Between integration and secession : the Muslim communities of the southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and western Burma/Myanmar 9780739103562, 0739103563

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B etween INTEGRATION a n d S ecession T he M u s l i m C o m m u n i t i e s of t h e Southern Philippines, Southern T h a il a n d , and W estern B ur m a / M yanmar

Between Integration and Secession

Between Integration and Secession The Muslim Communities o f the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar

Moshe Yegar

II LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York * Oxford

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Published in die United States of America by Lexington Books 4720 Boston Way, Lanham, Maryland 20706 12 Hid’s Copse Road Cumnor Hill, Oxford 0X2 9JJ, England Copyright 2002 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Libnuy Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Control Number: 2002107629 ISBN 0-7391-0356-3 (cloth: alk. paper) Printed in the United States of America © The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

/

To my wife, Dvorak

Contents Foreword

ix

Abbreviations

xiii

Maps

xvii

Introduction The Expansion of Islam in Southeast Asia

1

Part One: The Muslims of Arakan 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Beginnings of the Muslim Community in Burma Muslim Settlement in Arakan From the British Occupation through World War II World War II and Its Aftermath The Mujahideen Rebellion The Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA) The Military Coup and Its Aftermath

19 23 27 33 37 49 53

Part Two: The P&tani Muslims 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

The Emergence of the Patani MuslimCommunity The Annexation of Patani Hajji Sulong and Tunku Mayhiddin Causes of Friction and Attempts at Reform Separatist Movements The Communist Underground and Problems of the Border Areas Aspects of Foreign Relations: Malaysia, Arab Nations, and Islamic Conferences 15. The 1990s: Is the Revolt in Decline?

73 87 101 125 141 155 163 175

Fart Three: The Moro Muslims 16. The Emergence of the Moro Community 17. The Spanish Occupation Rsriod

vii

185 199

viii

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Contents

The American Occupation Period The Philippine Republic The Emergence of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) The Controversy over the Tripoli Agreement Autonomy

213 241 267 295 331

Summary

361

Appendixes Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E

385 387 389 395 397

Chronology

399

Glossary

411

Bibliography

415

Index

447

About the Author

463

Foreword For a quarter of a century and more, I have been absorbed with the topic of Muslim uprisings in Southeast Asia. In 1972, my book The Muslims o f Burma: A Study o f a Minority Group (Otto Harrassowitz, Weisbaden) dealt with the revolt of the Mujahideen in Arakan, which is in western Burma/Myanmar. In July of 1975,1 wrote a paper (in Hebrew) that dealt with Muslim uprisings in Thailand and the Philippines, which was published by the Shiloach Institute of Tel Aviv University. My intention had been to write a fuller study in English, but for a variety of reasons I was unable to do so until the beginning of 1996. In the more than twenty years that have elapsed since the original Hebrew monograph, there have been a host of changes and developments in the field, and other researchers have been drawn to the topic, producing a body of books and papers on various aspects of Muslim uprisings in Southeast Asia. During these two decades, particularly in the southern Philippines and southern Thailand, Muslim revolts grew in intensity. As a result, a great deal of new material is now available which requires study and research. The present undertaking is neither a translation, an update, nor an expansion of my original paper. It is, essentially, a new work and includes a study of the Mus­ lims of Arakan, the Rohingya. I believe it is important to assess the nature of these movements and the processes they have undergone for, despite the ethnic differ­ ences between the Rohingya of Arakan, the Malay Muslims of the Patani region in South Thailand, and the various Moro groups in the southern Philippines, the picture is better understood through a comparison of these three Muslim separatist movements of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia has other Muslim minorities—in Vietnam, in Cambodia, in Indonesia, and in Singapore—but their situation is so different that I do not see the cogency of viewing them in comparative terms or including them in the present study. The most difficult problem in studying the separatist movements is the question of sources. Basic historic events are not difficult to reconstruct because they have been extensively recorded by many researchers and journalists in the past few decades. An especially large body of information has been published on the Mus­ lim revolt in the Philippines; there is also a wealth of material on the Muslim uprising in Thailand, although this movement attracted less attention on the part of journalists and researchers. There are even some comparative studies between the two movements. The situation is much less satisfactory regarding the Muslim

X

Foreword

revolt in Arakan. Extant sources are less available perhaps because of the inacces­ sibility of the area, and the less than welcoming attitude of the Burmese/Myanmar government to journalists and other foreigners. The movements themselves have not all been of the same mind in the desire to bring their struggle before world public opinion. The Muslims of the southern Philippines understood the impor­ tance of mobilizing international support for their cause and made extensive use of communiques, speeches and interviews. As a result, there is a great deal of documentation about the movement. The availability of sources is not as good for the Muslims of the Patani area. In the early years after World War II, they also attempted to mobilize outside support, and for that stage of their revolt there is a good deal of documentation. In subsequent years, they devoted much less effort to this so that to a greater degree one is forced to rely on newspaper reports. There is almost no documentation for the Rohinga that originates with the movement itself, making it much more difficult to know and understand the situation of this minority. One also has to bear in mind the fact that some of the material generated by Muslim sources is tendentious, and must be evaluated with caution. Nonethe­ less, in most cases, by verifying the facts and weighing the material that has been published, one is able to arrive at a realistic, logical, and reasonable description of historic events which neutralizes inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and occasional misunderstandings, at least to a certain degree. This study was conducted under the auspices of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Prof. Moshe Maoz, former Chairperson of the Truman Institute, who invited me to become a Research Fellow of the Institute, and to Prof. Amnon Cohen, its present Chairperson. My sincere thanks also to the Institute staff for their generous help: Dr. Edy Kaufman, Executive Director; Dalia Shemer, Anat Mishali, and Jennie Nelson. Prof. Aharon Layish and Dr. Aryeh Oded were of great assistance in clarifying Arabic terms, and I am indebted to Ms. Tamar Sofer who drew the maps. My students at the Hebrew University with whom I discussed the issues dealt with in the book were very helpful. The librarians of the Truman Institute aided me in locating material, particularly Ricardo Schwed who was al­ ways ready to share his expertise. I was also helped by Esti Shapira, the librarian of the Oriental Reading Room at the National and University Library in Jerusalem. My thanks, as well, to Prof. Jonathan Goldstein of West Georgia College; Dr. Frank Shulman of Chicago; Prof. David J. Steinberg, President of Long Island University; Manny Ocampo of New York; His Excellency, Thai Ambassador Vara-Poj Snidvongs; Irit Ben-Aba; Ilan Baruch; David Danieli; and Ilan Fluss of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. In London, a wealth of material was made available to me in books and original documents at the Public Records Office (PRO), the British Library, and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). It was a genuine pleasure to benefit from the efficient and courteous services of these excellent institutions. The librarians at the Philippine University in Manila were especially forthcoming and expedi­

Foreword

xi

tious in responding to my requests. Prof. David Kushner of Haifa University helped me clarify a number of salient historical facts. Kari Druck worked dili­ gently in typing the manuscript, and Rivka and Amnon Hadary translated and edited a complicated Hebrew work. Dr. Raphael Fosner prepared the book for press with great dilligence and attention to detail. My thanks to all of them. While I am grateful to all those without whom the publication of this study would not have been possible, I alone am responsible for any errors that may have crept into the work.

The Truman Institute, Jerusalem

Moshe Yegar

Abbreviations ABIM

Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Muslim Youth Movement of Malay­ sia) AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines ALA Arakan Liberation Army ALP Arakan Liberation Party ARIF The Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front ARMM The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces BMA Bangsa Moro Army BMLO Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization BNPP Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (see also: NLFP) BRN Barisan Revolusi Nasional (NationalRevolutionary Front, Patani) BSPP Burma Socialist Program Party BWJ Barbara Whittingham-Jones Collections (SOAS) CCIA Central Committee for Islamic Affairs (Thailand) CIA US. Central Intelligence Agency CNI Commission of National Integration (Philippines) CPM See: MCP CPP Communist Party of the Philippines CPT Communist Party of Thailand CO Colonial Office (PRO) DAR Department of Agrarian Reform (Philippines) DO Dominions Office (PRO) EDCOR The Economic Development Corps (Philippines) E ll Encyclopaedia o f Islam, Leiden, 1913-1938 EI2 Encyclopaedia o f Islam, New Edition, Leiden, 19S4 FEER Far Eastern Economic Review FO Foreign Office (PRO) FRC Foreigner Registration Card (Burma/Myanmar) GAMPAR Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (The Association of the Malays of Greater Patani) GIP Grekkan Islam Patani

xiv ICFM ICS IDP KMLF MCFF MCP MDA MFA MILF MIM MNLF MNLF/RG MPLA MPRMP NARRA

Abbreviations

The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Indian Civilian Service Islamic Directorate of the Philippines Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Force (Burma/Myanmar) Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (Philippines) Malayan Communist Party (or: CPM) Mindanao Development Authority Mayu Frontier Administration Moro Islamic Liberation Front Muslim (later: Mindanao) Independence Movement Moro National Liberation Front Moro National Liberation Front/Reformist Group Malayan People’s Liberation Army Council of the Muslim People of Patani National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (Philippines) NDF National Democratic Front (Philippines) NLFP The National Liberation Front of Patani (see also: BNPP) NLSA The National Land Settlement Administration (Philippines) NPA New People’s Army (Philippines) NRC National Registration Card (Burma/Myanmar) OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OSSS Office of Strategic and Special Studies (Philippines) PAC Provincial Autonomous Council (Philippines) PAPERI Parti Persandaran Islam (Islamic Socialist Party) (Thailand) PARNAS Partai Revolusi Nasional (Patani) PAS Partai Islam se-Malaysia (see also: PMIP and PI) PI Partai Islam (see also: PMIP and PAS) PKPB Pergerakan Kemerdekaan Patani Bersatu (United Patani Freedom Movement) PLO Palestine Liberation Oiganization PMIP Pan Malayan Islamic Party (see also: PI and PAS) PPM Patani People’s Movement PPPP Pertubohan Persatuan Pembibasan Patani (see also: PULO) PRO Public Records Office, London PSRM Partai Sosialis Rak’yat Malaya PTF/RDM Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao PULA Patani United Liberation Army PULO Patani United Liberation Organization (see also: PPPP) RAD Reconstruction and Development Programme for Mindanao RCC A Regional Consultative Commission (Philippines)

Abbreviations

RIF RPF RSO SLORC SOAS SPCPD SPDA STMSG TJI TMPLAF TNPRP UAE UIFO UMNO UNHCR WHO WMC WML

xv

Rohingya Independence Force Rohingya Patriotic Front The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation State Law and Order Restoration Council (Burma/Myanmar) The School of African and Asian Studies, London Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development Southern Philippines Development Administration South Thailand Muslim Students Group Tantra Jihad Islam (Thailand) Thai Muslim People's Liberation Armed Forces Tentera Nasional Fembebasan Rak’yat Patani (Patani People’s Na­ tional Liberation Army) United Arab Emirates Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations (Philippines) United Malay National Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees World Health Organisation World Muslim Congress (Moatamar al-Alam al-Islami) World Muslim League

Maps Southeast Asia

xix

Myanmar/Burma

18

Malaysian-Thai Border

72

The Philippines

184

Provinces and Regions of South Philippines

359

xvii

SOUTHEAST ASIA '.*r

3 '4 'f

i

.


* Y .

Indian Ocean

Pacific Ocean

C?

» •

’ $

Sb> #

1000km

________________ ^ A U g f r R A L I / ^ \

Introduction

The Expansion of Islam in Southeast Asia1

Much before the first century, there is evidence of commerce between the Roman Empire and other Mediterranean lands, the cargo making its way mainly aboard Roman and Indian vessels. At the large port which sprang up on the southern coast of Ceylon, merchandise was exchanged between the Roman Empire, India, South­ east Asia, and China. One route went around the Indian subcontinent in the direc­ tion of the Straits of Hormuz to the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, and from there up the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to ports on the Mediterranean. Another route skirted the Arabian subcontinent to the port of Hadramaut, from there to the Straits of Bab al Mandeb and then to the Red Sea and Akaba. Alternately, the land route went from Hadramaut to Mecca and continued from there to Gaza or Da­ mascus. Merchandise was transported via all these routes from China and India to Mediterranean ports and Europe; merchandise was transported along the same routes from the Middle East back to China and India. In the Mediterranean littoral, the appetite for merchandise from Asia motivated Indian merchants to develop their contacts in Southeast Asia and even further afield. In the Middle East, from at least the first century, Arab merchants were also acquainted with trade routes through Asian waters. Most of these merchants came from trade centers along the Red Sea, southern Arabia, or the Persian Gulf. By the third century, there were already Persian merchants along the Malay Peninsula. These Arabs and Persians acted as go-betweens for European merchants who dealt with Asian merchants active in India and the western parts of the Malaysian archipelago. Arab commerce extended to China. It is likely that a group of Arab merchants, and perhaps Per­ sians as well, were in the city of Canton as early as the third century. Apparently the sea lanes from Egypt and Persia to India on the one hand, and from India to Southeast Asia on the other, were in Arab hands, and the number of Arab and Persian merchants grew in the first decade of the seventh century. But, because their ships were technically inferior and so had to stay close to the shore, the Chinese were not as involved in trade in the southern waters until long after the Indians, the Arabs, and the Malays of Southeast Asia, each of whom had learned enough about seasonal winds and navigation to sail in the open sea. In time, this commerce became a Muslim monopoly at both its western and eastern ends.2 1

2

Introduction

The rise of Islam in the Middle East, and its rapid expansion in the seventh century, severed contact between Europe, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Conse­ quently, the Muslims gained a monopoly over Asian trade with the West, becom­ ing the dominant player in this commerce. Colonies of Muslims, both Arab and Persian, spread all along the sea trade routes. As early as the middle of the eighth century, a sizable Muslim presence could be found along the southern coast of China, in the commercial ports of southern India and Southeast Asia, and it ap­ parently extended to the Philippines. The impetus for the expansion was not merely commercial. As a result of the conflict between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, many Shiite refugees fled eastward as far as Korea. A major part of the Shiite immigration to China was made up of Persians where, as noted, Persian ships had arrived even before the rise of Islam. The Chinese, themselves, had met Arabs and forged trade links with them in the fourth and seventh centuries. Arab and Persian merchants, as well as Indians, used the ports of Kedah and Patani from the eighth century onward. There were regular sailings to China via the Malabar coast in India, by way of Kedah in the Malay Peninsula, and via the Straits of Malacca. A round trip voyage to China lasted eighteen months. In the ninth century, there were contacts with Korea and Japan. In the same century, China, under the Tang dy­ nasty, enjoyed a period of growth which fostered close commercial links with the Abbasid Caliphate. The wide spectrum of commerce which developed was the outcome of such factors as increased agricultural production and industrial output, a network of secure land and sea routes, political stability, and the convenient geographic position of the Abbasid Caliphate poised, as it was, between Asia, the Mediterranean basin, and Europe. Trade with distant Asian lands—India, Ceylon, Southeast Asia, and China—was conducted along both land routes from the Per­ sian Gulf and land routes which led to India by way of Afghanistan, or to China via central Asia. Merchants brought silk, spices, perfumes, lumber, porcelain, sil­ ver and gold articles, precious jewels, jewelry, and so forth from these countries, and some of the trade made its way to Europe. In 878 c e , the free flow of com­ merce was impeded when Muslims were killed in southern China, and the port of Canton was closed to foreign traders. Many of those who survived moved to the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, particularly to Kalah (Klang or Kedah) and reestablished themselves there. Toward the end of the ninth century, trade along this route diminished due to both the fading fortunes of the Abbasid Caliphate and the weakening of the Tang dynasty in China. By the end of the tenth century, direct sailings from Persia to China had almost come to an end. Now Arab and Chinese merchants would meet in Kedah, Sumatra, or Java. Arab trade was mostly limited to ports along the Malabar coast, but the importance of ports along the archipelago did not diminish. Also by the end of the tenth century, Muslims were allowed to reenter China. When Malayas entered into the trade, they broadened contacts between foreign Muslim traders and the local population. During this same century, Chinese merchants began trade with Borneo while Muslim mer­ chants discovered possibilities for trade with the Sulu Islands.3

The Expansion o f Islam in Southeast Asia

3

Because sailing ships were dependent on monsoon winds and the seasons, it was essentia] for Arabs and other Muslim traders from India and Persia to set up domiciles in ports that were located in the heart of local communities. Muslim settlements spread rapidly in Asian port cities as Muslim merchants became vital to the economy of local communities. Rulers in the coastal areas of Southeast Asia realized that such important crops as fragrant wood, spices, etc., which were raised in their principalities, were in great demand. In a few places in the Malaysian archipelago there was gold as well. Consequently, these rulers were able to in­ crease their influence and power through the expeditious use of their resources. At the same time, other sovereigns gained influence by establishing entrepots where goods could be bought and sold. Merchants who engaged in such trade were warmly welcomed and protected. Thus, from the tenth century onward, Muslim traders gradually took over the spice trade of the Indian Ocean for their markets in the Middle East. For a while, in the period between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, Arab entrepreneurs were able to renew their direct commerce with China. This was made possible because of China’s interest in stamping out the piracy that had paralyzed commercial trade in the Straits of Malacca throughout the fourteenth century, and was accomplished in concert with the Muslim trading communities. China found a loyal vassal and ally in the sultan of Malacca whose principality was located at the narrowest point along the Malacca Straits, offering a convenient point of meeting for vessels in both directions. Thanks to this trade, Malacca became an important commercial center in the fifteenth century. The commercial superiority and the assertive character of Muslim rulers served as a strong driving force in the expansion of Islam along the entire Malaysian archi­ pelago precisely at a period when the influence of earlier religions and traditions was waning.4 Prior to the expansion of Islam, the prevalent religions for the population of Southeast Asia were Hinduism and Buddhism, which included a blend of local animistic beliefs. There are few solidly documented historic records regarding the early settlement period of Muslim commerce so it is difficult to reconstruct details of the process by which small enclaves of Muslim traders burgeoned into perma­ nent, established communities. Historians are divided on the matter, and this lack of unanimity extends to the question of Muslim expansion in Southeast Asia in general. It is important to keep in mind that Southeast Asia was one of the last regions of the world reached by Islam. Not until the mid-fifteenth century did Islam become a salient force in the region; not until the late nineteenth century did it become widespread within the general population. In part, this was a reac­ tion to colonial rule and, in part, a response to developments in the Middle East and influences radiating from that region. We will not, however, deal with these matters here. For the purposes of this study, a schematic description of Islam’s ex­ pansion and settlement in Southeast Asia which is consistent with the consensual view held by most historians writing about the region and the period is sufficient. It is generally assumed that in the first centuries after Muslim traders appeared

4

Introduction

in Southeast Asia, their advent was not accompanied by large scale religious con­ versions. Initially, the local inhabitants who did embrace Islam were women who had married the foreign Muslim traders, concubines, or maids and their offspring who grew up as Muslims. As communities of local Muslim traders grew, numbers of Ulama religious scholars from abroad, some of whom were Sufis, were also attracted to the communities. It was these scholars who apparently were the spear­ head of Islam’s expansion into Asia. This model repeated itself in all parts of the archipelago. With the passage of time, Muslim traders integrated with local inhab­ itants, raised families, and founded local Muslim communities; they were fol­ lowed by religious instructors who reinforced the faith among local Muslims, and proselytized among the general population. Local rulers then began to convert to Islam, whether out of political or economic considerations (Islam had extensive international commercial ties that brought wealth and affluence) or because they became ideologically convinced. Muslim traders, generally from among the Arab Sayyid nobility entered the ruling elites through marriage. Wealthy trading com­ munities gained influence and achieved status, and there were local rulers who appointed Muslims to senior positions. In a number of places in Malaysia, Sayyids became rulers in their own right holding a variety of titles. Whether or not all these rulers came from abroad is not known because sons of Sayyids who married local women continued to carry the titles. To this day, such titles can be found among the aristocracy of Islamic countries of Southeast Asia. Following the example set by the ruling aristocracies, their subjects too converted to Islam. This was followed by an effort on the part of local principalities that had converted to Islam to pros­ elytize the new religion among their neighbors, sometimes forcibly.5 A number of explanations have been put forward for the phenomenon of Islam’s expansion in Southeast Asia. There is a theory which says that those belonging to the lower social strata embraced Islam willingly so as to be free of the repressive practices of the caste system since in Islam, at least theoretically, equality reigns between all the faithful. The same explanation is advanced for the widespread Islamization of the lower castes in India. Another theory suggests that local chief­ tains converted to Islam because of the political and economic alliances which Muslim traders could provide. These advantages were based on Muslim solidarity that stemmed from belonging to the Ummah. Again, following the conversion to Islam by the chieftains, their subjects followed suit in keeping with the tradition of compliant behavior. Observers of the scene with religious inclinations feel that Islamic doctrine appealed to the hearts of the local populations. There are some who point out that the message of Islam as disseminated by Sufi religious instruc­ tors, who tended toward mysticism, was well suited to religious concepts already to be found within the local populations. Islam was tolerant of many syncretic customs, even such customs as appeared to be contrary to Islamic shari*a law. It is clear that over the generations, Muslim communities also sprang up due to mixed marriages and these, in concert with the other factors noted above, contributed to the expansion of Islam. It should be added that after Islam took root in India, in

The Expansion o f Islam in Southeast Asia

5

the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Indian merchants in Southeast Asia, most of them Muslims from Gujarat or southern India, became a major pros­ elytizing force thus fashioning the special blend of commerce and missionary ac­ tivity that was to characterize the expansion of Islam in the archipelago. The role of the Arab Sayyids and Sharifs has already been mentioned as well as the contri­ bution of indigenous Malaysians who themselves had converted to Islam.6 There was no significant Islamic presence in the countries of Southeast Asia until the end of the twelfth century. By the end of the thirteenth century, the first signs of Islamization in northern Sumatra appeared: a permanent Muslim pres­ ence in Perlak in 1290. Marco Polo, who visited the area at about that time, testi­ fied to the Islamization of the inhabitants by Muslim traders. A decade later the neighboring regions of Pedir, Acheh, and Pasai were ruled by Muslims. Other neighboring political entities were also in the process of Islamization, and from there Islam expanded along the coasts to nearby islands. Muslim merchants con­ tinued to settle in ports, marry local women, learn local dialects and customs, and associate with the aristocracy. Ultimately they converted the rulers of the coastal states and their populations to a simple, minimalist form of Islam which in turn was further expanded by the new Muslims. Of special importance for the expan­ sion of Islam in Southeast Asia was the Islamization of Malacca in approximately fourteen hundred. According to traditional chronicles (,Hikayat), the local ruler converted to Islam as a result of marriage to a princess from Pasai, and the per­ suasive efforts of Indian Muslims from Gujarat or southern India. The Malaccan ruler sought political support in his stand against Buddhist Siam and the Hindu Majapahit of Java. In short order, the Sultanate of Malacca developed and became a juncture for Asian international trade and a major commercial power. The con­ version of the Malaccan ruler to Islam had an enormous impact on the expansion of Islam in other parts of the Malaysian archipelago, including the Philippine Islands. In the fifteenth century, and the beginning of the sixteenth, Malacca be­ came a center for Islamic studies and propagation of the faith, in addition to its being a commercial center. Relations with Malacca induced the ruler of Brunei to convert to Islam in the second quarter of the fifteenth century. Arabs, or mission­ aries of Arab descent, or Indian Muslims (apparently Sufis) set out for Java from Malacca in order to advance the fortunes of Islam. Many of the traders belonged to Sufi orders, and their missionary zeal stands out when compared to Arab and Persian traders of previous periods who had not concerned themselves with mis­ sionary activity. It was only after the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258 that Sufism and Sufi orders played an important role in the spread of the religion, at least until the end of the eighteenth century. These orders played an important role in Islamic commercial centers. The new and vigorous propagators of Islam stressed the brotherhood of Islam, making only minimalist religious demands on the performance of laws, leaving room for local pre-Islamic beliefs and a variety of customs. The principalities of Jambi and Palembang converted to Islam towards the end of the fifteenth century. It is interesting that Buddhist states that traded

6

Introduction

with Malacca such as Pegu or Siam were not influenced by the new religion, and did not convert to Islam, apparently because of the vitality of Buddhism and the firm hold it had in the mainland areas of Southeast Asia. In neither of these in­ stances was there a political need to convert to Islam so as to gain allies against an enemy. It appears that the penetration of Islam into the Malayan peninsula (excluding the Malacca region) began after the route of Siam by Malacca in 1445. Pahang was incorporated into Malacca in 1456. Kedah converted in 1460. Trengganu and Patani became Muslim around 1474. In most of the states of the Malay peninsula, Islam became a focal point for resistance to the attempts at conquest by Buddhist Siam. Thus the early religious and political factors blended exactly as they did several hundred years later in expressions of anti-European colonialism. By 1550, all of Sumatra was Muslim, with the exception of the Batak in the interior of the island. The Minangkabau too remained anti-Muslim and faithful to their own traditions for many more years. In effect, the process of Islamization of the Malayan peninsula and archipelago drew a line of demarcation that separated the Buddhist mainland regions of Southeast Asia from the Islamic coastal states. Because of the loose, amorphous aspect of Islam, this situation remained unchanged until the end of the nineteenth century, the period of Dutch and British colonial consolidation in the region.7 In large measure, the Islamization of Java was decidedly different and slower than in other parts of the Malaysian archipelago where there was a determined resistance on the part of Hindus. Persian and Gujarat merchants had settled in the coastal cities of eastern Java even before the rise of the sultanate in Malacca. It is probable that systematic Muslim missionary effort began at the end of the four­ teenth century when missionaries from Java, many of whom were apparently Su­ fis, arrived in Pasai and Malacca. Javanese journeyed to Pasai and Malacca to study Islam and, on their return, themselves became missionaries and propagators of the faith. Java’s port cities were peaceably converted to Islam between 1456 and 1490 although the interior and eastern part of Java remained loyal to the Javanese-Hindu tradition for a much longer period. In the first quarter of the six­ teenth century, between 1515 and 1520, an uprising by a coalition of Muslim rulers from a number of Javanese areas outside Java proper broke out against the Majapahit state in the eastern area of central Java, an area that had been the core of Hindu culture. The Majapahit state surrendered and the defeated Hindus fled to the Island of Bali which had never accepted Islam. The Mataram state of central Java then increased in importance. Instability and disquiet prevailed in Java’s cen­ tral region for decades until a treaty was concluded between Mataram and the Muslim ports. Ultimately, this state too, converted to Islam in the seventeenth cen­ tury. As early as the sixteenth century, one Hindu state after another had converted to Islam. Bantam, in the Sunda region of Java, embraced Islam in 1525. Islam continued to expand, though penetration into the hinterland advanced more slowly. It bears remembering that in Java, more than in other parts of the archipelago, the acceptance of Islam was generally of a nominal and formal nature only. Buddhist

The Expansion o f Islam in Southeast Asia

7

and Hindu beliefs were incorporated into Islam, particularly those religious cus­ toms and principles of behavior known as adat\ whereas, cultural and other social forms persisted. Only gradually, as a result of more immediate contact with the Arab culture that came directly from Mecca, Medina, Cairo, and Hadramaut, was the earlier influence of Persian-Indian Muslims who had promoted the faith re­ placed. Consequently, to this day, Javanese Islam differs in a number of aspects from that of Islam in other parts of the archipelago.8 Other regions of the archipelago were also influenced by Islam in proportion to their commercial ties to Malacca. The people of the Molucca Islands gradually converted to Islam in the second half of the fifteenth century. The Raja of Borneo converted in IS 10 and subdued most of northwest Borneo by 1520. Islam reached the southernmost islands of the Philippines, Mindanao, and Sulu, in the middle of the sixteenth century, (although Arab missionaries had already come to Sulu from China by the fourteenth century). It is likely that all these conversions to Islam were the outcome of missionary work by Malaysians who were themselves Mus­ lims.9 Important to note is the fact that the appearance of Islam in Southeast Asia did not entail the subjugation of the local population to foreign rule. All the principalities that became Muslim were governed, either immediately or after a brief period, by local families. This is in contradistinction to the processes that took place following European incursions in the region during the sixteenth cen­ tury. The advance of Christianity saw those regions turned into colonies; that is, it involved their subjugation to European foreigners. The new religion itself, Christianity, was part and parcel of this subjugation. Basically, this explains the great opposition in the Malayan world to the coming of the Europeans.10 During the period of the Crusades, the crusaders and subsequently the affluent classes became accustomed to such luxury items as perfumes, silk, cotton, spices, woods, metals, ceramics, and other products that had previously been unknown in Europe. As the desire for such products grew in Europe, merchants were occupied with meeting the demand. The Crusades also sparked European fascination with geography and journeys of discovery, exciting a new interest in the science of navigation. In the wake of the Crusades, the authority and influence of western European monarchs grew, occasioning a decline in the power of the nobility and a burgeoning national sentiment; commerce expanded, cities swelled, navigational science became more exact, and, concomitantly, there was an increased appetite for luxury items. However, the expansion of Islam along the Mediterranean littoral from North Africa to the Balkans severed the contact between Europe and Asia, creating a need to find alternate routes. The Reconquest in Spain was completed by 1492, and expeditions set out with the purpose of finding a route to India and the spice islands of Southeast Asia which would circumnavigate Africa. In the fifteenth century, Portugal’s explorations were the most successful in this sphere. In 1498, Vasco da Gama sailed around Africa reaching Calicut in India, and so discovered a sea route to the East that bypassed the Mediterranean and the lands under Islam. Christian religious feeling among Portuguese sailors was very strong.

8

Introduction

The journeys of discovery were perceived as a religious war, a continuation of the Crusades and the Reconquest against the same Muslim enemy which the Portu­ guese encountered anew in the Indian Ocean. In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire dispatched naval expeditions to the Indian Ocean, but they were easily subdued by superior Portuguese vessels and armaments. Following the Portu­ guese, other European seafarers came on the scene, establishing a western Euro­ pean dominance in Africa, south Asia, and Southeast Asia which persisted until the mid-twentieth century. The spice trade whose route lay along the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, and from there to Europe, now shifted to ocean routes that were controlled by Europeans at either end. In the Portuguese bypass of Africa, the Mediterranean merchants who had served as middlemen bringing products to Europe until the fifteenth century, were also made redundant. In this respect, the year 1511 marked a highly significant juncture in the history of the slow but consistent expansion of Islam in the Southeast Asian islands. In that year, the Portuguese conquered the Sultanate of Malacca thereby repulsing Muslim superiority in Southeast Asia and the Arab-Muslim monopoly of interna­ tional trade with Southeast Asia. They were not, however, powerful enough to take over the spice trade in its entirety. Furthermore, the relentless and cruel missionizing efforts of the Portuguese enraged the local populations and had the precise effect of strengthening adherence to Islam rather than weakening it, stir­ ring the Muslims to take counter measures. More, the conquest of Malacca en­ couraged Muslim traders to visit other ports. Ports in Java, for example, now began to develop at the expense of Malacca, and Brunei expanded as a focal point of influence in the Molucca Islands and the Philippine archipelago. Acheh, too, be­ came an important Muslim trade and religious center. It was precisely Portuguese military victories that reinforced the extent of Islamic penetration into large parts of the archipelago during the course of the sixteenth century, and reinforced the consciousness of belonging to Dar al-Islam. The fall of Malacca in 1511 (which occurred less than twenty years after the fall of the Kingdom of Granada) caused the exodus of many Muslim religious functionaries to other parts of Southeast Asia, particularly to Sumatra and Java, and the rekindling of Islamic religious fervor to expand the faith throughout communities in Java, Borneo, Molucca, and other islands that had not as yet converted to Islam. The Portuguese in their com­ bined commercial-religious thrust for spice and souls elicited only a vigorous negative reaction from determined Muslims. Wars against the Portuguese increas­ ingly took on the aspect of a holy war—jihad. The outcome of Portuguese mis­ sionary activity in Southeast Asia was most unimpressive, particularly when com­ pared to the success of the Spaniards in converting the majority of the Philippine populations to Christianity.11 Brunei's rise as a commercial center, following the fall of Malacca, led to its emergence as a maritime power with commercial depots that reached as far away as Manila. Trade began around 1520 and was controlled by Muslims from Borneo. Brunei's trade supremacy in the Philippine Islands persisted until the arrival of the

The Expansion o f Islam in Southeast Asia

9

Spaniards. After the fall of Malacca, a branch of the Johor Sultan's family that had been close to the Sultanate of Malacca, made its way to east Minadanao. The Sultanate of Johor itself was established sometime after 1511. A member of the family arrived in Minadanao in 1520 and, with the aid of contacts he made through marriage, established the principality and brought Islam to Minadanao. By 1565 when the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines, there were already a number of sultanates in the southern islands connected by marriage: Brunei, Sulu, Magindanao, and Buayan. Spanish conquest of the Muslim settlement in Manila, and the establishment of a Spanish presence in its place by Legaspi in 1571, was signifi­ cant because it acted as a barrier to further Islamic expansion along the Philippine archipelago. The more southerly sultanates of Sulu and Magindanao, however, put up greater opposition. It was the Spaniards themselves who said that had they come but a few years later all of the islands, or at least their rulers, would have converted to Islam. When the Spaniards arrived, the majority of the population of Visaya and Luzon practiced local versions of paganism and animism. The Span­ iards began implementing their conquest by eradicating the power of Brunei in the islands and converting the local population to Christianity. With the exception of Muslims in the southern islands and the pagans of the inland mountainous region of the larger islands, by the year 1600, a majority of the Philippine population had been converted. The indigenous population of new Christians was called Indios. The Spaniards spared no efforts in converting the Muslims of the south and sub­ jugating them. Instructions received by Spanish commanders sent to conduct mil­ itary operations in the south stressed that Muslim conversion activity must be stopped and their mosques destroyed. This policy unleashed a series of wars that lasted three hundred years until 1898 when Spain transferred control of the Phil­ ippines to the United States. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Mus­ lims still felt strong enough to struggle with the Spaniards for control of Visaya, but for the most part the years that followed were spent on the defensive. Muslims fought against Spanish military expeditions composed mainly of conscripted Fil­ ipino Christians. An atmosphere of religious crusades characterized the wars which were marked by mutual killing and great destruction. Tens of thousands of Christians were captured into slavery as a result of Muslim sorties and sold in the markets of Sulu and Macasar to work on plantations of the Dutch East Indian Islands. Not until the middle of the nineteenth century, when Spanish steamships and other technological advances adversely effected Muslim military potential, did hostile activity by Muslims in the southern Philippines come to an end.12 In 1641, Malacca fell to the Dutch, and Portuguese Catholics were expelled. Even earlier, in 1619, Holland had established its commercial depot in Batavia. Although initially the Dutch attempted to restrain Muslim missionary activity among the local population and supported Christian missionaries to some extent, for the most part they had much less interest in religion than they did in commerce. One of the reasons for this neutral approach on the part of the Dutch Protestant colonial administration was the fear that missionary activity would give rise to

10

Introduction

anxiety among the Muslims which could lead to a fanatic reaction. Generally, mis­ sionary activities made headway only among such pagan tribes as the Batak in Sumatra, or the Torajos in the Celebes. Britain conquered Malacca in 1795, and British supremacy in the Malay Peninsula, which reached its zenith in the nine­ teenth century, was also devoid of vigorous missionary work. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, there were private schools maintained by missionary societies, and Chinese pupils who studied in such schools converted to Christian­ ity. In general, the British chose to ignore Islam and its status in their sphere of influence in the Malayan peninsula, as did the Dutch who also conducted a policy of religious tolerance in their colonial acquisitions in Southeast Asia.13 Establishment of the Muslim presence throughout Southeast Asia from north Sumatra to the Philippine archipelago was completed in the period between the beginning of the sixteenth and the end of the eighteenth centuries. Muslim com­ munities were possessed of a Muslim consciousness whose intensity is difficult to comprehend; that is, a sense of belonging to an inclusive Muslim community (Ummah) in the Malaysian archipelago, and to the Malaysian Dar al-lslam.i4 The sense of belonging grew even stronger in the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. In that period all of Southeast Asia, with the exception of Siam, was under colonial rule. The reigning European powers divided the area between themselves and demar­ cated the boundaries. They established countries whose frontiers have changed only minimally, or not at all, to this day. Among others, the countries established were Muslim Indonesia, the Malay Federation (called Malaysia today), and Mus­ lim Brunei, as well as the Philippines and the countries of Indo-China: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Even the frontiers of Burma are essentially an outcome of British rule. The boundaries cut across ethnic and religious regions involuntarily establish­ ing the Muslim minorities which are the subject of this study: the Muslims (Moro)ls of the south Philippines, a minority in a country with an overwhelming Christian majority ; the Malay Muslims of the Patani region in southern Thailand, a minority in a country that is overwhelmingly Buddhist; and the Rohingya of Arakan in western Burma/Myammar who are also a minority in a primarily Bud­ dhist state. All three of these minorities are in a situation of ferment and rebellion because of their sense of alienation from the majority; their identity is bound up with Islam and their desire is to unite with the Islamic Ummah and once again become part of Dar al-Islam. Singapore also has a Malay-Muslim minority but Singapore is a new island city-state which declared its independence only in 1965, and the circumstances of its existence are of an unusual nature. Vietnam and Cambodia have Muslim mi­ norities, but they are quite small and of marginal importance. There are other places in the world where Muslims are ruled by a non-Muslim majority. In many of these places, the Muslim minorities are neither at peace with the non-Muslim majority, nor have they acquiesced to its rule over them. Prominent among these

The Expansion o f Islam in Southeast Asia

11

are the Muslim minorities of the southern Philippines, southern Thailand, and the Arakan region of Burma/Myammar. As noted, one of the main thrusts of this study is an examination of the extent to which there was an Islamic religious-theological dimension to the three Muslim up­ risings of Southeast Asia. To this end, it is important to assess both the theoretical and the practical significance that Islamic concepts held for the rebelling popu­ lations. On the one hand, there was a generalized sense of Islamic solidarity and affinity with international Islamic bodies; on the other, there was the practical sig­ nificance of support for neighboring Islamic states in Southeast Asia and countries even further away. From a practical aspect, one must take into account the kind of agenda and activity that flows from religious commandments posited by con­ cepts of solidarity. The most relevant and basic concept in such an examination is the Ummah.16 The approximate sense of the word is people or community, and it relates to ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups. This concept, which originally encompassed only Arabs, changed its meaning in the course of time. As a result of Islamic expansion, the concept began to apply to other Muslim peoples and races; that is, all the believers in Islam. In theory, at least, it expresses the basic unity of all the Muslim faithful without geographic divisions and despite the differences between peoples and communities, or the gradations and nuances within Islam. Consequently, the notion stands in contradistinction to Western notions of race, nationality, and state. Muslims are aware that they are Muslim and they have an affinity to their co-religionists in distant lands and a sense of solidarity with them. This unity was shaken by the European colonial conquest of Arab lands, giving rise to movements of revolt for the defense of the Ummah in the face of European incursions. In the eyes of many Muslims, loyalty to the Ummah negates all other loyalties: national political, ethnic, linguistic, or geographic. The importance of this view as the source of prevailing social identity in large parts of the Muslim world persists even today. For Islam, the primary criterion of Muslim identity has always been religion. Consequently in Islam, the world is not divided according to nations as it is in the Western view, but between Moslems on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other. T\vo core notions flow from this: Dar al-Islam, whose definition is Islamic lands; and Dar al-Harb, 17 defined as warring states—lands that have not yet been conquered by Islam. The differentiation that Islamic law {sharia) makeV between these two concepts is based on a conceptual distinction between believers of Islam and infidels. There is no necessary congruence or identity between Ummah and Dar al-Islam. While Ummah carries the sociological significance of defining one’s identity as a result of belonging to the Islamic faith, Dar al-Islam stands for the political-legal aspect of the sovereign Islamic state (or states) pos­ sessed of territory and boundaries. Wherever he may be, a Muslim regards himself as belonging to the Islamic Ummah, even when he lives outside Dar al-Islam, even when he does not live under the legal authority and rule of Islam. What classifies

12

Introduction

him as belonging to Ummah is Islamic faith rather than the regime under which he lives. The central question, and the most difficult one, faced by the Muslim commu­ nities of Southeast Asia that found themselves under non-Muslim rule was how to respond to their situation. Should they accept the regime? Acquiesce? Or in­ tegrate? And under what conditions? Should they resist the regime and rebel {ji­ had)? Or should they migrate to an Islamic country? The problem is not simply a religious-theological one, nor is it merely one with the political-national dimension of relations between a minority community within a majority state. Quite early on—once the advance of Islam faltered, retreat began in some sectors, and Muslim populations were conquered by others—Muslim theologians began weighing the problem.18This occurred as soon as the Mongol conquest of Baghdad, later in Sicily, and in Christian Portugal and Spain. In the nineteenth century, Bosnia fell to the Hapsburg Empire, and exten­ sive regions were also conquered by Czarist Russia. England conquered Mogul India and, like Holland, also conquered Muslim territories in Southeast Asia. Dur­ ing the period of colonial rule in the nineteenth century when most Islamic lands fell to non-Muslim states, the problem gained greater urgency. As experts in Mus­ lim law considered the issues, different approaches surfaced regarding the obliga­ tions of Muslims living under non-Muslim rule. There were Muslim judges who felt that, if they could, these Muslims ought to abandon their domiciles and emi­ grate to Dar al-Islam (reminiscent of the emigration—hijrah—made by Muhamad the Prophet when he left Mecca for Medina) even when the non-Muslim regime treated them with tolerance. There were even more moderate views that held that if the non-Muslim regime displayed tolerance to its Muslim subjects, that is, enabled them to perform the commandments of their religion, act in accordance with its laws, and thus live as good Muslims who were retaining their Muslim identity, they should be allowed to remain citizens of the foreign state obeying the laws of that government. A still more moderate approach permitted Muslims to remain, if necessary, even under an intolerant regime and, in periods of oppression and persecution, pretend that they had converted to Christianity, as long as they secretly adhered to Islam. With the expansion of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, religious opinions were promulgated {fatwa)%but there is no record of theoretical theological discussions or a call for immigration to Dar al-Islam among the Muslims of the southern Phil­ ippines, southern Thailand, or Arakan. Many did escape to the Malay Peninsula, to Indonesia or eastern Pakistan/Bangladesh, but many more Muslims stood fast and put up resistance. The other side of the problem was also raised— the obliga­ tion incumbent upon the Ummah—that is, on members of the international Muslim community to concern themselves with coreligionists living as minorities in non-Muslim countries, particularly if they suffer oppression, deprivation or are subject to crisis conditions—the obligation to react, even to waging a war in which the entire Ummah is obliged to participate.

The Expansion o f Islam in Southeast Asia

13

In the chapters that follow, we will try to review the history of Muslim minority communities in these three countries in order to assess whether, and to what ex­ tent, such religious-theological issues were reflected at various stages of their re­ bellion and struggle.

Notes 1. In the introduction, we limit ourselves to a general description of Islam’s penetration into Southeast Asia without, however, examining the fascinating and important theories that relate to the topic because they are not relevant to our subject. For an appreciation of the complexity of the topic, see Anthony H. Johns, “Islam in Southeast Asia: Reflections and New Directions,” Indonesia, no. 19 (April 197S), 33-55; S. Q. Fatimi, Islam Comes to Malaysia (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1963). For a thorough overview of the topic of Islam in Southeast Asia, see M. B. Hooker, ‘Islam in Southeast Asia and the Pacific,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Modem Islamic World, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 284-290. 2. Ian Browning, Petra, 3rd ed. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1989), 17-18; John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 23, 26; Ste­ phen Frederic Dale, “Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia: Anticolonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines” The Journal o f Conflict Resolution, vol. 32, no.l (March 1988): 39-40; Cesar Adib Majul, “Theories on the Introduction and Expansion of Islam in Malaysia,” Silliman Journal, vol. 11, no. 4 (Oct-Nov 1964): 338-339. 3. Cady, Southeast Asia, 27,30,66-67; Hugh Clifford, Further India: Being the Story o f Exploration from the Earliest Times in Burma, Malaya, Siam, and Indo-China (London: Lawrence and Bullen, 1904): 16; Dale, “Religious Suicide,” 40; S. A. Huzayyin, Arabia and the Far East: Their Commercial and Cultural Relations in Graeco-Roman and Irano-Arabian Times (Cairo: Publications de la Societe Royale de Geographie d’Egypte, 1942), 151—152; Majul, “Theories on the Introduction,” 340; Majul, Muslims in the Philip­ pines (Quezon City: Philippines Press, 1973), 2; Majul, “An Historical Background on the Coming and Spread of Islam and Christianity in Southeast Asia,” Asian Studies, vol. 14, no. 2 (August 1976): 2; Suwannathat-Piam Kobkua, Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), 13-15. For a general description of the period, see S. Q. Fatimi, ‘The Role of China in the Spread of Islam in Southeast Asia,” mimeo (University of Singapore, 1959); Moshe Ma’oz, “The Abbasids,” in Hava Lazarus Yafeh, ed., Studies in the History o f the Arabs and Islam (Tel Aviv: Reshafim Publishing House, 1967), 217; and H. Z. Hirschberg, “The Jews under Islam,” in Studies in the History o f the Arabs and Islam, 308-312. Hirschberg also describes the significant role played by Jewish merchants in the commerce between Europe, the Abbasid Empire, India, and China. 4. Cady, Southeast Asia, 67-68,82,152; Dale, “Religious Suicide,” 40; M. Siddiq Khan, “Muslim Intercourse with Burma,” Islamic Culture (Hyderabad: Deccan 10, July 1936, and 11, April 1937), 416-419; Majul, “Theories on the Introduction,” 340-341, 349-352. 5. It is worth noting that the expansion of Islam in Southeast Asia is a special case in the history of the religion. In the seventh century, Arabs burst forth from the Arabian Peninsula and began their conquest in all directions—westward along North Africa as far as the Ibe-

14

Introduction

rian Peninsula, northward against the Byzantine Empire, eastward against the Sassanid Per­ sian Kingdom, and onward into the far reaches of the central Asian plain reaching the boundaries of China, or in the direction of India up to the Bay of Bengal. This expansion, and the conquest of still other extensive areas, was achieved by force of arms. The extent of the military expansion eastward was the Bay of Bengal but that was not the furthest spread of the new religion; in this case, it was not military prowess but the trading communities that were able to overcome the obstacle of the Indian Ocean and continue the spread of Islam which elsewhere had been primarily achieved through military conquest. Muslim traders had no military might. Indeed, the Arabs and other Muslims from abroad that reached Ma­ laysia made no effort to conquer territory, nor would it have been possible for them to do so. Islam was introduced into the archipelago of Southeast Asia at a relatively late date, and the region underwent an unusual process of Islamization. In most cases, though by no means all, the process of conversion was conducted through missionary persuasion without the use of violence. 6. Carmen A. Abubakar, “Islamization of the Southern Philippines: An Overview,” in F. Landa Jocano, ed., Filippino Muslims: Their Social Instiutions and Cultural Achievements (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, Asian Center, 1983), 8-9; Cady, Southeast Asia, 170; Dale, “Religious Suicide,” 41; Majul, “An Historical Background,” 3-4; idem, Muslims in the Philippines, 2; Majul, “Theories on the Introduction,” 341, 343-344, 362-364, 372-386, 395-397. For the term Ummah and other Islamic terms and their meaning, see further in the end­ notes, no. 16,17. 7. Abubakar, “Islamization,” 8-10; Atlas o f Islamic History, ed. Harry W. Hazard, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 42; Cady, Southeast Asia, 152-169; Os­ car L. Evangelista, “Some Aspects of the History of Islam in Southeast Asia” in Fteter Gowing, ed., Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988), 16-25; Majul, ‘Theories on the Introduction,” 341-359,366-367; Majul, “An Historical Background,” 2; Majul, “Malays” and “Malay Peninsula,” 233-235, 239; Kobkua, Thai-Malay Relations, 12. 8. Atlas o f Islamic History, 42; Cady, Southeast Asia, 167-171; Majul, “An Historical Background,” 3; idem, “Theories on the Introduction” 360-361, 369-370. 9. Atlas o f Islamic History, 42; Cady, Southeast Asia, 167; Majul, "Theories on the In­ troduction,” 361-362. 10. RsterG. Gowing and Robert D. Me Amis, The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 1. 11. Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe (New York-London: W. W. Norton, 1982), 32-42,91,130-131,190,195; Majul, "Theories on the Introduction,” 345,363-364, 387-391, 397-398; idem, “An Historical Background,” 4-5; idem, Muslims in the Philip­ pines. 6; idem, “The Role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People,” Asian Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (August, 1966) 309-311; C. W. Previte-Orton, The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 1075-1076,1112. The term jihad is referred to several times in this study. At this point, it is sufficient to note that as the concept developed throughout the history of Islam it took on different in­ terpretations in response to specific circumstances. To this day, various schools in Islam interpret jihad differently. In the context of resistance to colonial powers, particularly in the

The Expansion o f Islam in Southeast Asia

15

nineteenth century, jihad took on an aggressive, militant meaning that was acted out in uprisings against foreign rule and through guerilla and terror tactics. These resistance ac­ tivities had a distinct religious-Islamic coloration. And this is equally true for the twentieth century movements of rebellion dealt with in this study. 12. Majul, ‘Theories on the Introduction,” 391-393; idem, “An Historical Background,” 5-7. 13. Idem, “An Historical Background”, 8-9; idem, “Theories on the Introduction,” 393. 14. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 5,201, 204; Majul, “Theories on the Introduction,” 336. For the meaning of these Islamic terms, see endnotes 16 and 17. 15. “Moro” is derived from Moor, a name which the conquering Spaniards called the Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula, as well as the Ummayad dynasty of the eighth to the fifteenth centuries in Spain. Subsequently the Spaniards also used the term Moro for Mus­ lims they encountered in the Philippine Islands. 16. See Ummah in EI\ (Leiden, 1913-1938), vol. 8, 1015-1016; Sayed Z. Abedin and Sabha M. Abedin, “Muslim Minorities in Non-Muslim Societies,” Oxford Encyclopedia of Modem Islamic World, vol. 3, 112-113,115; Clive J. Christie, A Modem History of South­ east Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separation (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 161-163; Ahmad S. Dallal, “Ummah,” Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Modem Islamic World, vol. 4,267-268; Abdo A. Elkholy, “The Concept of Community in Islam,” Islamic Perspec­ tives (London: Islamic Foundation, 1979), 172-173; Samuel K. Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle 1900-1972 (Filipinas Foundation Inc., 1977), 3; Raphael Israeli, ed., The Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Major (London: Curzon Press, 1982), 1-4. For the term Ummah as well as such concepts as Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, see endnote 17 below. For the context of these terms among Filipine Muslims and the Muslims of Thailand, see Peter G. Gowing, “Moros and Khaek: The Position of Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and Thailand,” in Ahmad Ibrahim and Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussain, compilers. Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 186-189. 17. Rudolph Peters, “Dar al-Islam,” Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Modem Islamic World, vol. 1,338-339; Mohammad-Reza Djalili, “Dar al-Harb,” Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Mod­ em Islamic World, 337-338; Ahmad S. Dallal, “Ummah,” Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Mod­ em Islamic World, vol. 4, 269-270; Abdo A. Elkholy, “The Concept of Community in Is­ lam,” Islamic Perspectives (London: Islamic Foundation, 1979), 177. For a concrete understanding of the concept of Ummah, the following excerpt from an article by Bernard Lewis, “The Return of Islam” in Commentary, vol. 61, no. 1 (January 1976): 40-41, is useful: “For the Muslim, religion traditionally was not only universal but also central in the sense that it constituted the essential basis and focus of identity and loyalty. It was religion which distinguished those who belonged to the group and marked them off from those outside the group. A Muslim Iraqi would feel far closer bonds with a non-Iraqi Muslim than with a non-Muslim Iraqi. Muslims of different countries, speaking different languages, share the same memories of a common and sacred past, the same awareness of corporate identity, the same sense of a common predicament and destiny. It is not nation or country which, as in the West, forms the historic basis of identity, but the religio-political community, and the imported Western idea of ethnic and territorial nation­ hood remains, like secularism, alien and incompletely assimilated. The point was made with

16

Introduction

remarkable force and clarity by a Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire who, in reply to the exponents of the new-style patriotism, replied: 'The Fatherland of a Muslim is the place where the Holy Law of Islam prevails.’ And that was in 1917.” 18. Abedin and Abedin, “Muslim Minorities,” 113-114; Elkholy, “The Concept of Com­ munity,” 174, 178; Bernard Lewis, The Jews o f Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 22-24.

Part One

The Muslims of Arakan

MYANMAR/BURMA

Chapter One

Beginnings o f the Muslim Community in Burma1

The first Muslims to come to Burma arrived in the ninth century. They were seafarers, probably from Bengal, and traded in the areas of Arakan and the coast of Lower Burma. Though Burma was not on the main route between the Middle East, India, and China, it enjoyed a lively maritime traffic. In the ninth and tenth centuries, Muslim travelers, Persians as well as Arabs, mentioned southern Burma in their writing, describing an extensive commercial traffic that was being carried out along the coasts of India, Burma, the MaJay Peninsula, and Ceylon. Muslims who sailed in eastern waters were acquainted with the coastal areas of Arakan, the delta of the Irrawaddi River, and the cities of Pegu and Tenasserim. Indeed, the first Muslim settlements in Burma were established by such traders, some of whom came involuntarily because their ships had run aground and they were forced to seek refuge on land; occasionally, they settled permanently. There were Muslim settlers in the interior of Burma as well, but for the most part these were Muslims from India who had been captured in war and forcibly settled in the kingdom. Settlements in which Muslims reached the interior as mercenaries in the service of Burmese kings or local satraps are documented as early as the end of the eleventh century. There are no details, however, about the numerical strength or status of Muslims living in Burma in the tenth through the thirteenth centuries. Perhaps the absence of such information is an indication that they were not there in significant numbers. In 1277, Burma was confronted by a Muslim force from the east when the armies of Kublai Khan, coming from China and made up of Turkish Muslims, invaded. Although the Mongol rulers of China were not Muslims, Muslims occu­ pied important positions in China. No trace of this episodic Muslim incursion remains in Burma, nor of a subsequent one in the years 1283-1284. European travelers2 who visited Burma’s coastal cities in the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries described the settlements of Muslim traders and the commercial traffic they conducted from Burma by way of Sumatra, Malacca, and the Molucca Islands to China and Japan on the one hand, and via Bengal and Ceylon to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea on the other. The descriptions detail the types of merchandise bought and sold by Muslim traders, and take note of the 19

20

Chapter One

fact that some ports in Lower Burma developed into important shipbuilding and repair centers, primarily for Arab and Armenian traders. This was possible be­ cause of a plentiful supply of teakwood. Regular commerce from Arakan through Pegu, Tenasserim, Malacca or the Maldives Islands to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea continued in later periods as well despite interruptions caused by the wars waged against Bengal by Arakan kings, and Arakan and Portuguese pirates. The Muslims, most of whom originated in southern India or Persia, were very skillful in their conduct of trade; a number were also appointed to important administra­ tive positions by the Burmese kings. From the middle of the sixteenth until the middle of the eighteenth centuries, Muslims served in the Burmese army, gener­ ally in the king’s guard, and as riflemen, along with cannoneers from India and former Portuguese captives. Often they married Burmese women and settled in the area. The arrival of the British and French in the region at the end of the seventeenth century adversely affected the status of Muslims, and there were spo­ radic incidents in which Muslims were massacred by local inhabitants. At various times, Muslim traders who were active in Burmese ports found them­ selves subject to restrictive regulations imposed by Burmese kings and local rul­ ers, or suffered from the confiscation of property and other arbitrary measures. These were imposed despite the important commercial role Muslims played. Groups of Muslim traders, nonetheless, continued to be drawn to the port cities of Burma. Although Burmese trade was of secondary commercial importance when compared to the scope of commercial traffic between the Middle East and India to the southeastern Asian archipelago and China, Burmese ports had the advantage of being at the halfway point for Muslim sailors on their way from the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the ports of Coromandel, Malabar, and Ceylon, enroute to the Spice Islands of the Malayan archipelago, to China, and back. All of which contributed to Burma's prominence as a center of sea commerce. Weather, winds, and waves drove many ships to seek refuge in Burmese ports. Other ships called at these ports to take on supplies of food and water, or for repairs. The Muslim population developed as Muslim seafarers married Burmese women and remained permanently in Burmese port cities. And other nationalities, including Europeans, followed suit. In practice, Burmese rulers encouraged foreigners to marry local women; however, if the foreigner left, he was not permitted to take his wife or children with him, a practice mentioned by travelers in the eighteenth century. The offspring of these Arab, Persian, and Indian Muslims constituted the original core of the Burmese Muslim community, which was also known as the Zerbadi or Pathi.3 With time, the number of Muslims in Burma grew, in part the result of the offspring of mixed marriages, and in part, the result of immigration by more Mus­ lim traders. But despite this growth, Muslims remained a relatively small segment of the local population. There was never an outside military attempt by Muslims to conquer Burma permanently, neither was their missionary activity conducted from within. Nor is there evidence that the foothold Islam established in Burma

Beginnings o f the Muslim Community in Burma

21

was through conversions, as in the Malayan archipelago. It came about exclusively through immigration and exogamy. There are a number of reasons for this: 1. Burma’s topographical structure of forbidding mountains and jungles pre­ sented serious obstacles to those would be invaders by land. Major invasions which changed the face of Asia all came to a halt at the borders of Burma. The Mongol and Manchu conquests in China and central Asia, the invasions of the T\irkish Mongols and the Mongols of India veered in the direction of Southeast Asia but petered out before penetrating the hills of Burma and its jungles. This was the pattern from the beginning of the thirteenth century, and even Muslim Bengal was not able to provide support for an invasion of Burma. The efforts at expansion by Muslim India and the wars of Bengal with the kingdoms of Arakan and Burma never went beyond incursions or border warfare. 2. Furthermore, from a commercial standpoint Burma was neither as much of a challenge nor as attractive as the islands of the Malayan archipelago which did entice conquerors and missionaries, and the traders and seafarers who either came with the missionaries or in their wake. 3. Conceivably the most significant factor was religion. Not only were the Ma­ layan regions (today’s Indonesia and Malaysia) of primary commercial importance for Islam, but they also presented a certain religious vacuum. The Buddhist and Hindu religions prevalent there had degenerated and fallen into decline. They had become the religion of the court and ruling classes alone, never penetrating broader segments of the population. Consequently, these strata were relatively amenable to Islam when it came on the scene. This was not the case in Burma (or in other Buddhist countries of the Hinayana or the Theravada schools—Ceylon, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos.) From the end of the twelfth century, Buddhism was a truly popular religion in these places rather than a religion imposed by the Royal Court. It was a national religion in the sense that the overwhelming majority of the population subscribed to it. Traditionally, the king was considered the defender of Buddhism, and the terms Burmese and Buddhist became synonymous. A Burman could not legally convert to another religion, and such an act was severely punished. The law was enforced by a large caste of Buddhist monks that guided the spiritual supervision of the people. (This phenomenon also explains the singular lack of success of Christian missions in Burma hundreds of years later despite the fact that the British Colonial Administration did nothing to discourage them.) Generally, this commitment to Buddhism did not deter Burmese kings from acting tolerantly toward foreigners who enjoyed freedom of worship in accordance with their own religion. They were permitted to marry Burmese women and raise their children according to their religion; this was true for Muslims who settled in Burma as well. None of which was sufficient to create a movement of conversion to Islam. Muslims were not prevented from practicing their rituals but their religion did not attract the Bud­ dhist masses. Actually, there is no information about Muslim missionary attempts in Burma similar to those conducted, for example, in the Malayan archipelago.

22

Chapter One

Had such efforts been made, there is no doubt that they would have been met with fierce opposition. The Muslim maritime monopoly in Asia (and the period under review here in the history of Muslims in Burma) lasted until the beginning of the sixteenth cen­ tury and the arrival of European seafarers to the region. The Portuguese were first, followed by the Dutch, English, and French. As these groups took over Asian commerce, Muslim traders began to lose their traditional positions so that by the beginning of the seventeenth century they had lost almost all vestige of impor­ tance. They did maintain some independent activity in Burma, however, until the nineteenth century when the British completely consolidated their rule in India. The appearance of steamships put a final stop to international Muslim commerce with Burma though a limited coastal trade continued between the ports of India and Burma. Significant communities of Muslims were, however, already in place in Burmese port cities long before the waning of Muslim shipping. In the eight­ eenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, there were sizable Muslim com­ munities in the main cities of Burma. As a rule, Muslims lived in separate neigh­ borhoods from foreigners, enjoying a religious tolerance which was interrupted only in isolated instances. The Burmese had no interest in Muslim internal orga­ nization or religious life, nor did they try to convert Muslims to Buddhism. Mosques (as well as churches) were constructed without prejudice wherever there was a foreign community.

Notes 1. The following survey is based mainly on Moshe Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma: A Study of a Minority Group (Wiesbaden: University of Heidelberg, Otto Harasowitz, 1972), 1-17, 26-27. The sources given there are not repeated in this work, except in specific instances. New references appear in the endnotes of this survey. For a summarized version, see idem, “The Muslims of Burma,” in Raphael Israeli, ed., The Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Major (London: Curzon Press, 1982), 102-139; and idem, “The Muslims of Burma since Independence” Asian and African Studies, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1966): 1S9-205. 2. For details of sources, see Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 3-6. 3. For various appellations of Burmese Muslims, see Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 6-7; also idem, “Burmese,” in Richard V. Weekes, ed., Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey, 2nd ed. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 187-190; “Burma” E/1, vol. 2, 800. For a highly tendentious review of the Muslims of Arakan, see Matamar Al-Alam Al-Islami, History o f Arakan (Karachi: World Muslim Congress-Dept. of Dawah, 1978), particularly section 1, 3-35.

Chapter Two

Muslim Settlement in Arakan1

The Arakan region, which stretches for 350 miles along the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal, is isolated from Burma by the Arakan Yoma, a chain of hills that are difficult to traverse. The northern part of the area, called the Mayu region, can be seen as an almost direct continuation of eastern Bengal, with a close land connection over the years. These geographic conditions accounted for the separate historical development of the region until its conquest by the Kingdom of Burma at the end of the eighteenth century. This was true for the region in general, and for its Muslim population in particular. Beginning with their arrival in the Bay of Bengal, the earliest Muslim merchant ships also called at the ports of Arakan and Burma proper. Bengal became Muslim in 1203, but it remained the furthest eastern point of Islam's expansion. Muslim influence in Arakan was of great cultural and political importance. In effect, Arakan was the beachhead for Muslim penetration into other parts of Burma even if it never achieved the same degree of importance it did in Arakan. As a result of the close land and sea contacts maintained between the two countries, Muslims played a key role in the history of the Kingdom of Arakan. From the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the history of Arakan is bound up with Muslim Bengal. Muslim influence in Arakan began in 1430 when King Narameikhla (1404-1434) returned from exile in Bengal to Arakan. The Sultanate of Bengal helped with military support and subsequently Muslim sol­ diers from that expedition settled in Arakan. Narameikhla ceded some territory to the Sultan of Bengal and recognized his sovereignty over the areas. In recognition of his vassal status, Narameikhla and his heirs—-despite being Buddhists— received Muslim titles which were added to their Arakan titles. The King then decreed that coins of the Bengal Sultanate, which bore the Muslim inscriptions would be legal tender in Arakan. Such coins had been in circulation in Bengal ever since its capture by the Muslims in 1203. Later Narameikhla minted his own coins which bore the king's name in Burmese characters and, on the obverse side, his Muslim title in Persian. Arakan remained subordinate to Bengal in this way until 1531. Nine other vassal kings also carried Muslim titles. The custom of maintaining their Muslim titles, along 23

24

Chapter Two

with those of Burma, was practiced by the kings of Arakan even after they were liberated from dependency on the sultans of Bengal. The kings wanted to be con­ sidered sultans in their own right, after the fashion of the Moguls, and they were influenced by the fact that many of their subjects had become Muslims. Indeed, many Muslims served in prestigious positions in the royal administration despite its being Buddhist. There was another kind of interaction between the Kingdom of Arakan and the Muslim territories to its west as well. After the death of Narameikhla, Arakan grew in strength, expanded to the north, and raids bent on plunder were regularly carried out into Bengal. At the beginning of the seventeenth century when the Portuguese reached the shores of Bengal and Arakan, Arakan permitted them to set up military bases and granted them commercial rights. In return for this, the Portuguese aided Arakan’s military expeditions. To Arakan’s good fortune, the high quality of Portuguese firearms and artillery easily overcame that of the Mo­ guls who reigned in Bengal. Joint Arakan-Portuguese marauding expeditions into Bengal continued through the end of the eighteenth century, coming to a halt only with the growth of British naval power in the Bay of Bengal. Taking prisoners, many of whom were Muslims, and pressing them into slavery was an important part of the joint raids. In addition to the Muslim prisoners and slaves brought to Arakan from Bengal and northern India, there were other Muslims who came to Arakan, generally mercenaries who served in the king's guard. In 1660, an event of unusual importance occurred in the history of Arakan. The Mogul prince, Shah Shuja, escaped to Arakan following his defeat in the struggle for power in the Mogul succession, and a new wave of Muslims immigrated to Arakan in his wake. While Shah Shuja was warmly welcomed by the king of Arakan, relations between them soon deteriorated. In February of 1661, the shah and some of those in his entourage were assassinated by Arakan soldiers; in 1663, his children suffered the same fate.2 The Shah Shuja soldiers who survived the massacre were later inducted into the king’s guard, in a special archer's unit called, Kaman (Persian for bow.) The year 1684 was a period of unrest that culminated when riots broke out; 1692 saw a rebellion by Muslim soldiers, assisted by Bengali prisoners, who seized power in the kingdom. For twenty years, Muslim Kaman units, regularly rein­ forced by Afghan mercenaries who came from northern India, played a crucial role in the kingdom, periodically crowning and deposing Arakan’s kings. Effective control of the regime was completely in their hands until 1710 when King Sandawizay (1710-1731) managed to overcome them. Most of the Kaman were exiled to Ramree Island. Their offspring, still called by the same name, live in Ramree and in several villages near Akyab. They speak Arakanese and behave like their Buddhist neighbors, with the exception of their religion which remains Islam. A 1931 census shows 2,686 Kamans in Arakan. In 1785, Burma conquered Arakan and annexed it. The Burmese army of oc­ cupation in Arakan included a unit of Burmese Muslims, and their offspring still

Muslim Settlement in Arakan

25

live there. Today it is no longer possible to distinguish the various groups of Mus­ lims in Arakan, or to distinguish between them and Buddhist Arakanese in whose midst they live. Despite a number of Shiite traditions which they practice, Arakan Muslims are Sunnis, who call themselves Rohinga, Rohingya or Roewengya. The name is more commonly heard among the Muslims of north Arakan (the Mayu region) where more Arakan Muslims can be found than in the Akyab region. In 1961, their total numbers were estimated at 300,000.

Notes 1. See endnotes in Moshe Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma: A Study o f a Minority Group (Wiesbaden: University of Heidelberg, Otto Harasowitz, 1972), 18-25. Also “Arakan,” 606, and “Burma,” 1333 in E/2, vol.l; See also a general description in Ba Tha (Buthidaung), “Muslims in Arakan (Burma),” The Islamic Review; vol. 54, no. 4 (April 1966): 25-30, which is basically a repetition of articles by the same author. See Yegar, The Muslims of Burma, 137 (bibliography). 2. For a detailed account of this affair, of which there are a number of versions, see Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 21-24, sources there.

Chapter Three

From the British Occupation through World War II'

Burma was occupied by the British in three campaigns: 1824-1826, 1852, and 1885. Arakan was captured in the very first campaign. Among other structural, social, and economic changes wrought by the occupation, there was also a radical change in the makeup of the Muslim population which greatly increased as a result of immigration from India. The record of Indian immigration to Burma is as long as the history of those two countries. Throughout its existence, Burma has ab­ sorbed immigrants from India, but before the British occupation the numbers were relatively few and those who came disappeared quickly into the local population. The Hindus were completely assimilated by the Buddhist population, while the Muslims retained their religion but adapted to the Burmese way of life in all other respects. A large scale Indian immigration, encouraged by the British, began to arrive in the districts of Arakan and Tenasserim immediately following the first Anglo-Burmese war. Subsequently, these districts were annexed to India. The sec­ ond and third Anglo-Burmese wars, and the occupation of Upper Burma, greatly increased the flow of immigrants, particularly in the 1880s, creating a complicated and difficult socioeconomic problem. After Burma became a district of British India, Indians could enter the area with ease; that is, not as immigrants to a foreign country but as inhabitants moving from one district to another within the same political entity. Burma’s need for such residents stemmed from fundamental changes that occurred in its economic structure after Britain began developing the country. The changes required cheap coolie labor. Burma had always been sparsely populated, and India—conveniently nearby—was a cheap source of needed man­ power. One could generally tell which part of India a person came from by his occupation. For example, Muslims from Chittagong in Bengal, who made up a large segment of Indian immigrants, took over running transport on the rivers. Many of them made their homes in port towns, particularly Akyab in Arakan. The Chittagongs were well known for their loyalty to Islam. These Bengal Muslims integrated into the local Rohingya community by means of intermarriages between the Chit­ tagong and the local Rohingyas, or even Buddhists; most often, it was Muslim Chittagong men who had come south seeking work and Arakan women. The off27

28

Chapter Three

spring of such marriages were raised as Muslims and assimilated into the Chitta­ gong community, a community not substantively different than the Rohingya’s. Each year, during the plowing and harvesting seasons, twenty thousand Chittagongs from the north came south over the border to find temporary work in the rice fields of Arakan. Some returned, but many remained. The influx of these immigrants (Hindu as well as Muslim) created a new mi­ nority which, from many standpoints, was larger, more highly developed, and cer­ tainly more alien and despised than previous groups. Muslim immigrants devel­ oped a complex network (which earlier Burmese immigrants had not) of religious activities. They established mosques, religious colleges and other institutions, and even published their own newspapers. There were a number of reasons for this. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, there were twice as many Indian Muslim immigrants as local Muslims. Not only did their organizations have more money for community and religious activity, but they had a stronger desire to maintain a separate religious and social identity vis-a-vis the Buddhist environ­ ment. Indian Muslims established schools for the training of religious clergy and an entire chain of social institutions. They exerted a singular influence on the customs of Burmese Muslims, even to their mode of dress and the manner in which they performed religious precepts. This was particularly true for the Zerbadi, offspring of the many intermarriages that occurred in the wake of immi­ gration, despite the fact that the Zerbadi saw themselves as Burmese Muslims rather than Indians. By World War II, like other immigrants from India, the Muslims who left eastern Bengal established numerous social clubs that were based on place of origin, which dealt with cultural, educational, economic, and religious activities for the benefit of their membership; for example, the Dacca Club, the Chittagong Association, the Bengal Association, etc. Large-scale immigration from India combined with the rise of Burmese nationalism was the cause of considerable tension between the three different Muslim communities in Burma, as well as - between those communities and the Buddhist majority. Whereas many of the Mus^ lims from the Indian subcontinent became involved in the social clubs, the Bur­ mese Muslims—the Zerbadi and others—tended to identify with the Buddhist majority, and supported the Burmese Nationalist Movement. The Muslims of Arakan supported neither of them. This trend changed in a later period. For 116 years, the two communities, Muslim and Buddhist, lived more or less together under British rule without much incident, even though the latent animos­ ity between them broke out in sporadic riots and killings. Over the generations, the Muslim community in Arakan gradually expanded southward, pushing aside the Buddhists of Arakan. In 1941, only a handful of Buddhist villages remained in north Arakan; roughly a third of the seven hundred thousand inhabitants of north Arakan were Muslims.2 When Burma achieved independence in 1948, the status of Indian Muslims changed. Indian Muslims could no longer maintain the same ties to their former

From the British Occupation through World War II

29

home and were obliged either to apply for Burmese citizenship, or take on the status of aliens or stateless people. The various Indian associations in Burma did, however, continue their social, educational, and religious programs almost without change (with the exception of those that originated in Bengal, which had become East Pakistan in 1947.) All the associations from the area combined into a feder­ ation known as the All Burma Pakistan Association which, in effect, represented the largest Indian Muslim ethnic group in Burma. The heads of the association estimated the number of Pakistanis in Burma at 300,000 to 500,000 people. Be­ cause of the absence of reliable statistics, there is no way of gauging the accuracy of that estimate or other estimates regarding the number of Muslims in Burma.3 In contradistinction to other ethnic groups of immigrants from the Indian subcon­ tinent, the vast majority of Pakistanis were in a low socioeconomic bracket. Illit­ eracy was rife among Pakistanis, many of whom did not become naturalized Bur­ mese citizens simply because of ignorance or a lack of information, and who lost their Pakistani citizenship as well. There were some who opted to retain Pakistani citizenship. The association lobbied the authorities, either directly or through the Pakistan Embassy in Rangoon, to facilitate the naturalization of those who desired citizen­ ship. It also interceded with Pakistani authorities to ease the process of acquiring a Pakistani passport for those who wanted one. In the early years after indepen­ dence, Pakistanis in Burma were treated in the same way as immigrants from other parts of India. The mujahideen rebellion (see chapter 5) and the mutual accusations regarding it between Pakistan and Burma had no adverse effect on the life of former Pakistanis in Burma.4 This situation deteriorated following General Ne_ Win’s 1962 military coup in Burma. As a result of the large-scale, preponderantly Muslim immigration from India which began in 1870, the British administration set up special laws with regard to the personal status of Muslims using the Anglo-Muhammadan Law of British India as a model. Since Burma was a part of British India, the problem of legal jurisdiction did not arise and, in fact, basic legislation for Burma was copied from Indian regulations for Bengal. Anglo-Muhammadan Law assumed a formal basis in 1898 with the outcome that Indian law took precedence in matters of inheri­ tance, marriage, divorce, religion, and religious institutions. Difficulties arose be­ cause of the artificiality of the situation, particularly in cases regarding the Zerbadi where one of the parents was, or had been, a Buddhist for whom the laws were different. Such a legal system was more suited to the customs of Indian Muslims than to those of Burmese Muslims. Muhammadan Law lost some importance when Burma achieved independence in 1948, and declined even more after the National- % ization Program of 1964 during which many Muslims of Indian origin returned to India and Pakistan. Muslim laws in Burma had been an artificial creation of the British colonial period. When it came to an end, so did the laws.5 The large-scale immigration from India was opposed by Buddhist Burmans, particularly in Arakan, Tenasserim, and Lower Burma. This position became a

30

Chapter Three

~ central issue of the Burmese National Movement. The worldwide economic depres■*- sion, which effected Burma as well, was a major cause of the 1930-1931 anti-Indian riots. The riots of 1938 were directed specifically against Indian Mus­ lims, and some two hundred Muslims were killed. As the Burmese National Movement grew stronger in the pre-World War II period, opposition to the pres­ ence of Indians, and to Islam which Indian immigrants brought with them, grew.6 World War II and the Japanese occupation disrupted all previous arrangements and relations between the communities of Burmese Muslims. When the Burmese struggle for national independence began, Burmese Muslims wanted to take part. They were opposed to maintaining any links with India or any involvement in India's internal struggles between the Congress Party and the Muslims. They were also opposed to demands that would guarantee constitutional rights to the Muslim minority in Burma once Burma gained its independence. Indian Muslims had made such demands during the British occupation, and after the war, and both governments—first, the British and subsequently, the independent Burmese—had rejected them. Already in the period immediately preceding independence, it was clear that Indian Muslims were progressively losing their status as equal citizens, and that they would find themselves a foreign minority in independent Burma. The changed atmosphere brought about a partial reimmigration to India, though the majority remained. The Indian Muslims who remained in Burma were deter­ mined to weaken their ties to India and Pakistan, and adapt to the new reality. Confronted by an increasingly intolerant Burmese national movement, they chose not to emphasize their separate ethnicity. In their desire for Burmese society, many ^-Indian Muslims began adopting Burmese behavior and Burmese names. The trend was particularly strong among the Zerbadi—even those who, in the prewar period, had seen Indian Muslim customs as proper religious and cultural behavior. There was a great degree of overlap between the Burmese Movement of Na­ tional Liberation and Buddhist religious revival in Burma, a coalescence that was - strengthened after Burma's independence. Consequently, popular Burmese public * opinion did not distinguish between Indian Muslims and Burmese Muslims, a —differentiation which Burmese Muslims would have wished for.7 Instead, the Mus­ lims of North Arakan who regarded themselves as Burmese citizens, because of this and other factors unique to their situation, found themselves in a most difficult strait.

Notes 1. Moshe Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma: A Study o f a Minority Group (Wiesbaden: University of Heidelberg, Otto Harasowitz, 1972), 29-31. 2. FO 371/75660, Survey by P. Murray from the Foreign Ministry to Commonwealth Relations Office (January 16,1949). 3. Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 27-28,41.

From the British Occupation through Worid War II

31

4. R. H. Taylor, “Myanmar,” The Oxford Encyclopaedia o f the Modem Islamic World, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 214-215. 5. See appendix A. 6. For a detailed account of Burmese reaction, see Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 29-39. Important sources regarding anti-Muslim riots can be found in the two reports of the Gov­ ernment Inquiry Commission, Superintendent, Interim Report o f the Riot Inquiry Commit­ tee (Rangoon: Burma Government Printing and Stationery, 1939); and Superintendent, Fi­ nal Report o f the Riot Inquiry Committee (Rangoon, 1939). See also Clive J. Christie, A Modem History o f Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism, and Separation, Tauris Academic Studies (New York: I. B. Tauris, 19%), 63—164; “Burma," EI2, vol. 1,1333; Jan Becka, “Muslims,” Historical Dictionary o f Myanmar (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1995), 140. 7. For a detailed discussion, see Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 107-113.

Chapter Four

World War II and Its Aftermath

During the British occupation, hostility developed between the Muslim and Bud­ dhist populations in Arakan due to the same economic and social causes that had brought about a similar hostility in other parts of Burma. The turning point in their relations came when this tension, which had been present in Arakan even before the war, was let loose with the retreat of the British and the approach of the Japanese. Arakan was the furthest point the Japanese reached in the drive for India and thus, at the beginning of 1942, it became the front-line until the British recaptured it in early 1945. During the course of these three years, civil administration collapsed, arms were easily acquired, and crime and lawlessness became commonplace. Both armies, British and Japanese, exploited the frictions and animosity in the local population to further their own military aims. During the war years, Arakan was isolated from— the rest of the world in general, and particularly from other parts of Burma. One^; outcome of the war years was the growth of close relations between the British army and Arakan Muslims. When the Japanese advanced into Arakan in 1942, the Buddhists instigated cruel measures against the Muslim population. Thousands of Muslims (their exact number is unknown) were expelled from regions under Japanese rule in which Buddhists constituted a majority. The Muslims fled to eastern Bengal, or to North Arakan, seeking refuge in territories under British military rule. As they fled, many were killed or died of starvation. For their part, Muslims conducted retalia­ tory raids from British controlled territories where they were the majority, particularly in the vicinity of Maungdaw. In short order, these acts of mutual slaughter caused the Buddhist population of North Arakan to flee just as the Muslims had abandoned the South. In effect, Arakan was divided into Buddhist and Muslim, areas. From December 1942 until April 1943, the British waged an unsuccessful ~j counteroffensive, and the Japanese were able to expand their hold over most Mus­ lim regions in Arakan including Maungdaw. The situation continued to deterio­ rate, and communal strife grew worse impelling more Muslims to abandon their homes. In April of 1942, the British set up Force V, a guerilla unit that was active 33

34

Chapter Four

along the British-Japanese front. Muslims of Arakan were mobilized into the force beginning in September of that year. During the relative military stalemate that existed after the spring of 1943, Arakan Muslims in Force V took on such increas­ ingly important military roles as reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, rescue of downed aviators, and raids on Japanese collaborators. British officers serving in Force V provided assistance, particularly medical aid, to the Muslim population. In general, Muslim religious leaders supported the British (although there were those who sided with the Japanese) and this enabled the British to mobilize vii- lagers. At the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, the British launched a new ^ counteroffensive in Arakan. In January 1944, Maungdaw was recaptured. Force V played a decisive role in the offensive. The campaign was both arduous and long so that only in December 1944 were the British able to capture Buthidaung. By _ January of 1945, most of Arakan was back in British hands.1 It is not clear whether the British had made any commitments to the Muslims of Arakan regarding their status after the war since there are still no documents extant that would support such an assumption. The only evidence available indi­ cates that at the end of 1942 a Muslim officer of the Indian Civilian Service (ICS) visited the areas of both Maungdaw and Buthidaung with the aim of gaining sup­ port for the Indian-British war effort. It stands to reason that such a commitment remains in the realm of speculation until such time as more decisive proof is found. — In any case, Muslim leaders had the impression that the British had promised to A. grant them a Muslim National Area in the Maungdaw region. Among Muslim leaders there were those who supported the immediate secession of such a territory from Burma and its subsequent annexation by Pakistan or India when these coun­ tries achieved independence.2 Based apparently on what they had heard from Brit­ ish representatives, leaders of other ethnic communities—such as the Kachin and the Karen—who had supported the British war effort were also certain that when the war ended the British would reward their loyalty, granting them independence from Burma. At the same time, in the wake of British military successes, the Muslims of Arakan bolstered their position in all of North Arakan where they already consti­ tuted the majority. The British appointed Muslims to administrative positions in local authorities which easily enabled them to retaliate against those who had collaborated with the Japanese, particularly Buddhists. Muslims from Arakan who had fled to Bengal during the war, now returned to their villages. Their return was accompanied by land-hungry immigrants from Chittagong who settled in North Arakan, swelling the postwar Muslim population in the region. In addition to the large stocks of weapons that were left in Arakan after the war, extensive areas were controlled by roving bands which had been supplied with arms by both the British —and the Japanese during the war. The new British administration had no influence with these bands so they were free to engage in robbery and smuggling rice to Pakistan. The primary concern of the British administration was that an influx of refugees and other immigrants from Bengal would sharpen the communal and

%

World War II and Its Aftermath

35

religious tensions, and the hostile actions, between North Arakan Muslim and Buddhist communities which had continued unabated since 1942. The British fear was echoed by a new suspicion on the part of Arakan’s Muslim leaders that there— were growing indications that the British would leave Burma, granting it inde^ pendence. The country would then be ruled by the Burmese Buddhist majority. These portents served to focus the attention of many Rohingya and Chittagong living in Arakan on events and developments on the other side of the border, in Bengal. When it appeared that areas with a large Muslim majority in eastern Ben­ gal, including Chittagong, would be incorporated in Pakistan, irredentism tenden­ cies in North Arakan (evident during the war) grew stronger. In May 1946, public statements called for the annexation of Arakan areas with a Muslim majority to Pakistan. Some statements even called for the establishment of an independent Muslim state in the area between the Kaladan and Mayu Rivers: In July 1946, an irredentist movement, the North Arakan Muslim League, led by Moulvi Lookman Sahib, was founded. Its goal was to realize an independent Mus­ lim state. The drive to create a movement was more strongly felt by Muslims who had come from Chittagong than among the Rohingya. In July 1947, a number of Arakan Muslim leaders met with Ali Jinah of the Muslim League of India who, together with members of his party, were to be the founders of Pakistan. Beset by problems of their own, they did not want to take on the burden of hostility with the leadership of Burma so—understandably—they avoided encouraging such ir­ redentist tendencies. Ali Jinah went so far as to pointedly assure Burma’s first prime minister, General Aung San, that he did not support Arakan irredentism.3 — With the Japanese expulsion from Arakan, there was an outburst of national sentiment by the Buddhist population which no longer wanted to be ruled by Burmans. Turbulence in the region continued until the end of the regime on 4 January 1948, when Burma gained independence. Within six months of independence, — several rebellions broke out. The most serious of these was by the Communists \ who had been denied membership in the government coalition; four other rebel­ lions were on an ethnic basis—the Karens, Kachins, Mons, and Muslims of Arakan all of whom hoped to realize their separatist aims in opposition to the central Burmese government in Rangoon. For a long period of time, the govern­ ment was able to maintain its sovereignty only in the major cities. Gradually, and with great difficulty, it succeeded in extending its rule throughout the country.4

Notes 1. Christie, A Modem History o f Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Sep­ aration, Tauris Academic Studies (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 164-166; Bertil Lintner, “In the Dragon’s Wake,” FEER, vol. 124, no. 17 (April 26, 1984): 33-35.34; John W. Henderson, John W., Judith M. Heinman, Kenneth W Martindale, Rinn-Sup Shinn, John O. Weaver, and Eston T. White, Area Handbook for Burma (Washington, DC.: American University, Foreign Areas Studies Division, 1971), 78; Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency

36

Chapter Four

and the Politics o f Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991), 64. 2. FO 371/75660, Report by P. Murray of the Foreign Office to the Commonwealth Relations Office (Jan. 26,1949). (“Indeed, if these thoughts were not already in their minds, they were probably put there by a fanatically Moslem ICS officer who visited the area at the end of 1942, nominally to whip up support for the British-Indian war effort.”); Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma: A Study o f a Minority Group (Wiesbaden: University of Heidelberg, Otto Harasowitz, 1972), 96, note 2; Christie, A Modem History, 166; Andrew Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942-1945" Modem Asian Studies, vol. 20, no. 3 (1986): 502; Henderson et a l Area Handbook, 78. 3. Christie, A Modem History, 166-168; Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 96-97; FO 371/75660, Murray; Trevor O. Ling, “Religious Minorities in Burma in the Contemporary Period,” in de Silva, K. M., Pensri Duke, Ellen S. Goldberg, and Nathan Katz, eds. Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies: Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Burma (Boulder, Colo.: Pinter Publishers, 1988; London: Westview Press, 1988), 182; FO 435/1, Confidential print from FI 1229/17/79, Events in Burma 1939-48 (Foreign Office Research Dept., July 9, 1948); Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics o f Ethnicity, 64; Virginia Thompson and Richard Adlofff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), 154. 4. FO 371/75660, Murray; Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma,” 483.

Chapter Five

The Mujahideen Rebellion1

After Burma achieved independence in January 1948, the situation became even ^ more chaotic. Pre-independence officials were replaced by Arakan Buddhists, Buddhist refugees were allowed to return to and rebuild the homes and villages they had been forced to leave by Muslims several years earlier, and Muslims were forced off Buddhist lands they had seized. In fact, Muslim guerilla activity had already begun in November 1947. Incidents were followed by riots, and by March-April, the government lost all semblance of control in the region. The few Burmese military units that remained found themselves completely surrounded by a hostile Muslim population. Bands of armed Muslims began wandering through­ out the region frustrating government activity. They forcibly isolated the Arakan villagers who had resettled on their lands, denying them drinking water and food supplies, harassing them in every way imaginable, so that they were compelled to turn around and return to the south. Muslim religious leaders began preaching jihad against the Arakan “infidels.” Indeed, initially, guerilla activities were di­ rected more at “ethnic” targets (against the Buddhist Arakanese) than against the Burmese government. In April, many mujahideen gathered at a place called Taung Bazar led by Jafar Hussain (or Jafar Kawwal) who stood at the head of the move­ m ent A police launch sent to disperse the crowd was fired upon, and several policemen were killed in the exchange of fire. The Mujahideen Rebellion had begun. The significance of the Arabic term mujahideen chosen by this revolution­ ary movement—Fighters in a Holy War for Islam—should not be lost sight of.2 Subsequently, the Rohingya’s separatist struggle for a Muslim state in North Arakan took on a religious dimension. Estimates place the number of mujahideen armed men at anywhere from 2,000 to 5,000, organized into units of 500. The mujahideen movement, with former army people at its head, ran a training camp in the hills between Buthidaung and Maungdaw. They existed on assessments of food from villagers, enjoying a level of popularity and active support that extended beyond the Muslim population of " Arakan, which was estimated at between 100,000 to 120,000 people.3 Indeed, Muslim support for the mujahideen went beyond the frontiers, in the Chittagong region, but there was no aid from the authorities of East Bengal. With the border, 37

38

Chapter Five

in effect, wide open for movement in both directions, the mujahideen crossed it to obtain clothes and other necessary supplies, all the while smuggling rice into Pakistan which had a shortage of food and once in Pakistan, they were well re­ ceived. As the Burmese government was engaged in fighting rebel movements in other parts of the country and attempting to stave off economic collapse, the mujahideen took over a large part of North Arakan within a short span of time. All told, there were no more than 1,100 government troops in Arakan at the time, and not until 1951, could the government direct sufficient means or military forces to counter the revolt in the north. In the early days of the rebellion, there were rumors from Arakan about a possible mujahideen link to the Communist Red Flag Movement that had been operating in other parts of Arakan since 1947. The ru­ mors spoke of combined operations with the Communists against the central re­ gime. Arakan Buddhist separatist rebels also fought against the central Burmese government whose authority they did not accept and were known to cooperate with the Communist movement. Any fears concerning a Communisl-M ujahideen pact were quickly dispelled when the profound religious and ethnic hostilities that ex­ isted between North and South Arakan were taken into account. There was, how­ ever, some cooperation between the various rebel movements in Arakan, despite all the suspicions involving arms and of rice smuggling. In reality, Arakan Mus­ lims did not want to see a semiautonomous state as the Arakan Buddhists would have liked, since the Muslims certainly did not want to live by sufferance under a Buddhist administration. Conversely, there was no hope for an irredentist drive on the part of the Muslims to join Pakistan. In effect, what the rebels wanted, as did many of the Muslims of Arakan who did not actively support the rebels, was the establishment of a distinct Muslim region—“a frontier state” which would not, of necessity, secede from Burma but rather would be separated from Buddhist Arakan. This demand was sounded as early as April 1947 at a Muslim conference held in Maungdaw.4 Moderate Rohingya leaders attempted to convince the rebels to end the rebel­ lion, even as they attempted to persuade the government that the rebellion was instigated by an assortment of individuals. The majority of Arakan Muslims, they claimed, not only refrained from supporting the rebellion, but were themselves victims of the rebels. It was only the government’s actions and the incendiary behavior of the Buddhists in Arakan that had spurred feelings of rejection among the Arakan Muslims, fanned hostility between Muslims and Buddhists, and thus led to rebellion. They also contended that the rebellion stood in opposition to the principles of Islam, and that there was no justification for a declaration of jihad. Indeed, there were Rohingya leaders who, in 1948, demanded that Prime Minister U Nu provide them with arms to fight the rebels; the demand was repeated in 1950 and 1951, but the plea went unheeded. In any case, the responsibility for failure to quell the rebellion was put at the government’s door. This dissatisfaction with the government's role caused many Rohingya to submit to the rebels, sometimes aiding them against their will, particularly when they were threatened and could

The Mujahideen Rebellion

39

not resist. At the same time, there were leaders who warned the rebels against acts of vengeance toward the government and the army. Pressure by the moderates increased after the rebels suffered a surge of losses and casualties were not even afforded a Muslim burial.5 The government did attempt to negotiate with the rebels but in 1948 a govern­ ment delegation was sent to hear their complaints. The rebels claimed that the Rohingya were natives of Arakan, indigenous to the region. They were the off­ spring of Muslims who had settled there hundreds of years earlier, and despite similarities in religion, language, culture, and ethnicity differed from the popula­ tion in the adjacent Chittagong region. It was simply propaganda on the part of Arakan Buddhist extremists that had attempted to identify them with the Muslims of Pakistan. The rebels complained that Arakan Muslims were not permitted to serve in the army; that the government had replaced Muslim officials, policemen, and village headmen with Arakan Buddhists who frequently discriminated against members of the Muslim community, treating them as though they were aliens; humiliated Muslim dignitaries; extorted money, demanded bribes, and arbitrarily arrested Muslims. Nothing was done, they insisted, to improve the lot of the Rohingya either by providing education or improving the economic situation. Buddhist Arakanese spread anti-Rohingya propaganda accusing the Rohingya of being pro-Pakistani and wanting to unite with Pakistan, thus raising doubts as to their loyalty to the country. Limitations had been placed on the movement of Muslims who lived in the Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and the Rathedaung districts. With the exception of villages evacuated in the Maungdaw and Buthidaung dis­ tricts, Muslims were not allowed to return to the villages from which they had enlisted in 1942 in support of the British war effort. There were still approximately 13,000 Rohingya living in refugee camps in India and Pakistan, where they had fled during World War II, who were not being permitted to return. Those who managed to return were accused of being illegal Pakistani immigrants, and refu­ gees’ property and the lands were confiscated. The mujahideen demanded that the injustices be corrected so that they could live as full Burmese citizens in accord­ ance with law rather than subject to arbitrariness and oppression. After all their protests and pleas produced no results, they took up arms.6 After the breakdown in the talks, the rebels made quick work of driving out Buddhist Arakan villagers that had been resettled earlier. Battles raged with po­ lice and army units encamped in the region that had been under siege. As of December 1948, the main towns remained in government hands, but the limited government forces in Arakan could not prevent entire rural areas from falling to rebel control. The rebels employed guerilla tactics and had ample supplies of light weapons and ammunition, although much of it was antiquated and in poor con­ dition. Intelligence information indicated that they were in possession of some light artillery as well. Nonetheless, in August 1948, government circles in eastern Pakistan, who followed events in Arakan, assumed that the Burmese government would have no difficulty in regaining control of territories it had lost to the rebels

40

Chapter Five

as soon as the rainy season ended and the army could travel along the roads again.7 The Burmese government did not respond to the five demands made by Moulvi Jafar Kawal, leader of the Mujahid movement in Arakan, in September 1948: (1) declare the Akyab district to be an autonomous Free Muslim State under the sovereignty of Burma [a status resembling that of Hyderabad under the govern­ ment of India] ; (2) recognize Urdu as the language of the state; (3) establish inde­ pendent schools whose language of instruction would be Urdu; (4) release prison­ ers; (5) grant legal status to the Mujahid movement. In the absence of any re­ sponse, the mujahideen maintained their guerilla warfare. Refugees crowded the cities; in rural areas, rice growing was cut back because there were no seasonal laborers from Chittagong. But the identity of the Muslim movement in Arakan is unclear.8 From a report by the British Embassy in Rangoon, one gains the impres­ sion that there were two Muslim movements in Arakan. The first, the Mujahid, a separatist movement with an affinity to Pakistan; the second, the Arakanese Mus­ lim Autonomy Movement, the stronger of the two, which aspired to the establish­ ment of an independent state within the Union of Burma.9 It is conceivable that difficulties in obtaining information on events in Arakan resulted in confusion and that activities attributed to both movements, as well as the demands presented by Moulvi Jafar Kawal, were actually the demands of the Arakanese Muslim Auton­ omy Movement rather than those of the Mujahid movement. The notion of regional autonomy continued to grow. Though limited by a lack of ammunition, the rebels did not encounter effective military opposition. In No­ vember there was a severe erosion of their position. Although the Burmese army sustained losses, it was on the offensive in the Maungdaw and Buthidaung regions, burning down thirteen villages and six mosques near Maungdaw. As a result, the stream of refugees to the Pakistani shore of the Naaf River grew. The months that followed saw no change in the situation. Fighting between the mujahideen and the Burmese army went on with both sides making occasional forays into Pakistani territory in Chittagong. Nor was there a letup in rice smuggling or the flight of refugees. Early in February 1949, the number of refugees who had escaped to Chittagong in advance of the Burmese army was estimated at 20,000. Mujahideen who crossed the border into Pakistan were not handed over to the Burmese army in order to forestall hostile reactions among the Muslims of Arakan. The British ambassador in Rangoon, in a report on 12 February 1949, estimated that appar­ ently there were only 500 armed Muslim rebels, although they had many more 'supporters. He had difficulty determining whether or not the ultimate aim of the Muslims was the establishment of an independent state in the framework of the Burmese Union; however, should such a state emerge as merely an autonomy, he believed it would inevitably be drawn towards Pakistan. One may assume that his report was drawn from Burmese government circles and reflected what the latter knew or conjectured.10 Relations between Burma and Pakistan were not as strained as the tensions

The Mujahideen Rebellion

41

between India and Pakistan following the division of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, which resulted in the establishment of two states. Nonetheless, toward the end of 1948, the mounting agitation occasioned by the Muslim rebellion in the frontier region between eastern Bengal and Arakan took on serious political im­ plications.11In October of that year, Prime Minister U Nu and commander in chief of the army, Lieutenant-General Smith Dun visited Akyab where they heard re­ ports about arms and ammunition obtained by the rebels from the Pakistani side of the frontier, and that mujahideen casualties were getting medical attention in Pakistan. They learned that government forces were unsuccessful in preventing rice smuggling, and that the profits realized from this illicit trade were an added source of support for the rebellion. Muslim leaders such as Sultan Ahmed and Omra Meah, with bases in East Bengal, were also involved in the smuggling. It was assumed, however, that the Pakistani aid was a localized initiative which ap­ parently stemmed from the sympathy of local government functionaries. Smug­ gling was caused by a genuine shortage of rice in the Chittagong territory. The rebellion posed a problem for Pakistan that complicated its relations with Burma. The fighting waged by the Burmese army against the Muslim rebels in Arakan, who had ties to the frontier populations of eastern Bengal, was marked by cruel and repressive measures. This exacerbated the danger that the number of refugees seeking asylum in Chittagong would grow. Although the Pakistani government did everything it could to seal the border, its efforts were ineffective. Pakistani government behavior vis-^-vis the Burmese government remained correct. Even in the face of border incursions by Burmese forces who occasionally opened fire, the authorities displayed restraint, limiting their reactions to official protests. Pakistan was not interested in reinforcing an impression then current in certain Rangoon government circles that it was covertly involved in encouraging the Muslim rebellion in Arakan or that it was aiding the rebels. The early demands of the Bengal Muslim League, which had been set forth well before India and Pakistan achieved independence, embarrassed Pakistan. The Pakistani govern­ ment was certain that the Indian ambassador to Rangoon had maliciously spread rumors that Muslim rebels in Arakan were supported by Pakistan.12 In reality the situation on the ground was not as grave as such a connection ^ would seem to imply. In mid-February 1949, the governor of Chittagong province estimated that some 2,000 Muslim refugees had moved from Arakan to Pakistani territory, most of them living in areas close to the border to ease their return home once normalcy was reestablished. Another figure given at the time stated that 20,000 Muslims had entered Chittagong since the beginning of 1949. There was also a report that ISO armed mujahideen who crossed the border were sent back to Burmese territory when they refused to hand in their arms.13 This was appar­ ently the outcome of several days' fighting in North Arakan between the first and the fourth of February. Only limited forces were involved: on the government’s side, the Fifth Battalion of the Burma Rifles; and on the side of the Muslim rebels, relatively small guerilla units. The military success of the battalion was somewhat

42

Chapter Five

limited. While it did managed to force the retreat of a few rebel units to the other side of the Pakistani frontier, the guerilla units suffered almost no casualties. The Burmese army practiced a scorched earth policy, torching villages and crops. Sub­ sequently, the battalion was sent out of the region because it was needed more urgently elsewhere. These events reinforced the sympathy of North Arakan Mus­ lims for the mujahideen whose reputation had suffered because they practiced robbery and because of their hit-and-run tactics. The actions of the mujahideen resulted in acts of retaliation by the army during which innocent Muslim families were forced from their homes to seek asylum in Chittagong. At this stage it ap­ peared that the army did not possess sufficient strength to suppress the various uprisings in Arakan by direct military action, nor was there a likelihood of arriving at an arrangement through negotiations, particularly since the army’s behavior served to destroy any confidence in the government, even among moderate Mus­ lims.14 As Pakistani newspapers began reporting on the repression of Arakan Muslims by the Burmese government, political tension grew between Burma and Pakistan. From discussions Mohammed Ikramullah, secretary of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, held in London with officials of the British Foreign Ministry in May 1949, one gets an inkling of Pakistani policy and aspirations regarding its border with Burma. Ikramullah stated that the Paki­ stan government had attempted to seal off its border with Burma but that such a closure could neither be total nor could it prevent Arakan Muslim refugees from entering Pakistan territory. Great numbers of refugees had already arrived and maintaining them was very costly for the government of Pakistan. The Pakistani government had called the plight of the refugees to the attention of the Burmese government on a number of occasions and had demanded that they be returned to their former homes. However, since those homes had been seized by Buddhists, the Burmese government had not been enthusiastic about making appropriate ar­ rangements for the return of the refugees. Ikramullah went on to tell the British officials with whom he was meeting that Pakistan was interested in suppressing the mujahideen rebellion but that it had made it clear to the Burmese government that this should be done in “a civilized manner” which avoided atrocities. Pakistan was worried lest the cruel measures already carried out by the Burmese army could unleash anti-Burmese demonstrations in Pakistan sparking counterdemonstrations against Pakistan in Burma, and that ultimately Pakistani residents living in Burma would be endangered. Pakistan was also concerned about the rising numbers of refugees from Arakan to the Chittagong region. Between six and seven thousand had already crossed the border and were being housed in camps. There was the added fear that Communists were among the refugees. Ikramullah stated that in an effort to diffuse mutual suspicions between Pakistan and Burma, an agreement had been made between the two countries to appoint a Pakistani consul in Akyab and a Burmese consul in Chittagong.13 In May 1949, the Burmese government appointed a Peace Committee for North

The Mujahideen Rebellion

43

Arakan. Among its members were Muslim dignitaries who, at the behest of Prime Minister U Nu, initiated contacts with the Muslim rebels. The hope was that the Peace Committee could convince the mujahideen to lay down their arms and forego their demands for autonomy. Committee members reported that some reb­ els had, indeed, given up their arms. While there was a letup in the fighting at the ^ time, the government felt that it was caused by the monsoon rains, which made movement difficult, rather than the efforts of the Peace Committee. The govern­ ment expected the rebels to renew their offensive once movement in the terrain was possible again after the rains stopped.16 In June 1949, government control was limited to the port of Akyab while the mujahideen controlled North Arakan and the other rebel movements ruled the remaining parts of Arakan. Lacking sufficient regular forces, the government set up the Arakan Territorial Units. These units acted with great cruelty against the Muslim population, and the Muslim rebels retaliated in kind against the Buddhist population.17 " In August 1949, the Burmese government appointed another committee, unconnected to the Peace Committee, which was to function in the Buthidaung and Maungdaw regions. Its task was 1) to identify the causes for the mujahideen rebellion in Arakan; 2) to make recommendations for and against partition of the Akyab District and, in the event that it recommended partition; 3) to delineate boundaries. The committee was composed of leaders of the Arakanese Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (a governmental political organization), Muslim mem­ bers of Parliament, and a number of prominent private individuals. It appears that nothing came of the committee since nothing further was heard of its activities although sporadic incidents in the Muslim areas continued to be reported.18At the same time, representatives of North Arakan Muslim refugees in eastern Pakistan were also active, and on 22 December 1949, they sent a communication to the government of Burma with copies to various government offices in Pakistan. (A copy found its way to the British delegation in East Pakistan.) In the communique, they protested the atrocities that were being perpetrated by the Burmese army and which continued unabated despite all protests. And they cited the ongoing confis­ cation of food and fuel. The refugees demanded that the government encourage members of the Rohingya community to establish a home guard in every village and supply it with arms and ammunition so that they could defend themselves against Communists and Buddhist Arakanese whose aim was to rout the Rohingya as they had attempted to do in 1942.19 In February the British ambassador in Rangoon attempted to summarize the situation in Arakan, making it clear that the intelligence coming in from the ter­ ritory was sporadic, meager, and often contradictory, so that it was difficult to arrive at a cogent picture. He pointed out that since the end of 1948, the situation in North Arakan had deteriorated. Pressure by the Muslims on the government’s units in Maungdaw and Buthidaung increased. By 7 January 1949, the rebels had ~ captured such places as Rathedaung and others. The government sent no reinforce­ ments, but its meager forces on site did everything in their power to resist and, on

44

Chapter Five

February 4 were not only able to recapture Rathedaung but managed to reopen the ^ road between Buthidaung and Maungdaw. In the opinion of the British ambassa­ dor, it was clear that following upon the cruel acts employed by the Burmese government against the Muslims of Northwest Arakan, the latter would find it impossible to acquiesce quietly to Burmese rule. Minimally, the only solution they would find acceptable would be the establishment of a semiautonomous enclave. It seemed unlikely, however, that the Burmese would accept this concession be­ cause such an enclave would have strong pro-Pakistani tendencies. On the other hand, in his opinion, the Burmese were incapable of maintaining a strong, just, and moderate rule. Consequently, there would be a flood of refugees bearing tales of atrocities into South Chittagong, and the Pakistani government would find it difficult to restrain the attendant which it would find embarrassing. The ambas­ sador noted that despite this unsettled situation, rice cultivation and intensive smuggling from the Akyab district northward to Chittagong continued.20 In 1950, U Nu, the prime minister of Burma, set out on a visit to Maungdaw accompanied by the Ambassador of Pakistan. After that visit there were a number of changes in personnel, and officials as well as army units were replaced. But two years later in 1952, there were renewed accusations in the Pakistani press about the harassment of Muslims in Arakan. Burmese newspapers responded with de­ scriptions of the persecution of Buddhists by Muslim extremists in Pakistan, in­ cluding forced conversions. Reports were recirculated that the mujahideen re­ ceived arms and financial support from Pakistan. These rumors were denied by - both Pakistan and Burma, but it was clear that the mujahideen did frequently cross **the border into Pakistan (a difficult border to patrol effectively) so as to conceal their spoils or seek refuge from government forces that were in pursuit. Unofficial as it was, the aid extended to the mujahideen in East Pakistan where they were regarded as national and religious heroes and met by popular support.21 Between 1951 and 1954, reinforced government units annually waged large-scale offen­ sives against the mujahideen. Despite the fact that the military operations invari­ ably ended with the onset of the monsoon rains and the difficulties of the jungle-covered terrain impeded military operations, the mujahideen progressively lost their hold on the region. At the beginning of 1952, their strength was estimated at two thousand fighters; by the beginning of 1953, the number was down to a —mere three hundred. As with other guerrilla units in Burma, the mujahideen forces too were unstable. There were villagers who joined the fighters for limited periods, and then surrendered to government forces or returned to their homes while others replaced them. ~ In the second half of 1954, the mujahideen recouped and went on the offensive again, recapturing the areas of Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and most of Rathedaung. In Rangoon, Buddhists monks from Arakan held a protest fast against the mujahideen. In response to pressure, the government began a major offensive, called Operation Monsoon, in November. Mujahideen strength was broken, their strongholds captured, and a number of their leaders killed. From that point on,

The Mujahideen Rebellion

45

their military threat lessened considerably. Mujahideen units broke down into small groups which continued to rob and spread terror among Muslims and Bud­ dhists alike, particularly in remote regions. As they ceased their organized battles against army units, some turned to a campaign of systematic smuggling of rice from Arakan to Pakistan. Rice was either bought at a low price or confiscated from " villagers, and sold for high prices in Pakistan which continued to suffer from a shortage of the grain. The smuggling operation was not limited to the north but was prevalent in all parts of Arakan. Many non-Muslims (including government officials and army personnel) who were involved were brought to trial and impris­ oned. On the other side of the border, Pakistanis cooperated in the smuggling and ~ provided refuge to the mujahideen and their families. The rice harvest began in January, and smuggling activity was carried out during the dry season from Jan­ uary through May, a period also suitable for military activity. Consequently, there were frequent run-ins between smugglers and navy river patrols; occasionally the smugglers even attacked police stations. Mujahideen gang leaders would convene village heads, impose a tax, and proceed to organize the smuggling efforts with their cooperation. The mujahideen also encouraged the illegal immigration of— thousands of Chittagongs to Arakan from East Pakistan where there was a surplus y population. Because of the disorder and the hard local conditions, it was difficult to recognize illegal immigrants or distinguish between them from the local popu­ lation. The mujahideen interest in the illegal immigrants from East Pakistan was as workers who would cultivate abandoned land and grow rice on it. Rohingya leaders denied all this, claiming that not only was there no such immigration but that the Burmese authorities had invented the story in order to deny genuine Rohingya refugees the possibility of returning from Pakistan. Using the argument — that they were Chittagong made it possible to discriminate against the refugees, and arriving immigrants were often turned over to local authorities. Indeed, there were instances when Pakistanis were expelled and indigenous Muslim Arakanese were expelled along with them. In August of 1961, Burmese immigration officials estimated that ten thousand Pakistanis had destroyed their identity cards, acquired forged Burmese documents, and disappeared among the Muslim population of Arakan. A similar situation with similar claims was to reappear in that area several decades later. At the beginning of 1954, the Pakistan Embassy in Rangoon announced that ~ Cassim, a leader of the mujahideen, had been killed. The leadership had passed to him after Kawwal was murdered by his competitors in 1950.22Later it transpired that Cassim was only imprisoned in Chittagong where he was accused of illegal entry into Pakistan. The Burmese government expected that the rebel would be turned over to Burma even though there was no extradition agreement between the two countries. Pakistan refused and, in a debate in the Burmese Parliament in Rangoon, members of Parliament complained that despite the friendship between Burma and Pakistan, the rebel leader was not extradited. After his release from prison, he continued to live in Chittagong.23 Cassim’s imprisonment weakened the ^

46

Chapter Five

'

- mujahideen. His forces dispersed and established a camp for their families on the * Pakistan side of the frontier continuing the insurrection, smuggling rice, and rob­ bing until 4 July 1961 when approximately 290 mujahideen from the area of South Maungdaw surrendered to Brigadier Aung-Gyi, the deputy chief of staff of Burma. The rebels felt that there was no longer any point to their rebellion, espe­ cially after December 1961 when an agreement was reached between Pakistan and Burma to demarcate the border along the Naaf River, and to establish procedures for cooperation between the border commanders of Pakistan and Burma. Crossing - the frontier became increasingly difficult. The two countries wanted to prevent the mujahideen issue from becoming a bone of contention between them. The estab­ lishment of the Mayu region and the intensification of military operations helped speed the surrender. The several hundred remaining mujahideen who surrendered to Brigadier Aung-Gyi on 15 November, in East Buthidaung, received monetary grants and books of the Koran and were resettled in a special area in Maungdaw adjacent to a Burmese army camp.24

Notes 1. Moshe Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma: A Study o f a Minority Group (Wiesbaden: University of Heidelberg, Otto Harasowitz, 1972), 95-105. 2. FO 371/75660, Murray; Clive J. Christie, A Modem History o f Southeast Asia: Decol­ onization, Nationalism and Separation, Tauris Academic Studies (New York: I. B. Tauris, 19%), 168; Yegar, “Muslims of Burma,” 123-126; DO 142/453, “Burmese Border War: Muslims’ Fear of the Arakanese Pakistani Attitude,” from Michael Davidson, Special Cor­ respondent, The Scotsman (May 18, 1949); Tonia K. Devon, “Burma’s Muslim Minority: Out of the Shadows?” Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 75 (Berkeley, California: October, 1980): 27; Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics o f Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991), 87; Jan Becka, Historical Dictionary o f Myanmar (Metuchen, N.J.: Scare­ crow Press. 1995), 139. 3. See appendix B. 4. FO 371/75660, Murray; Christie, A Modem History, 168-169; FO 371/69515, the British Embassy in Rangoon to the Foreign Office in London (June 29,1948); DO 142/453, Deputy British High Commissioner, Dacca (July 18, 1948); ibid., July 25, 1948; ibid., Au­ gust 4, 1948; DO 142/453, London to High Commissioner in Karachi (August 13, 1948); Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), 154. 5. See footnote in Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 97. 6. Ibid., 97-98. 7. DO 142/453, Deputy British High Commissioner, Dacca, (August 1, 1948). 8. Ibid., September 5, 1948. 9. DO 142/453, Letter from the British Embassy, Rangoon, to the High Commissioner in Karachi (October 12, 1948). 10. DO 142/453, Deputy High Commissioner, Dacca (Nov. 6, 1948); DO 142/453 and FO 371/75660, British High Commissioner in Karachi to the Commonwealth Relations

The Mujahideen Rebellion

47

Office, London (Dec. 17, 1948); DO 142/453, Deputy High Commissioner, Chittagong, (Feb. 7, 1949); DO 142/453 and FO 371/75660, letter by the British Ambassador in Ran­ goon (February 12, 1949). 11. FO 435/2, Confidential print from FI 701/1013/79; James Bowker, Burma: Annual Review for 1948 (Rangoon, January 20, 1949), 7. 12. DO 142/453 and FO 371/75660, op cit.; DO 142/453, British High Commissioner in Pakistan to the Commonwealth Relations Office (February 12,1949); DO 142/453 and FO 371/75660, British Embassy in Rangoon to British High Commissioner in Karachi (Febru­ ary 28, 1949); DO 142/453, British High Commissioner, Karachi (March 4,1949). 13. DO 142/453, British High Commissioner, Pakistan (February 19,1949). 14. Ibid., (February 19,1949); DO 142/453, Deputy British High Commissioner, Dacca (February 28, 1949); FO 371/75660, British Embassy, Rangoon (April 4, 1949). 15. FO 371/76091 and DO 142/453, Mohammed Ikramullah in the Foreign Office, Lon­ don (May 5 and 19, 1949). 16. DO 142/453, “Burmese Border ‘War’: Moslems Fear of the Arkanese Pakistanis’ Attitude,” from Michael Davidson, Special Correspondent, The Scotsman (May 18,1949), a dispatch from Akyab; FO 371/75660, Deputy British High Commisioner, Dacca (June 18, 1949). 17. Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 98; Bertil Lintner, “In the Dragon’s Wake.” FEER, vol. 124, no. 17 (April 26, 1984), 33-35. 18. FO 371/75660, British Embassy’s letters, Rangoon (Aug. 9,1949), and also (Dec. 22, 1949). 19. FO 371/83115, The Central Arakanese Muslim Refugee Oiganization, East Pakistan, Head Office, Nilla (Dec. 22, 1949). 20. FO 371/83115, British Embassy, Rangoon (Feb. 21, 1950). 21. The descriptions that follow about the final stages of the mujahideen rebellion are based on Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 99-101 and the footnotes. See also Thompson and Adlofif, Minority Problems, 155-157; Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds o f Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Gainesville: University Press of Flor­ ida. 1993), 54. 22. Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics o f Ethnicity, 129; Christie, A Modem History, 169-170. 23. For biographical details regarding Cassim, see Yegar, The Muslims of Burma, 101, footnote 1. 24. Asia Yearbook 1963, 55; Devon, “Burma’s Muslim Minority,” 27; John W. Hender­ son, John W., Judith M. Heinman, Kenneth W. Martindale, Rinn-Sup Shinn, John O. Weaver, and Eston T. White, Area Handbook for Burma (Washington, D.C.: American University, Foreign Areas Studies Division, 1971), 78.

Chapter Six

The Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA)'

Even before fighting ceased in Arakan, the rebellion produced political results which were influenced by the enormous hostility that existed between Muslims and Buddhists. The Muslims rejected a demand by the Arakan Party (Buddhist) that Arakan be given the status of a “state” within the larger Burmese Union. All the party’s efforts to draw the Arakan Muslim members of Parliament into an all-Arakan faction following the elections of 1951, which would guarantee Mus­ lim rights in the “state” to be established, were rejected because of deep-seated distrust. Even moderate Muslim leaders who had reservations about the mujahideen rejected an Arakan Buddhist regime. Heads of the Rohingya in the Maungdaw and Buthidaung regions claimed the right of autonomy which would place the areas directly under the rule of the central government in Rangoon with­ out benefit of Buddhist Arakan officials or any other Arakan intervention in their life. As a minimal condition, they demanded the establishment of a separate region—even without official autonomous status—insisting only that it be directly answerable to the central government. The two Muslim members of the Burmese Constituent Assembly, and subsequently the four Muslim members of Parliament from Arakan, raised the demand at sessions of the assembly, in Parliament, and in the press. From 1960 through 1962, the Rohingya and other Muslim organizations in Arakan2 were active on behalf of Arakan Muslims, particularly those in the Maungdaw and Buthidaung regions. This was a direct response to U Nu’s decla­ ration on the eve of the April 1960 general elections that if his party were to win he would grant Arakan the status of a “state” within the Burmese Union, parallel to the status of other states in the union. After his election victory, U Nu appointed a Commission of Inquiry to assess all problems related to the Arakan question. A lengthy and closely argued memorandum was presented to the commission by the Rohingya Jamiat-al-Ulama Organization which posited that the Muslims of the area were a separate racial group, constituting a decisive majority there. They insisted on a distinct district that would be directly answerable to the government in Rangoon. Only such an arrangement could assure the cessation of illegal im­ migration and of commercial smuggling across the frontier, and would restore 49

50

Chapter Six

law and order. A special district would improve the dreadfully low standard of living of the inhabitants (most of whom depended on subsistence farming) would raise the backward conditions of education, and could prevent abuse of the popu­ lation by Arakan officials. They insisted on the establishment of an independent regional council which would enjoy local autonomy. As a compromise measure, those who drafted the memorandum agreed that the district could be a part of the Arakan “state” but that the head of state would be guided by the regional council in matters pertaining to the affairs of the district. This would apply as well to appointed officials who would be guided by the advice of the regional council. Furthermore, the district would receive a direct government allocation for its needs, particularly in the areas of culture, education, and the economy. The Rohingya Youth Organization held an Assembly in Rangoon on 31 July 1960 demanding that Arakan not be granted the status of a state because of the com­ munal tensions that existed between Muslims and Buddhists, dating back to the disturbances of 1942. A similar resolution was passed by the Rohingya Student Organization which added that if, nonetheless, a state were to be established, it would necessitate the partition of Arakan with separate autonomy for Muslims. Muslim members of Parliament from Maungdaw and Buthidaung also de­ manded that their regions not be incorporated into the proposed State of Arakan, and presented their demands to both the government and the Commission of In­ quiry. While they had no objection to the establishment of a state as such, its sovereignty ought not extend to Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and parts of Rathedaung where there were Muslim majorities. They expected these areas to be set up as an independent unit in order to insure the existence of the Rohingya. The imposition of an overriding state on the entire region could bring about the resumption of bloodshed. The problem of the Muslims of Akyab, and other areas in Arakan where Mus­ lims were not a majority, was more complex and resulted in tension between them and the Rohingya organizations. There were among them those who thought it pointless to oppose U Nu’s proposal of a state, which led them to favor statehood for all of Arakan including Muslim areas. Their fear was that separating the north­ ern regions of Arakan would adversely effect Muslims in other parts of Arakan and, consequently, they demanded guarantees for the Muslims. They wanted Mus­ lim participation in the Founding Constituent Assembly. In a memorandum pre­ sented to the Commission of Inquiry, their organizations stated that their support for a state would be contingent on the reciprocal support of Arakan Buddhists for their demands that the religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative, and educational needs of the Muslims be guaranteed in the constitution of the state. The head of the Arakan state would be alternately a Muslim and a non-Muslim. When a Muslim was head of state, the speaker of Parliament would be a non-Mus­ lim with a Muslim deputy, and vice versa. The same arrangement would hold for nominating committees and other bodies. Muslims would account for not less than a third of the ministers of the state. No law whose provisions might effect the life

The Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA)

51

of Muslims could be passed in the absence of support by the majority of Muslim members of the council. The head of state would act in accordance with the advice of Muslim members of government when making appointments to positions in the Muslim area. In all government positions, in public bodies, municipalities, etc., Muslims would enjoy a fair proportion in accordance with their size in the popu­ lation; the government would look after the educational and economic needs of Muslims; no student would be forced to participate in religious instruction in a religion other than his own; and the followers of all faiths could acquire religious instruction in keeping with their faith in all educational institutions. Supporters of every persuasion could establish their own educational institutions which would be recognized by the government. Muslims would be able to cultivate their unique Rohingya language (a combination of Arakanese, Bengali, and Urdu) and culture, and propagate their religion in conditions of complete freedom. A special official for Muslim affairs would be appointed whose responsibility would extend to in­ quiries into complaints and grievances on which he would report to the head of state. Every region in Arakan, particularly the North Arakan region, would retain the right to secede from the state during a ten-year period, bringing them under the direct rule of the central government in Rangoon. The advocates of this plan proposed to use as a model the arrangements between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, and the Chinese, Malaysians, Indians, and Pakistanis in Singapore. Of course, this preceded developments that occurred in Lebanon and Cyprus some years later which proved that the arrangements be­ tween the communities there were a failure and did not meet the test of reality. On 1 May 1961, the Burmese government announced the establishment of the' Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA) that encompassed the regions of-^ Muangdow, Buthidaung, and western Rathedaung. This could not be construed as autonomy since the region was administered by army officers. However, as the region was a separate administrative unit—not subject to Arakan—the Rohingya leadership agreed to the arrangement, particularly in view of the fact that the change occurred at the same time that the army, which was responsible for return­ ing security and order to the region, suppressed the mujahideen rebellion. At the^ beginning of 1962, the government prepared legislation to establish the “state” of Arakan, acceding to the Muslim request that it not include the Mayu district. But in March 1962 there was a military coup in Burma. U Nu’s government was over- thrown and supplanted by a government under General Ne Win. The new military government rescinded the plan to grant Arakan statehood within the union al­ though the Mayu administration was retained within the special framework estab­ lished for it in May 1961. The military coup brought Muslim political activity to an end. The policy of the military government put a stop to all activity by the minorities, many of whom had demanded greater measures of autonomy, a trend that gained momentum following U Nu’s 1960 election victory. General Ne Win"" regarded minority demands as a threat to Burma’s national unity. The military government instituted a much more radical economic policy than the one practiced

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by the civilian government that preceded it, and all businesses owned by foreign­ ers, including large local establishments, were nationalized. Economic enterprises owned by members of the Indian communities, as well as the Chinese minority, were expropriated in the course of 1963-1964. The result was a large-scale emi- gration from Burma. It is estimated that between 1963 and 1967, some 300,000 * Indians left, most of them Muslims, along with 100,000 Chinese. The majority of —the emigrants returned to their countries of origin—India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, but there were some who settled in various districts of northern Thai­ land. From the standpoint of the Muslim community, the nationalization policy of the military government hurt Muslim traders throughout Burma, especially in Rangoon. These business people had been the backbone of the entire Muslim minority and most of the leaders, functionaries, and financial supporters of the community’s activities and organizations were drawn from this circle.3

Notes 1. The following survey is based on Moshe Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma: A Study of a Minority Group (Wiesbaden: University of Heidelberg, Otto Harasowitz, 1972), 101-105, 113, and see notes there. 2. Ibid., 102, note 2, regarding these organizations. 3. Nalini Ranjan Chakravarti, The Indian Minority in Burma: The Rise and Decline o f an Immigrant Community (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 185-186; M. Ismael Khim Maung, The Population o f Burma: An Analysis o f the 1973 Census, vol. 97 (Hono­ lulu: East-West Population Institute, 1986), 17; David Joel Steinberg, ed., In Search o f Southeast Asia: A Modem History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 400; Trevor O. Ling, “Religious Minorities in Burma in the Contemporary Period,” in K. M. de Silva, Pensri Duke, Ellen S. Goldberg, and Nathan Katz, eds., Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies: Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Burma (Boulder, Colo.: Pinter Publishers, 1988; Lon­ don: Westview Press, 1988), 182-183; Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics o f Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991), 219; Omar Farouk, “The Muslims of Thailand,” in Ibrahim Lutfi, ed., Islamica (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan United Selangor, 1981), 102.

