari women between the Second [ 99 ]

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World War and the 1960s, and one of its earliest and most prominent bands adopted the name ‘Royal Navy’. Taarab was about more than performance, it was a competition between groups, and ‘Royal Navy’s’ main rivals also named themselves after a branch of Britain’s armed forces, ‘Royal Air Force’. The shows staged between these two bands ‘drew [large] crowds … became the talk of the town’, and took inspiration from their namesakes. In one instance, ‘Royal Air Force’ hired a plane and dropped leaflets over the town, prompting ‘Royal Navy’s’ leader, ‘The Admiral’, to approach a naval captain in port to take the group out in his warship: We had to show them up. So I rented a man-of-war and we went for a ride. We went out to the island, spent the day, had a picnic, and in the evening we returned to town. These were our games.140

This generated huge excitement in the town, ‘as fans watched, weighed the force and impact of each club’s latest moves, and cheered them on’. An important part of the bands’ identities and status resided in their attire, and ‘the style and “class” of the uniforms’141 attracted women to join ‘Royal Navy’. A similar appeal motivated men for real naval service, particularly recalling TRNVR members who faced other forms of social competition. The uniforms also inspired songs, which ‘Royal Navy’ used to mock ‘Royal Air Force’ for copying their motif: ‘They are indeed our uniforms, nor are there any others/if people imitate what is said they imitate words of meaning’.142 Following the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution, the new socialist regime forced ‘Royal Navy’ to change its name to Wanabaharia, or ‘Those Who Work at Sea’.143 The Navy had a similar influence on the Swahili coast of the mainland, where the musical dance form Beni Ngoma imitated naval drills accompanied by brass bands.144 Lelemama comprised two dances also tied to social class, one for women of high status and the other for those aspiring to it. Participants thus identified with symbols of colonial authority, both through costume and title, with the leader, ‘Queeni’, surrounded by ‘Admiral’, ‘Colonel’, and others. These social positions were traditionally male, and ‘for Muslim women, who had no public political or religious roles, identification with power’ and the Navy, provided ‘an 145 important function of lelemama associations’.

Amalgamation To increase their operational efficiency, the C-in-C East Indies in January 1941 recommended that the KRNVR, ZNVF and Tanganyika [ 100 ]

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Figure 10  Rear-Admiral Tennant and Sheikh Mbarak Ali Hinway, Liwali for Mombasa, aboard HMS Warspite

NVF be amalgamated for combined operations directed from Mombasa. Each unit was controlled by its respective government, which retained the power to revert personnel to civil duties at any time without consultation. Any Admiralty orders or appointments to the naval forces required the concurrence of the colonial governments, causing considerable delay and negotiation. The Admiralty was also concerned that officers tended to be seconded government servants, sometimes serving part-time whilst continuing in civil employment, and were believed to possess divided loyalties.146 There was concern, however, that the esprit de corps of the units might suffer should they lose their individual identities,147 particularly the ZNVF, whose members felt a greater affiliation to their Sultan. This was reflected in their distinctive uniforms displaying his personal cipher, which they were loath to give up for the sake of East African uniformity.148 As James Brennan has argued, the Sultan’s ‘great prestige’ and ‘power lay in his symbolic appeal’ expressed through ‘his office, body, anthem, and flag’ and, in this instance, his cipher.149 Furthermore, the ZNVF’s vessels uniquely bore the prefix ‘His Highness’ ships’,150 which would have to change to recognise His Majesty King George VI [ 101 ]

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as Commander-in-Chief. This reluctance to relinquish their outward expressions of fealty to their Sultan is indicative that in fighting for King and Country, Zanzibaris were in fact serving him and not the British Monarch, as wartime propaganda liked to portray, and demonstrates the Empire’s continued reliance on the colonial collaborative system for wartime support. Discrepancies in emoluments revealed the racial class-bias that influenced naval recruitment, with ‘native ratings’ in Tanganyika paid more than in Kenya because the mandate territory provided a higher 151 proportion of Arabs and ‘better-class’ Swahili. A racially prejudiced, paternalistic view of ZNVF ratings was also held by Somers’ successor, Commander C.B. Hoggan, who stated that ‘African and Indian personnel without European Officers or a ship would be of little use to the navy’.152 As all ZNVF officers bar one, Sub-Lieutenant Mosley, were also Government servants, it was ‘entirely out of the question’ that they be transferred to Kenya while Al Hathera was ‘employed in commercial work necessary to the Protectorate’.153 The major stumbling block for any merger was one of legality, however. In 1924, the Mandates Commission and British Government agreed that ‘the mandate would be violated if the Mandatory enlists the natives … for service in any military corps … not permanently quartered in the Territory’.154 This meant that while ‘a local Naval Force intended solely for local defence of the mandated territory itself’ could be raised, it ‘may not be entered for General service in HM Naval Forces’.155 Consequently, the 1931 CNDA was only made applicable to colonies, causing ‘difficulty in any amalgamation scheme for East Africa where Kenya is a Colony, Tanganyika a Mandate and Zanzibar a Protectorate’.156 Even Kenya’s position was a dubious one, being a Colony and Protectorate, with a ten-mile coastal strip leased from the Sultan of Zanzibar since 1895 defined as the latter. Kenya’s Acting Attorney-General in May 1939 raised the point that the KRNVR operated from ‘Mombasa, which are the territorial waters of the 157 Protectorate’, but this was ignored by the Admiralty and Colonial Office, meaning that technically the KRNVR was deployed outside of its legal jurisdiction. Following Singapore’s defeat and Ceylon’s bombing by Japan, Mombasa became the headquarters for Admiral Sir James Somerville’s Eastern Fleet from June 1942. With East Africa’s naval focus shifting from Italy to Japan, the Admiralty was keen to extend the KRNVR’s operational sphere. It therefore accepted in August 1942 Kenya’s offer to place the force ‘at HM’s disposal for general service in the Royal Navy’, despite the 1931 CNDA being inapplicable to a protectorate.158 The terms of the Zanzibar Constitution, and the limits of Britain’s [ 102 ]

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informal control there, made it ‘impossible for the Sultan’s subjects to be brought within the provisions of the Naval Discipline Act’, and so its personnel remained attached to the ZNVF,159 while the Zanzibar Government ceased its financial contribution to the KRNVR. To circumvent the CNDA, the Tanganyika NVF was disbanded in November 1944 and its Ordinance revoked, thus releasing its personnel to volunteer for the KRNVR.160 Hoggan expressed his frustration that ‘in nearly three and a half years of war not a single mine’ had been swept up by the ZNVF, though expenditure had increased with the addition of nineteen crew members and consumption of ‘200 tons more fuel oil per year’.161 It was therefore wondered ‘if the expense, wear and tear to the ship and the neglect of her civil duties is justified’ considering the Royal Navy’s heightened presence in Mombasa. Technological advances saw contact mines superseded by magnetic ones, for which Al Hathera was not equipped, meaning its presence was ‘more spectacular than useful’ and only served to assist ‘the enemies plans in keeping a very useful little general utility vessel and staff engaged in non-essential work’.162 With even the ZNVF’s CO viewing the force as superfluous, civil departments who had begrudged the Navy’s appropriation of their staff, reasserted themselves. The Al Hathera was reverted to duties as a passenger and cargo vessel between Unguja and Pemba and, though this forfeited its £2,000 grant from Britain, the deficit was offset as ‘so far as revenue earning on passages is concerned. It will facilitate clove movements … and above all release the volunteer European staff for their substantive duties’.163 The disparaging view from the top was that the ZNVF’s volunteers ‘have not the spare time in which to busy themselves with side lines and that the work of this Government is suffering seriously in consequence’,164 and the force was disbanded in June 1944.165

Racial management Though Kilindini’s development as a major fleet base offered additional possibilities for sea training and specialisation for KRNVR personnel, this was counteracted by the urgent need ashore for ‘men with local knowledge to handle the native African labour’ employed in the base’s expansion.166 Originally, its European and African ratings swapped monthly duties to ensure everyone obtained seatime and some knowledge of minesweeping and A/S work,167 but as the war against Japan intensified, a greater degree of racial discrimination permeated the force. Race not rank dictated naval deployment, as European officers and ratings were drafted to Royal Navy vessels,168 and sent East for the [ 103 ]

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final year of the war.169 The idea of employing African ratings in the Eastern theatre raised ‘considerable objections’ at the 1943 Manpower Conference in Nairobi,170 and so, unlike their askari counterparts, the KRNVR’s African personnel were left to defend the local waters around Kilindini.171 It was later admitted that this ‘limitation of East African Naval effort’ had been ‘imposed by size of European population’,172 which provided insufficient numbers of supervising officers. Compulsory Service was introduced to Kenya in early 1942. The Kenya Defence Force Ordinance required that ‘European youths must, on reaching the age of 18, register for military service’, but this meant ‘compliance with this order will … preclude a volunteer Unit, such as the Kenya RNVR, obtaining any recruits at all’.173 The unit was already ‘34 Europeans short’, whilst ‘the seriousness of this situation is enhanced by the fact that many of the Europeans are elderly and a number recently have had to be invalided, together with the fact that the malarial season (when casualties are bound to go up) is very close’.174 Shortages required they forgo their periodic leave to Britain, which Europeans were normally given after three years for ‘health reasons’, to counteract the tropical climate.175 Pensioners had already been given quartermaster duties to free able-bodied men to go to sea.176 Neither solution was ideal, as ‘experience has shown that older men find it hard to learn the work … younger men are apt to become unsettled for various reasons including the very limited scope for promotion’.177 This meant that even though the Naval authorities succeeded in amending the Compulsory Service orders so ‘that any youth of 18 reporting at any Base Details Camp will be given the option of joining the Navy’,178 ‘less than one percent’ took it up.179 This was despite the Navy soliciting schools to ‘assist in obtaining youths to volunteer’ and publicising the service.180 The Prince of Wales School in Kabete was targeted in particular as its discipline and traditions were modelled on the Britannia Royal Naval College (BRNC) at Dartmouth by it first headmaster, Captain (retired) Bertram W.L. Nicholson.181 Still ‘the vast majority of boys leaving school went into the Army and the Air Force simply because the KRNVR lacked the necessary martial 182 attraction’. The ‘great shortage of European personnel’, meant ‘none could be provided from Kenya’ for the RNVR, and ‘Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar are likewise exhausted’,183 forcing naval recruiters to look beyond East Africa. Enquiries were made about personnel in Colombo, Ceylon. The Government of Southern Rhodesia had to sternly tell the KRNVR that it would ‘not permit of any transfers of Rhodesian personnel to Units other than those raised in S.Rhodesia’,184 despite the Royal Navy having already recruited there.185 Soldiers in the South [ 104 ]

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African Army were approached, such as Leading Stoker G.F. Smith, 186 who had himself discharged so he could join the KRNVR. European women were also given jobs as drivers for naval cars, ‘carrying despatches and running to a set time table’, as it was work believed ‘could not be entrusted to an African’ or Indian.187 Local naval recruiters only sought British colonial subjects, however, believing that ‘all foreigners are as bad as one another and I think it highly undesirable to enlist them’.188 It was only towards the final year of the war that the Navy authorised more ‘substitution of native for European personnel … to get people back from the Services for their own civilian needs’.189 Though by 1 June 1945, 654 of the KRNVR’s 757 complement were African, only 13 had been promoted to petty officer, and with just two chief petty officers.190

Conclusion The Royal Navy had a century-long tradition of recruitment in East Africa before the colonial naval forces of the 1930s were established. As the anti-slavery campaign in the region intensified in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the prohibitive cost of ferrying Kroomen from West Africa meant local Seedies were enlisted as seamen. This was influenced by racial theories regarding their martial religion and Arab seafaring heritage, while African physical stereotypes saw freed slaves serving in engine rooms. Naval theatre was deployed to maintain the discipline and loyalty of the colonial population on ship and ashore. External defence concerns following the Washington Naval Treaty strategically outweighed racial fears of internal armed rebellion by indigenous armed forces, and efforts were proactively taken locally to augment imperial naval defence. Whitehouse’s local plan for a Kenyan naval reserve, despite support from the Admiralty, was delayed by metropole-directed bureaucracy, and colonial politics and economy. The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, was dispatched with his flagship to cajole public support and pressure the local legislature into establishing the force. Political backing was not wholehearted, however, with the colony failing to provide sufficient funds and seeking to offload administrative responsibility to the Admiralty, which, like the TRNVR, undermined the KRNVR’s professional standards. Collaborative indigenous elites were courted to lend their financial and cultural capital to the force, while the christening of HMS Kenya was used to encourage colonial unity and navalism. These were strained by wartime pressures, which threatened white settler status. While assistance that came from African chiefs and [ 105 ]

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Arabs was broadcast as imperial and naval propaganda through newspapers, radio and film, European businesses and civil departments fought for the same shallow pool of manpower. To increase their control and prevent colonial naval personnel from being reallocated, the Admiralty pushed for the amalgamation of the three East African naval forces, but were restricted by the legal, political and cultural limits of imperial control in the Zanzibar protectorate and Tanganyika mandate. Though it did take over administration of the KRNVR, local recruitment was undermined by Kenya’s introduction of compulsory service and better prospects in the military, as racial prejudice inhibited the deployment and promotion of African ratings.

Notes  1  F.M. Withers, ‘Nyasaland in 1895–96’, Nyasaland Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January, 1949), pp. 16–34.  2  Ibid.  3  David Killingray, ‘The Idea of a British Imperial African Army’, Journal of African History, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1979), pp. 421–436.  4  Ibid.  5  Clifford Pereira, ‘Black Liberators: The Role of African & Arab sailors in the Royal Navy within the Indian Ocean 1841–1941’, UNESCO symposium, Rabat (May, 2007).  6  Commander C.D.O. Shakespear, ‘African Natives in the Navy’, Naval Review (1922), p. 602, Sea Power Centre (hereafter SPC), Canberra.  7  Ibid., p. 608.  8  Ibid., p. 600.  9  Ibid., p. 605. 10  Ibid., p. 602. 11  Ibid., p. 605. 12  Ibid., p. 608. 13  Ibid., p. 604. 14  TNA, ADM116/2254, Enclosure No. 1 to Danae’s letter No. 52.P, 18 January 1924. 15  Shakespear, ‘African Natives in the Navy’, p. 609. 16  Ibid. 17  Ibid., p. 606. 18  TNA, CO822/1884, The Times, 10 October 1960. 19  TNA, CO822/1884, Daily Express, 10 October 1960. 20  Shakespear, ‘African Natives in the Navy’, pp. 608–609. 21  Ibid. 22  Ibid., p. 609. 23  Ibid., pp. 609–610. 24  Ibid., p. 610. 25  Pereira, ‘Black Liberators’. 26  C.J. Duder, ‘“Men of the Officer Class”: The Participants in the 1919 Soldier Settlement Scheme in Kenya’, African Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 366 (January, 1993), pp. 70, 74. 27  TNA, CO323/901, ‘Naval Defence of Kenya’, 20 April 1923, pp. 1–2. 28  TNA, CO323/918, Charles Walker to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 18 January 1924. 29  TNA, CO533/684, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies to Secretary of the Admiralty, 2 August 1926, p. 1.

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KEN YA A N D ZA N ZIB A R , P R E - 1 9 4 5 30  TNA, CO533/684, Charles Walker to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 16 December 1926, p. 2. 31  TNA, CO533/684, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies to Secretary of the Admiralty, 2 August 1926, p. 1. 32  Ibid., p. 2. 33  TNA, CO533/684, Charles Walker to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 16 December 1926, p. 1. 34  TNA, CO533/684, Edward Grigg to C-in-C, East Indies, 24 June 1926. 35  TNA, CO323/1020/12, ‘Kenya – Naval Defence’, June 1928. 36  TNA, CO533/684, Charles Walker to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 16 December 1926, p. 1. 37  TNA, CO533/421/8, Brig-General Governor to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 July 1932, p. 1. 38  Ibid., p. 2. 39  Ibid. 40  TNA, CO968/80/4, ‘Colonial Naval Forces’, July 1943. 41  Kenya National Archives (heareafter KNA), PC/COAST/2/1/8, Coast Province Report, 1933, p. 66. 42  KNA, PC/COAST/2/13/2, Martin Dunbar-Nasmith to Field Jones, 14 June 1933. 43  KNA, DC/KSM/22/10, ‘Chapter VII – Scheme to cope with internal rising’, pp. 122–123. 44  TNA, CO533/421/8, Brig-General Governor to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 July 1932, p. 1. 45  Ibid. 46  TNA, ADM1/18245, ‘KRNVR’ (Enclosure to Captain-in-Charge, Kilindini), 23 March 1946. 47  TNA, CO533/477/4, East African Governors Conference, June 1937, pp. 2, 4–5. 48  TNA, ADM1/18245, ‘KRNVR’ (Enclosure to Captain-in-Charge, Kilindini), 23 March 1946. 49  TNA, CO533/477/4, East African Governors Conference, June 1937, pp. 2, 4–5. 50  Ibid. 51  Zanzibar National Archives (hereafter ZNA), AB66/4, ‘Zanzibar Naval Force’, C.G. Somers, 26 September 1938. 52  TNA, CO533/477/4, East African Governors Conference, June 1937, pp. 2, 4–5. 53  East African Standard, 21 August 1939, p. 7. 54  KNA, AH/22/92, Lt. W. Phillips, Registrar–KRNVR, to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 19 February 1943. 55  East African Standard, 21 August 1939, p. 7. 56  TNA, CO533/477/4, East African Governors Conference, June 1937, pp. 2, 4–5. 57  TNA, ADM1/18245, ‘KRNVR’ (Enclosure to Captain-in-Charge, Kilindini), 23 March 1946. 58  TNA, CO533/477/4, East African Governors Conference, June 1937, pp. 2, 4–5. 59  TNA, ADM116/2254, V.A.C.S.S.S. letter No. 10/32/1/4, 26 January 1924, pp. 15–16. 60  ZNA, AB49/129, ‘East Africa Naval Force’, copy of note for Finance Committee, 1953. 61  ZNA, AB66/4, Chief Secretary to the Government, to Ag. Secretary to Governors’ Conference, Nairobi, 25 October 1938. 62  ZNA, AB66/4, ‘Zanzibar Naval Volunteer Force’, C.G. Somers, 26 September 1938. 63  ZNA, AB66/4, Somers to Chief Secretary, 2 November 1938. 64  ZNA, AB66/4, Chief Secretary to the Government, to Sultan’s Private Secretary, 26 June 1939. 65  ZNA, AB66/4, ‘Raising of Zanzibar Naval Volunteer Force’. 66  TNA, CO968/80/8, ‘East African Naval Defence Forces’, 1943. 67  ZNA, AB66/1, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, to British Resident, Zanzibar, 5 July 1939. 68  ZNA, AB66/1, Zanzibar to Lords of Admiralty, 16 July 1891. 69  ZNA, AB66/4, D.W. Saunders-Jones for Chief Secretary, 25 August 1938.

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EA ST A F R IC A  70  ZNA, AB66/4, C.G. Somers, to Chief Secretary to Government, Zanzibar, 5 June 1939.  71  ZNA, AB66/4, Commander Blunt to Chief Secretary, Zanzibar, 9 May 1939.  72  KNA, PC/COAST/2/13/2, Provincial Commissioner (PC) to Flag Lieutenant, Effingham, 20 June 1932.  73  TNA, ADM1/9669, Governor Brooke-Popham to Malcolm MacDonald, 7 July 1938.  74  TNA, ADM1/9669, Commander D.R. Blunt, CO, KRNVR, to Second Sea Lord, 16 July 1938.  75  TNA, ADM1/9669, Brooke-Popham, Governor, to Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 July 1938.  76  TNA, ADM1/9669, M.4013/38, Head of M., 3 August 1938.  77  TNA, ADM1/9669, M.4013/38, 28 July 1938.  78  Ibid.  79  TNA, ADM1/9669, Brooke-Popham to MacDonald, 22 August 1938.  80  TNA, ADM1/9669, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor of Kenya, 11 August 1938.  81  TNA, ADM1/9669, cutting from the East African Standard, Mombasa 23 August 1938.  82  East African Standard, 21 August 1939, p. 7.  83  Ibid.  84 Rüger, The Great Naval Game, p. 176.  85 Tracy, The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, p. xii.  86 Rüger, The Great Naval Game, pp. 176–177.  87  Ibid..  88  Ibid., pp. 177–178.  89  KNA, AH/18/3, G.W. Knapman, Officer-in-Charge, H.M. Eastern African Dependencies Office, to Chief Secretary to Government, Nairobi, 6 January 1941.  90  KNA, AH/18/3, Crown Agents’ Office, to Colonial Office, 9 October 1941.  91  KNA, AH/18/3, Governor, to Malcolm Macdonald, 15 March 1940, p. 4.  92 Rüger, The Great Naval Game, p. 177.  93  KNA, AH/18/3, ‘Press Office Handout No. 26’, 4 February 1952.  94  Quoted in East African Standard, 18 August 1939.  95  ZNA, AB27/17, Report by J.F.G. Troughton, Deputy Financial Secretary, Kenya, 19 May 1941.  96  Neil Roos, Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939–1961 (Aldershot, 2005), p. 50.  97  KNA, PC/COAST/1/13/145, No. 16 Kilindini Naval Orders, 1941.  98  KNA, PC/COAST/2/26/16, G.H. Heaton, Commissioner of Prisons, to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 23 June 1941.  99  Ibid., 10 June 1941. 100  KNA, PC/COAST/2/26/16, ‘European Staff, Prisons Department’, LieutenantCommander R.G. Buckley for Naval Officer-in-Charge, East Africa and Zanzibar, to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 16 June 1941. 101  KNA, AH/19/20, Director of Manpower to Chief Secretary, 11 January 1941. 102  KNA, AH/19/20, R.G. Buckley for Naval Officer i/c Kilindini, to Director of Manpower, 15 November 1940. 103  KNA, PC/COAST/2/1/72, Coast Province Report, 1945, p. 12. 104  KNA, PC/COAST/2/26/16, E.M. Hyde-Clarke, Chief Secretary, to Hassanali Verjee, 11 November 1939. 105  KNA, PC/COAST/2/26/16, Sir Ali bin Salim to Governor and Commander-inChief, Kenya, 12 December 1939. 106  TNA, ADM1/18245, Commander-in-Chief East Indies, ‘KRNVR’, 15 December 1945. 107  Ibid. 108  KNA, DC/KSM/1/1/129, Native Allocations, 1939.

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KEN YA A N D ZA N ZIB A R , P R E - 1 9 4 5 109  KNA, CA/12/36, Chief Secretary, to PC, Coast Province, 14 July 1942. 110  KNA, CA/12/36, Correspondence re: Chiefs visits to Royal Navy Military Units, 1942–1946. 111  KNA, CA/12/36, to PC, Nyeri, through DC, Fort Hall, 1 December 1942. 112  KNA, CA/12/36, C. Tomkinson, PC, Central Province, to PC, Coast Province, 3 November 1942. 113  KNA, CA/12/36, Officer-in-Charge, Northern Frontier, to O.V. Hodge, PC, Mombasa, 8 April 1943. 114  Ibid. 115  KNA, CA/12/36, c/o Native Affairs Office, Nairobi, 27 October 1942. 116  Ibid. 117  KNA, CA/12/36, ‘Visit of African Chiefs to Mombasa’, for Information Officer, 20 October 1942. 118  Fay Gadsden, ‘Wartime Propaganda in Kenya: The Kenya Information Office, 1939–1945’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1986), p. 407. 119  Rosaleen Smyth, ‘Britain’s African Colonies and British Propaganda during the Second World War’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1985), p. 77. 120  A.G. Dickson, ‘Studies in War-Time Organisation: (3) The Mobile Propaganda Unit, East Africa Command’, African Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 174 (1945), p. 10. 121  Smyth, ‘Britain’s African Colonies and British Propaganda’, p. 78. 122  Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM), A 27262, ‘Sailor linguist lectures to African audiences’, July 1943. 123  Dickson, ‘The Mobile Propaganda Unit’, pp. 15, 18. 124  Ibid. 125  Tom Rice, Father and Son (1945), BFI:942, Colonial Film: Moving Images of the British Empire (April, 2008), http://www.colonialfilm.org.uk/node/1755 [7 November 2013]. 126  G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans.J. Sibree (New York, 1956), p. 99. 127 Rice, Father and Son. 128  Michael Collins, ‘Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment”’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2013), p. 25. 129  ZNA, AB27/23, Resident, to Secretary of State, 6 September 1939. 130  ZNA, AB66/4, to H.H. Robinson, c/o Messers Smith Mackenzie & Co., Mombasa, 13 September 1939. 131  Ibid.. 132  ZNA, AB66/5, Lieutenant-Commander Somers to Chief Secretary, 22 July 1940. 133  ZNA, AB66/4, to H.H. Robinson, c/o Messers Smith Mackenzie & Co., Mombasa, 13 September 1939. 134  ZNA, AB66/4, Somers to Chief Secretary, 22 September 1939. 135  ZNA, AB66/5, Somers to Chief Secretary, 22 July 1940. 136  ZNA, AB27/23, Resident, to Secretary of State, 6 September 1939. 137  ZNA, AB66/4, to H.H. Robinson, c/o Messers Smith Mackenzie & Co., Mombasa, 13 September 1939. 138  ZNA, AB66/5, Somers to Chief Secretary, 22 July 1940. 139  ZNA, AB66/5, Lieutenant-Commander H.J. Hall, Temporary CO, ZNVF to C.S., 28 May 1941. 140  Laura Fair, ‘“It’s Just no Fun Anymore”: Women’s Experiences of Taarab before and after the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2002), pp. 72–73. 141  Ibid., p. 74. 142  Ibid. 143  Ibid., p. 64. 144  Tadasu Tsuruta, ‘Popular Music, Sports, and Politics: A Development of Urban Cultural Movements in Dar-es-Salaam, 1930s–1960s’, African Study Monograph, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2003), p. 199.

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EA ST A F R IC A 145  Margaret Strobel, ‘Women’s Wedding Celebrations in Mombasa, Kenya’, African Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (December, 1975), p. 40. 146  TNA, ADM1/16071, C.in C. Eastern Fleet to Admiralty, 30 June 1943. 147  TNA, CO968/80/8, Military Branch to Sabben-Clare, 2 September 1943. 148  TNA, CO968/80/8, A.R. Thomas, 10 March 1943. 149  James R. Brennan, ‘Lowering the Sultan’s Flag: Sovereignty and Decolonization in Coastal Kenya’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2008), p. 838. 150  TNA, CO968/80/8, E.L. Scott, 10 March 1943. 151  Ibid. 152  ZNA, AB49/127, Commander C.B. Hoggan, to Chief Secretary, 8 January 1943. 153  Ibid. 154  TNA, ADM1/8681/111, ‘Thirtieth Session of the Council of the League of Nations’ – Annex 662, August 1924. 155  TNA, ADM1/8681/111, V.W. Baddeley, M.4033/34, 25 October 1924. 156  TNA, CO968/145/1, E.E. Sabben-Clare to Commodore Dick, January 1944. 157  KNA, AG/16/104, Ag.Attorney General to Chief Secretary, 5 May 1939. 158  TNA, CO968/80/4, ‘Colonial Naval Forces’, July 1943. 159  TNA, ADM1/16071, For Head of M.II, 10 August 1944. 160  TNA, ADM1/16071, Tanganyika Territory (Sir W. Jackson) to Secretary of State, Colonies, 7 June 1944. 161  ZNA, AB49/127, Commander Hoggan to Chief Secretary, 24 January 1943. 162  Ibid. 163  ZNA, AB49/127, Ag.Chief Secretary to Ag.British Resident, 10 February 1943. 164  My underlining. Ibid. 165  TNA, CO537/1890, ‘Conference of East African Governors: Future Status of East African Royal Naval Volunteers Reserve’, 3 May 1946. 166  TNA, ADM1/18245, ‘KRNVR’ (Enclosure to Captain-in-Charge, Kilindini), 23 March 1946. 167  TNA, ADM1/18245, Commander-in-Chief East Indies, ‘KRNVR’, 15 December 1945. 168  TNA, ADM1/18245, Commander-in-Chief East Indies, ‘Activities of KRNVR’, 25 February 1946. 169  TNA, ADM1/18245, Commander-in-Chief East Indies, ‘KRNVR’, 15 December 1945. 170  KNA, AH/22/92, J.L. Fairclough to Commodore, Naval Air Stations East Africa, 26 April 1944. 171  TNA, ADM1/18245, ‘KRNVR’ (Enclosure to Captain-in-Charge, Kilindini), 23 March 1946. 172  TNA, CO537/1890, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, to Secretary of Admiralty, 20 February 1946. 173  KNA, AH/19/20, ‘KRNVR – Personnel’, Naval Officer-in-Charge, East Africa and Zanzibar to Chief Secretary, 11 March 1942. 174  Ibid. 175  KNA, AH/20/23, ‘KRNVR – Foreign Service’, P.B. Smyth, Office of Commodore, East Africa, to Secretary of Admiralty, 20 May 1945. 176  KNA, AH/19/20, ‘KRNVR – Personnel’, Naval Officer-in-Charge, East Africa and Zanzibar to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 18 June 1941. 177  KNA, AH/19/20, Lord Erroll, Deputy Director of Manpower, to CO, KRNVR, 16 February 1940. 178  KNA, AH/19/20, Naval Officer-in-Charge, East Africa and Zanzibar to Chief Secretary, 11 March 1942. 179  KNA, AH/19/20, R.G. Buckley for Naval Officer i/c Kilindini, to Deputy Director of Manpower, 19 November 1940. 180  KNA, AH/19/20, Naval Officer-in-Charge, East Africa and Zanzibar to Headmaster, Prince of Wales School, 11 March 1942.

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KEN YA A N D ZA N ZIB A R , P R E - 1 9 4 5 181  Old Cambrian Society, ‘“To the Uttermost” Captain B.W.L. Nicholson RN’, www.oldcambrians.com/Nicholson.html [6 November 2013]. 182  TNA, ADM1/18245, ‘KRNVR’ (Enclosure to Captain-in-Charge, Kilindini), 23 March 1946. 183  KNA, AH/19/20, ‘Discussion between the Governor and Captain Ferguson’, 2 September 1941. 184  KNA, AH/19/20, CO, RNVR to H.R. Montgomery, Deputy Director of Manpower, 13 June 1941. 185  KNA, AH/20/23, A.L.B. Perkins for Director of Manpower to Commodore, Kilindini, 14 February 1946. 186  KNA, AH/19/20, Naval Officer-in-Charge, East Africa and Zanzibar to Chief Secretary, 19 January 1942. 187  KNA, AH/22/92, Rear-Admiral C. Stuart to Director of Civil Emergency Services and Manpower, 14 August 1942. 188  KNA, AH/19/20, R.G. Buckley, for Naval Officer i/c Kilindini, to Deputy Director of Manpower, 15 November 1940. 189  TNA, CO968/80/8, Sabben-Clare to Fox, 13 March 1944. 190  TNA, ADM1/18245, Commander-in-Chief East Indies, ‘KRNVR’, 15 December 1945.

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Post-war East Africa

Colonial naval ‘development’ Although, following the Allied victory, Britain faced the prospect of decolonisation in South Asia, ‘visions of Africa’s role in a revitalized empire helped to sustain the dream of world power’.1 Kenya’s pivotal place in this vision was discussed in October 1945, when the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee endorsed the creation of a major military base in Mombasa. Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1946, visited Kenya during his tour of Africa in November and December 1947, where he investigated the creation of a grand African army to replace the one lost in India.2 Neither plan materialised as envisaged, yet the core principle of each was preserved through the KRNVR and its successor organisation, the Royal East African Navy (REAN). As discussed in the Caribbean, the value of such units became increasingly political and symbolic, as well as strategic, with the Admiralty stressing ‘the importance of encouraging the Colonial Naval Forces so that they may be a pro-British stabilising influence in their own countries in peace and a valuable asset to Commonwealth Naval Forces in war’.3 Colonial ‘development’ became the order of the day, to economically reinvigorate the Empire and justify Britain’s continued imperial presence since the Atlantic Charter proclaimed the universal right to self-determination, a principle espoused by Kenya’s nationalist leaders.4 Despite the shiny new veneer, developmentalism picked up where the ‘civilising mission’ left off by rebranding the racial hierarchy through which British hegemony maintained its moral authority to guide less ‘developed’ peoples towards eventual independence and according to its standards of modernity. The technocratic paternalism of development discourse was emphasised by Sir Philip Mitchell, Kenya’s Governor between 1944 and 1952, when he claimed that ‘the [ 112 ]

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great mass of people in this region are still in a state of ignorance and backwardness, uncivilized, superstitious, economically weak to the point of near helplessness and quite unable to construct a civilized future for themselves’. He therefore suggested that they ‘must be, 5 for a long time yet, wards in trust’ to Britain. Colonial naval forces had a role to play in this by ‘being an expression of and encouragement towards a sense of responsibility, self-respect and prestige’.6 To this end, the Admiralty’s Director of Plans argued that ‘the British Government should give practical expression to our traditional policy of improving the Colonies by Establishing a Colonial Defence Fund’, from which aid would be allocated according to: a. b. c. d.

The wealth of the particular Colony The good will and Naval aspirations of the Colony The Naval ability of the Colony The likely value of the Naval contribution of the Colony in war taking into account the size and efficiency of the Naval Forces it is physically, as opposed to financially, capable of providing and maintaining, and of its strategic position, e.g. whether the Colony is likely to include a future Commonwealth operational base.7

This ‘second colonial occupation’8 prompted an Empire-wide appraisal of colonial naval resources and their future utilisation, where it was suggested that the fifteen colonial naval reserves should be amalgamated into seven full-time regional navies. Plans were submitted by the Captain-in-Charge at Kilindini, to include the remaining elements of the KRNVR, ZNVF, Tanganyika NVF, Mauritius Coast Defence Squadron and Uganda in a new common navy for East Africa,9 a region of high strategic priority for the Admiralty: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

West Africa East Africa Southeast Asia Ceylon West Indies Hong Kong Pacific (Fiji)

The ‘nautical potentialities of the particular national characteristics of individual colonies’ was assessed by gauging ‘the extent to which each colony has shown spontaneous enthusiasm to produce Naval forces’, and produced the Admiralty’s ‘practical priority’ list:10 [ 113 ]

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Southeast Asia West Africa Ceylon West Indies Hong Kong Fiji East Africa

A comparison of the strategic and practical priority lists was then made to identify problem areas, with the biggest discrepancy being East Africa, ‘which is of high strategical importance but very low prac11 tical value’. With less navalism locally, the Admiralty concluded that ‘particular attention should be paid to the encouragement and development of the East African Naval forces’.12 Learning lessons from the war, it was vital ‘that in an emergency the Colonial Naval Forces are prepared to serve anywhere in the world and not only in local waters’.13 It was recognised that ‘this important principle will have a very pronounced influence on the spirit which the Volunteer Reserve achieves’, having witnessed the disillusionment of KRNVR personnel restricted to Mombasa.14 Though Zanzibar preferred to reform its own territorial unit due to ‘the extreme reluctance of ZNVF personnel to serve outside the Protectorate’, because ‘of the smallness of the numbers that are likely to be involved in any Zanzibar Naval Unit, it is not considered that the point of view expressed by Zanzibar materially affects the proposals’.15 A bigger stumbling block remained in the prohibitive legislation which did not allow the naval force of a mandate territory, namely Tanganyika, to merge with that of a colony. A new bill was needed, extending the powers of the 1931 CNDA to protectorates and Trust Territories, as the mandates had become under the United Nations, and ‘any group of territories where there is a common legislature for the group with power to legislate for their defence’, which clause was ‘specially 16 inserted to cover … the East African Central Assembly’. European settlers had been pushing for the formation of an East African Dominion since the Tanganyika mandate was acquired, hopes carried from 1924 by the Colonial Secretary Leo Amery and Kenyan Governor Sir Edward Grigg, but abandoned by the British Labour Government in 1931 upon discovering a union would be illegal.17 Maintaining Tanganyika’s territorial integrity gave Britain a chip to trade with Hitler for peace, but from December 1939 Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald was anxious to unify neighbouring colonial territories, ‘by amalgamation, federation, or other constitutional means’18 for the period of the war. The Civil Defence and Supply Council [ 114 ]

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(CDSC) was created on 23 March 1942 to coordinate between East Africa Command and the local governments. This stimulated Colonial Office fears of white Kenyan settler domination over the region, but it was decided that as ‘the needs of the war must be paramount, I do not think we can pay too much attention to political repercussion after 19 the war’. The war demonstrated the advantages of streamlining common services and highlighted the need for a joint representative body. Therefore from 1 January 1948, a nominated Central Legislative Assembly (EACLA) containing equal unofficial racial representation was created, with an East Africa High Commission (EAHC) comprising the governors.20 Common services included naval defence. The EACLA and EAHC were considered steps towards East African Federation. As in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, colonial naval amalgamation thus became part of an imperial reconfiguration of ‘the politics of collaboration so as to defy the logic of nationalism with its fetishisation of sovereign territoriality’, and preserve federated spheres of British influence.21 Though European opposition forced the abandonment of racial parity in the short-term, Tanganyika’s presence was crucial to creating a ‘point of balance between white-dominated Kenya and black-dominated Uganda’.22 This made it even more important that the new CNDA was passed on 9 March 1949, allowing the Trust Territory’s inclusion within the East African Naval Force.23 Despite the wartime restrictions caused by the limited European population, ‘approximately 30,000 in the proportion of 17:9:4 respectively for Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda’,24 it continued to be stressed that ‘officers should be of European descent’ with Africans to remain noncommissioned, while Seychellois who had held commissions in the KRNVR during the war were disbarred.25 The East African Naval Force (EANF) was constituted on 1 July 1950, becoming the Royal East African Navy (REAN) on the Queen’s birthday of June 1952.26 It had an initial complement of nine officers and 173 petty officers, ratings and other ranks, under Commander 27 E.A. Nicholson, operating the Shakespearian-class minesweeper HMEAS Rosalind, the 70-footer HMEAS Mvita, and smaller sail and motor boats. The colonial governments were keen to avoid a repeat of the situation where ‘the headquarters of the EANF will be turned into a Naval Base, the local Unit will be displaced, [and] training will be interrupted’, so Kenya’s Governor assigned Government House to be the Royal Navy’s wartime headquarters.28 Though the EANF benefitted from political support, it was again constrained by commercial interests, relying upon the East African Railways and Harbours Corporation, who leased them the land upon which the naval base was [ 115 ]

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built and was also the main purchaser of coal in the region, supplying the fuel to the EANF for HMEAS Rosalind. When the Corporation embarked on an oil conversion programme, the availability of coal at Kilindini became ‘very uncertain’, limiting the ability of the force to 29 carry out extensive duties. It was not until the acquisition of the more modern Ham-class minesweeper HMEAS Bassingham in 1958, that the REAN could ‘establish sound training for the creation of an electrical branch to start the turnover from steam to diesel’.30

Ethnic recruitment and management Of the EANF’s African ratings, 106 were transferred from the old KRNVR, with most representing ethnicities from the coast or near Lake Victoria:31 Kamba 46 Jaluos 28 Kikuyu  9 Mtaita  3 Mgiriama  3 Manyala  2 Mdigo  2 Mwkango  2 Muholo  1 Bajuni  1 Mduruma  1 Kisa  1 Buhehe  1 Mpokomo  1 Msumba  1 Kitosh  1 Mkakamega  1 Mumarach  1 Marama  1 Other ratings were recruited on the following territorial basis:32 Kenya 46% Tanganyika 30% Uganda 23% Zanzibar   1% Wartime bases like Dar es Salaam and Tanga were targeted as ‘men with previous experience and suitable education qualifications are likely to be available in those places’.33 While before 1939 ‘only a very [ 116 ]

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small number of Africans took to sea’, wartime demands created opportunities for African sailors aboard ocean-going vessels, they became classed as British Seamen and enjoyed the same rights and privileges within the Seamen’s Union. By June 1948, approximately 200 African seamen were left unemployed in Mombasa, ‘becoming very restless 34 owing to their inability to obtain ships’. The Navy offered an outlet for these socio-economic tensions and recruited 30 for the Boom Defence vessel HMS Barbour,35 but seconded Royal Navy officers struggled with the ‘supervision of a native crew whose language and customs are unfamiliar to them’. This was emphasised by Barbour’s CO, A.R. Hastings: Living conditions on board leave a lot to be wished for. With only two RN personnel living on board, after a trying day with the native crew, a little friction can be expected when tempers are short and nerves taut. Our steward and cook are just tribesmen and cleanliness is unknown to them. There is no variety in our food, what little plain cooking they can do has been taught them by the coxswain or myself. The natives think nothing of pumping up our fresh water (drinking) tank, by using the Fire and Bilge pump and a hose. It is much easier than using the hand pump fitted … On the whole, with an African crew, I find I have a heartbreaking and nerve-wracking job, to do which I find impossible to carry out to normal naval requirements. 36

With little experience of East Africa, Hastings judged his men in racially stereotypical terms and by Royal Navy standards, blaming supposed dirtiness, laziness and ignorance, when instead many of the problems he perceived were symptomatic of the more limited colonial facilities and training he was not used to working with. It was easier to blame African ratings than his own inflexibility. Older members of the KRNVR also held antiquated attitudes that undermined the post-war development agenda, such as LieutenantCommander Barham. He was criticised as having ‘failed in his duty as Divisional Officer in looking after the welfare of the ratings under his command’, because ‘he holds old fashioned views about the treatment of “natives” and is not really in sympathy with the policy of the EAHC in the building up of its new Naval Force’.37 Thirteen new English-speaking African recruits complained of the poor conditions under Barham: 1. Ratings slept on beds with wooden slats instead of springs, many of which were broken, leaving wide gaps. They had no mattress and only one blanket. Barham denied receiving a request for a second blanket or mattress to lie on. [ 117 ]

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2. The food ration was inadequate, especially in fresh vegetables. The Fleet Supply Officer concurred that the total ration scale was on the light side. 3. Ratings were issued with only one pair of boots. 4. One rating asked to be allowed to take courses in the United Kingdom. It was concluded that ‘if the EANF is to obtain recruits capable of operating and maintaining modern naval equipment they will require ratings with higher living standards than those normally recruited 38 with the army’. Barham was therefore replaced by Commander J.S. Milner of the Royal Navy, who acquired camp beds, free sandals, and improved rations for the ratings, though the ‘EANF had first to justify itself’ before higher training courses in Britain were considered. Afterwards, it was reported that Milner’s measures had produced ‘a great improvement in the organisation, administration, discipline and training’.39 To improve understanding, esprit de corps and training of the EANF, it was recommended that ‘knowledge of Swahili become an essential’ requirement for instructors.40 This cultural sensitivity was also echoed by Sir Edward Twining, the Governor of Tanganyika, who suggested for the EANF’s motto three Kiswahili proverbs: which could be understood by the African personnel: ‘Dawa ya moto ni moto’ (Fire must be met with fire): this might have been suitable had HMEAS Rosalind possessed heavier armament. ‘Kimya kingi kina mshindo mkuu’ (Much silence has a mighty noise): the Kiswahili equivalent of ‘Still waters run deep’, which could have had a reference to the Silent Service. ‘Uthabiti huleta sifa’ (Courage and perseverance bring glory): His Excellency’s own selection.41

The Admiralty overruled him, however, and instead endorsed ‘The Path of Duty’, taken from Tennyson’s Ode to the Death of the Duke of Wellington, which failed to inspire locally.42 Naval ethnic stereotyping influenced preferential selection, in which ‘experience has shown that the MKAMBAS make good Seamen whilst the JALUOS make good Engine-room ratings’.43 The Luo came from Nyanza Province on the shores of Lake Victoria, and thus made obvious naval recruits having produced a number of fishermen, ‘fine strong men with good muscles, bright eyes and fine teeth, hard-working and friendly’.44 The Kamba by contrast were a pastoral people from the dry slopes of the central highlands and, while within the curve of the [ 118 ]

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Tana River, their seafaring skill was not environmentally-influenced, though their traders had traversed the country from the Indian Ocean coast to Lakes Victoria and Turkana before the Arabs supplanted them at the end of the nineteenth century. Their appeal to naval recruiters lay more in their martial race identity. They had not been a precolonial military power but had emerged in the 1930s after locust plagues interrupted rainfall in Kamba reserves causing famine, while depression eradicated the honey and beeswax trade, forcing them to sell their livestock and move into the labour market. After Governor Sir Joseph Byrne pressured the military to alleviate poverty and unemployment in the reserves by employing more Kamba, they 45 provided another case of Gurkha syndrome, Timothy Parsons argues. They acquired a reputation from British officers for being ‘mechanically-minded’, ‘intelligent and virile’, were lauded by the Kenyan Government for their courage and dependability after accruing one of the best war records in East Africa, and importantly were considered loyal ‘soldiers of the Queen’, generally unaffected by the growing nationalist sentiment.46 Their technical aptitude and education, stemming from the Government African School in Machakos, meant they also possessed the knowledge and skill required to operate sophisticated naval equipment.47 Prospective Kamba and Luo recruits were targeted by the REAN through articles publicising the force, featuring photographs of African ratings, and circulated in the regional ethnic magazines Akamba48 and Joluo.49 These coincided with royal visits, such as that of Princess Margaret in September 1956 and the Queen Mother in February 1959, for whom the ratings formed guards-of-honour and manned an escort vessel for the royal yacht, visually reinforcing the imperial hierarchy and the monarchy’s symbolic role in tying the colonies to Britain. ‘The crown, visible symbol of this larger whole’, had become ‘the cornerstone of loyalty propaganda’ during the war.50 One officer and two African ratings from the REAN participated in Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation ceremony in London, and were presented with medals by 51 Her Majesty. The REAN was responsible for organising her birthday 52 parade, and sent HMEAS Rosalind to Zanzibar to provide the guard of honour on Coronation Day and participate in the local Tattoo, where ‘the Ship’s illuminations and the firework display in Pemba gave great pleasure and did much to make the local celebrations a success’.53 Jonathon Glassman has highlighted the importance the British attached ‘to public ceremonies that sacralised the Sultan’s position as head of state’ and upheld the ‘prestige of Arab status’ from which political influence was derived.54 The REAN played a role in this too, sending a party to pay respects to the Sultan of Zanzibar each year. [ 119 ]

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EA ST A F R IC A th For Sultan Khalifa’s 80 birthday celebrations in 1959, all three major vessels, HMEAS Rosalind, Mvita and Bassingham, participated in the ceremonial parade, while the REAN provided the guard of honour for second in line to the throne Seyyid Jamshid who was attending concurrent celebrations on the Coastal strip. Rosalind also served as escort for the Sultan’s yacht SS Seyyid Khalifa, and was guard ship at Zanzibar during the accession of his son Abdullah bin Khalifa in October 1960,55 when a REAN petty officer stood beside the new Sultan’s throne brandishing a Union Jack.56 The Navy’s traditional East African recruits, Seedies, had primarily been recruited from Zanzibar, but with the protectorate providing just 1% of the EANF’s manpower, alternative seafaring races were sought in Kenya. River and lakeside District Commissioners (DCs) were approached, but it proved ‘difficult to find suitable candidates from the fishing communities who possess the necessary educational and linguistic qualifications’.57 Though an ethnic quota was laid down for the Army by East Africa Command,58 for the EANF this was considered ‘impracticable as there are more tribes in the three territories than the total complement of sailors’.59 In contrast to the Police and Army, it was ‘felt that the question of tribal composition is only of minor importance as the force is designed to meet an external threat and not internal disorder’,60 though this role would be reassessed following the declaration of a State of Emergency. Problems of ethnic recruitment came when naval duty clashed with indigenous custom. Two Luo ratings, George Eliakim Odhiambo and Matthew Oremo, objected to cleaning the communal lavatories because ‘it will bring disgrace upon their families and will make it necessary for a cleansing ceremony to be carried out by the native witch doctor … before they can be received again into their families’.61 Oremo claimed the dishonour of these ‘latrine duties’ had caused his wife to leave him, and ‘he cannot now get back the cows which he paid as dowry’.62 The Navy argued that ‘whilst every endeavour is made in the REAN to satisfy tribal custom, it is not possible, especially in a ship to excuse ratings of any particular tribe from any duty’, and ‘the policy of the REAN is to run the internal organisation on similar lines to that of the Royal Navy, with a view to Africans ultimately 63 obtaining the same standard as Europeans’. Naval training was thus framed within developmentalism, representing a modernity undermined here by indigenous tradition. Characteristic of this ‘progress’ was the REAN’s attempt to break down ethnic rivalries and forge a crew by teaching the ‘value of “old shipmates”’; it felt that the ‘general friendliness among them, devoid of squabbles’ was evidence that the ratings had ‘adapted’ to this,64 and out of 165 African personnel from

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mixed groups, including a large number of Luo, only Odhiambo and Oremo had protested. The Kisumu DC was contacted to seek ‘an assurance from the chief of the tribe that there is no objection to these men taking their full part in the cleaning work’.65 Despite political moves away from indirect rule, the Navy still relied upon the endorsement of the chiefs to validate their own authority. Though the men’s claim was true in that it was disgraceful ‘to be employed as a sweeper … it is CERTAINLY NOT contrary to Luo custom if it is a duty shared by all and indeed if the lavatories are used only by them’.66 Oremo’s credibility was further undermined when it was revealed he had married his wife, Jennifer Okinda, while on leave without her parent’s consent. Therefore no dowry had been agreed, she had not left him but been ‘detained by her parents until three head of cattle are paid as brideprice’.67 A similar occurrence happened with John Adala, who also ‘while on leave took away a girl without the consent of the girl’s parents’, forcing the Navy to temporarily release him at the Chief of North Ugenya’s behest, ‘in order to perform marriage ceremonies according to tribal law’.68 Despite espousing their desire to westernise African ratings, the Navy still deferred to the indigenous customs and power structures for the discipline of the men. This supports Thomas Spear’s argument that ‘colonial power was limited by chiefs’ obligation to ensure community well-being to maintain the legitimacy on which colonial authorities depended … they became subject to local discourse of power that they never fully understood nor controlled’.69 Race-based management of the REAN created difficulties in recruiting Asian personnel. Though a small number of Asians volunteered for the KRNVR during the Second World War, most were conscripted for non-combatant duties, and they begrudged being overlooked for active duty and promotion compared to Europeans.70 Since the war there had been an increase in Asian living standards, costs of living, and remuneration in other jobs, meaning they were unwilling 71 to be paid on ‘an antiquated and discriminatory scale’ that persisted within the colonial armed forces. Asian chief petty officers were paid £315 a year, compared to £790 for Europeans, and just £60 for Africans.72 Ordinary ratings were paid 7 shillings a day for Europeans, 4.5 shillings for Asians, and 1.5 shillings for Africans; ration allowances were allocated on a 6-4-2 basis, travelling expenses on a 10-6.5-2 basis, while marriage allowances were 6 shillings and 7 shillings for European ratings and petty officers, 4 and 4.5 for Asian ratings and petty officers, and nothing for Africans.73 This was endorsed by the 1948 Holmes Commission Report, which recommended that ‘different races should have different scales’.74 Though the Kenyan Government was ‘unable to [ 121 ]

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agree that difference of pay should be based solely on racial grounds’, and the practice drew ‘serious criticism’ from Tanganyika’s Legislative Council,76 the EANF was subject to EAHC policy and not that of the colonial governments. With no European ratings in the new force, and no non-European officers, this discrepancy was not as pronounced. ‘To raise the pay of the African rating’, required ‘final approval of increased rates of pay for the African Askari of East African Command, since the emoluments of both Services must be co-related’, while the Uganda Government still thought it ‘extremely difficult in practice to draw distinctions between the different grades and ranks entirely and solely in terms of qualifications, experience and merit and not in terms of colour of descent’.77 The ‘better education, better technical or professional training and a better economic standard in life than some of the Europeans’ produced a ‘natural reluctance on the part of the Asian youth always to be placed subordinate to Europeans’.78 Mervyn Cowie, the Director of European Manpower, was also concerned with ‘an element growing up of Kenya chaps who are irresponsible, uncouth and unreliable’.79 He blamed ‘a “Pongo” attitude among some young men, particularly in Nairobi’ where ‘boys who came from quite good homes emerged from the schools with an exaggerated idea of their own importance and ability’, while others ‘grew up on farms where they had some authority which they often misused’.80 The higher standard of post-war education for Asians and Europeans encouraged loftier ambitions than naval or military service.

