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Also b y Moshe Pearlman COLLECTIVE MUFTI THE

OF JERUSALEM

ARMY

ADVENTURE THE

CAPTURE

AND

ADVENTURE

OF ISRAEL

IN

TRIAL

THE

SUN

OF ADOLF

EICHMANN

BEN GURION LOOKS BACK

BEN GURION LOOKS BACK in talks with Moshe Pearlman

SIMON

AND

SCHUSTER

New York

A L L RIGHTS RESERVED INCLUDING T H E RIGHT OF REPRODUCTION I N WHOLE OR I N PART I N A N Y FORM

COPYRIGHT © 1 9 6 3 B Y MOSHE PEARLMAN AND DAVID BEN GURION

P U B L I S H E D B Y S I M O N A N D SCHUSTER, I N C . ROCKEFELLER CENTER,

630 F I F T H

AVENUE

N E W YORK 20, N . Y .

FIRST PRINTING

LIBRARY O F CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER:

65-25283

These talks took place in Sde Boker and Jerusalem during 1964. They were conducted in Hebrew, the language in which M r Ben Gurion expresses himself most freely, though he is fluent in English as he is in several other languages. The translation is mine. I have omitted almost all m y questions in the biographical episodes, so as not to break the flow o f the narrative, and have retained only those in the

thematic sequences which serve as subject-guides. MOSHE PEARLMAN

Jerusalem, February 1965

Moshe Pearlman’s questions and comments are printed i n italic type.

CONTENTS

OYOv >

QO NN

REFLECTIONS ON INDEPENDENCE DAY EARLY YEARS

18

PIONEERING

34

SALONIKA, CONSTANTINOPLE, NEW YORK

42

POLITICAL APPRENTICESHIP

50

WEIZMANN AND HERZL

59 66

pg bd re

CON

om Norm

OO H

N

OOO

=



WO NN ™ co ©

CO

THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS

BRITISH MINISTERS WORLD LEADERS

107

FUNCTIONS OF A PRIME MINISTER

120

THE ARMY

136

ISRAEL A N D T H E A R A B S T A T E S

152

ISRAEL A N D G E R M A N Y

162

ISRAEL A N D T H E N E W L Y E M E R G E N T N A T I O N S

171

THE WORLD AND CHINA

181

BUDDHISM

189

SCIENCE AND ETHICS

195

MISCELLANY

202

RELIGION AND THE STATE

216

WHY THE JEWS HAVE SURVIVED

224

ISRAEL A N D T H E J E W I S H P E O P L E

235 253

INDEX

CHAPTER ONE

REFLECTIONS ON INDEPENDENCE DAY

Moshe Pearlman. Ben Gurion, your greatest moment must have been your declaration ofIsrael’s independence on the 14th of May 1948, and I don’t suppose there is anything about that day you can ever forget. What were your thoughts at this historic ceremony? Ben Gurion. I do not know that I can recapture all the thoughts that crowded into m y mind on that occasion, but I can remember the core o f m y thinking, for it was something I had dreamed o f and fought for the whole o f m y life, as had most o f the Jews in Israel and many many Jews outside: I thought, now at last we are responsible for our own destiny. I t is ours to shape. We had been a minority element in scores o f lands for almost two thousand years, our fate determined b y others. Sometimes, and in some lands, we enjoyed kind treatment, there was tolerance and the opportunity to develop. A t other times, we were restricted, hounded, persecuted, murdered. W e had just lost six million o f our people, slaughtered b y the Nazis. For centuries we had been like flowers in a wood, some plucked b y friendly hands, given water and nurtured, others trampled underfoot and crushed. A t no time could we be ourselves, enjoy independence, with the freedom to live a normal national life on our own soil, making our own decisions affecting our destiny. Now the hour had struck. We were independent once again. These reflections were uppermost in m y mind.

Coupled with them was the knowledge that while I was reading the Declaration o f Independence the armies o f the neighbouring Arab States were massing on our borders ready to march across.

BEN

GURION

LOOKS BACK

When, some hours later, I went to inspect the damage done

by the Egyptian bombing which marked the opening of the Arab war o n the new State, I remember thinking that if we were now responsible for our destiny, the rational question might well be whether in a few days or a few weeks we would have a destiny to shape. For we had no planes to match their planes, no artillery, no tanks. Yet none of us at the time had any

doubt about the outcome. A few days earlier, I had received a n urgent message from General George Marshall. He was United States Secretary of State at the time, and he urged me desperately not to go ahead with m y declared intention o f proclaiming independence. I had had similar messages from several other governments and distinguished individuals, some friends, some not so friendly. Marshall was a friend, a true friend, and he tried to discourage me not because he was opposed to a Jewish State but because he thought we would be quickly destroyed b y the overwhelmingly superior forces o f the Arab States. H e thought they would attack us if we declared our statehood, and our small, poorly armed forces would be overrun. H e begged me to wait for a more favourable political climate and in the meantime international arrangements might be made whereby the United Nations Partition Resolution could be implemented in some form. Here, then, was the counsel o f a friend and the military appreciation of our situation b y one of the world’s outstanding soldiers. O n the face o f it, such advice was not to be dismissed lightly. Yet it could not deflect us from our chosen course. For Marshall could not know what we knew — what we felt in our

very bones: that this was our historic hour; if we did not live u p to it, through fear o r weakness o f spirit, i t might b e genera-

tions or even centuries before our people were given another historic opportunity — if indeed we would be alive as a national group. However grave might be the repercussions of the decision to declare our independence, I knew that the future would be infinitely worse for m y people if we did N o t do so. We decided to go ahead and proclaim our independence as planned. Let me add that there was absolute unanimity among all m y colleagues in the 13-member National Administration [the 10

REFLECTIONS

ON INDEPENDENCE

DAY

body which became the Provisional Government of Israel the moment the Proclamation had been read and signed]. I remember that these thoughts were in m y mind when, o n m y way home from the late afternoon Independence ceremony, I watched the people dancing in the streets, celebrating the historic act to which we had all put our hand. I did not dance with them, though I felt with them the emotion o f the moment. I t was something to see — the sheer joy in their faces, the light in their eyes, the exuberance o f their movements, all caught in a surge of ecstasy. They were right to dance, I thought, even though I was all too aware — as many o f the dancers must have been aware — o f the dangers that faced us and the sacrifice we would suffer in defending the statehood we had just gained. I t had been the same, I reflected, some five and a half months earlier when the United Nations passed their Partition resolution calling for the end o f the Mandate over Palestine and the establishment o f independent Arab and Jewish States. I was asleep when that U N decision came through, on the 29th o f November 1947, because o f the time difference between New York and Jerusalem, and I was awakened to be given the news. I was in Kalia at the time, on the northern edge o f the Dead Sea, where I had gone to rest. Next day I returned to Jerusalem t o find the streets alive with rejoicing and celebration. I re-

joiced too, but I was much concerned with the morrow; the

attacks did in fact come the next day. As a matter o f fact, on the night o f Independence I was also awakened - twice. The first time was to hear the news o f President Truman’s declaration recognizing the new State o f Israel. The second was to be persuaded to make an Independence broadcast to the world — i t was about four o’clock in the morning, so that with the time difference it reached New York listeners in the evening. While I was broadcasting, listeners heard the crump of bombs landing near the improvised TelAviv studio from an Egyptian bomber. As soon as I had finished m y broadcast, I went to inspect the bomb damage, and the plea and warning of General Marshall came back to me. Would he prove right? I did not think so, though I knew his fears were well grounded. I knew equally well in m y heart that no one outside Israel could possibly II

BEN

GURION

LOOKS BACK

feel as we did, that we had to seize the historic moment and that despite the odds we would win. I t is probably Clausewitz who talked o f the conflict of wills in warfare: the stronger of the two wills wins. I knew, with Marshall, that we would be vastly outnumbered, and that we would face an enormous

superiority of arms. But I also knew, what Marshall did not know, that our will would prove stronger — not because we were . more militaristic than the Arabs but because we would be

fighting for a cause and also because defeat for us would mean national destruction. For the armies of the neighbouring Arab States, it was largely a battle for spoils. Failure for them would not mean the loss o f their countries, nor a n end to their exist-

ence as national entities. I t is also true, as Marshall indicated, that we had only a partisan force to fling against the regular armies of the Arab States. These armies, fully-fledged military machines, had

been trained for the kind of warfare that would soon be upon us. They were equipped with the standard weapons appropriate to a regular army, and were organized in the standard formations suitable for large-scale warfare — corps, divisions, brigades. We had the Haganah, an underground defence force with all the limitations o f a force that had had to train and operate in secrecy and conceal its weapons from the Mandatory authorities — no heavy weapons, small formations, an emphasis on local defence, much o f it static. As a matter o f fact it was only two months earlier, in March 1948, that for the first time we had undertaken engagements in which we committed a force as large as a brigade — and a very small brigade at that. But I had read m y Washington, as Marshall had also certainly done, though no doubt with different eyes. What struck m e so deeply was the nature o f Washington’s A r m y — they were

underfed, under-armed, with no proper clothing and meagre transport. They could have been called a rabble. Yet they had the stronger will — and they were victorious. I don’t say there is not a limit to the odds that can be faced and overcome. I do say, however, that the will of a people and the spirit and morale o f its army are immeasurably powerful factors in war and can be decisive. I knew they would be decisive in our war o f inde-

pendence. 12

REFLECTIONS

ON INDEPENDENCE

DAY

I n the event, General Marshall proved to be right in his reading of his intelligence reports: the Arab armies did attack soon after I had finished reading the Independence Scroll; they did march across our frontiers; and they did outnumber us very heavily in men and arms. H e was wrong in his prediction of the outcome. (So were m a n y other military experts, including

Britain’s Field-Marshal Montgomery who, someone told me,

had uttered the thought that ‘the Arabs would hit Israel for six!’) I do not blame Marshall for being mistaken — he was

pleased, by the way, to have been proved wrong — for he could not have known our people as we know ourselves. H e could not have known of what our people would be capable when roused to a supreme effort— as they were b y the threat o f destruction. Another figure springs to mind as I talk o f ‘threat of destruction’ and of people ‘roused to a supreme effort’ — Winston Churchill. A n d something I witnessed in London not long after he became Prime Minister may well have had a bearing on m y decision to go ahead with the Declaration o f Independence. I h a d flown t o England b y a circuitous route i n the early

summer o f 1 9 4 0 , leaving Haifa on the 25th o f April and reaching London o n the 1st of M a y — some three weeks after Germany invaded Norway and Denmark, nine days before she entered Holland and Belgium, nine days before Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister. I was Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine at the time, and I had come to England to try to persuade the British Government to authorize the establishment of a Jewish Army and to get it to utilize Palestine as a supply base for the forces in the Middle East b y developing her industry and agriculture. I was also anxious to secure a change in the Mandatory Administration, particularly the replacement o f the High Commissioner, Sir Harold McMichael. Because o f m y position I had been granted the appropriate military priority for a seat in the plane, even though both the Palestine Administration and the Colonial Office were vehemently opposed to the Jewish Army project and to developing Palestine as a supply base. They were highly reluctant to do anything which they thought would strengthen the Jewish position in Palestine, even though i t would at the same time be promoting the Allied war effort. They had even refused 13

BEN

GURION

LOOKS BACK

recruitment to the forces of Palestinian Jews who had rushed to join u p as soon as war broke out, and only at the insistence o f short-staffed local British military commanders did they finally agree to accept them — but even then only at the same rate

as Arabs volunteered. Since there was almost no Arab

volunteering, this proviso soon had to go by the board, and

Palestinian Jews were accepted into British regiments; but under political pressure, many o f them at first were kept on noncombatant duties. We felt that we had the right to fight, and we had the same right as other nations to fight under our own banner as part o f

the Allied Forces — particularly as Hitler had singled us out for special treatment and had declared war on us long before he had attacked anyone else. Soon after the outbreak o f war we had urged the acceptance of a Jewish fighting formation. I n London, Weizmann (Dr Chaim Weizmann, later to become Israel’s first President) had been most active, seeing members of the Government, army generals, members of Parliament, newspaper editors, exhorting, entreating, begging them to

accept our help. But the British Government showed no disposition to do so. I resolved to add m y voice to the efforts o f m y London colleagues. There were a few members o f the Government who were friendly and sympathetic to our cause,

the

most

outstanding being Churchill. But there was strong

opposition from the very ministerial colleagues who were

directly responsible for Palestinian affairs, notably Malcolm MacDonald, who was Colonial Secretary under Chamberlain, and Lord Lloyd, who replaced him when Churchill became Prime Minister. (Though let me say right away that, unlike Malcolm MacDonald, Lloyd was a sincere and honest man who spoke his mind straight-forwardly, and I always respected him even though he was an anti-Zionist.) Though Churchill was the kind of man who could have pushed through policy despite opposition, particularly after he became Prime Minister, it was perhaps understandable that our affairs were not at the top of his list of urgent priorities. The project was shelved for the time being, and Palestinian Jewish volunteers continued to serve i n British regiments — they were n o w allowed i n combat

units. Only in 1944 was our proposal finally approved, though

14

REFLECTIONS

ON INDEPENDENCE

DAY

in limited form, and the Jewish Brigade Group was set up. Credit for this must go largely to Weizmann and Moshe Sharett. But this is not the story I wanted to tell you. This is just the background to m y presence in London in 1940. I t is what I witnessed there at the time that I recalled some eight years later on

the eve of our independence. What I witnessed was the Battle of Britain, the battle that turned the tide, the battle o f ‘the few against the many’. I t climaxed several terrible months, perhaps the most terrible and the greatest months in Britain’s history, when she stood alone, after the fall o f Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France, with Italy linked to Germany, the United States neutral, German submarines taking a savage toll o f British shipping and invasion expected daily. Then came the nightly attacks by the Luftwaffe, with their massive destruction and dreadful casualties to the British people. I saw the nightly trek to the shelters at the sound o f the siren, and was impressed b y the orderly and cheerful manner in which the people behaved. I sometimes saw them when they emerged after the long night to find their homes in ruins. I saw them go about their business during the day as if the nightly horror did not exist, and proceed without panic to the shelters when there

were daylight raids. I heard the defiant tones of Churchill on the radio, and I saw defiance growing daily in the expressions and

actions of the people. ‘We can take it’ was their slogan a t the time, though any rational analysis of the respective strength o f Germany and Britain would have shown that they did not have a chance. Few of them could have told you how they would win,

but they were utterly certain that they would. I was enormously impressed by the spirit of this people who faced such odds with such confidence. M y faith in human capacity has always been strong, and what I witnessed then reinforced it. As a matter o f fact, I wrote something of this in a letter home to m y colleagues a t the time — o n the 21st o f August

1940:

‘Last

week was the turning point in the war. . . . Hitler suffered his greatest defeat. . . . Since the 8th o f August, more than 7 0 0 Germ a n aircraft have been destroyed. . . . T h e danger is not yet

past. Churchill realizes this better than most. I n his great speech 15

BEN

GURION

LOOKS BACK

yesterday, he did not gloss over the difficulties. . . . The general

spirit of confidence is based on the will and capacity to fight. . . . This has been an extraordinary example

O F H O W IMPORTANT

IS M O R A L FORCE I N T H E BALANCE O F MILITARY POWER. ENG-

LAND’S VICTORY THIS

W E E K IS PRIMARILY A VICTORY O F COURAGE

A N D SELF-CONFIDENCE. I T W A S T H E HEROIC VICTORY O F A F R E E PEOPLE DETERMINED T O R E M A I N F R E E A T A L L COSTS.’

I n Tel-Aviv in M a y 1948 — Jerusalem was then under siege

and isolated — as I pondered the dangers of an independence declaration and the odds against us, I recalled the men and women o f London during the blitz. A n d I said to myself: ‘ I have seen what a people is capable o f achieving in the hour o f supreme trial. I have seen their spirit touched b y nobility. This is what m a n can do. This is what the Jewish people can do.’ We went ahead. O f course m y faith in m y own people in Israel was not a blind faith. The story o f the few against the many was the story o f our lives. I knew what they could do because I had seen what they had accomplished in Palestine against adversity. I had seen

it almost from the moment I had stepped off the ship a t Jaffa as a young man o f nineteen in the summer o f 1906 after a two weeks’ voyage — steerage — aboard a Russian freighter. I had seen young intellectuals, who had forsaken the material

comforts of middle-class life in eastern Europe and who had never done a day’s work with their hands, now labouring in the resistant fields o f the land they sought to rebuild, back-breaking work from dawn to dusk under the hot middle-eastern sun, with

precious little nourishment that could be secured from the pittance they were paid. A n d they stuck it out, year in year out.

I had seen some of them braving the heat and humidity of swamps which they cleared for cultivation, and braving disease which took its vicious toll. Yet they stood their ground and did not desert the swamps for healthier climes. I had seen them beat off attacks b y Arab marauders. I had seen the rise o f the kibbutzim, seen young Jewish men and women respond to the challenge o f pioneering and not be put off b y hardship. Later, during the organized nationwide Arab onslaughts o n the Jewish community, I had seen how m y people reacted to physical danger; and when the Mandatory Administration

16

REFLECTIONS

ON INDEPENDENCE

DAY

tried to curb our development, I had seen how they reacted t o political danger. The story o f the Haganah, the story of ‘illegal’ immigration, the story o f the creation of farm settlements in isolated areas, all accomplished under conditions o f adversity,

of constant physical danger and rigorous administrative restrictions, showed courage, ingenuity and a sense of purpose. I do not say that other peoples would not have displayed the same qualities under these circumstances, given the same historic background. I say only that m y people did. And this knowledge was part o f me, pervading m y mind at all times, and especially in moments o f major decision. I said that the British experience o f 1 9 4 0 had made an impact on me, and I had remembered it in 1948 o n the eve o f our independence. Coupled

with my knowledge of what my own people had done, it enabled me to make one of the greatest decisions in m y life with comparative ease — that is, with a minimum o f doubt and a

maximum of confidence.

17

CHAPTER T W O

EARLY YEARS

You were telling of your arrival in this country as a young man of nineteen. You were clearly a politically conscious young man, well aware of the revolutionary ferment among some of the intellectuals in both Russia proper and Russo—Poland. How 1s it that you were not caught up in one or other of the local revolutionary movements, seeing your future there? Someone once suggested to me that if you had stayed in eastern Europe instead of coming to Palestine, you might have been one of the colleagues of Lenin and Trotsky. Impossible. I think I was determined to go to Palestine and play m y part in building this country from the

age of five, and a t no time from then until I set sail fourteen years later did I think o f doing anything else. I was born and brought u p in a Zionist home and soaked u p the Hebrew language and a love o f Zion as an infant. M y father was very

active in our home town of Plonsk in the Lovers of Zion movement, and the house always seemed full of his fellow members, and always full of Zionist talk. [Plonsk was a small town in what is now Poland, some forty miles north-west of Warsaw. David Ben Gurion was born there on the 16th of October 1886. His family name was Green, and he Hebraised it to Ben-Gurion shortly after he settled in Palestine.] H e got me a Hebrew teacher when I was five. But m y grandfather started teaching me the language o f the Bible when I was three. H e would take me o n his knee and play Hebrew word games with me — games which I remember to this day. H e taught me a great deal, and instilled in me a love o f the Hebrew language which has never left me.

18

EARLY

YEARS

H e b y the way was a very orthodox Jew. M y father was not very devout but he observed religious traditions. I myself had an orthodox religious spell when I was about seven, but not thereafter. M y father did not seem to mind. I think he knew I would be what he would have called a ‘good Jew’ because o f m y interest in Hebrew, Jewish history and Zionism. I remember that as a boy I wanted nothing o f Polish nationalism. I thought it irrelevant to Jewish freedom; and at elementary school in Plonsk I decided to learn Russian and not

Polish. One could choose either. O f course I could not help acquiring Polish, but it was not m y language at elementary school. Since there was no secondary school in m y home town, I went to high school in Warsaw. The plan, when I entered, was that I would proceed later to the Polytechnic to study engineering, for I knew that engineers would be needed in Palestine. But b y the time I had finished high school, I was completely caught u p in the Labour Zionist movement and anxious to get to Palestine as quickly as possible. I t was indeed as a schoolboy that I began m y organizational

activities and public speaking on behalf of the Zionist idea. You mention our awareness at the time o f the revolutionary ferment among the intellectuals. O f course we were aware o fit. We were part o f it. Among the politically conscious young Jews, there were two streams of revolutionary ideas and activity. One was

Zionist; the other was Bundist. As Labour Zionists, I and my group fought on two fronts, one major, one minor. The minor front was the already convinced Zionists, and our purpose was to persuade them to accept our thesis that true Zionism involved emigration to Palestine, working with our own hands to ‘redeem’ and build u p the country, and create there a model society based o n social, economic and political equality.

The major front was the Bund, and here we sought to convert them to the Zionist ideology. The Bundists were Jewish socialists who were bitterly anti-Zionist. They saw the salvation of the Jews in joint efforts with the Polish socialists to overthrow the existing Tsarist régime. Once that happened, they said, it would be replaced b y a socialist administration in which all peoples o f all colours, creeds and nationalities would enjoy the good life and there would no longer be any persecution or

19

BEN

GURION

LOOKS BACK

discrimination. We Labour Zionists were o f course in favour of

a change of régime in Poland from feudalism to democracy, and we worked towards it. But we were convinced that this alone would not solve the Jewish problem. Even with a new régime the Jews would still be subject to discrimination and persecution — possibly not as bad as before, possibly not at all for a period, but always subject to majority whim or policy, always subject to restrictions if not downright maltreatment. I t gives me no pleasure to note that what I and m y friends thought and said about this in the early years o f this century has unfortunately proved right. I n Russia and other countries in eastern Europe where revolutionary régimes overthrew the previous administrations, it is the sad fact that Jews suffer discrimination.

Many of the most vociferous Bundist leaders who gave energetic help t o the revolutionary movements lost their lives in purges when the revolutionaries came to power. Moreover, even if one could guarantee that Jews would be safe in a new liberal Russia or Poland, we Labour Zionists still insisted on rebuilding Zion. For we could achieve Jewish free-

dom, we felt, only if we could achieve national independence in our own land. We had the right of any other nation to develop our own language, our own culture, our own way o f life, not o n the sufferance of another people in another land administered b y a government not o f our own choosing, but as of right, b y our own exertions with our own people in our own land where we could be our own masters. The more I imbibed the mood and talk in m y father’s house, and the more I read o fJewish history, the more convinced was I that only in the Jewish homeland would the Jew be rid o f his bondage. I t was the revolutionary spirit o f the times that spurred me and m y friends to do something about it. We would therefore argue with our fathers’ friends and spend after-school

hours preaching on Zionist platforms, that Zionism did not mean loving Zion from afar, but going there and building it ourselves. I remember very well a summer day — I must have been seventeen or eighteen at the time — swimming in the river with m y friends Shlomo Zemach and Shmuel Fuchs and then, as we lay drying in the sun on the bank, arguing seriously about the 20

EARLY

YEARS

need to go to Palestine as quickly as possible. Zemach and Fuchs were older than I was, but the three of us were about the most active of our Zionist group and we spoke on platforms together. We decided on that summer day that a start had to be made, and before we had changed from our bathing costumes into our clothes it had been resolved that Zemach would go

first. H e went, Shlomo Zemach, the great friend o f m y young days, and a year and a half were to pass before I saw him again, when he came back to Plonsk for a brief visit, and then returned to Palestine together with me. Throughout the year and a half that he was in Palestine without me, he wrote me a weekly letter — every week without fail. The letters were never less than eighteen pages and they sometimes ran to twenty-five o r thirty.

I n each, he would tell me all that he had done since his previous report — the difficulties in getting a job, the kind of work he did when he found work, how he took to manual labour, how he found the country, the discussions on Zionist and labour ideology with the various groups of pioneers he met. Against the visionary dreams we had as youngsters in Plonsk he set the hard realities he found on the spot. And the gap was wide. Yet there was never a word of despair in his writings. Problems, yes; there were plenty; but in telling me about them, he would also suggest the steps we must take to overcome them. From Zemach’s letters — and each week I would wait avidly for the postman — I came to know intimately every feature o f the regions he had visited, every aspect of the physical, social

and political climate of the land a t that time. When I eventually reached Jaffa, with Zemach at m y side, I reached a country which was as familiar to me as m y birthplace. Zemach’s letters collected in book form would have made a fascinating study o f Palestine in the early years o f this century and o f the struggles o f the Zionist pioneers to lay the foundations of the Jewish State. I had kept them, just as I had kept m y own daily journal, and I took them with me to Turkey when I went there to study law in 1 9 1 2 . But I left them behind when I rushed back to Palestine at the outbreak o f war i n 1 9 1 4 , and was never able to retrieve them. I took steps to trace them several years later, but without result. A great pity, for there was much in the detailed history 21

BEN

GURION

LOOKS BACK

o f our struggles at that time which the young Israelis o f today

would do well to know. Zemach came back to visit his family early in 1906 — he had left home in secret and now wished to make it u p with them and we decided that I and a few others would go with him to Palestine when he returned. W e set off in the summer o f that year for Odessa and there got passages on a Russian cargoboat. We travelled fourth class, sleeping on the floor. I t was not a pleasure trip. The journey took two weeks, the vessel calling at

Salonika, Smyrna, Alexandretta and Beirut before anchoring off Jaffa. I spent the first year working as a labourer in the orange

groves of Petach Tikvah and its surroundings. Petach Tikvah was a Jewish settlement about a two and half hours’ walk from Jaffa. Zemach had been right. I t was not easy to get work, even though the employers were Jewish colonists, sons of pioneers, who had inherited land and farming experience, but not the pioneering spirit o f their fathers. They preferred hiring Arab

labourers because these were more used t o the work than the young intellectuals from Russia, did not cavil at the appallingly low pay, and had none of the ‘socialist nonsense’ of the young Jewish immigrants. But fellow pioneer labourers helped me and I got work. Life was tough, but not as tough as it had been for the parents o f our employers. T h e first Zionist pioneers w h o had come to the

country some twenty-five years earlier really faced hardship when they established the first farm villages — Petach Tikvah in

1878, Rishon LeZion in 1882, Hadera in 1891. I have long been fascinated b y the history o f these early settlers and I never cease to

be amazed a t their extraordinary determination and per-

sistence. The settlers at Hadera, for example, had to clear the entire region o f marsh before they could even get at the land to till it. Naturally, every one of them came down with malaria, and in those days there were no cheap and simple preventive drugs, and there was not much to be done when one got the sickness except wait and suffer. With recurrent attacks, the whole system o f the body became weak and debilitated and less resistant to other diseases which were also rife. Small wonder that the death rate was so high in Hadera. Yet the pioneers 22

EARLY

YEARS

stuck it out. There was the extraordinary case of the young settler and his wife who lost three children through complications following malaria. They died one after another. Their friends urged them to move to a more healthy spot; they had done their duty b y coming to Hadera to pioneer, and they had made their heavy sacrifice — the loss o f their three children; no one had the right to expect more from them, nor should they

expect more from themselves. They should now leave Hadera and spend their future in less discomfort and less danger.‘No,’ sald the bereaved parents, ‘we will not quit. This is where we came to settle and this is where we shall remain. Lo nazuz mi-po

(we shall not move from here).” And remain they did. Well surely that was true all over, and true also ofyou andyour group when you worked at Petach Tikvah? You too lived in the pre-DDT age, and Sejera was not immunefrom malaria. O h we had malaria all right. I ‘malaria’d’ quite

often, and indeed the doctor told me, after several particularly heavy bouts, that I had better leave the country and go back to

Europe, for I obviously could not take it. O f course I just

whistled at that kind o f advice. But after all I was on m y own. I was not yet married and I had no family responsibilities. But

there in Hadera, three children died and still the parents wouldn’t move. That takes a special kind of guts and dedication. Because of it, of course, Hadera flourishes today, and you need imagination to visualize its vines and orange groves and fields of wheat and barley and cotton, its factories and cottages and gardens, as one gigantic marsh. Part of this process is true o f many o f Israel’s settlements, where the pioneer founders stuck it out and the survivors patiently laboured to transform the local conditions and made the region habitable. But the story of Hadera and the other early settlements is particularly poignant because conditions were so much more primitive, the people so few and isolated; and these were people who had come fron comfortable homes in Russia, remote from the malarial mosquito and from the physical need to do manual labour to gain their bread. I f only the new generation of Israel could be made aware o f the early history o f modern Zionist

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settlement, I am sure the spirit of pioneering, lively as it is here, would be higher. Such an awareness would counter the tendency to take so much for granted, with little thought o f the toil that went into the achievement.