Chapter Seven

The Military Coup and Its Aftermath

The mujahideen did not totally disappear after the military defeats of 1961 and the* subsequent end of hostilities. Activity continued in the Buthidaung and Maungdaw districts, and Muslim underground organizations were set up or reactivated in North Arakan. There is some difficulty involved in ascertaining the names of thosewho were the heads of these organizations—indeed, the very names of the organizations—because various sources suggest different names. In any case, it is clear that after the forcible suppression of the student demonstration in Rangoonon 7 July 1962 by the Burmese army, there was a partial renewal of activity on the part of Muslim rebel organizations in Arakan and other protest movements in Burma. Muslim students who fled from the city to join the rebels in Arakan were among the students who had demonstrated at Rangoon University. One of these, Muhammad Jafar (or Jafar Habib or Muhammad Gafoor—it is unclear whether this refers to one man or to different individuals), who had been the chairman of the Rohingya Student Union in Rangoon, went underground in 1963 and reorgan­ ized the rebel movement that was seeking independence and separation from Burma. The movement was now called Rohingya Independence Force (RIF). An­ other leader, Zafar Sani, set up guerilla units called the Muslim (or Arakan) Na­ tional Liberation Party among Muslims living along the northern bank of the Naaf River. It is conceivable, but difficult to determine, whether or not the two move­ ments are in fact one. Contradictory reports exist concerning outside support for the Rohingya rebels. One view holds that Muhammad Jafar (Jafar Habib) sought help from Arab countries but received only token support. Another report says that Saudi Arabia sent aid including arms. Bangladesh itself avoided helping the rebels preferring to retain good relations with Burma. In this, they mirrored the behavior of East Pakistani authorities who, in 1954, actually arrested Cassim, the Mujahid leader, because his operations along the Burmese frontier complicated Pakistan's delicate relations with the Burmese government. Again, there is contradictory information which indicates that the Rohingya ob­ tained arms from Bangladesh when the latter was engaged in a war of liberation against Pakistan in 1971. Not much is known about the military activity of these guerilla organizations, other than that in 1969 the Burmese army uncovered a rebel ,J 3

54

Chapter Seven

arms cache in the jungles of the Mayu Hills in Arakan. In 1975, the rebel move­ ment changed its name to Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) but the number of armed members is unknown. The movement was based mainly in the hills of North Arakan close to the Bangladesh border. In 1983, Jafar Habib and three other lead­ ers of the RPF went on the haj to Mecca. While there they met representatives of the Saudi government but apparently did not convince them to provide aid. Nor were they successful in their efforts that year to obtain observer status at the Is­ lamic Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers which would have enabled the or_ganization’s involvement in the struggle. An appeal to the Burmese government was rejected, again because of the staunch desire of Bangladesh to retain good relations with Burma. At the same time, publications originating in Bangladesh point to some foreign attention to the movement—stemming, no doubt, from the following vexing events.1 When Bangladesh became an independent state in December 1971, Burma was one of the first countries to grant recognition. As a result of the war, an undeter­ mined number of Bengalis who were opposed to the cessation of Bangladesh from Pakistan fled to Arakan. Subsequently almost 17,000 Bengalis returned though the number that remained in Arakan continues to be unknown.2 General Ne Win’s visit to Bangladesh in April 1974 was intended to underscore the friendship between Burma and Bangladesh. (In January of that year Arakan had been granted the status of a state within the Union of Burma.) After the assassination of Bangladesh president, Sheik Mujib in August 1975, Burma again promptly recognized the new ... government in Dacca. Recognition came despite differences of approach on two bilateral issues between the countries. The first issue, actuated by oil explorations in the Bay of Bengal, concerned the demarcation of a maritime boundary between the countries; the second problem was related to the rebellion in the frontier area, a matter of no small importance since the land frontier crossed a mountainous terrain which could provide hiding places for rebel movements on both sides, mak­ ing the task of monitoring entry into the country difficult. At the beginning of - 1975, about 15,000 Muslims from the Arakan region (one version suggests the A number was only 3,500) were forced to leave their homes because of persecution by the local Buddhist population, crossing the border into Bangladesh. Burmese authorities detained 300 people in Arakan, accusing them of illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Bangladesh voiced official protests. In July 1977, Bangladesh president, General Ziaur Rahman, spent four days in Rangoon at the invitation of General Ne Win. The visit was marked by gestures of friendship which were ex­ changed between the rulers, and a commercial treaty was signed. At the same time, the question of the frontier and illegal crossings was raised. Bangladesh suggested convening periodic meetings between the sides to assess the situation along the frontier. Burma responded by saying that it would look into the proposal. Burma also agreed to look into a Bangladesh proposal that the 150 Bangladesh citizens who had been arrested in Rangoon and Akyab be returned. No progress was made in these talks.3

The Military Coup and Its Aftermath

55

The military regime of General Ne Win stepped up its suppression of autonomy*" seeking minorities, including the Muslims. And several months after his visit to i Bangladesh, new tensions developed between the two countries. The immediate cause was an operation carried out by Burmese immigration officials in western Arakan. There are conflicting reports about what occurred. The Burmese govern­ ment explained that the influx of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh—where con­ ditions of poverty and hunger that began in 1971, in the wake of Bangladesh’s war of independence, still prevailed—had grown lately and assumed threatening di­ mensions. The government also claimed that bands of illegal immigrants had razed isolated villages in Arakan in April 1978 and attacked police stations and immi­ gration offices. There was a similar influx in other sparsely settled regions such as Shan, Kachin, and Chin along the Burmese border but the extent of illegal infiltra­ tion in Arakan was enormous. In response, the government set out on a campaign called Naga Min which was a systematic search throughout the problematic re­ gions intended to update the government’s demographic data: to register and clas­ sify all the residents as to whether they were Burmese citizens, legally residing foreigners, or had entered the country illegally. In Kachin, Chin, and Rangoon itself, the operation was launched in May of 1977. On February 11 1978, it began in the city of Akyab in Arakan. From there 200 immigration police moved to the Buthidaung area; difficulties occurred at the end of the month when they reached the rural areas. On May 19, the Burmese government declared that it had examined 108,431 people. Legal steps were taken against 643 of them; 35,590, all Bengali, fled leaving 6,294 empty houses behind them. The government blamed “incite- ment by irresponsible people” and the apparent inability of residents to produce bonafide identity cards or acceptable registration documents—an indication that they were either illegal immigrants from Bangladesh or criminals running from justice who were afraid to face legal action. Later, Burmese sources stated that by 27 May, 101,048 people had abandoned Buthidaung and Maungdaw, many of whom had not gone to Bangladesh but were hiding in the jungle.4 The results of the Naga Min operation were detrimental when viewed from the Bangladesh side of the frontier. Initially, 70,000 refugees crossed the border into Bangladesh seeking asylum from what they described as acts of torture and atroc­ ity carried out by the Burmese authorities. It was reported that in the jungles along the border there were another 50,000 refugees who had been driven out of their— homes and who were attempting to reach Bangladesh. Many of those who sought safety in Bangladesh claimed that they were both Rohingya and Burmese citizens. They expressed the fear that, in effect, the Burmese authorities were intent on ridding Arakan of Muslims, all of whom they regarded as a foreign element, yet Bangladesh was not extending citizenship to them. The Bangladesh government established six refugee camps, and the refugees set up additional camps on their own initiative. By July, it was reported that there were 300 refugee camps! Al-~* though it is unclear what the term “camp” encompassed, it is almost certain that this was a highly inflated figure. Certainly there were eleven main camps along

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Chapter Seven

- the border. By mid-June, the number of refugees reported to have crossed the Naaf River had reached 200,000, and an additional 3,000 a day were leaving Burma. Between March and August 1978, more than a quarter million Muslims crossed ^Xhe Naaf River. Again and again refugees told horror stories about the Burmese army and local Arakan Buddhists—arbitrary arrests, rape, desecration of mosques, and the destruction of villages. Various sources indicated that if the army itself had not committed these acts, neither had they made any effort to prevent Buddhist Arakanese from spreading terror or destroying Muslim villages.s In the 11 February swoop by 200 Immigration Department police who had come ^ from Rangoon to Akyab, it was reported that the Muslim quarters of the city were sealed off and 1,734 people arrested in one night, some of whom had forged iden­ tity cards. The Muslims saw this as an attempt to oust them from Arakan and held a demonstration in the city on 17 February. The demonstration was put down by force, causing extreme panic. The Muslim population fled further north as the ~ campaign pushed forward. Regarding the lack of identity cards, the Muslims ar­ gued that when the Burmese government issued identity cards to its citizens in 1962, Rohingya Muslims were not issued National Registration Cards (NRC); in­ stead, they were given Foreigner Registration Cards (FRC). They refused them. As a result, the majority had no identity cards of any kind, and therefore were not considered Burmese citizens. Those few who had accepted NRC documents were forced to return them in 1977 when the authorities demanded them back. It was plainly unjust that now people without documents were being punished as infiltra­ tors from Bangladesh. One estimate places the number of such persons in prison at 6,000.6 At the beginning of April, an advisor to Bangladesh President Kazi Anwarul Huj traveled to Rangoon in order to initiate a dialogue on the refugee problem. The negotiations were continued in mid-April when Burma’s foreign minister, Brigadier General Myint Maung, came to Dacca. The talks were not con­ cluded, and it was decided that they would be resumed in Rangoon. At the end of April 1978, the Bangladesh government registered a sharp protest with the Burmese government concerning the expulsion by force of “thousands of —Burmese Muslim citizens” to Bangladesh. The President, Ziaur Rahman, spoke about the inhuman removal of Burmese Muslims from their country, and de­ manded that they be allowed to return. The Burmese government continued to insist that those who were expelled were Bangladesh citizens who had resided “ illegally in Burma. Tension along the Burma-Bangladesh border intensified. Naval units of both sides patrolled the Naaf River, and army reinforcements were sent to —the region. Each side accused the other of sniping and opening fire. Apparently the negative worldwide publicity Burma received after Bangladesh called for interna­ tional aid changed the Burmese position regarding repatriation. On 6 June, the foreign minister of Bangladesh, Tobarak Hussein, went to Rangoon to discuss the refugee issue with the Burmese government. Despite some monetary support from the United Nations, maintaining the refugees was a difficult proposition for pov­ erty stricken Bangladesh where the standard of living was extremely low. The

The Military Coup and Its Aftermath

57

UN assistance enabled Bangladesh to maintain ten or eleven temporary camps of bamboo huts and straw and to provide food for approximately 140,000 refugees. During the first three months there were cases of cholera and some 850 people, mostly women and children, died of malnutrition, dysentery, pneumonia and ma­ laria. It was clear that conditions would worsen with the beginning of the monsoon season. And, indeed, by the beginning of March 1979, 1,583 deaths were recorded, most o f them children. Much higher estimates have been suggested as well. Aid was sent by a number of Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia, and by international bodies. Saudi Arabia demanded that Burma ~ cease expelling Muslims. India was worried because small groups of refugees had managed to find their way into India. On 30 May, the United Nations High Com­ missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) requested a budget of $15.5 million which would cover an eight-month period of support for the refugees. The World Muslim League, headquartered in Mecca, issued a press release on 15 April 1978 regarding the distress of Arakan Muslims. On 9 July, both governments agreed to the repatriation of 200,000 refugees to Arakan. The Burmese agreed that anyone in possession of a National Registration Certificate could return but conceded that not all the refugees had such a docu­ ment. Repatriation was scheduled to begin at the end of August, the first stage intended for those who held National Registration Certificates, or Foreign Regis­ tration Certificates. The two parties also agreed on measures to prevent illegal entry into either country and a demarcation of the border. The Burmese insisted on guarantees that criminals would not be given refuge in Bangladesh. Dacca con­ sented because it too had run into difficulties in frontier regions with dissident elements that had escaped to Burmese territory. The Saudi ambassador to Bangladesh participated in the negotiations. For its part, the Burmese government continued to publish denials in the press about government repression of Muslims in Arakan, and to press the point took twenty-eight journalists to the border area to show them villages which, they said, were actually burned down by illegal im­ migrants who came from the city of Chittagong in Bangladesh.7 Burma agreed to the repatriation of refugees, but neither the number who wished to return nor the number Burma would actually accept was known. Bangladesh officials believed that there would not be any difficulty regarding ap­ proximately 100,000 refugees, about one-half of those who had National Registra­ tion Certificates or Foreign Registration Certificates (although the Burmese offi­ cials claimed that many of the documents were forgeries). Bangladesh felt that many refugees would fear to return unless they received sufficient guarantees about their safety in the future. The first group was scheduled for repatriation in early September. The beginning was slow. The refugees exhibited little enthusiasm for the project, and it was not easy to persuade them of its merit. The National Patriotic Front of the Rohingya continued to believe that the Naga Min campaign was aimed at expelling the Muslim population of Arakan and that was the true goal of the Burmese government. It was a notion that planted fear in the hearts of the

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refugees and deterred their return. There were those who had signed petitions to return, but later disappeared and apparently remained in Bangladesh. Others who were signatories were beaten, probably by opponents of repatriation. The repatriation campaign began on 15 September, but by the end of the month only 250 people had availed themselves of it. Inspection of documents was carried out by representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and to facilitate the operation, the Burmese authorities agreed to simplify procedures by accepting refugees without documents who could be identified by village heads, or in some cases, even by other returnees. In time the rate of return accelerated, and by March 1979, the number had grown to 80,055, with a weekly rate of some 5,000 to 6,000. Because of corruption on the part of the Bangladesh officials who were in charge, it was difficult to obtain accurate figures about the numbers of people living in camps or those who wished to return. Officials of the World Health Organization (WHO) claimed that highly inflated figures of deaths were reported in order to obtain cloth for shrouds, cloth which could then be sold. Conversely, there were exaggerations about the number of living refugees in order to get food rations. In theory, journalists and photographers were allowed to visit the camps, but camp officials were less than cooperative. Though the rate of return accelerated and procedures became more organized, aid officials believed that 50,000 refugees would, nonetheless, remain in Bangladesh because the Burmese government would not accept their means of identification. The UNHCR allocated seven mil­ lion dollars to the land resettlement program of refugee farmers. Other returnees were offered public-works employment such as paving roads or improving the ir­ rigation network. There were plans for the expansion of existing hospitals and health clinics and the construction of schools in distant hilly regions. In June 1979, the Burmese ambassador to Bangladesh announced that 151,000 refugees had al­ ready returned and that by the end of the month all the rest would be repatriated. In actuality, the program lasted somewhat longer. In mid-October, UNHCR offi­ cials supervising the operation stated that the Burmese government had provided returnees with construction materials, agricultural tools, and fishing nets but that there were still 9,000 people awaiting repatriation. A certain number of refugees managed to immigrate to other countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. The government prevented many of those who did return to Arakan from com­ ing back to their original villages. No new houses, schools, or mosques were built, nor did people return to their previous places of employment. Among those who found that they had no place to live and that their land had been seized by Buddhist residents, were people who opted to recross the border into Bangladesh. The truth is that the precise number of Muslim refugees from Arakan is unknown because many of them never registered at a specific place. The majority of the Rohingya were illiterate and few were able to provide documentary proof of any kind as to their citizenship.8 In any case, the large-scale return of the refugees motivated the Burmese regime to make yet another effort to rid itself of foreign populations, and

The Military Coup and Its Aftermath

59

in 1982, an immigration law was passed which turned the Rohingya into de facto foreigners. Throughout the crisis, the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) had absolutely no impact on events and remained inactive. By contrast, the Burmese Communist Party reacted quickly. They saw to it that passage was secured for refugees to Bangladesh, and they distributed literature calling on Arakan Buddhists to halt attacks on Muslims and join a united effort to overthrow the Ne Win government. A direct consequence of the RPF’s inaction was a split within the organization. In a 1978 magazine interview, Mohammed Zaffir (Ja’afar?) the leader of the RPF, said that the sole aim of the movement was to achieve territorial autonomy in the areas of Maungdaw and Buthidaung. There was an assumption that the underlying rea­ son of the Naga Min “identity” campaign in Arakan, ostensibly intended to provide demographic data on the number of illegal immigrants (accompanied as it was by stepped-up military activity), was actually to identify mujahideen elements in the population. The assumption was prompted by a fear that Arab states, particularly Libya, would use the mujahideen as a springboard for subversive activity as had happened in the South Philippines. The fear was shared by Bangladesh. The rebels mingled with their coreligionists in order to cross the border as refugees into Bangladesh. RPF members were greatly encouraged by the rise of pan-Islam movements in Islamic countries and looked to Muslim states, particu­ larly, Libya and Saudi Arabia would support their separatist aims in Arakan, pro­ viding them with aid and equipping them with arms. More moderate Muslims hoped that publicly expressed moral support by Islamic nations would help them to achieve human rights, freedom of religion, and civil equality in Burma.9 Burmese Muslims presented their case to the International Conference on Mus- > lim Minorities held in London in April 1980, and sponsored by the Islamic Council of Europe. A long list of accusations was presented against the Burmese govern­ ment including the closure of Muslim schools in Burma following the army’s sei­ zure of power in 1962, confiscation of mosque property, requirement of a license to slaughter cattle for Muslim holidays, prohibitions against joining the haj pil­ grimage to Mecca, restrictions on religious publications, and detention of Muslim religious leaders due to an assassination attempt on Ne Win in 1977. (At about the same time, the Burmese government issued a statement accusing Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi and Bangladesh of being behind the attempt.) Muslim com­ plaints also spoke of instances of torture and the fact that Muslims were singled out for attack by government forces during the suppression of the 1962 student riots. The issue of Muslims fleeing Arakan to Bangladesh was not mentioned. Th? conference responded to all these claims by expressing sorrow that there was no improvement in the condition of Muslim communities in non-Muslim lands, and regret at the lack of human and civil rights in these countries. Thailand and Burma were specifically mentioned. The conference appealed to all Muslim countries to aid their coreligionists everyplace that help was needed without, however, infring­ ing on the sovereignty of any country or its territorial integrity. In such places

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where Muslim communities were in physical danger, or their Islamic identity threatened, the Muslim world was called upon to employ its material and moral resources, and its significant economic and political powers in order to insure the protection of Muslim rights.10 Ferment among Arakan Muslims did not subside. Some sought out allies in other minority separatist groups that had been active in Burma since the end of World War II, particularly the Karen minority. In May 1976, a conclave of thirteen separatist minorities from Thailand-Burmese border areas met to work out military _ cooperation among themselves. All the organizations demanded full autonomy. Similar meetings had taken place earlier: in 1975, representatives of five bodies, including the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), which represented Arakan Bud­ dhists, set up the Federal National Democratic Front. The organizations agreed to cooperate with one another and to coordinate military operations against the cen­ tral government, but nothing came of the meeting.11 A new Muslim rebel organization, Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Force (KMLF), was established on 31 August 1984. Its leader, Mohammed Zaid, known as Brother Zaid, was a forty-seven-year-old former official in the Burma Airways Corporation. The strength of the KMLF was unknown although there is informa­ tion that a number of Muslims, apparently two hundred men, were armed and equipped by the Karen rebels in the hills of North Burma, the locale where the new Muslim organization was active. It was reported that members of the group had already taken part in a number of clashes with Burmese army units who were fighting against the Karens near the Thailand border. The KMLF said that it was organized in response to the anti-Muslim riots of June and July 1983 in the cities of Moulmein and Martaban where mobs had broken into Muslim quarters and burned mosques. A month later the riots spread to several places in the Irrawaddy Delta. Here, too, mosques were burned and hundreds of refugees streamed to the Thai border. Conceivably, the KMLF replaced earlier Muslim underground groups such as the Ummat Liberation Front, which was founded in Mandalay in 1976 and was no longer in existence, and the Rohingya Patriotic Front which was ineffective. The KMLF claimed that it represented all of Burma’s Muslims and that their aim was not the establishment of a separate Islamic state but rather a struggle to insure ^freedom of religious expression and guarantees against religious coercion. Mu­ hammad Zaid circulated an open letter he had written to the president of Burma, San Yu, which included a declaration of war against the central government. In his letter, he lambasted the burning of mosques in southern Burma and called for unity among Muslims. Copies of the letter were sent to the governments of Libya, Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as to several Muslim youth orga­ n iz a tio n s in Southeast Asian countries. In March 1987, differences surfaced be* tween Sunni and Shiite leaders in the movement, and the organization disbanded ... even as its members were fighting in Karen guerilla units. Rumors circulated that an organization in Burma was mobilizing Muslims and Buddhists in Arakan12 sending them as mercenaries to reinforce the Karen rebels. When the KMLF was

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disbanded, it was replaced by the Muslim Liberation Organization. It is possible ~s that KMLF served as the core of the new organization about which very little is known. What is known is that independent Muslim units continued to operate within the broader Karen rebel framework. It should be emphasized that the infor«mation with regard to these organizations is essentially disjointed, lacking in clar­ ity, and based on partial reports in the press without other direct or reliable sub­ stantiating sources.13 It must be added that in one area—smuggling—there was apparently no change in the traditional practices despite all the ups and downs in the political and mili­ tary situation along Burma’s frontier. Black-market activity and smuggling routes into and out of Burma in several directions, including Bangladesh, continued un­ abated. Rice, com, and betel nuts were smuggled out of Burma in exchange for textiles, medications, kerosene, sewing machines, canned goods, and other com­ modities that were in short supply there. The income from smuggling these items along almost the entire Burmese border was a primary source of funding for the various rebel groups.14 In 1982, an agreement to demarcate a 142 kilometer stretch of the frontier was concluded between Bangladesh and Burma. The border was actually set in 1985; there is no indication, however, that this facilitated sealing the border to prevent smuggling. The second area in which there was no change was the abuse of minorities (including the Rohingya of Arakan). During the 1980s, Amnesty International cited the imprisonment of Muslims and abuses in Arakan in its annual reports. It reported torture carried out by the army and the police in their interrogations, attacks on villagers engaged in prayer in mosques, restriction of freedom of movement, denial of human rights for refugees, and summary exe­ cutions carried out by the army. Amnesty International appealed to San Yu, the president of Burma, interceding on behalf of forty-five Muslims of Bengal origin who were accused of illegal immigration and who had been imprisoned for many years. The organization expressed suspicion that they were arrested because of their ethnic origin and religion. It is not known whether this appeal had any effect.15 Burma regarded minorities as a threat to its unity which was, in any case, shaky and sought to rid the country of them or limit their numbers. This tendency to deny foreigners the benefit of citizenship status could be seen not only in the national­ ization of property owned by foreigners and pressure on them to emigrate, but in the formulation of the Burma Citizenship Law. Passed on 15 October 1982, it replaced the Union Citizenship Act promulgated after Burma became independent and in force for only two years. Preparations for the enactment of the new citizen­ ship law began in 1976 and went on for approximately six years. The intent of the new law was to safeguard dominant positions of power and advantage for the Bur­ mese people who, according to the official definition, also included such local in­ digenous groups as the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Mon, Arakan Buddhists, Shan, and others who were present in Burma before 1823. The year 1823 was chosen as a baseline because the first Anglo-Burmese war broke out the following year during which the British annexed the border areas of Arakan and Tenasserim. As the

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result of that war, and the two Anglo-Burmese wars that followed when all of Burma came under British rule, foreigners began to move in freely, particularly from the Indian subcontinent and China. The law distinguished between three categories of citizenship. The first related to Burmans and members of the local communities noted above, all of whom enjoyed full political and economic rights. The second category applied to offspring of mixed marriages between communi­ ties, and to the mates of ethnic Burmans. These persons were classed as associate citizens. The category also applied to anyone who had lived in Burma for five consecutive years or had lived there for eight out of ten years preceding 1942 or before independence in 1948. Associate citizens had the right to earn a living but could not serve in any office. The third category related to naturalized citizens who were the offspring of other ethnic groups who entered Burma as immigrants during British colonial rule. Most people in that category had come from the Indian sub­ continent, though there was a scattering of Chinese and others as well. Within this category were many Muslims regarded by the Burmese army as potential security risks. Naturalized citizens could not fill any political function, serve in the armed forces, or be appointed as directors of government institutions. The manifest aim of the law was to discriminate against those who belonged in this category. The law occasioned great anger in the Muslim community of Burma, particularly among the Rohingya of North Arakan. The Rohingya saw themselves as Burmese citizens by virtue of their centuries-long residence in the region; however, the au­ thorities regarded them as illegal immigrants from Bengal. Indeed, the close con­ tacts across the border and the widespread assimilation between indigenous and immigrant Muslims, which went on uninterrupted throughout the period of British rule and before it, made it difficult to distinguish between who was indigenous and who was immigrant. The new citizenship law coupled with the series of military operations that had been waged against Muslims over the years raised suspicions that Burma was conducting a de facto process of ethnic cleansing.16 The perception of anti-Muslim prejudice was reinforced by events that occurred in the second half of 1988. For the twenty-six years following the military coup of 1962, Burma had been a socialist dictatorship with a single legal political party— the army. In June 1988, there were widespread, primarily nonviolent demonstra­ tions of students and Buddhist monks protesting against police violence, against the repression of political rights, and against the government’s failure in the con­ duct of the country’s economy. The authorities reacted by shutting down campuses and killing a number of students. The demonstrations intensified and on 23 June, General Ne Win resigned as head of the ruling party, the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). Demonstrations intensified even further during the months of Au­ gust and September when the demonstrators declared a general strike and de­ manded a change in the system and a return to democracy. On 18 September, the previous regime reinstated its rule by means of a military operation which put down demonstrations throughout the country, formally reinstituting military rule. The new regime called itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council

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(SLORC). Muslim leaders accused the government of using torture and extortion in predominantly Muslim populated regions, i.e., North Arakan. Muslims were being punished with special severity for participation in antigovernment demon­ strations, even though the demonstrations had been countrywide and were carried out by several ethnic groups which had acted in concert against the government.17 At the end of 1989, the government of Burma/Myanmar18 began to settle Bud­ dhists in Muslim areas of Arakan/Rakhine by displacing the local population which had traditionally been regarded as a hostile element in Burma. Muslims'' claimed that political activists and heads of their community were put under arrest. The army was implicated in robbery, rape, murder, and the burning of mosques. In April 1991, those who had been expelled or had escaped from their homes began arriving in Bangladesh as refugees, pushed to leave by the army. Others were conscripted by the army to work as forced laborers in road building, the construction of camps, or as porters. As is the case with much that relates to Burma, one is unable to determine the exact number of this new wave of refugees, with wide divergences reported in media sources. In the early months of 1991, hundreds of Muslims left Burma every week arriving at refugee camps in Bengal. When the monsoon season began, health problems broke out and became progres­ sively worse. An April cyclone badly damaged some of the refugee camps. In June1992, the estimated number of refugees who had come to Bangladesh fluctuated between 210,00 to 280,000. There were, however, many other refugees who were " dispersed within the Bangladesh population, a population already crowded and impoverished, many themselves without a place to live, wandering about in search of shelter, improvising temporary huts out of any material available. The govern­ ment of Bangladesh attempted to register the refugees systematically, provide medical examinations, and send them on to one of the dozen camps that had been prepared for them where they would receive ration cards. In December 1991, a unit of the Burmese army attacked an army camp in Bangladesh on the pretext that it was in pursuit of Rohingya rebels. One soldier was killed and three injured. The incident precipitated an increase in the stream of refugees that swelled at first to 1,000 a day, grew to 5,000, and finally to 7,000 a day. At that point, Bangladesh" appealed for international aid. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees at­ tempted to find funding, arrange for tents, provide medicines, and coordinate the work of private aid organizations that had begun working among the refugees. In March 1992, the number of refugees from Arakan eased somewhat but soon mounted again, reaching 2,000 to 3,000 a day. Among them were people who had first run away in 1978, returned to Burma, and were now in flight once more. The refugees reported that there were tens of thousands more refugees on the way. At the time the estimated number of homeless people was 85,000. In July 1992, ~ Bangladesh had registered 268,551 refugees; in 1993, the count by the UNHCR x stood at 228,000 Muslim refugees from Arakan, placed in seventeen camps in South Bangladesh. It was reported that 2,000 refugees died of disease and malnu­ trition during the first five months after they arrived at the camps.19

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As early as November 1991, the government of Bangladesh asked Burma to permit the repatriation of refugees who had crossed the frontier. Burma disregarded the request, asking instead that the UN mediate between it and Bangladesh. At that juncture, Burma was facing harsh criticism at the UN. In December 1991, the SLORC government of Burma was condemned by the UN General Assembly in New York, and in February and March 1992, there was a similar condemnation by the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. This condemnation related to the repression of democratic opposition (the National League for Democracy) headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as the flight of the Muslims. States that generally displayed friendship toward Burma, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and - Muslim Brunei, now showed signs of hostility. The uneasiness of the SLORC J government grew following remarks made by Prince Haled ben Sultan ben Abd el-Aziz, commander of the Saudi units in the Gulf War of 1991, when he visited Dacca in mid-April. He called on the UN to take measures against Burma similar —to Operation Desert Storm which the UN had mounted against Iraq. The Burmese government continued to reject accusations of abuse by the army of ethnic minor­ ities, including Muslims, but it did show some elasticity regarding its previous ^ stance and indicated a willingness to permit the refugees to return. On 28 April 1992, following five days of negotiations, Foreign Ministers, A. S. M. Mostafizur Rahman of Bangladesh and U Ohn Gyaw of Burma, signed two documents that called for the rapid repatriation of refugees. The Bangladesh foreign minister — stated that there were 223,000 refugees. The first agreement signed by the two foreign ministers laid down the principles for repatriation, and the second signed by officials of both foreign ministries dealt with technical modalities. The agree­ ments called for a “voluntary and secure” return. The arrangements for checking on the identity of refugees, most of whom had lost their documents or had them confiscated by security forces, were worked out. The Bangladesh foreign minister clarified “voluntary” return to mean that refugees would not be forced to return against their will. This was a matter of vital concern because many had lost trust in the Burmese government after experiencing the army’s brutality. The Burmese foreign minister said that even those refugees who had no proof of their citizenship would be allowed to return if they could prove that they had lived in Burma pre­ viously (by remembering the names of their village or of the village heads). The agreement included a paragraph on monitoring by the UN and about rehabilitation of the refugees. Both ministers expressed the hope that the process of return could be achieved in six months.20 In disregard of the agreement, the Burmese government refused to allow repre­ sentatives of the UNHCR or other UN agencies to supervise the repatriation proc­ ess. On their part, the refugees feared that they would once again be confronted with a fate of persecution and harassment at the hands of the Burmese authorities, circumstances which had been the cause of their earlier flight. They refused to return unless Burma agreed to independent international supervision of the repatriation and of the situation in Arakan. On 24 July 1992, the UN High Com-

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65

missioner for Refugees visited Rangoon, and after a series of talks, a Memoran­ dum of Understanding was signed in November between Burma and the UNHCR that regularized the presence of the organization, as well as other UN bodies, in Arakan. It also determined the form of supervision over the process of return for the refugees from Bangladesh. Not only was the number of refugees returning to Arakan by the end of 1992 quite small, but Bangladesh accused Burma of being responsible for the continued flight of refugees from Arakan even after the foreign ministers had signed an agreement in April. Toward the end of 1992, Burma began accepting refugees who returned voluntarily, without benefit of international su­ pervision. It was an extremely slow process; only 5,981 refugees returned by De­ cember 1992, but the pace picked up in 1993 when approximately 50,000 refugees returned. Representatives of both governments met once a month to check on progress. Bangladesh officials were even taken on guided tours in Arakan to re­ view the situation. But in Bangladesh the disagreements between refugees who refused to return without international supervision and those who agreed even in its absence generated acts of violence in the refugee camps which culminated in exchanges of fire between both sides.21 The world showed little interest in the problems facing the Muslims of Arakan, and what interest there was, was limited in its scope. Only the United States at­ tempted to bring pressure to bear on the SLORC regime. At a meeting of the ASEAN held in Manila in July, 1992, James Baker, the American secretary of state, asked the member nations who were attending to adopt a sharp stand against the infringement of human rights in Burma/Myanmar. The ASEAN countries, most of whom had their own difficulties with regard to human rights, preferred to 1 adopt a policy of “constructive engagement” influenced, no doubt, by their interest in recruiting Burma to their organization. Even the two large Muslim states, In­ donesia and Malaysia, sufficed with communiques critical of Burma/Myanmar's treatment of Muslims in Arakan and registered diplomatic protests about the treat­ ment of Muslims by the Burmese army, but refrained from taking any concrete steps beyond this. Representatives of the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) sought aid from the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and sent their rep­ resentatives to that body. They achieved very little in their efforts to get outside help from Islamic countries beyond a statement issued by the OIC in 1992 blaming the Burmese government for its persecution of Muslims and for the plight of the —' refugees. Myanmar continued to reject the UN’s expression of concern for the denial of human and political rights. In December 1992, the UN Assembly called for the reinstatement of human and political rights in Burma demanding the return to power of the National League for Democracy, led by those who had been duly elected in 1990; the release of Aung San Suu Kyi; and the protection of ethnic and religious minorities. The United States criticized Thailand for inviting a Burmese delegation to the Annual Meeting of the ASEAN Ministers which was to be held in Bangkok in July 1994. It took until 10 August 1996, when General Than Shwe, Head of the SLORC, was on a visit to Kuala Lumpur, that a protest was made by

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the representatives of twenty-nine nongovernmental agencies. Prominent among these was the influential Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) which boasted such important leaders as Anwar Ibrahim, then deputy prime minister. The protest was somewhat embarrassing to the Malaysian prime minister, Dr. Dato Muhammed Mahatir, who in other circumstances could be counted on to raise a variety of Muslim issues which might range from Bosnia to Chechnya. An impor­ tant factor in the increased criticism of Burma was apparently economic. Malaysia was heavily invested in Burma to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. Nonetheless, Malaysia permitted a leader of the Rohingya, Dr. Ahmad Kamal, to live in Malaysia. He had escaped to Bangladesh from Burma in the early 1990s, and from there to Malaysia. Once there, he was active in helping the ABIM move­ ment publicize the persecutions of Muslims in his native country.22 Repatriation of refugees was renewed in 1994 though it proceeded at a slow pace. By the end of the year 60,000 people had returned; by the end of 1995, 115,000; and by the end of 1996,200,000. Some 20,000 refugees remained unac­ counted for; it was reported that they simply disappeared from refugee camps when they refused repatriation. There were also reports of retaliation carried out against refugees who had returned to Arakan. UNHCR representatives in Myanmar investigated information that had come to them about the mistreatment of returnees and brought the information to the attention of local Burmese offi­ cials. A sense of uneasiness prevailed about the fate of Muslims in the area once the UNHCR mandate was no longer in effect.23 It is interesting that throughout this period there is no mention of significant operations of any kind by Rohingya units, the only exception being some skirmishes with army patrols in jungle areas. Nor is it clear whether organizations that were known—but whose names changed at various times—were the selfsame organizations or whether they were, in fact, new organizations. Additionally, nothing is known about their specific goals. At the beginning of the 1990s there were two organizations, the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). Both were based in southeast Bangladesh where the Dacca government permitted them to operate. Not surprisingly, their spokespeople claimed that they had thousands of supporters and hundreds of armed people in training. Perhaps they did not engage in military operations because of the overwhelming firepower of the well-trained Burmese army, or perhaps because there was no substance to their claim of num­ bers. Reports indicate that they tried to recruit experienced fighters from among the veterans of the Afghanistan war. For financial support, they had to turn to external sources. Representatives of the movements attempted to mobilize mate­ rial and moral assistance from Muslim states and international Islamic bodies, and an attempt was made to convince Muslim countries that taking a public stand against Burma would be acting in the defense of Islam. In any case, the ROS was apparently the larger of the two organizations. The second group, the ARIF, re­ ceived aid from the Jamaat Islami, a fundamentalist Bangladesh organization, which in turn received its support from Middle Eastern countries. The Jamaat

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Islami themselves protested against the return of the refugees. They did not make a demand for independence, but pinned their hopes on the leader of the Demo­ cratic movement, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the possibility that she might stand at the head of a government that would replace the SLORC regime. Bangladesh newspapers carried feature articles about fundamentalist Islamic groups that preached against the return of refugees to Arakan and in favor of the establishment of an independent Rohingya state in Arakan by means of rebellion. There was also a report that a Saudi aid agency was behind incitement in the camps calling for refugees to denounce the work of a French aid agency because it was Christian. All of this raised fears in the Bangladesh government that refugee camps from Arakan would become a training ground for extremists, that arms would be smug­ gled to them, and that pan-Islamic activity among the refugees could, when com­ bined with material aid, be a goad to militancy. It was a situation that had the potential of raising the level of tension in the area. India was also worried about such possibilities and called for “peaceful repatriation." Insofar as is known, the reaction of Islamic countries was less than spirited. Rohingya rebels were unsuc­ cessful in getting military aid from external Muslim sources, although a few Mus­ lim governments and several agencies sent some humanitarian assistance.24 Apparently the problem of Arakan Muslims will continue to weigh on Myanmar, and new crises will break out periodically. Indeed, when most of the Muslim refugees who fled at the beginning of the 1990s returned to Arakan, out­ breaks and anti-Muslim riots—instigated by Buddhists monks—broke out in Mandalay and other Burmese cities, in March 1997.2S Consequently, there is no reason to suppose that there will be a change in the situation of the Muslim pop^ ulation in Arakan.

Notes 1. U Min Thu (ex-Reuters correspondent in Burma), “Islam and Muslims in Burma,” mimeograph document; unclear whether it was ever published, found in my private papers (Aug. 27, 1986); Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics o f Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991), 219; Bertil Lintner, “In the Dragon’s Wake.” FEER, vol. 124, no. 17 (April 26,1984): 33-35 34-35; Asia Yearbook 1970,81; David I. Steinberg, “Constitutional and Political Basis of Minority Insurrections in Burma,” in Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani, eds., Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 68-72. It bears mentioning that the Muslim rebels in Arakan were not the only ones operating in that area. There were also strong nationalist sentiments among the Buddhist majority of Arakan whose geographic isolation west of the Arakan Yoma Hills resulted in scanty contact with the Burmans living on the other side of that range of hills. The Buddhists were unable to forget that they once had an independent kingdom which was conquered by the Burmans in 1784. In the 1950s, Arakanese members of Parliament attempted to finance a separate Arakan “state” within the Union but to no avail. In 1964, two years after the military coup,- 4

I

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a group of Arakan nationalists formed an underground group called the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) with a military arm, the Arakan Liberation Army (ALA). In 1974, the military regime granted Arakan the title of “state.” Only a formality, the “state” had no influence on the expanding rebel movement. In 1976, the army routed the rebel movement but insurgent remnants continued to stage occasional operations. Other rebellious groups persisted in _ Arakan, primary among them were the Communists. See Bertil Lintner, “A Legacy of Re­ bellion, FEER, vol. 124, no. 17 (April 16, 1984): 34-36. 2. J. P. Anand, “Burma-Bangladesh Refugee Problem,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 2, no. 4 (July 1978): 129. 3. P B. Sinha, “Ziaur Rahman Visits Burma,” Strategic Analysis, vol. I, no. 5 (August 1977): 9-11; lima Shankar Singh, “Burma’s Foreign Policy in the ’70s,” India Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3 (July-September 1978): 359; Anand, op cit., 129; Moshe Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma: A Study o f a Minority Group (Wiesbaden: University of Heidelberg, Otto Harasowitz, 1972), 128; Jan Becka, Historical Dictionary o f Myanmar (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1995), 170. 4. Daud Majlis, “Disturbance on the Border of Psace. The Exodus Reversed,” FEER, vol. 100, no. 20 (May 19, 1978): 37; M. C. T\in, “Burma: Census Raises the Temperature,” FEER, vol. 100, no. 21 (May 26 1978): 30; J. P Anand, “Bangladesh: Refugees from Burma,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 13, no. 27 (July 8, 1978): 1100; Yegar, “The Muslims of Burma,” 128-129. Figures are based on “Burma-Bangladesh,” Keesing’s Con­ temporary Archives, vol. 24 (October 6,1978): 29238; Tonia K. Devon, “Burma’s Muslim Minority: Out of the Shadows?” Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 75 (October 1980): 27-28. A curious note: the government of Bangladesh encouraged Muslim settlement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts which was close to its border with both India and Burma, displacing the local population of Buddhist tribespeople and other non-Muslims. During the 1970s, the Bangladesh army engaged in cruel and repressive measures in the area, and large units of army and police were garrisoned in the region. At the end of 1977, disturbances broke out between the army and the tribespeople who demanded regional autonomy such as they had under the British. Their guerilla movement was called Shanti Bahini. In “Bangladesh: Re­ volt in Chittagong Hill Tracts,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 13, no. 17 (April 29, 1978): 723,726-727. 5. Majlis, “Disturbance on the Border of Peace,” 36; Susan Drake and Barry Came, “Ref­ ugees: The Forced March,” Newsweek (June 19, 1978): 24; Richard Nations, “Refugees: Arab Eyes on Burma’s Border,” FEER, vol. 100, no. 26 (June 30, 1978): 12-13; Anand, “Burma-Bangladesh Refugee Problem,” 127-128; Asia Yearbook 1979, 128; M. Ali Kettani, Muslim Minorities in the World Today (London: Mansell, 1986): 142-144. 6. Majlis, op cit., 36; William Mattem, “Refugees: Burma’s Brand of Apartheid,” FEER, vol. 101, no. 28 (July 14, 1978): 30-31. 7. Majlis, op cit., 36-37; idem, “Refugees: Repatriation for the Rohingyas,” FEER, vol. 101, No. 29 (July 21, 1978): 20; Drake and Came, op cit., 24; Nations, op cit., 12-13; Anand, “Burma-Bangladesh Refugee Problem,” 127-131; idem, “Bangladesh: Refugees from Burma,” 1100-1101; Mattem, op cit., 32; Singh, op cit., 359; Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 29238-29239; William Scully and Frank N. Trager, “Burma 1978: The Thirtieth Year of Independence," Asian Survey, vol. 19, no. 2 (February 1979): 152-153. For the April 15,1978, text of the World Muslim League’s press release, see History o f Arakan (Burma), 57.

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8. Daud Majlis, “Refugees: Repatriation for the Rohingyas/' FEER, vol. 101,no. 29 (July 21.1978): 20; idem, “Burma and Bangladesh,” The Economist, vol. 268, no. 7041 (August 12.1978): 55. Maurice Lafite, “Burma: Still in Fear of the Dragon,” FEER, vol. 102, no. 44 (November 3,1978): 32; James P. Sterba, “At a Camp for Burmese Refugees, Death Is Routine,” The New York Times (March 2, 1979): A2; Sterba, “Return of the Rohingya,” Asiaweek (March 23,1979): 18; S. Kamaluddin, “Dialogue across the Fence,” FEER, vol. 104, no. 23 (June 8,1979): 32; William Scully and Frank N. Trager, “Burma 1979: Revers­ ing the TYend,” Asian Survey, vol. 20, no. 2 (February 1980): 171; Asia Year Book 1980, 114; Robert Shaplen, A Turning Wheel: Three Decades of the Asian Revolution (New York: Random House, 1979), 134-135; Ahmad Shafijul Huque, “Stranded Pakistanis and Bur­ mese Muslims in Bangladesh: Historical and Contemporary Dimensions,” Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2 (July 1990): 286-287; Lintner, “In the Dragon’s Wake,” 33; Bernard Imhasly, “The Flight of the Rohingya,” Swiss Review of World Affairs, vol. 42, no.3 (June 1992): 21-22. In the History of Arakan (Burma), 37-103, see photocopies of Indian, Bangladesh and Afghanistan newspapers that deal with the suffering of Rohingya refugees since World War II and in the years 1955,1959,1975, and 1978. 9. Nations, “Refugees: Arab Eyes on Burma’s Border,” 12-13; Anand, “BurmaBangladesh Refugee Problem,” 130; idem, “Bangladesh: Refugees from Burma,” 1100; Mattem, op cit, 32; R. H. Taylor, “Myanmar,” The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modem Islamic World, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 215; Devon, “Burma’s Mus­ lim Minority,” 28. 10. Ibid. 11. “Burma: Rebel Groups Aim for a United Front,” FEER (May 21,1976): 14. 12. In 1983, Arakan’s name was changed to Rakhine. Earlier, in January 1974, it had been^ granted the status of a state within the Union of Burma. David Steinberg, "Constitutional and Political Insurrections in Burma,” 64; Becka, Historical Dictionary, 170. 13. Bertil Lintner, “Muslims in die Mountains,” FEER (Feb. 9,1984): 23; “Burma: Rebel Groups Aim for a United Front,” 14; Smith, op cit., 400; U Min Thu, “Islam and Muslims in Burma,” 4-5; Steinberg, op cit, 68; R. J. May, “Ethnic Separatism in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Viewpoint, vol. 31, no. 2 (October 1990): 28-59. 14. M. C. T\in, “Letter from Rangoon,” FEER, vol. 103, no. 7 (February 16,1979): 70; Becka, op cit, 44. 15. Amnesty International Report 1982,190; 1985,203-204; 1986,214; 1987,152-153. 16. Sricharatchanya Paisal, “Burma: Some Are More Equal,” FEER, vol. 118, no. 4 (Octo­ ber 8,1982): 27; Husain Haqqani, “The Roots of Rebellion,” FEER, vol. 118, no. 45 (Novem­ ber 5,1982): 26; David Steinberg, “Burma in 1982: Incomplete Transitions,” Asian Survey, vol. 23, no. 2 (February 1983): 170; idem, “Constitutional and Political Basis,” 44, 51,78; Shamsuddin Ahmed, “The Dilemna of the Arkanese Muslims," The Muslim World League [MWL] Journal [Makkah] (Shawwal 1403) (July-August 1983): 59-61. The article includes an accusation that the Rohingya leadership did not rebel in order to change its fate. The writer disregards the mujahideen rebellion. Lintner, “Muslims in the Mountains,” 23; idem, “More Equal Than Others,” 36; Huque, “Stranded Pakistanis,” 285; Becka, op cit., 18,149; Christie, op cit, 170-171;idem, “Myanmar (Burma),” The Far East and Australasia 1996,632. 17. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practicesfor 1988,740, 746; Becka, op cit, 18-19; Huque, op. cit, 287. 18. Burma’s name was changed to Myanmar on May 27,1989. Most other place names,

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such as districts, cities, rivers, etc., were also changed; e.g., Arakan became Rakhine, Ran­ goon became Yangoon, etc. See Becka, op cit., 19,2,170,260. 19. Indian Express (April 26, 1991); “Burma: The Flight of the Rohingyas,” Asiaweek (August 23,1991): 29; Imhasly, “Flight of the Rohingya,” 20; Asian Recorder (July 22-28, 1992): 22458; Soutik Biswas, “Purge of the Muslims: Myanmar Refugees,” India Today, vol. 17, no. 17 (September 15, 1992): 15-16; US. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, 528; David Steinberg, “Myanmar in 1992: Plus Ca Change?” Asian Survey (February 1993): 182; Syed Aziz al Ahsan, “Burma’s Iron Hand toward Ethnic Minorities: The Rohingya Plight” Asian Profile, vol. 21, no. 4 (August 1993): 312; Amnesty International Report 1993, 217; ibid., 1994, 217, 219; Asia Yearbook 1993,92; “Myanmar (Burma),” The Far East and Australasia 1996,638. 20. Asian Recorder, vol. 38, no. 25 (June 17-23, 1992): 22379-22380; Biswas, op cit., 15-18; U.S. Department of State (February 1993): 528; John Bray, “Ethnic Minorities and the Future of Burma,” The World Today, vol. 48, no. 8-9 (August-September 1992): 144, 147; Asia Yearbook 1993,92; Becka, op cit., 20,44. 21. Asian Recorder, vol. 38, no. 30 (July 22-28, 1992): 22458; ibid., no. 36, (September 2-8,1992): 22554-22555; U.S. Department of State (February 1993), 528; ibid., (February 1994), 593, 595; Asia Yearbook 1993, 93; ibid., 1994, 99; Amnesty Intemaional Report 1994, 219; Biswas, op. cit., 17-19; Syed Aziz al Ahsan, op. cit., 315-316; Steinberg, “Myanmar in 1992,” 182. 22. Donald Wilson and David Henley, “Bearing the Crescent,” The Nation (September 15, 1995): A8; Bruce Matthews, “Religious Minorities in Myanmar: Hints of the Shadow,” Contemporary South Asia, vol. 4, no. 3 (November 1995): 299; Asia Yearbook 1995, 216; S. Jayasankaran, “Diplomacy: Seeing Red,” FEER, vol. 159, no. 35 (August 29, 1996): 18; Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds o f Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 54. 23. Asia Yearbook 1995, 96; Amnesty International Report 1995, 221; ibid., 1996, 233; “Myanmar (Burma),” The Far East and Australasia 1996, 638; “Burma: The Flight of the Rohingyas,” op cit., 29. 24. Imhasly, op cit., 22; Asian Recorder (September 2-8, 1992): 22554-22556; Biswas, op cit., 20-21; Syed Aziz al Ahsan, op cit., 316; Becka, op cit., 44—45. 25. Bertil Lintner, “Burma: Ethnic Scapegoat,” FEER, vol. 160, no. 15 (April 10,1997): 18.

Part Two

The Patani Muslims

MALAYSIAN - THAI BORDER

Chapter Eight

The Emergence of the Patani Muslim Community

Thailand is a Buddhist state whose approximately 50 million inhabitants belong to either the Hinayana or Theravada schools of Buddhism. The largest religious minority are the Muslims, estimated at between 3.5 to 4 percent of the total pop­ ulation, some 2 million people. Most Muslims, about 1.5 million, are concentrated in Thailand’s southern provinces, which border on Malaysia, where they constitute the majority of the population in the area. There are various estimates, some ap­ parently tendentious, regarding the size of the Muslim population in the southern provinces, which makes it impossible to determine exact numbers until a reliable and accurate census is taken.1The 3.5 to 4 percent figure is, therefore, merely an estimation to be regarded with reasonable caution. The origins of the Muslim community in Thailand were built on the movement of Islamization which began in the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipel­ ago in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, perhaps even at the end of the thir­ teenth. No precise data exists regarding the date of Islam's first penetration into Thailand. Since the dawn of Islam, however—or even earlier—Arab and Persian traders were known to visit ports in the region where many settled as a conse­ quence of their commerce with China. Some married local women, raised their children as Muslims, and so created the core of the Muslim community. In the course of time, Muslims from India joined these settlements. Apparently, in the middle of the fourteenth century, certainly a century later, there was a regular movement of Arab vessels in the Bay of Thailand, and widespread conversions to Islam began at about this time. The Sultanate of Malacca had a significant impact on the growth of Islam throughout the Malay Peninsula. In general, Islam spread first to ruling families who embraced it for personal, economic, or political inter­ ests. There were probably opportunities and commercial advantages that could be gained by contacts with Muslim traders, as well as benefits from their political ties with other countries along the route of maritime commerce. The spread of Islam by the traders enhanced everyone’s economic situation. Local rulers in the coastal areas benefited from taxes they imposed on products that moved through their ports, and Patani, a main commercial port in the Malay Peninsula, enjoyed great economic prosperity. The process of Islamization was gradual; the popula73

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tion at large did not always convert immediately in the wake of a ruling family's conversion, and Malays of the Patani region held on to many elements of their previous animistic and Hindu beliefs. In any case, by 1457, the Kingdom of Patani was considered to be an Islamic state which, eventually, even became a center of Islamic study. A similar process unfolded in other Malay kingdoms that neigh­ bored on Patani in the peninsula, an area which became the furthermost northern beachhead reached by Malays and the Islamic religion. Even before its consolida­ tion by means of the sea route, Islam spread to the plains of the interior of the Thai kingdom by the land route from Tenasserim, and this was accomplished mainly by Muslim traders from India.2 A parallel expansion of the Thai kingdom occurred southward into Malaya, and towards the end of the thirteenth century there was also a movement of Thai set­ tlers southward into the Songkhla region. About this time, the kings of Siam began to claim sovereignty over the southern Malay states which they regarded as their vassals. When the kings of Siam were strong, Malay rulers generally accepted the status of vassals which, in any case, afforded them a large measure of local auton­ omy. When the Siamese kingdom weakened, the Malay sultanates generally dis­ regarded it, refusing to pay a tribute called bunga mas dan perak—gold and silver decorated plants that were dispatched annually, or every two or three years. Vassalhood required the sultanates to conscript men for military service or other special needs, and granted the Thais veto rights over the appointment of new sultans upon the death of a predecessor. Until the penetration of European coun­ tries into Southeast Asia, relations between the countries of the region were con­ ducted as a tributary system, which meant that the overlordship of larger and stronger states was recognized by weaker neighbors. Siam itself recognized a sim­ ilar overlordship by the Chinese kingdom. The Malay sultans tended to regard the practice of sending gifts as an expression of friendship while the kings of Siam regarded it as a tribute and a token of loyalty. In any case, as long as their authority was unquestioned, the Thais tended to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of their vassals. Indeed, there are differences of opinion between scholars as to the extent of practical supervision Siam had over the affairs of the Malay states to its south. Nonetheless, among the Malay kingdoms there was always an aspiration to be free of any measure of control by Siam. Thailand's expansion southward was halted when wars in the north weakened the kingdom, and when, in the fifteenth century, the Sultanate of Malacca spread northward driving the Kingdom of Siam from its southern regions. Malacca’s reign then extended as far as Trengganu and Patani. The Islamic religion flourished even more readily among the Malays when Malacca was at the height of its powers as it became a center for inculcating the religion and a focal point for all the Malay sultanates in the peninsula. Islam served as a symbol of Malay solidarity against the Thais.3 Malacca was captured by the Pbrtuguese in 1511 whereupon Thailand resumed its southward expansion from the Songkhla region and its control of the Muslim sultanates of Patani, Kedah, Trengganu, and Kelantan. These principa­

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lities returned to their nominally tributary status in the tradition of the region. The local satraps retained a great measure of autonomy, the extent of which was deter­ mined both by Thailand’s fortunes of war with Burma—successes or failures—and by the measure of autonomy that Thai district rulers had at various times. In fact, there were Patani4 revolts against Siam beginning in the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century when Patani was conquered. There was no in­ terference in the southward expansion of the Thais either by the Portuguese or by the Dutch and British who also arrived in Southeast Asia in 1600. In a treaty signed between Portugal and Siam, Portugal was granted commercial rights to conduct trade from Patani with China and Japan. For the next 150 years, Patani served as an important commercial center for European shipping. It was a way station be­ tween Malacca and China and an entrepot for the exchange of goods between China and the important ports of the Southeast Asian archipelago. This activity gradually waned after 1620, and Patani began losing its importance as a center of international commerce although it continued to play a certain role for local mari­ time traffic between the Malay Peninsula and the countries of Indochina.5 Patani provided Siam with forced-labor levies until 1564 when Siam suffered a defeat by Burma, and the practice was brought to a halt. It was not until 1631 that the Siamese again received bunga mas from Patani. Shortly afterward, when Patani achieved independence, the dispatch of forced labor ceased until 1679 when it was resumed until the middle of the eighteenth century, along with other Malay sultanates. Once again, it is difficult to determine if sending the bunga mas was necessarily an indication of vassal status or merely an expression of respect vis-avis a distant power which could pose a threat. Patani and Kedah, geographically closer to Siam than other sultanates, suffered great subjugation as vassals, though to a some extent this was also true of Kelantan and Trengganu. Siam’s defeat by Burma in 1767 gave Patani another opportunity to move away from dependence on Siam; however, the first kings of the Chakri dynasty in Siam rebuilt the military might of the kingdom and took measures to reinstate their overlordship. After the war of 1785, King Rama I (1785-1867) dispatched an army to the south to rein­ force the kingdom’s rule over the region. Patani surrendered and to a very large extent became an integral part of the Kingdom of Siam. The bunga mas was reinstated and sent every three years. Following that war, Siam demanded that the sultanates of Perak, Kelantan, and Trengganu also send bunga mas, although at greater intervals. Disorder continued in the south as Patani made repeated attempts to cut itself off from Siam. Uprisings broke out from 1789 to 1791, and in 1808, and after yet another rebellion, Patani was reconquered. A decision was made to subdivide Patani into seven small districts in order to weaken it as a potential source of trouble. In practice, these subdivisions remained under the rule of mem­ bers of the traditional Malay aristocracy who held sway in all but one of the dis­ tricts. As rulers, they carried the title of Raja, received annual salaries, and though they retained a great measure of autonomy, they were supervised by a Thai gov­ ernor who lived in Songkhla. This subdivision into seven districts was the cause

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of great bitterness among the Malay rulers and brought neither peace nor quiet to the region. Nor was there any improvement in the efficiency of tax collection. In the nineteenth century, attempts were made to resist the tightening Thai control, but rebellions which broke out in 1832 and 1838 were put down by the army sent by Bangkok. Though the Malay rulers were not removed, Siam increased its su­ pervision over them. In the end, however, the territorial division of Patani (and of Kedah) did weaken these vassal states. Bangkok exercised its control over the semiautonomous Malay rulers indirectly, granting them a great measure of independence in the conduct of such internal affairs as the enactment of laws, taxation, and supervision over governmental bu­ reaucracy. This was much more latitude than was extended to other regions of the kingdom. In theory, every Malay ruler was chosen from among the traditional Malay elites. After formal confirmation by Bangkok, which was an absolute re­ quirement, the ruler was accorded the title of Raja by the king of Siam, and the appointment was then published in the official government gazette. For their part, Malay rulers raised taxes for the central government and provided the labor needed for specific projects and prescribed periods of time. Malay rulers were expected to demonstrate their loyalty by being present at the funeral pyres of kings who died and at the coronation of new kings at the Thai court.6 The most salient component in the political development of Siam vis-a-vis Patani was the ongoing, colonial expansion of British influence in the Malay Pen­ insula at the end of nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, and the Siamese apprehension it engendered. The parties to the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1826 recognized that the sultanates of Trengganu, Kelantan, Perak, and Selangor lay outside the king of Siam’s authority; whereas the sultanates of Patani and Kedah were considered an integral part of the kingdom. In 1876, the British gov­ ernment instructed the British high commissioner for Singapore to follow a policy which would ensure law and order, and conditions of peace in the Malay states in order to protect the commercial interests of British subjects, their property and their lives. It became clear that further British movement northward would conflict with Siam’s status and influence in the northern area of the peninsula. In 1896, the British arrived at an agreement with the French who were consolidating their rule in Indochina to regard Siam as a buffer zone between the spheres of influence of these two powers. The agreement prompted the British to secure their hold on the northern Malay sultanates in a move to protect their interest there. An Anglo-Siamese Agreement was signed in 1897 by which Britain recognized Siam’s sovereignty over Kelantan and Trengganu. Siam then committed itself not to grant any concessions in the Malay Peninsula to a foreign power other than Britain. The British administration in Singapore continued to press the Colonial Office in Lon­ don to adopt a policy which would weaken Siamese rule and authority in the Malay Peninsula thus reinforcing British influence. Siam, Britain’s colonial officials claimed, was incapable of protecting British interests in the Malay states which were nominally under Siamese rule.7

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In response to these threats to its sovereignty and to the political and diplomatic pressures exerted by Britain (as well as by France on its eastern frontier), Siam initiated a broad reorganization of its government aimed, among other things, at achieving a more efficient and close control over the distant southern provinces. The reforms began as early as 1892 when King Chulalongkom [Rama V] (1868-1910) placed all the districts of the kingdom under the direct supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. Siamese governors were appointed, and they began involving themselves in the affairs of the Malay rulers by canceling the local right of taxation and other sources of revenue. Malay rajas were given annual salaries and the right to retain part of the rice tax. The raja of Patani, along with rajas of other districts, protested. Conflicts proliferated to the point that the raja of Patani began planning a rebellion. On 10 January 1899, the governor-general of the Straits colonies, Sir Frank Swettenham, reported that Malay rulers of Patani and other districts in the region were seeking British support in order to be rid of Thai rule. They petitioned the British to come to their aid against what they considered to be the undermining of their traditional rights by the Siamese. The bitterness of the Malay rulers and their decision to seek British protection was a consequence of the attempts Bangkok had made to reorganize the Sultanate of Patani into seven Malay districts (which had been part of a unified Sultanate of Patani until 1898.) The attempts to introduce administrative changes by co-opting the seven new Ma­ lay rulers met only with their opposition. The British did not respond to Patani’s call for assistance, but in October 1901, Sir Frank Swettenham wrote the king of Siam his assessment of the Patani situation and offered to come to Bangkok to advise the King. At the end of 1901, in line with modernization reforms through­ out his kingdom, King Chulalongkom decided to accelerate the establishment of a centralized administration. In order to forestall any interference by the British authorities in Singapore, he acted decisively to bring the southern region under Bangkok’s direct rule. At a meeting in Patani, an official of the Thai Ministry of the Interior demanded that the Malay ruler, Raja Abdul Kader Qamaruddin, im­ plement the new administrative changes which, in effect, would have removed him from a position of any effective authority. When the raja refused, the Siamese deposed him, imprisoned him, and appointed his uncle in his place. T\vo years later, as a result of British pressure, and having signed a commitment to avoid politics, he was freed. The raja moved to Kelantan where he lived out the rest of his life. A number of Malay rulers in adjacent districts were also deposed and replaced by Thai officials. The seven districts were now reunited into a single administrative unit under the supervision of a Thai governor who was directly responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. The bunga mas tribute ended, and mat­ ters of taxation in the Malay districts were taken over by a Department of Revenue in a system which paralleled arrangements in the rest of the country. In another step that emphasized the integration of the region and movement away from Islam, the shari’a and adat laws were replaced in 1902 by Siamese law. In one area only, that of personal status (matters relating to family and property), which was a par­

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ticularly sensitive issue, the king granted a measure of autonomy to the Muslims. The government set up procedures for Muslim religious judges (kathis) by which they could only sit as advisors to Thai judges. The sides could appeal to a High Court of Justice, but no Islamic judge would be represented in the High Court. In actuality, this made Muslim judges dependent on the state court system without any independence or real autonomy. Not surprisingly, such courts were unpopular among the Muslim population of the south which preferred to present their reli­ gious and legal matters to Ulama in a private and noninstitutional setting. In any case, these far-reaching reforms angered the government of the Straits colonies. Not only did the reforms demonstrate to local Malay rulers that the British had no special status in relations between themselves and the Siamese government, but the reforms also emphasized Siam’s ability to deal with local breeches of disci­ pline as it saw fit. Indeed, local rulers had no recourse but to accept or to expect punishment. The case of the ruler of Patani, Tunku Abdul Kader Qamaruddin, was a striking example to other local rulers because he had been considered heir to the historic Patani kingdom. The sultan of Kelantan was particularly worried. Malay aristocratic circles began plans for a revolt in October. The assumption was that such an uprising would cause the French to attack Siam on the east, thus easing their plight. Arms and ammunition were acquired from a German firm in Singa­ pore. Understanding the implications of the situation, Swettenham did his best to persuade the raja of Patani not to revolt. He was convinced that British interests called for vitiating the power of Siam in the Malay Peninsula, perhaps even ending it, but in any case, preventing Siam from taking over Kelantan and Trengganu. Government officials in London, however, preferred maintaining amicable rela­ tions with Siam in the belief that interference in the Patani affair could only weaken Siam as a buffer between French Indochina and British India, British outposts in Burma and the Malay P&ninsula. Furthermore, Britain’s main interest was in the sultanates that lay to the south of Patani which also strengthened their inclination to avoid stirring up Siamese resentment over Patani. After stubborn efforts on his part, Swettenham managed to convince the British government that it ought to pressure Siam into signing a new agreement. Forced to accept British proposals, Siam agreed to negotiations. Negotiations were difficult because Siam suspected British designs on the Malay states under Siamese sovereignty. And, in­ deed, in the agreement, the British position clearly predominated. Frank Swettenham pressured the Siamese to relinquish their Malay territories in Britain’s favor. Negotiations lasted from March to October 1902, and ultimately Siam gave in to British pressure. On 6 October, Siam signed treaties with Kelantan and Trengganu but refused to include Patani in the new arrangements suggested by the British. Again, the British showed no special interest in Patani. According to the terms which came into effect in July 1909, the foreign affairs of these sultanates were ceded to the king of Siam while Britain sent officials to the two sultanates to act as “Siam advisor and Siam assistant advisor.” For his part, the king of Siam committed himself not to interfere in the internal matters of these sultanates. The

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treaty recognized the nominal vassal status of the sultanates vis-k-vis Siam but, in practice, forced the status of British Protectorate on them. A similar arrangement was made in Kedah in 1905. Patani was redivided in 1906, this time into four sub­ districts. A Siamese governor, appointed by the Central Administrative Authority of Siam was placed at the head of each subdistrict.8 As early as 1904, new negotiations were entered into with Siam to regularize the border between it and the Malay Peninsula. On 10 March 1909, an Anglo-Siamese treaty was signed which was to be the final territorial disposition, and which has, in fact, remained the mark of demarcation to this day. Siam was obliged to give up its sovereignty over the sultanates of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis which were granted the status of British Protectorates and, in consideration for this, the British relinquished various extraterritorial privileges they had held in Siam since 1855. There was no change in Patani’s status which was recognized as part of Siam. The District of Satun which had been a part of Kedah was now formalized as Siamese territory. Thus a split was created between the Muslim population of the Malay Peninsula and the Muslims of South Thailand who are ethnically also Malay. From a certain standpoint, the Siamese sovereignty which was imposed was more theoretical than practical because the newly ap­ pointed officials ruled over urban areas while the majority of the Malay Muslim population lived in villages. These officials spoke the Thai language rather than Malay, consequently Siamese bureaucracy impacted minimally on the traditional Malay way of life. However, partition raised irredentist aspirations in Patani whose population had strong religio-ethnic affinities to the Malay population on the other side of the new border and strong bonds which prevailed among the ruling families of Patani and Kelantan. Resentment against the Siamese was reinforced because the unfettered movement of people from either side was now limited by what had become a political frontier.9 The official name by which the government of Thailand refers to its entire Muslim community is Thai-Islam, a term used in order to underscore the national unity of all citizens of the state with no distinctions between religious, cultural, or ethnic differences. It is, however, important to distinguish between two main Mus­ lim communities in Thailand, the non-Malay and the Malay. The great majority of Muslims in Thailand are Malay (see endnote 1), and they are concentrated in the four southern districts of Patani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun. There is also a sizable Muslim population in two other southern districts: Krabai and Songkhla. These Muslims are ethnically Malay and speak Malay (with an admixture of a few Thai words.) Satun differs from the three other Muslim districts in Thailand in several ways. It does not have as intensive a history of separatist feelings and political confron­ tation with the central government as is the case in Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat; and it is characterized by much less tension with the Buddhist majority of Thai­ land. Perhaps because of a long history of close administrative interaction with the Thai majority, most inhabitants of Satun speak Thai. Also, a broad band of

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Thai Buddhist territory (in the Songkhla district) separates Satun from the other Muslim districts. From a political standpoint, the Malay Muslim minority in the south, particularly the three districts that previously made up the Sultanate of Patani, presented a problem. By comparison, the Satun district generally played a limited and less active role in the separatist movement and in political conflict with Bangkok. Among the Muslims of Satun, feelings of historic pride and disinclina­ tion to adapt to foreign rule were not as fierce nor as marked by an affinity to the local aristocratic leadership. There are less religious schools (pondoks) in Satun, and the Muslim community is relatively more inclined to send its children to gov­ ernment schools. Thai-speaking Muslims of Satun feel more fully Thai than do Malay-speaking Muslims; their identity with political parties at election time more closely resembles Buddhists than Malay-speaking Muslims.10 Malay-speaking Muslims differ from Buddhist Thais not only in religion and culture, but in every aspect of their life and customs. From the economic stand­ point, most Malay Muslims are villagers and earn their livelihood from agriculture—rice paddies, rubber trees, fruit trees, and fishing. Their cultural af­ finity is to their Malay brothers in nearby Malaysia more than to the Thai Buddhist majority. Malay Muslims constitute a homogeneous minority; they became Thai citizens involuntarily and refused to assimilate into Thai national culture; at best, they have very limited contact with the Thai majority and feel estranged from them.11 Malay Muslims do not regard themselves as a minority because in the southern districts where they live, they make up an overwhelming majority, about 75 percent of the population. In Islamic terms, the south is perceived as Dar al-Islam and the rest of Thailand, where the majority is Buddhist, is considered Dar al-Harb. The term Dar al-Islam refers to being part of the international totality (Ummah) of the believers which, theoretically at least, goes beyond political, cul­ tural, and geographic borders. In more concrete terms, the southern Thai districts belong to the Malay world of Southeast Asia from cultural, ethnic, and linguistic standpoints. These districts became part of the Buddhist Kingdom of Thailand only as the outcome of conquest and the demarcation of colonial borders which separated Patani from the rest of the Malay Muslim world and Dar al-Islam. Malay Muslims regard this as a historic accident. For hundreds of years, they perceived an identity between the religion of Islam and Malay culture. To be a Muslim meant to be Malay. The Malay term for conversion to Islam is masok melayu, meaning “entering into Malay" culture or joining the religio-cultural world of the Malays. The totality of life experience—traditions, historic memories, and the Malay Mus­ lim scale of values—are utterly different than those of Thai Buddhists. For Malay Muslims to speak Thai is tantamount to abandoning their language, religion, cul­ ture, and the Muslim Ummah. Put differently, loss of language is the loss of one’s identity. For Malay Muslims, the Malay language is an instrument for emphasizing their uniqueness and a focal point of their unity. Indeed, attempts by the Thai gov­ ernment to disseminate the Thai language among the Muslims of the south as part of a process of assimilation played a vital role in the escalation of Malay Muslim

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national ethnic feeling. Acquiescence to the political sovereignty of Buddhist Thailand is a desecration and an insult to religious principles. Consequently, the irredentist aspiration of Malay Muslims to reunite with the Malay Muslim world to the south played a central role in the political aspirations of Patani Muslims to secede from the Thai kingdom. Irredentism was expressed through protests, sub­ version, and violent opposition which began early in the twentieth century. Frus­ trations grew at the close of World War II when Patani Malays realized that the victorious allies would not give substance to their hopes for separation from Thai­ land. The emergence of an independent Indonesia after the war and of an independ­ ent Malaya in 1957 inflamed these feelings all the more.12 There was yet another Muslim community in Thailand, perhaps it would be more accurate to say a number of communities with various origins, that became part of the Thai population, generally by marriage to Thai women. These Thai Muslims, who are found in many districts of the kingdom, particularly in areas to the north and east of Bangkok, do not identify with the separatist and irredentist activities of southern Malay Muslims. These communities speak Thai and see themselves as fully Thai (not unlike the Burmese Muslims in Burma) and, to some extent, this is also how they are regarded. Very few speak Malay, they generally have Thai names, and they have adopted much of Thai culture, differing only in their religion. There is a large concentration of this Muslim group, some 200,000 or more, living in Bangkok and its environs. (Estimates differ as to their exact number.) For the most part, Thai Muslims live in their own neighborhoods and have a heightened religious and communal consciousness. Such religious precepts as the prohibition on eating pork help maintain their separation from Buddhist neighbors. In rural areas, the Muslims live even less apart from their neighbors. With the exception of a small Shiite community, most Muslims in Thailand are Sunni-Shafi’ites, though there is also a Hanafi grouping. Muslim communities are heterogeneous and include the offspring of immigrants from Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The Iranians came as merchants; the Pathans and other immi­ grants from the Indian subcontinent dealt in textiles, money lending, trades, and cattle raising, and are found throughout Thailand but primarily in the northeast. Immigrants from southern Asia began to appear in Thailand at the beginning of the seventeenth century as traders or refugees. Among the Thai Muslims, there are also Malays who were forcibly uprooted from southern regions and exiled to central and northern areas as captives or hostages, and who then found their place in other Muslim communities. There is also a small group of Indonesian Muslims, mostly traders, who fled from the Dutch regime. Muslim Chams from Cambodia settled in Thailand, some as early as the sixteenth century, but mostly in the nineteenth century. Some came as mercenaries for the Siamese army; others as refugees or cap­ tives. Chinese Muslims came from Yunan Province, for the most part in the nine­ teenth century, and settled in the northern districts of Thailand. Many were involved in a trading network which operated between the Shan lands, North Thailand and China. There were also a number of Arab settlers, most of them from Hadramaut.13

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Children of the various Thai Muslim communities attend government schools like all other Thai children. Under the aegis of mosques, the communities provide supplementary, afternoon religious schools throughout the week with a curriculum that includes basic Arabic, reading from the Koran, and religious commandments. There are a number of all-day schools, madrasah, in Bangkok. All these institu­ tions are under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. As distinguished from children in the Malay Muslim districts in the south who study in separate schools, the participation of Thai Muslim children in the state education system facilitated a closer interrelationship between Muslim immigrants and the general Thai popu­ lation. Intermarriage was an additional factor in the erosion of ethnic traditions among Thai Muslims. Children bom to mixed families were raised as Muslims like their fathers, but they spoke Thai and behaved and dressed as Thai under the in­ fluence of their mothers. In the Muslim districts of the south, the situation was, of course, different, forestalling such acculturation. Consequently, the Muslims of Bangkok and its environs have grown apart from the Malay Muslims of the south.14 In the 1920s, the movement for reform in Islam reached Thailand. Mainly a middle-class urban phenomena, it appealed to the educated classes in Bangkok where the movement was centered. The movement was opposed to retaining the old folk traditions of Islam which it saw as an impediment to modernizing trends. Reform brought about a split in the Thai Muslim community, and a competition for adherents ensued between two conflicting streams of thought: Khana Mai, the reform, and Khana Kau, the traditionalists. Reformists were based in urban localities; traditionalists drew most of their support from rural areas. The reform movement was influenced by the Islamic renaissance in Arab countries and by the ideas and writings of the Egyptian philosopher Muhamad Abduh (1849-1905). In Bangkok, the movement’s primary exponent was the Indonesian political refugee, Ahmad Wahab, who had been expelled by the Dutch authorities. New reform groups whose basic ideologies resembled the spirit of Muslim renaissance groups in the Middle East, Indonesia, and Malaysia were organized in Bangkok in the 1950s. The institutional system and important positions which dealt with Islamic matters within the Thai regime remained in the hands of the conservative Ulama. The reformists, who worked outside this framework and aimed their activities pri­ marily at the educated middle class, had only minimal impact on the great majority of the Muslim population. This was particularly true in rural areas and in the south­ ern districts. At the same time, conservative forces were making efforts to buttress Muslim institutions and build mosques and educational facilities in areas where Thai Muslims were found. Financial support for Muslim educational institutions in North Thailand was forthcoming from such Arab countries as Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Tbnis, Indonesia, Malaysia and, in particular, Saudi Arabia.15 Since the focus of this study is on the Malay Muslim population in the four southern districts, this discussion of developments within the Thai Muslim popu­ lation has been limited to a more general overview.

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Notes 1. See appendix C. 2. Andrew D. W. Forbes, ‘Thailand's Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession or Coexistence?” Asian Survey, vol. 22, no. 11 (University of California Press, November, 1982): 1056-1057; Raymond Scupin, “Islam in Thailand before the Bangkok Period,” Jour­ nal o f the Siam Society, vol. 68, part 1 (January 1980): 56-57; Thomas M. Fraser, Rusembilan: A Malay Fishing Village in Southern Thailand (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer­ sity Press, 1960), 148; W. K. Che Man, “The Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand,” Jour­ nal of the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 6, no. 1 (January 1985): 98; idem, Mus­ lim Separatism, The Mows o f the Southern Philippines and the Malays o f Southern Thai­ land (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990), 32-34; idem, “Patani: From Sovereign Sultanate to Subnation,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 14, nos. 1-2 (January-July 1993): 116-117; “Patani,” Encyclopaedia o f Islam, New Edition,

Leiden, 1954, vol. 8,285; Werner Kraus, “Islam in Thailand: Notes on the History of Mus­ lim Provinces, Thai Islamic Modernism and the Separatist Movement in the South,” Journal of the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 5, no. 2 (July 1984): 415. 3. Scupin, “Islam in Thailand Before the Bangkok Period,” 57; Che Man, “Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand,” 99; idem, Muslim Separatism, 34; Omar Farouk, ‘The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand,” in Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani, eds., Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia (Singa­ pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 235; Astri Suhrke and G. Noble, eds. “Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand,” in Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), 196; M. Ladd Thomas, “Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior as Obstacles to Political Integration of Thai Muslims ” Southeast Asia, vol. 3, no. 1 (winter 1977): 545; idem. Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces o f Southern Thailand, Occa­ sional Paper, no. 28 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, April 1975): 3; Vannaprasert Chaveewan, Rachimmula Ferayot, and Jitpoosa Manop, The Traditions Influ­ encing Social Integration Between the Thai Buddhists and the Thai Muslims. Department of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences and Center for Southern Thailand Studies (Pattani, Thailand: Prince of Songkla University, 1986), 8-9; Nantawan Haemindra, “The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thai­ land,” part 1 Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (September 1976): 198-199; FO 371/69999, Foreign Office Research Department, B. R. Pearn to Southeast Asia Depart­ ment. A. M. Palliser, 14 October 1948; H. E. Wilson, “Imperialism and Islam: The Impact of Modernization on the Malay Muslim of South Thailand,” in Andrew Forbes, ed., The Muslims o f Thailand, vol. 2, 53-55; Fraser, Rusembilan., 7-8, 19; Suwannathat-Pian Kobkua, Thai- Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), 2-4; Frederica M. Bunge, ed., Thailand: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Secretary of the Army, 1981), 14; Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study o f the Malay-Muslims o f Southern Thailand (Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat Univer­ sity, 1985), 28,47-51. 4. On the social-political structure, see W. K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 39-41. 5. Elise Higby and Donald Tbgby. “Inter-cultural Mediation in South Thailand.” In Ho, Robert, and E. C. Chapman, eds. Studies in Contemporary Thailand (Canberra: Research

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School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1973), 273-274; Thomas, “Bu­ reaucratic Attitudes,” 546; idem, “The Thai Muslims,” in Raphael Israeli, ed., The Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Major (London: Curzon Press, 1982), 158; Ronald Provencher, “Islam in Malaysia and Thailand," in Raphael Israeli, ed., The Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Major, 144. Fraser, Rusembilan, 19-22; “Patani,” El 1, vol. 6, 1035. 6. FO 371/69999, op. cit.; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” 198-201; “The Mus­ lim Malays of South Thailand: A Story of Their Struggle for Survival as Muslims against Thai Oppression and Their Future,” The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs, vol. 57, nos. 11-12 (November-December 1969): 16-18; Ibrahim Syukri (pseudonym), History o f the Malay Kingdom o f Patani (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1985), 10-15, 12-37; Christie, Modem History o f Southeast Asia, 174; Kobkua, ThaiMalay Relations, 5-7; Dulyakasem Uthai, “Muslim-Malay Separation in Southern Thai­ land: Factors Underlying the Political Revolt," in Joo-Jack Lim and S. Vani, eds. Armed Separation in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 221; idem, “The Emergence and Escalation of Ethnic Nationalism: The Case of the Muslim Malays in Southern Siam,” in Abdullah Taufik and Sharon Siddique, eds., Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 211-213; Wilson, “Imperialism and Islam,” 55; Che Man, “Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand,” 99; idem, Muslim Separatism, 34-35; idem, “Patani,” 117-118; Scupin, “Islam in Thailand,” 60; idem, 'Thailand as a Plural Society: Ethnic Interaction in a Buddhist Kingdom” Cross­ roads, vol. 2, no. 3 (1986): 121-122; T\igby and T\igby, “Inter-cultural Mediation,” 274; Thomas, “Bureaucratic Attitudes," 546; idem, “Political Violence in Thailand," Crossroads, vol. 1, no. 3 (October 1983): 3; Virginia Matheson and M. B. Hooker. “Jawi Literature in Patani: The Maintenance of an Islamic Tradition," Part 1, Journal o f the Malaysian Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 41, no. 254 (1988): 6-7. 7. FO 371/69999, op. cit.; Kobkua, “The 1902-Siamese Kelantan Treaty: An End to the Traditional Relations," Journal o f the Siam Society, vol. 72, parts 1-2 (January-July 1984): 97-101; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation of Ethnic Nationalism," 213-215; Christie, Modern History of Southeast Asia, 174; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 29. 8. FO 371/69999, op. cit.; Kobkua, Thai-Malay Relations, 16-19,205-213; idem, “ 1902 Siamese-Kelantan Treaty," 101, 106-113, 123 (The text of the Siamese-Kelantan Agree­ ment of 1902 is found in 134-139); Margaret L. Koch, “Patani and the Development of a Thai State,” Journal o f the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 50, part 2, no. 232 (1977): 69-88; Che Man, “Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand," 99-100; idem, Muslim Separatism, 35,62-63; idem, “Patanti," 118-119; Haemindra, “Problem of the Thai Muslims," 201-203; Fraser, “Rusembilan," 28-29; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation of Ethnic Nationalism," 214-216; Ruth McVey, “Identity and Rebellion among Southern Thai Muslims," in Andrew D. W. Forbes, ed. The Muslims o f Thailand, vol. 2, Politics o f the Malay-Speaking South (Gaya [Bihar]: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 34; Thomas, “Political Violence," 4; “The Muslim Malays of South Thailand," 18-19; Scupin, “Thailand as a Plural Society " 122; idem, “Muslims in South Thailand," 405-406; Christie, Modem History of Southeast Asia, 175; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 29-44, 51-57,119-132,136; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature," 7; Islam in Thailand, Min­ istry of Foreign Affairs. Bangkok (July 1976), 9. 9. FO 371/69999, op. cit.; Text of the 1909 treaty with exchange of letters in CO 825/48/12 (Siam 1909 Treaty between Great Britain and Siam, signed at Bangkok, March

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85

10, 1909. Ratifications exchanged in London, July 9, 1909). Omar Farouk, “Malaysia's Islamic Awakening: Impact on Singapore and Thai Muslims.” Conflict, vol. 8, no. 2/3 (1988): 162; Che Man, “Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand,” 100; idem, “The Thai Gov­ ernment and Islamic Institutions in the Four Southern Muslim Provinces of Thailand,” SO­ JOURN:, Social Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. 5, no. 2 (August 1990), 255-256; idem, “Patani,” 119; idem, Muslim Separatism, 45; Haemindra, “Problem of the Thai Muslims," 203; Uthai, “Muslim Malays Separation," 217; “Muslim Malays of South Thailand,” 19; Christie, Modem History o f Southeast Asia, 175; Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1058-1059; Farouk, “Historical and Transnational Dimensions,” 235-236; idem, “The Or­ igins and Evolution of Malay-Muslim Ethnic Nationalism in Southern Thailand,” in Abdullah Taufik and Sharon Siddique, eds., Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singa­ pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 250-251; John L. S. Girling, Thailand, Society and Politics (London: Cornell University Press, 1981), 53; Syukri, History o f the Malay Kingdom, xiv, xvi, 42-62; T\igby and Tbgby, “Intercultural Mediation,” 274-276; Willard A. Hanna, Peninsular Thailand, Part V The Thai Muslim Centers o f Patani and Yala, Southeast Asia Series, vol. 13, no. 26 [Thailand] (New York: American Universities Field StafT Reports Service, October 1965): 1-2; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature," 7; Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (New York: Cor­ nell University Press, 1965), 20; Kraus, “Islam and Thailand," 410-412; Suhrke, “The Thai Muslim Border Provinces: Some National Security Aspects," in Robert Ho and E. C. Chap­ man, eds., Studies o f Contemporary Thailand (Canberra: Australia National University, 1973), 531-547; M. Ladd Thomas, “Political Socialization of the Thai-Islam," in Robert K. Sakai, ed.,Studies on Asia (University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 89-105; Stephen I. Alpem, ‘The Thai Muslims,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 1, no. 4 (March/April 1974), 246-254. 10. Suhrke, “TheThai-Muslim Border Provinces," 297; idem, “Thailand," in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., The Politics o f Islamic Reassertion (London: Croom Helm, 1981) 234; idem, “Southeast Asia: The Muslims in Southern Thailand," in Robert G. Wirsing, Protection o f Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 318; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand," in Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, eds. Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), 196; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation of Ethnic Nationalism " 209; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 35; Farouk, “Malaysia’s Islamic Awakening,” 161; Robert B. Albritton, Pham-Ngam Gothamasam, Noree Jaisai, Manop Jitpoosa, Sunandpattira Nilchang, Ann Sa-Idi, “Electoral Participation by Southern Thai Buddhists and Muslims,” Southeast Asia Research, vol. 4, no. 2 (September 1966), 127,131,143. 11. Haemindra, “Problem of the Thai Muslims,” 197-198; Uthai, “Muslim-Malay Sepa­ ration," 217-218; Satha-Anand Chaiwat, “Patani in the 1980s: Academic Literature and Political Stories,” SOJOURN, vol. 7, no. 1 (February 1992): 29-30; Thomas, “Bureaucratic Attitudes" 547-548; idem, “Political Violence,” 5-7, 10; idem, “Thai Muslims," 156; Arong Suthasasna, “Occupational Distribution of Muslims in Thailand: Problems and Pros­ pects,” Journal of the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 5, no. 1 (1983/1984): 235, 241. 12. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 4-6, 9-15, 24, 28, 258-260, 269-276. Farouk, “Malaysia’s Islamic Awakening,” 157, 159; Uthai, “Muslim-Malay Separation," 218-219,229; Kraus, ‘'Islam in Thailand,’' 410; K. M. de Silva, Pensri Duke, Ellen S. Gold-

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berg, and Nathan Katz, eds., Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies: Sri Lanka, Thailand and Burma (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), 8-9; Christie, Modem History o f Southeast Asia, 173-174,190; Keyes, “Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand,” The Journal o f Asian Studies, vol. 30, no. 3 (May 1971), 551-567; “Ummah " E/1, vol. 4. 13. Prapartchob Abdul-Salam Preeda, “Muslim Community Development in a Non-Muslim Country: A Case Study of Thailand.” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim A f fairs, vol. 14, no. 1-2. (January and July 1994): 135, 139; Andrew D. W. Forbes, “Legacy of Resentment,” FEER, vol. 108, no. 26 (June 20,1980): 21-22; idem, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1057-1058; idem, “The Cin Ho (Yunnanese Chinese) Muslims of North Thai­ land,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 7, no. 1 (January 1986): 173, 175, 181; Donald Wilson and David Henley, “The Origins of Ban Krua Chams,” Bangkok Post (June 11, 1995); Farouk, “Muslims of Thailand,” 100-106; idem, “Malaysia's Islamic Awakening,” 161; Scupin, “Islamic Reformism in Thailand,” Journal o f the Siam Society, part 2, vol. 68 (July 1980): 1,10; idem, “Islam in Thailand before the Bangkok Period,” 55, 61-71; idem, “The Socio-Economic Status of Muslims in Central and North Thailand,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 3, no. 2 (winter 1981), 162-170; idem, “Thailand as aPlural Society,” 122-124; idem, “Cham Muslims of Thailand: A Haven of Security in Mainland Southeast Asia,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 10, no. 2 (July 1989), 486-491; idem, “Thailand,” 212; idem in Weekes, Muslim Peo­ ples, 784-785; F. D. O’Reilly, “Ethnic Minorities in Thailand,” Plural Societies, vol. 8, nos. 3/4 (autumn/winter 1977): 69; M. Akram Piracha, Muslims in Southeast Asia (Bangkok: SEATO Chulalongkom University, February 1962), 3-8; George L. Harris, Jackson A. Giddens, Thomas E. Lux, Frederica Muhlenberg, Frances Chadwick Rintz, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Harvey H. Smith, Area Handbook for Thailand (Reprinting. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 57-58,213; Hubert Freyn, “Profile of a Thai Muslim Settlement,” FEER, vol. 26, no. 8 (May 24,1962): 368-369; “Siam,” E/1, vol. 7,396-397. 14. Scupin, “Socio-Economic Status of Muslims,” 174-179, 185-188; idem, “Muslims in South Thailand,” 414; Weekes, Muslim Peoples, 785. 15. Scupin, “Islamic Reformism in Thailand,” 2-9; idem, “The Social Significance of the Haj for Thai Muslims,” The Muslim World, vol. 72, no. 1 (January 1982): 25-33; idem, “Socio-Economic Status of Muslims,” 184; idem, “Islamic Reformism in Thailand,” Jour­ nal o f the Siam Society, part 2, vol. 68 (July 1980): 1223-1235; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,” 415-420; Weekes, Muslim Peoples, 786-787; Prapartchob, “Muslim Community Develop­ ment,” 139. For the Arab impact on contemporary developments among reformist circles, see Scupin, “Interpreting Islamic Movements in Thailand,” Crossroads, vol. 3, nos. 2-3 (1987): 81-86.

Chapter Nine

The Annexation of Patani

The resistance to Siamese rule which has been described so far was, for the most part, organized by traditional Malay ruling families who had been deposed, but there were also spontaneous uprisings led by religious leaders in Yala and Patani. For these religious leaders, acquiescence to a non-Islamic regime by a Muslim was tantamount to flying in the face of religious commandments. In 1910, a man named To’tae led an uprising that burned down government offices. A year later, Hajji Bula headed another uprising that was put down by the government only with great pains. Both leaders, apparently Sufi sheiks who were preaching a holy war against the Siamese infidels, were arrested, and the region remained relatively quiet until the beginning of the 1920s.1 During the reign of Vajiravudh—Rama VI— (1910-1925), the government stepped up its attempts to bring the southern districts under its control and to integrate the Malay Muslim population. An im­ portant part of this campaign was a 1921 drive to impose the Primary Education Act. First proposed in 1912, the act required all Malay Muslim children to study at primary schools for four years so that they could learn the Thai language. The ordinance had limited success. Malay Muslim parents did not agree to send their children to Thai schools and resisted compulsory study of the Thai language which they regarded as a program of Siamization. Since the study of Islam was absent from the official curriculum, the act was interpreted as a government plan to downgrade Islamic culture. Consequently, in areas with a preponderantly Mus­ lim population, only 15 percent to 20 percent of the students in such schools were Muslims. Disturbances broke out in a number of places in opposition to the educa­ tion law.2 In 1922, an incident occurred that is illustrative of the disquiet in the south when villagers, incited by religious leaders, protested vigorously against paying taxes. Religious leaders were again behind the resistance that recurred in 1923. During the reign of King Vajiravudh, Malay Muslim resistance took on a political as well as a religious coloration. The Siamese government believed that the center of the movement was in Kelantan and that it was headed by the former raja of Patani, Abdul Kadar, and his sons who had been exiled to Kelantan. Siam assumed that the sultan of Kelantan supported this group, but the British denied it. Peace was 87

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restored when the Siamese government removed an extremely unpopular Siamese official and, at the same time, sent armed forces to the area. The rebellion was forcibly put down, arrests were carried out, and those suspected of leading the riots were executed. The uprisings of 1922 and 1923 forced the Siamese government to reevaluate its integration policy, particularly regarding compulsory education, in an attempt to defuse the tension in the region. King Vajiravudh issued new instructions to the Ministry of the Interior regarding relations with Muslims in the south. These instructions were primarily intended to ease regulations that seemed to run counter to Islam. Taxes imposed on Muslim villagers were reduced, and the king made a special point of insisting on the appointment of suitable officials. Contributing to this change in policy was the growing awareness of the Siamese government that nationalist feelings were on the rise among the population in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula, a sentiment which was expressed in their willingness to send aid to their Malay brothers in the Patani region. Kelantan, whose cultural and historic connection with the Muslims of Patani was long­ standing, was particularly involved. Siamese government circles were apprehen­ sive about the possibility that Patani would be lost to Britain if the forced political and cultural policy vis-&-vis the Muslims was not eased. Repression of their ethnic identity could only result in continued tension and outbreaks of violence in the south. Indeed, the softening of political and cultural pressure by the central government between 1923 and 1938 brought about diminished resistance by the Muslims.3 In 1925, following accounts in Muslim newspapers in India of the oppression of Siamese Muslims, expressions of sympathy were made by Indian Muslims for their brethren, some of whom appealed to the British regent in Delhi to come to the aid of the Muslims of Siam. The Indian government investigated the matter and went so far as to report its findings to the India Office in London requesting any information they might have. The British charge d’affaires reported that there was no truth to the rumors. Siamese newspapers also denied the reports that had been published in India. A number of Indian Muslim organizations and Indian publications rejected the explanations offered, and stood by the accuracy of the charges. They demanded that a Muslim Indian Committee of Inquiry be sent to Siam, but the Indian government did not respond to the demand. Still, on 9 July 1925, the government of India informed the government of Siam that a delegation of three Muslim Indian dignitaries was about to sail from Rangoon to Bangkok, and went so far as to provide intelligence details regarding the trio. The Siamese government announced that it was prepared to receive a bona fide delegation but that the three in question appeared to be propagandists. For reasons that are unclear, the delegation never arrived in Siam, and its members returned from Rangoon to India.4 On 24 June 1932, a coup in Bangkok put an end to the absolute monarchy in Thailand. The revolt, led by Pridi Phanomyong, had a great impact on the Muslims of the south. In great measure, the revolt had a democratizing effect. Malay Muslims

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of the Patani region could now have representation in the National Assembly and the Senate, but the revolutionaries also instituted a policy of national integration which stressed Thai ethnic identity as symbolized by the Buddhist religion and the monarchy. At one in the same time, the assimilation process of various ethnic mi­ norities grew while centralist tendencies in the new regime also grew. The seven districts which until 1906 had comprised the Sultanate of Patani were now reor­ ganized into the districts of Patani, Narathiwat, and Yala. These, along with the addition of the Satun district on the western coast, would be regarded as ordinary districts answerable directly to the Ministry of the Interior. The position of governor-general of the south was abolished. Siamese officials were appointed directly by Bangkok to administer the new districts, replacing the previous Muslim aris­ tocracy that had filled these functions. The new national policy called for supervi­ sion over administration, education, and instruction in the Thai language as part of the imposition of a new national ideology and the assimilation of the inhabitants of South Thailand without regard for religious or ethnic differences. In one sphere, a sharpening of the situation was certainly felt—the regime became much more nationalistic. For a number of years, the efforts at integration and Siamization were limited to drafting young Muslims into the army, teaching Thai language and history, and singing the national anthem in Thai schools. The policy had paltry success; on the contrary, it aroused the ire of the Muslims. Results were very poor in the educational field, primarily because of the low level of teaching. In 1937 there were 83 schools with 177 teachers for 8,327 pupils in Patani which, at the time, had a population of 350,000. Only 20 percent of the children of compulsory education age were enrolled in schools and most left within two years. The government’s compulsory education network was based on Buddhist principles, and the language of instruction was Thai. Buddhist monks served as teachers. The overwhelming majority of Muslims in the south rejected all this. In their eyes, participation in the government school system was equal to relinquishing their identity as ethnic and religious Malay Muslims. Not only did they not consider Thai their language, but they believed that the years of primary education ought to be devoted to their own religious instruction.5 In the religious-judicial sphere, the Muslim population continued to enjoy the relative autonomy that had been granted to them by the two absolute monarchs, Vajiravudh and Chulalongkom, but here, too, the government wanted to tighten supervision and broaden the scope of its authority over the judicial system and the codification of Islamic law in matters of family status and inheritance. The ap­ pointment of new Kathis, called Dato Yutitham, (there were six such functionaries) now required ratification by the State Council (as the Cabinet was known) before the royal announcement of appointments. The codification process began as early as 1929 but was not completed until 1941, and the declaration of its application in the districts of greater Patani came only on 19 November 1946. Thai officials regarded these special judicial arrangements as a gesture of kindness to the Malay Muslims, but the members of the community regarded it as an attempt to undercut

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their status. The Ulama, in particular, resisted codifying Islamic law and translat­ ing it from Arabic and Malay into Thai, seeing it as foreign interference in the religious matters of the community. The work of codification was conducted by Buddhist Thai jurists, aided by a few Ulama who were uncomfortable cooperating with the project. Initially, the leaders of the new regime raised hopes among the inhabitants of the south as to their future. The Malay Muslims believed that the parliamentary system would enable them to realize concessions from the central government which would allow them to maintain their autonomy in matters of religion, culture and language. Tunku Mahmmud Mayhiddin, the son of the popular Malay ruler, Raja Abdul Kader (who had died in 1933), returned from his exile in Malaya and presented himself for leadership of the Malay Muslims. However, the Malay Mus­ lim population in the south was still not sufficiently developed to take part in the new political arrangements of elections. The level of literacy in the south, so cru­ cial for political involvement, was much lower than the level in the rest of Thai­ land. Furthermore, members of the traditional Malay aristocracy that Mayhiddin stood for had little faith in the Thai authorities. Consequently, in the 1933 elections for the national parliament, only one Malay Muslim representative was elected for the Satun district. The other districts—Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat elected Bud­ dhist Thais as their representatives. The election results were a reflection of an important fact with regard to the Malay South. For example, most of the popula­ tion of Satun knew Thai, and their ability to communicate in that language enabled them to more easily participate in the Thai political process. In 1937, the govern­ ment appointed a Muslim resident of Bangkok to the Senate. He was neither an ideal nor a typical representative of the Muslim South, but the appointment was an indication that the government recognized the importance of the Muslim prob­ lem. Yet no Muslims were elected from the three southern districts in the subse­ quent elections of 1943, 1946, and 1948. Only in Satun was a Muslim reelected.6 The situation of the Muslims in the south deteriorated when the army tightened its hold on the country in December 1938, and a nationalist officer, Field Marshall Pibul Songkhram, became prime minister. His ascent to power ushered in a new period of political protests, violent confrontation, and the growth of separatist movements. Pibul Songkhram instituted an integration policy that stressed Thai racial identity and national unity, and introduced a number of Western practices. It was a policy of total Thai domination of the country which, by its very nature, emphasized the fusion of Thai identity with Buddhism. It was a program of forced assimilation which had little patience for the unique Malay Muslim culture, or the culture of other ethnic minorities. The sole expressions of culture to be tolerated in the state were those of the Thai people who lived in the center of the country. Minorities would have to adapt to Thai norms and assimilate into the Thai people and its culture. In order to reflect this goal of a unified Thai national and ethnic identity, the name of the state was changed in June 1939 from Siam to Thailand:

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The Land of the Thais. (In the period between 1946 and 1949, the name of the country reverted to Siam.) Pibul Songkhram’s nationalist policy was so sweeping that few elements of everyday life were left untouched. During his years in power, the Thai Custom Decree and other similar laws were passed which were aimed at changing the traditional customs of all religious minorities, and redesigning the social customs of the entire population. According to these decrees, Malays—both men and women—were forbidden their traditional dress and were required to wear Western clothes in public places. Those who broke the law were fined, at times even attacked by the police. Members of the Malay Muslim aristocracy were most vulnerable because of their highly visible traditional dress. There were instances when people returning from the haj pilgrimage to Mecca were forced by the police to remove the distinguishing scarf worn around the head. There were other decrees that required the population to use Western eating utensils and to sit on chairs around tables when eating. The few Muslims in government service were forbid­ den to have Malay Arabic names and required to adopt Thai names. The Malay language was out-of-bounds in government offices. This demand to make a tran­ sition to the Thai language was neither practical nor, indeed, was it possible. The language of the Muslim population in the southern districts was Malay, especially in the rural areas, and the government did not possess the technical means to enforce the change. It was not feasible to bridge Thai Buddhist national concepts and the Islamic faith, and the Malay population put up a strong resistance to the policy of compulsory assimilation. Even attempts to change place names or the names of people generally failed. In any case, the decrees themselves were enough to arouse opposition and enmity among the Malays of the south, and to strengthen their religio-ethnic solidarity in the face of the external danger of an uncompro­ mising, hostile regime. Perhaps the most serious assault on the religious sensitiv­ ities of Malay Muslims was the attempt by Thai officials to project the superiority of Buddhism, which was the state religion, and turn it into a symbol of patriotism in the framework of the government schools. Although this policy was directed at all the ethnic minorities, not the Malay Muslims alone, the Muslims saw it as a direct threat to the foundations of their religion and ethnicity. There were rumors that Muslim children in schools were compelled to show obeisance to statues of Buddha. A particularly grave incident which caused shock waves throughout the Muslim community took place on 12 January 1944 when the Thai governor of Patani made a speech to an assembly of Malay dignitaries and Ulama in which he called on them to display honor toward statues of Buddha by virtue of their being symbols of the state, which, he explained, was a gesture of respect rather than a requirement that they convert. The response was immediate. A member of the Malay Muslim Parliament in Narathiwat, Nai Adun Na Siburi (or Tunku Abdul Jalal bin Tunku Abdul Mutalib, or Tunku Yala Nasae) who sometime later, and until his death in 1977, was the head of the separatist movement, sent a letter on 14 February 1944 to the prime minister, Pibul Songkhram, protesting the cultural decrees and the insult to Islam by the Governor of Patani. He requested an inquiry

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of the affair and a correction to the situation in order to pacify the population. The prime minister's response, which was not sent until 29 April supported the actions of the governor. Tunku Jalal raised the matter in parliament in Bangkok and ex­ panded his remarks to include the behavior of all Thai officials in the south, calling for an immediate inquiry into the incidents. In December he sent yet another letter to the prime minister. When the letter remained unanswered, he left Parliament and fled to Malaya to join the separatist struggle against the government. The government’s campaign against the status of Islam in the southern provinces con­ tinued until 1944. The prime minister canceled the position of the Kathi and the shari'a courts in the southern districts and ceased to recognize the religious law that had been in force concerning marriage and inheritance. Henceforth, all citi­ zens of the state, regardless of religion, would be under civil judicial authority. The civil courts were also empowered to deal with all matters relating to the reli­ gion of Islam. The weekly day of rest on Friday was terminated. For the Malay Muslim population, these measures were all that was needed to justify, in Islamic terms, the call to jihad. There had always been resistance to Thai domination in the southern districts but, from this point onward, modem separatist and irredentist movements made their appearance. With the passage of time, opposition increased within Patani to the Thai policy of total assimilation and denigration of the Islamic religion. After Pibul took office, the traditional aristocratic Malay families and the Ulama renewed their struggle. In 1944, the local Ulama prevailed upon Hajji Sulong bin Abd al-Kader to take a position of leadership in the protest movement. The alternative facing the Malay Muslim population in the south was either ac­ quiescence to the process of assimilation which the Thai government was attempt­ ing to impose, or renewal of an active organized movement which would strive for autonomy, perhaps even independence. The international constellation seemed fa­ vorable to engaging in a new round of effort on behalf of an independent Greater Patani. Throughout the Malay Peninsula, the Malay National Movement had be­ come active, and it served as an inspiration to Patani Muslims. At the same time that Pibul began instituting his nationalist Thai policies, a pan-Malay movement arose that encouraged national sentiments in all the ethnic Malay groups of South­ east Asia, particularly those under British and Dutch colonial rule. This atmos­ phere contributed to strengthening the self-assurance and pride of the Malay Mus­ lims of South Thailand, and it was here that they found increasing support for their separatist aspirations. It is interesting that despite Pibul’s decrees, there were no outbursts of violence among the Malay Muslims in the south. A possible expla­ nation was the immense power at Pibul’s disposal. The only practical way open to the Muslims was to set up an underground movement which could rely on external aid and support. In 1939, after World War II had already begun, Tunku Mayhiddin left Thailand for Kelantan, together with some of his associates, to coordinate the activities of a Patani liberation movement. Numbers of Malay aristocrats and reli­ gious leaders also opted to cross the border into Kelantan, some traveled even as far as Saudi Arabia.7

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Pibul’s program of forced political and cultural assimilation continued through­ out the years of the war until his regime fell in 1944. It was Pibul who had con­ cluded the Thai-Japanese military alliance in 1941 which led his country into war against the allies, a step which enabled Thailand to realize a pan-Thai irredentist dream. The sultanates of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Pferlis, that had been vassals of Siam and then passed to British rule in the Anglo-Siam Agreement of 1909, were turned over to the Thais by Japan on 20 August 1943. Japan also de­ livered over areas of Laos, Cambodia, and Burma to Thailand. In reaction, Malay Muslim resistance to Thai rule toughened, and the Muslims saw themselves as allied with the British in the hope that it would serve their cause of liberation from Pibul’s regime. The annexation of the Malay sultanates by Thailand strengthened contacts between Malay Muslims in South Thailand and their brothers in the Malay Peninsula. Many Muslims from Patani who found refuge in the sultanates of the northern Malay Peninsula sustained their relationships with relatives that had stayed on in the Malay Muslim districts of South Thailand, which further strengthened the traditional links of the Malays of the south with the rest of the Malay world.8 Tunku Mahmmud Mayhiddin, the second son of the last raja of Patani, Tunku Abdul Kader, was in government service in Kelantan and became the recognized and most prominent leader of the separatist movement. In World War II, he joined the Kelantan Volunteer Force and when the Japanese invaded Malaya, escaped to India along with remnants of the British army. Once there, he played a role in enlisting Malay volunteers to Force 136 which coordinated guerilla activities against the Japanese in Malaya. Mayhiddin had underground contacts with reli­ gious leaders in South Thailand as well as with Malay Muslim members of Par­ liament. Tunku Mahmmud urged them to publicize their claims of religious op­ pression, and religious leaders willingly responded to his call in the expectation that at the end of the war England would support their struggle for independence and give them the political support they needed to redefine their relationship with the Thai government. The resistance movement of Malay Muslims was supported by Thailand’s previous prime minister, Pridi Phanomyong, who had been the ide­ ologue of the 1932 constitutional revolution, and who was head of the Thai under­ ground known as Seri Thai (Free Thai). He supported Mayhiddin leadership of the Malay Muslims and hinted that upon victory of the allied powers, the Patani region would gain independence with Mayhiddin at its head.9 It is unclear whether the British made any specific promises to the Malays of South Thailand, and if they did, at what governmental level such promises were made; it is equally unclear whether the Malays were in fact entertaining hopes that had no official basis at all, as had been the case with the Muslims of Arakan. The only testimony available in this matter has not been corroborated, yet it bears quoting: The British promised to reciprocate with full support for Patani independence. Little did Mayhiddin know, however, that the promise was made by a lower ech-

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Chapter Nine elon of the British military officers who were engaged in the war efforts against the Japanese. There was no official sanction of the reciprocal promises made by the British government. Pridi Phanomyong, leader of the Free Thai Movement during the war reported that “a group of British in New Delhi held a reception in honor of Mayhiddin with a toast: ‘Long live the King of Patani.’ With that toast, not only was independence promised, but also a former kingdom would be re­ stored, with Tunku Mayhiddin as its new ruler. At least that was what he was led to believe.”10

Examination of documents reveals that on 1 June 1943, the British Colonial Office promised that the areas of Patani and Satun would be annexed to Malaya after the war, and that this matter would be included in Britain’s postwar conditions to Siam. With the exception of areas heavily populated by Malays, the Colonial Office did not propose annexing additional Siamese territory except for areas which might have future strategic signifigance for the security of Malaya. In a Colonial Office memorandum, annexation is justified by a claim that the Malay population of southern Siam was the victim of a nationalist policy. The framers of the memo­ randum believed that if a plebiscite were to be held in that region, the overwhelm­ ing majority would doubtless vote for annexation to British Malaya.11 The mem­ orandum of the Colonial Office was based on a proposal made by George Max­ well, former chief secretary to the government of the Federated Malay States.12 With some amendments, the Foreign Office supported the recommendation of the Colonial Office and announced that it had no opposition to moving the Malay border northward should the inhabitants of the region express such a wish in a referendum. This was despite the fact that there was no military imperative to do so, particularly if military bases were to be established in the area. The Foreign Office also recommended that in the event of annexation of territory, no mention should be made of the term annexation, which could cause difficulties with the Americans. It would be preferable to base the demand for territory not on grounds of the population’s racial kinship (that is, ethnicity) but on the need for the territory to be part of a military base which could be a strategic asset of the United Na­ tions.13 On 26 November 1943, the Colonial Office memorandum as amended by the Foreign Office was sent to the Post Hostilities Planning Subcommittee.14 In November 1944, the Far East Committee of the British War Cabinet dis­ cussed the question of whether it was possible to allow Malay-speaking territories in South Thailand to join Malaya. Such a demand had been voiced by the popu­ lation of the south; in fact, the issue of religious discrimination directed toward that group by the government of Thailand was known to the allies. There was neither an official policy regarding the Patani region, nor the notion that Mayhiddin would ultimately be at its head. Britain’s aim in 1944 was to devise—within the framework of an international body—an undefined strategic arrangement for the entire region from the Straits of Kra to the Malay border. It was evident to everyone involved that any arrangement would adversely affect

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Thailand’s sovereignty in the region, including Patani. As a first step, Britain in­ tended to take back the four Malay sultanates that Thailand had annexed under Japan’s overlordship, but there was also some discussion of Patani’s status and the question of whether including Patani in postwar Malaya was not, after all, a logical step from the ethnic standpoint, one that would help secure British strategic inter­ ests in the region. Such border changes would certainly be welcomed by the Malay Muslim population of the country, and it would penalize Thailand for its behavior during the war. While Malay nationalism was at a fever pitch, particularly during the years 1945-1946, the issue of the border between Malaya and Thailand and the future status of Patani was hushed up.15 There were other reasons for this as well. The policy of forced nationalist assimilation came to an end with Japan’s defeat and the fall of Pibul’s regime in July 1944. It was replaced by a liberal and more moderate regime led by Pridi who understood that he must take the upsurge in political consciousness among Malay Muslims into account, as well as Thailand’s delicate circumstances in the international arena. One of the more important consequences of World War II in Southeast Asia was the rise of national move­ ments that led to the independence of countries in the region. The war brought colonial rule to an end and saw the beginning of a period of independent states. The Malay national movement spread throughout the Dutch India islands, the Malay Peninsula, the South Philippines, and South Thailand. The Thais, unques­ tionably, weie wary of territorial demands being made in the south which was pop­ ulated primarily by Malays. Pridi attempted to institute a policy of political integration that was not marked by forced cultural assimilation (which, in any case, had not been successful), sub­ stituting a new approach for dealing with Malay Muslims in the south. Many of the decrees enacted in the days of the Pibul government such as the “costume code” were repealed. One of the first steps taken was passage of the Patronage of Islam Act on 3 May 1945 which was meant to forge a link with the Muslim lead­ ership and appease it. By integrating the Ulama—the various Muslim functionaries—into the government’s network of officials, the hope was to create a sense of belonging. Politically, this could also weaken the separatist movement which was under the leadership of traditional aristocratic families such as Tunku Mayiddin and Tunku Abdul Jalal. In 1947 and 1948, royal decrees were added to the Patronage of Islam Act to ensure supervision over Islamic activities and to regularize them, while at the same time supporting the religious functionaries. The chief functionary of the Islamic religious system, known as a Chularajamontri, was considered the spiritual leader of all Thai Muslims, and was seen as the equivalent of the Shaikh al-Islam in Muslim states. He was appointed by the king upon a recommendation by the government, and he was required to advise the king and government in all matters pertaining to the life of the Muslim community and its religious activities. The description of the Chularajamontri's duties resembled that of the

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Sangha-raja who was at the head of the Buddhist religious hierarchy. The law also stated that the Ministry of the Interior would set up the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, made up of ten elected members drawn from district committees. The Chularajamontri served as chairman of the Central Committee which was under both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Interior. Its function was to supervise all administrative aspects of the religious life of Muslims in Thailand: supervision of registered mosques, distribution of financial grants and stipends to mosques, maintenance of lists of clergy, supervision of elections to mosque and regional committees, publication of religious books in Thai, the conduct of Islamic holidays, organization of Koran reading competitions between districts, organiza­ tion of the Islamic educational network and teacher training, representation at in­ ternational conferences of Thai Muslims, and all other matters pertaining to the life of Muslims in the country. A Provincial Committee for Islamic Affairs was set up by the Ministry of the Interior in every district where there was a sizable Muslim population to advise district authorities in everything pertaining to Islam. In 1978, twenty-six districts had such Islamic committees. The membership was drawn from mosque committees, and each district was to have a committee of seven to fifteen members. In each of the four districts of the south, two Muslim judges, Dato Yutitham, were also appointed by the Ministry of Justice to serve as counsels to the Thai state courts. Their responsibility was to advise on matters relating to Muslim family law in cases in which a Muslim was involved. In point of fact, it is unclear as to what the content, the extent, or the method was by which Muslim law was applied. The appointment, or the dismissal, of Ulama and other religious dignitaries to these committees was entrusted to the Ministry of the In­ terior to ensure that Ulama of dubious loyalty would not be appointed. Other laws and statutes passed in 1947 and 1949 required each mosque to have a Mosque Council, the basic organizational unit of the Muslim community. In order to be eligible for legal recognition and a government subsidy, mosques had to be registered with the government. Registration was not compulsory; indeed, many mosques in Thailand were “unofficial,” but most did choose to register. Each Mosque Council was required to have at least seven members, among them ex-of­ ficio clergy (the Imam, the Bilal, and the Khatib). Representatives of the Provin­ cial Committee for Islamic Affairs supervised election to the Mosque Council which took place every four years. All the councils, regardless of size, were subject to the Chulamjamontri. The same law made it incumbent upon the government to foster a network of religious educational institutions for Muslim children with an appropriate program for re­ ligious instruction. An Islamic college was established in 1950 with an enrollment of eight hundred students. The law referred to Muslims as ‘Thais of the Islamic faith” thus attempting to link the Muslims of the south to those in Bangkok and other districts. The Patronage Act caused a split between the Muslims of the south who cooperated with the regime and the separatists who wanted both cultural autonomy and political independence.16

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There was an additional problem in that not all of Thailand’s Muslims accepted the spiritual status of the Chulamjamontri, particularly true for certain circles in the southern districts because the position was always filled by a Muslim from Bangkok. Decisions on Islamic law made by the Chulamjamontri were all but disregarded by Malay Muslims in the south who invariably turned to local author­ ities in religious law or to Ulama for advice or afatwa. Even determining the dates of holidays was referred to local religious authorities rather than to Bangkok. Even in Bangkok itself, the Chulamjamontri’s authority was not accepted without ques­ tion either in reform-modernist circles or among radical fundamentalists. The mosques administered by such groups did not even bother to register at the Chulamjamontri’s office.17 Just as the Patronage Law and other statutes regarding Muslim affairs were intended as preventative measures against the possibility that Thailand might be forced to relinquish the Greater Patani district in an annexation to Malaya by the British, the 1946 law granting Muslim religious courts autonomy in matters of personal status was directed to the same end. The fact that the Pibul government had collaborated with Japan during the war made this possibility a very real threat. It was all the more ominous because Malay Muslim leaders in the south aspired to such a change and looked to the British to press for a referendum in the region in support of their demand for unification with Malaya which they much preferred to remaining part of Thailand. Thai leaders believed that not only was the law useful in placating Malay Muslims, but that the legislation was also actuated by rational and responsible considerations. The Muslims of the south, however, in­ terpreted it as interference in matters of their religion. The laws did not stem the growing political consciousness of Malay Muslims in South Thailand which was influenced by an expanding national movement of pan-Malaysia in Indonesia and in Malaya. Actually, the members of these movements generally showed little interest in the Muslims of South Thailand or the South Philippines. The Patronage Law that was intended as a countermeasure to irredentist feelings that arose at the end of the war was inadequate in stemming long-standing anti-Thai feelings. There was another reason for opposition to the law. Whereas the goal was to aid Muslims, establishing an Islamic bureaucratic system made Muslims even more dependent on the central government. For example, every mosque now needed government ratification for the selection of its Imam and the Mosque Council. Distrust of the government’s intentions did not abate. Seen as an additional symbol of the government’s intervention into their community’s affairs, for Muslims of the south, the authority of the Chulamjamontri and of the Islamic District Coun­ cils were in question from the very beginning. Nonetheless, the importance of the Patronage Law lay in the fact that for the first time the religious leadership of the Ulama was legitimated by the authorities. There was also a doctrinal difficulty: the function of religious leaders, working through the councils, was to advise a government of non-Muslims; that is of infidels, and there were those who regarded this as contradicting the principles of the shari'a .18

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Notes 1. Werner Kraus, “Islam in Thailand: Notes on the History of Muslim Provinces, Thai Islamic Modernism and the Separatist Movement in the South,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 5, no. 2 (July 1984): 412; W. K. Che Man, ‘The Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 6, no. 1 (January 1985): 100; Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study o f the Malay-Muslims o f Southern Thailand (Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University, 1985), 62-65. 2. Che Man, ‘The Thai Government and Islamic Institutions in the Four Southern Mus­ lim Provinces of Thailand,” SOJOURN: Social Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. 5, no. 2 (Au­ gust 1990): 256; idem, ‘‘Patani: From Sovereign Sultanate to Subnation,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 14, nos. 1-2 (January-July 1993): 119; George L. Harris, Jackson A. Giddens, Thomas E. Lux, Frederica Muhlenberg, Frances Chadwick Rintz, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Harvey H. Smith, Area Handbook for Thailand (Reprinting. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 91,189. 3. PRO: FO 371/69999; BWJ/MS 145982, “Some Facts about Malays in South Siam,” Information Bureau, Gambongan, Malayu Pattani Raya [The Association of Great Pattani Malays] The Federation of Malaya, (Kota Bharu, Kelantan, 16 March, 1948), 2; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 57-58, 65-71; Dulyakasem Uthai, “The Emergence and Escalation of Ethnic Nationalism: The Case of the Muslim Malays in Southern Siam,” in Taufik Abdullah, and Sharon Siddique, eds. Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singa­ pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 217; Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moms of the Southern Philippines and the Malays o f Southern Thailand (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990), 63-64; idem, “Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand,” 100-101; idem, “The Thai Government and Islamic Institutions,” 257; idem, “Patani,” 119-120; Nantawan Haemindra, “The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand,” part 1, Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (September 1976): 204-205; Ibrahim Syukri (pseudonym). History o f the Malay Kingdom of Patani (Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1985), 64; Kraus, “Islam and Thailand,” 412; Raymond Scupin, “Muslims in South Thailand: A Re­ view Essay,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Affairs, vol. 9, no. 2 (July 1988): 406-407; Geoffrey C. Gunn, “Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: Rhetoric and Reality in the Middle East Connection,” Journal o f Contemporary Asia, vol. 16, no. 1 (1986), 34; Ronald Provencher, “Islam in Malaysia and Thailand,” in Raphael Israeli, ed., The Crescent in the East. Islam in Asia Major (London: Curzon Press, 1982), 149; Clive J. Christie, A Modem History o f Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separation, Tauris Academic Studies (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 175-176. 4. Y. B. Mathur, “Muslims in Siam 1900-1925,” Studies in Islam, vol. 4, no. 4 (October 1968): 220-231. 5. FO 371/69999, Fteam to Palliser, 14 October, 1948; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Na­ tionalism, 86, 133-140; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” 204; Deliar Noer, “Con­ temporary Political Dimensions of Islam,” in M. B. Hooker, ed, Islam in Southeast Asia (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 211; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 217; Virginia Thompson, and Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University

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Press, 1955), 158-159; Andrew D. W. Forbes, ‘‘Legacy of Resentment," FEER, vol. 108, no. 26 (June 20): 22; idem, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession or Coexistence?" Asian Survey, vol. 22, no. 11 (University of California Press, November 1982), 1059; M. Ladd Thomas, "The Thai Muslims," in Raphael Israeli, ed., The Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Major (London: Curzon Press, 1982), 160; Scupin, “Muslims in South Thailand," 407-409; Christie, Modem History, 176. 6. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 71-83; Syukri, History o f the Malay King­ dom, 64-65. 7. BWJ/MS 145982, 3-6; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 86-93,98-99; Che Man, “Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand," 101; idem, “Thai Government and Islamic Institutions," 257; idem, “Muslim Separatism? 45, 65, 134; idem, “Patani," 120; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai-Muslims,” part 1, 206-207, part 2, 92; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation," 219-220; Omar Farouk, “The Historical and Transnational Dimensions of Malay-Muslim Separation in Southern Thailand," in Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani, eds., Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 236-237; idem, “Origins and Evolution," 252-260; Arong Suthasasna, “Thai Society and the Muslim Minority," in Andrew D. W. Forbes, ed.. The Muslims o f Thailand, vol 2: Politics o f the Malay-Speaking South (Gaya (Bihar]: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 94-97, 102; Syukri, History o f Malay Kingdom, 66-68; Forbes, “Legacy of Resentment," 22; idem, "Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1059; Thomas, “Thai Muslims," 160; Fraser, Rusembilan, 31,93-94; Scupin, ‘‘Muslims in South Thailand," 409; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature," 7-8; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand," 413; Christie, Modem History, 176-178; H. E. Wilson, “Imperialism and Islam: The Impact of ‘Modernization’ on the Malay Mus­ lims of South Thailand," in Andrew D. W. Forbes, ed., The Muslims o f Thailand, vol. 2, Politics of the Malay-Speaking South (Gaya [Bihar]: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 60-61; Thompson and Adloff, Minority Problems, 159; F. D. O’Reilly, “Ethnic Mi­ norities in Thailand," Plural Societies, vol. 8, nos. 3/4 (autumn/winter, 1977): 73; Hanna, Peninsular Thailand, part 2,3; FO 371/69999, Pearn to Palliser (14 October 1948). 8. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 93-94; Farouk, “Origins and Evolution," 252; idem, “Muslims of Thailand," 107-109, 117-120; Scupin, “Muslims in South Thailand," 409; Christie, Modem History, 177; Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), 75. 9. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 93,98; Scupin, “Muslims in South Thailand," 409-410; Christie, Modem History, 178. 10. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 95. This quotation has not as yet been sub­ stantiated in PRO documents, or in the files of the BWJ. Pitsuwan notes the source of his quote in English as an article written by Pridi in the Thai language. There are some who make the specific claim that during World War II the British made promises to Muslims in order to enlist them in the anti-Japanese struggle, and that the British reneged on the prom­ ise, but it is not clear on what these claims rely. Imtiyaz Yusuf, “Review of Surin Pitsuwan's Islam and Malay Nationalism," Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 8, no. 1 (January 1987), 197. Another two historians claim that the British promised Tunku Mahmmud Mayhiddin that Patani would be annexed to British Malaya. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 158; Farouk, “Historical and Transnational," 243-244. 11. CO 825/35/28, Memorandum sent by the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, Burma Office, and to the Military Sub-Committee on Reconstrution (1 June 1943). See

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also, FO 371/35979, Colonial Office letter of 7 October 1943. 12. FO 371/35979, Letter of George Maxwell to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonial Office (March 15, 1943.) See also, Farouk, “The Historical and Trans­ national,” 243-244. 13. FO 371/35979, a memorandum of the Foreign Office (June 25,1943); CO 825/35/28, Foreign Office to Colonial Office (July 8,1943). The same letter also in FO 371/35979 (July 8, 1943). 14. FO 371/35979, Foreign Office to Colonial Office (November 2, 1943); FO 371/35979, Colonial Office to the Post Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee (November 26, 1943). 15. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 99; Scupin, “Muslims in South Thailand,” 410; Christie, Modem History, 178-179; Wilson, “Imperialism and Islam,” 69-70. 16. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 99-105; Farouk, “Muslims of Thailand,” 111-116; Piracha, M. Akran. Muslims in Southeast Asia (Bangkok: SEATO Chulalongkom University, 1962) 11-12; Uthai, “Muslim-Malay Separatism,” 225; Scupin, “Muslims in South Thailand,” 410-411; idem, “Thailand,” 213; Thomas, “Thai Muslims,” 161; Donald Higby and Elise TUgby. “Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations in the Pattani Region: An Interpretation,” in Andrew D. W. Forbes, ed., The Muslims o f Thailand vol. 2: Politics o f the Malay-Speaking South (Gaya [Bihar]: Centre for Southest Asian Studies, 1989), 83; Fraser, Rusembilan, 153-154; T. H. Silcock, Thailand. Social and Economic Studies in Development (Canberra: Austrian National University Press, 1967), 6; Harris, et al., Area Handbook, 58,189,338; Hugo Loetscher, “In Thailand’s Muslim Provinces,” Swiss Review o f World Affairs, vol. 40, no. 5 (August 1990), 22-23; Che Man, “Thai Government and Islamic Institutions ” 258-262, 270-278; M. B. Hooker, Islamic Law in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984), 37,164; Islam in Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bangkok: July 1976), 4-6; “Islam: A Flourishing Faith in Thailand,” Malayan Times (May 19, 1965). 17. Farouk, “Muslims of Thailand,” 116, 120; idem, “Maylasia’s Islamic Awakening,” 162; Scupin, “Muslims in South Thailand,” 414; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 165; Suhrke, “Southeast Asia: The Muslims in Southern Thailand,” in R. G. Wirsing, ed., Pro­ tection of Ethnic Minorities. A Comparative Perspective ” (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 322-323. 18. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 106-109, 111, 118,145; Tbgby and Tbgby, “Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations,” 83; Imtiyaz, “Review of Surin Pitsuwan’s Islam and Malay Nationalism, 197; Bunge, Thailand, 108,183; Astri Suhrke, “Irredentism Contained: The Thai-Muslim Case,” Comparative Politics, vol. 7, no. 2 (January 1975): 194-196; Wilson, “Imperialism and Islam,” 62; On the development of pan-Malayan ideas in Indonesia and Malaya, see Angus McIntyre, “The 'Greater Indonesia’ Idea of National­ ism in Malaya and Indonesia ” Modem Asian Studies, vol. 7, part 1 (January 1973), 75-83.

Chapter Ten

Hajji Sulong and l \ i n k u Mayhiddin

Malay Muslims greeted Japan’s defeat at the end of World War II, and that of Thailand who had been her ally, with feelings of relief. On 16 August 1945, the Thai government announced that it would allow the sultanates of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perl is to revert to Malaya. Among the Muslims of the south there were great hopes that the victorious allies would punish Thailand, and that they would be liberated from its rule. The unification of all Muslims in the Malay Peninsula, and the annexation of the Patani district to British Malaya, were keenly anticipated. On 1 November 1945, a petition was sent by seven Malay Muslim leaders of the traditional aristocracy (six of the signatories lived in Ke­ lantan, and five of them held the title of Tunku, a Prince) to the headquarters of the British forces in Kuala Lumpur asking that the petition be forwarded to the secretary for the colonies. They requested that the provinces of Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat be separated from Siam, and be allowed to join the other sultanates in the Malay Peninsula. They detailed a long list of grievances against the Thais, including repression. They asked that in the peace treaty to be signed between Thailand and the British government, the districts they represented become part of British Malaya. This, however, was not to be. The Colonial Office and the Foreign Office determined that the British government would not take up the mat­ ter with the government of Siam, nor would the prime minister respond to the petition. Nonetheless, the British Legation in Bangkok was instructed to keep track of developments in the Patani region in order to ascertain whether the Sia­ mese were conducting repressive measures against the Muslims as the petition claimed. The British position was that it had a legitimate interest in affairs in South Siam because of traditional links between Patani and the northern Malay sultan­ ates; therefore, they feared that rioting in southern Thailand could impact on the Malay sultanates. Still, the British did not exploit the weakened situation of Thai­ land in the years 1945-1946 in order to realize the irredentist aspirations of the Malay Muslims nor did they encourage them that they would do so in the future. One reason for British reticence was the desire to achieve stability in the region and avoid further upheaval, particularly because of the Communist revolt in Malaya that had spread to areas bordering Thailand. Burma and Malaya were in great need 101

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of rice from Thailand. Cooperation was necessary between the governments of Malaya and Thailand to prevent the smuggling of rice and other foods, and to overcome lawlessness that had become prevalent in the south. Another, no less important reason, was America’s uneasiness that Britain might replay its imperi­ alist history in Asia generally, and in Thailand specifically. The United States made it clear to England that it would not accept any arrangements which would adversely affect Thai sovereignty or cause turmoil in the area. It was, therefore, both economic and political considerations which prompted Britain to abandon the Patani question. In order to forestall the excision of its southern provinces and lessen the likeli­ hood that Britain would annex them, the Pridi Phanomyong government, which took power in 1946, repealed a number of laws and ordinances enacted by the Pibul regime. Concessions and placating gestures were made to the Malay Mus­ lims, the most important of which was the Patronage of Islam Act (the conciliatory measure described above). In the same year, new legislation was passed that es­ tablished the principle of religious and cultural freedom and ended the assimilatory policy of Pibul. A special government Commission of Inquiry was set up in 1946 to study the complaints made by Malay Muslims in the south. Rumors cir­ culated that Malay Muslim witnesses who testified before the commission later found themselves victims of police harassment.1 Concessions made by Pridi’s government were to no avail; disquiet and feelings of bitterness continued in the south. In the postwar era, Malay Muslims began to exhibit much greater self-confidence as developments in neighboring Malaya raised expectations that they would soon get political independence within the framework of British Malaya. National militancy was awakened among Muslims of South Thailand who were striving for political union with their ethnic brothers. Groups of young people went to Malaya for military training in preparation for the expected confrontation with Thailand. At the same time two protest movements emerged. The first in Kelantan was led by Tunku Mahmmud Mayhiddin (a cor­ ruption of the Arab name Muhi a-Din), whose father, Tunku Abdul Kader, had died in exile in Kelantan in 1933. Most members of this movement came from the traditional aristocratic elites. The second movement was centered in Patani itself. It included religious dignitaries and was led by a religious teacher, Hajji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir, who was chairman of the Patani Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs (Majlis Ugama Islam). He was held in high esteem by his colleagues in the south who were, like himself, Ulama. Their disappointment with the meager benefits of their wartime support of the Allied cause against Japan (as demonstrated by the fact that Patani was not cut away from Thailand) convinced them to take part in the struggle. Hajji Sulong, who had studied theology for a number of years in Mecca, returned to Patani in 1930 and began teaching. In a short time, he acquired the status of an authority in religious matters. From the very beginning he had misgivings about government involvement in the community’s religious af­ fairs, although in 1945 he had agreed to accept an appointment as chairman of the

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Islamic District Council. In June 1946, he came to the conclusion that liberation of the Muslim southern districts would come only through armed struggle. Along with his colleagues, he saw this as the fulfillment of a religious obligation inherent in their role as religious functionaries. They called their movement Patani People's Movement (PPM). The aim of both movements was no longer—as it had been in the prewar years—merely to reinstitute the authority of Malay rulers who had been deposed, but the cessation of Muslim southern districts from Thailand and their unification with the sultanates of the Malay Peninsula. The demand had been stubbornly raised from the time the war ended. The fact that the population in the south was suffering from the distress of harassment by Thai officials, and by wide­ spread corruption, only added to the sense of general dissatisfaction. On 9 Sep­ tember 1946, there were riots in a village in Narathiwat district. A police agent was murdered, and the army burned down the village.2 The growing bitterness in the south, and the burgeoning demand there that the provinces be annexed to British Malaya, motivated the Thai government as early as August 1947 to dispatch a second Commission of Inquiry to look into the allegations against government officials, particularly against the police. The com­ mission found that the scope of complaint was not overwhelming although the Muslims did insist that the Malay language be officially recognized alongside Siamese and that it be taught in schools. They also insisted that Friday be recog­ nized as the weekly day of rest, and demanded the establishment of a special administrative body for the district to be headed by a Muslim high commissioner. The government promised concessions in the area of education, and agreed to Friday as the day of rest. On 24 August (some sources give the date as 3 April 1947) Hajji Sulong presented a seven-point petition to the Commission of Inquiry with the following demands: 1. Appointment of one Governor for all four southern districts who would be empowered to dismiss, replace, or suspend government of­ ficials. The Governor must be a native of the region and elected by local residents; 2. Eighty percent of government officials serving in the four districts must be Muslims; 3. Malay and Siamese would be the official languages; 4. Malay would be the language of instruction in elementary schools; 5. Muslim law would enjoy official sanction and operate through the Muslim courts, separate from civil courts; 6. All revenue generated in the four districts would remain there; 7. A Muslim Board would be established to conduct all Muslim affairs in the region, under the supreme authority of the Governor as men­ tioned in the first item. The petition further demanded that Malay Muslims no longer be considered Thai Islam, a means by which the Siamese government denied their Malay nationality, but acknowledged as Malay Muslims. A similar petition was later presented in

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Narathiwat by a group of fifty-five Malay Muslim leaders who added conditions that called for daily radio broadcasts in Malay, the closure of government offices on Fridays and other Muslim holidays, and the establishment of a modern educa­ tional system. Several days after that a petition from the Satun district was pre­ sented to the Commission of Inquiry. From the similarities between the various, nearly identical petitions, it becomes evident that Malay Muslims were demanding political autonomy and self-rule, though not couched as a separatist ultimatum as in the petition of 1944. Hajji Sulong considered Tunku Mayhiddin as preferred leader of the Malay struggle in South Thailand and saw him as head of an auton­ omous Patani. He went so far as to write to him on 27 January 1948, appealing to him to take on the leadership of the Malay Muslims in order to safeguard their rights. Copies of these letters were found in his possession when he was arrested. The implication of these demands was a call for the creation of an autonomous Muslim region with full authority in matters of language, culture, and finances. As in the previous case, once the commission returned to Bangkok, police perse­ cuted the witnesses that had appeared before it.3 Malay demands were unrealistic. It is doubtful, for instance, if the Malay Mus­ lim community in the south could have produced the large number of Muslim officials which would have been needed to staff the positions in their seven-point petition. It was also evident that the Thai government would not agree even to discuss the conditions, the effect of which would have been a recognition of sep­ aratist rights for various ethnic groups, agreement to demands for regional auton­ omy, and a limitation of Thai sovereignty or control over the southern districts. Actually, the government of Siam did not have a chance to respond to the demands because in November 1947 there was a military coup in Bangkok. Pridi was re­ moved as prime minister, and Pibul once again seized power. Fearing that the repressive regime which had characterized his previous rule would be reinstituted, Malay Muslims sent a petition to London asking Britain not to recognize the new government. Yet Britain did precisely that despite the role Pibul had played during the war years. Among other reasons for their unwillingness to reject the new gov­ ernment was Pibul’s agreement to cooperate with the British in their war against Communist guerillas. The Communists, who were contesting British rule in Ma­ laya, were based in Thai territory. Worried Malay Muslim leaders sent another petition, this time to Bangkok, which asked for guarantees that the Patronage of Islam Law, enacted during Pridi’s office in 1945, be honored. The Pibul govern­ ment reacted forcefully. On 16 January 1948, a number of Malay dignitaries, in­ cluding Hajji Sulong, were arrested. They were tried on 24 February 1949. Sulong, his son, and three colleagues were accused of treason and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. During the trial, the prosecutor claimed that the man most respon­ sible for the rioting in Narathiwat was Tunku Mayhiddin who had written to Hajji Sulong asking that Sulong organize a separatist movement. Sulong was accused of preaching in a number of places and plotting to separate the southern Muslim districts from Siam. He was active in raising funds for the movement, and, alleg­

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edly, had hoped to achieve secession from Siam with the support and cooperation of like-minded people on the other side of the border. Having served three and a half years, Sulong and his compatriots were released in 1952. But on 13 August 1954, Hajji Sulong and three associates, including his eldest son, were again taken in for questioning. They subsequently disappeared. The commonly accepted ex­ planation was that they were probably murdered by the Thai police. After Hajji Sulong's arrest, many leaders—both political and religious—fled Patani and crossed into Malaya. In Kedah and Kelantan, relief efforts were orga­ nized to assist the fugitives and the population that remained in Patani. The new Thai government did institute some concessions in order to ease the situation. Ma­ lay was permitted as the language of instruction in elementary schools in Muslim districts, and a plan to enlist Malay teachers for the coming school year was an­ nounced. Financial grants were given for the construction of mosques. Friday was set as the day of rest in schools, and a number of inept government officials were moved to other tasks. But, of course, the major demands of the Malay Muslims went unanswered. The concessions that were made were seen as merely cosmetic, particularly because the new policy was not applied systematically or quickly enough.4 Riots in the southern districts grew worse in January 1948 following Hajji Sulong’s arrest. Sulong had become the religious symbol which united the entire Malay Muslim population in the south, and in February a new wave of riots broke out in several places. In an especially serious incident, eight police were killed in an encounter with a band of Muslim guerillas. Information reaching Malaya told of repressive actions against Malays by the police which were stepped up after Marshal] Pibul’s return to power. Public meetings were outlawed, and armed po­ lice supervised prayers in mosques. A particularly violent clash occurred on 26 April in the village of Dusun Nyior in the Narathiwat district when villagers led by a religious teacher, Hajji Abdul Rahman, attacked a police unit. Fighting raged for two days between the villagers and the police until the uprising, in which both side suffered losses, was put down. The clash symbolized the beginning of the widespread separatist rebellion which then broke out in the south. As the government proceeded to reinforce its units in the south with both police and army units, it was estimated that approximately two thousand fled to Malaya following the outbreak of violence. In September 1948, claiming that it was fight­ ing against Communism, the government declared a state of emergency in the four Muslim districts in the south. The harsh behavior of the police caused political activists to go underground, but there were also open protests. This was the atmos­ phere that prevailed and which saw the rise of the separatist organizations.5 On 22 January 1948, three hundred Malay Muslim religious leaders held a rally demand­ ing an explanation for the arrest of Hajji Sulong insisting on his release on bail. The government ignored the demonstration and the very next day arrested a num­ ber of Sulong’s associates. Others promptly fled to Malaya. The Majlis Ugama Islam of Patani was declared outside the law. On 27 January Nai Adun Na Saiburi sent a telegram to the UN secretary general asking for help. Another telegram was

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dispatched on 16 February to Clement Attlee, the prime minister of Great Britain, by Tunku Mahmud Mayhiddin who also cabled the Thai prime minister demand­ ing the release of Hajji Sulong. A petition to the United Nations was organized in the southern districts which, it was reported, a quarter of a million Malay Muslims signed or used their fingerprint. There is no data on how the petition was organized nor the administrative network that was able to gather the signatures of so many people, about half of the adult population of the Muslim districts in the south, before the Thai authorities uncovered the operation and exiled many of its leaders to Bangkok. In searches conducted by the authorities in the area, only a small number of signed or finger-marked petitions were found. Either most of the ma­ terial was destroyed or, in fact, not that many people supported the petition. The petition, which was based on the Atlantic Charter in which the Allies promised to respect the rights of all peoples to choose their preferred form of government, demanded that the three districts, Patani, Yala, Narathiwat be allowed to secede from Thailand and join the Malay Federation. The petition had no effect whatso­ ever. The Pibul government arrested many of the signatories but, fearing negative international public opinion, sent a Commission of Inquiry to the south. In a speech in Parliament at the beginning of March, the prime minister admitted that there was unrest among the Muslim minority in the south. He added that Thailand would never agree to the secession of the four districts because other minorities could also raise similar demands and the state would then disintegrate; neither did he consider a referendum to be a viable option. As a result of the report presented by the Commission of Inquiry, in October 1949, the government announced a list of conciliatory steps vis-a-vis the Malay population. In taking these measures, the government, in effect, recognized a separate Muslim cultural identity. Even as the policy was announced, counterforce was being used against the separatists.6 The movement that was organized in Kelantan, made up primarily of Malay Muslim expatriates from Patani, was led by Tunku Mayhiddin. Mayhiddin was born in Patani on 30 October 1908, studied in Penang, and after moving to Malaya became a businessman in Kelantan and Trengganu. In 1933, while still maintaining his business interests, he was appointed supervisor of schools in the Sultanate of Kelantan. During World War II, Mayhiddin served in the British army, reaching the rank of major. He believed that when the war ended, Thailand would be forced to relinquish its southern districts which were primarily populated by Muslims, and that the majority of the population there was loyal to his dynasty; were he to declare himself ruler of Patani, he would receive British aid and, subsequently, Patani would join British Malaya. In World War II and the postwar political situation, he saw the Malays of the Patani region presented with an opportunity to secede from Thailand and join the Malay world. The close relations and affinity that existed between the inhabitants of Patani and those of the northern sultanates of the Malay Peninsula would also be valuable, particularly family connections between the Sul­ tanates on both sides of the border. After the war, he devoted himself to severing the southern districts from Thailand. His first great disappointment occurred when

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the British government refused to react to the 1 November petition which the group of Malay dignitaries had presented to the supreme British commander in Malaya. Then, on 1 January 1946, Britain signed a peace treaty with Thailand in which there was no mention of right of self-determination for the inhabitants of the Patani region. To achieve their goal of having the southern districts annexed to British Malaya, Mayhiddin and other Malay Muslim expatriates in Kelantan decided to proceed in two directions: they would muster support both in the British Colonial Administration in Malaya and within the general population of the Malay Penin­ sula, and they would also encourage violent acts in South Thailand which would demonstrate the great wretchedness the population felt under Thai rule. With some assistance from the British correspondent, Barbara Whittingham-Jones (whose private archives are available at the London School of Oriental and African Stud­ ies, SOAS), Mayhiddin began working on propaganda, dispatching material to the press in England, Malaya, and Singapore. Items were published in the media about the oppression of Muslims in the south and about the organization of Malays in Kelantan who were readying themselves to cross the border in order to fight in Thailand. The item which was of particular concern to the Thai government was described in a proposal to send a United Nations Commission of Inquiry to the area. The Thais had little faith in Britain who, they believed, sought to annex their southern provinces to British Malaya It was to prevent any justification for British interventions which prompted the government to undertake the conciliatory mea­ sures described above. In June 1946, the young king of Thailand, Ananda Mahidon, died under mysterious circumstances. Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong resigned and was replaced by Admiral Luang Damrong Nawasawat.7 It took the authorities in Bangkok until October 1946 to become aware of sepa­ ratist ferment in the south. It was at this juncture that apparently a suggestion was made that the Thai government attempt to work out an agreement with Tunku Mayhiddin in Kelantan. It is not clear whether the notion was first raised on the Thai side or whether it was Mayhiddin himself who came up with the idea. In any case, Mayhiddin approached Sir Edward Gent, governor of the Malayan Union and told him that the Siamese prime minister and the minister of the Interior had invited him to talks in Bangkok on matters relating to the four Malay districts in the south. Mayhiddin expressed the thought that the Thais intended to offer the districts au­ tonomy, and asked the advice of the British governor on the matter. Gent told Mayhiddin that should he accept the invitation, he would be acting solely on his own responsibility, and that it would be wise for him to check into the nature of the proposed talks before agreeing to go. A consultation was held in London, and the Foreign Ministry informed the Colonial Office that the Ministry had no ob­ jection to Mayhiddin’s trip to Bangkok.8 There was some concern in the Colonial Office that serious agitation among the Malays of South Siam could adversely affect relations between Britain and Siam. In this connection, it is interesting to note the poor opinion—hardly free of an arrogant or racial tone—which the Colo­ nial Office had of Mayhiddin and his manner:9

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Chapter Ten Like many Malays he loves intrigue for the sake of intrigue and laughs when he is called a rogue to his face. It is quite likely that on this occasion he has told the Malay authorities that the Siamese authorities wanted him to go up to Bangkok, while he has told the Siamese authorities that he was being sent on a mission by the Malay authorities. His credentials should be carefully scrutinized before we commit ourselves to giving him any support.

