British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole 9781400874637

Citation preview

British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole

D A N I E L A. B A U G H

PRINCETON

UNIVERSITY

PRINCETON,

NEW

PRESS

JERSEY

Copyright © 1965 by Princeton University Press ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

L. C. CARD: 63-23399

Publication of this book has been aided by the Ford Foundation program to support publication, through university presses, of works in the humanities and social sciences.

Printed in the United States of America by THE WILLIAM BYRD PRESS, INC.

TO MY FATHER AND MOTHER

T

HIS BOOK is about the ingredients of naval power in the eighteenth century: ships, bases, stores, victuals, seamen, and leadership. However, and here I shall borrow the words of John Hollond, who wrote on the royal navy more than three centuries ago, "I do not mean to run over in fruitless dis­ course how many ships his Majesty hath, what are their names, burdens in tons and tonnage, number of ordnance," nor will I discuss the dimensions of sails, rigging, and other equippage—"things fit in their places to be known, and yet better known by a digested list of them than other things fitter to be known." Like John Hollond, I am concerned with the "government" of the navy, with the administrative problems involved in furnishing the ingredients of naval power. A book on this subject cannot avoid reaching some conclu­ sions about the nature of Britain's naval strength. But this book is not about naval victory and defeat. Thus I have re­ sisted the temptation to explain the outcome of naval opera­ tions solely in terms of administrative factors, and the other factors—strategy, tactics, relative strength of the enemy—I have not studied. I hope the book will make a contribution to naval history by assisting those who may be prepared to study the whole range of factors that determine success or failure at sea, but my purpose is primarily to illuminate cer­ tain aspects of the nature and development of British govern­ ment. For in the eighteenth century the navy was one of the largest, most highly organized branches of the government; over the years it swallowed about half the public revenue. The book focusses on the second quarter of the eighteenth century, and particularly the war of 1739-1748, since war put administration to the test. For the most part, I believe, the administrative problems of that war were common to other eighteenth-century wars. However, although I have drawn most of my evidence from the 1739-1748 period, I have also found it necessary to reach back half a century or more to analyze the problems of naval administration and trace the development of solutions to them.

Preface

One can scarcely begin to study naval administration before the last decades of the eighteenth century without consulting the archives. Had I not had the opportunity to work in England for a long time this book could not have been writ­ ten, and I would like to thank those who were chiefly con­ cerned in giving me that opportunity: Professor Ε. E. Rich, Dr. Stanley Aston, Dr. G. Kitson Clark, Professor Kenneth M. Setton, and the late Professor Conyers Read. To the Fellows of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, I am grateful for many kindnesses and encouragements during my residence there. I wish to thank the staffs of the Public Record Office, the Na­ tional Maritime Museum, the Admiralty Library, and the manuscript room of the British Museum. Acknowledgement is also made to these institutions for permission to reproduce documents and pictures in their possession. I am indebted to the Duke of Bedford and the Marquess of Cholmondeley for allowing me to use their family manuscripts; and to Mr. Ken­ neth Timings, Commander P. K. Kemp, and Miss Gladys Scott Thomson for their help in making materials readily available. I am especially grateful to the late Commander R. D. Merriman, who generously placed at my disposal a large portion of his Queen Anne's Navy before its publication. Also Mr. Christopher Lloyd thoughtfully sent me sections of his work on eighteenth-century naval medicine before publica­ tion. To the reader I would like here to apologize for errors I may have made in citing the manuscript sources, since my present distance from the archives has made proper verifica­ tion impossible. This book began as a doctoral dissertation, submitted to Cambridge University in 1961, and I am especially indebted to Mr. John Ehrman, my supervisor, for his unfailing guidance and careful criticism. My debt to Captain John Creswell is also very great—his expert scrutiny saved me from numerous errors. I am also indebted to my colleagues, Professors John W. Shy and David D. Bien, for their helpful comments on portions of the book. Naturally I am responsible for the flaws and mistakes that remain. My thanks go to Mrs. Jan Garrison and Mrs. Frances McCarthy for some emergency typing. My thanks also go to the staff of Princeton University Press: to

Preface

Mrs. Marjorie Putney for her assistance, to Mrs. Helen Van Zandt for her work on the design of the book, and to Mr. David Harrop for his patience and encouragement. Above all, I wish to thank my mother, who saved me hours of toil on the index, and my father, whose careful use of the language I shall always admire. My father not only read carefully the entire book, but also assisted on points requiring last-minute research in London and in gathering together the illustra­ tions. My debt to my wife cannot be fully expressed. She proofread the book twice, and—far more important—raised three small children while it was being written, without letting that business delay its progress. Princeton, New Jersey January 1965

DANIEL A. BAUGH

Preface

vu

Note on Dates and Abbreviations

xv

1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 T h e Navy and the Constitution, 5 — T h e Politics of War, 1 0 — T h e War of 1739-1748, 2. T h e L o n d o n Offices T h e Navy Office, 3 2 — T h e Sick and Wounded Office, 48 — T h e Victualling Office, 5 2 — T h e Admiralty, 61 3. C o m m i s s i o n e d Officers T h e Development of the Officer Corps, 9 5 — T h e Test of War, 108—Morale, Discipline, and Competence, 138 4. T h e M a n n i n g P r o b l e m T h e Organization of Impressment, 150—Mobilization, 1739-1741, 163—1742-1748: T h e Problem of Desertion, 2O6—Manning Overseas, 2 1 5 — T h e Alternatives to Impressment, 224 5. Ships a n d S h i p b u i l d i n g T h e Fleet before the War, 241—Ship Design, 249— Shipbuilding, 253 6. T h e D o c k y a r d s T h e English Dockyards, Characteristics and Facilities, 262 — N a v a l Stores and Timber, 2 7 5 — T h e Resident Commissioner and the Dockyard Officers, 289—The Workmen, 308—Performance, 332 7. T h e Overseas Bases Facilities, 343—^Workmen, 359—Naval Officers and Sea Officers, 364 8. V i c t u a l l i n g T h e Seaman's Diet, 375—Planning, 386—Buying, 3 9 1 — Preserving and Packing, 422—Distributing, 431 9. N a v a l F i n a n c e T h e Estimates, 454—Cash and Debt, 470—Expenditure, 481 10. C o n c l u s i o n Appendices

21 29

93

147

241

262

341

373

452

494 507

I. Naval Debt, 1739-1749—II. T h e Royal Navy in 1742, 1745, and 1751 A Note on Sources Index

531 541

TABLES ι. Commissioners of the Navy during the War of 17391748 2. Ordinary Charge of the Victualling Office, 1747 3. Commissioners of the Victualling, 1739-1748 4. The Lords of the Admiralty, 1739-1748 5. Sources of Officer Entry, 1702-1712 6. The Half Pay Establishment of 1715 7. Officer Pay 8. Seniority Promotion to Flag Rank 9. Men Added to the Ships of Admiral Vernon's Squadron between June 7 and July 19, 1739 10. Standard Complements, 1739 11. Seamen and Landsmen Inducted during the Sum­ mer of 1739 12. Seamen Sent from on Board the Ships of War to Hospitals and Hospital Ships in Harbor 13. The Manning Level, 1739-1749 14. Comparison of Ships of the Royal Navy in 1714 and 1739 15. Ships either in Sea Pay in 1739 or Suitable for Fit­ ting Out 16. Number of Dockyard Workmen, 1711-1748 17. Dockyard Officers (Portsmouth), 1745 18. Sample of Promotion Ladder to Master Shipwright, 1722 19. Workmen of Deptford Yard and Their Wages, June 1748 20. The Establishment at Port Royal Yard, Jamaica, 1748 21. Seaman's Weekly Victualling Allowance 22. Declaration of Victuals for the Year 1746 23. Headings on the Ordinary Estimate of the Navy, 1740 24. Navy Board's Analysis of the Increase of Navy Debt, 1739-1746 25. Comparison of Victualling Expenses in 1703-1707 and 1740-1744

39 55 59 74 98 104 110 132 163 164 168 186 205 246 246 264 295 296 309 364 375 387 456 476 489

ILLUSTRATIONS (opposite page 256) PLATES

Sir Charles Wager A 6th Rate Ship on the Stocks at Deptford A 4th Rate Ship Leaving Dry Dock at Deptford Plymouth Dockyard, 1736 Plymouth Dockyard, 1774 A Ship Careened Impressing a Waterman Careening Wharf at Eng­ lish Harbor Thomas Corbett Woolwich Dockyard

British Museum National Maritime Museum, Greenwich National Maritime Museum, Greenwich National Maritime Museum, Greenwich National Maritime Museum, Greenwich National Maritime Museum, Greenwich Admiralty Library, Whitehall Ministry of Defence, Royal Navy

PRINTS

The Navy Office The Admiralty Office A Seaman's Ticket

Guildhall Library, London Guildhall Library, London National Maritime Museum, Greenwich

NOTE ON DATES Unless otherwise stated all dates are Old Style, except that January ist, not March 25th, is taken as the beginning of a new year. ABBREVIATIONS Admiralty records in the Public Record Office, London. Addl. MSS. Additional manuscripts in the British Museum. Corbett MSS. Manuscript collection of precedents with commentary, compiled by Thomas Corbett in the late 1730's and located at the Admiralty Library, Whitehall. Ehrman J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III (Cambridge, 1953). H.M.C. Historical Manuscripts Commission. MM. Mariner's Mirror. National Maritime Museum, Green­ N.M.M. wich. Navy Records Society. N.R.S. W. Cobbett, ed. Parliamentary History Pari. Hist. of England ... 1066 to ...1803 (36 vol., 1806-1820). p.c. Privy Council records in the Public Record Office. Public Record Office, London. P.R.O. Queen Anne's Navy R. D. Merriman, Queen Anne's Navy: Documents concerning the Administra· tion of the Navy of Queen Anne 77021714, N.R.S. (1961). Sir Herbert Richmond, The Navy in Richmond the War of 1739-48 (3 vol., Cambridge, 1920). S.P. State Papers in the Public Record Office.

Adm.

TJIM.S. Vernon Papers

Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. B. McL. Ranf t, The Vernon Papers, N.R.S. (1958).

V.CM.

Victoria History of the Counties of England.

The place of publication of all books cited is London unless otherwise stated. Full titles of works cited in abbreviated form may be located by consulting the author's name in the index.

British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole

The public debt has produced a difference of interests in this country. . . . It is the interest of the stockholders to in­ volve the nation in war, because they get by it: it is the interest of landed men and merchants to submit to many evils, rather than engage in war, since they must bear the chief burthen of it: and, however contemptible one may think the weight of the former, in comparison of that of the latter, it was their superior influence that involved the nation in the late frivolous war with Spain. —MALACHY POSTLETHWAYT, I 286. 2 To Sir Horace Mann, 26 May 1762, W. S. Lewis, W. H. Smith, and G. L. Lam, Horace Walpole's Correspondence with Sir Horace Mann (New Haven, 1954-in prog.) vi, 39.

ι. Introduction tory written thus far is drawn from admirals' and captains' dis­ patches. Although these dispatches provide an excellent foundation for the study of naval operations, they give a very one-sided view of the problems of naval administration. A commander at sea does not waste time telling the authorities what is right about the condition of his ships; he reports what is wrong. He wants the deficiencies corrected, and if it is too late for that, he wants his superiors to know why he cannot carry out his assignment or why he may fail in it when he tries. He is not disposed to understand the difficulties of the men who fit out, man, and supply his ships. Besides, all good sailors know that the officials ashore are irretrievably ineffi­ cient, certainly lazy, probably corrupt. As a result, the view we have of eighteenth-century British naval administration has tended to be a critical and accusatory view from seaward. Anyone acquainted with government in eighteenth-century Britain, however, is bound to acknowledge that the accusa­ tions may have foundation. It would be foolish to try to explain away flagrant corruption which the politicians them­ selves scarcely troubled to conceal, nor can it be denied that the prevailing corruption of public life infected the navy. Venality and neglect were so extensive in the eighteenthcentury navy that an administrative historian, if he did not know in advance that the British navy was by far the strongest and most consistently victorious navy of the period, could easily end with a catalogue of reasons for British naval col­ lapse. In fact, one historian who investigated the British navy in the early eighteenth century was so appalled by what she found that she concluded the empire must have been won by trade, for it could not have been won by the navy.3 Clearly one must keep one's balance. If the British navy triumphed in spite of corruption and neglect, then it might be wise to conclude that these factors do not explain very much about naval administration. In order to accept the no­ tion that all deficiencies in the fleet were the result of mal­ administration, one would have to believe that maintaining an effective fighting force at sea in those days was not a difficult a Ruth Bourne, Queen Anne's Navy in the West Indies (New Haven, Preface and pp. 279-283.

1939).

ι. Introduction task. One would have to forget that the eighteenth-century navy was, by the standards of its own day, a giant among organizations and that it was faced with problems of great complexity. Indeed, the means naval administrators had at hand for solving these problems were, from a twentieth-cen­ tury point of view, rude and feeble. Furthermore, Britain's opponents faced similar problems. Can the failures of every nation engaged in the eighteenthcentury struggle for empire be explained in terms of adminis­ trative neglect? Did every nation stumble at the same points, or did some solve certain problems better than others? For example, at the beginning of the war of 1739-1748 the British navy was slow to mobilize and made a rather poor showing. Many naval historians have agreed on an explanation: Sir Robert Walpole, who in 1739 had been prime minister for almost two decades, was not interested in fighting and had therefore allowed the navy and its administration to deterior­ ate.4 But, as Admiral Mahan pointed out, the long peace prior to 1739 enfeebled the French navy far more than the British.5 Moreover, when one observes that the British navy got off to a bad start not only in 1739, but also in 1756 and 1775, one wonders if there is not a more fundamental expla­ nation. Do certain features of the laws, the social structure, and the political life of mid-eighteenth-century Britain help to explain why her navy tended to mobilize slowly, yet finish by sweeping the enemy from the seas? The process by which a nation fits itself for war deserves analysis. To examine the problems involved in mobilizing and maintaining a fleet during the sailing-ship era may help naval historians understand precisely how administrative difficulties • This view is found most explicitly in Sir Oswyn Murray's "The Ad­ miralty," posthumously published in Mariner's Mirror, xxm-xxv (19371939); see MJVi v xxiv (1938), 310-214. But see also: D. Hannay, A Short History of the Royal Navy, 1213-181; (2 vol., 1909), 11, 100-1; M. Lewis, The Navy of Britain (1948), pp. 371, 376; C. Lloyd, The Nation and the Navy (1954), p. 90; A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (New York edn., 1957), pp. 230-231. It should be noted that Mahan's view of Walpole's responsibility is more balanced, as is that of Sir Herbert Rich­ mond (The Navy in the War of 1739-48), who studied this war more care­ fully than anyone else. 6 Mahan, Influence, p. 215.

ι. Introduction could narrow strategic choice and threaten the success of opera­ tions. To show how the British government went about solving these problems may throw light on the institutions and politics of eighteenth-century Britain, especially since the business of government in that era was, to a large extent, the business of waging war. The problems of naval administration touch many fields, and much of the ground is uncharted. One way to approach the subject is to study a single war—for example, the war of 1739-1748; to identify the problems which con­ fronted naval administrators in that war and account for the solutions they applied to them. That is what this book at­ tempts to do. In doing this it offers a portrait of the navy in the mideighteenth century, but not a complete portrait. Some aspects of naval administration are not discussed at all: the activities of the Board of Ordnance are omitted,® as well as the problem of caring for prisoners of war, which was a responsibility of the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded;7 technological topics, such as navigation and ship design, are also omitted.8 Other aspects of the navy's business are treated somewhat perfunctorily. This book offers little on shipboard administra­ tion (or on the warrant officers who directed it).9 Since a number of valuable studies concerned with naval stories and contracting already exist, those subjects are here dealt with β This Board, responsible for the supply of guns and ammunition to both the navy and the army, was not subject to Admiralty control. ι On prisoners of war in this era see Olive Anderson's articles in the English Hist. Rev., LXXV (I960) and MM., XVL (1959). s There are some first-rate books on navigation: E. G. R. Taylor, The Haven-Finding Art (1956); D. W. Waters, The Art of Navigation in Eng­ land in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times (1958); F. Marguet, Histoire de la longitude ά la mer au XVIIIe siecle en France (Paris, 1917). As yet there is no satisfactory study of the design of British men of war of the eighteenth century. For an introduction to the subject see Romola and R. C. Anderson, The Sailing Ship: Six Thousand Years of History (1926). β Considering the vast body of material available on shipboard activity, it is surprising that the studies we have are sketchy and anecdotal. C. N. Robinson, The British Tar in Fact and Fiction (1911) is an important guide to the various literary sources. C. N. Parkinson, Portsmouth Point: The Navy in Fiction, 1793-1815 (Liverpool, 1948) is a short and entertain­ ing anthology. See also C. Lloyd, Captain Marryat and the Old Navy ('939)- The best works on this subject are those of Michael Lewis: The Navy of Britain (1948), and A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815 (I960).

ι. Introduction briefly,10 and for the same reason no attempt is made to treat exhaustively the problems and progress of naval medicine.11 Moreover, the reader who is looking for a detailed discussion of the navy as a government department may be, perhaps, dis­ appointed. Those topics normally bounded by the narrower limits of "administrative history"—institutional development, refinement of office procedures, recruitment and organization of clerical staffs, and so forth—are not emphasized. Only Chapter s is explicitly concerned with the administrative structure. It outlines the central organization of the navy: the Admiralty, Navy, and Victualling Boards, their structure, interrelationship, and relationship to the higher echelons of the executive. It also tries to discover what sort of men were members of these boards, to assess their competence and dili­ gence, and to explain how they got their posts. But the chap­ ter's main purpose is introductory—to acquaint the reader with the men who were answerable to king and Parliament for the condition of the fleet. This book is a study of the dominant administrative prob­ lems and its aim is to show how the navy built, equipped, and repaired its ships; got seamen to serve in them; fed these men and tried to keep them in health; established dockyards and bases, at home and overseas, in order to accomplish these tasks more efficiently; organized a competent officer corps; and finally, how it financed the whole operation. THE NAVY AND THE CONSTITUTION

The inadequacies of eighteenth-century naval administra­ tion should be understood as part of a larger problem—the io R. G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (Cambridge, Mass., 1926); J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III (Cambridge, 1953); Sir W. Beveridge, Prices and Wages in England from the 12th to the 19th century (!939)- See also the unpublished dissertations of J. J. Malone, "The British Naval Stores and Forests Poliqf in New England, 1691-1775," London Uni­ versity, 1956, and J. G. Sperling, "Godolphin and the Organization of Public Credit, 1702-10," Cambridge University, 1954. Malone's work has recently been published: Pine Trees and Politics (1964). HThere is an excellent recent work: C. Lloyd and J. L. S. Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, 1200-1900: Vol. Ill, 1714-1815 (Edinburgh, 1961). This useful study of naval medicine was inspired by the late J. J. Keevilt who wrote the first two volumes.

ι. Introduction problem of governing in a constitutional environment essen­ tially hostile to vigorous administration. As Steven Watson has pointed out, "Corruption does not demonstrate the strength of pro-government forces, but their weakness."12 Large-scale corruption was a method by which British governments might offset their constitutional impotence. The navy, notwith­ standing the ordinary Englishman's pride in "the wooden walls," shared this impotence. As a department of govern­ ment, it had to contend with the spirit of aristocratic inde­ pendence, the sanctity of property, the political power of com­ mercial interests, and the frustrating—from an administrator's point of view—civil liberties guaranteed by the common law. To illustrate the navy's problem we might consider for a moment the commissioned officers. The traditional spirit of aristocratic independence flourished among them, even though only a handful of British naval officers were of noble lineage and a large number could make no claim at all to gentle birth. Those to whom birth had given no advantage learned to copy the manners of their betters. Although, to my knowledge, no officer in the eighteenth-century navy dared display haughtiness like that of John, Baron Berkeley, who in the time of Pepys, expressed unwillingness to follow the orders of his social inferiors,13 still many eighteenth-century officers clung to an attitude that might be described as feudal: while they considered it acceptable to acknowledge dependence on some great individual, they thought it disgraceful to appear subservient to government officials. And if an officer was of good family, or had acquired wealth, or, better yet, political influence—36 seats in the House of Commons were held by naval officers in 1747—he was likely to be very touchy about Admiralty dictation. This situation in itself might not have posed a serious prob­ lem. A spirit of independence, if it could not be assauged by tactful handling, might be offset by the unifying spirit of service to the king. But there was a complicating factor: most officers, it seems, were infected with the characteristic eightI2 J. Steven Watson, The Reign of George III (Oxford, i960), p. 9. is D. Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and William III (Oxford, 1955). P- 386·

ι. Introduction eenth-century ambition to found an estate, and of course the first step was to acquire a fortune. Naturally the course which led to plunder and prize money was rarely the same as that which would best serve strategic requirements. All too often naval officers demonstrated that their sense of professional ob­ ligation was not equal to their lust for private gain, and as a re­ sult they engaged themselves in a business which had very little to do with the naval service and over which the government had virtually no control.14 But so long as these activities did not lead an officer to direct disobedience, they were judged neither wicked nor dishonorable. The officers considered themselves soldiers of fortune. They could cite the example of Sir Francis Drake, who managed to combine self-enrichment and service to Queen Elizabeth without sacrifice of reputation. The idea of refusing to fight for plunder would have as­ tounded them. By the eighteenth century, war had become far too organized a business for such private goals and inde­ pendent posturings, but the old attitudes died hard and gave naval administrators a great deal of trouble. It is true that the king's navy was in a difficult position when dealing with those who could call on birth, wealth, or political influence. Every European government experienced similar difficulties; in fact, most European monarchs had far more trouble gaining the cooperation of their nobles than did the king of England. The difference was that in England constitu­ tional privilege, in many respects, ranged far down the social scale. One of the most important effects of this was that it tended to undermine military authority. It would be difficult to imagine the case of Lt. Frye, for example, coming up in any other country. While serving at Jamaica in 1744 Lt. George Frye of the Marines was court-martialed, found guilty of disobedience and disrespect, and sentenced "to be broke, rendered incapable of serving, and condemned to Suffer Fif­ teen Years Imprisonment." The court's proceedings were out of order, and when Frye returned to England he brought a civil action for false imprisonment against the president of the court, Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle. Lord Chief Justice Willes, 14See R. Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-176} (Ox­ ford, 1938), pp. 64-76.

ι. Introduction who heard the case in the Court of Common Pleas at West­ minster, ordered Admiral Ogle to pay £1000 damages. Thus encouraged, Frye proceeded to sue all the members of the court-martial. One member, Rear-Admiral Perry Mayne, hap­ pened to be sitting at the head of another court-martial at the time—one appointed to try the officers responsible for the shameful conduct of the battle of Toulon. Mayne and his colleagues reacted violently. They adjourned their court, re­ fused to reconvene except under Admiralty compulsion, and drew up "some Warm Resolutions" to be laid before the king about the blow that had been struck "at the Military Disci­ pline and Government of the Navy," and wrote a letter con­ taining disrespectful remarks about Chief Justice Willes. The Chief Justice returned fire by issuing warrants directing that Mayne and every other member of the court-martial be taken into custody. The Admiralty could offer no protection to its officers; they were forced to publish a humiliating apology, and this brought the matter to an end.15 Horace Walpole was much amused by the affair,16 and it is true that both sides had become silly with pride and anger, but the admirals were furious. The significance of the episode lies not so much in its demonstration of the supremacy of the common law over military law—which remains a feature of the British constitu­ tion today—but in the ferocious antimilitarism of the Chief Justice. Part of this ferocity was owing to Justice Willes's peculiar character, but not all. One may reasonably surmise that the incident could not have taken place in twentiethcentury Britain,17 whereas in the eighteenth century a naval officer had continually to reckon with harassment by civil is The affair is described in a number of sources. This account is taken from Sir John Barrow, The Life of George Lord Anson (1839), pp. 126-128 and Woburn MSS. xn, folios 13-21 (16-17 May 1746). See also Gentleman's Magazine, 1746, pp. 463-464. ie To Sir Horace Mann, 4 Nov. 1746, Lewis, Horace Walpole's Corre­ spondence, in, 328. IT See, for example, the important judgment of Justice McCardie of the King's Bench in the case, Heddon υ, Evans (1919). The Court's sympathetic understanding of military administrative difficulties is striking; repeatedly Justice McCardie lamented, but forgave, procedural errors which the army officers had committed. The text of the judgment, together with a valuable introduction, may be found in R. O'Sullivan, Military Law and the Supremacy of the Civil Courts (1921).

ι. Introduction authorities. It was not at all unusual for an eighteenth-century officer to suffer fine or imprisonment as a result of running afoul of the magistrates in the course of his duties. Of course not every subject of the king could afford to go to law; the tedious proceedings tended to be expensive. Surely the navy could bring administrative pressure to bear on the majority of Englishmen without much difficulty. And yet, if an Englishman were a freeman, or even if he were merely associated with friends who had the vote, he could count his constitutional blessings. It was worth while for the fishermen of Yarmouth to stand well with the Admiralty in wartime. Chiefly, they wanted immunity from impressment and protec­ tion of their vessels from enemy privateers. One would expect them to bow and scrape before the First Lord of the Admi­ ralty. But when the Duke of Bedford, the First Lord, visited Yarmouth in 1746 he was pointedly snubbed by the mayor and the townspeople. Captain Stringer, who accompanied the Duke, commented to a friend: "These fellows are asking fa­ vours every day from the board [of Admiralty] and yet treat their principal with so much scorn, ... but indeed what can be expected from a parcel of worthless fishermen."18 Worthless they may have been, but because the franchise of Yarmouth was moderately democratic, some of these fishermen could vote. Naturally their modest measure of political power did not free them from dependence on the ruling classes. The point is that it freed them from dependence on the Admiralty. Instead of grovelling before the Lords of the Admiralty, the fishermen of Yarmouth relied on a Walpole or a Townshend to sponsor their interests at Whitehall.18 It must be admitted that the great majority of Englishmen neither shared in the privileges accorded to wealth and social position nor enjoyed the protections guaranteed by the com­ mon law. To the largest class, the poor, the much-boasted liberties of Englishmen applied in name, but rarely in prac­ tice. But for our purposes it should be recognized that the is Mary E. Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell (1905), p. 266. 19 Sir Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (and edn., 1957), p. 104: ". . . at Yarmouth in Norfolk, between 1788 and 1784, one Member was always a Townshend and the other a Walpole."

ι. Introduction navy was not, on the whole, much concerned with these people. Some of them might be swept up by the press gangs, others employed from time to time as dockyard laborers, but the navy's most important administrative dealings were with men above the lowest station, and such men enjoyed and insisted on their traditional English liberties. THE POLITICS OF WAR

Most eighteenth-century Englishmen considered the consti­ tutional weakness of their central government an asset, not a liability. They congratulated themselves on having avoided the despotic horrors of the continent; a certain amount of governmental activity was admittedly necessary to insure tran­ quillity and prosperity within the realm, but it seemed best to keep this under local control. Men of this cast of mind could not be expected to favor any extension of the powers and concerns of the central government. And yet the scope of the central government's activities expanded steadily during the eighteenth century. Its administrative departments, includ­ ing the navy, continued to grow, and for the same reason they had grown during the seventeenth century: because of the increasing scope, complexity, and expense of waging war. The growth of central administration was acknowledged an evil, but a necessary evil if the nation was to be defended from foreign invasion, to command respect in diplomatic negotia­ tions, and to protect its trading interests and extend the boundaries of empire. To many Englishmen it seemed that only the first of these objectives was really worth the expense of waging war. Natur­ ally, whenever a clear-cut threat to the nation was commonly apprehended, it was not hard for English governments to find political support for a war policy, but in the eighteenth century such threats were rarely clear-cut. England's safety was secured by the Channel and by her navy. Ordinarily there was no immediate danger to the kingdom, and hence no compel­ ling argument for war under the heading of self-defense. But a great many other Englishmen thought of war as a profitable enterprise, essential to the growth of national strength and wealth. As a result, questions of trade, diplomacy, and war IO

ι. Introduction became intensely controversial. It was understood that, not­ withstanding the patronage at its disposal, a ministry could fall if its foreign policy failed to gain acceptance in Parlia­ ment. Consequently, in the eighteenth-century House of Com­ mons the most acrimonious debates were stimulated by con­ tradictory interpretations of continental diplomatic man­ euvers or by the loss—real or imagined—of trading advan­ tages.20 The most pressing problems of government were the problems of mobilizing for war and paying for its continua­ tion. Insofar as national politics were concerned with any­ thing other than the sordid struggle for office, they were concerned predominantly with these questions and problems.21 To analyze the political forces that clashed over the ques­ tions of war and trade is an admittedly difficult task. Those large disciplined blocks of political power called parties, which the historian so often finds convenient, did not exist in eighteenth-century Britain. It is true that men called them­ selves Whigs and Tories, but in doing so they merely commit­ ted themselves to a few vague principles. Besides, in the mideighteenth century, few active members of Parliament called themselves Tories. The struggle was largely among the Whigi. Some Whigs, particularly Whigs in opposition, seemed to hold strong views on foreign policy, but there is reason to suspect the sincerity of most, as Lord Hervey did; he divided Whigs "into patriots and courtiers, which was in plain English 'Whigs in place' and 'Whigs out of place.' "22 As a recent authority has written, "The Opposition, like the Administra­ tion, was a thing of shreds and patches. In a House of Com­ mons composed for the most part of independent self-return­ ing country gentlemen it could hardly be otherwise."23 Under 20See Lucy Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics (Oxford, 1952), p. si, and G. C. Gibbs1 "Parliament and Foreign Policy in the Age of Stanhope and Walpole," English Hist. Rev., LXXVH (1962), 18-37. 21 The only questions which showed signs of approaching these in im­ portance were those of taxation (usually, though not always, linked to the question of war or peace) and the health of the constitution. 22 John, Lord Hervey, Some Materials towards Memoirs of the Reign of King George II, ed. R. R. Sedgwick (3 vol., 1931), 1, 4. Hervey has inverted his parallel. 23 J. B. Owen, The Rise of the Pelhams (1957), p. 4.

Il

ι. Introduction such conditions some members were open to persuasion and many open to bribery in one form or another; many were opportunists, identifying themselves with certain political principles or economic interests as it suited their ambitions. For these reasons we should turn our attention away from the somewhat artificial political groupings and direct it instead to the interests at stake. These interests may be grouped as follows: the Court, the City, the Country. The terms were known to men of the eight­ eenth century, but not always understood to mean the same thing; I should make clear what I mean by them. By the Court I mean the personal wishes and inclinations of the king and of those who chose to advance themselves by assent­ ing to the king's wishes and promoting their fulfillment. The City, as Englishmen know, refers to the financial interest (the American equivalent of Wall Street). By the Country I mean the landed interest in a narrow sense, that is the interest of those landed gentlemen who resisted the charms of the City; who had—or thought they had—no stake in commerce or finance; who were stubbornly proud of their political inde­ pendence and resentful of the power of the "monied interest." I concede that this mode of dividing the body politic may be criticized from a number of points of view. Who or what com­ prised the "monied interest" is difficult to say.24 Certainly it was not merely, nor always, the big financiers, for the "monied interest"—perhaps it might be called the speculating interest —apparently had the support of London public opinion generally; hence it is best to use the term, the City.25 Another criticism is that men often find that their own interests conflict, and some men—inexplicably, from a cynic's viewpoint—throw their political weight against their immediate, visible interests. But none of this means that interests do not give rise to tangi­ ble forces in politics. The position taken by the Court in questions of war and But see the interesting article, "Monied Interest," in Postlethwayt's Universal Dictionary of Trade, n, 384-289. 28 Further justification for treating the City as a political block may be found in Lucy Sutherland, "The City of London in Eighteenth-century Politics," in Essays presented to Sir Lewis Namier, ed. R. Pares and A. J. P. Taylor (1956), pp. 49-74.

ι. Introduction trade naturally varied according to the inclinations of the monarch. Neither George I nor George II can be considered pacifistic, but both disliked wars that might prove disadvan­ tageous to the diplomatic position of Britain on the continent. This was the crux of the matter. The first two Hanoverian kings were much more concerned about the safety of Hanover and the figure cut by England in European diplomatic circles than about the trading interests of their English subjects. If there was to be war, the Court wanted Britain to fight not only on the oceans and in far-flung lands, but also on the continent. This "Hanoverian" foreign policy did not please English taxpayers, whether landed gentlemen or merchants of London, and ordinarily the king did not get his way. An alien ruling house pursuing what was to all appearances an alien foreign policy could not muster much patriotic sentiment. Moreover, in this sphere the power of bribery and influence was limited; there were some issues which crown patronage alone could not determine, and war was one of them. Sir Robert Walpole, who may be considered the manager of the Court interest for two decades, sedulously avoided war because he understood that war multiplied the problems of government and thus brought into play powerful forces that put too much stress on his delicate mechanism of political control. Nevertheless, the interest of the Court is not to be ignored. The constitution gave the king power to initiate foreign policy. This power was manifested in such episodes as the Mediterranean expedition under Admiral Sir George Byng in 171826 and the diplomatic 26 According to Lord Hervey: "Lord Torrington [Byng], who knew the late King's mind, and never had 'aucun but pour aucune action' but the making his court and his fortune, undertook this affair in the Mediter­ ranean upon very unsafe and unwarrantable clandestine orders, trans­ mitted to him from the late King, through the hands of Bernstorff, his German minister. Lord Torrington succeeded, beat the Spaniards, put the Emporer in possession of Sicily, got vast sums of money, cheated the sailors, and returned home, thanked, caressed and rewarded, instead of being censured, broke, or hanged, which indisputably he ought to have been for risking an English fleet without a legal English authority." See Hervey, Memoirs, 1, 38. Hervey believed that Byng's orders from the King had not passed through proper constitutional channels. In fact, they had. True, George I had not played the game above board, and the result was a cry of protest from the opposition Whigs (see J. H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole; The Making of a Statesman (1956), pp. 271-272) but constitution­

's

ι. Introduction adventures of Lord Carteret in 1743;27 its magnitude may be appreciated if one reflects that from the time of his rise to power (about 1722) until 1739 Walpole was able, thanks to careful maneuvering and the firm support of the king, to pre­ vent Britain from fighting a major war. However, Walpole finally failed in 1739, and he failed largely because of the City, which, on the whole, favored war and in 1739 seemed to want war very badly. Admittedly, not all the merchants of London wanted war. In general, it was the numerous body of lesser merchants and tradesmen who clamored for a fight—men in a hurry to make money, men who dreamed of the sudden riches that privateering might bestow on the lucky share-owner or lottery-ticket holder. A ministerial pamphleteer posed The Grand Question, Whether War, or no War, not to gentlemen of the opposition who, he assumed, knew that war would be foolish "whatever they may pretend," but "to Men of lower Rank, to the Body of the People, particularly to the people of this City, and more especially to the mercantile Part."28 The great figures of finance, the privileged men associated with the chartered companies, were ordinarily content with peace (with the ex­ ception of the Directors of the South Sea Company, who had reason to press for interference in Spanish America). More­ over, some merchants could only lose in the event of war, especially those engaged in reexporting colonial products to continental Europe. As a historian has pointed out, war with Spain meant that trade through Cadiz with Old Spain was sacrificed to contraband trade interest in New Spain.29 Never­ theless, the opinions circulated in The Craftsman and in the coffee houses favored war.30 For the commercial classes were ally they had no case. See also H. W. Richmond, "The Expedition to Sicily, 1718, under Sir George Byng," Jour. Royal United Service Inst.,

UIi (1909)' "35-"5«· 27 For the political implications of Carteret's diplomatic activity see Chapter V of Owen, Rise of the Pelhams. And see below p. 24. 28 The Grand Question, Whether War, or no War, with Spain, Im­ partially Consider'd: In Defence of the present Measures against those that delight in War (1739). 29 J. O. (McLachlan) Lindsay, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 16671750 (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 120-121. so On the influence of these opinions see Gibbs1 op. cit., p. 25.

ι. Introduction not united merely by greed; they shared an idea—the idea that there was only so much world trade to go round and the nation that wanted more was going to have to fight for it. Until Adam Smith published his famous book, this idea seemed scarcely open to question in the City, or indeed anywhere in England. Chatham believed in it, and turned it to political account. His oratory inspired traders with the notion that it was a high form of patriotism to support a bellicose policy calculated to fill their pockets. Since it is regrettably no trick at all to convince people that their private interest is identical with the national interest, this cannot be considered a remark­ able accomplishment. But Chatham's oratory did more. It reached out to all classes of Englishmen and persuaded many a country squire that trade really was a life-or-death matter, that a threat to English trade constituted an immediate and potentially mortal threat to the kingdom. But let this patriotic fervor dissipate (as it is bound to) and let this allegedly mortal threat be seen in less frightening proportions (as eventually it will be), then it becomes evident that war conceived as war for trade and profit is little more than a business enterprise. The commercial classes accepted war as such. An eighteenth-century Londoner saw nothing curious in the emphasis of the author of The Naval History of Great Britain (1757), when he concluded his history of the war of 1739-1748 by pointing out that the value of cargoes captured by the British during the war exceeded the value lost to the enemy by two million pounds.31 In answer to those who feared the cost of war and the growth of the national debt, a man of this cast of mind could reply that Great Britain's Speediest Sinking Fund is a Powerful Maritime War, Rightly Manag'd, and Especially in the West Indies.32 But how, we may wonder, might such a mode of assessing victory and brushing aside the cost of armaments have struck a country gentleman? To treat the Country, or landed interest, as a political block invites difficulties.33 For one thing, the Country member in siAnon., The Naval History of Great Britain (4 vol., 1758), iv, 319-320. 32 Pamphlet published in London, 1727. 33 However, eighteenth-century politicians knew what they meant when 1S

ι. Introduction the House of Commons generally took a fierce pride in his independence; he gloried in the notion that he could not be bribed, coerced, or stampeded. Even more important, by the mid-eighteenth century many of the biggest landowners had invested heavily in commerce. English merchants had always bought land; now landed gentlemen were buying East India or government bonds, and here or there one might find a wealthy squire venturing cash toward fitting out a privateer. This fusion of the interests of the commercial and landed classes was unique in Europe and has been recognized by historians as an important stabilizing force in eighteenth-cen­ tury British society. Far from denying this fusion, I wish to emphasize it. For without it one would be at a loss to explain how a House of Commons whose membership was so over­ whelmingly drawn from the landed class, could repeatedly endorse commercial and foreign policies primarily designed to benefit speculators in the City. Nevertheless, that there was a body of country gentlemen—particularly smaller landowners —not associated with, and fundamentally suspicious of, the trading classes is not to be ignored.34 Some accepted the Tory label; some did not. Like Dr. Johnson, these gentlemen de­ tested "the politics of stock-jobbers." Such men were not likely to develop enthusiasm for war undertaken as a business enterprise. A reflective landed gentle­ man might have argued thus: "You merchants of the City call yourselves patriots, and you speak of the kingdom in danger; I answer that your patriotism is rooted in avarice and that the dangers you speak of are imaginary. Whereupon you contend that, even if the question of national defense were set aside, still wars for trade are desirable because the wealth thus gained by the kingdom is vital to its continued strength and safety. I ask: To whom will these profits go? To me? I am not a share­ holder in this national enterprise. I receive none of its divi­ dends, though, thanks to the Land Tax, I contribute to its ex­ penses. Even our national treasury does not obtain a reasonable they referred to the "country gentlemen." See Sir Lewis Namier, "Country Gentlemen in Parliament, 1750-1783," History Today, iv (1954), 676-688. s*On the diverging interests of large and small landowners see G. E. Mingay, English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century (1963), p. a60.

l6

ι. Introduction share. Take, for example, the cargoes captured by your much vaunted privateers. Would a portion of their value find its way to the Exchequer? Not a penny. Why the king's revenue does not even share in the prizes captured by His Majesty's shipsl The captors would reap the full benefit.35 And all the while the national debt would rise by leaps and bounds, so that a landed gentleman, feeling its staggering weight, might wonder if he should ever again see the Land Tax below four shillings.86 And even if it could be shown that these profits of trade and conquest did accrue to the nation as a whole, I answer that they are far too dearly bought. You assert that your wars will swell the nation's wealth and strength; on the contrary, their true effect is to multiply its debts and difficulties."37 Once the first flush of patriotic feeling gave way to war-weariness such attitudes were likely to be assumed by a significant number of landed members of Parliament. In the eighteenth-century House of Commons the "antiwar party" was never far below the surface, even at the height of conflict. My purpose in offering this sketch of the political condition of mid-eighteenth-century Britain has been to show how greatly the navy depended on the support of the merchant classes. Naval administrators were agents of a constitutionally weak central government; when faced with the problem of waging war, they could summon few effective powers of coer­ cion. Nor could they rely on the marvellous power of patriotic fervor. It is true that the London mob might be stirred up, and perhaps a number of gentlemen might channel their inherited sense of chivalric honor into a national vein, but on the whole there was very little of the sort of patriotism that sustains a spirit of sacrifice. If it was to maintain an effective war effort the navy had no other recourse than to turn to the classes of men who most wanted war. What did this heavy dependence on the City's support mean for naval administra­ tion? SBAfter 1708 the Treasury took no share in prizes captured either by privateers or men of war. See Pares, Colonial Blockade, p. 6. se In December 1739 the Land Tax went from two to four shillings in the pound (13 Geo. II c. 2). ST Some of these arguments may be found in The Grand Question, Whether War, or no War.

ι. Introduction First, it should be recognized that in one very important respect the arrangement was distinctly advantageous: The British navy in the middle of the eighteenth century, unlike its adversaries, could count on adequate supplies of money. Half a century earlier the City, with the cooperation of the government, had fashioned what was for its time an uncom­ monly efficient system of public credit. During the wars of the eighteenth century this credit was at the navy's disposal; Parliament readily voted the duties and taxes, and approved the loans. Partly because the Stuart kings had frequently ignored the interests of the City of London, the Stuart navy had been perennially starved for cash, and this starvation had left its mark on every aspect of seventeenth-century naval administration. But in George II's time finance was scarcely a problem. By the eighteenth century a substantial portion of propertied Englishmen—especially men of the City—were able to think of war, not merely as an expensive, dynastic struggle designed to benefit a prince's family and favorites, but as a struggle that might be undertaken in the national interest. However, since the City paid the piper, the City expected to call the tune. And the City was hard to please. Beyond offering financial support, Londoners were not disposed to make sacrifices. Robert Walpole understood this. When told of the celebra­ tions in the City upon the declaration of war with Spain in 1739, it is said that he remarked, "They now ring the bells, but they will soon wring their hands."38 The merchants did not just wring their hands; they demanded that the war be con­ ducted in such a way as not to interfere with, or endanger, trade. In other words, the navy was asked to mobilize fleets and produce victories without inconveniencing the merchants. As the First Lord of the Admiralty was reminded in 1745, "The Murmurs of the people (who for this halfe Century have set their Hearts on trade) must be heard, and attended too."39 88 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole (3 vol., 1798), i, 618. se Letter to the Duke oi Bedford from an anonymous correspondent sign­ ing himself Woburn MSS. ix, folio 100.

ι. Introduction In presenting their demands the merchants paid little heed to strategic necessities. Their shipping losses were always heavy in war.40 They wanted convoy protection, and they wanted the seas swept clear of enemy privateers. The Admi­ ralty, if it decided ships could not be spared for all these tasks, might refuse, but no Admiralty Board could afford to make refusal a matter of policy. It was impossible to forget that in 1708 the commercial interest, because it was dissatisfied with the Admiralty's performance, managed to get a bill through Parliament directing 43 ships to be set aside for commerce protection; in effect, this Act of Parliament created a separate navy which the Admiralty could control only in the event of strategic emergency in home waters.41 A similar threat was made in 1741-1742. A convoys and cruisers bill passed in the Commons, but failed in the Lords; nevertheless, the Admi­ ralty was put under extreme pressure and wound up satisfy­ ing most of the merchant's demands.42 Similar pressure was put on commanders-in-chief on foreign station. As a result the requirements of strategy were more than once subordinated to the requirements of trade.43 The demands of the commercial interest affected not only the employment of the fleet, but also the moblizing of the fleet. The navy and merchants competed for the same men and the same materials during time of war. In the mideighteenth century shortages of materials were, with few ex­ ceptions, not serious. But the shortage of seamen was ex­ tremely serious. The shipping interests readily agreed that the *0 See R. Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (1962), pp. 327-337·

«Α condensed version of the Cruisers and Convoys Act (6 Anne c. 65) may be found in Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 344-346. The detailed reports of the Lords Committee of investigation and the Admiralty's reply may be found in the Journals of the House of Lords, xvm, 366-392, 404-422, 466472, 491. For earlier Parliamentary pressure see Ehrman, pp. 570-571. *2 Sir Herbert Richmond's account of this is excellent (1, 182-190). See also the Journals of the House of Commons, xxiv, 49®., and Pari. Hist., xii, 447, 748, 753-788. 43 C. E. Fayle arrived at some conclusions on this subject after reading Sir Herbert Richmond's history of the war of 1739-1748 and published them in two articles in the Jour. Royal United Service Inst.: "The De­ flection of Strategy by Commerce in the Eighteenth Century," LXVIII (1923), 281-290, and "Economic Pressure in the War of 1739-48," 434-446.

ι. Introduction navy needed them, but naturally no shipowner was eager to hand over his own men. The struggle for the seaman's services was fought out in the harbor approaches, in the streets of the port towns, in the local magistrates' courts, and in the House of Commons. In the forum of national politics each trading inter­ est insisted on its indispensability to the nation and to the war effort. The West India merchants argued that the shortage of seamen in the Caribbean was serious enough without the intrusion of the navy's press gangs. The agents for North America pointed out that the colonists did not consider them­ selves the king's subjects when it came to serving in the fleet. The fisheries were heard from, and M.P.'s from the ports lamented the interruption and harassment of the coastal trade. The champions of the privateering interest asserted that, though admittedly privateers signed on men who might have been available to the navy, privateers contributed materially to maritime success. This argument particularly annoyed navy men because in practice the navy rarely got the emergency assistance which privateers were supposed to provide. When a privateer had the misfortune to be put temporarily under an admiral's command, it was not unusual for her crew to desert en masse44 Admiral Edward Vernon wrote in 1745: As I have had more opportunity of knowing the nature and incli­ nations of those that seek to serve in privateers, I very well know that serving the public is the least part of either their thoughts or in­ clinations. The attaining plunder from merchant ships they hope to make an easy prey of, being the principal motive, and they little care who it is from, and are many of them as ready for making it on their own nation as any other. And are generally as far from an inclination to serve the public that the public service is their greatest detesta­ tion.48

However, the influence of the privateering interest was strong. Government speakers would remind the House that there was "See Adm. 3/48, 7 April, 4 Oct. 1744; Adm. 3/56, 3 Nov. 1746; and Vernon Papers, pp. 449, 507-508, 531-533. For an excellent summation of the role of privateering in naval warfare at this time see Pares, Colonial Blockade, pp. 17-33. « Vernon Papers, p. 508.

ι. Introduction a war to be won, and that the navy could not be brought to full fighting strength for want of seamen. But the House did almost nothing. The navy was considered just one of many competing national interests. We may condemn this apparently careless mode of waging war, and if we are inclined to do so, perhaps it is because we live in an age when so much thought and energy is devoted to victory that men rarely stop to consider what victory can, or ought to, achieve. Even intelligent men, in our day, have been deceived by their own slogans. In the eighteenth century this was less likely to happen. Then, Englishmen were used to thinking about the fruits of victory in concrete terms; it was a subject they continually debated. And if we are to investi­ gate why they fought their wars inefficiently, we must not neglect to remind ourselves occasionally—as they did—of why these wars were being fought. THE WAR OF 1739—1748

Since this book deals largely with the reaction of naval ad­ ministration to the demands of the war of 1739—1748, a brief sketch of these demands is in order.46 The Spanish war of 1739—also known as the war of Jenkins' Ear because of the publicity given to an atrocity committed by the Spaniards on a merchant captain named Jenkins—was forced on an unwilling king and reluctant ministry. The City of London clamored for war, and the opposition made the most of it in the House of Commons. War was seen to be the most likely agent for dissolving the compound of political power which Sir Robert Walpole and his friends had so care­ fully constructed. A year earlier the opposition had tried to force the government into war by putting forward an ex­ tremely popular bill authorizing letters of marque and repris*e The discussion of strategy and politics that follows is largely depend­ ent on Richmond, supplemented by: R. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1936),* J. B. Owen, The Rise of the Pelhams; P. Vaucher, Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury, 1J31 - I J 4 2 (Paris, 1924); Sir R. Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth-century Diplomacy, XJ40-IJ48 (1930); B. Williams, The Whig Supremacy (Oxford, 1939).

ι. Introduction als against Spain. In 1738 the attempt failed, but in 1739, by once again exploiting the endemic friction between British contraband traders and Spanish guarda costas in the West Indies, the opposition succeeded.47 Significantly, the initial "acts of hostility were not to be acts of war but reprisals, blows directed against Spanish commerce in reply to the injuries Spain had inflicted upon British trade."48 But repris­ als, as all knew, meant war, and Walpole's ministry was on its way to destruction. Once the war was begun, it was not clear what should be done besides giving a free hand to English privateers and protecting trade from those of Spain. The strategic aims of the war's proponents did not extend much beyond profit and plunder. The warmongers were only marginally interested in the conquest of Spanish territories either in Europe or Amer­ ica, while those who opposed the war were anxious to limit its dimensions and cost. Understandably, this divided spirit led to indecision, and it was logical that one of the first plans to be approved—that of sending a small squadron to attack Spanish trade in the Pacific—suited both the concept of maritime war and the desire to avoid large-scale enterprises.49 But the purely avaricious motive of the warmongers was complemented by one of passion. The urge to "humble Spain in the Indies" by conquest seized the popular mind. Admiral Vernon was sent out to capture Porto Bello in the summer of 1739, which he did handily with a small force. He himself was sceptical of a policy of conquest in the West Indies,50 but the Duke of Newcastle was persuaded by the noise in the City and in the House of Commons that Porto Bello was not enough, that ν A detailed account may be found in G. B. Hertz, British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century (1908), pp. 7-59. See also A. M. Wilson, French Foreign Policy during the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726-1743 (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), pp. 283-284. «Richmond, 1, 24. The scheme had long been a pet project of Sir Charles Wager's. See Coxe, Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, 11, 514. It resulted in Anson's famous circumnavigation. 00 Vernon was of the opinion that all that was necessary was to main­ tain a strong fleet there, "by which means, let who will possess the coun­ try, our Royal Master may command the wealth of it" (quoted in Wil­ liams, Whig Supremacy, p. 223).

ι. Introduction other Spanish strongholds had to be attacked. The choice was Havana or Cartagena. Havana was the stronger and would require a larger expeditionary force; Cartagena possessed a more menacing climate. Newcastle chose to dodge the deci­ sion, and wrote orders that left it to the commanders when they met at Jamaica to select an objective, but it was obvious from the size of the expeditionary force that sailed in October 1740, under the convoy of Sir Chaloner Ogle's fleet that Havana was beyond its means. In the event, Cartagena was tried, but disease forced the abandonment of the project just short of victory. It was implicit in the doctrine of purely maritime war that military involvement on the continent was to be avoided. The idea that Bourbon power might overrun Europe did not trouble the adherents of this doctrine, and they made light of the threat of French power to the English homeland.51 If France joined Spain against England, they argued—and they doubted that France would—there was nothing to fear so long as supremacy was maintained at sea. Whatever the merits of these calculations, the death of Emporer Charles VI of Austria in October 1740, Frederick of Prussia's invasion of Silesia the same year, and the Franco-Prussian alliance of June 1741, rendered such views irrelevant. For hostility between Prussia and Austria put the Electorate of Hanover in jeopardy; under such circumstances George II would not hear of any purely maritime policy, and would not suffer anyone to be his minis­ ter who favored it. Simultaneously the zest for West Indian expeditions began to wane. After the failure at Cartagena nothing seemed to go right. As one of the commanders on that station wrote to a friend: "I think this no Country for expeditions to be carried on wth. great Armies since the nature of ye Climate is such that it is impossible to keep ye people alive so long as to do any thing considerable."52 "As to the Spanish War and Vernon," wrote Horace Wal"1 For the basic dispute over strategy in eighteenth-century Britain, see R. Pares, "American vs. Continental Warfare, 1739-1763" in The His­ torian's Business (Oxford, 1961), pp. 130-172. 52 Rear Admiral Ogle to James Knight, 18 June 1741, Addl. MSS. 12431, folios 112-113.

ι. Introduction pole in April 1742, "there is no more talk of them; one would think they had both been taken by a privateer."53 The year 1742 saw the focus of activity shift to the continent. Britain sent troops and subsidies to support the Austrian cause. Sir Robert Walpole's ministry had been replaced, ironically, by one more disposed to intervene militarily on the continent. The most important member was Lord Carteret, who jour­ neyed to the continent with George II and, with the king's blessing, concocted diplomacy and strategy almost singlehandedly. In June 1743, although Britain and France were still not officially at war, the "Pragmatic army," incorporating British and Hanoverian troops and personally led into battle by George II, defeated a French army at Dettingen. The Eng­ lish people eagerly awaited news of further military successes, but such news did not come. The "Pragmatic army," though it soaked up British taxpayers' money, did not pursue the enemy with vigor. British continental policy seemed vacillat­ ing and timid. It would have been difficult for any ministry to sustain for very long popular support for a policy of military interven­ tion on the continent, however successful; too many English­ men were prone to detect a Hanoverian motive in anything a British government did on the other side of the Channel. But Carteret's unwillingness (or inability) to spell out his objec­ tives, his confessed intention of pleasing the king, and the inactivity of the "Pragmatic army"—these things together were enough to make even a reasonable Englishman suspi­ cious. As might be expected, the ordinary view in the House of Commons was that Britain's timid policy was the result of George II's fear for the safety of his beloved Hanover.64 In February 1744 the growing unpopularity of the ministry was augmented by the shameful failure of the Mediterranean fleet, under the command of Admiral Mathews, to prevent the Tou­ lon squadron from escaping. By December a new ministry with 53 To Sir Horace Mann, 8 April 174a, Lewis, Horace Walpole's Corre­ spondence, i, 390. " The question of whether or not their suspicions were well grounded defies a simple answer. See the conflicting views of Williams (Whig Su­ premacy, pp. «38-250) and Owen (Rise of the Pelhams, pp. 126-199).

ι. Introduction a "Broad Bottom," but without Carteret, was in office.55 During the years 1742-1743 the navy's role settled into routine. Its main preoccupations were: commerce protection; surveillance of the Brest, Toulon, and Ferrol squadrons (in the case of Toulon, of course, it failed); interception of Span­ ish treasure fleets; and support of the Austrian campaign in Italy. But early in 1744 a new threat became prominent. For six months the government had been picking up rumors of French preparations for an invasion of England; by February 1744 the threat seemed imminent, but because the strength of Sir John Norris's fleet in the Channel could not be challenged by the French, the transports never left Dunkirk. These prep arations, together with the battle of Toulon, marked the end of the shaky Anglo-French neutrality. In July 1745 the Young Pretender, Charles Edward, landed in Scotland, and soon at­ tached to himself a force sufficient to produce some disturbing achievements. Concurrently, French military successes in the Netherlands caused the ministry to contract another case of invasion jitters. Though fears of a French descent on the south coast were not without foundation, it was the rising in the north that constituted the most serious danger. Six thousand English troops were brought back from the lowlands to deal with the rebels. A naval force under the command of Vernon was assigned the dual mission of guarding the coasts of Eng­ land and intercepting French vessels bound northward with supplies and reinforcements. It fulfilled both missions. The invasion plan, never enthusiastically pursued by the French, was abandoned in December, and the crushing defeat of Charles Edward's army at Culloden in April 1746 virtually put an end to the rebellion of '45. Even during the Scottish rebellion the Parliamentary advo­ cates of a purely maritime policy managed to discern a "Han­ overian" motive in every effort to contain French military power on the continent. William Pitt was the most vocal and effective of these critics. He never overlooked an opportunity β» Broad Bottom: ". . . it is the reigning cant word, and means, the taking all parties and people, indifferently into the ministry." Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, 18 Feb. 174a, Lewis, Hcyrace Walpole's Correspondence3 1, 336-337.

ι. Introduction to agitate for a more vigorous prosecution of the war at sea and in the colonies. That some of his attempts were ridiculous Horace Walpole did not fail to mark: "The motion was, to augment our naval force, which, Pitt said, was the only method of putting an end to the rebellion.—Ships built a year hence to suppress an army of Highlanders, now marching through England!"56 Thus the government, far from en­ countering any difficulty in getting estimates voted for the navy, was put in a position of having to refuse the too-gene­ rous profferings of its most vociferous critic. One observer wrote: "What makes it still more extraordinary is that the D. of Bedford, Ld Gower, Ld Sandwich, Halifax, and every lord of the Admiralty except Grenville are as much or more against the motion and the measure of a war merely naval which is pointed at, as Lord Harrington or Mr. Pelham."57 This was an exaggeration. The Duke of Bedford was strongly in favor of attempts to complete the conquest of Canada that had been successfully initiated by the New England colonists, who, with the assistance of a squadron under Sir Peter Warren, had captured Louisburg in 1745.58 Nevertheless, the government stood firm against converting the war into a purely naval affair. After the invasion threat the French fleet never challenged the British, and France turned her maritime effort to com­ merce warfare. The sole exception was the French capture of Madras in 1746, thanks to inept command of the British squadron in the East Indies. But British diplomacy and mili­ tary support proved unable to reverse the progress of the French army in the Low Countries. And so, in order to pre­ vent French domination of this area, the British negotiators at the peace conference agreed to give up Louisburg.69 »e To Sir Horace Mann, aa Nov. 1745, Lewis, Horace Walpole's Corre­ spondence, in, 168. 57 Quoted by Owen (Rise of the Pelhams, p. ago). 58 The best account of the capture of Louisburg is in G. S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic (Toronto, 1950). For the Duke of Bedford's enthusiasm see Addl. MSS. 32707, folios 25-26; 32713, folios 426-427. 59 The French gave up Madras, but there are convincing reasons for believing that the British returned Louisburg to France, not in exchange for Madras, but in order to get the French out of the Netherlands. See

ι. Introduction The naval supremacy that Britain clearly established in European waters after 1745 was devastating to the commerce of France and embarrassing to her Treasury. But, though this supremacy encouraged the French to negotiate, it could not break the power of the French land forces. Not surprisingly, the treaty of Aix-Ia-Chapelle (1748) established, as far as Britain was concerned, the status quo ante bellum. It was perhaps more than the nation deserved. Only when the realm itself was threatened were the various factions and persuasions willing to pull together. At other times British strategy con­ sistently reflected the fact that there were those who wanted war and those who did not, and that among those who wanted war there was a sharp division over the question of its aims. The king kept his eye on continental developments, and the sacrifice of Louisburg at the peace table testifies to the power and influence of his views. On the other hand, the Parliamen­ tary opposition, which usually clamored for a purely maritime war, could not amass sufficient political power to force out the ministers who were willing to work with the king: George II did not want Pitt in his Cabinet and (in the war of 1739— 1748) he got his way. Newcastle tried to satisfy both sides, and wound up satisfying neither. Obviously, the value of this book depends on the degree to which the problems and methods of naval administration during the war of 1739—1748 may be considered typical of a broader period. Frankly, I believe that the dimensions may be enlarged in most respects without serious distortion. Chron­ ologically the war stands in the middle of an epoch that historians have judged the most static in modern British history. "It was an age of stability in politics, in religion, in literature, and in social observances."60 And this domestic stability was matched by a relatively fixed pattern of inter­ national conflict. From the time of William III until the defeat of Napoleon, France remained Britain's principal enemy, and the task of restraining France in Europe while divesting her (and Spain) of overseas trade and possessions posed a straJ. M. Sosin, "Louisburg and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748," William and Mary Quart., 3rd ser., xiv (1957), 516-535. so Williams, Whig Supremacy, p. 1.

ι. Introduction tegic problem to the ministers of George III that looked very much like the one faced by William III and his ministers. True, the dimensions of the problem increased, but its main outlines—except in the case of the American Revolutionary War—seemed much the same. Partly in consequence, the navy also changed very little: it grew larger, but did not appreciably change its character. Naval administration, once it had responded to the political developments of the late-seventeenth century, settled into rou­ tine. For guidance, the men who directed naval affairs tended to look, not to the present, but to the past, and as yet there were no striking technological developments to disconcert them. This is not to say that no one suggested reforms or that none were effected. As will be seen, this book is much con­ cerned with such suggestions, since they reveal how the navy's administrators judged their own system. But during the great­ est part of the eighteenth century the significant changes in the system were few.

But, of late Years, the Commissioners of the Navy have been eclipsed, and lessened by the Captains, and the Rules of the Navy. —HENRY MAYDMAN, 1691 1

I

F WE COULD contrive to go back two centuries and tour London we could gather some clues about the navy's administration merely by observing its buildings and their situations. We might start at the Navy Office, a few hundred yards northwest of the Tower of London where Crutched Friars joins Seething Lane (on a spot immediately behind the present Port of London Authority building). The principal building is extremely neat, regular, and plain: It stands in the Center of a handsome little pav'd Square, and looks like an eminent Mathematician with all his Apparatus about him; every Side of the Square being furnished with Buildings appertaining thereto. The Gate that opens to the Front of the principal Building is in Crutched-Friars: There is another opens into Mark-Lane, and a Back-Door into Tower-Hill. The Entrance from Crutched-Friars is quite handsome; it leads directly up to the great Hall, where the great Stair fronts you, and leads up to the Room where the Com­ missioners sit, and to the Offices where the Clerks more immediately attending on the Commissioners, as for making out Bills, Warrants, &c. do their business; and on each Side of the Hall below are other Offices, as the Surveyors, See. On the Sides of the Square toward Crutched-Friars, and Part towards Mark-Lane, are various others, as the Ticket-Office, &c. There are likewise Houses for the principal Commissioners, with Out-houses and suitable Conveniences.2

This building, designed by Sir Christopher Wren, was finished in 1682, but there has been a Navy Office on the spot since 1 Naval Speculations and Maritime Politicks (1691), p. 28. 2 Anon., The Laws, Ordinances, and Institutions of the Admiralty of Great Britain (a vol., 1746), 11, 385. This anonymous writer's statement that a gate opened onto Mark Lane is incorrect. There can be no doubt that the Navy OfiBce was bounded by Seething Lane, not Mark Lane; an older Navy OiBce was in Mark Lane. See J. Strype, A Survey of the Cities of Lon­ don and Westminster,. . . Written at First in the Year 1598, by John Stow, . . . Corrected, Improved, and very much Enlarged in the Year IJ20, 6th edn. (g vol., 1754), 1, 370 (map), 414.

2. The London Offices 1654. The earlier Office narrowly escaped destruction by the Great Fire, only to burn down in 1673; prior to 1654 the Navy Office occupied various sites in the vicinity of Tower Hill. The work of this Office is paper work. The main building was purposely isolated from the surrounding houses to preserve its letter books and account ledgers from fire. However, by the 1740's the records have already begun to overflow into other buildings.3 Some of the surrounding houses serve as residences, others as offices. One of them has sometimes served as the office for the Commissioner of Sick and Wounded sea­ men, but the Sick and Wounded Office—rather new and not yet firmly established in the mid-eighteenth century—tends to move about from one set of leased quarters to another.4 From the Navy Office it is less than a ten-minute walk to Old Broad Street, in the heart of the financial district. Here on the west side of the street between London Wall and Winchester Street stands the office of the Treasurer of the Navy, commonly known as the Pay Office.5 It is here that widows, disabled seamen, and ticketbuyers queue to be paid. Now we retrace our steps to Crutched Friars and then continue on a few hundred yards to the east­ ern side of Tower Hill. On Little Tower Hill, sometimes called East Smithfield, we confront a row of shops and ware­ houses broken just to the south of Rosemary Lane (now Royal Mint Street) by a thoroughfare which is traversed by tradesmens' carts and wagons.® If our visit is suitably timed we may see a large wagon laden with casks emerge and crawl down a quarter-mile to Tower Wharf, where the casks will be transferred to lighters, hoys, and transports for delivery to warships in the Thames and depots at home and at the over­ seas bases. The casks contain sea provisions. This is the Victualling Office, and it is plainly more than an office of clerks and papers. It is a food processing and packing plant as SR. D. Merriman, The Sergison Papers, N.R.S. (1950), pp. 13-14; Corbett MSS. xvii, folio 7; E. Chappell, "Samuel Pepys," MM., xix (1933), 218-219; Strype, Survey of London, 1, 414; Adm. 3/47, 21 Jan. 1744. * Adm. 3/45, 26 Nov. 1741, 8 Jan. 1742; The Laws, Ordinances and In­ stitutions, 11, 390. 5 See the plan in Strype, Survey of London, 1, facing p. 437. The site is now occupied by Winchester House, an office building. β See the map in Strype, Survey of London, 1, 69.

2. The London Offices well. The Office spreads out over six acres (on what is pres­ ently the site of the Royal Mint). There are numerous store­ houses, a cutting house and pickling shop, ovens for baking bread and biscuit, and in the rear a large cooperage. These buildings were built in 1701, the old ones being "ready to drop down."7 Victualling storehouses have stood on this ground since the time of Henry VIII, when it was surrendered by the abbot of St. Mary Graces; in fact, the old abbey func­ tioned as the first storehouse.8 We end our tour at the Admiralty Office. It is about two and a half miles from Tower Hill, and we might find it convenient to hire a coach. We are moving out of the teeming streets of the City, up Fleet Street and down the Strand to the broader, more dignified avenues of Westminster. The Admiralty build­ ing is on the west side of Whitehall, its rear overlooking St. James Park. Around us are the loci of national power: the Court, the Treasury, the Houses of Parliament. The Admiralty building (which still stands) is a solid and imposing building of brick and stone. The thing that strikes us is its newness. It was built in 1725 to replace an earlier building of 1699, which became prematurely unserviceable because of infirm founda­ tions.9 Before 1699 there was no Admiralty building because— although there had been a Lord High Admiral for centuries— there was nothing that could justifiably be considered an Ad­ miralty Office. In the mid-eighteenth century, then, the Admi­ ralty Office has only about a half-century's history behind it. It is logical that it should be located in Whitehall, for the First Lord ranks as one of the great officers of state; he and his colleagues on the Board of Admiralty are answerable to the king and Parliament on all naval matters. But this means that they are responsible for the activities of the Offices which we have just visited, and we may reasonably wonder how they manage to supervise what is going on two and a half miles away in the City. Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 9. 8 Strype, Survey of London, 1, 358; M. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Naxry (1896), p. 140. 9 See D. B. Smith, "The Admiralty Building," M.M., ix (1923), 271-282; London County Council, Survey of London, xvi (1935), 47-48. 1

2.

The London Offices

The division of activity and authority among various scat­ tered offices is a basic fact of naval administration in this period, and the difficulties generated by this arrangement— lack of coordination and occasionally complete breakdown of understanding—continued to plague the service well into the nineteenth century. It is sometimes assumed that the difficul­ ties ended in 1832 when the Commissioners of the Navy were abolished and their duties handed over to the Board of Admiralty. However, the problem apparently persisted, and the reason given by one observer in the middle of the nine­ teenth century was that the Board of Admiralty and those officials directly responsible for what had been the functions of the Navy Office remained under separate roofs—the Admi­ ralty in Whitehall, and the subordinate officials in Somerset House.10 We may see how the situation arose by studying the origins and activities of the various offices. THE NAVY OFFICE

The Navy Office was the home of the Navy Board, a body formally titled the Principal Officers and Commissioners of the Navy, whose origins can be traced to the establishment of the Principal Officers of the Navy in 1546. The Principal Officers had come into being because of the size and style of navy that Henry VIII had created. Whereas in the fifteenth century it had been reasonable to suppose that the king's naval needs might be supplied by contractors, in the time of Henry VIII such a scheme no longer merited serious consideration.11 For Henry VIII's navy was not only the largest England had ever had; it was also more continuously employed, and it included specialized fighting ships, built by the king's shipwrights, repaired in the king's docks, and supplied from the king's storehouses. As the navy grew, the Keeper (or Clerk) of the Ships, who traditionally had looked after the king's naval equipage, became overburdened. New officers were added, and in 1546 a Treasurer, a Comptroller, a Surveyor, and a Clerk of the Ships were named Principal Officers by letters 10 Parliamentary 411. 11 Oppenheim,

Papers, 1861, v,

57, 105-106, 178-179, 275, 278, 317-318,

Administration, pp. 24-28.

2. The London Offices patent.12 These Principal Officers remained the core of the Navy Board in the eighteenth century (the "Clerk of the Ships" came to be called "Clerk of the Acts"). If we recall the political upheavals of Tudor and Stuart times, it is not sur­ prising to find that during those two centuries the Principal Officers occasionally disappeared, but broadly speaking there had to be something like a Navy Office as long as there was a navy. In some instances the new titles were awarded to fa­ miliar faces, and, whenever they could, the new officers worked from inherited records and accounts. Not that the re­ cords were carefully preserved. As late as 1703 it was all too common for officers, anticipating death or retirement, to "carry away the Books & papers relating to their Offices, whereby the succeeding Officers are left in the Dark as to the State of the Affairs committed to their Charge."18 It was a practice hard to curb in a political climate habituated to reprisals against for­ mer officials. As late as 1719 Charles Sergison, Clerk of the Acts, carried away documents in bulk,14 but the state of Navy Office records preserved in the Public Record Office suggests that about this time the problem was being brought under control. On January 28, 1662 James, Duke of York, as Lord High Admiral promulgated the instructions by which the Navy Board was governed until 1832, when it was dissolved and its functions distributed among members of the Board of Admi­ ralty. Like most of the administrative creations of the Res­ toration, the Navy Board inherited nearly all of its procedures from the past.15 The instructions of 1662 laid down both re­ sponsibilities and procedures. The instructions of 1662 list twenty duties for which the ι2 Ibid., pp. 83-86; Ehrman, p. 179. is Corbett MSS. xvm, folio 13. " These are

The Sergison Papers,

by Commander Merriman. 10 The instructions are printed in

edited for the Navy Records Society

The (Economy of His Majesty's Navy

Office

(1717) and The Laws, Ordinances, and Institutions. For additions and modifications see Corbett MSS. xvn. The instructions were patterned on earlier instructions of 1640. For a full discussion of them see J. R. Tan­

Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval Manuscripts in the Pepysian Li­ brary at Magdalene College, Cambridge, N.R.S. (4 vol., 1903-32), 1, 20-26.

ner,

2. The London Offices Principal Officers and Commissioners were collectively respon­ sible. There is no need to review them in detail here. In gen­ eral, the Navy Board was responsible for what contemporaries called "the Civil Economy of the Navy"; this included almost everything except the deploying of ships and the recruiting and managing of fleet personnel (although, oddly enough, it still retained, in the mid-eighteenth century, the duty of ar­ ranging examinations for officer candidates in London, a duty which logically ought to have been transferred to the Admi­ ralty). The Navy Board's responsibilities fell into three major areas. First, it was responsible for the material condition of the fleet. It supervised the building, fitting out, and repairing of ships; the administration and maintenance of the dock­ yards; the purchase of naval stores; and the leasing of trans­ port vessels. It hired and discharged dockyard workers. It di­ rected the activities of the dockyard officers, recommending the diligent to the Admiralty for promotion. Second, the Board was charged with controlling naval expenditure. It supervised the payment of the salaries and wages of per­ sonnel both afloat and ashore; it audited the accounts of every official who spent money appropriated for the navy or was charged with the custody of naval materials, be he the Treas­ urer of the Navy, or the captain of a ship. Third, the Navy Board was responsible for the health and subsistence of the seamen. It did not deal with the problems in this area di­ rectly, but handed them over to two subordinate bodies, the Commissioners of Sick and Wounded and the Commissioners of Victualling. The existence of separate organizations for supplying the seamen's food and medical care indicates the tendency toward specialization that was characteristic of the civil administra­ tion of the navy. The members of the Navy Board were them­ selves specialists. Each Commissioner was assigned to an area of responsibility; he had his own office and his own clerical staff; and his position in respect to his fellow Commissioners was ordered according to an established hierarchy. The Treasurer of the Navy, as one might expect, was re­ ceiver and disburser of cash issued for naval services by the Exchequer. He was accountable for all naval expenditure, and

2. The Londxm Offices was expected to countersign all estimates and contracts. Offi­ cially the Treasurer held the highest position in the Navy Office, but it is possible to read the instructions of 1662 with­ out perceiving that, at the time they were promulgated, the Treasurer could no longer be considered an ordinary member of the Navy Board. During the mid-seventeenth century he had established himself in a separate office, and although an effort was made by new instructions in 1671 to curtail his independence and require him to work alongside his col­ leagues in the Navy Office, he remained separated (at the Pay Office in Broad Street).16 He rarely attended Board meet­ ings, and his signature did not appear on the Board's letters and warrants. In the course of time the Treasurership of the Navy became less an office of business and more a sinecure. The responsibility of accounting for naval expenditure, except for the formalities of ledger keeping, passed to the Navy Board. Because of the handsome salary—£2000, whereas the members of the Navy Board got £500—the Treasurership was a valued prize.17 The status of the office may be appreciated by surveying the quality of its holders during the war of 17391748: Arthur Onslow, 1734-1742, Speaker of the House of Commons; Thomas Clutterbuck, 1742, formerly a Lord of the Admiralty and of the Treasury; Sir Charles Wager, 17421743, formerly First Lord of the Admiralty; Sir John Rushout, 1743-1744, formerly a Lord of the Treasury; George Bubb Dodington, 1744-1749, formerly a Lord of the Treasury. All were heavyweights in the game of politics. The Comptroller acted as general auditor. His business was to investigate the business of his colleagues; to audit the Treasurer's accounts, the accounts of the Victualling Office, and the inventories and accounts of stores drawn up by the Surveyor. So that his audit would be more certain than a mere perusal of accounts, he was expected to acquaint him­ self with prevailing market prices of stores and provisions 16 Ibid., i, 25-26. " It is probable that the large salary was the key attraction. The assump­ tion that eighteenth-century Treasurers of the Navy profited enormously by manipulating large balances of public funds is apparently a doubtful one. See J. E. D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 1774~92 (Oxford, 1958), p. 145; and Sperling, op.cit., pp. 143-144.

2. The London Offices and with rates of wages. It was also his duty to match bills with estimates, directing the Treasurer accordingly. Although auditors are commonly associated in the popular mind with bookkeepers—parsimonious men of narrow vision—in reality an auditor is often in a position to comprehend and rationa­ lize the whole range of an organization's activities. This truth apparently did not escape the framers of the instructions, for they expected the Comptroller "to lead his Fellow-Officers as well as to comptrol their Actions," and, as it developed, the Comptroller usually acted as the coordinator of the Navy Board's efforts. However, the rank of the Comptroller and the nature of his instructions indicate the priority placed by seven­ teenth-century administrative thought on the problem of root­ ing out peculation and reducing royal expenditure. The thirdranking officer of the Navy Board, or second if we exclude the Treasurer, was the Surveyor. He was responsible for the design, construction, and maintenance of ships, the repair and alteration of dockyard facilities, the stocking of naval materi­ als at the yards, and the supplying of stores to the fleet. Con­ sequently he was the officer most closely associated with the activities of the dockyards. The Clerk of the Acts functioned as chief secretary of the Navy Office; it was his job to super­ vise the clerks, keep track of the correspondence, control the petty cash, and preserve records of all transactions. According to the instructions of 1662 these four Principal Officers comprised the Navy Board. But the Board in the eighteenth century numbered many more. In fact, its enlarge­ ment began even before the 1662 instructions were promul­ gated, for right from the start it was clear that the Comptrol­ ler, if he personally executed his auditing duties, would have little time to devote to the broader concerns of his office.18 And so extra Commissioners were assigned to the Navy Board, and by 1671 three of them held the titles: Comptroller of the Treasurer's Accounts, Comptroller of the Victualler's Ac­ counts, and Comptroller of the Storekeepers' Accounts. Othei-S assisted in various ways, by superintending payments of wages is Apparently no Comptroller ever carried out all the auditing duties assigned by his instructions; see Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 16.

2. The London Offices and by looking after the business of contracting for transport vessels both for military and naval services.19 In the eighteenth century there was ordinarily one extra Commissioner (some­ times referred to as a Commissioner at Large) in peacetime, and more in time of war; in 1739, for example, there was one, and in 1743 two more, Alexander Geddes and James Compton, were added; they were put to work on transport business. In addition, it was found expedient to have Commissioners of the Navy residing at the major dockyards. During the eight­ eenth century Commissioners were permanently in residence at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth. In 1742 a Commis­ sioner, at double salary, was appointed to reside at Port Mahon, Minorca, and another in 1744 at Deptford. These two posts were abolished when the war ended, and the one at Dept­ ford was never revived.20 The dockyard Commissioners21 were by their patents the colleagues, not the servants, of the Prin­ cipal Officers and Commissioners in London. According to Josiah Burchett, who was Admiralty Secretary for many years, "any three of the whole Number . . . are a Quorum.."22 When two London Commissioners visited Portsmouth in 1740 they, together with the resident Commissioner, constituted a Navy Board and transacted business as such.23 But, like the Treas­ urer of the Navy, these dockyard Commissioners rarely went to the Navy Office, and in the eighteenth century when people spoke of the Navy Board they normally meant the men at the Navy Office. The Navy Office was not a haven for indolent placemen or political appointees. No one could be appointed a Naval Com­ missioner unless he was evidently experienced either in sea or is E.g. Adm. 3/32, 20 March 1718; Adm. 3/47, 7 April 1743. In the time of Queen Anne there had been a separate Transport Office. 20 See Table 1. The Commissioner at Port Mahon was allowed double salary (Adm. 3/47, 22 June 1743). 21 The duties of the dockyard Commissioners are discussed below, pp. pp. 289-293. 22 J. Burchett, A Complete History of the most Remarkable Transactions at Sea (1720), Preface. 23 N.M.M. POR F/6, 21 Oct. 1740.

2. The London Offices TABLE 1. Commissioners of the N a v y during the War nf 1739-1748 Comptro oller Commissrmer restaent at Plymouth Richard Haddock, until 27 March Philip Vanbrugh, throughout the 1749 war Surveyor Commissioner resident at Chatham Sir Jacob Ackworth, until 27 July I7A7 Joint-Surveyors Sir Jacob Ackworth Joseph Allen, 27 July 1747 to 27 May 1749 , , Clerk of the Acts Thomas Pearse, until 15 April 1743 John Clevland, 15 April 1743 to 16 August 1746 Robert Osborn, 16 August 1746 to 27 July 1747 Daniel Devert, 27 July 1 7 4 7 — E d

Thomas Mathews, until 27 March 1742 Charles Brown, 27 March 1742— Commissioner resident at Deptford and Woolwich Thomas Whorwood, 15 June 1744 to 30 January 1745 Edward Falkingham, 30 January James Compton, 13 June 1746 to 9 January 1748 William Davies, 9 January 1748 to 27 May 1749 (office abolished) Commissioner resident at Port Mahon w a r d Falkingham, 18 December

Comptroller of the Treasurer's Accounts John Phillipson, until 30 December

1742 to 29 June 1744 Thomas Trefusis, 29 June 1744 to 9 January 1748 John Towry, 9 January 1748 to

William Corbett, 30 December 1743— _ ^^ „ , .... „. Comptroller of the Victualhng

27 May 1749 (office abolished) Extra Commissioners George Purvis, until 21 March 1741 ^^

John Fawler, until 7 June 1744' Francis Gashry, 7 June 1744 to 27 July 1747'' Robert Osborn, 27 July 1747—

7 June 1744 Edward Falkingham, 29 June 1744 to 25 January 1745° James Oswald, 25 January 1745 to 13 June 1746

. J. .7 t . , Comptroller of the Storekeepers Accounts George Crowle, throughout the war Commissioner resident at Portsmouth Richard Hughes, throughout the war

Edward Falkingham, 13 June Alexander Geddes, 15 Apnl 1743 to 27 May 1749 (office abolished) James Compton, 15 April 1743 to 27 July 1747 John Russell, 27 July 1747 to 27 May 1749 (office abolished)

This Table is based on the Patent Rolls. The dates are those of the patents, and therefore they do not accurately represent the periods during which the various Commissioners were actually engaged in the business of their offices. • Fawler died and Gashry was directed by the Admiralty to take over

39

2. The London Offices clerical affairs; nearly always the clerical experience was gained in the naval service.24 Richard Haddock, who served as Comptroller throughout the war of 1739—1748, was a former captain. The Surveyor was always selected from the ranks of the Master Shipwrights; Sir Jacob Ackworth, formerly Master Shipwright at Chatham, served as Surveyor for no less than thirty-four years (1715-1749). The Clerk of the Acts was us­ ually a former dockyard officer,25 and so were the three sub­ ordinate Comptrollers, although occasionally a sea officer might be advanced to one of the Comptrollerships after some seasoning as an extra Commissioner. Extra Commissioners were usually former captains; and experience at sea was an absolute prerequisite for appointment as dockyard Commis­ sioner. Once appointed, a Commissioner was secure in his place, although the Commissioners at Deptford and Port Mahon and the extra Commissioners had reason to fear retrench­ ment in peacetime.2® Otherwise only voluntary resignation, death, or superannuation in the event of extreme senility— extreme should be emphasized—could remove a man from the Navy Board. As a rule, then, Naval Commissioners were either former captains or former clerks, "bred to the sea" or "bred . . . to a quill."27 We must deal with the two types separately. A captain might leave the sea service to become a Com­ missioner of the Navy for a variety of reasons. First, he may never have had any intention of pursuing a career at sea for his branch of business (Adm. 3/48, 7 June 1744). This change is not re­ corded in the Patent Rolls. b It was originally intended that Falkingham should take over Fawler's branch of the business (Adm. 3/48, 18 June 1746), but this idea was ap­ parently dropped and Gashry continued in the office.

• For the greatest part of this period Falkingham was either at Port Mahon or enroute to England. 21 An exceptional case was that of James Oswald, an extra Commissioner and a member of Parliament, who served neither at sea, in the dockyards, nor in any of the London offices. 25 Eg. John Clevland; Daniel Devert; Robert Osborn went through the clerical ranks of the Admiralty Office. 28 See Table 1, and Adm. 3/60, 6 Jan. 1749. 27 The latter phrase (quoted by Richmond, 11, 122) was Admiral Thomas Mathews's, and he meant it pejoratively.

2. The London Offices life; it is probable that Richard Haddock, the Comptroller, and Richard Hughes, the Commissioner at Portsmouth, both of whom held positions formerly occupied by their fathers, went to sea simply with a view toward qualifying themselves for professional life ashore. Second, he might find the sea not to his taste, or his health not up to its demands; probably Philip Vanbrugh accepted the post at Plymouth in 1739 for this reason.28 Third, he might become persuaded—especi­ ally during time of peace—that prospects of advancement to flag rank were too far distant. This may explain why Matthew Norris, son of Admiral Sir John Norris, became Commissioner at Plymouth in 1736, although he may have tired of the sea or found his health not equal to it, for he died within two years. On the other hand, Captain George Clinton, who plainly felt that promotion to flag rank was too far in the future to contemplate seriously, preferred not to consider the Navy Board, since he hoped for something better: "If I should be made a Commissioner of the Navy," he told the Duke of Newcastle, "it will be Bread but it won't pay my debt."29 Fourth, a captain might calculate that prospects of promotion to rear-admiral were not only distant, but dim; Captains George Purvis and James Compton were probably motivated by this belief. Fifth, he might have no choice. If once passed over, his prospects for promotion to flag rank were virtually nil, and the Navy Board was a better-than-average consolation prize.30 An interesting question arises. By becoming a Naval Com­ missioner did a captain forfeit all chances for further advance­ ment at sea? The answer is "no," but he diminished them. Thomas Mathews was passed over for promotion to rear-ad­ miral in 1734, and he accepted the Commissionership at Chat­ ham in 1737, fully intending to spend the remainder of his days there.81 But he never, in his own mind, gave up his "pre­ tensions to a flag," and in 1742 he was commissioned Vice28 He suffered severely from the gout (Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, p. 101). 28 Addl. MSS. 32696, folios 353-354, 23 April 1741; and see below p. 138. soSee below pp. 131-135. si In October 1739 Mathews mentioned to the Navy Board that he was "in all probability, settled for Life" (Adm. 106/907, 18 Oct. 1739).

2. The London Offices Admiral of the Red, just as if he had never resigned his cap­ tain's commission. And it is significant that Captain (later Ad­ miral) Savage Mostyn was explicitly reassured, in 1749, that "his Accepting of the Office of Comptroller of the Navy [should] be no Prejudice to his Military Prefermt."32 But it made a difference whether the Commissionership was ac­ cepted in peacetime or wartime,33 and Captain James Compton seems to have miscalculated. When he accepted an extra Commissionership in 1743, he failed to foresee that promo­ tions to flag rank would soon come more rapidly than he had expected, and in July 1747 he found himself passed over. This astonished Compton, for just a month earlier he had managed to get elected to Parliament. He thereupon resolved to use his Parliamentary seat as a lever to pry a rear-admiral's commission out of the Admiralty. Their Lordships were told: ". . . as [they] . . . have not thought proper to Appoint him a Rear Adml. he is determined never to Qualify himself for a Commissioner of the Navy [i.e., give up his seat in Parlia­ ment], as he stands in the New General Patent for that Board, that as he has Six Months good by Act of Parliament to do it in, he hopes the Lords may by that time find a Vacancy for his Coming into his proper Rank as an Adml., for otherwise he shall not deem himself longer, than that time a Servant of the Crown. . . ."34 Compton's reference to his standing in the pa­ tent suggests that he might have been willing to stay at the Navy Board if the Admiralty were to offer him a less pre­ carious post than the Commissionership at Deptford. The Lords of the Admiralty were unmoved,35 and advised him that because he had accepted a position on the Navy Board during 32 Adm. 3/60, 2i March 1749. Mostyn became M.P. for Weobley in 1747. S3 Later on this became more clearly defined; see Sir John K. Laughton, Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham1 N.R.S. (3 vol., 1907-1911), 11, 143. siAdm. 3/57, 20 Aug. 1747. By the terms of the Place Act of 1742 (15 Geo. II c. 22), no Commissioner of the Navy or Victualling, nor any clerks or deputies, could sit in Parliament; however, the act specifically exempted the Treasurer of the Navy, the Comptroller, the Secretary of the Admiralty, and did not include the members of the Admiralty Board. The act did not take effect until the following Parliament, that is, after the general elec­ tion of 1747. AS See Woburn MSS. XVII, folio 8i, 14 Aug. 1747.

2. The London Offices time of war he was no longer considered a member of the sea service.36 Compton resigned from the Navy Board and thought he had suffered hard treatment. After the war he petitioned the king either for reinstatement as a Naval Commissioner or for promotion to admiral, claiming that he had resigned in 1747 because his right by seniority to succeed to one of the permanent positions on the Board had been violated. The petition was referred to the Lords of the Admiralty, who re­ plied that as "the Petitioner Solicited and obtained a Civil Employment during the . . . War," he had rendered himself ineligible for flag promotion; furthermore, they reported: ". .. as to those who he says have been preferred before him at the Navy Board they are such as have a right to precedence by Virtue of their particular Branches in the Business of the Of­ fice, where he had no Branch at all but was only a Commissr. at Large."37 The backgrounds of the clerical members of the Navy Board were more varied. Many started as pursers or dockyard clerks and moved up through the ranks of the dockyard service. There were other routes. Robert Osborn spent most of his life in the Admiralty Office.38 William Corbett, brother to Thomas, began in the Pay Office and served as Secretary to the Direc­ tors of Greenwich Hospital.39 These men owed their advance­ ment to good connections, political loyalty, public service, and sometimes borough influence. During the war, for example, three Naval Commissioners, Francis Gashry, George Crowle, and John Phillipson, sat in the House of Commons. Gashry was a Sick and Wounded Commissioner before moving up to the Navy Board in 1741. He owed his advancement to the fact that he was the political lieutenant of Sir Charles Wager, First 36 Adm. 3/57, 20 Aug. 1747: ". .. as he Accepted of a Civil Employment after the Commencement of the War with Spain, & has continued therein during the Course of the Present War with France, by which he gave up his Pretentions to any Military Preferment, the Lords Concluded he had no thoughts of ever Serving again at Sea, and as he still remains in the same Employment, . . . they cannot Conceive he has any just Cause to Complain." 37 Adm. 7/340, 5 April 1749. 38 See below p. 82. a» J. Chamberlayne, The Present State of Great Britain (1736); Adm. 3/47, 29 Dec. 1743.

2. The London Offices Lord of the Admiralty, and he seems to have been a principal manager of minor Admiralty patronage.40 In 1747 he resigned from the Navy Board in order to hold his seat in Parliament.41 Crowle, whose roots were in Yorkshire, had long sat for Hull and regularly placed his vote at the ministry's disposal. One of his rewards was the Navy Board, and he relinquished his Parliamentary seat in 1747 to stay on at the Board. In 1752 he succeeded John Russell as Consul at Lisbon, a post in which he performed clumsily and had to be replaced.42 Phillipson commanded formidable influence in the borough of Harwich, building on foundations laid by his father; the fact that he moved on to a seat at the Admiralty Board—where he did not stay long—indicates the nature of his power. But even Phillipson worked in his youth as a clerk in the Navy Office, smoothing the path to advancement by marrying the daughter of one of the Commissioners.43 Although no individual's ca­ reer can be taken as typical, that of John Russell, who became an extra Commissioner in 1747, probably provides as faithful an illustration as we are likely to have of the way a young man of business might rise to the Navy Board.44 John Russell's date of birth and lineage are uncertain; he seems to have considered himself distantly related to the Duke of Bedford, and it appears that the Duke was not disposed to deny it. Nothing is known of his apprenticeship. It is possible that he began as a captain's clerk and rose quickly through the pursers' ranks until, in 1722, he managed to get his foot on the bottom rung of the ladder of dockyard preferment; he was appointed Clerk of the Cheque and Storekeeper at Gi*oAdm. 3/45, 7 March 1741; Addl. MSS. 32693, folio 391; Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, p. 68. For more information on Gashry see Namier, Structure of Politics, p. 322. «ι Adm. 3/57, 19 June 1747. 42 sir Richard Lodge, The Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene (Cambridge, 1933), pp. xxx-xxxi, 131. 43 Phillipson's career is outlined by Namier (Structure of Politics, pp. 359-367)· a The following paragraphs are based on Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, except where otherwise noted. It would be tedious to cite all of the pages from which the information is taken, and so I will make parti­ cular citations only for quotations. The papers of minor officials during this period are comparatively rare, and it is extremely fortunate that John Russell's papers have not only been preserved, but also published.

2. The London Offices braltar (salary £ 200). He then sought and somehow gained the favor of Sir Charles Wager—later on he named his young­ est son "Wager"—and this favor proved a more valuable as­ set than anyone could have foreseen in the 1720's. In 1726 Russell was appointed Consul General at Tetuan, Morocco, at a salary of £250 (apparently he paid plenty for the patent), and finally in 1731 he found permanent employment in Eng­ land as Clerk of the Cheque at Woolwich. He was advanced to the same office at Deptford in 1739. Throughout this period, indeed throughout his life, Rus­ sell cultivated the friendship of sea officers and skillfully wove the web of mutual obligation: he found suitable young men to serve as their clerks; he corresponded with them and kept them in touch with London gossip and politics; he did what he could at the Admiralty and Navy Offices to support their re­ quests for favors. By 1736 it seemed that he was "acquainted with all the Captains in the world."45 Once at Woolwich, he set about to broaden his acquaintance outside the navy. Rus­ sell apparently did not lack social graces, for he enjoyed a close friendship with the Duke of Richmond—admittedly, the 2nd Duke was not scrupulously aristocratic in his private con­ duct—and regularly sat at his dinner table. He ran political errands for Richmond and other leading ministers; he man­ aged election business; he shopped for unusual items of food or finery at their request. He served as a kind of merchandise forwarding agent for the well-to-do and well-connected, who persistently sought his services because, as a dockyard officer, he was able to manage these transactions "without giving the custom house any trouble."46 In short, he acquired a reputa­ tion for getting things done. Russell played more than a pas­ sive role; he sent these great men exotic gifts (supplied to him by the captains of his acquaintance); he offered the Duke of Bedford a tiger, which was refused, and a turtle, which was ac­ cepted for gastronomic purposes. When the Duke of Marl­ borough confessed that he was "in great distress about a Mas­ querade" because he did not know how his Moroccan costume should be worn, Russell journeyed up to London to help him «5 Ibid., p. 85. 46 Ibid., p. 58.

2. The London Offices dress. In 1734 a friend had told him: "Continue your good of­ fices and you'll reap the benefit at the long run,"47 but by 1741 Russell was beginning to feel that he had run long enough. In May 1741 Commissioner Purvis of the Navy Board died, and Russell was disappointed, though not surprised, to learn that Francis Gashry had been selected to fill the vacancy. A friend wrote to him on this occasion: "Why won't you buy a Cornish Borough, or get your namesake ye D[uke of] Bed­ ford to put you up for some place of his own? Once get to be a Member of Parliament it won't be long before you either get Navy or Victualling board, but hope the former, for with­ out being a Member, nothing is to be done that way."48 By 1744 Russell was growing impatient, and he took the conven­ tional course of impatient men; he wrote to the Duke of New­ castle, begging His Grace's "great goodness to him, in pro­ moting him to a Branch, in the Commission of the Navy."49 To no avail. Finally, in December 1744, John Russell was touched by good fortune; his friends congratulated him, and his son wrote: "I am glad to find the Duke of Bedford is to be first Ld. of the Admiralty, for you have been too long at Deptford, though I think it a pleasant place enough."50 Promotion did not come until October 1746, when Russell was made a Com­ missioner of Victualling. His friend Commissioner Vanbrvgh was afraid that he might have made a mistake in accepting the lesser office: "Certain it is that we wish you all very well, but whether this removal of yours is really any advantage, you are the best judge; for my part I doubt it."51 But Russell had not miscalculated, for in December 1747 he finally attained the Navy Board. However, as an extra Commissioner his po­ sition was precarious. In December 1748 Lord Vere Beauclerk wrote to him: "I am very sorry to hear they talk again of a reduction; as to all I can do, you know you are sure of it, but it must be the Duke of Bedford must take you on his back and so I will tell him. If he insists to my Lord Sand­ wich, you can't fail."52 Although there was no hope of proMlbid., p. 69. *8 Ibid., p. 161. « Addl. MSS. 38703, folio 14, 4 May 1744. so Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, p. 232. ei Ibid., p. 259. MIbid., p. 271.

2. The London Offices viding for Russell at the Navy Office, Bedford managed to get him appointed Consul at Lisbon, where he died in January 1752· Russell's career shows how different were the backgrounds of the navy's clerical officers and sea officers. And yet at the same time it reveals one reason why the Navy Board—and in a larger sense, the navy—was not divided between clerical and military in the manner that plume and epde divided the French navy. For it seems clear that Russell advanced, especi­ ally in the early part of his career, by the aid of sea officers as much as by serving politicans and aristocrats ashore. He cal­ culated the influence of admirals and captains, and did not fail to cultivate their favor. Although the Commissioners of the Navy came from varied backgrounds, were assigned distinct duties, and had their own rooms and clerks, they were deservedly termed a "board" for they met together regularly and bore a collective responsibility. When they spoke on matters of policy they spoke as one man. As a rule, a body of men bearing a collec­ tive responsibility does not function reliably without a head, and yet the Navy Board in the eighteenth century did not have an officially recognized chairman. As we have seen, the Treasurer's elevated status excluded him from the Board. At the Restoration the matter of leadership remained unset­ tled; the 1662 instructions threw out a hint that the Comp­ troller was expected to lead his colleagues, but these same in­ structions immediately followed up the hint by emphasizing that his fellow officers ought to "be neither excluded from advising, nor yet from comptrolling him, when either from his Unexperience, Infidelity or otherwise, the Service . . . may be prejudic'd, or his Majesty's Treasure without Ground given away." To be advised is one thing; to be controlled is another. Observing how delicately the instructions deal with the issue, we cannot doubt that the framers left it unresolved deliber­ ately. But how are we to explain this? We can only surmise that such an arrangement was deemed unavoidable in an age when incapacity, perfidy, or neglect rarely proved sufficient causes for depriving a man of his office. In practice, the Comp-

2. The London Offices troller did tend to dominate.53 There was no question about it toward the end of the eighteenth century, but during the war of 1739—1748 this was not the case. The Comptroller, Richard Haddock, was too old and feeble to exercise authority. Towards the end of the war the affairs of his office were so badly in arrears that other Commissioners had to be assigned to assist him, and when he was finally superannuated, in Feb­ ruary 1749, the Admiralty commented that "the Office of Comptroller of the Navy should be filled with an Experienced, Able & Active Officer, which Qualifications cannot be ex­ pected from Mr. Haddock by reason of his Age and Infir­ mities."54 In fact, the leading member of the Navy Board throughout the war was Sir Jacob Ackworth, the Surveyor. Ackworth was an aggressive man. It is true that his office ranked next after the Comptrollership in the hierarchy, but other­ wise there was nothing in the instructions to sanction his dom­ ination. Nevertheless, the other members of the Board, as one disgruntled observer put it, were "determined to be led by the nose by a brute of a Shipwright, who never did any good in his life, but to his own creatures."55 THE SICK AND WOUNDED OFFICE

Although the Navy Board bore a general responsibility for the civil affairs of the navy, it delegated the management of a portion of these affairs to subordinate boards established in separate offices. On the whole, the Navy Board confined its di­ rect concern to the needs of ships; the needs of men were largely supplied by the Sick and Wounded Board and the Victualling Board. The Sick and Wounded Board, formally the Commis­ sioners for taking care of Sick and Wounded Seamen and for exchanging Prisoners of War, in fact grew out of the Navy Board. Sick and Wounded Commissioners were first appointed in 1653, but until the war of 1739-1748 they held office only in wartime; at the outbreak of every war a new Board had been 53 See generally Laughton, Barham Papers. 6*Adm. 3/59, 14 March 1748; Adm. 3/60, 20 March 1749. oisjack Russell to his father, March 1747: Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, pp. 269-870.

2. The London Offices established, and when hostilities ceased it was dissolved and its functions assumed by the Navy Board.56 In the eighteenth century the business of the Sick and Wounded Board in­ creased. It was not dissolved, but only reduced in 17x3, and two members continued on until 1715, at which time their duties were assigned to two Commissioners of the Navy; in 1716 these two men complained "that they were not able to go through the business themselves," and a Commissioner was appointed to handle it. Thus, during the long peace the Sick and Wounded Office was in effect a department within the Navy Office.67 In 1740 a new Sick and Wounded Board was set up, consisting of three members, and in 1745 a fourth was added.68 Soon after the war two Commissioners were retrenched, and in 1750 the other two feared that they might also be "turned adrift," but their fears proved unfounded and from this time on the Board remained in peace and war until it was liqui­ dated by an administrative reorganization of 1806.59 The impermanence of the Sick and Wounded Board before 1750 reflects the impermanence of the navy's medical organi­ zation and facilities. Until the Seven Years' War the royal navy had no permanent medical officers ashore, and no estab­ lished hospitals available for receiving sick seamen.60 Sick seamen and prisoners of war were put under the care of con­ tractors. They undertook to look after the sick men, provid­ ing all their needs—beds, victuals, medicine, nurses (but not clothing)—in a building fitted up as a hospital for a salary plus a contract payment per man per day. Where there were no large hospitals, or where the hospitals were overflowing, the men were quartered in lodging houses, the landladies also contracting with the Sick and Wounded Commissioners at a per diem rate. Overseas the arrangement was similar, the Sick and Wounded agent frequently being the same person as the Agent of the Victualling Office.61 Consequently, the main bus­ es Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, 11, 19-21, 96-97, 122, 172, 205-206, 235. Br Corbett MSS. xin, folios 4, 24-26. 68 Adm. 3/44, 11 July 1740; Adm. 98/2, 20 Feb. 1745. 59 Adm. 3/60, 25 April 1749; Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, pp. 306-307. eo Greenwich Hospital was established for the purpose of looking after the aged and infirm, not for receiving sick men from the fleet. si Corbett MSS. xm, folios 17-20; Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 223-224. Russell

2i The London Offices iness of the Sick and Wounded Commissioners was dealing with contractors: negotiating contracts, trying to insure proper performance of the contract terms, disbursing, and account­ ing. The reason that a fourth Commissioner was added in ϊ745 was that, even though the Office had the money issued to it, it had fallen behind in disbursing for want of enough Com­ missioners to supervise the payments.62 The contract system had many drawbacks. For a long time, in spite of the Navy Board's parsimony and conservatism, the navy had been moving gradually away from the use of sick quarters toward hospital ships and large hospitals.63 It is found by experience, that Hospitals contribute much more to the Preservation and Cures of Sick 8c Wounded Men, than Town Quarters, in regard they are attended by such Nurses 8cc. in Hospi­ tals, as understand their Circumstances, and are confined from Town Debauches, whereby Relapses are prevented, and Cures hastened, but Town Quarters are attended with Indigence, Ignorance, and Care­ lessness, which neglects and hazards the Patient, prolongs the Cure, and excessively swells the Publick Charge, it being observed that Cures in Hospitals (in all acute Diseases) are performed in much less time, and above all, do shorten (in a set Number of Men) the Bill of Mortality by one half or more, and being within the Walls of the Hospital, prevents Desertion, as is common in Town Quarters.®4

This was recorded in the 1720's. The opening years of the war of 1739—1748, as we shall see in another chapter, amply dem­ onstrated every word. Moreover, in these years it became ob­ vious that even large hospitals, so long as they were run on the contract system, were not good enough. Admiral Philip Caven­ dish, who observed the misery of the seamen at Portsmouth in 1740 and 1741, doubted whether any contractor could be trusted to provide an adequate standard of care. As early as March 1740 he and the dockyard Commissioner asked the AdRevell, for example, was agent of both offices at Port Mahon during the war of 1739—1748. e2 Adm. 98/1, 6 April 1744; Adm. 98/2, 20 Feb. 1745. For detailed in­ structions to the Commissioners of Sick and Wounded, see Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 224-227. es Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, 11, 125, 193-195, 248-249; Merriman, Sergison Papers, pp. 227-232; Queen Anne's Navy, 232-233. «4 Corbett MSS. xm, folio 9.

2. The London Offices miralty's consideration "whether it would not be an advantage to the poor men and consequently to the Service if the . . . hospital [at Portsmouth] was to be purchased by, and in every respect provided victualled and supported at the expense of the Crown."65 If this were to be opposed on the ground that it would ordinarily be empty and therefore a largely useless expense, Cavendish had an answer. "On my conscience," he wrote, "I think we shall never have less than iooo sick att Gosport, and many of our people choose to dye aboard their ships than to be sent thither."66 The suggestion was taken seriously; in fact, the Admiralty began to consider building hospitals at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham.67 In September 1740 the Navy Board was searching for a suitable location for build­ ing a hospital near Portsmouth,®8 and the following year, after receiving a report from the Commissioners of Sick and Wounded which estimated that in the long run it would ac­ tually be cheaper for the Crown to establish and administer its own hospitals rather than deal with contractors,69 the Admiralty presented a memorial to the king "proposing to Erect Hospitals at Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth."70 However, not until another memorial was presented in Sep­ tember 1744 did the ministry take action; apparently the Admiralty was moved to a second effort by a report from ViceAdmiral William Martin describing the "Irregularity and Drunkenness, among the Sick Men on shore at Sick Qrs. at Gosport."71 In January 1745 Parliament was asked to grant an initial £12,000 (the original total estimate was £86,769) for the construction of a royal hospital in the Portsmouth area. The result was the famous naval hospital at Haslar. Although it did not receive its first patients until the Seven Years' War, Haslar Hospital was, in a sense, a monument to the disasters of 1740 and 1741. With its establishment began the era of permanent naval hospitals. The navy was moving es N.M.M. POR H/14, 2 March 1740. ββ Adm. 1 /903, 19 June 1740. 67 Adm. 106/2554, 25 April 1740. ββ N.M.M. POR F/6, 5 Sept. 1740. ββ Adm. 1/3529, 31 March 1741. 70A copy of the memorial may be found in Adm. 7/340. Adm. 3/48, 15 Sept. 1744. See also Adm. 7/340.

2. The London Offices away from a system designed mainly just to get the sick men out of the ships where they might infect others and could not be adequately nursed, to a system designed mainly to preserve their lives and restore their health.72 At the beginning of the eighteenth century it was the Navy Board's view that Commissioners of Sick and Wounded should ideally be "persons of naval education familiar with its financial methods."78 Such men would be better than mere placemen, but there being no mention made of familiarity with medicine, we may surmise that the Navy Board was more interested in accounting than in the health of seamen. Dur­ ing the eighteenth century Sick and Wounded Boards some­ times included physicians, sometimes not. When the Commis­ sioners were reconstituted in 1740, Francis Gashry, who had been in charge of sick and wounded affairs in the Navy Ofiftce became senior member at a salary of £400; the two new Com­ missioners, William Bell and Nathaniel Hills, received £300. In 1741 Gashry moved to the Navy Board, Bell became senior member, and the vacancy was filled by William Allix; the new Commissioner in 1745 was Tyrwhit Caley, and he was replaced in 1747 by Esquire Cary. Allix and Cary lost their places in the retrenchment of 1749. None of these men was a physician, and it is probable that political connection was the main factor in their appointments. As we have seen, Francis Gashry was close to Sir Charles Wager, and so, apparently, was William Allix.74 THE VICTUALLING OFFICE

Although the Sick and Wounded Office grew out of the Navy Office, it would not be precise to say the same of the Victual­ ling Office. The large and specialized business of providing victuals for the fleet—in the mid-eighteenth century it ac­ counted for roughly one-quarter of the navy's expenditure— had never been managed directly by the Navy Board; the 72 See generally the excellent chapter, "The Decline of the Contract System," in Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, HI, 187-195; see also the chapter on Haslar hospital, pp. 207-260. " Quoted by Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, 11, 234. 74 Adm. 3/44, 11 July 1740; Adm. 3/45, 7 March 1741; Adm. 99/19; Adm. 3/37· 1S Feb. 1729; Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, p. 321.

2. The London Offices Navy Board had only audited the accounts of pursers and con­ tractors. Before 1684 the victualling had been carried on by contract, except for a brief period between 1654 and 1660 when it was administered by the state.75 A merchant, or syndicate, contracting to supply victuals to His Majesty's ships was awarded the privilege of renting the king's victualling shops and storehouses. The contract laid down the varieties of victuals to be supplied, the quality ex­ pected, and the methods to be followed in preserving and packing. Each year in late summer or early autumn a Declara­ tion was made by the king of the number of men to be vict­ ualled in the coming year; this was followed up by a state­ ment of the portions which the contractor was to place at the various ports. All victuals were to be delivered alongside for transfer and stowage by ship's company. The contractor agreed to issue victuals only by warrant from naval author­ ity, to require ships' pursers to "indent" (sign a receipt) for provisions supplied, and to submit his accounts—to be kept in a style prescribed by the navy—annually to the Navy Office for audit.76 Otherwise he was free to manage the business as he saw fit. If circumstances proved favorable, he might turn a handsome profit. If harvests failed or other misfortunes struck him the loss was, at least theoretically, his to stand. By this arrangement the government transferred to private hands a very troublesome business, but in return navy officials were forced to suffer the frustrations regularly experienced by those who would try to control without managing. When complaints about rotten cheese and putrid beef poured in from the fleet, when empty storehouses delayed the departure of an expedi­ tion, about all the government could do was remonstrate with the contractor or, at worst, threaten to terminate his contract —a threat that was seldom heeded because most of the time the government was heavily in debt to him. But on Jan­ uary 1, 1684 the victualling was entrusted to salaried com75 See Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 15a; and Oppenheim, Administration, pp. 326-327. ^eTanner, Catalogue, I, 165-177. The word "indent" arises from the practice of making out twin accounts on a single sheet, and tearing the paper in half, thus producing a unique jagged edge that could later be used for identification; one might think of it as a paper tally.

2. The London Offices missioners. After that, losses were government losses, and the king's ministers were able to deal with men who supposedly stood in fear of losing their jobs, should they lack an appro­ priate sense of their duties.77 The change proved permanent, and it marked the beginning of the Victualling Office. The Victualling Office grew rapidly. Table 2 shows its or­ ganization in 1747, with a total standing charge—they called it "Ordinary charge"—of £ 30,393. Much of this represented wartime growth, and a good deal was cut away when the war ended.78 Even so the standing charge at the outbreak of war in 1739 had stood at £16,241, and during the long peace the Vic­ tualling Office had not only maintained its depots in England, but also those at Gibraltar and Port Mahon.79 As may be de­ duced from Table 2, the London Office was in effect a collec­ tion of offices and workshops, each headed by a chief clerk. The instructions of 1715, by which the Victualling Commis­ sioners were governed during the war of 1739-1748, called for "branching out the whole business of their Office, in such man­ ner as that there might not be any part thereof but what should come under the particular inspection of some one Mem­ ber of the Board."80 Accordingly the responsibilities were di­ vided among the seven Commissioners as follows:81 1. Manager of the Secretary's Office, the office for keeping a Charge on Pursers, the office of the Clerk of the Issues, and the office for Comptrolling Accounts of Stores. 2. Inspector of the Cuttinghouse 3. Inspector of the Brewhouse 4. Inspector of the Cooperage 5. Inspector of the business of the Hoytaker 6. Inspector of the Bakehouse and the Mills 7. Inspector of the business of the Accountant General, the office for keeping a check on the Treasurer, the Short Allowance office, and the Muster Master of the Workmen and Laborers who make up the Pay Books.

iilbid., i, 181. 78 See Adm. 110/15, 21 July 1748 for details of retrenchment. 79Adm. 110/12, 16 Feb. 1740. This document also lists the increases in the ordinary charge since 1729. so Adm. 7/648. si Ibid.; verified by Adm. 110/15, ® Aug. 1747.