Colonial navalism Royal Navy visits were again used to stimulate navalism, this time by the colony’s namesake, HMS Kenya. In May 1949 the cruiser was reactivated to relieve HMS London on the Far East Station, and with it ‘likely to be its last commission; whereafter the Colony’s direct connection with the Royal Navy is likely to lapse … this last opportu81 nity should be taken’ advantage of to promote it. Kenya’s Legislative Council allocated £100 for an Inter-Mess trophy that would be ‘appreciated and most useful … for the lower deck’82 who did not benefit from its previous presentation. It desired that this represent ‘something more distinctive of Kenya’ than an orthodox cup; a leopard skin was suggested but dismissed as ‘it might not survive long the moist air and would probably get sodden’.83 Instead it was decided to present an ‘elephant tusk suitably polished and mounted … together with a picture of Government House’ to Kenya on 6 February 1952, prior to her ‘leading the Royal Escort of Warships for Their Royal Highnesses The [ 122 ]

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Princess Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh on their departure from 84 the Colony’, again reinforcing the connection between monarchy, navy and empire. The bond between ship and colony was developed in both directions, with CO Captain T.W. Brock, ‘anxious to obtain literature about Kenya as he wanted the officers and men to know something about the country whose name the ship carried’.85 A photograph of the ship was also donated to decorate the new Guildhall.86 Tours of Kenya were provided for the REAN, schoolchildren, sea rangers, chiefs, elders, and ‘other notable Africans and Arabs’;87 sailing, shooting, football, rugby and hockey matches were contested between the ship’s crew and local sports clubs, the REAN, police service, yacht club, Goan Institute, and Sikh Union; public entertainment also featured a tattoo by floodlight, live bands, a cinema, barbecue for young seamen, children’s party, tombola, dinner and cocktail parties, while members of the crew were taken on safari to Tsavo National Park and visited the East African Brewery. Though the crew reflected positively that ‘we didn’t know there were places like Kenya left after the War, where people are so kind’, having danced with ‘people drawn from very varied walks of European life in Nairobi’,88 they left with a racially skewed, idealised image of a harmonious white settler society, choreographed to cover up deeper colonial tensions that would soon erupt with the Mau Mau uprising in October 1952. It also masked the domestic political friction and economic strain created by Royal Navy visits. While the Nairobi Naval Entertainments Committee were given an annual grant of £250 from the City Council and another £250 from the Kenyan Government, only £50 was passed on to the Mombasa Naval Entertainments Committee, who received just £50 more from the city’s Municipal Board. This was despite all visiting navies calling at Mombasa; only sometimes would they travel up to Nairobi, and even then with just a quarter or third of the crew, leaving the rest requiring hospitality in port. Whilst money could be raised from sports matches, Mombasa was ‘not as well placed to do this as Nairobi. First because of the comparatively small number of Europeans in Mombasa and secondly because of the difficulty of obtaining an appropriate ground free-of-charge’.89 Some sections of the colony remained impervious to navalism. By serving as an Able Seaman, Ogango son of Ondago was exempt from Native Poll Tax, but his sub-headman in Manyala, Western Region, kept insisting he pay as he did not believe there was a navy in East Africa.90 Instead of applying to the REAN, Dicxon Ayieko Ochieng, an eighteen-year-old Luo, addressed his letter to ‘The Manager of the U.S. Navy, Mombasa’, though there was no American naval presence there.91 [ 123 ]

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One reason for the lack of awareness regarding the REAN was that, unlike the KAR which ‘deals in much larger numbers’, it was not thought ‘the small number of men required justifies naval recruiting 92 parties visiting Districts’. Instead, DCs were tasked with nominating recruits, but with Kenya’s Government ‘anxious … not to burden District Commissioners with more tasks’, it was suggested only certain districts be targeted as some ethnic groups were considered inherently unsuitable; ‘for instance, I cannot visualise a Suk leading a disciplined life on the ocean wave’, being self-reliant pastoralists from Kenya’s arid north.93 Though the Ministry of Defence was ‘surprised’ to discover three Masai Master Mariners,94 the Masai districts were excluded.95 So was Northern Province, where ‘there does not seem to be a Naval tradition’,96 while the Rift Valley districts already presented ‘the greatest difficulty in recruiting enough Special Farm Guards in competition with the Police, Army and Prisons’.97 Instead, it was decided to focus recruitment on Machakos, Kitui, Central Nyanza, South Nyanza, Coast Province, and Nairobi,98 as ‘Nairobi is full of Jaluo and Akamba’.99 In July 1954, approval was given to increase the number of African personnel from 165 to 200, alongside fifteen Europeans and six Asians.100 With Kenya ‘a little over-borne’, annual intakes were adjusted to maintain a regional balance.101 Approximately 50% of ratings re-engaged after their initial term, though this varied between branches, and there was ‘a steady wastage of naval communications ratings at the end of their first five years direct to other Government services’.102 With only an average of twenty-four vacancies each year, applicants were ‘far in excess of the numbers which can be accepted for entry’ and ‘usually of a high standard’.103 One of the ‘most promising sailors’ had served in the Army, and was so keen to join after receiving his acceptance letter that without waiting for his Railway Warrant, he ‘made his own way partly walking and partly hitch-hiking all the way from Kissii to Mombasa’, almost 800 kilometres.104 In January 1959 alone, 150 applicants from every territory converged on Mombasa ‘of 105 their own volition’ to volunteer. Table 5  Regional intake of African REAN ratings Year

Kenya

1954 1955 1957 1958 1959

11  6  0  3 15

Tanganyika

Uganda

  7   5  12   6 31 combined   8  13   5   5

Zanzibar

Total

1 0 0 0 0

24 24 31 24 25

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Of the REAN’s £94,761 expenditure for 1955–58, Kenya paid six 106 shares, Tanganyika four, Uganda three, and Zanzibar 0.4%. As landlocked Uganda contributed but could not have a ship visit it to show the flag, it was important the force still appear visible and relevant to those who held the protectorate’s purse strings. A tour of Mombasa was therefore arranged for nine members of Uganda’s Legislative Council on 16 July 1959, where they were given a divisional march past, shown around the naval base and HMS Bassingham, and taken out in the CO’s motorboat before sharing afternoon tea with him.107 To advertise the REAN to ‘members of the public, living far from the sea’ and tell ‘the story of the work they do for people of all races in East Africa’,108 from October 1953 the Navy manned an exhibition at the annual Royal Agricultural show in Nairobi’s Mitchell Park. The public ‘showed great interest in the modern equipment’ at REAN open days,109 and this technological modernity was emphasised at the show, with a sailor plotting the ship’s position with a Decca 974 radar, an echo sounder and a bridge gyroscope,110 a display on the art of minesweeping featuring a contact mine and an Oerlikon gun,111 and a practical demonstration by African ratings of breeches buoy rescue methods.112 This produced ‘many inquiries … from local residents and there was no dearth of applicants from the younger members of the community to join’.113 The REAN also erected a booth at the Kampala Trade Show with seamanship exhibits, a dinghy, and ratings providing a daily tug of war display in the arena.114 As in the Caribbean, prospective recruits were also courted at an early age through youth organisations such as the Sea Scouts and Mombasa Sea Rangers, while in 1953, Lieutenant-Commander (ret.) N.C. Easey formed Kenya’s first Sea Cadet Corps at Nairobi’s Duke of York School.115 These groups were accommodated in the naval base during training camps, taken to sea in Rosalind and Mvita, and given instruction in sailing, boat pulling, seamanship, helmsmanship, signalling and rifle shooting.116 The REAN also welcomed numerous visits by African, Arab and Asian schools and clubs, giving children 117 tours of the base and ships, and rides around the harbour in its MLs.

Welfare and development The Royal Navy believed that ‘the African has shown that with the right training and encouragement he can become an efficient sailor and take his place with … the British Navy’, but ‘bearing in mind the average mentality of African ratings and their lack of “sea sense” … constant repetition of the same duties [was] of the utmost importance’.118 Training was focused on ‘quickening the pace … physically [ 125 ]

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and mentally’, and ‘inculcating a higher sense of responsibility, spirit of service and resourcefulness … initiative, power of command and 119 confidence of the senior African ratings’. To this end, outward bound exercises were introduced, with crews sent on expeditions along inshore waterways and up Mount Kilimanjaro, minimally equipped ‘with a view to increasing their resourcefulness, team spirit and ability to fend for themselves under arduous conditions’.120 This was to benefit European personnel too, for even as late as the 1950s it was believed that climate and ‘the lack of winter was a debilitating influence’ on their constitution.121 The Director of Manpower wanted ‘to see youngsters join mountaineering clubs and take part in other “manly outdoor sports” rather than hang around the “pubs”’.122 Following the complaints against Hastings and Barham, provincial information officers were instructed to publicise that ‘African personnel of the REAN … are now enjoying greatly improved welfare facilities under a new campaign recently instituted by the Naval authorities’ while ‘plans for further expansion of the welfare programme envisage the introduction of various competitions and the formation of a Navy Band’.123 Nicholson’s welfare programme for African ratings went beyond naval training and was again tied to colonial development, seeking to improve the social and economic condition of the men, their families, and the community, and illustrate their ‘progress’ under Britain’s paternalistic instruction. Racial stereotypes were played on, such as the irresponsible, spendthrift African, unable to plan for the future: ‘Constant demand for casual payments to meet domestic emergencies’ created a ‘savings bank drive … for the encouragement of thrift’, and within three years ‘most sailors now preserve their money carefully’.124 In emphasising its success in teaching East Africans skills of economic management and good governance, the Navy was demonstrating that it too played an important role in preparing East Africans for eventual self-rule. This was influenced by the ‘ultra-imperialists’ of the late Victorian and Edwardian era, who believed that British 125 ‘character’ was the ‘moral foundation of its material greatness’. Its attributes included ‘soldierly virtues’ of energy, industry, perseverance, discipline and sacrifice, and crucially here, prudence and thrift, ‘qualities associated with economic advance and wealth creation’.126 The Empire was ‘not merely the key to glory and wealth, but a call to duty, and the means of service to mankind’.127 By passing on these qualities to East Africans, British naval officers fortified their own character too. An information and recreation room was installed where ratings were ‘encouraged to usefully occupy some of their leisure time and improve their general knowledge’ with photographs, posters, drawings, naval literature,128 English and African newspapers and vernacular [ 126 ]

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press from their home districts. The Red Cross provided parcels with games, books and a wireless set. Cards, tables and easy chairs were purchased from the welfare fund, while the shipwrights made a board for playing the local game bao. It was reported that the ‘success of this innovation is evidenced by the regular use that is made of the Recreation Room and of the extent to which the games supplied to Rosalind are in demand’, and it was ‘doing tremendous good’ for the 129 men’s conduct. The Admiralty provided a 16mm cinema projector to show weekly instructional films, while a canteen was opened for ratings to purchase discounted goods.130 By 1958 the library was still ‘very popular’, where ‘ratings continue to spend a lot of their spare time studying useful subjects from the non-fiction section’.131 Wives of the ratings were also offered domestic science classes, instruction in dressmaking, needlework, embroidery, crochet and tatting, basketwork, cooking, child welfare, English reading and writing, and a branch of the women’s organisation Maendaleo Ya Wanawake was formed.132 Dances, concerts and magic shows were arranged in the barracks for the men’s families.133 Poorer examination results in Kiswahili prompted a greater campaign for English as the REAN’s common medium from 1957, ‘since recruits from all the Territories seldom understand each other’ having come from ‘some 70 tribes’, while it would ‘enable them to take their place with the other naval forces of the Commonwealth’, strengthening imperial defence.134 Regular classes were conducted, and in 1961, 35 out of 43 ratings passed Elementary English, with 38 from 51 acquiring Standard English.135 In Peleleza, two football pitches were prepared, a .22 shooting range was constructed,136 and from late 1953 one afternoon a week was devoted to sport, with every man taking part in track and field, football or sailing. This led to one rating winning the Victor Ludorum Cup at the 1953 Coast Athletic Sports competition, while a sick berth attendant was selected to represent Coast Province at the 1959 Colony Athletics in Nyeri.137 It also produced a number of African coxswains 138 who enabled an annual sailing regatta to be held on Trafalgar Day, 139 providing a testing ground for prospective petty officers. In June 1957, the REAN won a three-nation regatta featuring the visiting HMS Ceylon, the East Indies flagship, and INS Delhi, flagship of the Indian Navy.140 REAN athletics competitions were held annually from 1953 at Peleleza recreation ground, becoming ‘popular … with many relatives of naval personnel’141 and the general public who came to watch. With many recruits coming from inland and unable to swim, a sharkpoof enclosure was built at the naval base for swimming instruction.142 Boxing, shooting and football were all ‘very popular with the African ratings’, with matches held throughout the year against local clubs and [ 127 ]

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visiting ships. In their first season competing in the local league, the REAN football team won seven matches, drew three, and lost five,144 while Leading Seaman Ali Said was selected to compete in the national Intermediate Boxing Championships in Nairobi in November 1961, and won ‘most promising boxer’ at the De Witt Trophy.145 Publicity for the welfare programme not only served to highlight the REAN’s contribution to colonial development and attract prospective recruits; ‘to encourage sport among the Africans it must be of a competitive nature’,146 to build ‘character’, ‘encourage initiative and develop the spirit of give and take’,147 and for this the force was ‘in urgent need of Cups or Trophies’.148 It was hoped ‘cities and districts, especially the home areas of the African Navy men, might wish to offer cups or trophies for such competitions as divisional football, tugof-war, boat pulling, javelin throwing, .22 rifle competition, divisional squad drill’, and whaler and dinghy racing.149 Donations were also welcomed towards the African Welfare fund, otherwise funded solely by the annual £48 NAAFI (Navy, Army and Air Force Institute) rebate, and the formation of a Navy Band ‘for use on ceremonial occasions and … as a morale factor’.150 This led the Ugandan Government to donate a silver trophy and pair of silver bugles,151 the Mombasa Municipal Board gifted £100 towards five drums,152 and a set of fifes were purchased. From ‘rather painful beginnings’,153 the band ‘progressed very considerably’ thanks to training from the KAR band, numbered twenty volunteer ratings and performed on parade and ‘important occasions’.154 A Trafalgar Cup for the sailing regatta was presented by the Naval Officers’ Association, Nairobi.155 The Zanzibar Government purchased a sailing trophy, donated £20 to the Welfare fund,156 while the Zanzibar Township Council provided a football trophy.157 Though this was ‘very much larger’ than Zanzibar’s proportional share in the REAN, it was considered that ‘the navy is for our protection as much as for anyone else regardless of who makes up the complement’.158 Thus naval gifts, visits and competitions not only connected the colonies with Britain and the Commonwealth internationally; through the REAN they also united local communities and the countries within the East African region, as a political and a cultural entity.

Aid to the civil power In 1952 it was suggested that a reserve unit of the REAN might also be formed, but after a Kenyan State of Emergency was declared at midnight on 20 October 1952 in response to Mau Mau, the scheme was shelved as many of its European applicants were already in the Kenya Police Reserve.159 Though the ‘Navy certainly had a value its [ 128 ]

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importance at this stage was not as great as the Army or the Police’, and Twining ‘felt there were other commitments which must be faced 160 first’. The regular REAN did have a role to play, however, and it was immediately put on an emergency footing by the Mombasa Internal Security Committee. All leave was cancelled, assault groups comprising 56 African ratings led by a European petty officer were formed and trained by the Royal Marines, a party was detailed to guard the Royal Naval Armament Depot, wireless/telegraphy staff provided continuous watch-keeping, and an emergency headquarters was set up in the naval base.161 Between 8 March and July 1954, an assault group was deployed to Lukenia prison camp to guard Mau Mau detainees whilst Army personnel participated in the unsuccessful ‘General China’ operation.162 HMEAS Rosalind was regularly used to transport Mau Mau prisoners to Lamu Island, including 391 in 1954 alone.163 The REAN regularly provided Aid to the Civil Power. HMEAS Rosalind provided disaster relief on 15 April 1952, transporting food, equipment and personnel to the port of Lindi in Tanganyika’s Southern Province after a cyclone hit.164 Between October and December 1961, after extensive flooding in Kipini, HMEAS Mvita transported food, stores and refugees, provided administrative support and interpreters for a relief contingent from HMS Striker.165 In March 1955, civil unrest followed an industrial strike of 10,000 Mombasa dock workers; REAN assault groups were put on standby while a party of 40, led by Lieutenant-Commander V.E. Jupp and Lieutenant F.P. Cox, guarded and patrolled the docks and assisted the Kenya Landing and Shipping Company in unloading perishable stores, relieving the Police for other essential duties.166 In March 1956 the REAN took custody of Archbishop Makarios, the Cypriot nationalist cleric who defied antisedition laws by demanding self-determination for Cyprus, and was exiled by Britain to Mahé Island in the Seychelles. The REAN transferred Makarios and fellow political prisoners to HMS Loch Fada for transportation to Mahé, before sending additional security forces with 167 HMEAS Rosalind to prevent any rescue attempt. By 1957, with ‘practically no soldiers stationed in Mombasa’, the REAN received additional training in rifles and automatic weapons and provided foot ‘patrols, guards, [and] general assistance in the clearance of important freight in the port, defence of oil supplies to the Territories, and the continuance of port communications’.168 The REAN was again ‘alerted’ to industrial trouble in Mombasa in 1958.169 There were efforts to increase the interoperability of the REAN and land forces, with joint amphibious exercises conducted with the KAR in 1957,170 and the Kenya Regiment, Kenya Police and Police Air Wing [ 129 ]

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EA ST A F R IC A 171 in 1958. This training was implemented for real in June 1961 when, following the Zanzibar General Election, ‘violence and intimidation, fanned by racial and political bitterness, resulted in some 60 fatalities across the island’. On 5 June, the Zanzibar Government requested the REAN’s assistance, and HMEAS Rosalind was dispatched carrying units of the KAR. For the next two weeks it landed troops and conducted patrols over Mensai Bay, East, South and Southwest Unguja coasts, and the Pemba channel to Mkoani port.172 The REAN also filled more peaceful, scientific roles for the EAHC. In February 1957, HMEAS Mvita assisted the East African Marine Fisheries Research Organisation in collecting and examining shoal specimens. An explosives expert was embarked with TNT charges, to be dropped into the water once shoals of fish were sighted by the organisation’s vessel Research. In October and November that year, Mvita assisted the Director of Overseas Surveys in charting Lamu, the Tana River, Tenewe and the Ziwaiu islands.173

The last sultan Britain continued to rely on its collaborative relationship with the Sultan of Zanzibar, but with the ageing Khalifa bin Harub approaching 80, thoughts turned to preserving British influence through his heirs. However, Khalifa’s grandson and second in line to the throne, Jamshid bin Abdullah, was considered ‘a grave problem’,174 a victim of the comfortable and privileged status of Zanzibari Arabs that Britain had encouraged for its own hegemonic benefit: He is now twenty-one … like so many Arabs here of good and well-to-do family he has no profession and has been brought up in the tradition that it is unnecessary, even undignified, to take a job or earn one’s living … The only outlet for his energy has been to drive fast cars to the danger of the public. He has a long police file in this connection and has just had a smash and been forbidden to drive again by the Sultan.175

Katherine Bliss and Ann Blum have argued that ‘fast cars’ allowed young men to establish ‘an independent masculine identity’ and ‘transgress more easily geographic and social boundaries’, but ‘frequently placed them in conflict with parental authority’.176 Though Jamshid was high-born, he was still overshadowed by the omnipresence of his grandfather in Zanzibar, and thus his penchant for speeding cars can be considered a similar expression of youthful individualism. In challenging conventions of respectability, he threatened not only colonial law and order, but also the prestige and authority of Zanzibar’s royal family and their imperial allies, particularly should he defy the Sultan’s [ 130 ]

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edict. Though hints of Orientalism were evident in their assumption of Arab idleness, British concerns here reflect the debate between David Cannadine and Peter Cain regarding character. Cannadine challenged the Orientalist notion of ‘othering’ by suggesting that imperial elites viewed the colonies as monarchical and hierarchical reflections 177 of British aristocracy, but Cain has argued that this fails to acknowledge that colonial administrators were often drawn from professional classes, who were ‘suspicious of the leisured independence and inherited wealth on which landed power rested as undermining of “character”’.178 Similarly, inherited wealth gave Jamshid the freedom to indulge in recreational driving, and with a ‘view to his becoming Sultan one day’, the British Resident in Zanzibar became concerned about ‘the effect of all this on his character, [as] sooner or later he will get into really serious trouble unless we can find something more profitable for him to do’.179 The British solution was ‘an attachment to a good regiment or to the navy for a year or two’, to allow Jamshid to ‘see something of the world and mix a little with the right kind of people outside of the narrow limits of society in Zanzibar’, and ‘above all … somewhere where he will be under discipline’.180 It was felt, however, that ‘his general education is so poor it may be doubtful whether he would be able to undertake the duties of an ordinary regimental officer’.181 With no REAN provision ‘yet’ for non-European officers,182 it was not ‘desirable to have him on the Lower Deck (e.g. as an Ordinary Seaman) in view of his status as a member of a ruling house’, as it would undermine the Sultan’s prestige.183 It was therefore suggested that ‘his knowledge of Arabic might be of some value, say, as an interpreter attached to the personal staff of the Commander-in-Chief East Indies’ instead.184 The issue was raised with Admiral Geoffrey Oliver, C-in-C East Indies, who agreed he could serve as an Honorary Midshipman to maintain status. The Colonial Office thought the proposal ‘a far preferable one to that of his appointment to the Arab Legion, which might well result in his becoming too much imbued with near-eastern poli185 tics’. Jamshid had already been exposed to Arab nationalism during his schooling in Beirut, where ‘from all accounts the influences he came into contact with were not for the best’.186 In Zanzibar there had grown ‘a good deal of anti-European and particularly anti-British activity amongst the younger Arabs’, caused by ‘affairs in the Middle East, particularly Egypt and Persia’.187 The Sultan was anxious ‘that Seyyid Jamshid is becoming involved in some of these activities … under the influence of Seif bin Hamoud and some of the lesser desirable young Arabs’, which for Britain was ‘certainly not for the good, particularly in view of events in the Middle East’.188 [ 131 ]

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Arab nationalism articulated itself in Zanzibar through the newspapers of the Arab Association, Al-Falaq, and the independent Mwongozi, which ‘preached that “true politics” consisted only of the goal of unifying and redeeming the nation from the shame of foreign 189 rule’. These local voices were supported by Egypt’s call for Arab, African and Muslim unity from the 1950s, with Radio Cairo broadcasting messages of anti-colonial support to nationalists along the Swahili Coast: Arab nationalism is penetrating the East African Jungle and Central Africa. The Arab League of Nationals on the one hand and the Arab Nations extending from the Atlantic to the Arabian Gulf, on the other hand should help our Brothers in Kenya and Zanzibar.190

Gamal Abdel Nasser became a popular figure in Zanzibar, with his photograph displayed in Arab homes, while ‘many girls carried handkerchiefs with his picture imprinted on them’.191 Within this climate, the British felt that the sooner they could get Jamshid ‘away from here for the time being and into the Navy where he will be under good influences the better’.192 British colonial officials could not afford to lose face in the eyes of the Sultan by failing to fulfil their side of the collaborative bargain: He has been one of our most loyal and whole-hearted friends for over forty years … he has done every single thing ever asked of him by the British Government; he hoped that he deserved well of it and that it would look after the interests of his son and grandsons … during the Navy’s association with the East African coast the Sultan has done much to help it. Surely there are strong grounds of gratitude and sentiment to reinforce the purely political arguments.193

The British had identified the Arabs in East Africa as a fellow seafaring race and used the Royal Navy to channel that shared maritime heritage into imperial sentiment: The Arabs of Zanzibar and of the coastal strip of Kenya, which is still nominally under the sovereignty of the Sultan, have a sea-faring tradition and, as you are probably aware, a great admiration for the Royal Navy, and the acceptance of Seyyid Jamshid as an Honorary Cadet for training on one of HM ships would not only provide the condition of work and discipline which the youth needs but would afford the highest gratification and pride to the Sultan and his people.194

Yet there were competing pressures on the British side. Finding sufficient midshipman accommodation was ‘a constant problem in [ 132 ]

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HM ships and to take Seyyid Jamshid on HMS Kenya would almost certainly mean “turning down” a cadet for training from Australia or New Zealand which the Admiralty would be very reluctant to do’ because of the increased strategic importance of the Dominions in 195 Commonwealth Defence and their gravitation towards the US. In this instance, however, ‘the political arguments for finding room for the Sultan’s grandson’ were more pressing.196 Khalifa was ‘delighted’ with the idea,197 and Jamshid said to be ‘extremely keen to go’,198 but the ‘considerable delay’ from the Admiralty meant ‘mischief-makers got to work on his mother’, provoking ‘strong opposition’ from her ‘and a certain section of the Arabs led … by Seif bin Hamoud’.199 Nationalist opposition was stimulated by the wartime colour bar prohibiting nonEuropeans from becoming officers, and ‘now, ironically enough, they object to Jamshid’s going into the Navy on the grounds that I wished to make him into a “young Englishman”’.200 This was not an inaccurate accusation, with Britain hoping to maintain its influence in Zanzibar by making Jamshid more sympathetic to British values through naval indoctrination. Finance was another issue, with a naval cadet’s pay insufficient to cover victualling and accommodation for both him and the servant required to uphold his status.201 Orientalist ideas about the ‘Arab mentality and their inferiority complex’ prompted a fear that if the Colonial Office were ‘to ask them for some financial provision, they would immediately see in it something “derogatory”’.202 With ‘Seif bin Hamoud … only too glad of any excuse to upset the arrangement’,203 it was therefore ‘desirable for political reasons that these payments should be made in [the UK] and not in Zanzibar’.204 It was suggested that this expenditure might be covered by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund,205 where one million pounds was allocated ‘for the pre-training of Colonial students … to the higher grades of the public service’. Jamshid technically did not qualify as he ‘already has his post designated by … hereditary principle’, yet an exception was made because: The Sultan and the British Resident are most anxious that he should be given some further education and training under discipline and in British surroundings to fit him for his future role as Sultan. There is at present a good deal of anti-British activity amongst the younger Arabs in Zanzibar and there is reason to believe that Jamshid is becoming mixed up in it. It is very important that he should be got away from these bad influences and trained in an atmosphere more favourable to British interests … it is obviously in our interests that he should have training of character as well as intellect under British influence.206

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The Treasury agreed to sanction a grant of £600 over two years, in the 207 ‘hope we shall get our money’s worth’. The remaining concern was that as a ‘honourary’ midshipman, Jamshid was not subject to the Naval Discipline Act, and therefore ‘if he were to refuse to obey an order … he would have to be sent home immediately’.208 It was hoped that ‘the loss of face he would suffer in this event might be extremely effective in keeping him on his best behaviour’.209 With his costs subsidised by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, and the Sultan providing ‘pocket money of £7–£8 per month from his private purse’,210 Arab objection was circumvented, and Jamshid joined HMS Newfoundland for training during its visit to Zanzibar on 1 July 1953.211 In December that year, Newfoundland’s Captain M.G. Goodenough reported that Jamshid was ‘getting on well’ having gradually overcome ‘fits of sulkiness and his objection to discipline’.212 His major concern was Jamshid’s ‘neglect of his religion – reading the Koran, prayers, attending mosque’, and the consumption of alcohol, though shipboard life provided ‘little privacy for a midshipman … and it is difficult for him also to ignore the social habit of having a drink in the mess’.213 ‘As regards drink’ the British Resident was ‘not worried. Provided he takes it in moderation’.214 As second heir to the Sultanate though, ‘it would of course be very much better if he kept up his religious observances’, and Goodenough was instructed ‘to encourage him to do so’ though it was accepted that Jamshid ‘is not a boy of exceptionally strong character … only a boy of strong character could be expected in the circumstances to keep up all the requirements of a strict Muslim’.215 While Jamshid’s ‘saving talent is his ability to handle people and he had a confident and easy manner with the [British] ratings’,216 several Royal Pakistan Navy midshipman training aboard Newfoundland caused him ‘sorrow’ because ‘they knew more than him – naturally – and rather bullied him and looked down on him and he hated them’.217 The Navy’s mission to ‘develop’ Jamshid meant he was viewed through a paternalistic lens by Goodenough, being seen as ‘still very simple and backward educationally and young for his age. He still on occasion thinks he is being slighted over some triviality and sulks and refuses. Then he is sorry 218 and weeps on my shoulder, poor little chap’. As Newfoundland was destined for ‘the Far East where many clubs are narrow-minded over colour’, Jamshid was transferred to HMS Ceylon for its cruise of East Africa in June 1954, where he was to spend shore leave in Zanzibar to avoid ‘awkwardness for him in some of the East African clubs’ which fell under the Sultan’s coastal rule.219 Yet, ‘it was clear as soon as Jamshid arrived … there was going to be difficulty over getting him to go back to the Navy’,220 as his mother ‘“went mad” at any suggestion that Jamshid should leave Zanzibar again’.221 Having left the service, [ 134 ]

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it was feared he would revert ‘to his old weakness for fast cars, foolish 222 friends and frail women’, but instead it was commented that ‘Jamshid has been behaving better … has been taking a full part in ceremonial and social functions … He has also been involved in marriage arrangements’,223 and had ‘found a niche … as supervisor of village community development schemes’ within the Administrative Service.224 Sultan Khalifa died on 9 October 1960 and British newspapers mourned the passing of ‘our best friend in East Africa’.225 His son Abdullah would rule for less than three years before his own death, and Jamshid ascended to the throne on 1 July 1963. His time in the Royal Navy had failed to sufficiently discipline or change his image as ‘arrogant and overbearing, and loses control of his temper easily’.226 Nor had it removed his political leanings and he openly backed the Arab-led Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), making him unpopular with the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) supported by the African majority, and causing the British Resident, Sir George Mooring, to warn that ‘there is a risk (though he does not think it a serious risk) that a republican movement may spring up among the Afro-Shirazis’.227 The ASP initially adopted a ‘policy of “wait and see”, on the expectation that he will soon give them all the ammunition they require to attack the throne’,228 while Jamshid’s penchant for pig hunting meant he still enjoyed some support from indigenous rural inhabitants. The British were cautiously optimistic that he would prove: in many respects a chip off the block of his grandfather ... [but this would] ... depend on which party comes to power in the elections [later that month] ... His lack of popularity, and his reputation for arrogance and high-handedness coming after the entirely negative reign of his father may erode yet further the very high regard in which the Throne was held during the reign of his grandfather. But if he can learn to curb his violent temper and can act fairly he could play a valuable part as Head of State.229

Britain got its preferred result when the ZNP and Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party alliance won 18 of the 31 seats, and granted independence to the new government on 10 December 1963. Frustrated with its lack of representation, despite claiming 54.2% of the vote, and harbouring deeper resentment at Arab privilege, the ASP allied itself with the Umma Party and on the morning of 12 January 1964 overthrew the Sultan in revolution, as Mooring had warned. Jamshid fled to the UK as thousands of Arabs were left slaughtered. Of the 130 British officials employed by the Zanzibar Government, only one dentist remained by July 1964, with the outgoing high commissioner reporting that British influence in Zanzibar had been ‘virtually eliminated’.230 Though the British Government denied evacuating him [ 135 ]

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EA ST A F R IC A 231 aboard HMS Owen, Jamshid ended up in Portsmouth, the home of the Royal Navy, where he remained in exile, a final futile testament to the relationship between the Zanzibar Sultanate and the senior service.

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Nationalism and disbandment Though by 1961, East Africans filled all higher rating positions, up to and including chief petty officer, only that year did the BRNC begin to consider prospective African officer cadets. The ‘trouble so far is finance. There isn’t enough money to send men off for training’.232 By the end of the year much larger problems would emerge, threatening the REAN’s very existence. On 9 December HMEAS Rosalind joined a Royal Navy squadron at Dar es Salaam to celebrate Tanganyika’s independence and participate in the Searchlight Tattoo at the Stadium.233 Only six days later, in its first major public statement since replacing the EAHC, the East African Common Services Organisation conveyed the news that Tanganyika was withdrawing from the REAN and ceasing its contribution towards its £94,000 upkeep. The country had argued that ‘the REAN in its present form was not suitable to meet the future requirements of Tanganyika as, being based in Mombasa, it was unable to operate with its existing resources effectively in Tanganyika’s waters’.234 The governments of Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar investigated whether it was possible to meet the increased expenditure to keep the REAN afloat or in a marine police capacity, but by January 1962 the decision was taken to disband the force. Tanganyika had always been sensitive about ‘the Nairobi mentality’, Kenya’s willingness to dominate proceedings and make common decisions without consultation, and they felt justified in acting similarly regarding the REAN. As early as October 1949, neither Governor Twining ‘nor my Tanganyikan colleagues are enamoured of the EAHC … it is all very bureaucratic, slightly dictatorial and things are decided before we get there under Kenya influence and primarily in Kenya’s interests’. In 1955 and 1959, the EAHC was criticised for undermining colonial sovereignty and the Tanganyika Federation of Labour voted 235 to dissolve it. In a Legislative Council debate in February 1957, future Finance Minister Paul Bomani argued that as Tanganyika was a ‘trusteeship country’ there was no ‘reason why it should have military amalgamation with colonies and protectorates. I think we should stand on our own’.236 When in April 1960, Kenya’s Francis Khamisi proposed that the EACLA ‘develop the REAN in order to make it a permanent defence service’, Tanganyika’s members objected until the EAHC’s future was decided.237 [ 136 ]

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Tanganyika’s decision to withdraw from the REAN drew opposition from the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Its secretary, Tom Mboya, believed Tanganyika’s decision had been unilaterally ‘taken in a very high-handed manner’ before the Central Assembly could be re-established and the matter discussed with regional partners and he feared ‘it may prejudice the plan of an East African Federation’ and ‘opens a door for the British Government’s efforts to establish a naval 238 base, since they may try to occupy the vacuum’. Mboya published an article in the East African Standard titled ‘Why East Africa Needs its Navy’, in which he challenged Tanganyika’s reasoning by highlighting that Uganda did not have a coastline yet still contributed on the understanding of the regional benefits the REAN offered. He argued that this expression of Tanganyikan nationalism established an ‘unfortunate’ precedent for the East African Federation, with such a political union requiring compromise as ‘not all its various activities can at the same time be based in all its component states’.239 The REAN’s disbandment would mean whatever ‘training any of our local people had gained’ would be lost, threatening the security of the whole region by leaving it exposed to ‘maritime Powers who may wish to exploit the vacuum in various subtle manoeuvres’.240 Mboya included Britain in this assessment, as Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar would either be forced to: go back to complete dependence on the Royal Navy, thereby creating a ready excuse for a British Naval base at Mombasa ... [or]... become another Kuwait and a pawn in international intrigue and the Cold War ... There exist at this very moment the ingredients that could lead to a real East/West power interest in East Africa and our Coast becomes all the more a matter of real strategic importance which must be in our own hands and not open for all comers or dependent on defence arrangements with any foreign Power.241

This was not the first time Tanganyika had acted unilaterally ‘entirely without consultation with the other interests’, as it previously decided to introduce a £100 licence fee for doctors in private practices without any consideration of how it ‘affects the common 242 structure in neighbouring territories’. Such trends produced a pessimistic fear that ‘this sort of “go-it-alone” action does not bode very well for the formation of the much to be desired Federation’.243 Mombasa’s Mayor, Dr M.A. Rana, called disbandment ‘a stab in the back for the people of Mombasa’.244 The city had already had its port rates revoked, and now faced additional lost revenue without the REAN to support local businesses,245 while the unemployment of 200 ‘African rating in particular, gives cause for great concern’.246 Furthermore, Mrs K.M. Fannin of the Municipal Council noted that without a local [ 137 ]

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naval force fewer warships from other navies would visit to participate in joint exercises, depriving the local economy of the income they brought with them. In 1961 for example, sixty warships and 35,000 naval personnel visited Mombasa, including the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, which carried a daily wage bill of £10,000, ‘much of which 247 was spent in the town’. Mboya politically capitalised on local feeling by visiting Mombasa four days later to tour the naval base with the RNO, Captain E.A. Gibbs, producing a front-page article for the East African Standard.248 Though ‘Mboya’s brand of nationalism’ wanted an ‘East African navy occupying the Mombasa installation, to keep the British out’ and avoid becoming victim to Cold War politics,249 critics argued that this militarisation would conversely ‘have dumped upon this country the obsolete military junk of the Cold War participants’ and would ‘not feed or educate’250 Kenyans: A military parade may bolster the ego of politicians at May Day celebrations, but the pride that one may feel as aircraft thunder across the sky, the tanks roar by on their metal tracks, and the rhythmic tramp of marching feet is the pride of primitive man in his achievement of destruction.251

Instead, it was suggested that East Africa ‘place the onus of territorial integrity squarely on the shoulders of the UN’.252 This was also the call of Derek Bryceson, Tanganyika’s Minister for Health and Labour in April 1961 when he proclaimed ‘“scrap the navy”, as Tanganyika could find better uses for its share of £28,000 of the cost’ while ‘East Africa should leave its protection in the good hands of the (British) Commonwealth and the UN’.253 ‘The declared policies of African politicians’ were that ‘East Africa would wish to remain neutral’ in any potential war.254 Yet, ‘a clause in the Hague Convention requires that a neutral country must control its ports if it is to remain neutral’ by possessing ‘patrol vessels capable of stopping incoming ships for exam255 ination by boarding parties to verify their peaceful purposes’. This had caused the creation of the Irish naval service during the Second World War.256 The REAN’s disbandment thus threatened East Africa’s future neutrality according to international law. Julius Nyerere forewarned in 1961 that ‘in the world as it is today nobody could seriously suggest that an African state can arm itself, or be armed, in order to defend itself against attack by one of the Great Powers … realistically, it can only be armed against another African state’.257 His decision to withdraw from the REAN was therefore carried out in the spirit of regional harmony, not in spite of it. He saw [ 138 ]

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demilitarisation as a means of ensuring Tanganyika’s neighbours did not turn on each other. Mboya also aspired for East African fellowship, but in contrast he saw naval cooperation as providing a guarantee of that. Tanganyika shared Mboya’s fear of post-colonial dependence upon Britain, as it informed the East African Common Services Organisation assembly in May 1962 that ‘you cannot approach any other powers … 258 to be responsible for your defence’. Again though, their views of the REAN’s role within this differed, with Mboya seeing it as a counterclaim against a British naval presence in Mombasa, while for Nyerere it tied Tanganyika’s defence to Britain’s colony and protectorate, inhibiting an autonomous foreign policy; for Mboya the REAN represented the end of British influence, for Nyerere, its perpetuation. He argued ‘all that we need within our national boundaries are sufficient forces for the purposes of maintaining law and order within those boundaries’.259 In emphasising ‘national’ boundaries, Nyerere asserts that regional goodwill should not compromise Tanganyikan sovereignty, which any East African Federation would do by definition. There would be no political U-turn and, on 30 June 1962, the REAN’s ensign was lowered for the final time at the Mombasa naval base as ‘The Last Post’ was sounded. Afterwards, Captain Gibbs presented its bugler, Jacob Ochieng, with the instrument he had blown since it had been donated by Uganda seven years earlier.260 The mutinies that gripped Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda during 19–25 January 1964 provided a brief fillip for Britain’s hopes of East African military and political unification. The Conservative Government believed the Royal Navy’s intervention to put down the rebellion, at the request of Kenyatta, Obote and Nyerere, ‘provided the United Kingdom with the opportunity of undertaking positive measures to promote the stability of the Governments of East African countries in the longer term’.261 Despite independence, Britain still viewed the region with an imperial mindset, which it justified by the Cold War context. As ‘East Africa has been traditionally a sphere of British influence’, Britain did not want to lose face in the eyes of its Western allies who ‘consider that it is our responsibility to arrest the spread of communism in this part of the world. To abrogate this responsibility 262 could not fail to diminish our international standing’. East African sovereignty was seen as subsidiary to Commonwealth strategy, as ‘we should be most unwilling to accept any hostile influence in countries which flank our communications with the Far East’.263 Settler colonialism also remained crucial for Britain’s ‘substantial financial and economic interests’ in the region, with ‘the maintenance of order and the development of trade and international confidence’ dependent upon ensuring ‘the safety and prosperity of British settlers’.264 [ 139 ]

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It was still thought that ‘the best means of promoting greater stability’ was to ‘encourage the local Governments to develop some form of joint security system as a prelude to eventual federation’, such 265 as the REAN. Indoctrination was still considered a key method of securing British influence, with it ‘indispensable that there should be a nucleus of British officers attached to the various national contingents and to the central organisation in advisory and training capacity’;266 this was despite the Tanganyika mutiny having been a reaction to the ongoing employment of fifty commissioned and non-commissioned British officers.267 Opinions continued to be imbued with paternalistic sentiments in which East Africa lacked ‘trained officers’ and ‘members of radical youth organisations, would be unlikely to constitute an efficient force’.268 By ‘reassuring the British settlers that they would not be left to the mercy of Africans’,269 a ‘civilising mission’ was still considered necessary to quell fears of a ‘barbarous’,270 violent Africa, and the spectre of Mau Mau which had been resurrected by the mutinies. This was also perceived in the threat of communist, radically nationalist, and military elements seeking to exploit the ‘political instability’, prompting Britain to ‘hedge our bets’ in doing ‘everything possible to support the existing regimes’, while through a ‘joint military security system’ establishing ‘our influence as far as possible over those elements of the armed forces who might be expected to seize power’.271 It was recognised that ‘it will not be agreeable to African opinion to have … continuing evidence of British influence in their affairs’ and thus it would be ‘necessary to extend our information services, both overt and covert, and to employ whatever techniques of counter subversion … to enlist popular support for our policies’.272 To this end, ‘military and economic aid’ was to be ‘considered together as part of a co-ordinated plan’.273 Despite the fact it ‘might arouse jealousy in Uganda’, additional defence assistance worth over £1.5 million was therefore provided to Kenya because of ‘the importance attached by the Royal Navy to retaining facilities’ at Mombasa,274 while a team of 275 Royal Navy experts was sent to advise on creating a Kenyan Navy. When it was decided in early 1966 that Tanzania needed a navy of its own, Nyerere’s reluctance to be seen as a ‘stooge of the colonialists’276 and his opposition to British sanctions against Rhodesia, led him to accept Chinese assistance instead.277

Conclusion To extend its operational scope and circumvent the legislative difficulties which hindered efforts to amalgamate the East African forces during the Second World War, the Admiralty passed a new CNDA [ 140 ]

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to reorganise colonial naval defence along regional lines. Like the proposed RWIN, the REAN’s mission was geared towards internal politics as much as it was external security. It was hoped that as a branch of the EAHC, the REAN would encourage regional cooperation and interdependence with the view of preserving British influence through East African Federation. To facilitate this, there were moves away from a policy of indirect rule to one of social and economic development. The Navy was projected as a manifestation of this modernity, whose welfare programme offered an outlet for the unemployed, nurtured youth organisations, improved health and character through physical training and competitive sports, instituted savings schemes to alleviate poverty, delivered technical qualifications and education through its library, English lessons, and domestic science classes for wives, while providing family entertainment and recreational facilities to combat delinquency. These efforts were publicised to attract naval recruits and financial contributions, and justify a British colonial presence under threat from Mau Mau nationalism. The REAN gave practical as well as ideological aid to the civil power, transporting and guarding Mau Mau prisoners, relieving troops for military operations, providing logistical support, humanitarian relief, internal security against civil disorder, and furthering scientific knowledge. Naval theatre and royal visits were still considered an important means of garnering colonial allegiance towards both the British monarchy and the Sultan of Zanzibar. The collaborative relationship with the Sultanate continued to be vital to Britain’s imperial power in the region, but was challenged by Arab nationalism. The British tried to strengthen their influence through the naval indoctrination of the Sultan’s heir, but in doing so they alienated African nationalist forces who seized control of the island following the revolution. Mainland nationalism would also scupper Britain’s plans for political and naval federation, with Nyerere terminating Tanganyika’s involvement in the REAN for fear it would inculcate a post-colonial dependency that would undermine his country’s sovereignty.

Notes  1  Hilda Nissimi, ‘Illusions of World Power in Kenya: Strategy, Decolonization, and the British Base, 1946–1961’, International History Review, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December, 2001), pp. 824–846.  2  Ibid.  3  TNA, CO537/1890, D. of P.’s minute of 25th April, 1946, M. 01172/46.  4  Gadsden, ‘Wartime Propaganda in Kenya’, p. 419.  5  Carl G. Rosberg Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of “Mau Mau”: Nationalism in Kenya (London, 1966), pp. 191–199, 209.