But is it not the tendency of every generation to take for

granted theproduct of the toil of the earlier generation? So it would seem; but it is definitely not true of my friends when we were young, nor was it true o f most Zionist pioneers who came to Israel both before and after me. We steeped ourselves in the history o f Jewish generations and our own activities were stimulated b y the stories o f their lives. I think the history of the Jews in this country over the last eighty years should be part of the curriculum in our schools, and I am sorry that I did little t o introduce it when I was Prime Minister. This is partly because I was preoccupied with problems o f defence, immigration and land development. I t is also because I

just did not know that it was not taught in schools. Only after retiring to Sde Boker did I find out how lacking were our children in knowledge o f this part o f our history. A n d how did 1 find out? From letters these children send me. I get hundreds o f letters a month from thirteen-, fourteen- and fifteen-year olds.

They write t o me on all sorts of subjects, mostly political problems which worry them and on which they either seek my guidance or engage in controversy. These youngsters were born in an independent State. They know nothing at first hand o f Jews living as a minority in a strange land, or o fJews living in this country under a foreign administration, or, indeed, o f an Israel without roads and piped water and big cities and hospitals and hygienic conditions. T o them, independence and modern services are taken for granted, and their letters show an amazing ignorance o f the struggles that brought both about.

To get back to Petach Tikvah, what work did you do

there? I ’ m afraid I could not have been much use as a labourer in the early months, for, as I have said, I suffered more

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YEARS

than most of the others from serious attacks of malaria. I would have a relapse about every two weeks, and each time I would be knocked out for six days. The only thing to do was lie on one’s bed. The days were not so bad, just uncomfortable, but the nights were horrible, nightmares from dusk to dawn. I told you what the doctor said — D r Stein was his name — ‘It’s no use. You can’t stay here. Go back.’ I stayed o n — and continued to get relapses; and this lasted the whole of that year. Then it suddenly stopped, and I never had another malarial attack since. Being so frequently sick, I could not be given a reasonable farm job, and so I was put on to carting wheelbarrows o f manure to spread on the orange groves. I became pretty proficient at this job b y the time I left Petach Tikvah and went to Sejera. M y wage as a field hand carting manure was 8 grush a day (about 3 cents o r 21d.). Then came Sejera, and with m y health regained, with no more malarial attacks, with a congenial group o f like-minded young people, and with m y first job o f real farming, I began to feel I was living the life we had envisaged in our discussions and dreamings as youngsters back in Plonsk. I became a ploughman, working with two oxen, and I enjoyed every minute of i t , though the work was hard and food and living conditions meagre. We felt, as we worked, that we were really building our homeland, and we had a very lively sense that we were rejuvenating soil which had been cultivated b y our forefathers. Sejera, midway between Nazareth and Tiberias, in lower Galilee, was part of a tract o f land which had been bought by the Jewish Colonization Association — JCA, an organization founded and financed b y Baron Maurice Hirsch o f Paris to enable Jewish villagers from pogrom-ridden Russia to settle as farmers in countries outside Europe. Sejera was now being worked b y a group o f young Zionist immigrants whose ideal was, as we called it, ktbush avodah — conquest of labour. I mentioned earlier the difficulty Jews found in getting labouring jobs, for Arab landowners naturally hired Arabs, and private Jewish landowners also preferred Arab labourers to Jewish field hands. Yet to become labourers, to work with our hands, was one o f the basic purposes i n our coming to the country — to build

the land ourselves, rather than leave the physical labour to the

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Arabs, and to create a Jewish working population, rather than a class o f overseers. We therefore created the movement called kibush avodah, and we would go out in groups, each one a collective labour force, and work in someone’s private farm, if we could get one to accept us, or, more frequently, on land acquited b y J C A or the Jewish National Fund. [ Jewish National Fund land was acquired largely with the pennies, kopeks and cents contributed by Jewish families all over the world to buy land in Palestine which would remain the inalienable property of the nation.] Sejera was J C A land, and Sejera in fact was the first collective. We the labourers were each paid 4 0 francs a month — though I believe I started off at go francs a month when I joined the group. (There were different currencies in circulation in different parts of the country; I think the franc we got then equalled 5 grush — about 2 cents or 14d. So m y first wage was about the then equivalent o f 2 cents o r 13d. a day.) The idea of a ‘conquest of labour’ group was to work a piece of land and prepare i t for permanent settlement, and then move off to another tract — either a swampy valley or a boulder-strewn hillslope — and get that ready for settlement. We, the ‘preparers’, intent on kibush avodah, were to be permanent pioneers, wandering from one place to another to carry out a kind of reclamation project and make the land fit for Jewish farm settlers. We had no intention at the time of becoming farm settlers ourselves. Ours was the job o f pioneering, of creating labour possibilities for a good many other Jews. These possibilities would give them a dignified return for their work and not leave them at the mercy o f reluctant employers who, when they did hire them, exploited them and worked them hard for little pay. There were some among the ‘conquest of labour’ groups who also saw in their activities the creation of a Jewish proletariat without whom, they felt, the Zionist revolution would fail.

The Sejera group stayed there t w o years, and this, as I say, was the life for us. Curiously enough, although most of us were new to manual labour, it was not the work that caused us hardship. I t was lack o f sleep. We were kept awake b y marauding Arabs — or the constant threat of a marauding attack. We were in Galilee, surrounded b y Arabs, and their aim was not so much murder, or to drive us away, as theft. U p to then, Jewish

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settlements had hired Circassian guards to keep off the marauders. But the Sejera group started something new. I t was absurd, they said, for Jewish settlers to be dependent on others for the guarding o f their crops and their lives. I f they continued in this fashion, they would never be free and they would never be safe. They had to defend themselves, and if there were places where guards had to be hired, the guards should be Jews. They therefore founded the organization o f watchmen called in Hebrew Hashomer. Hashomer in fact was the forerunner o f the Haganah, the underground Jewish defence force which we established after the First World War and which played so vigorous a part in defending Jewish life right u p to independence in 1948 when that task was taken over by the Israel Army. We at Sejera, therefore, responsible for our own defence, were always conscious o f the possibility o f attack. This sometimes led t o over-vigilance — and to a n amusing incident which is

still

fresh in m y mind after fifty-eight years. I had been sowing a field rather far from our base at Sejera, and it was getting rather late. So although I had not quite finished, I decided it was prudent to return home and leave behind the remaining bags o f seed, ready for me when I returned to continue work next morning. When I told this to the man in our group who served as works manager, he said it would not do, and that I had to go b a c k ; if I could not complete the sowing, a t least I h a d to re-

trieve the seed. I took m y mule and off I went. As we neared the field, the mule stopped and refused to go on. I dismounted and tried every trick I had learnt to get him to proceed, but I could not shake him. I must have spent about three-quarters o f an hour trying to soften his stubbornness, but without effect. There he had stopped and he would not go a step farther. Suddenly I heard shots coming from Sejera. Mounting, and turning the mule’s head in the direction of home — which is where he wanted to go i n the first place — I raced back as fast as I could. As I

approached the farm compound, I heard someone shout, ‘Look, he’s here’. The group then rushed u p to me with cries o f ‘Where is he? Where’s the bedouin? What happened? Did you kill him?’ When they had calmed down, I heard the story. Some time

after I left, they spotted a horse running riderless in the dusk. 27

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They immediately thought that since I had been gone so long they had not counted o n the obstinacy o f the mule — I must have been stopped b y a bedouin who had no doubt dismounted in order to rob me. There must have been a fight, and the horse had made off — the horse they had seen. But they had not known whether I had killed the bedouin or he had killed me. So they decided to seize the horse, fire shots in the air, and then, in the event that I had killed the Arab, approach the nearby mukhtar (chief) and explain that there had been this attack — he had no doubt heard the firing — and here was the horse. As they were telling me the story, one of them cried : ‘Heavens above, it’s M Y horse.” I n the general panic, none had recognized i t . They had been so anxious about the delay in m y return that they had imagined an attack; and the sudden appearance o f a horse fitted so neatly into the picture o f what they thought must have happened that none bothered to take a second look. Events at Sejera were not always as harmless as that. Many was the time when we had to fight for our lives. (Attacks would

come not from our

nearest

Arab neighbours, but from roving

bedouin or villagers farther afield.) I remember thinking at the time that having to fight off raiders gave us an added respect for human life, both our own and the enemy’s. This was heightened when we lost two o f our comrades in an engagement. I f on our journeyings we would meet someone who looked suspicious, we would be wary and on the alert, but we would not shoat first. As a matter o f fact, though, w e used to move through

Arab areas i n those days without any keen sense of danger. I remember once riding on horseback from Sejera right through to Beirut — across upper Galilee and the Lebanon, passing through exclusively Arab regions — without any trouble and without fear of trouble. And when I used to come down to Jaffa, I would often walk to Ben Shemen, again through Arab districts, without molestation. True, in the Coastal Plain and in Judea, there was less danger. I n the Galilee, however, one had always to be careful, particularly round Kafr Kana [Cana o f Galilee, scene ofJesus’ miracle o f turning water into wine] and Nazareth, both not far from Sejera. There, too, Arab attacks had theft rather than murder as their aim, but this of course did not rule out murder. Most of us learned prudence through our

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own mistakes. I learned m y lesson at the Arab village o f Yema, while walking once from Sejera to Yavniel. [Yavniel is about eight miles south-east of Sejera and eleven miles due east o f

Nazareth.] Going through Yema, I was stopped by an Arab who seemed interested in passing the time of day. Courtesy demanded that I stop for a chat, in the course o f which he expressed interest in m y revolver. I was sufficiently unsuspecting and foolish to hand it to him when he asked to examine it — a piece o f folly I was never to repeat. N o sooner had he received it when he pointed it at me and grabbed a small package I was carrying. I made a lunge to retrieve m y revolver but he struck m y hand with the butt, almost breaking m y knuckles, and fled. Furious at the incident, and particularly with myself, I hastened o n to Yavniel and went straight to the police station to report what had happened. Palestine was then under Turkish rule, and law and order in the Yavniel district were in the hands o f two Turkish policemen. I was full o f m y story and rattled i t off with great excitement, which was in marked contrast to the apparently lackadaisical attitude o f the policemen. There they sat in comfortable postures, their eyes droopy, seemingly bored and indifferent, though occasionally they would interrupt m y flow with a leisurely question. When I was finished, they sent for the local mukhtar, the Arab chief in the area, while I waited with growing impatience. I t was m y first encounter with the law. When the mukhtar arrived, I was asked to repeat m y story. There were more questions, more time went by, and m y fury kept mounting. Though I held myself in check, I wanted to shout at them to stop wasting time and rush out to chase m y assailant. But the tale and the questions were followed b y silence. There we all sat, I , the mukhtar and the two Turkish policemen. N o one said a word. I t was now more than an hour since I had first come in to report. Suddenly, though still leisurely, one of the policemen opened a drawer, took out a cane, stood up, went over to the mukhtar, and without warning, started belabouring him with i t . I looked on dumbfounded, utterly horrified b y -the spectacle, and unable to understand what it was all about. The beating stopped and the policeman growled to the mukhtar to get home fast, find the m a n who had stolen the revolver and the package and bring them back to the 29

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station. Woe betide him if he came back empty-handed. The mukhtar left. I remained. For an hour, the three o f us sat without exchanging a word. Then the mukhtar returned. I n his hands were the revolver and the package. That was how law and order were maintained in this country

As a matter o f fact, I never did get back the items stolen from me. The policemen said they had to keep them so that they could be produced in evidence when

i n the early years o f this century.

the culprit was eventually caught and charged. WhenI told this later to m y Yavniel friends, they laughed at m y naivety. The

police, they said, had no intention of taking action to bring my assailant to court. H e had been relieved of his spoils, and he had

probably had an uncomfortable time with the mukhtar who had suffered on his behalf. But it was too tiresome for the police t o pursue the matter further, particularly as b y doing nothing

they would be richer by one revolver and one package. However, the incident rankled, and some weeks later I met Joshua Hankin and told him about it. Hankin was a great fellow who helped to acquire much Jewish National Fund land in the Valley o fJezreel for pioneer settlement. Wise in the ways o f the country, he was determined to raise the level o f law maintenance as part o f his purpose to make the land safe for Jewish settlers. All I wanted at the time was to get back m y revolver, but Hankin was concerned that the legal procedures should be faithfully carried out. Here was an incident on which he could tackle the Turkish authorities and prod them to bring the culprit to trial, both as an example to the public and to indolent police. As a result of his efforts, m y attacker was finally brought to trial in Acre and given a two years’ sentence. But m y revolver was never returned.

You said a few moments ago that Sejera was the first collective. But what about Deganiah, which 1s always talked of as the ‘mother ofkibbutzim’ ? (Deganiah, in the Jordan Valley, wasfounded in 1909.) Indeed, I have often wondered why it was that you had not been one of thefounder-members ofDeganiah.

Sejera was the first collective group that worked as labourers on the land, preparing it, as I explained earlier when 30

EARLY

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I talked of ‘conquest o f labour’, for permanent settlers. Deganiah was the first collective to settle on the land they had themselves prepared, and to continue, as a permanent settlement, to live the collective life. They therefore created the first kibbutz, and can take pride in being the mother of this unique form o f social and economic organization.

Why did I not join Deganiah? Well, I was already a veteran o f Sejera when the Deganiah group was in formation, and then, in 1 9 0 8 , when the Sejera group moved on to ‘conquer’ another tract of land for Jewish labour, I took the opportunity of returning to Plonsk for a few months.

The fact was that by this time I was about to reach the age of conscription for the Russian Army. For myself, o f course, I was a Palestinian Jew, but to the Russian authorities I was a Russian subject, liable for military service. What they thought I was would not have interested me, nor what they considered m y obligations, for I no longer regarded myself as a Russian subject and I had no intention of serving in the Russian Army. I certainly had no desire to serve in an army which stood ready to fight in the defence of everything I abhorred, including antiSemitism. Moreover, I had already charted the course o f m y life and begun the journey — to live and work in Palestine and help to build the Zionist State. But m y family in Plonsk were still subject to Russian authority, and I did not want to cause them trouble. The rule was that if a young man failed to present himself for army service, his father was held responsible, and, i n addition to being subjected to various discomforts, was liable to a fine of, I believe, 300 roubles — a heavy sum a t that time. I could not allow m y father to pay the penalty for m y acts, and so

I returned, presented myself a t the conscription office, took the oath, and was inducted as a private in the army. M y father was now no longer responsible for me, and if I deserted, I would be posted as a deserter, but they could take no action, not even a fine, against m y father. That is precisely what I did. I deserted, smuggled myself out o f the country, and made m y way back to Palestine. The Deganiah group, when I returned, were still working as a ‘conquest of labour’ collective in the Jordan Valley, like our earlier group a t Sejera. B u t whereas we had

worked J C A land, they were working on land bought by the 31

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Jewish National Fund. Their site was known in Arabic as UmJuni, and it was little more than a malarial swamp which they were draining, cultivating and getting ready for settlement. They would be moving on to another site when their reclamation work here was completed.

Their work was hard, possibly harder than

at

Sejera. But

their financial arrangements with the Jewish National Fund

were somewhat better than ours with the JCA — though they were still pretty meagre. The group got 45 francs a month for each member (about go cents or 6s 6d) and any profits at the end o f the year were to be shared equally with the Jewish National Fund. They managed to make a small profit the first year, and again the second year. I t was then that Yosef Bussel, their key founder-member, said: ‘Why not let us stay here and develop this site, rather than move on to another? I s not this also “‘kibush avodah™?’ D r Arthur Ruppin, the distinguished sociologist and expert on agricultural settlement, who headed the newly established office of the Zionist Organization in Palestine, had come to the Jordan Valley to talk to the members o f this pioneer group. I

think there had been some trouble with the local J N F foreman and he was trying to resolve it. His sentiments were all with the workers, and when he heard of Bussel’s idea he was delighted to let them have the National Fund land for permanent settlement. That is what the land had been bought for. However, not all o f Bussel’s comrades were with him in his approach, and there was heated argument. Some were appalled a t the idea o f becoming ‘owner-farmers’, a hated class, associ-

ated in their minds with the exploitation oflabour and materialism. I t was not ‘pioneering’. Bussel told them this was nonsense. They were not turning themselves into plantation owners, hiring cheap Arab labour and sitting back with folded arms to enjoy the profits. They could continue as a collective. Everybody would continue to work as they had done. The land would be owned b y no one individually but b y all collectively. The majority o f the group backed Bussel. A n d that is how the first kibbutz was started, Deganiah. None o f them could know at the time that they were creating something unique, that others would follow their pattern, and that the kibbutz idea 32

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would expand and develop and become so important a force in the country. N o one could have foreseen the influence o n Jewish and universal values which their modest — to them — undertaking on the banks of the Jordan was destined to have. They probably did not give it a thought. They did what was de-

manded of them by the aim they had set themselves — to attach themselves to the soil o f their homeland and to live a life o f

honest work in an atmosphere of comradeship and freedom and within a framework of equality. They did not at the time ponder upon the deep significance that underlay the seemingly simple thing they did. Only now do we recognize how great was the

blessing hidden in the seed that was planted in their souls. And perhaps even now we are witnessing only a fraction of its ultimate yield.

33

CHAPTER THREE

PIONEERING

Wouldyou say, though, that the kibbutz has less influence now than it had before the State was established?

Yes, but that influence is still very great. The kibbutz is still the symbol of pioneering in Israel, and an example to our young people, attracting the best o f them. I t is true that the rate o f growth of the kibbutz movement has not kept pace with the growth in Israel’s population. But i t grows absolutely, with new kibbutzim* being established each year. I would say that among the changes brought about b y statehood, two in particular affect the kibbutzim. One is that statehood offers additional opportunities for pioneering, so you might say there was a kind of ‘competition’ in the kibbutz for the young idealist with a spirit of adventure. There is the regular army, the navy, the air force — and b y the way, the air force and the paratroopers, the élite volunteer units in the forces, have a higher percentage of kibbutznicks than any other group in the country. There is the merchant marine. There are the school-teaching jobs In remote areas; there are calls for farm instructors for new immigrants. Many are drawn to thesepioneer callingswho might otherwise have found their automatic way to a kibbutz. The second change brought b y statehood is mass immigration. Many of the immigrants came from unsophisticated backgrounds, remote from the advanced social and economic

principles of kibbutz life, and it was inevitable that fewer of them would join kibbutzim than was the case before the State was founded. Many of the earlier immigrants had undergone

* Kibbutzim is the Hebrew plural of Kibbutz. 34

PIONEERING

training in pioneer youth movements before their arrival in the

country. But this does not mean that none of the newcomers is capable o f pioneering or that the children o f some o f them will not find their way to a kibbutz. Pioneering is not exclusive to the élite. I t is inherent in every individual. Each man and woman has

hidden spiritual powers, which find expression in special circumstances. History is replete with the heroism o f ‘ordinary’

people who have responded to the challenge of the hour. Every good military commander knows that the measure o f his success is largely the measure in which he can transform an army o f ‘ordinary’ mortals into an army o f heroes. I n our case,

the pressure of historical need coupled with educational guidance produced an army of pioneers — young men and women from small towns in Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Galicia and also America, who came here and founded kibbutzim. The immigration since the foundation of the State has included very many from the countries of Islam, Asia and Africa, where in recent years they have had little opportunity to draw upon the treasures o f Jewish culture. But their basic character is no different from that of their immigrant predecessors. They too

have a rich potential of pioneer ability, and if it is difficult for the middle-aged to change their way of life, their children can. A n d I have no doubt there will be as many of them among the future founders o f new kibbutzim as there will be Sabras

and children of European parentage. They too are heirs to the martyred community o f Worms, the sainted disciples o f Rabbi Akivah, the warriors of Massada. But don’t you think that Israel’s growing affluence is leading to a decline in idealism? I have heard the comment from visitors who remember Israel during its period of austerity that with the development of the country and the ever-rising standard of living, idealism seems to be waning and there is a greater yearning for the benefits o f materialism. I don’t know whetheryou think this is true or not. But what interests me more isyour view on the uniwersal implication of this thesis. Do you believe that idealism canflourish only when people live in conditions of hardship and physical challenge and not in an atmosphere of material prosperity? 35

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No, I do not. I think the spirit of idealism can flourish whatever the standard of life that is either suffered or enjoyed. As a matter of fact, as I have already told you, most o f the early idealists went from comfort to hardship. Their idealism flourished when they were enjoying a good standard of life back in Russia or Poland, and it prompted them to come here and live under conditions that the poorest yokel back home would have shunned. It is m y view that the spirit of idealism is as alive in this country today as it was fifty years ago.

But I know where the confusion arises. People compare the conditions o f young pioneers today with those of their counterparts at the beginning of this century. But you cannot set today’s patterns in the context of sixty years ago. The basic values may be the same, but with economic achievement they assume a different garb. I know that some o f m y own friends who worked with me at Sejera are often guilty of this confusion of thought.

They recall the hardships we suffered then, compare them with the material benefits enjoyed today, and conclude that idealism is not what it was. This is nonsense. Here is an example of what I mean. Some sixty years ago, to get from Jaffa to Jerusalem, we used to walk. We would do it in two

days, one day for the trudge from the coast t o Bal el Wad,

where we would rest the night, and the next day for the climb through the Judean hills to Jerusalem. I t never occurred to us to d o the journey b y a drive i n a gharry (horse-drawn coach).

This just wasn’t done b y people like us. For one thing, we did not have the money. For another, the drive was most uncom-

fortable. There were n o roads a t the time, and these carriages had no springs, so you got bumped and shaken all the time. I know, because I once took a drive when I had to get from Jerusalem to Haifa rather quickly. I had posted a letter to m y father in Russia and it kept being ‘returned to sender’. Postal communications were not what they are today. There were different postal regions in the country, and none seemed to be subject to a common central authority. Anyway, after I had had m y letter returned for the second time, and anxious about m y father’s being worried b y m y involuntary silence, I decided to go to Haifa and personally get m y letter onto the ship that was

leaving for Odessa. For that I

went

36

by carriage. Well, I was

PIONEERING

almost a wreck b y the time I got to Haifa, and m y bones ached from the banging and bumping over miles and miles o f rough track in a springless vehicle. Never again for me. I got m y letter off and returned to Jerusalem about a hundred miles away — on foot. Walking, then, became part of the pattern of our lives, and it is associated with pioneering in the early days. But did that mean that to remain pioneers we had to continue to go everywhere on foot even after the invention o f the internal combustion

engine, springs and balloon tyres, and after the laying of tarmac roads?

Times change. Conditions change. And the form taken by idealism changes with them. I n the early kibbutzim, the members lived for years in tents, then for years in wooden huts, and only fairly recently did they allow themselves the luxury o f stone o r concrete houses. Today, a n e w kibbutz m a y get perma-

nent housing within a year or two. Does this make them less o f pioneers? Surely their response to the challenge o f the kibbutz way of life shows them to be of the same fibre as the early pioneers. T o be an idealist does not mean going back to the conditions o f the past. You asked a few moments ago about the kibbutz having less influence today, and I suppose you are referring to the comment

I hear occasionally that ‘only 4 per cent of the population in Israel are in kibbutzim’ — the suggestion being that the extent o f pioneering is smaller than it was. This is misleading. Four per cent, let me tell you, is a good deal larger than the percentage of Zionists who came to pioneer in Palestine at the beginning o f the century. Those who came were only a fraction o f 1 per cent o f those who could come. Any impersonal outside expert who based his conclusions on these stark statistics alone might have dismissed the immigration and pioneering o f this tiny minority as worthless, without influence, and with no prospect of succeeding. Yet this tiny minority became the driving force in the

building of this country. They did wonders; and their influence was out o f all proportion to their numbers. A n d i n the decades

between their coming and the achievement of statehood, there were even tinier minorities within that minority who undertook

actions which advanced us along the road to sovereignty. They

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were small groups of simple and anonymous idealists who carried out remarkable and dangerous acts o f resistance against the Mandatory authorities, whether it was intelligence missions within the police force or arms smuggling or whether it was the

constructive resistance of illegal immigration o r the overnight establishment of the ‘watchtower and barricade’ settlements in

the late 1930’s. He would have been a foolish prophet who said at the time that because the people physically involved in these activities were only a small percentage of the population, their influence was comparably small. I t is because o f them that Israel is a sovereign State today. Since the establishment o f the State, there have been m a n y

fields of action which have called for idealism, and the response has been magnificent. There are still the kibbutzim, with, as I mentioned, new ones being established each year. There are the

Defence Forces — and I know of some rare exploits by our soldiers, sailors and airmen which may have been matched but cannot have been topped by any other people. There are the moshavim (co-operative small-holding settlements) which have been created in remote areas and which call for a high standard o f idealism and pioneering. There are the children of older kibbutzim and moshavim who have left the comforts o f their

homes t o work with new immigrants in the new development areas. There are the teachers and doctors and farm instructors who have done the same.

No. You don’t have to walk thirty miles a day and eat dry bread and sleep on a board near a malarial swamp to be a pioneer in the Israel of 1965, as you did in the Palestine o f 19os,. Today you can enjoy better material conditions and still be an idealist. I believe that the spirit o f idealism

is still high i n the

State o f Israel, though we must ensure that i t is continually fostered. W e must never take it for granted and allow ourselves the luxury o f resting on past laurels. Is that why you left the Premiership and retired to kibbutz

Sde Boker? Leadership by example? I retired from office for several reasons. O n e o f

them was certainly because I wanted to live here in Sde Boker, a 38

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place which keeps me closest to the whole meaning of Zionism and the revived State of Israel. I first visited it in 1952 when I was on a tour o f the Negev, inspecting new settlements and development projects. I was taken to what was then a bare encampment in the heart of the desert where a group o f some twenty young men and women were creating a kibbutz. They had come to know the Negev during their army service, and fallen in love with i t ; and so they had decided to settle there o n

demobilization. I t was shortly after this that I saw them. They had just started scraping sand and clearing boulders to get at some soil which they could begin cultivating. I watched them as they worked, taking in their bleak surroundings — stretches o f

sand on all sides, broken here and there by hilly outcroppings of rock. I t was all very forbidding, a wilderness, hard and barren, where it seemed nothing could grow. I was full of pride in these youngsters who had come here to settle, proud that the spirit o f challenge and pioneering was so alive. Deganiah had been started in similar challenging circumstances and it had become the show place o f the Jordan Valley. Sde Boker, too, though set

in a more stubborn part of the country unfavoured by

nature, could become a show place of the Negev. If I was impressed with the young kibbutz members, I was also much taken b y the austere setting. Here, I felt, one was face to face with primeval nature, challenging man to be creative, to impose his will on her and force her to bring forth her yield. I n the process of working this reluctant land, one could also meditate, think through problems, for the starkness of the surroundings would make it easier to concentrate and would prompt simplicity and lucidity in thought. I resolved there and then, in m y mind, to join them. I did so a year later when I left government for a while. I remained a membe* of Sde Boker even when I returned to the Premiership in 1955, taking the opportunity on week-ends and vacations to stay there. With m y retirement from government in June 1963, Sde Boker has been m y home.