2. The London Offices TABLE 2. Ordinary Charge of the Victualling Office, 1747 (To the nearest pound) London

Seven Commissioners at £400 house money to four at £65 Secretary 4 clerks Cashier 4 clerks Accountant for Cash 7 clerks Clerk for Assignment of Bills and to Cheque on the Treasurer's Accounts 2 clerks Accountant for Stores 5 clerks Clerk of the Issues I clerk Clerk for keeping a Charge on Pursers' Accounts ι clerk Clerk for bringing up Accounts of Stores in Arrears 1 clerk Chief Clerk for stating and passing Pursers' Accounts ι clerk Master Cooper 2 clerks Clerk at Tower Wharf for Casks, Stores, and Hoops Wharfinger at the Redhouse, Deptford Clerk of the Cuttinghouse at Tower Hill house money 2 clerks Master Butcher Surveyor of Oxen and Hogs Clerk of the Bakehouse at Tower Hill house money 2 clerks Clerk of the Mills and the Bakehouse at Rotherhithe 1 clerk Clerk of the Brewhouse at Hartshorn 3 clerks Clerk of the Cheque at the Brewhouse 3 clerks Master Brewer messenger Chief Clerk of the Short Allowance Office 2 clerks Surveyor of the Works Hoytaker (£60 plus £20 house money) Master Distiller Total London salaries

£2,800 260 200 240 150 200 120 330 80 90 120 250 80 50 60 50 60 50 100 50 80 90 50 50 80 30 80 40 40 ioo 30 90 80 40 60 no 80 120 57 20 50 80 60 80 80 £7,017

2. The London Offices TABLE 2. Continued Rent, hoys, repairs, stationary, taxes, contingencies, etc. TotalLondonOffice

9,167 £16,184

Portsmouth

Agent Storekeeper Clerk of the Cheque Master Cooper Minor Clerks, rent, hoys, repairs, stationary, etc. Total

200 80 80 60 2,415

£ 2 , 835

Plymouth

Agent Storekeeper (£60 plus £10 house money) Clerk of the Cheque Master Cooper (£60 plus £10 house money) Master Brewer Other charges (similar to Portsmouth) Total

200 70 60 70 50 2,696 £3,146

Chatham

Agent Storekeeper Master Cooper Other charges

200 50 47 963

Total

£1,260

Dover

Agent Storekeeper Chief Clerk Other charges

200 50 50 1,965

Total

£2,265

Gibraltar

Agent (£200 plus £50 table money) Chief Clerk (£60 plus £30 table money) Clerk (£50 plus £25 table money) Cooper Other Charges Totals

250 90 75 39 127 £581

Port Mahon

Agent (£200 plus £50 table money) 5 Clerks (£50 plus £25 table money each) 10 Coopers (at £39)

250 375 390

2. The London Offices TABLE 2. Concluded Master Furner 3 Bakers (at £35) Other charges

50 105 650 Total

£1,822

Jamaica Agent Chief Clerk Clerk 2 Clerks (at £80) Master Cooper Cooper Other charges

300 120 100 160 80 62 1,126 Total

£1,948

Kinsale Agent Storekeeper Other charges

60 60 232 Total

Total Ordinary Charge of Victualling Office

£352 £30,393

This Table is based on: Adm. 110/15, 28 Jan. 1747. The following points should be noted: The "other charges"—rent, hoys, repairs, stationary, etc.—rose steeply in wartime; for example, in February 1740 these charges at Portsmouth were only £890, at Plymouth, £934 (see Adm. 110/12, 16 Feb. 1740). In the early part of the war there was a depot at Lisbon (see Adm. 110/13, 27 May 1742). Also, in 1742 the staff at Jamaica was larger, with two Agents at £300 (see Adm. 110/14, 13 Aug. 1745).

The detailed instructions were what one might expect: each Commissioner in charge of a workshop was to see that food or materials delivered met the contract terms as to quantity and quality, that his workmen did their jobs, and that proper ac­ counts were kept; the Commissioner inspecting the Hoytaker was to insure that all vessels hired by the Victualling Office— and the Victualling OfiBce hired all vessels and arranged all freight for transporting provisions both in home waters and abroad—were sound, properly equipped, and adequately manned;82 the business of the two Commissioners charged ex­ clusively with clerical affairs is evident from their titles.83 The 82 See Adm. 106/2554, 7 Jan. 1740. 88 For the detailed instructions of 1715 see Adm. 7/648.

2. The London Offices Commissioners met regularly as a Board, though seldom was any meeting attended by more than three or four members. All contracts were made by the Board; no victuals nor materi­ als could be bought, no repairs ordered, no vessels hired ex­ cept by the Board; recommendations to the Admiralty and orders to the Agents84 were signed by at least three members of the Board. In going through the Victualling Commission­ ers' letters, one is impressed by the distinctly clerical orien­ tation of their minds. During the war of 1739-1748 they generally seemed more concerned with making favorable con­ tracts and keeping proper accounts than with serving the fleet; they saw themselves as watchdogs on expenditure, and they often cautioned the Admiralty on matters of victualling expense. The navy deserved no better of them, for in the in­ structions of 1715 there was a marked emphasis on accounting. These instructions were born out of the scandals of the war of the Spanish Succession, when Victualling officers "had for many years, been intrusted with Provisions and Stores, which cost the Publick some Millions of Money [without being re­ quired] to pass any regular Accounts for the same."85 Although the Commissioners of Victualling were scrupu­ lously listed by seniority in the patents (see Table 3), senior­ ity did not govern, though it appears to have influenced, the assignment of duties. These duties were assigned by the Admiralty upon recommendation from the Victualling Board.8® There was no stipulated head of the Board, although the manager of the Secretary's office was usually the senior member and had the "most business, most Clerks, and a House."87 During most of the war of 1739-1748 two men, Stephen Bisse (manager of the Secretary's office) and Thomas Revell, ran the Victualling Office.88 In 1746, when Bisse died, 841 capitalize to make it clear that Victualling Agents were salaried officers of the Victualling department, and not private contractors, like Sick and Wounded agents; the full title was Agent Victualler. so Ibid.

8β E.g. Adm. 3/44, 3 Jan. 1740; Adm. 3/48, 23 June, 10 July 1744; Adm. 3/57. 7 Au g· »747: Adm · 110/15, 6 Aug. 1747. 8' Woburn MSS. xiu, folio 66, 16 Sept. 1746. 88 This is evident from the Victualling minute books (Adm. 111/27-29) and from their attendance at Admiralty Board meetings to discuss victual­ ling affairs (e.g. Adm. 3/44, 5 Feb., 23 March 1740). Sometimes the Admi-

2. The London Offices TABLE 3. Commissioners of the Victualling, 1739-1748 2 June 1738 Stephen Bisse, Henry Parsons, Thomas Revell, Thomas Brereton1 William Thompson, Francis Eyles, William Hay. I May 1741 Stephen Bisse, Thomas Revell, Thomas Brereton, William Thompson, Francis Eyles, William Hay, Thomas Trefusis. 13 August 1742 Stephen Bisse, Thomas Revell, Thomas Brereton, William Thompson, William Hay, Thomas Trefusis, Richard Hall. 29 June 1744 Stephen Bisse, Thomas Revell, Thomas Brereton, William Thompson, William Hay, Richard Hall, William Davies. 12 January 1745 Stephen Bisse, Thomas Revell, Thomas Brereton, William Hay, Richard Hall, William Davies, Arthur Stert. 6 February 1746 Stephen Bisse, Thomas Revell, Thomas Brereton, William Hay, Richard Hall, William Davies, James Wallace. 14 October 1746 Thomas Revell, Thomas Brereton, William Hay, Richard Hall, William Davies, James Wallace, John Russell. 23 June 1747 Richard Hall, William Davies, James Wallace, John Russell, Sir Francis Haskins Eyles Stiles, Horatio Townshend, Francis Vernon. 27 July 1747 Richard Hall, William Davies, James Wallace, Sir Francis Haskins Eyles Stiles, Horatio Townshend, Francis Vernon, William Jenkins. ρ January 1748 Richard Hall, James Wallace, Sir Francis Haskins Eyles Stiles, Horatio Townshend, Francis Vernon, William Jenkins, Tyrwhit Cayley. This Table is based on the Patent Rolls.

Lord Vere Beauclerk of the Admiralty, suggested to the First Lord that John Russell should have his branch, even though Russell had no previous experience in the Victualling Office and stood at the bottom of the list in respect to seniority.89 ralty minutes state that the "Victualling Commissioners" attended, but often they merely name Bisse or Revell, or both. 89 Woburn MSS., loc. cit.

2. The London Offices Whether Russell ever held the post I have not been able to discover; he moved to the Navy Board a year later, and it seems likely Revell remained the leading manager of victual­ ling affairs. Revell, Thomas Brereton, and William Hay, re­ signed in 1747 in order to qualify themselves to sit in the House of Commons under the terms of the Place Act.90 Af­ ter that the management of the Secretary's office went to Rich­ ard Hall, who stood highest in seniority; the Victualling min­ utes indicate that from 1747 on, Hall was the most active Com­ missioner. The Victualling Commissioners were a mixed group. At £400 per annum they were not so well rewarded as Naval Commissioners.91 The instructions assumed that they would be assigned duties according to their "Experience in Accounts, or their Judgment in flesh, Grain, Naval Affairs, &ca."92 In many cases the experience must have been very limited. The Hoytaker was always supervised by an ex-captain. Revell seems to have been a man of ability and long experience. Bisse worked his way up through the Victualling Office ranks.93 But Bisse was an exception. Although many Commissioners were com­ petent men of business, like John Russell and Richard Hall, their previous experience in victualling matters was nil, and they hoped to be advanced to something with a better salary as soon as possible.94 Many were in reality placemen; the salary was modest, but strict attendance does not seem to have been asked of them. This was especially true of those assigned to the cuttinghouse, bakehouse, brewhouse, and cooperage. Naturally, stricter supervision would have been desirable. The instruc­ tions suggest that even the chief clerks had become devoted to the long coffee-break: "You are further directed to Sign all Certificates and other Papers at your Office, and not at Taverns eoAdm. 3/57, 19 June 1747. Hay was apparently in much confusion as to how to proceed. See his letters to the Duke of Newcastle: Addl. MSS. 32711, folios 226, 489, 6 June, 22 June 1747. ei Three lived at the Office; four had an additional £65 house money. »2 Adm. 7/648. »3 See Admiral Sir Cloudisley Shovell's praise of his services in 1706 (Queen Anne's Navy, p. 279). β» Russell's career has already been described. For Hall's situation see Woburn MSS. xi, folio 11, 23 Jan. 1746; Hall moved to the Navy Board in 1752.

2. The London Offices and Coffee houses, as hath been heretofore practiced."95 All in all, there seems little doubt that the Victualling Eoard was more open to men with no professional background than the Navy Board. To the Duke of Newcastle this was a most satis­ factory circumstance, but not to Lord Anson, who when First Lord of the Admiralty in 1751, wrote: "I had the honour of your Grace's letter, with an enclosure from my Lord Davis, recommending Mr. Whitemore to be Commissioner of Victual­ ling. His Lordship might as well have asked for him to be made a captain of a man of war. . . . This gives me an op­ portunity of observing to your Grace, that instead of adding to the useless people that are allowed in that office (if we should have a war with France), more people of business must be brought into it."96 Unfortunately, Anson's attitude toward Vic­ tualling Board appointments was somewhat exceptional in po­ litical circles. But notwithstanding all this, the British fleet, as will be seen in another chapter, was better victualled in the war of 1739-1748 than in any previous war. THE ADMIRALTY

At the top of the naval administrative structure stood the Board of Admiralty, more properly "the Commissioners con­ stituted to execute the Office of Lord High Admiral." There were seven members, a First Lord97 and six subordinates, of whom one or two generally knew something of the sea service. Except for the period 1702-1708, when the Earl of Pembroke and Prince George of Denmark successively held the office of Lord High Admiral, and a brief, chaotic interlude under the Duke of Clarence in the nineteenth century, the Admiralty powers have been continuously executed by Commissioners since 1689.98 Before 1689 there had been Admiralty Boards, β» Pari. Hist., xi, 411-414; Adm. 7/648. ββ Quoted in S. W. C. Pack, Admiral Lord Anson (i960), p. 185. 1 use this term for convenience; occasionally men in the 1740's used it, but more often they spoke of the "First Commissioner." »s When this was written it was true, but on April 1, 1964 a major defense reorganization went into effect; see the White Paper published in July 1963: Central Organisation for Defence, Cmnd. 2097. By this re­ organization the powers of the Admiralty were put into the hands of a Defence Council. The Board thereupon created to supervise the civil administration of the navy was to be called the Navy Board, but after a

6l

Admiraltv

Offce

2. The London Offices but more frequently the Admiralty powers had been executed by a Lord High Admiral; occasionally the king had executed them, or a portion of them, personally." The Board of Admiralty bore over-all responsibility for the navy: the ships, the men, the facilities. Its power was exer­ cised through the sea officers, the subordinate Boards—Navy, Victualling, and Sick and Wounded—and a number of lesser authorities.100 For ordnance and ordnance stores the Admiralty relied on the Board of Ordnance; this body was "of an am­ phibious nature," since it supplied both army and navy. The Admiralty Board did not appoint its members and had no power to coerce them, a circumstance which was "often the occasion of Delays" in getting equipment to the fleet.101 Because the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty were of­ ficially constituted to execute the office of Lord High Admiral, they were empowered to act not only in all matters concerning the navy, but also in "those things which concern[ed] the Rights and Jurisdictions of or appertaining to the Office."102 The pristine powers of the Lord High Admiral, handed down through the centuries, ranged loosely over the maritime af­ fairs of the kingdom. Consequently the Board was entrusted with a number of administrative duties that concerned ship­ ping and navigation. For example, merchants who desired "Mediterranean passes" to protect their ships from the Barbary pirates applied to the Admiralty Office for them. The Board of Longitude, established by Parliament to encourage the invention of a practical method for measuring longitudi­ nal position, was answerable to the Admiralty.103 And it was logical that projects for discovering the Northwest Passage should wind up at the Admiralty Office for consideration.104 debate in the House of Lords sentiment won out over logic, and the name Admiralty Board was kept; see The Times, London, Feb. 26, 1964, p. 13. as Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 65, 246. For the early history of the office see also Ehrman, pp. 186-98; and W. G. Perrin, "The Lord High Admiral and the Board of Admiralty," MM., XII (1926), 117-144. 100 Such as the Directors of Greenwich Hospital, the Sixpenny Office, etc.; see generally Corbett MSS. VII and xm. 101 Ibid., xiv, folios 129-130. 102 From the patent; quoted by Ehrman, p. 187. 103 See Sir Charles Wager's papers: Addl. MSS. 19035. IO^ E.g. Adm. 3/48, 13 April 1744. For some of the Admiralty's peripheral

2. The London Offices It is necessary to single out one thing for which the Ad­ miralty was not responsible. It was not responsible for the di­ rection of naval strategy, and was only marginally responsi­ ble for the conduct of naval operations. The preparation of fleets and the selection of their commanders was the Admiral­ ty's business (although appointments to important commands had to be approved by the king and the leading ministers);105 the employment of those fleets was only partially so. Con­ fusion on this point arises from the fact that orders to fleet commanders touching the conduct of operations were gener­ ally issued by the Admiralty Board. But it was not the only body to issue such orders; fleet commanders always followed the orders of the King in Council as transmitted by a Secre­ tary of State.106 This was done to save time and promote sec­ recy. Even those orders that emanated from the Admiralty Of­ fice, if they involved major questions of strategy, were merely forwarded from there. The decisions were made elsewhere, by the king and his ministers.107 Ostensibly they were made by the Cabinet Council; in fact, they were made by the nucleus of statesmen who met informally in what historians have called an "inner cabinet."108 If one were forced to pick a single states­ man who had the power to decide, one would have to pick the Secretary of State for the Southern Department. As an author­ ity has remarked, "Newcastle during the greater part of the war of 1739-48 . . . controlled the fleets."109 The Admiralty managed routine operations virtually without interference; it stationed cruisers and assigned convoys, but it did not formu­ late strategic policy. There its role was merely advisory. Because of the informality of the system for determining responsibilities see J. D. Doty, The British Admiralty Board as a Factor in Colonial Administration, i68p-iy6j (Philadelphia, 1930), pp. 9-60. xos E.g. Woburn MSS. xrv, folio 54, 24 Oct. 1746. ioe And when the King was abroad, fleet commanders were to follow the orders of the Lords Justices, e.g. Adm. 3/44, 27 May 1740. 107 E.g. Addl. MSS. 32694, folio 177, 18 July 1740; 32695, folios 512-513, 25 Dec. 1740; 32698, folio 289, 8 Nov. 1741; Adm. 3/45, 24 Feb. 1741; Coxe, Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, 11, 483-84. And see M. A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State, 1681-1782 (Oxford, 1932), pp. 87-88. 108 R. R. Sedgwick, "The Inner Cabinet from 1739 to 1741," English Hist. Rev., xxxiv (1919), 290-302. 109 Thomson, Secretaries of State, p. 82. The statement is confirmed by Admiral Richmond's study of the war.

2. The London Offices policy, personalities meant a great deal. The First Lord sat at the meetings of the Cabinet Council (though he was not usually one of the Lords Justices); more important, he was a member of the "inner cabinet." Naturally, if he was a profes­ sional sea officer, he had the advantage of knowledge and ex­ perience; even if he was not, he knew better than anyone else in the cabinet the capabilities of the fighting instrument that his department maintained. If his advice was sound and cogently argued, if it was compatible with the basic war aims of the king and his ministers, it was likely to go unchallenged. In this sense the Admiralty Board did, through its leading member, fashion strategic policy, but it should be recognized that the First Lord was not the only naval expert summoned to the meetings of the "inner cabinet," nor was he necessarily the only one who attended the Cabinet Council. In Septem­ ber 1739 Admiral Sir John Norris was officially appointed a member of the Cabinet Council, because he was Admiral of the Fleet and because it was felt that he had something worth saying about strategic questions. Moreover, from the evidence of Norris's diary there can be little doubt that his voice was a strong one—just as strong as that of the First Lord, Sir Charles Wager—in spite of his recurrent grumbling that it was not heeded.110 Wager and Norris both attended "inner cabinet" meetings regularly. Newcastle may have "controlled the fleets," but he did not do so at important junctures without expert counsel, and when he neglected to provide himself with it, his close associate, Hardwicke, reminded him of the hazards: "Tho' we had the assistance of the Duke of Bedford last night, yet I beg leave to submit it to Your Grace's consideration whether it would not be advisable (before your maritime or­ ders are finally settled) to have the opinion of some of the Admirals & that they should be ordered to attend."111 Since maritime strategy was determined by the leading 110 Norris's diary is in Addl. MSS. 28132-28133. See also Hervey, Memoirs, pp. 926-940. 111 Addl. MSS. 32700, folio 321. This was written in July 1743. The Duke of Bedford was not yet First Lord, but attended cabinet meetings in a private capacity; he fancied himself an expert on sea afEairs, and though he probably knew more than his political colleagues, Hardwicke's request provides an interesting commentary on his value.

2. The London Offices ministers, the Board of Admiralty bore no independent re­ sponsibility for that strategy. Consequently the First Lord was not obliged to resign if his counsels went unheeded, nor did his tenure of office depend directly on the success or failure of fleet operations. He and his subordinates might protest and persuade, but their fortunes were intimately bound up with the political fortunes of the leading statesmen. It is impor­ tant to bear in mind that in the eighteenth century Admiralty Boards came and went for reasons only remotely connected, if at all, with the conduct of naval operations or administration.

The First Lords, 1739-1J48 In 1739 Sir Charles Wager, Admiral of the White, sat at the head of the Admiralty Board. When, upon the death of Lord Torrington in 1733, he was made First Lord, he had sixteen years of experience as a junior member of the Board behind him; apparently one of the drawbacks to Wager's appoint­ ment to the high post at the Admiralty was his low birth.112 He was Walpole's man, and he owed his long tenure as First Lord to the political stability that Walpole had maintained. When Walpole resigned, Wager resigned.113 He was an able sea officer who had made his fortune and reputation in 1708 by attacking and taking seventeen armed galleons with a force of three ships. His quality as an administrator is more diffi­ cult to assess and has been a subject of dispute. In 1739 Wager was seventy-three. He was accused at the time of being too old for his job, and historians have agreed.114 If age diminished his vigor, it was not superficially apparent. Wager attended all the Board meetings, and after war broke out the Board met almost every day and occasionally on Sun­ days.115 He also attended all the meetings of the Cabinet Council and "inner cabinet" when matters on the agenda con112

See a note in MJVf., xv (1929), 89. Cf. Murray, "The Admiralty," MM., xxiv (1938), 204-225. Murray has condemned not only Wager, but also Lord Anson for failing to obtain larger grants for the navy in peacetime (pp. 209, 212-214, 221). His views are based on a misunderstanding of the political position of the First Lord. 114 Murray, MJVi., xxiv, 212; M. A. Lewis, England's Sea Officers (1939), pp. 133-134; Dictionary of National Biography. 115 Adm. 3/43-45, passim. 11S

2. The London Offices cerned the navy.116 He defended the administration's naval pol­ icies on the floor of the House of Commons.117 But there are hints that Sir Charles was no longer able to carry the full bur­ den of his office. In 1740 an anonymous letter to the Duke of Newcastle commented: "Great Complaints are made of the Managemt. at the Adm-ty Office, the first Comm r being much advanced in years Depends wholly upon ye. advice of his Sec­ retary who Prime M[iniste]r like, transacts business fre­ quently without Applying to his Ma[ste]r."118 And subse­ quently another anonymous correspondent mentioned to the Duke of Bedford that Wager "tho a good sort of man was not thought by every body fit for such a Post . . . [and] saw every thing through the Eyes of his Servt. Gas[hr]y."119 Although these accusations come from unreliable sources, there is prob­ ably a measure of justice in them. Lord Hardwicke's opinion carries far more weight, and Hardwicke told Newcastle that it was "absolutely necessary" to prod the old admiral in order to avoid delays in dispatching squadrons.120 Against these criticisms must be set Sir Charles's univer­ sally acknowledged merits. Hardwicke himself judged him "a very honest and deserving Man."121 Whatever deficiencies there may have been in Wager's handling of everyday affairs, they were more than offset by his strength of character. He was a man who inspired loyalty and promoted harmony.122 It is evident that he alone was responsible for Admiral Vernon's appointment to command in the West Indies, and apparently he alone was able to keep that talented and difficult man loyal lie Addl. MSS. 28132, passim. HT Pari. Hist., x, 635; xi, 94, 110, 406; XII, 33, 71-142, 458. "β Addl. MSS. 32694, folio 362, 22 July 1740. On Josiah Burchett, the Secretary of the Admiralty at this time, see G. F. James, "Josiah Burchett," MM., xxiii (1937), 477-497. 119 Woburn MSS. IX, folio 110, March 1745. 120 Addl. MSS. 32698, folioS 4-5, 4 Sept. 1741. Apparently Wager himself doubted his physical capacity to continue early in 1742; see H.M.C., Diary of the 1st Earl of Egmont, in, 236. 121 Addl. MSS. 32700, folio 149, 27 May 1743. 122 The moving eulogy inscribed on Wager's monument in Westminster Abbey is printed in Mark Noble, A Biographical History of England (3 vol., 1806), HI, 227-229, together with a short sketch of Wager's character that should be compared against the entry in the Dictionary of National Biog­ raphy. The absence of personal criticism of Wager (except in respect to his age) in the letters of his contemporaries is striking.

2. The London Offices to the Admiralty.123 Even Sir John Norris, who felt that Wager held the post that was rightfully his own, served willingly and cooperatively. Sir John poured out his irritation onto the pages of his diary, but, happily, not often in his letters to the Admiralty, and when a controversy did arise over Norris's right to make appointments in the Channel squadron, Sir John acquiesced, even though precedent was on his side.124 This was to Sir John's credit, but he was a proud man, and we may presume from his subsequent actions that he would not have given in to any other First Lord. Wager was not by tempera­ ment a reformer; at seventy-three he was no longer energetic; but while he sat at the head of the Admiralty Board a spirit of unity pervaded the navy that was sadly lacking during the administration of his successor. In 174a, when Walpole fell and Wager resigned, Sir John Norris was not asked to fill the post, although he made no secret of his desire to have it; he was offered second place on the Admiralty Board, which he rightly considered beneath him, and upon failing to get the appointment he expected, he resigned his commission.125 Instead, Daniel Finch, Eighth Earl of Winchilsea and Third Earl of Nottingham, was made First Lord. The choice was purely political. At first the post was of­ fered to the Duke of Montagu, who declined on the grounds that he was not sufficiently acquainted with sea affairs, and then to Winchilsea, whose acquaintance can hardly have been much better; but he was intimately associated with Lord Car­ teret (later Earl Granville), and in 1742 Carteret's influence was very great. Winchilsea was the first man to preside at the Admiralty Board who was not a sea officer.126 There is no reason to believe that he was unintelligent or incompetent, or that the fleet went to ruin under his inexperienced guidance. In fact, on assuming command of a large squadron in Febru­ ary 1744 Sir John Norris "express'd his Satisfaction at the Condition he found the Ships in," and in the eighteenth cen123 This is clear from the correspondence between Wager and Vernon printed in the Vernon Papers. 124 See generally Addl. MSS. 2813a; also below p. 123. 125 Richmond, 1, 180-181. Norris was later persuaded to change his mind and keep his commission. 12 β ibid,., i, 180.

ζ. The London Offices tury admirals were not in the habit of saying things of this sort.127 But whatever Winchilsea's qualities, his appointment was a serious miscalculation. It fell to him to implement the policies of a ministry whose "Hanoverian" war aims were wildly unpopular. In an era when the loyalties of sea officers were not firmly bound to the Admiralty, the unprecedented appointment of a man to superintend them who was not of their stamp was likely to provoke insubordination. And it was Winchilsea's misfortune that his most important dealings were with two admirals who were insubordinate by temperament— Sir John Norris and Thomas Mathews. Vice-Admiral Thomas Mathews was commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean from 1743 to 1744. He was a quarrelsome, impatient man; he was also fearless, forthright, and self-con­ fident—an able, if impulsive, commander. He did not shun a fight, and he did not try to suppress or soften a critical re­ mark. His letters to the Admiralty, from the time he left Eng­ land until he returned, represent a solid stream of com­ plaints and requests: complaints about the condition of his ships and men, about his orders, about the facilities at Gi­ braltar and Port Mahon; requests for seamen, sails, cordage, carpenters, surgeons—nearly everything a fleet on foreign sta­ tion could require.128 It is probable that the complaints and requests were legitimate. But the way in which they were presented must have been extremely annoying. Two extracts are sufficient to indicate the temperature of the correspond­ ence. On November 25, 1743 Mathews wrote: "I am sorry to see the Pains their Lordships have taken to throw dirt so thick at me, but I have the pleasure of knowing where it must of Necessity stick at last." Although the Admiralty Lords were irritated, their letters showed restraint; nevertheless, in March 1744 Mathews deliberately delayed in responding, "being unwilling to be told a second Time of the Impetuosity of my Temper."129 Mathews seems to have been persuaded that the Admiralty had no concerns other than supplying the needs of his squadron, and he dismissed the Board's explanations as 12T Adm. 3/47, 7 Feb. 1744. 128 See generally Mathews to Admiralty, Adm. 1/381. 128 Adm. 1/381, as Nov. 1743, 13 March 1744.

ζ. The London Offices flimsy excuses; he as much as told them that they were either all corrupt or deliberately trying to deny him what he re­ quired. Moreover, he told the Duke of Newcastle, and judging from the noise in Parliament over the question of his supplies, he must have told his political friends as well.130 Winchilsea was subjected to the indignity of obeying the commands of one of his admirals as conveyed to him by the Secretary of State. And the reputation of the Admiralty suffered together with that of its First Lord. Why did the Admiralty put up with it? Toward the end of 1743 Mathews's dispatches contained repeated threats to re­ sign. But the Board was in a difficult position, for it did not want to appear to have encouraged him to resign, perhaps because he openly threatened to lay bare, when he came home, what he conceived to be the administration's mismanagement. Besides, it is worth putting up with complaints from com­ manders in the field, if they are energetically pursuing their assigned objectives. However, it is obvious that the Board should have done something; it was no secret that Mathews and his second-in-command, Richard Lestock, did not get along, and one of them should have been removed from the Mediterranean.131 But instead of making a hard decision, the Admiralty settled for a timid compromise: William Rowley, senior captain in Mathews's squadron, was promoted to rearadmiral, and commissions were drawn up for him and Lestock to command the ships in the Mediterranean; the commissions were sent to Mathews, who was directed to deliver them, if he chose to quit, or destroy them, if he chose to stay.132 He stayed. Thus the Admiralty, under Winchilsea's leadership, threw away its chance to mend the disunity of command that brought on the fiasco off Toulon. But even before the full details of the Toulon battle reached London, the Admiralty fell into complete degrada­ tion. In February 1744 the government was alarmed by the threat of a French invasion. After four years of complaining about not having any power to direct the fleet, Sir John Norris got his way. In the emergency the Cabinet Council gave him 130 See Pari. Hist., xm, 702-704. 131 See Richmond, 1, 197. 132 Adm. 1/381, 3 Jan. 1744.

2. The London Offices full control of the fleet without interference of any sort from the Admiralty, and in effect the powers of Admiralty were transferred to him. All the ships and seamen in England went under his control; only Norris could order courts-martial in home waters. The Board was powerless to assign cruisers and convoys to protect trade, and Norris at sea had neither the time nor the necessary information to do it. The arrangement was utterly unworkable, as their Lordships pointed out in a memorial to the king "representing in a full manner the prejudice such an unheard of & Extraordinary Power is to his Majesty's Service, & Indignity to their Lordships Commission, and even Impossibility of its being executed by Sr. John Norris."133 Though the Cabinet Council refused to admit any error, the powers were quickly restored to the office in White­ hall.134 In December 1744, Winchilsea fell from office with Earl Granville. Granville had had the support of the king, but not the Commons. A new, "broad-bottomed" ministry assembled, designed to rally as many factions as possible to the govern­ ment and to the war effort.135 One of the factions brought in was that controlled by John Russell, Fourth Duke of Bedford, and Lord Gower. Bedford's price for separating himself from the opposition was the Admiralty; he was attracted by sea affairs, though he had no special qualifications for conducting them. He was only thirtyfive, but his social rank and the magnitude of his wealth had scarcely any equal. As to his character and abilities, his con­ temporaries were agreed to a remarkable extent. Lord Hervey said that he "had knowledge and was not sensible he wanted parts."136 To Lord Hardwicke he seemed "an unwieldy ma­ chine; he has parts, but no temper."137 In Lord Chesterfield's view he possessed "a head so wrong-turned, and so invincibly obstinate, that the share of parts which he had was of little 133 Adm. 3/48, 17 March 1744. Richmond prints the letter in full (11, 87-88). 134 Adm. 3/48, 24 March 1744. 135 Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, pp. 236-241. 136 Hervey, Memoirs, p. 247. 137 P. C. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence

Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor

of Philip Yorke, Earl of

(3 vol., Cambridge, 1913), 1, 630.

2. The London Offices use to him, and very troublesome to others."138 In sum, he had brains, but not heart; though intelligent and cultivated, he was obstinate and unreliable. The Duke of Richmond wrote to Newcastle: "As for His Grace of Bedford being at the head of the Admiralty, I own I am very sorry for it, for I look upon him to be vain proud & wrong headed, 8c I fear you will have a great deal of plague with him."139 But there was more felicity than Richmond could have foreseen. One place on the Board was reserved for a flag officer, and whatever the political rea­ sons that prompted the selection of Rear-Admiral George Anson to fill it, they were insignificant compared to the pro­ fessional ones. Anson had just completed his famous circum­ navigation of the world. He was immensely popular, but more important, he was very able and very dedicated to the naval service. Bedford, with all his shortcomings, had the wit to put his trust in Anson, and did so eagerly, for he was preoccupied by other interests. Bedford loved Woburn—at this time he was building the great house that stands today—and he spent a good deal of time at Bath. He was not indolent, for his corre­ spondence with the other members of his Board, often written in his own hand,140 shows clearly that he never released his grip on the powers of his office. But his manner of doing business in absentia annoyed everyone, including the king and Newcastle. When the Earl of Chesterfield resigned as Secre­ tary of State for the Northern Department in 1748, Newcastle reluctantly shifted Bedford to the vacant Secretaryship (where his frequent absences proved much more vexing) and in­ stalled Lord Sandwich at the head of the Admiralty Board.141 The Junior Lords and. the Secretary The First Lord of the Admiralty's patent was no different from those of his colleagues, but his authority, although it was purely conventional, could not be challenged.142 An observer in is8 Characters by Lord Chesterfield contrasted . . .(1778), p. 51. 13» Addl. MSS. 32703, folio 464. «0 in 1747 Bedford complained of this to Anson: "Besides my being obliged to write with my own hands all my letters, quite tires me out;" Addl. MSS. 15955, *47· in See Yorke, Hardwicke, 1, 661. «2 Ehrman, p. 556.

2. The London Offices 1746 concluded: "The first Lord or Commissioner of the Ad­ miralty is in effect Lord High Admiral, having the supreme Direction of the Board, and disposes Affairs at his Pleasure, except that no Orders or Commissions are valid sign'd by him alone, it being necessary for two or more to sign with him; notwithstanding which he is not to be controul'd by them."143 The composition of Boards of Admiralty during the war of 1739—!748 reflected this circumstance. Most of the men chosen to serve as junior Lords of the Admiralty had no particular qualifications for administering naval affairs; they owed their appointments to the various factors that contributed to politi­ cal success—birth, royal favor, "interest," and ability—and they served because the salary was £1000 (the First Lord got an additional £2000 out of funds realized on the sale of old stores and provisions) and because, in terms of prestige and influence, a seat at the Admiralty was second only to a seat at the Treasury. They were invariably members of Parliament. A few had once been sea officers who, for one reason or another, preferred life ashore,144 and there was always at least one active flag officer on each Board; when Philip Cavendish, the only admiral on Lord Winchilsea's Board died, he was replaced by Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy. Apparently the notion that there should be more than one admiral on the Board was not universally entertained at the time. In 1751, Commissioner Hills of the Sick and Wounded commented: "Lord Sandwich and Trentham quitted the Admiralty and by this Lord Anson becomes first in that commission and the vacancies filled up with admirals Rowley and Boscawen. How three Admirals will agree, only time will show."145 Aside from reserving a place for an experienced sea officer, there did not seem to be any need for selecting the junior members with care. Unlike the Commissioners of the Navy and the Victualling, these men did not specialize and their duties were not defined; responsibility for various aspects of Admiralty affairs was not divided among them. Instead, their

"3 The Laws, Ordinances, and Institutions, n, §89. Any three signatures validated an order. m The only former sea officers on the list in Table 4 were Lord Archibald Hamilton and Lord Vere Beauclerk. 145 Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, p. 327.

2. The London Offices TABLE 4. The Lords of the Admiralty, 1739-1748 13 March 1738 Sir Charles Wager, Admiral of the White; Sir Thomas Lyttelton; Sir Thomas Frankland; Thomas Clutterbuck; (Lord) Harry Powlett; John Campbell; (Lord) Vere Beauclerk. 5 May 1741 Sir Charles Wager, Admiral of the White; Sir Thomas Frankland; (Lord) Harry Powlett; John Campbell; (Lord) Vere Beauclerk; (Lord Glenorchy) Sir John Campbell; Edward Thompson. jp March 1742 Daniel, Earl of Winchilsea and Nottingham; John Cockburne; (Lord) Archibald Hamilton; Charles, Lord Baltimore; Admiral Philip Cavendish; George Lee; John Trevor. 13 December 1743 Daniel, Earl of Winchilsea; John Cockburne; (Lord) Archibald Hamilton; Charles, Lord Baltimore; George Lee; Admiral Sir Charles Hardy; John Phillipson. 27 December 1744 John, Duke of Bedford; John, Earl of Sandwich; (Lord) Archibald Hamilton; (Lord) Vere Beauclerk; Charles, Lord Baltimore; Admiral George Anson; George Grenville. 25 April 1745 John, Duke of Bedford; John, Earl of Sandwich; (Lord) Archibald Hamilton; (Lord) Vere Beauclerk; Admiral George Anson; George Grenville; Henry Bilson Legge. 25 February 1746 John, Duke of Bedford; John, Earl of Sandwich; (Lord) Vere Beauclerk; Admiral George Anson; George Grenville; Henry Bilson Legge; William, Viscount Barrington. 27 June 1746 John, Duke of Bedford; John, Earl of Sandwich; (Lord) Vere Beauclerk; Admiral George Anson; George Grenville; William, Viscount Barrington; (Lord Duncannon) William Ponsonby. 23 June 1747 John, Duke of Bedford; John, Earl of Sandwich; (Lord) Vere Beauclerk; Admiral George Anson; William, Viscount Barrington; (Lord Duncannon) William Ponsonby; Welbore Ellis. 26 February 1748 John, Earl of Sandwich; (Lord) Vere Beauclerk; George, Lord Anson; William, Viscount Barrington; (Lord Duncannon) William Ponsonby; Welbore Ellis; John Stanhope. This Table is based on the Patent Rolls. Courtesy titles in parenthesis.

74

2. The London Offices functions were merely advisory and supplementary. This does not mean that the junior Lords had nothing to do other than to attend Board meetings occasionally. Lord Vere Beauclerk actually complained of the burdens of the job. We need not take him at his word—he was begging Newcastle to get him a peerage—but his lament cannot have been a complete fabrica­ tion: I can't help reflecting that it is now near nine Year since I was first a Lord of the Admiralty, and during the time I have been in must beg leave to refer my self to Your Grace for the share I have, and must bear, in this laborious Office, I can't help also reflecting that after so many years fatigue and anxiety, which is inseparable from the employment, I may by many various and probable, tho' I hope distant, accidents be just where I was nine Years ago, whilst others are advanc'd . . . to more profitable and easy employments. .146

But it is hard to know what he did, indeed what any of them did, for this is not the kind of thing the official records tell us. The Admiralty minutes express the collective decision of the Board. Occasionally we are given glimpses—Beauclerk going over the transport accounts with the Clerk of the Acts,147 or waiting on the king to hear his pleasure on Admiralty recom­ mendations and requests.148 It is evident that they met and issued orders in emergencies; night meetings were not unusual, and after September 1745 there were always clerks on hand at night and on Sundays.149 Probably matters of personnel ate up the bulk of their time. Trying to get support for one's friends, or those recommended by one's friends, for appointment and promotion can be very time-consuming.150 In addition there lie Addl. MSS. 32709, folios 330-331, 16 Dec. 1746. Beauclerk was the third son of Charles Beauclerk, 1st Duke of St. Albans, who was the illegitimate son of Charles II by Eleanor Gwynn. He left the sea for the Navy Board in 173a and in 1738 was given a place on the Admiralty Board (Adm. 3/43, 15 May 1738). Newcastle did not openly question Beauclerk's "dili­ gence in the Admiralty Office" (Addl. MSS. 32716, folio 190). 147 Adm. 3/52, 30 Dec. 1745. 148 E.g. Woburn MSS. xin, folios 52, 61, 10 Sept., 13 Sept. 1746. us Adm. 3/51, 9 Sept. 1745; Adm. 3/54, 9 June 1746. Two clerks were ordered to attend every evening in 1739, but apparently the practice fell into disuse until 1745; see Adm. 3/43, 25 Sept. 1739. is» E.g. ibid., folio 58, 12 Sept. 1746. Evidence of this sort of activity is abundant.

2. The London Offices was the business of granting leave to pursers, gunners, chap lains, minor officials, and so on.151 For obvious reasons, matters of personnel could not be left to the clerks. The junior members must have shared in the hearing of petitions, and in listening to, soothing, and perhaps fobbing off the many merchants who came to the Board desiring commerce protec­ tion.182 In sum, they probably spent a lot of time with those tasks which senior officials know to be beneath them, but which they do personally, either out of respect for the value of good public relations or because the tasks are too delicate or irregular to entrust to someone else. In the mid-nineteenth century Sir James Graham, who had been First Lord in the early 1830¾ (just before the Admiralty Board absorbed the responsibilities of the Navy Board), was asked what the duties of the junior Lords had been in those days. He answered: "Very much what Mr. Canning described to be the duties of Junior Lords of the Treasury, 'to make a House, to keep a House, and to cheer the minister.' "153 Still, we can be sure that their primary duty—whether or not it consumed the bulk of their time—was advisory: to read the correspondence and attend the Board meetings. Naturally, the importance of a junior Lord in this respect depended on his energy and talents. It also depended on the degree to which the First Lord wished to remain independent of his colleagues. In trying to assess the influence of these junior members of the Board, one must be particularly careful not to be per­ suaded by the abundance or paucity of letters and memo­ randa; if the junior members influenced the First Lord, they generally did it in conversation. About the internal function­ ing of Sir Charles Wager's Admiralty Board we know next to nothing. Since Sir Charles was himself a sea officer, it is reason­ able to assume that he kept his own counsel; when he needed assistance, it is likely that he obtained most of it from his experienced Secretary, Burchett, and his political lieutenant, lei The Admiralty minutes record countless grants of leave, promotions, appointments, etc., but they do not indicate who made the decisions. 152 Again, there are many instances in the Admiralty minutes of mer­ chants calling on the Admiralty and being heard by the Board. And see Woburn MSS. xv, folio 20, 10 Nov. 1746. 153 Parliamentary Papers, 1861, v, 132.

2. The London Offices Francis Gashry. But we cannot be certain. About Lord Winchilsea's administration we know even less, but we may pre­ sume that harmony did not prevail at the meetings of his Board, since it was alleged that two members—Admiral Caven­ dish and Lord Baltimore—refused to affix their signatures to some of the First Lord's orders.154But because the Duke of Bedford was so often absent from the meetings of his Board, there exists a substantial body of documentary evidence indi­ cating that his subordinates were active, informed, and influ­ ential. But of course we cannot infer that this situation per­ tained to all Boards, for it is certain that the important roles played by the junior members under Bedford were largely the consequence of His Grace's extraordinary method of conduct­ ing Admiralty affairs. The preserved correspondence indicates that important Admiralty decisions during Bedford's administration were taken by a triumvirate consisting of Bedford, Lord Sandwich, and Rear-Admiral Anson.155 Whereas Bedford's attitude to­ ward the business of his office was at best lukewarm, Sand­ wich's was earnest and enthusiastic. In 1745 Sandwich was only twenty-seven. In a sense he was serving an apprenticeship as a junior member, and it was his constant fear that Bedford would prematurely resign (as he often spoke of doing)156 and thus dash his hopes of succeeding the powerful Duke as First Lord, for without Bedford in the government Sandwich's chances for high office were negligible. As a consequence of these circumstances, Bedford was content to let Sandwich conduct the routine business of the Admiralty with the understanding that all important decisions were to be referred to him by post.157 And Bedford made it clear that he did not wish to be circumvented when it came to making appoint154 Pari. Hist., χπι, 703. 155 This is made clear in Barrow, Life of Anson, p. 107, and the Woburn MSS., ix-xx, confirm it. Modern writers have usually taken no notice of Lord Sandwich's role. ise See Woburn MSS. xi, folio 7, 23 Dec. 1745; xv, folio 74, 13 Dec. 1746; B. Dobree, ed., The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield (6 vol., 1932), m, 834. is? In October 1745 Sandwich wrote to Bedford: "I have I think told your Grace everything that occurred in our Naval Capacity, & shall con­ tinue by every post to inform you of what passes, & to apply to you for your advice & directions" (Woburn MSS. x, folio 111).

2. The London Offices ments. Once he rebuked Sandwich on this matter, and in reply Sandwich wrote: "I believe that my brethren at the board will do me the justice. . . to say, that I have never appointed any pursers without first knowing whether your Grace had any engagements of your own; after which I have allways made a point of dividing the recommendations as near as possible in an equal proportion among the rest of the Lords, & have by no means given the preference upon those occasions to myself."158 Plainly, Sandwich was not to consider himself as acting First Lord. Neither nobleman had much knowledge of sea affairs— though it was not part of Bedford's nature to admit it—and both relied heavily on the advice of Anson. Just how quickly Bedford put his trust in Anson cannot be determined. Al­ though Sandwich corresponded frequently with Bedford dur­ ing the year 1745, the first preserved letter from Anson among the Bedford papers is dated October 17, 1745, and the admiral apparently did not become a regular correspondent until the summer of 1746.159 This in itself means little, for early in 1745 Bedford's attendance at Board meetings was relatively good.160 However, it is almost certain that within a year of assuming office, the Duke placed full confidence in Anson's judgment on professional matters. The Duchess of Bedford was probably echoing her husband's opinion when she wrote in June 1746: "Mr. Anson tells me you are at Berwick my Dear Love & I allways believe all he says upon Sea affairs."161 Moreover, it is significant that Sandwich was at pains to emphasize to the Duke that, if he were appointed to sit at the head of the Admiralty, he would treat Anson, not merely as an advisor, but as a partner: If I am absent, Mr. Anson will then act as First Lord, and will be agreeable, I dare say, in that station, both to the King and his servants; and upon the footing he and I are together there can, I am persuaded, never subsist any jealousy between us, but, on the 158 Ibid., xvi, folio 25, Jan. 1747. 159 Ibid,., x, folio 106. 160 Adm. 3/49-51, passim. iei Woburn MSS. XII, folio 54. At this time Bedford was embarked with his regiment and headed north to join the Duke of Cumberland in bat­ tling the Young Pretender.

2. The London Offices contrary, a perfect union both in our private and public designs; . . . and I have no doubt that he can have any objection to acting with me in this capacity, for neither he or any one else can in reality ever consider it as acting under me.1®2

This close attachment to Sandwich and Bedford suited Anson. In June of 1747 Anson electioneered on Bedford's behalf,163 and it appears that he did not confine his advice to naval subjects: "I am sorry you are apprehensive of a farther opposi­ tion at Bedford, if the Breach you lately made there is not sufficient to carry the place by storm you must do as Louendalk did at Bergen ob Zoom and proceed by Sapping and Bribing, the latter you have been so little used too that I think you should try your hand now, as you may probably have some occasion for it upon another Election."164 As for his attachment to Sandwich, Anson made it clear that he would gladly serve under him and hastily silenced rumors that he would resign in the event that Sandwich succeeded Bedford: I have long known that your Grace intended to leave Ld. Sandwich your Successour. I must own he is the only Person after your Grace that I would act with and cannot help declaring that ever since your Grace made me acquainted with him I have had the greatest esteem and friendship for him, not so much for his Parts which are equalled by very few but from a thorough conviction that he will upon all occasions act upon the same honest Principles for the good of his Country that Your Grace has ever acted.165

Administration by triumvirate was more Sandwich's idea than Bedford's. Henry Legge assiduously cultivated favor with Bedford, and the Duke was apparently receptive;166 further­ more Bedford entrusted a good deal of business to Lord Vere Beauclerk. Sandwich, on the other hand, was suspicious of Legge,167 and knew Beauclerk to be his political enemy, for Sandwich was extremely anxious about the possibility that Beauclerk, who was attached to Newcastle, would be made ιβ2 Lord John Russell, ed., Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford (3 vol., 184a), 1, 192-193. 163 Woburn MSS. xvn, folios 41, 45, 21 June, 23 June 1747. 164 Ibid., xviii, folio 12, 17 Sept. 1747. 165 Ibid., xv, folio 74, 13 Dec. 1746. See also Bedford Correspondence, i, 319, 324-325· 166 Bedford Correspondence, I, 37-187, passim. 167 Ibid., i, 361-362.

2. The London Offices First Lord. His friend, Lord Chesterfield, tried to reassure him and told him that Beauclerk was out of the question.168 In any event, Sandwich's hopes of excluding the other members of the Board from important deliberations could not possibly be fulfilled. The members of the triumvirate were too often absent from London: Bedford was away at Woburn or Bath or with his regiment; Anson was often at sea with the western squadron; and Sandwich, much to his annoyance, spent a good part of his time in office at the Hague, where as special envoy he was in charge of negotiating the peace treaty. Although Sandwich admitted that he had "no title to expect to be con­ sulted in any appointment of OfiScers while [he was] away against [his] inclination for a time in another channel of business,"1ββ he continued to write to Bedford frequently on Admiralty matters and hopefully advised the Duke to be wary of everyone but Anson.170 But under the circumstances, as Sandwich well knew, power was bound to be shared by the other members of the Board. In fact, so many Board members were absent from London in September 1746 that there was difficulty in assembling enough to carry on everyday business. A letter from Lord Barrington to Bedford gives us a picture of the Admiralty Board on vacation: "Lord Duncannon goes into Derbyshire the 30th of this month and I have promised to see that there is a Board that day, & forward, till his return. To keep my word, and take care the Service does not suffer, I must come to Town the 29th. except anything should bring your Grace there about that time, in which case I beg the honour of a Line to inform me how long I may delay my Journey, A Few days of the Country at this time of the year would be the greatest favour."171 In April 1747, Anson, who was with the Channel fleet, wrote to Bedford: "I am sorry Your grace has so much trouble at the Board."172 And indeed there had recently been serious trouble when two junior members, Lord Barrington and George Grenville, had deliberately misrepresented the Board's proceedings lee Chesterfield Letters, m, 834, 865. 169 Woburn MSS. xvi, folio 23, 31 Jan. 1747 new style. 170 Bedford Correspondence, 1, 207. 171 Woburn MSS. xni, folio 74, 17 Sept. 1746; see also xrv, folio 80, 3 Nov. 1746.

1'"Ibid., xvi, folio 63, April 1747.

2. The London Offices to the Duke, in trying to get favorable orders issued to their relatives who were captains.173 But of course Bedford's careless superintendence invited trouble. And yet, in spite of this, and in spite of jealousy and suspicion among the junior Lords, the Board that came into power in December 1744 was, on the whole, administratively successful. For Bedford was an extremely powerful politician and was not afraid to step on well-connected people. In important matters his own decisions prevailed, and those decisions were often based on the sound advice of Lord Anson. If it is difficult to assess the role of the junior Lords of the Admiralty in general terms, it is equally difficult to assess that of the Secretary, for the two roles were interrelated; as the importance of the junior Lords increased, that of the Secre­ tary tended to decrease, and vice versa. This may be best illustrated by an extreme case: when the powers of the Admi­ ralty were in the hands of a Lord High Admiral instead of a Board, the Secretary of the Admiralty, as sole assistant, en­ joyed tremendous power and influence. Between 170a and 1708 Josicih Burchett was placed in this happy situation, but for most of his career he could not pretend to the powers that Pepys had possessed.174 Nevertheless, Burchett was a good deal more than an office manager, and if his role as Secretary placed him subordinate to the Board, he was also "indepen­ dent of its fortunes."175 His predecessors, Pepys and Phineas Bowles, had fallen from power with their patrons, but when Admiral Russell, to whom Burchett had been flag secretary, left the Board in 1699, Burchett stayed on. Secretaries still owed their appointments to political favor. It was impossible to rise to this post within the clerical ranks of the Admiralty Office. The clerks of the Office were assigned particular responsibilities,176 and they rose by seniority,177 but "8 See Barrow, Life of Anson, pp. 157-160. 174 James, MM., XXIII, 488. 175 Ehrman, p. 561. "β it is evident that they were assigned particular duties in the war of 1739-^48; see Adm. 3/43, 85 Sept. 1739 and Adm. 3/49, 15 Feb. 1745. However, the earliest full listing of the various assigned duties that I know of is that printed in G. F. James, "The Admiralty Establishment, 1759," 177 Bull. Inst. Hist. Res., xvi (1938), 24-27. E.g. Adm. 3/47, 18 June 1743.

8l

2. The London Offices they could not reasonably aspire to any office higher than that of first clerk. The Secretaryship was beyond their grasp,178 and it seems that from 1751 on it was no longer possible for them to rise even to the first clerkship, for Lord Anson in that year "made his secretary first clerk at the Admiralty office, over clerk's heads who had been 24 and 26 years in the office."179 For the ambitious the best course was to try to get to sea as a purser.180 Thomas Corbett, who was joint Secretary with Burchett in 1741-1742 and became Secretary upon the old man's retire­ ment, had been Lord Torrington's flag secretary before being brought to the Admiralty by Torrington as Deputy Secretary in 1727.181 John Clevland, who succeeded Corbett in 1748, came to the Admiralty as Second Secretary in 1746, probably as a result of Anson's influence.182 It may be noted that three different expedients were employed in order to provide an assistant for the Secretary during the war of 1739-1748: first there were joint Secretaries, then a Deputy Secretary, and ITS A single exception: In 1744 Robert Osborn, First Clerk, was promoted to Deputy Secretary at a salary of £600 (plus fees). But in 1746 he and John Clevland changed places; Clevland came to the Admiralty Office, and Osborn went to the Navy Board as Clerk of the Acts. It is significant that Osborn very definitely considered this a move downhill. See Adm. 3/49, 17 Nov. 1744; Adm. 3/55, 31 July 1746; Woburn MSS. xrv, folio 3, 6 Oct. 1746. 1T9 William Allix to John Russell, 14 May 1751, Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, p. 323. 180 See Adm. 3/48, 7 Aug. 1744. ISi Adm. 3/31, 19 May 1718. 182 See James, Bull. Inst. Hist. Res., xvi, 25. Mr. James states that Clev­ land was helped by Anson, and although this may have been so in 1746, the question remains: Who was responsible for Clevland's nomination to the Admiralty seat at Saltash in 1741 and his subsequent rise from Clerk of the Cheque at Plymouth to the Navy Board in 1743 (a big step), both events occurring when Anson was on the other side of the world? I have been unable to discover an answer. Clevland's career has been traced by an unknown researcher as follows: Born in 1706, eldest son of Capt. William Clevland, Naval Commissioner (Comptroller of the Storekeepers' Accounts, 1718-1732); appointed clerk to his father, 26 Dec. 1723; head clerk in his father's office, 26 Dec. 1726 (note the precise three-year interval); Clerk of the Cheque at Plymouth, 1730; Clerk of the Acts, 3 April 1743; Second Sec­ retary of the Admiralty, 4 Aug. 1746; M.P. for Sandwich, 1747-1761. See Admiralty Library MS. 127. For Cleveland's later career see Namier, Struc­ ture of Politics, pp. 40-42.

2. The London Offices finally a Second Secretary.183 And although it might be sup­ posed that these assistants were appointed to enable a new Board of Admiralty to circumvent the appointee of an earlier Board, the dates of the appointments do not bear this out. The true reasons were those given by the Admiralty: both Burchett and Corbett were too old to cope with the wartime business of the Office.184 As long as the Secretary remained fit to conduct the business of the Office, his influence and importance remained, regard­ less of changes in the political complexion of the Board. For example, in matters of patronage it appears that the Duke of Bedford treated the requests of Corbett and Clevland in much the same manner as he treated those of the junior members of the Board,185 and we may reasonably presume that during the administrations of Wager and Winchilsea the Secretaries were even more influential. It seems, then, that Secretaries of the Admiralty got the best of both worlds: they enjoyed a share in Admiralty patronage and as senior government officials they commanded a measure of political influence—yet, they were not troubled by the political difficulties that periodically swept their superiors from office.186 The Admiralty and the Navy Board

The state of relations between the Admiralty and the Navy Board was frequently a matter for concern, notwithstanding the Admiralty's clear-cut constitutional supremacy. There were two reasons for this: first, compared with the Navy Board, whose administrative responsibilities had been ac­ quired over the course of two centuries, the Admiralty Board was an upstart; second, while Admiralty Lords came and went according to the caprices of politics, Naval Commissioners enjoyed permanent tenure. In sum, the Admiralty's problem was a familiar administrative problem, that of the amateur being required to direct the activities of the expert. 183 For details and salaries, see Adm. 3/45, 2 Dec. 1741, 23 Feb. 174s; Adm. 3/55, 31 July, 14 Oct. 1746. 184 Adm. 3/45, 27 Oct. 1741; Adm. 3/55, 31 July 1746. 185 E.g. Woburn MSS. ix, folio 116, 18 April 1745. 186 Cf. Namier, Structure of Politics, pp. 41-42. The Secretary of the Admiralty invariably sat as member of Parliament for one of the Admi­ ralty boroughs.

S3

2. The London Offices Prior to 1689 there had not been much cause for conflict. The Lord High Admiral was the king's minister for sea affairs; his instrument for conducting them was the Navy Board, and his secretary was continually in touch with its members and their activities. In fact, during the reign of Charles II it was thought advisable for the Lord High Admiral "to visit and sit with the principal officers and commissioners of the navy" at least once a month.187 But during the reigns of Charles II and James II the navy's business grew at an unprecedented rate. The industrious Samuel Pepys, as Clerk of the Acts, had organized and rationalized the activities of the Navy Office. When he became Secretary of the Admiralty, he saw clearly the need to establish control at many levels of administration, and in order to do this it was necessary to set up a separate office with its own clerks, its own records, and its own daily routine.188 However, the bulk of the new business undertaken by the Admiralty Office had to do with personnel, and was not directly connected with Navy Board activities. As the Admi­ ralty became increasingly preoccupied by its own administra­ tive concerns, the two Offices fell more and more out of touch with one another, and, as one might expect, out of sympathy.189 Furthermore, as the business of the navy increased in size and complexity the Admiralty found it increasingly difficult either to appreciate the Navy Board's problems or to particularize its inefficiencies. In the main, the Admiralty Lords had to judge by results, and, of course, the Navy Board often failed to meet expectations.190 There were two approaches the Admiralty could follow in trying to solve the problem. One, of course, was to learn more about the Navy Board's business—its technical problems, its accounting methods, its administrative rules and conventions —and to insist on regular and detailed reports of its activities. It is sometimes not easy for executive bodies to get from sub­ ordinates full and candid reports of problems and difficulties. Consequently, the Admiralty tended to rely heavily on the 187 Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 36-37. 188 Ehrman, pp. 195-197. 189 Murray, MM., xxiv, 210. 190 For the disputes that took place during the war of the Spanish Suc­ cession see Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 11-12.

2. The London Offices admirals whom it appointed to superintend the preparation of squadrons for sea. By 1739 the presence of a commander-inchief whenever and wherever ships were fitting out in quantity had become a matter of routine, and during the war such admirals were almost constantly in attendance at Portsmouth and Plymouth. More important, each admiral served long enough to become thoroughly familiar with the job; for ex­ ample, during the war the command at Portsmouth was held predominantly by two men who did almost nothing else.191 Although the principal function of the commander-in-chief was to see that captains diligently applied themselves to the preparation of their ships, he was also in a position to observe dockyard progress and report shortcomings. But it must be stressed that his command was of the ships only; he had no authority ashore. The other approach was through the Admiralty's power of appointment. In the seventeenth century the subordinate Boards had had much more freedom to appoint and promote in their departments. For example, the Surveyor formerly appointed the dockyard Clerks of the Survey, but in the eighteenth century his patent included a clause which ex­ pressly denied him power to do this.192 The Victualling Com­ missioners formerly had a clause in their patent permitting them to appoint their Agents, but in the eighteenth century the clause was omitted.193 By the middle of the eighteenth century, although some appointments were technically "in the gift of" the Navy or Victualling Board, in practice every appointment in the naval organization was made according to the wishes of the First Lord of the Admiralty. His recommendation was tantamount to an order. The Duke of Bedford expressed him­ self on this matter in 1745: "I think myself justified in what 191 See the Admiralty minutes generally, and particularly Adm. 3/44, 85 Sept., 11 Nov. 1740; Adm. 3/46, 31 Aug. 1742; Adm. 3/47, 19 April 1743; Adm. 3/57, 17 July, 14 Aug. 1747. Admirals Philip Cavendish (until 1742) and James Steuart (after 1742) usually resided at Portsmouth. Occasionally, in slack times, the powers of commander-in-chief were vested in the resident Commissioner (e.g. Adm. 3/45, to July, 21 Nov. 1741; Adm. 3/48, 9 April 1744; Adm. 3/57, 27 July 1747). From 1745 to 1747 there was usually a commander-in-chief at the Nore. 192 Corbett MSS. xvii, folio 3; see also Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 18-19. 198 Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 5.

2. The London Offices I have now laid down, as I think by my Post, I am answerable both to the King and the Publick for the conduct of the inferior Boards, and as long as I continue in this station, I shall expect that my nomination . . . shall be accepted of."194 On this occasion the Navy Board had not challenged his prerogative; instead Bedford was objecting to the failure of Secretary Corbett to consult him before forwarding a recom­ mendation to the Navy Board.195 This development had ad­ vantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages were that it opened up the naval organization to political patronage, and it weakened the authority of the Navy and Victualling Com­ missioners over their departments, for it must be borne in mind that in general the navy could only reward, not punish; it was not customary for naval officials to be dismissed from office except for flagrant abuse or neglect. Thomas Corbett thought the Victualling Commissioners should have the power of appointing Agents; it "would make their Orders better respected; whereas being appointed by the Ld. High AdmL they regard only the Authority that made them, and little look on themselves as Officers of the Victualling, and are apt to slight their Orders."196 The advantages were that it helped to centralize authority in a naval organization that badly needed it; and if it invited political partonage, it also invited political control, which is what constitutional govern­ ment demanded; in another political atmosphere this control could be used by the king and the public to reform the navy. Besides, there is no indication that the subordinate Boards would have exercised the power to appoint and promote with more concern for the good of the service than the Admiralty.197 As we shall see in the following chapter, admirals argued, on the same grounds that Corbett argued for the Victualling Commissioners, that they should have more power to promote officers under them, the Admiralty less, and yet their appoint­ ments do not appear to have been particularly distinguished, 194 Woburn MSS. x, folio 43, 15 Aug. 1745. 195 ibid., xvii, folio 72, 4 Aug. 1747. iee Corbett MSS. xrv, folio 5. 197 Of course, any system could be abused. For the Navy Board's very interesting complaints to Lord Sandwich in 1781, see Laughton,

Papers, 11,

11-30.

Barham

2. The London Offices or clear of the influence of patronage. The effect of dispersing appointing power among lesser authorities would have been merely to disperse patronage. The argument for doing this was in its implications an argument against strong, central government. The Admiralty could hire, but not fire. A First Lord, if he held office long enough, could gradually fill the civil depart­ ments with his own appointees. Admittedly, this was a slow process. However, it was not necessary for the First Lord to replace subordinates in order to establish his authority. For he might raise or diminish a Naval Commissioner's influence by favoring or ignoring his recommendations on appoint­ ments. Still, much depended on time. It was important for a First Lord to be competent, energetic, and informed, but his influence over the subordinate Boards, and especially the Navy Board, which could not forget its former status, was to an extent proportional to his length (or anticipated length) of tenure at the Admiralty. Between 1714 and 1739 the Admiralty managed to improve relations with the Navy Board and establish closer control over its activities. Peace and political stability favored this. During the period 1717-1739 the office of First Lord changed hands only twice; the Earl of Berkeley, Lord Torrington, and Sir Charles Wager had the time, ability, and inclination to apply themselves to the task of mastering the civil affairs of the navy.198 Thomas Corbett's voluminous and detailed collec­ tion of precedents is palpable evidence of the Admiralty's intention of becoming better informed.199 The two Boards, instead of drifting farther apart during this peacetime period, drew closer together, not because the Admiralty made any concessions to the Navy Board, but because the First Lord was in a position to consolidate his power over it. The spirit of cooperation that resulted is evident from the frequency with which the Admiralty and Navy Boards met jointly; it is not an exaggeration to say that from 1714 to 1744 virtually 198 Moreover, Wager had been Comptroller of the Navy from 1715 to 1718. 199 it is probable that Corbett collected the information for the use of his patron, Torrington. For the dating of the Corbett MSS. see p. 533.

2. The London Offices every major problem, and every important change in policy, that affected the affairs of the Navy Office was discussed in a joint meeting of the two boards.200 But this spirit of coopera­ tion prevailed in spite of the system, not because the system was set up in a way that served to encourage it. The adminis­ trative barriers to mutual understanding remained: Naval Commissioners did not, like modern civil servants, feel obliged to obey unquestioningly the dictates of their superiors, and yet they could not be dismissed from office. It was the system that was at fault, but just as the disunifying effects of that system could be overcome by personal loyalties, so disunity, when it came, was bound to appear as a clash between person­ alities. Disunity followed abruptly upon the accession of the Duke of Bedford to power at the Admiralty. A new generation had taken over. Bedford was thirty-five years of age; Sandwich was but twenty-seven; Legge was thirty-seven;201 although Anson was forty-eight, his professional outlook had been conditioned by the current war, not by one which for him was no more than a childhood memory. On the other hand, the Navy Board, led by two aging survivors from an earlier era, had remained substantially unchanged in personnel and outlook for more than a decade. Sir Charles Wager had been a con­ temporary of these old men and had worked with them com­ fortably; Lord Winchilsea had not possessed the confidence to challenge them; but the men who took their seats at the Admiralty in December 1744 were bent on reform and innova­ tion. They were confident, youthful, and impatient, and their leader was a headstrong nobleman who, up to this time, had cast himself as a critic of the government's naval policies. Within three months the new Admiralty Board's meager stock of patience was almost exhausted. In February 1745 their Lordships were irritated by the Navy Board's delays in getting the Medway river sounded and dredged, and in April they directed the Navy Board to conclude a contract with 200 This is based on a careful reading of the Admiralty minutes for the period. 201 Legge did not join the Board until April 1745, and served for only a year, but it appears from his letters to Bedford that he was very active during his brief stay.

2. The London Offices Messers. Pantin and Machin for the purpose. The Naval Com­ missioners advised the Admiralty that this kind of order would set a dangerous precedent and open the door to political interference in contracting. The Admiralty apparently thought the advice insubordinate. The Commissioners pro­ tested that they had been misunderstood, that they had not had "the least Idea that it would be Construed as a Reflection on their Lordships Order." They added: "It hath been a Mortification to Us and a very severe one to find that our opinion hath not had the Weight with their Lordships We flattered Ourselves it would have."202 More severe mortifica­ tions were to follow. Throughout 1745 the Admiralty grew increasingly "weary of the perpetual Complaints they re­ ceived] from Captains for their Stores after cleaning."203 Their Lordships did not mince words. In March they were "much dissatisfied at such preposterous proceedings in the Affairs of [Sheerness] Yard."204 And their disgust with the Surveyor, Sir Jacob Ackworth was limitless, for Sir Jacob had not only failed to restore efficiency to the dockyards, but also had managed to obstruct the radical changes in ship design that they had hopefully put forward shortly after entering office.205 In March 1746, Henry Legge wrote to the Duke of Bedford: . . . we hope Your Grace don't suppose, notwithstanding any dis­ course that might have pass'd upon that Subject that we should proceed to a step of Such Consequence as appointing a joint-Sur­ veyor without yr Graces presence, . . . I am the more encouraged to send My verdict because I find it agrees entirely with the Opinion of Ld. Sandwich Se Mr. Anson . . . I shall therefore take the Liberty to use the Particle We. We are then extreamly of Opinion & agree in wishing that Sr. Jacob should retire with every Circumstance that can make his old age easy 8c happy, but retain no Influence in Naval Architecture. For it is high time Ships began to have bottoms to them, & more Expedition as well as better (Economy prevail'd in Dock Yards. This cannot happen whilst he has any Influence for whilst he has any he will have it all. We know Sr. Jacob to have so

7

202 Adm. 3/50, 28 Feb., 29 March, May 1745. 20s Adm. 3/53, 1 April 1746. 204 Adm. 3/50, 4 March 1745.

4

May

1745;

Adm.

106/2181, 26

205 See below pp.

April,

251-252.

2. The London Offices much of the Nature of Pompey the Great in him that he cannot be an equal & if Mr. Allen Qoseph Allen, Master Shipwright at Deptford] should have so much of the temper of Julius Caesar about him that he cannot brook a Superior—What must ensue but civil war added to the many Indecorums 8c distresses the Dock Yards at present labour under? Things will go on worse than ever, the same laziness, the same want of (Economy, the same aversion & discouragement to Ingenuity, nothing will be suffered to continue in the Yards but Cousins, & Flatterers, & nothing turn'd out but bad Ships & able Shipwrights, &c., &c.20e

The dispute over the dockyards was coming to a head. On March 8, 1746 the Admiralty ordered the Navy Board not to dock any ship unless it was certain her stores would be ready upon leaving the dock.207 Within a month it appeared that the order had not been followed in the case of the Defiance at Portsmouth;208 the Admiralty ordered Admiral Steuart to in­ vestigate, and the resident Commissioner, Richard Hughes, instantly protested: I sincerely wish [Hughes told the Navy Board] for the good of the Service, no Innovations, and especially of this kind, were ever to be made, . . . let every Admiral . . . Act as an Admiral, . . . and . . . Supervise . . . the Officers and Men . . . in all . . . Ships and Vessels in Commission, and under his Command . . . and no farther: But this, I believe, is the first Instance that has happened, or at least, I hope, that ever will happen, for an Admiral to enquire into the Conduct of (Yard) Officers, who are entirely Foreign to him; . . . in Short, it is shewing the greatest Slight & disregard to, and really looks, as if their Lordships distrusted the Board, as well as myself, and the Officers too.209

His worst fears were realized when the Admiralty ordered the Navy Board to direct the dockyard officers at Portsmouth to take orders directly from Admiral Steuart: The Lords observing that His Majesty's Ships . . . are taken into Portsmouth Dock, cleaned and put out again before any Prepara­ tions are made for providing them with Stores, by which Injudicious 2oe Woburn MSS. xi, folio 34, 6 March 1746. 207 Adm. 2/497, *6 April 1746; see also Adm. 2/496, 18 March, 11 April 1746. 208 Adm. 3/53, 1 April 1746. 209 N.M.M. POR F/7, 6 April 1746.

2. The London Offices Practice the Ships wait so long that they are foul again before they can proceed to Sea; Resolved that the Navy Board be directed to order the Officers of the said Yard to Observe such Orders as they shall receive from Vice Admiral Steuart, whom the Lords have ap­ pointed to overlook the said Works.210

This the Commissioners of the Navy refused to do. They did not immediately protest the order; they simply put it on the shelf.211 Within a fortnight the Admiralty became aware that nothing was happening, and issued a stern warning: "... their Lordships will not suffer their Orders to be trifled with, and. .. upon any Complaint of the Vice Admiral that any of the OfiScers of the Yard whatsoever shew want of regard to his Orders. . .their Lordps. will take such Measures as will not be agreeable to them. . ."212 Commissioner Hughes urged his col­ leagues not to be intimidated: To bring this Case nearer home, can you Gentlemen as a Board, be of any Consequence, is it not Slighting and as it were entirely setting you aside, . . . . . . if this New Scheme is to be followed, I hope the Good (tho' Obsolete) Method, of sending Orders from the Admiralty to you, directing such and such Services to be Perform'd . . . will be entirely left off, and thrown by; because it will be Increasing Business unnecessarily . . . Great things, I presume are Expected to Arise from this Practice; but, if disorder and disappointment don't in the End, I am much mistaken.213

Indeed, it does not seem that, in the short run, the Admi­ ralty could do very much. Unless their Lordships were pre­ pared in the midst of a war to demolish and reconstruct the entire civil administration of the navy, they could only choose to relent. In theory the Admiralty had the power to take this drastic step, but in practice it did not. As the Navy Board said: ". . .the Lord High Admiral . . . and . . . their Lordships Predecessors tho' by their Constitution invested with the Civil & Military power of the Navy have always Consulted with this 2io Adm. 3/53, 5 April 1746. 2H Later on they told the Admiralty: "We deferred directing the said Officers to follow such Orders as Vice Adml. Steuart should give them relating to the cleaning refitting & Storing his Majesty's ships . . ." (Adm. 106/2182, 24 May 1746). Adm. 2/497, '6 April 1746; see also ibid., 15 May 1746. 213 N.M.M. POR F/7, 20 May 1746.

2. The London Offices Board with regard to the Civil CEconomy of it and there is not Instance of any Alteration having been made in its Rules or Establishment but by the Advice and Opinion of this Board."214 The Lords of the Admiralty could not even get Sir Jacob Ackworth retired; all they could do was get a jointsurveyor appointed (Joseph Allen), and Sir Jacob stayed on at the Navy Board until March 1749, when he died. By August of 1746 they had taken in sail; they spoke of "requests" rather than "orders,"215 and during the remainder of the war relations between the two Boards steadily improved.21® But the price of good relations was the postponement of reform in the dock­ yards. 214 Adm.

106/2182, 24 May 1746. E.g. Adm. 3/55, 6 Aug. 1746: ". .. the Lords hope that on such extra­ ordinary occasions [emergencies], the officers of the Yards will make no Hesitation to comply with such Requests as they receive from the Commandrs. in Chief at their respective Ports." 216 This may be deduced not only from the less strident tone of their correspondence, but also from the increasing number of joint meetings; see Adm. 3/55-60 generally. 215

For my own Part I sincerely wish the Glory of His Majesty's Arms was more the Object in View amongst his Officers, than Self Interest appears to be. CAPTAIN CHARLES KNOWLESI

A man who would not fight for a galleon would fight for nothing. —ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES WAGER2

T

HE seventeenth century, especially the latter half, was a period of rapid growth for the English navy. There were more ships, and they were more frequently employed. The vessels themselves were of a new character—immense ships of the line, unlike anything else afloat, built and equipped for the sole purpose of fighting. Who was to command these ships? What sort of men were fitted to coordinate them in battle? These were questions that the seventeenth-century navy had trouble answering. It was not hard to find competent mariners, and mariners were used, but the drawback was that these "tarpaulin officers" rarely had the background and aptitude for effective command. The governments of the Common­ wealth had put generals in charge of fleets. After the Restora­ tion a good many persons of high birth, and negligible know­ ledge of the sea and ships, were entrusted with men of war. The situation will never be better described than it was by Macaulay: "There were gentlemen and there were seamen in the navy of Charles the Second. But the seamen were not gentlemen and the gentlemen were not seamen."8 In the middle of the eighteenth century this was no longer the case. There were still men of high and low birth in the commissioned ranks, but the former no longer deemed skill in seamanship unbecoming to men of dignity, and the latter no longer ridiculed gentlemanly manners as being effeminate. ι To the Admiralty, Adm. 1/834, 26 April 1747. 2 Attributed to Wager by J. Campbell, Lives of the British Admirals (rev. edn., 8 vol., 1814), vi, 219. »T. B. Macaulay, History of England from the Accession of James Il (ed. Firth, 6 vol., 1913-1915), 1, 294.

3· Commissioned Officers The clearly pointed moral which marked the happy ending of Charles Shadwell's play, The Fair Quaker of Deal (ca. 1710), was translated into fact.4 Commodore Flip, "a most illiterate Wappineer-tar" who caroused with the seamen when off duty, resolved to cast off his "old, Dull rascally conversation, and learn good sense and manners"; and Captain Mizen, "a finical sea fop," vowed to "play the effeminate fool no more, but bear the face of a man"; to strip his "fop-cabin" of all its "china baubles" and show himself a "true hero" in the queen's service. The change was accomplished largely through the creation of a corps of commissioned officers, a body of men required upon admission to demonstrate a minimum standard of pro­ fessional competence, linked to the navy by continuous pay, and ranked for promotion by seniority. The change had come slowly. It was initiated in the reign of Charles II, and acceler­ ated by policies introduced during the twenty years of ex­ hausting war with France. By about 1715 or 1720 the rules and conventions that accomplished it had all been adopted, and by the outbreak of war in 1739 their consequences were amply evident. Still, the implications of the new officer corps had to be reconciled with traditional concepts of naval service. There was much that was left untouched, and attitudes adjusted reluctantly. The creation of an officer corps also posed new problems. How was an Admiralty, not fully certain of the extent of its powers, to control the body that had been created? How was it to reward with promotion those deserving it by virtue of experience and long service, without clogging the highest ranks with dead wood? Or, on the other hand, how was it to promote the energetic and meritorious without opening the door to favoritism? These are problems familiar to organiza­ tions in all ages. The Admiralty faced another which was peculiar to eighteenth-century England: How was it to main­ tain professional standards when confronted with a powerful aristocracy eager to provide careers for younger sons, and a i See especially Captain Edward Thompson's revision of the play for performance in 1773, which is discussed fully in Robinson, British Tar, pp. 204-224.

S- Commissioned Officers political system constantly pressing to use the navy to meet the limitless demands of patronage? The aims of this chapter are to show how the corps of officers was developed, and to study its quality and effectiveness under the test of war. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICER CORPS

The development of the officer corps had its beginning in measures aimed at making seamen out of gentlemen. To the opposite approach the minds of the seventeenth-century, Eng­ lish governing class were not receptive. Nor would it have been practical: because of the favor they could command, the well-born were bound to attain high rank in the navy. The king and his ministers had no desire to keep them out. The incompetence of some of the Duke of York's court favorites infuriated Samuel Pepys, and the ease with which such men obtained commissions moved him to introduce a qualifying examination for lieutenants. But Pepys did not want to keep the aristocracy out of the navy; in fact, he longed to make the sea service as socially respectable as the army. "Were it not to be wished," he wrote, "that the seaman's trade might be made so honourable and profitable, as that not only the younger brothers of England might be encouraged to seek their for­ tunes that way, . . . but that even the elder might esteem it, for the dignity of it."5 As a result, reforms were designed to make the naval service attractive to gentlemen, and at the same time to force them to develop a measure of professional competence. Even if this approach failed to attract men of high birth—after all, since sea life was uncomfortable and hazardous, and since it was hard for an officer to absent him­ self from duty, the navy could never be as attractive to the aristocracy as the army—it would still have the advantage of attracting those who aspired to be gentlemen. If it succeeded, there would eventually be no room in the navy, at least above the level of lieutenant, for "tarpaulin officers." As Pepys knew, gentlemen, and especially men who aspired to that status, wanted opportunities for profit honorably ac­ quired. That the naval service became attractive to them, and they could be required to qualify themselves professionally, ο J. R. Tanner, Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes, N.R.S. (1926), pp. 405-406.

3· Commissioned Officers was in part due to circumstances beyond administrative con­ trol. A social change was in progress during the early eight­ eenth century, and one of its products was an insatiable hunger for suitable places for young men of good family.® Since the available sinecures did not increase rapidly enough to take care of them, the professions became attractive. Be­ sides, the navy offered the possibility of a fortune in prize money, should there be a war. But to a large extent the professional officer corps was the Admiralty's own creation. There were three major accomplish­ ments: First, a system was set up for encouraging "families of better quality . . . to breed up their younger sons to the art and practice of navigation."7 Second, qualifications were estab­ lished for a lieutenant's commission. Third, naval service was made permanent. Once commissioned, an officer could be separated from the navy only by resignation or misconduct; he received an allowance while unemployed and he was pro­ moted according to seniority. Together these measures made up a coherent program, but each was introduced and devel­ oped independently. Entry

On May 7, 1661 the Lord High Admiral directed that, in order "to give Encouragement to . . . young Gentlemen . . . willing to apply themselves to the learning of Navigation, and fitting themselves to the Service of the Sea," one volunteer at midshipman's pay should be substituted for one midshipman on each ship.8 These volunteers were officially designated "volunteers per order," that is, volunteers by warrant of the Admiralty; they came to be known colloquially as "King's Letter Boys." By 1677 a variation of this principle was so firmly in force that the wording of the establishment implied β This is an area of social history that has yet to be explored. A starting point is E. Hughes, "The Professions in the Eighteenth Century," Durham Univ. Jour., XLIV (195a), 46-55. For the question of increased numbers see Τ. H. Hollingsworth, "A Demographic Study of the British Ducal Fam­ ilies," Population Studies, xi (1957), 4-86. 1 Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 814. β James, Duke of York, Memoirs of the English Affairs, Chiefly Naval, 1660, to 16η$ (1729), p. 81.

Q. Commissioned Officers that there was to be no other source of lieutenants.® But such exclusiveness was never achieved, and in January 1702 official intentions were brought in line with official actions. The Admiralty observed that, while it had been "customary" to permit only volunteers per order to qualify, that procedure had been "a very great discouragement" to well qualified mates and midshipmen who had not been so warranted, and the restriction was officially relaxed.10 The administrators were not prepared to exclude entirely the candidates privately sponsored by captains and admirals. Nevertheless, during the ensuing war 48 per cent of those qualifying for lieutenant had been volunteers per order; of the rest 44 per cent had seen merchant service, and 16 per cent had neither held the king's letter nor served in merchantmen (see Table 5). These comprised what has been called the "servant entry," but it is significant that very few were actually rated servants on the books; instead they were rated able or ordinary seamen. Still, they were in effect apprenticed to the captain. He rated his men as he pleased, and favored promis­ ing officer-material with the higher rates, reserving the servant rating for incompetent or ill-favored boys whose wages he kept for himself.11 In the final years of the war the merchant entries diminished, and the number of volunteers per order and apprentices rose; and because the registers of passing certifi­ cates between 1713 and 1745 omit reference to time spent in merchant ships (in 1745 wartime needs again forced the navy to take men with such experience), we may surmise that very few who gained lieutenancies during that period came out of the merchant service. Thus the volunteer-per-order system had ® Queen Anne's Navy, p. 317. Merriman's summarizing of regulations pertaining to the development of the officer corps (pp. 310-317) is very valuable. 10 Merriman, Sergison Papers, p. 284. 11 This is confirmed by Ned Ward, Wooden World Dissected (1708), p. 14; "If he's allow'd a Score or two of Servants, for the greater Encourage­ ment to Navigation, he's sure to pick up a Scum that are good for nothing, that they may cost him next to nothing." Even at mid-century the num­ ber actually rated servant was rather small; cf. C. G. Pitcairn Jones's find­ ing that none of the 34 midshipmen rated on the Blandford between 1755 and 1758 had ever appeared on the ship's books as servant ("Midship­ men", MM., XL [1954], 212-219)·

g. Commissioned Officers TABLE 5. Sources of Officer Entry, 1702-1712 V.P.O. YEAR

17021703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 Total

TOTAL MEN

MERCHANT

NEITHER per cent

no.

per cent

no.

per cent

no.

38 25 26 34 34 40 47 32 32 25

41 42 47 41 53 45 49 56 58 55

43 27 31 45 31 45 47 19 6 9

47 46

18

20

59 55 83 64 88 97 57 55 45

IO

II

17 15 12 13 14 10 14 33 24

695

333

48

303

"3

16

92

56

54 49 51 49 33 II

20 44

8 IO

8 12 IO

8 18

This Table is based on passing certificates (Adm. 107/1,2). It must be emphasized that these figures are based on incomplete information. From 30 to 40 per cent of the passing certificates in the period 1700-1750 were issued overseas. The Adm. 107/- series contains only those issued by the Navy Board in London. The certificates issued abroad have disappeared, except for the period 1744-1747 (Adm. 6/86); since the volunteer-per-order system did not exist then, it is unfortunately not possible to find out if the pattern abroad was similar to that in London. The percentages do not add up to 100 because about 10 per cent of those who had seen merchant service were also given the king's letter. I have not included a separate category for "lower-deck" entry because I have been unable to formulate a definition of what that means sufficiently precise to serve as a basis for segregation. Perhaps most of the merchant entrants may be counted "lower deck," and the long time that a number of apprentices served prior to being rated mate or midshipman must place them in this category.

a marked effect on the pattern of officer procurement. It ac­ counted for almost half the lieutenants commissioned during Anne's reign, and as one might expect, the percentage of captains was even higher; more than two-thirds of the cap tains posted between 1708 and 1734 had been volunteers per order.12 But in the year 1730 the volunteer-per-order system was abandoned. Why? Partly because it was too exclusive; the navy from the outset was reluctant to be bound by this single source 12 This is based on a comparison of Rear Admiral John Hardy, A Chronological List of the Captains of His Majesty's Royal Navy . . . 16ηy 1783, (1784), and the passing certificates (Adm. 107/1-3). Certificates could be traced for just over half the captains.

3. Commissioned Officers of supply, and the apprentice-type entry, firmly rooted in social habit, was not to be eliminated.13 (For the rest of the eighteenth century it dominated.) In addition it was too expensive; during peacetime, when lieutenancies were scarce, young men tended to remain volunteers much longer than the specified three or four years.14 But also the scheme had out­ lived its usefulness. The navy could get good candidates with­ out it. For this reason it was suggested to the king that an academy be built "for the Reception and Education of Forty young Gentlemen for his Majesty's Service at Sea instead of the present Establishment of Volunteers in his Majesty's Ships."15 But the academy which was built at Portsmouth never amounted to much. The curriculum was not at fault; it pro­ vided mathematics and navigation, as well as the gentlemanly accouterments—fencing and dancing; the two years spent there counted as sea service for qualification purposes. It failed because it was thought by the potential candidates (or rather their parents and relatives) not to be a very promising way of getting ahead. Moreover, a boy at the academy stood in danger of being without a patron when he got out into the fleet. The Lords of the Admiralty were aware of this danger. In 1749, when they visited the academy, they took particular notice of: "Mr. Leake, a Young Gentleman of about Fourteen Years of Age, [who] was observed to have made an Uncom­ mon Progress, and being Recommended by all the Masters, for a most Ingenious deserving Lad, the Lords were pleased to Order him Five Guineas, for his Encouragement, And directed the Commissioner to inform them, when he had served his Time out, that he might be recommended to a proper Captain to take Care of, and Cherish so Valuable a Youth."10 Under 13 Queen Anne's Navy, p. 311. Adm. 107/3. One man, granted his certificate in 1724, had been paid as a volunteer per order for 6.5 of his 11 years preparatory service. Such cases prompted the Admiralty order of July 24, 1717, which limited service rated as volunteer per order to four or three years, depending on whether the candidate first entered between the ages of 13 and 14, or 15 and 16. Obviously the order was not carefully enforced. The order is printed in Report on the MSS. of Lady Du Cane (1905), p. si. is Adm. 3/38, 30 Jan. 1730; it was ordered in Council 21 Feb. 1730. ieAdm. 3/61, 5 Nov. 1749.

g. Commissioned Officers the circumstances people could hardly be blamed for trying to cultivate favor at sea for their sons right from the start. As a result, the academy did not become important until the early nineteenth century; in 1740, when the navy was straitened for places to put sick seamen, Admiral Cavendish said of the building: "There is but one or two Academy boys there. I should think that might be converted into an Hospital, for its of very little signification at present."17 To insure that young men had appropriate knowledge and experience before receiving commissions, three qualifications were introduced: a minimum age, an examination, and a minimum length of sea service. The enforcement of these requirements lay with the Navy Board, which issued a "pas­ sing certificate" verifying that each had been fulfilled. To prevent premature promotions a minimum age of twenty years was established in 1703.18 How well this regula­ tion was enforced is doubtful. Baptismal certificates had to be supplied to the Navy Board, and although this requirement was seldom waived,10 it is possible that forged baptismal certifi­ cates were common. Naturally, passing certificates granted on foreign station tended to be less exacting. The statement in Samuel Barrington's certificate is a model of carefully con­ structed vagueness: "He appears to be upwards of Twenty years of age."20 He was almost certainly not.21 The best guess is that the regulation hindered the promotion of the ridic­ ulously immature, no more. The examination was first introduced in 1677, in order to rid the navy of "volunteers, who having passed some time superficially at sea, and being related to families of interest at court, do obtain lieutenancies before they are fitted for it."23 IT Adm. 1/903, 27 April 1740. The Admiralty rejected the idea. 1S

Order in Council 1 May 1703, in Queen Anne's Navy, p. 319. The average age of candidates in 1702 was 26.8 years; after 1702 the clerks began to omit age from the registers. "As in the case of Thomas Frankland, October 20, 1737. Frankland, whose father was on the Admiralty Board, was born in the East Indies. He may well have been under age. aoAdm. 6/86, 1745. 21 Barrington went to sea at eleven (DJV.B.), and his certificate indicates little more than five years service. 22 Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 202-203.

3·

Commissioned Officers

Pepys, who was behind the scheme, noticed immediate effects from it; in 1678 he wrote: "I thank God we have not half the throng of those of the bastard breed pressing for employments which we heretofore used to be troubled with, they being conscious of their inability to pass this examination."23 How­ ever, it was not hard for a flag officer administering the exam­ ination on foreign station to let down the barriers for a favorite candidate. By the same order of 1677 that introduced the examina­ tion, a three-year sea requirement was prescribed. Two of these were to be served as volunteer per order and the third as midshipman, or "ordinary midshipman."24 On May 1, 1703 the requirement was increased to four years, and by an Admiralty resolution of February 22, 1729, to six years.25 Only special permission from the king could circumvent the sea require­ ment, and this was rarely granted.2® Of the three qualifications, it was the hardest to evade, and must have been the most effec­ tive. It is not a criticism of the system of entry that had been developed to point out that it could not supply full wartime needs. No one has yet found a system that can do that. Actu­ ally, this system was able to supply the demands of the war with Spain, but not the war with France.27 Faced with a short­ age, the Admiralty elected in 1745 to ease the restrictions; by giving a loose interpretation to the wording of the printed Regulations and Instructions—the rule, it was noted, did not specify that the six years had to be spent in the navy—the 23 ibid.., i, 205. 24 Merriman, Sergison Papers, pp. 867, 282-283. The rate of ordinary midshipman was introduced to accommodate officer candidates. Up to this time midshipman had been an exclusively lower-deck rate, and each ship could carry only a limited number on her books. For the rank of mid­ shipman see Merriman's discussion in Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 311-312. 25 Adm. 107/2, 1 May 1703, 15 May 1710; Adm. 107/3, 22 Feb. 1729. The passing certificate registers include as prefaces copies of the orders per­ tinent to volunteers and qualifications for lieutenant. 26 Barring falsification of the ship's books of course. Among the special cases: Lord George Forbes, one and one-half years in 1705; Hon. FitzroyHenry Lee, three years in 1720; Corbett observed (ca. 1729) that the Crown had "often sent" such orders (Corbett MSS. ix, folio 31), but the registers reveal less than a dozen. 27 The Admiralty minutes after 1744 record frequent complaints from captains that they lacked lieutenants.

3· Commissioned Officers Board was able to reduce the requirement of naval service to two years, spent as either midshipman or mate.28 This opened the door to those who had transferred from the merchant service. Though the Navy Board was advised "to take all. . . precautions not to be imposed upon,"29 the standards were inevitably depressed. For example, when the Admiralty in­ quired about the Navy Board's failure to examine one George Bowder, the Navy Board told the Secretary: "We desire you will acquaint their Lordships he is 55 Years of Age, [and] has not been in the Service of the Navy for 31 years past."30 Other dubious candidates, however, were apparently accepted, for a year later the Admiralty complained that it had been "receiv­ ing frequent information of Gentn. passing their Examinatn. for Lieut, who [were] very unfit and incapable."31 To this the Navy Board replied that it was doing its best, and took the opportunity to criticize the Admiralty's recent ruling, mention­ ing that the proof of the four years merchants' service was "very uncertain." The Commissioners added, "We must like­ wise ... observe that in Our Opinion ... [this new rule] is one Means of introducing Persons who may be unfit for Officers, although good Seamen, for We are firmly persuaded that a young Gentleman will learn more of the Officer in one Year in the Navy, than in three in a Merchant Ship."32 Naval admin­ istrators had come a long way from the old view that the best officers came from Wapping.33 Permanent Service

The navy could not possibly develop a professional corps without making service permanent, and two prerequisites for permanent service were constant income and hierarchical organization. The latter was based on seniority, the discussion of which will be deferred until it can be related to the ques­ tion of promotion. The former was supplied by a system of half pay, a stipend for unemployed officers; it tied them to the navy by holding them under obligation to it. In a sense half pay served as a reward for past services—benefits from reserve 28 Adm. 107/3, S8 March 1745. 29 Ibid. so Ibid., 30 April, 1 May 1745.

silbid., 6 April 1746. 32 Ibid., 12 April 1746. 38 See Tanner, Catalogue, 1, aoi.

β.

Commissioned Officers

programs often amount to this in the end—but the navy also intended that it should serve as a contract for future ones. The officers who received it were considered by the Admiralty an organized reserve, available on call. The function of half pay could be interpreted ambiguously: Which was it—an indefeasible reward, or a quid pro quo? The early establishments of half pay were undoubtedly intended as rewards. The first establishment came in 1668 and provided for flag officers only. Again in 1674, when the allow­ ance was extended to the captains of 1st and 2nd rates, it was given to them because "they had undergone the Brunt of the war, without sharing the Incident Advantages of it, such as Prizes, Convoys, and such like, which the Commanders of smaller Ships ran away with."34 The establishment of 1694, which promised peacetime half pay to captains down to the 5th rate and first lieutenants and masters of the first three rates, was in the same spirit. Except for a stipulation that offi­ cers who declined service could no longer enjoy the allow­ ance, and a loosely constructed suggestion that they were also expected to assist the Navy Board in examining candidates for lieutenant and other duties, it required very little of the recipients.35 This was a wartime measure, and its primary purpose was still to assure officers that their good services would not be forgotten when peace came. In contrast, the stated purpose of the half-pay establishment of 1700 was not just to provide a reward for services rendered, but also "to have always a Competent Number of Experienced Sea-Officers, supported on Shore, who [might] be within reach to answer any sudden or immergent Occasion." And this order introduced some clearly specified restrictions. In addition to the 1694 stipulations, half-pay officers were not to hold any other public employment; they were forbidden to go abroad (hence they could not enter merchant service); they were to keep the Admiralty informed of their residences; and if 34 Corbett MSS. xi, folios 29-31. In 1675 half pay was extended to the masters of those rates, as well as captains who had been commodores. 85 Merriman, Sergison Papers, p. 269; "P. C.," The Three Establishments concerning the Pay of the Sea-Officers (1705), p. 16. The Admiralty ap­ parently now considered half pay a permanent institution, for this order placed it "on the Ordinary Estimate of the Navy."

g. Commissioned Officers thought necessary, they could be called upon to reside near the dockyards and assist in fitting out ships. In short, they had to "at all times be ready to obey" the orders of the Admi­ ralty.86 These restrictions were repeated in the establishments of 1713 and 1715, which, in addition, stated explicitly that the allowance was to be given only to captains and lieutenants who might "stand fair to be employed when there [should] be occasion."37 In 1713 half pay was extended to virtually all com­ missioned officers, and so it remained in the establishment of 17x5, which continued unmodified until the end of the eight­ eenth century. The Admiralty, it seems, now considered this large body of half-pay officers a ready reserve. TABLE 6. The Half Pay Establishment of 1715 (per diem) Admiral of the Fleet Admiral of Blue or White Vice-admiral Rear-admiral 20 Captains at 30 Captains at 40 Captains at 50 Captains at 48 Captains at

£ s.

d.

2 I I O O O O O O

0 0 0

IO

15 5 17 IO

6

8 6 5 4

0 0 0 0 0

2 2

0

188 Lieutenants at 131 Lieutenants at

130

O O

6

261

Maintaining an organized reserve was far more of a prob­ lem than the framers of these later establishments are likely to have supposed. The Admiralty did make an effort to keep officers on half pay from leaving the kingdom, and it is appar­ ent from the Admiralty minutes that some sort of check was effected. Many lieutenants wrote requesting permission to enter the merchant service; they were permitted to do so and se Order in Council of April 18, 1700, printed in The Three Establish­ ments, pp. 36-42. ν Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 387-329.

3· Commissioned Officers retain their rank, but warned that it would mean forfeiting the half pay.38 Keeping track of residences was another matter. It was simply beyond the capabilities which the administrators could call upon, and the character of the Admiralty's efforts to maintain a list of addresses implies an air of resignation. In August 1727, with war threatening and a fleet fitting out, the Board ran an advertisement in the Gazette requesting all cap­ tains and lieutenants on half pay to report their "places of abode."39 Six months later it resolved "that a Book be regularly and Alphabetically kept in this Office, by One of the Clerks, of the Names of the Captains, Lieutenants, and Masters who may from time to time be in Half Pay." It also resolved, for the future, not to insert officers in the half-pay list, "except they send a letter stating their places of abode."40 All these resolutions came to nothing. In 1739 the Admiralty again had to run an advertisement in "the Printed Papers requiring all Lieutenants . . . not now employed to send an Acct . . . of the Places of their Abode." The Board could count on a certain amount of gentlemanly cooperation, in view of the emergency, but this did not contribute much. The advertisement was run again in December 1742.41 As for the restriction about holding "public employment," the Admiralty did not enforce it care­ fully.42 Many of the half-pay officers who held additional pub­ lic posts were, of course, persons well connected politically, and the restriction was often circumvented: The officer in question obtained permission from the Admiralty to receive his half pay without swearing to the necessary oath that he held no such employment.43 But the fundamental trouble was not administrative; it arose instead from the persistence of traditional attitudes towards service. The notion that half pay was a reward for past services was one never quite relinquished by the adminis­ trators themselves. In spite of repeated affirmations that the allowance was only for those who might "stand fair to be 39 Adm. 3/36, 3 Aug. 1787. 38 E.g. Adm. 3/46, 6 Nov. 1742. 4O Adm. 3/36, 15 Feb. 1728 «Adm. 3/43, 7 Aug. 1739; Adm. 3/46, 10 Dec. 174a. 42 However, there was an attempt in the early 1720's to cut off the half pay of flag officers who also held civil posts in the navy (Cholmondeley MSS. 11/4). « Corbett MSS. xi, folios 34-41.

3- Commissioned Officers employed" in the future, half pay continued to serve, in part, the function that prompted its original establishment—as a dole for the debilitated and aged. For example the establish­ ment of 1700 provided half pay only in peacetime, but in 1704 and 1705 it was granted in wartime to unemployed captains and lieutenants of the first three rates "who had served in the preceding war."44 Obviously these officers were no longer of any use to the navy, but the hearts of the administrators were not hard. Captain William Miller, for example, who had con­ tinued "disordered in his senses" for more than a decade, received half pay for the entire period.48 The degree to which half pay had to function as a pension fund depended, of course, on the adequacy of other means of providing for officers no longer serviceable. Given a benevo­ lently inclined administration, a more comprehensive super­ annuation system would have been the only means of relieving the half-pay list of its burden of senility. That this was so long in coming for commissioned officers may be blamed on the system of half pay itself. Warrant officers, for whom there was no half-pay establishment, shared in a superannuation program of long standing 46 Though the early establishments did allow something to commissioned officers incapacitated by wounds, and though there was a provision in 1692 for the widows of flag officers slain in battle,47 nothing was set aside for the merely aged. This is not to say that pensions were never granted to them. Flag officers and captains, until the introduc­ tion of the superannuation scheme of 1747, were provided for in a number of ways; some got sinecures in Greenwich Hospi­ tal, and some were favored with special pensions from the crown.48 But lieutenants who grew old in rank got virtually •44 Ibid., folio 31. 947). The distribution of prize money, as proclaimed by the king on June 19, 1740, may be found in P.R.O., P. C. 2/96. It is the same as the earlier one printed in Burchett,

Q. Commissioned Officers the breasts of all. But, of course, the pursuit of prizes was often incompatible with the pursuit of strategic objectives. Some admirals were careful about the disposition of their cruisers; others, like Admiral John Byng in 1747, felt no urgency about it; in fact, when Capt. Hervey returned to Vado Bay after a cruise that made him richer by £9,000 (and his admiral thereby richer by about £4,500), he found only three ships with the squadron, Byng having sent out the rest in search of prizes.73 Strategically, this could be hazardous. There was an­ other problem: prize money did not encourage captains to slug it out with enemy men-of-war at close quarters; in a way, it actually discouraged them from doing it. In all likelihood a captain's only reward for such action—outside of maintaining self-respect—would be a good reputation that might possibly, but not necessarily, prove helpful when his name came to be considered on some distant day for promotion to flag rank. If he did slug it out, chances were that his battle-stricken ship, even though victorious, would be unable to pluck the fruits from a convoy which her victory had exposed. Many captains believed that life was to be risked for money, not glory. The disadvantages of allowing prize money were obvious. Why then was it not taken away? Because the weight of tradi­ tion, when united with the political influence of the privateer­ ing interest in Parliament, could not be overcome. Tradition­ ally captains had a right to a share of the prizes they took; to take away this right would have seemed an outrage; to take it away without simultaneously eliminating privateering, impos­ sible. And there was not the slightest chance of abolishing the latter. In fact, the increased political power of private specu­ lators even managed, in 1708, to deprive the Crown of a share. Of course, the Parliamentary bills that paved the way for avarice bore spurious titles. In 1708 the principle that a captor Complete History, Preface. Roughly, the shares were as follows: i/ g for the flag; 14 for the captain (if he was not serving under a flag at the time, he took the flag share as well): i/a for lieutenants and certain categories of warrant officers; 14 to the remaining warrant and petty officers; and 14 to the crew. Cruising in the Channel in 1746, Capt. Augustus Hervey brought in a privateer of slight value. His share, including the flag share, was £149; each seaman got £1 (Erskine, Augustus Hetvey's Journal, p. 47). izibid., p. 63.

3· Commissioned Officers had the sole right to his prize found its way into law as a means "for the better securing the Trade of this Kingdom by Cruisers and Convoys."74 In 1738 it was suggested that priva­ teering would "help secure the American trade" from the depredations of the Spaniards, but in 1738 the nation was at peace, and the measure was voted down on the reasonable ground that legitimatizing plunder would bring on war.75 But on November 16, 1739, "the very second day of the session,"76 the act of 1708 was again brought into the Commons, this time not only for the purpose of protecting the American trade, but also "for the Encouragement of Seamen to enter into His Majesty's Service."77 In the debate that followed the cause of the seamen was steadfastly argued, but few speakers could have been so naive as to believe that it was the seamen's meager prize share, instead of the officers' and the privateers', that was generating the heat. Walpole wanted some sort of government control over privateers; he also wanted the Crown's share for the public revenue. Someone else suggested that the inequalities of prize money had a bad effect on naval morale, and pointed out that it was frequently the officer who did not do his duty who was most lavishly rewarded.78 Sir Charles Wager admitted that a liberal prize allowance would encourage officers "to be vigilant in looking out for the enemy's mercantile ships," but felt that it could do nothing to induce them to attack enemy ships of war.79 Protests, however, were hopeless. The bill did not appear to cost anything, for it was generosity with the money of France and Spain. London was clamoring for it, and, in spite of his loyalty to Walpole, Wager dared not say anything against prize money for fear of alienating his fellow officers; besides, everyone knew how Sir Charles himself had made his fortune. After the first reading ™ Title of 6 Anne c. 13. This act was augmented by 6 Anne c. 37, com­ monly called the "American Act." " Pari. Hist., x, 812-867. 7 6 Ibid., xi, 100. The words are Henry Pelham's, who was indignant that the bill's proponents had not even waited until the House had answered the king's address. 77 Title of 13 Geo. II c. 4. Pari. Hist, xi, 118. See also Pares, Colonial Blockade, pp. 40-41. 79 Pari. Hist., XI, 111.

g. Commissioned Officers Walpole capitulated, as "he dreaded to resist so popular a measure, and to offend the navy of England."80 In view of the value of prize money, why should any captain be reluctant to answer the Admiralty's call to service in time of war? The answer is that prizes were taken by captains who managed to be in the right place, at the right time, with the right sort of ship, and the right set of instructions; in establish­ ing these conditions luck played but a small part, and conse­ quently various assignments could be classified as desirable or undesirable. Roughly, Mediterranean service was desirable; there were ample opportunities for bullion carriage and rich prizes. To many officers West Indies service seemed undesir­ able; although there were merchantmen to be captured and occasional chances for freight money, these were offset by the chances of tropical disease. Of the captains promoted between 1700 and 1748 fifty-two eventually died in the West Indies of natural causes; only nine of the same group died natural deaths in the Mediterranean.81 The African slave coast was almost as undesirable as the West Indies for the same reason. Newfoundland and the East Indies fell somewhere between.82 Channel service seems to have been preferred to these two areas, but not to the Mediterranean. The attractiveness of any area could be modified by other circumstances; indepen­ dent cruising was desirable, fleet operations undesirable, and consequently smaller ships (20 to 50 guns) were usually pre­ ferred to larger in spite of the lower salary; in addition, there were "favorite cruises"—expeditions which stood little chance of encountering enemy warships and whose chief aim was to plunder merchant shipping. Anson's famous voyage to the Pacific was such a cruise, and squadrons sent to the Bay of Biscay to intercept Spanish register ships coming from Amer­ ica were, in spite of the possibility that they might face stiff opposition, also considered to be on a "favorite" assignment. Of course, individual preferences varied. An officer whose personal circumstances were comfortable might not relish a so Coxe, Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, 1, 630. 81 Hardy, List. Hardy's information is not complete, but the proportion is probably reliable. 82 Disease claimed lives in the East Indies just as heavily as in the West, but the opportunities for enrichment and advancement were greater. 11S

Q. Commissioned Officers cruise as adventuresome as Anson's, no matter how potentially lucrative. One whose personal affairs required close attention preferred Channel service to the Mediterranean. But the choices of most were ruled by ambition for riches. And on one thing nearly all were agreed: West Indies service was to be avoided. John Byng, who never in his life went to the West Indies, thought it outrageous that Augustus Hervey should have spent two years there without getting anything out of it.83 On rare occasions an officer who desired to "live an active life"84 volunteered for West Indies duty, but most officers dreaded it. 85 Captain Mizen, the foppish officer in The Fair Quaker of Deal, fancied getting "an order from the Admi­ ralty to send all the tar-captains to the West Indies."8® Such attitudes were bound to cause trouble in a war osten­ sibly begun to assert English maritime rights in the West Indies. And in 1740, when almost every ship in home waters was ordered to that theater, resignations rained on the Admi­ ralty.87 At first their Lordships were disposed to please, for substitutes could be found among those so hungry for employ­ ment that they would take anything. But the situation quickly got out of hand, and captains had to be told that alternative employments were not to be had. Captain Hemmington, for example, was advised that there were no other ships available, and that "if he [desired] to come on shoar upon Account of his Ship being bound to the West Indies, another Captain [would] be appointed to her."88 But he still got his half pay. On September 19 the Board was forced to resolve "that No Commission Officers ... who desire to resign for the future, be put on the List for Half Pay."89 Four months later the Board perused "a List of Lieutents. lately appointed to Ships put 83

Erskine, Augustus Hervey's Journal, p. 41. s* Addl. MSS. 32702, folio 9. 85 E.g. Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, pp. 90, 152. 86Act II, scene 3. 87Adm. 3/43-44, passim. Throughout the summer of 1740 there was a good bit of confusion about where the ships were headed. (See Richmond, 73"99 f°r the strategic indecision that kept captains guessing.) Many captains resigned upon receipt of orders that were subsequently cancelled, and not until late in August was it certain that most of the ships would go to the West Indies. 88Adm. 3/44, 29 Aug. 1740. 89Adm. 3/44, 19 Sept. 1740.

Il6

3. Commissioned Officers into Commission who had not accepted their Commissions, and ordered them to be wrote to on that Subject, and to be told that if they declined Serving they would be struck off the Half Pay List."80 The Admiralty's determination to require officers to serve when directed may be seen in the case of Capt. Roger Martin. In July 1742 he declined a voyage to the West Indies on the ground that it would further embarrass his "private affairs."91 Whereupon the Board instructed Admiral Cavendish at Ports­ mouth to get a "positive Declaration from him, whether he [would] go to Jamaica in the Assistance or not."92 Two days later Cavendish answered that Captain Martin had "declared to him in plain and positive Terms, that he would not go," and the Board, considering "the impossibility of keeping up the necessary discipline, or having their Orders regarded, if so slight an excuse should be given way to, resolved to appoint Captain Callis to command the Assistance, and to exclude Captain Martin, from any Right to Half Pay."93 But the Admiralty was no match for its officers. Captain Martin had ingenuously used the wrong formula. Most captains learned that claims of "ill health" worked better than suppli­ cations about "private affairs." In August 1740, when Admiral Balchen received an Admiralty order that all applications from officers under his command to resign should be forwarded through him, he answered, "I believe I shall have but few Applications for that purpose, for they know I am no favourer of Quitting, they must be bad if I write for them, but it is now become a fashion, if they dont like the Ship, or Voyage they Quitt for their health, Altho they Ayle Nothing."94 When junior officers could not get permission to resign they found other means: "I have observed [wrote Cavendish] that when Ships are ordered upon Voyages that are disagreeable to some Officers, and they cant get off, they get their Captains to put them Sick ashore to the Hospital, where they think themselves eoAdm. 3/45, 15 Feb. 1741. ei Adm. 3/46, 31 July 1742. The fact that Martin was somewhat satiated by taking two valuable prizes in 1741 (Charnock, Biographia Navalis, v, 47) probably has some bearing on his motives. 92 Adm. 3/46, 6 Aug. 174a. 03 Adm. 3/46, 12 Aug. 1742. Adm. 1/904, 15 Aug. 1740.