Ultimately, nothing came of this initiative, and Mayhiddin did not go to Bangkok. From his home in Kelantan, he mobilized favorable public opinion, issuing warn­ ings that the repressive acts against Malay Muslims in South Thailand were getting worse. Along with his associates in the expatriate community from Patani, he continued seeking support for the Patani cause in the press, among Malay per­ sonages, colonial officials, and British members of Parliament. He was active in other Muslim lands and at the United Nations, and he supported the use of some force. In December 1947 Mayhiddin considered declaring Patani independent, but the British authorities exerted pressure to prevent the declaration. From the end of 1945 until the beginning of 1948, several different groups operated in South Thailand. There was no coordination between them, and an impression of complete chaos in the region was created. Nor did all the groups recognize Tunku Mahmud Mayhiddin as their leader; some had organized spontaneously in re­ sponse to specific incidents or conditions. Meanwhile, confronted with the clear disinclination of the British to support separatist tendencies in Patani, Tunku Mayhiddin decided to look for support among the leaders of the Indonesian Na­ tional Movement. His proposal was that after it was liberated from Thai rule, Patani would join the Greater Indonesian Republic instead of becoming part of British Malaya. On 7 November 1947 Mayhiddin reached Java where he met with such prominent political leaders as Ahmad Sukarno and Dr. Abdul Gani in the hope of getting their public declarations of support, as well as material aid for a revolt. But he came away with nothing. It is conceivable that he did not make serious efforts in that direction because his real hope remained that Patani would join British Malaya. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the designated prime minister of Malaya, with whom he also had a meeting, was unable to do anything for him without British support.10 In the early months of 1948, Britain showed only weak and sporadic efforts to restrain anti-Thai activity by Patani Malays living in Kelantan. On 15 January the governor of Malaya warned Mayhiddin not to get involved in Thai politics. Six weeks later Mayhiddin received another warning. It was clear that cooperation with Thailand in suppressing the Communist revolt was Britain's highest priority. Mayhiddin responded by publishing a declaration, disseminated in the southern districts, in which he called on the population to avoid steps that could cause dis­ order and disturb the peace. Militant Malay Muslim elements put pressure on him to act more forcefully, and indeed, his status as leader suffered in militant separat­ ist circles. The situation in the southern districts continued to be abrasive, and by

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the end of 1948 information began coming through about clashes in the Patani region between Malay guerillas and Thai police forces.11 There was no agreement by the leaders of the Malay Muslims in the southern districts as to their aims. Some would have settled for achieving autonomy within Thailand; others sought an independent State of Patani; still others wanted Patani to become another sultanate in the Federation of Malaya which would be estab­ lished under British protection. Finally, there were the proponents of an unlikely proposal (which had been discussed in negotiation) by which the Republic of Indonesia would annex Patani. When the poorly coordinated elements of the sep­ aratist movement failed to achieve positive results, a decision was made to set up a formal organization within Malaya that would try to mobilize support for the cause. On 16 February 1948 the founding meeting of the Association of the Ma­ lays of Greater Patani (Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya [GAMPAR]) was convened in Kota Bharu, Kelantan. The initiators, Malay Muslim expatriates residing in MaJaya, were traditional aristocratic Malay families who had been deposed and lost status when Siam annexed the south and divided it into districts. The aims of the association were to foster welfare, encourage cooperation, raise the educa­ tional level, and reinstate Malay culture in South Thailand. The association was established without Mayhiddin’s knowledge. When it became known to him, he demanded that a second founding meeting be held in order to choose officers acceptable to him. That was on 5 March. Mayhiddin declared that the real goal of the association would be to conduct propaganda which would demand secession from Thailand and union with the Malay Federation, in the name of the Malay Nationalist Movement in South Thailand. The association would seek support and aid among the Malay sultans of the Malay Peninsula and from political organiza­ tions there, and would support the armed uprising which had already broken out in a number of places in the south. Mayhiddin would conduct the political activity, and Tunku Putera would command the guerilla operation. Tunku Jalal was among other important leaders at the meeting. In April 1948 the organization issued secret directives regarding its real aims. (1) Combining the four southern districts into a single unit within the framework of the Malay Federation; (2) Ending Siamese rule through propaganda in the villages (Kampongs)\ (3) Establishing a secret, revolu­ tionary council. The association chose a flag, a crescent and four stars on a back­ ground of red, white, and green; the four stars to symbolize the four Muslim districts in the south. The establishment of GAMPAR provided impetus and en­ couragement to the separatist cause. With the support of various political organi­ zations in Malaya, branches were opened in several towns. In April the Malay Nationalist Party met in Selangor, with other Malay leftist organizations in attend­ ance, to set up a branch of GAMPAR. On 26 April the Malay Council of World Affairs was convened, with the participation of representatives of various Muslim organizations in the city, to discuss a memorandum prepared by GAMPAR. A decision was made to send an official communication condemning the Thai re­ gime and the repressive measures it was conducting against Muslims. The con­

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demnations were sent to the colonial secretary, the UN, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, and the Arab League. The United Nations was asked to investigate the Thai administration in the south and to conduct a referendum which would demonstrate the aspirations of the population vis-&-vis secession of the southern districts from Siam. Copies were also sent to the Thai government. Further, the meeting urged Malays in the south not to abandon their homes but to remain and defend them. It was decided to establish a fund-raising campaign to aid the victims of Thai oppres­ sion. A branch of GAMPAR was established in Perak, and in May branches were set up in Kedah, Perlis, and Penang. There were suppositions that the Malay Com­ munist Party (MCP) was attempting to infiltrate the organization. Branches of GAMPAR were occupied primarily in distributing written propaganda which led to rumors among Malays in South Siam that their liberation from Siamese rule was close at hand, aided by the British who were in sympathy with them. GAMPAR also made preparations for an armed rebellion. About six hundred Malays from Patani, Kelantan, and Perak came to a training camp in a jungle area close to the Thailand-Kelantan border. Rumors abounded that refugees from South Siam had set up guerilla bands, and one source claimed they had a following of as many as two thousand people. Despite the fact that from its very inception there was a split in the leadership, the impression was that the organization was growing in strength.12 The British consul in Bangkok reacted to the reported founding of GAMPAR by observing that it was an organization that dealt in Malay nationalist propaganda, that there was a camp in Kelantan where he believed some four hun­ dred armed individuals were undergoing training (not six hundred as reported else­ where), and that not all of them were from Patani. He went on to say that they intended to invade Siam and to foment a revolution there. The consul sought prom­ ises from the British Foreign Office that vigorous steps would be taken to halt such activity in order to prevent tragic results if Siam were indeed to be attacked from Malay territory. He insisted that steps be taken to restrain GAMPAR and Mayhiddin so that harm could be avoided.13 The mounting tension in the southern districts and the situation of the Malay Muslim community were also discussed in the Bangkok Parliament. In a debate on 4 March, Muslim Senator Nai Banchong Sricharoon attacked the actions of government officials in the southern districts, complaining of their hostile attitude towards the residents, theft of property, burning of homes, and insults to their re­ ligion, leadership, and language. The senator, who was also a member of the Cen­ tral Islamic Council, reported that a number of his sources in the south had been murdered under mysterious circumstances, while others had escaped to Malaya. He asked what the government policy was regarding the south, and called upon the government to act with dispatch to remove the causes of unrest. Prime Minister Nai Khuang responded in a conciliatory tone and attempted to display moderation. He admitted that the cause of unrest among Malays in the south was harassment by inexperienced, even corrupt officials (similar complaints about corrupt offi­ cials had been made in other parts of the country, the problem was not limited to

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the south), the previous government’s policy which had placed obstacles in the way of freedom of religious practice, the fact that the language of instruction in schools was Siamese rather than Malay, but claimed it was also the result of subversive activities by outside troublemakers. He denied that there had been a deterioration in government policy vis-k-vis the residents of the southern districts, and an­ nounced that the government had established a Commission of Inquiry to examine the matter more thoroughly. Furthermore, new officials had been appointed to re­ place those about whom there had been complaints. Strict instructions were issued to permit freedom of religion and worship, and insure that Malay was the language of instruction in the schools. Discriminatory laws of the previous government were repealed. He promised that the government would read the Inquiry Commission’s report with care and act in accordance with its recommendations. He would, he said, convene a meeting of Muslim dignitaries with the purpose of soliciting their views. But the prime minister went on to make it clear that the southern districts would not have a separate administration because that would be in opposition to the law, that there would be no separate or special approach to any district, and that no referendum would be held. He attributed the unrest in the four districts to in­ citement, both from within Siam and from across the border, by a small group of agitators who were interested in gaining positions of power in the south and sepa­ ratism. He was certain that the nationalist fervor that existed after the war had been fanned by outside propagandists who had fled from South Siam. He believed that Britain would forbid the spread of foreign propaganda from Malaya.14 Following the debate in Parliament and the prime minister’s remarks, the British minister in Bangkok discussed the situation in Patani with the Siamese foreign minister on 6 March. The minister told the foreign minister that while he did not want to intervene in the internal matters of Siam, unrest in the Patani region pre­ sented a danger to relations between Siam and Malaya because it could easily be exploited by hostile elements from outside Siam. In support of his position, he cited the attitude of the Malay media, singling out the correspondent of the London Times in Singapore. The foreign minister emphatically denied that the government of Siam was looking for an excuse for cruel military and police action against the Malays. He believed that there were grounds to suspect that the Malay complaints in the southern districts were being used by elements on both sides of the border for political purposes.15 The press in Malaya and in Singapore did, indeed, give wide coverage to the repression suffered by the Muslims and demanded that Thailand grant autonomy, self-rule, or dominion status to the Malay population of the four districts as the solution to unrest in the region. They argued that whatever steps had been taken by the Thai government were insufficient. Some newspapers wrote that from a geo­ graphic, historic, economic, cultural, and religious standpoint, the four southern districts of Thailand were actually a part of Malaya. The fear was expressed that in the absence of a solution to the problem, the local population would turn to the Communists for aid. Indeed, there were Communist Party inspired items published

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in Utusan Melayu. An especially effective propaganda campaign for the Malay Muslims of the Patani district and for Tunku Mayhiddin was carried out by Barbara Whittingham-Jones who published articles in several newspapers, wrote memo­ randa, and distributed background information. Because terms such as autonomy, self-determination, independence, dominion status, or annexation to the Malay Federation were used interchangeably, the goals of the movement were unclear. The common denominator was a call for separation in one form or another from Thai rule.16 By contrast, the policy of the British authorities in Malaya was quite clear. They had no intention of supporting any policy that would endanger their friendly rela­ tions with Thailand. Both countries had an agenda to repel Communist terror; consequently, the British promised the Thai prime minister that the separatist movement had no official support from them.17 And, in fact, the Kelantan police acted to prevent smuggling of arms or border crossings by armed individuals into Siam, despite the fact that the topography of the region limited the effectiveness of police action. The police were also instructed to examine telegrams sent from Kelantan to Siam.18 On 9 April 1948 there was another countercoup in Bangkok in which Field Mar­ shal Pibul Songkhram was again returned to power, and again memories of his repressive policy heightened tensions among Muslims of the south. A Muslim member of Parliament from the Satun district was co-opted into the government in the position of under secretary of Education in the hope that he could assist the government in quieting unrest in the south. There were clashes and mutual attacks between armed bands of rebels and the Thai security forces. An especially severe incident occurred on 25 April 1948 when a district officer came upon a meeting of approximately one thousand Malays who had been granted “invulnerability” by a local “doctor." The crowd refused to disperse. Police were called and came under fire when they arrived. In the exchange of fire, five policemen and twenty to thirty Muslims were killed. The inhabitants described the incident as an interference by the Siamese government into a local Malay religious ceremony that had no connec­ tion to political separatism. Siamese sources claimed one thousand armed Muslims attacked a police station some forty-three kilometers from the border with Kelan­ tan. On 28 April Mayhiddin appealed to his supporters in South Siam to restrict their activity to legal means and peaceful methods, avoiding actions that might cause disorder and disturb the peace. In order to reduce tension, the Pibul govern­ ment proposed concessions. They agreed to Malay as the language of instruction in schools, and to complete religious freedom. In July 1948, the Ministry of Educa­ tion announced the opening of a Central Islamic Institute for the high school educa­ tion of Muslim students—a program in which one hour a week would be set aside for religious instruction in schools, and eight hours a week for instruction in Malay. (The college opened in April 1949. It offered a three year course in Islamic religion, Arabic and Siamese, and had an enrollment of two hundred students.)19 These events attracted a great deal of attention in Malaya and Britain, and the

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sultans of Malaya and the political leadership of the United Malay National Orga­ nization (UNNO) were able to win sympathy for the cause of the Muslims of Patani. However, by 1947-1948, the same leadership was absorbed with internal Malay matters. Britain, of course, had no intention of taking on the Patani problem, attaching more importance to the Communist uprising that broke out in 1948, which had drawn closer to the Malaya-Thailand border. There was some apprehen­ sion that the southern Thai regions would serve as a springboard for Communist incursions into northern Malaya. On 13 April intelligence sources in Malaya passed on information that a week earlier an Indonesian Communist, Ahmed Boestaman (Abdullah Sani bin Raja Kechil), with twenty-six followers, had come to Kedah at a point close to the border of Siam. It was assumed that he was involved in sending Malay fighters, by way of the jungle, to South Siam, and there was an estimate that three hundred Malays had already infiltrated the area. It was feared that Boestaman would make contact with Chinese Communists in South Siam who would provide arms and clothes for his men. The intelligence sources thought that some of his people were Indonesians (recognized by their accent). The working assumption was that actual fighting would not break out immediately once Boestaman and his people crossed the border (but only after a period of prepara­ tion). It was recommended that this information be conveyed to the Siam police, and the two police forces exchange intelligence information in subsequent cases, particularly with regard to the infiltration of Indonesian agents from Sumatra into South Siam. For the British, the gravest danger was the problem of Chinese com­ munist infiltration into Siam which would then become a base for Communist for­ ays. They were concerned about possible cooperation between the Malay Siamese and the Chinese Communists who would arrive by way of the Malay Peninsula. The political nature of GAMPAR brought it into confrontation with British au­ thorities in Malaya, the British having become suspicious and quite hostile to the organization. It was a vital British interest that cooperation with Thailand in polic­ ing the border be maintained. A state of emergency was declared in June 1948; in January 1949 a meeting took place in Songkhla attended by army officers, police, and Thai and British civilian officials. Such meetings had been taking place throughout 1948. While the British were interested in getting Thai cooperation for reasons already mentioned, the Thais were interested in making certain that any aid given to Malay separatists from the Malay Federation should be halted. The British claimed that the ineptness of the Thai police (whose equipment was poor and whose policemen were poorly paid) was the reason for poor results in preventing terrorists from crossing the border or from smuggling arms and food supplies to their comrades in Malaya. In December 1948 discussions between England and Thailand resulted in the Border Agreement on the Suppression of Communism which dealt with security of the frontier areas. Underlying the agreement was an understanding that in return for Thai military cooperation, the Malay authorities would suppress irredentist activities that originated on the Malay side of the border despite the fact that the

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two sides did not agree as to the extent of support the separatists were receiving from various sources in Malaya. The British made light of the magnitude of such support while the Thais regarded it very seriously and demanded that England bring the matter to an end. In any case, the British did put a stop to the irredentist activities that had been conducted in Kelantan on behalf of the Malay Muslims in Patani. GAMPAR headquarters in Singapore were raided, a number of the leaders arrested, and the organization declared illegal. In August 1949 another agreement of police cooperation was signed between Thailand and Malaya whose goal was to prevent movement of terrorists from one side of the frontier to another, and to allow each of the police forces to investigate information about wanted individuals or about terrorists' concentrations in nearby areas on the other side of the frontier. To make the agreement operative, each of the police forces was permitted to send its units to the other side of the frontier in hot pursuit of terrorists.20 Even as police and army units were being reinforced in the south, the Thai government hoped to overcome the separatist threat by other means, most of which were aimed at pacification and conciliation of the Malay population. Several re­ forms were promised such as freedom of religious expression, the use of the Malay language in elementary schools, and the removal of corrupt officials from their posts. The government also sent out a Commission of Inquiry composed of Mus­ lim members of Parliament from the south and government officials. In March 1948, it was announced that Seni Pramoj, the minister of Education, would travel to the south and that he would consult with Tunku Mayhiddin. Rumors circulated that Mayhiddin had been offered an important position in the government in return for his cooperation in achieving tranquility in the region. The rumors hurt Mayhiddin’s credibility among his colleagues. Militant members of GAMPAR responded with unambiguous threats that whoever acceded to Thai government initiatives would be considered a traitor. Mayhiddin himself admitted that he was losing his influence, but the Siamese continued to regard him as an effective leader responsible for the revolt in the south. The minister of Education did not make the proposed trip because of the revolt that broke out in April. With the declaration of an “emergency" in Malaya, there was a concomitant waning of GAMPAR’s power. In order to counteract rumors of severe treatment of Malay Muslims in the south­ ern district by Thai police, the government invited six Malay journalists to visit the region and investigate the situation for themselves. Upon their return to Ma­ laya, the newspapermen claimed that they had been followed by Thai police, and that they had discovered evidence of turmoil in the south. Indeed, they saw actual preparations for a revolt aimed at reestablishing the Patani Sultanate. The journal­ ists reported that the Malay Muslims persisted in wearing their traditional cos­ tumes, refusing to wear Thai clothes. The journalists admitted that they found very few candidates in the region able to fill senior administrative positions.21 This strategy of forceful reaction coupled with conciliatory gestures was neither effective in quelling the growing armed uprising nor in stemming the pro-separatist feeling that drew support from the Malay Peninsula. The root causes

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of the conflict had not been resolved, and the separatists certainly did not trust Pibul who was notorious for his extreme nationalist views and policy of forced assimilation. The separatists had demanded the right to self-determination and the return of Malay sovereignty to the four southern districts, but the concessions of Pibul’s government were insufficient to answer their expectations. They had antic­ ipated concrete aid from Malaya, but it was not forthcoming. Malaya was em­ broiled with its war against the Communist rebellion that dragged on from 1948 to 1960. Whatever assistance the separatists received from Malay Muslim expatri­ ates in Malaya, and from Malay sympathizers there, was both minimal and unco­ ordinated. Even the most widely accepted leader, Tunku Mahmud Mayhidden, failed in giving the kind of clear, forceful direction to his movement which was so necessary for the mobilization of real support and the achievement of his goal— autonomy, independence, or annexation to Malaya.22 The government of the Malay Federation continued its efforts to prevent active interference in the affairs of South Siam by Tunku Mayhiddin and his organizations in the federation. The Siamese authorities were convinced that Mayhiddin was the moving spirit behind the Patani underground movement despite the fact that he was an official in the Malay government. Senior British officials decided that he had to be reminded about the gravity of the situation in the south remaining unsettled. Once again the idea of an invitation to Mayhiddin, or other suitable Malay repre­ sentatives, was put forward. They were to be invited to a meeting in Bangkok on 4 July for negotiations. Mayhiddin’s response would, they believed, lay bare his real objectives. This idea, which was put forward by the British high commissioner for Southeast Asia in Singapore, had the blessings of the British Foreign Office and the Colonial Office in London. The Foreign Office suggested that the meeting with the Siamese minister for Islamic Affairs be held in Bangkok or on the boundary between the two countries. The views of the Siamese minister would be solicited for a clear declaration as to what should be done on behalf of the Malays of Patani. To insure that maximal publicity would be given to what the Siamese government was doing in the field, an independent, highly regarded journalist would be invited to attend. The Foreign Office believed that should the Siamese make serious efforts to resolve the complaints of the Malays, the potential danger from Mayhiddin would be lessened. Drastic measures against him would be taken only as a last resort. The Colonial Office agreed.23 The British ambassador discussed the necessity of improving the situation in South Siam with the Siamese foreign minister on 6 May. The notion was raised to invite Tunku Mayhiddin to Bangkok for a meeting with a delegation of Thai offi­ cials, headed by the minister without portfolio, on their return from the South. The foreign minister indicated that his government would give the matter careful con­ sideration. The ambassador raised the question once again in a meeting with the prime minister who initially had attached little importance to problems in the south but was convinced, apparently by the ambassador’s descriptions, that the situation could be dangerous to both Siamese and Malay interests. In any case, that was

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what the ambassador reported. The prime minister said that his government was waiting for the report of the minister without portfolio who had been sent to the south to investigate an incident that took place on 25 April.24 The very next day, in his role as Pibul’s personal emissary, the minister without portfolio, a Muslim named Che Abdullah Wang Puteh, met Mayhiddin in Kota Bharu. He told Mayhiddin that the Siamese government was prepared to convene a conference in which negotiations could take place with representatives of the Malay Muslim movement of South Siam. Pibul was even ready to think about changing the status of South Siam. He would send a special plane to Kota Bharu to bring Mayhiddin to Bangkok so that he could participate in the conference. The minister said that Hajji Sulong had been freed and legal action against him had been dropped. Mayhiddin accepted the proposal but made it conditional on the unqualified release of Hajji Sulong so that he could take part in the conference. Second, he insisted that the movement’s leaders in South Siam, who had recently fled, be allowed to return and that their personal safety be assured. Third, he de­ manded that police patrols be limited to the cities. Finally, he wanted the Siamese government to extend a formal invitation to him, copies of which would be sent to the British Foreign Ministry and the American ambassador. The high commis­ sioner in Singapore, who reported on this meeting, added that should the confer­ ence take place Mayhiddin would bring Tunku Jalal and a prominent Singapore lawyer with him. The Thai minister left Kota Bharu on 10 May enroute to Singgora in order to meet Hajji Sulong and bring him to Bangkok. He promised Mayhiddin that he would wire him soon with arrangements for the conference.25 The Foreign Office in London was heartened by the suggestion and decided that Britain should encourage Pibul’s attempt to find a solution by means of the pro­ posed conference. They felt that it was most desirable for the British ambassador in Bangkok to participate in the meeting should it take place. Departing from the earlier negative assessment of Mayhiddin, the Foreign Office now considered him the most reasonable of all those involved in the ferment in South Siam because he was pro-British. Solving the problem was a vital British interest because of the growing power of extreme leftist elements in South Siam, the infiltration from Sumatra, and the threat that UMNO would underwrite the Patani-Malay matter. However, from a 7 June conversation of the British ambassador with the Thai under secretary for foreign affairs, it transpired that neither Mayhiddin nor any delega­ tion from the south would come to Bangkok. On 1 July Pibul explained to the British ambassador in Bangkok that he did not believe that anything could be gained by Mayhiddin’s visit to Bangkok since he lived outside Siam; furthermore, the government saw him as the focal point of all the problems in the south. The British believed that Mayhiddin was acting properly, that his behavior was satis­ factory, and that it was directed toward a compromise and calm. Malay Federation authorities believed that Mayhiddin’s impact on Patani matters was eroding, and that the Thais were overestimating his political importance. Since the Siamese government considered the issue an exclusively internal Siamese matter (and

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therefore objected to British involvement in matters relating to the Patani region), they decided to appoint a new commission which would look into pragmatic steps to be taken for the improvement of the situation in South Siam. The mandate of the commission was to examine ways and means rather than the facts.26 The Bangkok press described the new commission as an official goodwill del­ egation whose responsibility was to neutralize the bitterness that existed between the local population and government officials in the wake of riots that had recently broken out in the region. The commission would be made up of members of Par­ liament from the south who were knowledgeable about Muslim matters.27 The British government was disappointed that there was not to be a meeting between Mayhiddin and Pibul, fearing that the Malay population in the federation would react negatively to what they saw as an insult to their brothers in South Siam and the effect that might have. Encouraged by the Communist movement which wanted to reinforce the impression that the British were indifferent to Malay inter­ ests, leftist elements among Malays in the federation were actively inciting against the government of Siam. They also wanted to discredit moderate Malay politicians in the federation, and in Singapore, by accusing them of a do-nothing policy re­ garding aid to the inhabitants of Patani. Anxiety grew that the response of moder­ ate Malay politicians would be to take a public stand that could adversely affect Siam’s relations with Malaya. The British, therefore, wanted the Siamese govern­ ment to institute administrative changes which would satisfy the Muslims in Patani and would prevent radical elements from exploiting Muslim grievances.28 Faced with their failed attempt to have Tunku Mayhiddin and Field Marshall Pibul meet in Bangkok, the British came up with a new initiative. They suggested that Dcito Onn, leader of UMNO, prepare a memorandum on the situation in Patani for the Thai ambassador who was posted in London, but was then in Singapore. The two met at the end of June 1948. Dato Onn told the Thai ambassador of the pressure being exerted on him to publish a declaration of sympathy for Patani Muslims in order to forestall a monopolization of that issue by the Communists. The Thai ambassador asked for a memorandum on the matter. He suggested that it be transmitted to him in Bangkok by the British ambassador there so that he, in turn, could present it to Field Marshall Pibul. British representatives in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok wanted to see a draft of the memorandum before it was sent so that they could comment.29 The British persisted in their efforts to influence the policy of the Siamese gov­ ernment in the southern Muslim districts. On 19 October 1948 the British ambas­ sador to Bangkok, who was generally a determined advocate of the Thai govern­ ment,30 met with the Siamese prime minister, and once again raised the problem of the Malay Muslims. Reports of their persecution by local Siamese officials were, he said, inflaming the atmosphere in Malaya. Pibul responded by accusing Mayhiddin of intrigues. He told the ambassador that his government was discuss­ ing the appointment of a Security Committee for the south, whose task would be to check the facts, and that he would not object if a British representative were to

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be co-opted to the committee and accompany it on its tour of the southern districts. The ambassador was not content with what he heard from the Siamese prime min­ ister and asked to have it in writing. On 22 October, he received a letter from the Siamese under secretary for Foreign Affairs that confirmed that there was no op­ position to the British consul in Songkhla joining the tour of the Security Commit­ tee to the south. In his letter, the under secretary repeated the accusation that, ac­ cording to information he had, the main reason for disturbances in the south was the subversive activity of a number of Muslim dignitaries, such as Mayhiddin and others, who had taken refuge in Kelantan, a British territory. The Muslim leaders were spreading false charges about repressive acts by the Siamese government and Siamese officials. These dignitaries, whose aim was to cut off the four southern districts from Siam, were, in fact, extorting money from local inhabitants for the acquisition of arms. The ambassador was asked to intervene with the Malay govern­ ment to end the subversive activities. The same accusations surfaced when a Sia­ mese general in the south repeated them to the British consul in Songkhla charging that Mayhiddin, who lived in Kota Bharu, was the prime organizer and that he was sending agents and propagandists to Patani in order to foment rebellion.31 Acting under Prime Minister Pibul’s orders, the head of the Siamese Secret Service (CID) called on the British ambassador in Bangkok to inform him that the prime minister had received the report of the Security Committee regarding South Siam. The committee found that Tunku Abdul Jalal and two other Muslim digni­ taries were continuing to incite revolt in the south from their position in Kota Bharu. The three dignitaries boasted that they had the support of the British and that should there be an uprising in the Malay region, the British would come to their aid. The Siamese commissioner general in Songkhla approached the British consul there informing him that he had received a report that Tunku Mayhiddin and Tunku Jalal were once again implicated in political riots, and that they had estab­ lished an organization in Kelantan whose members were Muslims from Siam. The organization was training eighty men to work with the Communists in the frontier area between Narathiwat and Patani. The Siamese official inquired as to what steps the British would take. The British consul responded that both British and Malay authorities would undertake drastic measures and would cooperate with the Sia­ mese authorities to end any subversive activity against the sovereignty of Siam. Concurrently, the British consul in Songkhla asked that the British representative in Kuala Lumpur send him a written denial in which he would state that the Malay personalities mentioned in the report were not connected to the rebellion in Patani or collaborating with the Communists. He noted that such information had become increasingly prevalent, and a letter from the authorities would be helpful to him in making oral denials.32 On January 6 and 7, at the Songkhla Conference attended by representatives of the Siamese government and of the Malay Federation, it was again decided to plan a combined police action. A course for training Siamese in jungle combat would be set up in Malaya. Should the Bangkok government support the plan, Britain

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would commit planes to take aerial photographs. From a political standpoint, the consultations were rather unsuccessful. The Siamese representatives remained un­ convinced of the sincerity of British declarations that they were doing everything in their power to suppress anti-Siamese activity in Malaya, and, in evidence, pro­ duced parts of British uniforms and British equipment that had been confiscated from Muslim guerilla fighters in the south. The Siamese were stalwart in their view that Mayhiddin and others were involved in fomenting turmoil in the south, and asked the government of the Malay Federation to take practical steps against them and prevent them from living next to the Siamese border. The British advisor in Kelantan attempted to convince the Siamese that Mayhiddin had lost his status because he had done so little for the Malays in South Siam, that he was embroiled in disagreements with Tunku Jalal, and also, although to a lesser extent, with Tunku Putera. He added that Tunku Jalal had become inactive as had the elderly Tunku Putera. With regard to GAMPAR, the British advisor stated that the orga­ nization was dying, perhaps already dead.33 The British ambassador in Bangkok also made persistent demands that the British authorities and the Malay authorities in the federation take aggressive steps to suppress the leaders of the irredentist movement in the Patani region, whereas the British high commissioner in Malaya was at pains to explain to the ambassador from Bangkok that there were political and constitutional constraints to prevent Britain from acting against individuals connected to the irredentist movement.34 The British were disturbed by stubborn Siamese allegations, broadly published in the Malay press, that Kelantan was the center of ferment in South Siam, and they made vigorous efforts to refute them. They insisted that thorough investiga­ tions had not turned up any evidence to support accusations that refugees from Thailand used British controlled territory to organize hostile activities in South Thailand. Tunku Mayhiddin wrote letters of protest to newspapers which had pub­ lished accusations by the Siamese governor of Yala alleging that Mayhiddin was involved in the March incident in which a leader of a Malay group was killed and documents, uniforms, and arms captured. The British ambassador in Bangkok relayed this information to the Siamese foreign minister in the name of the British high commissioner in Kuala Lumpur and added that people suspected of crossing the border were under surveillance. He promised that all necessary steps would be taken to prevent political activity among Thai refugees who supported the Malay irredentists in the south. In this regard, two actions were carried out to assure better coordination between the authorities on both sides of the border. The British con­ sul in Songkhla visited Kelantan in October, and on December 3-5, at the initiative of Britain, the Mentri Besar (chief minister) of Kelantan visited Songkhla as guest of the British consul where he met the Thai governor of the southern districts and other senior Thai officials.35 As though to give substance to Siamese suspicions vis-&-vis a British desire to annex territory in Patani and sympathy to the Malay Muslim cause (shared by the Americans because of rich deposits of tin in the region),36 a strange initiative

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originated from another source, the War Office in London. A document was pre­ pared there (“Aid to Thailand”) which spelled out both the economic advantages (tin) and the political/military advantages inherent in annexing Patani to Malaya. The document indicated this could be achieved in return for the supply of British arms to Thailand. Major General C. D. Packard who brought the document to the Colonial Office added comments of his own: One of my officers has written a paper on “Aid to Thailand/’ The paper suggests that Thailand should surrender to us the territory of Patani Malaya in return for arms; it being unlikely that she would have any other way of paying for arms we might be able to give her. We must, of course, avoid any act which smacks too much of Imperialism, since it seems to annoy the Dominions considerably.37 Both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office staunchly opposed Major Gen­ eral Packard’s proposal to detach the Patani region from Siam, annexing it to the Malay Federation. The Colonial Office appraised the general that it would not do to frighten the Siamese who were exhibiting gestures of friendship. The Siamese could pay for whatever equipment they needed even though, as a rule, they pre­ ferred getting whatever they could at no cost.38 In effect, this brought to an end the period of Tunku Mayhiddin’s leadership. There is a likely assumption that multiple loyalties were a drawback to his lead­ ership and were a cause of his inability to act decisively. Loyalty to the British prevented him from disregarding British interests. As a result, when they de­ manded that he restrain his supporters in Patani, he responded unreservedly de­ spite the fact that this weakened the guerilla activity which he supported and had actually begun. The deep respect he held for Britain coupled with his aspiration to win British agreement for his activities detracted from his loyalty to the sepa­ ratist cause. He hesitated to declare independence for Patani, and this indecisive­ ness lost him his credibility as a leader.39 Furthermore, there is an inference that he simply did not have sufficient leadership qualities. His failure symbolizes the waning of traditional aristocratic leadership among the Malay Muslims in South Thailand. On the other hand, these events can be seen as the success of Thai efforts to increase control of the region though they were still to face many years of hostile struggle.

Notes 1. BWJ/MS 145982, text of November 1, 1945 petition. See also FO 371/54421, Head­ quarters, British Military Administration, Malaya, Kuala Lumpur to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonial Office, London (January 28,1946). The same text can also be found in Christie, A Modem History of Southeast Asia, appendix 6, 227-230; FO 371/54421, The Straits Times (March 30, 1946); ibid., Colonial Office to Foreign Office (May 7,1946); ibid., Foreign Office to Bangkok Legation (May 21,1946); Pitsuwan, Islam

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and Malay Nationalism, 113-114; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation," 220; Che Man, "Malay-Muslims of South Thailand," 101; idem, "Thai Government and Islamic Institu­ tions,” 257; idem, "Patani," 120; Farouk, “Origins and Evolution," 260-261; Thomas, “Thai Muslims," 161; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand," 413; Wilson, “Imperialism and Islam," 61-64; Christie, Modem History, 179-182; Harris, Area Handbook, 276, 337; Thompson and Adloff, Minority Problems, 159; Loetscher, “In Thailand’s Muslim Provinces,” 18-25. 2. FO 371/69988, “Malaya and Siam,” The Malay Tribune (February 20,1948); BWJ/MS 145982, “Patani-Malay State outside Malaya,” The Straits Times (October 30, 1947); Bar­ bara Whittingham-Jones, “Patani Appeals to UNO,” Eastern World, vol. 2, no. 4 (April 1948), 4. Thai articles in response to the article above were published in La Liberte, Bang­ kok, January 1-2,1948. Copies can be found in BWJ/MS 145982. Che Man, Muslim Sep­ aratism, 65-66; idem, “Malay-Muslims," 101-102; Farouk, “Origins and Evolution," 261-262; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature," 8; Nuechterlein, Thailand and Struggle for Southeast Asia, 104; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 114,117-119, 142-150; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 39-40. 3. For text of Sulong’s petition, see BWJ/MS 145982, “Some Facts about Malays in South Siam," (Gabongan Malaya Pattani Raya: Information Bureau, 16 March 1948), 7; BWJ/MS 145982; Barbara Whittingham-Jones, “Patani-Malay State outside Malaya,” The Straits Times (October 30, 1947); Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 152, 155-158; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims," part 1,205-209; Farouk, “Origins and Evolution,” 262-263; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 220-221; Scupin, “Muslims in South Thai­ land,’^ ! 1-412; Christie, Modem History, 183; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand," 413. See also Che Man, “Malay-Muslims," 102; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature," 8; M. L. Thomas, ‘Thai Muslims,” 161; idem, “Thai Muslim Separation," 21; Wilson, “Imperialism and Is­ lam," 64-65; Wilson, Hugh. ‘Tengku Mahmud and the Dilemma of Partisan Duality,” Jour­ nal o f Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 23, no. 1 (March 1992): 52-53,55; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 40; Noer, “Contemporary Political Dimensions," 211-212; Ganganath Jha, “Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and Thailand," India Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3 (JulySeptember 1978): 340; Walker, Dennis. “Conflict between the Thai and Islamic Cultures in Southern Thailand, 1948-1970,” Studies in Islam, vol. 9, nos. 3-4 (July-October 1972), 135. 4. FO 371/69988, The Tunes (February 20,1948); FO 371/69989, The Malaya Tribune, (March 5,1948); FO 371/69993, Bangkok to Foreign Office (June 12,1948); Noer, “Con­ temporary Political Dimensions," 212; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 160; Syukri, “Irredentism Contained," 73; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 1, 210-211; Farouk, “Origins and Evolution,” 264; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 68; idem, “Malay-Muslims,” 102; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 221; “The Muslim Malays of South Thailand: A Story of Their Struggle for Survival Against Muslims Against Thai Oppression and Their Future,” Islamic Review and Arab Affairs, vol. 57, nos. 11-12 (November-December 1969): 22—23; Chee-Meow Seah, “The Muslim Issue and Implica­ tions for ASEAN,” Pacific Community, vol. 6. no. 1 (October 1974): 149; Forbes, “Legacy of Resentment," 22; idem, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1059-1060; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,” 414; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 40-42; Christie, Modem History, 183-184; Thompson and Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia, 161-163. 5. FO 371/69989, “Malays Fight Siam Police,” The Free Press (Singapore: March 5, 1948); Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 161,163-164; Haemindra, “Problem of the Thai Muslims,” part 1, 206, 216; Syukri, History o f the Malay Kingdom, 74; Che Man,

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Muslim Separatism, 66-67; idem, “Malay-Muslims,” 102; Uthai, “Emergence and Escala­ tion,” 222; Farouk, “Origins and Evolution,” 266-267; Thomas, “Thai Muslims,” 161-162. 6. Forbes, “Legacy of Resentment,” 22; idem, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1060; Wilson, ‘Tengku Mahmud,” 55-56; H. E. Wilson, “Imperialism and Islam,” 70; Fraser, Rusembilan, 120-121; Thomas, “Thai Muslims,” 162; Gunn, “Radical Islam,” 35; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 67; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 112; Farouk, “Ori­ gins and Evolution,” 264-265, 267-268; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 1, 212,214-215. 7. Wilson, ‘Tengku Mahmud and the Dilemma of Partisan Duality,” 37-50; Haemindra, op cit., 213; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 222; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nation­ alism, 58; Christie, Modern History, 186; Thompson and Adloff, Minority Problems, 160; BWJ/MS 145982, Barbara Whittingham-Jones, “Patani Malay State outside Malaya,” The Straits Times (October 30,1947); “The Muslim Malays of South Thailand,” 19-20. 8. FO 371/54441 from Malayan Union, Sir E. Gent to Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British Minister, Bangkok, November 19, 1946; FO 371/54441, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, November 20, 1946; Wilson, ‘Tengku Mahmud,” 50. 9. FO 371/54441, C. M. Anderson, Colonial Office, November 23, 1946; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 1,211. 10. Wilson, ‘Tengku Mahmud,” 51-52, 54; Christie, Modem History, 183; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 162. 11. Wilson, op cit., 56; Pitsuwan, op cit., 163; Haemindra, op cit., 213,222-225. 12. FO 371/69989, “Malays Fight Siam Police,” The Free Press (Singapore: March 5, 1948); ibid., "Colony Meeting Accuses Siam,” The Sunday Times (Singapore: March 7, 1948); ibid., “Malays Appeal to UN on South Siam," The Straits Times (March 8, 1948); FO 371/69990, “Muslim Party at Gunong Semanggol Decision on Siam,” Utasan Melayu (Kuala Lumpur: March 17,1948); ibid., “Malayans Allege Injustice in Siam,” The Malaya Tribune (March 22,1948); FO 371/69993, Letter from Sardon bin Hajji Jubir, Representa­ tive of the Muslim Organizations in Singapore to the Colonial Secretary (Singapore: March 25, 1948); FO 371/70002, Bangkok to Foreign Office (December 24, 1948). (Annexed— Notes on Gabongan Melayu Patani Raya [GAMPAR, Association of Greater Patani Malays] by Assistant Commissioner—Special Branch. Singapore: December 6, 1948); Pitsuwan, Islam, 161; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 66-67,135; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Mus­ lims,” 211,213-214,217-220; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 223; Farouk, “Histori­ cal and Transnational Dimensions,” 237-238; idem, “Origins and Evolution,” 265; Suhrke, “Irredentism Contained,” 1%; Wilson, ‘Tengku Mahmud,” 56-57; H. E. Wilson, “Imperi­ alism and Islam,” 65; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,” 414; R. J. May, “The Religious Factor in Three Minority Movements: The Moro of the Philippines, the Malays of Thailand, and Indonesia’s West Papuans,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2 (July 1991): 312-313; Thomson and Adloff, Minority Problems, 162; Christie, Modem History, 184; “The Muslim Malays of South Thailand,” 21. 13. FO 371/69989, From Bangkok to Foreign Office (March 25, 1948). 14. FO 371/69992, British Embassy Bangkok to Kuala Kumpur (April 23, 1948); FO 371/69989, “Favored Treatment for Bangkok Queried,” Liberty (Bangkok: March 5,1948); ibid., “S’pore Hq Alleged for Siam Troublemakers,” Sunday Tribune (Singapore: March 14, 1948); FO 371/69988, From Bangkok to Foreign Office (March 6, 1948); FO 371/69990, “Siam PM on Muslims,” The Straits Times (March 19, 1948); BWJ/MS 145982,

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“Some Facts about Malays in South Siam ” Information Bureau, op cit., 8-9. 15. FO 371/69988, From Bangkok to Foreign Office (March 8, 1948); ibid., op cit. (March 9,1948). 16. FO 371/69989, “More Promises to Patani,” The Singapore Free Press (March 13, 1948); ibid., “The Patani Malays,” The Straits Times (March 15,1948); FO 371/69990, “8 Malays Reported Shot in South Siam,” The Free Press (March 22, 1948); The same news item is found in FO 371/69991, “South Siam Feelers,” The Straits Times (March 23,1948); FO 371/69991, “Malays of Patani, Be on Your Guard. Do Not Be Tools of British and Siamese Politics,” Utusan Melayu (March 24,1948); ibid., ‘Towards a Republic of Patani,” op cit.; ibid., “Statement by the Malay Patani Union,” op cit. (March 27,1948); ibid., “Light on the South Siam Unrest,” The Malaya Tribune (April 2, 1948); FO 371/69993, “Siam’s Malay Provinces,” The Singapore Free Press (May 18,1948); ibid., From the Eastern World (May 1948) 3; FO 371/76290, “Siamese and Malays,” The Straits Times (March 31,1949); BWJ/MS 145982, Whittingham-Jones, “Patani Malay State outside Malaya,” The Straits Tunes (October 30, 1947); ibid., Whittingham-Jones, “Moslem Community in Siam Op­ pressed by Buddhist Rulers. Patani Isolated,” Scotsman (March 22, 1948); ibid., "To the Editor,” The Tunes (London: December 4, 1948). A letter signed by an “Agent for Patani Malays in London” most probably Whittingham-Jones herself; ibid., Whittingham-Jones, “Malay Revolt in Patani,” Probably mid-1948. Relates to the support that Patanis received from the Leftist Malay parties who had contacts with the Communists. These parties main­ tained agents in Patani for a period of time and conducted vigorous separatist propaganda there. They were aided by agents of the Indonesian Republic. Whittingham-Jones, “Patani Appeal to UNO,” 4-6. See also, Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” 221. 17. Haemindra, op cit., part 1, 221. 18. FO 371/69992, From Singapore to Foreign Office (April 29, 1948). 19. FO 371/69992, From Bangkok to Foreign Office (April 27, 1948); ibid., “Guerilla Revolt,” New Chronicle (April 27,1948); ibid., From Bangkok to Foreign Office (April 29, 1948); ibid., From Commissioner-General, Southeast Asia, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (May 5,1948); FO 371/69993, From Singapore to Foreign Office (May 18,1948); FO 371/69999, Foreign Office Research Dept. B. R. Psam to Southeast Asia Dept., A. M. Palliser (October 14,1948); FO 371/70001, “Islamic College’s Opening Now Set for Next Spring," The Bangkok Post (November 8, 1948); Hanna, A. Peninsular Thailand, Part II: The Border Provinces, 4. 20. FO 371/69989, “Rulers and Siam Issue,” Straits Times (March 9, 1948); FO 371/69991, “Siam Border Talks a ‘Great Success,’” Straits Times (March 23, 1948); ibid., “Siamese-Malayan Discussion A Success,” Utusan Melayu (March 24, 1948); ibid., From Singapore to Foreign Office (April 13,1948); FO 371/69992, From Commissioner-General, Southeast Asia to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (May 5,1948); Suhrke, “Irredentism Contained,” 191-194, 196-197; Farouk, “Historical and Transnational,” 238; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 1,216; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 67; H. E. Wilson, “Imperialism and Islam,” 65-69; Hugh Wilson, ‘Tengku Mahmud and the Dilemma,” 57-58; Christie, Modem History, 184-185; Thompson and Adloff, Minority Problems, 162. 21. Wilson, op cit., 58; Thompson and Adloff, op cit., 163-164; Haemindra, op cit., 220; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 223; FO 371/69991, “Siamese Prime Minister to Head Special Commission,” Utusan Zaman (March 28, 1948). An apparently inaccurate quota­ tion from the Straits Times said that the Siamese prime minister would head a Commission

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of Inquiry to investigate conditions in South Siam and that the commission would leave Bangkok at the beginning of April. Actually, this relates to information about the minister of Education. FO 371/69991, “Corrupt Officials Blamed,” Stmits Times (March 29,1948); FO 371/69992, A letter from the British Representative in Kuala Lumpur (April 7,1948). 22. Farouk, “Origins and Evolution,” 268; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 1, 220. 23. FO 371/69992, From Commissioner-General, Southeast Asia to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (May 5,1948); ibid., Draft of a cable from Foreign Office to Bangkok and Singapore (May 1948); ibid., Colonial Office memorandum (May 10,1948). 24. FO 371/69993, British Embassy, Bangkok to Kuala Lumpur (May 6,1949). 25. FO 371/69993, From Singapore to Foreign Office (May 18, 1948). 26. FO 371/69993, Foreign Office to Bangkok (May 25,1948); ibid., Bangkok to Foreign Office (June 7, 1948); FO 371/69994, British Embassy Bangkok to British representative Kuala Lumpur (June 11, 1948); ibid., Bangkok to Foreign Office (July 2, 1948); FO 371/69999, Singapore to Foreign Office (October 17, 1948). 27. FO 371/69994, “Good Will Mission Named to Appease Southern Muslims,” Bangkok Post (June 5, 1948). 28. FO 371/69993, Colonial Office (June 8,1948). 29. FO 371/69994, Singapore to Foreign Office (June 23, 1948); FO 371/69994, Singa­ pore to Bangkok (June 2 2 ,1948). 30. Ibid., Singapore to Foreign Office (June 23, 1948). For example, his somewhat strange dispatch of October 16,1948, to the Foreign Office (FO 371/69999) which showed basic misunderstanding by comparing the Muslims of the south with those who lived else­ where in Siam. 31. FO 371/69999, Bangkok to Foreign Office (October 19,1948); ibid., Bangkok to For­ eign Office (October 20, 1948); ibid., Bangkok to Foreign Office (October 22, 1948); FO 371/70001, British Consul, Songkhla to the British Ambassador, Bangkok (October 29, 1948). 32. FO 371/70001, Bangkok to Foreign Office (November 22, 1948); FO 371/70002, A letter from the Siamese Commissioner-General of Songkhla to the British Consul, Songkhla (November 27, 1948); ibid., British Consul, Songkhla to Siamese Commissioner-General (November 29, 1948); ibid., British Consul, Songkhla to Kuala Lumpur (December 1, 1948). 33. FO 371/76289, High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya to Secretary of State for the Colonies (February 8,1949). 34. FO 371/76290, High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya to Ambassador, Bangkok (March 11,1949). 35. FO 371/76292, Sir H. Gumey, Federation of Malaya to British Ambassador, Bangkok (October 21, 1949); ibid., British Ambassador, Bangkok to Siamese Minister of Foreign Affairs (October 26,1949); ibid., British Consul, Songkhla report (December 5, 1949). 36. FO 371/70001, Bangkok to Foreign Office (November 26,1948). 37. FO 371/76291, Major General C. D. Packard, the War Office, London to C. F. Seel, Colonial Office (June 16,1949); op cit., C. F. Seel, Colonial Office to Major General C D. Packard (June 28,1949). 38. Idem, Foreign Office to Colonial Office (September 7,1949). 39. Hugh Wilson, ‘Tengku Mahmud and the Dilemma,” 59.

Chapter Eleven

Causes of Friction and Attempts at Reform

From the end of World War II, the separatist ferment among Muslims of the south­ ern districts of Thailand was a constant source of conflict. A salient event that contributed to the increasing bitterness of the Malay Muslims occurred in 1954 with the mysterious disappearance of Hajji Sulong. Tension grew and the separat­ ist movement expanded. There were recurrent complaints of discriminatory treat­ ment of Muslims in the south by the government. It was clear that the policy of forced assimilation that had been initiated during the war, and then maintained under the leadership of Pibul Songkhram, had not achieved its goals. It served only to intensify feelings of grievance vis-a-vis the Bangkok government and strengthen the resistance of Malay Muslims to the central government. Increas­ ingly encouraged by the Ulama, the resistance was inflamed as well by the eco­ nomic situation in the south which began to deteriorate in the 1950s. The relation­ ship of ethnic differences to economic gaps was clearly evident; that is, between poor Malay Muslim farmers of Patani, and Chinese and Buddhist Thais who lived in the region. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the rate of natural increase (3 percent) coupled with the immigration of a Buddhist population from other regions in Thailand created an increasing pressure on arable land. Thai im­ migration to the southern districts and the government's distribution of land to the Thais took place during the Sarit government. Each Thai Buddhist family that settled in the south was granted seven to ten acres of land. The policy was under­ taken to encourage assimilation and to increase government control of the area, a policy which the government assumed would be useful in its war against the ter­ rorists. The Malay Muslim population objected to the encroachment of Thai Bud­ dhists into its areas, regarding it as a territorial invasion aimed at changing the ethnic balance in the region. They saw such Thai’ization as undermining their ownership of the land, and as establishing a Buddhist majority in the region. Be­ ginning in 1961, approximately one hundred thousand Buddhist Thais from all parts of Thailand settled in the southern districts. In 1969, an additional wave of settlement brought fifteen thousand families, or sixty thousand people to Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun—all under government sponsorship. Second, at the end of the Korean War, the world price of natural rubber fell. 125

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Economic conditions in the four southern districts were, in general, more de­ pressed than in other parts of the country or of neighboring Malaya. Neglected by the Thai government since its annexation at the beginning of the century, the Patani region’s development was limited, its economic structure primarily agricul­ tural. There has always been a gap between the southern districts and the rest of the country in terms of productivity and per-capita income. About 72 percent of the Malay Muslim population in the four southern districts live in villages, and the majority are self-employed farmers. They subsist by the combination of rice cultivation on small parcels of land, fruit and rubber trees, and coastal fishing. Tens of thousands seek seasonal employment in the Malay Peninsula or in Singa­ pore. Some go as far afield as Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in search of livelihood. Some are laborers and peddlers. By contrast, the Chinese who consti­ tute less than 6 percent of the total population in the Patani district account for most of its commercial and merchandising activity and own most of the trading companies. Buddhist Thais who live in the region are, typically, government offi­ cials, but there are also merchants and plantation owners among them. The Thais and the Chinese own the tin mines, large rubber plantations, and coconut groves. Only a small minority of Malay Muslims are in government service and even fewer are owners of large businesses or plantations. Many Malay Muslims in the south owned small stands of rubber trees, but the rubber produced was of low quality, and productivity was also low; therefore their small profits were affected all the more adversely when the price of rubber dropped. At the same time there was a depletion in the harvest of fish along the coastal region. Malay Muslim fishermen could not compete with the large, modem fishing vessels operated by Chinese and Thai Buddhists. The inefficient techniques used in the tin mines in the southern districts had a relatively low yield. And the cost of living in the southern district was high, particularly due to the price of rice which rose constantly (as it did in other parts of Thailand). In contrast, neighboring Malaya had a high productivity in rubber and tin which brought with it a rise in the standard of living and increased income. The Thai government was aware of the fact that all these economic factors contributed to political unrest. Consequently, in the decade between 1964 and 1974, the government initiated a number of agricultural development programs in the south intended to improve the economic and social conditions of the Malay Muslim districts. It was assumed that improved welfare would lower the danger of conflict and lessen the distance and isolation between the central government and the local population in the south. The plan was to pave more roads and im­ prove public services. Attempts were made to improve rubber tree cultivation and increase the rice yield. New crops were introduced, better animal husbandry was encouraged, and fishing methods were improved. Flood control measures were up­ dated and the extent of irrigated land increased. All these plans, however, were insufficient. Their success was severely limited because of an inefficient bureau­ cracy that employed complicated procedures and a lack of trust between the Thai authorities and the Muslim villagers. Many of the Muslim farmers avoided all con­

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tact with the officials because they feared it would lead to confiscation of their land or the imposition of higher taxes. Implementation of some of the economic pro­ grams created new jobs, but very few Muslims could benefit from them because of their inability to compete with Chinese or Thai Buddhists whose education was superior and who spoke Thai. Citizens of the north came to take these jobs. The failure to improve their lot left many Malay Muslims thinking that the government overlooked their needs and this exacerbated their feelings of discrimination. With­ out question, one of the causes for the erosion of security in the south and the prevalence of bandit gangs was economic privation.1 In great measure the poor level of performance of government officials in the south contributed to friction with the local population. Most officials did not speak Malay, had little knowledge of either the religion of Islam or the customs of Malay Muslims, had no social contact with Muslim society—contacts which, in any case, the Muslims did not welcome because they feared for their Malay traditions. Many Thai Buddhist officials felt superior, had a negative attitude, and were discrimina­ tory and prejudiced toward Muslims. This expressed itself in the use of derogatory names which were offensive to Muslim sensitivities. Invariably, the accepted con­ ception of the authorities was that to be a true citizen one had to be a Buddhist. Buddhist religion was the salient component in Thai identity; consequently, Mus­ lims were alien; they could not to be trusted, nor could their loyalty be depended on. Officials were incapable of understanding that Muslims of the south could not identify with symbols of Thai sovereignty because of their inherent Buddhist sig­ nificance, nor could they participate in state occasions because the ceremonies contradicted their Muslim beliefs. Thai Buddhist officials interpreted the behavior of Muslims in these instances as an insult and affront to the honor of the state. For their part, the Malays complained constantly about harassment, arrest on false charges, and corruption. They suspected that the Thai government and its officials wanted them to assimilate by changing their local customs, institutions, language, and even religion. Frequently government officials expressed their frustration at the unsolved problems of the southern districts by asserting that if the Malay Mus­ lims were dissatisfied with Thai rule, they could leave the country, but they could not take their land with them. For example, Prapat, who had been vice premier, was actually quoted as saying that the Malays could all go to Malaysia if they wished, but the land would remain in Thailand. All these factors caused the Muslim population to avoid contact with Thai Buddhist officialdom, and bred an ongoing sense of alienation from the government, its representatives in the south, and ulti­ mately nonidentification with the Thai state or people.2 The government attempted to address the issue by providing special training for Thai Buddhist officials who were sent to the south. They were required to take courses in Muslim society and culture and learn Malay. The courses began at the end of the 1960s. At the end of the 1970s, instructions were issued to remove corrupt officials but the problem with government officials remained unresolved. A campaign was mounted to encourage qualified Muslims to take positions in

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government service in the south. For example, in the summer of 1978, there were already two Muslim governors of southern districts. The difficulty was that Mus­ lim officials were caught between two conflicting demands: the government de­ mand for total assimilation and loyalty to the Buddhist state and its symbols on the one hand; and on the other, the expectation of their coreligionists for better treat­ ment. When Muslim officials changed their names to Thai names, in accordance with government guide lines, members of their own community regarded them as having cast off their culture and, as a result, lost confidence in them. Conversely, if such officials cultivated closeness with the Muslims, their employers considered them disloyal and their future in government service was jeopardized. Thus, de­ spite the fact that there were increased numbers of Malay Muslims in government service, there was only a minimal impact towards bridging the gap between the Malay Muslim rural population and the state.3 Despite all the efforts at reform, some violence persisted, although more limited in scope. As early as November 1948 British officials in Malaya reported that tens of armed Malay Muslim guerilla fighters, sometimes accompanied by women and children, crossed the border and asked for the protection of the Malay police in their continued hard struggle against the Siamese. The Malay police did not notify their Siamese counterparts of these incidents. The Siamese Security Forces con­ tinued their suppression of those whom they called “bandits and terrorists” in the years following 1948, and hundreds were apprehended and their arms confis­ cated.4 From time to time members of Parliament from the southern districts attempted to call attention to the region’s problems and to suggest a number of reforms. For instance, in 1953 they petitioned for an amnesty for political prisoners, for the convening of a Muslim Assembly that would have statutory rights, and for the appointment of a Malay Muslim Council with executive powers. The government objected to any proposals which would grant special privileges to the Malays of the southern districts using the conventional excuse that granting such privileges to one minority would raise similar demands by other minorities.5 Pibul’s attempts at forced assimilation of Malay Muslims came to an end when he was deposed by the coup of 16 September 1957 and his regime replaced by Field Marshal SaritThanarat’s military government. The new regime introduced a policy of gradual political integration which was intended to mollify Malay Muslims, but the policy of the two previous decades had already damaged intercommunal rela­ tions in the southern districts. Immediately after Pibul’s ouster, the accumulated bitterness of the Muslims was voiced in a formal demand for affirmative action presented to the Ministry of the Interior. The list of demands included establish­ ment of a Muslim university in the south, appointment of Muslim officials in the southern districts by the Ministry of the Interior, reservation of ten slots at the government police academy for Muslim students, and creation of special entrance exams restricted to Muslims who wished to enter government service (the assump­ tion being that they could not successfully compete in the general examination).

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In 1958, a book written by Hajji Sulong was published and distributed which called on Muslims to fight for their rights. The publication venture was carried out by one of Hajji Sulong’s sons, Amin Dato, who a year earlier had been elected to Parliament as a representative of the Patani region. The police sprang into action and most copies of the book were confiscated.6 Field Marshal Sarit wanted to effect a higher degree of national integration in order to augment national security; however, the incursion of the state into the sanctified area of religious authority had foreseeable results within the Malay Muslim community: resistance and rebellion. From the time he came to power in 1957, Sarit’s policy was more ambitious than previous government attempts at integrating the traditional leadership of the Muslim community into the state ap­ paratus. Sarit wanted to penetrate all the social and cultural institutions of the com­ munity since the real purpose of the government’s societal and economic develop­ ment for the area was actually to weaken the social values and the cultural institu­ tions of the Malay Muslim community. The reaction it engendered was a violent one. In 1960, having uncovered a separatist movement with cells in all four Muslim districts, the government announced that it had disbanded the organization and thwarted its aims. The movement had planned to begin its rebellious activities in March 1961. The leaders of the movement, among them Amin Dato, Hajji Sulong’s son, were arrested and accused of Communism and treason. Until it was disbanded, the organization had dealt in antigovernment political propaganda and the distribution of leaflets in Thai, Jawi, and English. The material dealt with reli­ gious education, the history of the Malay sultanates, encouragement of the Malay language, and ideas for waging the Muslim community's struggle. The organiza­ tion also collected money and stockpiled arms.7 There was nothing new in the discovery of the rebel movement. At the end of World War II recurrent rumors began to circulate about an imminent uprising in the southern districts. Indeed, periodic reports continued to testify to great agita­ tion among Malays throughout the 1960s. Field Marshal Sarit died in 1963 and was replaced by Thanom Kittikachom who was immediately confronted by grow­ ing difficulties in the south. Although there was no evidence of strong subversive activity by Muslims, the picture was misleading because political clamor and raids by bands of armed Muslims continued, though these were of limited scope and not terribly efficient. Some of the forays were carried out by groups of outright bandits rather than bonafide separatists; an annoyance easily dealt with by local Thai au­ thorities. Ordinary robbery and other forms of violence that had no political con­ text were constant and prevalent in all the southern districts. The 1960s saw an upsurge of such activity, in part the result of the distressed economic situation and easily acquired arms; in part from the traditional hostility of Muslims toward Bud­ dhists and government authority. But now, there was also, a reaction to the steppedup measures by the government. Clashes were on a limited scale between small units on both sides with relatively few casualties. Organizations surfaced occasion­ ally, were given names, but disappeared in short order. By 1970, twenty such or­

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ganizations were known to have existed, some composed of expatriates who re­ turned from the Malaysian side of the frontier. While the Thai government re­ garded them all as separatists, there was neither coordination nor a unity of aims between them. Some groups aspired to a greater degree of autonomy for Muslims without separation from Thailand; others, perhaps the majority, demanded imme­ diate secession and independence. Some groups wanted to install a sultan or a raja as head of state; others hoped to establish a republic. The stream which had de­ manded annexation to Malaya in the past was severely weakened because of op­ position to the notion expressed by Malay leaders. With every flare-up, the police intervened and suppressed the uprising. In the years 1963-1964, a more severe problem arose when guerilla units of the Malay People's Liberation Army (MPLA), which was the military arm of the Communist Party of Malaya (MCP) headed by Chin Pfeng, organized a recruitment campaign among the Muslims of South Thailand in order to reinforce their rebellion against the Malay government. At first, the Thai authorities feared cooperation between the Communist rebels, mostly Malay Chinese, and the Malay Muslim separatists. Such cooperation never materialized because there was a basic lack of sympathy between the Malay Mus­ lims and the Chinese Marxists. The Thais, however, suspected some limited col­ laboration between the two groups which may have lasted a number of years. There was also intelligence which indicated that Indonesian Communists had supplied arms to the separatists of the Patani region. Another source spoke of a confiscated arms shipment from Sumatra to the Malay Muslims.8 In any case, the irredentist movement in the southern districts gradually became better organized, apparent, and audacious. After 1967, the armed clashes increased in frequency. Smugglers, Muslim bands, and Communists were all involved.9 The common aim of all Thai governments has been the fostering of national unity among the heterogeneous ethnic and religious minorities in the country by means of forced acculturation based on a knowledge of the national culture, his­ tory, national symbols, and, most particularly, the national language. In theory, legally defined freedom of religion was maintained and is ensured by law. Thailand is a Buddhist country, but its society is secular and there is a division between religion and state. There are no restrictions on religious rituals, on the teaching of religion, or on conversion from one religion to another. There is neither organized discrimination nor a policy of persecuting religious minorities. Reli­ gious institutions are, however, required to register with the government. Thai gov­ ernments attempted to encourage a sense of Thai identity among Muslims— meaning that they were Thai in every respect, except religion. It was an approach that appeared logical from Bangkok's viewpoint, and in line with the theoretical legal view, but in fact stemmed from a basic misunderstanding of the nature of Islam. For Muslims, Islam is not merely a religion but an entire identity—both religious and secular. For Muslims, the notion of separation of church and state is meaningless. Language was a significant reason for the confrontation between Thais and

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131

Malay Muslims for it carries a symbolic identity with the religion of Islam. Malay is the mother tongue of approximately 75 percent of Muslims in the south. The local Malay dialect differs from the Malay spoken in Malaysia only in that it in­ cludes a number of Thai words, but people living on both sides of the Malay border had no difficulty understanding one another. Residents of the Satun district have a better knowledge of the Thai language than do Muslims in the three other southern districts. In its attempt to overcome the language obstacle, the government initiated a policy of assimilation through education; consequently, it was necessary to stress teaching the Thai language in Islamic educational institutions. The Primary Educa­ tion Act of 1921 was first introduced in the southern Muslim districts but results there were poor. Southern Malays systematically and stubbornly resisted the gov­ ernment’s efforts. Riots broke out in Patani in February 1923 as a result of attempts to implement the law, which required all children to study the Thai language for four or five years. The authorities were accused of trying to close down religious schools, called pondoks, and forcing Muslim children to study in Thai government schools. The Malays regarded the law as gradual Siamization, or Thai’ization of Patani; they saw it as undermining the Malay language and the religion of Islam, a way of leading Muslim children astray. Strongest opposition to the law came from those in conservative Muslim circles who would not want to send their chil­ dren to Thai schools. In effect, the law remained a dead letter until the coup of 1932. Then, in March 1936, a compulsory National Education Program was an­ nounced which was intended for all ethnic and religious communities.10 Neither the compulsory education policy of 1921 nor the policy of cultural as­ similation of 1939 succeeded in bringing about a significant expansion of Thai education, language, and culture among Malay Muslims. Indeed, the policies only served to stiffen Muslim resistance. Ultimately a compromise was arrived at which enabled instruction in the Malay language a number of hours a week, waived teach­ ing Buddhist principles and ethics, but added the history of Islam and the Malay peoples to the curriculum. This arrangement was also unsuccessful. Muslims con­ tinued to have a basically negative attitude toward secular government education. They regarded the government’s efforts as an attempt to inculcate their children with values that were in conflict with their own religious beliefs and practices. The mosque and the prayer room, the surnu, are focal points in Muslim life. They serve as a gathering place for daily and festival prayers, burial ceremonies, reading from the Koran, sermons, meetings and celebrations. But the same mosque and surau are also educational centers where children are taught. Generally, teachers are peo­ ple who themselves studied in the pondok. In effect, the pondok is the primary Islamic educational institution for Muslims in South Thailand. Most Malay Mus­ lims preferred a traditional education for their children in pondok institutions rather than in government schools. Therefore, the inculcation of Thai culture among the Malay population was extremely slow. The Thai language was identi­ fied by Muslims with the Buddhist religion, just as Malay was identified with Islam. In 1960, the Compulsory Education Law was extended to seven years of

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school, but this amendment went almost unenforced in many rural areas. Most Muslim students dropped out of government schools after a relatively short period. Previous Thai governments managed to do away with the political institutions of Malay Muslims and remove the Malay Muslim aristocracy, but they made no head­ way infiltrating the core sources of cultural religious influence. The government of Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat understood that the primary obstacle to the pro­ grams of integrating Malay Muslims and national ethnic integration were the pondok religious educational centers that were a characteristic of the community. Not only had they become a central cultural refuge for Malay Muslims, but at times even acted as centers for the dissemination of pan-Malay nationalist ideas and political separatism. In 1961, the government determined to turn the traditional pondoks into private schools for Islamic education, and register them accordingly, which meant that they would come under government supervision.11 A description of the nature of the pondok may be useful here. The pondok is a private, traditional Islamic educational institution in which the language of instruc­ tion is Malay, and some advanced studies are conducted in Arabic as well. Histor­ ically, the pondok played a central role in Islamic and Malay educational networks where they began to appear in Patani by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Arabic source of the word is funduk which means “inn” or “hostel.” On completing a year or two of study in their home village, under the local Imam, many students continue their studies in a pondok where they may remain for an additional one to ten years. They live in dormitories, study religious subjects for a full day, and also assist the teacher and his family in various household chores. Generally there is no tuition, but families that have the means often make contributions to the pondok. Pondoks have at least one teacher—a to ’khru or tok guru —who may be assisted by additional teachers called ustaz (teacher or expert, in Arabic.) The pondok is often owned by a local religious dignitary who teaches and administers the school. Patani was the most important center for Islamic studies in the Malay Peninsula in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, traditionally, the pondoks of Patani were highly regarded in the Malay world and in the entire Southeast Asian archi­ pelago. There is a supposition that the pondok method originated in Patani (similar schools in the rest of the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia are called pesantren). Students were attracted to popular pondoks from as far afield as the sultanates in the entire Malay Peninsula. Pondoks elicited strong feelings of loyalty and affinity by students toward their teachers, which helps explain the influential status of pondok teachers in the Muslim community and the prestige which they enjoy. Pondok teachers were always regarded by the local Muslim population, particu­ larly in rural areas, as authorities in everything having to do with the Muslim way of life and as spiritual advisors. Consequently, the Ulama —the most highly re­ spected and influential religious elite—were composed of pondok teachers and mosque functionaries. Male pondok students generally study until the age of seventeen or eighteen. Those who want to continue their religious studies can either remain in the pondok

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133

for an additional period, transfer to another pondok , or pursue their further educa­ tion abroad, often in Arab countries. Female students are in school until age twelve to fourteen. According to various sources,12 in the period from 1940 to 1960, some 70 per­ cent of all school-age Muslim youth were enrolled in pondoks, clearly a high rate of enrollment. Pondok pupils are supported by the community where they fill so­ cial and religious roles, and provide religious services at various family events and Muslim holidays. Students who return from studies overseas, chiefly from Saudi Arabia or Egypt (though also from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan), often join the staff of an existing pondok or establish a new one. At the end of the 1950s, there were more than five hundred pondoks in the four southern Muslim districts. It is difficult to determine the exact number because most of the pondoks revolve around the founding guru and frequently do not continue after his death. The bond between the pondok and Malay Muslim society is an integral one. Because of the status pondok teachers hold as disseminators of religious instruction and sources of spiritual inspiration for the entire community, they sometimes become the flash points for outbreaks against the central government. At the end of the nineteenth century, King Chulalongkom removed the educa­ tional system from supervision by Buddhist priests. Neither he nor his heirs, how­ ever, did anything to interfere with the pondok system of the southern Muslims except an unsuccessful attempt to apply an integration policy to many areas of Thai life. The Compulsory Education Law of 1921 was regarded as a provocation by Muslims. As a result few Muslims sent their children to government schools where instruction was carried out in the Thai language by Buddhist teachers. A 1949 law which regulated the functioning of schools that belonged to the Chinese minority and to Christian missionaries obliged them to register with the Ministry of Educa­ tion in order to receive a government license. Once again, the pondok remained outside government supervision until Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat came to power.13 When the government of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat realized that the 1921 Compulsory Education Law and the cultural assimilation policy of 1939 had sig­ nificantly failed in the dissemination of Thai culture, education, and language among the Muslims of the four southern districts, the government proclaimed yet another new policy in 1961. A program of “educational improvement" was put into effect aimed at transforming the pondoks into private schools for Islamic education to bring them into line with national educational standards. In this way, the pondoks were allowed to remain private but at the same time came under government su­ pervision; this had the advantage of also enabling them to receive financial aid. The program was intended to change the pondok \s traditional method of instruction and to weaken its impact, since the Thai government believed that the pondoks constituted the principal obstacle to the assimilation of the Malay Muslim commu­ nity. Thai officialdom regarded the pondok as a hot house of Islamic radicalism which led to subversive and separatist political activity. Successive Thai govern­

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ments believed that education should be the exclusive responsibility of the state, and that private educational institutions should be supervised to assure that they would aid rather than impede the goals of political integration and the cultivation of Thai values. In other words, they saw the existence of the pondoks as thwarting the government’s priority to inculcate Thai education, disseminate the Thai lan­ guage, and foster a Thai consciousness and loyalty to the Thai people and its king among Malay Muslims. According to the new policy, pondoks were forced to teach according to a government standard, in the Thai language, in accordance with the directives of the Ministry of Education. This applied to religious topics as well. While government sponsored pondoks retained the name “private,” they func­ tioned under government directives, and those that refused to follow the directives were closed. The final date for registration was set for 1971. Out of 537 pondoks that existed in the southern districts in 1971, ten years after the publication of the order, 109 schools were closed. (Estimates differ as to the actual number of pondoks that registered or closed.) In order to ease the transition, various forms of inducement were set out: financial assistance, scholarships, supplies of schoolbooks and other educational equipment which were offered to any pondok that had an enrollment exceeding forty students. Secular teachers were assigned to each pondok to teach the Thai language and other secular topics. Schoolbooks for both general and religious subjects were pre­ pared by the Ministry of Education; unfortunately they contained many errors which angered the Muslim population. In January 1964, the government had de­ cided that all registered pondoks would cease teaching the Malay language (in which religious subjects had been taught) and that no additional pondoks would be opened. In 1971, transition of pondoks to the new educational system became com­ pulsory. Thai replaced the Malay language, the study of traditional religious sub­ jects was downgraded, and a course in general studies was substituted. The need then arose to provide the pondoks with a teaching staff trained in general education and qualified to run a modern school. The traditional Ulama neither knew how nor were interested in performing such functions. Thai teachers were recruited from a number of places; thus, for the first time, non-Muslims were put into traditional Muslim institutions. Beginning with 1972, a course in continuing education was conducted in Bangkok and other cities for several score religious teachers and functionaries of local Islamic institutions. The purpose of these seminar-trips was to foster a feeling of national affinity among the teachers. These trips, which in­ cluded meetings with government officials, continued until the mid-1980s, and more than three thousand people participated. In addition to the support they re­ ceived from the Thai Education Ministry, some pondoks managed to obtain finan­ cial aid from Arab countries.14 The transformation of the traditional pondok network into private Islamic schools under government supervision had a decided influence on the Malay Mus­ lim community. First, in most villages and small towns, Muslim children began studying in a network of Islamic schools, pondoks , that had undergone change and

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which now taught general as well as religious subjects. Second, the pupils were now required to pay tuition for general education as well as religious studies, a greater outlay of money than that required in regular government schools. Third, the pupils now received less religious education than they had before, yet the level of secular education was also inadequate. As it stepped up its efforts to increase the number of general schools in Muslim districts, the Thai government found it had incurred an average increase of 40 percent in the cost of primary education in the four Muslim provinces. Today there is a four-year primary school in almost every village. Kindergartens were set up to teach the basics of the Thai language to Muslim children. High schools were opened in a number of places and in the capital of each district, technical schools as well. In 1967, in order to help Malay students continue their education and overcome the difficulties of passing entrance examinations to Thai institutions of higher learning, a university was launched in Songkhla with a faculty of education and a faculty of engineering. The university also has a Department for Islamic Studies. Since 1971, there has been a special allocation, intended for Muslim students, for higher education in other universities and in the police officers' academy. The goal was to create an elite strata within the Muslim districts that would be loyal to the state and aid in the integration process. Adult education programs in the four provinces were increased. Private Islamic schools, pondoks, that had undergone transformation, gradually decreased and were replaced by general Thai schools. Between 1968 and 1971, private Mus­ lim schools decreased from 535 to 426. By 1991, the number was down to 189. Not all Islamic schools that were registered were, in fact, operating. At the same time, there were 1,218 general schools in the four Muslim districts. It was esti­ mated that in 1991 the number of Muslim students enrolled in general schools was 202,972; while only 22,423 were in Islamic schools. Still, there remained a number of registered pondoks that taught religious studies exclusively and a number that went unregistered. Several factors explain the attrition in Islamic schools. Some private Islamic schools could not fulfill government standards and directives. Oth­ ers lost their salient character as institutions of religious instruction. Finally, many Muslim villages were unable to bear the financial burden of tuition which was increased in order to finance the running of the schools.1s Conservative circles among religious teachers and Imams in the villages re­ garded the Thai policy of transforming the pondoks into private Islamic schools as an attack on their Malay Islamic identity and an assault on their cultural, social, and religious values. These feelings found expression in the rebellion of separatist organizations. Pondoks were vital to the political and religious life of the Muslim community. General education undermined the basic power of the Ulamas and threatened to distance youth from the Malay Muslim heritage. Indeed, in 1968, attacks on the pondok unleashed a new wave of violent counteraction in the name of Islam and Malay nationalism. Still, there were also Malay Muslims who argued that a general education was necessary because it enabled Muslims to improve their economic and social situation, prepared them to better defend their rights

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against government oppression, and gave them social and economic mobility (en­ trance into government service was the conduit that would enable their political struggle). Thus a situation arose in which some Muslims sent their children to government schools, while separatist groups attacked these schools and their teachers. It would appear that the weakening of pondok institutions—actually their eradication—was an important achievement in the government’s integration policy in the southern provinces. The Thai nationalist integration policy that had begun in the 1920s ultimately succeeded in nullifying the role of one of the most impor­ tant Islamic institutions of the Malay Muslim community, removing it from the exclusive control of the Ulama. What had begun as an ostensible effort to support pondok education and improve its quality, turned into supervision and full govern­ ment control over Muslim education in the southern provinces. However, the gov­ ernment’s education policy did not succeed in forging either a uniform national culture or an identity of the south with the rest of the country. It had the opposite result. Both the ethnic conflict between the Malay Muslims and the central Thai regime, and the Muslim aspiration to separatism, only grew as a result of that policy. Another important result of the deterioration of pondok institutions was an up­ surge in the number of Muslim students who went abroad to study in Arab lands, such as Malaysia, Pakistan, and India. According to records of the Thai Ministry of Education, between 1980 and 1987,732 students studied abroad. Of these, 316 went to Saudi Arabia; 127 to Malaysia; 92 to Egypt; 88 to Pakistan; and the rest to Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and Sudan among others. As the government was not aware of all the students who had gone abroad, the real number is even higher. Many of these students obtained scholarships from the host governments and were influ­ enced by radical religious viewpoints that prevailed in the countries. Not surpris­ ingly, many developed feelings of hostility toward Thailand. Partially this was due to religious sentiments, but on their return, the students found that the government was not ready to employ them in its service. Consequently, many turned toward employment as teachers of religion and enjoyed the prestige that Malay Muslims had always felt toward religious figures. Quite a few joined separatist organizations in which they took an active part. Their contact with Arab countries and other Muslim lands was a problem for the Thai government because it facilitated ties between the separatist organizations and Islamic and Arab terror organizations. The returning students were also a link with radical Muslim regimes prepared to offer opportunities for training and money to Malay Muslims.16The fact that Arab countries financed Muslim organizations in Bangkok has been verified, and the Thai government suspected that Arab governments and a number of Muslim orga­ nizations also provided aid to separatists in the south, while the Thai press also accused Palestinians of providing military training to Malay Muslim guerillas. Libya was singled out as a financial backer of separatist organizations.17 In its push to achieve integration, the Thai government did not restrict itself to dismantling the pondok network. From the 1960s onward, attempts were also made

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to bolster the connection between the government inspired Central Islamic Com­ mittee and local Ulama, including closer ties to Provincial Islamic Councils in the south. Since the establishment of the Central Islamic Committee, mandated by the Islam Patronage Law of 1945, the position of the Chulamjamontri had been filled by a Bangkok Muslim despite the fact that most Muslims in Thailand were con­ centrated in the south. Indeed, the Malay Muslims of the south clearly demon­ strated their distrust of all senior religious functionaries in government service—the office of Chulamjamontri and members of the Central Islamic Com­ mittee. For example, in 1975, when the Chulamjamontri visited Patani, the local Ulama refused to welcome him in a special ceremony. From 1977 onward, the government began implementing a program aimed at winning the loyalty of Malay Muslims in the southern provinces. The Ministry of Interior sent delegations of Muslim religious figures and members of the Central Islamic Committee to preach in mosques in the south, but the program met with disdain. In yet another public relations campaign, the government invited local religious leaders, members of mosque councils from the south, to visits in Bangkok, much as it had done with teachers in the pondoks. In the two-year period between 1977 and 1979, 1,055 Imams from the south were invited to Bangkok at government expense; by 1983, the number had grown to 2,400. It is difficult to estimate what impact, if any, this program had.18 The government made a series of other attempts at displaying a liberal religious posture to the Muslim minority. The haj pilgrimage to Mecca is an example. From World War II on, the number of pilgrims grew steadily, reaching a figure of ap­ proximately 2,000 people a year. As part of its assistance to the pilgrims, a gov­ ernment supervised Thai travel agency made travel arrangements, and a medical team of Thai Muslims was provided for the journey. T\vo other examples: begin­ ning in 1961, contestants were sent to participate in the International Koran Read­ ing Competition held in Malaysia; and, at a clearly greater cost, money was allo­ cated for the construction of mosques—the most impressive of which is the Great Mosque in Patani—and funds were made available for the maintenance and repair of existing mosques. In another gesture of goodwill, radio and television programs were broadcast in the Malay language. The goal of all these steps, along with reforms in the economic and education spheres, was to encourage social and political integration and loyalty to the state while defusing religious ferment and bitterness among the Muslims. However, all these measures had limited success because of inefficient administration, lack of trained personnel, insufficient allocation of funds, and perhaps most of all, because of the Muslims’ opposition to integration and their desire to emancipate them­ selves from Thai Buddhist control. Ultimately, the political goals were not achieved, and the causes of ferment and bitterness were not removed.19

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Notes 1. Che Man, “Malay Muslims,” 104-105; idem, Muslim Separatism, 36-38, 162-163, 167-168; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” 102-103; Uthai, “Muslim Malay Sepa­ ratism,” 219, 230; idem, “Emergence and Escalation,” 228-229; Suhrke, “Loyalists and Separatists," 241; idem, “Southeast Asia,” 321-322; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 196-197; Asia Yearbook 1969, 318; Islam in Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok (July 1976), 10-13; “Patani,” EI2, vol. 8,286; Scupin, “Muslims in South Thailand,” 405; Thomas, “Thai Muslims.” 165-170; idem, “Cultural Factors Affecting the Rural Development Interface of Thai Bureaucrats and Thai Muslim Villagers,” Contempo­ rary Asia, vol. 7, no. 1 (June 1985): 2; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 46-48. The author’s evaluation of the effect of government reforms in the south is generally positive. Alexandra Close, “Thailand’s Border Alarms,” FEER, vol. 48, no. 9 (May 27,1965), 395-397; Hubert Freyn, “Senstive South,” FEER, vol. 49, no. 8 (August 19, 1965), 325-326; Farouk, “Ma­ laysia’s Islamic Awakening,” 162; David Brown, “From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 61, no. 1 (spring 1988): 64. 2. Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 2, 85, 91, 96-99; Arong Suthasasna, “Thai Society,” 97-99,101,103-111; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 229; Tligby and Tligby, “Intercultural Mediation,” 275-276, 283-291; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nation­ alism, 61, 167; idem, “The Lotus and the Crescent: Clashes of Religious Symbolisms in Southern Thailand,” in K. M. de Silva, Pensi Duke, Ellen S. Goldberg, and Nathan Katz, eds., Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies: Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Burma (London: Pin­ ter Publishers, 1988), 187-198; Scupin, “Islam in Thailand,” 61; Angela Burr, “Religious Institutional Diversity—Social, Structural and Conceptual Unity: Islam and Buddhism in a Southern Thai Coastal Fishing Village,” Journal o f the Siam Society, vol. 60, no. 2 (1972): 185-186; Thomas, “Thai Muslims,” 157-160; idem, “Political Violence,” 7-9; idem, “Cul­ tural Factors,” 1,3-7; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,” 412-413; Walker, “Conflict between Thai and Islamic Cultures,” 136-138; McVey, "Identity and Rebellion,” 36; Bunge, Thailand, 76-77; Suhrke, “Thai-Muslim Border Provinces,” 298; idem, “Loyalists and Separatists,” 239-240; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature,” 8; Farouk, “Muslims of Thailand,” 116-117 (on the meaning of the derogatory term, khaeg)\ A. V. N. Diller, “Islam and South­ ern Thai Ethnic Reference,” Southeast Asian Review, vol. 13, no. 1,2 (1988): 153-167 (on the meaning of the term khaek and other terms in reference to Muslims in Thailand); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 33; Che Man, “Malay-Muslims,” 103,106-107; idem, “Patani,” 121; NaTaksin Kochapum, “Thai Politics through Southern Eyes,” Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 69 (January-February 1980): 24 (quoting Vice Premier Prapat on the Malays and Thailand). 3. Thomas, ‘Thai Muslims,” 165; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 164-165, 168; Ganganath Jha, 'The Muslim Separatist Movement in Southern Thailand from an Indian Viewpoint.” in Andrew Forbes, The Muslims o f Thailand, vol. 2. Politics o f the Malay-Speaking South (Gaya [Bihar]: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 183-184, 196-199. 4. FO 371/70001, Federation of Malaya to Bangkok (November 10, 1948); FO 371/76290, “Bandit Campaign Brings in Total of 438 Captives,” Bangkok Post (March 4, 1949). 5. Thompson and Adloflf, Minority Problems, 164.

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6. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 167; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Mus­ lims,” part 2, 85; Forbes, “Legacy of Resentment,” 22; idem, “Thailand’s Muslim Minori­ ties,” 1060; Thomas, “Thai Muslims,” 162; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,” 414,419. 7. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 167-173; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Mus­ lims,” part 2, 85-86; Forbes, “Legacy of Resentment,” 22; idem, “Thailand’s Muslim Mi­ nority,” 1060. Thomas, “Thai Muslims,” 162. 8. FO 371/76292, “Siam Muslims Plotting Revolt,” The Straits Budget” (October 27, 1949). 9. Haemindra, “Problem of the Thai Muslims,” part 2. 86; Forbes, “Legacy of Resent­ ment,” 22; idem, “Thailand’s Muslim Minority,” 1060-1061; Thomas, “Thai Muslims,” 162-163; idem,’’Political Violence,” II, 15-16; Suhrke, “Irredentism Contained,” 198; Hanna, Peninsular Thailand, Part II, 3-4; Gunn, “Radical Islam,” 35 (quoting CIA research reports); John L. S. Girling, Thailand, Society and Politics (London: Cornell University Press, 1981), 54,257-258, 265-266. 10. Haemidra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 2,93-94; Uthai, “Emergence and Esca­ lation,” 225; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Patani in the 1980s,” 7,11,23; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature,” 4; John McBeth, “Separatism is the Goal and Religion the Weapon,” FEER, vol. 108, no. 26 (June 20, 1980): 20-21; Country Reports on Human Rights Prac­ tices for 1988, U.S. Department of State, 939. 11. Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 2,94; Che Man, “Malay Muslims,” 103; Walker, “Conflict between Thai and Islamic Cultures,” 136,138-153; Farouk, “Muslims of Thailand,” 110-111; idem, “Origins and Evolution,” 251; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Lit­ erature,” 18,42; “Patani,” EI2, vol. 8,286. 12. Che Man, ‘Thai Government and Islamic Institutions,” 263-264; idem, Muslim Sep­ aratism, 41, 45, 68, 129-134; idem, “Malay Muslims,” 103; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 25, 177-179, 182; Uthai, “Muslim Malay Separation," 222-223; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature,” 43-45,68. 13. McVey, Identity and Rebellion, 44; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 180; Loetscher, “Thailand’s Muslim Provinces,” 21-22. 14. Che Man, “Thai Government and Islamic Institutions,” 265-268; idem, Muslim Sep­ aratism, 166; idem, “Malay Muslims," 103; Uthai, “Muslim Malay Separation,” 223-224, 227-229; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 44- 46; Suhrke, “Irredentism Contained,” 198-199; Imtiyaz, “Review of Surin Pitsuwan,” 197; Arong Suthasasna, “Thai Society and the Muslim Minority," 101; Loetscher, “In Thailand’s Muslim Provinces,” 22; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature,” 7-10, 45-46; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism” 189-193. 15. Che Man, “Thai Government and Islamic Institutions,” 268 (presents a table showing that of some 181,000 Muslim students in the four provinces, only 40,000 attended Islamic Private Schools. The remainder attended Thai government schools); idem, “Patani," 120-121; idem, Muslim Separatism, 163-164; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 2, 94-95; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 173, 180, 183-196, 204-206; Scupin, “Muslims in South Thailand,” 412-414; Islam in Thailand, 6-7; Farouk, “Origins and Evolution,” 270; M. L.Thomas, “Cultural Factors,” 8—9; idem, “Thai Muslims,” 157, 170-173; Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1065-1066; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature," 48, 58; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 37-39. On the University of Patani, see David A. Andelman, “Thai Moslems—Oppressed Minority Strive to Find Way

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in Secular World,” The New York Times (July 1, 1975). 16. Che Man, “Thai Government and Islamic Institutions,” 266,269-270; idem, “Prob­ lems of Minority Populations,” 66; idem, Muslim Separatism, 97-98; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 217-218,226-228; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 203; Scupin, “Thailand as a Plural Society,” 125-132; Brown, “Peripheral Communities,” 74-75; Chavivun Prachuabmoh, ‘The Role of Women in Maintaining Ethnic Identity and Bound­ aries: A Case of Thai Muslims (the Malay-Speaking Group) in South Thailand,” in Andrew D. W. Forbes, ed., The Muslims o f Thailand, vol. 2. Politics o f the Malay-Speaking South (Gaya [Bihar]: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 118-120; Suhrke, “Loyalists and Separatists,” 238-239; idem, "Thailand,” 242-250; idem, “Thai Muslim Border Provinces,” 306-308; Farouk, “Historical and Transnational Dimensions,” 249. Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature,” 13-14. 17. Farouk, op cit., 250-251. 18. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 211-214. 19. Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 2,104; Islam in Thailand, 7-8; “Islam: A Flourishing Faith in Thailand,” Malayan Times (May 19, 1965); Fadlullah Wilmont, “Anti-Muslim Crusade,” Inquiry, vol. 5, no. 4 (April 1988): 58-62 (details all government offenses against Malay Muslims but is highly tendentious).

Chapter Twelve

Separatist Movements

Following the annexation of Patani to the Thai Kingdom in 1902, there were per­ iodic violent uprisings, attacks by guerilla forces, and the organization of subver­ sive groups of Muslims in the south. Government efforts to integrate the Malay Muslims and attempts at their forced assimilation gave rise to violent Muslim op­ position. The first nationalist Muslim groups to emerge after World War II were Hajji Sulong’s Patani People’s Movement, and the GAMPAR movement that or­ ganized in Malaya (both were described earlier). The two movements can be seen as the forerunners of the separatist underground that emerged later.1 It is difficult to present either a systematic list of the resistance and subversive groups active in South Thailand or to detail their structure and relative strengths. The situation is unclear and complicated because the area was rife with separatist Muslim organizations; Communists, both Malay and Thai, who were ethnically Chinese; and gangs of ordinary bandits and robbers, mostly made up of Muslims. The distinctions between them are not always clear cut. There were, for example, bandit groups—pure and simple—who claimed that they were separatists. There were also gangs that occasionally carried out missions for the separatist organiza­ tions. The Malay Muslim separatists were generally considered the least effective of all the armed bands in the south. The groups did not manage to unite or to create an organization that could rep­ resent all the separate groupings, or even most of them, despite several attempts to bring them all under an umbrella-like structure. Splintered into a number of groups, of which only a few had significant numbers, the fragmentation worked against effective action. In the early 1970s, it was estimated that approximately twenty separatist bodies existed. In several instances membership was drawn from Malay Muslims who lived in Malaysia. Students who had received an Islamic education in countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan, or Ma­ laysia were an important element in the separatist organizations. Having discov­ ered that employment in government service would not be available to them, many were attracted to the separatist groups where their personal frustrations combined with their religious feelings and motivated them to become part of underground organizations. Student links with Muslim bodies in Arab countries were somewhat 141

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useful in generating expressions of international interest in the plight of the Mus­ lims of the south. In the second half of the 1970s, the number of separatist groups declined. By 1981 only five remained. Some deteriorated because of ineffective leadership or lack of funds; others lost members to larger and stronger groups; in some in­ stances, former rebels submitted to the government or simply stopped their sepa­ ratist activity. The common denominator of those who continued to resist was the aspiration to have the Muslim provinces secede from Thailand by means of an armed struggle. Yet here too there were differences in ideological orientation, goals, tactics, and strategies. Differences arose in the scope of activity pursued by the organizations that sought full independence and the reestablishment of the Muslim sultanates and between those who hoped for unification with neighboring Malaysia or autonomy within a federated framework with Thailand. There was no unanimity of goals. A major cause of disagreement was the competition and per­ sonal struggles among the leaders of the various groups. There are no authoritative figures about the numerical strength of the organizations, not even of the largest, and there is a wide area of contradiction among sources. Nor is the extent of sup­ port by the rural Muslim population for the armed struggle easily determined. It is unclear whether or not the majority was indifferent and wanted to be left to their own devices, though there was certainly no show of readiness on their part to co­ operate with the authorities. Within the Muslim community, there were loyalist circles who claimed that Muslims should accede to the legitimacy of Thai rule and that it would be wise to cooperate with Thai authorities in finding a solution to the problems of the south. They attempted to achieve a cessation of hostilities through persuasion and peace­ ful means. But the efforts of a number of prominent people in the Muslim com­ munity to explain to government figures in Bangkok the special circumstances that existed in the south and the aspirations of the Muslim community fell on deaf ears. A number of these moderate Muslims were murdered—whether it was by the hand of government agents or radical separatists is unclear. In any case, the mur­ ders dissuaded others from initiating similar attempts at reconciliation. Nonethe­ less, in 1974, representatives of the South Thailand Muslim Students Group (STMSG) managed to bring a delegation from the south to Bangkok, and to ar­ range a meeting for them with the prime minister in order to discuss corruption and illegal actions of Thai officials in the south, and the harassment of the Malay Muslim population. The organization of Muslim students was inspired by the up­ rising of Thai students on 14 October 1973 which had been instrumental in return­ ing democratic rule to Thailand. STMSG announced its aims: justice for the four southern provinces, the establishment of a Muslim students' center in Bangkok, provision of aid and counsel to students from the south, and the dissemination of Islamic principles. The heads of the organization held meetings with government ministers where the accusation of corruption among government officials in the

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southern provinces was aired again. Following on yet another coup in October 1976, the organization was quickly disbanded. There were other Muslim leaders not linked to the separatist movements who also expressed their concern that suppression by police and the army, and the ar­ bitrary arrest of innocent people, would cause a grave counterreaction among the Muslim population. Financial sources of the separatist organizations stemmed pri­ marily from contributions by local and foreign supporters. Locally, there were forced contributions from non-Muslim business people, plantation owners, and shopkeepers. Assistance from abroad came from Muslim governments, various Muslim organizations, and from private donors. The actual number of members in all the organizations was relatively small when compared to the size of the general Muslim population in the south although the majority of Muslims in the south clearly identified with the separatists. This is true even if one accepts minimalist figures for the size of the Muslim community. The resort to violence was justified on the basis of the belief that Muslims were entitled to live in a normative order of their own; that is, Islam. Indeed, when one examines the underground pamphlets what emerges is a model of justifying violent activities as response and retaliation for the government’s use of force against Muslims, as a reaction to the govern­ ment’s cultural imperialism as demonstrated in the forcible inculcation of the Thai language, as well as other examples of forced assimilation which ran against the tenets of Islam or were offensive to it. Writers of the pamphlets relied heavily on quotations from the Koran and other Islamic works to justify their activities. The Thai government invariably suspected religious leaders and teachers of Islam as preaching separatist ideas and antigovernment activism. Many religious teachers did fill leadership roles in the separatist organizations. The focus of their political thinking was the Islamic religion.2 The most veteran of the separatist organizations was Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP)—the National Liberation Front of Patani (NLFP)— apparently founded in 1947. Several sources cite Tunku Mayhiddin as its founder. For thirty years, Tunku Yala Naser (also known as Tunku Abdul Jalal), the grandson of Tunku Abdul Kader, the former sultan of Patani who had escaped to Malaya in 1932, stood at the head of the organization and was also assistant head of GAMPAR. In 1949 he left for Malaya. He had good contacts in Kelantan where he found the financial support necessary to carry out military training. Members of traditional aristocratic families and religious figures joined him as did students who had returned from studies overseas in Saudi Arabia, Malaya, Pakistan, and Europe. (The separatist movements had a high proportion of such students.) Upon his death in September 1977, the leadership of BNPP (the organization was re­ garded as having a conservative Islamic character) was entrusted to a central com­ mittee of fifteen members headed by Badri Hamdan who had received his univer­ sity education at Al Azhar in Cairo. The secretary of the movement was Samsudin Abdul Salleh who had also studied in Egypt. At the head of the military arm stood Idris bin Mat Diah who was known by a number of other names: For Yeh, Deureh

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Madiyoh, and Bapa Idris. Apparently he returned to South Thailand in the mid1970s after an extended absence and was particularly active in Narathiwat. The leader of another guerilla group was Poh Su Wamaedisa who had a secular educa­ tion and had been a teacher in a government school in Yala. Poh Su Wamaedisa joined the underground in 1955. A year later he surrendered to the army and went to Bangkok. In 1961 he rejoined the underground, only to surrender once again in 1975. At its peak, the strength of the BNPP was estimated at 200 to 300 armed men, when it was called Tentera Nasional Pembebasan Rakyat Patani (TNPRP)— The Patani People’s National Liberation Army. Thai government sources estimated the TNPRP at one thousand men, at least in theory. The force was divided into units of forty or fifty with an insignia of a half moon and a star. After Poh Su Wamaedisa’s surrender, he was replaced by Poh Yeh (Bapa Idris). The group waged terror activities against Buddhist settlements which had been established by the government in the south. They also disseminated information and mobilized public opinion in Arab countries on behalf of the Patani Muslim cause. In 1972, the or­ ganization suffered a serious setback in the wake of an army and police campaign waged against it. A second blow, no less serious, occurred when in the elections held in nearby Kelantan in 1978, the Malay Muslim party that had supported them lost power. Originally known as the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), the name was subsequently changed to Partai Islam (PI). Leaders of BNPP dispersed—some moved to Sabah; others applied for and received Malaysian citizenship; and still others joined another separatist organization, the PULO. At this point, the number of fighters that remained was down to fifty.3 Another source dates the founding of the BNPP much later, on 10 September 1971 in Kelantan, but agrees that it was headed by Tunku Abdul Jalal (or Adun Na Saiburi, his Thai name) who was the head of a faction that broke away from the BRN organization. At the time of the split, he declared that his aim was to liberate all Muslim territory in South Thailand, and to establish Patani as a sovereign Is­ lamic state under a raja or a sultan. The platform was presented to a conference of Muslim foreign ministers, convened in Istanbul in 1976. The organization engaged in terror activities; extortion, and attacks on police stations, government officials, Chinese businessmen, and Thai Buddhist settlers with the aim of demonstrating that the southern provinces were a lawless and vulnerable region. By pressuring the Thai government, they hoped to extract government concessions to the sepa­ ratists. The heads of the organization believed that if the government stepped up its repressive measures, the unfavorable publicity would both embarrass the central government and also motivate more young people to join the ranks of the BNPP At the time, the organization claimed it had three thousand guerilla fighters at its command, but Thai sources estimated their number at merely one hundred. Ac­ cording to several sources, the organization sent its people abroad for training but the host countries are not identified. Arms were acquired from Indochina after the United States left Vietnam. The BNPP placed special emphasis on gaining the support of Malaysia and Muslim bodies. They maintained an international network

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of relations with elements in various Arab countries, with the PLO, and with such Islamic organizations as the Islamic Secretariat and the Arab League. A regular publication was produced in Malay, English, and Arabic and sent to Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and a number of Arab countries. Publications of the organization were distributed at Islamic conferences and international Islamic con­ ventions. The BNPP had good relations with the influential Partai Islam (PI), the conservative Islamic party in Kelantan. Material and moral support was given by the Kelantan authorities until Pi's electoral defeat in the 1978 elections, after which support was greatly reduced. Despite the fact that the Malaysian government dis­ avowed any involvement, the Thai government expressed its concern about such links. More than any of the other separatist organizations, the BNPP stressed Islam as the unifying force of all elements of Malay society.4 In the early 1960s, another organization was set up by Abdul Karim Hassan, also known as Ustaz Karim Hajji Hassan, who had studied in Cairo and was a teacher of religion in Narathiwat. The organization, called Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the National Revolutionary Front, drew its main support from among ed­ ucated young Muslims and intellectuals who had acquired their education abroad, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia. The military arm was commanded by Jehku Baku, also known as Mapiyoh Sadala who headed a unit of 150 to 300 guerillas who fought in Yala and part of Songkhla. The ideology of the organiza­ tion was an amalgam of Malay nationalism, anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, and Islam which gave it a leftist reputation. Greatly influenced by the national thought of Ahmad Sukarno, the organization made efforts to obtain his support. The BRN was not merely a separatist movement but had pan-Malay aspirations. The aim was to bring about a complete secession of the four Muslim provinces and the western part of Songkhla province, in order to establish a sovereign Malay Muslim repub­ lic. The intention was to incorporate such a state into a Malay broader nation which would encompass the entire Malay Archipelago. In 1961, the authorities arrested a number of the organization’s leaders, others escaped and crossed the frontier. The “confrontation" between Indonesia and Malaysia which erupted in 1963 brought about a split in the BRN between supporters of Indonesia and those who favored Malaysia. The dissidents organized a group called Partai Revolusi Nasional (PARNAS) but it was short lived. After the fall of Sukarno in September 1965, the heads of the BRN attempted to improve their relations with Malaysian politicians and made further attempts to get support from Arab countries and the PLO but were less successful than other underground organizations in the south. The BRN remained active in the southern region and had an extensive underground network but its Socialist platform and its radical revolutionary aims deterred the conserva­ tive majority among Malay Muslims, and religious leaders rejected it. There were rumors that the BRN had contacts with Communist underground movements ac­ tive in the south and had their support in the acquisition of arms and training. Considered a small, weak, but violent, movement, BRN’s effective influence was limited to the Yala district. Between November 1979 and March 1980, it carried

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out a number of terror attacks which included explosions and kidnappings that resulted in deaths and injuries.5 The largest, most influential and important of the separatist groups that operated in the south was the Patani United Liberation Oiganization (PULO) whose Ma­ layan name was Pertubohan Persatuan Pembibasan Patani (PPPP). Founded in Jan­ uary 1967, it was headed by Tunku Bira Kotanila (Kabir Abdul Rahman) of the Patani nobility. While still studying at Aligarh University in India, he established the organization whose platform was formulated a year later in Mecca. Tunku Bira spent several years in Saudi Arabia, frequenting other Arab countries and Malaysia as well. Though other organizations were based on either the traditional bond be­ tween offspring of the aristocracy and the religious leadership, or on Communist-Socialist tendencies, PULO attempted to speak to all elements in the Malay Muslim population and took a position which could unite all parts of the community. The organization, whose primary membership was mostly Malay Muslim students who had studied abroad, had a three-tiered organizational struc­ ture. The upper strata, which set policy, was centered in Mecca and relied on the eight thousand Patani expatriates who lived there. The seat of the second strata was in l\impat, Kelantan, and its function was to create political conditions conducive to guerilla warfare through appeals to public opinion in Malaysia. The third strata, the military, was active in the field. The secretariat of the organization was in Mecca with operational headquarters in Kelantan. PULO, like the other organiza­ tions, sought to liberate the Muslim provinces from Thai rule and to establish an independent Islamic state. Along with terror attacks in the southern provinces, PULO was active in alerting international bodies to the persecution of Malay Mus­ lims. More highly structured than the other organizations, PULO included depart­ ments for political, economic, military, and foreign affairs and maintained a wide network of contacts with foreign countries, particularly in the Arab world. Again, like other separatist organizations, members of the military arm of PULO, called the Patani United Liberation Army (PULA), received their military and political training abroad. It appears that the force was composed of military gangs, only nominally under PULO command. Most of the military activities—primarily kid­ napping and sabotage—were conducted in Yala, Patani, and Narathiwat from 1979 through 1980. Thai intelligence believed that the organization received financial support from sources in Malaysia, mostly from the PI party and circles close to it, and that a training facility was being maintained in Syria. The PLO also ran train­ ing programs for small groups of PULO fighters. The organization garnered sup­ port from international Muslim organizations such as the World Muslim Congress (WMC), also known as Moatamar al-Alam al-lslami. In fact, Thai officials attrib­ uted greater success to Tunka Bira in raising the case of the Muslim minority in the southern provinces at international Islamic forums than to any other Muslim leader. Under the cover of charitable contributions, Tunku Bira got financial sup­ port amounting to several million dollars a year from the governments of Syria and Libya (a source which dried up in 1978). To further increase its income, PULO

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invested the money in the purchase of a hotel in Hamburg. The Libyan Islamic Call Society also furnished sums of money to PULO and, at PULO’s request, Libya sent a fact-finding mission to Thailand at the end of May 1973. In 1981, PULO claimed to have 20,000 members. It is likely that the number was grossly exaggerated. Other estimates of the organization's strength in the three districts in which it was active fluctuated between 200 to 600 members that operated in small bands of ten to twenty people. At the beginning of the 1990s, membership in PULO shrank further to what was thought to be less than 100 members. The decline was caused in great measure because of Saudi Arabia's discomfort with the organization—for example, issuing identity cards in the name of the Patani Republic to Malay Mus­ lim laborers from Thailand who worked in Saudi Arabia. In a raid on PULO offices in Mecca, a number of the office staff were arrested. Some 700 PULO members were said to be deported. As a result, Chairman Tunku Bira Kotanila resigned, or was deposed, and was replaced by Dr. Arrong Moorang.6 There is information about a number of smaller militant Islamic bands. One of them, Sabilillah (the path of God), was set up in December 1975 and drew most of its members from Patani province. Unlike the three organizations already dis­ cussed whose main theater of operation was in rural settings, Sabilillah operated in urban areas. Apparently there were links to religious extremists in Malaysia, perhaps to certain elements within Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, which was founded in 1972 by Anwar Ibrahim. Ibrahim was later minister of Finance and vice-premier in the Malaysian government until he was deposed and arrested in 1998. The most serious action the group took was an explosion in Bangkok Airport on 4 June 1977, but it claimed responsibility for other acts of terror as well. An organization called Grekkan Islam Patani (GIP), which was centered in Kota Bharu in Kelantan, drew its membership from the large community of Patani expatriates who lived there. Ostensibly, the organization, which claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist acts, enjoyed the support of various Malay elements in Kelantan and Arab countries. Another group about which little is known was called Black December 1902. The name relates to the date on which Patani was annexed to the Kingdom of Thailand by King Chulalongkom on 20 December 1902. This group was active in Yala, claim­ ing responsibility for an explosion that took place 22 September 1978 when Yala was visited by the King. Pfcrgerakan Kemerdekaan Patani Bersatu (PKPB), the United Patani Freedom Movement, was founded in 1969 by Patani students who had studied in Pakistan. (Partai Revolusi Nasional [PARNAS] which had split from the BRN in 1965 has already been mentioned.) At the end of 1979, a parliamentary committee for South Thailand identified some 84 different armed groups (66 according to another source). These groups operated in Yala, Patani, Narathiwat, and Songkhla with an aggregate strength estimated at 1,500. Another assessment made by police and the army stated that the overall strength did not exceed 500 to 600. There is no clear delineation between ordinary robber bands and separatists groups. Indeed, many

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people—including Muslims in the southern districts—made no distinction be­ tween the separatist organizations and gangs of robbers and bandits. To one extent or another, they all took part in identical kidnappings, murder, extortion (even directed against the Muslim community), a common denominator which greatly hurt their prestige. None of the organizations had heavy arms, a unified command, or even coordinated activities, and their leaders suffered from limited ability. Most bands had only a few members. There were groups that declined and disappeared after a very short interval. Some members joined larger organizations or aban­ doned separatist activity altogether. None of the separatist organizations, including the largest, produced a popular leader or a charismatic figure that could galvanize popular support (as distinguished from the case of Muslims in the Philippines). In the mid-1970s, there was a push to organize all the underground movements under an umbrella organization, but the undertaking proved unsuccessful. In 1979, however, the BNPP and PULO agreed to coordinate their military operations and established a committee to that end. The two organizations claimed a combined fighting force of 3,000, a number far beyond the Thai army’s estimate of only 500. There is no certainty regarding either the real number or the effectiveness of the decision to combine forces. In 1989 representatives of the large separatist organi­ zations met in Patani and issued a communique about their mutual aim: independ­ ence for the Patani district by means of an armed struggle. And they agreed to set up a coordinating committee for their leaderships. Ultimately, in October 1991, it was reported that Bersatu Untuk Kemerdekan Patani (known simply as BERSATU), the United Front for Patani Independence, was established, and it appeared that new impetus was given to the armed struggle.7 While violent acts in the southern districts began in 1948, they accelerated after 1960. Most took place in Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat though there were a few in Satun, some in Bangkok, and other places as well. There were ambushes, road­ blocks, kidnappings, robberies, shut-downs of rubber plantations, confiscations of property, and extortions. These forays had political implications regardless as to whether they were carried out by actual separatist organizations or by bandits con­ nected to such organizations. For example, when wealthy merchants were kid­ napped, the intention was to bring about the flight of non-Muslims from the area. When rubber plantations were closed, it resulted in their sale to Muslims at very low prices because of owners’ fears. The aim of attacks on government schools and the kidnapping of Buddhist teachers and government officials—or even their murder—was to harm the government’s education program, and fear clearly played a role in requests by Buddhist teachers and officials that they be reassigned to other districts. At the same time, the separatist organizations conducted a nonviolent campaign which consisted of distributing leaflets and pamphlets that dealt with the history of Patani, Malay culture, and the history of Islam, along with condemna­ tions of the government, an appeal to Malay Muslims not to cooperate with the government, the police, or the army, and not to pay taxes. And they campaigned on behalf of sympathizers to their cause elected to regional councils. Mosques and

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pondoks served as foci for the dissemination of propaganda and for antigovern­ ment sermons. In another sphere of activity, emissaries were dispatched to Muslim countries to mobilize money and political support and to find suitable places for military training and the acquisition of arms. This kind of assistance came prima­ rily from Libya, Syria, the PLO, and from Malaysia, though equipment was also seized from the Thai armed forces or brought to South Thailand from Vietnam.8 Throughout the 1950s, Patani remained a region in the throes of ferment and disquiet marked by periodic outbreaks of terror and guerilla attacks. In the 1960s and 1970s, separatist organizations came to the fore, waging a wide sweep of anti­ government terror which, while audacious and blatant, was of a limited scope. Police stations, schools, teachers, government officials, Chinese businessmen, and Buddhist settlers were the main targets; in other words, anyone who was perceived as constituting a threat to “Malay identity.” Non-Muslim villagers, businessmen, and plantation owners were forced to pay protection money. At no point did terror­ ism actually put government rule in the south into question, not even during peaks of activity in the 1960s, the mid-1970s, or from 1979 through 1981. The attacks were more an irritant than a danger to government sovereignty in the area. It is almost certain that the separatist organizations themselves recognized the dispro­ portionate size and strength of their forces when compared to the Thai army. Con­ ceivably, the underlying rationale for their actions was the hope that the confron­ tation would force public opinion in Malaysia, and perhaps in Indonesia as well, to demand that their governments intervene in the dispute thus forcing the Thai government to give up its hold on the south. The appeal to public opinion in Arab and Muslim countries was similar. Such an assumption, however, was highly un­ realistic. In no way did Thailand give any sign that it was ready to consider any relaxation of its sovereignty in the southern provinces. In 1969, the attacks increased in frequency and boldness. Vigorous police action from 1969 through 1970 eased the situation, but in 1974 the scope of guerilla activities mounted once again. Tens of schools were closed, roads were unsafe for travel, owners of tin mines and rubber plantations capitulated to extortionist pres­ sure, bombs went off in train stations and hotels whose owners did not pay for protection, and the number of kidnappings aimed at obtaining ransom increased. Reinforced government units undertook a series of counteroffensives against the separatists (and against Communist rebels). In 1976, regulations were announced establishing an emergency regime under which the government was able to drop the right of appeal for those found guilty in a military court. In the years that followed, the regulations were used against people accused of Communist or Mus­ lim separatist involvement. In the course of the stepped-up military campaign that began in 1968 and continued through 1975, more than 300 Muslim separatists, including leaders and central figures were killed, 165 surrendered to the authori­ ties, and some 1,200 were taken into custody. Arms were seized and 250 guerilla camps destroyed. Nonetheless, the guerilla organizations kept up their operations but turned more and more to ordinary terror and extortion.

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During the 1970s, the government began a civilian program which was intended to work in parallel with its military campaign to stamp out terrorism. Called the Policy of Attraction, it was geared toward economic development. Roads were repaired, new roads paved, the electricity network expanded, and water supply and drainage much improved in several locales. The government made a concerted effort to exhibit its tolerance of the Islamic religion and Malay traditions. Buddhist officials were encouraged to learn Malay and to display respect toward Islamic sensitivities. In a calculated step aimed at proving its commitment to religious freedom, the government built a large mosque in Patani at a cost of $200,000. The government of Malaysia contributed funds to its construction and money was also subscribed for the building of other mosques. Government inefficiency and its inadequate measures in many of the development areas have already been noted, though it is possible that to some extent the programs did deter the growth of popular support for the separatists. They were not, however, sufficient to raise the standard of living in the southern provinces, or to change the population’s negative feelings and hostility toward the Thai regime. Adamant in its determination to wipe out the separatist movement and prevent any change in the status of the southern provinces, the government’s strategy was to initiate reforms—which in any case were inherently necessary—and make conciliatory gestures to the southern popu­ lation, coupled, of course, with stepped-up military pressure. And, in the period between September 1992 and October 1993 some 450 people from various sepa­ ratist groups surrendered.9 On 29 November 1975 the slain bodies of five Muslims were found in Narathiwat. A boy who had been with them but managed to escape said that they had been murdered by soldiers. Neither the governor of the district, nor army or police officers made any attempts at finding the murder suspects, going so far as to question whether the incident occurred at all. A wave of demonstrations, prob­ ably organized by PULO, then spread throughout the southern districts. Muslims by the tens of thousands (estimates fluctuate between 50,000 and 70,000) gathered at the central mosque of Patani on 11 December to protest the murders. They re­ mained there for forty-five days. Spokesmen for the demonstrators demanded that the prime minister come to the demonstration to hear their complaints, but the under secretary for the Interior was sent instead, and the minister of Justice some time after. PULO threatened retaliatory measures. Several days later, in an action which may have been carried out by Thai Buddhist extremists, a bomb was thrown into the crowd of Muslim demonstrators resulting in 12 dead and 30 injured (other reports placed the numbers at 25 dead and 40 injured). The Ulama declared the dead to be holy (shahid). On 23 January 1976 a government representative signed an agreement with representatives of the demonstrators in which their demands were accepted: payment of reparations to the bereaved Muslim families, impris­ onment of the guilty parties, removal of the Thai Marine unit from the district, and publication of the outcome of the police inquiry into the murders. It was also agreed that participators in the demonstration would not be punished. The gover­

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nor of Patani was removed from office and replaced by a Muslim, and on 30 January Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj visited the site. He was given a cool recep­ tion by the Muslim demonstrators. Expressions of support for the demonstrators also came from non-Muslims, particularly leftist students and intellectuals. A short time later, in another incident, an army officer driving his car ran down two Muslims. He was put to death by an infuriated mob. Members of the Sabilillah organization also retaliated, and on 4 June 1977 threw two bombs inside Don Muang Airport in Bangkok. Four people were injured. On 27 September 1977 separatist Muslims conducted their most daring terror attack when they threw two bombs close to King Bhumidol and Queen Sirikit as they visited in the Yala district. The king and queen escaped without injury, but there were 5 dead and 47 wounded. Four Muslims who confessed to membership in PULO were arrested and accused of the terrorist act. On 8 February 1980 a bomb exploded in the train station of Hat Yai in South Thailand wounding 12 people. Guerilla action went on during this entire period and some 160 armed clashes occurred in the southern provinces.10 Following intensified guerilla and terror activity, government forces also esca­ lated their actions and conducted wide-ranging military campaigns, some aimed at the underground Communist movements of Thai and Malays operating in the southern provinces. The large-scale operations were carried out in two waves: the first between January and July 1977 and the second between January and February 1978. Like government programs in education and development and invitations to Malay Muslims to visit Bangkok, the campaigns failed to pacify South Thailand. In 1980, there was a sharp deterioration in the security situation with reports of government attacks on innocent people, arbitrary arrests and detention, harass­ ment, and murders. The level of terrorist activity in Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat rose; however, it appears that many of the attacks were carried out by bandit groups and not by separatist organizations, a situation consistently difficult to distinguish. After the election defeat of the PMIP(PI) in Kelantan, and diminishing Libyan interest in the region, it is quite likely that PULO and other separatist groups suf­ fered a loss in the financial support they received. It may be that precisely such a condition was the cause of accelerated terrorism in the south because the separatist organizations themselves were forced to resort to banditry and extortion in order to make up their financial losses. A Thai military spokesman announced in 1980 that one hundred Thai Muslims who had undergone demolition training in an Arab country, ostensibly Libya, were apprehended on their way back to Thailand where they hoped to join the separatist struggle. Indeed, PULO admitted that it had re­ ceived other forms of assistance from Libya and Syria. At the same time that a secret PULO radio station began broadcasting, the separatists continued their at­ tacks on the Buddhist population and on government schools, which Muslims re­ garded as a symbol of their cultural repression. Scores were killed. In a number of places Buddhist families abandoned their homes and sought refuge in safer re­ gions. In a letter sent by PULO to the UN secretariat in New York, it was stated

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that terror is a legitimate weapon in international politics, and PULO threatened to attack Thai embassies in Asia and foreign embassies in Bangkok. The military campaign did reap some results. In 1982-1983, numbers of rebels surrendered and handed over their arms. (Here, too, it is difficult to rely on pub­ lished numbers.) Despite setbacks, the underground movement continued the kid­ nappings and assassinations. In January 1988, it was reported that another group of five hundred rebels surrendered. There is an assumption that only a minority of those surrendering were members of separatist organizations; it is likely that most were wanted criminals and army deserters.11 Terrorist attacks continued in subse­ quent years. For example, in August 1993, members of PULO torched thirty-four schools in the southern provinces and ambushed a train. In the same month, there was an attack on a unit of the Engineer Corps of the Thai army in Yala province which coincided with the state visit of prime minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir bin Muhamad, to Bangkok.12

Notes 1. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 216; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,” 421; Che Man, “Malay Muslims,” 103; idem, Muslim Separatism, 98, 135-136. On the structure of the separatist movement, see 209-212, Annex Eight. 2. Che Man, “Patani,” 121; idem, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 68; Haemindra, “Problem of the Thai Muslims,” part 2,86-87; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Islam and Violence: A Case Study o f Violent Events in the Four Southern Provinces, Thailand, 1976-1981, USF Monographs in Religion and Public Policy, no. 2 (Tampa, Florida: University of South Flor­ ida, 1987) 30-31; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 220, 227; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 208,231-232; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature,” 10; Forbes, “Thai­ land’s Muslim Minorities,” 1061; M. L. Thomas, “Bureaucratic Attitudes,” 548-549; idem, “Political Violence in Muslim Provinces,” 17, 19; idem, “Political Violence in Thailand,” 19; idem, “Thai Muslim Separation,” 22-26,29-30; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 33; Robert F. Zimmerman, “Insurgency in Thailand,” Problems o f Communism, vol. 25, no. 3 (May-June 1976), 22-23; Andrew Cornish, “Review of Chaiwat Satha-Anand’s Islam and Violence and Surin Pitsuwan’s Islam and Malay Nationalism,” SOJOURN: Social Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 1988): 92-93; Farouk, “Origins and Evolution,” 270-271, 274; Suhrke, “Thai-Muslim Border Provinces,” 302-306; idem, “Loyalists and Separatists,” 242-250; idem, “Southeast Asia: The Muslims in Southern Thailand,” in Rob­ ert G. Wirsing, Protection o f Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Pergaman Press, 1981), 325-336; idem, “Thailand,” in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., The Politics of Islamic Reassertion,” (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 241; Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand,” in Suhrke and Noble, eds., Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), 198-200. 3. Che Man, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 67; idem, “Malay Muslims,” 99, 108; idem, Muslim Separatism, 69-70; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 230-231; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 2,87; Satha-Anand Chaiwat, Islam and Vio­ lence, 14; Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1061, 1063; M. L. Thomas, “Political

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Violence in Thailand,” 19; McBeth, “Separatism Is the Goal,” 19-20; Kraus, “Islam in Thai­ land,” 421; 'Thailand’s Hidden Sore” 25; Marcel Barang, “Letter from Yala,” FEER, vol. 112, no. 19 (May 1,1981): 64; Gunn, “Radical Islam,” 35-36. 4. Farouk, “Historical and Transnational Dimensions,” 240-241; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 228-231; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 50-51; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 98-105, 109-112; May, “Religious Factor,” 313. 5. Farouk, op. cit., 238-240; Pitsuwan, ocit., 231-232; Uthai, “Emergence and Escala­ tion,” 231; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Islam and Violence, 15; Che Man, ocit., 105, 107-108; idem, “Malay Muslims," 108-109; McVey, op. cit., 50-51; McBeth, “Separatism Is the Goal,” 20; Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1063; M. L. Thomas, “Political Vio­ lence,” 19-20; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,” 422; May, “Religious Factor,” 313; “Thailand’s Hidden Sore,” 25. 6. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 234-236; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 99, 105-109; idem, “Malay Muslims,” 109; idem, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 67; Farouk, “Historical and Transnational,” 242; Satha-Anand Chaiwat, Islam and Violence, 15—16; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 231-232; M. L. Thomas, “Political Violence,” 20; idem, “Patani United Liberation Organization,” Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Modern Islamic World, vol. 3 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 306-307; idem, “Thai Muslims,” 163; McBeth, “Separation Is the Goal,” 19; Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minor­ ities,” 1063; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,” 421-422; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 49; May, “Religious Factor,” 313; “Libya’s Foreign Adventures,” Conflict Studies, no. 41 (De­ cember 1973), 15; “Aid from the Outside,” Asiaweek (April 4, 1980): 26-27; "Thailand’s Hidden Sore,” Asiaweek, vol. 6, no. 13 (April 4, 1980): 25. 7. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 223-224, 240, 256-258; Che Man, “Malay Muslims,” 109; idem, “Patani,” 121; Farouk, “Historical and Transnational,” 242-243; Uthai, “Emergence and Escalation,” 232; Satha-Anand Chaiwat, Islam and Violence, 16-17; Forbes, "Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1063-1064; M. L. Thomas, “Political Vi­ olence,” 17; idem, “Thai-Muslim Separatism,” 26; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 51; McBeth, "Separatism Is the Goal,” 20; May, “Religious Factor,” 313; Kraus, “Islam in Thai­ land,” 421; Hanna, Peninsular Thailand, Part V, 1-2; “Thailand’s Hidden Sore,” 25—27; Norman Peagam, “Boiling Point in the Troubled South,” FEER, vol. 92, no. 21 (May 21, 1976): 10-11. (An interview with representatives of the separatist organizations.) 8. Uthai, op. cit., 232-235; M. L. Thomas,” Thai Muslim Separatism,” 26-30; Pitsuwan, op. cit., 241-242; Bunge, Thailand, 220-221. 9. Pitsuwan, op. cit., 217; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 2, 87-88; Che Man, “Malay Muslims,” 103, 108; idem, “ Problems of Minority Populations," 67; idem, Muslim Separatism, 168-169; Forbes, “Legacy of Resentment,” 22; idem, “Thailand’s Mus­ lim Minorities,” 1061-1062; M. L. Thomas, Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces, 14—15; idem, “Political Violence in Thailand,” 18—21; Christie, Modem History, 187-188; Chee-Meow Seah, “Muslim Issue,” 150; Ganganath Jha, “Muslim Minorities in the Philip­ pines and Thailand,” India Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3 (July-September 1978): 339-341; "Thai­ land’s Hidden Sore,” 24-25; “Thailand,” Amnesty International Report 1988, 187. 10. Asia Yearbook 1977(FEER), 315; Pitsuwan, op. cit., 236-239,243; Che Man, “Malay Muslims,” 108; Farouk, “Origins and Evolution,” 271-274; Santi Mingmongkol, Commu­ nists and Thailand’s Muslim Problem,”’ Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 75 (Berkeley, Cali­ fornia: October 1980): 22-23; Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature,” 10; Forbes, op. cit.,

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22; idem, op. cit., 1062-1063; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 49; Norman fleagam, “Bangkok Moves to Appease the Muslims,” FEER, vol. 91, no. 6 (February 6, 1976): 13; “Thailand’s Hidden Sore,” 27-31; Paisal Sricharatchanya, “PULO and the Middle East Con­ nection,” FEER, vol. 114, no. 42 (October 9,1981): 26-29. 11. Che Man, “Malay Muslims,” 109; idem, “Patani,” 121; Santi Mingmongkol, op. cit., 22; Forbes, ‘Thailand’s Muslim Minorities," 1067; Keyes, Thailand, 132, 168; Loetscher, “In Thailand’s Muslim Provinces,” 19-21; “Bangkok Is Worried by Muslim Terror,” The Times (London: July 21, 1980); l\igby and l\igby, “Malay Muslim and Thai Buddhist Re­ lations,” 86-87. 12. “Thailand,” The Far East and Australasia 1996, 27th ed. (London: Europa Publica­ tions, 1995), 1010.

