The Development of British Naval Aviation, 1914-1918 1000387615, 9781000387612

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The Development of British Naval Aviation, 1914–1918

The Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) revolutionized warfare at sea, on land, and in the air. This little-known naval aviation organization introduced and operationalized aircraft carrier strike, aerial anti-submarine warfare, strategic bombing, and the air defence of the British Isles more than 20 years before the outbreak of the Second World War. Traditionally marginalised in a literature dominated by the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Air Force, the RNAS and its innovative practitioners, nevertheless, shaped the fundamentals of airpower and contributed significantly to the Allied victory in the First World War. The Development of British Naval Aviation utilizes archival documents and newly published research to resurrect the legacy of the RNAS and demonstrate its central role in Britain’s war effort. Alexander Howlett completed his PhD with the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London in 2019.

Routledge Studies in Modern British History

The Casino and Society in Britain Seamus Murphy Great Britain, the Dominions and the Transformation of the British Empire, 1907–1931 The Road to the Statute of Westminster Jaroslav Valkoun The Discourse of Repatriation in Britain, 1845–2016 A Political and Social History Daniel Renshaw The Devil and the Victorians Supernatural Evil in Nineteenth-Century English Culture Sarah Bartels Lord Dufferin, Ireland and the British Empire, c. 1820–1900 Rule by the Best? Annie Tindley Provincial Police Reform in Early Victorian England Cambridge, 1835–1856 Roger Swift Diplomatic Identity in Postwar Britain The Deconstruction of the Foreign Office “Type”, 1945–1997 James Southern The Development of British Naval Aviation, 1914–1918 Alexander Howlett For more information about this series, please visit: https://www. routledge.com/history/series/RSMBH

The Development of British Naval Aviation, 1914–1918

Alexander Howlett

First published 2021 by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Alexander Howlett The right of Alexander Howlett to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Howlett, Alexander, 1986- author. Title: The development of British naval aviation, 1914-1918 / Alexander Howlett. Description: New York, NY : Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2021. | Series: Routledge studies in modern British history | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021015746 (print) | LCCN 2021015747 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367650131 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367650148 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003127406 (ebook) | ISBN 9781000387612 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781000387629 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Great Britain. Royal Naval Air Service–History. | World War, 1914-1918–Aerial operations, British. | Naval aviation–History–World War, 1914-1918. | Great Britain. Royal Naval Air Service–Historiography Classification: LCC D786 .H69 2021 (print) | LCC D786 (ebook) | DDC 940.4/5941–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021015746 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021015747 ISBN: 978-0-367-65013-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-65014-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-12740-6 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

For Mom and Dad

Contents

Acknowledgmentsviii List of Abbreviationsix Introduction1 1 Fleet Naval Aviation

16

2 Anti-Submarine Warfare77 3 Long-Range Bombing128 4 Naval Air Defence161 Conclusion196 Bibliography Index

211 241

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the support of a great many people. I owe special thanks to Tim Benbow, Andrew Lambert, Christina Goulter, Eric Grove, Matthew Seligmann, Alan James, John Abbatiello, Tim Choi, Louis Halewood, Duncan Redford, Alexander Clarke, Christopher Bell, Simon Harley, Richard Dunley, Dennis Haslop, Tim Moots, John Ferris, Trent Hone, David Kohnen, Lewis Pulsipher, Michael Lowrey, Harry Smee, B. J. Armstrong, James Smith, Ross Mahoney, Anna Brinkman, Matthew Bento, James Boxall, Jason Campbell, Darren Oke, Shawn Kay, Daragh Markham, Mike Thornley, Elizabeth Bruton, James Pugh, David Morgan-Owen, Nicholas Rodger, Ben Jones, Innes McCartney, T. J. Linzy, Reda Hassan El Ashi, Steven Klein, Roxanne Panchasi, Guy Birks, Jordan Marliave, Anna Howlett, and Leah.

List of Abbreviations

AA ACA ACNS ADAS ADNC AFB A/S ASA ASAC ASD ASDIC ASW BCF BEF BIR CAS CAO CCC CCIJ CFS CID CIGS C-in-C CNS CO DAD DAS DASD DCNS D/F

Anti-Aircraft Admiral Commanding Aircraft Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff Assistant Director Air Services Assistant Director of Naval Construction German naval code, 1916 Anti-Submarine Assistant Superintendent for Airships/Aircraft Assistant Superintendent for Aircraft Construction Anti-Submarine Division Anti-Submarine Division Supersonics, early Sound Navigation and Ranging Anti-Submarine Warfare Battle Cruiser Fleet British Expeditionary Force Board of Invention and Research Chief of the Air Staff Central Air Office Churchill College archives, University of Cambridge Cross & Cockade International Journal Central Flying School (Upavon) Committee of Imperial Defence Chief of the Imperial General Staff Commander-in-Chief Chief of the Naval Staff Commanding Officer Director Air Department (1912–1915), Director Air Division (1918) Director Air Services Director Anti-Submarine Division Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff Direction Finding

x  List of Abbreviations DGMA DOD DNC EIESS FAA FDSF

Director General of Military Aeronautics Director Operations Division Director Naval Construction East Indies & Egypt Seaplane Squadron Fleet Air Arm Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 5 vols. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013–14, originally published 1961–70) GFAC Grand Fleet Air Committee GFAO Grand Fleet Air Orders GFBI Grand Fleet Battle Instructions GFBO Grand Fleet Battle Orders GHQ General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force GOC General Officer Commanding HMAS His Majesty’s Australian Ship HMS His Majesty’s Ship HVB German naval code, 1914–15 IAF Independent Air Force ICA Inspecting Captain of Airships IWM Imperial War Museum archives, London JRUSI Journal of the Royal United Services Institute JSCSC Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, library JWAC Joint War Air Committee LADA London Air Defence Area LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London NAS Naval Air Station NMM National Maritime Museum archives, Greenwich NRJ Naval Review Journal ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography RAC Rear Admiral Commanding RAF Royal Air Force RFC Royal Flying Corps RNAS Royal Naval Air Service RNVR Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve SAC Superintendent for Aircraft Construction SFO Senior Flying Officer SNO Senior Naval Officer SS Sea Scout (anti-submarine blimp) TNA The National Archives, Kew UB U-boat Coastal UC U-boat Minelayer USN United States Navy

List of Abbreviations xi USS VAC WIA W/T XO

United States Ship Vice Admiral Commanding Sir Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, 6 vols., reprint (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published 1922–37). Wireless-Telegraphy Executive Officer

Introduction

Naval and military aviation came of age during the First World War. The aviation revolution in Britain began in earnest with the formation of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) on 13 April 1912, divided into three branches, representing the British Army (Military Wing), the Royal Navy (Naval Wing), and the Central Flying School (CFS).1 On 23 June 1914, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, unilaterally declared the Naval Wing to be a component of the Royal Navy and renamed it the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) effective from July 1st.2 The RNAS thus became the service branch responsible for providing the Navy with air support from the beginning of the war until the creation of the Royal Air Force (RAF) on 1 April 1918, when the former RFC branches were merged back together under the auspices of the newly created Air Ministry. The creation of the RFC in 1912 was the result of an extensive series of cabinet subcommittee debates orchestrated by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) standing subcommittee chaired by Lord Haldane, who was then the Secretary of State for War in H. H. Asquith’s Liberal government. In July 1910, the Haldane standing subcommittee was tasked with investigating the development of international regulations regarding aerial navigation (aviation technology) and, on 18 November 1911, was ordered to establish another subcommittee to determine the government’s future air policy.3 Colonel J. E. B. Seely, Under-Secretary of State for War, took charge of this technical subcommittee and issued his report on 28 February 1912.4 Seely’s subcommittee determined that civilian aviation had indeed reached the point of maturity and, in the near future, would become an integral component of both military and naval operations.5 On 11 April, Seely’s subcommittee published a white paper recommending the formation of a unified air service. This report met with the approval of the Prime Minister and the Royal Warrant was immediately drafted and then approved on April 13th, before being printed for circulation on the 15th.6 The RFC’s aviators and administrators came from diverse backgrounds. The Naval Wing drew upon Frank McClean’s Eastchurch establishment, as well as selected junior officers and technicians with

2  Introduction experience in the Submarine Service.7 First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill, who was ever eager to modernize, rationalize and economize, while maintaining Britain’s maritime supremacy vis-à-vis the rising naval power of Germany, took a particular interest in the new aviation technology and cultivated the Naval Wing into a quasi-private air force.8 To administer the joint service and provide a forum for discussion of the latest technological developments, an Air Committee was formed on 25 April 1912 at the recommendation of the secretary of the CID, Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice Hankey.9 Colonel Seely himself would chair the Air Committee meetings, his task being to elucidate and attribute the respective functions of the RFC wings. Vice Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, then the Second Sea Lord, became the committee’s vice chairman, stepping in for Colonel Seely when required.10 In May, Churchill appointed Captain Murray Sueter, formerly the Inspecting Captain of Airships (see Chapter 1), as Director of the Air Department (DAD) to administer the new service branch.11 Officers of the Naval Wing were listed first aboard HMS Actaeon and then, following the publication of the Naval Wing Regulations on 15 July 1912, aboard HMS President and HMS Pembroke, inserted into the Navy Lists just below the section containing the Coast Guard.12 On 7 May 1913, in preparation for that summer’s naval maneuvers, HMS Hermes, under the command of Captain G. W. Vivian, was made the parent ship of what Captain Sueter in August of that year described as the ‘Naval Air Service’.13 On 30 December 1913, Commander Francis Scarlett, Captain Vivian’s XO aboard Hermes, was appointed Inspecting Captain of Aircraft, in charge of the Air Department’s newly created Central Air Office (CAO) at Sheerness.14 Churchill was determined to directly incorporate the Naval Wing into the Royal Navy and, on 1 July 1914, as mentioned, he relisted the Naval officers in the RFC as officers of the RNAS, being inserted thus into the main officers’ list just after the midshipmen, although the Royal Flying Corps (Naval Wing) continued to be listed after the Coast Guard. Just over a year later, on 29 July 1915, First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Balfour, Churchill’s successor following the May Crisis, declared the RNAS an integral component of the Royal Navy and did away with the RFC section of the Navy Lists altogether.15 The practical result of Balfour’s modification to the RNAS organization was to subordinate the Naval Air Stations (NAS) to their district Senior Naval Officers (SNOs), thus breaking the Air Department’s operational control over the RNAS wings and hopefully ‘dovetailing the Air Service into the general naval system’ alongside the other service branches such as the Royal Marines and the Submarine Service.16 Churchill, although ousted from the Admiralty, retained a cabinet spot as Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster and Sueter continued to correspond with the

Introduction 3 former First Lord. On 10 June, Sueter proposed to Churchill that the Admiralty Air Department should be elevated into a ‘British Air Service’ – ­incorporating all Naval and Military aviation – a policy that was directly opposite to that of tighter naval integration favoured by First Lord Balfour.17 Indeed, in August Balfour handed off the RNAS’ armoured car operations to the Army,18 and in September he replaced DAD Sueter with Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee, the latter becoming the Director of Air Services (DAS). Sueter, who had faithfully executed Churchill’s vision of imperial airpower, was effectively sidelined to the position of Superintendent for Aircraft Construction (SAC), although promoted to Commodore 1st Class to soften the blow.19 Over the course of the war the RNAS became not only the largest naval aviation force in the world, but also a leader in airpower theory and practice, with roles ranging from carrier strike to Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), strategic or long-range bombing, and air defence. The creation of the RAF on 1 April 1918 reunified the divided air services, but did not end the Royal Navy’s wartime involvement with naval aviation. The underexamined Air Division of the Naval Staff, established not coincidently at the same time as the Air Ministry in January 1918, continued to act as an umbrella organization for the former naval aviators, until it too was disbanded during the postwar demobilization of 1919. The aerial torpedo attack exercises conducted that year serve to demonstrate that, had the war continued a few months longer, the Flying Squadron of the Grand Fleet could have carried out an aerial torpedo strike against the High Sea Fleet base at Wilhelmshaven (see Chapter 1).20 This book utilizes archival research and recent specialized publications on the RNAS to unify what has traditionally been a disjointed and fragmented historiography. Specialists including Lewis Pulsipher, 21 Guy Robbins, 22 Brad King, 23 Christina Goulter, 24 John Abbatiello, 25 Ben Jones, 26 Eric Grove, 27 James Pugh, 28 David Hobbs, 29 and Dennis Haslop, 30 have all examined components of the whole, although their research is now separated by a span of nearly forty years and a vastly improved network of digital access and discussion. It is now clear that the RNAS was an essential component of the Royal Navy, with an immense range of evolving responsibilities, that left a profound impact not only on the development of naval aviation in Britain, but on the foundations of airpower itself.

Innovation During Wartime The RNAS, from inception as the Naval Wing of the RFC in April 1912 until final absorption into the RAF almost exactly six years later, was at the forefront of aviation developments, both technological and doctrinal. At first glance, some of the roles adopted by the RNAS, such as the long-range bombing of German industry (Chapter 3) or the air defence

4  Introduction of Britain (Chapter 4), seem with hindsight perhaps less related to naval aviation than the development of airships and aircraft for fleet operations (Chapter 1) or the introduction of aerial A/S methods to protect Britain’s oceanic trade (Chapter 2). The impression that the RNAS was distracted by these supposedly non-naval roles is, however, mistaken: air defence, for example, had been adopted by the Churchill administration as a stop-gap given the inability of the Military Wing, deployed entirely with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), to carry out this vital responsibility. Long-range bombing, likewise, took advantage of the development of specialized bombers, developed by the Air Department, to update what was, in fact, the traditional naval doctrine of offensive raiding. The RNAS, where responsibilities overlapped, was often fulfilling several roles simultaneously: routine coastal patrols, as another example, integrated together the functions of anti-Zeppelin patrol, A/S patrol, and naval reconnaissance. Long-range bombing likewise, when targeting Germany’s U-boat bases and Zeppelin sheds, clearly fulfilled a naval role in terms of reducing the enemy’s submarine and naval airship capacity. Indeed, it is the complexity of these overlapping missions that has resulted in the literature’s tendency to narrowly specialize: although this has produced a fantastically detailed historiography, it has also created the erroneous impression that the RNAS was a doctrinale mixing bowl, with no clearly defined purpose. The frequency of changing Admiralty administrations, combined with the evolution of the Air Department and the RNAS as organizations over the course of the war, has certainly contributed to this impression of doctrinal confusion. The influence of professional networks and relationships, as will become evident throughout this book, significantly shaped the development of the RNAS and its roles. Between July 1914 and its dissolution in April 1918, the Air Department’s leadership was shuffled three times, while the Admiralty itself rotated through no fewer than four separate administrations. In this whirlwind environment of wartime administrative upheaval and organizational reform, one would be astonished had the RNAS, in fact, developed in a perfectly linear fashion. This is not to excuse the various disasters and dead-ends that loom large in this narrative of British naval aviation development: the failure to develop a rigid airship for naval use before the war, the limitations of seaplane carrier technology as exposed at the Battle of Jutland, the inability of the Air Department and the Admiralty to defend the existence of its long-range bombing No. 3 Wing from War Office and RFC criticism, and the eventual loss of the RNAS to the RAF, collectively demonstrate that this history is by no means one of triumphant Whiggish progress, but neither is it pure bricolage.31 On the contrary, perhaps the foremost theoretical models for the reader to keep in mind are those of complex interactions and crisis management.32

Introduction 5 This book argues that aviation was assimilated by the Royal Navy in a nuanced, nonlinear, and, at times, undeniably haphazard fashion, conforming to existing service traditions and structures while simultaneously revolutionizing the Royal Navy’s conduct of war. Naval aviation development during the First World War ultimately transcended the war at sea, to shape the origins of airpower theory and practice, proof of the soundness of the Royal Navy’s conceptualization of naval aviation, despite significant setbacks. The RNAS, in short, not only transformed the Navy’s capabilities, but also contributed to the broader military revolution that by 1918 had become undeniable.33

The Historiographical Framework The historical material available on the subject of the RNAS, both archival and published, is immense and ranges from operational and personal archival records to detailed academic theses and specialized geographic monographs. The material relevant to the Air Department and the RNAS, for the benefit of future researchers, can be divided into roughly four layers: the first layer, representing official governmental material, is held in the collections of numerous archives and museums, of which the most significant are the National Archives at Kew, the British Library, the Imperial War Museum archives, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military History at King’s College London, the archives at Churchill College, Cambridge, the National Museum of the Royal Navy collection at Portsmouth, the Fleet Air Arm Museum at RNAS Yeovilton, the National Maritime Museum’s Caird library at Greenwich, and the archives at the RAF Museum in Hendon. The archival material is supplemented by the documentary collections produced by the Navy Records Society, including the collections on Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, 34 Vice Admiral David Beatty, 35 Vice Admiral Roger Keyes, 36 and Stephen Roskill’s important collection of RNAS-related documents.37 Although not a substitute for the archival records themselves, these specialized volumes provide a core documentary collection that functions as the starting point for advanced research in the archives proper. The second layer comprises autobiographies and memoirs, some unpublished and held in archives, many published and available in libraries, and others now digitized and widely available online. A number of the practitioners discussed in this book produced standalone monographs related to the history of naval aviation, or other elements of the naval war, that remain invaluable sources to this day. Examples include the three monographs by Admiral Jellicoe, 38 the publications of DAD Commodore Murray Sueter, 39 the two volumes on the Dover Patrol produced by Vice Admiral Reginald Bacon,40 and the combat memoirs of Wing Commander Charles Samson and Vice Admiral Richard Bell Davies, amongst many others.41 Examples of as yet unpublished

6  Introduction sources include the papers of Commander Hugh Williamson, held by Churchill College at Cambridge University,42 and the diaries of Admiral Commanding Aircraft (ACA) Rear Admiral Richard Phillimore, held by the Imperial War Museum in London.43 The third layer of documentation represents the published official histories, produced (usually) with the endorsement of the Admiralty or Air Ministry historical branches: in this case, specifically, the multivolume texts by Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones (The War in the Air),44 and Julian Corbett and Henry Newbolt (Naval Operations).45 These important sources provide the researcher with the first systematic attempts to describe the operations and administration of the Royal Navy and the RAF, including the Naval Wing and the RNAS. Controversial in some respects, these volumes remain the basis for all investigation into the RNAS – although the official history of this unique service was itself never written, instead being scattered throughout more than eleven volumes of multiservice official history. The fourth layer includes the writing of all subsequent modern historians. Significant texts in this regard are the five volumes of Arthur Marder’s history of the Royal Navy during the First World War,46 Stephen Roskill’s biographies,47 Peter Kemp,48 Hugh Popham,49 and Ray Sturtivant’s, 50 histories of the Fleet Air Arm (FAA), and Richard Layman’s numerous journal articles and monographs. 51 There are also several essential reference books, such as Ray Sturtivant and Gordon Page’s invaluable compendium of RNAS aircraft and squadrons, 52 Owen Thetford’s British Naval Aircraft since 1912, 53 and H. F. King’s Armament of British Aircraft, 1909–1939.54 Key sources for operational details, beyond the official histories, can be found in Dick Cronin’s Royal Navy Shipboard Aircraft Developments, 1912–1931, 55 Trevor Henshaw’s comprehensive compendium of air combats, The Sky Their Battlefield II: Air Fighting and the Air Casualties of the Great War, 56 and the essential RNAS Operational Reports, November 1915– March 1918, compiled by the Operations Division of the Naval Staff and reprinted by the Naval and Military Press; an outstanding resource for official history reprints.57 Scholars will also find important material in the academic journals, the pre-eminent of which are the Cross & Cockade International Journal (CCIJ) published quarterly, the RAF’s Air and Space Power Review, the Royal Navy’s Naval Review Journal (NRJ), and the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (JRUSI). Also useful are the archives of Stanley Spooner’s Flight magazine, Colin Grey’s The Aeroplane magazine, the journal Aerospace Historian, the London Times, and especially the Parliamentary and House of Lords Hansard archives. 58 More difficult to find, but containing useful miscellany, is the Jabberwock magazine of the Fleet Air Arm Museum, Yeovilton.59 In sum, the literature represents a vast repository of detail that enables a high fidelity

Introduction 7 of precision. As the operational and technical histories are filled out by the next generation of historians, academics continue to publish original research that utilizes untapped sources and interdisciplinary methods. The RNAS, and especially the Air Department that administered it, have nevertheless been marginalized in the literature. Military, rather than naval, aviation has become the popular avenue of approach to the study of the First World War in the air. Furthermore, a prioritization of interest in technical progress has, unfortunately, left the administration and organization of the Air Department – and especially its Air Division successor – largely obscure.

Book Structure This book addresses four key themes, with the objective of highlighting the most essential, although by no means exhaustive, components of the RNAS mission. Notable exclusions include the loaning of RNAS fighter squadrons to the RFC on the Western Front,60 RAF involvement in the intervention against Bolshevik Russia during the Civil War,61 and the fascinating mechanized and motorized components of the RNAS, such as the armoured car deployments to Belgium in 1914, at Gallipoli in 1915, and in Romania and Russia during 1916–1917.62 Likewise, the revolutionary introduction of the tank, orchestrated by First Lord Churchill – who delegated the problem to DAD Sueter and his team of talented aviation engineers – has been elucidated elsewhere in a number of fascinating studies.63 Lastly, although the naval aviation narrative continued into the interwar period, this important regenerative era has been excluded from this study as outside the temporal boundaries of the existence of the RNAS.64 Chapter 1 considers the development of naval aviation specifically for operations with the fleet. This aspect of the historiography is by far the most thoroughly studied, with the watershed events and key documents well identified. Notable developments include the history of Britain’s rigid airship program, the creation of seaplane and aircraft carriers, gunfire spotting missions carried out against the German light cruiser Königsberg in East Africa and against the Turkish fortifications at the Dardanelles, the events of the Battle of Jutland, the creation of the Grand Fleet Air Committee (GFAC) and the development of the Wilhelmshaven strike plan in 1917, and finally the assembling of the world’s first aircraft carrier group, the Flying Squadron of the Grand Fleet, and its defining raid against the Tondern Zeppelin sheds in July 1918, in which Sopwith Camels, flown off HMS Furious’ foredeck, bombed Zeppelins L54 and L60 in their western Schleswig shed complex. This was the high point of the Grand Fleet’s long aviation project, but it may have been surpassed by the torpedo bombing of Wilhelmshaven if the war had carried on much longer. Despite these successes, the creation of the RAF in

8  Introduction April 1918 meant ultimately the loss of control over naval aviation to the Air Ministry, and it was not long before the bitter interwar struggle for resources commenced. Chapter 2 examines the RNAS’ involvement with ASW, undoubtedly the most important naval aviation contribution to the war at sea. Hurried technological development in 1915 enabled routine air patrols of the North Sea and English Channel, with local NAS commanders taking the initiative to develop organic methods for countering Germany’s submarines. Nevertheless, the U-boat campaigns against merchant shipping during 1915 and 1916 demonstrated that the Royal Navy, and the Air Department, were not yet truly prepared to combat the U-boat, as the naval staff awaited technological developments that began to yield significant results early in 1917 and were especially effective by 1918. The threat posed by the U-boats, however, did not become critical until unrestricted submarine warfare commenced in February 1917 and, although losses peaked that April, the threat had been largely contained by September, following the general adoption of convoys for the Atlantic, Scandinavian, Dutch and French cross-Channel shipping routes. Historians are in agreement that the RNAS was an essential component of the Royal Navy’s trade defence mission, indeed, a force multiplier for convoy A/S protection and, by late 1918, a real threat to coastal U-boat operations.65 Admiral Jellicoe’s arrival as First Sea Lord in December 1916, and the consequent appointment of Commodore Godfrey Paine as Fifth Sea Lord in January 1917, was a watershed moment in the history of the U-boat crisis. Although Jellicoe left the Admiralty on 26 December 1917 over controversy related to the conduct of the A/S campaign and amid rumors concerning his health,66 one of Jellicoe’s final acts at the Admiralty, at the recommendation of the Director of the Operations Division (DOD) Rear Admiral George Hope, was to create an Air Division of the staff. This organization would pre-empt the creation of the Air Ministry in January 1918.67 The Air Division, in fact, survived the war, and remained a small component of the Naval Staff until 1919.68 Chapter 3 examines the controversial long-range bombing effort pioneered by the RNAS. The ability to bomb strategic targets behind the enemy’s lines was an important aspect of the RNAS mission throughout the war, although far less studied than fleet naval aviation or ASW.69 This chapter examines four areas in which the RNAS pioneered longrange bombing, of which only the first has received reasonable treatment in the literature. Long-range bombing began during Churchill’s administration, with the daring anti-Zeppelin base raids. During 1915, NAS Dunkirk expanded the bombing project to include the U-boat bases in Belgium, a mission that in 1916 evolved into an industrial bombing program spearheaded by DAS Vaughan-Lee: the traditional naval tactic of blockade was extended to include air attacks against Germany’s

Introduction 9 munitions industries.70 The controversial nature of these developments has been denigrated to a certain extent in the literature, as historians tend to perceive the Admiralty’s involvement in long-range bombing as a diversion from naval aviation at sea.71 The first British attempt at strategic bombing, specifically targeting Germany’s industrial centers, was carried out by Wing Captain William L. Elder’s No. 3 (Luxeuil) Wing in October 1916, a project that was reinvigorated in the spring of 1917.72 Ostensibly justified as retaliation for Zeppelin raids, and U-boat attacks against hospital ships, the real purpose of No. 3 Wing was to increase the effectiveness of the Royal Navy’s blockade by directly striking the enemy’s production facilities. No. 3 Wing struggled against Army Council opposition while it re-equipped with the powerful Handley Page bombers, and was eventually dismantled under increasing pressure from the War Office and indeed Field Marshal Douglas Haig’s General Headquarters (GHQ).73 This example is particularly significant considering that Germany’s Gotha raids began within a month of the dissolution of No. 3 Wing, demonstrating that another long-range bombing force would have to be constituted to conduct retaliatory bombing. In October 1917 the RFCled 41st Wing was formed at Ochey, to which the RNAS contributed two squadrons, and, in 1918, the 41st Wing became the basis of BrigadierGeneral Hugh Trenchard’s Independent Air Force (IAF). Although the IAF had been established to conduct strategic bombing, it was, in fact, employed primarily against operational targets, such as railways and aerodromes, with industrial bombing taking a backseat. The significance of the Navy’s invention of long-range industrial bombing has since become a source of embarrassment for the Air Ministry, having itself assumed the mantel of strategic bombing and even making it the raison d’etre of the RAF during the interwar period.74 Chapter 4 investigates the use of naval aviation for the air defence of Britain. Between September 1914 and February 1916, the RNAS was solely responsible for Britain’s air defence, a vast mission that the Air Department was initially unprepared to address. Nevertheless, DAD Sueter laid the foundation for Britain’s air defence against Germany’s Zeppelin threat by developing London’s first air defence system during the winter of 1914–1915. The inability of the naval air arm to prevent Zeppelins from bombing targets in London and southeastern England, however, exposed the limitations of the Navy’s air defences. At the beginning of 1916, therefore, First Lord of the Admiralty Balfour refocused on coastal defence, which, in fact, offered the best chance at intercepting both approaching Zeppelins and, as was demonstrated in the summer and fall of 1917, returning Gothas.75 The result was the development of a system of defence-in-depth, in which RNAS aircraft intercepted enemy bombers over the coasts as they approached Britain and then pursued them as they departed. This

10  Introduction system was remarkably successful and, combined with RFC and War Office improvements to London’s air defences, was responsible, first, for defeating the Zeppelin raiders, and then quickly adapting to, and indeed mastering, the Gotha bombers in 1917. The Gothas turned their attention from London to naval targets and bases along the English coast and at Dunkirk, and here again, as in the case of long-range bombing, the historiography has tended to emphasize the involvement of the RFC, ignoring the vital role of RNAS coastal defence. Chapter 5 concludes the book by evaluating the impact of the RNAS on Britain’s conduct of the First World War. The contributions of aviation pioneers and naval practitioners are highlighted, and the importance of the administrative and political situations emphasized. Britain’s naval aviation evolved within a matrix of shifting wartime and administrative priorities that are essential to appreciate if the Admiralty’s naval aviation policy is to be properly contextualized. The long-term contribution of the Air Department and the Air Division of the Naval Staff was to collect and disseminate operational reports that were ultimately distilled into training manuals, the foundations of written doctrine. The RNAS, on the eve of the creation of the RAF, had emerged as a fully integrated component of naval warfare and also a cutting-edge naval aviation force that had pioneered fleet aviation, long-range bombing, ASW and air defence. Despite the variable administrative context, amidst an environment of naval and military crisis, the RNAS successfully adapted to, and was in the process of developing novel solutions for, intractable naval problems (targeting warships in harbor, sinking U-boats, destroying the enemy’s industrial centers, defeating their bombers) when the creation of the RAF subsumed the RNAS into the new RFC-dominated organization. To be sure, this has produced a hundred years of controversy, with the RNAS perceived as an aberration; its pioneering contributions all but forgotten.

Notes 1. Walter Raleigh & H. A. Jones, The War in the Air [WIA], vol. I, 6 vols., reprint (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published in 1922–37), p. 199. David Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service in the Great War (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2017), p. 34. 2. Charles F. Gamble, The Story of a North Sea Air Station (London: Neville Spearman, 1967), pp. 75–6. 3. ‘Terms of Reference to the Standing Sub-Committee of the C.I.D., dated 18 July 1910’, the National Archives, Kew (TNA) [hereafter all archival sources cited are from The National Archives unless otherwise stated] CAB 38/19/60, #6 in Stephen Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service [hereafter Documents] (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., 1969), p. 20. Dennis Haslop, Early Naval Air Power: British and German Approaches, Kindle ebook (London: Routledge, 2018), p. 24.

Introduction 11 4. ‘Terms of Reference for and Extracts from Report by the Technical Sub-Committee of the Standing Sub-Committee of the C.I.D., date 28 February 1912’, CAB 38/20/1, #13 in Roskill, Documents, p. 33. 5. Walter Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, reprint (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published in 1922), pp. 198–9. Roskill, Documents, p. 3. 6. R. Dallas Brett, History of British Aviation, 1908–1914, vol. I, 2 vols. (Surbiton, Surrey: Air Research Publications, 1988), p. 147. Gamble, The Story of a North Sea Air Station, pp. 16–7. Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 34. Royal Warrant, Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing), War Office, 15 April 1912, ADM 116/1275. 7. Eric Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen? The Early Days of British Naval Flying’, in British Naval Aviation: The First 100 Years, ed. Tim Benbow ­(Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), p. 12. 8. Elie Halevy, The Rule of Democracy, 1905–1914, trans. E. I. Watkin, vol. VI, 6 vols. (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1961), p. 583. N. A. M. Rodger, The Admiralty (Suffolk: Lavenham Press Limited, 1979), p. 127. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Humanity Books, 1998), pp. 224–9. David Morgan-Owen, The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880–1914 (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 203–5. 9. Aerial Navigation: Report of the Standing Sub-Committee, Minutes of the 116th Meeting, 25 April 1912, CAB 2/2, p. 8. See also, ‘The Constitution, Functions and Procedure of the Air Committee, C.I.D. 162B, dated 4 November 1912’, CAB 38/22/35, #21 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 62–3. The first Air Committee meeting was held on 31 July 1912, see Air Committee, Minutes and Memorandum, July 1912–August 1914, CAB 14/1. 10. Raleigh, WIA vol. I, pp. 211–2. Air Committee, Committee of Imperial Defence, Minutes and Memoranda, July 1912–August 1914, ‘Minutes of the Sixth Meeting held at 2 Whitehall Gardens, S. W., on March 14th. 1913’. CAB 14/1, p. 76. 11. Gamble, Story of a North Sea Air Station, pp. 38–9. See also, Royal Flying Corps (Naval Wing), Formation, 1911–1914, ADM 116/1275. 12. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, pp. 17–8. James Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air: British Military and Naval Aviation, 1911–1918’ (PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2012), pp. 171–3. Brett, History of British Aviation, vol. II, pp. 128–9. See also, Navy Lists for 18 February 1913 , 18 April 1914, & 18 July 1914, accessed 15 November 2020. Regulation for Naval Wing of Royal Flying Corps, Admiralty, 15 July 1912, ADM 116/1275. 13. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, p. 21. 14. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 271. Ian Philpott, The Birth of the Royal Air Force (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2013), p. 37. Richard Layman, Before the Aircraft Carrier: Development of Aviation Vessels, 1849–1922 (London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd., 1989), p. 37. 15. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, pp. 24–5. Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 48. Navy Lists, 18 September 1915, accessed 15 November 2020, also 18 December 1916, accessed 15 November 2020. 16. Admiralty MSS, Balfour to Jellicoe letter, 26 August 1916, #7 in A. Temple Patterson, ed., The Jellicoe Papers, vol. II, 2 vols. (London: S­ pottiswoode,

12  Introduction Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., 1966), pp. 66–7. Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p. 305. 17. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, pp. 35–6. ‘Notes on the Formation of an Air Department’, 10 June 1915, ADM 1/8621, #69 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 207–9. 18. H. A. Jones, WIA, vol. V, reprint (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published in 1935), p. 169 fn. 19. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 346–8. 20. Ibid., pp. 472–5. Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914–1945, A Historical Survey (London: Jane’s Publishing Company, 1979), p. 143. 21. Lewis Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908–1918’ (PhD thesis, Duke University, 1981). 22. Guy Robbins, ‘The Evolution of the Aircraft Carrier, 1914–1916’ (PhD thesis, University of London, 1992). 23. Brad King, Royal Naval Air Service, 1912–1918 (Aldershot: Hikoki Publications, 1997). 24. Christina J. M. Goulter, ‘The Royal Naval Air Service: A Very Modern Force’, in Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, eds. Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), pp. 51–65. See also, Christina Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping Campaign, 1940– 1945, Kindle ebook (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). 25. John Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation and the Anti-Submarine Campaign, 1917–1918’ (PhD thesis, King’s College London, 2004), John Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I: British Naval Aviation and the Defeat of the U-Boats (New York: Routledge, 2006). 26. Ben Jones, ‘Ashore, Afloat and Airborne: The Logistics of British Naval Airpower, 1914–1945’ (PhD thesis, King’s College London, 2007). 27. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’ & ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps? The Royal Naval Air Service at War’, in British Naval Aviation, ed. Tim Benbow, pp. 7–27, 27–56, & Grove, ‘The Naval Aviation Controversy 1919–1939’, in Dreadnought to Daring: 100 Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in The Naval Review, ed. Peter Hore (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2012), pp. 113–27. 28. James Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air: British Military and Naval Aviation, 1911–1918’ (PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2012). 29. David Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service in the Great War (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2017). 30. Dennis Haslop, Early Naval Air Power: British and German Approaches, Kindle ebook (London: Routledge, 2018). 31. Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, trans. George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. (Letchworth, Hertfordshire: The Garden City Press Limited, 1966), pp. 20–30. Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1965), pp. 1–8, 23–6. 32. See, for example, Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents, Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp.  75–8. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 143–52. 33. David Jordan, ‘The Genesis of Modern Air Power: The RAF in 1918’, in Changing War: The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and the Birth of the Royal Air Force, 1918, ed. Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray, Kindle ebook (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), Chapter 10. See also,

Introduction 13 Alistair McCluskey, ‘The Battle of Amiens and the Development of British Air-Land Battle, 1918–45’, in Sheffield and Gray, eds., Changing War, Chapter 12. Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs (London: Chrysalis Books Group, 2004), pp. 37–46. 34. A. Temple Patterson, ed., The Jellicoe Papers, 2 vols (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., 1966–8). 35. Bryan Ranft, ed., The Beatty Papers, 2 vols. (Brookfield: Gower Publishing Company, 1989). 36. Paul G. Halpern, ed., The Keyes Papers, 2 vols. (London: Navy Records Society, 1972). 37. Stephen Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service ­(London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., 1969). 38. John Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1920), Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet 1914–1916: Its Creation, Development and Work, Kindle ebook (London: Not So Noble Books, originally published 1919), Jellicoe, The Submarine Peril (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1934). 39. Murray Sueter, The Evolution of the Submarine Boat, Mine and Torpedo, from the Sixteenth Century to the Present Time (Portsmouth: J. Griffin and Company, 1907), Murray Sueter, Airmen or Noahs: Fair Play for Our Airmen, the Great ‘Neon’ Air Myth Exposed (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1928). 40. Reginald Bacon, The Dover Patrol 1915–1917, 2 vols. (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1919). 41. Richard Bell Davies, Sailor in the Air: The Memoirs of the World’s First Carrier Pilot (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2008). 42. Williamson, Group Captain Hugh Alexander (1885–1979), WLMN, Churchill College Cambridge [CCC]. 43. The Private Papers of Admiral Sir Richard Phillimore GCB KCMG MVO JP, 5615, Imperial War Museum [IWM]. 44. Walter Raleigh & H. A. Jones, The War in the Air [WIA], 6 vols., reprint (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published 1922–37). 45. Julian Corbett & Henry Newbolt, Naval Operations, 5 vols., reprint (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published 1920–31). 46. Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow [FDSF], 5 vols. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013–4). 47. Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty (New York: Antheneum, 1981), & Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2004). 48. P. K. Kemp, Fleet Air Arm (London: Herbert Jenkins Ltd., 1954). 49. Hugh Popham, Into Wind (Bath: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1969). 50. Ray Sturtivant, British Naval Aviation: The Fleet Air Arm, 1917–1990 (London: Arms & Armour Press Ltd., 1990). 51. Richard Layman, Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence (London: Chatham Publishing, 1996), Richard Layman, Before the Aircraft Carrier: Development of Aviation Vessels, 1849–1922 (London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd., 1989). 52. Ray Sturtivant and Gordon Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, 1911–1919 (Tonbridge: Air Britain (Historians) Ltd., 1992). 53. Owen Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912, 4th ed. (London: ­Putnam, 1978). 54. H. F. King, Armament of British Aircraft, 1909–1939 (London: Putnam & Company Limited, 1971). 55. Dick Cronin, Royal Navy Shipboard Aircraft Developments, 1912–1931 (Tonbridge: Air Britain (Historians) Ltd., 1990).

14  Introduction 56. Trevor Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield II: Air Fighting and Air Casualties of the Great War, 2nd ed. (High Barnet: Fetubi Books, 2014). 57. Naval Staff Operations Division, Royal Naval Air Service Operations Reports, November 1915 to March 1918, 3 vols., reprint (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2019). 58. House of Lords historical Hansards, accessed 15 November 2020. House of Parliament historical Hansards, accessed 15 November 2020. 59. Jabberwock, The Journal of the Society of Friends of the Fleet Air Arm Museum, RNAS Yeovilton. Malcolm Smith, a regular contributor, has reproduced source material in his book, Voices in Flight: The Royal Naval Air Service During the Great War (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2014). 60. Jones, WIA, Appendices (London: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., 1937), pp. 142–4. 61. John Smith, Gone to Russia to Fight: The RAF in South Russia, 1918– 1920 (Stroud: Amberley Publishing Plc, 2010). 62. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, pp. 27–56. 63. Ernest Swinton, Over My Shoulder: The Autobiography of Sir Ernest D. Swinton (G. Roland, 1951), pp. 154–9, John Glanfield, The Devil’s ­C hariots: The Origins and Secret Battles of Tanks in the First World War, ebook (New York, Osprey Publishing, 2013), Chapter 3. Winston ­Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. II, 5 vols. Kindle ebook (New York: RosettaBooks, LLC, 2013, originally published 1923–31), Chapter 4. See also, Murray Sueter, The Evolution of the Tank: A Record of the Royal Naval Air Service Caterpillar Experiments (London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers Ltd., 1937), Albert Stern, Tanks: 1914–1918 (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published 1919). 64. Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914–1945. Paul Kennedy, ‘“Appeasement” and British defence policy in the inter-war years’ in British Journal of International Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, July 1978, pp. 161–177, H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, 1918–1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976), and Robin Higham, Bases of Air Strategy: Building Airfields for the RAF, 1914–1945 (London: Airlife, 1998). 65. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p. 344. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 356. 66. Stephen Roskill, ‘The Dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe’, in The Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 1, no. 4 (October 1966), pp. 69–93. 67. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 308. See, for example, ‘Memorandum by Captain F. R. Scarlett, Director Air Division, Naval Staff, dated 18 March 1918 and undated Minute by Captain W. W. Fisher, Director Anti-Submarine Division’, AIR 1/274, #233 in Roskill Documents, pp. 639–41. 68. Captain F. R. Scarlett became the first Director of the Air Division in January 1918, followed by Captain R. M. Groves, from October 1918 until August 1919. Nicholas Black, The British Naval Staff in the First World War (Boydell Press, 2009), p. 249. Robert Marsland Groves, Service Record, ADM 273/2/40, p. 40. Roskill, Documents, p. 635 fn. See also, G. Hope, Director Operations Division, Proposed Establishment of an Air Division, 19 December 1917, ADM 1/8508/285. 69. The best studies are Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), George K. Williams, Biplanes

Introduction 15 And Bombsights: British Bombing in World War I, Kindle ebook (Auckland: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014), and E. D. Harding and Peter Chapman, eds., A History of Number 16 Squadron: Royal Naval Air Service, (Morrisville, North Carolina: Lulu Press, 2006). 70. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 27. 71. Stephen Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service ­(London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., 1969), pp. xvi-ii. 72. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, p. 64. Tami Biddle, ‘Learning in Real Time: The Development and Implementation of Air Power in the First World War’ in Air Power History, p. 8. 73. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, C-in-C, British Expeditionary Force, to the War Office, dated from G.H.Q., British Armies in France, 24 February 1917, ADM 1/8449, #162 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 473–4. 74. James Streckfuss, ‘Eyes All Over the Sky: The Significance of Aerial Reconnaissance in the First World War’ (PhD Thesis, University of ­Cincinnati, 2011), p. 262. 75. H. A. Jones, WIA, vol. III, reprint (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published in 1931), pp. 154–5.

1

Fleet Naval Aviation

This chapter examines the evolution of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) as a component of the fleet at sea. It was well established before the war that the primary mission of naval aviation would be fleet reconnaissance, as was demonstrated during the 1913 naval maneuvers. The outbreak of the European war in August 1914 necessitated new roles, including seaplane carrier operations, anti-Zeppelin base raids, gunfire spotting, and carrier strike. Although envisioned before the war, few of these roles had yet transitioned from the experimental to the operational stage. Indeed, although the route was beset with hazards, the RNAS did eventually meet and surmount the material and doctrinal challenges. The wartime transformation is best illustrated by the Grand Fleet Flying Squadron’s successful destruction of the Tondern Zeppelin sheds, a naval air strike that destroyed Zeppelins L54 and L60 on 19 July 1918. When HMS Argus joined the Flying Squadron in October, Admiral Commanding Aircraft (ACA) Rear Admiral Richard Phillimore, furthermore, gained an aerial torpedo strike capability – 22 years before the battle of Taranto. The RNAS certainly experienced its share of setbacks as it developed fleet aviation operations: the prewar rigid airship R1 ‘Mayfly’ disaster, gunfire spotting limitations exposed at the Dardanelles, only a single seaplane flight at the Battle of Jutland and, most spectacular of all, the planning for the aerial torpedo attack against the High Sea Fleet base at Wilhelmshaven that fell through late in 1917, all attest to the difficulty of integrating new technology during the chaos of wartime. Flying accidents cost the RNAS dearly: Squadron Commander Edwin Dunning, a skilled test pilot, was killed in a carrier-landing experiment; Lieutenant Commander W. P. de Courcy Ireland, who formulated the first aerial torpedo strike plans, was killed testing an airship-plane, as was notable airship pioneer Wing Commander Neville Usborne. The final success of the RNAS as a component of the fleet, and the skills encoded in naval doctrine as the Grand Fleet Air Orders (GFAO), were therefore acquired with both difficulty and real human cost.

Fleet Naval Aviation 17 This chapter examines the transformation of the RNAS’ roles within the fleet, beginning as a purely reconnaissance platform but ultimately developing into an essential instrument of naval warfare, capable of gunfire spotting, close air support, and carrier strike missions. First, it explores the development of rigid airships by the Royal Navy. This was a controversial and much-delayed program that, although ultimately successful, has been generally relegated to enthusiast studies. Despite early setbacks, the Royal Navy concluded the First World War with rigid airships that were as good as, if not better than, the Zeppelins they were copied from in 1916–17. Second, the development of the aircraft carrier is considered, from the introduction of Britain’s first seaplane carriers through to the development of naval air strike as demonstrated at the Cuxhaven raid of December 1914. Third, the chapter examines the use of naval aviation for gunfire spotting and reconnaissance, including the effort at the Dardanelles, the involvement of the RNAS in the destruction of the Königsberg at the Rufiji river delta, the utilization of the RNAS at the Battle of Jutland, and the operations of the little known East Indies & Egypt Seaplane Squadron (EIESS) in the Mediterranean. Fourth, the focus returns to the North Sea and Grand Fleet C-in-C Admiral Sir David Beatty’s convening of the Grand Fleet Air Committee (GFAC), a watershed organization that established the path forward for fleet naval aviation. The aborted Wilhelmshaven strike planning of 1917, perhaps the most audacious conceptualization of the RNAS as an instrument of the naval offensive, which could have been carried out had the war lasted into 1919, is also considered.1 The chapter concludes by examining the doctrinal and technological development of the Flying Squadron of the Grand Fleet, Rear Admiral Richard Phillimore’s aircraft carrier group that conducted the Tondern raid of July 1918.2

Britain’s Rigid Airships The Admiralty’s efforts to catch up with Count Zeppelin’s work for the German armed forces spurred the development of the airship in Britain. The success of Germany’s rigid airship program, and its rapid integration into the Imperial Navy as a reconnaissance and signaling platform, was observed with apprehension in Britain, although it was not clear if the answer was the development of Britain’s own rigids or more advanced airplanes.3 Captain Reginald Bacon, the Director of Naval Ordnance in 1908, was the leading British advocate for the construction of rigid airships and he ought to be considered, along with Frank McClean, Winston Churchill, and Captain Murray Sueter, as one of the godfathers of British naval aviation.4 Captain Bacon had been the Admiralty’s representative at several air-related Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) subcommittee meetings, including the Subcommittee on Aerial Navigation that was chaired by Lord Esher and then Lord  Haldane.

18  Fleet Naval Aviation Bacon, along with Inspecting Captain of Airships (ICA) Sueter, was also on the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics which was presided over by John William Strutt, Lord Rayleigh, who was the chancellor of Cambridge University and formerly the president of the Royal Society.5 On 21 July 1908, Bacon recommended to Admiral Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, that Britain begin development of an indigenous rigid airship by placing an order for a prototype with the Vickers armament firm.6 When Lord Esher’s CID Subcommittee on Aerial Navigation met that December, First Sea Lord Fisher instructed Bacon to oversee the rigid airship program.7 The CID subcommittee met again on 28 January 1909, and agreed to budget £35,000 for construction of the airship, plus £50,000 for the cost of the shed.8 This £85,000 expenditure compared well with a destroyer (£80,000) and was significantly more economical than a new light cruiser (£400,000).9 On 9 May, the contract with Vickers was signed and construction commenced.10 Bacon was thus in overall charge of the project from the Admiralty’s end. An experienced submarine and torpedo expert, Bacon drew inspiration from the submarine specialists he had worked with in the past, including Captain Sueter. Sueter, who, as we have seen, had previously worked with Bacon on Lord Rayleigh’s Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, was appointed the chief Admiralty liaison with Vickers.11 Sir James McKechnie, manager of the Naval Construction Works at Barrow-in-Furness, led the Vickers team that also included Charles Robertson, head of engineering at Barrow, B. Comyn, the general manager of Cavendish, James Watson, the works manager, S. W. Hunt, the chief draughtsman, and H. B. Pratt, senior mathematician. Commander Oliver Schwann, Sueter’s Assistant Inspecting Captain of Airships, and his technical advisors Lt. Neville Usborne, Lt. C. P. Talbot, Engineer Lieutenant C. R. J. Randall, and Chief Artificer Engineer A. Sharpe, oversaw the work at the Barrow yard on behalf of the Navy.12 The Navy’s requirements specified an airship with a top speed of 40 knots, an operational ceiling of 1,500 ft, equipped with wireless-telegraphy (W/T), interior telephone communication, and a Zeiss reconnaissance camera.13 The design team recommended an airship 500 ft in length, 48  ft in diameter, with gasbags protected by a waterproof silk canvas that altogether provided for a lifting capacity of 663,000 cubic ft. The frame was to be made of wood but the Admiralty overruled this decision on the grounds that the ship was experimental and for this reason aluminum and then, in 1910, when Vickers acquired the patents from a German metallurgist, duralumin was selected.14 The result of these efforts was the technologically advanced but structurally weak airship No. 1, hopefully nicknamed the ‘Mayfly’. Despite the strong management and technical teams, progress was slow, over budget, and the airship was not completed until May 1911. Bacon, in November 1909, had retired from the Navy to assume the position of

Fleet Naval Aviation 19 managing director of the Coventry ordnance works, leaving Sueter in charge of the airship project.15 After completion, it was discovered that the airship was deficient in lift and thus elements of the superstructure and other components were removed.16 Unfortunately for the rigid airship program, the experimental duralumin frame was wrecked when the spine split in half as the airship was being maneuvered out of its shed on a windy 24 September 1911.17 It should be noted that airship accidents and setbacks were not at all uncommon: a similar disaster had damaged Germany’s LZ7 beyond repair on 28 June 1910 and LZ8 was wrecked while docking on 16 May 1911.18 Suspicion, nevertheless, rested on Sueter.19 Peter Brooks has argued that Lieutenant Usborne, who was the Admiralty’s technical advisor on airship development, or Charles G. Robertson, who was the actual manager at Barrow-in-Furness, were the true sources of the inadequate construction. 20 In either case, the subsequent inquiry, convened on 18 October 1911 and presided over by Rear Admiral Frederick Sturdee, one of Admiral Fisher’s numerous critics, unsurprisingly condemned the entire project as misguided.21 This was a near-fatal blow to the Royal Navy’s rigid airship program. Following the ‘Mayfly’ fiasco, the Admiralty set out to reform its Airship Section, at that time located at Farnborough. 22 Sueter was removed from his ICA position in February 1912 and the airship section disbanded. 23 Sueter and Colonel Mervyn O’Gorman, of the Royal Aircraft Factory, were despatched that summer to conduct espionage in Europe with the intent of profiling continental airships. Disguised as Americans, they toured airship facilities in France, Germany, and Austria, even securing a flight aboard the Zeppelin ‘Viktoria-Luise’ (LZ11) and upon return produced a well-received dossier on continental airship capabilities.24 Sueter was therefore not out in the wilderness for long and Churchill determined to appoint him as head of the new Air Department, proving the importance of benefactors to champion the technicians so that they could experiment and innovate in an environment of risk. 25 Although Sueter was appointed Director of the Air Department (DAD) in May, in the event, it took until 25 November for Churchill to secure funding from the Treasury for the new department. 26 In August, meanwhile, it had been decided for anti-submarine (A/S) purposes to acquire some small non-rigid airships of the ‘Astra Torres’ model from France along with a ‘Parseval’ model purchased from Germany, while Vickers would hopefully deliver another working rigid airship sometime in the future.27 Captain Sueter was still optimistic about the prospects for Britain’s airship development, and, in fact, was keen to start work on a second airship, but, for the time being, he believed that the purchase of the older model airships, along with a further £10,000 for experiments, would suffice.28 In October, Sueter was attempting to arrange for the purchase of a £30,000 German-built ‘Parseval’ semi-rigid type.29

20  Fleet Naval Aviation From the summer of 1912 until August 1914, the major interdepartmental council for the air services was the Air Committee, a joint service subcommittee. At committee meetings, Vice Admiral Jellicoe was not satisfied that the Admiralty was doing enough towards developing a rigid airship capability.30 As Second Sea Lord Jellicoe was responsible for the personnel of the Naval Wing, 31 and he expressed his conviction that airships, with their long endurance and superior station-keeping capabilities, were best suited for naval purposes.32 Jellicoe, with Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s permission, actually toured the Zeppelin ‘Hansa’ (LZ13) in May 1913.33 First Lord Churchill had, however, already become convinced that airplanes, not airships, were the future of naval aviation and was channeling resources, and more importantly his enthusiasm, towards the development of infrastructure for the former.34 The five seaplane stations built along the English coast before the war cost only £64,390 and the purchase of 22 airplanes in 1912 was expected to cost a mere £35,308 compared with the £284,500 earmarked for four prewar naval airship stations.35 A single airship station, with its complex hydrogen storage system, could cost as much as £150,000 in 1914, a rigid airship itself a further £50,000 to £60,000.36 In the event, the construction of all five prewar naval air stations, plus their wartime expansion and the construction of 19 new aerodromes, was calculated to have cost only £556,785, whereas, up to July 1915, £1,396,025 had been spent or allocated for what was planned as a total establishment of 22 airship stations – and these were the less complicated non-rigid bases.37 Aircraft, from Churchill’s prewar perspective, certainly appeared to be the more economical option compared to rigid airship development. The direct utility of aircraft in a fleet battle was, on the other hand, hypothetical, and since the Admiralty was split between the supporters of aircraft and rigid airships, Churchill did the only reasonable thing and endorsed both options. Indeed, as Ben Jones has observed, airships and their stations were by far the largest prewar Air Department expense, and thus the extent to which Churchill subsequently claimed a certain lack of enthusiasm for airship development is questionable.38 Despite the significant sums allocated for non-rigid and coastal airship development, the infrastructure for new rigid airship construction did not exist until 1916, by which time construction facilities were located at Barrow (Vickers), Inchinnan (Beardmore), Barlow (Armstrong), and Cardington (Shorts). A training base was built at Cranwell in 1918 and rigid airship stations were built at Longside, East Fortune, Howden, Pulham, and Kingsnorth, with a further station at Lough Neagh in Northern Ireland under construction when the war ended.39 Sueter’s interest in rigid airship development was certainly in no way diminished by the R1 disaster, and he persistently led the core group of the former ‘Mayfly’ designers in efforts to reinvigorate the rigid airship

Fleet Naval Aviation 21 program.40 In March 1914, his years of effort were rewarded when the contract for the 890,000 sq ft R9 was signed with Vickers.41 The outbreak of the war, of course, frustrated these efforts and, in August 1914, the RNAS possessed only two operational semi-rigid airships. Without rigid airships for communications and reconnaissance, it was believed, especially by the newly appointed Grand Fleet C-in-C Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, that the fleet would be at a significant tactical disadvantage when compared to the High Sea Fleet,42 which could call on three Zeppelins (LZ24, LZ27, and LZ28), although ironically only one (LZ24) was actually ready for North Sea operations at the outbreak of the war.43 To guard against the serious threat of German minelayers and submarines, made evident by a number of warship losses early in the war, vigilant patrol of the coastline and waterways was required (see Chapter 2). The ‘Parseval’ type No. 4 was used for this purpose early in the war to fly reconnaissance patrols over the English Channel.44 Fisher’s return to the Admiralty at the end of October 1914 renewed interest in non-rigid airships for A/S patrol. Indeed, the silver lining of Britain’s airship story was the startling success of the non-rigid Sea Scout blimps, a forerunner of the naval helicopter.45 In February 1915, Churchill halted work on the only rigid then being developed in Britain, No. 9, which had been under construction by Vickers since spring 1914, and then, on 12 March, cancelled the project altogether.46 Luckily for Jellicoe, not alone amongst the rigid airship proponents in the fleet, rigid airship construction was presently resumed when Arthur Balfour replaced Churchill as First Lord following the May Crisis. The important military details of the May Crisis, which led to the formation of Asquith’s coalition government, are too many and complicated to discuss in detail here, but a brief summary is important to understand the dramatic impact this watershed event had on the RNAS and Britain’s naval administration more generally. A series of boiling crises came to a head simultaneously and, when combined with the caprices of human fortune,47 elevated the Unionists under Bonar Law into a coalition government with Asquith’s Liberals. Let it suffice to say that the crisis originated in the spring of 1915, beginning with Germany’s Second Ypres offensive of 22 April, and was then exacerbated by the costly landings at Gallipoli three days later. The press, specifically Lord Northcliffe’s Daily Mail and London Times, put significant pressure on the government for its evident military failures.48 The supposed shell shortage, resulting from the Aubers Ridge offensive of 9 May and disclosed by the Times on the 14th,49 embarrassed the government and was discussed at the War Council meeting that day.50 The mood at Downing Street was one of ‘unrelieved gloom’ according to Hankey, the atmosphere ‘sulphurous’ according to Churchill’s account.51 Furthermore, Churchill informed the War Council of the ominous news that two U-boats had most likely entered the Dardanalles area of

22  Fleet Naval Aviation operations and that naval reinforcements, including monitors, barges, gunboats, kite-balloon ships, A/S vessels, blimps, and additional RNAS units were all required.52 This was too much for First Sea Lord Fisher, and he expressed his conviction that the entire Dardanelles affair should never have been undertaken in the first place: the resources Churchill was planning to redirect to the Dardanelles had originally been designed for Fisher’s own Baltic project, and the First Sea Lord now implicated both War Minister Kitchener and the Prime Minister for failing to follow through with the original plan.53 Also on the 14th, the Daily Mail reported on Churchill’s admission in the House of Commons that HMS Goliath had been torpedoed and sunk by Turkish destroyers on the 13th.54 Fisher resigned the following morning, and then confirmed his intentions to Asquith on the 15th, afterwards reinforcing his decision to Churchill on the 16th. Fisher made his bid to Asquith for supreme naval command on the 17th, and, failing that, departed the Admiralty on May 22nd.55 Churchill, who had been the subject of press scrutiny since the inception of the Dardanelles campaign, learned on 16 May that he was no longer to be included in the War Council and so resigned on the 25th as part of the required concessions to the Unionists for their support. 56 HMS Triumph had been torpedoed by U21 that same day and this disappointing news reached Churchill on the 26th, his last full day at the Admiralty. Former Unionist Prime Minister Balfour replaced Churchill, and Admiral Sir Henry Jackson replaced Fisher, despite Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson having been Churchill’s original candidate for Fisher’s successor. David Lloyd George, previously Chancellor of the Exchequer, was appointed Minister of Munitions, and Churchill was shuffled to the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster on 27 May, 57 another bleak day for the Royal Navy as U21 torpedoed and sank HMS Majestic, the third Royal Navy battleship lost at the Dardanelles that month. Balfour was quick to dispatch Wing Captain Frederick Sykes, Royal Flying Corps (RFC), to the Dardanelles to clear up what was perceived as Churchill’s mess and, in July, Balfour determined that the RNAS Squadrons were to be subordinated to their district Senior Naval Officers (SNOs). 58 Balfour was a firm believer in coastal defense and, in fact, expanded on many of the established policies and choices made by his predecessor. He did however, in September 1915, replace DAD Commodore Sueter with Rear Admiral Charles Vaughan-Lee who became the new Director of Air Services (DAS). The Balfour-Jackson duo, meanwhile, quickly resurrected the rigid airship project, much to the relief of Admiral Jellicoe.59 Work was resumed on R9 in August 1915 and in October a series of rigids of the 997,500 sq ft R23-class were ordered, airships No. 23, No. 24, No. 25, and No. 26 to be built simultaneously by Vickers (R23, R26), Beardmore (R24) and Armstrong-Whitworth (R25), with a further five

Fleet Naval Aviation 23 to follow in January 1916.60 DAS Vaughan-Lee increased this order to 11 by March 1916, hoping to ultimately have a dozen of the R23-class airships available for work with the Grand Fleet.61 The Air Department still expected airships to act as reconnaissance, long-range gunfire spotting and wireless communication platforms.62 Sueter, after his replacement by Vaughan-Lee in September 1915, became the Superintendent of Aircraft Construction (SAC), responsible for all departmental designs and contracts, including the Airship Section of the Air Department. Sueter could rely on his Assistant Superintendent, Wing Commander Edward Masterman, who had been the CO of Farnborough airship station since the outbreak of the war. Captain David Norris was Sueter’s Inspecting Captain of Rigid Airship Building, but responsibility for the design and construction of rigid airships was transferred, in October, to the Director of Naval Construction (DNC) Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt, and Norris was retasked to report over Sueter’s head to the Third Sea Lord, Rear Admiral Tudor.63 Wing Commander Robert Clark-Hall, formerly the Captain of HMS Ark Royal at the Dardanelles (see below), was made the Assistant Superintendent for Design.64 Kite-balloons were under the control of Squadron Commander Mackworth (formerly Major J. B. Mackworth, Royal Engineers) and Wing Commander Harold Woodcock was the Inspecting Commander of Dirigible Airship Building. DAS Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee, in his drive to rationalize the Air Department and prevent ‘water-tight compartments’, reorganized the Airship Section on 28 February 1916,65 splitting it into two branches: Construction & Supply, and Operations.66 Wing Commander Masterman was transferred to Barrow-in-Furness to work directly on airship design and testing, while Captain Norris was promoted to Second Assistant Superintendent for Aircraft Construction (ASAC II), an awkward title shortly changed to Assistant Superintendent for Airships (ASA), with Squadron Commander Woodcock in charge of non-rigid airships, and Wing Commander Mackworth appointed the head of a separate subsection for kite-balloons.67 Wing Commander Hunt was placed in charge of the Operations section, responsible for all airship operations, policy, personnel, stations, transport, foreign intelligence, diplomacy, meteorology, navigation and records.68 Norris, despite his title, was really the head of a combined operations and supply division, with Hunt as his deputy, airship construction having been transferred to the DNC’s office since October 1915, as we have seen.69 Non-rigid airship construction was likewise transferred to the Admiralty in July 1916.70 Although the Admiralty recommitted to rigid airship development on 4 February 1916, and again on 7 April, the British rigid designs were by this point in the war seriously technologically deficient in comparison to their German counterparts.71 A series of lucky strokes, however, soon enabled the British to catch up. Drawings of LZ85 were made after that

24  Fleet Naval Aviation airship was shot down over Salonika on 5 May 1916 (and the wreckage was shipped back to Britain for study),72 and then, on 24 September, Germany’s L33 was forced down over Essex.73 Reverse engineering produced a class of replicas, and two L33-types were thus ordered by the Admiralty in November 1916, followed by three more in January 1917. Further details emerged from the wreck of L48, shot down over Suffolk on 17 June 1917, in addition to L49, which was captured entirely intact when it came down in France on 20 October 1917.74 The German designs were incorporated into the British R33-class, with improvements continuing through to the advanced R36, and its height-climbing successors, R38 to R41, which were ordered in June 1918. By the autumn of 1917, the Admiralty intended to build more than a dozen of the Zeppelin-type airships.75 Churchill, by then the Minister of Munitions, was critical of the utility of these proposed vessels; however the Fifth Sea Lord, Commodore Godfrey Paine, was committed to what had effectively been Jellicoe’s policy all along: that the airships would prove themselves at fleet scouts, possibly as valuable as several light cruisers.76 Jellicoe wholeheartedly backed the new rigids and expressed his intention to build 16 of them, along with 20 new Coastal or North Sea-type non-rigids and another 20 Sea Scouts.77 These 1917 developments reflected Jellicoe’s awareness of Germany’s rigid airship advantage, but also reflected the material revolution the First Sea Lord had commenced as part of the A/S campaign (see Chapter 2). In May 1917, rigid airship construction, like all of the DNC’s and Third Sea Lord’s responsibilities, now fell under the authority of the Controller, Sir Eric Geddes.78 By August, proposals were floated to establish an entirely separate Airship Department, although nothing ultimately came of this scheme.79 Jellicoe, however, was wary lest the new Air Ministry absorb the Navy’s airships, and so reorganized the airship staff in September to create a separate department of Airship Production as part of the Material Branch of the Naval Staff.80 This sub-branch was composed of a civilian Director of Airship Production, E. C. Given, and his staff of RNAS regulars, including Wing Captain Masterman, then the most senior airship officer in the Navy, as well as Wing Commander Woodcock, the former non-rigid airship constructor. As with the Air Division of the Naval Staff, these reforms helped preserve RNAS (airship) talent prior to the creation of the Air Ministry.81 At the Air Department itself, Wing Captain Maitland, one of the original designers behind the Sea Scout blimp, was now the Captain Superintendent for Airships, proving to be the last link with the Air Department’s gradually fading rigid airship program.82 Maitland chaired an Airship Progress Committee that Wing Commander Hugh Williamson and Wing Commander Cecil Malone both attended, the first meeting of which was held on 11 February 1918, although by this stage, Maitland’s concerns were almost entirely related to the supply of sufficient airships to patrol

Fleet Naval Aviation 25 the various barrage lines and provide escorts for coastal convoys.83 Prior to the armistice, the Plans Division of the Naval Staff became increasingly significant for setting airship policy, although it was primarily concerned with A/S operations. The situation was now tenuous as the Royal Navy retained control over airship bases and procurement but not, after 1 April 1918, the crews – as they were transferred to the Royal Air Force (RAF). Eric Grove has observed that this arrangement was the result of an agreement between First Lord Geddes and Air Minister Sir William Weir regarding control of airships.84 The much delayed, and technically obsolete, R9 had at last been inflated on 27 November 1916, but, like the ‘Mayfly’ before it, was found deficient in lift and was thus lightened during the winter of 1916, finally becoming operational during March–April 1917.85 The first three R23-class airships followed in October and November 1917, with No. 26, now R26, fitted out at last in April 1918. A fourth ship, R27 was completed in March 1918, but was destroyed in its shed that August, and lastly R29, which was to have some success as an A/S platform (see Chapter 2), was commissioned in June 1918.86 Unfortunately, these indigenous British airships were considerably less powerful than their super-Zeppelin counterparts and were ill-suited for North Sea conditions.87 Their performance deficiencies were compounded by the demonstrated vulnerability of rigid airships to improved air defence fighters, which, from mid-1916, were capable of firing incendiary ammunition (see Chapter 4). The result of these limitations in terms of speed, lift, and survivability meant that the prototype airships were used only occasionally for convoy escort and were primarily relegated to training.88 The obsolete R9 was hastily scrapped in June 1918.89 Non-rigid construction, however, pressed ahead during the rearmament year of 1916. Twenty-seven Coastal-type non-rigid airships were delivered that year and four of the large North Sea-class were subsequently delivered in 1917, with the intention to work as fleet scouts covering the North Sea for the Grand Fleet.90 The North Sea and Coastal-types, due to their limited endurance and top speed, were not particularly successful in this role; however, they were more useful in the A/S and convoy protection roles.91 By 1918 a small flotilla of the reverse engineered Zeppelin-type airships were nearing completion. R33, the first of these, could have been a useful addition to the fleet for relaying signals, jamming transmissions and conducting reconnaissance, had the war continued into 1919.92 R33 (Armstrong) and R34 (Beardmore) began flight trials in the spring of 1918, the latter being accepted by the Navy and deployed to East Fortune on 29 May.93 By the time the advanced R33 and its sister ships were commissioned, after the war, the successful development of aircraft carriers, combined with high-altitude naval aircraft and (explosive) anti-Zeppelin ammunition, rendered the rigid airships too vulnerable

26  Fleet Naval Aviation and expensive for naval purposes, and thus obsolete – at least in North Sea conditions. The Royal Navy thus fought the entire war without the airships the Grand Fleet leadership had requested (of which, more below), although, in the event, Germany’s Zeppelins played only a minor role in terms of North Sea naval combat anyway and were instead employed primarily as long-range bombers against British cities in a misguided effort to weaken Britain’s resolve to carry on the war. For both Germany and Britain, the airship functioned as a naval weapon in ways very different from their intended purpose as imaged before the war. Ultimately, the Royal Navy did receive the British Zeppelins that had been imagined back in 1909. However, by the time these vessels were delivered, starting late in 1918, their utility had diminished vis-à-vis aircraft to such an extent that they were not seriously considered for fleet use. The smaller non-rigids that the Air Department introduced, and procured in significant quantities during the war, were more useful, although primarily in the A/S and convoy escort roles. This was certainly not the outcome that had been expected before the war: a lesson in terms of the unexpected results of new technologies, but also of the difficulty of closing a material gap during wartime; Britain’s delay in developing its own rigids resulted in stunted procurement that required several years to overcome. The effort to counter the Zeppelins, however, produced marked advances in aircraft development that, in part, contributed to the rise to the aircraft carrier. The implications of the 1911 ‘Mayfly’ disaster were thus profound, as this single setback necessitated the development of aircraft for fleet purposes, the result of which was Britain’s rapid adoption of seaplane carriers and, eventually, aircraft carriers.

Origins of the Aircraft Carrier The inability of the Admiralty to produce rigid airships along Zeppelin’s lines, prior to the war, had a profound impact on the development of the Naval Wing. Aircraft, less technologically complicated, far more economical, yet apparently capable of fulfilling many of the same roles as rigid airships, became the mainstay of the RNAS at the outbreak of the war. But what role would these short-range, rather fragile, machines play with the fleet? Eugene Ely, United States Navy (USN), first demonstrated that aircraft could indeed alight from and land back upon warships, having achieved this technological feat when he launched from the stationary USS Birmingham on 14 November 1910. For his next experiment, Ely attempted to land aboard a moving ship and, on 18 January 1911, he successfully landed aboard USS Pennsylvania.94 Similar experiments were taking place in Britain: on 18 November 1911, Commander Oliver

Fleet Naval Aviation 27 Schwann took off in a seaplane from the water at Barrow Dock, erasing the result of the unsuccessful trials held that September.95 Lieutenant Arthur Longmore, likewise, landed a Short seaplane in the River Medway on 11 December.96 Commander Charles Samson was up to the task of actually replicating Ely’s feat and successfully took off from a platform built above the forward turret of HMS Africa on 10 January 1912. On 9 May, Samson then flew off HMS Hibernia while the warship was underway.97 A track and trolley shipboard aircraft launching system had actually been patented near the end of 1911 by Captain Sueter, who received assistance on the design from Lieutenant Commander F. L. M. Boothby and H. G. Paterson.98 In another important milestone, newly promoted Squadron Commander Longmore dropped a 14-inch torpedo from his Short 81 seaplane at Calshot on 28 July 1914.99 These examples are representative of the experimental progress made before the war. The inventive skills acquired by the Naval Wing would later enable the wartime RNAS to adapt to a variety of technical and doctrinal challenges. Technical progress was uneven, however, as we have seen with the ‘Mayfly’ disaster. One area of critical importance that was as yet underdeveloped was the reliable transmission and reception of wireless-­telegraphy (W/T). The transmission of Morse code had been proven viable, but it was not yet possible to receive transmissions while in an aircraft due to the engine noise overwhelming the receiver.100 This was a disadvantage compared to the Zeppelin, in which larger and therefore more powerful and reliable W/T sets were housed in the airship cabin or in designated rooms.101 A related technological-doctrine problem, stemming from unreliable W/T development, was the practice of gunfire spotting. Although the concept had been tested by the RFC, it had not been examined by the RNAS and, as a result, had to be improvised during the Belgian coast operations of 1914 and at the Dardanelles in 1915 (see below).102 What coastal air stations there were in July 1914, as we have seen, owed their construction to the interest of First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill. Churchill’s predilection for adventure motivated him to personally take flying lessons with the Naval Wing in 1913,103 and his mercurial mind soon began to imagine long-range seaplanes that would reproduce many of the functions of the Coast Guard, while also protecting Britain’s coasts from enemy raids. Churchill had, in fact, coined the term ‘seaplane’, by shortening the unwieldy term ‘hydro-aeroplane’.104 The First Lord was in part following advice rendered by the CID’s Air Committee, of which Murray Sueter, Charles Samson, and John Jellicoe were all members. On 29 July 1914, Churchill wrote that ‘the primary duty of British aircraft is to fight enemy aircraft and thus afford protection against aerial attack’.105 Between September 1914 and February 1916, Churchill further shouldered the RNAS with responsibility for the air defence of Britain (see

28  Fleet Naval Aviation Chapter 4), in addition to the mission of bombing Germany’s Zeppelin infrastructure (see Chapter 3). Churchill’s focus on developing air defence and long-range strike capabilities influenced RNAS procurement toward the acquisition of efficient land-based fighters and bombers, rather than the specialized seaplanes (and ships) required for fleet operations. This decision to engage in defensive and offensive air warfare meant that the development of aircraft for use at sea was not the primary focus of the Air Department during Churchill’s tenure, although some progress was made with developing technical systems such as air-launched torpedoes and seaplane carriers.106 Churchill’s policy may have limited the capabilities of seaplanes and aircraft carriers early in the war, but it conversely resulted in the development of excellent air interceptors, anti-Zeppelin fighters, and dedicated bombers after 1915. Sueter, to his credit, was already thinking along more specifically naval lines. In the Air Committee report of 29 August 1912, the incoming DAD elaborated the functions of the Naval Wing, including fleet reconnaissance, ASW, detecting minelayers, locating enemy surface vessels, supporting friendly submarines, air defence and other functions. Sueter stated, furthermore, that airplanes must be adapted to work with the fleet’s capital ships, cruisers, and special airplane carriers.107 The leadership of the RNAS at the Air Department, and the senior aviators and officers at the Central Air Office (CAO), Sheerness, were familiar with the Royal Navy’s traditional unwritten service doctrine and it should be unremarkable that the duties of naval aviation were so clearly defined at this early date.108 It is worth noting that the Royal Navy had successfully assimilated a tremendous number of technical innovations over the preceding century, ranging from steam propulsion to shell-firing guns, torpedoes, electricity, W/T, fire control, and submarines. Aircraft represented another layer in this already sophisticated system-of-systems. Churchill demonstrated that he recognized the importance of aircraft for naval use in an Admiralty minute dated 26 October 1913, describing the need for new aircraft for roles including air defence, coastal patrol, fleet work, and long-range bombing.109 Furthermore, in December 1913, the First Lord tasked DNC D’Eyncourt to draft designs for a seaplane carrier.110 Over the preceding years, several proposals for aircraft-­carrying ships had been elucidated. Submarine Lieutenant Hugh Williamson, a future RNAS observer and staff officer, had, for example, produced an aircraft command-and-control ship concept in 1912.111 Seaplane carrier operations were actually demonstrated at the July 1913 naval maneuvers: HMS Hermes, an 1898 pattern cruiser, was modified to carry two seaplanes so as to simulate airship support and was attached to Second Sea Lord Vice Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s red force.112 Captain G. W. Vivian was Hermes’ CO, with Commander F. R. Scarlett, a recent CFS graduate, as his executive officer,113 and was also responsible for the red forces’ coastal air station, which was NAS Great

Fleet Naval Aviation 29 Yarmouth.114 Commander Samson took charge of Hermes’ air contingent.115 Admiral Callaghan’s blue force likewise could draw upon NAS Leven and Cromarty for air support.116 On 24 July, Jellicoe’s red force, taking advantage of low visibility conditions, was judged to have entirely avoided Callaghan’s much larger blue force and successfully carried out the landing of a marine raiding force.117 For the remainder of the maneuvers, the blue aircraft were primarily engaged in searching for red submarines (see Chapter 2). The experience of the naval maneuvers, importantly, exposed the limitations of W/T communication from the air.118 This practical experience improved the Naval Wing’s proficiency with fleet operations, although Hermes itself was not retained and was paid off in October 1913.119 Churchill, cognizant of the Kaiserliche Marine’s Zeppelin advantage, had grand designs for the Naval Wing, which, as already mentioned, he proposed to use as a supplement for the Coast Guard and, eventually, as a maritime security and search and rescue force.120 Seaplanes, although much less expensive and relatively disposable compared to airships, suffered from the difficulty of communications given their low-powered, transmitter-only, portable W/T sets that were significantly less versatile than the heavier sets carried aboard airships. Nevertheless, without rigid airships, seaplane carriers seemed to be the best available alternative for the Naval Wing. Towards this end, Churchill tasked Second Sea Lord Jellicoe with the goal of finding a suitable merchant ship for conversion to a fleet seaplane carrier,121 and authorized £81,000 for the conversion.122 It took until the following May, however, before a partially constructed Blyth Company coal tramp steamer was requisitioned for conversion into HMS Ark Royal.123 The 7,450-ton seaplane carrier conversion was designed by John H. Narbeth, the Assistant Director of Naval Construction (ADNC) (and, later in the war, the principal designer of the battleship-to-carrier conversion, HMS Eagle) with assistance from Constructor Charles J. W. Hope, of Blyth Shipbuilding and Dry Docks Company.124 Ark Royal was commissioned on 9 December 1914, featuring a 130-foot flying-off deck and capacity for five seaplanes and two airplanes,125 and was immediately dispatched to the Mediterranean as part of the Dardanelles expedition.126 This left the Grand Fleet with only its three cross-Channel ferries, Engadine, Riviera and Empress, which had been requisitioned from the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway Company on 11 August and hastily converted into seaplane carriers during September.127 On 17  April 1915, the Grand Fleet was joined by the old 18,000-ton Cunard liner RMS Campania that had been purchased for £32,500 on 27 November 1914, before its scheduled scrapping, and commissioned as a 20-knot seaplane carrier.128 In 1914, the CFS published its two-part RFC training manual, a landmark achievement that has been described as the first example of British

30  Fleet Naval Aviation air doctrine.129 The Military Wing’s half of the training manual was supplemented by a second volume, written by Wing Commander Frederick Sykes and printed in June, containing Sykes’ discourse on army aviation doctrine.130 The RNAS has been subsequently criticized for failing to produce a similar supplement.131 Indeed, Sykes himself criticized the Admiralty’s effort for its apparent ‘slowness’ toward developing a clear set of roles for the RNAS.132 The critics are not without grounds, as the Naval Wing portion of the manual is revealing for its almost total lack of statements on purpose regarding aircraft roles or functions, although topics such as handling, repair, construction, and history are described in detail.133 A second volume, the Naval Air Service Training Manual, was published in November 1914, but this manual merely reproduced the technical and historical material from the preceding edition, and again did not elaborate on missions or roles.134 However, as we have seen, the formal duties of the Naval Wing had already been elucidated at the Air Committee meetings in the summer of 1912. The Air Department’s focus on material and technical matters in the years immediately before the war is therefore entirely reasonable, given that the aircraft required to fulfill the Naval Wing’s missions were, as CFS instructor E. L. Gerrard observed in July 1914, ‘still in the experimental stage’.135 In the official history, Walter Raleigh summarized that, although training and experiments were progressing, as yet, ‘… no attempt had been made to equip the force completely for the needs of war.’136 Only limited funds were available for new aircraft, given that a significant portion of the total Air Department budget was still dedicated to the construction of more expensive rigid airships and their support infrastructure. The delay in rigid airship development caused by the ‘Mayfly’ disaster, combined with the technical immaturity of seaplane technology, meant that the Royal Navy entered the war without a dedicated aircraft carrier or fleet airship, relying, in other words, entirely on coastal bases for air support. Germany, in contrast, possessed a number of airships for army and navy use and had carried out exercises with the Zeppelins acting in the fleet reconnaissance role, although two naval Zeppelins, L1 (LZ14) and L2 (LZ18), had been lost during September– October 1913.137 France, Japan, Russia, and the United States, moreover, had all introduced converted seaplane carriers prior to August 1914.138

Seaplane Strike and Reconnaissance To address this aerial asymmetry in the event of war with Germany, Churchill planned to utilize the nascent RNAS to degrade Germany’s Zeppelin bases immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, a proposal that was supported by Prime Minister Asquith.139 The feasibility of Churchill’s project was demonstrated by the RNAS air attacks against Dusseldorf on 22 September and 9 October, the latter mission

Fleet Naval Aviation 31 a success in which Lieutenant ‘Reggie’ Marix destroyed Zeppelin ZIX (LZ25) in its shed. In November the Friedrichshafen Zeppelin facility was raided with some minor success and, in 1915, additional raids were flown against Gontrode, 25 May, and Evere, 7 June, the latter in which Flight Lieutenants Wilson and Mills destroyed LZ38 (see Chapter 3).140 On Christmas Eve 1914, a group of seaplane carriers attached to Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force departed to raid the Zeppelin turntable shed believed to be at Cuxhaven (actually at Nordholz: since October the Naval Airship Division HQ), in what was, in fact, the first aircraft carrier strike in history.141 Commodore (S) Roger Keyes prepared the original proposal, which, on 22 October at an Admiralty meeting, Commodore Tyrwhitt then showed to Churchill, First Sea Lord Prince Louis of Battenberg, and Chief of the Admiralty War Staff Vice Admiral Doveton Sturdee.142 Two attempts were made subsequently, the first on 25 October and the second on 23 November, although both were scratched due to poor weather.143 For the third, December, effort, Commodore Tyrwhitt had three seaplane carriers (converted cross-Channel ferries) available: HMS Empress, commanded by acting Flight Commander F.  W. Bowhill, HMS Engadine, under Squadron Commander L’Estrange Malone, and HMS Riviera,144 escorted by the Harwich Force’s three cruisers and 18 destroyers, plus Commodore Keyes with two more destroyers and ten or eleven submarines.145 On Christmas Day, the raiders managed to deploy nine seaplanes, of which seven were able to get off the water, but, due to low-lying fog, the pilots were unable to find the target, instead attacking targets of opportunity with their small bombs, while being fired upon by High Sea Fleet warships.146 Only two of the RNAS pilots (Kilner and Edmonds) made it back to the seaplane carriers and were recovered by Riveria.147 One pilot (Ross) was recovered by Keyes in Lurcher,148 a second pilot (Hewlett) was recovered by a Dutch trawler,149 and the other three (Miley, Blackburn, and Oliver) landed at sea and were recovered by British submarine E11 – despite nearly being attacked by Zeppelin L5.150 The carrier formation, meanwhile, was attacked with bombs from two German seaplanes and Zeppelin L6; actually the first air-naval battle in history, although no damage was inflicted.151 The RNAS seaplanes inflicted only minor damage on some warehouses in the Wilhelmshaven area: in regard to its primary mission, destruction of the Zeppelin sheds, the Cuxhaven raid was therefore not a success, however, significant reconnaissance over the High Sea Fleet base was completed, the mission’s secondary objective, and none of the pilots were lost during the raid.152 The Cuxhaven raid can be said to have foreshadowed combined air and sea operations yet to come. As David Hobbs put it, the raid ‘pointed toward the future of naval warfare’.153 Additional aircraft raids were organized early in 1915, such as Commander Samson’s 11 February bombing operation against Ostend

32  Fleet Naval Aviation and Zeebrugge, launched from Empress, with combined flights from the RNAS stations at Dunkirk, Dover, Eastchurch, and Hendon.154 Empress was later scheduled to attack the East Frisian coast radio station in the spring of 1915, but the operation was scratched due to weather conditions and Samson’s No. 3 Wing was deployed overseas to the Dardanelles shortly thereafter.155 Sueter, who was meanwhile juggling tasks at the Air Department, absorbed the aviation reports streaming back from the Dardanelles.156 Using these experiential reports to inform his departmental policy, he updated the roles of aircraft with the Grand Fleet. Kite-balloons, for example, which had been utilized extensively at the Dardanelles for gunfire spotting, received positive treatment in Sueter’s policy. Likewise, the DAD recommended further development of seaplane carriers and anti-Zeppelin measures: all suggestions that were not lost on the Grand Fleet leadership.157 For its part, the Grand Fleet of 1915 had to rely entirely upon HMS Campania, the repurposed Cunarder pressed into service in the spring of that year, joined only by HMS Engadine which was added to the Battle Cruiser Fleet at the end of October.158 Although additional seaplane carriers joined the fleet in driblets as 1916 progressed, Jellicoe, as Grand Fleet C-in-C, was annoyed by what seemed like glacial movement on the part of the Admiralty and the Air Department. From the perspective of the Air Department, however, 1915 was a period of immense material and organizational strain. The RNAS was not only responsible for the air defence of Britain – a responsibility the Zeppelins were putting to the test – but also at the forefront of ASW, of which the first unrestricted campaign was underway with the declaration of the ‘War Zone’ early in February. Furthermore, the RNAS was engaged developing and operationalizing the methods of gunfire spotting; first on the Belgian coast in 1914 and then at the Dardanelles in 1915 and it is to these developments that we must now turn.