3· Commissioned Officers secure, at least for a Month, in which time the Ship proceeds on her Voyage, and the Officer is left behind."95 In this way officers kept their rank and half pay. But even when the Admiralty caught up with an offender the worst it could do was strike his name from the list. Thus an officer who had no intention of ever serving again could remain on the half-pay list for years until war came, and then, when called up, resign without penalty. The system was highly inefficient, and after the war the Admiralty tried to tighten it up. Article 34 of the Navy bill of 1749 read: "All Half Pay Officers belonging to his Majesty's Navy, when ordered upon Service. . . , shall, in Case of their Disobedience to such Com­ mands, be liable to be tried and Punished by a Court-Mar­ tial."98 It was one of Lord Anson's pet reforms, but the uproar was deafening, the cries coming not only from the officer corps, but also from a public deeply hostile to any measure tending to promote "the ministerial power as the governing princi­ ple."97 Henry Pelham felt it wise to drop the measure—a clear victory for the officer who looked upon his "Half Pay as a Re­ ward of what he [had] already done, and not as an Engage­ ment for his future Services."98 Employments, Promotion, and Patronage

Those who opposed the Navy bill in 1749 had a powerful argument: desirable and undesirable employments were un­ deniably assigned on the basis of patronage. "Do Officers then know [asked Augustus Hervey], that there are now two sort of Services widely differing, the one Honourable and Advan­ tageous, the other Distressful and Severe, and do they know esAdm. 1/905, 29 May 1741. εβ [Temple West], An Examination and Refutation . . . The original draft of Article 34 was even more severe: "All half-pay officers belonging to his majesty's fleet shall be equally subject to discipline, and to be com­ manded whenever the good of his majesty's service shall require their attendance, as if they were actually upon full pay" (Gentleman's Magazine, 1749, p. 99). There was an instant protest, and the Board thought it best to trim sail. 97 Ibid,., p. 129. 98 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham (2 vol., 1829), 11, 64-65. [Lord Barrington], Considerations on the Bill for the better government of the Navy (1749), p. 17. Augustus Hervey's Journal (pp. 78-84) gives the best account of the legislative battle.

Il8

3· Commissioned Officers that if they are without Interest or Friends, that they cannot hope the former, and therefore, if they are employ'd it can only be to execute the latter?"99 They did know it, and they never doubted their privilege of rejection. The courts-martial proposed in the Navy bill of 1749 would be applied, then, only to those without interest or friends, for the others were either never assigned unpopular duties or else permitted to resign. The reason John Byng never went to the West Indies was that his father had been head of the Admiralty.100 George Clinton never went either. Witness the hurried letter sent to his powerful patron, the Duke of Newcastle, which begins: "My Signall was put out this morning on Board Adml. Balchen, to tell me my Ship was ordered to the West Indies which I own has struck me so that I hardly know what I say or do." He need not have worried, for Newcastle had matters well in hand, and soon Clinton was removed to another ship.101 Pa­ tronage even came to the rescue of Roger Martin. One year after he had been struck from the list of captains he explained to a different Board of Admiralty that "tho he only urged at that time the Confused Condition of his private Affairs in excuse for declining the Service, having been advised so to do, yet in reality he was in such an ill State of Health as to render him incapable of performing his duty at Sea, which was known to many Officers in the Navy, and . . . the Physicians saw him twice to Bath on that Account."102 The Board was satisfied with this explanation and restored him. The Duke of Bedford's administration was no less guilty of favoritism than the others. In March 1745 the Board reiterated a familiar principle: "The Lords will not compell any Officer to serve against his Will, but if he insists on quitting . . . , they will look upon it as his Intention to leave the Service, and there[A. Hervey], A Detection. 100 George Byng, Viscount Torrington, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1727-

1733· 101 Addl. MSS. 32695, folio 24, 7 Sept. 1740. Clinton was brother to Henry, 7th Earl of Lincoln, who married Lucy, sister to the Duke of New­ castle (A. Jacob, English Peerage [1766], p. 485). The Prince Frederick, the ship from which Clinton was removed, sailed from Spithead on October 18 to join Vernon; her captain, Lord Aubrey Beauclerk, brother to Lord Vere, was killed in action at Cartagena on 24 March 1741. 102 Adm. 3/48, 15 March 1744. X1 9

3. Commissioned Oficers fore he will not be entitled to half pay."103 But on August 14, 1746 Lord Sandwich wrote to Bedford: "Capt. Fermor of the Chatham has desired leave to quitt his ship on her being ordered for the Mediterranean, & as we imagined it would be reckoned an act of pique & resentment to his family had we refused him, we thought it best to comply with his request."104 And what prompted well-connected officers to be bold in refusing assignments naturally encouraged them to hope for better ones. It was Capt. Clinton who got the sweetest plum of all, the Mediterranean command, in 1737 when employments of any kind were scarce.105 Sometimes a bit of shrewd bargain­ ing entered into transactions about employment: "Mr. Knowles is gone with the Norwich and Canterbury to take upon him the government of Cape Breton. . . . I think I told you that Captain H. Osborn refused this government and command, and the reason given for it is said to be that there was only £500 a year tacked to the government. Mr. Knowles accepted of it in that manner, but he got £500 more tacked to it afterwards."106 Just as patronage controlled appointments, so it controlled promotion. Outside the flag ranks promotion and employ­ ment were inseparable. For although the growth of permanent service had given a meaning to rank that was dissociated from employment, a captain's rank continued to be acquired ordin­ arily through service in a captain's post (command of a ship of 20 guns or more).107 In the same manner, a lieutenant's commission depended on appointment to a ship. Six years or more (in peacetime) might elapse before an ill-connected man who passed his lieutenant's examination got his commis­ sion.108 Why, then, did not all officers assiduously cultivate favor with the Admiralty? Most tried. But for political and personal

103 Adm. 3/50, 1 March 1745. 104 Woburn MSS. xii, folio 39. 10B Addl. MSS. 32693, folios 245-248. ioe H.M.C., Du Cane, p. 112.

107 Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea (2nd edn., 1734), p. 8. ioe E.g. Adm. 1/904, 16 Sept. 1740.

3· Commissioned Officers reasons some could not or would not, and it is a fact of prime importance that often they did not have to. For one thing, political instability during most of the war years brought about frequent changes in the composition of the Board, which encouraged officers to hold out in hopes that their friends would rise to power. But most important, the Admi­ ralty was not the only fountain at which an officer's thirst for promotion and profit might be satisfied, since commanders-inchief on foreign station had the power to make appointments. Such appointments were subject to confirmation by the Admi­ ralty, but in practice they were voided only in cases where there was conflict with an established procedure or regula­ tion.109 Appointments overseas could only be made to fill vacancies. Deaths caused some, but most arose from resignations, and obviously a large number of overseas resignations could de­ prive the Admiralty of a substantial portion of its appointing power. For this reason the Board forbade officers to quit their employments while abroad, but here too it became standard procedure to claim ill health. It was conceivable that these abuses, if unchecked, might have caused the navy's promo­ tional system to degenerate into a variety of commission purchase, the money serving as a bribe to resign. In 1722 a Lt. Walker came home from the East Indies on the pretext of ill health—actually he worked his way back as fourth mate in an Indiaman—and was succeeded by one Blakeway, a mate, who paid him £100 traveling expenses.110 Thomas Mathews, who had been commander-in-chief in the East Indies on that occasion, found himself accused of allowing this again in 1743: "By some Letters which I received from England," he wrote to the Admiralty, "I find it is suspected by their Lordships that the Officers which I gave leave to Quit and to go home ... were permitted to resign for a Valuable Consideration. . . ; I take leave to assure their Lordships that I never have given 109 Only officers designated commanders-in-chief of squadrons by the Admiralty had this power; ordinary captains might fill vacancies, but their appointees were only allowed to draw the salary for the post while they held it and were not to be confirmed by the Admiralty; see Adm. 3/30, 1 Feb. 1717. no D. Hannay, "Purchase in the Navy," MM., π (1912), 105.

3· Commissioned Officers my Consent on any Such Account, & I am positive that there has not been a Six-penny piece given nor received."111 Obviously, if claims of ill health were hard for the Admi­ ralty to deal with at home, they were even harder to judge when coming from abroad. In 1739 the Admiralty cancelled the half pay of one captain and four lieutenants whom Admiral Haddock had allowed "to quit abroad upon Account of their want of health."112 In 1741 the Board asked Vernon, at Jamaica, not to let his officers resign except "in the single case of their losing their health, and its being dangerous to their lives if they continue in that part of the world."113 Some­ times an officer who had been struck off was restored after being examined by a surgeon in England,114 and in 1746 the Board directed Admiral Medley to make certain that all who desired to quit for reasons of health were first verified as being unfit "by the Physician, or in his absence, the two eldest [senior] surgeons of the Fleet."115 Nevertheless, no officer who had influential friends in Whitehall needed to worry, and throughout the war it was common for officers to resign abroad. Augustus Hervey's account of how he returned to England, after falling into disfavor with Admiral Davers in the West Indies, reflects the ill-concealed hypocrisy that must have been conventional in these matters: "Seeing no prospect of any promotion for me . . . I at length was ill, and desired leave to go on shore for my health, which with difficulty I obtained, . . . having determined to resign my commission of Second Lieutenant of the Cornwall and go home passenger in the Sea-horse."11β The power of commanders-in-chief in foreign waters to make appointments was grounded mainly on expediency, but the principle that they should have the right to regulate appointments in their squadrons—wherever they served—had a strong tradition behind it. In former times, when the officer corps was very loosely organized, flag officers had played a m Adm. 1/381, 24 April 1743. 112 Adm. 3/43, 4 May 1739. 113 Vernon Papers, p. 323. 114Adm. 3/45, 18 June 1741. 115 Adm. 3/53, 4 Feb. 1746. 118 Erskine, Augustus Hervey's Journal, pp. 37-38.

3. Commissioned Officers greater role in awarding promotions. In George I's reign the Admiral of the Fleet continued to have the power to appoint both at home and abroad.117 But as the officer corps became increasingly organized, the Admiralty extended its authority. For the good of the service promotions abroad still had to be allowed, but the printed Regulations of 1734 required that vacancies in the Channel were not to be filled, but reported to the Admiralty; and they made no mention of excepting the Admiral of the Fleet.118 In 1740 Sir John Norris, who was Admiral of the Fleet and in command of the Channel squad­ ron, was told that he must not make appointments. As one might expect, this centralizing of appointing power did not please the admirals. Sir John Norris expressed their feelings: "Give me leave to represent to Your Lordships, that I... must expect little Authority in a Fleet where I can advance or re­ move nobody."119 Norris gave in ("I shall be very carefull not to give Your Lordships any further Trouble of this Na­ ture"),120 but Admiral Vernon, when he commanded the Channel fleet in 1745-1746, did not, and Vernon had a much weaker case, for although he was the senior admiral on active duty, he did not bear the title Admiral of the Fleet. Vernon quarreled with the Admiralty on many points, but it was on the question of making appointments that the dispute which ended in his dismissal waxed hot; because he published a good portion of the argumentative correspondence he was struck from the list of flag officers.121 Operating in a political system founded on patronage, and lacking extensive powers of coer­ cion, the Admiralty controlled its officers very largely through its power to appoint. Understandably, it guarded that power carefully. ι" Adm. 3/30, ι Feb. 1717; Corbett MSS. κ, folio 10: "I observe, by perusing the several Commissns. granted out of this Office to Admirals & Commanders in Chief, that the Admiral of the Fleet has always a Clause in his Commission whether at home or abroad, to displace Officers. None else at home." us Regulations and Instructions (1734), p. 14. Presumably the rule was the same in the 1st edition (1731), but unfortunately I have not been able to consult that edition. us Adm. 1/903, 2g June 1740. 120 ibid. 121 See Vernon Papers, p. 536ff.

3· Commissioned Officers The trouble was that the commanders at sea felt that the power to appoint was an essential element of their authority also. Of course they wanted to help their friends and relatives. They also wanted to help themselves: by obliging politicians they could nurture the influence that was so useful in obtain­ ing the most promising assignments. And yet, their desire for power to appoint was not unreasonable. Conditions of service made it advisable to build up an entourage of loyal officers who would serve faithfully in battle and bear friendly testi­ mony at a court-martial in case of failure. Admiral Cavendish complained to his colleagues on the Board, "So many young Officers have been made Captains, [and] I have not had the Indulgence to provide for one of mine, which hurts me so much in my Command, that no good Officer will be fond of going with me."122 Every senior officer had a circle of profes­ sional friends whom he called his own—junior captains and lieutenants who tied themselves to him, and depended on him for favors and promotion. Some of them had served with him continually as lieutenants, moving with him from ship to ship, for the Admiralty usually allowed a captain to select two or more of his lieutenants when he took up his commission for a new ship. Augustus Hervey owed everything to Byng, for not only did Byng manage his promotion to captain, but also he allowed Hervey to write out his own cruising orders while in the Mediterranean.123 Small wonder that Hervey defended his commander steadfastly after the loss of Minorca. A few famous courts-martial should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in the eighteenth-century navy, the obedience of officers was largely secured by favors that inspired loyalty, not by punish­ ments. As we shall see in a moment, the promotion from lieutenant to captain was a crucial step, and the sooner it could be taken the better. Unless a lieutenant could count on the favor of early promotion by the Admiralty, what he wanted most was assignment to a squadron commanded by some one who he had reason to hope would promote him; other assignments, particularly hazardous ones, he would try to refuse. If a likely I22Adm. 1/905, 13 Sept. 1741. Erskine, Augustus Hervey's Journal, pp. 60-61.

123

3. Commissioned Officers patron became a commander-in-chief, lieutenants would bend their efforts towards getting abroad to him, sometimes going as passengers in men of war.124 In peacetime, when posts were scarce, it was common for unemployed lieutenants to ship as "volunteers" or "midshipmen extra" in the hope that vacancies would develop. And for an officer in propitious circumstances the death or removal of his commander was a disaster. Wit­ ness the anguish of the following letter from a lieutenant at Antigua: I have been five Months On Board Commodore Legg's Ship Where I Mett with More Kindness . . . from the Commodore than I cannot Exspress which made my Station in Life Happy. We Have been Out a Cruise. During which time the Commodore Stay'd on Shoar. We arrived here last Tuesday and to our Great Surprise found Poor Mr. Legg Dead and Buried . . . As for My Part I am under the Greatest Concern. I have Lost a Very Great friend and Which Way to Pro­ ceed I Cannot tell. All Our Officers are going Home as fast as Pos­ sible. I hope to see Capt. Frankland Soon & Intend to Advise With him. Here will be no Prosspect of Preferment for Me to Stay. Unless I could get Recommendation to the Officer that is to Command in ye Room of Mr. Legg Otherwise he will Provide for his Own Of­ ficers Which he Brings With him. Give Me leave Sr. to beg One favour of You, if you should see His Grace Duke of Newcastle. . .125

Thus, all naval officers were potentially patrons, and flag of­ ficers were often powerful ones.126 Inevitably they were drawn into politics. Norris once told Sir Charles Wager, "I am very sensible that you have many applications from our one [own] fraturnity, as well as from Sr Robert [Walpole] and many Dukes and Dutchessis and persons of destincion, Every body desiring to serve their particular friends,"127 but the First Lord was not the only one to get these applications; Norris got them 121 E.g.

Du Cane,

p. 56.

125 Addl. MSS. 32713, folio 576, 24 Sept. 1747, Lt. Henry Smith to Sir Francis Poole, who was M.P. for Lewes, a seat controlled by the Duke of Newcastle. ΐ2β Xn 1739 Sir John Norris, vexed that Sir Charles Wager who was jun­ ior to him should be First Lord, thought that the course of propriety would be to retire; but, old as he was, he reasoned, "After fifty

years servis as a

Capt. I should throw away the benefits of it, to the prejidis of my selfe famely and friends" (Addl. MSS. 28132, folio 107, 26 Dec. 1739). 127 Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS., folio 45269, 26 May 1734.

3. Commissioned Officers too; all commanders-in-chief got them.128 In fact, the Admi­ ralty Board members frequently sent recommendations to commanders-in-chief overseas.129 The upshot of it all was that the navy resolved itself into cliques and clusters, small and exclusive, large and diffuse, shifting, amorphous—a nearly perfect reflection of the politi­ cal structure of the nation. It not only paralleled that struc­ ture; it was part of it. Augustus Hervey—friend of Byng, enemy of Anson—enjoyed gracious audiences with the Prince of Wales and was received by the king in cold silence.130 Hervey's brother, the Earl of Bristol, tried to establish friendly relations with the Duke of Newcastle and the king, but it was no use. When in the end Hervey unmistakably demonstrated his professional abilities while cruising off Brest in 1759, his sister, noting that Lord Anson was openly expres­ sing approbation of his conduct, implored him not to "per­ petuate enmity and be perpetually blowing those embers that are now extinguished." But he could not bury it.131 Hervey was politically on the outside—until the accession of George III, after which he enjoyed rapid preferment and even­ tually became a Lord of the Admiralty. He would not be reconciled with the core of political power that sustained Anson, and he would not believe that Anson promoted any officer save for reasons of pure patronage.132 In short, he was one of many officers whose sympathies were normally with the opposition. The surest delineation of the political landscape of the navy may be made by observing who opposed the exten­ sion of Admiralty control over the officers and who did not. Those in favor at Court and in Whitehall generally supported strong Admiralty administration. Officers like Norris and Ver­ non, on the other hand, were usually hostile to the administra­ tions in power, Norris moderately—his clashes with the Admi12S E.g. Vernon Papers, pp. 39-40, 79, 122, 149, 241. One letter to Ad­ miral Medley began ominously: "You know that your old acquaintance has always something to ask of friends in power" (H.M.C., Du Cane, p. 97). 129 E.g., Vernon Papers, pp. 63, 135, 521; Library of Congress, VernonWager MSS., folio 45223. 130 Erskine, Augustus Hervey's Journal, pp. 41, 76, 81. isi Ibid., p. 308. 132 Ibid., pp. 74, 79, 281, 301.

3. Commissioned Officers ralty were mild—and Vernon violently.133 And so, as we might expect, Norris and Rowley, who had shielded Norris's son, Richard, from court-martial after the battle of Toulon, were among the admirals who, in 1749, signed the petition against Article 34 of the Navy bill; nor is it surprising to discover Capt. Augustus Hervey acting as a manager of the campaign against it.134 Seniority

In addition to the nine flag grades there were three com­ missioned ranks: lieutenant; master and commander; and captain. The reader is already acquainted with how two of these were attained. The other, master and commander, was held by officers who had commanded sloops, fireships, storeships, or hospital ships. During the war of 1739—1748 the rank was only beginning to be looked upon as a necessary step between lieutenant and captain. It was primarily a seaman's rank, and those officers who had ability, yet were utterly without family or influence, usually went no further. Officers who could expect favors, on the other hand, rarely tarried at master and commander, and it was common for them to be given tempor­ ary command of a sloop (usually for not more than a year) prior to their elevation to captain in a post ship.135 Because promotion was gained through appointment,136 it was possible for a young man to reach captain entirely by means of private patronage. Beyond captain this did not hold. Promotion to rear-admiral was entirely at the Admiralty's disposal and was subject to a system of seniority. The growing importance of seniority was characteristic of 133 Vernon's politics are difficult. He was a friend of William Pulteney's and he had spoken in favor of a Spanish war in 1738. But Sir Charles Wager, who valued him, hoped that when he returned from the West Indies his politics would be "Whig." What Sir Charles meant by "Whig" may perhaps be best understood by the way he referred to the election of 1741 as "a violent struggle . . . to get what I call a Tory Parliament" (Vernon Papers, pp. 79, 238). But Vernon's nature seems to have been just too "contrary" for him to be happy anywhere but in opposition. 134 Erskine, Augustus Hervey's Journal, pp. 78-84. 1Se This is based on a selection of captains who had obvious family con­ nections, aristocratic or naval. ΐ 3 β with the exception that 37 captains were posted by list by the king's order on 1 January 1713. See Hardy, List.

12J

3. Commissioned Officers the increasing permanence of commissioned service. Origin­ ally, seniority had provided the soundest formula for resolving the conflicts between captains on foreign station as to who was to obey whom. The chaos which had reigned in these matters in earlier times was dissipated largely by resort to this princi­ ple, and when the principle had to be violated the Admiralty took pains to avoid ambiguous situations.137 Seniority was also used for determining rates of half pay. Since the establishment of 1700 did not provide for all cap­ tains and lieutenants (it provided for 50 of the former, 100 of the latter), a method had to be set down for designating who was to receive it. Previously such matters had been determined by the "quality" of an officer's service, that is, the rate of the largest ship in which he had served. In 1700 the method was suddenly changed; when vacancies occurred on the half-pay list they were to be filled by those officers who had "the next Right thereto by Seniority, with respect to the Dates of their First Commissions or Warrants."138 Evidently the change was too swift, for in 1713 the system reverted to the "quality" basis, and the result in 1713 was an amalgam of the two methods. Seniority could cause an officer to rise on the half-pay list, but it only operated within each rate of ship. Since by 1748 a large number of captains had served in 3rd rates, but no higher, it remained of considerable importance in calculating the halfpay allowance.189 Most important of all, seniority, because it implied experi­ ence, was a natural recommendation for preferment. Early in the war during the reign of William III, the Admiralty 1ST Ehrman, pp. 455-456. A squadron commander's orders always in­ cluded specific instructions as to when he was authorized to display his "broad pendant." 188 The Three Etsablishments, p. 41. This explains the first printed "Navy List" of 1700, in which officers were listed by seniority; Pepys had listed them alphabetically; see W. G. Perrin, "Navy Lists," MJW., 1 (1911), 258-264. 13s Corbett MSS. xi, folio 32. The establishment of 1715 does not make clear that this amalgam of the two was to be the policy. I have deduced that it was from surveying the half-pay books (Adm. 25/33-5). In 1747, for example, the more senior of those who held the rank of master and commander were paid as 4-shilling captains, and the rest as 2s. 6d. lieu­ tenants. In this way the administrators fitted a newly developing rank into an establishment which did not provide for it.

Q. Commissioned Officers approached the problem of rewarding seniority by promotion, and one tangible result was an Admiralty order of March 1694 that "the first lieutenants of the three highest rates should be appointed strictly on seniority."140 Such an order was subject to the whims of future Admiralty Boards, but it reflected the growing recognition given length of service as an asset for promotion. In 1704, when Sir George Rooke quarreled with the Lord High Admiral over the principle, he asserted, "I have always been of Opinion, that where Seniority and Merit meet in the same Person, it would be of the utmost conse­ quence [i.e. detriment] to the Service, to discourage Officers so Qualified." But Prince George replied that Capt. Whet­ stone had been made rear-admiral over Wishart—who was Rooke's First Captain and the senior of the two141—because Whetstone had willingly served in the West Indies; and the Prince added, "I remember upon making the Flags last Year, all my Council were of Opinion, that the Crown never ty'd itself to Seniority in Chusing their Officers." But Rooke thought that the by-passing of his First Captain "so impair'd [his] Credit & Interest in the Fleet" that he had no choice but to resign. His maneuver was successful, for a week later Wishart was promoted to rear-admiral.142 In the years following the Treaty of Utrecht the Admiralty modified its policy in such a way as to place more emphasis on seniority. The Board recognized that it could not possibly build a corps of loyal, experienced officers unless it gave some assurance that long service would be rewarded. Nevertheless, it did not bind itself to a policy of strict seniority promotion. There were no rules formally laid down.143 One could hardly «0 Ehrman, p. 453. "i By only one number. "2 The letters were copied into Adm. Ind. 7588, a manuscript seniority list (ca. 1747). 1*3 Prof. Michael Lewis (England's Sea Officers, p. 132) states that there was a formal order in 1718, presumably following a similar statement in C. N. Robinson, The British Fleet (1894), p. 362. But I have been unable to discover any evidence of an order or resolution to this effect, although I searched the following documents in hopes of finding one: Adm. 1 /3630; !/3631; 1 /5154; 2/367; 3/3°; 3/31; 7/339; 7/675· Moreover, it is incon­ ceivable to me that a resolution of such importance could go unmentioned in the correspondence on the subject during the 1739—1748 war. Perhaps Commander Robinson was misled by the fact that the annual seniority lists were first printed in 1718.

Q. Commissioned Officers find a better indication of the character of eighteenth-century administrative regulations than the fact that this important rule, which was not written down, was virtually never broken, whereas the three rules governing promotion to lieutenant— qualifying examination, 20-year minimum age, and 6-year minimum service—which were recorded in the printed Regu­ lations,144 were often broken either in fact or in spirit. Essentially, what the new policy did was render repetition of Wishart's temporary misfortune extremely improbable. It did not mean that the senior captain was automatically se­ lected for rear-admiral when a vacancy occurred, but it did mean that the Admiralty could not reach down the list for a man without reckoning with those senior to him. In other words, the Board could not choose freely from the list of cap­ tains; if it felt that two captains merited promotion, but had only room to promote one, it had to select the senior man. That this had become the recognized practice in the early eighteenth century is indicated by official seniority lists, rank­ ing captains, masters and commanders, and lieutenants ac­ cording to the dates of their first commissions in those ranks; these lists were printed for the first time in 1718.145 Although it was apparently intended that seniority should also influence promotion to ranks below rear-admiral, there is no evidence that any serious attention was paid to it, probably because of the impossibility of abiding by it when vacancies occurred over­ seas.146 But in the case of promotion to rear-admiral the prin­ ciple of seniority was observed with scarcely any omissions. The adoption of this principle had important consequences. It meant that position on the captain's list was crucial. Even for promotion within the flag ranks, it was the date of promo­ tion to captain, not the date of promotion to rear-admiral, that counted. From the list (Table 8) it may be noted that when Forbes and Haddock were made rear-admirals in 1734, 144 Regulations and Instructions (1734), pp. 14-15·

145 Copies are in the P.R.O. (Adm. 118/5093-5094); these copies, which must have been the Admiralty Office's own, are valuable because they contain pen-and-ink entries as to why some names were dropped. 140 It is interesting that at about the same time the Admiralty tried to limit the appointments made by overseas commanders-in-chief; see Adm. 3/31, 7 March 1718.

I30

3. Commissioned Officers Mathews, Vernon, and Lestock were by-passed. But when the West Indies command was offered to Vernon in 1739 he in­ sisted on being restored to his former position on the list, and the Admiralty acceded; hence, his initial flag commission was that of Vice-Admiral of the Blue.147 Mathews was given the same privilege in 174a.148 Again, in June 1744 Haddock and Ogle by-passed Vernon, but a year later a different Board of Admiralty raised Vernon to Admiral of the White, thus restoring him to his original position.149 And so the Admiralty could make, if it chose, minor inversions in the seniority pat­ tern, but there was continual pressure to unmake them. Naturally, many captains managed to convince themselves that promotion to rear-admiral was automatic. Although the Admiralty had never tied itself to a system which could take no account of fitness to command, one can readily grasp that any policy involving selection would breed misunderstanding and resentment, especially in cases where unfitness had not been plainly demonstrated. And it seems that consciences in Whitehall were by no means clear about this. For some by­ passed captains the Admiralty found sinecures and pensions; Vernon Papers, p. 5. Why Vernon was selected is an interesting ques­ tion. The primary reason must have been that Sir Charles Wager thought him an able, if contentious, officer. Mr. Ranft is correct in dismissing the notion that he was sent out to silence his voice in Parliament; the command was strategically too important, and implied too much political power, for such a frivolous reason to predominate. But it should be rec­ ognized that he might not have been selected, had not the already exist­ ing admirals either refused the command or been otherwise employed; Norris and Wager were out of the question. Balchen was commander-inchief at Plymouth, and Cavendish at Portsmouth. The king would not employ Stewart, which Norris presumed "happened from sum vote in parliment" (Addl. MSS. 2813a, folio 14; Stewart was the only flag

officer

to vote against the Convention with Spain). Forbes, now Earl of Granard, declined to serve (ibid., folio 20) and was afterwards struck from the list. Hager was ordered superannuated

(ibid.),

and Ogle promoted in place of

him. Haddock was in the Mediterranean. Robinson's health was so bad that he would not go to Portsmouth in November 1739 (Adm. 3/43, 18 Nov. 1739). And Ogle was scheduled to cruise off Cape Finisterre (Rich­ mond, i, 26-27). Unquestionably the need to choose a new flag

(Vernon

was selected on 9 July) was what caused the superannuation of Hager and the promotion of Ogle (11 July). li SBut Lestock after his elevation to flag dock and Ogle. 149 yernon Papers, p. 434.

rank stayed junior to Had­

3. Commissioned Officers TABLE 8. Seniority Promotion to Flae Rank The first column of dates gives the year each man took post as captain; the second, the year of promotion to flag rank. Captains who died before their positions on the list entered "the promotion zone" have been omitted. Above Edward Vernon the list is incomplete, inasmuch as half a dozen captains who were still alive in 1739 and yet were never again employed after 1714 have been excluded. The analysis of seniority promotion begins with Vernon's name. The following abbreviations are employed: A F , Admiral of the Fleet A W , Admiral of the White AB, Admiral of the Blue V A R , Vice-adm. of the Red V A W , Vice-adm. of the White V A B , Vice-adm. of the Blue R A R , Rear-adm. of the Red R A W , Rear-adm. of the White R A B , Rear-adm. of the Blue 1690 1692

SRA, Superannuated rear-admiral B of A, Board of Admiralty NC, Naval Commissioner VC, Victualling Commissioner GH, Greenwich Hospital Rsgd., Resigned commission Dsmd., Dismissed from service C M , Court-martial D., Died

Sir John Norris Sir Charles Wager Lord Archibald Hamilton Richard Haddock Salmon Morrice Sir John Balchen Tudor Trevor William Moses Bennet Allen

1693 1695 1697 1697 1697 1698 1699

Philip Cavendish Richard Hughes

1701 1702

Charles Smith Thomas Mathews

1702 1703

1742

Humphrey Pudner Robert Harland Thomas Lawrence Hon. Charles Stewart Edward Vernon

1703 1704 1704 1704 1706

1729 1739

John Roberts Richard Lestock George, Lord Forbes (Earl of Granard) Nicholas Haddock John Hager Walter Pigot

1706 1706 1706

1742 1734

1707 1707 1707

1707 1708

1727 1728

1728

1734 1734

132

D. AF, 1749. Head of B of A, d. AW, 1743. Rsgd. to serve on B of A, 1734. Comptroller of the Navy, 1732. Rsgd. as V A W , 1734, pensioned. Also Govr. of GH; d. A W , 1744. Lt. Govr. of GH. Given pension. Never again employed after misconduct in 1706. B of A, 1742; d. AB, 1743. Rsgd. to become N C at Portsmth., 1729. Lt. Govr. of GH. Rsgd. to become N C at Chatham, 1737; re-instated as V A R in 1742; dsmd. by CM, 1746. No information. No information. Captain of GH. D. V A R , I740.» Initial rank V A B ; dsmd. AW, 1746. No information. Initial rank R A W ; d. AB, I746'> Govr. of Barbados; never served in flag rank; dsmd. V A B , 1739. D. A B , 1746. Superannuated while R A R , 1739° No information.

3. Commissioned Officers TABLE 8. Continued Tancred Robinson Sir Chaloner Ogle John Mihell Richard Rouzier John Hemmington James Gunman James Steuart Charles Brown Thomas Jacob George Purvis Sir Charles Hardy Philip Vanbrugh

1708 1708 1708 1708 1708 1708 1709 1709 1709 1709 1709 1710

John Fletcher Covin Mayne

1711 1711

Christopher Parker Thomas Graves John St. Lo Edward Blackett Robert Harwood Thomas Whorwood Tyrwitt Cayley Thomas Davers Hercules Baker Edward Falkingham Francis Hume Alexander Geddes Thomas Williams

1713 1713 1713 1713 1713 1713 1713 1713 1713 1713 1713 1714 1715

Charles Kendal Vincent Pearse Ellis Brand William Smith Hon. George Clinton

1715 1715 1715 1716 1716

William Rowley John Hildesley Robert Mann John Yeo William Martin Samuel Atkins George Protheroe Francis Delaval William Davies Isaac Townsend Humphrey Orme Henry Medley John Weller

1716 1716 1716 1718 1718 1718 1718 1719 1719 1720 1720 1721 1721

1736 1739

1742

1742

1743

1743 1743

1743

1744 1744

133

Rsgd, R A W , 1739.'' D. AF, 1751. No information. No information. S R A , 1747. Treasurer of GH. D. AF, 1757. N C at Chatham, 1742. No information. NC, 1735. B of A ; d. V A R , I744.» Rsgd. 1739 to become N C at Plymouth. No information. Rsgd. because of ill health, I74I-' S R A , 1747. S R A , 1747. S R A , 1747. No information. No information. N C at Deptford, 1744. V C , 1748. D. V A R , I746.« Treasurer of GH. N C at Port Mahon, 1742. No information. N C , 1743. Declined service in 1738 because of infirmities.*' No information. No information. S R A , 1747. S R A , 1747. D. A F , 1761, but became Govr. of N . Y . in 1741 and never served as flag. D. AF, 1768. S R A , 1747. Captain of GH. SRA, 1747. D. A B , 1756. SRA, 1747. No information. No information. V C , 1744D. A W , 1765. No information. D. V A B , 1747-' Employed in yachts.'

3. Commissioned Officers TABLE 8. Continued Matthew Consett Lord Vere Beauclerk Samuel Braithwaite Robert MacCarthy George Anson Sir Yelverton Peyton

1721 1721 1722 1722 1724 1725

Perry Mayne Francis Dansays

1725 1726

Charles Cotterell Robert Long Peter Warren Hon. John Byng Samuel Mead

1726 1727 1727 1727 1727

Christopher Pocklington William Miller John Gascoigne Henry Osborn Edward Baker William Smith Miles Stapleton Joseph Lingen Wm. Henry Fleming Hon. Fitzroy Henry Lee Israel Sparks Thomas Smith William Laws Thomas Griffin Cornelius Mitchell

1727 1727 1727 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728 1729 1730 1731 1731 1731

John Wingate William Parry John Towry Charles Fanshaw George Burrish Edward Hawke John Ambrose

1732 1732 1732 1733 1733 1734 1734

Edmund Williams

1734

John Durell James Compton Nicholas Robinson

1734 1734 1735

1745 1744 1745

1745 1745

1747

1747 1747 1747

1747

m

No information. B of A ; rsgd. as AB, 1749. No information. Went into foreign service. B o f A ; d . AF, 1762. Suspended for misconduct (1742), and later dsmd. by C M . Superannuated as V A R , 1757. Employed in yachts; Govr. of GH.k SRA, 1747SRA, 1747. D. V A R . 1752. Executed as AB, 1757. Was a Customs Commissr. at time of selection; request for flag refused.' SRA, 1747. Insane.™ SRA, 1747. Pensioned as AW, 1765. SRA, 1747. Rsgd. 1744. SRA, 1747SRA, 1747. No information. D. V A W , 1751. No mformation. D. AB, 1762. SRA, 1747. D. AW, 1771. Guilty of misconduct (1746), and later dsmd. by C M , 1749. No information. Employed in yachts.® N C at Port Mahon, 1748. SRA, 1747. Dsmd. by CM, 1745. D. AF, 1781. Dsmd. by CM, 1745, but restored as SRA, 1750. Dsmd. by CM, 1745; petition for SRA refused, 1747.° Petition for SRA refused.® NC, 1743. Dsmd. from command by CM, 1743-

3. Commissioned Officers Table 8. Concluded Richard Norris

1735

Charles Drummond William Chambers Thomas Trefusis

1736 1736 1736

1747

Charles Knowles Hon. John Forbes Hon. Edward Boscawen Thomas Fox

1737 1737

1747 1747

1737 1737

1747

Harcourt Master Charles Watson

1738 1738

1748

Disappeared after misconduct at Toulon, 1744. SRA, 1747. D. RAR, 1753. VC, 1741; N C at Port Mahon, 1744; SRA, 1748. D. AW, 1777. B of A ; d. AF, 1781. D. AB, 1761. Dsmd. by CM, 1747; restored to SRA. No information. D. V A W . 1757.

Except as noted below, the information is taken from: Official printed seniority lists in the P.R.O. (Adm. 118/5092-5094); John Hardy's List (1784); Sir George Jackson, Naval Commissioners . . . from 1660 to 1760 (ed. Sir G. F. Duckett, 1889); D. Bonner Smith and M. A. Lewis, The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815 (3 vol., Greenwich, 1954). The most difficult problem is establishing dates of death, and undoubtedly the list contains names which should have been omitted, and omits others that should have been included. « Adm. 3/43, II Dec. 1740. ' H. M. C., Du Cane, p. 195. •> H. M. C., Du Cane, p. 156. i Addl. MSS. 32694, folio 362. " Adm. 3/43, II July 1739. ' Adm. 8/19-22, passim. d Adm. 3/43, 8 Nov. 1739. ' Adm. 3/51, 5 Sept. 1745. • Adm. 3/48, 19 June 1744. "" Charnock, Biographia Navalis, ' A d m . 1/2099, 27 Apr. 1741. iv, 183. « Erskine, Augustus Hervey's " Adm. 8/18-21, passim. Journal, p. 45. ° Adm. 3/57, 24 July 1747. Adm. 3/48, 23 March 1744. » Ibid. others were given places as Naval or Victualling Commissioners. Hercules Baker, who was passed over in 1743, considered the flag appointment his "Right, after having Unexceptionably Served for it, upwards of Forty Years," but he settled for the Treasurership of Greenwich Hospital.^®" During the war, as the number of commitments for the fleet multiplied, the need for flag officers increased, and the Admiralty began to give a loose interpretation to the old establishment which allowed for only nine admirals. T h e expansion of the flag list began in December 1743.1®! But the accelerated 150 Addl. MSS. 32703, folio 176. 151 The immediate cause of this expansion must have been connected with the Admiralty's difficulties with Admiral Mathews; see above pp. 6970.

135

3· Commissioned Officers rate of promotions raised a problem: the Admiralty found that it did not have at its disposal places and pensions enough to take care of the captains it wished to set aside. It wanted to promote a number of energetic, deserving men, and its choices ranged far down the seniority list—in 1747 the Board was considering captains as far down as Edward Boscawen.152 But nearer the top of the list stood a number of borderline cases, men whom the Board did not wish to promote, yet did not wish to offend.153 Furthermore, a good deal of discontent had been stirred up in the fleet because of the captains already by­ passed. A correspondent of the Duke of Bedford's, who signed himself "M. I.," summed up the situation; his opinion would not be worth recording, were it not for the fact that the very expedient which he recommended was adopted two years later: It seems it has been the Custom (I know not for how long) for the Capts. in the Sea Service to expect the honour of being created a flag Olficer according to their length of Service; (too frequently fallsly so call'd) whereas nothing is more common than for a man whose Commission bears an old date to have seen but very little Service, . . .—Nevertheless, when a promotion is talk'd of, it being his turn, as he calls it, being high in the List, he immediately sum­ mons all his Relations, and, to be sure, don't forget his parliamentary Acquaintances, who Solicit and make a bustle about the Mans hav­ ing his Right; that is, he must be an Admiral because he is next in the List; and too often this Method has prevail'd to the great Scandal of the British Flag, . . . It is true the Board of Admiralty do frequently set persons aside, and in recompense make 'em Com­ missioners of Yards Sec. But as these Capts. are many more in num­ ber than can be provided for, and as they have made it a point of honour not to Serve after a person is promoted over their heads, I think it wou'd prevent a good deal of Murmuring, and disquietude, among them and their friends, to allow 'em Rear Admirals halfe pay; it would likewise ease the Board of a great deal of Trouble and impertinent Solicitation: The sum as a National expence would be so trifling that I don't think a single person would be against it.184 152 See Table 8. There is among the Admiralty papers a manuscript seniority list (Adm. Ind. 7588), undated, which stops two (inconsequential) names below Boscawen's and does not traverse the additional half-dozen to Legge. 163 For rumors of the political maneuverings that took place in antici­ pation of these promotions, see Du Cane, pp. 161-163. 154Woburn MSS. ix, folio 108, 16 March 1745.

3· Commissioned Officers On July 15, 1747 nine captains were promoted; simultane­ ously, those passed over were offered "a Pension . . . equal to the Halfe Pay of a Rear Admiral."165 In proposing the scheme to the king, the Admiralty made clear its concern over the "great Discontentment" of those captains by-passed, "and this in many Cases where no positive Misbehaviour of theirs can be alledged, or any Neglect of Duty whilst they were in the Service; But . . . on the other hand," their Lordships argued, "It would be attended with great prejudice to the Service, . . . if from a single Regard to length of Service, Captains should be made Flag OfiScers whose Age or want of Capacity render them unequal to have such a Trust reposed in them."186 OfiBcially these men were designated "Rear Admirals in Gen­ eral terms without any distinction of Colours," but subse­ quently such disappointed captains were spoken of as admirals of the "Yellow Squadron." It is evident that the Admiralty adopted this superannuation scheme because it felt obliged to provide for captains whom it did not choose to promote, and because its customary means for doing so had been exhausted. But the Board did not feel obliged to promote every captain who happened to become eligible by seniority; it could choose, so long as it confined its choices to captains near the top of the list. Although this limitation of choice was essential to the wel­ fare of the naval profession, it had an important and unavoid­ able disadvantage. There were only two steps from lieutenant to rear-admiral, and the second step took an interminably long time.157 The natural reaction of the patronge system to seniority was to get lieutenants into "post ships," that is, ships of 20 guns or more whose command meant a captaincy, while still very young. There were few "boy captains" in the 1740's but they became increasingly numerous subsequently, with the result that an officer who could not command favors or distinguish himself early in his career was likely to be dead or a dotard by the time his number came up. But most of that "β Adm. 3/57, 15 July 1747. we Adm. 7/340, 7 July 1747. The Order in Council is printed in Bar­ row, Life of Anson, pp. 147-149. in this era the rank of master and commander was not yet estab­ lished as an essential step on the promotion ladder.

3- Commissioned Officers came later. In 1740 it seemed even to a captain as well con­ nected as George Clinton that the prospect of a flag was hopeless. He could not have foreseen how Admiralty policy would moderate the effect of seniority during the coming dec­ ade, when he wrote to his patron, the Duke of Newcastle: "I have been 25 Years a Capt. in the Navy, which is a long time to remain in the Capacity for a Private Captain, more espe­ cially for a man of some Family. As to a Flag, My Lord, ye Prospect is so distant, that I can Scarce entertain any Thoughts of it."188 Few captains could dream of the favors that Clinton could ask for. If even he despaired of promotion, it is not surprising that most captains, especially younger ones, turned to other means for improving their fortune. The Duke of Bedford was told: "A Young fellow thinks the Flag so remote from him, that he is very indifferent about his Conduct after he gets a Ship."159 MORALE, DISCIPLINE, AND COMPETENCE

Because the Admiralty could not force its officers to take up employment when ordered, a larger officer corps had to be maintained than could be used. This was wasteful, of course, but as long as the Treasury could pay for it, not serious. The primary problem was that of denying promotion to incom­ petent officers and preventing avarice from tempting the rest to forsake their duty. Both aims could be achieved, as con­ temporaries recognized,160 through a regulated system of ad­ vancement based on merit. Such a system could do much to neutralize the effect of prize money. For although the fact that prize shares were proportioned not equally, but by rank, seems deplorable, it had the benign effect of enhancing the impor­ tance of promotion. Rank meant money; flag rank at sea al­ most assured a fortune. Under such circumstances the rigors of battle might well be borne even by the most avaricious cap­ tain, so long as the merit thus demonstrated had a fair chance I5S Addl. MSS. 32693, folios 245-248, 30 April 1740. Clinton was begging for the governorship of New York, which he got eventually. He was pro­ moted to rear-admiral in 1743, just three years later; but he never served. 169 Woburn MSS. ix, folio 108, 16 March 1745, letter from "M.I." ieo See the speeches by Sir Charles Wager and Lord Baltimore in 1739 (Pari. Hist., xi, 111-114).

3· Commissioned Officers of producing promotion. But promotion was not essential. Flag shares went to commodores too, and commodores were appointed ad hoc without regard to seniority, and not neces­ sarily with any regard to merit. A regulated system of promotion would have been almost impossible to institute under eighteenth-century conditions. And the principle of seniority alone was not acceptable as a basis for regulation; the Board rightly refused to be slavishly bound to a system which would reward long service at the ex­ pense of rewarding anything else. For, as modern civil-service experience has repeatedly shown, systems constructed to purge favoritism and political maneuvering are not necessarily con­ ducive to promoting merit; if too inflexible, they tend to focus attention on rooting out incompetence rather than rewarding exceptional talent and industry. However, by adopting a policy of selection, the Admiralty kept open the door to favor­ itism and—in an age when "friend" usually implied "political ally"—interest. The navy would have liked to have a promo­ tion system that would encourage all officers, but its primary goal was to provide a method for filling the top commands with men of ability. In spite of all the politics involved, this was achieved to some extent under the informal system of patronage. It was a system well suited to the needs of an officer corps scarcely more than a thousand strong, where nearly every captain's service reputation was well known to his seniors.161 Ordinarily, political connection could not advance an egregiously incom­ petent officer very far. Anson, when head of the Admiralty, balked at Newcastle's "borough recommendations," and re­ fused to promote those who had not demonstrated their abil­ ity.162 It was an attitude shared in some degree by the men who had preceded him in that post, and by nearly all of his colleagues at sea. Except, it seems, in the case of sons and lei Cf. Sir R. V. Hamilton and J. K. Laughton, Recollections of James Anthony Gardner, N.R.S. (1906), pp. 66-67: "The admiral was like Sylla the Dictator; that is, he would go any length to serve his friends, but was the reverse to those he had a dislike to. He appeared to be well ac­ quainted with the character of most of the officers in the service; his memory in that respect was astonishing." This was written in 1787, when the officer corps was much larger. ιβ2 Namier, Structure of Politics, pp. 33-34.

3- Commissioned Officers relatives, senior officers were usually careful about their pro­ motions and recommendations; they knew that their own rep­ utations would suffer for advancing young men to posts which they were unfit to hold.163 On the other hand, promis­ ing officers had a good chance of acquiring powerful friends afloat and ashore. The king himself, upon discovering that Edward Hawke—whose conduct at Toulon contrasted notably with that of his colleagues—lacked a powerful patron, referred to him as "my captain" and saw to his promotion when the time came.164 To promote a substantial number of officers who merited it was one thing. To establish a system that had the moralebuilding quality of being based on merit was another. Not all deserving officers were promoted. Far from it. Anson, though he staved off a great deal of outside political interference with the navy, was in no position to repudiate it entirely. All he could insist on was that persons recommended for whatever reasons also possessed professional ability. In truth, Anson helped his friends and hampered his enemies, and some of his enemies were able and deserving officers. "Is it not very re­ markable," wrote Henry Legge to the Duke of Bedford, "that almost all the glory we have got this war has fallen to the share of Mr. Anson's pupils—Bret, Stephens, and Saumarez?"166 These were dedicated officers, but it was Anson as their pa­ tron, not as their teacher, who put them in stations where glory was to be had—that was in his power. Augustus Hervey, surveying the favors which Anson distributed to his friends, could not bring himself to believe that the great admiral favored merit any more than anyone else did. And the attitude of Capt. John Hildesley was typical. In 1740 Hildesley tried to resign his command of the Grafton, when he learned she 163 in 1754 an admiral tried to explain the complexity of the situation to a young lieutenant who wondered whether his recent promotion put him under political obligation to the First Lord (Anson); the admiral's answer was yes, definitely, but he added: ". . . you were not made a lieutenant by him in stipulation for your vote, but as a young gentleman recommended by me to him . . . for whose behaviour I would be an­ swerable as an officer and a gentleman." Quoted in Maud Wyndham, Chronicles of the Eighteenth Century (2 vol., 1924), n, 64. is* A. T. Mahan, Types of Naval Officers (Boston, 1901), pp. 84-85. ies H. B. Legge to Bedford, 25 Oct. 1746, in Bedford Correspondence, I, 164.

3. Commissioned Officers was bound for the West Indies.166 Luckily for him she proved unfit to sail, although it is possible that it was not just luck, for that summer Admiral Balchen had accused him of inatten­ tion to duty while she was fitting out.167 In December 1743 he resigned the Cornwall, bound to the Mediterranean. But Hildesley saw no reason to connect his conduct with the fact that he was passed over for flag promotion in 1744. He wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: "If I was apprehensive any thing had impeded my preferment . . . except the want of friends to support my pretentions to a flag officer, I shou'd have had more modesty than ... to think of writing to intreat you to put forth your hand towards recovering my rank in the fleet so unfortunately lost. . . ."168 The patronage system meant that both the Admiralty and the officers were caught up in politics. Every organization faces the problem of favoritism—the ques­ tion is one of degree. In the eighteenth century proper con­ nections were so important that most officers came to believe that nothing else mattered. The proof of this is that nearly everyone in the service took care to establish connections, and the result was that the officer corps was divided up into cliques which hated and mistrusted one another. It was a system in which breakdown of morale and discipline constantly threat­ ened. The problem of discipline was intensified by the fact that once an officer attained the rank of captain, promotion was bound to become less important to him; there was only one more significant step, and that seemed far away. Instead, he concentrated on placing himself "in Fortune's way." He tried to avoid hazardous, unprofitable situations. This is not to say that all captains shied away from the dangers of battle and the chance for glory; but any captain who seemed slow or hesitant about engaging the enemy was likely to have his motives called into question, and probably with good reason. To compensate captains who fought well, but without profit to themselves, Parliament granted "five pounds for every Man which was living on board any . . . Ships of war . . .taken, sunk, burnt, or ιββ Adm. 3/44, 2 Sept., 6 Sept. 1740. 167 Adm. 3/44, 31 July 1740. ιββ Addl. MSS. 32703, folio 188. Hildesley was made a superannuated rear-admiral in 1747.

3· Commissioned Officers otherwise destroyed."169 This was called "head money." It was divided among the victorious crew in the same proportions as prize money, and its purpose was undisguisedly to encour­ age captains to attack "Ships of Force" and not just merchant­ men. In effect, it served as a recognition that reward was deserved, rather than a genuine incentive. The coercive instrument of discipline was the court-martial. That courts-martial were, on balance, equitable in their find­ ings was the opinion of that relentless critic, Admiral Ver­ non.170 Naturally, where the evidence was clear-cut the verdict was likely to be sound. But questions as to whether a captain fought well or ill, whether he obeyed or disobeyed instruc­ tions, could rarely have been clear-cut. Capt. Richard Norris's behavior in the battle of Toulon was such that his guilt must have seemed self-evident, but at the inquiry conducted by Admiral Rowley, Norris—who was the son of the Admiral of the Fleet—was found innocent.171 When he was ordered home to be court-martialed in England, he ran away, and who can say: Did he run because he feared his guilt would be found out, or because he feared a hostile political atmosphere and a hostile court? Perhaps both. But undeniably the navy's judicial system was also tangled up in the web of friendship and political obligation. If an accused officer had friends on the court-martial, they might get him off. If tried and convicted by a set of enemies abroad, he might gain pardon through his friends in the administration at home. If convicted and dis­ missed by a court-martial at home under the influence of a hostile Admiralty, he might upon a change in administration be restored to his full rank. If punishment was severe—as it was in the famous case of Admiral Byng—then there was always the suspicion that it arose from personal animosity or political expediency. All of these things happened regularly. Some officers were deprived of their commands for primarily political reasons. Aside from his power to dispense patronage, a commander at sea was by the very nature of his duties drawn into politics. When on foreign station he might bear the reιβ9 jg Geo. XI c. 4 (1740). It had been granted in 1708 also. 170 Pari. Hist., xiv, 404-405. "i See Richmond, n, 30.

Q. Commissioned Officers sponsibility of assigning convoys and protecting trade and set­ tlements; not only that, he frequently had to press seamen from already undermanned merchant vessels. In the House of Commons, as in the colonial assemblies, such matters were explosive. If the Directors of the East India Company were displeased by the conduct of the commander-in-chief in those waters, that was often a signal for his removal. In 1747 Edward Peyton was recalled at the Company's request for not engag­ ing La Bourdonnais.172 Capt. Fitzroy Lee was ordered courtmartialed in 1746 because the Council and Assembly of An­ tigua complained that the island's trade was "almost ruined" by his negligence.173 This episode prompted the following com­ ment from James Henshaw, London agent for a number of sea officers: The vigorous proceedings of the House of Commons have made it a fashion to find fault with the conduct of all sea-officers of the first and second rank. Accordingly we are told that the Jamaica mer­ chants have complained of Mr. Davers, because one of the ships in his convoy was taken, and he is to be recalled and the command given to Admiral Mayne. Mr. Lee, too, does not please the other set of West India merchants, and he is to be recalled; so that in these times, a gentleman who commands may not unproperly be said to have more masters than one.174

The Admiralty, forced to choose between standing by its officers and screening itself from the uproar, too often chose the latter, and under such circumstances it was understand­ able that officers often felt obliged to protect themselves from such political attacks by political means. Perhaps the chief value of courts-martial was that they 172 Though the Directors subsequently declined to supply the necessary proofs for bringing Peyton to trial, they did extract from the Admiralty the promise that Peyton "would never again be employed" in the East Indies (Adm. 3/58, 15 Dec. 1747). Mathews got similar treatment when he returned from the East Indies in 1724. The Directors could not, or would not, get sufficient evidence to prosecute him, though the Admiralty by no means discouraged them (Adm. 3/35, 24 July 1724 β.). 173 Adm. 3/56, 1 Dec. 1746. Lee was never brought to trial; the mer­ chants refused to produce evidence, and he was restored to his rank by the king in 1748 (Adm. 3/58, 16 Feb. 1748). As one may note from the seniority table, he was selected for rear-admiral while the court-martial was still pending. H.M.C.,

Du Cane,

pp. 54-55.

3. Commissioned Officers directed a searchlight of publicity on the conduct of sea offi­ cers. Reputations were on display, and the officers valued honor and reputation dearly—perhaps as much as they said they did. And obviously the British public cared about the performance of the navy. Few Englishmen have ever enjoyed as great popularity as Admiral Vernon did after his capture of Porto Bello; William Pulteney told him that in the election of 1741 he had already been chosen M. P. in three constituencies and "might have been chosen in twenty more."175 Nevertheless, after the failure at Cartagena and a subsequent failure at Porto Bello, the public began to lose some of its enthusiasm for Vernon. Sir Charles Wager wrote to him in 1742: "I find that some blame is laid upon you in this last expedition to Porto Bello. . . . But it is always expected by this nation that we should have success in everything we undertake, and when we have not, somebody is to be blamed."17® Undoubtedly Wager felt keenly what he wrote, for he had resigned from the Ad­ miralty a few months before, on the fall of Walpole, and the House of Commons was busily accusing the fallen government of mismanagement and corruption. Public opinion was by its nature a blunt instrument for securing discipline and success, but in the long run the government, the Admiralty, and the sea officers responded to its impact. How are we to evaluate the quality of an officer corps? It is hazardous to offer judgment on a matter which inevitably requires comparison with the officers of the enemy and which was undoubtedly a subject for argument at the time. The fact that Britain was on the whole victorious at sea during the eighteenth century should not lead us automatically to the conclusion that the superiority of her officers was the reason for it. And we should be careful not to make too much of bravery and daring in battle. Contemporaries valued this, and not without reason, but we should not overlook the crucial question as to how the commanders-in-chief chose to deploy their ships. As Mahan has reminded us, the most important question about a battle is likely to be: "How did the ships 175 Vernon Papers, "β Ibid., p. 256.

p. 840.

3> Commissioned Officers come to be just there?"177 All navies had their heroes, and occasionally the greatest heroes—one is reminded of George Rodney—were also the most avaricious and self-seeking. It would be very hard to prove that British admirals in the eighteenth century stationed their ships more disinterestedly than their opponents did. Were British officers better trained? Not formally, at any rate; the system of entry guaranteed at best minimum competence. Was the British officer corps more cohesive, united by better morale, excited by a more noble spirit? Thanks to administrative measures and to the social structure of England, it was socially more homogenous than either the officer corps of late-seventeenth-century England or of eighteenth-century France; there was also, because the navy was popular, a certain amount of pride in the service; but these advantages were much mitigated by the disunifying effect of political and personal animosities, encouraged by the patronage system. Did the British officer corps possess a better system of promotion? The only system was that of seniority, and the benefits of seniority promotion may well have been offset by its disadvantages. Was the British officer corps ruled by a more equitable and effective system of justice and punish­ ment? It does not seem so. If any pattern emerges from the naval history of the eighteenth century, it is that British offi­ cers generally fought more boldly and more competently; British captains handled their ships, British admirals their squadrons, more aggressively and more expertly. It is useful to ask why. Tentatively, three explanations may be offered, and none is predominantly administrative. First, the naval profession in Britain attracted some promising young men. This was partly due to its popularity, but also to its social status: the profession was acceptable to aristocrats, yet at the same time was not so soft as to attract too many. Whether aristocrats made good officers or not (and many did not), their presence in the navy served to attract men with good backgrounds and talents, who might otherwise have rejected the naval profession in favor of some livelihood which could accord them a more respectable position in socii" Mahan, Influence, p. 10.

3· Commissioned Officers ety. Second, British officers were more competent because they were more experienced. They spent more time at sea because Britain, year in, year out, had more ships at sea than her rivals. As Capt. Curtis Barnett remarked to Anson in 1745, "I am stupid enough to think that we are worse officers though better seamen than our neighbours."178 Third, they were more aggressive because it was British naval doctrine to pursue the enemy fleet until it was driven from the sea. Two of Britain's greatest naval failures in the mid-eighteenth century, that of Mathews in 1744 and Byng in 1756, occurred partly because the two admirals brought their squadrons into action clumsily, but mainly because they failed to keep pressure on the enemy after the battles were over.179 British naval doctrine called for aggressive tactics, whereas French squadrons generally went to sea, not to fight, but to accomplish a particular mission; the anxiety of the French commanders was to preserve their ships so that the mission might be carried out. The difference in objectives led to a difference in behavior.180 Experience and aggressiveness may be seen as products of something larger: the emphasis of the kingdom on maritime objectives, and the huge resources, financial and material, that the government was able to put at the navy's disposal. These resources enabled Britain to keep more ships at sea for longer periods; they made possible that strength in reserve which encouraged boldness at sea. In the final analysis, did not the weight of Britain's naval resources contribute to the quality of her naval leadership? its Quoted by Richmond, 1, p. xii. "9 Richmond, 11, 44-50; H. W. Richmond, Papers Relating to the Loss of Minorca in 1756, N.R.S. (1913), p. xi; B. Tunstall, Admiral Byng and the Loss of Minorca (1928), pp. 134-148. 180 See Mahan, Influence, pp. 5, 65-70.

-/.

SiXe

This is a matter of general interest since it goes far to show what barbarous laws can be enacted or kept in force in even "enlightened" periods when the most intelligent mem­ bers of a nation have no personal interest in amending them. —ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE1 Poor Sailors—you are the only class of Beings in our famed Country of Liberty really Slaves, devoted and hardly used, tho' the very Being of the Country depends on you. CAPT. THOMAS PASLEY, IjSo 2

The true misfortune is that we have not seamen. THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE, IJJFOI

I

N ONE very important respect the maritime resources of eighteenth-century Britain were not ample: there were not enough seamen to supply the wartime needs of both the navy and the merchant service. The seventeenth-century navy had dealt rather clumsily with a number of administrative prob­ lems, and in this book we are interested in seeing how the eighteenth century applied better solutions to most of them. But to the problem of manning the fleet the eighteenthcentury navy could not find a solution. The system of manning remained essentially what it had been in earlier times. It came to be operated with a more elaborate organization, and certain procedures became conventional; but because of its very na­ ture, because it was considered an evil, a system to be prac­ ticed under necessity but not to be reconciled with English law, it stood where the hand of reform could not touch it and thus remained irregular, unreliable, and inadequate. In fact, the system proved even less satisfactory in the eighteenth century than before, because a change had come over the character of naval service. In the seventeenth century the ι The Old Regime and the French Revolution (edn., New York, 1955), P- »25· 2 Private Sea Journals, 777S-/7S2, ed. R. M. S. Pasley (1931), p. 61. 3 Quoted in Part. Hist., xi, 1017.

4- The Manning Problem navy did not require the bulk of its seamen the year round, and they were available to serve the merchants in the off­ season, whereas in the eighteenth the navy wanted men for the duration of hostilities. And yet the system remained basic­ ally unchanged. As a result, in the war of 1739-1748 the problem of manning the fleet dwarfed all others. In nearly every case where not enough ships were provided soon enough, a lack of seamen may be blamed. No easy solution was possible. No administrator's snap of the fingers, no resolute elimination of corruption and indif­ ference could put seamen on board the ships when they were needed. The solution lay not in the hands of the Admiralty, but in the hands of the government and the people. As matters stood, the navy did not guarantee the seaman employment in peacetime, nor did it offer wages competitive with those paid by merchants in wartime. And the life of confinement which the king's ships offered was made all the more unattractive by the fact that those ships were so often destined for service in the West Indies.4 That few volunteered in wartime does not surprise us today, nor did it mystify naval administrators then. To attract volunteers a number of schemes were tried, the usual method being a cash inducement called bounty money. It rarely amounted to more than two guineas and was of little avail. In fact, it was the gesture of encouragement which preceded coercion. Thomas Corbett observed, "When fair means prove ineffectual to the Setting forth a Fleet, the Government has recourse to the more vio­ lent, of Pressing."® Impressment was unfair, and everyone knew it. It was a form of conscription legally applicable to seamen and "sea­ faring" men only, "men who used the sea," but the very dif­ ficulty of accurately defining such a class of men illustrates the 4 The idea that West Indies service was semisuicidal appears to have troubled the seamen as much as their officers. Ned Ward said a sailor "had rather run upon the Goodwin, than run to Jamaica" (Wooden World, p. 68). In 1745 the contractor for West-India packets complained that he could not get men for them, and the Admiralty reproved one West-India packet commander for "letting his Men know the Service he was going in," which resulted in total desertion. β Corbett MSS. x, folio 22.

4- The Manning Problem latitude available for injustice.6 Even if the question of sea­ faring status could have been clarified, the system would have remained incompatible with the Whig sense of property rights. The question whether a man had the right to the property of his own body had been one on which fundamental constitutional arguments of the seventeenth century had turned.7 Although in the eighteenth century the question whether all men should share responsibility for government remained open, no one argued with John Locke's proposition that "every man has a 'property' in his own 'person.' This nobody has any right to but himself."8 Many Englishmen felt that what was settled in theory ought to be observed in prac­ tice. Pamphleteers bent on ridiculing the management of the navy often directed attention to the injustices of impressment, and the plight of the seaman was sometimes employed to embarrass the government in Parliament. For it is inadvisable to look upon impressment as an institu­ tion freely encouraged and enjoying the universal approbation of a callous ruling class. In the 1740's opposition to it was vociferous, and it came from all quarters of society; twentiethcentury agitation against conscription is effete by comparison. And the opposition in that day was not merely verbal. At times it must have seemed to the Admiralty that the whole of Eng­ lish society and government—politicians, merchants, justices of the peace, customs officials—was conniving to frustrate the seaman's would-be captors, albeit not usually for human­ itarian reasons. The Lords of the Admiralty were themselves by no means content with the system. When Admiral Vernon, noted for his reforming zeal, wrote to them expressing his β The legal grounds on which the king's right to press rested are de­ scribed in J. R. Hutchinson, The Press Gang Afloat and Ashore (1913), pp. 1-18. Hutdiinson distinguishes between the words "pressed" and "prest," the former signifying duress, the latter voluntary service; the word "prest" arose from the fact that the seaman indicated his willingness to serve by accepting an imprest of money from the Crown, or, as it was sometimes put, he "took the king's shilling." Although it may be, as Hutchinson states, that the legality of impressment depended on using the word "prest" and not "pressed," the Admiralty and its correspondents in this period used the two indiscriminately. τ See the interesting interpretation of C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford, 1962). s Second Treatise of Government, Chapter V.

4· The Manning Problem distaste for the "restraint and confinement" that the system imposed on the men, the Secretary replied: Their Lordships command me to acquaint you that they are as much averse to the present methods of Pressing as any man can be, and wish some better method was established to man his Majesty's ships. But till the Legislature has done so, their Lordships think it their duty and also of all his Majesty's officers to exert their utmost dili­ gence to procure men to serve his Majesty at sea, according to the present methods, how disagreeable soever they may be; and not to expose the nation to danger from reasons of private tenderness.9 The manning problem that developed in the years 1739 and 1740 will be the primary concern of this chapter. These are in­ structive years, for they form the initial period of mobilization, and hence they present the problem in its most acute form.10 Partly because the problem was further magnified by the mis­ fortune of epidemic in the fleet at this time, they were also years of failure. And this failure diverts our attention, as it diverted that of the Board of Admiralty in the early 1740's, to a con­ sideration of practical alternatives to the system of impress­ ment. Not only did it inspire universal condemnation; it did not work. However, a century passed before any effective alter­ ation was made. That this was so is a tragic fact. Part of the function of this chapter is to try to explain why it was so. This involves a glance at the nature of the alternatives which were suggested and also an analysis of the pressures which served to restrict their scope, and which, in effect, closed the door on all of them. These observations will be offered in conclusion. THE ORGANIZATION OF IMPRESSMENT11

On June 5, 1739 the king authorized the Admiralty to issue press warrants, and the warrants were sent that same night to β Vernon Papers, pp. 486, 488. 10 The mobilization actually continued through the year 1741, but the problems of that year were substantially the same as those in 1740. 11 The machinery for recruiting volunteers was the same as that for impressment; I have chosen to use the word "impressment" rather than "recruiting" because the former is really what the organization was de­ signed to accomplish. But the press gang's "rendezvous" also served as a recruiting office for volunteers, and tenders picked up both willing and unwilling men; presently we shall see that the line between volunteers and prest men was often blurred.

ISO

4- The Manning Problem the ships in sea pay at Portsmouth and the Downs.12 The fol­ lowing day the Duke of Newcastle sent orders to Admiral Had­ dock in the Mediterranean to commence hostilities against Spain. The Admiralty minutes for the days immediately following June 5 reveal a flurry of activity. It is clear that the Board not only instantly understood the dimensions of the manning problem, but also knew how to attack it. This is not surprising if one recognizes that during the preceding twenty-five years of peace there had been about a dozen minor mobilizations, most of which could not be completed without resorting to impressment.13 As a result, by 1739 certain basic procedures for manning the fleet had become habitual. These procedures were directly supervised by the Admiralty Board; though the job consumed a large part of the Board's energies, no portion of it was cast on the Navy Board. To administer impressment the Admiralty called on, or devised, agencies directly respon­ sible to itself. The basic unit in the impressment organization was the press gang. Each gang consisted of about a score of seamen and was led by a lieutenant and a mate—all from the same ship. The Admiralty's policy throughout the war was that every ship not under sailing orders should assemble as many gangs as possible and either send them out in tenders or up to London.14 The "great ships"—the 1st and 2nd rates at Chat­ ham and Portsmouth which, though in sea pay, rarely went to sea—maintained gangs in London almost permanently. In theory the operating ships dispatched gangs when opportun­ ity offered, but impressment was a chore, and the fact that prest men were often distributed to the ships that needed them most and not necessarily assigned to the ship whose gang took them, discouraged many captains from making the effort. Many aspects of the press gang's operations are well known to naval antiquarians. Some of this knowledge tends toward legend, but on the whole it conforms with the facts. Perhaps 12

Adm. 3/43, 5 June 1739. for example, Adm. 3/32, March-May 1719, passim. "The gangs sent aboard merchant vessels from frigates and sloops were formed and dissolved as the occasion demanded; since they were not really administrative entities, this discussion does not apply to them. 18See,

jS1

4· The Manning Problem brutality has been overemphasized, while not enough notice has been taken of pettifogging, nor of the control which the Admiralty had over lieutenants and mates. Accountably, the view we have is that of the victim, and not the captor.18 How­ ever, the lieutenant in charge carried full responsibility for a ticklish, troublesome, and occasionally hazardous job. The nature of his duties led him into situations where he had to ascertain instantly the limits of his authority and the rights of his quarry under the common law. If he erred on so much as a technicality, he could count on precipitate action by local officials and unsympathetic handling at the Petty Sessions.18 Plainly, leading a gang was an onerous and unpopular job. The proper equipment for carrying it out was a thick skin and an unshakable sense of duty. That lieutenants assigned to it tended to shirk their duty, should not come as a surprise. Ned Ward's "roaring, threshing Fellow" who took brutal pleasure in pressing may have existed, but he does not seem to have been typical.17 A common sort of neglect was the habit that many lieuten­ ants had of staying behind at the rendezvous (often a public house) while the mate went out with the gang. This lack of zeal was inevitably reflected in the returns of seamen pressed, and to stimulate greater productivity the Admiralty offered officers on impressment duty ten shillings for each man taken, plus the promise that diligence in bringing in seamen would be rewarded with promotion, and negligence reprimanded.18 No doubt these measures helped, but one of their effects was to encourage the impressment of ineligible or unserviceable men who later had to be discharged.19 Commenting on one sloop commander who had brought in a particularly bad lot, Admiral Cavendish, the Commander in Chief at Portsmouth, said, "Instead of being paid Ten shillings a head, he deserves ι» Hutchinson, Press Gang suffers from these distortions, but it is a good account of the colorful aspects of impressment, and reliable in its facts. 16 E.g. Adm. 3/47, 12 April 1743. The Admiralty usually directed its solicitor to defend and bail lieutenants if necessary. IT Ward, Wooden World, p. 23. is Adm. 3/44, 15 Feb. 1740; Adm. 3/46, 28 Aug. 1742. is Adm. 3/46, 19 June 1742; Adm. 106/2556, 21 June 1742; Adm. 3/54, 13 May 1746.

4· The Manning Problem to be severely reprimanded for bringing them... In three days time any body may get a Thousand such Rabble to help Man the Fleet."20 How often lieutenants actually were rewarded with promotion for running an efficient gang is indetermin­ able since reasons for promotion were almost never recorded officially; the Admiralty minutes in 1740 state that two were given commands of fireships explicitly for this reason, and in 1742 one was dismissed for "loitering his time at Milford, and getting no men," but these are the only recorded instances.21 The carelessness of lieutenants not only served to reduce the intake of good seamen; it also invited the whole system to be compromised by corruption, for the power to press was easily convertible to cash. Lieutenants could be bought off,22 but it was much more likely for a mate to declare a perfectly healthy man "unfit" in return for coin, clothing—whatever the fright­ ened victim could produce. Furthermore, the mate (presum­ ably a slower witted, less circumspect creature) might ignore an obviously valid protection, might abuse his authority, might by an act of folly start a riot.23 In 1746 the Admiralty was told that even though lieutenants were repeatedly ordered "never to suffer their Gangs to go on Duty without being with them yet they seldom are, which occasions so much Disturb­ ance happening in the Streets."24 The Admiralty tried to set up a system for supervising the activities of lieutenants and their gangs wherever possible. In the London area two Regulating Captains were appointed "to see that no fraud or negligence [was] practiced by the procur­ ing Officers,"25 and the Admiralty delegated extensive powers to them. The most important of these was the power to dis­ charge, for since it was open to abuse, discharging lay at the heart of the problem of controlling impressment. Officially there were no discharges in wartime; the seaman's only legit20 Adm. 1/905, 23 April, 24 April 1741. The Adm. 1/902-905 letters will be cited frequently hereafter. All are from Admiral Cavendish to the Ad­ miralty except where otherwise noted. 21 Adm. 3/44, 1 March 1740; Adm. 3/46, 19 Oct. 1742. 22 E.g. Adm. 3/47, 15 Sept., so Sept., g8 Sept. 1743. 23 E.g. Adm. 3/45, 22 Feb. 1742. 21 Adm. 3/54, 18 May 1746. 28 Corbett MSS. x, folio 32.

4- The Manning Problem imate way out of the navy was to get released from a naval hospital as incurable. On impressment, however, discharges had to be permitted; the notion that press gangs were entirely unscrupulous, and that there was never an opportunity to appeal, is erroneous. Although lieutenants were continually urged to take care in selecting men, inevitably a great many taken up by the gangs were either physically unfit or rightfully exempt. The job of the Regulating Captains was to examine physically all the men raised in London,26 scrutinize their certificates of protection,27 determine the eligibility of substi­ tutes,28 adjudicate on claims to exemption by apprentices and householders,29 and order discharges accordingly.30 Those in­ ducted were sent to tenders in the river, which when filled carried them to ships lying at the Nore. It appears that, when in doubt, the Regulating Captains opted to induct, for in March 1741 the senior captain at the Nore corresponded a good deal with the Admiralty on the subject of discharges and suggested that his job would be much easier if the lieutenants in London were made to "send down their reason against each Man's name why they Press'd them."31 Except for occasional complaints about men of bad quality being sent to the Nore, the Admiralty left the Regulating Captains alone. The job, though responsible, was a thankless one, performed by halfpay captains who received an additional £5 a week for their trouble.32 Thomas Corbett thought they should be "relieved once a Fortnight,"33 but in the 1740's they might serve three months or more. Many received active commissions subsequent 2β In 1742 the Admiralty granted their request for a surgeon to distin­ guish malingerers (Adm. 3/45, 14 April, 17 April 1742). 27 Protections are discussed below, pp. 171-175. 28 Men taken up by the press could obtain release by producing a volun­ teer of similar quality. A favorite trick was to palm oil a foreign seaman who could later announce his nationality and demand discharge (Adm. 3/49, 15 Jan. 1745). 2» Apprentices were sometimes required to produce baptismal certificates (Adm. 1/710, Brown, 29 March 1741). so "All Persons aggrieved by the Press, apply to them for Redress" (Corbett MSS. x, folio 32). si Adm. 1/710, Brown, 17 March 1741. 32 The Admiralty waived the usual half-pay oath to enable them to receive it (Adm. 1/1827, Sept. 1729). S3 Corbett MSS. x, folio 32.

4- The Manning Problem to this service. The job had not yet become a burial scheme for captains without hope, as it did toward the end of the century when Regulating Captains were appointed to every major seaport in the kingdom. In cases where men were taken at sea or brought in by tenders, these regulatory duties were entrusted to flag officers. Since most tenders and cruisers were based at Portsmouth or Plymouth the commanders-in-chief there carried the heaviest responsibilities. If there was a flag officer in the Downs, he too performed these tasks; if not, the men were eventually de­ livered to Portsmouth to be surveyed by the admiral there. Whether commanders-in-chief should be delegated the author­ ity to discharge was a matter on which the Admiralty initially had difficulty making up its mind. One of the first things it did in June 1739 was divest captains of the power.34 And in August the Board denied it even to flag officers, which moved Admiral Cavendish, at Portsmouth, to remark that it would "create a good deal of trouble" if every discharge order had to originate in London.35 The order was hastily countermanded, and the admirals were authorized to discharge unserviceable men after "viewing them."36 The correspondence between the admirals and the Admiralty suggests that a considerable num­ ber of petitions for discharge were successful.37 Impressment Afloat

Although the activities of press gangs ashore are better known, the gangs afloat harvested more seamen. Impressment afloat was easier to administer than impressment ashore; al­ though there was no way to supervise closely gangs in tenders and cruisers, their activities engendered fewer complications. These vessels were stationed by orders emanating directly from the Admiralty Office, and the minute books testify to the 3* Adm. 3/43, 11 June 1739. 35 Adm. 1/902, 24 Aug. 1739. 30 Adm. 3/43, 26 Aug. 1739. The Admiralty's own reliability in these matters was questionable. In March 1740 the Board discovered that it was ordering discharges for men whose applications it had previously denied; the clerk "entrusted with the Book of Discharges" was thereupon required to keep a list of men who had applied (Adm. 3/44, 18 March 1740). 37 For example, see Admiral Davers' letters in Adm. 1/233.

4- The Manning Problem diligence with which plans were made to guard each section of the coast at the most promising season of the year. And yet, despite the Board's anxiety to control impressment operations in detail, they could not be controlled from Whitehall; for their execution depended chiefly on the number of men who could be spared, and as to that the Admiralty's information was seldom up to date. And so, while the Board dictated what areas it wanted patrolled, the commanders-in-chief at Ports­ mouth and Plymouth ordered most of the vessels out. A press gang sent out in a tender might consist of thirty or forty men, for reasons given by Admiral Cavendish: "I must beg leave to offer my opinion, that a Lieutenant and Twenty men, will be too few, considering there may be Privateers of three or four times that force, in the Channel, and besides it will not be safe for them to stay out after they have prest twelve or fourteen men, lest they should rise upon them."88 The press at sea not only used men, but used them up. When seamen were removed from a merchant vessel at sea, members of the press gang had to be put aboard in their places to navigate her safely into port. Upon arrival, these "men in lieu"—as they were called—drew conduct money from the Clerk of the Cheque at the nearest dockyard (at ports distant from dockyards the money was issued by customs officials)39 and made a leisurely land journey back to Portsmouth or wherever their ship was stationed. When a cruiser or tender exhausted her supply of surplus men in this manner she had to return to port and wait there until the "men in lieu" got back or until others could be found.40 And because the supply of men was the controlling factor, impressment activity showed a marked seasonal variation. It began to build up when the season ended for most fleet operations in November, was intensified in February, and by May reached a feverish pitch as the squadrons tried desperately to get to sea. The focus of impressment activity afloat was London be­ cause roughly half the nation's trade and shipping was con­ centrated there.41 And the importance of London was magniS8 Corbett MSS. x, folio 40. 88 Adm. ι/904, 27 Oct., 28 Oct. 1740. Adm. 1/902, 22 June 1739. 41 For figures see R. Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (1962), pp. 33-40.

*0 E.g.

4· The Manning Problem fied by the fact that a large percentage of seafaring men in other ports, excepting Bristol and Liverpool, were employed in fishing, barge traffic, and coastal shipping— all of which were deemed essential trades. Instead, it was the overseas trade which was thought best able to bear the burden of supplying the navy. With rare exceptions the navy did not take seamen from outward-bound merchant vessels, and the reason it did not may be best understood if one envisages impressment as a sort of game—albeit a grim one—in which certain informal rules came to be observed. In this epoch merchants had enough political power to prevent any serious limitation of their trade by the government, and yet they could not deny altogether the navy's right to some of their seamen. If the press had been applied to outbound vessels, it would have been as easy for the navy to get men as it was for customs officials to make their inspections; this would have resulted in complete stoppage of foreign trade, since seamen were not willing to undertake voyages in the face of such odds. Because the two parties, government and merchants, were unable to agree on a regular method of providing a portion of seamen for the navy, the Admiralty's power was deliberately relaxed, and the rules set up so that the seaman had a fighting chance of escaping naval service. Thus the navy had to operate by intercepting home­ ward-bound merchantmen, on the face of it scarcely more difficult than preventing them from going out. But it was the merchant seaman, not the vessel, that had to be intercepted, and there lay the navy's problem. For this reason the center of operations against London shipping was not at the Nore, but in the Downs. As merchant vessels passed there enroute to London their seamen took to the boats and fled to the comparative safety of the beach. Of­ ten cutters came out from Folkestone and Dover and for heavy fees carried them ashore; and seamen from those ports who had acquired protections from the press for other purposes en­ gaged themselves to masters at high wages to take the ships up to London. The navy tried to concentrate as many press gangs in the Downs as it could, so that the men might be taken be­ fore they could get ashore; it was the Admiralty's habit to

4- The Manning Problem order newly fitted men of war to the Downs as soon as they had "Men sufficient to sail them thither."42 But it is probable that most of the seamen got away. In October 1745 Admiral Vernon had a substantial force in the Downs when a merchant fleet from the West Indies arrived: "We have still a great sea for boats," he reported, "but our boats, long boats, and cutters are employed for impressing as their Lordships have directed, but to be sure the greatest part of them will escape, as they are as industrious to avoid it as we can be to execute it."43 Other areas were either less carefully guarded or not guarded at all. Cruisers patrolled the Channel with the dual mission of protecting trade from privateers and impressing, but they were not numerous enough to constitute an effec­ tive blockade. Also, returning convoys44 were expected to press seamen from the ships under their protection, and it is not surprising that so many West-India fleets ran from their protectors when they reached the Channel approaches or that the returning Baltic fleets often completed the voyage by mak­ ing a dash for various east-coast ports. Tenders steadily plied the south coast, and each of the great eastern ports generally had a tender based at it; regular visits were made to the lesser eastern ports. There was always a frigate in the Severn, but the western and Scottish coasts were often left unattended in the war of 1739—1748. A favorite hunting ground was Ireland; impressment vessels gathered men quickly there, chiefly, it appears, because there were large numbers of desti­ tute Irish volunteers. However, Admiral Cavendish had a low opinion of most of the men obtained in Ireland. Here is one of his many outbursts on the subject: "The Cambridge's two Lieuts . . . have brought from Dublin Seventy or Eighty peo­ ple, all Boys broken Tradesmen, Diseased Landmen &ca. that I can't pick Ten, out of the whole number fit to be sent aboard the Falkland."45 Later in the war the Admiralty was able to keep ten cruisers constantly at sea during the most important seasons for impressment on assigned stations from the North 42 E.g., Adm. 3/43, 17 July 1739. 43 Vernon Papers, pp. 485-486. 44 it is convenient to use this contemporary meaning of the word, which referred to the ship or ships of war, not the merchant fleet. 45 Adm. 1/905, 8 April 1741.

4- The Manning Problem Foreland to Land's End.46 However, the situation in which the British Isles would be completely encircled by the king's ships was not achieved until later in the century, though the Admiralty yearned for the capacity to do it in the 1740's.47 Impressment Ashore The peculiar feature of impressment ashore was its de­ pendence on civil authorities. Constables assisted and supple­ mented the efforts of London press gangs, and outside the great city the machinery of local government was called upon to apply the continual pressure on the hunted seaman that the navy, with its limited resources of manpower, could not effect. This machinery was actuated by order of the Privy Council. On June 15, 1739 the following authorities were directed to press seamen: the Vice-Admirals, Lord-Lieutenants, and Custodes Rotulorum of the Maritime Counties; the Lord-Lieu­ tenant of Ireland; the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports; and the Lieutenant of the Tower of London. Also press warrants were issued to constables within twenty miles of London, and the Lord Mayor was asked to assist them and the press gangs.48 A month later orders were sent to the mayors of Bristol, Chester, Hull, Newcastle, Poole, Liverpool, and Yarmouth to press seamen in their cities.49 As a result mayors, magistrates, sheriffs, justices of the peace, headboroughs, tithing men, bailiffs, and constables were enlisted in the service of impress­ ment. To encourage them there was added a reward of twenty shillings for each seaman procured, plus a conveyance allow­ ance of 6d. per mile (maximum 20 miles) per man.50 On paper it looked good, but in fact most civil officers refused to cooperate. Though the directions sent to the Lord Lieutenants and others assumed that they would be carried out with "Zeal and Vigour," the government must have been 46 Adm. 7/61. Of course their primary purpose was trade protection. 3/44, 23 Oct. 1740. For the stationing of sloops and tenders in 1740 see P.R.O., S.P. 42/23, 25 Nov. 1740. 48 P.R.O., P.C. 2/95, 15 June 1739. These methods of raising men were formerly much more important. A very detailed account of how the various authorities took up and delivered men to the navy is given in Corbett MSS. x, folios 51-77. P.R.O., P.C. 2/95, 19 July 1739. so Corbett MSS. x, folios 51-77.

*t Adm.

4- The Manning Problem aware that there was no reason for such confidence. The basic trouble was that good, capable seamen were generally able to command the support of a number of enfranchised friends. And since the preserving of local seamen from naval service was a matter on which community feeling ran high, mayors and magistrates prudently avoided taking effective action. In port towns such action would have been politically suicidal. Wit­ ness the distressed appeal to the Admiralty from the mayor of Gravesend who, because he permitted a man to be impres­ sed, was threatened with arrest by his constituents.51 On the other hand, there were in every community men who could neither expect political favor nor attract sympathy. These were the mischievous, the riotous, the semi-invalid, the feeble­ minded—none of them seamen, all of them a burden on the rates and charities and a nuisance to the justices of the peace. The temptation to dump such undesirables on the navy was always great, and at twenty shillings a head it was irresistible. A natural consequence was that every recruit supplied by a civil officer was, in the eyes of the sea officers, suspect.52 The indifference of civil authorities was immediately dem­ onstrated in 1739. On July 19 the Privy Council advised the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports of information it had received that "great Numbers" of seafaring men were conceal­ ing themselves within his jurisdiction, and "that the Officers there instead of taking up Seamen and Seafaring Men fit for His Majesty's Service . . . returned to the Persons appointed for receiving them, great Numbers of Unable Land Men."58 And on September 18, in response to a query as to why a lieutenant had been permitted to refuse a man sent by a jus­ tice of the peace, the Admiralty told the Customs Commis­ sioners, "Few or none of the Men sent by the Justices of the Peace, and brought to the Officers of the Customs at the Ports, are in any wise capable of serving his Majesty at Sea, and si Adm. 3/44, 9 April 1740; the Admiralty directed its solicitor to defend him at public expense. 52 This sort of mistrust has apparently not entirely disappeared in our own day, perhaps for good reasons. Magistrates have been accused re­ cently by army recruiting officers of trying to use the service as a house of correction for young misfits; see The Magistrate, xv, (1959), 31-32. is P.R.O., P.C. 2/95, 19 July 1739.

l6o

4- The Manning Problem therefore Occasion a needless Expense to the Navy."54 Admi­ ral Cavendish summed up the situation: "The Swift Sloop brought in χ 9 prest men (good seamen), and three Landmen, taken out of Jaol by the Civil Officers at Shoreham, which we must expect from them, so [I] hope we shall not have any great dependence upon them to Man the fleet."55 The real problem was not so much trying to get civil officers to participate in impressment as trying to keep them from obstructing it. "In 1718," wrote Corbett, "the Constable of the Tower had Orders from the Privy Council to take up all Seafaring Men lurking within the Hamlets and Liberties, and send them to the Regulating Captains. . . . But not one Man was raised, for the reason, that the Justices of the Peace ob­ structed the acting of the Constables."56 This intransigence encouraged numerous "frays," and sometimes minor officials were active participants. In London a bailiff was ringleader of a mob that assaulted the press gang of the Fox.57 Once, the whole gang of the Royal Sovereign was thrown into New Prison and had to be bailed out by the Solicitor of the Admi­ ralty. When Mr. Lane, Justice of the Peace of Middlesex and Chairman of the Quarter Sessions, came to the Admiralty Of­ fice to discuss the affair, "their Lordships took the Occasion to complain of several obstructions their Officers employed in raising Men met with from the Justices in the execution of their Press Warrants, which Mr. Lane promised to discourage all that lay in his Power."58 The promise produced no notice­ able change. If the situation was bad in London, it was worse elsewhere. Impressment on land was always at the sufferance of local authorities, in spite of the desires of the Privy Council. And the political structure of England at this time was well fitted for protecting local trade, fisheries, and seamen. It is true that press gangs in "the City and Liberties" of London had to be "countenanced" by the Lord Mayor, but normally he could be prevailed upon by the government to recognize the national Bt Adm. 3/43, 18 Sept. 1739. 65 Adm. 1/902, 14 July 1739. eeCorbett MSS. x, folio 63. " Adm. 3/44, 29 May 1740. 68 Adm. 3/49, 4 Oct., 19 Oct. 1744; the trouble arose when the gang tried to rescue one of its members from jail.

l6l

4- The Manning Problem need and give his assent.59 In 1745 he was even persuaded—in view of the threat from France—to countersign the press war­ rants.60 However, in nearly every provincial port press gangs were steadily and effectively thwarted. The Admiralty com­ plained to a representative of the mayor of Bristol "that the City of London allowed the King's Officers to press in the Heart of the City," and that though "there was a great Num­ ber of Seamen at Bristol . . . yet no Assistance was given by that City towards manning the King's ships."81 This advertise­ ment to attract seamen for a Bristol privateer is illustrative: Here is our chief encouragement, our ship belongs to Bristol, Poor Londoners when coming home they surely will be press'd all; We've no such fear when home we steer, with prizes under convoy, We'll frolick round all Bristol town, sweet liberty we enjoy.62

The pilot boats of Bristol were notorious for carrying men ashore, thus shielding them from the frigate stationed there.63 At other places customs officials were discovered using their boats for the same purpose.64 The eastern ports were particu­ larly unhappy hunting grounds for press gangs. At Hull, for example, a lieutenant was placed in the "House of Correc­ tion" by the deputy mayor.65 As Sir John Norris said of the civil officers in a cabinet meeting, "Tho they ware directed at their perill, it did not bring in any men nor gave any assistance to the officers apointed to press. If they could be obliged under sum penalty to exicute the power sent to them, we mout hope for a more speedy application in bringing men into the Servis; for it is well know[n] at the grate sea ports of Newcastle Yarmouth and all the rest, that an officer and his press gan[g] could not take them up, when the sivill power gave no assist­ ance." But it was not the practice, he was told, to coerce magistrates.66 59Corbett MSS. x, folio 30; Adm. 3/44, 11 April 1740; Adm. 3/46, ao Aug. 1742. 61 Adm. 3/53, 15 Feb. 1746. 60 Adm. 3/49, 14 Jan. 1745. 62 Quoted in R. Pares, "Manning the Navy in the West Indies, 1702-63," T.R.H.S., 4th ser., xx (1937), 46. 83 E.g. Adm. 3/47, 16 Nov. 1743. e< Adm. 3/43, 18 June 1739; Adm. 3/45, 6 Jan. 1741. ββ Adm. 3/47, 12 Aug. 1743. eeAddl. MSS. 28132, folio 36, 21 Sept. 1739.

4- The Manning Problem MOBILIZATION, 1739-174I

Volunteers Upon the outbreak of hostilities the Admiralty's first task was to dispatch a squadron to the West Indies. At the begin­ ning of June 1739 the total strength of the navy was roughly 16,000 men. In November 1738 it had been 24,500, but the government, eager to reduce expenses, had laid up half the twenty-eight ships at home and designated ten of those kept in sea pay as guardships, thus cutting the number of men borne by 8,500.67 Guardships were fully rigged, stored, and clean below the waterline—ready for sea in all respects except victuals and men; each carried a skeleton crew of 100. Eight of these guardships plus the Pearl constituted the squadron which sailed from Spithead under Admiral Vernon on July 23, 1739. It took, then, six weeks to get Vernon's squadron man­ ned and ready. That was reasonably good time for raising 2,870 men. It was done quickly because little reliance had to be placed on impressment. Vernon's squadron was manned mainly with volunteers. 9. Men Added to the Ships of Admiral Vernon's Squadron between June 7 and July 19, 1739

TATtr.K

Elizabeth Kent Lenox Burford Princess Louisa Strafford Worcester Norwich Pearl Totals

Complement 480 480 480 480 400 400 400 300 250

Volunteers 355 229 217 469 332 200 117 60 178

Impressed 68 51 51 138 38 69 98 40 70

3670

2157

623

Based on the status report of July 19, 1739 in Adm. 1/902. The Squad­ ron was almost fully manned on this date, since the eight guardships already carried 100 men each. The figures for individual ships changed somewhat before sailing, since the excess men of the Burford and Pearl were not yet all distributed at this time. βτ See Wager to Newcastle, 13 Nov. 1738, Library of Congress, VernonWager MSS., folio 45664.

4- The Manning Problem We may observe the navy's progress during mobilization through the eyes of Admiral Cavendish. Cavendish took up his command at Portsmouth on June 16, 1739. His initial job was to find men for the three 70-gun guardships at Ports­ mouth: Elizabeth, Kent, and Lenox. (See Table 9) Then as others of the squadron gathered at Spithead—the primary marshalling point of squadrons in this period—he became responsible for manning them too. TABLE 10. Standard Complements, 1739 1st rate 2nd rate 3rd rate 4th rate 5th rate 6th rate Sloop

100 guns 90 guns 80 guns 70 guns 60 guns 50 guns 40 guns 20 guns varied

900 men 800 men 600 men 480 men 400 men 300 men 250 men 130 men 70 men

The complements given are standard; there were minor variations. Until about 1740 the terms "highest, middle, and lowest complements" were in common use. For a 3rd rate this meant 520, 480, and 440. Ships were ordered to carry the first when ordered abroad; the second, for voy­ ages in home waters; the third, for lying in port over the winter and some­ times for Channel cruising. The pressure of the manning problem caused these distinctions to be dropped (the middle complement only was used), and ships ordered abroad were permitted to bear supernumeraries if they could get them.™

On June 21 Cavendish noted that most of the large ships at Portsmouth had "a good many" volunteers "upon their Lists, sent by their Lieutenants from London."69 But the quality of these men was generally poor. On July 18 Cavendish wrote: "The Burford [which had been at Chatham] came to Spithead this morning, and brought One Hundred and Thirty Eight Supernumeraries, but most of them the Scum of the World." The next day the Pearl arrived from the Thames, bringing 390 extra men; Cavendish judged there were "scarce fifty Seamen amongst them."70 He sent the following letter to the Admiralty: β8 A complete list of ships during the 1739—1748 period is given in Appendix 11. β9 Adm. 1/902, si June 1739. 70 Adm. 1/903, 18 July, 19 July 1739.

4· The Manning Problem The five hundred and Twenty four Men that were sent from the Nore, in the Burford and Pearl, to Man Mr. Vernon's Squadron, are distributed on board them, but surely there never was such Wretches, m a n y of t h e m Boys o f fourteen o r fifteen years o f Age, . . . and some upwards of Sixty or Seventy, but that is not the worst, for I believe there are above one Hundred of them that must be Turned away, being Bursten, full of the Pox, Itch, Lame, King's Evil, and all other Distempers, from the Hospitals at London, and will serve only to breed an Infection in the Ships; for the rest, most of them are Thieves, House breakers, Newgate Birds, and the very filth of London; and how to get rid of them I know not, because of the Six months Pay they are Indtled to, what I have thought of is to pay such of them, their Two Months Advance, as must be turned away, and then to Run them [i.e., consider them deserters] at their own desire, so that they will have some money, and not to be forced to Beg about the Country, . . . In all the former Warrs I never saw a parcell of Turn'd over Men half so bad, in short they are so very bad, that I don't know how to describe it.71

The trouble was that few good seamen would enter the navy during time of war. The best could look forward to merchant employment at high wartime wage levels; those who volun­ teered for the navy were generally the worst. Furthermore, many of the volunteers were not even seamen, and in the age of sail it was bad to have many landsmen aboard. Nowadays only a small percentage of a fighting ship's complement gets involved in shiphandling, but in those days, when the pro­ pulsive machinery was aloft, most of the crew had to be able to climb the rigging. A ship without experienced hands stood constantly in danger, and this was especially true of the smaller ships, which could ill afford to carry any landsmen at all. Therefore, considering the number of volunteers on board Vernon's squadron, Cavendish thought it necessary to remove some of the least fit and experienced of them in exchange for prest men out of his own flagship and other ships at Spithead. Having done that he pronounced the squadron "all well Mann'd now."72 Vernon disagreed. He complained to Sir Charles Wager that it was "the worst man'd Squadron that ever went out of England."73 But in contrast to squadrons that τι Adm. 1/902, 20 July 1739. ^ I b i d . ; Adm. 1/908, 23 July 1739. " Adm. 1/710, Wager, ss July 1739.

4- The Manning Problem followed him out, his was rather well manned; at least he went to sea with his complements filled. Ordinarily all commanders complained of the quality of their crews, for such complaints might be useful in case of failure and court-martial. Byng used it as an excuse in 1757. But why, if the quality of volunteers was usually so deplor­ able, did not the Admiralty abandon its attempts to attract them and turn its attention entirely to increasing the effective­ ness of impresssent? The answer is simple: though prest men were more competent seamen, a ship was helpless without volunteers, because prest men so readily deserted. Without volunteers a ship could not unload her stores prior to docking, nor could she make effective use of her boats. There were many other advantages in having volunteers, but the navy's most urgent need for them was related to the manning prob­ lem itself. It took willing men to trap unwilling ones. The number of volunteer seamen, more than any other factor, controlled the scale on which impressment could be operated. Two days after he arrived in Portsmouth in June 1739 Cavendish wrote, "I have got some Voluntiers, and I think I shall find men enough to send out in two Tenders more."74 Thereafter it was a continual battle to find more volunteers. When on July 14th, he noted that the Admiralty had ordered the Centurion and Kinsale, just arrived from abroad, to the Downs to press, he protested: "If those ships go from hence to the Downes, and the other Eight Ships are at Sea [Vernon's], all our Tenders, which are five or six must lye still, for want of Men that can be trusted to send out in them."75 And in September he wrote: "I am told by Commissioner Hughes that the Navy Board are going to take up more Tenders; to what purpose is it,... when they have no Men to send out in them, but a few Landmen That I took from other ships, that had too many."76 Since volunteers were so often inferior seamen, it was inevitable that merchants should complain that their ships were often en» Adm. 1/902, 18 June 1739. 75 Adm. 1/902, 14 July 1739. The Admiralty cancelled the Centurion's orders. 76 Adm. 1/902, 21 Sept. 1739.

4· The Manning Problem dangered by incompetent "men in lieu."77 Though he felt that the men were often not so bad as the merchants said, Caven­ dish was not blind to the justice of their pleas. "I am afraid," he wrote, "they send up very bad ones in lieu sometimes, altho I have frequently ordered the contrary, and will do all in my power, that it may be no more."78 But any attempts to do better by the merchants were bound to hamper impressment activity. When, in October 1739, the Admiralty asked Cavendish to suggest a 50-gun ship for Channel cruising, his reply threw the problem back to Whitehall: "The Panther is the forwardest Fifty Gun Ship here; she has no Seamen to send up in Lieu of Prest Men, and what people she has are very sorry ones, that have never been at Sea."79 Table 11 indicates the role played by volunteer seamen and landsmen in manning the fleet at the outbreak of hostilities. But by early autumn the navy felt that it was recruiting too many landsmen. On September 19, after receiving a complaint from Admiral Cavendish that he had more landsmen than he could dispose of, the Admiralty ordered impressment officers to reject them.80 However, the well of volunteer seamen was drying up, and new efforts were made to encourage them to enter. These efforts were in vain. In peacetime the navy did not even have to offer conduct money, that is, travel allowance from the point of entry to the ship, "the Men readily entering, for want of Employment."81 In June 1739 the inducement was conduct money and six-months' guaranteed pay.82 In Septem­ ber, responding to an Admiralty request, the king proclaimed bounty money: two guineas for able seamen and thirty shil­ lings for ordinary seamen who would enter voluntarily.83 It was 77 Adm. 3/43, 18 Oct. 1739. The complaint was voiced in Parliament (Pari. Hist, xi, 199-200). 78 Adm. 1/902, 21 Sept. 1739. 79 Adm. 1/902, 10 Oct. 1739. so Adm. 1/902, 17 Sept. 1739; Adm. 3/43, 17 Sept. 1739. As early as July 9 ships were directed to carry no more than i/5th landsmen, and civil authorities were told to stop sending them (Adm. 3/43, 9 July 1739). 81 Corbett MSS. x, folio 3. 82 P.R.O., P.C. 2/95, 15 June 1739. 83 P.R.O., P.C. 2/95, 27 Sept. 1739. A printed copy is in Addl. MSS. 28132, folio 45.

4- The Manning Problem, TABLE 11. Seamen and Landsmen Inducted during the Summer of 1739 (Figures represent men acquired between July 9 and the date given) Seamen Complement

Prest

Landsmen Volunteer

At the Nore (July 26)

Newcastle Argyle Tyger

2

30

-

34 78

6

240

800 600 480 480 480 400

347

341

256 I IOO

288

42 76 155

9

437 345 462 227

109

400 400

40

317 307

180

300 300 300

141 208

In the Downs (August 13)

Namur Russell Buckingham Orford Prince of Orange Superb

116

80

36

At Plymouth (October 19)

Warwick Lyon

47

78

The information is drawn from scattered reports in Adm. 1/792 and Adm. 1/902. Since these reports are incomplete, totals would be meaning­ less. Some ships carried more than their complements because it was cus­ tomary for commissioned ships to bear supernumeraries for those still in the dockyards.

to little effect. The number of volunteer seamen continued to diminish with scarcely a pause, and the following April the Admiralty decided that it could not afford to reject any ablebodied volunteers, landsmen or not.84 In 1741 the bounty was increased to £5 and £3 by Act of Parliament (14 Geo. II c. 38). Three weeks after it was announced Admiral Cavendish reported that it had yielded not more than a dozen seamen.85 In measuring the effect of bounty money, statistics mean almost nothing, for there is no way of determining how many of those who received the bounty were genuine volunteers.8® 8* Adm. 3/44, 8 April 1740. 85 Adm. 1/905, 13 April 1741. 8β A total of 451 able seamen signed on for the £5 bounty; 165 ordin­ ary seamen accepted the £3 bounty. Nevertheless, a pamphleteer probably estimated correctly when he wxote: "I may venture to affirm, not a Hun-

4- The Manning Problem "I should be glad," wrote Cavendish in 1741, "to know if the Impress'd men out of Merchant Ships, upon their declaring themselves Voluntiers, are entitled to the King's Bounty, for they are all Voluntiers as soon as they find they can't get away."87 The Admiralty ruled that they were to be considered volunteers.88 This did not mean that the bounty money was thrown away, for it encouraged the prest man to go quietly on board his assigned man of war—the bounty was not paid until after the second muster—and frustrated any later attempt to get the man discharged; it also protected the Admiralty from the claims of injured shipowners.89 But this was not its purpose, and the policy of paying it freely had a pernicious effect. It made it impossible to isolate a corps of true volunteers, the first step to be taken if conditions of serv­ ice were to be rendered attractive to them. Navy vs. Merchants

In the autumn and winter of 1739 the Admiralty had cause to rethink the problem. Impressment was bringing in too few, and these too slowly. The men produced by the civil officers were for the most part rejected as unfit, and the recent procla­ mation for bounty money appeared to have negligible effect. It was "two well knone to Everybody" that men were being got for the fleet only with enormous difficulty,90 and Sir John Norris "thought it mout be best for the present to suspend the declaration" of war, for fear that it might bring France into the struggle before the fleet could be brought up to strength.91 But the declaration (October 19) could not be long delayed, and soon fear of the French troubled the minis­ try greatly. In a cabinet meeting Sir Charles Wager was asked dred were raised by it" (Observations and Proposals concerning the Navy [2nd edn., 1745]). During the period 1738-1748 bounty was paid to 4,811 men: 451 able seamen at £5; a,881 able seamen at £2 2s.; 165 ordinary seamen at £3; 1088 ordinary seamen at £1 10s.; 226 landsmen at £1. The bounty for landsmen was offered later in the war. These figures are taken from Adm. 106/2187, 7 Feb. 1755. 8T Adm. 1/905, 2 May 1741. 88 Adm. 3/45, 4 June 1741. 89 Adm. 3/45, 17 July 1741. so Addl. MSS. 28132, folio 64, 29 Oct. 1739. 9i Ibid., folio 49, 2 Oct. 1739. i6Q

4- The Manning Problem how many ships might be got ready, and he answered that eighty of the line might be fitted out, but was certain that he could not man them without "farther assistance." Whereupon Sir Robert Walpole expressed clearly his inclination to sup­ port the Admiralty in its struggle, saying that "all methods should be indeuard to procure men for the ships."92 Two methods were suggested by Sir John Norris. One was to organize small Marine regiments, after the French example, for placement on board ships as needed.93 Though the idea of Marines was not rejected, doubts were expressed as to whether the French organization could be adapted to the English situa­ tion. Norris also suggested a registry of seamen similar to the ill-fated scheme enacted in the war during the reign of Wil­ liam III, but to be based on force rather than voluntary appli­ cation.94 This would require legislation. In fact, Parliamentary action could help the navy in a variety of ways. But in the next session of Parliament the navy got nothing. The registry bill was spurned,95 and the two acts that were passed in 1740 with the titular purpose of easing the navy's manning problem were in this respect completely hypocritical. The one was designed to palliate the effects of the wartime shortage of seamen on merchants by permitting English ship ping to be navigated by crews three-quarters foreign.96 Far from easing the navy's problem, this served to aggravate it, for it meant that press gangs boarding merchantmen would find fewer eligible seamen. The measure did nothing to insure that English seamen thus released would enter the naval service, and probably did much to drive them, in spite of statutory prohibitions, into employment abroad. The other act pro­ vided for prize money.97 Since the seaman's share was small, and since the act applied equally to privateers' crews, there was nothing in it to help the navy. A third act, passed the same year, was avowedly aimed at increasing the number of seamen available to merchant vessels by encouraging lands92 Ibid., folio 85, 26 Nov. 1739. BSIbid,., folios 36, 44-46, 64, 21 Sept., 25 Sept., 29 Oct. 1739. ^iIbid., folios 44-46, 25 Sept. 1739. »5 it is discussed below pp. 233-236. ββ i3 Geo. II c. 3. 97 13 Geo. II c. 4.

4· The Manning Problem men to take up sea careers.98 Whatever long-term benefits it may have offered to the navy by way of increasing the total supply of seamen, its immediate effect—and the navy's prob­ lem in 1739-1740 was immediate—was plainly prejudicial, because it contained a clause offering newly converted lands­ men a two-year immunity from the press. The possibility for abuse which this opened up must have been well known, for in 1705 Parliament had had to clarify a similar regulation enacted in 1703," in view of the fact that it had been "used flagrantly to protect seamen."100 This then was Parliament's contribution. The Admiralty turned to its own resources and the powers of the king in Council. There was another method to be endured, one at which Walpole did not flinch, but which other politicians ap­ proached nervously: that of bringing greater pressure on mer­ chant shipping, thus forcing it to disgorge a larger share of its seamen. This approach brought up the question of the man­ ner and extent of issuing protections. "No Press," observed Thomas Corbett, "is so strict where there are not granted many Protections."101 Naturally those vessels carrying the materials of war—stores, victuals, ord­ nance—had to have their crews protected. But trying to ascer­ tain which of the other forms of maritime commerce were indispensable to the nation in war, and to what extent, was not so easy. London had to have fish, food, and fuel—but how much? Naturally the question was a political one. On the whole, the screening of local fisheries bore no relation to the need for fish, and a number of the ocean fisheries were specific­ ally declared off limits to the navy by acts of Parliament.102 As as χ 3 Geo. II c. 17. This act was partially modelled on one of 1703 (a & 3 Anne c. 6) which went so far as to force masters to accept boys sent by parish officers. 2 & 3 Anne c. 6. 101 Corbett MSS. x, folio 46. 100 4 & g Anne c. 19. 102 Usually this was done on the grounds that they were "nurseries for seamen"—an argument that applied to every sort of maritime activity. At any rate, the fisheries were the navy's least likely source of seamen in this period. The Greenland fishery was so untouchable that its men could not even be impressed when found in colliers (Adm. 3/45, 10 April 1741). Toward the end of the century the government was far less disposed to exempt the fisheries. See generally G. S. Graham, "Fisheries and Sea Power," Report of the Canadian Hist. Assoc., 1941.

4· The Manning Problem for the coasting trade, the argument was stronger, since so much of the nation's internal communications depended on it. The effect of impressment on coal carriage was remarkable. Though the colliers had enjoyed immunities by acts of Parlia­ ment in the past,103 they were hit hard in the summer of 1739. The price of coal in London consequently soared, and on September 20 the Lord Mayor called personally at the Admi­ ralty Office to point out the need for granting protections to the colliers.104 Within a week the Privy Council ordered the Admiralty to issue them. This incident—one among many— shows that, though the Admiralty normally issued protections, it was, in the final analysis, the Council which decided to whom they should be given. On September 25, 1739, when the Privy Council "determined that it was not proper to give any more Protections, unless to Colliers, 'till the Fleet should be Manned,"105 it did not mean that no other crews could get protections, but it did mean that shipowners had now to apply direct to the Privy Council for them and receive them, if granted, by special dispensation. All this gives the misleading impression that the govern­ ment had tight control over protections. In fact, there was no way to centralize the issuing of these documents without engendering administrative chaos, and the power to dispense them was spread widely. The Admiralty itself issued protec­ tions to crews of ships bound abroad, as well as to coasters and fishing vessels; the Navy, Victualling, and Ordnance Boards filled out certificates as they needed them; agents of Sick and Wounded issued them to returned prisoners of war; the Regulating Captains made them out for seamen who had acquired substitutes. But a great many protections were not distributed by naval authorities at all. The Customs Office, Salt Office, and Trinity House protected hundreds of water­ men, lightermen, bargemen, tidesmen, ballastmen, pilots, ship­ wrights (who were frequently ex-seamen)—every sort of harbor worker. The number these authorities might issue was some­ times regulated, but there was no control over the manner of 103 Corbett MSS. x, folio 47. Also on the grounds that they were nurs­ eries. io^Adai. 3/43, ao Sept. 1739.