Chapter Thirteen

The Communist Underground and Problems of the Border Areas

To some extent, there is a connection between the revolt of the Malay Communist Party (MCP) in the Malay Peninsula and of the Muslim separatist movement in South Thailand. Both impacted on relations between Thailand and Malaysia, and this bears closer examination. The revolt of the Communists, most of whom were Malay Chinese in Malaysia, broke out in 1948 in response to directives of the Comintern (the Third Interna­ tional). During the 1950s, the Communist rebels regrouped near the Thai-Malay border where they had been gradually pushed by those Commonwealth forces (Australians, New Zealanders, and the British) which had borne the main brunt of the fighting. The revolt, which the Malay government termed “the emergency,” ended officially in 1960. Remnants of the MCP (or CPM) units (according to one estimate 4,500 Communist guerillas and according to another, 3,000), began set­ ting up shelter areas and army camps on the Thai side of the frontier in the vicinity of the Betong salient and in other regions. These frontier areas were ideal for gue­ rilla warfare because of the harsh terrain and impenetrable jungles. Having en­ trenched themselves, the MCP turned to mobilizing new fighters, training them, and acquiring financial aid and supplies. Rich Chinese in the area, who were own­ ers of large rubber plantations, were especially vulnerable to extortion. Although most of the new recruits were Chinese, a few Malay Muslims also joined the units. For many years, Malaysia had been upset with Thailand’s apathy regarding Com­ munist penetration. Early discussion of frontiers had begun between Thailand and Britain as early as 1949 when Britain still ruled the Malay Peninsula. Thailand’s more pressing concern was with suppressing revolts that had erupted in the north­ eastern part of the country, attending to problems that developed along her borders with Cambodia and Laos, and focusing on dangers that loomed from the spillover of the war in Indochina. For their own reasons, Thai authorities did not pursue the remnants of MCP that made their base in the southern frontier area. It appeared that there was an unspoken understanding between the MCP and the Thai author­ ities in which the Communists concentrated their actions only against Malaysia and did not attack Thai targets or incite the Malay population in the south. The Communists understood that it was in their best interest to forestall hostility of the 155

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Muslim population in the south toward them in order to insure that Communist food supplies would not be cut off and that the Muslims would not provide the police with information about their movements. They paid in full for food they bought, compensated farmers for any damages, and actually distributed medicines to the local population. Malay Muslims accepted the Communist presence. Al­ though they feared the reaction of the Thai police, they were more afraid of terror or punitive action on the part of the MCP.1 Perhaps the Thai government reacted coolly to Malaysian demands that it coop­ erate in restraining the MCP because Thailand assumed that as long as the organi­ zation existed, it posed a potential threat to Malaysia, in consequence of which Malaysia would refrain from aiding the Muslim separatists. Thai policy began changing only in the mid-1960s when it became clear that the strength of the MCP in the south was greater than had originally been thought and that its influence on the Chinese population of the south was growing. The government was also wary of cooperation between the MCP and the CPT, the underground Communist Party of Thailand. Indeed, certain links had been forged between these two Communist movements beginning in 1969, particularly in the areas of training and exchange of intelligence. The Thai government feared that not only the MCP of Malaya but also the underground Thai Communists would exploit separatist tendencies in the south. And there was some anxiety that there would be cooperation between the Communists and the Malay Muslim rebels, considered radicals and leftists. In fact, in July 1969, in order to broaden their political base, the Communists made over­ tures to the Malays in South Thailand and Malaysia. The initiative was based on propaganda which claimed that the philosophies of Islam and Marxism were not in conflict. To that end, MCP announced the establishment of a new front, Parti Persandaran Islam (PAPERI), the Islamic Socialist Party. Aimed at the Muslims of South Thailand, the CPT’s line of propaganda called for the overthrow of the Thai government because of its pro-Western stance and its replacement by a Mus­ lim autonomy or an independent Muslim state. (Another supposition suggests that, in fact, the CPT opposed the separatist ideology of the Muslims in the south.) Despite all the efforts of the Communists, Muslim participation in the activities of both Communist movements was quite limited and may not have existed at all because, basically, the two Communist movements were Chinese (the CPT even had Thai Buddhist members). In general, the Malay Muslims regarded both orga­ nizations with hostility and rejected their Communist ideology. Nonetheless, the fears of the Thai government remained unabated particularly because of the pro-separatist activities which the Communists conducted within the Muslim community and because of intelligence reports that pointed to an exchange of information and a supply of arms and ammunition which the separatists received from the Communists. Communist fighters crossed the frontier between the two countries almost at will, yet in the absence of an agreement between Thai and Malaysian forces in the frontier area and the coordination of activities between them, there was no solution to this problem. The unsettled border posed a danger

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to both Thailand and Malaysia to such an extent that at length the two countries determined to set up a joint Malaysian-Thai headquarters (Thai-Malaysian Border Committee) in Songkhla for combined operations against all guerilla and terror bands. The agreement was signed on 13 March 1965. (It was amended and im­ proved a number of times in the years that followed.) The agreement called for joint border patrols of infantry, armored cars, and helicopters and granted the right of hot pursuit five miles beyond the border with the right to remain in the territory of the neighboring country for a period of up to three days. The agreement per­ mitted Malaysia to garrison a unit of five hundred police in the city of Betong. The agreement further stated that there would be semiannual meetings at the min­ isterial level for discussions of the joint efforts. Meetings were held alternately in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. A regional border committee was set up for meetings of police officers and officials to take place four times a year; local commanders would meet more frequently. The Thais did not take full advantage of all the rights agreed upon but did post a liaison officer to the headquarters of the Malaysian brigade on the Malaysian side of the border. These steps impeded the operations of the MCP, some of whose camps were destroyed, but they did not seriously weaken the organization. Generally, the MCP had advance information about mil­ itary actions that would be taken against it and abandoned their camps before the army arrived.2 From April to May 1976, there was a brief hiatus in Malaysian-Thai coopera­ tion. Malaysia suspected Thai officials of allowing Communist guerillas to find refuge in the Betong salient. Malaysia, therefore, carried out unilateral cleanup operations on the Thai side of the border beginning on 17 April and continuing through 1 May. Malaysian units entered Thai villages and interrogated the villag­ ers, and Malaysian aircraft bombed various sites on Thai territory. While these raids did not achieve their objective, they did cause property damage and Thai civilians were wounded. The unilateral military activities provoked arguments and revealed the ongoing differences of opinion between Malaysia and Thailand about issues relating to the frontier region. In Betong, there was a demonstration against the presence of a Malaysian unit in the area, which the Malaysians were sure was organized by the Communists. The Thai government had no recourse, and on 4 June demanded that Malaysia withdraw its police unit from the region along with its secret agents and intelligence operatives. Thailand gave notice that this brought to an end existing arrangements for cooperation on the frontier, at least until a new agreement could be negotiated. The Malaysian government was angry; nonethe­ less, it immediately fulfilled the demand and withdrew its forces by 7 June. The response of Ghazali Shafie, Malaysian minister of the Interior, was that apparently Thailand had no real interest in fighting the Communists because whatever danger they posed was primarily against Malaysia. The Malaysian government believed that, in effect, the Betong salient was ruled by Communists, and that the Thai army showed little willingness to attack them. Thai officials responded by protesting that their permission for Malaysian incursions across the border had not been solicited,

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and consequently their sovereignty had been infringed upon. On 6 June the Thai minister for Foreign Affairs, who was in Singapore at the time, said that as a result of Malaysia’s withdrawal, Thailand was reinforcing its military presence on the frontier and that the existing agreement had to be reconsidered and a new, im­ proved frontier agreement needed to be signed. Thai officials in the south asserted that Muslim separatists were enjoying refuge and assistance in Malaysia, particu­ larly in Kelantan, and that in return for Thai military repression of Communists, the Malaysian army should help to suppress the Muslim separatists. Malaysia then imposed limitations on its trade with Thailand, and Thailand responded in the same coin.3 When negotiations resumed, the ongoing problems and the differences of opin­ ion and national interests between Thailand and Malaysia quickly came to a head. Malaysia was primarily interested in suppressing the Communists. Thailand, Ma­ laysia believed, should see the Communists as a common enemy despite the fact that Communist operations in the Betong salient were directed at Malaysia and not Thailand. By contrast, the Thais regarded the separatist Muslims in the four south­ ern provinces as their primary problem. The Thais suspected that there was Malaysian sympathy, perhaps even some support of the Muslim separatists. By turning a blind eye to Communist guerilla activity against Malaysia, the Thais exercised a measure of leverage against their neighbor. As long as Malaysia was preoccupied with the Communist threat, it would not jeopardize its interests by involvement in the Thai separatist issue. The Thais wanted a revision in the frontier agreement which would make Malaysian cooperation in suppressing Muslim separatists commensurate with the Malaysian demand for Thai suppression of the Communists. Malaysia opposed introducing overt anti-Muslim items into the agreement. They were concerned that it would create difficulties in public opinion in their own country or damage their relations with other Islamic countries if Malaysia appeared to be collaborating with Thailand against Muslim coreligionists. The Malaysians were disappointed by the lax efforts of the Thais in joint operations conducted against the Communists, but if the price they had to pay for increasing Thai pressure against Communists was their military cooperation against the Muslim rebels, Malaysia would not agree. The Thais proposed a new agreement which would require joint action against the Communist rebels by the forces of both countries. They proposed that the right of hot pursuit up to the five-mile limit into the territory of the neighboring state be retained, but were firm that the right of hot pursuit apply not only in anti-Communist operations but to other rebels as well. And this included Muslim separatists. From the Malaysian standpoint this was both politically and emotion­ ally a very sensitive issue. The Thais further demanded that Malaysia act more decisively against infiltration at the border, particularly by drug smugglers. In Sep­ tember 1976, the prime minister of Thailand, Seni Pramoj, and the prime minister of Malaysia, Dato Hussein, met in Penang, but they were unable to conclude a new agreement. The Malaysians persisted in their position that the Muslim separatists

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in South Thailand were an internal Thai problem and that Malaysia had neither the right nor the intention of getting involved.4 In October 1976 there was a coup in Bangkok. The new Thai government, which was more anti-Communist and also more inclined to stem the erosion of relations between Thailand and Malaysia, cleared the way for a renewed, comprehensive border agreement. The government showed a much greater readiness, in principle, for close cooperation with Malaysia against the MCP. In January 1977 a military operation by the soldiers of both armies was carried out against Communist gue­ rillas. Subsequently, negotiations were resumed and on 4 March 1977 a new Thai-Malaysia Border Agreement was signed which made possible 1) unilateral military strikes against the MCP across either side of the border, for short periods of time and of limited depth, conditional on authorization by the Regional Border Committee; 2) combined military operations under a joint commander acceptable to both sides. In the same month, a second combined, wide-ranging operation was carried out. Most MCP fighters fled from their camps but quickly rebuilt them once the Malaysians had returned to base. Although such joint military operations were occasionally mounted, their effectiveness was limited—neither were the Communist forces destroyed nor did they lose their nuisance capability. Casualties of the military actions were mostly the local villagers. Differences of national in­ terests in the frontier area and their divergent priorities remained: for Malaysia, the struggle against the Communists; for Thailand, the anti-Communist struggle was of secondary importance compared to other problems with which it had to deal, particularly Muslim separatism. Sources in the Thai police continued to claim that Malaysian patrols which operated in the frontier region did not attack Muslim dissidents they encountered, rather they collaborated with them to obtain intelli­ gence about movements of the MCP There was also a sense that Thailand had relinquished too much of its sovereignty in the frontier cooperation agreement with Malaysia. Thailand did not want to set up the precedent of an extended stay of foreign forces on its soil. In October 1979, Thailand decided to limit the scope of the agreement although, in that very month, there was a large-scale combined mil­ itary operation which included ten thousand Malaysian soldiers and a much smaller Thai unit.5 Even as these military operations were being carried out in the south, the under­ ground radio of the CPT announced (in March 1978) that the Thai Muslim Peoples Liberation Armed Forces (TMPLAF) had been set up as early as August of the previous year. The underground radio said that the organization supported Marx­ ism, Leninism, the thought of Mao Zedong, the rights of nations, and Muslim autonomy under the aegis of the Thai people, and that the TMPLAF would struggle for the Thai revolution. The communique was apparently released in the context of efforts to mobilize supporters among the Muslim population of the south. It is difficult to estimate either the numbers or the influence of this Communist front organization, and the lack of hard evidence makes it impossible to state categori­ cally that the TMPLAF actually existed, or if it was merely invented for propa­

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ganda purposes. In any case, the radio broadcast caught Thai security officers by surprise because they had not credited the CPT with the potential for collaboration with Muslim elements in the south.6 Early in 1981, the situation changed when it became known that there had been confrontations between members of PULO and the MCP. This development could have been the turning point in Thai-Malaysian efforts to fight both the Muslim rebels and the Communist underground in the frontier region, efforts that had met with great difficulties and were, in any case, partial and sporadic. Reports indi­ cated that since mid-February 1981 there had been armed clashes in the Betong salient between MCP and the Muslim separatist movements. The Betong area, which had effectively been under the control of 2,000 MCP fighters (according to Thai intelligence) was infiltrated by PULO fighters who had not only ambushed and killed Thai police and soldiers but also clashed with units of the MCP. The Communists then distributed leaflets in which they warned the local population not to aid Muslim rebels under pain of death. Muslim villagers began fleeing over the border to Malaysia and accused both the Communists and Thai soldiers of persecution and harassment. The murder of civilians, they reported, had begun in mid-March. By the beginning of May, 1,600 Muslim refugees from the Yala region arrived in camps that had been set up in Kedah and Perak. At this point, the Malaysian government asked Thai officials, who were surprised by the hostilities that PULO had initiated in Betong, to halt the flight of refugees. For its part, PULO accused the government of Thailand of arming the Communists against them. There were those in Thailand who believed the accusation for the following rea­ sons. Since the joint military operations of 1977-1978, Thailand had not rein­ forced its units in the Betong salient; after the joint operations, Malaysian military units were prevented from putting pressure to bear on the MCP; finally, in January 1980 the Thais ordered units of the Malaysian police that were bivouacked in Thai territory to leave. The MCP filled the vacuum—returning to the area and rebuild­ ing its bases. Concurrently, information was received of clashes with PULO. On 4 April there was a meeting between the assistant secretary-general of PULO, Hisham Abdullah (a graduate of A1 Azhar University in Cairo who had undergone training in a PLO base in Syria), with the chief minister of Kedah, Datuk Syed Nahar. Following the meeting, two interviews were given—the first by Hisham, the other by Ismail Quzafi, the PULO commander in the Betong salient, explaining the background to the flight of the refugees. Approximately 80 PULO fighters had come into the MCP area, in Betong, in the middle of March. According to both spokesmen, since the end of 1979, the Thai army and the MCP had cooperated in fighting PULO. The army provided 100 rifles, ammunition, and food to the Com­ munists. MCP viewed PULO infiltration into Betong as a threat and reported the matter to the Thai army which quickly sent reinforcements. At the end of March, there were four armed clashes between PULO and the Thai army. T\venty-six Thai soldiers were killed and 28 wounded in two PULO ambushes. Local residents threatened by either the army or by the MCP fled to Malaysia with the first 200

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refugees taken to the other side of the border by PULO people. In a version put forward by Thai intelligence officers, reference was made to ostensible links be­ tween Malaysian officials and members of PULO. Support for the assertion came from PULO documents that had been uncovered in which indication was made of PULO links to Malaysia and to Arab countries. On the Malaysian side of the bor­ der, PULO leaders apparently enjoyed freedom of movement and met with senior Malaysian officials. Hisham said that although they had not received any actual aid since 1979, members of PULO had had unofficial meetings with people high up in the prime minister’s office and the Malaysian Ministry of the Interior. There were also reports that PULO fighters were encamped on the Malaysian side of the border. In a distinct departure from what had been proposed by other separatist organizations some thirty years earlier, representatives of PULO stated that their goal was to achieve self-determination for South Thailand without any connection to Malaysia.7 On 15 June 1988, the Thai government began implementing a development plan for the southern provinces aimed at enhancing security, combating terror, and rais­ ing the standard of living of the local population. Muslim members of Parliament from the south and heads of the Islamic Committee of the Patani Region were among those militating for the renewed implementation of the development plan whose progress had faltered. A meeting of the Malaysia-Thailand Border Commit­ tee convened in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, found that the security situation on the frontier had much improved following the cessation of armed conflict by the Malay Communist Party in December 1989. Both delegations agreed that efforts should be made to stabilize the situation in the border region by means of socio­ economic development.8

Notes 1. Teik Soon Lau, “The Security Situation on the Malaysia-Thailand Border,” Asia Re­ search Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 2 (July 1971): 85-86; M. L. Thomas, "The Malayan Communist Insurgency” Asian Affairs, An American Review, vol. 4, no. 5 (May/June 1977): 306-311; idem, "Political Violence,” 21-29; John McBeth and K. Das, “A Frontier of Fear and Fac­ tions,” FEER, vol. 108, no. 26 (June 20,1980): 16; Zimmerman, “Insurgency in Thailand,” 22-23; “An Alliance of Terror,” FEER, vol. 76, no. 24, (June 10, 1972): 9; Communist Insurgency in Thailand, Royal Thai Government’s Communist Suppression Operations Command (Bangkok: June 1972); Communist Insurgency in Thailand, Unofficial Summary of the [Thai] Government White Paper, in Southeast Asian Spectrum, vol. 1, no. 4 (Bangkok: SEATO: July 1973), 35; The Communist Movement in West Malaysia and Singapore, Short Paper, no. 59 (Bangkok: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, February 1972). 2. Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 2,89-90; Teik Soon Lau, op. cit., 86-87; M. G. G. Pillai, “Thailand’s Border Worries,” FEER, vol. 47, no. 10 (March 12,1965): 420, 429; M. G. G. Pillai, “Malaysia: Death at the Border,” FEER, vol. 78, no. 45 (November 4, 1972): 24; idem, “The Prapas Style,” FEER, vol. 80, no. 15 (April 16,1973): 14-15; Bob

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Norton, “Thailand-Malaysia: Cramp in the Toe,” FEER, vol. 71, no. 1 (January 2, 1971): 7-8; “Thailand,” FEER, vol. 72, no. 25 (June 19, 1971): 4; Chandola Harish, “Thailand-Malaysia Tensions,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 11, no. 27 (July 3, 1976): 932; Suhrke, “Thai-Muslim Border Provinces,” 300-301; Forbes, “Thailand’s Mus­ lim Minorities,” 1062; Clark D. Neher, "Thailand: The Politics of Continuity,” Asian Survey, vol. 10, no. 2 (February 1970): 163-164; Zimmerman, op. cit., 23; M. L. Thomas, “The Malayan Communist Insurgents and Thai-Malaysian Relations,” Asian Affairs, An Ameri­ can Review, vol. 4, no. 6 (July/August 1977): 373-379; V. Suryanarayan and S. Sudhamani, “Malaysia-Thailand Cooperation and Communist Threat to Malaysia,” China Report, vol. 17, no. 4 (Delhi: July/August 1981): 26-27; Hubert Freyn, “Thailand: Stitch in TimeT’ FEER, vol. 50, no. 13 (December 30, 1965): 588; idem, “Sensitive South,” 323; idem, “Thailand: Strengthened South,” FEER, vol. 50, no. 4 (October 28,1965): 153-154; Regard­ ing the assumption that the CPT opposed separatist tendencies among Muslims of the south, see Norman Peagam, “Boiling Point in the Troubled South,” FEER, vol. 92, no. 21 (May 21, 1976): 10-11; idem, “Border Pact under Scrutiny,” FEER, vol. 92, no. 21, 12; John L. S. Girling, Thailand, Society and Politics (London: Cornell University Press, 1981), 267; Asia Yearbook 1966 (FEER), 329; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,” 421-422; Harvey Stockwin, “On the Border,” FEER, vol. 48, no. 1 (April 1, 1965): 5-6; Justus M. van der Kroef, Com­ munism in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 143. 3. Chandola Harish, op. cit., 933; M. L. Thomas, op. cit., 380-381; McBeth and Das, “Frontier of Fear,” 16—17; Richard Nations, ‘Thailand: Hot Pursuit after Whom?” FEER, vol. 93, no. 35 (August 27,1976): 33-34; K. Das, “Border Breaking Point,” FEER, vol. 92, no. 20 (May 14, 1976): 10-12; Suryanarayan and Sudhamani, “Malaysia-Thailand Coop­ eration,” 23-28; Asia Yearbook 1977 (FEER), 320; “Withdrawal from Betong,” Asian Al­ manac, vol. 15, no. 5 (January 19, 1977): 8052; Peagam, “Border Pact,” 12; Stockwin, ‘Troubled Border,” 8-9. 4. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 224, 232; Mingmongkol, “Communists,” 22-25. See also text of CPT’s radio announcement; Kroef, Communism in Southeast Asia, 160-161,198; Girling, Thailand, 267; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 51; Ganganath Jha, “Muslim Minorities,” 341; “Muslim Militants,” FEER, vol. 100, no. 15 (April 14,1978): 5. 5. Sricharatchanya Faisal, “The Muslims Move In,” FEER, vol. 114, no. 42 (October 9, 1981): 23-24; Sonsomsook Kamolwan, “Pay Now or Die Later,” FEER, vol. 108, no. 26 (June 20,1980): 20; Das, “Strife among the Rebels,” FEER, vol. 112, no. 19 (May 1,1981): 13-14; Hugh Rsyman, “An ASEAN Embarrassment,” FEER, vol. 12, no. 16 (April 10, 1981): 30; idem, “Refugees: PULO Looks Abroad,” FEER, vol. 112, no. 17 (April 17, 1981): 22; McVey, “Identity and Rebellion,” 51. 6. Dennis Rumley, “Conflict in International Border Regions,” Occasional Paper no. 31 (Nedlands, Western Australia: Indian Ocean Center for Peace Studies, University of West­ ern Australia, 1993), 17; “Revive Plan to Develop the south,” The Sunday Post (Bangkok: July 30,1995). 7. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 159; Haemindra, “Problem of Thai Muslims,” part 2, 100-101; Farouk, “Historical and Transnational,” 244; Suhrke, “Irredentism Contained,” 199; Hanna, Peninsular Thailand, Part II, 5. 8. Che Man, op. cit., 159; Farouk, op. cit., 244-245; idem, “Origins and Evolution,” 268-269; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 260; Thomas, “Bureaucratic Attitudes,” 550; Christie, Modem History, 188.

Chapter Fourteen

Aspects of Foreign Relations: Malaysia, Arab Nations, and Islamic Conferences

Malaya’s attainment of independence in 1958 and the establishment of Malaysia in 1963 raised the expectations of Malays in the Patani region that they would also find support for their aspiration to liberation from Thai rule. As they had been in the period following World War II, this aspiration was based on a common culture, religion, ethnic background, and history which bound together the Muslims of Patani and the Muslims of the Malay Peninsula. Indeed, geographic closeness af­ forded the Malays in South Thailand easy access, sympathy, and support for their cause in North Malaysia. The large number of expatriates from Patani that had made their way to Perak, Kedah, and Kelantan facilitated the growth of political organizations that confounded Thai authorities. Malaya/Malaysia became a safe haven for their political and military activity. After World War II, journalists and newspapers in the Malay Peninsula gave the cause of the Malay Muslims in Thai­ land sympathetic coverage, and the interest shown by various personalities and political parties in their problems bordered on support of their irredentist tenden­ cies. At the time that discussions leading to the establishment of Malaysia were being conducted in the 1960s, two small political parties called for the annexation of the four southern provinces to the incipient independent Malaysia. These were the Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM), which was considered a leftist party and, even more important, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP), which in 1973 changed its name to Partai Islam se-Malaysia (PAS). PMIP was a strong political force in the Sultanate of Trengganu and in Kelantan where it won the election and remained in power from 1959 until its defeat in 1978. PMIP was composed of orthodox Islamic groups and had a pan-Malay and radical Muslim outlook which spilled over to concern for Malay minorities in neighboring countries. At the time, there was a suspicion that these parties were receiving financial aid from Indone­ sia. The fact that Muslim separatist organizations in South Thailand had good con­ nections in Kelantan and that they received both material and other kinds of aid there was well known.1 The PMIP (or PAS) did not call directly for aid to the separatist organizations. Although the leaders did make efforts on behalf of the separatists, and provided actual assistance, they did so cautiously and clandestinely. PMIP leadership ex­ 163

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ploited the issue of Malaysian assistance to the separatists as a means of embar­ rassing the ruling party (UMNO) for not supporting Malay and Islamic interests. The Patani issue was first broached in the Malaysian Parliament by representatives of PMIP. In a speech he made at a political rally in Kelantan May 1969, Dato Muhamad Asri Hajji Muda, the leader of PMIP, called for the establishment of a Malay nation that would be made up of the sultanates of the Malay Peninsula and of the Patani region in South Thailand. It can be assumed that there was a direct connection between such a declaration and the build-up of tension with Chinese Malays in the peninsula which reached its peak in anti-Chinese riots that broke out in Malaysia on 13 May 1969. These events strengthened radical Malay elements in the government of Malaysia and fostered an atmosphere of support for the sep­ aratists of South Thailand. The communal riots in Malaysia had a pronounced impact on South Thailand where the separatists declared that they would set off a massive uprising. The Thai government, which regarded the events gravely, imme­ diately began wide-ranging military actions. The 1970s were a period of escalating violence in the southern provinces. In July 1970, Muhamad Asri wrote an article in The Muslim, a London publication, claiming that the struggle against Thai rule in South Thailand was a holy war (jihad) and was therefore deserving of worldwide Muslim support. An indication of the charged atmosphere which prevailed in Ma­ laysia can be seen in the reaction to the visit of Thailand’s prime minister, Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachom, when he visited Kuala Lumpur in mid-June 1971. TWo thousand Malaysian students demonstrated, protesting the Thai government’s uncompromising attitude toward Muslims in the south. The demonstration was organized by the youth wing of the ruling party in Malaysia, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) and by the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students (ABIM). The prime minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, assured his guest that he had no intention of interfering in Thai internal matters. The president of PAS, Dato Muhamad Asri, did not display the same sensitivity and on 18 June 1974, at the annual congress of his party, made a declaration that was interpreted as support for South Thailand Malay Muslims’ aspiration for autonomy. The im­ portance of this incident stemmed from the fact that in 1972 PAS had joined the Malaysian government coalition. At that time, Muhamad Asri was chief minister of the Kelantan Sultanate, as well as minister of Religious Affairs in the federal government coalition that was headed by Tun Abdul Razak. In his controversial speech, Muhamad Asri spoke about the sensitivity of the Muslim minority issue in South Thailand and the southern Philippines. He insisted that a solution that would ensure their rights was yet to be found. However, he did reiterate the prin­ ciple of nonintervention by the government of Malaysia in the internal affairs of other countries, particularly in the affairs of its friends in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. And he stressed the need for cooperation with Thai­ land to wipe out Communists in the border area. But he insisted on his right to express his opinion on the issue of the Muslims in the south, justifying it by saying that unrest in the four provinces would perpetuate strained relations between Thai­

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land and Malaysia. He claimed that the Muslim aspiration to autonomy (under special administrative arrangements) was a well-considered step towards peace. There were angry reactions in Thailand to his speech. Thai students held a dem­ onstration in Bangkok, and the matter was raised in the Thai Parliament. The Malaysian ambassador to Bangkok was called to the Thai Foreign Ministry where he was pressed for an explanation. Responding, the government of Malaysia ar­ gued that Asri meant only to express moral support. The Thai government contin­ ued to accuse Asri of interference in Thai internal affairs, reflecting the Thai government’s view that Asri was one of Malaysia's most radical politicians. He had, in the past, made statements which the Thais considered intervention in their internal affairs. This was particularly so because Thailand did not distinguish be­ tween insistence on limited autonomy and a demand for outright separation. Both demands were equally and categorically rejected; therefore, there was no readiness whatsoever to make concessions. The incident only exacerbated long-standing Thai suspicion regarding Malaysia’s policies and brought about a cooling of rela­ tions between the two countries. Tun Abdul Razak hastened to assure the Thai government that there was no change in Malaysia’s policy of noninterference in Thai affairs, and that Malaysia had no designs on the southern provinces. Despite this, Thailand (as well as two other neighbors of Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei) expressed anxiety regarding Malaysian interference in their internal af­ fairs. Bangkok newspapers reported the Thai government’s conviction that Muhamad Asri was sheltering Muslim rebels in Kelantan, that he sympathized with their goals, and provided them with assistance. In turn, this fired their hopes for autonomy, even separatism, and thereby contributed to the continuation of the conflict.2 Attempting to relieve tensions, Sanya Dharmasakti, the Thai prime min­ ister, then announced that the time had indeed come to find a solution to the problem of the Muslims in the south. He proposed a summit meeting to which Tun Abdul Razak would be invited. Meanwhile in a conciliatory gesture, the Egyptian secretary-general of the Islamic Secretariat, who had been invited to visit Bang­ kok, said that he did not support secession of the southern Muslim provinces, but he hoped that a greater degree of autonomy would be achieved by the Muslims of Thailand’s southern provinces (as well as the southern Philippines).3 Malaysia walked a tightrope in its approach to the Malay Muslims in South Thailand. The government had to balance between those political groups in South Thailand, which sympathized with separatist hopes and extended support and aid to them of one kind or another, and the Thai government. And traditionally, there was support and sympathy for the Muslims of Patani in the general Muslim pop­ ulation of Malaysia, particularly the villagers in the sultanates of the Malay Pen­ insula that bordered Thailand; Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis, Kedah, and Perak. The Malaysian government wanted to avoid alienating public opinion in those Sultan­ ates. Malaysia was a society made up of many communities. It was important to avoid establishing a precedent which could then be open to exploitation by such non-Malay communities in Sabah and Sarawak, a development which could upset

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the country’s delicate communal balance. This sensitive intercommunal situation was characteristic of ASEAN member-countries and impelled them to maintain a rigorous territorial status quo. Accepting the principle of ethnic self-determination could undermine the entire fabric of countries in the region. Both Thailand and Malaysia were convinced that ASEAN should be strengthened and bilateral rela­ tions safeguarded. The aim of ASEAN, which was established on 8 August 1967, was to foster economic and social activity among its first five members: Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. A second aim was to create a regional bloc for negotiations with the European Common Market and other international bodies. It was very important to the members of ASEAN that every effort be made to avoid damaging the organization or its orderly functioning. And, of course, there was Malaysia’s need for Thai cooperation in its police and military campaigns against Communist guerillas, from Malaysia, who had based them­ selves along the Thai side of the border. Malaysia, like Thailand and the other Southeast Asian countries, believed that their common interests took precedence over local disagreements and that any threat to existing borders could upset the delicate balance of the entire region. Indeed, the Muslim revolt in South Thailand (and similarly in the southern Philippines) was a disrupting factor to ASEAN har­ mony. Official Malaysian policy regarding problems of the Muslims in South Thai­ land was to suffice with formal statements which were merely expressions of sor­ row about the confrontation accompanied by a confirmation that it was an internal Thai problem. Despite this caution, suspicion between the two countries continued. Thailand remained unconvinced that Malaysia was doing everything it could to assist in solving the separatist threat in the south or to prevent sympathetic elements in Malaysia from extending help to the separatists, while Malaysia believed that Thai­ land did not do everything it could to assist in the anti-Communist guerilla cam­ paign. In any case, this crisis too was not long lasting, and Thailand was quick to overlook Muhamad Asri’s declarations.4 Thailand found new reason for worry when Datuk Dr. Mahathir bin Muhamad became prime minister of Malaysia. Mahathir was notorious for his xenophobic views and abrasive style which gave him an unsavory reputation in many countries of the world. He was considered an extremist Muslim and Thailand feared the impact of his appointment on its Muslim south. When 1,200 Malay Muslims fled to Kelantan, Mahathir threatened that he intended to “study the background of this mass exodus.” Thai officials pointed out that from the end of 1980 onwards the separatist movement was using uniforms and food supplies that resembled those in use by the Malaysian army. At the beginning of August 1981, Mahathir made an urgent visit to Bangkok in order to allay Thai fears.5 In recent years, one notes an impact on Muslims of the south that is a result of internal religious developments in Malaysia which are marked by a strengthening of Malay consciousness and Islamic identity. It may be that this is part of the gen­ eral atmosphere that has radiated throughout the Muslim world—the spread of

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ethnic nationalist Muslim groups throughout the Muslim world and the ascendance of radical fundamentalist movements influenced by the success of the 1979 Khoumeini revolution in Iran. This wave of Islamic revival reached the Muslims of Thailand from neighboring Malaysia and bolstered their consciousness of self and their demands for self-determination. From the beginning of the 1980s, con­ tacts have grown between various circles of Muslims in the south and groups of the tabligh and dakwah movements of Malaysia. These links have strengthened separatist tendencies.6 In 1990, general elections were held in Malaysia and in each of the states of the Malaysian Federation, which had important implications for the situation in the frontier areas. In the Kelantan election, the Partai Islam se-Malaysia (PAS), one of whose aims was to turn Malaysia into a more Islamic country, was reelected. The Thais persisted in believing that PAS was implicated in aid to the separatists de­ spite formal denials by the Malaysian government and its reassurances that it avoided involvement in Thailand’s internal affairs. Bilateral relations between Ma­ laysia and Thailand soon deteriorated again because of a number of incidents. One of these was related to demonstrations held in the south during May and June 1991, led by a Shiite Iranian activist. Because of a warrant issued for his arrest, he fled to Malaysia along with a number of his supporters. The second incident took place in mid-October 1996 when a man named Ismail Thanam was arrested in Kelantan and accused of membership in PULO. Thai authorities maintained that he had been apprehended with explosive materials in his possession and demanded his extradi­ tion. Malaysia countered by saying that he was a Malaysian citizen who was merely carrying some fireworks, and that he had been released on bail. These occurrences reinforced feelings of suspicion vis-&-vis Malaysia that were prevalent in Thailand and were also prompted by the extreme nationalism of Prime Minister Mahathir. Nonetheless, in July 1993, an agreement was concluded between Thailand, Malay­ sia, and Indonesia to promote the concept of the “growth triangle” which dealt with stepping up economic development in North Sumatra, the southern provinces of Thailand, and the southwestern sultanates of Malaysia. This was a significant de­ velopment in Thailand’s approach. Apparently Thailand concluded that its tradi­ tional perception of danger inherent in any encouragement to the separatist move­ ments in the opening of borders with its Muslim neighbors was outweighed by the economic advantages made possible by the new concept of economic cooperation with these same neighbors. In any case, a considerable time will have to pass before the economic and political results of this agreement can be evaluated.7 It bears pointing out that Indonesia’s approach to the Malay Muslim rebellion in South Thailand differed radically from Malaysia’s. Although during Ahmad Su­ karno’s regime there had been reports of Indonesian agents operating along the Thai-Malaysian frontier, Suharto— who was sensitive to the complex multiethnic nature of Indonesia—was at pains not to get involved in the conflict. Because of its own ethnic problems, Indonesia was interested in greatly limiting the principle of ethnic self-determination.8

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It is widely accepted that the strongest, even if not the only, influence on the Muslims of Southeast Asia—including those of the Patani region—was exerted by the Arab countries of the Middle East. This flowed from long and continuous con­ tacts which began with the appearance of Islam and goes on to the present day. Arab immigration to Southeast Asia over the generations, pilgrimages to Mecca which greatly increased from the mid-nineteenth century on, and the growing num­ bers of Southeast Asian students who study in Arab countries in recent times typify the intensity of these links. Consequently it is only natural that Arab countries should be a primary international arena in which separatist organizations try to air their complaints, get moral support for their cause, and material aid for their strug­ gle. The atmosphere of an Islamic renaissance that so marked the last generation, along with the establishment of Muslim institutions and world bodies, enhanced the importance of the Islamic bloc of countries on the international scene. All these contributed to a growing interest in the fortunes of Muslim minorities and to plac­ ing their interests on the agenda of international Muslim forums. According to an estimate by the Thai police, financial support from Arab countries, and from Mus­ lim organizations in Sweden, grew during the 1970s to a figure of $8.7 million. For example, in Saudi Arabia there is a large community of Malay Muslims from Patani who continue to maintain a connection with the southern provinces. They have helped in the organization of anti-Thai political and diplomatic activity. Most hold Saudi citizenship but have maintained family ties in Thailand and Malaysia. This community has been a useful source of financial and organizational aid for the separatist movements, as well as a pool for manpower. In the last few decades, between 10,000 and 30,000 workers from Thailand could be found in Saudi Ara­ bia. They, too, served as an important source of financing for the separatists. Do­ nations from Saudi Arabia came through various organizations such as the Muslim World League in Mecca, Darul Ifta in Riyadh, and the Islamic Solidarity Fund in Jeddah. By means of connections that Muslim pilgrims from Thailand made, the separatist organizations were able to develop a network in other foreign countries. The haj season was used as an opportunity for meetings between representatives of the separatist organizations and representatives of Islamic governments and other groups. The underground movements attempted to mobilize Malay Muslims who came on the haj. Thai authorities were aware of all this and tried to keep track of events through their diplomats in Jeddah. For example, in 1977, an investigation was opened in Thailand to look into allegations of arms smuggling to the rebels in the south by Muslim pilgrims who had returned to Mecca by way of the sea route. The Saudi government itself contributed money to PULO, to the BNPP, and to the BRN.9 Libya was also involved in sending financial aid to separatist organizations. One of its conduits was the World Islamic Call Society, and although the Thai govern­ ment asked that the flow of funds be halted, it appears that Libya remained a prime source of money for the separatists. Scores of Muslim students who were members of separatist organizations studied in Libya and there were Muslim workers from

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South Thailand in the country. Libya provided asylum for rebel leaders and a plat­ form from which they could expound their ideologies, and members of the sepa­ ratist organizations underwent military training there. Some evidence suggests that Libya provided arms as well, but it is unclear whether this was done in an ongoing, organized manner. In 1978, the Libyan ruler, Muammar Qaddafi, donated 20 mil­ lion bahts for the construction of a school for needy Muslim children. The Thai government regarded this, as it did any contribution from Arab countries, with suspicion even when they were ostensibly intended for social or educational needs. In 1982, a Libyan proposal to set up an Islamic Cultural Center in Thailand was turned down by the Thai government who feared that it would serve as a base for terrorism. Building the center was a Libyan condition for a much larger venture in which Libya would extend aid to southern Muslims in the amount of 100 million bahts. Negotiations which were undertaken between the Libyan delegation and Thai senior army officers were unofficial. Having resisted such a move for years, on 16 March 1982 Thailand agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Libya, but the presentation of credentials was postponed by both parties. Similarly, a pro­ posal by the United Arab Emirates of January 1975 to make a $4 million grant for Muslim education in the south was also rejected by Thailand. Kuwait did manage to send contributions by means of an organization called Al-Auqaf. Libya and Syria coordinated their activities on behalf of PULO at the UN in New York and presented joint petitions to the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations regarding the situation in Patani.10 In mid-1980, a number of PULO documents were seized, two of which were letters written in the Malay language. One was sent by the PULO liaison person in Damascus with information that a group of new recruits had finished their military training and were on their way to South Thailand via Malaysia. The second letter was written by the liaison person in Kelantan and dealt with the recruitment of young men for a new training course in Malaysia. In fact, Thai authorities discov­ ered that Muslim students from the southern provinces studying in the Middle East were receiving military training in Syria, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, among other countries. According to Thai military intelligence, at the beginning of 1985, at least sixty young members of PULO returned to the south having been trained in an unspecified Middle Eastern country, probably either Syria or Libya. In addition, Syria was sending financial contributions through the Baath Party. Contacts with the PLO were conducted through that organization’s representatives in Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi.11 The separatists in South Thailand sought assistance through international Mus­ lim organizations, too. Leaders of a number of separatist movements participated in sessions of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), an offshoot of the Organization of the [World] Islamic Conference (OIC). Their first exposure to this body was at a conference held in Jeddah, in March 1970. Subsequently they attended a conference in September 1970, in Karachi; another in March 1972 in Jeddah; and were at a meeting in Benghazi in March 1973. At the fifth conference

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held in Kuala Lumpur in June 1974, a letter by Tunku Abdul Jalal, leader of the BNPP, was circulated in which he called on the conference to help in the attainment of independence for the Patani region and to impose an oil embargo on Thailand. The conference disregarded his appeal. Representatives of the Liberation Front of South Thailand were in Kuala Lumpur at the time of the conference but were not permitted to make an official appearance. It is worth noting that violent acts in South Thailand accelerated as the date of the conference approached. At the sixth conference held in Jeddah in June 1975, it was decided to raise the issue of Muslim minorities in the world at the following conference. At the seventh session of the Conference of the OIC that took place in Istanbul in May 1976, the discussion was held behind closed doors; however, the separatist organizations of South Thailand were allowed to take part. At the eleventh conference, in Islamabad, in 1980, the BNPP was permitted to present a memorandum. The complaints of the southern Muslims also came up in conferences and conventions of other international Is­ lamic bodies such as the Asian Islamic Conference, the Arab League, Muslim World League, and at the Islamic Council of Europe which was held in London on 26-28 July 1978. Commissions of Inquiry from these organizations, and other Islamic delegations, visited the southern provinces a number of times, generally with the approval of the Thai government. For example, the Thai government in­ vited the secretary-general of OIC, Hassan al-Tohami, to visit Bangkok and the southern provinces. He concluded that there were no problems there, only “misunderstandings,” and promised the Thai government that the demands of the Muslims of the south would not be put on the agenda of the 1974 conference in Kuala Lumpur. In 1978, there was another visit to the south by Dr. Emanullah Khan, the secretary-general of the World Muslim League. Hie World Muslim League con­ vinced the BNPP and PULO to sign a provisional agreement to coordinate their operations. In 1977, the BNPP presented a letter of complaint to UN headquarters in Geneva transmitted by means of the World Muslim League, an organization under the patronage of the Saudi government. On a number of occasions, the pub­ lication of that organization had printed articles in support of the Malay Muslim in South Thailand.12 Despite all their efforts, the separatist organizations in South Thailand were unable to secure more than minimal aid from Arab countries or international Mus­ lim bodies. Certainly they were unable to match the magnitude of aid Muslim rebels in the Philippines received. One important reason for the difference was the degree of intensity and violence which marked the Muslim rebellion in South Thai­ land relative to the rebellion in the Philippines. No less important a reason were the counterefforts by the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia to prevent the conflict from escalating into an international affair which was predicated on their unwillingness to countenance foreign involvement in Southeast Asia. (Admittedly, this did play a role vis-&-vis the rebellion of the Philippine Muslims.) Another reason was their determination not to stretch their bilateral relations with Thailand, their partner in ASEAN, to the breaking point. Suharto's Indonesia was less sen­

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sitive than Malaysia to internal pressures by local radical Muslims, but Indonesia also strongly rejected to non-Southeast Asian involvement at international Islamic conferences. Indonesia’s motives were not limited to considerations of ASEAN; like the Malaysians, they were anxious about Muslim militancy in Arab countries which could lead to instability in Indonesia and Malaysia. Concerns of this kind encouraged Thailand to rely on its two Muslim neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, to support it at international Muslim meetings against the rhetoric of the extreme separatist organizations. In fact, the separatists were unable to mobilize official attention among Muslim bodies and conferences whenever Malaysian or Indone­ sian delegations were present. For example, at the Kuala Lumpur Conference of 1974, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and Indonesian Foreign Min­ ister Adam Malik opted for quiet diplomacy. The conference adopted their ap­ proach despite Libya’s demands that the jihad in South Thailand be supported. Tun Razak objected to the discussion of Muslim minorities in Thailand (and in the Philippines) at the conference because they were being dealt with in the framework of ASEAN. At the Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul in May 1976, the Malaysian and Indonesian representatives also refused to give offi­ cial support to the aspirations of the Patani Muslims.13 For its part, the Thai gov­ ernment mounted a diplomatic campaign among the member states of OIC to con­ vince them not to aid the rebels and to prevent the rebels from receiving assistance from international Islamic bodies.14

Notes 1. Asia Yearbook 1972 (FEER) 321; Haemindra, “Problem of the Thai Muslims,” part 2, 101; Teik Soon Lau, “Security Situation,” 87; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philip­ pines,” 201, 203; Das, “Sympathy Yes, Assistance No,” FEER, vol. 111, no. 3 (January 9, 1981): 12. 2. Farouk, “Historical and Transnational,” 245; Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 260; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 159; Asia Yearbook 1975 (FEER), 308; Stockwin, “Thailand—Looking South with Increasing Suspicion, FEER, vol. 85, no. 31 (August 9, 1974): 30-32; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 200-201,203; Das, “Sym­ pathy Yes,” 12; Suryanarayan and Sudhamani, “Malaysia-Thailand Cooperation,” 24-25; Chee-Meow Seah, “Muslim Issue,” 154. 3. Stockwin, “Marcos Gains Time from the Muslims,” FEER, vol. 85, no. 27 (July 8, 1974): 12. 4. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 159-160; Suhkre, “Irredentism Contained,” 200-202; Suhkre and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 203-206; Farouk, “Historical and Trans­ national,” 245-248; Das, “Sympathy Yes,” 12; idem, “Malaysia: A Joining of Forces,” FEER, vol. 90, no. 42 (October 17,1975): 14; M. L. Thomas, Political Violence, 20; idem, “Thai Muslims,” 164; “Aid from the Outside,” Asiaweek (April 4, 1980): 26-27; Keyes, Thailand, Buddhist Kingdom, 132; Christie, Modem History, 189. 5. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 262; Asia Yearbook 1982, 225. 6. Farouk, “Malaysia’s Islamic Awakening,” 162-163, 165-166; Satha-Anand Chaiwat,

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“Patani in the 1980s: Academic Literature and Political Stories” SOJOURN, Social Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. 7, no. 1 (February 1992): 2,13,25; Kraus, “Islam in Thailand,*' 423; Imtiyaz, “Review of Surin Pitsuwan," 197; Uthai, “Muslim-Malay Separation," 230. 7. Michael Vadkiotis, “Altered Chemistry," FEER, vol. 160, no. 5 (January 30,1997): 16; Rumley, “Conflict in International Border Regions," 13-14; “Thailand,” The Far East and Australasia, 1010. 8. Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Phillipines," 207; Hanna, Peninsular Thailand, Part II, 6; J. Soedjati Djiwandono, “Indonesia’s Relations with Other Southeast Asian Coun­ tries," Asian Perspective, vol. 1, no. 1 (spring 1977): 32-52. This article can serve as an illustration of what has been stated in the text The article is a detailed examination of Indonesian foreign policy from its inception. It does not offer any evidence that the problem of the Muslim minority in South Thailand or the southern Philippines was ever a factor in Indonesia’s policy. 9. Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 265; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 161-162; “Muslim World League," Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modem Islamic World, vol. 3, 208-210; Sricharatchany Paisal, “PULO and the Middle East Connection," FEER, vol. 114, no. 41 (October 9,1981): 26; Farouk, “Historical and Transnational," 249; Ganganath Jha, “The Muslim Separatist Movement," 194; Asia Yearbook 1972, 320; Fred R. von der Mehdan, Two Worlds of Islam. Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 55. 10. Pitsuwan, op. cit., 265; Che Man, op. cit, 161; VejpongsaTassanee, 'Thailand's Mus­ lim Ambassador," The Bangkok Post (June 2,1995); Mehden, op. cit, 55; Dilip Mukeijee, “Southeast Asia: Oil Financed Militancy,” World Focus, vol. 1, no. 5 (New Delhi: May 1980): 20-22; Ganganath Jha, op. cit., 194; Hugh feyman, “Refugees: PULO Looks Abroad,” FEER, vol. 112, no. 17 (April 17,1981): 22; Gunn, “Radical Islam," 37; Thomas, “Thai-Muslim Separatism," 30; “Libya Centre Raises Fears of Terrorist Base," The Bangkok Post (December 24, 1983); Paul Handley, “Diplomatic Dispatch," FEER, vol. 149, no. 32 (August 9,1990): 24. 11. Pitsuwan, op. cit, 265; Che Man, op. cit., 161; Paisal Sricharatchanya, “PULO and the Middle East Connection," 26; Ganganath Jha, op. cit., 194; Gunn, op. cit., 38; Thomas, op. cit., 30. 12. Che Man, op. cit., 160-161; Pitsuwan, op. cit, 221, 262-263; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines," 207; Nehemia Levtzion, International Islamic Solidarity and Its Limitations (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University, 1979), 46; Farouk, “Historical and Transnational,” 250; Na Taksin Kochapum, “Thai Poli­ tics through Southern Eyes," Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 69 (January-February 1980): 24—25; The Bangkok Post of August 22,1995, noted that Chechnyan representatives visited Muslims of the south. It is unclear from the article whether they came openly or clandes­ tinely to report, in Arabic, about the atrocities of the Russian army. The Chechens then went on to Malaysia and Indonesia. 13. Pitsuwan, op. cit, 263-264; Suhrke and Noble, op. cit, 207-208; Astri Suhrke and Robert L. Beckman, “Ethnic Conflict and International Relations," Pluml Societies, vol. 9, no. 4 (winter 1978): 5,12; Gunn, “Radical Islam," 37; Thomas, “Thai-Muslim Separation," 31; Dilip Mukeijee, “Southeast Asia," 22; M. G. G. Pillai, “Malaysia. A Touchy Subject" FEER, vol. 84, no. 25 (June 24, 1974): 18; Stockwin, “The Thai Face of Muslim Discon­ tent" FEER, vol. 85, no. 26 (July 1,1974): 13-14; “Islamic Conference Solidarity: A Ruling

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173

Vision,” FEER, vol. 85, no. 26 (July 1,1974): 12. 14. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 168; Tassanee, “Thailand’s Muslim Ambassador.” A portrait of a Thai Muslim woman who visited fourteen Muslim countries in order to dis­ seminate information on the good life of Muslims in Thailand.

Chapter Fifteen

The 1990s: Is the Revolt in Decline?

At the end of 1988, working through its Bangkok Embassy, Iran became active among the Muslims of the south, particularly within the small Shiite community there. On 4 January 1989 a Saudi consular official was murdered. Initially, the Thai police believed that the murder resulted from a disagreement between the Saudi official and a labor contractor who was engaged in bringing Thai laborers to Saudi Arabia. On 1 February 1990 three other Saudi consular officials were assassinated. These assassinations occurred several months after Riyadh had warned Bangkok that it expected a series of Iranian-inspired attacks on Saudi representatives in a campaign that would spread to the rest of Southeast Asia. The warning came after there were attacks on Saudi diplomats in TYirkey and Pakistan. While the Thai government was not prepared to blame Iran publicly, expressions of worry and suspicion regarding the involvement of Iran and the upsurge in Shiite activity in the south were clear. Rumors circulated that Iran had provided Thai separatists with military training. The Iran Embassy translated political and religious tracts into Thai and distributed them among Muslims, and ten Muslims returning to the south, who had studied in Iran, were identified as political activists. At various times, the Thai Foreign Ministry requested the Iranian Embassy to avoid dissem­ ination of propaganda against other countries, by which they meant the United States and Saudi Arabia. The assassinations became a cause of tension between Bangkok and Riyadh. The Saudi government stopped issuing entry visas to Thai laborers and went so far as to delay presentation of the Thai ambassador’s creden­ tials in Riyadh until 21 June, a delay of almost five months. Saudi officials criti­ cized the Thai government for not making public the fact that Iran was behind the assassinations and for its failure to apprehend the murderers. In June 1990 the Iranian ambassador denied all the allegations regarding his country’s involvement and stated that the separatists in the south were an internal Thai matter.1 Shiite involvement was reported in other incidents as well. Large Muslim dem­ onstrations in the southern provinces were organized by a local Shiite activist who had studied in Iran and continued to have connections there. Beginning in 1988, Sorayuth Sakulnasantisat, who had large resources available to him, was active in the south where he set up a network of followers and supporters. Sorayuth stirred 175

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up interest in Islamic fundamentalism, particularly among young people. On May 9-11, 1990, thousands of Muslims gathered in Yala to protest the murder of a young woman and her daughter by a soldier. On June 2-3, there were a number of violent incidents when thousands of Muslims massed at the mosque in Patani to hear sermons attacking the government and calls for autonomy. In his speeches, Sorayuth attacked both the official Muslim leadership and the chulamjamontri for collaborating with the government. The demonstrators threw rocks as brawls broke out with soldiers and police. These free-for-alls, too, were led by Sorayuth. Six days later, warrants were issued for the arrest of Sorayuth and some of his aides, but all of them managed to disappear and hide out. Thai sources believed that they had escaped to Malaysia, but Thailand did not request their extradition. It bears noting that Sorayuth did not deal directly in Shiite propaganda; rather, he disguised his Shiite identity speaking the praises of the local Muslim holyman, Hajji Sulong. The government suspected Shiite instigators and the involvement of the Iranian Embassy in demonstrations in Patani in 1989 and again in 1990, centered around the ancient mosque, Kru-ze. In 1935, the government had declared Kru-ze to be a historic site, but the Muslims continued to claim ownership of it. There are observ­ ers who believe that this was not a case of external incitement but an expression of consciousness-raising on the part of the Muslim minority, emphasizing its religious-communal identity. The government’s concern with the spread of Mus­ lim militancy grew when a police raid on a house in Bangkok uncovered a large store of military equipment, arms, and ammunition. Three Burmese Muslims who were suspected of ties with Bangladesh were arrested. Though they claimed that the arms were meant for Burmese Muslim rebels, the Thai police commander was convinced that the arms were actually intended for South Thailand because the suspects were carrying pictures of Shiite leaders from the south, including Sorayuth.2 Broad-based support for the idea of autonomy has persisted among Muslims of the south into the 1990s. Many Thai security people are inclined to regard Muslim resistance as an expression of Shiite inspired separatist tendencies although it would appear that a number of basic factors which have been at the root of Muslim uprisings in the southern provinces since the end of World War II still apply. The first and foremost of these core factors are the unbridgeable religious-cultural gaps which have grown in the past few years because of the radicalized atmosphere. Added to this are the embittered sensibilities caused by political inequality, eco­ nomic backwardness, feelings of discrimination in employment opportunities, and confrontations with the Thai Buddhist administration in which the Muslims have almost no place. These factors have remained unchanged in the course of the past fifty years despite a number of attempted reforms made at various times. A pri­ mary flashpoint of anger among the Muslim population was, and remains, the area of education. The government employs very few Muslims in state schools despite the large pool of unemployed Muslim teachers. The majority of teachers are Bud­ dhists sent to the south from other provinces. There is endless confrontation with

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traditional customs; for example, the question of students’ dress. According to regulations, students in government schools are required to wear short pants if they are boys, or skirts if they are girls. This runs counter to dress customs in the Muslim community. Boys are not permitted to wear the traditional hijab cap, and girls are forbidden to wear the head scarf. In several cases strong protests broke out, as happened in August 1996. Reaction was so severe that by October the Minister of the Interior had to cancel the regulation. And in those government schools in which Muslim students were allowed to wear clothing in keeping with Muslim custom, there were almost no dropouts. The teaching of Thai literature based on Buddhist principles which are not in keeping with Islamic values has also proved to be a major point of contention. For such reasons, many Muslim parents hesitate to send their children to government schools, preferring private Muslim schools. This is especially true in rural areas. The Muslim demand, therefore, is to effect a decen­ tralization of education which will enable them to shape the content of their chil­ dren’s schooling. This same demand is also being made by members of other ethnic minorities in North and Northeast Thailand. Muslims who can afford to send their children abroad for their studies enroll them in such places as Saudi Arabia, Ma­ laysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Thai officials respond to Muslim complaints about the underrepresentation of Muslims in government service by saying that it is the fault of the Muslims themselves because most of their children attend religious schools, then go abroad for their higher education which, in turn, causes a lack of fluency in the Thai language, and this stands in the way of their entering govern­ ment service. The low level participation of Muslims in economic and business affairs is also connected to the problem of education. Only a few Muslims study economics-related subjects; moreover, Muslims are unlikely to join government service because they are not interested in being sent to non-Muslim regions.3 Although the terror attacks of the separatists were less than effective, they did not end. In 1992 there were two rounds of discussion dealing with a cease-fire between the leader of PULO, Tunku Bilor Kortor Nilor who spent most of his time in Syria, and between commanders of the Thai army in the south. At one point it seemed as if Tunku Bilor had agreed to a proposal that members of PULO who surrendered would receive government aid in order to start a new life, but in August 1993 the situation deteriorated again because of a series of terror attacks. Among them, the thirty-two schools in Yala, Patani, and Narathiwat which were all set ablaze in one night by unidentified armed men. One version, particularly prevalent among southern Muslims, claims that the coordinated timing of the fires was not carried out by separatists but by other elements, perhaps even security forces, in order to justify their demands for greater resources and increased manpower.4 There were other violent actions including an attack on a train in which one person was killed. In several places there were clashes with armed bands, apparently members of PULO, in which a number of soldiers were killed. PULO issued a communique denying any connection to the incidents. While the government had no proof linking the attacks to PULO, the Thai intelligence community believed

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that this rash of attacks was carried out by the wing of PULO headed by Dr. Arrong Mooreng, who had quarreled with Tunku Bilor and found asylum in Malaysia. It is possible that Mooreng’s aim was to derail the talks between PULO and the gov­ ernment.5 The BRN also retained a number of armed units, although no informa­ tion is available on terror acts which can be attributed to them. A member of the organization who surrendered to government forces reported that BRN had camps along the Thai-Malaysian border, that its people were engaged in extortion from residents in the area, and occasionally also clashed with security forces.6 On August 7, 1995, PULO sent a letter to the government calling for a resump­ tion of the cease-fire talks. There were fears that this might unleash negative reac­ tions in the south. Earlier, at the beginning of July, an unknown organization calling itself the Patani National Army whose leader was Poh Ji Nai Krongpinang, a name also previously unknown, sent threatening letters to four religious leaders in the south, among them the chairman of the Patani Islamic Committee. Letters were also sent to a Muslim member of Parliament from the south and a former under secretary of the Interior who lived in Patani. Under threat of death, each one was told to pay protection money. Thai intelligence believed that the letters were sent from Malaysia. There is an assumption that the new organization was in some way connected to the Tantra Jihad Islam (TJI) which had stepped up its activities in the south during that period. It was common knowledge that TJI was composed of disappointed former members of PULO and BRN, the two main separatist organi­ zations whose activity had greatly diminished during the 1990s. Another report, of questionable reliability, indicated that at the end of 1997, a new organization known as the Council of the Muslim People of Patani (MPRMP) was set up by activists from all the movements. The new body concentrated on attacking police outposts and government offices.7 At the end of July 1995, the prime minister of Thailand, Banham Silpa-archa, visited the south and met with senior officials, army and police officers, and reli­ gious leaders to discuss security issues in the Muslim provinces and ongoing terror attacks by Muslim separatist organizations. The religious leaders were favorably impressed by the prime minister's request to meet with them for an exchange of views. His predecessors had not done so. They raised the problems of education in the schools, drugs that were proliferating among Muslim youth, and the issue of personal safety for religious leaders who had received threatening letters at the beginning of the month from the same unknown Patani National Army. The prime minister instructed the minister of the Interior to increase security measures in the south and to make every effort to prevent untoward incidents.8 A significant change in the Malaysian government’s attitude to Muslim terror in the south of Thailand occurred on 14 January 1998 when the Malaysian police in Kuala Lumpur arrested Hajji Sama-ae Thanam and three of his men and turned them over to the Thai authorities. The Thai police determined that Hajji Sama was the head of the military arm of PULO. At the same time, more rebels surrendered to the police. For a decade separatist rebels had crossed the border without hin­

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drance, particularly if they carried identity cards indicating that they belonged to a separatist organization. Apparently, this now came to an end. In February 1998 the prime ministers of Thailand, Chuan Leekpay, and Malaysia, Dr. Dato Mahathir, agreed to cooperate in the war against the separatists. The fact that Mahathir made this dramatic turnaround in his policy and braved the anger of conservative Mus­ lims in Malaysia indicates the seriousness of the decision made by both leaders to enforce law and order in the frontier region. For several years there had been dis­ cussions of a tripartite development zone that would encompass northern Malay­ sia, southern Thailand, and northern Indonesia (Sumatra), but the plan was not implemented because investors hesitated to come to such a turbulent region, a turbulence in which some Thai officials were themselves implicated. Heroin and opium continued to flow across the border and from there by way of Malaysian couriers to Australia, other countries in Asia, and western Europe. The severe economic crisis that emerged in Southeast Asia forced the two countries into cooperation, and apparently the Malaysian government decided to put a halt to the free access of separatists into their country. The decision was a source of worry to South Thailand Malay expatriates in Kelantan. Feeling that their Malaysian coreligionists had betrayed them, many—including some of the top leadership—escaped to Saudi Arabia and Europe.9 At the end of half a century of violent struggle waged by Muslim separatist movements in the southern provinces of Thailand, a number of conclusions can be seen as distinguishing the period. First, there has been absolutely no change in Thailand’s policy. The notion of granting any form of autonomy to the Muslims is as unacceptable to Thailand as the secessionist aspirations of the Muslims. The Thai government is implacable in its refusal to limit its sovereignty, in any way, in the area. When the Muslims resorted to violence and terror, various Thai govern­ ments responded vigorously, employing military force. At the same time, govern­ ments made some concessions in other areas: cultural-religious, educational, so­ cial, and economic. These concessions, whose effectiveness was partial at best, were insufficient to alter the basically negative stance of the majority of the Mus­ lim population vis-&-vis the Thai Buddhist regime. Cultural integration between Muslims and Thais is inconceivable in the foreseeable future. Such integration would be in grave opposition to the roots of Muslim identity. On the contrary, since the mid-1980s, there has been a noticeable growth in feelings of Islamic identity among Malay Muslims and in their adherence to their faith, the Malay language, and culture. Their basic suspicion and mistrust of the Thai Buddhist establishment has not abated, although occasionally one observes changes in the pattern of polit­ ical behavior, exemplified by the participation of a number of Muslim politicians in the political structure of the country, election to Parliament and the Senate, and a certain degree of participation in administration, including the government. The south remains poor and underdeveloped. There is only minimum Muslim participation in business and commerce with the majority of concerns that do busi­ ness in the south directed by non-Muslim Thais or Chinese Thais. Fer-capita in­

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come in the southern provinces is lower than in neighboring non-Muslim regions. Difficulties remain in the cultural sphere. The government still does not recognize the Malay language and forbids publications in it. Broadcasts in Malay are limited to three hours a day from a local army radio station. The government is at pains to veto any policy that might enhance Muslim strength. All of these problems persist, but there seems to have been a genuine erosion in the ability of the separatist move­ ment to make a difference, and the movement lacks sources of serious support. The separatist movements are unable, either from a numerical standpoint or from the standpoint of the equipment available to them, to stand up to the security forces. The recurring splits which the movements suffer weaken them greatly. There are sporadic incidents and an occasional terror attack but the loyalty of the Malay Muslim public has waned, at least at this stage. There are Muslims—the number is difficult to estimate—that do not support demands for autonomy or separatism. They are prepared to act within the state framework in order to improve their eco­ nomic, educational, and daily administrative situation. They are not, however, pre­ pared to relinquish their Malay Muslim identity even when they see government education as an avenue to cultural and economic mobility. It must be remembered that not all terror activity in the south is carried out by Muslim separatists. There are other elements also active in this sphere but it is difficult to distinguish between them and bands of robbers, drug smugglers, and the like. Support by the Muslim world, particularly Malaysia and Libya, is down. Nonetheless, affinity to religion is rising. T\iition-free government schools have been built everywhere, but 60 per­ cent of Muslim families, according to one estimate, prefer sending their children to private pondoks which provide a Muslim education alongside the standard gov­ ernment curriculum. The fact that the majority of teachers in government schools are Buddhist is a deterring factor for the majority of Muslim parents, evidenced by the harassment of these teachers, assassinations, and the torching of schools. The mosques are full of worshipers, and the religious revival can also be ob­ served in dress and the performance of other religious customs. A great quantity of Islamic literature from abroad finds its way into the region. Generally, it comes from Malaysia, and there is also a steady increase in the number of scholarships granted by other Muslim countries for students from the south. The number of pilgrims from Thailand to Mecca is up. And there is a weakening in values con­ nected to non-Islamic customs, the Adat,i0 which also occurs in other Muslim lands marked by religious revival and Islamic resurgence.

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Notes 1. Paul Handley, “Diplomatic Dispatch,” FEER, vol. 149, no. 32 (August 9, 1990): 24; Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, 7; [Iran was also linked to an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok in March 1994.] 2. Paul Handley, op. cit, 24; idem, “Deep Grievances," FEER, vol. 149, no. 32 (Ausust 9, 1990): 23-24; Satha-Anand Chaiwat, “Kru-ze: A Theatre for Renegotiating Muslim Identity,” SOJOURN: Social Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. 8, no. 1 (February 1993): 195-196,200. 3. Paul Handley, “Wind from the south,** FEER, vol. 149, no. 32 (August 9,1990): 22-23; Tbnsubhapol Kulcharee, “An Education That Fits” The Bangkok Post (June 9, 1995); Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature,** 58-59; Vatikiotis, “Thailand: Out of the Closet,** FEER, vol. 159, no. 47 (November 21, 1996): 31; “Catering to Diverse Cultural Needs,** The Bangkok Post (June 9,1995). 4. Julian Gearing, “Southern Discomfort,” Asiaweek, vol. 24, no. 1 (March 20,1998): 47. 5. US. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practicesfor 1993, 738, 746; Asia Yearbook 1994, 215; “Worrying Trend in the south,** The Bangkok Post (August 10, 1995). 6. “Separatist Movement Member Surrenders,*’ The Bangkok Post (July 30,1995). 7. “Death Threat Letter Sent to Ex-PM Den,** The Bangkok Post (July 7,1995); “Worry­ ing Trend in the south,*’ op. cit (August 10,1995). About the new organization, MPRMP, see Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements,** 448. 8. “Banham Tours South, Meets Local Leaders,** The Sunday Post (July 30, 1995); “Banham’s Trip to South Impresses Muslim Leaders,** The Bangkok Post (August 3,1995); “Banham Concerned over Security in Southern Provinces,** op. cit., (August 12,1995). 9. Gearing, “Southern Discomfort,** 44-47; Ganganath Jha, “Muslim Separatist Move­ ment,** 195. 10. Gearing, op. cit, 46-47; Vatikiotis, 'Thailand: Ties of Faith,” FEER, vol. 159, no. 15 (April 11,1996): 29-30; Bunge, Thailand: A Country Study; 77; Ganganath Jha, op. cit, 198; Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam, 54-55,96-97; Robert B. Albritton, “Political Diversity among Muslims in Thailand,** Asian Studies Review; vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1999): 233-246. A general survey of the contemporary situation of Thai Muslims.

'

Part Three

The Moro Muslims

THE PHILIPPINES

South China Sea

Philippine Sea

' ‘Q S a s il a n SULU t*

YAWI-TAWI

Cel ebes Sea 200kra

Chapter Sixteen

The Emergence of the Moro Community

It is likely that Muslim traders began plying their wares in the Sulu Archipelago sometime between the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth centuries. Eventually their trade routes extended from China to India, by way of the Malay Archipelago, to the Arabian Peninsula where the routes branched in two directions, one going to the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the other to Egypt and the ports of South Africa. From the eleventh century onward, Chinese, IndonesianHindus, and Arabs who were trading in the Archipelago began settling there. By the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries, there was prob­ ably a permanent settlement of foreign Muslim traders in Jolo who were also active in propagating their religion. The city of Jolo, which is the capital of Jolo Island, was a strategic transit depot for international commerce, not only for spices but also for other products traded between various Asian regions. Intermarriage be­ tween the traders and the elites of the local population was a natural by-product of commerce. At the end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth century, Islam was well established on the island, and from there it spread to the southern coast of Mindanao. A stream of Malay Muslim clerics from Sumatra and other places in the Malay Archipelago followed on the heels of Arab traders. Muslim missionaries also arrived from southern China. Some traders intermarried with local ruling families. Some, like Raja Baguinda Ali who came from Sumatra at the end of the fourteenth century and achieved a position of such prominence that he was able to establish his own local principality, had great personal success. In the middle of the following century, the Sultanate of Sulu was established by a number of local Dato who banded together and agreed to place the raja’s son-in-law, Sherif Abu Bakar, over them as a Muslim sultan. Many inhabitants of the coastal areas of Sulu then converted to Islam and this process was repeated in other parts of the archipelago. At its height, the Sulu Sultanate extended from Basilan and the Sulu Archipelago northward to Palawan, eastward to the southern coast of Zamboanga, and as far west as Borneo. From Sulu, Muslim traders and missionaries came to Mindanao, and at the end of the fifteenth century, Islam spread to Cotabato and Lanao. Sherif Muhammed Kabungsuwan, from Malaysia, was a central figure in this movement, winning the trust of the Maguindanao and converting them to Is185

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lam. In the second decade of the sixteenth century, a sultanate was established which eventually split into a number of sultanates—Maguin- danao, Bayan, and Butig. Islam grew stronger in Sulu and Mindanao as the result of several interact­ ing factors: the vigorous and intensive Islamization process that occurred in nearby Brunei and Ternate, intensive seafaring ties with Islamic Malacca and Java, and increasingly frequent visits of traders and Muslim missionaries from India and the Arabian Peninsula. Marriage bonds between the ruling families of Brunei, Sulu, Maguindanao, and Ternate also fostered the growth of the new religion. Occasion­ ally, Islam was spread by coercive means. In the first half of the sixteenth century, Islamic influences that originated in Borneo and Sulu extended to Mindoro and to the southern part of Luzon Island. When the Spaniards arrived in 1565, Islamic Sultanates were already established in Sulu and Mindanao, and Islam was engaged in an expansion to the northern islands. In 1571, the Spaniards routed Raja Sulei­ man who was the first Muslim sultan in the region of Manila and who had both family and commercial ties to Brunei and Malacca. This halted the northward spread of Islam and was the beginning of its retreat to the south.1 The processes which characterized the Islamization of South Philippines very much resembled those that had occurred in other islands of Southeast Asia: Islam was introduced by Muslim traders and missionaries who married into the local population and had offspring who then became the core of burgeoning Islamic communities; political leaders from other parts of the Malay world established a political presence, amassed military and political power, established political, sociocultural, educational, and Islamic religious institutions; and alliances forged between the ruling families of Sulu, Maguindanao, Lanao, Borneo, and the Ma­ lacca Islands raised communal consciousness and a feeling of Islamic identity. Generally, the process of Islamization relied on family ties and alliances as well as missionary propagating activity in which members of Sufi orders played a major role. These factors acted in concert or in varying combinations at different times in accordance with historical circumstances.2 Philippine Muslims are found on the island of Mindanaoand in the Sulu Archi­ pelago. The greatest demographic concentration is in the districts of Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, the Sulu Archipelago, and the islands of Basilan and Balabac. Unlike the situation among the Muslims of Thailand or Arakan in western Burma who make up ethnically homogeneous populations, the Muslims of the southern Phil­ ippines are a heterogeneous group. There is no consensus among scholars regard­ ing the number of Muslim groups in the south; estimates vary from six to ten ethnic-language groups, with some estimates as high as thirteen. Members of these groups speak various dialects of the languages extant in the Philippine Islands. There is no one language which unifies all the Muslims of the Philippines. Each group is more or less concentrated in a specific territorial area, but there are also regions in which members of various groups have mingled. Differences also exist in the social and economic life of the groups, as well as in the extent of religious

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orthodoxy to which the various communities adhere and their commitment to and fulfillment of Islamic precepts. Generally, Philippine Muslims are not well versed in their religion, although their devotion borders on the fanatic because they regard Islam as the focal point of their identity and way of life. With the exception of religious functionaries who operated under the sultans, the vast majority of Philippine Muslims did not know the Koran, practiced very few religious rituals or prohibitions. Even the five daily prayers, or the pilgrimage to Mecca, were largely unknown before the twentieth century. The number of mosques was quite small. For example, the Yakan and the Bajau groups, who were late in coming to Islam, retained pagan elements in their religious practices and were thought to be less rigorous in the observation of various commandments. In contrast, the Tausug are the oldest Muslim community and considered more orthodox. Islam is the central element that unites all these communities. Beyond this di­ mension, they differ from one another and before their conversion to Islam, the communities had differing cultures and diverse ways of life. Many of these differ­ ences persist. The four main communities are the Tausug and the Samal (or Sama) of the Sulu Archipelago and the Zamboanga region (some scholars regard both groups as being the same), the Maguindanao of Cotabato region and part of Zam­ boanga, and the Maranao of the Lanao Lake region (some scholars add the Ilanun of the Cotabato region.) These groups constitute 90 percent or more of the Muslim community in the Philippines, with the remaining population dispersed in the Zamboanga region, Bukidnon, Davao, and Palawan.3 The Tausugs of the Sulu Archipelago were the first to convert to Islam, probably in the second half of the fourteenth century and the beginning of the fifteenth. This coincided with the arrival of the Sufis who came to the Sulu Islands to preach to the Muslim community that was already there. Politically, economically, and nu­ merically, the Tausugs, who are generally considered orthodox in their religious way of life, are the dominant Muslim community in the Sulu Archipelago. Most live on Jolo Island, but Tausugs are also found in other Sulu islands, as well as in Zamboanga del Sur, Cotabato, the coastal region of Basilan Island, and in Sabah of Malaysia. In 1960, their numbers were estimated at 325,000; twenty years later, their numbers were assumed to have grown to 500,000 to 600,000. There are, how­ ever, much lower estimates. The language and the dialects usually heard among the Tausugs belong to the Malayo-Polynesian language group; they use a MalayArabic alphabet, mostly for religious needs. In the middle of the fifteenth century, the Tausug, the majority of whom were already Muslim, established the Sultanate of Sulu. In theory, all the inhabitants of the Sulu Archipelago were united under the sultanate, although there were several groups in the population for whom such sovereignty was merely nominal. In any case, by the time the Spaniards arrived, the sultanate was the strongest political entity in the Philippine Islands, conducting a lively trade with China until the mid­ dle of the nineteenth century. The secular character of the regime came to an end in 1915 when the Americans signed the Carpenter Treaty with the sultan of Sulu,

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Salip Jamal al-Kiram II, according to which he gave up his secular authority leav­ ing him with only religious and ritual functions. The Tausug consistently refused to recognize the central government in Manila while it was Spanish, later when it became American, and even after Philippine independence they maintained their right to autonomy. The long-standing aspiration of the Tausug for independent status within the Philippines found expression in rebellions or in political action. Prominent in the leadership of the rebel movement, they conducted a more aggres­ sive separatist fight than did the other communities. The primary source of liveli­ hood was based on agriculture, fishing, and local commerce, but other important sources of revenue were, traditionally, piracy and smuggling. These ventures con­ tinue, by various means, into the present.4 The Maguindanao are another important ethnic Muslim community in the Phil­ ippines. In the 1960 census, they numbered 360,000; subsequent estimates range from 500,000 to 885,000. Almost all the Maguindanao are centered in theCotabato region of Mindanao which includes the areas of Maguindanao, northern Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat. From a cultural and linguistic standpoint (the language spoken by the Maguindanao bears the same name), they are close to two other large Mus­ lim communities—the Maranao and the Iranon, also known as Iranun, Ilanun, and Ilanon. Most members of the community are engaged in agriculture and fishing. There is some evidence that the Maguindanao converted to Islam at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and established a sultanate which, at various times, ruled most of southern Mindanao from the Zamboanga Peninsula on the west to the Davao coast in the east. From the second half of the sixteenth century on Spanish efforts to subdue the Sultanate of Maguindanao were unsuccessful, and the wars between the Spaniards and the Maguindanao, and other Muslim communities in the south, lasted for more than three hundred years. The Spaniards recruited Chris­ tians from the northern islands to the army which resulted in far-reaching and long lasting hostility between Christians and Muslims in the Philippines. The version of Islam prevalent among the Maguindanao is highly syncretistic in nature, partic­ ularly in rural areas. Formal Islam coexists with ancient beliefs in spirits and ritual magic. Such beliefs are sometimes found even among the Ulama, religious leaders called pandita, who teach the Koran and the proper conduct of religious life. In the last generation, there has been a heightened interest in orthodox Islam and its cus­ toms, as is the case in other Philippine communities, a phenomenon which paral­ lels an increased sense of identity with the entire Muslim world. The number of young people undergoing formal religious education has grown considerably.5 Still another sizable community is the Maranao, most of whom live near Lake Lanao in the northwestern part of Mindanao Island. The Iranon community who live southwest of Lake Lanao on the coast of Illana Bay are closely linked to the Maranao. Like most other Filipinos, the ethnic origin of the Maranao is Malay and Indonesian. Living in an isolated and inaccessible territory, the Maranao were, consequently, the last of the sizable communities to convert to Islam, which came to them by way of Cotabato. The Maranaos were also a focus of stubborn resistance

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to the Spaniards, the Americans, the Japanese, and the government of the inde­ pendent Philippine Republic. A 1983 estimate puts the Maranao population at ap­ proximately 840,000, though another estimate is merely 400,000 to 500,000. In any case, they are apparently the second largest Muslim community after the Maguindanao—the majority concentrated in the Lanao del Sur region; the remain­ der in the Lanao del Norte region, with a few smaller centers in Cotabato and Zamboanga. Most people make their livelihood in agriculture and fishing, but some are also engaged in cottage industries and petty trade. The cultural and edu­ cational center of the community is in Marawi City (whose former name was Dansalan) which is at the northern edge of Lake Lanao. Rural areas are strongly influenced by local pre-Islamic beliefs and customs. Such customs gradually, but consistently, change under the impact of Arab and local teachers who studied at Islamic institutions throughout the Middle East.6 There arc a number of other Muslim groups—some sizable, others quite small— in the Philippines. The Samal (or Sama), dispersed throughout southeast Asia, have various names in different places. In the Philippines, most are concentrated on the islands of the Sulu Archipelago. The 1960 census determined that they number 81,000, but according to another estimate, there are as many as 180,000. Most are fishermen, a few deal in maritime commerce, or barter with their agri­ cultural neighbors.7The Yakan are a subgroup of the Samal. They number between 110,000 and 116,000; live mostly on Basilan Island to the south of Zamboanga City; and work in agriculture. Vestiges of pre-Islamic rituals are present in their version of Islam.8 The Bajau are also close to the Samal and see themselves as Muslims although their Tausug and Samal neighbors do not regard them as such. Bajau, most of whom live on boats and whose main occupation is fishing, are found in southern Sulu, on Tawi-Tawi and other islands, and in Sabah and other eastern Indonesian locations. In the Philippines they number between 4,500 and 5,000.9 There are 4,000 Sangil, most of whom are concentrated on a number of islands opposite the southeastern shore of Mindanao.10 The Jama Mapun are mainly farmers and most of them live on a number of Sulu Islands. Their estimated population is between 15,000 to 21,000.11 The Palawanon are approximately 57,000-70,000, most of whom live on Palawan Island where other Muslim com­ munities also reside. They are engaged in agriculture. Islam penetrated this com­ munity only in the last few generations, but the dissemination of Islam continues among them.12The Kalagan (or Karagan, or Calagan) live in the area of Davao Bay in South Mindanao and are estimated at 8,000 people. They work in agriculture, fishing, and a few are plantation workers. Those who live in the hilly regions are still pagan, but the Islamization process in their midst goes on. Members of the Kalibungans are found throughout small villages in the Zamboanga region of west­ ern Mindanao. Most are farmers and fishermen, but there are also a few who find their livelihood in commerce and cottage industries as a supplementary income.13 All attempts at determining the number of Muslims in the Philippines run into a methodological problem because there is a lack of dependable statistics and be­

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cause of a tendentious reporting of numbers—either raising or lowering them— for political, ideological, or propaganda considerations. The range of disagreement is wide. Statistics regarding the number of Muslims in the Philippines were never more than general, with the spread between unofficial estimates running between 5 and 12 percent of the total population. Muslim politicians consistently inflate the number of Muslims for political reasons, and election frauds were not unknown in this connection. Difficulty in obtaining exact numbers is also a function of Muslim hostility toward government officials. The unstable security situation has resulted in government officials limiting themselves to theoretical assumptions rather than conducting systematic efforts at census taking. Another problem has been the high mobility of the Muslim population, particularly among the Tausug. Despite all these difficulties, one may assume that the numbers proposed by the Bureau of Census and Statistics are the best data available. The situation is familiar from population estimates of Muslims in Thailand and in Burma/Myanmar. The following are the estimates published by scholars and historians for the last de­ cades. When the Americans conquered the Philippines in 1898, the number of Muslims was estimated at 150,000—although another estimate doubled that num­ ber. In 1918, a census conducted by the American authorities placed the number of Muslims at 443,000.14 In a subsequent census, 1939, it was assumed that there were 677,903 Muslims out of a total population of more than 15 million, or a little over 4 percent. At the time of the Japanese occupation, June 1943, the estimate was 650,000.15 According to a census of 1960, the population of the Philippines was put at 27 million, of which 90 percent were Christian; somewhat under 4 per­ cent were pagan, and 5 percent were Muslim (that is 1,350,000 people). However, according to another version, the number of Muslims was as high as 1,600,000. The remainder of the population is Chinese or other smaller groupings.16 In 1966, the number of Muslims was put at 1,600,000 out of a total population of 33 million according to one source, while another source put the number at 2 million Muslims.17A 1970 census again places the number of Muslims at 1.6 mil­ lion, or 4.32 percent of the general population;18 however, a claim basing itself on the same source for the same period of time, actually as early as 1969, puts the number of Muslims at either 2.5 or 3.5 million; that is, 5-10 percent of the total population. The largest Muslim concentrations were in Cotabato, Lanao, and Sulu, with the remainder in two regions of Zamboanga, and in Bukidnon, Davao, and in Palawan.19 In 1975, the consensual view returned to an estimate of 2.2 million Muslims (but still 5 percent of the total population), although the customarily dif­ fering evaluations fluctuated between 1.6 to 3.1 million, going as high as 4-5 mil­ lion according to the Muslims themselves.20 In 1979, the number of Muslims in the Philippines was given as 2,188,000 which was 5 percent of a total population of 42.2 million. At the time, some Muslim leaders again claimed that the number was 4-5 million.21 According to the census of 1980, there were 2,504,232 Mus­ lims. In February 1981 the Presidential Bureau announced that the Muslims of the south numbered 2 million out of a total population of 46 million; however, the

The Emergence o f the Moro Community

191

estimates of various Muslim sources at the time were between 3 to 5.5 million. Muslim organizations quoted high estimates in order to buttress their political de­ mands in the south while the government wanted to weaken political demands based on such demographics.22 Even an authority like Cesar Adib Majul quotes numbers which may not be credible. According to him, at the beginning of 1988 the Muslim population was between 4.5 to 5.5 million, or at least 9 percent of the total population which at that time was 55 million; whereas by 1990, the Muslims already numbered 5 or 6 million, or 8.5 percent of 66 million people23 Despite the differences among the various Muslim communities in the Philip­ pines, one cannot overlook the commonality that justifies the all-inclusive term Philippine Muslims. Islam is the primary element of this commonality. Islamiza­ tion occasioned dramatic political, economic, psychological, and social shifts. Monotheism came to occupy, although with varying degrees of emphasis, the place of previously held beliefs. Islam became a new way of life. New laws were adhered to and a different moral climate came into force. An Arabic alphabet was adapted to local languages, some of which were without an alphabet before the advent of Islam. Arabic literature and Arab words were assimilated. A certain degree of learning of the Arabic language, admittedly limited, was employed for religious and ritual matters and the study of the Koran, which is how Islam encouraged education and learning. The Islamic calendar became part of the culture. And, no less important, Philippine Muslims came to realize that they were part of a broader, universal Muslim community, the Ummah; more particularly, part of the Malaysian and Arab world, part of D ar al-Islam, linked by common spiritual bonds that transcended tribal, local, or linguistic ties. An inter-Islamic sense of solidarity was created. Thus Islam provided the various communities with a common basis of ethnic identity which found its realization through religion. This was the reason that, beginning with the Spanish and American regimes and subsequently in the era of the independent Philippine Republic, the majority of Muslims, throughout their generations, have not regarded the central government as their own govern­ ment, and therefore did not—and do not—identify with it. They continue to see themselves as separate from other inhabitants of the Philippine Islands 24 Among these ethnic communities there was a basic political and social Muslim network which became formalized into legal codes that had not existed in the pe­ riod preceding Islamization. The political organization which emerged among the Muslims of the South Philippines was similar to the one that prevailed among Malay and other Islamic communities of Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula fol­ lowing Islamization. Independent entities were established which were ruled by sultans. Their size varied from merely a few villages to the Sultanate of Sulu which, at its peak, encompassed the Sulu Archipelago, parts of Borneo, South Palawan, and parts of Mindanao. The Sultanate of Maguindanao was another sizable and important sultanate. Both sultanates bore the main burden of the long and difficult war against the Spaniards. The Muslim Sultanates of the south were better organ­ ized than various communities in the north and consequently were better able to

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resist the Spanish Conquest and conversion to Christianity. There were regional variations as well as certain organizational differences between the Muslim groups. For the main part, the structure was hierarchical, headed by a sultan who was assisted by a number of functionaries subordinate to him. Not all groups had sultans, nor were all the sultans united in the struggle against the colonial powers. The rationale for subordination to the sultan and the discipline which flowed from it carried the force of religious sanction because the sultan was, at one and the same time, the secular and religious leader of the community. The sh a ri’a Muslim legal code does not differentiate between secular and religious authority so that both were united in the person of the sultan. Notwithstanding some local differences, the system of functionaries generally followed the structure which prevailed in other Muslim regions of Southeast Asia. The Dato , who were heads of clans, served under the sultan and the functionaries of his court. Their office actually predates the arrival of Islam and was absorbed into the new sociopolitical reality. Acting according to customary law and practices, the Dato worked as a combina­ tion of political leader, landowner, judge, and one who fills a religious function. The position of Dato was hereditary although, in theory, authority flowed from personal ability and the prestige the Dato enjoyed among members of the commu­ nity. According to this system, the Muslims were organized into many small polit­ ical units with a Dato at the head of each, and these, in turn, were integrated into the sultanates established in Sulu and Mindanao. The class below the Dato was composed of freemen, and below them debt-bondsmen and slaves. In the past, people were forced into slavery through war, were born into it as the children of slaves, were debt-ridden people who sold themselves into slavery, or were enslaved by decree because of some crime. In recent times this phenomenon has, for all intents and purposes, disappeared. In those places where it continues, slaves are persons who have been kidnapped, offspring of slaves, or unwanted children bought from their parents. For the most part, the legal system among Muslims was based on religious courts, the Agama —a local council of community elders who adjudicated criminal and civil cases according to shari'a law—mingled with local non-Islamic custom, the Adat. Consequently there were differences from one place to another as there are to this day. The Muslims of Mindanao refer to this body of law as the Luwarun, which means “selection,” to denote their own code of law. The code is composed of the principles of sh a ri’a and local adat , and was employed by the Dato of Min­ danao, the kathis and the pandita religious leaders who did not understand Arabic. The exact date for compilation of the code is not known, but there is an assumption that it was before the middle of the eighteenth century. Each Dato is assisted in his deliberations by a judge called Tuan Caly —or Tuan Kali— (Kathi in Arabic). Con­ sidered the chief pandita of the region, the Tuan Caly was required to know how to read and write, and was regarded as the most authoritative interpreter of the law. Notwithstanding local differences in the political-religious-social structure among the Muslim communities of the south, it can be said that, in general terms, Moro

The Emergence o f the Mow Community

193

society was ruled by the laws of Islam and the customs of the Adat. This strong religious bond was the primary factor preventing Muslims from accepting or adapting to a different way of life.25 There are, of course, scholars who caution against exaggeration when describ­ ing changes which occurred in the population of the southern Philippines in the wake of Islamization.26 When Magellan came to Cebu in 1521, there was only a local political structure. There was no central government, no sense of identity that unified all the island’s inhabitants, nor was there a sense of common history. Islam had already expanded from one village to another, but it had not yet had sufficient time to change the way of life of the inhabitants or their form of social organiza­ tion. Islam had not yet created the same degree of institutional and cultural sophis­ tication that existed in other parts of the Muslim world.

Notes 1. Cesar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: Philippines Press, 1973). A basic text on the Muslims of the Philippines and their history. See also idem, ‘The Mus­ lims in the Philippines: An Historical Perspective,” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 2-5, Reprinted from Graphic (June 9,1971); idem, “Story of the Filipino Muslims," Philippines Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 3 (September 1973): 2-6; idem, “Role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People," Asian Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (August 1966): 308-309; idem, “Some Social and Cultural Problems of the Muslims in the Philippines," Asian Studies, vol. 14, no. 1 (April, 1976): 84-87; idem, “An Historical Background on the Coming and Spread of Islam and Christianity in Southeast Asia "Asian Studies, vol. 14, no. 2 (August 1976): 3; F. Landa Jocano, ed., Filipino Muslims: Their Social Institutions and Cultural Achievements (Quezon City: Diliman, Asian Center, University of the Philippines, 1983), 4; Rosalina Miravite, "Historical Background of the Moro Problem," in Antonio Isidro and Mamitua Saber, eds., Muslim Philippines (Marawi City: University Research Center, Mindanao State University, 1968), 35-36; Carmen A. Abubakar, “Islamization of the southern Philippines: An Over­ view," in F. Landa Jocano, ed., Filipino Muslims, 10-12; idem, “Islam in the Philippines— The Moro Problem," in Ali Asghar, ed., Islam in South and Southeast Asia (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1985), 41— 44; R. J. May, “The Philippines," in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., The Politics o f Islamic Reassertion (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 213-214; idem, “The Situa­ tion of the Philippine Muslims," Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 5, no. 2 (July 1984): 427; Abdurasad Asani, “The Bangsamoro People: A Nation in Travail," Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 6, no. 2 (July 1985): 295-296; Kenneth E. Bauzon, Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Identity in the Philippines (Ma­ nila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991), 57-63; Eliseo R. Mercado, "Culture, Eco­ nomics, and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins of the MNLF and the Politics of Moro Sep­ aratism," in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S., eds., Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia (Singa­ pore: Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 169-170; Samuel K. Tan, “Sulu under American Military Rule, 1899-1913," Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, vol. 33, no. 1 (March 1967): 1-4; Hilario M. Gomez Jr., "Muslim Christian Relations," in Vitaliano R.

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Gorospe and Richard L. Deals, eds., The Filipino in the Seventies: An Ecumenical Perspec­ tive (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1973), 155-160; Michael O. Mastura, Muslim Fil­ ipino Experience: A Collection o f Essays (Manila: Ministry of Muslim Affairs, 1984) 3-43; Frank M. Lebar, ed., Ethnic Groups o f Insular Southeast Asia, vol. 2 (New Haven: Philip­ pines and Formosa Human Relations Area Files Press, 1975), 2, 15; Sixto Y. Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago and Its People (London: George G. Harrap, 1923), 23-24; Thomas M. Kiefer, The Tausug, Violence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 3; Michael J. Diamond and Peter G. Gowing, Islam and Mus­ lims: Some Basic Information (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1981), 69-70; Peter G. Gowing, “Kris and Crescent: Dar Al-Islam in the Philippines,” Studies in Islam, vol. 3, no. 1 (New Delhi: January 1966), 2-4; idem, Mandate in Moroland: The American Govern­ ment o f Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920 (Quezon City: Diliman, Philippine Center for Ad­ vanced Studies, University of Philippines System, 1977), 8-9; idem, Muslim Filipinos—Heritage and Horizon (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1979), 15,17-22,24; idem. Mosque and Moro: A Study o f Muslims in the Philippines (Manila: Philippines Fed­ eration of Christian Churches, 1964), 16-19; idem, "The Muslim Filipino Minority,” in Raphael Israeli, ed., The Crescent in the East. Islam in Asia Major (London: Curzon Press, 1982), 218-220; Aijaz Ahmad, “Class and Colony in Mindanao," Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 82 (February 1982): 6-7; Nena Vreeland, Geoffrey B. Hurwitz, Peter Just, Phillip W. Moeller, and R. S. Shinn, Area Handbook for the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1976), 78, 185. 2. Abubakar, “Islamization of Southern Philippines,” op. cit., 12-13; idem, “Islam in the Philippines,” op. cit., 44. 3. Gowing, Mosque and Moro, op. cit., 1-6, 11; idem, Mandate in Moroland, op. cit., 5-7; idem, “Kris and Crescent,” op. cit., 5-8; idem, Muslim Filipinos, op cit., 1-3; Melvin Mednick, “Some Problems of Moro History and Political Organization ” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 14-15; Abdulsiddik A. Abbahil, “The Bangsa Moro: Their Self-Image and Intergroup Ethnic Attitudes,” The Dansalan Quarterly, vol. 5/4 (July 1984): 198-199, 202-215; Alunan C. Glang, “Modernizing the Muslims,” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 278; Jocano, Filipino Muslims, 2; May, “The Philippines,” 211; Richard L. Stone, “Intergroup Relations among the Tausug, Samal and Badjaw of Sulu,” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 74-99; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 85; M. B. Hooker, Islamic Law in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984), 25; Frank M. Lebar, ed. and compiler, Ethnic Groups o f Insular Southeast Asia, vol. 2: Philippines and Formosa (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1975), 23; Ahmad, “Class and Colony,” 7; Seah Chee-Meow, "The Muslim Issue and Implications for ASEAN,” Pacific Community, vol. 6, no. 1 (October 1974): 146-147. 4. Richard V. Weekes, ed., [D. V. Hart] Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey, 2nd ed. (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1984), 764-770; May, “The Philippines,” 211, 213; Gowing, “Kris and Crescent,” 9; idem, Muslim Filipinos, 18; Hooker, Islamic Law, 25; Kiefer, The Tausug: Violence and Law, 2-4, 132-141; idem, “The Tausug of Jolo and the Modem Philippines,” 100-112; idem, “Institutionalized Friendship and Warfare among the Tausug of Jolo,” 113-131; Lebar, Ethnic Groups, 1-5; Thomas J. O’Shaughnessy, “How

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Many Muslims Has the Philippines?” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 257; Patricia Horvatich, “Keeping Up with the Hassans: Tradition, Change, and Rituals of Death in a Sama Com­ munity," Pilipinas, no. 21 (fall 1993): 52; Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 178, 268; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 86; Asiri K. Abubakar, “Muslim Philippines: With Reference to the Sulus, Muslim-Christian Contradictions and the Mindanao Crisis,’*Asian Studies, vol. 11, no. 1(Manila: April 1973): 112-115; Tan, “Sulu under American Military Rule,” 166-167; Ahmad, “Class and Col­ ony,” 10-11; Abbahil, “Bangsa Moro,” 210. 5. Weekes, [James C. Stewart] op. cit., 462-466; Najeeb M. Saleeby, “The History of Maguindanao," in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 50-62; Rita G. Baltazar, “Islam and Seces­ sion,” Solidarity, vol. 6 (April 1971): 61—62; Ahmad, “Class and Colony,” 10-11; Abbahil, “Bangsa Moro,” 204; Mama S. Sinsuat, “Problems and Prospects of Maguindanaon Inte­ gration,” Solidarity, vol. 7, no. 4 (1972): 13; May, “The Philippines,” 211; O’Shaughnessy, “How Many Muslims,” 256; Hooker, Islamic Law, 20, 25; Lebar, Ethnic Groups, 35-36. 6. Weekes, [Carlton L. Riemer] op. cit., 495-499; Ahmad, op. cit., 10-11; Abbahil, op. cit., 207; Mamitua Saber, Mauyag M. Tamano, and Charles A. Warriner, ‘The Maratabat of the Maranao, in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 230-234; Mamitua Saber, “Maranao Social and Cultural Transition,” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 219-224; idem, “Muslim Filipinos in Unity within Diversity,” in Isidro Antonio and Mamitua Saber, ed., Muslim Philippines, 4-8, 14-19; Melvin Mednick, “Sultans and Mayors: The Relation of a National to an In­ digenous Political System,” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 225-229; O’Shaughnessy, “How Many Muslims,” 257; Hooker, Islamic Law, 25; Lebar, Ethnic Groups, 34-39. 7. Weekes, [William H. Goeghegan] op. cit., 654-659; Ahmad, op. cit., 10-11; Lebar, op. cit., 5-6. 8. Weekes, [Inger WulfT] op. cit., 655, 863-866; Inger Wulff, “Features of Yakan Cul­ ture,” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 242-255; Ahmad, op.cit., 10-11. 9. Weekes, [H. Arlo Nimmo] op. cit., 75-80,654-655; Ahmad, op. cit., 10-11. 10. Weekes, [Peter G. Gowing] op. cit., 659-660; Ahmad, op. cit., 10-11. 11. Weekes, op. cit., 655; Ahmad, op. cit., 10-11. 12. Weekes, [Gowing] op. cit., 599-600; Ahmad, op. cit., 10-11; Lebar, op. cit., 64. 13. Weekes, [Gowing] op. cit., 367-368. 14. Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines—A Study in National Development (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 571,863; Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to Amer­ ican Rule 1901-1913 (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1984), 102,208 n. 99; Gowing, Mandate in Morvland, 9. 15. Teopisto Guingona, “Historical Survey of Policies Pursued by Spain and the United States towards the Moros in the Philippines,” Dansalan Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 3 (April 1981): 165; Philippines National Summary 1970: Census o f Population and Housing (Manila: Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1970), 3. 16. Gowing, Mosque and Moro, 1; Lebar, Ethnic Groups, 15; O’Shaughnessy, “How

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Many Muslims,” 252-253, 258. 17. Gowing, “Kris and Crescent,” 1; Majul, “Role of Islam,” 303; see also, Aprodicio A. Laquian, “The Political Integration of Muslim Filipinos,” Philippine Journal of Public Ad­ ministration (October 18, 1969): 363, which estimates the number of Muslim Filipinos at that time as approximately 5 percent of the total population, or 1.8 million out of a total of 37 million. 18. Vreeland, Area Handbook, 85; O’Shaughnessy, op. cit., 253, 258; R. Joel de los Santos Jr., ‘Towards a Solution of the Moro Problem,” Dansalan Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 4 (July 1980): 217-218; Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand,” in Suhrke and Noble, eds., Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), 178; Majul, “Some Social and Cultural Problems” 99. By contrast, Aluman C. Glang argues in “A Constitution for the Muslims,” Solidarity, vol. 6, no. 9 (1971): 8, that in the 1970 census there were 4 million Muslims in the Philippines. 19. Glang, “Modernizing the Muslims, 277; idem, Muslim Secession or Integration (Quezon City: R. P. Garcia, 1969), 5, 30. 20. May, “The Philippines,” 211; Majul, “Some Social and Cultural Problems,” 99. 21. Gowing, Muslims Filipinos, 1; Ganganath Jha, “Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and Thailand,” India Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3 (July-September 1978): 328, states that the Muslims constitute 10 percent of the total population of the Philippines. 22. Abbahil, “The Bangsa Moro,” 227, 245; Ahmad, “Class and Colony,” 11, 14; Dia­ mond and Gowing, “Islam and Muslims,” 68. They quote 2.2 million as the number of Muslims in the Philippines; Gowing, “The Muslim Filipino Minority,” 211; Mastura, “Mus­ lim Filipino Experience ” 229; Ali M. Kettani, Muslim Minorities in the World Today (Lon­ don: Mansell, 1986), 134. In contrast to Kettani and other nonobjective, pro-Muslim sources, there are scholars who believe that the number of Muslims in the south did not even reach 2 million compared to 8 million Christians and an additional 700,000 pagan tribesmen there. In their view, the number of Muslims was overestimated, rather than underestimated, by the Census Bureau, as some Muslims claimed. See, Michael A. Costello, “The Demog­ raphy of Mindanao,” in Mark TUrner, R. J. May, and Lulu Respall TUrner, eds., Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1992), 30-41. 23. Cesar Adib Majul, “The Moro Struggle in the Philippines,” The Third World Quar­ terly, vol. 10, no. 2 (April 1988):897; idem, “Philippines ” Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Mod­ em Islamic World, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 326. 24. Najeeb M. Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1976), 67; Majul, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 5; Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 9; idem, Muslim Filipinos, 4, 10, 15-16; idem, “Kris and Crescent,” 4; idem, Mosque and Moro, 38,64-65; idem, “The Muslim Filipino Minority,” 211, 222-223; May, “The Philippines,” 211; Hooker, Islamic Law, 25; Joel de los Santos Jr., “Some Observations on the Historical Background of Muslim Secession,” Verge, vol. 3, no. 1 (Baguio: University of the Philippines, December 1970), 71-72; idem, “Reflections on the Moro Wars and the New Filipino,” ftster Gowing, ed.. Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988), 94; Jocano, Filipino Muslims, 4; Aruna Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy in Southern Philippines: Conflict and Cooperation ” Paper presented at the 34th International Congress, Asian and North African Studies, Hong Kong (August 22-28, 1993), 2; Rodney Tasker, “The Legacy of Strife,” FEER, vol. 95, no. 2 (January 14,1977): 21.

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197

25. Hooker, op. cit., 19-27, 222; Saleeby, op. cit., 67-70; Gowing, Mosque and Moro, 38-43; idem, “Kris and Crescent,” 8-10; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 180; Mednick, “Some Problems,” 17-26; Lebar, Ethnic Groups, 23; T. J. S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise o f Islam in Philippine Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980): 13-27; Rita G. Baltazar, “Islam and Secession,” 69; W. K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 29-32; Jocano, op. cit., 3; Santos, “Reflections on the Moro Wars,” 92, 94; Glang, “Muslim Secession,” 33; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 2; Vreeland, Area Hand­ book, 88-89, 186; Nicholas Tarling, Sulu and Sabah: A Study o f British Policy towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the Late Eighteenth Century (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978), 2-5; A. Dairymple, “Essay Toward an Account of Sulu,” Journal o f the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, vol. 3 (1849): 512-562. The account of a visitor to Sulu in 1761. 26. David Joel Steinberg, The Philippines: A Singular and Plural Place, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), 53-56,90; Howard M. Federspiel, “Islam and Muslims in the Southern Territories of the Philippine Islands during the American Colonial Period (1898-1946),” Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 29, no. 2 (September 1998): 346-347, 351-353.

Chapter Seventeen

The Spanish Occupation Period

Miguel Lopez de Legaspi arrived in the Philippines in 1565 and declared Spain sovereign over the islands. Islamization was only in its beginning stages in the Manila area when the Spaniards conquered the city, first in 1570, and finally a year later. The Spaniards encountered opposition from Raja Suleiman who had ruled Manila and who had ties to the Sultanate of Brunei on the northern coast of Bor­ neo, but Suleiman was routed, and his sultanate ceased to exist in May 1571 when the Spaniards completed their conquest of Manila. A historical parallel stands out. The fall of Granada in the Iberian Peninsula in 1492 brought to an end the extended Iberian War between Christians and Muslims that had begun in 711, and halted Islam’s spread into western Europe by way of the Iberian Peninsula. In a similar fashion, the conquest of Manila in 1570-1571 by the Spaniards halted another expansion of Islam to the north and to the east in Southeast Asia, in the direction of East Asia. There is an assumption, widely accepted by historians, that had the Spaniards not come to the Pacific, the Philippine Archipelago would probably have converted to Islam, and the way would have been opened to Islam’s continued expansion into Taiwan, South China and Japan. A crusadelike spirit, the result of hundreds of years of Christian-Muslim battles in Europe, and the Middle East, spurred the Spaniards on when they arrived in the islands of Southeast Asia. Spanish monks began their activity among the local population after the fall of Manila. Rapid conversion of the indigenous population did not, however, extend to the southern tribes in the difficult terrain of the hilly areas. Nor was headway made with the Muslims of the south. But the Spaniards did succeed in halting the advance of Islam, uprooting it from the northern islands, and limiting it to the areas of Mindanao, Sulu, and South Palawan where the sultanates of Sulu, Mindanao, and Bayan had become entrenched. This was the situation after hard fighting which, with only short and sporadic cease-fires, lasted more than three centuries to the end of Spanish rule in 1899. The main burden of the Spanish campaign was borne by Filipinos who had converted to Christianity and fought alongside Span­ iards in the wars. The hostility thus engendered has been at the root of the tradi­ tional bitterness which exists to this very day between Christian Filipinos and the Muslims of the south. The Spaniards had attempted to extirpate Islam from its hold 199

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in the southern islands but Islam was firmly rooted, and the Spaniards were unable to overcome stubborn Muslim resistance. For its part, Muslim resistance was also inspired by religious fervor and the spirit of jihad which was central to profound Islamic consciousness and which provided the Muslims with a sense of unity, both ideological and organizational. The Muslims reacted to the Spanish Christian threat with reinforced identity and vigorous efforts to resist the military drive to overcome them.' The Spaniards were determined to gain Muslim recognition of Spanish sover­ eignty, to develop commercial ties with the Muslims of the south, exploit the nat­ ural resources in their territory, put an end to their piracy and attacks on Christian settlements in Bisaya and Luzon, and convert them to Christianity as they had succeeded in doing in the northern islands. But it was the Spanish aim to convert them which was the strongest element in Muslim resistance to the Spaniards and their Christian allies whom they called Indios. The Muslims, whom the Spaniards called Moro,2 reacted with hostile acts and war. The events of the period only served to encourage the process of Islamization, raising religious consciousness and Muslim feelings of being part of the wider ranging Dar al-lslam. Conse­ quently, from the Muslim standpoint it was a holy war, a jihad. Reacting to the Spanish campaign of Christian missionizing, Muslim religious teachers also inten­ sified their activity. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the Muslims were neither unified nor well organized. During the Spanish period, there was almost no coordination between uprisings in Lanao and Cotabato with those in Sulu or other Muslim areas. The Muslim struggle was divided and limited. Many Dato who fought the Span­ iards were also fighting with each other. There were even Dato who occasionally collaborated with the Spaniards against other Dato. Still, the Muslims did not act only defensively but actually brought the war to the territory of their enemy. Their speedy vessels harassed Spanish shipping. They conducted forays against cities and villages on the coast of the islands of Bisaya and Luzon destroying Christian settlements and killing or enslaving the inhabitants. For their part, the Spanish sent an occasional punitive military expedition against the Moro and sometimes man­ aged to set up forts on the northern coasts of Mindanao, Zamboanga, or Jolo. At times, they even managed to levy taxes. Acts of cruelty were carried out by both sides.3 The confrontation between the Spaniards and the Muslims in the Philippines developed into what became known as the Moro Wars which, as noted, lasted more than three centuries. In its first stage, the struggle centered around political and commercial control of the Philippine Archipelago that had been held by the Sul­ tanate of Brunei which the Spaniards now contested. The first clash between the Spanish and between the Philippine and Borneo Muslims came in 1569, near Cebu, when the Spanish navy repulsed twenty ships from Sulu and Borneo which had been attacking coastal settlements in Bisaya. After they conquered Manila and Mindanao Island in the fighting of 1570-1571, the Spaniards sent military expe­

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201

ditions to Mindanao, Sulu, and Borneo in order to terminate Muslim commercial ventures in those places. Spanish forces attacked the capital of the Brunei Sultanate in 1578 and 1579, burning down the Great Mosque there. They succeeded in put­ ting an end to the hold of the Muslim sultanate in and around Manila and in expel­ ling Brunei and Bisaya merchants from North Mindanao. Although this was the end of Brunei’s influence on the political life of the Philippine Archipelago, the Spaniards were unable to force Brunei to accept vassal status which would have subordinated it to Spanish sovereignty; they did, however, manage to minimize its influence, turning it into a small coastal state. The Sultanate of Sulu was also at­ tacked in 1578, wrenching it from Brunei overlordship. When Brunei retreated from the territory, Sulu was able to develop in its own right, becoming an important focus of resistance to the Spaniards along with Mindanao. In 1596, the Spaniards set out on another military campaign, this time against the Sultanate of Maguindanao but it was not successful. Among his other instructions, the Spanish commander of the military expedition against Sulu and Maguindanao was ordered to make these sultanates vassal states, put an end to Islamic proselytizing, and force conversion on the rulers and general population by imposing Christian missionar­ ies into their midst. The Spaniards then made a number of unsuccessful attempts to establish settle­ ments on the northeastern coast of Mindanao and at the tip of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Muslim assistance sent to Mindanao from Ternate supported the resist­ ance by local inhabitants to the Spanish attack. From 1599 onward, the Sultanate of Maguindanao began its own naval forays of robbery and destruction, copying the initiative set by Sulu attacks in which coastal settlements in Bisaya and Luzon were robbed and burned.4 Mindanao’s distance from the Spanish seat of power in Luzon coupled with the determination of the Muslims to resist all attempts at the imposition of Hispanic culture were the primary obstacles to an effective coloni­ zation of the island. The Spaniards were either not able or not eager to overcome these difficulties. Consequently they failed to effect a sizable increase in the num­ ber of Christians there. Both fear of the Muslims and hostility and mistrust by Christian Filipinos—the Indios, militated against efforts to settle more Christian settlers in the south despite Jesuit efforts. Only in North Mindanao did some set­ tlement of people from Bisaya take hold.5 At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the struggle between the Spaniards and the sultanates of Maguindanao and Bayan for control of Bisaya grew fiercer. The contest ended in a victory for the Spanish when their forces captured the Molucca Islands in 1606. The victory also cut off sources of material and human reinforcements that had come from Ternate. The Muslims sued for peace which resulted in a rise in Spanish status and in the isolation of the Muslims of the south. In 1614, the sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao asked for Dutch aid and some assistance was forthcoming to Sulu, Maguindanao, and Ternate in order to buttress them in their resistance to Spanish rule. In 1616, 1625, and later, Sulu and Maguindanao increased their raids against the Spaniards. In 1619, the Sultanate of

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Bayan weakened and its position was taken over by the Sultanate of Maguindanao whose influence spread to the Maranao region.6 The next stage in the Moro Wars took place in the first half of the seventeenth century. The Spaniards attempted, with some success, to capture Mindanao and Sulu. In 1628, there was a Spanish raid on Sulu and, in the course of the attack, the Spaniards destroyed tombs of Muslim holy men in order to detract from the status of the place as a focus for pilgrimages. In 1634, they built a fortress in Zamboanga, and proceeded to attack Muslim sultanates from that position. In 1637, Sultan Kudarat of Mindanao was routed. In 1639, Jolo, the capital of the Sulu Sultanate, was overcome and a fortress built there. In 1639, Spain waged still another military campaign and the Muslims retreated inland. A large-scale mobilization of Indios was mounted to maintain the momentum in the offensive against the Muslims. Fighting was cruel and caused terrible destruction. Muslims were enslaved as oarsmen in the galleys of Spanish ships, just as Muslims enslaved Christians whom they captured. (Other prisoners were sold into slavery in the Molucca Islands.) As early as 1621, the number of such slaves was estimated at 10,000. Fear of the Dutch, who occasionally aided the Muslims, and fear of Muslim retaliation im­ pelled the Spanish to conclude peace treaties with Maguindanao in 1645 and with Sulu in 1646. The Spaniards evacuated their fort in Jolo, recognized the sover­ eignty of Sultan Kudarat over most of Mindanao Island, and conceded the owner­ ship of a number of islands by the sultan of Sulu. As a symbol of vassal status, the sultan of Sulu was required to send rice to Zamboanga, and Jesuits were allowed to preach in Sulu territory. The sultan agreed to stem piracy in Bisaya. He did not, however, fulfill his commitment and sporadic pirate raids against Bisaya continued with the aid of Dutch war ships that appeared in the region. The Spaniards did not react. Fighting broke out again in 1656, and Kudarat, the Sultan of Maguindanao, declared a jihad against the Spaniards, rallying the rulers of Ternate, Macasar, Brunei, and Sulu to his side. In 1663, the Spaniards abandoned their fortresses in the Molucca Islands and in the Bay of Zamboanga which afforded the southern sultanates a period of recuperation from the lengthy wars. For the next fifty-five years, there was relative calm between the Spaniards and the Muslims.7 During this period of cease-fire, the Sultanate of Sulu acquired North Borneo from the sultan of Brunei in return for his support in the dynastic conflicts with the Sultanate of Maguindanao. Sulu itself tried to take over the areas of Cotabato and Zamboanga. At the time the British, too, were attempting to gain a foothold in Sulu in order to secure a larger share of trade with China. Throughout this period, various elements within the southern Muslims continued their raids against the Spanish and the Christian population of the Philippines. Ultimately, the relative peace was broken in 1718 when the Spaniards decided to reconquer Zamboanga and fortify it anew. A period of bitter attacks between the Spaniards and Sulu forces began. The Maranao also stepped up assaults on a number of northern islands under Spanish rule. Thousands of prisoners were taken by the Muslims, leaving areas of Bisaya unpopulated. The Spanish retaliated with a punitive expedition.

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However, Badar ud-Din I, the sultan of Sulu, who was interested in developing commercial ties with Manila and China, approached the Spaniards with a proposal for peace. According to the agreement they arrived at in 1726, the Spaniards and Sulu were permitted to trade freely alongside each other and the Island of Basilan was ceded to Spain. However, in a series of raids on Bisaya, subjects of the sultan of Sulu broke the treaty resulting in renewed large-scale hostilities in 1730. A new sultan, Alim ud-Din I, came to power in 1735, and he sent a delegation to Manila which concluded yet another agreement with the Spanish in 1737. Among other things, the agreement stipulated that each side would come to the aid of the other should it be attacked. The sultan even agreed that Jesuit preachers could come into his territory, but the sultan’s policy ran into opposition by the Dato. Deposed by his brother, he left for Basilan and there requested Spanish help in returning him to power. In 1749, Alim ud-Din I underwent baptism. His brother, Sultan Muiz ud-Din, who had replaced him, now renewed hostilities. The years 1737,1740, and 1749 were particularly harsh. Scores of men, women, and children were forced into slavery as a result of raids and many others lost their lives in the hostilities. In June 1751, the Spanish army landed in Sulu whereupon the Dato acceded to the Spanish demand that they reinstall the previous sultan, Alim ud-Din I. As he was making his way back to Sulu, however, the Spaniards began to suspect that he was engaged in secret contacts with a number of Muslim leaders. He was returned to Manila and imprisoned. In 1752, a new wave of attacks began which continued until 1770. Thousands were killed or taken as slaves. Towns and villages were burned, the coastal areas of Luzon and Bisaya became desolate, and some places were totally razed and all the inhabitants enslaved. Because of a shortage of ships and money, the Spanish government was powerless to deal with the situation. The unending wars with the sultanates of Mindanao and Sulu caused the Spanish government immense financial losses and damaged Spanish interests commercially and other­ wise. At the same time, Sulu went so far as to attempt contacts with the Ottoman sultan of Istanbul in the hope that he would buttress Muslim independence. The year 1753 was particularly difficult for the Spaniards because of Muslim seafaring raids, nor did the situation improve much in subsequent years. Spain was embroiled in the Seven Year War in Europe, and on 6 October 1762 the British invaded Manila and captured it temporarily. The Muslims exploited the presence of the British, and their support, to step up attacks on the Spanish. From time to time, the Spanish carried out retaliatory attacks, and they, too, engaged in robbery, destruction, and the taking of prisoners. In 1763, the sultan of Sulu ceded the Brit­ ish some of his territory in North Borneo in gratitude for aid that they had extended to him. In 1769, Sulu fighters again raided Manila Bay taking prisoners.8 The inability of the Spanish to counter Muslim attacks continued through the end of the eighteenth century. Their fear of the British led them to concentrate primarily on the defense of Manila. The Spanish governor of the Philippines con­ tinued to conduct negotiations with the Muslim sultans but with minimal effective­ ness, and Muslim seafaring raids persisted. Later, in 1805 the Spanish governor of

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Zamboanga signed a peace treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, A’zim ud-Din III, in which the sultan agreed not to allow any foreign representatives into Sulu without Spanish acquiescence and, in the eventuality of a war between Spain and a foreign country, to seal his ports to Spain’s enemies. The treaty did not carry the mark of relations between a sovereign and a vassal; rather it was a case of the Spaniards trying to protect themselves against the British. In the same year, the Spanish con­ cluded a similar agreement with the sultan of Mindanao.9 The wars and the raids did not end. Sulu continued to be a focus of rivalry between European powers. The French sought to acquire a naval base in Basilan and, to that end, concluded an agreement with Sulu in 1844, while the British renewed their commercial treaties of the previous century with the Sulu Sultanate. The great interest these powers showed in the South Philippines was a major cause of concern for the Spaniards who feared loss of control and status, firing their resolve to bolster their hold on the south by subduing the Muslim sultanates.10The year 1848 marks the beginning of the downturn in the fortunes of the sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao. In that year, the Spanish first used steamships with canons and improved military equipment which enabled them to bring the Sulu Sea grad­ ually under their control, spelling the end of Muslim piracy in the region. There were several successes on land by the Spanish as well. In 1851, the Spaniards mounted a systematic military land campaign against Sulu which lasted until the end of Spanish rule when the Americans took control of the Philippines. In Feb­ ruary of the same year, the Spaniards captured Jolo and burned down the city, claiming that this was in retaliation for piracy on the part of a number of Dato. A short while later, after concluding an agreement with the sultan on 30 April 1851, they evacuated the city." The sultan was forced to agree to Spanish sovereignty by which he was forbidden to sign agreements with other European powers or with foreign commercial interests, and he agreed to put an end to piracy and to refrain from building fortifications without the permission of the Spanish governorgeneral. The Spanish undertook to avoid offending religious sensibilities in Sulu and to respect Muslim customs. They also committed themselves to pay an annual sum of fifteen hundred pesos as compensation for losses they had inflicted in war, plus additional sums to various Dato. The Spanish interpreted the agreement as a declaration of protectorate status for Sulu, but the sultan’s understanding was that it was a treaty of friendship between two sovereign powers. In any case, the agree­ ment was never honored and the sultan of Sulu continued to act as an independent ruler as he had in the past. In 1860, the Sultanate of Maguindanao was weakened to such an extent that Spain was able to penetrate Mindanao and place a governor there who, among other things, would be instrumental in broadening the activity of the Jesuit missionaries. And in Cotabato, the Spaniards were able to garrison their militia. In 1861, the Spanish reinforced their navy with an additional eighteen modern steamships which enabled the defeat of Muslim ships and put an end to the import of guns and ammunition acquired in Singapore. The Spanish divided the southern islands into six*districts placing them under

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administration of military governors. A governor-general was appointed for the entire region but the new administrative structure was only partially successful. Embroilments and aggressive acts continued, including new but sporadic out­ breaks of piracy. In 1870, a renewed and more serious attempt to capture Sulu and establish a permanent military presence there was motivated by Spain’s anxiety lest Sulu seek alliances with other European countries anxious for positions of influ­ ence in the Muslim sultanates. It was an act aimed particularly at forestalling Eng­ land’s entry into Sulu. What is more, the Spanish wanted to punish the sultan of Sulu for piracy carried out by some of his subjects. In February 1876 Spain sent yet another military expedition which captured Jolo, established a fort in the city, and put a garrison there which remained until 1899 when it was replaced by the Americans. In response to Spain’s initiative, the sultan called together his support­ ers and convened the Ulama who declared a jihad. Discipline and allegiance to the sultanate had greatly weakened since the defeat of 1876, and the people of Sulu were not unanimous in their support of the decision. Furthermore, groups of Dato acted against each other. But guerilla warfare went on and in the years 1877-1878, the Muslims mounted recurrent attacks on the Spanish garrison. They were all repulsed. Hostilities continued until another treaty was signed on 2 July 1878. Sulu was again declared a protectorate but with a high degree of autonomy in internal administration and commerce, while the sultan permitted Catholic missionaries freedom of movement and promised to protect them. The city of Jolo was enlarged and a hospital opened there. Spain assumed sovereignty over a number of islands in the Sulu region. In the same year, 1878, the sultan of Sulu ceded the last of his holdings in northern Bor­ neo Island to Britain’s Sabah North Borneo Company in return for an annual sub­ sidy of five thousand Mexican pesos. The question as to whether Sultan Mahmud Jamal al-Alam leased the lands in North Borneo or ceded them to the British was at the root of a dispute over North Borneo Sabah which broke out in 1963 between the Philippines and Malaysia. Three years later, Sultan Jamal al-Alam of Sulu died and fighting was renewed between the Spaniards and the Muslims. In 1886-1887, the Spaniards carried out a number of military expeditions and subdued Maguindanao. In the years 1889-1891, there were campaigns against the Maranao who were also partially routed. The attacks, as well as guerilla activity, went on through 1894-1895. While not invariably crowned by success, Spain’s vigorous military offensive in the closing decades of its rule in the Philippines inflicted heavy losses on the Muslims whose raids became ineffectual. The Muslim sultan­ ates were left with few options. Their commerce was interrupted, many of their settlements destroyed in the fighting, and the population depleted because of losses sustained in fighting, in starvation, and disease. In effect, the sultanates lost much of their independence despite the fact that the Spaniards did not manage to totally conquer Muslim territory. This was achieved only by the Americans a number of years later.12 It has already been noted that for Muslims the war against Christian Spaniards

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was a holy war, a jihad, which explains the name given to the Muslim combatants— mujahideen . ,3 The extended fighting had a formative influence on religious devel­ opments in the region and traces of this can readily be seen impacting on the re­ sistance to the Americans, even more in the rebellion against the Philippine gov­ ernment in the decades following World War II. The thousands of Muslims killed in the fighting against Spain were considered shahids, martyrs. As long as the sultanates could organize the war against infidel Spain, it was the duty of the sul­ tans to conduct the jihad, but beginning with the nineteenth century, and particu­ larly after the fall of Jolo to the Spaniards in 1876, it became abundantly apparent that the sultanates were not able to resist the Spaniards. As a consequence, the responsibility for conducting a jihad, that is, defending D ar al-Islam (or the obli­ gation to fight for the maintenance of the borders of Islam and their expansion) increasingly became a matter to be left to local communities who felt it their duty to defend D ar al-ls\am unto death as sh a ri’a Muslim law required. Personal jihad as it manifested itself with numbers of Sulu and Mindanao Muslims, especially members of the Tausug and Maguindanao communities, was carried out through individual attacks by Muslims on Spaniards or on Christian Filipinos. The attacks were meant to kill as many infidels as possible until the assailant himself would be killed and thus earn the status of a martyr, shahid, one who fell in a holy war, jihad, and is assured entrance into Paradise. There is testimony showing that women filled this religious mission as well. Religious functionaries had no diffi­ culty in finding volunteers to carry out suicide or self-sacrificing acts. Occasion­ ally these were persons who believed that they had committed sins in their lifetime and were convinced that only deeds of self-sacrifice would cleanse them so that they could enter Paradise. These self-sacrifice/suicides were called juram entado by the Spaniards meaning “someone who has taken an oath.” The word comes from the Spanish verb, juram entar— to take a vow or to testify under oath—and was first employed by Admiral Jose Malcampo who was acting governor-general during this period. The Muslims called the performance of such a religious command­ ment, perang sabil. In Malay, perang means “war,” and in Arabic, sabil means “way” or “path,” so that perang sabil becomes a contraction of the full term,/? sabil Allah —“in God’s path ” The individual who has decided to perform the act of self-sacrifice/suicide readied himself with the aid of an Imam or a pandita and with the help of prayers and ritual purification which prepared him to kill and be killed for the sake of liberating Muslim soil from the enemy. His head and eyebrows were shaved, he put on white robes, took an oath on the Koran, and only then set out on his mission. {Perang sabil should not be confused with the actions of someone who runs amuck which is another matter entirely.) Juramentado were subsequently car­ ried out against American soldiers who responded with the use of such rapid-fire weapons as the Colt 45 and the Crag-Jorgensen rifle.14 There were Muslim Ulama who rejected the peace agreement which the sultan of Sulu had signed with the Spaniards in 1878. They preached a continuation of the war by means of personal jihad, f i sabil Allah , and recruited suicidal

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mujahideen. Acts of suicide/self-sacrifice were carried out in Mindanao, generally directed against soldiers, and scores of Spaniards were killed in this way. The acts of terror were continued against the American army and against the Japanese in World War II, and against Filipino police who were in the service of the Japanese. This kind of terror, however, does not appear to have been employed in the Muslim rebellion against the independent Republic of the Philippines.15 For centuries the conflict in the southern Philippines between Christianity and Islam went unresolved. Neither of the contending religions had sufficient political or military strength to overcome the other. While the Spanish were able to drive Islam out of the northern Philippines and convert the area’s population to Chris­ tianity, they were unable to overcome the more entrenched sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao which put up an obstinate and organized resistance to all attempts to defeat them. The war, which was marked by bitterness and cruelty, had potent religious-theological considerations for both sides, engendering an overwhelming hostility between the Muslim and Christian populations which has lasted to the present day. A schism was created which split the population sharply along reli­ gious lines and set the Christian Indio against the Muslim Moro. The process of Islamization deepened among Moros, and a solidarity, which had not previously existed, was created between the various communities. Resistance to the Spanish and the “Wars of the Moro” shaped a concept of an all-inclusive Moro community despite differences among the various Muslim ethnic groups. In the closing de­ cades of the nineteenth century, other European powers sought to secure military bases in the Philippines in order to pursue commerce with the Muslims. As a result, the Spanish felt a strategic need to assure their sovereignty over the south by weak­ ening the traditional autonomy of the local sultans. Advances in military and naval technology, the invention of the telegraph followed by that of the telephone, gave the Spanish armed forces the advantage they had previously lacked over the Mus­ lims. Offensive capability was now in their hands and, indeed, the Spaniards gained victories and military achievements over the Muslim sultanates of Sulu and Min­ danao which they had not experienced during the previous hundreds of years of fighting. Despite military successes in the second half of the nineteenth century, by the end of their rule in the Philippines, the Spanish were not able to achieve more than nominal control over the Moro. Moro political structure, their laws, internal ad­ ministration, religion, social conditions, and practices were not affected by Spanish presence in the south. The Moro regarded themselves neither as a conquered peo­ ple, a Spanish colony, nor subject to Spanish rule. At no time did they accept the permanence of Spanish authority. It must be remembered that in this period, the second half of the nineteenth century, Spain’s colonial power was waning as a result of the growing impact of events in Europe: England’s victory in the Seven Year War, France’s conquest of Spain, and—no less important—the growing power of the United States. As Spanish domination diminished, the strength of the Philippine national movement rose. The high point of the rebellions and revolts

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was the 1896 revolution of the Christian North Philippines which greatly vitiated the Spanish hold on Luzon and forced them to commit a sizable military force there. For their part, the Muslims never stopped fighting the Spanish, whether openly or by guerilla warfare. Spanish resources and capability were stretched to the utmost. The weakness and inefficiency of their administrative system also con­ tributed to the failure of Spain to fully achieve its goal of subduing the Muslims. Still, it is reasonable to assume that if control of the Philippines continued, Spain would ultimately have been able to overcome the Muslims by virtue of the techno­ logical and military advantages acquired toward the end of Spain’s rule. What saved the Muslim area from being fully conquered was the revolution of 1896, led by Andreas Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo, which erupted in the northern prov­ inces. In fact, the leaders of the Philippine national movement believed that ethni­ cally, historically, and geographically the Muslims of the south were an integral part of the Philippine people, and they set forth this position in a manifesto pub­ lished in Hong Kong in 1898. The leadership attempted to enlist Muslim support against the common enemy, the Spanish, and actually warned the Moro about America’s colonial aims and the fact that the Americans had little respect for Moro religion and customs. On 1 January 1899 Aguinaldo called on the Muslims of Sulu and Mindanao to enter into negotiations with the aim of forging a national solidar­ ity based on genuine federation, with complete respect for Islamic beliefs and tra­ ditions. On 19 January 1899 Aguinaldo sent a letter to the sultan of Sulu in which he addressed the sultan as “my brother” and in which he promised that the tradi­ tions and the beliefs of all those in the Philippine Islands would be honored, and that there would be no resumption of the bloody wars that had been caused by Spanish ambitions. He invited the sultan to join the Philippine Republic. Similar appeals were made to other Dato. However, the appeals fell on deaf ears. Muslims regarded Spaniards and Christian Filipinos equally as their enemy. They under­ stood that the expulsion of the Spanish would only make way for the rise of a government of the very Christian Filipinos against whom they had fought for hun­ dreds of years. The Muslims preferred not to become involved. Later, there were even some Muslims who joined the American forces in suppressing the national revolution. They did so not because there was a sense of trust that the Americans would be concerned for their religion and customs but because of the opportunity afforded them to take revenge against their Christian enemies.16 In 1898, Spain was defeated by the United States in the Spanish-American War. In the Paris Treaty of that year, Spain was forced to cede the Philippine Islands, including the Muslim areas of Mindanao and Sulu, to the United States.

Notes 1. Majul, “Some Social and Cultural Problems,” 87-89; idem, “The Moro Struggle,” 897; idem, “The Philippines,” 326; idem, “The Muslims in the Philippines ” 7; Gowing, Mosque and Moro, 19-23; idem, “Kris and Crescent,” 11; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 10;

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idem, Muslim Filipinos, 14, 24-25, 28-29; idem, ‘The Muslim Filipino,” 220; Diamond and Gowing, Islam and Muslims, 75-76; Kiefer, The Tausug: Violence and Law, 3; George McTliman Kahin, Governments and Politics o f Southeast Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni­ versity Press, 1964), 680-681; John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 232-236. General background to Spain's colonial policy in the Philippines; Asiri Abubakar, “Muslim Philippines," 116; May, “The Philippines," 214; idem, “The Religious Factor,” 307; Ahmad, “Class and Colony,” 4; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 170; Carmen Abubakar, “Islam in the Philippines," 44-49; Miravite, “Historical Background,” 36-41; Santos, “Reflections on the Moro Wars,” 93; Sinsuat, “Problems and Prospects," 15; Stephen Frederic Dale, “Religious Suicide in Is­ lamic Asia: Anticolonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines," Journal o f Conflict Resolution, vol. 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 44; Tan, “Sulu under American Military Rule," 4-24; Glang, Muslim Secession, 41-57; Ralph Benjamin Thomas, Muslim but Fili­ pino: The Integration o f Philippine Muslims, 1917-1946, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania (1971), 1-7; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 28-48; Asani, “The Bangsamoro People," 296-299; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 79, 87. 2. The root of the term Moro is in the Latin word, “Maurus" or “Mauri.” In the Spanish form, it is “Moor which the Spaniards used for the Muslim conquerors of Spain who arrived in the eighth century from the Mauritania area of North Africa. The word was then used in reference to all Muslims. In the Philippines, this practice was continued and carried a de­ rogatory connotation; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 22, 44; Samuel K. Tan, “Unity and Disunity in the Muslim Struggle" Asian Studies, vol. 11, no. 3 (Manila: December 1973): 111; Lela Garner Noble, “The Philippines: Muslims Fight for an Independent State," South­ east Asia Chronicle, no. 75 (October 1980): 12; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 33-34. 3. Gowing, Mandate in M oroland 10—11; idem, “Kris and Crescent,” 11-12; Diamond and Gowing, Islam and Muslims, 76-77; Tan, “Unity and Disunity,” 115-116. 4. Majul, “Role of Islam,” 305, 310; idem, “Muslims in the Philippines” 7; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 20, 22-23, 29-31; Tarling, Sulu and Sabah, 5-6; Dale, “Religious Sui­ cide,” 45; Sixto Y. Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago, 24-25; Sinsuat, “Problems and Prospects," 14; Guingona, “Historical Survey," 166-171. The text of the instructions issued to the Span­ ish commanders; Mercado, “Culture, Economics and Revolt,” 170-171; Francisco S. J. Mallari, “Muslim Raids in Bicol, 1580-1792,” Philippine Studies, vol. 34 (third quarter, 1986), 259-260; Delor F. Angeles, ‘The Moro Wars,” in Peter G. Gowing, and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 27-28; Santos, “Reflections on the Moro Wars,” 94-95. 5. Frederick L. Wemstedt and Paul D. Simkins, “Migrations and the Settlement of Min­ danao," Journal o f Asian Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (November 1965): 84-86; Federico V. Mag­ dalena, “Colonization and the Moro-Indio Conflict in Mindanao, Philippines,” Studies in Third World Societies, no. 48 (June 1992): 59-61. 6. Majul, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 7-8; idem, “Role of Islam," 311; Santos, “Re­ flections, “ 95. 7. Majul, “Role of Islam,” 312; idem, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 8; Tarling, Sulu and Sabah, 6-7; Orosa, Sulu Archipelago, 25; Sinsuat, “Problems and Prospects " 14; Mallari, “Muslim Raids,” 264-266; Magdalena, “Colonization,” 61-62; Santos, op. cit., 95; Dale, “Religious Suicide,” 45; Thomas M. Kiefer, “Parrang Sabbil Ritual Suicide among the

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Tausug of Jolo" in Peter G. Gowing, ed., Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philip­ pines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988), 53. 8. Majul, “Role of Islam,” 312-313; idem, “Muslims in the Philippines," 9; Tarling, Sulu and Sabah, 10-12; Steinberg, In Search o f Southeast Asia , 94-95; Orosa, The Sulu Archi­ pelago, 26, 29; Santos, “Reflections,” 96; Mallori, “Muslim Raids,” 269-283; Francisco S. J. Mallori, “Camarines Towns under Seige,” Philippine Studies, vol. 38, (fourth quarter, 1990), 453-476. The article details Moro attacks and defense difficulties the Spanish en­ countered. 9. Tarling, op. cit., 35. 10. Majul, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 9-10; Orosoa, Sulu Archipelago, 29. 11. For the text of the agreement, see Teopisto Guingona, “Historical Survey of Policies," 171-174. 12. Majul, “Role of Islam,” 313; idem, “Muslims in the Philippines," 10; idem, “The Moro Struggle," 897; Gowing, “Kris and Crescent,” 9,12; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 12; Tarling, Sulu and Sabah, 119-120; Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago, 29-32; Dale, “Religious Suicide," 50; Tan, “Sulu under American Military Rule," 18; idem. The Filipino-Muslim Armed Struggle 1900-1972 (Filipinas Foundation, 1977), 56-57; Asiri K. Abubakar, “Mus­ lim Philippines,” 117-119; Angeles, “The Moro Wars,” 28-29; Guingona, “Historical Sur­ vey,” 175-181; Ahmad, “Class and Colony,” 4; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 171-172; Abubakar, “Islam in the Philippines” 44-47; Santos, “Reflections,” 96-98; Lebar, Ethnic Groups, 2, 23; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 185. 13. “Djihad,” El 1, vol. 2, 1042; “Djihad,” E/2,538; “Ribat," EI2, vol. 8,4%; “Jihad," in Thomas Patrick Hughes, Dictionary o f Islam (New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1977; 1st English reprint, 1985), 243-248; See also Bernard Lewis, The Assassins. A Radical Sect in Islam (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), 126-127. And particularly the last chap­ ter; Lewis, The Political Language o f Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 12-1 A, 11, 146-147n; idem, “Legal and Historical Reflections on the Position of Muslim Populations under non-Muslim Rule,” The Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Af­ fairs, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 1992): 1-16; Generally, it can be said that jihad is a command­ ment which obligates the entire community of Muslims—the Ulama, and calls for a military campaign aimed at the expansion of Islam, or the protection of Islam, against aggression by nonbelievers. When a Muslim country is attacked by nonbelievers, the Imam may call on all Muslims to take up arms. A Muslim who falls in battle in the Path of God (sabil il-AUah) is a martyr (shahid) and is thereby assured entrance into Paradise. The religious obligation to free the world from an unjust ruler undoubtedly contributed to the practice of murder as it was initially adopted by the Shiite Ismails (assassins) and later also by Suni communities. They carried out their duty through the self-sacrifice of the assassins who were almost invariably caught, and actually did not attempt to flee. This phenomenon also exists at pre­ sent among a number of the radical Arab Muslim terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad. The notion of martyrdom holds a central place in Islamic history, and the Arabic word for martyr is shahid. Modem-day applications are drawn from early Islamic sources regarding self-sacrifice. A thorough and comprehensive discussion of martyrdom and suicide in the history of Islam, and the link between them and jihad holy wars, may be found in E. Kohlberg, “Medieval Muslim Views on Martyrdom,” Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Mededelingen van de Afdeling Lettekunde, Nieuwe Recks, Deel 60, no. 7, (Amsterdam, 1997), 281-307. Also Franz Rosenthal,

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211

“Intihar,” EH, vol. 3,1246-1248; In recent years, the training of self-sacrificing terrorists has taken place in such countries as Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iran, and Sudan. The trainees are young Muslims from a number of countries, some Moro among them. Islamic literature reflects the belief that the process of Islamic expansion will persist until the entire world accepts the Islamic faith, or surrenders to Muslim control. Meanwhile, the world is divided into two: Dar al-Islam in which there are Muslim regimes and in which Islamic law applies, and Dar al-Harb which is temporarily under the rule of infidels. This situation began to change in the tenth century when countries under Muslim rule fell into Christian hands, and it became particularly acute in the nineteenth century with the expansion of European co­ lonial rule in most Islamic countries. For the Islamic rationale about murder through self-sacrifice, which is not suicide as such but is aimed at inflicting maximal losses on the enemy, see Raphael Israeli, “Islamikaze and Their Significance,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 9, no. 3 (autumn 1997): 97-99, 107-115. The author finds similarities be­ tween the fundamentalist Muslim terror organizations noted above and the Japanese kami­ kaze of World War II as regards motivation, organization, ideology, and the operational mode of their goals, and therefore suggests calling them Islamikaze. 14. Kiefer, “Parrang Sabbil,” 53-57; Dale, “Religious Suicide,” 47-56; Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago, 88-89; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 100-102; idem, Mosque and Moro, 50-52; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 97-100; Tan, Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 8-9, 12-14; Federspiel, “Islam and Muslims,” 353-354; Edward Ugarte, “Muslims and Madness in the Southern Philippines,” Pilipinas, no. 19 (fall 1992): 9-11. A thoroughgoing explanation of Juramentado in the Philippines in light of its general Islamic theological context. 15. Kiefer, “The Tausug,” 4,132-133; Tan, “Sulu under American Military Rule,” 19-20, 187; Majul, “Role of Islam,” 313-314; Gowing, “Kris and Crescent,” 13; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 13; Orosa, op. cit., 32; Federspiel, op. cit., 353-354. 16. Majul, op cit., 314; idem, “Philippines,” 326; idem, “An Historical Background,” 9-10; D. J. Steinberg, The Philippines, 90-91; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 70-86; May, "The Philippines,” 214; Peter G. Gowing, “America’s Proconsuls in Mindanao 1899-1913,” Dansalan Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 1 (1981): 7-8; Santos, “Some Observations,” 72-75; idem, “Reflections,” 98-99; idem, ‘Towards a Solution,” 219; Angeles, “The Moro Wars,” 29,31; Rad D. Silva, Two Hills o f the Same Land. Truth behind the Mindanao Problem (Mindanao-Sulu Critical Studies and Research Group, September 1979), 10-11; Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 65-66; Mercado, “Culture, Economics and Revolt,” 172-173; Federico V. Magdalena, “Moro-American Relations in the Philippines,” Philip­ pines Studies, vol. 44 (third quarter, 1996), 428-429; Gomez, “Muslim Christian Rela­ tions,” 159; Tasker, “Legacy of Strife,” 21; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 3-4; Louis Q. Lacar, “Neglected Dimensions in the Development of Muslim Mindanao and the Continu­ ing Struggle of the Moro People for Self-Determination,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 9, no. 2 (July 1988): 297; John P. Finley, “The Mohammedan Problem in the Philippines II,” The Journal o f Race Development, vol. 7, no. 1 (July 1960): 33; Federspiel, “Islam and Muslims,” 342.