Gunfire Spotting at the Dardanelles and East Africa Reconnaissance, as we have seen, was the original and essential function of military and naval aviation, and this remained true despite the rapid evolution of technology and the introduction of a variety of additional wartime missions.159 One of the first direct applications of military aviation was to act as an indirect observer for artillery, and it was clear that naval gunfire could likewise be directed from the air.160 Gunfire spotting had first been proposed at the prewar incarnation of the Air Committee, under Colonel Seely, and had been discussed at the first meeting on 31  July 1912. Director-General for Military Aeronautics (DGMA), Major-General Sir David Henderson proposed the development of an Army seaplane for coastal spotting purposes, and it was recognized that

Fleet Naval Aviation 33 this development would also be of interest to the Admiralty.161 However, despite the RFC conducting spotting trials,162 the Naval Wing had not advanced beyond gunfire spotting theory before the war and, as a result, RNAS pilots and observers were forced to develop techniques ad hoc during the conflict. The First Battle of Ypres in October 1914 indicated the likelihood that naval gunfire spotting would soon become a reality. During the Royal Marine and RNAS deployments along the Belgian coast, information from Squadron Commander Samson’s reconnaissance around Ostend and Zeebrugge was relayed, by a circuitous route, from the pilots to the Air Department and then through to Churchill, before being transmitted back to Rear Admiral Horace Hood’s naval forces. This was a line of communication that could not possibly offer accurate aerial spotting, although this was in practice what the No. 3 Squadron was attempting to do.163 To support these coastal operations, Churchill dispatched Hermes, reconverted for seaplane use, to the Belgian coast. Unfortunately, the old RNAS parent ship was torpedoed twice by U27 on 31 October off Calais, becoming one of the first Royal Navy warships to be sunk by U-boat.164 Hood was soon transferred to the Dover command and the Royal Navy forces at Antwerp were withdrawn. However, another method of aerial gunfire spotting had been demonstrated: the fixed kite-balloon. Wing Commander Maitland, while in command of a balloon detachment directing monitor fire against German positions between Nieuport and Coxyde in October, had produced some limited results – contingent upon cooperative weather conditions.165 Maitland was then appointed to Roehampton to establish a balloon training school, which was opened in March 1915.166 As we will see with other examples below, it is significant that this school was opened after the beginning of gunfire spotting operations at the Dardanelles. The Belgian coast operations indicated that the RNAS was capable of tactical reconnaissance and that, if the flash-to-bang time between air reports could be reduced, gunfire spotting and correction could become a reality. In two operations during 1915, aerial gunfire spotting indeed became a necessity: at the Dardanelles and against the Konigsberg in East Africa. In both theatres, the RNAS pilots, observers, and their naval gunlayers, due to the lack of prewar Naval Wing experimentation with gunfire spotting, were required to independently invent spotting methods actually during operations. Churchill, and Chief of the Admiralty War Staff Acting Vice Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, planned to utilize aerial gunfire spotting for the Dardanelles bombardment, with HMS Ark Royal providing the necessary seaplane support.167 Ark Royal, captained by Squadron Commander Robert Clark-Hall, an RNAS gunnery expert, departed for the Dardanelles on 1 February 1915 and arrived at Malta, where the

34  Fleet Naval Aviation Dardanelles force was assembling, on the 13th. The next day, ClarkHall met with his staff, including Flight Commander Hugh Williamson, to discuss the plan of operations. Williamson volunteered to act as an observer for gunfire spotting,168 although Sublieutenant W. Park and Lieutenant L. H. Strain were the more experienced W/T observers aboard Ark Royal.169 The seaplane carrier had been supplied with two battery-operated Sterling Telephone Company W/T sets, devices that were, as Layman put, ‘in a virtually experimental stage’.170 Since Ark Royal carried six seaplanes, three Type 807 Sopwiths, two Wights and one Type 135 Short Brothers,171 the W/T sets would have to be laboriously transferred between aircraft for each spotting mission. Ark Royal arrived at Tenedos on 17 February, a mere two days before the start of the bombardment,172 and was immediately ordered to carry out photography and reconnaissance missions – meaning that there was no time to practice gunfire spotting before operations commenced.173 This is significant as on 14 February, five days before the start of operations, Vice Admiral Sackville Carden, then in command of the Dardanelles expedition, had issued a detailed set of orders for his plan of attack, including an elaborate section on aerial gunfire spotting.174 Carden’s orders acknowledged that aircraft could not receive W/T signals from ships and, therefore, all messages sent back to aircraft in flight would have to be sent by spotlight, if at all. Carden’s revised 24 February orders expected that the spotting aircraft would supplement the spotting ships and a destroyer was specifically tasked with relaying the spotting signals to the firing warship.175 Carden’s instructions included a set of W/T procedures that required the spotting Captain (D) of the escorting destroyer to communicate by spotlight with the spotting aircraft; the Dardanelles commander furthermore emphasizing that ‘careful and accurate sending is more important than speed’.176 Carden’s detailed orders, although ingenious, were indicative of the gap between theory and practice: although his code system could, in theory, be used by an airborne spotter to state, for example, a ‘shot falls 40 yards to the right and 300 yards short of the target’ by means of a complex radio-spotlight communication system, actually operationalizing the system would have been a herculean achievement within a month, let alone the mere matter of days that elapsed between their issue and the start of bombardment.177 In addition to the difficulty of operationalizing an entirely new system of aerial gunfire spotting, there were other technical hurdles to overcome: the seaplanes aboard Ark Royal were generally underpowered and had difficulty operating in poor weather or rough sea conditions. The high tempo of operations soon caused attrition, such as on March 5th when Flight Commander Williamson, then acting as an observer, was injured when the propeller of his seaplane broke up in mid-air,178 although Flight Sublieutenant E. H. Dunning had a little more luck that day providing HMS Queen Elizabeth with gunfire spotting support.179

Fleet Naval Aviation 35 On March 9th, Vice Admiral Carden informed the Admiralty that he desperately required more air support.180 Commander Clark-Hall reinforced Carden’s request, submitting a report to the Admiralty pointing to the desirability of improved aircraft, specifically new Short seaplanes.181 On 16 and 17 March, Ark Royal’s aircraft successfully located enemy mines, but failed to do so on 18 March with disastrous consequences: the predreadnoughts Irresistible and Ocean, as well as the French Bouvet, were all sunk when they steamed into a Turkish minefield, and the battlecruiser HMS Inflexible was also damaged.182 As the naval assault continued, and despite the operational and technical hurdles, Ark Royal’s pilots and observers were gaining experience. Flight Sublieutenant Dunning flew a particularly memorable mission on 25 March when he singlehandedly piloted his aircraft and conducted the spotting for HMS Majestic.183 Vice Admiral Carden, however, worn out from the months of intensive planning, was compelled by medical order on 16 March to relinquish command to his second in command, Vice Admiral John de Robeck.184 Samson, meanwhile, had been ordered to the Dardanelles and while his No. 3 Squadron was redeployed, Ark Royal’s sailors were utilized as the work party for the establishment of an RNAS base at Tenedos.185 Ark Royal next deployed a seaplane apiece to the cruisers Doris and Minerva and was then sent to conduct various port strike, spotting and reconnaissance missions in the Gulf of Smyrna and the Gulf of Enos, before returning to Gallipoli to carry out spotting missions for HMS Agamemnon and HMS Lord Nelson between 12 and 15 April. The Turkish battleship Turgut Reis, formerly SMS Weissenburg, was even the target of an unsuccessful bombing mission launched from Ark Royal on the 15th.186 Experiments with kite-balloon spotting continued while the RNAS was being reinforced at the Dardanelles. In February 1915, Flight Commander Mackworth had traveled to France to observe the balloon factory at Chalais-Meudon.187 Upon his return to Britain, Mackworth was appointed to command HMS Manica, a merchant steamer converted to carry Kite Balloon Section No. 1, and departed for the Dardanelles on 27 March.188 The new kite-balloons, equipped with telephone sets, provided a stable platform for gunfire spotting and enabled nearly instantaneous tactical communication between spotter and ship. Upon arrival in theatre the advantages of the kite-balloon ship were demonstrated, such as on 19 April when Manica directed the 6-inch gunfire of HMS Bacchante to good effect against an enemy camp.189 Indeed, it was Manica’s balloon observer who spotted Turgut Reis on 25 April, the day of the main landings, and directed HMS Triumph’s fire, thus forcing the Turkish warship to withdraw.190 The following day Manica was detailed to spot for Queen Elizabeth and did so effectively against the Kojadere magazine. Ark Royal carried out operations in conjunction with Manica on 27 April when the Ark Royal’s seaplanes

36  Fleet Naval Aviation and Manica’s balloons were both utilized to spot for Queen Elizabeth against Turgut Reis, again preventing that warship from intervening.191 Also on the 27th, Manica directed Queen Elizabeth’s fire against the seized English transport Scutari and destroyed it at a range of seven miles, another notable milestone for kite-balloon gunfire spotting. The Turks retaliated by launching air attacks against the Manica, but were unsuccessful in their attempt to bomb that crucial vessel.192 The success of the kite-balloon ship was reported to the Air Department, with the result that several additional balloon ship conversions took place, including HMS Hector, Menelaus, City of Oxford, and Canning. Canning arrived at the Dardanelles in October 1915, in time for the evacuation that December, and was then redeployed to Salonika. Canning conducted operations there until May 1916 when it was sent back to Britain carrying the wreckage of Zeppelin LZ85 for study. Canning later became the balloon depot ship for the Grand Fleet.193 Manica and City of Oxford were eventually converted into seaplane carriers.194 The relative value of gunfire spotting from seaplane or kite-­balloon carriers was, however, on the decline following the arrival at the Dardanelles in May 1915 of Kapitanleutnant Otto Hersing in U21. Hersing proceeded to torpedo the predreadnought HMS Triumph on the 25th, followed by HMS Majestic on the 27th, accelerating the May Crisis and, in the process, forcing Ark Royal to return to Imbros where the carrier henceforth acted as a depot ship, although the seaplanes aboard continued to function in the capacity of reconnaissance, spotting, and A/S patrol.195 In November, Ark Royal was dispatched to Salonika where the carrier remained until March 1916.196 The next phase of seaplane carrier operations in the Mediterranean began with the arrival of HMS Ben-my-Chree at Iero Bay, Lesbos, on 12 June, bringing with it a potential torpedo strike capability in the form of its Short 184 seaplanes,197 that it was hoped might be used to torpedo the Breslau or Goeben if the opportunity arose.198 In late July, Ben-my-Chree was to be found spotting for the monitor HMS Roberts and, on 9 August, for HMS Cornwall at Gallipoli. The notable aerial torpedo attacks took place on 12 and 17 August.199 On the 12th, Flight Commander C. H. K. Edmonds torpedoed a 5,000-ton Turkish steamer that had previously been immobilized off Injeh Burnu by the British submarine E14. Edmonds, in a Short seaplane, dropped his 14-inch torpedo from 15 ft at 300 yards range and scored a direct hit on the damaged steamer. Edmonds repeated this feat on the 17th, badly damaging another Turkish steamer that was running supplies into Ak Bashi Liman, his target being subsequently towed back to Istanbul. 200 That same day, Flight Lieutenant G. B. Dacre, who was taxiing on the water near False Bay with engine trouble, located a Turkish tugboat and torpedoed it before returning to Ben-my-Chree at Xeros Bay.201 Collectively, these actions, although of only minor immediate consequence, heralded aerial torpedo

Fleet Naval Aviation 37 developments yet to come. Edmonds, for his part, was soon transferred back to Britain to work on aerial 18-inch torpedo development. 202 The Dardanelles was not the only theatre for gunfire spotting development during the summer of 1915. A simultaneous gunfire spotting operation was, in fact, taking place in German East Africa (Tanzania), where the German light cruiser Königsberg was blockaded in the Rufiji River delta. Flight Lieutenant J. T. Cull had arrived in theatre on 21 February with two 100-hp Sopwith seaplanes. The Sopwiths, it was discovered, were not robust enough to handle the tropical conditions and were thus supplemented, at the beginning of April, with three Shorts. These latter were used on 25 April to locate Königsberg and, on 18 June, the small RNAS deployment was reinforced by the arrival of Squadron Commander Robert Gordon who brought with him four crated Henri Farman and Caudron airplanes for the aerodrome that had by now been established on Mafia Island. Two monitors, Severn and Mersey, arrived in July and the task force set to work preparing to utilize aerial spotting to target the Königsberg. The practitioners developed their own system in theatre, based on the familiar clock-code system utilized by the RFC. 203 Several hits were made on Königsberg by aerial spotting on 6 July, with Cull and Gordon piloting the spotting missions for a total of 15 hours. The spotters were up again on the 11th, directing accurate salvos that set Königsberg afire, at which point the crew blew up the ship with their last torpedo. 204 The RNAS gunfire spotting experience at the Dardanelles and in East Africa strikingly demonstrated the capabilities of the naval aviation practitioners to innovate under the pressure of events. The doctrinal payoff was that the hard-won experience at the Dardanelles was eventually included in a report compiled for Vice Admiral Reginald Bacon, C-in-C Dover, who, in April 1915, independently held gunfire spotting trials with seaplanes from HMS Riviera spotting for the old battleship HMS Revenge.205 Commander E. Altham’s report on the Revenge trials, combined with the gunfire spotting experience gained at the Dardanelles, led to the establishment of a special fire control school at NAS Calshot that opened on 21 June.206 It can be seen then that the RNAS was, in fact, developing gunfire spotting techniques during three simultaneous, but geographically distinct, operations. The successes and failures of these developments attest not only to the doctrinal limitations of the prewar Naval Wing, but also to the pioneering spirit of innovation, what today might be described as a ‘can-do’ attitude, that permeated the RNAS.

Jutland and the 1916 Administrative Reforms The administrative upheaval at Whitehall resulting from the May Crisis, meanwhile, presented the Royal Navy with an opportunity to press for improvements in fleet aviation, and there was hope that the new

38  Fleet Naval Aviation Balfour-Jackson administration could be convinced to direct additional resources towards the Air Department. Balfour, as we have seen, supported the renewal of airship development, and DAS Vaughan-Lee, Sueter’s replacement as of September 1915, was committed to expanding Britain’s coastal air bases. Ironically, however, despite the supposedly ‘naval’ agenda of the new administration, the year 1916 would see little concrete improvement for the fleet’s naval aviation. Balfour and Vaughan-Lee had other aerial priorities, including the development of long-range bombing (see Chapter 3) and anti-Zeppelin coastal defence (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, Grand Fleet C-in-C Jellicoe had high expectations that his frequent requests for additional naval aviation resources would at last be met. In 1915 he attempted to unite his expectations for fleet air support with a general reappraisal of RNAS policy: the fleet required not only scouting and anti-Zeppelin air support, as Jellicoe confirmed in an air policy appreciation produced on June 4th, but Britain more generally had to rely on the RNAS to provide coastal observation, air defence, and A/S scouting. 207 In July, Jellicoe modified the Grand Fleet Battle Orders (GFBO) to include aerial reconnaissance, air defence, A/S, and counter-mine patrols, as essential duties of fleet aviation.208 Jellicoe also required a reliable means of countering Germany’s Zeppelin threat, 209 and the C-in-C remained apprehensive about the High Sea Fleet’s advantage in this regard, as he had nothing more than light cruisers and HMS Campania for his own scouting purposes.210 Throughout 1915, Jellicoe had worried that the enemy’s Zeppelins, by providing stable gunfire spotting and W/T communications to the High Sea Fleet, would give Germany a decisive advantage ‘equal to at least two light cruisers’ in any future naval encounter. 211 Furthermore, by July, he had become skeptical that seaplanes deployed from Campania would be useful in combat, but, nevertheless, he defended Campania’s utility when there was talk of scrapping the ship in October. 212 Fundamentally, the Grand Fleet needed improved aircraft carriers. Slow, experimental, progress was being made and Campania’s seaplanes were now equipped with disposable wheels, enabling them to launch as the carrier steamed into the wind.213 Furthermore a Sopwith Schneider Cup seaplane, thus fitted, was successfully launched from Campania’s flying-off deck while underway on 6 August 1915. 214 Jellicoe, in recognition of the experience gained at the Dardanelles, additionaly approved equipping Campania to carry kite-balloons.215 Campania was thus taken in to dry-dock at Liverpool in November, for a series of modifications including the extension of the flying-off deck and the fitting of balloon facilities, but the extensive nature of the modifications and repair work to Campania’s aged machinery meant that the Grand Fleet’s only carrier did not return to the fleet until 12 April 1916.216 HMS Engadine, likewise, had a balloon fitted and successfully tested

Fleet Naval Aviation 39 in North Sea conditions during the summer of 1915.217 As an aside, balloons continued to be fitted to the fleet’s warships and, by May 1917, balloon winches had been installed aboard nine battleships, two battlecruisers, the cruisers Glorious and Courageous, four light cruisers, and three destroyers: a rolling process that continued until the end of the war.218 As 1916 dawned, with Campania laid up in yard, the Grand Fleet was entirely lacking in dedicated air support. The only ships available at the beginning of the year were the 11 Isle of Man Steam Packet Company ferries, requisitioned during the first year of the war, some of which had been converted to seaplane carriers for use with the Harwich Force, as we have seen. One of these conversions, HMS Vindex, had been purchased on 15 March 1915 by the Churchill-Fisher administration for conversion and was ready for action by August of that year. Vindex, like Campania, Engadine, and Manxman, was fast enough to keep up with Grand Fleet’s battleships and could stay close to the BCF. Vindex, converted by Cunard and featuring a 64-foot flying-off deck – a design that was repeated for several of the converted seaplane carriers including Manxman, Nairana and Pegasus – could carry up to nine aircraft and was attached to the Nore command.219 On 30 August, DAD Sueter, in one of his last actions as the holder of that office, ordered trials from Vindex’s flying-off platform and these were carried out between 27 September and 7 October. The culmination of this effort occurred on November 3rd, when Flight Commander B. F. Fowler successfully launched from Vindex’s deck in a Bristol Scout.220 Vindex was then transferred to the Harwich Force. 221 These seaplane carrier conversions were suitable for operations with the coastal forces but what was vitally needed, beyond improvements to the existing converted carriers, were dedicated platforms capable of launching and recovering not only seaplanes but also high performance anti-Zeppelin airplanes. On 8 May 1916, towards this end, Jellicoe submitted to the Admiralty a design proposed by Captain Oliver Schwann, of the newly refurbished Campania, for a 27-knot seaplane carrier that featured both flying-off and flying-on platforms. Predictably, the Admiralty poured cold water on this proposal, pointing out that wartime prioritization did not allow for such immediate construction. The Admiralty, rather than building an entirely new ship, began to consider the potential conversion of the three ships of the very fast, but lightly armoured, Courageous class for airplane work. 222 The Harwich Force seaplane carriers, meanwhile, continued their raids against Germany’s Zeppelin bases. A series of raids planned for January and February 1916 were cancelled as a result of aircraft failures and poor weather, but Balfour planned to resume operations in the spring, believing that air strikes against the Zeppelin bases might entice the High Sea Fleet to sortie.223 The Houttave aerodrome was attacked on 20 March with a mix of 47 machines including 19 French

40  Fleet Naval Aviation and 16 Belgian aircraft, while Vindex and Riviera attacked Zeebrugge as a diversion.224 Commodore Tyrwhitt attempted to conduct air raids against the Zeppelin sheds at Hage and Hoyer on 25 and 26 March without success, 225 but on the 26th, a seaplane raid was conducted against Sylt, during which it was discovered that, in fact, there were no Zeppelin sheds at Houttave, as Flight Lieutenant L. P. Openshaw overflew Tondern and located the sheds there. 226 The seaplane carriers Vindex and Engadine carried out raids on 4 May, this time correctly targeting the sheds at Tondern, but of the 11 available machines, only three made it to the target, ultimately to no effect.227 A chance encounter during this operation interestingly did demonstrate that Zeppelins were not invulnerable to surface vessels: the light cruisers Galatea and Phaeton managed to destroy Zeppelin L7. 228 This raid program came to an end with Admiral Scheer’s sortie on 31 May. The Grand Fleet’s subsequent encounter with the High Sea Fleet startlingly demonstrated how much developmental work remained to be done in terms of RNAS integration with the fleet. Jellicoe’s orders to Campania, issued on 15 May, emphasized ‘short-range reconnaissance and observation of enemy movements, with spotting as a secondary function’. 229 Campania’s aircraft had, in fact, successfully completed gunfire spotting practice during 29 and 30 May, prior to receiving Jellicoe’s notice to sail. Campania, equipped with ten seaplanes (seven Sopwith single-seaters, three Short two-seaters) and a Caquot fixed balloon, received the C-in-C’s orders to prepare to sortie at 5:35 pm on 30 May. 230 On this occasion, traffic delays meant that Captain Schwann did not make it to sea until after midnight. 231 Sailing without a destroyer escort, in U-boat populated waters, was a nonstarter for Jellicoe and thus the C-in-C ordered Campania back to Scapa at 4:37 am.232 This was a significant command decision, as H. A. Jones observed, since Campania’s seaplanes might well have provided Jellicoe with the reconnaissance of the High Sea Fleet’s deployment that he needed to determine his own dispositions. 233 Captain Schwann also missed Admiral Scheer’s August sortie, as Campania had been disabled by machinery trouble. 234 This short cruiser battle, in which Scheer demonstrated his ability to integrate the High Sea Fleet with both U-boat flotillas and a force of eight Zeppelins, was a missed opportunity for the Grand Fleet. 235 Jutland, so far as the RNAS was concerned, was not a complete loss, however, as HMS Engadine, under the command of Lt. Commander C. G. Robinson, did sortie from Rosyth at 10 pm on 30 May, along with the rest of the BCF, and that seaplane carrier indeed played a small but historic role in the battle. 236 Between 2:40 and 2:45 pm on 31 May, Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, commanding the BCF aboard HMS Lion, ordered Engadine to perform seaplane reconnaissance to the north-east of his battlecruisers. 237 What turned out to be Engadine’s singular sortie at Jutland was flown by Flight Lieutenant F. J. Rutland and Assistant

Fleet Naval Aviation 41 Paymaster G. S. Trewin, who utilized their Short 184’s 60-mile-range Rouzet W/T set to transmit contact reports back to Engadine. These contact reports described elements of the High Sea Fleet’s Second Scouting Group and were received by Lt. Commander Robinson, but they were not successfully relayed, by signal lamp, to Beatty. 238 This was of no major consequence, however, as HMS Galatea had independently located the Second Scouting Group and had been reporting its movements since 2:20 pm.239 Nevertheless, Rutland and Trewin had indeed observed elements of the High Sea Fleet’s cruiser screen and reported as much between 3:30 and 3:48 pm. 240 A critical petrol pipe broke as the last report was being made and Rutland was forced to turn back for Engadine. 241 Rutland and Trewin landed safely and, although the defect was quickly repaired, were hoisted back aboard their carrier shortly after 4 pm. 242 The Harwich Force had meanwhile sortied at 5:15 pm, but Commodore Tyrwhitt was ordered back to harbour by the Admiralty. 243 On 1 June, at approximately 3:20 am, the Admiralty at last ordered Tyrwhitt to sea and the Harwich Force slipped its moorings thirty minutes later but, by this time, any chance of intercepting the High Sea Fleet had been lost. 244 At any rate, Vindex had been in for repairs since May 24th and thus could not have taken part in the battle.245 Several of Tyrwhitt’s light cruisers had been fitted with forecastle ramps for launching Sopwith Schneider seaplanes during 1915, but the Schneiders had all been dismantled by 1916 and the ramps were never used. 246 Vindex was back in operation on 17 June and, during a sortie on 2 August, launched Flight Lieutenant C. T. Freeman in a Bristol Scout to attack Zeppelin L17 with explosive Ranken darts – without success. 247 Vindex did sail with the Harwich Force during Scheer’s 18 August sortie, but saw no action. Engadine did no better on that occasion: although Flight Commander Rutland was deployed to attack a nearby Zeppelin, he was unable to ascend from a choppy sea. 248 Scheer’s August sortie, like the Battle of Jutland, reinforced in Jellicoe’s mind the conclusion that the RNAS was at best an uncertain auxiliary when it came to fleet operations. The fleet urgently required more reliable air support. In July, DAS Vaughan-Lee appointed a committee chaired by SAC Sueter, and including veteran RNAS officers – Commander Robert Clark-Hall, the former CO of Ark Royal, and Commander Hugh Williamson, Dardanelles veteran and now a staff officer at the Air Department, amongst others – to investigate aircraft carrier requirements. 249 This expert committee essentially raised the profile of Jellicoe’s requirements by endorsing the development of newly converted carriers capable of at least 20 knots. 250 On 12 October, Jellicoe pressed his case with Rear Admiral F. C. T. Tudor, the Third Sea Lord, who was responsible for naval material and new construction. Tudor could not promise Jellicoe much, a response that was indicative of the transitional nature

42  Fleet Naval Aviation of fleet aviation during 1916. Tudor pointed to the ongoing conversion of the liner Conte Rosso, the future HMS Argus, and emphasized that progress was being made with the development of flying boats, which Tudor hoped ultimately ‘would replace seaplanes and carriers’. 251 Jellicoe was critical of this plan, stressing that only carriers could provide the fleet with the organic aviation capability it required. The Grand Fleet C-in-C had as evidence the difficulty Tyrwhitt’s pilots were experiencing in their attempts to fly reconnaissance for a planned torpedo boat raid against the Schillig Roads. 252 As 1916 came to a close, a dramatic improvement in the Grand Fleet’s naval aviation was about to take place. The new War Cabinet, formed under Prime Minister David Lloyd George in December, heralded Jellicoe’s promotion out of the Grand Fleet, with Beatty succeeding him as C-in-C, and back to the Admiralty now as First Sea Lord. Jellicoe and Beatty were at last positioned to set their own priorities, in particular toward combating the spiraling U-boat crisis, with the development of the fleet’s aviation taking on new importance. 253

The Mediterranean and the East Indies and Egypt Seaplane Squadron Before returning to the North Sea, and the developments that took place there early in 1917, it is important to recognize the operational history of the unique, albeit transitional, East Indies & Egypt Seaplane Squadron (EIESS) that emerged out of the RNAS commitment to the Dardanelles campaign. This Eastern Mediterranean seaplane carrier group proved, in miniature, many of the naval aviation concepts later replicated with the Grand Fleet by the Flying Squadron. Wing Captain Samson played an important role, developing and commanding this prototypical carrier group. Samson’s No. 3 Squadron, as we have seen, had originally been dispatched to the Dardanelles on 26 February 1915, prior to Vice Admiral Carden’s March 8th request for additional air support. 254 Samson, along with his newly purchased French aircraft, arrived at the island of Imbros on 23 March before rebasing to Tenedos. 255 Between 28 March and 9 November, Samson’s pilots flew 394 gunfire-spotting missions, each flight averaging at least two hours.256 The Dardanelles campaign nevertheless ended on a low note for the RNAS. The naval aviation practitioners in theatre had certainly demonstrated their ability to innovate and had significantly advanced their capacity for gunfire spotting, photo-reconnaissance and close air support; however, the original mission of forcing the straits had not been achieved and the RFC had, in fact, assumed operational responsibility for the aerial aspects of the campaign. On 25 May, the day Balfour assumed the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, he determined, with

Fleet Naval Aviation 43 Sueter’s support, to dispatch Wing Commander Frederick Sykes (simultaneously Colonel Sykes, RFC, Colonel Commandant, Royal Marines, and now Wing Captain, RNAS) with orders to report on the situation at the Dardanelles, wither Sykes arrived on 24 June. 257 Sykes, in his capacity as a combined arms commander, administered all requests for air support and was responsible for, amongst other recommendations, 258 rationalizing the RNAS squadrons by upgrading them to wings. 259 Samson, for his part, was displeased with being railroaded by the Admiralty and the Air Department (amongst Sykes’ unpopular suggestions were rebasing No. 3 Wing at Imbros and purchasing Army-type aircraft), but was soon released from this embarrassing situation by Lord Kitchener’s decision, based on the War Committee’s recommendation of 23 November, to withdraw the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force from the Gallipoli Peninsula. 260 Samson, who was suffering from jaundice, was invalided back to Britain as the campaign wrapped up, bound for London on 29 January 1916, and followed by Sykes who departed not long afterwards. 261 Sykes’ replacement in theatre was the former head of the Naval Wing’s Central Air Office (CAO), Sheerness, Wing Captain F. R. Scarlett. Vice Admiral de Robeck’s post-evacuation naval establishment included two seaplane and two kite-balloon carriers, in addition to the Imbros-based No. 2 Wing under Wing Commander Eugene Gerrard, plus an airship base at Mudros. 262 Scarlett recommended replacing the kite-balloon ships with seaplane carriers, to be collectively placed under de Robeck’s command. 263 The C-in-C Eastern Mediterranean, however, preferred that the seaplane carrier force, now comprised of Ben-my-Chree, Empress (soon redeployed to the Bulgarian coast), 264 and two converted German freighters, Raven II and Anne, should be retained by the C-in-C East Indies for operations along the Egyptian coast. 265 Ben-my-Chree, the squadron flagship, was the 24-knot 1908 Vickers Sons and Maxim (Barrow)-built Isle of Man Steam Packet Company flagship, that had been taken up for conversion on 1 January 1915, and, as we have seen, sent to the Dardanelles that June. 266 On 7 January 1916, Ben-my-Chree was transferred to Port Said in the Eastern Mediterranean to act as the foundation for the EIESS. The squadron’s inaugural CO was 24-year-old Squadron Commander Cecil L’Estrange Malone, with Lt.  Erskine Childers as his intelligence officer. 267 Wing Commander Samson arrived on 14 May to take charge of the EIESS, with Flight Lieutenant T. H. England as his Senior Flying Officer (SFO), 268 and L’Estrange Malone took command of Raven II as Samson’s XO. 269 Since the beginning of 1916, the C-in-C East Indies was Rear Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, later Deputy First Sea Lord and then Jellicoe’s replacement as First Sea Lord in 1918. 270 Wemyss’ priority during 1916, however, was to work with the various eastern naval commands, including the Colombo, Cape, East African, and China groups, to address

44  Fleet Naval Aviation concerns regarding German merchant raiders, notably Captain Nerger in the Wolf who had orders for the Indian Ocean, while simultaneously supporting the ongoing operations in the Red Sea, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. 271 Toward the latter goal, the monitors M15, M23, and the gunboat HMS Espiegle, had been added to the EIESS so as to create a mobile bombardment force and, supported by an A/S escort in the form of French destroyers and trawlers, on 18 May the group deployed along the Egyptian coast as part of a combined arms mission to use aerial gunfire spotting in conjunction with monitor bombardment to attack the El Arish forts and airfield. 272 Wemyss soon dispatched the EIESS to the Red Sea, intending to use the squadron’s unique reconnaissance and gunfire spotting capabilities to keep watch on the Gulf of Aden. 273 Samson, as was to be expected given his penchant for the offensive, proceeded to conduct strike missions against Aden with his five seaplanes, dropping almost 1,000 lbs of ordnance in less than a week. 274 After attacking Turkish forces at Jeddah, Ben-my-Chree returned through Suez, arriving back at Port Said on 22 June. 275 Ben-my-Chree next ran A/S patrols around Suez, conducting 27 flights over ten days, during which the squadron destroyed three contraband runners, schooners in this case, by naval gunfire combined with seaplane bombing (Very lights and petrol bombs were used to direct spotting), a not-insignificant application of naval aviation against enemy merchant shipping. 276 The squadron continued to attack at will along the coast, carrying out bombing missions from Port Said to Cyprus by way of Palestine and Lebanon. As was the rule in Samson’s command, improvisation overcame many hurdles. Samson’s overconfidence in his own abilities, however, produced his most significant error of the war when Ben-my-Chree was caught unaware and destroyed by coastal gunfire near Castelorizo on 7 January 1917. The converted seaplane carrier was pummeled by enemy artillery until a shell penetrated the petrol store and burst, setting afire the aft section of the ship. 277 Samson was recalled to Britain to command NAS Great Yarmouth, with Wing Commander C. E. Risk succeeding him, and the seaplane carrier work continued in theatre. HMS Empress was sent to replace Samson’s flagship and, on 12 May, the EIESS sortied from Port Said and successfully bombed Beirut’s harbour, but Risk was frustrated in the effort to locate U-boats there. 278 In August, the 7,500ton HMS City of Oxford was dispatched as a replacement for Anne and Raven II, which were both converted back to merchant ships, 279 and, in October and November, City of Oxford worked in conjunction with the monitor HMS Raglan to attack the Deir Sineid, Gaza, railway station and bridge with notable success. 280 The final action of significance for the EIESS was the bombing of the Midilli (Breslau) and Yavuz (Goeben) when those warships sortied from the Dardanelles on 19 January 1918. 281 The two Turkish warships, after

Fleet Naval Aviation 45 sinking the monitors Raglan and M28, were hounded by RNAS and RFC aircraft. Breslau received a direct bomb hit and, during its escape, drove into a minefield where both ships struck a series of mines, fatally damaging the light cruiser such that it sank near Rabbit Island.282 Yavuz, retreating to the Dardanelles, became grounded at Nagara Point and was bombed over several days by seaplanes from Ark Royal and Empress. 270 sorties and 15 tons of 65-lb and 112-lb bombs were dropped, scoring at least two hits, and the carrier Manxman presently arrived carrying torpedo seaplanes to finish the job. On the 26th, however, before the torpedo-equipped seaplanes were ready for action, Yavuz was refloated and escaped into the Sea of Marmara. 283 Despite these successes, in particular the numerous gunfire spotting missions flown against shore-targets in confined waters, it was believed that the Mediterranean experience was not necessarily applicable in the more strenuous North Sea conditions.284 The operations of the EIESS nevertheless demonstrated the potential for seaplane carriers to operate together, not just as anti-Zeppelin raiders as was the case with the Harwich Force, but as a dedicated strike force.

The Grand Fleet Air Committee To return now to the North Sea, where the naval war in 1917 was swinging dramatically against the Allies. Jellicoe, as we have seen, had been promoted to First Sea Lord in David Lloyd George’s December 1916 War Cabinet. The beginning of the third phase of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917 now forced the Admiralty to prioritize the development of A/S measures of which non-rigid airships, coastal airplanes, and flying boats proved an integral component (see Chapter 2). Admiral Sir David Beatty, Jellicoe’s successor as Grand Fleet C-in-C, meanwhile, needed to know how the fleet’s naval aviation could be improved over the coming months. Beatty, as Arthur Marder put it, was eager to provide ‘a definite role to his aircraft in a fleet action’. 285 Toward this end, Beatty revised the Grand Fleet Battle Orders (GFBO) for 5 January 1917, the first issued under his authority as C-in-C. As little more than a month had elapsed since his promotion, Beatty’s first GFBOs essentially preserved Jellicoe’s system in style and substance, providing only the briefest explanation of the role of seaplane carriers with the fleet, namely, to fly kite-balloons and provide reconnaissance.286 At the end of January, Beatty added a dedicated section on airships, to be provided to the fleet by the SNOs at Kirkwall, Longside, and East Fortune, with roles including ASW and reconnaissance as far as 30 miles in advance of the Grand Fleet’s light cruiser screen. 287 At the beginning of the year, the entire Grand Fleet and BCF possessed only 24 aircraft: 12 reconnaissance seaplanes and 12 anti-Zeppelin fighters carried aboard Campania, Engadine and Manxman, the latter

46  Fleet Naval Aviation another Isle of Man packet steamer purchased in April 1916 and commissioned with the BCF that December, plus the three airship bases dedicated for fleet use.288 Although Beatty could count on a significant increase in the size of the RNAS during 1917, the effort was almost entirely directed toward ASW: it was estimated that another 800 A/S aircraft plus 200 flying boats would be needed that year.289 As such, Beatty could expect only two additional seaplane carriers then undergoing conversion, HMS Nairana and HMS Pegasus, but not until the summer of 1917.290 It was in this environment of uncertainty that Beatty, on 26 January, convened the watershed Grand Fleet Air Committee (GFAC) under the chairmanship of Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, CO 5th Battle Squadron, with the objective of determining the fleet’s future air requirements. 291 The GFAC convened quickly and presented its report on 5 February. Two days later, Beatty forwarded the report to the Admiralty, where it was received by Fifth Sea Lord Godfrey Paine, DAS VaughanLee’s replacement, and then circulated during the first week of March. 292 The GFAC owed a considerable debt to Jellicoe and Vaughan-Lee, whose recommendations from June 1915 and March 1916, respectively, Evan-Thomas essentially replicated. 293 The GFAC report included realistic statistics supplied by Captain Schwann of Campania, indicating that of the 26 aircraft carried aboard the Grand Fleet’s carriers, two in five should expect operational failures when deployed. Significantly, the report also abandoned efforts to develop gunfire spotting, deemed impractical in the rough North Sea weather conditions and unlikely in the midst of the chaos of battle. The report concluded that the essential functions of the RNAS with the fleet were primarily reconnaissance and air defence, expressed in terms of anti-Zeppelin capability, 294 and recommended equipping the fleet’s carriers with the latest aircraft (Sopwith Baby seaplanes and Sopwith Pup airplanes) to fulfill these roles. 295 Seaplanes were to be specialized as reconnaissance machines exclusively, and airplanes likewise to be specialized as fighters for anti-Zeppelin work.296 It is interesting to note that the GFAC expected as many as six Zeppelins to operate with the enemy fleet in a future engagement, recognition of the situation that, due to weather, had been only narrowly avoided at Jutland. 297 Beatty’s objective in convening the GFAC was essentially to construct a consensus, 298 and his report cover letter expressed complete agreement with the GFAC’s findings, with minor caveats regarding the removal of HMS Furious’ 18-inch guns and the use of light cruisers as seaplane carriers – if it meant reducing their armaments.299 The report’s statement that ‘…the Air Service so far as it is connected with the Grand Fleet suffers under grave disabilities owing to entire lack of efficient carriers’, provided Beatty with the ammunition he needed to press for carrier expansion.300 The GFAC report thus acted as the catalyst for expanding the fleet’s naval aviation, starting with the conversion of Furious.301 This

Fleet Naval Aviation 47 project had, in fact, been considered by Third Sea Lord Rear Admiral Tudor, and DAS Vaughan-Lee, in May 1916, and once again DNC D’Eyncourt was called upon to consider how to modify Furious and possibly also its sister ships, Glorious and Courageous (the conversions were ultimately completed during the interwar period).302 Furious, at the time of the GFAC recommendations in early February, was still under construction at the Armstrong Whitworth yard at Elswick. Furious was an ideal platform for conversion: at 30 knots, and about 19,000 tons, it was both fast enough to keep up with the battlecruisers and large enough to carry a substantial air wing. The Admiralty finally decided that Furious should be fitted with a launch platform and hanger forward, a project that was estimated to take about 14 weeks if work began in March, meaning that it would not be ready for service until the end of May.303 Instead of the forward 18-inch gun, the forecastle was now converted into a 228-ft flying-off deck.304 Furious was added to the Grand Fleet on 26 June, under the command of Captain Wilmot Nicolson, with Squadron Commander E. H. Dunning as SFO. Furious was at this time equipped to carry three Short 184s and five Sopwith Pups. Tragically, the pioneering Dunning was killed on 7 August while landing on Furious’ foredeck, after having made two successful landing attempts the previous days. This disaster led to a suspension of landing attempts and the decision to remove Furious’ stern gun so that a dedicated landing deck could be installed.305 Furious returned to the dockyard for these additional modifications on 14 November. Another significant outcome of the GFAC report was the recommendation that fighter aircraft be adapted for service aboard the fleet’s light cruisers. This was a popular proposal that enjoyed the support of the Admiralty, including the Air Department, and was notably endorsed by the naval Controller, Sir Eric Geddes. Geddes replaced Sir Edward Carson as First Lord of the Admiralty on 20 July 1917, 306 and, pursuant to the development of naval aviation, convened an Operations Committee on aircraft that included amongst its members, Jellicoe, Wemyss (Jellicoe’s deputy), the Director of the Anti-Submarine Department (ASD) Captain William Fisher, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (DCNS) Vice Admiral Oliver and, significantly, Fifth Sea Lord Commodore Paine. This Operations Committee, for its part, essentially pursued Captain Arthur Vyvyan’s August recommendations (see below) and, in October, agreed with what the GFAC had already recommended; that fighting aircraft should be added to all of the fleet’s cruisers and battlecruisers.307 On 23 August, Jellicoe himself produced a memorandum that endorsed the GFAC report and the Operations Committee’s recommendations, collectively a milestone in terms of the development of aviation for the fleet. Jellicoe’s memorandum called for: (1) airships as fleet scouts – he still believed that they would be as useful as new light cruisers; (2) kite-balloons and nonrigid airships for gunfire spotting, tactical

48  Fleet Naval Aviation reconnaissance and ASW in terms of coastal patrol flotillas and convoys; (3) seaplanes capable of roles such as fighting, spotting, and reconnaissance; and (4) aircraft to fulfill all other roles such as intercepting the enemy’s aircraft or conducting aerial torpedo attacks.308 The naval aviation needs of the Grand Fleet had at last been fully articulated and endorsed by senior Admiralty committees and the First Sea Lord. ASW, however, was still Jellicoe’s primary concern, but it was at last certain what direction the Grand Fleet would take towards developing its aviation capability. Captain Vyvyan, at this time the Assistant Director Air Services (ADAS), now augmented Jellicoe’s recommendations in a paper he submitted to the Fifth Sea Lord on 30 August. Vyvyan’s appreciation of the air situation, combined with Jellicoe’s letter, provided a one-two punch that functioned as a wake-up call in terms of advancing the development of the fleet’s airpower. Vyvyan argued that only the light cruisers, plus Furious, were fast enough to work with the fleet and thus all previously converted seaplane carriers were insufficient. Vyvyan’s appreciation was certainly true enough in terms of keeping up with the battlecruisers, but not entirely accurate in so far as operations with the fleet were concerned: even the slower carriers could provide a useful function as seaplane tenders and recovery vessels and indeed the ADAS now proposed exactly this role for Engadine, Empress, Riviera and Argus, when finished. For work with the fleet, Captain Vyvyan advocated three classes of aircraft: reconnaissance machines, fighters and a torpedo/bomber, for which he believed the optimum platform would be more fast Cavendishtype carrier conversions (HMS Cavendish became HMS Vindictive following the Zeebrugge raid).309 In terms of aircraft tactics, Vyvyan’s program formed the basis for what would become the Grand Fleet Air Orders (GFAO) later in 1918. Essentially, Vyvyan imagined a wave of reconnaissance machines flying ahead of the fleet that, upon encountering the enemy’s aircraft, or Zeppelins, would communicate back to the fleet by W/T, prompting the fleet to launch its fighters. The reconnaissance machines would then patrol for enemy submarines, although Vyvyan recognized that their W/T function would be almost totally negated by the general W/T battle traffic produced at this point. Argus would deploy its torpedo-bombers, which would then proceed to conduct a spoiling attack as a prelude to the general fleet battle.310 To summarize Vyvyan’s proposal: Furious, Cavendish, and the forthcoming Hermes, 311 would provide the principal reconnaissance and anti-Zeppelin platforms.312 Fighters would be dispersed on a variety of light cruisers including Glorious and Courageous, and Campania would be converted to a training ship.313 The cruisers’ various fighter aircraft would attack enemy aircraft, while Argus, positioned with the battleships, would launch its strike component of up to two-dozen torpedo bombers and then act as a recovery and refuelling

Fleet Naval Aviation 49 platform.314 The RNAS now had a definitive role with the fleet, as a core element of future battle tactics.315 With the functions and tactical roles of the fleet’s aircraft now established, it was apparent that the final major technical hurdle was the development of a routine take-off and landing capability. At a meeting held in August between Admiral Beatty and Rear Admiral Lionel Halsey, F. C. T. Tudor’s replacement as Third Sea Lord, it was agreed that in addition to Courageous and Glorious being fitted with flying-off decks, at least one cruiser from each of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th light cruiser squadrons should likewise be fitted.316 Wing Captain R. M. Groves, Assistant Secretary of the Air Board under Lord Cowdray, and Rear Admiral Richard F. Phillimore, then at Rosyth aboard his flagship HMS Repulse, were meanwhile working towards operationalizing the integration of aircraft with the fleet’s cruisers. Their first mission was to fit the cruiser Yarmouth with a small forward flight deck. It was from this ship that Flight Sublieutenant B. A. Smart successfully took off and destroyed Zeppelin L23 on the morning of 21 August 1917 (see Chapter 4).317 Soon specially designed rotary launchers were built, enabling aircraft-equipped warships to launch their planes directly into the wind, regardless of the direction the ship was steaming. Captain Dumaresq, RN, developed the rotating platform and trials were conducted aboard HMAS Sydney starting in December 1917.318 By the armistice ultimately all of the fleet’s light cruisers, as well as all of the capital ships in the Grand Fleet, were outfitted with launching platforms.319 To borrow Eric Grove’s phrase, when the war ended, ‘the Grand Fleet was awash with aircraft’.320 At that time, the carriers of the Flying Squadron (see below) provided up to 65 aircraft, additionally turret-launching platforms for two aircraft each had been fitted to 29 battleships and seven battlecruisers, with another 28 cruisers and light cruisers fitted with single-revolving or fixed-­launching platforms to equip Sopwith Camels, Pups and Beardmore WB3s for a total potential of 165 air and seaplanes carried organically by the fleet (a number only slightly reduced by the accidental sinking of Campania on 5 November 1918).321 Furthermore, mass-produced lighters, designed to be towed behind destroyers, were available and had been demonstrated launching Sopwith Pups and Felixstowe flying boats, thus augmenting an extensive flying establishment of coastal airbases – although after April 1918, controlled, of course, by the RAF under the auspices of the Air Ministry. To return to the summer of 1917: although Furious had been added to the fleet, the question of purpose-built aircraft carriers remained. Third Sea Lord Halsey, for his part, supported the development of additional fleet carriers but, due to the U-boat crisis prioritizing the construction and repair of merchant ships, the two planned large carriers that were on order continued to languish on the stocks as incomplete hulls.322 The first of these new carriers was the future HMS Argus, hull No. 519,

50  Fleet Naval Aviation having been ordered from the Beardmore works as a planned conversion of the Conte Rosso, an Italian liner capable of 19 and a half knots. The novel nature of the conversion and design of Argus was itself complex, adding to the incessant delays. Lt. Commander Williamson had been a proponent of the flush deck design, with the funnels and superstructure located to the starboard.323 Williamson’s revised 1915 proposal was, in fact, approved by Sueter, who sent Williamson to DNC D’Eyncourt, who, in turn, put Williamson in contact with assistant director J. H. Narbeth.324 Commander Gerard R. A. Holmes, formerly the constructor of Campania, produced a competing design.325 Back in October 1916, Third Sea Lord Tudor believed that Argus would be completed in October 1917, when, in fact, the design had yet to be finalized by August of that year.326 When finally commissioned, on 14 September 1918, under the command of Captain H. H. Smith, this 14,500-ton flush deck carrier was capable of carrying 20 machines in its 350-ft by 68-ft hanger.327 Argus was to prove a critical missing link in the Grand Fleet’s emerging naval aviation system, as it was the only carrier capable of safely recovering airplanes which, otherwise, had to ditch in the uncertain North Sea, with pilots hoping to be recovered by an escorting destroyer or friendly seaplane carrier. Argus, operating the Sopwith T1 torpedo bomber, would also be capable of conducting torpedo strikes, adding a powerful air offensive component to the Grand Fleet. One of the many technical hurdles to overcome was the development of a suitable arresting system, for which purpose some small funds had been appropriated by the Admiralty seaplane subcommittee as early as the summer of 1915. Tests were carried out on the Isle of Grain during 1916 with the result that a wire-arrester system was successfully installed aboard Furious in 1917.328 An important associated development was the introduction of a compressed air catapult for take-off, of which hydraulic and electric variants were also trialed.329 A Committee on Deck Landing was also created at the Air Department on 22 November 1917, and its preliminary report was circulated on 17 December.330 This committee was composed of veteran airmen and Air Department practioners, including Captain Vyvyan, Wing Commander Longmore, Wing Commander Courtney, Squadron Commander Busteed and Squadron Commander Rutland, plus Flight Commander Penney and Commander Holmes. The newly appointed Admiral Commanding Aircraft (ACA) Rear Admiral Phillimore, still aboard HMS Repulse at this time, was also involved. The Committee’s experimental work had also been carried out at the Isle of Grain depot, with the result that navalized Sopwith Camels and Pups were in development and fitted with the appropriate skids, release gear, and flotation devices.331 It was planned to place seven airplanes aboard Campania, 14 in Furious (by the end of February 1918), 20 in Argus, when that ship at last entered service, with another six in

Fleet Naval Aviation 51 Cavendish, then under conversion and slated for completion in May of 1918, although, like Argus, not actually operational until October.332 On 26 December 1917, Jellicoe, who had done so much to advance fleet aviation during 1917, was replaced by his deputy, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss. First Sea Lord Wemyss proceeded to produce a memorandum, dated 16 January 1918, that was demonstrative of the Geddes-Wemyss administration’s intention to follow through with previous recommendations, notably those made by Captain Vyvyan with the endorsement of Fifth Sea Lord Paine, as well as both Beatty and Jellicoe. The Operations Committee now concluded that fighters should be carried aboard all fighting ships and that the seaplane carriers Pegasus and Nairana should also be modified to carry fighters. The proposal recommended converting Campania into a training ship, as well as the prospective conversion of the former Chilean battleship Almirante Cochrane into the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle.333 This meant that there were four large carriers under construction or conversion at the beginning of 1918: Eagle, Hermes, Argus, and Vindictive (Cavendish). Once these joined HMS Furious, they would collectively comprise the most powerful and versatile naval aviation task force anywhere in the world.

The Wilhelmshaven Plan of 1917 The plan to attack the High Sea Fleet base at Wilhelmshaven was the most ambitious attempt to use naval aviation to strategically impact the war. The idea had been under development for some time, but the first serious effort to operationalize a mass aerial torpedo strike originated with the reinvigorated U-boat campaign during the summer and fall of 1917. The Grand Fleet leadership was under renewed pressure to find a naval offensive that could reduce the U-boat crisis. How this could be done, potentially, involved naval aviation in a precocious role: the U-boat bases on the Belgian coast and at Kiel were protected by extensive minefields, in turn, secured from being systematically swept by the existence of the High Sea Fleet.334 The radical solution to the U-boat crisis was, therefore, to somehow disable the German fleet, in turn pushing over the other dominos of Germany’s naval strategy, beginning with the minefields and ending with the submarine bases. One such proposal for cutting this Gordian knot was to attack the High Sea Fleet base with torpedo-equipped aircraft.335 Although the plan was never brought to fruition, it did produce subsidiary results of which the foremost was the creation of the Flying Squadron of the Grand Fleet.336 The first example of an aerial torpedo attack plan targeting Wilhelmshaven had, in fact, been proposed on 20 December 1915 by Lieutenant Commander W. P. de Courcy Ireland. Ireland, who at that time was the commanding officer of NAS Great Yarmouth, prepared a proposal for an aerial torpedo attack that he circulated to the Air

52  Fleet Naval Aviation Department’s staff.337 Lieutenant Commander Williamson, Squadron Commander Seddon, Wing Commander Groves, SAC Sueter, and DAS Vaughan-Lee all received copies.338 Ireland’s proposal was structured as a series of questions to which he did not yet have answers: first, he observed the existing technical requirements, foremost, an airplane capable of carrying torpedoes large enough to make the operation worthwhile. The existing 14-inch torpedoes, as Edmonds and Dacre demonstrated at the Dardanelles, could be carried by seaplanes but were deemed inadequate compared to the more powerful 18-inch and 21-inch torpedoes then in naval use; but there were no aircraft capable of carrying these.339 Unfortunately for the genesis of the project, Lt. Commander de Courcy Ireland, along with airship pioneer Wing Commander Neville Usborne, was killed at Kingsnorth on 21 February 1916 while testing the experimental airship-plane design (a fusion of a non-rigid envelope with a BE2 aircraft).340 The loss of these two experienced and creative practitioners was an irreplaceable double blow to the fleet’s naval aviation and airship development. The torpedo attack plan as a result seemed to evaporate. 341 SAC Sueter, who was still the head of the Air Department’s aviation design staff, was keen to see de Courcy Ireland’s ideas fulfilled and took it upon himself to propose air torpedo attacks against targets such as Wilhelmshaven, Pola, and Kiel.342 Jellicoe, however, was reforming the Admiralty and the Naval Staff between December 1916 and January–February 1917, 343 and this included personnel changes to the Air Department: DAS Vaughan-Lee was made Superintendent of Portsmouth Dockyard, Commodore Paine was made Fifth Sea Lord, and the undiplomatic Sueter, who was perceived as a member of the unified air force fifth column, 344 was shuffled off to Otranto to establish a seaplane base and barrage.345 Sueter, still trying to make the best of his situation, hoped to expand the RNAS forces in theatre in preparation for a possible torpedo strike or bombing mission against the Austrian bases at Pola and Fiume. In terms of the technical hurdles to overcome, Sueter got the ball rolling on 9 October 1916 when he sent a letter to Thomas Sopwith requesting a feasibility study on the development of a dedicated torpedo-carrying airplane, capable of carrying one or two 1,000-lb torpedoes. 346 The work Sueter was doing with Sopwith was however incomplete when he was transferred to the Italian theatre.347 Wing Commander Arthur Longmore, who was then on the technical staff of Lord Cowdray’s Air Board, stepped in to continue the work, of which the Sopwith T1 was the result.348 The Sopwith bomber was successfully trialed at the Isle of Grain between May and July 1917, 349 and a Short 320 torpedo bomber followed suit – both airplanes capable of carrying the 1,000-lb, 18-inch, Mk. IX torpedo.350 During August and September, Beatty, with the torpedo bomber now a reality, suggested the large-scale conversion of merchant vessels to

Fleet Naval Aviation 53 carry the airplanes, ultimately with the objective of conducting a massive 200-plane attack in the spring of 1918.351 Beatty had been influenced in this regard by a number of naval officers, including Captain Herbert Richmond, 352 Third Sea Lord Frederick Tudor and his replacement Rear Admiral Lionel Halsey, 353 Flight Commander Williamson, 354 and even Flight Lieutenant Rutland (who was at that time a technical advisor to the Third Sea Lord).355 As usual, there were major material and technical hurdles to overcome. Beatty expected that at least 17 converted merchant ships would be required as carriers, for an initial total of 121 bombers plus fighter support.356 Neither the ships nor the planes yet existed in the numbers that Beatty required and there was always the pressing concern of freeing up merchant shipping tonnage during the U-boat crisis. Unprecedented high-risk operations requiring merchant ship conversions were, therefore, unlikely to move ahead, despite the general popularity of the idea itself. Indeed, the subject of a large-scale air attack was discussed aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth on 24 August with both Jellicoe and Beatty present, amongst others.357 Beatty went to London shortly afterwards to discuss the idea with the Admiralty leadership.358 Beatty’s detailed proposal, submitted on 11 September, now called for 120 torpedo planes to launch from eight converted carriers.359 Despite these promising initial steps, Beatty’s plan was foredoomed in December 1917 by Jellicoe’s departure from the Admiralty. Jellicoe, for his part, had tried to advance the strike plan in October, and had also submitted a proposal for bombing attacks against the Bremen submarine slips to be conducted by 30 aircraft, but even this modest project, which could not be achieved without diverting aircraft from A/S patrols, was abandoned.360 The successful bombing of the Tondern Zeppelin sheds in July 1918 (see below) did, however, renew the prospect of a full-scale torpedo attack against the High Sea Fleet in harbour. As the material strength of the Flying Squadron increased, and as the Grand Fleet’s pilots gained experience, there was, in fact, renewed interest in the Wilhelmshaven strike plan. On 4 May, Colonel Samson, RAF, still in charge of NAS Great Yarmouth, forwarded his revitalization of the de Courcy Ireland proposal to Brigadier-General F. R. Scarlett, the Director of the Air Division (DAD – not to be confused with the Director of the Air Department) of the Naval Staff. This document represented Samson’s answers to de Courcy Ireland’s 1915 questions.361 Samson wanted seaplanes capable of carrying 21-inch torpedoes, heavier than the 18-inch used by the Sopwith-, Short-, and Blackburn-manufactured torpedo-planes.362 He proposed 100 aircraft, or four squadrons of 20 torpedo bombers plus another 20 fighters for escort.363 The attack would be preceded by a 48-hour photoreconnaissance. Samson provided several options for positioning the carrier strike and described the targets.364 Samson’s efforts nonetheless ultimately yielded nothing and, when the war ended, the

54  Fleet Naval Aviation only torpedo strike component in the fleet was that provided by HMS Argus in the form of the 20 Sopwith T1s of RAF No. 185 Squadron, having been formed at East Fortune on 7 October 1918.365 The case of the Wilhelmshaven plan is indicative of the constant juggling of priorities and the negative impact of that process on naval aviation developments for the fleet. Like the rigid airship setbacks before the war, and the limitations of aerial reconnaissance exposed at Jutland, the Wilhelmshaven plan demonstrated the potential for fleet aviation but also its weaknesses: developing a fully realized torpedo strike capability during wartime would require committed leadership both at the Admiralty and in the Grand Fleet. The theory may have been sound, but material limitations meant that the project never left the drawing board. Ironically, although the late summer and fall of 1917 had seen the development of the most comprehensive fleet air policy to date for the RNAS, it was also the same period in which the second of Jan Smuts’ reports appeared, making inevitable the creation of the Air Ministry and thus the merger of the RFC and RNAS into a single service (see Chapter 4). Despite this, as 1918 progressed, the reality was that the fleet was steadily gaining naval aviation capability and capacity: the Royal Navy seemed poised to match longstanding theory to material reality, yet was on the verge of losing control over the RNAS altogether.

The Flying Squadron of the Grand Fleet The formation of the Flying Squadron stands out as the final achievement of the RNAS in terms of fleet development: an integrated aircraft carrier strike group for Grand Fleet operations. This organization, introduced by Admiral Beatty, was meant to cement the Grand Fleet’s naval aviation as a dedicated squadron, with an explicitly defined role in fleet maneuvers. In the GFBOs of 22 July 1917, Beatty had grouped the Grand Fleet’s seaplane carriers into a squadron, at that time comprised of Campania, Engadine, Vindex, Nairana, and Pegasus and he updated the orders as more carriers came on line.366 On 24 September, amidst the backdrop of the Passchendaele offensive and the turmoil of the U-boat and Gotha campaigns, Beatty reviewed the Grand Fleet’s aircraft carrier development and recommended improvements ‘separate and distinct’ from the planning that was then, as we have seen, underway for the Wilhelmshaven torpedo strike.367 Beatty estimated that the Grand Fleet alone would require at least 15 reconnaissance, 30 torpedo, and 50 fighting machines for 1918.368 On 19 November, two days after the Second Battle of Heligoland Bight, Beatty proposed the creation of a Rear Admiral (Air) to act as a flag rank ‘adviser and deputy’ to the C-in-C on all aerial matters and to command the Grand Fleet’s aircraft and seaplane carriers.369 The title Beatty came up with was that of Admiral Commanding Aircraft (ACA),

Fleet Naval Aviation 55 whose responsibilities would encompass all of the aircraft, carriers, and naval air stations attached to the Grand Fleet.370 The Grand Fleet’s seaplane carrier squadron would be renamed the Flying Squadron, for which Beatty proposed HMS Furious, then undergoing refit, as the flagship.371 Rear Admiral Richard Phillimore was selected for this unique responsibility. Phillimore, a brainy career naval officer, veteran battlecruiser captain, division commander, and international diplomat, had, by late November 1917, amassed an impressive wartime record: he captained HMS Inflexible at the Battle of the Falkland Islands and during the Gallipoli landings, where he was beach master, traveled to Russia as a naval attaché in 1916, and then commanded Repulse and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at the Second Battle of Heligoland Bight. As ACA, Phillimore would be responsible ‘for the efficient training of personnel and upkeep of materiel and would superintend all experiments, trials, and practices of Aircraft’ – a broad mandate indeed. 372 The ACA would report to the Fifth Sea Lord and thus Phillimore would act as a liaison between Beatty concerning ‘principle or policy’ and the Air Department itself.373 The Admiralty approved Beatty’s proposal on 6 January 1918, but cautioned that the RNAS would shortly be transferred to the newly established Air Ministry, 374 the RNAS becoming instead ‘Air Force Contingents’ operating with the Grand Fleet.375 Phillimore’s appointment therefore provided Beatty with an experienced officer he could trust to safeguard the fleet’s aviation on the eve of the formation of the Air Ministry: all RAF naval aviation personnel would fall under the ACA’s command and thus the C-in-C Grand Fleet’s authority.376 Beatty, therefore, managed to keep the Grand Fleet’s former RNAS officers under his nominal command, despite their official transfer to the RAF on 1 April 1918. The modifications to Furious, with a new aft landing deck and hanger, were completed in March 1918 and Phillimore moved his flag to the carrier.377 Twelve trial landings were conducted aboard Furious between March and May, but the difficulty of maneuvering aircraft around the ship’s superstructure, and the disruption to air currents caused by the ship’s exhaust, conclusively demonstrated that a flush deck should be added in future – as was the case with the designs for Argus, Eagle, and Hermes.378 With Furious back in operation, it was not long before Phillimore began a series of North Sea patrols, building up to the spectacular strike against the Tondern Zeppelin sheds of 19 July. The Tondern shed complex, as we have seen, had been located by Flt. Lt. Openshaw during the Harwich Force’s Vindex sortie of 25 March 1916.379 The 1918 strike plan was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Clark-Hall, Phillimore’s chief of staff, and formerly the CO of HMS Ark Royal at the

56  Fleet Naval Aviation Dardanelles, 380 with input from Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Bell Davies, Wing Captain Elder’s deputy from his time with the long-range bombing No. 3 Wing (see Chapter 3).381 Bell Davies knew that Phillimore would relish the opportunity given his ‘penchant for offensive action’.382 The scheme, by then known as operation F4, was approved by Beatty on 9 June.383 The Grand Fleet telegrams of June–July 1918 demonstrate that Beatty gave Phillimore significant latitude in terms of the plan’s execution.384 The instructions as issued are suggestive of the depth of experience that had been accumulated by this late point in the war. 385 Phillimore’s orders were concise: the operation was to commence at 3 am, or as soon as light conditions permitted.386 The attack itself to be carried out at low altitude, the pilots involved having been instructed not to penetrate neutral airspace and, considering the critical nature of the objective, to avoid engaging enemy airplanes – although any Zeppelins encountered in flight were to be attacked immediately. Pilots were authorized to land in Denmark or Germany only if short on fuel.387 The planes, on return to the task force, would ditch and then be retrieved by destroyers marked with flags. Furious would display deck signals to instruct pilots on ditching procedures. The operation, now known as F7 after three aborted attempts, commenced on 18 July. Beatty, in preparation for the operation, signaled Phillimore to confirm that Tondern contained ‘two small sheds and one large shed, also possibly a second large shed’.388 Furious’ task force was designated Force A, comprising the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron with supporting destroyers, 389 while the covering force was designated Force B, including the 1st Battle Squadron, 7th Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers. While it was hoped that this operation might prove an invitation for the High Sea Fleet to sortie, the German fleet’s final wartime sortie had, in fact, already taken place on 24 April.390 At 3 am on 18 July, Furious was prepared to launch its Sopwith Camels, each machine armed with two 50-lb bombs, 391 but Phillimore made the decision to delay for 24 hours due to a thunderstorm. A second attempt was made at 3 am on 19 July and Furious successfully launched seven Sopwith Camels in two flights, although one airplane turned back. In the ensuing raid, Zeppelins L54 and L60 were completely destroyed, as was the Tondern primary shed. Of the six pilots who made the attack, four did not return, 392 but in the event, only a single pilot actually became a casualty: Lt. W. A. Yeulett who disappeared at sea.393 The other three missing pilots landed variously in Denmark.394 Grand Fleet C-in-C Beatty, based on the lessons learned from the Tondern raid, now put ACA Phillimore and his RAF staff to work developing an airplane ‘suitable for carrying in H.M. Ships for reconnaissance and spotting purposes’. The ACA submitted the technical report to Beatty, who in turn forwarded the report to the Admiralty, with his

Fleet Naval Aviation 57 additional comments, on 11 August.395 Beatty and Phillimore, after Tondern, were also continually updating the GFAOs, adding pages or making corrections on 10 and 19 August, 11, 14 and 20 September, 7, 10 and 19 October, and lastly on 8 November.396 On 1 December 1918, the RAF had 80 pilots, 46 observers, and 498  airmen aboard the Flying Squadron; 58 pilots, 13 observers, and 98 airmen aboard the other vessels of the Grand Fleet; and 66 pilots, 31 observers, 956 airmen, and 161 women, at air stations attached to the fleet. The Flying Squadron contained 7 two-seater seaplanes, 18 twoseater airplanes, 11 single-seater airplanes, and 18 torpedo bombers. There were another 11 two-seaters and 34 single-seaters with the rest of the Grand Fleet, plus 12 two-seaters and 27 single-seaters operational and another 211 aircraft variously under repair ashore. Before the end of 1918, therefore, the Grand Fleet could call upon a naval aviation establishment of no less than 388 aircraft, 204 pilots and 90 observers.397

Conclusion The Air Department, as initially led by Captain Sueter and supported by First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill, appreciated naval aviation as a revolutionary combined arms, as opposed to strictly naval, force with vast potential for the future of warfare. Churchill envisioned the Naval Wing as both a new form of coastal defence and as a mobile-striking force. Grand Fleet C-in-C Admiral Jellicoe, on the other hand, perceived aircraft and, more importantly, airships, as auxiliaries of the fleet, potential aids to the fleet’s gunnery and reconnaissance. Technical limitations, combined with the variable pace of operational learning and intra-service rivalry, left the Grand Fleet struggling to provide adequate air support for most of the war. Indeed, one of the most significant criticisms subsequently leveled against the Air Department and the Admiralty leadership was a failure to take seriously the role of aviation with the fleet.398 In 1915, the RNAS went to the Dardanelles improperly trained and equipped, but emerged with an impressive proficiency at gunfire spotting that was independently confirmed by the destruction of the Königsberg. Churchill’s faith in the organization’s ability to adapt was not misplaced; the cultivating of such a dynamic organization was undeniably to his credit. Adaptability and innovation, however, could not compensate altogether for technological and material limitations, casualties, and a lack of standardized training. The seaplane and kite-balloon gunfire spotting experiences of 1915 were particularly significant: the development of aerial gunfire spotting produced outcomes that significantly deviated from expectations. The adoption of balloons by the Air Department provides an example of the organization’s flexibility, much like the creation of the Sea Scout dirigibles.

58  Fleet Naval Aviation Indeed, the quick integration of balloons into the fleet, followed by their replacement by non-rigid airships and then airplanes and flying boats, provides a case study in terms of wartime technical adaptation. The Dardanelles was, however, also the end of Churchill’s tenure at the Admiralty, with Sueter following four months later. After Churchill’s departure, Balfour and Vaughan-Lee transitioned the RNAS into a decentralized organization that spent most of 1916 rearming and retraining to fight the Zeppelins and patrol the coasts for U-boats. The demand for material was incessant and it was in part the ever-increasing expense of acquiring new aircraft, and more powerful engines, that drove the government to transfer aircraft supply first to the Ministry of Munitions and then to the Air Ministry at the Hotel Cecil. Jutland dramatically exposed the Grand Fleet’s weakness in terms of naval aviation, commencing a long succession of reforms that culminated in Beatty’s GFAC of January 1917. The formation of the 1917 War Cabinet, under former Minister of Munitions and War Minister David Lloyd George, profoundly influenced the future of the RNAS in this regard, as did Beatty’s promotion to Grand Fleet C-in-C. The selection of Jellicoe as First Sea Lord, likewise, commenced a year-long period of material improvement for all manner of RNAS equipment, and training. Beatty built a consensus between the Grand Fleet, Admiralty and the Air Department about the future of fleet naval aviation, and, during August and September 1917, was the motive force behind the Wilhelmshaven strike plan. New aircraft carrier developments, particularly the conversion of HMS Furious, combined with the development of the torpedo bomber, prepared the ground for the Flying Squadron of the Grand Fleet. Rear Admiral Phillimore, as ACA, took command of the Grand Fleet’s united airpower and thereby keept the RNAS officers and airmen close at hand following the creation of the Air Ministry and then RAF. The Royal Navy, nevertheless, lost control of the Air Department when the RNAS merged with the RFC on 1 April 1918, returning to the arrangement that had existed before the war. All that remained at the Admiralty was the Air Division of the Naval Staff, along with the vestigial kite-­ balloon and airship sections. The actual impact of this administrative decision was not immediately apparent, however, considering the legacy of inter-service cooperation between the RFC and RNAS during the war, but it was, in fact, the beginning of what would prove to be a century of controversy, that indeed continues to this day.399 The lessons of the RNAS experience with the fleet during the First World War are clear: prewar theory, although in many cases visionary, did not adequately prepare the RNAS for the role it would play during the war. Likewise, the naval aviation policy of Churchill and Balfour, although put into practice with some initial success, failed to provide the fleet with the naval aviation capability it actually required.

Fleet Naval Aviation 59 Administrative reshuffling, technical limitations, and the vagaries of wartime crises, meant that little had been achieved in terms of fulfilling the air requirements of the Grand Fleet prior to 1917. Experimental misfortune and technical uncertainty before the 1914 left the Grand Fleet playing a precarious game of catch-up during the first three years of the war. Admiral Jellicoe, recognizing the fleet’s deficiencies, relegated naval aviation to a limited auxiliary – chiefly an aid to gunnery and reconnaissance. The restricted nature of the Grand Fleet’s aviation was demonstrated decisively at Jutland, when only a single sortie was flown and the fleet’s primary carrier had to be ordered back to harbour. Six months after Jutland, with Jellicoe’s promotion to First Sea Lord, Admiral Beatty as Grand Fleet C-in-C instituted a series of reforms that reinvigorated the fleet’s aviation, starting with the GFAC. Beatty’s influence was a much-needed tonic that, within a year, led to the creation of the Flying Squadron. The naval aviation of the Grand Fleet thus emerged at the end of the war with a clearly defined tactical doctrine that, indeed, remains relevant today.400 Ironically, the Royal Navy lost control of its aviation assets on 1 April 1918 with the creation of the RAF, just as quantum leaps in terms carrier and aircraft development were taking place. The early war obsession with rigid airships ultimately proved a technological dead-end: the advantage that Zeppelins were expected to provide to the High Sea Fleet in terms of gunnery and command and control, so feared by Admiral Jellicoe, never materialized. Moreover, by 1917, anti-Zeppelin airplanes and flying boats had caught up with the airships in terms of capability (see Chapter 4). Where naval aviation had entered the war as a gunfire auxiliary and unreliable reconnaissance platform, by 1918, it emerged as the centerpiece of the Battle Fleet concept, providing a revolutionary strike capacity protected by the Grand Fleet’s capital ships, a far cry from when Campania had been left behind at Jutland. The introduction of HMS Argus in October 1918, with its torpedo-bombing capability, made possible Taranto-like attacks, the reality of which was then demonstrated in the 1919 exercises. On 6 September 1919, 11 Sopwith T1 ‘cuckoos’ of RAF No. 186, Torpedo Development Squadron, Gosport (formed 1 January 1919 aboard HMS Argus as the successor to No. 185 Squadron – disbanded on 14 April), simulated an aerial torpedo strike against the Atlantic and Home Fleet’s 2nd Battle Squadron while it was stationary off Portland Harbour.401 Eight T1s were armed with torpedoes, the remaining three being equipped with smoke bombs. The attack took place in two waves: the first flight of five torpedo bombers and two smoke aircraft approached their targets overland from the north and scored two hits on HMS Implacable as well as single hits on both HMS Barham and Malaya.402 With this strike underway, the second wave attacked undetected from the south

60  Fleet Naval Aviation and struck the flagship HMS Queen Elizabeth twice with their dummy torpedoes. Between these two waves, only two torpedoes failed to score hits, those having struck the shallow seabed. The Atlantic and Home Fleet C-in-C, Admiral Sir Charles Madden, was impressed enough to write that the torpedo plane was now ‘the most dangerous form of torpedo attack upon heavy ships’.403 The September 1919 exercise was also the end of an era, a final glint of light in the long shadow of the postwar demobilization. Less than a month prior, on 15 August, Prime Minister David Lloyd George announced his plan to drastically reduce the expense of the armed forces. This ‘Ten-Year Rule’ effectively heralded the end of the wartime naval aviation force and, by April 1920, the former RNAS units had been reduced to not much more than a single squadron.404 54 former RNAS squadrons were disbanded in 1919 as the RAF was reduced from 200 wartime squadrons to a peacetime establishment of 25, with all 74 former RNAS squadrons, except No. 216 (see Chapter 3), completely disbanded by 1923.405 The demise of the Naval Wing was thus a bitter pill for the Royal Navy to swallow, the Admiralty having spent nearly a decade developing naval aviation to a high degree of excellence, tightly integrated with the fleet’s force structure and supported by a robust administrative apparatus, only to watch on the sidelines as the entire force was consumed and then forgotten by the Air Ministry. The budgetary bleakness of the interwar years was not, however, immediately apparent amidst the celebration of the war’s conclusion.

Notes 1. Ian M. Burns, The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, 1914– 1918, Kindle ebook (Oxford: Fonthill, 2014), Chapter 17, et seq. David Hobbs, ‘The First Pearl Harbor: The Attack by British Torpedo Planes on the German High Seas Fleet Planned for 1918’, in Warship 2007, eds. Antony Preston, John Jordan, and Stephen Dent (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), pp. 29–38. 2. Development and Operations of the Royal Naval Air Service in Home Waters, Fleet Co-operation, Pt. I, January 1917 to April 1918, AIR 1/677/21/13/1901. See also, Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, p. 115. 3. Marder, FDSF, vol. I, pp. 336–7. 4. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, pp. 9, 12. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 125. 5. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, pp. 31–2. Kostas Gavroglu, ‘Strutt, John William, Third Baron Rayleigh (1842–1919)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [hereafter ODNB]. Extracts from Paper by Captain Murray F. Sueter, Director of Air Department, Admiralty, dated 29 August 1912, AIR 1/652, #18 in Roskill, Documents, p. 56. See also, Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 159. 6. Guy Warner, Lighter Than Air: The Life and Times of Wing Commander N. F. Usborne RN, Kindle ebook (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2016), Chapter 3, loc. 1207. Terms of Reference of the C.I.D. Sub-Committee on ‘Aerial Navigation’, dated 23 October 1908, CAB 38/15/3, #1 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 5–7. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 172.

Fleet Naval Aviation 61 7. John Fisher, Memories (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), pp. 128–9. 8. Marder, FDSF, vol. I, p. 336. Robin Higham, The British Rigid Airship, 1908–1931: A Study in Weapons Policy (London: G. T. Foulis & Co. Ltd., 1961), pp. 37–8. John Swinfield, Airship: Design, Development and Disaster, Kindle ebook (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), Chapter 1, loc. 394. 9. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen? The Early Days of British Naval Flying’, p. 9. Extracts from the Report of the Aerial Navigation Sub-Committee of the C.I.D., dated 28 January 1909, CAB 38/15/3, #2 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 7–9. 10. Extracts from the Report of the Aerial Navigation Sub-Committee of the C.I.D., dated 28 January 1909, CAB 38/15/3, #2 in Roskill, Documents, p. 10. 11. Higham, British Rigid Airship, p. 40. Peter Brooks, Zeppelin: Rigid Airships 1893–1940 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), p. 52. 12. Higham, British Rigid Airship, pp. 39–40. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 172. Warner, Lighter Than Air, Chapter 3, loc. 1201, 1577. Service record of Neville Usborne, ADM 196/47/131. 13. Higham, British Rigid Airship, pp. 48–9. 14. George Whale, British Airships: Past, Present and Future, Kindle ebook (New York: Wallachia Publishers, 1919), Chapter 7, loc. 352–95. Swinfield, Airship, Chapter 1, loc. 394. 15. A. B. Sainsbury, ‘Bacon, Sir Reginald Hugh Spencer (1863–1947)’, in ODNB. 16. Higham, British Rigid Airship, pp. 49–51. 17. Whale, British Airships, Chapter 7, loc. 418. 18. Lord Ventry and Eugene Kolesnik, Jane’s Pocket Book of Airship Development (London: Macdonald and Jane’s Publishers Ltd., 1976), p. 82. 19. Edward Chilton, ‘Rear Admiral Sir Murray Sueter, CB’, in CCIJ, vol. 15, no. 2 (Summer 1984), p. 50. 20. Brooks, Zeppelin: Rigid Airships, p. 53. 21. Swinfield, Airship, Chapter 1, loc. 419. See also, V. W. Baddeley and Andrew Lambert, ‘Sturdee, Sir Frederick Charles Doveton, First Baronet (1859–1925)’, in ODNB. Higham, British Rigid Airship, pp. 52–3. 22. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 69. 23. Warner, Lighter Than Air, Chapter 3, loc. 2106–14. 24. Higham, British Rigid Airship, p. 58. 25. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, p. 20. 26. Gamble, The Story of a North Sea Air Station, pp. 15–6, 38–9. Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Young Statesman, 1901–1914, Kindle ebook, vol. II, 8 vols. (Hillsdale, Michigan: Hillsdale College Press, 2015), pp. 688–9. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908–1918’, p. 41. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Air Committee, 31 July 1912, CAB 41/1. 27. F. Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1922), p. 31. Chilton, ‘Rear Admiral Sir Murray Sueter, CB’, p. 50. Admiralty Air Department, Training Manual Part II (Naval Wing), 1914, AIR 1/824/204/5/71, p. 115. 28. Air Committee Minutes, Third Meeting, 7 November 1912, CAB 14/1, p. 22. 29. Director Air Department Captain Murray Sueter airship report, Air Committee, 8 October 1912, CAB 14/1, pp. 16, 18.

62  Fleet Naval Aviation 30. Jellicoe to Balfour, 10 July 1915 & Jellicoe to Admiralty, 29 July 1915, ADM 137/1953, #149 & #152 in A. Temple Patterson, ed., The Jellicoe Papers, vol. I, 2 vols. (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., 1966), pp. 172–3. 31. Jellicoe’s reply to Balfour from Iron Duke, 28 August 1916, Admiralty MSS, #7 in A. Temple Patterson, ed., The Jellicoe Papers, vol. II, 2 vols. (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., 1968), pp. 68–9. 32. Admiralty MSS. 49038, ‘Extracts from Jellicoe’s autobiographical notes (Add. Mss. 49038, pp. 239–50)’, #22 in Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol. I, p. 27. 33. Reginald Bacon, The Life of John Rushworth, Earl Jellicoe, Kindle ebook (Arcole Publishing, 2017, originally published 1936), Chapter 13, loc. 4165–76. Admiralty MSS. 49038, ‘Extracts from Jellicoe’s autobiographical notes (Add. Mss. 49038, pp. 239–50)’, #22 in Temple Patterson, The Jellicoe Papers, vol. I, p. 27. See also, German Naval Airships and other Aerial matters, Hugh Watson, 24 April 1913, Germany N.A. No. 21/13, #197 in Matthew Seligmann, ed., Naval Intelligence from Germany: The Reports of the British Naval Attaches in Berlin, 1906–1914 (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), pp. 492–3. 34. Marder, FDSF, vol. I, pp. 336–8 & Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 5–7. 35. Jones, ‘Ashore, Afloat and Airborne’, p. 62. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, p. 17. 36. Admiralty Air Department, Training Manual Part II (Naval Wing), 1914, AIR 1/824/204/5/71, p. 118. 37. Jones, ‘Ashore, Afloat and Airborne’, p. 62. 38. Roskill, Documents, p. 40 fn. Jones, ‘Ashore, Afloat and Airborne’, p. 62. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. I, 5 vols, Kindle ebook (New York: RosettaBooks, LLC, 2013, originally published 1923), p. 144. James Dorgan, ‘British Naval Aviation 1908–1914: A Case Study of Military Innovation’ in Journal of Military History and Defence Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 2020), p. 138. 39. C. E. S. Mowthorpe, Battlebags: British Airships of the First World War (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), p. 179. 40. Swinfield, Airship, Chapter 1, loc. 444. 41. Whale, British Airships, Chapter 7, loc. 434. 42. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 4–5. Marder, FDSF, vol. I, p. 341. Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, Chapter 2, loc. 546. 43. Reinhard Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet in the World War, Kindle ebook (Shilka Publishing, 2013, originally published 1919), p. 251. James Goldrick, The King’s Ships Were at Sea: The War in the North Sea August 1914–February 1915 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. 51. 44. J. F. Hart, ‘Airship Work for the Navy, 1914–1918’, in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute [JRUSI], vol. 70, no. 479 (1925), p. 501. 45. Popham, Into Wind, p. 42. 46. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 5. Jones, ‘Ashore, Afloat and Airborne’, p. 40. Higham, The British Rigid Airship, p. 127. 47. Michael Brock and Eleanor Brock, eds., H. H. Asquith Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 592–600. 48. Nicholas Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 412. 49. ‘Need For Shells’ & ‘Shells and the Great Battle’, 14 May 1915, London Times, pp. 8–9. 50. Minutes of the War Council meeting, 14 May 1915, CAB 42/2/19.

Fleet Naval Aviation 63 51. Marder, FDSF, vol. II, pp. 277–8. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. II, 5 vols, Kindle ebook (New York: RosettaBooks, LLC, 2013, originally published 1923), Chapter 18, loc. 5402. 52. Fisher, Memories, p. 83. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. II, Chapter 18, loc. 5466–514. 53. Fisher, Memories, p. 73. 54. ‘Loss of British Battleship’, 14 May 1915, Daily Mail, p. 5. 55. Richard Freeman, Tempestuous Genius: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, Kindle ebook (London: Endeavour Press Ltd., 2015), Chapter 23, loc. 5124. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. II, Chapter 18, loc. 5800–27. 56. Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, pp. 50–1. Roy Hattersley, David Lloyd George, The Great Outsider (London: Abacus, 2012), p. 376. 57. Paul Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 1914–1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 80–2. Alfred Havighurst, Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century, 4th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 120. Andrew Lambert, Admirals (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 2008), pp. 330–1. Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War, 1914–1916 (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1928), pp. xxix–xxx. Rodger, The Admiralty, p. 132. 58. Admiralty Board Minutes, 9 July 1915, ADM 167/49. 59. Higham, British Rigid Airship, p. 79. 60. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 7. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 393–4. Whale, British Airships, Chapter 7, loc. 509. Alexander Howlett, ‘The Royal Naval Air Service and the Evolution of Naval Aviation in Britain, 1914–1918’ (PhD thesis, King’s College London, 2019), p. 60. 61. Joint War Air Committee, Air Paper 4, 3 March 1916, AIR 1/270, #106 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 311–2. 62. Policy of RNAS, Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee, 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A. 63. Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee, Director Air Services 28 February 1916, Re-organisation of Airship Section, NMM VIV/7, p. 3. 64. Vivian’s list of the chief engineers in the Air Department, 1916, NMM VIV/7. 65. Director Air Services, Re-organisation of Airship Section, December 1915, NMM VIV/7. 66. Diagram of SAC section of Air Department, 1916, NMM VIV/7. 67. Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee, Director Air Services, 28 February 1916, Re-organisation of Airship Section, NMM VIV/7, p. 1. 68. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 356. 69. Ibid. 70. Director Air Services to Secretary of the Admiralty, Organisation of Air Department, 19 October 1916, NMM VIV/7. 71. Whale, British Airships, Chapter 6, loc. 643. Admiralty Board Minutes, Friday 4th February 1916, ADM 167/50. Admiralty Board Minutes, Friday 7th April 1916, ADM 167/50. 72. Higham, British Rigid Airship, p. 145. 73. Douglas H. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat: A History of the German Naval Airship Division, 1912–1918 (Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Military History, 1997), pp. 203–7. 74. Appendix I, German Naval Airships: 1912–1918, in Jones, WIA, vol. III. Howlett, ‘The Royal Naval Air Service’, p. 62. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat, p. 296. 75. Airships Construction Policy, August–October 1917, ADM 1/8621, #185 in Roskill, Documents, p. 531.