108

Adm. 3/43, 24 Sept., 26 Sept. 1739.

4- The Manning Problem their distribution.106 The Admiralty urged them to protect "no more than is absolutely necessary," to keep careful account of certificates issued, and to avoid protecting a seaman where a landsman might do.107 Naturally there was a good bit of abuse. Protections might be obtained through corrupt politicians. Admiralty clerks, and others who drew up certificates of protection, were al­ lowed fees; some must have managed to amplify these. In 1734 Sir John Norris told Wager that because the Lord Warden's officers had not been able to press a single man in Deal or the Isle of Thanet, he was inclined to credit "the general report, that every seaman in these ports that can raise ten shillings to give to a freeman of Sandwich, has a single protection."108 Folkestone and Dover boats continued to run fugitive seamen ashore throughout the war, in spite of Admiralty threats that all protections to seamen in those towns would be voided.109 Brighton fishermen did not have to resort to subterfuge; they were so religiously provided with Admiralty protections—for Sussex was looked after by the Duke of Newcastle—that they came to believe they possessed a natural immunity from the press.110 Sometimes protections were obtained by proper means, but under false pretences. The fact that it was usually easier for coasting vessels to get protections created a loophole. How could the Admiralty be certain that masters of coasting vessels were not bound for foreign ports? Sir Charles Wager thought that vessels over 90 tons in particular "should be suspected and some proof made that they [were] Coasters, and if that is not done," he said, "I don't see where this abuse will stop."111 ioe There were other issuing authorities. One of them, the Waterman's Company, was required to turn over 1,000 men to the navy, but it was very backward in doing so (Adm. 3/44, 11 Feb. 1740 ff). 107 Corbett MSS. x, folio 46; Adm. 3/44, 10 Feb. 1740; Adm. 3/46, 30 March 1743. i°s Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS., folio 45292. ίο» Adm. 3/43, 25 Aug. 1738; Adm. 3/47, 20 Aug. 1743. no See Addl. MSS. 32694, passim. Hutchinson (Press Gang, pp. 181-183) calls Brighton one of the Admiralty's "rare oversights," but faulty vision was not the problem. 111 Adm. 3/44, «9 Jan. 1740; Adm. 1/710, Wager, 5 July 1739; Adm. S/43. 6 July '739-

4- The Manning Problem The only hope of control lay in the wariness of the Admiralty clerks, and in February 1740 the Board directed them to be "very Carefull not to be imposed on by Masters of Ships applying for Protections as Coasters, but who [were] in reality bound on Foreign Voyages."112 But another variety of abuse was far more common and much more difficult to prevent. Protections were passed from hand to hand, frequently for a price. To put a stop to this practice, the Privy Council, on the advice of the Admiralty, ordered that each certificate should carry a description of the man protected together with his place of residence, and that anyone not matching the appearance described, or found in employment other than that for which he was protected, should be impressed.113 The effectiveness of this step was naturally limited by the impreciseness of verbal descriptions. Seamen continued to turn up on homeward-bound vessels with seemingly valid protections, in spite of the fact that such certificates could not have been legally obtained.114 And "Pi­ lots Badge Men, Yachts Men, Excise Men 8cc." continued to use their protections to carry homeward-bound ships into port, thus allowing crews to escape.115 Abuse invited counter-abuse. Some lieutenants came to view all protections with suspicion, to insist on an accuracy in the physical descriptions which was not attainable, and to press men on the slightest evidence of chicanery.116 The Admiralty Lords did not encourage this. Though they directed that any seaman not carrying his papers with him should be impressed, they did not want protected men pressed "as it brings a Great trouble and Clamour upon them and they must at last be discharged."117 In January 1740 matters came to a head. Protections had suddenly become scarce, because those granted to coasters and colliers had expired on December 31 and had not been re­ newed; it was reported that protections issued by the Victual112 Adm. 3/44, 24 Feb. 1740. H3P.R.O., P.C. 2/95, 31 Jan. 1740; and see Adm. 3/45, 7 April 1741. in Adm. 3/46, ι March 1743. us Adm. 3/46, 25 March 1743. neE.g. Adm. 3/46, 31 May 1742. 117 Adm. 1/903, 22 May 1740; Adm. 3/45, 27 Feb. 1742; Adm. 3/46, 8 March 1743; Adm. 3/48, 17 Sept. 1744; Adm. 3/50, 26 Feb., 4 March 1745.

4- The Manning Problem ling Office were changing hands "for 5 or 6 guineas apiece."118 Now the East India Company was applying for protections in order to send out eleven ships, and those, if granted, would number more than a thousand. Should more be issued? In Cabinet Council Sir Charles Wager estimated that for the ships in commission and those intended to be put in commis­ sion during the coming year, 7,000 more men were wanted, and he revealed the disquieting news "that in the presant indavors to gett men they did but keep up the numbers they had in the rume of those that dey and desert." He was certain that under the circumstances it would be impossible to meet a combined Franco-Spanish threat, and the ministers resolved to place the navy's needs above the merchants'. Wager was "desired to serch the Admiralty for all the methods that had been yoused for raising and getting seamen" so that the Coun­ cil might take further action.119 As a result the Admiralty appointed a committee, with Sir John Norris its chairman, to study the problem and make recommendations.120 The report of this committee was acted upon in Cabinet Council on January 31. Strongly worded instructions were sent out to the civil authorities; hopeful orders were given for curtailing abuse of protections; and the proclamation offering bounty money was revived with the interesting proviso that after March 15 the money was to be paid, not to the volunteer seaman, but to anyone who brought a seaman in. The most important action pursuant to this report was, however, the laying of an embargo on all outbound merchant vessels, to remain in effect "until the Fleet is manned."121 This was strong medicine. Embargoes were, of course, de­ tested by the merchants, but their employment at the com­ mencement of hostilities in order to seize enemy shipping and keep seamen from leaving the country had come to be ex118 Addl. MSS. 2813a, folio 119; Adm. 111/26, 12 Jan. 1740. 119 Addl. MSS. 28132, folio 119. 120 This sort of committee was common in Queen Anne's time (Corbett MSS. x, folio 79). The report is given in full in Addl. MSS. 28132, folios 123-126 and is outlined in Richmond, 1, 273-274. Sir Herbert mistakenly listed those who were invited, not those who attended (who were: Admi­ rals Norris, Cavendish, and Stewart; Captains James Stewart, Hardy, and Girlington). The meeting was held on January 16. 121 P.R.O., P.C. 2/95, 31 Jan. 1740.

4- The Manning Problem pected and accepted.122 But it was also expected that they should be of short duration. A general embargo had been laid on June 15, 1739. Petitions from various merchants for the release of their vessels had multiplied, and the ministry was put under heavy pressure. The Duke of Richmond had written to the Duke of Newcastle and emphasized with obscenity the prospect of his affairs, should the ban on colliers not be soon removed.123 That embargo came to an end on July 26, 1739. The embargo ordered in 1740 was similar in operation, but different in character: first, it was concerned only with foreign trade; second, there was apparently no prospect of its being lifted until the fleet was manned, that is, from the merchants' point of view, until the nation's foreign commerce was ruined. This sort of embargo was designed to bring men into the fleet by forcing owners to turn over a certain proportion of their crews to the navy in exchange for permission to sail and protections for the remainder; or, put another way, to make "them compound for some of their Men, for the Secur­ ity of the rest."124 "Compounding" for protections was by no means restricted to use in connection with the embargo. When the East India Company sought protections for its eleven ships, the Cabinet Council recommended to the Directors that they offer the Admiralty a portion of seamen equal to onefourth the number of protections desired, but the latter pro­ tested that they could not produce the men.125 The effect of the embargo was to make the need to "compound" more keenly felt. It was quickly lifted from vessels employed on government service and from foreign ships (provided they car­ ried no English seamen), but was otherwise firmly enforced.126 On February 11 the Council laid down the policy that peti­ tioners could get protections and permission to sail "upon 122 Corbett MSS. x, folios 32-40. The embargo was enforced by the Lords of the Treasury through the Customs Officers and with the aid of the governors of the forts. i2SAddl. MSS. 32692, folios 158-159. 124 Corbett MSS. x, folio 40. 125 P.R.O., P.C. 2/95, 10 Jan. 1740; Adm. 3/44, 13 Jan. to 8 Feb. 1740, passim. After a joint meeting with the Admiralty the Directors agreed to carry 60 per cent landsmen in return for 100 protections per ship. The Hudson's Bay Co. was permitted to make the same arrangement. ΐ2β But it was difficult to enforce in Ireland (Adm. 3/44, 13 Oct., 15 Oct. 1740).

4- The Manning Problem their bringing to his Majtys. servis about a third of the num­ ber thay desired protections for,"127 and the Regulating Cap­ tains were ordered to issue protections in return for such sea­ men.128 The Clerk of the Council seems to have been kept busy by these arrangements, judging by the lists of ships which entered into the agreement.129 And then suddenly on April 10, Sir Charles Wager read a memorial to the Council from his Board, recommending that the embargo be scrapped. There were several demurrers, and Sir John Norris spoke out "as much against it, as in desentsi [he] could," but the Council voted to follow the Admiralty's advice.130 Why, though the object of manning the fleet was not in sight of attainment, did the Admiralty divest itself of this seemingly powerful and effective weapon? The embargo was abandoned, not only because the merchants hated it, but also because "the inconsiderable Number of Men got by it" did not seem to justify the serious difficulties that it caused to the Victualling Office and the dockyards.131 In short, it did not work. The effect of a policy of forcing the merchants to hand over seamen to the navy was to drive the seamen deeper into hiding. Even the most zealous shipowners found it increasingly difficult to get crews under these terms; the East India Com­ pany had thought it absurd to try.132 Moreover, the effect of the embargo on other sources of seamen had to be considered, for vessels that did not go out could not come home as quarries for press gangs afloat, and it was easier to take men out of ships than houses. The severe privation that seamen were willing to undergo to avoid naval service rendered sustained use of the embargo as a means of manning the fleet impractical. So bitterly did merchant seamen detest naval service that they were often willing to risk death rather than be taken. "Frays," as contemporaries called them, between naval and 127 Addl. MSS. 28132, folio 147. 128 Adm. 3/44, 29 Feb. 1740. 128 P.R.O., P.C. 2/95, 7 March 1740 lists 36 vessels, and 19 March 1740, 67 vessels. There were many more. Few of these carried crews of more than 10, so in general the navy only got two or three men from each. 131 Adm. 7/339, 10 April 1740. 130 Addl. MSS. 28132, folio 165. 132 Corbett MSS. x, folio 35 describes a similar experience in 1702. Merchants petitioning in the House of Commons against the 1740 embargo said that the cost of getting seamen to sign on their vessels was some­ times "more than ten pounds per man" (Pari. Hist, xi, 579-582).

4- The Manning Problem merchant ships were frequent, and in these frays all available weapons were employed from "Billets, Mallets & Blocks" to cannon. East India ships seem to have given the most trouble. Theoretically there should have been no armed resistance, for captains and masters were required to keep weapons carefully secured, but many East India captains were either intimidated by, or sympathetic with, their crews. The crews preferred run­ ning to fighting wherever possible. In 1743 the crew of the Onslow off Dover simply abandoned her in a seaway, and naval seamen had to take her to her moorings.133 And when the Duke of Lorraine, which had put into Kinsale on her way home applied for a convoy to London, the man of war arrived to find her unable to muster enough men to make the voy­ age.134 In both cases the Admiralty expressed to the Directors of the East India Company its hope that the men would forfeit their wages according to statute, but the Directors, like most merchants, were more intent on preserving the good will of the seamen than on disciplining the fugitives.135 In fact, it seems that the most likely way for a seaman to lose his wages for a voyage was to be impressed; in such cases the master was expected to give the man his pay while the gang waited on board, but many masters callously took advantage of his help less state to save money.136 The East India Company, it seems, never failed to pay its men; in fact, the Directors took their side in the battle against the Admiralty without hesitation. Such an attitude led to incidents such as the following: I supose [Wager wrote to Walpole] you may have heard how the E. Indie Ships have behav'd to our Boats, that went on bord to press, when they ariv'd in the Downs . . . we had three men of War there (with their Convoy) they sent all their boats, but they fir'd upon them from their ships, and wounded several men. One was drown'd: in the Evening, the East Indie men got into their Boats with Arms, and went ashore, but were attack'd by our Boats who took some but most of them escap'd: so that we get, in the whole, but 156 Men, when we should have 500; the[y] pass'd by the Nore and would not bring too there, tho several shott were fir'd at them. I hope you will not give Protections to the next that ask for them.137 ls^ Adm. 3/50, 23 Feb. 1745. i3s Adm. 3/47, 12 Sept. 1743. 134 Adm. 3/48, 29 Feb. 1744. 136 Observations and Proposals, p. 13. 137 Cholmondeley MSS. 2969, 21 Sept. 1740.

4· The Manning Problem After this incident the Admiralty attempted to prosecute one of the East India captains, but with no success.138 A later at­ tempt to get a bill passed prescribing stiff penalties for masters who forcibly resisted the press made no progress in the House of Commons.139 Disease

With the coming of spring in 1740 came also the alarming realization that, in spite of strenuous efforts, the effective man­ power of the fleet was hardly increasing at all. From Novem­ ber 1739 to May 1740 the number of seamen actually mustered rose only from 29,435 to 30,676.140 For the sick lists were lengthening as fast as the lists of new recruits. The home fleet was gripped by epidemic. Thanks to ignorance of proper hygiene, rotten victuals, poor diet, overexposure topside, overcrowding and bad ventila­ tion below decks, and the seaman's generally careless attitude toward health, scurvy, dysentery, fever, and venereal disease were common in the fleet. But the epidemic of 1739-1741 was typhus. Typhus, or "ship fever," severely complicated the problem of mobilization throughout the eighteenth century. It was most common during mobilization because new recruits introduced it.141 It was transmitted by vermin. "The very filth of London," to use Admiral Cavendish's phrase, infected all the recruits in the crowded tenders, and they carried the dis­ ease with them to various ships of the fleet. Admiral Caven­ dish's fears—and Sir Charles Wager had agreed with him— about the pestilential effect of the human flotsam recruited in 1739 were fully realized by the spring of 1740.142 The epi­ demic was already fast developing by November 1739.143 It was aggravated by what was perhaps the severest winter of the 138 Adm. 3/44, 29 Oct. 1740; Adm. 3/45, 21 Jan. 1742. 139 Adm. 3/51, 18 March 1745. 1 40

House of Commons Journals, xxm, 437, 607. Medicine and the Navy,

1*1 Lloyd and Coulter,

in, 109, 338-340. I am

indebted to Mr. Lloyd for allowing me to read portions of

this book

prior to publication. 142 For Wager's opinion see Adm. 1/710, Wager, 22 July 1739. 1*3 Adm. 3/43, 10 Nov. 1739.

4- The Manning Problem eighteenth century.144 The "Violent and Malignant Fever" of 1739-1741 proved more deadly than ordinary "ship fever," and it left its mark ashore as well.145 The navy could neither prevent its spread nor offer ade­ quate care to its many victims. Fifteen years later James Lind rightly suggested that if recruits were properly handled, the problem would be greatly diminished.146 However, the means by which "ship fever" spread continued to puzzle physicians and surgeons, and without definite knowledge the Admiralty was not likely to introduce any decisive reform, for the re­ quirements of impressment made the sort of reform suggested by Lind very inconvenient.147 As for medical care, contem­ porary knowledge of "physick" offered little of value. The best the navy could do was minimize deaths and hasten recupera­ tion by providing the basic nursing requirements—warmth, proper food, rest, and cleanliness. But the navy's medical facilities in 1740 could not cope with an epidemic. By February 1740 they were overloaded. In the Portsmouth area there was a 380-bed hospital at Gosport, run by Sir James Barclay, Surgeon-Agent. The over­ flow was put in sick quarters at 7 shillings per man per week. Most of these were in Gosport, a poor neighborhood, because the residents of Portsmouth did not want sick seamen. The men in quarters were visited by surgeons and mates, under the supervision of a salaried Master Surgeon. Over-all respon­ sibility for sick seamen in the Portsmouth area lay with Dr. Samuel Brady, a physician originally appointed (October 27, 1739) temporarily at 20i. per day, but soon made permanent at £200 a year.148 Cf. T. Smollett, History of England (edn., 1818), iir, 38-39: "The river Thames was covered with such a crust of ice, that a multitude of people dwelled upon it in tents, . . . the fruits of the earth were de­ stroyed by cold." In January 1740 the tenders in the river Thames were so cold that the Regulating Captains were ordered to quarter the prest men ashore (Adm. 3/44, 11 Jan. 1740). 1*5 C. Creighton, A History of Epidemics in Britain (a vol., Cambridge, 1891-1894), 11, 349-351. J. Lind, Essay on the Most Effectual Means of Preserving the Health of Seamen in the Royal Navy (1757). 1« See, for example, Adm. 3/51, a6 Aug. 1745. "8 Adm. 3/44, 18 March 1740; Adm. 3/43, 10 Nov., 27 Oct. 1739; Adm. 3/44, 2 Feb. 1740. l8o

4- The Manning Problem It was the men in sick quarters who fared the worst. In April Admiral Cavendish wrote: I beg leave to lay before their Lordships the deplorable condition our Sick Men are in at their Quarters at Gosport, crowded Twenty or Thirty into a little Ale or Ginn house, and two or three in a Bed of different Diseases, without proper Nurses or People to look after them, and . . . in this miserable way, they Dye very fast, and those who recover, it is but Slowly, and such a Stanch there is amongst them, that it is not unlikely it may breed the Plague . . . I am told the most part of this winter, they have wanted fires in their quarters, wth. broken windows, that the poor men have been starv'd with Cold.149

Cavendish sent ten captains on a tour of inspection. Their reports, forwarded April 30, showed general agreement on the following points: first, the quarters were overcrowded, and the large numbers of sick made proper attendance by the surgeon's mates impossible; second, the men did not complain; third, the men had too much freedom to go about and get drunk, and frequently they were quartered in public houses. More than one captain suggested that the freedom to drink silenced criticism of the landladies: "They make no complaint of their Provisions or Attendance, which I presume they are prevailed on by the liberty they have of drinking."150 But the navy had to continue to use bad quarters because it had no choice. At the end of April, when Covill Mayne's squadron of four ships arrived at Spithead, Cavendish estimated there would be in them "at least three hundred sick men," and "God knows," he added, "where we shall put them."151 By the end of May new quarters for four or five hundred had been found "at Fareham & elsewhere," but, according to Cavendish, it "might have been done before, if thought fit, and have saved the life of many a poor Sailor."152 More than a year later, notwith­ standing the sincere efforts of Commissioner Hills of the Sick and Wounded, who had been sent to supervise at Portsmouth, there were "Six or Seven hundred poor miserable creatures, 1« Adm. 3/44, 23 April, 27 April 1740. 150 Adm. 1/903, 30 April 1740, Report. isi Adm. 1/903, 29 April 1740. 152 Adm. 3/44, 28 May 1740.

l8l

4- The Manning Problem Sick and dying dayly on board their Ships."153 And judging from Cavendish's unceasing requests, there were never enough surgeons and mates, either afloat or ashore; on many ships the surgeons themselves were either sick or dead.154 At Plymouth things were no better and perhaps worse. There was a salaried physician, Dr. John Seymour, a Surgeon, William Wyatt, and a contractor, Humphrey Buttall.155 The hospital had only 165 beds;156 and since there were fewer lodging houses available at Plymouth, various crude structures had to be fitted up as hospitals.157 In May 1740 it was reported that "the Hospital was in a very nasty Condition" and that the men were "miserable ... from the want of attendance, and even common Necessaries."158 Commissioner Vanbrugh in­ spected and found the staff inadequate; the Surgeon had been unable to procure proper nurses—nine of them had died in the past two months—and his assistants had deserted him "at the worst time."159 The Admiralty was not satisfied, and told the Sick and Wounded Board that it wanted to hear no more complaints.160 But this was asking the impossible, for in early June Admiral Balchen arrived with sickness raging in his six ships, and the number of sick put ashore at Plymouth rose in one month from 545 to over 2,000.161 The situation got out of hand.162 In a joint meeting with the Admiralty Board, it was decided that one of the Commissioners of Sick and Wounded should go to Plymouth and see for himself.163 Commissioner 153Adm. 1/905, 16 Sept. 1741. Cavendish did not mean that 600 men were dying per day. ι5* Adm. 1/903, 7 May 1740. 1e5Adm. 3/44, 21 April 1740; Adm. 1/3528, 15 July 1740. loeAdm. 1/3528, 26 Oct. 1733. In 1694 the navy "purchased a large House . . . near Plymouth, which was at first made use of as a Prison; but when the French War was over, and ever since, as an Hospital." "'Adm. 1/3528, 25 July 1740. See the interesting argument in 1734 over quartering sick men in the town of Plymouth (Adm. 1/3528, 11 March 1734 and dates following). 15SAdm. 3/44, 21 May 1740. 159Adm. 1/3528, 30 May 1740. 160 Adm. 3/44, 3 June 1740. 1S1Cholmondeley MSS. 12/1. Richmond, 1, 83. The Admiralty tried to warn the Sick and Wounded Board about the sickness in Balchen's ships (Adm. 3/44, 4 June 1740). 162 Adm. 1/3528, 25 July, 18 Aug. 1740. "3 Adm. 3/44, 29 Aug. 1740.

4- The Manning Problem Hills found the food tolerable, but not what it should have been; there was some crowding in the salt houses; "some Nurses . . . had fallen into a way of Exchanging the people's Provisions for Geneva, 8c bringing it to them in the Hospital"; but beyond this there was not much that could be immediately improved.164 The Admiralty held that Buttall had profited illegitimately and ordered him dismissed.165 Hills also visited Gosport, and as a result of his report Sir James Barclay, Surgeon and Agent of the hospital, was dismissed, the Admi­ ralty coming to the resolution that "for the future the Employ­ ment of Agent at Gosport be separated from that of the Surgeon."166 It is doubtful whether such dismissals could stamp out the neglect and abuse which the contract system invited. However, even if the agents had met their obligations, and even if enough quarters could have been found, the navy's medical system would have remained basically defective because it was not organized to keep the patients under proper discipline. This was a serious matter in the era of cheap gin. Life ashore was more pleasant than imprisonment aboard ship: sick men drank themselves to death; convalescing men stayed drunk and delayed recuperation. Even in the hospitals discipline might break down completely, as it did in the summer of 1740 at Plymouth after Capt. Hildesley's inspection. Hildesley told the sick men that it was his job "to redress little irregularities, and represent wilfull mismanagements"; he reminded them that it was in the interest of the hospital staff "to conceal the truth." "The Consequence immediately after was, and still is," the Surgeon reported, "that no Order can be observed in the Hospital; The Nurses are abused, beat, and forced to leave their Wards, and they have frequently changed, the new Ones are forced to fly from the Violence of those Rioters, who get Drunk, come in at all hours of the Night, threaten the Lives of the Nurses, and most inhumanly disturb the rest of the other 164 Adm. 1/3588, 17 Nov. 1740. 165 Adm. 3/45, 22 April 1741. ΐ6β Adm. 1/3528, 17 Nov. 1740; Adm. 3/45, 3 April 1741. Barclay was guilty of neglecting the men and of "frauds in his Accounts as Agent."

4- The Manning Problem poor Sick Creatures."1®7 This situation must have been un­ usual, but in sick quarters lack of discipline was normal. Landladies encouraged drinking. Their profit was swelled by skimping on provisions, and this could be done if the men did not complain; it would have been rash to deny them both food and drink, and gin was cheaper than food. According to Caven­ dish, the sick men at Gosport lay "in little Bawdy houses, two in a Bed for the most part, and what they call Nurses to attend them, are the Rotten whores that Ply about these houses, where they force from the poor Sick men a Will, and then destroy them with Ginn."168 Cheap gin and cheap women account for the nakedness of the men reported so often. They sold their slops (clothes) for money, and when that was done they drew slops again—the cost was checked against their wages—for the same purposes; the process might be endless.169 To curb this, Sick and Wounded agents were instructed not to supply the men with slops, but the instruction was frequently ignored. There was a pathetic irony in the situation: Men were dying of overexposure, and the persons appointed to supervise their recovery were forbidden to clothe them. By the war's end the navy had still not found a way out of this di­ lemma.170 But the liberty that the men took that was most damaging to the navy was the liberty of running away. They "go off as soon as they can crawl," wrote Cavendish.171 The importance of discipline may be seen by comparing the results achieved by Capt. Philip Vincent of the St. Albans. Vincent ignored the facilities at Gosport, and hired a barn and lodging houses on the Isle of Wight. By segregating the men according to their degree of sickness, and appointing "a careful Mate and two Midshipmen to constantly observe the conduct of the men . . . with regard to their Compliance in ιβ7 Adm. 1/3528, 25 July 1740. 188 Adm. 1/903, 28 May 1740. ιββ E.g. Adm. 1/381, Mathews, 13 March 1744. "ο Adm. 3/44, 25 April 1740. The Royal Sovereign was not allowed to issue slops to her ill-clad supernumerary men; in 1745 they were falling ill in great numbers and the Admiralty had to permit it (Adm. 3/49, 15 Jan., 19 Jan. 1745). i" Adm. 1/905, 16 Sept. 1741. The figures in Table 12 probably do not include all the desertions that resulted from putting sick men ashore, since a number ran away after being discharged by hospital authorities.

4- The Manning Problem, following the Surgeons directions," he cured a higher propor­ tion of men than Gosport hospital, at less cost, and with no desertions. The Admiralty approved of his conduct and or­ dered the Sick and Wounded Board to reimburse his expenses, notwithstanding his failure to follow normal procedure.172 A partial solution was the hospital ship, which could be fitted out quickly. From the very first Admiral Cavendish had urged that one of the three-decked ships in Ordinary should be converted, and by June 19, 1740 the Blenheim, an old 2nd rate, was ready to receive sick men, although arrangements for her administration were still not complete.173 As soon as this was done the Blenheim hospital ship proved valuable, and during the year 1742 only nine men deserted from her.174 Af­ ter the epidemic subsided the Sick and Wounded Board, anx­ ious to keep hold of contracted quarters in case of future emergencies, requested that no more men be sent to the hos­ pital ship as long as there were quarters on shore available. The Admiralty's reply was negative: "In view of the great Desertions that happen on Shore, we think the Ship of great use, from the Difficulty of the Seamens deserting from her when they recover."175 It was the reiterated policy that those with scabies (the itch) or venereal disease should be sent to the Blenheim whenever possible, "because if put on Shore they will run away."176 But the true solution was a long-term one: the establishment of permanent naval hospitals. The disaster of 1739-1741 led directly to the founding of Haslar Hospital, the first royal hospital designed to serve the fleet.177 The figures in Table 12 reveal the impact of the epidemic on mobilization. During the sixteen-month period covered by the table, the total number of men borne in sea pay increased by 12,373.178 The table shows that 4,773 men died or deserted after being put ashore for cure—roughly 3/8ths of the in172 Adm. 1/903, 17 June 1740; Adm. 3/44, 18 June 1740. lis Adm. 1/903, 23 April, 19 June 1740; Adm. 3/44, 24 April, «3 June, 14 July, 6 Nov., 15 Nov. 1740; Adm. 1/904, 30 Oct. 1740. There is a draw­ ing of the Blenheim in Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, HI, facing p. 60. 174 Adm. 98/1, 18 March 1743. 1« Adm. 3/45, 9 Jan. 174a. ΐ7β Adm. 3/46, 1 May, 15 May 1742; Adm. 3/47, 16 May 1743; Adm. 3/49, 19 Jan. 1745. 17S 177 See above p. 51. House of Commons Journals, xxm, 437, 607.

4. The Manning Problem TABLE 12. Seamen Sent from on Board the Ships of War to Hospitals and Hospital Ships in Harbor From July 10 to 20, 1739 August September October November December January 1740 February March April May June July August September October November Totals

Received 361 1061 508 805 1682 815 1675 2032 2496 2055 3039 3614 1458 987 2151 1166 616

Discharged 36 519 291 520 1453 627 922 1039 1774 1273 1908 2367 2172 1408 1104 1419 702

Dead 6 14 20 25 154 55 142 234 331 308 348 384 166 117 122 145 59

Deserted 22 29 20 33 94 140 68 41 57 114 198 146 223 297 219 287 155

26521

19534

2630

2143

Addl. MSS. 19031, folio 29. "Hospitals" should be taken to mean both hospitals and sick quarters. crease in manpower. During the critical spring of 1740 (February through June), while the navy was adding 3,627 to the books,!^® the fleet was sending 4,875 more men to the hospitals than it was getting back. In fact, the losses must have been far greater, for the table does not include men who died on board, nor does it distinguish between those discharged to the fleet and those discharged as unfit for service, and the number of the latter must have been considerable. The manpower of the fleet was not shrinking, since dead men and men ashore sick for more than thirty days were struck from the books, but it was scarcely growing. Summer 1740: The Crisis "Therefore, Sir Charles and Sir John, I must . . . again add, what has been the burden of my song in every Council these four months—Oh! seamen, seamen, seamen!" Such was Sir Robert Walpole's lament in the meeting of the Cabinet Coun179 Ibid.

186

4- The Manning Problem cil, May 6, 1740.180 The ships at home lacked one-third of their complements.181 A month before, Admiral Balchen had begged the Admiralty not to insist on compliance with sailing orders which in view of the undermanned condition of his ships would leave him "baffled" at sea and expose him to loss of reputation.182 Nor was all well with the ships already sent out. One captain, who had sailed from England thirty-eight under complement, put fifty sick ashore at Gibraltar, and was now cruising off Cape St. Mary's with thirty sick on board, wrote that "he could neither sleep day nor night for fear of finding what he was ordered to search for."183 After much shuffling of ships and men Balchen had got to sea (with five ships instead of eight), but it was soon clear that the Spanish had at Ferrol a squadron double his strength. Since no additional ships could be sent out, the ministry had to recall him to England.184 To make matters worse, there arrived on May 6 definite news that the French were fitting out twenty ships of the line at Brest.185 Walpole did not see how even the pacifistic Fleury could set aside this opportunity to embarrass England.186 Britain had to get a substantial squadron to sea. Thus the urgency and thoroughness with which the man­ ning problem was discussed in Cabinet Council on May 2a.187 The Lords of the Admiralty were called in to express their views. The Council was told that 4,698 men were still needed to man the twenty-five ships in commission, but that a squad­ ron of seventeen could be got to sea immediately upon pro­ duction of 2,465. The ministers aimed at this more modest tar­ get. Outstanding protections amounted to 14,800, of which about 7,000 were held by coasters and colliers, the rest by fish­ ing and outbound merchant vessels. Walpole recommended cancelling them all, a highly unpopular procedure. Sir John Norris put forward an alternate plan. Cancelling the protections, he pointed out, would not bring in men fast enough; better to draw 1,800 men from the Marine regiments, add to them two battalions of foot soldiers, and place them 182 Adm. 1/903, 4 April 1740. 180 Hervey, Memoirs, p. 933. 183 Hervey, Memoirs, p. 927. 181 Ibid. 184 Adm. 3/44, 5 April 1740; Richmond, 1, 80. 185 Ibid., I, 8i. 186 Hervey, Memoirs, pp. 937-938. 187 Ibid., pp. 937-940. Hervey's report of the meeting is very detailed.

1S7

4- The Manning Problem on board the ships. In case of a threatened invasion, he ar­ gued, the men could always be put ashore. Walpole firmly opposed using troops; he felt that the ships should be manned with seamen and only seamen; but Newcastle, Hardwicke, and Richmond favored Norris's plan, and it was adopted. The government was forced to call on the army because the six Marine regiments established after the outbreak of war in 1739 were not meeting expectations. They were slow in rais­ ing men and ill-organized to serve the fleet. "The Marines, as they are proposed to be raised at this juncture," an M.P. in opposition commented in November 1739, "are very different from the Marines, that were raised in the beginning of the last war, and . .. are indeed no other than an additional number of standing troops."188 In substance, he was right. Formerly Marines had been raised with an eye to­ ward serving the fleet, and they had been under the control of the Admiralty.188 The regiments established in 1739 were put under the Secretary at War. From the navy's point of view it was a bad arrangement. Its failings led to an inquiry by a Parliamentary Committee in 1746,190 and on February 28, 1747 a new establishment put the Marines back under Admiralty control.191 The organizing of the Marines on an army model in 1739 gave rise to problems of administration and of attitude. Ad­ ministratively the basic problem was that when Marines em­ barked as ship's company, their regimental organization prac­ tically disappeared. The Marine instructions of May 7, 1740 called for detachments of at least 24 men, and the men were to be kept with their company officers, but when the first Marines went aboard in June 1740 there were not enough officers ready to go aboard with them.192 There was much confusion. 188 Pari. Hist., xi, 194. For a discussion of Marines in this period see Richmond, 1, 267-275. lee Burchett, Complete History, pp. 615-618. ieo A Report from the Committee appointed to consider the State of His Majesty's Land Forces and Marines, 1746: Reports from Committees of the House of Commons, . . . not inserted in the Journals, 11, 75-211; pp. 134-163 discuss Marines. IE1 See Adm. 106/3544, bundle no. 1; Wobum MSS. XIII, folio 82, 28 Sept. 1746. i»2 The Marine instructions of May 7, 1740 are printed in Reports from

l88

4· The Manning Problem The Admiralty rarely had any idea of the number of Marines that might be available in regimental quarters, and the regi­ mental commands lost track of their men aboard ship.193 In February 1745 the Lords of the Admiralty pointed out to the senior Marine officer, Brig. Gen. Edward Wolfe, "how much the Accounts made up in the Navy Office from the Ships Muster Books, differ in the number of Marines serving in the Fleet, from the Accounts returned to him by the Regiments and how much the one falls short of the other." They asked him to "Report his Opinion, to what causes it is owing that so few Marines do actually serve at Sea."19i Much of the trouble arose because the Marines were lands­ men at heart, both officers and men. The colonels were drawn from the Foot Guards and so were most of the noncommis­ sioned officers.195 Officers of all ranks were reluctant to go to sea. The Admiralty Board in 1745 was disgusted with the "frequent Applications from Marine Officers to be excused from going to Sea, on pretence of ill Health," and asked Wolfe to advise them on distinguishing "real from feigned excuses." After consulting Wolfe the Board also decided to give no Marine officer on board leave without a certificate from his colonel.19® As for the men, it seemed to Admiral Cavendish that the regiments always managed to "pick out all their worst" for shipboard duty.197 Once on board, some of the Marines proved useful. Although they were not required to go aloft, they were encouraged, and many voluntarily learned to be seamen;198 but there was often a problem of discipline, the Marines and their lieutenants resenting the power of the ships' officers and petty officers.199 Committees, 11, 134; a manuscript copy of instructions for embarking Marines sent from the War Office to the Admiralty is in Adm. 1/4319; Adm. 3/44, 6 June 1740; Adm. 1/903, 18 June 1740. See Adm. 3/45, 25 Sept. 1741; Adm. 3/46, 21 Sept. 1742; Reports from Committees, 11, 136-139. 194 Adm. 3/50, 18 Feb., 18 March 1745. 195 p. H. Nicolas, History of the Royal Marine Forces (1845), p. 17. ΐ9β Adm. 3/49, 1 Jan., 30 Jan., 7 Feb. 1745. 197 Adm. 1/903, 26 May 1740. i98Addl. MSS. 19031, folios 372-373; Reports from Committees, 11, 139, 144; see also Richmond, 1, 275. 199 E.g. Adm. 3/47, 9 April, 18 June, 82 Sept. 1743; Adm. 3/50, 10 May, 13 May 1745.

4- The Manning Problem The upshot was that the Marines contributed few men in the critical spring and summer of 1740. Many of those assigned to the fleet fell sick,200 and some of them did it deliberately. Later, in 1745 a lieutenant colonel described "the Vile Prac­ tices used by the Marines on board the Ships at Portsmouth in purposely getting the Itch, in hopes to be sent to Southamp ton Hospital from whence they either desert, or sell their Slops, so that they are almost Naked when they return to the Ships."201 The Admiralty ordered 143 Marines to be put aboard the ships of Anson's squadron, which was also trying to get to sea at this time, but Sir John Norris wrote from Spithead that the regiment designated to supply them had only 97 men remaining in quarters, and of those 66 were sick 202 Al­ though at the Cabinet Council meeting in May, Norris had hoped the Marine regiments might supply 1,800 men, they supplied less than half that number in the summer of 1740.203 Such Marines as were available were put into the smaller ships; the larger ships were given soldiers. The thirteen ships of the line under Norris's command at Portsmouth contained 1,085 soldiers and 66 Marines.204 It had been originally intended that Norris sail with twenty ships of the line,205 but that being plainly impossible, he vol­ unteered to go with fifteen and eventually settled for two less, with the understanding that others would soon join him. Even then his squadron was short of complement because, as he re­ ported, "Accidents of Sickness &c., lessen their Number as fast as my Endeavours Supply them."206 On July 8 Sir ChaIoner Ogle's squadron of nine ships of force arrived at Spithead from the Mediterranean, and the Admiralty immediately 200 Adm. 1/903, 1 May, 6 May, 15 May, 30 May 1740; Adm. 1/905, 25 May 1741. 201 Adm. 3/49, 14 Jan. 1745. 202 Adm. 1 /904, Norris, 6 July 1740. 20s it is impossible to get an accurate count of the number of Marines on board in 1740 because most of the manning reports lumped soldiers and Marines together. Between July 1 and October 11 the Admiralty ordered 759 Marines to various ships (Adm. 2/56, passim.), but because of sickness, and because some of the orders were concerned with redirecting Marines originally assigned to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd rates to smaller ships (Adm. 2/56, 11 June 1740), the number actually mustered as ship's com­ pany may well have been below 500. 205 Richmond, 1, 86. 204 Adm. 1/904, Norris, 2 July 1740. 2oe Adm. 1/904, Norris, 3 July 1740.

4- The Manning Problem placed them under Norris's command.207 But this was done be­ fore it was known that Ogle had limped home; he had put 344 men sick ashore at Gibraltar, and was preparing to land 621 more at Portsmouth; he mustered 2,573 able-bodied men out of a total complement of 3,475.208 Eventually seven of Ogle's ships joined Norris, plus two from Plymouth.209 As it turned out, the fleet, which was ordered to the Bay of Biscay, never got there. It was delayed by contrary winds and damaged by rough weather. On July 26 Norris was forced to take shelter in Torbay, and there he remained for six weeks; three times he ventured out, and each time he was driven back by storms. All Europe watched the hapless fleet. Horace Walpole wrote from Italy: "The Italians take Torbay for an Eng­ lish town in the hands of the Spaniards, after the fashion of Gibraltar, and imagine 'tis a wonderful strong place, by our fleet's having retired from before it so often, and so often re­ turned."210 In such manner the fleet consumed its provisions and saw its numbers lessened by storm damage and disease, for it had carried to sea the same fever that had so impeded its sailing. The Jersey and Elizabeth received mast damage; the Princess Amelia and Augusta were so sickly that Norris had no choice but to send them into port.211 For with many men sick, and many others inexperienced they stood in danger. The situa­ tion of the Cambridge, described in a statement signed by her lieutenants and warrant officers on September 1, shows the predicament of the most severely affected ships: "The Com­ pany of the said ship in its best Condition always Consisted of raw & unskillfull Sailors (the very worst that any of us were Adm. 8/56, 8 July 1740. Adm. 1/380, Ogle, 26 May 1740; Adm. 1/904, 10 July 1740; this report of 10 July shows a muster of 2,708, but 130 of these were men that Norris had put into Ogle's stricken ships from the Salisbury, which had just arrived from Barbados. 209 Richmond (1, 89) states that six ships from Plymouth joined Norris; this was what had been intended, but only the Weymouth and Dunkirk were ready. 210 To Richard West, 8 Oct. 1740, W. S. Lewis, G. L. Lam, C. H. Ben­ nett, Horace Walpole's Correspondence with Thomas Gray, Richard West and Thomas Ashton (New Haven, 1948), p. 230. 211 Adm. 1/904, Norris, 7 Aug., 17 Aug. 1740. 207

20s

m

4- The Manning Problem, ever at Sea with) and now a Malignant Distemper raging amongst them. . . . In the last rough weather we cou'd never work her without all our hands, and now it appears by this Day's list that there are One Hundred and thirty one afflicted with the Said Distemper, and not thirty Seamen in health be­ fore the Mast."212 This was in some measure the condition of nearly every one of the ships of the fleet which anchored at Spithead on September 14 and began preparations for a voyage to the West Indies. The fleet destined for the West Indies under the command of Sir Chaloner Ogle was to consist of nearly every ship of the line at home. Its preparation was supervised by Admiral Cavendish. The Admiralty was anxious to know how many more men would be needed and pressed Cavendish for an exact account; because of the number of sick men he could not supply it. As late as September 30 he could only guess how many were sick on board—he guessed 600—and with "others dayly falling down, others returning from the Hospital," he found it "impossible to be exact in the Computation."213 The Admiralty wanted exact information because it was trying to determine how many more men would have to be "turned over," that is, how many would have to be removed from the ships staying home in order to complete those scheduled to sail. The "turn-over," a procedure which Thomas Corbett "reckoned one of the Diseases of the Navy," was nothing new. It was first practiced "regularly and on a large scale" in the navy of William III.214 That the procedure came to be used soon after war began in 1739 is hardly surprising, for· it was a temptingly simple way of solving any given problem of limited dimensions. Hence Cavendish was instructed in November 1739 to bring the six ships going to reinforce Haddock in the Mediterranean up to complement with men "from other ships at Portsmouth or Spithead."215 By the same method, by taking men out of the Princess Amelia and Boyne to man the Russell and Grafton, Admiral Balchen was able to carry out his orders 212 Enclosed in Adm. 1/904, Norris, 29 Sept. 1740. 213 Adm. 1/904, 30 Sept. 1740. 214 Corbett MSS. x, folio 114; Ehrman, p. 133. 215 Adm. 3/44, 8 Nov., 21 Nov. 1739.

4- The Manning Problem early in April 1740.216 Faced with a shortage of seamen and an urgent need to get a squadron to sea, why not draw on the ships not ordered to sail to man those that were? There were many reasons, and the Admiralty was well aware of them. These reasons, being largely concerned with long-term effects on the manning problem, were rightly dismissed in cases of real emergency, but the danger was that this handy solution easily became habitual. Worse yet, one turn-over naturally led to another. It might not be serious if the ship from which the men were taken was destined for a long dockyard overhaul; however, when there was an acute shortage of men such resources were never suf­ ficient. During the season for dispatching squadrons (roughly April to September) few ships were sent in for overhauls, and consequently periodic emergencies prompted the Admiralty to rob ships which it knew full well had to be brought up to com­ plement again within a month or two, if projected operations were to be carried out. Nearly every ship that suffered an acci­ dent requiring repairs or a delay in her fitting in the spring and summer of 1740 promptly lost her crew.217 On September 7 the six ships remaining at Portsmouth mustered but 792 men (305 were officers and servants) out of a total comple­ ment of 2,530; 427 of these were on board the Princess Amelia, which the Admiralty was trying hard to get to sea.218 At Plymouth the situation was the same.219 Thus by the end of summer, when nearly every ship was slated for the West Indies, the reckoning had come. Ships that had supplied others now had to be manned themselves, and there were no men at hand. Understandably—though not always justifiably, in view of the unfortunate weather—it seemed to many that the season's frenzied efforts to put various ships to sea had been strategically profitless. Muster books had been thrown into confusion, and shipboard morale badly shaken. The former 2ie Adm. 1/903, Balchen, 4 April, 7 April, 8 April 1740. 217 Based on status reports from Portsmouth and Plymouth in Adm. 1/904 and Adm. 1/797; about a dozen ships in all. 218 Adm. 1/904; report of 7 Sept. 1740. There were two other ships at Portsmouth well manned, but these were both cruisers undergoing minor repairs, and the Admiralty regarded their companies as untouchable. 219 Adm. 3/44, g6 Aug., 1 Sept., 9 Sept., 12 Sept. 1740.

m

4- The Manning Problem merely caused inconvenience; the latter was serious. Admiral Cavendish must have been thinking of the events of the pre­ vious summer when he wrote in June 1741: I see the Roebuck is under sailing orders . . . if we man him from other ships, we shall be eternally turning People over from ship to ship, which breaks their hearts, . . . I hope this will be avoided as much as possible, I shall always do what I can to prevent it, and do not see that there is a necessity of doing it so frequently; as for Prest men to be sure, it is right to dispose of them to the ships that want them, But the turning over Voluntiers, and Men that have be­ longed to ships some time, and like the ship and their Officers, I dare say that wont advance the Service at all.220

To appreciate fully Cavendish's argument one must recol­ lect that it was the ship and her officers, not the naval service, that commanded a seaman's loyalty. Promotion in the lower decks depended on favor, just as it did in the commissioned ranks. Conversely, captains tended to cultivate favorites among seamen and petty officers because it was almost impos­ sible to run the ship efficiently without a core of loyal and trustworthy men.221 Thus the removal of a captain from one ship to another implied the transfer of a portion of her crew, including not only the captain's servants but some of her petty officers and volunteer seamen as well. The printed Regula­ tions specified the number a captain of each rate of ship might take with him,222 but in reality the number depended on cir­ cumstances and the favor of the Admiralty. An extreme case is that of Capt. Harry Norris, who when ordered from the Ad­ venture to the Gloucester in order to go on the financially at­ tractive voyage with Anson, managed by his father's influence to get his whole company transferred.223 Whenever possible the Admiralty Lords tried to grant such requests, but they Adm. 1/905, 4 June 1741. For this reason the captains of newly commissioned ships, which later in the war frequently had none but prest men, were authorized by the Admiralty to "prevail with" volunteer seamen on other ships (e.g. Adm. 3/46, 28 Jan. 1743; Adm. 3/47, 9 Aug., 26 Sept. 1743; Adm. 3/48, a April 1744). 222 Regulations and Instructions (1734), pp. 40-41; e.g. Adm. 3/46, 25 Jan. 1743. 223 Adm. 3/44, 29 March 1740; Addl. MSS. 28132, folio 73. Ironically, Harry Norris quit the expedition at Madeira. 220

221

m

4· The Manning Problem drew the line when Capt. Harry Powlett asked that thirty of his men who had "been with him 4 or 5 years" might be al­ lowed to remain voluntarily out of pay until he got another ship.224 Theoretically there was no way for a man to change ships, or for captains to get men transferred to other ships, without Admiralty approval. In practice, it appears not to have been very difficult. The men did it by deserting from the ship they did not like and signing on one they did; whereupon the captain of the latter, anxious for volunteer seamen, wrote the Navy Board asking for the "R" (for Run) which had been set against the man's name in the muster books to be taken off so that he would not forfeit his wages for the previous ship. Such requests became routine, and though the Admiralty ad­ vised the Navy Board in 1744 to scrutinize them carefully and not be "put upon," they continued to be granted.225 For cap­ tains there was a simple way to get rid of men they did not like; they sent them ashore "sick." According to procedure, a man was no longer counted a member of a ship's company af­ ter he had been sick ashore for more than a month.22® In 1744, when the Admiralty learned that it was "a frequent practice with the Captains . . . to send Men on shore to the Hospitals, whose Ailments [were] but trifHing, . . . in order to get rid of such Men as they [did] not like," it ordered the surgeons to examine everyone sent ashore carefully and send back those who appeared not to require hospitalization.227 In view of the importance attached to these matters both by captains and seamen it is not surprising that arbitrary transfers of men by Admiralty order were devastating to morale.228 22* Adm. 3/49, 8 Jan. 1745; see also Woburn MSS. xvi, folios 65, 78, 8 April, 20 April 1740. 225 Adm. 3/49. 23 Oct. 1744; and see below p. 213. 22β Vernon Papers, p. 429; Corbett MSS. xm, folio 7; that there was much confusion over this regulation is evidenced in Adm. 3/50, 15 May 1745· 227 Adm. 3/49. si Nov. 1744; for an earlier report of this abuse see Adm. 3/45, 17 Dec. 1740. 228 Here is a report from Cavendish (Adm. 1/903, 21 June 1740): "I have enquired into the Cause of the complaint made by the Torbays men, and find these Complainants, were all Turned over from the Edinburg which occasioned a great Sulleness and discontent . . . that when they were ordered to do anything, they shewed a great Backwardness,

4- The Manning Problem The bulk of turn-overs occurred when ships were paid off, and ships were paid off not only when scheduled to be sold, scrapped, or laid up,, but also whenever major repairs were planned. The Admiralty took the view that in such instances the procedure was necessary, however regrettable it might be. There was no point in setting men free only to solicit their enlistment or impress them again. Usually some continuity was maintained by turning them over as a group into one ship; sometimes the men were given a choice of two; and occasion­ ally the officers and men from a worn-out ship were moved as a unit into the new one built to replace her. These were routine matters. It was rather the emergency turn-overs, the sort that occurred in the spring and summer of 1740, that moved the Admiralty to consider the effect on mo­ rale, and the extent of the Board's concern may be seen in its painstaking efforts to minimize the damage. As Cavendish pointed out, little harm was done by turning over prest men, who were disaffected anyhow; the Admiralty shifted them about at will.229 But volunteers—men who had picked out a particular ship when they entered—when transferred against their will ceased for practical purposes to be volunteers.230 Hence the principle was followed at the beginning of the war that only those "willing to be removed" should go, and when­ ever possible they were given a choice of ships.231 Naturally, some ships no one would willingly enter: the most powerful deterrent was an unpopular captain, but even the best-liked captains had difficulty getting men if they were under sailing orders for the West Indies, and some ships, like the Duke and Cambridge in 1741, had "the Reputation of being so un­ healthy, that nothing but Compulsion [would] prevail with the Men to go on board them."232 So compulsion was applied, but with as much discretion as possible. Normal procedure was to turn over those most recently entered on the ship's which was the cause, that they were beat and drove, perhaps a little too much." See also

Du Cane, pp. 63-64.

229 Cf. Corbett MSS. x, folio 114.

230 See Adm. 3/50, 4 May 1745.

231 E.g. Adm. 3/43, 6 June 1739; Adm. 3/44, a Feb. 1740. 232 Rumors of the destination of his squadron hampered Anson's ef­ forts to attract volunteers (Adm. 1/903, Stewart, 13 June 1740); the com­ ment on the sickly ships is Cavendish's (Adm. 1/905, 19 Sept. 1741).

4- The Manning Problem books first.233 As for petty officers, the idea of removing them was greeted with such universal abhorrence—Vernon con­ sidered them "the animating life of a ship's company"234—that even in emergencies the Admiralty tended to avoid it; when it was done, care was taken that no one would be turned over who could not be equally rated on the new ship.236 It is clear that the Admiralty Lords never put the question of morale out of mind, even while they were turning over hundreds of seamen into Ogle's squadron. When the Admiralty asked Admiral Cavendish to deliver an exact account of the men needed for Ogle's ships he could only guess that twelve or thirteen hundred more men would be required.23® Three ships were sent from the Downs to Spithead, and their men ordered to be turned over; four other ships were to be left at Spithead,237 but the Duke of Newcastle, who had hoped to assuage Walpole by leaving this token force at home for defense, was reluctant to have their men re­ moved.238 Sir Charles Wager, however, gave his (correct) opin­ ion that, even if the men of all seven ships were turned over, it would still not be enough, "and such a Squadron," he added, "will not I presume be sent without being [fully] man'd, for they can not get so many men in the West Indies, as they will loose."239 The government had already tried to find a 233 There are numerous examples in Adm. 1/903-904. 234 Vernon Papers, p. 448. 236 petty officers were always turned over when ships were paid off, but otherwise rarely; the flag officers were firmly against it. Few were turned over in the emergency of 1740 (Adm. 2/56, 30 Sept. 1740). Cavendish op­ posed turning them over, not only because of morale, but because he felt nothing would be gained; they would be vitally needed to man tenders for pressing after the West Indies squadron sailed. Equal rating of turn­ overs was required by Act of Parliament after 1728; see also Adm. 3/50, 18 Feb. 1745. 23β Ogle's squadron, as initially assigned, consisted of 35 ships (including 4 fire ships and a hospital ships); the complements totaled 13,615; Norris's complements had totaled 10,345. (Adm. 8/21); Adm. 1/904, 30 Sept. 1740. 237 From Downs: Roebuck, Chester, Rochester. At Portsmouth: Victory, Lenox, Kent, Falkland.

238 Addl. MSS. 32695, folio 156, Wager to Newcastle. 239 lbtd. While Norris's fleet was permitted to go to sea undermanned in July, and cruisers were sometimes explicitly ordered to do so (Adm. 3/44, 9 April 1740), it was not considered wise to send ships abroad, especially to the West Indies, unless fully manned.

4- The Manning Problem way out of the dilemma by the pitiful expedient of moving 600 of Lord Cathcart's Marines out of the transports and into the ships as part of complement; this meant that the fleet would be stripped of part of its men upon arrival at the objec­ tive (which turned out to be Cartagena).240 The thirteen hun­ dred estimated by Cavendish were needed in addition to these. By October 11, 1,158 men from nine vessels had been appor­ tioned among the West Indies squadron; practically every avail­ able seaman was transferred. Nevertheless, Ogle wrote to the Admiralty that he still needed 1,300 more men.241 By the time he sailed a total of about 1,450 men had been turned over to his ships;242 he went out short of complement, for in the end the Admiralty gave up hope of getting the squadron fully manned, even though it was bound for the West Indies. The delays in the final stages of preparation were due to other factors. On October 2 Admiral Cavendish wrote: "I hope in two or three days, to have all the Men removed into Sir Chaloner Ogle's Squadron, and if they are not delayed at the Dock, and by these Payments, I hope they will in four or five days be ready to sail."243 The payments to which he referred were wage payments to ships' companies, and though they did not di­ rectly influence the sailing date of the squadron, they did in­ directly. Why was this, of all times, the moment chosen to pay the ships? There were two reasons: first, it was required by statute; second, it was the best way to minimize desertions. In the 1740's, payments were scheduled almost entirely with the thought of discouraging desertion. Fifty years earlier the prime determinant had been the state of the navy's finances. Indeed, the turn-over in that period had been chiefly employed as a means to save money; by not paying the ships off, but rather turning the men over and withholding wages due, the navy was able to divert a greater portion of its meager funds to­ wards meeting the demands of its contractors.244 Important re240 Adm. 2/56, 24 Sept. 1740. For the effect of this order on operations see Richmond, I, 114, 123, 125. 2*1 Adm. 1/904, 4 Oct., 13 Oct. 1740. 243 Adm. 1/904, 2 Oct. 1740. 242 Adm. 1/904, status reports. 244 Ehrman, pp. 132-134.

1Q8

4- The Manning Problem, forms enacted by Parliament in 1728 put a stop to this abuse of the seamen;245 they required turned-over men to be paid before they sailed, not only all their wages for the previ­ ous ship, but two months advance as well. Thus the navy was explicitly directed by statute to pay a large number of men in Ogle's squadron before it put to sea. Furthermore, the Parlia­ mentary acts also required that all seamen, turned over or not, had to be paid twelve months wages every eighteen months. This guarantee of the seaman's rights put the Admiralty in difficul­ ties during the war, because the Board judged the withholding of wages to be its most effective deterrent to desertion. The worst time to pay a ship's company was upon arrival from abroad; the men would desert readily. And yet the law said they had to be paid. As a result, it became standard practice to pay all ships bound on foreign voyage just prior to depar­ ture in the hope that the men would be offered little chance to get ashore. Naturally the men disliked this procedure, and, though the justice of their complaint was compromised by their propensity to desert, it imposed an undeniable hardship on those who had families on shore, there being no reliable method for getting money to them.246 But the administrators were chiefly concerned with the threat of mass desertion. Payments had been made to Norris's squadron before he sailed,247 and in like manner orders were sent to Ogle on September 26; he was directed not to pay any more men than the statutes required, if the wind came fair for sailing.248 On October 7 the Lords Justices, anxious for Ogle to put to sea, directed him "not to stay for the Payment of any ships," but to sail as soon as his fleet was ready.249 By then most of his ships had been paid. But Ogle did not sail because his ships still needed water, 2451 Geo. II c. 9 and 14; the provisions are summarized in the

tions and Instructions 24β This provided

(1734), pp. 48-54. the most compelling reason

Regula­

for allowing "wives"

aboard, and women (some of them wives) crowded in the ships as pay-day approached. One ship, in April 1741, could not get under way per order because she had just been paid and "all the People [were] Drunk" (Adm. 1/905, 20 April 1741); see also Adm. 1/905, 22 June 1741. 247 Adm. 1/903, 28 June 1740. 248 Adm. 2/56, 2 Sept. 1740. 249 Adm. 3/44, 7 Oct. 1740.

m

4- The Manning Problem stores, and victuals. The problem of getting them aboard be­ came, during October, the focus of the difficulty. The ministry fretted.280 On the ioth, a nervous Admiralty, aware that every additional day at Spithead meant more manpower losses to the squadron by sickness and desertion, and that "so many Delays and disappointments . . . [had] given a General uneasyness," sent an express order to Ogle, instructing him to sail immedi­ ately, leaving behind two or three ships if necessary.251 Still he could not sail; the state of some ships' provisions made it un­ thinkable for them to undertake a West Indies voyage without further supply. The delays in provisioning were directly related to the problem of desertion. The payment of ships prior to depar­ ture was effective as long as there was no necessity for sending men ashore, but the task of provisioning and watering a fleet which had expended most of these items during the summer's cruising, and, in addition to that, of putting stores in for for­ eign service, was one which demanded constant use of the ships' boats. Some ships had no boats—they were being re­ paired in the dockyard—and those that had them were "afraid to trust their Men in them."252 That the squadron was bound for the West Indies was incentive enough for many seamen to desert; the payment decided the rest: "The men that are paid their Wages, and Advance money," wrote Cavendish on Octo­ ber 6, "Desert, when ever they come ashore in boats, which very much retards the Service, in getting off their Stores, &ca. . .. I wish with all my heart they may be ready by the lat­ ter end of this week, but by what I see they will not."253 To pre­ vent desertion each boat was required to carry a lieutenant, but even when this procedure was followed, it did not always work.254 To supplement the efforts of the ships' boats, Caven­ dish tried to hire additional tenders, but no more were avail­ able, and what tenders he did have had to be manned by dock­ yard laborers, to the detriment of operations in the yard.255 On the 14th the Admiralty instructed Ogle to forget the rest 250 Williams, Whig Supremacy, p. 223. 251 Adm. 2/56, 10 Oct. 1740; Adm. 1/904, 14 Oct. 252 Adm. 1/904, 13 Oct. 1740. 253 Adm. 1/904, 6 Oct. 1740. 25« Adm. 1/904, 16 Oct. 1740. 255 Adm. 1/904, ZOO

1740.

13

Oct.

1740.

4- The Manning Problem of the supplies and "go to sea so soon as ... watered."256 But on the 16th, when he "made the signal to unmoor, the Captains of the Boyne, Cumberland, Chichester & Torbay sent him word they could not possibly sail that Day."257 The first three, their holds not yet stowed for sea, were badly in need of beer and other victuals; the Torbay needed water and stores.258 "I had the vexation 8c mortification," wrote the Duke of Rich­ mond to his friend Newcastle, to see the fleet still at Spithead on Fryday evening [the 17th] . . . This thing I own gives me the utmost concern. The answer is always what can wee [the Cabinet Council] do? I own I am for punishing those that wont obey orders; & if Sr Challoner Ogle will not think fitt to obey the Kings orders, he ought to be stop'd try'd by a Court Martial, & some other good officer made a Flag & sent in his room. I do declare one thing, which is that if the house of Lords or Comons, nay the enemys in either should thinke fitt to call either Sr Challoner or whosoever may be in fault in this cruel national disapointment, to account, 8c that it should come to my vote, I shall give it for the enquiry. I would never be for distressing the innocent, butt can never be for screening the guilty.259 The unfortunate Ogle, who a month earlier had complained to a friend, "I am all day long over head & ears in papers,"260 moved to St. Helens on the 18th. Two ships, the Chichester and Princess Amelia (the latter had run aground on leaving harbor) straggled out and joined him on the 21st.261 The squadron lay at St. Helens with the troop transports, receiving last minute provisions and water via tender from Portsmouth, until the 26th. That day the wind swung round to the north­ east and they sailed. 1741

As soon as the West Indies squadron sailed the ministry zeeAdm. 3/44, 14 Oct. 1740; Addl. MSS. 28133, folio 63. There is an account of the shortages of water, victuals, and stores in Adm. 1/904, 11 Oct. 1740, but it is vague. Only 4 ships claimed to have their full al­ lowance of provisions; 10 ships still needed part of their stores; all except 8 needed water. At this time the squadron consisted of 26 men of war. 257 Adm. 3/44, 18 Oct. 1740. 258 Adm. 1/380, Ogle, 20 Oct. 1740. 269 Addl. MSS. 32695, folios 290-291. 260 Ibid., 12431, folio 108, Ogle to James Knight, 18 Sept. 1740. 261 Adm. 1/380, Ogle, 20 Oct., 21 Oct. 1740.

4- The Manning Problem turned its attention to the coming year. Twenty additional ships, requiring 9,710 men, were to be fitted out by April 1741.262 This was an ambitious proposal, and the navy did not begin the task of carrying it out from a position of advan­ tage. After Ogle's departure there was scarcely an able-bodied seaman left at Portsmouth. Cavendish did not even have enough men to get those ships scheduled for refit prepared for docking.263 In other ports the situation was similar. Only the cruising ships had men. The twenty ships of 50 guns or more in commission at home were short of their combined comple­ ments by 3,820 on the books, and 5,144 by muster, thus bring­ ing the actual requirement of additional men to 14,854.264 There were still almost 1,900 sick men ashore—1,300 at Portsmouth.265 The cruising ships could be ordered to concen­ trate on impressment, but the dispatching of tenders was held up by the shortage of men. On October 27 the Admiralty di­ rected Cavendish to send out as many tenders as he could find men for, but he said in reply, "There lyes the difficulty."266 Nevertheless, by November 11 there were fifteen tenders on station and "between four & five hundred men" taken since October 26.267 However, impressment alone could not meet the demand, and there was little hope of attracting volunteers because by this point in the war the number of unemployed seamen was near zero; nor was much to be expected from the six Marine regiments.268 By January 1741 Sir Charles Wager 262 The figures are given in a report among Walpole's papers (Cholmondeley MSS. 15/15, 21 Oct. 1740), and they match, with minor dis­ crepancies, those in P.R.O., S.P. 42/23, where the ships to be fitted out are listed by name and location. The report significantly separated the requirements of the 7 "great ships" (5450 men) from those of the 13 ships of 40 to 70 guns (4,260 men); the former were seen as a secondary manning objective, their enormous requirements not being justified by increased strategic usefulness. 263 Adm. 1/904, 27 Oct. 1740. 264 Cholmondeley MSS. 15/15. The chief causes of discrepancy between "borne" and "mustered" were: (1) deserters not yet made "Run" on the books; (2) sick men ashore less than a month; (3) men in tenders pressing. It is significant that in arriving at its total of 14,854 the report wrote off the men not mustered. (There were few out pressing at this time.) 265 P.R.O., S.P. 42/23, 10 Oct. 1740. 2ββ Adm. 1/904, 28 Oct. 1740. 267 P.R.O., S.P. 42/59, Clutterbuck to Newcastle, n Nov. 1740. 2β8 Adm. 1/4319; see the muster reports of Oct. and Nov. 1740.

4- The Manning Problem despaired of accomplishing the task without new powers or some new method. But there were no significant changes. The new £5 bounty proved fruitless, and a 35-shilling limit on merchant wages failed to touch the navy's problem. From the point of view of manning, the year 1741 saw a repeat performance in nearly every respect of the disappointments of 1740. An embargo was again imposed,268 but on April 29, two weeks after it was lifted, the ships at home of the four highest rates (combined comple­ ment 14,710) carried on their books only 9,646 men and mus­ tered of these but 6,489.270 Although impressment activity was intense during April and May, it seemed to Admiral Caven­ dish that the men brought in by tenders, especially those from Ireland, were of exceptionally poor quality.271 In one respect the government authorized harsher meas­ ures, for on June 1 all protections were repudiated by the Ad­ miralty. This action was accompanied by a "hot press"272 and produced a flurry of requests for discharge.273 The Duke of Newcastle gave Sir Charles Wager "Lists of 39 men, press'd from their Protections, all but 4, belonging to Brighthelmstone [Brighton]," but Wager reminded him that if the fisher­ men from one or two towns were discharged, it would "bring all the rest that are in like case, to demand the same thing," and much of the effectiveness of the annulment would be lost. It is to Sir Robert Walpole's credit that he stood by the Ad­ miralty on this issue, for much of Newcastle's anxiety to have these men released stemmed from fears about the im­ pending general election, which, as it happened, facilitated Walpole's exit from office.274 Some of the requests for dis2ββ

The details are given in Richmond, 1, 143. It was laid February g

and lifted April 14. 270 Adm. 7/413. However, there were considerable numbers out in tenders at this time (cf. Adm. 1/905, 26 May 1741). 271 His letters from 4 April to 3 May 1741 (Adm. 1/905) are filled with complaints about this. 2'2 The details of its organization in the Thames are given in Adm.

1/710; it was executed simultaneously in all ports (Adm. 1/905, a Jan.

'741)273 Adm. 3/45, June 1741, passim. 274 Adm. 1/710, 6 June, 7 June 1741; however, it appears that New­ castle got 17 of them discharged (Addl. MSS. 32697, folios 178-179).

4- The Manning Problem charge came from men exempted from impressment by Act of Parliament; here the policy allowing bounty money to every­ one showed its merits, because the Admiralty refused to dis­ charge anyone who, when pressed, had accepted it and thus nominally converted his status to that of volunteer.275 Sickness was again a major factor in 1741; but its effects were even more devastating to the enemy. The feeling in the cabi­ net shifted from consternation in March, upon hearing that the French squadron under D'Antin was returning from American waters, to relief a month later, upon the news that disease had taken the lives of more than 2,000 of his men.27® Similarly, Sir John Norris returned to Spithead on August 23 with his provisions gone and "above a thousand sick,"277 but the gold-carrying Spanish fleet that he had been sent out to intercept never left Havana, 4,000 of its men having perished by disease 278 By the end of summer the epidemic in England was as bad as ever. On September 16 four ships under orders to join the Mediterranean squadron reported that they had 1,016 sick, and there were no quarters ashore for more than 600 sick men at Portsmouth.279 The ships of 90 and 100 guns, which had lain in port all summer for want of men, were par­ ticularly vulnerable; just two of them, the Royal Sovereign and Duke, had 600 sick ashore and more on board. "How," Cavendish wondered, "they will be able to send all these great ships to Sea, is a Mystery to me."280 In his last letter from Portsmouth (November 24) Caven­ dish remarked, "I have not been a week at home in the Coun­ try these two years."281 As he looked forward to a brief respite from the labors and frustrations brought on by the manning problem, he could not be sure that the worst of it was over. But it was, both for him and for the navy. The epidemic, as no one could have known in November 1741, had run its 275 Adm. 3/45, 17 June 1741. 2™ Richmond, 1, 143. It was the sickness that forced D'Antin to leave the West Indies. 2T7 Adm. 1/905, Norris, 23 Aug. 1741. 278 Richmond, 1, 148. 279 Adm. 1/905, 16 Sept. 1741. 280 Adm. 1/905, i8 Sept. 1741. Eventually (November) two of them got to sea. 281 Adm. 1/905, 24 Nov. 1741.

TABLE 13. T h e Manning Level, 1739-1749

Total Total Total Total

complements of ships in commission seamen, Marines and soldiers borne seamen, Marines and soldiers mustered Marines and soldiers borne

This Table is based on Adm. 8/19-26; House of Commons Journals, XXIII, 2 2 1 , 4 3 7 , 6 0 7 ; XXIV, 7 2 , 398, 5 6 1 , 7 6 9 ; XXV, 84, 240, 5 0 1 , 700, 9 4 4 ;

4- The Manning Problem course. Foreseeable strategic requirements, it seemed to the government in the autumn of 1741, could be met with the existing strength of the fleet. No new demands developed to invalidate this estimate until 1744, and until that year the manning level fluctuated between 45,000 and 50,000. The mobilization was over. 1742-1748:

THE PROBLEM OF DESERTION

Throughout the war the methods for manning the fleet re­ mained basically unchanged. However, new conditions shifted the emphasis in a number of ways. Four additional Marine regiments were established in 1741, bringing the total to ten.282 Experienced volunteer seamen became almost impossible to attract; the limitations of cash as bait had been amply demon­ strated by the failure of the £5 bounty in 1741, and induce­ ment of this sort was thereafter held to the standard two guineas. To get volunteers, the Admiralty reversed its earlier policy of shunning landsmen and widely advertised its desire to have them.283 In 1743 gangs were sent inland in search of willing candidates, and lieutenants in tenders were instructed to urge them to enter.284 A further step was taken in 1744 when captains were ordered "to encourage all such Landmen ... by Mild Treatment 8c all other Ways to have a liking to the Ser­ vice."285 There is no doubt that the number of landsmen in­ creased both quantitatively and proportionally.286 In the spring Adm. 106/2187, 30 Jan. 1755. The number of Marines and soldiers mus­ tered was normally 300-500 less than the number borne. In spite of the fact that the figures printed in the House of Commons Journals agree with others found in manuscript sources, I do not think them reliable for the year 1742. There is good reason to believe that the sudden shifts at the beginning and end of that year are merely the result of changes in clerical method. For although it is conceivable that 5,000 men could have been dropped from the books during December 1741 and January 1742, it is not conceivable that 4,500 men (plus 1,500 soldiers and Marines) could have been added during December 1742 and January 1743. 282 This establishment was similar to that of the original six; the de­ tails are given in Nicolas, Marine Forces, pp. 24-25. 283 Adm. 3/45, 1 April 1742; Adm. 3/46, 1 Sept. 1742. 284 Adm. 3/47, 6 May, 9 May 1743. For a brief period in 1743 a £ 1 bounty was offered to landsmen. 285 Adm. 3/48, 14 April 1744. 2seAdm. 7/413-417.

4- The Manning Problem of 1744 the permissible ratio of seamen to landsmen on board a man of war became 2 to i,287 and so it continued for the duration of the war. Impressment, too, remained much the same in form, while experience and minor administrative changes increased its efficiency. Removal of the pressures that had so disrupted the system in 1740 and 1741 gave the Admiralty an opportunity to restore order. The authorities responsible for allocating men were directed to ensure that the men brought in by tenders and gangs in London were put on board the ships to which the lieutenants who had taken them belonged.288 There was prob­ ably no better way to provide lieutenants with incentive to procure men of reasonable quality; the policy also served to encourage captains to make a sincere effort to send press gangs up to London.289 Greater efficiency is indicated by the better and more frequent reports that the Admiralty insisted on, and got, after 1741. The records show a clear improvement in orderliness and completeness, and the official correspondence generally makes plain that the Board had a much better idea of the rate at which men were coming in and the success of each gang and tender.290 After 1741 the navy's growth was gradual (Table 13). Even the entry of France into the war did not bring about a sharp increase in the manning level, since French intervention had long been anticipated. A truly urgent manning situation did not recur until the summer of 1745 when the threat of a French invasion, sharpened by the Young Pretender's land­ ing in Scotland (July 25), called for the use of every available warship, even the unsuitable 1st and 2nd rates, which lay in port partially manned.291 To meet the emergency, orders were given that "One Man in Six from every Merchant Ship [that is, including outbound ones], notwithstanding their Protec­ tions," should be impressed.292 This severe measure did not 288 Adm. 3/46, 25 May, a8 May 1742. 287 Adm. 3/48, 8 June 1744. 289 Adm. 3/57, Ii March 1747; Adm. 3/58, 2 1 Oct. 1747. 290 See Adm. 3/45, 27 April 1742; Adm. 3/46, 26 June 1742; Adm. 3/47, 13 April 1743. Also the correspondence between Admiral Steuart at Ports­ mouth and the Admiralty (Adm. 1/906-916) is illustrative. 291 Vernon Papers, pp. 446-448. 292 Adm. 3/51, 1 Aug., 17 Sept. 1745. Certificates were issued to ships which were caught, to prevent repetition.

4- The Manning Problem exempt vessels carrying naval stores and provisions, nor even the transports bound for beleaguered Ostend,293 and to ease the pain the Admiralty announced that every man so pressed would be discharged at request after November 30.294 The complaints that arrived at the Admiralty Office were reason­ able; as one master pointed out, great distress resulted in cases where a ship had "but Six Men, three or four of which [were]... but old Men or Boys and only two good Seamen."298 But the Admiralty stood firm, pointing out that government ships were being equally penalized. And yet, it is clear from Table 13 that the over-all manning level was scarcely affected by these drastic proceedings—a vivid illustration of the in­ tractability of the problem. A primary reason for the sluggishness with which the fleet's manpower increased was that gains from recruiting were to a very large extent offset by losses from desertion. Although it is impossible to determine exactly how many men deserted, it is certain that the number was enormous. In April 1747 the Admiralty faced the disturbing news that "instead of the Number of Seamen in the Fleet increasing they diminish[ed] daily," in spite of the orders given to every captain "to en­ deavour constantly to procure Men."296 Up until 174a the Ad­ miralty's chief concern had been getting men; from 1742 on it devoted an equal amount of time and energy to the problem of keeping them. Since so many men were forcibly acquired they had to be forcibly retained, and men of war were made to function as prisons. However, ships could not be both efficient instru­ ments of war and places of confinement. Impressed men might be incarcerated beneath the hatch gratings of a tender tem­ porarily, but after a few days the risk of infection made such a 298 Adm. 3/51, 9 Aug. 1745. 294 In fact, the situation was still uncertain on that day, and the Admiralty informed those men that it was hoped they would not hold the Board to its word (Adm. 3/52, 30 Nov. 1745). 295 Adm. 3/52, 31 Oct. 1745; a common situation because of impress­ ment. 29β Adm. 3/57, 20 April 1747. Useful accounts of deserters do not exist; this fact illustrates in itself how ill-equipped the Admiralty was to cope with the problem. In later eighteenth-century wars the Admiralty kept better trade of desertions.

4- The Manning Problem procedure self-defeating. For a man of war, then, water was the prison wall, enough water to dishearten swimmers and provide an easy surveillance of approaching boats. This was a fact of great importance to naval administrators. As we have seen, it put severe restrictions on the use of ships' boats. It also meant that ships could not go into harbor, for example, from Spithead to Portsmouth or from the Nore to Chatham, without making arrangements for the temporary transfer of untrustworthy men to ships remaining out in the roads. In wartime the Admiralty expected this procedure to be strictly followed: "As to the Prest men and such men as may be sus­ pected to Desert [Cavendish wrote] I have never ordered any ship into the Harbour, but the Captain was directed, to put all such people on board ships at Spithead, it's true I have met with Captains that have not observed such orders, and their Men have Run away when they came in to Clean."297 In 1745 the Admiralty forbade Admiral Steuart to "suffer even Voluntiers to go on board the Ships they enterfed] for, which [were] fitting out, until they [got] to Spithead."298 Thus ships going into dockyard were stripped of most of their men, and those newly commissioned could have none until they came out. Naturally these precautions tended to lengthen refitting time, there being few men to handle stores and overhaul rigging, but the fear of desertion weighed more with the Admiralty than dockyard inconvenience and delay.299 Nevertheless, the confinement of seamen could not be strictly maintained, both for practical and humane reasons, and for reasons of negligence. As we have seen, sometimes there was no alternative to sending boats ashore, and some men had to be trusted to navigate the ships into harbor and help take out stores. Furthermore, there was a point beyond which the navy's administrators would not go in the matter of confining men. They sent sick men to quarters ashore without the slightest doubt that many would run away,300 and they granted leave to men who had been to sea two or three years 297 Adm. 1/905, 29 May 1741. See also Adm. 3/44, 14 April 1740; Adm. 3/46, 28 Sept. 174¾; Adm. 3/53, x8 Aug. 1746; Corbett MSS. x, folio 42. 299 See below pp. 335-337. 298 Adm. 3/52, 7 Oct. 1745. so® Adm. 1/905, 2 Sept. 1741; Cavendish: "I foresee that most of the Prest men will desert from their Sick Quarters."

4. The Manning Problem in the face of almost equally hopeless odds. It must be acknowl­ edged that the administrators acted from a mixture of practi­ cal and humane motives, but their correspondence shows clearly that the latter predominated—and it cannot be intel­ ligently argued that the whole lot of them were Pecksniffian. To offset the risks involved in granting these indulgences the Admiralty relied on the withholding of wages. In fact, it was common practice, though not universal, to separate the trustworthy from the untrustworthy simply by studying the amount of pay accumulated on the books.301 Early in the war the Admiralty tried to meet the requirements of the Parlia­ mentary Acts of 1728, but later it tended to give them a loose interpretation, especially in cases where men were to be granted leave. In April 1741 all the ships at home were or­ dered to be paid to June 1740. This was the last general pay order until the end of the war.302 After 1741 all pay orders were individual, and nearly all were issued either when ships were paid off or when they were bound overseas. In the latter case the men were always paid to within six months of the date of payment; in the former, where the payment was almost always followed by two or three weeks leave, an average of eighteen months' pay was held in reserve, and after 1744 it tended to be two years';303 the balance was paid after they reported aboard the ships to which they had been turned over. Still, the practice of putting a large chunk of wages into a seaman's hands at one time greatly tempted him to desert. Admiral Vernon believed, "The most effectual method to prevent desertions would be procuring some more humane method of manning our ships and of having our men more regularly paid in the serv­ ice."304 so1 For example, in 1742 when the Lancaster was paid off, the Ad­ miralty granted her men 14 days leave, but told her captain "to put such of his Men as have little Wages due them or he suspects will run away" on another ship (Adm. 3/46, 18 Oct. 1742). Normally this went without saying. 302 Adm. 3/45, 3 April 1741. A similar order had been given on March 7, 1740, but was not immediately carried out; however, nearly every ship was paid by October that year. 803 Ship payments are listed in the front pages of the volumes of Navy Board letters to the Admiralty (Adm. 106/2178-2184). See also Adm. 3/51, 4 July 1745. 304 Vernon Papers, p. 518.

4- The Manning Problem About most of the problems raised by the threat of deser­ tion the navy could do little, but in one respect the Admiralty Lords felt sure that the situation could be improved. They felt that by better discipline and greater care on the part of com­ missioned officers, by setting an alert watch, by hoisting in boats at night, by taking the trouble to transfer untrustworthy men before entering harbor, by restricting freedom in the dockyard, and by countless other precautions, most desertions could be prevented. Evidence has already been presented which indicates that many captains and lieutenants either did not bother or did not wish to give attention to these details. In 1742 the Admiralty set about to convince sea officers that it no longer was disposed to forgive such negligence: "Vice-ad­ miral Balchen and Rear Admiral Steuart are to be acquainted, that the Lords are so much dissatisfied to find so great a Deser­ tion of Seamen from the Ships that come in to clean, that they are determined to break the first Captain who shall be found negligent in keeping his Men together; and they are to be strictly directed to inform their Lordships of the Remiss­ ness of any Captain in not doing his Duty therein."305 It is im­ possible to ascertain the effectiveness of this approach. Four months later a lieutenant lost his employment for permitting four men to escape,306 but this stands as an isolated case. No doubt this new posture helped curb desertions arising out of pure negligence, but the problem was more compli­ cated than that, for this was an area where official prescription might seriously disrupt a valuable trust between officer and seaman built on personal confidence and loyalty. Even where captains could not offer sound reasons for taking a chance, there was a tendency to give a volunteer the benefit of the doubt. Captains' letters to the Board on this subject reveal a plain unwillingness to resort to severe measures, as well as a sense of helplessness. Captain George Clinton of the Prince Frederick wrote: "It was Impossible to keep them onboard, as we lay alongside the Hulk. Some of these Men I mentioned in my list, my Officers has taken several times, and brought on board, and they have gone away again when I have been walk305 Adm. 3/46, 26 June 1742; see also Adm. 3/46, 11 June 1742. 3oe Adm. 3/46, 8 Oct. 1742.

4- The Manning Problem ing the Quarter Deck, and tho I have call'd to them, have no regard."307 In 1742, when men from the ist-rate ships at Portsmouth were ordered to assist in preparing the under­ manned Torbay for sea, Admiral Mathews reported that "most of their good Men [were] absent in Hopes to avoid going out in the said ship"; he added, "Their Lordships will for­ give me saying some publick examples are absolutely neces­ sary, else the Service must suffer."308 But there was a wide­ spread feeling, shared by both officers and men, that straggling in the dockyard was a seaman's right, and no captain who valued his popularity with the men—an important asset— cared to be the first to institute strict discipline in this respect. Time and again the Admiralty had to admonish captains never to allow men to go from the ships until they were cleared for the dock.309 But when Capt. Robert Young's men, disgusted with the news that they were to be turned over to another ship before being given leave, walked off the ship "in a mutinous Manner," he felt there was nothing he could do about it.310 At Plymouth, when the Salisbury's men refused to board tenders to be taken to new ships at Liverpool and in­ sisted on immediate payment of their wages, the best the Ad­ miralty could do was advise the Commissioner there to con­ sult with the other captains in the area "about methods of reducing them to obedience." The Board showed itself in this instance to be much more concerned about recovering the good will of the men by "assuring them they [should] be paid all their Wages . . . at Spithead" than about having them punished311 All of this presents a side of naval discipline which, though less familiar, is much closer to describing the conditions of the period than that made famous by occasional acts of brutality. sot Adm. 1/1600, 11 June 1740. It may be argued, as this letter suggests, that Clinton was an ineffective officer, but there were many others of better reputation who allowed the men the same latitude and sometimes more. Cf., for example, the case of Captain Boscawen, Adm. 3/47, 7 April 1743, and also Adm. 3/51, 6 Sept. 1745 308 Adm. 1/381, Mathews, 16 April 1742. 809 E.g. Adm. 3/47, 16 May 1743. 810 Adm. 3/46, 9 Nov. 174a. An order did go out to pick them up as deserters, but there is no record of any being brought to trial. en Adm. 3/48, 18 June 1744.

4- The Manning Problem And attitudes that shaped this pattern of discipline influ­ enced the means of recovering the men who had run away. Thomas Corbett even wondered—with characteristic Whig respect for property—whether a deserter could be made to for­ feit his pay. "I am not satisfied," he wrote, "whether in Law a Man should lose his Wages for Desertion; nor do I find that the Lawyers are agreed about it."312 Of course the navy ruled them forfeit, and the action was never seriously challenged, but deserters were deprived of their prize shares only by Act of Parliament.313 Most deserters who were caught seem to have suffered no other punishment than loss of wages, and if a man did no more than take a month or so of unauthorized leave he was quite likely to salvage those as well; "R's" came off easily, and a man who was absent less than a month was not likely to have had an "R" put against his name at all: By the Rules of the Navy, the Clerks of the Cheque and Mustermasters have two sorts of Cheques, one with leave, and the other without, and the Method of mustering is, to cheque the Men who have leave, with that Mark, till the ship goes from under their Muster or till there is no hopes of their Return; and even those who are absent without leave, are not made Run, till after (at least) three Musters Absence, nor then neither, if any good reason can be given of their Absence: and even if they return after made R. and the Captain thinks they deserve to be relieved, it is never denied. This is not the cause of Men's Disgust to the Service, rather . . . the Lenity of this Practice encourages the Men to take the Liberty they do.314

Full pardon, then, was the rule, and there were few excep­ tions. It was usually obtained by unofficial means, but some­ times an amnesty was declared. "When the Desertion is ob­ served to be great amongst the Seamen. . . , a Proclamation is issued to give them a general Pardon provided they come in by such a day."315 This was done, for example, in 1743, adver­ tisements being placed in the newspapers to announce it.318 812 Corbett MSS. x, folio 87. 818 \η Geo. II c. 34 (>744)· The unclaimed share was paid to Greenwich Hospital. 314 Corbett MSS. x, folios 97-98; and see Vernon Papers, p. 324. SIB Corbett MSS. x, folio 85. sie Adm. 3/46, 24 Feb., 3 March 1743.

4- The Manning Problem. Courts-martial were reserved for special situations.317 And even those few who were so unfortunate as to be brought to trial rarely suffered punishment. The prescribed sentence was death,318 but the king almost invariably pardoned the offender, who was then hustled aboard a ship bound to distant parts as a member of her complement. It is almost certain that dur­ ing the whole war period less than a dozen men suffered death for desertion, these presumably pour encourager Ies autres—a procedure apparently as ineffective as it was un­ fair.319 For bringing in deserters who did not return of their own volition the navy's means were hardly better than the means for impressing them in the first place. The reward to con­ stables and justices of the peace was the same, 20 shillings per man, but in the case of deserters it was also given to soldiers; in 1745 the Admiralty went further and decided that the re­ ward was "not to be confined to Soldiers, Customs house Of­ ficers, and Constables, but to extend to all Persons who apprehend[ed] Straggling Seamen."320 Informers were also en­ couraged (one in 1746 got 40 shillings each for three men) but few came forward. Since deserters sometimes returned to their families, captains were instructed to inform the Admiralty of their "Places of Abode,"321 but more frequently the men signed onto privateers or merchant vessels. The Admiralty had the right to search any vessel in order to recover them, but there was always the danger that the lieutenant sent aboard to do it would pick out a few extra good hands on pretence that they had run away from the king's service. Where an sit E.g. Adm. 3/44, 29 Sept. 1740. sis Although Vernon had a man flogged alongside for it in the West Indies (Vernon Papers, p. 408). 319 Since all executions in England had to be authorized by the king, his pleasure was recorded (or should have been) in the Admiralty min­ utes. I have counted four execution orders for this offense, 1739-1748 (actually five, but one was countermanded). Admiral Byng executed a deserter in the Mediterranean; the man had already been under sentence once for desertion, and, after being pardoned by the king, he deserted again (Adm. 1/382, Byng, 8 March 1748). 320 Adm. 3/49, 25 Jan. 1745. The reward was charged against the sea­ man's wages (Adm. 3/44, 11 June 1740). Apparently the soldiers were either negligent, sympathetic to the seamen, or open to bribery (Adm. 3/49. 3° Jan. 1745). 321 E.g. Adm. 3/51, 8 Aug. 1745.

4- The Manning Problem East India ship was involved the lieutenant sent aboard was particularly admonished "to do it with Prudence and to med­ dle with no Men but his own."322 In Gravesend the market for fugitive seamen was so lively that the Admiralty decided in 1745 to appoint a Regulating Captain there, the first instance of a Regulating Captain being set up outside of London;323 also the Secretary at War was asked to send fifty Marines to "assist the Regulating Captain in preserving order."324 A pilot at Gravesend had testified to the Board that he had seen "constables who had press'd Men at that place, put them on board Merchant Ships," and "Crimps go from thence to the Hospital at Chatham, to induce the Men to run away, and enter into the Merchants Serv­ ice."325 One of the chief difficulties was proper identification. For this reason the Admiralty required from ship captains not only the residence but a physical description of every man who ran away, and captains in the Thames were told to send such information weekly, for the information of the Regulat­ ing Captain at Gravesend. In addition, the Admiralty asked that an informer ("some discreet Person") from each ship should be at his disposal.326 The methods of recovery never be­ came more sophisticated than this. On the whole, organization was too loose, and discipline too uneven, for the seaman to be convinced that there was a serious chance of his being retaken. Captains sometimes added to the confusion by letting their men straggle ashore without leave tickets,327 and even when tickets were issued press gangs often ignored them.328 The knowledge that it was a common occurrence for a straggler to be impressed, and thereby classified "Run" on his ship in spite of his intention to return, gave further nourishment to the spirit of leniency which characterized the problem and the methods chosen to deal with it. MANNING OVERSEAS

Overseas there were as many variations of the manning 322Adm. 3/46, 5 April 1743. 324 Adm. 3/49, 29 Jan. 1745. 323 Adm. 3/49, 24 Jan. 1745. 325 Adm. 3/48, 27 Sept. 1744. 32β Adm. 3/49, 26 Jan., 16 Feb. 1745. 327 E. g. Adm. 3/49, 15 Feb. 1745; Adm. 3/52, 27 Nov. 1745. 328 E.g. Vernon Papers, p. 561.

21S

4- The Manning Problem problem as there were theaters of war, but all had three things in common that distinguished them from the problem at home: First, disease was, with the exception of the period 1740-1741, a much more serious factor. Second, desertion was "principally owing to the very great wages offered to seamen" by merchants both English and foreign (and seamen often pre­ ferred foreign service because it kept them beyond reach of the press gang); other motives were comparatively negligible. Third, it was almost impossible for men of war abroad to ob­ tain suitable replacements for their losses. The unique aspects of the manning problem in American waters have been dealt with thoroughly and competently and need only to be summarized here.329 The Caribbean area was the most important. Here tropical fevers abetted by rumdrinking330 aggravated an already endemic shortage of seamen, a shortage that often developed even in peacetime owing to the peculiar circumstance that outbound vessels from the is­ lands sometimes required larger crews than inbound.331 In 1746 Admiral Davers, at Jamaica, reported that seamen were being offered £45 for the run home, with the result that many deserted the navy even though they had "Several years pay due."332 The shortage was intensified in wartime by the re­ cruiting by privateers. And West Indian colonists were ex­ tremely sensitive about impressment, since fear of impressment was one reason why vessels from North America preferred to trade with the French islands. In 1739 Governor Trelawny at Jamaica admitted to Sir Charles Wager that Commodore Brown's squadron needed men, but he added: "One must be 329 See Pares, T.R.H.S., 4th ser., xx, and Dora M. Clark, "The Impress­ ment of Seamen in the American Colonies" in Essays in Colonial History presented to Charles McLean Andrews (New Haven, 1931). My conclu­ sions about the problem in American waters do not differ from those reached by Pares and Clark. A good impression of the character of the problem may be got from the Vernon Papers. See also Doty, British Admiralty Board as a Factor in Colonial Administration, pp. 104-22. 330 See Vernon Papers, pp. 417-418; Vernon told General Cathcart that rum-drinking at Port Royal "might cost us, as great a loss of Men, As a Generall Action, And for that Reason I am hurrying to Sea, all that pos­ sible I can to prevent it" (Library of Congress, Vemon-Wager MSS., folio 46270, 21 Sept. 1740). SSi Pares, op. cit., pp. 32-35. 882 Adm. 1/233, Davers, 22 June 1746.

4. The Manning Problem very gentle in doing any thing that looks like an Impress, lest we frighten away or hinder from coming the Northward folks, who make up the best part of our strength in time of war & privateering."333 Trelawny hoped that "the Commodore or Capts. would without impressing apply to [himself] or to the Magistrates," but the magistrates at Jamaica were no more cooperative than those at home; later on Admiral Davers com­ plained of their rudeness to the navy, and their favoritism to­ ward privateers.334 Naval commanders felt that their ships were supplying, through desertion, more men to commercial and privateering vessels than they were taking away. In the West Indies death was as important a factor as deser­ tion. In February 1742 Sir Chaloner Ogle wrote: "We shall not be able to carrie to sea with us above 3000 men [out of a total complement of 6620] that are fitt to do duty so yt you may judge how fatal this climate is to Europians, particularly ye common sort."335 At first the navy at Jamaica was entirely dependent on sick quarters, and Admiral Vernon did not like it; he thought that if a hospital were built, it might save many lives, prevent desertion, and in the long run cost less by shortening convalescence: "For in the method we are now in of hiring houses in Port Royal, a town full of punch houses, as soon as they can crawl out of quarters they get to a punch house and so to a relapse."336 In the spring of 1740 the Admi­ ralty discussed plans for a permanent hospital on the island, and Vernon was instructed to purchase a site and begin con­ struction.837 The building progressed slowly—for a long time it was at a complete standstill for want of bricks from England —338 and it was not ready to receive men until 1745. Appar­ ently the whole project had to be written off. The building's location at New Greenwich was a "Morass from whence con­ stantly [arose] a noxious Vapour"; the patients suffered from S38 Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS., folios 45844-45, 8 Aug. 1739; see also the merchants' petition dated 6 Feb. 1746 in Adm. 1/233. 334 Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS., folio 45868, 20 Sept. 1739; Adm. 1/233, Davers, 5 Aug. 1745, 82 June 1746. sesAddl. MSS. 12431, folio 114. 33β Vernon Papers, p. 334. 33r Adm. 3/44, 10 May 1740. Excellent sources on the progress of the hospital are printed in Vernon Papers, pp. 305-398, passim. ess Adm. 3/47, 13 April 1743.

4- The Manning Problem blazing heat during the day and chill at night; healthy men ventured near the place at their peril.339 A report of January 15, 1749 stated: Many of the Marines "sent ashore as Guards to the Hospital have died within a few days after being upon duty, and great part of the rest have deserted, and nothing is more common than for some of the Boats Crews who carry the Sick ashoar or are sent to bring them off to run away"; it concluded that the hospital was "rather a hurt to the Service than a Relief."340 The unfortunate location of the hospital in­ dicates how much ignorance, as well as administrative neglect, led to the dreadful losses from disease in the West Indies; no one knew with certainty how to deal with malaria and yellow fever, and no one was to know for a long time to come. To make up these losses there was little that commanders in the West Indies could do. No help was to be expected from home. When Vernon asked that the ships coming out bring supernumeraries, he was told that the Admiralty had trouble enough just filling their complements. "It is taken for granted," wrote the Admiralty Secretary, "you will make use of the only resource left you, to strengthen the ships that re­ main with you out of those you send home as much as you can, without weakening them too much, and for the rest, to make use of such soldiers as are not employed on shore."341 Al­ though impressment was a possible resource, it was not a fruit­ ful one because its use was effectively restricted by the legis­ lative power of the West India interest. In 1708 that interest had secured by Act of Parliament (6 Anne c. 37) the abolition of impressment in American waters. The "American Act," though not ambiguous in its wording, gave rise to more than half a century of dispute over the question of its duration. Up to December 1722 the Admiralty acquiesced in the view that the Act was still in effect and made it a policy to send ships to the West Indies with their complements overfilled, but on that date their Lordships, acting on an opinion from their legal consultants that the Act became invalid when the war ended, 339 Adm. 1/233, 10 March 1746; Adm. 106/1061, 8 May 1748. See also Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, in, 101-104. a" Adm. 1/234, 15 Jan- ^749341 Vernon Papers, p. 322 (17 Aug. 1741). Vernon did borrow Marines and soldiers frequently (ibid., pp. 273, 275, 311).

4. The Manning Problem resolved to omit the prohibition on pressing from the instruc­ tions to commanders sent to the area.342 Five years later, when pestilence killed great numbers in Admiral Hosier's squadron (including the admiral), the effects of impressment became keenly felt, and the merchants complained to the Admiralty.343 The Board agreed that the one-in-five rule (only one man in five could be impressed from each vessel) which had been fol­ lowed before 1708 should be reinstated.344 This rule was still binding in 1739,345 but feeling ran high, and Vernon observed that impressment was "made the general groundwork of all their clamour here."346 It was no idle remark, for he and Ogle had just had a bitter quarrel with Governor Trelawny over the subject.347 In 1746 the West-India interest made its legislative power felt, and impressment was again banned in the area by Act of Parliament.348 On the North American continent matters were slightly dif­ ferent. Local authorities continued to prosecute captains for impressing, basing their proceedings on the American Act and ignoring the instructions to the governors which declared it no longer valid.349 In the Caribbean it was difficult to deny in practice the navy's interpretation of the law's duration be­ cause of the might of the squadrons which backed it up, but 342 Adm. 3/34, 2 Dec. 1722. A full account of the disputes over the Act is given in Clark, op. cit. 343 Adm. 3/36, 2 March, 21 Dec., 27 Dec. 1727. SM Adm. 3/36, 28 Dec. 1727, 2 Jan., 4 Jan. 1728. 345 Vernon Papers, p. 168. 34β Ibid., p. 261. 347 There were a number of spectacular incidents and Pares has de­ scribed them. Vernon's view of the quarrel with Trelawny is fully set forth in Vernon Papers, pp. 254-255, 259-262, 280-281; for Trelawny's reply see Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS., folio 46714. In 1743 Commodore Knowles at Antigua was thrown in jail, prosecuted, and fined heavily for ordering men to be impressed from a privateer. If Knowles was really taking men off privateers who were not deserters from the navy, then he was clearly in the wrong. Pares (op. cit., p. 50) was apparently misled by the order of 1745 (whereby everyone normally exempt was forced to give up one man in six) into believing that the question of pressing from privateers remained open. But in general, the Admiralty exempted all properly authorized privateers, and in 1746 the Board refused to help a captain who was being prosecuted in England for pressing from one (Adm. 3/54, 31 May 1746). 348 ig Geo. II c. 30. 349 Clark, op.cit.

4- The Manning Problem, on the mainland captains of solitary cruisers found few friends to support them.350 The local power of the colonial traders was complemented by the pressure of their agents in London. When one Samuel Batters was imprisoned at Charleston for the "murder" of a merchant seaman during an impressment struggle, the Lord Mayor of London, in deference to the wishes of the merchants, came to the Admiralty OfiSce and asked the Board not to solicit the king for his pardon.351 However, the Parliamentary power of the American colonists was not equal to that of the West-Indian sugar interest; although the bill of 1746 was originally designed to put an end to impressment everywhere in America, the Admiralty was able to get it mod­ ified so as to apply to the West Indies only.352 Captains in North American waters were instructed "not to make any indiscreet use" of their press warrants, and Admiral Townsend went so far as to order his captains not to impress any American seamen. But he was irritated by the way in which the Americans encouraged his men to desert and by the way his captains "if, perchance, they meet with them, . . . are mobbed, and the Men rescued," and he promised Governor Shirley of Massachusetts that he would "make good the Num­ ber of Men . . . carry'd off in so foul a manner."353 But it was hard to do. No people resented impressment more than Ameri­ cans did, partly because they were not ordinarily career sea­ men in the sense that English sailors were; they made only oc­ casional voyages and were accustomed to spending more time with their families.354 Naturally their resentment was mag­ nified by the discriminatory removal of the exemption under the American Act by the Parliamentary Act of 1746; they con­ tinued to demonstrate their conviction that the American Act 350 E.g. Adm. 3/47, 25 Oct. 1743. 301 Adm. 3/46, 17 Aug., 21 Aug. 1742. He was told that it was too late; the request had already gone to the Secretary of State. 352 19 Geo. II c. 30; Pares, op.cit., pp. 54-55. 353 Adm. 3/49, 16 Oct. 1744; Adm. 1/480, 17 Aug. 1746. Naturally Shirley's reply was that British seamen often did not have to be enticed to desert; although he admitted that there was some enticing, and it was wrong, he called attention to "the Seamen's fondness to go into the Priva­ teering Service from the Colony of Rhode Island" (Adm. 1 /480, folio 291, is Sept. 1746). One is reminded of the disputes prior to the war of 1812. SSi Pares develops this idea in Yankees and Creoles (1956), p. 19.

, " ' on the ~irn' ~.)'/ ..,.., ..~ Day of a~"u/ ..", One Thoufand Seven Hundred and t:>1'.a.6/ O~.u and ferved until the ,t.'0,,?h,(v.-nK·· Day of ... ~v_n~~ One Thoufand ~ Hundred and t-;1'~-t /h,.rL) at which Time he was difcIJarP being Unferviceable, and has received in Sundrys, to the following Amount, Ybl.

J..ctter and Nlllllber of theTiclr.ct. f/./lJ

(..t~J

J p'hp

J

,..,...

-

S Me6tt. Bryane ,,- 1 N a v y - - - - - a'4~-~/.iA',.. ~;b7CJ, ~CU-'l"-/..C) Bcd, __ _

- - '- -·Tobacco,-----v'Y-",/,;,,v t4d1?7;?" _ _ -"-_ _ _ ..... __ Dead Mens Cloatba - . _ _ _ . _ _

_

VenereaJa .. _ _._ _ _. _ _ ._., _._~ Cloatha in XVIIl> 15-27.

6. The Dockyards yardstick cut in the merchant builders' yards is unsuitable. First, one must make allowance for the acknowledged superi­ ority of workmanship in the royal yards, but how much is one to allow? Second, one cannot measure the price of size and com­ plexity. It is easy to forget that the very scope of an organiza­ tion's operations poses difficulties that are unrelated to each type of activity it embraces. An ignorant pamphleteer made this mistake in I1JitJ when he adjudged the whole official and clerical staff of a dockyard superfluous; his argument was that the merchant yards needed only a master shipwright, foreman, and clerk: Why not the dockyards?28® Third, one cannot calcu­ late the cost of flexibility, of the navy's need to remain free to shift workmen from one job to another of greater urgency. And fourth, one must bear in mind that the navy could not afford to adopt the labor policy of the private builders; it had to maintain a large reserve of skilled shipwrights; it had to assume responsibility for training future ones; and it was obliged to provide for aged ones. On the whole, the high cost of dockyard workmanship does not appear glaring enough to justify analysis of these elusive factors. Complaints about substandard materials have already been discussed and, in general, dismissed. As for workmanship, there were murmurings in the fleet, but the number of welldocumented instances is not impressive. Shortly after mobil­ ization there was a flurry of reported defects, and the Admi­ ralty seemed genuinely troubled about them, although few proved as serious as the captains made them sound.290 In 1741, though still displeased by reports of defective fitting, their Lordships were more "concerned to see such a deadness, and want of Vigour, in carrying on the Works,"281 and for the rest of the war this latter situation became such a constant preoc­ cupation that the former seems scarcely to have been no289 Mr. Williamson's Memoirs, p. 14. For a similar charge see Merriman, Sergison Papers, p. 125-126; the Navy Board's answer was, in effect: Who will do the jobs other than shipbuilding? 29" See Adm. 3/44, 30 Jan. 1740, and the Navy Board's reply Adm. 106/2178, 14 March 1740. Some of the ships were simply too far gone; this was obviously the case of the Defiance (converted to a hulk in 1743), into whose hull the Portsmouth caulkers drove in 1740, "upwards of a Thousand Weight of Ocham" (N.M.M. POR J/6, 29 March 1740). 29i Adm. 106/2179, 23 Oct. 1741.

6. The Dockyards ticed.292 When they resolved to initiate the practice of person­ ally inspecting the dockyards after the war, they were not particularly disturbed about the quality of the workmanship; their stated aims, rather, were to prevent unnecessary expense and to discover why the works were "not carried on with the Expedition that might be expected."293 After all, it was gener­ ally conceded that the products of the royal dockyards were superior to those of private builders and contractors. As early as 1740, when the Admiralty was investigating various re­ ported defects, Commissioner Hughes gave his opinion that the most important target for reform lay elsewhere: "With regard to the Works, that are performed here, I verily believe they are done, in as Substantial and Workmanlike manner, as at any of the other Yards, if not more so; but, that they are very tediously carried on, is too obvious."294 In all branches of the navy, opinion was unanimous that dockyard overhauls took too long, but, as one might expect, there was considerable disagreement as to why. In a few cases, especially at Plymouth after 1746, there were delays for want of cordage, but measured against the scale of dockyard opera­ tions during the war their number is negligible. There were more fundamental reasons. The Lords of the Admiralty, if one may judge from their attitude at the time of the dockyard visitation in 1749, appar­ ently took the view that much of the slow progress in the yards could be attributed to the indolence and lack of super­ vision of the workmen. Convincing evidence in support of this explanation has already been presented. And yet it is inter­ esting that Commissioner Hughes, while admitting that the works were carried on "very tediously," did not at the same time choose to blame it on the "general supineness" which he had lamented ten years before. In 1740 he gave an explanation of the delays which is worth quoting at length: . . . if you'l only take Notice, [he wrote to the Navy Board] when any Ship is Order'd into the Harbour to be Refitted, from the time of her first coming in, to her going out again, it is generally Three or 292 See especially Adm. 3/45, 1 Feb. 1742; Adm. 3/46, 16 Oct., 28 Oct.

1742· 2»3 Adm. 3/61, 9 June 1749. 284 N.M.M. POR F/6, 22 Feb. 1740.

S34

6. The Dockyards Four Months, let her Works be more or less; These Delays, I at­ tribute, to the [dockyard] officers not Exerting themselves, as they should do on every Occasion, but more especially, at this Critical Juncture; As well, as to the Works not being carried on, in so regular a Method as they ought to be, . . . and which, in my Opinion, should be put in practice: For instance, when any Ships that are full Man'd, are Order'd into this Harbour to be Refitted; on their arrival, the Officers of the Ships should Clear them for the Docks, . . . without loss of time; So soon as they are Clear'd, the Officers of the Yard should go on board, and survey the Defects Complained of, and, immediately on their being taken into the Docks, strictly and very Carefully to Survey them again; then place all the Hands on them, that can work, without Interrupting each other, that they may be put out again, (and such Works Compleated as are to be done on Float) without the loss of a Moments time ... But, whilst 50 Men are Employ'd on One ship, 60 on another, 70 on a Third, 100 on a Fourth, 8cca. which has been done, and is our present Case . .. with­ out having regard, whether they bear Men [seamen], or not, You may be Assured, we shall always be Embarrass'd with Work.295

As Hughes saw it, then, the main failure was a failure of management, a failure to plan for rapid output. But the pas­ sage also suggests that there were two other important sources of delay over which the dockyard officers, for all their failings, had little control: first, ships' companies were slow in prepar­ ing their ships for the dock on arrival, and in rigging and stowing them for sea on departure; second, the authorities in London failed to assign sensible priorities and, as we shall see shortly, stick to them. Until a ship was cleared of her guns and stores and a good part of her rigging struck down, she could neither be properly surveyed nor docked. Until she was rerigged, restowed, and reprovisioned, she could not put to sea. These tasks had always been the responsibility of the ship's company. But because of the indifference of captains whose only thoughts on enter­ ing harbor were concerned with getting leave,296 because of the lack of discipline, and because of the restrictions necessitated by the severity of the manning problem, these things were 295 N.M.M. POR F/6, 82 Feb. 1740. The italics are mine. 29β By the same token many captains were in no hurry to leave the dock­ yard. Time and again the Admiralty was irritated by the petty excuses given by captains whose ships had completed fitting at Deptford and

6. The Dockyards seldom done on time, and occasionally not done at all by the ship's company; in the latter case the riggers and laborers of the yard were left with the job. In 1741 the Deptford officers complained that they could not survey the Torrington be­ cause she still had all her stores aboard and no men.297 In 1745 the Master Attendant at Portsmouth requested more riggers because few of the ships there had men "to be de­ pended on, or even Trusted with Safety . . . on Shore," and Commissioner Hughes added, "Consequently, this must occa­ sion a great increase of Business . . . unknown in former Wars."298 Strictly speaking, his statement was not true. The failure of ships' companies to assist during dockyard overhaul had troubled the navy in Queen Anne's time. Then, however, the prime cause appears to have been lax discipline,299 whereas in the war of 1739-1748 there were two major causes, lax discipline and the policy of confinement: In 1747 the Master Attendant at Plymouth complained that, since "the Ships Companys . . . [were] put on board the Hulks & Ships in Ordinary at the times of transporting or Docking," he had his riggers so fully employed on these tasks that he "could not spare a Man to Work in the Rigging House."300 Finally, in 1749 when all eyes were turned on the problem of cutting back dockyard personnel, the Master Attendant at Chatham applied for permission to hire more riggers: the ships had been paid off; the seamen had departed leaving stores on board and rigging untouched.301 The situation was the same at Portsmouth, where the dockyard officers complained that "through the Ungovernable Behaviour of the Seamen, their Officers not being Able to keep them to their Duty, to Clear the Ships, they had been put into their hands in bad Condition, with most of the Stores and all the Ballast" still on Board.302 Woolwich for not "falling down to the Nore." (See the Admiralty min­ utes generally, and especially January and February 1745.) One captain wrote from the Nore to a friend: "You live in the land of the living and I in the Dead Sea." (Matcham,

A Forgotten John Russell,

p. 815).

297 Adm. 106/3305, 6 Nov. 1741. See also Adm. 106/2182, 13 Aug. 1746.

208N.M.M. POR F/7, 3 Jan. 1745. 299 Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 114, 119, 130-131. soo Adm. 106/1047, 11 Dec. 1747. soi Adm. 3/60, 14 Feb. 1749; Adm. 3/61, 6 July 1749. «02 Adm. 3/61, 3 Aug. 1749.