Chapter Eighteen

The American Occupation Period1

The Americans arrived in the Philippines in 1898 during the Spanish-American War. Their coming coincided with General Emilio Aguinaldo’s declaration of Philippine independence on 12 June 1898 and the Philippine national uprising against Spain. American forces captured Manila, and the Spaniards surrendered in other places as well. On 10 December 1898 a treaty was concluded between Spain and the United States in which the sovereignty of the entire Philippine Archipel­ ago, including the south, was turned over to the United States. The Philippine revolutionaries, headed by Aguinaldo, were frustrated and bitterly disappointed when the United States disregarded their declaration of independence, and they waged a three year war against the Americans that ended with surrender to U.S. forces on 16 April 1902. American forces did not come into Mindanao and Sulu until 19 May 1899 when they replaced the Spanish army and took over their gar­ risons. The Spanish army left the following day, and the Americans gradually took over the entire archipelago. American military rule lasted until 1901.2 In their war against the Philippine national movement, which was being waged in the northern islands, the Americans were concerned about insuring Muslim neu­ trality. At that stage they merely wanted to assure Muslim recognition of American sovereignty over the islands of the south.3 Ninety days after the conquest of Jolo, on 10 August 1899, the American military-governor of Jolo, Brigadier General John C. Bates, signed an agreement with the sultan of Sulu, Muhammad Jamalul Kiram II, which, in its essential points, resembled the 1878 treaty between Spain and the sultan of Sulu. According to the agreement, Muslims recognized the sov­ ereignty of the United States, agreed to assist in the suppression of piracy, would turn over to the American authorities those accused of carrying out crimes against non-Muslims; in addition, slaves would be permitted to buy their freedom. In re­ turn, Sulu was allowed to conduct its own internal affairs. The United States un­ dertook to maintain the dignity and authority of the sultan of Sulu and of other Dato. The Americans agreed to full religious freedom and noninterference in Is­ lamic religious matters. They also agreed to pay a permanent monthly subsidy in the amount of $250 to the sultan and smaller sums to the chief Dato. Further, Muslims would have the protection of the United States against any external inter213

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vention. Similar, but unwritten, agreements were concluded with Muslim leaders in Mindanao and Basilan. The interpretation given to these agreements by the Muslims of the south differed from that of the Americans. The Muslims believed that by virtue of the understandings they had neutralized the danger of American interference in their internal affairs and insured the continuation of their traditional way of life under circumstances that were no worse than those they had in the ultimate stage of Spanish rule.4 Between 1899 and 1901, the Americans were engaged in fighting against the independence movement in Luzon and Bisaya while they practiced a policy of nonintervention in anything that related to the Muslims of the south. The Muslims were satisfied with this state of affairs. But as the fighting in the north ended, American officers believed the time had come to apply a policy of direct control over Muslim territory—Moroland. The first American military-govemor of Mus­ lim areas in Mindanao and Sulu (called the Department of Mindanao and Sulu) was Brigadier General George W. Davis who held the office from August 1901 to July 1902. He attempted to halt slavery among the Moro, stop polygamy, and bring piracy to an end, as well as to weaken the despotic rule of the Dato over their subjects. Such Muslim practices ran counter to the American sense of justice. Gen­ eral Davis also sent a constant stream of military patrols to reconnoiter in Muslim territory. Muslim leaders saw all these measures as a threat to their community and traditional authority, and opposition to the American military occupation broke out in a number of places. The first incident occurred in Sulu in 1901 when Panglima Hassan and his men fought the Americans. Hassan was convinced that to resist foreign rule was to be obedient to the commandments of ft sabil Allah; he contin­ ued fighting the Americans for several years. A more serious incident occurred on 15 March 1902. A number of Maranao attacked an American cavalry patrol north of Lake Lanao in the Cotabato region. One soldier was killed and the patrol re­ treated. The army responded with a punitive raid. In May 1902 the battle of Bay an was fought against the Maranao. More than three hundred Muslims were killed, including two local sultans, as against one American officer and ten soldiers. Maranao resistance to the Americans continued, and in June 1902 the men of Sul­ tan Binbayan attacked the army; two local sultans were killed in the fighting. More attacks were mounted in September and October of that year. The campaign against the Maranao went on for another two years with Muslims suffering great losses, unable to withstand the overwhelming American military advantage. Re­ sistance to the Americans was organized by the aristocracy of Maranao who em­ ployed such religious terminology as jihad in their attempt to defend the Muslim community. The American military regime attempted to institute other changes that worried the Muslims such as the imposition of custom duties, taxation, and a requirement of land surveys, registry, and mapping. At the same time, the army began imposing regulations about health and sanitation, a number of schools were opened with American civilians and military personnel as teachers, bridges were built, and roads paved. The year 1903 saw the beginnings of a census. As they had

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with the regulations attempted by General Davis, the Muslims regarded these mea­ sures, too, with great suspicion.5 In 1902, the U.S. Congress passed the Philippines Bill to legitimize the integra­ tion of the Muslim population of the Philippines, a development which the Amer­ icans were eager to institute as the result of a change in American policy, which went from recognition of Muslim authority in their own internal matters to one of unmediated direct rule. The Muslim South was now called the Moro Province and was subdivided into five districts: Zamboanga, Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, and Sulu. The arrangement was in force from 1 June 1903 until 1 September 1913. Moro Province was administered directly by the American army as distinguished from other Philippine islands that were transferred to civilian administration once the uprising of the national movement came to an end. The governors of Moro Prov­ ince were generals with wide-ranging authority, both civilian and military. The first governor was Major General Leonard Wood (1903-1906), followed by Brig­ adier General Tasker H. Bliss (1906-1909), and Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1909-1913). During the decade in which Moro Province existed, its courts were administered according to principles of American jurisprudence, and traditional local leaders were granted only limited political authority in their regions. Under American supervision, public works were greatly expanded; schools, hospitals and clinics built; agriculture and commerce galvanized; and slavery declared illegal. Christian Filipinos from the north were encouraged to move to the south to assist in the development of the rich natural resources there. A new system of taxation was instituted with special importance attached to the institution of the head tax (the cedula) and a road tax. As a result of all these, as well as other changes, the sociopolitical structure of the Muslim community and its leaders underwent severe shocks. The status and power of the traditional leaders, the Dato, was weakened. New schools adversely affected the network of pandita educational institutions. The settlement of Christians in Muslim areas of the south constituted an even graver offense. All this occurred despite the declared policy of honoring the reli­ gion and customs of Islam, providing that they did not run counter to the basic principles of the American Constitution which were grounded in its concepts of justice. The Americans were particularly careful to retain the Islamic shari’a law regarding personal status and inheritance. Nonetheless, the policy of direct rule impinged on the status and prestige of the traditional Muslim elites and so im­ pacted on the religion itself. The Muslims neither understood nor accepted the distinction between secular and religious matters which the Americans brought with them. According to Islam, both religious and political authority resided in the person of the sultan and the various Dato. Infringing on their traditional role could only be construed as an affront to religion and the traditional way of life. As far as Muslims were concerned, the imposition of the laws and customs of foreign infi­ dels amounted to religious coercion and was a threat to the character of the Muslim Ulama. Repeal of slavery endangered the entire political-economic structure of traditional society, and the establishment of a district and regional government

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whose officials published injunctions enforced by the American army undermined the authority and status of traditional Muslim leadership. The question of the legal system was a complex one. In the past, Muslim life was regulated by laws promulgated by the sultans, composed of an integration of the Adat with the laws of shari’a. Expediting decisions was entrusted to the tradi­ tional network of religious courts—the Agama—headed by the Kathi, or the Coun­ cil of the Clan, or the Dato. Because it was foreign, American law was not under­ stood by Muslims who generally preferred to resolve their problems within the context of traditional legal frameworks. Bypassing Muslim courts and a refusal to recognize the traditional judicial authority of the heads of clans offended Muslim sensitivities. Further, Muslims recoiled from paying the cedula and other taxes because the money was going to a foreign government of infidels. Muslims ob­ jected to land grants to both foreigners and Christian Filipinos, and they objected to attempts at collecting their arms or granting foreign ships fishing rights in the offshore waters of Moroland. They suspected that, by means of the changes that had been instituted, the Americans intended to disseminate the principles and val­ ues of Christianity. Most particularly, they were anxious lest the public schools estrange their children from their religion and traditional way of life. Every attempt to change Muslim society or to impose foreign law appeared as an existential dan­ ger to their religion. Consequently, the very existence of the American created “Moro Province” and the policy of direct control was regarded as a serious threat which had to be fought with all one’s strength.6 General Leonard Wood, the military-governor from 1903 to1906 (and the governor-general of the Philippines from 1921 to 1927) was not an admirer of Is­ lam.7 Despite the experience and proficiency he had acquired, he found nothing of value in Muslim law, or the Adat of the Philippines, and believed that American law, enforced by military means, would instill discipline in the Muslims and put them on the road to progress. Indeed, American policy in the south was aimed at developing, civilizing, strengthening, and preparing the Muslims for self-rule in order to integrate them into the mainstream of life in the Philippines. Unlike the Spaniards before them, the Americans did not seek to convert the population to Christianity, rather they wanted to inculcate in all Filipinos—not only the Mus­ lims— such American values as individualism, social mobility, equality before the law, separation of church and state, and local democracy. The Muslims saw all this, equally, as endangering their culture and way of life. Separation of church and state was a particularly odious matter for the Muslims of the south and stemmed from America’s systemic misunderstanding of the essence of Islam. The officials in the American administration of Moro Province either did not know or chose to over­ look the fact that Muslims make no distinctions between religious and secular matters. Separation between religion and state, and between religion and politics, are Western concepts unknown to Islam. Islam is an overall, all-encompassing system. Muslim lands are Dar al-Islam. Any step in the direction of structural change in Muslim society, or the imposition of obedience to foreign laws, is a

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challenge to the very basis of Muslim religion and to its very existence. In the Muslim response to the Americans, one finds the same awakening spirit of jihad that was found in Muslim resistance to the Spaniards. General Leonard Wood mounted a campaign against Muslims who did not accept American law, and thou­ sands were killed in the fighting. Military-governors who came after him also fought against those the Americans dubbed bandits and outlaws. Granted that most Muslims acceded to American rule—some because of the personal advantage they derived from cooperation, others because they were too weak to resist, and the remainder because their contact with foreigners was infrequent so that their way of life was only minimally influenced—the Muslims that did elect to resist by force found wide-ranging moral support. Ultimately, after sustaining heavy losses, the Muslims realized that continued fighting in face of the modem weapons held by the Americans could only mean the disappearance of the Muslim.8 General Wood demanded that the Bates Agreement of August 1899 be scrapped. He, and many other American army officers who served in the area, believed that the agreement undercut the sovereignty of the United States because of the recog­ nition it gave to the authority of the sultan of Sulu in the internal affairs of the sultanate. Despite American undertakings to respect local political structure, it was apparent to these officers that enforcement of American rule in the south required restricting the authority of the sultan and the Dato. The president of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, agreed with General Wood’s recommendations, and the agreement was unilaterally set aside on 2 March 1904. On 21 March subsidies to the sultan and the Dato ended. Wood then appointed a small constitutional coun­ cil made up of American civilians and officers, and instituted changes in other spheres as well. The tough policy brought on violent reactions.9 Violence directed at the Moro Province policy actually began before the formal repeal of the Bates Agreement. In mid-October 1903 an incident that came to be known as the Hassan Uprising, already mentioned, occurred following an ex­ change of fire between Muslims and American army units. (Indeed, Hassan, who was an aristocrat with the title Panglima, had begun to engage the Americans as early as 1901.) The Americans rushed reinforcements to the area of the uprising which was supported by Sultan Jamal al-Kiram II, and other Dato who, it appears, were reacting to the American effort to put an end to slavery. Panglima Hassan was killed in March 1904. The year 1903 saw fighting in other places in Sulu as well. The tactic followed by the Sulu Tausug was to dig into a high point, wait for an American attack, and then fight from their trenches (the cotta) until beaten by superior American forces. In many cases they fought until the last man fell. During the same period, there was a renewal of the juramentado against American sol­ diers.10 In January 1905 Dato Usap led a rebellion in which he was supported by the religious preacher Hajji Masdali. By the end of the fighting, Dato Usap had been killed and Hajji Masdali was exiled to Singapore. On 13 May there were American attacks against Dato Pala who had called for a jihad. He, too, was killed, but his men continued fighting until the end of the year when they were defeated

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and dispersed. In 1903-1904, there were attacks against American forces and Christian settlers at Lanao. In April 1904 scores of Muslims were killed in a battle in Taraca; a number of Dato and pandita surrendered bringing a temporary lull in the fighting to Lanao. In Cotabato, Dato Ali challenged the Americans, refused to accept the law ending slavery, and mobilized the inhabitants of Cotabato Valley in a rebellion. Guerilla fighting continued until October 1905 when he and a hundred of his men were killed.11 One of the severest incidents to occur during General Wood’s administration was the Bud Dajo battle fought in Sulu on 7 March 1906. It began after hundreds of Muslims assembled at Bud Dajo Hill and fortified the position in a protest against the imposition of the cedula tax of the previous year and other highly unpopular decrees by the Americans, particularly the end of slavery. Several American offi­ cials, the sultan of Sulu himself, and some of the leading Dato advised the rebels to surrender, but they were not able to calm the situation. Fortification of the site lasted a number of months and, after a time, the rebels began assaults on villages in the neighborhood. The continued presence of the rebels on the hill constituted a threat not only to American rule in the territory but to the traditional authority of the sultan and the Dato. At the beginning of March, General Wood decided to wipe out the rebels. A two day battle began on 6 March and by the time it was over, there were 21 American soldiers men dead and approximately 73 wounded, while among the 1,000 Muslims who had fortified the hill there were 600 dead, including women and children.12 Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss was appointed governor of Moro Province following General Wood. He took up office about a month after the battle of Bud Dajo in the midst of great tension that persisted among the Muslims of Sulu and Mindanao; however, during his tenure there were no large-scale military operations or serious Muslim uprisings. His years were known as the peace era, not because Muslims had become reconciled to American rule, but because they had been bro­ ken in fighting General Wood’s forces. General Bliss gave special attention to the development of primary and secondary schools. The Americans attempted to in­ stitute compulsory education, putting pressure on members of the Dato class to send their children to government schools as an example to others. Many scholar­ ships were offered, and some Muslims were sent for further education in Manila or in the United States. But, by and large, Muslims rejected the demand to send their children to government schools for fear of Christian missionary efforts and because they regarded those schools as a threat to their traditional way of life. One result of pressuring Dato to send their children to government schools was that many of them substituted the children of their slaves in place of their own. There was only a very modest increase in the number of Muslim children in government schools; nonetheless, the American policy adversely effected the madarsah net­ work, the traditional religious schools of the pandita. Consequently, General Bliss advised granting aid to institutes of religious education as well, and some equip­ ment was, indeed, sent to Muslim schools.13

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Early in 1909, Bliss was promoted and in November of that year he was replaced by the third and last military-govemor of Moro Province, Brigadier General John J. Pershing who served in that post from 1909 to 1913. Pershing worked to improve social and economic conditions in Mindanao and Sulu, providing assistance in the development of agriculture, mining, and industry, and carrying on the work that had been done in the field of education by his two predecessors. He initiated a gradual increase in the number of civilian personnel in the administration with a consequent lowering in the number of army officers. One particularly sensitive sphere in which Pershing’s contribution was felt was the drive to disarm the Moro. On 8 September he put out an order to that effect. Many Moro, particularly in the Sulu and Lanao areas began assembling in the hills, planning armed resistance in the familiar style of cotta fortifications. Pershing then relented and postponed the implementation of his own orders. Some Moro returned home; others were taken into custody. In a number of districts, the Muslim population handed over its arms; in others, particularly on Jolo Island, there was a show of resistance. A major battle took place between June 11 and 16, 1913, in Bud Bagsak where 5,000 Muslims had massed. The number of Muslim dead is not verified but estimates range be­ tween 500 to 2,000 men. This was the last large military engagement which the Americans waged against the Moro until leaving the Philippines. On 10 August 1913 Muslim forces that had dug in on Talipao Hill were routed. On 22 October that same location was the site of yet another battle. With the exception of a few sporadic clashes in the following years, Muslim areas of the south were generally quiet. In all the battles in which the Americans fought—which they classified un­ der the heading of their “pacification program”—they were abetted by Dato who cooperated with them in apprehending and eliminating Muslim rebels. The Amer­ icans also recruited Christian Filipinos in their military campaigns. As early as 1901, units of Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary, composed al­ most entirely of Indios, were set up, although there were some units of Muslim soldiers, too, and these units took part in all the battles. The officers were invari­ ably Americans.14 Genera] Pershing’s administration intervened in another sensitive area which related to the religious life of Muslims—the haj to Mecca. Since the intervention concerned the welfare of pilgrims there was no serious opposition to it. The new policy, which was instituted in 1913, did not encourage pilgrimages unless the pilgrims could convince district authorities that they could afford the expensive journey. They were required to give proof that their families would not suffer hard­ ships during their absence and that there would be no need to sell property or go into debt to finance the journey. Traditionally, many families had impoverished themselves in order to enable the fulfillment of the commandment of the haj. Per­ shing was appalled when he discovered that many pilgrims would even sell them­ selves into slavery, to money lenders, to pay their way to Mecca. At times, pilgrims were cheated, robbed, or fell ill during the journey with no recourse to defense or care. After the new policy was put in place, only wealthy Muslims could afford to

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make the haj, and they were provided with letters to American consular officials enroute requesting that in case of need, aid should be made available to the pil­ grim.15 Both Generals Wood and Bliss had been convinced that the American army would have to retain control of the south for an extended period. It was Pershing who prepared the Muslim areas for transition from military to civilian rule which was consistent with the American policy of expediting preparation of the Philip­ pines Islands for independence. This had become policy after the Democratic Party won the majority in the House of Representatives in March 1911 and was reinforced with the election of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency of the United States two years later. First, Filipinos were granted a majority in both houses of the Philippine Assembly, and Philippinization of public administration was accel­ erated. The political changes impacted on Muslim areas, and a wholly civilian administration, not unlike the situation that obtained in other parts of the Philip­ pines, was set up. On 15 December 1913 the Moro Province was completely re­ constituted and its name changed to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. A civilian, Frank W. Carpenter, was appointed governor of the department. The United States regarded the Philippine Islands as a totality and wanted to administer it as such. Consequently, it became the task of the governor to unite Mindanao and Sulu with other parts of the Philippines. He transferred supervision over matters of the Muslim South from American administrators to Filipino administrators (al­ though only a few were Muslims) and continued sociopolitical development plans for the Moro so as to speed up the pace of their integration. A policy of “Philippinizing” the administration was initiated which permitted Philippine offi­ cials greater authority in Moroland. The result was a sense of bitterness among Muslims although there were some who went along with the government’s inte­ gration program. At the end of a six-year period of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu (1914-1920), the majority of officeholders in public service in the south­ ern Philippines were Christians, giving rise to Muslim complaints that the real meaning of “Philippinization” was “Christian Philippinization.” Carpenter di­ vided the Muslim South into seven districts and transferred the administration of a number of departments to relevant offices in the central government in Manila. For example, the administration of such matters as education, public works, health, law, and the development of agriculture and public lands was transferred from Zamboanga, the seat of the governor-general, to Manila. These reforms were called the Policy of Attraction.16 A particularly important reform Carpenter made to which the Muslims acqui­ esced was the cancellation of the Sultanate of Sulu. On 13 March 1915 talks were initiated in Zamboanga between the governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, Frank Carpenter, and Sultan Jamal al-Kiram II of Sulu and a number of his associates. The talks went on for nine days. On the final day, an agreement was signed.17 The Memorandum Agreement between the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and the Sultan of Sulu being the Complete Renunciation by the

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Latter of Pretensions of Sovereignty and a Definition of His Status states, among other things, that the Sultan of Sulu is the titular spiritual head18 of the Mohammedan Church in the Sulu Archipelago, with all the rights and privileges which under the Govern­ ment of the United States of America may be exercised by such an ecclesiastical authority, and subject to the same limitations which apply to the supreme spiritual heads of all other religions existing in American territory, including the right to solicit and receive voluntary popular contributions for the support of the clergy rites, and other necessary lawful expenses of an ecclesiastical character.

The agreement further stated that the sultan of Sulu, in his name and that of his subjects, recognizes the unlimited sovereignty of the United States, including the jurisdiction of its institutions, laws, and decrees. All religious freedoms have been guaranteed to the sultan of Sulu and to the entire Muslim population just as they are to the followers of other religious persuasions so long as in the fulfillment of their religious obligations there is no infringement of the basic principles of Amer­ ican law. Throughout the negotiations, the sultan claimed that he had acquired his hereditary sovereignty by virtue of a four-hundred-year history, and that the agree­ ments concluded with Spain merely limited such sovereignty to Moroland, and that consequently the Spaniards could not contractually transfer to the United States a sovereignty that was never theirs, according to the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the Bates Agreement that determined American sovereignty over the whole of the Philippine Islands recognized the sultan’s sovereignty to administer the internal matters of the Moro. These claims, however, carried no weight in the negotiations with Carpenter, the end of which was a signed document. As compensation for the privileges he lost, the American government granted land to the sultan and to the chief Dato. The monetary subsidies that they had been receiving were continued. The annual pension of the sultan was $6,000.19 During his term as governor of the department, Carpenter did a great deal to implement the Policy of Attraction by fostering development within Muslim com­ munities, particularly in the area of education. Compulsory education was enacted, the number of government schools grew from 72 in 1913, to 336 in 1919, and scholarships for advanced study in Manila and in the United States were made available. Other services were provided as well. The number of hospitals and clin­ ics multiplied to such an extent that medical attention became accessible to almost all the inhabitants. Public services were expanded and public buildings con­ structed; hundreds of kilometers of railways and roads were laid, bridges built, and phone lines stretched—all of which put an end to the isolation of many regions and forged a link between them and the centers of government and commerce. More Muslims were taken into local and regional government service. As early as 1916, a Muslim was co-opted to the Senate to represent Mindanao and Sulu. Periodically, Muslim leaders were taken on visits to Manila as guests of the government in the

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hope that such programs would elicit their cooperation with government officials. (Activity in the sphere of agriculture and the migration of Christians to Mindanao will be discussed later.) There were Muslims who interpreted this wave of development as a threat to their way of life, but, for the most part, the period known as the Era of the Depart­ ment was quiet. Though there were still sporadic outbreaks, the Muslims were exhausted by their years of armed resistance to government initiatives. Nonethe­ less, in 1917, Dato of the Bayan region in Lanao refused to hand over their weap­ ons to the authorities, to send their children to public schools, or to allow govern­ ment officials to survey their lands. In a number of incidents, rebellious local Dato and pandita were killed. In October of that year, Dato Ambang of Kidapawan called on Muslims in Cotabato to oppose the American infidels and the Christian Filipinos. Without recourse to arms, this attempt at activism fell by the wayside and other small-scale and scattered incidents were quickly suppressed.20 When World War I broke out in 1914, the American authorities were anxious about the possibility that Muslim Filipinos might show sympathy and solidarity for the Ottoman Empire which was fighting alongside Germany. The Ottoman sultan was a well-respected figure among the Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu, and regarded by them as the caliph of all the believers; or, in Western terms, the spir­ itual leader of the peoples of Islam. The fear was that the Moro would be incited against the American Christian government and Christian Filipinos, a concern the Americans held in common with all the Western colonial powers that had Muslim populations, such as the Indian subcontinent, the Malay Peninsula and the Islands of Dutch East India (Indonesia). In 1917, there was information about the impend­ ing visit of a Muslim emissary to Zamboanga, but he left the Philippines before the government could take steps against him. It was reported that Turkey was en­ gaged in disseminating Muslim propaganda among the Moro population. Most Moro, however, were indifferent to the war, even after America’s entry into it. Con­ versely, there were Muslims who bought war bonds, contributed to the Red Cross, and even wanted to set up a regiment of Moro soldiers, but this bit of patriotism did not gain permission 21 Carpenter did a great deal to encourage agricultural development in the south, hoping to attract immigrants from the north where there was a chronic shortage of land with its consequent unrest among the farmers. Both the Americans and the nationalists in the north who regarded the southern islands as an integral part of the Philippines understood the importance of natural resources in Mindanao and Sulu for the economic future of the country. And, indeed, in the wake of the Policy of Attraction, inhabitants of the densely populated islands of Luzon and Visaya were drawn to the south to take advantage of the economic possibilities that be­ came increasingly available in the public lands of Mindanao and Sulu. In effect, by 1850, the Spaniards had already begun colonization of the Muslim South by Christian Filipinos from the northern islands, an emigration forced on people who did not want to leave their homes in order to migrate southward. The Catholic

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Church was involved in selecting the candidates for the involuntary immigration. Initially, settlement was directed to the northern and eastern coasts of Mindanao, but gradually the settlements encompassed the other coasts of the island and ex­ tended to Basilan and Jolo as well. Muslim population was concentrated in the western, central, and southwestern parts of Mindanao. As early as the end of the Spanish period, the population of Mindanao was estimated at 500,000, of which 30 percent were Muslims, 20 percent “wild tribes,” and 50 percent Christians, most of whom were immigrants from Visaya. The proportions changed rapidly. Muslims quickly understood the implications of the spread of Christian settlement and re­ sponded viciously against the settlements. The attacks were at their height when the Americans captured Manila in 1898, and continued in Muslim areas, particu­ larly in the transition period between the departure of the Spaniards and the take­ over of the regime by the American army in 1899-1900.22 With the “pacification” that had eluded the Spaniards accomplished in just a few years, the Americans were more successful than their predecessors had been in plans to settle Christians from the north in the southern Philippines. General Wood saw a great American potential for settlement in Mindanao in the development of the island’s agriculture. On 30 January 1910 the Zamboanga Chamber of Com­ merce made representations to the president of the United States, General Wood, and other Americans requesting that the southern islands of the Philippines be separated politically from the Philippine Archipelago because of its great eco­ nomic potential, and that the islands be declared an American territory.23 There were also plans to establish colonies of American Blacks because of the supposi­ tion that they would be able to adapt easily to the climatic conditions of Mindanao. Ideas of this sort were raised very soon after the American conquest, but none were carried out. In the entire decade of the Moro Province, only 5,000 Americans, most of them army personnel and their families, responded to proposals to settle in the south. Most American settlers left after a few years. By 1907, only 100 American plantation owners remained, and even they left when most of the army units began evacuating Mindanao at the end of 1913. General Bliss, who was Woods replace­ ment, did not support the settlement scheme in Mindanao claiming that the Moro would respond violently in defense of their land. Planned agricultural settlement of Christians from the north did not begin until 1912 toward the end of General Pershing’s term of office. Pershing did support the idea of bringing settlers south from the densely populated areas of the North Philippines. Cotabato Valley was the first place the settlers came where 100 Christian families settled in 1912. In 1913, a law was passed for the establishment of agricultural colonies. The purpose was to increase agricultural production (particularly rice), improve the population distribution balance of the Philippines, begin the cultivation of fallow land, and enable settlers to become landowners. Five more places were chosen in the Cotabato Valley for settlements. Initially both Christian families (Indios) and Muslim families (Moro) were settled together. Carpenter, who was an enthusiastic supporter of these plans, hoped that the enterprise would facilitate the accultura­

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tion of the two populations and the assimilation of the Muslims, perhaps even create a homogeneous Philippine culture that could work together in developing the resources of Mindanao. The assumption was that the industriousness of the Christian settlers and their agricultural know-how would serve as both an example and an incentive to Muslims who would become more productive farmers. The new settlements were directed by non-Muslims and were intended to be an exam­ ple of democratic, well-organized community life. Those who wished to immi­ grate from the crowded north to work in agriculture in Mindanao and Sulu were given financial aid, housing, and other benefits. By 1915, there were already 2,362 families living there. During Carpenter’s term, most of the settlements were lo­ cated in Cotabato. Between 1913 and 1917, during which 8,000 settlers arrived, six sites were established, and another colony was set up in Lanao. The colonies had meager success, and many of the settlers left, some of whom returned to their place of origin. The isolation of many of the settlement sites, the threat of malaria, and the lack of services were among the factors that deterred many potential set­ tlers from coming. Between 1918 and 1939, other plans were put in motion by which the government extended aid only to people who had their own means. In this project, too, the results were disappointing. In 1919, a law was passed giving the various districts the authority to organize settlements for themselves and estab­ lish colonies with their own resources, but by 1935 not a single government settle­ ment plan was operative. In 1936, there were no more than 30,000 to 35,000 people in government agricultural colonies in Mindanao. While the government’s subsi­ dized plans managed to bring in relatively few people in the years preceding 1939, a parallel and more successful effort, intended to encourage a voluntary movement of settlers from Visaya to the south, was sponsored by the Interisland Migration Division of the Bureau of Labor. There are no substantiated numbers about this project, but it is estimated that between 1903 and 1939, immigration added 1.4 million people to the population of Mindanao.24 The most important socioeconomic innovation that the Carpenter administra­ tion attempted to institute was private ownership of land. Although the majority of the Muslim population lived in permanent settlements, occasionally land was tilled under a system of shifting agriculture. The concept of personal ownership of land was unknown, and the right to land use was connected to the traditional family or to membership in a clan, or to residence in the clan’s general territory. Communal ownership meant that the clan, or some group within the community, occupied land with loosely defined borders. Within this structure, ownership of land belonged to families rather than to the individuals that worked it. Land parcels were inherited from one generation to another. Sale of such land, or its transfer to other members of the community or to strangers, was governed by traditional procedures, the most important requirement being the agreement of the head of the community. Families of Dato laid claim to areas that were delineated in general terms. Well-defined boundaries existed only in regions where the position of the land lent it importance—for example, close to Lake Lanao, the plains of Cotabato, or tracts

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which surrounded cities such as Zamboanga or Jolo. Land was worked according to the customary laws of the adat. Philippine Muslims did not understand the mod­ em concept which the Americans introduced of property rights and legal owner­ ship of land that belongs to individuals rather to families. Consequently, they did not bother to survey land, classify it, or register a deed or title to it. As far as Muslims were concerned, their own laws and customs were sufficient, and they made no effort to fathom the contradictions or conflicts between their traditions and modern legal systems. The Americans, eager to develop the southern regions of Mindanao and Sulu with its sparse population and rich economic potential, con­ sidered the extensive areas as constituting public domain, under government own­ ership, and this made it salable. When the land was indeed sold, the Muslims re­ garded the action as a form of dispossession from their land. In spite of the dis­ dainful attitude held by many in the administration toward people whom they re­ garded as backward or politically and economically primitive, the Americans did begin a land registry in order to provide Muslims with economic security and clear ownership to whatever property they could prove as being theirs. The hope was that by granting Muslims official ownership of the land that they worked, the Mus­ lim population would be freed from economic dependence on the Dato class, and the traditional feudal ownership of land would thus be broken. Carpenter's inten­ tions were good when he instituted private ownership and encouraged enterprise; however, conflicting notions of land ownership and use quickly produced discord between the Americans and the Filipinos. The Muslims felt that they were the true and only owners of all the territory in Mindanao and Sulu, and they rejected the demands of the government and the Christian settlers for any part of it. Some forcibly opposed the work surveyor teams because they saw a connection between the surveys and property taxes which would be imposed on them in the future. Muslims saw land as a heritage, not as property that could be sold to strangers for profit. Private ownership of land was never a part of Muslim culture in the Philip­ pines because land was not regarded as a transferable commodity, something that required a bill of title. Only the right to use land could be transferred or renewed. The Dato did not own the land; they merely had the authority to assign right of usage in territory under their control. Nor did they know how to deal with the bureaucracy and documentation involved in registering land— which proved to be embarrassing—although in various Muslim communities wide stretches of land were, in fact, registered in the name of the Dato. Many ordinary Muslims assumed that their traditional right to the land that they cultivated, or even land that they did not cultivate but which they had always considered theirs, would never be chal­ lenged. They believed that land was communal property meant to support the com­ munity and provide for its needs. The land was Allah's and was held in trust (amanah) for future generations as part of Dar al-lslam, and it had to be safe­ guarded from aggressors. When the Americans sold land to immigrants or to large plantation companies in Cotabato, Lanao, and Sulu, they were acting in conso­ nance with their own concepts, but they were also flying in the face of Muslim

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tradition and custom. Such sales were carried out in accordance with notions of ownership as defined by American civil law and had no affinity whatsoever to traditional forms of Muslim ownership. In many places, land was confiscated from local residents who did not understand the necessary legal procedures for the ac­ quisition of ownership and title. Thus many Muslims became landless on the very land on which they had always lived because their traditional rights went unrecog­ nized, or worse, were ignored.25 These developments met with various reactions from different elements in the Muslim community. Those Dato who understood the new system were able to benefit from it. They simply registered the land used by their subjects as their own. Later, they sold parts of the land to the government, or to private owners, which at times meant evicting and dispossessing their own subjects. There were even some Dato who donated land to the government on which Filipinos from the north could be settled or sold land to the government for the same purpose. The price of land went up and so did the economic and political power of many Dato. To avoid paying taxes on newly surveyed land, many Muslims simply left and moved to regions where no surveys were being made, or which were designated as public land. Only later did some of these people begin to appreciate the financial value of their formerly held properties, the fact that they had lost out, had been misled, and, for all practical purposes, robbed. In such circumstances, it was relatively easy for settlers from the north and for influential people with connections in govern­ ment, both Muslim and Christian, to obtain a deed for land that had traditionally belonged to Muslims—a practice which contributed to the tension and violence in the south that lasted for decades. It was almost unavoidable that land claims based on conflicting systems of ownership would result in hostility between Muslims and Christians, and there were countless cases of cheating, misrepresentation, and har­ assment by one community or the other.26 The six year period in which the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was in existence was a time of accelerated integration of the Muslim population into the projected, self-governing united Philippines. The department was terminated on 5 February 1920 bringing to an end direct rule of the American administration in the south. Dealings with the Moro were now transferred to the central government's office of the secretary of the Interior in Manila. The office exercised its authority in the south through the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes which was a sub­ department of the Department of the Interior, and which functioned until 1937. Actually the unit was established on 29 August 1916 under the Jones Law of the American Congress. Primary control over Moroland in all matters that related to administration and legislation was now in the hands of Philippine officials, gener­ ally Christians, although broad areas of authority did remain with the American governor-general which enabled him to intervene in the administration of Minda­ nao and Sulu. American district governors remained in Lanao until 1930 and in Sulu until 1935. Under the new regime, which was controlled by Christian Filipi­ nos, the earlier Policy of Attraction fell into disuse and was replaced by a program

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for political and economic integration. Fewer concessions were now made to Mus­ lims. Moro reaction took the form of riots, antigovernment violence, and political resistance to inclusion in a future independent Philippine state.27 While the outbreaks during this period did not equal the severity of those di­ rected at the American administration through 1913, they were surely an indication of the accumulated bitterness among the Moro towards the new regime, and par­ ticularly against untried Christian Filipino officials who had replaced the more experienced Americans that had been dealing with the Moros. Disagreements about the south quickly came to the fore between the American governor-general and the Philippine Parliament over practices of Filipino officialdom. Old animos­ ities between Christians and Muslims broke out anew, particularly in Lanao. In 1921, there were armed clashes in Lanao because of laws concerning compulsory education in government schools. In 1923, there was an uprising of Muslims in Maranao who refused to pay taxes or special levies for building construction and resisted compulsory education in government schools. The leader of the revolt and fifty-four of his supporters were killed. That same year saw clashes between the police and Moro in Cotabato in which some one hundred Muslims were killed and their leader, Dato Santiago surrendered. In May 1923, there was a rebellion in Palawan sparked by the imposition of a head tax, compulsory school attendance laws, and land surveys. Many Moro refused to register their ownership of land as required by law or to pay taxes. In June, a religious preacher was killed in Palawan along with dozens of his supporters. Religious elements were at the root of a sim­ ilar uprising that took place in 1924 in an island near Mindanao, headed by a man who called himself Imam Mahdi.28 The rebels killed ten soldiers but the rebellion was quashed. Another rebellion, this one led by Dato Tahil, took place in Sulu provoked by a tax on lands, punishment for delinquency in the payment of other taxes, and resistance to a prohibition against the carrying of arms. Dato Tahil con­ structed a cotta fortification near the city of Jolo. Thirty to forty of his people were killed when it was attacked on 31 January 1927. Dato Tahil escaped but on 8 Feb­ ruary turned himself in to the Governor of Sulu and was sentenced to ten years in prison. In Lanao, twenty government schools were set afire in that year, effectively bringing the educational system there to a halt. In these incidents, and in guerilla fighting against the authorities, several hundred Muslims were killed. The Philippine police were seen as a foreign, hostile army of occupation and frequently the police acted that way. The situation was less severe in other Muslim areas, but the Moro aspiration to evict Christian Filipinos from the south was universal.29 There were only a few Muslim leaders who joined Christians in the demand for Philippine independence and for the departure of the Americans. Often these were jobholders on the district or national level, or people who had political or business dealings with the Christians. The majority of Muslims stubbornly preferred the continuation of American rule, if only to prevent themselves from being subjected to control by their Christian enemies. The Muslims believed that Christian Filipi­ nos would actively seek the demise of Islam and its traditions and the occupation

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of Muslim lands. Those who wanted a continued American presence in the Phil­ ippines petitioned the president of the United States and the American Congress. American plantation owners, businessmen, or government officials occasionally helped formulate petitions and were among the signatories. The Muslims insisted that the government, both in Washington, D.C., and in Manila, treat them as a separate community, even a separate people, to be differentiated from other groups in the Philippine Archipelago; a people who should, therefore, be permitted to maintain their special status under American rule, and in the eventuality of Philippine independence, be granted separate independence. A Commission of Inquiry sent to the Philippines in 1921 found that the Muslims were united in their opposition to Philippine independence and interested in continued rule by the United States. Should the Philippines gain independence, Muslims minimally de­ manded that the United States retain control over the southern islands. On 9 June 1921 some fifty-seven leaders (including some foreigners) signed a petition in Sulu which stated that the desires of the residents of Sulu were that the archipelago as a whole permanently remain an American territory. The petition detailed many complaints against the Christian Philippine authorities, particularly with regard to offenses against the religion of Islam. In 1923, Muslims demonstrated in Zambo­ anga carrying placards that said that they did not share the Christian demand for independence, and that they insisted on the separation of their territory from Luzon and Visaya. In 1924, another petition was sent by Muslim leaders in Zamboanga to the Congress of the United States. The signatories requested that Mindanao and Sulu be declared U.S. territory and demanded that Congress undertake measures to secure their safety and defense by seeing to the return of arms that had been confiscated from them. The signatories announced their intention to declare the independence of the Moro people in the framework of a constitutional sultanate should the Americans grant independence to the Philippine Islands. The petition was read into the Congressional Record of 6 May 1926 as an amendment to a lengthy and closely argued legislative proposal presented to Congress by Rep. Robert J. Bacon. The amendment consisted of a thorough historic survey of U.S. relations with the Moro. It called for detaching Moro districts in the Philippines and granting them a separate administration under direct American rule. The bill failed.30There were some officials in the American government who thought that should there be a decision for independence, the fate of Muslims in the south should not be entrusted to Christian Filipinos; their recommendation to consider the possibility of leaving Muslim and pagan areas in the south under American rule can be seen in a memorandum prepared on 6 January 1932 by the chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department in Washington, D.C.3' In 1933, a number of Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu who had apparently be­ come reconciled to the inevitability of an independent Philippines, which would include the southern islands, demanded that the Moro be represented in the Philippine Legislative Assembly. On 26 June of that year, a letter to this effect was sent to Manuel L. Quezon, president of the Senate in Manila. In April 1934 Senator

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Sergio Osmena, later vice-president of the Commonwealth, participated in a meet­ ing with Muslim leaders and several Dato. He promised to act on their behalf so that they could be represented by their own delegates to the Constitutional Con­ vention. Senate President Quezon also promised to safeguard Muslim interests and to increase the number of Muslim officials. On 10 July 1934 elections for a Con­ stitutional Convention were held and, in several Muslim regions, Dato were elected as representatives. But it appears that this trend of reluctant reconciliation on the part of the Muslims only spoke for a minority view. In May 1934 the U.S. Congress passed the lydings-McDuffie Bill which called for the establishment of an auton­ omous Commonwealth under which the Philippines would be granted full rights, initially in internal matters only, and later—on 4 July 1946—complete independ­ ence. The Moro opposed the bill, sorely disappointed with the American decision to relinquish direct control in the south and the agreement to turn the territory over to the Christian Filipinos who were traditional enemies of the Moro. That same year, armed incidents in Lanao were put down by the police. On 13 July 1934 two hundred leading Maranaos signed a petition written by the religious leader, Hajji Abdul Kamid Bogabong, and sent it to Frank Murphy, the American governor-general. They demanded that a law be passed which would guarantee that the religion of Islam, its customs and traditions would not be harmed and that freedom of religion would be assured to Muslims. They insisted on the recognition of Muslim law, and demanded that their lands be safeguarded for a twenty-year period (which would give Muslims sufficient time to get proof of ownership) dur­ ing which time it would not be transferred to Christians. And they demanded that qualified Muslims be appointed to government positions in the Lanao region. The petition closed with a statement that should their needs be disregarded, they would not participate in the Commonwealth government and would seek to separate Min­ danao and Sulu from an independent Philippines, leaving them under American rule. Muslim concerns were expressed in meetings held in 1935 at which Dato, Hajjis, Imams, and Kathis gathered to discuss fears that the United States would grant independence to the Philippines without securing the situation of the Mus­ lims. On March 18, 1935, just a few months before the establishment of the Com­ monwealth, a meeting was held in Dansalan (Marawi City) at which a petition, signed by 120 Maranao leaders, was sent to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Congress. The signatories claimed that the population of the Philippine Islands was composed of two peoples with differing religions, tradi­ tions, and customs. They complained of a negative attitude on the part of the Chris­ tians towards the Muslims, and expressed their concern about the future of the Muslim community under Christian Filipino rule, particularly in matters relating to their religion. Only Christians, they protested, stood to gain from the new con­ stitution. The Muslim territories—whose inhabitants did not want to be included in an independent Philippines—should be separated from the other islands of the archipelago. They were not successful in winning their demands. The United States accepted the hypothesis that spoke of one people in one country; therefore,

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despite Muslim objections, the Commonwealth was established on 14 November 1935 and responsibility for policy regarding Muslims was transferred to the gov­ ernment of the Commonwealth. Manuel Quezon was elected president, and in elections held in September 1935, three Moro were elected to the National Assem­ bly.32 The government of the Commonwealth had good intentions. It wanted all seg­ ments of the population, including Muslims, to benefit from a national policy of unity that was based on the equality of all citizens. President Manuel Quezon spoke of providing the Moro with good government and of his great interest in their welfare and progress. His declared policy, as announced in a 16 June 1936 speech was that both Muslims and Christians should be equally subject to the same law. He intended to institute complete legal and social equality and put an end to the privileges of the aristocracy. He opposed the Dato system which ran parallel to the administration of the country’s legal framework. His approach was that govern­ ment officials should treat each citizen directly and equally, without intervention of traditional aristocracies. And, indeed, the National Assembly repealed the spe­ cial laws for Mindanao and Sulu and the special arrangements that existed for them. The change of policy offended Moro sensitivities. Although there were Dato who benefited from the Commonwealth government—occasionally getting large tracts of land—generally their subjects were adversely effected. Muslim hostility to Christian Filipinos deepened because of efforts by the Commonwealth to end the preferential treatment Muslims had received under American rule. For exam­ ple, the Muslim Board which had been in operation until then to adjudicate con­ flicts between Moros according to Muslim law was closed down. Another exam­ ple, in March 1936 a parliamentary committee for Mindanao and Sulu affairs rec­ ommended the abolition of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. Members of the National Assembly from the south opposed the recommendation but, despite Moro opposition, President Quezon decided to close the bureau and it was terminated on 31 December 1936. In its place, the position of commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu was created, directly answerable to the Ministry of Labor and the Interior. The official, a Christian Filipino, was given wide-ranging authority in coordinating the work of all government agencies in the south.33 The opportunity to apply the new policy, terminating the privileged position of the traditional Muslim aristocracy, presented itself to the Commonwealth govern­ ment at the beginning of 1936 when the sultan of Sulu, Mohammed Jamal al-Kiram (who had relinquished the right to govern in an agreement he had signed in 1915), died. The special position of sultans and Dato (with their status as reli­ gious leaders and Muslim authority figures) had generally been retained by the Americans, but it undermined the concept of equality which Quezon championed. A council of Dato was convened, and the council decided that Mohammed Jamal al-Kiram’s replacement as the new sultan of Sulu would be Dayang Dayang-Hajji Piandoo. The government was asked to ratify its selection, but the request was rejected on the grounds that the sultanate had come to an end with Kiram’s death,

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and the government no longer recognized people with the title of sultan in the South Philippines. The policy was ratified anew on 20 September 1938 in a mem­ orandum sent by President Quezon to the secretary for Internal Affairs which stated that the ranks of sultan and Dato were canceled according to the principle that all Filipinos were equal before the law and in their treatment by government agencies. Consequently, sultans and Dato could no longer represent the Muslim population. Quezon attempted to nullify all titles carried by Muslim leaders, but in this he was unsuccessful.34 The Commonwealth administration also disregarded local Muslim courts (Agama). Again, Muslim religious sensitivities were greatly offended as they had been when the traditional aristocracy was set aside. Muslims persisted in their objections to the government's education policy which they regarded as imparting a Christian education, exposure to which could only be a detriment to their Islamic way of life. Attendance by Muslim students in public schools was limited during the Commonwealth period as it had been during the period of American rule. Re­ ligion was not the only reason for parents’ resistance. The Muslim population was poor and needed the help of the children in the fields, and the distance between Muslim settlements left many children far from schools.3s The settlement in the south by Christians from the northern islands went on from the final decades of Spanish rule into the period of direct American rule and con­ tinued under Philippine independence. It was one of the greatest— if not the foremost—irritants leading to friction with the Muslim community. The reality behind the Commonwealth government’s settlement policy was the dire economic straits in which it found itself. Agricultural land in the densely populated northern and central districts was in short supply, and severe unemployment was common. The idea was that a solution could be found in the southern, sparsely populated islands as immigrants were directed there to ease crowding in the north. But the government’s reasons went beyond economic ones. There was also a security con­ sideration: the need to increase the proportion of Christians in the south relative to the number of Muslims whose loyalty was suspect. This approach was in line with Quezon’s aim of integrating the Muslims of the south into the general population. In a 16 June 1936 speech, Quezon announced his intention of instituting the sys­ tematic settlement of Filipinos from the northern districts of Luzon and Visaya on land in the south in order to develop the economy of the southern region. Actually, this was a continuation of the 1912 American plan to settle Mindanao. The goal was to open extensive tracts of land in sparsely populated Mindanao, particularly Cotabato and Sulu, to Christian settlers from the crowded areas of Luzon and Visaya. Beginning in 1936, the pace of immigration was stepped up with the sup­ port of the Commonwealth government, the main settlement sites being Lanao and Cotabato. There were scores of settlers who came at their own initiative and took over land, and foreign and domestic investments in the region grew. There were those in the aristocracy who collaborated with the government and, not infre­ quently, traditional leaders who were registered as owners of public land sold it to

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settlers or to other economic interests. As they had been under the American rule, many among the Muslim population were confronted with difficulties. They did not understand, or perhaps did not wish to understand, the registration process of landownership—a system which ran counter to their concepts of community, as opposed to individual, ownership of land. Nor did government officials, entrusted with land registration, provide the Moro with assistance.36 In 1939, a more vigor­ ous agricultural settlement project was begun in the south. In June of that year, the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) was set up, and it added a new facet to the settlement picture with candidates drawn from army veterans. The aims of the NLSA were to deal with the acquisition of land from the government or from private sources, to organize settlement efforts and the cultivation of the land, to grant farmers from the north and demobilized soldiers the opportunity to acquire the land they worked, to foster immigration in sparsely settled regions, to enable the integration of people from various communities in the settlements in keeping with the government’s integration policy, and to develop more profitable crops. The major region of activity centered in Mindanao. In a number of cases, the government declared privately owned land to be in the public domain and made it available for purchase, although it was inhabited by Muslims who considered it to be their ancestral land. As early as 1935, Dato Salipada K. Pendatun (who was to fill public functions in subsequent years as well) wrote a memorandum to the deputy governor of the Philippines alerting him to the fact that the land issue could result in violence. And, indeed, within a very short time, the number of settlers who arrived under the aegis of the NLSA grew considerably. There was even a suggestion that year, not acted on despite the fact that it was proposed by Manuel Quezon himself, to settle ten thousand Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria who were being persecuted by the Nazi regime already in power in both those countries.37 Despite President Quezon’s declared policy of fostering equality and the unifi­ cation of the Philippine people, the Commonwealth government’s integration pol­ icy for the southern islands clearly discriminated in favor of the Christian popula­ tion, and this inevitably led to Muslim opposition. There is no doubt that Quezon wanted to limit irritants that could lead to conflict between Christians and Mus­ lims, but ultimately even he had to resort to force in order to overcome the bitter resistance of the Muslims. In any number of cases, the anger and recriminations broke out into armed clashes just as it did during the Spanish and American re­ gimes which preceded Quezon’s government. The worst of the military clashes between Muslims and the armed forces of the Philippine government were cen­ tered in Lanao during the years 1936-1941. Muslims, resorting to their old style of fighting from fortified cotta, were generally defeated by government forces.38 World War II put a stop to this period of transition in the Philippines. In Decem­ ber 1941 the Japanese invaded Davao and Sulu. For the most part they had no particular approach to the Muslims, treating them in the same manner as they did Christian Filipinos. Their policy was determined exclusively by military consider­

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ations. While the Japanese did not intervene in the internal affairs of the Moro, at times they used drastic and brutal repressive measures to enforce obedience on the population. During their entire military occupation, the Japanese were engaged in pacification measures to insure the cooperation of Muslim leaders in the southern islands. They did not succeed either because of the harshness and brutality of Jap­ anese officers in the field or because the Muslims remembered an earlier prewar rapprochement between themselves and the Americans. The majority of Muslims refused to collaborate with the Japanese or with the officials of the puppet govern­ ment appointed by them. Despite a vigorous propaganda campaign, the Japanese were not accepted by the Muslim population who regarded them as foreign occu­ piers and not as “fellow Asians.” Some Muslim leaders did cooperate with the Japanese because, among other reasons, they believed that it would benefit the members of their community. But there were also bands of anti-Japanese guerillas. Lanao, as well as Sulu and Cotabato, saw strong anti-Japanese fighting by guerilla units. Japanese reprisals were brutal and only exacerbated the hatred of the local population towards them. In Cotabato, the guerilla forces were organized by such notables as Dato Salipada Rashid Lucman Piendatun, his son-in-law, Dato Udtog Matalam, and others prominent for their political activity in the postwar years as well. Their guerilla units included Muslims and Christians who fought together, occasionally under American commanders. There was also cooperation between separate Muslim and Christian guerilla groups. Many in the Moro leadership be­ lieved that the Americans should be aided because of past American assistance to the Muslims. The guerilla units were in control of important areas in Cotabato; nonetheless, there were a few Dato in Cotabato and Sulu who cooperated with the Japanese, not only on the administrative level, but sometimes in counterguerilla fighting. Even in this pro-Japanese group, however, after a time numbers of people began moving to the other side and joined the guerillas. Following the distribution of American arms (which were brought to the Philippines from Australia in Amer­ ican submarines) to units of the Muslim guerillas, the status of the guerilla fighters rose in the eyes of both the Muslim and the Christian population. In the course of the war there were, of course, also cases of attacks by Muslim units against Chris­ tian settlers and attacks by Christian guerilla units against the Muslim population. During the Japanese occupation (1941-1944), a Philippine Government in Exile was set up in Washington, D.C., by Quezon and Osmena. Quezon died in exile, and Osmena returned after the war as the new president. In April 1946 the first postwar elections were held, and Manuel Roxas was elected president of the incipient in­ dependent Republic.39 The relationship between the Muslims and the Americans during and after World War II can be traced to a background of changing attitudes on the part of Muslims which turned from hostility and armed resistance to the beginnings of trust and acquiescence under continued American control. Armed Muslim resist­ ance during the American period went from relatively large-scale operations to sporadic small incidents. One of the most telling characteristics of the Moro resist­

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ance was the lack of coordination and cooperation between the various ethnic communities, though there were acts of heroism and self-sacrifice on all sides. This disharmony stemmed from a gamut of factors: the mutual suspicion that persisted between them as a result of a tradition of internal squabbles and distrust; the com­ petitiveness, antagonisms, and schisms between various Muslim leaders coupled with the lack of an acknowledged leader whose authority was acceptable to all, preventing a unified resistance to foreign rule that could have made the lot of the Americans much more difficult. The fact that there was no language common to all the Muslim communities also greatly impeded the emergence of unity. There was no connection between struggles conducted by Dato in Cotabato or in Lanao on the one hand, and in uprisings that occurred in Sulu on the other. Furthermore, there were Dato who collaborated with the Americans if only to spite their neigh­ bors and competitors, or because they hoped for American recognition and other benefits from the American authorities. In brief, there was no unified Muslim resistance to American rule. In fact, in the second decade of the twentieth century, American control in all Muslim areas was stronger because of defeats the Muslims suffered in a series of uprisings between 1906 and 1913. This state of affairs was greatly, but only gradually, changed after World War II (and this will be discussed later.) During the American Civil Administration (1914-1939) and into the Com­ monwealth period, armed resistance by the Muslims was even weaker, certainly as compared to what happened during the period of military rule (1899-1913), be­ cause most of the Moro had been disarmed. Further, although there was no short­ age of reasons for bitterness, particularly due to continued Christian settlement, the Civil Administration's Policy of Attraction and Integration was less repressive, more tolerant than policy in the military period had been. On the whole, reactions to the Civil Administration were less violent. The trust shown by many heads of Muslim communities toward the Americans grew because Muslims preferred American rule to Filipino Christian rule since the latter was considered a greater threat to their religious and cultural identity. Given all this, after the war, Muslim Dato appealed to the president of the United States and the Congress, asking that Mindanao and Sulu not be annexed to an independent Philippine state.40 By granting them opportunities for greater political, economic, and social ad­ vancement similar to those given Christian communities, the Americans hoped to draw the Muslims into support for a number of development plans. They believed there could be a gain of such ancillary goals as inculcating the American values of individualism, social mobility, equality before the law, separation of church and state, and the activation of democratic modes in local government. The Americans were mistaken in their assumption that religion could be separated from other as­ pects of Muslim life and that overcoming religious differences would then open the way toward the development of a united Philippine people. In this context, Americans fostered an expansion of the educational network, medical services, land registry, and new political forms. The problem was that with the growth in the number of Christians who achieved positions of prominence in government there

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were commensurately greater Muslim reservations, hostility, and alienation. While Christian political leaders supported plans for the advancement of the Muslims, their primary aspiration was independence. For example, termination of the De­ partment of Mindanao and Sulu as well as attempts at integrating the Muslims in general, was intended to demonstrate the existence of a united nation, while en­ couragement of settlement by northern Christians in Mindanao coupled with the plans for economic development of the southern districts would serve to both en­ hance order in the area and increase national prosperity. There were Muslims who cooperated with these goals. Muslims and Christians joined forces in election cam­ paigns for public office. There were Muslim officeholders who operated within the governing structure in order to acquire political power and economic advan­ tages. In the end, however, there were too many manifestations of insensitivity toward the Muslims, and this stood in the way of realizing the new democratic goals.41 World War II was the breaking point in this trend. With the achievement of independence in 1946, and the withdrawal of the Americans from the Philip­ pines, a new era began. But the entrenched causes of tension between Muslims and Christians were inflamed again, this time with greater intensity.

Notes 1. For a general, but brief, description of American policy toward the Muslims during the period of the American occupation, see Majul, “Some Social Cultural Problems," 89-91; Gowing, Mosque and Moro, 23-25; idem, Muslim Filipinos, 34-38; George, op. cit., 49-69; Tan, “Sulu under American Military Rule,” 54-87; Mastura, Muslim Filipino Experience, 78-92; Thomas, Muslim but Filipino, 324, 332-333, 337-339; Carmen Abubakar, “Islam in the Philippines,” 49-56; Miravite, “Historical Background,” 41-42; Federspiel, op. cit., 340-356. 2. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland 14-15, 26; idem, “America's Proconsuls,” 5; Lacar, “Neglected Dimensions,” 298. 3. At the beginning of the war with Spain, the American government was not aware of the existance of Muslims in the southern Philippines. When the fact was brought to the attention of the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Oscar S. Strauss, he was anxious to prevent a Muslim holy war against the Americans. Strauss requested a meeting with the Ottoman sultan, Abd al-Khamid, at which he asked that in his capacity as a Caliph of Islam, the sultan use his good offices with the Muslims of the Philippines. As it turned out, the sultan himself was unaware that there were Muslims in the Philippines and at­ tempted to find out whether they made pilgrimages to Mecca. A telegram sent to Mecca elicited the information that, indeed, they did make such piligrimages. Ambassador Strauss then produced copies of documents showing that the United States had signed agreements with Muslim dignitaries in 1796 with the Bey of Tripoli, in 1806 with the Berbers in North Africa, and a number of treaties with the Ottoman Empire itself beginning in 1895. In all these documents it was stated that the U.S. was not hostile to the laws, religion, or welfare of the Muslims, and that it had never fought against nor acted in a hostile way against any Muslim state. As a caliph, the sultan then sent a communique to the sultan of Sulu forbid-

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ding him to engage in any hostile activity against the Americans, since under US. rule there would certainly not be any interference in the religion of the Muslims. It is possible that this is one of the reasons that the Moro rejected Aguinaldo’s appeal to them. This communique apparently did not get to Mindanao and certainly not to Maranao. In any case, American President William McKinley sent Ambassador Strauss a letter commending him on his diplomatic efforts which forestalled a holy war. Regarding this episode, see John P. Finley, “The Mohammedan Problem in the Philippines,” The Journal o f Race Development, vol. 5, no. 4 (April 1915): 357-361. 4. For the text of the Bates Agreement, see Robert Bacon, “The Moro Problem in the Philippine Islands,” Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.: US. House of Representa­ tives, May 6,1926), 8835; Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 348-349 (appendix B). See also 318-319; Tan, “Sulu under American Military Rule,” 174-175; Guingona, “Historical Sur­ vey,” 182-184; See also Finley, “Mohammedan Problem II,” 28; Gowing, “Muslim-American Relations,” 373; idem, “America’s Proconsuls,” 8-9; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 46-47; Orosa, Sulu Archipelago, 35-37; Santos, “Some Observations,” 76; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 173-174; Mastura, Muslim Filipino Experi­ ence, 45-60; Carmen Abubakar, “Islam in the Philippines,” 49. 5. Gowing, “Muslim-American Relations,” 374-375; idem, “America’s Proconsuls,” 8-9, 11-12; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 319-320; Che Man, op. cit., 47; Santos, op. cit., 77-78; Magdelana, “Moro-American Relations,” 429-430; Regarding the Maranao’s bitter oppo­ sition to the American army’s paving of roads into Muslim territory, see R. L. Bullard, “Road Building among the Moros,” The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 92, no. 554 (December 1903): 820, 825, and idem, “Preparing Our Moros for Government,” op. cit., vol. 97, no. 3 (March 1906): 385-386; In both articles, the author describes the civilizing notion that motivated the Americans who wanted to improve the life of the Moro. 6. Gowing, “Muslim-American Relations,” 375-378; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 320-324; Kiefer, The Tausug, 4; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 47-48; R. B. Thomas, “Asia for Asiatics? Muslim Filipino Responses to Japanese Occupation and Propaganda during World War II,” Asian Forum, vol. 4, no. 3. (Washinton, D.C., July-September 1972): 44; Santos, “Some Observations,” 78-80; Horvatich, “Keeping Up with the Hassans,” 52-53; Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction, 103-104; Aprodicio A. Laquian, “The Political Integra­ tion of Muslim Filipinos,” The Philippine Journal o f Public Administration (October 18, 1969): 368-369; Magdalena, “Moro-American Relations,” 430; Carmen Abubakar, “Islam in the Philippines,” 52. 7. General Wood was not the only senior American in the Philippine administration who neither understood Islam nor showed much respect for the values and religion of the Mus­ lims of the south. Another such example is seen in the senior official, Ralston Hayden, who wrote in his article, “What Next for the Moro,” published in 1928, “The Moors, groups of primitive peoples without either national organization or sentiment are suspicious and afraid of the forces which they feel closing in around them.” p. 633. 8. R. B. Thomas, Muslim But Filipino, 15-16, 33-36; Gowing, “Muslim-American Re­ lations,” 372, 378-379; idem, Muslim Filipinos, 38-41; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 139-148,242. 9. D. J. Steinberg, The Philippines, 91; Gowing, “America’s Proconsuls,” 13—16; Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago, 41-42; Ugarte, “Muslims and Madness,” 17—18; Tan, “Sulu under American Military Rule,” 25-53.

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10. See endnotes 39 and 40; also Kiefer, The Tausug, 133. 11. Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago, 37-38,42; Tan, op. cit., 55, 83; Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 95-97; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 48-49. 12. Ugarte. “Muslims and Madness,” 2; D. J. Steinberg, The Philippines, 90; Orosa, op. cit., 37,43; Gowing, “America’s Proconsuls,” 16. 13. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 49-50; Gowing, op. cit., 18-20; Diamond and Gowing, Islam and Muslims, 78; May, “The Philippines,” 215; Carmen Abubakar, “Islam in the Philippines,” 51; Magdalena, “Colonization,” 64; idem, “Moro-American Relations," 431. 14. Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago, 45-46; Gowing, “Muslim-American Relations," 379; idem, “America’s Proconsuls,” 21, 23-24; Tan, The Filipino Muslims, 19-27; Guingona, “Historical Survey," 189; Clayton D. Laurie, “The Philippine Scouts: America’s Colonial Army, 1899-1913,” Philippine Studies, vol. 37 (second quarter, 1989), 190; Che Man, op. cit., 50; Magdalena, “Colonization,” 63. 15. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 247-248. 16. Gowing, op. cit., 18, 242,251,257-260,274; idem, “Muslim American Relations,” 373,379; idem, “America’s Proconsuls,” 22,24; Guingona, “Historical Survey,” 190; R. B. Thomas, Muslim but Filipino, 45-60; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 23-24,50-52; Ralston Hayden, “What Next for the Moro?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 6, no. 4 (July 1928): 639-640. 17. Text of memorandum in Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 352-353; Guingona, op. cit., 192-194; Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 176-179. 18. In theory, Islamic jurisprudence does not differentiate between spiritual-religious au­ thority and temporal authority. Such a distinction originated in Western civilization when a struggle developed between popes and emperors. Islam is not a church with a religious hierarchy such as the Catholic Church, and the caliph is not a pope. The distinction between temporal and spiritual-religious authority began in Muslim lands because of historio-political developments in the early centuries of Islam, in the period of the Abbasid Caliphate, when local regimes surfaced which, in theory, continued to recognize the sover­ eignty of the caliph despite the fact that he had lost his temporal powers. A written formu­ lation of this can be found in Thomas W. Arnold’s The Caliphate (London: 1965), 163-204: “The distinction between spiritual-religious and temporal authority in Islam began to take hold after the Treaty of Peace signed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia at Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774. The Ottoman Sultan, in compensation for the loss of sovereignty over the Crimean Tatars, was able to retain his religious authority over them as Caliph. Hence­ forth the notion of a spiritual Caliphate, modelled on the Christian Papacy but essentially foreign to Islam, gradually gained ground. The Ottomans made good use of it both as a focus of loyalty for their Muslim subects as well as a means for extending their influence among Muslim peoples outside the Empire. In the Constitution of 1876 the Ottoman ruler was recognized both as Sultan of the Empire and as a Caliph who is the protector of the Muslim religion. In several agreements with foreign countries (such as the one conceding Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria in 1908 or the Lausanne Treaty handing over Tripolitania to Italy in 1912) it was agreed that the authority of the Ottoman Caliph over his former Muslim subjects would be maintained. The distinction made between the two kinds of authority investitured in the Ottoman dynasty later made it possible for the TUrkish nationalists to abolish the Sultanate in 1922, while keeping the Caliphate, but they soon realized the reper­ cussions of retaining an institution linking them with the Muslim world, and in 1924 abol­

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ished the Caliphate as well”; I am indebted to Prof. David Kushnir of Haifa University for this reference. In material available to me in the preparation of this study, there was no documentary evidence that such precedents were known to the Americans or to the sultan of Sulu who signed the 1915 agreement. Nonetheless, expressions that found their way into the formal document (the Sultan of Sulu is the titular spiritual head of the Mohammedan Church) do give the impression that such precedents in terminology were known by the principles. It should be remembered that there were contacts between the Sultanate of Sulu and the Ottoman Empire, and that through such contacts such formulations could have become known. Another source for information might have been the American Embassy in Instanbul through whom the American negotiators could have become acquainted with the terms. There is room for further study of this matter. 19. Guingona, op. cit., 193-195; Gowing, “Kris and Crescent,” 14; idem, “Muslim-American Relations,” 381; Thomas, Muslim But Filipino, 157-161; Kiefer, The Tausug, 4; Tarling, Sulu and Sabah, 317. 20. Orosa, The Sulu Archipelago, 47-51,56; Hayden, “What Next for Moro?” 638-639; Gowing, “Muslim-American Relations,” 373, 380-381; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 320, 325-327; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 52; Carter G. Bentley, “Implicit Evangelism: American Education among the Muslim Maranao,” Pilipinas, no. 12 (spring 1989), 73-79; Gopinath. “Muslim Autonomy,” 5. 21. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 279-281; Orosa, op. cit., 54-55. 22. Finley, “The Mohammedan Problem II,” 38-39; Gowing, op. cit., 4; May, “The Phil­ ippines,” 216; Orosa, op. cit., 57; D. J. Steinberg, The Philippines, 17, 92. 23. For the text of the resolutions passed by the Zamboanga Chamber of Commerce on January 30, 1910, see Tan, The Filipino Muslims, 168-169. 24. Gowing, “Muslim-American Relations,” 376,380-381; idem. Mandate in Moroland, 291-293; idem, “America’s Proconsuls,” 17, 20; idem, Muslim Filipinos, 38; Silva, Two Hills of the Same Land, 35-36, 40-42; Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 71-80; Mercado, “Culture, Economics and Revolt,” 175; Magdalena, “Colonization,” 65; idem, “Moro-American Relations,” 432; Wemstedt and Simkins, “Migrations and Settlement of Mindanao,” 87-88; B. R. Rodil, “The Lumad and Moro of Mindanao: An Introduction,” Minority Rights Group International Report (July 1993): 12; May, “Muslim Separatism,” 298; idem, “The Philippines,” 216. 25. James C. Stewart, “The Cotabato Conflict: Impressions of an Outsider,” in Rster Gowing, ed, Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988), 115-116; R. B. Thomas, Muslim but Filipino, 35, 63-65; Carmen Abubakar, “Islam in the Philippines,” 52-55; Silva, op. cit., 66-67; Magdalena, “Moro-American Relations ” 431 -432; Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 898-899; Noble, “The Philippines,” 13; A basic text for understanding the approach implicit in important Ameri­ can laws vis-&-vis the Moro, and particularly the subject of Christian settlement and eco­ nomic development is found in an article written by an American administrator in the Phil­ ippines, Ralston Hayden, “What Next for the Moro?” published in 1928. 26. Stewart, op. cit., 116-117; Asiri Abubakar, “Muslim Philippines,” 123-124; Lacar, “Neglected Dimensions,” 300-301; Ahmad, "Class and Colony," 8. 27. Gowing, “Muslim-American Relations," 380-381; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 313, 326; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 52; May, “The Philippines," 215; Guingona, “Historical Survey," 197.

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239

28. For the meaning of these terms, see “Imama,” in El2, vol. 3, 1163-1169, and “al-Mahdi,” in EI2, vol. 5,1230-1238. There is no special significance to combining both these terms, nor are other such cases known. From sources available for this study, it is not clear whether the leader of this rebellion used both these titles. 29. Hayden, “What Next for the Moro?” 641-643; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 53-54; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 170. 30. Bacon, ‘The Moro Problem," 8830-8836. Contains also the 1924 petition, entitled “A Declaration of Rights and Purposes Addressed to the Congress of the United States of America,” Exhibit II. See also Gowing, op. cit., 168-169; Thomas, Muslim but Filipno, 41, 96-97, 126-127; Che Man, op. cit., 53; Santos, “Some Observations,” 71, 81-82; Glang, Muslim Secession, 75; Magdalena, “Moro-American Relations,” 433; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 6; Bauzon, Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Identity in the Philippines, 67-70. 31. Text of the memorandum in Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle (appendix G), 180-184. 32. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 169-174; idem, Mandate in Moroland, 327, 332, 339, 342; Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 899; R. B. Thomas, Muslim But Filipino, 193-197, 239-254; R. J. May, “The Religious Factor,” 307-308; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 54-55; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 6-7; idem, “Muslim Filipinos,” 97-100; T. J. S. George, “The Philippines: A Good Idea at the Time,” FEER, vol. 79, no. 12 (March 26, 1973): 14-15; Abdurasad Asani, “The Bangsamoro People,” 299-302; Santos, “Some Ob­ servations,” 81-82; Glang, Muslim Secession, 15-17, 75; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 179-180; B. R. Rodil, “The Lumad and Moro of Mindanao: An Introduc­ tion,” Minority Rights Group International Report (July 1993), 16; Tan, op. cit., 102; For text of the petition of March 18, 1935, see Leon M. Guerrero, “Philippines: Conflict of Cultures,” The Asian (Hong Kong: January 14-20, 1973), 20-28. 33. R. B. Thomas, op. cit., 269-270; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 176-177; Che Man, op. cit., 55; Mamintal A. Tamano, “Problems of the Muslims: A National Concern,” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publish­ ing House, 1974), 262; Guingona, “Historical Survey,” 198; Tan, op. cit., 36-46, 93-94; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 87,94-95. 34. Text of Quezon’s memorandum of September 20, 1938, can be found in Guingona, “Historical Survey,” 199-202, also 203; and Tamano, “Problems of the Muslims,” 262; Gopinath, “Muslim Filipinos,” 108. 35. Gopinath, op. cit., 108-109; Thomas, Muslim but Filipino, 275-279. 36. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 175-176; Gopinath, op. cit., 97,101-102; idem, “Muslim Autonomy,” 8. 37. Thomas, Muslim but Filipino, 264-267; Silva, Two Hills o f the Same Land, 36,43-44; Gopinath, “Muslim Filipinos,” 103, 105; Magdalena, “Colonization,” 65; Rodil, “Lumad and Moro,” 12. 38. Gowing, Mulslim Filipinos, 178; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 55-56; Gopinath, op. cit., 106, 112. 39. Thomas, “Asia for Asiatics?” 43-57; idem, Muslim but Filipino, 42-43, 289-309; Gowing, op. cit, 179-182; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 104; Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 106. 40. For the text of the Dato message, see Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities,” 331-332.

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41. Hayden, “What Next for the Moro?” 636-637; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 56; Tan, “Unity and Disunity,” 116-121,126,129,132-133; idem, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 47-52.

Chapter Nineteen

The Philippine Republic

On 4 July 1946 the United States granted the Philippines independence. Manuel A. Roxas was elected president and Elpidio Quirino vice-president. When Roxas died of a heart attack on 15 April of the following year, Quirino replaced him as president. The Muslim population of the southern Philippines found itself part of the new republic. Philippine leadership was imbued with a spirit of national fervor and a determination to establish a liberal, democratic country. Certainly the Mus­ lim southern islands would remain in the new republic; these districts had been an integral part of the Philippine national concept from the inception of the nationalist movement at the end of the nineteenth century. The leadership was convinced that Mindanao and Sulu were of vital importance to both the economic development of the country and its political security. Clearly, the notion of secession by the Muslim South would never be entertained, and Muslim insistence on secession could only run into strong opposition on the part of the government to suppress it. The majority of Muslims did not share in this spirit of nationalism although there were Moro leaders, particularly among those who had acquired a modem education, who wanted to maintain their positions of influence and privilege by supporting and participating in the new political system. Uneasy about an inde­ pendent Philippines ruled by a Christian majority, the Muslims, called Bangsa Mom (the Moro nation), did not regard themselves as citizens of the Philippine Republic and many felt their lands were being occupied by foreigners. Their pri­ mary loyalty was to Islam and their identity was unquestionably Muslim. They felt themselves a nation separate from the country's Christian majority and wanted to maintain their separate lives in keeping with their own social and economic codes and their own political ethics. The problem of conflicting loyalties grew in com­ plexity as a deepening sense of religious identity took hold which was an out­ growth of the Islamic renaissance and the politicization that accompanied it throughout the Muslim world in the 1950s and 1960s. In the South Philippines, despite internal splintering into a number of ethnic communities, for Muslims as a whole, the sense of separate identity was exacerbated by Christian immigration from the north and by feelings of discrimination against Muslims caused by the government’s integration policy.1 241

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In the early 1950s, a stream of religious preachcrs and teachers from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Qatar, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia began arriving in Mindanao and Sulu. They excited religious devotion. In a number of instances, they effected a reform in the religious customs of the Moro bringing them closer to the accepted norms of orthodox Islam in the observance of precepts and adher­ ence to customs and dress that were unknown in the Philippines before World War II. The influence of Arab countries, particularly that of Egypt following Abdul Nasser’s rise to power and the initiation of his pan-Islam policy, was very strong. Simultaneously, Arab governments, Islamic institutions, and universities such as al-Azhar in Cairo or the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia granted scholarships to young Moro men. Between 1977 and 1981, several hundred schol­ arships were awarded by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, and Libya. Many of these young students returned to the southern Phil­ ippines to become teachers in madrasas. Some students studied in secular univer­ sities in Cairo and a few even had military training. Organizations of Philippine Muslim students were established in a number of countries, and in subsequent years their members played an activist role in developments among Muslims of the south. The community of Philippine Muslim students in Cairo became a center for Islamic activism in search of political change in the Philippine Muslims. Moro leaders were invited to participate in conferences and seminars of various Muslim bodies. A growing number of Muslims from the south took part in the annual haj to Mecca, and annually hundreds returned from the haj to their com­ munities with enhanced prestige, religious devotion, and a greater commitment to Islam. In the years 1978-1980, some 4,498 Moro participated in the haj. The pil­ grimage to Mecca was a potent element in strengthening bonds between Muslims of Southeast Asia, including Philippine Muslims, and the international Muslim world. It facilitated the crystallization of a unique Muslim ethnic identity which differed from that of non-Muslim Filipinos and reinforced a sense of solidarity and fraternity. Burgeoning Islamic consciousness was expressed in the growing num­ ber of new mosques, religious schools (madrasas), and Islamic associations. The words Bangsa Moro became an identifying term for the various communities of Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu, a previously unknown phenomenon. Organiza­ tions were established for forging international links and soliciting financial aid from the Muslim world. Muslim governments made large financial grants for the construction of religious buildings in the southern Philippines and dozens of new mosques were financed in this way. Schools for the study of the Koran and insti­ tutions for the use of Muslim organizations were built with Arab money. Similarly, the dissemination of religious literature, from abroad or printed in the Philippines, was supported. In 1983, there were 987 madrasas, 3,095 religious instructors, and 132,811 students. These institutions taught reading of the Koran, performance of religious precepts, and the basic principles of Islam. Under the influence of Arab religious instructors, the curriculum of the madrasas was marginally expanded to include some courses in the history of Islam, mathematics, and other general top­

The Philippine Republic

243

ics. There were institutes of advanced religious study in Marawi City, Jolo, and other places. Many of the teachers in religious institutions received their salary from Arab countries. (It should be remembered that, as had been the case during the period of American rule, in the independent Philippines only a small minority of Muslim children, very few girls among them, attended government schools. Of these, a large proportion dropped out before grade 5.) The Philippine government also established Islamic institutions of higher learning at college or university level, such as the King Faisal Center of Arabic and Islamic Studies at Mindanao State University, and the Institute of Islamic Studies in the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies of the University of Quezon City. Muslim revival was spurred on following the rise of Arab nationalism and the appearance of independent Muslim states such as Pakistan and Indonesia after World War II. Since they always regarded themselves as part of the Ummah, and the international Muslim community, the Moro found their sense of Muslim iden­ tity reinforced by these developments. It is important also to take into account the newfound power and wealth which came about as a result of the discovery of oil, most of it in Muslim countries organized in OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.) Nor should the dynamics of nationality itself be lost sight of. The rise of Islamic radicalism in Muslim lands, and the public support given by some Muslim countries to the movements of Muslim revolt in the Philippines, and to a lesser extent, to Muslim revolts in Thailand and in Burma/Myanmar were unquestionably factors in the heightened militancy of Muslim minorities in those countries. All these elements fortified the ethno-religious consciousness of the Muslims and their sense of identity, as well as defining the alienation between them and the non-Muslim population of the Philippines. The new Muslim unity surfaced at the First Muslim Filipino Conference which was convened in 1955 in Cotabato City, where more than 5,000 people including delegations from Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Singapore participated. Another expression of pan-Islamic spirit was manifested at a mass rally held in Marawi City in June 1967 at the outbreak of the Arab-Israel War. Such resounding support for Egypt was heard that not only were donations collected, but many of the participants said that they wanted to join the Egyptian army. A young, new strata of Ulama with better religious and secular education made its appearance among the Moro. Educated young Muslims were more critical of traditional leaders, particularly of those who held political office, blaming them for inadequate efforts in improving the social and economic situa­ tion of the Muslim community. The traditional leadership was accused of main­ taining a feudal economic regime in which Muslims were exploited by fellow Muslims—an accusation never previously articulated.2 After 1950, signs of alienation, agitation, disquiet, and revolt began to appear in the Muslim South (not unlike those in Luzon in the north). At the beginning of 1951, Hajji Kamlun led a revolt in Sulu with a group that numbered between 100 and 300 people. The uprising lasted some five years, but its specific causes are

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unclear. Conceivably it broke out because of conflicts between local leaders; per­ haps because Kamlun refused to register land, claiming that it belonged to him in any case. Perhaps it was a revolt against foreign rule since the Philippine govern­ ment was perceived by many Muslims in the south as a foreign Christian govern­ ment that endangered the Moro’s traditional way of life, culture, and aspirations. Perhaps the revolt occurred as a reaction to Christian settlement in the south. There was another outbreak of hostilities in Lanao del Norte, this one led by Dato Tawan-Tawan. Suppressing these revolts required the use of a heavy military force which included thousands of soldiers. Kamlun surrendered on 31 July 1952 when he and fifty of his followers laid down their arms, but a week later they returned to the hills to continue the battle. On 22 August he was wounded, and on 10 No­ vember his men surrendered again and were sentenced to life in prison. They were given a reprieve on 2 December, only to return to the hills and renew the revolt in 1953. In November 1954 wide-ranging military action against Kamlun began and he surrendered for the last time on 24 September 1955. Kamlun remained in prison until he was pardoned by President Marcos on 11 December 1968.3 In 1954, after Kamlun’s revolt and the deterioration of the internal security sit­ uation in the Muslim areas, the Philippine Congress appointed a committee of three Muslim congressmen, headed by Congressman (later Senator) Domocao Alonto, to investigate the problems of the Moro and the situation in the south. The committee's report found that the Muslims neither identified as Philippine citizens nor as a part of the national body; instead, religion was the central element in their identity. Preferring to be called Muslims, their major loyalty was to the ethno-linguistic groups to which they belonged—Maranao, Tausug, Maguindanao, etc. This was particularly true for the rural Muslim population. Ed­ ucated Muslims tended to see themselves as “Filipino Muslims." In academic cir­ cles, both Muslims and Christians used the term “Moro.” The committee recom­ mended embarking on an educational and economic program for Muslims.4 The inquiry led the Philippine Congress to pass the Commission of National Integra­ tion (CNI) law in 1957. The purpose of the law was to raise the standard of living of Muslims by advancing their economic, social, educational, and political situa­ tion thus facilitating their full and permanent integration into the national society, a goal based on the premise that all citizens of the Philippines, regardless of their ethnic or religious community, belong to one nation. Belief was widespread that the development plans of the CNI could, indeed, achieve this goal. Of the five commissioners who headed the CNI until its dissolution, four were Muslims. Along with the CNI, the government established the State University of Mindanao in Marawi City to serve the educational needs of Muslims in the south and other minorities. The Mindanao Development Authority (MDA) was set up to expedite economic development in the south. Although it was formally founded two years earlier, the MDA did not begin its operations until 3 July 1963. Its mandate was short-term development programs such as the improvement of transportation and health services, coordination of private and public-sector activity, and arrange­

The Philippine Republic

245

ments for financial and administrative aid for the advancement of industrial, com­ mercial, and agricultural programs. The MDA was replaced by the Southern Phil­ ippines Development Administration (SPDA) in 1975 and the latter actually did assist in a number of projects. CNI’s results were spotty because of inefficient administration, corruption, inadequate budgets, and because it met with a cool reception by Muslims who suspected that the real goal of the declared integration was to blur Muslim identity. Until the 1970s, financial assistance to the Muslims of the south was meager and part of it found its way into the pockets of local politicians. In 1963, a committee of the Philippine Senate reviewed the work of the CNI and found that the hopes for achieving Muslim integration had not been realized and that social, economic, and educational gaps between Muslims and other sectors of the population had remained constant. Muslims recoiled from the paternalistic ap­ proach of the government’s policy which they believed was really meant to improve the lot of the Christians, and whose aims of assimilation they rejected. The CNI’s operation continued until April 1975 when it was disbanded.5 In only one area did the CNI achieve anything of importance. By offering stipends, it gave young Mus­ lims the opportunity to acquire an education. The program of stipends that reached its peak in the 1960s enabled Muslim students from poor families to attend a uni­ versity. Many completed studies in law, engineering, medicine, the fine arts, and the liberal arts. Between 1958 and 1967, the number of recipients of such grants rose from 109 to 1,210. Admittedly many were the children of Dato but opportu­ nities were also extended to a sizable number of other Muslims to study at the university. Perhaps most important was the fact that while engaged in studies, Mus­ lim students from various tribal groups were able to meet on campus. They began forming associations and organizations, had social gatherings and held discussions at which common problems were aired. They spoke about their common roots and historic efforts and the importance of unified action for the presentation of their complaints, which would be made first to the authorities at the academic institu­ tions where they were enrolled and later to the government. Manila became the focus of this activity. The only mosque in the city also served as a meeting place after Friday prayers. They became conscious of belonging to a large Muslim com­ munity which prompted crystallization of their historic common identity and na­ tionality. They perceived their nationality as differing from that of the Philippine people. In subsequent years, these meetings and discussions had far-reaching re­ sults; though certainly not with the outcome that those who founded CNI had in mind.6 At the end of World War II, the renewal of immigration southward from the congested areas of Luzon and Visaya and the settlement of a Christian population in the area of sparsely populated Mindanao were among the most disturbing ele­ ments in the heightened tension of Muslims and the growth of their hostility toward Christians. Actually, the immigration was a continuation of the 1913-1917 Amer­ ican policy of integration in which thousands of Christian settlers were directed to

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the south. Already then Muslims were disinherited from their lands and the popu­ lation balance in several places began shifting in favor of a Christian majority. The main thrust of settlement until 1939 had been to Mindanao or to other relatively uncultivated lands which the Muslims regarded as their own. During the war, im­ migration had ceased but soon after it ended the stream resumed, this time much more vigorously. Immigration in the 1950s and 1960s was exceptionally large in response to government settlement programs, as well to the fact that roads were being paved and there were improvements in the health system. The new roads opened many areas to settlement and attracted settlers who took possession of lands that bordered the roads. When the war ended, the government began a highly effective campaign to eradicate malaria and diseases. District hospitals were opened and, in general, there was an improvement in medical services. Under­ standably, these changes were among the factors that attracted new settlers. At this stage, most settlers went to Cotabato, Bukidnon, Davao, Zamboanga del Sur, and Agusan. During the twentieth century, the Muslim community in Mindanao grew at a pace similar to that of the population in the rest of the country. But the large-scale Christian immigration to Mindanao had a noticeable impact on the proportion of Muslims in the population, on landownership, and on the profound demographic change that occurred in the south. Between 1948 and 1960, six districts in Minda­ nao doubled, perhaps more than doubled their population, and the demographic balance in those districts changed completely to the detriment of the Muslims. This left a Muslim majority in merely five of the twenty-three districts of Mindanao Island, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan: Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi. In 1903, the population density on Mindanao Island was five per square kilometer; by 1948, density had climbed to 19 per square kilome­ ter.7 Another illustration of the regressing proportion of Muslims to Christians in the Mindanao population is seen in population figures. In 1903, there were 250,000 Muslims out of a total population of 327,741; that is, 76 percent Muslims compared to 24 percent non-Muslims. By 1975, Muslims had become much more numerous— 1,798,911, but this was out of a total population of 9,146,995 or only 20 percent of the population as compared to 80 percent non-Muslims. In Cotabato in 1960, there were only 370,000 Christians compared to 650,000 Muslims and other non-Christians; by 1970, the number of Christians had climbed to 750,000. Another example: in an important area of settlement, the Kapatagan Basin in Lanao del Norte, there were merely two dozen Christian settlers in 1918; by 1960, there were 93,000 Christians and 7,000 Maranao Muslims. Between 1903 and 1948 (the preindependence period), 700,000 people migrated to Mindanao, but in the twelve-year period from 1948 to 1960, some 1,250,000 migrated (and some estimates place the figure at two million). The rate of increase was not equal in all of Mindanao’s districts. The largest number of Christian settlers went to Cotabato and Davao, with another sizable immigration to Zamboanga. In any case, in those twelve years, 1948-1960, a population of just under three million in Mindanao

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247

grew to a bit over five million. More than half of this population growth—perhaps as many as one and a quarter to two million people—was the result of immigration by non-Muslims from the north. The rapid growth in population in Mindanao con­ tinued after 1960 as well. By 1970, the number of Christians in Mindanao was 6,294,224; and by 1980, the number had grown to 8,400,911. Thus the population of Mindanao as a whole, in 1980, was estimated at 10,905,243 of whom 2,504,332 were Muslims, for a ratio of 23 percent Muslims and 77 percent non-Muslims.8 Without delving into the minutiae of numbers and estimates, what clearly emerges is a realignment of the demographic balance in most of the districts of the Muslim South and a significant shift in political power there. Government intervention in the immigration process of Christians from the north did not begin immediately. In the early period, Manuel Roxas, the first pres­ ident of the republic, was primarily concerned with establishing political and eco­ nomic ties with the United States and could not spare much attention to other matters. The only internal problem which disturbed the government at the time was the Communist revolt of the Huk (Hukbalahap) in Luzon. The Huk had been or­ ganized on 29 March 1942 during World War II. When Roxas died on 15 April 1947, approximately two years after he was elected, the Huk rebellion continued to be the major domestic concern of the government under his successor, Elipidio Quirino. Consequently, from the first year of independence until 1950, only 8,300 families were brought to settlements established in the south by the government. Over the next four years, there were only 1,500 families. Settlement efforts were stepped up when Ramon Magsaysay, the man reputed to have reigned in the Huk in Luzon when he was secretary of Defense in Quirino’s government, was elected president. His persuasive offer to give tracts of land in Mindanao to former rebels who had surrendered may have been a major factor in the cessation of hostilities. The plan, called the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), aimed to relieve population density in Luzon and ease some of the economic pressures there, to benefit demobilized soldiers, and to develop the economic potential of Mindanao. The government's motivation was not anti-Muslim; rather, it stemmed from a con­ viction that the country had to be dealt with as a whole, and that there was no reason not to exploit possibilities which existed in the south to relieve the hardship caused by overpopulation in the north. The official settlement programs also attracted a spontaneous stream of immigrants who went to the south of their own volition with no connection to official bodies. Indeed, it was estimated that more people came privately than under government sponsorship, which may explain the wide-ranging estimates as to the number of Christian settlers from the north. Tens of thousands of Filipinos migrated to the south, among them landless farmers, former Commu­ nists, released prisoners, army veterans, and those who were merely adventurers. New cities sprang up and existing cities and villages grew and expanded. In the wake of the settlers, economic investments, most of them American, injected cap­ ital into establishing cattle ranches, expanding groves, developing mines, and har­ vesting lumber from the forest. At the same time, the government was involved in

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irrigation projects, building dams and developing hydroelectric power, improve­ ments in the sanitation services, and school construction. A more systematic approach to settlement began during Ramon Magsaysay’s term of office. In a gradual process, Christians (members of the Chinese commu­ nity) took control of business, industry, the economy in general, and exploited the natural resources of Mindanao. Christians took over public services as most Mus­ lims lacked the educational qualifications to compete with Christian job seekers. For the most part, workers in industry were Christian. And, since the lifestyle of the Christian settlers offended their sensibilities, Muslims avoided social contact with them.9 Magsaysay concentrated on dealing with immigration and settlement, breathing life into the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) which, though it had been founded before the outbreak of the war, was a moribund orga­ nization. In 1954, a new body was established to foster immigration and administer the territories targeted for future settlement. The National Resettlement and Reha­ bilitation Administration (NARRA) expanded settlement sites, especially for for­ mer Huk fighters that had surrendered. Between 1954 and 1958, some 23,400 Christian families were settled in Cotabato alone. Between 1960 and 1970, Cota­ bato’s Christian population more than doubled. Some claim that between 1960 and 1976, more than a million Christians settled in Mindanao. Of these, it appears that less than 10 percent of those who settled in Mindanao in the postwar years used the services of the NARRA though NARRA did oversee settlements that had more than 25,000 families and 695,000 hectares of land. In August 1963 NARRA was replaced by a body called the Land Authority. In September 1971 President Marcos closed this authority and established instead the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Settlement lands were transferred to the care of the Bureau of Resettle­ ment, a section of the DAR. In April 1973 Marcos established another coordinating body, Reconstruction and Development Program for Mindanao (RAD), which was to administer the rehabilitation programs already in existence as well as new pro­ jects. Among its other responsibilities, RAD dealt with Islamic education, pupil recruitment in the south, increasing the number of scholarships to Muslim stu­ dents, and conducting courses. There was also an attempt to prepare young Mus­ lims for positions in government service. Among the participants in the courses were scores of former rebels who had surrendered, and among these, there were some who upon completion of their course, returned to the underground.10 The growing movement of Christians into Muslim areas was the source of alarm and considerable tension caused, principally, by the question of landownership. Muslims felt that they were losing their homeland. Despite the fact that only part of the land was either inhabited or actually cultivated, they regarded most, if not all, the land in the south as traditionally belonging to them; that is, Muslim land. Though most Christian settlement took place on unoccupied territory, conflicts over land quickly developed between Muslims and Christians. The majority of judges who heard these cases in the courts were themselves Christians. Further, Christian settlers and business enterprises were more adept at presenting their po­

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sition, consequently decisions were generally made in their favor. They were also more adept at bribing corrupt officials and the police assisted them in enforcing their property rights. As a result, Muslim feelings of discrimination intensified. There were scores of cases in which Muslims were actually evicted from their land—again, reinforcing a sense of persecution. The government was seen as the accomplice of greedy, aggrandizing, land-grabbing Christians. Many Muslims re­ acted violently, attacking settlers and workers in logging operations. The police and army, mostly composed of Christians, saw them as criminals. Without official title or deed to the land that they had lived on for generations, because their concept of landownership was different and based on the adat custom that was diametri­ cally opposed to the government concept of private ownership, Muslims inadvert­ ently provided the government with official justification to declare extensive stretches of land, traditionally Muslim, as public land which could be parceled out to Christians. Muslims were pushed back into the hilly areas and hinterland. Large tracts of land, primarily forested, which the government considered public land, were subdivided and sold to corporations, politicians, and Christian businessmen. At the end of the 1960s, banana and pineapple plantations proliferated at the ex­ pense of the forest that had been cut down. In the process, many farmers of small holdings were displaced. Growing bitterness led to more conflict between Muslims and Christians, particularly in the years 1967 and 1968 in which many were killed.11 It is interesting to note that in the years 1972-1976, there was a parallel immigration of Muslims from the Maranao community who left Lanau for the densely Christian populated northern islands of Luzon and Visaya. The primary reasons for their immigration, they claimed, were the lack of security and turmoil in their own district as well as a search for better economic conditions.12The pre­ vailing system of traditional ownership in the Muslim community was part and parcel of the social structure. It was a case of community land, and the community was led by a Dato. Land disputes in the south, therefore, stemmed not only from conflicting social systems but legal systems as well. Moro society was based on an unwritten ancient tradition; whereas, the Christians relied on legal documents. When disputes arose, the Christians appealed to the courts; when the Moro felt aggrieved, they turned to violence. Political leader of his community, the Dato was also a judge/arbiter, a landowner, and occasionally a religious functionary as well. No clearly defined territorial lines demarcated land that belonged to the Dato or the community,13 which led to recurrent conflicts and power plays between them. The government of the Philippines attempted to win over some of the Dato by integrating them into political parties, awarding them positions, and encouraging them to acquire a general education. There were, in fact, Muslim leaders who did adapt to the new economic system and, in return, were rewarded by positions in the administration. Some, particularly in the 1950s, became mayors of cities, dis­ trict governors, and members of Congress. Co-option into the system brought the Dato material benefits and power, but there was also an erosion in their traditional legitimacy. The dissonance between the benefits that the Dato enjoyed versus the

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relative distress of the broader Moro society and the role played by some of the elites in assisting in the transfer of land to Christian settlers, aroused a growing distrust of the Dato. Repercussions were felt some years later when a broad-based Muslim uprising broke out under the leadership of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The law defined any land in Mindanao that was not registered with the govern­ ment as public land or military areas. Although many Moro did not apply to land registry offices because they did not understand the procedures involved or could not afford to pay surveyors' costs, and registration and legal fees; land registry officials, sometimes corrupt and almost invariably non-Muslim, placed obstacles in the way of those who were ready to register ownership of their land. To overcome the legal requirements for registering ownership of public lands, the government resorted to listing traditional local leaders as owners which enabled the govern­ ment to sell the land to settlers, or enter into partnership with domestic or foreign business enterprises. The Dato, because they were often accomplices in dispos­ sessing Moro from their land, were in a conflict of interest with their own commu­ nities. All too often parties with economic or administrative interests exploited the ignorance or indifference of Muslims to Philippine land laws, cheating them and robbing them of their lands in collusion with corrupt government officials. Graver still was the collaboration of Muslim leaders who personally profited from trans­ actions in real estate and the sale of their people’s land to others. At times they then disingenuously incited the Moro to demand the return of the same lands, occasion­ ally by violent means. At the beginning of the 1950s, the number of incidents between Christian settlers and Muslims grew considerably, and in the beginning of the 1970s, there was an even greater escalation of hostile acts.14 There were incidents in the Sulu Archipelago that paralleled those in Mindanao, and acts of violence increased in the 1960s there, too. The causes were familiar: seizure of cultivatable land, competition with Christian immigrants, and the sense of discrimination. Estrangement from the government was rampant as the Muslims experienced heightened anxiety about dangers to the integrity of their traditional religious and Islamic way of life in what they saw as government interference in their internal matters. In Sulu, there was an additional element of competition with Christians over fishing rights which also impacted on employment opportunities for Muslims. The government placed limitations on trade with North Borneo. Af­ ter enjoying centuries-long legitimacy, such trade was now subject to customs du­ ties or was considered smuggling. Seeing themselves without recourse, Muslims did turn to smuggling, banditry, and piracy. Police and army units were dispatched and they acted with great harshness. The population complained of police attacks on innocent people; in fact, the very presence of the army was seen as an aggres­ sion. In 1961, a Muslim congressman from Sulut Dato Ombra Amilbangsa tabled a law in the House of Representatives in Manila, calling on the government to grant autonomy to his district. His intention was to dramatize Muslim complaints. Al­ though the proposition was defeated, it did serve as a warning of escalating ferment

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among the Muslims of Sulu, and it aroused political debate among the Muslim intelligentsia.15Immediately following Amilbangsa’s initiative, a movement led by Hajal Ouh made its appearance with the goal of achieving independence for Sulu, Basilan, and Zamboanga. The movement dispersed when Hajal Ouh was killed.16 The Philippine Senate set up another two Commissions of Inquiry to examine the deteriorating situation among Muslims of the south. The commissions cited immi­ gration from the north and the confiscation of land as primary causes for the con­ flict between Muslims and Christians.17 By the mid 1960s, a new type of leadership emerged among the Moro— young, educated, and radical—drawn from the professional classes, particularly lawyers. Muslim students and clerics who had studied abroad now openly criticized the government’s discriminatory policy in such areas as the diplomatic service and the economic and political spheres. They protested the continued exploitation of Min­ danao Island and its natural resources, and the landgrab by Christian settlers. At about the same time, private armed militias sprang up, led by local politicians, both Christian and Muslim. The complicated question concerning the disposition of the Sabah territory in North Borneo now came to the fore as the Philippine government pressed its claim for sovereignty over the region. President Diosdado Macapagal first raised the demand to the government of England in 1962. Macapagal said that the Philippine claim was based on the fact that Sabah had been part of the Sultanate of Sulu which held sovereignty there even before the Europeans came to the region. While it was true that much earlier, in 1878, the region had been leased to a private company, the British North Borneo Company, sovereignty over the region had not been waived. When the company gave Sabah to the British government in 1946, it acted illegally since it did not hold sovereignty over the region. Nevertheless, Eng­ land subsequently transferred ownership to Malaysia on 16 September 1963. Mus­ lims in the Philippines believed that Sabah was part of their territory. Clearly the British view was different.18 In 1967, a secret unit of 180 Filipinos— all of whose officers were Christian—from the Samal community were recruited into the Philippine army. They were trained in jungle fighting and demolition on the Island of Corregidor. The purpose of the training was to prepare them to infiltrate Sabah, carry out sabotage activities, and incite the local inhabitants to support annexation of Sabah to the Philippines. The proposed military operation was called jabidah, and it was to be part of a larger plan. On 18 March 1968 soldiers in the unit were killed by their Christian officers—estimates range between twenty-eight and sixtyeight dead—under unclear circumstances. One of the Muslim soldiers who man­ aged to escape reported the murders, which became known as the "jabidah mas­ sacre” or the “Corregidor incident." In one version, the recruits were said to have refused to carry out a command and were therefore shot. In another version, the soldiers were said to have protested their conditions of service and demanded that they be returned home to Sulu. An investigation mounted by the Congress in Ma­ nila was unable to bring the guilty parties to trial. This was a serious blow, perhaps the final one, to the government’s attempts at integration. The murders were at the

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center of ferment and bitterness among Muslims of the south who saw the massa­ cre as proof that President Ferdinand Marcos (elected to office in 1965) had no regard for their lives. Nur Misuari, a participant in the student demonstration held in Manila to protest the massacre, later pointed to the protests against the “jabidah massacre” and the establishment of the MIM organization as factors in his entering politics.19 There were several significant outcomes, both domestic and external, to the jabidah massacre. The affair raised the international community’s awareness to the issue of the Moro. But the primary result was the negative impact it had on Phil­ ippines relations with nearby Malaysia. Diplomatic ties between the two countries were cut off. Tunku Abdul Rahman, prime minister of Malaysia, realized that the Philippine government was not only acting at the diplomatic level to achieve its claim to Sabah but was also preparing commando soldiers for an invasion of the region. It was apparently at this point that Malaysia began training Moro rebels and providing them with arms. The chief minister of the Sabah government, Tun Mustafa, was incensed. He had earlier expressed his anger when the Philippines first raised the issue of Sabah. The jabidah massacre stiffened his resolve and had a great bearing on the assistance he gave Muslim dissidents in the southern Phil­ ippines in the following years.20 On 1 May 1968, in response to the jabidah massacre, Dato Udtog Matalam and other members of the Muslim aristocracy established the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM)—the name was later changed to the Mindanao Independence Movement. Matalam had been the governor of Cotabato but was defeated in the election of 1967. There are questions about the seriousness of his ventures, ques­ tions even regarding his character, with some attributing the establishment of MIM to his personal frustration rather than to ideological motives. In the manifesto of the movement published on 1 May, which was written in a traditional Islamic style replete with religious terminology, it was stated that the Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan wanted to secede from the Philippines in order to establish an Islamic state that would actualize their ideas and ideals, preserve their ancestral heritage, and safeguard and develop their Muslim traditions. The mani­ festo defined those areas of the south populated by Muslims that would be included in the projected Islamic state. It declared that the Muslims of the Philippines had a history and a culture of their own which differed from that of the Christian ma­ jority so that it would be impossible to include the Muslims in a Philippine state. The manifesto than listed a four-point Declaration of Principles. 1) The Muslim right to self-determination; 2) Islam is the religion of the community. It is both an ideology and a way of life, and its adherents should be granted a defined territory within which its laws, its beliefs, and its teachings would be safeguarded; 3) The economic advancement, cultural development and political independence for which the Muslims hope can only be realized within its boundaries of such a ter­ ritory; 4) The Muslims are capable of self-rule or political independence.21 Copies of the manifesto were sent to all Muslim leaders in the Philippines, to non-Muslim

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Philippine political leaders, to the Philippine press, heads of Islamic governments, and the United Nations. On 8 June 1968 explanatory material regarding the man­ ifesto was published. Among other things it stated, “that it is the duty and obliga­ tion of every Muslim to wage jihad physically or spiritually, to change Dar al-Aman (the present status of Muslim communities) to Dar al-Islam and prevent it from becoming Dar al-Harb, and that “the movement shall be guided by the principles and teachings of the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah of the holy Prophet.” In his letter of 26 July to the president of the Philippines, Dato Udtog Matalam reiterated the main points of the manifesto and protested the government’s attitude toward Muslims, the dispatch of army units to Sulu to repress the legitimate aspi­ rations of the Muslims, and a redoubling of efforts to relocate settlers from Luzon and Visaya. And, once again, the determination of the Muslims to establish an independent government was stressed. On 26 August 1968 Dato Udtog Matalam published two additional documents—a Declaration of Policy and a memorandum in which he detailed the Muslim character of the Islamic state which MIM intended to establish.22 MIM never managed to become a popular movement. It was hardly even a po­ litical movement. The efforts of Matalam and his associates were limited to the documents quoted above and to communiques that appeared in the press. Later, Dato Udtog Matalam publicly recanted his original position. His pronouncements were, in any case, taken more seriously among Christians who feared a Muslim uprising than among his fellow Muslims who remained indifferent to his activities because they regarded them as the antics of a frustrated Muslim politician. In Oc­ tober 1968 President Marcos met Matalam and offered him the position of presi­ dent’s advisor for Muslim Affairs. The offer effectively removed Matalam from the Muslim political scene, but it did not change anything in the agitated atmosphere and tensions in the south that kept mounting. Nonetheless, it must be said that the appearance of the MIM marked the beginning of a series of violent acts and gue­ rilla warfare in the south that grew ever more severe.23 A short while after MIM was founded, Sultan Rashid Lucman established another radical Muslim organi­ zation, the Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations (UIFO). Yet a third organi­ zation, Ansar al-Islam, which was more conservative, was founded in the same year by Philippine Senator Domacao Alonto who in addition to activity in the South Philippines also sought the support of Muslims abroad. At the end of 1969, ninety young Muslims set out for training in guerilla warfare in a Malaysian army camp on the Island of Pangkor which lies opposite the western coast of the Malay Peninsula. It was a joint group sent by both UIFO and MIM. Young people such as Nur Misuari, Abul Khayr Alonto, Jimi Lucman (the son of Rashid Lucman), and others with “progressive” ideas were in the contingent. Later, on their return home, these young men established the MNLF and the BMA (the Bangsa Moro Army) and were among the main leaders of the movement in the struggle of the southern Muslims. According to one report, there were several English mercenaries among their instructors as well as a number of Palestinian Arabs. The chief minister of

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Sabah, Tun Mustafa, whose origins were Tausug, arranged for the contingent's training with the approval of the prime minister of the central Malaysian govern­ ment, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who promised Rashid Lucman, and other Moro lead­ ers that he would provide assistance, although officially the Tunku denied any such involvement. The task of the recruits was to organize armed bands of MIM—called Black Shirts—in Mindanao and Sulu upon their return. The name derived from the color of the uniform of the first recruits who were sent for training abroad. At the suggestion of the Malaysian government, Philippine Muslim leaders who pre­ sented complaints to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) did so in the name of an organization which, strangely enough, was established with the government’s encouragement and was called the Islamic Directorate of the Philip­ pines (IDP), the aim being to coordinate outside assistance to Philippine Muslims. Some of the organizers of the IDP were from the conservative and traditional lead­ ership, but there were also such militants among them as Rashid Lucman, Macapanton Abbas, and Nur Misuari. They signed their names to a declaration of unity which established the readiness of Muslims to defend Islam and a national homeland against all forms of aggression against the Ummah.24 During 1969 there were some sporadic incidents, particularly in Cotabato, but beginning with March 1970, the violence intensified as private armies were organ­ ized in the region. In that month a battle broke out in southern Cotabato between Muslims and Tiruray pagan bands. From April until December, the incidents spread to northern Cotabato and some districts of Lanao. Leaders of political or­ ganizations on all sides were behind the bands of pagan Tiruray and Christian Ilongo, who were dubbed ilagas (rats). Armed bands of Christians were set up for defense against Muslim armed gangs, called by such names as Baracudas in Lanao del Norte or Black Shirts in Cotabato, who attacked Christian settlers. Each side carried out raids against civilians of the other religion. There were hundreds of causalities and much property damage as a result. Muslim farmers, Christian set­ tlers, and members of pagan tribes in the region abandoned their homes to escape the danger of the gangs. The number of people who fled was estimated at 30,000; by the end of 1971, the estimated number of refugees, most of them Muslim, rose to 100,000. Army and police units were also involved, usually, according to Mus­ lim claims, siding with the Christians. The Baracuda were linked to a Muslim congressman, Ali Dimaporo; the Black Shirts to Matalam, founder of the MIM. The ilagas, who coordinated their activity with the constabulary, were linked to the Christian governor of Lanao del Norte and to other Christian politicians and were financed by the large businesses and companies. A free-for-all developed in which Muslims fought against Christians, and Christians against Muslims; the army and police fought the Muslims; and private political armies fought against Muslim fanners, Christian settlers, or even against the army.25 In May 1971 Mamintal Tamano, a Muslim senator, announced that effective government rule had ceased and utter anarchy reigned in Cotabato district. Schools were closed, houses and farms abandoned, hundreds of people had been killed,

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much property destroyed, and tens of thousands of the inhabitants had become refugees. It was a situation in which people attempted to escape to more secure regions where their coreligionists constituted the majority. The army was con­ fronted with great difficulty in carrying out its duty because of the difficult terrain, lack of roads, and lack of helicopters for maintaining lines of communication in isolated areas. The circumstances were exploited by both Muslim and Christian gangs. President Marcos ordered the dispatch of a battalion of 600 soldiers and an artillery unit to reinforce the 400 police already in the region so that a cleanup action could be carried out. At the same time, he tried to convince Muslim leaders to surrender and turn in their arms in return for assurances that he would imple­ ment plans for economic development. In June, the army captured a Muslim gang leader and some of his men. It forced another leader, a former mayor, Bangum Aratuc to surrender, and he was given a government position and a monetary grant. However, outbreaks and acts of hostility did not abate. On the contrary, they be­ came more numerous, widespread, and resulted in countermeasures on both sides. At this point, cooperation between local Christian authorities and Christian gangs became obvious as did the link between traditional Muslim leaders of the MIM and the Black Shirts. Muslim army and police officers were suspected of giving aid to the Muslims rebels. For all intents and purposes, in areas populated by Mus­ lims, control by the central government ceased.26 A particularly grave incident occurred in June 1971 in Manili, a village in North Cotabato. Sixty-five Muslims (some claim seventy)—men, women, and children— were murdered in a mosque by the Ilagas. Muslims accused the police of aiding the killers. The massacre was viewed with special severity and as a grave offense precisely because it took place inside a mosque. Another massacre occurred in the village of Wao in the Lanao del Sur district. Incidents continued into August and September as ambushes, torching of houses, and other terror attacks accelerated; in Lanao del Norte there were battles between Baracudas and Ilagas. The extensive evacuations of both Muslim and Christian populations continued.27 Muslims of the Philippines began turning to Arab and other Muslim countries with appeals for assistance. As early as April 1969 Udtog Matalam went to Kuala Lumpur to meet with delegations to the Conference of Muslim States being held there. On 22 April he told reporters there that he had come despite the opposition of President Marcos. Not until two years later, after the incident in Manili, was there an Arab response. Libya was the first to react, placing the matter before the UN Subcommittee for Human Rights in August 1971. It was the first time that the Moro issue came up at an international forum. Supported by representatives of other Muslim states, Libya accused the Philippine government of genocide and persecution of religious minorities. President Qadhafi of Libya was determined to give material aid as well to the Philippine Muslims, and at the outbreak of hostil­ ities, there were reports of Arab support for the Muslim rebellion. In June 1972 President Marcos directed his intelligence services to investigate accusations that arms, ammunition, and money were being provided by Libya to the rebels and that

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“foreign experts” were seen at Muslim training camps in Mindanao where osten­ sibly they taught guerilla warfare and intelligence gathering. Marcos ordered his people to check out a reported agreement between Yihya Khan, the president of Pakistan, and Libya according to which Pakistan would serve as a conduit for sup­ plies to the Muslim rebels. Ostensibly the Libyan-Pakistani agreement to supply arms to the Muslims of the Philippines had already been reached by the end of 1971. Pakistan undertook to transport the shipment of arms by air. At the time, the Pakistanis were receiving support from Libya in their struggle against India over the Bangladesh issue. When information about the air shipments to the Muslims became known in Manila, the possibility of cutting off relations with Pakistan was debated. The issue was dropped because the India-Pakistan war broke out which resulted in the removal of General Yihya Khan as head of state in Pakistan, and his replacement by Zulfikar Ali Bhuto.28 Muslim and Christian leaders attempted to suggest solutions for ending the vi­ olence and bloodshed in Lanao and Cotabato, but both the central government and local authorities in the south were indecisive and ineffective in dealing with the problem. At the beginning of 1971, the former chairman of CNI, Senator Mamintal Tamano,29 warned of an impending bloodbath in Mindanao if the government did not pay more attention to minority needs. On 26 February 1971 President Marcos ordered a cease-fire in the south to enable negotiations for a peaceful solution to the conflict between the two communities. He offered financial aid to the leaders of the rebelling Muslim bands in Cotabato in order to improve the economic situ­ ation. He also promised to act for a solution to the land issue, but on 30 March changed his orders and commanded the security forces to renew military action and impose order. Although the government increased the number of soldiers in the south, the situation was not eased. Fighting continued and spread to the districts of Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, and Lanao del Sur. Faced with im­ pending elections to the Senate in November, tensions and violence mounted. The election campaign was considered important to both Muslims and Christians be­ cause it focused attention on changes in the balance of political power between them. Particularly conspicuous were the districts of North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte where there were already Christian majorities. Indeed, many Christian pol­ iticians were elected in places that had previously been held by Muslim sultans and Dato. In North Cotabato, a Christian former police officer ran against the governor of North Cotabato, a Muslim, and won. Most cities now had Christian mayors which confirmed the success of Christian settlement in changing the demographic balance and transferring political power in a number of regions from Muslims to Christians. There were similar changes in the district of Lanao del Norte. In the course of the election campaign, some Muslim leaders called for a jihad against the Ilaga who were seen as a threat to the very existence of the Moro. The situation came to a peak with the ambush and killing of 22 policemen at the end of October, followed by the Tacub massacre at Lanao del Norte when 40 Muslims, returning from the elections on 22 November, were murdered by soldiers. The soldiers were

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released for “lack of evidence.” At the end of 1971, official sources confirmed that from the beginning of the fighting, 1,566 people had been killed, of which 56 percent were Muslims. Other sources put the figure at 800 dead. There were ap­ proximately 100,000 refugees on both sides. Muslims now saw themselves more threatened than ever by the army and armed Christian bands.30 The alarming events set off an international Muslim reaction. In July 1971 fol­ lowing the Jabidah massacre, Muammar Qadhafi sent a communication to Presi­ dent Marcos expressing deep concern. The Philippine government felt that it had to defend itself against the accusations, particularly because of its increasing de­ pendence on Arab oil. On 28 September 1971 the acting Philippine foreign min­ ister, Jose Ingles, denied that there was religious repression in Mindanao. The difficulties there, he said, stemmed from land disputes and political tensions, and added that even though his government regarded the events as an “internal matter,” it was ready to respond to any complaints. The further deterioration of events in October 1971 resulted in a condemnation of the Philippine government by Libya, Kuwait, Malaysia, and the Islamic secretariat of the OIC, and the accusation that the Philippines were engaged in genocide and the slaughter of Muslims. An appeal was made for UN intervention. Libya began sending aid through Rashid Lucman, a former congressman from the Lanao del Sur district, who was considered the patron of Nur Misuari. In January 1972 on the advice of President Suharto of Indonesia, President Ferdinand Marcos invited the ambassadors of Indonesia, Ma­ laysia, Singapore, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to tour the southern districts. There was opposition in the Philippine Cabinet to affording foreign ele­ ments an opportunity to intervene in internal matters, but Marcos apparently be­ lieved that on-site observations by foreign Muslims would show that the fighting in the south was devoid of a religious dimension. The ambassadors reported that there was no anti-Muslim genocide in the Philippines. In March 1972 a diplomatic delegation from Libya offered the Philippine government economic aid if it would end its war against the southern Muslims. The delegation contributed 35,000 Brit­ ish pounds sterling (five million pesos) to the Muslims earmarked for the purchase of land on which to build a mosque as well as for buying rice, medications, and clothing. A Libyan representative visited Indonesia and Malaysia requesting that they, too, assist the rebels. In a letter to the press, the Libyan representative in Manila denied that Libya was providing aid to the rebels and claimed that any monies given were for religious needs, rehabilitation, the construction of a Muslim cultural center, and a mosque, and for buying food and medications for the refu­ gees in Mindanao. Moreover, that all these activities were conducted openly through the Central Bank of the Philippines. Libya was not giving military aid, and such an accusation was nothing but “disinformation from Israeli sources,” in­ tended to harm Libya’s relations with the Philippines. Nonetheless, the Libyan representative did not refrain from threatening the Philippines should the genocide against the Muslims continue.31 At the invitation of the Philippine government in July of that year, a second

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delegation from Libya and Egypt visited the area. At the end of a four-day mission, they concluded that the Muslims in the south believed that the dispute in Mindanao had turned into a “religious war” and that local authorities were supporting the armed bands. Neither delegation, the one in January or the second in July, found any proof that would support Moro accusations that a genocide was being carried out against them by the Philippine government. Despite this, in September 1972, the rector of Al-Azhar University in Cairo issued a condemnation of the “geno­ cide” in the Philippines and called on Muslim governments to rally to the aid of their brothers. Six days later, Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt, announced that Egypt was sending an urgent shipment of aid to the Muslims. On 27 July a Philippine Muslim leader, Salipada Pendatun, the Speaker pro tem of the Philippine House of Representatives, reported that while on a recent tour of Mus­ lim countries, in which he was seeking support for the rebel groups in Mindanao, he had received promises of aid from the leaders of Algeria, Morocco, and Libya.32 There was no respite in the war of the Christian and Muslim bands even after the elections of November 1971. In May 1972 acts of hostility proliferated in areas of mixed populations in the Lanao del Sur and the Zamboanga del Sur districts and in Sulu. Rumors circulated that in the Sulu Island there were Muslim training camps in which some of the instructors were Malay-speaking foreigners. The flight of Muslims and Christians from mixed areas continued unabated. By the middle of 1972, violence had encompassed all Muslim southern areas. Most of the fight­ ing was of a local, even a personal, nature but among the Muslim groups there were early signs of an administrative structure on the one hand and an ideologicalreligious dimension, pointing to a separatist jihad (holy war), on the other. In 1972, recognition grew among Muslims of the inevitable need for separatism that would lead to the establishment of an independent Muslim state. At the end of August 1972 hundreds of Muslim students in Manila began leaving their studies in order to return to their homes in the south. The immediate cause was the news that Pres­ ident Marcos intended to declare a state of military emergency in the Muslim dis­ tricts of the south during which arms traditionally held by the local population would be confiscated as a first step in the reestablishment of calm and the suppres­ sion of the revolt.33 Indeed, on 21 September 1972 President Ferdinand Marcos did declare martial law throughout the Philippines. The country was at the brink of anarchy. Marcos cited two reasons for the step he had taken—the utter chaos in Mindanao and the organization of a Muslim separatist movement in the south. More than 1,000 ci­ vilians, he said, and 2,000 armed Muslims and Christians had been killed, and more than half a million people were wounded, or uprooted from their homes. The army sustained many losses although Marcos did not give a number. The economy of the south had been plunged into paralysis. The declaration of martial law and the government’s decision to disarm the population only served to stiffen the resolve of Muslim dissidents to fight for independence. The idea that they would be dis­ armed had a social and religious resonance for Muslims because it was, as well.

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an insult to their pride. Consequently, attempts to deprive them of their weapons met with fierce resistance which only caused a greater deterioration of the security situation. The Muslims believed that turning over their arms would leave them defenseless against their traditional enemies. The net result of imposing martial law was an escalation of the conflict rather than its containment. It was precisely the declaration of a state of emergency that underscored feelings of insecurity among Muslims, aroused their revolutionary consciousness, and helped to strengthen the status of the MNLF. The movement, with its goal of self-determination, now became the foremost Muslim separatist organization and a spearhead of the antigovemment struggle.34 Muslim response to the state of emergency was rapid and spontaneous. New people joined the revolt. On October 21 and 22, 1972, a group of Maranao, num­ bering several hundred fighters, headed by Vicuna, attacked Marawi City. They invaded the city by means of a coordinated attack that employed jeeps on land and motorboats from the lake. The first assault, which lasted ten hours, was directed against three targets: the headquarters of the constabulary, a bridge that controlled one of the entrances into the city, and Mindanao State University. The attack came as a complete surprise. Both the bridge and the university were captured, and though police headquarters was not overrun, an airport was taken instead. At the university, rebels took over the radio station and began broadcasting. The auda­ ciousness of the attack was a novelty. The rebels did not retreat until 24 October after army reinforcements reached the city. Official reports put the number of dead at seventy-five, and as the fighting came to an end, many Christian families fled the city. In its investigation, the government found that seven different Muslim groups had participated in the coordinated attack, under an umbrella organization calling itself Mindanao Revolutionary Council for Independence. The council urged the Muslim population to go out to a jihad. The attack took even Nur Misuari and the heads of the MNLF by surprise; indeed, once fighting died down in Marawi City, and the rebels driven back, the umbrella organization was never heard about again. A significant aspect of the attack was that it signaled the beginning of in­ volvement by religious leaders in the expanding armed struggle. Subsequent at­ tacks were now directed by the MNLF or carried out under its initiative, reinforcing its status as the leading power in the Muslim movement of revolt. In November 1972 military reinforcements were sent to the south. The Muslims saw the stepped-up military presence as a declaration of war against them, and the MNLF responded by attacking the army and its installations. By the end of 1972, the rebellion encompassed all of southwest Mindanao: Cotabato and Lanao districts, the Zamboanga Peninsula, the Basilan Islands, the Sulu Islands, and Tawi-Tawi.3S In tandem with the escalation of hostilities, a number of Muslim organizations approached the authorities suggesting cooperation between themselves and the government in order to pacify the region. Muslim personalities went to the scene of the fighting in an attempt to calm feelings and to defuse the situation, perhaps even to achieve a surrender by the rebels in exchange for the promise of amnesty

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that would remain in effect until 18 February 1973. President Marcos stated that he intended to step up the pace of development plans for Mindanao, and that he would make land available to Muslims who had been displaced from their homes by Christian settlers. Despite all this, there were continued collisions between gov­ ernment forces and rebels. At the end of November 1972, it became clear that the rebellion was no longer characterized by spontaneous and sporadic outbreaks of violence, but was being coordinated in a systematic military campaign which stretched the Philippine army to its limits. At the end of December, it was reported that for the first time Muslim rebels had downed an aircraft. There was a signifi­ cant growth in the number of battle casualties. Both developments indicated a pal­ pable worsening of the situation precisely because of government efforts to disarm the Muslim population. In that same month, large arms shipments from abroad were reported to have been delivered to the Muslim rebels. The position was com­ plex because the government was confronted by a dual problem—on the one hand, it had to contend with rebelling Muslims; and on the other, Christian militias were not being responsive to government discipline. In an effort to bring the fighting to an end, President Marcos ordered a temporary unilateral cessation of hostilities in the south, and a temporary suspension of the state of emergency between 20 De­ cember 1972 and 15 January 1973. He announced that he would offer the rebels the possibility of surrender in return for an amnesty. But on 1 January, even as he made the announcement, additional army units, air and naval forces were sent to the south. That month the rebels almost completed their conquest of all of Basilan Island. There were also clashes in Sulu where the rebels managed to take control of certain areas where, it was estimated, the rebels had 1,600 people under arms. Even after the President extended the deadline for the pardon a number of times, until April 1973, the number of Muslims who took advantage of it was negligible.36

Notes 1. Deliar Noer, “Contemporary Political Dimensions of Islam,” in M. B. Hooker, ed., Islam in Southeast Asia (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 207-209; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 56-57; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 187; Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), vii, x; Michael O. Mastura, “Maguindanaon Hopes and Fears from the Constitutional Convention,” in Pster Gowing, ed., Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publish­ ers, 1988), 121-129; Lela G. Noble, “The Muslim-Christian Conflict: Its Religious Back­ ground,” Solidarity, vol. 11, no. 2 (March-April 1977): 16-17; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 180-181; Abbahil, “The Bangsa Moro,” 202, 218, 22, 243-244; Bauzon, Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Identity, 70-72,149,165; Laquian, “Political Integration,” 364-365; Tasker, “Legacy of Strife,” 21; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 75, 80, 85, 86, 378; For examples of the Muslim viewpoint on the issue of belonging to the Philippine entity, see Glang, “A Constitution for the Muslims,” 10,12,14; and AbhoudSyed Lingga, “The Cultural Colonization of the Bangsa Moro People,” Dansalan Quarterly, vol.

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3, no. 4 (1982): 198,203; Jaimal D. Rasul, Muslim-Christian Land: Ours to Share (Quezon City: Alemar-Phoenix, 1979), 4-5; For the Muslim view on the reasons for their grievances, see Abaton Muslim Macapado, The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative (Marawi City: Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao Slate University, 1994), 117-133; Joel de los Santos, “The ‘Chris­ tian Problem’ and the Philippine South,” Asian Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (August 1975): 30-31, 41. 2. Cesar Adib Majul, “The Moros of the Philippines,1"Conflict, vol. 8, no. 2/3 (1988): 169; idem, “The Philippines,” 327; idem, “The Moro Struggle,” 901-902; Gowing, “Kris and Crescent,” 2,15-16; idem, Mosque and Moro, 66-78; idem, Muslim Filipinos, 42, 69-71, 183, 186; idem, ‘The Muslim Filipinos,” 221; idem, “How Muslim Are the Muslim Filipi­ nos?” in Bster G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 288-292; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Phil­ ippines,” 182-183; Noble, “Muslim-Christian Conflict,” 18; idem, “Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations,” Asian Survey, vol. 15, no. 5 (May 1975): 472; idem, “Re­ ligion and Opposition to the Marcos Regime,” Pilipinas, no. 13 (fall 1989): 74; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 243-244; Thomas, Muslim but Filipino, 319; R. J. May, “The Moro Movement in Southern Philippines,” Ethnic Studies Report, vol. 6, no. 2 (July 1988): 52; idem, “The Philippines,” in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., The Politics o f Islamic Reassertion (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 218,229; idem, “The Religious Factor,” 308; H. Monte Hill, “The Impact of Philippine Development Policy upon Filipino Muslims: A Retrospect,” Journal of the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1-2(1982): 31 -34; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 57-58; D. J. Steinberg, The Philippines, 92; Louis Q. Lacar, “Culture Contact and National Identification among Philippine Muslims,” Philippine Studies, vol. 42 (fourth quarter, 1994), 431-434, 446-447; idem, “The Emerging Role of Muslim Women in a Rapidly Changing Society: The Philippine Case,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 1992): 83-84; idem, “Neglected Dimen­ sions,” 304-305; Cuthbert O. M. I. Billman, “Islam in Sulu,” Philippine Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (1960): 52-57; Chester L. Hunt, “Moslem and Christian in the Philippines,” Pacific Af­ fairs, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1955): 344-345; O’Shaunghnessy, “Filipino Muslims,” 140; Bentley, “Implicit Evangelism,” 88, 91; Saber, “Muslim Filipinos in Unity within Diver­ sity,” 19-22; Thomas M. McKenna, “The Sources of Muslim Separatism in Cotabato,” Pilipinas, no. 21 (fall 1993): 9-10; Antonio Isidro, “The Muslim Filipino and Islam,” in Muslim Philippines, in Antonio Isidro and Mamitua Saber, eds., Muslim Philippines (Marawi City: Mindanao State University, University Research Center, 1968), 53-56; idem, “Education of the Muslims,” in Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 271-276; idem, “Education in the Muslim Regions,” in Antonio Isidro and Mamitua Saber, eds., Muslim Philippines (Marawi City: Mindanao State University, University Research Center, 1968), 98-108; Mastura, Muslim Filipino Experience, 93-107; Ganganath Jha, “The Muslim Separatist Movement in Southern Thailand,” 185; Kettani, Muslim Minorities, 137; Rasul, Muslim-Christian Land, 62-64, 69; Noer, “Contemporary Political Dimensions,” 215; D. J. Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, 437; Mehden, Two Worlds o f Islam, 94-97,99; Laquian, “Political Integration,” 369-370; Horvatich, “Keeping Up with the Hassans,” 51; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 171; There were Muslim Filipinos who sought comparisons, whether positive or negative, between the Muslims of the Philippines and the Arab minority in Israel, and the

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Palestinian Arabs. These comparisons revealed an incomplete knowledge of the topic. For example, see Glang, “A Constitution for the Muslims,” 15-16; Tamano, “The Expectations of the Muslims as Philippine Citizens,” Solidarity, vol. 10 (July*August 197S): 32. 3. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 58-59; Tan, The Filipino Muslim, 113-117; Kiefer, The Tausug, 4; Asani, “The Bangsamoro Psople,” 305; Gomez, “Muslim-Christian Relations,” 162; Tamano, “Problems of the Muslims,” 263; Carmen Abubakar, “Islam in the Philip­ pines,” 56. 4. McAmis, “Muslim Filipinos” 43; Carmen Abubakar, op. cit., 56; Tamano, op. cit., 263; Majul, “The Moros of the Philippines,” 169. 5. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 184-185,208-211; Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 900; Mi­ chael O. Mastura, “Development Program for Mindanao and Sulu: Retrospect and Pros­ pect,” in Peter Gowing, ed., Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988), 144-146; Noble, “Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations,” 454-456; Gomez, “Muslim-Christian Relations,” 162; R. J. May, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” in May and Nemenzo, The Philippines after Marcos (New York: St. Mar­ tin’s Press, 1989), 113; idem, “The Situation of Philippine Muslims,” 429; idem, “The Phil­ ippines,” 224; Thomas, Muslim but Filipino, 318; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 59-60, 151; Hill, “The Impact of Philippine Development Policy,” 24-25, 27-31, 35-38; Bauzon, Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Identity, 70-71; Carmen Abubakar, op. cit., 56; Tamano, op. cit., 263, 266; Pushpesh Pant, “Communal Violence and Secessionist Insur­ gency in the Philippines,” Analysis Journal, vol. 5, no. 4 (New Delhi: April 1973): 538-539. 6. Asani, “The Bangsamoro People,” 304-305; McKenna, “Sources of Muslim Separa­ tism,” 9; Tamano, “Expectations of the Muslims,” 31. 7. Gowing, “Kris and Crescent,” 17-18; May, “Muslim Separatism,” 298; idem, “The Philippines,” 211; idem, “The Wild West in the South: A Recent Political History of Min­ danao,” in Mark T\imer, R. J. May, and Lulu Respall T\irner, eds., Mindanao: Land o f Un­ fulfilled Promise (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1992), 141; Magdalena, "Coloniza­ tion,” 66-67; idem, “Moro-American Relations,” 437; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 86-88, 171,187; “Back to Terror Politics,” Asiaweek, vol. 6, no. 12 (March 28, 1980):21; John F. Kantner and Lee McCaffrey, ed., Population and Development in Southeast Asia (London: Lexington Books, 1975), 31-56. 8. Wernstedt and Simkins, “Migrations and the Settlement,” 83-84, 89-90, 93-94, 100-102; Hans Luther, “Background to the Muslim Secessionist Movement in the Philip­ pines,” Asia Research Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 10 (Singapore: March 31, 1974): 2520; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 189; idem, “The Muslim Filipino Minority,” 213-214, 217; W. K. Che Man, “Problems of Minority Populations in Nation-Building: The Case of the Moros in the Philippines and the Malays in Thailand,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 1992): 61-62; idem, Muslim Separatism, 25, 60; Brown, “From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations,” 60; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities,” 332. 9. T. J. S. George, Revolt in Mindanao, 104-105; D. J. Steinberg, The Philippines, 24,92, 114; May, “The Philippines,” 217; idem, “The Situation of the Philippine Muslims,” 428; Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 900; idem, “The Moros of the Philippines,” 169; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 189; Ramon Magsaysay was the first politician in the Philippines who worked at cultivating his image as a leader of the entire nation. For example, in the election campaign of 1953, he told the Muslims in Mindanao that if he were elected president he would provide ships for the pilgrimage to Mecca. See Stephen R. Shalom, “Counterinsur­

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gency in the Philippines,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 7, no. 2 (1977): 171. 10. Wernstedt and Simkins, “Migrations and the Settlement of Mindanao,” 83,91-92; D. J. Steinberg, op. cit., 92, 124; Mastura, “Development Program for Mindanao and Sulu,” 144; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 264-266; Silva, Two Hills o f the Same Land, 44-46; Bhagwan Dass Arora, “Insurgency in the southern Philippines: Domestic and Foreign Implications-I,” Foreign Affairs Reports, vol. 24, no. 11 (November 1975): 178; Ahmad, “Class and Colony,” 9; Rodil, “The Lumad and Moro,” 12; Man Mohini Kaul, “The Marcos Regime in the Philippines,” India Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3 (July-September 1978): 320. 11. Majul. “The Moros of the Philippines,” 172; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 105,107; Lela Gamer Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines "Pacific Affairs. vol. 49, no. 3 (fall 1976): 406; idem, “The Philippines: Muslims Fight,” 13; May, “Muslim Separatism,” 298; Wernstedt and Simkins, “Migrations and the Settlements,” 101; Ernst Utrecht, “The Separatist Movement in the southern Philippines,” Race and Class, vol. 16, no. 4 (April 1975): 388-389; McKenna, “Sources of Muslim Separatism,” 13-18; Luther, “Background to the Muslim Secessionist Movement,” 2519; O’Shaughnessy, “Filipino Muslims,” 139; Mamitua Saber, “The Majority-Minority Situation in the Philippines,” Sol­ idarity, vol. 10 (July-August 1975): 36, 43; Gomez, “Muslim-Christian Relations,” 169; Bemadino Ronquillo, “Philippines: Land for Grabs,” FEER, vol. 69, no. 30 (July 23,1970): 11; Sheila Ocampo, “Philippines: Guerillas Gain in Paradise Lost,” FEER, vol. 108, no. 16 (April 11, 1980): 20; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-I ” 178-179. 12. Luis Q. Lacar and Carmelita S. Lacar, “Maranao Muslim Migration and Its Impact on Migrant Children,” Philippine Studies, vol. 37 (first quarter, 1989): 5, 12. 13. For a detailed discussion of the traditional and religious elites of Moro societies, see Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 116-129. 14. Gowing. Muslim Filipinos, 189-190; Noble, “Religion and Opposition,” 74,77; May, “The Philippines,” 217-218; Luther, “Background to Muslim Secessionist Movement,” 2520; Hunt, “Moslem and Christian,” 333, 337-340; Brown, “From Feriphal Communi­ ties,” 72; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 154; Tan, The Filipino-Muslim Armed Struggle, 113, 117-118. 15. For the text of the Amilbangsa’s proposal, see Glang, Muslim Secession or Integra­ tion? 121-122, appendix G, and 83-85; Majul, “The Moros of the Philippines,” 172-173; idem, “The Moro Struggle,” 900-901; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 188; May, ‘The Wild West in the South,” 126-130; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 60; Baltazar, “Islam and Se­ cession,” 63-64; Gomez, “Muslim-Christian Relations,” 170; Asani, “The Bangsamoro People,” 305; Rodil, “The Lumad and Moro,” 16. 16. Asani, op. cit., 305. 17. May, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 113. 18. Peter Sidler, “In the ‘Wild South’ of the Philippines,” Swiss Review o f World Affairs, no. 6 (June 1994): 23; McKenna, “The Sources of Muslim Separatism,” 9; Philippine Claim to North Borneo (Sabah), vol. 2 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1967), 1, 3,5-7. 19. Majul, “The Moros of the Philippines,” 173; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 191-192; Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front,” 408; idem, “Chronology of Muslim Rebel­ lion in the southern Philippines,” Research Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 1-2 (Marawi City: Dansalan Research Center, September-October, 1978), 1; Noer, “Contemporary Political Dimen­ sions,” 209-210; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 107-128; May, “The Philippines,” 218; Mc­ Kenna, op. cit., 8-9; Gomez, “Muslim-Christian Relations” 160-163; Mercado, “Culture,

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Economics, and Revolt,” 155-156; Che Man, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 62; idem, Muslim Separatism, 61; Asani, "The Bangsamoro People,” 304. 20. Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 409; idem, “Chronology of Muslim Rebellion,” 1; May, "The Situation of Philippine Muslims,” 428; McKenna, op. cit., 9; Che Man, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 62. 21. For the text of the Manifesto, see Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration? 103-105, (appendix A). Text also found in Baltazar, “Islam and Secession,” 64-65, and in Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 187-188, (appendix B). 22. For texts of other MIM documents quoted here, see Glang, op. cit., 106-120, (appen­ dices B-F). An evaluation of Dato Udtog Matalam, ibid., 57-59. See also Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 204; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 156-157; Gopinath. “Muslim Autonomy,” 10; Rodil, “The Lumad and Moro,” 16. 23. Majul, “Moros of the Philippines,” 174; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 129-142; May, “The Philippines,” 218; McAmis, “Muslim Filipinos,” 45; McKenna, “Sources of Muslim Separatism,” 6, 8; O’Shaughnessy, “Filipino Muslims,” 141; Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 120; Gunn, “Radical Islam in Southeast Asia,” 46-47; Brown, “From Pe­ ripheral Communities,” 73; Asiri Abubakar, “Muslim Philippines,” 125-126; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-I,” 179. 24. May, “The Moro Movement,” 52-53; idem, “The Religious Factor,” 308; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 75; idem, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 63; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 157; see Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration? for biographies and evaluations of Domocao Alonto, 62-64; Rashid Lucman, 66-69. 25. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (May 1-8,1971), 24580; Asia Yearbook 1972,270; Majul, ‘The Moro Struggle,” 903-905; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 188,192-194; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 143-161; Noble, ‘The Moro National Liberation Front,” 410; idem, “The Muslim-Christian Conflict,” 17; idem, “Chronology of Muslim Rebellion,” 1; McAmis, “Muslim Filipinos,” 46-47; May, “The Philippines ” 219; Utrecht, “The Separat­ ist Movement,” 390-392; Rodney Tasker, “The Moro Rebellion: Who Calls the Shots?” FEER, vol. 95, no. 2 (January 14, 1977): 18; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 75; Gomez, “Muslim Christian Relations,” 164-166; Aluman C. Glang, “Cotabato Crisis: Why the Shooting Won’t Stop,” Solidarity, vol. 7, no. 4 (1972): 6-7; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 154,157-159; Aijaz Ahmad, “The War against the Muslims,” Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 82 (February 1982): 15-16; Pant, “Communal Violence,” 531-534; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the southern Philippines-I ” 179-180; Gopinath, “Muslim Auton­ omy,” 11; Rodil, “The Lumad and Moro,” 16-17. 26. Peter Cook, “Philippines: Wrath of the Gods,” FEER, vol. 73, no. 27 (July 3, 1971): 15; Bernardino Ronquillo, “Philippines: Disenchanted Isle,” FEER, vol. 71, no. 11 (March 13, 1971): 13-15; idem, “Philippines: Roots of Violence,” FEER, vol. 22, no. 25 (June 19, 1971): 8; idem, “Philippines: The Communal Backlash,” FEER, vol. 83, no. 37 (September 11.1971): 10; “Philippines: The First Eruption,” FEER, vol. 73, no. 35 (August 28, 1971): 7-8; Frances Stamer, “Philippines: Blood and Ballots,” FEER, vol. 84, no. 51 (December 18.1971): 17; The Manila Chronicle (September 10, 1972). 27. Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 410; idem, “Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations,” 456,457-459; idem, “Chronology of Muslim Rebellion,” 2; Carl H. Lande, “The Philippine Political Party System,” Journal of Southeast Asian His­ tory,vol. 8 ,no. 1 (Singapore: March 1967): 37; George, Revolt in Mindanao, I62-177;Peter

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Cook, “Southern Philippines: But Whose Law?” FEER, vol. 72, no. 21 (May 22,1971): 20; May, “The Philippines,” 219; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 149-151; idem, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 62; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities,” 332-333. 28. The Asian (Hong Kong, April 30-May 6,1972); “Philippines,” FEER, vol. 76, no. 26 (June 24, 1972): 5; “Philippines,” FEER, vol. 77, no. 27 (July 1, 1972): 5. 29. Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration ? 70-71; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the South­ ern Philippines-I,” 181. 30. Kessing’s Contemporary Archives (May 1-8,1971): 24580; Asia Yearbook 1972,272; Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 905; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 194-195; Noble, “Chronol­ ogy of Muslim Rebellion,” 2; idem, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 407,410; idem, “Religion and Opposition, 78, 84; May, “The Philippines,” 219; idem, “The Moro Move­ ment” 53; McAmis, “Muslim Filipinos,” 48-49; Lindy Washburn, “Muslim Resistance: With or Without the Elite,” Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 75, (October 1980): 19-20; Tas­ ker, “The Moro Rebellion,” 18; Bernadino Ronquillo, “Philippines: Broken Promise,” FEER, vol. 74, no. 50 (December 11, 1971): 14—17; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 75; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 158, 160. 31. The Daily Mirror (Singapore: March 23, 1972); The Manila Chronicle (March 27, 1972), editorial; The Manila Times (May 10, 1972); George, “The Philippines,” 16. 32. Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 905-906; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 195-196; Noble, “Chronology of Muslim Rebellion,” 2; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 244-246; McAmis, “Muslim Filipinos,” 48, 50-52; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the southern Philippines-I,” 181-185; McKenna, “Sources of Muslim Separatism,” 18-21; Pant, “Communal Violence,” 534-535, 537-538; Philippine News (July 15, 1972); The Manila Times [API (September 12, 1972); New Nation [UPI] (Singapore: January 8, 1973); For Salipada Psndatun, see Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration? 59-62. 33. Noble, op. cit., 2; Noble, “Muslim Separatism,” 1098; McAmis, op. cit., 51; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 183,185; Utrecht, “The Separatist Movement,” 393; The Manila Times (September 14, 1972). 34. Majul, “The Moros of the Philippines,” 175; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 196; May, “The Philippines,” 220; idem, “The Moro Movement,” 53; idem, “The Religious Factor,” 308; George, op. cit., 190-192; Che Man, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 63; Rodil, “The Lumud and Moro,” 17; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 161. 35. Gowing, op. cit., 196; George, op. cit., 204-208; McAmis, “Muslim Filipinos,” 52; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 75; Washburn, “Muslim Resistance,” 19; Mercado, op. cit., 161-162; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 379. 36. “Philippines: Restoring Order,” FEER, vol. 78, no. 48 (November 25, 1972): 13; Bernardino Ronquillo, “Philippines: Christmas Joy,” FEER, vol. 78, no. 53 (December 30, 1972): 20; Judy Stowe, “The Philippines: Three Dimensional Muslims,” FEER, vol. 80, no. 24 (June 18,1973): 5; New Nation (Singapore: December 29,1972); The Asian Student (San Francisco: January 6,1973); The Evening Express (Manila: January 9,1973); Press Bulletin (Manila: January 16 and 22,1973); The official version describing events that led up to the declaration of martial law was issued by the chief of staff of the Philippine army in his article which appeared in a publication of SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok. General Romeo Cesar Espino, “Insurgency and Martial Law in the Philippines,” Southeast Asian Spectrum, vol. 1, no. 2 (January 1973): 1-5.