64  Fleet Naval Aviation 76. Notes by Mr. W. S. Churchill, Minister of Munitions, dated 11 October 1917 and reply by Commodore Godfrey Paine, 5th Sea Lord, undated, #185 in Roskill, Documents, ADM 1/8621, pp. 532–3. 77. Air Policy, Notes of a conference aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth, 24 August 1917, ADM 137/1420, #83 in Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol.  II, pp. 201–2. 78. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 174–8. 79. Board Minute No. 1 of 23 August 1917, ADM 167/53, #183 in Roskill, Documents, p. 525. 80. Appendix C, Admiralty, End of December 1917, list of members of the Naval Staff in Jellicoe, Crisis of the Naval War, p. 288. Higham, British Rigid Airship, pp. 112–3. 81. Jellicoe, Crisis of the Naval War, p. 288 82. Ibid., p. 293. 83. Minutes of Airship Progress Committee, first meeting, 11 February 1918, AIR 1/306. 84. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm or Armoured Corps?’, p. 52. 85. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 395. Whale, British Airships, Chapter 7, loc. 496. 86. Robert F. Grattan, The Origins of Air War (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 155. 87. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 41. 88. Ibid. 89. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 7. Ian Castle, British Airships, 1905–1930 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009), p. 26. 90. Jones WIA, IV, p. 40. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 6. Airships Instructions, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, 24 January 1917, ADM 116/1342, p. 416. 91. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 40, 42. 92. Castle, British Airships, pp. 30–4. 93. Whale, British Airships, Chapter 7, loc. 681–96. 94. Michael Haskew, Aircraft Carriers: The Illustrated History of the World’s Most Important Warships (Minneapolis, USA: Zenith Press, 2016), pp. 14–6. 95. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, p. 11. See also, Brett, The History of British Aviation, 1908–1914, vol. I, p. 118. 96. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 32. 97. Haskew, Aircraft Carriers, pp. 20–21. 98. Richard Layman, ‘HMS Ark Royal – 1914–1922’, in CCIJ, vol. 18, no. 4 (Winter 1987), p. 145. 99. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 6. Extracts from The Life Story of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, G.C.B., D.S.C., RAF Hendon, DC 74/102/39, p. 37. 100. Admiralty Air Department, Training Manual Part II (Naval Wing), 1914, AIR 1/824/204/5/71, p. 77. 101. Telefunken radio-telegraphic sets had been installed starting with LZ6 in 1909, Michael Belafi, The Zeppelin, translated by Cordula Werschkun (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2015), p. 343. 102. Christopher M. Bell, Churchill and The Dardanelles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 121. 103. Churchill, Young Statesman, 1901–1914, p. 696. Howlett, ‘The Royal Naval Air Service’, pp. 120–1. 104. Jones, ‘Ashore, Afloat and Airborne’, p. 38. ‘Admiralty Letter M.01495/12 of 2 November 1912 to the Admiral Commanding Coast Guard and Reserves’, AIR 1/652, #20 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 61–2. DNC’s

Fleet Naval Aviation 65 Department, Admiralty, Aircraft Carriers, Part I: 1914–1918, January 1919, NMM DEY/95. 105. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, p. 25. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 274. 106. Roskill, Documents, pp. xv–xvi. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 38–43. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, pp. 160–71. 107. Extracts from Paper by Captain Murray F. Sueter, Director of Air Department, Admiralty, 29 August 1912, AIR 1/652, #18 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 58–9. Gamble, The Story of a North Sea Air Station, pp. 24–5. 108. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, pp. 122–3, 131– 42. James Pugh, ‘Oil and Water: A Comparison of Military and Naval Aviation Doctrine in Britain, 1912–1914’, in A Military Transformed?, eds. M. LoCicero, R. Mahoney, and S. Mitchell (Solihull: Helion, 2014), pp. 128–31. 109. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 265–6. 110. DNC Department, Admiralty, Aircraft Carriers, Part. 1, 1914–1918, ­January 1919, NMM DEY/95, pp. 3–4. Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 46–7. 111. Aeroplanes for Naval Service, Hugh Williamson, March 1912, CCC WLMN 1/1, pp. 1–3. See also, Early Submissions made by Air Depart. to Obtain Suitable Seaplane Carrying Ships, 1915, AIR 1/2577. 112. Popham, Into Wind, p. 12. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen? The Early Days of British Naval Flying’, pp. 17–18. Richard Layman, Before the Aircraft Carrier: Development of Aviation Vessels, 1849–1922 (London: Conway Maritime Press, Ltd., 1989), p. 34. 113. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 52–3. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 264, 271. Service record of Francis Rowland Scarlett, ADM 196/44/131. 114. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 264. Admiralty MSS, Jellicoe’s response to Balfour from Iron Duke, 28 August 1916, #7 in Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol II, p. 69. Employment of the Royal Flying Corps in the Manoeuvres, Naval Wing, Extracts from the Second Annual Report by the Air Committee on the Royal Flying Corps, C.I.D. 190B, dated 9 May 1914, CAB 38/27/22, #41 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 137–8. 115. Alan Smith, ‘From Sail to Wing – The Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill,’ in CCIJ, vol. 25, no. 1 (1994), p. 4. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 264–5. 116. Gamble, The Story of a North Sea Air Station, pp. 48–9. 117. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 284–5. Morgan-Owen, Fear of Invasion, pp. 222–3. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 265. Gamble, The Story of a North Sea Air Station, pp. 46–56. 118. Burns, The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, Chapter 1. 119. Paul Fontenoy, Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, Inc., 2006), p. 3. 120. Churchill Minute to Colonel Seely, Secretary of State for War, 6 December 1913, ADM 1/8621, #36 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 119–20. 121. Howlett, ‘The Royal Naval Air Service’, p. 68. Admiralty Board Minutes, Wednesday 29th October 1913, ADM 167/47. 122. Layman, ‘HMS Ark Royal’, p. 146. 123. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 9–10. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, p. 23. John Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War I (London: Random House Group Ltd., 2001), p. 85. DNC Department, Admiralty, Aircraft Carriers, part 1, 1914–1918, January 1919, NMM DEY/95, p. 3. 124. Fontenoy, Aircraft Carriers, p. 3. 125. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 10. 126. Robbins, The Aircraft Carrier Story, pp. 16–7.

66  Fleet Naval Aviation 127. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 368. 128. Layman, Before the Aircraft Carrier, pp. 48–50. J. J. Colledge and Ben Warlow, Ships of the Royal Navy, The Complete Record of All F ­ ighting Ships of the Royal Navy (Philadelphia & Newbury: Casemate, 2010), p.  58. Marder, FDSF, vol. III, p. 48. McBride, ‘“The Hatbox”: HMS Argus’, p. 74. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 103. 129. James Pugh, The Royal Flying Corps, the Western Front and the Control of the Air, 1914–1918, Kindle ebook (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 30. 130. Wing Commander Sykes, Training Manual Royal Flying Corps, Part I, May 1914, AIR 10/179. Sykes, Training Manual AP 144, Royal Flying Corps, Part II, Military Wing, 1915, AIR 1/785/204/558. Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes, pp. 40–1, 48. 131. Pugh, ‘Oil and Water’, pp. 132–5. 132. Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War, p. 32. 133. Admiralty Air Department, Training Manual Part II (Naval Wing), 1914, AIR 1/824/204/5/71. 134. Naval Air Service Training Manual, November 1914, AIR 10/117. 135. 10 June 1920, ‘Some personal notes – 1914–1915, RNAS by Group Captain, E. L. Gerrard’ AIR 1/2301. 136. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 272. 137. Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet in the World War, pp. 251–2. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat, pp. 31, 38–45. 138. Layman, Before the Aircraft Carrier, pp. 17, 87, 96, 111. Haslop, Early Naval Air Power, p. 24. 139. Brock and Brock, eds., H. H. Asquith Letters to Venetia Stanley, p. 285. 140. Ian Gardiner, The Flatpack Bombers: The Royal Navy and the ‘Zeppelin Menace’, Kindle ebook (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), Chapters 3–4. Howlett, ‘The Royal Naval Air Service’, pp. 156–7. 141. Goldrick, The King’s Ships Were at Sea, p. 223. Gardiner, Flatpack Bombers, Chapter 5, loc. 2092. Robert K. Massie, Castles of Steel: ­Britain, ­Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), pp. 361–74. Richard Layman, The Cuxhaven Raid: The World’s First Carrier Air Strike (London: Conway Maritime Press, Ltd., 1985), p. 45, 73. A. Temple Patterson, Tyrwhitt of the Harwich Force (London: Macdonald & Jane’s, 1973), pp. 94–7. 142. Layman, The Cuxhaven Raid, p. 36. Temple Patterson, Tyrwhitt of the Harwich Force, p. 81. 143. David Wragg, A Century of British Naval Aviation, 1909–2009 ­(Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2009), p. 18. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 80–1. 144. Smith, ‘From Sail to Wing’, pp. 4–5. 145. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. II, pp. 51–2. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 402. Massie, Castles of Steel, p. 366. Layman, The Cuxhaven Raid, p. 59. ­Temple Patterson, Tyrwhitt of the Harwich Force, pp. 94–5. 146. Massie, Castles of Steel, p. 365. Layman, The Cuxhaven Raid, pp. 85–96. Michael Goodall, ‘F E T Hewlett and the Cuxhaven Raid’ in CCIJ, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 1975), pp. 70–2. 147. Layman, The Cuxhaven Raid, p. 102. 148. Ibid. 149. Goodall, ‘F. E. T. Hewlett and the Cuxhaven Raid’, p. 72. 150. Layman, The Cuxhaven Raid, pp. 103–4. Popham, Into Wind, pp. 23–4. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 405. Massie, Castles of Steel, pp. 370–1. 151. Layman, The Cuxhaven Raid, pp. 99–101.

Fleet Naval Aviation 67 152. Massie, Castles of Steel, p. 368. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. II, p. 52. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 405. 153. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 92. 154. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 341–2. 155. Smith, ‘From Sail to Wing’, p. 6. 156. See, for example: Reports, returns and papers from HMS ‘Ark Royal’ January to May 1915, AIR 1/361/15/228/49. 157. Employment of aircraft with the Grand Fleet, and statement on aircraft spotting, 1915, AIR 1/2577, p. 4. Appendix, AIR 1/2577, p. 5. 158. Layman, Before the Aircraft Carrier, p. 40. 159. James Streckfuss, Eyes All Over the Sky: Aerial Reconnaissance in the First World War, Kindle ebook (Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2016), Chapter 7 et seq. 160. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 392–3. Grattan, The Origins of Air War, pp. 148–9. Philpott, The Birth of the Royal Air Force, p. 38. Particulars of HMS Ark Royal. ‘Unsigned and Undated paper, probably written early in 1915, AIR 1/361, #66 in Roskill, Documents, p. 203. 161. Statement by General Henderson, First Air Committee Meeting, 31 July 1912, CAB 14/1. 162. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 231. 163. Important Signals Made and Received, 25 October 1914, Rear Admiral Hood, HOOD 5/1 CCC, p. 15. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 392–3. 164. Marder, FDSF, vol. II, p. 98. 165. Kender, ‘Manica and the Foundation of the British Kite Balloon Service’, p. 223. 166. Ibid., p. 225. 167. Bell, Churchill and The Dardanelles, pp. 93–4. 168. Hugh Williamson’s Dardanelles Diary, CCC, WLMN 1/4, p. 157. 169. Lt. Col. L. H. Strain’s 1923 notes on Ark Royal gunfire spotting, March 1915, AIR 1/726/137/1, p. 2. 170. Layman, ‘HMS Ark Royal’, p. 149. Lt. Col. L. H. Strain’s 1923 notes on Ark Royal gunfire spotting, March 1915, AIR 1/726/137/1, p. 2. 171. R. H. Clark-Hall & J. K. Clark-Hall, Air Marshal Sir Robert Clark-Hall (Christchurch: The Raven Press Co. Ltd., 1995), p. 67. 172. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 10. 173. Layman, ‘HMS Ark Royal’, pp. 149–50. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran, p. 5. See also, log of HMS Ark Royal, 9 December 1914–30 April 1915, ADM 53/34098. 174. Vice Admiral Commanding Eastern Squadron Mediterranean, Carden, Orders for forcing of the Dardanelles by the Allied Squadron, HMS Queen Elizabeth, 14 February 1915, CCC DRBK 4/3, p. 6. 175. Admiral Carden, Instructions for Aircraft, 24 February 1915, CCC DRBK 4/3, p. 6. 176. Vice Admiral Commanding Eastern Squadron Mediterranean, Orders for forcing of the Dardanelles by the Allied Squadron, HMS Queen Elizabeth, 14 February 1915, CCC, DRBK 4/3, p. 6. See also Appendix I, Signals between Spotting and Firing Ships. 177. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. II, pp. 143–5. 178. Ibid., p. 151. 179. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 18. 180. C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, Gallipoli, vol. I, reprint (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., 1929), pp. 86–7 fn. 181. Layman, ‘HMS Ark Royal’, p. 152. 182. Ibid., p. 151.

68  Fleet Naval Aviation 183. Ibid., p. 152. 184. Bell, Churchill and The Dardanelles, p. 137. 185. Samson, Fights and Flights, p. 218. 186. Layman, ‘HMS Ark Royal’, pp. 152–3. 187. Kender, ‘Manica and the Foundation of the British Kite Balloon Service’, p. 223. 188. Ibid., p. 223. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 33–4. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 6. 189. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 35. Kender, ‘Manica and the Foundation of the British Kite Balloon Service’, p. 224. 190. Kender, ‘Manica and the Foundation of the British Kite Balloon Service’, p. 225. 191. Layman, ‘HMS Ark Royal’, pp. 152–3. 192. Kender, ‘Manica and the Foundation of the British Kite Balloon Service’, p. 226. 193. Ibid., p. 226 194. Ibid. 195. Layman, ‘HMS Ark Royal’, p. 153. 196. Ibid., p. 154. 197. Ibid., p. 149. 198. History of the development of torpedo aircraft, RAF Hendon, AC 74/12/2/10, p. 5. 199. Burns, ‘The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part I’, p. 151. 200. Ibid., p. 153. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 64–5. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 145. 201. Burns, ‘The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part I’, p. 153. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 65. 202. Ian Burns, Ben-my-Chree, Woman of My Heart: Isle of Man Packet Steamer and Seaplane Carrier (Leicester: Colin Huston, 2008), p. 81. 203. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 9. On the clock-code see, Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 342. 204. Jones, WIA, vol. III, pp. 6–13. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 151–3. Robert Gaudi, African Kaiser, General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa, 1914–1918, Kindle ebook (New York: Caliber, 2017), pp. 281–3. Wing Commander J. T. Cull, History of R.N.A.S. operations in East Africa, November 1914 to January 1917, AIR 1/725/106/1. Report of Fregatten-Kapitan Looff, 11 July 1915, German Narrative of Events Leading up to the Loss of the ‘Koenigsberg’, ADM 137/4297, pp. 2–5. 205. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 361–2. 206. Ibid., pp. 362–3. Bacon, The Dover Patrol, vol. I, pp. 114–5. 207. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 355. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p. 304. 208. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 355. ‘Grand Fleet Battle Orders. Volume I. August 1914 to May 31st, 1916’ & ‘Grand Fleet Battle Orders, Part VII. Sheets issued between Jan. 1916 and May 1916’. ADM 186/595. 209. Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol. II, p. 173. 210. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 4. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 164. See also, Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, pp. 309–10. Extract from Minutes of Conference held Onboard H.M.S. Iron Duke on 12 October 1916 between Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, C-in-C, Grand Fleet and Rear Admiral F. C. T. Tudor, 3rd Sea Lord, AIR 1/651, #138 in Roskill, Documents, p. 388. Jellicoe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 29 July 1915, ADM 137/1953, ff. 9–10, #152 in Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol. I, pp. 174–5. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p. 304.

Fleet Naval Aviation 69 211. Jellicoe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 29 July 1915, ADM 137/1953, #152 & Jellicoe to Beatty, 7 August 1915, #153 in Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol. I, pp. 173-5. ‘Letter No. 31/E/15 dated 8 October 1915 from Captain O. Schwann Commanding H.M.S. Campania to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Second Battle Squadron; covering letter by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, to Admiralty, dated 12 October 1915, and Minutes on above by Vice Admiral H. F. Oliver and Rear Admiral F. C. T. Tudor’, AIR 1/636, #80 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 226–9. See also, Layman, Naval Aviation in the First World War, p. 164. Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air, pp. 309–10. 212. Jellicoe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 29 July 1915, ADM 137/1953, #152 in Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol. I, p. 173. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 355. 213. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 364. 214. Ibid. 215. Letter No. 31/E/15 dated 8 October 1915 from Captain O. Schwann Commanding H.M.S. Campania to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Second Battle Squadron; covering Letter by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, ­Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, to Admiralty, dated 12 October 1915, and Minutes on above by Vice-Admiral H. F. Oliver and Rear Admiral F. C. T. Tudor, AIR 1/636, #80 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 226–9. 216. Ibid., pp. 396, 405. 217. Kender, ‘The Manica and the Foundation of the British Kite Balloon Service’, p. 226. 218. Ibid., p. 227. 219. Ian Burns and Roger Nailer, ‘HMS Vindex – Mixed Carrier 1915–19’, in CCIJ, vol. 17, no. 3 (1986), pp. 97–9. 220. Ibid., pp. 99–100. 221. Ibid., p. 100. 222. Extracts from Correspondence between Admiral Sir John Jellicoe and Admiralty, May-July 1916, AIR 1/648, #125 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 360–1. 223. Burns and Nailer, ‘HMS Vindex’, p. 103. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. III, p. 309. 224. Burns and Nailer, ‘HMS Vindex’, p. 101. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #8, pp. 22–5. 225. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. III, pp. 273–4, 290–1. Marder, FDSF, vol. II, pp. 421–3. 226. Burns and Nailer, ‘HMS Vindex’, pp. 101–2. Kemp, Fleet Air Arm, p. 55. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #8, p. 24. 227. Burns and Nailer, ‘HMS Vindex’, p. 104. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. III, pp. 310–11. 228. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. III, p. 311. 229. John Campbell, Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, first edition (New York: Lyons Press, 1998), p. 26. See also, Orders and Memoranda issued by the Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet for General Distribution, 1916 1st April to 30th June, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, 2 April 1916, ADM 137/2008, p. 39 & 39a. 230. Official Narrative of the Battle of Jutland: The movements of H.M.S. Campania, 12 November 1925–14 May 1926, AIR 1/671. 231. Marder, FDSF, vol. III, p. 49. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 405–6. ­Campbell, Jutland, p. 26. 232. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 406. Marder, FDSF, vol. III, p. 49. See also, Burns, The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, Chapter 9, loc. 1945–99.

70  Fleet Naval Aviation 233. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 405–6. 234. Ibid., p. 416. Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 187. Howlett, ‘The Royal Naval Air Service’, pp. 75–6. 235. Martin Kender, ‘The Manica and the Foundation of the British Kite Balloon Service’, in CCIJ, vol. 31, no. 4 (Winter 2000), pp. 226–7. Jones, ‘Ashore, Afloat and Airborne’, p. 39. Newbolt, Naval Operations, vol. IV, pp. 31–42. 236. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 407. 237. Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996), p. 107. 238. H. W. Fawcett and G. W. W. Hooper, eds., The Fighting at Jutland ­(Driffield: Oakpost Ltd., 2010), pp. 22–3. William Schleihauf, ed., ­Jutland: The Naval Staff Appreciation (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2016), pp. 54–5. Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 184–5. 239. Duncan Redford and Philip. D. Grove, The Royal Navy, A History Since 1900 (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014), pp. 67–8. Schleihauf, ed., Jutland: The Naval Staff Appreciation, pp. 47–55. 240. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 407–8. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol.  III, p. 333. Campbell, Jutland, pp. 33, 35. Marder, FDSF, vol. III, p. 63. Add. MSS.49014, ff. 40-58, ‘Documents relating to the Battle of Jutland. A. Signals, 30th and 31st May and 1st June 1916’ #228 in, Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol. I, pp. 291–2. 241. Campbell, Jutland, p. 35. Burns, The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, Chapter 9, loc. 2100. 242. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 408. 243. Marder, FDSF, vol. III, p. 50. Temple Patterson, Tyrwhitt of the Harwich Force, pp. 162–3. 244. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. III, p. 414. John Brooks, The Battle of Jutland (Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 439. 245. Burns and Nailer, ‘HMS Vindex’, p. 105. 246. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. III, p. 54. Cronin, Royal Navy Shipboard Aircraft Developments, pp. 157, 160–1. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, pp. 75–6, 80. 247. James Goldrick, After Jutland: The Naval War in North European Waters, June 1916–November 1918, Kindle ebook (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2018), Chapter 4, loc. 1457. Burns and Nailer, ‘HMS Vindex’, p. 105. 248. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 419. 249. Robbins, The Aircraft Carrier Story, p. 38. 250. Ibid., pp. 38–9. 251. Conference of the C-in-C Home Fleets with the Third Sea Lord on board HMS Iron Duke, 12 October 1916, AIR 1/651, #138 in Roskill, Documents, p. 388. 252. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 420–1. 253. Marder, FDSF, vol. III, pp. 313, 336–2. 254. Bell, Churchill And The Dardanelles, p. 128. 255. Samson, Fights and Flights, pp. 218–9. 256. R. C. M. Pink to DAS, Royal Naval Air Service, Communique No. 3, 22 December 1915, AIR 1/2577, p. 2. 257. Ash, Air Revolution, pp. 75–7. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’ p. 37. F. H. Sykes, From Many Angles (London: George Harrap Ltd., 1942), p. 165. 258. Report from Colonel F. H. Sykes, RFC, on the subject of RNAS units & aerial requirements of the Naval & Military Forces at Dardanelles, 9 July 1915, AIR 1/625/17/12.

Fleet Naval Aviation 71 259. W. A. B. Douglas, ‘The R.N.A.S. in Combined Operations 1914–1915’, in Dreadnought to Polaris: Maritime Strategy since Mahan, ed. A. M. J. Hyatt (Vancouver: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1973), p. 27. 260. Ash, Air Revolution, p. 77. Samson, Fights and Flights, pp. 255–6, 265. See also, Vice Admiral de Robeck to Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, 25 August 1915, AIR 1/361, #78 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 223–4. On the Gallipoli withdrawal decision see, Aspinall-Oglander, Gallipoli, vol.  II, p. 422. 261. Ash, Air Revolution, p. 86. Burns, Ben-my-Chree, p. 135. 262. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 370. 263. Ibid., p. 371. 264. Ibid., p. 374. 265. Ibid., p. 372. 266. Ian Burns, ‘Woman of My Heart – The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part I’, in CCIJ, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1975), pp. 145, 147–8. 267. Burns, ‘The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part I’, pp. 155–7. Cronin, Royal Navy Shipboard Aircraft Developments, pp. 200–1. Hugh & Robin Popham, eds., A Thirst for The Sea: The Sailing Adventures of Erskine Childers (London: Standford Maritime Limited, 1979), p. 20. 268. Samson, Fights and Flights, p. 294. 269. Ian Burns, ‘Woman of My Heart – The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part II’, in CCIJ, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1976), p. 1. 270. Paul G. Halpern, ed., The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, 1915–1918 (Aldershot, Hants: Temple Smith, 1987), p. 69. 271. Newbolt, Naval Operations, vol. IV, pp. 179, 210–12. 272. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 184-5. Burns, ‘The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part II’, p. 2. Samson, Fights and Flights, pp. 298–9, 302. 273. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 369. 274. Burns, ‘The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part II’, p. 3. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, pp. 37–8. 275. Burns, ‘The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part II’, p. 5. 276. Ibid., pp. 3, 5. 277. Burns, Ben-my-Chree, p. 201. 278. Flight Commander Brooke aboard HMS Empress to Officer Commanding East Indies & Egypt Seaplane Squadron, May 13, 1917, AIR 1/659. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 38. 279. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 155. Layman, Before the Aircraft Carrier, p. 76. 280. Newbolt, Naval Operations, vol. V, p. 78. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 282. 281. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 38. 282. Kemp, Fleet Air Arm, p. 75. 283. Marder, FDSF, vol. V, pp. 15–17. 284. Burns, The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, Chapter 10, loc. 2443–60. Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas to Admiral Beatty, Air Requirements of the Grand Fleet, 5 February 1917, AIR 1/648, p. 20. 285. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 37. 286. Seaplane Carriers, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, 5 January 1917, ADM 186/596, p. 45. 287. Airship Instructions, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, vol. II, 24 January 1917, ADM 116/1342, p. 416. 288. W. R. D. Acland, ‘The Development of the Fleet Air Arm’, in The Royal United Services Institution Journal, vol. 79, no. 514 (1934): 260–79,

72  Fleet Naval Aviation p.  261. Beatty to Admiralty, 21 January 1917, ADM 1/8475, #158 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 460–1. 289. Jones, ‘Ashore, Afloat and Airborne’, p. 38. 290. Redford and Grove, The Royal Navy, p. 96. Acland, ‘The Development of the Fleet Air Arm’, p. 261. RNAS Policy and Development, Paine reply, 30 January 1917, ADM 1/8478/10, p. 2. 291. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 4–6. 292. Report of Committee on Royal Naval Air Service. (H. F.0036/212 of 26 January 1917), 5 February 1917, AIR 1/648. ‘Air Requirements of the Grand Fleet’. No.299/H.F.0036, from Home Fleet C-in-C to Admiralty, 7 February 1917, AIR 1/648, p. 18. Report of Committee on Royal Naval Air Service. (H.F.0036/212 of 26th January 1917), AIR 1/648, p.  19. Admiralty notes on Grand Fleet Air Committee Report, 3 March 1917, AIR 1/648. See also, ‘Letter No. 299/H.F.0036 from Admiral Sir David Beatty to the Admiralty from H.M.S. Iron Duke dated 7 February 1917, enclosing the Report of the Grand Fleet Committee on Air Requirements’ #161 in Roskill, Documents, p. 453. 293. Hugh Evan-Thomas to Beatty, 26 January 1917, ADM 1/648, p. 20. Compare with Jellicoe’s 4 June 1915 memorandum in Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 355, and Joint War Air Committee, Paper Air 4, 3 March 1916, AIR 1/270, #106 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 309–11. 294. Hugh Evan-Thomas to Beatty, Report of Committee on Royal Naval Air Service, H.F.0036/212, 26 January 1917, ADM 1/648, p. 20. 295. Ibid., pp. 22, 24. 296. Ibid., p. 25. 297. Ibid., p. 23. 298. Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, p. 215. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 289–92. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 11. 299. Beatty to Secretary of the Admiralty, 7 February 1917, AIR 1/648, p. 18, or #161 in Roskill, Documents, p. 469. 300. Hugh Evan-Thomas to Beatty, Report of Committee on Royal Naval Air Service, H.F.0036/212, 26 January 1917, ADM 1/648, p. 26. 301. Air Requirements of the Grand Fleet, No. 299/H.F.0036, from Home Fleet C-in-C to Admiralty, 7 February 1917, AIR 1/648, p 18. Report of Committee on Royal Naval Air Service, H.F.0036/212, 26 January 1917, AIR 1/648, p. 19. Admiralty notes on Grand Fleet Air Committee Report, 3 March, 1917, AIR 1/648. 302. C-in-C Grand Fleet to Admiralty, Sketch and description of proposed seaplane carrier, 8 May 1916 & Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee to DNC, 11 May 1916, AIR 1/648. See also, Extracts from Correspondence between Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, C-in-C, Grand Fleet, and Admiralty regarding a 27-knot Seaplane Carrier, May–July 1916, AIR 1/648, #125 in Roskill, Documents, p. 360. Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919–1929, vol. I, 2 vols. ­(London: Collins, 1968–76), p. 263. 303. Armstrong Naval Yard, High Walker, Newcastle-on-Tyne, to S. V. Goodall, Esquire, 27 February 1917, AIR 1/648. Requirements of the Grand Fleet, Proposed Alterations to HMS Furious, 11 March 1917, AIR 1/648/17/122/383. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 291–2. 304. Ian M. Burns, ‘Some Raid That, By Cripes! HMS Furious and the Tondern Raid, 19 July 1918, Part 1’, CCIJ, vol. 49, no. 2 (2018): 83–109, p. 95. 305. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 27–31. 306. Rodger, The Admiralty, p. 121. 307. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 30 fn.

Fleet Naval Aviation 73 308. ‘Admiralty Memorandum on Naval Air Policy’, 23 August 1917, ­Appendix I in Jones, WIA, vol. IV. 309. Memorandum dated 30 August 1917 by Captain A. V. Vyvyan ‘For Director of Air Services’ addressed to 5th Sea Lord, and Minutes by Rear Admiral G. Paine, 5th Sea Lord, and Vice-Admiral H. F. Oliver, D.C.N.S., AIR 1/667 and ADM 1/8436, #188 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 536–41. 310. Ibid., pp. 539–40. 311. The Hermes plans were approved in April 1917, to be designed by Charles J. W. Hopkins, who had assisted John H. Narbeth, the Assistant Director of Naval Construction and principal designer, with HMS Eagle. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908–1918’, p. 237. Layman, ‘HMS Ark Royal’, p. 147. 312. ADM 1/8436 and AIR 1/667, in Roskill, Documents, p. 537. 313. Ibid., pp. 537, 539. 314. Ibid., pp. 537, 539–40. 315. Till, Air Power, pp. 137–9. 316. Extracts from Minutes of a Conference between Admiral Sir David Beatty, C-in-C, Grand Fleet, and Rear Admiral Lionel Halsey, 3rd Sea Lord, in August 1917, AIR 1/667, #186 in Roskill, Documents, p. 534. 317. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 24–5. 318. Ibid., p. 31. 319. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 26, 30–1. 320. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 53. 321. Dick Cronin, Royal Navy Shipboard Aircraft Developments, 1912–1931 (Tonbridge: Air Britain (Historians) Ltd., 1990), pp. 39–40, 61–3. 322. Robbins, The Aircraft Carrier Story, p. 42. 323. Richard Layman, ‘Hugh Williamson and the Development of the Aircraft Carrier’, in CCIJ, vol. 13, no. 2 (Summer 1982), p. 70. 324. Ibid., p. 71. 325. Ibid., p. 72. 326. Extract from Minutes of Conference held Onboard H.M.S. Iron Duke on 12 October 1916 between Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, C-in-C, Grand Fleet and Rear Admiral F. C. T. Tudor, 3rd Sea Lord, AIR 1/651, #138 in Roskill, Documents, p. 388. See also, Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 42. 327. Log of HMS Argus, 14 September 1918 to 31 January 1919, ADM 53/34046. Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War I, p. 84. 328. Layman, ‘Hugh Williamson’, p. 72. 329. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 22–3. 330. Committee on Deck Landing, Preliminary Report, 17 December 1917, AIR 1/662. 331. Ibid. 332. Director of Naval Construction Tennyson D’Eyncourt, Aircraft Carriers, part I, January 1919, NMM DEY/95, p. 7. 333. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 31–2. 334. Hobbs, ‘The First Pearl Harbor’, p. 29. 335. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 236. 336. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, vol. I (London: Collins, 1968), pp. 248–9. 337. Gamble, The Story of a North Sea Air Station, p. 109. 338. Commander Ireland’s report to R. N. Air Station, Great Yarmouth, 20 December 1915, AIR 1/659. 339. Ibid., p. 3.

74  Fleet Naval Aviation 340. Warner, Lighter Than Air, Chapter 4, loc., 3742. 341. Service record of Lt. Cmdr. W. P. de Courcy Ireland, ADM 273/2, p. 27. 342. Memorandum by Captain Murray F. Sueter, Superintendent of Aircraft Construction, on ‘Policy to be Followed as Regards Development and Use of Torpedo-Carrying Seaplanes’, dated 20 December 1916, with relevant Minutes by Members of the Board, ADM 1/8477, #150 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 434–43. 343. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 60, 69. Jellicoe, Crisis of the Naval War, pp. 10–14. 344. Article proposing a ‘Royal Air Service’ from the Globe of 13 October 1915, AIR 1/361, written by Sueter for Charles Palmer, editor of the Globe, #81 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 230–3. 345. Paul Halpern, ed., The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, 1915-1918 (Aldershot, Hants: Temple Smith, 1987), p. 241 fn. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 44. 346. Bruce Robertson ed., Sopwith – The Man and His Aircraft (Bedford: The Sidney Press, Ltd., 1970), p. 125. 347. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 458. 348. Robertson ed., Sopwith – The Man and His Aircraft, p. 125. Arthur Longmore, From Sea to Sky: 1910–1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), p. 67. 349. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 22. Philip MacDougall, When The Navy Took To The Air: The Experimental Seaplane Stations of the Royal Naval Air Service (Croydon: Fonthill Media, 2017), pp. 129–30. History of the development of torpedo aircraft, RAF Hendon, AC 74/12/2/10, p. 7. 350. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 33. H. F. King, Armament of British Aircraft, 1909–1939 (London: Putnam & Company Limited, 1971), p. 310. 351. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 22. C-in-C Grand Fleet to Admiralty, Considerations of an attack by torpedo planes on the High Sea Fleet, 11 September 1917, ADM 137/1938, pp. 104–6. 352. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 192. 353. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 21–2. 354. Memo by H. A. Williamson, ‘Torpedo Attack on German Fleet by Aircraft Proposals by Sqdn. CDR. Ireland’, Ireland (RNAS CO, Great Yarmouth) to Vaughan-Lee (DAS), 29 December 1915, AIR 1/659. 355. Marder, Portrait of an Admiral, The Life and Papers of Herbert Richmond, ed. Arthur Marder (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 269–70. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 237. Extracts from Letter No. 2243/H.F.0022 of 11 September 1917 from Admiral Sir David Beatty, C-in-C, Grand Fleet, to the Admiralty entitled ‘Considerations of an Attack by Torpedo Planes on the High Sea Fleet’ ADM 1/8486, #189 in Roskill, Documents, p. 541. Desmond Young, Rutland of Jutland (London: Cassell, 1963), p. 68. Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, p. 233. 356. Hobbs, ‘The First Pearl Harbor’, p. 31. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 463–4. 357. ‘Notes of a conference held on board H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth’, 24 August 1917, ADM 137/1420, #83 in Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol.  II, pp. 197–9. 358. Marder, Portrait of an Admiral, p. 270. 359. Extracts from ‘… Admiral Sir David Beatty, C-in-C, Grand Fleet, to the Admiralty entitled ‘Considerations of an Attack by Torpedo Planes on the High Sea Fleet’. 11 September 1917, ADM 1/8486, #189 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 541–3. AIR 1/6641, according to Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 198 n7. Hobbs, ‘The First Pearl Harbor’, p. 34. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 50.

Fleet Naval Aviation 75 360. Air Raids Committee of the War Cabinet, first meeting 1 October 1917, Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 239 fn. 361. Colonel C. R. Samson, Suggested Aeroplane Offensive, 4 May 1918, ADM 1/8525/136. 362. Ibid., p. 1. 363. Ibid., p. 2. 364. Ibid., p. 5. 365. Newman, ‘Pioneering Torpedo Training at East Fortune 1918’, CCIJ, vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn 2005), pp. 150–1. 366. Stockholm was the original name of the seaplane carrier Pegasus, formerly a cargo and passenger steamer being built for the Great Eastern Railway and completed as a 21-knot seaplane carrier in September 1917. Burns, The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, Chapter 10, loc. 2315. Admiral Beatty, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, 22 July 1917 & 5 September 1917, ADM 116/1342. Director of Naval Construction Tennyson D’Eyncourt, Aircraft Carriers, part I, January 1919, NMM DEY/95 p. 10. 367. ‘Letter No. 2353/H.F. 0036 of 24 September 1917 from Admiral Sir David Beatty, C-in-C, Grand Fleet, to the Admiralty entitled “Aircraft Requirements of the Grand Fleet”’, ADM 1/8486, #192 in Roskill, Documents, p. 547. 368. ‘Letter No. 2353/H.F. 0036 of 24 September 1917 from Admiral Sir David Beatty, C-in-C, Grand Fleet, to the Admiralty entitled “Aircraft Requirements of the Grand Fleet”’, ADM 1/8486, #192 in Roskill, Documents, p. 546. 369. Beatty to Admiralty, 19 November 1917, ADM 1/8504, #207 in Roskill, Documents, p. 586. 370. Admiral Beatty, Appointment of Flag Officer for Command of Seaplane Carriers, etc. of the Grand Fleet, 19 November 1917, ADM 1/8504, #207 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 586–7. 371. Ibid., p. 586. For the complete operations of HMS Furious while flagship of the Flying Squadron, see Appendix 2: HMS Furious Operations, 1917 and 1918 in Burns, The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, ADM 137/876 & ADM 137/877. 372. Roskill, Documents, p. 586. 373. Beatty’s draft of the ACA functions, 29 December 1917, ADM 1/8504. 374. The creation of the RAF had been decided upon at the War Cabinet meeting of 24 August 1917. Roskill, Documents, p. 587. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, p. 104. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 13. 375. Roskill, Documents, p. 587. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 332–3. 376. Beatty draft of ACA functions, 29 December 1917, ADM 1/8504. 377. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 34. 378. Director of Naval Construction Tennyson D’Eyncourt, Aircraft Carrier, part I, 1918, NMM DEY/95, p. 7. 379. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 397–8. Burns, The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, Chapter 6, loc. 1478. 380. Bell Davies, Sailor in the Air, p. 172. 381. Ibid., p 177. 382. Ibid. 383. Ian Burns, ‘Some Raid That, By Cripes! HMS Furious and the Tondern Raid, Part 1, 19 July 1918’, CCIJ, vol. 49, no. 2 (Summer 2018), pp. 83–109 & ‘Some Raid That, By Cripes! HMS Furious and the Tondern Raid, Part 2, 19 July 1918’, in CCIJ, vol. 49, no. 3 (Autumn 2018), pp. 169–196 & The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, Chapter 14, loc. 3274.

76  Fleet Naval Aviation 384. Phillimore to Beatty, 2 July 1918, Grand Fleet: secret and personal telegrams, Commander-in-Chief’s copies, ADM 137/2064. 385. Dick Cronin, ‘Tondern: Prelude, Climax and Aftermath’ in CCIJ, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer, 1994), pp. 59–60. 386. Ibid., p. 59. 387. Cronin, ‘Tondern: Prelude, Climax and Aftermath’, p. 60. 388. Beatty to Phillimore, 16 July 1918, Grand Fleet: secret and personal telegrams, Commander-in-Chief’s copies, ADM 137/2064. 389. Cronin, ‘Tondern: Prelude, Climax and Aftermath’, p. 60. 390. Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, p. 144. Scheer, High Sea Fleet, p. 396, Goldrick, After Jutland, Chapter 13, loc. 5269. 391. Pilots were Capt. W. D. Jackson, Capt. W. F. Dickson, Lt. N. E. Williams, Capt. B. A. Smart, Capt T. K. Thyne, Lt. S. Dawson and Lt. W. A. Yeullett. Cronin, ‘Tondern: Prelude, Climax and Aftermath’, p. 61. Phillimore to Beatty, 20 July 1918, ‘Grand Fleet: secret and personal telegrams, Commander-in-Chief’s copies’, ADM 137/2064. 392. Phillimore to Beatty, 20 July 1918 & Air Ministry to Beatty, 25 July 1918, ‘Grand Fleet: secret and personal telegrams, Commander-in-Chief’s copies’, ADM 137/2064. 393. Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 456. 394. Bell Davies, Sailor in the Air, p 178. Cronin, ‘Tondern: Prelude, Climax and Aftermath’, p. 68. 395. Beatty to Admiralty, 11 August 1918, AIR 1/643, #265 in Roskill, Documents, p. 699. 396. Admiral David Beatty, Grand Fleet Air Orders, August–November 1918, ADM 137/401, pp. 24–32. 397. Royal Air Force, State of Personnel and Material with Grand Fleet, 1st December 1918, IWM RFP/10. 398. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 359. 399. Future Distribution of Aircraft Carriers, 2 February 1919, ADM 1/8550/28. See also, ‘C.B. 973. Naval War Manual’ Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division, 1925 October, ADM 186/66, pp. 49–58. ‘From Rear-Admiral R. F. Phillimore’, 25 January 1919, NMM BTY 13/30/2, reproduced as #6 in Bryan Ranft, ed., The Beatty Papers, vol. II, ­(Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1993), pp. 19–21. Grove, ‘The Naval Aviation Controversy, 1919–1939’. Eric Grove, ‘The Discovery of Doctrine: British Naval Thinking at the Close of the Twentieth Century’, in The Development of British Naval Thinking, ed. Geoffrey Till (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 183. 400. Robert Rubel, ‘A Theory of Naval Airpower’, in Naval War College Review, vol. 67, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 63–80, p. 65 et seq. 401. Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 472–5. Newman, ‘Pioneering Torpedo Training at East Fortune’, p. 151. 402. Burns, The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, Chapter 17, loc. 4274. 403. Till, Air Power, p. 143. 404. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive, p. 37. 405. Popham, Into Wind, p. 84. Lewis, Squadron Histories: RFC, RNAS, and RAF, 1912–1959 (London: Putnam, 1959), pp. 68–88. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, 1911–1919, pp. 432–40. Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, p. 30.

2

Anti-Submarine Warfare

The German U-boat threat was the greatest naval threat the Allies faced during the First World War. Royal Naval officers, since the inception of aviation, were quick to realize the potential of the Naval Wing as a response to the submarine threat, yet specialized aircraft remained on the drawing board until prioritized by wartime necessity. Technical progress hinged on a few key innovators who were able to develop justin-time solutions: Sir John Fisher’s Sea Scout blimps (1915), J. C. Porte’s Felixstowe flying boats, responsible for the famous ‘Spider Web’ patrols (1917), and then H. A. Williamson’s work on the Blackburn Kangaroo (1918) were all vital, but not individually sufficient, to prevent British, Allied, and neutral shipping losses. The Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) contribution to the suppression and defeat of the U-boats developed along three distinct lines: first, naval aircraft provided continuous patrol over the North Sea, Mediterranean, English Channel, and the Western Approaches, searching for submarines and preventing their unhindered access to the surface (where a submarine’s diesel engines provided increased speed and recharged the boat’s batteries) – hundreds of aircraft and airships conducted daylight patrols of the coasts of the British Isles with the goal of restricting U-boat access to the surface. Second, RNAS flying boats, seaplanes, and airships flew escort missions for convoys, thereby protecting Allied and British shipping from U-boat attack. Third, RNAS bombers directly attacked the U-boat bases along the Belgian coast at Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Bruges, thus diverting the enemy’s resources to air defence, and creating a constant source of difficulty for the U-boat crews and their dockyard support.1 This chapter focuses on the first two roles – the bombing campaign against Germany’s submarine bases from RNAS Dunkirk is discussed in Chapter 3, Long-Range Bombing. Although significant improvements were made in terms of A/S weaponry, aircraft, and doctrine, especially during the 1917–1918 crisis of the naval war, the most common application of RNAS airships, aircraft, and kite-balloons remained, throughout the war, in the deterrent role: aimed at preventing submarine attack.

78  Anti-Submarine Warfare The War Cabinet and Admiralty drama surrounding the introduction of organized merchant convoys during the 1917–1918 submarine crisis has been thoroughly studied, 2 but the aircraft and airship contribution to convoy escort much less so, despite aircraft being a vital contribution to the convoy system: U-boats were extremely reticent to attack convoys if they were defended by both surface and air escorts. Indeed, until December 1917 there were no cases of U-boats attacking a convoy with both surface and air (or airship) escort and, from then until the end of the war, only eight cases have been accounted – resulting in the total loss of a mere five vessels.3 The subject of submarines, their development potential for coastal defence and integration into the fleet, were a topic of frequent discussion in the Royal Navy prior to the outbreak of the war. Between 1912 and 1914, a group of undersea warfare specialists in the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, and the Naval Wing, theorized that aircraft would play an important role in ASW. At the same time, as the first coastal air stations and airship sheds were being built, experiments were carried out to determine if aircraft could locate and attack submerged submarines. The impression held after the First World War that little had been done by the Royal Navy to prepare for ASW is not entirely correct – although it is fair to note that efforts were still in the experimental stage when the war began.4 The outbreak of war, as we have seen, caused tremendous disruption to the organization and mission of the RNAS. Resources were transferred first to the Belgian coast (Samson’s pioneering use of armoured cars and airplanes is a case in point) and then to the Dardanelles. During this initial phase of the war, when the RNAS was also responsible for the aerial defence of Britain, Germany’s U-boats were quick to emerge as a threat to the fleet’s warships. The losses of HMS Pathfinder, Cressy, Hogue, Aboukir, Formidable, Hawke, and the seaplane carrier Hermes, within the first six months of conflict, testified to the reality of the submarine threat. These were not insignificant losses, but it was in the role of merchant shipping interdiction and destruction that the U-boats were to prove the greatest peril to the Allied war effort. While Germany’s overseas squadrons and surface raiders were quickly destroyed or bottled up in neutral ports, the U-boat emerged as a formidable instrument in the oceanic trade war. The first phase of this vast contest began on 4 February 1915 with the declaration of the ‘War Zone’ around the British Isles.5 Diplomatic pressure, specifically the deterrent effect of warnings from the United States following the sinking of the Lusitania by U20 on 7 May 1915 and then the Arabic by U24 on 19 August, was enough to prompt the German High Command to rein in the U-boats. This cycle was repeated following the February 1916 resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare – until UB29 torpedoed the Sussex on 24 March

Anti-Submarine Warfare 79 and thus prompted another round of threats from the United States.6 The U-boats, by May 1916 nevertheless, had destroyed just over a million tons of British shipping and, although the loss rate declined during the summer as the U-boats were withdrawn to work with the High Sea Fleet, by the end of September British merchant losses had reached 107,000 tons per month, with another 170,000 tons sunk that October.7 The inability of the High Sea Fleet to defeat the Grand Fleet during the Battle of Jutland, followed by Admiral Reinhard Scheer’s likewise unsuccessful August sortie, demonstrated that a new naval strategy was needed. Chief of the German Naval Staff Admiral von Holtzendorff was eager to renew the unrestricted submarine campaign, believing it to be the best chance to defeat Britain in 1917.8 The Royal Navy’s initial responses to Germany’s foray into unrestricted submarine warfare were hesitant and inadequate, and this was fully exposed early in 1917 when the U-boats unleashed a systematic effort to destroy British, Allied, and neutral merchant shipping. In February, over 500,000 tons were sunk, a loss rate that increased to 600,000 in March, before reaching the wartime high of 850,000 tons in April.9 The result of this action, as Germany’s leaders expected, was the declaration of war by the United States against Germany on 6 April. It was imagined, by Ludendorff and the General Staff, that this development would be of little consequence if the U-boats could cut Britain’s oceanic supply lines before the addition of American industry and manpower were able to tell in the Allies’ favour.10 At the height of the 1917 crisis, the Admiralty reshuffled the Naval Staff by appointing Sir Eric Geddes overall Shipping Controller with responsibility for all naval and merchant shipping, amongst other duties. At the end of May, Vice Admiral Henry Oliver’s position of Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) was merged with the First Sea Lord’s office and Jellicoe assumed responsibility for both. Oliver was made Deputy Chief of Staff and held that office until January 1918.11 Alexander Duff was promoted to Assistant Chief of Staff and William Fisher took over the Anti-Submarine Division (ASD), which now acquired an Air Section (Section 11) under Wing Commander Hugh Williamson. Captain Richard Webb, meanwhile, continued as head of the Trade Division – where he had been installed since 1914. Ultimately, it was these officers who were responsible for the introduction and coordination of an elaborate system of merchant convoys, escorted by both air and surface assets, that salvaged the situation. By the spring of 1917, there had been three successful efforts to regularize convoys for the most vital supplies: first, the cross-Channel coal trade, which supplied France with more than a million tons of coal every month, had been regularized into a series of protected sailings that were virtually immune to attack: of the 37,927 ships convoyed in the coal trade from inception on 10 February 1917 to the end of the war, only

80  Anti-Submarine Warfare 53 were lost.12 Second, the Scandinavian ore trade, a tenuous supply line between the Orkneys and the coast of Norway that supplied Britain with iron and other heavy metals, was likewise organized into convoys.13 Although highly successful, this route was attacked on several occasions, including by German surface elements. Third, the essential Dutch ‘beef trips’, that kept Britain supplied with foodstuff from the Netherlands, was put under escorted convoy by Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt and the Harwich Force.14 With these successful examples in the Channel and North Sea it was soon obvious that inbound and outbound Atlantic convoys should be organized, as was done in the summer and fall.15 Without labouring the issue, it can be said that the logic of convoy was ultimately irrefutable: all criticism of the introduction of convoys was eventually revealed to have been based on specious reasoning or erroneous data, which furthermore contradicted the Royal Navy’s own history and experience during the 18th and early 19th century wars with France, Spain, Napoleon, and the United States: the enforcement of convoy regulations had, in fact, been legislated by the Convoy Act of 1798.16 With inbound Atlantic convoys adopted by July 1917, alongside a greatly expanded set of countermeasures that Jellicoe was tirelessly introducing, shipping losses began to decline. When outbound Atlantic convoys began to be convoyed in September, only 186,647 tons of British shipping was lost, and it became clear that the worst of the crisis had been surmounted.17 British merchant shipping losses, nevertheless, continued to fluctuate around this level until the final months of the war, suggesting that the U-boat threat was never completely neutralized, although it was successfully contained.18 Throughout the war, the RNAS acted alongside the Navy as an important instrument of ASW, multiplying the effectiveness of convoy escort while simultaneously creating a real threat that decreased the effectiveness of the U-boats. A vast combination of non-rigid airships, flying boats, air and seaplanes, executed the RNAS air patrol mission. Thousands of hours of A/S patrols were flown over the North Sea, English Channel, Western Approaches, and the Mediterranean, restricting the U-boats’ freedom of action, inflicting damage, and in at least one case in 1918, actually sinking a U-boat from air attack. This gradual accumulation of aerial A/S experience was compiled by the Naval Staff and then published, creating a series of manuals for pilot and observer training, indeed, demonstrating the fundamentals of operational research and organizational learning. Aircraft were so essential to the Navy’s conduct of ASW that an Air Section was added to the ASD and, in January 1918, a separate Air Division of the staff was created primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with ASW. As with the other RNAS roles, aerial ASW began as prewar theory before evolving into a core component of the RNAS mission-set. When the Royal Air Force (RAF) was formed on 1 April 1918, the third service

Anti-Submarine Warfare 81 inherited the Air Department’s fully evolved A/S system, by then organized into large regional air groups for coastal patrols and for flying daylight escort missions over Allied merchant convoys.

Aircraft Against Submarines: Prewar Theory The Naval Wing of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) experienced a flurry of theoretical and experimental innovation during the two years immediately preceding the outbreak of war. This was a pioneering era in which progress was made against a backdrop of setbacks and reversals. The first experiments conducted by the Royal Navy, with the goal of developing aerial A/S methods, were the result of First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher’s secret A/S committee, which had been created in April 1909. During June and July that year, experiments were carried out at the Vernon torpedo school in Portsmouth. Various methods of attack and detection were tested on eight A-class submarines.19 Fisher, who retired on his sixty-ninth birthday, 25 January 1910, was succeeded as First Sea Lord by Admiral Arthur Wilson and, in March, Rear Admiral Cecil Burney was appointed president of the reconstituted Submarine Committee. Additional A/S trials were carried out in July and August that year, and again in 1911, including exercises with the Home Fleet’s battleships. 20 Burney was succeeded by Vice Admiral Frederick Sturdee in 1911 and Sturdee, in turn, was replaced by Rear Admiral Currey and then Rear Admiral Tupper. Rear Admiral Robert Phipps Hornby was the final committee president, appointed in May 1914. 21 Two of the more pertinent trials were carried out in June, at Harwich, and in September, at Rosyth, during 1912, to determine if seaplanes could, in fact, detect submarines from the air. 22 Using the destroyer HMS Crusader as a base, Naval Wing airplanes attempted to determine if aircraft could detect and attack submerged submarines, a crucial component of modern ASW.23 Eastchurch’s Commander Charles Samson, while conducting experiments at the Firth of Forth in October that year, was able to demonstrate that periscopes could indeed be spotted from the air, and that the submarine’s trailing oil slick was visible ‘from altitudes between 1,200 and 3,000 feet’. 24 Critically, Samson demonstrated that communication between aircraft and destroyers was possible using a combination of flares, klaxons, and, on the part of friendly ships, sirens and semaphore. Director of the Air Department (DAD) Captain Murray Sueter was himself a specialist in submarine and mine warfare, having published several works on the subject, 25 and, in an Air Committee report for August 1912, Sueter had listed ‘assisting destroyers to detect and destroy submarines’ as a fundamental duty of naval aircraft. 26 The culmination of this prewar research was the utilization of Naval Wing seaplanes at the 1913 naval maneuvers, during which A/S methods were put to the test (see below).

82  Anti-Submarine Warfare In the burgeoning field of aerial ASW, the Royal Navy had every reason to expect success from the Naval Wing, although the focus was clearly on detecting – as opposed to destroying – submarines. During this formative prewar period, Lieutenant Hugh Williamson was one of the Navy’s most influential submarine, torpedo, and mine warfare practitioners. He realized the importance of aircraft in the A/S role: Williamson earned his pilot’s certificate in 1911 and then attended the Central Flying School (CFS) in September 1913. 27 In December 1911 Williamson composed, and then in January forwarded to the Admiralty, a memorandum exploring the possibilities of using aircraft for ASW. 28 Therein, Williamson described a specialized A/S warship of 20 knots that he intended to transport submarine-hunting aircraft and be capable of launching flights of two to four seaplanes. Once a submarine was sighted, additional aircraft armed with bombs would launch and attempt to attack the submarine until destroyers arrived on the scene. 29 Williamson had, in fact, visualized the essentials of the escort, or helicopter, carrier concept. He was also aware that aircraft could exert pressure on submarines simply by forcing them to submerge, thus draining their batteries and denying them access to the surface. 30 Williamson was by no means alone as an A/S theorist in this regard. Lieutenant Charles Dennistoun Burney, after a stint working for his father, Admiral Cecil Burney, on the Submarine Committee in 1911, was placed on half-pay so that he could work as a contractor for the Bristol Corporation developing seaplanes. 31 In 1913, Lt. Burney wrote an article for the Naval Review discussing the subject of naval aviation. 32 Submarine warfare was a significant topic for the 1913 Naval Review, but it was Lt. Burney who raised the possibility of aviation, specifically, functioning in the A/S role. 33 Burney believed that airplanes would be capable of spotting submarines, both on the surface by their periscopes, and while submerged in clear water. Burney, like Williamson, also believed that airplanes would be best employed as scouts for the fleet, attacking submarines if the opportunity arose. 34 Another important practitioner was Captain G. W. Vivian, who had commanded the converted carrier HMS Hermes at the 1913 naval maneuvers. Afterwards, Vivian produced a lecture on the uses of seaplanes that was delivered in December that year at the Royal Navy’s War College, Portsmouth.35 Vivian pointed out that submarines would be most vulnerable in the clear water of the Mediterranean, whereas the stormy North Sea would provide some measure of protection for submerged submarines. Vivian, like the other prewar theorists, suspected that seaplanes would be most useful in detecting and reporting submarines, rather than directly attacking them, although he also recognized that an attack capability would likely be developed in the near future. 36

Anti-Submarine Warfare 83 Vivian, like Burney, Williamson, and Sueter, believed that seaplanes should be designed specifically to hunt for submarines; indeed, there was general agreement amongst air-minded naval officers that airplanes would play an important A/S role in the future. Beginning in November 1912, Churchill’s administration started to construct a series of airship sheds and air stations along the east coast of England (see Chapter 1). Once the bases were in place, RNAS squadrons were deployed to fly coastal patrol missions. In an early example of district command, the Admiral of Patrols, Commodore George Ballard after 1 May 1914, was assigned a prewar air establishment of 50 wireless-telegraphy (W/T)-equipped aircraft, with responsibility for the eastern seaboard.37 The Naval Wing at that time was comprised of 35 airplanes, with 30 of those stationed at Eastchurch, and 55 seaplanes spread across five seaplane stations. Commodore Ballard intended to use his aircraft in combination with surface flotillas and Royal Navy submarines to conduct both coastal and long-range patrols.38 One of the experimental hurdles to overcome was to devise a reliable method of bomb-dropping, essential for the airplane’s future success as an offensive instrument in the A/S role. Vivian and Burney, as we have seen, were in agreement that it was not only possible but, in fact, probable, that bombs would be used to attack submarines in the future. Burney favoured small projectiles of 30 lbs, whereas, Vivian discussed the development of 100-lb bombs.39 Experiments carried out at the beginning of 1914 by Commander Samson, with assistance from Lieutenant Robert Clark-Hall, determined that 100-lb bombs could be dropped safely from 350 ft.40 It was soon discovered that 230-lb bombs were the best compromise between aircraft-carrying capacity and hitting power, although the first 230-lb bombs were not deployed until May 1917.41 By 1918, the effectiveness of the 230-lb bombs was in doubt and specially designed 520-lb A/S bombs were introduced for use with the Blackburn Kangaroo aircraft.42 Sueter, Williamson, Vivian, Burney, and others, knew that submarines were a threat and that the Naval Wing ought to be doing more to counter that threat. There was general agreement that new surface ships would have to be designed to conduct A/S search and destroy missions. Airships, in association with their function as fleet scouts (see Chapter 1), would likely provide some form of A/S support. Once an enemy submarine was located, airplanes would target it with bombs, and, if the airplane carried a W/T transmitter, report back to the fleet or coastal station so that destroyers could be vectored onto the submarine’s location. How did the Admiralty perceive this flurry of experimentation? Churchill, in a March 1913 address to the Commons, predicted that the Naval Wing would indeed play a role locating and destroying submarines in the near future.43 On 26 October, the First Lord authored a

84  Anti-Submarine Warfare minute elaborating the tactical missions required of Britain’s naval aviators; Churchill did not specifically mention an A/S capability in this case as he was focused instead on aerial patrols more generally.44 By the spring of 1914, however, Churchill believed that aircraft would indeed play a key role in support of trade protection, both warning merchant shipping of the presence of raiders and locating submarines from the air.45 Tellingly, merchant raiders and submarines, in the First Lord’s eyes, were not yet considered as synonymous. The Royal Navy’s practitioners, including especially the Naval Wing in the early years of King George V’s reign, were greatly concerned about the emerging technology and techniques of ASW. However, when war broke out in 1914, no solution had yet presented itself. In part, this was a purely technical problem: the large and long-range airplanes, airships, and seaplanes, capable of carrying heavy ordnance and the necessary W/T equipment, had not yet been developed. Although the material equipment had to be improved, the essential role of aircraft in ASW was accepted, if not completely elaborated. An Air Department lecture given in 1913 on aircraft, for example, focused exclusively on the technical aspects of airplanes and airships and did not specifically mention any A/S role. In December that year, the Navy established a program to investigate the best method for air attack against submarines.46 The 1913 naval maneuvers provided the most realistic testing grounds for experimenting with prewar aerial ASW. Seaplanes, equipped with W/T sets, deployed from HMS Hermes and were able to successfully transmit Morse code containing submarine contact reports.47 Three patrols were organized at Cromarty NAS, with the result that contact reports were ‘immediately sent to the Naval Intelligence Centre, situated at the Coastguard Station, who repeated it by wireless to the Senior Officer of Patrols stationed at Fortrose’. Torpedo boats were dispatched in response, and these were deemed by the umpires to have put submarine D3 out of action.48 It is important to note, however, that the focus of these trials, like all the prewar experiments, were on providing the fleet with an offensive aerial A/S capability, rather than developing methods for protecting merchant shipping. This oversight is significant as several prominent naval practitioners had, in fact, raised alarm before the war that submarines would likely act in the trade interdiction role – as the U-boats did, indeed, begin to do in February 1915. The aerial coastal patrol scheme favoured by First Lord Churchill was actually a system of defence against Zeppelins, for which the Navy was responsible between August 1914 and February 1916 (see Chapter 4). The initial losses of warships to U-boat attack during the fall and winter of 1914 seemed to emphasize that it was in this capacity that the submarine was most threatening, creating a false sense of security regarding merchant shipping.

Anti-Submarine Warfare 85 Admiral Fisher, retired but still active as a naval promoter and technical advisor, predicted in a paper that he forwarded to Prime Minister Asquith in January 1914, that the submarine would, in all probability, emerge as a counter-blockade weapon and Fisher also pointed out that at present ‘no means exist of preventing hostile submarines emerging from their own ports and cruising more or less at will’.49 Williamson, in his March 1912 paper, was of the same opinion, having stated that no defence existed to prevent submarines from acting as counterblockade vessels near a friendly port, despite the Naval Wing developments to date.50 Fisher and Williamson’s concerns were amplified by Admiral Sir Percy Scott who, in an article he wrote for the Times early in 1914, explicitly predicted that the submarine, in wartime, probably would be utilized as a commerce raider – violating the strictures of international law meant to protect the crews of merchant ships from belligerent attack.51 Although a number of naval officers shared Scott’s concerns, others, such as Rear Admiral Reginald Bacon, were skeptical that a power such as Germany would stoop to such uncivilized methods of war.52 The prewar debate regarding the submarine’s role as a commerce raider was ultimately inconclusive, with powerful voices advocating both thesis and antithesis, yet no consensus emerged. In fact, both sides of the debate were at least partially correct. After 1 July 1914, the RNAS adopted A/S patrol and base bombing as its primary contribution to ASW. Local commanders, not directly engaged in Churchill’s initiatives, had to make use of the RNAS squadrons attached to the air stations in their naval districts, which meant that initially there was little coordination of efforts, a situation that was compounded by the relentless struggle for resources, as the RNAS was quickly dispersed to distant theatres. This situation did not change until the Air Department was reorganized in July 1915.

Introduction of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare Churchill, with the war underway, began to implement his sweeping offensive plans. For the RNAS, this meant a rapid deployment to the continent. The first air patrols were flown to provide coverage of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) as it crossed over to France in August 1914 – considered, with hindsight, to be a great missed opportunity for the U-boats to inflict a crippling blow before the arrival of the British Army in France.53 With Churchill orchestrating the defence at Antwerp, and Samson racing around the Belgian countryside in his armoured cars, the responsibility for covering the Channel and Belgian coast fell to Squadron Commander Arthur Longmore’s No. 1 Wing, which was presently deployed to Dunkirk. While undertaking these overseas functions, the RNAS was also responsible for protecting the English mainland from attack: this meant

86  Anti-Submarine Warfare patrolling the coast for approaching Zeppelins and enemy surface vessels (see Chapter 4). When Admiral Fisher returned to the Admiralty on 30 October, he recognized the need for a stop-gap measure to fill in for the missing seaplanes that were desperately required for routine A/S patrols. The Navy had by now suffered a series of significant warship losses to submarines and mines, as we have seen, and Fisher was determined to do something about it. The First Sea Lord, therefore, held a meeting on 31 October with the result that George Holt Thomas, a civilian technical advisor for the Aircraft Manufacturing Company Limited (Airco), was appointed to design a prototype A/S flying machine.54 The rushed planning for the Dardanelles campaign, however, soon distracted the Admiralty and it was not until 28 February 1915, after Germany declared the War Zone around Britain, that Fisher was able to mobilize the Air Department to actually deliver the blimps he imagined for the A/S role.55 Writing to Grand Fleet C-in-C Admiral Jellicoe, Fisher described these ‘Sea Scouts’ (SS) as potential submarine destroyers (Fisher’s phrase, typically rendered in all capitals) and it has since been noted that Fisher and his team had essentially invented the precursor to the helicopter.56 Sueter, with the First Sea Lord’s support, tasked Wing Commander E. A. D. Masterman, the most senior airship officer in the RNAS and the CO of Farnborough airship station, 57 alongside airship pioneer Wing Commander N. F. Usborne and his Kingsnorth factory, to develop the emergency program. The first machine was primarily designed by Holt Thomas and was completed in only three weeks, built from prefabricated components: a single Willows envelope coupled to a BE2 aircraft fuselage, sporting a 70-hp Renault engine that provided for 8 hours’ endurance at 40 to 50 mph.58 A second prototype, designed by Wing Commander Usborne, followed shortly afterwards, but it was the third model, Sea Scout 3, that then went into production. These scouts were fitted with a W/T transmitter and receiver set and could carry up to 160 lbs of bombs. By June 1915, there were 50 Sea Scouts on order, although only 13 were actually delivered by the end of that year.59 Fisher, however, had departed the Admiralty by that point as a result of his resignation during the May Crisis (see Chapter  1). He instead took on the task of developing wartime technology under the guidance of the Board of Invention and Research (BIR), of which he was made chairman – a Royal Navy think tank that first met on 19 July 1915 at the Hotel Metropole. Fisher continued his advocacy for aerial research, appointing Professor R. J. Strutt (later fourth Baron Rayleigh, son of the chairman of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Lord Rayleigh, and a physics professor at Imperial College London) to oversee the BIR’s airship, aeroplane, and seaplane subcommittees.60 In May 1915, the larger Coastal (C)-type non-rigid airships were introduced. These were another of Usborne’s blimp projects, composed in this case of two Avro aircraft fuselages attached back-to-back with

Anti-Submarine Warfare 87 lift provided by a ‘tri-lobe’ balloon.61 Improved versions of all the A/S and patrol blimps were manufactured as the war continued, and the Sea Scout was eventually replaced by the improved SSZ or type-Zero. While the original SS could carry 160 lbs of bombs for 8 hours, the SSZs could carry 350 lbs with endurance for 12 hours, a testament to the exponential improvement in, what was, in fact, completely new technology developed over the course of only two years. 36 Sea Scouts entered service during the war, plus 66 of the improved SSZs. 31 C-type and 22 C* (Coastal-Star) also entered service. The largest non-rigid airships built for the Royal Navy were the 12 North Sea-type, with a crew of ten and capacity for 700 lbs of bombs carried for over 20 hours.62 The Royal Navy also engineered its own rigid airships (see Chapter 1) and those began to join the fleet late in 1917, although their function proved to be mainly in a training and coastal reconnaissance role, with one notable exception (see below). The non-rigid airships, to summarize, were a relative success: one of the few bright spots against an otherwise dismal backdrop at the Hotel Cecil during 1915. The commitments at the Dardanelles and East Africa, in addition to the responsibility for the air defence of Britain, ‘strained the limited resources of the RNAS’, and only a few coastal stations were able to carry out regular air patrols.63 Sueter, for his part, had ordered the development of prototype flying boats in the fall of 1914, based on the recommendations of Squadron Commander J. C. Porte, and success with these prompted an order, in March 1915, for 50 of these H4-type machines.64 After the May Crisis, the Air Department was reorganized by the incoming Admiralty administration of Admiral Sir Henry Jackson and former Prime Minister Arthur Balfour. The result was a major administrative transformation, in stages, beginning with the declaration on 29  July that the RNAS was henceforth absorbed into the Navy. The immediate result of this policy was to place the RNAS station commanders directly at the disposal of their district Senior Naval Officers (SNOs) who were now responsible for devising and carrying out any required air patrol missions.65 This was the model of the Coast Guard as applied to the RNAS, something Churchill had proposed in 1913, and been opposed by Sueter in February 1914, who, however, later came around to the idea in January 1915.66 Balfour’s primary concern for the remainder of 1915 was preventing, or at least responding to, the Zeppelin attacks against London (see Chapter 4). High-altitude antiZeppelin sweeps were thus prioritized at the expense of lower altitude coastal A/S patrols.67 By decentralizing the RNAS, Balfour put the onus on the naval air stations to find means of carrying out the counter-U-boat offensive, however, with resources stretched to the limits, this was no easy task. Balfour’s decentralized system had the benefit of improving response

88  Anti-Submarine Warfare times, but at the cost of regional concentration of force. What were actually needed were supra-district, or regional, commands to unite the disconnected RNAS stations into coherent groups, better suited to take advantage of intelligence, communications, and inter-service cooperation. The basis for this supra-district structure actually existed, in the prototype form of the senior district commanders. The most significant of which were the Rear Admiral East Coast of England (George Ballard), the Commodore Lowestoft (Alfred Ellison), the C-in-C Dover Patrol (Vice Admiral Reginald Bacon), the C-in-C the Nore (Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Callaghan), and the Harwich Force commander (Commodore Tyrwhitt). Each of these regional commands was assisted by his associated senior RNAS commander. Admiral Callaghan, for example, was supported by Wing Commander Henry Smyth-Osbourne, who acted in the capacity of District Commander of Aircraft. Wing Commander Smyth-Osbourne controlled the stations at Eastchurch, the Isle of Grain and Westgate, and, on 12 June 1916, he was appointed directly to the C-in-C the Nore’s staff.68 Likewise, the Dover Patrol under Vice Admiral Bacon was supported by NAS Dunkirk and Dover, under the command of Wing Captain Charles Lambe. Wing Captain Lambe’s Dunkirk and Dover air stations were unique, in that they possessed enough resources to carry out regular operations throughout 1915. Lambe, much like Commander Samson, favoured bombing as the surest means of reducing the U-boat threat, by directly attacking their bases in Belgium. This was ultimately an extension of Churchill’s early war policy of developing the means to strike the enemy’s Zeppelin bases.69 The first successful aerial bombardment of the U-boat bases took place on 24 March 1915. Five pilots, including Squadron Commander I. T. Courtney and Flight Lieutenant Harold Rosher, from Longmore’s No. 1 Squadron (Dunkirk), raided the U-boat base at Hoboken near Antwerp.  Although only Courtney and Rosher arrived over the target, they believed they had damaged two U-boats.70 The difficulty of bombing Antwerp, however, soon produced a shift in targets, with Bruges, Ostend, and Zeebrugge thereafter the priority.71 Occasionally, patrols did encounter submarines, such as on 26 August when Squadron Commander A. W. Bigsworth dropped two 65-lb bombs on a U-boat near Ostend.72 Or, again, on 28 September, when Flight Sublieutenant T. E. Viney, with a French observer in his Henry Farman airplane, dropped two 65-lb bombs on a submarine, believing – in error – to have destroyed it.73 In November, Rear Admiral George Ballard became the first Rear Admiral East Coast of England, an evolution of the Admiral of Patrols position he had previously held. Ballard worked closely with his associated commanders, amongst them the SNOs Lowestoft, Harwich, Grand Fleet, the Nore, and the VA Dover.74 Ballard’s major concern, at this phase of the war, was orchestrating the transition from overseas patrols to

Anti-Submarine Warfare 89 coastal patrols, specifically,75 as the primary mission for the coastal naval stations was to defeat the Zeppelins that were raiding the English coast.76

Expansion of the Patrol Schemes During 1916 In February 1916, the RNAS relinquished its responsibility for Britain’s air defence to the Army, including the, by then, quite large London defence network. Debate was ongoing between the Army and Navy leadership regarding the correct areas of responsibility for the two air services. At the 28 February Joint War Air Committee (JWAC) meeting, for example, it was concluded that the Navy’s SNOs and Army’s General Officers Commanding (GOCs) would conduct all air operations, unless they involved a scale of effort that required the question to be sent to the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff and/or the Director of Military Operations for further discussion.77 This was effectively recognition of the status quo as it had been established since July 1915, when the Air Department’s direct control over the squadrons was transferred to the SNOs.78 A significant result of this decentralization of the Air Department was that responsibility for implementing A/S patrols rested with the SNOs, which they did on an ad hoc basis and without central coordination. By circumventing the Air Department’s chain of command, this reform improved tactical communication between the Royal Navy’s district SNOs and the RNAS station and squadron commanders.79 There was a downside, however, as the individual decentralized stations were often short on seaplanes and pilots with the result that A/S patrols were conducted infrequently, if at all. The Navy’s SNOs, furthermore, held varying opinions about the best use of the aircraft in their districts – and this doctrinal confusion could lead to inefficiencies. Both the strengths and weaknesses of this system were dramatically illustrated on 24–25 April 1916, when the High Sea Fleet raided Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth. Despite the sortie of the raiding force having been detected by British signals intelligence, the approaching German surface group slipped in at night when air patrols were not available.80 Zeppelins L9 and L21 were engaged spotting for the bombardment group, which had taken up station off Lowestoft, and were not acting as part of a simultaneously organized six Zeppelin raid.81 The Zeppelins were sighted at 3:45 am and attacked unsuccessfully by Flight Commander Nicholl and Flight Lieutenant Hards in a pair of BE2c airplanes from NAS Great Yarmouth.82 Another Zeppelin, in fact probably L21 considering that the raiding Zeppelins were already on their way home no later than 2 am,83 was also located and chased by Nicholl and Hards.84 At 4.05 am, Flight Sublieutenants H. G. Hall and D. C. Evans, in a Short seaplane from Great Yarmouth, located Scheer’s battlecruisers, commanded by Rear Admiral Boedicker in place of the sick Hipper, and harmlessly bombed them. This was only five minutes before

90  Anti-Submarine Warfare Boedicker opened fire on Lowestoft, and the bombardment was finished within ten minutes. At 4:20 am, Boedicker steered north for Yarmouth. The German warships were chased by aircraft from Great Yarmouth: Hall and Evans were joined by four more aircraft that had been scrambled at 4:30 am, and together they dropped ineffective 16-lb and 65-lb bombs on the battlecruisers, but this did not dissuade Boedicker, who proceeded to open fire against Yarmouth at 4:42 am, before turning to join with Scheer. His mission complete, Scheer promptly steered for home, pursued by Commodore Tyrwhitt and the Harwich Force.85 During this early morning action, Flight Lieutenant C. H. C. Smith, in a Bristol Scout, spotted three U-boats, east of Southwold, and dropped a dozen grenades and three 16-lb bombs on them, forcing them to submerge.86 Likewise, Flight Sublieutenants C. J. Galpin (Short 38) and F. D. Till (Short 184), out of Felixstowe, encountered a UB-type submarine that they forced to submerge with bombing attacks.87 The failure of the patrolling aircraft to locate Scheer’s raiding force until mere minutes before the bombardment commenced demonstrated a serious gap in terms of night-capable aircraft and pilots, while the inability of the aircraft to damage either Zeppelin L13, or the raiding group, demonstrated another material deficiency in terms of aircraft weaponry. Furthermore, the lack of coordination between NAS Great Yarmouth and the SNO Lowestoft was most disturbing, given that Flight Lieutenant Hall’s seaplane, amongst others, was equipped with W/T.88 Luckily for the Navy, Scheer’s raid was focused on attacking shore batteries and bombarding private residences – the actual intent of the sortie had been a demonstration in support of the Irish Easter rebellion, but Scheer optimistically believed he might also have prompted a limited fleet action, or defeated isolated RN patrol squadrons.89 In response to the weaknesses in the coastal defence system that had been exposed by the Lowestoft-Yarmouth raid, improvements for night-flying (illuminated dashboards, improved flares for landing) were introduced and, in May, the coastal air warning system was expanded.90 Another idea, proposed to Balfour by Vice Admiral Beatty on 25 June 1916, was to have Admiral Lewis Bayly appointed commander of a detached squadron of submarine-hunting vessels including, ‘…6 or more airships, 20 or more aeroplanes’, plus destroyers, trawlers, motorboats, and RN submarines, to sweep the North Sea for U-boats.91 Bayly, however, had fallen out of favour over the loss of HMS Formidable (torpedoed and sunk off Start Point early in the morning on New Year’s Day 1915 by U24), for which he, as Channel Fleet commander, was held responsible.92 In July, at the Admiralty’s displeasure, he was sent instead to command at Queenstown in Ireland, with responsibility for the Western Approaches – ironically to become one of the most important districts when unrestricted submarine warfare was unleashed in 1917.93 Another change in district command was made on 1 May 1916, when the

Anti-Submarine Warfare 91 Admiralty replaced Rear Admiral East Coast of England George Ballard with Rear Admiral Stuart Nicholson.94 In August, Nicholson produced a memorandum outlining his expanded policy for coastal patrols, of which the aerial elements were outlined to Director Air Services (DAS) Vaughan-Lee. Air patrols would be divided into three types: coastal, anti-Zeppelin, and A/S.95 It is notable that Nicholson’s coastal defence orders were aimed at catching transiting Zeppelins, as these were still engaged bombing Britain’s coastal towns (see Chapter 4).96 Commodore Ellison, SNO Lowestoft, was unimpressed with his airship assets, notably, the Coastal-types operating from the Pulham station that appeared to be underperforming as scouts.97 He was not alone in this assessment: Vice Admiral Bayly, now at Queenstown, was known to be ‘lukewarm’ about using seaplanes as he believed that they would require diverting his limited supply of sloops and patrol craft for support.98 It was invariably useful for airships and seaplanes to range over coastlines controlled by multiple districts, with the result that some form of horizontal inter-regional cooperation, regardless of Admiralty policy, would be necessary. The Admiralty, however, still needed to exert vertical control on occasion, as was demonstrated in September 1916 when Balfour established a patrol scheme through NAS Calshot and its substations, grouped collectively under the command of the C-in-C Portsmouth.99 Patrols of Short seaplanes were now launched from NAS Bembridge, on the Isle of Wight, from which they were capable of covering the Channel and its vital French coal trade. 1916, to make a long story short, had been a year of rearming and retraining. The military learning curve model, discussed by historians of the Western Front,100 was very much in evidence as, although new technologies were entering service, best practices had yet to be devised and dissemination of experience was haphazard, a situation that was complicated by the wartime expansion of the RNAS: by August the RNAS comprised 2,401 officers and 20,355 men, an enormous expansion when, in May 1914, the entire RNAS had numbered only 111 officers and 544 men.101 The RNAS non-rigid airship complement expanded by 25 to 47, while the total aircraft establishment grew by 40 to reach 160 machines at the end of 1916.102 Although these were significant advances, as yet no reliable aerial A/S weapons existed and thus patrolling aircraft, and blimps, could do little more than inconvenience the enemy U-boats. As 1917 dawned, the RNAS was still focused on coastal defence and anti-Zeppelin patrol, but ASW was about to become the top priority.

The Air Department and the 1917 Reforms During 1917 and 1918, Germany ordered a total of 493 U-boats and, in a reckless gambit to knock Britain out of the war, reintroduced unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917.103 The resulting rapid

92  Anti-Submarine Warfare escalation in Allied shipping losses put pressure on the Admiralty to deliver results in the A/S struggle.104 The beginning of this third phase of unrestricted submarine warfare generated a crisis that forced the Air Department to increase its contribution to ASW. The Admiralty’s A/S policy for 1917 was laid out by Rear Admiral Alexander Duff, who was First Sea Lord Jellicoe’s appointee to head the new ASD. In January, Duff conducted an ‘exhaustive survey’ of A/S methods and concluded that two general lines of policy should be followed, namely focusing on the attack of U-boats wherever located (patrols), combined with increased protection for merchant shipping.105 Duff believed that seaplanes and airplanes should act offensively, seeking out and harassing the U-boats, an opinion he shared with First Sea Lord Jellicoe.106 Duff’s policy in effect meant more aircraft patrols from the coast, combined with destroyers and other escorts patrolling established sea-lanes. The result of this policy, although not entirely of Duff’s making (the ‘approach route’ system had been originally organized in July 1916 to create four approach ‘cones’ which were swept by patrol ships so as to keep the routes clear of enemy raiders),107 was to funnel shipping into dangerously crowded and exposed lanes. A great number of destroyers and patrol craft were needed to sweep the approach cones, and it was of course highly unlikely that patrol ships steaming alone would ever encounter U-boats not wanting to be found. As Henry Jones phrased it, the approach-lane system had the effect of ‘concentrating great numbers of [merchant] ships along the patrol routes off the south coast of Ireland and in the Bristol Channel’ where they were easy prey for lurking submarines.108 Jellicoe, meanwhile, emphasized patrols of the coastal approaches, hoping to keep Allied merchant vessels concentrated near the more easily defended coasts. The Admiralty seemed to have handed the U-boats their targets on a silver platter; the restricted coastal approaches were particularly vulnerable to Germany’s shortrange coastal (UB)- and minelaying (UC)-type submarines. But the real threat lay with the limited defences available for protecting the Western Approaches. The trade routes, converging along the west coast of Britain and Ireland, were highly exposed at the beginning of 1917, as no air stations had yet been built to cover the west coasts of the United Kingdom. Vice Admiral Bayly, as we have seen, was skeptical that seaplanes were of much use, even as late as the closing months of 1916.109 This oversight, of the development of seaplane and airship bases on the western coasts, was soon exposed as a serious error in defence planning. The United States’ entry into the war in April 1917 necessitated protecting the Western Approaches from U-boats preying on cross-Atlantic traffic. Extreme measures were taken, such as the attempt to close off the North Sea entrance between Norway and Scotland using an enormous mine barrage, combined with expanded minefields, nets, and patrols in the English Channel, North Sea, and along the coast of Belgium.110

Anti-Submarine Warfare 93 When he succeeded Admiral Sir Henry Jackson as First Sea Lord, Jellicoe reshuffled the Air Department by removing Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee as DAS and, on 10 January, introduced Commodore Godfrey Paine as the new Fifth Sea Lord. Paine was formerly the commandant of the CFS at Upavon, and then commandant of the officer school at RNAS Cranwell, his primary experience being with personnel and training. According to Jellicoe, Paine ‘devoted much energy to the provision of suitable aircraft’ for A/S purposes.111 Also on the Admiralty Board at this time was Admiral Cecil Burney (Second Sea Lord), an A/S specialist, as we have seen, along with the air-minded Rear Admiral Tudor (still Third Sea Lord), and Commodore, soon to be promoted to Rear Admiral, Lionel Halsey (Fourth Sea Lord). Halsey was made Third Sea Lord when Geddes joined as Controller in May, and Tudor was shuffled off to the China station.112 Captain A. Vyvyan stayed on to become Commodore Paine’s assistant, and Captain D. T. Norris remained as the assistant for airships. Jellicoe also set about rationalizing the organization of the RNAS wings, starting with NAS Dover and Dunkirk in April: No. 1 Wing, stationed at St. Pol, was composed of Nos. 2, 9, and 12 Squadrons. No. 4 Wing, headquartered at La Panne, was composed of Nos. 4, 10, and 11 Squadrons, and No. 5 Wing, at Coudekerque, was composed of No. 5, 7, and 15 squadrons. Thus, approximately 150 naval aircraft were on establishment for this important naval aviation center.113 Jellicoe, importantly, realized that the SNOs needed to be concentrated to optimize them for aerial ASW. His method was to focus on regional commands, to which senior RNAS officers could be directly attached. The RNAS squadrons were thus formed into regional groups under the command of a district commander. The process demonstrated at Dover-Dunkirk was repeated for the C-in-C Portsmouth, the C-in-C East Coast of England, and the C-in-C Plymouth. By the end of the war, there were nine RAF groups and one US Naval Air Service group operating from the British Isles, associated with fifteen district commands, of which the most important were Plymouth (Devonport, No. 9 Group), Portsmouth (No. 10 Group), Dover & Dunkirk (No. 5 Group and, after July 1918 at Dunkirk, US Naval Air Service), the Nore, Harwich, Lowestoft (No. 4 Group), East Coast of England (No. 18 Group), Coast of Scotland (Rosyth, No. 22 Group), Orkneys & Shetlands, and the Grand Fleet, (No. 28 Group), Larne Harbour (No. 25 Group) and the Coast of Ireland (No. 11 Group and US Naval Air Service). The process of forming the RNAS into these regional groups began in January when the Operations Division of the Naval Staff concentrated the air stations at the Nore, Harwich, Yarmouth, Killingholme, South Shields, Dundee, and Houton Bay, into a single group to better facilitate coastal patrol and to operate the newly introduced Large America-type flying boats. Grand Fleet C-in-C Beatty wanted 150 of these machines

94  Anti-Submarine Warfare for fleet work and coastal patrol, although only 50 were, in fact, delivered to Felixstowe, Great Yarmouth, Killingholme, Calshot, Cattewater, and the Scillies, by the end of the war.114 Wing Commander Samson, returned from his tour in the eastern Mediterranean, was appointed CO of NAS Great Yarmouth (later RAF No. 228 Squadron) on 5 November 1917, shortly thereafter being promoted to Wing Captain.115 Samson later recalled that the ‘[p]rotection of our shipping against attack from submarine and aircraft’ was his number one priority.116 Likewise, the RNAS stations under the C-in-C Portsmouth, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, were reorganized, creating the Channel Group, CO Wing Commander A. W. Bigsworth, who had his HQ at Calshot (later RAF No. 240 Squadron), his regional bases including NAS Portland (No.  241), Bembridge, Newhaven (opened 11 May, later No.  242), the SS- and Coastal-type airship station at Polegate (transferred from Wing Captain Lambe’s Dover command on 23 July), the seaplane base at Cherbourg (26 July), the kite-balloon station at Tipnor (opened 28 September), and Lee-on-Solent (5 October).117 Following the procedures outlined by Jellicoe, the RNAS squadrons responsible for the Western Approaches were also concentrated together, becoming the South-West Group, with bases at the Isles of Scilly (later RAF No. 234 Squadron), Newlyn (No. 235) and Cattewater (237 & 238), and the airship station at Mullion (No. 236), plus Pembroke (No. 255), and Fishguard (No. 245). Collectively, these squadrons were placed under Wing Captain Eugene Gerrard, with his HQ at Devonport, whose RN counterpart was the C-in-C Plymouth, Vice Admiral Alexander Bethell.118 Gerrard arrived to take command of the RNAS squadrons in Bethell’s district on 13 March,119 and, on 3 April, he was appointed commander of the RNAS South-West Group, a position he retained after 1 April 1918 as Brigadier-General in command of the RAF’s No. 9 Group.120 Admiral Beatty at the Grand Fleet was also looking for solutions to the U-boat problem, including the Wilhelmshaven strike plan, as we have seen (Chapter 1).121 Beatty’s defensive method, however, was to employ large numbers of aircraft, including older models and trainers, such as the DH4 and DH6, to suppress the U-boats, if not directly attack them, a concept described as ‘scarecrow’ tactics.122 In June 1917, Beatty ordered the Caldale airship station to conduct daily patrols, with missions including convoy escort, as well as mine and U-boat detection.123 Beatty’s contact at this point was the C-in-C Rosyth, Admiral Sir Frederick T. Hamilton, until his death in October 1917, and then Admiral Cecil Burney. By February 1918, Burney was able to produce his own orders for the aircraft working with the convoys under his command, and he stressed the need for close communication between aircraft and convoy escorts.124 Beatty also formed the small Destroyer Kite Balloon Force, composed of five destroyers equipped with kite-balloons to act as an A/S flotilla.125

Anti-Submarine Warfare 95 Kite-balloons were found to be especially effective, given that the U-boat commanders knew that fixed balloons could identify and direct gunfire against them with relative ease, thus ‘as soon as a submarine sees a kite-balloon it submerges and remains submerged’. Kite-balloons could also operate at night, providing the aerial protection that was lacking after the daylight aircraft patrols had returned to base.126 This pattern of regionalization, or reconcentration, essentially applied the model of the old Admiral of Patrols to the entire United Kingdom.127 As a result, it returned some of the centralization and inter-district communication that had been lost when Balfour subordinated the RNAS squadrons to the district SNOs in July 1915. The reader may have gathered the impression that the RNAS and the Air Department were under a continuous state of reorganization; in fact, by the middle of 1917, the naval air service had gone through three distinct organizational phases. These changes in administration, as John Abbatiello observed, ‘caused an almost constant reorganizing of naval air supervision and policy; such inconstant senior supervision meant that the A/S role for aircraft did not mature steadily.’128 Indeed, the RNAS under Churchill’s command had been treated as if it were another military branch of the Navy, such as the Royal Marines or Naval Infantry, if not a Coast Guard. Then, in February 1916, the Admiralty relinquished responsibility for the air defence of Britain (see Chapter 3), with coastal and maritime patrol becoming the primary RNAS mission, although still focused on locating and intercepting high-flying Zeppelins. The unrestricted submarine crisis, in the spring of 1917, forced the Admiralty once again to change tact, with the RNAS now becoming primarily an A/S organization. Thus, it can be seen that the RNAS evolved over the course of the war, albeit haphazardly, in response to changing perceptions of the primary threat, as prioritized by the Admiralty. On 11 March, Jellicoe instructed Fifth Sea Lord Paine, along with DASD Duff and the Operations Division of the Staff, to devise a scheme for centralizing and standardizing airship and aircraft patrols on the East Coast, as part of the general rationalization of the coastal patrol organization. This was a significant effort that involved the C-in-C Nore, SNO Harwich, SNO Lowestoft, Rear Admiral Commanding (RAC) East Coast of England, C-in-C Rosyth, and Vice Admiral Commanding (VAC) Orkneys.129 In May, David Lloyd George merged the First Sea Lord’s office with that of the CNS, with Jellicoe shunting Admiral Sir Henry Oliver to the position of Deputy CNS (DCNS), alongside Admiral Duff, the former head of the vital ASD, who became Assistant CNS (ACNS).130 The Prime Minister’s reforms forced Jellicoe to expand the staff beyond his usual dual structure model of Operations and Material,131 to a triplicate structure (adding Planning), with implications for naval aviation.