6. The Dockyards The Admiralty recognized the problem, but often failed to meet it with resolution. Where danger of desertion was a fac­ tor nothing could be done; their Lordships came to the con­ clusion early in the war that whatever time might be gained by putting untrustworthy seamen to work in the dockyard would be more than offset by delays in getting replacements for those who ran away.303 As to granting captains leave, the Admiralty must be credited with intentions of firmness,304 but favorites were too often excepted. As for discipline, it de­ pended largely on the captains, and it was the task of the admirals at the ports to see that captains diligently and ear­ nestly prepared their ships for the dock and for sea. Anson, for example, was well aware of the importance of his presence at Plymouth in expediting the refitting of the western squad­ ron. But there was a limit to what a captain could do about getting his ship rerigged and restowed, if he had not a nucleus of trustworthy seamen in his crew. Toward the end of the Seven Years War the Admiralty discovered that it could fit out ships with alacrity at Deptford, Woolwich, and Chatham by hiring riggers by contract.305 Far from assisting the dockyard officers, some captains actu­ ally impeded their efforts. The supremacy of the military over the civil departments of the navy was not, in the 1740's, any longer a matter for uncertainty, and captains meant to have their ships fitted according to taste, regulations notwithstand­ ing. After investigating the reasons for delay in fitting out the Woolwich, Commissioner Hughes concluded that the Ports­ mouth officers (and Hughes was by no means biased in their favor, for he once wrote, ". . . 'tis Natural for them, to Ad­ vance everything, that can be Urged . . . to Screen and Vindi­ cate themselves")306 were "innocent of any neglect." He wrote to the Navy Board: "If she had remained here Two or Three Months longer, and the Board had thought proper to Indulge Captn. Herbert, in every thing he ask'd for; I fear, at the Expiration of that Time, it would have been said, the Ship was not Compleated, nor all the Stores on board." Hughes 303 See above p. 209. 304 E.g. Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, 305 Β. M. King's MS. 44. soe N.M.M. POR F/6, 22 Feb. 1740.

p. 19a.

6. The Dockyards admitted that captains were, perhaps, best qualified to judge what was best for their ships. But, he went on, "Things, (I am sorry to say it) are now come to such a Pass, that, unless they are Supplied with whatever they Ask for or desire, tho' directly Contrary & Opposite, to the Establishment & Standing Orders of the Navy, it is impossible to give Satisfaction: ... and when­ ever Denied, the Character of the Yard OfBcers are called in Question, they are Often Censur'd, and even Nick Named, only for Adhering to the Orders they have received."307 It was this sort of attitude that made standardization of dimensions and allowances both vital and vulnerable.308 Another cause of delay and confusion in the dockyards was inadequate planning and coordination at higher levels. It was up to the Admiralty to decide which works should have pre­ cedence; its decision was forwarded to the dockyards through the Navy Office. Although it is evident that on a number of occasions the dockyards did not get the clear statements of priority which they required,309 it is not possible to determine exactly where the fault lay. The Navy Board claimed that such matters were Admiralty business, that its function was merely to pass on Admiralty orders. The Admiralty, in 1746, accused the Navy Board of being unfit to perform even this simple task, and further claimed that the information it re­ ceived from the Navy Ofiice and the dockyards, upon which it relied in making decisions, was inadequate and sometimes misleading. In the wake of this particularly acrimonious dis­ pute came the Admiralty's decision to order Admiral Steuart at Portsmouth to take dockyard affairs into his own hands.310 Lack of accurate information had been a complaint of long­ standing. The Admiralty depended chiefly on the survey re­ ports and the Weekly Progress Report, both of which it received directly from the dockyards.311 Among other things sor N.M.M. POR F/7, 16 April 1743. For an example of this see Adm. 30s N.M.M. POR F/7, 22 April 1743. Nov. 1741. 309 E.g. Adm. 106/3306, 23 Nov. 1744; N.M.M. POR F/7, 27 Feb. 1746; there are many other examples. sio See above pp. 90-91. s11 The method of preparing the Weekly Progress Report is described in Adm. 106/3377, 19 June "74°- A copy was simultaneously prepared for the Navy Board. The only extant copies for this period are in the N.M.M. (POR J/i), and they cover but a few years. 106/3305, 20

6. The Dockyards the Weekly Progress Report showed how many workmen were assigned to each ship, what works were completed, and the scheduled date for completion of the ship's overhaul.312 In 1740 the accuracy of the reports had been particularly ques­ tioned,313 and Commissioner Hughes, on hearing that a car­ penter admitted to being coerced into certifying that his ship was ready for sea when it was not, and noting that some of the originally scheduled dates of completion had proven absurd, concluded: ". . . the Progress (is a meer Farce, and) really Amuses, more than it Satisfies."314 Although the situation seems to have improved as to accuracy—in 1743 Hughes cited the Progress Reports as evidence in one of his letters—315 the Admiralty Lords were still not content with the timeliness of the information they were getting; in 1746 they introduced a form for Daily Progress Reports.316 Notwithstanding these annoyances, much of the blame for confusion over priorities must be centered on Whitehall. As Commissioner Hughes pointed out in 1740, it was absolutely essential that those ships which could best prepare themselves for sea after docking should be taken in hand first. The Lords of the Admiralty fully embraced this policy,317 and yet again and again, while absorbed in each new strategic necessity, they allowed it to be undermined by their own orders. From a reading of the Admiralty minutes one gets the impression that every order to the Navy Board concluded with the words "with all possible dispatch," "as soon as may be," or some other vague phrase indicating urgency. The tiresome repetition of such phrases leads one to reflect that where everything is priority nothing is priority, and one searches in vain for evi­ dence that a system was instituted for reconciling each new demand with the preceding ones.318 S12 N.M.M. POR J/i. 813 Adm. 3/44, 13 Feb., 18 April, 8 Sept. 1740. 311 N.M.M. POR F/6, 22 Feb. 1740. 315 N.M.M. POR F/7, 16 April 1743. 3ieAdm. 3/53, 11 April 1746; Adm. 3/54, 84 May 1746; Adm. 3/56, 19 Jan. 1747. si? See, for example, Adm. 3/47, 7 July 1743. sieit is impossible to cite any portion of the vast quantity of scattered evidence upon which these assertions are based. But a good illustration of the Admiralty's irresponsibility in these matters is provided by its

6. The Dockyards The delays caused by inefficiency in the dockyards were serious. The delays caused by the manning problem were more serious. And it is possible that, because the necessity of min­ imizing the latter served to aggravate the former, contempor­ ary observers were given a distorted view of dockyard failings. Nevertheless, neither this nor the other factors offered here in extenuation, can contradict the Admiralty's estimate that the works were "not carried on with the Expedition that might be expected." tendency to favor merchants' requests to have their vessels refitted in the royal dockyards during the war. The owners of uncommonly large ships were particularly in need of the dockyards' facilities, since few private dry docks could accommodate such vessels; the Admiralty often obliged. (See Adm. 3/49, 20 Oct. 1744 and Adm. 3/46, ai June 174a; there are a dozen other examples.) Admittedly, the Admiralty ordered these works to be undertaken on a not-to-interfere basis, but this, the Navy Board pointed out, was silly. When, in 1745, the Admiralty ordered a privateer docked at Plymouth on this basis, the Navy Board protested: "It is im­ possible to take a Ship into one of his Majts. Docks and Refit her without interrupting the Works of that Yard." (Adm. 106/2181, 10 April 1745). It should have been obvious.

7. %S%e ©vewlsdtt The Spanish war which began in 1739, was principally a colony quarrel. —ADAM SMITH, /7761 The assurance of being supplied . . . gave me . . . hopes of being enabled to serve his Majesty successfully, it being my ardent desire, . . . but it is his Majesty's orders must furnish the means; and ships must be sent out well found with stores, and constantly supplied, or the zeal of the most diligent or able officer, may be rendered entirely fruitless. —ADMIRAL VERNON, from Port Royal, Jamaica, /7./02

T

HE GROWTH of the British navy in the eighteenth century was to a large extent the direct result of its radi­ cally enlarged strategic commitments in foreign waters. Be­ tween 1689 and 1714 England assumed a role in continental conflicts which, whether she liked it or not, she could not renounce, and as a natural consequence of this role the Med­ iterranean turned into a major theater of operations for the British navy. Simultaneously colonies and foreign trade pros­ pered, and Whig governments were neither able nor inclined to deny colonists and merchants the protection they demanded from piracy, privateering, and raids of plunder. Moreover, naval strength had to be found, not only to defend the empire, but also to support a policy of expanding its boundaries by conquest. All of these things had been necessary at one time or another before. But where a cruiser had sufficed in the seventeenth century, it was now often necessary to employ a squadron; what had been a squadron's task now seemed impos­ sible without a fleet; and what had been accomplished by an expedition now required a permanently stationed force. It was impractical and expensive to recall the ships deployed on these services to England for routine upkeep. In the wars during the time of William III and Queen Anne, the Admiralty freely admitted the desirability of relieving West Indian cruisers annually; but in practice such a procedure, 1 Wealth of

Nations, n, a Vernon Papers, p. 58.

131.

7· The Overseas Bases because of time lost in transit and the necessity of syn­ chronizing departures with convoy schedules, called for twice the number of ships.3 In some theaters the alternative of refitting and replenishing on the spot did not pose severe problems, so long as it was merely a matter of one or two ships. For example, in New England naval stores were generally plentiful, and there were competent local artisans to assist ships' companies. Knowles wrote from Boston in 1747: "There will be no repair wanting to any of the Stationed Ships but what may be done here and with as much Ex­ pedition as in any Yard in England and I think full as well."4 Similarly, it was possible to carry out refits at Mediterranean ports normally open to the English, like Leghorn and Lisbon, but the navy dared not rely entirely on places that might open or close according to the caprices of diplomacy. In the time of Queen Anne, the Navy Board had a storekeeper at Lisbon, but in the war of 1739-1748 the neutral Portuguese government, under pressure from France and Spain, would not permit it, and there were continual difficulties with Portuguese customs over stores sent from England to the ships refitting there.® As for the West Indies, local supplies and services were expensive and unreliable. A large squadron could hardly be accommodated by facilities of this kind. In 1694, when it was thought strategically advisable to have Admiral Russell's fleet winter and refit at Cadiz, the bulk of the equipment, stores, provisions, and skilled labor had to be sent out from England. "The nucleus of an English dockyard had in fact to be set up, at short notice, 1,100 miles from England and in a foreign state."6 This operation was undertaken wholeheartedly—a Commissioner of the Navy and a Commissioner of Victualling went out to Cadiz—and completed successfully; it was a remarkable feat, not the kind of thing to be repeated as a matter of routine. When repetition became necessary, the only sensible answer was a permanent base. s See Bourne, Queen Anne's Navy in the West Indies, pp. 62, 75. * Adm. 1/234, 28 Nov. 1747. β Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS. 46342-3; Adm. 3/32, 20 Oct. 1719, 14 Jan. 1720, 11 July 1721; Adm. 3/51, 18 July 1745. β Ehrman, p. 526 and generally pp. 517-544.

7· The Overseas Bases FACILITIES

Wliat constituted an overseas base? The question may be best answered by noting what services it was meant to provide. The basic requirements of a ship on active service may be stated succinctly. First, there were the needs of the crew: water, provisions, medical care. Second, there were the needs of the ship: replenishment of expendable stores, such as powder, shot, pitch, and tar; replacement of damaged sails, rigging, masts, and yards; periodic cleaning of the bottom and replacement of wood sheathing when necessary; caulking; minor repairs. In this chapter we are concerned with the needs of the ship. The main problem for ships overseas, assuming they were adequately supplied with stores, was cleaning. Of course the best way was to do it in dry dock. Another way was to expose first one side of the bottom, then the other. This might be done either by grounding the ship on a beach or river bank, or by careening her in a sheltered harbor. In either case all the guns and stores had to be taken out and every opening on that part of the ship to be immersed had to be plugged, planked, and caulked. Grounding was an easier method because it took advantage of the tide for exposing the bottom; however, it had two drawbacks: it was not well suited to large ships, and in the places abroad where the navy most frequently operated it had to be ruled out because of insufficient range of tide. So the usual method was careening. This method called for "heaving the ship down on one side, by the application of a strong purchase to her masts," which had to be elaborately shored up to prevent their breaking under the tremendous strain. The basic requirements for careening were "careening gear"—heavy hawsers, blocks, and so on—and a stationary point outside the ship to which the purchase might be attached.7 Careening was an "extremely troublesome" and "very dan­ gerous" operation. Furthermore, it tended to weaken a ship structurally. In 1815 one could say that it was "a practice t W. Falconer, A New Universal Dictionary of the Marine, rev. edn. Burney (1815), pp. 75-77.

γ. The Overseas Bases very rarely adopted in the British navy,"8 but until the end of the eighteenth century it was very common. Overseas it was unavoidable. There were no dry docks, and ships' bottoms fouled quickly and were attacked severely by the worm until copper sheathing began to be introduced in the 1770's. During most of the eighteenth century ships were given a sheath of tarred felt, planked over, in hopes of protecting them against teredo navalis. It did not work very well, and un­ less a ship was periodically careened so that the filth could be burned off and the worm killed by breaming, she might be devoured very quickly, especially in the West Indies. A competent crew, if supplied with stores and careening gear, could careen their ship unaided. Sometimes ships used their guns to anchor the purchase ashore. Naturally it was tedious work. Lord Anson's squadron was sent to the South Seas with careening gear, as were ships bound for the Slave Coast and the East Indies, but in areas more regularly frequented the hazards, delays, and difficulties of self-sufficiency were considered avoidable. A ship on her own had to be hove down by hand, that is without the aid of a capstan. If sailing in company she might heave down alongside another ship with the aid of the assisting ship's capstan. But a better method was to use a hulk. A hulk had four advantages: it could serve as a receptacle for the removed stores, or, alternatively as lodgings for seamen and workers; it could be permanently adapted for careening lower masts; and it avoided the necessity of tying up a serv­ iceable ship which might be otherwise employed. But the most desirable place to careen a ship was alongside a wharf,9 where there was plenty of room to work the capstans, and stores and guns could be cleared quickly. During the eighteenth century the decision to construct a careening wharf was tantamount to a decision to establish a base. The logical appurtenances of a careening wharf—capstans, capstan house, storehouses—were usually incorporated in the original plan. It was only a matter of time before the base also acquired a forge, a masthouse, a β ibid., pp. 75-76. s A hulk (or another ship) was still necessary for stepping lower masts.

7· The Overseas Bases boat yard, a cooperage, a gun wharf with magazine (appropri­ ately distant from the other structures), living quarters, harbor defenses, and perhaps a second careening wharf. In the war of 1739-1748 none of the overseas bases developed beyond this stage. Cruisers stationed in the North American colonies generally relied on local resources. At Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Charleston the usual procedure was to heave them down at commercial wharfs or prepared careening places and draw bills on the Navy Board for victuals and naval stores obtained from colonial merchants.10 This had its drawbacks. Prices were high, and some materials, particularly masts, were not to be had at the southern ports at any price.11 Consequently the Navy Board arranged for stores to be deposited at these ports in hired storehouses. In Nova Scotia local resources were negligible (save for masts), and the situation was complicated by the periodic necessity of basing a sizeable squadron in the area during the closing years of the war. In November 1745 Captain Peter Warren set about constructing a careening wharf at Louisburg; the Navy Board sent out careening gear, storehouses were built, and a number of ships were cleaned and refitted there.12 However, the tides made it impossible to ground the ships firmly, and the "generally foggy and very uncertain" weather was a continuing annoyance. For these reasons Captain Knowles, in April 1747, doubted the advisability of trying to keep the wharf at Louisburg in repair.13 Knowles tried grounding his ships at Annapolis Royal, in order to take advantage of the enormous range of tide in the area. There, after he had "Levell'd the Bed of the River at Low water and fix'd Blocks to receive the Ships Keel," he found "the Slacks so very short and the Tides running so excessive rapid" that he was forced to give it up and go down to Boston.14 10

See generally the bundles of Navy BoaTd in-letters (Adm. 106/905-

1087 series); e.g. Adm. 106/942, Peyton, 30 Nov. 1741. 11 Adm. 3/46, 13 Sept. 1742; Adm. 3/47, 4 July 1743, 19 Jan. 1744. 12 Adm. 3/52, 2 Nov. 1745; Adm. 1/480, 3 Oct. 1745; Adm. 3/53, 24 March 1746; Adm. 1/234, 30 April 1747.

is Adm. 1/234, 3° April 1747. "Adm. 106/1044, Knowles, 28 June 1747.

7· The Overseas Bases At "Georges Island" in Nantasket roads he beached the Bien Aime, a condemned mast carrier taken from the French, and using this hulk as a storehouse, he careened and refitted his small squadron.15 In Knowles's opinion, Boston was by far the best place to service the ships on North American station. "All the American Station'd Ships" should be cleaned there, he said, "not only as it can be done with much more Expedition but better done and much Cheaper (I will Answer for it at least one half) and shou'd it happen to fall out that the Tydes don't rise high enough they may heave down by the Bien Αχπιέ, One Sett of the Careening Geer being here and the other at Louisberg. I mention this because I find the several Colonies where there are Station'd Ships all desirous of having Carreening places made for them there which will be an Im­ mense Charge."16 The East Indies squadron, from the time it arrived on station in 1745 to the time it was ordered home in 1749, used the Dutch-held harbor of Trincomalee, Ceylon, as a cleaning and refitting base.17 Until the Preston (50) was sunk for a hulk in 1748 (her condition was so bad that the voyage home could not be risked), the ships had to heave down alongside one another, and on one occasion the Medway was careened alongside the Ilchester, an East India ship. The facilities were primitive. Stores and provisions were put ashore under tents; and since the lower masts of the larger ships could not be removed, there was nothing to do when the Medway's mainmast broke while heaving down, but fish it.18 The Medway also developed a serious leak, which could not be fixed by careening; as a result she too had to be left be­ hind when the squadron sailed for England. Fresh provisions were obtained locally, and ordnance stores could be drawn from the East India Company arsenals at Bombay and Madras, but naval stores, though occasionally purchasable is Ibid. The smaller ships were beached, the larger—Norwich (50) and Canterbury (60)—were hove down by each other. ieAdm. 106/1044, Knowles, 20 Nov. 1747; also Adm. 1/234, 28 Nov.

1747· 17 This paragraph is principally based on H. A. Colgate, "Trincomalee and the East Indies Squadron, 1746-1844," M.A. thesis. University of London, 1959, pp. 15-30, 397-398. is Adm. 106/1032, Peyton, 28 Nov. 1746.

7· The Overseas Bases from the Dutch and British companies, were generally scarce and expensive.19 Supplies sent out by the Navy Board in East India ships were inadequate and untimely, and the situation was aggravated when Madras fell by the loss of a large quantity of supplies to the French.20 Consequently the squadron had to resort to jury-masts cut from local forests and to continue with rigging no longer serviceable. On the whole, the facilities at Trincomalee were not a match for teredo navalis; it is not surprising that the long voyage from England to the East Indies turned out to be, for many ships, a one-way passage. In 1725, with Anglo-Spanish relations deteriorating rapidly, the Admiralty began to give serious thought to the condition of its West Indian bases. Up to that time most ships were cleaned in Port Royal harbor, Jamaica,21 and in 1728 the hulk put there in the time of Queen Anne was replaced with a new one.22 But there seemed to be a serious objection to establishing permanent facilities at Port Royal: about thirty years earlier the town had been reduced, first by earthquake, then by fire, and a number of Jamaicans were convinced that it was doomed to further holocausts.23 This was one reason why the Admiralty determined that Port Antonio, on the northeastern coast of the island, should be the site for permanent development. Work was accordingly begun on the fortifications at Navy Island (formerly Lynch's Island), Port Antonio in 1729. The place was highly recommended, and it seems plain that it was the Admiralty's intention eventually to transfer everything lodged at Port Royal and Kingston to the new base.24 In 1731 Admiral Charles Stewart told the Admiralty: "I think the service may be carry'd on with half the expence which ie Adm. 1/160, Barnett, 29 Aug. 1745. 20 Adm. 106/1032, Peyton, 28 Nov. 1746. 21 Admiralty Library chart Vz-10-81 indicates where Benbow's squadron had careened. 22 Adm. 3/37, 21 May 1728; Adm. 1/231, Stewart, 11 Nov. 1729; Bourne, Queen Anne's Navy in the West Indies, p. 73. 23 Ibid., pp. 35-36, and E. Long, The History of Jamaica (3 vol., 17741775), n, 141-147· 24 Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS. 45008-9, 7 June 1729; Adm. 1/231, Stewart, 11 Nov. 1729, 16 March 1730.

j. The Overseas Bases had been usual here at Jamaica, the Convenience of the Hulk with a little expence on the Island Will probably be Sufficient to answer the end of Cleaning the Ships on this Station."25 The same year Charles Knowles was made Master and Commander of the Southampton Hulk "and sent to Jamaica in Order to make a Careening Wharf and Erect a Storehouse at Port Antonio. . & to Fortify the Harbour."26 By 1735 a careening wharf, hospital, masthouse, boathouse, some storehouses, and three brick officers' houses had been built on Navy Island.27 At the outbreak of war in 1739 the careening wharf was fit to receive smaller ships, but the storehouses and harbor defenses had fallen into decay.28 Although these were re­ paired,29 Port Antonio remained of secondary importance—to be used not by choice, but by necessity whenever the facilities at Port Royal became overloaded.80 In 1746 a former officerin-charge at Port Antonio mentioned that "before the Wharfs was made at Port Royal, His Majesty's ships then came often to Port Antonio."31 And when Knowles arrived at Jamaica in 1748 he commented: "Port Antonio I find has been made no manner of Use of," adding (perhaps out of loyalty for his own handiwork), "but I have sent two small Cruizers there now to Clean, and doubt not of making it Answer all the Ends proposed."82 A year later he inspected the base and found it, on the whole, still serviceable, except that the careening wharf was badly in need of repair.88 In 1749 his successor, Admiral Townsend, transferred the workers at Port Antonio to Port Royal, and early in 1750 the officer-in25 Adm. 1/231, Stewart, 10 May 1731. 26 Adm. 1/234, Knowles, 30 March 1747. This is quoted from a petition submitted by Knowles, wherein he claimed to have lost rank as a result of his being engaged in these engineering activities. 27 Adm. 1 /2006, Knowles, 16 March, 19 Sept. 1732, 20 Oct. 1733, March 1734 (MS. damaged), 25 July 1735. 28 Vernon Papers, pp. 313, 329, 334. 29 Adm. 106/958, Jamaica, 3 July 1742; Library of Congress, VernonWager MSS. 45869. so E.g. Adm. 106/992, Jamaica, 11 June 1744. si Adm. 106/1030, Jamaica, 21 Oct. 1746. 82 Adm. 1/234, Knowles, 6 April 1748. «8 Adm. 1/234, Knowles, 23 June 1749. This survey report gives a very detailed picture of the structures built there.

7·

The Overseas Bases

charge reported that one part of the careening wharf had "Tumbled into the Sea."34 Port Antonio's unpopularity was chiefly due to its situation on the windward side of the island. The daily rains in winter were such a hindrance that careened ships had to be breamed at night. And the weather seemed to breed disease. In 1732 Port Antonio was so badly stricken by a deadly contagion that the works came to a standstill. Captain Knowles wrote: I have sent home several of the Workmen Invalids, & buried most of the rest, the chief Settlers are leaving the Place and I greatly fear its Malignancy will soon make us, the few Workmen now left if not closely look'd after wou'd run away they are so much terrify'd at the Place, . . . not one in ten recovers . . . The Difficulty the Navy Board Exprest They had in procuring the last Workmen, gives me room to fear They will now meet with greater to gett more, (as the Sickness of the Place is known). Numbers of all Sorts will be wanted if Their Lordships continues the thoughts of making Antonio the General Magazine.35

Even before the works were completed their Lordships showed signs of abandoning such thoughts. Sir Chaloner Ogle, who was commander-in-chief at Jamaica in 1733, thought Port Antonio was a poor location for a base. Naturally this dis­ tressed Sir Charles Wager. "It would be very strange," he told Ogle, "if after all the account we have had of it, which induc'd the Board to be at the expense of purchasing Lynches Island & laying out so much money upon it, . .. that we should at last give it up & say we have been misinform'd, and squander'd & wasted so much money upon such information only, which now we find to be all wrong, 8c that it is no place at all."3® But essentially that is what happened.37 The very year that the works at Port Antonio were finished, Sir Chaloner Ogle careened his entire squadron at Port Royal 84 Adm. 1/234, Townsend, 4 Dec. 1749; Adm. 106/1083, Jamaica, 6 Feb. 1750. as Adm. 1/2006, Knowles, 17 Dec. 1732. The disease is described in James Lind, An Essay on Diseases incidental to Europeans in hot Climates (1768), pp. 207-208. se Library of Congress, Vernon-Wager MSS. 45223-4, 7 July 1733. ST For the eventual fate of Port Antonio see Long, History of Jamaica, n, 171-176.

S49

7·

The Overseas Bases

and removed the workers from Port Antonio for the purpose.38 And that same year, 1735, work was begun on facilities at Port Royal which were to cost an estimated £3000. These included a careening wharf, capstan house, storehouses, two brick officers' houses, and a wall to surround the yard.39 As a result the base at Port Royal, far from being in a state of ruin at the outbreak of war in 1739, was relatively new and still growing. But it quickly became obvious that the facilities then exist­ ing could scarcely support the squadron sent out under Ad­ miral Vernon, to say nothing of the fleet which sailed to Ja­ maica under Ogle's command in 1740. Before Ogle set sail plans and estimates for a second careening wharf had been ap­ proved in London.40 At the same time it was recognized that the naval storehouses at Kingston could not possibly ac­ commodate the quantities to be sent out;41 the Navy Board therefore contracted with a Boston firm to frame two store­ houses and a masthouse, and ship the prefabricated sections together with all other necessary materials to Jamaica.42 By the end of 1742 "three fine new storehouses" had been erected at New Greenwich on part of the land bought for the hospital. The new careening wharf, for which a capstan house was also being framed at Boston, was ready for service early in 1744.43 Nevertheless, the two wharves at Port Royal could handle only two ships at a time, and, although Vernon de38 Adm. 1/1695, Dent, 28 June 1735. 39Adm. 1/1695, Dent, 4 Aug., 20 Oct. 1735, 5 June 1736; Adm. 1/2006, Knowles, undated estimate ca. 1735. Half of the capstan house originally framed for Port Antonio was set up at Port Royal. «ο Adm. 3/44, 8 Aug., 15 Aug. 1740. The new wharf (estimated cost £2,967) had been strongly urged by Vernon (Vernon Papers, pp. 328-331). In drawing up the plans and determining the proper location, the Navy Board relied on Knowles, who, as we shall see, continued to be regarded as an authority on matters concerning West Indian bases. 41 Supplementary storage space could be hired in Kingston, but this got to be expensive (Adm. 106/923, Jamaica, 22 March 1741). Adm. 106/2178, 3 Dec., 10 Dec. 1740. Vernon Papers, p. 356; Adm. 1/233, Ogle, 19 June 1743; Adm. 106/ 992, Jamaica, 11 June 1744. The capstan house (133 ft. χ 37 ft.) had an upper floor, intended for stowage; the building's estimated cost was: £492 for materials and workmanship; £320 for freight (Adm. 106/923, Jamaica, 22 March 1741).

7· The Overseas Bases plored having to careen ships alongside one another,44 it often proved necessary. This was usually done at "the Pallasadoes." To facilitate the careening of smaller vessels there, an old merchant vessel was sunk as a hulk. Since ships' stores often had to be lodged under tents, to the detriment of both the stores and the sails used to make the tents, another old vessel was bought for them; sheds were constructed in the yard for the same purpose, and in 1742 the Lark was sunk to the southward of the new careening wharf.45 Other improvements during the war included "a footbridge" (in effect a long, boat wharf) at the storehouses at Kingston;48 a footbridge at the watering place at Rock Rivulet (sometimes called Rock Ford);47 sheds for ordnance stores at Mosquito Point; a cooperage at Rock Rivulet;48 a new forge and additional boat houses at the yard; a brick wall around the yard; victualling storehouses (assembled at New York) at New Greenwich;49 and the hospital at New Greenwich.. The impression might be got from all this that by the war's end Port Royal was solidly established as a naval base with the pattern of its future development firmly laid down. While this is partially true, one must take into account the per­ ishability of wooden structures in the West Indies and the conditions of urgency under which the facilities at Port Royal so rapidly expanded. Nevertheless, the impression is correct to this extent; the building of two careening wharves adjacent to the town of Port Royal pointed to further de­ velopment of that area; for, even though "the greatest part of the Piles" of the new wharf were "eat asunder by the Worms" just five years after its completion, even though the capstan house that stood behind it was in "very bad" condition ("either Rotten or eat by the Wood Ants"), the cost of repairing the wharf, by sinking new piles outboard of the old and filling in the gap with rubble, was far less than that ** Vernon Papers, p. 316. 45 Adm. 106/940, Jamaica, 20 Dec. 1741; Vernon Papers, pp. 325, 355. «Ibid., pp. 327, 333, 336. 47 Ibid., p. 334. is ibid., p. 325. 49 Ibid.; and Adm. 106/940, Jamaica, 9 July, 11 July 1741.

7·

The Overseas Bases

of building one elsewhere.60 Storehouses and sheds, on the other hand, did not constitute so permanent an investment. These had been erected haphazardly at various locations around the harbor in response to the urgent needs of the moment, and Knowles, who was commander-in-chief at Jamaica in 1749, refused to authorize their repair.51 He rightly saw that it was time to reconstruct the base according to a plan. As an initial step he proposed that the storehouses at Kingston and New Greenwich should be allowed to decay and be replaced by new ones at Port Royal. I will venture to Affirm [he added] that had Inconveniencies and obstructions been studied in the Disposition of the several Magazines in this Harbour they could not have been accomplished more Ef­ fectually. The Ships Careen at Port Royal, send for their Stores (7 Miles) to Kingston, for their Provisions (5 Miles) to new Greenwich, For their Water (12 Miles) to Rock Fort, and for their Ordnance Stores (5 Miles) to Mosquito Point, so that every different Officer's Stores are Scituated as far asunder as the Length and Breadth of the Harbour will admit them to be placed, and when the Breezes blows ships may wait several days and cannot send a Boat to any one of them let the Urgency . . . be ever so great; whereas they might all (Except the Water) have been Connected together at Port Royal very Commodiously.52

English Harbor, Antigua, had long been recognized as a superb hurricane anchorage before efforts were begun in 1728 to equip it as a naval base.53 The base was initially established at the request of "several Merchants of Anteso The quoted descriptions are from Knowles's report on the structures at Port Royal, enclosed in his letter to the Admiralty of 23 June 1749 (Adm. 1/234). It is curious that the new careening wharf should have deteriorated more quickly than the old; one can readily understand why the conduct of teredo was so perplexing. w Adm. 106/1073, 31 Aug. 1749. 52 Adm. 106/1061, Knowles, 8 May 1748. Knowles was simplifying here. Actually naval stores were lodged at three separate locations: timber and plank at Port Royal; frequently issued items at Kingston (where the Storekeeper maintained his office); heavier items at New Greenwich (Adm. 106/1073, Jamaica, 19 Nov. 1748; Vernon Papers, p. 356). Knowles's elabor­ ate plan for the yard at Port Royal (executed only in part) may be seen in the Admiralty Library (Vz-10-75). 03 See Queen Anne's Navy, p. 129.

7· The Overseas Bases goa" to serve the cruisers stationed in the Leeward Islands,54 but its rapid growth was partly owing to the fact that North American squadrons found English Harbor a convenient place to winter. In 1739 the facilities included a careening wharf, which, ac­ cording to Warner Tempest who had been Storekeeper there since 1731, had already been "thrice rebuilt," two storehouses on the eastern side of the harbor, and a large storehouse on the western side.55 In 1742 Capt. William Lisle, then senior officer in the Leeward Islands, urged the building of a second wharf. His squadron consisted of only seven ships, none of them larger than 50 guns, but he told the Admiralty: "I may venture to Affirm that the Ship whose Turn it will be to careen last, will be four Months from her Coming in to her going out."5® Lisle proposed building the new wharf on the western side of the harbor. He hoped the Admiralty would give orders to have it faced with stone rather than timber piles. He wrote: "The worms eat . . . [the timber] be­ yond conception, for Example the last WarfiE lasted but Seven Years, and the present one has been but four, and many of the Piles are already Eat off . . . and not only the Warff but the Birth where the ship must lay to Careen will be entirely Ruined" (because the rubble would spill into the water). "A stone Warff," he added, "will in all probability last to the World's End."57 The latter prediction was a bit extreme, but the stone wharves which were built later in the century are still there. However, in the 1740's the authorities in London decided against anything so lavish as stone.58 These works on the western side had scarcely got under way when Captain Knowles appeared on the scene and decided that the new location was unwise because of the shoals there and the consequent expense of projecting the wharf far out into the water. He told Lisle that if the existing wharf: 64 Adm. 3/37, 29 Nov., 19 Dec. 1728. The Antigua legislature agreed to provide the necessary land and to erect a stone fort at the harbor en­ trance; the latter was completed in 1731 (Cal. State Papers, America and West Indies, 1731, pp. 202, 248). so Adm. 1/2041, Lisle, 11 Nov. 1742. 6β Adm. 1/2041, Lisle, 24 Oct. 1742. β* Ibid. 88 Adm. 3/46, 11 Jan. 1743.

7· The Overseas Bases was lengthened 30 or 40 foot and a set of new Piles Carry'd out three or four foot without these Old ones; even an Eighty Gun Ship might heave down alongside it. And if that Side from the three Gun Battery to the Corner of the Wharf was Carry'd out 25 or 30 feet, a 60 or 70 Gun Ship might heave down there likewise, without Incommoding the Ship at the other part of the Wharf. I am well assured that the Expense of repairing the old Wharf, with the addition I propose will not amount to the Ninth part of making a new one, where You design'd it, nor will it take One Quarter part of the time.59

Sensing that Knowles's scheme would be approved and au­ thorization of his own rescinded, Lisle dispatched a rather lame justification and advised the Admiralty that he would await further instructions before proceeding with the new wharf.60 His expectations were realized.61 Nevertheless, because of its terrain the western side was a logical site for further development of the yard, and it is there that Knowles erected most of the storehouses and other structures. Between 1743 and 1745 the facilities at English Harbor ex­ panded rapidly. While Captain Warren cruised with the squadron, Knowles stayed behind and supervised the sinking of piles, the levelling and filling, and the erecting of storehouses. In March 1744 he told the Admiralty: "I doubt not when it is finished of it's being Esteemed the Compleatest Place of any His Majesty has abroad."62 The Antigua legis­ lature provided 130 negroes to assist, and 200 Spanish pris­ oners were also employed,63 but the island was unable to supply the necessary bricklayers, masons, and house carpenters. These had to be sent out from England, and they were paid handsomely: four shillings per diem plus food, lodgings, and full pay during passage.64 In June 1744 Knowles reported that the works were "in great forward­ ness, even beyond Expectation,"65 and by 1745 he had placed 5» Adm. 1 /2041 Lisle, 8 Sept. 1743 contains a copy of Knowles's letter to Lisle on this occasion. eo Adm. 1 /2041, Lisle, 8 Sept., 25 Oct. 1743. si Adm. 3/47, 8 Aug., 16 Aug. 1743. «2 Adm. 1/2007, Knowles, 6 Jan., 17 March 1744. β3 Adm. 3/47, a6 Aug. 1743: Adm. 1/2007, Knowles, 17 March 1744. β4 Adm. 3/47, 5 Dec. 1743: Adm. 106/2180, 9 Dec. 1743. es Adm. 1/2007, Knowles, 22 June 1744.

7·

The Overseas Bases

the Ludlow Castle on the western side as a hulk, finished the long (180 foot) side of the careening wharf, and erected nearly all of the storehouses. With the aid of the Ludlow Castle it was now possible to careen two ships at a time.66 Knowles's request for chain moorings to facilitate warping into harbor against the wind was turned down.67 Also, a much-needed ordnance storehouse did not receive Ad­ miralty approval until 1748.68 All the same, it was undeniable that "a vast deal of work" had been done.68 British ships of war had cleaned at Gibraltar ever since its capture in 1704. No wharf had to be built, since the New Mole could be adapted to serve the purpose.70 The Navy Board believed that it was possible to careen two men of war simultaneously at the New Mole, but in 1744 Cap­ tain John Crookshanks gave his opinion that "the Mold," as he persisted in calling it, was not "convenient for more than one Ship at a time."71 As they stood in 1739 the facilities at Gibraltar were inadequate, for Britain had done very little to develop the base. The steps that were taken were mainly aimed at serving the garrison rather than the fleet. We have already seen that the town of Gibraltar was unable to accommodate the sick seamen from the fleet in 1739-1740, and that this resulted in the building of a hospital.72 There was also a severe shortage of storehouses, for it was almost impossible to hire anything suitable. The problem had been foreseen. In 1728 the Admiralty resolved that "there be laid ββ A complete account of the works accomplished may be found in Adm. 1/2007, Knowles, 26 Feb. 1745. β7 Adm. 3/49, 15 Jan. 1745; Adm. 106/2181, 10 Jan. 1745. Nevertheless, the constant easterly winds were a problem, and eventually bollards for warping in were located at various points around the harbor; see H. R. H. Vaughan, "The Old Dockyard at English Harbour, Antigua," MM., xi ('925). 30^306ββ Adm. 1/305, Townsend, 1 Oct. 1745; Adm. 1/306, Osborn, 24 May 1748; Adm. 3/58, 13 Feb. 1748. β» Adm. 106/992, Antigua (Warner Tempest to Navy Board), 13 July 1745· 70 The New Mole, which lay to the southward of the town of Gibraltar and the Old Mole, was built between 1620 and 1665 (E. R. Kenyon, Gibraltar under Moor, Spaniard and Briton (1938), p. 11). 71 Adm. 106/2180, 14 Dec. 1743; Adm. 1/1602, Crookshanks, 25 May »744· 72 Above p. 222.

7· The Overseas Bases before the Board all the Complaints . . . made of the want of Storehouse Room at Gibraltar,"73 and eventually a new victualling storehouse was built. In 1736 a 350-foot wharf was added to facilitate victualling and watering. But the shortage of space for victuals and naval stores remained. When war broke out there were only the new victualling storehouse, which was not big enough, an old church, which had to be given to the Ordnance office, a former convent, which was too far away from the water, and various buildings hired in "inconvenient parts of town.'"74 Near the New Mole, where the ships careened, there was nothing. A newly appointed storekeeper told Admiral Mathews in 1742: "I was surprised to find the Stores lay in such a confused manner, especially those at the New Mole, which I am almost afraid to take charge of, for as ships of all Nations are continually there, I think 'tis scarce possible to prevent Embezzlements, Besides they receive great Damage.'"75 After much delay, construction was finally begun on some permanent store­ houses at the New Mole in 1746.78 Minorca was captured from the Spanish in 1708, and like Gibraltar, it was taken for no other purpose than to serve as a naval base. But there the similarity of the two bases ends. Gibraltar's value lay chiefly in its location; Minorca's asset was not so much its location as its superb harbor at Port Mahon. If given a choice between Minorca and Gibraltar, most sea officers would have agreed with James Lind that Minorca was "by much the most valuable."77 Admiral Haddock, for example, planned to spend the winter of 1741-1742 refitting at Gibraltar; but in December, having had his fill of bad weather at a place where the squadron was "exposed extreamely to an open Road and very fowl Ground," TS Adm.

3/37, 23 July 1728. 1* Lt. Col. Thomas James, The History of the Herculean Straits (2 vol., 1771), 11, 308; Adm. no/12, 9 Dec. 1740; Richard Larkins to Mathews, 26 June 1742, enclosed in Adm. 1/381, Mathews, 28 Oct. 1742. 7B Ibid. TeAdm. 3/46, 3 Feb. 1743; Adm. 106/2181, 5 July 1745; H.M.C., Du Cane, p. 107. 'T J. Lind, Three Letters relating to the Navy, Gibraltar, and Port Mahon (1757), pp. 113-114. The letter quoted was written in 1748.

7· The Overseas Bases which ruined the ships' cables, he gave it up and sailed for Port Mahon.78 Situated at the southeastern end of the island, Port Mahon harbor was indeed "the ideal naval harbour of the eighteenth century,"79 and it had facilities to match. Immediately below the town of Mahon, which stood on a plateau overlooking the harbor, lay "a fine Wharf of great Extent in Length, and proportionably broad"; it was capable of receiving five men of war at a time.80 This was inherited from the Spanish, together with the ancient fortress of St. Philip commanding the harbor's mouth, which British army engineers had rehabilitated during the peacetime period. One of the first structures added by the British was the hospital on Bloody Island, built in 1711; by the time war broke out in 1739, it had fallen badly into disrepair. At the wharf the navy in­ stalled careening capstans, and erected "convenient Magazines" for stores, plus a victualling depot and a cooperage. Across the harbor from the careening wharf, on the north side, a masthouse and mast pond, a smith's shop, and a small boat yard were established.81 These were the facilities at Port Mahon in 1739. One has only to glance at the size of the fleet in the Mediter­ ranean in late 1743 (34 ships of the line) to understand why the facilities proved inadequate. Until 1742 there were no serious difficulties, but the heavy augmentation of the fleet that year forced the navy to hire places in the town, and "the Carriage up & down the Hill" was "tedious & Ex­ pensive." The Victualling Agent had recommended in 1741 that the Crown purchase a local building, but no authorization was sent, and the Admiralty, Navy, and Victualling Boards continued to exchange letters on the matter—it developed into a larger question concerning the proper location of the victualling depot—until the emergency had passed.82 Space for '8 Adm. 1/380, 9 Dec. 1741. Tunstall, Byng and the Loss of Minorca, p. 90. so See J. Armstrong, The History of the Island of Minorca (and edn., 1756), p. 16, and illustration, p. 28; Adm. 1/381, Rowley, 16 Dec. 1744. si Armstrong, History of Minorca, pp. 16, 18; Adm. 1/381, 10 Dec. 174a. 82 Adm. no/ia, 25 Feb. 1741; Adm. no/13, 15 Oct. 174a, ia July, 8 Sept. 1743, 39 Feb. 1744.

7· The Overseas Bases naval stores was equally scarce, but here the administration was more resolute. Plans drawn up in December 1742 called for a new storehouse at the western end of the great wharf, plus a number of smaller buildings along the wharf for housing ships' stores. Most of the expansion, however, took place on the north side, in the area that later became the central feature of the Mahon base. New storehouses and workshops were built there, the slip to the masthouse was enlarged, and work was begun on a careening wharf and cap­ stan house.83 By June 1745 the wharf on the north side was complete, and construction begun on boathouses, saw pits, and additional workshops, the latter "being absolutely Necessary to Secure the Workmen from the Extream heat in the Summer, and the Violent rains in the Winter."84 These were extensive improvements, but they were not completed until after a large portion of the Mediterranean fleet had returned home. And yet, even if the new wharf and storehouses had been ready a year earlier, the facilities could not have begun to service so large a fleet. All Mathews could do while waiting off Toulon for the French was fret, grumble, and chastise,85 but when Admiral Rowley took the fleet into Port Mahon late in 1744, he attacked the problem with ingenuity and vigor. Rowley saw that ships were spending too much time at the careening wharf unloading guns and stores, and discovered that he could make additional wharves, "without putting the Government to any further charge, than that of some tools and a little powder to blow up rocks," where ships could prepare themselves for going alongside the main wharf.86 These wharves were, of course, no more than rough, stone ledges. None of them appear on later plans of Mahon har­ bor,87 but they illustrate the kind of thing that an imaginative commander-in-chief might do in an emergency; they show that ssAdm. 1/381, 10 Dec. 1742; Adm. 106/994, Port Mahon, 10 Jan. 1744. 84 Adm. 106/1007, Port Mahon, 18 June 1745. 85 E.g. Adm. 1/381, Mathews, 31 Dec. 1743. 86 Adm. 1/381, Rowley, 16 Dec. 1744. With these he could "clear twelve ships at a time." 87 There is a particularly detailed plan of the harbor (ca. 1765) in the Admiralty Library (Pfo B 16).

S5S

7· The Overseas Bases

an admiral with a willingness to improvise could overcome difficulties that another might resignedly lay at the door of the administration in London. WORKMEN

Originally, all repairs and refits at these bases were carried out by ships' companies under the direction of ships' officers; there were obvious disadvantages to this practice. We have already noted that a crew at sea and a crew in port were two different things, notwithstanding appearances on paper. One factor was sickness. At the end of a cruise a ship's company might contain very few men fit to unload stores and labor at the capstans; moreover, in the West Indies, thanks to rum, prostitutes, mosquitoes, and the tropical sun, the men were often in worse condition ashore than they were at sea.88 Whenever a number of ships were refitted together it was the practice to pool all the healthy men available and apply them to one ship at a time, but this was not as simple as it sounds. Capt. William Lisle wrote from Antigua: It may . . . be said that tho' some of the ships may be weakly Man'd Yett by the Assistance of Others those ships might be sooner dispatch'd. I answer they are all thus assisted by the other ships, but then it's attended with the 111 Consequence of great Nors. of Seamens deserting the Service, for there is nothing that a Sailor shews so thorough an Antipathy too as Bad Provisions, & Working on board of any Ship except that they belong too, and Especially those belong­ ing to the ship who's turn is to be last will naturally say, after we have help'd Everybody, who will be left to help us, and this hint spread among them will occasion the desertion of a whole Ships Com­ pany. English Harbour is not like other places. I have try'd all the means . . . and find it Impossible to keep them, unless they them­ selves are willing to stay. I have Try'd Severity, Sentrys, Clemencys, Sports, and diversions of many kinds, and all to no . . . Purpose. This time when I came first hither I call'd up my Ships Company, and told them that their objection to a Man of War had allways been pretended to be want of Liberty but that this should not be their Case, for that I'd give Twenty of them leave to go on Shore at a as Adm. 1/234, Knowles, 6 April 1748: ". . . it Generally happens after Careening the Ships are more Sickly and more Men dye than at any other Season of the Year."

7·

The Overseas Bases

time, and as they return'd others should go in their Room; the Con­ sequence of this was as soon as the first Twenty gott on Shore, they Walk'd quite across the Island, to a place where a Ship lay at an Anchor bound for Philladelphia, on board which Nineteen of them went, and was sail'd . . . in less than Six hours after they left the Scarbro.89 At Port Royal desertion was such a problem that towards the end of the war it was thought necessary to prohibit many sea­ men from assisting in careening operations.90 And when Knowles established the Bien Aimd as a hulk at Nantasket in Boston harbor, he did it not only "to receive Ships Stores," but also to "Secure their Men" and "prevent. . . deserting."91 Desertion from Minorca was not so easy. James Lind com­ mented: "At Minorca . . . our men may refresh themselves, and be permitted to go ashore, without much hazard of their being able to run away."92 Nevertheless the seamen tended to work or not as they chose. In 1747 the crew of the Dunkirk, when ordered to assist in heaving down the Antelope, "refused . . . and Cryed out, one and all, and left the Wharf." Admiral Byng wrote, "I am told by the Captains abroad here that this has frequently been the practice of many Ships Companys at that place."93 Even if the crews had fully cooperated in the unloading and careening, there still could not be found among them enough caulkers and carpenters to complete the overhauls quickly. Wherever possible such workers were hired locally, but in most cases it was found necessary to bring out skilled workmen from England. Even during peacetime it was necessary to maintain a permanent working force of shipwrights and caulkers at Port Royal and Port Mahon. And whenever an abnormally large squadron came in for refit the commander-in-chief engaged 89 Adm. 1/2041, Lisle, 25 Oct. 1743. eoAdm. 1/234, Knowles, 6 April 1748: "And as Governor Trelawny has promised to Engage the Legislature to send 250 Negroes to Assist in heaving the Ships down I hope I shall henceforth be able to keep the Squadron better Mann'd . . . as all the Suspected Men in any Ship Orderd to Carreen may be put on Board some other Ship of the Squadron." ei Adm. 106/1044, Knowles, 28 June 1747. «2 Lind, Three Letters, p. 123. es Adm. 1/382, Byng, 3 Oct. 1747.

7· The Overseas Bases additional workmen locally, paying them by entering their names on the ships' books as carpenter's mates.94 But it was impossible to get enough men in this manner, and wage rates were exorbitant. At Jamaica, Negro caulkers were available but expensive, and Admiral Stewart was pleased to hear that the Admiralty intended to buy its own Negroes for the purpose. He wrote in 1730: "It has been the Common Practice for the Gentlemen of this Station to buy Negroes, to have them taught to Caulk, and the Government to pay Ten Shilling a day for their hire."86 At English Harbor, on the other hand, even Negro labor was difficult to get. In 174a the Storekeeper there wrote to the Navy Board: I heartily wish that every work necessary to be perform'd here could be Accomplish'd by Persons in his Majesty's Service, for Wages, Rates, & Prices of things, and Workmanship in this Country are so Exces­ sive dear & Extravagant (and Especially at English Harbour) being the most remote part of the Island that it is very difficult to get Workmen or Labourers even on their own terms, ... the Inhabitants not caring that their Slaves should break from their Usual Labours to do that which they apprehend is dangerous; and those that I have procur'd now, I could not get nearer English Harbour than from Twelve Miles Distance.96

In the Mediterranean area local labor was more readily avail­ able. However, English captains did not have a high opinion of these workers. Captain Steuart of the Cumberland, who was forced to repair storm damage at Lisbon in the autumn of 1740, wrote: "To my great mortification a whole week passed before 'twas possible for me to get either caulker or bricklayer to come on board and when they did, they were so slow with their works and so many of their holy days intervened that ... I've fretted myself sick, but now I have got clear and done with these d d Portuguese workmen I find myself much »4 Vemon Papers, pp. 368, 37a. This procedure was authorized by the Admiralty on 4 May 1738 (Adm. 3/43); naturally captains going abroad were urged to enlist as many carpenters and caulkers as they could get prior to leaving England. »5 Adm. 1/231, Stewart, 89 Oct. 1730. The government maintained ten slave caulkers permanently at Jamaica, but during the war many more had to be hired. »e Adm. 106/950, Antigua, 25 June 1742.

7· The Overseas Bases easier."97 And according to Captain Crookshanks, the Gen­ oese caulkers at Gibraltar were "slow and indifferent workmen at best, and when they have a Jobb on a Kings ship, don't Scruple to own they make the most of it."98 But the navy could not get along without them. Shipwrights and caulkers for Port Mahon were so badly needed when Mathews's great squadron was in the Mediterranean that they were recruited not only on the island, but also at Villefranche, Leghorn, and Genoa.99 Indeed, it appears that manpower was as serious a problem at Port Mahon as facilities.100 It was im­ possible to hire enough workers locally. The Navy Board began recruiting shipwrights and caulkers for Jamaica, Gibraltar, and Port Mahon in 1740. As we have seen, it was difficult enough to get these workmen for the home yards; to persuade them to go abroad the Navy Board had to promise highly attractive wages. This was well worth doing, as the Board knew, because the desperate commanders abroad, if not supported by workmen from England, would hire what men they could get on the spot, notwithstanding their lack of skill and the fantastic cost. The initial offer made by the Board was as follows: 1. Carpenter's mates' pay of a 5th rate ship (32s. per month) 2. Victuals during passage out and home 3. Three years obligated service 4. The right to be entered, together with a servant, in one of the home dockyards upon return (assuming good behavior abroad) 5. 2s. 6d. or 35. 6d. per day for each day worked abroad For Gibraltar and Port Mahon the rate was ss. 6d.; for "the Dunghill of the Universe,"101 it was 35. 6d.,102 and not a single workman signed up for Jamaica on these terms. Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, pp. 141-14¾. es Adm. 1/1602, Crookshanks, 30 June 1744. eeAdm. 1/381, 8 Nov. 1742, 23 Sept. 1743; Adm. 3/46, 16 July 1742; Adm. 106/979, Port Mahon, 5 Dec. 1742. The last document contains a copy of the contract which twenty-six French and Italian workmen signed. 100 Adm. 1/380-382, passim., and particularly Adm. 1/381, 24 June, 17 Sept. 1742. 101 Ned Ward, A Trip to Jamaica (1700), p. 13. 102 Vernon Papers, pp. 329-330.

7· The Overseas Bases Therefore, in 1741 the Navy Board increased the monthly pay for Jamaica workers to 365., payable at the Navy Office semiannually to "wives or attorneys," and the daily wage to 55. payable weekly on the spot. Also, anyone who agreed to go would be allowed a servant at double the rate of pay given shipwrights' servants at home, and be entitled to the privileges of Greenwich Hospital and the Chatham Chest which paid grants to men maimed in the service.103 This offer got results,104 and in 1743 the same terms were equally successful in attracting men for Antigua.105 The Mediterranean bases, on the other hand, were not so universally detested, and the original offer of June 1740 stood for most of the war.106 The value of these English workmen was instantly demon­ strated at Port Mahon. In October 1742, Mathews wrote: "The fifteen Shipwrights brought out by the Newcastle have had a good Effect, it having reduc'd the Minorcans to reason without advancing their wages."107 The difficulty was that they insisted on going home at the end of their three years' service, and the Navy Board did not take sufficient care to provide replacements. In 1746 there were reports from Port Mahon of "the Mutinous Behaviour of the greatest part of the Artificers sent from England," which stemmed from the Navy Board's failure to bring them home on time. However, by adding 6d. to their daily pay, the Board persuaded many of them to stay on;108 and in 1747 the men were permitted free passage to Mahon for their wives.109 The same pressure for extra inducements was felt at Jamaica, and when the war ended the average shipwright at Port Royal was getting no less than 115. 7 i/2d. per day.110 Table 20 shows how thor103 Vernon Papers, pp. 345-346. 101 Adm. 3/45, 24 Aug., 31 Aug. 1741, 10 April 1742. 10s Adm. 3/47, 12 Sept., 18 Sept. 1743; Adm. 106/979, Antigua, 16 Oct. 1743· ioe Adm. 3/46, 10 Aug. 1742; Adm. 3/47, 28 May, 22 July 1743; Adm. 106/3553, 25 May, 25 Oct. 1743; Adm. 106/2182, 19 Nov. 1746. 107 Adm. 1/381, 28 Oct. 1742. 108 Adm. 106/2182, 19 Nov. 1746. 109 Adm. 106/2183, 12 Oct. 1747; Adm. 3/58, 12 Dec. 1747. no See Table 20. This is calculated as follows: Daily pay, 7s. Daily equivalent of monthly pay (365., 28 days), is. 4 1 /2 d. One servant, 35. 3 d. Total, iii. 7 1/2d. (Some servants earned more, some less.) Compare this against the standard daily wage in England, 25. id.

7·

The Overseas Bases

TABLE 20. The Establishment at Port Royal Yard, Jamaica, 1748 I Master Shipwright

£200 per annum

(plus 3 servants at 3s. 3d. per diem)

ι Clerk £ 60 per annum I Master Attendant (1 servant at is. 3d.) £100 per annum I Boatswain of the Yard plus £1 16s. per month ι Os. p.d. plus £1 4s. per month 10 Watchmen (Able seamen) is. ioid. p.d. plus £1 16s. per month 1 Foreman ios. p.d. plus £1 16s. per month 2 Quartermen 7s. 6d. p.d. plus £1 16s. per month 29 Shipwrights 7s. p.d. 13 Servants to foreman, shipwrights and quartermen: most at 3s. 3d.; others at 4s. 2id., 5s. i\d., and is. "jd. 6 House Carpenters plus £1 16s. per month 7s. p.d. 1 Sawyer plus £1 16s. per month 7s. p.d. 3 Smiths plus £1 16s. per month 7s. p.d. 53 Caulkers (Negro) 5s. p.d. 2 Sawyers (Negro) 5s· P-d. 6 Smiths (Negro) 5s. p.d. 51 Laborers (Negro) 5s· P-d. 10 "King's Negroes" Slaves owned by the navy. ι Storekeeper £200 per annum I First Clerk £ 80 per annum 5 Clerks £ 70 per annum each I Clerk £ 50 per annum 3 Watchmen is. 10id. p.d. plus £1 4s. per month 6 Watchmen (Negro) 2s. 6d. day and night 14 Laborers (Negro) is. 10id. p.d. 7 Boat Crew (Negro) is. 10id. p.d. Based on Adm. 106/1061, Jamaica, 8 May 1748. The list is actually dated Jan. 29, 1748. It also gives the tasks assigned each clerk and the name of the commander-in-chief who authorized each new appointment or hiring.

oughly the old idea that crews should look after their ships had become subverted by the end of the war. NAVAL OFFICERS AND SEA OFFICERS

In Queen Anne's time captains stationed in the West Indies bought and hired what they needed by dealing directly with local merchants. It was a system open to abuse, and toward the end of the queen's reign a number of captains who had served in the West Indies found themselves threatened with debtors' prison because the Navy and Victualling Boards refused to allow their accounts.111 In out-of-the-way places no 111 Bourne, Queen Anne's Navy in the West Indies, pp. 83-85.

S64

7· The Overseas Bases other method was possible, but at the established bases the Navy Board found it advisable to maintain its own rep­ resentative, who, because of his direct responsibility to that Board, was known as a Naval Officer.112 A Naval Officer was many things. Most commonly he per­ formed the offices of Storekeeper, Clerk of the Cheque, and Clerk of the Survey. If the base employed a permanent staff of workmen, as Port Royal, Port Antonio, and Port Mahon did, then his functions might also include those of a Master Shipwright. Before 1739 there were Naval Officers resi­ dent at all five of the established bases overseas. At Port Royal peacetime activity was considered sufficient to justify two Naval Officers, one to supervise the workmen (the Master Ship wright), and one to perform the clerical duties (often called simply, the Storekeeper). The moment war was declared the Naval Officer at Port Mahon became Master Shipwright, and a Storekeeper was sent out to supervise the clerical offices.113 During the war, as the bases expanded so did their staffs. At Port Royal Admiral Vernon appointed a foreman under the Master Shipwright in January 1740. Nine months later he added a Master Attendant, "both for easing the Builder of some part of his former care, and having a due care taken for preventing accidents in careening, and prudent expenditure of stores on the occasion, for through the sickness of some, and the unskilfulness of other Boatswains, great negligence and waste was occasioned."114 The staffs of these overseas bases grew mainly because the commanders-in-chief found perma­ nent officers more reliable than ships' officers. The growth at Port Mahon was equally rapid,115 and in 1743 the Navy Board went so far as to appoint a Commissioner to reside there.116 When peace came there were, of course, severe 112 There is a source of confusion here, for customs ofiBcers were also called naval officers. 11SAdm. 3/43, 31 Oct. 1739. Actually a second officer was sent to Mahon in 1738, but he was recalled when it seemed that war with Spain had been averted (Adm. 3/43, 25 May 1738). n4 Vernon Papers, p. 337. us See. Adm. 1/381, 5 April 1742; Adm. 1/382, 8 Dec. 1744; Adm. 3/56, 28 Dec. 1746. lie Commissioner Falkingham's instructions may be found in Adm. 7/638.

γ. The Overseas Bases retrenchments at all the bases.117 The Navy Board even suggested that no Naval Officer was necessary at English Har­ bor during peacetime, that the business of supplying ships there could be well enough performed by a local merchant; but the Admiralty rejected the idea.118 Notwithstanding the administrative development of over­ seas bases, it appears that the commander-in-chief on a foreign station remained to a very large extent master of his own house. In theory the established Naval Officers were repre­ sentatives of the Navy Board; in practice nearly every one of them owed his appointment to some flag officer. In theory the yard workmen were the concern of the Master Shipwright; in practice the commander-in-chief interfered as much as he liked. In theory the Storekeeper was the guardian of the public purse, charged by the Navy Board to devote himself to the prevention of extravagance and waste; in practice he did as he was told by the sea officers. In theory the construction of new facilities could not be undertaken until plans and estimates had been approved by the Navy and Admiralty Boards; in practice the Navy Board's earliest knowledge of some projects came when it learned that the bills of exchange had been drawn. The last circumstance may be used to illustrate why such a state of affairs was allowed to persist. The Navy Board was dis­ posed in such cases not to honor the bills; it was the Admi­ ralty's leniency, rather, that encouraged sea officers to take liberties. And who can blame their Lordships? If a flag officer abroad said that a new storehouse or storeship was needed, it was needed as soon as possible, not two years hence. The price of waiting for Navy Board approval may be easily appre­ ciated by observing the case of the Gibraltar storehouses. Three years after Admiral Mathews had reported the urgent necessity for these buildings nothing had been done. While "25 or 30 house carpenters" lay idle at Gibraltar, having completed the construction of the hospital there, the Navy Board threw WTSee Adm. 1/382, Forbes, 2 Jan. 1749; Adm. 106/2184, 10 May 1749. At Jamaica these did not occur without a good bit of controversy (Adm. 1/234, Knowles, 8 Nov. 1748, 14 April, 4 Dec. 1749; Adm. 106/1061, Jamaica, 8 May 1748; Adm. 106/1073, Jamaica, 19 Nov. 1748). 11s Adm. 106/2184, 26 Aug. 1748; Adm. 106/1068, Antigua, 5 Nov. 1749.

y. The Overseas Bases away months, and then years, trying to resolve conflicting opinions as to where the new storehouses should be located.119 Many overseas commanders, like the energetic Knowles, reasoned that the Navy Board was really in no position to de­ cide such matters. Warren and Knowles erected storehouses, laid out harbor defenses, and bought several storeships at An­ tigua without bothering to seek authorization. As for the im­ provements to the base, the Navy Board was content to won­ der "whether there appearfed] a necessity for carrying on such considerable Works at Antigua." But the purchased ves­ sels were another matter: "There is something in it of so extraordinary a Nature," they wrote to the Admiralty, "that We apprehend We are not Justified in paying the Bills."120 In fact, the vessels that Warren and Knowles had bought for the navy were their own prizes. Obviously the opportunities for abuse were enormous, but the navy could not afford to let administrative objections prevent the use of captured vessels. The Navy Board was ordered to accept the bills.121 But it did not always do so. After the war Captain Joseph Hamar, who had built on his own initiative a careening wharf at Charles­ ton, for which there was not the slightest necessity, was made to pay part of the expense out of his salary.122 The authority of a sea officer on foreign station was as in­ disputable as the authority of the Admiralty at home, and a Naval Officer could not expect much help from the Navy Board, should his conduct be called into question. Sea offi­ cers had influence, whereas Naval Officers were often fresh from the warrant ranks, former pursers, carpenters, or masters, men like John Russell, who wrote in 1722 that he had "been struggling this fifteen years past for a living in the World," and had finally by his "own industry [got] appointed to act as Clerk of the Cheque at Gibraltar."123 Such men were utterly dependent on the favor of sea officers, both for the security of no Adm. 3/46, 25 Aug. 1742; Adm.

106/2180,

ia

July

1744; Adm.

106/2181, 5 July 1745; Adm. 3/51, 11 July 1745. 120 Adm. 106/2180, 24 Aug. 1744. 121 Adm. 106/2181, 26 Dec. 1745; Adm. 106/2182, 13 March 1746. 122 Adm. 106/2184, 17 Aug. 1748, 19 Sept. 1749; Adm. 106/2185, 19 Jan. 1750. 123 Matcham,

A Forgotten John Russell,

p. 4.

7· The Overseas Bases their new station in life and for their future aspirations. Young Jack Russell, while Storekeeper at Gibraltar, was anx­ ious to advance to better things as soon as possible, so that he might be his "own master and not be subservient to every piti­ ful little fellow as styles himself a Captain."124 The Naval Officer found himself not only caught between the sea officers and the Navy Board, but also between the local commander-in-chief and his captains. The commanderin-chief was fully aware of the necessity of conserving stores as much as possible, while many captains, more intent on private gain than the good of the service, forced the Naval Officer to issue stores in excess of the quantities needed and to enter upon transactions of dubious propriety. To limit the demands made on the Storekeeper at Port Royal, Vernon called in the assistance of the Master Shipwright.125 And he directed Sir Chaloner Ogle "to give the strictest injunctions to all officers appointed on surveys, to be careful not to condemn any, but what they shall find an absolute necessity for, and always to re­ port, what other services such condemned store may be capa­ ble of being converted to."126 As long as the commander-inchief was on the scene, such measures had hope of success. When he was gone the situation reverted to anarchy. In 1745 Jack Russell wrote to his father from Gibraltar: "You are sen­ sible what a storekeeper's trouble is, with Commodores and their unprecedented orders, which has not been my case as yet, as a Flag has been on the spot."127 Thomas Woodward, first clerk to the Storekeeper at Port Royal, told the Navy Board in 1749 that he could not be expected to stand up to sea officers, unless the things they requested were specifically prohibited by Navy Board regulation. He wrote: "I should not have known how to have disobey'd them; for there is not even a Master & Commander who don't talk of suspending in case of disobedience &ca."128 And in 1750, the Storekeeper, Mathew 124 Ibid., p. 269. 125 Vernon Papers, pp. 373-374. Vernon ordered the Master Attendant to do the same for boatswains' stores. 12 ^Ibid., p. 393. It is reasonable to suppose that many condemned items were not frivolously discarded, but sold for high prices in the West Indian market. 127 Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, p. 269. 128 Adm. 106/1073, Jamaica, 4 Sept. 1749.

7· The Overseas Bases Wallen, wrote: "I have been inform'd of some People that have gone home with a Resolution to do me a prejudice, whom... I have very innocently made my Enemies."129 From all this it is obvious that the performance of an over­ seas base depended very largely on the diligence and fore­ sight of the commander-in-chief. Of course, if strategic neces­ sity compelled him to be absent while ships were refitting, then he could not perform his vital supervisory function. It was precisely because Admiral Mathews was placed in this sit­ uation in 1742-1743 that the authorities in London resolved to appoint a Naval Commissioner to reside at Port Mahon. But during this period Mathews's case was exceptional. In most cases the commander was on the spot when his squadron re­ fitted, and it was up to him, not someone else, to see that the job was done quickly and correctly. No one disputed his responsibility "for carrying on the civil economy of the fleet as well as military" in this situation,130 and he did not lack powers to meet it. The local Master Shipwright was often a man of his own choosing; if not, and if the man proved in­ competent or uncooperative, there were ways of circumvent­ ing him. In general, admirals abroad appointed extra officials as they pleased and got away with it.131 If more workmen were needed, the commander-in-chief could hire them. If his stores and provisions ran low, he could buy them in the local mar­ ket, and if they proved unobtainable locally, as they often did, he could contract for them at distant places and engage the necessary freight.132 Finally, if he thought the facilities inade­ quate, he could build what he needed. For all of these things 129 Adm. 106/1083, Jamaica, 11 Feb. 1750. 130 Vernon Papers, p. 393. E.g. Adm. 1/382, Rowley, 8 Dec. 1744; Adm. 3/51, 87 June 1745; Adm. 1/234, Knowles, 1 Aug. 1748. This did not apply to the Storekeeper, who had always to be dealt with and could not have his functions usurped; however, if the Storekeeper died the commander-in-chief could appoint a successor. 132 The West-Indian commanders-in-chief often sent to North America for emergency supplies (e.g. Vernon Papers, pp. 60, 67; Adm. 106/992, Antigua, 12 July 1745). Mathews bought stores at Genoa, Leghorn, and Nice; he had "the Ropemakers at Genoa and Nice constantly employed" (Adm. 1/381, 16 Nov. 1742, 9 Feb., 28 March, 11 Oct. 1743).

S69

7· The Overseas Bases the Navy Board paid the bills; sometimes there were quarrels, but with few exceptions the bills were paid. Of course, it was hardly that simple. Disease might immobil­ ize the crews, and there was the problem of desertion. Ship­ wrights and caulkers were usually not to be got locally at any price; the same was often true of stores and provisions. Nor could new facilities be added quickly enough to have any ef­ fect on immediate problems. It was on these topics that the complaints and excuses of commanders overseas centered, particularly on stores. It would be difficult to find a dispatch from an admiral abroad to the Admiralty that did not include a request for cordage, masts, and sails. In sum these dispatches leave the reader with an overwhelming impression that the administration in London was letting the overseas commanders down badly. How reliable this impression is we cannot tell. We know that not only was the Admiralty genuinely concerned over the problem, but also the ministry, for admirals abroad did not hesitate to mention their difficulties to Secretaries of State. We know that the Navy Board occasionally had laborers working all night at Deptford loading storeships for the Mediterranean and West Indies.133 We have seen that cordage, the item that figured most frequently in the complaints, was in short supply in the home dockyards as well. But we have also seen that very large quantities of cordage were sent out, and that the demands of the overseas squadrons were sometimes given pre­ cedence over those of the home fleet.134 On the other hand, we know that the commanders at Jamaica (and presumably at the other bases too) were alive to the problem of waste and embezzlement. We know that captains, carpenters, and boat­ swains were addicted to hoarding;135 that many stores rotted before they were put to use;138 and that because of unwar­ ranted demands by ships' officers for equipment of the wrong size, and difficulties in outfitting ships whose dimensions— though supposedly uniform within each class—varied greatly, the best attempts of the Navy Board to apportion shipments las E.g. Adm. 106/3305, 8 Nov. 174a; Adm. 106/3306, 8 May 1745. 134 Above p. 285. There are numerous instances. 135 Adm. 106/1061, Jamaica, 8 May 1748. ΐ3β Above p. 377.

37Ο

j. The Overseas Bases according to probable requirements were frustrated.137 Finally, we have observed that ships used up masts and cordage at an unprecedented, and consequently not immediately predict­ able, rate. While it is obvious that squadrons abroad did not get all the stores from England that they needed, it is not ob­ vious that the administration viewed the matter complacently or dealt with it negligently.138 One failure on the part of the administration is clear-cut. The Admiralty tended to leave the ships abroad too long. Here the overseas commanders were victims of their own suc­ cesses; for inasmuch as they managed to maintain their ships in reasonable fighting condition, they inadvertently encour­ aged the Admiralty to overlook the fact that many of the hulls were badly in need of drydock overhaul. The process of ca­ reening was highly destructive. In 1743 Captain Elliott Smith said of his ship, the Advice: ". . . since her heaving down at English Harbour she is very much weakened and droops very much foreward."139 Such complaints were commonplace. Ad­ miral Vernon wrote in October 1740: "Mr. Brown's [Commo­ dore Brown, his predecessor] ships are all grown so crazy that they will bear no more careening in this country, and I hope I shall receive their Lordships' orders for their coming home in next summer, not thinking them fit for a winter passage .. ."140 In January 1749, Admiral Byng reported that out of 29 ships in his Mediterranean force, 15 of them had been abroad four years or more; "they are become so very weak," he said, "they will not bear being hove down."141 Although commanders 137 Adm. 106/1061, Jamaica, 8 May 1748; Adm. 106/993, Jamaica, 11 June 1744. 138 in 1746 the Navy Board vehemently rejected the Admiralty's sug­ gestion that a privateer should be supplied with stores lodged at Port Mahon: ". . . altho We Employ all the Artificers We can in the Kings Yards, as well as all the Contractors We can depend upon, to make Sails, Cables, Cordage, Anchors & all other Sorts of Stores; Yet, We have not hitherto been able to furnish the Demands that have been made . . . for the use of . . . ships, that have Refitted at the said Port & at Gibraltar. . . . Stores transported thither, with so much hazard and at so great an Expence, . . . are so Valuable, that no Price can be a Compensation for Want of them . . ." (Adm. 106/2183, 26 Sept. 1746). is» Adm. 1/2459, Smith, 3 Jan. 1743. 140 Vernon Papers, p. 316. in Adm. 1/382, Byng, 12 Jan. 1748.

7· The Overseas Bases urged the Admiralty to send such ships home, when the orders to do so were actually received, they often balked; they wanted replacements sent out first.142 The Admiralty, while ac­ knowledging the propriety of this procedure, found it impos­ sible to find the necessary additional seamen. As a result, when the time finally came some ships proved unfit to make the voy­ age.148 Such losses cannot be used as evidence of failure to pro­ vide adequate facilities for maintaining ships abroad. On the contrary, they indicate how much the British navy relied on these facilities—facilities which no other navy could match. 1*2 E.g. Adm. 3/47, 29 June 1743; Adm. 7/340, 22 Aug. 1743; Adm. 1/381, 17 June 1744. "3 E.g. Adm. 1/381, Mathews, 15 Sept., 21 Sept. 1743.

The Commission of the Victualling was instituted in hopes of Cheapness, the Contractors being known to have made large Profits, but it has proved otherwise. Whatever the Allowance to the Victualling is, they have it (and often more) which was not so to the Contractors. THOMAS CORBETT, Cd, J7291

I

N THE sixteenth and seventeenth centuries victualling dif­ ficulties repeatedly frustrated and constricted the opera­ tions of the English fleet. Because of victualling failures, squadrons were slow in deploying, ships were forced off sta­ tion, blockades were lifted prematurely, expeditions were cut short. When shipboard provisions ran out, or went bad, mo­ rale was destroyed and men sometimes sickened and died. Con­ sequently the victualling situation frequently influenced stra­ tegic decisions.2 With good reason the authority on Tudor and Stuart naval administration has estimated that the problem of victualling gave "more trouble than any of the other details of administration,"3 and even at the end of the seventeenth cen­ tury there was no sign of improvement. Burchett, who partic­ ipated in the naval administration of the war of William III, remarked that during that war "the want of timely Supplies [of victuals] . . . at several times . . . greatly obstructed those Designs, which otherwise might have been carried on with greater Advantage to the Publick."4 This was not the situation in the time of Walpole. Admit1 Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 51. 2 It is not hard to find examples of the impact of victualling operations in Tudor and Stuart times. For a start see Oppenheim, Administration, pp. 82, 136, 142-144, 228-229, 235-236, 327-328; J. R. Powell and Ε. K. Tim­ ings, Documents relating to the Civil War, 1642-1648, N.R.S. (1963), pp. 92, 158, 171, 192, 360, 388-389, 402; S. R. Gardiner and C. T. Atkinson, Papers relating to the First Dutch War, 1652-1654, N.R.S. (6 vol., 1899-1930), m, 176; v, 257, 267, 274, 276-277, 328, 343, 375, 391; vi, 236; G. L. Marcus, A Naval History of England (1961), 1, 158; Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 152-159. 3 Oppenheim, Administration, p. 81. 4Burchett, Memoirs of Transactions at Sea (1703), To the Reader. Of the truth of this there can be no doubt; see MSS. of the House of Lords, 1693-1695, pp. 157-164, 252-288, and Ehrman, pp. 314-316, 478-482, 488-489, 588-589, 593-594.

8. Victualling tedly the intricacies of the victualling problem continued to give trouble in the eighteenth century; we should not expect otherwise in an era which had mastered something of the art, but almost nothing of the science, of food preservation. But there was an important change. In the sixteenth and seven­ teenth centuries, victualling problems regularly bothered com­ manders at sea, whereas in the eighteenth they rarely became major difficulties for anyone but the administrators. Naturally admirals and captains continued to complain of bad provi­ sions and to worry about future supplies, but it is striking how seldom, during the war of 1739-1748, they altered their plans or postponed their moves because of inadequate victuals. A measure of victualling effectiveness may be found in the accounts of short allowance money paid. Short allowance money was paid to seamen in lieu of provisions not supplied them because of shortage. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries English ships were put to short allowance as a mat­ ter of course. But during the first five years of the war of 1739-:1748, a period which saw a large portion of the fleet deployed in the West Indies and Mediterranean, the total amount paid on the short allowance account was only onetwelfth of the amount paid during the first five years of Queen Anne's War.5 It appears that by the mid-eighteenth century British naval administration had developed an effective solu­ tion to the problem of victualling. How had they managed it? To understand the nature of the change we will divide the victualling problem into its four component parts: planning, buying, preserving and packing, distributing. In this chapter we shall see that new conditions in the eighteenth century permitted more effective planning and reduced the difficulties of purchasing; that there were no significant improvements in the techniques of preserving and packing; and that the system of distribution was improved not only to cope with the complex problems posed by squadrons abroad, but also to provide a higher standard of service at home. In other words, it will be shown that victualling be­ came more reliable not through technological, but rather ad­ ministrative advance, an advance largely made possible by »Adm. 110/14, 4 Feb. 1746.

8. Victualling the government's willingness and ability to pay the price of better service. But before analyzing the improvement of the victualling service, we must consider a more general ques­ tion. THE SEAMAN'S DIET

Is it not true, the informed reader may ask, that the health of British seamen remained generally poor in the eighteenth century and that bad victuals was a major cause of this? Did they not continue to suffer severely from eating spoiled vic­ tuals? Even when the food was wholesome, was not the diet notoriously unbalanced? And if so, why was nothing done about it? The problem of spoilage we shall investigate pres­ ently; here we will be concerned with the diet. Was the fail­ ure to improve the diet the result of indifferent administra­ tion or of other causes? According to the 1734 edition of printed Regulations and Instructions the weekly allowance of victuals was as given in Table 21.® TABLE 21. Seaman's Weekly Victualling Allowance Beer Beef Pork Peas Oatmeal Butter Cheese Biscuit (lbs.) (gallons) (lbs.) (lbs.) (pints) (pints) (oz.) (oz.)

Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday

I I I I I I I

ι

-

I

-

-

I I I I I I

2

-

-

I

2

-

-

-

-

-

-

2

-

I

-

-

2

-

* § -

-

4 -

4 -

I

2

4

-

-

-

The instructions provided for certain modifications. Ships in port had "bread in loaves" instead of biscuit, and fresh meat instead of salted twice a week. If necessary, eight ounces of Cheshire cheese could be substituted for twelve of Suffolk. (Until 1757 Suffolk cheese was standard issue. It was a hard, thin, skim-milk or "flet" cheese of dismal reputation eaten by the poor, but it kept well. After 1757 Cheshire cheese became β p. 61.

8. Victualling standard in the navy.)7 On foreign voyages—most of which carried ships into warmer climates—the instructions author­ ized substitutes that either kept better or could be more easily bought locally, for example: olive oil for butter; rice for oat­ meal; flour, raisins, currants, and beef-suet for salt beef, salt pork, and peas; and wine, brandy, or rum for beer. The in­ structions laid down precise quantitative equivalents for these substitutes.8 Any other modifications required royal approval,9 and, except in emergencies, the ships were victualled accord­ ing to the rules. It must be acknowledged that the diet was ample; it yielded 4000-4500 calories per day.10 It is true that the seaman never got his full daily allowance. On the one hand pursers were authorized to make a standard reduction in the amounts is­ sued (one-eighth on everything except meat) in order to offset on their accounts losses caused by waste and seepage;11 on the other hand many pursers profited at the expense of the men—contemporary accounts of naval life abound with com­ plaints about this—by making unauthorized reductions and by issuing provisions that had been condemned as inedible. On extended cruises even an honest purser might have to issue unpalatable provisions. However, since 4000 calories a day is usually more than an active man requires, it is probable that the men got enough to eat except when circumstances forced the ship to go to short allowance. In fact, there is evidence that some men considered the allowance more than ample, be­ cause they regularly "sold" a portion of their victuals to the purser, that is they voluntarily accepted reduced rations for cash or credit.12 The table shows that the men were allowed a gallon of beer a day, every day. That was considerable, par­ ticularly when one remembers that sea beer was deliberately brewed extra strong so that it would keep better. Neverthe1 See V. Cheke, The Story of Cheese-Making in Britain (1959), pp. 102, 110, 122, 321; Beveridge, Prices and Wages, p. 555. 8 A very detailed statement of the standard victualling allowance may be found in Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 254-2¾¾. »Corbett MSS. xrv, folio 57. 10 J. C. Drummond and Anne Wilbraham, The Englishman's Food (1939). p· 313· nAdm. 106/2178, 30 May 1739. 12 Adm. 110/14, 22 April 1746; Merriman, Sergison Papers, p. 255.

8. Victualling less the men were allowed not just a gallon, but in reality as much as they wanted; and when their friends came aboard all drank freely. The pursers saw no possibility of limiting the issues, and the Navy Board rejected every suggestion that the allowance be reduced, in spite of the fact that beer was bulky, expensive, and troublesome. For a reduction would be almost impossible to enforce, and even if possible, devastating to mo­ rale; everyone knew how much the seamen valued their "an­ cient liberty of resorting to the Beer at Pleasure."13 All in all the assortment of victuals seems to have been agreeable. Beer, bread, meat, and cheese were the foundations of the eight­ eenth-century Englishman's diet; the lower classes ate little else, and it is likely that, except on long cruises, the naval sea­ man probably ate as well as most men of his class ashore.14 But however agreeable it may have seemed, it supplied vir­ tually no Vitamin C and thus the men were frequent victims of scurvy. Until the end of the eighteenth century the diet scarcely changed. The early years of the century saw the intro­ duction, wherever feasible, of fresh meat on a regular basis, and in the middle of the century fresh vegetables were made available to captains on request. But on the whole the sea­ man's weekly allowance of victuals remained as it had been in the sixteenth century,15 and until the 1790's the problem of scurvy remained largely unsolved. Why was improvement so long delayed? Was it because naval administrators were not interested? At the outset, it must be granted that the Victualling Commissioners, at least during the first half of the eighteenth century, do not seem to have cared much about improving the diet. Part of the reason is that they did not consider dietary questions within their competence. When the Admiralty asked them whether substi13 Merriman, Sergison Papers, pp. 250-251; Queen Anne's Navy, p. 290; MSS. of the House of Lords, 1704-1706, pp. 222-223; Adm. 106/ 2178, 30 May 1739; Corbett MSS. xrv, folio 39. nDrummond and Wilbraham, Englishman's Food, pp. 123, 258. For the average worker's diet, see G. E. Fussell, "The Change in Farm La­ bourers' Diet during Two Centuries," Economic History, 1 (1927), 268-274, and Fussell "The London Cheesemongers of the Eighteenth Century," Economic History, 1 (1928), 394. is See Beveridge, Prices and Wages, p. 505; Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 170171; and various editions of the printed Regulations and Instructions.

S77

8. Victualling tuting spirits for beer might be good for shipboard health, they offered no opinion; it could not be their business, they said, for only people at sea could observe and judge.16 But it must also be acknowledged that the Commissioners were gen­ erally hostile to change. They feared new kinds of expense and were quick to worry about the unpopularity of changes among the seamen. There is something to be said for their caution. Unquestionably the seamen were exceedingly suspi­ cious of changes and looked upon the weekly allowance as an ancient right. Moreover, few of the changes suggested would have been of any value. The pattern of English agriculture and the limited means of preserving food narrowed the range of substitutes. Still, every captain seemed to have his own theory on victualling, just as he had on masting or ballasting. As the Victualling Board pointed out, "Almost every captain will have different Sentiments as to the way of Victualing that is best, so should the Various proposals arising from their Opinion be given into, the Service would run the hazard of being involved in endless difficulties."17 Certainly regularity and continuity were important. The trouble was that to the Victualling Commissioners they were all-important. Like most civil servants, these men were deeply conservative, and they wanted to save themselves the trouble that innovation brings. The kind of change they considered acceptable was one that either solved an administrative problem or resulted in a saving to the Crown. Hence, they welcomed the substitution of oat­ meal for stock fish because stock fish grew scarcer and more expensive in the late seventeenth century,18 although it was well known that the men did not like oatmeal.19 And so if there was to be any initiative for improving the diet, it would have to come, not from the Victualling Commissioners, but from the Admiralty. The Admiralty Board heard the com­ plaints of the captains; it keenly felt the shortage of seamen and considered the preservation of their health to be worth great trouble and expense; it knew that scurvy was killing and ieAdm. 110/13, 20 April 1743; Adm. 110/14, 10 June *7451SCorbett MSS. xiv, folio 35. 17 Adm. 110/13, 3° April 1744. 19 According to Capt. Charles Knowles it was "seldom or never Eaten" (Adm. 110/13, 30 April 1744).

8. Victualling disabling large numbers of men; and it was pretty sure that the trouble lay in the diet. Most changes in the diet in the eighteenth century were urged by the Admiralty and under­ taken as attempts to rid the fleet of scurvy. But if the Admi­ ralty Board made an effort to eliminate scurvy, the question still stands: Why was there no success until the end of the century, especially since all that was needed was the addition of fresh fruits or vegetables to the seaman's diet?20 When answering this question it must be borne in mind that as late as 1750 there was still disagreement among medi­ cal men as to whether scurvy was fundamentally a dietary dis­ ease. Admittedly, for generations men had been saying that fresh fruits and vegetables were effective in preventing and curing it, and it had long been observed that men afflicted with scurvy often experienced an intense natural craving for such foods.21 But men had been saying other things too. Two of the most eminent authorities on naval medicine in Walpole's day, William Cockburn and Samuel Mead, acknowledged the possible value of fruits and green vegetables but neverthe­ less concluded that the main problem was the seaman's con­ dition of life: his exposure to damp, cold, salt air topside, to a putrid and foul atmosphere below decks, and his confinement and lack of exercise.22 Even James Lind, who is rightly credited with discovering the true nature of the disease and its cure, thought that these conditions encouraged scurvy. But Lind em­ phasized that in his view the main cause was dietary, and his chief contribution was to prove by a famous experiment, con­ ducted in 1747, that orange or lemon juice would prevent 20 Since our concern here is with victualling, we will deal with the problem of scurvy mainly in its relation to the victualling problem. For a brief, but comprehensive history of scruvy in the eighteenth century, which includes a persuasive explanation of why it was not conquered until the 1790 's, see Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, in, 293328. Anyone interested in the subject should also turn to James Lind's famous Treatise of the Scurvy (Edinburgh, 1753). I have used the edition by C. P. Stewart and D. Guthrie (Edinburgh, 1953). Lind dedicated the book to Anson. 21 See Lind, Treatise, p. 98. 22Cockburn's Sea Diseases (1696) went through many editions. Mead's "Discourse on the Scurvy" (1749) may be found in his collected Works (Edinburgh, 1763), vol. u.

8. Victualling the disease.23 Unfortunately, Lind's findings were not suffi­ ciently noticed, and physicians and surgeons continued to speculate and experiment. For example, as late as 1782 an en­ lightened captain like Sir Thomas Pasley could write things like: "Never idle consequently no danger of the Scurvey this Trip"; or "the very Earth is the first of cures for the Scurvey." Acting on the latter assumption, Pasley buried his scorbutic seamen up to their necks in boxes of earth which he had on deck.24 The confusion of ideas on scurvy in the mid-eight­ eenth century is illustrated by a remark of Admiral Caven­ dish's: "They must be ashore to smell the fresh earth, and get Herbs and blackberries &c. whc. they tell me contributes greatly to their recovery."25 Thus the truth was buried among the fictions. Nevertheless, by the middle decades of the eighteenth century it appears that most men, whatever their favorite theories on scurvy, understood that green vegetables were helpful. During the eighteenth century vegetables came to be much more widely accepted by ordinary Englishmen as part of their daily fare,2® and when "greens" came to be eaten regularly ashore men be­ gan to suspect that the sailor's diet might be incomplete with­ out them. Why then were they not added to the regular al­ lowance of victuals? To a minor extent they were, but the great deterrent was that they did not keep. The navy first attempted to provide ships with a regular supply of green vegetables in the closing years of the war of 1739-1748. On January 17, 1747, the Admiralty ordered that "the Companys of Cruising Ships should be supply'd with Fresh Meat and Greens four days in a Week when they came into Port afflicted with the Scurvy or other Illnesses."27 The fol23 Lind made no claim to being the first to discover the value of oranges and lemons; in fact he bolstered his argument for their use by pointing out that "their experienced virtues [had] stood the test of near 200 years" (Treatise, p. 154). 2* R. M. S. Pasley, ed., Private Sea Journals, 1778-1782, kept by Admiral Sir Thomas Pasley, Bart. (1931), pp. 828, 216-217. 25 Adm. 1/905, 5 Sept. 1741. 2β See Drummond and Wilbraham, Engishman's Food, pp. 123-124, 127128, 259, 309. Before the eighteenth century there was apparently a good deal of "land scurvy" in England. 2? Adm. 110/15, 7 Dec. 1747.

8. Victualling lowing December an enlightened purser named John Troughton proposed that the Admiralty should order all captains at Spithead to take on, together with the fresh meat, a portion of vegetables "as a means to Cure and prevent the Scurvey."28 Other pursers petitioned against this, fearing that it would prove burdensome and unprofitable to them, and so the Ad­ miralty referred the matter to the Victualling Commissioners. The Commissioners were against it, but their reasons are in­ teresting. They did not deny that vegetables might be desir­ able. Instead, they called the Admiralty's attention to the fact that no "greens" had been actually requisitioned by admirals and captains as a result of the January 1747 order. From this they surmised that the order was unnecessary: "It seems rea­ sonable to conclude that the Men must have been Supply'd to their Satisfaction, and in such Manner as their Officers thought proper by the Pursers, or that by Means of their Prize Money, or by Exchanging the Savings of their provisions (being al­ ways at whole Allowance) with the pursers or otherwise, they have provided themselves with such Vegetables along their Ships sides [from bumboats], as were agreeable to them, for otherwise what was further wanted, We presume would have been demanded of Our Agents in pursuance of the said Or­ der."29 Their recommendation was that the navy should make no general order or special contract concerning vege­ tables, but merely direct captains "to see that Pursers do con­ stantly furnish such a proportion of Greens with the Fresh Meat as . . . thought necessary by the Surgeons."30 In other words, it was either up to individual captains to look after their crews or each man to look after himself; vegetables were to be treated as a medical aid, not as a regular supplement to the diet. At first the Lords of the Admiralty accepted these rec­ ommendations,31 but two months later they made it clear that in their opinion the men should be given vegetables as regu­ larly as possible. On February 10, 1748, their Lordships "re­ solved that all His Maj ts. Ships in the Ports of Great Britain, & Ireland be furnished with fresh meat four times a Week, 28Adm. 3/58, 4 Dec. 1747. 29 Adra. 110/15, 7 Dec. 1747. 30 I b i d . si Adm. 3/58, 11 Dec. 1747.

S. Victualling and the Captains of the said Ships be directed to take Care that their Pursers do furnish them at the same time with Greens & Roots, as much as they shall judge sufficient."32 This of course still left it up to the captains, but at least it called the matter to their attention. The directive came too late to affect the victualling in the war of 1739-1748, but it is interesting that the ships blockading Brest in 1759 under Admiral Hawke were supplied with "cabbages, turnips, carrots, potatoes, and onions" at the admiral's request.33 And so in the middle of the eighteenth century fresh vegetables were beginning to be used as a supplement to the seaman's diet in home waters. Actually there was not much change. The usual result of the system was to leave it to the whim of the purser, and pursers were of­ ten reluctant to take the trouble and the risks. In any event this approach to scurvy could obviously have only limited application: fresh vegetables were troublesome to supply, and their use on long cruises, where the problem of scurvy was most acute, was out of the question. So the search for other solutions continued. The situation is summed up in the title of a pamphlet published by a naval surgeon named David MacBride in 1764: An Historical Account of a New Method of Treating the Scurvy at sea; containing ten cases which show that this destructive disease may be easily and ef­ fectually cured without the aid of fresh vegetable Diet. 34 MacBride was enthusiastic about "wort," which may be de­ scribed as a beer concentrate; it made terrible beer, but kept better.35 Other substances found various proponents during the eighteenth century, among which were vinegar, mustard seed, cider, and elixir of vitriol. Vinegar had been considered effective against scurvy for a long time, and in 1740 a half pint was added to the seaman's weekly victualling allowance.38 Mustard seed and cider were given various trials, and elixir of 52 Adm. 3/58, 10 Feb. 1748. G. Marcus, Quiberon Bay (i960), pp. 63-65. 34 The influence of this pamphlet is assessed by Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, in, 308-312. 35 On wort, see P. Mathias, The Brewing Industry in England, 1700-1830 (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 204-209. se Admiralty order of 3 July 1740; see Adm. 110/12, 20 Feb. 1741, and Adm. 110/14, 13 July 1744. This was for internal use and in addition to the vinegar supplied to the ships as a disinfectant. 33

8. Victualling vitriol was regularly supplied to naval surgeons in the first half of the eighteenth century. Wort was undoubtedly de­ veloped because many eighteenth-century Englishmen con­ sidered beer a particularly healthful drink.37 Anson believed this ("as soon as our beer is expended the ships soon become Hospitals"), and so did the Admiralty.38 Cider was favored for similar reasons.39 At length it was discovered that none of these things was of value. Behind many remedies was the common assumption that scurvy was caused by the extremely salty nature of the sea­ man's diet. Commissioner Hills of the Sick and Wounded con­ sidered elixir of vitriol valuable because it dissolved "the Salts contained in the provisions while in the Stomach."40 The French agronomist and Inspector of Marine, Henry Louis Duhamel de Monceau, flatly stated: "The salted meats, upon which the ships' crews are fed, appear to be the principal cause of scurvy," and he reasoned out an explanation of how excess salt produced scurvy by inhibiting digestion.41 James Lind also believed that reducing the intake of salt was impor­ tant in preventing scurvy,42 and Josiah Burchett, without pre­ tending "to offer Physical Reasons, why the eating too much Salt Meats" was harmful, assumed that the answer lay in sub­ stituting fresh provisions.43 When Burchett spoke of fresh provisions he was probably thinking mainly of fresh meat, and whenever the Admiralty Lords recommended fresh vegetables to the captains it was always in conjunction with fresh meat. Because they saw salt as the main enemy they considered fresh meat at least as help­ ful as fresh vegetables. Admiral Russell was as anxious to have fresh meat as vegetables in 1692, and so was Admiral Hawke *1 E.g. Γ. Thomson, who published an Essay on Scurvy in 1790; see Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, m, 323. 38 Anson to the Duke of Bedford, Woburn MSS. XIII, folio 23, Si Aug. 1746; Adm. 3/52, 31 Oct. 1745. S3 Adm. 111/33, 17 July 1747. «Adm. 1/3528, 11 Dec. 1740. *1 Quoted by N. Appert, The Book for All Households or The Art of Preserving Animal and Vegetable Substances for Many Years, Paris, 1810, trans, by K. G. Bitting (Chicago, 1920), p. 3. •42 Lind, Treatise, p. 29. «Burchett, Memoirs of Transactions at Sea, To the Reader.

3S3

δ. Victualling in 1759. Hawke wrote: "I am extremely glad to find their Lordships have ordered Bullocks and sheep for the preserva­ tion of the sick. I hope such numbers will be sent as that the ships' companies [i.e. healthy men as well] may have a share, to prevent their falling down in scorbutic disorders."44 Even Sir Gilbert Blane, the naval physician who was greatly responsible for the introduction of lemons, believed for a long time that fresh meat was effective against scurvy.45 All this was to be expected. Englishmen had traditionally considered meat the foundation of a healthy diet. But the result was that in the eighteenth century a large portion of the navy's effort to conquer scurvy through dietary improvement was applied to the problem of supplying fresh meat. Ships in the Mediter­ ranean might have been supplied with citrus fruits without much difficulty, but instead, with great trouble and expense, they were supplied with fresh meat. Apparently Sir Charles Wager had kept his squadron free of scurvy on a Baltic cruise in 1725 by stocking up on lemons before he left the Mediter­ ranean,46 but this was exceptional. As for ships in home waters, the Admiralty was much more resolute on the subject of fresh meat than on vegetables. When the Victualling Board suggested, in May 1740, that renewal of contracts for fresh meat should be delayed because of high prices, the Admiralty Secretary replied that it was "their Lordsps.' Directions that the Seamen be supplied with Fresh Meat, twice a Week at all the Ports, let the Market Price be what it will, for the better Preservation of the health of the Seamen."47 And in 1747 even though a severe cattle plague in England raised meat prices, the ships at home were still supplied with fresh meat.48 If the Admiralty in this period had been similarly determined to provide fresh fruits or vegetables, it might have won the battle against scurvy fifty years sooner. ** MSS. of the House of Lords, 1692-1693, p. 232; Hawke to Admiralty, 34 July 1759, quoted by Marcus, Quiberon Bay, p. 63. « Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, m, 323. Samuel Mead, op.cit., 11, 251-252. «Adm. 110/12, 30 May 1740; Adm. 3/44, a June 1740. When the government, as an emergency measure, prohibited slaughter­ ing cattle the ships were supplied with fresh mutton (Adm. 110/15, 7 Dec.

»747)·

8. Victualling In general two factors delayed progress in improving the naval diet. One was of course ignorance; the other, the char­ acteristic permissiveness of eighteenth-century naval adminis­ tration. Beer and fresh meat had their value, but as we have seen the effort made to supply these items stemmed largely from the belief that they were effective against scurvy. Hence the effort was misdirected. As for permissiveness, it should be borne in mind that eighteenth-century Englishmen were not in the habit of coercing men to improve their condition. In other chapters of this book we have observed that the navy was by modern standards a very loosely administered organiza­ tion. Admirals and captains were required to follow specific procedures only in essential matters, such as tactical maneu­ vering and accounting for expenses. In other areas the admin­ istrative style was to urge or request, and a great deal was left to the discretion of the commander. The same spirit generally prevailed in the relations between captain and crew. If the men wanted "greens" or other unusual victuals, that was their concern. In an extreme situation a captain might require his men to eat unpalatable or strange victuals, but ordinarily what the men ate was up to the men, and it was well known that a captain who interfered in such a matter risked ruining morale.49 It is true that Captain Cook flogged two men for not eating their ration of fresh meat,50 but Cook was an unusual man and an uncommonly effective captain. In this connection it is worth observing that when lemon juice was taken aboard a number of squadrons in the years between 1793 and 1796— this is ordinarily deemed the turning point in the history of scurvy in the royal navy—it was not done by Admiralty order, but rather by order of fleet commanders who chose to requisi­ tion the juice from supplies made available by Admiralty or­ der.51 With this background of the seaman's diet we may now turn to the administrative aspects of the victualling problem. « E.g. Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, in, 310. SO ibid., HI, 305. Bi Ibid., in, 320-326. An Admiralty order requiring the regular issue of fresh vegetables whenever possible to all ships did not come until 1796; regular issue of lemon juice was not ordered until 1799.

8. Victualling PLANNING

Numbering more than 40,000, the navy's wartime shipboard population in this period was larger than that of any English city save London. Plans for feeding it had to be laid months in advance. The combination of distant squadrons and unreli­ able transportation is enough to explain the necessity of planning. But suppose we ignore for a moment the trans­ portation problem. What other factors made long-range plan­ ning inescapable? It is quite conceivable that if the shipboard diet had not in­ cluded salt meat, the victualling might have been carried out on short notice except under unusually adverse market con­ ditions. For one thing the provisions did not have to be made available all at once. Although a large portion was needed in April and May when most ships (especially the biggest) put to sea, the remainder was issued piecemeal during the course of the year. Most items could have been provided from com­ mercial resources within five or six weeks. True, the navy might have had to accept a good deal of inferior beer and bis­ cuit; its huge orders would certainly have driven market prices up; and the risks of shortage would have been great. On oc­ casion, when needs were hard to predict, buying to meet cur­ rent requirements might have seemed very tempting. But the key problem was that of salt beef and salt pork. Salt meat could not be safely packed in the summer months, the very months when most ships were at sea and emergency replenish­ ments most likely to be demanded. For example, in 1652, when the government received "great complaints . . . of the badness and unwholesomeness of the victuals," the contractors offered as their excuse that "for want of timely notice," they were "constrained . . . to kill the meat and make other provi­ sions in hot weather."52 And so the government was obliged to offer a prediction of the coming year's needs on the eve of the killing season. During the war of 1739-1748 the prediction was ordinarily made in late September. It was known as the Declaration of Victuals, and it stated how many men would be employed 52 Gardiner and Atkinson, First Dutch War, in, 176.

8. Victualling during the coming year, for how many months, and at what ports the provisions were to be made available. Since calcula­ tions of this sort could not be made without raising large ques­ tions like "War or no war?" and "If war, what will be the ex­ tent and orientation of maritime operations?" they were made at the highest level of government and announced by royal authority. In effect, although the leading ministers de­ cided the number of men to be employed, the plan of distri­ bution at the ports was always, in the mid-eighteenth cen­ tury, that suggested by the Victualling Commissioners. Table 22, for example, contains their suggestion for 1746; it became the Declaration for that year.53 TABLE 22. Declaration of Victuals for the Year 1746 Victuals for Forty thousand Men thirteen Lunary Months, commencing the 1st January next, & ending the 31st December 1746; Hereafter mention'd are the Names of the Ports, and the Number of Men to be provided for at each Port, Viz.

At London

Portsmouth Plymouth Dover Kinsale Plantations, if it should be judged a proper proportion for the ships that may be Employ'd there Total

The Ships at Chatham, Sheerness, Deptford & Woolwich are commonly 21 ,ooo< Victuall'd from London & mostly the Ships in the Streights & Jamaica 8,000 4,000 2,000 2,000

3,000 40,000

Now at first glance this may seem indicative of careful, de­ tailed planning. In fact, the Declaration was very vague. In 1745 the average number of seamen and marines mustered in the fleet was 49,000; there was no reason to believe the navy would be smaller in 1746 (in fact, the 1746 average was 52, 500), and yet the Declaration called for victualling only 40, osAdm. 110/14, 27 Sept. 1745.

8. Victualling ooo men.54 Moreover, there was no formal allowance for spoil­ age, nor any allowance for extra services like providing for military garrisons and expeditions, services which the Victual­ ling Office knew from repeated experience would probably be required. There was no hint in the Declaration that probably a third of the year's needs would not be purchased and issued by the Victualling Office (if the pattern of the previous five years were to continue), but rather purchased abroad and paid for by bills of exchange.55 As for the allocations at the various ports, they were not governed by specific and predic­ table needs. Instead they were designed to enable rapid re­ sponse to probable, yet essentially unpredictable, fleet de­ mands, and they tended to become stereotyped: for example, the Declarations for 1747 and 1748 were letter-perfect repro­ ductions of the one for 1746.56 As for the over-all estimate of numbers to be fed, it turns out that the Declaration never de­ viated from the figure presented to Parliament in the Sea Serv­ ice estimates, a figure which was never, except accidentally, accurate.57 The Declaration was the only official instrument of advanced planning in the victualling service. If its purpose was to predict with precision the future requirements of the fleet, it must be judged as something of a farce. The Declaration of Victuals had a long history. It was the legal instrument authorizing preparation of naval victuals. In the eighteenth century it was merely a formality, because a letter from the Admiralty was sufficient warrant for the Com­ missioners of Victualling to act. But the Declaration had not always been a formality. In the days of victualling by contract it had been the contractor's basic guide.58 A contractor was not obliged to make preparations until the Declaration was made, and if it came too late the fleet was bound to suffer. Before the eighteenth century the Declaration often came late, and the main reason is not hard to find. Under the condi­ tions of sixteenth and seventeenth-century warfare naval re84 The figures are in House of Commons Journals, xxv, 84, 840. 55 E.g. Adm. 3/44, 10 April, 5 Sept. 1740; Adm. 3/51, 29 Aug. 1745; Adm. 3/52, 11 Oct. 1745; Adm. 3/55, 22 Sept. 1746. The figures on provisions bought through bills of exchange are in Table 25. »7 See above p. 205 and below pp. 460-462. 68 See Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 1; and Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 171.

δ. Victualling quirements varied widely from one year to the next, and to avoid waste governments would try to predict their victualling needs with precision: in one year the Declaration might be 16,000 men for six months, the next 12,000 men for 8 months, and so on. Peering into a cloudy diplomatic and strategic fu­ ture, anxious to avoid needless expense, they often delayed the Declaration to the contractor until the last possible (some­ times impossible) moment. Perhaps the most noteworthy oc­ casions are the mobilizations of 1585 and 1588. The mobiliza­ tion of 1585 was delayed by victualling difficulties and the sea­ men who defeated the Armada were miserably fed. It was not because the victualling was ineptly managed, but rather be­ cause Elizabeth's government "chose to incur the risks of par­ simony"; the victualling failure was the consequence "of a de­ cision taken 'at the highest levels'."59 True, Elizabeth was a notorious procrastinator; but the point is that, since she was also parsimonious, she was given the strongest temptation to procrastinate on the matter of victuals. It is interesting to contrast here the mobilization of 1739. A similar vacillation occurred as Walpole's government tried to stem the enthusiasm for war while awaiting the decision of the Spanish court. September 1738 passed without a Declaration of Victuals from the king; then October and November. The Admiralty sent His Majesty a formal reminder in December.60 But the Declaration did not come until the end of March.®1 At such a date it could hardly be of any use for planning. And it hardly mattered, for this Declaration advised the Victualling Office to provide for only 12,000 seamen, just 2,000 more than the normal peacetime minimum. There was no hint that the fleet would mobilize for war that summer and muster 24,000 men by July. And yet in spite of all this the fleet was, on the whole, adequately victualled in 1739, indeed during the entire mobilization. Once mobilization was over the question of planning, as far as the total number of men was concerned, simply disapB9 J. A. Williamson, Sir John Hawkins (Oxford, 1927), p. 424, and Haw­ kins of Plymouth (London, 1949), p. 281. See also pp. 323, 366 of the former, and pp. 310-311 of the latter. eo Adm. 3/43, 27 Dec. 1738. eiAdm. 3/43, «8 March 1739.

8. Victualling peared. From 1741 to 1748 fleet strength remained some­ where between about 45,000 and 55,000 men. The Declaration never varied—40,000 men for thirteen lunary months. Its ir­ relevance to the planning process was an indication of the fact that the victualling had become a service. Two new conditions had enabled it to become a service. One is obvious: the policy of keeping ships permanently manned for the duration of hostilities. Although this policy posed a new and difficult problem of manning, it permitted a steady, more methodical approach to the problem of victual­ ling. Victualling operations became at once more complex and more certain. There was a wider variety of services to per­ form, but the larger scale of operations meant greater oppor­ tunities for emergency transfer of provisions from one place to another; surplus sea victuals could be issued to ships in port. A navy in permanent pay—even in peacetime it mus­ tered 10,000 men or more—naturally acquired a permanent victualling service. The other condition was the capability of government finance. Victualling could not be made depend­ able unless the government was willing to stand the cost of abundant and well distributed reserves. The financially hardpressed governments of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­ turies tended to accent economy. The governments of the eighteenth century could afford the reserves. These two new conditions transformed the victualling problem. They con­ verted a bewildering question of planning into a manageable problem of distribution, and they made possible the creation of a permanent victualling service. A natural query remains unanswered. How did the Victual­ ling Commissioners in 1739 manage to provide, without warn­ ing, for a navy which increased from 15,000 in April to 30,000 in December? They were able to do it partly because the mo­ bilization stretched out over many months, and partly because they already had a respectable quantity of provisions on hand (the 1738 Declaration was for 20,000 men). But the main reason was that they were able to buy what they needed. In the eighteenth century the penalties of faulty planning were less severe because the victualling service had opportunities for emergency buying that had not been available before.

8. Victualling BUYING

There were five methods of buying victuals for the navy. First, they could be bought directly from local tradesmen by commanders-in-chief or captains of ships cruising indepen­ dently. The admiral or captain could pay either with his own money, which he expected to recover when his accounts were balanced and passed by the Victualling Commissioners, or with bills of exchange drawn on the Commissioners. Second, provisions could be bought at the request of naval comman­ ders by designated merchants authorized to draw bills of ex­ change on the Victualling Commissioners; the Commissioners usually referred to these merchants as their "correspondents." Third, they could be bought by contractors, men who had agreed with the Commissioners to provide a full range of vic­ tuals at a particular port or in a particular area at a given price per man per day. Fourth, they could be bought by Agents upon orders from either the Victualling Commission­ ers or a local commander-in-chief. Fifth, provisions could be bought from contractors and tradesmen by the Victualling Commissioners themselves; the provisions were to be delivered to Victualling storekeepers at London or at other ports. In the war of 1739-1748 the bulk of the navy's victuals was negoti­ ated for in London, but the other four methods were often used, and it is necessary to know about the operation of each, if we are to understand the development and improvement of the victualling organization during the eighteenth century. The first method, self-service victualling by sea officers, was simple and could be quite efficient in particular instances, but it was unreliable and open to abuse. It was used mainly for replenishing in areas rarely visited by naval ships where there was no resident Agent, contractor, or correspondent. For ex­ ample, Sir Peter Warren's squadron at Cape Breton was sent beef and pork from England, but Warren was instructed to buy dry provisions in North America and draw bills of ex­ change on the London Office.62 It was also used to enable cruisers to stay on station. Cruisers in the thirteen colonies of­ ten replenished everything locally, and in certain parts of the β2 Adm. 3/51, 9 August 1745.

δ. Victualling Mediterranean cruisers bought wine, oil, bread, and fresh pro­ visions in local markets;63 even in England ships cruising off smaller ports such as Weymouth or King's Lynn were per­ mitted to buy locally and draw bills of exchange.64 And of course commanders were always allowed to buy victuals in emergencies. The navy tried to limit private purchase as much as pos­ sible. Wine, oil, rum, and other provisions not supplied by the Office were to be obtained wherever possible from desig­ nated sources. The Regulations and Instructions were very clear on this point: provisions were not to be purchased "in Places where there [was] an Agent or Contractor, or when there [was] a Likelihood of coming in their Way"; and yet, as the Victualling Commissioners told the Admiralty, pursers continually "endeavoured to evade the true meaning of some parts of their Instructions, . . . by pretended misconstructions thereof."65 It was hard for a purser to evade them without his captain's cooperation, but many captains were more than co­ operative. In 1706 a certain Captain George Camocke refused to accept victuals provided by the Agent Victualler at Dublin, preferring to buy on his own. According to the Agent, he said "he would not, nor should the Commissioners of the Victual­ ling (using such expressions that I am ashamed to mention) force him to victual at any of their offices."66 I have not found anyone in the war of 1739-1748 as blunt and intractable as Captain Camocke, but the evidence indicates that many acted as he did without shouting about it. In the 1730's the Admi­ ralty repeatedly had to order ships "sent to the Foreign Plan­ tations, not to take in more provisions than necessary to bring them home." In 1740, when the Admiralty learned that ships stationed at the Leeward Islands were "frequently" going to Barbados and sometimes to the thirteen colonies in order to victual privately instead of through the established contrac­ tor, "strict Orders" were given to prevent it. According to β3 Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 57; Adm. 1/380, 30 June 1740; Adm. 1/381, 4 April 1744. β4 Adm. 110/15, 16 June 1748, 17 Feb. 1749. «5 Regulations and Instructions (1734), pp. 133-123; Adm. 110/12, 29 May 1739. ββ Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 279-280.