What work do you do on the kibbutz? A t first I was given the job of tending sheep. And I 39

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learned a new farm job that I had not known before — sheep shearing. I was allowed to work half a day on the farm and the other half writing. Then we found that the area was not well suited to raising horses, cattle and sheep, as we had hoped, and we went over to fruit plantation. We now grow excellent apples, peaches, plums, grapes and almonds, and because of our climate we are able to market them in the off-season at comparably higher prices. I n the last few months, however, I have done little farm work, for m y writing pressures have been great. Do you find Sde Boker very different from other kibbutzim

in the Negev? Not really, except that it seemed to me when I first saw it that there was not a single feature about the location which favoured settlement. All was challenge. But this o f course has been true in greater or lesser measure o f the other Negev kibbutzim, and if Sde Boker had not existed I might well have joined one o f them. However, not only was Sde Boker there, but its members decided to keep it independent and not seek

affiliation with one of the political kibbutz movements. This too attracted me.

You say this, you who were not only Prime Minister but leader ofMapa, keenly political and a believer in national organization? Yes, and I know that m y attitude caused much discussion in m y party, but I never regretted this decision. O f course I a m keenly political, but I am against the intrusion o f

party politics, Mapai included, into the national kibbutz movements and into kibbutz life. With a couple o f exceptions, all the

kibbutzim in the country are affiliated to one or other o f the political parties. Political feeling is so intense that if a member finds himself unable to subscribe to all the tenets o f his party, he is out in the cold, even though he may be a n excellent kibbutznick — a good worker and a helpful comrade. I should add that this intolerance is particularly marked in the kibbutzim o f

Ahdut Avodah and Mapam, whereas in the kibbutzim linked to Mapai there is greater freedom o f political thought. What 40

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happened a few years ago, when a political rift on the national scene led to a split i n a number o f kibbutzim, was tragic. People

who had created a kibbutz and worked together for years as comrades suddenly parted company because of political differences. I t was a most unhappy episode, and it stemmed directly from the kibbutz being linked with political parties. Yes, I believe in national organization. But not political. I think all kibbutzim should be organized in a single national movement which can concern itself with the special problems o f kibbutz life. But the kibbutz should have no political affiliation itself; the individual members should be able to have direct party membership, and they should be free to join the party o f their choice — or to join no party. The irony is that in the meantime Sde Boker has become

affiliated

to

Ihud Hakibbutzim ve’hakevutzot, the Mapai

kibbutz movement! This was not because of me, I assure you,

nor because the members suddenly saw the light. I t was simply that they felt the need for backing b y a national movement. Since most of them were politically-minded, and since no non-

political kibbutz movement existed, they chose the one that was least restrictive, the one which did not insist on a regimentation o f their political thought. A t election time, Sde Boker votes are distributed among several parties and not given exclusively to Mapai. As a matter of fact, one of m y closest young friends here and a founder member of Sde Boker is a man whose politics could not have been more bitterly opposed to mine — h e was once one of the most active members of the Stern terrorist

group. I do not know quite what his politics are today, nor how he votes at elections. Yet he is a first class kibbutznick. Since I am mentioning young friends here, let me recall —though not at all in a political context — that one o f m y great delights was the discovery one day that the young man working with me as a fellow member o f Sde Boker turned out to be the grandson o f an old friend named Regachevsky. Regachevsky, who later changed his name to Regev, was a comrade of mine at Sejera in 1 9 0 7 !

41

CHAPTER FOUR

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To get back to those early years, what happened after Sejera — afteryour returnfrom the ‘military service’ trip to Russia?

Well, I had been pretty active in discussions — particularly in discussions about our future — in the labour Zionist movement in the country, the Poalei Zion, and I had also begun contributing articles to the organ o f the movement, a journal called Ahidut (Unity). What set me writing were some incidents in Petach Tikvah which made me very angry Jewish workers being turned down b y Jewish farmers in favour o f Arab labourers at a lower wage. 1 wrote two articles for Ahdut, and after that I became a frequent contributor, though the paper itself did not appear too regularly. The movement then decided to issue it as a monthly with Itzhak Ben Zvi (later President o f Israel) as editor, and Ben Zvi asked me to join the staff. I did not d o so a t the time, as m y heart was

still

i n manual

labour. But for several months after m y return from Russia, I visited pioneer groups in the Galilee, and I became convinced that we needed to organize ourselves on a national basis. We would never enlarge the opportunities for Jewish labour and we would never get dignified conditions o f work unless we were organized. A n d when w e were, we would not only raise workers’

standards but we would also become a force to secure from the Turkish authorities an appropriate status and appropriate rights for the Jews o f Palestine. I n 1 9 1 0 I left Galilee for Jerusalem, the new headquarters, 42

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after Jaffa, of the Poalei Zion party. I joined the staff o f Akdut, which we later turned into a weekly, and also helped in organizational activities for the party. Our three major aims were to organize the workers, unify the Jewish population, and get the Ottoman Government to grant us autonomy.

O f course I was torn, in those Jerusalem days, as I was often in the years that followed, between the wish to remain a labourer on the land and the wish to use whatever talents I had to advance the welfare o f the Jewish people. But after a little while in Jerusalem, I was convinced that coming there and involving myself in educational and political work had been a correct decision. Looking back after fifty-five years, I still think the decision was proper. Not that I would not have enjoyed the simple but tough life o f a farm labourer. I think I could have been quite happy — but the happiness would have been limited

by the frontiers of my simple pattern of living, and marked by twinges of conscience that I could and should be doing more for m y people. I certainly would not have had the deeply satisfying existence i t has been given me to enjoy. After several months in Jerusalem, i t became clear to me and to Ben Zvi that in order to get anywhere with the Turkish authorities, we needed to know the Turkish language, Turkish law, and more about the Ottoman system of government. We began to think o f the possibility of going to Turkey to study law at the University o f Constantinople (Istanbul), thereby fitting ourselves for more effective work when we returned. But i t was not until early in 1 9 1 2 that we were able to go. We went with the blessings of our party — and I with the financial support o f m y father. M y father of course had wanted to send me an allowance when I first reached Palestine, b u t I h a d declined. N o w I accepted — and I must say h e was very pleased. For h e

had made no bones about his reluctance to see me go when I had left home to become a land worker in Palestine, even though h e had had a life-long devotion to Zionism. A n d I well under-

stood that part of his pleasure now was that I seemed to be forsaking the land for the legal profession. T o equip myself with some knowledge of Turkish so that I would be able to follow the lectures at the university, I went first to Salonika, and found myself staying there much longer than I 43

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had expected. I chose Salonika, which was part of the Ottoman Empire a t the time, because it had a large Jewish community, and I thought it would be more congenial to be with m y own people. Salonika was a strange city for a Jew who was now living in Palestine but who had lived earlier in the Diaspora. For unlike Plonsk, which was a gentile city withJewish quarters, Salonika seemed in many ways to be a wholly Jewish city. There were lots of Jewish manual labourers and Jews in other

occupations which, in Plonsk as in most cities of the Diaspora, were always associated with non-Jews. Only in Palestine had I seen Jews with picks and shovels. Yet here I was in Salonika, in the Diaspora, and all around me were Jews who worked with their hands. Almost all the stevedores and other port workers in this very important harbour town were Jews. I n fact, ships which arrived on a Friday night had to wait till Saturday night or Sunday morning t o be off-loaded. While some of the Jews spoke Turkish and Greek, all o f them spoke Ladino. This was the Jewish language — the ‘Yiddish’ if you like — of the Sephardi Jews, and it is very like Castilian Spanish. Indeed, it bears a closer relation to Spanish than did the Yiddish of central and eastern Europe to the German language. [The word ‘Sephardi’ is a Hebrew word meaning

‘Spanish’, and the SephardiJews, who are t o be found mostly in the Mediterranean area, but also in more distant lands, are descendants of the famous Jewish community of Spain who were expelled or fled the Inquisition at the end o f the fifteenth century. They carried the language with them.] I lodged with a Jewish family, and the mother o f the house could never quite get over the fact that, though I was a Jew, I could not speak ‘the Jewish tongue’ — Ladino. T o speak to m y fellow Jews, I would talk in Russian and a friend would translate i t into Turkish or Ladino. There were times when a double translation was required — from Russian into Turkish and from Turkish into Ladino. I kept thinking that some time in the future — I did not know i t would be so soon but I knew it would happen eventually — Jews would b e able to talk to each

other in their own ancient language — Hebrew. This was m y first experience of spending any length of time among Sephardi Jews, and I was quite amazed at the idea they 44

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seemed to have about Ashkenasi Jews. [The Jews o f Russia and Europe are Ashkenasis. So are most of the Jews of the United States who come originally from Russia and Europe.] I was pretty surprised when I was warned one day by a local friend who was helping me with m y Turkish not to tell the mother of the house where I lodged that I was an Ashkenasi. H e was somewhat diffident about explaining why, but when I pressed him, he said that the ordinary Jew in Salonika equated an Ashkenasi with an ‘owner of a house of shame’. I t appears that some time before, a Jew from Russia had come to Salonika and opened such a ‘house’ which had become well known. I am sorry now that I so set m y face against learning Ladino. I could have picked it u p in three months with the utmost ease, and I would not have had to go to the laborious trouble o f learning Spanish, as I did a few years ago when I wanted to read Don Quixote in the original after m y secretary had whetted m y interest. H e knew Ladino well, and he spoke so glowingly of the beauty of the language that with his guidance and the aid of a grammar and a dictionary, I learned enough Spanish to be able to read. While I studied — I was Prime Minister at the time —

I kept thinking of m y Salonika days and what a pity I had done nothing about the language then. But there were two reasons why I had not. One was that I looked on Ladino as I looked on Yiddish; it was the language of Diaspora Jews, and I was passionately involved at the time in trying to get it replaced by Hebrew. A n essential part of m y Zionism — seeking sovereignty for the Jewish people in their land — was reviving the language they had spoken when they last enjoyed sovereignty, the language of the Bible, Hebrew. The second and more immediately practical reason was m y concentration o n Turkish. I wished to learn it thoroughly so as to do well in m y university studies,

and I was not prepared t o take time off — and possibly confuse myself — i n trying to acquire another tongue. So Turkish

was what I learned and tried to speak all the time I was in Salonika. Salonika had a Faculty of Law — I think it was a branch of the University of Constantinople — and it was there that I started m y law studies. I n fact the first three months o f m y stay, I devoted twelve hours a day to learning the language, and then I 45

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had enough to begin attending lectures. I stayed altogether for a year and a half and then, with the capture of the city b y the Greeks in the Graeco—Turkish war, I left for Constantinople to resume m y studies there. You once told me that although your general purpose in going to Turkey to study was to familiarize yourself with Turkish law, the better to be able to deal with the Turkish authorities in Palestine, you had a more specific reason. Yes, I had. The Parliament of the Ottoman Empire at the time included a sprinkling o f nationals from its colonial provinces. The imperial Government also comprised a few non-Turks, and b y tradition there was always one Armenian and one Jew. M y idea was to go to Turkey, study Law, and thus equip myself with the necessary professional training to stand for Parliament. I would get a seat in Parliament, and then I would become the Jewish member o f the Ottoman Government. Although the presence o f non-Turks in Parliament and Government was largely political window-dressing, I thought that I would be close enough to the seat of power to be able to advance the development and progress of the Jews in Palestine. A t the same time, I would be able in a variety of ways to assist a Jewish freedom movement which might attain at first a measure of autonomy, and eventually full independence. This was. m y reasoning. I must say I was surprised to find this approach so much at variance with that o f the Arab students I came across in Constantinople. Some of them were m y friends, and we would speak

quite openly about our lives, our political philosophy, our hopes o f the future. I t seemed strange to me that these intellectual young Arabs did not see the future in terms of their struggle for independence from Turkish rule. None of them spoke at the time o f the creation of independent Arab States, let alone working towards such a goal. O n the contrary, most of them looked forward to a vaster and more grandiose Turkish Empire, offering grander opportunities for administrative posts which they, Arabs educated at Turkey’s mother university, would be asked to fill. Before them, i n such posts, stretched a life o f ease, 46

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luxury and material honours. As a matter of fact, very few of them took any part later in the movements for Arab independence, whereas the Palestinian Jewish students at the time, Itzhak Ben Zvi, myself, David Remez, Moshe Sharett and others, were to spend their lives actively fighting for Jewish self-determination, and most of us lived to see the birth of the State of Israel and to be among the signatories of the Pro-

clamation of Independence. With what kind of ideas, with what thoughts of thefuture, didyou leave Constantinople to return to Palestine after the outbreak of war in August 1 9 1 4 ?

I confess with no idea that I would be spending too much time away before returning to m y studies i n Turkey.

Indeed I left with Ben Zvi largely to see what was happening in Palestine in the new world situation, and we both expected to be back pretty soon. We even left most of our belongings behind, including, as I have said, m y precious diary and papers. We did not expect the war to last four years; we did not expect the Tsarist régime in Russia to collapse; we did not expect the vast Turkish Empire to crumble and the British Government to come out with the Balfour Declaration. We certainly did not expect that soon after our arrival in Jerusalem, continuing with our party work and issuing Ahdut, we would be clapped in jail b y the Turkish authorities and eventually expelled. We did not think that though the war would bring untold sufferings to all — including our own people — i t might also offer new opportunities for our national status; and w e could not have foretold

in 1 9 1 4 the direction in which those new opportunities would lie. I , for one, could not have imagined that I would end u p spending almost three years o f the war in the United States. But once I was expelled, together with Ben Zvi, early in 1915, America was the one country where we felt we could continue our labour Zionist work. There were b y then hundreds o f thousands ofJewish immigrants there from Russia and Europe who were sympathetic to our cause, even though they had chosen that land and not Palestine as the country of their 47

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future. And America was still neutral. So to America we sailed, even though we had our difficulties: first getting from Jaffa to Alexandria when we had no personal papers, nothing to define our nationality; then persuading the British authorities, who had jailed us for being enemy aliens — the Turks had expelled us for being pro-British — to release us; and then trying to get transatlantic passages to the States. But we finally made it, reaching Ellis Island in the summer o f 1 9 1 5 . There we were taken care of b y our friends in the Poalei Zion party.

It was in the party that we both worked. The ideas we sought to advance were the same as those we had preached back in Plonsk and Warsaw before we had emigrated to Palestine — that Zionism had to be a practical movement which stimulated Jews to come to Palestine to be pioneer workers and themselves build

up their homeland. We eventually founded the Hechalutz (pioneers) movement to give young Jews in America farm training to prepare them for their new life in Palestine, and also to instruct

them in Hebrew. We did not know when we would

all be able to return to Palestine, but when we did, we wanted to be accompanied b y a veritable army of pioneers. I a m afraid that we were not very successful in terms o f num-

bers — though the young Hechalutz members who did leave America for Palestine in the decades that followed did admirable work here and have an honoured place in the kibbutz and in the general pioneering life o f this country. I think we did manage to plant some fruitful seeds, but it was very hard going. The Poalei Zion was a very small branch o f the Zionist Movement, and even the movement as a whole, as far as the rank and file were concerned, saw their Zionism largely in philan-

thropic terms — though in this they were certainly generous. The leaders did engage in political activity, but they were not always convinced that only the backing o f solid settlement achievements b y the Jews in Palestine could give success to their activity, and that without the practical side of Zionism their efforts would be sterile. As in Plonsk, we also found ourselves having to spend much energy and time arguing with the Bundists. We found in America, unlike in Plonsk o f course, an atmo-

sphere of freedom for the Jews which they had never known in 48

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Russia or eastern Europe. A t no moment were we lulled into the illusion that this was real Jewish freedom, freedom for the Jewish people, the answer to the Jewish problem; but we were not effective in converting the bulk o f American Jewry to

our point of view.

CHAPTER F I V E

P O L I T I C A L APPRENTICESHIP

Then came your return to the Middle East in 1 9 1 8 as a volunteer with the Jewish Legion in the Royal Fusiliers, and your resumption of work in the labour movement after demobilization, working towards the creation of a united Jewish labour federation. This federation, the Histadruth, was founded in 1920 and you became its secretary general, which made you the most powerful labour leader in the land. Would you say that this was the beginning ofyour serious political “apprenticeship,” giving you the kind of experience which helped you to carry the highest responsibilities of the State when it was brought into being twenty-eightyears later? I would say that m y political apprenticeship, as you call it, began much earlier, and I would add that the very creation o f the Histadruth was the fruit o f years o f political

activity and experience on the part o f m y colleagues and myself. I t is true, of course, that holding office in the Histadruth gave us responsibilities and opportunities which we were able to develop and broaden in scope so that eventually we could proclaim and run the affairs of the State with confidence. But as for me, I consider that I started the preliminary phase o f m y political apprenticeship when I was a schoolboy in Plonsk and Warsaw, and in this country shortly after m y arrival. For what is political activity? I t 1s subscribing to political ideas which you think are right and just — and doing something about i t ; trying to persuade others to accept your outlook, then trying to per-

suade them to join you or support you, then organizing them into a political force, and then using this force to secure the fulfilment o f your ideas. True, in m y early years, m y political 50

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activity was limited to propagating ideas and getting others to accept them. Political organization came a little later, after I

had left Sejera and was working on Aidut and for the Poalei Zion party. That is when the second phase of m y political ap-

prenticeship really started. The Histadruth was founded ten years later, and I think it was a direct result of the experience we had gained in those ten years, just as the achievement of statehood — and the achievements of the State — would not have been possible without the experience gained b y the nation and the leaders in the years that preceded it. I t takes more than a proclamation to make a State; and it takes more than an election to produce effective leadership; such leadership emerges only when behind i t are years and years of political activity at the grass-roots level. I t took a lot of such activity and effort to establish the Histadruth — and it was a good thing that i t was established, for witho u t i t I doubt whether w e w o u l d have h a d a State. B u t i t was

not easy. I t was not like founding a company, with a handful o f people in a room taking a decision and signing a piece o f paper. I t was one o f the hardest things to get going, to get our own party to accept it, then to get other labour parties to join us,

then to get general acceptance among the workers; and when we had got all that, to use the new organization as a force to get

its claims accepted by the employers, by the Government — even by the other parties in the Zionist Organization. H o w were we able to do it? Only b y harnessing the ideas and experience we had acquired in the years we had worked as labourers in Petach Tikvah and Sejera, and after. We knew the conditions o f the labourer because we had experienced them ourselves. We knew the pattern of their thoughts because, as comrades, we had talked and argued for years. We knew that only b y organizing ourselves could we both improve our lot

and weld ourselves into a political force that would enable us to build the country, create a defence movement, and eventually become our own masters. Yet this organization, so obviously needed, so obviously imperative if the Jewish position in Palestine was to be advanced, did not come into being spontaneously. I t had to be fought for and worked for. Its launching was due largely to Ahdut Avodah, the new party of labour 51

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unity which our Poalei Zion party had been largely responsible for creating in February 1919. But this unity did not extend to the Hapoel Hazair labour party, and it was to take months before we got them to come in with us in the Histadruth which they did, but retained their independence as a party. Not until 1930 were they to merge with Ahdut Avodah to form a

new united labour party, Mapai, which became, and has remained, the largest political party in the country. But did you not find that with the backing o fan organization in which you held important office, and as leader o f a party which was

growing in numbers, the range of your political experience now widened to take in the crucial element of power? You could now wield power, albeit limited, and this gave a dimension to your political experience which you never had in Plonsk nor in Sejera nor yet in your party work in pre-war Jerusalem. It was now surely your aim to increase that power so that eventually you and your party would be able to implement your ideas. I am suggesting that the practical process of developing political power really started with your assumption of office in the newly created Histadruth and leadership in the Ahdut Avodah party, and that

the political experience you gained in the years that followed stoodyou in inestimable stead whenyou became Prime Muinister. Yes, I would say this was true. And I would add that m y fundamental approach in political life to the struggle for power and the use of political power once it has been achieved has remained virtually unchanged since m y Histadrut days. Whether you hold humble office in a municipality or in a small union or high office in a national government, the principles are the same; you must know what you want to achieve, be certain o f your aims, and have these goals constantly in mind. You must fix your priorities. You must educate your

party, and must educate the wider public. You must have confidence in your people — often greater confidence than they have in themselves, for the true political leader knows instinctively the measure of man’s capacities and can rouse him to exert them in time of crisis. You must know when to fight your political opponents, and when to mark time. You must never compromise on matters of principle. You must always be con52

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scious of the element of timing, and this demands a constant awareness o f what is going on around you - in your region, if you are a local leader, in your country and in the world if you are a national leader. A n d since the world never stops for a

moment, and the pattern o f power changes its elements like the movement o f a kaleidoscope, you must constantly reassess chosen policies towards the achievement of your aims. A political

leader must spend a lot of time thinking. And he must spend a lot of time educating the public, and educating them anew.

As I look back, it seems that in many ways political life was much more difficult in the old days than it was when I became Prime Minister. For when you have a State, you have a parliament and a cabinet and laws and the machinery for enforcing them. O f course you need the support o f your people, but once you have parliamentary sanction for policy, it can be implemented b y a written order. I n the early years before statehood, our major political weapon was our power of persuasion. We had to persuade our people to accept our policies. We had no

power of enforcement. Once we had set u p the Histadruth, we could then try and

force the pace ofJewish development in Palestine both with the British Mandatory Administration and with the World Zionist authorities. The administration, we felt, was not very friendly, despite the fact that the High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, was a Jew. The world Zionist leaders, we felt, were cautious, and tended to put the accent more o n high level political negotiation than on down to earth practical development. We in the labour movement in Palestine always insisted that the fate o f Zionism would be determined in the land o f Zion, and whether or not it would be achieved would depend less o n international political promises than o n what we managed to build u p in the country. The Balfour Declaration and the aim o f the League of Nations Mandate would remain pieces of paper if we did not manage to bring Jews into Palestine and prepare the land for large scale settlement. Immigration and settlement would themselves create the inescapable political facts which would bring independence. We pressed hard for Zionist funds to be devoted to land purchase, to the creation of new farm settlements, to facilitate

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immigration. I myself spent much time in the 1 9 2 0 ’ s travelling to

London and to western, central and eastern Europe addressing the Jewish communities there, urging the Zionists to be true

Zionists and to come and join us in Palestine, and pressing the Zionist leadership to give top priority to mobilizing more and more resources to make possible the expansion o f our pioneer labours. During those years, I also found myself as a representative o f Palestine labour at World Zionist Congresses urging the same theme. I do not say that Zionist leaders in the Dia-

spora were opposed to us, or did not support us. They were positively proud of the work that was being done in the country — most o f which indeed was financed b y the funds they raised — and the kibbutz to them was something o f a showcase o f

Zionism, the symbol of idealism in which they could take vicarious pride. But I felt that deep down they believed that whatever rights would be secured in Palestine for the Jewish people would be gained less through our practical pioneering work than through political negotiations with and pressure o n the Mandatory and other governments. We, on the other hand,

while recognizing that political negotiation and pressure were of high importance, believed that they were secondary to the task o f development in Palestine. You may say this was just a ques-

tion of emphasis, of priorities; but I think it went deeper than that. We on our side were convinced that unless we extended our physical settlement o f the land, the most eloquent and energetic political approaches to Whitehall would come to naught; and that in fact physical achievement was the weightiest political argument and the one to which the Man-

datory and other governments would pay most heed. We never deviated from this approach and gradually the Diaspora Zionist leaders came round to accepting it. Years later, in July 1937, when the report o f the Royal Commission on Palestine was published (the Peel Report) recommending partition, it

was seen that the area they had recommended as the projected Jewish State followed roughly the areas which the Jews had settled! The Negev, for example, was out. Now I do not say there were not other reasons — notably British strategic reasons — for excluding the Negev, and these would have operated even if that region had been populated b y Jews. But it would have 54

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perhaps been more difficult for the Peel Commission to justify this recommendation. As it was, they could simply point to the emptiness of the Negev. Against this, we of course had the powerful political argument that the country was intended, in the terms of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, for the Jewish people, particularly for those who had yet to come. But I say that an even more powerful political argument would have been our physical development of the Negev. I t was with an emphasis on such practical development that we started working in the Histadruth in 1 9 2 0 . And, incidentally, in the process, we created something new in labour organization. The Histadruth, the General Federation ofJewish Labour, did not confine itself to improving conditions of work. I n the

absence of adequate social services under the Mandatory Government, the Histadruth initiated them for its members. I t took over the workers’ health service, Kupath Cholim, which became the best in the country. I t ran schools. I t made itself

responsible for the welfare of the workers. And then it took a big step further. T o widen the opportunities for work for the new

immigrants — shut o u t for the most part from Government projects and completely from the Arab economy — the Histadruth created jobs b y going into the business of building and con-

tracting for public works, which they were later to extend to heavy industry. Let me add, too, that for the first ten years of its existence, the Haganah (the Jewish underground defence force) was affiliated to the Histadruth. I mentioned earlier the establishment o f the Ahdut Avodah party in 1919. A t a party conference in June 1920 a t Kinneret, the decision was taken to organize a Jewish

Defence movement. The needs were now too wide to be met b y Hashomer (the watchmen’s organization founded at Sejera in 1 9 0 9 ) , and the executive committee o f the party was empowered to work out the arrangements for the new organization with the leaders of Hashomer. The result was the Haganah, though it was not called that at first. Its full name was Gedud Ha’ Haganah veHa’Avodah, Hebrew for ‘Legion o f Defence and Labour’, but for security reasons, it was always referred to in the early years b y the innocuous Gedud Ha’Avodah - ‘Labour Legion’ — with ‘Haganah’ omitted. Later, as the Haganah 35

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became bigger and stronger, with full time cadres, it was known

by no other name. I n December 1 9 2 0 , when the Histadruth came into being, it accepted the task o f defence, and the Haganah was affiliated to it. Yosef Hecht was its commander. This lasted until 1 9 3 0 when, following the Arab riots o f 1929, the Vaad Leumi (the Jewish National Assembly) set u p a nineman security committee to investigate the organization o f Jewish defence. They urged that the non-Histadruth section o f the population should have an equal representation in the

direction of the defence movement, and we agreed. A high command was established with six members. The three Histadruth representatives were Dov Hos, Eliyahu Golomb and Meir Rutberg; the others were Dov Gefen, Saadia Shoshani and Issachar Sitkoff. (Dov Hos and Eliyahu Golomb were two of four brothers-in-law who played a very active role in defence and political affairs. The other two are Moshe Sharett and Shaul Avigur. Hos was killed i n a car crash at the beginning o f

the Second World War and Golomb died a t the end of the war.) The command started off with faltering steps. Resources were

limited and whatever money there was went to the purchase of small arms and ammunition. There was no full time personnel —-

even the members of the high command themselves. They did not even have a fixed office, but operated from their respec-

not

tive places o f work. Only in 1933 was action taken to set u p a permanent staff and, on the basis o f parity, two organizers were appointed, Dov Hos for the Histadruth and Dov Gefen, an official o f the Tel-Aviv Municipality, for the others. Hos was later assigned to other Histadruth and political duties and was replaced b y Avigur, who became in fact the Haganah’s full time organizer. Avigur succeeded in strengthening the authority o f the central command against the tendency o f regional units to act independently and he also worked more closely with the Executive in Jerusalem o f the World Zionist Organization. For b y now our labour party had made great gains and at the 1933 Zionist Congress, we secured our first three seats o n the Executive, with myself, Eleazar Kaplan and Moshe Sharett as members. We were able to exert once again our decisive voice in the direction o f the Haganah, and from then o n began our most serious efforts to acquire arms — no easy task, and no easy 56

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task to get them shipped into Palestine without the knowledge o f the Administration — and also to start u p an undercover arms industry. Both activities were modest b y later standards, but they were a big advance on the situation in the twenties. Later, Avigur was put in charge of illegal immigration and Eliyahu Golomb became the central figure in the Haganah. Golomb’s name is indeed the one most widely associated with the Haganah during its crucial years — the late 1 9 3 0 ’ s and the war period. After his death, the leading figures were D r Moshe Sneh, then a member o f the General Zionist party, Zeev Shefer, a kibbutznick from Ayelet Hashachar, Israel Galilee, a kibbutznick from Na’an, Professor Yochanan Ratner, one o f the few top Haganah commanders with any advanced training and experience in a regular army — the Russian Army — and Yaacov Dori, the last Chief of Staff o f the Haganah and the first Chief o f Staff of the Israel Defence Forces when the State was established. I n the years immediately before the State was founded,

all the top appointments t o the Haganah command were in fact made b y me. Although I am digressing somewhat, can I ask at this point whether in founding the Haganah, you andyour colleagues had in mind only the immediate defence ofJewish settlements or wereyou also thinking of the need to create a trainedforce which you might eventually need to back up your political demands? I would say that the second purpose was not absent from our minds. But the first was most urgent, and that was enough to bring the Haganah into being. I have already told you of the considerations which led to the founding of Hashomer. They applied with even greater force to the Haganah, for we were more numerous and our settlements were more scattered. If we could not rely on our own defence, we cotild never break new ground. Moreover, the threat of Arab attack was now graver than i t had been in the early years of the century. Every new kibbutz or moshav which would now plant itself in some isolated spot — and all were isolated i n those days — could expect to be attacked on its first or second night. None would have lasted more than a couple of days if i t had been 57

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unable to defend itself. True, the Mandatory authorities were

responsible for defence. But even if they had shown the most sympathetic will in the world, they would not have had enough troops and police to guard every Jewish outpost. Moreover, if we h a d had to rely on them for defence, they and not we would have become the determining factor as to how many farm villages we established, and where. They and not we would have decided the pace of our development. For if we said we wanted to found a kibbutz in such and such a place, they could always veto i t by claiming that they had not the force to defend it. No, it was quite clear that we had to make our own defence

arrangements — even though this was against the Mandatory law and we had to go underground. And since moulding a nation was also part o f our Zionist purpose, we were concerned in developing a self-reliant Jew, one who did not depend on someone else to protect his life in his own country. I would say, therefore, that the immediate purpose o f the Haganah was to meet the immediate physical danger. The second purpose was to give us greater freedom and independence in our settlement and development programme. Not only would we not be put off from pioneering a region far from a Jewish-populated area and therefore open to attack, but we specifically chose such regions and eventually made them safe for further settlement. For it was our experience in those years that when initial Arab attacks were successfully beaten off and our people stood their ground, the attacks later became less frequent. The third purpose was to give self-reliance to our

people. And the fourth — which became more relevant as we moved into the 1930’s — was to fashion a force upon which w e

could depend should there be any attempt either on the part o f the Arabs or the Mandatory Government, or both, to trample o n our rights in the country.