96  Anti-Submarine Warfare The legacy of the RNAS expansion, base development, and maritime patrol focus are clearly in evidence in the successor RAF’s organization and doctrine late in the war.132 The wisdom of Jellicoe’s RNAS Group organization is that, while it retained the advantage of laissez-faire flexibility at the naval districts, it recognized that a degree of doctrinal homogeneity, and command authority, was important to prevent local repetition and disorder when operating at an enlarged geographical scale. Although Jellicoe was simply following his standard centralization procedure, the result on the decentralized RNAS was profound. With the regional commands now acting as hubs, disseminating information to the local NAS nodes, Jellicoe had, in fact, created a hybrid system of control that combined local initiative and freedom of action with regional direction, comparable to the ‘cybernetic structure’ of the London Air Defence Area (LADA) network as described by John Ferris.133 With Jellicoe as CNS, the naval staff began to exert greater control over the planning and execution of ASW. While DCNS Vice Admiral Oliver handled Operations and Plans, ACNS Rear Admiral Duff controlled a multi-departmental organization that included the Convoys, Trade, and Anti-Submarine departments. The ASD was headed, following Duff’s promotion, by Captain W. W. Fisher who, together with Fifth Sea Lord Paine, desired an integrated approach to the U-boat threat including seaplanes, flying boats, airplanes, and airships all in conjunction with surface craft.134 Normally several aircraft conducted a typical routine patrol, but the new procedures added an additional machine, held in reserve, for emergency use. In this new contact patrol model, the aircraft were to operate closely with destroyers so that the air and sea platforms could maintain contact via prearranged waypoints.135 The Naval Staff acted as a clearing house for these doctrinale recommendations, assimilating and disseminating tactical recommendations as they emerged from the district SNOs. The regional system was put to the test in May, when Rear Admiral East Coast of England Nicholson introduced a comprehensive airship patrol scheme.136 This scheme essentially proposed changing the local airship patrols so that airships launched from NAS Howden could proceed out of the district’s operating area, fly to NAS East Fortune or Pulham, and back again. This was significant as the patrol scheme involved coordinating communications between the RA East Coast of England, C-in-C Rosyth, Commodore Lowestoft, and C-in-C Coast of Scotland. A recommendation to implement the scheme was forwarded to the Director of the Operations Division, Rear Admiral George P. W. Hope, who approved the proposal on 21 May.137 The enemy, however, also gets a vote, and as the threat from German aircraft increased late in 1917, First Sea Lord Wemyss, who had replaced Jellicoe in December that year was, in January 1918, forced to withdraw the Pulham Coastal-type

Anti-Submarine Warfare 97 non-rigid patrols following the loss of C17 and C27, it was believed to enemy seaplanes.138 For their part, the Admiralty and the naval staff continued to evolve and adapt to the U-boat crisis. In January 1917, a chart room was established for the ASD as Room X in the Admiralty House, collecting information from coastal patrols, signals intelligence, and the merchant marine, to plot U-boat positions. The X Room was a ground floor drawing room, on the wall of which was posted the six-by-nine foot Home Waters submarine chart.139 In May, the Mercantile Movements and Trade division also established its Convoy Section directly in the House, so as to be in close contact with the ASD’s chart room.140 The essential source of information for the ASD chart was the signals intelligence specialists and cryptologists in Room 40 of the Admiralty Old Building. Room 40 was constantly generating intelligence from Direction Finding (D/F), that utilized the W/T transmissions of U-boats, Zeppelins, and surface ships, to triangulate their positions.141 Once a submarine’s location had been fixed, the chart room was updated by pneumatic tube link from Room 40. Beginning in May, this vital information was then dispatched directly to the coastal air stations, where duplicates of the Admiralty’s Home Waters submarine plot were kept.142 Incidentally, as was the case with the construction of the coastal air stations, the vital D/F stations were at first established only on the east coast, a deficit that became critical in 1917 when the submarine war expanded to the Western Approaches.143 The original communication lines between the Air Department and the coastal stations had been established by Sueter in 1915 as part of the Air Department’s air defence system (see Chapter 4), but it was now necessary to expand the network. The officer behind this expansion was none other than the versatile Commander Williamson.144 Williamson, head of the Naval Staff’s Operations Division, Section 11 (Air Operations),145 soon became head of the ASD’s internal Air Section.146 In June, he introduced the ASD’s Anti-Submarine Reports (ASRs).147 These were tabulations of all RNAS A/S operations, similar to the operational reports, albeit of a broader scope, that had been produced for the DAS by Lieutenant Commander Richard C. M. Pink beginning in late 1915.148 By July, the vital west coast air bases had been completed and airplane patrol schemes for the Western Approaches were introduced, modeled on the ‘Spider Web’ patrols then being flown from NAS Felixstowe.149 As applied to the North Sea, this system involved four flying boats conducting a simultaneous survey over a 60-mile diameter circle for five hours.150 Reports were plotted at NAS Felixstowe, whence additional flying boats were dispatched to investigate sightings.151 RNAS aircraft contributed to this system by providing the most rapid response to submarine sightings and, optimally, the most direct means of attack. An escorting destroyer in a typical A/S attack might expend

98  Anti-Submarine Warfare as many as 40 depth charges trying to sink a U-boat, whereas one or two well-placed bombs would likely cripple, if not sink, a U-boat.152 Although hydrophone systems were under development by the summer of 1917, there was as yet no certain method for detecting a submerged submarine. Thus, the best chance of executing a successful A/S attack came from aircraft able to drop their bombs before the submarine could submerge. The new flying boats, on which so much expectation rested, were first delivered by the American, Glenn Curtiss. Known therefore as ‘America’ models, these first appeared in mid-1916 and were steadily improved under the auspices of Wing Commander John Cyril Porte at NAS Felixstowe. These machines promised to fill the gap in terms of a powerful and longrange A/S capability that had so far been lacking.153 The large multi-­ engine flying boats were ideal for searching wide swathes of the ocean over many hours and, although long patrols were certainly exhausting for the pilots, the flying boats possessed both the speed and payload required to conduct attack runs against submarines caught out in the open. Wing Commander Porte had a stellar pedigree in this regard. His association with aircraft and ASW stretched back to 1908 when, as a Lieutenant attached to the submarine depot ship HMS Mercury, he had been in command of submarine C38.154 In 1909, Porte was working on glider development and, a year later, experimenting with 35-hp monoplanes. After lessons at Rheims in July 1911, he received an Aero Club de France pilot’s certificate, but was medically retired from the Royal Navy in October due to a lung ailment.155 Porte was next employed as a technical advisor with the Deperdussin Company in Gosport before traveling to the United States to work directly for Curtiss at Hammondsport, where he was diligently employed designing flying boats. When the war broke out, Porte returned to Britain and joined the RNAS.156 In 1915, Squadron Commander Porte was attached to NAS Hendon, where he fulfilled training duties, until, on 27 September, he was appointed to command the experimental Felixstowe station, tasking himself to improve flying boat designs.157 Curtiss, for his part, delivered the first H8 flying boats to Porte in July 1916, but these were found to be underpowered. Porte replaced the flying boats’ 160-hp Curtiss engines with 275-hp Rolls Royce engines and redesignated the H8s as the H12.158 The H12, equipped with four Lewis guns and two 230-lb bombs, proved a capable A/S weapon. Porte improved the design during 1917 and by the beginning of 1918 had developed the Felixstowe F2A model, powered by two 345-hp Rolls Royce Eagle VIII engines, capable of accelerating up to 100 mph at 2,000 ft while carrying a dozen Lewis guns and up to 500 lbs of bombs for 6-hours flying time.159 The advanced F3 and F5 models could carry more than 900 lbs of bombs and the 6-pdr Davis recoilless gun: an A/S cannon under development by the RNAS and the Royal Navy since late 1916.160

Anti-Submarine Warfare 99 Another key area of experimentation taking place simultaneously was the development of hydrophone technology, pioneered by Captain C. P. Ryan, RN, and later, the Air Division of the staff. The prototype hydrophones had been introduced in March 1915, and were deployed to shore stations in 1916, then entering production as the ship-borne Mark I and II models in spring 1917.161 Captain F. R. Scarlett of the Air Division continued this work in 1918 and, on 18 March, authorized seaplane hydrophone experiments at NAS Calshot.162 Scarlett realized that duplicate efforts were taking place under C-in-C the Nore at the Isle of Grain experimental seaplane station and so moved the entire project there on the 25th. In the event, this combination of aircraft, hydrophones, and surface assets can be said to have achieved only a single success: the extraordinary destruction of UB115 on 29 September 1918, made possible through the combined efforts of RN airship R29, the destroyer HMS Ouse and a group of trawlers equipped with hydrophones (see below).163 Experiments were also attempted with hydrophone-equipped airships, but these trials were abandoned as seaplanes were found to be the more suitable platform.164 Recommendations for improving A/S equipment and methods continued to flow in from the districts throughout 1917–1918. On 23 June 1917, Director Operations Division (DOD) Hope addressed Vice Admiral Bacon’s concerns regarding the degraded quality of the machines available at Dunkirk and recommended, based on a conversation with CNS Jellicoe, that Dunkirk receive airships as a replacement for its seaplanes, in addition to new Bristol Scout biplanes.165 DASD Captain Fisher, as a result of this report, and with Hope and Bacon’s approval, detached the seaplane carrier HMS Riviera to conduct roving A/S patrols, starting at the Scilly Isles and attached to C-in-C Devonport’s command.166 At the beginning of 1918, Jellicoe’s material and organizational revolution were paying dividends: new equipment, from destroyers to depth-charges, including mines, hydrophones, Q-ships, merchantman freighter armaments, and hundreds of aircraft, airships, and Auxiliary Patrol vessels enabled systematic A/S patrols and, critically, aerial escort for merchant convoys. In the Mediterranean, however, the A/S effort was coming up short. In December 1916, Vice Admiral Oliver proposed reducing the RNAS establishment at Malta and Gibraltar so that forces could be rebased at Otranto.167 Early in 1917, after a row related to his role in the development of the tank,168 the Admiralty dispatched Sueter to command the RNAS buildup at Otranto, and by June operations were underway.169 The Otranto barrage was meant to replicate the Dover barrage, the latter having been greatly expanded during November–December 1917.170 The Otranto version was to include two kite-balloon stations, one each at Brindisi and Corfu. To illustrate the complexity of these kite-balloon operations, it is worth observing that each station required 100 service personnel, including four mechanics, 12 telephone

100  Anti-Submarine Warfare operators, six carpenters, a dozen riggers, 20 deckhands, 50 aircraft men, and 25 officers. Amongst the various logistical requirements for the six balloon sheds at each kite-balloon station were 15 kite-balloons, 12 W-type meteorological balloons, 900 bottles of hydrogen, plentiful mosquito netting, a sickbay, three field kitchens, two sets of telephones, 10 kilowatts of lighting, 50 rifles, and 25 pistols with ammunition and 250 Brock flares.171 The material requirements for the planned Northern barrage, outlined in September 1917 and meant to cut off U-boat access to the North Sea, were even more vast. As Beatty confided in conversation with Captain Herbert Richmond on 25 August, Jellicoe was merely trying to appease the Cabinet’s sense of the colossal and was himself skeptical of success.172 The project required mining the entire 240 miles between the Orkneys and the nearest Norwegian fjord.173 Minelaying did not actually commence until March 1918, but nevertheless, the enormous project was very nearly completed by November.174 To summarize the situation in 1917: by the end of the year, the RNAS squadrons involved in ASW had been successfully grouped into geographical regions and re-equipped with flying boats and airplanes more suitable for hunting submarines. RNAS bases had been established on the west coast of the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean. New methods of tabulating and disseminating information, had been devised and implemented. The first RNAS victories against the U-boats were recorded in April and May, but the enemy submarines soon adapted to the new equipment and methods. Although escorted merchant convoys ensured that the U-boat threat was gradually reduced, the submarines were still sinking hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping every month. Still, the long-term technological and organizational maturation of the RNAS from 1914–1916 had produced real results, and just in time.

The Convoy System and Air Patrols The new methods were achieving their purpose, a fact reflected by the declining merchant shipping loss rate after mid-1917. Indeed, the serious shipping losses peaked in April, just as the new air patrol methods were becoming operational, followed shortly by the introduction of convoys.175 The introduction of Atlantic convoys, after July 1917, added another layer to the RNAS mission set. Abbatiello identified four convoy types for which the RNAS provided air cover: short-distance convoys between Britain and France, warship escort (including the Grand Fleet), trans-oceanic convoys, and all other coastal convoys in British waters.176 Convoy roles were defined, like patrols, by the district SNOs although, during 1917, the command structure was shifting to the RNAS regional

Anti-Submarine Warfare 101 groups, as we have seen.177 Jellicoe was wary about forcing convoys upon the district SNOs, preferring instead to let the newly empowered regional commanders handle implementation. Although details were left to the districts, a kind of standardized model did emerge. Airplanes were grouped into staggered flights, to fly convoy cover during daylight hours. Airships were especially useful for sweeping the ocean ahead of the convoy routes.178 Kite-balloons, which had been adapted into the fleet’s inventory as observation and gunfire-spotting platforms (see Chapter 1), were also usefully employed aboard convoy escorts. Admiral Beatty, who was advised on aerial matters by Vice Admiral Sir John de Robeck, of the 2nd Battle Squadron, ordered kite-balloon trials in support of convoys in July 1917.179 Wing Captain Gerrard’s South-West Group, shortly thereafter in August and September, prepared a patrol scheme for the area around Cornwall and the Channel approaches, and produced written orders primarily focused on airships for convoy escort, the decision to introduce outbound Atlantic convoys having been made on 11 August.180 Indeed, on 17 April, Gerrard and Bethell had adopted the scheme proposed by Squadron Commander R. B. B. Colmore of NAS Mullion.181 Colmore’s report, forwarded by Gerrard to the new DAS (and Fifth Sea Lord) Commodore Paine on 23 April,182 described a combination of routine, emergency, and contact (destroyer plus seaplane) patrols, arranged so that at least one aircraft was always kept in readiness to launch and respond to U-boat reports on short notice. Based initially on the same ‘Spider Web’ octagonal patrols utilized by NAS Felixstowe, by August, the patrol system had evolved to include specified area patrols for emergency response.183 Bethell also arranged patrol zones for the trawler and auxiliary patrols in the Plymouth area,184 and the entire system was networked together by telephone and telegraph cables. W/T stations were established at the Scillies, Land’s End, Falmouth, Plymouth, and Portland Bill.185 Convoy escorts were in place in the Plymouth district by 26 May, with the first convoy escorted from Gibraltar by HMS Hardy; flagship of the Senior Officer of the torpedo boat escorts,186 supported by an H12 flying boat from the Scillies, where three H12s had been flown out to the then under-construction NAS Tresco back in February 1917.187 Four flying boats were operating each month during the summer of 1917, a figure that declined to only one or two during the winter, but then increased to five and eventually six during August 1918, the same month No. 34 Squadron was formally transferred to the RAF as No. 234 Squadron.188 In June 1917, only 46 airplane and 46 airship escort missions were flown in Home Waters; six months later, despite poor weather, 68 aircraft, and 59 airship, escort missions were flown in December. Flights fell slightly to 34 and 47, respectively, in January 1918.189 The escort mission figures dramatically increased that March, however,

102  Anti-Submarine Warfare when they reached 80 airplane, and 132 airship, escort missions, with flights doubling to 176 and 184, respectively, in April, and then jumping to 402 airplane, and 269 airship, Home Water missions in May. Coastal convoys were introduced in June, the final element in the convoy equation,190 and in August a copious 1,340 airplane, and 454 airship, escort missions were flown, the peak of the aerial escort effort.191 Between May and October 1918, 3,434 out of 4,670 aircraft escort missions were flown by RAF No. 18 Group, with responsibility for the east coast of England, where U-boats were still active despite coastal convoys also being the most thoroughly implemented. The next most significant region, with 846 airplane escort missions flown, was Portsmouth (No. 10 Group) where the cross-Channel traffic was concentrated. Airship escort missions were more evenly divided over the home regions during this time, with 241 flown by No. 18 Group, 249 flown by No. 22 Group (Scotland), 301 flown by No. 5 Group (Dover-Dunkirk), 341 flown by No. 9 Group (Plymouth) and 347 flown by Nos. 14 and 25 Groups (Ireland). The majority of kite-balloon escorts, 53 out of 96, were flown by the Plymouth Group, where kite-balloons were a vital element of protection for the trans-Atlantic convoys.192 Improvements in training and education coincided with the development of the aerial convoy escort and maritime patrol system. In March 1918, the Air Department summarized its ASW learning to date, publishing a number of manuals right up to the eve of the formation of the RAF. The manual titled ‘Use of Aircraft for the Protection of Shipping’, for example, emphasized the importance of aircraft cover for convoys, and was printed on 30 March.193 This manual also reiterated a long-­ standing concern of the Air Department that ‘the methods of using aircraft should, so far as is practicable, be standardized and, not as at present, left to the idiosyncrasies of local staffs and Commanding Officers’ – an indication of the latitude that Jellicoe’s regional control model allowed for.194 That same month the Airship Department also published a manual: ‘Notes on Aids to Submarine Hunting’.195 The creation of a unified tactical doctrine seems to have originated with Williamson, in 1918 an RAF Lieutenant Colonel, who worked alongside the C-in-C East Coast of England as the CO RAF No. 18 Group. Williamson naturally favoured a combined arms scheme and thus proposed a tiered system, with airplanes flying convoy escort in reliefs, and non-rigid airships providing close-in support.196 In August, Williamson produced a paper on the use of airplanes for ASW,197 observing that the new specialty aircraft, notably the Blackburn Kangaroo he had helped design, were superior to both airships and seaplanes. As for convoy escort, Williamson wrote that ‘the Enemy’s submarines have been seriously hampered in their operations by the constant fear of being attacked or sighted by aircraft’.198 He recommended adopting the 520-lb bomb for the Blackburn aircraft, being convinced that the 230-lb bomb

Anti-Submarine Warfare 103 was ineffective.199 Flag Captain Powlett, sitting in for Vice Admiral East Coast of England Sir Edward Charlton, who was on leave, forwarded Williamson’s letter to the Admiralty where on 26 August, Colonel R. M. Groves, another RNAS veteran and now the Director of the Air Division, read and approved Williamson’s recommendations. 200 Coastal patrols, despite the introduction of the comprehensive convoy system, remained the mainstay of the RNAS ASW effort throughout the U-boat crisis. By the end of March 1918, the Air Department estimated that only 7% to 20% of total patrols had been specifically devoted to escorting merchant shipping: the vast majority of hours flown were of the coastal patrol type.201 Between May and October 1918, 22,622 aircraft ASW patrols were flown, compared to only 4,670 escort missions. The figure for airships was 5,176 patrols to 1,561 escort missions.202 The Air Division reiterated that the district SNOs should be specifically instructed to order convoy escort missions, for which a specialized staff should be appointed. This staff would communicate directly with the districts to ensure compliance with the Air Division’s recommendations.203 In this case, cooperation between the Air Ministry and Admiralty had been hindered by the dissolution of the Fifth Sea Lord position: upon the creation of the Air Ministry, Commodore Paine joined the Air Council as Master General of Personnel. 204

Accounting RNAS Anti-Submarine Victories How did the A/S system perform in terms of actually defeating enemy submarines? This question is difficult to answer given the vagaries of determining successful sinkings.205 In many cases, when pilots reported sinking U-boats, it was in fact more likely that they merely damaged them, if any damage was inflicted at all. It is the case, however, that aircraft frequently attacked U-boats, which is perhaps the better measure of First World War aerial ASW successes, as opposed to sinkings outright. On 24 April 1917, for example, H12 flying boat No. 8655, piloted by Flight Lieutenant C. L. Scott, sortied from Calshot in response to a distress call from the Italian steamship Portofino that was being attacked by a submarine 16 miles south of Weymouth. Scott sighted a submarine off the Portland Bill and dropped a pair of 100-lb bombs a few feet from the U-boat’s conning tower as it was submerging. The destroyer HMS Ambuscade arrived on the scene within thirty minutes and Scott returned to base. Ambuscade sighted the U-boat as it was surfacing but it then immediately submerged, so Ambuscade steamed into attack position and dropped two depth charges on the U-boat’s location, believing to have destroyed it. 206 The ASD’s 1919 list of sunk U-boats showed that the naval staff believed this had been UB39, however, subsequent maritime archaeology located no wreck where the ASD list indicated, 207 and, in fact,

104  Anti-Submarine Warfare UB39 was destroyed on 15 May when it drove into a mine north-west of Bruges while returning from patrol.208 It is unclear what, if any, damage the H12 flying boat, or the destroyer’s depth charges, inflicted during the A/S action on 24 April, nor is it evident what U-boat they had engaged. The importance of the case, for our purposes, is that an aerial A/S attack was carried out, at the very least an unpleasant experience for the U-boat’s crew. Nor was this an isolated incident: RNAS aircraft conducted no less than five separate bombing attacks against submarines operating in Home Waters during the month of April. Patrols continued, and on 20 May Flight Sublieutenants C. R. Morrish and H. G. Boswell in H12 flying boat No. 8663 attacked a U-boat with 230-lb bombs. 209 It was not until the end of the month, however, that an RNAS aircraft likely sank a U-boat: on 27 May, following a report by the decoy ship HMS Acton, H12 No. 8656, piloted by Lt. W. L. Anderson, sighted, bombed, and almost certainly sank UC66 north of the Isles of Scilly with four 100-lb bombs. 210 The previously established narrative, that UC66 was depth charged by the trawler Sea King off the Lizard on 12 June and then destroyed by a mine impact while passing through the Dover barrage, is contradicted by the presence of UC66’s wreck off the south of the Lizard, seeming to confirm the aerial attack narrative. 211 UC66, however, was only one of the 13 coastal-type U-boats attacked by flying boats based at Felixstowe, Killingholme, Calshot, and Tresco between April and June, 212 and on 29 July, UC16 and UC65 were both attacked by flying boats in the North Hinder area.213 This is significant in terms of contextualizing UC66’s sinking: the RNAS was frequently bombing U-boats during the spring 1917 patrols. Results dried up after this spate of initial successes, as the U-boat crews adapted to the Royal Navy’s improved A/S measures. Although U-boats were regularly being sighted and attacked from the air, it was not until 22 September that another submarine was successfully destroyed by aerial means. On this occasion, Flight Sublieutenants N. A. Magor and C. E. S. Lusk, in Curtiss H12 No. 8695, successfully bombed and destroyed either UB32 or UC21 (at the time it was believed to have been UC72) with two 230-lb bombs off the East Hinder, near the Belgian coast.214 Thus far we have related two cases where, in all probability, the U-boats in question were destroyed by air attack, but this was far from what was believed immediately after the war: U69, 215 plus coastal and minelaying types UB12, 216 UB20, 217 UB36, 218 UB39, 219 UC1, 220 UC6, 221 UC36, 222 and UC72, 223 were all variously credited as destroyed by RNAS or RAF aircraft during the war. Careful scrutiny of German and Admiralty records, combined with modern marine archaeology, has however, in most, but not all, cases, determined more probable fates. It is significant, nevertheless, for the history of ASW that the perception was that aircraft had been more successful than they really were, at least in terms of direct attack against U-boats during 1917–1918.

Anti-Submarine Warfare 105 UB20 was bombed in May while docked at Bruges, and then again in June, resulting in five weeks of repairs. The submarine departed Ostend on 28 July with a small crew of 17 to test repairs to the pressure hull and never returned to port. Initially, flying boat No. 8676 was credited with sinking UB20 on 29 July, 224 however, recent investigation of the wreck site has indicated that the U-boat most likely stumbled into a newly laid British minefield and was thus destroyed. 225 UC72 was credited to flying boat No. 8695 in an attack near the Sunk Light Vessel on 22 September. Again, however, the otherwise accepted narrative is that UC72 was sunk by HMS Acton, that is, Q34, on 20 August in the Bay of Biscay. 226 UC6 was credited to flying boat No. 8676, and indeed that flying boat had been responsible for bombing a submarine near Thornton Ridge on 28 September, as was dramatically retold by T. D. Hallam.227 In fact, UC6 hit a series of mines the day prior in the Thames estuary.228 Likewise, UC1 was credited as destroyed by flying boat No. 8689 on 24 July south-west of the North Hinder Light Vessel, near the coast of Flanders.229 Wing Commander J. C. Porte, himself, led a flight of five flying boats that sighted and attacked a periscope nearby the North Hinder Light Vessel, dropping a total of five 230-lb bombs.230 UC1 had, in fact, departed Zeebrugge on 18 July bound for its mine-laying objective near Calais, but was destroyed by an enormous explosion, most likely a mine or torpedo, before it could move beyond the Flemish coast.231 Lastly, U69 was believed to have been the victim of HMS Patriot’s depth charge attack on 12 July, the location of the submarine notably having been exposed by that destroyer’s kite-balloon, operated by Flight Lieutenant O. A. Butcher.232 In fact, U69 vanished after 24 July while patrolling in the Irish Sea.233 The significance of these cases is that they highlight the combined Royal Navy-RNAS A/S effort, including the use of aircraft and kite-balloons. At the very least, the presence of aircraft and patrolling airships forced U-boats to run underwater, reducing their speed and range, and significantly increasing the risk of a collision with Allied minefields. Two cases deserve further investigation, UC36, in particular, is one such example. UC36 departed Zeebrugge on 16 May 1917 and, by 30  May, was reported missing.234 Lieutenants Morrish and Boswell, in H12 flying boat No. 8663, reported bombing submarines on 19 and 20 May, the first 22 miles east of, and the second only ten miles from, the North Hinder Light Vessel. 235 The pilots were awarded a bounty after the war for having sunk a U-boat on one of these occasions, although, had it been UC36, it was operating outside of its established patrol zone. Furthermore, marine archaeologist Tomas Termote has noted that there are no UC-type wrecks near the North Hinder Light Vessel. 236 Thus, it seems more likely that Morrish and Boswell either missed their target or merely damaged their elusive

106  Anti-Submarine Warfare U-boat prey on these occasions. The conventional explanation is that UC36 blew up on its own mines near the Isle of Wight on, or around, 19 May, or was rammed by the French steamer Moliere two days later near Ushant, although the possibility of a successful aircraft sinking should not be ignored.237 The fate of UB12 is far from clear. It was claimed sunk on 12 August 1918 by a flight of DH4s, under command of Captain K. G. Boyd from RAF Dunkirk. This is unlikely, however, as UB12 did not depart Zeebrugge until 19 August. 238 At any rate, it vanished without a trace and no wreck has since been identified. What is significant about these cases, taken together, is that aircraft were routinely attacking enemy submarines during the 1917–1918 crisis, even if the rate of successful attacks was lower than was believed during wartime. The introduction of new equipment, doctrine, and close cooperation between surface ships and aircraft, improved the situation in 1918 and there are a number of U-boats, in fact, sunk by a combination of air and surface forces that year: UB31, UB59, UC70, UB83, UB103, and UB115, although, once again, marine archaeology and scrutiny of the historical record have subsequently added qualifications to some of these cases. UB31, for example, illustrates how complex the fog-of-war could become. UB31 was believed to have struck a mine on 2 May 1918 while trying to avoid a surface A/S patrol, consisting of three armed drifters, that had been alerted to an oil patch by dirigible SSZ29. 239 Innes McCartney, however, believes this depth charge attack was actually conducted against the recently sunk UB78, which had struck a mine trying to cross through the Dover barrage on 19 April and was positioned where the wreck of UB31 should have been. 240 Since the drifters had spotted a periscope before conducting their attack, it seems possible that they had, in fact, engaged UB31, which then escaped, before it drove into the Dover barrage minefield. SSZ29, therefore, most likely observed the remnants and fuel leakage of UB78 and mistook the wreck for a damaged, rather than recently sunk, submarine. 241 UB59 provides a fairly straightforward case in which naval longrange bombing played a role. The submarine was badly damaged when it struck a pair of mines on 4 May while trying to pass through the Dover barrage. The U-boat managed to exfiltrate back to Ostend, was towed to Bruges, only to be bombed in dry-dock on 16 May (Bruges was a regular target of RNAS, RAF, and indeed, USN, bombing efforts from Dunkirk, see Chapter 3). Repairs were ongoing when, on 5 October, the maintenance crew blew up the U-boat to prevent its capture as the Allies liberated occupied Belgium. 242 The destruction of UC70 provides an interesting example of combined arms work. This mine-laying submarine was in dry dock at Ostend for repairs when Dover Patrol monitors shelled the dock on 5 June 1917, with aerial spotting assistance, further damaging the minelayer. 243 UC70 was

Anti-Submarine Warfare 107 then under repair for a year, finally returning to sea on 21 August 1918 with orders to mine the east coast of England. The U-boat, leaking oil, was located while underwater off Whitby on 28 August by Lieutenant E. F. Waring in Blackburn Kangaroo B9983. Waring proceeded to drop a 520-lb bomb on the U-boat, before alerting nearby destroyer HMS Ouse that then completed the destruction of UC70 with depth charges. 244 Kite-balloons were not only a crucial element of the convoy escort system, but were also important for routine patrol work, as the case of UB83 demonstrates. UB83, attached to the High Sea Fleet’s U-boats, was spotted on the surface southwest of the Orkneys on the morning of 10 September by the kite-balloon of destroyer HMS Ophelia. 245 UB83 submerged, but was then depth charged to destruction. 246 UB103 was likewise located from the air, on this occasion by SSZ1, piloted by Ensign N. J. Learned, USNR: on 16 September, while patrolling over the Dover barrage deep mine area, Learned reported an oil track. Five or six drifters converged on the U-boat’s location and dropped depth charges. Thirty minutes later, there was a mine explosion in the barrier, suggesting UB103 had driven into the minefield and been destroyed. 247 The case of UB115 demonstrated that rigid airships could also play a role in ASW. On 29 September 1918, British rigid R29 located UB115 by oil slick north of Sunderland, southeast of Coquet Island. Destroyers HMS Ouse and Star, in addition to six trawlers, were directed to the suspected submarine’s location where they used a hydrophone to detect engine noises, and then deployed depth charges, destroying the U-boat. 248 Last, although it did not concern British naval aviation, it is worth mentioning the case of U39 as it illustrates that aircraft did not, necessarily, have to sink a U-boat to knock it out of the war: U39 was forced to intern itself in Spain after being damaged by French seaplane attacks in the Mediterranean. 249 Collectively, these cases demonstrate that as the submarine crisis progressed, the RNAS, and its RAF successor, were not only gaining in efficiency as an A/S force but were also cultivating combined arms skills in cooperation with the Royal Navy’s surface ASW doctrine. The dramatic increase in the quality and quantity of bombs, mines, and depth charges – ­orchestrated by Jellicoe during his tenure as First Sea Lord – ­furthermore presented a real danger to coastal U-boat operations.250 These material improvements, accelerated further by Wemyss and Geddes in 1918, certainly paid dividends. 251 New machines such as the Blackburn Kangaroo, developed in part with input from Colonel Williamson, 252 combined with new doctrine, circulated by Wing Captain F. R. Scarlett at the Air Division, contributed to the successful A/S effort in 1918. During the war, Germany produced 373 U-boats, of which 145 were claimed destroyed by British efforts: 30 U-boats were sunk by depth charges, 253 11 were sunk by Q-ships, 254 and at least five U-boats were destroyed by a combination

108  Anti-Submarine Warfare of aircraft and surface vessels, another two most likely destroyed by aircraft operating alone, for a total of seven U-boats destroyed through the involvement of British aircraft in some manner. Despite this relatively small tally of A/S victories by the RNAS and RAF, it is useful to keep in mind the number of attacks carried out. Attacks could still be operationally significant if they caused damage or forced a U-boat to abandon its patrol. Squadron Commander Hallam, assisted by Lieutenant Partridge, RNVR, assumed command of the flying boats at NAS Felixstowe in March 1917, and generated 550 ‘Spider Web’ patrols over the North Sea between May and December, during which 44 submarines were reported and 25 attacked with bombs; a steady A/S effort. 255 During 1917, Wing Commander Bigsworth’s Channel Group flew 1,540 aircraft patrol missions, 406 Sea Scout and Coastal airship sorties from Polegate, and 29 kite-balloon sorties from Tipnor. Enemy submarines were encountered 27 times, resulting in eight attacks that were considered to have caused damage.256 During 1918, RAF Groups No. 9 (Plymouth), No. 10 (Portsmouth), and No. 18 (East Coast of England) conducted 48 attacks against enemy submarines between July and the end of September. 257 In sum, airplanes and seaplanes conducted 182 attacks against submarines, with airships adding another 26 attacks, across all theatres, other than the Mediterranean, between February 1917 and October 1918. 258 By June 1918, it was not unusual for an airplane to attack an enemy submarine with bombs, follow up with a report by W/T for destroyer support, such that any submarine surviving a bombing attack had to assume that it would be further persecuted unless it rapidly vacated the area. 259 If a U-boat was spotted or reported, it was very likely to be attacked by planes or airships, although airplanes, responsible for 267 sightings, or roughly one sighting every other day between June 1917 and October 1918, were much more effective than airships, the latter accounting for only 47 total sightings during the same period. 260 The Blackburn Kangaroo, introduced in spring 1918, was the most successful A/S patrol aircraft of the war, despite only 17 having been delivered before the armistice – of which, only 11 were involved in operations by 31 October. 261 The Kangaroo could carry 1,040 lbs of bombs: the standard load-out being one or two 520-lb bombs, or up to four 230-lb bombs. 262 Kangaroos sighted 12 submarines over 600 hours of flying between April and November 1918, or one sighting every 50 hours. These figures compare favourably with the Large America flying boats, which produced one sighting per 196 hours, and very favourably compared to Coastal airships at one sighting per 2,416 hours. 263 Based on Sturtivant and Page’s figures, at least one 520-lb bomb, and as many as 16 230-lb bombs, were dropped on suspected U-boats by Kangaroos during 1918, but the only recognized sinking was against UC70, with the assistance of a nearby destroyer, as we have seen. 264

Anti-Submarine Warfare 109

The Royal Air Force and the Air Division of the Naval Staff In December 1917, it was recognized that the Naval Staff required a separate Air Division to handle the administration, and operational planning, of the RNAS and, moreover, to act as a liaison between the Admiralty and the newly created Air Ministry.265 Jellicoe was behind this initiative, in fact it was one of his final acts as First Sea Lord. 266 The Air Division was established in the Admiralty building, in rooms 16 (HQ), 45 (Material), 41 (Airships), and 42 (Operations).267 The Air Division, ‘staffed by RAF officers, most of whom were former RNAS members’ ensured that the Naval Staff would retain some control over naval air assets, despite the formation of the Air Ministry. 268 The Air Division files, held by the National Archives, Kew, represent a vast trove of material, much of which is dedicated to ASW.269 The first Director of the Air Division was Wing Captain Scarlett, the former head of the Central Air Office (CAO), Sheerness. Shortly after taking office, Scarlett pointed out the lack of knowledge concerning the training of RNAS pilots and observers for operating against submarines. Early in March 1918, Scarlett wrote that the RNAS station commanders, and squadron pilots, still lacked ‘knowledge of various matters in relation to enemy submarines which must govern the policy they pursue’. 270 The solution was the publication of new manuals covering the practicalities of submarine identification and attack. In March, with the formation of the RAF merely days away, the Air Division began drafting a manual to educate the future RAF pilots, synthesizing the organizational A/S knowledge of the RNAS and Air Department prior to their dissolution. 271 The Air Ministry, for its part, intended to conduct ASW by brute force, beginning with the transfer of 27 flights between April and June 1918, for an eventual total of 34 flights – 204 DH6 aircraft – employed for A/S duty. 272 These aircraft were short on W/T equipment and, furthermore, the Admiralty was required to provide the observers. A new observer school was therefore formed at Aldeburgh. 273 Scarlett’s office produced a training scheme for A/S work by the end of May. Newly trained observers would be qualified to transmit W/T signals, read and communicate semaphore, navigate, carry out bombing attacks, recognize friendly and enemy vessels, and train with the machine gun – essential naval tasks that required years to cultivate. 274 The Air Division was central to the development of this expanded training scheme. Another manual produced by the Air Division has been subsequently cited as being of critical importance in terms of prototypical A/S doctrine – the ‘Notes on the Co-operation of Aircraft with Surface Craft for Escorting Convoys of Merchant Ships’ manual, published late in 1918. 275 This manual described the best practices for

110  Anti-Submarine Warfare seaplane convoy escort. Machines were to fly close to the convoy, keeping a good watch out for periscopes, and were instructed to immediately make signals (by Very lights), if a U-boat were spotted. 276 Seaplanes, due to the limited crew comforts available, were not to stay aloft for more than about three hours, whereas flying boats, with larger crews, could stay flying for between four and six hours.277 Convoy cover was to be flown in a series of rotating patrols, each seaplane staggered to arrive over the convoy as the previous escort was completing its patrol. The manual encouraged seaplanes to use the sun to tactical advantage, thus, to keep position between the sun and the convoy to improve visibility. Further, a special pair of ‘submarine goggles’ were supplied to the airplane’s crew, designed to cause a submarine’s ‘periscope to show up bright red’ for further improved spotting. 278 Pilots were reminded that these colour-filtered goggles were imperative, considering that ‘…hostile submarines are very carefully camouflaged’ and thus difficult to detect otherwise. 279 All aircraft involved were to be fitted with both W/T and Aldis lamps for signaling. The latter were also to be carried by the convoy escorts as ‘experience has shown that in this work a ship’s searchlight is almost useless.’280 Indeed, communications were a central focus of the manual, which also stipulated that pilots and observers alike should be ‘thoroughly acquainted with all Very light signals, etc., all recognition signals and marks, as used by British submarines and surface craft’. Knowledge of current signals was doubly important, to prevent the enemy from gaining knowledge of signaling and to prevent friendly fire.281 Again, this requirement clearly demonstrated the need for highly trained specialists, both naval pilots and observers, within the RAF. 282 Although published in December 1918, after the war, this manual provides a glimpse into the Air Division’s fully realized methods and doctrine. The Air Division, alongside Williamson’s Air Section of the ASD, 283 thus became a clearing house for doctrine publications and memorandum that were passed up the chain from the districts and fleet commanders. The Air Division was specifically tasked with the study of all A/S methods used by the regional air groups. As with Williamson’s ASRs, the Air Division now published ‘Reports of Naval Air Operations’, fulfilling the same function of compiling operational reports to elucidate the best practices for publication and distribution. 284 The Air Division oversaw all naval air matters, regardless of theatre, and was responsible for networking between the naval air stations in Britain, on the continent, and in the Mediterranean. At Malta, for example, it was planned to station Large America flying boats and Sea Scout dirigibles as part of a broad A/S scheme.285 SNO Egypt possessed an air complement stationed at Alexandria, but the entire flying boat programme remained focused on Malta, and none could be spared for the C-in-C Mediterranean when, at the beginning of March 1918, he

Anti-Submarine Warfare 111 requested support. 286 Indeed, Arthur Longmore, formerly CO No.  1 Squadron RNAS at Dunkirk, until the USN took over, like Sueter was relocated to Taranto, where he believed at least a dozen flying boats were needed to supplement the twelve seaplanes stationed at Alexandria, the latter being of only limited use. 287 On 22 May, the RAF units stationed at Egypt were reorganized into their own regional group, comprised of the Port Said Seaplane Station, NAS Alexandria, No. 2 Balloon base, and HMS City of Oxford. 288 Even farther abroad, Royal Navy seaplane carriers were conducting A/S missions: between 24 October and 25 November 1918, HMS Orotava carried out seaplane patrols at Dakar, Senegal, in conjunction with French forces. 289 On 5 November, Lt. V. W. Lamb, RAF, took Short 184 No. N2816, armed with 330 lbs of bombs, and carrying as observer Lieutenant N. J. Picken, RAF, up to patrol the Dakar harbour. 290 On 9 November, they escorted a convoy led by HMS Ebro, and flew a scout patrol over the surrounding area and route ahead. 291 Orotava conducted a total of four A/S patrols during this timeframe, although no submarines were spotted this late in the war.292 HMS Mantua also conducted similar operations as part of the far-ranging Plymouth command, which included Dakar and the Azores in its area of responsibility.293 The attachment of seaplane carriers, such as Riviera, Orotava, City of Oxford, and Mantua, to these regional commands in the A/S role represented a precursor of the escort carrier, increasing the ability of commanders to supply local air support to convoys on distant stations. After April 1918, there was significant continuity between the former naval squadrons and the Admiralty: the Air Division of the Staff now resembled the former Air Department, while the RAF groups retained their former RNAS regional structures. 294 The Admiralty, for its part, reiterated the importance of communication and cooperation in a policy statement released in April, emphasizing that the air groups were to be in telephone contact with both the SNOs and the air stations. 295 Airships and kite-balloons would provide the essential convoy escort function, backed by patrolling airplanes and special hunter-killer squadrons dedicated to rapid response to U-boat activity. 296 Flying boats, capable of landing and deploying hydrophones, were also expected to provide a listening capability, and to engage in patrol and convoy activity farther from the coast.297 An enormous building programme of more than 1,000 aircraft was recommended, including flying boats, seaplanes, and specially designed coastal patrol aircraft such as the Kangaroo. 298 The creation of the RAF and, in particular, the Independent Air Force (see Chapter 3) had a negative impact on the procurement of aircraft for the A/S role. Handley Page bombers flying from Redcar, which were briefly used for ASW ‘with conspicuous success’, were instead transferred to strategic bombing operations in France. 299 The Air Ministry preferred to supply the A/S squadrons with DH6 trainers, rather than the more

112  Anti-Submarine Warfare useful DH4 bombers.300 Similar procurement issues were experienced with regard to flying boats: between November 1917 and February 1918, the Air Board promised to deliver 63 Large America-type flying boats, but only 20 were actually delivered.301 The bitter truth is that the RAF was not fully aware of the importance of the A/S mission, preferring instead to focus on Home Defence and strategic bombing. It was for this reason that the creation of the RAF, despite the change in uniforms and ranks, had at first almost no impact on the established RNAS policy, although this situation was sure to change as former RFC officers and practitioners came to dominate the third service. The debate around priority, which missions deserved the most resources and why, was to be repeated in the next war.302

Conclusion From the inception of the Naval Wing of the RFC, aerial ASW was expected to be a component of Britain’s naval aviation mission. The extent of this role was at first limited by strategic confusion and budget cuts in 1914, indeed, the Air Department had been caught off guard. In January 1914 Churchill and Sueter agreed, for budgetary reasons, to postpone the Naval Wing’s modernization programme until 1916–1917, leaving the entire budget for 1915–1916 at only £780,000 to £815,000.303 New construction, under this proposal, consumed 58% of the budget for the first two years, with another £200,000 dedicated to general works, with stores and pay receiving less than £100,000 each.304 These figures are significant as they suggest that the Admiralty was planning to cap per annum Air Department spending at around £1 million for the years 1914–1917, with a total expenditure of £988,450, matching that of Germany or France, but also not much more than the cost of a pair of new light cruisers, all told. The result was an intentional short-changing of the Air Department, planned for 1915, that could be said to have backfired on Churchill’s administration when the war started. Churchill and Fisher, in the event, treated the Air Department as a technical think-tank, and the RNAS as a military branch within the Royal Navy, like the Coast Guard or Royal Marines – an inestimable maritime resource, but certainly not a dedicated A/S force. By September 1915, this regime had been replaced with Balfour-Jackson and DAS Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee, collectively a more conservative administration that loosened the Air Department’s central control over the RNAS squadrons and stations, abandoned the overland air defence of Britain, and implemented the long-range bombing of German industry in an evolution of the Navy’s blockade doctrine (significantly justified as either attacking steel industries used for submarine production, or as retaliation for submarine attacks on merchant shipping).305 Balfour’s reforms not only put the RNAS Squadrons at the service of their district SNOs, but

Anti-Submarine Warfare 113 also isolated those districts into individual commands, thus limiting the transmission of experiential learning between commands, although some of the stovepipe nature of the Churchill administration was retained. Early wartime efforts to directly bomb the U-boat bases were not generally successful. The U-boats, although deterred from carrying out attacks on merchant shipping by international pressure, continued to attack warships. Combined with the extensive mine warfare engaged in by both sides, the U-boats scored a number of critical successes in 1914, 1915, and 1916. During this period of relative restraint, the impact of the U-boats, despite increasing merchant-shipping losses, was always tempered by the position of the United States and other neutrals. Total shipping destroyed by enemy action, between August 1914 and May 1916, never exceeded 200,000 tons a month, while tonnage destroyed exclusively by submarines crossed only 100,000 tons for the first time in May 1915, the month the Lusitania was torpedoed, and then peaked in August that year, when the sinking of the Arabic prompted further American protest. After a significant decline, 140,000 tons were sunk in November, a figure that was not again approached until March 1916 – when the campaign was once more curtailed by international protest. In April that year, the U-boats were withdrawn to work with the High Sea Fleet in its planned upcoming surface actions.306 Nevertheless, when combined with the warships destroyed by submarines and mines, these figures solidified the submarines’ growing reputation as a raider and fleet auxiliary; they did not, however, represent a serious threat to the Allied war effort. Although the warship losses were serious, targets were more often than not obsolescent ships, and shipping losses were soon replaced by new production. The RNAS, as such, was engaged in ASW only insofar as that mission coincided with other vital wartime priorities, notably, anti-Zeppelin patrols and fleet operations. Although the first steps were taken towards bombing the enemy’s submarine bases in Belgium, and the first dedicated A/S weapon systems such as the Sea Scout dirigibles were introduced, the RNAS at this point in the war was far from a credible A/S force. The situation began to change at the end of 1916 when Admiral Jellicoe was transferred from the Grand Fleet and installed as First Sea Lord. In February 1917, Germany initiated the third phase of the submarine crisis by unleashing the U-boats to attack all merchant shipping, regardless of the impact this would have on neutral governments, and the United States promptly declared war on 6 April, despite President Wilson’s 1916 election-year promise to keep the US out of the war. The solution was to introduce more effective methods and equipment and then to assemble the most critical mercantile trade into protected convoys. New RNAS flying boats made certain the U-boats operated on the surface under the constant risk of air attack, although after the initial success of the flying boats in April and May 1917, the U-boat

114  Anti-Submarine Warfare commanders adapted, and the aerial patrols became less effective. Without central direction, it was left to the naval districts to set policy individually, or unite together organically, encouraged by the RNAS commanders over whose districts they flew, as was demonstrated by the C-in-C East Coast of England and at Dover-Dunkirk, both prototypical air groups, as we have seen. Jellicoe’s singular solution was to appoint RNAS group commanders, equal partners with their regional Navy equivalents. These powerful joint forces were able to react quickly to submarine threats, leveraging the new flying boats, improved seaplanes, airplane bombers and fighters, as well as rigid and non-rigid airships. At this point, the Allied material advantage began to weigh, as A/S air patrols, expanded bombing of submarine bases and, crucially, aircraft escort of merchant convoys, proved a potent tonic in the struggle against the U-boats. The appointment of Fifth Sea Lord Godfrey Paine provided central direction as the regional commanders and their RNAS group partners developed coastal defence and shipping protection doctrine. Lessons learned were soon referred to the Naval Staff for accumulation, distillation, and distribution. The First Sea Lord, after May 1917 also the CNS, directed specialized missions as required, such as the planning for the Wilhelmshaven attack proposed in the fall of 1917 (see Chapter 1), the ultimate objective of which was to defeat the Belgian submarine bases. First Lord Edward Carson was dismissed by Lloyd George, and replaced by Eric Geddes, the Controller, and Geddes, in turn, replaced Jellicoe with the more palatable Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss. Although Geddes believed in retaining the Navy’s airpower, ultimately he oversaw the dismantling of the RNAS, leaving aerial ASW in the precarious hands of the Army-dominated RAF. As we have seen, aerial ASW had been explored before the war, but the experimental and theoretical work had not yet prepared the RNAS to carry out the mission on a mass scale. The lack of prewar experience, combined with the RN’s decentralized approach to its naval aviation assets between June 1915 and January 1917 resulted, initially, in little unity of effort: each district, squadron, and the various service leaders, all produced different, and sometimes conflicting, proposals about where and how best to utilize naval aviation for ASW and the protection of merchant shipping more generally. The significance of the RNAS in the A/S role was summarized by Abbatiello, quoting the Barley and Waters post-Second World War staff study to the effect that ‘during the unrestricted submarine campaign [1917–1918] only 257 out of 83,958 ships (of over 500 tons) [that] sailed under convoy escort were lost to U-boats in Home Waters. Out of 1,757 total losses during the period, the vast majority (1,500 or 86%) occurred when ships sailed independently’ and thus without convoy or air support.307 During 1918, the Admiralty observed only

Anti-Submarine Warfare 115 six occasions in which U-boats attacked convoys escorted by both air and surface assets.308 On the other hand, Air Ministry figures indicate that, despite RAF efforts, between 1 July and 30 September 1918, 329 attacks were carried out against unconvoyed merchant shipping by submarines, even when airplanes and airships were operating with No. 9, No. 10, and No. 18 Groups: aircraft clearly worked best as part of the total system.309 Layman concluded that the RNAS A/S effort, in terms of sea-lane defence, is best appreciated for its total strategic, rather than immediately tactical, impact.310 In terms of RNAS A/S practitioners, the stand-out example is without a doubt Commander Hugh Williamson. An innovative prewar theorist, Williamson contributed to a number of important technical projects and went on to command the Air Section of the ASD, thus providing a wealth of material that significantly contributed to the development of a tactical and operational A/S naval aviation doctrine. Furthermore, the interaction between the Naval Staff and the Board of Admiralty (with Commodore Paine as Fifth Sea Lord) did much to restructure the relationship between the RNAS station commanders and the naval district officers under whom they served. Although the situation, after the May Crisis of 1915, was never as straightforward as it had been before it, the system did eventually evolve to a high degree of efficiency, and Jellicoe, ultimately, deserves much of this credit. Despite the limited tactical successes of 1917–1918, the war experience seemed to demonstrate that ‘the only rival of the submarine patrol is the aircraft patrol’.311 Unfortunately, this was only part of the story, and the hard lessons learned from 1914–1918, would have to be relearned in the Second World War.312

Notes 1. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, pp. 107–8. 2. Tim Benbow, Naval Warfare 1914–1918, Kindle ebook (London: Amber Books Ltd., 2011), Chapter 6, loc. 3177. 3. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, pp. 108, 112. 4. W. S. King-Hall, ‘The Influence of the Submarine in the Naval Warfare of the Future’, in JRUSI, vol. 64, no. 455 (August 1919), p. 364. 5. Lawrence Sondhaus, German Submarine Warfare in World War I: The Onset of Total War at Sea (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2017), pp.  30–1. See also, John C. G. Rohl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941, trans. Sheila de Bellaigue and Roy Bridge, Kindle ebook, vol. III, 3 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 1151. 6. Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, pp.  85–9. Marder, FDSF, vol. II, pp. 346–7. 7. British Merchant Vessels Lost by Hostile Action, August 1914–May 1916, CAB 42/15/16. See also, J. A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control, An Experiment in International Administration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), Table No. 6, pp. 355–9.

116  Anti-Submarine Warfare 8. John Keegan, The First World War, Vintage Canada (Toronto: Random House of Canada Ltd., 2000), pp. 352–3. Benbow, Naval Warfare, Chapter 6, loc. 3003. Andreas Michelsen, Submarine Warfare, 1914–1918 (Miami: Trident Publishing, 2017), pp. 37–8. Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, pp. 301–8. 9. Rossano, Stalking the U-Boat, p. 2. Redford and Grove, The Royal Navy, p. 81. 10. Erich Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story, August 1914–November 1918, Forgotten Books reprint, vol. II, 2 vols. (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1919), pp. 415–8. Rohl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss, vol. III, p. 1154. 11. Service record of Henry Francis Oliver, ADM 196/42/357. 12. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 139. See also, Naval Staff Training and Staff Duties Division, Naval Staff Monographs (Historical), Home Waters, Part  8, December 1916 to April 1917, vol. XVIII, 19 vols. (1933), pp. 30–1, 462. 13. D. W. Waters and Frederick Barley, The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939–1945, ed. Eric Grove (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 7, 40. See also, Jellicoe, Crisis of the Naval War, p. 48. 14. A. Temple Patterson, Tyrwhitt of the Harwich Force: The Life of the Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt (London: Macdonald & Jane’s, 1973), p. 185. 15. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 118–21. 16. John Terraine, Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars, 1916–1945, Kindle ebook (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), Part 1, Chapter 3, loc. 1223. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812, vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1892), p. 205. 17. Salter, Allied Shipping Control, p. 358. 18. Fig 3.3, British, Allied and neutral merchant vessels destroyed by enemy action, 1 June 1916–31 October 1918, Redford and Grove, The Royal Navy, p. 81. 19. R. Dunley, ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Pre-First World War Royal Navy: A Cultural Failure?’ in War in History (February 2019), p. 13 fn. 20. Marder, FDSF, vol. I, p. 205. Dunley, ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare’, p. 14. 21. Nicholas Lambert, ed., The Submarine Service, 1900–1918 (London: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), p. 128 fn. Dunley, ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare’, p. 19. 22. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 185–6, 267. 23. Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), p. 210. W. D. Hackmann, ‘Burney, Sir (Charles) Dennistoun, Second Baronet (1888–1968), Marine and Aeronautical Engineer,’ ODNB. Michael Heseltine, ‘Priorities in British Defence Policy’, in The Future of British Sea Power, ed. Geoffrey Till (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. 9. 24. John Abbatiello, ‘Doctrinal Innovation in the Royal Naval Air Service: Samson, Longmore and Williamson’, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, no. 132 (April 2009): pp. 35–45, p. 36. 25. Murray Sueter, The Evolution of the Submarine Boat, Mine and Torpedo, from the Sixteenth Century to the Present Time (London: J. Griffin and Company, 1907). Murray Sueter, ‘ESSAY. Third Place. Subject – “In the Existing State of Development of War-Ships and of Torpedo and Submarine Vessels, in What Manner Can the Strategical Objects, Formerly Pursued by Means of Blockading an Enemy in His Own Ports, Be Best Attained?”’, in JRUSI, vol. 48, no. 2 (July 1, 1904), p. 757.

Anti-Submarine Warfare 117 26. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, pp. 83–4. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 132. Extracts from Paper by Captain Murray Sueter, Director of Air Department, Admiralty, dated 29 August 1912, AIR 1/652, #18 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 56–60. 27. Abbatiello, ‘Doctrinal Innovation in the Royal Naval Air Service’, p. 35. 28. Lt. H. A. Williamson, Aeroplanes for Naval Service, March 1912, CCC WILMN 1/1. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p.  266. Although the draft held by the Churchill Archives is dated March 1912, the paper was originally drafted in December 1911 and submitted on 22 January 1912. See, Guy Robbins, The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908–1945 (London: Cassel & Co, 2001), p. 13. 29. Williamson, the Aeroplane in use against Submarines, March 1912, CCC WILMN 1/1, p. 2. 30. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 80. Goulter, ‘Royal Naval Air Service’, p. 54. 31. Hackmann, ‘Burney, Sir (Charles) Dennistoun, Second Baronet (1888–1968)’. 32. C. D. Burney, ‘Air Power’, in NRJ, vol. 1, no. 2 (1913), pp. 57–75. 33. Peter Padfield, ‘The Submarine as Commerce Raider’, in Dreadnought to Daring: 100 Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in The Naval Review, ed. Peter Hore (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2012): pp. 95–111, pp. 95–6. 34. Burney, ‘Air Power’, p. 63. 35. Captain G. W. Vivian, Précis of Lecture on ‘SEA-PLANES’, The Uses and Employment of Sea-Planes in War. Royal Naval War College Portsmouth, December 1913, NMM VIV/8. 36. Ibid., p. 7. 37. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, p. 286. N. A. M. Rodger, ‘Ballard, George Alexander (1862–1948), Naval Officer’, ODNB. 38. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p.  84. Extracts from the Second Annual Report by the Air Committee on the Royal Flying Corps. C.I.D. 190B, dated 9 May 1914, CAB 38/27/22, #41 in Roskill, Documents, p. 129. 39. Burney, ‘Air Power’, p.  61. Captain G. W. Vivian, Précis of Lecture on ‘SEA-PLANES’, The Uses and Employment of Sea-Planes in War. Royal Naval War College Portsmouth, December 1913. VIV/8, NMM, p. 3. 40. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 268. 41. Notes on the Co-operation of Aircraft with Surface Craft for Escorting Convoys of Merchant Ships, Air Division, Naval Staff, December 1918, AIR 10/860, p. 12. 42. King, Armament of British Aircraft, p. 45. 43. Mr. Churchill’s statement on Navy Estimates, 26 March 1913, HC, vol. 50, cc. 1774. 44. Winston Churchill, Tactical Objects for which Naval Seaplanes are required, First Lord minute, 26 October 1913, AIR 1/2496. 45. Marder, FDSF, vol. I, p. 337. 46. Air Department, Aeroplanes for Naval Service, 1913, AIR 1/626/17/88, p. 25. Goulter, ‘Royal Naval Air Service’, pp. 53–4. 47. Appendix No. 1. Report of Captain of Hermes on Use of Aircraft During Manoeuvres. In W. H. May’s Report, August 1913, AIR 1/626/17/46, p. 82. 48. Ibid., p. 85 49. John Fisher, Records (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), p. 183. 50. Aeroplanes for Naval Service, March 1912, CCC WILMN 1/1, part II, p. 1.

118  Anti-Submarine Warfare 51. Percy Scott, The Times, 5 June 1914. 52. Padfield, ‘The Submarine as Commerce Raider’, pp. 96–7. 53. Warner, Lighter Than Air, Chapter 4, loc. 3182. Dwight Messimer, Find and Destroy: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War I (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 5. 54. Freeman, Tempestuous Genius, Chapter 23, loc. 4841. 55. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 82. 56. Fisher, Memories, p. 125. Popham, Into Wind, pp. 41–2. 57. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 96. 58. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, pp. 37, 39. 59. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 81. 60. Willem Hackmann, Seek & Strike: Sonar, Anti-Submarine Warfare and the Royal Navy, 1914–54 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1984), p. 18. List of Committees appointed to consider Questions arising during the Present War, 31 March 1916, CAB 42/11/11, p. 27. 61. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 37. 62. Ibid., p. 39. 63. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 86. 64. H. J. C. Harper, ‘The Development of the Flying Boat’, in JRUSI, vol. 82, no. 526 (1937), p. 361. 65. Admiralty Weekly Order No. 1204/15, 29 July 1915, ADM 1/8408, #72 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 212–3. 66. Churchill Minute to Colonel Seely, Secretary of State for War, 6 December 1913, Some Minutes by Mr. Churchill on Aviation Matters, September–December 1913, ADM 1/8621, #36, in Roskill, Documents, p.  119. Christopher Bell, Churchill And Sea Power (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 85. Draft Proposals by Captain Murray F. Sueter, Director Air Department, Admiralty, for the Reorganisation of the Naval Air Service, 24 February 1914, ADM 1/8378, #43 in Roskill, Documents, p. 146. Director Air Department, Murray Sueter, Administrative changes and discipline of the Royal Naval Air Service, 5 January 1915, ADM 1/8408/7. See also, Extracts from Admiralty Weekly Order No. 166 of 5 February 1915 ‘Naval Air Service-Reorganisation’, ADM 1/8408, #62 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 193–4. 67. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 86. 68. Commander Smyth-Osbourne’s statement at the Air Board meeting of 24  May 1916, AIR 6/1. Service Record for Wing Captain Henry P. Smyth-Osbourne, ADM 273/2, p. 35. 69. Martin Gilbert, The Challenge of War: Winston S. Churchill, 1914–1916, vol. III, 8 vols. (London: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1990), p. 66. 70. Owen Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912 (London: Putnam, 1978), p. 36. 71. Development and Operations of the R.N.A.S. in Home Waters, Submarine Campaign, Part II. AIR 1/677/21/13/1902. 72. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 377. Also Flight, vol. 7, no. 36 (3 September 1915), p. 648. 73. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 378. See also Flight, vol. 7, no. 50 (10 December 1915), p. 978. 74. Massie, Castles of Steel, p. 322. 75. Extracts from Letter No. 1102/W.552 of 31 October 1915 from Rear Admiral G. A. Ballard, Admiral of Patrols, to the Secretary of the Admiralty, AIR 1/650, #86 in Roskill, Documents, p. 250. 76. Extracts from Admiralty Letter M.08235 of 26 October 1915, AIR 1/650, #85 in Roskill, Documents, p. 249.

Anti-Submarine Warfare 119 77. Hankey to Admiralty, Conclusions of the Second JWAC meeting, 7 March 1916, ADM 1/8449, #108 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 317–8. 78. Conclusion of the Second Meeting, held at 2 Whitehall Gardens, S. W., on Monday, February 28, 1916, ADM 1/8449. 79. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive, p. 10. 80. Gamble, Story of a North Sea Air Station, pp. 172–6. See also, Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914–1918 (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1982), p. 148. 81. Jones, WIA, vol. III, pp.  203–7. Christopher Cole and E. F. Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain 1914–1918 (London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1984), pp. 127–9. See also, Neil R. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz (Stroud: The History Press, 2015), p. 174. 82. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat, pp. 156–7. 83. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz, p. 171 et seq. See also Joseph Morris, ­German Air Raids on Britain 1914–1918 (East Sussex: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., 1993), p. 93. 84. Gamble, Story of a North Sea Air Station, pp. 174–5. Gamble says this was L16; however, this is unlikely. 85. Gamble, Story of a North Sea Air Station, p. 174. Marder, FDSF, vol. II, pp. 425–6. Temple Patterson, Tyrwhitt of the Harwich Force, pp. 156–60. 86. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #9, p. 30. 87. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 206. Cole & Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 127. 88. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 206. 89. Marder, FDSF, vol. II, p.  425. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol.  III, pp. 303–4. Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, p. 157 et seq. 90. Jones, WIA, vol. III, pp. 170–1, 177–8. 91. Marder, FDSF, vol. II, p. 362. 92. Ibid., pp.  98–9. See also, Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 19. 93. W. M. James and Andrew Lambert, ‘Bayly, Sir Lewis (1857–1938), Naval Officer’, ODNB. 94. Rodger, ‘Ballard, George Alexander (1862–1948), Naval Officer’, ODNB. 95. Orders re Aircraft Patrols issued to Air Stations under Command of R. A. C. East Coast, 16 August 1916, AIR 1/635/17/122/117. See also, Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 87. 96. Orders re Aircraft Patrols issued to Air Stations under Command of R. A. C. East Coast, 16 August 1916, AIR 1/635/17/122/117, p. 2. 97. Malcolm Fife, British Airship Bases of the Twentieth Century, Kindle ebook (Oxford: Fonthill Media Limited, 2015), p. 82. 98. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 46. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 82. 99. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 424–5. 100. Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, The First World: Myths and Realities, Kindle ebook (London: Endeavour Press Ltd., 2014), Afterthoughts, loc. 5057–65. Jim Beach, ‘Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British GHQ, 1917–1918’, in War in History, vol. 19, no. 4 (November 2012), pp. 464–91. 101. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p.  87. Extracts from the Second Annual Report by the Air Committee on the Royal Flying Corps. C.I.D. 190B, dated 9 May 1914, CAB 38/27/22, #41 in Roskill, Documents, p. 131. 102. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 89. 103. Appendix III, F: Submarine Programs in Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 360.

120  Anti-Submarine Warfare 104. Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch. The RNAS in Home Waters. January 1917–April 1918, Part II: Submarine Campaign. AIR 1/677/21/13/1902, p. 7. 105. Ibid., p. 2. 106. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 46. 107. Norman Leslie, ‘The System of Convoys for Merchant Shipping in 1917 and 1918’, NRJ, vol. 5, no. 1 (1917): 42–95, p. 43. Richard Webb, ‘Trade Defence in War’, JRUSI, vol. 70, no. 477 (1925), p. 38. See also, Matthew Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German Threat, 1901–1914 (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 110. 108. Jones, WIA, IV, p. 45. Interestingly, this had been essentially Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson’s prediction regarding the scheme when it had been discussed in 1905: see, Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German Threat, p. 111. 109. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 31. 110. Messimer, Find and Destroy, p. 181. See also, Steve Dunn, Securing The Narrow Sea: The Dover Patrol, 1914–1918 (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2017). 111. Admiralty Board Minutes, Wednesday 31 January 1917, ADM 167/51. Jellicoe, Crisis of the Naval War, p 71. 112. V. W. Baddeley and Marc Brodie, ‘Halsey, Sir Lionel (1972–1949), Naval Officer’, ODNB. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 59–60, 215–7. 113. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 100. 114. Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch, The RNAS in Home Waters. January 1917–April 1918, Part II: Submarine Campaign. AIR 1/677/21/13/1902, p. 11. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, pp. 144–5. 115. Jellicoe, Crisis of the Naval War, p. 49. 116. Samson, Fights and Flights, p. 356. 117. Fife, British Airship Bases, Chapter 3, loc. 907. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p.  89. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p.  140. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 48. See also, RNAS Portsmouth Group, General Report of Work Carried out during year 1917, 2 December 1917, AIR 1/659. 118. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 48. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 138. 119. Service record for Eugene Louis Gerrard, DSO, ADM 273/2/42. 120. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’ pp. 52–3. Extract from the London Gazette of 2 April 1918, ADM 116/1822, #241 in Roskill, Documents, p. 654. 121. Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch. The RNAS in Home Waters. January 1917–April 1918, Part II: Submarine Campaign, AIR 1/677/21/13/1902, p. 14. 122. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 331. 123. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 115. 124. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 183. See also Rosyth Secret Memorandum No. 067/19, 15 February 1918, AIR 1/291/15/226/140. 125. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 145. 126. Air Department, Memorandum on the Use of Aircraft for the Protection of Shipping, with Charts. 30 March 1918, AIR 1/279/15/226/133, Appendix 4, p. 15. 127. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 164. 128. Ibid., pp. 17–19. 129. Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch, The RNAS in Home Waters, January 1917–April 1918, Part II: Submarine Campaign, AIR 1/677/21/13/1902, p. 11. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 48–9. 130. Black, British Naval Staff, p. 192. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 176–7.

Anti-Submarine Warfare 121 131. Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, Chapter 3, loc. 868. 132. Figure 5.1, RAF (Naval) Air Groups and major naval districts, 31 October 1918, Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 110. 133. Ferris, ‘Achieving Air Ascendancy: Challenge and Response in British Strategic Air Defence, 1915–40’, in Air Power History, ed. Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002): 21–50, p. 31. 134. Air Department, Memorandum on the Use of Aircraft for the Protection of Shipping, with Charts, 30 March 1918. AIR 1/279/15/226/133, Appendix 4, p. 9. 135. Ibid., p. 10. 136. Rear Admiral East Coast, Suggested new scheme of aerial patrols on the East Coast, 18 May 1917, AIR 1/641/17/122/223. 137. Rear Admiral Commanding East Coast of England to Admiralty, No. 1634/W.548/14, 19 May 1917, AIR 1/641. 138. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p.  92. Mowthorpe, Battlebags, pp. 52, 60. 139. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 264–5. I am grateful to Simon Harley for clarifying the structure of the Admiralty buildings at this time. 140. Nicholas Black, ‘The Admiralty War Staff and Its Influence on the Conduct of the Naval War between 1914 and 1918’ (PhD thesis, London, University College London, 2005), pp.  180, 247. Black, British Naval Staff, pp. 184–8, 185, 223, 290, 301. Goldrick, After Jutland, Chapter 9, loc. 3307–16. 141. Beesly, Room 40, pp.  254–5. Llewellyn-Jones, The Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 8. 142. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 50. 143. Black, British Naval Staff, pp. 186–7. 144. Abbatiello, ‘Doctrinal Innovation in the Royal Naval Air Service’, p. 42. 145. Air Department. Organisation & Duties of Admiralty Concerning the Air Services. June 1917–February 1918. AIR 1/279/15/226/127, pp. 2, 4. 146. Figure 7.1, ‘The structure of the Anti-Submarine Division, n.d. [January 1918]’, in Black, British Naval Staff, p. 223, ADM 137/2715. 147. See AIR 1/2105, and AIR 1/626. 148. Lt. Commander R. C. M. Pink to DAS, Royal Naval Air Service, Communique No. 3, 22 December 1915, AIR 1/2577. 149. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 48–9. T. D. Hallam, The Spider Web (Driffield: Leonaur, 2009). 150. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 53–4. 151. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 141. 152. Llewellyn-Jones, The Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 10. 153. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 82. 154. Service record of J. C. Porte, ADM 196/49/9. J. J. Colledge and Ben Warlow, Ships of the Royal Navy, The Complete Record of All Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy (Philadelphia & Newbury: Casemate, 2010), p. 223. 155. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 18–9. 156. Harper, ‘The Development of the Flying Boat’, p. 361. Service record of John Cyril Porte, ADM 196/143/234, also ADM 196/49/9. 157. The Naval Who’s Who, 1917 (Polstead: J. B. Hayward & Son: 1981), p. 261. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 464–5. 158. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 362. 159. Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912, pp. 194–6.

122  Anti-Submarine Warfare 160. King, Armament of British Aircraft, p. 183. Director Air Services Commodore Godfrey Paine to Admiralty, Royal Naval Air Service, Policy and Development, 21 January 1917, ADM 1/8478/10, p. 3. 161. Messimer, Find and Destroy, pp.  113–5. Hackmann, Seek & Strike, pp. 65–6. 162. F. R. Scarlett note on C-in-C Nore, Hydrophone Experimental fitting of seaplanes, 25 March 1918, AD369, AIR 1/275. 163. Hackmann, Seek & Strike, p.  70. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p.  348. Tomas Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser: Unterseebootflotille Flandern, 1915–1918, Kindle ebook (Hamburg: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2015), Ub-Boote, loc. 5795. 164. Hackmann, Seek & Strike, p. 68. 165. Director Operations Division, Rear Admiral P. W. Hope minute to Vice-Admiral Bacon’s cover-letter attached to Wing Captain Lambe’s report on offensive operations at Dunkerque, 10 June 1917, AIR 1/641. 166. DOD Hope and DASD Fisher minute to Vice-Admiral Bacon’s letter of 4 July 1917, AIR 1/641. 167. Henry Oliver to First Sea Lord, 15 December 1916, AIR 1/656. 168. Gamble, Story of a North Sea Air Station, pp. 280–1. 169. Terry Treadwell, The First Naval Air War (Stroud: The History Press Ltd., 2010), pp. 41–2. 170. Newbolt, Naval Operations, vol. V, pp. 178–80. 171. C-in-C Mediterranean to Director Air Division, 2 March 1918. Appendix 4. Kite Balloon Requirements for Otranto Barrage. AD 152, AIR 1/274. 172. Marder, Portrait of an Admiral, p. 268. 173. Marder, FDSF, vol. V, p. 66. 174. Ibid. 175. Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch, The RNAS in Home Waters. January 1917–April 1918, Part II: Submarine Campaign, AIR 1/677/21/13/1902, p. 14. Temple Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, vol. II, p. 114. 176. Abbatiello, Anti-submarine Warfare, pp. 109, 118. 177. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 163. 178. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 59–60. 179. Abbatiello, Anti-submarine Warfare, p. 116. 180. Ibid., p.  119. SW Group Patrol Orders, 1 September 1917, AIR 1/644/17/122/292. See also Peter London, U-Boat Hunters: Cornwall’s Air War 1916–19 (Mount Hawke, Truro: Dyllansow Truran, 1999), p. 89. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp.  260–1. Newbolt, Naval Operations, vol. V, p. 103. 181. RNAS Station Index, 31 March 1918, AIR 1/670, Appendix II in Roskill, Documents, p.750. See also, Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, ­Appendix 2, p. 176. 182. Wing Captain South West Group to Director Air Services, 23 April 1917, AIR 1/644. London, U-Boat Hunters, p. 55. 183. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p.  48. Wing Captain E. L. Gerrard, ‘South-West Group-Patrol Orders’, 1 September 1917, AIR 1/305, & Wing Captain Gerrard to C-in-C Plymouth, 19 September 1917, AIR 1/644. 184. Newbolt, Naval Operations, vol. V, p. 197. 185. Ibid., p. 197. 186. ACNS Duff to C-in-C Devonport, Rear Admiral Bethell, ‘Gibraltar Merchant Ship Convoy Report from Escort’, 26 May 1917, ADM 137/1323. 187. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 47. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 119. 188. Lewis, Squadron Histories, p. 79. London, U-Boat Hunters, p. 88.

Anti-Submarine Warfare 123 189. Air Department, Memorandum on the Use of Aircraft for the Protection of Shipping, with Charts, 30 March 1918, AIR 1/279/15/226/133, ­Appendix 6. 190. Charles Ernest Fayle, Seaborne Trade: Submarine Warfare, vol. III, 3  vols., reprint (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, Ltd., originally published 1924), p. 366. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 111. V. E. Tarrant, The U-Boat Offensive, 1914–1945 (London: Cassel & Co., 2000), p. 69. 191. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 174, Appendix 1: Merchant losses and aircraft sorties. 192. Ibid., pp. 126–7. 193. Air Department, Memorandum on the Use of Aircraft for the Protection of Shipping, with Charts, 30 March 1918, AIR 1/279/15/226/133. 194. Ibid., p. 1. 195. Notes on Aids to Submarine Hunting, March–April 1918, ADM 186/415. 196. Abbatiello, ‘Doctrinal Innovation in the Royal Naval Air Service’, p. 43. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 124. Col H. A. Williamson, Aircraft on Convoy Escort, East Coast Command, 15 September 1918, AIR 1/289/15/226/139. 197. Hugh Williamson, Employment of Aeroplanes for Anti-Submarine Work, 14 August 1918, AIR 1/642/17/122/252. 198. Ibid., p. 1. 199. Ibid., p. 2. 200. R. M. Groves, Director Air Division, minute to: Hugh Williamson, Employment of Aeroplanes for Anti-Submarine Work, 26 August 1918, AD 3845, AIR 1/642. 201. Air Department, Memorandum on the Use of Aircraft for the Protection of Shipping, with Charts, 30 March 1918, AIR 1/279/15/226/133, p. 5. 202. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, pp. 126–7. 203. Air Department, Memorandum on the Use of Aircraft for the Protection of Shipping, with Charts, 30 March 1918, AIR 1/279/15/226/133, pp. 6–7. 204. Memorandum as to the functions of the Fifth Sea Lord and Director of Air Services, June 1917, AIR 1/279/15/226/127, p. 3. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 22. Marder, FDSF, vol. V, p. 64 fn. 205. Innes McCartney, ‘The Archaeology of First World War U-Boat Losses in the English Channel and Its Impact on the Historical Record’, in The Mariner’s Mirror, vol. 105, no. 2 (May 2019), p.  191. I am grateful to Michael Lowrey who kindly provided me with his database of First World War U-boat sinkings in preparation for this section. 206. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #32, p.  3. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 55. 207. McCartney, ‘The Archaeology of First World War U-Boat Losses’, p. 188. Reported destruction of/damage to submarines, August 1914 to January 1919, ADM 239/26. 208. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 55. Innes McCartney, ‘The Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict: Comparing the Archaeology of German Submarine Wrecks to the Historical Text, Volume One’, (PhD thesis, Bournemouth University, 2013), p.  160. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, UB-Boote, loc. 5130. RNAS Portsmouth Group, General Report of Work Carried out during year 1917, 2 December 1917, AIR 1/659. The conventional narrative is that UB39 was destroyed on 17 May 1917 by the decoy schooner Glen. See Messimer, Verschollen, p. 161 & Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 181.

124  Anti-Submarine Warfare 209. Harper, ‘The Development of the Flying Boat’, p. 362. 210. McCartney, ‘Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict’, pp. 139, 160, 171. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 140. Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p.  372. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 153. 211. Steven R. Dunn, Bayly’s War (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2018), p. 235 fn. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, UC-Boote, loc. 6912-6. See also, Tarrant, The U-Boat Offensive, p. 54. 212. See Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, pp. 140–2. 213. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Ub-Boote, loc. 4671–733. Grant, U-Boats Destroyed, p. 54 fn. 214. UB32 has also been credited to a Wight seaplane attack. The date of 18 August and location of Cape Barfleur is given, with Flight Sublieutenant Mossop in a Wight seaplane receiving credit, see Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 372. See also, Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 49, and Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, pp.  170, 142. Messimer, Verschollen, pp. 154, Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 1. Eberhard Moller and Werner Brack, The Encyclopedia of U-Boats from 1904 to the Present Day, trans. Andrea Battson and Roger Chesneau (London: Greenhill Books, 2004), p. 45. Alfred Price, Aircraft versus Submarines: The Evolution of the Anti-Submarine Aircraft, 1912 to 1972 (London: William Kimber, 1973), p. 23. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Ub-Boote, loc. 4955. I am grateful to Michael Lowrey for pointing out the largely unknown fate of UC21: see also, Messimer, Verschollen, p. 258. 215. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 88. Terraine, Business in Great Waters, Part 1, Chapter 4, loc. 1705–19. 216. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 133. 217. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 65. Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 372. 218. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 64. Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 372. 219. McCartney, ‘Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict, p.  160. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Ub-Boote, loc. 5130 220. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 65. 221. Ibid., p. 66. 222. Ibid., p. 54. Price, Aircraft versus Submarines, p. 22–3. 223. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 73. Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 213, see Price, Aircraft versus Submarines, p. 23. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 310. Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 263. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Uc-Boote, loc. 7102. 224. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 141. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 141. 225. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 142. 226. Moller and Brack, The Encyclopedia of U-Boats, p. 62. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 310. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Uc-Boote, loc. 7102. 227. Hallam, The Spider Web, pp. 106–9. 228. Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 373. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 243. Moller and Brack, The Encyclopedia of U-Boats, p. 54. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Ub-Boote, loc. 6023–4. 229. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 142. Moller and Brack, The Encyclopedia of U-Boats, p. 44. Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, p. 192. 230. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 65.

Anti-Submarine Warfare 125 231. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 237. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Ub-Boote, loc. 5852–66. 232. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 88. Terraine, Business in Great Waters, Part 1, Chapter 4, loc. 1705–19. 233. Moller and Brack, The Encyclopedia of U-Boats, p. 30. 234. Price, Aircraft versus Submarines, pp. 22–3. 235. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p.  141. Hobbs, The Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 243. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Uc-Boote, loc. 6361–4. 236. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 54. Harper, ‘The Development of the Flying Boat’, p.  271. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 141. 237. Robert Grant, U-Boats Destroyed (London: Putnam, 1964), p. 152. Messimer, Verschollen, p.  271. Grant, U-Boats Destroyed, p.  70. See also Michael Lowrey, ‘Reassessing the fates of UB36 and UC36’ accessed 15 November 2020. 238. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 346. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Ub-Boote, loc. 4356–64. 239. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Ub-Boote, loc. 4917. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 153. McCartney, “Maritime Archaeology”, pp. 84–8. Moller and Brack, The Encyclopedia of U-Boats, p. 45. 240. McCartney, “Maritime Archaeology”, pp. 89–92. 241. McCartney, “Maritime Archaeology”, p. 84. 242. Dunn, Securing the Narrow Sea, p.  201. Messimer, Verschollen, pp. 180–4. 243. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Uc-Boote, loc. 7012–720. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, p. 55. Bacon, The Dover Patrol, vol. I, pp. 140–2. 244. Messimer, Verschollen, p.  309, Grant, U-Boats Destroyed, pp.  128–9. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 356. 245. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 208. 246. Grant, U-Boats Destroyed, pp. 103–4. 247. Mowthorpe, Battlebags, p.  80. Messimer, Verschollen, p.  214. Grant, U-Boats Destroyed, p. 93. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Ub-Boote, loc. 5575. 248. Layman, Naval Aviation. p.  211. Grattan, The Origins of Air War, p. 155. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 177. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, pp.  347–8. McCartney, ‘Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict’, pp. 103–4. Messimer, Verschollen, p. 226. Termote, Krieg Unter Wasser, Ub-Boote, loc. 5795. 249. Price, Aircraft versus Submarines, p. 29. 250. Michelsen, Submarine Warfare, 1914–1918, p.  94, John Jellicoe, The Submarine Peril (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1934), p. 13. 251. Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War, p. 49. 252. Hugh Williamson, Employment of Aeroplanes for Anti-Submarine Work, 14 August 1918, AIR 1/642/17/122/252. Also reproduced as #267 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 703–5. 253. Hackmann, Seek & Strike, p.  71. See also, Grant, U-Boats Destroyed, p. 159. 254. Marder, FDSF, vol. II, p. 356. 255. Harper, ‘The Development of the Flying Boat’, p.  364. Gordon Kinsey, ­Seaplanes–Felixstowe: The Story of the Air Station, 1913–1963 ­(Lavenham: Terrence Dalton, 1978), p. 43. 256. RNAS Portsmouth Group, General Report of Work Carried Out During Year 1917, 2 December 1917, AIR 1/659.