8. Victualling Admiral Knowles, commander-in-chief at Jamaica in 1748, Capt. Robert Erskine had victualled his ships with fresh pro­ visions "absolutely Contrary to a written order of [his] to all the Captains."67 The examples could be multiplied. In fact, such evasions were so common that one wonders whether Knowles—who himself drew up some dubious accounts— would have reported Erskine's victualling transactions had he not been angered by Erskine's other forms of misconduct.68 It was a nuisance for captains and pursers to draw up the accounts and assemble the vouchers required by the Victual­ ling Office when provisions were purchased privately. But they did it eagerly because they made money out of it. Some of the profits were legitimate. If they managed to buy provisions for less than the credits allowed them by the Olfice (in lieu of provisions not supplied by its Agents), their profit arose from purely private transactions which the government did not claim power to audit. But naturally there were many possibili­ ties for abuse; an unscrupulous captain might buy inferior provisions, or undervictual his crew.69 Probably the most com­ mon profit-making procedure was to submit inflated accounts to the Victualling Office; to insure a favorable balance on their accounts captains and pursers employed that standard instrument of corruption, the false voucher, or "kick-back." The complexity of the rules printed in the Regulations and Instructions for the purpose of keeping prices in private transactions near the market, indicates the difficulty of curb­ ing abuse.70 Vouchers of this kind were so untrustworthy that pursers and captains, though allowed credit for leakage of beer on their accounts, were never to expect "any Allowance for Leakage of Wine, Oyl, Brandy, Rum, or Arrack"; for erAdm. 3/43, 18 Aug. 1738; Adm. 3/45, 20 Dec. 1740; Adm. 1/234, 18 Nov. 1748. es See above p. 367. 69 Regulations and Instructions (1734), p. 116; Queen Anne's Navy, p. 286; Merriman, Sergison Papers, pp. 253-254. In the 1690's Victualling Agents gave money rather than credits, but it proved too tempting for the pursers, who would sometimes spend the money for private purposes and then run heavily into debt to the Victualling Office in order to buy pro­ visions for their ships, and so in the eighteenth century the rules generally limited Agents to giving credits; see ibid., p. 264, and Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 57. Regulations and Instructions (1734), pp. 122-123.

8. Victualling whereas beer was supplied from official sources, the rules per­ mitted the other items to be bought in places where the Vic­ tualling Office had no way of knowing whether the casks were full when they came on board.71 Sometimes there were no vouchers at all. Sir Peter Warren presented none to the Vic­ tualling Office after his return from Cape Breton,72 and when captains or pursers were debtors on their accounts it was not unknown for the account books to be washed overboard in mysterious accidents.73 Even when proper accounts and vouch­ ers were presented the method of checking and passing the ac­ counts was so imperfect that a well-constructed fraud stood a good chance of going undetected.74 Thus far I have treated these transactions as though they were carried on not only by pursers, but by captains and ad­ mirals as well. This has been intentional, because although the frauds committed by eighteenth-century pursers are well known, those by commissioned officers are not. However, with admirals and captains cheating was a sideline. With pursers, whose primary duties were the receiving, issuing, and account­ ing for provisions, cheating must have been a way of life.75 A purser's salary was quite low in proportion to his responsibil­ ities; moreover, the rules of the Navy and Victualling Offices were so stacked against him that in Pepys' opinion, "A purser without professed cheating is a professed loser."76 Some pur­ sers, especially those who could command favors, were not really pursers at all; they merely held the place, drew the salary, and let a deputy do the work.77 Others got leave from duty so continuously that in effect they were functioning 71 Ibid., pp. 120-121. '2Adm. no/ig, 16 Jan. 1749. 73 E.g. Adm. 3/56, 27 Oct. 1746. 7* On the deficiencies of auditing procedures see Adm. 106/2178, 30 May 1739, and Addl. MSS. 19033, folios 21-22. 75 For the pursers' frauds, see Lewis, England's Sea Officers, pp. 242-247, and Robinson, British Tar in Fact and Fiction, p. 89. 'β in 1739 the Navy Board recommended doubling the salaries of pursers on board ships in commission (Adm. 106/2178, 30 May 1739); nothing was done. Pepys's remark is quoted in Lewis, England's Sea Officers, p. 245. 77 E.g. Adm. 3/44, 3 Sept., 1 Oct. 1740; Adm. 3/45, 12 Feb., 7 March 1741; Adm. 3/47, 9 Feb. 1744; Adm. 1/3642, 15 Aug. 1728.

8. Victualling through deputies.78 In 1741, noting their absence from duty, Admiral Cavendish commented: "I am afraid some of these Pursers, have no thoughts of going to Sea, nor taking care of their ships, so they do but get what money they can into their clutches.'"79 Pursers rose to their positions by the usual route for clerical officials, either by the recommendation of power­ ful persons ashore, or, more commonly, by the help of captains and admirals at sea; ordinarily a young man began as a cap­ tain's clerk.80 Naturally they had to learn the business. Invari­ ably a prerequisite of fraudulent manipulation is knowing the proper forms; an incompetent purser could wind up a loser.81 And so pursers were not virtuous, but it has been too often overlooked that it was very difficult, if not impossible, for a purser to cheat either the crew or the king if the captain did his duty. Ned Ward wrote that a captain would by no means let his purser "play his Pranks on board, except he pay him soundly for a Licence; and truly that Projector is as good an Annuity to him, as a first-rate Bawdy-house is to a Middlesex Justice."82 Professor Lewis has noted that "owing to the im­ mense powers they wielded" the captains "seem to have been getting a finger into the pie."83 Considering the fact that the average purser's career was practically in the captain's palm, it is wise to include the possibility that some eighteenth-century captains regularly forced pursers to break the rules, just as commodores and admirals forced Naval Officers to do so ashore. For example, young Jack Russell, who did not get along with his captain, was obliged to buy up some wood that was cargo in one of the captain's prizes.84 In fact, Jack Russell did not care much for the job: "I do not know who would be a Purser, to run so many hazards as we do. . . . I assure you if 78 There are countless instances in the Admiralty minutes. Occasionally the Admiralty grew annoyed at this (e.g. Adm. 3/56, 29 Oct. 1746; Adm. 3/58, 8 Sept. 1747; Adm. 3/61, 19 May 1749). 79 Adm. 1/905, 6 April 1741. so E.g. Addl. MSS. 32696, folio 452; 32697, folio 66; 32700, folio 323; 32702, folio 56; Adm. 3/47, 29 Nov. 1743, and see Ward, Wooden World, p. 87. 81 E.g. H.M.C., Du Cane, p. 98. 82 Ward, Wooden World, p. 23. 83 Lewis, England's Sea Officers, p. 246. 84 Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, p. 222.

8. Victualling ever I have two or three hundred pounds to spare, I'll buy into the Marines."85 Eighteenth-century writers like Ned Ward, Barnaby Slush, Smollett, and Fielding generally gave a low opinion of navy captains. Were they being unjust? C. N. Robinson has said they were; he has termed Ward's descrip­ tion a "libellous exaggeration of a certain class of captains" and has suggested that Barnaby Slush's "harsh judgment would seem to apply better to some greedy purser than to the captain."86 Journalists and novelists customarily exaggerate, but perhaps they were closer to the mark than Robinson has allowed. For evidence we need only to look at ships of the 6th rate and sloops, which until November 30, 1738 did not carry pursers; their captains functioned as pursers,87 and the dishon­ est behavior of these captains led to an Order in Council in­ stalling pursers in such ships.88 Let us allow one of these captains, John Ambrose, to describe his own conduct, bearing in mind that his letter was addressed to the Admiral of the Fleet: A few days past there was a Survey taken of all my pursers stores of my ship, & a purser put Into her; I have made up my Books, & send them p. this opportunity in order to pass my accounts, from ye 6th March 1738/39 to the 26th April 1739: As I have Cast It, the Ballance in my favour amounts to one thousand and forty pounds; I am apprehensive yt. the Commissrs. for Victualling will make some difficulty In passing them, as I have not taken up any Wine from the Contractors here, but begg your Interest In Case Mr. Jasper my Agent sho'd apply to Mr. Bell for It, in Case he sho'd meet with any difficulty. What little money I Could make here this Last year I Lay'd out on my ship, In order to make the best Advantage of It, but that perquisite is now lost to Captns. of Sixth Rates, but as you Remarke, we must Lessen our Expences otherwise we must Run In debt, for the pay without some Italian trips Can never Support us. It is very happy for me, that this New Regulation was not made five years past, but now I can bear the Reduction very well as I have got handsomely before hand with the World.89 86 Robinson, British Tar, pp. 80-81. 85 Ibid., p. 229. 87 Adm. 7/339, folios 522-523; Adm. 3/43, 16 Jan. 1739. 88 Merriman, Sergison Papers, pp. 253-254, and Adm. 106/2178, 30 May »739β» Addl. MSS. 28133* folios 173-174, Captain John Ambrose of the Greyhound to Admiral Sir John Norris, dated Gibraltar, 6 May 1739.

8. Victualling By putting pursers into 6th rates and sloops the navy in­ curred a new expense in salaries, but the Admiralty expected it to "be compensated for by the captain acting as check on the purser," which as matters stood might have been put more meaningfully, if less delicately, the other way round.90 But in a world where it was possible for a captain like Ambrose to count the profits from inflated accounts as ordinary perquisites and to ask the Admiral of the Fleet to intercede at the Vic­ tualling Office in case the accounts ran into trouble, it is not easy to see how much could have been done to curb abuse. The only answer was to limit private buying by sea officers. A second method of buying was through designated corres­ pondents. Actually, this differed very little from direct buying by sea officers, and was almost equally open to abuse. Corres­ pondents were usually English merchants living abroad. They knew local markets; they could negotiate effectively with local tradesmen and arrange bills of exchange easily; all in all they could save the sea officers considerable trouble and were espe­ cially useful in large undertakings. The supplying of fresh meat to the Mediterranean fleet may serve as an example. Purchase was arranged by John Birtles, Consul at Genoa, and Burrington Goldsworthy, Consul at Leghorn, who functioned as Victualling correspondents and were aided by Arthur Villettes, British Minister at the Court of Turin. Admiral Mathews bought through them in 1744 when supplies from England were delayed, but in 1746 the Victualling Commis­ sioners, finding that ships were demanding cattle from their correspondents in Italy as a matter of routine, tried to put a stop to it, the method being "attended with great extra ex­ pense, and . . . subject to many abuses."91 Unquestionably there were abuses, for lest it be thought that British consuls might have exerted some check on the dealings of sea officers, it should be noted that men like Birtles and Goldsworthy served also as agents for prizes; they aimed to please; they in­ vited sea officers to dine and lodge with them and eagerly sought what business they might offer.92 Naturally the victual81 so Adm. 7/339, folios 522-523. DuCane, p. 103. 92 See Augustus Hervey's Journal, pp. 55, 60, 63, 69, 132. Goldsworthy was a good friend of John Russell's; see Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, pp. 107-210, passim.

8. Victualling ling arrangements were made profitable to all parties except the government. Admiral Byng, who did not like Admiral Medley, claimed that Medley bought oxen at "above double the Markett price." At the end of the war the accounts for fresh meat purchases ordered by Mathews, Rowley, and Medley in !743' !744. and 1745, remained in confusion; the Victualling Commissioners found that, among other things, they had no report of how much meat went to each ship, and hence no way of holding the pursers to account. But in spite of the abuses the Admiralty Lords would not curtail the purchase of fresh meat through correspondents in the Mediterranean. In their view the objections raised by the Victualling Commis­ sioners were "much more than balanced by the good Effects."93 There was a sizeable difference between a correspondent and a contractor. A correspondent merely facilitated the pur­ chase of victuals by sea officers; he maintained no stock of provisions, and was under no obligation to supply what could not be bought locally. A contractor, on the other hand, had a firm commitment with the Victualling Commissioners to supply victuals from stock to all naval vessels that might de­ mand them at a designated port. Sometimes the contract was for a single item. There were standing contracts for wine at various ports in the Mediterranean and at Madeira (ships bound for the West Indies often took wine aboard there). There were contracts for rum in the West Indies.94 In the reign of Queen Anne the navy had this sort of contract for beer at every port except London, but the contractors at Portsmouth, Messrs. Ridge and Dixon, got together with the pursers and bribed them to sign receipts for more beer than was actually delivered to the ships.95 During the war of 1739-1748 the ports of Scotland and of the north and west of England were served by contractors (in peacetime, captains of cruisers in these areas often negotiated es Adm. 110/14, 4 March 1745; Adm. 110/15, 11 March 1747; Adm. 3/57, 22 March 1747; Adm. 110/15, 28 Dec. 1747, 19 Feb. 1748; Adm. 3/59, 2 March 1748. 94 One of the Navy's West Indian rum contractors was William Beckford, later Lord Mayor of London (Vernon Papers, p. 364). 95 See Mathias, Brewing Industry, pp. 198-199; Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 46.

8. Victualling contracts with the Victualling Board for supplying their own ships).9® There was a contract for New England and another for Virginia.97 In the West Indies there were two contracts also, one for Jamaica, and one for Barbados and the Leeward Is­ lands. In these the contractor was engaged to supply a full range of victuals at a contract price per man per day. By this system the navy could have stocks of provisions on hand at distant ports with a minimum of administrative trouble for the Victualling department. As for vulnerability to abuse, it was a better system than in­ dependent victualling by sea officers. Thomas Corbett pointed out: "If a Contractor does not give good Provisions, the cap­ tain is a Cheque upon him, and will return them, but there is no Comptroll on the Captain, and the men must take what he will give them."98 However, sea officers and contractors could collaborate. Corbett had to admit: "There will always be a combination between Contractors and Pursers, and a Con­ tractor being . . . Allowed iod. a day for Victualling, will give yd. to a Purser in Money, and receive from him a receipt for an equal Proportion of Provisions. For this reason the Cruisers are fond of Victualling at the By-Ports."99 For contrac­ tors were rarely to be trusted, and they often got their con­ tracts for the wrong reasons. It seemed obvious to John HolIond that seventeenth-century contractors were both awarded contracts and shielded from punishment for fraud through favoritism and bribery. And undoubtedly political influence played a role in eighteenth-century contracting for victuals, though not so often in the navy as in the army, where ad­ ministration was more irregular.100 Even when fraud was ex­ posed the penalties were not severe. After Sir Thomas Ridge's beer contract at Portsmouth was investigated by the House of Commons, he was deprived of his seat in the House and prosecuted, but his firm continued to sell beer to the navy.101 »6 E.g. Adm. 111/25, 6 July, 20 Sept. 1737. 97 Adm. 110/15, 26 June, 4 Sept. 1747. as Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 49. 99 Ibid., folio 50. 100 Tanner, Hollond's Discourses, pp. 155-160; Namier, Structure of Politics, pp. 45-53. 101 Mathias, Brewing Industry, p. 199; Pari. Hist., vi, 1001; Adm. 111/25, 5 Oct· »737·

8. Vtctualling However, there was a change in procedure: in the 1730's Ridge no longer delivered directly to the ships, but instead to the Victualling storehouses at Portsmouth. Corbett felt that this was the best way to curb contractors' abuses. There should be no contact between Victualling contractors and pursers, he thought, "any more than the Boatswains and Carpenters have with the Navy Contractors, who never see them nor know any thing of them."102 But of course this would re­ quire everywhere a regular Victualling department depot, with storehouses, clerks, and an Agent. The most serious disadvantage of the contract method of victualling was that it was likely to fail under wartime pres­ sures. It worked well enough in the northern ports so long as just a few cruisers were involved, but when put to the test by the rebellion of '45, it failed. On the west coast of Scotland in 1745, the contract was in the hands of James Henshaw, the London agent of many admirals and captains.103 The captains cruising there complained that Henshaw's agent at Greenock never had the three months' supply of provisions on hand re­ quired by the contract. When Greenock fell to the rebels, the cruisers were directed to victual at Dublin or Liverpool, but the contractor at Liverpool had "lately given Warning, for the Determining the Contract," so the ships had to go to Dublin or else draw bills of exchange at Belfast or Carrickfergus for what could be got there.104 Over on the east coast John Byng's small squadron with about 1,600 men was more than the con­ tractor, John Biggen, could service. Biggen had the contracts for Leith, Berwick, Newcastle, and Hull. Leith and Berwick were in rebel hands, but Biggen told the Victualling Com­ missioners that he could "very well supply" 1,600 men at New­ castle on two or three weeks' notice, if they would send him some casks. Three weeks later Biggen reported that he could not provide bread, butter, and cheese at Newcastle, so "in order to prevent disappointment to the service" the Victual­ ling Commissioners shipped these items north from London. In the end they wound up sending not only these, but also 102 Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 47.

103 For the ubiquitous Henshaw see Erskine, Augustus Heruey's Journal, pp. 56, 118, 146, 262, and

Du Cane, pp. 49s.

104 Adm. 110/14, 23 Sept., 11 Nov. 1745; Adm. 3/52, 13 Nov. 1745.

δ. Victualling beer and meat—in other words almost everything—from their London storehouses.105 There is no better illustration of the limitations of the con­ tract system than the victualling of the West Indies squadron. Until the war of 1739-1748 ships there had always been vic­ tualled by contract. The main reason was that it was cheaper. Most of the dry provisions were got in North America, and beef and butter were ordinarily sent out from Ireland.108 Thomas Corbett wrote: The Commrs. of the Victualling, in their Letter of 22d. Novemr. 1728, prefer supplying the Ships at Jamaica by Contract, before the sending out Provisions from England. The King's Provisions, includ­ ing all Expences, would come out at about i2d. a day, whereas the Contracts are cheaper. Besides they are fresher from Ireland, where they kill from September to the end of April, than they could [ji'c] from London, where they kill only between Michaelmas and Christ­ mas. They have it sometimes in 6 Weeks from Ireland.107

Victualling the fleet in the West Indies was not a business for little fellows. Throughout the 1730's the contracts at Ja­ maica and at Barbados and the Leeward Islands were held by Edwin Lascelles; the Lascelles family was powerful in island trade. In January 1737, when the Victualling Commissioners tried to renegotiate Lascelles' contract at lower rates, he re­ fused, and they were cornered because no one else tendered a bid.108 Lascelles held the contract for most of the war; in 1747 it passed into the hands of Messrs. Mason and Simpson, and in 1749 to George Maxwell, who was affiliated with the house of Lascelles.109 The contract for Jamaica was held by Mason and Simpson, who had "settled agents and correspondents at all proper places in Europe & America."110 However, the war had a treioB Adm. no/14, 21 Oct., 7 Nov., 26 Nov. 1745; Adm. 3/52, 28 Nov. 1745· ioe Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, pp. 491-493; Vernon Papers, pp. 132, 362; Adm. 110/15, 8 Jan. 1748. 107 Corbett MSS. xrv, folios 35-36. ioe Adm. 111/25, 7 Jan. 1737. 109 Adm. 3/47, 1 Feb. 1744; Adm. 110/14, 25 May 1744; Adm. 110/15, 11 Sept. 1747, 15 March 1749. The house of Lascelles and Maxwell is frequently mentioned in Pares's War and Trade in the West Indies. 110 Adm. 110/12, 24 Sept. 1740; Vernon Papers, p. 359.

8. Victualling mendous impact on their sources of supply. Prices of dry pro­ visions in North America rose sharply under the heavy de­ mands of the army and navy.111 By October 1740 Admiral Ver­ non was convinced that they could not handle the job. He wrote to the Admiralty: I can already feel the difference by the increase of the squadron. It being easy to provide for a small number, which can't be easily practicable for a large one, and as it lies heavy on my mind, I can't but suggest I fear there will be a failure in this, and from the fol­ lowing reasons, that I have observed they have relied on performing their Contract by supplies from our Northern Colonies. Whilst they wanted no more than in former years, and peaceable times, that might have been depended upon. But now their demands is like to be so vastly increased, it is to be doubted the growth of that country can supply it.112

But even before the Admiralty received Vernon's letter it had decided to terminate the contract. In September 1740, Mason and Simpson, already uneasy about the rise in Ameri­ can prices, had to ponder the consequences of a bad harvest in England. Their contract, at 8d. per man per day, was due to expire in March 1741; they submitted a new tender at 10¾113 Though substantial, this was a reasonable increase, and the Victualling Commissioners knew there was no hope of getting anyone to take up the contract at a cheaper rate. They consulted the Admiralty. In a joint meeting it was decided that the victualling at Jamaica should be placed under the manage­ ment of the Victualling Office. John Gray and Benjamin Maynard were appointed joint-Agents at Jamaica.114 This step was not taken because of any incompetence or corruption on the part of the contractors. On the contrary, Vernon admitted that Mason and Simpson had performed "without much occasion of complaint"; the Victualling Board could think of "no persons more proper" to undertake it; and the Admiralty felt that they "had long served the Government, and honestly."115 Nor was it taken to save money, although, ad111 Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, pp. 492-493. 112 Vernon Papers, p. 133; see also pp. 360-361. 113 Adm. 110/12, 24 Sept. 1740. 114 Adm. 3/44, 21 Oct., 27 Oct. 1740; Adm. 3/45, 25 Nov. 1740. lie Vernon Papers, pp. 133, 162; Adm. 3/45, 17 Sept. 1741.

8. Victualling mittedly, the rise in prices brought matters to a head, and the Victualling Board—always drawn to considerations of expense—pointed out one financial advantage: that the con­ tractors would require large imprests of money, whereas if the business were "under Management of the Office, such large Sums [would] not be required at once, but Bills made out by degrees, and . . . paid in Course."116 It was done because the navy was planning to send about 20,000 men, or nearly half its strength to the West Indies, and this would mean roughly £300,000 worth of victuals per year. By assuming control the navy hoped to cope with "the many unexpected misfortunes which [might] happen during the Course of so large a Con­ tract."1" This brings us to the fourth method: buying by Agents of the Victualling Office. Here we must discriminate between Agents in England and Agents abroad. In the middle of the eighteenth century the Agents in England, that is at Chatham, Dover, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, arranged purchases them­ selves only in emergencies or when specifically directed by the Victualling Board. During the war of 1739-1748 the Board repeatedly authorized its Agent at Plymouth to negotiate for certain items on his own, but the dealings for the other ports were carried on in London, except for small purchases; in any event the terms of every contract drawn by the Agents were immediately reported to the London Office.118 Half a century earlier the Agents in England had been given far more lati­ tude. "Till the year 1706," Corbett tells us, "the Agents and Storekeepers had not any Instructions to guide themselves by, nor any Cheque or Comptrol kept on them, which led many (no doubt) into the Temptation of raising themselves For­ tunes, at the Expence of the Publick."119 And before 1700 it was apparently "the constant practice of the agents of the sev­ eral victualling ports . . . to draw bills of exchange on the . . . neAdm. 110/12, 27 Oct. 1740; this letter is printed in Vernon Papers, pp. 361-362. Mason and Simpson had already asked for large imprests (Adm. 3/44, 30 Nov. 1739, 17 April 1740; Vernon Papers, 357-359). For an explanation of payment in Course see below p. 471. HT Adm. 110/12, 27 Oct. 1740. us Adm. 111/27, 16 Sept., 30 Sept., 21 Oct., 4 Nov., 27 Nov. 1741, 15 Jan. 1742: Adm. 111/31, 17 April 1745. 119 Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 20.

8. Victualling Commissioners of Victualling after a mercantile way, in gen­ eral terms, upon account, without accompanying such, their bills, either with quality, quantity, or price."120 The mess was investigated by Parliament in 1704, but the accounts were so confused and incomplete that it was almost impossible to track down the frauds.121 As a result there was a reorganization of the Victualling department between the years 1700 and 1715, and the power of Agents to negotiate purchases was sharply curtailed.122 Their business became centered on main­ taining inventories and issuing to the fleet. Agents abroad, on the other hand, had a standing authori­ zation to supplement the victuals sent out from England by local purchases. Some of these Agents were stationed afloat, others ashore. In the war of 1739-1748 only the East Indies squadron carried an Agent on board. Except for meat, which was sent out from England in East India Company ships (there could be "no certain Dependence of procuring Flesh in the East Indies for any Considerable Number of Men"), most provisions were bought in India.123 These the squadron's Agent bought upon order from the commodore. At first, pay­ ment was by bill of exchange, but the rate of exchange which Commodore Barnett's Agent got was so poor that the Agents for the squadrons deployed under Griffen and Boscawen were given huge imprests in "Weighty Dollars."124 In the reigns of William III and Anne large squadrons in the Mediterranean had usually carried Agents on board, but during the first half of the eighteenth century these gradually came to be located permanently ashore;125 by 1739 there were Agents at Port Mahon and Gibraltar. As we have seen, joint-Agents were ap­ pointed for Jamaica in 1740. In 1745 an Agent was established at Kinsale.126 120 See the long report by the Victualling Commissioners, dated 30 Oc­ tober 1703, in Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 262-268. 121 Ibid,., and

MSS. of

the House of Lords, 1702-1704, pp. 416-

421; House of Commons Journals, xvi, 514, 522-524; Pari. Hist., vi, 1028. 122 See Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 2, and Adm. 7/648. 123 Adm. 110/15, 23 Oct. 1747. 124 Adm. 3/52, 18 Oct. 1745; Adm. 3/53, 8 Feb., 12 Feb. 1746; Adm. 110/14, 12 Feb. 1746; Adm. 110/15, 18 Sept., 21 Sept., 30 Sept. 1747; Adm. 3/58, 21 Sept. 1747.

125 Corbett MSS. xrv, folios 14-16.

126 Adm. 3/32, 21 Dec. 1719; Adm. 3/43, 25 Sept. 1739; Adm. 3/45, 5 April 1742; Adm. 3/49, 9 Feb. 1745.

8. Victualling When Gray and Maynard were appointed Agents at Ja­ maica they complained that their salaries (£300 each) were too low and their clerks too few, but their complaint went un­ heeded.127 When they got out to Jamaica, they set about in­ creasing their pay by their own efforts. They arranged with West Indian dealers for a "rake-off" of 10 per cent of the gross on fresh meat contracts and 5 or 6 per cent on rum. In 1745 Maynard died, thus exposing his accounts to examination be­ fore they were properly arranged. Gray was forced to resign in 1746, and although Admiral Davers, the commander-inchief at Jamaica, told the Admiralty that the accusations made against him arose from his "having distinguish'd him­ self for his Attachment to the Naval Interest," the Victualling Board after the war verified the fact that Gray and Maynard had pocketed £50,157 on the meat contracts alone.128 Even be­ fore the war was over the Admiralty decided to put the vic­ tualling at Jamaica back under contract. The Victualling Board estimated that it would save 15 per cent, and Admiral Knowles wrote from the island: "I am extream glad to find the Victualling put into Contract as I am fully convinc'd the Crown will save many Thousand pounds a Year by it."129 Whatever the navy saved by putting the victualling at Ja­ maica under the control of its own Agents, it is unlikely to have been money. The bulk of the navy's food was bought by the Commissioners themselves in London. This gave them direct control over most of their expenditure. But how, it may be asked, were the Vict­ ualling Commissioners to negotiate purchases directly if they were situated in the metropolis instead of at the centers of agri­ cultural marketing? The answer is that London in the eight­ eenth century was the unrivaled center of British agricultural marketing.130 London's wheat and barley came mostly from East 127 Adm. 3/45, 3 Dec., 9 Dec. 1740. Gray was formerly the Clerk at Tower Wharf, salary £80 (Adm. 111/28, 6 Dec. 1742). 128 Adm. 3/51, 22 Aug. 1745; Adm. 1/233, May 1746, 22 June 1746; Adm. 3/60, 13 April 1749. 129 Adm. 110/15, 8 Jan. 1748; Adm. 1/234, Nov. 1748. 130 See generally Ehrman, pp. 148-149; F. J. Fisher, "The Development of the London Food Market, 1540-1640," Econ. Hist. Rev., ν (1935), 46-64; R. Β. Westerfield, Middlemen in English Business particularly between 1660 and 1760, published in Trans, of the Conn. Academy of Arts and

8. Victualling Anglia: some by sea from King's Lynn and other ports, some overland through Hitchin, and a good deal, in the middle of the eighteenth century, down the Lea River by barge. Throughout the century there was a growing tendency for these to be shipped as flour and malt.131 Cattle came to London on the hoof from far away Scotland and Wales. Scottish cattle were fattened in Norfolk and Suffolk before being driven on to Smithfield market. Welsh cattle were fattened in Somerset, Wiltshire, Essex, and Kent.132 Hogs were also driven from nearby counties, and fattened on the wastes of London's immense brewing and distilling industries.133 Butter came by sea from east-coast ports like York, Hull, Scarborough, Stock­ ton, and Newcastle; the large output of Suffolk and adjacent counties came either by coasting vessels or by land from Cam­ bridge. More than half of London's cheese came from Che­ shire, Lancashire, and Warwickshire by sea; about a quarter came by barge down the Thames (some of this was Cheddar), and a quarter from Hull and Suffolk by land and sea.134 Thus the scope of the British agricultural market in the eighteenth century was national, and London was the focal point. And there seems little doubt that the development of this vast and Sciences, xix (1915), 123-125, 130-182, 187-208; N. S. B. Gras, The Evolution of the English Corn Market from the twelfth to the eighteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1916). A very rough impression of the improvement of the marketing system may be got by comparing G. E. Fussell, "The Traffic in Farm Produce in Seventeenth-Century England," Agri. Hist., xx (1946), 77-86, and G. E. Fussell and C. Goodman, "Traffic in Farm Produce in Eighteenth-Century England," Agri. Hist., xn (1938), 355-368. Since these and other works cited below may seem to comprise an im­ pressive bibliography, it is worth repeating Mr. Mathias's comment that the history of British agricultural marketing has not yet been properly studied (Brewing Industry, pp. 10a, 387). The chapter on "Development of the Livestock Market" in R. Trow-Smith, A History of British Live­ stock Husbandry, 1J00-1900 (1959), pp. 224-232 is brief and sketchy. 131 Fussell and Goodman, Agri. Hist., XII, 356-361; Gras, Corn Market, pp. 107-108, 119-120; Mathias, Brewing Industry, pp. 425-447. 132 See Caroline Skeel, "The Cattle Trade between Wales and England from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries," T.R.M.S., 4th ser., ix (1926), 135-198; G. E. Fussell and C. Goodman, "Eighteenth-Century Traf­ fic in Livestock," Economic History, HI (1936), 216, 218-221. 133 Ibid., pp. 232-234; Mathias, Brewing Industry, p. 42. 134 W. Maitland, The History and Survey of London (2 vol., 1756) II, 758759; G. E. Fussell and C. Goodman, "The Eighteenth-Century Traffic in Milk Products," Economic History, HI (1937), 380-387.

8. Victualling complex marketing system was greatly responsible for the improvement of British agriculture, which at the time ranked as the most efficient and progressive in Europe.135 The British navy enjoyed the benefits. If it had wished, it could ordinarily have filled all its needs in the London mar­ ket. For example, the navy's greatest demand was for beef, each seaman being allowed 208 lbs, a year (4 lbs. χ 52 weeks); a fleet of 40,000 men would therefore require 8,320,000 pounds. In the 1740's the Victualling Office set a "standard of six hundred Weight for oxen for Sea Store"; no contractor could deliver a beast weighing less than five hundredweight without paying a penalty, and in fact the oxen killed for sea store at London during the 1744-1745 season weighed, on an average, "upwards of seven hundred Weight."136 According to an estimate given by Thomas Corbett in the late 1720's, oxen were "reckoned to hold out 160 4-lb. pieces one with another," and at this rate about 12,000 head a year would meet the navy's entire need.137 An observer calculated that during the year 1725 a total of 73,691 cattle were sold at Smithfield mar­ ket, and nearly 100,000 in the entire London area.138 The story for pork is similar. A year's allowance of pork for 40,000 seamen was 4,160,000 pounds. The average hog bought by the navy would yield roughly 100 pounds of usable pork; 40,000 hogs would supply the navy. In the year 1731 London dealers sold an estimated total of 187,000 animals.139 Each seaman was allowed 19 i/2 pounds of butter a year, which for a navy of 40,000 amounts to 780,000 pounds; in the year 1729 London imported more than 16,000,000 pounds.140 As for cheese, the allowance was 39 pounds per man a year, or 1,560,000 pounds for 40,000 men. In the year 1729 London imported about 21,000,000 pounds of cheese.141 Had the navy not chosen to brew 135 See Fisher, Econ. Hist. Rev., v, 56; and G. E. Fussell and C. Good­ man, "Crop Husbandry in Eighteenth-Century England," Agri. Hist., xvi (1942), 62. ΐ3β Adm. 110/14, 8 July 1745; Adm. 111/26, 23 Jan. 1740. As early as 1704, according to a Victualling Office report, only 220 out of 2,690 oxen bought by the navy weighed less than 6 cwt. (Adm. 110/2, 25 Aug. 1704). is? Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 28. 138 Maitland, History of London, 11, 756-757. 138 Ibid., n, 758. no Ibid.; 292,263 firkins X 56 = 16,366,728 pounds. 1« Ibid., 11, 759; the year here, as for butter above, was reckoned from Lady Day, 1729.

8. Victualling most of its own beer, the rapidly expanding London brewing industry could easily have supplied its needs.142 However, al­ though the huge London market was a great convenience to such a large buyer as the navy, there were, as we have seen, many ways of buying, in many places. Thus there was never any possibility that London would be required to supply 40,000 men. In fact, much of what the Victualling Commis­ sioners negotiated for in London never came near the city. The method of contracting was of long standing. Newspaper advertisements were published announcing the day set to "treat" for a particular commodity, and the leading dealers in that commodity were notified. On the appointed day the Vic­ tualling Commissioners met at the Office; the interested dealers handed over written tenders, and these tenders, to­ gether with those received by mail, were then opened and read. If the dealer submitting the lowest bid was willing (and judged competent) to supply the entire amount needed, there was no more to it, and the contract was drawn; frequently, no single dealer could supply the whole amount, whereupon the Commissioners would ask some of those present to meet the lowest bid. It was because the dealers at Plymouth were generally small men who tendered bids by letter that the Victualling Commissioners found it convenient to delegate power of negotiation to their Agent there.143 Occasionally the Board thought all the tenders unsatisfactory and postponed buying.144 There were two kinds of beef contracts: one for sea store, the other for fresh meat. Oxen for sea store were slaughtered from late September to early May "as ye Weather . . . permit­ ted, & ye service required it."145 The contracts were made on a quarterly basis; those drawn in late September or October specified a number of animals to be delivered before Christ­ mas; those drawn in January, before Lady Day; and so on. It was assumed that the animals would be delivered to the cuttinghouses gradually. The only beef contracts for shorter 142 See Mathias, Brewing Industry, pp. 31-87, 195-201. us Adm. 111/27, 16 Sept. 1741. i"For a very full discussion of Victualling OiBce contracting see Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. 503-534. 145 Ibid., pp. 548-549; Adm. 110/2, 25 Aug. 1704.

8. Victualling periods were made when stocks were low and the Board was trying to rush or extend the killing season; for example, con­ tracts for delivery within two weeks were drawn on April 28, 1738 and September 12, 1740.146 The fresh meat contracts were sometimes for three months, but usually less. No particular number of animals was tendered; instead, the contractor agreed to supply a port with whatever the ships there needed. However, there were some limits: often the contractor was not required to supply more than a specified number per week, and the Portsmouth contractor, being based in Wiltshire at Bradford (on Avon), insisted on ten days' notice and man­ datory receipt regardless of whether "the demand should be lessened by ships sailing from the Port."147 The cost of oxen both for fresh meat and for sea store was reckoned in shillings per hundredweight, and the same dealers generally tendered bids on both. Provincial dealers played a larger role in the navy's beef contracting than they did in most items. This was because it was usually cheaper to supply Portsmouth and Plymouth from the fattening areas in the western counties. Throughout the war William Lea of Bradford supplied Portsmouth with nearly all its oxen, both for sea store and for fresh meat; this meant roughly 3,000 animals a year. Although he ordinarily tendered by letter, the London dealers rarely managed to underbid him and often did not even try. Portsmouth prices tended to be slightly higher than London prices, but transportation costs gave Lea the advantage.148 The dealers for Plymouth were ΐ4β Adm. 111/26, 28 April 1738; Adm. 111/27, 12 Sept. 1740. These dates are old style, and it should be remembered that from the point of view of seasonal climate they should be thought of as May 10 and September 24, which means that in 1738 the Victualling OfBce was willing to go on killing for sea store as late as May 24. Naturally, everything depended on the weather. I have experienced one English summer throughout which, it seemed, it would have been quite safe to pack salt beef without interruption. "7 Adm. 111/26, 19 April 1738, 26 Sept. 1739, 2 Jan. 1740; Adm. 111/27, *5 Feb· 1741. 1*8 E.g. Adm. 111/26, 4 Oct. 1738, 21 March, 20 June, 12 Sept. 1739 (in this instance Lea is beaten by a Gosport dealer), 2 Jan. 1740; Adm. 111/27, 12 Sept. (a London dealer wins a small contract), 26 Sept. 1740, 5 Feb. 1741, 22 May, 16 Sept. 1741, 26 Feb. 1742; Adm. m/31, 23 Sept. 1745,* Adm. 111/33, 25 March 1747 (a London dealer gets the fresh meat con­ tract); Adm. 111/34, Sept. 1747; instances of Lea's gaining the contracts could fill a page.

8. Victualling established in such places as Totnes, Honiton, Exeter, and Plymouth itself; they tendered bids by letter.149 The navy usually got its beef cheaper in Plymouth than it did in Lon­ don.150 Similarly, Kent markets could usually supply Dover at prices slightly under London's, and once, when Dover bids failed to arrive in time, the Board told a London dealer who had come to tender that the day for treating was postponed.151 At London the dealers were big men, like John Nicholson, John Jennings, Richard Carter, George Brownsworth, John Slapp, and Christopher Barton, who were prepared to deliver one or two thousand oxen a quarter. Sometimes one dealer had the whole London contract; often two or three shared it.152 Such men kept the navy supplied throughout the war, even though, toward the end, the country was hit by the most severe cattle plague of the century.153 The same men also dealt in hogs, and often tendered both oxen and hogs to the Victualling Board. However, there was some specialization: Peter Lefebvre, who was awarded many contracts, seems to have dealt mainly in hogs; and so also did John Mason; other contracts went to John Nicholson and Christopher Barton. The London contractors during the war regularly delivered eight or ten thousand hogs a year.154 The reason why the navy bought a larger proportion of pork than beef in the London market was explained by the Victualling Commissioners: "The killing of Town fed Hogs has been a use in the Navy chiefly since the Distilling Trade has of late so much increased"; in order to get country-fed pork they would have had to advertise in places like Falmouth, Biddeford, Liverpool, Hull, and Newcastle, because the farmers within reach of London all sold their hogs "lean to be fed by «9 E.g. Adm. 111/26, 4 Oct. 1738, 12 Sept. 1739; Adm. 111/27, 26 Sept.

>74o· 150 Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. 570, 594-596. 151 Adm. 111/27, 16 Sept. 1741. See also Adm. 111/26, 4 Oct. 1738, 26 Sept. 1739, 2 Jan. 1740. 152 E.g. Adm. 111/26, 12 Sept. 1739; Adm. 111/27, 26 Sept. 1740; Adm. 111/31,23 Sept. 1745. 153 Adm. 111/31, 2 Oct. 1745; Adm. 111/33, 25 March 1747; Adm. 110/14, 10 Dec. 1746; C. F. Mullett, "The Cattle Distemper in Mid-EighteenthCentury England," Agri. Hist., xx (1946), 144-165. is* E.g. Adm. Ii 1/26, 4 Oct. 1738, 12 Sept. 1739, 2 Jan. 1740; Adm. 111/27, 26 Sept. 1740, 16 Sept. 1741.

8. Victualling Distillers."155 Although William Lea also tendered hogs for Portsmouth, his prices were often higher, and the navy was reluctant to buy them from him. In peacetime the navy could choose not to buy for Portsmouth, but instead ship salt pork in the cask from London, but in wartime it usually paid Lea's price.156 At Plymouth hogs were generally cheaper than in London.157 Dry provisions were bought mainly in London. Salt con­ tracts went to large importers.158 Wheat, flour, biscuit meal, and peas were often tendered by the same men; for example, during the month of January 1741 Christopher Barton, in ad­ dition to tendering hogs to the Office, tendered all four of these.159 Malt and hops were in other hands.160 Although the navy baked some of its bread and biscuit, at the beginning of the war most was supplied under contract by numerous bakers at London, Portsmouth, and Plymouth.161 It was a bad system. When naval demands were heavy the commercial bakers did not have enough surplus capacity to meet them, and there was always a danger of their combining to raise prices. When war began the navy found that most of the bakers at Ports­ mouth who had supplied the navy in former wars had gone out of business. As early as August 15, 1739 the Victualling Board anticipated shortages and asked the Admiralty's permis­ sion to build more ovens and bakehouses, but these could not be ready in time to meet mobilization needs. Biscuit was get­ ting scarce at London in the autumn even though the Board had its own ovens going full blast and "all the Town Bakers engaged." In 1740 ships preparing for sea could not be given their full six months' supply, for the commercial bakers re­ fused to give priority to their navy contracts. They preferred to sell what they baked on the market, and reap the unusually i5B Adm. 110/12, 2 July 1740. ΐ5β E.g. Adm. 111/25, 19 Oct. 1737; Adm. 111/26, 12 Sept. 1739, 2 Jan. 1740.

157 Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. 571, 595. 158 Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. 535-548. 15» Adm. 111/27, 2 Jan., 7 Jan., 20 Jan. 1741. ieo E.g. Adm. 111/26, 7 Nov., 12 Nov. 1739. Mathias, Brewing Industry,

pp. 455-465. 496-516. iei E.g. Adm. 111/25, 28 Nov., 21 Dec. 1737; Adm. 111/26, 12 Nov., 13 Dec. 1739, 7 Jan. 1740.

8. Victualling high prices caused by the navy's demand and bad weather. Gradually the Victualling Board added to its own baking ca­ pacity, and its purchase of biscuit meal in quantity dates from this time.1®2 The contracts for butter and cheese were unusual, and they are worth special attention both because supplies were not always regular and plentiful, and because the contracts them­ selves represent a type that was prevalent in earlier times. Although there was one important difference, namely that all butter and cheese was to be delivered at London for further distribution by the Office instead of directly to the fleet, the basic character of these contracts reflected the old method: a single contractor undertook to supply, not a given quantity, but whatever amount of butter and cheese the navy required, as demanded, at a contract price for each. The contract ran for a whole year, from Michaelmas (September 29th) to Michael­ mas, and the contractor stood the gains and losses. The Vict­ ualling Commissioners expected the contractors to consider the future: "Persons who make annual Agreements with Us . . . must We presume always have a regard in their Calculations to the Fluctuations of Marketts, 8c ask a price accordingly."163 But undeniably, predicting the dairy market a year in advance was a risky business, and it is not surprising that the Board seems to have been put to more trouble by its butter and cheese contracts than by any other kind. Perhaps the speculative nature of these contracts had some appeal, for there were usually three or four bidders. The men who bid were sizeable merchants—they had to be to handle the business and the risks. Some, like John Nicholson, John Simpson, Peter Lefebvre, and Christopher Barton, also dealt in livestock and other commodities, but cheesemongering was a highly organized trade, and the low bidder was usually a specialist, or a partnership of specialists.164 Among the cheeseιβ2 Adm. 110/12, 15 Aug., 12 Sept. 1739, 25 April, 27 June 1740, 20 Jan., Jan., 27 March, 4 Nov. 1741; Adm. 110/13, 8 Sept. 1743; Adm. 111/27, 3 Oct. 1740; Adm. 3/44, 30 June 1740; Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. 545. 571· ιβ3 Adm. 110/14, 12 June 1745. Beer was the only other item bought on this sort o£ contract in the mid-eighteenth century (e.g. Adm. 111/25, 5 Oct. 1737). There were beer contracts for Portsmouth and Chatham. iei Adm. 111/25, 3 Aug. 1737; Adm. 111/26, 23 Aug., 13 Sept. 1738, 22 28

8. Victualling mongers who bid regularly for the navy contract were John Child, Thomas Farrar, and Robert Barnevelt. In fact, Barnevelt almost never failed to tender a highly competitive bid. He seems to have geared his business to serving the navy, and during the war of 1739-1748 he held the butter and cheese contract most of the time. But the London cheesemongers constituted what looked like a club, and there was always the danger of their being "in a combination." In 1738 the Victual­ ling Commissioners suspected this and postponed negotia­ tions.1®5 However, most of the trouble arose from market fluctua­ tions. 1740 and 1741 were bad years for butter and cheese production. The "great Scarcity" which developed in the spring of 1741 was aggravated by a very dry summer.166 On August 26th, the day published for treating, none of the dealers showed up; all the Board got was a letter from Thomas Simpson. Not only were Simpson's prices too high; he also wanted a clause in his contract stipulating even higher prices in the event of war with France, a proposal which the Board did not think "consistent with the Rules" of their Office. The contracting was postponed.167 On September 9th the Board met again to receive tenders, and this time four dealers of­ fered; the partners who had held the contract the year before, and presumably got their fingers burnt, were not among them. Robert Barnevelt tendered the lowest bid, but the Board still thought the prices too high and deferred making the contract again.168 Finally, with cash in hand, the Commissioners decided to circumvent the cheesemongers, because they thought that the prices offered made no allowance for the probability that the following summer might prove kind & productive of great Quantitys of Butter & Cheese. Aug. 1739; Adm. 111/27, 87 Aug· !74°, 9 Sept. 1741; Adm. 111/30, 29 Aug. 1744; Adm. 111/31, 28 Aug. 1745; Adm. 111/34, '9 Aug. 1747. See generally G. E. Fussell, "The London Cheesemongers of the Eighteenth Century," Economic History, 1 (1928), 394-398; unfortunately this article does not name a single cheesemonger. ies ibid,., p. 395; Adm. 111/26, 23 Aug., 13 Sept. 1738. ιββ Adm. 110/12, 16 March, 9 April 1741; Adm. 3/45, 80 March, 9 Sept. 1741. Adm. 111/27, Aug. 1741. lee Adm. 111/27, 9 Sept. 1741.

8. Victualling They therefore judg'd it advisable to Employ Mr. Walter Mitchell as Purveyour, and ordered him accordingly to go immediately into Suffolk, Sc there buy on His Majties. Accot: 500 Wey of Suffolk Cheese & 1000 Firkins of Butter of ye best that Country produces for shiping on the cheapest terms he can procure them, agreeing with them for ready money in as much as it is ye Custom there; And that this Order may not be made publick as it may alarm the Trade, Se they consequently take advantage thereof, he is ordered to cor­ respond wth. ye Accountant for Stores of all his proceedings, direct­ ing his Letters to his House.169

These quantities of cheese and butter were only a year's supply for about 3,300 men, but it was enough to tide the navy over until it became evident to the dealers that 1742 would indeed prove kind and productive. The next year the contract price of butter dropped a penny a pound.170 The navy had trouble with Robert Barnevelt in 1745. But­ ter and cheese prices rose sharply that year because the cattle plague was raging in Holland and continental merchants were buying heavily in the London market. Although the Victualling Commissioners admitted that Barnevelt was hav­ ing hard luck, they refused to give him the slightest relief.171 When the Board received tenders for the new contract on August 28th Barnevelt submitted much higher prices, and the contract was awarded to Thomas Farrar. But Barnevelt's con­ tract still had a month to run, and that month, thanks to the Jacobite invasion threat, was a busy one for the navy: the fleet was straining for maximum mobilization; in addition the Vict­ ualling Office had to supply the transports that were being sent to bring home some of the troops from the Netherlands. The Board stepped up its demands, but Barnevelt did not make the deliveries. He was obviously dragging his feet. He called at the Office on September 18th and told the Board that there was no cheese in London to be bought. On the 25th (his contract was due to expire on the 29th) the Board ordered large quantities to victual the transports. Barnevelt said he could fill only a portion of the order, so the Commissioners Ie9Adm. 111/27, 9 Nov. 1741. This minute shows every evidence of having been inserted later. 170 Beveridge, Prices and Wages, p. 576. m Adm. 110/14, 27 Feb., ia June 1745. 4i4

8. Victualling directed their officers to try to buy what they could on the best terms possible; and then they had another thought: they wondered if the new contractor, Farrar, would be able to sup­ ply these urgent demands. Farrar said he could, but of course this was at the new, higher prices. Barnevelt had let them down. Perhaps he felt they were taking advantage of him, and perhaps they were, although the evidence suggests that their needs in September 1745 were real and urgent. In spite of all this Barnevelt was back again tendering a bid the following summer, and the Board awarded him the contract. Further­ more, in spite of complaints about bad butter in the spring of 1747, and his slowness of delivery during the summer, he was given the contract again in 1747. How is this to be explained? Was it politics or favoritism? It was probably neither, for Barnevelt's bid in 1747 was substantially under Farrar's, and there were no other tenders.172 The 1747 contract contained new clauses for insuring good quality, and one which required the contractor to bear "the Charge of sending Butter or Cheese by land Carriage to the out ports, for want of his Timely supplying the Demands to send by Water."173 Undoubtedly the cattle plague, which by 1747 had hit the English dairylands hard, was complicating Barnevelt's task. And the coming of peace dealt him a blow. In 1749 he petitioned for recompense; he said he lost £4000 on the 1748 contract because the peace caught him with his ware­ houses full of butter and cheese which he had bought "at dear Rates, by reason of the Mortality among the cattle," and none of it was "Saleable for home Consumption." The Commis­ sioners were not sympathetic. The "rise & fall of Marketts, Continuance of Peace or War, & other accidents" made no difference. "And We must not omit to add," they told the Admiralty, "that We do not conceive what Mr. Barnevelt means by alledging . . . that the Butter & Cheese . . . was not Saleable for home Consumption, since it is expressly Stip­ ulated by his Contract that all . . . should be good sound & Merchantable, and therefore if he had taken Measures to ful­ fill his Contract faithfully & honestly, We see no Reason 172 Adm.

111/31, 28 Aug.,

18 Sept., 26 Sept., 28 Sept. 1745; Adm.

111/33, 4 March 1747; Adm. 111/34, 19 i7s Adm. 111/34, >9 Aug. 1747.

A "g·.

21 Aug. 1747.

8. Victualling why ... [it] should not have been Saleable."174 In spite of this, the firm of Barnevelt continued to hold the contract during most of the next thirty years.175 Contracts for other provisions rarely entailed this sort of bickering, and after allowing for the inconvenience of purchasing and of warehousing these perishable items, one still wonders why the Victualling Com­ missioners continued to put up with the system. It would be tedious to discuss the various markets outside London where the Victualling Board bought provisions, but there is one that must not be overlooked, and that is Ireland. In this period Ireland was the largest exporter of beef and butter in Europe. Livestock products accounted for about half the value of her exports in the first half of the eighteenth cen­ tury. By 1750 her exports of beef and butter roughly equalled the quantities sold in London markets.176 None of this went to Great Britain. In Charles II's reign the English landed interest had gained the legislative prohibition of Irish agricultural products. Until then Ireland had mainly sent live animals for fattening in England; after the prohibition the Irish gradually changed over to slaughtering and packing for other markets, and Irish exports of provisions in the cask—especially salt beef, salt pork, and butter—increased enormously. Much of this (generally the better quality) went to the British colonies in America and the West Indies, but the bulk was bought by the French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch. The French bought about one-third of all Irish beef and butter exported, and most of it was sent to the French West Indies; the island of Martinique was fed "exclusively with provisions from Ire­ land."177 For Ireland could undersell all of Western Europe; in 1739 it was reported that good beef could be bought for a penny a pound, and butter for three pence, roughly half English prices.178 Irish beef and pork were so cheap that navy contractors in the late seventeenth century bought both of them in defiance of contracts that required them to buy English.179 174 Adm. 110/15, 25 Feb. 1749. 175 Beveridge, Prices and Wages, p. 516. ΐ7β See J. O'Donovan, The Economic History of Live Stock in Ireland (Cork, 1940), pp. 103-104, 108, 111. This is a useful book. "7 Ibid., pp. 46-76, 103-106.

178 Ibid., pp. 107-108; Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. ΐ7β See Tanner, Hollond's Discourses, p. 177.

194, 313.

8. Victualling In the 1720's the Admiralty—presumably under political pres­ sure—was anxious that the West Indian fleet be victualled as much as possible with supplies from England,180 but, as we have seen, the advantages of victualling ships in that area from Ireland were substantial, and in the war of 1739-1748, not only the contractors but the Victualling Office itself bought provisions for Jamaica in Ireland. The existence of so large a producer and exporter of live­ stock products close at hand and under British rule was both a convenience and embarrassment to the government. On the one hand Ireland offered abundant reserves in case of extreme scarcity in Great Britain. Naturally, the Victualling Commis­ sioners wanted to take advantage of Ireland's low prices con­ tinually, but the Admiralty would permit it only when per­ suaded of the necessity. Soon after war broke out the Victualling Commissioners were faced with the problem of replenishing Haddock's squadron (6,000 men) in the Mediterranean. It was easy enough to buy most provisions in London, but for meat they had recourse to Ireland. "Two of the Three Months Flesh," they told the Admiralty in July 1739, "has been pro­ vided at Cork, the Stores here not admitting of sending the whole from hence."181 Again in September, noting that their stores of salt meat were "near exhausted by complying with the great demands of the Service since the last Killing Season was over," they recommended further supplying the Mediter­ ranean squadron from Ireland, where the killing season began earlier in the autumn; they also proposed sending out Irish butter, since the war had hindered purchase of Spanish olive oil. The Admiralty was reluctant, probably suspecting that the Commissioners were attracted by low prices as much as they were disturbed by shortage.182 But in 1741, when the great drought sent English prices to high levels, the Admiralty gave them permission to buy meat and butter in Ireland, cautioning them "to make Use of this Liberty no farther than should be absolutely necessary to keep down the Contracts [in England] at a reasonable Price."183 When the cattle plague struck Eng180 Adm. 3/37, 10 June, 29 Oct. 1788. 181 Adm. 110/12, 18 July 1739. 182 Adm. 110/12, 5 Sept. 1739; Adm. 3/43, 7 Sept., 11 Sept. 1739. 183 Adm. 3/45, 9 Sept. 1741; Adm. 111/27, u Sept. 1741.

8. Victualling land later in the war, the Admiralty again permitted buying in Ireland.184 But these were not the only times the navy bought Irish provisions, and this brings us to the matter of embarrassment. Irish provisions supplied Britain's rivals, or more particu­ larly—and this was what was so troubling—the possessions and ships of Britain's rivals in the West Indies. If free expor­ tation were permitted in wartime it would mean that the French West Indian colonies could be provisioned as cheaply and easily as the English. Of what value, then, was British sea power? This logic led to an Order in Council of November 27, 1740 laying an embargo on all Irish provisions. As the war progressed it was gradually relaxed on one item after another, but after the outbreak of rebellion in Scotland it was imposed again.185 The effect of such embargoes on the Irish economy was staggering. A long embargo could mean "the almost absolute Ruin" of Ireland.186 But what could be done to relieve Irish agriculture? One way of helping would be to have the navy buy the provisions intended for export as they came on the market. Consequently, in September 1740 and in January 1746, the Admiralty told the Victualling Board that it was the king's pleasure that the navy should "contract in Ireland for as much Provisions from thence as can be that the Embargo laid on all Ships laden with Provisions in the Kingdom, may be attended with as little Inconvenience as possible."187 What­ ever relief this may have afforded Irish agriculture, it also meant that the navy was in a position to buy large quantities of victuals at knockdown prices at a time when they were becoming expensive in England, and naturally it was alleged that such embargoes were imposed solely to serve the interest of British army and navy contractors.188 However, the accusa­ tions of pamphleteers and political gossipmongers should be treated with caution. Undoubtedly these embargoes were typi­ cal of the callously selfish stance toward Ireland regularly assumed by the British government, but it seems probable that 184

E.g. Adm. 3/58, 27 Jan. 1748. See Addl. MSS. 32695, folios 485-491; 32696, folio 183; 32705, folio 439. ise Addl. MSS. 32713, folios 470-471. is' Adm. 110/12, 24 Sept. 1740; Adm. 3/53, 27 Jan. 1746. 188 See O'Donovan, Live Stock in Ireland, p. 107; Pari. Hist., xi, 867-894. 1S5

8. Victualling the main motive behind them was strategic, that the govern­ ment was more concerned with denying Irish provisions to the enemy than with getting them cheap for its own forces.189 In September 1740, obeying orders from the government, the Victualling Commissioners wrote to their correspondents at Cork, Messrs. Calwell, Lawton & Carlton, directing them "to buy up for the Service of His Majesty's Navy, all the Beef, Pork & Butter which they should be able to procure in that Kingdom."190 It was understood that this might involve 10,000 oxen, 15,000 hogs, and 30,000 firkins of butter. On December 17, 1740 the Victualling Commissioners forwarded a report from their correspondents in Ireland showing that between September nth and December 5th they had bought 13,160 live oxen plus 7,830 barrels of salt beef, 1,200 live hogs plus 110 barrels of salt pork, and 18,325 firkins of butter. This was enough beef to feed 34,350 men for one year, and enough butter for 52,600. The Victualling Commissioners commented that "as the Quantitys appear to be pretty considerable, and . .. Our Correspondents have We believe hitherto bought up all that has been offer'd to be sold, and being informed that the Embargo is taken off from Butter," it might be wise to give orders to the correspondents "for slacking their hands."191 The Admiralty inquired as to whether enough had 189 O'Donovan seems inclined to accept the view that the aim of an embargo was to enrich the contractors. I am not convinced. No doubt the contractors favored it, and many commanded political influence, but even with British governmental corruption in full view it is hard to picture a handful of contractors provoking so drastic a measure. The main motive may perhaps be brought into focus by asking: What would have been the point of trying to stop merchants in the British West Indies from supply­ ing victuals to the French islands without simultaneously cutting off Irish exports? The argument that the prohibitions and the embargoes failed, in fact, to deny Britain's enemies the provisions they wanted seems to me both difficult to prove and, in so far as the ministers thought it would have effect, irrelevant. If the ministers are to be blamed, it is not for their prohibition of Irish exports to the enemy, but for their failure to open the English market to them in time of war. 190 Adm. 110/12, 24 Sept. 1740, 17 Oct. 1740. In 1746 similar orders were given to the Victualling Agent at Kinsale (Adm. 110/14, 2 July 1746). 191 Adm. 110/12, 24 Sept. 1740, 17 Dec. 1740. I cannot discover why so little pork was purchased. The calculations for beef and butter are as follows: 1 Irish ox (generally smaller than English) yielded about 2 barrels of beef; 1 barrel of beef weighed 200 lbs. net (see O'Donovan, Live Stock in

8. Victualling been bought to meet the needs of the fleet at Jamaica, and five days later, on December 22nd, the Victualling Commis­ sioners were ordered to stop buying in Ireland.192 However, late in March 1741 the Admiralty was shocked to learn that, notwithstanding shipments to deployed squadrons during the autumn and winter, there were still 34,000 barrels of beef and 17,500 firkins of butter left on hand. How did it happen? The Victualling Office explained that the last report was on Decem­ ber 5th and that their letter curtailing buying (sent December 23rd) was not received by their Irish correspondents until January 2nd; even then it did not give orders to cease, but merely "for slacking their hands." On the evening of April 22nd, three Victualling Commissioners met with the Admi­ ralty Board, and there "an Order was Signed for their buying no more Provisions in Ireland of any kind."193 The navy had over­ bought. Now the question arose of how to dispose of all this beef and butter. The Victualling Commissioners wrote: "We cannot propose a better method, . . . as well with regard to (Economy, as for the keeping any part thereof, should it be sold, from falling into the Hands of an Enemy, than to expend the same in His Mys. Navall Service." Naturally, but how? Once the needs of the Mediterranean and West Indies were met, what was to be done with the rest? The cruisers in Western waters could not use much. So the Victualling Com­ missioners proposed that 10,000 barrels of beef and 8,000 fir­ kins of butter be brought to Spithead for the use of the Chan­ nel squadron. It arrived in June, too late; the squadron under Sir John Norris had sailed, victualled with English provi­ sions.194 While the transports accumulated demurrage costs, the Commissioners wondered what to do with the provisions. They asked if the Admiralty would spare some ships in Ordin­ ary for temporary stowage, since, as everyone knew, the proviIreland, pp. 104, 129). As we have seen each seaman was allowed 208 lbs. of beef a year, or roughly 1 barrel. So: 13,160 oxen Xa = 26,320 barrels. 26,320 + 7,830 = 34,350 barrels, about enough for 34,350 men for one year. 1 firkin of butter weighed 56 lbs. net. Each seaman was allowed 19 1/2 lbs. a year. So: 18,325 firkins χ 56 = 1,026,200 lbs. 19 1/2 = 52,600. ι»2 Adm. 3/45, 19 Dec., 22 Dec. 1740. iesAdm. 110/12, 24 March 1741, 4 April 1741; Adm. 3/45, 22 April 1741. ie* Adm. 110/12, 24 March 1741, 4 April 1741, 17 June 1741.

8. Victualling sions could not "be landed without being forfeited by Law."195 Thus we are treated with one of those ironic situations in eighteenth-century limited warfare. At a time when butter had grown scarce and expensive in England and the Victualling Commissioners were reduced to suggesting treacle as a substi­ tute, a large quantity of butter owned by the navy was spoiling in Ireland.19® The customs officials would not even permit Irish provisions to be stored in English naval storehouses. In 1741, obviously in a jam, the Admiralty did obtain permission from the Treasury to transship (but not land) the Irish provisions, but it is clear that this was a special concession, for when the navy found itself again with excess Irish provisions on hand in 1743, the Admiralty did not feel it could ground another request on the precedent of 1741.197 The result was that in 1743 the customs officers would not permit even the transfer of Irish provisions from the cargo vessels to men of war at Spithead. The Victualling Office obtained the Attorney General's opin­ ion that it was lawful, but the Treasury paid no attention, and in the end Irish beef and pork that had originally been judged too old for foreign service was sent to Port Mahon with instruc­ tions to the Agent there to issue what was serviceable and sell the rest.198 Customs officials, both in England and Ireland, harassed the navy throughout the war. They charged export duty on naval provisions at Cork even though there was no precedent for it.199 They began levying duty on small amounts of unex­ pended brandy, rum, rice, and oil on board ships returning from Jamaica, even though they admitted they had allowed the navy to land such before.200 In 1745 Irish customs officials enforced the embargo so strictly that the navy could not move provisions it had bought from Cork to Kinsale, and the Admi­ ralty had to ask the Secretary of State to obtain their release; even then customs officers demanded export duties and fees 19s Adm. 110/ia, 17 June 1741. ιββ Adm. 110/12, 9 April 1741. 197 Adm. 110/13, 9 May, 12 May 1743. lee Adm. 110/13, 19 Feb. 1743, 9 May, 12 May, 20 May 1743; Adm. 3/46, 10 March 1743; Adm. 3/47, 11 May, 20 May 1743. i»9 Adm. 110/12, 24 April 1741. 200 Adm. 110/13, 22 Feb. 1743.

8. Victualling from the Victualling Agent at Kinsale, claiming that until they had orders from the Treasury they could "look on him in no other light than as a Merchant."201 But notwithstanding this unprecedented stringency on the part of the customs, as the years passed the British legislature was gradually forced to understand the absurdity of its prohibition of Irish agricul­ tural products. An act of 1758 (31 Geo. II c. 28), passed in time of scarcity, was the first of a long series of acts opening up the British market to Irish agriculture.202 One consequence of this development was that by the end of the eighteenth century the navy was buying almost all of its salt beef in Ire­ land.203 We are now in a position to see how the navy was able to meet the sudden demands of the 1739 mobilization when the supplies of victuals in its storehouses ran out. On the one hand, commanders abroad had considerable opportunities for supplying themselves in emergencies through the use of bills of exchange drawn on the Victualling Office. On the other hand, most provisions could be supplied on demand in the great London market. The exceptions were biscuit and salt meat. The biscuit problem was one of manufacturing, and the Victualling Office dealt with it by adding to its own baking facilities during the war. As for salt beef and pork, which took time to prepare and could not be packed in all seasons, the navy was able to fall back on the enormous quantities pro­ duced in Ireland. PRESERVING AND PACKING

The eighteenth century could not find a simple, technical answer to the problem of premature spoilage. The ancient methods of preservation could not succeed without vigilance and care, and might not succeed even then. Of the various items salt beef and pork were the most reliable. According to 201 Adm. 3/50, si March 1745; Adm. χ 10/14, 11 March 1746, 10 May 1746. 202 See O'Donovan, Live Stock in Ireland, p. 110. 203 Beveridge, Prices and Wages, p. 549. One o£ these Irish beef con­ tracts is printed in detail in House of Commons, Reports from Commit­ tees, XIIi (1798), 534.

8. Victualling the Board, "long & Constant Experience" showed that they "held good in various Climates from one to four or five Years," unless subjected to "some Accident of Defect in the Cask, or loss of Pickle."204 Salt beef and pork might be kept in store three or four years before being sold as unserviceable.205 Butter and cheese were expected to last at least six months, and contractors were obliged to forfeit the value of any condemned by survey within six months of delivery to the Victualling Office. Ordinarily the navy did not put more than a four months' supply of each on board ships in Channel service, and a three months' supply on ships going abroad.206 The navy's beer contractors were also made to forfeit the value of all condemned within six months,207 and if it could have been relied on for that long, that would have been sufficient, be­ cause beer was bulky, and allowances were usually governed by stowage space, not spoilage. Naturally wine, brandy, and rum, with their high alcoholic content, were quite reliable. As for dry provisions, they might keep a long time, if kept clean and dry. Bread for sea was a heavy, compressed biscuit (often called bread); the ships were regularly stowed with a six months' supply of it, and six months' peas and oatmeal. But how were these to be kept dry in a ship's hold? How was butter and cheese to be kept cool? How could casks of beef be kept from knocking against one another and leaking? Seamen were all too familiar with rancid butter, rotten peas, cheese as hard as rock (Suffolk cheese was hard enough when fresh), stink­ ing and sour beer, biscuit so full of maggots and insects that it looked like raisin bread, and salt beef so hard that vigorous boiling would not soften it. Everyone familiar with ancient sea lore can call to mind some nauseating description of sea victuals. Here is one, a report from Admiral Russell in 1689: ". . . in severall of the buts of beare, great heapes of stuff was found at the bottom of the buts not unlike mens' guts, which has alaramed the seamen to a strange degre."208 204 Adm. 110/14, 8 July 1745. 205 E.g. Adm. 111/25, 22 April, 27 April 1737. 2oe Adm. 110/13, 28 Nov. 1743; Adm. 110/14, 28 June 1745; Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 35. 207 Adm. 110/15, 11 Nov. 1747. 208 Quoted by Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, n, 173.

8. Victualling The question the administrative historian must ask is: What might have been done about it? The problem of preventing adulteration and premature spoilage should be divided into three parts: first, seeing that provisions delivered by contrac­ tors were of good quality; second, preparing them carefully, and packing them in clean, sound casks; third, guarding against damage and deterioration in the ship's hold. There was not much the Victualling Ofiice could do about the third part of the problem, aside from suggesting improved methods of stowage, but the first two comprised the business of most of its employees. To the Victualling Commissioners in 1743 it seemed: "Per­ sons Contracting with the Office daily arrive at a higher Pitch of Craft and Artifice than ever, in attempting to impose on Us in the qualitys of the Species they Contract for. . . . [There is] no guard against their impositions but the Judgment, Strict attendance & Experience & Fidelity of our Officers."209 The instructions make it clear that inspecting incoming provisions was the most important duty of the heads of the various branches.210 Most of these officers, unlike the Commissioners over them, were suitably experienced; although they were appointed by the Admiralty, they were selected from names (usually three for each post) submitted by the Victualling Board, and the Board almost always recommended men who had served a considerable time as clerks and foremen in the victualling service. Once appointed, such an officer was fixed for life; he would not be dismissed except for negligence or corruption.211 On the other hand he was not promotable. He had risen as high as his occupation and social status would permit; there was little to encourage him to be honest and conscientious, and if he wished to improve his income, the best way was to accept bribes from the contractors. Naturally, we can only know of instances in which these officers were caught, but there seem to be plenty. In 1739 the Master Butcher at London was fined and warned of dismissal for receiving eight oxen judged "too thin & lean & unfit," and in 1740 the Board 209 Adm. 110/13, 19 Jan. 1743. 210 Adm. 49/59; Adm. 7/648. an E.g. Adm. 3/47, 16 Sept. 1743; Adm. 110/ia, 27 Feb. 1742; Adm. 110/13, 12 Jan. 1743, 18 Jan. 1744.

8. Victualling decided to appoint a special inspector of oxen and hogs at London, "having had frequent intimation that Oxen of an inferiour Quality . . . have of late been attempted to be served by the Contractors."212 The Master Brewer at Plymouth was ordered dismissed by the Admiralty Lords in 1743 after com­ plaints about his beer led to the discovery that he had received inferior malt; however, "their Lordps. Commiserating the Miserable Circumstances he & his Family [would] be reduced to," soon decided to give him another chance; he was up for dismissal again in 1748, but the Admiralty again let him off with a fine and a reprimand.213 The Clerk of the Mills at London was suspended in 1748 for receiving unfit wheat and "promoting a combination" among the contractors.214 The Clerk of the Bakehouse was suspended in 1742 for accepting peas "of a Moist bad quality," but was later restored on the ground that the peas in question were harvested in 1740, a bad year for the crop.215 These and other instances led the Victualling Board, late in the war, "to include a clause in all future contracts requiring the contractor to take Oath that he has not given & will not in future give any Officer, Clerk, [or] Instrument concerned in the Receipt of stores any money or other thing as a gratuity, fee, or reward for favours in or relating to the Contract."216 But this step, far from suggesting that the abuses might be curbed, suggests rather the hopeless­ ness of doing so. Still, it would be hard to prove that more than a small por­ tion of the total supplies received from the contractors was bad. It was fairly easy to detect deficiencies in items like peas, flour, wheat, and malt, and officers and clerks who cheated on such items (as to quality) must have been taking a consider­ able risk, even after allowance is made for connivance within the department. As for oxen and hogs, although there was some room for abuse, their quality on receipt was not nearly so important as what was done to the meat after slaughter. 212 Adm. 111/26, 12 Nov. 1739; Adm. 111/27,

Sept. 1740.

213 Adm. 110/13, 2 Dec. 1743; Adm. 3/47, 25 Jan., 3 Feb. 1744; Adm. 110/15, 26 Jan. 1748; Adm. 3/58, 19 Jan., 30 Jan. 1748. 214 Adm. 110/15, 1 Aug. 1748. 21B Adm. 110/12, 27 Feb. 1742. 2ie Adm. 111/34, 18 Nov. 1747·

8. Victualling Some items were very hard to inspect. Contract beer, butter, and cheese were in this category, because they were delivered to the fleet in the contractors' casks. But here the navy pro­ tected itself by not paying for any that proved unfit within six months of delivery. This procedure, in the opinion of the Victualling Board, was "the strongest Tye that [could] be thought of to induce any Contractor . . . not to issue" provi­ sions that would not "hold good."217 However, although it threatened the contractor, it provided no guarantee for the ships. Old or poor quality butter was a poor risk, but in times of scarcity the contractor was greatly tempted to supply it; the result was that in 1747 the Victualling Commissioners tried to develop a stricter system. The contractor was required to allow Victualling inspectors into his warehouse to taste the butter and mark the examined casks; he was to issue no butter to the navy unless it was so marked; any butter that spoiled within three months of delivery would cost him not only the contract price for it, but also a 50 per cent penalty; for butter that spoiled within six months, he was to pay the contract price plus the Victualling Office's expenses, if any, for "freight up & down to 8c from the out ports."218 These were severe conditions, and yet we have already seen that in the following year Robert Barnevelt, the contractor, by his own admission stocked some butter and cheese "not Saleable for home Consumption." In 1810 the man commonly credited with the invention of canning wrote: "All the imaginable means heretofore used for preserving foods or medicines are reduced to two principal methods; one in which desiccation is employed, the other in which more or less of a characteristic foreign substance is added to prevent fermentation and putrefaction."219Although this should be modified to admit the preservative action of controlled fermentation in some foods, such as cheese and beer, and the short-term value of cooling and of sealing from atmospheric corruption, on the whole the simplification holds, 217 Adm. 110/14, 25 June 1745; Adm. 110/15, 11 Nov. 1747. 218 Adm. 110/14, 28 June 1745; Adm. 111/33, 10 Nov. 1746, 4 May, 3 June, 20 July 1747; Adm. 111/34, '9 Aug. 1747. 219 Nicolas Appert, The Book for All Households or The Art of Preserv­

ing Animal and Vegetable Substances for Many Years, Paris, 1810, trans, by K. G. Bitting (Chicago, 1920), p. 1.

8. Victualling and it is the basis on which the Victualling Commissioners divided provisions into categories of "wet" and "dry." Biscuit, peas, and oatmeal were of course dry provisions. How they classified butter, cheese, and beer is not clear, for when they spoke of wet provisions, they usually meant salt beef and salt pork. In 1852 a witness told a Parliamentary committee that in all his career he had never known salt beef and pork to go bad within two years of delivery, so long as the casks remained full of pickle.220 Thus the old method, though it rendered meat hard and scarcely palatable,221 was nevertheless fundamentally reliable. Of course in the nineteenth century it was brought to a state of perfection that the salters and packers of the eighteenth century could not hope to achieve. As another witness in 1852 said, the salt meat then was "not like the same thing that it was" when he entered the navy forty years be­ fore.222 But the process for curing and packing beef and pork did not change much during the eighteenth century: after slaughter the meat was cooled, cut, salted twice with a mixture of "Newcastle" white salt and French bay salt, and packed tightly in casks filled to the brim with pickle. The pickle was made by boiling, scumming, and clarifying the "bloody pickle" that had drained from the meat; one Clerk of the Cuttinghouse suggested that pure brine might be safer, but the Vic­ tualling Board replied that the packers for the East India Company also used the "bloody pickle."223 Although the pro­ cess stayed the same, there were nevertheless many attempts to improve it, for the Victualling Commissioners were "de­ sirous of leaving no experiment or method untryed."224 They tried two experiments during the war of 1739-1748; both involved additives to the pickle. The first prescription was suggested by "an experienced Surgeon" who quoted at length from Beguin's Tyrocmium Chymicum1 a widely published, 220 Parliamentary Papers, 1852, xv, Select Committee on Preserved Meats (Navy), 66. 221 Adm. 110/13, 12 July 1743. 222 Parliamentary Papers, 1852, xv, 139. 223 Adm. 49/59

contains full

110/12, 12 Nov., 5 Dec. 1740. 224 Adm. no/12, 19 Sept. 1740.

details of

the

process;

see also

Adm.

8. Victualling early seventeenth-century chemistry text; he calculated that the stuff would not only help the meat keep longer, but also serve as "a great Specifick to prevent the Scurvy, and other malignant Diseases." The OfBce went ahead with an experi­ ment, but four and a half years later the beef in both the casks with and without the additive proved "very sweet" and satis­ factory.225 The other experiment was with "a New & Secret Method" known to a packer named William Guy. The Vic­ tualling Commissioners were reluctant to try it because Guy wanted an outrageously high royalty in case it proved success­ ful; they told the Admiralty that one of their employees, Benjamin Jones, claimed to know the "secret" substance that Guy planned to use. But the Admiralty told them to go ahead with an experiment. They packed up a considerable amount according to the three methods—theirs, Guy's, and Jones's— and scattered it all over the world, to the East Indies, the West Indies, the Coast of Africa, and so on. Unfortunately no record of the results has survived.228 The Commissioners rightly be­ lieved that the important thing was to concentrate on care­ fully performing basic operations; properly salted meat, "Packed in good Cask & well pickled" would prove as longlasting as any.227 Indeed, salt beef and pork appear to have drawn the fewest complaints from the fleet, and when justifi­ able complaint arose, the Board was quick to take action.228 With beer it was another story. A tedious search might yield a dozen complaints about salt meat during the war of 17391748, but it would be easy to fill this entire page with refer­ ences citing complaints from the fleet about beer. One captain reported that all his beer "was Condemned and thrown over­ board within a week after he Sailed," and this was not un­ common.229 In 1747 the beer in Admiral Hawke's ships went bad so quickly that they used up their water and had to shorten their cruise. The Victualling Board was told: "The Lords are extreamly dissatisfied to receive such frequent Com225 Ibid.; Adm. 3/44, 6 Oct. 1740; Adm. 110/14, 8 July 1745. 22β Adm. 3/50, 2 May 1745; Adm. 3/51, 16 July 1745; Adm. no/14, 8 July. 26 Nov. 1745, 27 Feb., ι Dec. 1746; Adm. 110/15, 3 April 1747. 227 Adm. 110/14, 8 July 1745. 228 E.g. Adm. 110/12, 5 Dec. 1740; Adm. 110/14, 1 Feb. 1746. 22β Adm. 3/51, 26 Aug. 1745.

S. Victualling plaints of the Beer .. . by which it becomes impossible to keep a Squadron at Sea."280 There had always been "frequent Instances . . . of Beer proving bad both from the King's Brewhouses and the Contractors," and the Victualling Commis­ sioners were repeatedly asked "to consider and give their opinion how those complaints [might] be prevented for the future."231 But there lay the problem. The Commissioners did not have a solution, but they had an explanation, and they offered it to the Admiralty so often that their Lordships must have grown tired of hearing it: "It has been found by long Experience, that there is no depend­ ence on the keeping of Beer brew'd in the Summer Months."232 Unquestionably, as technology then stood, brewing in hot weather was extremely hazardous because it was almost impos­ sible to control the fermentation; the commercial brewers avoided the summer months.233 But was it right for the Victual­ ling Commissioners to blame most of their troubles on summer brewing? Apparently it was. In view of the massive volume of complaints recorded in the Admiralty minutes, it is striking that nearly all came between August and November. As the Commissioners reminded the Admiralty: "[In hot weather] the Risque of Brewing is so great, that our Contractors would gladly make considerable Abatements in their annual prices, if they could be excused from it"; they knew they had to take the loss on what went bad within six months.234 And although the Commissioners readily acknowledged other possible rea­ sons for failure, they felt that, considering the number of "Miscarriages & Losses . . . in private Trade," the fact that the naval brewhouses sometimes turned out bad beer should not be "a matter of astonishment."236 Sometimes it was possible to pinpoint the blame: if the malt was poor, the beer would be "small"—weak in alcoholic content—thus "making it apt to turn Sower sooner"; and of course there would be trouble if the casks were not properly 230 Adm. 3/58, 20 Oct. 1747. Adm. 3/47, 26 Aug. 1743. 232 Adm. 110/13, 3 Sept. 1742. 233 Mathias, Brewing Industry, pp. 19, 48, 234 Adm. 110/15, 11 Nov. 1747. 2ss Adm. 110/12, 26 Oct. 1741. 231 E.g.

74.

8. Victualling cleaned, aired, and scalded after being returned from the fleet, because ships ordinarily filled their empty beer casks with salt water for ballast. These were failings that got the Plymouth Master Brewer in trouble.236 But sometimes the Victualling Commissioners simply had to confess they were "at a loss to Account for" the spoilage, for in those days there was more art than science in brewing.237 The Admiralty charged that they "too easily [gave] Credit" to the excuses offered by their brewing officers, but the Commissioners answered that the probable reason why the Master Brewer at Hartshorn submitted his resignation was that he had grown tired of their harass­ ment.238 One obvious solution lay in accumulating "as large a stock as possible in Cool Weather." But considering that sum­ mer was the time of heaviest consumption, it would have required a tremendous increase of storage facilities.239 The efforts made in this direction by the Victualling Commission­ ers were too feeble,240 and beer continued to be their most unreliable item. The Victualling Commissioners had little control over many of the causes of spoilage. For example, when William Guy suggested that his new method of curing salt meat might cut premature losses by half, they were incredulous, for they knew how often bad cask and loss of pickle were to blame: "We presume," they wrote, "that it is impossible for Mr Guy or any one else, let them use what Method they will, to prevent Meat from becoming sometimes defective by such Accidents."241 Bad casks were the Victualling Office's responsibility. Its own coopers were engaged mainly in reconditioning returned casks; new casks were bought from numerous private cooper­ ages,242 and abuses were hard to stop: during the war three 23β Adm. 110/13, 3 Dec., 19 Dec. 1743; Adm. 3/47, 22 Nov., 86 Nov., 5 Dec. 1743. 237 Mathias, Brewing Industry, pp. 19-20, 47-76, 189-191; Adm. 110 /12, 26 Oct. 1741; Adm. 110/13, 23 Sept. 1742. 238 Adm. 3/57, 16 Sept., 12 Oct., 5 Dec. 1747; Adm. 110/12, 26 Oct. 1741; Adm. 110/13, 8 Sept. 1743. 239 Adm. 110/15, 11 Nov. 1747. ζω E.g. Adm. 110/12, 29 Aug. 1740; Adm. 110/15, 1 Feb., 18 Feb. 1748. 211 Adm. 110/14, 8 July 1745. See also Adm. 110/14, 27 Feb. 1746; Adm. 110/15, 29 Feb. 1748; Parliamentary Papers, 1852, xv, 66. 242 E.g. Adm. 111/27, 9 Nov. 1741. 43Ο

S. Victualling different Master Coopers at London were fired.243 But even good casks would leak if treated roughly or stowed improperly. In such cases the meat might be saved if Agents and ships' officers quickly replenished the pickle.244 The stowage and transportation problems of all victuals were formidable: bis­ cuit, peas, and oatmeal could not stand dampness; beer could not stand agitation; butter could not stand heat; and nothing could survive prolonged contact with bilgewater. For the dry provisions the Victualling Commissioners were experimenting in the 1740's with a system for ventilating the ships' bread room.245 For the more perishable items, like beer, butter, and cheese, which could not be depended on for a long voyage, they found substitutes. But there was not much else they could do. DISTRIBUTING

The Victualling department divided ships into two cate­ gories: those in sea victualling and those in petty warrant (or harbor) victualling. Ships in petty warrant got older provi­ sions and weaker beer, but except for minor variations the weekly allowance was the same. The distinction lay mainly in the methods of issuing and accounting. Sea victualling was by far the most important. Officially every warrant for victualling a ship for sea issued from the Admiralty. Actually, the Regulations for the sea service per­ mitted any ship coming "into Port in want of Provisions" to be revictualled by warrant from a local commander-in-chief, and "in urgent Cases" the captain's warrant was enough.246 A great many warrants did in fact issue from the Admiralty (the minute books are full of them) for it was up to the Admiralty to decide each ship's destination, and that could mean a difference in the victualling plan. Ships assigned to Channel service were usually victualled for four months; ships bound to the East Indies for eight; ships bound for the west 2 *3

Adm. 110/12, 21 Oct. 1741; Adm. 3/45, 22 Oct. 1741: Adm. 110/14,

29 June 1745: Adm. 3/51, 17 July 1745; Adm. 110/14, 3/56, 24 Dec. 1746. 244 See Regulations

and Instructions

(1734), p. 67.

245 Adm. 110/13, 30 July 1743. 24β Regulations and Instructions (1734), p. 65.

22

Dec. 1746; Adm.

8. Victualling coast of Africa, the West Indies, or North America were vic­ tualled for six months, but with only three months' supply of butter and cheese and the remainder in olive oil; if bound for the Mediterranean, they were not supplied with oil, but "with Credit, or Foreign Money (if Credit cannot be had) for pro­ curing Oil abroad."247 The allowance of water cask also dif­ fered. Ships in home waters were issued one tun per hun­ dred men per month; those going abroad took on as much as they could stow. Sometimes the Admiralty's warrant gave particular directions concerning brandy, malt spirits, and other substitutes. Upon issuance of the victualling warrant the purser in­ dented with the local Agent for the provisions put aboard. At the end of the voyage this indent, together with the ship's victualling book (a record of the men victualled on board) and the inventory of unexpended and returned provisions, formed the basis for reckoning the purser's accounts.248 Essen­ tially, this was the system of issuing. The rules were hardly constricting, yet they became even looser during the war. In 174a the allowance of water cask for ships at home was dou­ bled, and in 1747 ships could have as much cask as their captains wanted.249 In 1744 a general order was given which allowed captains in home waters to take on three months' provisions, as required, without any order from the Admi­ ralty.250 In effect, during the war, the ships at home were per­ mitted to draw on Victualling Agents as freely as ships abroad did. The Admiralty was determined that there should be no delays for want of proper pieces of paper. Avoiding delays was largely a matter of maintaining ade­ quate and readily accessible stocks. This in turn depended on stowage, handling, and transporting facilities. The London Office, in spite of the fact that it had "made very few Improve247 Ibid,, p. 64. 248 For details on issuing and accounting procedure see Adm. 7/648 and the printed Pursers Instructions. To my knowledge, not many copies of the Pursers Instructions have survived; there is one, undated but issued to its recipient in 1735, in the Acton collection of the Cambridge Univer­ sity Library. 249 Adm. 110/12, 8 March 174s; Adm. 3/45, n March 1742; Adm. 3/57, 14 August 1747. 250 Adm. 3/48, 11 June 1744.

8. Victualling ments in any of its Branches . . . since the Victualling was first put into Commission [1684]," was generally able to cope with the demands made on it during the first half of the war. These demands included victualling ships fitting out and refitting in the Thames dockyards, local cruising ships, army transports, and above all loading the victuallers going out to squadrons overseas. And yet early in the war the Victualling Commis­ sioners realized they were running too close to the margin. If routine wartime demands were stretching their London facili­ ties to the limit, what would happen, they wondered, "in time of any considerable Action"? They believed it would be "impossible . . . on any sudden equipment of large Fleets of Men of War or Transports to keep pace with the other Branches of the Navy." They were already hiring "all the Warehouses" they could find near Tower Hill, and these were "scattered up and down in an inconvenient manner." The rent totaled £500 a year, to say nothing of the extra cartage costs involved. But what troubled the Commissioners most was the situation at the Tower Wharf. Their Office had "only two Cranes there to ship provs. off & to land staves, Returns of Cask & other stores." Moreover, the wharf was too small: returned provisions, empty casks, hoops, and staves required a lot of ground "to stow them on till they could be fetch'd." Since 1724 the Victualling Commissioners had been trying to gain the use of more of the wharf, but the Board of Ordnance repeatedly turned them down. They did not seek to acquire the area used by the Ordnance department for shipping, but rather the portion being used for stables, coach-houses, and a dung wharf; as they saw it, these were "trivial uses." Toward the end of 1740 they offered to build stables and coach-houses elsewhere at the Victualling's expense, but the Board of Ordnance refused. Instead it offered the use of Ordnance cranes in times of emergency. But the Victualling Commission­ ers replied that those were the very times when the Ordnance department would be least able to spare any. Another request, well supported by the Admiralty, was made in 1746, but the Ordnance Board would not budge.251 251 Adm. 110/12, 29 Nov., 9 Dec. 1740; Adm. 110/13, H May 1742; Adm. 110/14, 8 Jan., 4 March 1746.

8. Victualling Thus the London OfiBce could neither increase its ware­ house space nor its wharfage. To expand it would have to move. The war of 1739-1748 saw the beginning of the re­ moval of the OfiSce from Tower Hill to Deptford. In 1742 the Admiralty and Victualling Boards met together to discuss the possibility of buying Sir John Evelyn's estate at Deptford, called the Redhouse. The place had many advantages. It occupied eleven acres on the riverside, stretching from Cuckhold's Point to the wall of the dockyard. There was an 8oo-foot timber wharf already built, which could accommodate four vessels. There were some storehouses on the property. Al­ though about one-quarter of these had burnt beyond salvage three or four years before, some of the others remained usable, and some could be repaired. Moreover, in those days, when innovation was feared and distrusted, it was comforting to reflect that the place had been made use of by the Victualling and Transport Offices in the reign of Queen Anne. Evelyn wanted £10,000 for transfer to the Crown in fee simple.252 The arguments of the Victualling Board seemed convincing, and the Admiralty went ahead. The Admiralty asked for an esti­ mate of what it would cost, in addition to the purchase price, to make the place usable. The Commissioners came up with £4,478 7s. 6d. This would include the refurbishing of some existing storehouses, the building of a large new one, and the smoothing of the wharf and passage from the storehouse "to make a good Roling Way" (for the casks). In addition they sent "a Plan of a General Victg. OfiBce in case it [should] be judged proper at any time hereafter to erect one by little & little on that ground." The Admiralty's memorial recommend­ ing purchase of the estate went to the Council on August 16, 1742.253 The Council did not approve purchase, but Evelyn was willing to lease for £500 per annum, and by July 1743 the Victualling had taken possession.254 The Victualling Commissioners were eager to get started on 252 Adm. 110/13, 14 May, a June 1748. 25 SAdm. 3/46, 8i May 1742; Adm. 110/13, 25 June 1742; Adm. 7/340, 16 August 1742. 25* Adm. 110/13, s Dec., 23 April, 13 July 1743. Actually, there was

some slight difficulty evicting the tenants and their goods (Adm. 110/13, 14 Oct., Ii Nov., 16 Nov. 1743).

8. Victualling construction, but the Admiralty Lords were thinking far into the future; they wanted to consider "a Plan for Building an Entire Victualling Office there"; the development was to be piecemeal, but not haphazard. Such a plan, involving an esti­ mated £73,902 7j. 10 1 /2d. for construction and repairs, was submitted and approved. The priority items were a new store­ house, which would hold everything in the hired storehouses near Tower Hill, brick facing for the wharf, and a mill for grinding oatmeal.255 On these work was begun. In 1747 a new wall was built around the property, and a small cooperage for reconditioning returned casks. The same year fire destroyed the bakehouse at Rotherhithe. Bakehouses were very vulner­ able, and the navy had lost three in the last two years by fire— at Dover and Plymouth. (Since baking was hot work the work­ ers tended to drink a lot of beer and grow careless.) The Vict­ ualling Commissioners, though forced in times of shortage to bake in their ovens at Tower Hill, hated to do it because an accident might destroy the entire London Office. But at Deptford there was enough space to isolate the bakehouse from the storehouses, and so after the Rotherhithe fire of 1747 it was decided to build a new bakehouse at Deptford large enough (estimated cost £4,000) to handle all the London baking.266 This was as far as the development of the area went in the war of 1739-1748. By 1785 the entire London Office was relocated there.257 The London Office was too far up river for quick replenish­ ment of cruisers. There was a Victualling Office at Chatham, but it was no better situated for the task. Its functions were to serve the ships in petty warrant at Chatham and Sheerness and to victual newly fitted ships for sea. The Chatham Office was seldom under pressure during the war of 1739-1748 and al255 Adm. 3/47, 14 July, 26 Sept. 1743; Adm. 110/13, 8 Sept. 1743. 25β Adm. 3/57, 14 March 1747; Adm. 110/15, 9 March, 6 April, 6 May, 22 June 1747; Adm. 111/33, 22 April 1747. 257 V.C.H., Kent, n, 372. There was a fire in the new storehouse at Deptford in 1749, and it was reported that the losses ran to £200,000. The V.C.H. (p. 373) says the figure was "probably a great exaggeration"; it was wildly exaggerated, since the damage could hardly have exceeded the £3,600 cost of the building plus the Victualling Board's estimate of £1,500 for loss of stores (Adm. 110/13, 8 Sept. 1743; Adm. 110/15, 16 Jan.

»749)·

4S5

8. Victualling most nothing was done to improve its facilities.258 Since Sheerness was an operating base, one might have expected the navy to have established a Victualling depot there. The idea was considered in the 1690's, but rejected because it was "a damp place, unfit for dry provisions" and there was no place to build storehouses without incurring the tremendous expense of lay­ ing foundations "in the ooze and mud."259 In 1745 a small depot at Harwich was planned, but nothing came of it.260 In­ stead, the navy relied on the guardship at the Nore for emer­ gency issues: the Royal Sovereign was kept heavily stocked so that cruisers calling at the Nore might be supplied on de­ mand2®1 The rendezvous in the Downs was served by the Dover Office. It was a small establishment of ancient standing, and between 1744 and 1746, when the invasion scare caused a large concentration of ships there, it could not take the load and had to be assisted by London.262 The most important Victualling outports were Portsmouth and Plymouth, and the facilities at both expanded during the eighteenth century. The Portsmouth and Plymouth Offices were, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, little more than depots—storehouses plus a cooperage—except that they operated their own slaughtering and packinghouses. During the century they added their own breweries and bakeries. For in the era before the technological revolution in food proc­ essing any complete Victualling installation possessed store­ houses, a cooperage, a packinghouse, a brewery, and a bakery. Local meatpacking was adopted because it was much easier and cheaper to buy live cattle than ship salt beef; also there was the advantage of freshness. Again, in the case of brewing it was the bulkiness of the finished product that determined the matter. As for bread and biscuit, freshness was a more im­ portant consideration than shipping space, since dry provi­ sions nearly always deteriorated when shipped by water. 258 The only improvement requested was a small additional storehouse (Adm. 110/13, a6 August 1741). 259 See Merriman, Sergison Papers, pp. 239-242. 260 Adm. 110/14, 14 May, 10 June, 3 July 1745. 2βι See Adm. 3/48, 17 Sept., 20 Sept. 1744; Adm. 3/54, 21 April 1746. 202 Adm. 3/48, 3 March 1744; Adm. 110/13, 5 March 1744; Adm. 3/52, 7 Dec. 1745; Adm. 110/14, 2 Jan. 1746.

8. Victualling The Portsmouth Office was, next to London, the most active. At the beginning of the war it had an ample packinghouse, but no bakery or brewery. The reason was that it had always obtained bread, biscuit, and beer by local contract. We have already seen that in 1739 the Victualling Commissioners thought it unwise to rely entirely on the contract bakers at Portsmouth. The Office there got its own bakehouse, with six ovens, early in the war, and in 1744 a new mill was added be­ cause the risks of fraud were much greater in buying meal than in buying grain.263 After the war the Crown purchased a brewery at Gosport.264 At Plymouth the risks and disadvantages of relying on con­ tractors became apparent much earlier. Contract beer at Ply­ mouth was inferior and expensive. Since the time of Queen Anne the navy had rented a brewhouse there, but it was too small, and in 1733 construction was begun on a new brewhouse on the Cornish side of the Hamoaze at South Down, near the mouth of Millbrook Creek. It could brew 80 tuns a week, and vessels could conveniently load at a nearby wharf on any high tide.265 Nevertheless, the Plymouth brewhouse could not keep up with the wartime demands of the fleet, and the capacity at South Down, both for brewing and storage, had to be much enlarged.266 The bread situation was scarcely better. In April 1741 the Admiralty ordered the Victualling Board to build a bakehouse on ground situated between the Office and the town. The work progressed slowly, and finally halted when the building contractor died. In 1743 the Victualling Board got it going again, and took the occasion to ask the Admiralty's permission to build a wharf near the new building. They also mentioned that their slaughterhouse at Plymouth was falling apart.267 Indeed, when the war began all the buildings were "in 263 Adm. 110/12, 15 Aug. 1739, 27 June 1740; Adm. 110/13, 11 March, 11 Nov. 1743; Adm. 3/47, 16 Nov. 1743; Adm. 110/14, 16 Nov. 1744. 2β4 Mathias, Brewing Industry, pp. 201-202. 2β5 Ibid., pp. 201, 203; Queen Anne's Navy, p. 280; Adm. 110/13, 8 Oct. 1742. 5 Dec. 1743. 2 ^eAdm. 110/12, 21

Oct. 1741; Adm. 3/46, 14 Sept., 15 Sept. 1742; Adm. Sept., 8 Oct. 1742; Adm. 3/46, 8 Oct. 1742; Adm. 110/14, 13 May, 19 Dec. 1746; Adm. 3/54, 15 May 1746; Adm. 110/15, >5 J Iy 1747· 2β7 Adm. 110/12, 20 Jan., 27 March, 4 Nov. 1741; Adm. 110/13, 8 Sept. 1743· 110/13, 16

u

8. Victualling a ruinous and shattered condition," for they had been used by the Victualling service even before the Plymouth Dockyard was established. However, any extensive project was bound to open the question of whether the existing installation should be repaired and improved, or the whole Office relocated. It was an old question. The Victualling Commissioners had raised it in 1740; in fact, as they said, "all former Commrs. of the Victualing" back to the time the dockyard was built had questioned the suitability of the site, because the new dockyard put the fleet far away in the Hamoaze Estuary.268 It would have been odd if Admiralty and Victualling Boards that were at this time engaged in boldly mapping out a new Office at Deptford had ignored the situation at Plymouth. The main part of the Office was located near the town of Plymouth at a place called the Lamhay, under the walls of the citadel on the northeast side, stretching along the waterfront to the Barbican. The area was not spacious, and vessels of more than thirty tons could not load provisions at the wharves except "after half flood." There seemed to be no reason why the navy should develop a site where the existing buildings could be discarded with scant loss, where the waterfront would require expensive improvement, where the ground afforded little room for expansion, and where ships, though under ur­ gent sailing orders, could not obtain provisions because it was not safe for their boats to cross the Sound in foul weather.269 Therefore in 1743 the Admiralty asked the Victualling Com­ missioners to draw up an assessment of the entire situation of facilities at Plymouth, and this was done. The assessment made it plain that the present layout was bad. The problem was to find a new site, a "Commodious Place at or near the Hamoaze."270 Richard Hall of the Victualling Board went to Plymouth to study the possibilities. They boiled down to two areas. One was the Millbrook Creek area—either on the brew­ ery side (South Down), or across the Creek at Empacombe, near Mt. Edgcumbe. There was plenty of good, dry land, it would be easy to develop the waterfront, and the site was close see Adm. 110/12, ag Aug. 1740; Adm. 110/13, 5 Dec. 1743. 2β9 Adm. no/ia, ag Aug. 1740; Adm. 3/44, 3 Sept. 1740; Adm. 110/13, 5 Dec. 1743; P.R.O., Maps and Plans, 1, 154. 27« Adm. 3/47, 26 Sept., 5 Dec. 1743; Adm. 110/13, 5 Dec. 1743.

8. Victualling to the ships fitting out. Twice before, once in 1707 and again in 1722, the Crown had actually ordered the erection of a new Office on this site, but both times the order was withdrawn. Although the town of Plymouth was hostile, the main objec­ tion to this plan was that it would put the Office on the Corn­ ish side of the Hamoaze. Since "the greatest part of the Cat­ tle" brought to the Plymouth Office for slaughter were "the produce of Devon," they would either have to be ferried across or driven round the Tamar; in either case it would mean greater expense and possible delays. Another objection was that orders by post from London would be slower in reaching the Office. Therefore Richard Hall, in 1745, sought a location on the Devonshire side, east of the dockyard, but in this area there were the problems of fresh-water supply and of prepar­ ing the ground, which was largely tidal mud.271 With Hall's indecisive report the matter rested until May 1745 when the Admiralty awoke to the fact that nothing was being done to finish the bakehouse ordered built four years earlier. And as the Admiralty, toward the end of the war, grew anxious to service more and more ships at Plymouth, considerations of the future were pushed aside by immediate requirements. Or­ ders were given to rebuild the slaughterhouse at the Lamhay, build a new wharf, add numerous storehouses and sheds, and build another bakehouse (in addition to the one ordered in 1741) because "the Bread . . . bought from Contractors to the Westward [was] not near so good as [that] . . . made in His Majtys. Bakehouses" and that "sent from the Eastward" was sometimes "long Waterborne" in passage. It was also de­ cided to build a storehouse at South Down from which ships might be supplied in bad weather and emergencies.272 After these improvements the idea of moving the Office from the Lamhay became less attractive, and it remained there until the great Royal William Victualling Office was built on filled ground at Stonehouse (on the Devonshire side between the 271 Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 280-281, 284-285; Adm. 110/13, 5 Dec. 1743; Adm. 3/47, 8 Dec. 1743; Adm. 110/14, u March 1745. 272 Adm. 110/14, 11 March 1745, 13 May 1746; Adm. 110/15, !5 Juty 1747; Adm. 3/50, 21 May 1745; Adm. 3/51, 23 Aug. 1745; Adm. 3/54, 15 May 1746; Adm. 3/57, 3 April, 16 Aug. 1747.

8. Victualling dockyard and town of Plymouth) between 1828 and 1835.273 Delays in supplying beer and bread were usually caused by insufficient production, and we have seen that during the war improvements at the Victualling establishments were primarily aimed at increasing the output of these two items. But gener­ ally delays were due to shipping failures, arising either from scarcity of working vessels or from interruption by adverse winds and enemy threats. Of course there was a relationship between facilities and shipping requirements: local produc­ tion, plus convenient and ample storage space, though they usually involved larger inventories and higher costs, naturally lessened the degree of dependence on shipping. This held true whether it was a ship in the Hamoaze replenishing at nearby South Down instead of the Lamhay, or a squadron in the Mediterranean calling at Port Mahon instead of worrying over the fate of periodic shipments from England. But there were limits; from a practical standpoint none of the Victualling ports, save London, could be made entirely self-supporting. In 1746 the Victualling Board reminded the Admiralty that there was little point in going ahead with the improvements at Plymouth unless regular convoys were scheduled for ship­ ments "from the Eastern ports."274 And in times of stress the critical importance of shipping was everywhere evident; there never seemed to be enough vessels at hand. The invasion threat of 1745-1746 illustrates this. It was un­ questionably one of those times of "considerable Action" dreaded by the Victualling Commissioners, in which the in­ adequacy of their London facilities would surely be revealed. The London Office was called upon, in addition to its routine services, to victual an unusual number of troop transports, a large squadron in the Downs, and a squadron cruising off Scotland. Naturally there were delays, and the Commissioners were asked to explain them.275 And while it is true that they mentioned the bottleneck at Tower Wharf (as they had pre­ dicted, the Board of Ordnance turned them down when they asked permission to use the Ordnance cranes), they made it 273 Queen Anne's Navy, p. 285 n. 1; Murray's Handbook for Travellers in Devon and Cornwall (6th edn., 1865), p. 75. 274 Adm. 110/14, >3

May

1746·

275 E.g. Adm. 3/58, 8 Jan.

1746.

44Ο

8. Victualling clear that the main difficulty was shipping. The Office's own vessels were fully employed. Some were on loan to the Dover Agent because a year before some bold French privateers had snatched away a Dover hoy and a water boat.276 In the Thames the "demand for Small Craft," largely the result of naval re­ quirements, was so great that it was almost impossible to hire them "at any Rate." On top of this, financial difficulties had forced the government to stop payments on the Victualling Course, which meant that Victualling freight bills quickly be­ came subject to heavy discounts. Under the circumstances, the only way the Commissioners could get vessels was to impress them and pay ready money. It was essential, they told the Ad­ miralty, that something should be done about freight bills. Three months later the contractor for Victualling lighterage at London underlined their point by giving warning on his contract, and it quickly became clear that no one else wanted the business unless paid by interest-bearing bills.277 These financial troubles were temporary, but shipping was always a problem. Because requirements were irregular, be­ cause plans were always being upset by uncontrollable factors, the business could not be reduced to routine. The Hoytaker's branch always seemed to be moving from one crisis to ahother, and its affairs repeatedly engaged the attention of the whole Board. In spite of heavy government demands it does not appear that there was an over-all scarcity of tonnage in wartime, thanks to the reduction of commercial business. For the ship­ ping industry in war was plagued by high costs, and the chief cause of high costs was the difficulty and expense of mann­ ing.278 One would assume that this situation played into the government's hands, since vessels hired for war services could readily obtain protections for their crews. And in fact it seems that such vessels seldom had difficulty getting seamen.279 Similarily, the Office's own vessels were easily manned at wage rates below the market level. Even though the Victualling 27β Adm. 110/14, 19 Jan. 1745. 277 Adm. 110/14, g Jan., 11 April 1746. 278 See Davis, Rise of Shipping Industry, p. 320. 279 χ have discovered only two instances of difficulty during the war; Adm. 110/12, 9 Sept. 1741; Adm. 110/13, 3 March 1743.

8. Victualling Board had to raise its pay for able bodied seamen to 35 shill­ ings a month in 1742,280 still able seamen could earn more elsewhere. They accepted the government's 35 shillings because they enjoyed a constant protection from impressment. It is therefore interesting to find the Victualling Commis­ sioners complaining that shipping was hard to get, that ship­ owners accepted government business as a last resort, as some­ thing to be avoided if they could get "other more beneficial Employment."281 It is difficult to explain why. Probably delayed payment on freight bills was a factor; it unquestionably was in 1746. However, for a good part of the war, discount rates were calculable. The most likely explanation is that the gov­ ernment was slow in adjusting its rates and terms of hire to meet wartime market conditions. For example, in January 1741, a year and a half after the war began, the Victualling Com­ missioners were still trying to get shipping for Jamaica on a tonnage basis. On this occasion they got only one-sixth of what they needed, although investigation showed that there was no scarcity. The trouble was with the terms—the owners wanted compensation for the expensive delays which sailing in con­ voy always involved—and the solution was to hire vessels on a monthly basis for the entire voyage, out and back.282 This is not to imply that the Victualling Commissioners refused to meet the market price of shipping. When pressed they were capable of ordering their Agents "to procure freight if to be had on any Terms, rather than suffer the service to be de­ layed."283 But they were slow; their conservatism, their anxiety to keep costs down, their frequently expressed fear of being imposed upon—these things did not fit them to deal in a rapidly fluctuating market. This same spirit led them to haggle 280 Adm. 110/12, 4 Jan. 1742. 281 Adm. 110/13, 22 Nov. 1743. 282 Adm. 110/12, 26 Jan., 31 Jan. 1741; Adm. 3/45, 29 Jan. 1741. Davis (Rise of Shipping Industry, pp. 329-332) calls the government's rates "reasonable," suggests that the reluctance may have been a tactical pose —which it may sometimes have been—and cites "one real and important objection to dealing with the government": the discount rate. His evidence on the discount rate is entirely drawn from the period before 1714, a pe­ riod in which high and unpredictable rates were undoubtedly the main cause. But the shipowners' reluctance continued after 1714, during periods when Navy and Victualling bills were regularly paid. 283 Adm. no/14, 19 Jan. 1745.

8. Victualling over the price of a new and badly needed hoy for Portsmouth until finally all the builders there became occupied with other work.284 The manning problem, which affected so many branches of naval administration, also added to the difficulties of the vic­ tualling service. The fact that seamen employed in the service were constantly protected from impressment afforded a valu­ able recruiting advantage, but every once in a while a pro­ tection would be ignored by a press gang, and instantly the situation was transformed. Until the victim was released and confidence restored, activity in the area would all but cease: crews of the Office hoys stayed ashore, and it was impossible to hire private vessels because they could not get crews either.285 Far more important was the greater burden which the mann­ ing problem threw on the Office's harbor shipping. As the war progressed Agents were increasingly called upon to deliver water to the ships. Delivering victuals had always been the responsibility of the Office, but watering was not, and water was one of the bulkiest items. The Agents protested and the Com­ missioners in London protested: "The Officers of His Majtys. Fleet seem inclined, altho the Watering their Ships has hith­ erto been always look't upon as part of their Duty, to make use of every pretext to throw that service upon this Office, with­ out considering perhaps, the Expence." In the previous war, they said, ships at the outports had never taken on water at the expense of the Office.286 But the Admiralty, though it grew irri­ tated with captains who made no effort to help themselves, al­ ways ordered the Victualling department to deliver water if requested by the captains. Such orders were, of course, neces­ sitated by the threat of desertion.287 Major victualling failures were rare in the war of 1739-1748, but when they occurred it was almost always because some­ thing went wrong after the Victualling Office had completed its part of the job. In August 1741, for example, the Plymouth 284 Adm. 110/14, 5 Nov. 1744. 285 E.g. Adm. 110/12, ia March, 10 June

1741; Addl. MSS.

19031,

folio 224, 8 Oct. 1746. 286 Adm. 110/14, 1 April, 19 March 1745. 287 Adm. 3/49, 18 Jan. 1745: Adm. 3/50, 2 March 1745; Adm. 3/54, 21 April 1746; Adm. 110/15, 28 Sept. 1748.