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CHAPTER SIX

WEIZMANN AND HERZL

When you talked earlier of world Kionist leaders having morefaith in their political activity than in constructive work in Palestine, were you including D r Chaim Weizmann?

No. For him, as for us, the main purpose of Zionism was the work of creative development that was being carried out in the land o f Israel. Though he was leader of the Zionist movement, that movement was to h i m a means to a n end — reviving Israel as the homeland o f the Jews. This m a y sound odd to you,

for you will say that this is what every Zionist wanted. But I am afraid that to many o f Weizmann’s colleagues, the movement and the activities i t generated seemed at times to become ends in themselves. Actually, Weizmann was too great a man to be compared to his contemporaries in the movement. While I cannot claim to b e objective about h i m — I was tied to Chaim

Weizmann with a thousand threads, even though I opposed his views on several critical occasions — I would think it more appropriate to compare him to Herzl. Both were giant figures who rose to great heights in the cause of Zionism. Rarely in the history of any nation have two men, so close to each other in time, exercised so great an impact on the lives o f their fellows. Yet Herzl and Weizmann were very different from each other, different in background, in approach, in the nature o f their capabilities, and in their attitudes towards their own people. Herzl came from the world of the non-Jew, educated in an atmosphere of assimilation, knowing nothing of the language or literature of his people, unfamiliar with the Jewish masses, their mentality, their idiom. There was obviously an inherent Jewish 39

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feeling, but he got to Judaism and to the idea o f Jewish statehood through his reaction to external events — to the manifestations of anti-Semitism capped b y the Dreyfus affair. H e came to the Jewish masses from this ‘other world’ — and fascinated them as no east European Jew at the time would have done, arousing in them an almost Messianic fervour. (His dis-

tinguished appearance seemed to match the role of prophet.) This man, detached from Judaism until that moment, arrived on the scene towards the end of the last century as the emissary ofJewish history, come to awaken his people. O f east European Jewry, he knew only that they suffered poverty and persecution. Sensitive as he had always been to human sorrow - as his general writings show — he had the boldness and vision to recognize that Jewish suffering could be the spur to the nation’s rebirth when directed towards the goal of redemption. And he set about leading them to this goal, he who knew little o f their life, customs, language, culture. H e attracted them b y his great humanitarianism, his compassion, his love. I n a way, I suppose, he seemed to them like some distinguished distant relative. A n d to him they seemed perfect. I doubt whether he had any idea o f their faults and frailties; and if h e had, h e would never have

dared to criticize them. For he was not of their kind, and he was too sensitive and noble to risk giving offence. I n many major respects, Weizmann was the exact opposite. H e was first and foremost what could be called a Jewish Jew. H e was born in a small Russian hamlet within the pale ofJewish settlement, brought u p in the lap of Judaism among the Jewish masses and absorbing their insight, their humour, their intelligence. This was the man who later studied and settled in western Europe and acquired the ways of European culture, moving with distinction through the portals of the great o f many lands. H e spoke English, French and German as fluently as he spoke Russian, Yiddish and Hebrew. Yet his perceptiveness, subtlety, alertness, keen wit, humour and unpretentiousness found their finest expression through the intimate medium o f his beloved Yiddish. Herzl found his way to the land of Israel through the territorial idea of a Jewish State; Weizmann through an inward Messianic tie with all that is meant by ‘Eretz Yisrael’, The Land 60

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of Israel. He had acquired this love of country as a n infant a t home, in religious school, through the Hebrew language, through Hebrew prayer. I t was part of his nature. Inevitable, therefore, that he should oppose the Uganda proposal so passionately; ‘Eretz Yisrael’ stood above statehood in a strange territory. Weizmann was also the greatest Jewish emissary to the gentile world, the most gifted and fascinating envoy the Jewish people ever produced. There was no one quite like him. With his Jewish grandeur, his Jewish profundity, his sense of history, his genius for expressing the centuries — old longings ofJewry, he represented to the non-Jewish world the very embodiment of the Jewish people. I was not prominent in Zionist councils at the time of the Balfour Declaration, so that it is only at second hand that I know of Weizmann’s tremendous personal charm and influence i n his encounters with m e n like Balfour, Lloyd George, Smuts

and others at the time. But later, as Weizmann’s aide in the World Zionist Executive, I was with him at many meetings with British statesmen both i n and o u t o f Government — Tories,

Liberals and Labour men. I saw and heard how he presented our case, saw with what respect and esteem he was held b y them all. A n d this was true with whomever he spoke, people of all strata, high and low. I t was as if they were being talked to not b y an individual but b y the spirit of generations o f Jewry at their noblest. Having been with him on these occasions, I can correct a popular misconception. H e was widely known among our own people as a man of moderation, a man o f compromise, and for that reason he was opposed b y many within the Zionist movement. But the fact is that Weizmann’s moderation was evident only when h e spoke to us, to his brethren, to the Zionists,

at our Congresses — for he thought he knew our limitations. But when he spoke to the non-Jewish world, he was neither moderate nor humble — in the less nice sense of that word. I never failed to be astonished, when I was with him at meetings with Cabinet Ministers, by his inner forcefulness, by his determined manner. H e could be angry with these m e n o f power — and h e h a d occasion to b e only too often — but his anger emerged with

such natural dignity that i t was always deeply moving. Here was 61

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no fawning suppliant. Here was a proud representative of a historic people demanding the righting of age-long wrongs. From his throat sprang the full anguish of Jewish misery, the

long humiliation of our people, the depth of our sufferings and the constancy of our hopes. That is why he was always listened to with respect, though his words were not always accepted. The Jewish message is not easily accepted b y this world. I t was as ‘interpreter’ to the non-Jewish world that Weizmann first displayed his genius — I ’ m talking now o f his political and not his scientific brilliance, which h e displayed much earlier.

But that represented only part of his historic greatness. After winning over the foremost personages in the British Government

during the First World War, he became leader of the

Jewish people; and the greatness of that leadership stemmed from the fact that his Jewishness preceded his Zionism. This meant that for him the Land of Israel and activity in the Land were everything. Herzl perceived intuitively that territorial independence was the solution to the Jewish problem, once he became aware of the problem. But there was a certain abstraction to his vision: i t was not related to a specific land, for he knew the sufferings but not the character nor the longings of the

Jewish people, and he imagined that, if n o t Palestine, another land might do. Weizmann’s vision was linked wholly with Israel and there was about i t a realism at more than one level.

I t was basically realistic because i t saw that the ancient homeland o f the Jews was the only land in which Jewish sovereignty could and must be revived, and that i t was the only land for which the Jews would make the required effort. A t the same time Weizmann was realistic at what I might call the operational level: he was aware of the difficulties o f developing the long neglected land and o f securing the necessary preliminary conditions to encourage such development; he was aware o f

the make-up, mood and circumstances of the Jewish people — with all their weaknesses; and he was familiar with the international political scene — with all its complexities and stumbling blocks. H e was accused, mostly b y those who talked loudest but did little, of lacking in foresight. But they did not know Weizmann. The fact is that he put all his considerable abilities into securing the fulfilment o f the Zionist vision, and his 62

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greatness as a Zionist lay in his continuous striving to lay the foundations of the homeland and rebuild it. As a man of action, he had often to show patience and an understanding o f difficulties, and this is when he was attacked for ‘going slow’. But when necessary, he could be, and he was, stubborn and unyielding. I would certainly rate him as the only practical man among all the Zionist leaders of his time. H e was certainly the only one of the great Zionist leaders both of the west and the east who left the Diaspora not through any external pressure and not through persecution. H e identified himself personally with the Zionist undertaking in Palestine and settled here. H e had an assured and distinguished position in England such as are given to few Jews in the world, yet he remained close to the pioneering movement of Israel workers for the whole of his life. When Hitler came to power, Weizmann realized more than anyone else did the scale and intensity of the approaching calamity. This moderate statesman, who had believed i n a gradual, slow but steady advance in our creative development, w h o urged patience a n d restraint, himself threw off restraint

and became impatient and intolerant of inaction. N o one who heard i t will ever forget his awesome address to the Peel Commission in 1936. You will remember that this was the British Royal Commission which came to Palestine in the wake of the Arab anti-Jewish terrorism which had broken out that year, the Commission which drew u p its celebrated Partition Report. Well, Weizmann’s testimony before it was probably the most penetrating analysis ever given of the plight of the Jewish people and their position in the nonJewish world. I t was accompanied b y the most vigorous claim ever put forward for the immediate creation of the Jewish State as the only means of saving the Jewish masses from the dangers that threatened them. Weizmann at the time spoke not of the sixteen million Jews in the world but of the immediate dangers to the six million Jews in Europe, devoid of hope and facing destruction. H e spoke as a prophet of doom. And when he was done, we heard for the first time from the lips of statesmen in whose hands lay the fate of the country the explicit words — a ‘Jewish State’.

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You know what happened - the Peel Partition plan, the internal conflicts, the hesitancy o f the British Government — first their ‘Yes’ and then their ‘No’ — and the outbreak o f war. The six million Jews of whom Weizmann had spoken, and for whose speedy rescue he had made so impassioned a plea, were wiped out. These six million were the mainstay of the nation, embodying the richest treasures of Jewish culture and learning and Zionism. Weizmann represented us all when he wanted to save them for their own sake, for the sake o f the nation, for the sake of the future Jewish State. The men in whose hands lay the key to their deliverance closed their ears, and the destroyer did his work without hindrance. This was the greatest tragedy of all for us.

Then came another tragedy to rub salt into Weizmann’s wounds. I would say i t was the political tragedy of Weizmann’s life. H e was let down b y the very country in whom he had put

his trust, the country which had been designated as the world’s representative in Palestine — Britain. After the Peel Commission’s proposal to establish a Jewish State in part of the land was turned down, England withdrew from its mission to aid the Jews in establishing their national home, either because she did not want to or was unable to. This was the gravest possible blow to the Jewish leader who had cherished so deep a faith in the British people. Indeed, his entire political creed had been based on Jewish—British co-operation. And yet his Zionist and Jewish convictions triumphed over this disaster, though not easily and not quickly, and it was in these years that he and I had our major differences. I t is m y belief that from the beginning o f what we can call the White Paper epoch — spring o f 1939 — u p to the United Nations Partition Resolution o f November 194%, Weizmann was beset b y a gnawing inner confusion and stress, and he failed to find his way. But even in those years he showed his human greatness. H e continued to carry out his Zionist tasks with absolute dedication and vigour, even though officially he was only a rank and file Zionist and not the leader of the movement. But he needed no title. Wherever he was and whatever he was, he towered head and shoulders above everyone else. H e served the movement loyally, and far from obstructing, he helped those who had

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chosen a new course, even though for a long time he doubted that it was the correct one. I t was a great moment in m y life, and I am sure in his, when I was able, as Prime Minister immediately after the proclamation o f statehood, to propose that he become Israel’s first

President. Rarely i n history does a creator achieve his reward. Moses was allowed to see the land from afar but not to enter it. Herzl died o n alien soil while the dream o f his life was still far from fulfilment. Weizmann was granted b y the historic providence of the Jewish people to see the fruits of his life’s work — the State of Israel. H e helped to lay its foundations, he helped to build it, and now Israel was proud to elect him its first citizen.

His Presidency enhanced the glory of our State and nation; and the State was the crowning glory o f his life.

I have spoken here only of Weizmann the Zionist and Jewish leader. But of course he was also a great man of the spirit and an illustrious man o f science. A n d even if he had never been involved in Jewish affairs, his scientific achievements would have given him an honoured place in Jewish history and the history of mankind. H e not only understood the importance o f science in the resurgence o f Israel but he also laid the foundations for its institutions o f higher learning, notably the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Weizmann Institute o f Science in Rehovoth. Weizmann’s place in Jewish history is alongside the great rulers and kings of old, and as the foremost leader who fashioned our sovereign statehood in our own times.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS

On the Mandatory Government, you said earlier that you thought it was not very friendly even at first, when the High Commissioner was Sir Herbert Samuel, a Jew. Was he not a friend? H e personally was, though I confess that I had not much use for him at the time, and i t was only many years later that I developed a deep respect and admiration for him as a man, as an intellectual and as a Jew. But I and m y friends felt that his administration was very lukewarm to the whole concept o f the Balfour Declaration. I think this may have been largely due to the fact that they were rather a second-rate lot with limited vision and limited horizons. Moreover, they had

been sent

out

by the British Colonial Ministry, the Cabinet

ministry responsible for Palestine, to administer something which was completely new to them. We were not a colony. We were a mandated territory, which meant that the Government could not do what it liked but was answerable to the League o f Nations. These administrators came — and I don’t think the ‘first team’ was sent — and started operating as if we were a colony. When we objected — and the objections came mostly from the Jews, who were more alert to their rights than the Arabs — they reacted first with surprise and then with a certain hostility.

This o f course was not true o f Samuel himself, who was neither hostile nor second rate. But I did not share the widespread feeling of m y community that he was a kind o f Jewish king, come to reign over us. H e was what was called a good Jew, conceived as a latter day Nehemiah, and he was definitely 66

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anxious to see the Jewish revival in their ancient land. H e had in fact been a warm supporter of the Balfour Declaration when many other Anglo-Jewish leaders had been opposed to it. But arriving as first High Commissioner in a country with two rival communities, he was most concerned to show no favouritism between Arab and Jew, the more so because he was himself a Jew. I understood his difficulties. Granted his background, he must have felt a psychological need to show the Arabs that he was not biased. Maybe his very friendliness to the Zionist cause may

have prompted him to lean over even more backwards to demonstrate that he was being ‘fair’. And I am afraid that this

led him to pursue policies, and

to

recommend policies to the

British Government, which were not in keeping with the specific injunctions of the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate, b y virtue of which the British ruled, which were to promote the establishment o f the Jewish National Home. As a technical administrator, of course, he was first class. H e had long experience of public service; he had a brilliant m i n d ; and he had a civilized sense of history. But there were times when I and people like me thought he should have acted with greater courage. And for many many years, even when we became good friends, as we did later, I could not shed the feeling I had had in the early twenties that he had been less than lionhearted. And then in 1946 I changed m y mind about him completely — after reading his House of Lords speech in the debate which followed the blowing u p of a wing of the King David

Hotel in Jerusalem. What a speech! The sabotage had been the dastardly act of dissident terrorists, and i t had been vigorously condemned b y most o f the Jews i n the country and b y all the

official institutions of the community, including those which I headed. I t was of course condemned b y Lord Samuel too. But his speech was mainly devoted to emphasizing the tragedy and frustration which had prompted the act, frustration caused directly b y the cruel policy of His Majesty’s Government in closing the doors of Palestine to the few surviving victims of Nazism. (Ernest Bevin was Foreign Minister at the time.) This speech alone redeemed Samuel in m y eyes. T o attack the Government for creating the atmosphere which prompted the

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perpetration of an act of terror — and to do so as a Jew — when

the Government and the British public were yelling for the blood o f the terrorists, was a manifestation o f immense courage. But at the time, as I say, I and m y friends had our hesitations

about him. I have no doubt that his appointment had been intended b y the British Government as a step in the spirit o f the Balfour Declaration and as a gesture o f promise to the Jews. But any prior analysis of the prospects would have shown that his position would be extremely difficult in time o f crisis. I t must have been clear a t the outset that h e would always feel h e h a d

to show impartiality — even though the very terms o f the Mandate were partial, deliberately framed to revive the Jewish National Home. We felt that when Samuel was faced with conflict between the Jews and the Arabs, he became an umpire instead o f a High Commissioner. Mark you, it would be wrong of me to give you the impression that blame for our slow development in the early years o f the Mandate rests with Samuel. I believe most o f the blame must be borne by us, the Jewish people. They just did not come in the numbers they should have come. True, Russia b y then was cut off. But we had millions of Jews in Poland, in other countries o f eastern and central Europe, in Britain, in America. Among them were those who certainly called themselves ‘good Zionists’. They could have come. The gates were open. Neither the British Government nor the Administration would have hindered them — as they did so bitterly in the later years. More Zionist funds could have been contributed to finance the purchase of more land and more extensive settlement. With more immigration and more money — and both could have been forthcoming — it would have been far easier for us to build u p in the early

1920’s

what w e did a decade and two decades later.

And if this had been done, we could have saved many more thousands o f German Jews than we were allowed to do when Hitler reached power. For not only would our capacity to absorb them have been greater, but we would then have been a more formidable political force to overcome the restrictions o f the British Government. Who knows? Perhaps we might then have got our State before the war, and we would have been independent and free to take i n our brethren from the European 68

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countries who later perished when these were overrun by the Nazis. No, I think we ourselves are to blame for not responding as we should have done to the opportunities of the 1 9 2 0 ’ s . A n d we bear a heavy burden of responsibility for all the lives that could have been saved. M y criticism of the Samuel administration is of a different order, and on another level, a lower level. Didyou have much to do with the High Commissioner at the time? No. I did not really know Samuel then, though we had met on a few occasions. I t was only later, particularly when I was elected to the executive o f the Jewish Agency, that I had frequent dealings with the High Commissioners and got to

know them well, though I had begun t o see the head of the administration in the late 1 9 2 0 ’ s . Field-Marshal Lord Plumer followed Samuel, and he was first class. I do not mean that he always did what we asked h i m to do, though his relations with us were very good, but he was a firm and wise governor. There was nothing o f the umpire about him. H e governed, and he governed with no nonsense. When the Mufti (Haj Amin el Husseini, Mufti o f Jerusalem and political leader o f the Palestine Arabs) once told him that if he followed a certain course he, the Mufti, would not be responsible for law and order, Lord Plumer froze him by declaring: ‘7 am responsible for law and order in this country, and I shall see that it is enforced.’ But for the most part he was easy and unpretentious; nothing stiff or stuffed-shirt about him, despite a story he once told me about himself which I found quite out of character — and maybe that is why I remember it. Towards the end of the First World War, when he was in command somewhere near the Austrian front, he was asked b y Lord Northcliffe, Britain’s director o f propaganda, to fire leaflets across the enemy lines calling on the Austrian troops to rise against the Germans or to come over and join the Allied forces. Plumer refused. ‘ I was brought u p as a soldier to fight with military weapons,’ he told Northcliffe, ‘and that is what I will continue to do with the enemy - fight them with weapons. They too are soldiers, and i t would be unfair

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to undermine them with propaganda leaflets.” Northcliffe, no doubt taken aback b y this Colonel Blimp reaction — though it was clear as Plumer told me the story that he, Plumer, had not thought of it in those terms — retorted : ‘ I don’t think you understand. This is not a request. This is an order.” Plumer refused to budge, regarding such an order as out of keeping with military tradition. The result, he told me, was that he was summarily

transferred to the Italian front. But it did not affect his military record, his glory, or his later career. H e had replaced Samuel in 1925 and he returned to England in 1928. We were sorry to see him go, for while he was in Palestine he certainly never behaved as one might have thought he would from this story of his contretemps with Northcliffe.

Since we are on High Commissioners, what were the other ones like?

The best were undoubtedly Plumer, Wauchope (General Sir Arthur Wauchope) and Gort (Field-Marshal

Lord Gort VC). The worst was undoubtedly (Sir Harold) McMichael. Seems strange in a way, that the finest High Commissioners we ever had should have been soldiers. I do not think it was due to their military training. I t is just that they

happened t o be good people — they were first-class administrators, they were understanding, and they grasped and were

sympathetic to the historic idea of reviving the Jewish homeland. O f the three, I knew Wauchope best, and had most to d o with him, for it was during his tenure o f office (1931 to 1938)

that I was elected chairman o f the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization. His term also coincided with the advent o f Hitler and the desperate need to rescue German Jewry and bring them to Palestine. H e supported our demands for a revolutionary change in the British Colonial Office’s immigration policy, one that would enable us to take in tens o f thousands o f our fellow Jews. H e did all he could to help us in this, and was thus frequently at loggerheads with his home government in London. I t was during Wauchope’s administration that Jewish immigration reached its peak year — more

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As a matter of fact, the appointment of Wauchope was intended as a sympathetic gesture to us o n the part o f a n em-

barrassed British Labour Government in 1 9 3 1 . I had been personally advised b y Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald o f the plan to appoint ‘a good man, a fellow Scot’, who would support Jewish immigration and land settlement. I t was m y first meeting with MacDonald as Prime Minister — we met first in 1922 when he visited this country — and with his son, Malcolm, who was later to prove so restrictive a Colonial Minister, but who, in 1 9 3 1 , was friendly and showed none o f the duplicity he was later to display. The meeting came about in this way. The 1 9 2 9 Arab riots, following disputes over the Wailing Wall, resulted in the murder and maiming of numerous Jews in predominantly Arab areas, and was followed b y general unrest in the country. The new Labour Government in England sent out a commission whose recommendations were accepted b y the Colonial Minister, Lord Passfield, formerly M r Sidney Webb.

The new policy he announced was the worst blow we had received u p to then. For not only did i t restrict Jewish immigration and the acquisition of land, but it was couched in terms which reversed the purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate, and condemned the Jews to be ‘frozen’ as a permanent minority. Only the combined efforts o f the Jews o f Palestine, the Zionist movement and other Jewish sympathizers in the world brought Passfield’s efforts to naught. And, incidentally, one o f the persons most helpful to us at the time was Ernest Bevin, who was to cause us so much trouble when he became Foreign Minister fourteen years later. H e was then leader of the Transport and General Workers Union, and he was approached b y one o f our very able young men, Dov Hos, w h o h a d been sent to London to work for the annulment o f

Passfield’s policy. Bevin listened to Dov Hos, was impressed b y the man and b y his arguments, and promised ‘to instruct m y boys’ to vote against the Government if the restrictions against the Jews were not withdrawn. Bevin’s ‘boys’ were the fifteen or so members o f parliament who were nominees o f Bevin’s union, and I am sure that Bevin’s pressure had a major impact o n Ramsay MacDonald. Meanwhile, D r Chaim Weizmann had 71

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resigned from the Presidency of the World Zionist Organization as a protest against the Government’s policy. A t the Seventeenth Zionist Congress in Basle, which I attended as a delegate o f m y party, Weizmann asked me to go to London to see Prime Minister MacDonald. I t was known, b y then, that action was being taken b y the Government to change its policy. MacDonald had set u p a Cabinet committee to re-examine the issue, headed b y Foreign Minister Arthur Henderson, and he eventually drafted an interpretation of Passfield’s announcement which completely reversed its policy. Before this happened, it was arranged that I would meet MacDonald, and since I was reaching London on a Sunday and time was short, I was taken to meet the Prime Minister at his official country home at Chequers. Malcolm was with him, and both father and son spoke

warmly of our work in Palestine. He then told me that the new ‘interpretation’ which was being worked o n would in fact nullify the objectionable elements o f Passfield’s policy. This ‘interpretation’ eventually took the form o f a letter b y the Prime Minister to D r Weizmann. Before I left, and to assure me that all would now be well, he told me that he would be appointing a new High Commissioner who would execute the new policy with sympathy. H e did not o f course mention his name, but it turned out to be Wauchope. Apart from helping us o n immigration, Wauchope seemed to have a deeper understanding than any other High Commissioner o f what we were trying to do in Palestine, that we were not only trying to develop a country but also revive our nation.