126  Anti-Submarine Warfare 257. Appendix XVIII: Comparison of Anti-Submarine Flying Operations Between Groups Nos. 9, 10, and 18 from 1st July 1918 to 20th September 1918, in Jones, WIA, Appendixes, p. 88. 258. Ibid. 259. Extracts of Information received from Air Stations of Operations by Royal Air Force Contingents from 13th June to 16th June 1918, Operations from Killingholme, AIR 1/296, p. 3. 260. Ibid. 261. Abbatiello, Anti-submarine Warfare, p. 56. 262. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 29. 263. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p.  334, cited in Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 298 fn. 264. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p.  356, see also, King, Armament of British Aircraft, p. 45. 265. Office Memorandum, 14 January 1918, AIR 1/279/15/226/127, p. 3. 266. Proposed Establishment of Air Division of Naval Staff, 16 December 1917, ADM 1/8508/285. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, p. 341. 267. Black, British Naval Staff, pp. 304–5. 268. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 22. 269. The Air Division files are in AIR 1/273 to AIR 1/292. 270. Director Air Division, Supply to those actively engaged in anti-submarine operations with intelligence relating to types, performance and probably tactics of enemy submarines, 8 March 1918, AD35, AIR 1/273. 271. ‘Memorandum by Captain F. R. Scarlett, Director Air Division, Naval Staff, dated 7 March 1918’, AIR 1/273, #231, Roskill, Documents, pp. 635–7. 272. DAD Scarlett & W. A. Robinson to Secretary of the Admiralty, 5 April 1918, AIR 1/656. 273. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 335 fn. 274. Training of Personnel for Anti-Submarine Work, Memorandum by Captain F. R. Scarlett addressed to Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (ViceAdmiral Sir A. Duff) and 2nd Sea Lord (Vice-Admiral Sir H. L. Heath), dated 31 May 1918, AIR 1/274, #256 in Roskill, Documents, p. 676. 275. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 168. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, pp. 111–12. Notes on the Co-operation of Aircraft with Surface Craft for Escorting Convoys of Merchant Ships, AIR 1/2321/223/41/885. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 306, also in AIR 10/860. 276. Notes on the Co-operation of Aircraft with Surface Craft for Escorting Convoys of Merchant Ships, Air Division, Naval Staff, December 1918, AIR 10/860, p. 1. 277. Ibid., p. 5. 278. Ibid., p. 9. 279. Ibid., p. 8. 280. Ibid., p. 6. 281. Flight Commander P. Holmes, Report of Patrol in H12 No. 8661, Felixstowe, 30 April 1917, ADM 1/8486/82. 282. Ibid., p. 11. 283. Black, British Naval Staff, p. 197. 284. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 145. See also, Air Division, ‘Reports of Naval Air Operations’, AIR 1/626/17/59. 285. Air Division, RNAS, F. E. Boats landing at Malta, re. inspection and acceptance of 5 March 1918, AIR 1/273. 286. F. R. Scarlett, DAD, Seaplane Station, Alexandria, 6 March 1918, AIR 1/273.

Anti-Submarine Warfare 127 287. The British C-in-C. Mediterranean, Seaplane Base at Alexandria, 9 March 1918, AD37, AIR 1/273. 288. Lt. Col. Norman Leslie to Director Air Organisation, No. 64 Wing has been activated, 28 May 1918, AD 37, AIR 1/273. 289. Lt. Vernon W. Lamb, CO HMS Orotava, report of operations at Dakar, November 23, 1918, AD49, AIR 1/273. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 223. 290. Lt. V. W. Lamb, RAF, patrol report of seaplane attached to HMS Orotava at Dakar, 5 November 1918, AIR 1/273. 291. Lt. V. W. Lamb, RAF, patrol report of seaplane attached to HMS Orotava at Dakar, 9 November 1918, AIR 1/273. 292. Lieutenant V. W. Lamb, RAF, CO HMS Orotava, report on operations to Director Air Division, 23 November 1918, AD49, AIR 1/273. 293. Director Air Division to C-in-C Plymouth, 1 October 1918, AD 49, ADM 1/273. 294. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 334. 295. Ibid. 296. Ibid. 297. Ibid., p. 335. 298. Ibid., pp. 336–7, 340. 299. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 299. Air Department, Memorandum on the Use of Aircraft for the Protection of Shipping, with Charts, 30 March 1918, AIR 1/279/15/226/133, p. 4. 300. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 300. 301. Air Department. Memorandum on the Use of Aircraft for the Protection of Shipping, with Charts, 30 March 1918, AIR 1/279/15/226/133, p. 3. 302. Tim Benbow, ‘Brothers in Arms: The Admiralty, the Air Ministry, and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1940–1943’, in Global War Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2014), pp. 41–88. 303. Director Air Department, Air Service Estimates, 22 January 1914, AIR 1/2440. 304. Ibid. 305. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing (London: William Kimber & Co. Ltd., 1973), pp. 79, 91. 306. Fig 2.3. British, Allied and Neutral Merchant Vessels Destroyed by Enemy Action, 4 August 1914–31 May 1916, Redford and Grove, ‘The Royal Navy’, p. 63. 307. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 163. 308. Abbatiello, ‘Anti-submarine Warfare’, p. 108. 309. Appendix XVIII, Comparison of Anti-Submarine Flying Operations Between Groups Nos. 9, 10, and 18 from 1st July 1918 to 30th September 1918, Jones, WIA, Appendices, p. 88. 310. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 88. 311. King-Hall, ‘The Influence of the Submarine in the Naval Warfare of the Future’, p. 369. 312. Goulter, ‘Royal Naval Air Service’, p. 51.

3

Long-Range Bombing

Long-range bombing in this context refers to the use of aircraft (or airships, in the case of Germany’s Zeppelins) to bomb military, industrial, or civilian targets. This was a novel concept in 1914, but one that had been foreseen since the dawn of aviation: in H. G. Wells’ War in the Air, Zeppelins are used to destroy an ironclad fleet before attacking New York City.1 This chapter focuses on the offensive use of airpower by the Royal Navy: the role of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) as an air defence organization, against long-range bombing, is discussed in Chapter 4. Four examples are discussed here, covering key watersheds that are representative of the breadth of the RNAS’ bombing operations during the war. Examined first are the pioneering 1914 anti-Zeppelin base raids, arranged and executed by the Churchill administration. These missions notably included the first air raid targeting an industrial facility. Second, the operations and administration of the Dunkirk Wing are considered, the first systematic RNAS bombing program targeting Germany’s submarine bases, communications, aerodromes and docks on the Belgian coast. This was a vast bombing effort, as has been referenced in Chapter 2, aimed primarily, but not exclusively, at reducing the effectiveness of the coastal U-boats stationed in Flanders. Third, the chapter focuses on the almost totally unknown case of RNAS No. 3 Wing, the maligned naval air organization dedicated exclusively to bombing industrial targets in Germany from bases in France. Fourth, the history of RNAS No. 16 Squadron, the October 1917 successor to No. 3 Wing and an integral component of the Royal Flying Corps’ (RFC’s) long-range bombing precursor to the Royal Air Force’s (RAF’s) Independent Air Force (IAF). 2 These very different, but thematically comparable, long-range bombing campaigns are representative of the general development of the RNAS itself: gradually transitioning from an experimental organization to a sophisticated and essential component of Britain’s armed forces. Churchill’s audacious Zeppelin shed raids attempted to preempt and neutralize Germany’s signature rigid airship force by attacking the Zeppelins’ bases at the outset of hostilities. In doing so, the RNAS

Long-Range Bombing 129 pioneered the first aircraft carrier strike mission in the form of the Cuxhaven raid of Christmas 1914 (see Chapter 1). Wing Captain Charles Lambe’s Dunkirk force demonstrated that naval aviation could extend naval bombardment against shore facilities, in this case, the Flanders U-boat bases. No. 3 Wing, for its part, staked the Air Department’s claim to the origins of strategic airpower. The beginning of the longrange bombing campaign against German industry in May 1916 was a project that Neville Jones has described as ‘the boldest, and perhaps the most successful, experiment in the use of airpower during the war’.3 The first true reprisal raids against civilian targets were also carried out by No. 3 Wing, thus demonstrating not only the tremendous potential of long-range bombing to reduce the enemy’s industrial capacity, but also the terrifying future of air attacks against civilian targets, a defining component of offensive airpower during the 20th century, and beyond. Unfortunately, for the Air Department, inter-service squabbling with the RFC over control of airplane engine supply generated a systematic effort to cripple and dismantle No. 3 Wing, a goal that was consummated in March 1917. Ironically, in June 1917, Germany then commenced its indiscriminate Gotha raids, bombing London and the south-east of England: it quickly became apparent that dismantling No. 3 Wing had been an error. It was not until October that another long-range bombing force could be assembled to retaliate, this time in the form of the 41st Wing, RFC, to which the RNAS contributed No. 16 Squadron, another important naval aviation story that has generally flown under the radar in terms of the historiography of the early RAF. Certainly, this chapter represents the most contentious point in the history of RNAS-RFC relations. The Air Department’s foray into longrange bombing was seen as the Navy encroaching on the Army’s territory. The fact that the RNAS developed and executed long-range bombing, indeed, had pioneered the very concept of bombing against Zeppelin sheds, naval bases, railways, factories and city centers, was quietly forgotten, not least by the young RAF, eager to stake its claim to a unique airpower role. The War Office, in its effort to stop the RNAS bombing program and thereby secure for the RFC the entirety of the available aviation resources, ultimately proved so successful that it opened the door for the Third Service, and thus cost both the Army and Navy their airpower altogether.

Churchill and the Anti-Zeppelin Raids of 1914 In August 1914, the RNAS put into practice a bold plan to counter Germany’s Zeppelin advantage by launching a bombing offensive targeting the exposed Zeppelin bases themselves. The pioneering RNAS aviators acted in the capacity of raiders, flying dangerous strike missions against Germany’s Zeppelin sheds and factories. These audacious efforts

130  Long-Range Bombing represented the first foundation stones of what would gradually build into a comprehensive program of naval bombing. For First Lord Churchill, the RNAS presented a means of overcoming the Zeppelin asymmetry: bombing the Zeppelin bases from the air, given the great difficulty of intercepting and destroying Zeppelins in flight, was the only sure means of reducing the enemy’s airship advantage.4 The hydrogen and compressed gas-filled Zeppelin sheds at Dusseldorf and Cologne were the ideal targets from Churchill’s perspective.5 Commander Samson, Churchill’s primary RNAS practitioner and a champion of close air support, on 22 September 1914, dispatched from Antwerp four of his pilots, Major Eugene Gerrard, Lieutenant Charles Collet, Flight Lieutenant Reggie Marix and Squadron Commander Spencer Grey, to raid the Dusseldorf and Cologne sheds, a liminal event no less significant than Bleriot’s crossing of the Channel in 1909.6 In the event, only Collet was able to successfully locate the targeted Dusseldorf shed, and he dropped two 20-lb Hales bombs on it, but, as he was flying at only 400 ft, the altitude was too low for the bomb fuses to arm and so inflicted no damage.7 A second raid was carried out on 8 October, and this time met with conspicuous success.8 Squadron Commander Grey’s target was Cologne and Flt. Lt. Marix was to attack Dusseldorf, both targets necessitating a round trip of 220 miles. Grey could not locate the Zeppelin shed at Cologne and so bombed the city’s railway station instead, but Flt. Lt. Marix, having located the Dusseldorf shed and braved the enemy’s fire, dropped his two Hales bombs from between 500 and 600 ft and successfully destroyed Zeppelin ZIX (LZ25) in its shed. Marix’s damaged Sopwith Tabloid crash-landed outside Antwerp, but he was able to return to base after commandeering a bicycle.9 The evacuation of Antwerp was already underway, and Samson’s No. 3 Squadron was presently redeployed to Ostend. Friedrichshafen, on the Swiss border, was raided the following month, this event notably the first air raid targeting an industrial center: the Zeppelin complex on the shore of Lake Constance.10 This target, significantly, included not only the Zeppelin sheds but also a seaplane factory and the airship factory itself.11 The operation was launched from the French aerodrome at Belfort on 21 November, organized by Lt. Noel Pemberton Billing, the founder of Supermarine Aircraft and later an Independent MP, 1916–1921.12 Four 80-hp Avro aircraft, each carrying four 20-lb bombs, were supplied for the mission, with three pilots successfully making it off the ground. Squadron Commander E. F. Briggs, Flight Commander J. T. Babington, and Flight Lieutenant S. V. Sippe flew the 125-mile flight path that skirted neutral Switzerland to Lake Constance.13 Nine bombs were dropped on the Friedrichshafen complex, igniting the hydrogen storage facilities, and army Zeppelin L7 narrowly avoided destruction in its shed.14 Briggs was shot down by machine-gun

Long-Range Bombing 131 fire and captured, although he subsequently escaped. This minor success was followed up by the Harwich Force’s Christmas Day seaplane strike against the Cuxhaven sheds (see Chapter 1).15 Although these raids were in keeping with the Royal Navy’s attack at source tradition, embodied by innumerable historical examples from Drake to Cochrane, they were also in no small measure extraordinarily dangerous and thus not indefinitely sustainable at this early stage of the war.16 Due to unfavourable weather conditions, and the transfer of Samson’s squadron to the Dardanelles, the RNAS anti-Zeppelin raids were suspended at the end of 1914 and did not resume until the mission of 25 May 1915, when Flight Sublieutenant Rex Warneford unsuccessfully attacked the Gontrode Zeppelin shed (RFC raids, however, were ­ongoing – on 19 April, for example, Captain L. G. Hawker had attempted to bomb the Gontrode shed).17 On 7 June, Flt. Lt. Wilson and Flt. Lt. Mills attacked the airship base at Evere and succeeded in destroying Zeppelin LZ38 in its shed.18 Churchill, for his part, was seeking a more reliable solution and thus, in April, introduced plans for the construction of heavy bombing aircraft.19 At a conference held by the First Lord early that month, with the Dardanelles crisis unfolding in the background, Churchill committed the Air Department to the development of a ‘heavy bomb-dropping type’ of airplane capable of carrying upwards of 500 lbs of ordnance. 20 This was part of Churchill’s plan to deliver ‘smashing blows’ against the enemy’s industrial base.21 Churchill, as a result of the May Crisis, however, was soon out of office.22 Commodore Sueter, as we have seen, was then himself subsequently sidelined to the position of SAC in September; but this did not herald the end of long-range bombing efforts as Sueter and, in particular, his chief assistant Captain A. V. Vyvyan, carried on the project. 23

The Dunkirk Wing and Long-Range Bombing in Belgium RNAS Dunkirk was established by Admiralty order on 1 September 1914 as a base for anti-Zeppelin operations.24 In the taxonomy of the Air Department’s wide-ranging operations, Dunkirk ranked first both in size and importance. The numerous aerodromes around Dunkirk provided ample capacity for RNAS wings and squadrons, and routine patrols were carried out to counter both the U-boat and Zeppelin threats (see Chapters 2 and 4). Less well appreciated is the extent to which RNAS Dunkirk was a staging ground for bombing of the enemy’s railroads, aerodromes, and naval bases. The Dunkirk aerodromes originated with the RNAS deployment to Belgium, with Commander Samson moving between Antwerp and Ostend before arriving at Dunkirk late in 1914. On 11 October 1914, Dunkirk and Dover had been incorporated into a single command under the authority of the C-in-C Dover. 25

132  Long-Range Bombing When Samson deployed to the Dardanelles in March 1915, Squadron Commander Arthur Longmore and his No. 1 Wing took over the Dunkirk responsibilities. Wing Commander Longmore’s No. 1 Wing was flown over to Dunkirk on 26 February 1915, bringing with him Squadron Commanders Rathbone and Courtney. 26 Commander Longmore was tasked with a range of missions including air defence, attack of the enemy’s surface craft, anti-Zeppelin operations, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and, importantly for our purposes here, the bombing of German naval facilities on the occupied Belgian coast. 27 Air raids against the Belgian coast began early in 1915, and some significant results were produced. Director of the Air Department (DAD) Sueter even assumed the airpower mantle and, with Commander Samson’s assistance, organized a mass raid against the Ostend docks, targeting guns, railways, and harbour vessels. Sueter, who personally took command of this operation, had 22 airplanes and 12 seaplanes from five bases plus the carrier HMS Empress, commanded by Lt. Bowhill, at his disposal. The raid was originally planned for 11 February but, due to poor weather, was delayed 24 hours. For this effort, Sueter launched 21 aircraft, and utilized the newly delivered 65-lb and 100-lb bombs, to drop a total ordnance package of 1,820 lbs on the Belgian coast, with some pilots bombing the Ostend docks and others hitting infrastructure targets such as the Zeebrugge railway and electrical stations. 28 A repeat raid four days later demonstrated, however, how dangerous these naval airstrikes could be, as four pilots failed to return. Nevertheless, it was judged that the 1,740 lbs of bombs dropped by the RNAS, plus another 800 lbs dropped by the French, had inflicted considerable damage to the Ostend and Zeebrugge targets, and thus justified the casualties. 29 Between 1 March and 20 June 1915, the RNAS, RFC, and French air force on the Western Front dropped 4,062 bombs during 483 attacks. Of these, only 35, or 7%, were carried out against ‘ammunition depots, factories, power stations, and ship-building yards’, with only a handful considered to have been successes. Other targets included railway junctions, but, again, only three of 141 such attacks were judged to have been successful.30 The bombing campaign was ultimately conducted continuously for three years: in 1916, the experience gained by the Dunkirk Wing encouraged the development of industrial bombing that, by 1918, had reached a crescendo and was causing serious problems both for the Flanders U-boat flotillas and the German occupying force. As we saw in Chapter 1, Rear Admiral Hood, the first C-in-C Dover, was replaced by Rear Admiral Bacon in April 1915. Bacon came out of retirement to take the post and, for his trouble, was promoted to Vice Admiral that July.31 Bacon, a torpedo and undersea warfare specialist, as well as one of Admiral Sir John Fisher’s many followers, was committed to the development and expansion of the Dover barrage: his policy involved the construction of a series of warning nets laid across the

Long-Range Bombing 133 Channel narrows, supported by minefields, patrolled routes, monitors, and submarines (see Chapter 2).32 After the July–August 1915 decentralization of the RNAS, Bacon’s air support was provided by Captain Charles L. Lambe, who superseded Longmore. Acting Wing Captain Lambe had expected a Coast Guard-like assignment: Lambe would be in overall command of the RNAS forces deployed at Dover and Dunkirk. Lambe had been given this assignment following their Lordship’s displeasure resulting from the loss of HMS Hermes on 31 October 1914, the RNAS parent ship having been torpedoed while under Lambe’s command by U27 as it was crossing the English Channel (see Chapter 1).33 Lambe had known Bacon for some time, as the two had both pursued specialist education at Portsmouth, in the 1890s the location of the HMS Vernon torpedo school. Furthermore, both had partaken in the notorious gunboat expedition to Benin, Nigeria, under Rear Admiral Rawson in February 1897.34 Commander Bacon, at that time, had been aboard HMS Theseus under Captain Campbell.35 Also with Bacon, aboard Theseus, was Lieutenant Arthur Vyvyan, the future Assistant Director of the Air Department, then 20 years old. At Benin, Vyvyan had landed with the shore-party of 540 Royal Marines and naval officers.36 Sublieutenant Lambe, for his part, was acting commander of the 850-ton screw gunboat Magpie.37 After recapturing Benin, and receiving the Queen’s telegram of thanks,38 Vyvyan, Lambe, and Bacon all moved on to careers that led them to the RNAS.39 When Wing Captain Lambe was appointed CO NAS Dover-Dunkirk in August 1915, operations at that time revolved around missions flown for the Western Front, and included patrols along the coast.40 Typical missions included air patrol, reconnaissance, gunfire spotting, and, as we have seen, bombing of the occupied Belgian dockyards, with occasional anti-Zeppelin and A/S activities when chance allowed.41 Lambe immediately set about reorganizing his command. He merged the Dover-Dunkirk squadrons together into No. 1 Wing, eight squadrons of six aircraft each, two squadrons stationed at Dover, the rest at Dunkirk.42 Next, he determined to prioritize a bombing policy, expecting new airplanes and pilot reinforcements in the spring of 1916. The weapons he needed, dedicated night and day bombers such as the Handley Page and DH4 aircraft, were still in the developmental stage, as were the first tanks and flying boats at this time. The RNAS had to make do with Sopwith 1 12  Strutters, 130-hp French-made Clergetengined two-seaters armed with 500 rounds for the Vickers gun, synchronized by an RNAS Scarff-Dibovsky gear, and modified for bombing by replacing the observer’s position with storage for up to 260 lbs of bombs.43 The Dardanelles expedition concluded in January 1916, and in February the RNAS returned responsibility for the air defence of Britain

134  Long-Range Bombing to the RFC (see Chapter 4), these two developments generating a windfall of resources for reallocation to offensive operations. In March, therefore, Director Air Services (DAS) Vaughan-Lee approved the expansion of NAS Dunkirk to a total of three wings (120 machines and 72 pilots), with one of those wings specifically designated for bombing. The objectives of the force under Lambe’s command now included targets such as ‘canal locks, bridges, railway stations, airship sheds, and aerodromes’  – these were operational targets prioritized by the RNAS and RFC, as opposed to missions of a strategic nature (such as factories).44 The increasingly land-oriented character of RNAS Dunkirk did not escape the notice of the Fourth Sea Lord, Commodore Cecil Lambert, or the Second Sea Lord, Vice Admiral F. T. Hamilton, with the former disapproving of Vaughan-Lee’s expansion of NAS Dunkirk.45 Vice Admiral Bacon, for his part, was not convinced that independent bombing operations would be useful to the navy.46 In June 1916, Bacon suspended bombing operations altogether.47 The bombing pause did not last long, however, as Bacon, at Lambe’s request, and considering the increase in German naval activity over the summer and fall of 1916, reauthorized limited bombing raids against Ostend and Zeebrugge.48 Lambe then authorized the bombing of Ghistelles aerodrome early in September, justifying this by the imperative need to support operations at the Somme,49 and in December agreed to transfer resources to the War Office to directly support the RFC on the Western Front.50 Jellicoe, after he became First Sea Lord, accelerated the bombing policy and in February 1917 Lambe was able to add Bruges was once again to the target list.51 Over six tons of bombs were dropped on Ostend, Zeebrugge, Bruges, the Ghent aerodrome, and other targets, by March of that year, when bombing was temporarily halted due to poor weather.52 A major reorganization occurred in April when, at last, high-performance bombers, the DH4s and Handley Pages, arrived.53 No. 5 Wing was established for day and night bombing, composed of No. 5 Squadron (DH4) and No. 7 Squadron (Handley Page) in those roles, respectively.54 Germany’s Gotha raids, however, precipitated another policy shift, and the enemy’s aerodromes once more became priority targets (see Chapter 4).55 The question of how the Dunkirk and Dover forces should be employed – against the submarine bases, or other targets – was a constant source of disruption for Lambe’s agenda. He dispatched a letter to Bacon on 10  June expressing his concern that the enemy’s concentration of U-boats at Bruges, combined with the arrival of aircraft reinforcements, meant that air patrol and A/S missions off the enemy’s coast were now needed more than ever.56 Lambe proposed replacing the seaplanes under his command with specialized bombing airplanes to improve overall efficiency, while maintaining steady patrols, and raids, against Ostend

Long-Range Bombing 135 and Zeebrugge. Bacon pointed to the improbability of this scheme given the strong presence of enemy fighter aircraft then concentrating around Dunkirk. Bacon, in truth, considered an RNAS offensive policy ‘useless’ unless pursued on a massive scale, a critique that was later replicated by the RFC in reference to the Navy’s industrial bombing operations (see below).57 Bacon, although he did not share Lambe’s enthusiasm for RNAS bombing program, did not actually stop the bombing missions from taking place, once they were resumed in 1917. There was also top-down pressure from the Admiralty regarding the cost and effectiveness of the Dunkirk Wing’s efforts.58 In September, the Passchendaele offensive diverted RNAS resources away from naval targets and, when combined with increasing German air force counterattacks and improved defences, not to mention the onset of winter, the ability to carry out long-range bombing was extremely limited by late 1917.59 Lambe’s year-end report admitted that the 1915 and 1916 efforts had not been widely effective, although, raids targeting enemy aerodromes had produced some limited success.60 Nevertheless, statistics kept of the bombing missions demonstrate that bombing was maintained on a fairly significant scale during 1917: Zeebrugge was raided 24  times between April and May 1917, with ‘over 1,000 bombs, containing thirty tons of explosives’ dropped, according to Unionist party leader Bonar Law.61 Over the course of the year, the Dunkirk and Dover forces dropped 334 tons of munitions, although much less was dropped on naval targets, specifically.62

Admiral Keyes and the Offensive Renewed Vice Admiral Roger Keyes, formerly Commodore (S), a veteran staff officer from the Dardanelles and, since November 1917, chairman of the Channel Barrage Committee, replaced Vice Admiral Bacon as C-in-C Dover on New Year’s Day 1918.63 Keyes was expected to follow a more aggressive policy than his predecessor, bringing an energetic reputation to the Dover Patrol.64 In early February, Keyes requested that Lambe provide a report on the bombing efforts to date.65 Lambe, still pressing for more offensive action, found Keyes to be someone he could work with.66 There were new challenges in 1918, however. The newly formed Air Ministry, having been created at the beginning of 1918 (see Chapter 4), in February determined to significantly restructure the Dover-Dunkirk command so as to focus on air defence and ASW. Under this new arrangement, the Handley Page O/400 squadrons, which Lambe had been using for day and night bombing, were transferred for operations with the BEF, although ostensibly remaining under Lambe’s command.67 Keyes protested on Lambe’s behalf, when Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig received the Dunkirk bombers, as Keyes and Lambe had been planning

136  Long-Range Bombing to use the Handley Page bombers against the Bruges submarine pens.68 In March, Keyes did propose an expansion of the A/S base bombing effort, but was now frustrated by the enemy; Operation Michael, Ludendorff’s spring offensive, forced a change in priorities.69 The longstanding conflict between the Navy’s requirements and the Army’s requests for support were not resolved by the Air Ministry, with Keyes and Lambe continuing to express concern about the situation into the summer of 1918. The Admiralty backed Keyes on 3 May, stating that ‘My Lords are in general agreement with the remarks of the Vice Admiral, Dover, and are strongly of the opinion that a constant and maintained bombing offensive against enemy submarines, torpedo boats and other craft now accumulating in the Bruges Canal is a matter of the utmost urgency.’70 On 16 May 1918 the Air Ministry reformed Lambe’s command, creating No. 5 Group RAF. Lambe’s operating orders for 27 May called for No. 5 Group’s bombers to attack the Bruges docks twice daily, by day and night.71 After almost three years of back-and-forth, reversals in policy, and numerous requests to support the RFC and then the RAF, Lambe, now a Brigadier-General, finally received the go-ahead for his planned mass bombing program. In June, he ordered the DH9-equipped RAF No. 217 squadron, the only dedicated ASW squadron under his command, to attack the Zeebrugge lock gates.72 The 82nd Wing, also at Lambe’s disposal, was to focus on attacking shipping.73 SNO Dunkirk proceeded to carry out intensive bombing operations against the Ostend and Zeebrugge docks, of which the details are too numerous to reproduce here, but the significance is shown in summary: each day between 13 and 19 June, for example, the RAF dropped thousands of pounds of bombs against targets such as Ostend, Zeebrugge, the Bruges docks, Ghistelles aerodrome and railways junctions, in addition to attacking enemy shipping.74 The target selection is significant as it reflected the constantly changing priorities juggled between the RAF and BEF. As Abbatiello described it, ‘Keyes, Haig and Salmond… [were] embroiled in an almost constant exchange of telegrams regarding the trading of squadrons between No. 5 Group and the BEF’s air contingent.’75 The focus by the RAF on bombing railways and communications had become the basis of the Air Ministry’s aerial offensive, exemplified by the work of the IAF, discussed below. Lambe was not going to let administrative territorialism stop his bombing program just as it was reaching its zenith. Bruges and Zeebrugge were bombed heavily in May and June with the result that the Bruges electrical works were destroyed and the lock gates at Zeebrugge damaged, real strategic successes that had been RNAS and RN objectives since 1916.76 The operations against the port facilities were finally brought to a close in September when the RAF transitioned to assisting the general Allied offensive, and the Americans, who had steadily been expanding their bombing capacity since July, took over operations at Dunkirk.77

Long-Range Bombing 137 The postwar report by Major Erskine Childers and Major E. N. G. Morris reflected poorly on the legacy of the Dunkirk wing’s bombing.78 Their report observed that 1,085 tons of bombs were dropped on enemy targets between February 1917 and November 1918, of which, almost 524 tons were dropped on Zeebrugge, Bruges, and Ostend.79 Another 280 tons were dropped on railways, and 130 tons on aerodromes, both prominent targets in the final months of the war.80 One significant feature of the Dunkirk-based bombing campaign was the divergent perspectives on mission planning. Wing Captain Lambe, as we have seen, was committed to a bombing agenda throughout his entire tenure, despite disagreements with Vice Admiral Bacon – a relationship that Captain Richmond characterized as demonstrating ‘pettiness’ on Bacon’s part.81 The appointment of Vice Admiral Keyes, who was more closely aligned with Lambe’s bombing agenda than Vice Admiral Bacon, occurred too late in the war to influence naval aviation policy more broadly: the RNAS ceased to exist less than three months after Keyes’ appointment. The RNAS bombing experience from Dunkirk demonstrated that synergy and consistency of leadership were more important than strictly material considerations.

Bombing Germany’s Industry To explain the origins of the Royal Navy’s pioneering industrial bombing effort, it is necessary to step back from 1918 and to return to the beginning of 1916 when DAS Rear Admiral Charles Vaughan-Lee, and his assistant Captain A. V. Vyvyan, demonstrated a willingness to maintain Churchill’s established offensive air policy. In February 1916, the RNAS turned over responsibility for the air defence of Britain to the RFC, leaving the Air Department with only the Dunkirk wing to carry out offensive bombing, as we have seen. Vaughan-Lee, however, with support from Vyvyan and SAC Sueter, now desired to expand Churchill’s bombing offensive to strike behind the enemy’s lines, just as the pioneers had done against the Zeppelin bases in 1914.82 Rather than simply target enemy bases or communications, however, Vaughan-Lee and Vyvyan now planned, in conjunction with the French Aviation Department, to target Germany’s industrial capacity itself. Vaughan-Lee certainly appreciated the distinction between the strategic and tactical application of airpower.83 Long-range bombing, and specifically the concept of industrial bombing, had been on Vaughan-Lee’s mind since 17 February when he wrote to Chief of the Admiralty War Staff Rear Admiral Henry Oliver that the RNAS should ‘develop long distance offensive work as much as possible.’84 Vaughan-Lee’s intention, to expand long-distance bombing operations, although soundly in keeping with the policy of his predecessors, was about to run up against the bitter contest of inter-service rivalry. On

138  Long-Range Bombing 28 January 1916, Director General of Military Aeronatuics (DGMA) Major-General Sir David Henderson penned a note for the CID suggesting that the War Committee should establish definite boundaries, defining the responsibilities of the RFC and RNAS.85 He went on to claim that ‘long-range offensive operations are being prepared for both services and there is [a] grave possibility of duplication and consequent waste’.86 On 25 February, the Joint War Air Committee (JWAC) was established, before which body Vaughan-Lee brought forward his air-­ offensive policy statement.87 On 28 February, the DAS reiterated his recommendation, describing a plan to use the RNAS to attack Germany’s ‘…naval productive capacity as a whole’.88 Vaughan-Lee pressed his case again on March 3rd,89 and at the JWAC meeting three days later met with success: given that the RFC was incapable of conducting this mission, it was agreed that the Navy should move ahead with the long-range bombing program.90 Vaughan-Lee again endorsed ‘long distance bombing’ in a 15 March memorandum, wherein he revealed more of the project’s details.91 The DAS’ intention was to target steel manufacture in the Saar region, allegedly a source of material for U-boat construction.92 The Sopwith Strutters then entering service possessed just enough endurance to make the 240 km, four-and-a-half-hour, round trip between Luxeuil-les-Bains and the industrial works at Mannheim.93 Vaughan-Lee’s recommendations were circulated as the JWAC Interim Report of 20 March, explicitly endorsing long-distance bombing.94 The concept of dockyard, arsenal or airshed attack related more directly to the operations of the Dunkirk wing; however, the inclusion of factories in Vaughan-Lee’s policy is significant. Debate at the Admiralty continued behind closed doors. VaughanLee, Sueter, and Vyvyan all advocated in favour of an expanded longrange bombing program and there was general agreement on this matter between First Lord Balfour, First Sea Lord Jackson, and Third Sea Lord Tudor.95 Further, it was agreed that the War Office’s opposition to the proposed RNAS long-range bombing programme was purely reactionary, given that the RFC did not, in fact, possess the means to conduct long-range bombing missions, contrary to Henderson’s claim that the RFC was moving in that direction.96 On 4 April, Vaughan-Lee contacted Vice Admiral Oliver and explained his rationale for insisting on the offensive policy, arguing that the best possible way to mitigate the Zeppelin threat was by bombing of the enemy’s bases and, significantly, the munitions factories in Germany: the DAS believed these bombing raids would, moreover, have an important impact on enemy morale.97 From the Navy’s perspective, there was every reason to start industrial bombing, both as retaliation for the Zeppelin raids against England, but also as part of a broader program aimed at reducing Germany’s capacity to continue the war – in effect, as an extension of the naval blockade. Chief of the War Staff Oliver authorized DAS

Long-Range Bombing 139 Vaughan-Lee to push ahead with the project, working directly through the French, and thus circumventing the War Office entirely.98 But soon the Army reasserted itself. Although in May Field Marshal Haig had already approved the bombing effort, in principle, the Army Council had second thoughts. The Council issued a statement on 25 May to the effect that the Navy should not be operating from Armydemarcated regions. Vaughan-Lee, however, had the support of the JWAC, and Field Marshal Haig even authored a supporting letter on 3 June, stating that ‘the C-in-C of the British armies is not concerned’ by RNAS operations conducted in the French sector.99 Nevertheless, the Army Council persisted, authoring another criticism of the RNAS policy. DAS Vaughan-Lee was understandably concerned by the Army’s complaints: ‘It is the same story’, he wrote on June 5th, ‘the War Office want to stop our long distance bombing in order to get hold of our engines and machines and so to cover their own deficiencies’, a not-unreasonable assessment of what was quickly becoming a serious inter-service quarrel.100 Major-General Hugh Trenchard, the RFC field commander in France, and Haig’s right-hand airman,101 now made a request through the Curzon Air Board for 60 additional machines – aircraft that had been intended for the RNAS bombing project. With preparations for the Somme campaign consuming resources, and the Air Department operating behind the British Expeditionary Force’s (BEF) lines, the Admiralty agreed to hand over the machines that otherwise would have gone to the No. 3 Wing, as it was then being re-established;102 Samson’s original No. 3 Wing had been dispersed when the Dardanelles campaign closed down in December 1915 (see Chapter 1).103 The reformed No. 3 Wing’s initial machines, as result of the Somme battle, were thus transferred to the RFC in driblets between June and September 1916.104 This crippled the Wing and, by the end of August, only 22 machines had actually been delivered to the RNAS bombing project, with a further 47 by the New Year.105 The deficiency was somewhat remedied by the acquisition of Breguet bombers from France, but this was a distinct setback for No. 3 Wing. Nevertheless, despite the mixed signals from the Air Board, Army Council, BEF HQ, and RFC in the field, by the end of July 1916, the RNAS had advanced its long-range bombing program to the point where operations were now possible.

RNAS No. 3 Wing, 1916–1917 Despite the jockeying for resources at the JWAC, the first elements of No. 3 Wing were formed in February at Detling, where a core group of Sopwith Strutters was organized under Squadron Commander R. L.  G. ‘Reggie’ Marix.106 They were to target the factories at Essen and Dusseldorf. However, the project was halted in May as the flight

140  Long-Range Bombing path to the targets would have violated the airspace of the neutral Netherlands.107 On 1 May, Captain William L. Elder was dispatched to Paris to inquire if the French authorities still desired the assistance of an RNAS force in their proposed joint industrial bombing project.108 Meeting with approval, the project was revived and, at the end of May, orders went out to assemble a wing to cooperate with the French 4th Bombardment Group at Luxeuil, forward-based at Ochey, where the target was industry located near Freiburg. A construction party of 125 men was dispatched to Luxeuil on 16 June.109 In addition to Captain Elder and Squadron Commander Marix, the strong No. 3 Wing team included Wing Commander Richard Bell Davies, of later Flying Squadron fame (see Chapter 1). Marix, based at Manston, near Ramsgate, was responsible for training the Wing’s squadrons (RNAS bombing training itself took place at Eastchurch).110 Operational command of No. 3 Wing was given to Bell Davies. The wing included a large number of Canadians (44 out of 74 pilots), notably including the future Western Front ace Raymond Collishaw.111 As part of the buildup, it was intended to dispatch six Sopwith Strutters a week, for ten weeks, until the requisite 60 machines had been assembled. That number, well short of the 100 machines ultimately planned, was never reached. Captain Elder, who had replaced Captain F. R. Scarlett as the Inspecting Captain of Aircraft in November 1914, was now promoted to acting Wing Captain and placed in overall command of No. 3 Wing, effective 14 June 1916.112 Elder’s operational orders arrived on 27 July, instructing him on how to cooperate with the French, but also stipulating that ‘as a general rule, the objectives should be of military value’.113 The bombing of unfortified towns, as had been considered at the Hague convention of 1907, was not permitted. To make certain the Army did not interfere with this naval project, Wing Captain Elder was supplied with an advanced cypher known as ‘J’ for communicating directly to the Secretary of the Admiralty or to Captain W. H. Kelly, the naval liaison in Paris.114 The first operation was carried out on 30 July as a joint FrancoBritish effort, targeting German benzene stores and barracks located at Mulheim.115 Poor flying weather ‘black fogs and mists’ – pollution from the munitions works that accumulated around the factories – hampered detection of specific targets.116 The two Strutters that managed to launch and fly the 190-km distance to Mulheim were attacked by anti-aircraft fire and only managed to drop 520 lbs of bombs.117 The Mauser factory at Oberndorf was selected for the second mission, with the date of attack provisionally set for 3 September, but operations were again delayed, due to weather, with the result that action was not finally resumed until 12 October. On that date, 15 RNAS bombers, escorted by six fighters, dropped 3,867 lbs of bombs on the Mauser factory as the French

Long-Range Bombing 141 flew a simultaneous mission with 25 bombers and nine fighters.118 Three RNAS aircraft were forced down and their pilots captured, but the Allies claimed that six German planes were destroyed.119 It is significant to observe that the light French-built Breguet pusher-type bombers, although vulnerable at an altitude of 9,000 ft, were still able to penetrate to the target and drop their bombs, returning successfully.120 This raid against the Oberndorf works appeared to be a great success and the Admiralty was keen to take credit, observing that the French report on the raid had not specified that the British aircraft in question were Naval: an oversight that Wing Captain Elder was explicitly instructed to remedy in future.121 Elder reported on 25 October that the Germans had constructed four new aerodromes and were enhancing their air defences around the targeted industrial centers. In fact, a German Home Air Defence Command had been created in October,122 reflecting similar developments that had previously occurred in Britain during 1915–1916. Germany’s home defence arrangements were, however, of a still limited nature early in 1917, indicating that the Allies had struck a significant blow against which the Germans were not prepared to defend. Increased Zeppelin and bomber retaliation against Britain soon followed (see Chapter 4). On 23 October, Red Squadron of No. 3 Wing, based at Ochey, and in conjunction with the French, bombed the steelworks at Hagendingen with 3,000 lbs of bombs, disabling three of the five furnaces.123 The Thyssen Works at Hagendingen were also bombed on 23 October and then, as the Wing picked up momentum, the Volklingen steelworks were bombed on 10 November.124 On 26 October, the Admiralty proposed to the Air Board that it intended to keep 200 machines in France, at DAS Vaughan-Lee’s request, while also seeking to acquire an additional 2,000 engines for the purpose of long-range bombing.125 These were the kinds of numbers that were guaranteed to raise concerns with the RFC, then much depleted after the conclusion of the Somme campaign. Vaughan-Lee held his ground, reasserting his March position at a meeting of the War Committee on 9 November.126 First Lord of the Admiralty Balfour and Air Board president Lord Curzon, meanwhile, battled for control of the RNAS, until Curzon was replaced by Lord Cowdray, and Balfour by Sir Edward Carson at the beginning of 1917. The result was that control of aircraft procurement was transferred to the Ministry of Munitions and then to the Air Board, which had actually been Curzon’s goal all along.127 Jellicoe and Carson, for their part, had been distracted by the pressing requirements of the U-boat crisis and thus were unable to intervene when Colonel Jan Smuts issued his air unification reports in the fall of 1917, effectively guaranteeing the creation of the Air Ministry and RAF. The year 1917 would thus herald disaster for the Navy’s long-range bombing program, despite continuous improvements that were, in fact,

142  Long-Range Bombing developing No. 3 Wing into a powerful implement for strategic bombing. The weather turned poor after October 1916 and remained so for many months, well into April and the spring of 1917, and there was correspondingly little time for flying. The 1916–1917 winter was generally regarded as extraordinarily harsh, thus curtailing the effectiveness of No. 3 Wing’s bombing effort.128 Wing Captain Elder reported that the oil in the Clerget engines of the Strutters froze in the unheated sheds at Ochey.129 This delay in operations, however, enabled No. 3 Wing to refit, with night-bombing Handley Page O/100 aircraft at last being delivered over the winter. The first of these powerful aircraft were added to the wing in November 1916, although operations did not take place until the night of 16/17 March, when a single Handley Page was utilized on a raid.130 Each of these two-engine bombers could carry up to 12 100-lb bombs; thus each Handley Page bomber had the lifting capacity of three of the DH4 day-bombers that were likewise being delivered to the RNAS at this time.131 The War Office, RFC, and Army Council, meanwhile, increased their opposition to the RNAS long-range bombing program. Trenchard and Henderson had already pressured Haig to withdraw his support, and the Field Marshal did so on 1 November in a critical letter that denounced the apparent diversion of long-range bombing.132 Lieutenant-General Henderson, when debate was sparked by the first report of the Air Board, also in November, insisted that the government take a position on the definite policy of the two air services.133 The debate was territorial and the Admiralty was clearly at a disadvantage as the key players on the Air Board, Army Council, and at the Ministry of Munitions, had already set their minds in favour of the creation of a unified Air Ministry. Indeed, Henderson, Curzon, and Montagu, amongst others, had decided, as early as the beginning of 1916, that they favoured the development of an Imperial Air Service and were thus moving in that direction while the Admiralty, understandably, dragged its heels. In November, Rear Admiral Tudor, the Third Sea Lord, responsible for the Royal Navy’s material, pointed out that the RNAS was rather different from the RFC in that the RNAS was tightly integrated into the Navy and if ‘the Supply of the Naval aircraft was to be transferred it would mean uprooting the whole organization’.134 According to Tudor, it was primarily the duty of the RNAS to focus on interfering with the efficiency of the German Fleet. The ‘first object of [the RNAS] should therefore be to destroy in their sheds the Zeppelins which are the eyes of the German fleet and the second to attack the factories which provide for the replacement of the guns, &c. of that fleet, with a view either to inflict actual damage upon them or to reduce their output by compelling the extinction of lights, &c’.135 Tudor, by advocating for the naval bombing campaign, was thus following the lead of Balfour, and Churchill before him.

Long-Range Bombing 143 The Admiralty, as we have seen, conceived of the RNAS long-range bombing program as a component of its broader naval policy, and indeed as a priority, whereas the Air Board and Ministry of Munitions perceived only intransience towards their own airpower agenda. DGMA Henderson could only see the resources that, in his mind’s eye, should have been directed towards the Army. The battle over the future of No. 3 Wing was ultimately a lost cause. Jellicoe had replaced the strongest proponent of long-range bombing, DAS Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee, when he created Fifth Sea Lord Commodore Godfrey Paine’s position on 10 January 1917. Paine’s primary mission was to oversee the expansion of the RNAS into a dedicated A/S and fleet force.136 Paine therefore had every reason to jettison the long-range bombing mission, much as Balfour had abandoned the air defence responsibility in February 1916, especially since No. 3 Wing’s Handley Page bombers could then be retasked for bombing Bruges or flying A/S patrols (see Chapter 2). When asked by Commodore Paine if Field Marshal Haig could provide evidence to support the claims regarding the impact of bombing on steel production, Haig considered it ‘highly improbable’ that there had been much of an impact.137 In March, Haig, with the support of RFC commander Trenchard, framed the Navy’s No. 3 Wing bombing program as an encroachment on the proper authority of C-in-C. On 7 March, 6 planes, 19 pilots, and 100 ratings were transferred to Dunkirk, beginning the drawdown of No. 3 Wing. The writing was on the wall and, on the 25th, the Luxeuil bombing wing was ordered to disband. A final industrial bombing mission was proposed, but then postponed on 1 April, so that a retaliatory raid against Freiburg could be flown.138 Before this mission took place, however, a single Hanley Page managed to raid the railways at Arnaville, dropping 12 100-lb bombs with good effect.139 This raid was followed by two additional raids on 14 April, both flown by single Handley Page bombers, the same day as the Freiburg raid. One plane bombed the Hagendingen blast furnaces, while the other bombed the aerodrome at Chambley.140 On 14 April, Freiburg’s city center was bombed in a strictly reprisal raid for the torpedoing of the hospital ships Glenart Castle, Asturias, and Gloucester Castle, although the cycle of retaliation continued with the sinking of Lanfranc and Donegal both on the evening of 17 April.141 Incidently, the loss of these hospital ships by U-boat attack convinced the Allies to abandon designating their ships with the requisite Red Cross paint and lighting.142 The retaliatory raid was carried out by 25 British and 15 French aircraft, the last operation of No. 3 Wing.143 Wing Captain Elder could not help but remind the Admiralty that the wing was being disbanded precisely when the weather was likely to improve, while the immense effort of assembling the pilots, machines, mechanics, and staff would be lost.144 The choice of a retaliatory raid as

144  Long-Range Bombing the final mission seemed especially bizarre: what if further retaliation were required in the future?

The Impact of No. 3 Wing Between October 1916 and April 1917, No. 3 Wing carried out 18 longrange raids, of which 13 were raids against industrial targets, dropping an average of 2,500 lbs of bombs per raid (38,617 lbs total).145 The direct impact on Germany’s war production, however, was small. During November and December 1916, for example, it was assessed that production at the targeted blast furnaces declined by only about 4%, possibly because some of the Swiss labourers returned home as a result of the bombing.146 It is important to recognize that, despite the minimal impact on production figures, the raids produced a disproportionate effect so far as they, ‘…compelled the Germans to divert aeroplanes, labour, and material…’ towards home defence rather than the front lines.147 This is always a questionable justification given the logic of determining what was not utilized at the front, and George Williams argues that the German squadron records, which portray the air defence reaction as limited and primarily aimed against the French, have ‘demolished’ this argument.148 Williams concluded that the ‘Admiralty bombs never posed a threat to German productivity along the Saar’.149 However, No. 3 Wing’s mission was terminated at exactly the point when its operational strength was reaching significant levels; therefore the impact of the wing could have been much greater had it been allowed to continue, and indeed expand, during 1917. The No. 3 Wing experience, generally speaking, was a disappointment. Squadron Commander Richard Bell Davies reported that both he and Wing Captain Elder had been demoralized by the work that they felt was taking them away from their proper role with the fleet, to which they were both soon to return.150 This may have been merely sour grapes on Bell Davies part, whereas Captain Elder ‘greatly regretted’ having to close down the wing.151 It is worth pointing out that the close cooperation between the Allies encouraged the French to develop their own heavy ‘Essen bomber’ as a replacement for the Handley Page bombers which were returned to Britain.152 The disbandment of the wing meant that 60 skilled officers, a trained staff, and 1,200 men were dispersed – not only halting operations but also making it impossible to restart them on short notice.153 In May, the remaining aircraft were reformed as No. 10 (Naval) Squadron for service on the Western Front.154 RFC Director-General Henderson and Field Marshal Haig have been identified as responsible for pushing through the dismemberment of the RNAS long-range bombing project.155 Indeed, the RFC was quick to assume control and, in October, Major-General Trenchard was ordered to establish the long-range 41st Wing RFC at Nancy.156 The War Office,

Long-Range Bombing 145 despite its earlier criticisms, seemed suddenly to have gained an appreciation of the utility of targeting the enemy’s blast furnaces and munitions factories.157 By January 1918, the Air Policy Committee, which was responsible for setting up Trenchard’s long-range wing in October 1917, advocated a systematic bombing campaign in which individual towns would be bombed, with the goal that the ‘morale of the workmen is so shaken that output is seriously interfered with’.158 The impact of No. 3 Wing, at the very least, had been enough to convince the RFC that long-range bombing was indeed worth undertaking.

The 41st Wing and RNAS No. 16 Squadron The disbanding of No. 3 Wing coincided with the beginning of Germany’s 1917 Gotha raids on England. The case for resuming long-range bombing, specifically with the intention of retaliating for the Gotha raids, was discussed at the War Cabinet meeting of 26 June. Field Marshal Haig, DGMA Henderson, and Major-General Trenchard were all consulted. Trenchard, not surprisingly, expressed skepticism, and Haig professed that he could not recommend it but, if the Cabinet decided to move ahead, the Field Marshal believed the force should be placed under his control.159 The critical letter, authored by Lieutenant-General Henderson, Commodore Paine, Major-General Trenchard, and endorsed by Field Marshal Haig, suggested that only Mannheim was worth bombing, and that only two squadrons of DH4s could be spared for such an operation. Thirty aircraft were suggested as the force minimum, but ultimately the subcommittee report recommended delaying operations until October.160 By that time, however, the weather restrictions encountered by No. 3 Wing the previous year were liable to be repeated. Furthermore, the War Cabinet was informed on 5 September that the base of Germany’s Gotha squadrons had been located and was to be counter-bombed by aircraft attached to Haig’s command.161 The question of how to ‘carry the aerial war into Germany, not merely on the ground of reprisal’ was raised,162 and speed was of the essence. Unfortunately, no British long-range bombing squadron was available. How different the situation would have been if No. 3 Wing had been retained. Eventually, Trenchard established the RFC’s 41st Wing with Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. N. Newall, the future Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), in operational command.163 Ironically, the RFC now requested RNAS support for its usurpation of the long-range bombing mission.164 The Admiralty Air Department’s contribution was No. 16 squadron, scratched together from several sources: four Handley Page O/400s originating from Redcar, Hendon, and Coudekerque were matched by other HP O/100s and the squadron was built up to ten aircraft, based at Manston, Kent.165 The squadron’s machinists and ratings were assembled on short notice.166 The new squadron was initially designated the

146  Long-Range Bombing ‘A’ flight of RNAS No. 7 Squadron and, by mid-October 1917, was deployed to Ochey, France.167 Squadron Commander K. S. Savory was in command, a veteran Handley Page officer who had flown bombing missions over Istanbul and against Turkish shipping.168 The inaugural raid was carried out on 24 October, targeting the Burback works at Saarbrucken.169 No. 16 Squadron conducted raids against railway junctions, factories, and military barracks from its base at Ochey, and it was not long before the Germans became aware of the operations. Ochey was subsequently counter-raided on 15 November, when the enemy dropped a dozen bombs on the aerodrome.170 By the beginning of 1918, No. 16 was one of only two remaining RNAS squadrons operating with the RFC, the other being No. 8 Squadron attached to the BEF.171 Squadron Commander Savory was soon replaced by Squadron Commander H. A. Buss, who remained with No. 16 Squadron until replaced himself by Major W. R. Read on 1 September.172 Under Trenchard’s leadership, the 41st Wing and its component Naval squadron were focused on Haig’s objectives: targeting tactical and operational locations as much as possible. In Haig’s calculus, endorsed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, the strategic pinpricks the 41st Wing produced by bombing German industry were simply not worth the effort.173 In Haig’s view, the war was going to be won or lost on the Western Front, and therefore all material should be concentrated for operations there. Trenchard, ironic given his inter-war commitment to strategic bombing during his second tenure as CAS, was a true believer in Haig’s method, which meant focusing the 41st Wing generally on operational and tactical targets, usually enemy aerodromes and railway depots, with only 57.4% of bombs dropped (53.5% of sorties) on industrial targets, such as blast furnaces and chemical or munitions works.174 The lack of training amongst the 41st Wing’s RFC squadrons, furthermore, made it all but impossible to inflict serious damage on their industrial targets.175 Churchill, the Minister of Munitions at this time, and Sir William Weir, future Air Minister, believed that the completion of a rearmament and training cycle over the winter of 1917–1918 would permit a windfall of machines in the second half of 1918, thus greatly expanding the longrange bombing effort.176 Rear Admiral Mark Kerr notably affirmed this view, observing in October 1917 that a dramatic expansion of the air war was critical. He wrote, towards this end, that ‘we must start at once with our preparations to lay their factories flat and to destroy their aerodromes. This will entail the building of 2,000 big bombing machines as a minimum’.177 Kerr found himself facing First Sea Lord Jellicoe’s ire for his pro-RFC stance, but soon escaped to the Air Ministry where he was made Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.178 Kerr, like Murray Sueter, was one of the independent ‘Fifth Column’ within the Cabinet and amongst the

Long-Range Bombing 147 Navy’s senior officers who sympathized with Churchill and Henderson’s original vision of a unified air force.179 Nor were Kerr and Sueter alone. Longtime bombing advocate A. V. Vyvyan who, as we have seen, had authored many of DAS VaughanLee’s long-range bombing memoranda, while serving as the head of the Naval Assistant’s office for the Director, now advanced the Admiralty’s policy of night bombing by heavy aircraft. At the Air Board meeting on 30 July 1917, it had been decided to authorize an order of 100 Handley Page machines, primarily for night bombing operations, in addition to three experimental super-heavy aircraft, the Handley Page type V1500.180 Trenchard and Henderson, still focused on supporting the RFC with light and medium bombers at the expense of heavier aircraft, opposed this decision. Vyvyan convinced the skeptical RFC commanders, with data presented at the Air Board meeting on 10 August, that the Handley Page bombers suffered a lower casualty rate than the smaller DH4 aircraft the Army was using.181 Vyvyan’s commitment to heavy bombers, in this regard, was proven correct as by the end of the war squadrons No. 216 and 215, the two former Naval squadrons of the Independent Force (see below), sustained only four injuries between them, with 39 pilots missing, shot down or captured. This compared well with the former RFC squadrons, No. 99 squadron, for example, with 6 killed, 16 wounded, and 42 missing, and No. 55 squadron with 13 killed, 11 wounded, and 36 missing.182 Wastage between the two Naval squadrons in terms of aircraft amounted to only 13 Handley Page bombers. A greater testament to Churchill and Sueter’s vision from 1915 – excepting perhaps the development of the tank – would be difficult to find. With the formation of the Air Ministry in January 1918, Vyvyan was made Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and, alongside Deputy Chief Kerr, was in a position to directly impact CAS Major-General Frederick Sykes, himself a convert to the offensive bombing mission, desirous of what his biographer, Eric Ash, described as ‘the continuous long-range bombing of German industries’.183

Independent Air Force CAS Sykes, following Trenchard’s resignation in April 1918, laid out the case for the ‘dislocation of Germany’s industrial effort by longrange bombing’, a task Sykes considered vital to the overall war effort.184 To fulfill Sykes’ vision, the RAF Independent Air Force (IAF), or Idependent Force, also known as the VIII Brigade, was created on 6 June. The IAF was the logical next step in terms of expanding the 41st Wing’s mission. The VIII Brigade was composed of two wings, divided between night and day bombing squadrons. The 41st Wing assumed the duties of the day bombing squadron, and No. 216

148  Long-Range Bombing Squadron, formerly No. 16 RNAS, now under the command of MajorGeneral Thomson, joined No. 100 Squadron to comprise the 83rd Wing, based at Bainville-sur-Madon, for night-bombing operations.185 In June, when Trenchard returned to the field as the IAF commander, he had at his disposal three daylight bombing squadrons and two night bombing squadrons. The IAF was soon expanded to nine squadrons, including, on 4 July, No. 215 Squadron (naval), under the command of Major J. F. Jones with more Handley Page O/400 bombers. On 19 August, the two naval squadrons were concentrated at Autreville.186 Trenchard had been out in the cold since his split with Air Minister Rothermere in March, an upheaval comparable to the May Crisis that had brought down Fisher and Churchill in 1915 and, as such, the former RFC field commander had no choice but to take the proffered IAF job.187 CAS Sykes, one of Trenchard’s strongest critics, considered his appointment a purely temporary affair.188 Ironically, Sykes found himself in the same position as Vaughan-Lee in 1916, desirous to ensure that his longrange bombing force was not interfered with by the C-in-C BEF, Field Marshal Haig.189 Sykes, however, could count on the support of Rothermere’s replacement as Air Minister, Lord Weir, who, like Rear Admiral Kerr, believed that the best way to counter Germany’s offensive bombing campaign was in kind.190 Still, Weir and Sykes did receive something comparable to the bitter pill that the Army Council had foisted upon the RNAS back in May 1917, in this case encountering opposition from the French regarding control of the IAF – which they believed should be incorporated into an Inter-Allied Force under Supreme Commander Foch’s authority.191 Like the Admiralty in 1916, Sykes and Weir simply ignored these objections and carried on as though nothing had changed. It is difficult to avoid comparisons with the No. 3 Wing experience two years prior. Weir, like the Air Ministry in general, believed more in the morale impact of bombing rather than its potential for industrial destruction as such, and thus informed Trenchard that, according to Ash, ‘he did not care if the bombers missed their industrial targets and hoped that the bombers would set off large fires in German villages’.192 Sykes preferred to focus on industrial bombing proper, but was willing to defer to the War Cabinet’s ruling on reprisal and morale bombing. With his mission thus liberally, and vaguely, defined, Trenchard went to work. Trenchard now gave lip-service to industrial bombing, claiming that he intended ‘[to] attack as many of the large industrial centres as it was possible to reach with the machines at my disposal’,193 but quickly reverted to his old tactics of supporting the Army by bombing targets in their interest: namely, aerodromes, railways, and bases, as had been his policy while working with Haig.194 Trenchard continued to believe that an attritional air battle, leading to aerial dominance, had to precede any long-range bombing operations.195 This was a position strikingly similar

Long-Range Bombing 149 to the belief held by GHQ that the ‘wearing-out’ battle must precede the breakthrough.196 Communications, railroad depots, and railway junctions, specifically, were a particular favourite of Trenchard and it was these centers that received the greatest attention under his leadership. Railway junctions were bombed at Metz (183 bomb hits), Thionville (120), Trevers (14), Ehrange (12), Saarbrucken (61), Coblenz (7), and Cologne (no hits), along with several others.197 Trenchard focused on Germany’s exposed rolling stock, bombing locomotive sheds and workshops incessantly. Industrial targets were indeed bombed, such as the iron ore basins in Lorraine, the coal basins in the Saar Valley, and the chemical and poison gas works at Ludwigshafen, but generally as secondary objectives.198 Due to factors ranging from weather, engine failures, and enemy action, the IAF bombers rarely arrived over the target with their entire force. Furthermore, targets were often bombed by mistake or as targets of opportunity, following Trenchard’s guidance to focus on rail-lines, aerodromes, and other military targets.199 Industrial bombing fell to an even lower priority during preparation for the Hundred Days offensive. 200 Trenchard’s explanation for his own reversal of policy hinged on his conception of airpower: early in 1919 he explained to Lord Weir how ‘…in the past I had referred to the necessity for equipping the [BEF] on the Western Front with sufficient aircraft to hold and beat the German aerial forces on the Western Front; that the bombing of Germany was a luxury till this had been accomplished, but that, once accomplished, it became a necessity.’201 Trenchard’s explanation in this regard is certainly fitting in terms of his close relationship with Field Marshal Haig, who, likewise, believed in the phased battle model. As Cooper put it, the military air policy ‘…on the Western Front was a microcosm of the strategy employed by Haig against Germany’s commanding position in northeast France’.202 Trenchard’s tactics, in short, were focused on making an impact on the ground war. 203 The 41st Wing and IAF, over their combined year-long campaign between October 1917 and November 1918, dropped 665 tons of bombs, the equivalent of 947 sorties by Handley Page bombers.204 Of the 508 raids conducted by the 41st Wing and the IAF, only 172 were actually flown against targets in Germany, initially the result of the great range required, however, longer-range Handley Page and DH9 bombers were introduced in 1918. 205 543 tons were dropped by Trenchard’s command alone between June and November 1918, indicating the limited scale of the 41st Wing’s efforts over the winter of 1917. 206 No. 216 Squadron dropped 176.5 tons, or 27% of the grand total, primarily against railroads and enemy aerodromes. 207 According to postwar statistics reproduced in the official history, No. 216 and No. 215 squadrons, while operating with the 41st Wing and IAF, carried out a total of 70 raids of which only 28 were successfully conducted against primarily industrial

150  Long-Range Bombing targets (targets that were not specifically railways, barracks, or aerodromes). One postwar assessment indicated that the IAF, in the final eight months of the war, carried out at least 150 raids against aerodromes, primarily night raids against Boulay, Morhange, and Buhl, with an average of one and a half tons dropped per raid. 208 Even when industrial centers were specifically targeted by the naval squadrons, such as the Saarbrucken Burbach steelworks or the chemical factories at Mannheim, the attacks themselves were usually divided between multiple individual targets such as railway junctions, barracks, and aerodromes. The Metz-Sablon railway junction, for example, was bombed 36 times by the two naval squadrons. Another six raids were primarily carried out against enemy bases, barracks, and docks. A total of 220.25 tons were dropped specifically on aerodromes – representative of Trenchard’s prioritization. 209 Difficulty assembling the bombing formations, weather interference, and engine failures, would often prevent the bombers from reaching their targets, with the result that the nearest target of opportunity, invariably railroad junctions, were the most straightforward targets of attack. These figures are significant as they demonstrate that the former RNAS squadrons, with the longest experience in night bombing with Handley Page aircraft, were ordered primarily to attack the enemy’s communications and air bases. To conclude, Major-General Trenchard perceived the IAF as an instrument of operational destruction, and correspondingly prioritized bombing missions against the enemy’s bases and communications. This was despite agreement at the Air Ministry, and indeed in the Cabinet, that industrial targets proper should be focused on. Trenchard refused to change his methods, and thus there simply was no systematic campaign against enemy industry. Under Trenchard, the IAF resembled more the RNAS Dunkirk group than No. 3 Wing, the latter’s targets having been strictly industrial in nature: steelworks, blast furnaces, and munitions factories. 210 It must have been with some sense of bittersweet vindication that Foreign Secretary Balfour, in October 1918, urged a transition to attacks specifically focused against only five German cities. 211 Trenchard shot back by telegraphing to Foch that the entire IAF should be transferred to Haig’s command, the final indication that the leopard had not changed its spots.

Conclusion The RNAS long-range bombing effort developed in four phases over the course of the war. Beginning with the targeting of Zeppelin sheds and factories in 1914–1915, the mission expanded to coastal bombing against the German-occupied Belgian bases in 1915–1916, before industrial bombing was undertaken as an extension of the Navy’s blockade in 1916–1917. During 1918, the former RNAS squadrons contributed

Long-Range Bombing 151 their extensive bombing experience to form the backbone of the RAF’s long-range bombing program, both from Dunkirk, where raids against coastal facilities were launched around the clock and, in the form of the 41st Wing and later the IAF, where Naval squadrons contributed to the BEF’s conduct of the war by reducing the enemy’s aerodromes and lines of communication. What is striking, considering all of these bombing operations, is how they were consistently waylaid by changing political and military administrations. Personality differences in the Cabinet, at the Admiralty and amongst the Air Board, contributed to the repeated divergence of objectives and priorities. Inter-service rivalry with the Army Council and War Office doomed RNAS No. 3 Wing to dissolution, and the material exigencies of the Western Front swallowed up RNAS forces from both Dunkirk and Luxeuil. Although the Navy was the first to develop long-range bombing methods, particularly under the leadership of First Lords Churchill (with DAD Sueter) and Balfour (with DAS Vaughan-Lee), it was ultimately the RFC that seized control of the long-range bombing force. The relentless assault by the Army Council and RFC against No. 3 Wing is particularly significant. It was generally assumed, by the War Office, that any activity from the inland aerodromes (especially on the Western Front) should be restricted to the Army’s use, regardless of the fact that the Admiralty possessed the technical knowledge and machines required to conduct long-range bombing raids. The RFC leadership, notably DGMA Henderson and RFC field commander Trenchard, insisted that the RNAS bombers should be transferred to the Western Front commanders, a request the Air Department was willing to acquiesce to for strictly military necessity, until pressure from the Air Board, War Office, and, critically, Sir Douglas Haig, became so strong that the Navy was forced to abandon its long-range bombing campaign altogether. The RFC then cynically reversed course and assumed control over long-range bombing by reinstating operations under the 41st Wing. Despite the leadership role shifting from the RNAS to the RFC, the Navy remained involved by providing heavy bomber squadrons to operate with the 41st Wing and later the IAF. Even after the RNAS ceased to exist in April 1918, the newly designated RAF No. 216 (naval) Squadron remained a core component of the IAF under Major-General Trenchard. Significantly, it was the Navy’s Handley Page bombers that proved the most effective long-range bombing aircraft, although they were ultimately misused by Trenchard, who scattered them against operational targets rather than concentrating them against the enemy’s industrial centers as CAS Sykes and Air Minister Weir had intended. The lessons from the Navy’s experience with long-range bombing are three-fold. First, the RNAS quickly developed a capability to carry out the full spectrum of bombing operations, from the initial anti-­Zeppelin raids of 1914 through to the systematic tactical and operational bombing

152  Long-Range Bombing of the Dunkirk wing. With this experience behind them, the RNAS developed its dedicated long-range bombing force, No. 3 Wing. This experience produced the second lesson: the War Office was perfectly willing to decry the utility of No. 3 Wing until it could assume control itself, at which point the Army failed to produce an equally dedicated bombing force, preferring to focus on tactical and operational targets more in line with their established priorities. The Admiralty Air Department, for its part, should not have folded to the inter-service attacks against No. 3 Wing. Second, although Vaughan-Lee was a willing convert to the Churchill policy of long-range bombing, his replacement by Fifth Sea Lord Paine doomed the long-range bombing mission as the RNAS refocused on ASW and fleet aviation. Thus, inter-service rivalry only partly explains the Navy’s abandonment of their leadership role over long-range bombing in 1917: fluctuating administrative priorities tipped the scales. In fact, had it been expanded and reinforced, rather than pared-down and dismantled, No. 3 Wing would have been well positioned to retaliate for the Gotha campaign when it started, in addition to carrying out the destruction of Germany’s industry on an increasingly significant scale during 1918. The capability gap created by the disbanding of No. 3 Wing meant that there was no force available to retaliate for the Gotha campaign until the 41st Wing was formed in October 1917. The Air Department thus, indirectly, contributed to the public and government outcry against the way the air war was being run, and this, at least in part, served to justify the conclusions of the Smuts Committee (see Chapter 4). Third, the wartime BEF and RFC leadership of Haig and Trenchard had no interest in long-range bombing, insofar as it did not immediately contribute to the material battle on the Western Front: it had been a Naval role, comparable to blockade, that formed the basis for the industrial bombing mission.

Notes 1. H. G. Wells, The War in the Air (London: The Pall Mall Magazine, 1908), pp. 125 et seq. 2. Eric Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 1912–1918 ­(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), p. 6. 3. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing (London: William ­K imber & Co. Limited, 1973), p. 107. 4. Goulter, ‘Royal Naval Air Service’, p.  56. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 313. 5. Ian Gardiner, The Flatpack Bombers: The Royal Navy and the ‘Zeppelin Menace’, Kindle ebook (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), Chapter 3, loc. 1098. Gilbert, The Challenge of War, vol. III, pp. 88–9. 6. Gardiner, The Flatpack Bombers, Chapter 3, loc. 1170–78. 7. Samson, Fights and Flights, pp. 52–3. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 389. John Oliver, Samson and the Dunkirk Circus, 3 Squadron Royal Naval Air

Long-Range Bombing 153 S­ ervice, 1914–15 (San Bernardino, CA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017), pp. 91–2. 8. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 390. 9. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p.  312. Sturtivant, British Naval Aviation, Appendix I, p.  215. Popham, Into Wind, p.  17. Ventry and ­Kolesnik, Jane’s Pocket Book of Airship Development, p. 83. Oliver, Samson and the Dunkirk Circus, p. 93. Gardiner, The Flatpack Bombers, Chapter  3, loc. 1265–98. John Lea, Reggie, The Life of Air Vice Marshal R. L. G. Marix CB DSO (Durham: The Pentland Press Ltd., 1994), pp. 27–8. 10. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 395–7. Layman, Naval Aviation, pp. 67–8. 11. Gardiner, The Flatpack Bombers, Chapter 4, loc. 1559. 12. Searle, G. R. ‘Billing, Noel Pemberton (1881–1948)’, ODNB. 13. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 76–80. 14. Brock and Brock, Letters to Venetia Stanley, p.  319 fn. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 395–6. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 68. Mary Gibson, Warneford, VC (Yeovilton: The Fleet Air Arm Museum, 1979), p. 73. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 15. Ian Castle, The Zeppelin Base Raids: Germany 1914 (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2011), pp. 38–47. 15. Massie, Castles of Steel, pp. 361–74. Eric Grove, The Royal Navy since 1815 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 117–8. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 369. Belafi, The Zeppelin, p. 333. Gardiner, The Flatpack Bombers, Chapter 5. 16. Gardiner, The Flatpack Bombers, Introduction, loc. 289. 17. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 142–3. O’Moore Creagh and E. M. Humpris, The V.C. and D.S.O. Book, vol. I. 3 vols. (Naval & Military Press reprint, London: The Standard Art Book Co. Ltd., 1920), p. 188. 18. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 53. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 350–2. Malcolm Cooper, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, in CCIJ, vol. 17, no. 2 (Summer 1986), p. 50. Bacon, Dover Patrol, vol. I, p. 224. Robinson, Zeppelin in Combat, p. 97. 19. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p. 301. 20. Extracts from Minutes of a Conference held in the Admiralty on 3 April 1915, ADM 1/8497, #64 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 198–9. 21. Goulter, ‘Royal Naval Air Service’, p. 57. 22. Gilbert, The Challenge of War, vol. III, pp. 445–66. 23. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive, p.  28. Howlett, ‘The Royal Naval Air Service’, pp. 232, 236. 24. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 375, Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, pp. 59–62. 25. Bacon, The Dover Patrol, vol. II, p. 217. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 339. 26. Arthur Longmore, RN and RAF: 1911 to 1945, part II, RAF Museum Hendon, DC 74/102/40, p. 7. 27. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 63. 28. Bacon, The Dover Patrol, vol. I, p. 219. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 102. Samson, Fights and Flights, pp. 195–9. 29. Samson, Fights and Flights, pp. 200–2. 30. Cooper, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, p. 50. 31. Service record of Reginald H. S. Bacon, ADM 196/87/95. 32. Marder, FDSF, vol. II, p. 353. 33. C. L. Lambe Service Record, ADM 196/44, p. 105. Layman, Before the Aircraft Carrier, p. 37. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 63. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 128. 34. Ian Hernon, Britain’s Forgotten Wars: Colonial Campaigns of the 19th Century (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2007), pp. 415–22. L. G. C. Laughton

154  Long-Range Bombing and Andrew Lambert, ‘Rawson, Sir Harry Holdsworth (1843–1910), Naval Officer’, ODNB. 35. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation and the Anti-Submarine Campaign’, p. 104. Reginald Bacon, Benin, The City of Blood, Kindle ebook (London: Arnold, 1897), Chapter 6, loc. 630. 36. The Naval Who’s Who, 1917 (Polstead: J. B. Hayward & Son, 1981), p. 154. 37. A. B. Sainsbury, ‘Bacon, Sir Reginald Hugh Spencer (1863–1947)’, ODNB. The Naval Who’s Who, 1917 (Polstead: J. B. Hayward & Son, 1981), p. 93. Bacon, The City of Blood, loc. 972. Colledge and Warlow, Ships of the Royal Navy, p. 212. 38. ‘The Queen and the Benin Expedition’, 2 March 1897, London Times, p. 5. 39. Marder, FDSF, vol IV, p.  315. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p.  63. Service record of Arthur V. Vyvyan, ADM 196/89/161 & ADM 196/141/286. 40. List of Naval Squadrons which served with the R.F.C. and the R.A.F. on the Western Front 1914–1918, Appendix 29 in Jones, WIA, Appendices, pp. 142–4. See also, Harold Rosher, In the Royal Naval Air Service: Being the War Letters of the Late Harold Rosher to His Family, Kindle ebook (Auckland: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2013, originally published in 1916), Chapters 4 & 6. 41. Report by W/Cdr. A. M. Longmore on patrols and spotting operations carried out in Belgium and on Belgian Coast, 30 June–13 July 1915, ADM 1/672, pp. 1–6. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 377–9. 42. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 63. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 426. 43. King, Armament of British Aircraft, p. 327. Thetford, British Naval Aircraft, p. 221. 44. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 64. 45. Memorandum of Meeting Held in Second Sea Lord’s Room, 21 March 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A, pp. 2–4. 46. Dunn, Securing The Narrow Sea, pp. 146–7. 47. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, p. 82. 48. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 67. 49. Ibid., p. 66. 50. Westrop, A History of No. 6 Squadron: Royal Naval Air Service in World War I (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, Limited, 2006), p.  12. See also, G.  R. Bromet, ed., Naval Eight, reprint (Suffolk: The Signal Press Ltd., 1931). 51. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 68. 52. Ibid. 53. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, pp. 124–5. 54. No. 5 Wing conducted significant bombing operations during late 1916 and throughout 1917, also cooperating with the RFC on the Western Front. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 81–2. RNAS Dunkirk Report on bombing raid by No. 5 Wing RNAS in cooperation with Royal Flying Corps on Ghistelles Aerodromes, 3 September 1916, AIR 1/633/17/122/87. 55. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 69. 56. ‘Extracts from Letter H.Q. No. 562 from Wing Captain C. L. Lambe, Commanding R.N. Air Station Dunkirk, to the Vice-Admiral Dover Patrol, dated 10 June 1917’, and ‘Covering Letter by Vice-Admiral R. H. Bacon to the Admiralty’, AIR 1/641, #170, in Roskill, Documents, pp. 484–5. 57. ‘Extracts from Letter H.Q. No. 562 from Wing Captain C. L. Lambe, Commanding R.N. Air Station Dunkirk, to the Vice-Admiral Dover

Long-Range Bombing 155 Patrol, dated 10 June 1917’, and ‘Covering Letter by Vice-Admiral R. H. Bacon to the Admiralty’, AIR 1/641, #170 and #171, in Roskill, Documents, pp. 484–7. 58. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 66. 59. Ibid., pp. 70–1. 60. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 118. 61. Statement by Bonar Law, 5 June 1917, HC, vol. 94, cc. 20–30. 62. Appreciation of British Naval Effort during the War: Role of the R. N. A. S., 16 January 1919, ADM 1/8549/13, p. 15. 63. Newbolt, Naval Operations, vol. V, pp. 178–9. Dunn, Securing The Narrow Sea, p. 157. 64. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 117. 65. Plans Division: war records, Volume 5, Lambe to Keyes Report, ‘The general effects of Offensive Operations carried out by Bomb-dropping in aircraft’, 3 February 1918, ADM 137/2710. 66. ‘Admiralty Letter M.02426 of 23 February 1918 to Air Ministry enclosing Letter No. 9364 of 3 February 1918 from Captain C. L. Lambe, Commanding R.N. Air Station, Dunkirk, to the Vice-Admiral, Dover Patrol’. AIR 1/35, #228 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 633–4. 67. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, pp. 118–9. 68. Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes, p. 126. Roskill, Documents, p. 611. 69. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, pp. 74–5. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 120. 70. ‘Admiralty Letter M.04252 of 3 May 1918 to Air Ministry…’ ADM 1/8500, #250 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 666–7. 71. Abbatiello, ‘British Naval Aviation’, p. 120. 72. Ibid., p. 122. See also, AIR 1/58/15/9/62. 73. Lambe to C. F. Kilnor CO No. 82 wing, 14 August 1918 AIR 1/95/15/9/263. 74. Extracts of Information received from Air Stations of Operations by Royal Air Force Contingents from 13th June to 16th June 1918. Operations from Dunkirk, AIR 1/296, p. 1. 75. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 75. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid., pp. 77–8. 78. Report of the Aircraft Bombing Committee of Effects of Bombing in Belgium and Enemy Defensive Measures, March 1919, AIR 1/2115/207/56/1. See also Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 131. 79. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, pp. 131–2. 80. Ibid., p. 131. 81. Dunn, Securing the Narrow Sea, p.  146. Arthur Marder, ed., Portrait of an Admiral, The Life and Papers of Herbert Richmond (Cambridge: ­Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 244–5. 82. Cooper, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, p. 51. 83. Admiralty document on RNAS bombing, 25 February 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A. History of No. 3 Wing, RNAS, undated, AIR 1/2107/207/42. A. D. Harvey, ‘Subjective Impressions in the Archives: Britain’s National Archives as a Source for Personal Accounts, and Personal Opinions, of Air Warfare 1914–1918’, in CCIJ, vol. 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2014), p. 204. 84. Vaughan-Lee, Director Air Services to the Chief of Staff, Henry Oliver, 17 February 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A, p. 2. 85. Major-General Henderson, Duties of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, 28 January 1916, CAB 42/8/2 also CAB 24/2/9. 86. Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, vol. I (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1970), p. 251.

156  Long-Range Bombing 87. Statement of policy and duties of the Royal Naval Air Service for production at the Joint War Air Committee, 28 February 1916, AIR 2/35. 88. Goulter, ‘The Royal Naval Air Service’, p.  59. See also, Joint War Air Committee, Extracts from Paper Air 4, dated 3 March 1916, AIR 1/270, #106 in Roskill, Documents, p. 310. 89. Joint War Air Committee, Extracts from Paper Air 4, dated 3 March 1916, AIR 1/270, #106 in, Roskill, Documents, pp. 309–15. 90. Ibid., pp. 309–15. See also, Minutes of the JWAC meeting, 6 March 1916, AIR 1/2319. Minute by Sir W. Graham Greene, dated 4 June 1916, ADM 1/8449, #128 in Roskill, Documents, p. 365. War Office Letter 79/8883 (M.O.1) of (?) 25 May 1916 to Admiralty… ADM 1/8449, #128 in Roskill, Documents, p. 364. 91. Vaughan-Lee minute on RNAS Establishment, 15 March 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A. 92. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 118. 93. Thetford, British Naval Aircraft, pp. 296–7. 94. Emphasis in original. Joint War Air Committee, Extracts from Paper Air 4, dated 3 March 1916, AIR 1/270, #106 in Roskill, Documents, p. 310. 95. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 323. 96. Memorandum of Meeting Held in Second Sea Lord’s Room, Tuesday, 21 March 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A, p. 2. 97. Vaughan-Lee to Henry Oliver, 4 April 1916, ADM 1/8449. 98. Minute by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, Chief of the War Staff, 5 April 1916, ADM 1/8449, #120 in Roskill, Documents, p. 344. 99. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, pp. 80–1, 97. See also, GHQ Directive, 3 June 1916, AIR 1/978/204/5/1139. History of No. 3 Wing, RNAS, undated, AIR 1/2107/207/42. 100. Minute by Rear Admiral C. L. Vaughan-Lee dated 5 June 1916, ADM 1/8449, #128 in Roskill, Documents, p. 365. 101. Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, Kindle ebook (London: Aurum Press Ltd., 2011), p. 151. 102. Letter from the Secretary of the Air Board AB 97/5 of 23 June 1916 to the Secretary of the Admiralty, AIR 1/650, #129 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 366–7. History of No. 3 Wing, RNAS, undated, AIR 1/2107/207/42. 103. Samson, Fights and Flights, pp. 286–8. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials, p. 433. 104. Jones, ‘Ashore, Afloat and Airborne’, p. 42. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 74. 105. Layman, Naval Aviation, p. 74. 106. History of No. 3 Wing, RNAS, undated, AIR 1/2107/207/42. 107. Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, pp. 79–80. Operation Record Book, No. 216 Squadron, RAF, Late No. 16 Squadron, RNAS, 1939, AIR 27/1332/1. 108. Wing Captain Elder, summary of No. 3 Wing history, 24 May 1917, AIR 1/2266, p. 2 109. Ibid. 110. Marix was disabled by a plane crash in October 1916, losing a leg. Davies, Sailor in the Air, pp. 145–6. Bruce Lewis, A Few of the First (London: Leo Cooper, 1997), p. 127. Roskill, Documents, p. 27. Lea, Reggie, The Life of Air Vice Marshal R L G Marix, pp. 58–9. 111. Roger Gunn, Raymond Collishaw and the Black Flight (Toronto: Dundurn, 2013), p. 47. 112. Elder, William Leslie, RNAS Record of Service, ADM 273/2, p. 44. 113. W. Graham Greene to CO No. 3 Wing, 27 July 1916, AIR 1/115.

Long-Range Bombing 157 114. Admiralty Letter M.06613 of 27 July 1916 to the Officer Commanding No. 3 Wing, RNAS, in France, ADM 1/8449, #132 in Roskill, Documents, p. 373. 115. Gunn, Raymond Collishaw and the Black Flight, p. 46. 116. Operations Record Book, No. 216 Squadron, RAF, late No. 16 Squadron, RNAS, 1939, AIR 27/1332. 117. Operations from Luxeuil and Ochey – details of air raids over enemy territory, July 1916, AIR 1/111/15/39/1. 118. Gunn, Raymond Collishaw and the Black Flight, p.  50. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 453. Operations from Luxeuil and Ochey… AIR 1/111/15/39/1. 119. Operations from Luxeuil and Ochey, AIR 1/111/15/39/1. 120. Wing Commander R. B. Davies, No. 3 Wing Oberndorf raid pilot reports, 12 October 1916, AIR 1/111. 121. Secretary of Admiralty to CO RNAS No. 3 Wing, 19 October 1916, AIR 1/115. 122. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, p. 118. See also, Proposals for bombing of blast furnaces in France, Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, AIR 2/123. 123. Roger Gunn, Raymond Collishaw and the Black Flight, pp. 59–60. 124. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 453. 125. Memorandum for the War Committee: Long-Range Bombing Operations by Aircraft, 9 November 1916, CAB 42/26/1, p. 1. (Same as #144 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 418–22.) 126. Ibid., p. 2. 127. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 45. 128. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, p. 105. 129. Wing Captain Elder to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 24 May 1917, AIR 1/2266, p. 4. 130. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, p. 122. 131. Ibid., pp. 122–5. 132. Ibid., p. 93. 133. Cooper, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, p. 53. 134. Rear Admiral Tudor’s statement, Minutes of the One Hundred and Forty-First meeting of the War Committee, 28 November 1916, CAB 42/26/1, p. 9. 135. ‘Memorandum for the War Committee: Long-Range Bombing Operations by Aircraft’, 9 November 1916, CAB 42/26/1, #144 in Roskill, Documents, p. 418. 136. Thirty-Second Meeting of the Air Board, 3 January 1917, AIR 6/4. 137. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 122. 138. Ibid., p. 121 fn. 139. Commanding Officer Handley Page Squadron to Wing Captain Elder, 5–6 April 1917, AIR 1/638. 140. Wing Captain Elder, Appendix II, Summary of Raids Carried out by No.  3 Wing, RNAS, between 30th July and 14th April 1917, AIR 1/2266. 141. Gibson and Prendergast, The German Submarine War, pp. 164–5. 142. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, p. 123. 143. Ibid., p. 122. 144. Wing Captain Elder to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 24 May 1917, AIR 1/2266. 145. Notes on report of bombing operations of No. 3 Wing RNAS in France during winter 1916/1917, AIR 1/2266. Cooper, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, p. 52. Wing Captain Elder history and operations of No. 3 Wing, 24 May 1917, AIR 1/2266, p. 5.

158  Long-Range Bombing 146. Cooper, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, p.  52. Davies, Sailor in the Air, p. 157. 147. Ibid., p. 122. 148. George K. Williams, Biplanes and Bombsight: British Bombing in World War I, Kindle ebook, (Auckland: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014), Chapter 1, loc. 696. 149. Ibid., loc. 659. 150. Davies, Sailor in the Air, p. 158. 151. Wing Captain Elder to Secretary of the Admiralty, 24 May 1917, AIR 1/2266. 152. Lee Kennett, The First Air War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 50. 153. Wing Captain Elder, 24 May 1917, AIR 1/115. 154. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare, p. 64. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 121. 155. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 321. 156. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 123. 157. ‘Extracts from Minutes of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Air Board held on 11 December 1916. A.B. 30’, ADM 1/8449, #147 in Roskill, Documents, p. 431. 158. Reports and memorandum drawn up for consideration by Strategic Council, 17 January 1918, AIR 1/463/15/312/137. Cooper, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, p. 55. 159. Appendix, Cabinet Committee War Policy on Long-Distance Bombing Operations, War Cabinet 169, 26 June 1917, CAB 23/3/17, p. 9. 160. Appendix I & II. Report on Long-Distance Bombing Operations War Cabinet 169, 20 & 22 June 1917, CAB 23/3/17, p. 9. 161. War Cabinet Minutes 228, 5 September 1917, CAB 23/4/2, p. 2. 162. Ibid. 163. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, pp. 122–3. 164. Operation Record Book, No. 216 Squadron, RAF, Late No. 16 Squadron, RNAS, 1939, AIR 27/1332/1, p. 3. 165. Peter Lewis, Squadron Histories: RFC, RNAS, and RAF, 1912–1959 (London: Putnam, 1959), p. 75. 166. Wing Captain Lambe to Commodore Dunkirk and Vice-Admiral Dover Patrol, 31 October 1917, AIR 1/640. 167. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials, p.  435. Operation Record Book, No. 216 Squadron, RAF, Late No. 16 Squadron, RNAS, 1939, AIR 27/1332/1. 168. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, pp. 406–7. 169. Operation Record Book, No. 216 Squadron, AIR 27/1332/1. 170. Ibid., p. 5 171. Appendix XXVIII, List of Naval Squadrons which served with the RFC and RAF on the Western Front 1914–1918, in Jones, WIA, Appendices, pp. 142–4. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, pp. 122–3. 172. E. D. Harding and Peter Chapman, eds. A History of Number 16 Squadron: Royal Naval Air Service (Morrisville, North Carolina: Lulu Press, 2006), p. 15. 173. Air Raids and Bombing of Germany, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet, 9 October 1917, CAB 23/4/21 pp. 5–6. 174. Richard Overy, The Birth of the RAF, 1918, Kindle ebook (London: Allen Lane, 2018), pp. 33–4, 37. Williams, Biplanes and Bombsights, Chapter 3, loc. 2214–42. 175. Williams, Biplanes and Bombsights, Chapter 3, loc. 2359–77. 176. Air Raids and Bombing of Germany, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet, 9 October 1917, CAB 23/4/21, p. 6.