8. Victualling OfBce ran out of bread, flour, butter, and cheese. Naturally the Admiralty wanted to know why, and the Victualling Commis­ sioners managed to lay the blame at the Admiralty's door. The provisions were all at Spithead, they explained, awaiting a convoy and a fair wind. And they added: "Unless a Convoy be kept constantly running Backwards 8c forwards with every Shift of Wind between the Downs 8c Plymouth it will be impos­ sible for Us to keep the Western Ports constantly 8c regularly furnish'd."288 Such difficulties on a grand scale characterized the problem of distributing victuals to squadrons and bases overseas. It was a problem that involved not only shipping, but also strategy and communications, and in struggling with it the administrators groped in the dark: they worked from in­ ventory reports that were months out of date; they could not calculate the amount of spoilage; they could not be sure that the latest shipment was not lost to the enemy or the elements. But they followed a method which, in view of the uncertain­ ties, made sense and generally proved successful. The process began with an exchange of information be­ tween the Admiralty and Victualling Boards. For illustration let us assume they were discussing a shipment to the West Indies. Only the Admiralty was in a position to estimate the number of seamen that would be stationed there during the months ahead, and it was up to the Admiralty also to appoint men of war for convoy and set a date of departure. The Vic­ tualling Commissioners suggested the quantities that should be sent. They were guided by the latest reports of inventories afloat and ashore: one from the commander-in-chief (the rou­ tine "state of the ships" report), the other from their Jamaica Agent. Naturally the reports did not reach London regularly; the Commissioners also had to take into account recent ship­ ments not yet received at Jamaica and to apply their general knowledge of spoilage rates in the area.289 With this informa­ tion the Admiralty would decide, let us say, that four months' provisions for 6,500 men would be sent under convoy on a particular date; thereupon the Victualling Board would be 288 Adm. 110/12, vj-Aug. 1741. 289 For a table showing the Office's estimate of the state of victualling on Jamaica station see Adm. 110/12, 13 May 1741.

8. Victualling ordered to take up shipping. Sometimes Victualling Commis­ sioners would attend an Admiralty Board meeting and the de­ cision would be made in consultation;290 however, in the ab­ sence of special problems or urgent requests from abroad the business would ordinarily be done by correspondence. In fact, it was often a matter of routine. The East Indies situation was so far beyond control that there was seldom anything to discuss; the usual procedure was to send eight months' supply with every outbound Company fleet, if the Company agreed to take it all.291 The Mediterranean situation was almost the opposite, and it was ordinarily so well under control that it could be reduced to routine. Communications were much more rapid; inventory reports were therefore more frequent and reliable; and spoilage problems were less severe. Even though the navy had 18,000 men in the Mediterranean in 1742 and 1743, supplies were ordered out regularly about every six months.292 But the West Indies were neither close enough for reliable reports nor so far away as to put impending dis­ asters beyond remedy. Understandably the victualling of the West Indian fleet gave rise to more anxiety than any other service, and occasionally victuals were sent to Jamaica without convoy in "runners"—large, armed merchantmen.293 Success obviously hinged on the execution of the schedule. What sort of timetable were they working with? Again, we may use the West Indies as an example. On October 22, 1743 the Victualling Commissioners calculated that inventories afloat and ashore at Jamaica would probably be exhausted during March 1744 and suggested that shipping should be taken up immediately for another four months' supply.294 It generally took a week, sometimes two, for the Admiralty and Victualling Boards to reach a decision. Then vessels had to be hired and loaded. Except when Irish provisions were used the overseas squadrons were supplied from the London Office, "the Provi­ sions ... being better,"295 and it took at least "six Weeks to get 280 E.g. Adm. 3/45, 83 Nov. 1740, 11 May 1741; Adm. 3/46, 9 Aug., 12 Aug. 174a. 281 E.g. Adm. 110/14, >7 Nov. 1746; Adm. 3/58, 1 Jan. 1748. 292 Adm. 3/46, 17 June, 9 Dec. 1742; Adm. 3/47, 12 May, 23 Nov. 1743. 28S E.g. Adm. 110/12, 12 March 1741; Adm. 110/14, 9 Jan- *745· 294 Adm. 110/13, 22 Oct. 1743. 295 Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 11.

8. Victualling . . . [victuallers] round to Spithead after their being hyred even should they not wait at all for Convoys."296 This left two or three months for the voyage to Jamaica. That might be plenty, but in some seasons of the year it was not uncommon for convoys to be detained in the Channel by contrary winds for three or four weeks. The navy had to allow a broad mar­ gin for delay, for obviously superabundance was the only in­ surance against the uncertainties. And yet the schedule could not be moved ahead very far. It might have been wise, though expensive, to maintain large stocks of naval stores at the over­ seas bases, but this did not hold for victuals because they spoiled. The answer was not bigger, but more frequent ship­ ments. And although the Victualling Commissioners favored such a policy, the Admiralty did not, because it meant tying up even more ships of war in convoy duty. When it came to Jamaica, where provisions spoiled quickly in the heat, the Commissioners insisted that four months was the maximum interval.297 And in 1741, when the West Indian fleet mustered 16,000 men, they felt it would be impossible "to get at any particular times such large Proportions of Provisions before­ hand" and that the method "least lyable to Delays or Disap­ pointments" would be "to go on dayly providing and Ship­ ping Provisions for this Service, and that Convoys should be Ordered to Sail every Two Months" with what was ready.298 The shipments to the Mediterranean, where spoilage posed fewer problems, were larger. As we have said, they went out every six months like clockwork. But the six months' supply for Admiral Mathews's 16,000 men, ordered on December 5, 1743 to sail on January 20, 1744, did not sail on that date, though the victuallers were loaded and ready.299 The convoy did not sail until three months later, April 23rd; it was de­ tained partly by contrary winds, but mostly by the threat of a superior French squadron operating out of Brest. What, the Admiralty asked the Victualling Commissioners in early March, would be the fate of Mathews's fleet if the victuallers were de­ layed much longer? They replied: "We are apprehensive it 2ββ Adm. 110/14, 29 March 1745. 28? Adm. 110/13, 14 June 1742, 82 Oct. 1743. 298 Adm. 110/12, 31 Jan. 1741. 299 Adm. 3/47, 12 Dec. 1743; Adm. no/13,

8

Feb.

1744.

8. Victualling would throw the Fleet . . . into the utmost Distress being humbly of Opinion that the Admiral would not be able to get Sufficient Supplys . . . anywhere in those parts." According to the latest reports, Mathews had at Port Mahon, Gibraltar, and afloat enough to last him until about the third week in April. After that, they assumed his ships would have to scatter "for their Subsistance, where they would probably consume such Supplys as they might be able to meet with as fast as they [could] Collect them."300 On May 3rd the victuallers arrived safely at Lisbon, but they remained there beyond Mathews's reach until August 30th, when they were shifted to Gibraltar by Admiral Balchen's squadron. They did not join the Medi­ terranean fleet until the third week in October.301 It was un­ questionably the greatest victualling failure of the war, and the Victualling Office had nothing to do with it. "It hath been an old and great dispute which is the best way of victualling, whether by particular men as contractors at a certain rate, or by the State themselves upon account." So wrote John Hollond in 1659.302 Seventeenth-century naval ad­ ministrators argued and experimented, but they could not find a solution to the victualling problem because they were forced to work with too little money. Those who favored contracting could not get out of their minds how incompetent servants of the state usually were in business matters when compared with great merchants like Josiah Child and Thomas Papillon, who were members of the victualling syndicate in 1671. If such men made a profit, the argument ran, that ought to be con­ sidered a small insurance premium against the unlimited charges which the state's own servants might run up through corruption and carelessness. Contractors would victual the navy well, if only the government would stop making them carry its debts. There was nothing wrong with the system that would not be cured by the government's keeping its part of the bargain. The opponents of contracting, on the other hand, found it easy to discover benefits for the contractors and hard soo Adm. 3/48, 5 March 1744; Adm. no/13, 7 March 1744. sol Richmond, n, 86, 96-99, 109, 125-127, 236. 202 Tanner, Hollond's Discourses, p. 154.

δ. Victualling to discover any for the navy. John Hollond was convinced that contracting made no sense. As he saw it, the interests of the contractors and the interests of the navy were irreconcilable. There might be corruption in any system, but in contracting corruption was inevitable: the profit-motive infected everyone concerned; sea officers were continually tempted to make deals with the contractors. The result was that there was no one in the victualling organization thinking of the service, "for men are men, and may and will be tempted, and the victualler's contract hath enough in it to make . . . a lame man leap—I mean to endear and engage men of all ranks, both in parlia­ ment, council of state, commission of the admiralty, commit­ tee of the navy and commissioners under them to the interest of the contractor."303 The administrators of Charles II's navy, well aware that victualling was one of their weakest opera­ tions, shuffled the contracting arrangements, changed contrac­ tors, and all to little effect.304 It seemed to Pepys that whenever anything went wrong the contractors always managed to ex­ cuse themselves by blaming late payment from the Excheq­ uer.305 And yet putting the victualling under government management in 1684 did not produce much improvement. When war broke out in 1689 the Commissioners failed miser­ ably. They did not provide enough, and much of what they did provide was bad; the fleet was consequently forced off station in the middle of its first campaign. The House of Com­ mons that convened in November 1689 was in an uproar, and the Commissioners were summoned to appear before it. Wil­ liam III tried to put the victualling back out to contract, then reconsidered, and by offering a £1000 salary persuaded Thomas Papillon to sit at the head of the Victualling Board.308 Although Papillon was an experienced and able man, during the war the Channel fleet was nevertheless frequently put to short allowance. It did not matter much what system was used while money remained short. But however irrelevant to the problem of the seventeenth century, government management was an essential ground­ work for the improvement of the service in the eighteenth. As sos Ibid., pp. 154-169. so* Tanner, Catalogue, 1, 156.

S05 Ibid., p. 178. pp. 314-316.

soe Ehrman,

8. Victualling long as money remained insufficient, buying would remain the key to the victualling problem, and that being so, there was much to be said for putting the business into the hands of experienced contractors. Government management could be of no value unless the government could develop a body of skilled managers, and there was no denying that the Vicualling Office in its early days was a very loosely run organiza­ tion. There was practically no check on the dealings of the Agents; their purchases went largely unaudited, and they were allowed to keep their own payroll (until the dockyard quarterbook system was introduced in the victualling service in 1703). In reality they were not governed by any effective set of in­ structions until 1706.307 Quite rightly many men wondered whether a government pressed for funds could afford a vic­ tualling organization that was not under the discipline of profit and loss. But when money ceased to be the main con­ sideration, as it did in the eighteenth century, then attention came to be focussed on reliable service rather than shrewd buying. The fleet wanted uniform quality, dependable sources of supply, abundant reserves, and extensive distributing ser­ vices—things which no contractor could be expected to pro­ vide. If, as Thomas Corbett said, the Victualling Commission was "instituted in hopes of cheapness," that was because it was impossible for any seventeenth-century administrator to ignore the question of expense. But that was not why the Com­ mission continued. It continued, regardless of expense, in order to provide better service. To meet the rising standards of service the government augmented its facilities for packing, baking, brewing, stowing, handling, and shipping. It learned to provide more than enough and to accept waste as an unavoidable consequence of preparedness. It began to expect regular reports in order to detect developing shortages as early as possible.308 It became insoT Corbett MSS. xiv, folios 20-21. 808 One of the disadvantages of the Jamaica contract was that there was no way the government could find out how things stood. In 1741 when the Admiralty wanted the Victualling Commissioners to answer with "the utmost Exactness" questions like "When did provisions last arrive at Jamaica?" and "When will more be sent out?" they replied that they did not know and that Messrs. Mason and Simpson did not know either (Adm. 110/12, 31 Jan. 1741). See also Adm. 110/14, 25 May 1744.

8. Victualling creasingly interested in ways of getting admirals, captains, and pursers out of the victualling business. The less sea officers and provisions contractors saw of one another the better. And the fewer private transactions by sea officers the better. Corbett wished there might be "either Agents or Contractors in all parts of the World" where naval ships called, for when officers victualled their own ships it was often both bad for the crew and bad for the service. The men suffered because they had to take whatever their commanders chose to buy; and the ser­ vice suffered because it put "into the Captain's head thoughts not so much of keeping the Sea, and doing Service against the Enemy, as seeking out for a good Market & loitering in Port, to provide Provisions for the ship."309 It is not to be supposed that the new standards of service were always met or that any extraordinary effort was made to meet them. Government management certainly did not confer purity and vitality on the victualling service, but the new standards that it made possible were of great benefit to the fleet. The eighteenth-century expansion of victualling adminis­ tration was aimed at improving the quality and distribution of the traditional range of victuals. The administrators were not inclined to meddle with the diet. The Victualling Com­ missioners disclaimed knowledge of dietary matters, and the Admiralty, the sea officers, and most of the experts were too much influenced by the notion that the diet's only bad feature was excessive salt. Moreover, no one was eager to tell the sea­ man what he should eat: the administrators were reluctant to make him eat green vegetables and afraid to limit his beer. Of course, in effect a very rigid diet was imposed, but no one looked at it that way, least of all the seaman. Like so many things in the eighteenth century, the diet had become an ancient right, and it was all the more difficult to modify for that reason. The growing expense of the new services made eighteenthcentury Victualling Commissioners uneasy. They felt that their main responsibility was to prevent abuses and to keep down costs, and for this they can hardly be blamed since it was the dominant theme of their instructions.310 Hence they often tried so9 Corbett MSS. xiv, folios 48-49.

sl°

See above p. 58.

8. Victualling to see reforms and improvements in terms of stamping out abuse: they wanted to build more storehouses because it would enable them to receive and issue all provisions them­ selves, and thus eliminate corrupt transactions between sea officers and contractors;311 they wanted their own bakehouses not only to insure quality and dependability, but also to pre­ vent price-fixing combinations among the biscuit dealers. But by eliminating abuse they were often improving service, and either way one chose to view it, it could cost money. Their view was not always negative. When justifying the proposed facilities at Deptford they admitted that "very large sums" were involved, with few possibilities of offsetting savings. But they thought the expense had to be weighed "against the great Advantages the Service would reap" and wondered "whether it would not be more advisable to be at any extraordinary charge of that kind, than to hazard the frustrating any one great Expedition or Design by delay."312 This was exceptional; they never spent eagerly, and of most extra expenses they were skeptical. The Admiralty forced them to spend. For example, the Commissioners opposed private buying of fresh meat for the Mediterranean squadron on the ground that it invited costly abuse, but the Admiralty overruled them. In fact, not­ withstanding the expansion of the victualling department, purchases abroad were as heavy in the war of 1739—1748 as they had ever been. Mathews's fleet did not starve in 1744 when the victuallers from England were delayed. Though it went to short allowance, it was not even forced off station. For Mathews had no trouble buying wine, oil, bread, and rice locally, and by threatening to leave the coast of Italy he also got the Sardinian government to make available emergency supplies of fresh meat.313 His bills of exchange drawn on the Victualling Office were readily accepted, as they were the world over. In no other branch of naval administration was the impact of the government's recently developed financial power so strikingly demonstrated. 311 See Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 298-300. •312 Adm. 110/13, 14 May 1742. 313 Adm. 1/381, 4 April 1744; Richmond, 11, 126.

Gentlemen have continued strangers to it [the Ordinary estimate of the navy], not that it requires any intense ap­ plication or exalted abilities, but because the circumstances of their lives, and the situation of their affairs, have af­ forded them no opportunity of . . . obtaining any informa­ tion of maritime affairs; . . . this ignorance, Sir, however excusable, has had very dangerous consequences, it has given the commissioners and officers of the navy an authority with­ out limits, it has given them a power which majesty itself has always been denied, of disposing of the public money with­ out a reason for their demands, and without an account of their expences. Gentlemen have been ashamed to deny the supplies which were required as necessary, without assigning a reason for their refusal, and have been afraid of attempt­ ing to reason upon a subject which they had not studied, and which they might think impossible for them to study with success. . . . But for what end do we sit here? Is it to give a sanction to the wildest calculations, and grant sup­ plies without asking how they are made use of? LORD BALTIMORE, Addressing the House of Commons, 1740 1

The ordinary expence of the greater part of modern govern­ ments in time of peace being equal or nearly equal to their ordinary revenue, when war comes, they are both unwilling and unable to increase their revenue in proportion to the increase of their expence. They are unwilling, for fear of offending the people, who by so great and so sudden an increase of taxes, would soon be disgusted with the war; and they are unable, from not well knowing what taxes would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted. The facility of borrowing delivers them from the embarrassment which this fear and inability would otherwise occasion. ADAM SMITH, 17762

HE NAVY was the greatest of the government spending departments. Occasionally the army spent more in a given year than the navy, but very seldom. Besides, army organiza1 Pari. Hist., XI, 404-406.

2 Wealth of Nations, 11, 455.

g. Naval Finance tion was decentralized; the administrative responsibilities of the War Office were nothing to those of the three naval offices. Any study of the administration of public expenditure in the eighteenth century would necessarily have the navy as its centerpiece. And, no doubt, it is because the techniques and problems involved in the administration of spending cannot be properly generalized, whereas those of revenue collection can, that we have some admirable and detailed studies of the latter and almost none of the former.8 Studies of Treasury administration have necessarily had to avoid the subject of departmental spending.4 In fact, there are only two works that deal in depth with naval expenditure, and both of them are concerned with the period between 1689 and 1714.5 It may be surmised that the administration of naval spending constitutes in itself a subject for a book; however, there is only space here for a brief sketch. This has meant that an interesting aspect of that administration has had to be neglected, namely, depart­ mental accounting. It would not be difficult to outline the way in which naval accounting was intended to function, but it would be impossible to present a trustworthy evaluation of its effectiveness in practice without discussing the subject at length.® Instead, this chapter will describe the conditions s I refer particularly to: E. E. Hoon, The Organization of the English Customs System, 1696-1786 (New York, 1938); E. Hughes, Studies in Ad­ ministration and Finance, 1558-1825 (Manchester, 1934); and W. R. Ward, The English Land Tax in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1953). * J. E. D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration (Oxford, 1958) offers a useful discussion of naval spending from the point of view of the Treasury. J. G. Sperling, "Godolphin and the Organization of Public Credit, 1702-1710," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1954 includes an admirable and lengthy chapter on naval expenditure, but its attention is confined mostly to naval income and Navy Board purchasing. S. B. Baxter wrote in his Development of the Treasury (1957) that any worthwhile attempt to deal with departmental spending would have doubled the length of the book. ο Ehrman; Sperling, op.cit. β Most of the regulations governing naval accounting may be found in the following: Navy instructions of 1662; Regulations and Instructions relating to . . . Service at Sea (numerous editions, from 1731); Adm. 7/648; Pursers Instructions. An excellent discussion of accounting in so far as it concerned the Treasurer of the Navy may be found in W. Molleson and J. Lane, Reports of the Commissioners appointed to examine, take, and state the Public Accounts (3 vol., 1783-1787), Third Report, 1, 27-39, Eighth Report, 11, 3-40. That the practices discussed in these reports

Q. Naval

Finance

under which the navy received its income, consider some con­ sequences of those conditions, and briefly trace the pattern of naval spending. In doing this it will show that the government deliberately underestimated its wartime naval expenses, and that, nevertheless, year after year the estimates were approved by a Parliament that must have known they were false. It will show that this systematic underestimating, though it did not lead to serious financial difficulties (in the war of 1739-1748), did result in a shortage of ready cash. It will explain why the shortage of cash did not embarrass naval administration until the war had been under way a number of years. Finally, it will show that the navy spent more in the war of 1739-1748 than in the previous war (Queen Anne's) and will attempt to ac­ count for the increased spending. THE ESTIMATES

The navy got no money without the approval of Parliament. In the eighteenth century this fundamental feature of the constitution was no longer disputed. However, the conven­ tional practices of modern Parliaments, of scrutinizing appro­ priations and reviewing expenditures, were not followed. Nor was it common for eighteenth-century Parliaments to take a unified stand against the Crown and bargain their votes of supply against royal concessions, as their predecessors had so often done. For Parliaments in the eighteenth century were carefully managed by the politicians, and, as is well known, many members were bought off in one way or another. One may look upon this employment of royal patronage and influ­ ence as evidence of corruption, but David Hume, writing in 1741, thought it absolutely essential for maintaining the bal­ ance of the constitution.7 Of course, no ministry's grip on the were also followed in the early eighteenth century is verified by Cholmondeley MSS. 20/66, undated, but from internal evidence after 1728 and before 1742. And see Addl. MSS. 19031, folio 95, 20 Nov. 1742. The Molleson and Lane reports are also printed in the House of Commons Journals; see Binney, British Public Finance, p. 298 for locations. 7 "How easy, therefore, would it be for that house [the Commons] to wrest from the crown all these powers, one after another; by making every grant conditional, and choosing their time so well, that their refusal of supply should only distress the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage over us?" Quoted in Ε. N. Williams, The Eighteenth-Century Constitution (Cambridge, i960), p. 75.

g. Naval Finance legislature was so firm that it could afford to ignore its preju­ dices and antipathies. The Civil List was always a favorite target of Parliamentary invective; the army did not fare much better. Subsidies for foreign armies, it was frequently argued, amounted to no more than direct grants for the preservation of Hanover. Still, ministries did not often encounter difficulty in getting supplies voted for these services, and when it came to the naval estimates, it was apparently plain sailing. W. A. Shaw came to the conclusion that the approval of naval estimates in this period was such a foregone conclusion that the attendant Parliamentary proceedings were merely "a for­ mality."8 This judgment is correct, but it leaves a number of things unexplained. There were three separate naval estimates: the Ordinary estimate, the estimate for Sea Service, and the estimate for Extraordinary Repairs.® The Ordinary estimate, generally speaking, covered the fixed costs of the naval establishment plus the maintenance charges of dockyard installations and ships laid up in Ordinary. Table 23 gives the Ordinary esti­ mate for the year 1740. These figures are representative, for the Ordinary estimate did not vary much from year to year, though it was higher in peacetime than in wartime. For exam­ ple, the following year, 1741, there was a net decrease in the estimate of £15,012, since the cost of additional clerks and contingencies in the various offices was more than compen­ sated by the effects of a reduced number of ships in Ordinary and a shorter half-pay list.10 In fact, the charges on the Ordin­ ary estimate in 1741 did not differ greatly from those in 1704 (£184,692 vs. £168,887, both excluding Greenwich Hospital); the modest increase was due to higher payments for upkeep of ships, docks, and buildings, and for half pay.11 But after the war of 1739—1748 the Ordinary estimate found a higher plateau, reflecting the increased size of the fleet in Ordinary, the expansion of the officer corps, and a slightly larger admin­ istrative staff. In 1750 it stood at £293,625.12 β W. A. Shaw, Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers, 1742-IJ45 (1903), pp. xxvii—xxxvi. s See generally Burchett, Complete History, Preface. 10 Addl. MSS. 19031, folio 86. 12 Addl. MSS. 33046, folio 244. 11 Addl. MSS. 19032, folio 37.

g. Naval Finance TABLE 23. Headings on the Ordinary Estimate of the Navy, 1740 Salaries to officials and clerks of the Admiralty and Navy Offices (but not Victualling), plus contingencies of those Offices Pensions for retired flag officers, lieutenants, warrant officers, dockyard officers, and their widows Dockyard officers, clerks, contingencies Salaries to officers at the outports Half pay to sea officers Sick and Wounded Office standing charges Wages to warrant officers and seamen aboard ships in Ordinary Victuals to same Upkeep of harbor moorings Repairs to ships in Ordinary and dockyard equipment

£ 28,281

11,586 £ 17,734 £

£ 3,728 £ 20,000 £ 1,336 £ 24,258 £ 11,069

£ 19,377 £ 62,335

Total Grant for Greenwich Hospital

£199,704 £ 10,000

Total

£209,704

The table is based on Adm. 7/170. Details of the Ordinary estimate may be found here and in Adm. 7/177; the estimates printed in the House of Commons Journals are summaries, slightly fuller than what appears above. After 1745 grants were also made for Haslar Hospital (Addl. MSS. 33046, folio 237).

The estimate for Sea Service accounted for the great bulk of the navy's income. This estimate was reckoned in terms of seamen, and it was the number of seamen that was debated and voted by Parliament. The apportioning of the Sea Service grant was determined by a very simple calculation. The navy was given £4 per man per month for thirteen lunar (28-day) months. Of this £4, 30s. was set aside for Wages, S1JS. for Wear & Tear, 19$. for Victualling, and 4s. for Ordnance. There was no distinct allocation for Sick and Wounded. The heading of Wages applied only to wages in the fleet; wages paid to dockyard workmen went under Wear & Tear, and wages in the Victualling service under Victualling. Assuming a vote of 40,000 men—the usual figure in the war of 1739—1748 —the annual supplies for Sea Service may be set forth as shown on the next page (first column X 13 X 40,000). The £104,000 was paid direct to the Board of Ordnance, so the navy's annual income by way of the Sea Service estimate was, in fact, £1,976,000.

g. Naval Finance Wages Wear & Tear Victualling Ordnance Total

30s. 19s. 4s.

780,000 702,000 494,000 104,000

80s.

£2,080,000

27s.

£

An estimate for Extraordinary Repairs was voted to provide for repairs to ships and facilities—this also embraced new construction—not already covered by the other estimates.13 For our purposes the most important thing to note about it was that it was never granted by Parliament during the war of 1739—1748. Although dockyard officials regularly accounted for expenditures under the heading "Extraordinary Re­ pairs,"14 and Extraordinary estimates were sometimes submit­ ted to high government officials,15 it appears that only once during the war did the government choose to submit such an estimate to the House of Commons; that was for the year 1743, and the House rejected it.16 The estimate had a better chance of gaining approval in peacetime, possibly because it was obvious that the money for Wear & Tear in a Sea Service estimate for 10,000 men would not answer the requirements of maintaining a large fleet in reserve. Parliament regularly voted estimates for Extraordinary Repairs between 1715 and 1721, but after that sporadically, in 1730, 173a, 1733, 1736, 1737, and 1738; moreover, it appears that the grants made in the late 1730's were substantially less than the requests.17 The naval estimates were prepared by the Navy Board upon direction from the Admiralty. The estimate for Sea Service was straightforward; once the king in Council had advised the Admiralty as to the number of seamen to be employed, there was little to be done. The Ordinary estimate was subject to a number of alterations at the beginning of a war, and in 1740 these were worked out in a joint meeting of the Admiis Burchett, Complete History, Preface. 14 See Deptford Letter Books; e.g. Adm. 106/3305, 3 March 1741. 10 There is a copy of an estimate for Extraordinary Repairs for 1740 among Walpole's papers (Cholmondeley MSS. 19/37). ieAddl. MSS. 33046, folio 237. The estimate totalled £135,025. it Adm. 3/52, 26 Nov. 1745; Addl. MSS. 33046, folios 237, 253; Adm. 106/2182, 3 March 1746; Adm. 106/3545, Part n, Bundle 17.

g. Naval Finance ralty and Navy Boards.18 After being accepted by the Admi­ ralty, the estimates were laid before the king "for his Royal Approbation."19 Copies were sent to the Treasury, but this was for information only, and the completed estimates were pre­ sented to Parliament by an Admiralty representative—the First Lord himself, if eligible.20 Occasionally the Ordinary estimate was attacked in the House of Commons, but although some of the sums were highly dubious it was hard for the critics to make any head­ way. The estimates, together with a statement of the navy debt and an account of cash currently in the hands of the Treasurer of the Navy,21 lay on the table for inspection by interested members at their leisure. Few were interested, for few could understand what the headings referred to, let alone judge the propriety of the sums. Moreover, the estimates were discussed in a committee of the whole, and under such circumstances it was nearly impossible to pursue a methodical analysis. If the House wanted its approval to be anything more than a for­ mality, it would have to appoint a special committee to study the figures and demand additional information. Sometimes the opposition maneuvered for the appointment of such a committee. Quoting the "old Proverb, what is every Man's Business, is no Man's Business," Sir William Wyndham moved that "the Ordinary Estimate of the Navy for the year 1736, . . . should be referred to the Consideration of a Select Com­ mittee."22 In support of the motion it was argued that "no gentleman, even of those . . . best acquainted with the affairs is Adm. 3/44, 13 Nov. 1740. is E.g. Adm. 3/43, 20 Jan. 1738. 2Shaw, Calendar Treasury Books, 1 J 4 2 - I J 4 ; , pp. xxvi, xxix—xxxvi. 21 These are printed in the House of Commons Journals; for locations see Appendix 1. The officially printed statements of the navy debt are more detailed than the summaries that appear in Appendix 1, but scarcely more informative. Whether the Commons was given any detailed supple­ mentary reports on naval finance as a matter of routine, we cannot know; such papers, if they existed, did not survive the fire of 1834. 22 The Historical Register, xxi, 193. Another version of this debate, taken from Gentleman's Magazine (Sept., 1736), is printed in Pari. Hist., IX, 1005-1015. Although neither may be presumed to be fully reliable, they do not differ as to the substance of what was said, and I have used both. Unfortunately, both simply lump the arguments into two groups— ministerial and opposition.

g. Naval Finance of our navy . . . [could] from a bare perusal at our table, determine, whether the articles of expence . . . [were] all necessary."23 In reply the government speakers denied that there was any need for detailed investigation. The items, they said, were readily comprehensible, so straightforward that "a school-boy might fully examine [them] in half an hour."24 This was nonsense, but the ministry had the Commons well under control and to no one's surprise the proposal of a select committee was rejected, 256 to 155.25 The opposition tried again in 1740. The attack was launched by Lord Baltimore, who was interested in naval affairs and later acquired a seat on the Admiralty Board. He began by trying to persuade the members (with words quoted at the head of this chapter) that the Ordinary estimate was worth their attention. And he had a plan of attack; there was one sum whose falsity was almost self-evident—any gentleman could be made to see it. This was the sum for harbor moorings (see Table 23), and on it he focused attention. Why, he asked, was the estimated cost of harbor moorings reduced by only £2,000—from £21,000 in 1739 to £19,000 in 1740—when, as everyone knew, mobilization had greatly reduced the number of ships in harbor? Sir Charles Wager defended the estimate; it should be remembered, he said, that these were estimates, necessarily inexact, that many large ships still remained in Ordinary, and that maintenance of the moorings could not cease merely because ships had left them.26 But the opposition was not satisfied. Sir George Oxenden offered "an open and ingenuous proposal." He said: ". . . if any gentleman will say that £19,000 can be expended in moorage, I will agree to the other articles without further examination, after having re­ ceived such unexpected satisfaction with regard to this."27 This brought a reply from Thomas Corbett, then Deputy Secre­ tary of the Admiralty, a reply which is interesting because, in effect, it admitted the irrelevance of the estimates as far as control of expenditure was concerned: 2s Pari.

Hist., IX, 1006.

Ibid., p. 1011. 25 Ibid., p. 1015. 2β Pari. Hist., XI, 404.-406.

27 Ibid., p. 409.

g. Naval Finance I

cannot, without wonder, hear [the estimates] so nicely examined. It requires no long reflection to perceive, that nobody can gain any thing by a low or high computation. If the moorage, computed at

£19,000 should amount to £24,000 must it not be defrayed? And if it should fall below £15,000 will not the remaining part be so much laid up for the expences of the next year? If we could regulate our expence by our calculation, I should be zealous for reducing it; but so it is, that our calculations . . . must yield to our necessities.28

To this Lord Polwarth replied: "I am still more convinced, . .. that it is necessary to refer it to a secret committee. . . . The whole calculation, as it now lies before us, is to me a heap of confusion, an unintelligible collection of articles comprising other articles unmentioned, as the hon. gent, himself confes­ ses: such intricacies as these will for ever elude a superficial enquiry."29 These were reasonable judgments, but no com­ mittee was appointed. The sole effect of such attacks was to make the Admiralty Lords wary of the Ordinary estimate: they took pains to see that it looked right when compared with earlier estimates, to keep the figures low and in good propor­ tion, and to make sure that changes could be easily and simply defended.30 In 1743 they sent it back to the Navy Board be­ cause they did not think the reasons given for adding "£16,600 more than . . . that of last year" to the heading of Ordinary Repairs were good enough.31 Although the Ordinary estimate was occasionally probed by the House of Commons, the estimate for Sea Service never was, even though it amounted to ten times as much. The reason is simple: the estimate for Sea Service was not by any sensible standard an estimate at all; nothing was itemized so there was nothing to investigate. The only figure that changed from year to year was the number of seamen to be provided for, and from 1740 to 1748 even that never changed; it stayed at 40,000. Therefore a debate on the Sea Service estimate was bound to be a debate on the size of the fleet; the questions that arose were bound to be concerned with foreign policy. Normally, the Sea Service estimate was a subject for debate 28 Ibid., p. 410. 29 Ibid., pp. 410-411. sosee Adm. 106/3377, 17 Sept. 1740. 31 Adm. 3/46, 8 Jan. 1743.

g. Naval Finance in peacetime, but not in wartime. Those who quarreled with the estimate in peacetime were divided into two rather dis­ organized groups: some felt that any estimate of more than 10,000 or ia,000 men was too high unless the government meant war; others hoped that a larger mobilization than that requested by the Admiralty might provoke a war, and war was what they wanted. Both factions agreed that the figure of 20,000 men, which the Admiralty often thought advisable in the early years of George II's reign, was good for nothing but "expeditions to Spithead and the like,"32 a waste of public money whereby the nation bore the expense of war without war's supposed benefits. In such debates the finances of the navy were not, for they could not be, discussed. It appears that careful and honest estimates of naval ex­ penditure were not required; that the navy could get the money it needed merely for the asking, especially in wartime. Therefore it is puzzling to discover that the navy did not ask for enough to cover its expenses, and yet there can be no doubt that it did not and that its decision was deliberate. Every year the government submitted estimates which it knew to be inadequate and let the deficiencies pile up in the form of naval debt. Although a ministerial speaker is reported to have maintained that the estimates "always contained the whole Charge,... so far as could be foreseen and determined,"33 this was absurd. The method of calculating the estimate for Sea Service at £4. per man per month was "as old as Cromwell's time."34 As one naval official pointed out: ". . . the Works of the Ships . . . as well as the Repairs of the Docks, Wharfs, and Buildings . . . , the Expences on them Seldom Quadrate with the Estimates, which are Collected and Made in the same Form as they have been long before, and Ever since, the Revolution."35 And there were many items, undreamed of or insignificant in the seventeenth century, for which no allow­ ance was made, such as "head money," recruiting induce32 H. M. C., Egmont Diary, 11, 16. as Pari. Hist., ix, 1009-1010. This was in 1736. The statement to this ef­ fect in the Historical Register version is more moderate and probably more accurate (xxi, 188). 34 Corbett MSS. xi, folios 101-102. 86 Addl. MSS. 19033, folio 4.

g. Naval Finance ments, premiums on American naval stores (which during the 1720's added £21,000 to the navy debt in ten years),36 and maintenance of prisoners of war. These additional expenses were so readily recognized as contributors to the navy's chronic indebtedness that Thomas Corbett copied out a list of them in his collection of precedents.37 In only one instance during the war did the navy make special provision for un­ usual expenses: from 1741 until the war's end sums were annually requested (and granted) for defraying the expense of victualling troops, and hiring and converting troop trans­ ports. But these were not really estimates; the amount granted each year by Parliament was always the amount spent on the army the previous year.38 This was done because one thing that Parliament was not at all apathetic about was the possi­ bility that funds granted to the navy were being spent on the army.39 Many extraordinary naval expenses, while easily pre­ dictable, were not mentioned in the estimates. The costs of the new Admiralty building in Whitehall (£57,130) and the Naval Academy at Portsmouth (£6,675) wer^ simply added to the navy debt.40 But the effect of these nonrecurrent items was minor in comparison with the effect of the wartime prac­ tice of deliberately underestimating the size of the fleet to be maintained. The government stubbornly persisted in pre­ senting Sea Service estimates for 40,000 seamen during the war, notwithstanding the fact that upwards of 45,000 were regularly borne on the books year in, year out. Finally, it cannot be supposed that members of Parliament were de­ ceived by this underestimating. The premiums on American naval stores were established by Parliament itself, and yet no specific appropriation was made to pay them. The con­ struction of a spacious and costly new Admiralty building in Whitehall can hardly have been a secret. And the persistent discrepancy between the number of seamen estimated and the number borne was plainly evident from the "Borne and Musse Ibid. ST Corbett MSS. xi, folio 104. This list was drawn up by the Navy Board in 1705. By 1739 a number of other items could have been added. 38 Addl. MSS. 33046, folio 237. 39 Pari. Hist., vi, 1025; Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 22. *0 Addl. MSS. 33046, folio 66.

g. Naval Finance tered" statement that accompanied each Sea Service estimate and was eventually printed in the House of Commons Journab. How are we to explain this policy of underestimating? A student of government finance in Queen Anne's reign has suggested that the House of Commons wanted it this way; since it had no machinery for controlling public expenditure it tried to limit spending in a general way by keeping the navy on "short rations."41 Possibly some members felt they were doing this. However, all must have known that the navy could freely run up its debt—and did—and it is a fact that both in Queen Anne's reign and George II's the navy debt was eventually provided for by the House without detailed investigation. It is true that in Queen Anne's reign commis­ sions were sometimes appointed to examine the public ac­ counts, whereas under Walpole and his successors govern­ ments managed to prevent the creation of such bothersome commissions; but such commissions could be appointed and do their work regardless of whether the navy was kept on "short rations" or not. Another possible explanation would turn this around. Per­ haps the House of Commons was suspicious of the policy of underestimating, while the government favored it because by it the House was kept in the dark. In 1736 an opposition speaker accused the ministry of doing this: "I am afraid that these estimates were made deficient on purpose to conceal, for some time, from the nation the expence. . . ; because, as our Navy is a favourable article, it was expected that the Parlia­ ment would readily agree, without any inquiry, to make that deficiency good, whenever it should be thought necessary to make application for that purpose."42 Undoubtedly the minis­ ters felt that the less Parliament knew about the way they spent public money, the better. They had good political reasons for not submitting informative estimates, and the constitution did not require them to do so. As a ministerial speaker said in 1736: "To pretend that Ministers, by directions from his Majesty cannot nor ought not to order a Dock, Dockyard or *1 Sperling, op.cit., pp. 66-67. « Pari. Hist., IX, 1014.

g. Naval Finance Admiralty office to be repaired or rebuilt, without having first laid the same before Parliament, seems to me something very extraordinary; it may be as well pretended, that they ought not to order a man of war to be rebuilt or repaired, without having first laid the same before Parliament."43 Of course in theory, Parliament, having the power to appropriate, had the right to see that its wishes were carried out, but in practice there were no administrative means for doing it and Parlia­ ment consistently showed itself to be uninterested in creating them. Here we are ofiEered one of those familiar instances in which eighteenth-century constitutional theory was not matched by the political and administrative facts. The esti­ mates continued to be drawn up along seventeenth-century lines: they were not designed as an instrument of control; their purpose was simply to predict needs so that sufficient funds might be granted; the main estimate for the navy, the Sea Service estimate, can be understood in no other way. And naturally, carefully itemized estimates would have been use­ less until some system was created for tracing expenditures. For example, according to Thomas Corbett the money voted on the Ordinary estimate for harbor victuals was "never ac­ counted to" the Victualling Commissioners so that in effect they victualled "about 1500 Men in Ordinary for nothing," but who besides Corbett and a handful of clerks could know that?44 When it came to tracing costs of particular services, departmental officials could scarcely make anything of their own figures, and the official auditing procedure of the Crown, though not purely medieval, might as well have been. In sum, "the practice of appropriation, accounting, and audit was, at first, negligible and, at best, fragmentary and spasmodic un­ til... the nineteenth century."45 So long as this was the case, all that a Parliamentary investi­ gation could hope to do was dip into the accounts here and there in search of abuses, and such an investigation was bound to be used for political purposes. The fact that it was so used is revealed by both the timing and flavor of the reports of Historical Register, xxi, 189-190. 44 Corbett MSS. xiv, folios 51-52. 45 B. Chubb, The Control of Public Expenditure (Oxford, 195a), p. 6.

g. Naval Finance Parliamentary commissions appointed to examine the public accounts during Queen Anne's reign. In the age of Walpole inquiries into estimates and accounts were purely weapons of opposition, and understood to be such by both sides. The object was not to reform government, but to discredit and weaken the ministry. A Lords' protest recorded against Walpole's government in 1741 shows to what extravagant lengths the opposition was willing to go; it was claimed that there had been enough "money granted by Parliament in the last six or seven years, upon the several heads applicable to the repairing and rebuilding . . . ships, as would have been sufficient to rebuild the whole fleet of Britain from the keels."46 Parliament was not disposed to understand administration. It considered administration the business of the executive. It is signifi­ cant that when, during the American war, an unruly House of Commons did launch a thorough investigation of the finan­ cial affairs of the executive, its motive was not to put those affairs in better order, but to lay an ax to the supposed root of executive influence over the legislature.47 And because Parlia­ ment considered itself the enemy of administration, there was no point in giving it any more information than necessary. We may conclude that this was a major reason why the govern­ ment was content to employ the vague and generalized system of estimating that had been handed down from the past. But should we also conclude that this was the reason for the persistent underestimating of naval expenses? There is too much evidence to the contrary. For one thing Parliament was more suspicious of military spending than naval, and yet the army estimates were usually adjusted to match expenses.48 Furthermore, the Navy and Admiralty Boards were ready and willing to submit estimates for Extraordinary Repairs, even though estimates of this sort were comparatively detailed and specific; there was little reason to fear that this would open the door to troublesome interference so long as Parliament had no way of controlling over-all naval spending. Finally, *e Parliamentary Papers; consisting of a Complete Collection of Kings Speeches . . . and . . . Lords Protests (3 vol., 1797), m, 383. *1 See generally D. L. Keir, "Economical Reform, 1779-1787," Law Quarterly Rev., L (1934), 368-385. *8 Binney1 British Public Finance, pp. 143, 150-151, 159.

Q. Naval Finance what was there to lose by submitting Sea Service estimates for the actual number of men serving in the fleet instead of just 40,000? No information would be thereby divulged that was not being regularly reported anyhow. We are driven to the conclusion that naval expenses were underestimated largely because it was politically expedient to do so. Every sum that appeared on the estimates (assuming approval) became part of the budget and had to be met by an appropriation of funds. And every new means of supply entailed difficulties and provoked fears and resentments, whether it was levying a new tax, floating a loan supported by a new tax, negotiating with the Bank, or raiding the sinking fund. Raising funds was a ministry's most delicate task; it was the crucial test of political fidelity, and Parliamentary approval could never be taken for granted. Year after year in Queen Anne's reign the House of Commons refused to vote the full Ordinary estimate,49 and we have seen that during the first half of the eighteenth century it rejected estimates for Extraor­ dinary Repairs both in peace and war. In 1745, when the navy was hard pressed for cash, the Navy Board told the Admiralty that it was "absolutely necessary to have Extraor­ dinary Estimates delivered Yearly, and to get the House to allow them," but the Admiralty's answer was that if the House could first be got to appropriate the Sea Service allowance "for every Man employed . . . at Sea then it [might] be proper to ask for extraordinary Money, but not before."60 An authority on later eighteenth-century finance blames the policy of underestimating on the naval administrators: they ran in the rut of precedent and failed to appreciate the economies that would arise from keeping the navy debt low.51 Certainly from the American war on, underestimating made little sense, be­ cause right from the start of that war additional funds had to be raised to reduce the navy debt. But earlier in the century this was not the case. In the war of 1739-1748 the government did not have to ask Parliament to deal with the navy debt until 1747. Certainly naval administrators would have preShaw, Calendar Treasury Books, 1708, p. xxi; /709, p. xxv 50 Adm. 3/52, «6 Nov. 1745. 51 Binney, British Public Finance, pp. 142-143

g. Ή aval Finance ferred to work with cash. If they ran in a rut of precedent, it was mainly because no ministry wanted to launch a new system of estimates that would instantly swell the annual budget. In 1749 one M.P., noting that the navy estimates were plainly insufficient, said that they were made so "for the sake of gaining a short-lived popularity to our ministers.... Present ease has been the only goddess they adored."52 The path of least resistance was to let the navy debt grow. This path would not have been open, had it not been for two circumstances: one was that many naval services could be operated on a basis of deferred payment; the other, that there existed a well-developed system of naval credit.53 Admittedly, it would have been impractical, if not impossible, to try to mobilize a fleet without seeking an immediate grant from Parliament, because victualling and certain other services, as we shall see, required either cash or very short-term credit. For this reason, when war threatened in 1738 the Admiralty sought and got an emergency supply for 10,000 additional seamen, and when war broke out in 1739 Parliament voted a lump sum of £500,000 (of which the navy got £278,676) for increasing forces "by Sea & Land as the Exigency of AfEairs should require."54 But the fact remains that the navy was far less dependent on ready money than the other services were, such as the army or the subsidizing of allied armies. It was made so not only by the nature of some of its expenses, but also by its possession of an old and established system of credit. That system had been developed in an age when Parliamentary grants were uneven and unreliable. By inheriting it eight­ eenth-century naval administrators enjoyed the advantage of insulation from the effects of temporary shortages at the Ex­ chequer, but they also inherited a disadvantage, in that the government was tempted into letting them starve for cash. Of course naval credit was not limitless, and its health ultimately depended on Parliamentary action, but Parliament 52 Pari. Hist, xiv, 611. 53 By "naval credit" I mean credit not formally backed by Parliament. Public credit concerned the national (funded) debt; naval credit, the navy (unfunded) debt. The navy debt took the form of unpaid Navy, Victual­ ling, and Sick and Wounded bills. "Adm. 3/43, 11 April, 26 May 1738; Addl. MSS. 33046, folio 253.

g. Naval Finance was placed in a difficult position: if it did not provide funds to meet the already contracted obligations, it had to face the disastrous consequences of demolishing the navy's credit. The result was that Parliament was not only powerless to trace appropriations, but also to limit naval spending. Members did not like the situation; the opposition Lords once termed Walpole's fiscal methods "unappropriation,"55 and he and other ministers were charged with intent to deceive. But al­ though deception was a result, it was not the motive. The motive was an old and familiar one: neither the executive nor the legislature wanted to raise money until the alternatives were exhausted. Obviously if any procedures for limiting naval spending did exist, they existed within the executive branch of the govern­ ment. But any notion that the Treasury imposed restrictions may be dismissed.5® It might be supposed that the Treasury controlled naval spending by controlling issues, and that this was the reason the Treasurer of the Navy was obliged, when requesting money from the Exchequer, to state the "Heads of Services" for which it was needed.57 But it turns out that the information was supplied simply because the formalities of accounting necessitated it.58 The money was always issued in the manner requested, irrespective of the portions theoreti­ cally allotted to each heading in the Sea Service estimate (Wages 3Oiv Wear & Tear SrJS., Victualling 195.).59 It is true that the Treasury occasionally asked the navy for an itemized statement of its anticipated requirements for the coming six months or year, but this was done primarily to help the Treasury plan, not to fetter the navy. And the account returned by the Navy Board was hardly precise. For example, the Board's schedule in February 1744 called for about £2, 55 Pari. Hist., ix, 603. °eShaw, Calendar Treasury Books, 1742-1745, p. xxxvii. 5T Ibid., pp. xxxviii-ix. Shaw wisely avoided drawing any conclusion of this sort. 58 Molleson and Lane, Reports, 1, 223. 69 Once the money was issued under a particular heading it could not be transferred by the Treasurer of the Navy to another heading (Binney, British Public Finance, p. 140), but it is clear that the amount issued under each heading was not governed, in practice, by the estimates; see, for example, Cholmondeley MSS. 20/9C, and Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 36-38.

g. Naval Finance 700,000 for the coming year; of this, about one-third was care­ fully itemized, and the remaining £1,800,000 was set down simply as a balance. "This Ballance," the Treasury was told, "may be applied to make good what is wanted on the Heads of Wear & Tear, &ca. . . , and from time to time to such Ser­ vices as may arise on the Head of Wages, and if not wanted on that head, may towards the latter part of the year be issued for the further Payment of the Yards and Course or any other Service that may want it."eo In other words, it might be spent on anything. Naturally, the Treasury used the schedule to help it assign priorities among the various departments, and it had the power to delay the issue of funds. If the navy urgently needed cash, the Naval Commissioners had to "use their In­ stances at the Treasury" to get it; and if the sum was partic­ ularly large, and the need particularly urgent, the matter was determined at a higher level.61 The Treasury could regulate the navy's supply of cash, but it did not have the power, the means, or the inclination to judge whether or not the navy's expenses were excessive. In general, such limits as there were on naval expenditure in George II's reign were set internally, not externally. The Admiralty had the power to issue "Orders for the building, repairing, fitting out, and paying off, and laying up in Har­ bour His Majesty's Ships." The Navy and Victualling Boards, before they could undertake "any considerable Work, or Buildings," were required to submit estimates to the Admi­ ralty, and if the Admiralty approved, orders were given "for their being performed accordingly."62 For Parliament and the Treasury were, in effect, powerless to pass judgment on the Admiralty's decisions. As for reviewing expenses, all the Audi­ tors of the Imprest did was check the Treasurer of the Navy's arithmetic, and they were years behind in doing that; in real­ ity the only audit of his accounts was performed by the Navy Board.63 To us it may seem fantastic that a government depart­ ment should be trusted to control its own spending, but in «0 Adm. 106/3180, 15 Feb. 1744. For other schedules see Adm. 106/2181, 30 Nov. 1745; Adm. 106/2182, 23 June 1746, 23 Feb. 1747. ei E.g. Adm. 3/52, 26 Nov., 6 Dec. 1745; Adm. 1/710, 12 Sept. 1740. ez Burchett, Complete History, Preface; Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 22. 83 Binney, British Public Finance, pp. 143-146.

q. Naval Finance those days, since the external machinery for exercising such control was rudimentary, and its practitioners untutored, the idea that the task should be left to those most closely ac­ quainted with naval affairs seemed logical. Of course, within broad limits the leading ministers exercised an informal sort of control. One cannot go through Walpole's private papers without realizing that he knew a good deal about how the navy was spending its money.64 And sometimes there were formal procedures. For example, before undertaking the new building for their office in 1723—obviously a large and un­ usual expense—the Lords of the Admiralty submitted an esti­ mate for approval of the King in Council.65 Similarly, in May 1739 the Admiralty felt obliged to obtain royal approval be­ fore ordering the construction of seventeen new frigates;6® but this involved a very large sum, and the nation was not yet at war. And it is remarkable that the procedure was not repeated during the war. In fact, as we have already seen, when the Admiralty's ambitious and expensive shipbuilding program helped to swell the navy debt to more than £5,000,000 in 1746, it was the Navy Board that sounded the alarm.67 CASH AND DEBT

The navy debt was itemized under the heads of Wages, Wear & Tear, Victualling, and Sick and Wounded, but from a financial point of view it is useful to divide it into two com­ ponents of a different nature. First, there were the sums set aside for paying arrears of wages on the books of ships paid off, sea-pay obligations currently accumulating, and unpaid short allowance money. Some of these obligations would have to be met within a year; others, especially wages payable at "recalls," might continue unpaid much longer.68 Second, there were the sums for which bills had been issued (or would be issued shortly); this component constituted the bulk of the β* Cholmondeley MSS., classes 19 and 20. es Adm. 7/339, 4 March 1723. The estimate was £22400, less than half the ultimate cost. The "Estimate and a Plan of the New Buildings was sent to Mr. Stanyan, One of the Clerks of the Council." 66 Adm. 7/339, 25 May 1739. βτ Above pp. 254-255. 68 "Recalls" are discussed below pp. 478-479.

47Ο

g. Naval Finance debt. The bills were variously designated Navy bills, Victual­ ling bills, and Sick and Wounded bills, but all were payable by the Treasurer of the Navy, and we may employ "navy bills" as a generic term for them, just as contemporaries often did. Navy bills were payable "in Course," that is, in strict chronol­ ogy according to date of registry (the Victualling Course was separate).69 Obviously, the larger the debt, the longer the Course; similarly, the longer the Course, the longer the period of maturity and the higher the discount a recipient had to accept if he wished to sell his bill on the market for cash.70 So long as the navy debt increased at a moderate and regular rate, investors who bought navy bills could predict the date of payment with reasonable accuracy. For in this period there was no reason to doubt the regularity of supplies from the Exchequer for meeting the Course, whereas there were compelling reasons half a century earlier; between 1739 and 1748 the navy got, without undue delay, every penny voted by Parliament.71 During the first four years of the war the navy debt accumulated at a rate of half a million pounds or less annually, and under these circumstances a merchant who sold goods to the navy could count on converting his bills into cash at moderate discount. But in 1744 the situation began to change; the debt grew more rapidly. The reason was that the navy was growing short of cash. In 1745 and 1746 it was no longer able to maintain regular payments on the Courses and the debt soared.72 As naval credit faltered merchants began to raise prices to offset the higher discount rate.73 In May 1746 β9 Corbett summed up the advantages of the method: "Payment by Course . . . puts the Members of the Board out of the Suspicion of mak­ ing any Advantage thereby, and obviates all occasions of apprehending unfair Practices, and frees the Board from the continual Applications and Sollicitations which must unavoidably attend the contrary Method" (Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 48). A few navy bills were payable on demand, were not put on the Course, and were not considered part of the navy debt; they were equivalent to ready money. 'o The discount also varied according to whether the bills were '"interest bills" or not; most Navy bills began to yield 4 per cent interest six months after registry; most Victualling bills paid no interest ordinarily, τι Addl. MSS. 33046, folio 237. f 2 For debt figures see Appendix 1. 73 By April 1746 the discount rate on Navy bills (interest bearing) had risen to about 12 per cent (Adm. 106/1032, 4 April 1746).

g. Naval Finance an attempt was made to steady the market in navy bills by announcing that interest, which was normally paid together with principal when bills were finally cashed, would be paid quarterly.74 But the only effective way to restore naval credit was to resume regular payments on the Courses. As the year 1746 drew to a close the Board of Admiralty tried to persuade Henry Pelham of the necessity for an additional grant.76 Although in late 1745 and 1746 naval credit faltered and public credit was put to a severe test, public credit remained basically sound throughout the war. Whereas in 1710 naval credit collapsed because of the weakness of public credit,76 in 1746 public credit was in a position to rescue naval credit, and in 1747 a million pounds was raised for reducing the navy debt; another million was granted by Parliament the follow­ ing year. So rapidly was the debt accumulating that these sums did not produce a net reduction, but they arrested the growth, and that was sufficient to restore confidence. In 1749 the bulk of the navy debt was discharged by a supply of over £4,000,000 for the purpose.77 All of this was managed by borrowing. In William Ill's reign the first serious attempts were made to organize public finance in such a way that the government might efficiently carry on war by borrowing. The methods employed were ex­ perimental, and not always successful; moreover, because the soundness of public credit was by no means taken for granted at that time, provision had to be made for amortization. When one considers, for example, that an offer of life annuities in 1694 was made on terms which allowed 14 per cent interest plus special tax-exemption privileges, one can readily ap­ preciate the crushing burden that debt imposed on the Ex­ chequer. Moreover, the fact that the annuities subscribed by the public were term annuities, which had to be paid off either on the death of the subscriber or at the end of a stipulated period, stood in the way of subsequent conversions 74 Addl. MSS. 33046, folio 81; N.M.M. POR F/7, 4 May 1746. This had been done in 1709; see Queen Anne's Navy, p. 33. 70 Bedford Correspondence, 1, 197-200. 7β Sperling, op.cit., p. 108. The South Sea Company owed its origin to this situation. " Addl. MSS. 33046, folio 853.

g. Naval Finance for the purpose of reducing interest charges. Hence govern­ ments in the reigns of William III and Anne generally pre­ ferred negotiating through the Bank, the East India Company, and eventually the South Sea Company, to making offerings direct to the public. But in 1715 the situation began to change: the first genuinely perpetual annuities were issued; they were redeemable only at the option of the government; and in a manner that became conventional during the eighteenth cen­ tury, the interest on these was met by a specified tax revenue, and no provision was made for paying the principal.78 Of course, the notion that in all propriety the government ought to try to amortize the debt died hard. The establish­ ment of a sinking fund for this purpose was one of the notable financial features of George I's reign, and Walpole's diversion of it in 1734 to other services (in fact, the yield from the fund, £1,200,000, was applied to the navy debt) provoked a storm of protest; it was considered fiscally immoral.79 David Hume thought that if the nation persisted in mortgaging its public revenue, it was doomed, and his convictions were so widely shared that we may perhaps assume that they represented the orthodox view.80 But the less contemplative, investing public apparently paid little heed. When the government carried out conversions people readily took up the new issues at lower interest rates. As Lord Hervey pointed out in 1735: "The creditors of the public have been so far from entering into a contract in order to have their debts paid, that they entered into it for fear of being paid."81 By the time war came in 1739 the government had devel­ oped its funding system to a point where it no longer had to 'SThis is based on E. L. Hargreaves, The National Debt (1930), pp. 1-59·

" Part of the protest was over the fact that by Taiding the sinking fund the government had developed another instrument for circumventing Parliamentary approval of its budget; this was what the opposition Lords called "unappropriation" (Pari. Hist., ix, 602-604). However, as Binney shows, Walpole's action was sensible from a financial point of view (British Public Finance, pp. 108-109). so David Hume, Writings on Economics, ed. E. Rotwein (1955), pp. 90-107. For a collection of various gloomy prognostications see Sir John Sinclair, Appendix to The History of the Public Revenue of the British Empire (1789). 8i Pari. Hist., ix, 916.

g. Naval Finance rely chiefly on intermediaries like the Bank and the great chartered companies. These agencies continued to play a role in war finance, but the remarkable achievements of 1747-1749 were made possible by public subscription. In 1747 the total budget, which included £1,000,000 for application to the navy debt, exceeded £13,500,000; £6,300,000 of this was raised by 4-per-cent annuities serviced by a general levy of 12 pence per pound on imported merchandise. "To the grant of this large loan, no objection was offered [by Parliament]; . . . two mil­ lions . . . were subscribed, within a few hours, before it was known from what source the interest would be drawn."82 In 1749> £4,072,472 of the navy debt was funded, £1,000,000 of it by a loan at 3 per cent, and the balance by 4-per-cent annui­ ties; the interest on both was "made payable from the unap­ propriated monies of the sinking fund." Thus, the vast war­ time debt of the navy was almost entirely funded "without a single additional tax."83 Walpole's critics in 1734 had warned that the government's next step would be "to mortgage the Sinking-Fund,"84 and they were right. But the war was paid for, and the predicted disasters did not materialize. As a result, the navy was able to spend beyond its estimates with impunity. Understandably, naval credit was a delicate flower. Navy bills were merely obligations on the Treasurer of the Navy, and insofar as they represented expenditure not formally approved by Parliament, there was no guarantee that they would ever be cashed. The market in them was narrow.85 But so long as the government could fund the navy debt with ease, and without fear of Parliamentary refusal—in 1749 the only criticism of the funding operation voiced in the House of Commons was concerned with arrears of a subsidy to Austria86—the health of naval credit could not be a matter for 82 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham (2 vol., 1829), 1, 38a. ss ibid., π, 73. 84 Pari. Hist., IX, 603. 85 According to Thomas Mortimer (Everyman his Own Broker, 4th. edn., [1761], pp. 156-157) navy bills were best suited to the speculating lions, because they were usually drawn for large sums and the date of payment was rather uncertain; he advised the lambs, at whom his book was presumably aimed, not to meddle with them. 86 Coxe, Pelham Administration, 11, 72-73.

g. ΝαυαΙ Finance doubt, and the obligation to submit realistic estimates could be postponed. In fact, it was not until 1797, when "the col­ lapse of the funding system was feared," that the basic appro­ priation for Sea Service was raised from £4 to £7 per man per month.87 In the war of 1739-1748, then, there were no severe finan­ cial difficulties. However, the government's reluctance to sub­ mit realistic estimates to Parliament meant that the navy did not have enough cash at its disposal. This rarely interrupted the service, for when it began to do so in 1746 the navy persuaded the ministry to obtain additional supplies. But it is worth examining how the navy managed for so long on inade­ quate issues of cash. Appendix I gives the navy debt in summarized form. It is evident that until 1745 the Navy and Victualling Courses were kept well under control. The amount due on the Navy Course, after rising to a wartime level during the year 1740, did not surpass £500,000 until 1745; similarly, the Victualling Course maintained a level of about £250,000 until 1745 when it increased to £422,623. This reflects the fact that until late 1745 the navy was able to discharge the bills on these Courses regularly six to eight months after registry, and it thereby avoided inflated prices and kept interest charges low.88 But in 1745 the Courses began to lengthen, and in 1746 the situation got out of hand; the amounts due on the Navy and Victualling Courses swelled to £1,222,137 and £828,262 respectively. The figures in Appendix I also reveal how the navy man­ aged to maintain regular payments on the Courses during the first five or six years of the war. It was done principally by drawing on funds earmarked for seamen's wages, and to a 87 Binney, British Public Finance, p. 143. 88 The total amount of interest paid on Navy bills (excluding Victual­ ling) between January 1, 1739 and December 31, 1746 was £13,666, a very small amount when placed against the gross amount of the Navy Course during that period (Adm. 106/2182, 2 Feb. 1747). The table in Beveridge, Prices and Wages, p. 627, showing the length of the Course of the Navy, is useless for assessing the effect on the dis­ count rate. The great "range in the length of the intervals between registration and payment" puzzles the authors, and I cannot explain it either. The table given for the Victualling Course (p. 522) seems far more reliable.

g. Naval Finance minor extent by delaying wage payments to dockyard workmen. It may be observed that, while debts under the heads of Wear & Tear and Victualling stayed within reasonable limits, the debt under the head of Wages steadily increased. The Navy Board calculated that by the end of 1743, £500,223 had been "bor­ rowed of Wages" for the service of Wear & Tear, and £473,276 for Victualling.89 Early in 1747 the Navy Board analyzed the increase of the debt during the war and this appears in Table 24.

TABLE 24. Navy Board's Analysis of the Increase of Navy Debt, 1739-1746 (to the nearest pound)

Net debt 31 Dec. 1738 Increase by 31 Dec. 1746 Borrowed from Wages: for Wear & Tear for Victuals True increase

Wages

Wear & Tear

264,885 2,373.412

201,614 1,542,862

Victuals

Total

536,945 70,445 780,526 4,698,802

(1,556,842) 797,226 759,606 817.570

2,340,088

1,540,132

Based on Adm. 106/2182, 2 Feb. 1747. The first two figures under each head, when added, do not produce the corresponding sums in Appendix I for 1746. There are three reasons for this: first, the cash in the hands of the Treasurer of the Navy has already been subtracted from each of the three heads; second, army expenses have already been subtracted from Wear & Tear and Victualling; third, the Sick and Wounded debt has been added to the head of Wages. However, the sum of the figures in the "Total" column agrees with the net debt given in Appendix 1.

The "borrowings" referred to were purely theoretical. The money was credited to Wages because, according to the tradi­ tional rules for proportioning the Sea Service supplies, that is how it had been appropriated by Parliament. But this ancient system was devised at a time when ships were normally paid off annually, whereas in the 1740's it would have been imprac­ tical, and in many cases impossible, to pay seamen their wages on a regular basis. Consequently, as ships and men were added to the fleet in the early years of the war, wage obligations 8» Addl. MSS. 19031, folio 117.

g. Naval Finance accumulated that either did not have to be met immediately or could not possibly be met immediately for administrative, not financial, reasons. And as long as ships being put in com­ mission outnumbered those being paid off there was a reser­ voir of funds, theoretically set aside for paying seamen's wages, which could be applied to other, more urgent services. Even­ tually, of course, these wages had to be paid, and when the navy began paying off ships as fast, or faster, than it was put­ ting them into service, "borrowing of Wages" came to an end.90 This happened toward the end of 1745. On November 26 the Treasurer of the Navy and the Navy Board were summoned to the Admiralty to discuss "the Payment of the Wages due to the Seamen lately come home from the Mediterranean and West Indies." Shortage of money was causing delays and the men were getting restless. The navy had already received its "whole Proportion" from the Treasury for 1745 and virtually all of it was spent. While the Treasurer had less than £6,000 available on the heading of Wages, the amount due to ships ordered to be paid off was £369,439, of which £173,603 was owing "to the Companies of Ships already put out of Commis­ sion." The Navy Board felt that £200,000 right away might "quiet the Minds of the Seamen" and urged the Admiralty Lords to talk to the Treasury Board about it.91 Obviously such demands halted the practice of "borrowing from Wages," and this is reflected in the figures: in 1744, £228,752 out of the appropriation for Wages was applied to Wear & Tear, and £"5>575 to Victualling, but in 1746, only £27,492 was bor­ rowed for Wear & Tear, and nothing for Victualling.92 Natu­ rally this put pressure on these other services. At the end of November 1745 the Naval Commissioners said they needed £1,400,000, in addition to the £200,000 for seamen's wages, for paying the Courses up to June 1745 and two quarters of wages to the dockyards. Their needs were enormous, they said, because the Admiralty's shipbuilding program had grown enormously.93 But they did not get the money. Wages to the dockyards continued in arrears, and for a time, in 1746, pay­ ee It should be remembered that ships were paid off when they entered the dockyard for major overhaul. 92 Adm. 106/2182, 2 Feb. 1747. β1 Adm. 3/52, 26 Nov. 1745. »3 Adm. 3/52, 26 Nov. 1745; Adm. 106/2181, 30 Nov. 1745.

g. Naval Finance ments on the Courses had to be abandoned entirely;94 at the end of 1746 the Navy and Victualling Courses remained un­ paid as far back as October 1745.95 The Courses were the critical elements of the navy debt. When it became impossible to discharge them by the expedient of postponing wage pay­ ments to seamen, naval credit was jeopardized, and the govern­ ment was forced to ask Parliament for more money.9® Did the practice of postponing wage payments aggravate the manning problem by undermining morale? It is certain that morale was damaged. One way was through delayed pay­ ments of "recalls." The figures (Appendix I) show that dur­ ing 1748 the debt under the head of Wages decreased by about £800,000, and the reason was that every effort was made to raise money for paying off ships promptly when the war ended: for one thing, the seamen, anticipating freedom, were hard to keep under control, and for another, every day's delay in paying off a ship added an unnecessary expense for wages and victualling.97 To pay off these ships the navy was willing to divert money from the Courses. But the figures also show that at the same time there was a sharp increase in the amount of wages owed on the books of ships paid off. This was money payable "at recall." Not all of it can be considered unfairly withheld by the navy. Some of it remained on the books for years until the seamen to whom it was credited requested payment. But a good portion was owed to widows, to attor­ neys, or to seamen who for one reason or another were not on board when the ship was paid off; many of these people hung β* The scheme of proposed disbursements which the Navy Board drew up in June 1746 made no provision for discharging the Courses; it did include £11,283 f°r interest (Adm. 106/2182, 23 June 1746). The policy of paying quarterly interest on navy bills was adopted about this time, es Adm. 106/2182, 11 Feb. 1747. »«The government might have tried to raise additional money for the navy a year earlier, had it not been for the financial panic which struck in late 1745 and lasted until May 1746; see L. S. Pressnell, "London Bank­ ers in Wartime 1739-84," in Studies in the Industrial Revolution, ed. L. S. Pressnell (i960), pp. 161-162. Pressnell ascribes the tightening of credit at this time to the entry of France into the war and the Jacobite rebel­ lion, but it seems likely that sudden growth of the navy debt (for the reasons I have described) may also have alarmed the public. 97 In 1713, when the Admiralty had no hope of getting enough cash to pay off the ships promptly, it encouraged the men to take leave so that the cost of the victuals, at least, might be saved (N.M.M. POR B/8).

g. Naval Finance about the Pay Office in Broad Street or the Commissioners' offices at the dockyards, waiting for the driblets that were pro­ vided from time to time for paying "recalls." Their situation was particularly miserable near the end of the war. Both Commissioner Hughes (Portsmouth) and Commissioner Brown (Chatham) lamented that there was not enough money to "carry on the Recalls regularly." Hughes said: ". . . it gives me great Concern to see Numbers of poor Wretches Discharged Unserviceable, Widows &ca. at a great distance from their Homes, attending Week after Week, . . . and no prospect of receiving the Wages of their Deceased Husbands or Friends."98 Those who were able-bodied used the only weapon they had to gain fair treatment. Commissioner Brown wrote: I have met with Frequent Insults from the Common Seamen, who have had their Recalls at the Hill House, but nothing ever came up to this present day, when about 300 of them could not be paid, the money not holding out. I therefore thought it proper to let them know, that I expected more money down soon, but instead of their going away, followed me down as far as the Dock Gate, 8c mistaking Capt. John Hardy, for his brother Charles, who I had paid his wages for the Jersey, they fell fowl of him & beat him in a most cruell man­ ner, & it was a mute [sic] point in them, whether they would beat me or not."

But generally speaking, because the payment of "recalls" did not directly affect the active service the Navy Board could get away with procrastination, and in this case the seaman was kept from his wages purely for reasons of fiscal convenience. No doubt the practice of withholding the wages of men on active service also damaged morale. The acts of 1728 were specifically designed to put a stop to it. They came in the wake of a £500,000 grant to reduce the navy debt, for in 1728 Parliament took an unusual step: instead of compliantly vot­ ing the money, it stipulated that the entire sum was to be applied to arrears of wages and, in addition, laid down rules »8 N.M.M. POR F/7, 15 May 1746. as N.M.M. CHA L/23, 7 Feb. 1749. Most commissioned and warrant officers had to pass accounts before receiving their pay, and consequently they were usually paid at "recall"; naturally their claims were given precedence.

g. Naval Finance which would require the navy to pay seamen at regular inter­ vals.100 It is probable that in doing this Parliament aimed not only at helping the men, but also at depriving the navy of its favorite method of running up the debt. But although the acts had effect in peacetime, they became dead letters in war­ time, for soon after the war began the navy ignored them. It did not ignore them in every respect. The Admiralty went to considerable lengths to see that turned-over men were paid. As we have seen, Sir Chaloner Ogle's squadron was paid in September 1740 in spite of the difficulties. Similarly, the Admiralty would not make an exception in order to facilitate the manning of Admiral Boscawen's squadron, preparing to sail to the East Indies in 1747: their Lordships would not allow men to be put aboard Boscawen's ships if they could not be paid before sailing.101 One further instance should be sufficient. On December 30, 1746 Henry Legge, a junior Lord of the Admiralty, actually borrowed £3000 on his "own Ac­ count" in order to pay seamen whom his brother, Commodore Edward Legge, wanted turned over into his squadron. The situation arose because the Treasurer of the Navy's supplies for Wages were exhausted, and the Treasury was closed for the holidays. Legge hoped "to be reimbursed out of the First Issue after the Holidays." He wrote to the Duke of Bedford, "By this means the faith of the Act of Parliament will be strictly observed."102 But the key provisions of the acts were those requiring frequent and regular payments, and in wartime these were not observed. For administrative reasons it was impossible to pay ships abroad regularly. As for the fleet at home, it appears that when the Naval Commissioners told the Admiralty in 1740 that "the Ships at home . . . [were] constantly paid a Years Wages generally before Eighteen months became due," they were telling the truth.103 But after 1740 the practice was discon­ tinued. 100 χ Geo. II c. 9 and c. 14. 102 Woburn MSS. xv, folio 89.

101

Adm. 3/58, 19 Oct. 1747.

103 Adm. 106/2178, 1 Oct. 1740; see also the pay schedule at the be­ ginning ο £ the volume. The Navy Board admitted that another rule laid down by the acts, requiring two months' wages to be paid every six, was not complied with.

g. Naval Finance It was discontinued because the navy's administrators were more concerned about desertion than morale. Their wagepaying policy was tailored to conditions that were predomi­ nantly coercive. Morale, already destroyed by other policies, seemed to them a secondary consideration (and their judg­ ment was later vindicated by the failure of Grenville's Navy Bill, enacted in 1758, to produce the results that its sponsor anticipated).104 If they let themselves be bound by statute in the matter of paying turned-over men, that was because the rules did not conflict with their aim of preventing desertion. But this same aim led them to abandon regular and frequent payments. And although the cash this policy yielded was a by­ product, the administrators undoubtedly tended to make the most of it. Only toward the end of the war, when administra­ tive conditions required it, did the navy give priority to wage payments and divert funds from the Courses for the purpose. EXPENDITURE

One thing stands out from the Navy Board's analysis of the increase of the debt (Table 24). Of the three categories— Wages, Wear & Tear, Victualling—Wages was the least blamable for the navy's excess spending.105 In fact, the Navy Board calculated that nearly all of the true increase under the head of Wages (£817,570) could be attributed to the expense, reckoned at 30s. per man per month, of bearing men in excess of those voted by the Sea Service estimates (£806,008).106 It is not difficult to explain why the charge on the head of Wages, after allowing for excess seamen borne, corresponded so closely with the estimates. For all practical purposes wage rates, both for officers and men, had remained static ever since the 104 See the interesting debate on this measure in Pari. Hist, xv, 839-870. 105 Some definitions are required. By using the word "excess" in this discussion I do not mean to pass judgment on the administrators; I mean, quite narrowly, "in excess of the estimates." By "spending" I mean all transactions whether cash or credit. ioeThe figure £806,008 was used by the Navy Board in its lengthy ex­ planation of the reasons for the increase of the navy debt; I shall refer to this document (Adm. 106/3182, 2 Feb. 1747) often in the paragraphs that follow. I have verified this particular figure

by using the annual statements of

g. Naval Finance method of drawing up the estimates had been devised. The special allowances to sea officers and seamen granted since that time, particularly "head money," pensions, and half pay, were charged to the Ordinary estimate, and consequently appeared under the head of Wear 8c Tear, not Wages.107 Admittedly, the figure of £817,570, which the Navy Board calculated in 1747 to be the true increase of the debt under this head, cannot be accepted as representing actual expenses. For to some extent the statements of debt were in themselves estimates; although most of the expenses could be set down with reasonable accuracy, there were a few, especially in connection with over­ seas activities, that could not be foreseen and were not in­ cluded. And so it is probable that the true excessive spending under Wages (and under the other heads too) was slightly higher.108 However, according to these figures, during the eight-year period ending December 31, 1746 the navy's spend­ ing under the head of Wages exceeded Parliamentary grants by 14.3 per cent.109 Nearly all of this may be attributed to the fact that more men were borne than were voted. During the same period spending under the head of Wear & men borne in excess of those voted. The sources of these figures same as the sources of Table 13: Ii,604 1739 2,181 1740 1741 3.329 Seamen borne in excess 1742 479 of Parliamentary votes 1743 4.342 7,202 1744 6,766 174s 11,072 α 746 Total 30s.

are the

46,975

is

Less — or — of £278,676, which was the navy's share 76s. 38 (exclusive of Ordnance) of the £500,000 granted by Parliament in 1739

• £110,004

£806,009 The money granted on the Ordinary estimate was assigned to the head of Wear & Tear for accounting purposes. 108 For this reason X would have preferred to use an analysis of the navy debt dated 1748 or 1749, but I have been unable to discover one. ίο» This percentage, as well as those for Wear & Tear and Victualling, was calculated by using the figures in Table 24 and apportioning the Parliamentary grants (summarized in Addl. MSS. 33046, folio 237) under the proper heads. Wages: true increase of debt, £817,570 divided by total grants, £5,706,504 = 14.3. 1Ot

g. Naval Finance Tear exceeded the grants by 34.7 per cent.110 Slightly more than half of this may be attributed to maintaining a larger fleet than that voted by Parliament, that is a fleet capable of carry­ ing more than 40,000 men.111 As for the remainder of the increase, the method used by the Navy Board to account for it was so fraught with double counting as to be meaningless. The Board's method was to set down the figure representing the expense of excess seamen borne (£1,313,719), and then to keep adding expenses whose nature they considered extraor­ dinary until a sum was reached approximately equal to the increased debt (£2,340,089). Some of these items were legiti­ mate; that is to say, they represented expenses that had long been recognized as extras for which additional funds had never been granted by Parliament: "head money," premiums on naval stores, interest on navy bills, and so forth. But others were more dubious. For example, a good portion of the excess spending was blamed on shipbuilding, but traditionally Wear & Tear encompassed shipbuilding, and, according to the estab­ lished method of appropriating, listing it as an additional expense was unjustifiable. Thus we are forced to look else­ where for a satisfactory analysis of spending under the head of 110 Wear & Tear: true increase of debt, £2,340,089 divided by total grants (including both Wear Se Tear and Ordinary), £6,735,460 = 34-7· This calculation excludes army expenses. The whole of the income de­ rived from the Ordinary estimates is included here except for the sums granted for harbor victuals, which during the period amounted to £84,158. I have applied this £84,158 to the Victualling calculation. Should I have applied it here instead? We have seen that, according to Corbett in the late 1720's the money for harbor victuals was never accounted to the Victualling Commissioners (above p. 464). On the other hand Parlia­ ment thought it was granting it for Victualling, and there is evidence that during the war of 1739-1748 it was applied to that heading (below note 125). My dilemma here further illustrates how hazardous these calcula­ tions are and how primitive the Navy Board's methods were for ana­ lyzing its expenses. 111 The Navy Board charged £1,313,719 to men borne in excess of those voted (Adm. 106/2182, 2 Feb. 1747). Verification of this figure (by the method used in note 106) reveals that in making its calculation the Board counted not only excess seamen, but also soldiers and marines, which, since they served as complement, was reasonable: 46,975 excess seamen plus 33,522 soldiers and marines = 80497 excess men χ 13 χ zjs. = £1,412,722, from which must be subtracted £99,003 (which is 27/76 of 278,676) = £1,313,719.

Q. Naval Finance Wear & Tear, but unfortunately there is no convenient place to look. Considering the nature of the accounts, any attempt at analysis would involve us in the same sort of double count­ ing as that practiced by the Navy Board. However, it is not difficult to explain the excess spending in general terms, by using expenses under the head of Wear & Tear during the war of the Spanish Succession as a basis for comparison. For in that war these expenses did not appreciably exceed the esti­ mates.112 The reasons for the marked change in the war of 1739-1748, aside from the great expense of maintaining a fleet bearing more than 40,000 men, may be divided into three categories: theoretical accuracy of the estimates; cost of mate­ rials; cost of workmanship. A basic inaccuracy in the estimate for Wear & Tear was steadily developing throughout the eighteenth century. It was caused by the fact that ships of each class were getting bigger, while their complements were not increasing commensurately. Therefore when Parliament voted 40,000 seamen, that number of men was bound to imply a heavier fleet in the 1740's than it had implied at the beginning of the century. In other words tons of warships per seaman increased. According to a rough calculation this increase amounted to 12 per cent.113 And it is not unreasonable to assume that this increase affected costs un­ der the head of Wear & Tear in similar proportion. We know that the navy spent more for materials in the war of 1739-1748 than in the previous war. During the years 1703 through 1707 £2,050,789 was spent on naval stores; for the corresponding five-year period, 1740 through 1744, the figure was £2,348,582—an increase of 14.5 per cent.114 The increase was due to larger purchases, not higher prices. For, taken over­ all, prices for naval stores were slightly lower in the war of 1739-1748 than they were in the war of the Spanish Succession. Although prices of masts increased slightly, pitch, tar, hemp, anchors, and a number of other items were cheaper.11® Part of the decrease of pitch and tar prices may be explained by the breaking of the Swedish monopoly, but to a large extent the 112 Queen Anne's Navy, p. 40. "3 Iq making this calculation

I

have used only ships of

50

to

80

guns

g. Naval Finance over-all drop in prices may be attributed to the changed conditions in which the navy's system of purchase operated. The system itself scarcely changed at all. It was basically the same as that used by the Victualling Board, which has already been described.116 No doubt it was perverted by corruption. Officers too often left the inspection of incoming materials to their clerks,117 and as John Hollond wrote a hundred years earlier: ". . . it is almost incredible what mischief a man that enjoys not 401, per annum from the King may do."118 Appar­ ently everyone had his hand out for "Treats and Rewards in Money."119 One disgruntled ex-shipwright estimated that it would cost an uninitiated merchant £40 to buy off the officers (TPM = Tons per Man): 1706 Guns Tons Men TPM 80 70 60 50

1283 1069 914 704

500 440 365 280

2.56 2.43 2.50 2.51

1741 Tons

Men

TPM

Percentage incr. TPM

1472 1291 1124 969

600 480 400 300

2.4s 2.69 2.81 3.23

—4.6 10.7 12.4 28.7

Average

11.8

(Tonnage figures are taken from Adm. 106/2182, 2 Feb. 1747). The table shows that the increase in the tons-per-man ratio was greater in small ships. The decrease in the 80-gun ships is probably not typical, since a number of 80-gun ships in Queen Anne's reign carried 530 men. The larg­ est and the smallest ships are omitted because their complements varied, but rough calculations I have made indicate that there were very slight increases in the ratio for the go and 100-gun ships, and enormous increases for the 40 and 20-gun ships. Precision is impossible because of countless variables. The figure 12 per cent serves merely as a guide. For example, if one uses Charnock's table of shipbuilding costs (Marine Architecture, hi, 126), one arrives at an increase of the costs-per-man ratio of about 20 per cent, but it is not certain that the costs Charnock gives were based purely on tonnage. i"The figures are taken from Adm. 106/2181, 9 Dec. 1745. 115 Malone, opxit., appended graph; Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. 672-679. lie Detailed information on the Navy Board's system of purchase may be found in Ehrman, pp. 49-65; Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. 612-630; and Sperling, op.cit., pp. 86-100. 117 Adm. 106/2507, 20 July 1715; Adm. 106/3357, 4 Feb. 1742; Adm. 106/3359.28 MaY '746. us Tanner, Hollond's Discourses, p. 88. lie Adm. 106/2507, 7 Nov. 1729.

g. Naval Finance and clerks of a yard, beginning with the Boatswain of the Yard, who had to be "courted to unload" his vessel; otherwise, he said, "she shall lie until she sinks."120 But it is doubtful that this sort of petty corruption meant that load upon load of sub­ standard material was accepted into store. The letters of the Deptford Storekeeper show that numerous "abatements" (i.e. deductions) were made before making out bills because goods were judged inferior to the quality specified in the contract, and sometimes shipments were refused completely.121 Perhaps these things happened because the merchants in question neglected to keep the clerks and officers sweet. We cannot know. But probably the main effect of the insistence on gratu­ ities was to irritate the merchants rather than to inflate heavily the cost of materials. Most important for our purposes here, there is no reason to think that the impact of corruption on costs was any greater in the middle of the eighteenth century than at the beginning. What did change over the half-century, however, was that the Navy Board became far less handicapped by inability to pay its bills. As we have seen, the discount rate on Navy bills was moderate until late 1745. But in the time of Queen Anne, the Course steadily lengthened from about six months in 1702 to thirty-four months in 1711, and in 1711 Navy bills were being discounted at 33 per cent.122 The improved financial situ­ ation in the 1740's saved the navy both trouble and money. It diminished the problem of contract enforcement, since price in­ stability was one of the major causes of nonfulfillment of con­ tracts, and afforded lower costs through lower discount rates. The rise in the cost of workmanship, on the other hand, is striking. During the five-year period 1703 through 1707 the navy spent £886,363 for labor in the dockyards and ropeyards, while in the period 1740 through 1744 it spent £1,529,789— an increase of 72.6 per cent.123 How much of this represented more work done, and how much a rise in wage rates is, as we have seen, a question that cannot be precisely answered;124 but 120 Mr. Williamson's Memoirs (1717), p. 32. 121 See generally Adm. 106/3356-3360. I22Sperling, opxit., p. 110. "3 Calculated from figures in Adm. 106/2181, 9 Oct. 1745. 124 Above p. 332-333.

g. Naval Finance in view of the size of the increase as well as the evidence indi­ cating a larger fleet consuming more materials, it is probable that it represented some of both. Summing up, we may say that about half the excess spend­ ing for Wear & Tear should be ascribed to maintaining a larger fleet than that voted. As for the other half, it seems clear that the navy bought more materials (at somewhat lower prices) and paid much more for dockyard labor, some of which resulted in greater output. Part of the additional mate­ rials and labor-output were required to maintain a fleet of greater tonnage, but a good deal must have been spent for other new and costly services. If one takes into account the cost of more elaborate and extensive dockyard equipment, the more rapid decay of ships, replacing masts and rigging on a scale hitherto unknown, applying dockyard workmen to tasks that were formerly done by seamen, and the waste of stores abroad, one realizes that the navy of 1739-1748 could not have avoided running into debt on the head of Wear & Tear, even if Parliament had granted Sea Service estimates for the full number of men. The greatest excess spending was under the head of Victual­ ling. During the eight-year period ending December 31, 1746 victualling expenses exceeded Parliamentary grants by 41.6 per cent.125 The Victualling Board blamed about one-third of this excess on the 37,339 men mustered beyond those voted.126 Aside from this and a few inconsequential items, the Board could give no detailed account of why it had spent almost 125 Money granted for Victualling during this period amounted to £3,699,139. including £84,158 voted on the Ordinary estimate for harbor victuals; this figure was calculated in the same manner as that for Wages (note 109) and coincides closely with the one given by the Victualling Board, £3,699,277, in its separate report on the Victualling debt (Adm. 106/2182, 2 Feb. 1747). The excess expenditure, according to Table 24, amounted to £1,540,139; the Victualling OfiSce figure was £1,539,469. These figures exclude expenses for victualling the army. Actually unpaid vic­ tualling obligations were probably greater than this by about £75,000 because of the sums due on pursers' accounts not yet balanced and bills of exchange (many of them drawn in the East Indies) not yet registered; see Adm. 106/3545, Part n, Bundle 17. ΐ2β victualling expense was computed on the basis of the number of seamen mustered, not borne: 37,339 men at 19s. per man per month amounts to £461,139 (Adm. 106/2182, 2 Feb. 1747).

Q. Naval Finance half again the amount allotted by Parliament. But in general terms the reasons were obvious. They were summed up in an explanation offered by the Board: The prices of Provisions particularly in the Years 1740 & 1741 were very high and exceeded those of preceeding Years. The very high prices given for Provisions abroad with Extraordinary Freights & Demurrage paid to Merchant Ships for carrying out Provisions for ... Ships in the West Indies, Mediterranean &ca., and the very great decay of Victuals abroad, particularly in the West Indies where a greater number of Men have been Employed since the Year 1738 than in any former Warr, have Occasioned the Increase of the Charge of the Victualling over and above the Allowance of 19s. a Man a Month.127

It was natural that the Victualling Commissioners should blame high prices, and especially the bad years of 1740 and 1741, since the harvests in the 1730's had been good and prices low.128 It was also natural that they should blame the high cost of distributing provisions abroad. We have already noted Corbett's estimate that if the Victualling Office supplied the West Indies squadron, it would cost about 12 d. per man per day—or 28s. per month.129 In 1740 and 1741 nearly 20,000 men (about 40 per cent of the fleet) were stationed in the West Indies, and in 1743 and 1744 about the same percentage was deployed in the Mediterranean. Undoubtedly the increased spending was caused by higher prices for provisions and by higher distribution expenses (including greater waste), but nevertheless the Victualling Board's explanation is unsatis­ fying. It implies that the high prices during the war were unusual, that is, merely accidental, and it does not try to dis­ cover whether the main factor was higher prices for provisions or the higher cost of services; the two are simply lumped to­ gether. Is it possible to carry the analysis further? At first glance it would appear that the figures in Table 25 make it possible. In 1745 the Admiralty asked the Victualling Board to analyze victualling expenses and compare them against expenses in the previous war; these figures were the 12T Ibid. 128 Beveridge, Prices and Wages, p. 73a. 129 Above p. 401.

87,333 37,566 15.526

7.292 30,562

37.890

4.956

6,914 6,085 4,146 4,188 4,112

7.975

8,060

7,544 5,599

129,652

133,332 190,578

192,571

51.801 46,984

61,938

16,644 25,366 19,404 17.850 25,168 2,441

4.383

624 2,814 3,852 368,838 284,904 404,601

579,689

499,781

373,356 458,395 439,723 467.179

318,103

712,653 587,966 748,609

675.564 918,571

774.416 773.313

12,042 10,517 0 0 0 0 0

9.797

516.356

604,496 719,909

5.230

Total

2.572

Pro- Interest visions on &ca. Bills

Net Total

677,578

10,970 576,995 16,377 732,233

35,075

124,564 550,999 111,918 806,653

not available

Cost of Army Victuals

smce pay books were not kept by some Agents m that period. The Board also said that there was no way of isolating army victualling costs in the time of Queen Anne. Total expenses for the latter half of the earlier war were also given; they show how expenses rose under the pressure of high prices: 1708, £680,867; 1709, £822,821; 1710, £942,879; 1711, £912,745. In both wars Parliamentary grants for victualling amounted to about £500,000 per year.

33,743 39.399 39,935 42,954

29,140

FIGURES TO THE NE AREST POTU FND 12,672 49.300 23,678 29,398 14,220 24,164 61,363 34.641 22,918 28,293 16,045 93,345 16,467 27,170 134.123 45.074 12,602 26,962 109,672 47.561

34.357 34.311 45.104

29.914 30.435

22,461 28,889

13.588

Bills of Exchange

Incident and Salaries Short Contingent Allowance and Charges Wages Incurred

The table is based on Adm. 110/14, 4 Feb. 1746. It is given here almost exactly in the form it was given to the Admiralty; the only modification I have made is to consolidate freight and demurrage. I have kept the distinction between Extra and Ordinary freights because, although I have no certain evidence, I assume that Extra Freights involved shipping abroad. The Victualling Board, in submitting these figures, mentioned that Salaries and Wages had to be estimated for the earlier period

1743 1744

14.883 14,080 15,400

15,350

1741

1742

23,581 19,700

30,958

32.503 36,534 36,781

17.832 25,148

24.294

Extra Ordinary Balances Freights Freights paid on and De- and De- Pursers' murrage murrage Accounts

35.186

1706 1707 1740

1705

1703 1704

Necessary and Beer Year Money

TABLE 25. Comparison of Victualling Expenses in 1703-1707 and 1740-1744

g. Naval Finance result. But unfortunately they do not help us much. For one thing excessive victualling spending in the war of 1739-1748 cannot be explained by using the war of the Spanish Succes­ sion as a basis for comparison because victualling spending in that war also exceeded the estimates by a great amount— about 33 per cent.130 Furthermore, attempts to use the table for cost analysis are frustrated by the Victualling Office's system of accounting. In spite of appearances, none of the headings truly separate provisions costs from distribution costs, or the expense of supplying ships at home from the expense of sup­ plying ships abroad. Exactly what the headings include the document does not say, but it is probable that "Provisions, 8cca." includes payments to contractors and therefore includes some distributing expenses. For this same reason "Provisions, &ca." cannot be assumed to refer solely to provisions supplied in England, and "Bills of Exchange" cannot be assumed to include all provisions supplied abroad; in fact, the probable reason for the sudden increase on the headings of "Bills of Exchange" and "Extra Freights" after 1740 was the transfer of Jamaica victualling from contractors to the Office. Finally, the Victualling Board made no attempt to adjust the figures for variations in the number of men victualled and the dis­ count rate on Victualling bills. We must regrettably conclude that we cannot know precisely what the Victualling Office was getting for its money, and we may note that the Admiralty and Victualling Boards probably could not know either. However, although the figures do not lend themselves to analysis, they do suggest some trends. The increase of pay­ ments by bill of exchange indicates that the burden of victual­ ling ships in foreign waters was heavier in the war of 17391748 than in the war of the Spanish Succession. The increases under "Wages and Salaries" and "Contingent Charges" reveal the growth of the Victualling organization. And one of the most striking changes is the sharp drop in short allowance and beer money.131 These decreases were much to the administra130 Navy debt figures compiled in 1710 are printed in Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 34-41. 131 Xn the table Necessary and beer money are lumped together; since the allowance to pursers of Necessary money, with which they bought coal, candles, utensils, etc., remained the same, changes in the amounts 49Ο

Q. Naval Finance tion's credit: they not only reveal a more effective distributing system, but they are also laudable because the established allowances (ii/2d. per day for short allowance; i/2d. per day for beer) were of ancient standing and did not begin to match the value of the denied provisions. As Thomas Corbett put it: "The King saves Money by putting the Fleet to Short Allow­ ance."132 One very important phenomenon that the figures in Table 25 reveal, when set against price indices, is the violent manner in which over-all victualling costs reacted to fluctuations in the provisions market.133 It is obvious that the Victualling Commissioners could not ignore high prices when explaining their high costs. But were prices in the war of 1739-1748 unusually high, as the Commissioners considered them to be? Although 1740 and 1741 were bad years, it does not appear that provisions prices on the whole were any higher in this war than in other eighteenth-century wars. In fact they may have been slightly lower.134 In the war of the Spanish Succes­ sion the Victualling Commissioners were spending so much more than their appropriations that both they and the Navy Board sought—fruitlessly of course—a revision of the esti­ mates. They blamed the increase on the Victualling Ordinary (for which there was no grant on the Ordinary estimate), the cost of victualling ships overseas, and the fact that provisions were "dearer than formerly."135 Why were provisions dearer than formerly? Was it because of bad harvests? Occasionally it was, but the statistics indicate that their effects were short­ lived. Was it because high discount rates inflated the con­ tracts? Partly; however, the Victualling Commissioners dem­ onstrated that in 1714, when the discount rate was negligible, the cost of provisioning could not possibly be kept within the of beer money paid must have been largely responsible for changes under the heading. 132 Corbett MSS. xiv, folio 39. 133 For indices see: Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. 731-732; Elizabeth W. Gilboy, "The Cost of Living and Real Wages in Eighteenth-Century England," Rev. Econ. Statistics, xvra (1936), 135-137. 134 Beveridge, Prices and Wages, pp. 731-732. About the only items that the navy paid more for, on the whole, in the war of 1739-1748 as com­ pared with the period 1702-1712, were butter and biscuit. 135 Queen Anne's Navy, pp. 47-48, 306-307.

g. Naval Finance estimates.13® Did the OiBce spend too much because of corrup­ tion and inefficiency? Perhaps, but probably not enough for it to be significant. The important fact is that prices were gener­ ally higher in wartime during the eighteenth century than in peacetime. During the period 1650-1750 peacetime prices for provisions remained at about the same level, except of course when influenced by crop failures; but in wartime they tended to rise. Hence the Victualling Commissioners in the first half of the eighteenth century were apt to consider war­ time prices unusual. An economist has offered an explanation of the phenomenon. It is briefly this: prices rose in wartime because of the inflationary pressure generated by government borrowing; the unfunded debt in particular (navy bills, ex­ chequer bills, and so on) increased the money supply, and the effect was heaviest on food prices; but before 1689 the wartime rises did not occur because government borrowing was on a far smaller scale.137 If this is what happened, then the govern­ ment's very success in establishing a credit system was an important cause of its failure to keep the cost of victualling within the estimates. Surveying the pattern of naval expenditure, we are struck by the contrast between the rigidity of the estimates in all respects and the flexibility of spending in all but one respect: wages in the fleet. If it was expensive to supply overseas squadrons with victuals and stores, the expense was met. If wartime inflation raised prices for provisions, the prices were paid. If new and bigger ships were wanted, they were built. When dockyard workmen struck for higher pay to offset the wartime cost of living, the navy yielded. When seamen em­ ployed by the administrative departments demanded higher wages, they got them. But wages in the fleet stayed as they were in the seventeenth century. This meant that officers' sala­ ries remained frozen too, but officers had ways of looking after themselves, and few reckoned salary their most important source of income. But to the men, wages were important; their prize shares were not big enough for one stroke of fortune to 13» Ibid., p. 308. isTEIizabeth B. Schumpeter, "English Prices and Public Finance, 1660j822," Rev. Econ. Statistics, xx (1938), si-37.

g. Naval Finance offset months of low pay. Higher costs forced the government during the latter half of the eighteenth century to raise Sea Service requests to 50,000, 70,000, and so on, and to insist on grants for Extraordinary Repairs. But the ancient structure of the estimates—30J. for Wages, 27s. for Wear & Tear, 195. for Victualling—continued unchanged until 1797. It took a mu­ tiny in the home fleet to raise an able seaman's pay by a few shillings a month. This occurred at a time of severe financial crisis, and a fundamental recasting of the estimates followed in its wake. Is it unfair to surmise that one reason for the govern­ ment's reluctance to revise any of the ancient allocations under Sea Service was that such revision would inevitably bring forward the embarrassing question of raising wages? It is a sad commentary on both the administrators and legislators of eighteenth-century Britain that the idea of easing the man­ ning problem by raising wages was never seriously entertained.

J0, Though we are very strong by sea in ships we have no power to make our seamen go on board of them, even to defend the nation if attacked; but I will not mention our weakness in that respect, not but that we have men enough for all our ships, and I hope this Session the Parliament will think it necessary to compel them to come in. SIR CHARLES WAGER, /7^01

Indeed, the financial system that arose after the Revolu­ tion was the key to the power of England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. —G. M. TREVELYAN2

I

T IS possible to trace many features of naval administration back to the time of Elizabeth and, in some cases, to the Mid­ dle Ages, but before 1660 the line of development is irregular and often interrupted. After 1660 the line is unbroken. Shortly after Charles II was restored, the regulations of the navy were reestablished by statute (13 Car. II s.i c.9), and instructions for governing the Navy Office, based on the lessons of both the early Stuart and Commonwealth periods, were promul­ gated. To this legacy were added the innovations of Samuel Pepys, who began the interminable task of substituting profes­ sional for amateur, formula for whim, and—it is not strange that a diarist should promote this regrettable feature of organ­ izational growth—paper for talk. Then, in the long wars against Louis XIV, both the size of the navy and the scope of its activities were greatly magnified, and the structure of administration grew and changed accordingly. By 1714 the naval administrative system in Britain was well established. Lord Anson did not create that system when he came on the scene in the middle of the eighteenth century; he simply made more efficient use of it. Anson's reputation as a great naval admin­ istrator is unquestionably well deserved. But the historian's habit of linking important achievements to important men can easily lead to distortion, particularly in the field of admin1 2

Vernon Papers, p. 136. The English Revolution, 1688-1689 (Oxford, 1938), p. 179.

20. Conclusion istration, where efforts at improvement are regularly con­ sidered either unworthy of public notice, or from another point of view, likely to be misunderstood by the public mind and therefore best carried on without fanfare. It has been commonly supposed that the period of growth came to an end in 1714 and that the navy declined during the long peace that followed. But if one is willing to make allow­ ance for the inevitable effect of peace on the instruments of war, the administrative record during this period seems at least satisfactory and perhaps better than satisfactory. For the most part it was a period of consolidation, one in which the developments of the preceding quarter-century of war were digested and institutionalized. And while the navy's adminis­ tration was being put in better order, its material condition was not overlooked. Far from falling into decay, the facilities of the dockyards were refurbished and in some cases ex­ panded. In addition, new bases were constructed overseas where none had existed before. As for the fleet, its material condition was, on the whole, acceptable. There were too many large ships in 1739, and not enough cruisers, but this was invariably the case at the beginning of every eighteenthcentury war,3 and as we have seen, there was a logical, if not wholly satisfying, explanation for the situation. The attention given to administrative arrangements after the close of the wars against Louis XIV was, perhaps, no more than one might expect, considering the impact of those wars on the British navy. But it does seem remarkable, in view of the effects of peace and retrenchment, that the material condi­ tion of the navy did not deteriorate more than it did. Actually this is not difficult to explain, and we need not ascribe it to any extraordinary diligence on the part of naval administrators. The fact is that historians have tended to overlook the unquiet nature of the 1714-1739 peace. The West Indian bases were built because trouble with Spain threatened continually after 1725. And if the fleet was maintained, the main reason was that British statesmen, including Walpole, were prepared to 8 See the chapter by Sir Herbert Richmond in Johnson's England, ed. A. S. Turberville (8 vol., Oxford, 1933). 1. 40-43.

49S

ί ο . Conclusion use it in order to insure continuance of the peace they desired.4 Thanks to periodic, though limited, mobilizations the navy retained a measure of vitality. Contemporaries apparently sensed this. If the government's critics believed that the navy was unfit for mobilization, they neglected to mention it. On the contrary, in their speeches and pamphlets they seemed to assume that the British navy could hold the French in check and vanquish Spain effortlessly.5 Britain was unquestionably the leading naval power of Europe when war broke out in 1739·

The main foundation of that power was money. In peace the navy's grants from Parliament were enough to give it the benefits of permanent organization. In war it was enabled to meet the high costs of victuals, dockyard labor, and sending supplies to ships in foreign waters. Broadly speaking, it was the better financial condition of the government in the eight­ eenth century that caused a naval administrative system whose basic characteristics had not changed greatly since the seven­ teenth century to produce better results. Money even di­ minished the ill effects of corruption. Eighteenth-century naval administrators were undoubtedly just as corrupt as their predecessors; in fact, their total embezzlements probably reached levels hitherto unknown. But the important thing is the effect of corruption on the service. In earlier times when administrators filled their own pockets the fleet was bound to suffer, but under conditions of abundance it was usually the 4See Sir Herbert Richmond, The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558-1727 (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 396-397. 5The following verse was written after the Treaty of Seville (1729), which the Spaniards were encouraged to sign by the mobilization of 33 British men of war. It epitomizes the spirit of the times: What need the British Fleet to leave her Shoar Or make, in distant Climes, her Thunder roar? She's arm'd, she's join'd, prepar'd to plough the Main. Sure that's enough to humble haughty Spain! Thus when Jove's Bird does but for Flight prepare, Th'affrighted Doves streight to their Home repair. Quoted in An Historical Account of the Many Signal Naval Atchievements obtained by the English over the Spaniards, from the year 1350 to the Present Time (1739), p. 108. The particular sentiments here are, of course, ministerial, but the assumption of naval strength was common to all parties.

ίο. Conclusion royal treasury that suffered rather than the fleet. Above all, financial power gave the navy staying power. If the British fleet enjoyed virtually unchallenged supremacy toward the end of some eighteenth-century wars, it was often because its opponents were demobilized for want of money. We can imagine the feelings of a French Minister of Marine during the final years of one of these wars—seeing his own requests for funds repeatedly denied, while across the Channel a huge naval debt was being effortlessly converted by public loans at 6 per cent or less.® The relationship between financial power and naval power becomes even more conspicuous when one considers the man­ ning problem. Here was the one great problem to which money was not applied. During the preceding centuries the navy had been gradually developing means for meeting the sudden demands of war in respect to ships, victuals, stores, and even officers; the means involved permanent organization and peacetime reserves, and they were expensive. But the seamen remained unorganized. A reservoir of trained seamen existed, and in principle it was felt that they belonged to the nation as a whole—to the trade in peace and to the navy and the privateers in war. But in practice, of course, the reservoir was not big enough for wartime needs, and hence the great administrative problem arose of bringing men into the navy. It was a problem of mobilization; and it was growing all the more difficult to solve during the eighteenth century because of the increasing size and changing nature of naval require­ ments, and the rising level of wartime wages. The problem was hidden from the view of most eighteenthcentury Englishmen. It was hard for them to believe that their country, for centuries a land of seafaring men, should have trouble finding crews for ships of war. Nevertheless, sea officers, the Admiralty, and the government were fully aware of it. In 1735 Walpole, considering that Europe had not yet weathered the diplomatic storm of the previous year, argued against partial demobilization on this ground. He said that it would be "highly imprudent. . . to pay off part of our seamen, «See, for example, the lament of Berryer, Minister of Marine in 1760, quoted by Pares in Historian's Business, pp. 156-157.

ίο. Conclusion particularly if one considers how difficult it would be in a country such as this to bring them together again in case of pressing need; that in countries where government was arbi­ trary all the seamen were registered and could be brought together whenever needed; but that it was not so in this country."7 A member of the opposition answered by denying that Britain was put at much disadvantage by this; he rashly calculated: ". . . from a hot press among our coasters, colliers and inland trade, we could in a very few days increase the number of men on board our ships of war to 40,000 at least."8 But the events of the past had proved him wrong and Walpole right, and so would those of the future. In April 1740 Sir John Norris wrote in his diary: "It is the greatest misfortune that our Government cant find any way to man the ships in Com­ mission, or what mout be putt in Commission if we had men."9 Perhaps, had it not been for delays in manning, the mobiliza­ tion might have been carried out with admirable speed in 1739, and modern historians would be disposed to congratu­ late the navy's peacetime administrators rather than condemn them. There were three possible solutions to the problem, none of which could be attempted without Parliamentary authoriza­ tion. One was to raise wages in wartime. Admittedly this would not have solved the problem, because naval wages could not possibly have been raised to a level competitive with merchants', but it would have lessened its severity. However, the propertied classes as represented in Parliament had no desire to raise wages: landed men feared higher taxes, and merchants were anxious to keep seamen's wages as low as possible. And in any event the question of raising wages was scarcely considered because naval administrators did not think 1 Translated from a French report of a debate in the Commons on Feb. 7, 1735, which is printed in P. Mantoux, Notes sur Ies comptes rendus des stances du parlement anglais au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1906), pp. 88-89. Since these French reports of Parliamentary debates are thought to be more accurate than the versions printed in English maga­ zines, it is interesting to note that a comparison with Pari. Hist., ix, 695696 reveals no difference in substance and very little in wording. β Pari. Hist, ix, 701-702. After the war the opposition took the manning problem more seriously in such debates (e.g. Pari. Hist, xiv, 828-868). β Addl. MSS. 28132, folio 171.

ίο. Conclusion in terms of fluctuating wage-rates, and M.P.'s tended to judge costs by standards of the distant past. To obtain other skills where manpower was scarce—to get shipwrights, caulkers, sailmakers, smiths, and ropemakers—the navy did in effect pay higher wages, but it did so by indirect methods. Another solution would have been to establish a permanent and specially privileged body of volunteers. The Marine regi­ ments were a feeble step in this direction. But if it was to be of any value, a voluntary corps would entail additional expense, for although money alone could not solve the manning prob­ lem, without money it could not be solved. This approach could not make headway, however, against the common as­ sumption that there were plenty of seamen, that it was one of the purposes of commerce to produce them, and that therefore there was no need for the taxpayers to support a special corps of them. The third solution was conscription: to organize the exist­ ing body of seamen and to coerce them to enter the service in an equitable and efficient manner. In 1720 Josiah Burchett publicly pledged that he would never cease striving for a sys­ tem of this sort: "As this [the registry system] is a thing of such a Nature as to require no small Application to render it effec­ tual, I have only hinted at it here; but if it shall at any time be judged proper to put it in Practice, and it shall please God to bless me with the Continuance of Life and Health, I will most readily contribute all I am able towards the establishing what, in my humble Opinion, may so much tend to the Good of my Country."10 But it was not "judged proper to put it in Practice." One reason was that merchants were not interested in making it easier for the navy to get men. But the main trouble was that conscription ran against the grain of the constitution. It smacked too much of royal tyranny. The issue was up to Parliament, and Parliament refused. The result was that the Admiralty was forced to carry on with an extremely inefficient and unjust system of manning. The Board endeavored to curb brutality and learned to spend money freely to keep the men well fed and in health, and these things no doubt aided shipboard morale. But their effect 10 Burchett, Complete History, Preface.

10.

Conclusion

on the manning problem was negligible; they were things any prudent owner would have done for his slaves. The men recognized the king's service for what it was; they refused to enter it willingly and deserted it whenever opportunity offered. Ships became floating prisons, and the dockyard and victualling services were thus required to undertake tasks that might otherwise have been accomplished by the fleet. The manning problem not only delayed mobilization, but also caused naval administration as a whole to become warped by the need to prevent desertion. Are we to consider seamen one of the navy's greatest weaknesses? We are confronted with the fact that Britain's opponents did not think so, and with good reason. There is reason to believe that on the whole Britain's seamen were quicker on the yardarm and on the gun-deck; they had sailed more and fought more than their opponents. They were rough, loyal, and aggressive, and though the nation failed them, it appears that in the day of battle they did not fail the nation.l1 In spite of the massive problem of recruiting them and the administrative disadvantages of confining them, these men should be counted one of Britain's prime naval assets. Our conclusion must be that the difficulty of getting seamen was a great source of naval weakness at the beginning of a war, but that their numbers and experience were a source of strength as war progressed. It is important to note these foundations of British naval strength because of the tendency of naval historians to portray a dedicated body of sea officers struggling successfully with an inferior fighting instrument which had been prepared for them by corrupt and negligent administrators ashore. No doubt there was corruption, but the sea officers fully shared in it: they too cheated on accounts and worked for the promotion of their friends. But were not Britain's sea officers a great asset? Potentially they were; their numbers were relatively large and they were generally more experienced at sea than their opponents. But the intense degree to which personal and political animosity might divide them rendered their value uncertain on any particular occasion. The sea officers 11

Robinson, British Tar in Fact and Fiction, pp. 23, 107.