Chapter Twenty

The Emergence of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

In 1972, the MNLF, with Nur Misuari at its head, took the lead in the Muslim revolutionary movement against the government. The movement had begun in 1969 when ninety volunteers left for military training in the Malay Peninsula. A committee of seven was elected, and Nur Misuari was chosen as chairman. Abul Khayr Alonto, the scion of a wealthy, aristocratic family related to an important senator from Maranao, Domacao Alonto, and the son of a former district governor of Lanao del Sur was his deputy. Later, Alonto was replaced as deputy by Hashim Salamat. Nur Misuari was a Tausug from Sulu. In 1964, while studying at the University of the Philippines in Manila, Misuari was active in the establishment of the first student organization, Bagong Asya, which attempted to introduce ideolog­ ical elements into campus politics. Later, he was one of the founders of a leftist, radical Marxist organization, Kabataang Makabayan (Patriot Youth). Apparently he dropped out of the organization when he came to the conclusion that it was placing Muslim interests in second place though Misuari and his supporters saw no conflict between their radicalism and their profound Muslim identity. In the course of time, Misuari was appointed as a lecturer in political science at the uni­ versity. In 1967, he was a central figure in the founding of the Philippine Muslim Nationalist League and became editor of its publication, Philippine Muslim News. Young people were attracted to him because of his ideas about the need for an armed uprising. At the beginning of 1969, he met Dato Udtog Mata lam and made contact with two other prominent Muslim politicians, Salipada Pfendatun from Co­ tabato, and Rashid Lucman from Lanao. They were of help to him in the organi­ zation of a training camp on the Island of Pangkor on the west coast of Malaya, in which he was also a participant. These men were Dato and sons of the traditional, aristocratic elite; Nur Misuari was from a common background. Shortly after­ wards, the two politicians regretted their support because the military training in Malaysia invested Misuari with independent political power. The young people who founded MNLF were drawn mostly from the University of Manila, and their Muslim consciousness was stronger than their ethnic commitment to the Maranao, Maguindanao, or Tausug communities. It was their Moro nationality which they emphasized. Besides independence from the Philippines, they aspired to social 267

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reforms and to changing the feudal character of the distribution of property and political power in the Muslim community of the south. Once they returned to the Philippines from their own training camp, they began training new volunteers. Unlike the other Muslim organizations that existed in the Philippines, MNLF was able to establish a more or less stable structure and to forge links with Muslim elements outside the Philippines. These sympathizers agreed to provide training, arms, asylum, money, and political pressure on the Philippine government. It was for all these reasons that following the declaration of martial law in 1972 when fighting between Muslims and Christians, and between Muslims and the govern­ ment, escalated to full-scale warfare, the MNLF quickly became the dominant Muslim organization.1 In 1969, the same year that the core of MNLF was organized at the training camp in Malaysia, another young Muslim, Hashim Salamat, established Nurul Islam, an organization whose aim was to disseminate the ideas of an Islamic revival among the Moro. Salamat was bom in Cotabato to a wealthy family of the aristocracy and was related to former Congressman Salipada Pendatun and through him to Dato Udtog Matalam. At the age of sixteen, he went on the haj pilgrimage and remained in Mecca to complete his high school studies. In 1959, he enrolled as a student at Al-Azhar University in Cairo where he quickly combined radical Moro politics with revolutionary Islamic ideas. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines where he met Misuari and other radicals and soon became one of the prominent people in MNLF. In 1978, he left the organization. The chief activists in MNLF came from two circles: students who had studied at secular institutions such as the University of the Philippines and those who had studied at Madrasas and other Islamic insti­ tutions in Arab countries.2 In mid-1971, Nur Misuari convened a special conference of Muslims in Zam­ boanga City for an emergency session to discuss the situation of the Muslims of the south. Among the participants were some of the first trainees from the camp in Malaysia and members of the youth wing of MIM. From the early stages of the movement, many Ulama had held prominent positions in the leadership of the organization and its various branches, supporting the notion of establishing an Islamic republic ruled by the shari’a. During the conference, criticism was voiced of this traditional leadership—their attempts to maintain their privileges, their political and financial corruption, and the misuse of their status in the face of neglecting the needs of their communities. The consensus was that traditional leaders should be denied any special status or legitimacy as spokesmen for the Bangsa Mow. But the most important result of the conference was the official founding of the MNLF, with Nur Misuari as its chairman. In effect, this confirmed his tacit leadership since the period of the training camp in Pangkor Island. A number of Dato from the traditional leadership, including Rashid Lucman who had been critical of Misuari, nonetheless, remained at the top of the MNLF. Other organizations, such as MIM and Nurul Islam, disbanded at this time. The confer­ ence decided that MNLF would carry out its struggle along two parallel avenues:

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an international political thrust, particularly in Muslim countries; and an armed guerilla struggle.3 MNLF was loosely structured. Theoretically it had parallel political and military networks. The political network was composed of a Central Committee with thir­ teen (some say twenty) members, and Nur Misuari as chairman. Initially, the Cen­ tral Committee operated from Sabah, later from Tripoli in Libya. It was responsible for the general policy of the movement. In effect, it concentrated on acquiring diplomatic and financial support from Muslim sources abroad, and the dispatch of arms and other supplies to rebel units fighting in the Philippines. A secretariat, answerable to the Central Committee, was divided into bureaus which dealt with politics, propaganda and information, education, assistance to refugees, and dis­ trict and village committees. The head of each bureau was an ex-officio member of the Central Committee. Theoretically there was also a Popular Congress, a Su­ preme Revolutionary Tribunal and, paralleling them, Regional Tribunals and Re­ gional Congresses. The first Congress convened in Mindanao in 1974 to ratify the MNLF Manifesto. The Congress did not meet again until 1986 when Misuari re­ turned to the Philippines for meetings with President Corazon Aquino. The mili­ tary arm of the movement, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) reported to the Central Committee, although there was no direct supervision. The commander of the BMA was responsible for coordination of the three military commands in Sulu, Cota­ bato, and Lanao. These, in turn, directed the district, regional, and village field units. The three way division of BMA units corresponded to the primary ethnic divisions of the Muslim population, and the officer at the head of each command was a member of the appropriate ethnic group: Sulu, Maguindanao, or Maranao. Each command dealt with training, local propaganda, education, distribution of arms, and finances. There were also local defense units attached to local BMA units. New recruits received six months training, including political orientation. Some recruits were directed to training camps in Sabah where a selection process identified candidates to be sent to Libya, Syria, Egypt, or training camps of the PLO.4 There were aspects of the MNLF activities in which women were engaged. These included recruitment propaganda, communications, supplies, medication, and arms; and women also served as radio operators and messengers. In some MNLF camps women could be found to care for the wounded and maintain sani­ tation, and women also cared for widows and orphans of MNLF fighters, sewed uniforms, collected donations, and did clerical work both in Philippines and over­ seas offices.5 In practical terms, the MNLF was not an orderly body based on a hierarchical table of organization, not even when it was at the peak of its activities from early 1973 until late 1977. The Central Committee was controlled by a number of personalities who were constantly squabbling with one another. As will be de­ scribed later, there were even some members of the Central Committee who sur­ rendered to the Philippine government. Only infrequently did the secretariat at­ tend to the matters for which they were theoretically responsible. Also, commu­

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nication between the Central Committee and fighting units in the field was gen­ erally tenuous, so that regional commands operated independently of one another. Generally they managed to extend their patronage to separate armed groups that were already operating. But other independent guerilla units which fought against the government continued to exist on the fringes of the MNLF, and the organiza­ tion had no control over these. Occasionally there was coordination, and some of the independent units carried out tasks for the MNLF; at other times, they pursued their own interests, whether tribal or personal. Guerilla raids went on without ad­ vance permission from the Central Committee. Under such circumstances, any attempt to estimate the true strength of the MNLF fighting forces at its high point is in the realm of mere speculation, and estimates range from 5,000 to 30,000 men. There were men who fought for a given period and, after a while, returned to their home. What is undoubtedly true is the popularity of the MNLF and its support by most Muslims. With the spread of the fighting, and the increase in the number of Muslim communities that suffered at the hands of government forces—whether as civilian casualties or as refugees driven from their villages—the number of young Muslims who felt a religious duty to join the mujahideen grew commensurately. Despite all the difficulties in obtaining information and the lack of clarity that prevailed in combat areas, it is evident that the MNLF had become the primary separatist organization— the strongest and most important of them all. A great part of its leading position stemmed from the fact that it was the major supplier of arms to the fighting bands, including those that were not actually part of the movement itself.6 The MNLF was now the prime spokesman and representative of Muslims in the southern Philippines, particularly for contact with Muslim countries and interna­ tional Muslim bodies. Aid which came from external Muslim sources, particularly from Libya and Sabah (and Malaysia as a whole), was delivered to the MNLF These contacts enabled the rebels to engage in a wide-ranging military campaign against the government. The main reason that MNLF could keep so many disparate and occasionally opposing forces in line was Misuari's status as the most effective liaison with foreign suppliers of arms, and other support, without which the fight­ ing could not have continued. As noted, Malaysia provided clandestine aid in both supplying arms and training volunteers, apparently as early as 1968. Malaysia’s motives were not, strictly speaking, religious solidarity with the Muslims of the south, but more a reaction to the Philippine government’s policies and its claims to Sabah. The Malaysian government interpreted \heJabidah incident as proof that the Philippine army had recruited Muslims to infiltrate Sabah to carry out sabotage there, in order to further Philippine claim to the territory. It is difficult to determine for how long a period the Malaysian government itself was directly involved in aid to the MNLF Conceivably the aid to the rebels diminished after 1969 when the Philippines and Malaysia became interested in mutual cooperation within the con­ text of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and wanted to main­ tain the stability of that body. Malaysia’s policy regarding the Philippines was com­

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plicated by the conflicting goals of maintaining cooperative relations through ASEAN on the one hand; and its commitment to assist the Muslim rebels, on the other. Although it never overtly admitted to providing any aid, only a few observers were taken in by its denials. At a later period, Malaysia and Indonesia lobbied for noninterference in Philippine internal affairs at international Islamic conferences, and extended valuable political support to reduce the pressures of Arab and Mus­ lim states on the Philippines. Nonetheless, it appears that at least until 1975 the central Malaysian government did nothing to intervene or to put an end to the aid extended to the rebels by Tun Mustafa, the first minister of Sabah, in cooperation with Libya. The relationship that prevailed between the federal Malaysian govern­ ment and the eastern state of Sabah was an unusual one: not restraining Tun Mustafa apparently stemmed from the widely held belief in Malaysia that Presi­ dent Marcos deserved to be punished. There was also the feeling that one should not cross Tun Mustafa who was an important vote-getter badly needed by the Malaysian government. In general, Mustafa supported the federal government, but he was known to be capable of striking out independently as well. By mid-1975, the leaders of Malaysia decided to seek his resignation. The aid he provided the Muslim separatists and the implications this held for Malaysian-Philippine rela­ tions were undoubtedly important factors in the decision. The equivalent policy of the Philippines was to continue fighting the Muslim separatist movement but to avoid military action against Sabah or public expressions of criticism of Malaysia. Without officially relinquishing its formal demand, the Philippines did not pursue public pressure in support of its claims over Sabah. There was still another reason for Malaysia’s policy. That reason was the result of three years of bitter conflict (1963-1966) known as “the confrontation” with Indonesia. Although the Philippine demand for Sabah predated the conflict with Indonesia, it went on even after that conflict was resolved. Malaysia had other points of tension in its relations with Singapore and Thailand. In the same period, Malaysia’s military security hinged on aid from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. At the end of the 1960s, it was clear that the military presence of those countries in the region would soon end. After Marcos was elected president in 1966, the Philippines wanted to reestablish diplomatic relations with Malaysia and join Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in establishing ASEAN. How­ ever, these efforts to forge closer relations were tainted by the Jabidah incident. After the House of Representatives passed a law declaring Philippine sovereignty over Sabah, diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines were sus­ pended. Malaysia cancelled its agreement with the Philippines to fight against smuggling, recalled its diplomatic officers from Manila, and demanded that the Philippines remove the staff of its embassy from Kuala Lumpur.7 Tun Mustafa’s animosity toward the Philippine government had begun in 1962 when Diosdado Macapagal’s government laid claim to Sabah. Mustafa, who had relatives in Sulu and was considered to be a fanatic Muslim, opposed any conces­ sions to the Philippines. He was suspected of harboring ambitions to become sultan

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of Sabah which could either be part of the Federation of Malaysia, or an independ­ ent state which would or would not include Muslim regions of the South Philip­ pines. All these factors probably played a part in his enabling Sabah to become a training ground for the MNLF, and providing the organization with supplies, com­ munications, and asylum.8 Only when Tun Mustafa’s political fortunes took a re­ versal did it become clear to what extent his direct personal involvement influ­ enced Sabah’s support of the MNLF uprising. Libyan arms shipments arrived in Sabah by way of two Arab emirates in the Persian Gulf. On at least one occasion, a shipment from Pakistan arrived in Sabah by air. From Sabah, the arms were transferred by boat to the southern Philippines. The shipments diminished in Au­ gust and by December they had stopped completely. From that point on, the MNLF had to rely on arms that its men captured in the fighting or bought from demoral­ ized and corrupt Philippine soldiers and policemen. One result of all this was that several groups of combatants within the MNLF, who had joined in order to assure their supply of arms, no longer had a reason to remain loyal to the organization. Over time, the MNLF established its own arms workshop, primarily to make land mines. When Mustafa was defeated in the Sabah elections of April 1976, he was replaced by Tun Fuad Stephans who was more closely aligned with the policy of the central government in Kuala Lumpur. He declared that he would not permit the Muslim separatists of the South Philippines to use Sabah as a base of operations in their fighting, as an asylum for their soldiers, or as a haven for refugees who fled from Sulu to Sabah. Muslim refugees had begun coming to Sabah in 1972, and by the end of 1979 there were 140,000 refugees there, some 14 percent of Sabah’s total population. Their arrival precipitated a food shortage, and there were outbreaks of malaria in several places. The government of Sabah spent sizable sums of money for medical and other aid to the refugees. Along with the refugees, there were 25,000 other Filipinos who held work permits. The net result was that the local population suffered from unemployment, particularly because the Filipi­ nos were ready to work for much lower wages and this fed local resentments. After failing in its appeal to Saudi Arabia for funds, the government of Sabah applied to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for $14 million for refugee resettlement. Saudi Arabia contributed a mere $15 thousand, nor did its policy change after Stephans’ death in an airplane accident in June 1976.9 Libya’s involvement with the Muslim separatists of the south has already been noted. It was an outgrowth of contacts made with Col. Muammar Qadhafi by Ra­ shid Lucman, the Muslim political leader from the Lanao del Sur district. When hostilities escalated in 1970 and 1971, Qadhafi accused the Philippine government of genocide and openly threatened to support the Muslims. Later, a Libyan spokes­ man went on record to state even more specifically that, since 1971, Libya had assisted the MNLF with arms, funds, asylum for members of the organization, and efforts to organize economic sanctions by Muslim governments against the Mar­ cos’ regime. Indeed, in the early stages of the revolt, the major part of MNLF’s financial support came from Libya. In 1972, Nur Misuari received $3.5 million.

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Additional financial help came from the Solidarity Fund of the OIC.10 At a later stage, the MNLF began raising money locally through Zakat contributions from the Muslim population in the south. In rural areas, the rebels were provided with food.11 The history of Philippine relations with its neighbor Indonesia is worthy of a brief note. Tension between the two countries dated back to the 1960s during Pres­ ident Ahmad Sukarno’s rule. The Philippine government was anxious about secu­ rity in the face of the Indonesian expansionist policy known as Greater Indonesia (Indonesia Raya), one of whose aims was annexation of the Muslim districts of the Philippines (along with the Malay Peninsula and the Patani region.) In March, 1965, the Philippine Congress discussed the issue of illegal entry by Indonesian immigrants to Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Although several hundred such infiltrators were apprehended and sent back to Indonesia, the illegal move­ ment continued. Among the infiltrators caught by the Philippine Security Forces, were Indonesian spies, some of whom were Communists. Philippine officials were convinced that this was a directed infiltration, and that it had subversive aims. The Philippine police estimated that there were between 10,000 to 15,000 illegals in Mindanao.12 Such pan-Malay notions permeated the atmosphere of the region for many years influencing intellectuals in Indonesia, in the Malay Peninsula, and among Muslim minorities in the South Philippines and South Thailand. There were many who looked to the day when all the ethnic Malay communities would unite under one government. The situation changed when Suharto became president of Indonesia. The pri­ mary aim of his policy was to insure regional stability, and therefore his actions were precisely intended to pacify Mindanao and maintain good neighborly rela­ tions with the Philippine government. Indonesia made efforts to negotiate between Malaysia and the Philippines. At the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, the Indonesians believed that an agreement could be hammered out by which the Phil­ ippines would forego their demands for Sabah, while Malaysia would bring Tun Mustafa’s activity to an end. The Philippine government agreed but the Malaysians refused. There is no evidence extant that Indonesia helped the Muslims of the Philippines by sending them arms. As a matter of fact, in March 1973 Indonesia rejected a Libyan offer that arms bought with Libyan money be sent to the Philip­ pines via Kalimantan and Sulawesi. On 3 May 1974 President Suharto set out on a conciliatory, three-day series of talks with Tun Abdul Razak, the prime minister of Malaysia, in an attempt to improve relations between Malaysia and the Philip­ pines. At the end of May 1974, even as the bitter fighting in Sulu and Cotabato was going on, President Marcos visited Indonesia to report to President Suharto on the result of his talks with Razak in which he was asked to restrain the rebellion. Suharto tried to convince Marcos to meet with representatives of the MNLF but Marcos refused. Suharto agreed to step up aerial and naval patrols in border areas to prevent the movement of people and arms originating on the Indonesian side. A year later, Indonesia signed yet another agreement with the Philippines, reassuring

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them that Indonesian territory would not serve as a haven for illegal operations against the Philippines. Tun Razak was not interested in a three-way summit, nor in a Philippine promise to forego its claim to Sabah in return for a halt to Malaysian intervention on behalf of the Muslim rebellion. He felt that, in any case, the Philippine claim to Sabah neither had any substance nor constituted a threat. The Indonesians suggested to the Philippine government that they seek a way to solicit southern Muslims cooperation with the authorities, perhaps through granting them a certain measure of political autonomy; that is, seeking out a political solution to the problem by means of negotiating with the rebels.13 In 1970, the year after MNLF had its beginnings, another separatist organiza­ tion, the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) was formed. The BMLO was a continuation of an older umbrella organization of separatist forces in the south, the Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations (UIFO) with origins in the pre-World War II years. Congressman Rashid Lucman who had initiated the ar­ rangements for sending ninety young people for training in Malaysia was the head of the BMLO Supreme Executive Council and Macapanton Abbas was another prominent leader. Nur Misuari was appointed commander of the Military Commit­ tee in Sulu, Abul Khayr Alonto was appointed head of the Military Committee in Lanao, and Hashim Salamat appointed head of the Military Committee in Co­ tabato. The first two men used their BMLO appointments as commanders as a basis for strengthening MNLF. In 1971, Rashid Lucman, Senator Domacao Alonto and Senator Salipada Pendatun traveled to Libya where they met with Muammar Qadhafi and asked for support for the Moro struggle. As noted earlier, Qadhafi promised to help. After martial law was declared in September 1972, Macapanton Abbas went to Jeddah where he met with the secretary-general of the OIC, Tunku Abdul Rahman (the former prime minister of Malaysia) and raised the issue of the Muslims of the south. Shortly afterward tension broke out between the mainly aristocratic-traditional BMLO leadership and the younger, educated leaders of the MNLF who had radical views. As will be remembered, the MNLF members were not only calling for liberation from the Philippines, they also wanted the senior traditional Muslim leadership replaced. At the same time that Abbas was holding talks in Jeddah with the secretary-general of the OIC, Nur Misuari and his aide at the time, Hashim Salamat, went to Libya to initiate their own request for assis­ tance. The heads of the BMLO accused them of diverting Libyan aid directly to the MNLF and, in fact, the Libyans found the MNLF the more suitable of the two organizations. An open conflict now broke out between the leadership of MNLF and the leadership of BMLO. In a separate development, the Philippine govern­ ment offered a reward for the capture of Nur Misuari and his associates. They escaped to Sabah and from there to Tripoli in Libya. Having established a new base of operations for the Central Committee of the MNLF, they were able to deal with sending arms and Libyan money to those Muslim groups already engaged in the

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fighting. On the diplomatic front, they worked for OIC recognition of the MNLF. Alonto remained in the Philippines and was considered the supreme commander of the fighting forces. Despite the fact that the Dato exploited Misuari’s Marxist past as a university student in order to spread rumors that the MNLF was a cam­ ouflaged Communist plot against Islam, the MNLF remained the primary separat­ ist factor in the struggle of southern Muslims. Some BMLO leadership such as Lucman, Abbas, and others who had failed in obtaining Libyan aid later began to cooperate with the Philippine government in an effort to halt hostilities in the south. In 1975, they mounted a conference where the demand was made that au­ tonomy be granted to the Muslims. President Marcos rejected the demand, and they went into voluntary exile in Saudi Arabia to continue their struggle from there. Rashid Lucman died there in 1984.14 As noted, it was the Declaration of Martial Law in September 1972, which was the catalyst for the Muslim rebellion in the entire south. The first major attack occurred on 21 October 1972 in Marawi City. It was followed immediately by vigorous MNLF activity which turned 1973 and the first quarter of 1974 into a critical and harsh period. Fighting spread to Basilan Island and to the Sulu Archi­ pelago. In November, reports that sizable shipments of arms had reached Jolo and the Tawi-Tawi Islands became more persistent. At the close of February 1973, Cotabato experienced a major attack. By the end of March, Muslim forces con­ trolled extensive rural areas in Basilan, Sulu, and large parts of the Lanao, Zam­ boanga, and Cotabato districts. The rebels cut off roads, carried out ambushes, and showed a high level of mobility and surprise. Their forces became better coordi­ nated and equipped, and the military leadership was better than it had been in the past. The rebels distributed leaflets describing the aims of their struggle; they even attempted to convince the local Christian population that they had nothing to fear because the operations were directed only against government forces. The nature of the antigovemment struggle shifted primarily because of an important change in the makeup of the fighting forces. No longer were these the traditional armed bands of the past who had been engaged for the most part in sporadic hit-and-run incidents. They were replaced by new, young, idealistic fighters with a university background and clearly defined political views who joined the fighting forces and developed a sophisticated guerilla operation which was better organized, system­ atic, and effective. Many of them were religious Muslims who, on the one hand opposed the government, but on the other also opposed the traditional elites. This element had been absent in the earlier stage of the uprising. In fact, this was no longer a movement directed against Christian communities. The clearly defined enemy was now the central government. In the field, BMA units of the MNLF fought shoulder to shoulder with independent bands of Muslim guerillas. In addi­ tion to the novelty of attacks on urban centers, closing roads, ambushes, and sur­ prise raids, they were even able to down some enemy planes and helicopters. The intelligence operation of the rebels was far superior to that of the army. They en­ joyed the advantage of popularity among the Muslim population while the army

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soldiers were considered foreigners. Reports circulated that local tribes had joined the struggle as well as Communist units from the New People’s Army (NPA). The cost of all this was felt in enormous economic losses, extensive property damage, and, of course, the loss of life. While there are no reliable statistics, it is estimated that by 1977 the number of dead was 50,000 to 60,000 Muslims, Christians, sol­ diers, and civilians. The number of homeless was placed at 200,000 to 300,000—some say a million. One hundred thousand Muslim refugees, or more, fled to Sabah. There are, of course, higher assessments of casualties and refugees. November 1973 was a month that saw great bloodshed. The army poured in massive reinforcements and, in December, unleashed a series of coordinated oper­ ations using land forces, marines, and air support against the MNLF in Sulu. Fight­ ing lasted four days during which the army suffered heavy losses and, initially, was forced to retreat. All of which testified to the strength of the rebels and their fight­ ing ability. A particularly heavy battle began on 7 February 1974 and in the course of the fighting which lasted two weeks, the city of Jolo was destroyed with a loss of 400 to 660 Muslims, and an estimated 215 soldiers dead. The army again mounted a combined operation using naval units, air force, and artillery against a rebel force thought to be 16,000 to 20,000 fighters, only half of whom were in the field at any given time. The rebels fought in units of 200 or 300 men. Their power of maneuver and mobility was unlimited while government forces were mainly tied down to a static defense of cities and roads. Army units in the south were made up mostly of new recruits with inferior commanders; consequently, there was poor discipline. Government and police forces numbered about 35,000, but the number grew progressively larger, and by 1975,75 percent of the Philippine army, approx­ imately 250,000 soldiers, were concentrated in the south. The annual military budget expanded greatly. Despite the early successes of the rebels, the government held the advantage because they had air force, navy, tanks, and artillery units at their command. After a brief time, the quality of the commanders and organiza­ tional ability of the army improved. Both sides carried out acts of brutality.15 When hostilities escalated in 1973, the government came to the conclusion that it had to mount a propaganda campaign discrediting the rebels. The government took the line that it was fighting against a rebel movement strongly influenced by Communist-Maoist ideas. The allegation was based on documents seized from the Philippine Communist Party. Among other things, the documents stated that the party’s program should be directed at Luzon Island, the country’s administrative center; while some strategic importance should be given to the armed struggle in the other islands, for example, Mindanao. In the view of the government, there was a considerable expansion of subversive Maoist activity in new locales on Luzon Island, in Visaya, and Mindanao. On the other side of the propaganda war, radio broadcasts of the Communist underground in the Philippines, accused the government of murdering Muslims.16 The government’s claim of Maoist influences was greeted with skepticism, not because there was any doubt about Maoist intentions, but because the extent of

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Communist penetration into the Muslim community was considered negligible. Admittedly, Nur Misuari was assumed to have had leftist tendencies which dated back to his connection with Communist circles while he was at the university. There were two reasons for the reservations: first, the Muslim religious Weltan­ schauung of the rebels was antithetical to the antireligious ideology of the Com­ munist Party; and second, the goals of the Communist struggle were vastly differ­ ent from those of the Muslims. Indeed, there was no real evidence of an operational link between the Muslim rebels and the Communists. Had there been such coop­ eration, many Muslims would have turned against Nur Misuari. Further, any alli­ ance with the Communists would have harmed the vital links which the MNLF had created with Muslim countries and with the OIC, and consequently, with the source of rebel supplies.17 The ideology of the MNLF was never definitively formulated. There was, how­ ever, a central demand: independence for the Muslim areas in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. But there was no agreement as to whether the final goal was independ­ ence or merely autonomy—and if autonomy, what kind—and the answer to that question was different at different times. An April 1973 declaration of aims by the MNLF demanded that the government army be withdrawn from the south, that all lands taken from the Moro be returned, that the laws of Islam and the adat be enacted in Muslim territory, and that the Muslim regions of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan be granted autonomy. The declaration included complaints about the ar­ my’s torching of houses in Muslim villages, robbery, and affronts to the honor of Muslim women and to places of worship.18On 28 April 1974 the official manifesto of the MNLF was published over the signature of Hajji Nur Misuari, chairman of the Central Committee of the MNLF. The manifesto had been prepared for pres­ entation to the Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers scheduled to meet in Kuala Lumpur. It was a more far-reaching document than the previous one had been, and stated that “We, the five million Bangsa Moro people, seek emancipation from tyrannical Philippine rule.” To this end the MNLF was established, including its military arm, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA). The Bangsa Moro people have cut all political, economic, and other contacts with the Philippine government, and have established the Bangsa Moro Republic which effectively exercises its author­ ity over large segments of the national homeland. We believe that armed struggle is the only means by which complete freedom and independence can be achieved. We will not settle for less than this. We will establish a democratic government which will not permit any form of exploitation or repression. If there are Filipinos (that is, non-Muslims) who want to remain in the national homeland of the Bangsa MoWy even after it has achieved its independence, they will be entitled to equal rights and protection as all other citizens, providing that they forego their Philippine citizenship and accept citizenship in the Republic of Bangsa Moro. The Bangsa Moro people and its revolution undertake to uphold the culture of Islam in its homeland and to develop it without prejudice against other religions or indige­ nous cultures. We are committed to the principle that we constitute an integral part

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of the Islamic world, as well as the Third World, and all of subjugated colonial humanity. What stands out in this manifesto is that its framers had recourse to nationalist terms, an indication of their intention to establish a Muslim nation. They regarded the revolt as a nationalist struggle whose aim was the establishment of a single, independent homeland for all the ethno-linguistic groups that comprised the Mus­ lim community in the Philippines. The manifesto was rife with expressions of religious ideology such as Islamic renewal and jihad that had played such a crucial role at various times during the Muslim rebellion.19 President Ferdinand Marcos understood that the appearance of the MNLF sig­ naled a new dimension of hostilities in the south. No longer was it a question of fighting local war lords and Dato of the traditional aristocracy, the government now confronted a new war of liberation led by a movement that subscribed to Islamic national ideology, ideas of class equality, and principles of a new social order. In response, the Philippine government implemented a policy which inte­ grated a number of approaches in its efforts to rout the rebels: an unyielding mil­ itary campaign to convince the rebels that they had no hope of winning, develop­ ment plans intended to ease the social and economic hardships of the Muslim population, and a campaign of psychological warfare to politically discredit the MNLF and revile Misuari as a Maoist. At the same time as it was exploiting splits in the MNLF leadership, the government sought allies within the Muslim commu­ nity and initiated diplomatic activity in Arab and Muslim countries in order to circumvent Misuari's advantage in this area as well.20 Throughout 1973, bitter fighting continued in Mindanao, Basilan, and Sulu, and army reinforcements were again sent to the south. President Marcos attempted to win the support of traditional Muslim leaders or, failing that, to neutralize their opposition. He invited three hundred Muslim dignitaries to the Presidential Palace in Manila on 3 January 1973. Among the guests were congressmen, district gov­ ernors, mayors, and representatives of Muslim organizations. Marcos announced that he would grant a selective pardon and economic benefits to rebels that agreed to surrender, and that the reprieve would remain in effect for anyone laying down his arms by February 18. He detailed his plans for economic reform and pointed out that, indeed, the government could point to a number of successes in that area. In December 1974 the surrender of many rebels was reported. Army forces recap­ tured areas they had lost in Basilan and Mindanao. Earlier, in April 1973 President Marcos established a Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Develop­ ment of Mindanao (PTF/RDM) headed by Alejandro Melchor, the presidential executive secretary. The task force was to coordinate all operations for assessing war damage to private property and government facilities, to work out a rehabili­ tation program for the south, to reestablish law and order through military means, to capture rebel leaders, to expedite the plans for granting selective pardons, and to prepare a rehabilitation program for those who were pardoned. A number of BMLO leaders, among them Rashid Lucman, agreed to cooperate with the gov-

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emment claiming that by aligning themselves with the Presidential Task Force they could gain legitimization and recognition for the Moro struggle. In April 1973 Senator Mamintal A. Tamano, former chairman of the CNI and the president's former advisor on Muslim Affairs, proposed that the government begin a broad program of resettling landless Muslims, establish a Muslim Development Bank and grant judicial recognition of the shari’a. He advocated passing a law which would guarantee land to Muslims in the five districts in which they still constituted the majority. He suggested that quotas be set for the appointment of Muslims to positions in all branches of government service and that more Muslims should be recruited into the army. Senator Tamano noted that the permanent solution to the problems of the south would only come about if the fears that beset the Moro people could be neutralized, fears that they would be cut off from their religion; that their values, customs, and traditions would be lost; that their ancestral lands would be expropriated, and the fear that they would have no part in ruling the country because they were not partners in government and did not benefit from the fruits of economic growth. Marcos agreed to a number of Tamano's recommendations and announced that in addition to the pardon, he was launching a package of social and economic measures designed to appease the Muslims. The measures included establishing the Muslim Amanah Bank on 2 August 1973, canceling the prohibition on the historic barter-trade between Philippine Muslims and Borneo, funding roadbuilding projects and electrification, aiding the rehabilitation of refugees, estab­ lishing an Institute for Islamic Studies in the Philippine University at Manila, ap­ pointing Muslims to government positions, and recognizing Muslim holidays.21 The president also undertook to have Muslim law systematically assembled and codified. This was not a new idea. As early as 1903, during the period of American rule, it was decided that the Legislative Assembly would promulgate laws based on customs prevalent among the Moro and see to their codification. But the project never got off the ground. On 10 January 1967 the office of the president deter­ mined that only one aspect of special relations with the Muslims would be dealt with—regulating arrangements for the haj to Mecca. It was decided that the CNI, in consultation with the appropriate government ministries, would supervise the haj pilgrimage for Philippine Muslims. On 1 August 1973 a special team of the Presidential Task Force was set up to codify Muslim laws in areas of personal status such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and so forth. In April 1974 the team presented a draft for administering Muslim law, attempting to coordinate the net­ work of Muslim law with general Philippine law, and making it possible to grant official sanction to Muslim law. The draft law also dealt with Muslim courts as part of the national courts system. In October 1973 a presidential order was an­ nounced recognizing Muslim holidays. But it took almost four more years, until February 1977, for another presidential order to be issued: the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, a definitive declaration of the law as it applied to Philippine Muslims. President Marcos declared that in promulgating the law, he

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was giving operative force to the paragraph in the Tripoli Agreement (discussed later) of December 1976, which called for granting Muslims in the autonomous areas the right to establish their own court system which would function according to the laws of the shari ' a 22 In its strategy to exploit the widening rifts within the Muslim leadership, the government continued to bypass the rebels and cultivate the traditional leadership. In May 1974 Marcos recognized Rashid Lucman as the paramount sultan of Min­ danao and Sulu. On 9 May nineteen sultans of aristocratic families of Mindanao and Sulu signed a declaration promising aid, full cooperation, and loyalty to the government. From 4 to 6 of June of that year, Sultan Rashid Lucman and other Moro leaders convened a well-attended conference at the University of Mindanao in Marawi City. The conference voted unanimously to support the leadership of President Marcos and passed resolutions on government policy which were, in general, supportive of the government’s attempts to deal with the Moro rebellion by means of social and economic reforms, but also included a recommendation to grant autonomy to the Muslims of the south. The government found this resolution disappointing. There were no tangible results to attempts by Marcos to draw the Dato closer and thus further splinter Muslim leadership because the old leadership class had become almost devoid of influence. Martial law had deprived them of power and the ideology of the MNLF leadership deprived them of any authority whatsoever.23 The MNLF revolt presented many Dato with a dilemma. Those who supported government policy put themselves at risk of violence from the rebels and at a loss of political legitimacy within the Muslim community; those who supported the rebels faced the danger of government reprisals and the loss of their political status. Faced by these contradictory pressures, the traditional elites reacted to the rebel­ lion in three ways. One group condemned the rebels and promised the government continued support. The older Dato who were, for the most part, politically and economically established belonged to that group. A second group, which included mostly younger and better educated Dato, tacitly accepted President Marcos’s rule. Admittedly they supported most of the complaints which the rebels raised, but they were opposed to the use of force or secession from the republic regarding neither of these as legitimate avenues for dealing with the Muslim problem. They accepted government money and/or government positions and justified martial law. The third group actually joined the rebellion. In a general sense, but not inevitably, this group included young Dato, sons or younger brothers of those who opted for the first two approaches. A number of them became field commanders or reached other senior positions in MNLF district leadership. A characteristic common to quite a few in this group was the high rate of defection. Commanders from the Dato class surrendered to the government more frequently and in greater numbers than did those from a nonaristocratic background. Desertions were the result of efforts by other Dato, frequently family members, to persuade them to cooperate with the government. The behavior of members of all three groups testified to a

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common class interest. The leadership of MNLF, including the radicals among them, who sought to bring about social change, hesitated to criticize the institution of the Dato, primarily because in the early stages of the revolt they relied on the support of some of the more important traditional leaders and did not want to place that support in jeopardy. Secondly, a call for the termination of the Dato system would undercut one of the central arguments of the leaders of the rebellion who wanted to appear as continuing the Moro’s past anticolonial struggles.24 At the third session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Jeddah, March 1972, Libya raised the issue of the affliction of the Moro people. Stressing the need for Muslim solidarity and cooperation, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia spoke about the massacre of Muslims in the Philippines. Discussion was postponed mostly because of Indonesia’s intervention. Still, the conference ap­ pointed a team which was instructed to monitor the security of Muslims in the Philippines. From that time on, Arab Islamic support for Philippine Muslims be­ came increasingly open and unambiguous. Qadhafi, the host for the Fourth Con­ ference of ICFM, held in Benghazi 24-26 March 1973, demanded that the issue now come up for a comprehensive discussion. He was supported in this by Tunku Abdul Rahman, secretary-general of the ICFM. Indonesia indicated its reserva­ tions by lowering the level of its representation at the conference; rather than the its foreign minister, Indonesia sent the under-secretary of the Foreign Ministry at the head of its delegation to the conference. On 21 March, the eve of the confer­ ence, the MNLF unleashed a series of attacks in Cotabato the goal of which was undoubtedly to focus public attention in the Muslim world on the situation in the South Philippines. At the opening session of the conference, the Libyan foreign minister and the secretary-general of OIC, Tunku Abdul Rahman, published re­ ports that accused the Philippine government of responsibility for the oppression of Muslims and their expulsion from their lands. As a conciliatory gesture to In­ donesia and Malaysia, who were not interested in pursuing the topic for fear that an extreme decision by the conference would have a negative impact on stability in their countries, it was decided to extend an invitation to the Philippine ambas­ sador to Cairo, a Muslim, in order to give him a platform for presenting his gov­ ernment’s position. The ambassador dismissed the accusations, claiming that there was neither discrimination nor oppression of Muslims in his country. His speech was interrupted dramatically by the appearance of a seven year old Muslim boy whom the Libyans displayed as a living testimony to the atrocities committed by the Philippine army. His parents had been murdered, and soldiers had cut off his hand and an ear. Libya then presented a resolution calling on Muslim countries to break off diplomatic relations with the Philippines, place an embargo on the coun­ try, and submit a complaint to the United Nations. Indonesia and Malaysia exer­ cised their influence to moderate the Libyan resolution, arguing that it was danger­ ous to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. In its amended form the resolution was much more moderate. The amendment was carried as a result of Saudi Arabia’s influence, supported by Indonesia and Malaysia. The final resolu­

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tion criticized the Philippines and appointed a delegation of Muslim foreign min­ isters who were to visit the Philippines in order to meet with President Marcos and investigate the situation of the Muslims there. The conference further decided on an appeal to “peace loving’*countries and to international religious organizations to use their good offices with the Philippine government to end its campaign of violence against the Muslim community and to safeguard the security and basic freedoms of that community. The conference resolved to establish a voluntary fund for aid to Philippine Muslims and requested that Indonesia and Malaysia act in support of the resolution through ASEAN. A main reason that the extreme Libyan position was not carried was that a number of the member countries at the confer­ ence feared the precedent of external intervention because of problems with their own minorities. The Muslim countries regarded radical ethnic self-determination as undesirable. Multiethnic countries in the region, such as Indonesia and Malay­ sia, were particularly uneasy. Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia made up the delegation of foreign ministers to the Philippines called the Quadripartite Min­ isterial Commission or the Committee of Four.25 On 18 April 1973 a conference of ASEAN was held in Pattaya, Thailand. When it closed, a communique was issued regarding the situation in the South Philippines which stated that the conference had taken note of the facts as reported by the Philippine foreign minister and of the emphasis he placed on his government’s efforts to improve the situation in the south. The statement went on to thank the government of the Philippines and the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia for their support at the recent Benghazi Conference. The conference noted that the stability and security of Southeast Asia were the collective responsibility of the countries of the region. In effect, this was a show of support for the Philippine position.26 Nothing happened at the Pattaya Conference which could weaken the resolution of the Benghazi Conference or the determination of Libya to continue to act on behalf of the Muslims of the south. President Marcos was confronted by a grave dilemma. Were he to agree to ac­ cept the delegation which the Benghazi Conference had mandated, he would, in fact, be recognizing an order to investigate a matter which he regarded as internal. He would, in fact, be recognizing the right of an international Islamic body to investigate an issue which he considered to be an internal matter; furthermore, the investigating body was predisposed to championing the case of the Muslim minor­ ity. His hesitancy was reinforced by members of his cabinet who also believed that it would be unwise to allow foreign representatives to pass judgment on the situa­ tion in the south. But Marcos had to weigh the reaction of Middle East suppliers of oil to the Philippines. He feared that should he refuse to accept the Muslim delegation, the Philippines would be placed in jeopardy of an oil embargo, a pos­ sibility which became much more likely several months later, in October 1973, when hostilities broke out between Syria/Egypt and Israel. Furthermore, neither the government’s military campaigns nor the socioeconomic reforms had resolved the situation. Marcos knew the rebels to be entirely dependent on Libyan support.

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He regarded Libya as a key player and hoped that cooperation with Libya would achieve an end to the rebellion. And he was certain that anyone observing the situation in the south would support his view that the government had no conflict with the Muslims as Muslims. In July 1973 it appeared that this position was correct when a delegation of the World Muslim League came from Mecca. The delegation expressed its satisfaction with the situation that prevailed in Mindanao and reported that in their meetings with Muslims in the Philippines, they had taken the position that secession was out of the question. In Jakarta, which the delegation also visited, they heard from Pres­ ident Suharto that the Muslims of the Philippines ought to seek solutions to their problems through negotiations rather than by resorting to force. In August, the Delegation of Four Muslim Foreign Ministers of the ICFM arrived in the Philip­ pines. The delegation spent two days in the area of the fighting in Mindanao and Sulu. At the end of its survey, the delegation convened a press conference in Manila at which it rejected the accusations of the Philippine government which alleged that the MNLF was a Maoist organization (as Philippine propaganda would have had it). The delegation went on to criticize the army’s strong-arm tactics against the Muslims, and stated that the only solution to the conflict was political rather than socioeconomic or military. Members of the Delegation of Four Muslim For­ eign Ministers called on President Marcos to negotiate with the new, young Mus­ lim leadership represented by the MNLF. They believed that this organization was sufficiently strong to continue the fight against the government and that it would be a mistake on the part of the government to dismiss it. The Philippine govern­ ment was disappointed by such a negative report, and Libya announced that the Moro issue would remain on the agenda of the international Muslim community.27 In his efforts to forestall publication of the report and his fear of an Arab oil embargo, Marcos engaged in pro-Arab and anti-Israel gestures, not unlike other governments who were dependent on the good graces of the Arabs. In 1973, there were a number of significant developments in the relationship of the Philippines to Arab countries as the Middle East became a focus of interest in Marcos’s new diplomacy. The diplomatic offensive was designed to neutralize Libya’s advocacy of the MNLF, to insure that an Arab oil embargo would not fall upon the Philip­ pines, and to diversify trade with Arab countries. Another factor that had to be taken into consideration was the fact that there were 100,000 Philippine workers in Arab countries. According to official estimates, these workers transferred ap­ proximately one billion dollars a year to the Philippines, a windfall for the treasury which was suffering from a shortage of foreign currency. In the 1973 Middle East war, the Philippines were quick to side with the Arabs. Arab countries, and other Islamic states, viewed their relations with the Philippines in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict and were pleased when the Philippines took an anti-Israel po­ sition. The government’s diplomatic relations with the Arab world saw a major breakthrough on 8 November 1973, when the new Egyptian ambassador presented his credentials to Manila. Marcos used the opportunity to condemn Israel, calling

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on it to withdraw from territories captured from the Arabs only a month earlier. T\vo weeks later, another communique reported that Marcos supported the Pales­ tinian right to self-determination. On 22 November 1973 Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo sent a letter to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, which included President Marcos’s declaration. The gesture was intended to underscore yet again Philippine support of the Arab side in the Middle East conflict. In December when the Deputy prime minister/foreign minister of Syria, Abdul Halim Khadam, visited the Phil­ ippines, Marcos reiterated Philippine support for the UN decision that called on Israel to withdraw from Arab territory. The first resident Philippine minister to Saudi Arabia, who was appointed in October of that year, was a Muslim. Embassies were opened in Iran and Algiers and diplomatic relations were estab­ lished with the United Arab Emirates. The Philippines went on to reestablish its diplomatic relations with Iraq and recognized the PLO as the legitimate represent­ ative of the Palestinian people. There was a certain irony in this not only because the PLO had been among those aiding the MNLF and training some of its mem­ bers, but also because the PLO had been a source of inspiration for Nur Misuari in the early period as well as in subsequent years. The success of the PLO in its struggle against Israel, and its mix of violent acts on the one hand and diplomacy on the other which served to effect international pressure on Israel, served as a model and an impetus to the MNLF. Ultimately, however, the MNLF was unable to attain the same kind of autonomy that the PLO did—in effect, almost complete sovereignty.28 Philippine policy continued along the same path in subsequent years. In October 1980 a Philippine embassy was opened in Jordan. In recognition of this behavior, the Arab countries decided not to cut oil ship­ ments to the Philippines. Oil import was crucial, and the dependence on Arab sources sensitized the Philippines to the political demands of Arab countries. Ninety percent of the oil came from the Middle East, most of it from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Oil imports rose from $250 million in 1973, to more than $700 million in 1974. The Philippines hoped to reduce its trade deficit with Arab countries by increasing exports to them, and in 1973 the first commercial delegation visited Manila. In June the first loan agreement with Kuwait was signed for $17 million. Representatives of Saudi Arabian companies arrived to examine the possibilities of trade with the Philippines, and the government had expectations that ventures could be set up. The government hoped that Arab countries would provide finan­ cial support for special projects which could improve the economic situation of Muslims in the south. It also looked forward to financial grants to the Amanah Bank so that it could broaden the scope of its loans in the south. Imelda Marcos played an important role in strengthening Philippine ties with Arab countries, act­ ing as a special envoy of President Marcos. In Egypt, she conducted discussions with President Sadat; in Algeria, she met with President Houari Boumedienne and, on his advice, flew to New York for a meeting with the Algerian Foreign Minister Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika, who was president of the UN General Assembly at the time, in order to present the Philippine case to Arab representatives to the UN.

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From there she flew to Riyadh to extend President Marcos’s condolences on the assassination of King Faisal. In the following years, Imelda Marcos continued to meet with Arab leaders in Iraq and New York. Arab leaders reciprocated with gestures of their own with such visits to the Philippines as that of King Hussein of Jordan; of Jihan Sadat, wife of the Egyptian president; of the ministers of Educa­ tion and Oil of Saudi Arabia, and of the Iraqi foreign minister. Habib Bourgiba, president of Ibnisia told the Philippine minister of Information that his country would never support any secession in the Philippines.29 From February 18-21, 1974, the Second Islamic Summit meeting was held in Lahore, Pakistan. (The first was held in Rabat in September 1968.) At the time, violent fighting was taking place in Jolo which, as noted earlier, caused devastation throughout the city. The Muslim rebels wanted to place the rebellion on the con­ ference agenda as is clear from a letter Nur Misuari wrote on 17 January 1974, published in The Straits Times of Malaysia on 22 February. The Philippine gov­ ernment was uneasy about the outcome of the conference at which the report of the Four Muslim Foreign Ministers was scheduled to be circulated. ASEAN mem­ bers continued to exhibit extreme sensitivity about Philippine national interests, particularly in the face of Arab Islamic pressure. Indonesia demanded that discus­ sion of the problems of the South Philippines be sidestepped, preferring a more convenient topic—the problem of peace in West Asia, meaning the Arab-Israel conflict. Tun Abdul Razak, prime minister of Malaysia, spoke at the conference saying that the situation in the South Philippines was a cause of deep concern in Malaysia which had already had to absorb many thousands of refugees. He added that his government had taken steps to find a solution to the problem in consulta­ tion with the Philippine government, and he called on all Muslim countries to use their good offices to influence the Philippine government to implement a just so­ lution to the plight of the Muslims. At the same time, he emphasized that this was an internal Philippine affair, reiterating that Malaysia and the rest of the Muslim world could not avoid being concerned. In fact, there was no public discussion of the Muslim revolt in the southern Philippines at the conference, nor was a resolu­ tion of condemnation passed.30For its part, the Philippine government took a num­ ber of steps to repair damage to its image caused by the campaign in Jolo, including the transfer of funds to the Amanah Bank for loans and other financial aid to people whose houses had been destroyed. But such palliative measures had little effect in easing the situation because the fighting had increased Moro insecurity, suspicion, and lack of trust. In March 1974, two weeks after the Lahore Conference, Omar Sakkaf, the Saudi foreign minister, visited the Philippines. President Marcos ex­ plained the plans for development and rehabilitation projected for Mindanao and Sulu and tried to convince his visitor of the sincerity of the government’s inten­ tions. Sakkaf promised Muslim representatives with whom he met that Saudi Ara­ bia would assist the Philippines in finding a solution to the Mindanao conflict. The Philippine government was conciliatory in its relations with the members of ASEAN since it continued to need their support; however, at the beginning of

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March, there were again reports that the rebels had received aid from Malaysia, particularly from Tun Mustafa. The Philippine government now openly accused not only Tun Mustafa, the chief minister of Sabah, but the Malaysian federal gov­ ernment for involvement in the Muslim revolt. The result was heightened tension between the two countries. Marcos expected difficulties at the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) that was slated to convene in Kuala Lumpur in June, and he did not want to further antagonize Malaysia. Consequently, he approached Indonesia asking it to intercede, and Indonesia did, indeed, make efforts in that direction. At the end of May 1974, President Ferdinand Marcos paid a state visit to Indonesia and met with President Suharto. The two agreed that regional disputes should be dealt with within the region, without permitting external elements to interfere. Indonesia was interested in preventing the involvement of Arab states in events in Southeast Asia. It also wanted to forestall the possibility that the issue of the revolt in the southern Philippines would be exploited by Indonesian politicians which would impact negatively on Indonesia’s internal stability.31 The Fifth Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers (ICFM) was held in Kuala Lumpur from June 19-25,1974. In anticipation of the conference, and while it was in progress, the rebels escalated their military activity in South Mindanao. The army used artillery and military aircraft to repulse the attacks.32 The Malaysian prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, stated that the conference would not deal with the problem of the Islamic minority in the South Philippines, and that it was pref­ erable for the issue to be dealt within the context of ASEAN. The Indonesian for­ eign minister, Adam Malik, did much to defuse treatment of the issue. Both pre­ ferred “quiet diplomacy.” In contradistinction, a number of Arab representatives declared that one of their major concerns was the problem of Muslim minorities in the world and a second was Middle East developments. In fact, the August, 1973 report of the Committee of Four Foreign Ministers occupied an important place on the conference agenda. A recommendation that autonomy be granted to Muslims in the south, which had been passed at the Conference of Muslim Dignitaries con­ vened at Mindanao University in Marawi City that same month, was now included as an addendum to the report. Despite Malaysian and Indonesian efforts to prevent it, the report was discussed. The Libyan Foreign Minister raised the issue of the rebellion in the southern Philippines, openly admitting that Libya had provided money, arms, and ammunition to the rebels, thereby confirming the accusation made by the Philippine government. Libya, he said, would continue to help and use every means at its disposal, including an oil embargo, in order to assure a political solution to the problem but he denied that the arms were sent via Malaysia. He demanded that Marcos meet with the leaders of the MNLF. In defense of the Philippine government, the Indonesian representative said that the Philippines had established the Muslim Welfare Agency with OIC funding. He argued that the sincerity of President Marcos and his aspiration to work for a Philippine society in which the Muslims would take their rightful place was beyond question. On 24 June the Somali foreign minister, speaking for the Delegation of Muslim Foreign

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Ministers, presented the delegation's report which was highly critical. The report criticized President Marcos’s actions in the south. Indonesia and Malaysia again joined forces to prevent passage of an anti-Philippine resolution, but on 25 June such a resolution was passed. The conference expressed its deep and ongoing con­ cern about the situation of the Muslims in the South Philippines. It called on the Philippine government to avoid any action that would cause the killing of Muslims, destruction of their property and places of prayer. It did take note of the steps taken by the government to improve the lot of the Muslims but believed that social and economic measures were insufficient. The conference demanded that the Philippine government seek a political solution by peaceful means and through negotiation with Muslim leaders, particularly with representatives of the MNLF, under the patronage of the OIC, within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. The conference called upon the Philippine government to put an immediate end to military campaigns, to provide protection and security for the Muslims, to return refugees to their home, and to halt organized Christian immigration from the north to the south. The conference authorized the establishment of the Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency to be funded by the Islamic Solidarity Fund in order to provide direct assistance to Muslims in the south, and requested that the secretary-general of OIC, Hassan al-Tohamy, discuss these matters with the Philippine government in consultation with the Committee of Four Foreign Ministers. These resolutions of the Kuala Lumpur Conference enhanced the prestige of the MNLF and represented a not inconsiderable diplomatic victory for the organization which had skillfully ex­ ploited the conference, as well as other conferences of Arab countries, as an arena for advantageous political activity.33 Nonetheless, the importance of the Kuala Lumpur Conference was that it did not accede to the MNLF demand for secession and the establishment of an inde­ pendent state. During the conference, Abdul Hamid Lucman and Hashim Salamat, representatives of the MNLF, were in Kuala Lumpur, but they were prevented from participating in the conference, even with observer status. Lucman announced that if Marcos did not seek a political solution, as the conference demanded, the strug­ gle for independence would continue. He appealed to President Marcos to initiate negotiations by ordering a cease-fire. At the conclusion of the conference, the two representatives of the MNLF issued a communique in which they thanked Muslim countries for the concern they had shown for the plight of the Muslims. One im­ portant conclusion which the heads of MNLF drew from the conference was that there would be nothing but cold comfort from Malaysia and Indonesia. Hencefor­ ward the main thrust of their diplomatic efforts would be directed at gaining sym­ pathy for their cause from Arab countries. President Marcos published a communique as well, in which he praised the resolutions of the Kuala Lumpur Conference. His government was grateful that the onference had accepted the basic premise that the territorial integrity of the Philippines was a nonnegotiable princi­ ple. Consequently, it accepted the conference’s recommendation that called for

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direct negotiations with the rebels. This was significant because it was an indica­ tion that, in spite of its denials, the government officially recognized the MNLF. Misuari saw this as a great diplomatic victory. At the Kuala Lumpur Conference, the MNLF realized the impressive achievement of mobilizing Arab and Muslim support for its struggle, although there was a price to be paid. The MNLF now had to modulate its demands for secession and suffice with a claim for autonomy. The Philippine government, too, had to moderate its position in return for consideration of its stand. It had to make concessions, the most important of which was to agree to negotiate directly with the MNLF instead of pinning its hopes for a solution to the problem on military means.34 Fighting persisted in the months following the Kuala Lumpur Conference. In June there were battles in the vicinity of Cotabato City. From August to October, the fighting around Davao, Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur districts grew heav­ ier. This was despite the fact that the army reported an increase in the number of Moros who had surrendered and a split in MNLF leadership. The Philippine gov­ ernment found it necessary to turn to the United States with an urgent request to replenish military supplies. Marcos announced that he was prepared to arm civil­ ians in the Mindanao region to help in the fighting. He also extended the amnesty deadline for surrendering rebels a number of times. He reiterated statements he had made on previous occasions, that he intended to pacify the rebellion through economic, social, and political reforms rather than relying on military might, and that he would end economic arrangements that had fostered a sense of discontent and mistrust among the Muslims. He went so far as to make demonstrative efforts to show his high regard for the Muslim minority and its culture. At the opening ceremony of the Center for Pluralistic Art held in Manila on 7 July, the Muslims were given great prominence and, in a military parade in honor of Independence Day on 4 July, Muslim units marched, led by officers wearing the traditional Arab kufiyah and iqal headdress. Meanwhile, the diplomatic momentum which began with the Kuala Lumpur Conference continued. The foreign minister of Lebanon came to Manila shortly after the end of the conference where he heard from Marcos that his government’s policy was committed to social and economic development rather than a recourse to arms. In August the secretary-general of the OIC, Hassan al-Tohamy, also made a number of visits. In November 1974 President Marcos declared a two month unilateral cease-fire, saying that its continuation was de­ pendent on the outcome of negotiations with the rebels.35

Notes 1. Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 409; idem, “The Muslim-Christian Conflict,” 17; idem, “The Philippines,” 13, 16; idem, “Muslim Separatism," 1098; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 181-182; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 197-200; May, “The Moro Movement,” 53; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 77-78; Brown, “from

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Peripheral Communities,” 73-74; McKenna, “The Sources of Muslim Separatism,” 11; Stowe, op. cit., 5; Robin Osborne, “Philippines: The Men Who Defy Marcos,” FEER, vol. 83, no. 10 (March 11,1974): 15—16; J. S. Barry, “The Philippines: Why the Roads Are Not Safe Anymore,” FEER, vol. 81, no. 26 (July 2,1973): 22-24; “Philippines: Who’s Backing the Muslim Rebels?” FEER, vol. 83, no. 12 (March 25, 1974): 12—13; The Bangkok Post (March 24, 1973). 2. McKenna, op. cit., 10-11; Anthony Davis, “Rebels without a Pause,” Asiaweek, vol. 24, no. 13 (April 13, 1998): 32. 3. Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 159-160, 162; Nagasura Madale, “The Resurgence of Islam and Nationalism in the Philippines,” in Taufik Abdallah and Sharon Siddique, eds., Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 287; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 11-12; Luther, “Background to the Muslim Secessionist Movement,” 2521. 4. May, “The Moro Movement,” 54-55; idem, “The Philippines,” 221; Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 412; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 201; Che Man, Muslim Sep­ aratism, 82-84; idem, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” The Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Modem Islamic World, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 132. 5. Vivienne Angeles, “Women and Revolution: Philippine Muslim Women's Participa­ tion in the Moro National Liberation Front,” The Muslim World, vol. 86, no. 2 (April 1996): 130-147. 6. May, “The Moro Movement,” 54-55; idem, “The Religious Factor,” 308; Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 405, 413; McKenna, “Sources of Muslim Separatism” 22; Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 197; D. J. Steinberg, The Philippines, 92-93, 126. 7. Gowing, op. cit., 197, 214; Noble, “Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations,” 453-454, 469; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 231, 233-234; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines," 182-184; Suhrke, Noble, and Beckman, “Ethnic Conflict and Interna­ tional Relations,” 7-8, 12-14; Kaul, “The Marcos Regime,” 320-321; Harvey Stockwin, “Philippines: Marcos’ Vietnam?” FEER, vol. 79, no. 26 (March 26, 1973): 13-16; M. G. G. Pillai, “Sabah Sums,” FEER, vol. 79, no. 26 (March 26, 1973): 16; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 138-141; Mukeijee, “Southeast Asia: Oil Financed Militancy,” 20-22; K. Das, “ASEAN-Razak: The Value of Cooperation,” FEER, vol. 89, no. 29 (July 18, 1975): 28; Gunn, “Radical Islam,” 47; For a concise description of the controversy over the formation of Malaysia, the Sabah issue, and other related issues noted above, see Nehemia Levzion, International Islamic Solidarity and Its Limitations (Jerualem: Magnes Press, 1979), 28-31. 8. Many more details that are not part of this review about the involvement of Malaysia, the role played by Tun Mustafa in activity to assist the rebels, and the Philippine claim to Sabah can be found in Bernard K. Gordon, “Regionalism and Instability in Southeast Asia,” Orbis, vol. 10, no. 2 (summer 1966): 446-447; Ronquillo, “Philippines-Malaysia: Clipping Marcos’ Wings,” FEER, vol. 71, no. 13 (March 27, 1971): 11—14; idem, “The Borneo Claim,” FEER, vol. 40, no. 8 (May 23, 1963): 418-420; R. H. Leary, “Sulu and Sabah,” FEER, vol. 41, no. 1 (July 4,1963): 19-21; Stamer, “Macapagal and Borneo,” FEER, vol. 40, no. 2 (April 11, 1963): 68-71; M. O. ArifT, “The Philippines Claim to Sabah: Its His­ torical, Legal, and Political Implications,” Asia Current Affairs 13 (1970); Connie fbwell, “Life and Death in Paradise,” FEER, vol. 76, no. 14 (April 1, 1972): 15; M. G. Pillai, “Mustapha’s Kingdom,” FEER, vol. 78, no. 48 (November 15, 1972): 25-26; “With Such

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Friends,” FEER, vol. 79, no. 7 (February 19, 1973): 5; Robin Osborne, “Backdoor Barter Trade,” FEER, vol. 83, no. 12, (March 25, 1974): 20-21; Brian Gomez, ‘To Moroland?” FEER, vol. 82, no. 50 (December 17,1973): 25-26; “Steering a Collision Course,” FEER, vol. 83, no. 11 (March 18, 1974): 5; “Dropping the Sabah Claim,” FEER, vol. 81, no. 29 (July 23, 1973): 5; Harvey Stockwin, “Philippines: Courting Cyniscism,” FEER, vol. 81, no. 34 (August 27,1973): 12; idem, “Philippines: A State of Violent Suspense,” FEER, vol. 83, no. 11 (March 18,1974): 23, 27-28; idem, “ Indonesia-Philippines: Toward a Muslim Solution,” FEER, vol. 84, no. 22 (June 3, 1974): 15; The Sydney Morning Herald (March 24, 1973); The Nation (Bangkok: March 25, 27, 1973); The Mirror (Singapore: April 16, 1973); Sin Chew and Nanyang [AP] (Singapore: March 20, 1973); The Working People's Daily (Rangoon: July 23,1974) [Dennis Bloodworth]. 9. Gowing, op. cit., 215; George, op. cit., 235-236, 238; Nobel, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 410, 413-414; idem, “The Philippines,” 14; idem, “The Muslim-Christian Conflict," 18; Suhrke and Noble, op. cit., 184; Pillai, “Sabah Sums,” 16; May, “The Philippines,” 225; Robert McDonald, “The MNLF Gears for Battle—But Weap­ ons Are a Problem,” Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 13, no. 11 (May 1987): 15; “Refugees: Quiet Crisis in Sabah,” 17-19. 10. The Islamic Conference Organization was established in May 1971. Its two main organs are the Conference of Heads of State and the Islamic Conference of Foreign Minis­ ters. It consists of fifty member-states and the PLO. MNLF and the TUrkish community in Cyprus were granted observer status in 1977. For a concise history of the organization, see Levzion, International Islamic Solidarity and Its Limitations; On the OIC and other inter­ national Muslim organizations, see Jacob M. Landau, “Pan-Islam,” in Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Modem Islamic World, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 300-301; Martin Kramer, “Congresses,” in Oxford Encyclopedia, vol. 1,308-311; Reinhard Schulze, “Muslim World League," in Oxford Encyclopedia, vol. 3, 208-210; Golan W. Choudhury and J. P. Bannerman, “Organization of the Islamic Conference," in Oxford Encyclopedia, vol. 3, 260-266. 11. Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 185; Nagasura T. Madale, “The Future of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as a Separatist Movement in South­ ern Philippines,” in Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani, Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia (Sin­ gapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 183-184; Noble, “The Philippines,” 13; Shaul Ramati, “The Philippine Insuigencies. The Libyan Connection," Manila Report, no. 3 (Singapore: November 1988): 5,9,11-12; May, “The Moro Movement,” 54-55. 12. Bemadino Ronquillo, “Philippines: Backdoor Entry,” FEER, vol. 48, no. 1 (April 1, 1965): 10-11; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 142. 13. Stockwin, “Indonesia-Philippines: Tbward a Muslim Solution,” 16—17; “The Imelda Touch,” FEER, vol. 84, no. 19 (May 13, 1974): 10; “Libya’s Foreign Adventures,” Conflict Studies, no. 41 (December 1973): 15; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 232-233; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 189-191. 14. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 78-79; idem, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 63; May, “The Moro Movement,” 53-54; McKenna, “Sources of Muslim Separatism,” 22; George, op. cit., 201-202,227-231; Brown, “From Peripheriphal Communities,” 74. 15. Noble, “Chronology of Muslim Rebellion," 2-3; idem, “Ethnicity and Philipppine-Malaysian Relations," 459-460, 464-466; Diamond and Gowing, Islam and Muslims, 79; May, “The Philippines,” 220-221; George, op. cit., 192-195, 208-213;

The M ow National Liberation Fwnt (MNLF)

291

Thomas M. McKenna, “Martial Law, Moro Nationalism, and Traditional Leadership in Co­ tabato,” Pilipinas, no. 18 (spring 1992): 2-3; Che Man, “Problems of Minority Popula­ tions,” 64; Bernadino Ronquillo, “Philippines: Relying on the Pentagon’s Shield,” FEER, vol. 84, no. 20 (May 20,1974): 33-34; idem, “Philippines: Situation Serious,” FEER, vol. 80, no. 18 (May 7, 1973): 16; idem, “Philippines: Toward Normalcy,” FEER, vol. 80, no. 22 (June 4, 1973): 14; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 163; Brian Phelan, “Spectre of Jehad,” FEER, vol. 80, no. 19 (May 14,1973): 29-31; Ahmad, “The War against the Muslims,” 16; Bernard Wideman, “Jolo’s Lingering Sense of Misery,” FEER, vol. 84, no. 25 (June 24, 1974): 32-33; Pant, “Communal Violence,” 535-537; Harvey Stockwin, “Philippines: Rebellion’s Communal Fallout,”f ,E£/?, vol. 83, no. 9 (March 4,1974): 13-14; idem, “Jolo—A Man-Made Disaster,” FEER, vol. 83, no. 8 (February 25, 1974): 10—11; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-II,” Foreign Affairs Reports, vol. 24, no. 12 (December 1975): 196; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities,” 333; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 379-380; Asia Yearbook 1975, 261; Joseph Lelyveld, “Manila’s Endless War,” The New York Times (March 9, 1975); The Evening Express (Manila: May 29, 1973); The Jerusalem Post [AP] (July 15, 1973). 16. SEATO short paper, no. 52, The Maoist Communist Party o f the Philippines, 19, 35; Bernadino Ronquillo, “Philippines: Whose Last Bulwark?’ FEER, vol. 25, no. 2 (January 8,1972): 14; May, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 114-115; For a comprehensive summary of the government position, see Pster G. Gowing, “Contrasting Agendas for Psace in the Southern Philippines,” Kebar Seberang, no. 8/9 (1981), 129-133 [copied in Gowing, ed., Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988), 156-173]. 17. George, Revolt in Mindanao, 203; idem, “For Marcos, the Lesser Danger,” FEER, vol. 79, no. 1 (January 8,1973): 23-25; idem, “The Philippines: A Good Idea at the Time,” 13,15; Bernadino Ronquillo, “A Helping Hand in Troubled Times,” FEER, vol. 83, no. 11 (March 18,1974): 28; May, “The Philippines,” 223; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 380; Samuel K. Tan, “The MNLF and the CPP,” in Workshop on Philippine Communism (Singapore Information Resource Center: July 2-8, 1988): 1-17 [panel 6). 18. May, op. cit., 221; idem, “The Religious Factor,” 309; D. J. Steinberg, In Search o f Southeast Asia, 437; The MNLF position is explained in great detail in Nur Misuari’s lengthy statement of June 25, 1973. See Selected Documents (ISIP) part 3,1-31. 19. For text of the MNLF Manifesto of April 28,1974, see Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 87, 189-90; annex 3. See also May, ‘The Religious Factor," 309; and May, “The Moro Movement,” 55-57; McKenna, “Martial Law,” 8-9; Madale, “Future of the Moro National Liberation Front,” 178-181. 20. Diamond and Gowing, Islam and Muslims, 80-82; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 242; May, “The Religious Factor,” 309; idem, “The Situation of Phlippine Muslims,” 430. 21. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (March 5-11,1973), 25763-25764; Noble, “Eth­ nicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations,” 461-462; idem, “Chronology of Muslim Re­ bellion,” 2-3; May, “The Philippines,” 224-225; idem, “ The Situation of Philippine Mus­ lims,” 429; idem, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 113-114; Seah Chee-Meow, “The Muslim Issue,” 148; Mastura, Muslim Filipino Experience, 255-272; Noer, “Contemporary Political Dimensions," 210; “Continued Muslim Unrest in the Philippines,” Asia Research Bulletin, Special Focus, vol. 2, no. 12 (Singapore: April 1-30, 1973): 1758; Alejandro Melchor, “Reconstruction and Development Program for Southern Philippines,” Philippines Quar-

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terly, vol. 5, no. 3 (September 1973): 29-35; Mindanao Report, prepared by OCR/GHQ [n.d.]; Bernard Wideman, “The South: Love Goes Down with the Sun,” FEER, vol. 83, no. 2 (January 14,1974): 30-31; Tunes Journal (Manila: October 28,1973; November 12-14, 1973); Bulletin Today (Manila: November 9, 1973); The Asian Student, vol. 22, no. 7 (San

Francisco: December 22, 1973), 2; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities,” 329-330, 333-334; Madale, “The Resurgence of Islam,” 290, 292, 295-301; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-I,” 188-189. 22. Majul, “Some Social and Cultural Problems,” 95; idem, “Philippines,” 327; G. Carter Bentley, “Order and the Law in Muslim Mindanao,” in Mark l\imer, R. J. May, and Lulu Respall TUmer, eds., Mindanao: Land o f Unfulfilled Promise (Quezon City: New Day Pub­ lishers), 100; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 151-154; Michael O. Mastura, “The Philippine State and ‘Secularized’ Muslim Concepts: Aspects and Problems ” in Peter Gowing, ed.. Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988), 131-132,135,137; idem, Muslim Filipino Experience, 199-226; “Philippines,” Asia Research Bulletin (August 1-31, 1973): 2077; For the most systematic, basic treatment on the issue of Islamic law in the Philippines, see Hooker, Islamic Law in Southeast Asia 38, 221-247. 23. Che Man, op. cit., 79; Noble, “Chronology of Muslim Rebellion,” 2-3; May, “The Philippines,” 226; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-II,” 199; Kaul, “The Marcos Regime,” 319. 24. McKenna, “Martial Law,” 6,9. 25. For texts of the resolutions of the Islamic Conferences of Jeddah and Benghazi, see Selected Documents (ISIP) - Part I, 20-22; Noble, “Chronology of Muslim Rebellion,” 3; idem, “Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations,” 462; George, “Philippines: Fblitics of Revenge,” FEER, vol. 80, no. 13 (April 2,1973): 16; idem, “Philippines: A Good Idea at the Time,” 14-16; idem, Revolt in Mindanao, 218; Levzion, International Islamic Soli­ darity, 32; Suhrke, Noble and Beckman, “Ethnic Conflict,” 13; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 185; Luther, “Background to the Muslim Secessionist Movement,” 2521; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 142-143; “Philippines: Muslim Secessionist Insur­ gency— Problem Continues,” Asia Research Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 11 (Singapore, March 1-31, 1973): 1700; The Bangkok Post [UPI] (March 26, 1973); The Nation (Bangkok: March 27, 1973); The Sydney Morning Herald (March 24, 1973); May, “The Philippines,” 225-226; Man Mohini Kaul, “Muslims in the Philippines,” Institute o f Defence Studies and Analysis Journal, vol. 10, no. 1 (July-September 1977): 33-35. 26. Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, press statement, April 19, 1973. The Philippine foreign minister’s spccch at the Pattaya Conference was published in: Carlos P. Romulo, “Muslim ‘Problem’ a Purely Domestic Affair,” Philippine Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 3 (September 1973): 10-12. See also Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-I,” 183, 185-188. 27. Nobel, “Chronology,” 3; idem, “Ethnicity and Philippine Malaysian Relations,” 463; Levzion, op. cit., 32-33; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 246-248; Vreeland, Area Handbook, 380; Mehden, Two Worlds o f Islam, 44, 46; Bemadino Ronquillo, “Philippines: Off the Trigger,” FEER, vol. 80, no. 25 (June 25, 1973): 15, 18; Philippine Fortnightly Review (September 1, 1973); “Philippines,” Asia Research Bulletin (August 1-31, 1973): 2077; Utusan Melayu (Kuala Lumpur: August 7, 8, 20,1973); Nanyang (Kuala Lumpur: August 8, 1973); Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines - 1,” 189-190.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

293

28. Justus M. van der Kroef, “Pattern of Political Opposition in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 51, no. 4 (winter 1978-1979) 632; Kaul, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 30,36 n.. 25. 29. Suhrke, Noble, and Beckman, “Ethnic Conflict/’ 14; D. J. Steinberg, The Philippines, 22,42, 126; “Philippine-Arab World Relations: A Breakthrough,” Asian Defence Journal, no. 2 (1974): 48-49; Asia Yearbook 1981, 229-230; Asia Yearbook 1982, 226; Philip Bowring, “Arab Rewards,” FEER, vol. 85, no. 32 (August 16,1974): 50; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 145-146. 30. “The Current Internal Situation,” (March 6, 1974). This background paper was cir­ culated among foreign ambassadors in the Philippines by the chief of staff of the Philippine army; Malaysian Digest (March 10,1974); Utrecht, “The Separatist Movement,” 395-397. 31. Noble, “Chronology,” 3; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-II,” 197-200; Ronquillo, “A Helping Hand,” 28; Harvey Stockwin, “Indonesia-Philippines: To­ wards a Muslim Solution,” 15; idem, “Indonesia-Philippines. Trying to Be Good Neigh­ bors,” FEER, vol. 84, no. 23 (June 10, 1974): 16-17. 32. “Rebel Activity in Philippines,” New York Tunes (June 24, 1974). 33. For text of the Kuala Lumpur resolution, see Selected Documents (1SIP) - Part I, 23-26; see also Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 213-214, [annex 9]; also Peter G. Gowing, “Religion and Regional Cooperation: The Mindanao Problem and ASEAN,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1-2 (1982): 15-20; Noble, "The Moro Na­ tional Liberation Front,” 414,416,419; idem, “Muslim Separatism,” 1099; idem, “Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations,” 466-467; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philip­ pines,” 186, 191-192; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 247-248; Levzion, International Is­ lamic Solidarity, 45; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines— II.” 200-202; Santos, ‘Towards a Solution,” 226; Seah Chee-Meow, “The Muslim Issue,” 140-141, 152-156. 34. Noble, op. cit., 467-468; idem, “Religion and Opposition,” 85; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 218-219,248-249; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 143; Levzion, op. cit., 45-46; Bhagwan, op. cit., 202; M. G. G. Pillai, “Malaysia: A Touchy Subject,” 18; idem, “Razak: The Peacemaker,” FEER,vol. 85, no. 26 (July 1, 1974): 12-13; Harvey Stockwin, “Marcos Gains Time from the Muslims,” 10-12; Tasker, "The Moro Rebellion,” 19. 35. Noble, “Chronology of Muslim Rebellion,” 3-4; Bhagwan, op. cit., 203-204; Pant, “Communal Violence," 540; “Philippines: Muslim Secessionist Insurgency,” Asia Research Bulletin, 1699-1700; Stockwin, op. cit., 12; Sydney H. Schanberg, “Islamic Parley Con­ demns Manila on Moslem Dispute,” New York Times (June 27,1974).

Chapter Twenty-one

The Controversy over the Tripoli Agreement

In January 1975 Secretary-General al-Tohamy visited Manila for the third time and the Indonesian foreign minister, Adam Malik, followed. Both of them were seek­ ing ways to begin negotiations with the rebels. Anxious about an Arab oil embargo, Marcos acceded to al-Tohamy’s request and that very month sent a delegation to Jeddah, headed by Alejandro Melchor, for talks with Nur Misuari and other leaders of the MNLF. The discussions soon came to an impasse because MNLF demands were considered extreme. The Muslims insisted on the establishment of autonomy in Mindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi as well as the recall of government forces from the south. Melchor claimed that should he accept such conditions, it would be tantamount to betrayal. According to him, “external factors” were using the MNLF to further their own aims; nonetheless, he would continue seeking a solution through peaceful means. On 3 February 1975 Marcos announced that the negotiations had failed and that his government would never agree to the rebel demand for autonomy and the es­ tablishment of their own independent army. Nur Misuari called on the government to recognize the territorial integrity of the Bangsa Moro homeland and its internal sovereignty, as well as the political autonomy of the region. Misuari went further, demanding that the MNLF constitute the core of authority in the region and that it be permitted to have its own security forces and the exclusive responsibility for internal security. The only responsibility remaining to the central government would be defense against external danger. Melchor flatly refused to discuss these proposals. For their part, the MNLF representatives accused the government dele­ gation of not having been given authority to discuss a political solution. According to the MNLF, the proposal had been to establish a federation with a separate army which fell short of secession from the Philippines. The government regarded this as an attack on its sovereignty and on the integrity of the country, claiming that the Muslims were trying to undermine the negotiations. As negotiations broke down, it was decided to attempt to resume meetings in April. Despite the impasse in this round and the government's denial, the significance of the Jeddah talks was gov­ ernment recognition of the MNLF, an important diplomatic achievement for Nur Misuari. Meanwhile, both sides escalated their military action. On 15 January, the 295

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same day on which the Jeddah negotiations began, a force of four hundred rebels attacked an army camp in Jolo, killing forty-one people. On the following day, they destroyed the radio station in Marawi City, and on 28 January mounted attacks on a number of other towns.1 In the period following the failed Jeddah negotiations, the government was on the defensive. Nur Misuari published a scathing attack against the government, detailing such discrimination against the Muslims as the lack of opportunities in government employment and military service and, even more unacceptable, the government’s determination to cut off Muslim students from their Islamic heritage through the education network. The article took special aim at the immigration policy which brought Christians to Muslim areas: “Among the first to set foot on Mindanao and other parts of our national homeland were countless numbers of prostitutes, lepers, ex-convicts, and all the other dregs of Filipino society. All their social refuse were brought to the Bangsa Moro homeland.” Misuari further wrote that the Philippine government was conducting a genocide against Muslims, the purpose of which was to bring about the permanent colonization of their national homeland. Throughout history, Misuari wrote, the Bangsa Moro were an inde­ pendent, separate national entity. From time immemorial, the Bangsa Moro had aspired to establish a separate and independent Muslim state. Until the present time, because of faults of the leadership, these efforts had failed, but now the MNLF had succeeded in organizing all the freedom fighters in the revolutionary struggle.2 The MNLF felt encouraged and, to its original list, added the demand that Islamic countries be directly involved in organizing the government of the Bangsa Moro autonomous state, as well as in the planning and implementation of its economic and social programs. Furthermore, the organization announced that it would not accept a renewal of talks unless Manila announced its agreement in advance to the establishment of an autonomous government which would be led by Misuari. Other complications arose. Negotiations which the government had conducted with the rebels resulted in a sense of apprehension on the part of Christian Filipinos in the south who believed that Mindanao was about to be handed over to the MNLF. Some even hurried to sell their property. At the same time, groups of Muslims surfaced who rejected the government’s intention to recognize the MNLF as the sole representative of Muslims in the south. l\vo years of fighting, and the domi­ nant status achieved by the MNLF during the war, had screened the schisms that had always characterized the Muslim community ; these divisions which now came to the fore anew. There were Muslim circles that had never joined the MNLF be­ cause they were either opposed to the notion of secession or to MNLF’s violent methods and its conduct of the war. There were also some who believed that the MNLF was solely an ethnic organization of the Tausug, the Samal, and the Maguindanao. These opponents feared that a Bangsa Moro state, ruled by MNLF, would be autocratic and would suppress them more than it would the Christians. Taking advantage of the opportunity posed by Muslims who were not members of

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the MNLF and who were protesting at not having been included in the negotia­ tions, the government announced it would not relate to the MNLF as the sole rep­ resentative of all Philippine Muslims, and that it was necessary to include other groups in the negotiations for peace.3 A number of preparatory acts preceded this initiative. On 11 February 1975 Marcos turned to the Muslim rebels and suggested a cease-fire and resumption of negotiations. At the same time, he appealed to Malaysia, Indonesia, and a number of Arab states for their help in obtaining a cease-fire. On 20 February he disclosed that he had requested President Suharto’s assistance in renewing peace talks with the Muslim rebels. Foreign Minister Malik announced that Indonesia was prepared to offer its good services but had no wish to intervene in the internal matters of the Philippines. In March, al-Tohamy dispatched a letter he had written Marcos in which he asked for a renewal of peace talks on condition that the Philippine gov­ ernment agree to grant state autonomy to the Bangsa Moro in Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, and Palawan. At the end of March, President Marcos announced that ne­ gotiations would resume in April, in Jeddah, or perhaps Mindanao. President Mar­ cos took another step to weaken the MNLF’s status. On April 16-19, a peace con­ ference was called in Zamboanga City attended by a government delegation com­ posed of Muslims headed by the Philippine ambassador to Saudi Arabia and ap­ proximately two hundred leaders of various rebel bands, most of them organiza­ tions that had remained outside the MNLF Representatives of the MNLF boy­ cotted the meeting which, in any case, did not have any impact on the situation in the south. The conference rejected the demand for the establishment of a separate Islamic state; it did, however, press for the implementation of certain reforms. And, indeed. President Marcos announced that he was dismissing a number of district governors and mayors, appointing Muslims to some positions, establishing a Southern Philippines Development Authority, accepting former rebels into the army, and allocating money for paving roads. The government embarked on a pro­ gram of vigorous initiatives abroad as well. Senior Philippine representatives vis­ ited Arab capitals where they held discussions with local leaders. The campaign was personally directed by the president’s wife, Imelda Marcos. She had visited the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, and Khaled, king of Saudi Arabia, who promised to support the peace process. Other Philippine dignitaries met with the president of TUnisia and diplomatic relations were established with Algeria. Ku­ wait and the United Arab Emirates examined proposals for investments in the Phil­ ippines. Despite all this, the MNLF continued operations and the extent of their attacks escalated in April, perhaps to undermine negotiations between government representatives and non-MNLF groups. Reports circulated of further surrender by many more rebels which may have resulted from a combination of government concessions in its pacification efforts and the army’s stepped-up activity in the south. By the beginning of 1976, 17,160 men were said to have surrendered.4 Meanwhile, Hassan al-Tohamy continued his efforts to renew negotiations be­ tween the Philippine government and the MNLF. In May, he sent Marcos a pro­

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posal that had been prepared by the Delegation of Four Muslim Foreign Ministers (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Somalia, and Senegal) to that effect. The nine-point proposal paralleled the demands which the MNLF had put forward at the time of the Jeddah negotiations: self-rule for the Muslims in Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Palawan within the context of Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity. The territory to be included in the autonomy would encompass areas which had belonged to Muslims before 1944. Christians and other minorities living in the territory would enjoy the same status as that of minorities in Muslim countries.5 At the second meeting of Muslim leaders who were not affiliated with the MNLF, which Presi­ dent Marcos convened in June in Zamboanga, this proposal was found unaccepta­ ble. Instead, the Marcos version of autonomy was ratified. The Marcos plan called for dividing the southern districts into four regions which would be granted auton­ omy in certain spheres of authority.6 It was against the background of these developments that on July 12-15, 1975, the Sixth Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers again convened in Jeddah. The issue of the Moro was an item on the agenda. Philippine Foreign Minister Alejandro Melchor was sent to the conference in a bid to alleviate pressures being exerted on the government. Melchor informed the participants of President Marcos’s decision to grant “virtual autonomy” to the Muslim districts of the south. Neither the details of the proposed autonomy, nor its content, were spelled out, but great emphasis was placed on the fact that at the second meeting of Muslim leaders who met in Zamboanga City, the participants endorsed the plan. Nur Misuari pre­ sented a lengthy appeal to the conference,7 that went into the historical as well as the immediate reasons that there was no peace in the south. The document stipu­ lated that the Moro were one people, with a common past and future, a common­ ality of religion, and a well-defined territory of their own, which encompassed Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. The document presented a historical overview of the Moro people’s struggle to maintain their independence during the colonial re­ gimes of both Spain and America, a war in which the colonialists had been sup­ ported by Filipinos from the north. It noted that the Philippine Republic, which was established after World War II, was arbitrarily and illegally extended to include the Bangsa Moro and their homeland, despite all protests and opposition. The doc­ ument continued with an exposition of the Philippine government’s colonialist pol­ icy in the south and its goal of destroying Muslim culture, religion, and Bangsa Moro society. It reiterated the call made in the 1973 manifesto to withdraw gov­ ernment forces from Muslim areas, return all the lands that had been expropriated from the Moro, and promulgate Muslim law (shari'a) and Muslim customs (adat) in Muslim areas. The document further stated that it was incumbent upon the Mus­ lim population to conduct a physical and spiritual jihad in order to return the Moro homeland to Daral-lslam. The document revealed a certain change in the position of the MNLF on the issue of autonomy versus independence. Originally, the orga­ nization had declared that it was fighting for the independence of the entire dis­ tricts of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan— twenty-three districts in all, although, in

The Controversy over the Tripoli Agreement

299

actuality, the Moro were concentrated in only part of this area, and constituted a majority in only five of the districts: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. The MNLF leadership, however, was convinced that the indepen­ dent state should also include territories taken from them by Christian settlers. Leading up to the Jeddah conference, the MNLF altered its demand from inde­ pendence to a broad autonomy with internal sovereignty within the framework of the Philippines. (Later, when negotiations with the Philippine government ran into difficulties, the MNLF reverted to its original demand for secession. But by the time the Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers was held in Libya in May 1977—under the pressure of the OIC, particularly of Indonesia and Malaysia—the MNLF gave up its demand for full independence and acquiesced to the notion of autonomy alone, as will be discussed later.) When he addressed the conference, Adam Malik, the Indonesian foreign minister, said that Nur Misuari's “demands were disproportionate” because no sovereign government worthy of the name could agree to an autonomy plan such as had been put forth by the Committee of Four. Libya supported the MNLF demands. Ultimately, the conference ratified the decision of the Kuala Lumpur conference and called for the renewal of direct talks in Jeddah between the Philippine government and the MNLF at the earliest possi­ ble opportunity. The talks would take place under the auspices of the secretarygeneral of the OIC, and the continuation of the negotiations would be based on the plan of the Committee of Four Foreign Ministers. The import of this decision was that the MNLF demand for a broad autonomy was accepted, and the more limited Marcos autonomy plan was rejected. Of course, this was unacceptable to the Philippine government. The conference also decided that a further round of nego­ tiations should be held in Tripoli in November 1976.8 During the entire time it was involved in negotiations, the MNLF continued its military operations. Guerilla warfare was waged by small bands, generally in rural areas. At times MNLF men managed to attack cities or towns and capture them for a short period. More frequently, they engaged in acts of urban terror, throwing explosives or sabotaging government projects. They abducted citizens, foreigners, and wealthy Christians, and hijacked airplanes. And at times, BMA units of the MNLF succeeded in mounting more complex and better coordinated attacks. The cost to the Marcos government in money and manpower was high, and the budget of the security forces from the time martial law was imposed quadrupled, reaching $325 million in 1975. Casualties averaged at least one hundred dead a month, particularly in periods of intense fighting. Army mobilization weakened public support for Marcos despite the high rate of unemployment in the Philippines. In many places in the south, the low level of army discipline precipitated hostility among the civilian population, both Christian and Muslim. Army units in the south were reinforced and the scope of their operations expanded. By the end of 1975, it was evident that the MNLF had lost the initiative and its momentum, and that there was a military stalemate. Hostilities now waned somewhat, except for Sulu where ambushes and violence continued and civilian suffering was great. The MNLF

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found itself under pressure—its organizational structure splintered into many small field units, and coordinated action was difficult to maintain as local units took the initiative in various regions. Most members of the Central Committee Executive, including Chairman Nur Misuari, preferred to remain overseas so that the war was directed through the use of couriers. Fissures emerged between the executive and commanders in the field. Ethnic and political divisions between the leadership became obvious. Serious splits developed within the Central Commit­ tee. While Nur Misuari continued to champion the establishment of an indepen­ dent Bangsa Moro state, his assistant at the time, Abul Khayr Alonto, sought a compromise. President Marcos was not unaware of the disagreements. He under­ stood that should the fighting persist, it would lead to greater unity in the ranks of the MNLF; whereas, a proposal for a political solution based on regional autonomy would split the organization further. In concert with the Policy of Attraction and the buildup of great military superiority, the government managed to gradually limit the fighting. By the beginning of 1976, there were 50 battalions of army, marines, and police numbering approximately 35,000 soldiers with additional support forces of artil­ lery, armor, naval and air units. There were 49,000 armed militia in the regional defense forces. The numbers grew constantly, reaching a total of 115,000 armed government forces. Although some of the officers in the Philippine army were highly qualified, it would appear that its forces in the field were not as excellent. They were not trained in jungle or swamp warfare and fell easy prey to ambushes. Until 1976, poor morale was a salient problem. Soldiers who came from the north had difficulty because they did not know the languages or dialects spoken in the south, and their arrogant behavior vis-a-vis the local population added to their unpopularity. Command and supply functions of the army were poorly organized. In 1976 the situation improved considerably, particularly with regard to training and supplies. Soldiers’ pay was raised and better equipment provided to all units of the service. According to military sources, the army faced 5,000 armed rebels as compared to 10,000 in the previous year—3,000 in Cotabato and Lanao; and 2,000 in Zamboanga and Sulu. (There were, of course, conflicting estimates about the size of forces on both sides.) According to government assessments, the num­ ber of MNLF fighters decreased as a result of rebel losses and defections. Much of the loss of Muslim initiative in the fighting came as a result of the political defeat of Tun Mustafa, the chief minister of Sabah, and the subsequent cut in mil­ itary aid from that source. As will be remembered, he was replaced by Tun Fuad Stephens, who let it be known that he would not countenance separatists using Sabah as a base for their anti government activities, nor as a place of refuge for their soldiers.9 From the time martial law was declared, until the end of 1975, the fight­ ing had disastrous results in the south. There is no confirmed data regarding the extent of the losses, but it is estimated that the number of casualties in army forces was 5,000 men and 60,000 among the civilian population, primarily Muslims. More than a million people were made homeless. Approximately 200,000 refugees

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fled to neighboring Sabah. Property loss was enormous. The numbers given by President Marcos were much lower.10 There were occasional reports that the MNLF had concluded a tactical treaty with the communist New People’s Army (NPA) which had established an organi­ zation on Samar Island north of Mindanao. There were rumors that representatives of the communist organization visited Mindanao in order to contact members of the MNLF Central Committee with the aim of concluding a military treaty of sorts between the two organizations. The Muslims turned down these proposals, claim­ ing that there was an ideological gap between the movements despite the fact that they were both fighting a common enemy—the Philippine government. The MNLF was anxious lest a link to the Communists might damage their contacts with the Muslim world. In a 1975 interview, a spokesman for MNLF said that although the MNLF did stand for social revolution within the Moro community, it was not a communist movement, nor did it have any connection to the Commu­ nists. Despite this denial, there were signs of local cooperation in the Davao region between bands of fighting Muslims and communist groups who exchanged intel­ ligence and granted each other asylum.11The possibility exists that such local con­ tacts reflected the lack of control MNLF exercised over commanders in the field. Rumors and reports of such cooperation were repeated in the following years, par­ ticularly during the 1980s when the MNLF demand to secede from the Philippines and establish an independent state was supported by the (communist) National Democratic Front (NDF). In 1985 there was a consultation of MNLF leaders in Mindanao at which it was decided that they were ready to establish channels of communication and cooperation with opposition groups (meaning the NDF) in order to hasten the fall of the Marcos regime. The government made consistent efforts to exploit such rumors in order to discredit the MNLF as it accused Misuari of Maoist tendencies and connections to the NDF. The reality of combat in the South Philippines was complex and sometimes bizarre. Despite everything, the separatists enjoyed the sympathetic support of the Muslim community. Furthermore, there were instances when soldiers sold their arms to rebels. There were even some elements of traditional banditry and old conflicts between clans in the fighting. Peculiar to the Muslim rebellion was its different character in each of the three primary, ethnic Moro areas. The Maranao people around Marawi and Lake Lanao in central Mindanao were more isolated, conservative, and suspicious of strangers. They were unable to sustain consecutive and long-lasting campaigns against the army as the other two communities did— the Maguindanao and the Sulu, who were somewhat more modem in their way of life. These circumstances were reflected in an interview given by Abul Khayr Alonto in June 1975 to two Italian journalists. Alonto was deputy commander of MNLF and one of the first leaders to begin the Muslim armed struggle in the South. He had studied law at the University of the Philippines in Manila. In 1971 he was elected deputy mayor of Marawi City, a position he held until he joined Nur Misuari. In the interview, Alonto said that the Moro had no wish to secede from

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the Philippines. They merely aspired to autonomy and federal-state relations as was the case in the American system, but added that they wished to maintain their own army in the Moro state. He said that the morale of the Philippine army was so low that the Moro were able to buy arms from soldiers. Later, the soldiers would report that they had lost their arms on the battlefield but often it was the officers themselves who sold arms. Asked about MNLF ideology, he said that it was both “Islamic and democratic.” The MNLF did not intend to reestablish the rule of the old sultanates. The MNLF wanted an independent, democratic, federal republic because it recognized that not all inhabitants of the southern Philippines were Mus­ lims. Alonto admitted that there was a feeling of Muslim identity, thanks to which the MNLF received aid from Tun Mustafa, chief minister of Sabah, from President Qadhafi and from other Muslim sources. Regarding the political program of MNLF, he said that in the beginning they had sought full independence but, in order to prove their peaceful aims, had subsequently acceded to requests for com­ promise which they received and agreed to the establishment of an autonomous Bangsa Mom state in the islands of Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, and Palawan within the context of Philippine sovereignty. At present, they sought the establishment of a federative autonomous state under the Philippine government. Although Marcos did attempt to describe their position as demanding a totally independent state, the truth was that they realized that no Philippine president would agree to a division of the country. Consequently, what they asked for was not secession but a federa­ tive state of their own with its own separate army. Regarding the Jeddah talks, Alonto said that the Philippine government had been forced to recognize the legit­ imacy of their struggle.12 Only a few months later, on 2 September 1976 Misuari granted an interview in Tripoli to a Belgian correspondent. For the most part, his answers were very similar to those of Abul Khayr Alonto. He was more forthcoming with information about the type of arms the MNLF had and other technical matters.13 Several years later, in 1984, Misuari distributed a document that had detailed guidelines for the polit­ ical cadres and military commanders of the MNLF A composite of his speeches, interviews, and letters dating from the early 1980s, the document was apparently an effort on his part to present an overall worldview which would show him to be the architect of Moro Islamic ideology.14 It was in this period that cracks began to appear within the leadership of the MNLF. These grew sharper with the passage of time, particularly in 1977. The first fissures surfaced in 1974 when commanders in Lanao and Cotabato, close to Hashim Salamat, accused Tausug rebels aligned with Misuari of stockpiling mili­ tary equipment from Libya without giving them their share. Misuari accused lead­ ers in central Mindanao of not taking a full part in the fighting. Tensions such as these encouraged defections to government forces, particularly by those in the sen­ ior leadership. The first important incident occurred on 14 August 1975. The gov­ ernment published a report that an MNLF leader had met with President Marcos and accepted his proposal for a cease-fire. The report went on to say that a second

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meeting was scheduled at which arrangements for autonomy and the internal se­ curity forces would be discussed. As will be remembered, these were the two issues that caused the breakdown of the Jeddah talks in January 1975. The leader involved was a former judge, Abdul Hamid Lucman, who had joined MNLF in 1972, and who was a member of the MNLF delegation to the Kuala Lumpur conference in 1974. Lucman believed that the government had moderated its position, opening a window to a possible accord. From Tripoli, Misuari reacted by saying that no MNLF representative had been authorized to speak in his name. Nonetheless, Lucman’s step had important repercussions because he was joined by a number of senior officers in the organization who also accepted President Marcos’s condi­ tions for surrender, among them A1 Kaluang, a relative of Lucman and an impor­ tant field commander in Jolo. He had been in the MNLF’s initial group of ninety trainees in Sabah and had trained there for an entire year between 1969 and 1970. A day after Kaluang surrendered (some time later, he reversed himself and rejoined the rebel ranks) Hajji Hudan Abubakar, a leader of the MNLF fighters in Basilan who had also been in the initial group of trainees, went to Manila to meet with government officials. Dozens of other rebels surrendered and were granted full amnesty and positions in the government. President Marcos claimed that approx­ imately half the MNLF forces, between 8,000 and 9,000 rebels, also surrendered. There are no reliable or independent figures on the number of people who actually crossed sides in 1975-1976. In any case, the surrender of the senior commanders was evidence of the deterioration of morale in the ranks of the MNLF The com­ manders met with journalists and presented their firm demands for Muslim auton­ omy. The only way to facilitate an end to the conflict, they said, was for a meeting to be arranged between Marcos and Misuari. As a result of the defections, general fatigue, and offers of amnesty by the government, fighting did wane, but the MNLF maintained itself and its operations.15 The Seventh Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers met in Istanbul between May 12-15, 1976. As it had before the opening of other conferences, the MNLF again mounted strong attacks in Jolo and Zamboanga. Scores of government sol­ diers fell in the fighting and hostages were taken. Representatives of the Philippine government announced a new autonomy plan. According to the proposal, two “Au­ tonomous Commissions" would be established which would enable Muslims to take part more fully in government affairs and which would set priorities for polit­ ical, economic, and social development in Muslim areas. Misuari addressed the conference, asking its participants to put pressure on the Philippine government to accept the decisions of both the 1974 and 1975 conferences. On 15 May the foreign ministers reaffirmed their decisions made at previous conferences and called on both sides to renew negotiations that could lead to a solution in the South Philip­ pines. Negotiations should be based on the plan of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission for the termination of the government’s military campaign against the Muslims. Further, the plan called for a withdrawal of forces, and the implementa­ tion of the obligation which had been undertaken by the Philippine government to

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grant autonomy “within the State of the Philippines.”16The fact that, for the most part, the Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers had endorsed the MNLF policy, and rejected the policy of the Philippine government, was again an impressive diplomatic achievement for the MNLF Marcos now concluded that Libyan president, Col. Muammar Qadhafi, held the key to the solution of the problem of the Muslim rebellion because he was its primary supporter. It was Qadhafi who granted asylum to MNLF people, provided them with moral support, financial, and military assistance. It was Qadhafi who had put pressure on the OIC to support the MNLF. And it was this support that, since 1972, had enabled the MNLF to maintain its rebellion. In Marcos’s evalua­ tion, even if a military defeat of the rebels could be achieved, it would be at the price of an oil embargo, and therefore it was preferable to seek a peaceful solution providing that it was not contingent upon an acceptance of Misuari’s preconditions. Marcos made it clear that Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity were not negotiable. In November 1976 he sent his wife, Imelda, to Tripoli in an effort to arrive at an understanding with Qadhafi about renewing talks with the MNLF, particularly with Misuari who was living in Libya at the time. Imelda Marcos had two meetings with Qadhafi. What emerged from these talks was a political docu­ ment that came to be called the Tripoli Agreement which was signed on 23 De­ cember. A cease-fire agreement was also prepared. In the wake of Imelda Marcos’s visit, a series of meetings ensued between representatives of the Philippine gov­ ernment and the MNLF, as well as representatives of the Islamic Conference. The meetings resulted in a renewal of negotiations between the sides which took place in Tripoli from December 15-23.17 The talks were conducted between government representatives and a MNLF delegation headed by Nur Misuari. The Libyan foreign minister, Ali Abdussalam Treki, served as chairman of the meetings which were also attended by members of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia) and Dr. Ahmad Karim Gaye, secretary-general of the OIC. Ultimately a document was signed that set tentative conditions for a peace agreement and a cease-fire which was to become effective on the day following the end of the talks. The main points of the Tripoli Agreement were:18 1. Establishment of autonomy in the South Philippines within the sover­ eignty and the territorial integrity of the Philippines; 2. Areas of the autonomy shall comprise Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zam­ boanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan; 3. Foreign policy shall reside with the Central Government of the Philip­ pines; 4. National defense shall be the concern of the Central Government. At a later date the integration of MNLF forces into the Philippine army will

The Controversy over the Tripoli Agreement

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

305

be discussed; In the areas of the autonomy, Muslims shall have the right to set up their own courts which would operate in accordance with sharia law. Mus­ lims shall be represented throughout the country’s court system, includ­ ing the Supreme Court; Authorities of the autonomy in the southern Philippines will have the right to establish schools, colleges, and universities. The relations of such institutions with the overall educational system will be discussed at a later stage; The Muslims shall have their own administrative system. The relations between such an administrative system and the central administration will be discussed at a later date; The autonomy administration shall have its own economic and financial system. Details of the relations between this network and the central financial and monetary system will be discussed at a later date; The autonomy authorities shall have representation and the right of par­ ticipation in the Central Government and in all branches of the Security Services. The number of representatives and means of participation will be fixed later; Special regional security forces will be established in the territory of the autonomy. Their relations with the central security forces will be deter­ mined later; A Legislative Assembly and Executive Council shall be established in the autonomous area. The Legislative Assembly shall be chosen through direct election. Members of the Executive Council will be appointed by the Legislative Assembly. The number of members of each body will be determined at a later date; Mines and natural resources shall belong to the Central Government. A reasonable percentage of income from these sources will be fixed for the benefit of the autonomous territory. All outstanding points to be determined at a later date will be discussed by the Mixed Committee of the Philippine government and the MNLF which shall be convened in Tripoli in February 1977; An immediate cease-fire will be declared. A Joint Committee of both sides, assisted by the OIC, represented by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission will supervise the implementation of the cease-fire; This same Joint Committee will also supervise a complete amnesty throughout the areas of the autonomy, the cancellation of all legal claims resulting from events which took place in the southern Philippines, the repatriation of all refugees to their homes, and insure freedom of move­ ment and assembly; The final agreement concerning the autonomy shall be signed in Manila [no date was stipulated].

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17.

18.

Immediately after signing the agreement in Manila, a Provisional Gov­ ernment will be established in the autonomous territories. This Provi­ sional Government shall be appointed by the President of the Republic. The Provisional Government will be responsible for preparing the elec­ tions to the Legislative Assembly in the autonomous territories, and to administer the autonomy until the government [Executive Branch] is empowered by the Legislative Assembly. The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary steps for the implementation of this Agreement.19

Originally, the MNLF demanded that all twenty-one districts encompassing Min­ danao, Sulu, Basilan, and Palawan be included in the Bangsa Moro state, but at the meetings in Tripoli, they agreed to accept thirteen districts of which eight had a Christian majority. The cease-fire benefited both sides—the MNLF needed time to recover from the fighting and to reorganize, and the army also needed a break. At a press conference held on 27 December, President Marcos announced that the cease-fire would go into effect gradually until its completion on 20 January 1977. Supervision would be by a committee composed of equal numbers of government and MNLF representatives and by representatives of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission. Discussion of the details of the Tripoli Agreement, he said, would continue in Libya on 3 February 1977 with the aim of achieving a final solution. Col. Qadhafi had agreed to visit Manila in April 1977 to attend the ceremonial signing of the full agreement. With a few isolated, local exceptions, the cease-fire came into effect and was honored until the end of 1977. The Tripoli Agreement raised hopes in the Philippines and elsewhere that the war which had lasted for years would now end. As an illustration of the optimism which followed the agreement, President Ferdinand Marcos was showered with praise in Indonesia by both the press and by political personalities for his readiness to grant autonomy to the Muslims of the south. In Manila, however, there were many who believed that the Tripoli Agreement signaled an important MNLF vic­ tory, primarily because the agreement recognized the status of the MNLF as a belligerent party. Furthermore, the terms of the agreement, particularly those that set forth the principles of autonomy, were actually close to many of the demands of the MNLF. The rebels had now achieved a solid basis for their autonomy, sanc­ tioned by international guarantees. It was the Philippine delegation to Tripoli that had insisted on the inclusion of paragraph 18 of the agreement which stipulated that the Philippine government must undertake all the legal procedures for imple­ mentation of the entire agreement. Marcos stressed that any step aimed at joining the Muslim districts into one unit would require a referendum in the districts in­ volved, and he announced his intentions to conduct such a referendum. The MNLF opposed a referendum claiming that it was not concluded as part of the Tripoli Agreement. Thus, the agreement quickly ran into difficulties over questions of interpretation and practical implementation.20

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In January 1977 representatives of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission of the ICFM arrived in the Philippines to begin supervision of the cease-fire, and an accord was signed between representatives of the government and representatives of the MNLF on implementation of the cease-fire. In February, a further amnesty for Muslim rebels who would lay down their arms was declared. On the eleventh of the month, the Philippine government announced that it would hold a referen­ dum on the twenty-first in thirteen southern districts both to determine the territo­ rial extent of the autonomous area and to clarify whether inhabitants desired to live under MNLF rule and thus be part of the autonomous region. Subsequently, the referendum was postponed— first to 17 March and later to 17 April. On 9 February, discussions began in Tripoli regarding implementation of the agreement. The talks continued for a month but ended in a stalemate. The impasse that resulted impelled President Marcos to send his wife, Imelda, to Tripoli once again in an attempt to break the deadlock. While she was there, there was an exchange of letters, on March 18-19, between Qadhafi and Marcos confirming the understanding reached between Imelda Marcos and the president of Libya. The letters covered the following points: 1) President Marcos would publicize a decree establishing autonomy in thirteen districts in the south; 2) A provisional government would be installed in which representatives of the MNLF would participate; 3) The provi­ sional government would organize a referendum within the area of the autonomy to determine the form of the administration there.21 Consequently, on 26 March Marcos declared the establishment of autonomy in thirteen southern districts. He offered Nur Misuari the chairmanship of the provi­ sional government, but Misuari refused to accept such a limited autonomy. Ini­ tially, President Marcos appointed six Muslim district governors and seven Chris­ tian district governors, and a high commissioner over all. Together, they constituted the provisional government. In March 1980 the government proceeded to divide the south into two autono­ mous regions: number 9 and number 12. The autonomy government for District 9 which included Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, and Lanao del Norte was set up in Zamboanga City. The autonomy government for District 12 which included Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat was set up in Cotabato City. (The districts of Palawan, Davao del Sur, and South Cotabato were outside both districts, but their inhabitants took part in the referen­ dum that was held soon after.) In May 1979 representatives were elected to each of the two legislative assemblies, and President Marcos appointed a chairman to the Executive Council of each. The Regional Legislative Assemblies were invested with authority to enact local bylaws regarding administrative matters, develop­ ment and infrastructure, rural and municipal planning, health, welfare, and social services. The autonomous regions were proscribed from acting in matters that came under the jurisdiction of the national government. In the presidential decree of 25 July which established the two autonomies, it was stated that laws of the national government took precedence over regional legislation. The two regional

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autonomies were answerable directly to the president. The MNLF regarded the establishment of these two autonomies as fraudulent and deceitful and called on Muslim countries to put pressure on the Marcos gov­ ernment to act in accordance with the Tripoli Agreement and in keeping with the MNLF interpretation of it.22 MNLF representatives presented a counterproposal which called for the establishment of what was virtually a separate state. The intent of the proposal was to establish an autonomous district with Zamboanga City as its capital. A provisional government would be organized by the Central Commit­ tee of the MNLF. This government would then decide on the makeup of the Re­ gional Assembly (Majlis ash-Shura) which would in turn choose a Regional Ex­ ecutive Council and a chief minister (Majlis al-Tanfeezi). These appointments would require ratification by the MNLF Central Committee. The proposal also dealt with the establishment of regional security forces composed of MNLF sol­ diers (or the military arm of the Bangsa Moro Army—BMA). These security forces would absorb units of the Philippine police and other groups on a selective basis to be equipped by the Philippine government. The proposal called further for a network of shari'a courts, and a separate educational system. The autonomy would have its own flag and insignia and would have authority to negotiate agree­ ments for foreign aid and loans. There was no chance that Marcos would agree to this plan, which had been worked out as early as 3 June 1975 in Jeddah, but which he regarded it as injurious to Philippine sovereignty.23 Marcos was determined to conduct the referendum in the southern districts us­ ing questions which he had formulated. Acting within what he described as the requirements of the law, Marcos insisted that it was necessary to ascertain whether or not the inhabitants of the region wanted to live under an MNLF regime. MNLF announced that it would boycott the referendum but would not sabotage it. The anxiety of MNLF leadership about the referendum was clearly due to the fact that Christians made up the majority in eight districts; only Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur had a Muslim majority. On 14 April Qadhafi sent a telegram of protest to Marcos, who answered him that very day.24 More protests regarding the wording of the questions and the procedures envisioned for the ref­ erendum were sent to Marcos by Karim Gaye, the secretary-general of OIC and by Nur Misuari himself. Despite protests, the referendum was held on 17 April and the results were publicized on the twenty-third of the month.25 The majority of the respondents to the referendum were opposed to the proposal of an MNLF auton­ omy, as well as to the incorporation of the thirteen districts into one region under the MNLF. But the Marcos plan to grant autonomy to two regions was ratified. Most Muslims boycotted the referendum. The April 20-21 negotiations between representatives of the MNLF and the government, at which the secretary-general of the OIC participated along with the Committee of Four in an effort to resolve the situation, came to a halt amid mutual recriminations and threats of renewed hostilities. Carlos Romulo, the foreign minister, was sent to a number of Arab states, and to Indonesia and Malaysia, to explain the Philippine government's

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position. Despite his efforts, at the Eighth Conference of Muslim Foreign Minis­ ters convened in Tripoli from May 16-22, 1977, responsibility for the failure of the February negotiations in Tripoli and the April negotiations in Manila was placed at the door of the Philippine government. The foreign ministers called on Muslim states to support the MNLF and attacked the Philippine government for evading the fulfillment of its international obligations. The conference stated that the MNLF was the legitimate representative of the Muslims in the south. While the conference did not impose sanctions on the Philippines, it did instruct the Com­ mittee of Four and the secretary-general to continue working toward conciliation between the Philippine government and the MNLF. To demonstrate its support for the rebels, the OIC accorded the MNLF observer status at the conference.26 Upon his return from Tripoli, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said that initially the Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers in Tripoli had intended to adopt a sterner resolution rebuking the government of the Philippines but that Indonesia and a number of other countries did not want a resolution that would appear to be too one-sided.27 In July 1977 reports began to filter in about breaches of the cease-fire in the Philippines. On 17 September, a large explosion in Basilan killed twenty-five peo­ ple. The MNLF denied any involvement. Government forces carried out reprisals during which fifty-nine people were killed. The secretary-general of the OIC sent a telegram to the Philippine administration protesting the army’s actions. In Octo­ ber, incidents grew more numerous; on the tenth of the month, thirty-five soldiers, including a brigadier-general, were killed in Sulu. President Marcos again spoke about possible links between the MNLF and the NPA, despite the fact that, as it had been in the past, such an alliance was unlikely both for Islamic religious rea­ sons and because it would endanger the MNLF’s support by Muslim countries. Nonetheless, rumors persisted about instances of local cooperation between Mus­ lim and Communist fighters. The government resorted to the use of armor and helicopters in Sulu, killing many civilians. Bitter fighting went on into December of that year. Hostilities spread to remote places in southern Palawan, the most westerly island of the Philippines which had a Muslim population but, which until this period, had not been involved in the Muslim revolt. The government was trou­ bled by the spread of hostilities to the area because there were promising signs of oil there and plans had been made to begin production. Violations of the cease-fire continued on both sides during the course of 1978. The OIC sent its official representative in Manila to assess the situation in the south and to propose his good offices as a mediator between the two sides each of whom was accusing the other of breaking the agreement. The upper echelons of the Philippine army attempted to convince President Marcos that a solution to the conflict in the south could be attained by more drastic military measures. The MNLF was not able to renew the fighting momentum it had had before the Tripoli Agreement, nor was the scale of the fighting as intense as it had been during 1973-1976. More localized and sporadic though they were, the battles still took a

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toll of many loses. A large part of the fighting elements within MNLF had scat­ tered or were beset by confusion. Many fighters had accepted the government’s offer of rehabilitation and surrendered, and among the leadership there were those who accepted positions within the autonomy which the government had set up. Those who remained in the hills lacked the determination and the unity which had posed such a threat in the past. Some now turned from ambushes to agriculture, and the army allowed them to continue these pursuits without harassment as long as they did not engage in violence. Difficulties arose in providing a reliable distri­ bution of arms and food to the rebels. There were some cases of corruption and abuse of the Muslim population within the ranks of the rebels themselves. Another important element which adversely effected unity, morale, and military effective­ ness was that senior leaders of the movement were absent, preferring residence in Arab lands from which they directed the campaign. This absence of senior leader­ ship permitted gaps between ethnic gaps to widen and exacerbated the existing, traditional interethnic hostilities within MNLF. The result was an atmosphere of greater localism in the ranks of the BMA which became the background for the splits that broke out in the movement after the Tripoli Agreement was signed. In the field, fighting groups coalesced around local leaders. There were cases in which some groups completely disregarded the leadership and fought one another. And in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ranks of the MNLF and other groups of Muslim combatants suffered from battle fatigue with the result that the MNLF was no longer the cardinal problem facing the Philippine army in the south. Still, it was clear that the Muslim rebellion had not been stamped out. The MNLF may have been in a dormant stage, but certainly it had not been eradicated. Now the com­ munist guerilla movement, the New People’s Army (NPA), became the greater threat. In any case, the army was able to greatly reduce its table of organization in the south and divert forces and resources to fighting the NPA.28 Terror activities did not end. In advance of the 16 April meeting of Muslim Foreign Ministers in Islamabad, scores of people were killed and hundreds injured in a string of explosions and grenade attacks in Mindanao in the middle of March 1980—a repeat of MNLF tactics to make headlines and call public attention to its cause. The government now accused both the MNLF and the NPA. Conceivably these attacks were the work of ordinary criminal elements in the hire of local pol­ iticians concerned about local elections in a number of cities, rather than by either of the two guerilla movements, the Muslims or the Communists. A particularly severe incident occurred on the Island of Pata on 12 February 1981. Units of the MNLF ambushed an army unit, killing 120 soldiers including a bri­ gade commander. Rebel losses were 60 to 90 dead. Facts about the battle are un­ clear because of difficulties in getting hard information about events in remote areas. In any case, it appears that in army reprisals all the villages on the island were destroyed and many of the inhabitants killed; estimates range from 400 to 2,000 dead. At the end of April, the army relocated 3,000 inhabitants of Pata to Jolo.29

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The year 1977 saw a turning point in the history of the MNLF. Among the sev­ eral events which took place then, the most serious was the split in the leadership of the movement and the disintegration of its Central Committee. MNLF was shaken by the breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement and the disunity, mistrust, and divisions that had already existed among the top leadership of the movement came to the surface. The immediate causes of the split were differences of opinion about the autonomy and the question of whether it was feasible to continue negotiations based on the Tripoli Agreement. Personality differences, ambitions, and ideologi­ cal and ethnic tensions within the movement also played a part. The first to chal­ lenge Nur Misuari’s leadership was Hashim Salamat when, in 1978, he bolted the movement with his followers. He had been a member of the Central Committee and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the MNLF in Cairo. Salamat accused Misuari of autocratic behavior, sowing the seeds of disappointment among mujahideen active in the field, of Communist tendencies, deviations from Islam, and corruption. Since Salamat failed to convince the OIC to recognize him as the leader of MNLF, he set up a rival organization, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). By the change of name, Salamat wanted to signal his organization’s Is­ lamic orientation, and he then transferred the movement’s center to Pakistan. Ap­ proximately 500 of his men (some say 1,000) trained in Afghanistan. MILF camps had a more overt religious lifestyle than those of the MNLF. PLO people could also be found in these camps. Initially, Salamat enjoyed the support of former Con­ gressmen Sultan Rashid Lucman from Lanao and Salipada Pendatun, a member of the Maguindanao aristocracy of Cotabato, both of whom were living in exile in Jeddah. He was also supported by Domocao Alonto from Ansar al-Islam. Salamat, who was a Maguindanao, claimed that Misuari tended to be overly secretive, that he did not involve the leadership in the distribution of monies that came from Arab sources, giving clear preference to the members of the Tausug and other commu­ nities. MILF began building a support system in the villages, and its people began cultivating Islamic sentiments and a religious way of life. Organizations for women, youth, and Ulama were set up which assisted in mobilization efforts for the Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). For his part, Nur Misuari accused Salamat of betraying the MNLF and expelled him from the Central Committee in February 1978. Arab countries became in­ volved in the internecine fighting. Egypt supported Hashim Salamat; whereas Qadhafi described him as a pawn of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. At a later stage, Lucman and Pendatun abandoned Salamat whom they considered weak, and reestablished another organization, the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) under their aegis. The BMLO was the original organization to which both Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat had belonged in 1970. The OIC did not recog­ nize the organization. Pendatun returned to the Philippines in 1980; Lucman died in 1984. They were replaced by Macapantan Abbas, Jr. who was supported by veteran Muslim politicians, mostly from Maranao. A relatively conservative orga­ nization, the BMLO was accused of being a puppet of President Marcos’s govern­

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ment in radical circles. It was alleged that he was interested in using it to further exploit divisions in the Muslim population. In 1982, yet another organization called MNLF-Reformist Group (RG) was founded made up mostly of members from the Maranao community. It first operated from Jeddah and later transferred operations to Malaysia. The founder was Dimas Pundato, who had also been a vice-chairman of the MNLF Central Committee during the 1970s. He was located in Saudi Arabia. The organization went into decline quickly because Dimas Pundato accepted a government position in Manila. While each of the three groups claimed that it was the true representative of the Bangsa Moro—Nur Misuari’s MNLF, Hashim Salamat’s MILF, and the MNLF-Reformist Group of Pundato—the OIC consistently supported Nur Misuari and recognized him as the legitimate spokesman of Muslims in the South Philippines.30 It was quite obvious that the schism in the MNLF was largely along tribal and ethnic lines and that the three rebel organizations were based on the three major ethnic communities of the Muslims in the south. It will be remembered that Nur Misuari was a member of the Samal Tribe of Sulu, that he did not belong to the aristocracy, and that most of his comrades were Tausug and Samal. Hashim Salamat was an aristocrat who had received a religious education, was from Maguindanao, and most of his supporters belonged to that community. Rashid Lucman and Salipada Pendatun, and the MNLF-RG wing, were mostly from Maranao and stemmed from religious, tradi­ tional circles as did most of their BMLO predecessors. The three groups each had a distinct territorial and ethnic base. Nur Misuari's MNLF was strongest in the Sulu Archipelago; Salamat’s MILF was strongest in the Cotabato region; and the MNLF-RG were mostly from Lanao. Each of the groups also had supporters in other regions.31 On 7 June 1978 Nur Misuari sustained another blow when Abul Khayr Alonto, a vice-chairman of the MNLF, a commander in the north Mindanao Revolutionary Command, and one of the most senior people in the MNLF, surrendered to the government. Five hundred of his men of the Maranao tribe laid down their arms with him, while another segment remained in the hills. This was the second time that he had surrendered; the first was in January of the previous year, but he had returned to the hills a short time later. This time he was apparently satisfied that one could rely on government undertakings regarding the autonomy or perhaps that it was the proper time for him to enter politics in the southern region. Talks with government officials in March 1978 and a meeting with President Marcos pre­ ceded his crossing the lines. Misuari, of course, expelled Alonto from the Central Committee. Alonto believed that while Misuari persisted in demanding full inde­ pendence, he and other members of the MNLF were now ready to agree to the establishment of an autonomy. Al Kaluang, one of the most hardened field com­ manders in the Sulu region, also surrendered a short time later. He, too, had pre­ viously surrendered in 1976 and returned to the jungle a year later. Alonto was appointed speaker of the Legislative Assembly of District 12 of the autonomy. Aware of the instability of support from traditional Muslim elites for the MNLF,

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Marcos made great efforts to draw them to the government's side. High salaried positions of honor were offered to those who surrendered, along with special fi­ nancial grants. Defecting rebels were allowed to keep their arms or were issued new arms. This resulted in the surrender of many MNLF leaders at the head of their men. Some estimates place the number of rebels surrendering in the thou­ sands, but there is no assurance as to the reliability of the numbers. For example, in 1982, the government claimed that 37,000 had already surrendered, an unlikely estimate. There were any number of cases of fraudulent behavior. There were reb­ els who surrendered more than once, even twice and three times. After “surrender­ ing” they would return to the underground with ease, fresh supplies in hand. There were men who disguised themselves as rebels who came to surrender in order to avail themselves of the material benefits offered. For example, in 1980, 146 field commanders joined government service. They claimed that, in actuality, they did not desert the MNLF but simply joined the government as representatives of their organization.32Abul Khayr Alonto proved the truth of these suspicions to President Marcos. As will be recalled, the Eighth Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers that was held in Tripoli in May 1977, directed the Committee of Four and the secretarygeneral of the organization to continue negotiation efforts between the government of the Philippines and the MNLF Even in the face of violence, terror, and govern­ ment reprisals, attempts to resume negotiations and bridge the gap between the sides did not abate. On 25 September 1977 the government of the Philippines in­ vited Nur Misuari to come to Zamboanga City, or any other city in the Philippines, for purposes of negotiating “in the spirit of the Tripoli Agreement.” A copy of the letter was sent to the OIC. In October, Imelda Marcos traveled to the UN Assembly in New York to counteract propaganda of the MNLF who were, again, stepping up their hostile acts. On 14 November 1977 Misuari responded to the Philippine gov­ ernment’s invitation by saying that he was ready to resume talks on condition that they be held in a neutral country under the auspices of the OIC, in keeping with the Tripoli Agreement, and on condition that all military attacks against the MNLF be suspended before the talks began. At the time, Karim Gaye, secretary-general of the OIC, asked to visit Manila but the request was denied by the Philippine government. The tendency in Manila, where it was felt that the government’s po­ sition had strengthened, was to treat the revolt as an internal matter. Consequently, it was considered preferable to avoid the intervention of external bodies supportive of the MNLF and to deal directly with the rebels. This appeared to be the best approach since the status of the MNLF had been weakened by the splits in the movement and because of diminished international support, particularly from Libya. The OIC did continue to back the MNLF and Misuari in the face of demands by groups that had broken away from the movement, but at the same time it coun­ seled all sides towards conciliation. Misuari’s return to the hard-line approach that demanded full independence was rejected by the OIC. At the beginning of 1978, the Committee of Four informed the Philippine government that Misuari was fully

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in control of MNLF armed forces, that his only aim was to achieve autonomy within the framework of the Philippine Republic, and that he was ready to reopen negotiations in the context of the Tripoli Agreement. Presented by the OIC, this was actually an MNLF initiative. The secretary-general of the OIC asked the Philippine government to halt military action against Muslims in the south. On 1 April the government sent a communication to the OIC confirming that its policy was directed at peace and at the development and welfare of the Muslim commu­ nities. The document stated that negotiations had broken down because of the un­ yielding position of the MNLF which had demanded the establishment of a sepa­ rate army, and control of the executive and legislative branches of the autonomy. The communication pointed out that in light of splits in the MNLF, it was difficult to determine who represented the Muslims.33 Misuari’s initiative was evidently timed to coincide with the opening of the Ninth Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Dakar, Senegal, on April 24-28, 1978. Reports were heard from Misuari, the Committee of Four, and the secretary-general. The conference then expressed its regret over the murder of Muslims “by the army,” called on both sides to stop the fighting and renew nego­ tiations, confirmed the conciliatory role of the Committee of Four, reiterated its recognition of the MNLF as the legal representative of the Muslims in the South Philippines, appealed to members of the OIC to provide moral and material sup­ port to the MNLF, and called for the establishment of internal autonomy for the Muslim community in the South Philippines. This time, because of the MNLF’s waning strength, the Philippine government did not pay much attention to the res­ olutions of the conference. Marcos was certainly not ready to accept preconditions by the MNLF though it appears that there was one condition he could live with, that of conducting the talks at a site outside the Philippines.34 On 19 May 1978 the prime minister of Malaysia and the president of Indonesia attempted to bring about a renewal of the talks in keeping with the Dakar ICFM resolutions. This was preceded by talks between the Philippine and Malaysian gov­ ernments on the question of the Philippine’s waiving its claim to Sabah. A year earlier, on 4 August 1977 at a conference of the heads of ASEAN in Kuala Lumpur, Marcos had announced that his government would initiate steps to waive the Sabah claim. In the wake of that announcement, President Marcos visited Sabah between August 9 and 10 where he received assurances that Sabah was no longer aiding the MNLF. In response to the initiative of Indonesian President Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn to renew negotiations, Marcos said that there were three different rebel organizations, and his government did not know with whom they were to negotiate. The split in the MNLF between Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat enabled Marcos to sidestep the combined peace initiative of In­ donesia and Malaysia and to disregard the recognition of the MNLF by the Dakar conference. Marcos’ strategy at the time was based on his hope that Hashim Salamat, who was considered more moderate than Misuari on the issue of inde­ pendence for the Moro, would agree to a compromise which would allow a cessa­

The Controversy over the Tripoli Agreement

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tion of hostilities by the Muslims of Maguindanao, and which would result in nar­ rowing the rebellion down to the Tausug region in the Sulu Archipelago and parts of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Nonetheless, in March 1980 Malaysia attempted to organize a secret meeting between Nur Misuari and Philippine government repre­ sentatives in Kuala Lumpur. The attempt was unsuccessful. On 5 September of the same year, Indonesia tried to host such a meeting in Jakarta, but this meeting, too, did not materialize because of Nur Misuari’s refusal to participate in a discussion based on the autonomy Marcos had established despite pressure from the OIC. At this point, Misuari declared that he would no longer suffice with autonomy, and that the MNLF was reverting to its original goal—secession from the Philippines and the establishment of an independent state.35 At the beginning of June 1979, the Muslim foreign ministers met in Fez, Mo­ rocco, for their tenth conference. This time, too, the causes of the Muslim rebels were given support, as the conference promised both moral and material aid, and resolved to establish a special fund for this purpose. This time, too, as at the pre­ vious conference, the OIC contributed money to the MNLF. The resolution sup­ porting the MNLF also warned Manila that the conflict would be raised at the UN, a development which the Philippine government wanted to forestall and which the MNLF applied pressure to insure. In a BMLO position paper presented to the conference, Iran was asked to impose oil sanctions in order both to force the Phil­ ippines to honor the Tripoli Agreement and to repeal emergency regulations in Muslim areas. The document called on all Arab countries to use the oil weapon in support of non-Arab Muslims who were victims of genocide. As in previous years, the OIC again recognized the MNLF as the spokesman for Muslims in the South Philippines. The conference gave Indonesia the task of bringing the Philippine government and the rebel leaders to the negotiating table. The MNLF repeated its conditions for engaging in new talks with the Philippine government and warned against negotiating with any group other than itself. Misuari appealed to the OIC not to recognize negotiations that Marcos might hold with breakaway groups. His organization stressed that the peace talks would have to be conducted within the context of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, under the auspices of the OIC, and in a country other than the Philippines. The conference endorsed these conditions but its formulation was that the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 was the proper basis for the solution of the Philippine Muslims, “within the framework of national unity and sovereignty of the Philippines.” The conference rejected President Marcos’s assertion that he was acting in accordance with the agreement and that the proof of this could be seen in the elections that were held at the beginning of April 1979 for two regional autonomy assemblies in the south. Marcos had sent emissaries to Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat in an effort to convince them to participate in the elections but to no avail. The OIC found this claim unacceptable. It appears that most of the inhabitants of election District 9 and District 12 of the autonomy did not understand what they were being asked to vote on. In a mostly quiet elec­ tion, there had been only a few acts of violence.36

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The Philippine government had no respite from the diplomatic challenges by which it was beset. The next problem it had to face was the Conference of Muslim Asian Peoples slated to be convened in Islamabad, Pakistan, in June 1979. Misuari acted in the same spirit and used the same methods as he had in all other confer­ ences. And again, the OIC pressured Misuari to renew a dialogue with the Philippine government. The OIC also exerted pressure—particularly Malaysia and Indonesia—on President Marcos to renew the talks. Neither Malaysia nor Indone­ sia did anything to disguise their anxiety that stepped-up involvement by external radical Islamic elements on the Moro issue would bring about the support of ex­ tremist Muslim separatist groups in their countries as well. Marcos, who feared that Libya would renew its aid to the MNLF, declared that although his government had fulfilled its obligations in accordance with the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, by establishing two autonomous regional governments in the south, his representa­ tives would still be ready to meet representatives of the other side, at any location, in order to bring about an end to the fighting in the south. As a conciliatory gesture, and despite MNLF refusal to recognize the two autonomies, Marcos left open the possibility of MNLF representation in the legislative assemblies of both autonomies. Notwithstanding all the gestures, differences of interpretation of the Tripoli Agreement and attitudes towards autonomy remained unchanged. The pos­ sibility of overcoming the stalemate and renewing the talks remained unclear.37 At the Eleventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, May 17-21, 1980, which was also convened in Islamabad, Nur Misuari announced that he had re­ verted to the original MNLF position according to which only self-determination and independence would solve the problem of the Muslims in the South Philip­ pines. This was in response to the fact that President Marcos had torpedoed all attempts to find a solution in keeping with the 1976 Tripoli Agreement for auton­ omy. Misuari asked the conference to raise the issue at the UN. A communique published at the end of the conference made clear the extent of diplomatic support which the conference was prepared to extend to the MNLF. The conference blamed the Philippine government for continuing to infringe on the rights of Muslims, and censured the Marcos government for obstructionist tactics in negotiations to achieve peace. The foreign ministers were not prepared to go further than support­ ing regional autonomy as it had been formulated in the Tripoli Agreement (al­ though the interpretation which the conference gave to the formula supported the view of MNLF rather than the narrow construction of the Marcos reading) and would not recommend sanctions or action that departed from accepted diplomatic pressures, which remained vague.38 In an interview that appeared at the time in a London publication, Nur Misuari was given an opportunity to spell out his position. Misuari said that the original demand of the MNLF was for full independence and liberation from “colonial rule” by the Philippines, but that subsequently he had acceded to an appeal by the OIC presented at the Muslim Foreign Ministers Conference in Kuala Lumpur in 1974, and had agreed to defer the demand for full independence and to explore the

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option of full political autonomy instead as it had been formulated in the Tripoli Agreement. The agreement was a framework agreement only, and it called for formulating a protocol of modalities by which an autonomy administration could be set up. The MNLF had further agreed that the cease-fire be monitored by an Observers Group, but the Marcos government had exploited the cease-fire to re­ inforce its military units in the south and to prepare for a renewal of the war, with the aid of Israel. On the very eve of negotiations in Manila in April, 1977, Marcos had carried out a sham referendum in the south asking inhabitants whether or not they chose to become part of the autonomous region. Manila succeeded in getting the results it wanted. In May 1979 the Philippine government held another “elec­ tion” to what it called an “Autonomy Assembly.” It began by removing three dis­ tricts from the autonomy plan, gerrymandering the thirteen districts intended for the autonomy, and restructuring the ten remaining districts into two regions. Mar­ cos claimed that he had thus fulfilled the Tripoli Agreement, but it was a unilateral action taken without the participation of the other side to the conflict. At the end of 1979, the secretary-general of OIC went to Manila and concluded an agreement with Marcos for the renewal of unconditional negotiations with the MNLF. Then, even as preparations for the talks were being concluded, the Philippine Foreign Ministry declared the Tripoli Agreement null and void. (The announcement actually came in March 1980 but was later denied.) In light of all this, Misuari had concluded that there was no hope that a peaceful solution could be achieved by political means. The interviewer asked Misuari how much truth there was to President Marcos’s claim that the MNLF did not represent all the inhabitants of the southern Philippines as a result of splits in the movement, and of Hashim Salamat's breakaway. Misuari dismissed the action as unimportant. He also made little of claims that he and the MNLF had received significant financial support which was misappropriated and did not find its way to the people in the field. Misuari responded that, in the first place, aid had not been unlimited, and secondly, that the MNLF had a proper supervisory and accounting apparatus which prevented any misappropriation of funds. As to the situation in the field, the localities in the countryside were fully under MNLF control. Government forces appeared sporadically and then left the scene. About cooperation with the NPA, he said that there was no formal link to that organization but it was clear that both organizations were working towards defeating their common enemy.39 At the same time, Misuari issued a call to all Muslim oil producers to impose an embargo on the Philippines.40 At the Third Conference of Islamic Heads of State held in Mecca in January 1981, the MNLF officially announced that it was reasserting its earlier claim to self-determination and independence.41 And in Baghdad, at the TWelfth Confer­ ence of Muslim Foreign Ministers, June 1-6,1981, Misuari reiterated this position. He asked the conference to recognize the basic right of Muslims in the south to self-determination and to an independent Bangsa Mow republic. He recalled that he had made this request a year earlier at the May 1980 conference in Islamabad.