Long-Range Bombing 159 177. Memorandum titled ‘Air Policy’, 11 October 1917, addressed to Lord Cowdray, President of the Air Board, by Rear Admiral Mark E. F. Kerr. Cabinet G.T. 2284. Milner Papers, Bodleian, Box 122, Folio 84–5, #198 Roskill, Documents, pp. 562–4. 178. Mark Kerr, Land Sea and Air (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1927), p.  293. Service record of Mark Edward Frederic Kerr, ADM 196/42, sheet 126, p. 253. 179. Correspondence between Lord Rothermere, President of the Air Board, and Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord, November–December 1917, ADM 116/1602, #252 in Roskill, Documents, p. 669. Correspondence between Sir Eric Geddes, 1st Lord, and Sir William Weir, Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force, May 1918, ADM 116/1807, #210 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 592–3. 180. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 166. 181. Ibid., p. 167. 182. Statistics of Work of Squadrons of the Independent Force, Including Wastage, June–November 1918, Appendix XII, in Jones, WIA, Appendices, pp. 40–1. 183. Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes, p. 155. 184. Sykes minute to David Lloyd George, 1 June 1918, in the Air Power Review, Special Edition, Spring 2013, p. 228. 185. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 135. 186. Appreciation of British Naval Effort during the War – Role of the R. N. A. S., 16 January 1919, ADM 1/8549/13, p. 11. Statistics of Work of Squadrons of the Independent Force, Including Wastage, June–November 1918, Appendix XII, in Jones, WIA, Appendices, pp.  40–1 & Appendix XV, State of Independent Force, Royal Air Force, p. 87. See also Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials, p. 435. 187. Malcolm Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 128–9. 188. Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes, p. 157. 189. Ibid., p. 159. 190. Ibid., pp. 159–60. 191. Ibid., p. 161. 192. Ibid., p. 166. 193. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 136. 194. Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes, p.  167. Williams, Biplanes and Bombsights, Chapter 4, loc. 2396. 195. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, pp.  136–7. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, p. 93. 196. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, Chapter 7, loc. 3429. 197. Railways, Report of the Effects and Results of the Bombing of Germany by the 8th. Brigade and Independent Force, Royal Air Force, JSCSC, p. 7. 198. Ibid., pp. 1–2. 199. Statistics of Work of Squadrons of the Independent Force, Including Wastage, June–November 1918, Appendix XII, in Jones, WIA, Appendices, pp. 40–1. 200. Major General Trenchard to Lord Weir, Air Minister, 1 January 1919, in the Air Power Review, Special Edition, Spring 2013, p. 236. 201. Ibid., pp. 234–5. 202. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, p. 76. 203. See, for example, Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, pp. 174–5. Russell Miller, Trenchard: Father of the Royal Air Force, Kindle ebook (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2016), Chapter 10, loc. 2618.

160  Long-Range Bombing 204. Cooper, ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing’, p. 49. 205. Ibid. 206. Statistics of Work of Squadrons of the Independent Force, Including Wastage, June–November 1918, Appendix XII, in Jones, WIA, Appendices, p. 40. 207. Lewis, Squadron Histories, p. 75. 208. Report on the Effects and Results of the Bombing of Germany by 8th Brigade and Independent Force, Royal Air Force: (D) Aerodromes, JSCSC, p. 31. 209. Major General Trenchard to Lord Weir, Air Minister, 1 January 1919, in Air Power Review, Special Edition, Spring 2013, p. 237. 210. Jones, WIA, vol. II, p. 253. 211. Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes, p. 168.

4

Naval Air Defence

As has been the case with the other themes discussed in this book, the Royal Naval Air Service’s (RNAS) air defence role evolved over several phases. In the first phase, September 1914 to February 1916, the RNAS was directly responsible for the entirety of Britain’s air defence. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, and Director of the Air Department (DAD) Commodore Murray Sueter, oversaw the development and implementation of the RNAS’ telephone exchange network that, by connecting Britain’s air stations and anti-aircraft batteries with the Admiralty, Air Department and War Office buildings in London, became the cornerstone of Britain’s air defence system. Churchill’s resignation in May 1915, and his replacement as First Lord by Arthur Balfour, began the transition to the second phase: in June, Balfour decentralized the RNAS, by subordinating the air stations to their naval district commanders, and Sueter was shuffled aside as Superintendent for Aircraft Construction (SAC) in September. In February 1916, Balfour abandoned the RNAS air defence role altogether, returning responsibility for Britain’s air defence to the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), so that the RNAS could be refocused on Zeppelin interception over Britain’s coasts and the North Sea. This second phase, from February 1916 to May 1917, was characterized by a dramatic expansion and rearmament of the RNAS, undertaken at the behest of Director Air Services (DAS) Rear Admiral C. L. Vaughan-Lee, and the RNAS emerged in the summer of 1917 as an effective anti-Zeppelin and night-fighting force. The third phase commenced categorically on 25 May 1917, when the first of Germany’s daylight Gotha raids took place, and lasted until the end of the war on 11 November 1918. The air battle over England and the North Sea during this period took on a new degree of immediacy for Britain’s civilian population, and the coalition government of Prime Minister David Lloyd George, in particular. To respond to the crisis, Lloyd George approved the creation of the Air Ministry, which was formed in January 1918, and shortly thereafter Germany’s bombers were redirected to France in preparation for Ludendorff’s spring ­offensive – but the creation of the RAF on April 1st

162  Naval Air Defence did not conclude the RNAS’ role as an air defence organization: sporadic Staaken bomber and Zeppelin raids continued until nearly the end of the war. Historians have since argued that the Air Ministry was created primarily to deflect criticism of the government over the Gotha campaign, and to appease the proponents of an imperial air service.1 The transition to the RAF, so far as the Navy was concerned, was yet another administrative upheaval that, by this point in the war, had become a perennial occurrence for the naval air service: the former RNAS station and group commanders essentially carried on their prior missions as best they could, despite additional pressure resulting from the withdrawal of naval squadrons to support RAF operations in France. Naval squadrons, nevertheless, continued to fly air defense missions primarily over the coasts, scoring notable successes against Germany’s late war super-Zeppelins. For most of the war, the RNAS had been engaged patrolling and defending Britain’s coasts, a mission that included ASW and was inseparable from the defence of Britain’s airspace (see Chapter 2). The RNAS’ role as an interceptor of the Zeppelin and Gotha bombing raids highlights the interrelated nature of the Air Department as a multi-mission organization. Despite the vital air defence role played by the RNAS, the historiographical focus on the formation of the RAF and the ‘first battle of Britain’ has meant that the complicated and innovative contribution of the RNAS to Britain’s air defence has been quietly forgotten.

Churchill’s Prewar Air Defence Policy It is important to briefly survey Churchill’s conceptualization of air defence in the prewar period, as it was his arrangement with the Minister of War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, that transferred complete responsibility for Britain’s air defence to the RNAS on 3 September 1914.2 The imperative to defend against air attack first entered the British public’s consciousness during the Edwardian period: the sensational proposals of the invasion literature, combined with the science fiction of H. G. Wells, raised concerns about Britain’s possible exposure to air attack. The reality of the new technology was demonstrated by Louis Bleriot’s famous cross-Channel flight in 1909. The question of Britain’s readiness to defend itself from air attack was pressed home in the popular press, through publications like Aeroplane, a magazine founded by Charles Grey, and the Daily Mail and Times newspapers, published by the air advocate Alfred Harmsworth, Lord Northcliffe.3 The alarmism in the popular press provided a contrast to the sober preparations made by practitioners such as Colonel J. E. B. Seely, the chairman of the Air Committee, and Brigadier-General David Henderson and Major Frederick Sykes, the commanders of the Military

Naval Air Defence 163 Wing of the RFC. Sykes, in particular, considered the possibility of aerial fighting when he wrote the RFC’s prewar training manual, a landmark component of prewar air doctrine.4 James Pugh has observed that the Admiralty, for its part, became aware of the potential threat from German air attacks in 1911.5 For the Naval Wing, air defence was an important area of discussion and experimentation: the Naval Wing existed to support the Royal Navy in the air and this meant developing both offensive and defensive capabilities in keeping with the Navy’s traditional roles, significantly, defending Britain’s coasts, preventing invasion, and taking offensive action against the enemy’s bases.6 Indeed, air defence of naval facilities was a role that had been endorsed by DAD Sueter, who was also the naval representative on the prewar Air Committee. Sueter argued in favour of naval aircraft defending bases and facilities,7 and observed the difficulties that would likely be experienced with aircraft attempting to intercept airships, given the ability of rigid airships to outclimb any existing airplanes.8 The DAD’s general Naval Wing policy, as circulated on 29 August 1912, emphasized, foremost, the importance of naval air reconnaissance, but also included a final requirement aimed at ‘preventing attacks on Dockyards, Magazines, Oil Storage Tanks, etc. by hostile Aircraft’.9 Experimental work continued apace at Eastchurch, with the goal of developing the technical capabilities that would enable naval aircraft to fight defensively. As Lieutenant Robert Clark-Hall wrote at the beginning of 1914, ‘machine-gun aeroplanes are (or will be) required to drive off enemy machines approaching our ports with the intention of obtaining information or attacking with bombs our magazines, oil tanks, or dockyards’.10 In June 1913, the Naval Ordnance Department advocated arming every naval aircraft with some form of weaponry, wether machine guns, small cannons, or rockets and grenades.11 Churchill for his part was convinced that Germany’s Zeppelins possessed the potential to seriously threaten the Navy’s stores and magazines and that the only solution was to somehow prevent the airships from reaching their targets – as could ‘only be done by attacking them’.12 Churchill’s counterattack theory ultimately necessitated locating and bombing the Zeppelin sheds themselves (see Chapter 3). Churchill therefore, late in 1913, circulated a proposal for new aircraft including a ‘fighting Seaplane’, and a ‘home-service fighting aeroplane’ specifically designed with intercepting Zeppelins in mind.13 On 21 December, Churchill reiterated his intentions to DAD Sueter and the Fourth Sea Lord, reaffirming his imperative that the Naval Wing acquire ‘fighting’ airplanes, for war purposes related to coast defence, against both enemy airplanes and Zeppelins, and to compete with the Military Wing of the RFC.14 The outcome of the 1913 naval maneuvers (see below) encouraged Churchill’s conviction that more needed to be done in terms of coastal

164  Naval Air Defence reconnaissance, an area where the Naval Wing could potentially be decisive as a source of information. Indeed, air defence was becoming one of Churchill’s foremost concerns. In May 1914, he called for the formation of a squadron of ‘ten fighting aeroplanes’ to be established at Eastchurch for the sole purpose of the defence of Chatham Dockyard and the Chattenden magazines and fuel tanks.15 The theory of air defence, however, like that of ASW and indeed naval air strike, was running ahead of the technical capabilities of the aircraft available, and thus there was little the Navy could realistically do to defend against potential air raids.16 With Britain’s lead in dreadnought construction advancing during 1914, Churchill’s concept of operations solidified on a general naval offensive.17 Influenced by the strategic theory of Julian Corbett, this approach identified the combined naval and military (that is, maritime) offensive as the proper attitude of the superior sea power in a naval conflict.18 Churchill hoped the general naval offensive, which he planned to launch immediately upon the outbreak of war, would counter any offensive aerial action by Germany’s Zeppelins.19 The RNAS component of this policy, in addition to the deployment of advanced forces to the Belgian coast, 20 involved the raiding of Germany’s Zeppelin sheds at Cologne, Friedrichshafen, and Cuxhaven (see Chapters 1 and 3). 21 This approach updated the traditional Royal Navy maritime strategy of expeditions and raids targeting the enemy’s fleet bases. However, it was also an admission that the RNAS could not stop the Zeppelins once they were actually airborne.

Building Britain’s Air Defence Since the entire Military Wing of the RFC had deployed to France to support the BEF, Churchill, with Kitchener’s consent, placed the RNAS in charge of the nation’s air defence. DAD Sueter set to work developing an integrated air defence system, utilizing guns, searchlights, observation posts, aerodromes, Naval Air Stations (NAS), and a telephone exchange network to identify, locate, and attack raiding Zeppelins. 22 Sueter took to the task with his usual gusto and, within only a few days, had an appraisal of London’s air defence in Churchill’s hands. A detailed appreciation of the air defence system, with contributions from Third Sea Lord Tudor, was then bundled together with a report by the Director of Naval Ordnance, Rear Admiral Morgan Singer, and published on 16 October. 23 Gun and searchlight positions were rapidly installed during September, and the first telephone lines were laid on October 7th.24 Soon there were 20 gun and searchlight positions in operation with another five under construction. 25 By October 22nd, there were nine 3-inch, 43 6-pdr and four 3-pdr guns in position around London. 26 The gun crews were drawn from the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) and on 9 October, the

Naval Air Defence 165 RNVR Anti-Aircraft Corps was created and immediately placed under Sueter’s authority. 27 Local branches were then established at Dover, Sheffield, and Portsmouth, and mobile AA units, assembled from converted gun-trucks, were also formed. 28 In November, the War Office agreed to assume responsibility for the gun defences outside London, so that Sueter would not be overwhelmed with responsibility for the defence of the capital and, by December, there were 33 guns in position along the east coast. 29 Expanding the RNAS Home Defence squadrons was the second order of business. Churchill, on 5 September, intended to divide the RNAS into two groups: first, a continental airplane force to attack Zeppelin sheds and enemy aerodromes and, second, an interception force to be stationed between Dover and London and supported by flights from Eastchurch, Calshot, and Hendon; collectively linked to the Admiralty by a telephone and telegraph network.30 In October, Churchill, Tudor, and Sueter, approved the construction of emergency landing grounds in London itself and a series of clearings were established at Regent’s Park, Kensington Gardens, Battersea Park, and Buckingham Palace,31 equipped initially with Bleriot headlamps and then with red acetylene lamps for night operations.32 It was not long into 1915 before the Zeppelins began their deadly work. Organized by the chief of Germany’s naval airship division, Fregattenkapitan Peter Strasser, the first raid was carried out on the night of 19 January.33 On January 25th, the RFC responded by arranging for all its air stations east of Farnborough to provide two aircraft in the event of a raid, indicating that the Air Department considered Britain’s air defence both an RFC and RNAS concern.34 Churchill, however, exerted his drive for central control and, on 27 January, all RNAS ranks were split from the RFC and transferred to the Admiralty’s officer register, HMS President – another step on the path towards the integration of the RNAS with the Royal Navy.35 The London-Sheerness-Dover triangle was the focal point for air defence, with as many as 60 airplanes stationed therein.36 On the continent, NAS Dunkirk, attached to the Dover command, contributed enormously to the defence of the home islands by providing aerodromes close enough to the front lines to enable RNAS fighters to intercept returning Zeppelins (and then Gothas in 1917/18).37 Pugh described the Dunkirk and East Coast stations as forming components of a ‘coherent strategy for the control of the air’.38 Squadron Commander Arthur Longmore, CO No. 1 Squadron, which Sueter had stationed at Dunkirk on 26 February 1915, was specifically ordered to ‘endeavor to prevent Zeppelins and aeroplanes operating from bases in Belgium from [conducting] raids on England’.39 In April, Vice Admiral Reginald Bacon assumed command of the Dover Patrol and he was quick to reinforce the importance of the anti-Zeppelin mission for NAS Dunkirk.40 Sueter,

166  Naval Air Defence likewise, reiterated the vital role of Dunkirk as an anti-Zeppelin base in his 21 June general orders, which also upgraded No. 1 Squadron to No. 1 Wing, and included coastal A/S patrols, naval gunfire spotting, with bombing attacks against submarine yards and power stations given lower priority.41 On the night of 31 May, Sueter, from his ‘chief control position’ atop the Admiralty Arch, witnessed the first Zeppelin raid on London.42 It was now clear that the Zeppelins were a real threat, against which defensive measures were so far inadequate. In the event, it was NAS Dunkirk that made the first successful interceptions, as the fighters launched from Dunkirk, on warning of attack against England, had time to fly to altitude and thus, potentially, intercept Zeppelins returning to base. It was in this regard that LZ39, while returning from an aborted raid against Calais undertaken with LZ37, was located early on the morning of 17 May. Nine Dunkirk fighters had been scrambled to intercept LZ38, that airship having dropped bombs on Ramsgate and Dover,43 but instead LZ39 was intercepted over Ostend by Squadron Commander Spencer Grey, Flight Commander A. W. Bigsworth, and Flight Sublieutenant Rex Warneford. Grey and Warneford fired Lewis gun and rifle rounds at the Zeppelin, but without effect. Bigsworth managed to get above the Zeppelin and dropped four 20 lb bombs on its superstructure, killing one of the crew and injuring several others, in addition to knocking out one of the airship’s propellers, although not inflicting enough damage to destroy the Zeppelin.44 Flight Sublieutenant Warneford scored the first victory by destroying LZ37 near Ghent on 7 June, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross – tragically, Warneford was killed in a flying accident only ten days later.45 Nevertheless, the Dunkirk pilots had demonstrated that, with a degree of luck, RNAS fighters could successfully intercept Zeppelins and bring them down. The difficulty of destroying a Zeppelin with darts or bombs, however, made it clear that improved equipment was necessary if the RNAS was to truly disrupt the enemy’s bombing offensive. Under Churchill’s leadership, the RNAS became the first line of defence against the Zeppelin raids. Churchill’s doctrine, as made apparent by the actions of the RNAS and Air Department immediately after August 1914, centered on a combination of counter-offensive airstrikes against the Zeppelin sheds (see Chapter 3), combined with defensive aircraft stationed at the various aerodromes and naval air stations in London and around the east coast of England and at Dunkirk. Commodore Sueter deserves credit for laying the groundwork of the essential AA, searchlight, and telephonic communication network that made the rapid reporting of Zeppelin contacts possible. The Churchill-Sueter administration demonstrated an understanding of the threat and commenced the process of developing a defence, however tenuous the chances of success may have been. There were major gaps in the system: developing

Naval Air Defence 167 a night-flying capability, for example, was essential to counter Zeppelin attacks but training progressed slowly – by September 1915, only 16 night-flying pilots were deployed to Home Defence stations, with two at Hendon, two at Chingford, one at Chelmsford, two at Eastchurch, two at Grain, one at Westgate, and three at Felixstowe and Yarmouth.46 The rapid development of improved aircraft, training, munitions, and doctrine, during 1916 dramatically changed this situation. 1916 was a year of expansion and reconstitution for the RNAS, with First Lord of the Admiralty Balfour focusing on A/S coastal patrol and DAS Vaughan-Lee introducing the long-range bombing mission (see Chapters  2 and 3). New training manuals were published, helping to disseminate the wartime experience of 1915, and specially designed anti-Zeppelin ammunition was introduced. Combined with the RNAS Scarff-Dibovski interrupter gear, and new airplanes equipped with more powerful engines (such as the Sopwith Triplane), the RNAS became a serious impediment to the Zeppelins’ efforts.47 RNAS aircraft could now reach the operating heights of the Zeppelins and attack them with weaponry capable of exploiting the Zeppelin’s exposed hydrogen cells. In response, Germany introduced improved airships capable of reaching yet higher altitudes still.

Reorganization and the Anti-Zeppelin Arms Race Balfour, as soon as he replaced Churchill, intended to reverse course on air defence. On 18 June 1915, he announced that the Navy would be returning responsibility for Britain’s air defence to the War Office, abandoning the Churchill-Kitchener agreement.48 An interim step towards this goal was to transition responsibility for the AA defence of London to the Army and, at the Admiralty Board meeting of 10 September, it was arranged for the Board to assume formal responsibility for the artillery defence of the London metropolitan area, prior to the handover of responsibility to the War Office.49 To take some of the pressure off Sueter, and to better manage the transition to the Army, Admiral Sir Percy Scott was appointed by Balfour on 12 September to command London’s AA defences until the handover.50 Scott, a tenacious gunnery modernizer, performed as expected and quickly built up the regional defences. 51 It was acknowledged, at the Admiralty Board meeting on 25 November, that the War Office would presently assume responsibility for the aerial defence of London and, at the War Council meeting four days later, it was agreed that the Army was to take control of the AA defences,52 although another conference was forthcoming to work out the details.53 Balfour was anxious to be rid of the entire affair and, further, he appeared to have been unaware of the arrangements made between Kitchener and Churchill.54 Political pressure in the House of Commons accumulated over the summer of 1915, where it was not clear to the

168  Naval Air Defence Members of Parliament that the Navy’s air defence efforts were meeting with success, so long as the bombs kept falling on London. 55 The inability of the RNAS to stop the large raid of 31 January–1 February 1916 added further pressure to the Admiralty to hand over responsibility to the Army.56 On 14 February, Balfour did precisely this.57 Lord Curzon, then Lord Privy Seal, was able to write two days later that the Navy’s duties, so far as air defence was concerned, would be focused on intercepting Zeppelins through coastal patrols, exclusively.58 The RNAS-RFC zone of responsibility was demarcated by a line established 30 miles inland from the coast, and all RNAS aerodromes inside that limit were transferred to the Army.59 Two months later, Field Marshal Sir John French, recalled following the disappointing Battle of Loos and appointed C-in-C Home Forces in December 1915, inherited the Sueter-Scott AA establishment. At the beginning of 1916, this defensive force included 108 searchlights, 38 fixed guns, 25 mobile guns in London, and another 111 lights plus 197 guns located around the various coastal bases and ports. There were still very few AA guns established directly for the protection of the RNAS bases, leaving the coastal seaplane stations and aerodromes vulnerable to attack. Although Admiral Scott had done his best, it was clear to Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Sir William Robertson that, as of the planned transfer date, the London defence area required an additional 75 guns and 51 searchlights, plus another 330 guns and 230 lights, not to mention 92 additional airplanes, to effectively protect the countryside around London – a serious drain on munitions that highlighted the secondary consequences of the implicit Zeppelin threat. Minister of Munitions David Lloyd George, formerly the Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer, did not believe these orders could be fulfilled until July 1916.60 Balfour’s decentralized naval administration empowered the district Senior Naval Officers (SNOs) with broad leeway to orchestrate their air defence responsibilities as they saw fit. On 26 October 1915, for example, Vice Admiral Bacon and his SNO Dunkirk, Commodore C. D. Johnson, agreed that the RNAS forces at Dunkirk and St. Pol (Longmore’s No. 1 Wing),61 were to be in close telephone contact with the Governor of Dunkirk to enable cooperation with the French air forces when intercepting Zeppelins – a demonstration of direct cooperation between local forces.62 With Home Defence duties now split between the RNAS and RFC, the need for inter-service cooperation only increased. Asquith’s coalition government, responding to this concern, established the Joint War Air Committee (JWAC) on 15 February 1916 as the first wartime inter-­ service air organization and appointed Lord Derby to the chair, with the Navy being represented by DAS Vaughan-Lee, SAC Sueter, and Squadron Commander W. Briggs.63 Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice Hankey, the War

Naval Air Defence 169 Committee Secretary, had proposed the formation of the JWAC hoping to recreate the consultative atmosphere of the prewar Air Committee.64 In theory, the JWAC would fill the policy vacuum created by Churchill’s departure, while also functioning as a forum to resolve issues regarding spheres of responsibility and details of supply between the RFC and RNAS although, in practice, it devolved into squabbling between the chair, Lord Derby, who along with his deputy Lord Montagu, favoured unification – a measure the services were both opposed to.65 The renewed focus on coastal patrol, however, did provide the RNAS with a clear goal, foremost of which was to intercept and destroy the Zeppelins. DAS Vaughan-Lee presented a report to the JWAC on 3 March in which he summarized his belief that the RNAS should defeat enemy aircraft attempting to reach the coasts, leaving inland air defence to the RFC. Vaughan-Lee emphasized that the RNAS was responsible for air defence against ‘all hostile aircraft attempting to reach this country’.66 The interim JWAC report, commissioned on 24 February and in print by 20 March,67 contained a concise statement on air defence: the RNAS was to ‘patrol our own coasts, to look out for [the] enemy’s ships and submarines [and] to meet and repel the enemy’s aircraft and also possibly to discover minefields’.68 The JWAC report on RNAS duties ultimately placed home defence as third in priority to fleet work and long-range bombing (see Chapter 3), although it did recognize that there was a significant interrelationship between coastal patrol, fleet work, and ASW.69 The other side the JWAC story is the intensification of the inter-service rivalry between the RNAS and the RFC. Director General for Military Aeronautics (DGMA) Henderson used the JWAC as a platform to criticize perceived inter-service supply duplication, something Vaughan-Lee, Sueter and Wing Commander Briggs, the naval representatives on the JWAC, flatly denied.70 What was true was that the Navy was not specifically prioritizing the procurement of fighter aircraft. As of February, the RNAS had dedicated only 114 aircraft, of a planned establishment of 152 (not counting the eight small flying boats, 24 reconnaissance machines, and six fighters at Dunkirk), for home defence purposes.71 For the time being, the RNAS had to make due with a number of obsolete BE2c airplanes.72 The RFC, aware of the Navy’s position as the first line of defence, did, however, agree that the RNAS should receive precedence for supply.73 Still, by March, while the RNAS possessed 52 large floatplanes and flying boats, plus 70 small seaplanes, only 44 fighters had been specifically dedicated to home defence.74 The collapse of the JWAC, the reasons for which are significantly related to the theoretical development of a united air service,75 prompted Lord Curzon to assume responsibility for a new Air Board – but the same underlying issues remained. The new Board first met on 22 May, with Third Sea Lord Tudor and DAS Vaughan-Lee representing the Navy.76

170  Naval Air Defence The mandate for discussion was primarily supply, and the board’s powers were to be considered as advisory only.77 After lengthy deliberations during the summer of 1916, the Board’s first report was issued in October. The report was, in fact, a highly polemical document, with Curzon denouncing the Admiralty for a failure to cooperate.78 Curzon, like Montagu (Derby’s deputy) and Churchill before him, believed that, ultimately, an Imperial Air Service – theoretically capable of uniting the Britsih Empire by air transport at a lower cost than either the Army or Navy – represented the future of Britain’s imperial defence and thus justified the necessity of unifying the RNAS and RFC under a single ministry.79 Balfour and Vaughan-Lee were, naturally enough, opposed to this measure, as it would have prevented the services from determining their own requirements, and thus Curzon found his efforts to advance unification routinely frustrated.80 It would require the Gotha attacks on London in the summer of 1917 to finally overcome service opposition and pave the way for a unified air force.

Signals Intelligence and Reconnaissance Essential to the RNAS air defence system was the collection and dissemination of information. The Admiralty was constantly receiving intelligence from its various naval squadrons, flotillas, shore observers, light vessels, and, of course, from patrolling RNAS aircraft. Intercepted communications from Germany’s W/T transmissions provided advanced warning of incoming raids and RNAS patrol aircraft or RN surface vessels were usually the first to make contact with approaching Zeppelins. Indeed, the Admiralty’s intelligence network was a central pillar of the Home Defence establishment. The first warning of an imminent air raid was usually received by Room 40 of the Naval Staff, headed by Sir Alfred Ewing, who reported to Captain William Reginald ‘Blinker’ Hall, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Hall, in turn, relied upon Commander Herbert W. W. Hope as the liaison between Room 40 and the essential D/F radio stations along the English east coast, where communications between approaching Zeppelins were intercepted.81 These stations served a double purpose: on the one hand, providing navigational support for the Royal Navy’s warships and, on the other, intercepting German W/T transmissions for Room 40. The Zeppelins themselves, to position themselves when forming up for night raids, also sent signals to Germany’s own D/F system, established in 1915. As such, the Zeppelins were particularly susceptible to signal interception during 1915 and early 1916. If communications between the Admiralty and the coastal bases had been well established (as was not always the case, see below), RNAS aircraft could be prepared to fly interception sorties with a reasonable degree of lead time, although the potential success of any interception mission was

Naval Air Defence 171 restricted early in the war due to lack of suitable ammunition and, later, by the Zeppelins’ height-climbing characteristics. Whenever an approaching Zeppelin group departed their bases on a raid, they sent a signal back to their headquarters indicating that the airships had switched to the compromised signals code book, HVB, with the intent of protecting the current naval codes if forced to land in enemy territory. HVB was replaced by the newer AFB code aboard Zeppelins early in 1916, however, a copy of the new codebook was captured from the wreckage of L32 when that Zeppelin was shot down by the RFC early on 24 September 1916 and sent to Room 40.82 When the Admiralty War Staff’s Naval Intelligence Division, or the War Office’s Military Intelligence Department, for that matter, intercepted an HVB code communication, it could be concluded, therefore, that a Zeppelin raid was imminent. The Zeppelin commanders did not recognize that this practice was as an error until the end of 1916.83 Zeppelin W/T transmissions, once intercepted by the east coast D/F stations, were referred to Room 40 where they were, in Patrick Beesly’s words, ‘…easily read by the British’.84 The result of this effort was to greatly aid Home Defence in preparing for, and locating, approaching Zeppelin raids (and for tracking U-boats and German surface vessels, see Chapter 2). Through these methods, and despite the uncertainty of communications resulting from early telephone and W/T technology, intelligence consistently provided the RNAS coastal stations with advanced warning, even if the resulting air (or sea) interception efforts were not successful.85 Advanced warning was not only useful for the RNAS, but also for the Grand Fleet: on the morning of 2 April 1916, the position reports made by the Zeppelins heading to raid Rosyth, for example, were detected and reported by the Admiralty to Vice Admiral Beatty, providing time for him to put to sea.86 Although the Air Department was continuously expanding its telephone network to include searchlight control points, AA emplacements, defensive aerodromes, all linked directly to the War Office and Admiralty HQ,87 this information exchange, like all wartime innovations, was an imperfect system. Gaps in the network existed: as late as February 1916, for example, there was no direct telephone line between NAS Yarmouth and the C-in-C Great Yarmouth.88 This had implications for the celerity of response, as demonstrated by the Zeppelin raid against Yarmouth on the night of 17 August 1915. The approaching Zeppelins were reported by the Admiralty to Great Yarmouth at 7:36 pm, and then confirmed at 8:30 pm by W/T reports from HMS Kingfisher, a river gunboat, yet the first airplanes were not in the air until 10 pm.89 The vital telephone lines could become congested to the point of uselessness, or be destroyed by enemy action. In some cases, the fragile telephone wires were carried away by RNAS aircraft attempting to land at night, or were shot-through by anti-aircraft fire.90 The system could

172  Naval Air Defence be jammed or ‘spoofed’ by the Zeppelins themselves, as the airships carried powerful W/T sets and the Zeppelins could even jam local ship-tostation W/T transmissions, as was reported by destroyers and tenders off Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth during the night raid of 19 January 1915.91 False and inaccurate reports from the air stations could also cause confusion and wasted effort.92 Considered in context, the Admiralty’s intelligence collection effort and telephone exchange network were cutting edge technology for 1915–1916 and routinely provided ample warning to the east coast air stations. It is interesting to observe that it was entirely possible to identify and track approaching Zeppelins more than a year before the suitable equipment and training had been introduced to ensure their destruction. When the Zeppelins were superseded by the Gotha bombers in May 1917, the Germans were able to somewhat neutralize this intelligence advantage – warning times dropped from hours to mere minutes.

The Navy’s Role 1916 was the decisive year for the Zeppelin campaign. Balfour’s reforms, emphasizing closer cooperation between the RNAS and the Navy’s surface vessels, combined with the new aircraft, weapons, and training, championed by DAS Vaughan-Lee, contributed fundamentally to the defeat of the Zeppelins that year. The anti-Zeppelin measures in 1916 were a success for joint operations: Royal Navy warships provided an unexpected level of support, protecting the approaches to key waterways and acting as mobile AA batteries for the underprotected coastal air stations.93 Indeed, flotilla craft were routinely utilized not only as gunnery platforms but also for anti-­ Zeppelin patrol and early warning. Zeppelin L9, bombing Hull on 6 June 1915, for example, was attacked by guns fired from HMS Adventure, a Yarrow river gunboat, although this was not enough to prevent L9, under the command of the determined, iconoclastic, Kapitanleutnant Heinrich Mathy, from attacking his target.94 Trawlers at Yarmouth were ordered to conduct anti-Zeppelin patrols in September 1915.95 Warship AA fire often represented the only means of point defence, as airplanes required advanced warning to sortie and reach interception altitude. Lowestoft, the headquarters of the district in which NAS Yarmouth was located, was the scene of a significant number of shipbased anti-aircraft engagements during 1915 and 1916. On the night of 13 October 1915, for example, HMS Isle of Wight used its 3-pdr gun to attack two of the five Zeppelins that were on a mission to raid London, although no damage was inflicted.96 Likewise, on the morning of 20 February 1916, the torpedo gunboat HMS Halcyon employed its Maxim machine guns and 4.7-inch gun against an enemy seaplane as it conducted a bombing attack against Lowestoft,97 and the torpedo

Naval Air Defence 173 gunboat HMS Dryad used its searchlight to track a Zeppelin on the morning of April 1st, again near Lowestoft.98 These limited defensive capabilities were representative of the sparse deployment of stationary guns, outside of London, at the beginning of 1916. In January 1916, the monitors of the Dover Patrol were massed at the entrance of the Thames to prevent Zeppelins from using that waterway for navigation purposes, and four gunboats were further equipped with AA guns and situated at Brightlingsea, Lowestoft, the Humber, and the Wash, to act as floating batteries.99 On 31 January, following the interception of signals intelligence from approaching Zeppelins, Commodore Tyrwhitt was ordered to dispatch an anti-Zeppelin force, including light cruisers and the gunboats Kingfisher and Cantatrice, which were both equipped with seaplanes specifically for anti-Zeppelin operations, although, in this particular case, the warships were unable to locate the approaching Zeppelin formation due to thick fog.100 Admiral Jellicoe, with advance notice from the Admiralty on 2 April, deployed a light cruiser squadron and four destroyers from Rosyth in an unsuccessful attempt to intercept returning Zeppelins that had been raiding Rosyth that evening.101 Light cruisers and other warships were frequently used for AA purposes, such as during the Tondern raid of 3 May 1916 when the light cruisers Galatea and Phaeton actually shot down Zeppelin L7. It is also worth noting that, on this occasion, that the Royal Navy submarine E31 was able to rescue seven of the downed Zeppelin’s crew.102 Indeed, submarines and seaplane carriers were important components of First Lord Balfour and DAS Vaughan-Lee’s anti-Zeppelin policy as outlined in 1915 and 1916. The submarines E4 and E6, actually at Churchill’s recommendation, were fitted with 6-pdr anti-aircraft guns and on 1 September 1915 were sent to the Heligoland approach to patrol for Zeppelins. Both submarines, in fact, spotted Zeppelins, and E6 even managed to engage L9 on 4 September, although without success.103 On 6 March 1916, Vaughan-Lee intended to have the SNO Lowestoft and the C-in-C East Coast of England work in tandem, utilizing the converted seaplane carriers HMS Brocklesby and Killingholme, which were each fitted with two or three Sopwith seaplanes.104 Support would be provided by the seaplane carriers stationed at Harwich and the Humber, including the carrier HMS Vindex, that had been loaned to the Fifth Light Cruiser Squadron in November 1915 to assist in the defence of Lowestoft. The concept was to deploy the carriers to designated locations from where they could launch their seaplanes in the hope of catching a transiting Zeppelin.105 Vindex and Brocklesby were put to good use in 1916. The former, escorted by four destroyers and the cruiser HMS Conquest, deployed 50  miles off Lowestoft on August 2nd and indeed spotted Zeppelins, which were fired upon by Conquest although no hits were scored. Vindex launched Flight Lieutenant Charles T. Freeman in a Bristol Scout to chase,

174  Naval Air Defence and Freeman was able to attack Zeppelin L17, although without success.106 Brocklesby, meanwhile, 40 miles northwest of Vindex, deployed two Sopwith Schneiders that managed a brief, albeit easily avoided, attack against what was likely L13, afterwards returning to Yarmouth.107 These cases demonstrate that, during 1916, the Navy’s warships played an increasingly important role in the overall anti-Zeppelin effort, eventually culminating in the Tondern raid of July 1918 (see Chapter 1).

Retraining and Rearming in 1916 The series of unsuccessful interceptions over the preceeding years demonstrated that defeating the Zeppelins necessitated specialized equipment and new training methods, both of which were developed and then implemented under DAS Vaughan-Lee’s watch as 1916 progressed. Flight training for RNAS pilots proceeded in phases, beginning with disciplinary training at the Crystal Palace, followed by 20 to 24 hours of solo flight training conducted at Eastchurch, where the gunnery school was also located and observation and bomb-dropping were both taught.108 Initial training was completed at Chingford, where aircraft familiarization and dual and solo flying were taught.109 The RNAS officer school at Cranwell opened on 1 April 1916 under the leadership of Captain Godfrey Paine, hitherto the commandant of the CFS, Upavon.110 Training at Cranwell included such air defence-related topics as ‘cross-country flying, navigation, engines, aerial gunnery, bomb-dropping, photography, and wireless telegraphy.’111 Candidates took a final exam and were then posted to their assigned air stations.112 It was not until September 1917, however, that an RNAS school specifically for teaching air fighting was established, at Freiston.113 The introduction of specialized training manuals was a central component of the 1916 training reforms. The July 1916 armaments training manual, produced by the Air Department, demonstrated that air fighting and air defence were taken very seriously indeed. RNAS priorities identified in this handbook included the ‘attack [of] enemy aircraft by heavier-than-air machines’ and the first topic discussed was attacking lighter-than-air machines with small 10- or 20-lb bombs.114 The manual included two chapters on pedagogy and instruction, including three examples of teaching aids – for the Lewis gun, the RNAS bomb-mirror Mark II, and aiming diagrams for air fighting.115 Section M, Instructional, provided almost 70 pages of lectures on subjects such as heavy guns in aircraft, anti-aircraft attack, bomb sighting, gunfire spotting, machine-gun training, Lewis gun instruction, explosives, and other subjects, including the instructions supplied to the RFC’s machine gun training school at Hythe.116 The 54-day training regime outlined in the armament handbook was designed to provide a broad range of subject familiarization, shooting practice, drill, and technical instruction,

Naval Air Defence 175 by the end of which the trained gunner would be able to strip, assemble, handle, and fire an assortment of weapons, including the Vickers, Lewis, and Davis guns. Shooting while airborne was exercised against stationary and moving targets, towed box-kites, automobiles, and boats.117 The best practice for anti-Zeppelin attack was identified as approaching ‘from right ahead, turning and crossing their bows at an angle of 45° to their course’.118 Pugh concluded that this manual demonstrated the RNAS’ commitment to the improvement of its air defence capability.119 Night-flying training also developed during 1916. Early in March, DAS Vaughan-Lee was informed of a recommendation, from the RNAS Commander at Calshot, for using blue Very lights to assist landing.120 By the end of April, the Very light scheme had been well developed and was used to inform nearby airfields to light their landing flares when a friendly aircraft was on approach.121 On 8 July, Admiral Callaghan, C-in-C the Nore, circulated his recommendation for a night recognition system including the Nore, Dover, and Harwich regions, in addition to the Army’s commands.122 The RFC, for its part, had been experiencing difficulty cultivating night-flying skills: although the equipment and experience for night-­ flying training advanced significantly during the summer of 1916, so had the requirements of the Western Front as a result of the Somme battles.123 It took until February 1917 for the RFC’s supply of night-trained pilots to begin to recover, yet home defence requirements only continued to increase.124 Worse, General Nivelle’s Aisne offensive, which the BEF and RFC supported at Arras, necessitated that 77 of 198 ‘trained night-flying pilots’ be withdrawn from the Home Defence forces for duties overseas.125 Indeed, the RFC’s tendency to prioritize resources for the Western Front meant that the air defence squadrons were often under-manned and ill-equipped, putting more pressure on the RNAS to intercept Zeppelins before they could reach the coast of England. The final area of development during 1916, and the crucial element in terms of defeating the Zeppelins, was the introduction of new types of ammunition and weaponry specifically designed to destroy airships. On 11 August 1915, Third Sea Lord Tudor, responsible for naval material, had chaired an Admiralty conference on the subject of anti-­Zeppelin armament.126 The dilemma was that the more equipment, munitions, guns, grenades, darts, and bombs that the fighters were equipped with, the less likely that they would be able to ascend to the heights required to engage the Zeppelins.127 Some form of incendiary, or explosive, ammunition was clearly required. Incendiary ammunition, authorized for War Office and Admiralty use by the War Committee on 25 November 1915, had been under investigation and development for some time, but supplies were short.128 Furthermore, ammunition imperfections, especially in terms of incendiary, explosive and tracer bullets, could prove disabling during a counter-Zeppelin attack: on 5 September 1917, for example, a

176  Naval Air Defence DH4 flown from Great Yarmouth, in an attempt to intercept Zeppelin L44, encountered three weapons jams and a burst breech, crippling the aircraft’s attack.129 Supplies of high-quality incendiary ammunition, also known as ‘general’ and ‘guaranteed’ or ‘K’ ammunition – possibly for secrecy and legal purposes – were introduced to reduce the propensity for bullet malfunctions. By mid-1916, the Sparklet, Pomeroy, Brock, Buckingham, Kynocks, and Greenwood & Batley ammunition were all available for Lewis, Hotchkiss, Vickers, Maxim, Colt, and Chauchat machine guns, with the RNAS preferring the Lewis, Vickers, and Maxim guns, as well as the Farquhar-Hill rifle, all of which could fire Buckingham incendiary ammunition.130 This steady technological progress yielded results: L21 was destroyed by naval pilots off Lowestoft on 28 November 1916, shot down by Flight Lieutenant E. Cadbury, flying from Burgh Castle, with Flight Sublieutenant E. L. Pulling, flying from Bacton.131 Combined with victories secured by the RFC Home Defence squadrons over London, the danger of the Zeppelins had been significantly reduced by the beginning of 1917.

Decline of the Zeppelins and Rise of the Gothas RNAS and RFC fighters had inflicted heavy losses on the Zeppelins during 1916, forcing Zeppelin leader Strasser to adjust his tactics.132 As the naval Zeppelin division rearmed with height-climbing airships, the responsibility for raiding England passed to the German army’s new Gotha bombers.133 The appointment of Paul von Hindenburg as Chief of the General Staff, on 28 August 1916, with Erich Ludendorff as First Quartermaster General, produced a change in Germany’s Western Front strategy.134 In October, the German army air service was reformed as the Luftstreitkrafte, under the overall command of General Ernst von Hoeppner and, by March 1917, a dedicated long-range bombing force was introduced, the first squadron known as Kampfgeschwader I (Kagohl I). Supplied with the Gotha IV bomber, and under the command of Hauptmann Ernst Brandenburg and Hauptmann Rudolf Kleine,135 the Gothas were meant to deliver a destructive psychological attack to the metropolis of London, coinciding with the reintroduction of unrestricted submarine warfare against Allied and neutral merchant shipping, thus delivering a double-blow that would optimistically paralyze Britain’s war effort.136 The RNAS and the other coast defence forces faced a new kind of threat, but it was still RNAS fighters that provided the best chance of interception. Since the Gotha bombers were not usually detected until they were crossing the English coast, it was not possible to stop them from approaching in mass formation. The fast and maneuverable bombers, furthermore, were well-defended by overlapping machine guns,

Naval Air Defence 177 making them extremely difficult targets to engage. However, it was possible to intercept the Gothas on their return journey over the North Sea, when the bomber crews were fatigued and fuel was low. The naval Zeppelins, still under the authority of the relentless Fregattenkapitan Strasser, were now deployed as support for the Gothas. The first Gotha attack was, therefore, preceded by a Zeppelin raid of six airships on the night of 23 May.137 The weather was thundering with hail at higher altitudes on this occasion, so only East Anglia was attacked: L43 (Kraushaar) bombed Suffolk via Harwich and Sheerness, killing one civilian and damaging several cottages; L40 (Sommerfeldt) dropped a 300-kg bomb on some cottages in Little Plumstead, blowing out windows and destroying a greenhouse, afterwards bombing some telegraph wires in Knapton and knocking some out – but London had been the raiders’ target.138 As the Zeppelins were returning to base, early on the morning of the 24th, the RNAS launched 32 defensive sorties, 42% of the total Home Defence sorties flown, excluding Dunkirk.139 Flight Lieutenant C. J. Galpin, in Curtiss H12 flying boat #8666 out of NAS Yarmouth, located L40 at 5:30 am, ten miles north-east of Terschelling Island (almost the same place and time when Galpin and Flight Sublieutenant Leckie had engaged and destroyed L22 ten days before),140 as the Zeppelin was returning to base along the Dutch coast. Galpin fired half a drum of Brock and Pomeroy ammunition into the Zeppelin’s rigid envelope – but, given the rain, and a smokescreen deployed by the Zeppelin, Galpin’s bullets had no effect.141 The weather cleared on the 25th and 21 Gothas crossed the North Sea to bomb London. The raiders were spotted by the Tongue Lightship at 4:45 pm, and the RNAS coastal stations scrambled their planes, a total of 19 aircraft from Manston, Westgate, and Felixstowe, but they were unable to locate the incoming bombers.142 The Gothas crossed the Essex coast at 5 pm, but were prevented from flying on to London by a cloudbank.143 The raiders instead flew back out to sea – after dropping their bombs on Hythe and Folkestone, ultimately killing 77 civilians and wounded 105 more, in addition to 18 soldiers killed, and 90 or 93 Canadian soldiers injured, when Shorncliffe camp was bombed.144 The Gothas were then intercepted by RNAS fighters as they were returning to base, first by Flight Lieutenant Reginald Leslie in Sopwith Pup #3691 from Dover, and then by nine RNAS Pups from No. 4 and No. 9 Squadrons of No. 4 Wing, Dunkirk, that air station having been alerted by telephone when the air raids commenced. Leslie fired 150 rounds into one of the Gothas, causing black smoke to pour from one of its engines, before being driven off by a pair of Gothas.145 One enemy bomber was, in fact, brought down over the sea in the ensuing chase by the No. 4 Squadron machines, and a second Gotha crashed before landing.146 On this occasion, 77 defence sorties were flown, with the RNAS contributing 40 from its coastal stations, or 52% of the total (64% if the nine sorties from Dunkirk are added).147

178  Naval Air Defence The Gothas tried again for London on 5 June but, in the event, the 22 machines that crossed the coast ended up bombing Sheerness at about 6:25 pm. AA guns from NAS Eastchurch fired on the raiders as did the gunboat HMS Blazer.148 Three No. 4 Squadron Pups were in the air against this raid and Flight Commander Newberry, in fact, encountered the approaching Gothas, chased and fired until his guns jammed, after which the Dunkirk fighters were compelled to land at Manston for refueling.149 Three No. 4 Squadron Pups, plus seven Pups and Triplanes from No. 9 Squadron, then intercepted the returning Gotha flights and damaged some but did not destroy any (despite their claims to the contrary), although one Gotha had been shot down by AA fire from Sheerness and Shoeburyness, two of its crew being recovered by the British.150 The Home Defence squadrons generated 62 sorties, of which 21 were RNAS aircraft or 34% (55% if the 13 sorties from Dunkirk are added).151 The expected London raid at last took place at 11:35 am on 13 June when 14 aircraft bombed the capital as another four machines attacked Shoeburyness and Margate.152 5,000 kg (11,000 lbs) of bombs were dropped – 126 bombs, totally 8,000 lbs, on the metropolis of London itself, killing 162 people and injuring 432.153 Flight Lieutenant F. M. Fox in Pup #9940 from Manston attacked the formation approaching London, firing a tray of ammunition at one of the rearmost bombers, but could inflict no damage before his gun jammed and he was driven off by the Gothas, subsequently crashing while landing.154 No. 9 Squadron at Dunkirk scrambled seven fighters to intercept the returning Gothas, although none were located and Flight Sublieutenant Shearer was killed when his Triplane #N5374 crashed.155 In total, the Home Defence stations generated 94 sorties of which 30 were RNAS from the east coast stations, representing 32% of total Home Defence sorties flown (39% adding the seven Dunkirk sorties), but again the bombers escaped largely unscathed.156 Although the daylight Gotha attacks were getting through to their targets, the bombing squadrons were suffering some attrition and damage in every mission. Four Zeppelins were dispatched to raid London on the night of 16 June as an interlude while the Gothas were refit (Brandenburg’s leg was broken in a flying accident a few days later; he was replaced by Rudolf Kleine while he recovered),157 although only L42 (Dietrich) and L48 (Eichler) made it to the coast, the latter bombing Harwich before being shot down by RFC fighters.158 The Gothas resumed operations on 4 July, raiding Harwich and Felixstowe with 18 bombers and dropping 4,400 kg (9,700 lbs) on their targets. The bombers did considerable damage to NAS Felixstowe where a flying boat was destroyed, another damaged, five naval ratings killed and 15 wounded, and the base telephone wires were cut.159 In total, the raiders faced 103 Home Defence sorties, of which 17% or 18% were from RNAS coastal stations (37% if the 20 Dunkirk sorties are added).160 Five Camels from No. 4 Squadron (Dunkirk) encountered the

Naval Air Defence 179 returning Gothas 30 miles northwest of Ostend and fought six combats. Flight Commander A. M. Shook in Camel #N6363 damaged one of the bombers before his guns jammed, Flight Sublieutenant S. E. Ellis in #N6337 fired 350 rounds and damaged a second bomber before his guns likewise jammed and Flight Sublieutenant A. J. Enstone in #N6347 fired 100 rounds into a third machine, but none of the Gothas were brought down.161 The Gothas conducted their next London raid on July 7th, taking off at 8 am with 24 machines.162 The RNAS launched 28 sorties representing 26% of the total Home Defence response (32% if the seven No. 6 Squadron Camels, attached the RFC at the time, are added),163 including 16 sorties flown from NAS Manston – the pilots landing and refueling to continue the outbound chase.164 The Gothas were supported by a number of sea and airplanes, their presence helping to draw the Dunkirk fighters away from the Gothas.165 One Gotha was shot down by an RFC No. 50 Squadron fighter during the resulting long North Sea chase, and four more Gothas, badly damaged from engagements with the RNAS Manston fighters, were wrecked after crash landing at their Ghent aerodrome.166 The audacity of the daylight raids produced public outcry and generated renewed calls for a concrete government response.167 This public pressure on the fragile coalition government prompted Lloyd George, on 11 July, to convene Lieutenant-General Jan Smuts’ small committee on air defence measures.168 Smuts immediately produced what is known to history as the first Smuts report, circulated on the 19th.169 In addition to recommending the appointment of a singular London Air Defence Area (LADA) commander, implemented in the form of Brigadier-General Ashmore,170 the report also concluded that, although uniformity of command, new tactics, and improved communications should be stressed, for the time being, the successful RNAS coastal squadrons ‘should continue to operate under separate Naval Commands’.171 The second half of Smuts’ report was completed on 17 August and this time he unequivocally concluded in favour of the creation of an Air Ministry – with the objective of unifying the RFC and RNAS.172 DGMA Henderson had long supported this measure, arguing that the need for unity of service in the face of the Gothas was imperative.173 Ultimately, the decision to merge the RFC and RNAS was done for political reasons, pioneered by a select group of imperial airpower advocates within the Army, Navy, and civilian administrations.174 In retrospect, it is clear that this measure was, indeed, unnecessary: the reorganization of the LADA defences by Brigadier-General Ashmore, combined with the RNAS coastal defences, moreover, had increased the risk of continued daylight Gotha raids such that, in September, the Gothas switched to night raids. Smuts’ third report, issued on 6  September in response to the first night bomber attack, stated that ‘…the raiders have

180  Naval Air Defence not been able to penetrate the line of our coast defences by day’ – a clear admission that the defences, as established prior to 7 July, were, in fact, working.175 Indeed, if combats are examined rather than the number of sorties, the picture of relative effort is somewhat different. RNAS interception of the Gotha raid of 22 August was particularly significant as the combination of anti-aircraft gunfire and naval fighters from NAS Manston, Dover, and Walmer were responsible for downing three enemy bombers, ultimately forcing the German raiders to transition to night attacks.176 The 22 August raid also provides an example of the manner in which statistics can tell a misleading story: the RNAS generated only 17 aircraft sorties, as compared to the 121 fighters sent up by the RFC, but it was the former that accounted for the successful interceptions. The value of the naval fighters as interceptors is even more marked when it is considered that Flight Sublieutenant B. A. Smart, launched from HMS Yarmouth in Sopwith Pup #N6430, had destroyed Zeppelin L23 off the Danish coast the previous morning.177 On the evening of 4 September, the Germans opened the night bombing campaign with nine Gothas raiding London, Dover, and Margate. One Gotha was destroyed, probably by AA fire, but no interceptions were made.178 The War Cabinet now began to focus on retaliation, and Smuts’ third report recommended a counteroffensive against the enemy’s aerodromes as the best solution.179 Smuts was keen to report that action had already been taken, specifically in terms of the formation of the 41st Wing RFC for bombing targets in Germany (see Chapter 3).180 On the night of September 24th, 13 Gothas bombed targets around the east coast of England, including three bombers that managed to reach London. Ten Zeppelins simultaneously attacked the Norfolk region.181 These raids were met by only limited resistance. The Gothas flew a second raid the next evening, with three bombers reaching London, and the first combined Gotha and Giant raids followed on the night of the 28th (during which the Gotha squadron Kagohl I bombed Dunkirk),182 and again on the 29th. Another 11 Gothas made for London on the night of 30 September, followed by 18 Gothas targeting London on the night of 1 October. The monitor HMS Marshal Ney claimed to have shot down a Gotha near Ramsgate on the night of the 28th, but this was the only success the Navy could claim.183 Statistics collated by Cole and Cheesman show no RNAS sorties against the bombers attacking England during the 1 October raid. However, simultaneous to the London raid, 22 Gothas from Kagohl I (Hauptmann Alfred Keller) attacked Dunkirk, where they dropped ten tons of bombs on various targets around the air station and successfully destroyed 23 RNAS aircraft on the ground.184 This example is of particular importance when it is observed that only 12 bombers actually made attacks against England that night.185 Thus, what would at first

Naval Air Defence 181 appear to be a failure of RNAS coastal interception is recast as a significant diversion of enemy force away from England, given the importance of neutralizing Dunkirk as a base for the RNAS’ fighters.186 It is also notable, on this occasion, that the 19 RFC fighters sent up to intercept the raiders failed to make any attacks, and that the London AA guns themselves were short on shells and many were worn out from the week of incessant action.187 In fact, the RNAS squadrons that could have been engaged in air defence sorties, such as No. 10 (Sopwith Triplanes) and No. 9 (Sopwith Pups),188 had been loaned to the Army on 14 May and 15 June, respectively, and were not returned to the Dover-Dunkirk command until after the Gothas had transitioned to night raids.189 To fill the gaps in its defence forces, the RNAS attempted innovative measures: Handley Page bombers from No. 7A squadron (after December No. 14 squadron RNAS stationed at Coudekerque), conducted a combined bombing and air patrol mission and successfully intercepted Gothas returning from England on the morning of 30 September. One of the Handley Page aircraft was able to damage a Gotha and the enemy bomber subsequently crashed near the border with Holland.190 On 19 October, the Zeppelins launched an 11-ship raid against targets in the Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool areas and were met by 11 RNAS and 67 RFC sorties. Five Zeppelins were lost due to weather in what amounted to a fiasco,191 and, as a result, this was the last Zeppelin raid until March the following year.192 Another Gotha raid was carried out on the night of 31 October with London as the target. However, in the event, the bombs were dropped on Dover, Ramsgate, Margate and other cities and towns, so that only ten of the 22 Gothas reached London.193 London was raided again on 5 December, and again on 18 and 22 December, the last raids of the year for 1917.194 Although the RFC flew many sorties on these occasions, the RNAS, outside of Dunkirk, remained grounded for night operations.195 After the September attacks, with the weather deteriorating, the priority for Germany shifted back to the Western Front. The BEF offensive at Third Ypres was soon checked and, when combined with the defeat of the Italians at Caporetto and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the military initiative passed back to Germany. The Gotha bombers, responding to the changing military situation, conducted raids only sporadically during the winter of 1917, with targets other than London predominating. Hauptmann Rudolf Kleine, commanding Kagohl III, was now ordered to cease attacks against England and redirect his forces to support Hauptmann Keller’s (Kagohl I) raids against Dunkirk, but Kleine was killed in December 1917.196 The situation was also changing for the RNAS early in 1918. American reinforcements were arriving in France and would soon relieve some of the pressure on the RNAS squadrons at Dunkirk.197 Vice Admiral

182  Naval Air Defence Sir Roger Keyes left the naval staff’s Plans Division to replace Dover’s Vice Admiral Reginald Bacon on New Year’s Day 1918 (see Chapter 3), and, within three days of assuming command, he submitted a request for information from the Fifth Sea Lord, the Air Ministry, and Wing Captain Lambe, regarding the material requirements at Dover and Dunkirk. In addition to the various reconnaissance, A/S, and airship assets requested, all parties agreed that at least three squadrons of fighters were needed for air defence at Dunkirk.198 On 10 January, Wing Captain Lambe submitted his requirements to Keyes but made no specific mention of fighter aircraft, focusing instead almost entirely on A/S equipment, recognition that, for the Navy, ASW was still the foremost priority.199 As of 1 April 1918, Vice Admiral Keyes was able to retain only a single RAF Wing, the 61st (five naval squadrons), while the 64th Wing (four naval squadrons) and 65th Wing (five naval squadrons) were both transferred to the BEF.200 Keyes, recognizing the critical situation at the front, later authorized the transfer of his best fighters, Nos. 201 and 210 Squadrons, to Haig’s command. 201 The Gothas shifted targets to the Western Front after the London raid of 28 January 1918, leaving the remaining Zeppelins and Giant bombers to carry on the air war over England. Night bombing of London was, however, purely a psychological operation, as there was no means of determining the accuracy of the bombing runs. Dunkirk, meanwhile, had become ‘a funnel through which the British were pouring troops, ammunition, and supplies… [and] had become as important a target as London’. 202 The RNAS mission was thus shifting from the air defence of Britain to protecting the Channel ports from tactical attacks. Although the Zeppelins continued to attack in small formations, they no longer posed any real threat to England’s defences. Wing Commander Samson, who had been placed in charge of NAS Great Yarmouth after his tour in the Mediterranean (see Chapter 1), included orders to the flying boats under his command to the extent that they should endeavor to intercept Zeppelins returning from raids. Samson considered air defence and anti-Zeppelin functions the second and fourth priorities of his command, behind only protection of merchant shipping and general air reconnaissance. 203 Yarmouth and Felixstowe, important naval air stations in the ASW campaign, scored several Zeppelin victories, including the destruction of Zeppelin L22 by Flight Sublieutenant Galpin on 14 May, 204 and L43 by Flight Sublieutenant Hobbs on 14 June. 205

Naval Air Defence after the Creation of the RAF The final raids of 1918 were carried out primarily by the Giant bombers as the Gothas had been transferred to the Western Front to assist during Germany’s spring offensive. A desperate Zeppelin raid on the night of 12 April was met by 11 sorties from the former RNAS stations and

Naval Air Defence 183 Zeppelin L62 was chased out to sea (on 10 May, that Zeppelin was shot down by an F2A flying boat piloted by Captains T. C. Pattinson and A. H. Munday). 206 A final all-out airplane raid against London was conducted on 19 May by 38 Gothas and three Giants, but the limited results of this raid spelled out the impracticality of continuing with the bombing of Britain. 207 The formation of the RAF on 1 April significantly impacted resources that had hitherto been allocated to the RNAS. The Air Ministry was primarily concerned with two forms of operations, namely, supporting the BEF on the Western Front, and providing for the eventual longrange bombing of Germany. The result was that many of the former naval squadrons were transferred to Field Marshal Haig or to MajorGeneral Trenchard’s IAF (see Chapter 3). The RFC Military Wing and Army Council conceptualization of airpower had come to predominate, leaving only one-third of the former RNAS resources for ASW, U-boat base bombing, fleet operations and, significantly, air defence. The RAF mandate to support the BEF was, however, not entirely unreasonable during the period immediately following the creation of the third service. Following the initiation of Ludendorff’s spring offensive (Operation Michael) on 21 March, the military situation in France changed dramatically, and Dunkirk soon became a frontline town. By 27 March, Wing Captain Lambe, and his French and American counterparts, were seriously considering withdrawing from Dunkirk altogether.208 Thus, the formation of the RAF occurred at a time of acute crisis when the BEF required as much support as it was possible to provide. At Dover-Dunkirk, Vice Admiral Keyes did receive back No. 204 Squadron with its Pups and Camels on 21 April, 209 but, overall, the former RNAS forces at Dunkirk had been whittled down to almost nothing. However, by the end of May, the situation had changed so much that the Air Ministry was able to dispatch No. 38 (FE2bs) Home Defence Squadron to Keyes who, after the Zeebrugge and Ostend naval raids, was entirely committed to General Lambe’s agenda of bombing the enemy’s submarine bases (see Chapter 2).210 On the evening of 6 June, the Germans retaliated by bombing the Coudekerque and Teteghem aerodromes with the result that several hangers and nine fighters were destroyed. Keyes was forced to request an additional fighter squadron from the Admiralty, but he was reminded that the Air Ministry was now responsible and that they were not likely to fulfil his request. 211 Dunkirk’s role as a critical hub in the air defence network thus never truly recovered from the twin blows of Operation Michael and the creation of the RAF. The American Northern Bombing Group, however, was rapidly expanding, although the objective of this force was, as the name implies, focused on long-range bombing, primarily of submarine bases, and not air defence. 212 Furthermore, the rapid expansion of the American aviation forces was beset with technical and training problems, meaning

184  Naval Air Defence the USN would not be able to fill the gap left by the departure of the experienced naval squadrons until late in 1918, or more likely, 1919. 213 The situation, as it concerned naval air defence late in the war, was expressed to the Air Ministry by the former RNAS group commanders in a survey proposed by the Air Ministry on 9 September and carried out between then and 22 November.214 Colonel Samson, in command of RAF No. 4 Group and representing the RAF for the Harwich command, stated that attempts to standardize machines should be avoided, as doing so invariably produced aircraft ill-suited for specialized tasks. In Samson’s list of 18 duties, air defence received prominent attention, with roles ranging from anti-Zeppelin operations and air defence of patrolling ships, to the protection of merchant shipping from air and U-boat attack.215 Samson emphasized that he would require a multitude of specialized aircraft and that a one-size-fits-all approach from the Air Ministry would not be satisfactory. Colonel Williamson, commanding RAF No. 18 Group, East Coast of Scotland, likewise observed that naval air defence would continue as a responsibility of the ‘Marine Operation Groups’ of the RAF, which he differentiated from strictly home defence forces in the tradition of the Balfour administration’s division of responsibilities.216 Admiral Sturdee, since May 1918 the C-in-C the Nore, recognized the need for at least two squadrons of fighting airplanes, one for air defence and another for offensive air patrol. 217 BrigadierGeneral Lambe, likewise, acknowledged the need for ‘fighting scouts’. 218 In short, all the Royal Navy and former RNAS commanders who were queried concurred that a variety of specialized air and seaplanes would be required for air defence in the foreseeable future, and that defensive fighting machines would play a role in almost every district or command. The continuity of roles is striking: the RAF, little concerned with ASW, protection of merchant shipping, or coastal defence, was unaware of how significant the RNAS missions actually were. As the war in the west came to a close, the final air raids by Germany’s naval Zeppelins took place. L62 was destroyed off Heligoland on 10 May, L54 and L60 were destroyed in the Tondern raid on 19 July, and then L70 was shot down off Wells-next-the-Sea, Norfolk on 5 August. Lastly, L53 was destroyed off Terschelling on 11 August 1918. 219 Flying boats and aircraft from NAS Great Yarmouth destroyed five Zeppelins during the war.220 Of these, two apiece were shot down by RNAS pilots Leckie and Cadbury, a demonstration of the importance of experience and naval training in the anti-Zeppelin role.221 The loss of the last two Zeppelins is worth recounting as it concludes the Zeppelin story during the First World War. The final Zeppelin raid on England took place on the night of August 5th and was intercepted by Major Cadbury, RAF, flying from Great Yarmouth in a DH4. Cadbury encountered and destroyed Zeppelin L70, not only Germany’s latest Zeppelin, but then also carrying Fregattenkapitan Peter Strasser, the celebrated architect of

Naval Air Defence 185 the Zeppelin fleet. 222 Strasser’s demise was a final reversal from which the Zeppelin force could not recover. Six days later, on the morning of 11 August, Lieutenant Culley, in his Sopwith Camel, took off from a lighter towed by the destroyer HMS Redoubt and destroyed L53. 223 The Zeppelins had been comprehensively defeated, in no small measure by the RNAS and its RAF successor. In purely monetary terms, the total German bombing effort against Britain inflicted approximately £2.96 million in property damage over four years of conflict. This was the equivalent of one Queen Elizabethclass super-dreadnought or slightly more than seven new light cruisers. 224 The impact of the bombing raids was however more than just material: the psychological and propaganda impact profoundly influenced the political and social situation at the homefront, including the future development of industrial warfare. The RNAS had played a role during every stage of the air defence campaign, one that is rarely recognized amidst historiography that focuses too often exclusively on the RFC and RAF.

Conclusion Under Churchill’s centralizing drive, the Air Department had perhaps been overambitious when assuming responsibility for Britain’s air defence in September 1914. However, with the RFC completely deployed to the continent, there simply was no alternative but for the Navy to take responsibility. The best efforts of Churchill and Sueter succeeded, insofar as they provided the basis for an air defence system that continued to evolve throughout the remainder of the war. Balfour’s refocusing on coastal defence recognized that home defence, composed primarily of AA guns and land fighters, was best left to the army and RFC. The RNAS, despite the transfer of responsibility in February 1916, remained the frontline of air defence, however, as the RFC Home Defence squadrons generally consisted of second rate aircraft and pilots, the highly trained RNAS coastal defence forces, with superior aircraft, were therefore more likely to achieve intercepts and produce real results in the anti-Zeppelin campaign. The RNAS contribution after February 1916 was primarily in terms of coastal defence, a role that did double duty both in terms of the all-important A/S patrol, but also as a method of locating and attacking Zeppelin raiders. The Navy was correct to focus on coastal interception as the primary objective after February 1916, as this was, in fact, the most likely point at which to intercept returning attackers. Signals intelligence enabled advance notice of incoming airship raids, making it possible to intercept attacking Zeppelins en route. With new ammunition, aircraft, and night-flying methods introduced during 1916, the RNAS was able to intercept several Zeppelins and was thus well prepared for the daylight

186  Naval Air Defence Gotha raids of 1917. Although the night raids of late 1917 changed this dynamic, the RNAS continued to play an important role intercepting Zeppelins and diverting German bombers away from England to NAS Dunkirk, increasingly the center of the air battle in 1918. RNAS air defence has been overlooked due to the formation of the RAF and the historiography of the ‘First Battle of Britain’ that has decontextualized the significant contribution of the RNAS to defeating both the Zeppelins and Gothas. From the perspective of the Navy’s traditional role as the first-line of defence against invasion, the RNAS took up the mantle of fighting Zeppelin and airplane attacks against England. It was remarkably successful in this role and by late 1917 had contributed to the defeat of both the Zeppelin and Gotha raids. Air defence naturally formed one of the pillars of the RNAS mission, from bombing Zeppelin bases to conducting interceptions over England and the North Sea, to reducing Gotha formations during their return flights, to bombing the Gotha aerodromes at source, the RNAS provided the best chance of combating the raiders. The RFC home defence forces and LADA had both evolved from the Air Department’s pioneering efforts under Sueter and Churchill, foreshadowing Fighter Command’s role in the Second World War.

Notes 1. John Sweetman, ‘The Smuts Report of 1917: Merely Political Window-­ Dressing?’ in Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (1981), pp. 152–74. Christopher Luck, ‘The Smuts Report: Interpreting and Misinterpreting the Promise of Air Power’, in Changing War, pp. 153–9. 2. Churchill, Young Statesman, 1901–1914, vol. II, p. 530. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, pp. 27–8. Gilbert, The Challenge of War, vol. III, pp. 65–6. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 7. Captain L. S. Stansfeld, The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Anti-Aircraft Corps, AIR 1/648, #49 in Roskill, Documents, p. 168. 3. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p. 111. Cumming, The Battle for Britain, Chapter 2, loc. 285. David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: Militarism, Modernity and Machines, Kindle ebook ­(London: Penguin Books, 2013), p. 4. 4. Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912–1918, pp.  40–3. Pugh, The Royal Flying Corps, the Western Front and the Control of the Air, 1914–1918, p. 31. Pugh, ‘Oil and Water: A Comparison of Military and Naval Aviation Doctrine in Britain, 1912–1914’, pp. 136–8. RFC Training Manual, Pt. II, correspondence and proofs, February 1913, AIR 1/785/204/4/558. The Navy’s technical manual is the Royal Flying Corps Training Manual, Part II (Naval Wing), Air Department, Admiralty, 1914, AIR 1/824/204/5/71. 5. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, pp.  67–73, 133. Pugh, The Royal Flying Corps, p. 19. 6. David Morgan-Owen, The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 12–3.

Naval Air Defence 187 7. Minutes of first Air Committee meeting, 31 July 1912, CAB 14/1, p. 6. 8. Minutes of third Air Committee meeting, 7 November 1912, CAB 14/1, p. 20. 9. Extracts from Paper by Captain Murray F. Sueter, Director of Air Department, Admiralty, dated 29 August 1912, AIR 1/652, #18 in Roskill, Documents, p. 59. 10. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, p. 270. 11. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, pp. 20–1. 12. Extracts from Minutes of 122nd Meeting of C.I.D. on 6th February 1913, CAB 38/23/9, #27 in Roskill, Documents, p.  84. Marder, FSDF, vol. I, p. 340. 13. Raleigh, WIA, vol. I, pp. 265–6. 14. Churchill to Fourth Sea Lord, DAD and D of C, 21 December 1913, Some Minutes by Mr. Churchill on Aviation Matters, September–­December 1913, ADM 1/8621, #36 in Roskill, Documents, p.  123. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 40. 15. Churchill to Secretary of Admiralty, Fourth Sea Lord, and DAD, 18 May 1914, Some Minutes by Mr. Churchill on Aviation Matters, May–June 1914, ADM 1/8621, #42 in Roskill, Documents, p. 139. Castle, The First Blitz: Bombing London in the First World War, p. 12. 16. Memorandum on ‘Aerial Defence by Mr. Churchill, dated 22 October 1914, CAB 37/121/133, #54 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 181–3. See also, Captain L. S. Stansfeld, The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Anti-Aircraft Corps, AIR 1/648, #49 in Roskill, Documents, pp.  168, also Extracts from ‘Report on the Subject of the Defence of London against Aerial Attack’, by Captain Murray F. Sueter, Director, Air Department, Admiralty, dated 16  October 1914, CAB 37/121/125, #52 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 172–9. 17. Christopher Bell, Churchill And Sea Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 38. 18. Julian Corbett, War Course, Notes on Strategy, Portsmouth, January 1909, CBT 6/15–16, NMM, pp.  2–3. See also: Andrew Lambert, ‘Sir Julian Corbett and the Naval War Course’, in Dreadnought to Daring, p.  41 & Andrew Lambert, ‘The Naval War Course, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and the Origins of “The British Way in Warfare”’, in The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856–1956, eds., Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson, ebook (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), pp. 219–56. Also, John W. Gloystein, ‘Mahan, Corbett, and Economy of Force in the Command of Sea and Air’ (MA thesis, Air University, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2007), pp. 28–33. 19. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, p.  269. Churchill, World Crisis, vol. I, p. 274. 20. Samson, Fights and Flights, p. 6. 21. Michael Brock and Eleanor Brock, eds., H. H. Asquith Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1985), p. 285. 22. Nicolas J. d’Ombrain, ‘Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914’, in JRUSI, vol. 115, no. March (1970), pp.  38–9. Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes, p.  35. Marder, FDSF, vol. I, p. 342. W. H. C. S. Thring, ‘A Defence Organisation for the British Nations’, in NRJ, vol. 9, no. 1 (1921), p. 17. 23. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs, p.  165. Extracts from ‘Report on the Subject of the Defence of London against Aerial Attack’, by Captain Murray F. Sueter, Director Air Department, Admiralty, dated 16 October 1914, CAB 37/121/125, #52 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 172–9.

188  Naval Air Defence 24. Extracts from ‘Report on the Subject of the Defence of London against Aerial Attack’, by Captain Murray F. Sueter, 16 October 1914, CAB 37/121/125, #52 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 172–9. See also, Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 83. 25. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs, p. 166. Jerry White, Zeppelin Nights: London in the First World War (London: The Bodley Head, 2014), p. 39. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. I, pp. 275–7. 26. Memorandum on ‘Aerial Defence’ by Mr. Churchill, dated 22 October 1914, CAB 37/121/133, #54 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 181–3. 27. Captain L. S. Stansfeld, The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Anti-Aircraft Corps, May 1919, AIR 1/648/17/122/385, p. 1. 28. Churchill statement, War Council, Notes from a meeting held at 10 Downing St. on 1 Dec 1914, AIR 1/2319. White, Zeppelin Nights, p. 39. 29. Jones, WIA, vol. III, pp. 72, 157. 30. Churchill, World Crisis, vol. I, p. 276. 31. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 82. 32. Extracts from ‘Report on the Subject of the Defence of London against Aerial Attack’, by Captain Murray F. Sueter, Director Air Department, Admiralty, dated 16 October 1914, CAB 37/121/125, #52 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 172–9. 33. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, pp. 24–5. 34. Ibid., p. 15. 35. Admiralty Weekly Orders, Naval Air Service – Re-organisation, M.0160/15, 27 January 1915, ADM 1/8408/7. 36. Ian Philpott, The Birth of the Royal Air Force (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2013), p. 144. Castle, The First Blitz, p. 13. 37. Bacon, The Dover Patrol 1915–1917, vol. II, pp. 217, 223–4. 38. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p. 292. 39. Arthur Longmore, From Sea to Sky: 1910-1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), p. 45. 40. Bacon, The Dover Patrol 1915–1917, vol. II, pp. 219, 223–4. 41. Commodore Murray Sueter, Operations Order A.D. No. 15, Orders for Naval Air Service Units Based at Dunkirk, 21 June 1915, AIR 1/672. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 443. 42. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs, p. 170. 43. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz, pp. 65–7. Jones, WIA, vol. III, pp. 98–9. 44. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, pp. 53–4. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, p. 116. 45. Jones, WIA, vol. III, Appendix II. Gibson, Warneford, VC, pp.  82–93. Service record of Reginald Alexander John Warneford ADM 273/8/193. Creagh and Humpris, The V.C. and D.S.O. Book, vol. I, p. 169. 46. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, pp. 37–8. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 124. 47. Thetford, British Naval Aircraft, p. 304. 48. Admiralty Board minute, 18 June 1915, ADM 167/49, p. 1. 49. Admiralty Board Minutes, 10 September 1915, ADM 167/49. 50. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 122. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs, pp. 174, 176–7. Jack Herris and Bob Pearson, Aircraft of World War I, 1914–1918 ­(London: Amber Books Ltd., 2014), p. 71. Captain L. S. Stansfeld, The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Anti-Aircraft Corps, AIR 1/648, #49 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 168–9. 51. Percy Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy, Kindle ebook (London: Endeavour Press Ltd., 2015), Chapter 18. See also, Andrew Lambert, ‘Scott, Sir Percy Moreton, First Baronet (1853–1924), Naval Officer and Engineer’, ODNB.

Naval Air Defence 189 52. Duties of the Royal Naval Air Service and The Royal Flying Corps, War Committee Minutes, 10 February 1916, CAB 42/8/5, pp. 4–5. 53. Admiralty Board Minutes, 25 November 1915, ADM 167/49. 54. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, p. 46. Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p. 40. Jones, vol. III, pp. 268–9. Extracts from ‘Secretary’s Notes of a Meeting of War Council’ held on 7 January 1915, #60 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 190–2. Prime Minister’s statement, War Committee minutes, 10 February 1916, CAB 42/8/5. See also Memorandum on ‘Aerial Defence’ by Mr. Churchill, 22 October 1914, CAB 37/121/133, #54 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 181–2. 55. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, p.  90. Statement by Mr. King, 19 July 1915, & 22 July 1915, HC, vol. 73, cc. 1156, 1648. 56. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, p. 43. 57. Duties of the Royal Naval Air Service and The Royal Flying Corps, War Committee Minutes, 10 February 1916, CAB 42/8/5, p. 6. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 313. 58. Extracts from Memorandum for the Cabinet by Lord Curzon, Lord Privy Seal, dated 14 February 1916, CAB 37/142, #102 in Roskill, Documents, p. 299. Gloystein, ‘Mahan, Corbett, and Economy of Force in the Command of Sea and Air’, pp. 37–8. Beesly, Room 40, p. 142. 59. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, p. 97. 60. Duties of the Royal Naval Air Service and The Royal Flying Corps, War Committee Minutes, 10 February 1916, CAB 42/8/5, pp. 6–7. War Committee minutes, 10 February 1916, AIR 1/2319, Appendix. 61. Bacon, The Dover Patrol, vol. II, p. 223. 62. SNO Dunkirk to Sub-Chief General Staff, 27 October 1915, ADM 137/2278. 63. Haslop, Early Naval Air Power, p. 98. 64. Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914–1918, vol. II, 2 vols., Kindle ebook (New York: Routledge, 2014), Chapter 54, loc. 2271. Roskill, Hankey, vol. I, p. 251. 65. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, pp. 46–7. 66. Vaughan-Lee, Joint War Air Committee. Extracts from Paper Air 4, dated 3 March 1916, ADM 1/270, #106 in Roskill, Documents, pp.  309–11. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, p. 43. 67. Joint War Air Committee, Interim Report, 20 March 1916, AIR 1/2319. 68. Ibid. 69. Joint War Air Committee, Interim Report, 20 March 1916, AIR 1/2319, p. 5. 70. Note by the Naval Representatives on the Joint War Air Committee. JWAC 3, undated but laid before the Committee on 23 March 1916, AIR 1/2319, #110 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 321–2. 71. Machines Available, Naval, Joint War Air Committee, 29 February 1916, AIR 1/2319. 72. Director Air Services, Present Deficiencies and Future Requirements of the Royal Naval Air Service, Joint War Air Committee, 22 March 1916, AIR 1/2319. 73. Policy of Army Council with Regard to Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing), JWAC, 2 March 1916, AIR 1/2319, p. 2. 74. Table 2, Policy of the RNAS, Joint War Air Committee, March 1916, AIR 1/2319. 75. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, p. 47. Haslop, Early Naval Air Power, p. 99. 76. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Air Board, 22 May 1916, AIR 6/1.

190  Naval Air Defence 77. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 272. 78. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, p.  56. Extracts from First Report of the Air Board, addressed to the War Committee and dated 23  October 1916, AIR 1/2311 and CAB 22/75, #140 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 389–404. 79. Extracts from Memorandum for the Cabinet by Lord Curzon, Lord Privy Seal, dated 14 February 1916, CAB 37/142, #102 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 297–301. 80. David Gilmour, Curzon, Imperial Statesman (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 453. 81. Marder, FSDF, vol. II, pp. 133–4. Black, British Naval Staff, p. 187. 82. Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914-1918 (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1982), p. 145. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz, Chapter 2, loc. 3771. 83. Beesly, Room 40, p. 141. 84. Ibid., p. 70. 85. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence, p. 85. 86. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 196. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence, pp. 122–3. 87. Oliver Schwann, ADAD, Changes in Administration of the Naval Air Service: Report of Committee, 4 January 1915, ADM 1/8408/7, p.  2. Extracts from ‘Report on the Subject of the Defence of London against Aerial Attack’, by Captain Murray F. Sueter, Director Air Department, Admiralty, dated 16 October 1914, CAB 37/121/125, #52 in Roskill, Documents, p. 177. 88. C-in-C Lowestoft to Admiralty, 20 February 1916, ADM 137/2213. 89. Commander H. C. Sherbrooke SNO Great Yarmouth to Captain-inCharge Lowestoft, 18 August 1915, ADM 137/2213. 90. H.M. Naval Base, Great Yarmouth, reports, 29 January 1915, ADM 137/2213, p. 13. Lieutenant Colonel commanding 1/25 Cyclist Battalion to Captain-in-Charge Lowestoft, 25 September 1915, ADM 137/2213. C-in-C Lowestoft & Yarmouth to Admiralty, 20 February 1916, ADM 137/2213. Flight Sub-Lieutenant F. Reeves to CO Air Stations Great Yarmouth, 26 April 1916, ADM 137/2213, p.  2. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence, p. 21. 91. Ministry of Defence Air Staff, British Air and Space Power Doctrine: AP 3000 Fourth Edition (Ministry of Defence, 2009), p.  40. H.M. Naval Base, Great Yarmouth, reports, 29 January 1915, ADM 137/2213, p. 12. 92. C-in-C Lowestoft to Commander, RNAS Great Yarmouth, 27 November 1915, ADM 137/2213. 93. Director Air Services Rear-Admiral Vaughan-Lee, Defence of Air Stations from Aircraft Attacks, 4 February 1916, AIR 1/148. 94. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 103. Lieutenant Commander O. F. Murray, Harwich, to Admiral of Patrols, Immingham, 7 June 1915, ADM 137/2241, p. 2. 95. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 118. 96. H. G. Sherbrooke C-in-C Yarmouth Naval Base to Lowestoft, forwarded to Director Admiralty Intelligence Division 18 October 1915, ADM 137/2213. Jones, WIA, vol. III, p. 129. 97. C-in-C Lowestoft to Admiralty, 20 February 1916, ADM 137/2213. 98. Lieutenant Commander HMS Dryad to C-in-C Lowestoft, 1 April 1916, ADM 137/2213. 99. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. III, p. 277. Jones, WIA, vol III, p. 106. 100. Jones, WIA, vol III, pp. 135–6. 101. Ibid., p. 199. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz, Chapter two, loc. 2643.