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EA ST A F R IC A  6  TNA, CO537/1890, D. of P.’s minute of 25th April, 1946, M. 01172/46.  7  Ibid.  8  First coined by D.A. Low and J. Lonsdale, ‘Introduction’, in Low and Alison Smith (eds.), The Oxford History of East Africa (Oxford, 1976), pp. 1–64.  9  TNA, CO537/1890, ‘Conference of East African Governors: Future Status of East African Royal Naval Volunteers Reserve’, 3 May 1946. 10  TNA, ADM116/5599, Director of Plans to Head of M.II, 13 July 1946. 11  Ibid. 12  Ibid. 13  TNA, CO537/1890, D. of P.’s minute of 25th April, 1946, M. 01172/46. 14  TNA, CO537/1890, ‘Future of The Naval Volunteer Reserve in East Africa’ (Enclosure to Captain-in-Charge, Kilindini’s letter), 13 November 1945. 15  TNA, CO537/1890, P.R. Smith, Captain-in-Charge, Kilindini, to Commander-inChief, East Indies, 7 January 1946. 16  TNA, CO537/4166, Secretary of State for Colonies, to EAHC, 23 December 1948. 17  Michael D. Callahan, ‘The Failure of “Closer Union” in British East Africa, 1929–31’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1997), pp. 267–293. 18  N.J. Westcott, ‘Closer Union and the future of East Africa, 1939–1948: A case study of the “official mind of imperialism”’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1981), pp. 68–69. 19  Ibid., pp. 71–72. 20  John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979), p. 475. 21  Collins, ‘Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment”’, p. 24. 22 Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, p. 475. 23  TNA, CO537/5088, C.B.A. Darling, ‘East African Naval Force’, 13 May 1949. 24  TNA, CO537/1890, ‘Future of The Naval Volunteer Reserve in East Africa’ (Enclosure to Captain-in-Charge, Kilindini’s letter), 13 November 1945. 25  TNA, ADM1/21872, Commander-in-Chief East Indies to Admiralty, 9 May 1949. 26  KNA, AH/17/2, REAN Establishment, 1950–57. 27  TNA, CO537/6437, ‘East African Naval Force’, 27 July 1950. 28  TNA, CO537/4166, Office of Administrator to EAHC, 14 August 1948. 29  TNA, CO537/5088, Office of EAHC to J.H. Wallace, Colonial Office, 3 November 1949. 30  ZNA, BF15/5, Report: REAN, 1958. 31  KNA, AH/17/2, Commander J. Milner, RNO, to Chief Secretary, 3 May 1950. 32  KNA, AH/17/2, Acting Administrator to Chief Secretaries, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, Entebbe, Zanzibar, 15 April 1950. 33  KNA, AH/17/2, Chief Secretary to Government, to Administrator, EAHC, 6 June 1950. 34  KNA, ABK/11/65, C.J. Child, Asst.Superintendent-in-Charge, Port Police, to Asst. Superintendent, Police, Railway and Harbour Police, 15 June 1948. 35  KNA, ABK/11/65, Labour Commissioner to Deputy Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 8 February 1949. 36  TNA, CO537/6437, Commanding Officer H.M.S. MAURITIUS, 4 September 1950. 37  Ibid. 38  Ibid. 39  Ibid. 40  Ibid. 41  ZNA, AB49/127, T. Leahy, Private Secretary, to Administrator, EAHC, 1 January 1955. 42  ZNA, AB49/127, Russell, Administrator EAHC, to Private Secretaries to Governors, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and British Resident, Zanzibar, 30 November 1954. 43  KNA, AH/17/2, Commander J. Milner, RNO, to Chief Secretary, 3 May 1950. 44  KNA, DC/KMG/2/24/10, John Batten, Information Officer, EAHC, 5 June 1959, p. 2. 45  Timothy Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa (Westport, 2003), p. 37.

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46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53 

Parsons, ‘“Wakamba Warriors Are Soldiers of the Queen”’, pp. 671, 685. Ibid., p. 680. KNA, AHC/9/62, Akamba Magazine, 1956. KNA, AHC/9/137, Joluo Magazine, 1956–57. Smyth, ‘Britain’s African Colonies and British Propaganda’, pp. 75–76. ZNA, BF14/1, Report: EAHC, 1953, p. 90. ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. ZNA, AB49/128, Ag.Chief Secretary to Government, to Commander E.A. Nicolson, RNO, 10 June 1953. 54  Jonathon Glassman, War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar (Bloomington, 2011), p. 52. 55  ZNA, BF15/7, Report: REAN, 1960. 56  TNA, CO822/1884, ‘Programme for the Accession Ceremony of H.H. Seyyid Abdullah’. 57  KNA, AH/17/2, Ag.Chief Secretary to Administrator, EAHC, 11 May 1950. 58  KNA, AH/17/2, ‘Tribal Composition of REAN’, E. Ross Magenty for Permanent Secretary for Defence, to PC, Coast Province, 2 August 1957. 59  KNA, AH/17/2, ‘Composition of the REAN’, Commander E.A.W. Gibbs, RNO, East Africa, to Ministry of Defence, Nairobi, 9 August 1957. 60  KNA, AH/17/2, Chief Secretary to Government, to the Administrator, EAHC, 6 June 1950. 61  KNA, DC/KSM/1/22/34, RNO to DC, Kisumu, Re: George Eliakim Odhiambo s/o M. Ondeh & Matthew Oremo s/o N. Ongere, 2 April 1954. 62  Ibid. 63  Ibid. 64  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1952. 65  KNA, DC/KSM/1/22/34, RNO to DC, Kisumu, Re: George Eliakim Odhiambo s/o M. Ondeh & Matthew Oremo s/o N. Ongere, 2 April 1954. 66  Original underlining. KNA, DC/KSM/1/22/34, Ag.Registrar, REF.No. 629/F/B(1)/54, 2 April 1954. 67  KNA, DC/KSM/1/22/34, T.A. Watts, DC, Central Nyanza to RNO, 17 April 1954. 68  KNA, DC/KSM/1/22/34, D.W. Shaw, DC, Central Nyanza, to Officer Commanding, Royal Navy Armament Depot, Mombasa, 6 April 1954. 69  Thomas Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’, The Journal of African History, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2003), pp. 3, 9. 70  KNA, AH/5/33, Manpower Committee: Asian Manpower (Prepared by Asian Elected Members), 20 January 1955. 71  Ibid. 72  KNA, AH/17/4, Bruce Hutt, Ag.Chief Secretary to Government, to Administrator, EAHC, 5 December 1951. 73  KNA, AH/18/2, ‘Regulations for Royal East African Naval Volunteer Reserve’, 25 August 1953. 74 KNA, AH/17/4, Bruce Hutt, Ag.Chief Secretary to the Government, to Administrator, EAHC, 5 December 1951. 75  KNA, AH/18/2, ‘Regulations for Royal East African Naval Volunteer Reserve’, 25 August 1953. 76 KNA, AH/17/4, Bruce Hutt, Ag.Chief Secretary to the Government, to Administrator, EAHC, 5 December 1951. 77  KNA, AH/18/2, ‘REAN – Volunteer Reserve’, Russell for Administrator to Chief Secretaries, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, 11 November 1952. 78  KNA, AH/5/33, Manpower Committee: Asian Manpower (Prepared by Asian Elected Members), 20 January 1955. 79  KNA, AH/5/33, East African Standard, 17 July 1954. 80  Ibid. 81  KNA, AH/18/3, ‘HMS Kenya’ circulated to all members of standing Finance Committee, 9 November 1949. 82  Ibid.

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EA ST A F R IC A  83  KNA, AH/18/3, Ag.Game Warden to Private Secretary to Governor, 30 December 1949.  84  KNA, AH/18/3, ‘Presentation to HMS Kenya’, 4 February 1952.  85  KNA, AH/18/3, East African Office to J.R. Irving Bell, Private Secretary to Governor of Kenya, 13 October 1949.  86  KNA, AS/3/15, Chairman to Commodore N.S. Henderson, HMS Kenya, 28 July 1956.  87  KNA, AS/3/15, Commodore, HMS Kenya to PC, Coast.  88 KNA, AH/18/4, Roger Bulteel, Secretary/Treasurer, Naval Entertainment Committee to Editor, East African Standard, 7 July 1952.  89  KNA, AH/18/4, H.W. Newell, Chairman, Naval Entertainments Committee to Provincial Governor, Mombasa, 6 February 1953.  90  KNA, DC/KSM/1/22/34, Welfare Officer, REAN, to DC, Kisumu, 10 February 1956.  91  KNA, DC/KSM/1/22/34, T.A. Watts, DC, Central Nyanza, to RNO, 17 April 1954.  92  KNA, OP/1/797, H.D. Dent, Ministry of Defence to H.C.F. Wilks, Ministry of African Affairs, 14 September 1955.  93  KNA, OP/1/797, H.C.F. Wilks to H.D. Dent, 16 June 1955.  94  KNA, OP/1/797, H.D. Dent, Ministry of Defence to H.C.F. Wilks, Ministry of African Affairs, 14 September 1955.  95  KNA, OP/1/797, Commissioner, Southern Province, to Secretary for African Affairs, 20 September 1955.  96  KNA, OP/1/797, Ag.PC, Northern Province, to Secretary for African Affairs, 28 September 1955.  97  KNA, OP/1/797, PC, Rift Valley Province, to Secretary for African Affairs, 27 September 1955.  98  KNA, OP/1/797, Secretary for African Affairs to Secretary for Defence, 5 October 1955.  99  KNA, OP/1/797, Ag.Officer-in-Charge, Nairobi Extra-Provincial District to Secretary for African Affairs, 26 September 1955. 100  ZNA, BF14/1, Report: EAHC, 1954, pp. 81–82. 101  ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 102  ZNA, BF15/6, Report: REAN, 1959. 103  ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 104  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1952. 105  ZNA, BF15/5, Report: REAN, 1958. 106  KNA, AH/18/1, M.D., Re(40/1), June 1957. 107  ZNA, BF15/6, Report: REAN, 1959. 108  KNA, DC/KMG/2/24/10, EAHC Press Release No. 82, 1961. 109  ZNA, BF15/7, Report: REAN, 1960. 110  KNA, DC/KMG/2/24/10, EAHC Press Release No. 82, 1961. 111  ZNA, BF15/6, Report: REAN, 1959. 112  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1953. 113  Ibid. 114  ZNA, BF14/1, Report: EAHC, 1955, pp. 70–72. 115  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1953. 116  ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 117  ZNA, BF15/6, Report: REAN, 1959. 118  ZNA, AB49/127, Captain J.C. Stopford, HMS Ceylon, Inspection of REAN, 10 September 1955. 119  ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 120  ZNA, BF15/5-6, Reports: REAN, 1958–59. 121  KNA, AH/5/33, East African Standard, 17 July 1954. 122  Ibid. 123  KNA, DC/KSM/1/22/34, Information Officer, Nyanza, to D.C.s North, Central, South Nyanza, and Kricho, 19 March 1955. 124  ZNA, BF15/6, Report: REAN, 1959.

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PO ST- WA R EA ST A F R IC A 125  Peter J. Cain, ‘Empire and the Languages of Character and Virtue in Later Victorian and Edwardian Britain’, Modern Intellectual History, Vol. 4, No. 2 (August, 2007), p. 252. 126 Ibid. 127  Lord Curzon, 1908, quoted in ibid., p. 269. 128  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1952. 129  ZNA, AB49/130, Commander E.A. Nicholson, RNO, to British Resident, Zanzibar, 14 January 1955. 130  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1952. 131  ZNA, BF15/5, Report: REAN, 1958. 132 Ibid. 133  ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 134  ZNA, BF15/4, Report: REAN, 1957. 135  ZNA, BF15/8, Report: REAN, 1961. 136  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1952. 137  ZNA, BF15/6, Report: REAN, 1959. 138  ZNA, AB49/130, Commander E.A. Nicholson, RNO, to British Resident, Zanzibar, 14 January 1955. 139  ZNA, BF14/1, Report on the EAHC, 1954, pp. 81–82. 140  ZNA, BF15/4, Report: REAN, 1957. 141  ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 142  ZNA, BF15/7, Report: REAN, 1960. 143  ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 144  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1953. 145  ZNA, BF15/8, Report: REAN, 1961. 146  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1953. 147  ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 148  ZNA, AB49/130, Commander E.A. Nicholson, RNO, to British Resident, Zanzibar, 14 January 1955. 149  KNA, DC/KSM/1/22/34, Information Officer, Nyanza, to D.C.s North, Central, South Nyanza, and Kricho, 19 March 1955. 150  ZNA, AB49/130, Commander E.A. Nicholson, RNO, to British Resident, Zanzibar, 14 January 1955. 151  ZNA, AB49/130, P. Pulling for Ag.Chief Secretary, Uganda, to RNO, Mombasa, 17 February 1955. 152  KNA, CA/12/12, Desmond O’Hagan, PC, Coast, to Secretary for African Affairs, 1 April 1955. 153  ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 154  ZNA, BF15/4, Report: REAN, 1957. 155  ZNA, BF14/1, Report: EAHC, 1954, pp. 81–82. 156  ZNA, AB49/130, Ag.Financial Secretary to C.D., 17 February 1955. 157  ZNA, AB49/130, T.S. Madden for Chief Secretary, to RNO, Mombasa, 28 June 1955. 158  ZNA, AB49/130, Item 2, 15 February 1955. 159  KNA, AH/18/2, ‘Press Office Handout No. 16’, Secretariat, Nairobi, 5 February 1953. 160  KNA, AH/18/2, 7th meeting of East African Defence Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, 2 September 1953. 161  ZNA, AB49/127, REAN Report, 1952. 162  KNA, AE/15/2, EAHC, Administrator’s Report, H.C.(54)12, p. 10. 163  ZNA, BF14/1, Report: EAHC, 1954, pp. 81–82. 164  ZNA, BF14/1, Report: EAHC, 1952, pp. 76–77. 165  ZNA, BF15/8, Report: REAN, 1961. 166  ZNA, BF14/1, Report: EAHC, 1955, pp. 70–72. 167  Makarios would become Cyprus’ first president in 1960. ZNA, BF15/3, Report: REAN, 1955–56. 168  ZNA, BF15/4, Report: REAN, 1957.

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169  170  171  172  173  174  175  176 

ZNA, BF15/5, Report: REAN, 1958. ZNA, BF15/4, Report: REAN, 1957. ZNA, BF15/6, Report: REAN, 1959. ZNA, BF15/8, Report: REAN, 1961. ZNA, BF15/4, Report: REAN, 1957. TNA, CO822/562, J.D. Rankine to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 15 April 1952. Ibid. Katherine Elaine Bliss and Ann S. Blum, ‘Dangerous Driving: Adolescence, Sex, and the Gendered Experience of Public Space in Early-Twentieth-Century Mexico City’, in William E. French and Katherine Elaine Bliss (eds.), Gender, Sexuality, and Power in Latin America Since Independence (Plymouth, 2007), pp. 183, 164. 177  David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire (London, 2001). 178  P.J. Cain, ‘Character and Imperialism: the British Financial Administration of Egypt, 1878–1914’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2006), p. 177. 179  TNA, CO822/562, J.D. Rankine to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 15 April 1952. 180  Ibid. 181  Ibid. 182  Ibid. 183  Ibid., 20 June 1952. 184  Ibid., 15 April 1952. 185  TNA, CO822/562, Lloyd to Rankine, 26 June 1952. 186  TNA, CO822/562, Rankine to Lloyd, 15 April 1952. 187  Ibid., 25 July 1952. 188  Ibid., 18 August 1952. 189  Jonathon Glassman, ‘Sorting out the Tribes: The Creation of Racial Identities in Colonial Zanzibar’s Newspaper Wars’, Journal of African History, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2000), pp. 405–406. 190  Quoted in Brennan, ‘Lowering the Sultan’s Flag’, p. 847. 191  Jane Campbell, ‘Multiracialism and Politics in Zanzibar’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 1 (March, 1962), p. 77. 192  TNA, CO822/562, Rankine to Lloyd, 25 July 1952. 193  Ibid., 18 August 1952. 194  TNA, CO822/562, P. Rogers to B.C. Sendall, Admiralty, 10 July 1952. 195  TNA, CO822/562, Lloyd to Rankine, 8 August 1952. 196  Ibid. 197  TNA, CO822/562, Rankine to Lloyd, 20 June 1952. 198  TNA, CO822/562, Rankine to P. Rogers, 9 March 1953. 199  Ibid. 200  Ibid. 201  TNA, CO822/562, E.N. Fitzgerald, Colonial Office, to S.T. Charles, Treasury, 11 May 1953. 202  TNA, CO822/562, Rankine to P. Rogers, 13 March 1953. 203  Ibid. 204  TNA, CO822/562, P. Rogers to B.C. Sendall, 24 April 1953. 205  TNA, CO822/562, P. Rogers to Rankine, 8 May 1953. 206  TNA, CO822/562, E.N. Fitzgerald, Colonial Office, to S.T. Charles, Treasury, 11 May 1953. 207  TNA, CO822/562, S.T. Charles to E.N. Fitzgerald, 10 June 1953. 208  TNA, CO822/562, B.C. Sendall to P. Rogers, 22 August 1952. 209  Ibid. 210  TNA, CO822/562, E.N. Fitzgerald, Colonial Office, to S.T. Charles, Treasury, 11 May 1953. 211  TNA, CO822/562, Rankine, to E.B. David, 8 July 1953. 212  TNA, CO822/759, Captain Michael Goodenough, to Rankine, 16 December 1953. 213  Ibid.

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PO ST- WA R EA ST A F R IC A 214  TNA, CO822/759, Rankine, to E.B. David, 9 January 1954. 215 Ibid. 216  TNA, CO822/759, W.N. Hillier-Fry, Foreign Office, to Major F.C.L. Chauncy, Muscat, 19 May 1954. 217  TNA, CO822/759, Goodenough, to Rankine, 7 April 1954. 218  Ibid. 219  Ibid. 220  TNA, CO822/759, Rankine, to E.B. David, Colonial Office, 29 September 1954. 221  TNA, CO822/759, Resident, to W.A.C. Mathieson, Colonial Office, 11 June 1955. 222  TNA, CO822/759, E.B. David, to W.N. Hillier-Fry, 10 May 1954. 223  TNA, CO822/759, Resident, to W.A.C. Mathieson, Colonial Office, 11 June 1955. 224  TNA, CO822/1884, Resident, to W.B.L. Monson, Colonial Office, 14 December 1960. 225  TNA, CO822/1884, News Chronicle, 10 October 1960. 226  TNA, CO822/3014, Sir G.Mooring, Zanzibar, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 July 1963. 227  TNA, CO822/1884, Sir John Martin, Secretary of State, 5 January 1961. 228  TNA, CO822/3014, Sir G. Mooring, Zanzibar, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 July 1963. 229  Ibid. 230  Ian Speller, ‘An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2007), pp. 283–302. 231  East African Standard, 14 January 1964, p. 1. 232  KNA, AH/17/2, The Daily Nation, 26 April 1961, p. 7. 233  ZNA, BF15/8, Report: REAN, 1961. 234  East African Standard, 4 January 1962, p. 4. 235  Joseph S. Nye, ‘East African Economic Integration’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December, 1963), pp. 475–502. 236  Ali A. Mazrui, ‘Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September, 1968), p. 272. 237  Ibid. 238  East African Standard, 4 January 1962, p. 1. 239  Ibid., p. 4. 240  Ibid. 241  Ibid. 242  East African Standard, 8 January 1962, p. 4. 243  Ibid. 244  East African Standard, 6 January 1962, p. 3. 245  Ibid. 246  East African Standard, 8 January 1962, p. 4. 247  East African Standard, 6 January 1962, p. 3. 248  East African Standard, 9 January 1962, p. 1. 249  East African Standard, 8 January 1962, p. 4. 250  S.W. Sparkhall, Nairobi, quoted in East African Standard, 11 January 1962, p. 5. 251  Ibid. 252  Ibid. 253  East African Standard, 8 January 1962, p. 4. 254  Ibid. 255  Ibid. 256  Ibid. 257  Ali A. Mazrui, ‘Tanzania versus East Africa’, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1965), p. 271. 258  Ibid., p. 273. 259  Mazrui, ‘Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania’, p. 271. 260  East African Standard, 2 July 1962, p. 5. 261  TNA, CAB148/4, Policy Implications of Developments in East Africa, 31 January 1964, p. 1.

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269  270  271  272  273  274  275  276  277 

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Christopher MacRae and Tony Laurence, ‘The 1964 Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny and the British Armed Intervention that Ended it’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 152, No. 2 (2007), p. 99. TNA, CAB148/4, Policy Implications of Developments in East Africa, 31 January 1964, p. 2. Ibid. Frederick Cooper, ‘Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 99, No. 5 (December, 1994), p. 1529. TNA, CAB148/4, Policy Implications of Developments in East Africa, 31 January 1964, p. 2. Ibid. TNA, CAB148/4, Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee Meeting, 29 January 1964. Ibid. TNA, CAB148/4, Kenya: Defence and Financial Discussions, 12 March 1964. MacRae and Laurence, ‘The 1964 Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny’, p. 98. Martin Bailey, ‘Tanzania and China’, African Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 294 (January, 1975), pp. 39–50, 41, 44.

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PA RT III

Southeast Asia

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PERLIS

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0

SIAM

200

km

State boundary K ED A H

District boundary

K ELA N TAN

PENANG

TERENGGANU

DINDING

South FEDERATED MALAY STATES

China Sea

S t r ait of M alac c a

Kuala Lumpur

Tanjung Tuan (Malacca) MALACCA

JOHOR

Unfederated Malay states Federated Malay States (FMS) British Straits Settlements

Map 4  Malaya and the Straits Settlements, c.1939

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CHA P T E R SIX

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The Straits Settlements and Malaya

Origins As early as 1902, the same year as the Anglo-Japanese naval treaty, military authorities in Malaya pressed for the creation of locallyrecruited volunteer units. Ian Hamilton, Inspector-General of overseas forces, argued in 1913 that ‘a loyal and patriotic Malay nation, trained to arms might well prove in future a fitting guardian for the western portal to the Pacific, a doughty defender of one of the richest and fairest portions of the British Empire’.1 Malays were not considered a martial race, however, and were seen to be ‘soft’, ‘indolent’,2 and too ‘easy going’ having not fiercely challenged colonialism as Indians had.3 Governor Arthur Young argued that Malays would ‘resist routine and also prolonged barrack life with continual discipline’, but suggested alternatively that ‘a naval unit would appeal to the Malay, he would feel perfectly at home on the water. His objection to discipline and hard work on land would not be the same when on water’.4 This seafaring identity was rooted in the fundamental role played by Malay merchants and pirate mercenaries in shaping the fortunes of the Malacca Straits and the region’s sultanates; amongst the most noted were the Orang Laut, or People of the Sea,5 boat dwellers who lived a rootless and nomadic existence from coast to coast, being hired to serve as the sultan’s personal navies, fishermen, traders, and tax collectors.6 Young’s proposal was considered unfeasible, however, due to the expense of providing ships and the disruption it would cause during ‘padi planting and harvest’.7 Records show that in 1917 a locally-led unit, named the Coast Defence Volunteers, was briefly raised in Singapore and Penang and conducted A/S patrols. Its nine officers and 200 other ranks were drawn entirely from European manpower and the force was disbanded at the end of the First World War.8 [ 151 ]

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SO U TH EAS T A S IA

As in East Africa, a collaborative relationship was forged between the Royal Navy and the local sultans. Being ‘deeply sensible of the benefits of British protection’ and desiring to ‘express their loyalty in some tangible form with a view to the strengthening of the British Empire and maintaining her naval supremacy’, the Malay Sultans in 1913 paid for the construction of the Queen Elizabeth-class battle9 ship, HMS Malaya, which fought in the Battle of Jutland bearing a Malayan tiger as its crest. Critics in Britain at the time ‘denounced the acceptance of assistance from native potentates’ as demeaning to the country’s imperial status.10 Yet interwar pressures forced a change in attitudes, and it became ‘not only fair but essential’ that the SSS visit Malaya during its cruise, as the Federated States ‘for their size did more than any Dominion for the Empire during the war. They are intensely loyal and patriotic’.11 This had already been encouraged by HMS Malaya’s ‘homecoming’ in January 1921, when its officers served as imperial sporting missionaries by donating two cups for ‘the furtherance of football of both codes in Malaya’.12 When Vice-Admiral Field arrived with the SSS in February 1924, in view of Malaya’s already ‘magnificent contributions’, in which 20% of its revenue was allocated to naval and military defence, he ‘felt it invidious to urge them to do more’ and ‘refrained from making any public reference to the question of local contributions to naval defence’.13 It was left to the local press to argue that colonial naval forces were necessary to ‘place our defences on sound foundations’, and ‘draw into active sympathy with them the very considerable number of our citizens who have inherited the ardent sea-love of our native country’.14 The concern in Singapore came from Japan’s emergence as a naval superpower with imperial ambitions of its own and a deteriorating relationship with Britain: If the hopes of a long peace are disappointed we who live on the border of the Pacific will be nearer to the war than we were to the last … If we have to face danger it will come to us over the blue waters, and when our big ships go forth to fight, we shall need watchful eyes to guard our commerce, and to keep our waters free from hidden dangers.15

This local view aptly understood the Admiralty’s envisaged colonial naval strategy, whereby the Royal Navy would engage the enemy fleet on the high seas, leaving harbour defence, local convoy escort, minesweeping, and A/S patrols to colonial naval reserves. Apart from its strategic location, Singapore was seen as an ideal recruiting ground for such a unit as it possessed ‘ardent yachtsmen’ and ‘fine waters in which naval training may be given’.16 In common with [ 152 ]

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the Caribbean and East Africa, this instruction would produce social and health benefits as well as defensive ones, serving as a moral force which fortified character otherwise sapped by the tropical climate:

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A few hours on the water acts as a tonic, and weekends may be made wholesome on a Naval Volunteer cruise … the Yacht Club which started bound almost at once into popularity, and it has become a source of delight. We believe that the proposed naval unit will be equally popular, once our tropical inertia has been overcome.17

Colonial naval reserves were thus viewed in a similar way to hill stations, providing physically separate sanctuaries in cooler conditions that offered Europeans ‘relief not merely from the physical toll of a harsh climate but from the social and psychological toll of an alien culture’.18 By going out to sea, like visiting a hill station, ‘the British could restore the physical and psychic energies they needed for their imperial tasks, replicate the social and cultural environments that embodied the values they sought to project, and regulate and reproduce the individual agents who were vital to the continuance of their rule’.19 It would take nine years for the unit to be established as, like Trinidad and Kenya, the scheme became bogged down in legislative and financial wrangling. In September 1932, the Honourable Mr J. Bagnall asked the assembly whether the force was being created to protect the Singapore naval base, which represented an imperial rather than local interest, and should therefore be funded by Britain and not the Straits Settlements. It was argued in response that a naval reserve had been suggested before the base in 1923, and that if the latter was ‘not big enough to look after itself and at the same time provide protection of our food supplies, it is hardly likely that the task could be performed satisfactorily by an $84,301 RNVR’.20 The final decision rested with the Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi, who refuted any connection between the two and stated that a local naval unit would be charged ‘simply and solely’ with ‘the maintaining in times of emergency, of free passage to the Singapore harbour … a vital interest to this Colony and we all 21 ought to be anxious to safeguard it’. He added: It is a very lamentable fact not greatly to our credit that we did not pay any contribution whatever to our defence by sea or air. We are content to allow the whole of the burden to fall upon the British taxpayer although every one of you knows that he is more heavily burdened than we are. This service is intended for our use entirely … all steps that are in my opinion, necessary, and which are within my power, and can be afforded by the Colony, should be taken to safeguard our vital interests.22

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Race and recruitment The Straits Settlements Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (SSRNVR) was finally established in Singapore on 20 April 1934. Initially administered by the Army but trained by the Navy, the force quickly recruited 50 officers and 200 ratings, leaving a large waiting list. Initial instruction was conducted aboard the Governor’s yacht, Sea Belle II, until 18 January 1935, when the Admiralty provided the Acaciaclass sloop HMS Laburnum on free loan to serve as the SSRNVR’s headquarters and drill ship. The officer-in-charge, LieutenantCommander L.A.W. Johnson, was previously chief of the Fishery Protection Gunboat, Liffey, and was publicly lauded for his ‘keenness and energy’.23 Within Admiralty and Colonial Office circles, however, it was considered that the appointment ‘has not been altogether as successful as had been hoped’, with Johnson described as ‘tired’,24 perhaps inevitable given colonial reliance on retired naval officers. He was assisted by Chief Petty Officer E.W. Hull, a former instructor at the torpedo school HMS Vernon. The Army loaned Sergeant Major Adnan Raji from the Straits Settlements Volunteer Corps to act as drill instructor,25 and he became the first Malay chief petty officer.26 The other officers were Europeans, some with ‘experience of nautical matters’,27 though many were ‘merchants, brokers, planters and miners’.28 The ratings were all Malay, some possessing seagoing experience as fishermen or merchant seamen, although others were clerks, tambies29 and motor engineers. Officers and ratings undertook four-year courses in minesweeping, mining and depth charges, gunnery, field training and seamanship, with pilotage for officers and signalling for the signals section only.30 They also embarked upon cruises aboard visiting warships and HMS Terror, the Royal Navy monitor stationed at the naval base. This was not purely to gain practical experience, but also to ‘promote social contacts, and generally to make this unit feel like the navy has taken the RNVR under its wing’, with a view to encouraging its ‘esprit de corps and keenness’.31 Despite a Chinese majority in Singapore and significant Chinese communities across Malaya, they were excluded from the SSRNVR. The British justified this discriminatory policy by identifying Malays as a ‘seafaring people and along the coasts of the Peninsula there are hundreds of sturdy fishermen suitable for training’.32 That Malays were recruited from inland and non-maritime backgrounds too indicates that a latent naval aptitude was considered more racially innate to them than the result of environmental factors.

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Earlier aspirations for using the SSRNVR as a force for social and moral change re-emerged when it was suggested that it could provide an outlet for the colony’s unemployed Malays:

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The pay is enough to satisfy the easy-going Malay (a dollar a day), the work suits him, the discipline also apparently suits him – very much better than anyone expected it would – and he likes the sea and boats and everything associated with them.33

Besides an innate love of the sea, the colonial discourse of the ‘lazy Malay’ emerges in the lower salary scale34 and their easy-going nature which meant they would less likely antagonise the chain-of-command. The Chinese by contrast were seen as ‘superstitious and stubborn’ by the Royal Navy, who associated them with labour unrest following the Hong Kong seamen’s strike of 1922.35 A report on the Fighting Value of the Races of Malaya, published in 1930 by the General Officer Commanding Singapore, Major-General Harry Pritchard, contributed to the colonial view that the Chinese only displayed ‘fighting value’ when it was for personal gain, such as when ‘Chinese burglars stood up well in their brushes with the police’.36 Whereas Malays ‘could be relied on to be loyal to their Sultans’,37 the British had concerns about Chinese social and political affiliations, which were more ambiguous and might run counter to colonial interests, particularly with the Kuomintang, Malayan Communist Party, and secret societies. Of the local Indian groups, it was thought ‘one cannot make soldiers out of Tamils’.38 Though Sikhs were proven fighters, they were considered ‘well-known intriguers’, while Sikh policemen had been ‘passively disloyal’ when the Punjabi Muslim battalion mutinied in Singapore in 1915.39 The SSRNVR’s discriminatory recruitment policy was criticised by the Eurasian community, who highlighted the issue in its campaign for political and social rights: The Eurasian position is tragic, due to the fact that we are brought up in European environment, with European traditions and living standards. As a rule we are not an agricultural race, so we cannot go back to the land, as some suggest. Neither do we get a dole … The pro-Malay policy in Malaya as a whole has crushed our hopes, and we are being entirely ‘cabined’. Our Malacca lads would jump at the chance, if given the opportunity to enrol in the navy or the RNVR, as they are on par with the Malays, where the sea is concerned, having come from a long line of seafaring forebears.40

The General Officer Commanding suggested that Eurasian martial ability varied greatly; the ‘cross with Chinese’ was considered better [ 155 ]

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than with Malay, and while the best type of Eurasian could ‘almost’ be on a par with pure British, the worst were ‘quite useless for any 41 purpose’. Maritime heritage here was not enough to qualify Eurasians as a seafaring race. Whereas Caymanians were similar to Eurasians in possessing an ancestral link to European sailors, their relative isolation and lack of development for centuries reinforced a distinctive sense of cultural inferiority, which legitimised British colonial leadership. Eurasians on the other hand were more closely connected to their European relatives and retained similar customs, though they were perceived as racially other. In a more ethnically heterogeneous and strategically significant society they represented an unsettling manifestation of colonial fears about the dangers of ‘going native’, and the threat posed to British character and racial purity upon which their imperial hegemony rested. Within the hierarchy of the Navy, Eurasians would distort the relationship between class and race that demarcated the chain-of-command and underpinned the authority of its European officers. From March 1937, several Singapore-trained officers were stationed in Penang.42 These formed the nucleus of a second SSRNVR unit based there from October 1938, and renamed the Malayan Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (MRNVR). It grew from 20 officers and 100 ratings, to 158 British officers and 650 ratings on the eve of the Second World.43 On 4 September 1939, the officers and ratings of both RNVR forces were released from civilian employment and mobilised for wartime service.44 On the same date, the Admiralty and Ministry of War Transport began requisitioning and modifying large numbers of merchant vessels from Singaporean, Malayan and Hong Kong shipping companies, notably the Straits Steamship Company. By 1941, 51 of these had been commissioned into the MRNVR as His Majesty’s Ships, armed with cannons, Lewis guns, depth charges, and minesweepers.45 Their captains were given temporary naval commissions and retained their original crews, this way allowing Chinese into the force.46 In addition to the RNVR units, in 1939 a full-time Royal Navy (Malay Section) was formed to relieve European Royal Navy personnel on-station for service elsewhere, it was known colloquially as the ‘Malay Navy’ and was based in HMS Pelandok at Singapore.47 The section was again exclusively open to Malays, aged between 15 and 20 years old. As professionals serving aboard Royal Navy vessels, higher educational standards were expected, with Cambridge certificate or English school Standard Seven required for the telegraphy branch.48 Like the ZNVF, their uniform incorporated a local motif, ‘a blue and gold sarong … a never-ending source of pride’ which fostered the unit’s esprit de corps, but additionally marked them out as culturally [ 156 ]

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other and meant they could never fully assimilate into the Royal 49 Navy crews they served with. Recruitment posters and notices were published in the local press and issued at district offices throughout the country.50 By the end of 1939, around 400 Malays, from Singapore, Sarawak and the Peninsula, were serving in the Malay Navy, growing to 1,430 by the end of 1941,51 with thousands more on the waiting list.52 The force’s popularity was again attributed to the Malay’s seagoing nature: The sea attracts the Malay like water does a duck. He joined the SSRNVR when the call for volunteers came – and he and his friends are still joining. Last September, there were whispers in the Bazaars and the Kampongs that Malays would be wanted in a unit of their own in the RN. Before the naval authorities in Singapore could fully appreciate the work of the whispers, they were inundated with applications. 53

Like Caymanians, the fact that Malays embraced this identity as a seafaring race could be linked to Gurkha syndrome, being economically disadvantaged compared to Malaya’s Chinese and Indians.54 Racialised images like the kampong, or traditional village, reinforced the Navy’s ‘civilising mission’ to elevate Malays from ‘Oriental’ stagnancy to become conscientious and ‘productive’ members of society: It is another step towards employing the ‘sons of the soil’ in the defence of their own country. First … came the SSRNVR which confirmed the belief that coffee-shop loungers and office peons could be turned into good sailors, and that in the country there was plenty of material that could be absorbed into the RN.55

Wartime propaganda aimed at the metropole also emphasised the ‘progress’ made by ‘fishing and peasant folk’ who ‘were famed once as pirates. Today, they make fine seamen … under supervision of British officers’.56 Ultra-imperialists had believed that Britain would ‘“irresistibly fall into national sluggishness of thought, were it not for the world-wide interests given us by the necessity of governing and educating the inhabitants of so vast an empire” … its civilisation might decline and that a kind of Oriental torpor might descend upon 57 the nation’. As evinced in the Caribbean and East Africa, their notion of character continued to resonate for the Navy, and it was hoped this ‘civilising duty’ would reinvigorate its European officers suffering ‘tropical inertia’,58 and strengthen the moral fortitude of the British Empire. Under Britain’s naval paternalism, the traditional ‘lounger’, or ‘lazy Malay’, was thus transformed into an alert, dedicated professional sailor: [ 157 ]

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On a visit to HMS Pelandok yesterday, we saw the ratings at their training, noticed the concentrated looks on their faces as they listened to lectures on boxing, the compass, anchor and cable work, and the rule of the road at sea; watched their nimble fingers making bends and hitches and splicing wires; heard the dots and dashes of an electronic ‘buzzer’ as they were being taught signalling and telegraphy, and appreciated their quickness at the guns.59

By April 1940, five Malays had passed out as leading seamen to become instructors and were being trained as petty officers. Indigenisation illustrated the ‘progress’ made under British colonial leadership, justifying their imperial authority with the men’s endorsement; ‘Of course I’ll sign up for another year, and another, and another’, said Hashim bin Karim, while Acting Petty Officer Haroun, professed his loyalty to the Empire’s cause: ‘We in these ships are doing our best to help to win the war, and of course, we will win. We are all united, 60 aren’t we!’ Mohamed Haji bin Yunos, a Singapore municipality clerk, was mobilised by the SSNRVR and attached to a minesweeper. Though working ‘hard and long hours … I and my brother are proud to be of service to our king and country’.61 Like Haroun, this was reported as an expression of imperial patriotism but, as in Zanzibar, local sultans retained authority, particularly as Islamic leaders. With multiple Malay sovereigns and states, the notion of ‘king and country’ was much more nuanced for Malay ratings, as was their loyalty.

Wartime loyalty The most infamous naval action involving Singapore was the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse on 10 December 1941. Churchill’s decision to try and deter Japan with an untested battleship and an unmodernised, lightly armoured, First World War battlecruiser, without air cover, was itself influenced by racial theory and an arrogant belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority over an ‘Oriental’ foe. Force Z’s destruction led Churchill to proclaim ‘I never received a more direct shock … the full horror of the news sank in … Over all this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme, and we everywhere were weak 62 and naked’. With the Japanese able to operate with impunity in both sky and sea, Singapore surrendered on 15 February 1942, the so-called ‘worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history’.63 This is the popular Western memory of Singapore’s fall and, for postcolonial historiography, defeat by an Asian power supposedly shattered British prestige and its illusion of racial superiority, stimulating anti-colonial nationalism across the Empire. [ 158 ]

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Although Singapore is widely remembered as an embarrassment for Britain and the Royal Navy, it does hold interesting parallels with Dunkirk, another retreat but one conversely remembered as a moment of national heroism. Immediately after the war, The Straits Times published numerous articles celebrating the exploits of local volunteers, including the naval forces. Like Dunkirk, these men were praised for evacuating Penang and Singapore against the odds, paying a high price in the process; only nine of 61 MRNVR ships broke through the enemy cordon to reach Sumatra and Java, the rest were sunk by 64 Japanese forces. Approximately 30 MRNVR officers escaped, with 41 killed or missing in action and 49 taken prisoner. For their actions they were awarded ten Distinguished Service Crosses (DSC), one Distinguished Service Order (DSO), and eight mentions in dispatches. Amongst the ratings, 53 were killed in action, 120 were missing in action, and around 500 were recovered.65 Their remembrance as ‘acts of bravery and devotion which make us humble at the thought that we are beneficiaries of such sacrifice’,66 challenge traditional assumptions and mark the battle as one of local heroism rather than humiliation. Dahim Ahmad bin Noordin joined the Malay Navy as a signalman in October 1941. Upon hearing about Dunkirk, he thought it ‘terrible’, not the ‘disaster turned triumph’,67 or ‘miracle’ of Dunkirk68 that Churchill propagated in Britain. The collective anaesthesia that the Dunkirk spirit served for the British did not seemingly extend to Malays. They had no semantic illusion; it was plainly defeat. It did not deter Ahmad from joining the Malay Navy, and its pull lay in that it ‘stood for something’, though the push factor was ‘in war time civilians suffer’.69 He was less worried about the dangers, being a bachelor, a desirable trait for the Navy who wanted men who would ‘not pine, and whose total disappearance for months on end is no cause for distress’.70 His Cambridge English Certificate impressed his interviewer, who was less than stringent in encouraging Ahmad to pressure peers into joining: They didn’t ask much, only they look at the certificate, they say ‘you like to join the navy’, ‘yeah, I like to join the navy’, ‘oh that’s good’ … I accepted, and they said ‘why don’t you call your friends to join?’71

Two months later, war with Japan broke out, after which Ahmad received ‘training to kill, to shoot, to use the bayonet’.72 He considered British treatment ‘alright, so far, at that time … no discrimination … still discipline’.73 Ahmad expressed a genuine belief in British military power, confident they would defend Singapore with so many troops, [ 159 ]

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despite their being raw. This was shaken upon seeing the survivors from HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse:

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We were shocked, because, we read in the papers a few weeks before the outbreak of the war, according to Mr Churchill, British pride of the navy, the Prince of Wales and Repulse, unsinkable.74

HMS Prince of Wales had been nicknamed ‘HMS Unsinkable’, a hegemonic myth internalised by Ahmad and his fellow Malay ratings. For them, Prince of Wales was more than a ship; it was the technological manifestation of the British Empire’s professed superiority, and its destruction not only undermined Britain’s imperial self-assurance but also colonial belief in it. Ahmad did not go to sea but was engaged with filling defensive sandbags, placing granite rocks on the airfield to prevent enemy landings and guarding military installations. Despite the apparent threat, they were ‘not even given weapon[s] to defend ourselves because we were naval personnel not soldiers’.75 When the Malay Navy barracks were damaged by Japanese bombers, the full-time ratings slept alongside reservists in HMS Laburnum at Telok Ayer Basin. When evacuation was called on 10 February 1942, Lieutenant-Commander H. Vickers, the Malay Navy’s CO, gave his men the choice of staying in Singapore or following the British out. Ahmad decided to leave, more from fear than loyalty: I was really scared because if the Japanese capture us and find out we were former members of a naval unit, maybe they will take us as POWs [prisoners of war] or maybe kill us. You heard stories of Japanese brutality in China. So I left.76

As in East Africa, British imperialism in Southeast Asia relied on collaboration with the local sultans, to control the Malay population through adat – Malay custom – and Islam. Yet, some Malays renounced their adat and the social hierarchies it enforced, expressing anti-establishment sentiments towards the sultans and their colonial allies. Imperial and naval allegiance was not necessarily synonymous in such instances. Rahman Abdul bin Ya’acob served in the MRNVR after his Straits Company steamship was requisitioned, and so was not a volunteer in its truest sense. Educated in an English school, at around fourteen Abdul began to resent having ‘to raise two hands to pray to’ the sultans: I don’t like the way they treat Asians, see, whatever they did was right, and these Asians, we had to bow to them … People respect them because

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they think that the Sultans and the British people are divine, which I never think that. I think that only God is divine.77

He ran away to sea from fear of his father’s canings and did not mind naval discipline, considering it a ‘free life’ in comparison: an escape from repression ashore, his father’s brutality and the feudalism of the sultans. Most deckhands were Malay, with Chinese greasers (in the engine room), cooks and boys (stewards) who were ‘very co-operative’78 with one another, bound together by a seafaring identity that separated them from ‘shore people’, regardless of ethnicity and religion. The men ate mostly European food, and never questioned the meat: ‘we just say “as long as we don’t know” … sailors at that time we don’t care much about the food, whether halal or not, we just eat what is served’.79 Observation of other Islamic customs was similarly lax: I was brought up very strict so I never touched alcohol, although some sailors did drink when they go ashore [sic]. Sometimes when you have an opportunity you pray, if you don’t have, you don’t pray. No special time or places to pray.80

Having evacuated European civilians from Penang, Abdul was captured with shipmates by the Japanese in Singapore: I was arrested by the Japanese, and after being questioned, tortured for a while, taught how to respect the Japanese soldiers … after hammering, slapping, kicking, then told how to bow to the Japanese, and then we were released. We are helpless, and to me, torturing, all these things, I ever had getting from my father [sic].81

Some were subjected to water torture and were questioned in Japanese, except when chided as ‘Britisher, slave to the British’.82 Despite this, Abdul re-joined the RNVR after the war, not necessarily out of loyalty to the Sultan or Empire, but because of the camaraderie and escapism he felt through it.

Exile in Ceylon After the fall of Singapore, the local RNVRs were disbanded, with surviving officers transferred to the Imperial RNVR from 1 March 1942 to serve in the Eastern Fleet. The remaining Malay ratings, around 300, were engaged on non-continuous service in Ceylon, mainly performing port duties, although several served in East Africa, India, and Australia.83 Those who escaped Japanese occupation found themselves in exile, and the treatment they received mentally and physically only [ 161 ]

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served to heighten their alienation. In June 1943 rumours emerged of dissatisfaction amongst the Malay ratings in Ceylon. This was investigated by Mr C.D. Ahearne, Colonial Office Representative in India and Political Secretary to Commander-in-Chief E.A. Ross of the Malayan Civil Service: There was a spirit of discouragement and depression amongst them caused by a feeling that they were being unfairly treated and were friendless exiles in a foreign country. They mentioned that the promises made to them when they were recruited had not been kept and they compared their conditions with those of the CRNVR and the Dutch Malay ratings.84

Specifically, the men were aggrieved at receiving poorer overseas and kit allowances, and having to travel third class when Ceylon RNVR (CRNVR) ratings travelled second. The kit and travel complaints were resolved, and a small pay increase granted, but Lieutenant Ramsden, responsible for the Malay personnel between April 1942 and March 1943, claimed that the main problems were still internal: The men feel they have been abandoned and the position has been made worse by the arrival of four Malay RNVR men from Australia. The RNVR people who got to the country were all billeted in private houses. One married an Australian girl and deserted. Four came on to Colombo. They had lost all sense of naval discipline and had even abandoned their Malay adat.85

As with Rahman Abdul, religious custom gave way to operational pragmatism, eroding Malay identity. From March 1943, the men were moved into barracks under Warrant Officer Baigent, an instructor from HMS Laburnum who identified with the MRNVR ‘bad hats’.86 Despite common ethnicity, the Malays on Ceylon were not a homogenous group, and were divided by age and profession; a feud between the older part-time MRNVR and younger full-time Malay Navy had caused a stabbing in Singapore. Baigent was influenced by the English-speaking MRNVR rating Ismail who had arrived from Australia, undermining the authority of the Malay Navy petty officers. Consequently, younger Malay Navy ratings were ‘afraid to sleep in their beds and slipped outside to take their rest and thus avoid possibilities of being 87 victimised’. Ramsden suggested that the 52 Malay Navy seamen be sent to the American base, but this was dismissed by Ahearne and Ross as ‘politically dangerous’.88 Such an arrangement would risk further dissatisfaction as American and Dutch East Indies pay was four times that of the Malays. Also amongst the Americans was Lt. Meade, a [ 162 ]

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former Straits Settlements Police Inspector turned US citizen, who was suspected of trying ‘to create a nucleus of Malays who would form a spearhead of American influence on our return to Malaya’, and could 89 undermine British attempts at reasserting imperial control. Over a dozen Malays were questioned, and only one, Abu Othman, admitted that ‘relations between the two bodies outside the barracks were not cordial’.90 The common concern was insufficient wages and they wanted a family allowance to marry locally. One of the, so-called, bad hats, Karim, complained that meat was ‘not killed according to Mohamedan custom’, but Ross explained that ‘owing to rinderpest in India goat was not obtainable’.91 Seaman Ismail bin Haji, was a clerk in the Klang health office before being drafted as a telegraphist: He was fed up with the service. He had no hope if he remained on. He would like to get out and get another job of any kind whatever. He had no trouble with any other men, he was just sick of life. He was obviously in a miserable state of melancholia.92

The doctor claimed that there was ‘a bigger percentage of such cases amongst the Malays than amongst the Europeans as their mental background was not sufficient to enable them to stand up to the strains imposed on them’.93 Furthermore, ‘a case of attempted suicide recently was due to the development of religious mania’.94 These medical opinions were influenced by colonial scientific racism and the belief that Malays were ‘capable of developing a psycho-pathological disorder called latah … if … sufficiently persecuted, teased, and harassed’.95 Latah is a culture-bound syndrome peculiar to Southeast Asia, whereby some Malays will lose self-control, fall into a trance-like or hysteric state, shout obscenities, imitate words, gestures or actions, or be unable to recognise their own identity, if suddenly exposed to noise, shock or fright, all of which were likely in war. Naval medical reports thus also ‘created and perpetuated images of mental deficiency of the Malayan Other, which justified and encouraged European domi96 nation’, and reinforced Orientalist discourse. The Admiralty and Colonial Office both emphasised ‘the importance from the political point of view of ensuring that the men return to Malaya with good opinion of their treatment under British protection’.97 Ahearne recommended the secondment of ‘a good Malay speaking officer to act in the capacity of welfare officer’.98 Ismail was transferred to Delhi ‘where there is plenty of Malay company’ and he was re-employed as a clerk.99 Pay for Malay seaman was brought in-line with the CRNVR, promotion opportunities were improved by [ 163 ]

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the creation of an additional Malay chief petty officer post, a Marriage and Children’s Allowance Scheme was introduced, and a daily food allowance provided for the men to cook for themselves. It was reported afterwards that ‘the Malays are a happy contented and loyal body of men … all the Malays expressed their willingness to serve in the 100 Imperial Forces till the end of the war’.