500

ί ο . Conclusion were a mixed group, and as such were a power for good or ill. Which it would be was up to the Admiralty. Thus far we have been considering fundamental strengths and weaknesses, and our analysis suggests that while the Brit­ ish navy tended to be slow to mobilize, it had unparalleled means of increasing its strength as war lengthened out. How well it overcame its weaknesses and capitalized on its strengths depended of course on execution. The executive organ of the navy was ostensibly the Admiralty, and naval historians have often wrestled with the problem of relating naval power to Admiralty administration. The results, however, have some­ times been confusing, for there has been misunderstanding as to what any particular Admiralty Board in the eighteenth century might reasonably have been expected to achieve. This misunderstanding has arisen from a failure to discrimi­ nate between what the Admiralty controlled directly, what it controlled indirectly, and what it merely influenced. We shall take these up in reverse order. The main ingredients of a recipe for victory had to be sup plied by the ministry. It was the ministry's responsibility to provide enough money to maintain the fleet in peacetime; to recognize the critical problem of mobilization and to take precautions accordingly; not to flinch at the expense of a long war; and to allow ships to be deployed according to strategic need rather than to yield indiscriminately to every influential trading interest that petitioned for protection by convoys and cruisers. These were the ministry's responsibilities because they involved political issues. Naturally the First Lord might try to influence the ministry's decisions, but on the whole an Admi­ ralty Board that appeared strong in these fundamental re­ spects derived its strength from its membership in a strong, well-constructed ministry. The bulk of administration of the navy was not directly under Admiralty control. The Admiralty Lords might wish to interfere in the business of the Commissioners of the Navy, Victualling, and Sick and Wounded, but they always had to consider the possibility that, in terms of immediate results, their interference might do more harm than good. The choice —as it so often is when dealing with the lower echelons of

SOi

ί ο . Conclusion administration—was to undertake a thorough overhaul or else leave things alone. Theoretically the Admiralty had the power to undertake such an overhaul. It overhauled the Victualling Olfice in the early part of the century. However, the Victual­ ling Ofiice was a young organization at that time, and its performance had been notoriously poor. The Navy Office and the dockyard organization were another matter. They were of ancient standing and enjoyed the moral authority that that invariably implied in eighteenth-century England. Therefore in these branches of administration an Admiralty Board in­ clined toward reform could not do much more than make occasional changes in policy, complain and criticize, and try to fill vacancies with able administrators. The results of such actions were as likely to benefit future Admiralty administra­ tions as the one that undertook them. What was directly under Admiralty control, although its control was not exclusive, was the disposition of ships and the promotion and assignment of officers. In the case of ships con­ trol was shared, to a varying degree, by the Admiralty and those members of the government who set strategic policy; it was also shared with commanders-in-chief at sea, since many of the most important decisions had to be made on the spot. In selecting fleet commanders, and officers to serve under them, the Admiralty's control was not absolute—the king or a powerful minister might veto a particular selection. Neverthe­ less, in this respect its authority was, in fact, rarely challenged. This is not to say that its selections were never influenced from outside. On the contrary, the Admiralty was beseiged by aristo­ crats seeking favors for relatives and friends, and politicians trying to keep up the government's interest in Parliamentary constituencies. It was continually being pulled by personal friendships. The true test of any particular Board's perform­ ance lay in its ability to resist these pressures; to appoint the most able and dedicated officers to the key commands; to shield them from political attack when they took a correct, but un­ popular course; and to see to it that officers who neglected their duties and refused all but the choicest assignments were, if not punished, at least not promoted. For an impartial policy was basic to morale in the fleet. Without it the officer

ίο. Conclusion corps lay fragmented in factions and the interest of the service was forgotten. The test was a difficult one, because eighteenthcentury Admiralty Boards were unavoidably immersed in poli­ tics. Although none could hope to be completely impartial, some scarcely tried. The course of the war of 1739-1748 illustrates these obser­ vations. Although at the beginning success was hampered by the manning problem and by uncertainty of strategic aim, Walpole's ministry, to its credit, faced up to the possibility of war with France and accepted the necessity and expense of full mobilization. At the same time the Admiralty, under Sir Charles Wager, commanded the loyalty of its admirals, be­ cause Wager, for all his faults, was liked and trusted. He also had the courage to assign Vernon, a difficult man who had made countless enemies in the ministry and at court, to the crucial West Indian command. From 1742 to 1744 Admiralty administration under the Earl of Winchilsea reflected the weakness of Carteret's ministry. The crowning disaster of this period was the battle of Toulon, a disaster that might have been prevented if the Admiralty, which had known for months that Admirals Mathews and Lestock did not get along, had had the courage to recall one of them. The greatest change in naval administration during the war came in December 1744 when Bedford, Sandwich, and Anson took office. However, this change did not bring with it any significant reform of the administrative departments, for in that respect the new Board's efforts were largely frustrated. In 1745 it tried to introduce radical alterations in ship design, but failed to over­ come the old conservatism. It took drastic steps to expedite refitting in the dockyards and succeeded only in antagonizing the Navy Board. It investigated extravagance and inefficiency in the dockyards and, after due consideration, decided to do nothing until after the war. But in dealing with the sea serv­ ice, the Board's measures were effective. It set out to improve discipline. By initiating a superannuation program it made way for younger and more vigorous flag officers. Most impor­ tant, there was a refreshing emphasis on merit in its selections for advancement. That failures of naval leadership were few toward the end of the war testifies to the value of these

ί ο . Conclusion measures, but an equally important cause of success at sea was simply the increased size and strength of the fleet. And the principal reason for the increase was that the new Board of December 1744 was part of a new "broad-bottomed" admin­ istration, one willing to prosecute the war vigorously and able to pay the price. Thus the Admiralty had the means at hand to revitalize naval leadership, but was poorly equipped to solve the basic problems of naval administration. The improvement of leader­ ship at sea after 1744 came largely through the efforts of a single, dedicated officer, who had a talent for politics without having the appearance and inclinations of a politician. What Lord Anson had done could be easily undone by less worthy succes­ sors. His contribution, however, was significant as an example to others, a standard against which future administrations might be judged, and as such had lasting influence. But not even Anson could lift the dead weight of tradition from the dockyards, nor could he introduce, unassisted, a more efficient and equitable method of manning the fleet. In the final analysis significant administrative reform had to be based on some extension of the power of the central govern­ ment. But government leaders argued the merits of enlarging Admiralty powers to wary and unsympathetic Parliaments. On questions of this kind politicians in office had difficulty obtaining the support of those M.P.'s whom they held under obligation. For the average eighteenth-century Englishman, whether he called himself a Whig or a Tory, preferred liberty to governmental efficiency. Besides, most Englishmen considered the unpalatable medi­ cine of increased governmental power unnecessary. Reform could be had without it. In fact, according to their reasoning, to augment the powers of government was to proceed in a direction away from reform, since government by its very nature was corrupt. The repeated example of ambitious politicians—out of office, fulminating against corruption, but in office, contentedly corrupt—seemed to prove it. Noting this, some M.P.'s did not seek office; they felt that their coun­ try needed their independence more than their services.12 ι2 See Namier, History Today, τν (1954), 677-680.

ίο. Conclusion Such was their state of mind. But if they believed this, then how did they suppose better government was to be achieved? The answer was naively simple: by rooting out the poisonous influence of bribery and royal patronage. This done, the political significance of landed gentlemen would be restored; the traditional governors of England would take their right­ ful places, if not actually as public officials, then as overseers of the excutive and guardians of the interest of the nation. It was not to be doubted that such gentlemen of good will and broad understanding would arrive at identical conclusions as to the national interest. That interest was singular and ob­ vious; right-minded men could not fail to perceive it. This attitude was very common. It made it unnecessary for anyone outside the executive to consider questions of reform in an educated and systematic way. And it made it almost impossible for any ministry to allow a program of administra­ tive reform to take precedence over the requirements of politi­ cal management. Until the disasters of the war for American independence, few Englishmen saw the need, and fewer still felt the inclination, to reform a navy which, for all its faults, was the acknowledged mistress of the seas.

APPENDIX I THE NAVY DEBT, 1739-1749 Explanation of terms used: W & T1 Ordy, Extra—Wear & Tear, Ordinary, Extraordinary Repairs W & T, Trans.—Wear & Tear, Ordinary, Transports Navy Course—Navy and Transport bills Not billed, B of E—Charge on items for which no bills had yet been made out on December 31, plus estimated charge on Bills of Exchange Dockyard wages—Wages owing to dockyard and ropeyard workers Paid off—Wages owed on books of ships paid off In pay—Wage obligations accruing on books of ships in sea pay Office wages—Wages owed to Victualling Office workers in London and at the ports Necy money, B of E—Necessary money, extra necessary money, Bills of Exchange and Victualling contingencies S & W—debt of Sick and Wounded OiBce Other—under W & T, Ordy, it includes premiums owing on naval stores and half pay not yet paid to sea officers —under Wages, it includes the Course for pilot's wages, surgeons necessaries, bounty money for widows —under Victualling, it includes short allowance money owed on the books of ships paid off, items for which bills were not yet made out on December 31, and (where not otherwise specified) Necessary money and Bills of Exchange Cash in hand or to come—Cash in the hands of various Treasurers of the Navy, or still due from the Exchequer on the supplies voted for the year Army transports—Cost of hiring and victualling troops and transports; a supply to match this amount was invariably voted by Parlia­ ment the following year, and the Navy Board did not consider it as part of the navy debt

Annendices Navy debt on 31 December 1738 was £536.945 31 December 1739 W & T, Ordy, Extra: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Net debt 31 December 1740 W & T, Ordy, Extra: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other

£314.179 111,470 160,838 19,706

606,193

Wages: Paid off In pay Other

64,798 803,727 19.457

887,982

Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Other

250,110 12,606 22,855

285,571 42,192

S&W Total Cash in hand or to come

1,821,938 520,412 1,301,526 229,840 £1,071,686

Actual Army transports Net debt

509

Appendices 31 December 1 7 4 7

W & T, Ordy, Trans: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Actual Army transports Net debt W & T, Ordy, Trans: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other

31 December 1742

Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Actual Army transports Net debt

5^3

Appendices 31 December

1743

W & T, Ordy, Trans: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Actual Army transports Net debt W & T, Ordy, Trans: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Necy money; B of E Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Actual Army transports Net debt

31 December 1744

Appendices 31 December 1 7 4 7

W & T, Ordy, Trans: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Necy money; B of E Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Actual Army transports Net debt W & T, Ordy, Trans: Navy Course Not billed; B or E Dockyard wages Other

31 December 1746

Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Necy money; B of E Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Actual Army transports Net debt

5^3

Appendices 31 December

1747

W & T, Ordy, Trans: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Necy money; B of E Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Actual Army transports Net debt W & T, Ordy, Trans: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other

31 December 1748

Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Actual Army transports Net debt

5^3

Appendices W & T, Ordy, Trans: Navy Course Not billed; B of E Dockyard wages Other

31 December

1740

Wages: Paid off In pay Other Victualling: Victualling Course Office wages Other S&W Total Cash in hand or to come Actual Army transports Npt Heht Condensed from House of Commons Journals, x x i n , 435, 641; x x i v , 105, 418, 572, 753; XXV, 82, 232, 502, 694, 96-5. All figures to the nearest pound.

90 90 90 90 90 90

90 90

ICO

100 100 100 100 100 100 100

100

Guns

ms

Britannia

Royal George London Royal Sovereign Royal William Lost at sea.

Barfleur Blenheim Duke Prince George St. George Marlborough Namur

Britannia

Royal George London Royal Sovereign Royal William Victory

Barjleur Blenheim Duke Prince George St. George Marlborough Namur

(Royal Anne) {Royal Anne) Scheduled for rebuilding, but not done.

1742

Barfleur Blenheim Duke Prince George St. George Marlborough Wrecked {Namur)

2ND RATE

Royal Sovereign Royal William

(Britannia) Royal George

06 06 33 19 33 19 19

IQ 33

—

—

45 19 43

06

Establishment 1ST RATE

{Royal Anne)

1751

Built

1740

1729

1732

1739 1723

1716 1709

1737

1721 1728* 1719

1715

1719

1712

Rebuilt

A P P E N D I X II T H E R O Y A L N A V Y IN 1742, 1745, A N D 1751 1st through 6th Rates (Ships in parentheses are being built or rebuilt)

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Dockyard, Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Woolwich Woolwich Portsmouth Woolwich Chatham Chatham Portsmouth Portsmouth Deptford Woolwich Woolwich Deptford Portsmouth Chatham Deptford Chatham

Dockyard

Builder

Woolwich

Place

Princess Amelia

Boyne Princess Caroline Cambridge

Chichester Cornwall {Culloden) Cumberland

{Devonshire)

Princess Amelia

Boyne Princess Caroline Cambridge

Chichester Cornwall

Cumberland

{Devonshire)

Dorsetshire

80

80 80 80 80 80 80

74 80

80

80

74

Dorsetshire

{Prince) Princess Royal (Ramallies) Sandwich Union

90 90 90 90 90 90

90 90

1751

66 guns.

Invincible

R e d . t o 66 guns in 1 7 4 8 . R e d . t o 66 guns in 1747.

Cornwall Culloden

{Cambridge)

Boyne Princess Caroline

06

41

33

—

06 19

33 19 06

19

41 06 41 06 19

19

Establishment

3RD RATE

Princess Amelia Ordered red. to

( Union)

{Neptune) Prince Princess Royal Ramallies Sandwich

2ND RATE—continued

(Prince) Princess Royal (Ramallies) Sandwich Union

1745

Neptune

1742

Neptune

Guns

1745

1747

Built

A P P E N D I X II. Continued

1712

1739

1706 1726

1739 1730 1715

\T2(>

1749 1715 1725

1750 1711

1730

Re-built

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Woolwich Portsmouth Captured

Dockyard

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Builder

Deptford Woolwich Woolwich Deptford Woolwich Deptford Deptford Woolwich

Portsmouth

Woolwich Portsmouth Chatham Deptford Portsmouth Chatham Chatham Chatham

Place

Bedford Berwick Buckingham

Burford Captain

Edinburgh Elizabeth Essex

Bedford (Berwick) Buckingham

Burford (Captain)

(Edinburgh) Elizabeth Essex

70 70 70 70 70 66 66 70 70 70

70

70

Buckingham Burford Captain {Chichester) Cumberland Devonshire Edinburgh Elizabeth Essex

Bedford, Berwick

Serviceable remains incorporated in a 66-gun ship. Monarch Newark {Newark) Norfolk (Norfolk) Russell Russell Shrewsbury Somerset Terrible Torbay Torbay Red. to 74 guns.

Torbay

Russell Shrewsbury Somerset

(Newark) Norfolk

Lancaster

80

74

So 80 80 80 80 80

74

8o

41 33 33

—

—

33 33 19 45 19 33

06

19 06 19

41 19

19

174s

1743 1731 1751 1722 1743

1731

Dockyard Dockyard

Captured Chatham Plymouth

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Portsmouth Deptford Deptford Deptford Deptford Woolwich Portsmouth Woolwich Woolwich Chatham Chatham Woolwich 1740

1744 1737 1740

1739

1719

Deptford Deptford Woolwich Captured Deptford

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Dockyard

Portsmouth

1735 1713

1747 1728

1722

Prince of Orange Royal Oak Orford

Princessa Revenge

70 72 70

{Monmouth) Nassau (Northumberland)

Lenox

Ipswich Kent

64 70 70 70 70 70 70 70

70 64 70 70 70 66 70 70

(HamptonCourt)

Prince Frederick Grafton

64 70 70

70

1742

Guns

Princessa Revenge

Establishment

Grafton Hampton Court Intrepid Ipswich

Orford Princessa Revenge

33

45

33 33 41 45 19 33 od

19 10 41 41 19

45 41

3RD RATE—continued Fougueux Prince Frederick 33

1751

Kent Lancaster Lenox Magnanime Mars Monmouth Monmouth Nassau Nassau Lost to the French in 1 7 4 4 . {Northumberland) Northumberland Prince of Orange Red. to 60 guns. Royal Oak Royal Oak Wrecked

(Kent) (Lancaster) Lenox

Ipswich

{Grafton) Hampton Court

Prince Frederick

1745

1749

1750 1734

1749

1746

1750

Built

A P P E N D I X II. Continued

1742

1741 1712

1743

1742 1740

1723

1730 1724

1744

1725

1740

Re-built

Woolwich Captured Deptford

Captured Deptford Woolwich Portsmouth Deptford Captured Portsmouth Woolwich Deptford Woolwich Chatham Captured Captured Deptford Chatham Woolwich Plymouth Deptford Plymouth Limehouse

Place

Dockyard

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard William Johnson Dockyard

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Builder

Augusta (Canturbury) Centurion

60 60 60 60 60

Dragon Dreadnought

Dunkirk

60 60

60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60

{Exeter) Jersey Kingston Lion Princess Louisa

Deptford

60 60 60

Defiance

( Yarmouth)

(Yarmouth)

70 70 64 70 70

{Eagle) Exeter Jersey Kingston Lion

Dunkirk

Dragon Dreadnought

Defiance Deptford

Augusta {Canturbury) Centurion

Sterling Castle Suffolk

Sterling Castle Suffolk

70

7o

{Dunkirk) Eagle Exeter Jersey Kingston Lion

Defiance Deptford Ordered red. to 50 guns Dragon Dreadnought

Anson St. Albans Augusta Canturbury Red. to 50 guns in 1746.

4TH RATE

Sterling Castle Suffolk Somerset Swiftsure Trident Vanguard Yarmouth

33 33 33 33 33 19

19

33 33

06 41 19

45 45 33 41 19

45 41

33 33 45 45

1732

1736

1745

1736

1742

1732

1744

1732

1747 1747 1736

1745

1748

1750

1748

1742

1738

1740

1744

1734

1730*

1745

1740

Portsmouth Woolwich Harwich Plymouth Plymouth Plymouth Deptford Plymouth

Woolwich Deptford

Chatham Deptford Deptford

Bursledon Deptford Deptford Plymouth Portsmouth

Chatham Woolwich Chatham Deptford Captured East Cowes Deptford

Dockyard Bronsden and Wells Dockyard Dockyard John Barnard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Dockyard Thomas West Dockyard

Philomen Ewer Thomas West Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Philomen Ewer Dockyard

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

60 60 58 60

Rippon Rupert Strafford

Rippon Rupert Strafford Sunderland

Warwick

Tilbury

Burnt accidently {Tilbury) Warwick

Sunderland Superb

(Nottingham) Pembroke Plymouth

(Nottingham) Pembroke Plymouth

Superb

Montague

Princess Louisa Princess Mary Medway

1745

Montague

(Princess Mary) Medway

60 60 60

60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60

1742

Guns

Establishment

Tilbury Vigilant Warwick

19

19 41

4TH RATE—continued Princess Louisa 41 Princess Mary 33 Abandoned in 33 East Indies. (Medway) 45 06 {Montague) Nottingham 33 Wrecked 19 Plymouth 19 — Prince of Orange 19 Rupert 33 Strafford 33 19 Sunderland 41 Superb 33 Tiger 45

1751

1733

1733 1745

1736 1747

1735 1724

1734

1733

1744

Built

A P P E N D I X II. Continued

1744

1735 1740

1722

1745

1716

1742 1742

Re-built

Chatham Portsmouth Captured Plymouth

Deptford Portsmouth Sheerness Sheerness Woolwich Chatham Deptford Woolwich Sheerness Chatham Chatham Portsmouth Woolwich Rotherhithe

Limehouse Portsmouth Rotherhithe

Place

Dockyard

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Wells and Stanton Dockyard Dockyard

Robert Carter Dockyard Elias Bird

Builder

50 50 50 50 50 50 50

50 50 50 50 50 50

50 50 50 50 50 50 50

6o 60 60 60 60 60 60

Falmouth

Dartmouth Falkland

Colchester

Chatham Chester

Bristol

St. Albans Antelope Argyle Assistance

Advice

Worcester York

Windsor

Weymouth

{York)

Windsor Worcester

{Weymouth)

Falkland Falmouth

Wrecked {Colchester) Dartmouth

Chester

Chatham

{Bristol)

{Falmouth)

Falkland

Colchester Blew up in action

Chester

Bristol Centurion

Red. to 44 guns and renamed Milford. (Advtce) Advice Wrecked Antelope Antelope Argyle Assistance Assistance

{Windsor) Worcester York

Wrecked

19 41 33 19 41 19 45

19 06 41

—

06 41

33 4S 19 41 33 33 45 06 41 33 33 19 19 45

1746

1708 1743

1732

1711

1747

1712 1745

1735

1736

1741 1720 1744 1729

1721

1721

1746

1737 1741 1722 1725

1738*

1729 1745

Chatham Southampton Woolwich Deptford Bursledon Woolwich Woolwich

Plymouth Woolwich Portsmouth Deptford Chatham Deptford

Deptford Southampton Plymouth Woolwich Woolwich Woolwich Medway Riv.

Plymouth Plymouth Deptford Woolwich Portsmouth Plymouth Plymouth Dockyard George Rowcliff Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Hogben and Sedger Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Bronsden and Co. Dockyard Robert Carter Dockyard Dockyard Philomen Ewer Dockyard Dockyard

Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

50 50 50 50

50

50 50 50 50

50 50 50 50 50 50 50

50 50 50

50 50

Guns

Portland

Oxford Panther

Nonsuch Norwich

Newcastle

Leopard

Litchfield Leopard Wrecked

Newcastle Nonsuch Nonsuch Red. to 44 guns and renamed Enterprise in 1744. {Norwich) Norwich Oxford Oxford Became a hulk at Deptford. {Panther) Panther

Newcastle

(Litchfield) Leopard Maidstone

Guernsey Hampshire Harwich

Guernsey Hampshire

Litchfield

Wrecked

Greenwich Guernsey Hampshire Harwich Isis

41 19 06 41 19

19 45 33 06

If 41 33 33

19 45 33 33 41

Establishment 1751 4TH RATE—continued Destroyed in South Seas 33 Gloucester Gloucester 41

1745

Greenwich

Gloucester

1742

1746

1745

1741

1750

1744

1746 1741

1743

1741

1748

1736 1744

Built

A P P E N D I X II. Continued

1722

1727 1716

1718

1732

1730

1740

1730

Re-built

Blackwall Portsmouth Woolwich Plymouth Portsmouth

Woolwich Portsmouth Rotherhithe Chatham

Philip Perry Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Dockyard John Barnard Philip Perry Bronsden and Wells Dockyard Dockyard John Quallett Dockyard

Dockyard Whetstone and Grevill Dockyard Moody Janvrin Dockyard John Barnard John Barnard

Sheerness Rotherhithe Chatham Beaulieu Riv. Chatham Ipswich Harwich Captured Plymouth Harwich Blackwall Deptford

Builder

Place

Adventure

44

44 44

44

40

44

(Anglesea)

Tiger Winchester

Sutherland

Severn

Salisbury

Woolwich

Ruby

Romney

Rochester

{Preston)

so 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50

50 50 50 50 50

50

Portland

Anglesea

Adventure

41 45 45

Assurance

45

33

06 41 19 41 33 45 33 45 06 06 41 33

19

—

33 45 06

41

Taken by French Anglesea

Adventure Ambuscade America

5TH RATE

(Preston) Became a hulk at Port Mahon. Rochester Romney Red. to 44 guns in 1 7 4 6 . Red. to 44 guns and renamed Mermaid. (Ruby) Ruby Became a hulk at Kinsale. (Salisbury) Salisbury Taken by French Severn Severn Sutherland Sutherland Tavistock Wrecked Became a hulk at Harwich. Winchester Winchester Woolwich

Preston

Portland

1747

1742 1746

1749

1741

1744

1747

1741

1747

1745

1745

1708

1744

1741

1717

1722

1739

1726

1726

1715 1749

1742

Bursledon

Hull Liverpool

Hull Captured New England

Deptford Bursledon Portsmouth East Cowes Plymouth Harwich Rotherhithe Hull Sheerness Plymouth Rotherhithe Deptford

Plymouth Deptford Deptford Deptford Deptford

Limehouse

Nathaniel Messerve Hugh Blaydes Gorrill and Parks Richard Heather

Hugh Blaydes

Dockyard Philomen Ewer Dockyard Philomen Ewer Dockyard John Barnard James Taylor Hugh Blaydes Dockyard Dockyard Elias Bird Dockyard

Thomas Snelgrove Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard

Hastings Hector

Gosport

44 44 44

44 44 44 44 44

Feversham Folkstone Fowey

Eltham

Diamond Dover

1743

44 44 44 44 44 44 44

44 44 44 44

Guns

Hector

Hastings

Establishment

Prince Edward Eltham Enterprise Expedition

Hector Humber

Prince Henry Hastings

1740 1740 1709 1744

33

41 45

-rp

45 33

1748

1743

1740

1747

1740

1747

45 33 33 06

33

1745

1741 1740

1745 1747

Built

41 33

5TH RATE—continued Chesterfield 41 Crown 45 Diamond 33 Dover 33

I751

Feversham Folkstone Red. to 24 guns and renamed Queenborough. Lost at sea Fowey Glory Gosport Gosport

{Prince Edward) Eltham Enterprise

Diamond Dover

(Chesterfield)

1745

A P P E N D I X II. Continued

1721

1718

1736

Re-built

Liverpool Liverpool Plymouth Hull Bursledon

Hull Captured Limehouse

Rotherhithe Deptford Chatham Liverpool Blackwall Rotherhithe Portsmouth

Rotherhithe Rotherhithe Limehouse Deptford

Place

Thomas ^ 1 tnrrwTO JllCI^l UVC John Gorill John Okill Dockyard Hugh Blaydes Smith & Co.

Hugh Blaydes

John Quallett James Taylor Robert Carter Bronsden and Wells Henry Bird Dockyard Dockyard John Okill Philip Perry Elias Bird Dockyard

Builder

44 44 44 44 44 44

44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44

Saphire

Roebuck

Pearl

Lynn Mary Galley

Ludlow Castle

Looe

Saphire

Roebuck Romney Saphire

Poole Rainbow

(Poole)

Roebuck

Pearl Penzance

Mary Galley

Pearl

Mary Galley Mermaid Milford

Became a hulk at Antigua. Ludlow Castle Ludlow Castle Lynn Lynn

(Looe)

Liverpool Liverpool Lost on American Coast

Liverpool Looe

44 44

44

Launceston

Launceston

Jason Kinsale Kinsale Became a hulk at Jamaica. Lark Lark

Launceston

Kinsale Lark

44

44 44 44 44

33

41 4S 19 41

19 41 45

19 41 33 19 41

41

33 33

33

33 19 41

1740

1743

1745 1747

1744 1747

1708 1712

1744

1740

1744

1745

1741 1741

1741

1744

1741

1726

1733

1726

1727

1723

1726

Hull Limehouse Woolwich Southampton Deptford Limehouse

Woolwich Rotherhithe Deptford Plymouth Rotherhithe Deptford Deptford Deptford Liverpool Chichester

Liverpool

Liverpool Limehouse

Rotherhithe

Captured Rotherhithe Woolwich Liverpool Henry Bird Dockyard Richard Golightly John Buxton, Sr. John Okill Thomas Snelgrove Gorrill and Parks Dockyard James Taylor Thomas West Dockyard Henry Bird Dockyard Dockyard Dockyard John Okill Chitty and Vernon Hugh Blaydes Robert Carter Dockyard George Rowcliff Dockyard Robert Carter

20 24

Bridgewater

24 24 24 20 24

Dolphin

Deal Castle

Biddeford Blandford

Biddeford Blandford

24 24 24

Dolphin

Deal Castle

Bridgewater

Alborough Alderney

(Alborough)

24 24 20 24

(Southsea Castle)

Torrington

Southsea Castle

44 44 44 44 44

1745

(Torrington)

1742

Guns

Dolphin

Deal Castte

Bridgewater Centaur

Biddeford Blandford Boston

Amazon Arutidel

33 45

33 41 41 19 41

1751

1731

1746

1740 1744 1746

1740 1741 1748

1746

45 33 33 45

1742 1742

41 41

1745 1747 1742 1749

6TH KATE

Built

5TH RATE—continued 06 Southsea Castle 41 Thetis 41 Torrington 41 Woolwich 45

1751

Establishment

A P P E N D I X II. Continued

1727

1724*

Re-buUt

Deptford Woolwich

King's Lynn Southampton Hull Sheemess Liverpool

Ipswich Deptford New England

Liverpool Hull Captured Chichester

Portsmouth Liverpool Liverpool Southampton Beaulieu Riv.

Place

Chitty and Vernon John Barnard Thomas West Benjamin Hollowell John Pearson George Rowcliff Hugh Blaydes Dockyard Richard Golightly Dockyard Dockyard

John Okill John Reed

Dockyard John Okill John Okill George Rowcliff Moody Janvrin

Builder

45 19 41 33

Fowey

24

Portmahon

Queenborough

Phoenix Portmahon

24 20 24 24

Phoenix

(Mercury)

Phoenix Portmahon

Nightingale

—

19 41 33

—

41

—

33 33

Lively Lyme

Lively Lyme

24 24 24 24 24

Lost at Sea Lyme Mermaid Mercury

33 41

Kennington Lowestoft

Kennington {Lowestoft)

Guarland Hind

19 41 45

33

Lost at Sea

Glasgow Greyhound

06 33

Experiment

24 24

(Guarland)

Gibraltar (Glasgow) Greyhound

Dursley Galley Experiment Flamborough Fox

Guarland

Greyhound

Gibraltar

Dursley Galley Experiment Flamborough Fox

20 24 24

24 20 24 24

20 24 20 24

1709

1743 1740

1740 1740 1748 1749 1745

1736 1742

1748 1749

1745 1741

1749

1740

1718 1740

1727

1724

1727

1727

Portsmouth

Purchased Woolwich Limehouse Deptford

Rotherhithe Rotherhithe Deptford Beaulieu Riv. Liverpool

Deptford Deptford

Sheerness Sheerness Chichester

Bewley Deptford Hull Limehouse

Deptford Rotherhithe Portsmouth Rotherhithe

Dockyard John Graves John Buxton, Jr. Dockyard

Dockyard Henry Bird Dockyard John Buxton, Sr. Moody Janvrin Dockyard John Reed Thomas Snelgrove Dockyard Dockyard Chitty and Vernon Dockyard John Buxton, Sr. John Quallett James Taylor Dockyard Henry Adams Richard Golightly

Squirrel Success

Squirrel Success

Success

Solebay Sphinx

Solehay

{Solehay)

24 24 20 24

Sheerness

Seahorse

Seaford

Rye

Rose

Reknown

Queenborough

Shoreham Siren

Sheerness

Seahorse

{Rye) Scarborough Seaford

Rippon's Prize Rose

Establishment

33 45 19 33

19 41 41

33 41

19

33 33 41 33 33

4S

6 T H R A T E --continued

1751

Shoreham {Siren)

Shoreham

Sheerness

Seahorse

Scarborough Seaford

Rose Rye

1742

20 24 24

20 24 20 24

30 20 24 24 24 24 24

24

Guns

1740

1742 1748

1744 1745

1748 1731 1743

1740 1740 1745 1740 1741

1747

Built

A P P E N D I X II. Continued

1727

Deptford Hull Limehouse 1720

Plymouth Rotherhithe Woolwich Hull

Deptford Harwich Deptford Rotherhithe

Captured Captured Rotherhithe Deptford Southampton Blackwall Shoreham

Rotherhithe

Place

1727

Re-built

Henry Bird Elias Bird Robert Carter Philip Perry Stow and Bartlett Dockyard John Barnard Dockyard John Buxton, or. Dockyard John Reed Thomas Snelgrove Dockyard John Allen Dockyard Hugh Blaydes

Earlyman Sparrow

Builder

Winchilsea

Wager

Unicorn Lost in South Seas Wager Wager Winchilsea Winchilsea

Tartar Triton

Surprise

* Underwent major repair instead of being rebuilt.

24 24 24

24

Tartar {Triton)

20 24

Tartar

(Surprise)

24

41 33

—

33 41

41

1744 1740

1748

1745

1746 1734

Plymouth Purchased Rotherhithe Limehouse

Deptford Bursledon

Beaulieu Riv.

John Quallett Robert Carter

Wyatt and Major Dockyard Richard Heather Dockyard

30 32 19 30

24

Listed 7 12 16

Listed 7 13 16 25 30 34 24 32 18 26 33 22 29

14

II

Actual 6

1742 Listed 6 13 16 26 30 34 30 40 21 25 26 25 33

13

II

Actual 5

1745

13

36 33 31 39 39

Listed 5 13 35 28 29 39 39

II

Actual 3 10

1751

The "Actual" column excludes ships being built or rebuilt, but may include ships which were not in condition to be fitted for sea. As for sloops of war, the navy had 20 in 1742 plus one under construction; none of these was built before 1730. The navy had 27 sloops in 1745 plus 6 under construction; of the 27 only 7 were built before 1740. The lists are reproduced from official ones: Adm. 106/2179, 25 June 1742; Adm. 106/2181, l Jan 1745; Addl. MSS. 9337. These lists are not accurate in every detail, and I have not done the extensive research that is necessary to verify them. Unfortunately I could not discover a list for 1738 or 1739, although one probably exists. The comparison figures in the Summary for 1739 are taken from the same source as Table 14. The information on ships wrecked or lost is taken from Sir W. L. Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History (5 vol., 18971903), III, 310-311.

44 20 or 24

50

90 80 70 60

ICO

Guns

1739

SUMMARY

A NOTE ON SOURCES This book is based almost entirely on Admiralty records that re­ main unprinted. A few secondary writings touch on the subject, and I have indicated the places I have been helped by them in the foot­ notes. Nevertheless, there are some to which I feel indebted in a general way that may possibly not be revealed by my citations; this is especially true of the following: R. G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (Cambridge, Mass., 1926) J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697 (Cam­ bridge, 1953) M. A. Lewis, England's Sea Officers (1939) C. Lloyd and J. L. S. Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, 1200-1900: Vol. Ill,1J14-1815 (Edinburgh, 1961) R. D. Merriman's introductions in Queen Anne's Navy, N.R.S. (1961) R. Pares, "The Manning of the Navy in the West Indies, 1702-63," T.R.H.S. 4th ser., xx (1937) Sir Herbert Richmond, The Navy of the War of 1739-1748 (3 vol., Cambridge, 1920). As for printed sources dealing with the 1739-1748 period, they are scanty. Only these deserve to be singled out: D. Erskine, Augustus Hervey's Journal (1953) H.M.C., Du Cane MSS. (1905) Mary E. Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell (1905) B. McL. Ranft, The Vernon Papers, N.R.S. (1958) Lord John Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford (3 vol., 1842). Unfortunately the only statistical information of naval interest printed in the House of Commons Journals during this period is con­ tained in the abstracts of the Ordinary estimates, the statements of navy debt, and the statements of seamen borne and mustered. The House of Lords Journals are even more barren, and the Parliamen­ tary Papers contain little on naval administration until late in the century. Therefore my purpose in this note is mainly to describe the manuscript sources. The body of official documents concerning the administration of the navy in this period, preserved in the Public Record Office and the National Maritime Museum, is so vast that one instinctively looks for indexes, abstracts, and summaries. They are disappointingly scarce. It is not difficult to discover the outlines of the administrative structure and how it was designed to function, but to find out how

Note on Sources administration worked in practice requires a considerable amount of searching. First let us deal with the administrative structure. Taken together, the following sources offer a complete picture of the establishments of the various naval administrative bodies, their responsibilities, and the rules and statutes by which they were governed: The collections of Statutes at Large. Corbett MSS. in the Admiralty Library. I shall discuss this collec­ tion presently. The (Economy of His Majesty's Navy Office (1717). This prints the original instructions (1662) to the Navy Board and the dockyard officers. Adm. 106/2507-2508. Compilation of standing orders to the dock­ yards (indexed by Adm. Ind. 9315). Adm. 49/137-139 is an almost identical compilation and is indexed in the third volume. Adm. 7/648. A manuscript volume that sets forth the duties of the Victualling Commissioners and their subordinates as established in l7l5· The Laws, Ordinances, and Institutions of the Admiralty (2 vol., 1746). This provides an over-all survey, plus some interesting side­ lights. Regulations and Instructions relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea. The 1st edition was published in 1731. I used the 2nd edition of 1734 because it happened to be at hand; it scarcely differs from the 1st or from the 6th edition of 1746. J. Burchett, A Complete History of the most Remarkable Trans­ actions at Sea (1720). The Preface gives a succinct account of the Admiralty organization and the Lord High Admiral's powers. To determine the effectiveness of the administrative system, it is necessary to have both statistics and critical opinions of competent contemporary observers. There is no shortage of either in the official records and correspondence, but, for the most part, the Admiralty collection in the Public Record Office is low-grade ore for the prospecting historian of administration. There are some richer veins elsewhere. The best sources of statistics are the summaries which were drawn up for the Admiralty and for interested statesmen. Unfortunately many of these have disappeared. (It is certain that there were a great many; frequent requests for them are recorded in the Admiralty minutes.) Sometimes they were copied into the out-letter books, and three collections of out-letter books particularly concern this book:

Note on Sources Adm. 106/2178-2192. Navy Board out-letters to the Admiralty and Treasury. Adm. 110/12-15. Victualling Board out-letters to the Admiralty, Navy Board, Treasury, and Treasurer of the Navy. Adm. 98/1-4. Sick and Wounded Board out-letters to the Admiralty and other authorities. But all too often, especially if the statistical report was extensive, only the letter of transmittal was copied into the out-letter book. In such cases the letters themselves should be consulted; most of the letters received by the Admiralty are on deposit at the National Maritime Museum. Nevertheless, the search is often fruitless. Many of the enclosures were separated from the letters, and the more im­ portant ones are often missing. Some were pocketed by the First Lord; others were forwarded to a Secretary of State. A number of valuable ones survive in the following collections: AddL MSS. 19031-19034. Sir Charles Wager's papers. Addl. MSS. 33046-33048. Duke of Newcastle's army and navy pa­ pers. Cholmondeley MSS. 11-20. Sir Robert Walpole's administrative papers, mostly naval. For a description and criticism of the naval administrative system in practice, the Corbett MSS. in the Admiralty Library are a detailed, yet manageable, source. Thomas Corbett, while Deputy Secretary of the Admiralty, probably compiled the information in these volumes as a handbook for his patron, Torrington, soon after the latter was appointed First Lord in 1727. I am encouraged to venture this speculation by internal evidence. Few entries cite occurrences after 1728; those that do, deal with events of 1739 and 1740 and are in­ serted in what looks to be Sir Charles Wager's own handwriting. The guiding principle of the work was clearly to ascertain what procedures were firmly established by precedent and what were not. The material is arranged by topics, and the twenty-one volumes deal with every aspect of naval administration. I have read nineteen of them very carefully. Their titles indicate their contents: I—Sovereignty of the Seas II—American Colonies III—Extracts from the Statute Books IV—Lord High Admiral's Powers V—Vice-admirals and Admiralty Courts VI—Piracy and Prizes

Nofe on Sources VII—Trinity House; Chatham Chest; Guardships; Watermen; Transport Office VIII—Shipbuilding IX—Commission and Warrant Officers X—Raising Seamen XI—Sea Pay and Naval Estimates XII—Plantations; Pensions; Passes XIII—Sick & Wounded; Prisoners of war; Hospital Ships; Sur­ geons; Courts-martial; Judge Advocate; Muster Master; Secretary of the Admiralty; Treasury Office; Yachts; Bomb Vessels; African Company; The Fishery; Newfoundland; Ireland; Holland; Post Office; Merchant Ships XIV—Victualling Office; Ordnance Office XV—Naval Stores XVI—Marines XVII-Navy Board XVIII—Dockyards and Ordinary XX—Convoys and Cruisers The most rewarding part of the Corbett MSS. from the standpoint of the historian is not the precedents, but Corbett's own obiter dicta. These offer, at once, a shrewd estimate of the weaknesses of the sys­ tem as seen by an informed contemporary, and a picture of the way in which the official mind that was tied to precedent could generate unnecessary—from our own utilitarian viewpoint—confusion. How­ ever, there are two minor disadvantages of the collection for the purposes of this book. First, it was compiled fifteen years too early. Most of the entries deal with problems and policies in the reigns of William and Anne. Although the material is helpful in contrasting the policies of the 1740's with those of an earlier era, similar back­ ground material is readily available in printed works, namely: J. R. Tanner, Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval Manuscripts in the Pepysian Library, N.R.S. (4 vol., 1903-1922); R. B. Merriman's two collections, also published by the Navy Records Society, The Sergison Papers and Queen Anne's Navy; and John Ehrman's Navy in the War of William, III. The second disadvantage of the Corbett MSS. is that they are only superficially comprehensive. They were never completed. Some of the volumes are packed with information, particularly IX, Χ, XI. Some are virtually bound volumes of blank paper. For it was never intended that they should be completed; they were to be kept continually up-to-date. In dealing with naval administration in this period there is no way of avoiding a systematic search of the vast body of official rec-

Note on Sources ords. Before beginning one should realize that a great deal of the information is duplicated and try to choose the series of documents (either in the Public Record Office or the National Maritime Mu­ seum) that provides it most conveniently. The printed List of Admiralty Records Preserved in the Public Record Office (1904) suggests no obvious path of entry. (The reprint edition (Kraus: New York, 1963) should be used in preference to the original because it gives the new class numbers and reproduces some important addi­ tions and corrections.) The abundant indexes and compilations in the P.R.O. are mainly intended for the genealogist and biographical researcher. The most useful indexes from the administrative stand­ point are those drawn up by eighteenth-century Admiralty officials for their own use, but almost none of these applies to the period before 1750; the only important exception is the index to flag officers' dispatches (Adm. Ind. 4755-4758), compiled in the early nineteenth century but reaching back as far as 1711. Consequently, for the first half of the century the only practical course is to search the most promising groups of documents. The following list contains the more important classes of docu­ ments that I consulted. I shall sketch the contents of each class and indicate the way in which the book depends on it. Public Record Office Adm. 1. Admiralty in-letters. The captains' letters, which form the bulk of this collection, I have scarcely touched; they are arranged alphabetically. The letters from commanders-in-chief are arranged geographically and thus are easier to use. Those from abroad give a vivid and concise picture of the main administrative problems on each foreign station. Those from the ports in England provide the surest and most detailed guide to the problems connected with fit­ ting out and dispatching squadrons, particularly the manning prob­ lem. The letters from commanders-in-chief I have read very carefully. Adm. 2. Admiralty order books and out-letter books. This col­ lection is divided into three main categories: Orders, Lords' letters, and Secretary's letters. Orders generally pertain to the sea service. The reason for the division of the letters into two groups is annoyingly obscure. Generally speaking, if one is searching for an administrative order that will affect the activities of the dockyards, it is likely to be found among the Lords' letters; on the other hand, if no executive action is involved, or if the action merely affects one of the London Offices (e.g. an order to pay an officer his salary), the Secretary's letters should be searched first. All other factors being

Note on Sources equal, if a letter to the Navy Board is involved, it is easier to use the ADM A (Navy Board in-letters from the Admiralty) collection at the National Maritime Museum; these letters are collected in one group and ordered chronologically. I have consulted the Adm. a series only on special points. Adm. 3. Admiralty Board minutes. I have read all of these from 1714 to 1749. They have the advantage of being concise and com­ prehensive. They have the disadvantage of being officially imper­ sonal, and as a result can be occasionally misleading. Adm. 7. Miscellaneous lists and accounts. These can be as valuable as they are difliicult to use. There is no alternative to checking every item in the List and inspecting those that appear promising. The List often does not describe the documents accurately. Adm. 8. Lists of ships, their stations, captains, and lieutenants (compiled monthly). These are chiefly valuable for guidance in us­ ing the captains' letters (Adm. 1), since by consulting this series one can discover what captains were at particular stations at particular moments. In this manner the information in the flag officers' dis­ patches may be supplemented. Adm. 107. Lieutenants' passing certificates. The registers contain copies only of those issued at the Navy Office. The sole surviving collection of certificates issued abroad during this period is Adm. 6/86 (1744-1747). Adm. 106/905-1087. Miscellaneous Navy Board in-letters. These are bundles, grouped by calendar year (new style) and arranged alphabetically according to the sender; for example, a letter from the Woolwich officers written in 1740 will be found under "W" for that year. This series includes all letters received by the Navy Board except those from the Admiralty, Victualling, and Sick and Wounded Boards. The main body of the collection consists of letters from dockyard officers and Commissioners, but there are also to be found here letters from admirals, captains, purveyors, mer­ chants, and others. It is a difficult series to use. For one thing, the bundles are filthy (a minor annoyance that becomes a major incon­ venience if one is forced to use them repeatedly). Another difficulty is that a degree of sophistication is required before one can cope with the alphabetical classification. For example, in order to in­ spect all the letters relating to Portsmouth yard one must look

Note on Sources under not only "P" (for Portsmouth officers), but also "H" (for Commissioner Hughes); similarly, for Plymouth one must search both "P" and "V" (Vanbrugh); and yet all the letters from Chatham yard, including those from Commissioners Mathews and Brown, may be found under "C." When it comes to the overseas bases the difficulties are more serious; letters from English Harbor, Antigua may be found both under "A" (it might just as logically have been "E") and "T" (for Warner Tempest, who was the Storekeeper at the base). The collections seem to be reasonably complete in respect to letters received from the home dockyards, but many of the letters from Navy Board officials overseas, including those from the Com­ missioners at Port Mahon, have disappeared. In spite of the dif­ ficulties it is a valuable collection, and I have used it extensively. After all, no other important records of Plymouth and Woolwich dockyards in this period have survived. Adm. 106/2178-2192. Navy Board out-letters to the Admiralty and the Treasury. This is perhaps the most convenient single collection for studying naval administration. The content of each letter is succinctly summarized in a chronological list at the end of each volume, but these lists are not indexes. For the period before 1738 one must consult the Admiralty in-letters from the Navy Board (Adm. 1); also, there are omissions in the books covering this period, and recourse must be had to certain volumes of the Admiralty inletters at the National Maritime Museum, specifically ADM B/114, 119-123. I searched the out-letter books as far as the year 1760 in quest of statistical summaries relating to the war of 1739—1748. Adm. 106/2552-2563. Navy Board minutes. The volumes after 1745 are missing until 1752. The minutes illustrate the Navy Board's daily rountine and its purchasing arrangements. I have consulted them only on special points. Adm. 106/3254-3256. Deal yard letter books. Of scant value. Adm. 106/3304-3308; 3356-3360; 3377-3379. Deptford yard outletter books. These are extremely valuable. They form the only reasonably complete set of dockyard letters that has survived, and fortunately the enclosures are copied into these books in full. Since the books were kept in different dockyard offices, there are a num­ ber of series: Series 1 (3304-3308) Master Shipwright's, Master Attendant's, and

Note on Sources Clerk of the Survey's letters. Series 2 (3356-3360) Storekeeper's letters. Series 3 (3377-3379) Clerk of the Cheque's letters. After 1750 the Clerk of the Survey's letters were copied into separate volumes (series 7). Since many of the letters were sent by the dock­ yard officers collectively, they may be found in more than one series. I have read all three series carefully. Adm. 106/3553. Sheerness Master Shipwright's out-letter book. This is the only letter book of Sheerness yard for this period in the P.R.O. It is very useful. Adm. 49. Miscellaneous Navy Board accounts and registers. These are documents that were in possession of the Accountant General's department at the time they were turned over to the Public Record Office, but in the eighteenth century these papers belonged to the Navy Office and Pay Office. The same methods that have been sug­ gested above for using the Adm. 7 series must be pursued while working with the Adm. 49 series. Adm. 110. Victualling Board out-letters to the Admiralty, Navy Board, Treasury, and Treasurer of the Navy. These letters are the best source of information on victualling policy. I have read Adm. 110/12-15 very carefully. Adm. 111. Victualling Board minutes. These were the basis of the discussion of buying victuals in England. Adm. 98. Sick and Wounded Board out-letters. This series begins in 1742. For the years 1727-1741 the Admiralty in-letters (Adm. !/3528-3529) must be consulted. I have read the letters concerned with the earlier part of the war. Adm. 99. Sick and Wounded Board minutes. I have consulted these only on special points. S.P. 42. State Papers, Naval. These are largely concerned with matters of strategy. A sampling indicated to me that a thorough search would not prove worth while. National Maritime Museum

ADM A. Navy Board in-letters from the Admiralty. These, and

Note on Sources the ADM B collection, I consulted only when searching for parti­ cular statistical enclosures. ADM B. Admiralty in-letters from the Navy Board. CHA L. Commissioner Brown's letters to the Navy Board from Chatham yard. These are much more convenient to use than the Navy Board in-letters at the Public Record Office (Adm. 106/9051087); I have read them all, but the volumes for the early part of the war are missing. POR F. Commissioner Hughes's letters to the Navy Board from Portsmouth yard. I read this extremely valuable collection with care. British Museum

King's MS. 44. A beautifully executed manuscript volume describ­ ing the state of the dockyards ca. 1770. It includes a large number of plans which show at a glance the development of the yards since the late seventeenth century. There is a rough copy of this volume in the National Maritime Museum (LAD 11). Addl. MSS. 15955-15957. Lord Anson's correspondence. Not of much value for the war of 1739—1748. Addl. MSS. 19028-19039. Sir Charles Wager's papers. Chiefly valuable for the period immediately preceding 1739. Addl. MSS. 28126-28157. Sir John Norris's papers. The corres­ pondence is largely concerned with the period preceding the war of 1739-1748. Norris's diary (28132-3) is one of the most valuable sources for the early years of the war; however, Norris was far more interested in strategy than administration, and the diary reflects this. I have read the diary carefully—no simple task, because of the old admiral's shaky hand and fantastic spelling. Addl. MSS. 32692-33748. Duke of Newcastle's domestic correspond­ ence. I searched all the volumes covering the war period. Though it provided some background in politics and patronage, it was an effort that produced a very low yield. Addl. MSS. 33046-33048. Duke of Newcastle's army and navy papers. The information in these papers is largely statistical and of very great value. Admiralty Library

Corbett MSS. This collection I have already discussed; it is very valuable.

Note on Sources Library of Congress Vernon-Wager MSS. 45012-46862. Letters and papers of Admirals Wager and Vernon. Most of the Vernon correspondence may be found in other collections. For my purposes Wager's papers, prin­ cipally concerned with the period 1729-1740, were the most useful. Of particular interest are some letters from Admiral Norris dealing with the mobilization of 1734, and some from Governor Trelawny at Jamaica to Francis Gashry. But of greatest importance to naval administration are the papers dealing with the planning and de­ velopment of the Jamaican bases during the peacetime period. There is a good guide to the collection: W. C. Ford, List of the VernonWager Manuscripts in the Library of Congress (Washington, 1904). Other Manuscripts Cholmondeley (Houghton) MSS. 11-20. Sir Robert Walpole's ad­ ministrative papers, mostly naval. These are largely concerned with the peacetime period and the first two years of the war. They con­ tain a number of valuable reports. There is a good class list in the Cambridge University Library, where they are on deposit. Woburn MSS. vin-xx. Duke of Bedford's correspondence. The letters are almost entirely those received by Bedford. The collection is the one from which Lord John Russell extracted the letters printed in his three-volume edition of the Bedford Correspondence. The printed letters are primarily concerned with strategy and poli­ tics. Those that remain unpublished, many of which are from members of Bedford's Admiralty Board, are generally of far more interest to the historian of administration. I have read them with great care. NOTE: Full titles of printed works cited in abbreviated form may be located by consulting the author's name in the index.

absenteeism, 311-1¾, 314, 320, 326 Academy, see Naval Academy accounts, captains' and admirals', 109-10, 364, 393-94. 896-97. 479; dockyard, 293-94, 297-98, 300, 305, 457; Navy Board, 453, 468-69, 48284; public, 463-65; pursers', 376, 393-98, 432; Victualling Board, 36, 58, 432, 449, 490. See also audit­ ing Ackworth, Sir Jacob, 39-40, 48, 8992, 299, 302 Admiral of the Fleet, 123 Admiralty Board, 6i-g2; member­ ship, 42, 72-81; powers and duties, 5-10, 32, 61-66, 71, 302, 501-04 policies concerning: dockyards and victualling, 305-06, 322, 328, 425. 434-35. 451: merchants, 18-19, 371; seamen, 150, 182, 197, 209-15, 226, 239-40, 378-85, 398, 480-81 relations with: the ministry, 6466, 469-70, 472, 501; Navy and Victualling Boards, 58-59, 83-92, 338, 366-67, 501-02; sea officers, 6, 105-07, 109, 116-18, 120-27, 1S0. 138-44; Treasury, 421, 468-69 See also First Lord, Secretary of the Admiralty Admiralty building, 31, 62, 462, 470 advance money, 200 adze, 321 Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 27 Albion, Forests and Sea Power, 5 Allen, Capt. Bennet, 132 Allen, Joseph, 39, 90, 92, 296, 304 Allix, William, 52, 82 Ambrose, Capt. John, 111, 134, 39697 America, see North America, New England American Act, 114, 218-19, 220-21 An Infallible Project, 225 anchors, 266, 284 Anderson, The Sailing Ship, 4 Annapolis Royal, 345 annuities, 472-74 Anson, Admiral George, 1st Baron,

134; Admiralty Board member, 66, 72, 77-82, 126, 140, 302, 305, 379. 494. 503-04; papers, 539; squadron commander, 112, 11516, 190, 194, 196, 223, 274, 281, 344; views and policies, 61, 118, 139-40. 308. 383 Antigua, 125, 143, 219, 352-55, 35960, 367. See also English Harbor Antin, Admiral Marquis d', 204 apprentice seamen, 154, 171 apprentices, see servants apprenticeship, in dockyards, 29697. 304. 3l6"18 aristocracy, 6-7, 94-95, 145, 306. See also patronage Armada, 389 Armstrong, History of Minorca, 357 army, 95, 189, 388, 433, 452-53, 455, 462, 465, 483, 487, 489. See also soldiers arrack, 393 artisans, see dockyard workmen assogues ships, 111 Atkins, Capt. Samuel, 133 auditing, 35-37, 53, 463-64, 469. See also accounts Austria, 23-25, 474

Bagehot, Walter, 241 bakehouses, 60, 435 Baker, Capt. Edward, 134 Baker, Capt. Hercules, 133, 135 Balchen, Admiral Sir John, 117, 119, 131-32, 141, 182, 187, 192, 211, 230, 291. 447 Baltic naval stores, 276, 279-81 Baltimore, Charles, Lord, 74, 77, 138, 452, 459 Bank of England, 473-74 baptismal certificates, 100, 154 Barbados, 392 Barbary pirates, 63 Barclay, Sir James, 183 Baring, Sir Francis T., 262 barley, 405-06 Barnard, Sir John, 232, 235-36, 238

Index Barnes and Owen, Sandwich Papers, 829 Barnett, Capt. Curtis, 146, 223, 404 Barnevelt, Robert, 413-16, 426 barrel, 419 Barrington, Lt. Samuel, 100 Barrington, William, Viscount, 74, 80, 118 Barrow, Life of Anson, 8 Barton, Christopher, 410-12 "basseying," 312 Bath, 72, 80, iig Batters, Samuel, 220 Bay of Biscay, 115, 119 Beauclerk, Capt. Lord Aubrey, 119 Beauclerk, Lord Vere, 46, 73-75, 79. 134. 3°2 Beckford, William, 1, 398 Bedford, John Russell, 4th Duke of, 26, 65, 67; correspondence, 531, 540; as First Lord, 9, 44-47, 71-72, 74,77-81, 83, 85, 88-89, i°7< 119-20, 136-38, 140, 244, 259, 302, 305, 308, 503 Bedford Correspondence, 79 Bedford, Duchess of, 78 beef, 375-76,407-10, 416-23,425, 427. 28, 436. See oiso meat beer, allowance of, 375-77; brewing and spoilage, 425, 428-30; consid­ ered healthful, 382-83; contract­ ing for, 398-99, 421, 423, 426; sup­ plying, 394, 408, 4S6-37> 44°· See also drunkenness beer money, 489-91 Beguin's Tyrocinium Chymicum, 427 Belfast, 400 Bell, William, 52, 396 Benbow, Admiral John, 347 Bergen ob Zoom, 79 Berkeley, James, 3rd Earl of, 87 Berkeley, John, 3rd Baron, 6 Berwick, 78, 400 Bernstorff, 13 Berryer, Nicolas Reni, 497 Bettesworth, Henry, 317 Beveridge, Prices and Wages, 5 Biggen, John, 400 bills, navy, 467, 470-72, 474-78, 486; paid in Course, 471, 475-78; Vict­ ualling, 441-42, 489

bills of exchange, 345, 366-67, 370, 388, 391-92, 397, 403-04, 422, 451, 489-90 Binney1 British Public Finance, 36 Bird, Elias, 256 Bird, Henry, 256 biscuit, 375, 411-12, 422-23, 436, 439, 491 biscuit meal, 411-12, 437 Bisse, Stephen, 58-60 Blakeway, Lt., 121 Blackett, Capt. Edward, 133 Blane, Sir Gilbert, 384 Blaydes, Hugh, 256 Board of Ordnance, see Ordnance Board Board of Trade, 279-81, 321 Boatswain of the Yard, 297, 308, 486 boatswain's stores, 298 Bombay, 346 borough influence, see patronage, political influence Boscawen, Capt. Edward, 73, 135-36, 212, 314, 404, 480 Boston, Mass., 221, 257, 342, 346, 35°. 360 bounty money, 148, 167-69, 175, 20304, so6, 229-30, 237, 239, 298 Bourne, Queen Anne's Navy in the West Indies, 2 Bowder, George, 102 Bowles, Phineas1 81 Bradford on Avon, 409 Brady, Dr. Samuel, 180 Braithwaite1 Capt. Samuel, 134 Brand, Capt. Ellis, 133 brandy, 376, 423 Brazil, 223 bread, 375, 377, 423. See also biscuit breaming, 344, 349 Brereton, Thomas, 59-60 Brest, 25, 126, 187, 382, 446 Brett, Capt. Peircy, 140, 226 Brighton, 173, 203 Bristol, 157, 159, 162 Bristol, George Hervey, 2nd Earl of, 126 Britles, John, 397 "broad-bottomed" ministry, 25, 71, 504 Brown, Capt. Charles, Commissioner

Index at Chatham, 39, 133, 216, 299, 329. 371. 479. 539Brownsworth, George, 410 brutality, 152, 212, 225-26. See also discipline Buenos Aires, 111 building slips, 261, 273-74 bullion carriage, see freight money Burchett, Josiah, 67, 76, 81-83, 373, 383. 499 Burchett, Complete History, 38; Memoirs, 280 Burford, Thomas, 317 Burrish, Capt. George, 134, 270 Buttall, Humphrey, 182-83 butter, 375-76, 406-07, 412-17, 41920, 423, 426, 491 Buxton, John, 256 Byng, Admiral Sir George, 1st Vis­ count Torrington, 13, 82, 87, 119 Byng, Admiral John, 113, 116, 119, 124, 126, 134, 146, 166, 214, 360, 371· 398> 400 Cabinet Council, 64-66, 70-71, 17577, 186-87, *9°' 201· 434 Cadiz, 14, 111, 342 Caley, see Cayley Callis, Capt. Smith, 117 "calls," 309, 311-12, 314 Calwell, Lawton, and Carlton, Messrs., 419 Cambridge, 406 Camocke, Capt. George, 392 Campbell, John, 74 Campbell, Sir John, Lord Glenorchy, 74 Canada, 26. See also Cape Breton, Louisburg, North America canvas, see sails Cape Breton, 120, 257, 391 Cape Ortegal, 112 Cape St. Mary's, 187 Cape St. Vincent, 111 captains, pay and income, 103, 106, 109-13, 115, 392-94; promotion, 120, 124, 128, 130; relations with crews, 97, 194, 209, 211-13, 232, 399, 443. See also sea officers careening, 343-46, 351, 371 careening wharf, 344-58, 367

carpenters, house, 296; of ships, 296, 314, 322, 361 carpenter's stores, 298 Carrickfergus, 400 Cartagena, 23, 144, 198 Carter, Richard, 410 Carter, Robert, 256 Carteret, John, 1st Earl Granville, 14, 24-25, 68, 71, 305, 503 Cartwright and Findlay, 242 Cary, Esquire, 52 cask, 423, 428, 430-31 Cathcart, Gen. Charles, 9th Baron, 198, 216 cattle, 397, 406-07, 409-10, 419, 436, 439. See also beef cattle plague, 384, 414-15, 417-18 caulkers, 271, 296, 310, 322-24, 326, 360-62 Cavendish, Admiral Philip, 73-74, 85, 124, 131-32, 164; letters, 153; manages manning at Portsmouth, '52- 155-56. ·58. »6i. 165-69, 175, 189, 192, 194-98, 200, 202-04, 209 views and policies: on sick men, 50-51, 100, 179, 181, 184-85; on other matters, 124, 226, 245, 380, 395 Cayley (or Caley), Capt. Tyrwitt, 52, 59· 133 Chambers, Capt. William, 135 Chamberlayne, Present State of Great Britain, 43 Charles I, 238 Charles II, 75, m Charles VI, of Austria, 23 Charles Edward, see Young Pre­ tender Charleston, 345, 367 Charnock, John, 245, 247, 251, 485 Charnock, Biographia Navalis, 106; Marine Architecture, 241 Chatham, Earl of, see Pitt Chatham Chest, 363 Chatham dockyard, 263, 267-69; Commissioner at, 38-39, 41; strikes at, 323-24, 326. See also Brown, Mathews Chatham ropeyard, 286-88 Chatham victualling depot, 56, 403, 435-36

Index cheese, 375, 377, 406-07. 412-16, 483, 426 cheesemongers, 412-14 Cheshire cheese, 375, 406 Chester, 159 Chesterfield, Philip Stanhope, 4th Earl of, 71-72, 77, 80 Chesterfield Letters, 77 Child, John, 413 Child, Josiah, 447 "chips," 321-22 dder, 382-83 Cinque Ports, see Lord Warden civil authorities, see magistrates Clark, 216 Clevland, John, 39-40, 82-83, 302-03 Clevland, Capt. William, 82 Clinton, Capt. George, 41, 119-20, 133. 138, 211-12 Clerk of the Acts, 33, 37, 39-40, 75, 82, 84, 227 Clerk of the Bakehouse and Mills, 55. 425 Clerk of the Cheque, 156, 213, 293, 295. 897-98, 300-01, 303-05, 311 Clerk of the Cuttinghouse, 55, 427 Clerk of the Ropeyard, 288, 295, 298-99 Clerk of the Ships, 32-33 Clerk of the Survey, 85, 293-94, 298, 300, 302 clerks. Admiralty, 75, 81-82, 173,captain's, 300, 395; dockyard, 299300; Navy Board, 40, 47 clothing, see slops Clutterbuck, Thomas, 26, 74, 202 coal, 172 coasting vessels, 173-74, 187 Cock, John, 308 Cockbum, William, 379 Cockburne, John, 74 Colby, Thomas, 304-06 colliers, 171-72, 174, 176, 187 commanders-in-chief, 101, 121-26, »43. 155. 166, 358-62, 365-70, 444, 502 commerce protection, 76, 143, 159. See also convoys, cruisers commercial interest, see merchants commissioned officers, see sea officers Commissioners of the Navy, see

Navy Board, dockyard Commissioners Commissioners of the Sick and Wounded, see Sick and Wounded Board Commissioners of the Victualling, see Victualling Board compass timber, 282-83 compasses, 266 compounding for seamen, 176 complements, of ships, 164, 2og Compton, Capt. James, 38-39, 41-43, 134 Comptroller, 32, 36-37, 39-42, 47-48, 87. 293 Comptroller of the Storekeepers' Accounts, 37, 39, 293, 298 Comptroller of the Treasurer's Accounts, 37, 39, 469 Comptroller of the Victualling Accounts, 37, 39 conduct money, 156, 167, 298 Consett, Capt. Matthew, 134 Constable of the Tower, 161 constables, 159, 161, 214-15, 238 329 consuls, 222, 397 Cotterell, Capt. Charles, 134 contracting. Admiralty influence in, 89; for naval stores, 278, 284-86, 485-86; for shipbuilding, 254-59; for sick quarters, 49-52, 182-83; for timber, 242, 281-82; for victualling shipping, 441-42; for victuals, 53, 373, 388-89, 391-422, 426, 447-50 convoy money, 103, 111 convoys, 19, 114, 143, 158, 178, 342, 440, 442, 444, 446-47 Cook, Capt. James, 385 coopers, 430-31 Corbett, Thomas, 82-83, 86; collection of precedents, 87, 533-34; speaks in Parliament, 459-60; views and precedents, 86, 101, 109, 148, 154, 161, 171, 192, 213, 298, 373. 399-401. 403, 407, 449-50, 462, 471, 483, 491 Corbett, William, 39, 43 cordage, see rope Cork, 417, 419, 421 Cornish borough, 46 correspondents, 391, 397-98

544

Index corruption, 2, 6, 496-97, 504-05; in dockyards, 304-07,485-86; and protections, 173; of pursers, 376, 398400; of sea officers, 109-10, 393-97, 500; in victualling service, 403-05, 424-26, 430-31. 447-5 See also patronage, political influence cost of. Admiralty building, 462, 470; dry dock at Portsmouth, 273; facilities at Port Royal, 350; Irish beef, 416; jetty at Plymouth, 274, labor in dockyards, 338-33, 48687; Naval Academy, 462; naval stores, 280, 371, 484-86; shipbuilding, 255-58, 485; victualling in West Indies, 401-03, 405; victualling shipping, 441-42; victualling storehouse at Deptford, 435; victuals, 488-92 cost of living, 324, 328 country gentlemen, see landed gentlemen court-martial, 7, 118-19, 124, 127, 142-44, 201, 214. See also discipline Course, see bills Coxe, Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, 18; Pelham Administration, 118 Craftsman, The, 14 credit, naval, 403, 447, 467-68, 471. 72, 474, 478, 486; public, 18, 47275, 478. See also bills, debt credits, victualling, 432 Crookshanks, Capt. John, 226, 355, 36a Crowle, George, 39, 43-44 Crowley, Ambrose, 327 Crowley and Bannister, Messrs., 884 cruisers, 193, 202, 224, 495 Cruisers and Convoys Act, 19 Culloden, 25 Cumberland, Duke of, 305 currants, 376 Custodes Rotulorum, 159 customs officers, 45, 156, 160, 162, 172, 214, 480-22 Dansays, Capt. Francis, 134 Davers, Admiral Thomas, 128, 133, 143, 155, 216-17, 405 Davies, Capt. William, 39, 59, 133

Davis, Lord, 61 Davis, Rise of the Shipping Industry, 19 Deal, 173, 262 debt, navy, 255, 328, 458, 462-63, 466-67, 470-81, 508-14; public, I, 107, 452, 472-74 decay, see rot Declaration of Victuals, 53, 386-90 Defoe, Daniel, 268 Delaval, Capt. Francis, 133 "demand," 265-66 Dennis, Richard, 305 Deptford dockyard, 263-66, 279, 289, 301; Commissioner at, 38-40, 42; workmen at, 309 Deptford victualling depot, 434-35, 45»

Deputy Secretary, 82 desertion of seamen, 50, 166, 184-86, 195. 198-200, 208-15, 887, 230, 337, 340, 443, 481, 500; overseas, ai617, 280-21, 359-60 Dettingen, 84 Devert, Daniel, 39-40, 30a diet of seamen, 375-85, 450, 490-91 discipline, in dockyards, 307, 311-16, 380, 383-84, 329-32, 335-36; of Marines, 189; of sea officers, 111, 114,117-19,124, 138-45; of seamen, 183-84, 209, 211-12, 225-26, 360, 377. 385. 450. 477. 479- See also brutality, court-martial, desertion, drunkenness discharges of seamen, 153-55, i69> 174, 186, 203-04, 208, 887 disease, 165, 179-87, 190-98, 196, 202, 204, 208-09, 216-19, 221-22, 349, 359. See also scurvy, typhus dockyard Commissioners, 38-40, 50, 136, 812, 827, 889-93, 365, 479 dockyard officers, 44-45, 90-91, 255, 259-60, 292-308, 338. See also naval officers dockyard workmen, 265, 299-304, 308-38,359-64. See also extra work, wages dockyards, 868-340; Admiralty visitation of, 891-92, 331-34 Dodington, George Bubb, 36 Dorset, Charles Sackville, and Duke of, 304

545

Index Doty, British Admiralty Board, 64 Dover, 157, 173, 178; victualling at, 56, 403, 410, 436, 441 Downs, the, 151, 155, 157-58, 166, 178, 197, 440 Drake, Sir Francis, 7 dry docks, 265, 267, 269-70, 272-74 dry provisions, 411-12, 427 dry rot, 241-44. See also rot Drummond, Capt. Charles, 135 Drummond and Wilbraham, Eng­ lishman's Food, 376 drunkenness, 51, 181-84, 199. 216-17, 3'4> 376-77. 435 Dublin, 158, 392, 400 Duhamel de Monceau, Henry Louis, 383 Duncannon, William Ponsonby, Lord, 74, 80 Dunkirk, 25 Durell, Capt. John, 134 Dutch East India Company, 416 Dutch seamen, 223 East India Company, 143, 175-79, 215, 346-47. 404. 427. 445. 473 East Indies, 26, 115, 121, 143, 344, 346-47, 404, 445 elixir of vitriol, 382-83 Elizabeth, 389 Ellis, Welbore, 74 embargo, 175-77, 203, 418-19 embezzlement, 293, 298, 306, 370 Empacombe, 438 English Harbor, 352-55, 359-60. See also Antigua Erskine, Capt. Robert, 393 Erskine, Augustus Hervey's Journal, 107 Establishments, of ship dimensions, 25>-53. 370-71 estimates, naval, 26, 454-70; Extra­ ordinary, 243, 457, 465-66, 493; Ordinary, 103, 243, 452, 455-60, 464, 466, 482-83, 487, 491; Sea Service, 243, 456-57, 460-63, 47576, 491, 493 Evelyn, Sir John, 434 examination for lieutenant, 100-02 Exchequer, see Treasury Excise Crisis, 238 Exeter, 410

extra Commissioners, 37-40, 46 extra work, 284, 309-11, 317, 322-24, 326-32 Eyles, see Stiles Fair Quaker of Deal, 94, 116, 225 Falkingham, Capt. Edward, 39-40, 133, 221-22, 365 Fanshaw, Capt. Charles, 134 Fareham, 181 Farrar, Thomas, 413-15 "favorite cruise," 115 Fawler, John, 39-40 fees, 173, 298, 310, 306 Fellows, Thomas, 296 Fermor, Capt. William, 120 Ferrol, 25 fever, see disease, typhus Fielding, Henry. 396 firkin, 420 First Lord of the Admiralty, 31, 61, 65. 72-73, 85-87. See also Admi­ ralty Board fish, 378 fisheries, 171-72, 187, 203 flag officers, see commanders-inchief, sea officers Fleury, Cardinal, 187 Fleming, Capt. William Henry, 134 Fletcher, Capt. John, 133 flour, 376, 406, 411 Folkestone, 157, 173 Forbes, Admiral George, 3rd Earl of Granard, ιοί, 130-32 Forbes, Capt. John, 135, 223 foreign seamen, 154, 170, 222-23 Fox, Capt. Thomas, 135 Franco-Prussian alliance, 23 Frankland, Sir Thomas, 74 Frankland, Capt. Thomas, 100, 125 fraud, see corruption freight, see shipping freight money, 110-12, 115 French navy, 3; mobilization of sea­ men, 234-35, 498; naval captains, 109; naval stores, 276, 281; ship design, 251-53 French West Indies, 216, 416, 418-19 fruits, see lemon juice, vegetables Frye, Lt. George, 7-8 Gage, Thomas, Lord, 236

Index Gardiner and Atkinson, First Dutch War, 373 Gascoigne, Capt. John, 134 Gashry, Francis, 39-40, 43-44, 46, 52, 67. 77· 540 Gazette, 105 Geddes, Capt. Alexander, 38-39, 133 Genoa, 362, 369, 397 Genoese caulkers, 362 George II, 13, 23-24 Gibbs, 11 Gibraltar, 44-45, 56, 111, 187, 191, 221-22, 246, 302, 355-56, 366-67, 371, 404, 447 Girlington, Capt. Richard, 175 gin, 181, 183-84 Glenorchy, see Campbell Goldsworthy, Burrington, 397 Goodwin, John, 305-06 Gosport, 51, 180-84, 4°9> 437 Governor of Fort St. George, 223 Governor of Fort William, 223 Governor of Massachusetts, 220 Governor of New York, 138 Governor of Newfoundland, 120 Gower, John Leveson-Gower, 1st Earl, 26, 71 Graham, Sir James, 76 Granard, see Forbes Granville, see Carteret Graves, Capt. Thomas, 133 Gravesend, 160, 215 Gray, John, 304 Gray, John, 402, 405 Great Northern War, 280 "great ships," 151, 202, 249-50, 252, 268 Greenland fishery, 171 Greenwich, 327 Greenwich Hospital, 43, 49, 63, 106, 135, 213, 230, 363, 455-56 Greenock, 400 Grenville, George, 74, 80-81, 481 Grenville's Navy Act, 227-29, 481 Griffin, Capt. Thomas, 134, 223-24 guarda costas, 22 guardships, 163-64 Guion, 302 Gunman, Capt. James, 133 Guy, William, 428, 430 Gwynn, Eleanor, 75

Haddock, Admiral Nicholas, 122, 130-32, 151, 192, 221-28, 356 Haddock, Capt. Richard, Comptrol­ ler, 39-41, 48, 132 Hager, Admiral John, 131-32 Hales, Dr. Stephen, 244 half pay, for sea officers, 103-08, 11618, 122, 128, 136-37, 154, 456; pro­ posed for seamen, 240 Hall, Richard, 59-60, 439 Hamar, Capt. Joseph, 367 Hamilton, Lord Archibald, 73-74, 132 Hamoaze Estuary, 274, 437-39 Hanoverian foreign policy, 13, es­ se, 69, 455 Hardwicke, Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of, 65, 67, 71, 188 Hardy, Admiral Sir Charles, 73-74, 133. 175 Hardy, Capt. Charles, 479 Hardy, Capt. John, 470 Hardy, List, g8 Harland, Capt. Robert, 132 Harrington, William Stanhope, 1st Earl of, 26 Harwich, 44, 262, 269, 305, 436 Harwood, Capt. Robert, 133 Haslar Hospital, 51, 185, 456 hatcheller, 286 Havana, 23, 111, 204 Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward, 134, 140, 382-84, 428 Hay, William, 59-60 Hays, Robert, 296 "head money," 141-42 health, as excuse for resigning, 117, 119, 121-22, 189; of dockyard of­ ficers, 307-08; of Sheerness work­ men, 270. See also disease, scurvy Hemmington, Capt. John, 116, 133 hemp, see rope Henshaw, James, 143, 400 Herbert, Capt. Richard, 337 Hervey, Capt. Augustus, 107, 112-13, 116, 118, 122, 124, 126-27, 14° Hervey, A Detection, 107 Hervey, John, Baron, 11, 13, 71, 187, 473 Hervey, Memoirs, n Hervey, Capt. William, 226

Index Hildesley, Capt. John, 133, 140-41, 183 Hills, Nathaniel, 58, 73, 181-83, 383 Hitchin, 406 hogs, 406-07, 410-11, 419. See also pork holidays, in dockyards, 310, 325 Holland, John, 301 Hollond, John, 306, 399, 447-48, 485 Holloway, William, 313 Honiton, 410 Hosier, Admiral Francis, 219 hospital, 49-51, 100, 180-86, 195, 215; at Gibraltar, 222, 335; at Jamaica, 217-18, 350-51; at Port Mahon, 221. 357 hospital ships, 127, 185-86, 197 House of Commons, see Parliament Hoytaker, 55, 57, 60 Hudson's Bay Company, 176 Hughes, Capt. Richard, Commissioner at Portsmouth, 39, 41, 132, 289-91; letters, 539; views and policies, 90-91, 109, 242, 273. 293-94. 307-08,311,313, 315, 317, 320, 324, 326, 328, 330, 334-35, 337-39, 479 hulk, 270-72, 344, 346. 348, 351, 355, 360 Hull, 44, 159, 162, 856, 260, 323, 400, 406 Hume, David, 454, 473 Hume, Capt. Francis, 133 Hunt, John, 296 Hutchinson, Press Gang, 149 impressment, of seamen, 148-62,166, 178-80, 207, 224-25, 235, 239-40 (in West Indies, 216-19; in North America, 819-81; in Mediterranean, 221-23); of shipwrights, 383. 330, 332; of striking workmen, 288, 327, 330 cost of, 224; legality of, 149, 224. 233

imprests, of money, 256, 403-04 indent, 53, 432 India, see East Indies inscription maritime, 234 Ireland, Lord Lieutenant of, 159; recruiting in, 158, 203; victuals from, 401, 416-22 iron, 276, 283-85, 288

Italy, see Genoa, Leghorn, Turin itch, 165, 185, 190 Jacob, Capt. Thomas, 133 Jamaica, 57, 117, 143, 216-17, 277, 885, 347-58. 368. 401-05-

Port Antonio, Port Royal, West Indies James, Duke of York, 33, 95; James II, 111 James, Bull. Inst. Hist. Res., 81; M.M., 67 Jasper, Mr., 396 Jenkins' Ear, 21 Jenkins, Richard, 308 Jenkins, William, 59 Jennings, John, 410 Johnson, Andrew, 318 Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 16, 225, 237 joiners, 896, 326 Jones, Benjamin, 428 justices of the peace, see magistrates Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, 5 Kempthorne, Thomas, 868 Kendal, Capt. Charles, 133 Keppel, Capt. Augustus, 859 King's Evil, 165 King's Letter Boy, see volunteer per order King's Lynn, 398, 406 Kingston, Jamaica, 347, 350-58 Kinsale, 57, 178, 868, 404, 481-22 Kitson, MM., 243 knees and standards, 859-60, aSa Knowles, Admiral Charles, 108, 180, 135, 819, 881, 348, 350, 367; views and policies, 93, n8, aai, 257, 342, 345-46, 348, 358-55, 360, 378, 393, 405 laborers, dockyard, 866, 296, 300, 381 La Bourdonnais, Admiral Bertrand Francois Mahi de, 143 Lamhay, 438-39 Land Tax, 16-17 landed gentlemen, 1, 11, 15-17, 239, 498. 505 landsmen, 158, 160-61, 165-71, 173, 206, 221 Lascars, 223

548

Index Lascelles, Edwin, 401 Laughton, Barham Papers, 42 Lawrence, Capt. Thomas, 13a Laws, Capt. William, 134 Laws, Ordinances, and Institutions, 29 Lea River, 406 Lea, William, 409, 411 Leake, Mr., 99 Leaper, Charles, 318 Lee, Captain Fitzroy Henry, 101, 134. 143 Lee, George, 74 Leeward Islands, 392, 401. See also Antigua Lefebvre, Peter, 410, 41a Legge, Capt. Edward, 125, 136, 480 Legge, Henry Bilson, 74, 79, 89, 140, 480 Leghorn, 223, 342, 362, 369, 397 Leith, 400 lemon juice, 379-80, 384-85 Lestock, Admiral Richard, 70, 13132. 503 Lewes, 125 Lewis, England's Sea Officers, 66 lieutenants, pay and income, 103-07, 113, 128; in press gangs, 152-53, 162, 207; promotion, 35, 97-98, 101-02, 108, 120, 124-25. See also sea officers Lincoln, Henry Clinton, 7th EarI of, 119 Lind, James, 180, 356, 360, 379-80, 383 Lind, Three Letters, 356; Treatise, 379

Lingen, Capt. Joseph, 134 Lisbon, 44, 47, 57, 112, 222, 342, 361, 447

Lisle, Capt. William, 353-54. 359"6° List of Admiralty Records, 535 Liverpool, 157, 159, 212, 256, 323, 400 Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, 5 Lock, Peirson, ag6 Locke, John, 149 London, impressment in, 151, 15354, 161-62, 171-72, 207; as a mar. ket, 265, 405-16; victualling facili­

ties at, 30-31, 432-35, 440-41. See also Lord Mayor, merchants Long, Capt. Robert, 134 Longitude, Board of, 63 Lord High Admiral, 31, 33, 61-62, 73, 81, 84, 91, 96, 129, 306. See also Admiralty Board Lord Mayor of London, 159, 161, 172, 220 Lords Justices, 64-65, 199 Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, 159"6°. 173

Loton, John, 302 Louisburg, 26-27, 345-46 Luck, Joseph, 296 lunary months, 229 Luttrell, Temple, 240 Lymington, 244 Lynch's Island, see Port Antonio Lyttelton, Sir Thomas, 74 MacCarthy, Capt. Robert, 134 Macaulay, Thomas B., 93 MacBride, David, 382 Macleod, MM., 295; Unpublished Extracts, 109 Madeira, 194, 398 Madras, 26, 346-47 magistrates, 9, 159-62, 175, 214, 239, 325; at Jamaica, 217; at Minorca, «23 Mahan, Alfred T., 3, 144-45 Mahan, Influence, 3 Malone, Naval Stores Policy, 5 malt, 406, 425 Mann, Capt. Robert, 133 manning, see seamen Marcus, Quiberon Bay, 382 marine architecture, see ships Marines, 170, 187-90, 198, 202, 20506, 215, 218, 229-30, 396 Marlborough, Charles Spencer, 3rd Duke of, 45 Marseilles, 223 Martin, Capt. Roger, 117, 119 Martin, Admiral William, 51, 133 Martinique, 416 Mason, John, 410 Mason and Simpson, Messrs., 401-03, 449

Master, Capt. Harcourt, 135 master, 103, 106, 297

Index master and commander, 127-28 Master Attendant, 244, 293-97, 303. 305, 307-08, 336. See also dockyard officers Master Boatbuilder, 296 Master Brewer, 55-56, 425, 430 Master Butcher, 55, 424 Master Caulker, 295-96, 304 Master Cooper, 56-57, 431 Master Mastmaker, 296, 304 Master Ropemaker, 295, 299 Master Shipwright, 40, 252-53, 89396, 301, 303-04, 307, 319, 324, 36568. See also dockyard officers masts, 191, 252, 276-79, 281, 318-13, 345

Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell, 9 mate, 102, 153, 184 mathematics, 99, 303-04 Mathews, Admiral Thomas, as Commissioner at Chatham, 39-41, 282, 890, 318; as fleet commander, 2425, 41, 69-70, 121-22, 131-32, 135, 143, 146, 221-22, 249, 290, 369, 39798, 446-47,451,503; views and policies, 40, 212, 858-60, 294, 307, 313. 317. 326-27, 358, 366 Mathias, Brewing Industry, 382 Maxwell, George, 401 Maydman, Henry, 29 Maynard, Benjamin, 402, 405 Mayne, Capt. Covill, 133, 181 Mayne, Admiral Perry, 8, 134, 143 Mead, Capt. Samuel, 134 Mead, Samuel, 379 Mead, Works, 379 meat, fresh, 375, 377, 380-81, 383-85, 397-98, 405, 409, 451; Irish, 41622; salt, 383-84, 386, 404, 416-22, 427-28, 430-31. See also beef, pork Mediterranean, 69-70, 115-16, 120, 204, 249-50, 285, 341, 371, 384; manning in, 221-23; victualling in, 392. 397-98. 404. 417. 445-47. 451. See also Gibraltar, Port Mahon Mediterranean passes, 63 Medley. Admiral Henry, 112, 122, 126, 133, 223, 398 Medway River, 88, 268-69 "men in lieu," 156, 167, 230

merchant builders, 254-60, 28i-8g, 310-11, 321-23, 330-33 merchant service, officers from, 9798, 102-04; seamen in, 148, 165, 203, 229-31, 238-39 merchants, as an interest group, 1, ii-ao. 111, 258-39; and the man. ning problem, 157, 166-67, 169-79, 234. 237-39

Baltic, 276; North American, 820; West Indian, 143, 216-80, 352, 419 See also commerce protection, privateering interest, shipping, shipowners Merriman, Sergison Papers, 30 midshipman, 96-98, 101-08, 184 midshipman extra, 125 Milford, 153 Mihell, Capt. John, 133 Miller, Capt. William, 106, 134 Minorca, 38, 134, 82i, 223, 360. See also Port Mahon Mitchell, Capt. Cornelius, 134 Mitchell, Walter, 414 Molleson and Lane, Reports, 453 monied interest, 1, 12. See also merchants Montagu, John, 2nd Duke of, 68 moorage, 456, 459-60 moot, 320-21 Morocco, 45 Morrice, Capt. Salmon, 138 Moses, Capt. William, 132 Mostyn, Capt. Savage, 42, 260 mulcts, 311, 323-24, 326 Murray, MM., 3 mutiny of 1797, 493 mutton, 384 Myngs, Capt. Christopher, 109 Namier, Structure of Politics, 9; History Today, 16 Nantasket roads, 346, 360 national debt, iee debt Naval Academy, 99-100, 304, 462 naval administration before 1739, 10, 494-95 naval architecture, see ships Naval Commissioners, see Navy Board naval credit, see credit

550

Index naval officers, 364-69. See also sea officers naval stores, 4-5, 89-90, 200-01, 253, 275-89, 298; supplied overseas, 263, 265-66, 275, 277, 285, 341-42, 346-47, 355-56, 358, 368-71, 446, 46a, 484-86 navigation, 4, 63, 96, 99 Navy Bill of 1749, 118-19, 127 Navy Board, 32-48; membership, 3847, 301; powers and responsibili­ ties, 33-38, 47-49, 82-92, 98, 100, 102-03, 151, 299-300, 302, 306-07, 318-19, 338, 366-67, 468-69, 502 policies concerning: dockyards, 274-75, 289-93> 320. 323-31; health of seamen, 50-52; manning, 172, 189, 195, 222, 232, 477-81; naval stores, 242, 279-81, 283, 285, 485," officer training, 102; ropeyards, 287-89; seaman's diet, 377; ship­ building, 248, 252, 254-260; stores and workmen overseas, 362-63, 3771 navy debt, see debt Navy Island, see Port Antonio Navy Office, 29-30, 32, 34 Necessary money, 489-90 Negro slaves, 223, 354, 360-62 New England, 26, 256-57, 279-81, 321. 399 New Greenwich, Jamaica, 217, 35052 New York, 345 Newcastle, Thomas Pelham-Holles, 1st Duke of, as Secretary of State, 22-23, 27, 41, 64-65, 67, 70, 147, 151, 176, 188, 197, 201; papers, 539; as patron and political man. ager, 41, 46, 60-61, 72, 75, 79-80, 119, 125-26, 138-39, 141, 173, 203, 3°4 Newfoundland, 115, 120 Nice, 369 Nicholson, John, 410, 412 Nicolas, Marine Forces, 189 Nore, the, 85, 154, 157, 178, 209, 269, 271, 336, 436 Norfolk, 345, 406 Norris, Capt. Harry, 194 Norris, Admiral Sir John, 41, 65, 68, 112, 125-27, 131-32, 251, 396;

as fleet commander, 25, 68, 7071, 190-91, 197, 204, 249, 420; pa­ pers, 539; views and policies, 162, 169-70, 173, 175, 177, 187-88, 23435, 237, 330. 396, 498 Norris, Capt. Matthew, 41 Norris, Capt. Richard, 127, 135, 142 North America, 216-17, 219-21, 276, 279, 345-46, 369, 391, 401-02. 4»6 Northwest Passage, 63 Nottingham, see Winchilsea Nova Scotia, see Cape Breton, Louisburg nurses, 180-85 oak, see timber oarmaker, 310, 318 oatmeal, 375-76, 378, 423 Observations and Proposals, 169 O'Donovan, Live Stock in Ireland, 416 CEconomy of His Majesty's Navy Office, 33 officers, see dockyard officers, naval officers, petty officers, sea officers, victualling officers, warrant officers Ogle, Admiral Sir Chaloner, 7-8, 23, 131, 190-93, 197-98, 200-01, 217, 219- 277, 349, 368, 480 olive oil, 376, 392, 417, 432 Onslow, Arthur, 36, 227, 260 Oppenheim, Administration, 31 Ordinary, see estimates, ships Ordnance Board, 4, 63, 172, 433, 440 Orme, Capt. Humphrey, 133 Osborn, Capt. Henry, 120, 134, 269 Osborn, Robert, 39-40, 43, 82 Ostend, 208 Oswald, James, 39-40 outports, see victualling facilities overseers, 259-60 overtime, see extra work Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, 11 oxen, see cattle Oxenden, Sir George, 459 Pack, Anson, 61 Palmer, Francis, 313 Pantin and Machin, Messrs., 89 Papillon, Thomas, 447-48 Pares, Colonial Blockade, 7; His­ torian's Business, 23; T.R.H.S.,

Index 162; War and Trade in the West Indies, 21 parish officers, 171 Parker, Capt. Christopher, 133 Parliament, 11, 16-19, 21, 27, 48-44, 51. 63, 73, 144, 201, 248-49, 316, 319, 498, 504-05; and manning, 20-21, 143, 167, 170-71, 179, 188, 225, 229, 234-40, 494, 498-99; and navy debt, 458, 474, 479-80; and naval estimates, 248, 452, 454-68, 473; and sea officers, 6, 70, 111, 113-14, 141, 143; and victualling, 399, 404, 416, 482, 448. See also statutes Parry, Capt. William, 134 Parsons, Henry, 59 Pasley, Capt. Sir Thomas, 147, 380 Pasley, Private Sea Journals, 380 passing certificates, 98, 100-01 patronage, 11, 13, 43-47, 83, 86-87, 502, 504-05; in dockyards, 244, 260, 890, 302-07, 318-19; and sea officers, 95, 99-100, 118-27, 136-37, 139-42, 395. See also political influence pay, see half pay, salaries, wages Pay Office, 30, 36, 43, 227, 479 Pearse, Thomas, 39 Pearse, Capt. Vincent, 133 peas, 375-76, 411, 423, 425 Pelham, Henry, 26, 114, 118, 304, 472 Pembroke, Thomas Herbert, 8th Earl of, 61 pensions, 106, 131, 136-37, 230, 237, 240, 456. See also superannuation Pepys, Samuel, 30, 81, 84, 95, 101, 128, 394, 448, 494 petty officers 113, 189, 194, 197 petty warrant victualling, 431 Peyton, Capt. Edward, 143 Peyton, Capt. Sir Yelverton, 134 Philadelphia, 345, 360 Phillipson, John, 39, 43-44, 74 Pigot, Capt. Walter, 132 Piscatawqua, 257 pitch, see tar Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 14, 85-27 Place Act, 42-44, 60 Plymouth dockyard, 85, 263, 273-75,

283, 291, 322-23; Commissioner at, 38-39, 41, 291-93. See also Vanbrugh Plymouth hospital, 51, 182-84 Plymouth ropeyard, 286, 288 Plymouth victualling depot, 56, 403, 408-11, 436-40, 443-44 Pocklington, Capt. Christopher, 134 political influence, 9, 139, 203, 290, 316, 318-19, 399, 405. 419. 448. 465, 502-03. See also patronage Ponsonby, see Duncannon Pool, John, 896 Poole, Sir Francis, 185 pork, 375-76, 407, 410-11, 416, 419, 481-83. See also meat Port Antonio, 347-50 Port Mahon, 56, 221, 356-58, 365, 371, 404; Commissioner at, 38-40, 369 Port Royal, 216-17, 347-52, 364-65, 368 Porto Belle, 82, 144 Portsmouth dockyard, 90-91, 263, 266-68, 272-73, 275, 289-91, 29495. 307. 311. 382. 338; Commissioner at, 38-39, 41, 290, 293; strikes at, 324, 326-37. See also Hughes Portsmouth Naval Academy, see Naval Academy Portsmouth ropeyard, 886-87 Portsmouth victualling depot, 56, 403, 409, 411, 436-37 Portuguese government, 822, 342 Portuguese seamen, 223 Portuguese workmen, 361-62 Postlethwayt, Malachy, 1, 12 Postlethwayt, Universal Dictionary of Trade, 1 post ship, 120, 127, 137 Powlett, Lord Harry Powlett, Capt. Harry, 195 Pragmatic army, 24 prices, see cost prisoners of war, 4, 48-49, 223, 354 private builders, see merchant builders privateering interest, 14, 17, 20, 28, 113-14 privateers, 20, 156, 162, 214, 216-20, 229, 371; French, 441

552

Index Privy Council, 159-61, 172, 174, 177, 470 prize agent, 397, 400 prize money, 7, 16, 103, 110-17, 13839, 170, 213, 230, 367, 395 promotion, 47, 82-83, 86; of sea officers, 41-43, 68, 89, 100-02, 113, 118-26, 128-39, 153; of seamen, 194. 23° in dockyards, 292, 295-96, 299307, 316, 318-19, 367-69; in vict­ ualling service, 424 protections, 154, 157, 171-77, 187, 203, 207, 443 Protheroe, Capt. George, 133 public credit, see credit public debt, see debt Pudner, Capt. Humphrey, 132 Pulteney, William, Earl of Bath, 127, 144, 226, 229, 236, 248-49 purser, 53, 82, 227, 300, 302, 305, 376-77, 381-82, 392-400, 432, 48990 Pursers Instructions, 438 Purveyor, 282, 295, 322 Purvis, Capt. George, 39, 41, 46, 133 Quallett, John, 256 quarterman, 259, 296, 307, 309, 31316, 323-24 Queenborough, 271 "R," see "Run" raisins, 376 rebellion of '45, 25-26, 207, 400, 478 rebuilding, 247-48 "recalls," 227, 478-79 Redhouse, Deptford, 434 register ships, 111, 115 Registry Act (1696), 230, 234, 240 registry of seamen, 170, 230, 233-40, 499

Regulating Captains, 153-55, 172, 177, 180, 215 Regulations and Instructions, 120 reserve officers, see half pay reserve of seamen, 230-34, 240. See also registry resident Commissioners, see dock­ yard Commissioners retirement, see superannuation Revell, Thomas, 58-60 Rhode Island, 220

rice, 376 Richmond, Charles Lennox, and Duke of, 45, 72, 176, 188, 201, 303, 319 Richards, William, 296 Ridge, Sir Thomas, 398-400 riggers, 297, 336-37 rigging, 253, 255, 266, 278, 285, 33536 Roberts, Capt. John, 132 Robinson, Capt. Nicholas, 134 Robinson, Admiral Tancred, 133 Robinson, British Tar, 4; The Brit­ ish Fleet, 129 Rochester, 317-18 Rodney, Admiral Sir George, 145 Rooke, Admiral Sir George, 129 Roope, Nicolas, 299 rope, 276-80, 283, 285-88 ropemakers, 285-88, 369 ropeyards, 273, 278-79, 285-88, 299 Roswell, John, 296 rot, of ships, 241-44, 257-58, 268; of stores, 277; of victuals, 386,422-30 Rotherhithe, 55, 435 Rouzier, Capt. Richard, 133 Royal William Victualling Office, 439-40

Rowley, Admiral William, 70, 73, 112, 127, 133, 142, 358, 398 Rule, John, 302-03 rum, 216-17, 376, 392, 398, 405, 423 "Run," 165, 195, 202, 213, 215, 31112, 315-16, 325 Rushout, Sir John, 36 Russell, Admiral Edward, Earl of Orford, 81, 342, 383, 423 Russell, Jack, 48, 368, 395 Russell, John, 39, 44-47, 59-60, 291, 301-03, 318-19, 367, 397 Russia, 279-80 Ruz , Jean-Charles Dujardin de, 276 sailmakers, 284, 297 sails, 266, 277, 281, 283-84, 288 St. Helens, 201 St. Lo, Capt. John, 133 salaries, of dockyard officers, 295; of sea officers, 108-10; in victual­ ling service, 55-57 salt, 383-84, 411, 427. See also meat Salt Office, 172

Index Saltash, 8a Sandwich, John Montagu, of, 26, 46, 72-74, 77-80,

263-69, 272-74, 295, 321. See also 4th

Earl

86, 120,

262

Sandwich, 82, 173 Sardinia, 451 Saumarez, Capt. Philip, 140 sawyers, 296, 310 scabies, see itch Scarborough, 406 Scottish rebellion, see rebellion Scotland, 158, 398, 400, 406, 440 scurvy, 221, 377-85, 428 sea officers, 6-9, 93-146, 385, 500, 503-04

dealings with: dockyards, 27678, 293, 301-03, 306, 335-38, 36469; victualling, 378, 380-82, 391400, 450

See also captains, commanders-

in-chief, discipline, lieutenants, promotion, prize money, salaries, seniority Sea Service estimate, see estimates seamen, 19-21, 147-240, 372, 492-93, 497-500; number of, 185-86, 20506, 460-62, 483; and refitting of ships, 200, 202, 212, 335-40, 35960, 364; in victualling service, 441-43. See also bounty money, brutality, diet, desertion, disci­ pline, disease, impressment, mer­ chant service, protections, turn­ over, volunteers, wages Secretary at War, 188, 215 Secretary of the Admiralty, 42, 67, 76, 81-84

seniority, 43, 58-60, 81, 128-38 Sergent, John, 302 Sergison, Charles, 33 servants, of sea officers, 97, 108-10, 194; in dockyards, 271, 287-88, 299-300, 312, 314. 3l6"2°, 323. 328-

«9, 363 Severn River, 323 Seville, Treaty of, 496 Seymour, Dr. John, 182 Shadwell, Charles, 94 Shaw, Calendar Treasury Books, 455 sheathing, 344 Sheerness dockyard, 89, 263, 269-72, 282, 294, 326, 436 242, 247, 249, 254-61,

shipbuilding,

merchant builders shipowners, 169, 172, 177-79, 257, 442. See also merchant service, merchants shipping, merchant, 19, 157-58, 16971, 175-79, 187, 207-08, 214-17, 222-23, 232, 257-60; of timber, 283;

of victuals, 57, 440-47, 488-90.

See also merchants

ships, 241-61; design of, 4, 89-90, 248-53. 3°3: life of, 241, 243, 245, 254; number of, 245-55; Ordi­ nary, 185, 243-45, 248-49, 254, 263, 268-71, 273, 297, 455-56, 459; size of, 241, 248, 268, 484-85. See also "great ships" ships (for a full list of the navy, see 515-31): Adventure, 194, 260; Ad­ vice, 371; Antelope, 360; Argyle, 168; Assistance, 117; Augusta, 191;

Bien Aime, 346, 360; Blandford, 97; Blenheim, 185, 245; Boyne, 201, 251; Britannia, 247; Buckingham, 168, 296; Burford, 163-65; Cambridge, 158, 191, 196; Canterbury, 120, 346; Centurion, 166,252, 302; Chatham, 120; Ches­ ter, 197; Chichester, 201, 251; Cornwall, 122, 140; Cumberland, 201, 361; Defiance, 90, 333; Dread­ nought, 314; Duke, 196, 204; Dun­ kirk, 191, 360; Edinburgh, 195; Elizabeth, 163-64, 191; Falkland, 97; Fox, 161; Gloucester, 194; Grafton, 140, 192, 247; Greenwich, 296; Greyhound, 111, 246; Jamaica sloop, 296; Jersey, 191, 479; Kent, 163-64, 197; Kinsale, 166; Lancas­ ter, 210; Lark, 247, 351; Lenox, 16364, 197; Lion, 168; Ludlow Castle, 355; Medway, 346; Monmouth, 284; Namur, 168, 247, 307; Nassau, 324; Newcastle, 168; Norwich, 120, 163, 346; Nottingham, 272; Orford, 168; Panther, 167; Pearl, 163-65; Pembroke, 269; Preston, 346; Prince, 269, 302; Prince Fred­ erick, 119, 211, 284-85; Prince George, 244; Prince of Orange, 168; Princess Amelia, 191-93, 201; Princess Louisa, 163; Princess Mary, 270; Princessa, 251; Roch192,

Index ester, 197; Roebuck, 194, 197; Romney, 247; Royal Sovereign, 161, 184, 204, 327, 436; Royal William, 241; Russell, 168, 192. 251; Rye, 285; St. Albans, 184; Salisbury, 191, 212, 278; Seahorse, 122; Severn, 223; Southampton Hulk, 348; Strafford, 163; Sunder­ land, 226; Superb, 168, 226; Swift sloop, 161; Thetis, 274; Torbay, 195, 201, 212; Torrington, 336; Tyger, 168; Victory, 197; Wager, 302; Warwick, 168; Weymouth, 191; Woolwich, 337; Worcester, 163 ships of East India Company: Duke of Lorraine, 178; llchester, 346; Onslow, 178 shipwrights, 48, 172, 252-55, 260, 270-71, 275, 296, 300, 303-04, 31333, 360-63 Shirley, Gov. William, 220 Shoreham, 161 short allowance, 374, 448, 489-91 Shory, Thomas, 304 Shovell, Admiral Sir Cloudisley, 60 Sicily, 13 Sick and Wounded Board, 4, 30, 43, 48-52, 58, 172, 181-85, 456 sick quarters, 49-51, 180-86, 204, 209, 217 Simpson, John, 412 sinking fund, 473-74 Sixpenny Office, 63 Slapp, John, 410 slaves, see Negro slaves slops, 184, 190, 227-28 Slush, Barnaby, 396 Smith, Adam, 15, 229, 341, 452 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 229 Smith, Capt. Charles, 132 Smith, Capt. Elliott, 371 Smith, Lt. Henry, 125 Smith, Capt. Thomas, 134 Smith, Capt. William, 133, 134 Smithfield market, 406-07 smiths, 284, 325-27 Smollett, Tobias, 396 soldiers, 187-88, 190, 205, 214, 218, 237, 325-27. See also army Somerset House, 32 South Sea Company, 14, 473 Southampton, 256

Spain, 1, 14, 18, 21-23, 27, 114, 151, 187, 204, 342, 416-17, 495-96 Sparks, Capt. Israel, 134 Sperling, Public Credit, 5 spinner, 286 Spithead, 272 standards, see knees Stanhope, John, 74 Stanyan, Mr., 470 Stapleton, Capt. Miles, 134 statutes, 42-44, 60, 494 concerning: Irish provisions, 422; manning, 168, 170-72, 197, 204, 213, 218-21, 230, 234, 240; naval stores, 279-80; paying sea­ men, 198-99, 210, 226-29, 479-81 Stert, Arthur, 59 Steuart, Admiral James, 85, 90-91, 133. 175. 207, 209, 212, 291, 338, 361 Stewart, Admiral Charles, 131-32, 175. 347. 36i Stiles, Sir Francis Haskins Eyles, 59 Stockton, 406 Stonehouse, 439 Storekeeper, 56-57, 265, 293, 297-300, 302, 305. 366-69 stores, see naval stores storeships, 127, 277, 297 strikes, in dockyards, 288, 323-27 Stringer, Capt. John, 9 Strype, Survey of London, 2q Suffolk, 406 Suffolk cheese, 375, 414 superannuation, 40, 106, 136-37, 24445· 307-08' 320 surgeons, 180-85 surgeon's mates, 180-82 Surveyor, 32, 37, 39-40, 48, 85, 89, 253, 265, 293-94, 298, 320 Sutherland, William, 286 Sutherland, Britain's Glory, 241; Shipbuilders Assistant, 253 Sutton, Samuel, 244 Sweden, 279-80 Tanner, Catalogue, 33 tar and pitch, 276, 278-80, 288 "tarpaulin officers," 93, 95, 116 task work, 331-32 taxes, 11, 452, 466, 473 Taylor, John, 256 Tempest, Warner, 353

Index teredo navalis, 242, 877, 344, 347, 351-53 Tetuan, 45 Thanet, Isle of, 173 Thompson, Edward, 74 Thompson, Capt. Edward, 94 Thompson, William, 59 Thomson, Secretaries of State, 64 The Three Establishments, 103 tickets, pay, 226-28; leave, 215 tide, 865, 268, 343, 345. See also extra work timber, 848-43. 247. 257-59. 275-77. 281-83, 322 tobacco, 887-28, 313 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 147, 262 Tomlinson, Robert, 224, 229, 231, 840 Tomlinson Papers, 224 Torbay, 191 Torrington, see Byng Tory, 11, 16, 127 Toulon, Battle of, 8, 24-25, 70, 127, 140, 142, 503 Tower of London, 89 Tower Wharf, 30, 55, 433, 440 Townsend, Admiral Isaac, 133, 220, 348 Townshend, Horatio, 59 Townshend, Thomas, 840 Townshend family, 9 Towry, Capt. John, 39, 134 trade, see commerce protection, merchants Transport Office, 38, 434 transports, army, 414, 440 treacle, 421 Treasurer of the Navy, 30, 38, 35-36, 42, 227, 860, 893, 897, 453, 468-69, 471, 474, 477, 480 Treasury, 16-17, 35-36, 73, 76, 138, 421-82, 453, 468-69, 471, 477, 480 treenails, 320 Trefusis, Capt. Thomas, 39, 59, 135 Trelawny, Gov. Edward, 216-17, 219, 360, 540 Trentham, Granville LevesonGower, Lord, 73 Trevelyan, G. M., 494 Trevor, John, 74 Trevor, Capt. Tudor, 132 Trincomalee, 346-47 Trinity House, 172

Troughton, John, 381 Tunstall, Byng and the Loss of Minorca, 146 Turin, 397 turn-over, 198-99, 818, 838, 480 turpentine, 878-79 typhus, 179-85, 191, 881-82 "unappropriation," 468, 473 Vado Bay, 113 Vanbrugh, Capt. Philip, Commissioner at Plymouth, 39, 41, 46, 133, 182, 291, 293, 295, 307, 322, 326 vegetables, 377, 380-85 venereal disease, 185 ventilation, 179, 243-44, 431 Vernon, Admiral Edward, 22-23, 25, 67, 119, 188-83, 126-27, 131-32, 144. 158, 163, 165-66, 218-19, 233, 365, 503; papers, 531, 540; views and policies, 80, 88, 107, 148, 149, 165, 197, 810, 817, 225, 227, 235, 250, 341. 350. 368, 371. 402 Vernon, Francis, 59 victualling, 58-61, 373-451, 487-92; facilities, 30-31, 54-57, 356-57, 43841; issuing procedures, 431-32; overseas victualling, 401-03, 405, 444.47 Victualling Agents, 49, 56-58, 40305, 438, 449 Victualling Board, 48, 58-61, 85-86, 373, 404, 447-50; policies, 377-78, 381, 384, 397-98, 411-12, 417. 442. 450-51 Victualling officers, 424-86 Villefranche, 362 Villettes, Arthur, 397 Vincent, Capt. Philip, 184 vinegar, 382 Virginia, 399 volunteer per order, 96-99 volunteers, 150, 158, 163-69, 175, 194-96, 202, 204, 206, 8O9, 811, 225, 230, 837, 239. 499 Wager, Admiral Sir Charles, 36, 43, 45, 58, 65-68, 74, 76, 87-88, 114, 187. 131-32. 379. 384. 503; papers, 539-40; views and policies, 93, 114, 138, 144, 169-70, 173-75, 177-79,

556

Index 197,202-03,237-38,248, 349, 459, 494

wages of dockyard workmen, 284, 28687, 309-10, 316, 321-22, 327-31, 361-64, 476-77. 499 of merchant seamen, 178-203, 216, 230, 238-39 of seamen, 167, 200, 226-29, 240, 492-93. 498; payment of, 37, 195, 198-99, 210, 212-14, 226-28, 232, «93. 470, 475-8I in victualling service, 441-42, 489 Wales, Frederick, Prince of, 126 Wales, 283, 406 Walker, Lt., 121 Wallace, James, 59 Wallen, Mathew, 368-69 Walpole, Horace, 1, 8, 23-26, 191 Walpole, Sir Robert, 24, 66, 68, 125, 144; papers, 540; views and poli­ cies: in general, 3, 13-14, 18, 2122, 114-15, 187, 197, 239, 463, 473; on naval administration, 170-71, 186-87, 203, 224, 226-27, 229, 233, 235-37, 239, 47°. 495497-98, 503 Walpole family, 9 Wapping, 102 Ward, Ned, 97, 152, 225, 362, 395-96 Ward, Wooden World, 97 warrant officers, 4, 106, 113, 230, 244-45, 297, 479 Warren, Admiral Sir Peter, 26, 112, »34. «57. «74-75. 308, 345. 354. 367. 391. 394 Warwickshire, 406 water, fresh, 199-201, 271, 273, 352, 443 water cask allowance, 432 Waterman's Company, 173 Watson, Capt. Charles, 135 Watts, Mr. 282 Weekly Progress Report, 338-39 Weller, Capt. John, 133 Weobley, 42 West, An Examination and Refuta­ tion, 108

West, Thomas, 256, 282 West Indies, bases in, 347-55, 359, 495, 540; manning in, 216-21; un­ popularity of service in, 115-16, 119, 122, 129, 141, 143, 148, 196, 200; victualling in, 392, 401-03, 405, 416-19, 444-49, 488 Weymouth, 392 wheat, 405-06, 411, 425 Whetstone, Admiral William, 129 Whig, 11, 127 Whitemore, Mr., 61 Whittington, Thomas, 237 Whorwood, Capt. Thomas, 39, 133 Wickham, 304 Wight, Isle of, 184 Willes, Sir John, 7-8 William III, 448 Williams, Whig Supremacy, 21 Williams, Capt. Edmund, 134 Williams, Capt. Thomas, 133 Winchilsea, Daniel Finch, 8th Earl of, 68-71, 73-74, 77, 88, 305, 503 wine, 376, 392, 398, 423 Wingate, Capt. John, 134 Wishart, Admiral Sir James, 129-30 Woburn, 72, 80 Wolfe, Gen. Edward, 189 women aboard ship, 199, 269 Woodward, Thomas, 368 Woolwich dockyard, 263, 267, 273, 281; Commissioner at, 39, 289 Woolwich ropeyard, 267, 285-88, 299 worm, see teredo navalis wort, 382-83 Wren, Sir Christopher, 29 Wyatt, William, 182 Wyndham, Sir William, 458 Yarmouth, 9, 159, 162 "Yellow Squadron," 137 Yeo, Capt. John, 133 Yonge, Sir William, 225 York, Duke of, see James York, 406 Yorke, Hardwicke, 71 Young Pretender, 25, 207 Young, Capt. Robert, 212