Naval Air Defence 191 102. Kemp credits E31 with shooting down L7: P. K. Kemp, H. M. Submarines (London: Herbert Jenkins Ltd., 1953), p. 120. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. III, p.  310. Appendix I, German Naval Airships 1912-1918, Jones, WIA, vol. III. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat, p. 163. 103. Jones, WIA, vol III, pp. 117–8. 104. Ibid., p. 135. 105. Rear-Admiral Vaughan-Lee, Proposed Operations to Deter Hostile Airships from Raiding England, 6 March 1916, AIR 1/148. 106. Freeman was forced to ditch, and was later interned in Holland. Jones, WIA, vol III, p.  216. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, p. 143. 107. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, p. 144. 108. Chaz Bartlett, Bomber Pilot, 1916–1918 (London: Ian Allan Ltd, 1974), p. 17. 109. In March 1916, the education program at RNAS Chingford involved lectures on aerodynamics, engines, navigation, and meteorology, Bartlett, Bomber Pilot, p. 16. 110. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 439. 111. Ibid., p. 440. 112. Bartlett, Bomber Pilot, pp. 18–9. 113. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 443 fn. 114. Handbook of Aircraft Armament, July 1916, C.B. 1161 authorized by Vaughan Lee, ADM 186/165, p. 2. 115. Section L, Teaching Apparatus. CB 1161, Handbook of Aircraft Armament, Air Department, July 1916, ADM 186/165. 116. Section M, Instructional, CB 1161, Handbook of Aircraft Armament, Air Department, July 1916, ADM 186/165, p. 17. 117. Ibid., pp. 18–9. 118. Ibid., p. 22. 119. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p. 322. 120. Director Air Services to CO RNAS Calshot, 9 March 1916, AIR 1/148. 121. Flight Sub-Lieutenant G. W. Fane to CO Naval Air Station Great Yarmouth, 26 April 1916, ADM 137/2213. 122. Admiral G. A. Callaghan, Nore Special order #1387 – Recognition Signals for Friendly Aircraft at Night, AIR 1/148. 123. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, pp. 96–7. 124. Ibid., p. 188. 125. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 24. 126. At the time, the RFC was experimenting with .45 Pomeroy incendiary bullets fired by converted Maxim machine guns, as well as 1-pdr Vickers guns. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, p. 108–9. 127. Ibid. 128. Use of Explosive Bullets against Hostile Airships. Memorandum by the Chairman of the Air Board, 20 July 1916, AIR 1/2319. 129. Specially selected .303-inch ammunition for Royal Naval Air Service, 10  October 1916, MUN 4/2424. Joseph Morris, German Air Raids on Britain, 1914-1918, reprint (Dallington, East Sussex: The Naval & Military Press, Ltd, 1993), pp. 118–20. Gamble, The Story of a North Sea Air Station, p. 261 fn. 130. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence, p. 169. Section D, Ammunition, & Section H, Gun Sights, & Section G, Q. F. and Machine Guns, CB 1161, Handbook of Aircraft Armament, Air Department, July 1916, ADM 186/165, p. 2. See also, Harry Smee and Henry Macrory, Gunpowder &

192  Naval Air Defence Glory: The Explosive Life of Frank Brock OBE, Kindle ebook (Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2020), p. 134 et seq. 131. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, pp. 179, 182–3. 132. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat, pp. 225–6. 133. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 1. Morris, German Air Raids on Britain, p. 160. 134. Roger Chichering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 74–6, 91. 135. Raymond Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, 1917-1918 (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1966), p. 37. 136. Ibid., pp.  36–7. Walter Goerlitz, The History of the German General Staff, 1657–1945, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1961), pp. 185–6. 137. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, pp. 201–6. 138. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz, pp. 267–70. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 12–4. 139. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, pp. 201–3. 140. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 247–8. 141. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 14. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #34, 17–31 May 1917, p. 3. 142. Andrew Hyde, The First Blitz: The German Air Campaign Against Britain, 1917–1918, Kindle ebook (London: Leo Cooper, 2012), Chapter 6, loc. 1518–26. 143. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 20–1. 144. Martin Easdown and Thomas Genth, A Glint in the Sky: German Air Attacks on Folkestone, Dover, Ramsgate, Margate and Sheerness During the First World War (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005), pp. 49–107. ­Stephen Wynn, Folkestone in the Great War. Kindle ebook (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., 2017), Chapter 5, loc. 867–1032. Susan Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz, Kindle ebook (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 64. 145. Jonathan Sutherland and Diane Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917: The First Heavy Bomber Raids on England, Kindle ebook (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2006), Chapter 5, loc. 1080–100, 1108–15. 146. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, pp. 232, 237–8. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #34, 17–31 May 1917, pp. 3–5. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, p. 24. Morris, German Air Raids on Britain, pp. 220–1. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 20–22. 147. Sutherland and Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917, Appendix II, loc. 3026. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, pp. 232–3. 148. Sutherland and Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917, Chapter 5, loc. 1239. 149. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, pp.  46–7. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #35, 1–15 June 1917, pp. 5, 7. 150. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, p. 47. Morris, German Air Raids on Britain, p. 221. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 25. 151. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, pp. 238–40. 152. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 26–7. Sutherland and Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917, Chapter 5, loc. 1282–303. 153. Morris, German Air Raids on Britain, pp. 222–3. Sutherland and Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917, Appendix II, loc. 3026. 154. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 173. 155. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #35, 1–15 June 1917, pp. 6, 8. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 253. 156. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, pp. 201–3, 238, 250.

Naval Air Defence 193 157. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, p. 61. Sutherland and Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917, Chapter 5, loc. 1332. 158. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, pp. 250–5. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz, pp. 270–8. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, p. 61. 159. Sutherland and Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917, chapter 6, loc. 1403. 160. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 34–6. 161. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, p. 259. Morris, G ­ erman Air Raids on Britain, p.  225. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, pp. 69–71. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, pp. 275–6. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. II, #37, 1–16 July 1917, pp. 2–3, 7. 162. Sutherland and Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917, Chapter 6, loc. 1417. 163. Mike Westrop, A History of No. 6 Squadron: Royal Naval Air Service in World War I (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, Limited, 2006), p. 94. 164. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, p. 270. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. II, #37, 1–16 July 1917, pp. 7–9. 165. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 37–8. 166. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, pp. 78–9. Sutherland and Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917, Chapter 6, loc. 1489–503. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, pp. 261, 269. 167. White, Zeppelin Nights, pp. 213–4. Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire, pp. 73–9. Overy, The Birth of the RAF, pp. 22–3. 168. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. II, 2 vols., Kindle ebook (Arcole Publishing, 2017, originally published 1938), Chapter 57, loc. 1062–72. Philip Joubert, The Third Service, The Story Behind the Royal Air Force (London: Thames & Hudson, 1955), pp.  48–9. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, p. 99. 169. War Cabinet Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence Against Air-Raids, First Report, 11 July 1917, CAB 24/20/53. Roskill, Documents, p. 510. Jones, WIA, vol. V, Appendix VI, Home Defence, p. 487. See, Luck, ‘The Smuts Report’, p. 153. 170. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, p. 89. E. B. Ashmore, Air Defence (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1929). 171. Home Defence, Report of Lieutenant-General J. C. Smut’s Committee, July 1917, in Jones, WIA, vol. V, Appendix VI, pp. 488–9. 172. Air Organisation, Second Report of the Prime Minister’s Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence against Air Raids, 17 August 1917, Appendix II, in Jones, WIA, Appendices, pp. 8, 13. Cooper, Birth of Independent Air Power, pp. 100–4. 173. Memorandum on the Organisation of the Air Services, Lieutenant-­General Sir David Henderson, July 1917, Appendix I in Jones WIA, Appendices, p. 1. 174. Sweetman, ‘The Smuts Report of 1917’. Overy, The Birth of the RAF, pp. 25–30. 175. Lieutenant-General Jan Smuts, Night Raids on London, 6 September 1917, Appendix VII in Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 491–3. 176. Trevor Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield II: Air Fighting and Air Casualties of the Great War, 2nd ed. (High Barnet: Fetubi Books, 2014), p. 263. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, pp. 288–300. Morris, German Air Raids on Britain, p. 231. Sutherland and Canwell, Battle of Britain 1917, Chapter 6, loc. 1712–47. Fredette, First Battle of Britain, pp. 107–9. 177. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 229–33. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, p. 279.

194  Naval Air Defence 178. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 62–4. Cole and Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain, pp. 324–5. 179. Lieutenant-General Jan Smuts, Night Air Raids on London, 6 September 1917, Appendix VII in Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 491–3. 180. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 86–90. Jerry White, Zeppelin Nights: London in the First World War (London: The Bodley Head, 2014), pp. 214–19. 181. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 78–82. 182. Fredette, First Battle of Britain, p. 140. 183. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 83. 184. Jones, WIA, vol. IV, pp. 99–100. 185. Fredette, First Battle of Britain, p. 146. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 342. 186. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, pp. 342–3. 187. Morris, German Air Raids on Britain, p.  243. Fredette, First Battle of Britain, pp. 144–7. 188. Mike Westrop, A History of No.10 Squadron Royal Naval Air Service in World War I (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2004), p. 11. 189. Bacon, Dover Patrol, vol. II, p. 249. 190. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 338. 191. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz, Chapter 3, loc. 4931. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 345. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat, p. 303. 192. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp. 92–102. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz, 3, pp. 289–303. 193. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 353. 194. Ibid., pp. 355, 357, 362. 195. Ibid., p. 361. 196. Fredette, First Battle of Britain, p. 131. 197. Geoffrey Rossano and Thomas Wildenberg, Striking the Hornets’ Nest (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), p. 170. 198. Captain C. Fuller, Director of Plans, 14 January 1918, coversheet to VA Dover requirements for Dover, AIR 1/662/17/122/671. 199. Wing Captain Lambe to VA Dover Patrol, 10 January 1918, AIR 1/662. 200. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p.  382. Sturtivant and Page, Royal Navy Aircraft Serials and Units, pp. 432–5. 201. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 383. 202. Fredette, First Battle of Britain, p. 131. 203. Samson, Fights and Flights, p. 356. 204. RNAS Yarmouth to C-in-C Lowestoft, Report on destruction of Zeppelin L22, 14 May 1917, AIR 1/637/17/122/153. Harper, ‘The Development of the Flying Boat’, pp. 362–3. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #33, 1–16 May 1917, pp. 2–3. 205. Robinson, Zeppelin in Combat, pp.  259–60. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 392–3. Appendix I, German Airships, in Jones, WIA, vol. III. Marder, FDSF, vol. IV, pp. 16–7. Popham, Into Wind, p. 57. Kemp, Fleet Air Arm, p. 62. Jones, WIA, vol. V, p. 13. Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Reports, vol. I, #35, 1–15 June 1917, pp. 4–5. 206. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 410. Storey, The Zeppelin Blitz, p. 270. 207. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 423. 208. Geoffrey Rossano, Stalking the U-Boat, U.S. Naval Aviation in Europe during World War I (Gainesville: University Press of Florida), p. 64. 209. Jones, WIA, vol. VI, p. 384 fn. 210. Ibid., p. 391. 211. Ibid., p. 394.

Naval Air Defence 195 212. William Sims, The Victory at Sea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016), p. 331. 213. Rossano and Wildenberg, Striking the Hornets’ Nest, pp. 90–2. 214. Admiralty Letter No. M.023435 of 9 September 1918, extracts from replies thereto received from Commanders-in-Chief, Flag Officers and R.A.F. Authorities, and Admiralty Minutes on the same, ADM 1/8540, #271 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 715–33. 215. Colonel Samson (No. 4 Group) to SNO Shotley, Operations which could be carried out by aircraft in Harwich Command in 1920, 14 September 1918, ADM 1/8540/258. 216. Colonel Williamson (No. 18 Group) to VA East Coast of Scotland, 22 September 1918, ADM 1/8540/258. 217. C-in-C the Nore to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 30 September 1918, ADM 1/8540/258. 218. Brigadier-General Lambe (No. 5 Group) to VA Dover Patrol, 21 S­ eptember 1918, ADM 1/8540/258. 219. Appendix I: German Naval Airships, 1912–1918, Jones, WIA, vol. III. 220. Samson, Fights and Flights, p. 357. 221. Ibid. 222. Jones, WIA, vol. V, pp.  131–3. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of ­Britain, pp. 436–46. Morris, German Air Raids on Britain, pp. 196–8. 223. Jack Herris and Bob Pearson, Aircraft of World War I, 1914–1918 ­(London: Amber Books Ltd, 2014), p. 93. Hobbs, Royal Navy’s Air Service, pp. 400–1. 224. Cole and Cheesman, Air Defence of Britain, p. 449. Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen?’, p. 9. Table 16, Characteristics of British Battleships, 1889–1913, in Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889–1914 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993).

Conclusion

The path forward for Britain’s naval aviation had often been rocky, marred by wartime losses, administrative upheavals, and inter-service rivalry; yet, by 1 April 1918, the Royal Naval Air Service’s (RNAS’) practitioners had not only developed the full range of naval aviation capabilities, but also demonstrated fundamental aspects of what would become the basis of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF’s) airpower doctrine. The RNAS introduced and developed the seaplane and aircraft carrier to advanced degrees of capability, contributed enormously to the vital trade protection and A/S missions, pioneered long-range bombing before it was appreciated by the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), and played an essential role in the defence of Britain from both Zeppelin and Gotha attacks. The Cuxhaven (1914) and Tondern (1918) strikes encapsulated the Navy’s accumulation of aircraft carrier experience over four years of war. Reconnaissance and gunfire spotting missions impacted the war at sea and quickly became a standard component of amphibious operations. Aircraft and airship escort improved the security of convoy operations, while coastal patrols brought several U-boats into the bombsights of the naval aviators. The RNAS had played a crucial role in the A/S campaign, developing an immense coastal patrol system that the RAF adopted upon its creation. RNAS air raids against Zeppelin facilities paved the war for long-range bombing against the enemy’s industry and No. 3 Wing (Luxeuil) operationalized this unique concept before being dismantled as a result of inter-service rivalry. RNAS squadrons, it should not be forgotten, were frequently deployed alongside the RFC in France and Belgium, and former naval squadrons formed the core of the 41st Wing and the IAF. Many former RNAS practitioners, who had developed naval aviation during the war, would go on to play significant roles with the RAF after 1919, not to mention after 1939. Although, at the end of the First World War, the RNAS’ officers now belonged to the RAF, it was clear that a close relationship with the postwar Navy was essential. RAF Brigadier-General Oliver Swann, formerly Captain Schwann of HMS Campania, argued as much in a 1919 article in the Naval Review.1 Conducting naval, or maritime, warfare without aircraft, in all of its myriad aspects, was now unthinkable.

Conclusion 197

Impact of Government Policy and Naval Administration on the RNAS The administrative context determined how the RNAS practitioners approached the development of naval aviation between 1914 and 1918. This context can be described in three phases, framed generally by the changing administrations at the Admiralty and Air Department. The first phase began when First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill formally created the RNAS by renaming the Naval Wing on 1 July 1914. Although Churchill departed the Admiralty in May 1915, the influence of the Churchill period did not come to a close until February 1916. It was then that the Royal Navy’s responsibility for the air defence of Britain was returned to the RFC, ending a policy Churchill had maintained since his September 1914 arrangement with War Minister Lord Kitchener. This period was dominated by the dynamic personalities of Churchill and Director of the Air Department (DAD) Commodore Murray Sueter, with First Lord Arthur Balfour and Director Air Services (DAS) Vaughan-Lee becoming the dominant administrators as 1915 drew to a close. Much has been said about Churchill’s influence on naval aviation development. The long and short of the matter is that Churchill’s administration was ultimately a mixed blessing. His drive and energy certainly contributed to the rising status of the naval aviators as a class of their own, technically proficient, daring, and possessing an esprit de corps well suited to the pioneers of a cutting edge-combined arms force. Churchill’s ambitious agenda and centralizing drive, however, were brought to an uncontrollable boiling point when his thrusting personality was teamed with the volcanic character of Admiral Sir John Fisher, who returned as First Sea Lord on 30 October 1914. Churchill and Fisher’s tendency to use the Air Department as a technological think-tank, combined with operational over-reach, pushed the RNAS to its administrative and operational limits. Churchill’s role as a champion of naval aviation led him to commit to policies that decisively impacted the development of the Naval Wing, not always for the better. Churchill’s support for Captain Reginald Bacon’s airship program was mercurial, with the unfortunate result that the First Lord’s enthusiasm cooled after the ‘Mayfly’ disaster of 1911. Although work could have been redoubled following this setback, rigid airship development was instead relegated to the backburner. Churchill allowed the disaster to handicap Britain’s rigid airship program, with results that lasted the entire war. Had the Admiralty, and Churchill in particular, shown a greater willingness to accept this setback and overcome it, Germany’s Zeppelin advantage would perhaps not have been as pronounced early in the war, and the Navy, certainly, would have been better equipped to provide aerial reconnaissance for the fleet, a critical missing link that Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty never tired of describing.

198  Conclusion Another key decision by Churchill was the assumption of responsibility for the air defence of Britain. This policy, while it suited Churchill’s aggrandizing temperament, burdened DAD Sueter with immense responsibility at precisely the time his administrative powers were being strained by the requirements of the war. Resources that were expended developing Britain’s air defence could have been directed towards tailoring the RNAS’ role with the fleet, or been focused on the Dardanelles campaign. Instead, Sueter was forced to split his limited time on a task of purely local importance, considering that the Zeppelins were not going to win the war on their own. First Lord Balfour’s reversal of this policy in February 1916 indicated that the Air Department had taken on more than it could realistically handle. Without the initiative of the Churchill-Sueter combination, on the other hand, Britain would have been totally unprepared for the Zeppelin offensive when it came: the first naval air stations were constructed under Churchill’s watch, making it possible for the RNAS to patrol Britain’s coasts, and the RNAS armoured cars and airplanes, which were to prove the basis for a mechanized, expeditionary, warfare revolution, had been cultivated at Churchill’s insistence. Churchill capitalized on this unique RNAS capability to counter Germany’s Zeppelin advantage through longrange bombing and to provide gunfire spotting at the Dardanelles. The RNAS was becoming a totally new kind of military organization, driven more by Churchill’s imagination than by immediate naval necessity.2 The aircraft, airships, and equipment that became standard components of the RNAS’ inventory, later in the war, from the Handley Page bombers to the Sea Scout blimps, were imagined, developed, and tested during Churchill’s tenure. The Grand Fleet’s primary aircraft carriers, Campania and Engadine, were converted and worked up with the fleet, while the fundamentals of reconnaissance and gunfire spotting were both developed and then demonstrated at the Dardanelles and in German East Africa. Sueter, for his part, worked tirelessly to solve technical problems handed to him by Churchill, ranging from the development of Britain’s air defence to long-range bombers – even including the invention of the tank.3 The RNAS during this period was indeed land-oriented, conducting armoured car operations in Belgium, defending British territory from Zeppelin attack, raiding Germany’s Zeppelin sheds, and providing close air support at Gallipoli. Churchill’s dismissal, as a result of the May Crisis, set the stage for the second phase of the administrative history of the RNAS. Although Balfour’s tenure as First Lord began in May 1915, he initially maintained many of Churchill’s policies. Balfour began to deviate from Churchill’s agenda when he took the key decision, on 29 July 1915, to integrate the RNAS further within the Navy,4 and then, in September, decided to replace Commodore Sueter with Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee. These were important steps toward realigning the RNAS as a properly

Conclusion 199 naval organization, but it was Balfour’s decisive policy shift in February 1916 that truly marked the conclusion of the Churchill era. By the beginning of 1916 it was clear that Balfour would pursue a different policy: The RNAS was facing new challenges, such as the accelerated Zeppelin and U-boat campaigns, and including the threat from a reinvigorated High Sea Fleet. The RNAS was reoriented as a maritime organization, becoming Britain’s most immediate line of defence. Technical innovation during this period was less spectacular, but more fundamental. Lessons learned at the Dardanelles and Dunkirk were applied to the fleet, strengthening aerial close air support, gunfire spotting, and reconnaissance missions. Improvements to aircraft W/T sets, bombsights, anti-Zeppelin incendiary ammunition, and an expanded and systematized training regime, greatly increased the overall effectiveness of the RNAS. Balfour’s naval-focused RNAS policy can then be said to have lasted until Jellicoe’s addition of the Fifth Sea Lord position on the Admiralty Board, as part of the reforms in January 1917. Although Balfour’s policy of decentralization heralded the end of the freewheeling Churchill–Sueter–Samson days, he also laid the groundwork for the regional system of control that Jellicoe was to expand in 1917. The RNAS, from Balfour’s perspective, had to swim before it could fly – support the Navy first, primarily at sea. The new model was thus less the Royal Marines, as it had been under Churchill, and more the Submarine Service. No. 3 Wing, and its long-range bombing mission, was the exception that proved the rule. The creation and demise of Wing Captain Elder’s prototype strategic bombing force had a profound impact on the conduct of the air war. The long-range bombing of Germany’s industry showcased the new technologies and foreshadowed a core component of airpower yet to come. However, like the ‘Mayfly’ disaster, the disbanding of No. 3 Wing proved a watershed decision that fundamentally transformed the scope of the RNAS’ responsibilities. The result was a delay in the development of a retaliatory capacity at exactly the moment when the Gothas started to bomb the British homefront. Control of long-range bombing passed to the RFC, but the momentum toward independent operations and offensive bombing could, nevertheless, no longer be resisted. David Lloyd George’s ascension to Prime Minister of the coalition government in December 1916 heralded the conclusion of the BalfourJackson period. Admiral John Jellicoe’s appointment as First Sea Lord then became the defining event that shaped the administration of the RNAS until the formation of the Air Ministry in January 1918.5 AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASW) was Jellicoe’s top priority and the RNAS refocused on this aspect of the naval war. Jellicoe’s Naval Staff reforms tightly integrated the RNAS into the structure of the Navy and the appointment of Fifth Sea Lord Godfrey Paine, at the outset of 1917, finally put naval aviation on a level playing field with the Army Council

200  Conclusion (although, by picking a pro-RFC administrator such as Commodore Paine, Jellicoe reopened the door leading to unification that had been temporarily closed with Sueter’s departure). The regional RNAS groups, created as a result of Jellicoe’s 1917 reforms, became the basis for the RAF system of home defence after April 1918, while the best technical officers in the RNAS were given the resources to implement revolutionary systems that ultimately contributed to victory over the U-boats. With Jellicoe at the Admiralty, the Grand Fleet became the responsibility of Admiral Sir David Beatty, whose strong desire to bring the High Sea Fleet to action resulted in the creation of the Grand Fleet’s Flying Squadron, the world’s first aircraft carrier group, under the command of Rear Admiral Richard Phillimore. Commodore Sueter, who had been sidelined as Superintendent of Aircraft Construction (SAC), went to work alongside Thomas Sopwith and others to devise a torpedo-bomber capable of carrier operations, as aircraft-launching equipment was added to every capital ship in the fleet. New aircraft, ammunition and training methods introduced by DAS Vaughan-Lee, and advanced by Commodore Paine at RNAS Cranwell during 1916, had, by 1917 given the naval aviators the edge over the Zeppelin menace and the daylight Gotha raids, although the nuisance night raids by Staaken Giant bombers continued. Jellicoe’s December 1917 creation of the Air Division of the Naval Staff ensured that the naval aviators would continue to be represented while operational learning to date was codified and disseminated, despite the loss of the Air Department to the Air Ministry. It was this system, implemented by Jellicoe’s successor Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, that carried the RNAS wings and squadrons (former wings and squadrons after 1 April 1918) through to the conclusion of the war. The changing political and service priorities during the war thus profoundly impacted the development of Britain’s naval aviation, shaping the structure within which the practitioners carried out their developmental work. Furthermore, the path forward for the service administrators, and the RNAS practitioners, was frequently constrained by the exigencies of the war itself. Within this bounded structure, the RNAS practitioners had to demonstrate agency and initiative in the implementation of policies that, often as not, required inventing entirely new equipment and procedures. The naval aviators needed champions who could advance their cause as much as the Navy needed technical and operational specialists. A significant lesson from the administrative aspect of naval aviation’s development was the long-term impact of choices made under uncertain circumstances. The immensity of the RNAS roles and responsibilities made naval aviation an essential component of national strategy. Put into Second World War terms, the RNAS was, in fact, not only the Fleet Air Arm, but also Coastal Command, Bomber Command, and Fighter Command. Specialists conditioned by the fragmented literature to think

Conclusion 201 of naval aviation in terms of only one, or at most two, of these roles will have difficulty understanding the breadth and significance of RNAS operations during the First World War. Indeed, the RNAS has been criticized for lacking a clear doctrinal foundation, with the result that deviations from the, supposedly, natural role of naval aviation as an adjunct of the fleet were frequent.6 This argument does not recognize that the core naval aviation roles had, in fact, been established before the war with wartime deviations actually representing the flexibility of the Air Department to respond to a variety of technological challenges. Certainly, each administration prioritized different components of the RNAS mission-set over the course of the war. But these deviations were unavoidable in response to emergent wartime conditions, and demonstrated adaptability by the RNAS, rather than exemplifying failed doctrine. The wartime administrative matrix certainly suggests that naval aviation was, at least, moving in the right direction before the war, the most evident weaknesses were generally technological: delayed rigid airship development, inability to counter Zeppelins until 1916, and lack of powerful response to the U-boats until 1917/18. In the case of the inability to defend the Air Department’s longrange bombing program, and ultimately the creation of the RAF, there were political considerations that superseded the Admiralty’s domain, and certainly the Air Department itself was not to blame. Over the course of the war, the RNAS had to contend with four different Admiralty First Lords, five First Sea Lords, three separate Air Department heads, the complete reorganization of the Naval Staff under Jellicoe, and then the final abolition of the Air Department altogether. The frequent changes in administrative personnel meant that the continuity of policy from month to month was a real concern, and complete reversals of commitment were not uncommon. Immense pressure was placed on the service practitioners and the Naval Staff’s officers to produce doctrinal and operational continuity between changing administrations, and to respond to the service’s needs in wartime.

Practitioners and their Contribution to Naval Aviation’s Development If the doctrine is to be discussed, it should be observed that the best results were obtained when there was synergy of purpose between the RNAS practitioners and the Royal Navy’s officers and administrators. As 1917 progressed, the district SNOs, and fleet commanders, could depend on their naval aviation contingents, and, as the RNAS group commanders gained experience working directly alongside their SNOs, they achieved historic results. The success of the Flying Squadron of the Grand Fleet, the bombing of the Belgium coast by RNAS Dover-Dunkirk, and the integration of RNAS coastal stations into ASW, demonstrated how the

202  Conclusion RNAS practitioners learned to work closely alongside their Royal Navy counterparts. The Navy, for its part, supplied air-minded commanders who could champion the naval aviators and advance their requests for material and operational planning. By placing RNAS personnel directly on their staffs, the SNOs could, at least partially, remedy the development of intra-service confusion, but only if the RNAS practitioners could trust that their Royal Navy counterparts had their best interests at heart. Vice Admiral Reginald Bacon’s multiyear divergence of opinion with Wing Captain Charles Lambe perhaps best illustrates the frustration that could result from cross-purposes. While Lambe was a true proponent of long-range bombing, Bacon preferred developing aerial gunfire spotting techniques. The problem was resolved in January 1918 when Vice Admiral Roger Keyes replaced Bacon. Keyes and Lambe then formed an effective partnership and the bombing campaign accelerated. The case of the A/S campaign provides further examples of synergy: Admiral Alexander Bethell, the SNO Plymouth, worked closely with the RNAS South-West Group CO, Wing Captain Eugene Gerrard, to implement flying boat A/S patrols above the western approaches. Rear Admiral Stanley Colville, SNO Portsmouth, likewise, worked with the RNAS Channel Group CO, Wing Commander A. W. Bigsworth, to suppress the U-boat threat and protect the vital French coal trade. In the distant environs of Queenstown, Ireland, Vice Admiral Lewis Bayly, although initially skeptical about aerial support, later developed a cooperative relationship with Captain Hutch Cone, United States Navy. BrigadierGeneral Hugh Trenchard provides a counterexample: so focused on bombing at the operational and tactical scale that his Independent Force was never properly utilized. Unity of purpose within a changing wartime framework, with administrators coming and going amidst a flurry of technical innovations, would test the limits of any prewar doctrinal establishment, let alone a completely new form of warfare emerging from the chrysalis. The best naval aviation practitioners were able to use their experience and imagination to produce novel solutions to technical problems or simply provide the support staff and leadership required to press home what were, more often than not, immensely complicated combined operations. Commodore Sueter, for example, played an early role in the development of rigid airships, then established Britain’s anti-aircraft defences, and later worked on the development of torpedo-equipped aircraft for the fleet. Like Colonel Frederick Sykes, who was an enormously important figure in the development of prewar RFC training, doctrine, and an early practitioner of close air support and strategic bombing, Sueter’s contribution to Captain Paine’s Naval Wing portion of the joint RFC training manual should not be forgotten.7 DAS Vaughan-Lee, likewise, deserves credit for his work on the RNAS armament manual that reformed naval aviation training and weaponry during the crucial

Conclusion 203 summer of 1916. Rear Admiral Frederick Tudor, as Third Sea Lord, also contributed to the development of air defence and anti-Zeppelin armaments, and was involved in planning the futuristic, but ultimately unnecessary, Wilhelmshaven strike. Tudor, however, had opposed the development of fleet carriers, a policy his successor as Third Sea Lord, Rear Admiral Lionel Halsey, was keen to reverse. Wing Commander Samson, at the tactical level, may have started off as an experimental pilot at Eastchurch, but his role steadily evolved until his experience ranged from armoured car operations to seaplane carrier command, ultimately leading to RAF regional command in the A/S and air defence roles at NAS Great Yarmouth. Wing Commander Hugh Williamson’s contribution also encompassed the spectrum of naval aviation roles, from aircraft carrier development, gunfire spotting, to submarine hunting, and even operational research.8 Wing Commander Arthur Longmore, after establishing the all-important continental RNAS station at Dunkirk, found himself commanding a gun turret aboard HMS Tiger at the Battle of Jutland, before flying off to the Mediterranean to help Sueter prepare A/S measures.9 Flight Commander F. W. Bowhill (later Air Chief Marshal Bowhill) and Squadron Commander L’Estrange Malone, both commanders of North Sea seaplane carriers, were responsible for operationalizing the earliest naval airstrikes, supported by pilots and observers such as Flight Commander F. E. T. Hewlett and Lieutenant Erskine Childers, who collectively proved that (given favourable weather conditions) aircraft could act offensively with the fleet. Flight Commanders C. H. K. Edmonds and G. B. Dacre put the seaplane into action as a vehicle for torpedo delivery at the Dardanelles, and then contributed to gunfire spotting missions with the East Indies & Egypt Seaplane Squadron (EIESS). Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Bell Davies, Admiral Commanding Aircraft (ACA) Rear Admiral Richard Phillimore’s Senior Flying Officer (SFO), along with Colonel Robert Clark-Hall, Phillimore’s chief of staff, planned and executed the famous Tondern Raid of July 1918, demonstrating how far the technique of naval airstrike had been advanced by the RNAS, despite the pilots and aircraft having been transferred to the RAF’s jurisdiction. Third Sea Lord Halsey, and Captain Herbert Richmond, deserve credit for promoting the naval airstrike plan against Wilhelmshaven. It should also not be forgotten that it was Major Egbert Cadbury, formerly Flight Lieutenant RNAS, who destroyed L70, and the Zeppelin force commander Peter Strasser along with it. Not often mentioned is the number of practitioners who came from the Submarine Service or had prewar torpedo specialization. This group included Bacon, Sueter, Williamson, and Longmore, but also J. C. Porte of NAS Felixstowe fame. With careers spanning so many foundational components of emerging 20th-century naval warfare, understanding the contribution of each of these pioneers must be done with a holistic approach,

204  Conclusion to avoid the historiographical equivalent of missing the forest for the trees. This is not to denigrate the contribution of more specialized practitioners, however. As chairman of the Grand Fleet Air Committee (GFAC), Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas provided the fleet with a clear articulation of its air roles, although his involvement with naval aviation ended at that point. Likewise, Rear Admiral Phillimore’s Grand Fleet Air Orders (GFAOs) provided the Flying Squadron with its written responsibilities, setting the groundwork for naval aviation doctrine proper. Lt. Commander de Courcy Ireland pioneered the theory of aerial attack on ships in harbour in December 1915, a concept so far ahead of its time that Samson was still scratching away at a similar proposal three years later. Ireland’s death, alongside Wing Commander Usborne, meant the end of two promising naval aviation careers–a serious blow to the developmental side of the RNAS. Squadron Commander Edwin Dunning gave his life testing experimental landing techniques, ultimately leading to the development of safer carrier operations. Rear Admiral Horace Hood pioneered air reconnaissance during his operations along the Belgian coast, and demonstrated the potential of gunfire spotting, an essential element of the naval bombardment deployed at the Dardanelles the following year, but his death at Jutland meant no further role in RNAS history. Vice Admiral Sackville Carden, who devised a method of gunfire spotting from scratch prior to the Dardanelles bombardment, was shortly thereafter replaced by Rear Admiral John de Robeck and thus the full extent of his contribution has not generally been recognized. Commander Robert Clark-Hall operationalized Carden’s gunfire spotting theory aboard HMS Ark Royal at the opening of the naval bombardment; meanwhile, Squadron Commander Robert Gordon and Flight Lieutenant J. T. Cull demonstrated the viability of similar methods against the Königsberg – independent achievements that testify to the soundness of the RNAS’ unwritten doctrine. The well-known case of Flight Commander F.  J. Rutland, and his historic seaplane reconnaissance at Jutland, proved that aircraft could operate with the fleet in a major engagement, albeit in a limited capacity.10 Less well known is Wing Commander I. T. Courtney’s contribution to the Deck Landing Committee of November 1917, that paved the way for the integration of aircraft into the battle fleet. The efforts of Wing Commanders Edward Maitland and Neville Usborne toward the development of nonrigid airships paid dividends in the A/S campaign, as did Squadron Commander Theodore Hallam’s work on the ‘spider web’ patrols. Squadron Commander Reggie Marix executed a prototypical long-range bombing mission against Germany’s Zeppelin sheds, and then contributed to the training of pilots for Wing Captain Elder’s No. 3 Wing. Elder, for his part, demonstrated his

Conclusion 205 capacity for material development and staff work as Inspecting Captain of Aircraft before pioneering No. 3 Wing’s long-range bombing mission. Rear Admiral Phillimore’s development of the Flying Squadron from his flagship HMS Furious would not have been possible without the foresight of Grand Fleet C-in-C Admiral Sir David Beatty, who likewise deserves credit for convening the GFAC and advancing ASW. Training, good staff work, and the publication of literature became more essential as the war progressed, and here especially the contribution of the RNAS practitioners is evident. Captain Godfrey Paine oversaw the training of the entire RFC from inception until he was appointed to RNAS Cranwell. Paine, as Fifth Sea Lord, shouldered the burden for training and educating naval aviators, in particular, to support Jellicoe’s A/S agenda. Captain G. W. Vivian, in a narrower capacity, produced one of the earliest lectures on aerial ASW while he was commanding HMS Hermes in 1913, another example of multithematic practice. LieutenantCommander Richard C. M. Pink, who prepared the operation reports for Sueter and Vaughan-Lee in 1915, although almost totally unknown today, is significant for having started the collection of material that would make possible operational research when Williamson became head of the Air Section of the ASD. Captain A. V. Vyvyan, another significant staff officer working behind the scenes at the Air Department, provided a critical and continuous policy-link throughout the changing Air Department administrations. Vyvyan was an engine of work, organizing material and drafting schemes ranging from anti-Zeppelin operations to long-range bombing. Other unsung heroes of the maritime war were the regional SNOs, often the driving force behind not only aerial ASW but also Britain’s coastal defence. District officers such as Rear Admiral George Ballard, Rear Admiral Stuart Nicholson, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Callaghan, Admiral Sir Alexander Bethell, Rear Admiral Stanley Colville, Vice  Admiral Cecil Burney, and, of course, Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt (not to mention Bacon and Keyes) should feature prominently in any history of the RNAS and its contribution to the naval-air war. Rear Admiral George Hope of the Operations Division also deserves credit for proposing to Jellicoe that an Air Division of the staff should be established, and Brigadier-Generals Scarlett and Groves, who went on to lead that Air Division, were far more influential than history has thus far recorded, their contributions ranging from organising naval air stations to systematizing training manuals and advancing hydrophone technology. The myriad contributions of these naval aviation practitioners demonstrates that, in terms of the historiography of the RNAS, and Britain’s naval aviation development during the First World War in general, it is no longer enough to simply cite the well-worn cases of Churchill, Sueter, Tudor, Sykes, Samson, Rutland, Longmore, and Williamson.11 The modern researcher must move beyond the fragmentation of the specialized

206  Conclusion literature and commit to a broader prosopography, examining the RNAS and its personalities with holistic breadth.

Technical Innovation and Material Limitations While the administrators established and modified priorities, it remained for the RNAS practitioners, working with Britain’s aviation industry, to design and develop solutions that could fill these operational requirements. The impact of the RNAS on aviation technical development has been well recognized.12 After the declaration of the War Zone around Britain, First Sea Lord Fisher, who had been quick to realize the importance of aircraft for ASW, tasked Wing Commander Usborne to develop a technical response to the U-boat threat – the experimental Sea Scout blimps – an entirely new concept that had to be engineered from prefabricated components. Grand Fleet C-in-C Beatty’s plan to strike Wilhelmshaven in 1917 required devising torpedo-carrying airplanes, and the need to intercept high-flying Zeppelins and Gothas resulted in the development of triplane interceptors, capable of reaching altitude quickly. Despite the best efforts of the practitioners, however, certain strategic decisions sometimes simply outpaced the technology altogether, forcing reliance on daring or desperation instead. Examples include the RNAS attempt to find a means to attack Zeppelins without incendiary bullets, the establishment of No. 3 Wing prior to the delivery of its heavy bombers or Admiral Percy Scott’s jury-rigged anti-aircraft solutions that were, admittedly, unlikely to deter determined Zeppelin raiders. Technical specialists, who could navigate between the Naval Staff and the civilian firms, speeding development of key systems, or introducing new technological solutions, were as invaluable as experienced and courageous pilots to test new and often dangerous equipment. Technical setbacks and personnel losses could halt entire programs. The deaths of Wing Commander Usborne, Lt. Commander Ireland, Squadron Commander Dunning, and Flight Lieutenant Warneford all give testimony to the threadbare nature of war in the air more than a century ago. The talent and experience lost with each casualty simply could not be conveniently replaced. The RNAS practitioners always seemed to be playing catch-up. Constantly evolving technical requirements put extraordinary pressure on single firms and small design teams, or even individual designers, to an extent that with hindsight seems genuinely rash. Lieutenant C. D. Burney’s work on the prewar A/S committee never got the attention it deserved, nor did Williamson’s early work on aircraft carriers. Wing Captain Scarlett’s advocacy for hydrophone development, a system ultimately attached to coastal monitoring stations, destroyers, other A/S vessels, aircraft and airships, paved the way for the important AntiSubmarine Division Supersonics (ASDIC) of the future. Commander

Conclusion 207 Williamson made certain that the Blackburn Kangaroo became the most successful A/S aircraft of the war, but only in 1918 when the submarine crisis was receding. The Navy would have been hard-pressed to fight the war in the air without RNAS Warrant Officer F. W. Scarff’s ring for the Lewis gun, or his Scarff-Dibovsky machine gun interrupter gear.13 Likewise, the question of how the RNAS would have engaged in ASW in 1917 without Squadron Commander J. C. Porte and his flying boat designs, or without Holt Thomas, Captain David Norris, and Commander E. A. D. Masterman’s airships, is a serious reminder of the importance of cultivating redundant talent: efficiency in a technologically complex environment such as total war is not necessarily the advantage economists might contend. In 1915, there were simply not enough Sea Scout blimps available for A/S patrol and the Grand Fleet never received the rigid airships it desperately required for fleet work. Only a single seaplane carrier could be provided for the opening of the Dardanelles bombardment, a situation that was repeated at Jutland more than a year later. Aircraft engines were in such short supply that they had to be purchased from France and the United States. Low-quality incendiary ammunition allowed more than one Zeppelin to escape what should have been certain destruction. Outstanding leadership and technical wizardry could almost overcome material limitations, but even the best practitioners could not turn water into wine.

Conceptualizations of Naval Aviation During the First World War The core question this book sought to address was how naval aviation was appreciated and shaped by the Royal Navy’s practitioners and service administrators. The preceding chapters have developed the argument that the RNAS was profoundly influenced by the directives and theories of the naval and civilian leadership at the Admiralty and amongst the Air Department. Furthermore, although visionaries could imagine a future flush with aircraft, realizing this dream during wartime was a herculean challenge. The airplane and airship transformed the conduct of war on land and at sea, foremost by enabling the attack of military and industrial targets behind the trench-lines, and indeed on the homefront itself, while also offering fleet commanders new possibilities for airstrike and defence, including the potential to counter the introduction of the submarine, the ultimate weapon of trade destruction. For Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, and Commodore Murray Sueter, as the Director of the Air Department, aviation was a novel element of naval power, combining traditional naval functions, such as coastal reconnaissance and defence from invasion, with the offensive possibilities that seemed to mirror late 19th century thinking

208  Conclusion amongst France’s jeune ecole and Britain’s Young Turk counterparts.14 Comparatively inexpensive weapons systems could perhaps be employed to upset the dominance of the Navy’s white elephants.15 Aircraft and airships could strike naval targets in their defended harbours, offering the Royal Navy – or any military organization that utilized them – the ability to extend traditional naval concepts such as blockade and coastal raids even as far as the enemy’s cities.16 The Navy’s aircraft offered the only defence against such attacks: that all of this was perceived before war broke out in 1914 may come as a surprise. The Royal Navy adopted aircraft and airships in a similar fashion to the other technical systems that had relentlessly transformed the Navy’s material foundations over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries. From shell firing guns to steam power, iron armour to self-­propelled torpedoes, electric power, W/T, and the submarine, aeronautics was viewed as the next step in a logical progression of innovation. Aerial warfare, however, also heralded a more fundamental revolution: the independent offensive in the air. In the total war calculus of attrition and aerial bombing, the RNAS offered the only means of countering Germany’s Zeppelin raiders – by providing the only reasonable means of retaliation (Sir John Fisher’s other option, executing prisoners, was deemed unacceptable).17 The promise of industrial bombing might even hasten the impact of the naval blockade. Airships and airplanes, in their most significant role, provided protection for Britain’s merchant convoys, statistically guaranteeing the safety of coastal and eventually oceanic trade. Germany’s U-boats soon found their freedom of action restricted by aircraft patrols and submarine crews could not loiter on the surface without some degree of risk – except at night. Submarines caught on the surface by aircraft were exposed to immediate attack and had to assume their position would be reported to nearby destroyers for further pursuit. So revolutionary was naval aviation, in fact, that within the Royal Navy itself, a number of practitioners, including Commodore Sueter, Admiral Kerr, Commodore Paine, Captain Vyvyan, and others, became motive forces behind the ideas of the airpower futurists in the Army, RFC, and amongst the civilian leadership. The vision of these futurists was that a unified air force would eventually surpass the older services altogether. Without these key naval advocates of unification, the RAF might never have been created. Whether these individuals were accurate in their beliefs is another matter, but what can be said is that, through their advocacy for air unity and independence, war itself was fundamentally transformed, and any future conflict, at sea or otherwise, would undoubtedly require a significant number of aircraft, pilots, and their supporting bases and training infrastructure. Historians have perhaps overstated the immediate impact of the formation of the RAF on naval affairs, as the ongoing contribution of the

Conclusion 209 former naval squadrons to long-range bombing, ASW, air defence, and fleet work, carried on essentially as before. A final point, in this regard, is the inverse: the impact of the RNAS on the RAF, which has been almost totally ignored, given the confrontational inter-service rivalry that emerged immediately after the war. Yet, it was the RNAS that had pioneered industrial bombing, and developed Britain’s first air defence network, both core components of the RAF’s mission after 1919. The fundamental error in the formation of the RAF was the assumption that a unified air service could do whatever the RFC and RNAS had done before. Although the former RNAS officers and personnel maintained their service duties in the final months of the war, the tightening budgets and postwar rivalry put the naval aviators at a terminal disadvantage, with no recourse elsewhere if their material requirements were not met. For the Royal Navy, the RAF’s control of naval aviation became an albatross that threatened to dramatically weaken Britain’s maritime defence, thus establishing the roots of a conflict that has persisted to the present day. The tragedy in the history of the RNAS is thus its final demise. After the wartime struggle to build capability, the Navy’s airplanes, stations, and officers (but not its airships or aircraft carriers) were all lost to the RAF. The long-term negative impact of this decision on the interwar development of naval aviation in Britain is now well established.18 Whatever savings were prophesied to occur through the unity of the air under a single service were offset by the need to finance, with shriveled postwar budgets, three separate military organizations.19 But none of this was known to be the fate of Britain’s naval aviation in the fall of 1918, let alone in the fall of 1914. That certain RNAS wartime roles have subsequently been perceived as aberrations, or of purely experimental value, is to misjudge the Navy’s interest in aerial warfare, as well as the interrelated nature of air defence and offensive.20 Aircraft, although they may have entered naval service as uncertain reconnaissance auxiliaries, evolved, over the course of the war, into an entirely new form of warfare. In short, Britain’s naval aviation development during the First World War impacted every aspect of the war at sea, and beyond.

Notes 1. Oliver Swann, ‘Naval Air Requirements’ in NRJ, vol. 7, no. 3, 1919, pp. 305–13. See also, Grove, ‘The Naval Aviation Controversy, 1919–1939’, pp. 113–6. 2. Pugh, ‘Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p. 345. 3. Higham, The British Rigid Airship, p. 94. 4. Admiralty Weekly Order No. 1204/15, 29 July 1915, ADM 1/8408, #72 in Roskill, Documents, pp. 212–3. 5. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, p. 361. 6. Roskill, Documents, pp. xvi–ii, 453.

210  Conclusion 7. Pugh, ‘Oil and Water’, pp. 131, 135–6. 8. Haslop, Early Naval Air Power, pp. 105–6. 9. Longmore, From Sea to Sky, pp. 45–77. 10. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 184. 11. Roskill, Documents, pp. xiii–xvii. Abbatiello, ‘Doctrinal Innovation in the Royal Naval Air Service’, pp. 35–45. Pugh, ‘Oil and Water’, pp. 132–8. Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, pp. 302–8. 12. Goulter, ‘Royal Naval Air Service’, pp. 51–65. 13. Jones, WIA, vol. II, pp. 163–4. 14. Peter Padfield, ‘The Submarine as Commerce Raider’, in Dreadnought to Daring: 100 Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in The Naval Review, ed. Peter Hore (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2012), pp. 95–8. 15. Arne Roksund, The Jeune Ecole: The Strategy of the Weak (Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. x–xi. 16. Marder, FDSF, vol. I, pp. 337–9. 17. Freeman, Tempestuous Genius, Chapter 23, loc. 4948–64. 18. Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, p. 189. 19. Anthony Cumming, The Battle for Britain: Interservice Rivalry between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, 1909–40, Kindle ebook (­Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), Chapter 10, loc. 3490. 20. Pulsipher, ‘Aircraft and the Royal Navy’, pp. 356–9.

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Bibliography 213 /625/17/12 - Report from Colonel F. H. Sykes, RFC, on the subject of RNAS units & aerial requirements of the Naval & Military Forces at Dardanelles, 9 July 1915. /626/17/46 - Appendix No. 1. Report of Captain of Hermes on Use of Aircraft During Manoeuvres. In W. H. May’s Report, August 1913. /626/17/59 - Air Division, ‘Reports of Naval Air Operations’. /626/17/88 - Air Department, Aeroplanes for Naval Service, 1913. /633 - RNAS Dunkirk Report on bombing raid by No. 5 Wing RNAS in Cooperation with RFC on Ghistelles Aerodrome, 3–20 September 1916. /633/17/122/87 - RNAS Dunkirk Report on bombing raid by No. 5 Wing RNAS in cooperation with Royal Flying Corps on Ghistelles Aerodromes, 3 September 1916. /635/17/122/117 - Orders re. Aircraft Patrols issued to Air Stations under Command of R. A. C. East Coast, 16 August 1916. /637/17/122/153 - RNAS Yarmouth to C-in-C Lowestoft, Report on destruction of Zeppelin L22, 14 May 1917. /638 - Commanding Officer Handley Page Squadron to Wing Captain Elder, raid night of 5–6 April 1917. /640 - Orders and reports by Wing Captain Lambe while head of RNAS Dover-Dunkirk - Wing Captain Lambe to Commodore Dunkirk and Vice Admiral Dover Patrol, 31 October 1917. /641 - Rear Admiral Commanding East Coast of England to Admiralty, No. 1634/W.548/14, 19 May 1917. - Director Operations Division, Rear-Admiral P. W. Hope minute to Vice-Admiral Bacon’s cover-letter attached to Wing Captain Lambe’s report on offensive operations at Dunkerque, 10 June 1917. - DOD Hope and DASD Fisher minute to Vice-Admiral Bacon’s letter of 4 July 1917. /641/17/122/223 - Rear Admiral East Coast, Suggested new scheme of aerial patrols on the East Coast, 18 May 1917. /642 - R. M. Groves, Director Air Division, minute to: Hugh Williamson, Employment of Aeroplanes for Anti-Submarine Work. 26 August 1918, AD 3845. /642/17/122/252 - Hugh Williamson, Employment of Aeroplanes for Anti-Submarine Work, 14 August 1918. /644/17/122/292 - SW Group Patrol Orders, 1 September 1917. /648 - Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas to Admiral Beatty, Air Requirements of the Grand Fleet, 5 February 1917. - Report of Committee on Royal Naval Air Service. (H.F.0036/212 of 26th January 1917).

214  Bibliography - Admiralty notes on Grand Fleet Air Committee Report. 3 March 1917. - Rear-Admiral Vaughan-Lee to DNC, 11 May 1916. - Armstrong Naval Yard, High Walker, Newcastle-on-Tyne, to S. V. Goodall, Esquire, 27 February 1917. /648/17/122/385 - Captain L. S. Stansfeld, The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Anti-Aircraft Corps, May 1919. /656 - Henry Oliver to First Sea Lord, 15 December 1916. /659 - Commander Ireland’s report to R. N. Air Station, Great Yarmouth, 20 December 1915. - Memo by H. A. Williamson, ‘Torpedo Attack on German Fleet by Aircraft Proposals by Sqdn. CDR. Ireland’, Ireland (RNAS CO, Great Yarmouth) to Vaughan-Lee (DAS), 29 December 1915. - Flight Commander Brooke aboard HMS Empress to Officer Commanding East Indies & Egypt Seaplane Squadron, May 13, 1915. - RNAS Portsmouth Group, General Report of Work Carried out during year 1917, 2 December 1917. /662 - Committee on Deck Landing, Preliminary Report, 17 December 1917. - Wing Captain Lambe to VA Dover Patrol, 10 January 1918. /662/17/122/671 - Captain C. Fuller, Director of Plans, 14 January 1918, coversheet to VA Dover requirements for Dover. /672 - Orders and reports by Wing Captain Lambe while head of RNAS Dover-Dunkirk. - Commodore Murray Sueter, Operations Order A.D. No. 15, Orders for Naval Air Service Units Based at Dunkirk, 21 June 1915. /675/21/13/1385 - J. C. Nerney, ‘History of the Anti-Submarine Campaign, 1914-1917’. /677/21/13/1901 - Development and Operations of the Royal Naval Air Service in Home Waters, Fleet Co-operation, Pt. I, January 1917 to April 1918. /677/21/13/1902 - Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch. The RNAS in Home Waters. January 1917 – April 1918, Part II: Submarine Campaign. /695 - No. 203 Squadron, Royal Air Force. (Formerly No. 2 Squadron, RNAS) /725/106/1 - Wing Commander J. T. Cull, History of RNAS operations in East Africa, November 1914 to January 1917. /726/137/1 - Lt. Col. L. H. Strain’s 1923 notes on Ark Royal gunfire spotting, March 1915. /785/204/558 - Sykes, Training Manual AP 144, Royal Flying Corps, Part II, Military Wing, 1915.

Bibliography 215 /824/204/5/71 - Admiralty Air Department, Training Manual Part II (Naval Wing), 1914. /978/204/5/1139 - GHQ Directive, 3 June 1916. /2105 - RNAS Anti-Submarine Reports, June 1917–March 1918. /2107/207/42 - History of No. 3 Wing, RNAS, undated. /2115/207/56/1 - Report of the Aircraft Bombing Committee of Effects of Bombing in Belgium and Enemy Defensive Measures, March 1919. /2266 - Wing Captain Elder, summary of No. 3 Wing history, 24 May 1917. - Wing Captain Elder, Appendix II, Summary of Raids Carried out by No. 3 Wing, RNAS, between 30th July 1916 and 14 April 1917. - Notes on report of bombing operations of No. 3 Wing RNAS in France during winter 1916/1917. - No. 3 Wing Operations in France, Admiralty War Staff (O.D.) March 1917. /2301 - 10 June 1920, ‘Some personal notes – 1914–1915, RNAS by Group Captain, E. L. Gerrard. /2319 - Minutes of the JWAC meeting, 6 March 1916. - Churchill statement, War Council, Notes from a meeting held at 10 Downing St. on 1 Dec. 1914. - War Committee minutes, 10 February 1916. - Machines Available, Naval, Joint War Air Committee, 29 February 1916. - Policy of Army Council with Regard to Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing), JWAC, 2 March 1916. - Table 2, Policy of the RNAS, Joint War Air Committee, March 1916. - Joint War Air Committee, Interim Report, 20 March 1916. - Director Air Services, Present Deficiencies and Future Requirements of the Royal Naval Air Service, Joint War Air Committee, 22 March 1916. - Use of Explosive Bullets against Hostile Airships. Memorandum by the Chairman of the Air Board, 20 July 1916. /2321/223/41/885 - Notes on the Co-operation of Aircraft with Surface Craft for Escorting Convoys of Merchant Ships. /2440 - Director Air Department, Air Service Estimates, 22 January 1914. /2496 - Winston Churchill, Tactical Objects for which Naval Seaplanes are required, First Lord minute, 26 October 1913. /2577 - Early Submissions made by Air Depart. to Obtain Suitable Seaplane-Carrying Ships, 1915. - R. C. M. Pink to DAS, Royal Naval Air Service, Communique No. 3, 22 December 1915.

216  Bibliography AIR 2 Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence files /35 - Statement of policy and duties of the Royal Naval Air Service for production at the Joint War Air Committee, 28 February 1916. /123 - Proposals for bombing of blast furnaces in France, Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine. AIR 6 Air Board Minutes /1 - Captain A. L. Ellison, R.N. statement at 24 May 1916 meeting of Air Board. - Commander Smyth Osbourne’s statement at the Air Board meeting of 24 May 1916. - Minutes of the First Meeting of the Air Board, 22 May 1916. /4 - Thirty Second Meeting of the Air Board, 3 January 1917. AIR 27 Air Ministry, Operations Records /1332/1 - Operation Record Book, No. 216 Squadron, RAF, Late No. 16 Squadron, RNAS, 1939. AIR 10 Ministry of Defence and predecessors: Air Publications and Reports /117 - Naval Air Service Training Manual, November 1914. /179 - Wing Commander Sykes, Training Manual Royal Flying Corps, Part I, May 1914. /860 - Notes on the Co-operation of Aircraft with surface craft for Escorting Convoys of Merchant Ships, Air Division, Naval Staff, December 1918. ADM 1 Admiralty Correspondence and Papers /8408/7 - Director Air Department, Murray Sueter, Administrative changes and discipline of the Royal Naval Air Service, 5 January 1915. - Admiralty Weekly Orders, Naval Air Service – Re-organisation, M.0160/15, 27 January 1915. - Oliver Schwann, ADAD, Changes in Administration of the Naval Air Service: Report of Committee, 4 January 1915. /8449 - Conclusion of the Second Meeting, held at 2 Whitehall Hardens, S. W., on Monday, February 28, 1916. /8449/39A - Policy of RNAS, Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee, 1916. - Memorandum of Meeting Held in Second Sea Lord’s Room, 21 March 1916. - Admiralty document on RNAS bombing, 25 February 1916. - Vaughan-Lee, Director Air Services to the Chief of Staff, Henry Oliver, 17 February 1916. - Vaughan-Lee minute on RNAS Establishment, 15 March 1916. - Vaughan-Lee to Henry Oliver, 4 April 1916. /8478/10 - RNAS Policy and Development, Paine reply, 30 January 1917. - Director Air Services Commodore Godfrey Paine to Admiralty, Royal Naval Air Service, Policy and Development, 21 January 1917.

Bibliography 217 /8486/82 - Flight Commander P. Holmes, report of patrol in H12 No. 8661, Felixstowe, 30 April 1917. /8504 - Beatty’s draft of the ACA functions, 29 December 1917. /8508/285 - G. Hope, Director Operations Division, Proposed Establishment of an Air Division, 19 December 1917. /8525/136 - Colonel C. R. Samson, Suggested Aeroplane Offensive, 4 May 1918. /8540/258 - Colonel Samson (No. 4 Group) to SNO Shotley, Operations which could be carried out by aircraft in Harwich Command in 1920, 14 September 1918. - Colonel Williamson (No. 18 Group) to VA East Coast of Scotland, 22 September 1918. - C-in-C Nore to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 30 September 1918. - Brigadier-General Lambe (No. 5 Group) to VA Dover Patrol, 21 September 1918. /8549/13 - Appreciation of British Naval Effort during the War. Role of the RNAS, 16 January 1919. /8550/28 - Future Distribution of Aircraft Carriers, 2 February 1919. ADM 53 Ship’s logs /34046 - Log of HMS Argus, 14 September 1918 to 31 January 1919. /34098 - Log of HMS Ark Royal, 9 December 1914 to 30 April 1915. ADM 116 Admiralty Records, Cases /1342 - Airships Instructions, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, 24 January 1917. Admiral Beatty, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, 22 July 1917 & 5 September 1917. Grand Fleet Battle Instructions, Instructions for Aircraft, 1 January 1918. ADM 137 Admiralty Records used for Official History /401 - Admiral David Beatty, Grand Fleet Air Orders, 14 March 1918. /876 - Grand Fleet, Reports of Proceedings, October – December 1917. /877 - Grand Fleet, Reports of Proceedings, 1918. /1938 - Secret packs of the C-in-C Grand Fleet, volume 58. /2008 - Orders and Memoranda issued by the Commander-inChief Grand Fleet for General Distribution, 1916, 1 April to 30 June, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, 2 April 1916. /2213 - Captain-in-Charge Lowestoft and Yarmouth to Admiralty, 28 April 1915. - C-in-C Lowestoft to Admiralty, 20 February 1915.

218  Bibliography - Commander H. C. Cherbrooke SNO Great Yarmouth to Captainin-Charge Lowestoft, 18 August 1915. - H.M. Naval Base, Great Yarmouth, reports, 29 January 1915. - Lieutenant Colonel commanding 1/25 Cyclist Battalion to Captain-in-Charge Lowestoft, 25 September 1915. - H. G. Sherbrooke C-in-C Yarmouth Naval Base to Lowestoft, forwarded to Director Admiralty Intelligence Division, 18 October 1915. - C-in-C Lowestoft to Commander, RNAS Great Yarmouth, 27 November 1915. - C-in-C Lowestoft & Yarmouth to Admiralty, 20 February 1916. - Lieutenant Commander HMS Dryad to C-in-C Lowestoft, 1 April 1916. - Flight Sub-Lieutenant F. Reeves to CO Air Stations Great Yarmouth, 26 April 1916. - Flight Sub-Lieutenant G. W. Fane to CO Naval Air Station Great Yarmouth, 26 April 1916. /2237 - Yarmouth & Lowestoft Base Records, 1914–1918, vol 1. /2241 - Lieutenant Commander O. F. Murray, Harwich, to Admiral of Patrols, Immingham, 7 June 1915. /2278 - Dunkirk, Commodores Records, No. 11. - SNO Dunkirk to Sub-Chief General Staff, 27 October 1915. /2710 - Plans Division: war records, Volume 5, Lambe to Keyes Report, ‘The general effects of Offensive Operations carried out by Bomb-dropping in aircraft’, 3 February 1918. /2715 - The structure of the Anti-Submarine Division, n.d. [January 1918]. /4055 - Grand Fleet Battle Instructions, January 1, 1918. - Grand Fleet Battle Instructions, November 25, 1918. /4297 - Report of Fregatten-Kapitan Looff, 11 July 1915, p.  2. German Narrative of Events leading up to the loss of the ‘Koenigsberg’. ADM 167 Admiralty Board Minutes /47 - Admiralty Board Minutes, Wednesday, 29 October 1913. /49 - Admiralty Board Minutes, 9 July 1915. - Admiralty Board Minutes, 18 June 1915. - Admiralty Board Minutes, 10 September 1915. - Admiralty Board Minutes, 25 November 1915. /50 - Admiralty Board Minutes, Friday, 4 February 1916. /51 - Admiralty Board Minutes, Wednesday 31 January 1917. ADM 186 Admiralty Publications /66 - ‘C.B. 973. Naval War Manual’ Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division, 1925 October. /165 - Director Air Services, Handbook of Aircraft Armament, July 1916, C.B. 1161.

Bibliography 219 /595 - ‘Grand Fleet Battle Orders. Volume I. August 1914 to May 31st, 1916’ & ‘Grand Fleet Battle Orders, Part VII. Sheets issued between Jan. 1916 and May 1916’. /596 - Seaplane Carriers, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, 5 January 1917. ADM 196 Officers’ Service Records /20/469 - Service record of Reginald H. S. Bacon. /40/84 - Service record of Cecil Burney. /42 - Service record of Mark Edward Frederic Kerr. /42/357 - Service record of Henry Francis Oliver. /44 - Service record of Charles L. Lambe. /44/131 - Service record of Francis R. Scarlett. /47/131 - Service record of Neville F. Usborne. /87/95 - Service record of Reginald H. S. Bacon. /89 - Service record of Gerald W. Vivian. /125/33 - Service record of Francis R. Scarlett. /126/30 - Service record of Robert Hamilton Clark-Hall. /141 - Service record of Francis R. Scarlett. /143/234 - Service record of John Cyril Porte. ADM 273 Royal Naval Air Service Registers. /2/17 - Service record of John Cyril Porte. /2/27 - Service record of W. P. de Courcy Ireland. /2/35 - Service record of Henry P. Smyth-Osbourne. /2/44 - Service record of William Leslie Elder. /2/40 - Service record of Robert Marsland Groves. /8/193 - Service record of Reginald Alexander John Warneford. /31/5 - Service record of Robert Gordon. /31/26 - Service record of John Cyril Porte. CAB 14 Cabinet Records, Committee of Imperial Defence /1 - Air Committee Minutes, 1912–1914. CAB 23 War Cabinet Minutes, 1917 /3/17 - Appendix, Cabinet Committee War Policy on Long-Distance Bombing Operations, War Cabinet 169, 26 June 1917. - Appendix I & II. Report on Long-Distance Bombing Operations War Cabinet 169, 20 & 22 June 1917. /4/2 - War Cabinet Minutes 228, 5 September 1917. /4/21 - Air Raids and Bombing of Germany, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet, 9 October 1917. CAB 24 War Cabinet Minutes, 1916 /2/9 - Major-General Henderson, Duties of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, 28 January 1916. /20/53 - War Cabinet Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence Against Air-Raids, First Report, 11 July 1917. CAB 42 War Council & Successors, Copies of Minutes /2/19 - Minutes of the War Council meeting, 14 May 1915.

220  Bibliography /8/2 - Major-General Henderson, Duties of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, 28 January 1916. /8/5 - Duties of the Royal Naval Air Service and The Royal Flying Corps, War Committee Minutes, 10 February 1916. - Prime Minister’s statement, War Committee minutes, 10 February 1916. - Duties of the Royal Naval Air Service and The Royal Flying Corps, War Committee Minutes, 10 February 1916. /11/11 - List of Committees appointed to consider Questions arising during the Present War, 31 March 1916, CAB 42, p. 27. /15/16 - British Merchant Vessels Lost by Hostile Action, August 1914 – May 1916. /26/1 - Memorandum for the War Committee: Long-Range Bombing Operations by Aircraft, 9 November 1916. - Rear Admiral Tudor’s statement, Minutes of the One Hundred and Forty-First meeting of the War Committee, 28 November 1916. MUN 4 Ministry of Munitions Records /2424 - Specially Selected .303-inch ammunition for Royal Naval Air Service, 10 October 1916. Churchill College, Cambridge DRBK 4/3 - Vice Admiral Commanding Eastern Squadron Mediterranean, Carden, Orders for forcing of the Dardanelles by the Allied Squadron, HMS Queen Elizabeth, 14 February 1915. HOOD 5/1 - Important Signals Made and Received, 25 October 1914, Rear-Admiral Hood. WLMN 1/1 - Aeroplanes for Naval Service, Hugh Williamson, March 1912. - ‘The Aeroplane in Use Against Submarines’ Group Captain Hugh Williamson Papers. /4 - Williamson’s Dardanelles diary. National Maritime Museum, Greenwich BTY/7/3/4 - Selections from Grand Fleet Battle Instructions. DEY/34 - The Flying Boat, draft article by Narbeth, 1 January 1924. DEY/95 - DNC’s Department, Admiralty, Aircraft Carriers, Part I: 1914–1918, January 1919. VIV/7 - Vivian’s list of the chief engineers in the Air Department, 1916.

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Books & Edited Volumes Abbatiello, John J. Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I: British Naval Aviation and the Defeat of the U-Boats. New York: Routledge, 2006. Abbott, Patrick. The British Airship at War, 1914–1918. Lavenham: Terence Dalton Ltd., 1989. Adlam, Henry. The Disastrous Fall and Triumphant Rise of the Fleet Air Arm from 1912–1945 (Ebook). Kindle ebook. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2014. Air Staff, Ministry of Defence. British Air and Space Power Doctrine: AP 3000.Fourth Edition. Shrivenham, Swindon: Ministry of Defence, 2009. Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Second Edition. New York: Longman, 1999. Anon.The Naval Who’s Who, 1917. Polstead: J. B. Hayward & Son, 1981. Ash, Eric. Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912–1918. Cass Series: Studies in Air Power 8. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999. Ashmore, E. B. Air Defence. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1929. Aspinall-Oglander, C. F. Gallipoli, Volume I: Inception of the Campaign to May 1915. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Reprint. Official History of the Great War, Military Operations. Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., 1929. ———. Gallipoli, Volume II: May 1915 to the Evacuation. Vol. 2. 2 vols. Reprint. Official History of the Great War, Military Operations. Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., 1931. ———. Roger Keyes: Being the Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes of Zeebrugge and Dover. London: The Hogarth Press, 1951. Bacon, Reginald. Benin, The City of Blood. London: Arnold, 1897. ———. The Dover Patrol 1915–1917. Vol. 1. 2 Vols. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1919. ———. The Dover Patrol 1915–1917. Vol. 2. 2 Vols. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1919. ———. The Life of John Rushworth, Earl Jellicoe. Kindle ebook. Arcole Publishing, 2017, originally published in 1936. Balfour, Arthur. The Navy and the War, August 1914 to August 1915. Kindle ebook. London: Darling and Son, Ltd., 1915. Barker, Ralph. A Brief History of the Royal Flying Corps in World War I. London: Constable & Robinson Ltd., 2002. Bartlett, C. P. O. Bomber Pilot 1916–1918. Edited by Chaz Bowyer. London: Ian Allan Ltd., 1974. Beaverbrook, Lord. Politicians and the War, 1914–1916. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1928. ———. Men and Power, 1917–1918. London: Hutchinson, 1956. Beesly, Patrick. Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914–1918. London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1982. Belafi, Michael. The Zeppelin. Translated by Cordula Werschkun. Ebook. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2015.

224  Bibliography Bell, A. C. The Blockade of Germany, and of the countries associated with her in the great war, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, 1914–1918. Reprint. Uckfield: Naval & Military Press Ltd., 1937. Bell, Christopher M. Churchill and Sea Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. ———. Churchill and the Dardanelles. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017. Bell Davies, Richard. Sailor in the Air: The Memoirs of the World’s First Carrier Pilot. Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2008. Benbow, Tim, ed. The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs. London: Chrysalis Books Group, 2004. ———. British Naval Aviation: The First 100 Years. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011. ———. Naval Warfare 1914–1918. Kindle ebook. The History of World War I. London: Amber Books Ltd., 2011. Bewsher, Paul. ‘Green Balls’: The Adventures of a Night-Bomber. London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1919. Bilbe, Tina. Kingsnorth Airship Station: In Defence of the Nation. Kindle ebook. The History Press, 2014. Black, Nicholas. The British Naval Staff in the First World War. Rochester: Boydell & Brewer Inc., 2011. Brett, R. Dallas. The History of British Aviation, 1908–1914. Vol. 1. 2 vols. London: The Aviation Book Club, 1933. ———. The History of British Aviation, 1908–1914. Combined ed. Surrey: Air Research Publications, 1988. Brock, Michael, and Eleanor Brock, eds. H. H. Asquith Letters to Venetia Stanley. Oxford University Press, 1985. Bromet, G. R. ed. Naval Eight. Reprint. Suffolk: The Signal Press Ltd., 1931. Brooks, John. The Battle of Jutland. Cambridge University Press, 2016. Brooks, Peter W. Zeppelin: Rigid Airships 1893–1940. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992. Burns, Ian M. Ben-my-Chree, Woman of My Heart: Isle of Man Packet Steamer and Seaplane Carrier. Leicester: Colin Huston, 2008. ———. The RNAS and the Birth of the Aircraft Carrier, 1914–1918. Ebook. Oxford: Fonthill, 2014. Butterfield, Herbert. The Whig Interpretation of History. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1965. Campbell, John. Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting. First edition. New York: Lyons Press, 1998. Castle, Ian. British Airships, 1905–1930. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009. ———. The Zeppelin Base Raids: Germany 1914. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2011. ———. The First Blitz: Bombing London in the First World War. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2015. Chichering, Roger. Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Churchill, Randolph S. Winston S. Churchill: Young Statesman, 1901–1914. Kindle ebook. Vol. 2. 8 Vols. Hillsdale, Michigan: Hillsdale College Press, 2015.

Bibliography 225 Churchill, Winston. The World Crisis: 1911–1914. Kindle ebook. Vol. 1. 5 vols. New York: RosettaBooks, LLC, 2013, originally published in 1923. ———. The World Crisis: Part II, 1915. Kindle ebook. Vol. 2. 5 vols. New York: RosettaBooks, LLC, 2013, originally published in 1923. ———. The World Crisis: Part III, 1916–1918. Kindle ebook. Vol. 3. 5 vols. New York: RosettaBooks, LLC, 2013, originally published in 1927. ———. The World Crisis: Part IV, The Aftermath. Kindle ebook. Vol. 4. 5 vols. New York: RosettaBooks, LLC, 2013, originally published in 1929. Clark-Hall, R. H., and J. L. Clark-Hall. Air Marshal Sir Robert Clark-Hall, K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O. Christchurch, New Zealand: The Raven Press Co. Ltd., 1995. Cliffe, Steve. Churchill, Kitchener and Lloyd George: First World Warlords. Kindle ebook. Oxford: Fonthill Media, Ltd., 2014. Cole, Christopher, and E. F. Cheesman. The Air Defence of Britain 1914–1918. London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1984. Colledge, J. J., and Ben Warlow. Ships of the Royal Navy, The Complete Record of All Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy. Philadelphia & Newbury: Casemate, 2010. Cooke, David. Sky Battle: 1914–1918, The Story of Aviation in World War I. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970. Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986. Corbett, Julian. Naval Operations. Vol. 1. 5 vols. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. Reprint. Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published in 1920. ———. Naval Operations. Vol. 2. 5 vols. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. Reprint. Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published in 1921. ———. Naval Operations. Vol. 3. 5 vols. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents. Reprint. Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., originally published in 1923. ———. Principles of Maritime Strategy. Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004. Creagh, O’Moore and E. M. Humpris. The V.C. and D.S.O. Book. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Naval & Military Press reprint, London: The Standard Art Book Co. Ltd., 1920. Cronin, Dick. Royal Navy Shipboard Aircraft Developments, 1912–1931. Tonbridge: Air Britain (Historians) Ltd., 1990. Cumming, Anthony J. The Battle for Britain: Interservice Rivalry between the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, 1909–40. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015. D’Eyncourt, Eustace Tennyson. A Shipbuilder’s Yarn, the Record of a Naval Constructor. London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1948. Darling, Kev. Fleet Air Arm Carrier War: The History of British Naval Aviation. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2009. Dunn, Steve. Securing The Narrow Sea: The Dover Patrol, 1914–1918. Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2017. ———. Bayly’s War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2018. Easdown, Martin, and Thomas Genth. A Glint in the Sky: German Air Attacks on Folkestone, Dover, Ramsgate, Margate and Sheerness During the First World War. Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005.

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Articles & Book Chapters Abbatiello, John J. ‘Doctrinal Innovation in the Royal Naval Air Service: Samson, Longmore, and Williamson.’ Journal of the Australian Naval Institute. No. 132 (April 2009): 35–45. ———. ‘The Myths and Realities of Air Anti-Submarine Warfare during the Great War.’ Air Power Review. Vol. 12. No. 1 (2009): 14–31.

236  Bibliography Acland, W. R. D. ‘The Development of the Fleet Air Arm.’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institution. Vol. 79. No. 514 (1934): 260–79. Baddeley, V. W., and Halpern, Paul G. ‘Burney, Sir Cecil, First Baronet (1858– 1929), Naval Officer.’ The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press, 2004. ———, and Marc Brodie. ‘Halsey, Sir Lionel (1972–1949), Naval Officer.’ The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press, 2004. Beach, Jim. ‘Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British GHQ, 1917– 1918.’ War in History. Vol 19. No. 4 (November 2012): 464–91. Benbow, Tim. ‘Brothers in Arms: The Admiralty, the Air Ministry, and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1940–1943.’ Global War Studies. Vol. 11. No. 1 (2014): 41–88. Boothby, F. L. M. ‘Aircraft for Sea Service.’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institution. Vol. 56. No. 1 (June 1912): 751– 80. Bullen, John. ‘The Royal Navy and Air Power: The Projected Torpedo-Bomber Attack on the High Seas Fleet at Wilhelmshaven in 1918.’ Imperial War Museum Review. Vol. 2 (1987). Burney, C. D. ‘Air Power.’ Naval Review Journal. Vol. 1. No. 2 (1913): 57–75. Burns, Ian M. ‘Woman of My Heart – The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part I.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol. 6. No. 4 (Winter 1975): 145–57. ———. ‘Woman of My Heart – The Story of Ben-my-Chree, Part II.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol 7. No. 1 (Spring 1976): 1–12. ———. ‘Some Raid That, By Cripes! HMS Furious and the Tondern Raid, Part 1, 19 July 1918.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol 49. No. 2 (Summer 2018): 83–109. ———. ‘Some Raid That, By Cripes! HMS Furious and the Tondern Raid, Part 2, 19 July 1918.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol 49. No. 3 (Autumn 2018): 169–96. Burns, Ian M., and Roger Nailer. ‘HMS Vindex – Mixed Carrier 1915–1919.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol. 17. No. 3 (1986): 97–111. Chilton, Edward. ‘Rear Admiral Sir Murray Sueter, CB.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol. 15. No. 2 (Summer 1984): 49–55. Cooper, Malcolm. ‘Blueprint for Confusion: The Administrative Background to the Formation of the Royal Air Force, 1912–1919.’ Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 22. No. 3 (July 1, 1987): 437–53. ———. ‘The British Experience of Strategic Bombing.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol. 17. No. 2 (Summer 1986): 49–61. Cronin, Dick. ‘Tondern: Prelude, Climax and Aftermath.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal, Vol. 25. No. 2 (Summer 1994): 57–68. d’Ombrain, Nicolas J. ‘Churchill at the Admiralty and the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1911–1914.’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institution. Vol. 115. No. 657 (1970): 38–41. Douglas, W. A. B. ‘The RNAS in Combined Operations 1914–1915.’ In Dreadnought to Polaris: Maritime Strategy since Mahan, edited by A. M. J. Hyatt, 19–29. Vancouver: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1973. Dunley, R. ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Pre-First World War Royal Navy: A Cultural Failure?’ War in History. February 2019: 1–26. Ferris, John. ‘“Airbandit”: C3I and Strategic Air Defence during the First Battle of Britain, 1915–1918.’ In Strategy & Intelligence: British Policy During the First World War, 23–66. London: The Hambledon Press, 1996.

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Bibliography 239 Marder, Arthur. ‘The Dardanelles Revisited: Further Thoughts on the Naval Prelude.’ In Dreadnought to Polaris: Maritime Strategy since Mahan, edited by A. M. J. Hyatt, 30–47. Vancouver: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1973. McBride, Keith. ‘“The Hatbox”: HMS Argus.’ In Warship 1994, edited by John Roberts, 71–87. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1994. McCartney, Innes. ‘The Archaeology of First World War U-Boat Losses in the English Channel and Its Impact on the Historical Record.’ In The Mariner’s Mirror. Vol. 105. No. 2 (May 2019): 183–201. McCluskey, Alistair. ‘The Battle of Amiens and the Development of British AirLand Battle, 1918–1945.’ In Changing War: The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and The Birth of the Royal Air Force, 1918, edited by Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray, Kindle ebook, Chapter 12. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. Newman, Grant. ‘Pioneering Torpedo Training at East Fortune 1918.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol. 36. No. 3 (Autumn 2005): 143–52. Padfield, Peter. ‘The Submarine as Commerce Raider.’ In Dreadnought to Daring: 100 Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in The Naval Review, edited by Peter Hore, 95–111. Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2012. Parton, Neville. ‘The Development of Early RAF Doctrine.’ The Journal of Military History. Vol. 72. No. 4 (October 2008): 1155–78. Pugh, James. ‘Oil and Water: A Comparison of Military and Naval Aviation Doctrine in Britain, 1912–1914.’ In A Military Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792–1945, edited by M. LoCicero, R. Mahoney, and S. Mitchell, 124–38. Solihull: Helion, 2014. Richards, Dennis. ‘Maitland, Edward Maitland (1880–1921), Air Force Officer and Developer of Airships and Parachutes.’ The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press, 2004. Robinson, Douglas H. ‘Zeppelin Intelligence.’ Aerospace Historian, March 1974. Rodger, N. A. M. ‘Ballard, George Alexander (1862–1948), Naval Officer.’ The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press, 2019. Roskill, Stephen. ‘The Dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe.’ Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1966): 69–93. Sainsbury, A. B. ‘Bacon, Sir Reginald Hugh Spencer (1863–1947).’ The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press, 2004. Searle, G. R. ‘Billing, Noel Pemberton (1881–1948).’ The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press, 2015. Smith, Alan. ‘From Sail to Wing – The Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol. 25. No. 1 (1994): 1–17. Sueter, Murray. ‘ESSAY. Third Place. Subject: “In the Existing State of Development of War-Ships and of Torpedo and Submarine Vessels, in What Manner Can the Strategical Objects, Formerly Pursued by Means of Blockading an Enemy in His Own Ports, Be Best Attained?” Journal of the Royal United Services Institution. Vol. 48. No. 2 (July 1, 1904): 757. Swann, Oliver. ‘Naval Air Requirements.’ Naval Review Journal. Vol. 7. No. 3 (1919): 305–13. Sweetman, John. ‘The Smuts Report of 1917: Merely Political Window-Dressing?’ Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol. 4. No. 2 (1981): 152–74. Thring, W. H. C. S. ‘A Defence Organisation for the British Nations.’ Naval Review Journal. Vol. 9. No. 1 (1921): 7.

240  Bibliography Turpin, Brian J. ‘Coastal Patrol Airships, 1915–1918.’ Cross & Cockade International Journal. Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1984): 63–71. Ventry, Lord. ‘British Naval Non-Rigid Airships, 1914–1918.’ Naval Review Journal. Vol. 46. No. 1 (January 1958): 26–33. Webb, Richard. ‘Trade Defence in War.’ Royal United Services Institution Journal. Vol. 70. No. 477 (1925): 31–55. Woodman, Richard. ‘The Problems of Convoys, 1914–1917.’ In Dreadnought to Daring: 100 Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in the Naval Review, edited by Peter Hore, 53–66. Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2012.