One of his deepest interests was the kibbutz. Though he was a soldier and a Scottish aristocrat, whose upbringing was far removed from the co-operative patterns o f the kibbutz, he was much taken b y their way of life and had a great affection for kibbutznicks. H e thought them the salt of the earth. H e used to tell me that he had rarely seen men and women so dedicated and, whether or not one agreed with their general outlook, i t was soul-lifting to find people prepared to shape their lives i n accordance with their ideals. This, h e thought, was real

integrity; and integrity had his highest respect. H e was a man interested in ideas, and our relations were such 72

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that we would often spend evenings together in intellectual discussion without mention of State business. There was an amusing incident one evening, which had a helpful aftermath. We were dining at Government House, and I had been asked to

come specially early so that we could talk before dinner. Wauchope took me for a stroll in the beautiful gardens o f the residence, which was perched on one o f the most charming hills ofJerusalem with magnificent views o f the city to the west and the distant Dead Sea to the east. As we walked and talked, we passed several men working in the gardens, far more, it seemed to me, than were on the official gardening staff o f even such

spacious grounds. When we came abreast of one of them, he straightened up, spade in hand, and hailed me with ‘Shalom’. I gave him a ‘Shalom’ greeting in reply. I t was m y friend Bankover, a kibbutznick, who had been arrested and given a prison sentence some days earlier for taking part in an unauthorized demonstration demanding that more Jews be employed on government public works. I t transpired that men convicted of minor offences spent their nights in the lock-up and days in the gardens. Sir Arthur had seen that Bankover was not one of the regular gardeners, so he must have been a convict, and he felt rather embarrassed at entertaining a guest who was friendly with a prisoner, and one moreover who was carrying out his sentence in Sir Arthur’s own house. We talked about him and I told the High Commissioner what a dedicated idealist and devoted pioneer he was. I added that it might well have been me gardening in his grounds, in place of Bankover, for I was in favour of the demonstration at which he had been arrested and in favour of the purpose it sought to achieve. Sir Arthur seemed sympathetic and promised to do what he could to get him released. H e telephoned m e next morning. ‘ I ' m terribly sorry,’ h e said,

‘but on looking through m y documents, I find that while I thought I had sovereign powers in this country, it seems that I have no powers to release a convicted prisoner. Only the Chief of Police can do that.’ ‘Sir Arthur,’ I replied, ‘ I leave i t to your ingenuity to find a way.” Bankover was released the next day. Though he was a soldier — or perhaps because he was a soldier 73

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— he was a man of peace, and he sought as far as possible to avoid bloodshed. I think this may have led him to underrate the gravity of the Mufti-led rising in 1936 and to underestimate the Arab capacity to cause widespread disorders throughout the land. When Britain’s Colonial Minister Ormsby-Gore sent out General (later Field-Marshal) Dill with two divisions to restore order, Wauchope, who was opposed to the dispatch of so large a force, won his point in refusing to allow more than a part o f this army to be committed. I think this was a mistake, and I thought and said so at the time. H a d strong immediate action been taken, the Arab riots would have been put down quickly and would not have lasted almost three years. And Lord Gort?

Gort was a fine High Commissioner, a fine man, and a most courageous soldier. Unnecessary to add that, for his

Victoria Cross says enough. H e had seen much of war, seen

much bloodshed and misery. This may have toughened his nerve, but not his heart. H e was warm and humane. I even once saw h i m with tears i n his eyes — which must come as a sur-

prise to the large public who knew his fighting record but who had never met him. I t was in 1944, and I had just returned to Jerusalem from a visit to newly liberated Bulgaria. Gort had asked me to come and tell him about m y trip. I t had been a most dramatic and heart-breaking experience, seeing people

just released from the

terror

of death under which they had

lived for years. Bulgaria was almost the only country under Nazi influence whose Government had refused to allow the Eichmann division of the SS to carry off all its Jews to death camps, although the Germans did manage to lay their hands on ‘foreign Jews’ of recently annexed Thrace and Macedonia. When the Eichmann bureau increased its pressure, the Bulgarians replied b y removing all their Jews to their own forced labour camps inside the country. The Jews suffered grim hardship, but they were not murdered. Most o f them survived, and shortly after Bulgaria was liberated b y the Russian Army, I was allowed to visit the Jewish community. The ground had been prepared b y one of our excellent Haganah boys, Venia 74

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Hadari, who had managed to get into Bulgaria and start putting the Jewish community on its feet. H e took me round. I described to Lord Gort what I had seen, the wretchedness, the poverty, the hunger, the ragged children without shoes — none of them, but none, had anything on their feet. And as I spoke, I saw the eyes o f this tough soldier well with tears. H e was a rare and good man. I t is sad that he should have died so soon after, a t a comparatively early age.

How about the other extreme, Sir HaroldMcMichael?

Oh, McMichael. He was dreadful. Very bad indeed. I don’t say this because he was opposed to us, which he was. There were others who did not see eye to eye with us but whom we could respect as persons. McMichael was different. H e was petty-minded, arrogant, bureaucratic, full o f himself and his power; he behaved as a potentate towards ‘natives’; and, which was the most grievous sin in a man of affairs, he had a closed mind. I think h e was philosophically incapable o f un-

derstanding the role of the human spirit in political affairs, and so he could never begin to grasp the idea of Zionism. Lacking the qualities of the visionary, devoid of a sense o f history, he conceived his task within the narrow terms o f the desk administrator w h o sees only problems, not challenges.

As h e saw it,

his role, as representative of the British Crown, was to keep a strict harness o n two recalcitrant and inferior communities, the Arabs and the Jews. As Chairman of the Jewish Agency at the time — McMichael followed Wauchope in 1938 and lasted until 1944 when he was replaced b y Gort — I naturally had frequent business meetings with him. I cannot recall a single one which was not distasteful. Even with enemies who are separated politically and emotionally b y an abyss, there can be points o f intellectual contact. I am quite certain, for example, that there would have been such contact with Egypt’s President Nasser had we ever met. But never with McMichael. His appointment and his whole term o f office were a disaster — a disaster for us, for Palestine and for Britain. But did not the attitude of the High Commissioner reflect 73

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attitudes in London? Did he not have to obey the orders ofhis government?

Policy was decided in Britain, not in Palestine.

Yes, of course. A High Commissioner might not be able to change the broad lines o f policy laid down in London, though he could try. But in the execution o f policy he could

behave wisely or ineptly, with sympathy or with animosity. His powers were considerable. There was a great deal that he could do — either well or badly. Look at Wauchope and what he was

able to do in the field of immigration and in the case of General Dill and his two divisions. McMichael was both inept and malicious, and he showed this soon after his arrival when he recommended the hanging of Shlomo Ben Yosef on the 2gth o f June 1938. This single act contributed more than anything else to

the growth of the dissident terrorist organization, Etzel.

The background involves a bit o f the history o f the terrorist organization and the struggle within their group between the moderates and the extremists, a struggle which McMichael’s act helped to determine in favour o f the extremists. These were fond of claiming that the Haganah was too passive, and that terrorism was the only answer to the terrorism o f the Arabs in their most serious campaign o f attacking the Jews from 1936 to

1939. This was a period when not only I , who was close to it, but any objective historian would say that the Haganah stood the supreme test. Not only did it preserve our position in the country but it enabled us to strengthen it and to extend our settlement and our development. Its watchwords were restraint, in the face of Arab terror, and expansion of our constructive activities as the best answer to Arab attempts to stunt our development. Restraint did not mean passivity. Its call was to fight only terrorist gangs, and never to kill an innocent Arab. When we were attacked, we defended ourselves, and the Haganah’s offensive operations were directed solely against the bands o f attackers. I was most firm in turning m y face resolutely against any indiscrimate reprisal action. The extremists of Etzel, part of the Revisionist movement — dissident Zionists who refused to accept the authority o f the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency — urged o n the other hand that terror should be met with terror and that for 76

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every Jew killed by an Arab, an Arab should be killed. This horrifying call could, in the circumstances of the country at the time, appeal to headstrong young people. T o the undying honour o f our community, it was spurned by all but the few, even though the few made themselves felt. The bulk o f Palestine Jewry heeded our vehement warnings not to descend to the level o f our opponents, not t o sully our good name and the name of our Haganah fighters b y stooping to the wicked and immoral act o f murdering an innocent Arab. Fight the attackers - yes. But leave the innocents alone. W h a t is not generally known is that most o f the Revisionists

felt as we did, and supported the Haganah policy of restraint. Most notable of them was their own leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky, w h o was living i n exile at the time but whose influence o n

his party was strong. H e opposed terrorism not only on moral but also on political grounds; for he hoped to get Britain to legalize a Jewish Legion, and Britain would not be persuaded b y military force but only b y an appeal to her moral conscience. When the Arab outbreaks started in April 1936, hearing that some of his followers were denouncing restraint as cowardice, Jabotinsky cabled the Etzel Command ‘demanding’ restraint. H e followed i t u p with an article in the Etzel paper in which he wrote:

‘For the sake of one hope alone it is worth enduring this situation [of restraint]. This hope is the Jewish Legion. I have been engaged in discussions on the Legion since 1920. The most important and dangerous argument against i t has b e e n : it is not right to a r m the Jews and not the Arabs. T o

this there is only one reply: Arabs attack peaceful neighbours; the Jews d o not. T h e Jews, even i n the midst o f attack,

do not lose their senses, but are able to restrain themselves. Self-restraint is painful and dangerous, but if it can help us persuade the Mandatory Government to establish at least the beginning of legal defence, this heavy price will be worth while. Restraint can do us this service. I do not say that i t will, b u t i t c a n . . . Jabotinsky’s attitude naturally caused embarrassment and confusion in his Revisionist movement. Tension grew between the moderates and the extremists as Arab attacks continued,

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with the extremists chafing for action. In the middle of 1937, one of the Etzel leaders went to meet Jabotinsky abroad to tell him that Etzel could no longer follow the policy of restraint. According to Jabotinsky’s biographer, J . Schechtman, Jabotin: sky replied

‘Where is the heroism in shooting an Arab peasant in the back when he comes on his donkey bringing vegetables to Tel Aviv? And what public advantage is gained b y such an act?’ Etzel did not accept this reply, and they broke the national discipline of restraint when in November 1937 they tried to rob an employee of the Jewish Workers’ Bank in order to finance their activities. They were chased and caught b y people in the street.

They were more successful in their next job — executing

one of their own members for a breach o f Etzel discipline. When the Arab terror flared to a new climax at the end o f 1937, Etzel carried out acts o f terror against Arabs in Jaffa and

Jerusalem. This did not weaken Arab terrorism; it intensified it. A t this time, the Haganah was busy fighting Arab attackers, not murdering at random, and our pioneers were busy establishing new farm settlements in the heart o f Arab territory, and holding their ground. Several put u p a fighting defence with acts of heroism which matched some of those in the War o f Independence and the Sinai campaign. There was no Etzel man among them.

This difference in behaviour had its impact on the community, and on Etzel itself. The moderates began to gain an

edge on the extremists, for how could bomb-throwing in a n Arab quarter o fJaffa be compared to the heroism o f the defence o f Tirath Zvi (a kibbutz in the Beth She’an Valley) or the Haganah battles a t Hanita (a kibbutz in northern Galilee) which followed its establishment, or the exploits o f Haganah

members of Wingate’s Special Night Squads, chasing Arab bands to their bases and engaging them there? Then came the Shlomo Ben Yosef incident, and the extremists had their martyr. From then on they dominated the Etzel command. Ben Yosef was a member o f an Etzel unit stationed at Rosh Pinna. The leader of the unit was a moderate who understood 78

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and accepted the policy of restraint, but some of his men did not. I t transpired later that one of them, a seventeen-year old named Avraham Shein, at an evening get-together, had once called for a toast to the first of their group who would go to the gallows. O n the 21st o f April 1938, Shein and two friends, Ben Yosef

and Zurabin, broke out of camp in defiance of their leader’s orders, and, armed with pistols and hand grenades, shot u p several Arab cars. None caused any damage, but the shots roused tension in the neighbourhood. The three lads ran away and hid in an abandoned barn where they were found by a police patrol. They could probably have got away with a light

sentence, for they had caused no damage and the police themselves were prepared to treat it as a trivial incident, possibly because of their youth. But, as a report o f the affair recorded, ‘the three were gripped b y a fever o f hysterical “heroism”, admitted what they had done and declared that b y firing at the vehicles they sought to demonstrate against the Arab terror.’ There was nothing for it. They were brought to trial. I n the inner councils of the Revisionist movement, there was discussion as to how the defence should be conducted. Jabotin-

sky’s representative in the country won over the majority to the view that the defence line should be the same as in an ordinary trial, namely that it should seek to belittle the incident and try to secure a soft verdict. The minority wanted to turn the trial into a political demonstration. The defence lawyers conducted their case in accordance with the majority’s decision. But the extremist minority decided to ignore party discipline and took matters into its own hands. O n the second day of the trial, held in Haifa, the terrorists carried o u t three attacks o n Haifa

Arabs, killing two and wounding one.

This was not calculated to soften the hearts of the judges. ‘Their behaviour,’ as a historian’s report has it, ‘gave the impression that they needed a hanging, no matter what.” The verdict was to be given o n the 5th o f June 1938. The charge carried as a maximum the death penalty. Before it was announced, defence counsel asked for a light sentence, in consideration o f the Jewish community’s general behaviour of restraint throughout the two years of Arab terror. H e warned the court not to turn 79

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the young men into ‘martyrs’ who would be set u p as an

example to Jewish youth. O n that day, I convened a meeting o f the Jewish Agency Executive and said : “These three youngsters do not deserve the death penalty, although the act they committed is not only a crime in the ordinary sense but also a crime against the Jewish nation.. .. The true responsibility rests upon their leaders and teachers. . . . The hanging o f these three lads, who have killed no one, is only liable to intensify the gravity of the position among some o f the Jewish youth, and push them to senseless acts. Alive, these youngsters are no danger to the public: it will be different if they die. . . . We must do everything in our power to avert the death sentence.’ We were unsuccessful. Zurabin was declared of unsound

mind. Shein and Ben Yosef were given the death penalty. A little later, Shein’s sentence was commuted to life imprisonment because of his youth. Ben Yosef was to be executed. His fate was now in the hands o f the High Commissioner, McMichael, and the British Army Commander, General

Haining, who had shortly before succeeded General Wavell. They could confirm or commute the sentence. Careful briefs were submitted to them, arguing the alleviating circumstances: Ben Yosef had killed no one, he was not a hardened criminal, and so on. Nor were they left in doubt about the dangerous impact execution would have upon the Jewish community, making it more difficult for us to maintain the policy o f restraint. I

and my colleagues in the Jewish Agency Executive, Jabotinsky and many other public figures did what they could to save Ben Yosef’s life. T o no effect. After consultations with McMichael, Haining confirmed the death sentence. Ben Yosef was hanged some three weeks later. This was McMichael’s first evil act. I t was also an act showing n o imagination and no grasp o f the delicate political balances. I t was the act of a poor and weak administrator who tries to show that he is tough. I t led directly to the extremists dominating the Etzel Command. They started a series o f reprisals and acts o f terror against the Arabs. The people who suffered most, however, 8o

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were the Jewish community. For not only did their actions fail to halt the Arab terrorist movement; it caused an intensification with an increased toll o f Jewish victims. Moreover, Haifa and Jaffa, which had been Arab centres o f opposition to their own terrorists, now opened their doors to them. Incidentally, the History of the Haganah, dealing with this episode, says: ‘From a military point of view, Etzel’s operations were tantamount to sabotage o f the military effort i n time o f

battle. Etzel opened new fronts even in places where there had been quiet, or where relative quiet had been achieved in the course o f time. But the brunt of the lawless situation that

now arose in those places was borne, of course, not by the Etzel youngsters but b y the men of Haganah.’ Wise and humane decisions on the part of McMichael would have curbed lawlessness and reduced the suffering both among the Jews and the Arabs. After McMichael came Gort, and he wasfollowed in 1945

by General Sir Alan Cunningham. What was he like? H e was Britain’s last High Commissioner — he left in 1948 — and he had the misfortune o f presiding at Government House at a time when events were just too much for him and it was clear that he was just running a holding operation. Policy was pretty exclusively in the hands of London — and that meant Ernest Bevin. Cunningham must often have felt like a fireman sent to quell a blaze, standing with hose in hand while the stop-cock was being operated b y the commander back at headquarters; and what the commander was sending through the pipe was not water but petrol. Bevin’s heartless policy towards Jewish immigration, legal as well as illegal, was bound to cause eruptions in Palestine, as were his other restrictive orders o n Jewish development. Cunningham could not have been sorry to know that he would soon be pulling out, though he must have hoped, as I frequently told him, that it could have been done with more goodwill, more fairness and greater dignity. I n all m y dealings with him, I found him a courteous and friendly individual, but he knew and I knew that he was merely

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going through the motions of being an administrator. A great man might perhaps have been somewhat more effective, even though power was concentrated in London, but that was not a period in Britain’s history when she was throwing u p great

men.

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What of the British Ministers responsible for policy in Palestine with whom you had dealings? The Cabinet Minister in Britain officially responsible for Palestine was the Colonial Secretary, but where the Foreign Minister was a strong personality we found that i t was he rather than the Colonial Minister who determined policy. This certainly happened when Bevin was Foreign Minister and Arthur Creech-Jones was the Colonial Secretary. Creech-Jones had been very friendly to Zionism before he joined the Cabinet, but then he found that he was not master in his own house. Moreover, he had been a protégé o f Bevin in the trade union movement. As Colonial Minister, therefore, he always acted o n

instructions from Bevin. H e couldn’t have enjoyed bearing the nominal responsibility for acts which must have been distasteful to him, and which were a denial of all he had believed and fought for most of his political life. But he didn’t do anything about it. A n d h e didn’t resign. W h e n I was n o t being angry

over policy issued in his name, I felt sorry for him. Actually, both the Foreign and Colonial Offices exercised a decisive influence on Palestine policy throughout the period o f the Mandate, and I think it’s true to say that for most of that period, the Ministers and permanent officials o f both Ministries were not friendly to Zionism. Most of the officials were certainly pro-Arab and thought Britain had made a great mistake in committing herself to the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. Their unfriendly and often extremely hostile attitude persisted right u p to the establishment o f the State o f Israel.

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There were only two Foreign Secretaries who were sincere and consistent in their sympathy for the Zionist cause — Balfour, the Conservative, and Arthur Henderson, the Labour Party Foreign Secretary under Ramsay MacDonald. WILLIAM

GEORGE ARTHUR

ORMSBY-GORE

O f the Colonial Secretaries, the only one who remained true to his earlier friendship and pursued policies in accordance with his Zionist beliefs, and with the spirit of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, was Ormsby-Gore (later Lord Harlech). And in doing so, he had often to overrule the insistent urgings of his permanent officials. H e came to office in 1936 when Stanley Baldwin was Prime Minister and Anthony Eden was Foreign Secretary. H e was very good. H e knew the country, knew its problems, and knew at first hand, for he was in Palestine at the time, his country’s commitments at the end of the First World

War to help create a Jewish National Home. H e revered D r Chaim Weizmann, and almost considered himself his disciple. MALCOLM MACDONALD

O f the others with whom I had dealings, Cunliff-Lister, who was in office in 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 3 5 , I found pretty neutral, neither friendly nor hostile. Then came Malcolm MacDonald, in 1935. We suffered more from him than from any other Colonial Secretary. Before taking office, he had been pro-Zionist, like his father. But then he turned his back o n us. A n d it was he more than anyone else who was responsible for the White Paper of 1939 which curbed Jewish immigration, and foresaw its total stoppage after five years, and restricted Jewish land settlement. This insidious policy was to last right u p to the emergence o f

Israel statehood. I have said earlier that m y feelings towards people were not necessarily conditioned b y their agreement with or opposition to Zionism. What I found distasteful about Malcolm MacDonald was his hypocrisy, and his slyness i n negotiation. H e was not

straightforward. I confess that I did not recognize this at first. I n the early period of his ministry, he pretended to favour our

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cause and would always offer ‘friendly’ reasons for not doing

things we thought he should have done. He was even reassuring when he convened the St James’s Palace talks at the beginning o f 1939 which ended with the White Paper. Before the talks, he promised D r Weizmann and me categorically that Jewish immigration would not be stopped, that the Jews would never be turned into a permanent minority in Palestine, and that the terms of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate would be safeguarded. I t was with this guarantee that we agreed to join in the talks. The result was a complete betrayal. Let me be clear. MacDonald had every right to change his mind, every right to swing from pro-Zionism to anti-Zionism, every right to hold any opinion he wished. And I could have

respected him if he had come out openly and told us that he was sorry but he now felt that Britain should pursue a pro-Arab policy. But to be double-faced, to talk double-talk, and to hoodwink us with guarantees which he knew at the time he made them that he intended to break, showed him to be a man lacking i n integrity.

LORD

LLOYD

Quite different was the man picked to replace him b y Churchill

as soon as he became Prime Minister in 1940 — Lord Lloyd. There was a man who was an avowed anti-Zionist, and yet I respected him. Indeed I can say that we enjoyed a personal friendship even though our views on Zionism, as o n most political matters, were poles apart. I found him a sincere and honest man, who spoke his mind straightforwardly. I was in London when he was appointed Colonial Secretary, and we met several times then. But that had not been our first meeting. We had first met in Jerusalem at the end of 1937 when he, I think, was head o f the British Council, and our personal friendship dated from that talk, even though, as I say, we were divided in our opinions. The only thing we shared at the time was a common aversion to Neville Chamberlain’s foreign policy. We next met in London in October 1938. H e had written in one of the Sunday papers a popular article on Palestine which was outspokenly pro-Arab and very condemnatory

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of the British promise of a Jewish National Home contained in the Balfour Declaration. After reading the article, I rang him up and he asked me to come over for a talk. Again, we first discussed Chamberlain’s policy — Chamberlain had urged Czechoslovakia a month earlier to give way to Hitler’s claim to the Sudetenland — and we were both even more scathing than we had been at our previous meeting. Then we came to his article, and Lloyd apologized for the way it had been written — he had had to write it in a h u r r y— but he did not apologize for its contents. H e said to m e : ‘ I want to speak to you bluntly. We English are in a dilemma. . . « We are u p against the hostility o f both the Jews and the

Arabs. And our enemies incite the Arabs

to

threaten our

position in the Near East if we do not accept the Palestine

Arabs’ demand. . . . Britain should not be afraid of either the Arabs or the Jews. I am neither a Zionist nor an anti-Zionist, but I am not pro-Arab either. We have to do the right thing. The Arabs must remain the majority in Palestine, and we have to

give them a promise to that effect. You Jews, o n the other hand, have the right to receive what I would call a “Vatican City’ — not in the old city o f Jerusalem but outside its walls. I am a Christian, and I have a profound attachment to Zion. A Jewish

Vatican City would be a symbol for the whole ofJewry.’ I remember replying that I too would be candid and blunt. As for British promises to the Arabs, the Arabs had already received sovereignty in a vast area in the Middle East, with the creation o f several Arab States as a direct result o f the success o f Allied arms. As for Palestine, the British Government had on a number o f occasions declared that Palestine had not been included in the promises given to the Arabs. As for his talk about our driving the Arabs out o f the country, I could assure h i m

from m y personal experience that it was entirely unfounded. Far from dispossessing the Arabs, Jewish settlement had attracted Arabs from neighbouring countries. Then I told h i m : ‘The Jewish people has no army, navy or air force, while you have a tremendous empire. But if you try and force minority status upon us in our own National Home, don’t talk about justice. I t would be a most cruel betrayal o f the undertaking you assumed in the eyes o f the world and we shall resist it. We will

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never let you impose Arab rule o n us. I f you try, you will have

to keep a much larger army in Palestine than you have now, and even then you won’t succeed. We have suffered under all kinds of régimes all over the world, but we will never tolerate foreign domination in Palestine. You offer us a Vatican City, and I appreciate your understanding of our religious ties with Jerusalem. They mean something to you because you are a Christian. But I am afraid there is one thing you do not grasp, because it is a feeling which no Englishman has ever h a d : the driving force behind our movement is the lack o f a homeland. A n d Palestine is our homeland, and we must live there as in our own home. A Vatican City is not home. Under Arab rule, our national life would be destroyed. Take m y word for it, we shall never agree to minority status in Palestine; we shall never sub-

mit t o Arab rule; and all the might of the British Empire will not make us do so.’ T o this, Lloyd said : ‘So you believe there is no other way but the creation of a Jewish State?’ ‘Yes,’ said I , ‘we must have a Jewish State. But it must be strong and i t must be big enough, otherwise we shall not survive, and then the effort will be worthless for us and for you. I am not British. I am a Jew. But i t is just because I am a Jew that I feel a bond with Britain. We are an oriental people, but we have lived in the western world for hundreds of years. We return to Israel bearing western culture. Our links with that culture are o f great importance, and the best connection with i t is through England. I believe our needs and the needs of England go hand in hand.’ I recall that Lloyd demurred at that, and I asked him frankly, ‘Don’t you trust us?’ H e replied: ‘ I believe in Weizmann, and I know that he is loyal. I believe in you, too, though I can’t say why. But leaders come and go. The two o f you will not always head the Zionist movement. The Palestinian shore o f the Mediterranean is a matter o f life and death for the British Empire. But the Jews who come to Palestine are not British; they come from all kinds of countries, Poland, Rumania and so on, and their ideas are not British at all.’ I told him that during the war (the First World War) the

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workers of Palestine — almost all of them immigrants from the countries he had mentioned —- volunteered for the British Army. I myself, who had also come from one of those countries, had been expelled by the Turks at the beginning of the war and had returned from America with four thousand Jewish soldiers as volunteers in the British Army. Most o f them were Polish Jews, because American nationals had not been allowed to volunteer for the British forces. Otherwise we could have mobilized another hundred thousand to serve with the British forces. I went o n to tell him that before the war, young Russian Jews were revolutionaries, because they naturally wished to destroy the régime that was oppressing them, and before leaving Russia

for Palestine, I too had been a revolutionary. To which Lloyd asked ‘And are you still one?’ ‘More than ever,’ I replied, and I added that in Palestine, however, our young people had become a constructive force, and their aim was to build, not to destroy. They had acquired a sense o f national responsibility and, in spite o f their opposition to current British policy, they could understand their positive

ties with Britain. It was not a question of gratitude but of Jewish national interest. After m y fairly lengthy elaboration, Lloyd said, to m y considerable surprise: ‘So you are sure you must have a Jewish State, and a strong one at that? You may well be right. You deserve a Jewish State.’ And he went on to juggle with ideas o f possible borders, saying that the State ‘should lie partly in western Palestine and partly in Transjordan. But that is impossible unless we extend the scope o f this idea. You can get what you want if you bring the

neighbouring Arab countries into the picture. A Jewish State will be feasible only within the framework o f an Arab Federation.’ I told him that I would be willing to accept this, and that over the years I had had talks with Arab leaders along those lines. O n the spot, Lloyd suggested that we meet again together with D r Weizmann to explore these ideas further, and he there and then telephoned Weizmann’s secretary and fixed a lunch meeting for the three o f us for three days later at his home. H e would bring appropriate maps, he said, and then he added: 88

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‘Afterwards I shall arrange a meeting with Arab leaders. The Arabs have confidence in me. I am not pro-Arab; I know that the Arabs are not our friends; but they know that I am an honest man, and when I talk to them I speak m y mind, just as I do to you. I told them we shall never go back o n our undertakings to the Jews, and they know I mean what I say. We shall see what will come of all this.’ Later in the day I saw Captain Orde Wingate, and told him of m y talk with Lloyd. I said it would be most valuable if he could see Lloyd and tell him something of his work as a British officer in training our boys in Special Night Squads to combat the Arab terror. Wingate saw Lloyd the same evening and was invited to join Weizmann and me for the luncheon meeting three days later. GENERAL ORDE CHARLES WINGATE