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Return to Malaya As early as September 1943, the Admiralty discussed reconstituting the MRNVR with the Malay ratings in Ceylon for the re-occupation of Malaya. By April 1944 it was assumed ‘sooner or later the ports of British Malaya will be in our hands’, and as Malay was the ‘lingua franca’, men who spoke it were required for contact with ‘Asiatics’ ashore.101 Furthermore, ‘patriot forces’ like the MRNVR would provide ‘a particularly valuable contribution to associating the inhabitants of Malaya with the turn of the tide, and to easing our own position on re-occupation’.102 Thus, as in the Caribbean and East Africa, colonial naval forces were primarily seen as an ideological tool to extend Britain’s imperial influence. It was felt ‘the presence of other (Naval trained) Asiatics in a British party ought to be a great advantage’ in ‘dealings with the inhabitants’ and convincing them that the British came as liberators and not invaders.103 To reinforce this impression of ‘partnership’, MRNVR personnel were not to be employed as mere ‘hands’, but would be promoted to serve as ‘orderlies, tallymen, piermasters, interpreters with local labour, or even in offices’.104 The suggestion of recruiting Malays from amongst the Cape community was not pursued, as South Africa’s racial policies meant ‘the Union Government are not in favour of recruiting “natives” in the armed forces’105. Still, a marked shift from pre-war policy saw a reconstituted MRNVR open to all races of the peninsula, ‘without discrimination’: It would appeal as a patriotic rallying point to all in Malaya and not simply the British oriental subjects resident in the Straits Settlements. The active cooperation and goodwill of the coastal Malays and Chinese will we assume be important to attract.106

The Japanese surrendered before Operation Zipper, the British codename for Malaya’s ‘liberation, took place. Financial pressures saw the MRNVR disbanded again on 26 February 1946, followed by the Malay Navy on 11 March 1947.107

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‘Hearts and minds’ The situation would soon change again after a state of emergency was declared in Malaya on 16 June 1948. The newly-formed Federation of Malaya was concerned at the prospect of equipping large numbers of Singaporean ground forces, with the island being predominantly Chinese. It was therefore decided that the Federation would provide the army and Singapore the navy to combat the communist threat.108 A full-time Malayan Naval Force (MNF) was formed on 24 December 1948, under the command of the Penang-born Royal Navy officer, Captain H.E.H. Nicholls. It was based in Woodlands Barracks adjoining the Royal Navy base at Sembawang, and was supported by a reconstituted part-time MRNVR. They drew upon Malay servicemen from the war, but the ideological nature of the Emergency forced a permanent change in earlier ethnic restrictions, attempting to offset the communist insurgents by drawing the Malayan Chinese closer to the state and into the Navy.109 The Admiralty’s decision was criticised by the Malay language, nationalist newspaper Utusan Melayu,110 but by July 1953 the newly-christened Royal Malayan Navy (RMN) was comprised of approximately 80% Malays, 10% Chinese and 10% others, though it was hoped more Chinese would volunteer.111 Symptomatic of the Emergency, all new recruits were subjected to additional political and criminal screening, to ensure the force was not infiltrated by communist elements.112 As well as social and political pressures, there were also practical imperatives behind Chinese recruitment. Most of the 350 Malay ratings who returned after the war were ‘semi-trained men’ from the seaman and communications branches, with only sufficient engine room personnel to operate two vessels.113 A large number of Chinese mechanics who could plug this operational deficiency had worked in the Singapore naval base and, thus, most of the MNF’s early chief engineers came to be Chinese, creating a racial stereotype in the minds of British officers that ‘Chinese by and large make very good engineers’.114 Yet it was rather a social consequence of the lower standard of Malay education that meant they generally lacked the technical knowledge and English proficiency required for the position. Five harbour defence MLs used during the Arakan Campaign in Burma and left rotting in Keppel Harbour were transferred as patrol vessels. They were commanded by two old British reservists and three regular Sub-Lieutenants seconded from the Royal Navy. One was Peter Fosten who, in 1950, was serving aboard the frigate HMS Cardigan Bay in the Eastern Fleet when the Singapore Government called for Royal Navy volunteers to serve in the MNF. Having spent the first six [ 165 ]

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years of his life on a rubber research station in Malaya, Fosten felt an urge to return to his roots and was appointed to command P.3509. The 400-mile patrol area meant the vessels were re-designated as ‘Seaward’ defence MLs, though not designed for the three-month long operations. Only the wheelhouse and bridge were armour-plated, making the vessels unstable at sea, while the hulls would get punctured by bamboo jetties. Rudders and propellers were unprotected and broke in shallow rivers and bars. Their primary role was to search fishing kampongs and tongkangs (boats) for terrorists and weapons smuggled from Indonesia, while they assisted counter-insurgency operations 115 inland by transporting Gurkhas up-river and providing fire support. Cultural sensitivity was incentivised by offering MNF officers an extra 18 pence per day for passing an oral exam in Malay, as the British waged a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign against the communists. Naval visits were part of this, as the MLs dropped anchor in remote villages, invited children aboard and screened films.116 There were fears that insurgents were moving across the Siamese border, and so two MLs were sent to ‘show the flag’ in Phuket. The ships were opened to the general public, even attracting a couple of Buddhist monks, and the interest was so ‘phenomenal’ that when the boat came to take the visitors off, the ML almost tipped over as they all rushed to one side. As thanks, the local Chinese community took the COs for a meal, followed by a trip to the ‘best brothel in town’.117 Upon spotting a pair of naval-issue shoes, Fosten was able to extricate himself from the delicate situation by telling his hosts he was most grateful for their kindness, but would lose face if he used the same establishment as his sailors.118 The basic conditions of the MLs meant religious customs were still not strictly observed. Water was carefully rationed and the men could only wash properly when in port. Though the MLs carried two fridges and sets of pans so Muslim personnel could cook separately, Fosten’s Malay coxswain suggested it would be simpler to let one man prepare the same meals and use the other fridge for drinks. During Ramadan, Fosten allowed the crew to eat normal meals during the day because of their strenuous duties in the tropical heat, meaning the men had to 119 pretend to look desperately hungry when they returned to port.

Malaysianisation Malay cadets were sent to the BRNC at Dartmouth from 1955, and there Islamic principles were also ignored; drinking alcohol was encouraged ‘to bring out the social attributes and train you to be good officers, to be able to mix’.120 The opportunity for officer training attracted a more [ 166 ]

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ethnically and geographically heterogeneous group to the Navy than before; nine were selected in the first batch from over 500 applicants, comprising two Malays, three Chinese, two Indians, one Sri Lankan and one Eurasian. Seven came from the Peninsula, stretching from the northernmost state, Perlis, to the southernmost, Johore Bahru. The 121 final two were from the islands of Singapore and Pulau Bukom. The Singaporean, Chitharanjan Kuttan, was an ethnic Indian who had seen the newspaper advertisements and been drawn by his ‘craving to be associated with the sea’.122 This began as a boy, for ‘when the fleet visited I made friends with the sailors, talked to them and enjoyed their company. It planted the seed,’ and he had joined the Sea Cadet Corps.123 The Sri Lankan member of that first batch, Thanabalasingam, was officially classed as Indian. He joined from Kuala Lumpur and was impressed when the Navy sent him a first-class rail ticket to attend an interview in Singapore. Coming from Ceylon Tamil heritage he had a single name, so the naval records listed his father’s as his surname, and because the Dartmouth instructor couldn’t master Thanabalasingam son of Karalasingam, he acquired the Anglicised nickname Bob. He became the first non-Caucasian to be selected as Divisional Captain at the BRNC, but had problems with a couple of British midshipmen. One in particular was heard shouting, ‘I’m not taking orders from a foreigner’, and refused to turn up for physical training until Thanabalasingam threatened to report him. On another occasion, the same midshipman exclaimed, ‘this is a British naval college, can’t have foreigners coming and usurping’.124 The individual was an aristocrat, and his xenophobia was thus more class-based than racial. Though the Malayan midshipmen did not experience widespread problems with British personnel, there were always individuals who expressed negative attitudes towards them. Kuttan underwent sea training in the destroyer HMS Cavalier as the only non-British officer aboard. There he found one of the other Acting Sub-Lieutenants, ‘about five times my size’ who ‘didn’t quite like the idea of I wearing the same stripe as he, I mean, he had his grudge against me; so he made my life 125 a bit tough … bullied me’. When he went to speak to the CO, J.D. Hope, he was told, ‘there are two ways of learning – you learn from bad examples and you learn from good examples’, no additional action was taken and the situation remained the same except Kuttan ‘bore in mind what the Commander said’.126 Malaya achieved Merdeka, its independence, on 31 August 1957. At this time the RMN amounted to 31 officers, all but three of whom were British, 98 senior sailors, including 28 British, and around 500 junior sailors.127 A part-time Singapore Women’s Auxiliary Naval Service (SWANS) was formed in 1957, and received forty applications [ 167 ]

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SO U TH EAS T A S IA 128 by December. The RMN had developed on the assumption it would form the basis for Malaya’s national navy, with seven of the nine BRNC cadets having been recruited from the Federation. It was, however, ‘seen as wholly Singaporean and was thus viewed with suspicion’ by Malaya’s politicians.129 The first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, initially wanted to form a new service at Port Swettenham, but then Indonesia claimed a 12 nautical mile zone near Malaya’s territorial waters and Britain sweetened the transfer with $M20 million in naval aid.130 Thus, on 1 July 1958, the Federation Government took control of seven seaward defence MLs, two inshore minesweepers, and paid a $M400,000 annual rent for the Singapore base.131 Malayan independence caused ‘a bit of anxiety’ for the Singaporean personnel such as Kuttan, and they were given the option of leaving the Navy to prevent a conflict of duty should future relations deteriorate between Malaya and Singapore, but he and the officer from Pulau Bukom decided to put their naval careers first.132 The RMN retained its Royal title, originally awarded by Queen Elizabeth II, but now recognising the Malay sultans as heads of state. The Tunku suspected a lingering British colonial influence, and it was decided to replace the RMN’s British Naval Chief, Commodore E.D. Norman, with a Captain from the Royal Australian Navy. As Malayan Defence Minister Dato Abdul Razak explained on 25 August 1958, ‘for political reasons the Federation Government did not want to be too dependent on the United Kingdom’.133 Like Nyerere and Tanganyika three years later, it was feared Britain would be able to continue influencing the country’s post-colonial policies through its naval association. Following high-powered discussions between Rahman and the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, ‘one of the best of the younger RAN officers’,134 Captain William J. Dovers, replaced Norman as Malaya’s Naval Chief in February 1960. The shortage of qualified Malayan officers meant the Dartmouth trainees were rushed into senior positions. Upon returning, Thanabalasingam was appointed as the first naval instructor at Malaya’s Royal Military College, responsible for training a dozen cadets. Only seven or eight turned up, however, and of those only three met the required standard for Dartmouth, with the rest absorbed into 135 the Army. In the meantime, the majority of RMN officers remained British. Few were seconded Royal Navy regulars and the unprofessionalism demonstrated by some of the retirees and reservists antagonised the Dartmouth Malaysians, who returned with a higher level of training than their commanders. In 1961, Kuttan was appointed as Executive Officer of an inshore minesweeper under a RNR LieutenantCommander known as ‘Gino’,136 who had served in the RMN for years

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but was ‘useless at navigation’, and a ‘disgrace to the British navy, he 137 was a total pisshead’:

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[He was] a very poor professional and also a very poor quality man, he was on his whiskey from sunrise to sundown … unhappiness began to grow in me right from the start after my return.138

The Lieutenant-Commander was later discovered drunk and unconscious during a surprise inspection by Dovers, who immediately relieved him of his command.139 He was not an exception, however: [There were] quite a number of them. All terrible … their behaviour, their professional knowledge was, oh my goodness, almost zero, you know; but this was where, I’m sorry to say this, where the Royal Navy made a big mistake, by sending rubbish, it set a very bad example … the Malaysian Armed Forces became wise to it, they started asking for officers from the Australian Navy … and they sent the best.140

This was reflected by the Australian Defence Committee’s appointment of Dovers, having stipulated that the officer must be (a) on the Active list, (b) not passed over for promotion, and (c) carefully chosen for tact and cooperative ability.141 He was not their first choice, however, and Captain Rhoades had been provisionally accepted, until Britain tried to counter by offering Malaya a first-class officer of its own. Wanting to extricate itself from British naval hegemony, the Malayan Government requested a younger Australian Captain of around forty-five years of age142 and, as Rhoades was fifty, Dovers was selected because of the political ‘embarrassment the Malayan Government might feel vis-à-vis the Royal Navy if an officer of an older age were chosen’.143 Kuttan’s view of the British officers is corroborated by Dovers’ own assessment that they were ‘a very mixed bag’, whose ‘leadership … left very much to be desired’, though local climate also continued to be blamed for undermining European character, with ‘the trop144 ical Malacca Straits … not conducive to drive and enthusiasm’. He therefore decided to ‘replace the old and bold contract officers where necessary with younger regular officers from the RAN and RN’, and within ‘12 months I had terminated the employment of some 30 out of 35 officers whom I considered had little to contribute’.145 Two more Australians, Commodores A.M. Synnot and A.N. Dollard, would command the RMN after Dovers. When it came to choosing Dollard’s successor in early 1967, Razak insisted the post be Malaysianised. Though he preferred an ethnic Malay candidate, Dollard advised that he was ‘too young and inexperienced’,146 and so a [ 169 ]

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Tamil, Thanabalasingam, was appointed as the first Malaysian Chief on 1 December 1967 at the age of just 32. Malaysianisation of the fleet was completed in November 1969, and that of the Ministry of Defence 147 Naval staff division followed two years later.

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Conclusion There can be little doubt that the formation of naval forces in British Southeast Asia was stimulated by the construction of the Singapore naval base, though it was played down by the Governor and imperial interests. The Admiralty’s naval defence strategy depended on colonial legislatures supporting auxiliary units with money as well as manpower. To acknowledge that a RNVR was connected to the base would admit its presence was an imperial not local interest, and place the expense at the feet of the British Government. The Admiralty thus needed local allies, such as the Governor and the Malay sultans, to collaborate with its scheme. A naval reserve was justified locally in developmental terms, and the socio-economic improvement it would bring to unemployed Malay youths. Yet this discourse was prejudiced by racial ideology, particularly the stereotype of the ‘lazy Malay’; colonial naval forces were purveyors of imperial paternalism, improving the character of stagnant ‘Orientals’ through benevolent British instruction. While the loyalty of Malays was secured through the sultans, doubts existed regarding the other ethnic groups, most notably the Chinese, who were believed to have conflicting political and social allegiances, and Eurasians, whose racial impurity challenged the race-based hierarchy of the naval chainof-command and colonial society. Colonial and naval officials justified excluding such groups by identifying Malays as a seafaring race, while Malays readily embraced this identity as it improved their economic and social standing. Western-centric representations of Singapore’s fall have created a distorted historical memory that inadequately acknowledges the actions of colonial volunteers. For the MRNVR, the battle was a costly but heroic one, more in keeping with the glorification of Dunkirk than Churchill’s humiliating ‘capitulation’,148 as they evacuated mainly European civilians in the face of overwhelming odds and with many paying the ultimate price. Yet only British colonial officers were awarded for their bravery, and not the Malay ratings. Those who did leave with the British did so less out of patriotic loyalty than self-preservation. Push factors were generally more dominant than pull ones for naval ratings escaping domestic abuse, religious persecution, economic hardship, or Japanese retribution. In Ceylon, [ 170 ]

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TH E STRA I TS SETTLEM E N T S A N D M A L AYA

away from home and encountering other colonial and Allied troops, inequalities were highlighted, which fractured imperial unity and discipline. Rather than being brothers in arms fighting for the same Empire in a common cause, they felt like ‘friendless exiles in a foreign 149 country’. Yet protest did not form around ethnic unity, as it did with Caymanians. Instead, age and class divided the younger, bettereducated Malay Navy professionals from the older, more numerous MRNVR part-timers. Irrational Malay behaviour was associated with scientific racism around latah, which reassured British anxieties about their ability to reassert colonial authority over Malaya, and elsewhere, after the War. American influence was seen as a threat to British imperial designs, as it was in the Caribbean. A conciliatory attitude was therefore adopted, improving the material condition and status of the Malay ratings to secure their practical and symbolic support for the British return. The Malay naval units were disbanded after the war, only for a new force to be formed in response to the Emergency. The ideological shifts of the Cold War forced the Navy to abandon its racially prejudiced recruitment policies and enlist Chinese, as Britain waged a campaign for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the peninsula. The MNF contributed to this by ‘showing the flag’ to remote communities and uncooperative neighbours, welcoming the public aboard its vessels and providing entertainment, including films, to project positive propaganda, while it raided fishing communities, landed troops and shelled jungle positions. Less cultural respect was afforded to Islamic Malay customs, which continued to be subordinated to the practical demands of naval service. It would take another decade after independence before the RMN was nationalised and given a Malaysian naval chief. The RMN’s amateur roots as volunteer reserves undermined its attempts to professionalise the service, with the incompetence of retired and reserve British officers undermining the Navy’s efficiency and Britain’s prestige. This loss of respect, and the Malaysian Government’s desire to assert its post-colonial autonomy, led it to forge a closer naval relationship with Australia at the expense of British hegemony.

Notes  1  Nadzan Haron, ‘Colonial Defence and British Approach to the Problems in Malaya 1874–1918’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 275–295, 286–287.  2 Metcalf, Imperial Connections, p. 77.  3  Kevin Blackburn, ‘Colonial Forces as Postcolonial Memories: The Commemoration and Memory of the Malay Regiment in Modern Malaysia and Singapore’, in Hack and Rettig (eds.), Colonial Armies, p. 302.

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SO U TH EAS T A S IA  4  Haron, ‘Colonial Defence and British Approach’, p. 287.  5  Cynthia Chou, The Orang Suku Laut of Riau, Indonesia: The Inalienable Gift of Territory (London, 2010), p. 1.  6  Geoffrey Benjamin, ‘On Being Tribal in the Malay World’, in Geoffrey Benjamin and Cynthia Chou (eds.), Tribal Communities in the Malay World: Historical, Cultural and Social Perspectives (Singapore, 2002), pp. 41, 45.  7  Haron, ‘Colonial Defence and British Approach’, p. 287.  8 Lucas, The Empire At War, Vol. II, pp. 382, 385.  9 Ferraby, The Imperial British Navy, p. 91. 10  Mitcham, ‘Navalism and Greater Britain’, pp. 285–286. 11  TNA, ADM116/2219, D.O.D., 8 October 1923. 12  The HMS Malaya Cup is still awarded for the winner of the Malay rugby sevens, while its association football equivalent was replaced in 1967, though the competition continues as the Malaysia Cup. The Straits Times, 7 November 1921, p. 10. 13  TNA, ADM116/2254, V.A.C.S.S.S. letter No. 47/32/1/4, 27 February 1924. 14  The Straits Times, 18 April 1925, p. 8. 15  Ibid. 16  Ibid. 17  Ibid. 18  Dane Kennedy, The Magic Mountains: Hill Stations and the British Raj (London, 1996), p. 1. 19  Ibid., p. 8. 20  The Straits Times, 27 and 28 September 1932, pp. 12, 10. 21  The Straits Times, 19 October 1932, p. 12. 22  Ibid. 23  The Straits Times, 7 December 1934, p. 13. 24  TNA, CO877/13/27, ‘Instructor in Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force’, 22 January 1937. 25  Royal Malaysian Navy Museum (hereafter TLDM), , Malacca, 2 July 2009. 26  Nordin (ed.), Honour and Sacrifice p. 21. 27  The Straits Times, 7 December 1934, p. 13. 28  The Straits Times, 28 December 1939, p. 10. 29  Tamby is Tamil for younger brother, applied to colonial office boys. 30  The Straits Times, 7 December 1934, p. 13. 31  The Straits Times, 8 December 1935, p. 2. 32  The Straits Times, 26 January 1937, p. 11. 33  The Straits Times, 23 May 1937, p. 2. 34  The ‘lazy’ stereotype proliferated as Malays refused to integrate into the colonial plantation economy, producing a lower salary scale in a ‘discriminating system’. Syed Hussein Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism (London, 1977), pp. 227, 280. 35  Liew Kai Khium, ‘Labour Formation, Identity, and Resistance in HM Dockyard, Singapore (1921–1971)’, International Review of Social History, Vol. 51, No. 3 (December, 2006), pp. 415–439. 36  Quoted in McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, pp. 225–226. 37  Ibid. 38  Ibid. 39  Ibid. 40  The Straits Times, 25 May 1937, p. 12. 41  Quoted in McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, p. 225. 42  The Straits Times, 6 March 1937, p. 13. 43  TLDM, Malacca, 2 July 2009. 44  The Straits Times, 28 December 1939, p. 10. 45  TLDM, Malacca, 2 July 2009. 46  The Straits Times, 28 December 1939, p. 10.

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TH E STRA I TS SETTLEM E N T S A N D M A L AYA 47 A pelandok is a mouse deer, native to the Malay peninsula and a favourite character in folk tales. 48  The Straits Times, 28 December 1939. 49  The Straits Times, 28 September 1940, p. 11. 50  Mahmud Ghazemy et al., Royal Malaysian Navy: 55 Years (Kuala Lumpur, 1990), p. 20. 51  TLDM, Malacca, 2 July 2009. 52  The Straits Times, 28 September 1940, p. 11. 53  Ibid. 54 Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, p. 25. 55  The Straits Times, 28 September 1940, p. 11. 56  IWM, K 1430, ‘Malays in the British Navy, Malay, c.1942’. 57  Charles Dilke, 1872, quoted in Cain, ‘Empire and the Languages of Character’, pp. 270, 279. 58  The Straits Times, 18 April 1925, p. 8. 59  The Straits Times, 28 September 1940, p. 11. 60  The Straits Times, 21 February 1940, p. 10. 61  The Straits Times, 28 December 1939, p. 10. 62  Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (London, 1950), p. 487. 63  Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (London, 1950), p. 81. 64 Ghazemy Royal Malaysian Navy, p. 77. 65  The Straits Times, 7 July 1946, p. 4. 66  The Straits Times, 12 February 1950, p. 8. 67  The Times (London), 6 June 1940, p. 5. 68  Winston Churchill, House of Commons, 4 June 1940, The Churchill Centre, https:// www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/1940finest-hour/128-we-shall-fight-on-the-beaches [18 May 2014]. 69  Oral History Centre, Singapore (heareafter OHC), interview with Ahmad, Dahim bin Noordin, by Daniel Chew, 1 November 1991, 001318, reel 2. 70  ‘The Age of Entry of Naval Cadets’, Naval Review, Vol. 8 (1920), p. 538. 71  OHC, interview with Dahim Ahmad bin Noordin, by Daniel Chew, 1 November 1991, 001318, reel 2. 72  Ibid. 73  Ibid. 74  Ibid., 5 March 1992, reel 3. 75  Ibid. 76  Ibid. 77  OHC, interview with Rahman Abdul bin Ya’acob, by Daniel Chew, 5 July 1994, 001527, reel 1. 78  Ibid. 79  Ibid. 80  Ibid. 81  Abdul claimed to have been violently abused by his father, a motivation for his running off to join the navy. 82  Ibid. 83  TNA, ADM1/12995, 1 September 1943. 84  TNA, CO968/145/5, ‘Visit to Ceylon’, Item 50. 85  Ibid. 86  Ibid. 87  Ibid., Item 51. 88  Ibid. 89  Ibid. 90  Ibid. 91  Ibid., Item 52. 92  Ibid. 93  Ibid. 94  Ibid.

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SO U TH EAS T A S IA  95 Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native, p. 48.  96  Robert L. Winzler, Latah in Southeast Asia: The history and ethnography of a culture-bound syndrome (Cambridge, 1995), p. 3.  97  TNA, CO968/145/5, Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet, and SabbenClare to Fox, 10 June 1944.  98  TNA, CO968/145/5, ‘Visit to Ceylon’, Items 52–53.  99  TNA, CO968/145/5, Colonial Representative in India to Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 July 1944, Item 49. 100  TNA, CO968/145/5, ‘Visit to Ceylon’, Item 52. 101  TNA, ADM1/12995, A.H. Phillips, Director of Local Defence, 26 April 1944. 102  TNA, ADM1/12995, Sabben-Clare to M.J. Fox, 27 July 1943. 103  TNA, ADM1/12995, A.H. Phillips, Director of Local Defence, 26 April 1944. 104  Ibid. 105  TNA, ADM1/12995, C.C. Hughes-Hallett, Director of Plans, 5 May 1944. 106  TNA, ADM1/12995, Sabben-Clare to M.J. Fox, 27 July 1943. 107  TNA, CO537/2534, ‘Malayan Naval Forces’, 8 August 1947. 108  Goldrick and McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia, pp. 136–137. 109  Cynthia H. Enloe, ‘Ethnicity in the Evolution of Asia’s Armed Bureaucracies’, in DeWitt C. Ellinwood and Cynthia H. Enloe (eds.), Ethnicity and the Military in Asia (London, 1981), p. 9. 110  The Straits Times, 9 October 1948, p. 5. 111  The Straits Times, 8 July 1955, p. 7. 112  TNA, ADM1/21872, Item 22, 1 July 1949. 113  TNA, CO537/2534, ‘The Malayan Local Forces’, 1946, p. 3. 114  Interview by author with Peter Fosten, 14 August 2009, Newton Abbot. 115  Peter Fosten, ‘A Far East Odyssey, Part Two: Aiding the Civil Power, Malaya 1950– 53’, unpublished memoir. 116  OHC, Interview with Chitharanjan Kuttan, by Jason Lim, September 2002, 002697, reel 4. 117  Interview by author with Fosten. 118  Ibid. 119  Ibid. 120  Interview by author with Tan Sri Thanabalasingam, 25 June 2009, Kuala Lumpur. 121  Ibid. 122  Interview with Chitharanjan Kuttan, by Jason Lim. 123  Interview by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan, 17 July 2009, Singapore. 124  Interview by author with Thanabalasingam. 125  Interview by author with Kuttan. 126  Ibid. 127  Ian Pfenningwerth, Tiger Territory: The Untold Story of the Royal Australian Navy in Southeast Asia from 1948 to 1971 (Sydney, 2008), p. 99. th 128  Republic of Singapore Navy, Onwards and Upwards: 30 Anniversary Navy News Special Edition (Singapore, 1997), Chapter 1. 129  Goldrick and McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia, p. 93. 130 Pfenningwerth, Tiger Territory, p. 100. 131  Ibid., pp. 100–101. 132  Interview by author with Kuttan. 133  National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), A5799, 87/1959, C.W. Clugston, Secretary, Defence Committee, 24 September 1959. 134  NAA, A1945, 162/1/7, Athol Townley, Minister for Defence, to R.G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, 7 December 1959. 135  Interview by author with Thanabalasingam. 136 Pfenningwerth, Tiger Territory, p. 106. 137  Interview by author with Kuttan. 138  OHC, interview with Kuttan, by Lim, 11 September 2002, 002697, reel 2. 139 Pfenningwerth, Tiger Territory, p. 106, corroborated in interview by author with Thanabalasingam, who was serving aboard as navigator.

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140  Interview by author with Kuttan. 141  NAA, A2031, DCM108/1959, Report by Defence Committee, October 1959. 142  NAA, A1945, 162/1/7, ‘Proposal for Australian Naval Officer to Command Malayan Navy’, Department of the Navy Memorandum, 30 November 1959. 143  NAA, A1945, 162/1/7, J.G. Gorton, Minister for the Navy, to A.G. Townley, Minister for Defence, 1 December 1959. 144  SPC, letter from Admiral W.J. Dovers to Admiral James Goldrick, 10 October 1992. 145 Ibid. 146 Pfenningwerth, Tiger Territory, p. 122. 147  NAA, A9735, 208/1 part 1, Savingram 3/70, 23 January 1970. 148  Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (London, 1950), p. 81. 149  TNA, CO968/145/5, ‘Visit to Ceylon’, Item 50.

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PA RT IV

East Asia

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C

H

I

N

A Tai Pang Wan

Sheung Shui

Hau Hoi Wan

Tuen Mun

New Territories Tsuen Wan

Hong Kong Lantau island

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Aberdeen

Kowloon

Hong Kong Island

S o u t h

C h i n a 0

S e a km

20

Map 5  Hong Kong, c.1939

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CHA P T E R SEVEN

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Hong Kong, pre-1945

‘Oriental’ origins Though few records remain, it is known that by 25 April 1885 a seagoing Hong Kong Auxiliary Flotilla had been raised by Governor Sir George Bowen, comprising volunteers from the Water Police, yachtsmen, and with the Assistant Harbour-Master as Commodore. Though not officially affiliated to the senior service, the Royal Navy did lend support to this local endeavour; two former gunboats, HMS Tweed and HMS Wyvern, were reconditioned for use as training vessels, and a Royal Navy gunner took on the duties of instructor. A requisition order was placed by the Governor to the Commodore at Hong Kong for ‘boats, signal books, signal flags and cones for the use of the Aux. Flotilla’.1 By 16 June that year, the Flotilla had acquired the government launches Daisy and Lilly, with the suggestion they be fitted with Whitehead torpedoes, while volunteers were trained by the resident Royal Navy Torpedo Lieutenant. This is the last known record relating to the Hong Kong Auxiliary Flotilla, and it was disbanded sometime shortly after.2 During the nineteenth century, Chinese cooks and personal servants were unofficially employed directly by Royal Navy officers stationed in the Far East. In 1905 this arrangement was formalised with the establishment of a Locally Enlisted Personnel (LEP) division in Hong Kong, consisting of two seamen petty officers, fifty able seamen, seven stokes 3 and nine mess boys. These were full-time servicemen appointed to Royal Navy and not colonial vessels. The political, economic and strategic pressures of the interwar years forced serious discussion regarding Hong Kong’s naval defence. The imposition of Article XIX of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, in which no new defensive fortifications could be constructed in Hong Kong, raised the possibility of forming a local branch of the RNVR in lieu. At the 1925 Flag Officers Conference in Singapore, it was noted [ 179 ]

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EA ST A S IA

that insufficient consideration had been given to Hong Kong’s defence 4 relative to the priority accorded to Singapore. Despite pessimistic predictions from the Admiralty, the General Officer Commanding Hong Kong suggested that if the naval defence provision was increased the colony could potentially hold out in the event of a Japanese attack. In February the following year, the new Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi, advanced this by emphasising Hong Kong’s strategic importance as a naval anchorage, ‘the only defended advanced base from which operations could be conducted against Japan’.5 Key assets were its large repair facilities and eight docks, providing a convoy assembly point able to equip armed merchantmen, whilst serving as a contraband control base during a European war. It was emphasised that, in the event of war in the East, the colony would be exposed to ‘the maximum scale of attack’, and therefore needed to take all possible precautions to defend itself.6 In view of the ‘special expenditure involved in the construction of an aerodrome at Hong Kong and the grave depression in the trade of the Colony’, the Colonial Secretary was unable to sanction the necessary expenditure for a local RNVR, however, and the scheme was ‘postponed until conditions are more favourable’.7 Local culture was also blamed in the form of Hong Kong’s ‘usual “maskee” spirit’, an ethnically characterised form of indifference associated with the Chinese, which had ‘let the matter [of the RNVR] drift as one of those things which will be attended to in due course’.8 Maskee roughly translates as ‘don’t mind’.9 It was a negative trait, used to derogate the Chinese, and part of the broader Orientalist discourse underpinning western hegemony in the East: It is ‘Maskee, maskee,’ all the time in China. If a stone bridge has tumbled down, and a great part of the population is put a couple of miles out of its path during year after year, maskee. If a house falls and blocks a highway, ‘Maskee,’ says everyone, and there the heap lies. ‘Maskee’ is what you are told if you suggest that someone go to the help of a man or a woman in dire trouble. And even when a foreign power, without warrant or excuse, wages war upon the Northern strongholds of the empire, ‘Maskee,’ says all the rest of China.10

Foreign imperialism was seen as a direct consequence of ‘Oriental’ lethargy and lack of moral and social conscience, qualities the ‘civilising mission’ claimed to be instilling. China’s dominance by the West was therefore considered a combination of Western activity and Chinese passivity, each equally culpable in a collaborative restructuring of power, even if a large degree of that collaboration was unconscious or indirect. [ 180 ]

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H O N G KO N G , P R E - 1 9 4 5

By relating maskee to inefficiency in the governmental bureaucracy, including a Legislative Council without Chinese representation, this characterisation transcended its ethnic roots to influence Hong Kong’s European population. It undermined British prestige in that the colonial administration was being called into question by its inactivity regarding the RNVR. This resonated with Victorian fears about the morally corrosive atmosphere of the ‘Orient’ upon British character, reflected in the irresponsible inertia of the Hong Kong Government on the issue of colonial naval defence. This lay it open to criticism that it was failing in its patriotic duty to help the motherland in her defence of the Empire, a prominent theme in Imperial Defence Committee meetings earlier that year, where it was stressed that the colonies should shoulder: a burden which was growing increasingly heavy on the Home taxpayers – the maintenance of naval vessels and personnel ... Hong Kong is hardly in a position to build ships or to shoulder more than a small part of the cost of Imperial Defence but the formation locally of a RNVR would give local people the opportunity of indicating their willingness to do what is in their power.11

Arguments for the social benefits naval service would provide the colony with, beyond strategic defence, were emphasised in that ‘it would provide young fellows with invaluable experience and the opportunity of healthful relaxation and exercise’.12 Those with, arguably, the most to gain from the establishment of a local naval reserve, the Royal Navy, were quick to voice their practical and moral support by offering to loan personnel and two mine-laying sloops, gaining public approval through the local press: Hong Kong, as His Excellency remarked at the time, as one of the most important outposts of the Empire, is dependent for its prosperity on the maintenance of its shipping connections, it is to be hoped that this promise of the naval authorities will be made use of and that the whole thing will not fall through for lack of interest on the part of the powers that be.13

Potential recruits were identified in ‘several ex-naval men at present resident in the Colony’, while the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club (RHKYC), would ‘provide other enthusiasts with the advantage of a knowledge of our local coasts’.14 The Admiralty reacted to the scheme’s postponement by stressing its potential ramifications. It admitted that, in the event of war, the Royal Navy would struggle to meet its operational requirements [ 181 ]

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‘without the assistance of a number of RNVR Officers and a mine15 sweeping vessel’ in Hong Kong. It also, more broadly, threatened ‘the Admiralty policy of encouraging Colonies to assist in Naval defence’, being a ‘precedent which may be expected to react adversely on the willingness which other Colonies were also beginning to show, to prepare to form their own minesweeping units’.16 It was finally stated that the enthusiasm of volunteers from the Yacht Club ‘will have been very effectually damped, and the revival of the proposal in the future rendered difficult’,17 though this would not ultimately prove the case. The proposed Hong Kong RNVR resurfaced again three years later when it was included in the draft estimates of expenditure for the Legislative Council. This amounted to $25,488 per annum, including: $2,832 for personal emoluments to be split between an officer instructor, a warrant officer, two petty officers, a clerk and a messenger; $6,000 for cruising; $4,000 for ammunition; $6,600 for uniforms; and $960 for a drill ground at the proposed headquarters at the RHKYC. A sum of $2,800 was also earmarked for fitting out the rescue tug, Kau Sing, for use by the force.18 The proposal, however, was not ‘considered on its merits. The dollar had slumped and economy was called for – so the RNVR scheme perished along with the Saikung road and other seeming extravagances’.19 It was not only economic factors that counted against it. Inter-service rivalry between the Army and Navy and parochial self-interest raised its head, with military leaders voicing their opposition to the proposed force, fearing the effect it would have on their recruitment: We are of the opinion that the formation of the RNVR may to a certain extent detrimentally affect the Volunteers Defence Corps, and that Corps serves a far more useful and practical purpose. We consider that the RNR is unnecessary here and that Naval work should be left to the Navy; and we shall vote against the item for its establishment in the Appropriation Bill for 1930.20

There therefore existed a lack of local understanding or concern for the issues of imperial defence, the operational overstretch that existed, and the greater strategic role a naval reserve would play. The colony expected the Royal Navy to continue defending Hong Kong from external threats, despite it being a notion that contradicted the Navy’s traditional expeditionary mission to intercept enemies on the high seas before they could threaten ports. In fact, such assumptions were reinforced by Admiral Richmond in 1924, who stated: ‘In my opinion the strategical situation which would result from the loss of Hong Kong does not justify withholding naval forces if by their action they [ 182 ]

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H O N G KO N G , P R E - 1 9 4 5 21 could contribute towards preventing its loss’. It was thus considered that ‘naval forces had to play a significant role in the defence of the colony, despite the long-established policy of not tying naval forces to local defence of bases’.22 To a large degree this was influenced by the weak state of Hong Kong’s physical defences, which could not be improved due to Article XIX.23

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Cultivating colonial navalism By mid-1933, despite several false starts, there was still no RNVR in Hong Kong. This was partly attributed to a ‘lack of contact between the Navy and the Hong Kong community, with a resulting absence of understanding and friendship … extraordinary at a naval base and inexplicable in view of the fact that the Colony is unquestionably ship-minded’.24 Blame was apportioned to both ‘the community for its selfishness and the Navy for its exaggerated independence and its traditional silence’, though it was observed that retired naval men had been ‘absorbed with a peculiar facility into local life, demonstrating that there is no great difficulty’.25 The catalyst for change was the appointment of a new Commodore-in-Charge at Hong Kong, Frank Elliot, a descendant of Captain Charles Elliot, the first administrator of the colony. Perhaps it was this personal connection that made him more adept at navigating local conditions, as he was accredited with ‘liberalising [the Navy’s] local outlook and entering more deeply into the Colony’s consciousness’.26 In 1933, despite uncertainty over the colony’s defensibility in an East Asian war, the Admiralty acknowledged Hong Kong’s importance as a base for protecting Britain’s China interests and for enabling the Royal Navy to operate in Japanese waters.27 Upon his appointment that year, Elliot was ordered by Admiral Frederic Dreyer, commander of the China Station, to ‘get the RNVR proposal going’,28 but faced similar problems to 1929: One difficulty is finance. Another and more serious one is that though personnel exists it is otherwise committed. There has always been sign of jealousy between different auxiliary units. It is argued that the VDC [Volunteer Defence Corps] would be more usefully employed as Special Police: and the Volunteers themselves are frequently appealing for recruits.29

As demonstrated four years earlier, inter-service rivalry and parochialism meant that, to implement the scheme, Elliot had to first surmount the obstructions posed by the Hong Kong military, centred on General Barret of the Royal Hong Kong Regiment (otherwise known [ 183 ]

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as The Volunteers), who viewed a RNVR as a threat to their recruitment interests:

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Looking at the past history it appeared that every time the question of a Naval Defence Force had come before the Council it was squashed by the General, who also represented the three services on the Council, unless the C-in-C was present. Commodore Hong Kong was not on the council. It therefore seemed that somehow or other I had to ‘get’ at Members before the meeting and get the Governor on my side.30

Elliot’s solution was to throw a Red, White and Blue cocktail party for the wives of the leading taipans (foreign businessmen), and after several rounds of drinks he made an impassioned speech in which ‘the women of the Colony were the brains of the Colony, and every time this question came up their menfolk were browbeaten by the General into turning the scheme down’.31 After convincing the wives to get their husbands to vote in Council for the formation of the RNVR, Elliot produced the Secretary of the Hong Kong branch of the Navy League, who signed on not just the wives but their husbands by proxy, increasing its membership overnight from ten members to over one hundred. When the question was raised again in Council and put to a vote, ‘much to the disgust of the General it was carried unanimously’, with Elliot adding, ‘I don’t think he ever forgave me for … as he said … completely out manoeuvring him’.32 Elliot followed this with a meeting at the RHKYC at 17.30 on 28 September 1933, to solicit recruits for the force. Over sixty men attended, following up on the interest expressed the last time the scheme was raised: ‘You can count on me up to the hilt,’ said the Commodore. ‘Anything I can do to further the scheme I will do. I have been talking to the heads of shipping concerns and I feel sure we shall get support from them. They realise that in summer it will actually benefit a man’s health as well as promote his training as a Naval Volunteer if he goes away for a few days fresh air on an anti-piracy patrol.’ The Commodore then made some observations with a view to making it clear to the layman that the Colony cannot be adequately defended solely by land forces. In time of emergency the greater part of the China Fleet might have to go elsewhere and there was definite need for a nucleus of men who knew something about minesweeping and could keep channels clear.33

Health and the resulting social benefits to the colony were again used here to attract popular support. The message also had a political purpose, with Elliot appealing not just to the assembled congregation, who as yachtsmen were hardly laymen; it was conveyed through the [ 184 ]

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press to Hong Kong’s Government and general public, who were less knowledgeable about naval affairs, who suffered from an ‘absence of 34 understanding and friendship’, and who were perhaps susceptible to the military’s propaganda. This absence of friendship had begun to border on distrust amongst ruling elites, who found British supremacy being challenged from within.35 A growing number of mavericks were starting to side actively with the Asian population during the 1930s. One was C.M. Faure, a Royal Navy Commander in Canton before he resigned in 1928. Having been involved in the Navy’s suppression of Chinese demonstrators in Shamian three years earlier, he had awoken to the ‘cruder manifestations of British power’ and, after moving to Hong Kong, he ‘went native’ in the eyes of other expatriates, ‘living among the Chinese in the Wanchai district and advising members of the banned leftist unions in their collisions with the colony’s Government’.36 Elliot’s naval reserve and courting of the taipans’ wives and local yacht club were part of a strategy to turn colonial thoughts seaward, and foster a greater integration and understanding between the local community and the Navy to offset such destabilising influences. N.A.M. Rodger has argued that: the demands of sea power were not only greater … but fell upon a much wider cross-section of society, and required a much greater degree of social, political, and administrative integration than armies did ... [therefore, whereas] a military regime could sustain itself by force … a navy had to earn public support. Autocracy was adequate for an army, but navies needed consensus ...37

Thus the Navy became associated with liberalism. This need for consensus also applied to Elliot in Hong Kong for, in order to combat Barret’s military autocracy, he had to win the public over to his naval scheme. The first public turnout for the Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force (HKNVF), thus coincided with an inaugural Hong Kong Navy Week, bookended by Trafalgar Day on Saturday 21 October, and Hong Kong’s first Navy Day the following Saturday, modelled on British naval exhibitions. Doubts were raised in some quarters that though ‘the idea itself is not new, and has been advocated from time-to-time – optimists have even wondered whether there is not sufficient keen38 ness to enable public interest to last a whole week’. Elliot was more sanguine that Navy Week could achieve its material goals; he ‘hoped that as a result of the celebrations, a sufficient number of people would agree to join’ the HKNVF, and ‘there would be a good turn-out of prospective volunteers on Trafalgar Day to show the Governor and the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, who would be in Hong Kong that [ 185 ]

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39 day, that the Colony was earnest in this matter’. It was felt beforehand that Trafalgar Day ‘has fallen to become one of Britain’s minor anniversaries’:40

In Hong Kong in some years there was nothing to mark it except a display of flags afloat, whose message did not penetrate far into the civilian consciousness: and in some other parts of the Empire the day was not observed at all … what the Navy means to the Colony it should not be necessary to emphasise. After the war, there were frequent expressions of hope that the celebration would be more elaborate here and for many years there had been talk of a naval ‘tattoo’ – not merely for our entertainment, but to keep interest alive and cement the feelings of companionship and interdependence of the Silent Service and the civilian community …41

The optimistic view that ‘there is unquestionably much scope for cooperation’42 in Hong Kong was stimulated by the re-establishment of a local Navy League branch in 1923, and the organisation of successful fundraisers the following year with a grand concert and Flag Day. Yet it was admitted that it took the combined ‘threat of another World War, and the co-operative spirit of our new and popular Commodore’,43 for Hong Kong to view the Navy with increased sympathy: The Navy remains the Empire’s first line of defence, however, and there is nothing in the world situation today to justify neglect of preparedness … in Hong Kong, however, far away from home without political influence, though likely to be uncomfortably close to the next war, we need not trouble ourselves with questions of consistency upon the armaments problem. Our role is to accommodate the fleet, its personnel, as well as its vessels. It is appropriate therefore that, whatever our views upon peace and war, we should cultivate comradeship with officers and men of the Navy: that, in fact, should be the principal object of the Hong Kong branch of the Navy League.44

There was a strong public belief that war was not only possible, but probable, and that the belligerent would be Japan, a view shared by the Admiralty. In London, the press reported that, rather than being defensive and reactionary in its function and formation, a naval force in Hong Kong actually fuelled tension in the Pacific.45 Efforts were therefore made to distance public celebrations of the Navy from any negative association with jingoism, as ‘in these days the Jingo has no friends, nor is it the intention to promote a war spirit’.46 This can be seen as symptomatic of changing attitudes after the First World War, where the jingoism that accompanied the outbreak of that conflict had been overshadowed by the spectre of death that followed. [ 186 ]

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Jim English’s study of ‘Empire Day in Britain’ offers a useful model for analysing the celebration of Trafalgar Day and Navy Week in Hong Kong. His premise is that ‘the survival of and (in some places) extension of Empire Day celebrations appears curious, given that its attendant militaristic rituals and jingoistic legacy appeared 47 anachronistic after the catastrophe of the war’. This could also be said of Trafalgar Day. English argues that Empire Day’s continued relevance can be attributed to ‘its ability to connect with popular sentiment by means of cultural transformation’, and its hegemonic function in presenting ‘imperial identity as an effective counter to radical socialist or “red” identity’.48 In this first instance, rather than Trafalgar Day being a reaction to pre-existing popular sentiment, it played a more active role in shaping it to increase support for the Navy amongst an apathetically ‘sea blind’49 Hong Kong public. English’s latter explanation has more overt relevance for Hong Kong, a colony bordered by China’s civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party since 1927; here the threat of ‘red’ identity to British imperialism was very real. Trafalgar Day’s role in fortifying imperial unity is reflected in Herfried Munkler’s theory that ‘the representation and attributed meaning of war as mediated through culture creates the idea of a common history and mutual solidarity’.50 By drawing Hong Kong’s Chinese sentimentally closer to Britain through celebration of the Navy, they might be turned away from sympathies across the border that could politically and socially threaten British colonial rule. English’s study suggests that the First World War led to the rebuttal of jingoism by new conventions of public behaviour, reflected by the inclusion of elements of Armistice Day into Empire Day’s activities, namely the ‘incorporation of solemn rites of remembrance’.51 Though the act of remembrance was performed on Trafalgar Day in Hong Kong, overall the celebratory mood of Navy Week was more in keeping with pre-war Empire Day festivals, despite official attempts to downplay jingoistic overtones. It could be said that Hong Kong’s geographical and personal distance from the epicentre of the First World War, where a much smaller proportion of its populace would have lost their lives, meant it was shielded from the full horrors of that conflict. The collective act of remembrance therefore lacked the same level of emotional intensity locally, being culturally displaced, a foreign import not rooted in the colony’s social fabric. In addition, a central aim of Elliot’s Navy Week was to attract volunteers for the HKNVF, and thus to focus too much attention on the death of servicemen during war would provide a major disincentive against enlisting. [ 187 ]

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Hong Kong’s Navy Week was supported by the local press, who publicised the event via several naval-themed articles in the weeks leading up to and during the festivities. This naval fervour even penetrated the South China Morning Post’s regular ‘World of Women’ column, which carried an article exploring the sartorial history of 52 ‘Sailors’ Suits’, a fashion which Mary Conley has shown originated in Victorian Britain where the sailor suit became ‘domesticated for mass consumption’.53 ‘World of Women’ patriotically suggested that ‘ladies and girls in the Colony might make a special effort to include Navy blue in their costumes on these two days’.54 Its correspondent, Abigail, reporting on Navy Day, lauded the displays arranged in the Naval Yard and marvelled that ‘even the dress of the diver changes’,55 again connecting the Navy to ‘progress’. Other items in the day’s programme, ‘designed with the object of affording the public opportunities to view the ships and some of their activities at close quarters thereby bringing the Colony of Hong Kong into close touch with the Royal Navy’, included open ships, a demonstration of destroyers in action, the destruction of an ‘enemy’ submarine, an engagement with a pirate junk, a cinema showing naval films, an amusement Park, and nautical tableaux.56 This can be considered another example of naval theatre. Rüger argues that by ‘merging regional, national and imperial identities, the naval theatre provided an important stage for processes of cultural nation-building, at a time when shared visions of nationhood were contested both from within and without’.57 Similarly, in front of a backdrop of contested identities and national struggle in China, the local press were quick to proclaim Navy Week an overwhelming success that ‘aroused considerable public interest’ in the ‘silent service’,58 and strengthened the imperial bond between Britain and Hong Kong: Highly reminiscent of Navy Week at Chatham or Portsmouth, the local Navy Day celebrations on Saturday will long remain as the most successful variety of entertainment ever provided in the Colony. Approximately 6,300 persons entered the Navy Yard between 1.30pm and 6pm, exceeding by far the highest anticipations. So dense were the throngs, particularly aboard HMS Eagle, that long queues had to be formed to control them. The happy inspiration that prompted the authorities to throw open the Naval Yard for the first time in local history has succeeded, in an unparalleled manner, in awakening interest in the Silent Service. At no point in the history of Hong Kong have relations between the Navy and the general public stood so high as they do today, and Navy Day, following so close upon Trafalgar Day, has undoubtedly cemented the bonds of friendship that have grown rapidly during the past few months.59

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Elliot’s motivations may not have been entirely altruistic or servicemotivated, however. As with other imperial missionaries on the frontiers of empire, such as the Caymans’ Commissioner Cardinall, he was also guided by personal legacy. The Royal Navy permanently loaned the HKNVF the First World War sloop HMS Cornflower on 31 March 1934, to serve as drill ship. Elliot used this opportunity to commemorate in perpetuity his status as founder of the HKNVF and its successor organisations, when he ‘kindly granted permission to embody his family insignia and motto in a new crest for the Force’. The Elliots were one of the most famous Scottish border clans, and ‘the facsimile of the head of the Cornflower was replaced by that of a forearm and hand wielding a scimitar. The scroll with the motto 60 “FORTITER ET RECTE” [“Bravely and Right”] was added’. This branding of the force with Elliot’s crest was not merely a vainglorious act of self-validation, but also cemented the long connection between Hong Kong and his family, stretching back to when Captain Charles Elliot first negotiated the island’s acquisition for Britain and served as its first administrator. It marked the Elliots’ historical role in shaping the colony, and redressed their public humiliation by Lord Palmerston

Figure 11  Elliot-inspired HKNVF crest and motto

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who, disapproving of the terms negotiated by Charles Elliot, dismissed him and denounced the island as ‘a barren rock with hardly a house 61 upon it’. Hong Kong’s subsequent prosperity had vindicated Charles Elliot’s vision, a fact now demonstratively embedded within its naval force with the Elliot clan’s honour restored, an important concept for military/naval dynasties.