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In his speech Misuari also detailed the incident at Pata Island of February 1981 and the heavy losses sustained by the civilian population. Misuari spoke of the peace initiative of Senator Benigno Aquino, one of the leading opponents of Pres­ ident Marcos. Ingratiating himself with representatives of the Arab countries, Misuari compared Israel’s prime minister, Menahem Begin, to President Marcos with the words, “These two arch-criminals.”42 It is important to note that President Marcos was continuing with reforms in the religious sphere which had begun in 1978 when the Code of Muslim Personal Law was passed. The law dealt with personal and family issues, the resolution of con­ flicts, and religious judicial decisions (fatwa). In effect, this was a system of civil law which reformulated Islamic law then current among Philippine Muslims. Shari’a courts were also established at the time. On 15 February 1978 the Philippine Pilgrimage Authority was set up and began operations in 1979. It re­ sulted in the rise of the number of pilgrims from 1,022 that year to 2,000 in 1982, and the services extended to pilgrims also expanded. On 28 May 1981 a separate ministry was established to deal with the haj to Mecca, economic and cultural matters, shari’a courts, the Amanah Bank, scholarships to Muslim students, teacher training for the madrasas, an annual competition in readings from the Ko­ ran, aid to madrasas and mosques, and other items connected to the life of the Muslim community 43 Senator Benigno Aquino was active throughout 1980-1981 seeking a solution to the crisis in the south. He was living in exile in the United States during this period, having been forced to leave the Philippines because of the hostility between him and his political rival, President Ferdinand Marcos. He met with Nur Misuari a number of times and attempted to act as an intermediary between the MNLF and the Philippine government. Aquino announced that he had laid the foundation for a possible arrangement with the MNLF based on the Tripoli Agreement. In order to facilitate practical negotiations between the government and the various rebel organizations that were at loggerheads with one another, he attempted to effect a reconciliation between Misuari and Rashid Lucman of the BMLO and Hashim Salamat of the MILF. He was able to achieve a compromise with Lucman but not with Salamat. In March 1982 the impasse was further complicated with the break­ away of MNLF-RG, led by Pundato. Aquino prepared an aide-memoire in which he stipulated that in order to thaw the frozen negotiations for implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, President Marcos would have to declare, unequivocally, that the Philippine government recognized the agreement and was ready to renew talks without preconditions. In the absence of such an understanding, the MNLF would not be bound by any moral or legal obligation to the Tripoli Agreement and could renew its efforts to achieve self-determination. Because he was in Egypt at the time, Hashim Salamat, leader of MILF, did not participate in the talks. But, Aquino claimed Salamat would join the talks if Misuari and Lucman would agree to meet. Further, Aquino revealed that his visit to Jeddah and his talks with the heads of the rebels on 13 May 1981 were undertaken at the initiative of President

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Marcos, his political enemy, who was worried about reverberations to the bloody events on Pata Island. Aquino recommended a full autonomy plan to Misuari which would include legislative powers, an educational network, local govern­ ment, and security forces. It was very doubtful that Marcos would have agreed to all the conditions that Aquino had outlined; in any case, however, Senator Aquino’s initiative came to naught.44 At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, under Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran became increasingly involved in the fortunes of the Muslim com­ munity of the Philippines. The revolt in the south captured Iran’s attention and its revolutionary regime then made contact with the MNLF, providing some support. In May 1979 Rashid Lucman visited Ayatollah Khomeini but was not able to elicit promises of aid. Soon after, on 9 June, when visiting Teheran, Misuari met with Khomeini and other Iranian leaders and did get such promises. The visit raised Misuari’s morale and that of his comrades in MNLF, particularly against the back­ ground of the difficult period that had set in with the defection of Hashim Salamat, the struggle with BMLO, and the surrender of a number of senior commanders to the Philippine army. Following his visit with Khomeini, Misuari opened an office in Teheran, and in November 1980 the MNLF office was officially recognized as an embassy. Earlier, on 15 November 1979 the Iranian minister of Oil had an­ nounced that he was suspending oil exports to the Philippines, an MNLF achieve­ ment which even the BMLO lauded. The Philippine government was worried not only about the loss of Iranian oil but about the possibility that other Muslim ex­ porting countries might follow suit. The Iranians attempted to heal the divisions between the rebel groups, but the effort was unsuccessful. In pursuit of that aim, Hashim Salamat, who was living in Egypt, was invited to Teheran. His decision not to go was made out of consideration for what were then the strained relations between Egypt and Iran. On 6 June 1982 Misuari again went to Teheran at the head of a large delegation and again met with Ayatollah Khomeini and other leaders of the regime. Once more he received promises of political and financial aid in the struggle for self-determination and independence for the Bangsa Moro. Misuari was interviewed in the media and, as on other occasions, attacked Israel. Reports reached Manila of mili­ tary aid and of Iranians with military experience that had begun arriving in the southern Philippines and of MNLF men who were being sent to Iran for military training. On 23 June 1983 former Senator Benigno Aquino testified before the Subcom­ mittee for Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington, D.C. He said that MNLF commanders were training in Libya, Syria, and Iran and that Iran was bankrolling purchases of arms and ammunition acquired by the PLO and Yassar Arafat. Iran was paying for arms that were sent to the southern Philippines from PLO storehouses in Syria. Unlike Libya, Saudi Arabia, or other Muslim countries that consistently demanded the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement as the basis for Muslim autonomy

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and peace, Iran backed self-determination and independence for the Muslims. De­ spite his impressive achievements in Iran, Nur Misuari did not neglect his links to the more moderate Muslim states. He and his men continued to visit Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Pakistan.45 Iranian students in the Philippines played an important role in Iran’s involvement there. Iranians had begun enrolling in Philippine universities and colleges as early as the 1960s, attracted by low tuition and the fact that English was the language of instruction. At the time of the Khomeini revolution, there were between 2,500 and 3,500 Iranians studying in the Philippines made possible with scholarships awarded them by the shah. In February 1979 approximately 700 students broke into the Iranian Embassy and hung pictures of Khomeini to mark the victory of the revolution. A half year later, in August 1979, some 200 Iranian and Philippine Muslim students demonstrated near a mosque in Manila against Jimmy Carter, president of the United States and Menahem Begin, prime minister of Israel, protesting at­ tacks carried out by Israel against Lebanon, the “Israeli conquest” of Jerusalem, and the “expulsion of Palestinians from Palestine.” At the end of 1979, large ship­ ments of religious literature, pamphlets, newspapers, and journals began arriving in the Philippines directly from Iran and were available through the Iranian Em­ bassy and Iranian students who openly distributed them. The literature was dis­ seminated to Islamic institutions, organizations, and students. On 15 November more than 200 students held an anti-American demonstration opposite the US. Embassy, and reports circulated that some students were aiding the Moro. In re­ sponse, President Marcos prohibited all demonstrations by foreigners. Following the Iranian oil embargo, the Philippine Ministry of Education began looking into the files of all Iranian students in order to discover who among them was living in the Philippines illegally. Undeterred, the Iranians continued their activities. On 30 November 1979 local Muslims inspired by Iranian students held a pro-Khomeini demonstration opposite the American Embassy. The Manila police arrested 25 demonstrators. On 5 December the Ministry of Education announced that it was limiting the number of foreign students. No Iranians were accepted for the 1980-1981 academic year, and 30 Iranian students were deported. The activities of the Iranian students took a number of forms—demonstrations, hunger strikes, and prayers at mosques, all of which continued through 1980. Paralleling the re­ duced number of Iranian students in the Philippines, there was a great reduction in the number of Philippine workers in Iran, from 6,000 in 1978 to 1,300 in April 1980 and the numbers kept diminishing. In 1981, demonstrations and activities by Iranian students continued to disturb the peace. They were followed by arrests and deportations. At the same time, violence broke out between two factions of Iranian students—those who were pro-Khomeini and their opponents. The Khomeini sup­ porters maintained close relations with the MNLF, including the transfer of money and arms. In August 1983 the existence of killer squads of militant Iranian students who engaged in exterminating pro-Shah and anti-Khomeini students became

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known. Nine anti-Khomeini students were reported missing. In the same year, 200 Iranian students were deported.46 Saudi Arabia was another Middle East state to which Marcos attached great importance, devoting time and effort to improve relations. At the beginning of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia was supplying 42 percent of the oil needs of the Philippines, and 150,000 Philippine laborers were employed there. Like other Muslim states, Saudi Arabia was disappointed that the Philippines had not fulfilled its commit­ ments to the Tripoli Agreement in accordance with the interpretation of the Mus­ lim states and the MNLF. Saudi Arabia demonstrated its displeasure by granting financial aid— to the tune of $250 million—to the MNLF for arms purchases. This was a particularly important development because after 1977 there had been a drop in Libyan support for the MNLF. On 17 November 1980 Saudi Arabia informed the Philippine government that it was revoking its contract to supply 10,000 barrels of oil daily and gave as its reasons genocide against the Muslims of the Philippines and nonimplementation of the Tripoli Agreement. The decision was reversed in 1981 after Imelda Marcos went to New York for a meeting with Saudi representa­ tives, and the follow-up meeting of President Marcos in Saudi Arabia on March 21-23,1983, was seen as a significant development. Marcos discussed the danger to the integrity of the Philippines posed by the secessionist movement in the south and asked the Saudis to use their good offices with members of OIC not to support the separatists. It was reported that the Saudis agreed to the request but made it conditional on a renewal of negotiations by Marcos with Misuari with the intention of carrying out the goal of a genuine autonomy in accordance with the Tripoli Agreement and the establishment of a single Muslim Autonomous Region in place of the two that had been set up in 1978. Marcos also discussed technical-economic cooperation between the two countries but, while there was an exchange of drafts, no treaty was signed.47 There was still another aspect to his visit. On the eve of Marcos’s departure for Saudi Arabia, the speaker of the Legislative Assembly of District 12, Abul Khayr Alonto, let it be known that until he had surrendered to government forces, he had been deputy commander of the MNLF; he sent Marcos a pamphlet in which he sharply criticized the functioning of the Legislative Assembly in both districts of the autonomy. He called for uniting the districts and granting significant and sub­ stantive autonomy to a single Legislative Assembly in consonance with the Tripoli Agreement. The publication of the pamphlet was in large part a reflection of the position of the MNLF; consequently, Alonto was dropped from the official party traveling to Saudi Arabia with Marcos. Nonetheless, when he returned from his talks with King Khalid, Marcos announced that the legislative chambers of both districts would, indeed, be united.48 The problem of the Moro remained on the agenda at the annual meetings of the Islamic Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers (ICFM) and the ICFM continued to adopt resolutions, as did the summit meetings of the heads of Muslim states

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(OIC). In August 1982 a conference of ICFM convened in Niger. The conference reissued its call to the Philippine government to resume negotiations based on the Tripoli Agreement with the MNLF. Misuari insisted that the conference accept his demands for secession from the Philippines and for the independence of the Bangsa Moro, but the conference did not support his position nor did it agree to impose sanctions on the Philippines. The conference also heard the demands of the breakaway Muslim organizations in the south which sought recognition. Speaking in the name of the “new leadership” of the MNLF, Hashim Salamat, for example, presented a document ostensibly detailing their position, but which was, in fact, really intended as a denunciation of Misuari. The document went into the history of the conflict in the south from the time the Emergency Law was declared in September 1972. Government policy was sharply criticized, particularly the es­ tablishment of the two autonomous regions. The document expressed the readiness of the “new leadership” of MNLF to renew negotiations and spelled out their ef­ forts to arrive at a solution by peaceful means. The government, it pointed out, had rejected all overtures. Finally, Hashim Salamat asked the OIC to recognize the fact that Nur Misuari had been abandoned by all the senior field commanders and the heads of the MNLF, and therefore recognition should now be transferred to the new leadership. In this skirmish, Misuari won out. The conference decided in his favor and reaffirmed its recognition of him and the MNLF as the legitimate representa­ tives of the Muslims in the Philippines.49 In January 1983 there was an attempt by the World Muslim Congress (Mu’atamar al-Alam al-Islami) which met in Karachi, Pakistan, to heal the rifts between all the rebel factions. This attempt, too, failed. Representatives of other Muslim organizations in the Philippines were present along with leaders who had defected to the government’s side, some of whom had meanwhile become govern­ ment officials. Misuari, Salamat, and Pundato did not attend; Lucman did. As with previous conferences, there was a final declaration, the Karachi Declaration, which called on the sides to renew negotiations for concluding the conflict on the basis of the Tripoli Agreement. The declaration also called for unification of the two legislative assemblies in the two autonomous regions.50 On 6 December 1983 the fourteenth conference of the ICFM was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh. In his address, Nur Misuari repeated his stand that the Moro and their homeland had unwillingly been made part of the Philippines. The Moro were a separate, national presence. Their religion and customs were different and there­ fore they should be granted independence. In a press conference, Misuari said that the military strength of the MNLF exceeded 30,000 men. (Estimates in Manila, at the time, placed the number at only 10,000.) He went on to say that his movement sought self-determination and full independence for the Muslims in the south. When he employed the term “homeland,” Misuari was relating to the twenty-five districts of the southern Philippines.51 A short while after the conference, on a visit to Pakistan, Misuari asked for permission to open a MNLF office in Islamabad. He met with a number of high officials, but his request to meet with President Zia

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al-Haq was denied, he was told, due to the president’s busy schedule. The real reason was the Pakistani government’s desire not to appear too close to the Muslim separatists—although secretly they supported them—in order not to jeopardize Pakistan’s friendship with the Philippine government.52 On 21 August 1983 President Marcos’s foremost rival Benigno Aquino was murdered in Manila Airport. A wave of mass demonstrations and demands for political change swept the Philippines. In May 1984 general elections were held in the country for the National Assembly, and the opposition won 60 out of 183 seats. Following Aquino’s murder, Marcos found himself hard-pressed from a number of quarters. The events played into Nur Misuari’s hands as he attempted to delay any further negotiations with the Marcos regime. In an address he made to the Decem­ ber 18-22, 1984, fifteenth Conference of the Muslim Foreign Ministers in San’a, the capital of North Yemen, Misuari described the chaos that reigned in the Phil­ ippines. He predicted an early end of the Marcos regime and warned against reach­ ing any arrangement with his faltering dictatorship. Again, he called on the con­ ference to adopt a resolution in favor of self-determination for the Moro, and asked the conference to raise the Moro issue before the UN, the Organization of Una­ ligned States, and other bodies that dealt with problems of colonialism. Misuari said that he had established contact with a number of opposition polit­ ical groups in Manila since Aquino’s death, and that these groups were ready to accede to Muslim demands for independence. However, the groups mentioned by Misuari were marginal, radical, and leftist. In a MNLF communique released at the end of the March 3-5, 1985, conference of ICFM, Misuari repeated his earlier statements, adding a call to the Bangsa Moro to unite in the war effort against the failing Marcos regime. The document condemned the dissidents from the MNLF but expressed a readiness to reinstate them. It called for preparations for the estab­ lishment of a provisional government of a Bangsa Mow republic and expressed confidence in the leadership of Chairman Nur Misuari (who, in this document was called Professor). On 15 February 1986 there was a military revolt in Manila which opened the door to a series of events that forced Marcos to leave the Philippines for exile in the United States where he died in September 1989. In March, Corazon Aquino, widow of Benigno Aquino, was elected as the seventh president of the Philippine Republic. She remained in this position until 1992 when Fidel Ramos was elected president.53

Notes 1. Noble, op. cit., 4; idem, “Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations,” 468; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 186; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 249; May, “The Philippines,” 226; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-II,” 203-205; Santos, 'Towards a Solution,” 226; Lely veld, “Manila’s Endless War”; Massimo Quinque, “Manila’s Misery,” FEER, vol. 88, no. 26 (June 27, 1975): 21.

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2. Nur Mizhuari, “The Nature of the Moro Struggle in the Philippines,” Impact Interna­ tional (February 14-27, 1975), 8-10. 3. George, Revolt in Mindano, 251-252.

4. Noble, “Chronology,” 4; George, op. cit. 252; May, “The Philippines," 226-227; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines—II,” 205-206; Tasker, “The Moro Re­ bellion,” 18-20; “Marcos Grants Concessions to Moslems in Mindanao,” New York Tunes (April 22, 1975); Alice Villadolid, “Manila Reports Mindanao Truce,” New York Times (August 15, 1975). 5. The term “status of minorities in Muslim countries” is unclear, as is the treatment which the MNLF proposed to grant Christians in the Bangsa Moro state it intended to establish. For a discussion of the theoretical aspects of the status of non-Muslims in Muslim society in accordance with traditional Muslim law, see “Dhimma" in El2,227-231. 6. Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Phlippines187; Noble, “Chronology,” 5. 7. For the text of Misuari’s “Appeal to Islamic World for Support of the Moro People in Southern Philippines,” see Selected Documents - Part 3 (ISIP), 32-70. 8. For text of the Sixth Islamic Conference in Jeddah, see Selected Documents - Part I (ISIP), 27-28; Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 414-415, 419-420; idem, “The Muslim-Christian Conflict,” 18-19; idem, “Muslim Separatism in the Philippines," 1099; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 187, 191; Gowing, “Contrasting Agendas,” 128, 133-135; idem, Muslim Filipinos, 212-214, 217-218; George, “Revolt in Mindanao,” 252-253; May, “Muslim Separatism," 301; idem, “The Philippines,” 222; idem, “The Moro Movement in Southern Philippines,” 55; Mercado, “The Moro People’s Strug­ gle” 160; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-II,” 206-207; Bernard Wideman, “Marcos Gains the Upper Hand,” FEER, vol. 92, no. 17 (April 23, 1976): 12; Che Man, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 64; idem, Muslim Separatism, 80,145 (Text of the Sixth Islamic Conference Resolution in Jeddah, 217, appendix 11). 9. Noble, “Chronology,” 5; idem, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 418-420,422; Rodney Tasker, “Security Forces al Their Best,” FEER, vol. 95, no. 1 (January 7, 1977): 28-29; idem, “Philippines: Waiting for Word from the Rebels,” FEER, vol. 94, no. 46 (No­ vember 12, 1976): 33; Wideman, op. cit., 10-11; Ahmad, “War against the Muslims,” 17-18; Bhagwan, op. cit., 208-210; Asia Yearbook 1977, 274; Fox Butterfield, “A Jungle View of the War in the Philippines," Asia Magazine (November 30, 1975): 4-6; Carl A. Trocki, “Islam: Threat to ASEAN Regional Unity?” Current History, vol. 78, no. 456 (April, 1980): 181. 10. Trocki, op. cit., 181; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities," 330; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 80. 11. Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front,” 417-418; Che Man, Muslim Separa­ tism, 88; Quinque, “Manila’s Misery,” 21; May, “The Moro Movement,” 56; idem, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 122-123; S. Kamaluddin and Rodney Tasker, “Philippines: Pressing the Point,” FEER, vol. 122, no. 51 (December 22,1983): 26; Trocki, op. cit., 181; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 17. 12. Fabio Mucchi and Massimo Quinque, “Interview: A Religious War of Attrition,” FEER, vol. 88, no. 26 (June 27, 1975): 22-23; Quinque, op. cit., 22-23; Butterfield, “A Jungle View of War," 7. 13. Selected Documents - Part 3 (ISIP), 157-168. 14. “MNLF Guidelines for Political Cadres and Military Commanders, 1984,” Selected

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Documents - Part 3 (ISIP), 134-156.

15. Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front,” 420-421; Lela Gamer Noble, “Min­ danao: A Perspective from the Philippine Frontier,” Crossroads, vol. 1, no. 3 (October 1983): 87-88; idem, “Chronology,” 5; idem, “The Philippines: Muslims Fight for an Inde­ pendent State,” 14; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 260-261; Richard Vokey, “Khomeini’s Hand in the Islamic Glove,” FEER, vol. 108, no. 16 (April 11,1980): 22; Bernard Wideman, “An Opening in the Jungle,” FEER, vol. 89, no. 37 (September 12,1975): 24-25; Bhagwan, “Insurgency in the Southern Philippines-II,” 207-208. 16. Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front” 423-424; idem, “Chronology,” 5; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 187; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 144-145; Bernard Wideman, “Philippines: Easter Rebels Take Revenge,” FEER, vol. 92, no. 19 (May 7, 1976): 21; For text of the resolution of the Seventh Islamic Conference, Istanbul, see: Selected Documents - Part 1, (ISIP), 29-30. 17. Noble, “Chronology,” 6; Suhrke and Noble, op. cit., 188; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 253; Gunn, “Radical Islam,” 47; Noer, “Contemporary Political Dimensions,” 210; Tasker, “Philippines: Waiting for Word from the Rebels,” 32-33; McKenna, “Sources of Muslim Separatism,” 23; Kaul, “The Marcos Regime,” 321; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Separatist Movement,” 183; “Philippines: Formidable Obstacles to Peace Formula in Mindanao,” Asia Research Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 9 (Singapore: February 29, 1977), Monthly Political Supple­ ment, 297; May, “The Philippines,” 227-228. 18. For text of the Tripoli Agreement, see Selected Documents - Part 1 (ISIP), 1-5. 19. Edmundo Garcia and Carolina G. Hernandez, Waging Peace in the Philippines. Pro­ ceedings o f the 1988 International Conference on Conflict Resolution (Manila: Ateneo Cen­ ter for Social Policy and Public Affairs, 1989), 191-195; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, appendix 1, 183-186; Aide Memoire, annex A, 28-33; Ramati, “The Philippine Insurgencies,” (excerpts), 25-27; Gowing, “Contrasting Agendas,” 135. 20. Gowing, “Religion and Regional Cooperation,” 17; Noble, “Chronology,” 6; idem, “The Philippines,” 14; idem, “Muslim Separatism in the Philippines,” 1099-1100; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 185,188; May, “Situation of Philippine Muslims,” 431; Che Man, op. cit., 146-147; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 163-164; Ahmad, “The War against the Muslims,” 18; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities,” 335; S. K. Gosh, “Insurgent Movements in Southeast Asia,” India Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3 (New Delhi: September, 1978): 304; Rosihan Anwar, “Concerned Onlooker,” Asiaweek, vol. 3, no. 11 (March 18, 1977): 13; “Back to Terror Politics,” Asiaweek, 19; “Marcos Sets Final Talks with Moslems,” New York Times (December 28, 1976); Rodney Tasker, “Marcos Moves Closer to Southern Peace,” FEER, vol. 95, no. 1 (January 7, 1977): 24-28; idem, “Philippines Peace Pact: Christians Concerned,” FEER, vol. 95, no. 6 (February 11,1977): 13-14. 21. For the text of the Qadhafi-Marcos letters and accord, see Selected Documents - Part I (ISIP), 6-14 and Aide Memoire, 34-37; For the position of the MNLF, see Selected Doc­ uments - Part 3 (ISIP), 169-173. See also Rodney Tasker, “Imelda Tries to Keep the Peace,” FEER, vol. 96, no. 13 (April 1,1977): 12; idem, “Autonomy Telethon,” FEER, vol. 96, no. 14 (April 8,1977): 8-9. 22. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 147, 155-156; Rodil, “The Lumad and Moro," 17; Tasker, “Plebiscite for the south,” FEER, vol. 95, no. 8 (February 15, 1977): 23; “New Councils for Mindanao," Asiaweek, vol. 5, no. 32 (August 10, 1979): 21; Asani, “The

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Bangsamoro People,” 306-310; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 164; Madale, “Resurgence of Islam,” 288-289; idem, “The Future of the Moro National Liberation Front" 182; Gowing, “Contrasting Agendas,” 135; James Clad, “The Other Rebellion” FEER, vol. 133, no. 30 (July 24, 1986): 41; Ahmad, “The War against the Muslims,” 19; Ramati, “The Philippine Insurgencies,” 17; Noble, “Chronology,” 6-7; For a detailed ac­ count of President Marcos’s autonomy districts, see Sheilah Ocampo, “Philippines: Marcos Still Calls the Shots,” FEER, vol. 105, no. 32 (August 10,1979): 26-27. For a detailed report of implementation of the autonomy plan and government policy following the Tripoli Agreement (undated, no author) which was apparently prepared by the government for the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission, in 1981 or later, see: Selected Documents - Part 1 (IS1P), 38-54. 23. May, “The Philippines,” 222; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities,” 336-37; “The Peace That Failed,” Asiaweek, vol. 3, no. 11 (March 18, 1977): 14; Tasker, “Imelda Tries,” 12-13; idem, “Marcos Has an Eye on Resources,” FEER, vol. 96, no. 14 (April 8,1977): 9; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, annex 10, 215-216; Selected Documents - Part 1 (ISIP), 33-37; On May 3,1977, President Marcos delivered an address to the Legislative Advisory Assembly. In it he reviewed development of events up to the breakdown of negotiations. He detailed the disagreement between his government and the MNLF whose demands he was unwilling to accept. For the text of the address, see: Selected Documents - Part 2 (ISIP), 1-18. 24. For the text of exchange of cables, see Selected Documents - Part 1 (ISIP), 11-14; See also Tasker, “Muslim Peace Talks Run Aground,” FEER, vol. 95, no. 9 (March 4,1977): 8-9; Tasker, “Confusion in the South,” FEER, vol. 96, no. 13 (April 1,1977): 12-14. 25. For official results of the referendum-plebiscite of April 17,1977, see Selected Doc­ uments - Part 1 (ISIP), 15-19. See also Tasker, “Philippines: Uneasy Peace after the Pleb­ iscite,” FEER, vol. 96, no. 17 (April 29,1977): 9-11. 26. For text of the resolution of the ICFM Eighth Conference in Tripoli, May 16-22, 1977, see Selected Documents - Part 1 (ISIP), 31-32. See also Misuari’s address to the conference, in Selected Documents - (ISIP), Part 3,71-84. See also Noble, “Chronology,” 7; idem, “The Philippines: Muslims Fight for an Independent State,” 14; idem, “Muslim Separatism,” 1100-1104; Suhrke and Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines,” 188-194; May, “The Moro Movement,” 57; idem, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 115-116; D. J. Steinberg, The Philippines, 126-127, 181; Gunn, “Radical Islam,” 47; Gowing, “Religion and Re­ gional Cooperation,” 17; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 147-148; Levzion, International Islamic Solidarity, 53-54; Noer, “Contemporary Political Dimensions,” 210-211; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 165; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities,” 335-338; Kaul, ‘The Marcos Regime,” 321; “Peace in Mindanao,” Asiaweek, vol. 3, no. 6 (February 11, 1977): 8-9, 13; “Philippines: Formidable Obstacles,” 296-297; “Back to Terror Poli­ tics,” 19; Asia Yearbook 1976,261; idem, 1978,288,291; Tasker, “Philippines: Setback for Southern Peace,” FEER, vol. 96, no. 19 (May 13,1977): 11-13; idem, “Psace Gets Another Chance,” FEER, vol. 96, no. 22 (June 3,1977): 8-9; idem, “A Showpiece Faces Scepticism,” FEER, vol. 104, no. 19 (May 11, 1979): 18-20. 27. Rosihan Anwar, “Manila Revisited,” Asiaweek, vol. 3, no. 25 (June 26, 1979): 11. 28. Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 912; Gowing, “Religion and Regional Cooperation,” 17; Noble, “Chronology,” 7; Justus M. van der Kroef, Communism in Southeast Asia, 93-94; Levzion, International Islamic Solidarity, 54; May, “The Situation of Philippine

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Muslims,” 432; Ivan Molloy, ‘The Decline of the Moro National Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines,” Journal o f Contemporary Asia, vol. 18, no. 1 (1988): 62-72; idem, “Revolution in the Philippines. The Question of an Alliance between Islam and Commun­ ism,” Asian Survey, vol. 25, no. 8 (August 1985): 822-832; Paul Wilson, “Interview with the MNLF Leadership,” FEER, vol. 105, no. 33 (August 17, 1979): 29; Ocampo, “Philip­ pines: Guerillas Gain,” 20; Ocampo-Kalfors, “Eastern Davao is the Hot Spot as NPA Am­ bushes Claim More Victims,” FEER, vol. 119, no. 10 (March 10,1983): 20; Rodney Tasker, “Words of Peace ‘Futile,’” FEER, vol. 98, no. 47 (November 25,1977): 27-28; idem, “Phil­ ippines: Rebels Shift to New Targets,” FEER, vol. 102, no. 48 (December 1,1978): 22-23; idem, “Calm on the Moro Front,” FEER, vol. 125, no. 32 (August 9,1984): 29-30; Richard Vokey, “Islands under the Gun,” FEER, vol. 112, no. 20 (May 8, 1981): 36-40; idem, “Khomeini’s Hand in the Islamic Glove,” 23; Trocki, "Islam: Threat to ASEAN,” 181; David Jenkins, “Insurgency, Not External Threat, Is the Worry,” FEER, vol. 119, no. 10 (March 10, 1983): 18; Robert Shaplen, A Turning Wheel: Three Decades o f the Asian Revolution (New York: Random House, 1979), 224, Asia Yearbook 1983,231; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minorities,” 338. 29. Vokey, op. cit., 42; Ocampo, op. cit. 19; "Southern Savagery,” Asiaweek, vol. 6, no. 11 (March 21,1980): 16; "124 Soldiers Die in Surprise Attack,” [UPI], The Jerusalem Post (February 15, 1981); "Back to Terror Politics,” 18-20. 30. Majul, "The Moros of the Philippines,” 176; idem, "The Iranian Revolution and the Muslims in the Philippines,” in John L. Esposito, ed.. The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 262, 277-278; Noble, "The Philippines: Muslims Fight for an Independent State,” 16; May, "The Philippines,” 223-224; idem, "The Situation of Philippine Muslims,” 434; idem, "Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 119-120; idem, "The Moro Movement,” 57-58; idem, "The Religious Factor,” 309-310; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 261-263; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 84-89, 90-97,194-195,197-199 (annexes 4,5,6); Che Man, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 64-65; Gunn, "Radical Islam,” 47-49; Anthony Davis, "Islamic Guerillas Threaten the Fragile Peace on Mindanao,” Jane’s Intelligence Revue, vol. 10, no. 5 (May 1998): 31-32; McKenna, "Martial Law,” 10; Mercado, “Culture, Economics, and Revolt,” 166-167; Ahmad, “The War against the Muslims,” 19-21; Kamaluddin and Tasker, “Philippines: Pressing the Point,” 26; Tasker, “Marcos Tries,” 21-23; Asia Yearbook 1981, 228-229; 1982, 225; “Rebel Retorts,” FEER, vol. 100, no. 23 (June 9, 1978): 6-8; "Backer for Salamat,” FEER, vol. 100, no. 15 (April 14, 1978): 5. 31. Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 909-911; May, “The Philippines under Aquino: A Re­ spective from Mindanao,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 8, no. 2 (July 1987): 349; Madale, “The Future of the Moro National Liberation Front,” 185; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 16; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 89. 32. Washburn, "Muslim Resistance,” 18-21; Noble, "The Philippines: Muslims Fight,” 17; May, “The Situation of Philippine Muslims,” 435; idem, "Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 118; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 263; Vokey, "Islands under the Gun,” 38; Rodney Tasker, “Philippines: A New Peace Initiative,” FEER, vol. 100, no. 14 (April 7, 1978): 16; idem, “Philippines: Rebels Shift,” 23; Ramati, "The Philippines Insurgency,” 17. 33. Noble, "Chronology,” 8-9; Tasker, "Words of Peace,” 28; idem, "Philippines: A New Peace Initiative,” 16; May, “The Religious Factor,” 310; Jha Ganganath, “Muslim Minori­ ties,” 338-339.

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34. Noble, op. cit., 9; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 148; “Back to Terror Politics,” 20; “Marcos Buys More Time,” FEER, vol. 100, no. 23 (June 9, 1978): 34. 35. Noble, op.cit., 9; idem, “The Philippines: Muslims Fight,” 12; “Marcos Buys More Time,” 33-34; George, Revolt in Mindinao, 264; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 16; Gowing, “Religion and Regional Cooperation,” 18, 20; Majul, “The Iranian Revolution,” 265; May, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 116; Clad, “The Other Rebellion,” 41. 36. Majul, op. cit., 266; May, op. cit., 116; Rodney Tasker, “An Islamic Boost for the Rebels,” FEER, vol. 104, no. 23 (June 8,1979): 38; Ocampo, “Philippines: Why the ‘Water Banker’ Stood,” FEER, vol. 104, no. 20 (May 18, 1979): 16, 21; Trocki, “Islam: Threat to ASEAN,” 181; “Non-negotiable Terms,” FEER, vol. 104, no. 24 (June 15, 1979): 5. 37. Vokey, “Khomeini’s Hand,” 21; Ocampo, “Philippines: Calling in the Neighbors” FEER, vol. 107, no. 6 (February 8, 1980): 18-19; “Marcos Buys More Time,” 34. 38. Speech delivered by Nur Misuari at the Eleventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Min­ isters, in Islamabad, May 17-21,1980, Selected Documents - Part 3 (ISIP), 96-104; Noble, “The Philippines: Muslims Fight,” 12, 17; Mehden, Two Worlds o f Islam, 56-58. 39. Nur Misuari, ‘The War Is Spreading and Our Forces Are Getting More and More Entrenched,” Impact International, vol. 10, no. 10 (London: May 23-June 12,1980): 5-7. 40. Majul, “The Iranian Revolution,” 266. 41. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 81; idem, “Problems of Minority Populations,” 64; Asani, “The Bangsamoro People,” 310. 42. “The Bangsa Moro Revolution,” address of Nur Misuari, twelfth Islamic Conference in Baghdad, June 1-6, 1981, Selected Documents - Part 3 (ISIP), 105-106. 43. Hooker, Islam in Southeast Asia, 17, 180; George, Revolt in Mindanao, 266-267; May, “The Situation of Philippine Muslims,” 430; Madale, “The Resurgence of Islam,” 289, 307-310. 44. “Now the Real Aquino,” Asiaweek, vol. 7, no. 40 (October 9, 1981): 21-24; Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 914-915; May, “The Situation of Philippine Muslims,” 435; idem, “The Philippines Under Aquino,” 348; idem, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 120; Kamaluddin and Tasker, “Philippines: Pressing the Point,” 26. 45. Majul, “The Iranian Revolution,” 262-265,267-270; Vokey, “Khomeini’s Hand,” 22; Noble, “Muslim Separatism in the Philippines,” 1112. 46. Majul, op. cit., 258-259, 265, 271-277; Vokey, op. cit., 22; Mehden, Two Worlds o f Islam, 69-70. 47. Noble, “Mindanao: A Perspective,” 89; Majul, op. cit., 279 n; May, “Muslim Separa­ tism,” 305; Mehden, op. cit., 36; Mastura, Muslim Filipino Experience, 275, 277; Ocampo, “Philippines: Calling in the Neighbors,” 19; Asia Yearbook 1983, 234. 48. May, “The Situation of Philippine Muslims,” 431-432; idem, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 116. 49. May, “The Situation of Philippine Muslims,” 435; idem, “Muslim and Tribal Filipi­ nos,” 120-121; A position paper of Hashim Salamat, June 8-9, 1982, in Selected Docu­ ments - Part 3 (ISIP), 176-194. 50. Noble, “Mindanao: A Perspective,” 87-88; May, ‘The Situation of Philippine Mus­ lims,” 435-436; idem, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” 121; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 86.

51. Kamaluddin and Tasker, “Philippines: Pressing the Point,” 26; Carmen Abubakar, “Islam in the Philippines,” 70.

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52. “Moros Look to Zia,” FEER, vol. 124, no. 17 (April 26,1984): 15. 53. Asia Yearbook 1993,191; Kamaluddin and Tasker, “Philippines: Pressing the Point,” 26; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 17; Text of Misuari’s address in Sana’a in Selected Documents - Part 3 (ISIP), 117—133; “Communique 4 - General meeting of the MNLF leadership. March, 1985,” Selected Documents - Part 3 (ISIP), 195-205.

Chapter Twenty-two

Autonomy

In the period leading up to the presidential elections of March 1986 a number of opposition groups announced their support for the Moro struggle. For their part, several Muslim groups expressed support for the anti-Marcos forces. In a communique released in Mindanao in March 1985 the MNLF leadership said they were prepared to establish channels of communication and cooperation with op­ position groups in order to accelerate the fall of the Marcos regime. In the election campaign, Corazon “Cory” Aquino promised that should she be elected she would help develop autonomy for the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu in accordance with the Tripoli Agreement, without, however—and she emphasized this—favoring their separation from the republic. She went so far as to promise the opening of talks with the MNLF, should she be elected. Her brother-in-law, Senator Benigno Aquino’s younger brother, Agapito (“Butz”) Aquino, reestablished contact with Nur Misuari in Spain. They discussed MNLF support and that of the Muslims of the south in the upcoming elections. In consideration of this, Agapito Aquino promised to support Muslim autonomy in keeping with the Tripoli Agreement, in the event of an election victory. The meeting in Spain was used by President Mar­ cos in his election propaganda against Corazon Aquino, accusing her of agreeing to Muslim secession from the republic. She denied the accusation saying that she supported genuine autonomy for the Muslims within the context of the territorial integrity of the state.1 Immediately after Corazon Aquino assumed office, it was announced that lead­ ers of the three rebel Muslim movements would return to the Philippines to hold cease-fire talks, but the efforts to orchestrate a joint meeting with the major groups failed. Despite the fact that the army ordered a unilateral cease-fire in a confidence building measure, the only delegation to appear was the MNLF-RG/BMLO, who came from Malaysia to meet with the minister of Defense. Aquino would not rec­ ognize this delegation as being representative of all the Moro people. The delega­ tion left, blaming the government for bad faith. The Aquino government decided to try to hold negotiations with Misuari, but from March until June 1986 there was no progress. Initially welcomed, there were now signs of disappointment in the new government. At the end of April, hostilities broke out between bands of rebels and 331

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the army in Sulu. The intention of the rebels was to use the clashes as a means of maintaining pressure on the government. In June 1986 the undersecretary for For­ eign Affairs, Mamintal Tamano, himself a Muslim, visited a number of Arab coun­ tries in order to ask the OIC and the World Muslim League to initiate talks between Moro leaders and the new government.2 Although this initiative did not achieve its goal, in a subsequent August trip to Jeddah to meet with Misuari, “Butz” Aquino was able to prevail upon him to return to the Philippines for talks with President Aquino. At the same time, work was begun on formulating specific sections of the new constitution (ratified at the beginning of 1987) relating to a “Muslim Minda­ nao.” On 15 October 1986 the Constitutional Committee agreed to the inclusion of a section in the constitution which would grant autonomy to “Muslim Minda­ nao” within the context of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Philippines. Another subsection stated that within a year and a half of the first Congress to be elected in the Philippines under the new constitution, laws and regulations for such an autonomous region would be decided. In August 1986 Agapito Aquino and Nur Misuari met in Saudi Arabia. The Aquino government had agreed to grant autonomy to the four districts that had a Muslim majority, and Misuari agreed to come to the Philippines for a meeting with President Aquino. Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference were active in arranging the meeting and in overcoming Misuari's insistence on com­ plete independence and sovereignty for a Bangsa Moro state. Apparently, Misuari was quite isolated in his obstinate stand on the issue of independence. OIC was not supportive, and ASEAN—countries which neighbored the Philippines—actually opposed it despite the fact they were themselves Muslim. It seemed preferable for Misuari to compromise with Aquino’s recommendations which were a far better solution than the two powerless regional autonomies that had been set up by Pres­ ident Marcos. But Misuari had no intention of giving up easily.3 Misuari’s return to the Philippines had about it the feeling of a triumphal home­ coming. On 3 September he took part in a mass Bangsa Moro congress in Sulu which lasted for four days. Most of the participants were from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, but people came from other places as well. At least 2,000 of those assembled were armed, but the army did not interfere. One of the participants in the congress was a Libyan diplomat from the staff of the Embassy in Manila. But eleven ambassa­ dors of OIC countries represented in Manila did not respond to the invitation from the MNLF. On 5 September Corazon Aquino flew to Jolo and had a two-hour meeting with Misuari. They agreed to renew negotiations between them under the auspices of OIC, and to declare a cease-fire despite doubts as to whether the dis­ sident groups would honor it. Hashim Salamat, the MILF leader, was quick to say that he would not be obligated by such an agreement. The leaders of MNLF-RG let it be known that the results of future talks would not be binding on their orga­ nization unless their representatives took part. In order to express their opposition, these organizations now carried out guerilla attacks against soldiers and military installations. There were also clashes between units of the MNLF and those of

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MILF. The government allowed Misuari to visit several localities in southwest Mindanao and Sulu for meetings with Muslims. Wherever he went, he was greeted as a hero, but Christians were troubled. There were some elements in the govern­ ment, and more especially in the army, who opposed President Aquino’s initiative vis-&-vis Misuari. Several church circles and the Christian population in the south were worried about the seriousness of Aquino’s autonomy policy, accusing the president of encouraging Muslim separatism. Indeed, it was pointed out that during his visit to the Philippines, Misuari betrayed the government’s confidence and was engaged in mobilizing people for the MNLF. Among radical Christian groups in northwest Mindanao, a Christian Liberation Army was set up in order to resist a Muslim takeover.4 The Aquino-Misuari meeting in Jolo had decided to reinstitute talks, and the first session in which both sides attended negotiations, and at which the secretarygeneral of the OIC was present, took place in Jeddah on 3 January 1987. After four days of talks, an agreement was reached between Misuari and a government rep­ resentative to hold a thoroughgoing discussion in Zamboanga about the proposal to grant full autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan pred­ icated on “democratic procedures.” The implication was that it would be necessary to solicit the agreement of Christians living in Mindanao who made up 80 percent of the population in the south. Both sides agreed to the establishment of a Joint Committee with six members, three from each side, to discuss details of the au­ tonomy. The committee was to begin its meetings in Manila on 9 February with ninety days allotted to it to finish its work. Misuari made a far-reaching concession when he dropped his long-standing demand for the establishment of an independ­ ent Muslim state in the south and agreed to suffice with full autonomy instead. Without a doubt, this was the result of pressure on him by the OIC. In the Jeddah talks, the sides had agreed to establish District Committees to supervise local cease-fires, as well as to propose social and economic development plans for the south. The MNLF opposed a referendum and preferred that the autonomy be ar­ ranged by political rather than by constitutional means. The MNLF demanded that Aquino publish a presidential decree doing away with sections of the proposed constitution that related to autonomy for “Muslim Mindanao.” Ratification by ref­ erendum was scheduled for 2 February. Misuari warned that the entire peace proc­ ess would be put in jeopardy if those sections were not removed. Aquino replied personally that she was unable to cancel sections of the constitution. On 2 February the constitution was ratified by a large majority. The sections to which Misuari was opposed declared the establishment of a Muslim autonomy in the south (and in Cordillera, a district in the north) “within the context of the constitution and of national sovereignty” providing that autonomy was ratified by a majority of re­ spondents in a referendum. Only those geographical regions voting “yes” in the referendum would become autonomous. Misuari was fearful that the section would limit the autonomy to a small area of Mindanao, particularly since the government

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representative to the Jeddah talks had clearly stated that “Muslim Mindanao” as it was referred to in the new constitution meant only areas that had “a Muslim ma­ jority.” In actual terms, this meant confining the autonomy area to the five districts with a Muslim majority, and not thirteen as the MNLF demanded. It was clear that President Aquino would not agree to subject a Christian population to any kind of Muslim rule.5 The delegations met in Manila on 9 February and resumed their talks in Zam­ boanga City on 20 February. MNLF presented a detailed paper with 26 points. Among others, these included: 1) Foreign affairs will be the joint responsibility of the national government and the government of the Autonomy; 2) This will also apply to national defense. At least 85 percent of the security forces will be MNLF fighters. Within the borders of the Autonomy, the head of the Autonomy govern­ ment will also be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces; 3) The head of the Autonomy government will have exclusive authority over the Administration. The Autonomy government will have proportional representation in all branches of the central administration; 4) The head of the Autonomy government will appoint the directors of all the units, offices, and branches of government services in the area of the Autonomy; 5) The government of the Autonomy will establish a judicial system, including shari 'a courts for Muslims and a District Supreme Court; 6) The Autonomy government will have the sole prerogative to establish an educational system for all branches and at all levels; 7) The Autonomy will have its own finan­ cial and monetary systems. It will have the right to levy taxes. And furthermore, it will receive 85 percent of the national taxes collected in its territory, and it will decide on its budget and be empowered to conduct negotiations and receive finan­ cial and economic aid from non-Muslim sources. It will hold sole authority over natural resources and receive 85 percent of the income that such resources gener­ ate. All infrastructure projects will be under its control. The Autonomy alone will oversee and administer its accounts; 8) The national government will indemnify all civilian victims of the war who live in the territory as well as those who fled to Malaysia. It will extend immediate aid to rehabilitate the autonomous area and rebuild it. President Aquino refused to exclude the region from the 2 February 1987 con­ stitutional referendum. The constitution was ratified by a large majority, including the Muslim districts, despite the fact that MNLF and MILF boycotted it. A third round of talks, held on 10 March, came to a stalemate because of government insistence on setting up a Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) to be com­ posed of representatives of various strata of the population in the proposed auton­ omous region. There were also disagreements about the interpretation of some of the provisions in the constitution regarding the autonomy. Talks were renewed on 24 March and again stalled. The government delegation claimed that, in effect, the MNLF was looking for a way to secede and declare independence. Nonetheless, the talks did proceed but without results and ground to a halt on 9 May. The MNLF warned of the renewal of hostilities, damage to the plantations of foreign compa­

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nies, and attacks on individuals. Misuari now condemned the Aquino administra­ tion, again appealed to the OIC asking it to put pressure on the government. De­ spite the breakdown in negotiations, unofficial contacts between the MNLF and the government continued. MNLF suggested that the talks return to Jeddah under the auspices of OIC, but the government had little interest in increasing the in­ volvement of an external element which was not always friendly in what the gov­ ernment regarded as an internal Philippine matter. At the same time, the govern­ ment was at pains to keep the OIC advised, in detail, of its position.6 In August, following the freeze in talks on autonomy arrangements, the Philippine government gave notice that it would no longer consult with the leaders of the MNLF. As noted, in October 1987 a Regional Consultative Commission was set up to formulate an “organic law" for the establishment of a regional autonomy for Muslim Mindanao which would be proposed to the Congress in Manila. De­ spite everything that had taken place, the government attempted to secure the par­ ticipation of the two primary Moro organizations, MNLF and MILF, in formulat­ ing the law, but to no avail. After several months of work, in January 1989, RCC presented both houses of Congress with the bill it had prepared. In August 1989 President Aquino signed the bill into law. The law stated that autonomy would apply to thirteen districts and nine cities as stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement, but this was contingent on its being ratified in a referendum to be held in the districts that were involved. The law spelled out the division of power in the regional au­ tonomy government with regard to local and regional matters. Executive as well as legislative authority would be established, as well as special courts—shari’a and tribal—with judicial authority in personal, family, and property matters. The re­ gional government would be sovereign over the local economy, particularly in an­ ything related to the exploitation of natural resources. The autonomy government would have the right to levy taxes. For its part, the Philippine government under­ took to allocate funds for the benefit of the region.7 The law for the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with direct elections for a unicameral Legislative Assembly in each dis­ trict was the subject of a referendum on 19 November 1989 held in the thirteen districts and nine cities of the south. This was contrary to the position of the MNLF which demanded autonomy in twenty-three districts without benefit of a referen­ dum. With no great success, the MNLF appealed to the Muslim population to boycott the referendum. The majority of the Christian population (comprising 66 percent of the thirteen districts in which the referendum was held, compared to 28 percent Muslims) opposed autonomy. Only four districts, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, voted for the government proposal. These districts then made up the autonomous region. Even Basilan, with its Muslim ma­ jority, voted against the autonomy. Cotabato was selected as the seat of the ARMM government. The MNLF announced its intention of renewing hostilities and called upon the other Moro organizations to unite in the armed struggle. Indeed, the num­ ber of clashes rose even before the referendum was held, and certainly after it.

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According to one estimate, at the time the MNLF had 2,500 men under arms, with a further 5,500 trained militia. This force was considered unequal to carrying out military activity to the extent of fighting that went on during the 1970s, but another component of the MNLF’s force and authority was the continued support of the OIC.8 This was made abundantly clear at the seventeenth Annual Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers convened in Amman, Jordan, in March 1988 and at the eighteenth conference held in Riyadh in March 1989. Resolutions passed at both conferences expressed sorrow at the failure of the Philippine government to honor its obligations to implement the Tripoli Agreement. Both conferences noted that the steps taken by the Philippine government, including the establishment of RCC, were not in keeping with the Tripoli Agreement which called for the establishment of autonomy in thirteen districts.9 Elections for the governor and vice-governor of the autonomy, and for the Re­ gional Legislative Assembly were held in February 1990. In October of the same year, President Aquino signed into law the transfer of the first government powers to the autonomy. Additional powers were gradually turned over at a later period. With this, the Philippine government claimed it had implemented the Tripoli Agreement. The heads of the MNLF persisted in arguing that the Tripoli Agree­ ment had not been honored because autonomy was only partial and was carried out in merely four of the thirteen districts that had been discussed. As violence esca­ lated, the army continued to act against Muslim rebel organizations (as well as the NPA). Villages suspected of aiding the MNLF were bombed. There were many casualties, much property damage, and thousands abandoned their homes.10 Both the referendum and the establishment of ARMM were a hard blow for Misuari. The results of the referendum convinced many OIC member-states that the Philippine government had at least attempted to deal with the problem of the Muslims of the south. The OIC was now interested in removing the Mindanao issue from its agenda because it feared that should it extend full member status to the MNLF as Misuari continually demanded, other minorities—such as the Kurds in Iraq and Iran, and Muslim minorities in other countries—would follow suit. OIC was now engaged in a more crucial problem, the new Middle East crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Consequently, the Conference of Foreign Ministers that met in Cairo in 1990 did not even discuss the MNLF request for full membership. Even with all these complications, including the establishment of ARMM, it did not appear that MNLF was going to disappear; rather, it continued to exhibit signs that it was still a political and military power in the south.11 The deadlock in contacts between the Philippine government and the MNLF was broken only after General Fidel Ramos was elected president of the Philippine Republic. In October 1992 a government representative met with Nur Misuari in Tripoli. Misuari, who was seeking a way to rehabilitate his prestige, said that he was prepared to return from exile for meetings with the government if the talks were to be based on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. TWo weeks later, President Ramos agreed to conduct negotiations with the MNLF, granting the OIC observer

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status at the talks. Considerable progress in the talks with MNLF was made in the first quarter of 1993. At the same time, Ramos declared that he was granting par­ dons to rebels who turned themselves in. Nonetheless, he did order military action against dissident groups who had broken away from the MNLF and, particularly in January and February, were carrying out terror attacks. Scores of men were killed by explosives thrown by Muslim radicals from ambushes they had set for army units, and in severe countermeasures carried out by the army. There were numerous kidnappings for ransom. It was not always clear who stood behind the violence, or whether it was political or merely criminal. Both government and MNLF spokesmen persisted in blaming the acts of violence on “bandits” or “trai­ torous Muslim rebels.” At the beginning of 1993, there were increasing signs that both the MNLF and the MILF were drafting people and rearming them. No less worrisome was the appearance of a new radical Islamic terror organization, calling itself Abu-Sayyaf, which was founded in 1989. In April 1992 preparatory talks lasting three days took place in Jakarta to pave the way for formal negotiations between government representatives and Nur Misuari. The OIC had supported such preliminaries which concluded with a min­ imal understanding that formal talks would begin within a year for the implemen­ tation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. Progress was possible because the MNLF had significantly departed from its unwavering stand and had agreed in principle to put in abeyance its demand for the secession of the Muslim South from the Philippine Republic. Depending on how the talks progressed, the MNLF would agree to remove the demand from the agenda. On the strength of this agreement, the government decided to open official talks with the MNLF but, at the same time, continue exploratory talks with the MILF.12 The first round of formal negotiations between the Philippine government and the MNLF was held in Jakarta in October 1993. Initially, the MNLF demanded the establishment of an autonomous Islamic state in the south. This was not even a starting point for the beginning of negotiations. The demand was dropped and, after further negotiations, both sides signed a memorandum of understanding in November, and an interim agreement for a cease-fire. Misuari was now permitted to return to Mindanao, and he did so in December. Responding to the progress made in the talks, the dissident MILF and Abu-Sayyaf groups unleashed more violence in the south. Throughout 1994, Abu-Sayyaf kept up acts of terror, kidnap­ ping, and explosions, including an attack on a Catholic cathedral in Davao City which brought on Christian reprisals against three mosques. In January 1994 con­ ditions for the cease-fire were worked out. They called for both sides to stand in place, and to avoid provocation. Nur Misuari agreed that the MNLF's demand to establish a transition government in ARMM would not automatically limit the term of office of the incumbent officials in the autonomous region, a term which was to run until 1996. In addition, the agreement dealt with economic, judicial, and educational matters, but many issues were tabled for a later round of talks.13 Along with his efforts to renew the peace talks, President Ramos conducted

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diplomatic efforts abroad to explain the Philippine government's position. In Jan­ uary, he traveled to Malaysia to discuss the Sabah problem. The Philippines had not actively raised its claim to that territory for several years, but neither had it officially relinquished it, a measure which could only be achieved by an act of the Philippine Congress. In order to normalize relations with Malaysia, Ramos opened a diplomatic Extension Office in Sabah which was, in effect, a Consulate and, as such, tacit recognition of Malaysian sovereignty in Sabah. According to various estimates, there were between 300,000 and 700,000 Muslims, refugees and illegal immigrants from the South Philippines in Sabah. There was now a genuine im­ provement in the atmosphere as a result of action taken by Ramos and his plan, announced in March, to establish an East ASEAN Growth Area that would encom­ pass the southern Philippines, Sabah and Sarawak of East Malaysia, the Brunei Sultanate of the Indonesian Islands, Celebes, and Moluccas. In October, Ramos visited Saudi Arabia where the number of Filipinos was estimated at 100,000.14 The second round of talks was held in Jakarta in April 1994, and a subsequent round was convened there for a further five days in September. The MNLF dele­ gation was headed by Nur Misuari, and the Philippine government was represented by the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia. The deputy secretary-general of OIC was present, and the Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas, was very much in­ volved during the course of the talks. Both sides signed an interim agreement re­ garding education and local judicial authority in keeping with the shari’a law. Progress was made in administrative arrangements for constituting an autonomy government, including its right to establish a bank and deal with other financial matters in consultation with the central bank. At the conclusion of the meetings, Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas said that further talks would be needed to deal with the administration of the autonomy and its representation in the central gov­ ernment, and in the legislative branch, and in determining how income generated from the natural resources of the area would be allocated. Still on the agenda were the issues of national defense and security; the question, for example, of the inte­ gration of MNLF fighters into the army. The only area of agreement in this sphere was that three Indonesian officers would be assigned to the South Philippines to supervise the cease-fire. Meanwhile, the twenty-second Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers, held in Casablanca, Morocco, in December 1994, again took up what had almost be­ come a ritual, an appeal to Muslims throughout the world, to governments and organizations, to extend financial help to the MNLF in order to help it in its peace discussions with the Philippine government. The OIC reiterated its position that the MNLF was the sole legitimate representative of Muslims in the South Philip­ pines and that the OIC would support a peace agreement “in the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines.”13 The talks re­ sumed in Mindanao in January 1995. The government informed Nur Misuari that it guaranteed his safety, despite the fact that at the time it was carrying out military actions against MILF and Abu-Sayyaf. At the end of the talks, the government

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declared that it agreed to the establishment of a provisional MNLF government in the Muslim region in the south, and that this would be contingent on congressional approval and the holding of a referendum. Despite a severe raid by Abu-Sayyaf on the city of Ipil in April 1995, the talks went on in June in Jakarta. At the time, the Philippine foreign minister said that this incursion would not adversely affect peace talks with MNLF. A stalemate developed during the June meetings because of disagreements over the area to be included within the jurisdiction of the provi­ sional government and because of the need to hold a referendum. The MNLF ob­ jected to the referendum because it feared that the results would not favor the Muslims and insisted on sole control of the entire southern Philippines. Misuari demanded that the ARMM be dissolved and the 1976 Tripoli Agreement imple­ mented. The agreement had provided for the establishment of a MNLF provisional government, without recourse to a referendum, which would include thirteen of the twenty-five districts in the south. Nur Misuari said that he would only agree to a referendum if, before it was held, the MNLF could establish a provisional gov­ ernment that would ensure that the results of the referendum were not falsified, a condition to which the government could not agree. As will be remembered, the ARMM was established in 1991 by a congressional law that called for holding a referendum in thirteen districts. At that time, only four districts voted their will­ ingness to become part of the autonomy. The Ramos government stubbornly in­ sisted that a new law would have to be passed in the Congress in order to broaden ARMM, and that a new referendum would have to be held.16 The peace talks moved slowly. In November 1995 the two sides held another round which also ended inconclusively. The stalemate was not broken until June 1996 after both sides, aided by the OIC, arrived at an understanding that the agree­ ment would have two parts. According to the first part, Misuari would become governor of the ARMM in autonomy elections scheduled for 9 September, sup­ ported by President Ramos. This would signify that Misuari recognized the law of the Philippine Republic. In the second part—which was intended to show that this agreement had some semblance to the Tripoli Agreement—the thirteen districts which the MNLF claimed (actually now fourteen since one district was split into two in 1992) would be renamed the Special Zone for Peace and Development, and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development—SPCPD would be established. Nur Misuari was appointed overseer of the SPCPD for a three year term. This was to be a trial period for the purpose of channeling development funds for the entire South Philippines, and during the three-year period, Misuari would attempt to convince the inhabitants of Christian districts that it was to their advan­ tage to join the autonomy. IWo bodies were set up to work with Misuari: a Con­ sultative Assembly consisting of eighty-one members, of whom forty-four would be MNLF people, and a Religious Consultative Assembly (Darul Jfta). Three years later, another referendum would be held in each district and each city in order to determine whether they would now join the ARMM. Meanwhile the ARMM would continue to function in the original four districts which ratified it in the 1989

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referendum. Further, according to the agreement, 7,500 MNLF men would join the army and other security services, and the rest would lay down their arms. The agreement did not give the MNLF the independent state it wanted, but nonetheless considerable autonomy was granted, as well as promises of generous budgets. The heads of the MNLF believed that Misuari’s appointment as governor, and the MNLF’s participation in SPCPD, would show the inhabitants of the southern districts, including non-Muslims—that Muslims could, indeed, be relied on to ad­ minister the south and that Christian districts could safely join the autonomy. Misuari, who had returned from his exile in the Middle East, immediately em­ barked on visits throughout Mindanao in an attempt to win over opponents to the agreement. However, it was an optimistic assumption that the districts, most of whose inhabitants were Christian, could be persuaded to be part of a regional gov­ ernment ruled by Muslims. Signs of opposition among Christians in the south be­ gan to surface. Fearful of a takeover by the MNLF, Christian groups began arming. In a number of cities there were protest demonstrations. The Council of Catholic Bishops of the Philippines, as well as some Protestant groups, condemned the establishment of SPCPD as an illegal act. They were apprehensive about the fate of religious freedom for Christians, worried that Islam would become a compul­ sory subject in the schools, and that the influence of the sharVa courts would grow. Legal experts had doubts about the status of OIC in the projected arrangement. They regarded this as an infringement on Philippine foreign policy and an opening to foreign governments to interfere in the internal matters of the Philippines. Misuari hastened to promise that there would be no religious coercion, and that the inclusion of Islam in the school curriculum would apply only to Muslims. On 30 July President Ramos accompanied by all his ministers visited South Mindanao. They were greeted by thousands of Christians demonstrating against them.17In the Muslim community, too, there was great opposition to the agreement and disappointment in Misuari. Many of his people went over to the MILF. In a public relations campaign, Misuari maintained that the primary aim of the MNLF—Muslim autonomy in the south—remained, but that he had decided to shift from “the path of war to the path of peace.” He said that he had accepted the chairmanship of SPCPD because he regarded it as the sole solution to the dead­ locked peace talks. It was merely a transitional stage to the establishment of a permanent government autonomy in fourteen districts and ten cities of the south. He expressed the hope that aided by the budget placed at his disposal as governor of ARMM, he would be able to work towards the improvement of such vital matters as water supply and electrification and perhaps even transportation. ARMM would be the operational arm of the SPCPD. Misuari added that most members of MNLF would join the regional police force. President Ramos, for his part, explained that SPCPD was neither a regional government, nor a ruling authority. It had no legis­ lative competence or jurisdiction over local government authority, the police, or army. The ARMM was neither an autonomous region nor a political subdivision of the central government, merely an administrative arm for a transitional period

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which remained under the supervision and control of the president of the republic. The authority and power of the SPCPD were an extension of the president’s powers. Ramos expressed his hope that this arrangement would remove the causes of se­ cessionist aspirations among Muslims of the south.18 At the beginning of August 1996, Jose de Venecia, the Speaker of the House in Manila, announced that the government saw Nur Misuari as the leading contender in the referendum for governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) scheduled for September. TWo weeks later, President Fidel Ramos de­ clared that the signing ceremony of the peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF would be held on 2 September. And, in fact, the peace treaty was signed that day; thus, ostensibly ending the Muslim rebellion in the south that had gone for twenty-four years. In the course of the rebellion, 100,000 people lost their lives, half of them rebels, 30 percent in government forces, and 20 percent civilians. (There are some who estimate the number of dead at 50,000.) The government had spent at least $3 billion on the war. On 13 September Misuari officially took up his position as governor of ARMM. He had begun the revolt when he was thirty-three, and he was appointed governor at fifty-seven. President Ramos promised him an annual budget of $380 million for the administration of the region. Misuari immediately began attempts to attract foreign investors. He announced that he would use “moral pressure” in order to persuade the radical groups opposed to the agreement, who were persisting in their demands for a sep­ arate Islamic state, to refrain from acts of violence. It appears that the major rea­ sons Misuari relinquished his demands were battle fatigue after the long-lasting war, the schisms in the MNLF, and extended isolation. There were pressures ex­ erted on him by the OIC member states to compromise despite the fact that out­ wardly they maintained their support as demonstrated when the Libyan ambassa­ dor to Manila announced that Nur Misuari, the governor of ARMM, enjoyed the confidence of all fifty-six members of OIC.19 The agreement had obvious shortcomings. Misuari was completely dependent on monies transferred from Manila; further, to a large extent he was dependent on the goodwill of the governors of the four districts which composed the ARMM. Without their cooperation, there was not much that he could do. SPCPD powers were quite limited. Its budget came from President Ramos’ funds, and its authority stemmed from the president. To all intents and purposes, Ramos was Misuari’s direct superior. Among Muslims there were some who believed that the entire exercise was a face-saving device for Misuari. It allowed him to lay down his arms honorably and terminate the struggle. He seemed to have come to the conclusion that the war was hopeless, and that he would have to make due with the four dis­ tricts presently in the ARMM, most of whose inhabitants were Muslim. There were Christians who believed that the government had given up too much and that the SPCPD was a de facto provisional government which would be controlled by the MNLF. They feared that the new structure would impose itself on the other dis­ tricts, including those with a Christian majority. Disagreements regarding interpre­

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tations of the agreement sprang up from the very beginning. The MNLF believed that the SPCPD would have police powers and would also have control over cus­ toms and public works. Government representatives, however, did not agree with that interpretation. The major weakness of the agreement, however, stemmed from the refusal of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to join in. MILF grew progressively stronger, both building its forces in the south, and forging links to radical Muslim external elements, particularly Pakistan and Afghanistan. Disap­ pointed MNLF members were a source for the growing MILF membership. MILF, and the Abu-Sayyaf group which had appeared on the scene, did not accept the agreement and continued to fight. Peace, it seemed, would not come to the Muslim South in the wake of the Misuari-Ramos agreement.20 It will be remembered that MILF was founded by Hashim Salamat and others who had defected from the MNLF in 1978 because they regarded the MNLF as too secular and too moderate. While the MNLF was ultimately prepared to settle for a loose autonomy for Muslims, the MILF persisted in its demand for no less than a separate Islamic state with full independence. For the MILF, the struggle against the central government was a jihad, a holy war, rather than a territorial conflict amenable to solution by negotiation. Soon after its inception, the MILF dispatched 600 men to fight alongside the mujahideen in Afghanistan in their war against the Soviet invasion. (Some claim that 1,000 men were sent; some say 300, most of whom died there.) In Afghanistan, the MILF established links to financial and military fundamentalist Muslim sources in Arab countries. Evidence of this can be seen in the Russian arms which they could only have obtained through these sources. Additional arms were secretly acquired from units of the Philippine army. The Corazon Aquino government’s moderate policy toward MILF enabled the or­ ganization to grow, and during those years, the MILF avoided frontal confronta­ tions with the army, staging relatively small incidents. Its forces were centered in West Mindanao where its largest training camp, Abubakar al-Sidik (named for the first Caliph after the Prophet Mohammed) was located in a thick forest bordering on the districts of Mindanao and Lanao del Sur. Apparently, Hashim Salamat had his headquarters there. The MILF spokesman said Abubakar al-Sidik was both a military camp and the nucleus of the separate Islamic state to which the organiza­ tion was committed. In MILF controlled territory, a shari’a court network and a legislative system were set up alongside the armed forces. Estimates as to the strength of the MILF are extremely varied. Government sources put the number of men in the MILF at 8,000 to 10,000 as compared to the 16,000 men of the MNLF; in any case, far less than the 40,000 given in another estimate, not to speak of the 120,000 which the MILF itself claimed. Although MILF’s strongest areas of sup­ port were in the Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and the Cotabato districts, there was strong support in other districts as well, even in Zamboanga, Sulu, and Basilan which were traditionally centers of the MNLF. Hashim Salamat did not believe that the ARMM autonomy would succeed, nor that it was a genuine autonomy; conse­ quently, the central government in Manila had to be toppled. Muslims were re­

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quired to live a fully Islamic way of life in accordance with the Koran and in ad­ herence to the commandments of the shari’a without compromise—a stand he believed that the MNLF was not prepared to take. In the projected Muslim state that would be established in the South Philippines, all tribes and religious commu­ nities would live side by side under conditions of full freedom. A federative struc­ ture would be established in the Philippines in which one of the states would be the Bangsa Moro. The MILF called for a plebiscite of all the native inhabitants of Mindanao, excluding the Christian immigrants who began arriving after 1935 (and who already constituted the majority of the population), on the question of whether they wanted to establish a separate state in the areas of a Muslim majority. Again, a condition to which the government could not agree.21 Clashes between the MILF and army and police units had begun in December 1994. At the end of January 1995, a cease-fire was arranged and, at the same time that the government and the MNLF were conducting negotiations, the MILF ex­ ploited the cessation of hostilities to reinforce its position and to train and rearm its forces. New clashes broke out between the MILF and the army which sent its own reinforcements to Cotabato. In the course of 1996, the number of incidents grew. The MILF preferred attacking government installations such as the oil drill­ ing project in Maguindanao and an irrigation site in North Cotabato. The govern­ ment had to abandon the projects. There were many more kidnappings and bank robberies in Manila and in the larger towns of Mindanao. In February and March, 6,000 families fled from their homes because of the fighting between Muslim reb­ els and the army. The fiercest clashes were in the Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao districts, but there were also incidents in a number of towns in Zamboanga, Cota­ bato, and Basilan.22 At the end of June 1996, Hashim Salamat, who had slipped back into the Phil­ ippines, called 500 officers of various Muslim guerilla bands from all parts of Mindanao to MILF headquarters in the Abubakar camp. The gathering lasted five days and discussed the peace signed between the government and the MNLF. At the discussions, it was decided that the Misuari-Ramos agreement on regional au­ tonomy did not constitute an answer to the demand of Mindanao Muslims for self-rule and for an independent Islamic state; furthermore, it was a blow to the Tripoli Agreement. As chairman of the MILF, Hashim Salamat stated that his organization would not be party to such an agreement. In fact, MNLF soldiers and their officers who opposed the agreement were joining the MILF.23 In October 1996, a mass rally of thousands protesting the agreement was held in the Basilan district, and in Decem­ ber in the Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao districts. The demonstrations lasted several days. Ostensibly organized by a body calling itself the Bangsa Moro Peo­ ple’s Consultative Assembly, the demonstrations were probably inspired by MILF, and were highly embarrassing to Nur Misuari who was already installed as gover­ nor of ARMM. The government, preparing for peace talks with MILF, was also worried about the demonstrations. Clashes and terror attacks continued in North

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Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte, and primarily in Basilan, where the army stepped up its attacks on the MILF. The government’s evaluation was that the MILF was flexing its muscles prior to negotiations in order to make the point that the MNLF alone was not able to promise quiet and security in the south. At the same time, President Ramos offered to open negotiations with the MILF similar to those that had just been concluded with MNLF. And, indeed, on 27 January 1997 the Philippine army and MILF signed an agreement for a provisional cease-fire.24 The cease-fire did not endure. Clashes broke out again between MILF and gov­ ernment forces. On 16 June MILF had taken forty-three workers of the Philippine National Oil Company. Such kidnappings had become a major source of income for the MILF, perhaps even its greatest source. In reaction to the wave of kidnap­ pings for ransom, on 26 June 1997 the army attacked and captured the Raja-Muda camp of the MILF in North Cotabato, considered the second largest after the Abubakar camp. The retreating rebels took approximately one hundred civilians as hostages. Three of them were later found dead. Following the raid on the Raja-Muda camp, President Ramos ordered attacks on MILF to stop, and in July a cease-fire was again agreed on. Nevertheless, small local incidents continued. In a 28 July speech, President Ramos promised to reopen peace talks with the MILF, but in October there was a further escalation when it was discovered that two ter­ rorists killed in clashes with the army were identified as an Egyptian and a Paki­ stani. There were further incidents in January and February with growing tensions and clashes between MNLF and MILF. In Basilan, MNLF forces cooperated with the army against the MILF. Incidents between the MILF and the army continued into the early part of 1999. At the same time, the newly elected president of the Philippines, Joseph Estrada, conducted negotiations with Hashim Salamat with the aim of arriving at a peace agreement. President Estrada offered Salamat a number of large-scale development plans but was unwilling to discuss Salamat’s main de­ mand, granting independence to the Muslim South.25 Another terror organization, smaller but much more militant, was a source of severe provocation for the government. The mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), whose name in Arabic was al-Harakatul Islamia, was founded in 1989. It was commonly known as Abu-Sayyaf (the sword bearer), the name adopted by its founder, Abubakar Abdurazak Janjalani. Bom in Basilan in 1963 to a poor fisherman’s family, in the 1980s, he studied in Libya, Syria, and Saudi Arabia with the assistance of an MNLF scholarship. He did his military training in PLO camps and in Libya, and fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s. On returning to the Philippines, he became a religious instructor in Basilan. He combined les­ sons and sermons in which he preached an Islamic revolution and jihad against both the government and the Christian settlers while at the same time organizing a terror group. Other central members of Abu-Sayyaf also studied in Arab coun­ tries and fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet army. While the organization never published a manifesto, its basic aim was clear: in the long run, to establish an independent Islamic state in the Muslim South which would institute religious

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law; and meanwhile, to strike against the Christian population, particularly Chris­ tian institutions and clerics through the use of terror, kidnapping, and murder. Es­ timates as to the number of members of the organization fluctuated between 100 and 1,000 armed men, with veterans of the Afghanistan war acting as their instruc­ tors in guerilla warfare. For further training members of the movement were sent to Pakistan and to Libya. One reason for the difficulty in arriving at an accurate estimate of Abu-Sayyaf’s numerical strength was that certain elements within the MNLF—over whom the central leadership had little control—and some members of the MILF occasionally took part in Abu-Sayyaf’s raids, and then returned to their own movements. The growth of Abu-Sayyaf was partially due to a feeling rife in certain radical Muslim circles in the south that Nur Misuari and the MNLF had betrayed the Muslim cause when they entered into negotiations with the govern­ ment. The same reason may also explain the irregular and sporadic participation of MNLF and MILF fighters alongside Abu-Sayyaf. Both larger organizations, MNLF and MILF, denied any connection with Abu-Sayyaf, but the authorities suspected that, minimally, they both tolerated Abu-Sayyaf and perhaps it was even useful for them that such an organization existed and that it continued to harass the government. There were some who compared Abu-Sayyaf to radical Arab terror organizations that had opposed the PLO agreement with Israel and persisted in terrorism. The Philippine intelligence service believed that religious institutions that had proliferated in recent years in the Philippines served as conduits for con­ tact between international Islamic terrorist organizations abroad and such terror organizations in the Philippines.26 From the end of 1991, the Abu-Sayyaf organization was implicated in a string of violent terrorist incidents involving explosions, abductions, and murder, primar­ ily in West Mindanao, but in Manila as well. In August 1991, two missionaries— one from New Zealand and the other from Sweden—were assassinated in Zambo­ anga City. In August 1992, a number of priests and monks were murdered; in October, a monk was abducted in Basilan; and in November, a doctor, his wife and children were also abducted in Basilan. In January 1993, two nuns were kidnapped in Sulu; later, in February, the organization abducted American and Spanish Cath­ olic priests. The MNLF denied any connection to these incidents and condemned them. Philippine political figures, MNLF people, and representatives of Libya and the PLO participated in negotiations to free the nuns and were successful after nineteen days of talks. There was no direct mention of Abu-Sayyaf in connection with these incidents. The name first surfaced in February 1993 when a bomb ex­ ploded at the airport in Zamboanga City injuring twenty-three people. The orga­ nization was given much wider notice in the wake of kidnappings and terror that occurred later. In April 1993, President Ramos acknowledged its existence, saying that “Muslim radicals” were plotting hostile acts in order to call attention to the upcoming meeting of the OIC, scheduled to convene in Pakistan. On 27 April a bomb went off at the airport in Manila, and on 11 May bombs went off at the Manila train station. In May 1993 the army attacked Abu-Sayyaf’s al-Medinah

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camp in Zamboanga and captured it, but Janjalani and his men escaped to Sulu with the help of MNLF boats. In June 1993, as a representative of the Vatican was visiting Zamboanga City, an armed man came dangerously close to him. In July, there were more explosions in that city and in other places. In the ambush of a bus in Basilan, 15 Christians were murdered and the 35 hostages were taken later re­ leased after a ransom was paid. Abductions continued. In December 1993 a bomb exploded in a cathedral in Davao City where seven were killed and 130 injured. The violence escalated in June 1994. On 3 June the army began an assault on Abu-Sayyaf bands in Sulu. The organization responded with still more terror at­ tacks, particularly in Zamboanga City and Basilan. Scores of civilians were hurt. The army captured the headquarters of the organization on Sulu Island. Abu-Sayyaf then took 74 Christian hostages in Basilan, of which 15 were killed and the rest released sometime later. In January 1995, heavy fighting ensued be­ tween the army and Abu-Sayyaf. From 1991 until mid-1995, Abu-Sayyaf carried out 94 abductions, 75 explosions, 58 robberies, 50 murders, 24 cases of arson, 12 raids, 9 demolitions, and other acts of terror in the course of which a total of 165 people were killed and 331 wounded. Catholic religious figures were targeted as the primary victims. Before the visit of Pope John Paul II to the Philippines, AbuSayyaf made threats on the pope's life, and warned that it would abduct priests and kill them. At the same time, a MILF leader in Cotabato announced that his group had no hostile intentions toward the pope and that they welcomed his forthcoming visit. He denied that MILF had established a link with Abu-Sayyaf to sow terror in Mindanao and embarrass the government during the visit. The MILF, he said, had taken steps to forestall attacks during the pope’s visit. The MNLF representa­ tive in Basilan also denied allegations that his organization supported Abu-Sayyaf. According to him, there were substantive differences of opinion between the two organizations regarding policy and goals. On 5 January Nur Misuari published a personal communique from his residence in Saudi Arabia calling on all Philippine Muslims to welcome the pope. Misuari said that the MNLF was prepared to assist the government in thwarting AbuSayyaf plots.27 On 21 February 1995 a man named Edwin Angeles turned himself in to the Philippine authorities. Angeles, who was also known as Abu Qudamahach or Ibrahim Panduga, was deputy commander of the Abu-Sayyaf organization, and he had had a falling out with Janjalani. His home was Davao, and like Nur Misuari, he too had studied political science at the University of the Philippines. The infor­ mation Angeles brought with him cast light on the nature of the organization. Par­ ticularly revealing was information about its international links and its participa­ tion in international terror plans initiated, for the most part, by Ramzi Ahmed Yousuf. It was Yousuf who had planned the explosion in the New York World Trade Center in 1993. Ramzi Yousuf, accompanied by a Russian from Afghanistan, had come to Basilan in 1993. They connected with Abu-Sayyaf, planned a campaign of terrorism, and trained members of the organization. Yousuf and Abu-Sayyaf

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members plotted to murder Pope John Paul II in a suicide attack which was sup­ posed to take place in Manila on 12 January 1995. On 24 January two American planes were supposed to be blown up above Hong Kong, and attacks were to be unleashed on the United States and Israel embassies in Manila as well. An explo­ sion in a small Philippine Airlines plane in which a Japanese passenger was killed and ten wounded, on 11 December 1994, carried out by Ramzi Yousuf, was a trial exercise in preparation for all these acts of terror. Another attack was planned for the beginning of February when a Pakistani was supposed to crash a small plane loaded with explosives inside the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) com­ pound in Washington, D.C. Ramzi Ahmed Yousuf, the mastermind behind all these plans, was inadvertently discovered in Manila because of a fire that broke out in an apartment in which he was living while he was handling explosives. On 6 Jan­ uary the police swooped down on the place, but Yousuf managed to escape. He was, however, apprehended in Pakistan by American Secret Service agents and Pakistani intelligence officers, and extradited to the United States where he was tried and sentenced to a long prison term. Edwin Angeles further revealed that Yousuf's aim was to turn the Abu-Sayyaf organization into a center for interna­ tional terror. Yousuf was instrumental in obtaining aid for the organization—arms, money, and training from the Libyan government, from terror groups such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Hizbullah in Lebanon, from Arab countries, and from groups in Pakistan, Malaysia and, apparently, Iran as well. The Philippine police discovered a letter sent from Syria, in January, by one of the heads of Hizbullah saying that Hafez Assad, the Syrian president, was prepared to give Abu-Sayyaf money to purchase arms. Financial aid also came from nongovernmental Saudi Arabian organizations, charitable foundations, and business firms linked to the wealthy Saudi contractor, Osama bin Laden, whose name was linked to numerous terror attacks (including the explosions that took place in August 1998 in the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).28 A key figure in links to terror organizations abroad was the Saudi businessman, Mohammad Jamal Calipha who was based in Khartoum, in the Sudan. He visited the Philippines frequently and had connections with Ramzi Yousuf and other Arabs who had been arrested in the Philippines around the pope’s visit. He set up and financed a number of Muslim institutions in the Philippines, ostensibly for charitable purposes which, in practice, served as conduits for transfers of money to Abu-Sayyaf and other radical elements. The funds allowed young Filipinos to be sent for training in Afghanistan and enabled the planning of several terror activities. Calipha was arrested in California in December 1994.29 The Philippine government instituted a number of measures to counteract the contacts with international terror, particularly at the time of the pope’s visit. The government’s committee on security which dealt with preparations for the visit scheduled for January 12-16, 1995, gave instructions to all Philippine consulates and embassies in the Middle East that visas were not to be issued to a list of 109 radical Muslims/Arabs suspected of terrorism. The list of suspects was sent to the

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Philippine government by the Vatican.30 The security services were particularly interested in apprehending six Pakistanis who had infiltrated into the country and who were known to be involved with Abu-Sayyaf preparations for an attempt on the life of the pope. The Pakistani ambassador to Manila threatened to lodge a diplomatic protest about these accusations, denying that his government supported the Abu-Sayyaf organization.31 Eight Iranians who arrived in Manila from Kuala Lumpur on 5 January were refused entrance for fear that there was some connec­ tion between them and Abu-Sayyaf, their arrival seemingly timed to coincide with plans to sabotage the pope’s visit. Manila airport authorities reported that, begin­ ning with 1993, there was a steady increase in the number of arriving passengers—ostensibly clerics, students, teachers, and traders—from Arab coun­ tries and Iran. (There were also reports of numbers of people who had entered illegally from the south.)32 On 30 March the police arrested six Arab terrorists who were in possession of arms and explosives and who had ties to Ramzi Yousuf. Earlier, a Pakistani businessman had been arrested who was known to have been implicated in the 1993 New York Trade Center bombing, in a separate attempt on the pope’s life, and in plots to blow up airplanes. All of them had met with heads of the Abu-Sayyaf group in Basilan. Of the six Arabs who were arrested, there were two Jordanian, one Syrian, one from Oman, one Palestinian, and one from the United Arab Emirates. All six were connected to the radical Hamas organization based in Gaza. The police continued their concentrated search for more terrorists. TWo businessmen from Bangladesh were expelled immediately on arrival, sus­ pected of links to the Abu-S^yyaf organization. Eight terror suspects, including four more Arabs, were arrested in Davao City at the end of April, suspected of ties to the six Arabs arrested on 30 March. l\vo were Palestinians from Jordan; one, from Kuwait, was studying medicine in Davao; the four Philippine Muslims ar­ rested were members of Abu-Sayyaf. Upon arrest, the group was found with a revolver, explosives, instruction manuals for making bombs, and Hamas publica­ tions in their possession. The plot against the pope was frustrated, but President Ramos said, on 8 April 1995, that he had every reason to believe that there was a connection between Abu-Sayyaf and terror organizations in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and Syria and that arms had arrived from all these countries.33 As part of the cam­ paign against terror, the Bureau of Immigration decided to limit the number of students allowed entry from Arab countries and from Iran. There were already more than 1,000 students in the country (mostly Pakistanis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Iraqis, and Iranians),34 many of whose whereabouts were unknown. On 27 April three Iranians involved in terror attacks were arrested and accused of a long record of assistance to Muslim terrorists in Manila, of forging documents for use in illegal entry, for supplying dollars, and for trafficking in drugs.33 It was reported that foreign Muslim emissaries were recruiting members of Abu-Sayyaf in Mindanao for the international Muslim brigade that was being set up to help Muslims in Bosnia in their war against the Serbs and the Croatians.36 On 17 May an Egyptian religious instructor was detained in Zamboanga City, accused of

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maintaining contact with the Abu-Sayyaf organization. The following day it was reported that the police were looking for thirty-six foreigners suspected of terror activities and links to Abu-Sayyaf—Pakistanis, Iranians, Egyptians, Sudanese, and Palestinians who were carrying Jordanian passports and were registered as stu­ dents. A military intelligence source revealed that Tamil Muslim terrorist groups from Sri Lanka and India were aided by Abu-Sayyaf in transporting arms through the Philippines that had originated in China.37 On 9 January 1995 a battle raged in Basilan between army units supported by helicopters and Abu-Sayyaf. The MNLF was warned that its camps would also come under army fire if they provided fleeing Abu-Sayyaf men with asylum. AbuSayyaf’s most spectacular attack was carried out on 4 April 1995. In a daring raid, two hundred of the organization’s men attacked the city of Ipil in the Zamboanga del Sur district, which was populated for the most part by Christians. Some dissi­ dent MNLF members, and perhaps MILF members as well, participated in the attack. The raiders killed fifty-seven soldiers and civilians, including the com­ mander of the battalion that was garrisoned in the city, and wounded scores more. They robbed banks and businesses, and then torched the city center. The assault lasted three hours, after which they retreated taking twenty-three hostages with them. In their retreat, they took even more hostages in the various places through which they passed; subsequently, they released some and murdered others. An­ other attack was mounted against the city of Tiingawan. Here, six civilians were killed. The army and police set out in pursuit of the attackers in a campaign that went on for three weeks and employed helicopters and artillery, but the attackers escaped to the hills or neighboring islands. Thousands of villagers fled from their homes in order to avoid being caught in the middle of the fighting between the army and Abu-Sayyaf. T\vo commanders were identified in the fighting—the first, a member of Abu-Sayyaf; and the second, a MNLF member. There were no losses reported among the attackers, nor were any taken prisoner. The raid was so effi­ cient and well coordinated that the forces which began the strike at midday, coming from both land and sea, were not spotted before the actual onslaught. Government forces were caught completely off guard and responded ineffectively, and were then slow to begin their pursuit.38 It was reported that there were foreign terrorists, apparently from Middle Eastern countries, among the attackers.39 Although Philippine army intelligence claimed that it had information on coop­ eration by the MNLF and the MILF with Abu-Sayyaf in the attack on Ipil, because of the peace talks then in process, the tendency was to de-emphasize the accusation that MNLF people had participated in the fighting. Indeed, MNLF published a condemnation of the attack, stressing that there were no contacts between MNLF and Abu-Sayyaf even though it was known that elements of MNLF in Basilan and Cotabato had trained members of Abu-Sayyaf in guerilla fighting tactics and dem­ olition, and had supplied them with arms and medications. MNLF Chairman Misuari, in Jeddah at the time, sharply condemned the attack on Ipil, stressing that MNLF had never agreed either with the goals of Abu-Sayyaf, or with its terrorist

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methods which could endanger all of the MNLF’s achievements. MILF made do with a communique saying that there were foreign terrorists in the Philippines. As a matter of fact, in a communique of 11 April a break away faction of MNLF took responsibility for the attack on Ipil and accused Nur Misuari of treachery for con­ ducting peace talks with the government.40 On 12 April an army source confirmed that the MNLF breakaway faction, called the National Islamic Council Command, had participated in the attack on Ipil. Documents captured in Zamboanga and Basilan revealed contacts between Abu-Sayyaf and terror organizations in Egypt, and with the Palestinian Hamas movement, and the Hizbullah movement in Syria and Lebanon 41 From Saudi Arabia, Nur Misuari confirmed that there was such a breakaway faction, and that its leaders had been expelled from MNLF as early as 1990. The massacre in Ipil, he said, was a tragic event. He asserted that the aim of Abu-Sayyaf was to sabotage the peace talks and the cease-fire agreement which had been signed a year earlier. He was also convinced that the MILF was not in­ volved in the attack. At the time, President Ramos weighed a temporary suspen­ sion of the cease-fire agreement with MNLF because the cease-fire agreement was hampering the army in its attempts to apprehend members of Abu-Sayyaf. The agreement required that the army get MNLF permission before it entered territory under MNLF jurisdiction, and this prevented the army from hot pursuit of those who found asylum in MNLF territory. The government decided to appeal to the UN Committee on Human Rights to condemn the murder of innocent civilians by Abu-Sayyaf 42 On 24 April 1995 talks began in Zamboanga City between representatives of the government and MNLF in the presence of OIC observers to investigate the accu­ sation that MNLF people had taken part in the attack on Ipil. The Philippine min­ ister of Defense, Renato de Villa, admitted that MNLF had lost commanders to the Abu-Sayyaf organization, making it possible that some of them took part in the raid. The MNLF representatives denied army reports that members of their organi­ zation were involved in the Ipil attack and announced that they would conduct their own investigation of the raid. Anyone proved to have been involved in the raid, they promised, would suffer punishment. Government representatives gave the MNLF a list of five officers and eighty-five fighting men that had taken part in the attack. The list was composed on the basis of government sources, interviews with inhab­ itants of Ipil, and with hostages that had managed to escape. From Jeddah, Nur Misuari responded immediately saying that the officers named were no longer members of MNLF; whereas, the MNLF representatives to the talks rejected the government’s list of suspected participants in the raid saying that the list was a combination of unknown and illogical names; for example, names of elderly or dead people, or people no longer living in the Philippines. The representatives said that in the internal investigation that they themselves had conducted, not a single MNLF member was discovered to have taken part in the raid and, they added, their organization strictly adhered to the cease-fire that was concluded in 1993. The

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chief of staff of the Philippine army retorted that he did not believe the findings of the MNLF.43 Despite these developments, and despite his determination to go on with his antiterror campaign against Abu-Sayyaf and the MILF, President Ramos was com­ mitted to negotiations with the MNLF. He was optimistic about the chances for the peace process and was not ready to allow the raid on Ipil or other terror attacks to diminish the prospects for peace.44 At the same time, he made diplomatic efforts to deter Muslims abroad who were aiding and abetting terrorism in the southern Philippines from continuing their support. The first group he turned to was the PLO. At the end of April 1995, President Fidel Ramos invited PLO Chairman Yassar Arafat to visit Manila in order to improve cooperation between the Philippine government and the PLO in the fight against terror. At the Eighth An­ nual Meeting of Muslim Foreign Ministers in Bandung, the Philippine foreign minister, Roberto Romulos, met with Farouk Kadumi who was responsible for PLO foreign relations. Kadumi told Romulos that he was prepared to help the Philippines deal with their problems of terror 45 On 16 April the Philippine minister of the Interior visited Pakistan and asked the Pakistan government to assist in re­ straining terror activities of Pakistanis in the Philippines. Army and police author­ ities in Pakistan verified that there were contacts between Pakistani terrorists and the Abu-Sayyaf organization, and that Pakistanis participated in a number of terror attacks, including the raid on Ipil. As a result of the visit, both countries agreed to an exchange of intelligence and police cooperation in the fight against terror.46 Indonesia was not suspected of aiding terror, and was quick to deny allegations that it was training Philippine Muslim rebels. Indonesia emphasized the good re­ lations that existed between the two countries and the assistance that it had ex­ tended to the Philippines at international forums, including with the OIC.47 Ma­ laysia also responded favorably to President Ramos’s request for closer coopera­ tion in the antiterrorist campaign. Both countries agreed that naval patrols of the Malaysian navy should be stepped up in order to prevent members of Abu-Sayyaf finding asylum in Malaysia. According to reports that were popular in the Philip­ pines, Abu-Sayyaf did maintain training camps in Malaysia, particularly in Sabah, from which its men set out for terror activity in Mindanao. The organization re­ cruited young men, some only fourteen years old, sent to train in Malaysia, and supplied them with arms when their training was completed. The Philippine gov­ ernment hoped that Malaysia would now act to limit this threat48 Malaysia wel­ comed the agreement between MNLF and the Philippine government and ex­ pressed the hope that the establishment of peace in the South Philippines would convince Philippine refugees who had found asylum in Sabah to return to their homes and that the number of illegal refugees, who constituted a hardship and an irritant, would be lowered. There were approximately 500,(XX) illegal immigrants in Sabah, half from the Philippines and half from Indonesia 49On 11 May President Ramos announced that he would convene a meeting in Mindanao to discuss prob­ lems of peace and security in the region in light of the threat presented by Abu-

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Sayyaf and other terrorist elements in West Mindanao. Later, when Janjalani was killed in mid-December 1998 members of Abu-Sayyaf carried out a number of terror attacks in the Sulu area to avenge his death.50 The security situation in the south did not improve significantly after the agree­ ment signed in 19%. To date, the experience of the autonomy has not been seen as a success, and Misuari has no achievements to which he can point. The ARMM government did not fulfill expectations because of inexperience, corruption, and bureaucratic inertia. Most of the money that came to ARMM from the Philippine government or from the United Nations was expended on salaries instead of on development plans. It appeared that Nur Misuari was not overly disturbed by prob­ lems of ongoing terror, kidnappings, and murders by the MILF and Abu-Sayyaf, nor by ordinary banditry, nor with the administrative difficulties of the autonomy. He absented himself from his office for extended periods, preferring to spend much time abroad which he explained as seeking investments. Consequently, he did not deal with the daily problems of his office. It appeared that he was concerned about maintaining his international connections and his status as an international figure. According to the 1996 agreement, another referendum was to be held in 1999 in fourteen districts of the south, after which it was hoped that the area of ARMM could be expanded. The question to be decided by voters was whether to join ARMM which, as will be remembered, is presently composed of only four dis­ tricts. Meanwhile, it was reported that the heads of two districts of the four, have already demanded the right to withdraw from ARMM, and the prospects that there will be additional districts who wish to join is not great. In the government’s efforts to achieve an agreement with MILF, Nur Misuari has been sidelined.51 Successive governments of the Philippines have resorted to political, economic, legal, and police-military means in their fight against Islamic terror. The Marcos regime established districts 9 and 12 which in President Marcos's view were con­ sonant with the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The government of Corazon Aquino signed the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Law in 1988 which included the districts of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, and Tawi- Tawi. President Fidel Ramos signed a peace treaty with MNLF which led to the estab­ lishment of the southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and for development plans for the next fifteen years in Mindanao. Po­ litical reforms and economic programs were intended to deal with the causes o f violence and the drive for separation. They were meant to bring an end to back­ wardness and poverty which a number of Philippine governments considered to be the main cause of terror activity in the south. At the same time as political reform and economic plans were being made, there was an intensification of military and police activity in the south. Apparently, despite all that was done, the southern Muslim districts remain the most backward in the Philippines, and they continue to lag behind most of the other regions of the country both economically and cul­ turally. The aid that was promised did not fully materialize, according even to

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testimony of sources close to the authorities. The frustration that characterized Muslim inhabitants of the south continues unabated.32

Notes 1. Majul, "The Moro Struggle,” 915; May, "The Philippines under Aquino,” 348; idem, "The Moro Movement,” 58-59; idem, “The Religious Factor,” 310; US. Department of State, Country Reports, 1988,912. 2. At the time, as on other occasions, Misuari was at pains to underscore analogies be­ tween the situation of the Moros and that of the Palestinian Arabs. He condemned US. President Ronald Reagan and organized demonstrations condemning the American bomb­ ing of Libya. All these steps were undoubtedly part of an effort to curry favor with Arab governments. See Clad, “Philippines: A Step towards Peace,” FEER, vol. 133, no. 38 (Sep­ tember 18,1986): 25; Christopher S. Wren, “Filipino Moslems: A New Piece to Fit into the Puzzle,” New York Times (May 13, 1986). 3. Majul, op. cit., 915-916; idem, "The Moros of the Philippines,” 176-177; May, "The Philippines under Aquino,” 349-351; idem, "The Moro Movement,” 59; idem, "The Reli­ gious Factor,” 310; Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 89-90,141,148; “The Philippines,” The Far East and Australasia 1996, 27th ed. (London: Europa Publications, 1995), 903; James Clad, “The Misuari Gamble/TEE/?, vol. 133, no. 37 (September 11, 1986): 18-19; Wren, op. cit; Asia Yearbook 1987,225,227. 4. Majul, op. cit., 915-916; May, "The Philippines under Aquino,” 351; idem, “The Wild West in the south,” 135; idem, "The Moro Movement,” 59; idem, "The Religious Factor,” 310; Mercado, “The Moro People’s Struggle,” 163-164; Clad, “Philippines: A Step towards Peace,” 24-25; idem, "The Other Rebellion,” 41-42; “The Philippines,” op.cit., 903; “Talk­ ing Peace with the Moros,” Asiaweek, vol. 12, no. 37 (September 14,1986): 10-11. 5. Text of the Jeddah Accord of January 3-4, 1987 in Aide Memoire, 38-41 (annex B); Majul, op. cit., 917; idem, “The Moros of the Philippines,” 177; May, “The Philippines under Aquino,” 351-354; idem, “The Moro Movement," 59; idem, "The Religious Factor,” 310-311; Peter Bacho, “The Muslim Secessionist Movement,” Journal o f International Af­ fairs, vol. 41, no. 1 (summer/fall 1987): 158-163; Nagasura T. Madale, “The Organic Law for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao: Contrasting Views," in Mark l\imer, R. J. May, Lulu Respall Tlimer, eds., Mindanao: Land o f Unfulfilled Promise (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1992), 170; James Clad, “Autonomy and Acrimony,” FEER, vol. 135, no. 3 (January 15,1987): 17-18; Ramati, “The Philippine Insurgencies,” 19-20; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 18; Asia Yearbook 1988,215,217; “Agreements: Second Try at Au­ tonomy,” Asiaweek, vol. 13, no. 3 (January 18, 1987): 16-17; “Rsace Talks: Meanwhile, Back at the Front,” Asiaweek, vol. 13, no. 21 (May 24,1987): 15. 6. Text of MNLF Panel proposal presented in Zamboanga City on February 20,1987, in Aide Memoire, 42-48. The government panel’s reply of April 8,1987: op., cit., 49-70. The government proposed Provincial Autonomous Council (PAC) of April 24, 1987: op. cit., 114-119. MNLF Revised Proposal of April 15,1987: op. cit., 121-130. Government’s Aide Memoire presented to the secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Conference on May 17,1987: op. cit., 1-19. See also Majul, “The Moro Struggle,” 917-920; idem, ‘The Moros of the Philippines,” 177-178; Mercado, “The Moro People’s Struggle,” 164; Ramati,

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op. cit., 20-22; “The Philippines,” The Far East and Australasia 1996,904; Asia Yearbook 1988,217; idem, 1989, 207-209. 7. Mercado, op. cit., 164-165; “The Philippines” op. cit., 904. 8. May, “The Wild West in the south,” 136; John McBeth, “A Flawed Formula,” FEER, vol. 146, no. 47 (November 23,1989): 37-38; idem, “Pocket Homeland,” FEER, vol. 146, no. 48 (November 30, 1989): 13; Rigoberto Tiglao, “Philippines: The Fire Next Time,” FEER, vol. 159, no. 13 (March 28, 1996): 28; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 19; “The Philippines,” op. cit., 904-905. 9. Majul, “The Moros of the Philippines,” 179-180; May, ‘The Religious Factor” 311; Madale, “The Organic Law,” 170-183; Peter M. Sales, “War and Peace in the Southern Philippines: An Analysis of Negotiations between the Ramos Administration and the Moro National Liberation Front” Pilipinas, no. 27 (fall 19%): 51; Jose Manuel Tesoro and An­ tonio Lopez, “A Fresh Threat to P sa c e Asiaweek, vol. 23, no. 27 (July 11,1997): 20; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports 1992,645; Amnesty International 1990, 194. 10. McBeth, “Pocket Homeland,” 13; Amnesty International 1991, 186. 11. John McBeth, “Philippines: Rebel Hopes Dashed,” FEER, vol. 149, no. 36 (Septem­ ber 6, 1990): 30-32; Asia Yearbook 1991, 201. 12. Amnesty International 1993, 240; idem, 1994, 242, 244; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports 1993, 717; Sidler, “In the ‘Wild South,’” 22-23; Sales, “War and Peace,” 52; Richard Martin, “Resurgent Islam,” FEER, vol. 157, no. 7 (February 17, 1994): 36; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 19-21; “The Philippines,” The Far East and Australasia, 1996, 906-907; “Philippines: Trouble in the south,” Asiaweek, vol. 19, no. 15 (April 14, 1993): 28. 13. “The Phillipines,” op. cit., 908; Asia Yearbook 1995,195; Philippine Daily Inquirer, (January 8, 1995); Sales, op. cit., 58; “Philippines,” op. cit., 29-30. 14. Sidler, op. cit., 23; “The Philippines,” op. cit., 910; Asia Yearbook 1994, 194; idem, 1995, 195. 15. Manila Standard, The Manila Times, (January 7, 1995); “Manila to Continue Talks with Rebels,” The Straits Times (September 7, 1994). 16. “The Philippines,” op. cit., 908-909; Sales, op. cit., 59; Rigoberto Tiglao, “Philip­ pines: Peace in His Time,” FEER, vol. 159, no. 36 (September 5, 1996): 24; The Philippine Star (January 3, 1995); The Manila Times (January 5, 1995); Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 25,1995); International Herald Tribune (June 21, August 4, 1995). 17. Tiglao, op. cit., 24; Sales, op. cit., 62-63; Tim Healy and Antonio Lopez, “The Anat­ omy of a Deal,” Asiaweek, vol. 22, no. 37 (September 13,1996): 21-22; Lopez, “Will They Give Peace a Chance,” Asiaweek, vol. 22, no. 34 (August 23, 1996): 20; “Diaspora,” [edi­ torial] Philippine Human Rights Update, vol. 10, no. 5 (May-June 1996): 1; “Cracks in the Peace Plan,” Asiaweek, vol. 22, no. 32 (August 9,19%): 24; Amnesty International 1996, 251; Syed Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines,” Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 5 (May 1998): 450; Thomas M. McKenna, “Armed Separatism and Muslim Autonomy in the Southern Philippines,” ISIM Newsletter, no. 2 (Leiden: March, 1999), 11. 18. Tiglao, op. cit., 24; Healy and Lopez, op. cit., 22; Sales, op. cit., 63; “Cracks in the Peace Plan,” op. cit., 24. 19. Tiglao, op. cit., 24; Sales, op. cit., 61,63; Healy and Lopez, op. cit., 21-22; idem, “A Warrior Comes in from the Cold,” Asiaweek, vol. 22, no. 52 (December 27,1996-January

Autonomy

355

3, 1997): 36; Davis, “Islamic Guerillas Threaten the Fragile Peace,” 30; “Philippines: Misuari’s Promise,” FEER, vol. 159, no. 40 (October 3, 1996): 13; “Philippines: Misuari Takes Office,” FEER, vol. 159, no. 41 (October 10,1996): 15; The Manila Chronicle [spe­ cial report] (November 4, 1996), 25. 20. Tiglao, op. cit., 24,27-28. 21. Tiglao, “Philippines: The Fire Next Time,” 26-30; idem, “The Hard Corps,” FEER, vol. 159, no. 36 (September 5, 1996): 28; idem, “Moro Reprise,” FEER, vol. 160, no. 1 (December 26, 1996-January 2, 1997): 22; idem, “Return to Arms,” FEER, vol. 160, no. 30 (July 24,1997): 32; Davis, “Rebels without a Pause,” 30-35; idem, “Islamic Guerillas,” 31-33; Ahmed Rashid, “Islam: March of the Militants,” FEER, vol. 158, no. 10 (March 9, 1995): 19; Marites D. Vitug, “The MILF Factor,” Philippine Human Rights Update, vol. 10, no. 5 (May-June 1996): 5 [Reprinted from The Manila Times, April 18, 1996]. 22. “The Philippines,” The Far East and Australasia (1996), 909; “Diaspora,” [editorial], Philippine Human Rights Update, 1; “Refugees in Mindanao: Lives in the Balance,” Philippine Human Rights Update, vol. 10, no. 5 (May-June 1996): 4—5; Asia Yearbook 1996, 194; The Manila Chronicle (January 6,1995). 23. Tiglao, ‘The Hard Corps,” 28; “Moro Action Call,” FEER, vol. 159, no. 15 (April 11, 1996): 12. 24. Tiglao, “Moro Reprise,” 22; idem, “Return to Arms,” 32; “Philippines, Cinema Blast,” FEER, vol. 160, no. 3 (January 16, 1997): 13; “Philippines: Truce with Muslims,” FEER, vol. 160, no. 6 (February 6, 1997): 13; Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila Bulletin (October 28, 1996); Manila Bulletin (November 2, 1996); The Manila Chronicle (Novem­ ber 4, 1996); Philippine Daily Inquirer (November 6, 1996). 25. Tiglao, “Return to Arms,” 32; Tesoro and Lopez, “A Fresh Threat,” 20; Davis, “Rebels without a Pause,” 31, 34; idem, “Islamic Guerillas,” 34-35; Islam, “The Islamic Indepen­ dence Movements,” 451; Antonio Lopez, “Mindanao’s Chance,” Asiaweek, vol. 25, no. 9 (March 5,1999): 26-29; James Hookway, “Weak Mindanao Economy Fuels Islamic Rebel Group,” The Asian Wall Street Journal (June 14, 1999); Syed Serajul Islam, “The Moro Separatist Movement in the Philippines: Recent Developments,” Asian Thought and Soci­ ety, vol. 24, no. 71 (May-August, 1999): 153-162. 26. Merliza M. Makinano, Terrorism as a Threat to National Security, OSS Working Paper. Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines [OSS/AFP] (Quezon City: 1997), 11-14; Tiglao, “Islam: To Fight or Not to Fight,” FEER, vol. 158, no. 10 (March 10, 1995): 21; Sales, “War and Peace,” 52-53; Mark TUrner, ‘Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu-Sayyaf,” Contemporary South­ east Asia, vol. 17, no. 1 (June 19,1995): 14-15; Davis, “Islamic Guerillas,” 33; Gopinath, “Muslim Autonomy,” 20; “Philippines: Trouble in the south," Asiaweek, 30; Asia Yearbook 1995, 195; Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 7, 1995); The Manila Times (April 8, 1995); Manila Bulletin (April 8 and 9,1995); The Manila Chronicle (April 10,1995); International Herald Tribune (May 26, 1995). 27. T\imer, ‘Terrorism and Secession,” 1,3-7; “The Philippines,” The Far East and Aus­ tralasia 1996,908; The Philippine Star (January 5,6,7 and March 22,1995); People!s Jour­ nal (January 6, 1995); The Manila Chronicle (January 6 and 7, March 28, April 10,1995); Philip- pine Daily Inquirer (January 8 and 10, April 7, 1995); The Manila Times (April 8, 1995). 28. Makanano, Terrorism as a Threat, 13-14; Anthony Spaeth, “A Mad Dream of Global

356

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Terror,” Time, vol. 145, no. 14 (April 10, 1995): 31; Tlimer, op. cit., 8, 16; Rashid, “March of the Militants,” 18-19; "The Philippines,” op. cit., 909; HaAretz weekly supple­ ment (July 25, 1997): 14; Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 7, 1995; Articles detailing the information released by Edwin Angeles were published on March 24,1995 in the following Philippine newspapers: Today, Business World, The Manila Chronicle, People’s Journal, Manila Standard, Philippine Daily Inquirer. Details of Ramzi Yousuf's activities in Manila were published on February 13,1995, in Manila Standard, Manila Bulletin. For assistance given in arms shipments, terror activities and training for Abu-Sayyaf and MILF from Arab and other Muslim sources in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Libya, Malaysia, Egypt, Su­ dan, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, see Today, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and The Philippine Star, January 3, 1995; The Philippine Star, People’s Journal, Manila Standard, Business World, Philippine Daily Inquirer, The Manila Chronicle and Today, January 4, 1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 10, 1995, and April 4,1995; Money Asia, Manila Bulletin, Manila Standard, April 8,1995; Newsasia, Money Asia, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 17,1995; Tune magazine of April 10 published a report that Malaysia was training terrorists. There

was an angry reaction from Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad who said that such an accusation was a Western plot to discredit his country and hurt its economic devel­ opment; Manila Bulletin, April 10,1995. 29. Manila Bulletin, April 8,1995; Manila Standard, People’s Journal, Philippine Daily Inquirer, The Philippine Star, Newsasia, and Money Asia, April 17,1995; Ronen Bergman, “The Philippine Connection,” [Hebrew] HaAretz (July 25, 1997). 30. Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star, January 3, 1995. 31. Manila Standard, January 5, 1995; Manila Standard, January 6, 1995. 32. The Manila Times and The Philippine Star, January 6, 1995; The Manila Chronicle, January 7, 1995; People’s Journal, January 10, 1995; The Philippine Star, February 13, 1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, People’s Journal, Today, Manila Standard, The Manila Times, The Manila Chronicle, and Money Asia, April 3,1995; Manila Standard, Philippine Daily Inquirer, The Manila Chronicle, The Philippine Star, People’s Journal, The Manila Tunes, Today, and Business World, April 5, 1995; The Manila Times, April 6, 1995; The Philippine Star, April 6 and 7,1995; Manila Standard, April 8,1995; Manila Bulletin, April 9, 1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 11, 1995; Newsasia, Money Asia, and Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 17, 1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 25 and 26, 1995; Peoples Journal, The Manila Chronicle. Manila Standard, Today, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and The Philippine Star, April 27, 1995. 33. Philippine Daily Inquirer, The Philippine Star, People’s Journal, and Manila Bulletin, April 9,1995; Manila Standard, Business World, and The Manila Chronicle, April 18,1995;

Ramos later corrected his statements and said that the Abu-Sayyaf organization trained its men in Afghanistan, and not in Pakistan. 34. Manila Bulletin, April 14,1995; People’s Journal, April 15, 1995. 35. Today and The Manila Chronicle, April 28, 1995; The Manila Chronicle, May 12, 1995. 36. Manila Bulletin, April 10,1995. 37. Philippine Daily Inquirer and Manila Standard, May 17,1995; Manila Standard, Today, The Philippine Star, and Manila Bulletin, May 18, 1995. 38. International Herald Tribune, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Today, Business World, Money Asia, The Manila Chronicle, The Philippine Star, People’s Journal, and The Manila

Autonomy

357

Times, April 5,1995; The Philippine Star, Today, and The Manila Chronicle, April 6,1995; The Manila Times, Manila Bulletin, Tempo, Today, The Manila Chronicle, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and Manila Standard, April 7, 1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 8, 1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila Standard, and The Manila Chronicle, April 12, 1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 20, 1995; International Herald Tribune, May 26, 1995; Himer, ‘Terrorism and Secession,” 8; Sales, “War and Fteace,” 61; “The Philippines,” The Far East and Australasia, 909; Asia Yearbook 1996, 194; Amnesty International 1996, 252-253. 39. The Philippine Star, January 10,1995; Today, Manila Standard, The Philippine Star, BD, Manila Bulletin, People’s Journal, The Manila Times, and Money Asia, April 10,1995. 40. The Manila Times, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Business World, Manila Standard, and Manila Bulletin, April 6,1995; The Manila Times and Manila Bulletin, April 9,1995; The Manila Times and Today, April 12,1995. 41. People’s Journal, Manila Bulletin and Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 13, 1995. 42. Manila Standard, Manila Bulletin and The Manila Times, April 19,1995. 43. The Manila Times and Money Asia, April 25,1995; Business World and Tempo, April 26, 1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, The Philippine Star, Manila Bulletin, and Manila Standard, April 27, 1995; Business World, April 30 and May 3, 1995; The Philippine Star, May 13, 1995; The Manila Times, May 16, 1995; The Manila Chronicle, May 17, 1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer and Manila Standard, May 18, 1995. 44. People’s Journal, April 11,1995; Manila Bulletin, The Manila Times, and The Manila Chronicle, April 20, 1995; Manila Standard, April 23,1995; Today, April 24, 1995. 45. The Philippine Star, April 28, 1995; Today, April 28 and 29,1995. 46. Manila Standard, People’s Journal, The Philippine Star, and Manila Bulletin, April 17, 1995; Manila Standard, Today, May 6, 1995; The Philippine Star, May 8, 1995; Today, May 10,1995. 47. The Philippine Star, March 1, 1995. 48. The Manila Times, April 16, 1995. 49. Manila Bulletin, November 5,1995. 50. Manila Standard, May 12, 1995; The Manila Times, May 17, 1995; Lopez, “Minda­ nao’s Chance,” 28. 51. Tesoro and Lopez, “A Fresh Threat,” 20; Lopez, op. cit., 29; Davis, “Rebels without a Pause,” 30; idem, “Islamic Guerillas,” 31. 52. Makinano, Terrorism as a Threat, 10,15; Hookway, “Weak Mindanao Economy.”