Let me add a word here about Wingate. H e was a most extraordinary man — a very courageous fighter, an original thinker, a magnificent leader in the field, a man who read widely and examined problems with real depth, a man of imagination and daring, an innovator who was later to introduce a new concept in fighting and, as a general, to create and command the celebrated Chindits in Burma where he was killed in 1944. H e was also a passionate Zionist. Born in India of a Scottish family, he had been raised in an atmosphere o f rigid puritanism. The first things he read were the Scriptures, and from the Bible came his knowledge of and attachment to the Land of Israel and the Jewish people. H e chose the army as his career and served for several years in India and the Sudan. The troubles in Palestine in the mid-thirties brought him to that country in 1937 as an intelligence officer o n General (later Field-Marshal) Dill’s staff, and he was posted to the Haifa command where he was responsible for Galilee. His visits to Jewish settlements convinced him that, as he wrote to his uncle, Sir Reginald Wingate, at the time: ‘ I have seen the Jewish youth in the kibbutzim and I assure you that the Jew will produce better soldiers than ours.’ With the co-operation of the Haganah, he organized ambushes against the Arab bands who were smuggling arms across

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the border from Syria, and himself led and took part in the

fighting. General Wavell replaced Dill at the end of the year and he was quick to appraise Wingate’s unusual talents. Wingate submitted a memorandum to him which was outspoken in its criticism of British Army methods in fighting the Arab bands and suggested a new approach. Instead o f static defence, which was not very effective, which tied down more troops than was necessary, which gradually weakened their fighting qualities, and which did not deter the enemy, Wingate proposed the creation and rigorous training o f small mobile patrols which would operate mostly at night, base their actions on good intelligence, take the enemy by surprise and engage them wherever they were. Part o f his proposal was the radical suggestion that these special forces should be mixed, comprising both British troops and local Jews. A start was made with mixed night patrols to defend the Iraq oil pipeline which ran through the Jezreel Valley and Lower Galilee to Haifa. O n the basis o f this success, Wingate got the go ahead to establish Special Night Squads, composed largely of Jewish settlement police. The Jews were trained by British officers and

NCO’s under Wingate’s direction. Wingate placed great emphasis on ‘night as an offensive weapon’, and I can tell you that this and other things he taught our boys later played an important part in Israel’s War of Independence. Wingate saw in the Night Squads proof that the spirit o f the Maccabees still lived in the Jewish youth o f our day. H e sought to

imbue the British Command with the same faith and show

them that not only did the Jews have the capacity and will to defend themselves but would also be loyal allies in the East to a Britain beset b y war. I a m afraid that h e did not find much

sympathy for these views in Britain’s army circles, but Britain’s grave situation in the summer o f 1938 prompted them to agree to Wingate’s plan that local Jews be accepted for operations with the army. However, even this was done reluctantly, and no training budget was offered by the British Army. This was therefore borne b y the Jewish Agency, and in September 1938, one hundred o f the Haganah’s best young officers presented themselves for a special training course at kibbutz Ein Harod in the Valley o f Jezreel. Most o f these young men were later to disQO

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tinguish themselves in our War of Independence and in the shaping o f the Army of Israel, bearing out what Wingate said when he addressed them on the opening day of the course: ‘We are establishing here the foundation for the Army of Zion. . . . Difficult times are upon us. All lovers o f freedom must

unite and prepare themselves t o m a n the defences. You people, whose friend I am, suffer more than any other. Ifit fights, i t will achieve its independence in its land.’ A few weeks later, however, came the Munich agreement, and with it a lessening o f the sense of urgency among the British commanders in Palestine. One of its results was the removal o f Wingate, and he was sent back to England. Officers who shared his ideas and had helped him train the Jewish Night Squads were posted away to other units. As the political situation deteriorated and the Colonial Office became more hostile to Zionism in the first half of 1939, so did the attitude of the political and military authorities in Palestine towards these Jewish units. With the approach o f war, the Squads were broken u p one b y one. But Wingate and his doctrines o f warfare had made their impact on the very men who were later to play so vital a part in

securing Israel’s independence. When Wingate left Palestine, he came to London on home leave and saw a good deal of our people there, notably D r Weizmann and Berl Locker, representative in London of the Jerusalem Executive o f the Jewish Agency. I n the W a r Office, he spoke to whoever was prepared to listen on the need to strengthen the fighting power of the Jews o f Palestine, urging that this would prove invaluable for the defence of the Middle East in the war that was bound to come. His colleagues and military superiors regarded him as rather a ‘crank’ on the subject of Zionism, but they respected him as an unusual soldier — his DSO, while only a Captain, for bravery in Palestine, marked him as a daring fighter, and his novel ideas of warfare, even when they were not accepted, marked him as an original thinker. And so he was well received. A n d when I had told him of m y talk with Lord Lloyd, he had n o difficulty in seeing him the same night and, as I have said, Lloyd was impressed and asked him along to lunch with Weizmann a n d myself. 91

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(continued)

Lloyd opened by saying that in our talk a few days earlier I had convinced him that the Jews could not remain a minority in Palestine and that a Jewish State was a necessity. H e had

thought a ‘Vatican City’ would suffice but he now understood that there had to be a Jewish State. However, Galilee had to

remain in Arab hands — ‘the Arabs would never agree that you should get Galilee’ — and in any case, he asked, why was Galilee so important for us? D r Weizmann told him that we had traditional and historical ties with Galilee. I t had played an important part in Jewish life, not only during our era of independence but also in the Middle Ages. Moreover, said Weizmann,

we had t o have some part of the mountains; we could not just settle in the valleys. I added the political need for a common frontier with the Lebanon, a country with a large Christian community that could hold on only precariously in a Moslem ocean. The Lebanese Christians were in a similar situation to

ours, and it was important for both that we should be neighbours. But Lloyd kept insisting on the Arab claim to Galilee. H e said that Jewish control o f the entire Mediterranean coast o f Palestine might present a danger to Britain, and he repeated what he had told me, that though he had confidence in Weizmann and me, he did not know who would succeed us as leaders of Palestine Jewry. Weizmann asked: ‘What are you afraid of, that we would make a pact with Germany or Italy?’ T o which Lloyd replied that the whole problem of Palestine was rooted in fear. ‘We fear you; you fear the Arabs; and the Arabs in their turn fear you. Perhaps we should hear what Captain Wingate has to say.’ Wingate stressed the strategic importance o f Palestine, the Mediterranean and Akaba. Palestine’s geographical situation

was unique. Unless Britain had a secure base in that country, she would not be able to maintain her foothold in the Middle East. The Arabs were utterly unreliable. Their word was not a word. They could not organize themselves. They had n o ideal to unite them. They bickered amongst themselves. From the military point of view they were worth very little. They did not 92

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know how to fight. During the last year, said Wingate, they had taken gold from Lawrence and the Turks alike. They had killed both British and Turks — depending o n w h o seemed t o

be the weaker. They took things for granted, not because they were ungrateful but because they believed all that they received was a gift from Allah. Saudi Arabia was unstable; Iraq and Syria were torn b y internal strife. The whole Arab world was ridden b y intrigues and rivalries. The Jews of Palestine alone constituted a stable force which could be relied on. And Wingate thought that British policy in the Middle East should be based on friendship with Turkey and with a strong Jewish Palestine. Lloyd then took a map of Palestine and asked Wingate to give him a rough idea of the frontiers of the Jewish State as he envisaged them — but without Haifa and the Galilee. Wingate did so, and Lloyd said he believed he could persuade some of his Arab friends to give their consent. H e also promised to talk to the Colonial Secretary. W h y had he been so insistent on excluding Haifa and Galilee? Weizmann and I knew the answer. For Weizmann had a short time before received a note from his friend Leopold Amery, who was now Secretary of State for India. Amery reported a talk he had had with the Iraqi Foreign Minister who, he said, had not entirely rejected the idea of the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab States, or at least a plan for Jewish autonomy. But he insisted that this should apply ‘only to the South of Palestine, not to the North’. Amery said he had the feeling that the Arabs, or at least the Iraqis, considered it particularly important that they should get Haifa, and did not consider Beirut as a suitable substitute for an outlet to the Mediterranean, either geographically or politically. Nothing really came of the meetings with Lloyd on those occasions, for what followed were the St James’s Palace Conferences early in 1939 and the MacDonald White Paper. A year and a half after the lunch meeting with Lloyd, he became Colonial Secretary, and on the 5th of M a y 1 9 4 0 , three days after his appointment, D r Weizmann and I went along to see him. We had no illusions that he would revoke the White Paper policy, but we hoped he would be of help to us in setting u p 93

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Jewish military units. I n this we were partly successful, as we also were in getting him to instruct the Palestine authorities to be less harsh to the Jews and to stop the searches for arms in Jewish settlements. But he was against the creation of a Jewish Army as part of the Allied Forces. I do not know whether we would have been able to move him from this position if he had lived, but it is possible. For although his orientation throughout his political life had been pro-Arab, he was open to new ideas,

and if he could eventually have been persuaded that the British war effort would be greatly aided b y strengthening the Jews o f

Palestine, he might have adopted such a policy. He died eight months later. LORD MOYNE

I n his place, Churchill appointed another of his close friends, Lord Moyne. I met h i m first o n the 21st o f August 1941, two weeks after he had taken office. I expected to talk t o him only

about the raising o f a Jewish Army — a topic in which I found him completely unyielding — but he went on to ask about the

future of the Jewish people. He said that after the war the situation o f European Jews would be very grave and Palestine would be unable to solve it, for it was too small. Naturally I demurred, and he asked me how many Jews we could settle in Palestine. I told him that i t depended on the kind of government we had there, but if i t was interested in Jewish settlement, there would be room for three million in, say, the first ten years. H e thought the figure fantastic for such a small country, where-

upon I told him what had been done in the field of immigration and settlement u p to then. I n 1 9 3 0 , Lord Passfield had accepted the view o f a so-called expert, Sir John Hope-Simpson, that there was not enough room in Palestine ‘to swing a cat round’, and he wanted to stop immigration. When his policy had been reversed b y his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ramsay MacDonald and Arthur Henderson, and a sympathetic High Commissioner, Wauchope, was sent out, immigration went u p from

4,000

in

1931,

to 66,500 i n 1935, all i n a n area o f about 5

per cent o f the country. A Jewish State could take in more than a quarter of a million a year. 94

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Moyne was not impressed and he had got it into his head that the only solution would be the establishment o f a Jewish State in Europe. ‘Hitler’s régime will have been smashed,’ he said, ‘and the Germans expelled from East Prussia. That’s where the Jews will be settled.’

I told him that I believed in victory and that he would be able to do what he liked with Germany. H e could drive the Germans out of Prussia with machine-guns, but not even with machine-guns would he bring the Jewish masses to settle in Prussia. The land o f the Jews, I told him, was Palestine. H e thought m y attitude naive and short-sighted. The Germans deserved no mercy, he said, and Palestine could not take in all the homeless Jews. T o this I replied that at the beginning o f the century Joseph Chamberlain had got the British Government to offer us Uganda, and it was just the Russian Jews, the most oppressed Jewish community i n all Europe, w h o spurned

the offer. Uganda did not interest them, even as a temporary asylum. There was only one land where we would settle and gain our independence. But I made n o impact o n Moyne. W e met a few times there-

after, and he always came back to the point that Palestine was no solution to the problem of homeless Jews and that one had to find another territory. Apart from his general pro-Arab outlook — which did not affect m y judgement o f h i m as a m a n — h e

struck me as one who was more at home with plans than with

people, and who therefore disregarded the human element. He rejected Palestine for the Jews because the Arabs objected. But something would have to be done for the Jews after the war, so he looked at a map of Europe, marked a piece o f Germany which would hold a few millions, and that’s where he would put the Jews. All very neat and simple. H e just could not understand why i t would not work. I believe he really did think I was naive and short-sighted. Moyne was replaced early in 1 9 4 2 b y Lord Cranbourne, and he in turn was succeeded at the end of 1943 b y Oliver Stanley. Both were good and friendly people, and were certainly better for us than either Lloyd or Moyne; but neither had the power to press for a major strengthening o f our position

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ERNEST BEVIN

You asked me about Bevin. Bevin was very different from Moyne and certainly from Lloyd, even though all were antiZionist. The most bitterly hostile action against Palestinian Jewry was taken when Ernest Bevin was Britain’s Foreign Secretary and directly responsible for Palestine policy. H e made no bones about his responsibility, even though the Colonial Secretary was nominally in charge. Bevin was backed b y Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and as he was a powerful character he, with Attlee’s support, allowed no other Cabinet Minister to interfere with either the formulation or execution of his policies. This was confirmed to me b y several of his Cabinet colleagues. Bevin was not the first Foreign Minister who wanted to nullify the Balfour Declaration and the terms o f the Mandate. But he was the first to try with such zeal to put that wish into effect. Three things were surprising about this attitude: it was a

complete reversal of his behaviour in 1 9 3 0 when he was so helpful in quashing the restrictive Passfield White Paper; he was a leader of the very party — the Labour Party — which was committed to supporting Jewish national aspirations in Palestine; and he was being harsh towards a people who — as the world had just learned — had lost six million under the Nazis. I have often been asked how I explain this strange behaviour. I don’t know that I can with any completeness, even though I formed certain judgements of the man from the several meetings I had with him. I t has been said that he was anti-Semitic and that this explains his policies. I a m most reluctant to accept this, although I have been told several first hand stories which lend substance to this charge. But I have always been careful to distinguish between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism — you can like Jews and still disagree with Zionism. And so I prefer to consider Bevin simply as an anti-Zionist. Why, then, was he helpful to us in 1 9 3 0 ? I think he knew very little about the problems involved at that time, but he was concerned with the political repercussions o f the Passfield White Paper. I t is possible, too, that he had little respect for Passfield, the intellectual, and indeed he remained suspicious of Labour Party intellectuals throughout his life. H e was also much taken 96

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by the Palestine Jewish Labour representative Dov Hos, who

had come t o London a t the time to mobilize opposition to the Passfield policy, and was impressed with his arguments. But I doubt whether he gave very much thought to Palestine from then until the day he became Foreign Secretary.

When he took over the Foreign Office, it is said that his principal aim was to check the spread o f Communism, and he was anxious to secure the support o f as many uncommitted countries as possible in pursuance o f this aim. H e saw the Arab

world as a big possible prize in this campaign, and if the price was the sacrifice o f tiny Jewish Palestine that was just too bad. There may be something in this. M y summing u p of the man from m y talks with him is that he was a very forceful character indeed, very strong-willed, bubbling with self-confidence and with considerable powers o f leadership. These stemmed, however, from a conscious ability to ride rough-shod over opponents, and he tended to rely on that rather than on persuasion b y argument. I do not think he was a man who read widely, since his conversation did not give this impression, nor a man who thought out problems from first principles. I am sure he had convictions; but I fancy that some o f what he thought were convictions were simple prejudices. What I disliked most about him was his closed mind, his lack o f sensitivity and his absence o f a sense o f history. H e also showed the weakness o f a man who is afraid to reverse himself lest he appear weak. I a m not criticizing him merely because I disagreed with his policies. But I think Bevin had very serious failings as a statesman. Y o u can’t b e a serious statesman and have a closed mind,

nor can you be over-confident. I think that when he became Foreign Secretary, he was briefed b y his permanent advisers on, among other regions, Palestine. These advisers, as I have said earlier, were consistently anti-Zionist. This is not hearsay. We had had dealings with them all the time, and we knew. I think they must have persuaded him - as they had always tried to persuade us — that, ‘with the best will in the world’, as the saying goes, encouragingJewish immigration would only anger the Arabs who were now, in the new post-war world, a considerable force. T o upset them would not only damage British

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interests, by weakening her influence and endangering her Middle East bases and oil supplies, but it would also push them into the arms of Soviet Russia. I t is conceivable that they may have added, knowing their man, that to push through an anti-

Zionist policy would require much courage and determination, particularly with world public opinion deeply moved b y the grave tragedy which had befallen the Jews o f Europe. I think i t likely that Bevin may have regarded this as a challenge and felt confident that if anyone could undertake such a task it was he. You will remember that not long after he took office he declared that he would solve the Palestine problem.

Well, he took his first restrictive steps and he was probably overwhelmed b y the opposition they encountered. They were resisted b y the Jews of Palestine, and then came criticism from

various capitals of the world, notably from Washington. Bevin was angered b y our refusal dumbly to submit to his dictates,

and even more so by the intervention of compassionate governments. The survivors of Europe’s death camps were clamouring to come to Palestine, yet he thought his ‘No’ would be quietly accepted b y them and b y us. Truman’s request that 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 be allowed to immigrate evoked an undiplomatic response from him. As opposition to his policy mounted, the more determined did he become to push it through. And the tougher he became, the more vigorous was our resistance. Our ‘illegal’ immigration mounted — and this angered him even more. The climax came with the ‘illegals’ o f the Haganah ship Exodus, when Bevin committed an act which I think will long remain a blot on the British r e c o r d : h e ordered the immigrants to b e forcibly re-

turned to the hated soil o f Germany. Such an order could have come only from a man lacking in sensitivity, in imagination, in a feeling for history, and in an innate understanding o f the essential rightness or wrongness of a particular course o f action. After that, I would have nothing more to do with him. A n d after that, too, I knew that we could hope for nothing more from Britain; we had to do everything in our power to prepare ourselves for independence as soon as possible. I t is ironic to reflect that b y the very vigour and brutality of his efforts to impose permanent minority status on us in our own homeland, he stimulated us to secure statehood more quickly. 98

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SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

H o w can Churchill be described in ordinary terms? H e was unique. Not only was he the greatest leader Britain ever produced but he was certainly among the greatest statesmen o f all time. And who in history can match his varied adventures, the facets to his character, his many-sided talents? What he did in 1940

was a rare feat in history: he lifted an entire nation out of

the depths o f humiliation and defeat, instilled in them the spiritual strength to hold fast against heavy odds, and eventually roused them to efforts which ensured victory. H e did this in a democracy, where his basic weapon to get a united nation behind him was his own power of persuasion. H e was able to do so b y his unique combination o f qualities — magnetic leadership, powerful eloquence, contagious courage, supreme self-confidence, a deep sense of history and an unshakeable faith in the destiny of his people. His shoulders were broad enough to bear

the heaviest possible responsibility, and there was nothing dilatory about his decision-making. I am sure he welcomed power when i t came, because I am sure he knew he was the only m a n at the time w h o could save Britain. A n d he did. I know the

age-old discussion about whether the man produces the hour or the hour the man. I think i t is quite o n the cards that if n o t for

Churchill, England would have gone down — with all the implications for the world if that had happened. History would

have been quite different if there had been n o Churchill. One of the interesting things reflecting on democracy, and on this man, who wielded power so cheerfully and so easily, is that if he had not been given power in 1 9 4 0 , he would not have seized i t ; and it was touch and go whether he would be given it. Though b y nature a rebel, pugnacious and adventurous, he was yet an absolute stickler for constitutional forms. Born and brought u p in the greatest democratic society in the world, his reverence for parliamentary institutions was unshakeable. Throughout the 1 9 3 0 ’ s , though he knew that in sheer ability he was head and shoulders above anyone else in his party, he was rigidly excluded from office, and took no steps to secure office. H e knew that his own party colleagues, who were the Government o f the day, were running the country to ruin. H e 99

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spoke out against their lack of preparedness, called attention to the dangers of Hitler; but he saw himself powerless to stop the inevitable doom. When war came, he was reluctantly admitted

into the Cabinet, and he quickly showed his mettle. But when catastrophe struck in 1940, his party were still reluctant to give him the top job, even though they knew that Chamberlain had to go. Chamberlain and his principal colleagues wanted Halifax, and Churchill was in fact asked if he would serve under

Halifax. The most Churchill did to further his own chances was not to reply. The party that really ensured Churchill’s Premiership was the Labour Party. They took a stand agreeing to join a national government only under Churchill. There was noth-

ing for it, and Chamberlain had to tell the king t o ask Churchill to form a Government. Thus was England saved. I never met Churchill when he was in office. But we got together later when he had been succeeded b y Macmillan and I was on an official visit to London. I was struck b y the depth of his feeling about Zionism and Israel, and he spoke a great deal

about this chapter in world history. He talked with reverence and affection about his old friend Chaim Weizmann, and he was proud o f his long and consistent support for the idea o f the

Jewish National Home ever since the Balfour Declaration. He saw the establishment o f the State o f Israel and what he called its prowess in the War of Independence as the crowning achievement o f a policy he had helped initiate at the end o f the First World War, even though his country had not always proved faithful to its early promises. Churchill knew well the history o f the Jews both in their own land and in the Diaspora, and he had a tremendous admiration for their tenacity and extraordinary capacity for survival despite the long and cruel persecution they had suffered. Thousands o f years had not changed their character — nor eased their sufferings nor destroyed their spirit. The Jews had remained alive in spite o f everything the world had done to them — and despite all they had done to themselves, with their internal dissensions. This, and their spiritual greatness, prompted the parallel in Churchill’s mind between them and the Greeks. Both had left mankind a legacy o f wisdom and genius. Athens and Jerusalem are the most precious cities in the history o f western civilization. 100

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Their religious and philosophical contributions dominate modern culture and belief. This recognition was part of Churchill’s intellectual make-up, and it came out in his talk with me and, o f course, in his writings. H e had always been a friend o f Zionism, and o n Zionism Churchill was absolutely consistent. There were great occasions in the House o f Commons when he came out against his own party. I n 1937 during the parliamentary debate on the Peel Partition Report, Churchill attacked the Chamberlain Government’s proposals for violating the obligations o f the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. During the 1939 debate on the White Paper, he condemned it as an act o f betrayal. H e even voted against it, in opposition to his own Conservative Party. Early in 1940, the Labour Party moved a motion o f no-con-

fidence after the Chamberlain Government issued the restrictive Land Regulations in accordance with the White Paper. Churchill b y then was in the Cabinet as First Lord o f the Admiralty. H e deliberately absented himself from Parliament so as not to have to vote against the motion. N o w I have often been asked b y m y friends why I am less critical of Churchill than I a m o f others who failed to help us when they were in a position to do so. Here, they say, I seem to excuse Churchill by finding a virtue in his absenting himself from Parliament, when in fact he could have made a point o f attending and voting against the Government o f which he was a member. This would have brought about his dramatic

resignation which would have highlighted the iniquities of the Government’s Palestine policy. Better still, if Churchill had threatened to behave in this way, it might have prompted Chamberlain and his Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald to be less restrictive towards the Jews o f Palestine. Within the framework of Zionist thinking, this is a valid point. A n d I was i n full agreement with m y colleagues i n London to try to get Churchill to take action i n the Cabinet — and if

necessary spectacular action in Parliament ~ against the White Paper. But I knew at the time that Churchill would not do so, for inevitably his priorities were not mine and m y priorities could not be his. T o me and to m y people, what the Chamberlain Government was doing was catastrophic; i t was also harmful 101

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to British interests. To Churchill, what they were doing was unfortunate and distasteful and foolish. But for him to oppose it would jeopardize his own Cabinet position, and with it his

power over the British Navy, his share in the conduct of the war, and his chance of the Premiership. W h y then, when he became Prime Minister, did he not

abolish the White Paper’s Land Regulations? I think he should have done, and our political work was directed towards getting him to do so. But we were not so naive as to think that he would

conceive it as his primary task to

set

Britain’s Palestine policy

back o n to a Zionist path. H e was a Zionist sympathizer. But he was an Englishman first, and he was chiefly preoccupied with the conduct o f the war and the struggle for victory. H e held, and rightly, that while the war was on the main thing was to

defeat Hitler. He would not go against the anti-Zionist

urgings of a colleague if he regarded that colleague as important to him in advancing his overall war aim. H e would set aside his Zionist sympathies for strategic, political or even psychological considerations, whether these considerations were sound or not. A good example is the creation o f a Jewish Army. We had raised it with Chamberlain and we raised it again when Churchill became Premier. H e was in favour o f it. Some of his Cabinet colleagues, whom he respected highly, were against it. This might not have swayed him, but what did do so was the opposition o f the commanding general in the field — Wavell, who was afraid

of possible Arab unrest if a Jewish force was established. Churchill thought these fears were groundless, but on a matter which was o f subsidiary importance to both of them, he was prepared to respect the wishes o f a commander who was

fighting a difficult and strategically vital campaign. I do not know whether I was as tolerant o f Churchill at the time as I a m now. But I well understand today that anyone who bears a heavy, above all a historic, responsibility — and no one in recent times bore greater responsibility than Churchill — must b e

allowed to take such factors into consideration, even when they

keep him from following his own sympathies and inclinations. Certainly his Zionist sympathies never weakened, and this he showed in several ways. Within days o f his assuming the Premiership and after he had removed MacDonald as Colonial 102

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Secretary, he wished t o arm the Jews of Palestine, saying a t the time that ‘with proper weapons [they] would have made a good fight against all comers.” But, as he wrote later, ‘Here I encountered every kind o f resistance.’ His new Colonial Secretary was Lord Lloyd, b y no means a friend o f Zionism but a m a n o f integrity. T o h i m Churchill wrote, thirteen days after becoming Prime Minister: “The main and almost the sole aim in Palestine at the present time is to liberate the eleven battalions of excellent [British] Regular

troops who are now tethered there. For this purpose the Jews should be armed in their own defence, and properly organized as speedily as possible . . . we cannot leave them unarmed when our troops leave, as leave they must at a very early date.” This was written before Italy’s entry into the war, which changed the situation, and the troops did not leave ‘at a very early date’. A month later he wrote to Lloyd again, expressing disapproval o f the heavy sentences passed on members o f the Haganah caught bearing arms: “The cruel penalties imposed b y your predecessor (MacDonald) upon the Jews in Palestine for arming have made it necessary to tie u p needless forces for their

protection. Pray let me know exactly what weapons and organization the Jews have for self-defence.” Churchill was

clearly concerned both by the harshness of the sentences and by the foolishness o f the policy which resulted in tying down troops needed elsewhere. I am sure he knew that Haganah arms were used solely for defence against Arab attack, and he was clearly o f the conviction that in the war against Hitler the Jews were wholly reliable and useful allies and should be used, whereas the Arabs were at worst hostile and at best doubtful. Yet in October 1939, under Chamberlain and MacDonald, there had been the arrest o f the celebrated ‘Forty-three’, a group of fine Haganah soldiers who were caught training with arms. Among them were such distinguished future officers of the Israel Army as Moshe Dayan, who later lost an eye fighting with the British in their Syrian campaign, and Moshe Carmel. They were given savage sentences, which were confirmed b y High Commissioner McMichael and the commanding general in Palestine, General Barker, and fully backed b y Colonial Minister Malcolm MacDonald in London. Chaim Weizmann went to see the Chief o f 103

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the Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, who told him that he thought the sentences both senseless and harsh. We knew that Ironside, who, with Churchill, was fully alive to the value o f Palestine Jewry’s help to the allied war effort, had in

fact sent instructions to General Barker ‘not t o do anything foolish’, such as carrying out searches for Jewish arms or dismissing Jews from the army and the police. But Ironside was virtually alone among the military men, as Churchill a t that

time was virtually alone in his views on Palestine among his colleagues in the Cabinet, and MacDonald, backed by Chamberlain, backed the narrow McMichael and Barker in Palestine. Churchill’s letter to Lloyd appears to have had its effect

only several months later, when the forty-three were released, together with two other groups who had also been jailed for possessing arms. But Lloyd’s immediate reply must have been

negative. I do not know what Lloyd wrote, but I do know that three weeks later Churchill sent him another note in which he said

“The failure of the policy which you favour is proved by the very large numbers of sorely-needed troops you have to

keep in Palestine — more than 2 0 , 0 0 0 men. This is the price we have to pay for the anti-Jewish policy which has been persisted in for some years. Should the war go heavily in

Egypt, all these troops will have t o be withdrawn, and the position of the Jewish colonists will be one of the greatest danger. Indeed I am sure that we shall be told that we cannot withdraw these troops, though they include some of the best

and are vitally needed elsewhere. If the Jews were properly armed, our forces would become available, and there would be n o danger o f the Jews attacking the Arabs, because they are entirely dependent upon us and our command of the seas. I think it is little less than a scandal that at a time when we are fighting for our lives these very large forces should be im-

mobilized in support of a policy which commends itself only t o a section o f the Conservative Party. I could certainly not

associate myself with such an answer as you have drawn u p for me. [Churchill as Prime Minister was due to answer a question on the subject in the House of Commons.] I do not 104

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at all admit that Arab feeling in the Near East and India would be prejudiced in the manner you suggest.’ Churchill was certainly doing his best to translate his views on Palestine Jewry into action; but his only goal was winning the war, and if the people he relied o n in this overall effort were opposed to h i m o n Palestine policy, h e was prepared to post-

pone action, even though he felt strongly on the subject and was convinced that he was right and they were wrong. We must remember, too, that although the proposal for a Jewish Army was delayed and delayed, it was eventually

adopted by the Churchill Government. I doubt whether this would have happened under any other Premier. Certainly no other Prime Minister would have announced it with such felicitous words. When he talked o f it in the House o f Commons, eight days after the official announcement, Churchill said : “The British Army in Italy includes Palestinian units. I wish to recall a fact which members have no doubt read, and which they will certainly appreciate and approve. His Majesty’s Government has decided to accede to the request o f the Jewish Agency for Palestine to set u p a Jewish Brigade

Group which will take part in battle. ‘Many Jews are serving in our armies, and in the armies of America, on all fronts. I t seems to me indeed appropriate that a special Jewish unit, a special unit o f that race which has suffered indescribable torments from the Nazis, should be represented as a distinct formation among the forces gathered for the final overthrow, and I have no doubt that they will take part not only in the struggle but also in the occupation

which will follow.’ I have said elsewhere that the two men who played the major part in securing this great achievement o f a distinctive Jewish formation were D r Weizmann and Moshe Sharett. Incidentally, after the defeat of the German forces in northern Italy, Churchill’s message of thanks to Field-Marshal Alexander specifically mentioned the Jewish force among those who participated in the victory. Even though, as I said earlier, I may be rather more tolerant o f Churchill than I was during the war, I had as great an 105

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admiration for him then as I have now. I ' l l tell you an incident on this very subject which occurred in 1 9 4 0 , some months after he became Prime Minister. I was in London at the time and was having meetings with Lord Lloyd, pressing for enlistment o f Palestine Jews into combat units, during the very weeks when he was exchanging the notes with Churchill which I have just mentioned. I was leaving for the United States o n the 21st o f

September, and shortly before m y departure I called on Lloyd. We talked o f many things, including the good meeting D r Weizmann had had three weeks earlier with the Prime Minister.