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Expansion The physical deterioration of the ageing Cornflower raised legal issues regarding the Washington Naval Treaty. As the force’s headquarters she was not required to be seaworthy, but the stipulation of Article XIX that ‘no new fortifications shall be established in the territories specified’ meant the vessel could ‘not be allowed to degenerate to a hulk so that she can be considered part of the fixed defence of Hong Kong’.62 As the conditions of the loan had not included the cost of maintaining the propelling machinery, this resulted in more financial wrangling between the colony and Admiralty as to who was liable, with the cost falling on Hong Kong’s Government. From its initial estimate of $15,000 per annum, the ship’s upkeep increased to $120,000 over five years, approximately half of the money voted to maintain the HKNVF.63 By 1937 the Commodore reported that ‘great progress has been made by the Chinese ratings, who are now able to form an efficient minesweeping personnel’.64 These ratings were specifically recruited from maritime backgrounds, in particular ‘Chinese boat “Boys”, sampan owners and launch hands’.65 That basic ‘sea sense inherent in them’ was then ‘developed by training in western equipment and routine, gunnery, signals, etc.’.66 Consequently, under British tutelage they were said to have gained a ‘fair’ general knowledge of seamanship, and ‘their bearing at the various parades which they attended showed them to be keen and smart’.67 The ‘credit for this progress is entirely due to the unfailing patience and tact’ of their Royal Navy 68 instructors, the report concluded, situating naval training within an established tradition of paternalism underpinning British imperialism. Despite this development, ‘very serious objections’ were raised at the liability of Europeans to serve outside the Colony and relying too much on Chinese manpower, which the Royal Navy had associated with labour unrest since the Hong Kong seamen’s strike of 1922,69 and with a prominent ‘communistic element’ known to be rooted in the Chinese Seamen’s Union:70 The European man-power of the Colony is strictly limited and in a serious emergency every available European will be required to man the

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defences and essential services. If at such a time an important part of this man-power were to be called elsewhere … the sudden withdrawal of only a few officers or Cadets would disorganise the whole Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force, very grave concern would be caused to those responsible for the Colony’s defence.71

On 25 March 1936, the limited number of European volunteers prompted the Governor of Hong Kong to officially extend ‘an invitation to volunteer service’, declaring it ‘the duty of every able-bodied British-born man of suitable age to undergo training which will qualify him to take part in the most effective manner possible in the defence of the Colony’.72 The status of permanent seamen ratings was increased from Class II to Class I, with a pay rise of $2 a month, in the hope of securing ‘a better type’ of permanent European rating ‘to be an example to the Chinese Volunteers’.73 Yet response was slow and, to bolster the ranks, entry conditions were not always rigorously enforced. The Wavy Navy was not so bad and not so hot … I was very lazy as regards signalling … I only passed through my signalling test owing to the fact that several of us were taken at the same time and I was able to listen to the others calling out the dots and dashes for my benefit.74

As in other colonies, the local Scouting organisation was seen to offer potential signalmen.75 The crisis of September 1938, when the SinoJapanese conflict spilled over into Hong Kong’s territorial waters and Japanese warships attacked Chinese junks, brought home ‘the importance to the Colony of the Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Reserve’.76 Furthermore, Japan’s unabated expansion into China and the escalating situation in Europe, decreased the likelihood of Britain being able to successfully defend Hong Kong in the event of war. In late 1937, a revised (Eastern) War Memorandum advised that should this occur, Hong Kong could not be held and would have to be evacuated because its vulnerability to Japanese air attack ruled it out as an advanced fleet base.77 This determined the passing of Ordinance No. 25 on 1 August 1939,78 which gave ‘authority to the Navy to use the [HKNVF] at any parts requiring assistance, especially Singapore’.79 Surviving personnel and vessels could therefore be redeployed to continue fighting should Hong Kong have to be abandoned as anticipated. Consequently, the HKNVF’s members were asked if they were prepared to volunteer for general service in an emergency; sixty-eight from seventy-seven European Officers accepted, along with ‘a very high percentage of the Minewatching Branch and considerable numbers of Asiatics’.80 These were then formed into a Hong Kong Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (HKRNVR), though the HKNVF technically remained in effect for [ 191 ]

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those few men unwilling to volunteer for general service. By 1941, 81 90% of colonial naval personnel had accepted the obligation. To offset local concerns regarding absent European manpower, an additional European Seamen Branch was established, ‘primarily for the defence of the Colony’.82

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Mobilisation for war The outbreak of war with Germany, followed by the occupation of the New Territories’ border region by Japanese troops, increased local tensions and led to the partial mobilisation of the HKRNVR. This was ‘partly as a measure of general preparedness and to ensure a better surveillance of the waters surrounding the Colony; and partly to assist in the control of British merchant ships’.83 Its first members were mobilised for full-time service on 30 August 1939, joined by additional batches on 4 September and 26 October that year. The HKRNVR was thus the first naval volunteer unit in the British Empire to be mobilised and sent to sea, technically before war was declared, and with its own officers in command of the auxiliary flotilla.84 The age and condition of the equipment bequeathed to them caused ‘disorganisation due to failure of some, in fact most, of the old A.P.V’s [Auxiliary Patrol Vessels] to stand up to unaccustomed heavy duty’.85 Not designed for continuous naval patrols, they lacked cooking facilities and had improvised living quarters. Possessing few seagoing vessels in peacetime also meant ‘the acquiring of “sea legs” was a painful process’.86 The Communication Branch ratings in particular ‘did not take kindly to routine and discipline, suffered from sea-sickness and were pretty miserable and difficult’.87 Despite these challenges, overall ‘the adjustment to some semblance of order and routine was hard work but it was accomplished with remarkable harmony and good temper’.88 Though it would be two years before the Second World War boiled over in the East, the growing demands of the European conflict necessitated the withdrawal of increasing numbers of Royal Navy personnel from Hong Kong, with additional responsibilities falling on the 89 HKRNVR. Thus, the force successfully filled the Admiralty’s strategic hopes for colonial naval devolution, despite some local scepticism: Although the past seven months have not seen the tide of war approach near the Colony, so that in ill-informed quarters the work of the Hong Kong Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve may be considered of little value, yet it has contributed directly and in no small measure to the Imperial War effort in two important factors, firstly, by adding to the security of the Fortress of Hong Kong, and, secondly, by relieving Active Service

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officers and men, in order that they may proceed to the United Kingdom for service in the Fleet in home waters.90

This informed wider discourse whereby ‘military spokesmen propagated the dogma (first heard, and distrusted, by Rudyard Kipling on a visit to the colony in 1889) that Hong Kong was an “impregnable fortress”’,91 though the restrictions of Article XIX meant this bravado was more myth than reality. The HKRNVR’s response in the early days of the war earned it plaudits from the colony’s Governor: I wish in the first place to acknowledge both the ready alacrity with which those who were called up turned out and the high sense of public spirit of many of their employers who were seriously embarrassed by the sudden depletion of their staffs.92

This ‘high sense of public spirit’ prompted the influential Eurasian businessman Sir Robert Ho Tung to loan the HKRNVR his river steamer Tai Hing on 17 August 1940 for the duration of the war, as a replacement for the decrepit Cornflower. Ho Tung had previously donated the cost of two airplanes and several ambulances to the British Government during the First World War, and had administered Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee Fund and the South African War Fund. As John Carroll has argued, ‘just as royal visits and representation at empire exhibitions helped put places like Hong Kong on the map for many Britons, they enabled prominent Hong Kong merchants to distinguish themselves, at home and across the empire’.93 With East African businessmen making similar offers, war and local naval forces gave ambitious colonial subjects an opportunity to court imperial patronage and elevate their social status through material expressions of wartime patriotism. The Tai Hing was renamed on 7 September 1940 once the Admiralty authorised the Commodore’s proposal ‘to retain the name HMS Cornflower in perpetuity for use of the HKRNVR Headquarters 94 whether afloat or ashore’, strengthening the force’s identity, esprit de corps and pride in the service, and tightening the bond fostered by Elliot between Hong Kong’s community and the Navy. It also forged a tradition, demonstrating that the HKRNVR’s role was seen as longterm, beyond the current conflict, both within local thought and the ‘official mind’ of the Admiralty. The pressures of war had seemingly produced a positive response in Hong Kong, strengthening its sense of social and imperial duty, The Times reported: The backwash of war has made changes in the life and habits of Hongkong … Local-born British subjects, a ‘minority’ of growing importance

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in Hong-kong, are becoming more articulate for their rights … social conscience is being awakened so that it is no longer left to the zealous few to tackle the social evils of the place … the general attitude of 20 years ago, ‘I am not here for my health,’ had given way to a stronger sense of civic duty. People who could not, at one time, see beyond the Kowloon hills, now have a broader concept of Hong-kong’s position in relation to China, the Empire, and the changing world.95

This article was written for a besieged British public who had been cut off from Europe with France’s fall, and for whom stories about colonial support boosted domestic morale by fortifying a feeling that Britain was not, in fact, alone. In the context of fascist authoritarianism, that social liberalism was flourishing within the British Empire, producing positive social and moral benefits, justified Britain’s raison d’être for the war and her imperial role. Yet this portrayal of colonial unity was deceptive, as the local-born British minority were politicised in reaction to the influx of Chinese refugees from across Hong Kong’s border. Rather than the colony coming closer together, ethnic divisions were actually being brought into sharper focus. Even amongst Europeans, this facade of civil-military solidarity was slipping. The Governor had ‘entrusted’ Commander J. Petrie to prepare a mobilisation roster, ‘to nominate if possible only those whose mobilisation would cause least inconvenience to the civil community’.96 Expected to make ‘a private assessment of their value in the civil community’, Petrie selfishly concluded that ‘my need for Senior Officers, however, out-weighed other considerations’.97 On 15 September 1939, after two naval batches had been mobilised, concerns were already being aired that subordinated ‘civilian employers might oppose further mobilisation of members of their staff’, as ‘during the summer months foreign firms have members of their staffs on Home Leave’.98 It was not practicable to call up any European seamen, as the naval pay could not match their civilian wages and was ‘inadequate to support their families’, therefore they remained ‘in reserve against an emergency when the entire man-power of the Colony might be mobi99 lised’. The fact that Hong Kong was detached from the main theatre of conflict and tried to maintain a policy of business as usual, stretched the colony’s resources more than if total war had been declared locally: There was shortage of mobilised officer personnel due to the main effect of the war not having reached Hong Kong. A balance between local sea defence requirements and the needs of employers to retain their staff had to be found. The Admiralty needed the men but the Home Government stated that trade must be maintained – result, the formation of a local Reference Board to assess the claims of both parties.100

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By 16 May 1940, the strains on European manpower in Hong Kong were such that Governor Sir Geoffry Northcote told Petrie to look outside the Colony for full-time naval officers: The war-made demands upon the Civil Service were such that I could hold out no hope of more members of the Service who hold commission in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve or Naval Volunteer Force being available for mobilisation – fourteen were mobilised in the early months of the war and eleven are still on regular duty – nor did it appear from what he said that the prospects of getting many more from the nonofficial community were at all bright …. I advised him to discuss with the Commodore the feasibility of getting, say, a dozen sea-faring men of the officer class from Shanghai.101

Yet, attracting them to Hong Kong was another matter and was done, like in the Cayman Islands, by feeding misinformation, which caused a degree of discontent and exacerbated inter-colonial rivalries, undermining service unity and esprit de corps: The 1940 recruitment and intake of our ‘Shanghai contingent’. Excellent chaps, nearly all of them, but they were persuaded in Shanghai to volunteer into the Hong Kong RNVR on what was at best a misunderstanding – and was viewed by some of them (eager for active service) as downright deception. That, and the not uncommon pre-war Shanghai-Hong Kong rivalry, tended to make them a rather indigestible intake at least at the start!102

Unable to spare any personnel under such restrictions, the mobilised members of the HKRNVR had to forgo their home leave to Britain.103 This frustrated the aspirations of British members of the force, who felt divorced from the war being waged in Europe. The fact that they released Royal Navy personnel for deployment to more active theatres was little consolation for their own desires for meaningful action. That they continued to identify home as being Britain and not Hong Kong, which was just a temporary domicile, meant they subordinated the colony’s needs to that of imperial defence: We are impatient to be ‘in it’ at home. Our unmobilised men want to be mobilised. All over the Empire unmobilised men want to be mobilised; mobilised men want active engagement with the enemy. This World War is today being actively fought by the privileged few … We have volunteered for General Service. The Admiralty knows it and will call upon us for service elsewhere when we are required. We are doing our job for the Empire and we are doing it well. It is the Empire which is at war.104

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In contrast, ‘to the Seamen Ratings the first few weeks seemed as sublimely uneventful as life in general seems to the mass of 105 Chinese’. They did not possess the same attachment to Britain, or share concerns about her fortunes in the far-removed European conflict when China had been at war much earlier, and several unmobi lised Chinese personnel were struck off for not attending drills.106 This was despite moves to entice Chinese ratings with free meals before Tuesday and Friday training, as ‘many of the Volunteers are either very poorly paid or unemployed’, and ‘a Rating travelling several miles to attend a Drill is poorly recompensed by 15 cents and that to provide a meal, in addition to the bounty, would ensure a larger attendance of men fit to undergo instruction’.107 One tactic to combat apathy was to institute a series of short broadcasts on naval subjects of general interest ‘to provide efficient propaganda on Naval matters’.108 Though European members of the HKRNVR wanted to fight, this patriotism did not necessarily extend to civil society. Hong Kong was the first Crown Colony to implement compulsory service, convening tribunals from 28 August 1939. A number of men protested against the draft on work grounds and other time commitments, attracting criticism from sections of the community. ‘Mrs M.’ was so ‘disgusted with some of the men in Hong Kong for the silly excuses some put forward to exempt them from military service’, she publicly scolded them though the South China Morning Post: A lot of people seem to think that their jobs are very important, but don’t they understand that they would all be at a standstill in the case of an emergency? … Thank Heaven we have the Regular Army and Navy. I suppose some of these ‘busy men’ in Hong Kong think that the Services can guard the Colony so that they can keep their jobs in comfort.109

In response, ‘BUSINESSMAN’ argued that: Members of the fighting forces are so by choice, having taken to the Navy or Army as a profession and as such, during the last twenty odd years, have a very pleasant time, short working hours and plenty of games … As far as the male civilian population of this Colony is concerned, I have little doubt that in the event of an emergency they will do their bit … a number were involved in the last war and experience has taught them not to allow themselves to fall into the grip of officialdom until absolutely necessary.110

Those bonds of friendship and understanding which Commodore Elliot had worked so hard to foster between the Navy and the Hong Kong public, quickly unravelled under competing wartime demands, [ 196 ]

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as they did in East Africa. The local perception that the war in Europe did not constitute an emergency in Hong Kong and did not warrant more active involvement, was further evinced by ‘NOT YET A VOLUNTEER’. He nonchalantly claimed that, ‘if and when the war does come I do not think that it will require “Compulsory Service” 111 to make most Englishmen do their bit’, though he was notably less certain about the colony’s other ethnic groups.

Transient loyalty War and disagreements around compulsory service not only sparked divisions between civil society and the services, men and women, but also between ethnicities: While any decent foreigner (our opponents excepted of course) will fight for or help willingly the country which gave him hospitality, nearly all Chinese seem either not to mind a bit or are ready to rush elsewhere, for safety. The native population is composed of what? Eighty percent of coolies, shop fokis [workers/waiters] and the like; hardly with a brain and of course without any sense of country; they are hardly over the animal class and must be treated as such. Those remaining (real Hong Kong Chinese apart) are composed of taipans, retired officials or generals, traders, and tens of thousands of little sneaks who ran away from their country to escape their military duties. The whole lot (or nearly) is full of corruption, ready to sell anything to anyone or acclaim any flag for a few dollars.112

Though this perception from Mr ‘Gallus’ is loaded with racial prejudice, it does reflect some of the identity problems associated with Hong Kong’s nature as an entrepôt. This status had naturally encouraged a transient business community to develop in the colony, bearing a cosmopolitan commercial outlook, and has led Ackbar Abbas to describe Hong Kong as ‘not so much a place as a space of transit’.113 Chinese traders followed the profitable opportunities that Hong Kong offered, but generally did not settle there, instead returning to their homelands and the families left behind with money made from their transnational ventures: few, if any, having been born at the place. The majority of these men are engaged in trade, and only reside in Hong-Kong long enough to obtain a competency with which they may return to their native land. The facilities of transit now afforded by the various lines of steamers render a trip home so inexpensive and expeditious, that those who can afford it frequently avail themselves of a run to the old country.114

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Out of a population of 849,800 in 1931, less than a third, 276,400, had 115 been born in Hong Kong. Though John Carroll has convincingly argued that a Hong Kong identity began to form before 1949 as part of a rising Chinese bourgeoisie bound together by ‘its members commitment to making money’, these men did not represent the ranks of the HKRNVR, who were drawn from a Chinese working class which ‘maintained a long tradition of popular animosity toward Colonial rule’.116 While free trade capitalism cut across national borders, strengthening Hong Kong during peacetime with the wealth it cultivated, in war such transiency caused the War Office to question the loyalty and willingness of these economic migrants to defend the colony which did not constitute their home: From the point of view of defence it would be no exaggeration to say that all Chinamen in Hong Kong would be open to suspicion of anti-British intentions should they be present in a siege of Hong Kong as part of a beleaguered populace. We feel that their reactions would immediately turn to the side which appeared likely to be the probable winner. The world situation and other such things we feel are unlikely to influence the transient loyalty of a Chinaman.117

Yet by encouraging a laissez-faire outlook in Hong Kong, the British were themselves architects in fostering this morally-corrupting commerciality: The Colony is just a big godown [warehouse], armed to the teeth, in the Far East. Its soil is not productive by nature and therefore cannot support an agricultural population worth mentioning. It has to depend on trade and handicraft manufactures. Napoleon has said – ‘Commerce dries up the soul; the merchant has neither faith nor country’. Chinese are just humans and if what Bonaparte said applies well to his people and their neighbours; it cannot be surprising some Chinese merchants have degraded.118

While ‘Gallus’ viewed the Chinese as ‘hardly over the animal class’, here they were recognised as ‘just humans’ who became unfortunate victims of Western capitalism. More often, colonial discourse positioned benighted ‘Oriental’ lethargy as the other to enlightened British ‘progress’. Unlike other areas of the British Empire, such as within Africa, China was recognised as having once been a great civilisation that had fallen into a state of stagnancy as a consequence of its long self-imposed isolation from the West. The ‘civilising mission’ there was about resurrecting Chinese civilisation along ‘modern’ Western models. Within this paternalistic dynamic, there resided a fear that the teacher could become corrupted by the moral decay of the ‘Oriental’ [ 198 ]

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climate. However, rather than providing the antidote, in this instance the degrading force was seen to be Britain and its, supposedly, civilised commercial values. Mr ‘Gallus’s’ views prompted an angry response from the Chinese community, exacerbating colonial divisions on the eve of the Second World War: It is always good to know what others think of us. Besides, I had always wondered why we who are living here are so apathetic and indifferent to its safety. Now I know. If Gallus’ outburst be representative of the general European sentiments towards their fellow Chinese residents, thinking that 80% of us are ‘hardly with a brain and of course without any sense of country’ and ‘are hardly over the animal class’ then what more could they expect from us?119

Preconceptions regarding Chinese unreliability were reinforced by wide-scale desertions from the HKRNVR after Japan invaded Hong Kong on 8 December 1941. By failing to keep the non-European population informed about the war situation, the colonial authorities confirmed Chinese assumptions ‘that the war was a British affair that had nothing to do with them … Faced with this crisis, their instinct was to run’.120 The HKRNVR practice of mooring vessels in lots of two down Aberdeen Harbour, and thus concentrating targets for the Japanese, seemed ‘disturbingly idiotic to Chinese after [the] first bombing’;121 when HMS Indira was sunk by this ‘morale-shaking bombing’, the entire crew of the adjacent HMS Perla ‘bolted’; panic usually spread from the engine room ratings, who were trapped within the bowels of the ship, unable to see what was going on outside.122 Aboard HMS Minnie on 11 December, two men were rendered unconscious from fear, mess boys and engine room ratings rioted, the crew refused to go to sea again, and each time Aberdeen Harbour was raided and the Dockyard Police disappeared into the shelters, the crew took advantage and ran. Minnie’s CO managed to gather replacements by 16 December, only for them to arrive at the dockyard in time to witness a 123 large air raid; they immediately reversed their decision to join. Though a number of Chinese remained loyal, some British officers retained their prejudices. When the crew of HMS Frosty rendezvoused at the Aberdeen Industrial School on 19 December to receive their evacuation orders, the CO was told by the on-duty Royal Navy officer, Lieutenant-Commander Harrison: ‘tell all your Chinese to fuck off, and you to get up into the hills … I’m not standing any truck from a two and a half wavy navy … your messman might be a fifth columnist’.124 The Chinese messman in question had fifteen years prior service in the Royal Navy to his name. Upon the British return to Hong Kong after [ 199 ]

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the war, conscious of their precarious position in reasserting colonial authority, ‘it was agreed that to avoid possible political complications and damage to British prestige the trouble must be cleared up’ regarding those Chinese ratings illegally discharged by Harrison, and 125 questions of pay and demobilisation settled. The reasons behind the desertions were not the result of any innately unreliable characteristic amongst the Chinese, despite the British harbouring such preconceptions. Many of the conditions which prompted Chinese ratings to desert from the force were created by the naval and colonial authorities themselves. There was disenchantment with the round-the-clock work and meagre rations. There had been particular resentment at the fact that on 11 December they had been ordered to fire upon fellow Chinese, destroying at least twenty junks and crippling many more suspected of carrying Japanese infiltrators, rumours which proved to be false.126 At the same time, shore batteries bombarded a fishing village at the head of Picnic Bay. It was later admitted by HKRNVR officer J.C. McDouall, that these actions were taken without seeking formal identification, as ‘no officer on any ship concerned or in any shore battery saw any Japanese in the junks, though all but those on Perla and Poseidon were admittedly too far away to distinguish faces’.127 The suddenness of the Japanese attack meant that billeting of HKRNVR families could not be sanctioned in time to move them from the mainland and into safe houses on the island. Fear for their families’ safety thus increased amongst the men when the Japanese entered Kowloon and unopposed air raids escalated, exacerbated by ‘over-optimistic assurances of families being looked after’ which were ‘too often quickly found to be false’. With no leave given to check on families, many deserters took matters into their own hands. Those ratings ‘without families usually seemed comparatively undisturbed by danger’,128 ironic considering it was the Chinese without roots in Hong Kong who the British originally believed could not be relied upon in war. A large proportion of deserters had formerly been merchant sailors enlisted in the HKRNVR on T.124 contracts when their vessels were requisitioned, and ‘because they had always been able to leave or be dismissed at one month’s notice, their training and discipline had consequently suffered’ and they were therefore not volunteers in the same sense, nor had they received the same level of naval training to maintain discipline: ‘from the Ratings point of view they were employed and paid as Merchant crews – bombing was not in 129 the contract’. This was not a uniquely Chinese problem, and the Royal Navy experienced similar issues with British crews, though colonial officials [ 200 ]

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failed to acknowledge this. It was commonly accepted in Britain that the ‘serious and growing shortage of seafarers’ had resulted ‘in 130 an inferior class of men being signed on’ T.124 contracts. Until the opening of a depot at HMS Mersey, these men were recruited locally by the Ministry of Shipping, resulting in a ‘lack of discrimination’.131 The Rear-Admiral of the Third Battle Squadron, Halifax, called them ‘the riff-raff of Glasgow and Belfast’,132 for the Admiral Commanding Reserves they were ‘men of the “animal” type or morally bad’,133 while Vice-Admiral Charles Kennedy-Purvis, Commander-in-Chief of the American and West Indies Station, concurred with both by saying: ‘many of these men are the lowest scum of sea port towns in Scotland, Ireland and England, and in their manners and habits are little better than animals’.134 This discourse echoes that of ‘Gallus’, indicating that such prejudices were as much class driven as racially motivated, as David Cannadine suggests.135 The T.124 crew of the enemy observation drifter The Boys refused to go to sea and ‘behaved in a mutinous way’,136 on account that ‘if a German submarine came alongside knowing that they were (a) not in usual drifter’s fishing ground, [and] (b) not properly equipped for fishing, they would be immediately shot’.137 Like the HKRNVR ratings who objected to mooring practices, they failed to see logic in naval policy decided elsewhere. The fact that ‘the majority of mercantile marine ratings and fishermen have little or no knowledge of discipline as understood in a man-of-war’,138 while shortages produced ‘circumstances which have not enabled any choice to be made of the men to be signed on, nor permitted of any training’,139 equally applied to T.124s in the HKRNVR. What was not fully understood in British aspersions on Chinese loyalty is that within Chinese culture, military service was believed to be lesser in social status than the merchant class. Naval volunteering would have lowered many in Chinese eyes. Ironically, official policy since the nineteenth century had fostered a lack of Chinese sympathy towards colonial affairs by preserving communal distinctiveness, leaving the Chinese community to handle their own internal policing, adjudication, social welfare and medical care through an assortment of indigenous institutions. By 1936, Hong Kong’s European and Chinese communities were only ‘just beginning’ to mix on a social basis,140 and during this decade ‘pushing forward within the framework of their own self-contained world the Chinese were starting in various ways to pose a steadily growing challenge to British hegemony’.141 On 8 December 1941, the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, eight hours after the strike on Pearl Harbour, bringing with war a change in popular discourse. The day after, Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert BrookePopham, now the Commander-in-Chief Far East Command, alongside [ 201 ]

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C-in-C of the China Station, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, issued the following statement:

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Let us all remember that we here in the Far East form part of the great campaign for the preservation in the world of truth and justice and freedom; confidence, resolution, enterprise and devotion to the cause must and will inspire every one of us in the fighting services, while from the civilian population, we expect that patience, endurance and serenity which is the great virtue of the East and which will go far to assist the fighting men to gain final and complete victory.142

With the colony besieged by Japanese soldiers, it could not afford to face opposition within its own ranks as well. The British official response above is interesting, not only in its appeal to trans-ethnic colonial unity in the face of a common enemy, but also how it attempts this through cultural sympathy. The language used is layered with subtextual resonance for the Chinese community. Serenity is explicitly mentioned in relation to the East; this notion carries specific religious connotations, being commonly associated with Buddhism, though also an influence in Taoism. These were the major religions in Hong Kong, with the Colony affected by the Buddhist revival that occurred in South China during the 1920s.143 One of the Ten Perfections (dasa paramiyo) ¯ listed in the Buddhavamsa scripture of Theravada Buddhism is serenity, which alongside equanimity, represents upekkha: ¯ Upekkha¯ means equanimity in the face of the fluctuations of worldly fortune … it is indifference only to the demands of the ego-self with its craving for pleasure and position, not to the well-being of one’s fellow human beings. True equanimity is the pinnacle of the four social attitudes that the Buddhist texts call the ‘divine abodes’.144

The Second World War can surely be viewed as one of the ultimate ‘fluctuations of worldly fortune’. A call for serenity/upekkha¯ upon Hong Kong’s invasion was an appeal to that higher virtue within the transient Chinese population whom the British doubted, to put aside their individual impulses to abandon the Colony, or possibly aid the Japanese, and act for its greater good as upekkha¯ dictated. The utilisation of such cultural signifiers thus acted as a mechanism for imperial control, aiding the preservation of colonial law and order during the crisis. It would also counter any attempts at garnering popular support through religious solidarity by Buddhist elements of the Japanese army. Beside serenity, most of the qualities that the Brooke-Popham/Layton statement categorically lists carry religious connotations. Truth, or sacca, is found in Buddha’s ‘Four Noble Truths’, as well as being one [ 202 ]

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of the Ten Perfections. Resolution, or adhitthana, ¯ is another of the Ten Perfections, as are patience and endurance,˙ ˙ known together as khanti, ˙ ıla, and enterprise is comparable to energy, virtue is equated with S¯ vigour, and effort which constitute viriya. The Brooke-Popham/Layton statement thus appeals to six of the Ten Perfections. As Hong Kong’s situation deteriorated in the face of Japan’s onslaught and with desertions from the HKRNVR, officials attempted to disperse doubts about Britain’s ability to defend the colony so as to maintain Chinese support: The public morale is good and Command Headquarters pay tribute to the remarkable imperturbability of the Chinese. This quick adaption to war conditions is necessary and helpful. It is no small achievement to have settled down in a few days to war routine. Again is demonstrated the Chinese capacity for making the best of things.145

Such assurances were a smokescreen, however, and within days of their issuance, preparations were being made for the inevitable surrender: The order came through for all ships in the harbour to be scuttled. The Japs had made a sudden break-through and there was a sudden sort of panic. Actually it was another week before we gave in. We only had a quarter of the island left in which to fight.146

The escape of the 2nd MTB Flotilla Despite the desperate situation, and perhaps symptomatic of not being Royal Navy regulars fully conditioned by naval discipline, a group of HKRNVR officers in the 2nd MTB Flotilla deliberately disobeyed this order: We emphatically refused to scuttle. Around us was the most miserable sight that could greet any seaman’s eyes; ships in all stages of being sunk, not by enemy action but by our own hands. It was certainly a black morning. We refused to scuttle because among many reasons we were determined never to give up our boats to the Japs but make a break for it at the last moment.147

In hindsight they believed their disobedience was ‘lucky for the defenders that we hadn’t scuttled’ for, as the only British vessels left afloat with the exception of two gunboats, the MTBs became invaluable and were drafted to undertake many tasks they were not designed for, such as ‘ferrying troops, stores and ammunition, patrol work, messenger work, evacuating troops off rocky shores at night and [ 203 ]

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anything else that needed to be done’. authorities of their planned escape:

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Word then reached the high

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They were interested in getting away from the island Admiral Chan Chak, China’s No.2 Admiral, some of his staff and some higher British Officers and decided to combine the two parties. Three or Four days before the end we were under official orders to get away at the last moment at all costs after picking up the official party. We were selfishly pleased. It was a chance. It was obvious that the island could not hold out very much longer.149

Needless to say, they chose to follow these particular orders, being in their better interests, though regret was expressed at having to hide the fact from comrades, and ‘leave behind so many of one’s pals and slip off in the night as if we were running away at the last moment, even though we realised that that was not the case’.150 Regarding this last sentiment, however, that had been their original intention before the plan to evacuate the Admiral was imposed on them by the authorities, thus providing them with a moral absolution that retrospectively altered their perception of the incident and their personal motives. Consequently, collective empathy relating a ‘heroic last stand’ with the battle for Hong Kong was preserved, emphasised by the resolution that Hong Kong ‘could not be held but must be defended’:151 When I think of what happened in Malaya and at Singapore I am filled with pride at the thought of the really marvellous show which had been put up by the island’s defenders. At the end, after about ten days of nonstop fighting against heavy odds, with hardly any sleep, food or rest and with no reserves at all, they were outnumbered about five to one, but they didn’t give in until the Japs had taken about three quarters of the island.152

It is not so much a collective or empire-transcendent British character which is being lauded; instead Hong Kong heroism is being defined, not only in relation to the Japanese aggressors, but also the seeming capitulation of their colonial brethren in Singapore and Malaya. This sense of distinction was further emphasised by the clear priority given to Singapore by the Admiralty, both in pre-war planning and in April 1941, when the Commander-in-Chief, Singapore, transferred a number of inferior Chinese Bren guns to Hong Kong’s naval vessels, in exchange 153 for their superior Lewis Guns, which were dispatched to Singapore. Furthermore, the RNVR was issued with dud ammunition ‘that cost us dearly enough’ when put into action against the Japanese, displayed in the sample of failure rates:154 [ 204 ]

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Table 6  Sample of HKRNVR vessels and dud ammunition fired during hostilities, 8–19 December 1941 HKRNVR Vessel

Percentage of duds

Cornflower Minnie Shun Wo Perla

At least 50% 30% 10% At least 60%

Vessels such as the Insect-class gunboats Moth and Cicala were also left understrength from personnel transfers, lacking the crew to utilise all their guns and forcing them to prioritise only: those which are more urgent at the moment ... If Moth or Cicala or both are supporting the left flank of Army at any time on mainland and are attacked by aircraft whilst bombarding with their 6” armament, I consider that they should temporarily cease fire with A or B Gun and with the 8 men thus released man their pom-pom and 3” until the attack is driven off.155

The feelings of one of the aforementioned pals left behind, Ralph Goodwin, were more mixed, having been laid-up in hospital when, from the engines of the MTBs, he heard: a muffled throbbing roar ... tuning up for their last run ... The sound of those motors warming up on Christmas night, 1942, is still with me whenever my thoughts drift back, just as I heard it at the time, from my hospital bed. My feelings were confused and violent. Pleasure that some of the boats were still afloat and would yet cheat the enemy; anger at my own helpless impotence; despair when the low roar faded into distance, and the feeling that the last link with freedom had gone.156

Though Goodwin did not seemingly resent the escapees, their actions nevertheless had a profound effect on those left behind. The Navy and the MTBs personified liberty, and their departure from the colony reflected the symbolic moment when Hong Kong shifted from Britain’s ‘benevolent’ rule to Japan’s fascist authoritarianism. The escapees carried Hong Kong’s freedom with them, resigning those servicemen left behind to POW camps; in the words of Goodwin, ‘there could be no “Dunkirk” for the beleaguered 157 troops’. Individual attempts to escape the POW camps, including by Goodwin, provoked stronger responses, as the remaining members were made to suffer the ‘additional privations’ of interrogations, torture and further arrests as collective punishment.158 Yet for the [ 205 ]

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majority, the in-group identity of the HKRNVR overrode such separation and hardship:

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We were after all still mobilised, and we lived, worked, and went through it very much as a unit. That episode [in the POW camps] is part of Hong Kong RNVR’s history … It was this feeling of belonging to the HKRNVR that prompted me in writing … so much about activities of individual members who left us for weeks or months in 1940 or 1941 … They were only away from us for a time, they came back to us, and even whilst away they were still representatives of the HKRNVR.159

The experience in the camps helped foster a collective memory amongst the HKRNVR of valour in defeat, which was epitomised by 2nd MTB, though the reality for many was less triumphant: Every single CO had insisted that wherever there was any real fighting it was his men and his alone that had been in the thick of it, and that on the rare occasions when any other unit had been seen at all they had been taking cover or running away … I think there is a very reasonable explanation of this apparently myopic and vainglorious attitude from which the various COs, especially suffered in the Camp. The fact is that after the first few days of the battle communications, co-ordination and general control by HQ Command steadily deteriorated to near vanishing point … COs doing their very best in the field became clueless as to what was going on elsewhere, and steadily lost all co-ordinated contact with other units. No wonder that their principal recollections 3½ years later, whilst still POWs, were of little but what their own men had been doing in a long series of mainly rearguard and often unsupported actions.160

Admiral Chan Chak The glorification of the 2nd MTB Flotilla’s escape from the island has been borne out in the subsequent historiography and its popular commemoration.161 The actions of ‘a fleet which amounted, in one dismissive summary, to a “few naval launches”’,162 has been elevated to the status of ‘heroic myth’,163 not just of the British Empire, but of the Chinese too.164 This is built on the presence of Admiral Chan Chak, whose evacuation was facilitated by the Admiralty, on its vessels and manned by its personnel, though his assistance was crucial in successfully traversing mainland China: The British considered themselves to be rescuing Chan Chak: Chan Chak, however, had no doubt that he was rescuing them … Only he had the local knowledge and contact that would enable the party to proceed into the Chinese interior.165

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For the naval authorities, it was ‘unheard of for a commander to prejudice the safety of his ships to save two Chinese, however distin166 and thus the MTBs left the rendezvous point before guished’, Chan Chak had arrived, forcing the one-legged Admiral to catch up overland. Concern for Chan Chak’s wellbeing came less from naval quarters and more from F.W. Kendal of the Secret Service, who feared the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek would lose trust in Britain if the Admiral and his aide were captured, tortured and killed,167 compromising British prestige in East Asia and their wartime alliance. A hegemonic relationship had been inculcated over the preceding decade, with Chan Chak studying European navies as part of his reorganisation of China’s and was present in Hong Kong when the HKNVF was formed in 1933.168 Prior to Western and Japanese incursions into China, ‘invaders were Sinicized, and barbarians beyond the border paid humble tribute to “civilization,” reinforcing a Sinocentric view of Chinese civilization as universal and superior’.169 Confucian universalism essentially involved a ‘fierce racism, rejection of other cultures … and cultural superiority’.170 Confucian teachings also questioned the value of direct military action: The traditional view held by Confucius is that caution is the better part of valour and that it ill behooves the wise man to risk his own life inappropriately. The profound pacification of the country, especially after the rule of the Mongols, greatly enhanced this mood. The empire became an empire of peace.171

Neo-Confucianism bred not only anti-foreignism but also antimilitarism, resulting in a paradox that set a precedent for the future utilisation of military knowledge from abroad: The stress on civil virtues and the growing importance of the vaunted examination system as a channel for upward mobility led to a general decline in martial spirit. Yet even as China turned inward, her everpresent need for foreign military and administrative expertise assured that outsiders would continue to find their way into the Chinese service.172

The position of the soldier thus came to occupy ‘the lowest rung of Chinese society’, and gave rise to the Chinese proverb: ‘good iron is not used for nails; good men do not become soldiers’.173 The military became a ‘despised’ occupation, and ‘a cultivated literary man would not engage in social intercourse on an equal footing with army officers’.174 Classed lower than merchants, the soldier was excluded from the standard Confucian list of the four occupations established in Chinese lore, which, in descending order, constituted the scholar [ 207 ]

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EA ST A S IA

(shi), farmer (nong), artisan (gong), and merchant (shang). This omission was because the Confucian wenren (literati) who compiled the listing regarded the practitioners of wu (violence) as their mortal enemies who incarnated the very evil of brute force that it was a Confucianist’s moral 175 duty to extirpate in the cause of civilised behaviour. Such cultural attitudes contributed to the difficulties in recruiting for the HKRNVR. Demonstrations of violence and militarism were considered antithetical to Confucian notions of civilisation and Chinese cultural superiority. It has been argued by Charles Hucker amongst others that China thus ‘became so civilized they lacked the martial values and sense of ethnicity (as opposed to culturalism) with which to fight off the invaders, who ordinarily promised to rule in the Chinese fashion’.176 In this sense, they came to view themselves as a non-martial race, an identity which was then reflected to the outside world, and reproduced through Orientalist perceptions. The shock to the system came with the, so-called, Century of Humiliation and Western imperial aggression following the First Opium War, which ‘fundamentally dislodged Chinese intellectuals from their Confucian haven [creating a] sense of impotence, frustration, and humiliation’.177 This period highlighted the technological – and by extension the military and naval – disparity between China and the industrialised West, evinced in the popular Chinese phrase ‘backwards/beaten’ (luohou aida): Interpreted as ‘the backwards will be beaten’ (luohou jiuyao aida), the phrase implies that the former caused the latter: economic and technological backwardness led to China’s defeat at the hands of the West.178

Therefore, modernisation of its military along Western lines came to be viewed as a way of reversing this backwardness, a hegemonic trend continued by Chan Chak’s modelling of China’s navy on Britain’s, whom he ‘had always admired’.179 Hong Kong had been expected to hold out for ninety days but had managed just eighteen,180 and ‘many stories’ abounded in China about Britain’s ‘lack of effort to defend the Island’.181 To maintain their ‘friendship and co-operation’, Chan Chak was asked to broadcast a message to the Chinese attesting to ‘the fighting qualities of the British forces’.182 It was not only ‘New China’ who ‘needed heroes’, to extend Peter Hays Gries’ argument;183 Hong Kong needed heroes of its own. Paradoxically, Chan Chak filled that role for British colonial officials; he was Chinese, anti-communist, he respected British hegemony and naval tradition, he epitomised the cooperative spirit between the British and Chinese which would be essential to both communities’ [ 208 ]

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H O N G KO N G , P R E - 1 9 4 5

future prosperity in Hong Kong, and he collaborated with the colonial authorities to fortify their position, being awarded the KBE (Knight Commander of the British Empire) for his efforts. Though Chan Chak was instructed by Chiang Kai-shek to take charge of the Nationalist underground there, he had ended up ‘working quietly with 184 the British police and intelligence services’. During the invasion he rallied Hong Kong’s Chinese with propaganda, brought in anticolonial elements likes snipers and triad leaders and ‘used a combination of threats and payoffs to persuade them to abandon any thoughts of massacring Europeans and instead tackle the saboteurs’.185 While Chan Chak the man was not from Hong Kong, his idealised ‘spirit’ became rooted there as a rallying symbol for ‘Hongkonger’ nationalism, representing its own collective strength and perseverance during wartime in the face of overwhelming odds. Gries has argued that ‘war is at once the graveyard of peoples and the birthplace of nations. Most nations are born out of the ashes of war; indeed, nations define themselves through conflict with other nations’.186 Its invasion by the Japanese in the Second World War was the moment Hong Kong and its people came of age, transforming its relationship with both Britain and China.

Notes  1  South China Morning Post, 24 October 1933, p. 13.  2  Ibid.  3  P.J. Melson (ed.), White Ensign – Red Dragon: The History of the Royal Navy in Hong Kong 1841–1997, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong, 1997), p. 105.  4  TNA, ADM116/3121, ‘Flag Officers at Singapore Conference’, 1925, p. 18.  5  TNA, CO129/505/2, ‘Committee of Imperial Defence – Hong Kong Local Forces’, 26 September 1927, p. 1.  6  Ibid.  7  TNA, CO129/505/2, Admiralty to the Colonial Office, 22 August 1927.  8  The China Mail, 6 August 1926, p. 6.  9  Mamie Meredith, ‘Longfellow’s “Excelsior” Done into Pidgin-English’, The American Dialect Society, Vol. 5, No. 2 (December, 1929), p. 149. 10  Julian Ralph, Alone in China, and other stories (London, 1897), p. 70. 11  The China Mail, 6 August 1926, p. 6. 12  Ibid. 13  Ibid. 14  Ibid. 15  TNA, CO129/505/2, Admiralty to the Colonial Office, 22 August 1927. 16  Ibid. 17  Ibid. 18  The Hong Kong Telegraph, 6 September 1929, p. 1. 19  South China Morning Post, 8 September 1933, p. 12. 20  The China Mail, 19 September 1929, p. 6. 21  TNA, ADM116/6125, ‘Remarks on Paragraphs in Detail, Part 1’, p. 3. 22  Ibid., ‘Part II’, p. 5. 23 Field, Royal Navy Strategy, pp. 61–62. 24  South China Morning Post, 8 September 1933, p. 12. 25  Ibid.

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EA ST A S IA 26  Ibid. 27 Field, Royal Navy Strategy, p. 102. 28  Public Records Office, Hong Kong (hereafter PROHK), HKRS6-1-1695, Rear-Admiral F. Elliot to Commander F. Warrington-Strong, HKRNR, 26 February 1967. 29  South China Morning Post, 8 September 1933, p. 12. 30  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1695, Rear-Admiral F. Elliot to Commander F. WarringtonStrong, HKRNR, 26 February 1967. 31  Ibid. 32  Ibid. 33  South China Morning Post, 30 September 1933, p. 16. 34  South China Morning Post, 8 September 1933, p. 12. 35  Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation (London, 2003), p. 19. 36  Ibid. 37  N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Great Britain 660–1640 (London, 1997), p. 432. 38  South China Morning Post, 21 October 1933. 39  Ibid. 40  South China Morning Post, 23 October 1933, p. 12. 41  Ibid. 42  Ibid. 43  Ibid. 44  Ibid. 45  The Hong Kong Telegraph, 25 October 1933, p. 10. 46  South China Morning Post, 23 October 1933, p. 12. 47  Jim English, ‘Empire Day in Britain, 1904–1958’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2006), pp. 247–276, 260. 48  Ibid. 49  Duncan Redford defines ‘sea blindness’ as ‘the inability to connect with maritime issues at either an individual or political level’. He argues that a ‘sea change in attitude towards the Navy’ occurred during the interwar period as the development of air power threatened to make naval security ‘appear irrelevant’ in the eyes of the British public. Duncan Redford, ‘The Royal Navy, Sea Blindness and British National Identity’, in Redford (ed.), Maritime History and Identity: The Sea and Culture in the Modern World (London, 2013), pp. 62, 70–71. 50  Herfried Munkler, ‘Nation as a Model of Political Order and the Growth of National Identity in Europe’, International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1999), pp. 283–299, 289. 51  English, ‘Empire Day in Britain’, p. 275. 52  South China Morning Post, 5 October 1933, p. 17. 53 Conley, Jack Tar to Union Jack, p. 9. 54  South China Morning Post, 16 September 1933, p. 10. 55  South China Morning Post, 31 October 1933, p. 10. 56  South China Morning Post, 16 September 1933, p. 10. 57 Rüger, The Great Naval Game, p. 182. 58 South China Morning Post, 26 October 1933, p. 11. 59  South China Morning Post, 30 October 1933, p. 11. 60  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1695, Item 2, ‘HKRNVR Crest’. 61  Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (London, 2007), p. 14. 62  TNA, ADM116/4343, Commander-in-Chief, China to Commodore, Hong Kong, 2 December 1934. 63  TNA, ADM116/4343, ‘Appendix to letter, Commanding Office, HKNVF, to Commodore, Hong Kong’, 21 December 1938, p. 1. 64  TNA, CO129/557/7, Commodore, Hong Kong, to Governor, Hong Kong, 17 April 1936. st st 65  TNA, ADM116/4343, ‘Report – 1 April 1936 to 31 March, 1937’, CO, HKNVR, to Commodore, Hong Kong, 2 April 1937.