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Summary

Numerous points of similarity exist between the Muslim communities of the Phil­ ippines and Muslim communities in the Patani region of Thailand and of Arakan in Burma/Myanmar, making it useful to compare these three minority communi­ ties each of whom rebelled against non-Muslim majority regimes. In two of the countries, Thailand and Burma/Myanmar, the majority of the population is Bud­ dhist; in the Philippines, Christian. It is not accidental, then, that in the pervasive atmosphere of heightened nationalism which followed World War II, rebellions by Muslim minorities broke out. In Thailand and the Philippines, these outbreaks were the continuation of an ongoing tradition of resistance to a central regime which long antedated World War II. In all three countries, the rebelling Muslim minorities lived in well-defined territorial concentrations, adjacent to neighboring Muslim states. (In two cases, Thailand and Burma/Myanmar, Muslim communi­ ties exist which differ in their ethnic composition and which did not revolt against the central authority ; these groups remain outside the scope of this study.) Accord­ ing to population estimates, in all three cases, Muslims comprise 4-6 percent of the general population.1 Some basic elements differentiate the communities. From ethnic and religious standpoints, the Muslims of Patani in South Thailand and the Moro of the southern Philippines belong to the Malay world while the Rohingya of Arakan are closer to the Muslims of Bengal. There are also significant differences in the rebel move­ ments of each of the communities with regard to historical background, aspirations and goals, and in their operational effectiveness. Goals or aspirations, however were, invariably, neither clearly nor unambiguously expressed. In general, the rebel groups can all be classed as separatist movements that sought independence, or at least varying degrees of autonomy. In each of the three cases, the rebel movements employed the tactics of guerilla warfare to achieve their goals. In presenting their positions, the separatist movements could give an impression of lacking both so­ phistication and consistency, although there is the possibility that at times the fuzz­ iness and ambiguity were intentional. At times, it was also unclear whether the Muslim communities aspired only to independence, or whether they would have been satisfied with an improved standard of living and the acceptance of some of their demands in the religious, social, educational, and economic spheres, as well as the co-option of Muslims into governmental networks. This lack of clarity was 361

362

Summary

more characteristic of the Muslims of Thailand and those of the South Philippines; less true for the Rohingya of Arakan. In the Philippines, even more in Thailand, the distinction between fighting for Muslim interests and outright banditry was often blurred, a situation which was costly to the rebel movements in terms of a tarnished image and did nothing for their popularity, not even among members of their own community. Certainly it weakened their position. A comparison of the three separatist movements shows distinct differences in the quality of leadership that developed in each of them. For example, the Muslims of Arakan were not able to produce a leadership from among themselves whose stature was such that it could unite the entire Rohingya people, or for that matter most of the Rohingya. Neither were they able to build a network linking them to international Muslim bodies and Islamic countries as the Patani Muslims—even more the Moro—were able to do. Once the leadership of mujahideen leader Cassim came to an end, and that was as early as 1961, the Rohingya had no one of stature at their head. In contrast, there was a broad group of talented and able people among the Moro whose educational background and ability were such that they could function within the emergency situation in which they found them­ selves. Many of the founders of MNLF, and other rebel movements in the South Phil­ ippines, were students and academics who—particularly in the early years of the rebellion—were able to work in concert with the traditional leadership elites and the Ulama. Among the Patani Muslims, too, there were students who had acquired an education in institutions of higher learning in Thailand itself or abroad in Arab countries. In theory, they were able to develop patterns of activity similar to those of the Moro students: to mobilize members for the underground organizations; to establish a network of political and propaganda work; to forge international links; and to solicit military, financial, and political aid in support of their separatist struggle. However, the Patani Muslims did not make either significant or serious efforts in this direction to equal the achievements of Nur Misuari, Hashim Salamat, and many others that preceded them. The only exception was Major Mayhiddin, and even this high point in the Patani Muslim struggle was limited to the early period soon after the end of the World War II. Another reason for the weakness of the separatist movements can be found in their lack of consensus about the goals they wanted to achieve, a reflection of the personal struggles between leaders of the various factions. The schisms that char­ acterized the separatist movements, particularly in the Philippines and Thailand, injured the projection of a unified cause and was an obstacle to either political or military decisive action. It is conceivable that if all the diverse factions in the rebel movements could have united in their struggle, their situation would have appre­ ciably improved and their accomplishments would have been more telling. In general, it can be said that the majority of Muslim rebels in the Philippines wanted to secede and to establish an independent Muslim state. Even the most moderate among them sought, minimally, full autonomy for their people. There

Summary

363

were even some Moro who wished to unite with neighboring Malaysia. The Mus­ lims of the Patani region, too, were striving for either independence or to become a part of Malaysia. The Muslims of Arakan wanted an autonomy which would, essentially, guarantee freedom of religion and their civil rights as part of the Union of Burma. Only a small faction hoped for unification with neighboring eastern Pakistan/Bangladesh. The diverse expectations of the three communities impacted qualitatively on the nature of their liberation movements. In the Philippines, the Muslim rebellion took on the dimensions of a full-fledged war, particularly severe during the regime of President Ferdinand Marcos. There were times when governmental control of a number of areas in the south was in serious question. In order to curb the revolt, the government had to commit heavy resources to the conflict. For internal, polit­ ical, and geographic reasons, as well as because of external pressures exerted by international Islamic bodies, outright victory was unachievable.The vehemence and burning Islamic religious fervor of the Moro rebellion is attested to by the rise of the martyr phenomenon, the personal jihad, particularly true during the periods of Spanish and American rule. There were no equivalent manifestations among the Muslims of Patani or the Rohingya. While the Muslims of Patani did resemble the Philippine Moro in seeing their identity as different than the Buddhist majority against which they violently rebelled, still, their war was less all-encompassing and certainly less effective than that which the MNLF managed to mount. The Muslims of Patani were never potentially able to threaten the government’s hold in the south­ ern provinces or to put it in question. They simply could not withstand the military might of the Thai government. In Burma, by comparison, after the mujahideen rebellion was put down and the army had reestablished its hold on Muslim areas of Arakan, resistance was more often channeled into the occasional diplomatic protest and appeal to Muslim coun­ tries or international Muslim bodies for aid, but primarily it took the form of flight across the border to Bangladesh. Ultimately, when compared to that of the other rebel movements, the Rohingya rebellion was relatively minor. Apparently, the number of fighting men which the Arakan Muslim community was able to enlist was never more than a few hundred, not even when the fighting was at its peak during the 1950s. From those who surrendered in 1961, five hundred in all, one can deduce that the mujahideen never exceeded several hundred fighters. This is true even if one takes into account the possibility that some men did not participate in surrender ceremonies but simply left for their homes forfeiting the financial grants, promises of land, and copies of the Koran that were being offered. Another fact that should be taken into account regarding this rebel movement is the confu­ sion about any practical difference between indigenous Rohingya and other Mus­ lims who had infiltrated from Chittagong. Apparently, all sides chose to de-emphasize these differences: the British during their regime, the government of inde­ pendent Burma, and the Pakistani and Muslim population of Arakan itself. From Burma’s point of view, all the Muslims in Arakan were foreigners and the distinc­

364

Summary

tions between Rohingya and other Muslims in the area did not exercise either ci­ vilian or military functionaries. Any attempt to understand Muslim rebellions in Southeast Asia must take into account more than an analysis of the local factors in each country, or a description of relations between the Muslim minority and the majority government against which it struggled. It is essential to examine these phenomena against the broader background of Islamic theological concepts which are a part of the outlook and the ideology of Philippine, Thai, and Burmese Muslims. One also needs to view the rebellions against the background of similar happenings which have occurred in other parts of the Muslim world in the fifty years that have elapsed since the end of World War II.2 Muslims aspire to live in a Muslim state; serious problems of identity confront those who cannot, and this occasionally results in crisis. Muslims everywhere per­ ceive themselves as belonging to the integral, undivided community of Islam, the Ummah, a concept which is a core tenet in the political-religious thought of Islam. It is the basis for the growth of the pan-Islamic movement which arose at the end of the nineteenth century, calling for Islamic solidarity as a response to the chal­ lenge of Western imperialism. Muslims who live as a minority in a non-Muslim environment have the sense that they are denied the right of sovereign expression. Many of them opt to conduct their lives in isolation from their surroundings which, at times, gives rise to mistrust by and confrontations with the majority society. The problem can be exacerbated in places where Muslim minorities constitute a ma­ jority within some districts of a larger non-Muslim country, a situation which causes an optical illusion that may obscure the fact that the Muslims are, in fact, a minority. Local concentrations can give rise to rebellious trends, separatist tenden­ cies, and reliance on violence directed against the regime of “unbelievers.” The conflict is then defined as a jihad, a holy war. In such circumstances, the non-Islamic state—that is, the society of the majority—is also confronted by a difficult dilemma. One course of action can be an attempt to assimilate and acculturate the minority which the regime regards as a threat to the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the country. Another option can be an attempt to minimize the ex­ tent of the minority’s exclusive hold on a district by encouraging the immigration of non-Muslims into those very areas. The government can also, where circum­ stances are propitious, expel or weaken the presence of the minority by various means—and we have seen examples of such policies in all three of the countries which comprise the subject of this work. For its part, the Muslim minority can accept life in the framework of a pluralistic, tolerant state if the majority govern­ ment will permit this. Vis-k-vis a policy of enforced assimilation, the Muslim mi­ nority can respond by some adaptation while maintaining, in so far as possible, the foundations of its faith and communal unity. Yet another option is resisting all compromise, isolation, or violent opposition which takes the form of military struggle to secede or at least achieve maximal autonomy. Indeed when the majority society rejects the limitations of coexistence and attempts to subdue the minority,

Summary

365

the outcome is usually violent. It is reasonable to assume that a Muslim minority will resort to violence when the prevailing dynamic within the society becomes religiously militant. Usually this takes place under the influence of external Islamic elements or when the Muslims believe that the central regime is weak and the time opportune to free itself from the rule of the majority society and acquire political and cultural-religious independence. Similar phenomena have occurred through­ out human history and are not limited to Muslim societies. It is this behavior which is characteristic of the three Muslim minorities in the countries within the compass of this study during various periods in their history, particularly since the end of World War II. In theory, Islam must ultimately strive to express itself through a political regime because its way of life is all-inclusive; there is no separation between religion and state. In essence, the origins of such a separation arose only in Western society and is unknown in Islamic thought. From a tactical perspective and in certain circum­ stances of peace, a Muslim community can adapt to a non-Muslim polity, cultivat­ ing hopes for the realization of its political aspirations sometime in the future. Should the appropriate historical circumstances arise, it is almost certain that an effort will be made to declare a separate Muslim presence which goes as far as political independence because the rule of non-Muslims over Muslims is consid­ ered an affront to Islam and to the proper order of the world. Generally, the mem­ bers of a Muslim minority community living in a non-Muslim state will be outsid­ ers in many respects and will cultivate separatist notions, either more moderate or more radical, depending on the historic circumstances. In recent decades, there has been a radicalization of Muslim communities throughout the world. This trend takes several forms from the unwillingness of a Muslim minority to adapt to the majority culture among which it lives to expres­ sions of intolerance, even persecution, by some Muslim states toward their own non-Muslim minorities. The rebel movements of the Moro and of the Muslims of Patani were certainly impacted on by the postwar Islamic renaissance and the spread of the pan-Islam movement. Such processes widened the gap between the Moro and the majority Christian society in the Philippines, and between the Patani Muslims and the majority Buddhist-Thai population in Patani. At the same time, the link between these Muslim communities and the international Muslim world grew stronger. From the 1970s on, this affinity was reinforced in the wake of the growing strength and increasing wealth of the oil producing Muslim states. The three Muslim rebellions of Southeast Asia must be examined against this back­ ground as well. This study raises the question as to whether, in principle, Muslim minorities can live within the framework of a state whose majority population is not Muslim, or whether, inexorably, the Muslim community will strive to secede whenever there appears to be the opportunity to do so. The history of the rebellions in the three countries under review indicates that there is no definitive answer. Consequently, these rebellions should also be viewed in a broader historic context as well as in

366

Summary

the discrete circumstances which apply to each of the communities under review. Ultimately, the rebellions are not entirely the result of events which began after World War II, but each is a direct historical continuity of the relationship of the specific ethnic Muslim community to its non-Muslim surroundings over an ex­ tended period of time and in the tradition of a persistent struggle. This is particu­ larly true with regard to the Moro in the Philippines and the Muslims of Patani in Thailand. Islam has historic precedents of Muslims living under non-Muslim rule espe­ cially after the nineteenth century when Europe’s colonial expansion brought large Muslim communities under foreign domination. On a general level, Muslim think­ ers and Ulama have dealt extensively with this issue. Yet, there is no evidence that the theoretical-ideological dimension of the problem has been examined by the local Ulama of Southeast Asia where, it appears, the entire philosophy was de­ pendent on import, particularly from Arab countries. Indeed, most observers and scholars make no mention of such a domestic literature. The historian, W. K. Che Man, is almost alone as a scholar who bases his work on the documents of Moro rebels in the Philippines that make extensive use of Arabic verses from the Koran and other Islamic expressions. There is nothing in the literature regarding the Patani Muslims or the Muslims of Arakan. If such documents exist, it would ap­ pear that they have not found their way into the hands of scholars. Many of the studies which deal with the rebellions are not useful for an understanding of the theoretical Islamic aspect of the issue. Some of the material extant can be faulted for tendentiousness. There are even publications and studies that cross the border into propagandistic and selective writing as they chronicle the rebellions or their interpretation. This is true primarily of publications that deal with the Muslim rebellion in the Philippines which have been the subject of much attention. In Thai­ land, there were even fewer Muslim thinkers, historians, and observers of the scene than in the Philippines. Among the Rohingya, they were almost nonexistent. In this respect, what emerges from the differing historical developments is the clear difference between the situation of the Patani Muslims on the one hand and that of the Moro in the Philippines and the Rohingya in Burma on the other. The turning point for the Muslims of South Thailand came with the signing of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1910 which left Patani in Siamese hands. From this point on, the Muslims lost their independence and came under non-Islamic rule. The family of the Patani sultan, along with some of the traditional elites, moved to nearby Kelantan and other places but the majority of the Muslim population re­ mained in place. It is doubtful whether theological considerations about leaving an area of Daral-Harb played a part in the emigration. It was the new political reality rather than religious considerations that impelled them to emigrate. Arakan had never had a similar history of Muslim sovereignty. There the Muslims experienced deep disappointment after World War II when the area of Arakan was annexed to independent Burma without granting the Muslims the autonomy that they had ex­ pected. For the Moro, other elements were at work. The Moro were inspired by a

Summary

367

sense of pride in their successful military exploits against the Spaniards during a major part of Spanish rule in the Philippines, by their courageous stand against the Americans, and by the fact that their inclusion in an independent Philippines meant the imposition of a foreign regime in which they had no interest in participating. The flight of Rohingya refugees to Bengal, or of Moro to Sabah, was not motivated by theological considerations of abandoning territory that had become Dar al-Harb but stemmed from the suffering which accompanied the fighting and a desire to avoid the hardships that it imposed. The Muslim resistance movements in the countries covered by this study can be classed as nationalist movements. At base, these movements were an Islamic re­ action by an ethnic-religious minority against foreign governments seen as repre­ senting nationalities different than those with which the Muslim communities would choose to affiliate. As a result, the national movements took on a combined political and religious aspect. In the rebellions with which we deal, and in several other cases in the Muslim world, Islam and nationalism reinforce each other in rejecting foreign rule, which explains the tendency of the Ulamah to support such rebel groups, sometimes playing a direct leadership role in them alongside political nonreligious leaders, at times even without them. In the case of the Malay Muslims of Patani, the fact of their being Muslims had two important outcomes. First, Islam became a focus for their separate communal, national identity differentiating them from the Thai Buddhist majority population whose identity was centered on the Buddhist king and in all the symbolic parapher­ nalia of a Buddhist state. Second, their Islamic identity forged strong links with the Malays of the Malay Peninsula and it was this that fired their irredentist aspi­ rations. And this identity also served as the basis for the support and sympathy that many circles in Malaya extended to the Patani separatists. For the Muslims of the South Philippines, the Islamic religion provided a unifying cement that defined ethnic identity which was able to overcome, in part, the ethnic and linguistic dif­ ferences between the various communities: Tausug, Maguindanao, Maranao, and others. Despite the common goal, however, the tendency to break up into factions existed among these rebel movements because of personal, tribal-ethnic, and even ideological differences. It appears that even the religion of Islam could not totally overcome the fractiousness occasioned by personal ambitions or group aspirations. Indeed, this internal bickering was one of the main reasons for the weakness of the rebel groups. In Burma, religion was the major factor that motivated the Muslims of Arakan who saw themselves as a separate community. Their separatist demands were directed not only at the central Buddhist government but also toward Arakanese Buddhists who had their own separatist demands which stemmed from an ethnic-national background, but not a religious one. The religion of Islam was the one element that linked the minority populations with the larger Ummah. On another level, it was this element that provided external moral and logistic support to the rebel movements—to a different degree in each case—in their opposition to national governments. Such assistance influenced the nature of the Muslim strug­

368

Summary

gle and its effectiveness. As noted, this was particularly true in the case of the Moro rebellion, less so, in the case of the Muslims of Patani, and was of minimal impor­ tance in the struggle of the Rohingya. This aspect is perhaps made more clear if stated as follows: Muslim rebellions in the Philippines, Thailand, and Burma are not simply the uprisings of ethnic minorities against national governments. They are also wars between different re­ ligious communities—between Muslims and Buddhists in Thailand and Burma, and between Muslims and Christians in the Philippines. Muslims have invariably been prepared to take violent action which they perceived as a holy war, a jihad, in order to fight for the achievement of their goals. They did not regard themselves as part of the majority population which they saw as alien to their religion, nation­ ality, language, and culture. Particularly in the case of the Muslims of the southern Philippines and the Muslims of South Thailand, the rule of the central government over the territory in which they had been living for generations was perceived as illegitimate. They regarded these areas as Muslim lands that had been conquered by foreign elements from which it must be liberated. They did not regard them­ selves as minorities; therefore, they did not believe that they had an obligation to obey the commands of a non-Muslim, illegitimate regime. From their standpoint, it was a religious duty to liberate lands that had become Dar al-Harb and to return them to the compass of Dar al-Islam. This approach does not hold true for the Muslim communities of Bangkok and its surroundings, or for Rangoon and other places in Burma/Myanmar. In these cases, Muslims do not claim to be a majority in the areas in which they live. Muslims in these communities attempted to identify as Thai or Burmese while retaining the religion of Islam. Nonetheless, despite their having undergone a certain process of integration, such Islamic groups face a not inconsiderable difficulty (which does not appear to apply to the Malay Muslims of Patani or the Rohingya); for them, too, religion will continue to be an obstacle to full identity. To be a Thai in Thailand or a Burman in Burma means to be a Bud­ dhist, exactly as in Malaysia, Malay means to be Muslim. These urban Muslim communities are composed of various heterogeneous groups who were uprooted from their natural historic locales. They do not enjoy the benefits of a geographic nearness to Malaysia or to Muslim Bangladesh, they do not live in significant geographic concentrations, and they do not make up the majority in their districts. Although they have a separate religious identity, they are devoid of the element that stresses national identity. Consequently, there are no separatist tendencies among them, they do not rebel against the central authority, nor do they belong to the topic under discussion here. While it is clear that the religious factor, the sense of Islamic identity, and the commitment to jihad, all have a salient importance for understanding Muslim op­ position movements in the Philippines, Thailand, and Burma/Myanmar, they were not the only factors. The direct, immediate, and most blatant causes for the out­ break of the rebellions were the social and economic grievances and the feelings of bitterness which went beyond the religious sphere. Present in everyday life,

Summary

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these conditions served to severely turn the Muslim populations of the countries in question against their central governments. While it was true that on the one hand the Muslims sought independence or a broad-spectrum autonomy, a limita­ tion to the necessity for contact with or dependence on the central governments; on the other hand, there were complaints by the Muslims that their need for eco­ nomic and social development programs was not getting sufficient attention, and that members of their community had no part in senior administration roles in the governments. More important, they complained that their lands were being expro­ priated for the benefit of settlers (Christian or Buddhist). Indeed, in order to un­ derpin government control in geographic areas where Muslim were a majority, the governments of the three countries each settled non-Muslim populations in Mus­ lim areas, a potent means for restricting the Muslim communities and turning them into minorities. In the Philippines, Christians from the north were massively and systematically settled in the southern Muslim islands as early as the period of American rule, and even more intensively after independence so that the extent of Muslim majority in the south was greatly reduced. Nor is there any doubt that the settlement policy of successive Philippine governments was highly successful; in fact, only five districts of the south—Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi—still have a Muslim majority. Indeed, this was one of the prime causes for the outbreak of the rebellion and the bitter fighting by Muslims. In Thailand, there was a similar settlement drive of a Buddhist population but in much smaller and less significant numbers. Buddhist settlements in the Muslim South did not bring about substantive demographic changes. In Arakan, Buddhists took over Muslim lands and drove out the inhabitants, but it is difficult to say whether this was the work of the government or a local initiative by Arakan Buddhists. Another sore grievance of the Muslim population which stood out in Thailand particularly was that Thai leaders and government officials, in general, in the southern districts displayed a haughty and arrogant attitude toward the Muslims of Patani. They were disinclined to consider Muslim demands which they invariably regarded as constituting a threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state and which were, therefore, not negotiable or amenable to compromise. It was Philippine governments which exhibited a greater readiness to search for avenues of dialogue with the Muslims, to be receptive to some of their demands, to consider reforms and to compromise so long as there was no fear that these steps would undermine basic national principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In Burma/Myanmar there were simply no negotiations between the Muslim popula­ tion of Arakan and the central government, particularly after the military coup of 1962. Muslims in the South Philippines complained of another kind of injustice; namely, that most of the natural resources and wealth in their regions were concen­ trated in the hands of Christians and foreign investors. Whatever economic devel­ opment there was contributed little to improving conditions of the Muslim popu­ lation. The situation was similar in Patani where most of the wealth was controlled

370

Summary

by the Chinese community or that of Thai Buddhists. Consequently, the Muslims in both these countries rejected government plans for economic development, along with reforms in the educational sphere, as threatening their communal, reli­ gious, and cultural identity and endangering their way of life. They had neither interest nor desire in cooperating with plans meant to integrate them into the ma­ jority population; plans which they perceived as hostile, as eager to take their lands, disinherit them from their traditional rights, and infringe on their way of life, turn­ ing them into a minority in their own territories. There is another grievance at whose core lies an unexpected coincidence. It has to do with what can be seen as the “British connection” claimed by both the Rohingya of Arakan and the Muslims of Patani. A question, yet to be answered, is did these Muslim groups get some kind of British promises of support during the course of World War II? Although there is no documented proof that the British did, in fact, promise the Muslims of either of these communities anything concrete, there is a surprising similarity in this unresolved issue. Conceivably oral promises were given by British officers in the field and, if so, did they or did they not act on the instructions of their superiors. Perhaps some day the truth will emerge. Mean­ while, it is certainly reasonable to assume that the Muslims in Arakan as well as in the Patani region, believed that in consideration for their loyalty and services during the war, they would be properly rewarded and aided in the pursuit of their aspirations. Against the background of these high hopes, one can better understand their disappointment after the war which inevitably led them to armed resistance. International Islamic awakening which began in the second half of the twentieth century, demonstratively marked by the establishment of the Organization of Is­ lamic Conference (OIC) in 1969, the annual meetings of Muslim Foreign Minis­ ters (ICFM) sponsored by OIC, and wide-ranging activity of other Islamic organi­ zations affiliated with OIC, gave new impetus to feelings of a political and popular pan-Islam in the Muslim world. Among the declared goals of the OIC was action in support of the struggles of all Islamic peoples and communities to insure their honor, independence, and the national rights of Muslims. This new international Muslim impetus affected all the Islamic nations and buttressed the self-image of Muslim minorities everywhere, including the Muslim communities in the South Philippines, South Thailand, and in Arakan in Burma. The minorities now became aware of the growing political might of Islamic countries and the enormous wealth that was generated by their oil reserves. Radical Islamic countries, predominantly Libya but others as well, began supplying arms, funds, and providing diplomatic support to separatist Muslim movements, thus investing these struggles with an international dimension. Saudi Arabia exhibited a growing interest in Muslim mi­ norities. To a lesser extent, such countries as Syria, Sudan, and Egypt became involved in the issue, as well as the PLO. After Khomeini’s Shiite revolution, Iran also became an active player in support of separatist Muslim organizations, carry­ ing on terror activities and propaganda. The annual conferences of Muslim Foreign Ministers whose primary interest was in the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israel

Summary

371

conflict devoted a certain part of their energies and time to dealing with the prob­ lem of minorities. Thus they became players in the diplomatic efforts to resolve these confrontations and in pressures exerted on the countries involved. Delega­ tions were sent and resolutions adopted at the conferences of OIC and ICFM. Such diplomatic activity stood out particularly with regard to the Philippines. The Mus­ lim states were very selective in their support of Muslim revolts in Southeast Asia. They dealt extensively with the Philippines, less so with Thailand, and only in small measure with Burma/Myanmar. And this external international Islamic fac­ tors had a great impact on the outcome of the conflict in the Philippines. In 1973-1974, battles in the southern Philippines elicited a lively interest in all Is­ lamic countries and prompted the dispatch of Libyan and other support to the reb­ els, and served to raise the Moro issue at international Muslim forums. Because of connections with the Muslim world, during several stages of their struggle the Philippine Muslims experienced heightened expectations that their separatist goals would be realized. At its very outset, the MNLF rebellion received considerable aid from Colonel Qadhafi, the Libyan ruler, without which it is doubt­ ful that the rebellion would have gotten as far as it did. Later, Qadhafi changed the emphasis of his policy, preferring a compromise solution—autonomy rather than separation—and moved from direct military aid to diplomatic support for the reb­ els. In the absence of outside pressure from Islamic states, particularly Libya, Pres­ ident Ferdinand Marcos might have continued, or even stepped up, his military campaign against the MNLF. Paradoxically, it was precisely the external Muslim involvement, which Marcos had encouraged in the hope that it would be instru­ mental in proving the justice of his government's policy, that enabled international Islamic pressure to be brought to bear on him crippling his military campaign and forcing him to accept negotiations with the rebels. Marcos discovered that inter­ national involvement is generally partial rather than altruistic and objective, and it has a price. In many cases, such involvement means one-sided pressure rather than neutral arbitration. Particularly during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippine government realized that only if it refrained from escalating the fighting and the use of extreme military measures could it minimize a growing external involvement in support of the Muslims, and avoid the threat of an Arab oil em­ bargo. The government knew that the issue of autonomy—and what such auton­ omy would include—was open to negotiation because the OIC had agreed that there would be no infringement of Philippine territorial integrity or national sov­ ereignty. The Islamic states would be satisfied with the granting of some kind of autonomy to the Moro; that is, they did not support the MNLF demand for the establishment of a separate, independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines. In fact, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 and subsequent agreements signed with the governments of Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos echoed this same understand­ ing. Nonetheless, it was pressure by Islamic states which undoubtedly helped the MNLF extract certain concessions from the Philippine governments which, ini­ tially, were disinclined to grant them.3 International Muslim involvement enabled

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Summary

the separatist struggle in the Philippines to reap greater results than did the struggle of the Patani Muslims. The Muslims of Patani did not achieve any measure of autonomy, nor were there negotiations between the Thai government and the rebel movements. The separatist movement in the Philippines, in contrast, was more all-encompassing in its organization and pursued a more aggressive military cam­ paign and was certainly more successful in mobilizing foreign aid. It succeeded in unleashing a war of attrition that became one of the severest problems faced by the regime, particularly during Marcos’s administration. All of which had its own price. As a result of the heavy fighting, loss of life and property were greater in the southern Philippines than they were in South Thailand where the Muslims did not mount as violent a struggle. In the case of the Muslims of South Thailand, external Islamic elements also contributed to the heightening of Islamic consciousness and sharpened demands for autonomy and separation. But as distinguished from the Moro, the Muslims of Patani made less headway at the OIC and the ICFM in capturing international concern for their plight, and even the extent of interest they did manage to raise at these international Muslim conferences was limited. The international Muslim community paid but scant attention to their issues and applied almost no pressure on the government of Thailand. Nor were there dramatic military events in Thai­ land that could equal the drama of events in the southern Philippines and so mo­ bilize the same degree of attention. It was in neighboring Malaysia that the issue of the Patani Muslims took on importance. Even if one accepts the assumption that the aid the Patani rebels received from Malaysia was not official, but rather the outcome of local and “private” initiatives, Malaysia’s involvement helped to re­ strain the actions of the Thai government, preventing both the intensification of Thai military activity and the Thai policy of forced assimilation which the govern­ ment imposed at various times. The presence of a Muslim state whose population was Malay on the other side of the frontier was a catalyst for Muslims of Patani in reinforcing their Islamic-Malay consciousness. In reality, the government of Ma­ laysia could not overlook its ethnic-religious links with the Patani Muslims or act indifferently towards them without running the risk of alienating public opinion at home. The possibility of a sharp reaction by the government of Malaysia to an overly aggressive policy by Thailand toward the Muslims of the south did go a long way toward moderating Thai policy. However, Thailand had countermeasures available which lessened the likelihood of Malaysian intervention on behalf of the Patani Muslims. In practice, a situation was created that obliged both governments to cooperate. Thailand could refrain from cooperating with the Malaysian govern­ ment in its fight against the MCP Communist undeiground. Although only rem­ nants of MCP forces found refuge in the frontier area between the two countries, Malaysia still regarded them as a potential threat. Consequently, Malaysia wanted to avoid straining its relations with Thailand. The Malaysian government had to balance three considerations when assessing the Patani rebellion. First, Malaysia’s

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373

desire to maintain correct, even good relations, with the Thai government. Second, quid pro quo policy by which the Thai government helped in suppressing the Com­ munist rebellion in return for Malaysia’s assistance in restraining Patani separatist actions. But, third, the Muslims of the Patani region were considered to be brothers, Malay-Muslims, with the same ethnic and religious identity as the majority of Malays in Malaysia. The government of Malaysia was, therefore, unable to agree to overt suppression but could not, on the other hand, support Patani separatist demands. Neither could they encourage them without endangering the advantages to be gained from the maintenance of good relations with Thailand. Only limited, highly radicalized factions in Malaysia, particularly the sultanates of the northern Malay Peninsula, could allow themselves such a “brotherly” course of action. But even among the sultanates, no champion appeared who could assist the Patani Muslims as TUn Mustafa, the chief minister of Sabah, had when he came to the aid of his neighbors, the Moro of the Philippines. Eventually, the Malaysian govern­ ment embarked on a policy of nonintervention, the outcome of which was a halt to support for Patani Muslims, even from nonofficial sources. The mutual interests of Thailand and Malaysia were certainly an important factor in limiting the sepa­ ratist movement in southern Thailand and preventing its growth. Not so in the South Philippines. There a situation arose which was precisely the opposite be­ cause of the Philippine-Malaysia conflict over Sabah which served as the impetus for Malaysia’s support of the Moro. Since the only effort to cultivate links to inter­ national Muslim bodies which the Patani Muslims made was directed at neighbor­ ing Malaysia, the Thai government felt no need to initiate diplomatic activity in Arab and Muslim countries to the extent that the Philippine government did in order to halt, or at least rein in, the activity of the separatist organizations. International Islamic bodies were even less involved with the Rohingya rebel­ lion in Arakan; there was almost no international Islamic concern or even interest in their fate. In 1983, when Rohingya leaders petitioned the ICFM to obtain ob­ server status which could have helped them in their struggle, they were refused. The Muslims of Arakan were simply unable to arouse the same kind of sympa­ thetic resonance that the MNLF of the Philippines, or even the Muslim organiza­ tions of South Thailand, had succeeded in doing. Most of the Rohingya lived in isolated villages which were difficult to get to, and their economic backwardness and isolation were obstacles to the creation of a strong political movement which could effectively act against the repressive measures of their government. Further­ more, insofar as is known, there were no dramatic events, such as major battles, that could galvanize an international response. The media did not go to the Rohingya in order to report about them. With the exception of some small human­ itarian help offered by Muslim and other aid organizations to Rohingya refugees that crossed the border into Bangladesh, there is no evidence of significant interest by Arab states or international Islamic bodies in their plight. The major source of their help was the government of Bangladesh which worked on their behalf be­ cause of its own interest in their repatriation. Itself a poor state, Bangladesh wanted

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Summary

the refugees to return to their homes so that they would be relieved of the burden of caring for them. Had they known how to generate world pressure in their favor on the internationally isolated government of Burma/Myanmar, it is possible that the Rohingya could have mobilized international Muslim support. From the standpoint of intervention by external forces, it is necessary to distin­ guish between a passive, moderate model as in the case of Indonesia, and the more active Malaysian model. Indonesia granted neither moral nor material support to the separatist Islamic organizations in either South Thailand or the southern Phil­ ippines. Apparently the only attempt was made by the Indonesian Communist Party at the end of World War II when they tried to infiltrate men and arms into Patani from Sumatra. Indonesia itself acted only at the diplomatic level, primarily at international Islamic conferences. And this was in order to weaken the involve­ ment of Arab countries in the affairs of Southeast Asia. Indonesia was concerned about the negative impact that ethnic rebel movements could have on its own sta­ bility, as well as about the effect of foreign involvement on the stability of the entire region. Indonesia was wary because of the presence of radical Islamic groups, and non-Muslim ethnic minorities such as the Christians in East Timor, the Hindus in Bali, and other communities in various places along the Indonesian archipelago. This anxiety was a factor both in Indonesia’s reservations about the MNLF’s aspi­ ration to independence, and in the position it shared with Malaysia that ASEAN, rather than the Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers, was the appropriate fo­ rum for dealing with such problems. Indonesia did not want to see a precedent in which international Muslim bodies could intervene in the internal affairs of any state in Southeast Asia. Although Indonesia kept its distance from the Moro and Patani rebel movements, it did make mediation efforts toward the achievement of a political solution. Again, its limited involvement in the struggle of Muslim mi­ norities stemmed from its basic position that there should be no support for strug­ gles of self-determination of ethnic or religious minorities because of its own po­ tential vulnerability in this sphere, and because of its unwillingness to countenance foreign intervention, particularly Arab, in the affairs of the region. Despite differences in each of the three cases, international Islamic involvement needs to be viewed in perspective. International concern for the plight of the Rohingya of Arakan, the Muslims of Patani, and the Moro of the Philippines was limited to Arab and Muslim countries, but did not go beyond international Islamic bodies. No attempt was made to turn the UN into a diplomatic arena in which to arraign the governments of Burma/Myanmar, Thailand, or the Philippines, as was the case, for example, with the Palestinian Arabs who mounted a systematic cam­ paign against Israel at the UN over a period of many years. In the case of Southeast Asia, the Arab and Muslim countries did not use their great power in the UN to this end. Neither the United States nor European countries intervened directly nor offered their good offices as negotiators as they did in the Arab-Israel conflict. A somewhat strange fact bears noting. Although it might have been expected, there was no cooperation between the three Muslim rebel movements. This was

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despite the fact that the three separatist movements obtained their aid—admittedly of vastly different proportions—from the selfsame outside sources. What informa­ tion there is about this indicates that contacts between rebel movements were lim­ ited to visits by their representatives in overseas offices where ideas and informa­ tion were exchanged. No leader went to the battle areas of the others, nor was there mutual aid between them. Each movement concentrated on its own problems. It can be assumed that cooperation between them would have raised the extent of the international Islamic community’s involvement to a much higher level. Perhaps it would have escalated tensions in Southeast Asia as a whole, and so increased the pressure on the three governments concerned. It is possible that another reason for the lack of cooperation between the rebel movements was precisely the absence of an external element to encourage, cultivate, and support it. A theological aspect to the involvement of outside Islamic elements in the Mus­ lim rebel organizations of Southeast Asia originated in radical movements within Arab countries which supported terror and, following the Khomeini revolution, in Iran. The theological influence was felt primarily in the Philippines, only mini­ mally in Thailand and Burma. The Muslims of the Philippines had a history of several hundred years of war against the Spaniards and that struggle had a marked religious dimension. It was fired by the fight against the militant efforts of the Catholic Church to convert the Filipinos, and their struggle in support of Islam. This dimension was not present in either of the other two Muslim minorities in the Buddhist countries of Thailand and Burma. For this reason, the phenomena of religious suicide, or ritual personal self-sacrifice—the personal jihad—or as it was called among the Moro, the juramentado, was not known among Patani Muslims or the Rohingya. Islamic religious devotion played a far more vivid role among the Moro. The literature of the Moro—books, pamphlets, leaflets, and speeches—was relatively prolific compared to the paucity of publications in the Muslim move­ ments in Patani and Arakan. And the Moro made use of highly charged religious terminology and style. Another factor that must be given its proper weight relates to behavioral differences between the separatist movements in the South Philip­ pines and those of South Patani: the Muslims of Patani were subject to direct, or indirect, Thai rule from the eighteenth century on; whereas, Christians began rul­ ing in the administration of the southern districts of the Philippines only toward the end of the American rule, more so after independence in 1946. Thailand’s con­ trol over its Muslim population went on for a much longer period which, to some degree, may have inured the Patani Muslims to it. For the Moro, Christian rule was a new and aggravating burden. The governments of the Philippines and Thailand responded to the threats of their separatist organizations by embarking on a number of economic and social programs, which were implemented in parallel to military and police actions. By contrast, Burma employed administrative-military means almost exclusively. The governments of both the Philippines and Thailand attempted to integrate their Muslim populations, by force if need be, out of an aspiration to forge a national

376

Summary

unity in the face of the centrifugal forces of traditional, communal regionalism. Efforts were directed at teaching the national language, improving the quality of the educational system, training non-Muslim officials to act with sensitivity to­ ward Muslims in their jurisdiction, preparing Muslims for government service, offering concessions and various economic development programs, and even in­ stituting certain reforms—particularly in the Philippines—which permitted the ap­ plication of a measure of Islamic law for Muslims. Both governments took such measures not only because of a desire for pacification, but also in response to the pressures exerted by Muslim governments and other international Islamic organi­ zations which, at one and the same time, aided the rebel movements and demanded that the situation of the Muslim communities be ameliorated through political means. Both Muslim communities opposed the policies of assimilation; however, the resistance of the Patani Muslims was neither as vigorous nor as violent as that of the Moro. It would appear that the assimilatory policy of the Thai government had a greater degree of success, and from the government’s standpoint, some of the measures on which it had embarked reaped positive results. This was particu­ larly true in the area of establishing new schools which resulted in weakening the status of the pondok and limiting their number, as well as a greater fluency in the Thai language among groups of Malay Muslims in the south. In the Philippines—even in Thailand—the central governments were hesitant about bringing the full weight of their military force to bear on suppressing the rebellion. The hesitancy was caused by a fear of how neighboring Muslim coun­ tries—Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia—would react, and by the threat of an Arab oil embargo. This was also the reason that in the 1970s and 1980s these two countries increasingly acceded to demands by Arab countries to criticize Is­ rael. At the same time, there was a difference in the extent of the military operation, in the number of men committed to it, and in the very nature of the military activity engaged in by each of the countries. The extent of destruction, number of casual­ ties, and the level of involvement by external Islamic elements, particularly Arab, also varied from one country to the other. Still, there is no doubt that the impor­ tance of the military, material, moral, and political support that the Moro received from foreign Islamic and Arab sources made the salient difference between the achievements of the Moro in the Philippines and the other Muslim movements in Thailand and Burma. It should be added that, for the most part, the Thai govern­ ment showed greater determination in the deployment of its army and police against the Muslims of Patani than the Philippine government did against its sep­ aratist movement. This may have been due to logistic and other difficulties, such as corruption and inefficiency, which the Philippine army had. The dimen­ sions of the problem, size of the Muslim population, and the territorial expanse in which military activity took place was much smaller in southern Thailand than in the Philippines. The determination to fight exhibited by the Muslims of the south Philippines far exceeded that of the Muslims of South Thailand. The situation was considerably different in Burma. Burma was not interested in

Summary

377

integrating the Muslim population of Arakan which it perceived as a foreign pop­ ulation over which it had no control. Administrative measures instituted for pur­ poses of census taking caused recurrent flight by sizable numbers of Muslim to neighboring Bangladesh, whether through choice or because the army and Bur­ mese police engaged in a planned expulsion. Beginning in 1961, the Burmese army did not encounter any meaningful armed opposition in Arakan. Nor did it seem that in the foreseeable future there would be a significant Rohingya military threat to the central government’s ability to rule in the Arakan region. The marginality of Arakan Muslims in the international Islamic world can perhaps be seen in the piquant fact that the very few written reports about what was happening among them lacked even the ritual condemnation of Israel such as could be found in MNLF documents. Apparently, representatives of Arab countries who overlooked the plight of the Rohingya were equally unenthusiastic about expressions of soli­ darity with the Patani Muslims whose documents also contained only meager ref­ erences to Israel. All three rebel movements were equally distant from the Arab-Israel conflict in the Middle East about which their leadership knows little. The artificiality with which a number of the leaders of separatist movements, par­ ticularly Nur Misuari, responded to Arab demands that they condemn Israel, both in documents and in speeches, was all the more blatant in light of the fact that in such expressions of solidarity with the Palestinians that they did make, there is no mention of other Islamic issues. In any case, Muslim populations in the Philippines and Thailand were not ready to respond affirmatively to or cooperate with government efforts at integration even if the implementation of the programs had not been tainted by corruption and inefficiency, as indeed they were. Attempts to embark on integration programs of one sort or another only served to aggravate political and religious antagonisms, to exacerbate the uprisings, and to add fuel to the demands for separatism and independence of the Muslim communities. The cruelty of the military campaigns undercut whatever advantages could possibly have been gleaned by means of eco­ nomic and cultural reforms. The campaigns had precisely the effect of reinforcing feelings of Muslim identity and motivated many young people to join the rebel organizations. Unlike Thailand or Burma/Myanmar, the Philippine government was sensitive to criticism expressed in Islamic countries about events concerning the Muslim minority, and the government attempted to refute the accusations against it. Con­ ceivably this sensitivity stemmed from Philippine dependence on Arab oil. The Philippine government invited foreign Muslim representatives to visit the south, creating an opening for greater Arab-Islamic involvement and an implicit invita­ tion for pressure on itself to make concessions to the rebels. Presidents Marcos, Aquino, and Ramos displayed an eagerness for peace negotiations and conse­ quently had to compromise and grant concessions. Events in Thailand and Burma took a different turn. Their governments did not exhibit the same enthusiasm for negotiations. Insofar as they could, they rejected external involvement and bent all

378

Summary

their efforts toward dealing with the Muslim revolts as an internal matter. They had a fair measure of success both because of objective circumstances and because o f differences in the nature of the fighting (detailed in several places in the text). Because of diplomatic considerations, Malaysia preferred good relations with neighboring Thailand and cooperation along their common border to participation in the struggle of the Patani Muslims who were their brothers in ethnic origin and Islam. The same held true for eastern Pakistan/Bangladesh who did not want the issue of the mujahideen in Arakan to become a stumbling block in relations with neighboring Burma/Myanmar, a position substantiated by the Pakistan-Burma Treaty of December 1961 which established procedures for cooperation along the common frontier. Perhaps OIC countries were acting according to a double stand­ ard vis-&>vis the Muslim rebellions for exactly the same reason. The Philippine government did want external involvement and, in fact, received it; whereas, Thai­ land and Burma opposed such intervention; consequently the OIC showed only slight interest in becoming involved, a possible explanation for the fact that neither the rebellion of the Patani Muslims nor the Rohingya generated serious Muslim international support. Indeed, these rebellions waned long before the Moro rebel­ lion without having achieved their goals, unlike the Moro. It should be remem­ bered that in the case of the Philippines, although the outcome of international Islamic involvement did not coincide with the Philippine government's desires and intentions, neither did OIC countries support secession but accepted only auton­ omy. The important contributions of Indonesia and Malaysia to this matter have already been discussed above. From the end of World War II on, Muslims of the South Philippines, Thailand, and Arakan demanded independence or, alternately, wide-ranging autonomy. To­ ward this end, they engaged in guerilla warfare. After a half century of struggle, it appears that the Muslims of Patani failed in their goal. The Rohingya, whose dis­ tress only grew during the fighting, also failed. The Moro, however, were able to achieve autonomy, albeit limited and partial, and a far cry from their original as­ pirations ; still, a noteworthy success. What were the reasons for this partial and limited success which nonetheless stands out against the failure of the Patani Mus­ lims and the Rohingya?4 One factor is the relatively weak sense of discrimination which the Patani Muslims felt as compared to the outraged sense of discrimination among the Moro. The Thai government was more interested in maintaining its sovereignty and control in the Patani region than it was in repressing its Muslim population. The transfer of Buddhist settlers from the north was very moderate when compared to the intensive settlement by Christians in the Muslim districts of the southern Philippines, a salient cause of the aggressive response by the Moro. In fact, Christians became the majority in almost all the districts of the Muslim South which was not the case in Patani. We have already dealt with the important issue of leadership. Particularly with the establishment of MNLF, the Moro move­ ment was led by an educated cadre that had a sense for politics. Their organiza­ tional ability was far superior to that of the Patani Muslim leadership, most of

Summary

379

whom were clerics and belonged to the traditional aristocracy. Despite the fact that all the members of the rebel organizations in Patani belonged to the same ethnic community—Malay Muslims—they were more divided than the Moro, though the Moro were heterogeneous and came from various ethnic communities. For most of the years of fighting in the South Philippines, the MNLF was the foremost rebel organization on the scene, gaining political recognition by Islamic countries. This was achieved despite the serious blows the organization suffered on the field of battle, and despite splits in its leadership. Another element working for the Moro was the relative weakness of the Philippine government which clearly felt itself subject to pressures by Muslim states as it attempted to negotiate a peace agree­ ment in the south for which it was prepared to compromise. The Thai government had no tendency to compromise or to suffer any infringement of its absolute sov­ ereignty in the south, the only exceptions being a number of marginal concessions it made to the Patani Muslims in social and economic matters. Moreover, the sep­ aratist organizations of the Patani Muslims were unable to marshal wide support either within their own public or from Islamic countries and the OIC. This was in sharp contrast to the Moro who were able to mobilize such wide support both at home and abroad. The fortunes of war changed and changed again in each of the three countries in which the separatists fought. The fiercest battles were in the South Philippines where costly losses brought on by long periods of fighting, fatigue, and attrition resulted in frequent breaks in the fighting and in cease-fires. Although there were some military successes by government forces in the war against the separatists, the rebels—particularly in the Philippines, to a lesser extent in Thailand, and even less in Arakan—were able to maintain their strength through additional recruit­ ment from within the Muslim community. The problem was that basic conditions remained as they had been. Most of the Muslims of the South Philippines, South Thailand, and Arakan still wished to live their lives in accordance with the tradi­ tions and religious precepts of their religion without outside interference from the central governments of the regions in which they lived. Linguistic and religious differences, as well as historic hostilities, between Muslim minorities and the Bud­ dhist majority among whom they lived in Thailand and Burma, and the Christian majority in the Philippines were not, and are not, easily bridged. For this reason, there is no chance that various development programs in the areas of education, or in economic and social spheres, will be crowned with the results that the govern­ ments of the Philippines and Thailand would like. Burma has no such programs. The history of Muslim rebellions in Southeast Asia indicates that attempts to seek a solution to the problems of the Muslim minorities through economic or social instrumentalities did not succeed. The failure of those who believed in the possibility of integrating the minorities into the society of the national majority among whom they dwelled, was due to misunderstanding the basic, deep-seated ethnic and religious dimension of the Muslim rebellions. There was an insufficient understanding of the fundamentally religious aspect of the Muslim communities.

380

Summary

Nor was there an awareness of Muslim suspicion that the aim of the integration policies, particularly in the Philippines and Thailand, was not to improve their lot, but rather to accelerate their assimilation into the general non-Muslim society, and to undermine their religion and political identity. Members of Muslim minorities in all three countries dealt with in this study saw the conflict in more than socio­ economic terms. They viewed it primarily as religious, ethnic, and national and, indeed, the rebel movements were decidedly nationalist, ethnic, and religious movements. At times, the violent outbreaks were spurred precisely because of stepped-up integration efforts coupled with shabby behavior on the part of the government and its officials. The Muslims accused central governments of being insensitive to their demands and their needs. At base, the rebelling Muslims in these countries called for more than freedom of religion in the narrow meaning of the term; they wanted recognition as representing a separate religion and culture and a different national grouping. (A comparison could be made here with the Muslims of India who fought for an independent Pakistan under the banner of a separate national grouping by virtue of their unique Muslim identity.) The roots of the rebellions by the Moro and the Muslims of Patani are embedded in a long history of ethnic-religious isolation, of memories of self-rule or extended and bit­ ter struggles to maintain it. To a large extent, this is true for the Rohingya as well. Resistance to assimilation and a striving for autonomy or independence—which means separation from the environing non-Islamic society—are the profound aims of these Muslim minority societies. The connection to religion is the primary ele­ ment in their lives and in their consciousness. The position of all three governments is no less resolute or decisive, and there is a notable similarity in the official stance of all three. The majority population regards the territories settled by Muslims as integral to the national territory; under no circumstances will they agree to grant greater autonomy to their Muslim citi­ zens. The governments certainly will not agree to secession nor to any action that compromises the integrity of the countries as they are now constituted. Neither will they countenance a weakening of national sovereignty, a matter on which they are not prepared to negotiate, even at the cost of a protracted war. The views of the Muslim minorities are seen as a national threat. Under a great deal of pressure, the Philippines agreed to grant the Moro a measure of autonomy. Thailand avoided increased concession and halted its policy of forced assimilation. The Muslims of Arakan managed only to gain permission for their refugees, or at least some of them, to be repatriated. There is no indication that either the principles of religious belief among Muslims, or the prevailing stand by the governments of Burma/ Myanmar, Thailand, or the Philippines will change in the foreseeable future.5 This does not necessarily mean renewed outbreaks of violence. There may be extended periods of truce, quiet, or cease-fire. There may be terror attacks of var­ ying degrees of destruction depending on internal developments or influences from abroad, or the impact of external forces may have the opposite effect, pacifi­ cation. Apparently, the relation of governments and majority populations to Mus­

Summary

381

lim minorities will remain tense and colored by hostility. Core problems will con­ tinue as they have been—unresolved—despite the fact that in recent years there has been a sharp decline in the scope of violence. The partial autonomy that Mus­ lims were granted in the South Philippines, and the status quo or stalemate that has emerged in South Thailand and in the Arakan districts, are not true solutions be­ cause they do not penetrate to the roots of problematic relationships between Mus­ lim minorities and non-Muslim majority societies. Questions may be posed as well about the autonomy agreement signed in the Philippines with the MNLF which was ostensibly the solution to the long-standing crisis there. Has Nur Misuari been convinced that he cannot force a significant change in the government’s position by resorting to force, as became clear during the long years of fighting that were waged, and that therefore it is preferable to make do with the autonomy he was proffered? Or for that matter, was the autonomy agreement achieved because the Muslims suffered from attrition, exhausted by their heavy losses, destruction, flight of refugees, and because of a realization that their goals could not be gained, and therefore it was in their best interest to make do with the partial autonomy they were offered, more than which even interna­ tional aid was unable to secure for them? And perhaps even Nur Misuari, after so many years of fighting, now wants to enjoy the pleasures of governing? It is a fact that there are other rebel movements—the MILF and the Abu-Sayyaf organization—which did not accept the autonomy proposal and continued the struggle. As for President Ramos—did the autonomy he proposed to Misuari stem from an assumption that it was a temporary solution and that the reality of a Christian majority population in the south would occasion a gradual erosion of the limited Muslim autonomy which was agreed? Only the future can answer these questions. The problem of the Muslim minorities in the three countries dealt with in this study appears to be insoluble. There is no bridging the chasm between Muslim minorities that aspire to independence who are, in principle, unwilling to live under non-Islamic rule, and the majority governments that are unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty over these same areas. It is doubtful whether a change in the policy of the central government which would grant economic, social, and religio-cultural improvements will suffice, unless the Muslim populations can re­ gard these measures as a step toward autonomy that will ultimately lead to inde­ pendence or annexation to a neighboring Muslim state, if and when international circumstances permit. Information which has appeared in the past several years from the region indicates that there is no basic change in the situation of the three Muslim communities under discussion as compared to what is known about events that took place there twenty or more years ago. The problems are endemic while the solutions—as, for example, autonomy in the Philippines—managed to bring only partial and relative pacification. Perhaps the current situation should be re­ garded as a cease-fire until a change in circumstances occurs because solutions were not properly implemented, or because they are really not substantive solutions

382

Summary

to the problems of these regions. By their very nature, Muslim populations in Southeast Asia are unable to be absorbed into the majority culture because they will not adapt to non-Muslim rule. The central government, for its part, is unwill­ ing to forego any sovereignty. In the case of the Philippines, only a partial and limited autonomy was granted. Which is not to say that it is impossible to continue living with insoluble prob­ lems without unavoidable recourse to violence, particularly in a period of fatigue and weakness. The cease-fire can persist for many years, even when it is accom­ panied by limited guerilla activity which only serves to keep the problem on the agenda. What alternatives are available to the Muslim minorities? There are a few: 1. Acquiescence to being ruled by the majority, along with a certain measure of integration. This seems neither reasonable nor possible. From a religious and eth­ nic standpoint, Muslims are inherently unable to accept the degree of assimilation which the Philippines and Thailand would like. Myanmar is not at all interested in integration. 2. Continuation of the armed struggle for independence, or for a wide-ranging, broad autonomy to the extent that political or military circumstances will permit. The long years of fighting since the end of World War II have enfeebled and fa­ tigued all sides so that much time will have to pass until the armed struggle can be renewed. 3. Annexation of the Moro and of the Patani Muslims to Malaysia or to Indone­ sia, and of the Rohingya to Bangladesh. Such an option seems utterly unrealistic at present for reasons that have been noted in the previous pages. 4. Acceptance of the present situation, and an end to the struggle, in each of the countries. For now, it appears that the three separatist movements have opted for this alternative, each for its own reasons. What options exist for the governments? 1. Relinquishing sovereignty in those areas in which Muslims constitute a ma­ jority. This seems completely unlikely from the standpoint of each of the govern­ ments discussed. Not a single government will agree to limit its sovereignty in any part of the national territory. 2. Granting certain concessions to Muslims in the sphere of religio-cultural au­ tonomy, programs for economic welfare, etc. This appears to be the most that can be expected with varying degrees of concession which will have to be made by the Philippine and Thai governments. It is doubtful whether the Burmese government would be willing to initiate such a policy. What can be concluded then is that the present situation in all three countries will continue with various permutations, and local ups and downs. One cannot really expect a transformation unless there is a drastic and dramatic change of circumstances which is brought on by either internal or external factors in a way that cannot now be foretold.

Summary

383

Notes 1. Certain comparisons can also be made with Muslim minorities in other countries. See, for example, an attempted comparison between the Muslims of Patani and the Arab minor­ ity in Israel: Erik Cohen, “Citizenship, Nationality and Religion in Israel and Thailand,” Thai Society in Comparative Perspective, Studies in Contemporary Thailand, vol. 1, chap. 6, (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1991), 105-127. For a general review of ethnic separatism in Indonesia (Molucca. Aceh, and West Papua), the Philippines (Muslims of the south), Thai­ land (Muslims of the south), Myanmar (Karen, Shan, Kachin, and Muslims), see R. J. May, “Ethnic Separatism in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Viewpoint, vol. 31, no. 2 (October 1990): 28-59. 2. For a systematic and authoritative discussion of this issue, Raphael Israeli, “Muslim Minorities under Non-Islamic Rule,” Current History, vol. 78, no. 456 (April, 1980): 159-164, 184-185. W. K. Che Man also deals extensively with the religious aspects of Muslim rebellions being a part in the processes which the entire Muslim world has been undergoing since the end of World War II. See Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moms o f the Southern Philippines and the Malays o f Southern Thailand (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990), 12-17, 24,70-74, 113-114,136-137, 162,173-179. 3. For an analysis of the impact of involvement by external Muslim forces on the rebel­ lions in the Philippines and Thailand, see Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, “Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand,” Suhrke and Noble, eds., Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), 195, 208-210; R. J. May, “The Religious Factor in Three Minority Movements: The Moro of the Philippines, the Malays of Thailand and In­ donesia’s West Papuans,” Journal o f the Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2 (July 1991): 319. This article also appeared in Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 13, no. 4 (March 1992). 4. For an attempt to explain the relative success of the Moro, see Syed Serajul Islam, (The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines,” Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 5 (May 1998): 441-456. 5. On this issue, see Clive J. Christie, A Modem History o f Southeast Asia: Decoloniza­ tion, Nationalism and Separation, Tauris Academic Studies (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 162-163. See also Howard M. Federspiel, “Islam and Development in the Nations of ASEAN” Asian Survey, vol. 25, no. 8 (August 1985): 813. A Muslim view is given in Hussain Haqqani, “The Roots of Rebellion,” FEER, vol. 118, no. 45 (November 5,1982): 26-27.

Appendix A

The first census in Burma was conducted in August 1872. Subsequent censuses were conducted a decade apart. The last one, in 1941, was not completed because of the Japanese occupation of Burma. There has not been a complete, detailed census since Burma’s independence though partial censuses, limited to selected areas, have been taken. As a result, there have not been exact figures either on the overall population of Burma since 1931, nor the specific number of Muslims living there. The 1931 census gives the Muslim population as 584,839 out of a total population of 14,647,470; or 4 percent of the population. Of this figure, 396,504 were Indian Muslims. In addition; 186,861 were Burmese Muslims from various sects; 1,474 were Chinese Muslims; 41 percent of the Muslims in Burma lived in Arakan. The 1931 census discovered a growth in the number of Indian Muslims bom in Burma. This was primarily the outcome of the large number of immigrants who settled permanently in the Akyab district. An analysis of the seven full-scale censuses conducted in Burma between 1872 and 1931 shows a general growth in the country’s population with the numerical ratio of Muslims remaining more or less permanent at 4 percent. At the time of the Japanese invasion, although large numbers of Muslims fled to India (Muslims and Hindus), many returned when the war ended. At the same time, Chittagongs returned to northern Arakan so that essentially the ratio stayed as it had been in 1931. From time to time, Muslim organizations and private individuals published their own estimates regarding Muslim numerical strength in Burma. They claimed a million, even as high as 1.5 million people. The goal was to make a claim for proportional representation in the governing bodies of independent Burma commensurate with the numbers that were presented; however, the figures were never documented. The census found that Indian Muslims made up two-thirds of the total Muslim population of Burma. This ratio changed after the military coup of March 1962 with the large exodus of Indians (both Muslim and Hindu) from Burma. It is quite likely that today’s per­ centage of Muslims in the general population is smaller (4 percent) than it had been during the years of British rule (Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 115-122). It is conceivable that the number of Muslims in 1958 reached 600,000, but it is difficult to give a definitive number (“Burma” in E ll, 1960: 1333). According to a census published in 1983, Muslims in Burma numbered 3.9 per­ cent of a total population of 34 million. This is despite the fact that the same source 385

386

Appendix A

states that following the general nationalization of the economy in 1963, several hundred thousand Southeast Asians, including many Muslims, returned to their countries of origin, which should certainly have changed the demographic balance (“Myanmar” in Oxford Encyclopaedia o f the Modem Islamic World, 3: 214-215). No documentation is given for the claim (which appears to be highly tenden­ tious) that there were 1,460,000 Muslims living in Arakan in 1982 comprising 56 percent of the total 2.6 million inhabitants in the district. The same source states that, at the time, another 2.1 million Muslims lived elsewhere in Burma bringing the overall Muslim population to 3,560,000 or 10.7 percent of the total population (Kettani, Muslim Minorities in the World Today, 141-142). The number 3.9 percent Muslims in the total population of Burma/Myanmar, estimated in 1993 at 44.5 million, is also cited by (Becka 1995: 2, 103, 140). The article “Myanmar (Burma)” (in The Far East and Australasia 1996:653) notes that at the end of 1991 there were 3.6 percent Muslims out of a total of 41,550,000 people in Burma. In 1994, the population of Burma/Myanmar was estimated at 45 million o f which 1,620,233— or 3 percent—were Muslims (Matthews, “Religious Minorities in Myanmar: Hints of the Shadow,” 287). Muslim spokesmen claim that Muslims number 6 million or 13 percent of the total population (Matthews, “Religious Minorities in Myanmar: Hints of the Shadow,” 287,297, 303). On the Chinese-Muslim community in Burma, see Yegar, “The Muslims o f Burma Since Independence,” 73-85; Andrew D. W. Forbes, “The ‘Panthay* (Yunnanese Chinese) Muslims of Burma,” 384-394.

Appendix B

There is no exact number for the Muslim population of Arakan relative to Burma’s total population. According to the census of 1931, the Muslim population in the Maungdaw and Buthidaung regions numbered 130,524. Many of these were not properly speaking Arakan Rohingya Muslims, but Chittagongs who arrived with the annual immigration of cheap labor brought to Burma by landowners and mer­ chants. Many settled in Arakan. The events of World War II and its aftermath saw numerous changes in the makeup of Arakan’s population and there is no clear data on this score. Arakan Muslims claim a population of between 300,000 and 500.000 apparently cited by them for polemical purposes, but not based on either facts or a census since no census was taken. Western sources too sometimes cite similar high numbers whose origin is unclear (see Yegar, The Muslims o f Burma, 95). At the end of February 1949, the British Embassy in Rangoon estimated the number of all Muslims in Arakan at between 200,000 and 250,000, of which only 100.000 to 120,000 lived in the Maungdaw-Buthidaung region (DO 142/453 and FO 371/75660, Feb. 28, 1949). This was written with the intention of expressing a strange if not ludicrous worry of the British high commissioner in Pakistan to the effect that the rebellion in Arakan could bring a possible outflow of up to half a million Muslim refugees to Chittagong (DO 142/453, February 12, 1949). P. Murray in the review cited above places the estimate of Muslims in Arakan at 100.000 to 120,000 (FO 371/75660, Jan. 26, 1949). The Akyab reporter of The Scotsman in a communique of 18 May 1949 estimated the number of Muslims in Arakan at 130,000, stating that 80,000 of them were Pakistani citizens (DO 142/453, May 18, 1949); whereas in 1991 an estimate was published that put the number of Rohingya Arakan Muslims at one to two million! Along with a com­ ment that many of these Rohingya lived in exile, the reporter added that these numbers must be treated with caution (Smith, Burma, 30). A similar assessment claimed that today’s Rohingya constitute a third of the inhabitants of Arakan, or two million people; See Matthews 1995: 297. Tonia K. Devon (“Burma’s Muslim Minority: Out of the Shadows?,” 27) cites Muslim leaders in Arakan who claim that the Muslims constitute approximately 650,000 out of 1.4 million total Muslim population of Arakan. Similar numbers are accepted by others as well. Their claim is that the estimated 387

388

Appendix B

numbers in Arakan are 1.7 million inhabitants of which 600,000 are Muslims (Anand, “Bangladesh: Refugees from Burma,” 1100-1101). Occasionally esti­ mates are published with totally unsubstantiated numbers. See, for example, Asian Recorder, vol. 38, no. 36 (September 2-8, 1992): 22556 which determined that there are 3 million Muslims living in Arakan! There is another unfounded exag­ geration in Ahsan (“Burma’s Iron Hands towards Ethnic Minorities: The Rohingya Plight,” 311), according to which there are approximately 2 million Rohingya of which approximately half—or 1 million—live in exile and the rest in Arakan.

Appendix C

On 16 March 1948 a separatist organization of Malay Muslims in southern Thai­ land put the overall number of inhabitants in the four southern provinces, Patani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun [also known as Satul] at 607,500 people, of which 486,000 were Malay (BWJ/SOAS, MS 145982: Information Bureau, Gabongan Malayu Pattani Raya - Association of Greater Pattani Malays, 16 March, 1948. “Some Facts about Malays in South Siam”: 1). A British assessment of the period approximated the number of Malays in all Siam at only 400,000, most of them in the southern provinces (FO 371/69999, 14 October 1948). On 27 October 1949 The Straits Budget, a Singapore newspaper, gave the num­ ber of Muslims in the four southern provinces at 380,000 (FO 371/76292: “Siam Muslims Plotting Revolt”). Over time, estimates rose to as much as a half million Malay Muslims said to comprise 85 percent of the total population in the southern provinces (Thompson and Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia, 158). The 1960 census places the number of Muslims at 1,025,567 or 3.9 percent of the total population. Of these, 800,000 were Malays concentrated in the southern provinces comprising a majority of 70 percent of the area’s population (U.S. Army Handbook fo r Thailand: 5, 57, 213; Harris et al., Area Handbook fo r Thailand.). Similar figures were also registered in the 1970 census. An additional source, relating to the 1960 census, places the number of Muslims at only 1.5 million which, twenty years later, reached a number of 3 million Muslims. This source notes that the Muslims of Thailand believe this number to be greatly underesti­ mated, that the true number is 6 to 7 million. Some 70 percent live in the four southern provinces where they make up the following percentages of the total populations: Patani - 95 percent; Yala - 87 percent; Narathiwat - 80 percent; Satun - 75 percent (Suthasasna, “Occupational Distribution of Muslims in Thai­ land: Problems and Prospects,” 234). An outstanding scholar of Thailand’s Muslims, basing herself on the same 1960 census, states that the Muslims of the south make up approximately 3 percent of Thailand’s population or 700,000. In the four southern provinces, they account for 70 or 80 percent of the local populations (Suhrke, “Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand,” 237; 1975:192). 389

390

Appendix C

A somewhat similar estimate also places the Muslims of southern Thailand at 70 percent (see TUgby and Tligby, “Inter-cultural Mediation in South Thailand,” 276, 279). Muslim sources give much higher estimates. One of these puts the number of Muslims in the south in 1969 at 900,000 or 80 percent of the total population in the region (The Islamic Review o f Arab Affairs 1969: 16). The Malayan Times, 19 May 1965 raised the number of Muslims in Thailand to 3 million, most living in the southern provinces. A similar estimate, published several years later in an official Thai government publication, also placed the number of Muslims in the country at 3 million (Bangkok Public Relations Depart­ ment 1972: 69). The New York Times estimated the number of Muslims at 1.5 million, stating that they constituted 4 percent of the total population of the state which numbered 40 million, and almost 90 percent of three southern provinces, not including Satun (Andelman, “Thai Moslems—Oppressed Minority Strive to Find Way in Secular World,” 1 July 1975). In a 1973 census, the number of Muslims in the four southern provinces was listed as 828,150 or 75 percent of the region’s overall population of 1,103,819. In Thailand as a whole, Muslims numbered 4 percent of the population (Noer, “Con­ temporary Political Dimensions of Islam,” 211; Haemindra, “The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand,” 197-198). A government publication of 1975 states that the overall population of Thailand is 42 million, and that the Muslims number 1,600,000 or 3.8 percent. Half of them live in the four southern provinces where they make up 75 percent of the popula­ tion (Bangkok Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1976: 1). The 1980 census also puts the Muslim population at 3.8 percent (Keyes 1987: 14). In a census carried out by the Thai Ministry of the Interior on 31 December 1979, 977,281 Malay Muslims were registered in southern Thailand, constituting 2.84 percent of the country’s 45 million. In the four southern provinces, they con­ stituted 74.7 percent; the balance of the population in these districts being Thai Buddhists or Chinese Buddhists. The breakdown of the Muslim population by district was 77.75 percent in Patani; 60 percent in Yala; 80 percent in Narathiwat; and 70 percent in Satun (Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 16-17). A minimalist approach is found in Nagel's Encyclopedia-Guide: Thailand (1982: 39,94). According to this estimate, the Muslims number 700,000 of which Malays account for more than 500,000. In an article by Astri Suhrke, she reiterates her estimate that the Muslims of the south number 1 million inhabitants in four southern districts amounting to less than 3 percent of Thailand’s total population. The article gives a comparative table for the years 1960, 1970, and 1977 based on official census results; however, details are given only for Yala, Narathiwat, and Patani, while the province of Satun is not dealt with. Suhrke believes the official censuses to be generally reliable and

Appendix C

391

accepts them as the basis for estimates of the numbers of Muslims in south Thai­ land. This is despite the fact that the Muslim rebel organizations claimed much higher numbers. In her view, exhaustive data on the population of Muslim districts may not be possible because security conditions there do not permit easy admin­ istrative access (Wirsing, Protection o f Ethnic Minorities. Comparative Perspec­ tive, 318, 320). Not all scholars who deal with the Malay-Muslim community in South Thailand are concerned about exact population numbers of that community. Some research­ ers found it sufficient to make the general statement that there are 1 million Mus­ lims who comprise 3 percent of the total population of the country without spec­ ifying that Muslims live in certain areas in Thailand (M. Ladd Thomas, “Bureau­ cratic Attitudes and Behavior,” 545; “Thai Muslim Separatism,” 19; Political Vi­ olence, 18; and “The Thai Muslims,” 156). In one of his papers, W. K. Che Man (“The Malay-Muslims of Southern Thai­ land,” 98) makes a general statement that Malay Muslims account for 4 percent (i.e., about 1.8 million) of the total population of Thailand which he gives at 45 million. In two of his later publications, he cites statistical data for 1982 and 1985 claiming that the overall population in the provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, Satun, and Patani is 1,408,087. Of these, 71 percent are Muslims, with the following subtotals: in Patani, 77 percent Muslims; in Narathiwat, 78 percent; in Yala, 63 percent; and in Satun, 66 percent (Che Man, (The Thai Government and Islamic Institutions,” 36; “Problems of Minority Populations,” 66). In one publication, Raymond Scupin (“Islamic Reformism in Thailand.” 9) states that in 1976 the population of Thailand numbered 42 million, and that, at the time, Muslims constituted 3.8 percent of the total population. However, in another article he published that same year (“The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand,” 1223), he puts the Muslim population at 8-10 percent of the total. And in still another article in 1981 (“The Socio-Economic Status of Muslims in Central and North Thailand,” 162), he states that 85-90 percent of the inhabitants of the southern provinces are Muslim, and that this aggregate composes 6-8 per­ cent of the total population of 42 million people. In his contribution to Weekes’ work, Scupin (“Thais,” 783-784) writes that there are 2 million Muslims in Thailand, and that they make up 4 percent of the total population. Of these, the Malay Muslims who live in the south number 1.8 million. Elsewhere in the same work, the data for the total population of Thailand in 1983 is given as 50.8 million, of which 2,037,000 are Muslims representing 4 percent of the total. Of these, 1,824,000 or 3.59 percent are Malays; 203,000 or 0.4 percent are Thais; 6,000 or 0.01 percent are Chinese; and an additional 4,000 are South Asians (ibid., 907). Another source claims that in 1980, Thailand’s population numbered 40,961,331 and of these the inhabitants of the south were 1,338,169: Patani, 457,760; Narathiwat, 441,803; Satun, 164,740; Yala, 273,866. There is no specific mention of Muslims (Matheson and Hooker, “Jawi Literature in Patani,” 68).

392

Appendix C

Yet another authority writes that the 1980 population estimate for Muslims in Thailand is 1.75 million, and that they constitute 4 percent of the total population (Forbes, “Legacy of Resentment,” 21). In Scupin’s article, “Thailand,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia o f the Modem Is­ lamic World ( 1955:212), he writes that there are approximately 4 million Muslims in Thailand out of a total population of 54 million, and 3 million of these live in the southern districts. The journalist, Paul Handley (“Deep Grievances,” 22) reports that the number of Muslims in Thailand is some 2 million or more, and that 75 percent live in the southern districts. Omar Farouk (“The Muslims of Thailand,” 98) is aware of the fact that estimates of the Muslim population in Thailand vary from source to source. He bases this assertion on official Thai sources that put the Muslims at 3.9 percent of the total population. The various numbers are: 1947 - 670,404; 1960 - 1,025,569; 1970 — 1,325,587. But, he notes, that there are some who dispute the numbers. For exam­ ple, the Central Committee for Islamic Affairs (CCIA) of Thailand claims that in 1977 Muslims constituted 10 percent of the total population, putting their number at 4.5 million. In Farouk’s opinion, one may assume that both the data originating in official sources as well as that which originates in Muslim sources is tenden­ tious and should be regarded with caution. Further in the article, Farouk cites additional figures, In 1975 there were 1,606,500 Muslims in Thailand; of these, 803,250 were concentrated in the four southern provinces, a rise in numbers com­ pared to the 710,906 Muslims reported in these areas in 1970, out of a total pop­ ulation of 972,968. This represents 73.1 percent according to the following break­ down: Satun - 69.3 percent; Patani - 77.3 percent; Yala - 60.2 percent; Narathiwat - 77.9 percent (ibid., pp 100, 107). In another place Farouk (“Malaysia’s Islamic Awakening,” 161) writes that the Muslims of Thailand number 5-8 percent of the total population, and then adds a cautionary note that it depends on which set of figures the reader chooses to believe. Andrew Forbes (“Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1056, 1064) states that the numbers of Muslims in Thailand is estimated at 1,750,000 or 4 percent of the population. He cites estimates from various sources to conclude that 4 percent is the most reasonable figure. In the same article, he changes the estimate somewhat, stating that the Malay Muslims in the South number 1.4 million or 3-5 percent of the total population. The Malays in the southern provinces average 75 percent of the population there according to the following breakdown: Satun - 83 percent; Patani and Narathiwat - 78 percent each; Yala - 61 percent (ibid). A 1986 study makes a similar estimate, 1,364,000 Muslims or 3.8 percent of the total Thai population. About half of the Muslims are concentrated in the south­ ern districts where they constitute 75 percent of the general population (Uthai, “Muslim-Malay Separation in Southern Thailand.” 217). A team of Thai scholars states that the number of Muslims in the south is 1,153,707 and that they make up from 70-80 percent of the residents of the area

Appendix C

393

(Chaveewan et al. The Traditions Influencing Social Integration, 1,10,13,15-16, 19-20). Another Thai researcher notes that in 1978 the number of Muslims in Thailand was 1,606,500. Most, approximately 75 percent, are Malays who live in the four southern provinces (“The Role of Women,” 114—115). Jha (“The Muslim Separatist Movement,” 185) estimates that there are 2 million Muslims in Thailand, four-fifths of them Malays living in the four southern prov­ inces where they number 909,500 or 75 percent of the 1,212,673 total population of the area. In “Conflict in International Border Regions” Rumley (1993: 9, 12) writes that in 1962 the Malay Muslim population in South Thailand was estimated at 750,000 and that in 1990 it was estimated at 1.5 million. The same source put the total number of Muslims in Thailand at 2 million. The Encyclopedia o f Islam estimated the number of inhabitants in the four southern provinces at 1.5 million, of which 80 percent were Malay Muslims (“Patani,” £/2, 1993: 285). A different estimate puts the total population of Thailand in 1994 at 53 million of which 3.8 million or 7.2 percent are Muslims living in the four southern prov­ inces (Preeda, “Muslim Community Development,” 135). An altogether different estimate based on unknown sources, perhaps tenden­ tious, claims that in 1982 the population of Thailand was 50,020,000 of which 6 million or 12 percent of the total population were Muslims. Four million of these lived in the southern districts and were Malay Muslims (Kettani, Muslim Minori­ ties in the World Today; 134, 138-139). The latest estimates place the number of Malay Muslims in the southern prov­ inces between 700,000 to 1 million. This group amounts to 80 percent of the Muslim population of Thailand (The Far East and Australasia 1996: 1001; Chris­ tie, A Modem History o f Southeast Asia, 173; Imtiyaz, “Aspects of Islam in Thai­ land Today,” 19). Clearly the conclusion to be drawn from this wealth of data is that one cannot determine either the exact number of Muslims in Thailand, or the specific number of Muslims in the southern provinces. There is no recourse other than accepting the conventional estimates of the majority of researchers who are not tainted by special interests.

Appendix D

Generally, it can be said that jihad is a commandment which obligates the entire community of Muslims—the Ulama, and calls for a military campaign aimed at the expansion of Islam, or the protection of Islam, against aggression by non­ believers. When a Muslim country is attacked by nonbelievers, the Imam may call on all Muslims to take up arms. A Muslim who falls in battle in the Path of God (sabil il-Allah) is a martyr (shahid) and is thereby assured entrance into Paradise. The religious obligation to free the world from an unjust ruler undoubtedly con­ tributed to the practice of murder as it was initially adopted by the Shiite Ismailis (assassins) and later also by Sunni communities. They carried out their duty through the self-sacrifice of the assassins who were almost invariably caught, and actually did not attempt to flee. This phenomenon also exists at present among a number of the radical Arab Muslim terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad. The notion of martyrdom holds a central place in Islamic history, and the Arabic word for martyr is shahid. Modern-day applica­ tions are drawn from early Islamic sources regarding self-sacrifice. A thorough and comprehensive discussion of martyrdom and suicide in the history of Islam, and the link between them and jihad holy wars, may be found in Kohlberg, “Me­ dieval Muslim Views on Martyrdom,” 281-307; Rosenthal Muslim Intellectual and Social History, 1246-1248, 339-259. In recent years, the training of self-sacrificing terrorists has taken place in such countries as Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iran, and Sudan. The trainees are young Mus­ lims from a number of countries, some Moro among them. Islamic literature re­ flects the belief that the process of Islamic expansion will persist until the entire world accepts the Islamic faith, or surrenders to Muslim control. Meanwhile, the world is divided into two: Dar al-lslam in which there are Muslim regimes and in which Islamic law applies, and Dar al-Harb which is temporarily under the rule of infidels. This situation began to change in the tenth century when countries under Muslim rule fell into Christian hands, and it became particularly acute in the 19th century with the expansion of European colonial rule in most Islamic countries. For the Islamic rationale about murder through self-sacrifice, which is not sui­ cide as such but is aimed at inflicting maximal losses on the enemy, see Israeli, “Islamikaze and Their Significance,” 97-99, 107-115. The author finds similar­ 395

396

Appendix D

ities between the fundamentalist Muslim terror organizations noted above and the Japanese kamikaze of World War II as regards motivation, organization, ideology, and the operational mode of their goals, and therefore suggests calling them Islamikaze.

Appendix E

At the beginning of the war with Spain, the American government was not aware of the existance of Muslims in the southern Philippines. When the fact was brought to the attention of the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Oscar S. Strauss, he was anxious to prevent a Muslim holy war against the Amer­ icans. Strauss requested a meeting with the Ottoman sultan, Abd al-Hamid, at which he asked that in his capacity as a caliph of Islam, the Sultan use his good offices with the Muslims of the Philippines. As it turned out, the sultan himself was unaware that there were Muslims in the Philippines and attempted to find out whether they made pilgrimages to Mecca. A telegram sent to Mecca elicited the information that, indeed, they did make such piligrimages. Ambassador Strauss then produced copies of documents showing that the United States had signed agreements with Muslim dignitaries in 1796 with the Bey of Tripoli, in 1806 with the Berbers in North Africa, and a number of treaties with the Ottoman Empire itself beginning in 1895. In all these documents it was stated that the United States was not hostile to the laws, religion, or welfare of the Muslims, and that it had never fought against nor acted in a hostile way against any Muslim state. As a caliph, the sultan then sent a communique to the sultan of Sulu forbidding him to engage in any hostile activity against the Americans since under U.S. rule there would certainly not be any interference in the religion of the Muslims. It is possible that this is one of the reasons that the Moro rejected Aguinaldo *s appeal to them. This communique apparently did not get to Mindanao, and certainly not to the Maranao. In any case, American President William McKinley sent Ambassador Strauss a letter commending him on his diplomatic efforts which forestalled a holy war (see Finley, “The Mohammedan Problem in the Philippines,” 357-361).

397

Chronology 1457 The Kingdom of Patani converts to Islam. 1521 Magellan comes to Cebu. 1565 Miguel Lopez de Legaspi arrives in the Philippines and declares Spain sovereign over the islands. 1571 May : The Spaniards route Raja Suleiman of Manila; his sultanate ceases to exist. 1785 The Kingdom of Burma annexes Arakan. 1826 Anglo-Siamese Treaty. The British government recognizes Patani as part of Siam. 1878 July 2: Spanish-Sulu Treaty is signed. The Sultanate of Sulu becomes a Spanish protectorate. 1885 British conquest of Burma is complete. 1898 December 10: Spain is defeated by the United States; Spanish rule comes to an end in the Philippines. 1899 August: Bates Agreement is made with the sultan of Sulu. 1902 May: Battle of Bayan against the Maranao in Mindanao December 20: Thai Kingdom annexes Patani.

399

400

Chronology

1903 June 1: The Moro Province is established in the south Philippines. (The arrange­ ment remains in force until 1 September 1913.) October: Hassan uprising in Sulu. 1904 March 2: The Bates Agreement with the sultan of Sulu is unilaterally set aside by the US. administration. April: Battle of Taraca in Lanao. 1905 January: Dato Usap rebellion in Sulu. 1906 March 7: Battle of Bud Dajo in Sulu. 1909 March 10: Anglo-Siamese Treaty. Patani is recognized as part of Siam. November: Brigadier General John J. Pershing appointed military-governor of the Moro Province. 1913 June 11-12: Battle of Bud Bagsak in Jolo. August 10: Battle of Talipao Hill. October 22: Second Battle of Talipao Hill. December 15: Moro Province is renamed Department of Mindanao and Sulu. 1915 March 15: The Sultanate of Sulu is abolished by the Carpenter-Jamal al-Kiram II Agreement. 1920 February 5: The Department, of Mindanao and Sulu is terminated. 1921 June 9: Fifty-seven leaders in Sulu sign a petition stating that they want the Ar­ chipelago to remain an American territory. The Primary Education Act is imposed in Patani. 1922-23 Uprisings in Patani (South Siam). Uprisings in Sulu and Mindanao (the Philippines). 1924 Another petition is sent by Muslim leaders in the southern Philippines to the U.S. Congress asking that Mindanao and Sulu be declared U.S. territory.

Chronology

401

1932

June 24: A coup in Bangkok puts an end to the absolute monarchy in Thailand. Administrative reforms are introduced in Patani. The sultan of Patani, TUnku Abdul Kader, escapes to Malaya.

1934 May: The U.S. Congress passes the lydings-McDuffie Bill which calls for the establishment of an autonomous commonwealth in the Philippines.

1935 November 14: The Commonwealth of the Philippines is established. Manuel Quezon is elected president.

1936 March: A compulsory National Education Program is announced in Thailand.

1938 July 26: Anti-Muslim riots break out in Burma. December: Field Marshal Pibul Songkhram becomes prime minister of Thailand (Siam).

1939 TUnku Mayhiddin leaves Thailand for Kelantan to coordinate the activities of a Patani liberation movement. June: The National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) is established in the Philippines to encourage Christian settlement in the south.

1941 December: The Japanese invade the Philippines and continue their conquest of Southeast Asia. Pibul concludes a Thai-Japanese military alliance.

1942 Buddhist-Muslim riots break out in Arakan.

1943 June 1: The British Colonial Office promises that the areas of Patani and Satun will be annexed to Malaya after the war.

1944 January 12: Muslim Patani leaders protest the cultural decrees imposed by the governor of Patani. July: Pibul’s regime in Thailand falls.

1945 January: The British reconquer Arakan. May 3: The Patronage of Islam Act is passed in Thailand. November 1: A petition is sent by seven Patani Muslim leaders to British head­

Chronology

402

quarters in Kuala Lumpur asking that the southern provinces be annexed to Malaya.

1946 June: Hajji Sulong establishes the Patani Peoples Movement (PPM). July: The North Arakan Muslim League is founded. July 4: The United States grants the Philippines independence. Manuel A. Roxas is elected president. September 9: Riots break out in Narathiwat district in southern Thailand. November 19: The codification of Islamic law in Thailand is completed.

1947 August: The Thai government dispatches a Commission of Inquiry to the south. August 24: Hajji Sulong presents a seven-point petition to the Thai Commission of Inquiry. The National Liberation Front of Patani (BNPP) is founded.

1948 January 4: Burma achieves independence. January 16: Hajji Sulong is arrested. Riots in Patani intensify. February 16: The Association of the Malays of Greater Patani (GAMPAR) is es­ tablished. February 24: Hajji Sulong is sentenced to seven years imprisonment. March 5: Ibnku Mayhiddin declares that the goal of GAMPAR is secession from Thailand and union with the Malay Federation. April 9: Coup in Bangkok. Field Marshal Pibul Songkhram returns to power. Mus­ lim rebellion spreads. April 26: Violent clashes occur in Dusun Nyior, Narathiwat. April: The mujahideen rebellion in Arakan begins. September: A state of emergency is declared in the four Muslim districts of south­ ern Thailand. December: The mujahideen control most of northern Arakan. England and Thailand sign the Border Agreement on the Suppression of Communism. The Malay Communist Party (MCP) begins its revolt.

1949 January: A meeting takes place in Songkhla, South Thailand, attended by army officers, police, and Thai and British civilian officials (from Malaya). May : The government of Burma appoints a Peace Committee for North Arakan. August: Another agreement concerning police cooperation is signed between Thailand and Malaya.

1954 August 13: Hajji Sulong and three of his associates disappear.

Chronology

403

The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) is estab­ lished in the Philippines to foster immigration of Christian settlers to the Muslim South. November: “Operation Monsoon” begins in Arakan.

1955 September 24: Hajji Kamlun surrenders in Sulu.

1957 August: Malaya becomes independent. September 16: Pibul is deposed by a coup and replaced by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. The Philippine Congress passes the Commission of National Integration (CNI) law. (The CNI is subsequently disbanded in April 1975.)

1961 May 1: The Mayu Frontier Administration in Arakan is established. July 4: TWo hundred and ninety mujahideen in Arakan surrender. November 15: Several hundred more mujahideen surrender in Arakan. A program of “educational improvement” aimed at transforming the pondoks in southern Thailand into private schools for Islamic education is put into effect. Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) is founded in the Patani area.

1962 March: Military coup in Burma

1963 July 3: The Mindanao Development Authority (MDA) is set up (replaced by the Southern Philippines Development Administration—SPDA in 1975). August: NARRA (in the Philippines) is replaced by the Land Authority. Malaysia is established. The “confrontation” between Indonesia and Malaysia erupts.

1964 January: The government of Thailand decides that all registered pondoks will cease teaching the Malay language.

1965 March 13: An agreement is signed to set up a Thai-Malaysian Border Committee. September: The fall of Ahmad Sukarno, president of Indonesia.

1967 January: The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) is founded. August 8: ASEAN is established.

1968 March 18: The “Jabidah massacre” in the Philippines.

404

Chronology

May 1: The Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) is established in the Philip­ pines. September: The first Islamic Summit Meeting is held in Rabat. 1969 May: Dato Muhamad Asri Hajji Muda, the leader of PMIP, calls for the establish­ ment of a Malay nation to include Patani. Ninety young Muslims set out from the Philippines for training in Malaysia. Nur Misuari is one of the trainees. 1970 March: ICFM/OIC Conference in Jeddah. Violence intensifies in the southern Philippines. September: OIC Conference in Karachi. BMLO is formed in the southern Philippines. 1971 June: Manili incident in North Cotabato. The MNLF is founded. Libya begins providing aid. July: Muammar Qadhafi sends a communication to President Marcos expressing deep concern because of the situation in the southern Philippines. September: President Ferdinand Marcos closes the Land Authority and in its place establishes the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). October: Further deterioration of events in the southern Philippines results in a condemnation of the Philippine government by Libya, Kuwait, Malaysia, and the OIC. 1972 January: President Ferdinand Marcos invites ambassadors of Arab and Islamic countries to tour the southern districts. March: Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Jeddah. May: Acts of hostility proliferate in the southern Philippines. June: President Marcos directs his intelligence services to investigate accusations that arms, ammunition, and money are being provided by Libya to Muslim rebels. July: At the invitation of the Philippine government, a second delegation from Libya and Egypt visit the south. September: The rector of al-Azhar University in Cairo issues a condemnation of the “genocide” in the Philippines. September 21: President Ferdinand Marcos declares martial law throughout the Philippines. October 21: Several hundred Maranao attack Marawi City in Mindanao. The Mus­ lim rebellion encompasses all of the southern Philippines.

Chronology

405

1973 March 24-26: Fourth Conference of ICFM is held in Benghazi. April: President Marcos establishes a coordinating body—Reconstruction and De­ velopment Program for Mindanao (RDM). May: Libya sends a fact-finding mission to Thailand. July: A delegation of the Muslim World League visits the Philippines. October: Presidential order recognizing Muslim holidays is announced in the Phil­ ippines. November: Massive military operations are launched against MNLF in Sulu.

1974 February 7: MNLF-army battle over the city of Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago. February 18-21: The Second Islamic Summit meeting is held in Lahore, Pakistan. April 28: Official manifesto of the MNLF is published. June 19-25: Fifth Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers (ICFM) is held in Kuala Lumpur.

1975 January 15-16: MNLF attacks in Jolo and Marawi City. February 11: President Marcos proposes a cease-fire with the MNLF and resump­ tion of negotiations. July 12-15: The Sixth Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers is convened in Jeddah. December: The Sabilillah band is founded in Thailand. December 11: Mass demonstration at the central mosque of Patani as a result of the murder of five Muslims in Narathiwat on November 29.

1976 May 12-15: Seventh Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers meets in Istanbul. June 7: Malaysia withdraws its troops from the Betong salient at the demand of Thailand. October: Coup in Bangkok. December 23: Tripoli Agreement is signed between the Philippines and Libya.

1977 January: Joint military operation by Thai and Malaysian troops is carried out against Communist guerillas. February: Code of Muslim Personal Laws is issued in the Philippines. March 4: New Malaysian-Thai Border Agreement is signed. March 26: President Marcos declares the autonomy of thirteen southern districts of the Philippines. April 17: Referendum is held in the southern districts of the Philippines. May 16-22: Eighth Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers is convened in Trip­ oli. June 4: The Sabilillah are responsible for an explosion in Bangkok airport.

406

Chronology

September-October: Acts of MNLF terror and military reprisals take place in Basilan, Sulu, and Mindanao.

1978 February 11: Start of Operation Naga Min in Arakan; mass flight of Rohingya refugees across the border. February IS: Philippine Pilgrimage Authority is set up (and begins operations in 1979). February: Hashim Salamat splits from MNLF and establishes MILE April 24-28: Ninth Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers (ICFM) meets in Dakar, Senegal. June 7: Abul Khayr Alonto, a vice-chairman of the MNLF, surrenders to the Philippine government. July 9: Bangladesh and Burma agree to repatriate 200,000 refugees. July 26-28: Islamic Council of Europe is held in London. September 22: Explosion in Yala during the visit of the king of Thailand

1979 June: Tenth Conference of the Muslim Foreign Ministers meets in Fez, Morocco. November 15: Iranian minister of Oil announces that he is suspending oil exports to the Philippines. December 5: Following disturbances and demonstrations by Iranian and Philippine Muslim students in Manila, the Ministry of Education announces that it is limiting the number of foreign students. No Iranians were accepted for the 1980-1981 academic year; thirty Iranian students are deported.

1980 January: Thai government orders units of the Malaysian police to leave Thai ter­ ritory. February 8: Bomb explosion in the train station of Hat Yai in South Thailand. April: International Conference on Muslim Minorities is held in London. May 17-21: Eleventh Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers is held in Islamabad. November 17: Saudi Arabia revokes its contract to supply oil to the Philippines. (The decision is reversed in 1981.)

1981 January: Third Conference of Islamic Heads of State is held in Mecca. February 12: Severe incident between units of MNLF and the army occurs on the Island of Pata, Sulu Archipelago. May 13: Filipino Senator Benigno Aquino meets in Jeddah with Muslim rebel leaders. May 28: A separate ministry is established in the Philippines to deal with the haj to Mecca, shari’a courts, and other Islamic matters. June 1-6: T\velfth Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers is held in Baghdad.

Chronology

407

1982 March 16: Thailand agrees to establish diplomatic relations with Libya. August: Conference of ICFM is convened in Niger. October 15: Burma Citizenship Law is passed. Libyan proposal to set up an Islamic Cultural Center in Thailand is turned down by the Thai government.

1983 June 23: Former Senator Benigno Aquino testifies before the subcommittee for Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington, D.C. that MNLF commanders are training in Libya, Syria, and Iran, and that Iran is bankrolling purchases of arms and ammunition acquired by the PLO. June-July: Anti-Muslim riots in Burma/Myanmar. August 21: Benigno Aquino is murdered in Manila airport. December 6: Fourteenth Conference of the ICFM is held in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

1984 August 31: Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Force is established in Myanmar. December 18-22: Fifteenth Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers is convened in San’a, North Yemen.

1986 February 15: Military revolt in Manila. Marcos is forced to leave the Philippines. Mrs. Corazon Aquino is elected president. August: Agapito Aquino and Nur Misuari meet in Saudi Arabia. September 3: Nur Misuari participates in a Bangsa Moro Conference in Sulu. September 5: Corazon Aquino meets Misuari in Jolo.

1987 January 3: An agreement is reached in Jeddah between Nur Misuari and represen­ tatives of the Philippine government on future talks. February 20: Delegations resume their talks in Zamboanga City, Mindanao. March 10: Third round of talks comes to a stalemate.

1988 January: Some 500 Muslim rebels surrender in southern Thailand. March: Seventeenth Annual Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers is held in Amman, Jordan. June 15: Thai government begins implementing a development plan for the south­ ern provinces.

1989 January 4: Saudi consulate official is murdered in Bangkok. March: Eighteenth Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers is held in Riyadh.

408

Chronology

August: President Aquino signs a bill for the establishment of an autonomous region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). November 19: A referendum on ARMM is held in thirteen districts and nine cities of the southern Philippines. December: CPM ceases its operations on the borders of southern Thailand and Malaysia. The “Abu-Sayyaf” organization is established.

1990 February 1: Three Saudi consular officials are assassinated in Bangkok. February: Elections for the governor and vice-governor of ARMM and for the Regional Legislative Assembly are held. May 9-11: Thousands of Muslims gather in Yala to protest the murder of a woman and her daughter by a soldier. June 2-3: A number of violent incidents break out at the mosque in Patani.

1991 April: New wave of Rohingya refugees begin crossing from Arakan to Bangladesh. May and June: Demonstrations are staged in South Thailand led by a Shiite Iranian activist. October: United Front for Patani Independence (Bersatu) is founded.

1992 April: Preparatory talks take place in Jakarta to pave the way for formal negotia­ tions between Filipino representatives and Nur Misuari. April 28: Foreign ministers of Bangladesh and Burma/Myanmar sign an agree­ ment on repatriation of refugees. October: A representative of President Fidel Ramos and Nur Misuari meet in Tripoli.

1993 May: Filipino army attacks “Abu-Sayyaf” camp in reprisal for terrorist attacks. July: An agreement is concluded between Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia to promote the concept of the “growth triangle.” August: Members of PULO torch 34 schools in Southern Thailand and ambush a train. A unit of the Thai army is attacked in Yala. October: First round of formal negotiations between the Philippine government and the MNLF is held in Jakarta.

1994 April: Second round of talks is held in Jakarta between Nur Misuari and the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia. (A subsequent round is convened there in September.) June 3: The Philippine army begins an assault on “Abu-Sayyaf” bands in Sulu.

Chronology

409

December: T\venty-second Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers is held in Casablanca, Morocco. Clashes between the MILF and the Filipino army and police units begin.

1995 January: Talks resume in Mindanao between Nur Misuari and representatives of the government of the Philippines. Heavy fighting ensues between the army and “Abu-Sayyaf” units. January 12-16: The pope visits the Philippines. April 4: “Abu-Sayyaf” raid on the city of Ipil in Mindanao. August 7: PULO sends a letter to the Thai government calling for cease-fire talks.

19% June: An agreement is reached between MNLF and the government of the Philip­ pines according to which Nur Misuari becomes governor of ARMM. MILF rejects the agreement. August: Muslim protests break out against Thai government regulations concern­ ing student dress. The regulations are canceled in October. September 2: A peace treaty is signed between MNLF and the government of the Philippines.

1998 January 14: Malaysian police arrest four PULO leaders and turn them over to Thai authorities. January 27: The Philippine army and MILF sign an agreement for a provisional cease-fire. February: The prime ministers of Thailand and Malaysia agree to cooperate in the war against the separatists. June 16: Clashes break out again between MILF and Filipino government forces. Filipino army units capture the Raja-Muda camp of the MILF in Mindanao. December: Abubakar Abdulrazak Janjalani, founder of the “Abu-Sayyaf” organi­ zation is killed.

Glossary A - Arabic; S - Spanish; B - Burmese; T - Thai; M - Malay; Tg - Tagalog

abu-Sayyaf (A) - The Swordbearer adat (A) - Customary laws, localized traditional law and custom agama (M) - Religion amanah (A) - Deposit, thing entrusted to bangsa (M) - Nation bangsa Moro (M) - The Moro nation bilal (A) - Crier to prayer cedula (S) - Head tax, document, warrant, to licence chulamjamontri (T) - State Councillor for Islamic Affairs in Thailand. The spir­ itual leader of the Muslims in Thailand appointed by the king at the recom­ mendation of the government. Adviser to the king and the government on all matters concerning the Muslim community in Thailand and its religious ac­ tivity. cota, cotta (Tg) - A fort or its walls dakwah (A) - Fear of God, religious revival, mission activity. Refers to radical Muslim groups. See: tabligh daral-Harb, darul Harb (A) - Non-Muslim (infidel) countries, the country of the enemy. Literally, seat of war dar al-Islam, darul Islam (A) - The land of Islam, territory of Islam, Islamic countries darul Ifta (A) - An institution in Riyadh for the publication of religious legal opinions dato, datu, datuk (M) - traditional leader, chief dato Yutitham (T) - See: kathi fatwa (A) - Religious ruling, decision of sacred law haj (A) - The pilgrimage to Mecca hajji (A) - Pilgrim, a Muslim who has performed the pilgrimage duty, a title of great prestige hana.fi (A) - One of the four Sunni Islamic schools of religious law hijab (A) - Veil hijmh (A) - The beginning of the Islamic era - a . d 622, literally, immigration hikayat (A) - Narrative, story, tale 411

412

Glossary

iqal (A) - Headband (to hold the kufiyah) imam (A) - Muslim religious leader, prayer leader in a mosque indio (S) - An Indian native to North America; in the Philippines, a term for a native who has converted to Christianity jawi (M) - The script for writing Malay or Indonesian using Arabic letters; Indo­ nesians or Malays who reside in Mecca jihad (A) - Holy war or struggle against non-Muslim enemies juramentado (S) - A Muslim who takes an oath to kill non-Muslims as a suicidal act. This term is used in the Philippines. The Muslims of the south referred to it as parang sabil. Administer an oath to, to swear in, to be sworn in. kalima (A) - The word of God, expression of Muslim faith (“bismillah er-Rahman er-Rahim") kampong (M) - Village, quarter, residential area for lower classes in town or city kathi, qadi (A) - Muslim judge khatib (A) - Preacher Koran, Qur’an (A) - Islamic Holy Scriptures kufiyah (A) - Head shawl luwaran (Tg) - Selection, denotes the legal codex of the Mindanao Muslims, a composite of principles of the local shari*a and the adat. madrasa (A) - Islamic religious school majlis ash-Shura (A) - Council, legislative council majlis al-Tanfeezi (A) - Executive council Moro (S) - Muslim, Moorish, a Spanish term for the Muslims of the Philippines mujahid, mujaheed (pi. mujahidin, mujahideen) (A) - A participant in a holy war pandita (TG) - A religious learned man, alim (ulama) among the Moro of the Philippines panthay (B) - Chinese Muslims pathi (B) - Appellation for members of the Muslim community in Burma/ Myanmar perang, parang (M) - War, battle perang sabil/sabilillah (M and A) - “War in the Path of Allah,” name for suicide/ self-sacrifice of Muslims against infidels pesantren (M) - Traditional religious Islamic boarding school in Indonesia. See: madrasah, pondok pondok (M) - Traditional religious Islamic boarding school in Patani and in the Malay Peninsula, mostly in rural areas Qur’an (A) - See: Koran Rohinga, Rohingya (B) - A term for the Muslims of northern Arakan (Rakhine) sabil (A) - Road, path sabilillah (A) - The Path of God, struggle in the name of Allah, a term used for those who take a vow to kill non-Muslims. In the Philippines: juramentado sayyid (A) - Chief, descendant of the Prophet Muhamad shafii (A) - One of the four Islamic Sunni schools of religious law

Glossary

413

shahid (A) - Martyr, killed in a holy war shaikh (Sufi) (A) - Chief of a Sufi order shaikh al-Islam (A) - Historically the title of the chief mufti in the Ottoman Em­ pire. Also sometimes used by chiefs of Islamic religious institutions in other Islamic countries. shari’a (A) - Islamic law based on scholarly religious interpretation of the Qur'an and Islamic basic sources sharif (A) - Noble, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad shia (A) - A Muslim sect which is distinguished from the Sunnis in that its mem­ bers regard only the offspring of the Prophet Muhammad as the legitimate heirs of the Caliphate, in the leadership of the Muslim world. shii (A) - One who belongs to the shia. sufi (A) - A Muslim devotee, Muslim ascetic sunnah (A) - The Muslim tradition of the Oral Law that recounts the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, his sayings, edicts, and way of life which are to serve as a model for Muslims. Most Muslims in the world belong to the sunnah school. surau (M) - Islamic prayer house tabligh (A) - Religious message. Refers to radical Muslim groups that engage in missionary activity. See: dakwah to khra (or: tok guru) (M) - Traditional religious teacher in a pondok tun (M) - Title for nobleman tunku (or: tengku) (M) - Nobleman, prince ulama (sing.: alim) (A) - Religious scholars, religious learned men, religious teachers, an authority on the interpretation of Islam law (shari'a) umma (A) - The Muslim community, the Muslim people ustaz (A) - Nontraditional religious teacher, master zakat (A) - Muslim legal alms zerbadi (B) - Burmese Muslims who are descendants of mixed marriages, usually of Arab, Persian, or Indian-Muslim fathers and Burmese mothers.

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445

In d e x

Abd al-Hamid, 397 Abduh, Muhamad, 82 Abu Bakar, Shcrif, 183 Abu Qudamahach, 346 Abu-Sayyaf, 337,338,342, 344-346,348, 349, 351,381,408-409 Abubakar al-Sidik, 342 Abubakar camp, 343-345 Acheh, 5, 8 adai, 7,77,178,190-191,214, 223, 249, 277,298 Afghan mercenaries, 24 Afghanistan, 2,66, 81,167, 311, 342,344, 346,395 Agama, 190,214,231 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 204,211, 397 Agusan, 246 Ahmad Kamal, 66 Ahmad Wahab, 82 Akyab, 24,27,40-44, 50, 54-56, 385, 387 Al Kaluang, 303,312 al-Auqaf, 167 al-Azhar University, 141,158,242,258, 268,404 al-Medinah camp, 345 Alatas, Ali, 338 Algeria, 258,284,297 Algiers, 284 Ali, Dato, 216 Aligarh University, 144 Alim ud-Din 1,199 All Burma Pakistan Association, 29 Alonto, Abul Khayr, 253,267,274-275, 300-301,312-313,321,406 Alonto, Domacao, 244,267,274, 311 Amanah Bank, 284,285,318 Ambang of Kidapawan, Dato, 220

America[n], 94,102,116,119,185, 186-188, 200-204, 211, 213-215, 217-221, 223, 225,227, 228, 232-234, 247,279,298,345; Blacks, 221; planes, 347; policy of integration, 245; rule, 363,369,375 Amilbangsa, Ombra, 250 Amin Dato, 127 Amman, 336,407 Amnesty International, 61 Ananda Mahidon, 107 Angeles, Edwin, 346-347 Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 66, 145,162 Anglo-Burmese War, 27, 61 Anglo-Muhammadan Law, 29 Anglo-Siamese Treaties, 76,93,366, 399-400 Ansar al-Islam, 253,311 Anwar Ibrahim, 66,145 Anwarul Huj, Kazi, 56 Aquino administration, 335 Aquino, Agapito (Butz), 331-332,407 Aquino, Benigno, 318, 323, 331,406-407 Aquino, Corazon Cory (President), 269, 323,331-334,336,342,352,371,377, 407 Arab[s], 2-5,7,11,19,73,102,143,147, 166,183, 255, 271, 278, 347, 374, 376; Arab League, 110, 143,168; merchants, 1; missionaries, 7; money, 242; Muslim terrorist organizations, 395; nationalism, 243; oil, 257, 377; oil embargo, 283,371,376; settlers, 81; states, 59,286,297,308,373; terrorists, 35; trade, 2 Arab and Armenian traders, 2

447

448

Index

Arab and local teachers, 187 Arab countries, S3,126,133,134,136, 141. 142-145, 159, 166-169, 242, 243, 268, 283, 284, 287, 311, 315, 318, 332, 342, 344, 347, 348, 362, 366, 374, 376, 377; Muslim countries, 29, 373-374, 404 Arab-Islamic involvement, 377 Arab-Israel conflict, 283,285,370,374, 377 Arab-Israel War. 243 Arabian Peninsula, 183-184 Arabic. 112,132,143,189-190,202, 344, 366 Arafat, Yassar, 319,351 Arakan, 45,50 Arakan Buddhists, 25,367, 369 Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), 60 Arakan Muslims, 57, 67, 363,377, 387 Arakan National Liberation Party, 53 Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), 65,66 Arakan Territorial Units, 43 Arakan Yoma, 23 Arakanese Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League, 43 Arakanese Muslim Autonomy Movement, 40 Arrong Moorang, 145,176 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 65, 65,162, 164,168, 270-271, 282, 285, 314, 332, 338, 374, 403 Asia, 3.4,7,197 Asian Islamic Conference, 168 Asri, Dato Hajji Muda Muhamad, 162^164,404 Assad, Hafez, 347 Association of the Malays of Greater Patani, 109 Aung San, 35 Aung San Suu Kyi, 64,65,67 Aung-Gyi, Brigadier, 46 Australia, 177, 233,271 Austria, 232 Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM), 335-337,339,340, 342, 343, 408-409 A'zim ud-Din III, 200 Bacon, Robert J.. 226 Badar ud-Din 1.199 Badri Hamdan. 141 Baghdad, 317,406 Bagong Asya, 267 Baguinda, Raja Ali, 183 Bajou, 185,187 Baker, James, 65 Balabac, 184 Bali, 374 Bandung, 351 Bangkok, 65,76,77,80-82,88-90,92, 96. 97, 101, 104, 106-108, 110-112. 115-119, 125, 130, 134, 136, 137, 142. 142, 145. 146. 149-150, 155, 157, 163. 164, 168, 173-174, 368, 401-402. 405-408 Bangladesh, 12,52-56,58-61,63,65,66, 174, 256, 322, 348, 363, 368, 373, 377. 378, 382,406-408 Bangsa Moro, 241,242,268,277, 296-298, 300, 302, 306, 312, 317, 319, 322, 323 332, 343,407 Bangsa Moro Army (BMA), 253,269, 275,277,299,308 310 Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), 311 Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), 274-275,278,311, 315, 318, 319,404 Bangsa Moro People's Consultative Assembly. 343 Bangum Aratuc. 255 Banham Silpa-archa, 176 Baracudas, 254-255 Barisan Nasional Ifembebasan Patani (BNPP), 141-143, 146,166 Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), 142, 143,166,176,403 Basilan, 183-185,187,199-200,212,221. 246, 251. 259-260, 275, 278, 297-299.

Index

302-304, 306-309, 333, 335, 342-346, 348-350, 369,406 Bates Agreement, 215,219,399 Bates John C. (Brigadier-General), 211 Bay of Bengal, 23,54 Bayan, 184,197,199,212,220,399 Begin, Menahem, 318,320 Bengal, 1*-21,24, 27-29,33-35,37,41, 61-63,361,367 Bengal Association, 28 Bengal Muslim League, 41 Bengali, 51 Benghazi, 167,281,405 Benghazi Conference, 282 Betong, 155 Betong salient, 153,156, 158 Bhumidol, King, 149 Bhuto, Zulfikar Ali, 256 Bilal, 96 Bilor Kortor Nilor Tunku, 175-177 Bira Kotanila, Tunku (Kabir Abdul Rahman), 144-145 Bisaya, 198-199,212 Black December (1882), 145 Black Shirts, 254-255 Bliss, Tasker H. (Brigadier-General), 213, 216-218,221 Boestaman, Ahmed (Abdullah Sani bin RajaKechil), 113 Bogabong, Hajji Abdul Kamid, 227 Bonifacio, Andreas, 204 Borneo, 2 ,7-S, 183-184,189,197-200, 201,279 Bosnia, 66, 348 Boumedienne, Houari, 284 Bourgiba, Habib, 285 Bouteflika, Abd al-Aziz, 284 Britain, British, 6,10,20,22,24,27,61,75, 77-78, 87-88, 92, 95, 102, 104, 106-108, 110-120, 128, 153, 200-201, 251,271,363,399; post-war conditions to Siam, 94. See also England, English British Foreign Ministry/Office, 42,94, 101,110,115-116,120 British India, 29 British Malaya, 101-103,106-108

449

British military officers, 94 British North Borneo Company, 251 British occupation, 30,33 British officials, 42,402 British Protectorate, 79 British rule, 93,385 British strategic interests in the region, 95 British War Cabinet, 94 British war effort, 39 British-Japanese front, 34 Brunei, 5,8,10,64,163,184,197-200, 332,338 Buayan, 9 Bud Bagsak, 217,400 Bud Dajo, 216,400 Buddhism, Buddhists, 3,5,6,10,21-24, 27-30,33-35,42,44,45,49,50,56,58, 59,60,61,73,81,89,96,125-131,133, 142, 146-149, 174, 178, 361, 365, 368, 369; countries, 375; extremists, 39; majority, 79,363,379; national concepts, 91; refugees, 37; separatist rebels, 38; settlers, 38; territory, 80; monks, 67 Bukidnon, 185,188,246 Bula, Hajji, 87 bunga mas, 74,75,77 Bureau of Non-Christian lYibes, 224,228 Burma Citizenship Law, 61,407 Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), 62 Burmese Communist Party, 59 Burmese Muslims, 28,29,30,56,59, 81, 174, 364, 385 Burmese National Movement, 30 Buthidaung, 4-5,34,37,39,43-44,46, 49,51,53,55, 59,387 Butig, 184 Cairo, 7, 26,27, 141,143, 158, 242,281, 311,336,404 Calagan, 187 California, 347 Caliph, 220,397 Calipha, Mohammad Jamal, 347 Cambodia, 1,21,81,93,153 Carpenter Treaty, 185

450

Index

Carpenter, Frank W., 218-221,223 Chulalongkom, King (Rama V), 77, 88, Carpenter-Jamal al-Kiram n Agreement, 133,145 Chulamjamontri, 95-97,137,174 400 Carter, Jimmy, 320 Citizenship Law, 62 Casablanca, 34,41,409 Code of Muslim Personal Law, 279,318, Cassim, 5,45,53,362 405 Catholic Church, 220,375 Colonial Office. 76,94,101,107,115, 12a 401 Catholic missionaries, 201 Cebu, 191,198,399 Comintern (the Third International), 153 Commission of National Integration cedula, 22,213-214 Celebes, 1,34 (CNI), 244-245,256,279,403 Central Committee for Islamic Affairs Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu, (CCIA), 392 228 Commonwealth, 227-231,234,401; Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, 11,96,137 forces, 153; Philippines, 401 Communism, Communists, 35,38,42,43, Central Islamic Institute, 112 Ceylon, 1,2,19-21 101, 104-105, 108, 111-113, 115, 117, Chakri, 75 118, 129-130, 141, 143-144, 147, 149, 153-154, 156-158, 162, 310, 404; Chams, 81 Chechnya, 66 guerillas, 16,155,157,164,405; Chin, 55 Maoist ideas, 276; rebellion, 373; Chin Feng, 130 rebels, 130; Red Flag Movement, 38; revolt, 247 China, Chinese, 1-3,7,10,19-21,62,73, 75, 81, 125-127, 141, 153, 183, 185, Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), 154, 188, 197, 200-199, 248, 349, 391; 157-158 Compulsory Education Law, 131,133 Buddhists, 390; businessmen, 2,142, 147; Communists, 113; minority, 133; Conference of Islamic Heads of State, 317 Conference of Muslim Asian Peoples, 316 Muslims, 81,385-386; Thais, 177 Chittagong, 27, 28, 34, 35,37, 39-42,44, Conferences of Muslim Foreign Ministers 45,57,363 (ICFM), 171,279,285,288,300,301, 303-304, 307, 309, 313-314, 317, Chittagong Association, 28 Chittagongs, 45,385,387 322-323, 336, 338, 351, 371-374, Christian[s], 9,12,51,186,188,197, 404-405,407 199-200, 204, 213, 216, 220-221, 223, Congress Party, 30 225, 227, 232-234, 244-245, 247-248, Congressional Record, 226 251, 253-254, 256, 258, 268, 275-276,Coromandel, 20 296, 298, 308, 333-335, 341, 346, 349, Corregidor incident, 251 361, 368-369, 374-375, 378; districts, costume code, 95 339-340; education, 231; immigrants, Cotabato. 183-188,198,200, 200, 212213, 216, 220-223, 225, 231, 233-234, 287,343; Liberation Army, 333; 243, 246, 248, 252, 254-256,259, 267, majority, 241,252,306,381; 268, 269, 273-275, 281,288, 302, 307, missionaries, 21,133,199; reprisals, 311-312, 335, 342-344, 346, 349,404 337; setdement, 248,250,260,344, cotta, 215,217,225,232 401; Spaniards, 201 Christianity, 7,9,10,12,190,198,203,214 Council of the Muslim Psople of Patani (MPRMP), 176 Chuan Leekpay, 177

Index Cyprus, 51

Dacca, 54,56, 57,64,66 Dacca Club, 28 Dakar, 314 Dakar Conference, 314 Damascus, 1,167 Dansalan, 187, 227 Dar al-Aman, 253 Dar al-Harb, 11, 80,253, 366,367, 368, 395 Dar al-Islam, 8,10,11, 80,189,198,202, 214,223,253,298,368,395 Darul Ifta, 166,339 Dato, 183,190,198, 199-201,204, 211-217, 219-220, 222-225, 227-234, 245, 249-250, 253, 255,267, 268,275, 278, 280-281 Dato Yutitham, 89,96 Davao, 184-188,213,232,246,288,301, 337,346 Davao City, 346,348 Davao del Sur, 304,307 Davis, George W. (Brigadier-General), 212-213 Dayang Dayang-Haji Piandoo, 228 Delhi, 88 Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), 248,404 Department of Mindanao and Sulu, 212, 218,224, 235,400 Desert Storm, 64 Deureh Madiyoh, 141 Dhaka, 322,407 Dimaporo, Ali, 254 Dun, Smith, 41 Dusun Nyior, 105,402 Dutch: authorities, 82; colonial rule, 92; East India, 220; East Indian Islands, 9, 95; regime, 81 East Pakistan, 29,43-45,53 East Timor, 374 Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), 247 Egypt, 1,133,136,141,141,183,242,243,

451

257-258, 269, 282-284, 311, 318-320, 344, 348-350,370,404 Emanullah Khan, 168 Emergency Law, 322 England, English, 12,22,93,102,107,113, 114, 143, 201, 203, 251, 253. See also Britain, British England and Thailand Border Agreement on the Suppression of Communism, 113,402 Estrada, Joseph, 344 Europe, 1,2,7,8,141,177, 197, 199,366 European seafarers, 22 Rusal, King, 281,284-285 fatwa, 12,97, 318 Federal National Democratic Front, 60 Federated Malay States (FMS), 94 Fez, 315,406 f i sabil AUah. See sabil il-Allah Filipino Christians, 9,197,199,202,204, 213-214, 217, 220, 224-228, 232, 296; rule, 234 Filipino Muslims, 220,244 First Muslim Filipino Conference, 243 Force V, 33, 34,93,136 Foreign Registration Certificates, 57 Foreigner Registration Cards (FRC), 56 France, French, 20,22,76-78,200 Free Thai Movement, 93,94 Gafoor, Muhammad, 53 Gama, Vasco da, 7 GAMPAR, 109,110,113,119,141,402 Gani, Abdul, 108 Gaza, 1,348 Geneva, 64,168 Gent, Edward, 107 Germany, 78,220,232 Granada, 197 Greater Patani, 92,97 Grekkan Islam Patani (GIP), 145 growth triangle, 165 Gulf states, 58,320 Gulf War of 1991,64

452

Index

Hadramaut, 1,7,81 haj, 166,217,242,279,318,406 Haj pilgrimage, 137 Hajal Ouh, 251 Hajjis, 227 Haled bin Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, 64 Hamas, 348,395 Hamburg, 145 Hanafi grouping, 81 Hanoi, 167 Hashim Salamat, 267-268,274,287,302, 311-312, 314, 317-318, 322, 332, 342, 344, 362,406 Hassan Uprising, 215,400 HatYai, 149,406 hijab, 175 Hinduism, Hindus, 3,5-7,21,27-28,74, 374, 385 Hisham Abdullah, 158-159 Hizbullah, 347,350,397 Holland: the Dutch, 6,9,12,22,75, 199-200 holy war. See Jihad Hong Kong, 204, 347 Hudan Abubakar, Hajji, 303 Huk (Hukbalahap), 247-248 Hussein, Dato, 156 Hussein, King, 285 Hyderabad, 40 Iberian Peninsula War, 197 Idris, Bapa, 142 Idris bin Mat Diah, 141 Ikramullah, Mohammed, 42 ilagas, 254-256 Danon, Danum, 185-186 Ibngo, 254 Imam, 96,97,132,135,137,202,227,395 Imam Mahdi, 225 India, 1-4, 7, 12, 19-20, 22,24,27-30, 33-34,40-41,52,57,62,67,73-74,78, 81,88,93,136,143-144,183-184,256, 349,380,385 India Office, 88 Indian Civilian Service (ICS), 34 Indian Muslims, 3,5,7,28-29,88,385

Indios, 9 ,19&-200,203,217,221 Indochina, 10,75-76,78,142,153 Indonesia^], 10,12,21,57,64-65, 81-82, 97, 108-110, 113, 130, 132-133, 141. 143, 147, 161, 164-165,168-169, 175, 177, 189, 220, 242-243, 257, 271, 273-274, 281-282, 285-287, 295, 297, 299, 306, 308-309,314-316, 332, 338. 351, 374, 376, 378, 382, 403, 408; archipelago, 73,374; Communist Bvty, 374; Muslims, 81; National Movement, 108; Hindus, 183 Indonesia Raya, 273 Ingles, Jose, 257 International Conference on Muslim Minorities, 59,406 International Koran Reading Competition, 137 lpil, 339,349, 351,409 Iran[ian], 57,60, 81,165,173,257,284, 315,319, 336, 347-349, 370, 375, 395, 407; activist, 41, 406; students, 320, 406 Iranon. See Ilanon Iraq, 64, 136,243,257,284-285, 336 Irnwaddi River, 19,60 Islam Patronage Law of 1945,137 Islamabad, 168,310, 316-317,322,406 Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM). See Conferences of Muslim Foreign Ministers Islamic Council of Europe, 59,168,406 Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP), 254 Islamic Secretariat, 143,163 Islamic Solidarity Fund, 166,287 Islamikaze, 396 Ismail Thanam, 165 Israel, 257,282, 317-320,345, 347, 374, 376-377 Istanbul, 142,168-169,199,303,405 Jabidah, 251-252,257,270-271,403 Jafar, Muhammad, 53 Jafar Habib, 53, 54 Jafar Hussain, 37

Index

Jakarta, 283,315.337-339.408 Jalal. Tunku Abdul. 92.95.109.116. 118-119.141-142,168 JamaMapun, 187 Jamaat Islami. 66 Janjalani, Abubakar Abdulrazak, 344,346. 352,409 Japan, Japanese, 19,30,33,35,75,93-94, 97, 101-102, 187, 197, 203, 232, 347, 396,401; occupation, 188,385 Java, 2, 5,6, 8,108,184 Jawi, 129 Jeddah, 166-167,274,281,295,297-299, 302-303, 308, 311-312, 318, 332-335, 349-350.404-407 Jeddah negotiations, 296 Jehku Baku, 143 Jerusalem. 320 Jesuit missionaries, 200 Jewish refugees, 232 jihad, 8,12.92.162.198.200-202,212, 215, 253,256, 258-259,278,298, 342, 344, 363-364, 368, 375,395 Jinah, Ali, 35 John Paul II, Rope, 346-347 Jolo. 183.185,198,200,200-202,211, 217, 221.223.225.243,275,285,296. 303, 310,332-333,400,405,407 Jones Law, 224 Jordan. 284-285.336.348-349.407 juramentado, 202,215.375 Kahataang Makabayan (Patriot Youth), 267 Kabungsuwan, Sherif Muhammed, 183 Kachin, 34-35, 55,61 Kader Qamaruddin, Tunku Abdul, 77-78, 87,90,93,102,141,401 Kadumi, Farouk, 351 Kaladan, 35 Kalagan, 187 Kalibungans, 187 Kalimantan, 273 Kaman, 24 Kamlun, Hajji, 243-244,403 Karachi, 167,322,404

453

Karagan, 187 Karen, 34.35.60.60,61 Karim, Hajji Hassan Ustaz, 143 Karim Gaye, Ahmad, 304,308,313 Kathi, Kathis, 78,89,92,190,214,227 Kawal, Moulvi Jafar, 37,40,45 Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Force (KMLF), 60,407 Kayah, 61 Kedah, 2,6.74-76.79.93.101.105,110, 113,158,161,163 Kelantan, 74-79,87-88,92-93.101-102. 105-110, 112, 114, 118-119, 141-145, 149,156,161-165,167, 177, 366,401 Kelantan Volunteer Force, 93 Kenya, 347 Khadam, Abdul Halim, 286 Khaled (King of Saudi Arabia), 297,321 Khana Kau, 82 Khana Mai, 82 Khartoum, 347 Khatib, 96 Khomeini: Ayatollah, 165,319,370; revolution, 320,375; supporters, 320 Koran, 82,96,131,141,185,186,189,202, 242,253,318, 343, 363, 366 Korea, 2 Korean war, 125 Kota Bharu, 109,116,118,145 Krabai, 79 Kru-ze. 174 Kuala Lumpur, 65,101,117-119,155,159, 162, 167-169, 176, 255, 271, 272, 277, 286,314-316,348,402,405 Kuala Lumpur Conference, 287,288,299, 303 Kublai Khan, 19 Kukrit Pramqj, 149 Kuwait, 82,136,167,242,257,284,297. 336. 348.404 Lahore. 285.405 Lanao. 183-186,188,198,212-213, 216-217, 220, 222-225, 227, 231-234, 254, 256, 259, 267, 269, 272, 274-275, 300-302,311-312,400

454

Index

Lanao del Norte, 187,244,246,254-256, 304,307 Lanao del Sur, 187,246,255-258,267,288, 299,304,307-308,335,342,352,369 Laos, 10,21,93,153 Lebanon, 51, 167,288,350,395 Legaspi, Miguel Lopez de, 197,399 Leninism, 157 Libya[n], 59-60,82,136,144-145,147,149 166-167, 169, 178, 242, 255-258, 269-272, 274-275, 281-283, 286, 298-299, 302, 304, 306-307, 313, 316, 319, 321, 332, 344-345, 347-348, 370-371,404-405, 407; aid, 275; arms shipment, 272; Libyan Islamic Call Society, 145 London, 42, 59,76,78, 88,104,107, 111, 115-117,168,406 Lookman Sahib, Moulvi, 35 Lower Burma, 29 Luang Damrong Nawasawat, 107 Lucman Pendatun, Dato Salipada Rashid, 232-233, 253-254, 257, 267-268, 272, 274-275,278,280,311-312 Lucman, Abdul Hamid, 287,303,318,322 Lucman, Jimi, 253 Luwaran, 190 Luzon, 9,184,198-199,199,204,212,220, 226,231,243,245,247,249,253,276 Macapagal, Diosdado, 251,271 Macapanton Abbas Jr., 254,274, 311 Macasar, 9 madarsah, 82,216,242, 318 Magellan, Ferdinand, 191,399 Magsaysay, Ramon, 247-248 Maguindanao, 183-187,189,199-200, 200-202, 244, 246, 267, 269, 288, 296, 299, 301, 304, 307, 308, 311-312, 315, 335, 342-343, 352, 367, 369 Mahathir bin Muhamad, Datuk, 66,150, 164-165,177 Majlis al-Tanfeezi, 308 Majlis ash-Shum, 308 Majlis Ugama Islam, 102, 105 Majul, Cesar Adib, 189

Malabar, 2,20 Malacca, 2,3, 5-10,19-20,73-75, 184 Malay, 79,105,111-113,115,117-118. 127,131-132,143,153, 162, 184, 186, 202,258,273,361,368,372,390-392 Malay archipelago, 1,3,5-6,10,20-21, 143,183 Malay Chinese, 130,153,162 Malay Communist Party (MCP), 110,130, 153-155,157-159, 372,402,408 Malay: Arabic alphabet, 185; culture, 146; language, 129,134, 177-178,403; traditions, 149 Malay Federation, 94, 106,109,112-113, 115-116, 118-120,402 Malay irredentists, 119 Malay Muslims, 10, 80,82, 88-89,90-91, 95, 97, 101-105, 107-110, 112, 114-117, 119-120, 125-136, 141, 142-145, 149, 153-154, 161-166, 168, 177-178,183, 367,368, 376, 389-390, 392-393; aristocracy, 75, 91; guerilla fighters, 128 Malay nationalism, 95,135; Malay National Movement, 92,109 Malay Peninsula, 1-2, 12,19,73,75-76, 78-79, 88, 92-93, 95, 101, 103, 106-107, 109, 113-114, 126, 132, 153, 161-163, 189, 220, 253, 267, 273, 367, 373 Malay People's Liberation Army (MPLA), 130 Malay rulers, 76-78; ruling families, 87 Malay states, 76 Malay Sultanates, 74-76,95,101,129; Sultans, 109 Malaya, 74, 81,90, 92-95,97 101,102, 104-115, 117-120, 126, 128, 130, 141, 141,154,161, 367,401-403 Malayan Union, 107 Malays of South Thailand, 93 Malaysia[ns], 5,7,10,21,64-66, 73, 80, 82, 127, 130-131, 133, 136-137, 141-145, 147-150, 153-158, 161-169, 174-178, 183, 185, 189, 201, 242, 251-254, 257, 267, 268, 270-274,

Index

281-282, 285-287, 297,299, 308, 312, 314-316, 331-332, 334, 338, 347, 351, 363, 368, 372-374, 376, 378, 382, 403-406,408-409 Malcampo, Admiral Jose, 202 Maldives Islands, 20 Malik, Adam, 169,286,295,297,299,309 Manchu, 21 Mandalay, 60,67 Manila, 8-9,65,186,188,199,201,203, 213, 218, 220-221, 223, 226, 228, 245, 250-252, 256-258, 267, 271, 278-279, 283-284, 288, 295-296, 303, 305-306, 309, 312-313, 315, 317, 319-320, 322-323, 332-335, 341-343, 345, 347-348, 351, 399,406-407 Manili, 255,404 Mao Zedong, 159 Maoist: influences, 276,278; organization, 283; tendencies, 301 Mapiyoh Sadala, 145 Maranao. 187,188-189,202,205,214, 227, 229, 244,246,249,259,267,269, 301, 311-312,367,397,399-404 Marawi City, 189,229,243-244,259,275, 280,286, 296, 301,404-405 Marcos regime, 352 Marcos, ftrdinand. 244,248,252-253,255, 257, 258, 260,271-273, 275, 278-279, 282-284, 286-287, 295, 297, 299-302, 304, 306-309, 311, 313-314, 316-321, 323, 331-332,363, 371-372, 377,405, 407,409 Marcos, Imelda, 284-285,297, 306-307, 313, 321 Martaban, 60 martial law. 258,268,274-275, 280, 299-300,404 Marxism, 156.159 Marxist organization. 267,275 Masdali, Hajji, 217 masok melayu* 80 Maungdaw, 33-34,37-40,43-44,46, 49-50, 53,55, 59,387 Maxwell, George, 94 Mayhiddin, Tunku Mahmmud, 90.92-93,

455

95. 102, 104, 106-109, 110, 112, 114-116, 117-119, 120, 143, 362,401, 402 Mayu, 23,25,35,51 Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA), 49, 51,403 Mayu Hills, 54 Mayu Region, 46 McKinley, William, 397 Mecca, 1,7,12,54,57,59,91,102,137, 146-147, 168, 180, 219, 242, 268, 279, 283.317-319, 397,406 Medina, 7,12,242 Mediterranean, 1,2,7,8,185 Melchor, Alejandro, 278,295,298 Middle East, 1-3,19-20,82,168-169, 189, 199, 282,284,286, 321, 336, 340, 347, 349, 377; conflict, 284; countries, 66

Mindanao, 7,9,185,188-189,191, 199-204, 206-208, 213-214, 218-232, 234-235, 241-248. 250-252, 254, 256-260, 269, 273, 276-278, 280, 283, 285-288, 295-298, 301-302, 306, 301, 312, 331-333, 335-338, 340, 342-343, 345-346, 348, 351-352, 397, 39^400, 404.406-407.409 Mindanao Development Authority (MDA). 244-245,403 Mindanao State University, 259 Mindoro, 186 Misuari, Nur, 252,254,257,259,267-270, 272, 274-275, 277-278, 284-285, 288, 295-296, 298, 301, 303-304, 307-308, 311, 313-314, 316, 318, 320, 322-323, 331-333, 335-337, 339-341, 343, 345-346, 349-350, 352, 362, 377, 381, 404.407-409 Misuari-Ramos agreement, 342-343 MNLF Manifesto, 269 MNLF-Reformist Group (RG), 318, 312, 332 MNLF-RG/BMLO, 331 Moguls, 24 Mohammed Zaffir, 59 Mohammed Zaid, 60

456

Index

Molucca, Molucca Islands, 7-8,19, 201-202,338 Mon, 35,61 Mongol, 19,21 Mongols of India, 21 Monsoon, Operation, 44,403 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 311-312, 318, 332-335,337-338,340, 342-346, 349-352,381,406,409 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 250,253,259,267-270,272-278, 280-281, 283-284, 286-288, 295-323, 331-346, 349-352, 362-363, 371, 373-374,377-379,381,404-409 Moro Province, 215-220,223,400 Moro Wars, 200,202,207 Morocco, 82, 258,315,338,406,409 Moroland, 214,216,220-221,226 Mosque Council, 96-97 mosques, 9,22,28,40,56,59-61,63, 82, 96-97, 105, 131-132, 137, 148, 150, 176,180, 187,201,242, 245, 255,257, 318,320,337,405,408 Mostafizur Rahman, 64 Moulmein, 60 Mu ‘atamar al-Alam al-lslanu, 146, 322 Muhammad Salip Jamalul Kiram II, Sultan, 188,213,217,220,230,402 Muiz ud-Din, 203 Mujahid movement, 40 mujahideen, 29,38-44,46,49, 51,53,59, 206-207, 270, 311, 342, 362-363, 378, 403 Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), 344 mujahideen rebellion, 402 Mujib, Sheik, 54 Murphy, Frank, 229 Muslim: countries, 66; guerilla fighters, 119; missionaries, 9,185-186; states, 95; traders, 2-5, 8, 185-186 Muslim Foreign Ministers. See Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers (ICFM) Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), 252-255,268,404 Muslim Indian Committee, 88

Muslim League of India, 35 Muslim Liberation Organization, 61 Muslim National Area, 34 Mustafa, 7im, 252,254,271-273,286,300, 302,373 Myint Mating, 56 Naaf River, 40,46, 53, 56 Naga Min, Operation, 55, 57,59,406 Nahar, Datuk Syed, 160 Nai Adun Na Siburi (or Tunku Abdul Jalal bin Tunku Abdul Mutalib, or TUnku Yala Nai Banchong Nasae), 91,105, 110,144 Nai Banchong Sricharoon, 110 Nai Khuang, 110 Narameikhla, 23,24 Narathiwat, 79,89-91,101,103-106,118. 125, 144-148, 150-151, 177, 389-392, 402,405 Nasser, Abdul, 242 National Democratic Front (NDF), 301 National Education Program, 401 National Islamic Council Command, 350 National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), 232,248,401 National League for Democracy, 64-65 National Liberation Front of Patani (BNPP), 143-145,148, 168,402 National Registration Cards (NRC), 56 National Registration Certificate, 57 National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), 248, 403-405 Nazi regime, 232 Ne Win, 29, 51, 54-55, 59,62 New Delhi. 94 New Malaysiaim-Thai Border Agreement, 405 New People’s Army (NPA), 276,301, 309-310, 317, 336 New York, 64, 151,169,284,313, 321; World Trade Center, 346,348 New Zealand, 271,345 Niger, 322,407 North Africa, 7,13,397

Index

457

Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP/PI), 144-146,151,163-164,404 pan-Malaysia, 97 pandita, 188,192,206,215,218,222 Panduga, Ibrahim, 346 Pangkor, 253,267-268 Panglima Hassan, 214 Paris Agreement, 221 Paris TYeaty, 208 Partai Islam (PI). See Pan-Malayan Islamic Ohn Gyaw, U, 64 Party Partai Islam se-Malaysia (PAS), 163-164, oil embargo, 282,304,320 Oman, 348 167 Omra Meah, 41 Partai Revolusi Nasional (R\RNAS), 145 Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM), Onn, Datuk Hussein, 117,243 163 OPEC, 243 Parti Itersandaran Islam (P\PERI), the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), Islamic Socialist Party, 156 65,170-171,254,257,273-275,277, 281, 286, 288, 299, 304-305, 308-309, Pasai, 5-6 311-317, 321-322, 332-333, 335-341, Pata, 310,318-319,406 345, 350-351,371-372,37&-379,404 Patani (kingdom of), 74; Malays, 81; Osama bin Laden, 347 Muslims, 81,92,117; National Army, 178 Osmena, Sergio, 229,233 Patani People's Movement (PPM), 103, Ottoman Empire, 8,222,397 141,402 Patani United Liberation Army (PULA), Pacific, 199 146 Packard, C. D. (Major-General), 120 Patani United Liberation Organization Pahang, 6 (PULO), 144,146,148,150-151, Pakistan, 12,29-30,34-35,38-43,45, 160-161,167-170,177-178,403,408 52-54, 57-58, 60, 81, 110, 133, 136, 141, 143, 145, 147, 175, 177, 242-243, Pathans, 81 256-257, 272, 285, 311, 316, 320, Pathi, 20 322-323, 342, 344-345, 347-349, 351, Patronage of Islam Act, 95-97,102,104, 363,378,380,387,405 401 Pattaya, 284 Pala, Dato, 217 Palawan. 185,187,189-191,199,227,246, Peace Committee for North Arakan, 42 252, 277, 297-298, 302, 304, 306-307,Pegu, 6,19,20 Penang, 106,110,158 309,333 Perak, 75-76,110,160,163,165 Palawanon, 189 Palestine, Palestinians, 136,253,284, 320, perang sabil, 206 Pergerakan Kemerdekaan Patani Bersatu. 348-349, 374,377 See United Patani Freedom Movement Palestinian Hamas, 350 (PKPB) Palestinian issue, 370 pan-lslam[ic], 59,364-365,370; activity, Rerlak, 5 67; policy, 242; spirit, 243 Periis, 79,93,101,110,165 Pershing, John J. (Brigadier-General), 215, pan-Malay, 145,163,273; movement, 92 North Arakan, 30,33-35,37-38,41-43, 53-54,62-63 North Arakan Muslim League, 35,402 North Borneo, 203,205,250-251 North Borneo Company, 205 North Cotabato, 304,307 North Yemen, 323,407 Nu, U, 38,41,43-44,49-51 Nurul Islam, 268

458

Index

219-220,223,400 Persia, Persians, 1-3,6,20,23-24 Persian Gulf. 1,2, 8,19-20,272 Persian traders, 2,5.73 Pertubohan Persatuan Pembibasan Patani (PPPP), 146 pesantren, 132 Philippine Archipelago, 8-10,199-201, 213,223,228 Philippine Communist Party, 276 Philippine Government in Exile, 233 Philippine Muslim Nationalist League, 267 Philippine Muslim News, 267 Philippine Muslims, 186-187,191,225, 242, 254-255, 279, 281-282, 297, 315, 318, 346, 348, 371; rebels, 351 Philippine national movement, 208,213 Philippine Pilgrimage Authority, 318,406 Philippines Bill, 215 Pibul Songkhram (Field Marshal), 90-93, 95, 97. 102, 104. 106. 112. 115. 118, 125,128,401-403 PLO, 145-146,149,160, 169,269,284, 311, 319, 344-345, 351, 370,407 Poh Ji Nal Krongpinang, 178 Poh Yeh, Pot Yeh, 143-144 178 Policy of Attraction, ISO, 220-222,226, 234,300 Polo, Marco, 5 pondokfs], 80,131,137,149,180,376,403 Itortugal, Portuguese, 7,12,22,24,74,75; pirates, 20 Post Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee, 94 Prapat, 127 Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao (PTF/RDM), 248,278,406 Pridi Phanomyong, 88,93-95,102,104, 107 Primary Education Act (1901), 87,131, 400 Pundato, Dimas, 312,318,322 Puteh, Che Abdullah Wang, 116 Putera, Tunku, 109,119

Qadhafi, Muammar, 59,169,255, 257, 272, 274, 281, 302, 304, 306-308, 371, 404 Qatar, 136,242 Quadripartite Ministerial Commission, 305-307 Quezon, Manuel L., 228,230,232-233, 401 Quirino, Elpidio, 241,247 Qur’an. See Koran Rabat, 285,404 Rahman, Hajji Abdul, 105 Rahman, Tunku Abdul, 108,252,254, 274,281 Raja, 75-77,130,144, Raja of Patani, 77,78 Raja-Muda camp, 344,409 Rama I, King, 75 Ramos government, 339 Ramos, Fidel, 323,336-337,340-341, 344-345, 348,350,371, 377, 381,408 Ramree Island, 24 Ramzi Ahmed Yousuf, 346,348 Rangoon, 35,40-41,43,45,49,56,65,88, 368 Rathedaung, 39,43-44,50-51 Razak, Tun Abdul, 164-165,171, 273-274,285-286 Reconstruction and Development Program for Mindanao (RAD), 248,405 Red Sea, 19-20 Regional Consultative Commission (RCC), 334-336 Riyadh, 168,175,285, 336,407 Roewengya, 25 Rohingya, 10,25,27-28,35,37,39,43,45, 49-50, 53, 55, 59, 61, 63, 66-67, 361-362, 364, 366, 368, 370, 373, 375, 377-378, 380, 382, 387-388,406,408 Rohingya Independence Force (RIF), S3 Rohingya Jamiat-al-Ulama Organization, 49 Rohingya language, 51 Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), 54, 59, 60

Index

Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), 66 Rohingya Student Organization, 50 Rohingya Student Union, 53 Rohingya Youth Organization, 50 Romulo, Carlos P., 284,308 Romulos, Roberto, 351 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 229 Roosevelt, Theodore, 217 Roxas, Manuel A., 233,241,257,402 Russian, 346 Sabah, 144,165,187,189,205,251-252, 254, 269, 274,276,286, 300, 303, 314, 338,351, 367,373 sabil il-AUah, 147,151,395,405 Sadat, Anwar. 258,284,297,311 Sadat, Jihan. 285 Sakkaf, Omar, 285 Sama-ae Thanam, Hajji, 178 Samal, 187,189,251,296,312 Samsudin Abdul Salleh, 143 San Yu, 60,61 San’a, 323,407 Sandawizay, 24 Sangil, 189 Santiago, Dato, 227 Sanya Dharmasakti, 265 Sarawak, 165,338 Sarit Thanarat (Field Marshal), 125,128, 129,132-133,403 Satun, 79, 89-90.94,112,125, 131, 148, 389,392,401 Saudi Arabia, 53,57,60, 82,92, 126,133, 136, 141, 143, 146-147, 168, 175, 177, 179, 242, 257, 272, 275, 281-282, 284-285, 297-298, 304, 312, 319, 321, 332, 338, 344, 346-347, 350, 370, 406-407 Sayyids, 4, 5 Selangor, 76,109 Senegal, 282,298, 304, 314 Seni Pramoj, 114,158 Seri Thai (Free Thai), 93-94 Seven Year War, 203,207 Shafie, Ghazali, 157

459

Shah Shuja, 24 shtMd; 150,206,395 Shaikh al-Islam, 95 Shan, 55,61,81 shari’a, 4,11,77,97,192,206,215-216, 268, 279-280, 298, 305, 308, 334-335, 338,340,342-343,406; Shari’a courts. 92.318 Sharifs, 5 Shia, Shiites, 2,25,60.81.167,175-176, 395,408; Shiite revolution, 370 Siam, 5-6,10,74,79, 88,90-91,93,101, 103, 105, 107, 120, 389, 399-400; Muslims, 88 Singapore, 10,51,76-78,107, 111, 114, 117, 126, 158, 166, 204, 217, 243,257, 271 Sirikit, Queen, 151 Somalia, 282,298,304 Songkhla, 74-75,79-80,113,118-119, 135,145.147,157,402 Sorayuth Sakulnasantisat, 175 South Africa, 185 South Cotabato, 304,307 South Thailand Muslim Students Group (STMSG), 142 Southeast Asia, 1-2,4, 8,10-12,21, 74-75, 80, 95, 115,170-171, 175, 179, 186, 192,199,242,282,286,364, 366, 371,374,379,382,386,401 Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), 339-341, 352 Southern Philippines Development Administration (SPDA), 245,403 Soviet army, 344 Soviet invasion, 342 Spain, Spaniards, 7-9,12,186,188-189, 191, 199-202, 204, 206-208, 213-214, 216-217, 221, 223, 231-232, 298, 331, 363, 367, 375, 397, 399; Catholic priests, 345 Spanish-American War, 208, 213 Spanish-Sulu Treaty, 399 Spice Islands, 20 Sri Lanka, 349

460

Index

State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 62,64,65,67 Stephans, Tun Fuad, 272,300 Straits colonies, 78 Straits of Kra, 94 Strauss, Oscar S., 397 Sudan, 136,347,349,370,395 Sufi, Sufis, 4-6, 87,186, 187 Suharto, 167,170,257,273,283,286,297 Sukarno, Ahmad, 108,145,167, 273,403 Sulawesi, 273 Suleiman, Raja, 186,199,399 Sulong bin Abdul Kadir, Hajji, 92, 102-106, 116, 125,129,141,176,402 Sultan Ahmed, 41 Sultan Binbayan, 214 Sultan Kudarat, 188,304, 307, 343 Sultan Mahmud Jamal al-Alam, 205 Sultanate of Patani, 80, 89 Sultanate of Sulu, 185 Sulu, 7,9, 186-187, 190,192,199,208, 213, 215, 217, 222,224,234, 241, 243, 246, 250, 254, 25&-260, 267, 269, 271, 278, 280,283,285, 295,297-298, 302, 304, 306, 310, 312,331, 333, 335, 342, 345-346, 352, 369, 397, 399-400, 403, 405,407-408 Sulu Archipelago, 185-187,189,191,246, 250,273,275,312,315,406 Sulu Islands, 2 Sumatra, 2,5-6,8,10,19,113,116,130, 167,179,185,374 Sunnah, 253 Sunni, Sunnis, 2,25,60, 395 Sunni-Shafi’ites, 81 sumu, 131 Sweden, 168,345 Swettenham, Frank, 77-78 Syria, 146, 149, 151, 160,169,177,269, 282, 284, 319, 344, 347, 348, 350, 370, 407 Ibcub massacre, 256 Ifehil, Dato, 227 Taiwan, 199 Talipao Hill, 219,400

Tbmano, Mamintal A., 254,256,279, 332 Teunil Muslim terrorist group, 349 Tantm Jihad Islam (TJI), 178 Tanzania, 347 Taraca, 218,400 Tbung Bazar, 37 Ttuisug, 187,190,206,217,244, 254, 267, 296,302,311-312,315,367 Tfcwan-Tkwan, Dato, 244 Tawj-Twri, 189,246,259,275, 295, 299, 304,307,332-333,335,352,369 Ifeheran, 319 Ibnasserim, 19-20,27,29,61, 74 Ibntera Nasional Rembebasan Rakyat Patani (TNPRP), 144 Tfcmate, 186,201,202 Thai Buddhists, 125-127,137, 144, 156, 176, 179, 367, 370,390 Thai Communists, 156 Thai Custom Decree, 91 Thai Islam, 79,103 Thai Muslims, 81-82,95-96,137,151 Thai-Malaysian Border Committee, 157, 403 Thailand, 21,52,59-60 Thai-Malaysia Border Agreement, 159 Than Shwe, 65 Thanom Kitdkachorn (Field Marshal), 129.164 Tiruray, 254 to'khru or tok guru* 132 To'tae, 87 Tobarak Hussein, 56 Ibhami, Hassan al-, 170,287-288,295, 297 lYeki, Ali Abdussalam, 304 lYengganu, 6, 74-76,78-79,93, 101,106, 163.165 Tripoli, 269,274,299, 302,307,309, 313, 336,397,405,408 Tripoli Agreement, 280,304,306,308, 310-311, 313, 319, 321-322, 331, 335, 337, 339,343, 352, 371,405 Tuan Caly, Than Kali, 192 TUmpat, 146 l\mgawan, 349

Index

l\inis, 82 l\misia, 285,297 l\irkey, 175,222 Ibrkish Mongols, 21 lydings-McDuffie Bill, 229,401 US. Congress, 215,226,228,229,234, 400 US. House of Representatives, 319 US. territory, 400 Udtog Matalam, Dato, 233,252-254,268 Ulama, 4, 78, 82,90,92, 95, 97, 102, 125, 132, 134-135, 137,150, 188, 205-206, 215, 243, 259, 268, 311, 362, 366-367, 395 Ummah, 4,10-12, 16, 80,191,254,364, 367 Ummat Liberation Front, 60 UN General Assembly, 284,313 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 57-58,63-66,272 UN Human Rights Commission, 64,350 Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations (UIFO), 253,274 United Arab Emirates, 169,242,284,297, 348 United Front for Patani Independence (Bersatu), 148,408 United Malay National Organization (UMNO), 113,116-117,164 United Nations, 56-57,64,94,105, 107-108, 110, 151, 169-170,253, 255, 257,281,284, 315-316,323, 352,374 United Patani Freedom Movement (PKPB), 147 United States, 9,65,102,144,175, 207-208, 213, 217-218, 220-221, 223, 228-229, 234, 241, 247, 288, 318, 320, 323, 347, 374,397,399,402 University of Manila, 280 University of Mindanao, 280 Urdu, 40, 51 Usap, Dato, 400 ustaz, 132 Utusan Melayu, 112

461

Vajiravudh (Rama VI), 87-89 Vatican, 346,348 Venecia, Jose de, 341 Vietnam, 10,144,149 Villa, Renatode, 350 Visaya, 9,222,224,228,231,245,249, 253,276 War Office in London, 120 Washington, D.C., 228,233,319,347,407 Whittingham-Jones, Barbara, 107,112 Wilson, Woodrow, 220 Wood, General Leonard, 215-218,220,223 World Health Organization (WHO), 58 World Islamic Call Society, 168 World Muslim Congress (WMC). See Mu *atamar al-Alam al-Islami World Muslim League (WML), 57,168, 170,283, 332,405 World War 1,222 World War n, 28,30,39,60,81,92-93,95, 101, 106,125,129, 137,141,163, 176, 206-207, 232, 235, 242-243, 245, 247, 274, 298, 361-362, 364, 366, 370, 374, 378, 382, 387,396 Yakan, 187,189 Yala, 79,87,89,90,101,106,119,125, 144-145, 147-148, 151-152, 160, 176-177,389,392,406,408 Yala Naser, Tunku, 143 Yihya Khan, 256 Ytinan Province, 81 Zafar Sani, 53 Zakat, 273 Zamboanga, 185,187-188,190,200,202, 204,215, 220, 222-223, 225, 228, 246, 251, 259, 268, 275, 297-298, 300, 303, 307-308, 313, 333-334, 342, 345-346, 348, 350,407 Zamboanga City, 268 Zamboanga del Norte, 256,304,344 Zamboanga del Sur, 187,246,256,258, 304,307,349 Zamboanga Peninsula, 315

462

Zerbadi, 20.28-30 Zia al-Haq, 322

Index

Ziaur Rahman, 54,56

About the Author Dr. Moshe Yegar is a research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and teaches Islam in Southeast Asia at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Moshe Yegar has had a distinguished career in Israel's diplomatic service (1956-1995). He served in Burma and Malaysia and was the Deputy Director General of Asian Affairs in the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. He also served as Consul-General in Philadelphia and New York and as Ambassador to Sweden and the Czech Republic. His writings on Islamic affairs in Southeast Asia include: The Muslims o f Burma: A Study o f a Minority Group (Wiesbaden: University of Heidelberg, Otto Harasowitz, 1972); Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya: Policies and Implementation, 1874-1941 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1979); Malaysia—Attempts at Dialogue with a Muslim Country [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1996). Dr. Yegar was awarded the 1994 Palacky Gold Medal for Merit in Social Sciences from the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.

463