As I spoke of Churchill, Lloyd said t o me, ‘You like him because he is a Zionist.” To which I replied: ‘No, in spite of i t . ’ This surprised him, and his face was all query. I explained: ‘You are not a Zionist — and you act i n

accordance with your convictions. Churchill is a Zionist — but he does not at present act like one. Yet in spite o f this, I am full o f admiration for him.’

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GENERAL CHARLES DE GAULLE

General Charles de Gaulle is undoubtedly the greatest European statesman today, cast in a majestic mould. H e seems to possess all the text-book attributes o f greatness, and he is one of the few men of stature who do not disappoint on meeting. H e is as impressive as his image. H e has tremendous natural leadership. H e is fearless in politics as he was in war. His confidence is

supreme and his power of decision utterly unfaltering. He has a dazzlingly original and analytical mind. H e is never ordinary or banal either in his actions or in his thought, because his actions always follow his thinking, and he thinks deeply and from first

principles. He has grandeur of style and, like Churchill, a profound sense of history and of destiny. He has, as well, a n extraordinary memory. O n meeting him one is quickly taken by his great charm and his very human qualities, though to the general public he may appear aloof. H e has an iron will and an unswerving dedication to one goal — the greatness o f France. H e is not one o f those leaders who floats passively along with the tide o f events; he shapes events. A n d the history o f France in our generation is unquestionably what de Gaulle has made it.

His friendship for Israel dates back to several years before the State, for he was familiar — and saw at first hand — what our people were doing in Palestine at the beginning o f the war, and particularly what our boys in the Haganah were doing and were

capable of doing towards the Allied war effort. He had been m u c h concerned, after the fall o f France i n 1940, to clear out 107

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the Vichy authorities in Syria and Lebanon, and the Haganah played its part in those operations. I knew what de Gaulle had felt at the time, but I was nevertheless surprised and very pleased to hear an echo of it shortly after the war. I n November 1945, I had a talk in Paris with Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, and as it was our first meeting after France’s liberation I congratulated him on the renewal o f French democratic sovereignty. I told him that our people’s friendship with France

had existed as far back as the First World War and I hoped this friendship would continue to be close. I told him that it would certainly be strengthened when the Jewish State was established, which I said I was sure would be soon. There was, at the moment, a severe crisis between us and the British Government. I hoped that it would not long continue. But I told Bidault that even after those relations improved, which I was sure they would

with the passage of time, we would wish t o maintain strong ties with France. Bidault expressed his appreciation o f our friendship and said that his Government was sympathetic to Zionism. H e then told me that he had gone to London a few weeks earlier, to meet his opposite number, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, with whom he was to review policy, including policy in the Middle

East. Before leaving Paris, he had consulted with General de Gaulle, and, said Bidault to me, de Gaulle had given him these words to take to London: “Tell Bevin that I was in Palestine and I saw what the Jews are doing there. Tell him that the Jews are the only force that is developing the country.’ PRESIDENT

ROOSEVELT

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BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER

During the Second World War, I spent a good deal o f time in the United States o n several extended visits trying to mobilize the support o f the American Government for the creation o f a Jewish Army and for our general aims in Palestine. I also worked among the various Zionist bodies preparing them for

our major political demand of statehood when war would end. President Roosevelt’s attitude t o Zionism was somewhat ambiguous. As a lofty humanitarian, he was sensitive t o the 108

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tragedy of European Jewry. Supreme Court Justices Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, both life-long Zionists, were among his intimate friends. H e may have felt some sympathy

for Zionist aspirations; but he did not believe that tiny Palestine could provide a solution for the Jewish people. H e recognized that after the war it would be necessary to find a haven for the uprooted and shattered Jewish survivors, but he thought Palestine was too small to take them in. O n m y visit to Washington at the end of 1 9 4 0 , I made a special point o f seeing Brandeis. H e was undoubtedly the greatest Jew o f the United States. Deeply devoted to Zionism, he had played a part in Britain’s issue o f the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and had done much to secure President Wilson’s support for it. I n the years immediately following the Declaration, however, his Zionist philosophy was somewhat naive. H e thought that this document had solved all political problems, and that Palestine could now be colonized on a straightforward business basis in accordance with the standard American pattern of the times. I t was this that led to his break with Weizmann and to the split in the American Zionist movement. But over the years

Brandeis had reached a deeper understanding of Zionism, and when I saw him in 1 9 4 0 , he admitted to me that he had been wrong in 1 9 2 0 . H e had not then seen the need for and importance of pioneering, nor had he understood that the building o f a nation and development of a long neglected land could not be achieved b y ordinary commercial methods. As time went on, moreover, he had grasped the vital importance of labour settlement and pioneering initiative; without them, he now saw, we would never have registered the achievements o f agricultural and urban settlement, a Jewish working population, and a defence force. H e had also changed in his attitude towards Britain. A t first, his confidence in British goodwill was unbounded. When I met him in 1937 after the Zionist Congress which had discussed the Peel Partition proposal, he declared himself vigorously opposed to it because it was less than Britain had promised and to which she was committed. H e thought she would eventually come round, and dismissed what Britain was then doing in Palestine 109

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as ‘a temporary aberration’. Now, in 1940, I found him completely disillusioned about Britain’s integrity. But when I sought

his help in fighting the MacDonald White Paper, he demurred, o n the ground that this might embarrass the American Government which was Britain’s friend. I had to return to Palestine shortly after this meeting, but knowing this great m a n as I did, I was sure that he would give further thought to the arguments in our talk and change his mind, for he was never afraid o f changing his mind. I think he would have conceded that the demand for fair play for the Jews of Palestine did not conflict with his duty as an American citizen, and as for the circumstance of war, strengthening the Jews there would help the military effort against Hitler. But

time ran out. When next I came to the United States in 1941, Brandeis had already passed away.

Incidentally, the journey back to Palestine after my 1940 visit took a month, for I had to go b y flying boat on the long east— west route via New York, San Francisco, Honolulu, New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Calcutta, Karachi and Basra to Tiberias, o n the Sea o f Galilee. I had a n interest-

ing interlude in New Zealand. The Flying Clipper flew only during the daylight hours, and when I reached Auckland, where we were staying the night, representatives of the local

Jewish community came

out to meet

me. They had been

apprised of my coming and had arranged a reception for me in the community hall; and they asked me to address them. During m y talk two men entered the hall and their arrival caused

great excitement among the audience, which burst into spontaneous applause. During the hand-clapping, I asked m y chairm a n w h o they were. T h e one i n front, said he, was the Mayor o f

Auckland, a Jew. The other was the Prime Minister o f New Zealand, Peter Fraser. When I finished speaking, the Prime Minister asked for the

floor, and said warm things about Palestine. Then the Mayor got up, a n d this is what h e s a i d : ‘ I was o n m y w a y t o this meet-

ing when I met the Prime Minister. H e asked me where I was going and I told him I was on m y way to meet the Chairman o f the Zionist Executive from Jerusalem. “ I ’ l l join you,” said the 110

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Prime Minister, and he did.” There are not many countries in the world where one would encounter such warmth and informality. The man who was perhaps the most helpful to me on m y various visits to the United States during the war was the brilliant Felix Frankfurter. I n m y efforts to gain the support o f the American Government not only for such immediate aims as a Jewish Army but also for post-war constitutional changes in Palestine, Frankfurter was invaluable and tireless in arranging for me to meet his friends among the principal figures in

the Administration. I consulted him about every political step I took in the United States a t that time. One episode I recall very clearly involved a comprehensive memorandum I was to submit for the attention o f President Roosevelt at the beginning o f 1 9 4 2 . I t was virtually the case for a Jewish State after the war, and I must say that although most

Zionist leaders in America agreed with me, there were some who thought I was being premature. I was pleased to find Frankfurter entirely with me in m y approach, and also in the importance o f its getting to the ears and eyes o f Roosevelt. Not only did he make the arrangements for i t to get to the President, but he himself went over every sentence and every word, as did another friend o f ours and one of the President’s advisers, Ben Cohen. The memorandum declared that both history and international law had designated the land o f Israel as the National

Home of the Jewish people. Since the First World War, i t had taken in more Jewish immigrants than any other country. But after the war we would face a grim Jewish refugee problem. H o w many would Palestine then be able to take? This would depend on the kind of régime i t had. Even under an indifferent or hostile régime, powerful inner forces had enabled the Jews to expand the capacity o f the country to absorb large-scale immigration: the desperate need of so many Jews to find a safe and self-governing asylum; the pioneering initiative o f the Zionist settlers; the deep love for the land of his fathers implanted in the Jewish heart. I f these forces were allowed to flourish b y a régime that was ITI

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neither indifferent nor hostile but dedicated to the welcoming and settlement of the immigrants and the development of the land, the country would be able to take as many Jews as would come. The memorandum then went into detail on this point, giving the facts o n immigration, settlement, economic progress, the development o f Hebrew culture, the organization of the Jewish defence force, the creation o f Jewish self-governing institutions. I t also drew attention to the empty stretches in the country and its natural resources which were not being ex-

ploited. After the war, therefore, a new régime would be needed which should be guided b y the unwavering purpose of building the country and taking in new immigrants on a large scale. This

could be done only by a Jewish Government. Only a Jewish administration would be completely identified with the needs and aims o f the Jewish settlers. I remember ending the memorandum with ‘To secure a homeland for homeless Jews, Jews themselves must be entrusted with its reconstitution.’ After this document had gone to the White House, I sent copies to all the leaders o f the Zionist movement in the United States, and it served as the basis of the celebrated Biltmore Programme which was adopted at the All-Zionist Conference

(in the Biltmore Hotel, hence the name) in the middle of May 1 9 4 2 , with the participation o f D r Weizmann. Weizmann, indeed, made one o f the greatest speeches of his life. The Biltmore Programme was the first official declaration ofJewish statehood as Zionism’s post-war aim. I like to reflect that Felix Frankfurter had a part in it. A n d since some of the terms o f the memorandum also found their way subsequently into Israel’s Proclamation of Independence, he had a part in that too.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

The United States leader with whom I had dealings before he became President was Eisenhower. We first met at the end of October 1945 when he was Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. I saw him in Frankfurt shortly after I had made an extensive visit to the surviving Jews w h o were then being cared

for in Displaced Persons camps. I visited all the camps in the 112

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American and British sectors of Germany, since I was Chairman of the Jewish Agency at the time and the General had given me every facility to see the people and places I wanted to see. What I saw added a dimension to what I had read and heard o f the Nazi infamies, and made me more bitter than ever at the post-

war policies of the British Government. I had just come from London where I had found it impossible to move Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Minister Bevin to raise the restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine. They were absolutely determined to continue the policy of the 1939 White Paper. And here in Europe I saw the death camps, saw the gas chambers where millions o f m y people had been murdered, saw the crematoria where their bodies had been burnt. A n d I saw the ones who had miraculously survived. All they wanted to do now was to shake the soil o f Germany from their feet and go to Palestine to start a new life for themselves and their

nation. But they were not allowed to go. M r Bevin had shut the gates.

This was the background to m y meeting with Eisenhower. But I had first seen his Chief of Staff, General Bedell Smith, and I must say he was one o f the wisest men I have ever met. I n a long political life, I knew from m y talks with non-Jews how difficult it was — particularly before the establishment o f Israel — for them to understand the nature o f the Jewish problem and our bonds with our ancient land. This, after all, is a unique phenomenon and one which is outside the range o f anyone who is not Jewish. Bedell Smith had a grasp of ideas as quick as lightning. H e seemed to understand the core o f the problem after a few sentences. His sympathy was as immediate as his helpfulness, and at that first meeting in Frankfurt we struck u p a warm friendship which lasted until his death in 1961. Bedell Smith took me in to see Eisenhower, and I put u p certain proposals based o n m y visits to the D P camps and o n m y

talks with the D P leaders. I asked for better conditions in the camps; I urged that young refugees wishing to settle on the land in Palestine be given farm training and the older ones given vocational instruction; I spoke of their need for Hebrew books so that they could study the language in the meantime. These were not available in Europe, and I suggested that he send a 113

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military plane to Palestine once a week to bring back books, agricultural instructors and teachers. The plane could also carry mail between the refugees in the camps and their relatives in Palestine, and this would greatly boost their morale. I found Eisenhower very wam and responsive. Bedell Smith had certainly prepared the ground, for Eisenhower’s first words t o m e were, ‘ I a m told that you are the moving spirit i n the

building of Palestine.” ‘Only one of them,’ I told him, but I did

thank him on behalf of the Jewish people for his liberation of Europe. That, I added, was a chapter in world history; ‘but what you do after the liberation for the remnants of our people is a chapter in Jewish history.” Eisenhower said he knew that the refugees wanted to settle in Palestine but that was out o f his hands. All he could do was help them while they were in Germany, and that he was ready to do. And he did — he did all I asked of him, making available farms for training and arranging for books, instructors and teachers to come i n from Palestine. And, to expedite matters, h e

agreed to send a weekly military plane to Palestine. The first

plane went off soon after our talk. The British Mandatory authorities were most unhappy when it reached the country and

they learned its purpose. But there was little they could do with that plane and the cargo of Hebrew books and Jewish personnel it brought back to the refugees in Germany; for they could hardly turn away a craft sent b y the Commander-in-Chief o f the Allied Forces in Europe. But they quickly signalled London, and the British Foreign Office quickly signalled the State Department in Washington, and the State Department quickly had an instruction sent to General Eisenhower ordering him not to send any more flights. That, then, was the only plane that was sent. Most of the other proposals, however, went into effect. Incidentally, on the provision of farms for agricultural pioneer training, something happened which showed Eisenhower’s very human approach. I had met him again shortly after his people had expropriated and made available to the refugees a very suitable estate which had belonged to a high-up Nazi. The refugees had rejected it. I myself had not happened to have heard about it and when Eisenhower mentioned i t to me, I 114

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thought he would be put out b y this apparent spurning of his goodwill. H e quickly put me at m y ease by saying, ‘ I understand them, and I know why they refused our offer o f this estate.

After all the Nazis did to them, how can w e expect sur-

viving Jews to work the land of known Nazis?’ We met several years later, when he was President of his country, and I was Prime Minister o f mine, and we also exchanged a good deal o f correspondence. 1 always found him anxious to be understanding and helpful, except during the Sinai campaign and in the immediate weeks following the fighting. H e called upon me most urgently, though in far more polite language than was used b y Russia’s Marshal Bulganin, to

withdraw Israel’s forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip,

and to do so unconditionally. I was equally insistent in m y refusal to pull out completely unless we had adequate safeguards that this territory would not again be used b y Egypt as a base for infiltration attacks, and for blockading Israel and international shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba. The deadlock lasted i n fact for several months — from the beginning o f

November 1956 to the first of March 1957 — but towards the end, more and more members of the United Nations had begun to understand the nature of Israel’s security problems and the measures we had taken to prevent further Egyptian aggression. The fact that we were adamant in refusing to budge without safeguards also had its impact. A t all events, Eisenhower, whose ears had been deaf to our explanations during and immediately after the fighting, now also began to show more understanding, and this in fact was the key factor which led to a satisfactory conclusion to the crisis. H e promised full American backing for the safeguards we were demanding at the United Nations and it was arranged that America’s representative at the U N , Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, would make the

appropriate statement

at

the General Assembly. There was

a hold-up at the last minute when Lodge, apparently ignoring White House instructions, failed to give utterance to one of the promises Eisenhower had agreed to. I accordingly held u p the withdrawal order to our troops and sent a signal to the President telling him why. The matter was quickly cleared u p in a letter from Eisenhower to me which set things straight. 115

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PRESIDENT TRUMAN

Truman was a President o f great courage and great power of decision. Which other President would have dismissed General MacArthur in so summary a fashion? A man o f the people, he also knew about power and the techniques of government, for he

had served a long apprenticeship in Congress. When he reached the White House, he showed that while he could listen to his advisers, he also knew when to follow his own bent. H e could initiate policy and he knew how to carry it through. I met him both when he was President and I was Prime Minister and, as on the last occasion, when he was already out o f office. Though many may think of him as hard-boiled, I found

him both very human and sensitive. For us Israelis, of course, his most memorable act was in recognizing the State o f Israel

within minutes of my proclamation of independence. At our last meeting, after a very interesting talk, just before he left me — it was in a New York hotel suite — I told him that as a foreigner I could not judge what would be his place in American history; but his helpfulness to us, his constant sympathy with our aims

in Israel, his courageous decision to recognize our new State so quickly, and his steadfast support since then had given him a n immortal place in Jewish history. As I said that, tears suddenly sprang to his eyes. And his eyes were still wet when he bade me good-bye. I had rarely seen anyone so moved. I tried to hold him for a few minutes until he had become more composed, for I recalled that the hotel corridors were full o f waiting journalists and photographers. H e left. A little later, I too had to go out, and a correspondent came u p to m e to ask ‘Why was President Truman i n tears when he left

you?’ Actually, the decision about recognition was not the first time that Truman had shown his understanding of the needs and yearnings of the Jewish people. Shortly after the war, when Britain’s Attlee and Bevin began to show their stubborn antiZionism, Truman tried to do what he could to get them to introduce a little humanity — and realism — into their Palestine policy. A n d he did this even though his own State Department 116

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people were being pressed by their opposite numbers in the British Foreign Office to co-ordinate with them o n this policy, with much success. The Anglo-American Commission o f

Inquiry’s Report is public knowledge, with their recommendation to permit the immediate immigration into Palestine o f 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 Jewish refugees — a recommendation which was such a blow to Attlee and Bevin and so warmly welcomed b y Truman. What is less well known is that as early as August 1945, Truman sent a letter to Attlee telling him that ‘because o f the natural interest’ of his Government in ‘the present condition and future fate o f those displaced persons in Germany who may prove to be stateless or non-repatriable’, he had sent Earl G . Harrison to inquire into the situation, and Harrison had suggested that 100,000

additional immigration certificates for immigration to

Palestine should be granted. The letter continued: ‘As I said to you in Potsdam the American people as a whole firmly believe that immigration into Palestine should not be closed and that a reasonable number of Europe’s persecuted Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be

permitted to re-settle there. . . . The main solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation o f as many as possible o f the nonrepatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine. If it is to be effective, such action should not be long delayed. . . . ’ This plea was ignored b y the British Government, and Bevin was later to make some unhappy remarks about ‘Jewish influence’ in the political life o f America. PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Kennedy may have become a great President — he had all the makings o f a great leader — and it is sad indeed that he was cut down, and in such tragic circumstances. H e was a man of real calibre, with that indefinable quality o f leadership and the ability to take difficult decisions. I first met him when he was a Senator. I had been told to expect a young man, but when he walked into m y office I was not prepared for one so young. H e looked a man o f about twenty-seven, and I wondered how he could have managed to do all the things he had done and to hold out the promise with which he was so widely credited. But 117

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as we talked, I found myself recognizing that there was something special about him. Apart from having great charm, and being very bright and quick, he was so obviously interested,

passionately interested, in ideas. To our discussion of political problems, he brought a n awareness of the practical considerations involved, a deep concern for people, and — what I found rare in a practical politician — an intellectual excitement, the kind one associates with scholars faced with challenging data. I saw him again when he was President. The personality was much the same, and he was as free and frank in his talk as he had

been before he was elected to run the affairs of the most powerful country on earth. There was the same sincere concern for

people, and far from appearing to be weighed down by the huge responsibility for so many lives, he seemed buoyed u p b y the

challenging fact that his o w n actions could enhance them. There I think is one of the essential ingredients of greatness in leadership. H e knew a good deal about the Middle East, was familiar with the progress and problems o f Israel, was sympathetic to our cause, and was helpful to us. During his Presidency and m y Premiership, we kept u p a most fruitful exchange of correspondence, and I think we got to know each other quite well through

these letters, which did not always take the normal diplomatic form usual between heads of governments, but rather that o f a dialogue between friends. PRESIDENT JOHNSON

I met President Johnson when he was a Senator and I was o n one o f m y visits to the United States. W e did not meet after h e

entered the White House for b y then I had already retired from office. M y impressions o f him, therefore, are those o f our earlier meeting. Maturity and confidence are not always the concomitants o f political experience; but Johnson had them. H e also appeared comfortable with the already considerable power he then exercised as Senate Majority Leader — and this is an important quality in leadership. But he also showed another quality which impressed me deeply, for i t is b y no means as common as it should be among men in high office: the quality 118

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of compassion. When I told him about our immigrants from backward or oppressive countries, how we took them in, housed them, trained them for productive lives, he reacted as if he was himself living the process, as if the man in him could feel all they went through, the politician in him could understand our administrative problems, and the statesman in him could recognize the grandeur of the human adventure. I think these qualities are evident in most o f what he has

done since he became President. He likes people and he understands them, and they feel a kinship with him which few other

Presidents have evoked. He also has the rare experience and sagacity which enables him t o do something about the human condition, to translate his goodwill into political action. H e has the knowledge of governmental machinery at his fingertips, knows exactly h o w to set the wheels o f government i n motion,

how to keep them going, and the confident courage to keep them moving in the direction he wants. D A G HAMMARSK]JOLD

Dag Hammarskjold came to Israel several times and on each visit we spent long hours in formal talks and even longer hours in informal conversation. We also wrote to each other quite often. M y summing u p o f him is that he was not a great man, though he was a prodigious and tireless worker; but he was a great intellectual. H e knew a great deal and he was a voracious reader. H e did not carry responsibility lightly. H e always seemed heavily weighed down b y the burdens o f the United Nations, and I think he was unhappy much of the time. H e was a very complicated individual and very much o f an introvert. When we first met, we started off badly, but later we became great friends. I t is tragic that he should have died as he did.

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When you took office as first Prime Minister of the State of Israel, didyou have the overriding consciousness that you were now the architect of the new State and the man who could shape a nation ? I suppose every leader o f a State sees his major

tasks as those of perfecting his society and making his special impact o n the destiny o f his people. I do not know that I would use the term architect, but if I stayed with the building idiom I would say that the big difference between Israel and

other States a t the time was that we had to construct a State edifice almost from the drawing-board — laying the foundations and erecting the main structure — whereas other State leaders had inherited the structure and were concerned with renovations, repairs and the building o f new wings, in addition, o f course, to running their ‘going concern’. We were not a ‘going concern.” W e had to start almost from scratch — I say almost

because we had had useful experience a t the Jewish Agency administering the Jewish sector o f the country during the Mandatory period, and we had also started planning the services o f statehood more than a year earlier. But now we had to bring the drawing-board to life. We had to create a government administration, a parliament, a n army. A n d w e h a d to d o all

this under the violent pressure o f battle. As to what you call ‘moulding a nation’, I imagine every national leader has a picture o f the kind o f society he would like his people to achieve and presumably works towards it. For myself, long before I took office as Prime Minister, m y goal 120

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was the creation of a model society which could become, in the language of the Biblical prophets, ‘a light unto the nations’. I wanted the new Israel to be a democratic society; to be idealistic; to follow the injunction o f helping thy neighbour; to work hard in pioneering the desert spaces and rebuilding our long neglected land; for all to work in harmony with each other without the one being exploited b y the other; to give homogeneity to the diverse immigrant groups to whom we opened our gates on the very first day o f our State; to raise the educational, social and economic levels of those who came from primitive lands t o a standard o f equality with the veteran

settlers; to harness the boons o f modern scientific discovery to the ancient moral teachings o f our forebears. These were m y goals, and the goals o f m y colleagues. O f course, the moment you are in power, things look very different from the way they look to a theoretician. You realize that not everything that needs to be done can be done at once ~ you are limited by money and you are limited b y skilled manpower. So you must have your priorities. And I would say that the key function o f a Prime Minister is the fixing o f priorities. But to do this wisely, he must have a set of basic aims, he must have judgement, he must be able, in the army term, to ‘appreciate the situation’, both the national and the international, and h e must b e able to judge the character and capaci-

ties o f his Ministerial colleagues and the experts. N o w you may say that fixing priorities on the day we took office must have been easy, for we had a war on our hands and everyone would have understood had we directed our resources exclusively to the war effort. This would have been easy. But we had a set of basic aims for our new society, and some we had to implement immediately to mark the course we proposed to follow. We opened our gates to free immigration. We had to show, by deed, that Israel was the Jewish home and all Jews who wished or needed to come were welcome. They came, most o f them penniless refugees from lands o f poverty or persecution, or both. We fed them, clothed them, gave them shelter, cared for them until they could stand on their own feet. The resources spent on them were immense. We received much help from wealthier Jewish communities overseas. But our own people in 121

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Israel responded handsomely. Some took immigrants into their own homes. All submitted with good will to stiffer taxation to help finance immigrant housing and settlement. All accepted an austerity régime which distributed our food and clothing supplies equally among the entire population, newcomers and old-timers, rich and poor.