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H O N G KO N G , P R E - 1 9 4 5  66  Ibid.  67  TNA, CO129/557/7, Commodore, Hong Kong, to Governor, Hong Kong, 17 April 1936.  68  Ibid.  69  Liew, ‘Labour Formation, Identity, and Resistance’, pp. 415–439.  70 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 30.  71  TNA, CO129/555/9, Officer Administering the Government to Malcolm Macdonald, 28 August 1935, pp. 2–3.  72  TNA, CO129/557/7, W.T. Southern, Colonial Secretary, 12 March 1936.  73  PROHK, HKRS7-1-1716, Commodore, Hong Kong to CO, HKNVF, ‘Annual Estimates’, 12 August 1937.  74  Wavy Navy was the nickname for reservists on account of their wavy sleeve rings, which differentiated them from the straight lace worn by Royal Navy regulars. PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, ‘With the MTBs – December 1941’, letter of a Sub-Lieutenant, HKRNVR to his brother.  75  PROHK, HKRS7-1-1716, HKNVF Communications Branch to CO, 30 March 1938.  76  TNA, ADM116/4343, HKNVF – Annual Report, 31 March, 1939.  77  Ian Cowman, Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations on the Pacific, 1937–1941 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 21–22.  78  TNA, CO129/584/8, ‘HKRNR and HKNVF – Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31st March, 1940’, p. 1.  79  South China Morning Post, 3 June 1937, p. 2.  80  TNA, CO129/584/8, ‘HKRNR and HKNVF – Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31st March, 1940’, p. 2.  81  TNA, CO825/32/3, ‘Statutory Declaration’, Commander James Petrie, Sydney, 1942.  82  TNA, CO129/584/8, ‘HKRNR and HKNVF – Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31st March, 1940’, p. 2.  83  TNA, CO129/584/8, Commodore A.M. Peters to Governor, 11 April 1940, p. 1.  84  TNA, CO129/584/8, Commander Petrie, CO HKRNVR, 8 September 1939, p. 1.  85  TNA, CO129/588/15, HKRNVR – A.S.R.71/40, 30 August 1940, p. 1.  86  Ibid.  87  TNA, CO129/584/8, ‘HKRNR and HKNVF – Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31st March, 1940’, p. 3.  88  Ibid.  89  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, Ralph Smith to B.J.B. Morahan, 14 April 1950, p. 3.  90  TNA, CO129/584/8, Commodore A.M. Peters to Governor, 11 April 1940, p. 1.  91 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 47.  92  TNA, CO129/584/8, A.S.R.9, Commander Petrie, HKRNVR CO, 8 September 1939, p. 1.  93  John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong (London, 2005), pp. 74–75.  94  TNA, CO129/588/15, Report by CO, 1 April 1940 to 31 March 1941, p. 2.  95  The Times, 7 July 1941, p. 5.  96  TNA, CO129/584/8, ‘HKRNR and HKNVF – Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31st March, 1940’, p. 3.  97  Ibid.  98  Ibid., p. 4.  99  Ibid., p. 6. 100  TNA, CO129/588/15, HKRNVR – A.S.R.71/40, 30 August 1940, p. 1. 101  TNA, CO129/584/8, Governor to Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 16 May 1940, pp. 1–2. 102  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall to A. Sommerfelt, 5 April 1961, p. 2. 103  TNA, CO129/588/15, HKRNVR – A.S.R.71/40, 30 August 1940, p. 2. 104  Ibid., pp. 2–3. 105  Ibid., p. 1. 106  TNA, CO129/588/15, Report by CO, 1 April 1940 to 31 March 1941, p. 1. 107  PROHK, HKRS7-1-1716, Commodore, Hong Kong to CO, HKNVF, ‘Annual Estimates’, 12 August 1937.

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EA ST A S IA 108  PROHK, HKRS7-1-1771(1), Publicity on Naval Matters, 19 April 1940. 109  South China Morning Post, 1 September 1939, p. 8. 110  South China Morning Post, 2 August 1939, p. 8. 111  Ibid. 112  South China Morning Post, 1 September 1939, p. 8. 113  Ackbar Abbas, Hong Kong: The Culture of Disappearance (Minneapolis, 1997), p. 4. 114  South China Morning Post, 1 September 1939, p. 8. 115  Fan Shu Ching, The Population of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1974), pp. 18–19. 116 Carroll, Edge of Empires, pp. 3–5. 117  TNA, FO371/27622, Lieutenant-Colonel F.C. Scott, War Office, to Gent, Colonial Office, 22 August 1941, p. 185. 118  South China Morning Post, 2 September 1939, p. 8. 119  Ibid. 120 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, pp. 55–56. 121  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall Papers, p. 7. 122  Ibid., p. 10. 123  Ibid. 124  Ibid., ‘Two and a half wavy navy’– a reserve Lieutenant-Commander. p. 24. 125  PROHK, HKRS7-1-1716, CO, HKRNVR, to Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong, 8 September 1945. 126  Lieutenant-Commander Gandy, HKRNVR, quoted in Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 69. 127  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall Papers, p. 15. 128  Ibid. 129  Ibid., p. 10. 130  TNA, ADM1/10872, Director of Sea Transport, 24 February 1941. 131  TNA, ADM1/10872, Director of Personnel Services, 5 March 1941. 132  TNA, ADM1/10872, Rear-Admiral, Third Battle Squadron, Halifax, to Secretary of the Admiralty, 5 January 1941. 133  TNA, ADM1/10872, Admiral Commanding Reserves, 8 March 1941. 134  TNA, ADM1/10872, Vice-Admiral Charles Kennedy-Purvis, C-in-C, American and West Indies Station, to Secretary of the Admiralty, 16 January 1941. 135 Cannadine, Ornamentalism. 136  TNA, ADM178/185, J.D. Walker, ‘Extract from report (16 December 1939) from Representative of Director of Sea Transport’. 137  TNA, ADM178/185, Commodore, RN Barracks, Chatham, to Commander-inChief, The Nore, 23 December 1939. 138  TNA, ADM178/185, ‘T.124 Personnel – Discipline’, 18 January 1940. 139  TNA, ADM1/10872, Director of Sea Transport, 24 February 1941. 140  Percy Chen, China Called Me: My Life inside the Chinese Revolution (Boston, 1979), p. 277, 17. 141 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, pp. 4–5. 142  South China Morning Post, 9 December 1941, p. 6. 143  Bernard H. K. Luk, ‘Religion in Hong Kong History’, in Lee Pui-tak (ed.), Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: interaction and reintegration (Hong Kong, 2005), pp. 45–46. 144  Bhikku Bodhi, ‘Toward a Threshold of Understanding’, Access to Insight, 5 June 2010, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bps-essay_30.html [15 March 2012]. 145  South China Morning Post, 13 December 1941, p. 4. 146  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, ‘With the MTBs – December 1941’, letter of a Sub-Lieutenant, HKRNVR, to his brother. 147  Ibid. 148  Ibid. 149  Ibid. 150  Ibid. 151  Sir Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke, Footprints: The Memoirs of Sir Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke (Hong Kong, 1975), p. 58.

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H O N G KO N G , P R E - 1 9 4 5 152  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, ‘With the MTBs – December 1941’, letter of a SubLieutenant, HKRNVR, to his brother. 153  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall Papers, p. 38. 154  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall to A. Sommerfelt, 5 April 1961, p. 1. 155  PROHK, HKRS7-1-1716, Captain, Extended Defence Officer to Commodore, Hong Kong, 3 May 1941. 156  R.B., Goodwin, Hongkong Escape (London, 1953), p. 213. 157  Ibid., p. 9. 158  Ibid., pp. 220–221. 159  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1706, McDouall to Sommerfelt, 5 April 1961, p. 3. 160  Ibid., pp. 3–4. 161  The Hong Kong Escape Re-enactment Organisation (HERO), comprised of descendants, raise public awareness and recognition of 2nd MTB’s actions, notably through the ‘Escape from Hong Kong: Road to Waichow’ exhibition, which opened on 24 December 2009 at the Hong Kong Museum of Coastal Defence. 162 Selwyn-Clarke, Footprints, p. 184. 163  On ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’, see John M. MacKenzie (ed.), Popular Imperialism and the Military: 1850–1950 (Manchester, 1992), pp. 109–138. 164  HERO (see note 161) emphasise this unity, highlighting that ‘this was the first time in history that the Chinese and British joined forces against a common enemy’: http://www.hongkongescape.org/images/HK/HERO_Mission_Statement_ Jan_2011.pdf. A film in Production by Lion Rock Films also features the tag-line ‘An Epic Tale of East Meets West’: http://lionrockfilms.com/#4 [30 January 2014]. 165 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 74. 166  Oliver Lindsay, Going Down of the Sun: Hong Kong and South-East Asia 1941– 1945 (London, 1981), p. 7. 167  Ibid. 168 South China Morning Post, 19 September 1933. 169  Peter Hays Gries, ‘Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today’, in Lionel M. Jensen and Timothy B. Weston (eds.), China’s Transformations: The Stories beyond the Headlines (Plymouth, 2007), p. 115. 170  Lei Yi, ‘Modern “Sinocentricism” and “Nationalism”’, pp. 49–50, quoted in Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (London, 2004), p. 8. 171  Max Weber, ‘The Chinese Literati’, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London, 1948), p. 422. 172  Richard J. Smith, ‘The Employment of Foreign Military Talent: Chinese Tradition and Late Ching Practice’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, Vol. 15 (1975), p. 121. 173  Morton H. Fried, ‘Military Status in Chinese Society’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 57, No. 4 (January, 1952), p. 348. 174  Weber, ‘The Chinese Literati’, p. 422. 175  John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (London, 2001), p. 109. 176  Ibid., pp. 109–110. 177  Tu Wei-ming, Cultural China, p. 2, quoted in Gries, China’s New Nationalism, pp. 47–48. 178 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 50. 179  Tim Luard, Escape from Hong Kong: Admiral Chan Chak’s Christmas Day Dash, 1941 (Hong Kong, 2012), Kindle location 924. 180 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 73. 181  TNA, WO208/381, British Embassy, Chungking, to War Office, 31 March 1942. 182  Ibid. 183  Gries, ‘Narratives to Live By’, p. 116. 184 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 41. 185 Luard, Escape from Hong Kong, loc. 1038–1053. 186 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 69.

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C H I N A

J A PA N

South

Hong Kong

China Sea PHILIPPINES

I NDOCH I N A

M ALAYA MALAYA

Singapore Indian Ocean DUTCH EAST I ND I E S

0

km

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2000

Map 6  East Asia, c.1949

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CHA P T E R EIG H T

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Post-war Hong Kong

Restoring imperial ‘face’ The initial defeat of Britain by an Asian power in the Second World War marked a shift in China’s attitudes towards British power, compounded by their own elevation in the post-war international system to one of the Big Five. According to Steve Tsang, ‘the Chinese no longer tolerated a slag in the face as readily as they had done before the war’.1 Whereas Chinese prestige increased, Britain’s diminished, and to British naval authorities returning to Hong Kong, the restoration of their own prestige, or face, in the eyes of the local Chinese population, was inexorably tied to their ability to legitimately re-establish colonial power: ‘Face’ (= prestige) is important to the Oriental. When we surrendered Hong Kong we lost face; we now have to regain Hong Kong and face. The Chinese will judge us by our behaviour ashore and first impressions will count.2

Though the notion of a ‘civilising mission’ under British leadership remained, the language had altered from a providentially ordained right to rule, to a more constructive and cooperative discourse of development. As with Governor Young’s plans for political reform, there was a more pronounced realisation that Britain’s position in Hong Kong was more precarious and could only be maintained by closer collaboration with the local Chinese population, and that relationship needed to be built upon increased cultural understanding as opposed to an expectation of respect built upon racial hierarchy. Steve Tsang has termed this ‘the 1946 outlook’, which recognised that ‘the very survival of British rule in Hong Kong would depend on winning over the hearts and minds of the majority Chinese residents’.3 This new spirit of tolerance was symbolised most poignantly by the removal of the long-estab[ 215 ]

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EA ST A S IA

lished colour bar that prohibited Chinese residents on the Peak. These progressive changes, however, were born largely out of political pragmatism. During the war, an understanding was reached between the British Government and Chiang Kai-shek that the issue of the New Territories and Hong Kong would be addressed after Japan’s defeat. Governor Young believed that ‘given the Chinese Government’s determination to recover Hong Kong … the only way to keep the colony 4 British was to make the local inhabitants want to do so’. For that to happen, they needed to be transformed ‘from Chinese sojourners into citizens of British Hong Kong’.5 Political and social reform, like cultural devices such as historical memory and heroic myth, were thus tools utilised by Britain to forge a sympathetic Hongkonger identity, which would help re-establish British imperialism there. To understand ‘face’ within this context, one must appreciate its more nuanced meaning within Chinese culture, evinced in its dual translation as both mien-tzu and lien: Mien-tzu, stands for … reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation. This is prestige that is accumulated by means of personal effort or clever maneuvering … The other kind of ‘face’, lien … is the respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation … It represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego’s moral character, the loss of which makes it impossible to function properly within the community.6

Though Britain had acquired power and mien-tzu through economic and military strength, her actions at the outset of the Second World War were seen as unbefitting of her high status and the moral character expected of one in that position, causing Britain to lose lien in the eyes of the Chinese: The appeasement policy of Chamberlain up to the outbreak of the European War, in the face of Britain’s treaty to smaller nations, was felt as extremely ‘lien-losing’ in China. To be unwilling to keep promises to weaker nations because of its own interests was neither compatible with its claim to status as the most powerful empire of the world, nor with the desire of the leaders of the nation to be termed gentlemen.7

There was a belief that this behaviour extended to Britain’s dealings with China too, and ‘in their eyes the British were feeling their way to a “Far Eastern Munich”’.8 Lien, or moral conduct, thus held more gravitas for the Chinese population than expressions of Britain’s material supremacy, such as the Navy or finance, which constituted mien-tzu. This also raises a significant parallel within imperial theory [ 216 ]

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PO ST- WA R H O N G K O N G

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and the Gramscian notion of hegemony, whereby political power flows from moral authority rather than force. The erosion of Britain’s lien had a foreboding antecedent in the Republic of China, where a similar neglect of lien had contributed to internal unrest: Once wealth is acquired, power attained and position consolidated, they trust their mien-tzu to be strong enough to hush talk about their moral character. The warlords during the early part of the Republic are a good example … They believed that they could maintain their position and prestige by means of money and military force, but their disregard for lien earned them the contempt of their nation.9

Flaunting British mien-tzu through the naval theatre that accompanied the arrival of the impressive British Pacific Fleet, and promises of commercial growth were not enough; the British had to also restore their lien to prevent Hong Kong going the same way. The desire to regain face in the eyes of the Chinese can also help explain the development of Hong Kong’s wartime heroic myth. The twentieth-century Chinese writer Lu Xun critiqued the Chinese ‘desire for face’ in his caricature, Ah Q, known for his ‘psychological victory technique’ by which he maintained an inflated sense of self:10 After suffering humiliating public beatings, Ah Q frequently hits himself. Why? Ah Q sought to fool himself into thinking that he was actually giving – not receiving – a licking.11

Lu Xun suggests that by turning defeats into victories, Ah Q is able to save face. Gries has demonstrated that ‘many Chinese narratives of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese military encounters … transform defeats into heroic victories with an Ah Q-like magic’.12 It can be argued that this revisionist tradition extends to the Battle of Hong Kong, not just within Chinese narratives but in British ones also. By adopting Ah Q’s ‘psychological victory technique’, the British could turn defeat in Hong Kong into victory, perpetuated via heroic myth in order to help restore lost face. There exists a phrase, fu-yen mien-tzu, or ‘padding (someone’s) 13 mien-tzu’, where one will show another person enough deference to obtain their goodwill, though it may hide one’s true judgement. The British were seen to be guilty of this in the war: A Chinese student remarked one day that all through the Sino-Japanese war the British had been fu-yenning China’s mien-tzu, encouraging her to fight on, and making promises when necessary, but sending only a minimum of effective aid. This expressed clearly that the student had no confidence in Britain’s sincerity.14

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The gentleman’s agreement made with Chiang Kai-shek regarding discussion over the New Territories can be viewed as another case, co-opting an ‘ally’ through vague, and ultimately false, promises. The British reneged on an earlier understanding that, as Allied Commander of the China theatre, Hong Kong was ‘within the operational sphere of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’, and that as laid down in General 15 Order No.1, Japan’s forces there should surrender to him. Instead, the British dispatched Rear-Admiral Harcourt’s task force to Hong Kong to accept the Japanese surrender ahead of Chiang’s army. Though it had been in Britain’s interests during wartime to fu-yen Chiang’s mien-tzu and ‘authority’, Britain considered it ‘a point of national honour … to recover [Hong Kong], and restore it to its normal state and prosperity’.16 Chiang could not be allowed to reach Hong Kong ahead of them, as ‘once in occupation, a Chinese force of whatever nature might prove difficult to extrude by diplomatic means’.17 Being the first to recover Hong Kong was considered crucial for British ‘prestige and future relations with China’.18 Yet it was counter-productive as, upon hearing of Britain’s action, the Chinese Government was offended by their ‘rather high-handed’ behaviour,19 further compromising Britain’s lien. During the nineteenth century, ‘face’ was used by the British missionary Arthur Smith to emphasise the defects of ‘Chinese racial character’ and justify his Christian ‘civilising mission’, and it became engrained in Orientalist discourse:20 Face … represented duplicitous Oriental ‘disguise’. Fearful of society – ‘the mob’ and its unruly passions – classical Liberals began to use words like face to project their fears about society and the emotions onto the Orient, the realm of the mindless Yellow Horde. Paradoxically, the East came to represent both a passive ‘herd mentality’ and a cunning duplicitousness to Western minds. This helped preserve the good qualities of individualism and rationality for Liberalism and the West.21

Those qualities of individualism would be needed to rebuild British capitalism in Hong Kong. Face had traditionally been ascribed to the ‘Oriental’ other, a characteristic which lowered him in relation to Europeans. Whereas the British originally looked down upon Chinese face, now British face was being scrutinised by the Chinese; their roles had been reversed; China had acquired an equal international footing and could now look Britain in the eye. The British had to appeal to Chinese perceptions and cultural values and behave appropriately, as emphasised to returning British naval personnel: The behaviour and bearing of our landing parties must be exemplary. There will be numerous temptations, values may have changed and

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liquor of a kind available for barter, women camp followers of the Japanese will be seeking new patronage, etc. The Chinese have great dignity. For instance, they are never seen drunk in public, whatever they may do in private, and for a British rank or rating to misbehave with wine or women at this time will do us no good.22

The ‘rape of Nanking’ by the Japanese stimulated the ‘recurring figure of China as a raped woman’ within Nationalist discourse, causing many young Chinese men to become ‘enraged by the very idea of white men intimately involved with Chinese women’.23 Before the war, relationships with local women were tolerated by the Navy, albeit as ‘the sordid pursuit of low-grade whites’, not officers.24 This was exploited by Japan’s spies before the invasion, particularly at Nagasaki Joe’s, a popular Japanese bar in the Wanchai district, where ‘a pint of beer cost ten cents less than anywhere else in town; and the girls made a beeline for British naval ratings’ to gather information.25 HKRNVR officers fraternising with foreigners in the Hong Kong Club had to be warned against ‘careless conversation about service matters such as ship movements’.26 Now, not only were the Chinese more protective of their female members and their new status, any intimate association, regardless of rank or rating, was considered more dangerous by the British, having been compromised before. Returning naval personnel had to tread a difficult balance between treating the Hong Kong Chinese as friends, while maintaining a respectful distance: In dealing with the Chinese good humour and a sense of humour always help. If you make a Chinese laugh, preferably with you, not at you, things should be well. In the case of the Chinese the difficulty will not be to keep away from them, but to keep them away from you. They will be keen to help in any way and will try to join up as washers up, sweepers, dhobi boys, etc. This must not be allowed, anyway to begin with.27

Yet, as fu-yen mien-tzu implies, though the British may have padded Chinese mien-tzu by praising their ‘great dignity’ and ‘humour’, it masked naval orders to ‘regard all Orientals with suspicion’.28 The metaphorical ‘Oriental’ disguise had manifested itself literally: Inexperienced people are unable to distinguish between Japanese and Chinese. A favourite Japanese trick is to adopt Chinese dress and to hide a bomb, grenade or machine gun under the long gown. It is appreciated that many old friends of China Station days such as mess-boys, sampan men, side-party ‘Marys’, cobblers, tailors and dhobi men will be anxious to renew relations, but at present all Orientals must be treated with suspicion.29

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This tension between presenting a more conciliatory attitude towards the Chinese and maintaining the imperial status quo affected discussions regarding war gratuities. The institutionalised discrimination which underpinned the chain-of-command was magnified, presenting uncomfortable dilemmas. Though the HKRNVR included both Chinese and European ratings, this ethnic equality existed superficially on a peacetime basis and was not deemed a desirable situation for war. Plans had been in place that, following full mobilisation, all European seamen would be automatically promoted to petty officer 30 to give them seniority over Chinese seamen. Financial inequalities also existed, with rates of pay for ‘Asiatic ratings’ in the HKRNVR, ‘of a much lower standard’ than those of European ratings, and with no marriage allowance.31 Again, conscious of their tentative post-war position in the colony and the need to appeal to Chinese ‘hearts and minds’, the British accepted that ‘it would appear unfair generally to introduce two different rates’ for gratuities.32 Financial complaints extended further. Personnel from outside Hong Kong, entitled to repatriation but who had elected to remain in the colony, were given a cash grant in lieu of Overseas Benefit Leave. This was wrongly extended to certain European HKRNVR personnel, though they technically ‘belonged to Hong Kong’, creating further grievance for Chinese ratings: This mistake had led to discrimination, which in effect was racial discrimination and in consequence there was amongst the Hong Kong Volunteers demobilised in the colony a feeling of considerable discontent.33

To offset this, the Colonial Office was asked to sanction an ex gratia cash grant to all Hong Kong Volunteers domiciled and demobilised in the colony. There were also issues over back pay. Following Hong Kong’s defeat, all service personnel in the colony were given until June 1943 to report to Waichow, roughly seventy miles from Hong Kong, where they would be given six months back pay. Those not reporting there would receive only one month. Yet, ‘representatives of the HKRNVR … had no knowledge relative to anyone having to report at Waichow 34 during the Japanese occupation’. Furthermore, a ‘HKRNVR representative questioned some of his ratings now in Hong Kong and they state that they never heard of such an order’.35 Recognising the unofficial contribution volunteers made to the Allied cause after the colony’s fall, ‘sending money and food into the POW camps, etc., and by assisting in escapes’ and, more importantly, to avoid further [ 220 ]

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charges of racial prejudice ‘in the interests of future volunteering’, back pay was granted to all personnel released or who escaped before 36 1 August 1945.

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Reconstitution Both Labour and Conservative post-war governments understood the importance of a ‘second colonial occupation’ for Britain’s economic reconstruction, with Ernest Bevin declaring ‘if the British Empire fell … it would mean the standard of life of our constituencies would fall rapidly’.37 With mainland China united under Mao’s Communists from 1949, Clement Attlee’s Cabinet believed a failure to retain Hong Kong would damage British prestige and ‘have grave repercussions for the allied position in South East Asia and Far East generally’, labelling the colony the ‘Berlin of Asia’.38 The naval debate accompanying this was whether to establish a permanent, full-time navy in Hong Kong or resurrect a part-time volunteer unit along the lines of the HKRNVR. The Admiralty favoured the former, but faced opposition from Governor Grantham, who believed that the money spent on such a force might ‘be better applied to the expansion of the Water Police’.39 Again, the tug of war between Admiralty and local interests over control arose, while a major concern continued to be manpower. Despite official overtures to the Chinese community, privately it was still believed they were unreliable, with doubts having been reinforced by the desertions witnessed during the Battle of Hong Kong. The ‘most probable form of emergency’ conceived at this time by the local Government was a ‘civil disturbance involving a general strike and the cessation of essential services, possibly combined with or in sympathy with an external threat’.40 It was anticipated that ‘no assistance of any sort will be forthcoming from the Chinese population, and the Colony may have to be maintained by the efforts of the 41 non-Chinese population alone’. For Governor Grantham: The final, and in my view, decisive point against the formation of a local naval force is the questions of crews. The maintenance of such a force would entail the enlistment of a large number of Asiatics as ratings. It has already been explained that the most probable emergency in which Government forces would be employed is that of civil disturbances involving the disaffection of almost the entire Chinese populace. In these circumstances the ships of a local naval force would in all probability cease to be effective units and would become a liability rather than an asset.42

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Despite its conciliatory facade, key figures within the British administration still did not trust the majority of Hong Kong’s Chinese. A significant factor was the huge post-war influx of immigrants from mainland China, with Hong Kong’s population rising from around 43 600,000 in 1945 to over two million in 1950, and 2.5 million in 1955, increasing the number of possible subversives. For a civil emergency, it was ‘felt that the establishment of a local naval force in Hong Kong would be wasteful and without justification’, and would ‘detract from the [European] man-power available for the HKVDC [Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps] and the manning of essential services’.44 Local military recruitment once more posed a challenge to the Navy’s plans. The ODC concurred with Grantham that the establishment of a full-time Hong Kong navy was unfeasible. It did, however, conclude that a reformed part-time force ‘would be justified on account of its value in time of war’, despite offering ‘little value in case of civil disturbances’.45 The HKVDC would also be re-established. It was again stressed that ‘there is no doubt that the greatest single problem facing the civil administration is the shortage of reliable manpower’,46 which prohibited the reconstitution of both units on pre-war lines. The British Government feared that ‘China, assisted by her large expatriate communities in south-east Asia, could become an even greater menace to Britain’s interests than Japan had been’, and ‘it would not be possible in the event of war with China, to rely on the great majority of Chinese in the Colony’:47 The dangers that those responsible for the Colony’s defence consider most probable are internal unrest, and attacks by guerrilla forces from without, or a combination of the two. Briefly, in the circumstances envisaged it is not improbable that the vast majority of the Chinese who preponderate in the Colony would be, at best, of no assistance to the Government, and, at the worst, actually hostile.48

Though many new immigrants established ties with the PRC ‘simply to preclude attacks on relatives’ still living on the mainland,49 Britain’s position in Hong Kong was still too tenuous to risk provoking China by clamping down on communist activities within trade unions, schools, secret societies and the press; to do so might ‘alienate non-aligned sections of society and drive political organisations underground, encouraging a shift to terrorist methods’.50 The PRC could thus destabilise the colony by using this infrastructure ‘to start popular disturbances, by sending in troops, or by introducing an embargo on trade’, leaving Hong Kong in an almost perpetual state of insecurity.51 The defensive unpreparedness of the colony was brought into focus between 20 April [ 222 ]

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and 31 July 1949, when Chinese Communist forces fired upon and held hostage in the Yangtze River the Royal Navy sloop HMS Amethyst, undermining British prestige and prompting Britain to strengthen Hong 52 Kong’s garrison. At 2.30am on 25 September 1952, a PRC warship fired upon the British ferry S.S. Takshing in Hong Kong’s approaches, diverting it to Lafsami Island, where the vessel was boarded and two Chinese passengers removed. Her Majesty’s Ships Consort and Mounts Bay exchanged fire with Lafsami shore batteries as they escorted the Takshing back into British territorial waters, with the two men reportedly having been involved in counterfeiting currency.53 From 1951, Chinese newspapers pushed a more aggressive line against the Hong Kong Government’s social policies, its currency was banned from use in south China, border incidents increased, and the PRC considered ‘measures’ to protect the colony’s citizens from ‘imperial suppression’.54 With international tensions rising over Korea, Indochina and Taiwan, it warned Britain that its position in Hong Kong would be threatened if it aligned itself too closely with the United States.55 The British Cabinet believed that both the potential threat and ‘support obtained from the Chinese will depend, more than on any other single factor, on the military strength of the Colony’s defences’,56 and thus it became even more important that a local naval force be re-established. It was estimated that there were only six thousand ‘reliable’ non-Chinese civilians in the Colony.57 Yet, 15,800 persons were required to man all civilian services, the local forces and police. It was thus unavoidable that ‘very considerable reliance must be placed on Chinese’,58 despite reservations. The manpower issue was exacerbated by the fact that recruitment for the reconstituted forces would start virtually from scratch, as ‘many members of the [previous] forces had been killed or had died while prisoners-of-war, others had passed the age limit for service’, while ‘some had retired from Hong Kong never to return’,59 reinforcing the impression of colonial transiency. Fresh memories of the Japanese invasion produced a ‘reluctance of the general public to come forward for voluntary service so soon after a 60 war’. This was marked ‘by a certain cynicism, bred by the events of 1941–45, regarding the value of defence preparations’;61 it was not just the Chinese community who were affected by British prestige or its absence. A sense of wartime abandonment by Britain was further fostered by Hong Kong’s downgrading as a strategic port.62 Rather than galvanise the local population into taking responsibility for their own defence it had the adverse effect, increasing Hong Kong’s dependency on Britain. It was not only a question of manpower but also how to fund separate military and naval units, with ‘financial stringency brought about by many calls upon the Colony’s revenue in the years of reconstruction [ 223 ]

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consequent upon the damage received during the war years’. Wartime mobilisation had also ‘revealed a number of defects in the status of the Volunteer Forces and their organisation’.64 The HKRNVR had contended with the overriding demands of the Royal Navy, with its needs subordinated on account of being funded by the Colonial and not Imperial Government, causing ‘endless complications and expense’.65 It was realised that ‘those who are coming back to Hong Kong will soon be all here and unless we are able to maintain their interest they will drift out of touch or become involved with other Units’.66 Of particular worry was the Navy’s traditional rivalry with the HKVDC, ‘who have the advantage of a HQ building, will soon be recruiting and we may lose some promising material’ consequently.67 Yet Commander Vernall, the HKRNVR’s CO, also faced direct competition from the Royal Navy itself, who were drawing on colonial manpower to reinforce their regular ranks. Ethnicity was again an overriding factor, with Vernall ‘concerned primarily with the European personnel since most of my best ratings have joined the Royal Navy or Police and are lost to me’.68 Rather than reorganising two distinct units as had existed before the war, the colony’s ‘limited man-power and financial resources’ dictated that ‘the most efficient and economical solution is to combine the Naval and Military elements for all practicable purposes into one force – to be called the Hong Kong Defence Force’.69 This provided ‘economies in overhead expenses for office accommodation, staff and recreational facilities’.70 It was particularly stressed that the new force should not only recruit and train a body of volunteers, but also ‘provide full social and recreational services … important to the spirit and efficiency of the Corps’.71 A Colony’s conception of its obligation to the Volunteer must be enlarged to extend beyond mercenary rewards for services rendered … They must in addition be the Headquarters of the social, recreational and public spirited life of the youth of the Colony … providing a common meeting place where all ranks and those of different social groups can meet on equal terms … There was never any intention of using this as bait … I see in the provision of a reasonable Recreation and Welfare Wing in the new Headquarters an excellent opportunity of engendering and fostering that civic spirit which the Press is continually and rightly pointing out is one of the great needs in this colony … the Force as envisaged will provide that common ground for mutual service and understanding which is the only basis on which a community such as ours can hope to exist and prosper in the world.72

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forming a locally rooted Hongkonger identity to combat colonial transiency. Traditional inter-service rivalry would also be countered, as ‘by combining within one unit the principle users of man-power, cutthroat competition is eliminated, and a planned use of the man-power 73 available becomes possible’. Concerned about losing its own influence within this reorganisation, the Admiralty stressed that ‘naval training must not repetition not however be swamped by military activities’.74 To prevent the spread of unwelcome precedents elsewhere in the Empire, and ensure inter-colonial operability, they insisted that despite this military amalgamation, the ‘Naval Wing should work on lines similar to any other local Colonial Naval force’. At the local level, Commodore L.N. Brownfield, Commodore-in-Charge at Hong Kong, also feared a diminishment of his own authority, and asserted that the RNVR should be placed ‘firmly under the wing of the Royal Navy’.75 Colonial and Admiralty interests again diverged, as the force became involved in a three-way tug of war, between Brownfield, Colonel L.T. Ride, Commandant of the Hong Kong Defence Force, the man responsible for its conception, and Commander Morahan, Vernall’s successor as CO of the HKRNVR. As Brownfield put it to Ride: The present organisation for running the HKRNVR is unsatisfactory. As I see it, there appear to be three people attempting to run it, you, Morahan, and myself. This is bound to lead to confusion and difficulty … I am in favour of the Hong Kong RNVR becoming an off-shoot of its parent service the Royal Navy … There is nothing personal in my suggestions. I mention this as there has undoubtedly been some clash of personalities on a lower level. It is my opinion that I hold the machinery efficiently to look after the RNVR and by so doing might relieve you of an embarrassing child … both of us have the same aim which is to produce a happy and efficient Volunteer Force.76

Brownfield simultaneously petitioned the Colonial Secretary in Hong Kong on this matter: War and peace organisation must be the same. In war the Hong Kong RNVR becomes an integral part of the Royal Navy and it is felt that, for them efficiently to play their part, they must be closely integrated with the Royal Navy in peace. The existing regulations state ‘ …the Naval Force when serving in the Colony shall be under the orders of the Commodore, Hong Kong …’ This seems both logical and desirable, and, if accepted, the obvious outcome should be that the Commodore is responsible to the Governor for all matters concerning the Naval Force. This is a responsibility I am most willing to assume.77

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Morahan also favoured closer association with the Royal Navy than the new Defence Force, to the extent that Ride felt the HKRNVR CO was publicly ‘making things difficult again’ and approached Governor 78 Grantham to make Morahan fall in line. At the annual public Review, Morahan objected to the Defence Force Sergeant Major marching in front of his Colour Party and conveying an impression that the naval unit was led by their traditional rivals the Volunteers Corps. This was overcome by increasing the distance between Sergeant Major Jones and the HKRNVR so that they appeared separate.79 When arrangements were made for the Queen’s Birthday Parade, Morahan raised the issue again, arguing that ‘as Parade Commander he does not require the presence of an Adjutant or R.S.M. [Regiment Sergeant Major]’.80 Ride responded that ‘the composition of the Detachment representing the RHKDF is my responsibility, and that the R.S.M. (Mr Jones) is to parade and will parade in his proper place’, causing Morahan’s complaint to Colonel Vaughan:81 The ‘Combined Forces’ nature of the detachment is adequately shown by the fact that the HKRNVR and the Regiment are marching in the rear of the RAF instead of their proper place in the rear of their parent service.82

Ride contended that Morahan was ‘entirely incorrect’, and that ‘the HKRNVR is a part of the RHKDF and its proper place is with the Force and not with its parent service’, adding that ‘it is part of the same old plan of Morahan to dissociate the HKRNVR as much as possible from HK Forces’.83 Under pressure from the Governor, Morahan claimed ‘he had been misrepresented’, which Ride derided: ‘If Commander Morahan does not mean what he writes in letter, he should not write them and waste his own and other people’s time’, adding ‘at RHKDF HQ we never have this type of trouble with either the Auxiliary Air Force or the H.K. Regiment, nor do we have this trouble with the HKRNVR when Commander Morahan is not in command’.84 This was echoed in a Working Party interim report for the RHKDF’s reorganisation: The HQ of the Hong Kong Defence Force which has exercised administrative control over all three services within the Force, has proved its value to the Army and the Royal Air Force … The RNVR, on the other hand, report that the intervention of a HQ has prejudiced their efficiency; they consider that it has had a retrograde effect on the work both of the HQ and of the Naval Squadron.85

The main reasons for the ‘divergence of opinion’ between the Services was attributed to three factors: (a) in time of war the RNVR would operate under the direct command of the Commodore-in-Charge in [ 226 ]

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Hong Kong, therefore it was ‘considered that administration, as well as command, should be vested in the Royal Navy, and not in an interService Defence Force HQ’, while in HMS Tamar an appropriate facility already existed; (b) both the Army and RAF had produced Regular Officers to facilitate cooperation, while the Admiralty had not yet filled this position; and (c) ‘personalities involved have not overcome their 86 differences and have allowed them to interfere with Service efficiency’. Of course, point (a)’s assumption regarding Tamar overlooks the fact that during the Second World War, priority over resources was given to the Royal Navy, stifling HKRNVR operations.87 After discussion by the Working Party, it was decided that the HKRNVR would remain part of the HK Defence Force in name, but would be run to ‘a considerably larger extent by the Commodore in charge’ with ‘only certain reserve subjects …laid down and dealt with through the Commandant’. This would ‘meet all the requirements of the RN without involving a lot of new legislature and public split’ and enable the force to continue sharing the ‘Messes and canteens, sports gatherings and social evenings, shooting matches etc., which it is considered form an important part of volunteering in the Colony’.88 Sport played an important political and symbolic role in reasserting the RHKDF’s authority over the HKRNVR, it being declared that ‘the Defence Force shall have first call on all members of the HKRNVR to represent the Command in all competitions and sports’, and not the Royal Navy.89 The Commodore-in-Charge believed it ‘essential’, considering the inferior status and treatment afforded the HKRNVR during the previous conflict and its haemorrhaging of personnel to the senior service, that ‘although the force will form a part of the unified Defence Force, it should nevertheless be able to feel itself just as much a part of the Navy … there should be no suggestion in any quarter that the local naval force is a “poor relation”’.90 Despite this, the new HKRNVR experienced ‘difficulties in the purchase of stores and supplies from the Royal Navy and in reconciliation of Naval Methods with those 91 of local Government’, partly because it lacked a permanent Supply Officer due to manpower restrictions.

Racial grouping In his speech to the Legislative Council, Ride ‘made the point that the new Force is designed to eliminate all racial discrimination without losing the advantages of racial grouping’:92 If we draft men into the Companies on the old racial basis we are quite liable to have one company only 30 or 40 strong, and another over 200

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strong, a state of affairs impossible in any modern army … The only claim to promotion in the new Force is to be competence … future officers will be officers of the Force and not of any one group, and as such they will be competent to hold any post of their rank.93

This presented a ‘problem of officering’ that was ‘causing a certain amount of uneasiness’ amongst men resistant to the prospect of ‘one racial group being commanded by an officer of another group’.94 Despite Ride’s public assertions regarding the meritocratic nature of the new Defence Force, it had been decided that ‘racial grouping – though not racial discrimination – will be maintained to a limited extent’.95 Furthermore, the new policy applied primarily to the Hong Kong Regiment, and was not considered suitable for the naval force, where it was advocated that racial segregation should be preserved on grounds of hygiene and naval efficiency: It is inevitable that in the narrow confines of a ship there must be some form of racial division unless the Asiatic is educated to European standards in certain respects. The galley and sanitary arrangements for a mixed European and Asiatic ship’s company may well render impracticable the mixed manning of a ship. It is essential that recruits be drawn from the better educated type of Asiatic.96

Additional racial division was advocated for wartime mobilisation, in which ‘all the personnel and dependents of European officers and men shall become the sole responsibility of the Royal Navy’ with ‘the welfare of the dependents of Asiatics to remain a Colonial responsibility’.97 Nor was this a clear split between rank and file. Alongside the British, there were Australian, New Zealand and South African officers who fell under the former category, with Indian and Ceylonese officers in the latter,98 while British and Portuguese ratings were separated from Chinese. Practically, the HKRNVR CO claimed ‘there is much give and take between groups and races – and there is keen 99 interest in promotion in all branches’. Yet despite ‘enthusiasm engendered by the successful Camp and Sea Training period’, the HKRNVR’s ‘chief problem throughout [1950–51] has been a lack of continuity in attendance. Particularly do those Volunteers who work in Banks find it difficult to get away from their work’.100 Rather than increase the number of Chinese, it was preferable to alleviate personnel problems by integrating European women into the support branches of the force, freeing up men for more frontline roles. These were formed into a local Women’s Royal Naval Service (WRENS) unit: [ 228 ]

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Wrens are being trained in Secretariat, Meteorological, and Supply duties and a Plotting team is about to start. Their attendance is always very high …Occasionally the ladies go out for a day in the MFV [Motor Fishing Vessel] and they attend all Ceremonial Parades. They also attended occasional lectures.101

Command of this unit was given to Mrs Pamela Mary Butler, a qualified first-class stenographer secretary and the wife of a naval officer, giving her ‘a knowledge of Naval matters which is so essential in this post’.102 As elsewhere in the Empire, a cadet force was also established to give basic military training, ‘bring together boys and girls of all nationalities’, and provide cadets with a healthy and useful interest.103 Preference for British recruits by no means guaranteed loyalty to the HKRNVR; many still put their attachment to Britain over the needs of the colony. A number of prospective volunteers questioned whether they could leave the colony and join the regular British forces after signing up for the RHKDF, echoing HKRNVR frustrations in the previous conflict by arguing, ‘I don’t want to have to stay here training in Hong Kong during a war when I could be more usefully employed elsewhere’:104 The specific answer to such a question is yes, he could, but not after an emergency was declared here; but the general answer is that this is Hong Kong’s army, recruited from Hong Kong’s citizens, to defend Hong Kong and paid for by Hong Kong’s citizens … Each citizen of service age must make up his own mind whether he feels it is his duty to serve the Empire in general or his colony in particular. This Force is for those who wish to serve in defence of this Colony.105

This issue of allegiance reflected deeper local concerns regarding Britain’s continued ability and commitment to defend Hong Kong and preserve it as a British colony, having already surrendered it once, and with decolonisation spreading. Prospective volunteers asked the question, ‘What is the good of all this unless we know it is the policy of His 106 Majesty’s Government to hold Hong Kong?’ This was addressed in the House of Commons by Christopher Mayhew, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, responding to Churchill and relayed to Hong Kong’s public: It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government to maintain their position in Hong Kong. We entirely appreciate the importance of Hong Kong as described by the Honourable Gentleman. Indeed, we feel in this particularly troubled situation the value and the importance of Hong Kong as a centre of stability will be greater than ever.107

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In truth, the colony was ‘too valuable for the United Kingdom to abandon in peace, and yet too peripheral to be worth committing 108 scarce resources for its survival at war’. As proven during the Second World War, geographically ‘it lacked natural defensive strength’ and a ‘successful defence would require the establishment of a military position … into south China’.109 British politicians ‘remained acutely conscious of Hong Kong’s vulnerability throughout the 1950s’ and of the strategic reality that if China really ‘wanted the return of Hong Kong then British rule was untenable’.110 Thus, another question continually asked of Ride and the Defence Force was ‘against whom are we being asked to defend the Colony?’:111 We shall defend the Colony against all comers; this Force is not designed to be directed against any one in particular nor to resist any one possible aggressor … Any one will therefore search in vain, if he looks to the organisation of the Force for a clue as to the identity of Hong Kong’s most probable public enemy no. 1.112

Despite their public reticence, officials were privately very clear that the ‘probable public enemy no. 1’ was the PRC. This informed the policy ‘that instruction in A/S should be confined to officers’ because ‘as the force will be international it must be considered highly probable that the Soviets will be able to introduce an agent among the ratings’:113 Not only have the Communists overrun CHINA, but increasing Russian assistance is a menace to the safety of Hong Kong. The Chinese Peoples Government possess in Communism means by which they could ferment Internal Security problems within the Colony to an extent not possessed by previous Governments of CHINA.114

Compulsory service The Commandant reported to the Colonial Secretariat in September 1949 that ‘it is the excellent local [Chinese] response that provides another excuse for Europeans holding back, they fear that a Force with a large percentage of local volunteers will be unsafe to be in’.115 Such fears were exacerbated by the move away from racial grouping, adopted on political grounds. It was not simply a case of attracting volunteers; they had to be seen as ‘reliable’. With insufficient numbers of Europeans volunteering, it was decided in September 1951 to reintroduce compulsory service to the colony.116 The proportion of Europeans to non-Europeans in the Defence Force was fixed at a ratio of 1:1, despite over 97% of the general population being Chinese,117 a [ 230 ]

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Table 7  RHKDF membership by ‘races’, 31 December 1956 Force

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RHKDF HKRNVR

UK/Old Dominion

Others/NonChinese

Total NonChinese

Chinese

Total Strength

347  85

496  13

843  98

603  96

1,446 194

figure that became increasingly disproportionate as Chinese immigration rose. To compensate for this disparity, included in the European/ non-Chinese numbers were Indians, Pakistanis, Malays, Singhalese, as well as British, Old Dominion, Eurasians and Portuguese.118 In fact, by factoring these groups into the ‘European’ category, the ratio actually came nearer to 3:2 against the Chinese. The flexibility of identity, and perhaps a desire to shed markers of ‘otherness’ and associated prejudices regarding allegiance, was demonstrated on many registration forms, where inaccurate or ambiguous data was entered under the category ‘race’. A number of persons declaring themselves to be ‘British’ were ‘patently of some other racial origin, while others … described themselves as “European”, “white”, or “human”’.119 The 1:1 ratio had been fixed for the Defence Force overall, yet within it European manpower was ‘very unequally distributed’, and the proportion of Europeans in the HKRNVR was ‘much higher than that in the Hong Kong Regiment’.120 One factor behind this was that the HKRNVR uniquely remained an all-volunteer unit, while the other RHKDF services incorporated compulsory servicemen. This was partly attributed to the unique appeal naval service had to those possessing the call of the sea: Certain units by their intrinsic nature are likely to attract more volunteers than others, namely the HKRNVR and HKAAF [Hong Kong Auxiliary Air Force] who will always attract personnel who are by nature interested in the sea or air.121

The Admiralty agreed in principle that ‘there must be good leadership and promotion prospects in any organisation for it to be successful’, and ‘racial integration is a fact for ratings’, however, it was considered ‘impracticable … for officers due to security considerations’.122 Unlike the Hong Kong Regiment, which was an entirely local defence force, the HKRNVR ‘was liable to serve in any part of the world in the event of hostilities’,123 with its personnel incorporated into the Royal Navy. Thus the potential inclusion of subversive Chinese groups in the Navy, possessing either communist or triad ties, posed a far greater threat to imperial security. This restriction on the naval officer class [ 231 ]

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conflicted with Ride’s statement that ‘racial or social status cannot be the grounds on which any differentiation in rank, pay or treatment 124 is based’. It also created operational problems, as not all Chinese ratings spoke sufficient English. With no Chinese in command positions, ‘the language difficulty for English-speaking personnel in controlling Chinese ratings sometimes led to the European doing too much of the actual work instead of directing others to do the job’.125 The HKRNVR was able to take advantage of the Regiment’s relative unpopularity to attract a greater portion of European personnel. This was because when a European was called up to the Regiment, they could avoid military service by agreeing to ‘volunteer’ for the Navy instead. In one intake of 34 UK-born conscripts for the RHKDF, ‘only 15 were enrolled in the Regiment; 19 objected to service and of that 19 … six volunteered for the Hong Kong RNVR only to avoid conscription into the Hong Kong Regiment’.126 It was considered ‘wishful thinking that should … the Hong Kong Regiment be put on the same basis as the HKRVNR, that they will receive that number of volunteers to enable that Unit to function’. For some ‘volunteers’, it was not so much the maritime pull of the HKRNVR that attracted them to the force, as an ‘abhorrence of the physical effort involved’ in military service which pushed them away from the Regiment.127 The technicality that such men were classed as volunteers meant that if they failed to comply with naval instruction they might be discharged as ‘unsuitable or inefficient’, whereas in the Regiment they would be liable to prosecution. This further encouraged ‘those who would dodge the rigours of the Regiment, applying for service in the HKRNVR even though such service does not appeal to them, for which they have no interest and in all probability would become seasick’.128 Regardless, it was stressed that Hong Kong’s nature as a naval base meant that the HKRNVR ‘would always have a place in defence plans’, and in 1957 its maritime traditions provided ‘enough volunteers to fill 50% to 60% of the present small establishment even if there were no question of 129 having to join another service if they did not volunteer for the RNVR’. Within a decade, however, the naval reserve would be disbanded. The Chinese community were also treated differently regarding compulsory service: Because of the large numbers of British Chinese, their diverse quality and the desirability in some units of having a suitable balance between Chinese and Non-Chinese, it has been possible to be selective in compulsion of Chinese … it has always been the policy not to preserve unduly with those who in one way or another fail to measure up, as it has always been possible to replace them.

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This ran counter to the post-war development discourse preached by colonial administrators, and while Europeans were liable to be prosecuted, a Chinese man ‘who is quite capable of fulfilling his part is not only never prosecuted but is discarded and thus usually relieved of all responsibilities’, and consequently, it was ‘not in the interests of Government or of the successful administration of compulsory 130 service’ for this to become public knowledge. About 15,000 Chinese were registered as British Subjects, several times more than utilised by the RHKDF, but this number was vastly disproportionate to the 300,000–600,000 Hong Kong-born Chinese men over 17 years of age it was estimated resided in the colony: In other words only 2.5% to 5% of the Chinese British subjects in the Colony have registered as such … there are some who although Hong Kong born do not consider themselves as British Subjects, some who prefer not to register in case it should be held against them, some to avoid being conscripted and some who are illiterate.131

Though this fuelled colonial prejudices concerning Chinese loyalty, like military service, ‘conscription’ carried particularly negative cultural connotations that inhibited more Chinese from registering as British subjects, which colonial propaganda struggled to surmount: The most appropriate Chinese words by which to render the difficult English expression ‘National Service’ are shaú pei tuk, mo. The literal translation of these four words is ‘Defence Service’ or ‘Defensive Service’. I discussed this with the Hon. S.C.A. [Secretary for Chinese Affairs] and the three Chinese Members [of the Legislative Council] this morning and have also discussed it with the Political Adviser. Every other possible alternative appears to be ruled out by reason of undesirable word-association. It is important that the word ‘conscription’ be avoided. Conscription as practiced in England, i.e., compulsory registration with exemption on grounds of conscientious objection etc., is a totally different thing from conscription in China which is a press gang affair coupled with the worst form of official corruption. Nevertheless, both are accurately described as ‘conscription’. The Chinese words to avoid are CHING and KEUNG PIK as both of these have undesirable connotations … We must also find suitable translations for other defence terms. No satisfactory equivalent appears to exist for ‘Civil Defence’, ‘Passive Air Defence’, and so on.132

Meanwhile, British citizens in Hong Kong were speaking out against compulsory service, which they saw as hypocritical to ‘we British who are so often lauding the benefits of Democracy with its freedom of speech and guarding of person rights’.133 Such discourse helped define [ 233 ]

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EA ST A S IA 134 British Hong Kong from ‘the gentlemen across the border’, adding that ‘if we are going to preach democracy, let us practice it’.135 The local authorities realised that compulsory service was unsustainable once Britain abandoned it, and it ceased in the colony in March 1961.