Index

Abbatiello, John, historian 3, 95, 100, 114, 136 Aboukir HMS, armoured cruiser 78 Actaeon HMS, depot ship 2 Acton HMS, Q34 104 ACA (Admiral Commanding Aircraft) see Phillimore, Rear Admiral Richard F. ACNS (Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff) see Duff, Rear Admiral Alexander ADAS (Assistant Director Air Services) see Vyvyan, Captain Arthur V. Admiral of Patrols see Ballard, Rear Admiral George Admiralty 2–4, 10, 17, 20, 22–3, 28, 30, 33, 39, 41–3, 45–9, 52–5, 57–8, 60, 78–9, 82–3, 86–7, 90–2, 95, 97, 99, 103–4, 109, 111–2, 115, 131, 133, 136, 138, 140–5, 147, 151–2, 161, 163, 165–8, 170–2, 175, 183, 197, 199–201, 207; administration 4, 21, 24, 42, 60, 79, 87, 151, 196–7; Airship Department 102; Airship Section 19, 58; Naval Ordnance Department 163–4; old building 97, 109; prioritizes ASW 45, 91–2; records 104; reverse engineers L33-class Zeppelins 24; seaplane subcommittee 50; see also Air Department; Controller, RN; convoys; DNC; Naval Staff; Royal Navy Admiralty War Staff see Naval Staff; Oliver, Vice Admiral Sir Henry; Sturdee, Vice Admiral Frederick Charles Doveton

ADNC (Assistant Director of Naval Construction) see Narbeth, John H Adventure HMS, gunboat 172 Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 18, 86 aerodromes 9, 20, 37, 39, 44, 131, 135, 137. 141, 146, 149–51, 164–6, 168, 171, 180, 186; Battersea Park 165; Boulay 150; Buckingham Palace 165; Buhl 150; Chambley 143; Ghent 134, 166, 179; Ghistelles 134, 136; Houttave 39–40; Kensington Gardens 165; Morhange 150; Ochey 140–1, 146; Regent’s Park 165; Teteghem 183; see also long-range bombing; NAS; RAF Wings; RFC Wings; RNAS Wings Aeroplane 162 Africa HMS, predreadnought 27 Agamemnon HMS, predreadnought 35 AICA (Assistant Inspecting Captain of Airships) 18 see Schwann, Captain Oliver Air Board 112, 142–3, 147, 151; under Cowdray 49, 52, 141; under Curzon 139, 141, 169–70 Air Committee 2, 20, 27–8, 30, 32, 81, 163, 169; see also Seely, Colonel J. E. B. Air Council 103; see also Air Ministry air defence see Home Defence; RNAS Air Department 2–5, 8–10, 19–20, 23, 28, 30, 33, 36, 38, 41, 43, 47, 50–3, 55, 57–8, 81, 84, 89, 91, 103, 109, 111–2, 129, 131, 137, 139, 145, 151–2, 161–2, 165–6,

242  Index 171, 174, 185–6, 197–8, 200–1, 207; administration & organization 4, 22, 52, 85, 87, 89, 93, 95, 171; Airship Department proposal 24; Airship Section 23–4; armaments manual 174, 202; Committee on Deck Landing 50, 204; located at the Hotel Cecil 87; material focus 30, 84, 112; and non-rigid airships 19, 23, 25, 45, 86; publishes trade protection manual 102; and rigid airships 4, 20; staff 41, 52; see also airships (British); Captain Superintendent for Airships; Naval Staff; RNAS; Sueter, Commodore Murray Air Division see Naval Staff Air Minister see Churchill, Sir Winston S.; Rothermere, Viscount Harold Harmsworth; Weir, Sir William Air Ministry 1, 3, 8–9, 25, 49, 54–5, 58, 109, 111, 115, 135–6, 141–2, 146–8, 152, 179, 182–4, 199–200; and airship control 24; located at the Hotel Cecil 58; endorses longrange bombing 150, 183; dissolves naval aviation 60; post-war survey 184; see also Weir, Sir William aircraft (Allied) 4, 26, 28, 30, 39, 46, 49–50, 55, 57, 59, 77–8, 80–1, 83, 91, 95, 128, 139, 143, 145, 163, 165, 167–8, 170, 174, 176, 178, 184–5, 196, 198, 209; A/S aircraft 46, 77, 82, 86, 90, 93–6, 98, 100, 102, 105, 107–110, 115, 182, 206–8; Airco 86; airship-plane 16, 52; ‘America’ flying boats 98; Avro 86, 130; BE2 52, 86; BE2c 89, 169; Beardmore WB3 49; Blackburn 53; Blackburn Kangaroo 77, 83, 102, 107–8, 111, 207; bombers 4, 9, 28, 53, 77, 102, 114, 131, 133–4, 136, 139–42, 146–7, 149–51, 181, 198, 206; Breguet co. 139, 141; Bristol co. 82; Bristol Scout 39, 41, 90, 99, 173; Caudron 37; Curtiss H4 flying boat 87; Curtiss H8 93, 98; Curtiss H12 ‘Large America’ 49, 77, 98, 101, 103–4, 108, 110, 112, 177; DH4 94, 106, 112, 133–4, 142, 145, 147, 176, 184; DH6 94, 109, 111; DH9 136, 149; ‘Essen’

bomber 144; FE2b 183; Felixstowe F2A flying boat 98, 183; Felixstowe F3 98; Felixstowe F5 98; fighters 28, 46–8, 51, 53–4, 114, 140–1, 163–6, 169, 175–85; flying boats 42, 45–6, 58–9, 77, 80, 87, 96–8, 100, 108, 110–4, 133, 169, 182, 184, 202; gliders 98; Handley Page aircraft 9, 111, 134, 136, 143, 146–7, 149–51, 181, 198; Handley Page O/100 142, 145; Handley Page O/400 135, 145, 148; Handley Page V1500 147; Henri Farman 37, 88; interceptors 28, 48, 163, 165–6, 169–71, 177, 180–1, 185, 206; seaplanes 7, 16, 17, 20, 27–31, 34, 36–46, 49–50, 52, 57, 80–3, 86, 89–92, 96–7, 99, 101, 107–8, 110–1, 114, 132, 134, 163, 169, 172–3, 184, 196, 203–4; Short 38 90; Short 81 27; Short 135 34; Short 184 36, 41, 47, 90, 111; Short 320 52; Short Brothers 20, 27, 34– 7, 40, 53, 89, 91; Sopwith 807 34; Sopwith aircraft 37, 40, 53, 173; Sopwith Baby 46; Sopwith Camel 7, 49–50, 56, 178–9, 183, 185; Sopwith Pup 46–7, 49–50, 177–8, 181, 183; Sopwith Schneider 38, 41, 174; Sopwith 1 ½ Strutters 133, 138–40, 142; Sopwith T1 ‘cuckoo’ 50, 52, 54, 59–60; Sopwith Tabloid 130; Sopwith Triplane 167, 178, 181, 206; Supermarine 130; torpedo planes 36, 45, 48, 50–4, 57–60, 200, 202, 206; transports 170; Wights 34; anti-Zeppelin airplanes 39, 45, 59, 165–6, 172–3, 203 aircraft carriers 4, 7, 17, 22, 26, 28–9, 30–1, 38–9, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 54–5, 58–9, 111, 173, 196, 200, 203, 207, 209; A/S operations 111; landing and launching developments 16, 38, 41, 47, 49–50; seaplane carrier conversions 2, 23, 28–9, 39, 41, 48; see also Anne HMS; Argus HMS; Ark Royal HMS; Ben-myChree HMS; Brocklesby HMS; Campania HMS; Canning HMS; City of Oxford HMS; Eagle HMS; Empress HMS; Engadine HMS;

Index 243 Furious HMS; Hector HMS; Hermes HMS (1919); Hermes HMS (1913); Hibernia HMS; Killingholme HMS; Manica HMS; Mantua HMS; Manxman HMS; Menelaus HMS; Nairana HMS; Orotava HMS; Pegasus HMS; Raven II HMS; Riviera HMS; Vindex HMS; Vindictive HMS; EIESS; Grand Fleet; kite-balloons; RNAS; Royal Navy Aircraft Manufacturing Company Limited (Airco) see aircraft (Allied); Thomas, George Holt airpower 3, 28, 48, 114, 128–9, 132, 137, 143, 149, 179, 183, 199, 208; doctrine and theory 3, 29–30, 58, 183, 196, 207; see also imperial defence; naval aviation; RAF; RNAS; strategic bombing Airship Department see Admiralty airships (British) 4, 7, 17, 20–1, 24–5, 29, 38, 45, 52, 54, 57–9, 77, 80, 83, 87, 90–1, 93, 95–6, 99, 101, 108, 111, 114–5, 182, 196–8, 202, 206–8; ‘Astra Torres’ type (French) 19; C17 97; C27 97; Coastal (C)-type 24–5, 86–7, 91, 94, 96–7, 108; Coastal-Star (C*)-type 87; No. 4 21; North Sea-type 24–5, 87; ‘Parseval’ type (German) 19, 21; R1 ‘Mayfly’ 16, 18–9, 25–6, 30, 197, 199; R9 21–2, 25; R23 22, 25; R24 22; R25 22; R26 22, 25; R27 25; R29 25, 99, 107; R33 24–5; R34 25; R36 24; R38 24; R41 24; Sea Scouts (SS-type) 21, 24, 57, 77, 86–7, 94, 108, 110, 113, 198, 206–7; Sea Scout 3 86; SSZ (Sea Scout Zero) 87; SSZ1 107; SSZ29 106; Willows 86; see also Air Department; convoys; Zeppelins Airship Progress Committee 24 airship stations 20, 43, 83; see also NAS Aisne, Second Battle 175 Ak Bashi Liman see Gallipoli Allies 45, 77–8, 81, 92, 105, 113–4, 136, 141, 143–4, 176; Inter-Allied Force 148 Almirante Cochrane see Eagle HMS Altham, Commander E. 37; see also Revenge, HMS; Riviera HMS Ambuscade HMS, destroyer 103

ammunition 133, 167, 171, 175–8, 185, 200; incendiary or explosive 25, 175–8, 199, 206–7; see also RNAS; weapons amphibious landings 21, 29, 35, 196; see also Dardanelles Anderson, Lieutenant W. L. 104 Anne HMS, seaplane carrier 43–4 anti-aircraft see weapons Antwerp 33, 85, 88, 130 archives 5–6 Argus HMS, aircraft carrier 16, 42, 48–51, 54–5, 59 Arabic SS: sunk by U24 78, 113 Ark Royal HMS, seaplane carrier 23, 29, 33–6, 41, 45, 55, 82; at Dardanelles 29, 33–6, 45, 204; see also Clark-Hall, Wing Commander Robert Armstrong Whitworth, armaments firm 20, 25, 47; see also Barlow; Elswick Army (British) 1, 3, 43, 85, 89, 114, 129, 136, 139, 143, 147–8, 151–2, 167–8, 170, 175, 179, 208; armoured cars 3; seaplane development 32; see also BEF; Home Defence Army Council 9, 139, 142, 148, 151, 183, 199 Arras, Battle of 175 ASA (Assistant Superintendent for Airships), see Norris, Captain David ASAC (Assistant Superintendent for Aircraft Construction) see Masterman, Wing Commander Edward Ash, Eric, historian 147–8 Ashmore, Brigadier-General Edward 179; see also Home Defence Asquith, Herbert H.: forms coalition government 21; approves formation of RFC 1; during May Crisis 21–2; as Prime Minister 1, 168; endorses Zeppelin base raids 30; receives Fisher’s submarine report 85 ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) 3–4, 8, 10, 19, 24–6, 28–9, 32, 44–6, 48, 77–8, 80–2, 84, 88, 91, 93, 95–7, 99, 100, 102–5, 107, 109, 114, 132–3, 135, 152, 162, 164, 182–4, 196, 199, 201, 203–6, 209

244  Index A/S patrols 4, 8, 21, 36, 38, 44, 48, 53, 58, 77, 80, 83–6, 89, 91–2, 96–9, 101, 103–4, 106–8, 111, 114, 134, 136, 143, 165, 167, 185, 202, 207; ASDIC (Anti-Submarine Division Supersonics) 206; ASRs (A/S reports) 97, 110; early developments 78, 80–45, 112; hydrophones 98–9, 107, 111, 205; ‘Spider Web’ patrols 77, 97, 101, 108, 204; see also convoys Atlantic Ocean 80, 92, 100–2; see also convoys Aubers Ridge offensive 21 Austria 19, 52 Azores 111 Babington, Flight Commander J. T. 130 Bacchante HMS, armoured cruiser 35 Bacon, Vice Admiral Sir Reginald 5, 17–9, 37, 85, 99, 132–5, 137, 168, 197, 202–3, 205; on Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 18; and Benin expedition 133; as Director of Naval Ordnance 17; CO Dover Patrol 88, 165, 168, 181; suspends Dunkirk bombing operations 134; conducts gunfire spotting trials 37; retires to manage Coventry 18–9; rigid airship development 17–8, 197; memoirs 5; see also Dover Patrol; Lambe, Wing Captain Charles; SNOs Balfour, Sir Arthur: relinquishes RNAS air defence role 9, 89, 95, 143, 161, 167–8, 198; and coastal defence 9, 38, 87, 112, 167, 172, 185; as First Lord of the Admiralty 2–3, 9, 21–2, 38, 42, 58, 87, 90–1, 141–2, 168, 170, 172, 184, 197–9; as Foreign Secretary 150; replaces Sueter with Vaughan-Lee 3, 22; resumes rigid airship developments 21–2, 38; subordinates RNAS to SNOs 2–3, 22, 58, 87, 95, 112, 161, 168, 198–9; supports longrange bombing 39, 112, 138, 151; transfers RNAS armoured cars to Army 3; anti-Zeppelin policy 173 Ballard, Rear Admiral George: as Admiral of Patrols 83, 95, 205; as Rear Admiral East Coast of England 88

Baltic project 22 Barham HMS, battleship 59 Barley, Frederick, historian 114 Barlow 20; see also Armstrong Whitworth Barrow-in-Furness 18–20, 23, 27, 43; see also Vickers Sons and Maxim Battenberg, Prince Louis of: as First Sea Lord 31 battlecruisers 40, 47–9, 55, 89–90 battleships 35–6, 39, 48–9, 81, 164 batteries see engines Bay of Biscay 105 Bayly, Vice Admiral Lewis 90; SNO Queenstown 91, 202 BCF (Battle Cruiser Fleet) 32, 39–40, 45–6; see also Grand Fleet Beardmore, armaments firm 20, 25, 50; see also aircraft (Allied); Inchinnan Beatty, Admiral Sir David 5, 17, 40–2, 45–6, 49, 51, 55, 57–9, 90, 93–4, 171, 197, 205–6; forms Flying Squadron 54–5, 200; orders air reconnaissance at Jutland 40; convenes GFAC 17, 45–6, 58, 205; revises GFBO 45; as Grand Fleet C-in-C 42, 45, 54–5, 58–9, 200; orders kite-balloon trials for convoys 101; and ‘scarecrow’ tactics 94; approves Tondern raid 56; and Wilhelmshaven strike plan 52–3, 58, 94, 206 Beesly, Patrick, historian 171 BEF (British Expeditionary Force) 4, 85, 135–6, 139, 146, 148–9, 152, 164, 175, 181–3; GHQ (General Headquarters) 9, 149; see also Haig, Field Marshal Sir Douglas; Army (British) Belgium 7–8, 27, 32–3, 40, 51, 78, 85, 88, 92, 104–6, 113–4, 128, 131–3, 150, 164, 196, 198, 201, 204; see also long-range bombing; U-boat bases Ben-my-Chree HMS, seaplane carrier 36, 43–4; sunk as Castelorizo 44 Bethell, Admiral Sir Alexander 94, 101, 205; SNO Plymouth 202 Bigsworth, Wing Commander A. W. 88, 166; CO Channel Group 94, 108, 202 Billing, Lieutenant Noel Pemberton 130

Index 245 BIR (Board of Invention and Research) 86; see also Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Arbuthnot; Strutt, R. J. Birmingham USS, light cruiser 26 Blackburn co. see aircraft (Allied) Blackburn, Flight Sublieutenant V. G. 31 Blazer HMS, gunboat 178 Bleriot, Louis 130, 162 blimps see airships (British) blockade see Royal Navy Blyth Shipbuilding co. 29; see also Ark Royal HMS Bolshevik revolution 7, 181 bombing see long-range bombing; RNAS; weapons Bonar Law, Andrew 21, 135 Boothby, Lieutenant Commander F. L. M. 27 Boswell, Flight Sublieutenant H. G. 104–5 Bouvet, French predreadnought 35 Bowhill, Flight Commander F. W.: CO Empress 31, 132, 203 Boyd, Captain K. G. 106 Brandenburg, Hauptmann Ernst 176, 178 Breslau, light cruiser (German) see Midilli Briggs, Squadron Commander E. F. 130–1 Briggs, Wing Commander W.: JWAC member 168–9 British Air Service see Imperial Air Service British Empire 170 British Isles see Great Britain Brock co. ammunition firm 100, 176–7; see also ammunition Brocklesby HMS, seaplane carrier 173–4 Brooks, Peter, historian 19 Burney, Lieutenant Charles Dennistoun 83, 206; and A/S theory 82 Burney, Admiral Cecil: CO Rosyth 94, 205; as Second Sea Lord 93; as president of the Submarine Committee 81–2 Buss, Squadron Commander H. A. 146 Busteed, Squadron Commander H. R. 50 Butcher, Flight Lieutenant O. A. 105

Cadbury, Flight Lieutenant E. 176, 184, 203 Calais 33, 105 Callaghan, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George: commands blue force (1913) 29; C-in-C the Nore 88, 175; see also SNOs Cambridge University 5, 18 Campania HMS, seaplane carrier 29, 32, 38–40, 45–6, 48–51, 54, 59, 196, 198; fitted with kite-balloon 38; converted to training ship 48, 51 Canada 140, 177 Canning HMS, kite-balloon ship 36; Grand Fleet balloon depot ship 36 Cantatrice HMS, gunboat 173 CAO (Central Air Office, Sheerness) 2, 28, 43, 109; see also Air Department; Scarlett, Wing Captain F. R. Caporetto, Battle of 181 Captain Superintendent for Airships see Maitland, Wing Captain Edward Carden, Vice Admiral Sackville 34–5; and gunfire spotting 34, 204; replaced by de Robeck 35; see also Dardanelles Cardington, Short Brothers 20; see also airships (British); aircraft (Allied) Carson, Sir Edward 47, 114, 141 CAS (Chief of the Air Staff) see Sykes, Major-General Sir Frederick H.; Trenchard, Major-General Hugh casualties see RNAS; strategic bombing Cavendish HMS see Vindictive HMS Cavendish dock 18; see also Vickers Sons and Maxim CFS (Central Flying School), Upavon 1, 13, 28–9, 82, 93, 174; see also RFC; RNAS Chalais-Meudon 35; see also kite-balloons; Mackworth, Wing Commander J. B. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster see Churchill, Sir Winston S. Chancellor of the Exchequer see Lloyd George, David Cheesman, E. F., historian 180 Chief of the Admiralty War Staff see Naval Staff

246  Index Childers, Major Erskine 43, 137, 203 Charlton, Vice Admiral Sir Edward 103 Churchill, Sir Winston S. 1–2, 17, 28, 31, 33, 39, 58, 83–5, 130–1, 137, 148, 151–2, 165, 169, 173, 185, 197, 199, 205; favours aircraft over airships 20; Air Department budgeting 19, 112; assumes responsibility for air defence 4, 27–8, 162, 164–7, 185–6, 197–8; and Belgium operations 33, 85; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 2, 22; and Coast Guard model for Naval Wing 27, 29, 87, 95, 112; and Dardanelles planning 33; as First Lord of the Admiralty 1–2, 19, 21, 27, 31, 33, 39, 57, 83, 142, 161, 169, 207; and heavy bombers 131; tasks Jellicoe with seaplane carrier development 29; takes flying lessons with Naval Wing 27; and Naval Wing roles 84; and May Crisis 21, 58, 131, 161, 169, 197–8; and mechanized warfare 7, 198; as Minister of Munitions 24, 146; cancels R9 project 21; creates RNAS from RFC (Naval Wing) 2, 165, 197; coins ‘seaplane’ 27; and seaplane carrier conversions 39; appoints Sueter to Air Department 19; supports unified air service 147; and Zeppelin base raids 28, 30–1, 88, 128, 130, 163, 165 CID (Committee of Imperial Defence) 1–2, 17, 27, 138; Subcommittee on Aerial Navigation 1, 17; see also committees; Viscount Reginald Baliol Brett; Seely, Colonel J. E. B CIGS (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) see Robertson, Field Marshal Sir William City of Oxford HMS, kite-balloon ship 36; converted to seaplane carrier 36, 44, 111 civilians see long-range bombing; strategic bombing; Zeppelins Clark-Hall, Wing Commander Robert 23, 33–5, 41, 55, 83, 163, 203–4; ACA’s chief of staff 55; as Assistant Superintendent for Design 23; CO HMS Ark Royal 33–5, 55; see also Ark Royal HMS

CNS (Chief of the Naval Staff) 79, 95, 114; see also Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John; Naval Staff Coast Guard 2, 27, 29, 87, 95, 112, 133; see also Churchill, Sir Winston S. coastal patrol see RNAS; Royal Navy Cole, Christopher, historian 180 Collet, Lieutenant Charles 130 Collishaw, Raymond 140 Colmore, Squadron Commander R. B. B. 101 Colville, Admiral Sir Stanley 94, 205; SNO Portsmouth 202 committees 41, 50, 81, 145; see also Admiralty; Air Committee; Air Department; Airship Progress Committee; Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; CID (Committee of Imperial Defence); GFAC (Grand Fleet Air Committee); JWAC (Joint War Air Committee); Operations Committee; Submarine Committee; War Committee communications 21, 81, 88–9, 110–1, 128, 136–7, 140, 149–51, 170–1, 179; Aldis lamps 110; Brock flares 100; D/F (Direction-Finding) 97, 170–1; Flares 165; jamming 25, 48, 172; London network 89, 96, 161, 164–6, 170–2; Morse code 84; pneumatic tubes 97; Rouzet co. 41; semaphore 81, 109; signals intelligence 89, 97, 170–3, 185; signal lamps 40; Sterling Telephone co. 34; Telegraph 56, 136, 150, 165, 177; telephones 18, 35, 100–1, 111, 161, 164–6, 168, 171, 177–8; very lights 44, 110, 175 W/T (wireless-telegraphy) 18, 23, 27–9, 32, 34, 38, 41, 48, 83–4, 86, 90, 97, 101, 108–9, 170–2, 174, 199, 208; see also Home Defence; LADA; London; Naval Staff Comyn, B. 18 Cone, Captain Hutch (USN) 202 Conquest HMS, light cruiser 173 Constantinople see Istanbul Conte Rosso see Argus HMS Controller, RN see Geddes, Vice Admiral Sir Eric Campbell; Third Sea Lord convoys 8, 25–6, 48, 77–81, 94, 97, 100–1, 208; air escorts 77–9,

Index 247 81, 94, 99, 101–3, 110, 114–5, 196; airship operations 25–6, 78, 94, 101–2, 196; approach route system 92; Atlantic 8, 80, 100–1; coastal 25, 100, 102; Convoy Act of 1789 80; Dutch beef trips 8, 80; French coal trade 8, 79, 91, 102; kite-balloons support 101, 111; Scandinavian ore trade 8, 80; see also Naval Staff, U-boats Cooper, Malcolm, historian 149 Corbett, Sir Julian, historian 6, 164 Cornwall 101 Cornwall HMS, armoured cruiser 36 Courtney, Wing Commander I. T. 50, 88, 132, 204 Courageous HMS, cruiser 39, 47–9 Coventry ordnance works 19; see also Bacon, Vice Admiral Reginald Cowdray, Viscount Weetman Pearson see Air Board Coxyde 33 Cranwell see NAS Cressy HMS, armoured cruiser 78 Cronin, Dick, historian 6 cruisers 28, 31, 38–41, 45, 47–9, 112, 173, 185 Crusader HMS, destroyer 81 cryptology 97; ‘J’ cypher 140; HVB Zeppelin code 171; see also communications; Naval Staff Cull, Flight Lieutenant J. T. 37, 204 Culley, Flight Lieutenant S. D. 185 Cunard shipbuilding co. 32, 39; see also Campania HMS; Vindex HMS Currey, Rear Admiral Bernard: president of the Submarine Committee 81 Curtiss co. see aircraft (Allied); engines Curtiss, Glenn 98; see also Porte, Wing Commander J. C. Cuxhaven see Harwich Force; Zeppelin bases Curzon, Marquess George Nathaniel 139, 141, 168–70; supports Imperial Air Service 142, 170; see also Air Board Cyprus 44 D’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace Tennyson: as DNC 23–4, 28, 47, 50 Dacre, Flight Lieutenant G. B.: conducts aerial torpedo attack at Dardanelles 36, 52, 203

DAD (Director Air Department) see Sueter, Commodore Murray DAD (Director Air Division) see Groves, Wing Captain R. M.; Scarlett, Wing Captain F. R. Dakar, Senegal 111 Daily Mail 21–2, 162 DAS (Director Air Services) see Paine, Commodore Godfrey; VaughanLee, Rear Admiral C. L. DASD (Director Anti-Submarine Division) see Duff, Rear Admiral Alexander; Fisher, Captain William W.; Naval Staff Dardanelles 7, 16–7, 21–2, 27, 29, 32–4, 36–8, 42–5, 52, 55, 57–8, 78, 82, 86–7, 131–3, 198–9, 204, 207; evacuation from 36, 42–3, 133, 139; Gallipoli landings 21, 35, 55 Davies, Squadron Commander Richard Bell 140, 143, 203; memoirs 5 DCNS (Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff) see Oliver, Vice Admiral Henry de Courcy Ireland, Lieutenant Commander W. P. 16, 53, 204, 206; proposes Wilhelmshaven torpedo strike 51–2 Deperdussin co. see Porte, Wing Commander J. C. depth charges see weapons Deputy First Sea Lord see Wemyss, Rear Admiral Sir Rosslyn de Robeck, Vice Admiral John 35, 43; replaces Carden 35, 204; as C-in-C Eastern Mediterranean 43; CO 2nd Battle Squadron 101 Denmark 56, 180 Derby, Earl Edward Stanley: as JWAC Chairman 168–9 destroyers 22, 31, 34, 39–40, 44, 49–50, 56, 81–3, 90, 92, 94, 96–7, 99, 101, 103–8, 172–3, 185, 206; and towed lighters 49, 185; see also kite-balloons D/F (Direction-Finding) see communications DGMA (Director-General for Military Aeronautics) see Henderson, Major-General Sir David Dietrich, Kapitanleutnant Martin 178 diplomacy 78

248  Index Director of Airship Production see Given, E. C. Director of Military Operations 89 dirigibles see airships (British) DNC (Director of Naval Construction) see Controller, RN; d’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace Tennyson; Narbeth, John H. Doris HMS, cruiser 35 Dover Patrol 5, 33, 88, 106–7, 131–3, 135, 165, 173, 181; see also Bacon, Vice Admiral Sir Reginald; Hood, Rear Admiral Sir Horace; Keyes, Vice Admiral Sir Roger; SNOs Downing Street 21 dreadnoughts see battleships drifters 106 Dryad HMS, gunboat 173 Duff, Rear Admiral Alexander: as ACNS 79, 95–6; as DASD 79, 92, 95 Dumaresq, Captain John: invents rotary aircraft launcher 49; see also Sydney HMAS Dunning, Squadron Commander Edwin H. 16, 34–5, 204, 206; SFO Furious 47 Dusseldorf see Zeppelin bases Dutch see Holland Eagle HMS, aircraft carrier 29, 51, 55 East Africa 7, 17, 32–3, 37, 43, 87, 198 Eastchurch see NAS East Frisia 32 East Indies 43; see also EIESS; Wemyss, Rear Admiral Sir Rosslyn Ebro HMS, armed merchant cruiser 111 Edmonds, Flight Commander C. H. K. 31, 36; conducts aerial torpedo attack at Dardanelles 36, 52, 203; and torpedo development 37 Egypt 44, 111; see also EIES; SNOs Eichler, Kapitanleutnant F. G. 178 EIESS (East Indies & Egypt Seaplane Squadron) 17, 42, 44, 203; see also Malone, Wing Commander Cecil L’Estrange; Samson, Wing Commander Charles El Arish, fort complex 44 Elder, Wing Captain William L. 9, 56, 139, 141–4, 199, 204; as

Inspecting Captain of Aircraft 140, 205; see also long-range bombing; RNAS Wings Ellis, Flight Sublieutenant S. E. 179 Ellison, Commodore Alfred: as Commodore Lowestoft 88, 91 Elswick 47 Ely, Eugene B. 26–7 Empress HMS, seaplane carrier 29, 31–2, 43–5, 48, 132; see also Bowhill, Flight Commander F. W.; EIESS engines 98, 129, 139, 141–2, 149–50, 167, 174, 177, 207; airplane rotary 58; Clerget 133, 142; Curtiss 98; Renault 86; Rolls Royce 98; submarine diesel and battery 77, 82, 107 England 9–10, 83, 102, 107, 129, 138, 145, 161, 165–6, 176, 178, 180–2, 184, 186; see also Great Britain; Home Defence England, Flight Lieutenant T. H.: as Samson’s SFO for the EIESS 43 English Channel 8, 21, 77, 80, 85, 91, 101–2, 130, 133, 162, 182; Western Approaches 77, 80, 90, 92, 94, 97; see also convoys; merchant shipping; RAF; RNAS; Royal Navy; SNOs Engadine HMS, seaplane carrier 29, 31–2, 38–41, 45, 48, 54, 198; fitted with kite-balloon 38–9; see also BCF; Jutland, Battle of; Malone, Wing Commander Cecil L’Estrange; Robinson, Lieutenant Commander C. G. Enos, Gulf of 35 Enstone, Flight Sublieutenant A. J. 179 Entente powers see Allies escort carriers 82, 111; see also aircraft carriers Esher, Viscount Reginald Baliol Brett 17–8 Espiegle HMS, gunboat 44 Essen 139 Essex 24, 177 Evans, Flight Sublieutenant D. C. 89–90 Evan-Thomas, Rear Admiral Hugh 46, 203; see also GFAC Ewing, Sir Alfred 170

Index 249 Falkland Islands, Battle of 55 False Bay see Gallipoli FDSF (From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow) see Marder, Arthur, historian Ferris, John, historian 96 Fifth Sea Lord see Paine, Commodore Godfrey Fighter Command 186 First World War 1, 5–7, 10, 17, 58, 77–8, 103, 184, 196, 201, 205, 207, 209 Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Arbuthnot 19, 81, 85, 132, 148, 206, 208; establishes A/S committee 81; chairman of the BIR 86; as First Sea Lord 18, 21–2, 39, 81, 86, 197; appoints Bacon to rigid airship program 18; predicts unrestricted submarine warfare 85; resigns during May Crisis 22; and Sea Scouts 77, 86 Fisher, Captain William W.: as DASD 79, 96, 99; on Operations Committee 47 fire control 28, 37; see also NAS; RNAS First Lord of the Admiralty; see Balfour, Sir Arthur; Carson, Sir Edward; Churchill, Sir Winston S.; Geddes, Vice Admiral Sir Eric Campbell First Sea Lord 8, 18, 22, 24, 31, 42–3, 45, 48, 58–9, 79, 81, 95; see Battenberg, Prince Louis of; Fisher, Admiral Sir John; Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry; Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John; Wemyss, Vice Admiral Sir Rosslyn; Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur Fiume 52 Flanders see Belgium; U-boat bases; Ypres flotilla vessels 172 flying boats see aircraft (Allied) flying squadron see Grand Fleet; Phillimore, Rear Admiral Richard F. Foch, Marshal Ferdinand 148, 150 Folkestone 177 Formidable HMS, predreadnought 78, 90 Fourth Sea Lord see Halsey, Rear Admiral Lionel; Lambert, Commodore Cecil

Fowler, Flight Commander B. F. 39; see also Vindex HMS Fox, Flight Lieutenant F. M. 178 France 19, 30, 35, 39, 42, 44, 79–80, 85, 91, 98, 100, 106–7, 111, 128, 130, 132, 139–41, 143–4, 148–9, 162, 164, 168, 181, 183, 196, 207–8; Aviation Department 137; jeune ecole 208; see also Allies; convoys Freeman, Flight Lieutenant Charles. T. 41, 173–4 Freiburg 140, 143 freighters see merchant shipping French, Field Marshal Sir John: appointed CO Home Defence 168 French coal trade see convoys Furious HMS, aircraft carrier 7, 46–51, 55–6, 58, 205; see also Grand Fleet; RNAS Galatea HMS, light cruiser 40–1, 173; see also Jutland, Battle of Gallipoli 7, 21, 35–6, 43, 198; see also Dardanelles Galpin, Flight Sublieutenant C. J. 90, 177, 182 Geddes, Vice Admiral Sir Eric Campbell: as Controller 24, 47, 79, 93; as First Lord of the Admiralty 25, 51, 107, 114; convenes Operations Committee 47 Germany 2–3, 8–9, 19, 24, 30, 39, 44, 51, 56, 77, 79–80, 85–6, 89–90, 92, 96, 104, 107, 112, 128–9, 134, 137–8, 140–2, 144–9, 152, 161, 163–5, 170, 172, 176, 180–6, 197–9, 208; General Staff 79; High Command 78; Home Air Defence Command 141; see also High Sea Fleet; Imperial Navy; U-boats; Zeppelins Gerrard, Wing Captain Eugene L. 30, 130; CO No. 2 Wing 43; CO South-West Group 94, 101, 202 GFAC (Grand Fleet Air Committee) 7, 17, 45–7, 58–9, 204–5; see also Evan-Thomas, Rear Admiral Hugh GFAO (Grand Fleet Air Orders) 16, 48, 57, 204 GFBO (Grand Fleet Battle Orders) 38, 45, 54 Gibraltar 99, 101

250  Index Given, E. C.: Director of Airship Production 24 Glorious HMS, cruiser 39, 47–9 GOC (General Officer Commanding) see Army (British) Goeben, battlecruiser (German) see Yavuz Goliath HMS, predreadnought 22 Gordon, Squadron Commander Robert 37, 204 Gothas 9–10, 54, 134, 145, 152, 161–2, 165, 170, 172, 176–81, 185–6, 196, 199, 206; night operations 179–81, 186, 200; raids against London 129, 176–83; raids against RNAS bases 178, 180; see also long-range bombing; RNAS; strategic bombing; Zeppelins Goulter, Christina, historian 3 Gulf of Aden 44 Grand Fleet 3, 7, 16, 21, 23, 25, 29, 32, 36, 38–40, 42, 45, 48–51, 54–5, 57–9, 79, 86, 88, 93–4, 113, 171, 198–201, 205–7; 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron 55; 1st Battle Squadron 56; 2nd Battle Squadron 59, 101; 5th Battle Squadron 46; convoy operations 100–1; Flying Squadron 3, 7, 16–7, 42, 49, 51, 53–9, 140, 200–1, 204; light cruiser squadrons 49, 56; see also aircraft carriers; airships (British); Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John; Beatty, Admiral Sir David; Phillimore, Rear Admiral Richard F.; RNAS Great Britain 1–4, 9, 26–7, 37, 43, 77–8, 80, 86, 91, 93, 95, 98, 100, 106, 110, 112, 129, 137–8, 141, 143–4, 161–7, 176, 178, 182, 185, 196–9, 202, 205–6, 208–9; see also British Empire, Home Defence; Royal Navy Greenwich, National Maritime Museum 5 Grey, Squadron Commander Spencer 130, 166 Grove, Eric, historian 3, 25, 49 Groves, Wing Captain R. M. 52, 205; Assistant Secretary of the Air Board 49; as DAD 103 gunboats 22, 44, 133, 171–3, 178 gunfire spotting see RNAS

Hagendingen 141, 143 Hague convention 140 Haig, Field Marshal Sir Douglas 9, 136, 139, 142–6, 148–50, 152, 182–3; see also Army (British); BEF; Western Front Halcyon HMS, gunboat 172 Haldane, Viscount Richard: as War Minister 1; chairman of CID Standing Subcommittee on Aerial Navigation 1, 17–8 Hall, Flight Sublieutenant H. G. 89–90 Hall, Captain William Reginald ‘Blinker’: Director of Naval Intelligence 170 Hallam, Squadron Commander T. D. 105, 108, 204 Halsey, Rear Admiral Lionel: as Third Sea Lord 49, 53, 93, 203; as Fourth Sea Lord 93 Hamilton, Admiral Sir Frederick T.: CO Rosyth 94; as Second Sea Lord 134 Handley Page see aircraft (Allied) Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice: advocates for Air Committee 2; proposes JWAC 169; and May Crisis 21; as War Committee Secretary 168 Hards, Flight Lieutenant F. G. D. 89 Hardy HMS, destroyer 101 Harwich Force 31, 39, 41, 45, 55, 80, 88, 90, 173; Fifth Light Cruiser Squadron 173; raids Cuxhaven 31, 131; raids Tondern 40, 55, 173; see also aircraft carriers; SNOs; Tyrwhitt, Commodore Reginald Haslop, Dennis, historian 3 Hawke HMS, protected cruiser 78 Hawker, Captain L. G. 131 Hector HMS, kite-balloon ship 36 helicopters 21, 82, 86; see also airships (British) Heligoland Bight 173, 184; Second Battle of 54–5 Henderson, Major-General Sir David: as DGMA 32, 138, 142–5, 147, 151, 162, 169, 179; supports Imperial Air Service 142 Henshaw, Trevor, historian 6 Hermes HMS (1919), aircraft carrier 48, 51, 55

Index 251 Hermes HMS (1913), seaplane carrier 2, 28–9, 33, 78, 82, 84, 203; sunk by U27 33, 133 Hersing, Kapitanleutnant Otto 36 Hewlett, Flight Commander F. E. T. 31, 203 Hibernia HMS 27 High Sea Fleet 3, 16, 21, 31, 38–41, 51, 53, 56, 59, 79–80, 107, 113, 142, 199–200; raids Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth 89–90; Second Scouting Group 41; attached U-boats 107, 113; see also Scheer, Admiral Reinhard; U-boats; Zeppelins Hindenburg, Field Marshal Paul von: Chief of the German General Staff 176 historiography 3–8, 10, 17, 78, 91, 95, 104, 129, 149, 162, 185–6, 200–1, 205, 208–9 Hobbs, David, historian 3, 31 Hobbs, Flight Sublieutenant B. D. 182 Hoeppner, General Ernst von see Luftstreitkrafte Hogue HMS, armoured cruiser 78 Holland 31, 80, 140, 177, 181; see also convoys Holmes, Commander Gerard R. A. 50 Holtzendorff, Admiral Henning von: Chief of the German Naval Staff 79 Home Defence 112, 163, 165, 167–71, 175–9, 183–6, 199; see also communications; French, Field Marshal Sir John; RNAS; Scott, Admiral Sir Percy Home Fleet see Royal Navy homefront 185, 199, 207 Hood, Rear Admiral Sir Horace: CO Dover Patrol 33, 132, 204; see also Dover Patrol Hope, Commander Herbert W. W. 170 Hope, Constructor Charles J. W. 29 Hope, Rear Admiral George P. W.: DOD (Director Operations Division) 8, 96, 99, 205 Hornby, Rear Admiral Robert Phipps: as president of the Submarine Committee 81 hospital ships 9, 143 Hotel Cecil see Air Department; Air Ministry

House of Commons 22, 83, 167–8 Hull 172 Humber, the 173 Hunt, S. W. 18 Hunt, Wing Commander 23; see also Norris, Captain David IAF (Independent Air Force or Independent Force) 9, 111, 128, 136, 147–51, 183, 196, 202, see also Trenchard, Major-General Hugh ICA (Inspecting Captain of Airships) 2, 18 ICRAB (Inspecting Captain of Rigid Airship Building) see Norris, Captain David Iero Bay 36 Imperial Air Service (proposed) 3, 142, 162, 169–70, 179 Imperial College London 86 imperial defence 3, 170, see also CID; Home Defence Imperial Navy (German) 17, 29, see also High Sea Fleet; Zeppelins Imperial War Museum 5 Implacable HMS, predreadnought 59 Inchinnan 20; see also Beardmore Indian Ocean 44 Inflexible HMS, battlecruiser 35, 55 information 33, 96–7, 100, 63–4, 170–1; see also communications Injeh Burnu 36 interwar period 9, 47, 60, 209 Ireland 20, 92, 102, 202; and Easter Rebellion 90; see also Great Britain; High Sea Fleet Irish Sea 105 Irresistible HMS, predreadnought 35 Isle of Man Steam Packet co. 39, 43, 46; see also aircraft carriers Isles of Scilly 99,104; see also NAS Isle of Wight 106; see also NAS Isle of Wight HMS, gunboat 172 Istanbul 36, 146 Italy 50, 52, 103, 181 Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry: as First Sea Lord 22, 38, 87, 93, 112, 138, 199 Japan 30 Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John, 2, 39–40, 48, 51, 53, 58–9, 80, 86, 96, 99, 113–5, 141, 143, 146, 173, 201,

252  Index 205; expands Dunkirk bombing operations 134; on Air Committee 2, 27; creates Air Division 109, 200, 205; encourages airship program 21–2, 24, 32, 47, 57, 99; Ark Royal conversion 29; as CNS 79, 95–6; convoy implementation 101; appoints Fifth Sea Lord 93, 143, 199–200; as First Sea Lord 8, 42, 45, 58–9, 79, 92–3, 107, 115, 134; endorses GFAC report 47; and Grand Fleet air requirements 38–42, 46–8; as Grand Fleet C-in-C 21, 32, 40–2, 57; tours LZ13 20; and material reforms 80, 99, 107; memoirs 5; and Naval Staff reforms 52, 95, 199; skepticism of Northern Barrage 100; on Operations Committee 47; rationalizes RNAS organization 93, 95–6, 102, 199–200; commands red force (1913) 28; as Second Sea Lord 2, 20, 28–9; and the Wilhelmshaven strike plan 53; and Zeppelin asymmetry 38, 59, 197; see also Naval Staff Johnson, Commodore C. D.: SNO Dunkirk 168 joint operations 114, 172 Jones, Ben, historian 3, 20 Jones, Henry A., historian 6, 40, 92 Jones, Major J. F. 148 Jones, Neville, historian 129 journals, academic 6 Jutland, Battle of 4, 7, 16–7, 37, 40, 46, 54, 58–9, 79, 203–4, 207 JWAC (Joint War Air Committee) 89, 138–9, 168–9; see also Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice; longrange bombing; Vaughan-Lee, Rear Admiral C. L. Kagohl I (Kampfgeschwader I) 176, 180–1 Kagohl III (Kampfgeschwader III) 181 Kaiserliche Marine see Imperial Navy (German) Keller, Hauptmann Alfred 180–1 Kelly, Captain W. H. 140 Kemp, Peter, historian 6 Kerr, Rear Admiral Mark 147–8, 208; as Deputy CAS 146

Keyes, Vice Admiral Sir Roger 5, 205; as Commodore (S) 31; as CO Dover 135–7, 181, 183, 202; supports Lambe’s bombing agenda 183; see also Bacon, Vice Admiral Sir Reginald; Dover Patrol; Lambe, Wing Captain Charles; SNOs Kiel see U-boat bases Killingholme HMS, seaplane carrier 173 Kilner, Flight Commander C. F. 31 King, Brad, historian 3 King Edward VII 162 King George V 84 King, H. F., historian 6 King’s College London, Liddell Hart Centre 5 Kingfisher HMS, gunboat 171, 173 Kitchener, Field Marshal Lord Herbert Horatio; and air defence 164, 167, 197; and Dardanelles withdrawal 43; and May Crisis 22; as War Minister 162 kite-balloons 21, 23, 32–3, 35–6, 38–9, 43, 45, 47, 57–8, 77, 94–5, 99, 101, 105, 107, 111; and Belgian coast operations 33; Caquot-type 40; at the Dardanelles 32, 35–6; Destroyer Kite Balloon Force 94; and destroyer A/S operations 106–7; fitted to Grand Fleet warships 39; and the Otranto barrage 99; Section No. 1 35; see also aircraft carriers; convoys; Mackworth, Wing Commander J. B.; NAS Kleine, Hauptmann Rudolf 176, 178, 181 Königsberg, light cruiser (German) 7, 17, 33, 37, 57, 204 Kraushaar, Kapitanleutnant H. 177 LADA (London Air Defence Area) 96, 179, 186; see also Ashmore, Brigadier-General Edward; Home Defence Lamb, Lieutenant V. W. 111 Lambe, Wing Captain Charles: and Benin expedition 133; CO NAS Dunkirk and Dover 88, 94, 129, 133–7, 182–4, 202; see also Dover Patrol; NAS; SNOs Lambert, Commodore Cecil: as Fourth Sea Lord 134

Index 253 law 176 Layman, R. D., historian 34, 115 Learned, Ensign N. J. (USNR) 107 learning curve see historiography Lebanon 44 Leckie, Flight Sublieutenant Robert 177, 184 Lesbos 36 Leslie, Flight Lieutenant Reginald 177 Liberals 21; see Asquith, Herbert H. lightships 104–5, 170, 177 Lion HMS, battlecruiser 40 Liverpool 38, 181 Lloyd George, David: Chancellor of the Exchequer 22; Minister of Munitions 22, 58, 168; as Prime Minister 42, 45, 60, 95, 114, 179, 199 logistics and supply 58, 79–80, 99, 111, 129, 134, 138, 143–4, 163, 169, 175, 178–9, 181–3; see also Air Ministry; engines; Ministry of Munitions; RNAS London 9–10, 43, 89, 129, 161, 164–5, 167–8, 172–3, 176–83; see also Admiralty; Air Department; communications; Gothas; Home Defence; LADA; strategic bombing; War Cabinet; War Office; Whitehall; Zeppelin raids London Times 21, 85, 162 Longmore, Wing Commander Arthur 50, 52, 85, 88, 111, 132–3, 165, 168, 203, 205; tests aerial torpedo 27; at Jutland 203; and torpedo plane development 52 long-range bombing 3–4, 9, 28, 38, 44, 53, 56, 77, 128–30, 134–5, 137–43, 146–7, 150, 152, 167, 176, 180, 183, 196, 199, 201–2, 204–5, 209; of aerodromes 9, 128, 131, 134–5, 137, 143, 146, 148–51; of civilian targets 129, 140, 143, 148, 150, 161; of factories or industry 3, 9, 52, 112, 128–32, 135–50, 165, 196, 199, 204, 207–9; of railroads 9, 44, 130–2, 134, 136–7, 143, 146, 148–51; of U-boat bases 4, 8, 53, 77, 85, 88, 105–6, 113–4, 128, 132–7, 143, 165, 183; of Zeppelin bases 4, 7–8, 16–7, 30–1, 39, 53, 55, 88, 128, 130–1, 134, 150, 163,

166, 186, 196, 198, 204; see also aircraft (Allied); Gothas; RNAS; strategic bombing; Zeppelin bases; Zeppelin raids Loos, Battle of 168 Lord Nelson HMS, predreadnought 35 Ludendorff, General Erich 136, 161, 183; as First Quartermaster General 79, 176 Luftstreitkrafte 176 Lurcher HMS, destroyer 31; see also Keyes, Vice Admiral Sir Roger Lusitania RMS: sunk by U20 78, 113 Lusk, Flight Sublieutenant C. E. S. Luxeuil-les-Bains see RNAS Wings; Elder, Wing Captain William L. M15, monitor 44 M23, monitor 44 M28, monitor 45 Mackworth, Wing Commander J. B. 23, 35; CO Manica 35 Madden, Admiral Sir Charles 60 magazines see munitions Magor, Flight Sublieutenant N. A. 104 Magpie HMS, gunboat 133 Maitland, Wing Captain Edward 24, 33, 204; Captain Superintendent for Airships 24; establishes balloon school at Roehampton 33; see also kite-balloons; NAS Majestic HMS, predreadnought 22, 35–6 Malaya HMS, battleship 59 Malone, Wing Commander Cecil L’Estrange: on Airship Progress Committee 24; XO EIESS 43 CO Engadine 31, 203; CO Raven II 43 Manchester 181 Manica HMS, kite-balloon ship 35–6; converted to seaplane carrier 36 Mannheim 138, 145, 150 Margate 178, 180 Mantua HMS, seaplane carrier 111 Manxman HMS, seaplane carrier 39, 45 maintenance see RNAS Marder, Arthur, historian 6, 45 marine archaeology 104, 106 Marine Nationale see France maritime (theory) 29, 164, 196, 199

254  Index Marix, Squadron Commander R. L. G. ‘Reggie’ 31, 130, 139, 204; see also RNAS Wings; Zeppelins Marmara, Sea of 45 Marshal Ney HMS, monitor 180 Masterman, Wing Captain Edward A. D. 23–4, 86, 207; ASAC 23; on staff of Director of Airship Production 24; CO Farnborough 86 Mathy, Kapitanleutnant Heinrich 172 Mauser co. 140 Maxim see Vickers Sons and Maxim May Crisis 2, 21, 36–7, 87, 115, 131, 148, 198 McCartney, Innes, marine archaeologist 106 McClean, Frank 1, 17 McKechnie, Sir James 18 medical 100 Mediterranean Expeditionary Force 43; see also Dardanelles; Gallipoli; RNAS Mediterranean Sea 17, 29, 36, 42–3, 45, 77, 80, 82, 94, 99, 100, 107–8, 110, 182, 203 Medway River 27 Menelaus HMS, kite-balloon ship 36 merchant raiders 44, 78, 84, 92; see also U-boats; unrestricted submarine warfare merchant shipping 4, 8, 29, 43–4, 52–3, 77–9, 81, 84, 92, 94, 99, 103, 109, 112–5, 136, 146, 176, 182, 184, 196; interdiction and sinking 78–80, 84, 100, 113, 207–8; see also ASW; convoys; Royal Navy Mercury HMS, submarine depot ship 98 Mersey HMS, monitor 37 Mesopotamia 44 meteorology see weather Midilli, light cruiser (Turkish) 36, 44–5 Miley, Flight Lieutenant A. J. 31 military revolution see historiography Military Wing see RFC Mills, Flight Lieutenant J. S. 31, 131 mines see weapons mine barrages 25, 52; Dover barrage 99, 104, 106–7, 132, 135; Northern barrage 92, 100; Otranto barrage 99 minefields 45, 51, 92, 94, 103–6, 133

minelayers 21, 28, 100, 106; see also UC minesweeping see RNAS; Royal Navy Minerva HMS cruiser 35 Ministry of Munitions 22, 24, 58, 141–3, 146; at Hotel Metropole 86; see Churchill, Sir Winston S.; Lloyd George, David Moliere SS, steamer (French) 106 monitors 22, 33, 36–7, 44, 106, 133, 173, 180 Montagu, Baron John Walter Edward Douglas-Scott: as JWAC deputy 169–70; supports Imperial Air Service 142, 170 Morris, Major E. N. G. 137 Morrish, Flight Sublieutenant C. R. 104–5 Mulheim 140 Munitions 9, 138, 140, 145–6, 150, 163–4, 167–8; see also ammunition; long-range bombing; weapons Nairana HMS, seaplane carrier 39, 46, 54; modified to carry fighters 51 National Archives, Kew 5, 109 Narbeth, John H: as ADNC 29, 50 NAS (Naval Air Stations) 2, 8, 20, 27, 32, 55, 57, 78, 87–9, 92, 96–7, 109, 111, 161–3, 166, 171–2, 174, 182, 198, 205, 209; Aldeburgh (observer school) 109; Alexandria 110–1; Bacton 176; Bembridge 91, 94; Brindisi (kite-balloons) 99; Burgh Castle 176; Caldale (airships) 94; Calshot (experimental) 27, 37, 91, 94, 99, 103–4, 165, 175; Cattewater 94; Chelmsford 167; Cherbourg 94; Chingford (training) 167, 174; Corfu 99; Coudekerque 93, 145, 181, 183; Cranwell (RNAS/RAF officer school) 20, 93, 174, 200, 205; Cromarty 29, 84; Crystal Palace (training) 174; Dover 32, 88, 93–4, 102, 114, 133–4, 165, 180–3, 201; Dundee 93; Dunkirk 8, 10, 32, 77, 85, 88, 93–4, 99, 102, 106, 111, 114, 128–9, 131–8, 143, 150–2, 165–6, 168, 177–83, 186, 199, 201, 203; Eastchurch (training) 1, 32, 81, 83, 88, 140, 163–5, 167, 174, 178, 203; East Fortune (airships /

Index 255 torpedoes) 20, 25, 45, 54, 96; Farnborough (airships) 19, 23, 86, 165; Felixstowe 49, 77, 90, 94, 97–8, 101, 104, 108, 167, 177–8, 182, 203; Fishguard 94; Freiston (training) 174; Gibraltar 99; Great Yarmouth 28–9, 44, 51, 53, 89–90, 94, 167, 171–2, 174, 176–7, 182, 184, 203; Hendon 5, 32, 98, 145, 165, 167; Houton Bay 93; Howden (airships) 20, 96; Imbros 36, 42–3; Isle of Grain (experimental) 50, 52, 88, 99, 167; Isle of Wight 91; Killingholme 93–4, 104; Kingsnorth (non-rigid airships) 20, 52, 86; Kirkwall 45; Land’s End 101; La Panne 93; Lee-on-Solent 94; Leven 29; Longside 20, 45; Lough Neagh 20; Mafia Island 37; Malta 99, 110; Manston 140, 145, 177–80; Mudros (airships) 43; Mullion (non-rigid airships) 94, 101; Munday, Captain A. H. 183; Newhaven 94; Newlyn 94; Otranto 52, 99; Pembroke 94; Polegate (non-rigid airships) 94, 108; Portland 94; Port Said 111; Pulham (non-rigid airships) 20, 91, 96; Redcar (bombers) 111, 145; Roehampton (kite-balloon school) 33; South Shields 93; St. Pol 93, 168; Taranto 111; Tenedos 34–5, 42; Tipnor (kite-balloons) 94, 108; Tresco, the Scillies (flying boats) 94, 99, 101, 104; Walmer 180; Westgate 88, 167, 177; Yeovilton (FAA Museum) 5–6; see also RNAS naval aviation 1, 4, 7–9, 16, 20, 57, 95, 114–5, 129, 137, 196–7, 199–203, 207–9 naval maneuvers 2–3, 16, 28–9, 81–2, 84, 163 Naval Operations see Corbett, Sir Julian; Newbolt, Henry Naval Review see Royal Navy Naval Staff 3, 8, 25, 31, 33, 58, 79–80, 93, 95–7, 109, 111, 114–5, 170–1, 199–201, 206; Air Division 3, 7–8, 10, 24, 53, 58, 80, 99, 103, 107, 109–111, 200, 205; ASD (Anti-Submarine Division), 47, 79–80, 92, 96–7, 103, 110, 115, 205; ASD Air Section 79–80, 82,

BK-TandF-HOWLETT_9780367650131-200540-Index.indd 255

97, 110, 115, 205; Chief of the Admiralty War Staff 31, 33, 89, 138; Convoy Division 96; Material Branch, airship production 24; Naval Intelligence Division 171; Operations Division 6, 8, 93, 95–6, 99, 205; Operations Division Air Section (section 11) 98; Plans Division 25, 96, 181; Room 40 (cryptology) 97, 170–1; Room X (charts) 97; Trade Division 79, 96–7; Trade Division Convoy Section 97; see also CNS (Chief of the Naval Staff); Duff, Rear Admiral Alexander; Fisher, Captain William W.; Groves, Wing Captain R. M.; Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John; Oliver, Vice Admiral Sir Henry; Scarlett, Wing Captain F. R.; Sturdee, Vice Admiral Frederick Charles Doveton; Webb, Captain Richard; Williamson, Wing Commander Hugh Naval Wing see RFC navigation 23, 170, 173 Navy Records Society 5 Netherlands see Holland network see communications Newall, Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. N. 145 Newberry, Flight Commander J. D. 178 Newbolt, Henry, historian 6 New York City 128 Nicholl, Flight Commander V. 89 Nicholson, Rear Admiral Stuart: as Rear Admiral East Coast of England 91, 96, 205 Nicolson, Captain Wilmot 47; see also Furious HMS Nieuport 33 Nigeria: Benin expedition 133 night-flying see RNAS Nivelle, General Robert see Aisne, Second Battle Norfolk 180, 184 Norris, Captain David: as ICRAB (Inspecting Captain of Rigid Airship Building) 23; as ASAC II (Second Assistant Superintendent for Aircraft Construction) 23; as ASA (Assistant Superintendent for Airships) 23, 93, 207

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256  Index North Sea 8, 17, 21, 25–6, 39, 42, 45–6, 55, 77, 80, 82, 90, 92, 97, 100, 108, 161, 177, 179, 186, 203; see also mine barrage Northcliffe, Viscount Alfred Harmsworth 21, 162 Norway 80, 92, 100; see also convoys Oberndorf 140–1 Ocean HMS, predreadnought 35 O’Gorman, Colonel Mervyn 19; see also Royal Aircraft Factory Oliver, Flight Commander D. A. 31 Oliver, Vice Admiral Sir Henry: as Chief of the Admiralty War Staff 33, 89, 99, 137–8; as DCNS 47, 79, 95–6 Openshaw, Flight Lieutenant L. P. 40, 55 Operations Committee 47, 51 Operation Michael 136, 182–3 Ophelia HMS, destroyer 107 Orotava HMS, seaplane carrier 111 Ostend see U-boat bases Ouse HMS, destroyer 99, 107 Page, Gordon, historian 6, 108 Paine, Commodore Godfrey: and RNAS Cranwell 174, 200, 205; as Fifth Sea Lord 8, 24, 46–8, 51–2, 55, 93, 95–6, 101, 103, 114–5, 143, 145, 152, 182, 199–200, 208; as Master General of Personnel 103 Palestine 44 Park, Sublieutenant W. 34 Paris 140 Partridge, Lieutenant 108 Passchendaele see Ypres Paterson, H. G. 27 Pathfinder HMS, scout cruiser 78 Patriot HMS, destroyer 105 Pattinson, Captain T. C. 183 Pegasus HMS, seaplane carrier 39, 46, 54; modified to carry fighters 51 Pembroke HMS, flagship Chatham Dockyard 2 Penney, Flight Commander D. E. 50 Pennsylvania USS 26 Phaeton HMS, light cruiser 40, 173 Phillimore, Rear Admiral Richard F. 17, 49–50, 55–8, 204–5; as ACA 16, 50, 55, 58, 200, 203; diaries of 5; and the Tondern raid 55–6;

see also Air Department; Grand Fleet; RAF; RNAS; Zeppelin bases photoreconnaissance see RNAS Picken, Lieutenant N. J. 111 Pink, Lieutenant Commander Richard C. M.: produces Air Department operations reports 97, 205 Pola see torpedo strike, aerial Pomeroy, John see ammunition Popham, Hugh, historian 6 Porte, Wing Commander J. C. 77, 87, 98, 203; flies A/S patrols 105; CO C38 98; advisor for Deperdussin co. 98; and flying boat development 98, 207 Portfino SS, 103 Powlett, Captain F. A. 103 Prat, H. B. 18 President HMS, accounting base 2, 165 propaganda 185 Pugh, James, historian 3, 163, 165, 175 Pulling, Flight Sublieutenant E. L. 176 Pulsipher, Lewis, historian 3 Q-ships 99, 105, 107 Queen Elizabeth HMS, battleship 34–6, 53, 60, 185 Queen Victoria 133 radio see communications RAF (Royal Air Force) 1, 3–4, 7–9, 25, 49, 53–8, 80, 93, 106, 108– 112, 114–5, 128–9, 136, 141, 151, 161–2, 183–6, 196, 200–1, 203, 208–9; Coastal Command 200; and Grand Fleet operations 56–7; see also Air Ministry; long-range bombing; RFC RAF aircraft: No. N2816 Short 184 111 RAF bases: Autreville (bombers) 148; Gosport (torpedo school) 59 RAF Brigades: VIII 147 RAF Groups: Egypt Group 111; No. 4 93, 184; No. 5 93, 102, 136; No. 9 93–4, 102, 108, 115; No. 10 93, 102, 108, 115; No. 11 93; No. 14 102; No. 18 93, 102, 108, 115, 184; No. 22 93, 102; No. 25 93, 102; No. 28 93

Index 257 RAF Squadrons: No. 38 183; No. 100 147; No. 185 54, 59; No. 186 Torpedo Development Squadron 59; No. 201 182; No. 204 183; No. 210 182; No. 215 147–9; No. 216 60, 147–9, 151; No. 217 136 No. 228 94; No. 234 94, 101; No. 235 94; No. 236 94; No. 237 94; No. 238 94; No. 240 94; No. 241 94; No. 242 94; No. 245 94; No. 255 94 RAF Wings: 41st 147–9, 196; 61st 182; 64th 182; 65th 182; 82nd 136; 83rd 147 Raglan HMS, monitor 44 Raleigh, Sir Walter, historian 6, 30 Ramsgate 180 Randall, Engineer Lieutenant C. R. J. 18 Rathbone, Squadron Commander C. E. H. 132 Raven II HMS, seaplane carrier 43–4 Rayleigh, Lord John William Strutt: chairman of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 18, 86; see also Strutt, R. J. Read, Major W. R. 146 Rear Admiral (Air) see Phillimore, Rear Admiral Richard F. reconnaissance see RNAS Red Cross 143 Red Sea 44 Redoubt HMS, destroyer 185 Renault see engines Repulse HMS, battlecruiser 49–50, 55; see also Heligoland Bight, Second Battle of; Phillimore, Rear Admiral Richard F. Revenge HMS, predreadnought 37 RFC (Royal Flying Corps) 1–2, 7, 9–10, 22, 27, 29, 33, 37, 42, 45, 54, 58, 81, 112, 128–9, 131–5, 137–9, 141–2, 145–8, 151–2, 161, 163–5, 168–71, 174–6, 178–81, 183, 185–6, 196, 199–200, 202, 205, 208–9; clock-code spotting system 37; Military Wing 1, 4, 30, 32, 163–4, 183; Naval Wing 1–3, 6, 20, 26–7, 29–30, 33, 37, 43, 57, 60, 77–8, 81–5, 112, 163–4, 197; training manual 29–30 RFC bases: Hythe (training) 174, 177 RFC Squadrons: No. 50 179; No. 55 147; No. 99 147

RFC Wings: 41st (Ochey) 9, 129, 144–9, 151–2, 180, 196 Richmond, Captain Herbert 53, 100, 137, 203 rigid airships see airships (British); Zeppelins Risk, Wing Commander C. E. 44 Riviera HMS, seaplane carrier 29, 31, 37, 40, 48, 99, 111 RNAS (Royal Naval Air Service) 2, 7, 9, 21, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32–3, 35, 37, 40, 42, 45–6, 52, 54–5, 57–8, 60, 77, 80, 85–7, 91, 93–6, 100, 106, 108, 111, 114, 128–9, 131–3, 135–42, 144–5, 147, 150–2, 161–2, 164, 168–9, 175–86, 196–7, 199–200, 202, 205–6, 209; armoured cars 3, 7, 78, 85, 198, 203; and air defence 3–4, 9–10, 25, 27–8, 32, 38, 46, 77–8, 85–7, 95, 97, 112, 132–3, 135, 137, 161–2, 164–70, 174–5, 177–86, 197–8, 203, 208–9; air fighting 174, 177–80, 182, 186; aviation experiments 16–7, 27, 33, 35, 38–9, 41, 50, 52, 55, 78, 163; casualties 16, 34, 47, 52, 147, 166, 177–8, 196, 204, 206; close air support 17, 42, 102, 130, 198–9, 202; coastal patrols 10, 20, 28–9, 45, 57, 78, 81, 87, 91–3, 95, 97–8, 100, 103, 113, 131, 133, 162, 169, 179–81, 184–5, 196, 198; as combined arms 57, 99, 112, 165, 197; counter-mine patrols 38, 94; doctrine 4, 10, 16, 27–8, 30, 37, 45, 48–9, 59, 77, 80, 89, 96–7, 102, 109–110, 114–5, 164–5, 167, 179, 200–1, 204; fleet operations 4, 7, 16–7, 20, 28, 38, 40–1, 47–52, 54, 57, 83, 113, 143, 152, 169, 183, 196–200, 203, 209; gunfire spotting 7, 16–7, 23, 27, 32–7, 40, 42, 44–7, 56–7, 59, 101, 106, 133, 165, 174, 196, 198–9, 202–4; and inter-service rivalry 57–8, 129, 137, 139, 142–4, 151–2, 169, 196, 209; leadership 137, 201–2, 207; manpower 91, 112, 144–5; maintenance and repair 106, 143, 145, 147; material development 58, 77, 80, 84, 164, 166–7, 172, 174–5, 182, 207; night-flying 89–90, 95, 133–6, 142, 147–8, 150, 161, 167, 171, 175, 181, 185;

258  Index observers 28, 32–5, 57, 80, 82, 88, 109, 111, 133, 170, 174, 203; operational research 80, 97, 109–110, 203, 205; photography 34, 42, 53, 174; pilots 16, 31, 33, 35, 37, 42, 50, 53, 56–7, 80, 82, 88–9, 104, 109–111, 132–4, 140–1, 143, 147, 166–7, 174, 177–9, 183–5, 202–4, 208; port strikes 35, 44, 131, 133, 150, 203–4; absorbed by RAF 25, 49, 55, 58–9, 80, 106, 108, 111, 137; reconnaissance 4, 16–7, 21, 23, 25, 28, 31–6, 38, 40, 42, 45–6, 48, 53–4, 56–7, 59, 82, 87, 133, 163–4, 169–70, 182, 196–9, 204, 207, 209; regulations 2; roles 3–5, 7–10, 16–7, 30, 38, 45, 49, 54, 59, 77–8, 80, 82, 84–6, 95, 109, 112, 114, 128–9, 134, 142–4, 161–3, 165, 170, 182–4, 186, 196, 198–201, 204, 207, 209; squadrons upgraded to wings 43; subordinated to district SNOs 2–3, 22, 87, 89, 112, 133; and technology 3–4, 7, 27, 57, 112, 164, 174, 197, 199–201, 206–7; training 25, 30, 33, 57–8, 80, 91, 98, 102, 109, 140, 146, 167, 172, 174–5, 183–4, 199–200, 205; U-boat destruction 80, 98–9, 100, 103–8; U-boat suppression 77, 80, 82, 85, 91, 94, 102, 104–5; warship bombing 35, 44–5, 89–90; women 57; anti-Zeppelin operations 4, 32, 38–9, 45–6, 48, 58, 87–8, 91, 95, 113, 131–3, 142, 151, 161, 165–8, 172–5, 182, 184–6, 196, 199, 203, 205; see also aircraft (Allied); aircraft carriers; Air Department; Air Ministry; airships (British); ASW; Dardanelles; EIESS; Grand Fleet; Harwich Force; long-range bombing; RAF; RFC; Royal Navy; torpedo strike, aerial; weapons; Zeppelins RNAS aircraft: No. 3691, Sopwith Pup 177; No. 8655, H12 103; No. 8656, H12 104; No. 8663, H12 104–5; No. 8666, H12 177; No. 8676, H12 105; No. 8689, H12 105; No. 8695, H12 104–5; No. 9940, Sopwith Pup 178; No. B9983, Blackburn Kangaroo 107; No. N5374, Sopwith Triplane 178; No. N6337, Sopwith Camel 179;

No. N6347, Sopwith Camel 179; No. N6363, Sopwith Camel 179; No. N6430, Sopwith Pup 180; see also aircraft (Allied); airship (British) RNAS Groups 88, 93, 100; Channel Group 94, 108, 202; South-West Group 94, 101, 202; see also Bigsworth, Wing Commander A. W.; Dover Patrol; Gerrard, Wing Commander Eugene L.; Grand Fleet; Lambe, Wing Captain Charles; NAS; SNOs RNAS Squadrons: No. 1 88, 111, 165–6; No. 2 93; No. 3 33, 35, 42, 130; No. 4 93, 177–8; No. 5 93, 134; No. 6 179; No. 7 93, 134, 146; No. 7A 181; No. 8 146; No. 9 93, 177–8, 181; No. 10 93, 144, 181; No. 11 93; No. 12 93; No. 14 181; No. 15 93; No. 16 128–9, 145–8; No. 34 101; Red Squadron 141 RNAS Wings: No. 1 85, 93, 132–3, 165, 168; No. 2 43; No. 3 4, 32, 43, 139; No. 3 (Luxeuil) 4, 9, 56, 128–9, 139–45, 148, 150–2, 196, 199, 204–6; No. 4 93, 177; No. 5 93, 134 Robbins, Guy, historian 3 Roberts HMS, monitor 36 Robertson, Charles 18–9 Robertson, Field Marshal Sir William: as CIGS (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) 146, 168 Robinson, Lieutenant Commander C. G. 40–1; see also Engadine HMS Rolls Royce co. see engines Romania 7 Room 40 see Naval Staff Rosher, Flight Lieutenant Harold 88 Roskill, Stephen, historian 5–6 Ross, Flight Commander R. P. 31 Rothermere, Viscount Harold Harmsworth: as Air Minister 148 Royal Aircraft Factory 19 Royal Engineers 23 Royal Marines 2, 33, 43, 78, 95, 112, 133, 199 Royal Navy 1, 4–5, 8–9, 18, 25–6, 28, 37–8, 54, 58, 60, 77–82–4, 86–7, 89, 95, 98, 104, 111, 128–9, 133–4, 136–9, 142, 147, 151–2, 162–5, 168–70, 172–3, 179, 182–3,

Index 259 185–6, 196–9, 201–2, 207–9; Atlantic and Home Fleet 59–60; Auxiliary Patrol 99, 101; Battle Fleet concept 59, 204; blockade 8–9, 85, 112, 138, 150, 152, 208; Channel Fleet 90; coastal patrols 21, 45, 48, 83–4, 89, 92, 168, 173, 184; doctrine 3, 28, 131, 163; establishes A/S program 84; FAA (Fleet Air Arm) 5–6, 200; Home Fleet 81; Home Waters 97, 101, 104, 114; National Museum, Portsmouth 5; demise of naval aviation 60; Naval Intelligence Centre 84; Naval Review 82, 196; Navy Lists 2; Submarine Service 2, 18, 81, 98, 110, 199, 203; technological developments 28; Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) 108, 164–5; War College 82; Young Turks 208; anti-Zeppelin operations 38–9, 45, 55, 168, 172–3; see also aircraft carriers; airships (British); Admiralty; ASW; Grand Fleet; RNAS; submarines Royal Navy bases see SNOs Royal Society 18 Rufiji River see East Africa Russia 7, 30, 55, 181 Rutland, Flight Commander F. J. 40–1, 50, 53, 205 Ryan, Captain C. P. 98 Saar 138, 144, 149 Saarbrucken 146, 150 SAC (Superintendent for Aircraft Construction); see Sueter, Commodore Murray Salmond, Brigadier General John 136 Salonika 24, 36 Samson, Wing Captain Charles R. 43–4, 53, 83, 85, 88, 130, 132, 139, 182, 184, 199, 203–5; on Air Committee 27; and loss of Ben-myChree 44; and early aviation 27, 81; and Belgian coast operations 31, 33, 78, 131; at Dardanelles 32, 35, 43, 131–2; CO EIESS 42–3; CO Great Yarmouth 44, 53, 94, 182; commands Hermes air contingent 29; memoirs 5; see also Ben-myChree HMS; EIESS; NAS; RNAS; RNAS Wings

Savory, Squadron Commander K. S. 146 Scarff, Warrant Officer F. W.: Lewis gun ring 207; Vickers gun (ScarffDibovsky) interrupter 133, 167, 207 Scarlett, Wing Captain F. R. 2, 53, 140, 205; as DAD (Director Air Division) 53, 99, 107, 109; XO Hermes (1913) 2, 28; and hydrophone development 99, 206; as Inspecting Captain of Aircraft 2, 18; succeeds Sykes in Eastern Mediterranean 43; see also CAO Scheer, Admiral Reinhard 40–1, 79, 89; and August sortie 41, 79; and Lowestoft-Yarmouth raid 89–90; see also High Sea Fleet; Imperial Navy (German); Jutland, Battle of Schillig see Wilhelmshaven fleet base schooners 44 Schwann, Captain Oliver: and early aviation 27; CO Campania 39–40, 46, 196; oversees R1 work at Barrow 18; and seaplane carrier designs 39; see also Campania HMS; Grand Fleet Scotland 92, 93, 96, 102, 184 Scott, Flight Lieutenant C. L. 103 Scott, Admiral Sir Percy 85, 167–8, 206; see also ASW; Home Defence Scutari, transport (Turkish) 36 Sea King, trawler 104 seaplane carriers see aircraft carriers seaplanes see aircraft (Allied) seapower 164 search and rescue 29, 173; see also Coast Guard searchlights 34, 110, 164, 166, 168, 171, 173; see also communications Second Sea Lord see Burney, Admiral Cecil; Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John Second World War 112, 114–5, 186, 200 Seddon, Squadron Commander J. W. 52 Seely, Colonel J. E. B 2, 32, 162; Air Committee chairman 2, 32; CID technical subcommittee chairman 1; Under-Secretary of State for War 1 Severn HMS, monitor 37 SFO (Senior Flying Officer) 43, 47, 203

260  Index Sharpe, Chief Artificer Engineer A. 18 Shearer, Flight Sublieutenant T. R. 178 Sheerness 177–8; see also CAO shell crisis see May Crisis Shoeburyness 178 Shook, Flight Commander A. M. 179 Short Brothers see aircraft (Allied) signals intelligence see communications Singer, Rear Admiral Morgan 164 Sippe, Flight Lieutenant S. V. 130 Smart, Flight Sublieutenant B. A. 49, 180 Smith, Flight Lieutenant C. H. C. 90 Smith, Captain H. H.: CO Argus 50 Smuts Committee see Smuts, Jan Smuts, Lieutenant-General Jan 54, 141, 152; first report 179; second report 54, 179; third report 179–80 Smyrna, Gulf of 35 Smyth-Osbourne, Wing Commander Henry: as District Commander of Aircraft 88; see also NAS SNOs (Senior Naval Officers) and RN districts 2, 22, 45, 87, 89, 93, 95–6, 100–1, 103, 111–2, 161, 168, 201–2, 205; the Cape 43; Chatham Dockyard 164; China 43, 93; Coast of Ireland 93; Coast of Scotland 93, 96, 184; Colombo 43; Devonport 93–4, 99; Dover 32–3, 37, 88, 93, 102, 114, 131, 135, 165–6, 175, 177, 180–1; Dunkirk 136, 168; East Coast of England 88, 91, 93, 95–6, 102–3, 108, 114, 170, 172–3; Egypt 110; Falmouth 101; Fortrose 84; Gosport 98; Harwich 81, 88, 93, 95, 173, 175, 177–8, 184; Land’s End 101; Larne Harbour 93; Lowestoft 88–91, 93, 95–6, 172–3; Malta 33; the Nore 39, 88, 93, 95, 99, 175, 184; Orkneys & Shetlands 80, 93, 95; Plymouth 93–4, 101, 102, 108, 111, 202; Portland Bill 101; Portland Harbour 59; Port Said 43–4; Portsmouth 81–2, 91, 93–4, 102, 108, 133, 165, 202; Queenstown 90–1, 202; Rosyth 40, 49, 81, 94–6, 171, 173; Scapa Flow 40; the Scillies 101; Senior Officer of Patrols 84; Yarmouth 89–90,

93, 171–2; see also Dover Patrol; East Africa; East Indies; Egypt; Grand Fleet; Harwich Force; Indian Ocean; Mediterranean Sea; Mesopotamia; NAS; Red Sea Somme, Battle of 134, 139, 141, 175 Sommerfeldt, Kapitanleutnant E. 177 sonar see ASW Sopwith co. see aircraft (Allied) Sopwith, Thomas 52, 200 South-Eastern and Chatham Railway co. 29 Spain 80, 107 Strain, Lieutenant L. H. 34 strategic bombing 3, 8–9, 111–2, 134, 142, 146–7, 150, 166, 178, 183, 199, 208; civilian casualties 177–8; morale impact 138, 145, 148, 170, 176, 182, 185; see also Gothas; long-range bombing; RNAS; Zeppelin raids Strutt, R. J. 86 Sturdee, Vice Admiral Frederick Charles Doveton: C-in-C the Nore 184; as Chief of the Admiralty War Staff 31; chairs R1 inquiry 19; president of the Submarine Committee 81 Sturtivant, Ray, historian 6, 108 Subcommittee on Aerial Navigation 17 submarines 21, 28, 31, 48, 77–8, 81–4, 88, 90, 93, 97–8, 107–8, 110–1, 115, 133–4, 136, 165, 169, 173, 207–8; A-class 81; C38 98; D3 84; E4 173; E6 173; E11 31; E14 36; E31 173; early theory and developments 78, 81–2; see also ASW; Grand Fleet; High Sea Fleet; Royal Navy; U-boats; unrestricted submarine warfare Submarine Committee 81; see also Burney, Admiral Cecil; Currey, Rear Admiral Bernard; Hornby, Rear Admiral Robert Phipps; Sturdee, Vice Admiral Frederick Charles Doveton; Tupper, Rear Admiral Reginald Sueter, Commodore Murray 2–3, 17, 19, 32, 39, 43, 50, 52, 57–8, 87, 97, 99, 111, 137, 147, 163, 165–7, 199, 205, 208; on Air Committee 27–8, 163; and aircraft launching systems 27, 39; develops air defence of Britain 9, 97, 161, 163–6,

Index 261 168, 185–6, 198, 202; as DAD (Director Air Department) 2–3, 9, 19, 28, 57, 112, 132, 197, 207; and development of flying boats 87; endorses kite-balloons 32; as ICA (Inspecting Captain of Airships) 18–9; long-range bombing development 131, 137–8, 151, 198; memoirs 5; develops Naval Wing doctrine 28, 32, 81; and Otranto barrage 52, 99, 203; R1 program and successors, 18–9, 19, 21, 202; as SAC 3, 23, 41, 51–2, 131, 161, 168, 200; Sea Scout development 86; and submarine warfare 81, 83; and tank development 7, 99, 198; and torpedo plane development 52, 200, 202; replaced by Vaughan-Lee 22, 58, 198; supports unified air service 3, 52, 146–7, 200, 208; as Vickers liaison 18; see also Air Department; Churchill, Sir Winston S.; communications; Home Defence; RNAS; tanks Suez 44 Suffolk 24, 177 Supermarine Aircraft co. see aircraft (Allied) Sussex SS: torpedoed by UB29 78 Star HMS, destroyer 107 Strasser, Fregattenkaptian Peter 165, 176–7, 184–5, 203; see also Zeppelins Switzerland 130, 144 Sydney HMAS, light cruiser 49 Sykes, Major-General Sir Frederick H. 22, 30, 43, 162–3, 202; sent to Dardanelles 42–3; as CAS 147–8, 151; and RFC training manual 30; rationalizes RNAS at Dardanelles 43 Talbot, Lieutenant C. P. 18 tanks 7, 99, 133, 147, 198 Tanzania see East Africa Taranto, Battle of 16, 59; see also torpedo strike, aerial telephones see communications Ten-Year Rule 60 Termote, Tomas, marine archaeologist 105 Terschelling Island 177, 184 Thames river 105, 173 Theseus HMS, protected cruiser 133 Thetford, Owen, historian 6

Third Sea Lord see Controller, RN; Halsey, Rear Admiral Lionel; Tudor, Rear Admiral Frederick C. T. Thomas, George Holt 86, 207 Thomson, Major-General 148 Tiger HMS, battlecruiser 203 Till, Flight Sublieutenant F. D. 90 Tirpitz, Grand Admiral Alfred von 20; see also Imperial Navy (German) Tondern see Zeppelin bases torpedoes see weapons torpedo boats 84, 136, 172–3 torpedo strike, aerial 36, 45, 48, 50–4, 59, 164; at Gallipoli 36; planned against Kiel 51–2; planned against Pola, 52; planned against Wilhelmshaven 3, 7, 16–7, 51–4, 58, 94, 114, 203, 206; at the 1919 exercise 3, 59–60 training see RNAS Treasury (British) 19 Trenchard, Major-General Hugh 139, 142–3, 145–7, 151–2, 183, 202; as CAS 146–7; as CO IAF 9, 148–50 Trewin, Assistant Paymaster G. S. 41 trawlers 44, 90, 101, 172; equipped with hydrophones 99, 107 Triumph HMS, predreadnought 22, 35–6 Tudor, Rear Admiral Frederick C. T.: CO China station 93; Third Sea Lord 23, 24, 41–2, 47, 49–50, 53, 93, 138, 142, 164–5, 169, 175, 203, 205 Tupper, Rear Admiral Reginald: president of the Submarine Committee 81 tugboats 36 Turgut Reis, battleship (Turkish) 35–6 Turkey 35–6, 44, 146 Tyrwhitt, Commodore Reginald 31, 40–2, 80, 88, 90, 173, 205; see also Harwich Force U-boats 8–9, 21, 40, 42, 49, 51, 53– 4, 58, 77–80, 84–5, 87–8, 90–2, 94, 96–8, 100–8, 110–5, 131, 134, 138, 171, 184, 196, 199–201, 206, 208; U20 78; U21 22, 36; U24 78, 90; U27 33, 133; U39 107; U69 104–5; UB-type 90, 92; UB12 104, 106; UB20 104–5; UB29 78;

262  Index UB31 106; UB32 104; UB36 104; UB39 103–4; UB59 106; UB78 106; UB83 106–7; UB103 106–7; UB115 99, 106–7; UC-type 92, 104–5; UC1 104–5; UC6 104–5; UC16 104; UC21 104; UC36 104–6; UC65 104; UC66 104; UC70 106, 108; UC72 104–5 U-boat bases 4, 8, 77, 85, 88, 113–4, 128–9, 183; Bremen 53; Bruges 77, 88, 103–6, 134, 136–7, 143; Hoboken 88; Kiel 51–2; Ostend 31, 33, 77, 88, 105–6, 130, 132, 134, 136–7, 166, 179, 183; Zeebrugge 32–3, 40, 48, 77, 88, 105–6, 132, 134–7, 183; see also ASW; longrange bombing undersea warfare see submarines; unrestricted submarine warfare Unionists 21; see also Bonar Law, Andrew United Kingdom see Great Britain United States of America 30, 78–80, 98, 136, 181, 183, 207; declares war on Germany 79, 92, 113 unrestricted submarine warfare: delays aircraft carrier construction 49–50; first phase, War Zone declared 32, 78, 86, 206; second phase 8, 42, 91, 113; third phase 45, 49, 51, 53–4, 78, 80, 92, 95, 97, 103, 106–7, 113–4, 141, 176, 207; curtailed by US pressure 78–9, 113; see also ASW; convoys; merchant shipping; Naval Staff; Royal Navy; U-boats Usborne, Wing Commander Neville 16, 18–9, 52, 86, 204, 206 USN (United States Navy) 26, 110, 184, 202; Air Service 93, 106–7, 202; Naval Reserve 107; Northern Bombing Group 183 Vaughan-Lee, Rear Admiral C. L. 3, 46–7, 52, 58, 91, 93, 97, 138–9, 141, 143, 147–8, 152, 161, 168–9, 174–5, 197–8, 200; reorganizes Air Department 23; convenes aircraft carrier committee 41; expands airship program 23; expands coastal air bases 38; appointed DAS 3, 22, 112, 134, 198; supports long-range bombing 8, 112, 137–9, 151, 167; material reforms 172, 174, 202;

as Superintendent of Portsmouth Dockyard 52; anti-Zeppelin policy 173 Vernon HMS, torpedo school 81, 133 Vickers Sons and Maxim, armament firm 18–21, 43, 133; acquires duralumin patents 18; see also Barrowin-Furness; weapons Victoria Cross 166 Vindex HMS, seaplane carrier 39–41, 54–5, 173–4 Vindictive HMS, aircraft carrier 48, 51 Viney, Flight Sublieutenant T. E. 88 Vivian, Captain G. W. 2, 83; CO Hermes (1913) 2, 28, 82, 205 Vyvyan, Captain Arthur V. 47–8, 50–1, 131, 205, 208; as ADAS 48, 137–8; as Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 147; and Benin expedition 133; as Paine’s assistant 93 War Cabinet 42, 45, 58, 78, 100, 145–6, 148, 150–1, 180 War Committee 43, 141, 169, 175 War Council 21, 167 War Ministry see Haldane, Viscount Richard; Kitchener, Field Marshal Lord Herbert Horatio; Lloyd George, David; Seely, Colonel J. E. B. Warneford, Flight Sublieutenant Rex, 131, 166, 206 War Office 4, 9–10, 129, 134, 138–9, 142, 145, 151–2, 161, 165, 167, 171, 175; Military Intelligence Department 171; see also Army Council; BEF; Army (British); RFC Waters, D. W., historian 114 Watson, James 18 War Zone see unrestricted submarine warfare Waring, Lieutenant E. F. 107 weather 23, 31–4, 39, 46, 56, 101, 131–2, 134, 140, 142–3, 145, 149–50, 173, 177, 181, 203; meteorological balloons 100 weapons: anti-aircraft (AA) guns 140, 161, 164–8, 171–4, 178, 180–1, 185, 202, 206; bombs 44–5, 56, 82–3, 86–90, 98, 102–9, 111, 130–3, 135, 137, 140–4, 146, 149, 163, 166, 168, 174, 177–8, 180, 196; Chauchat 176; Colt

Index 263 176; Davis recoilless gun 98, 175; depth charges 98–9, 103–4, 106–7; Farquhar-Hill rifle 176; grenades 90, 163, 175; Hotchkiss 176; Lewis guns 98, 166, 174–6, 207; machine guns 109, 133, 163, 172, 174, 176, 207; Maxim guns 172, 176; mines 25, 35, 45, 81–2, 86, 94, 99, 100, 104, 106–7, 113; naval guns 35, 44, 46–7, 142, 172; Ranken darts 41, 166, 175; rockets 163; small arms 100, 166, 176; smoke 59; torpedoes 3, 27–8, 36–7, 45, 48, 50– 3, 59–60, 82, 105, 133, 202, 208; Vickers guns 133, 175–6; see also ammunition; Burney, Lieutenant Charles Dennistoun; Longmore, Wing Commander Arthur; RNAS; Scarff, Warrant Officer F. W. Webb, Captain Richard: as head of Naval Staff Trade Division 79 Weir, Viscount William 25, 146, 148–9, 151; see also Air Ministry Weissenburg SMS see Turgut Reis Wells, H. G. 128, 162 Wemyss, Vice Admiral Sir Rosslyn: as C-in-C East Indies 43; as Deputy First Sea Lord; as First Sea Lord 51, 96, 107, 114, 200; on Operations Committee 47 Western Approaches see English Channel Western Front 7, 91, 132–4, 140, 144, 146, 149, 151, 175–6, 181–3; see also Army (British); BEF Weymouth 103 Whitehall 37 WIA (War In The Air) see Jones, Henry A.; Raleigh, Walter Wilhelmshaven fleet base 3, 7, 16–7, 31, 42, 51–4, 58, 94, 114, 203, 206; see also High Sea Fleet; torpedo strike, aerial; Zeppelins Williams, George, historian 144 Williamson, Wing Commander Hugh 53, 83, 85, 97, 102–3, 184, 203, 205; proposes aircraft carrier 28, 82, 206; on Air Department staff 41, 52; aboard Ark Royal 34, 82; A/S developments 82, 85, 97, 115; head of ASD Air Section 79, 97, 110, 115, 205; on Airship Progress Committee 24; and Blackburn Kangaroo 77, 102, 107,

207; injured at Dardanelles 34; and flush deck design 50; memoirs 6; head of Operations Division air section 97 Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur 22, 81 Wilson, Flight Lieutenant J. P. 31, 131 Wilson, President Woodrow 113 W/T (wireless-telegraphy) see communications Wolf, merchant raider (German) 44; see also merchant raiders women see RNAS Woodcock, Wing Commander Harold: Inspecting Commander of Dirigible Airship Building 23; on staff of Director Airship Production 24 Xeros Bay see Gallipoli Yarmouth HMS, light cruiser 49, 180 Yavuz, battlecruiser (Turkish) 36, 44–5 Yeulett, Lieutenant W. A. 56 Ypres: First Battle of 33; Second Battle of 21; Third Battle of 54, 135, 181; see also Belgium; U-boat bases Zeebrugge see U-boat bases Zeiss co. 18 Zeppelin, Count Ferdinand von 17 Zeppelins 9, 17, 23–8, 30, 32, 38, 40–1, 46, 48, 55–6, 59, 86–7, 89, 91, 95, 97, 128, 130, 133, 138, 141–2, 151, 161–78, 181–2, 184–6, 196–201, 203, 206–8; as comms, recon or spotting platforms 17, 30, 38, 89; L1 (LZ14) 30; L2 (LZ18) 30; L3 (LZ24) 21; L4 (LZ27) 21; L5 (LZ28) 21, 31; L6 (LZ31) 31; L7 (LZ32) 40, 130, 173; L9 (LZ36) 89, 172–3; L13 (LZ45) 90, 174; L17 (LZ53) 41, 174; L21 (LZ61) 89, 176; L22 (LZ64) 177, 182; L23 (LZ66) 49, 180; L32 (LZ74) 171; L33 (LZ76) 24; L40 (LZ88) 177; L42 (LZ91) 178; L43 (LZ92) 177, 182; L44 (LZ93) 176; L48 (LZ95) 24, 178; L49 (LZ96) 24; L53 (LZ100) 184–5; L54 (LZ99) 7, 16, 56, 184; L60 (LZ108) 7, 16, 56, 184; L62

264  Index (LZ107) 183–4; L70 (LZ112) 184–5, 203; LZ7 ‘Deutschland’ 19; LZ8 ‘Deutschland II’ 19; LZ11 ‘Viktoria-Luise’ 19; LZ13 ‘Hansa’ 20; LZ25 ‘Z IX’ 31, 130; LZ37 166; LZ38 31, 131, 166; LZ39 166; LZ85 23–4, 36; see also airships (British); Gothas; longrange bombing; RNAS; strategic bombing; Zeppelin raids Zeppelin bases 4, 39, 88, 128–30, 137, 150, 163, 204; Cologne 130, 164–5; Cuxhaven 17, 31, 128, 131, 164, 196; Dusseldorf 30, 130, 139;

Evere 31, 131; Friedrichshafen 31, 130, 164; Gontrode 31, 131; Hage 40; Hoyer 40; Nordholz, Naval Airship Division HQ 31; Tondern 7, 16–7, 40, 53, 55–6, 173–4, 184, 196, 203 Zeppelin co. 26; Staaken (Giant bomber) 162, 180, 182–3, 200; see also Gothas Zeppelin raids: against Britain 9–10, 32, 89, 91, 97, 138, 141, 165–6, 171–2, 177–8, 180–4, 198, 208; against London 9–10, 87, 166, 168, 172, 176–8