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Riot and unrest Many of the reservations regarding Chinese integration into the RHKDF stemmed from fears of their reliability when faced with fellow Chinese, either in the form of soldiers attacking from the mainland, or dissidents within the colony. Naval authorities considered that ‘Hong Kong is the sort of place where a volunteer is almost certain to be intimidated or got at in some way if there is a civil disturbance’.136 This occurred on 10 October 1956, the anniversary of the 1911 Nationalist Revolution, when Communists clashed with Kuomintang supporters, causing large-scale rioting lasting two days and leaving 59 dead. That both sides ‘saw the colony as another battleground for the unfinished Chinese civil war’ posed a continual challenge to colonial law and order,137 with the Communists ‘quick to take advantage of any exploitative situations to undermine the credibility and image of British rule’.138 Premier Zhou Enlai quickly proclaimed the PRC’s ‘duty [to] protect’ Kowloon’s residents who had ‘no confidence’ in the colonial Government, and that ‘Communist China could not permit further Hong Kong disorders on the doorstep of China’.139 This ‘“menacing” attitude’ and the ‘exaggerated and alarmist commentary’ by Beijing and Guangzhou radio stations shook the British Government,140 who questioned the local garrison’s ability to maintain internal security so much that by March 1957 it was ‘considering abandoning Hongkong’ altogether.141 The RHKDF had not in fact been deployed to assist the Police and British Army in restoring law and order, attracting further public criticism as to why Hong Kong’s citizens were wasting time and taxes on a 142 force that was not called out in a civil emergency. Commandant Ride replied that ‘the role which the Force has to play in a time of trouble is no longer to assist in maintaining internal security’, and that it was ‘primarily trained for an operational role in warfare, not for internal security duties’. Commercial priorities once more predominated as he argued it would be counterproductive to call out the RHKDF, as ‘the dislocation of the economic life of the Colony resulting from the disturbances and the curfew would have been considerably increased if members of the Force living on the Island had been withdrawn from their normal employment’.143 Yet, four years earlier, a report by the Deputy Commandant stated that: [ 234 ]

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The object of the RHKDF may be taken as to raise, maintain, and train a local armed force in the Colony of Hong Kong to provide assistance to the Police Force in the event of internal security disorders, and to supplement the Regular Forces of the Crown in the event of War.144

It was reiterated in communication between Hong Kong’s cabinet members, that the RHKDF’s ‘primary role, [is] to assist the Regular Forces in maintenance of internal security’, while fighting alongside regular military and naval forces in defence of the colony was only its ‘secondary role’.145 Furthermore, it was stated that the RHKDF had reached ‘a satisfactory stage of training’ to take on Internal Security duties from May 1952. It was, however, expressed that: Opinion amongst responsible officers of the Force is divided on the question of how the Chinese component would stand up to I.S. duties. Col. Bailey … is apprehensive. He assures me that the I.S. role is generally very unpopular in the rank and file of the Force and he is most anxious that we should not stress this role more than we have to.146

Following the riot, Commandant Ride privately ‘hinted that the real reason the Regiment was not mobilised was that because it is predominantly Chinese, it could not be trusted’, being conscious enough to add ‘obviously you can’t mention this latter point’.147 Ironically, a member of the public advocating the RHKDF’s use as an ‘Internal Security Force’, argued that the fact it contained ‘many members who could speak fluent Chinese … would give them an enormous advantage over Regular Army units when dealing with unruly mobs’.148 Thus the establishment’s fears regarding Chinese reliability did not necessarily reflect broader colonial society. On 4 September 1958 the Navy experienced unrest in its own ranks after four ratings were tried for slackness in obeying orders. They were acquitted through lack of clear and sufficient evidence, but during the case, a Chinese senior engineroom artificer from the same ship also wilfully disobeyed an order to remain aboard and went ashore to HMS Tamar, where he was placed under close arrest. This prompted an orderly demonstration by ratings in Tamar who remained behind offduty for three and a half hours. After being confronted, about half went home, though another 30 made further scenes outside the main gate in front of left-wing reporters. On 10 September another rating refused an order to join one of HM Ships, was charged with wilful disobedience and dismissed from the service. Those chiefly affected were engineroom ratings, a number of seamen and some communications ratings, and the ‘immediate symptoms of the malaise’ constituted a general ‘reluctance to man the local flotilla’.149 This was influenced by the [ 235 ]

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particularly hostile policies pursued by the PRC that year, including the dumping of commodities in Southeast Asia,150 and ‘recent Chinese measures against fishermen and the intensive patrolling which the Navy had to put on to counter them. This meant more seatime which was one of the pretexts that the men advanced’.151 There was evidence to suggest that the antagonistic political situation also created more direct ‘intimidation and pressure on families’:152 The true explanation is more likely to be a reluctance to become too closely involved in action so clearly opposed to the Chinese Government’s policy, aided and abetted by intimidation by left-wing union leaders. Many of the ratings are members of the left-wing Government Armed Forces and Hospital Workers Union. It is difficult to assess at this stage the seriousness of the trouble, or the extent to which it is being coordinated with the renewal of left-wing agitation in the Dockyard. It is however clear that left-wing activity is involved, and it is also clear that the security of the local flotilla is distinctly threatened.153

The Colonial Office considered this ‘a disturbing state of affairs’, and suggested that the Admiralty make plans for replacing locally enlisted personnel in their inshore minesweepers with British ratings,154 concerned about the strategic consequences for British prestige vis-àvis China: These ships are British naval vessels, and as they are out-numbered by Chinese Communist vessels in the vicinity of Hong Kong it is vitally important that they operate at full efficiency. We would look silly if one of them was seized by a dissident crew and taken over to Communist China. We would also look silly if at a time of great stress it was found that they would not go to sea. The situation in Hong Kong, particularly the naval situation, at present looks to me to be rather dicey.155

As a consequence, the minesweepers were temporarily assigned two additional personnel from the UK.156 Local intelligence revealed a year later that ‘a sense of insecurity about their future’ had made Chinese naval personnel ‘a target for union agitation’, and though ‘triad penetration of Hong Kong Other Ranks has been substantially reduced by judicious weeding out … further attempts at infiltration are expected’.157 The HKRNVR was still seen in developmental terms, offering an outlet for eradicating undesirable elements in the force and broader society, with the Governor evoking the earlier arguments of Elliot and Ride: In Hong Kong there are, it is true, many undesirable influences which can induce young people to go wrong, but there are also very many

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opportunities for young men and women to join organisations, such as yours, which will not only give them useful training but will also offer them outlets for their surplus energies and their high spirits, and in a way moreover that is of real service to the community … your work and training in the RNR or WRNR [Women’s Royal Naval Reserve] as the case may be is a form of public service of great use and value to the Colony … Hong Kong as a community depends greatly upon the sea and upon sea communications … Your ships form a valuable addition to what is otherwise available for the protection of Hong Kong’s interests.158

Disbandment On 1 January 1959 the HKRNVR became the Hong Kong Royal Naval Reserve (HKRNR), as the Admiralty incorporated all remaining RNVR forces across the Empire into the RNR.159 In the short term, this did not present much real change for the unit operationally; it still remained a part of the RHKDF, but by bringing the HKRNR closer in-line with the Royal Navy and its own RNR unit based in HMS Tamar, the HKRNR lost its local distinctiveness, which would ultimately lead to its demise. Since 21 June 1959, the sole vessels operated by the HKRNR were two Ham-class minesweepers, HM Ships Cardinham (often incorrectly spelt Cardingham) and Etchingham, supplied by the Admiralty on free loan, with the Hong Kong Government paying maintenance and running costs.160 Despite having only been launched in 1952 and 1957 respectively, neither vessel was built to handle tropical conditions, which accelerated the corrosion of their aluminium-lined hulls and increased the expense for Hong Kong’s Government.161 The issue came to a head in late 1966, with Cardinham requiring a major refit in order to remain in service. This arrived at a time when debate was taking place regarding Hong Kong’s defence contribution to Britain, and how it should represent ‘something that is meaningful and of value under present conditions, not merely something which was meaningful at 162 some point in the past’. The HKRNR was singled out, for ‘while it was considered important for the Colony to have some defence against mines when the vessels were acquired, this is not regarded as essential today’, partly on account of the fact that the Royal Navy also operated its own minesweeping flotilla at Hong Kong. It was also noted that only twice since the end of the Second World War had the colony valued a naval presence, and on both occasions the HKRNR had been superfluous: First, when Chinese gunboats were skirmishing with Hong Kong fishing vessels in the Pearl River Estuary [in 1952], we depended on a Royal

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Navy frigate to show the flag and when the seaborne influx of illegal immigrants developed in 1962 the minesweepers with their wooden frames and thin aluminium ‘skin’ were found to be unsuitable for the job of putting boarding parties on to suspected ‘snakeboats’.163

This operational ineffectiveness was compounded by their lack of use in internal security, notably during the 1956 riots. The HKRNR, at $1.2 million a year, was already the most expensive part-time service in the colony in terms of cost per man, a warship inevitably being more expensive than the Regiment’s light armaments. When the minesweepers’ deteriorating condition was discovered, representations were made to the British Government for their replacement. The Secretary of State for the colonies replied that the possibility of the HKRNR being disbanded was not considered a strong enough reason for giving another ‘gift or loan’.164 The geopolitical map had shifted dramatically in the intervening years. Cyprus, British Somaliland, Nigeria (1960), Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, British Cameroons (1961), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Western Samoa (1962), Kenya, Zanzibar (1963), Zambia, Malawi, Malta (1964), Gambia (1965), Botswana and Lesotho (1966) had all gained independence, and within a year Harold Wilson’s Government would announce Britain’s withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’. Large-scale decolonisation meant there was no longer a problem of imperial overstretch, removing the necessity of maintaining colonial naval reserves, and with Royal Navy vessels permanently on station in Hong Kong, the HKRNR was not worth subsidising from a metropole perspective. During these negotiations, local investigation was made into finding a new raison d’être for the HKRNR, such as ‘a more realistic role in internal security or the prevention of illegal immigration’.165 Maritime defence against the latter was primarily the responsibility of the Marine Police, however, and, apart from the minesweepers, the majority of Government craft suitable for such a purpose had already been earmarked for use by the Marine Police and its auxiliaries. Replacing the minesweepers was thus practically and financially unjustifiable, ‘since expenditure of about $3.5 million (the cost of two naval seaward defence vessels) would equally produce a pair of the new larger police sector launches’. It was regrettably concluded that ‘in the absence of support from the British Government towards their external role, the increasing expenditure on the HKRNR can no longer be justified’.166 On Sunday 12 March 1967, a service was held at St. John’s Cathedral for the HKRNR’s decommissioning. Reverend A. Howison remarked that ‘in bringing their Ensign to the Cathedral the Reserve [ 238 ]

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were laying before God their contribution to the cause of freedom, 167 Even at its wake, order and justice between men and nations’. this connection between the Navy and liberty, depicted so strongly during the Second World War in the British Empire’s selfidentification and appeal for colonial mobilisation and unity, was reaffirmed. In ‘training too closely with the Royal Navy and emphasising its British rather than Hong Kong connections’, most notably under Morahan’s command, the HKRNR made ‘a tactical error’.168 It failed to evolve with the transforming social and cultural landscape of the colony and the dramatic rise in immigration from the mainland, while its prejudiced aversion to Chinese manpower, along with its determination to remain a ‘volunteer’ force, meant it existed largely detached and aloof from emerging Hongkonger identity, preferring to draw closer to its British associations than engage in the state-building project of the colonial Government. Whereas Hong Kong’s ‘regiment was not one of the British Army’s so the Hong Kong Government continued its funding’,169 the HKRNR was considered expendable by both Britain and Hong Kong as it supplemented the strategic role already provided by Royal Navy units stationed there. This made it a prime target for budget cuts at a time when the colony was facing huge financial outlay on large civic projects such as highways, housing, industrialisation, tunnels and reservoirs demanded by its booming population. It had been stressed from the outset that ‘the long term aim of any RNVR must be to attain such standard of proficiency in all aspects of Naval Life that they may take their place in the Royal Navy if required’.170 Arguably the HKRNR achieved that goal as, following disbandment, its remaining members were incorporated into the Royal Navy’s RNR branch at Hong Kong, running the Naval Control of Shipping unit until the colony was returned to China.171

Conclusion As with other colonial naval forces, the HKRNVR was born out of and developed according to a mixture of local and metropole influences, themselves shaped by a range of strategic, political, social, economic and cultural concerns. Though the Admiralty and Colonial Office encouraged the colonies to play their part in imperial defence by forming naval volunteer forces, distance meant they struggled to overcome parochial interests and rivalry for funding from the colonial budget, epitomised by General Barret’s Royal Hong Kong Regiment. This fostered racial prejudice, relating colonial inefficiency to maskee, and framing Chinese culture as undermining British moral values. Such negative preconceptions influenced attitudes towards Chinese [ 239 ]

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recruitment. The Admiralty were dependent on ‘men on the spot’, like Commodore Frank Elliot, to advance their colonial naval scheme by courting key civic and political figures, and drawing the public into active sympathy with its aims through naval theatre. Though Elliot was acting under Admiralty orders, he was also influenced by family honour and legacy. Thus, a mixture of motives – imperial, local and personal – intersected to influence the force’s development, and not always in its best interests. A key justification for Hong Kong’s naval force framed it within the discourse of the ‘civilising mission’ and empire development, emphasising the moral and social improvement that paternalistic Royal Navy instruction could bring to the colony’s population. Yet there were limits, and more negative traits were considered intrinsic to Chinese character, notably transient loyalty. Paradoxically, the British actively fostered such cultural fluidity, encouraging the economic migrancy required for Hong Kong to flourish as an entrepôt. Thus, disloyalty or unreliability were not innate Chinese attributes as depicted by officials, but were colonial characteristics evolving from socio-economic circumstances, and also applied to British recruits more concerned about the war in Europe. During the Japanese invasion, although some Chinese personnel fought loyally until the end, the fact that many deserted reinforced British preconceptions. A number of factors behind this Chinese reaction had again been created by the British authorities themselves, however, such as the absence of information, constant work with no shore leave to check on families who had not been billeted, poor rations, misguided orders to fire on Chinese junks, as well as more explicit racism from certain officers on the ground. A distinction should also be made between ratings who genuinely volunteered to serve in the HKRNVR, and those who enlisted only because their merchant vessels had been requisitioned, and whose allegiance, training and discipline was thus looser and unconnected to ethnicity, proven by the similar experience of British T.124s in the Royal Navy. The British authorities also displayed a lack of cultural sympathy towards the stigma attached to military service by Confucianism and the impact this had on Chinese attitudes towards the forces. They sought to address this upon returning to Hong Kong, following initial defeat by Japan. There was a realisation that to re-establish British colonial authority and imperial prestige, they needed to regain face in the eyes of the Chinese population. A more collaborative and progressive relationship was encouraged, though this masked imperial insecurities, as elsewhere in the Empire. A stronger local Hongkonger identity needed to be forged, to displace conflicting allegiances that held the [ 240 ]

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colony back. Historical memory helped, with the heroic myth of Hong Kong’s brave last stand emphasising a victor narrative, rather than one of British humiliation to restore imperial prestige and face. Admiral Chan Chak represented this new spirit of Anglo-Chinese cooperation and what could be achieved if they worked together. Yet this discourse encountered more entrenched resistance within the ranks of the Defence Force, despite the conciliatory public rhetoric espoused by senior figures such as Commandant Ride. Compulsory service was introduced not because there were not enough potential volunteers in the colony, but because the majority were Chinese and not European, though again British conscripts protested against the draft. Military service and conscription carried uniquely negative cultural connotations for the Chinese, while education and language issues also inhibited them from registering as British subjects. Whereas earlier doubts focused on their perceived lack of patriotism, unreliability, and flightiness, these grew into fears of active sedition once the People’s Republic of China emerged. Racial prejudices were built upon British paranoia of their numerical inferiority and isolated imperial position, covering up their own questionable loyalties to Hong Kong; both from the public who preferred to serve in Britain’s armed forces, and the UK Government who saw the colony as economically valuable but strategically isolated and ultimately indefensible against the PRC. This reality limited the military resources Britain was willing to commit to the task, while communist influence in Hong Kong was left unchecked in case China was provoked. This inevitably produced fears of infiltration – substantiated by insubordination within the HKRNVR during September 1958 – and resulted in reluctance to use the Defence Forces for internal security, most notably during the civil unrest of October 1956, which perpetuated an air of distrust. The HKRNVR reacted by tightening its British connection with the Royal Navy, rather than engaging more with the burgeoning Hongkongers disassociated from it. Its identity became bound up in anachronistic sentimentality tied to past imperial glories, not in keeping with the progressive spirit of the times. Service insularity, local detachment, and the lack of a practical or political purpose for either the Hong Kong or British Governments, meant the HKRNR failed to evolve with the rapidly-changing political, economic and strategic climate of the late 1950s and 1960s, in which decolonisation ultimately rendered colonial naval forces obsolete.

Notes  1  Steve Tsang, Governing Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 2007), p. 54.

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EA ST A S IA  2  PROHK, HKMS No. 74 1-1, ‘Instructions and Hints in the Event of Surrender by the Japanese. Precautions Against Treachery’, Enclosure to Commander Task Force, 21 August, 1945, p. 2.  3  Steve Tsang (ed.), Government and Politics: A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1995), p. 6.  4  Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong 1945–1952 (Oxford, 1988), p. 186.  5 Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, pp. 43–44.  6  Hsein Chin Hu, ‘The Chinese Concept of Face’, American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January–March, 1944), p. 45.  7  Ibid., p. 48.  8  Xia, ‘Liao Chengzhi zai Xianggang’, p. 156, cited in Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 33.  9  Hsein, ‘The Chinese Concept of Face’, p. 64. 10 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 27. 11  Lu Xun, ‘True Story of Ah Q’. p. 75 cited in ibid., p. 27. 12  Ibid., p. 28. 13  Hsein, ‘The Chinese Concept of Face’, p. 59. 14  Ibid. 15  TNA, FO371/46251, ‘Arrangements for the Administration of Hong Kong in the Event of its Liberation by Regular Chinese Forces’, July 1945. 16  TNA, FO371/46251, ‘Political Issues between Great Britain and China regarding Hong Kong’, 7 July 1945. 17  TNA, HS1/171, Rait’s minute to DDMI (P/W), 19 August 1944. 18  TNA, HS1/171, Britmis Chungking to War Office, 20 July 1945. 19  TNA, FO371/46252, Chungking to Foreign Office, 16 August 1945. 20 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, pp. 22–23. 21  Ibid. 22  PROHK, HKMS No. 74 1-1, ‘Instructions and Hints in the Event of Surrender By the Japanese. Precautions Against Treachery’, Enclosure to Commander Task Force, 21 August 1945, p. 2. 23 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 10. 24 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 11. 25  Ibid. p. 36. 26  PROHK, HKRS7-1-1771(1), Commodore-in-Charge’s Memorandum No. 2527, 10 January 1940, p. 3. 27  PROHK, HKMS No. 74 1-1, ‘Instructions and Hints in the Event of Surrender By the Japanese. Precautions Against Treachery’, Enclosure to Commander Task Force, 21 August 1945, p. 2. 28  Ibid. 29  Ibid. 30  TNA, CO825/41/7, Item 76, ‘Note By the Hong Kong Finance Liaison Officer’, 20 January 1944. 31  TNA, CO825/41/7, Acting Commanding Officer, HKRNVR to C.C.A.O., 18 March 1946. 32  Ibid. 33  TNA, CO825/41/7, ‘First Meeting of the Hong Kong Forces, War Service Committee’, 12 December 1945. 34  TNA, CO825/41/7, ‘Back Pay of locally enlisted Volunteers’, Representatives, HKRNVR and HKVDC to Chairman, Hongkong Forces War Service Committee, 15 December 1946. 35  Ibid. 36  Ibid. 37  Quoted in David Clayton, Imperialism Revisited: Political and Economic Relations between Britain and China, 1950–54 (Basingstoke, 1997), p. 97. 38  Ibid. 39  TNA, CO537/4163, ‘Extract from the Governor of Hong Kong’s Secret despatch of the 21st October, 1946’.

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PO ST- WA R H O N G K O N G 40  TNA, CO537/4163, Secretariat File No: 6/1397/46TS, Appendix V, 6 August 1947, p. 5. 41  Ibid. 42  Ibid., p. 6. 43 Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, p. 167. 44  TNA, CO537/4163, Secretariat File No: 6/1397/46TS, Appendix V., 6 August 1947, p. 6. 45  TNA, CO537/4163, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Officer Administering Government of Hong Kong, 2 January 1948. 46  TNA, CAB21/2431, ‘Progress made in planning civil measures for defence’, p. 6. 47  Christopher Thorne, ‘Wartime British Planning for the Post-War Far East’, in Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War, pp. 215–216. 48  TNA, CAB21/2431, ‘The Hong Kong Defence Force’, 1949, p. 2. 49 Clayton, Imperialism Revisited, p. 118. 50  Ibid., pp. 99–102. 51  Ibid. 52  Chi-Kwan Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations, 1949– 1957 (Oxford, 2004), p. 41. 53  PROHK, HKRS369-11-14, Commonwealth Relations Office telegram, 9 October 1952. 54 Clayton, Imperialism Revisited, p. 117. 55 Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 175–177. 56  TNA, CAB21/2431, ‘Progress made in planning civil measures for defence’, p. 6. 57  Ibid. 58  Ibid. 59  TNA, CAB 21/2431, ‘The Hong Kong Defence Force’, 1949, p. 1. 60  Ibid. 61  Ibid. 62  To Class C, ‘a port at which it will be impossible or unnecessary to install or store defences in peacetime, but for which defence schemes should be prepared to meet Probable wartime uses’, TNA, CO537/4163, Secretariat File No:6/1397/46TS, Appendix V, 6 August 1947, p. 6. 63  TNA, CAB21/2431, ‘The Hong Kong Defence Force’, 1949, p. 1. 64  Ibid. 65  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1695, ‘Future of the HKRNVR’, Commander P.J. Vernall, HKRNVR, CO, 9 November 1946, p. 1. 66  Ibid. 67  Ibid. 68  Ibid. 69  TNA, CO537/4163, Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong, to Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet, ‘Future of the Hong Kong RNVR’, 5 April 1948, p. 1. 70  TNA, CAB21/2431, ‘The Hong Kong Defence Force’, 1949, p. 2. 71  TNA, CO537/4163, Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong, to Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet, ‘Future of the Hong Kong RNVR’, 5 April 1948, p. 1. 72  PROHK, HKRS212-1/5-/7, ‘Speech by Ride before Legislative Council on first reading of Defence Force Bill 1948’, p. 12. 73  TNA, CAB21/2431, ‘The Hong Kong Defence Force’, 1949, p. 2. 74  TNA, CAB21/2431, Admiralty to Commodore-in-Charge Hong Kong, 3 June 1948. 75  PROHK, HKRS304-8-32, Commodore L.N. Brownfield to Colonel L.T. Ride, 24 January 1950. 76  Ibid. 77  PROHK, HKRS304-8-32, L.N. Brownfield to Colonial Secretary, 23 January 1950. 78  PROHK, HKRS304-8-32, Commandant [Ride] to Sir Alexander Grantham, 18 April 1953. 79  Ibid. 80  Ibid.

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 81   82   83   84   85 

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. PROHK, HKRS304-8-32, ‘Reorganisation of the HK Defence Force’, 28 July 1950, p. 3.  86  Ibid.  87  TNA, CO537/4163, Commodore-in-Charge to Colonial Secretary, 13 July 1948.  88  Ibid.  89  PROHK, HKRS304-8-32, L.N. Brownfield, Commodore to General Officer Commanding, 8 August 1950.  90  TNA, CO537/4163, Commodore-in-Charge to Colonial Secretary, 13 July 1948.  91  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1695, ‘HKRNVR 1950-51’, Lt.Cmdr. W.G. Willcock, CO, HKRNVR, 20 June 1951, p. 3.  92  PROHK, HKRS212-1/5-/7, ‘Speech by Ride before Legislative Council on first reading of Defence Force Bill 1948’, pp. 4–6.  93  Ibid.  94  Ibid.  95  TNA, CAB21/2431, ‘The Hong Kong Defence Force’, 1949, p. 3.  96  Ibid., p. 4.  97  PROHK, HKRS304-8-32, L.N. Brownfield, Commodore to General Officer Commanding, 8 August 1950.  98  PROHK, HKRS303-8-2, Analysis by Unit and Place of Birth of Persons Attested up to 20 December 1949.  99  PROHK, HKRS6-1-1695, ‘HK RNVR 1950–51’, Lt.Cmdr. W.G. Willcock, CO, HKRNVR, 20 June 1951, p. 4. 100  Ibid., p. 3. 101  Ibid. 102  PROHK, HKRS303-8-2, Cmdr. B.J.B. Morahan, CO, HKRNVR, to Colonial Secretary, 31 March 1950. 103  PROHK, HKRS305-8-45, Draft Regulations, Second Schedule, p. 2. 104  PROHK, HKRS212-1/5-7, ‘Speech by Ride before Legislative Council on first reading of Defence Force Bill 1948’, p. 9. 105  Ibid. 106  Ibid., pp. 10–11. 107  Ibid. 108  Chi-Kwan Mark, ‘Defence or Decolonisation? Britain, the United States, and the Hong Kong Question in 1957’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2005), pp. 51–72, 53. 109  Ibid. 110 Clayton, Imperialism Revisited, pp. 97–100. 111  PROHK, HKRS212-1/5-7, ‘Speech by Ride before Legislative Council on first reading of Defence Force Bill 1948’, p. 10. 112  Ibid. 113  TNA, CO537/4163, Commander-in-Chief Far East to Admiralty, 18 December 1948. 114  Original capitalisation. PROHK, HKRS304-8-32, ‘Reorganisation of the HK Defence Force’, 28 July 1950, p. 2. 115  PROHK, HKRS367-10-14, Manpower (Paper No. 2) Additional Reductions In Strength, 1959, pp. 3–4. 116  PROHK, HKRS367-10-14, ‘The Royal Hong Kong Defence Force’ by Lt.-Col. C.P. Vaughan, p. 4. 117 Fan, The Population of Hong Kong, p. 18. 118  PROHK, HKRS 369-11-10, Report of a Working Part on the Reorganisation of the RHKDF, 1959. 119  PROHK, HKRS 369-11-8, Dept. of Statistics to Colonial Sec., 10 February 1951. 120  PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, Colonial Secretariat to Deputy Commandant, RHKDF, 18 September 1953.

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PO ST- WA R H O N G K O N G 121  PROHK, HKRS367-10-14, Manpower (Paper No. 2) Additional Reductions In Strength, 1959, pp. 3–4. 122  PROHK, HKRS 369-11-10, Questionnaire on the Effects of Voluntary Service, 3 January 1961. 123  PROHK, HKRS 369-11-10, Ratio of Chinese to Non-Chinese Manpower, 1961. 124  PROHK, HKRS 369-11-10, Extracts from a memo. by Brigadier L.T. Ride, 4 February 1948. 125  PROHK, HKRS 41-2-343, Commodore A.R.L. Butler, RN, Report of Inspection HMS Cardingham and Etchingham, 14 July 1961. 126  PROHK, HKRS 367-10-15, ‘Compulsory Service Ordinance, 1951 Further to discussion’, 14 April 1958, pp. 1–3. 127  Ibid. 128  Ibid. 129  PROHK, HKRS369-11-8, V.F. Clarke, Assistant Director of Manpower to Colonial Secretary, 19 March 1957. 130  PROHK, HKRS369-11-8, Col. Secretariat to Deputy Commandant, RHKDF, 20 December 1958. 131  PROHK, HKRS369-11-9, Assistant Director of Manpower, V.F. Clarke, to Colonial Secretary, 8 February 1957. 132  PROHK, HKRS369-11-8, Deputy Colonial Secretary to Public Relations Officer, 9 January 1951. 133  PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, South China Morning Post, 26 August 1954. 134  Ibid. 135  Ibid., 2 September 1954. 136  PROHK, HKRS305-8-45, Lieutenant-Commander George Reynolds to Office of Commodore, 25 June 1948. 137 Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, p. 15. 138  Connie Lee Hong-nee, ‘Society and policing in Hong Kong: a study of the 1956 riot’, Ph.D. thesis (University of Hong Kong, 1995), pp. 100–101. 139  Quoted in Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, p. 70. 140  Ibid., p. 121. 141  Mark, ‘Defence or decolonisation?’, p. 52. 142  PROHK, HKRS367-10-14, cuttings from South China Morning Post, October 1956. 143  PROHK, HKRS367-10-14, E.B. Ride to Brigadier L.T. Ride, 31 October 1956. 144  PROHK, HKRS367-10-14, ‘The Royal Hong Kong Defence Force’ by Lt.-Col. C.P. Vaughan, p. 5. 145  PROHK, HKRS367-10-14, ‘Note on Internal Security Role of RHKDF’, Defence Secretary Claude Burgess, to Colonial Secretary, 5 April 1952, pp. 1–2. 146  Ibid. 147  PROHK, HKRS367-10-14, L.T. Ride to E. B. David, Colonial Secretariat, Hong Kong, 30 October 1956. 148  PROHK, HKRS367-10-14, South China Morning Post, 22 October 1956. 149  TNA, CO1030/793, Items 21–22, Governor, Hong Kong, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 September 1958, pp. 1–2. 150  Steve Tsang, ‘Strategy for Survival: The Cold War and Hong Kong’s Policy Towards Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Activities in the 1950s’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1997), pp. 305–306. 151  TNA, CO1030/793, Items 21–22, Governor, Hong Kong, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 September 1958, pp. 1–2. 152  Ibid. 153  Ibid. 154  TNA, CO1030/793, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Officer Administering Government of Hong Kong, 14 October 1958. 155  TNA, CO1030/793, Item 5, A. Campbell, Colonial Office, 24 September 1958. 156  TNA, CO1030/793, Item 18, Campbell to Admiralty, 1 October 1958. 157  TNA, CO1030/793, Item 9, L.I.C. Monthly Intelligence Report, Hong Kong, October 1959.

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EA ST A S IA 158  PROHK, HKRS545-1-201-1, Hong Kong Government Information Services: Bulletin, 18 November 1964, p. 3. 159  PROHK, HKRS369-11-2, Progress Report by Defence Secretary (1 January–31 March 1959), p. 4. 160  PROHK, HKRS70-3-323, ‘Two Inshore Minesweepers for HKRNR: Commissioning Service’, 18 June 1959. 161  PROHK, HKRS70-3-323, Memo. for Executive Council: HKRNR, 29 November 1966. 162  PROHK, HKRS70-3-323, Hong Kong Star, 10 December 1966. 163  PROHK, HKRS70-3-323, South China Morning Post, 9 December 1966. 164  PROHK, HKRS70-3-323, Memo. for Executive Council: HKRNR, 29 November 1966. 165  Ibid. 166  Ibid. 167  PROHK, HKRS70-3-323, South China Morning Post, 13 March 1967. 168  Melson (ed.), White Ensign – Red Dragon, p. 113. 169  Ibid. 170  PROHK, HKRS41-2-296, HKRNVR 1949–50 – Report by B.J.B. Morahan, CO, 21 July 1950. 171  Melson (ed.), White Ensign – Red Dragon, p. 113.

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Conclusion

The notion of imperial overstretch has presented a theoretical battleground for decades. While economic historians have debated the cost benefits of empire to Britain to question whether it was worth having despite increasing commitments, cultural historians have argued that such calculations fail to take into account the unquantifiable benefits derived from imperial power, such as status or prestige, which influenced international relations. Such challenges have spawned attempts to redefine the concept, notably strategic overextension. Yet, the persistence of the original terminology emphasises the concept’s elusiveness for both historians and political theorists. One problem is that it has grown beyond its original context. For the British Empire the issue was intrinsically tied to imperial naval defence, but this has never been analysed at a sub-Dominion level for the twentieth century before. The material strength of the Royal Navy and its ability to defend Britain’s global interests preoccupied the rise of the discourse for contemporaries, most famously in Chamberlain’s ‘weary Titan’ speech of 1902. If we reconsider imperial overstretch in relation to colonial naval development after the First World War, the concept retains its integrity. The restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty and the deteriorating geopolitical situation of the interwar years meant that the Royal Navy simply no longer had the necessary resources in finance, manpower and ships, to meet all its global responsibilities and threats simultaneously. This was openly acknowledged by the Admiralty, who were forced to put aside racially prejudiced reservations regarding nonwhite colonial manpower in order to appeal to Britain’s dependencies to share the burden. To achieve this, collaboration was crucial. The Admiralty in the metropole could not develop a colonial naval culture from afar. It needed ‘men on the spot’ to ascertain local conditions, forge alliances with indigenous rulers, colonial politicians and businessmen, cajole [ 247 ]

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C O N C L U S IO N

obstructive elements and military rivals like Hong Kong’s General Barret – sometimes through wives – court the press, and canvass public support, particularly yacht clubs and youth organisations, from whom volunteers would be drawn. Visiting officers ‘showing the flag’ of local Royal Navy stations, such as Admirals Ellerton and DunbarNasmith, acted as important missionaries for spreading naval culture, but the formation of colonial forces in Trinidad, the Cayman Islands, Kenya, Zanzibar, Singapore, and Hong Kong was heavily reliant on the local support of Ashley Cooper, Commissioner Cardinall, LieutenantCommander Whitehouse, A.M. Campbell, Sir Ali bin Salim, Sultan Khalifa, Governor Clementi and Commodore Elliot, men who believed in the service and the Empire but were also concerned about personal legacies and commercial advantage. They recognised the need to encourage colonial naval culture through a composite strategy of ‘invented traditions’, naval theatre, and propaganda disseminated via regional, national, local and vernacular press, radio and film; tours and open days, school trips and youth camps, theatrical public displays and trade fairs, warship christenings, and the commemoration of Trafalgar Day through schooling, sailing regattas, and festivals. The loyalty of indigenous manpower was rallied and maintained by the symbolism of local rulers, such as the Sultans of Malaya and Zanzibar, African chiefs and colonial sympathisers like Chan Chak. Material as well as moral assistance came in the form of monetary donations, trophies, decorations, musical instruments, clothing, Sir Ali’s house, and vessels like Clementi’s yacht, Sir Robert Ho Tung’s steamer, and even a battleship from the Malay Sultans, with colonial navalism offering local collaborators an opportunity to increase their own influence within the imperial system. Yet the Admiralty was approaching the issue from a position of imperial weakness not strength. The metropole-colonial dynamic was inverted, with the Navy dependent upon the local legislatures holding the purse strings and power to support or veto its schemes, and was hindered by members such as Kenya’s Governor Grigg and Bagnall in Singapore. The professional training of the naval forces was undermined by wrangling between the Admiralty and colonial governments, particularly in Trinidad and Kenya, as both sides attempted to lighten their financial obligations and pass administration on to the other. As securing colonial financial subsidies was one of the Admiralty’s primary motivations, it stood firm and ceded operational control to the governors. This created a problem in wartime by restricting the deployment of colonial naval forces to territorial waters, with its personnel liable to revert to civil duties until the Governor offered to place them at ‘His Majesty’s disposal’; while this was an option [ 248 ]

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C O N C LU S IO N

for colonies, it was illegal for protectorates and mandates until a new CNDA was passed in 1949. Even then, colonial governments reasserted their control over the local population by introducing compulsory service, most notably in Kenya and Hong Kong. This was fundamentally linked to racialised fears that elevating Africans and Chinese above their colonial status might undermine British authority, particularly if confronted with internal security duties. The fluid nature of port cities inevitably produced transient, or floating, populations and, to keep key positions under white control, the limited pool of Europeans had to be conscripted and suitably allocated. As volunteer forces, the Navy were not allocated conscripts and, though the policy cost it recruits in East Africa, it benefitted in East Asia; the predominance of Africans in the KRNVR meant that by the end of the war it was restricted to local duties, limiting the appeal for European volunteers, whereas the HKRNVR had a disproportionate number of Europeans in its ranks because it was seen as preferable to compulsory military service. To justify colonial expenditure, the economic and social benefits of naval volunteer forces, which resonated more with the general public, were emphasised as much as strategic arguments. They provided employment, education, attracted international visitors and boosted local businesses. Welfare provisions were intended to morally and materially improve the lives of colonial sailors and their families. While naval training developed the forces physically and professionally, they also played an ideological and political role. ‘Progress’ under naval instruction reinforced the notion of a ‘civilising mission’, where colonial peoples still required Britain’s paternal guidance before they were considered ‘developed’ enough to govern themselves, politically and militarily. In this context, sport was not just about improving the health of the men and teaching team spirit; it was also about exercising character. This was deemed important for Europeans too, as the Navy carried residual pseudoscientific beliefs in the debilitating effects of tropical climates on officers serving in the Caribbean, East Africa and Asia. It thus perpetuated the ideas of ultra-imperialists long after their Victorian heyday. Just because the discourse of the ‘civilising mission’ had evolved into development, the sentiments remained in the minds of paternalistic naval and colonial officials, who used propaganda to reinforce British hegemony as well as recruit colonial sailors. With the war stimulating a nationalist surge, federation came to be seen as the best way to retain British influence in the West Indies, East Africa and Malaya. Colonial naval forces were seen as an important step in fostering regional cooperation. There were grand plans to merge [ 249 ]

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the 15 colonial naval forces into seven professional regional navies, but ultimately only the REAN would evolve as intended, though the CRNVR would form the nucleus of an independent Ceylon Navy from 1948 and Hong Kong retained a volunteer reserve. A RMN did emerge, but after the MRNVR and Royal Navy (Malay section) had disbanded, and only because a State of Emergency was declared. In Kenya and Malaya, the navies played an important internal security role, guarding and transporting prisoners, protecting key facilities, providing logistical support, landing troops and lending suppressive fire, though in Hong Kong emergency duties were curbed by doubts regarding Chinese loyalty. Their mission was equally symbolic; by ‘showing the flag’ and demonstrating British benevolence to indigenous populations, they hoped that in opening their ships they would open colonial ‘hearts and minds’. They served as prestige forces to bolster British hegemony under threat from US and PRC influence and reassert its presence in the Caribbean, Malaya and Hong Kong following American and Japanese occupations. Colonial naval culture promoted and relied upon volunteerism, but this hindered the professional development of the units. Though formed to relieve the Admiralty’s manpower burden, the fact that the best naval officers could not be spared meant they resorted to ‘tired’ retirees, ignorant or uninterested in relating to the local cultures, amateurs whose unprofessionalism undermined local respect for the chain of command and the Royal Navy’s prestige, and unqualified European settlers awarded commissions for the colour of their skin and their colonial status, who carried the race and class-based prejudices of that society with them. Part-time colonial sailors were still judged by professional Royal Navy standards, inevitably producing shortcomings, but which the authorities preferred to blame on racial inferiority than admit they had provided inadequate training and equipment. Structural discrimination also created inequalities of pay, service conditions, and promotion, which were highlighted by the transnational encounters that imperial and wartime service exposed colonial servicemen to, and culminated in cases of indiscipline, protest and desertion by Caymanians, Trinidadians, East African Luo, Hong Kong Chinese, and Malays in Ceylon. Competing forms of nationalism would ultimately dismantle both the REAN and plans for a RWIN, as well as impair the Federations of East Africa and the West Indies, as Tanganyika’s and Jamaica’s nationalist leaders feared naval dependency would compromise their political independence. In trying to counter Arab nationalism by developing a closer naval relationship with the Zanzibar Sultanate, Britain would also be ostracised by the African nationalists who ultimately seized power. [ 250 ]

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Colonial naval culture also produced new racial ideologies and imperial discourses of power for Britain’s ‘colonisation of the mind’. As with the martial race theory that influenced colonial naval recruiters, there existed no definitive ethno-cultural framework for their identification of seafaring races; such conceptions varied between regions and evolved according to local conditions and imperial requirements. Seafaring race theory was but one of several pseudoscientific racial ideologies utilised over the forerunning century to reaffirm British primacy and legitimise their imperial authority. It interacted with Orientalist discourse to reinforce the notion of the colonial other in Malaya and Hong Kong, by perpetuating concepts such as maskee, latah, and face, though class concerns also fed British fears of diminishing prestige and respectability, particularly in monarchical Zanzibar. Within the context of the armed forces, this implicit hegemony played an additional role in enforcing discipline and preserving a racially demarcated chain of command. Seafaring race theory served to divide and rule, legitimising the exclusion of groups seen as threatening to British authority within this racial ordering, such as Chinese and Eurasians in Southeast Asia, whilst buttressing colonial collaborators. In the Caribbean, Caymanians were given favoured status, officially on account of their seafaring qualities, though this masked the fact they were considered more reliable on account of their lighter skin colour and British ancestry than slave-descended West Indians who expressed anti-colonial nationalistic sentiments. Despite their landed nature, Kamba seamen in Kenya were similarly valued for their general apathy towards anti-colonial politics. As with the martial races, Kamba, Caymanian and Malay ratings exhibited characteristics of Gurkha syndrome, embracing seafaring identity and the naval employment it offered in order to alleviate their relative poverty. Ultimately, for the British authorities the perceived imperial loyalty of colonial naval recruits was considered more important than any seafaring ability they might possess, inherent or otherwise. Despite their relatively small numerical size, this book has shown that colonial naval forces and the cultures they inspired can tell us a significant amount about the imperial system they were born out of; how it reacted to internal and external pressures, reinforced its authority on practical and ideological levels, and the impact it had upon the politics, cultures, and societies it sought to dominate. In the process, this book advances developments within the new imperial and naval histories, by broadening our understanding of navies as social and cultural institutions, where power was expressed as much in the ideas and relations they cultivated, as through the barrels of their guns. [ 251 ]

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B IB L IOGRAPH Y

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Primary sources Cayman Islands National Archive (CINA) Colonial Report 1937. XH/117/5, Government Notice 73/41, 2 June 1941. XH/117/5, Letter from Bertram Ebanks to Acting Commissioner, 6 July 1941. Government Notice, No.98/39, 30 August 1939. ‘Trafalgar Day’, Central Registry File 706/35, 5 October 1935. Imperial War Museum, London (IWM) K 1430, ‘Malays in the British Navy, Malaya, c.1942’, Ministry of Information Second World War Official Collection. A 27262, ‘Sailor linguist lectures to African audiences’, Admiralty Official Collection, July 1943. Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London Shuckburgh, John, Colonial Civil History of the War, Vol. 1, Part II (1949). Kenya National Archives (KNA) ABK/11/65, Africa Seamen. AE/15/2, East Africa High Commission, 1953–55. AG/16/104, Kenya Naval Volunteer, 1940. AH/5/33, Internal Security Cabinet Committee on Manpower, 1954–55. AH/17/2, REAN Establishment, 1950–57. AH/17/4, REAN Act Regulations, 1951–52. AH/18/1, Royal East African Navy, 1949–57. AH/18/2, REAN Volunteer Reserve, 1953–54. AH/18/3, HMS Kenya, 1939–52. AH/18/4, Naval Entertainments, 1950–56. AH/19/20, Manpower KRNVR and Naval Reserve, 1939–42. AH/20/23, Procedure Naval, 1945–47. AH/22/92, Recruitment African Ratings for KRNVR, 1942–44. AHC/9/62, Akamba Magazine, 1956. AHC/9/137, Joluo Magazine, 1956–57. AS/3/15, Naval Visits Programme, 1956–62. CA/12/12, EA Naval Force Recruiting, 1958–60. CA/12/36, Chiefs Visits to Royal Navy, 1942–46. DC/KMG/2/24/10, East Africa Commission, 1959–61. DC/KSM/1/1/129, Native Allocations, 1939. DC/KSM/22/10, Defence Scheme, 1934–42. DC/KSM/1/22/34, Naval Prize, 1956–60.

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OP/1/797, Royal East African Navy Recruitment, 1954–58. PC/COAST/1/13/145, Navy Base Kilindini, 1941. PC/COAST/2/1/8, Coast Province Annual Report, 1933. PC/COAST/2/1/72, Coast Province Annual Report, 1945. PC/COAST/2/13/2, British Navy, 1920–33. PC/COAST/2/26/16 – War Crisis, 1939–42. The National Archives (TNA), London ADM1/8681/111, Mandated Territories, 1925. ADM1/8715/189, Imperial Naval Defence, 1927. ADM1/9669, Sir Ali bin Salim, 1938. ADM1/9749, Cayman Islands: presentation by Admiralty, 1937–38. ADM1/10872, Engine room ratings serving on armed merchant cruisers under T.124 agreements, 1941. ADM1/10969, Trinidad: institution of RNVR Force, 1939–40. ADM1/11057, Trinidad: War Diaries, 1940–41. ADM1/12995, Revival of Malayan RNVR, 1943–44. ADM1/13014, Colonial Naval Forces: publicity, 1943–44. ADM1/16071, Disbandment of Tanganyika Naval Volunteer Force, 1943–44. ADM1/18245, Proposed history of Colonial naval forces, 1945–46. ADM1/21872, Colonial permanent and volunteer naval forces, 1948–52. ADM1/23215, Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and British West Indies Navy, 1939–52. ADM116/2219, Empire Cruise, Vol. 1, 1923–24. ADM116/2254, Special Service Squadron – Letters, Vol. 1, 1924. ADM116/2396, Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1923–31. ADM116/3121, Flag Officers at Singapore. Conferences in 1925 and 1934. ADM116/3125, War Memorandum (Eastern), 1924–27. ADM116/4343, Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force, 1933–40. ADM116/5599, Future of naval forces of the Colonial Empire, mandated territories and protectorates, 1945–46. ADM116/6125, Signals prior to commencement of Operation Musketeer, 1956. ADM178/185, Mercantile Marine personnel serving in Royal Navy under T124 engagements, 1939. ADM178/301, Disturbances at Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Headquarters, 1943. ADM205/88, Commonwealth and Foreign Navies; Manpower and Manning, 1953. CAB2/3, Committee of Imperial Defence: Meetings. Nos. 120–175, 1912–23. CAB21/187, Naval defence to the Empire, 1921. CAB21/2431, Hong Kong: volunteer defence forces, 1947–51. CAB66/14, United States Bases: System of Command in Leased Territories, 1941. CAB148/4, Kenya – Defence, 1964. CO129/505/2, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Force: Hong Kong, 1927–31.

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Roos, Neil, Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939–1961 (Aldershot, 2005). Rosberg, Carl G. Jr., and John Nottingham, The Myth of “Mau Mau”: Nationalism in Kenya (London, 1966). Royal Malaysian Navy (ed.), Serving the Nation (Kuala Lumpur, 2004). Rüger, Jan, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, 2007). Said, Edward, Orientalism (London, 2003). Selvon, Sam, Foreday Morning: Selected Prose 1946–1986 (Essex, 1989). Selwyn-Clarke, Sir Selwyn, Footprints: The Memoirs of Sir Selwyn SelwynClarke (Hong Kong, 1975). Seymour, A. J., Edgar Mittelholzer: The Man and his Work, being the text of the 1967 Edgar Mittelholzer Memorial Lectures (Georgetown, 1968). Smith, Roger C., The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands (Florida, 2000). Snow, Philip, The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation (London, 2003). Steel, Frances, Oceania under Steam: Sea Transport and the Cultures of Colonialism, c.1870–1914 (Manchester, 2011). Streets, Heather, Martial races: The military, race and masculinity in British imperial culture, 1857–1914 (Manchester, 2004). Tracy, Nicholas (ed.), The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, 1900–1940, Publications of the Navy Records Society, Vol. 136 (Aldershot, 1997). Tsang, Steve, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong 1945–1952 (Oxford, 1988). Tsang, Steve (ed.), Government and Politics: A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1995). Tsang, Steve, A Modern History of Hong Kong (London, 2007). Tsang, Steve, Governing Hong Kong: Administrative Officers from the 19th Century to the Handover to China, 1862–1997 (New York, 2007). Vail, Leroy, The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkeley, 1989). Visram, Rozina, Ayahs, Lascars and Princes: Indians in Britain, 1700–1947 (London, 1986). Wemyss, Georgie, The Invisible Empire: White Discourse, Tolerance and Belonging (Farnham, 2009). Williams, Neville, A History of the Cayman Islands (Grand Cayman, 1970). Winzler, Robert L., Latah in Southeast Asia: The history and ethnography of a culture-bound syndrome (Cambridge, 1995). Newspapers and periodicals The China Mail, 6 August 1926–19 September 1929. East African Standard, 18 August 1939–14 January 1964. The Goshawk: Journal of the Royal Naval Air Station, Trinidad, April–July 1941. The Hong Kong Telegraph, 6 September 1929–25 October 1933. Naval Review, 1920–22. Newstar, 1995. The Northwester, November 1972–March 1974.

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Museums TLDM (Royal Malaysian Navy) Museum, Malacca, 2 July 2009. Video resources Path to Life: Honouring the Cayman Islands Veterans, documentary broadcast from George Town, 8 November 2009. Web resources Bodhi, Bhikku, ‘Toward a Threshold of Understanding’, Access to Insight, 5 June 2010, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bpsessay_30.html [15 March 2012]. CayCompass.com, ‘Poppy time here’, 27 October 2008, http://www.compasscayman.com/caycompass/2008/10/27/Poppy-time-here/ [30 January 2014]. Churchill, Winston, House of Commons speech, 4 June 1940, The Churchill Centre, https://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-ofwinston-churchill/1940-finest-hour/128-we-shall-fight-on-the-beaches [18 May 2014]. Colonial Film: Moving Images of the British Empire, ‘Oxford University Cayman Islands Expedition’, BFI 8710, http://www.colonialfilm.org.uk/ node/1275 [6 February 2014].

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Note: t. indicates a table; f. indicates a figure; m. indicates a map. Abbas, Ackbar 197 Abdullah bin Khalifa, Sultan 120, 135 Abyssinian Crisis (1935), 20 Adventure (gunboat) 79 Ahearne, C.D. 162, 163 HMS Ajax 30 Al Hathera (Zanzibari minesweeper) 86, 99, 102, 103 Ali bin Salim, Sir 87–88, 92, 248 Alice, Princess, Duchess of Gloucester 89 Alrinira Lights (Italian freighter) 32 Amery, Leo 114 HMS Amethyst 222–223 Anderson, J.C. 44 anti-submarine (A/S) warfare 19, 49, 50, 85, 103, 151, 152, 230 appeasement policy of Chamberlain 216 Arabs 79, 92, 102, 119–120, 123, 125, 130–131, 132 nationalism 8, 131–132, 133, 135, 141, 250 Seedies (Muslim sailors) 80, 81, 82, 87, 105, 120 slaughter of in Zanzibar (1964) 135 stereotypes, 130, 131, 133 support for KRNVR 87–88, 92, 105–106 Armistice Day 187 Atlantic Charter 112 Attlee, Clement 112, 221 Australasian territories xii, 9, 13, 14, 16t. Australia xii, 9, 13, 14, 16t., 133, 162 naval relationship with Malaya 168, 169, 171 Bagnall, Honourable Mr J. 153, 248 Baigent, Warrant Officer 162 Barbados 29, 48, 60, 70–71 HMS Barbour 117 Barham, Lieutenant-Commander 117–118, 126 Barret, General 183–184, 185, 239, 248 HMEAS Bassingham 116, 120, 125 HMS Benbow 33, 44 Bevin, Ernest 221 Blakeney, Lieutenant-Commander 32 Blunt, Commander 87, 89 Bodden, Rayal 55 Bomani, Paul 136 Borden, Linda 68 Bowen, Sir George 179 The Boys (enemy observation drifter) 201 Britannia Royal Naval College (BRNC), Dartmouth 104, 136, 166–167, 168 British Empire China as post-war threat to 222–223, 234, 236, 237–238 colonies, protectorates and mandate territories 8, 102–103, 106, 114, 248

communist threat to in East 187, 222–223, 234, 236, 237–238 ‘heroic myths’ 10, 203–206, 216, 217, 241 illusion of Pax Britannica 22 imperial division of labour 40–42 ‘imperial overstretch’ xiii, 1, 7, 15–16, 20–23, 49, 182, 238, 247 monarchy’s symbolic role 119, 122–123 nautical nature of 13, 16 race-based hierarchy 4, 8, 18, 50, 70, 83, 94, 119, 131, 156, 170, 215 use of cultural sympathy 202–203 weakening in interwar years 16–17, 19, 20, 22–23, 248 withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ 238 see also collaboration, imperial British Guiana 29 Brock, T.W. 123 Brooke-Popham, Sir Robert 88, 89, 90, 201–203 Brownfield, L.N. 225 Bryceson, Derek 138 Buckley, Lieutenant-Commander 92 Buddhism 202–203 Burma 1, 22, 165 Bustamante, Alexander 48 Butler, Mrs Pamela Mary 229 Butler riots in Trinidad (June 1937) 29 Byrne, Sir Joseph 119 Calder-Marshall, Arthur 36 calinda chants 37–38 calypso warriorhood 8, 35–38, 50 Campbell, A.M. 84, 248 Canada xii–xiii, 31, 33, 66, 89 Cardinall, Allen Wolsey 66, 67, 68, 69–70, 71–72, 189, 248 HMS Cardinham 237 Caribbean xiii, 7, 28m. Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement (1940) 8, 33, 34, 46 Federation plans 48, 50, 249, 250 First World War naval detachment from 29 German Operation Neuland (1942-44) 33, 46, 50, 61 labour unrest 7, 8, 29–30, 34, 49–50 nationalism in, 7, 29, 49–50, 251 Royal West Indian Navy (RWIN) proposal 47–49, 47t., 50, 250 status of different West Indian groups 8, 56–60, 65–66 US influence and interests in 7–8, 34–35, 46–47 see also Cayman Islanders; Trinidad Carnarvon Commission report (1882) 14

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INDEX Cayman Islanders xiii, 55–66, 71–72 British preference for Caymanian recruits 8, 56–60, 65–66, 251 Christianity 57, 61, 69–71 Ebanks surname 59 enthusiasm for the Royal Navy 67–69 identity 66–71 imperial patriotism 56, 60–61, 62, 65, 68–70 maritime identity 55, 56–58, 65–72, 156, 157 negative attitudes to Trinidad 59–63, 70 Oxford University film (1938) 67–68 Royal Navy warship visits to 67, 68–69, 71 sailing regatta 55, 66, 67, 68–69, 71 Sea Scouts 68–69, 71 skin colour 57, 61, 72, 251 Trafalgar Day school essay competition 68, 71 volunteers in TRNVR from 8, 33, 43, 55, 56, 58–66, 67, 70–71, 72 Cayman Islands Yacht and Sailing Club 68, 71 Central African Protectorate (now Malawi) 79 HMS Ceylon 127, 134 Ceylon xii, xiii, 1, 8, 21, 102, 104, 167 Malay ratings exile in after fall of Singapore 9, 161–164, 170–171 Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (CRNVR) 162, 249 Chamberlain, Joseph 14–15, 89, 247 Chan Chak, Admiral 10, 204, 206–207, 208– 209, 241, 248 character, colonial, development of 1, 4, 6, 9, 126–128, 131, 141, 152–153, 157–158, 170, 249 Chatfield, Lord 20–21 Chiang Kai-shek 207, 209, 216, 218 China 20, 140, 206–209, 215–221 Admiral Chan Chak 10, 204, 206–207, 208–209, 241, 248 civil war (from 1927) 187, 207 ‘civilising mission’ towards 180, 198–199, 218 Communist revolution xiv, 10, 221 Confucian influences on naval culture 10, 207–208, 240 meaning of ‘face’ in culture of 216–217 Sino-Japanese conflict 191, 217 see also People’s Republic of China (PRC) Chinese communities anti-Chinese sentiment 154, 155, 170, 180–181, 197, 198, 199–200, 239 attitudes to military service 201, 207–208, 233, 240, 241 Chinese stereotypes 165, 180–181, 190 compulsory service in Hong Kong not enforced on 232–233 discrimination against in SSRNVR 154 in Hong Kong 10, 180–181, 185, 187, 190– 191, 196, 197–199, 201–203 in Hong Kong, post-war 215–216, 218–220, 221–222, 223, 230–233, 241 Hong Kong seamen’s strike (1922) 155, 190–191 in Malaya 154, 157, 165, 166, 167, 171

Maskee stereotype 180–181, 239–240, 251 ratings in HKNVF 190, 191, 196, 198, 203, 220, 230–231, 232 removal of Peak colour bar in Hong Kong 215–216 Royal Navy views on 155 in Singapore 154, 165 wartime influx of refugees to Hong Kong 194 Christianity 57, 61, 69–71, 218 Churchill, Winston 57, 158, 159, 160, 170, 229 Cicala (Insect-class gunboat) 205 cinema and film 3, 67–68, 96–98, 106, 248 ‘civilising mission’ 1, 4, 69, 86, 90, 96–98, 140, 240, 249 for China 180, 198–199, 218 Christianity and 69–70, 218 developmentalism as successor to 112–113, 215, 249 in Southeast Asia 157, 215, 218 see also paternalism, naval Clementi, Sir Cecil 153, 180, 248 climate, tropical 42–43, 49, 50, 57, 104, 126, 153, 157, 169, 249 Cold War 9, 10, 138–140, 171 collaboration, imperial 1 African chiefs and elders 93–96, 105–106, 121, 248 ambition and social status 193, 248 Admiral Chan Chak 10, 204, 206–207, 208–209, 241, 248 ‘Gurkha syndrome’ 5, 66, 119, 157, 251 of ruling elites 8, 9, 34, 87, 102, 105–106, 152, 160–161, 170, 247–248 seafaring race theory and 7, 8, 251 Colonial Conferences (1887, 1902) 14–15 Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) 98 Colonial Development and Welfare Fund 133–134 Colonial Naval Defence Acts (CNDAs) 1865 Act 13, 83, 84 1931 Act 6, 8, 19, 31, 84, 102, 114 1949 Act 115, 140–141, 249 protectorates not covered by 98, 102–103, 114, 249 Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) 15, 17, 18, 84 Confucian philosophy 10, 207–208, 240 HMS Consort 223 Cooper, Ashley 30, 248 Cooper, Lieutenant 86–87 HMS Cornflower 189, 190, 193 HMS Corsair 58 Cowie, Mervyn 122 cricket 39, 39f. Crimean War 13 Cullen, Percy 79 Cyprus 129, 238 Dar es Salaam 81, 96, 116, 136 decolonisation era xiv, 9, 112, 138–140, 238, 241 Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement (1940) 8, 33, 34, 46

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development discourse, colonial 9, 112–115, 117–118, 120–121, 126, 141, 215–216, 233, 236–237, 240, 249 Dicey, Edward 14, 20, 22 Dickson, A.G. 96 Dilke, Charles 13–14 djeli (West African singers) 38 Dollard, A.N. 169 Dovers, William J. 168, 169 Dreyer, Frederic 183 Dunbar-Nasmith, Sir Martin 84, 87, 248 Dunkirk evacuations 159, 170 Dutch East Indies 162 Easey, N.C. 125 East Africa 78m. African sailors in Seamen’s Union 117 Arab slavers 79 British imperial mindset in post-colonial era 139–140 Central African naval force 79 Central Legislative Assembly (EACLA) 115, 136, 137 Civil Defence and Supply Council (CDSC) 114–115 colonial parochialism 84, 136 ‘Empire Cruise’ visit to xiii, 81, 86 fears of post-colonial dependence on Britain 137, 139, 140, 141, 168 Federation plans 9, 114–115, 137, 139, 140, 141, 249, 250 First World War action on lakes xiii High Commission (EAHC) 115, 122, 130, 136, 141 indigenous custom issues 120–121 naval amalgamation proposal (1941) 100– 104, 106 naval protests (1919) 82 post-war colonial ‘development’ issues 9, 112, 113–115, 117–119, 120–121, 126–128, 141 post-war common navy proposals 113 recruits in First World War 80–81 Second World War action against Italians 8, 92–93 slave trade East Africa 79, 80, 87 Somali identity 82–83, 85 wartime European manpower shortages 91–92, 99, 104–105, 106, 249 youth organisations 125, 140, 141 see also Kenya; Tanganyika; Uganda; Zanzibar East African Common Services Organisation 136, 139 East African Marine Fisheries Research Organisation 130 East African Railways and Harbours Corporation 115–116 East Asia 10, 179, 181, 214m. restoring of imperial ‘face’ in 10, 215–220, 240–241 Ebanks, Bertram 70 Ebanks, Thomas Ewart 66 Eden, Uline 64–65

Edinburgh, Duke of 123 HMS Effingham 84 Egerton, W.G. 19 Egypt 131, 132 Elizabeth II, Queen 115, 119, 123, 168 Ellerton, Walter 84, 248 Elliot, Charles 183, 189–190 Elliot, Frank 183–186, 187, 189–190, 189f., 193, 196–197, 240, 248 ‘Empire Cruise’ by Special Service Squadron (1923 –24) xii–xiii, 18, 81, 152 Empire Day 187 Enlightenment philosophy 42–43, 44 HMS Etchingham 237 Eurasian communities 155–156, 167, 170, 193 Fannin, Mrs K.M. 137–138 Father and Son (‘Focus on Empire’ film) 96–98 Faure, C.M. 185 Field, Sir Frederick 86, 152 Fiji xii, 1, 18, 22 First World War xiii, 16, 17, 23, 29, 80–81, 151, 186–187, 193 Battle of Jutland (1916) 152 Forbes, Henry 36 Fosten, Peter 165–166 France 20 HMS Frosty 199 Gambia 1, 22, 238 ‘General China’ operation in Kenya 129 Germany xiii, 2, 20, 23, 81 Anglo-German naval rivalry (pre-1914) 2, 14–15 Operation Neuland (1942–44) 33, 46, 50, 61 Gibbs, E.A. 138, 139 Gill, Jaswant Singh 5 Gladstone, William 14 Glidden, Clive 64 Gold Coast 1, 21 Goldfield (Caymanian schooner) 67 HMS Good Hope 89 Goodenough, M.G. 134 Goodwin, Ralph 205 Graf Spee, sinking of 36 Gramscian notion of hegemony 217 Grantham, Governor 221, 222, 226 Great Depression 7 Grenada 47 HMS Griffon 86–7 Grigg, Sir Edward 84, 114, 248 ‘Gurkha syndrome’ 5, 66, 119, 157, 251 Gurkhas 166 Guyanese recruits to TRNVR 33, 70 Hague Convention 138 Halifax, Rear-Admiral 201 Hamilton, Ian 151 Harcourt, Rear-Admiral 218 Haroun, Acting Petty Officer 158 Harrison, Lieutenant-Commander 199–200 Hashim bin Karim 158 Hassan, Ramazan 96, 97f. Hastings, A.R. 117, 126

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INDEX HMS Hawkins 84 Hicks, Reverend George 70 historical memory 8, 66–71, 170, 216, 241 Hitler, Adolf 70, 114 Ho Tung, Sir Robert 193, 248 Hoggan, C.B. 102, 103 Holland, Sir Henry 14 Holmes Commission Report (1948) 121 Hong Kong 178m. Auxiliary Flotilla (c.1885) 179 British post-war return to 199–200, 215–216, 218–220, 240–241 Buddhist revival of 1920s 202–203 Chinese exclusion from compulsory service 232–233 Chinese population 10, 180–181, 185, 187, 190–191, 196, 197–199, 201–203 Chinese population, post-war 215–216, 218–220, 221–222, 223, 230–233, 241 CID proposals for RNVR (1922) 18 colonial parochialism 183 colonial re-establishment in 215–216, 218– 220, 221–227, 240–241 ‘communistic elements’ in 190–191, 222, 234, 241 compulsory service 196–197, 230–231, 232–234, 241, 248, 249 defensibility against Japan 183, 191 downgrading as a strategic port 223 European community 181, 190–192, 193– 195, 196–197, 222, 224, 231, 232, 241 evacuation of 199, 203–204, 206–207 imperial and civic duty 193–194, 195–197 as ‘impregnable fortress’ 193 inter-service rivalry in 182, 183–185, 224–227, 239 Japanese invasion and occupation of, xiv, 10, 199, 200, 201–206, 208, 209, 215 large-scale rioting (October 1956) 234–235, 238, 241 leftists unions in, 155, 185, 190, 222, 236 Locally Enlisted Personnel (LEP) division 179 Maskee stereotype 180–181, 239–240, 251 naval defence in interwar years 179–192 Navy League branch 184, 186 Navy Week and Trafalgar Day 185–189 Navy withdrawals to European conflict 192, 195 New Territories, 178m. 192, 216, 218 notion of the colonial other 198, 218, 231, 251 Palmerston’s denunciation of 189–190 plans for RNVR 179–180, 181–182, 183–188 post-war British commitment to 229–230 post-war development discourse 215–216 post-war influx of Chinese immigrants 222, 231, 239 post-war naval debate 221–222, 223–224 PRC influence in 222, 236, 241 PRC threat to 222–223, 230, 234, 236, 237–8, 241 removal of Peak colour bar 215–216 restoring of imperial ‘face’ in 10, 215–220, 240–241

revisionist version of fall of 203–207, 217, 241 rioting and unrest 10, 155, 190–191, 234– 235, 238, 241 seamen’s strike (1922) 155, 190–191 Singapore naval base subsidy 18 socio-economic heritage 10, 197, 198, 199, 240 strategic importance as naval anchorage 180 transient population of 10, 197–198, 224– 225, 240 vulnerability during 1950s 230 wartime ethnic tensions 197–199 wartime influx of Chinese refugees 194 Washington Naval Agreement 17–18, 179, 183, 190, 193 Hong Kong Club 219 Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force (HKNVF) 21, 184–192, 189f., 207 Hong Kong Royal Naval Reserve (HKRNR) 237–239 Hong Kong Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (HKRNVR) xiii, 1 additional responsibilities (1939–41) 192–194 as all-volunteer unit, 231, 239 anti-Chinese sentiment in 199–200, 239, 240 becomes HKRNR (1959) 237–239 Chinese desertions from 10, 199, 200, 203, 221, 240 Chinese ratings 190, 191, 196, 198, 203, 220, 230–231, 232 Chinese recruits 10, 196, 198, 199–200, 203, 220, 230–231, 232, 239 close association with Royal Navy 224, 225–227, 231–232, 237–238, 239, 241 colony versus wider Empire allegiances 196–197, 229, 241 creation of (1939) 191–192 decommissioning of (1967) 238–239 defective weapons from Singapore 204–205, 205t. development in relation to Japanese expansionism 10, 186, 191 escape of 2nd MTB Flotilla,10, 203–207 European volunteers 191, 195, 196, 224 fears over Chinese reliability 199–201, 219–220, 221–222, 231–232, 234–236, 240, 241, 250 financing of 190, 223–224, 237–238, 239 imperial security issues in recruitment 221–222, 231–232, 241 institutionalised discrimination in 220–221, 228 long-term role of 193 mobilisation (1939) 192, 194–195 as more popular than Regiment 232, 249 personnel in Japanese POW camps 205–206, 220 recruitment 190–192, 194–196, 208 in RHKDF 224–228, 237 Shanghai recruits 195 ships of 189, 192, 193, 237

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Hong Kong Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (HKRNVR) (continued) social and developmental benefits of 184, 224–225, 236–237, 240 T.124 Merchant crews 200–201, 240 training of 190 wartime European manpower shortages, 192, 195 Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC) 222, 224 HMS Hood xii, 18 Hope, J.D. 167 Howison, Reverend A. 238–239 Hull, E.W. 154 India 4–5, 6, 20, 21, 57, 127, 155 Mutiny/Rebellion (1857), 4, 13 HMS Indira 199 Indonesia 9, 168 invented traditions 1, 66, 67–69, 71, 248 Ismail bin Haji 163 Italy 20, 23 Jamaica xiii, 29, 48, 62, 250 James, R.H. 92 Jamshid bin Abdullah 120, 130–136, 141 Japan Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902, xiii, 14, 17, 23 Eastern Fleet’s retreat in Second World War 8, 93, 102 expansionism 10, 20, 23, 152, 191 fall of Singapore to (15 February 1942) 9, 158–159, 160, 170, 204 invasion and occupation of Hong Kong xiv, 10, 199, 200, 201–206, 208, 209, 215 invasion of Manchuria (1931) 20 as major naval power 17, 18, 23, 152 Meiji Restoration 18 occupation of New Territories’ border region 192 as possible threat to Kenya 84 ‘rape of Nanking’ by 219 responses to in interwar period 10, 17–18, 20, 152–153, 180, 183, 186–192 Shanghai crisis (1932) 20 Sino-Japanese conflict 191, 217 surrender of 164, 218 Tientsin crisis (June 1939) 20 treatment of prisoners 161, 205–206 Johnson, L.A.W. 154 Johnson, Seaman 63, 64–65 Jones, Arthur Creech 48 Kamba people of Kenya 7, 85, 118–119, 124, 251 Karima, Chief Sila 93–94 Kendal, F.W. 207 HMS Kenya 88–90, 90f., 105, 122–123, 133 Kennedy-Purvis, Charles 201 Kenya African chiefs and elders 93–96, 105–106, 121 Asian population 121, 122 collaborating local elites 87–88, 105–106

as Colony and Protectorate 102 colour bar in wartime KRNVR 91, 133 community wirelesses 96 Compulsory Service for Europeans 9, 104, 106, 248 education standards in 92, 119, 122, 127 ‘Empire Cruise’ visit to xii, xiii, 18 ethnic tensions within 87, 91–92 European community 83, 88, 90, 91–92, 94, 104, 106, 115, 123 financing of REAN 125 issue of poor whites 91 Kamba ethnic group 7, 85, 118–119, 124, 251 Kilindini naval base 85, 103, 104, 113, 116 Luo ethnic group 118, 119, 120–121, 123, 124 Mau Mau Emergency 9, 123, 128–129, 141 Mombasa as headquarters for Eastern Fleet 8, 93, 102 Montgomery’s visit (1947) 112 mutiny (January 1964) 139 nationalist ideologies 9, 112, 137, 138 objections to race-based pay 121–122 post-colonial ‘military and economic aid’ 140 post-war colonial ‘development’ issues 112, 120–121, 126–128 Royal Navy visits 122–123 Soldier Settlement Scheme (1919) 83 Tanganyikan distrust of ‘Nairobi mentality’ 136 Whitehouse proposes local naval force 83, 84, 105 Kenya African National Union (KANU) 137 Kenya Landing and Shipping Company 129 Kenya Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (KRNVR) 94f., 95f. action in Basra and Persian Gulf (1941–43) 93 African personnel excluded from Eastern theatre 103–104, 106, 114, 249 Sir Ali bin Salim as honorary Captain 88 Asian personnel 121 creation of (1933) 1, 8, 22, 84 European community attitudes to 88, 90 European officers and petty officers 85, 92, 103–104, 105 Father and Son (‘Focus on Empire’ film) 96–98 financing of 85, 87, 88, 103, 105 internal security role 85, 249 Italian Somaliland campaign 8, 92–93, 95 legal jurisdiction 102 permanent nucleus of regular African ratings 85 placed at ‘HM’s disposal’ (1942) 102, 106 poaching of ZNVF personnel 99 post-war colonial ‘development’ 112, 113, 117 REAN as successor organisation 112, 116 Seychellois officers 115 ships of 92–93 support from Arab community 87–88, 92, 105–106

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INDEX training of 84, 85, 86, 88, 103 volunteers from Tanganyika 103 wartime colour bar 91, 133 wartime European manpower shortages 91–92, 104–105, 106, 248–249 Kenyatta, Jomo 139 Khalifa bin Harub, Sultan 81–82, 86, 120, 130– 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 248 Khamisi, Francis 136 Kilimanjaro, Mount 126 Kilindini naval base 85, 103, 104, 113, 116 King’s African Rifles (KAR) 85, 104, 122, 124, 128, 129–130 Kipling, Rudyard xiii, 193 Kru people 6, 80, 82, 105 Kuomintang 155, 187, 207, 234 Kuttan, Chitharanjan 167, 168–169 HMS Laburnum 154, 160, 162 Lamu Island, Kenya 129 lascars, South Asian 6 latah concept 163, 171, 251 Layton, Sir Geoffrey 202–203 Lee, N.H. 93 Lettow, General von 80–81 liberalism 185, 194, 218 Lindsay, Lieutenant-Commander D.S.G. 31–32 Littledale, H.F. 88 Lloyd George, David 17 HMS Loch Fada 129 London Naval Conference (1935–36) 20 Lu Xun 217 Lukenia prison camp, Kenya 129 Luo people of Kenya 118, 119, 120–121, 123, 124 MacDonald, Malcolm 114 MacMunn, George, The Martial Races of India (1933) 4–5 Maendaleo Ya Wanawake (women’s organisation) 127 Makarios, Archbishop 129 HMS Malaya 152 Malaya 150m. British naval aid 168 Chinese communities across 154, 157, 165, 166, 167, 171 collaborating local elites 152, 160–161, 170 Communist Party 155 defence spending 152 education standards in 165 ‘Empire Cruise’ visit to xii, xiii, 18, 152 fall to Japan 9, 204 fear of post-colonial dependence on Britain 168 Fighting Value of the Races of Malaya (1930 report) 155 independence (1957) 167, 168 latah concept 163, 171, 251 local Indian groups 155, 157, 167 Malay as ‘lingua franca’ 164, 166 naval relationship with Australia 168, 169, 171 notion of the colonial other 156–157, 163, 251

plans for liberation of (1944–45) 164 post-war imperial re-establishment 9, 163–167, 171 RNVR branch in Penang 22 Royal Military College 168 Royal Navy (Malay Section)/‘Malay Navy’ 9, 22, 156–158, 159–160, 162–163, 164, 171, 249 seagoing identity 151, 152, 154–155, 156, 157, 161, 170 Singapore naval base subsidy 17 State of Emergency (1948–60), 9, 165–166, 171, 249 Sultans 152, 158, 160–161, 168, 170, 248 Young’s naval unit proposals 151 Malayan Naval Force (MNF) 165–166, 171 Malayan Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (MRNVR) 1, 5, 156 adat and Islam 160–161 Chinese in crews 156, 161, 171 disbanding of (1946) 164, 171, 249 evacuation of Singapore and Penang 159, 161, 170 improvements in conditions 163–164, 171 ratings in exile after fall of Singapore 9, 161–164, 170–171 reconstituted part-time force (1948) 165 Manchuria, invasion of (1931) 20 Mandates Commission 102 Manley, Norman 48 Mao Zedong 10, 221 Margaret, Princess 119 martial race theory 4–5, 7, 56, 71, 151, 208, 250 Aryanism 57, 72 ‘Gurkha syndrome’ 5, 66, 119, 157, 251 Muslims in 80, 105 masculinity 3, 130 calypso warriorhood 8, 35–38, 50 stickfight tradition in Trinidad 37–38 US ‘invasion’ of Trinidad 35–36, 38, 45, 50 Mauritius 1, 22, 113 Mayhew, Christopher 229 Mbarak Ali Hinway, Sheikh 101f. Mboya, Tom 137, 138, 139 McCoy, Harry 58, 64–65, 68 McDouall, J.C. 200 McLaughlin, David 68 McLoughlin, Glendower 68 McLoughlin, Norman Rudolph 60–61, 63 Meade, Lieutenant 162–163 Menzies, Robert 168 HMS Mersey 201 Middle East 8, 131 Milner, J.S. 118 minesweeping xiii, 19, 21–22, 86, 99, 116, 125, 152, 154 in Caribbean 33, 55 in East Africa 83, 85, 86, 92, 99, 103, 116 in Hong Kong 182, 184, 190, 236, 237 HMS Minnie 199 Mitchell, Sir Philip 112–113 Mittelholzer, Edgar 45–46, 66 Mlozi, Sultan 79 Mohamed Haji bin Yunos 158

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INDEX Mombasa 83–86, 87, 91–93, 101, 102, 112, 114, 117, 125, 128 costs of Royal Navy visits 123 effects on of REAN disbandment 137–138 as headquarters for Eastern Fleet 8, 93, 102 labour unrest in 129 in post-colonial era 136, 137, 138, 139, 140 Monroe Doctrine 35 Monsell, Lord 20 Montgomery, Bernard 112 Mooring, Sir George 135 Morahan, Commander 225, 226, 239 Moth (Insect-class gunboat) 205 HMS Mounts Bay 223 musical and dance forms, Swahili 99–100 Muslims in East Africa 80, 83, 100, 134 in martial race theory 6, 80, 105 Punjabi mutiny in Singapore (1915) 155 in Southeast Asia 158, 160–161, 162, 163, 166, 171 HMEAS Mvita 115, 120, 125, 129, 130 Nagasaki Joe’s in Hong Kong 219 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 132 nationalisms, anti-colonial 1, 115, 158, 250 in Africa 8, 9, 112, 131–132, 133, 135, 137, 138, 141, 250 Arab 8, 131–132, 133, 135, 141, 250 in Caribbean 7, 29, 49–50, 251 Naval Defence Act (1889) 14 Naval Discipline Act 103, 134 naval forces in colonies xiii–xiv Central African naval force 79 comparisons with hill stations 153 complements/strength statistics 21t. as confined to ‘territorial waters’ 13, 31, 98, 102, 248 creation of (1933–41) 1, 7, 21–23 disbanding of 10, 103, 136–139, 161, 164, 171, 238–239, 249 financial motives for 19, 31, 38, 47–48, 83, 85, 170, 181, 247, 248 post-war amalgamation proposals 113–114, 249 post-war colonial ‘development’ 112, 113–115, 117–119, 120–121, 126–128, 141, 249 in white settler colonies 13 naval theatre concept xii, 1, 2, 3, 8, 22, 81, 248 in Hong Kong 10, 188, 217, 240 imperial naming rituals 9, 88–90, 105 Kenyan chiefs and elders 93–96 MNF visits to remote communities 166, 171 Royal Navy visits xiii, 67, 68–69, 71, 81, 86, 122–123, 141, 154 royal pageantry 119–120, 122–123, 141 use of monarchical authority 81–82, 119, 122–123 Navy League 14, 184, 186 Navy Week 93, 185–189 Ndungu, Chief 94 New Zealand xii, 13, 14, 16t., 18, 133

HMS Newfoundland 134 Nicholls, H.E.H. 165 Nicholson, Bertram W.L. 104 Nicholson, E.A. 115, 126 Nigeria 1, 22 HMS Nigeria 58 Norman, E.D. 168 Northcote, Sir Geoffry 195 Nyerere, Julius 138–139, 140, 141, 168 Obote, Milton 139 Ochieng, Jacob 139 Odhiambo, George Eliakim 120, 121 Ogango, Able Seaman 123 oil production in Trinidad 7, 8, 29, 30 US imports from circum-Caribbean 35 Oliver, Geoffrey 131 Opium War, First 208 Orang Laut people 151 Oremo, Matthew 120, 121 Orientalism 4, 10, 18, 133, 157, 158, 170, 180, 198–199, 208 disguise 218, 219 ‘face’ concept 215, 218, 251 lethargy and torpor 157, 180, 198 notion of ‘othering’ 131, 156–157, 163, 198, 218, 231, 251 HMS Orion 67–68 Overseas Defence Committee (ODC) 19, 21–22, 84, 222 HMS Owen 136 Oxford University 67–68 Palmerston, Lord 189–190 Panama Canal 35 paternalism, naval 1, 4, 42, 69, 112–113, 134, 140, 249 in China 198–199 in East Africa 94–95, 96–98, 102, 126 in Hong Kong 190, 240 in Malaya 157–158, 170 pay 9, 19, 82, 102, 121–122, 250 in HKRNVR 196, 220–221 in KRNVR 85, 102 in MRNVR 163 in REAN 121–122 in SSRNVR 155 in TRNVR 45, 50 HMS Pelandok 156, 158 Pemba 87, 103, 119, 130, 135 Penang 9, 18, 22, 151, 156, 159, 161 People’s Republic of China (PRC) xiv, 10, 221, 222–223 as threat to Hong Kong 222–223, 230, 234, 236, 241 HMS Perla 199, 200 Petrie, J. 194, 195 Phillips, C.G.M. 91 Poland, Commodore 88 port cities, transient populations 10, 197–198, 224–225, 240, 248–249 port protection xiii, 92, 138, 152 HMS Poseidon 200

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INDEX power, imperial discourses of 2 Anglo-Saxonism 4, 18, 35, 158 ‘colonisation of the mind’ 4, 250 indigenous customs and power structures 120–121, 141, 247, 248 see also collaboration, imperial racial hierarchies 4, 8, 18, 50, 70, 83, 94, 119, 131, 156, 170, 215 see also Orientalism; seafaring race theory ‘prestige’, imperial 1, 7, 14, 113, 158, 171, 250, 251 in East Asia 181, 200, 207, 215–220, 221, 223, 240–241 in interwar years 20, 22, 23, 67, 68 as shaken by Second World War 10, 91–2, 215 as threatened in Caribbean 7–8, 46–47, 50 as threatened in wartime Kenya 91–92 Prince of Wales School in Kabete 104 HMS Prince of Wales, sinking of 158, 160 Pritchard, Harry 155 propaganda xiii, 38–42, 119, 248, 249 collaborating indigenous elites 8–9, 88, 95–96, 105–106 in East Africa 95–98, 105–106, 141 in Hong Kong 196, 209 in Malaya 157, 171 reinforcing imperial hierarchies 8, 50, 112 use of film and cinema 96–98, 106, 248 prostitution 35 Pulau Bukom 167, 168 Punjabis 5, 6, 155 Queen Mother 119 racial and colonial prejudice African stereotypes 81 anti-Chinese sentiment 154, 155, 170, 180– 181, 197, 198, 199–200, 239, 240 Arab stereotypes 130, 131, 133 at BRNC, Dartmouth 167 built upon British paranoia in Hong Kong 241 Chinese in Hong Kong 10 Chinese stereotypes 165, 180–181, 190 colour bar in wartime KRNVR 133 development discourse 112–113, 117–119 effects of naval manpower shortages 9, 21, 49, 104–105, 106, 222, 247, 248–249, 250 against HKRNVR ratings 220–221 against KRNVR ratings 105 Malay stereotypes 151, 155, 163, 170, 171 naval ethnic stereotyping 118–119, 124 need for sizeable European communities 18 prejudice between colonial cultures 59 ‘racial’ suitability for naval service 1, 42, 48–49, 56–60, 65–66, 102 against ZNVF ratings 102 racial discrimination against Chinese in SSRNVR 154 colour bar in wartime KRNVR 91 against HKRNVR ratings 228 against KRNVR ratings 103–104, 105, 106, 114, 133

against REAN ratings 115, 117–119, 121– 122, 125–126 RHKDF 1:1 ethnic recruitment ratio 230–231 in SSRNVR 154, 155 towards TRNVR ratings 42–43, 44–45, 48–49, 50, 58–60, 64–66, 72 racial ideology African stereotypes 81, 117, 125–126 Aryanism 57, 72 Churchill as influenced by 158 Churchill’s ‘island race’ discourse 57 climatic suitability discourses 42–43, 49, 50, 57, 126 colonial naval culture’s production of 250–251 colonial scientific racism 163, 171 Enlightenment philosophy 42–43 ethnic division of labour 80 Eurasians as racially other 156 latah concept 163, 171, 251 martial race theory 4–5 otherness and 39, 60, 61, 98, 131, 156–157, 163, 198, 218, 231, 251 physical stereotypes 49, 57, 80, 105, 118 pseudoscientific theories 72, 250–251 ‘seafaring race’ theory xiii, 1–2, 4 Southeast Asia’s naval forces 9, 155 Radiman, Chief Petty Officer 3–4 radio stations, community 66–67, 96, 106, 248 Rahman, Tunku Abdul 168 Rahman Abdul bin Ya’acob 160–161, 162 Raji, Adnan 154 Ramsden, Lieutenant 162 Rana, Dr M.A. 137 Rankine, Roosevelt 55–56, 62 Ratnagiri Muslims 6 raw material production 29, 30, 35 Razak, Dato Abdul 168, 169–170 recruitment and management, military 4 recruitment and management, naval 1 in Cayman Islands 66–70 in East Africa 8–9, 79–81, 82–83, 103–105, 114, 249 ethnic stereotyping 118–119, 124, 125–126 European community in Zanzibar impedes 99 in HKNVF 190–191 in HKRNVR (post-war) 221–222, 223–224, 227–229, 230–232, 239–240 indigenous custom issues 120–121 in KRNVR 92–93, 208 lack of awareness of REAN’s existence 123–124 Manpower Conference (Nairobi, 1943) 104 of MRNVR 156 racial class-bias 102, 156, 250 racial grouping in RHKDF recruitment 227–228, 230 REAN 116–118, 119, 120–122 Royal Navy (Malay Section)/‘Malay Navy’ 157–158, 159–160 seafaring race theory 2, 6, 7 of SSRNVR 154

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INDEX recruitment and management, naval (continued) status of different West Indian groups 8 targeting of coastal or riverine peoples 6–7 in Trinidad 8 wartime European manpower shortages 91–92, 99, 104–105, 106 Red Cross 127 HMS Repulse xii, 18, 158, 160 HMS Resolution 93 Rhoades, Captain 169 Rhodesia 140 Ride, L.T. 225, 226, 227–228, 232, 234, 235, 241 Rivers, W. Hewitt, 62 Robinson, James 57 HMEAS Rosalind 115, 116, 119, 120, 125, 127, 129, 130, 136 Ross, E.A. 162, 163 Royal East African Navy (REAN) (EANF from 1950–52) as aid to the civil power 129–130, 141, 249 as constrained by commercial interests 115–116 creation of (1950) 115, 141 disaster relief activities 129, 141 disbanding of (1962) 136–139, 250 ethnic recruitment 116–118, 119, 120–122, 123–125, 124f. financing of 125, 136, 137 Mau Mau Emergency and 129, 141 Navy Band 128 racial discrimination in 115, 117–119, 121–122 royal pageantry 119–120, 141 ships of 115, 116 sporting activities 127–128, 141 as successor to KRNVR 112, 249 Tanganyikan withdrawal from 136, 137, 138–139, 141 training of 125–126, 129–130, 136 welfare facilities 117–118, 126–128, 141 youth recruitment 125 Royal Hong Kong Defence Force (RHKDF) 224–227, 231t., 237 internal security role 234–235, 238, 241, 250 racial grouping in recruitment 10, 227–228, 230–231 Royal Hong Kong Regiment (The Volunteers) 183–184, 228, 231, 232, 239 Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club (RHKYC) 181, 182, 184–185 Royal Indian Navy 6, 21, 127 Royal Malayan Navy (RMN) 165–170, 171, 249 Royal Malaysian Navy 3–4, 9 Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) 14, 79, 83, 99, 168–169, 237, 239 Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) 14, 161 Royal Navy 2–4 Chinese personnel 179, 235–236 collaborating local elites 8, 9, 34, 87–88, 102, 105–106, 152, 160–161, 170, 247–248 East Africa amalgamation proposal (1941) 100–104, 106

‘Empire Cruise’ by Special Service Squadron (1923 –24) xii–xiii, 18, 81, 152 expenditure on xii, 13–15, 16t., 19 freed Africans in 80, 105 HKRNVR links with 224, 225–227, 231– 232, 237–238, 239, 241 at Hong Kong 179, 181–190, 192, 195, 199– 200, 224, 225–227, 231–232, 235–236, 237–239, 249 impact of compulsory service 9, 10, 104, 106, 196–197, 230–234, 241, 248, 249 Imperial Fleet concept 17 ‘imperial overstretch’ xiii, 1, 7, 15–16, 20–23, 49, 182, 238, 247 in interwar years xiii, 10, 16–19, 20, 22–23, 248 manpower shortages 9, 19, 49, 104–105, 106 in Mediterranean 20, 23 metropole’s defence as priority over colonies 14–15, 19, 23 move to oil fired ships 7, 47 mutinies (1919) 82 naming of ships after parts of Empire 88–90, 105 nineteenth-century expenditure (to 1914) 13–15, 16t. non-white personnel in Indian Ocean (1881) 80 one-power standard doctrine 18 post-war amalgamation proposals 113–114, 249 post-war reinforcements from colonies 224 Regulations for the Entry of Naval Cadets (1906) 80 restoring of imperial ‘face’ in East Asia 10, 215–220, 240–241 RHKDF and 225–227 roving fleet strategy 18, 19, 182–183 Swahili musical forms 99–100 T.124 Merchant crews, 200–201, 240 Trafalgar Day 68, 71, 127, 185–189 two-power standard xiii, 14 Royal Pakistan Navy 134 Rum and Coca Cola (calypso) 35 Rushworth, Mr 92 Russian war scare (1878) 14 Said, Ali 128 Sarawak 157 Sea Belle II (yacht) 154 seafaring race theory xiii, 1–2, 4, 5–6, 250–251 Cayman Islanders 55, 56–58, 65–72, 156, 157 in East Africa 118–119, 124, 132 Eurasians as not qualified 155–156 imperial collaboration and 7, 8, 251 Malays 151, 154 racial prejudice in Caribbean 48–49 Royal Indian Navy 6 Seedies (Muslim sailors) 6, 80, 81, 82, 87, 105, 120 Second World War 1, 9 British prestige after 10, 215–220, 221, 223, 240–241, 250

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INDEX Eastern Fleet’s retreat against Japanese 8, 93, 102 Eastern theatre (1944–45) 103–104 fall of Malaya and Straits Settlements 9, 158–159, 160, 170 Italian Somaliland campaign 8, 92–93, 95 withdrawals from Hong Kong to Europe 192, 195 Seif bin Hamoud 131, 133 Selvon, Samuel 32–33, 43, 45–46, 59 Sembawang naval base 165 Seymore, Lloyd 62–63 Shakespear, Commander 82 Shanghai crisis (1932) 20 Sierra Leone xii, 1, 18, 22 signalling and communications 32, 33, 154, 191, 192 Sikhs 155 Singapore xii, 5, 9, 18, 21, 152–153, 191 Admiralty’s prioritising of 17, 179–180, 204–205 Chinese majority in 154, 165 Coast Defence Volunteers (1917) 151 Eastern Fleet’s retreat from 8, 102 fall to Japan (15 February 1942) 9, 158–159, 160, 170, 204 Flag Officers Conference (1925) 179–180 naval base 9, 17–18, 153, 154, 165, 168, 170 Punjabi Muslim mutiny (1915) 155 RMN cadets from 167, 168 Royal Navy (Malay Section)/‘Malay Navy’ at 156–158, 159–160 sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse 158, 160 Washington Naval Agreement 17–18 Women’s Auxiliary Naval Service (SWANS) 167–168 slave trade in East Africa 79, 80, 87, 105 Smith, Arthur 218 Smith, G.F. 105 Smith, William Harvey 60 social class 3, 91, 100, 131, 171, 250, 251 racial class-bias 83, 102, 121–122, 156, 167, 201, 250 Somers, C.G. 86, 99, 102 Somerville, Sir James 102 South Africa xii, 44, 89, 91, 104–105, 164 Boer War (1899–1902) 79, 89 South China Morning Post 188, 196–197 Southern Rhodesia 104 Soviet Union 230 sport 39, 81, 123, 127–128, 152, 227, 249 St. Lucia 47 Straits Settlements, xiii, 1, 9, 18, 150m. 152– 153, 154 see also Penang; Singapore Straits Settlements Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (SSRNVR) 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158 Straits Steamship Company 5–6, 156, 160 HMS Striker 129 Swahili language 118 Synnot, A.M. 169

SS Takshing 223 HMS Tamar 227, 235, 237 Tamils 155, 167 Tanga 116 Battle of (November 1914) 80–81 Tanganyika 1, 8, 9, 18, 81, 122 cyclone disaster (April 1952) 129 fear of post-colonial dependence on Britain 139, 140, 141, 168, 250 financing of REAN 125, 136 independence (1961) 136 as Mandate territory 102, 106, 114 mutiny (January 1964) 139, 140 post-war colonial ‘development’ 114, 115 withdrawal from REAN 136, 137, 138–139, 141 Tanganyika, Lake 79 Tanganyika Naval Volunteer Force (NVF) 22, 96, 103, 113 Tanzanian navy 140 Taoism 202 Tennant, Rear-Admiral 101f. Tennyson, Alfred 118 HMS Terror 30, 154 Thanabalasingam Karalasingam 167, 168, 170 Tientsin crisis (June 1939) 20 Trafalgar Day 68, 71, 127, 185–189, 248 Trinidad xiii, 1, 29–34, 38–46 calypso in 36–38 hostility to Caymanians 61, 62–63 labour unrest 8, 29–30, 34, 49–50 nationalism 29–30, 49–50 negative Caymanian attitudes to 59–63, 70 oil-production 7, 8, 29, 30 Staubles Bay naval base 33, 34, 39f., 41f., 44–45, 60–61 stickfight tradition 37–38 US ‘invasion’ of 8, 34–36, 38, 45, 46, 50 US naval base at Chaguaramas 34, 39 wartime disorder and crime 61, 62 Trinidad Naval Volunteer Force (TNVF) communications and signalling 32, 33 granting of RNVR status (May 1941) 31 inauguration of (1939) 22, 30–31 lack of training and equipment 32, 42, 50 officers as white 31–32, 33, 42–43, 50 recruitment and deployment 31–33, 34t. wartime expenditure on 31 Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (TRNVR) 7, 8, 37f., 39f., 40f., 41f. Caymanian volunteers 8, 33, 43, 55, 56, 58–66, 67, 70–71, 72 establishment of (1939) 49–50 ethnic tensions within 60–64, 72 financing of 47, 85, 86 issue of food 61, 62–63 loyalty to Britain 36 officers seconded from Royal Navy 43–44 poor conditions for Caymanian volunteers 60–2, 63–64, 72 poor leadership 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50 poor medical services 60–61, 63, 65, 72 post-war imperial mission of 8, 46–47, 48–49, 50

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Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (TRNVR) (continued) propaganda concerning 38–42 racial discrimination towards ratings 42–43, 44–45, 48–49, 50, 72 racial disturbances at Staubles Bay (May 1943) 44–45 recruitment across the Caribbean 8, 33, 34t., 43, 55, 56, 58–66, 67, 70–71 Samuel Selvon on 32–33, 43 Twining, Sir Edward 118 Uganda 8, 84, 85, 113, 115, 128 financing of REAN 125, 137 mutiny (January 1964) 139 uniforms, naval 3, 33, 100, 101, 156–157, 188 United Nations (UN) 114, 138 United States Caribbean and 7–8, 34–35, 46–47 demand for oil 35 Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement (1940) 8, 33, 34, 46 forces in Southeast Asia 162–163, 171 ‘invasion’ of Trinidad (1940) 8, 34–36, 38, 45, 46, 50 as major naval power 17, 23 PRC threat to British Empire and 223 racial issues in southern states 35 Venezuela 29 Verjee, Hassanali Suleman 92 Vernall, Commander 224 Vickers, H. 160 Victoria, Lake 79 HMS Victorious 138 volunteerism, naval as hindering to professional development 171, 250 motivations 8, 55–56, 65, 68, 70, 71, 124, 157 origins of 7, 13–15, 17–19, 21–23 social and developmental benefits of 184, 224–225, 227, 236–237, 240, 249 in white settler colonies 13 Waichow 220 HMS Warspite 101f. Washington Naval Agreement xii–xiii, 7, 8, 17–18, 23, 83, 105, 179, 183, 190, 193, 247 Watler, Roddy 69

welfare schemes, naval 9, 126–128, 141, 249 Whitehouse, Lieutenant-Commander 83, 105, 248 Wilkinson, Commander 44, 45, 63, 65–66 Wilson, Harold 238 women, 9 Chinese 219 Europeans in KRNVR 105, 228–229 issue of poor whites in Kenya 91 naval uniforms in Hong Kong 188 Singapore Women’s Auxiliary Naval Service (SWANS) 167–168 Swahili musical and dance forms 99–100 taipans’ wives in Hong Kong 184, 185 in Trinidad 35, 45 wives of REAN ratings 127, 141 in Zanzibar 99–100 Wood, Cecil 68 Woodhouse, Charles 30 Wynne, W.R.M. 48 Young, Arthur 151, 215, 216 Young, Sir Hubert 30, 31, 35 youth organisations 9, 32–33, 125, 140, 141, 247, 248 Zanzibar abolition of slavery in (1907) 80 Arab nationalism in 131–132, 133, 135, 141 Cooper’s Royal Naval Institute in Mnasi Moja 86–87 ‘Empire Cruise’ visit to xii, xiii, 86 financing of naval forces 85, 86, 103, 125, 128 overthrow of Sultanate (1964) 100, 135–136, 141 political parties in 135 protectorate status 81, 98, 102–103, 106 rival European interests in 99 Royal Navy bombardment of palace (1896) 81–82 Seedies (Muslim sailors) 80, 81, 82, 87, 105, 120 Sultan (Seyyid) 9, 80, 81–82, 86, 101–102, 103, 119–120, 130–136, 141, 158, 248, 250, 251 violence after 1961 General Election 130 Zanzibar Naval Volunteer Force (ZNVF) 1, 8, 22, 86–87, 98–103, 113, 114, 156 Zhou Enlai 234

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