Another step we took in accordance with our basic aims was the introduction of free universal elementary education. That may not sound so startling, for there are many countries which offer this educational service and more. But we had just been born; our resources were limited, and desperately needed to finance food and guns. Nevertheless, we decided to give education, like immigration, a high enough priority after security to enable both to advance. Let me say that in making these priority decisions, I had the entire Cabinet with me. But I can tell you that some ‘experts’ came to m e to tell m e that I was behaving suicidally,

that i t

was absurd to divert a single penny and a single man from the army, and absurd to assume subsidiary burdens; the military burden was enough. This is where judgement in national leadership comes in. The expert must know his facts and figures in the field in which he has specialized. H e does not have to know people, and in the nature o f things, having devoted his time to his specialist subject, he is unlikely to have had much experience in political organization or leadership. A

Prime Minister, on the other hand, has got there precisely through such experience — a n experience which enables h i m to

know people, to know their capacities, to know their responses to a particular policy i n a particular circumstance.

If, allied

to this judgement o f people, he can also make a wise assessment o f situations, he can go ahead and fix his priorities with confidence no matter what the experts say. We in the Cabinet in 1948 knew that we were hard-pressed o n the battle fronts. But we also knew that our people would rise to the great challenge, and rise more gallantly, if we started implementing the very things they were fighting for. So it proved. Nor were the immigrants passive recipients o f help. They helped too, the able-bodied joining the fighting ranks and the others settling in farm villages and growing food. As a result o f this open door 122

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policy on immigration, which was supported b y all the political leaders though frowned upon by several ‘experts’, we brought in almost seven hundred thousand newcomers in our first four years. If we had frozen our immigration, could we have achieved what we did with the meagre population we had in 1948? A n d could we have done it with a nation o f illiterates — which is what we might have become had we not insisted on universal education from the very outset? I do not want you to feel from what I have said that I a m against experts. I am not. But we were talking o f the functions o f a Prime Minister and I think it important for national leader-

ship anywhere t o mark well the boundaries of the expert’s functions. The expert, whether as high level adviser to Government leaders or top civil servant, has an increasingly important place in the modern State. But the ultimate decision on policy rests with the elected representatives. I t is for them to frame policy, for them to set the goals they wish the State to attain. I n a well-run, highly-developed society, with a trained civil service and good specialists, the experts will tell the national leaders how their policies may most effectively be carried out. I t is also their job to draw attention to any shortcomings and

dangers in such policies. The leaders will then decide whether to g o ahead o r not, and if to g o ahead, a t what pace to proceed.

As Prime Minister for many years, how did you choose your Cabinets? I regret that I was not as free in the choice o f m y colleagues as, say, the President of the United States is, who can virtually choose whom he wants, or the Prime Minister o f

Great Britain, who need draw on members only of his own party. The Governments I headed were all Coalition Cabinets, because o f the unfortunate electoral system we have. I t is based on proportional representation, with the entire country as one constituency, which makes for an abundance o f small parties, with none gaining an absolute majority over all the others. M y own party, Mapai, has consistently polled an overwhelmingly larger number o f votes than any other party, but we have never reached 5 1 per cent. We have therefore always been called 123

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upon to form a Government but have always had to take in partners. I n pre-coalition bargaining, there had to be give and take o n policy, and tough negotiation o n the allocation o f Cabinet seats. But once we agreed on the number o f seats a minority party would get, and the portfolios, it was u p to the party, not to me, to determine who the Ministers would be. For the most part, they turned out to be very good. A colleague I admired more than most, for example, was Rabbi Maimon, a member not o f m y party but of the Religious party. I also got o n very well with another longtime Religious party Minister, Chaim Moshe Shapiro. There was a n occasional minority party

Minister for whom I did not have a high regard, but I had to accept him. Sometimes, the party itself realized that he had not been too effective and it would send a replacement in the next coalition.

With m y own party, o f course, it was easier, and we always had the largest number o f portfolios. Here, the choice o f who should be in the Cabinet was worked out b y the party leadership, under m y chairmanship, though the specific allocation o f portfolios would be left to me. By and large, the eligible Ministers were drawn from the leadership, the m e n and women whose names appeared at the top o f the Mapai electoral list. But, to maintain a balance, we also took into account the various claims of the regions, the kibbutzim, the moshavim, the trade unions and so on. O n portfolios, I always insisted that Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Treasury would go to members of m y party. These were never negotiable, though in the bargaining with coalition parties before the formation o f a government, they would occasionally put in their claim to one of them. But they rarely insisted, knowing well that I would never give way. I n addition to

the Premiership, I also always headed the Defence Ministry.

As to the running o f the Government, I always set out its major goals, drawing u p a statement on overall policy which was agreed to b y m y coalition partners at the conclusion o f our negotiations. I would then proceed to the Knesset and secure its parliamentary acceptance. This statement would be the guide to all members o f the Cabinet, and they would be expected to keep in mind these long term aims in making their day-to-day 124

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decisions. Their criterion a t the moment o f decision had always to be whether it would advance those aims and enable Israel to reach its goals more quickly and effectively. This sounds very simple and straightforward, but in practice you andyour Ministers were often compelled to make decisions which retarded your long term aims. There was a time, for example, early on in your Premiership when we did not have as many hospitals as we needed, and as we have now. Money demanded by the Health Ministry went to increase the defence budget, thereby setting back your goal of the highest standard in medical services. I n peace, as in war, the tactical aim must be set in the context o f the strategic aim, but often a tactical withdrawal on one front may be necessary in order to advance on another and thereby reach the strategic goal. If I , as Prime Minister, a m persuaded that additional expenditures on defence are

necessary to preserve our security and that without them we may be overrun, it would be foolish to run the risk o f destruction, in which, after all, new hospitals would be destroyed too. Better to keep the goal o f an excellent medical service in mind, increase the defence budget one year, and hope that in the following year defence can be cut and the health budget increased. But does not that mean that health will always lose out? The threats of Israel’s neighbours are such that a good case can always be made out by the military experts to increase the defence budget. The record is against you, for we did in fact successively increase the health budget so that today there is enough hospital space available or being built. But you have in fact put your finger on one o f the prime roles o f a Prime Minister, the point I mentioned earlier about the fixing of priorities based on judgement of a situation. O f course the threats to Israel’s security are serious. Defence weapons get more costly each year. The army always wants more and better equipment, and the army is right. The Health Ministry always wants a bigger budget, and it is right too. T h e Prime Minister 125

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must make his appreciation of the situation and, in the light o f

that assessment, make his decision. Moreover increased development enlarges the national income. Every ministry wants a

bigger slice of that increase. I t is u p to the Prime Minister to set the priorities. A good Prime Minister must not only have judgement but also confidence in his own judgement. This does not mean that he must have a closed mind. I n considering a situation, his mind must be open. But when his advisers have gone and he has finished weighing u p the pros and cons, he must make a decision, and having made it, he must stick to it. Your specific example of the defence budget reminds me o f a decision I once made which was based on m y estimate of the immediate military future, which differed from the appreciation of the situation by the Chief of Staff. I wanted to cut the army budget, and thereby make more money available for education and health and economic development, because I did not think we would have a full-scale war for at least the next two or three years. I reached this conclusion b y m y reading of the international situation and the position in the neighbouring Arab States. The Chief of Staff, a most distinguished individual, set his face firmly against a n army cut. Since h e felt so strongly

about it, he did not believe he could conscientiously go along with m y policy. H e resigned. I was sorry to see him go, but i t was the only course. Dzd any ofyour Cabinet colleagues ever complain that you were interfering in their affairs? Sometimes.

Couldyou name names? Well let me say that there were complaints not that I was interfering in their affairs, for they all respected m y right to an active interest in what they were doing, but that I sometimes took steps or said things about their sphere of responsibility without consulting them. Looking back, I am afraid that I did not always respect the niceties of inter-ministerial pro126

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cedures, though at the time I had no idea that I was offending anyone’s susceptibilities. I remember that the Education Minister in one o f m y Cabinets was once much put out because I received a delegation of university students who had been

demonstrating against the Ministry of Education. I wanted t o end the deadlock between them — and I did, by giving a hearing to the students. The Minister was very angry when he heard about i t later, but I was not sorry I had done what I did. H a d I told him beforehand o f m y intention, he would almost certainly have objected. This would have led to a showdown, and he might have resigned. I was prepared to accept his resignation, but I had no wish to precipitate it. I n the event he was

angry, but he did not resign. How about foreign affairs? Were you not always accused of beingyour own Foreign Minister and is not that the real reason why Moshe Sharett resigned? I do not know that I have been ‘accused’, but I would say quite openly that an Israeli Prime Minister must also be his own Foreign Minister. Foreign affairs, like defence, is one o f the key spheres of government, and, like defence, can b e affected b y a right o r wrong decision a t the lowest level,

which is not the case with other ministries. I f a post office is opened at an inappropriate location, or a road built too narrow, or a hospital erected that traps too much sun, i t is very irksome but not catastrophic. A frontier incident, on the other hand, in

which a shot is fired by a private soldier under the command of a sergeant, can create dangerous political tensions. I n the same way, relations with other powers can be affected b y a wise or foolish reply to an approach b y a foreign government. Because o f this, I was naturally interested in all that went on in the Foreign Ministry. I would read all the important diplomatic cables each morning and make whatever suggestions I thought fit. If foreign governments took any action or made statements or decided policy which affected Israel, I considered i t m y duty and m y responsibility to decide on our reaction. Matters of vital issue would of course come before the Cabinet for their decision. But I would make m y position known between Cabinets. I f it 127

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differed from that of the Foreign Minister, he could either accept m y line or bring it before the Government. I agree that this may not have been always agreeable to M r Moshe Sharett. I t would have been easier, I suppose, if I had interested myself as little in the day-to-day workings o f his ministry as I did, say, in the Ministry of Works or the Postal Ministry. These would report to me from time to time on their general activities, but they would not be asked b y me for daily

reports on how many feet of new road had been laid or how many new telephones had been installed. Foreign affairs were different. I did want to know what was going on in every capital every day. Finally our ways parted, aided I confess b y differences o f personality which made working together difficult, though I had and have a high respect for his long and proud record of great service to the people and the country both before and after the establishment o f the State. When, after retiring temporarily in 1953 to Sde Boker, I resumed the Premiership, i t was clear to me that if Sharett wanted to be the kind of Foreign Minister he envisaged, there was no room for me as Prime Minister. I put it to our party. I was prepared to go.

The party decided to retain me, and Sharett resigned. I t is unfortunate, but such things are inevitable in political life. Looking back, what are the thingsyou now thinkyou should have done or would like to have done when you were Prime Minister

which you did not do? The two main projects I should like to have carried through are free secondary education for all, and not just free elementary schooling, and a change in the electoral system. We were unable to do either, though for different reasons, one o f which was lack o f money, and the other was lack of political support; but I a m convinced that both will eventually be achieved and must be fought for until they are. The point about secondary education is not only that we must remain true to our traditions o f learning, must strive for quality in our people, must provide the intellectual tools to fashion a model society, but we must close the gap o f inequality between those who can and those who cannot afford a higher education 128

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— with all its dangerous implications o f perpetuating inequality. Eventually, o f course, I would like to see an extension o f educational equality to the universities, but i t will be some years before we can afford that. Not that we can easily afford free universal secondary education at the moment, though it would be less difficult today than at any time that I was Prime Minister. But we must find a way to do so as quickly as possible if we are ever to achieve the goals for Israel w e set ourselves — and

one of the basic ones was equality o f opportunity. Without equal access to higher learning, you get a class-riven society, with the top jobs in government and in the private economy going always to those who can afford a higher education, while the bright minds among the poor are not given a chance. Our

large scale heterogeneous immigration has made this problem more acute than it ever was in the early days of m y Premiership. More than half o f the immigrants have come from Moslem countries in Asia and Africa where conditions were primitive and educational facilities minimal. They had little chance to better themselves. I n Israel, they have every such chance, enjoying equality with everyone else in housing, in jobs, and in

political life. But in the field of higher education, where all are limited, their limitations are greater. The fact is that we just have not yet had the resources to build all the secondary schools we need, nor have we had the resources or the time to train all the secondary school-teachers we would require to staff all the schools if we had them. Moreover, as a new and developing country, we had sundry calls on the nation’s intellectual manpower, and these compete with the call for teachers. True, new secondary schools are being opened all the time, but lack o f resources slows the pace. Not all pupils can therefore be accepted. What we did during m y Premiership, and this continues, was to grant scholarships to pupils o f merit, so that bright children o f poor parents have the opportunity o f advancing their education. The remaining places are taken b y fee-paying pupils — and this of course cuts out children of the

poor. I have been told by members of opposition parties that this system in fact inflicts inequality on the well-to-do, for the bright child of a rich family pays fees whereas a bright child who is 129

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poor does not. This is true — and proper. But I should like the average child who is poor to have the same opportunity as the rich, who can pay for a secondary education and then enjoy all

the perquisites in later life, including better jobs, which such a n education grants, whether the child is below average, average

or bright. Since immigrants from primitive countries are usually poor, and usually have large families, most of their children do not get beyond elementary school. This keeps them down. A serious concomitant o f this is that since many o f them come from Asia and North Africa they tend to feel that they are ‘kept down’ not because of objective difficulties but because they are ‘Orientals’. This bears within it the seed o f dangerous communal rivalry, with the feeling that there are ‘Orientals’ and ‘Europeans’, instead of all being Jews together in Israel. I t may also be sharpened b y the fact that before the foundation o f the State most o f the immigrants were from Europe, and it is only

natural that the leaders in pioneering, in government, in politics, in the army, in industry and in business are Europeans. This, however, is the result of certain historic processes. I t does not mean that ‘Europeans’ are better than ‘Orientals’. Given the same opportunities, each would do as well — or as badly — as the other. When I was i n office, I used to tell the army staff that I looked forward to the day when our top general would be an ‘Oriental’. N o reason why he should not be. I have seen them in the army and many have already been in the country long enough to rise to junior command, and they are first rate. I have seen some of them in the Knesset, and they

are first-class parliamentary members. One of them who was born in Syria and who had the same educational opportunities as a well-to-do European is Eliyahu Sasson. After a distinguished record in our Foreign Ministry, I took him into m y last Cabinet as Minister o f Posts. His son is in our Diplomatic Corps.

There is no doubt that in another generation, the leadership in all spheres of the country’s life will comprise ‘Orientals’ and ‘Europeans’ in pretty equal numbers without anyone wondering w h o is what. They will all feel a n d b e regarded as simple

unclassified Israelis. But I would like the pace hastened, and this can come about only through free universal secondary education. The only thing holding i t u p is money. 130

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A change in the electoral system, to m y mind a crucial need, is different. Here what holds it u p is not money but bitter political opposition b y all the small parties in the State. Their opposition is understandable, for they would all vanish, to be replaced b y two large opposing parties; but it flows from a narrow partyminded rather than State-minded approach. What we have at present is the system o f proportional representation, which makes the Knesset a faithful mathematical reflection of political groupings in the country, but which also inevitably encourages the growth of many small parties — for even a minute but wellorganized group can muster sufficient votes in the whole country to return one or two members to Parliament. What follows from this 1s that no single party can muster sufficient seats to wield an overall majority. I t must form a coalition with one or more smaller parties, who would never on their own reach power, in order to govern. And to do so it must compromise on policy, even though it received a mandate from the largest section o f the electorate to pursue the policy i t outlined at the elections. I n a way, therefore, the Government comes into being not through the direct vote of the people but through inter-party bargaining. Moreover, the stability of the Government is impaired, for it is constantly at the mercy ofits minority partners who can upset its Knesset majority. Depending on their support for this majority, a coalition may find i t difficult to act in accordance with national needs, having to submit to extortion b y these very minority parties whose views were rejected b y the majority of the electorate. I t was m y experience in all the governments I headed that small parties asked to join m y coalition demanded as their price the fulfilment of their factional demands. When I used to tell them that these demands had been rejected b y the majority o f the voters, or otherwise they would have gained as many Knesset seats as m y party, they would counter b y arguing that without the few seats they could offer me I would have no coalition. T o which I could reply that I could approach another of the small parties. Sometimes they would reduce their demands; sometimes, thinking I was bluffing, they would remain adamant — and I did go to another party. Is this the way a government should be formed after a ? general election 131

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I t was also m y experience that because most of the extreme

opposition parties, extreme right and extreme left, could never get together to establish a coalition government, their opposition was irresponsible. They could utter whatever claims they liked, both on the hustings and in the Knesset, knowing that they would never be called upon to make them good. They could attack us at will, on every issue, even on those where they would have behaved as we did if they were in power, knowing that they never would be. I n the United States and Great Britain the opposition is responsible because it may find itself in the driver’s seat at the next election. Proportional representation artificially inflates and even

produces factional differences. For a small party thrives on real or imaginary differences. Only thus can it hold its small circle of earnest supporters together, faithfuls who may sincerely believe that they are putting national interests first but who in fact subordinate them to their factional interests. I n every one of the elections I fought, I found there was an artificial stimulation of differences even on issues where the nation was not at all divided, such issues as security, immigration, and the participation of both co-operative and private enterprise in economic development. This system is particularly dangerous for Israel. For thousands of years we lived without a State o f our own, with no power to decide our national fate, suspended in a vacuum, debating abstract problems, delighting in hair-splitting dialectics. Lacking the framework of a State to hold the nation together, we split ourselves u p into myriad groups, each with its own organization to express its particular nuance o f thought or outlook, passionately partisan, passionately against the other groups. Each claimed to encompass the sum total of righteousness and wisdom and to chart the future o f Jewry and o f the world, spurning co-operation, ignoring common responsibilities, not deeply concerned for the overriding interests of the community. I s not all this reflected in the tragic joke about the J e w requiring two synagogues — one where h e prays and the

other where ‘if you paid me I wouldn’t enter’? W h y then did we adopt proportional representation when the State was established? Because most of the early Zionists came 132

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from the countries of eastern Europe, the Balkans and Germany where this was the prevailing system, and also because these Zionists were also in large measure prisoners of their factional past. This was therefore the system adopted for election to the Zionist Congress. When the State came, the Zionist parties, joined b y new ones and splinter groups which were unable to make common cause on any other major issue, joined together to retain it in order to perpetuate their party existence. Once kept, it has become extremely difficult to replace. But replace it we must, for it is dangerous to continue a system which guarantees unstable government and irresponsible opposition. What I want, what I tried to introduce and what I shall continue to fight for as long as I am active, is a two- or three-party system based on some form o f constituency representation not unlike the political system in Britain. What would happen is that small parties would merge with those politically closest to themselves and agree on a common platform. You would then probably get a large left-of-centre party

and a large right-of-centre party and a moderate party in between — as in Britain. Each party would then become, as with the parties in Britain and America, a kind o f coalition party under a single umbrella. Their platforms might be compromise platforms, but the electorate would know in advance what policies would be implemented if a particular party got in. They do not completely in Israel, for those who voted Mapai, for example, did not know in advance which other parties I might be forced to take into m y coalition and what concessions I might therefore be forced to make. You will find a firm and orderly democracy only where the citizen can choose between two and not more alternative parties, espousing alternative policies, to run the State. I f you have more, a minority can always secure the upper hand. Choosing between such alternatives, the electorate also chooses the Prime Minister, knows what policy will be pursued b y the winning side, and what issues will be opposed or supported b y the responsible opposition, which is made responsible b y the fact that it will be called to take over if the nation is dissatisfied with the Government. I n Israel, half a dozen parties claim to be an alternative — which is mathematically impossible: you can

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have many minorities, but only one party can have a majority — 5 1 or more per cent. I n a two-party system, the opposition dare not be immoderate, irresponsible, oblivious of national needs. But small parties can say what they like. Their promissory notes will never be cashed. Moreover, the constituency representation system, which would result in two or three large parties, would bring members o f Parliament closer to the people. A t present, voters know only those at the top of the 120-member list which each party submits a t election time to cover the 1 2 0 seats i n the Knesset. Members

who are elected are not necessarily associated with a particular town, village or region, though it is true that in framing party lists, account is taken of regional claims. If a citizen has a grievance which he thinks should be aired in Parliament, he has no constituency member to turn to, as he has in Britain or America. H e can do it through his party, but that is not the same thing. Parliament to the ordinary man in the street is thus not some-

thing personal, which would make tangible his feeling of democracy, but an Olympian institution which turns to him for his vote once every few years.

Not only is there no need but it is downright dangerous, in politics, to go down to the lowest common denominator to form a party: under proportional representation you could probably get a party appealing exclusively to red-heads, or plumbers, or young folk who like to dance the fox-trot. What you need in a party is common agreement o n the broadest issues affecting the country, with differences between parties reflecting differences in political, economic and social outlooks.

There is room in Israel for

two

parties: one aiming

at

‘conservation’, with slight improvements here and there, viewing private capital and absolutely free enterprise as the main instruments o f progress; and a second seeking to change society through co-operation between workers, encouraging and offering full scope to the physically and mentally constructive people to develop the country. We need a two-party system more than most countries because we desperately need good government, fruitful opposition and maximum unanimity if we are to ward off the dangers from our neighbours, achieve the great tasks we have set ourselves,

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and give our people true democratic values. I am encouraged

by growing signs that

at

least one other party, and numerous

independents, are coming round to this view. One of the more substantial of the smaller parties together with Mapai may be able to secure a Knesset majority for a change in the electoral

system. I t cannot come too quickly.

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THE ARMY

What would you say is special about the Army of Israel? Four qualities spring t o m i n d : its spirit, its origins,

its structure — a people’s army with the professional skills of a regular army — and its pioneering and educational functions in

peace time. We cannot be as powerful as the American or the Russian Army. Nor can we ever match, in numbers, the armies o f our potential enemies, the neighbouring Arab States. But in the spirit and quality o f our soldiers, there is no reason why they should not equal those of the best armies in the world, and there is every reason why they must be superior to those o f the enemy. As to the spirit o f our men, I like to think — and I think I a m right — that it is inspired b y a sense of history and a sense o f destiny, which includes a recognition of the needs and meaning o f modern Israel. A n d our emphasis on quality, in the absence o f quantity, is not only desirable in itself but is also forced upon us by the size of our country, the size o f our manpower, the scale of our resources. All are small and limited. The only thing that is great is the danger from our neighbours, and the size of the forces they can — and did - launch against us. We had, and we have, no alternative but to ensure that every man in our army was, and is, more than a match for his adversary. Spirit and quality were much in evidence in the men and women who made u p the defence movements which were the forerunners o f today’s Army o f Israel — Hashomer and the Haganah. They were certainly inspired by the pioneering spirit

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o f building — and therefore o f safeguarding - the independent Jewish homeland. They built and they defended. They were the pioneer settlers and they were the soldiers who fought to protect

their lives and their settlements. ‘This quality was equally in evidence in the battles which immediately followed our proclamation of statehood when, with no field artillery, n o tanks, n o aircraft other than small training planes, we faced the well-equipped regular armies o f five Arab States. What tipped the scales was the spirit o f our men and women, for women took part with the men in the front line fighting. I n no other way can one explain incidents, o f which

there were many, where a few dozen teen-agers, boys and girls, armed only with rifles, a single machine-gun and a bazooka,

held off hundreds of enemy troops, attacking with artillery and tanks and supported b y fighter aircraft. I t has often been said that one man knowing what he is fighting for can usually defeat several of the enemy whose heart is not in the battle. The military point o f this thesis is the moral superiority of the man who is prepared to fight to the last, to die if necessary in the attempt, over the man who values his life over his ideals. I t is this spirit which was evident in Hashomer and the Haganah and which we have sought to foster in all our subsequent training in the modern Army of Israel. I n our officers’ schools, for example, our future subalterns are not taught to order their men ‘Into action!” Their cry is ‘Follow me’. This leadership b y example is in fact the principle of leadership in all walks of life. I n battle it is o f paramount importance. I t leads to high casualties among the officer ranks, but it reduces the number o f overall casualties. I t also raises the fighting quality of the men, heightens the chances of success and shortens the duration o f the battle. I n the War ofIndependence, the casualty rate among our best young officers was very high; and in the Sinai Campaign, where our losses were light, many of those who were killed were officers. The country today feels their loss. They would have done well in other pioneering activities in the State, just as their more fortunate comrades have proved themselves brilliant organizers and dedicated leaders in the regular army, in the establishment o f kibbutzim, in the creation and administration of new development areas in hitherto

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isolated regions, in opening u p the Negev, and in running

large industrial plants, like the Dead Sea Works. The losses in battle, as I say, are sorely felt. But they gave us victory and security.

But I would have been failing in m y duty indeed if I had allowed our men to continue in battle armed only with fighting spirit — without better weapons and without a more appropriate military organization to meet the new scale of enemy action. And it would be untrue to offer the impression that the changeover from the Haganah to the Israel Army was effected in twenty-four hours. Actually, the major preparations to convert the Haganah into an army were begun three years before the birth of the State, and if it were not for that I am doubtful whether we would have withstood the Arab onslaught in 1948. For the Haganah, after all, as its name implies, was a defence force, in the narrowest sense of the term defence. Apart from the few small units that operated like the Special Night Squads o f Wingate’s day, the Haganah’s function during the Mandatory period was static, local defence. The bearing of arms was illegal, and this limited the nature of the Haganah’s weapons to those that could be easily hidden. I t also limited the movement o f Haganah units; if they pursued the enemy after an attack on a Jewish settlement, which they were prepared and well able to do, they were liable to be stopped b y a British army or police patrol and arrested for being illegally armed. The Haganah had therefore to content itself with staving off attack. I t could not, like the army o f an independent country under attack, strike at the enemy’s bases and destroy his armed forces and so prevent him from making war again quickly. I t could not use a navy and a n air force. I t could not even put a large scale infantry formation in the field. I had long been concerned in changing the outlook and pattern o f fighting o f our men, and I remember convening a gathering of Haganah commanders shortly after the outbreak o f the Second World War and telling them that what faced us whenever we secured independence was probably a full-scale war. This, I said, called for a complete revolution in the strategy and tactics to which they had been used. Static local defence would have to be abandoned, and training now had to

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include, for whenever we would need to implement it, going out to meet the enemy as far as possible from his targets and as close as possible to his bases. This called for the fashioning o f an army which could meet in the field the regular Arab armies who would oppose us. This meant the establishment o f a more effective arms industry than the one we had, which had served

the Haganah well but which would n o w be inadequate. I t meant also the acquisition o f heavy weapons overseas which w e were unable to use or in some cases even bring in while the Mandatory authorities were in the country, but which we would

require as soon as they left. I n the summer of 1945, with war in Europe over, I went to the United States to see what I could do about solving our arms problem. Arms meant money, and we had none. I did not expect to get arms from the United States but I did expect to get money to finance purchases which might be effected elsewhere. A n d for this I turned to a good friend, Henry Montor, who had

directed with such success the United Jewish Appeal which financed immigrant settlement in Palestine. I asked him for a list o f about twenty wealthy Jews whose devotion to the security o f Palestinian Jewry was wholehearted, and I asked another friend, Rudolph Sonnenborn, to offer his house for a meeting

on a subject of great importance. Both responded willingly without asking any questions. The result of the meeting was several million dollars with which w e could begin to ‘shop’

for machinery and equipment to set u p a proper arms industry.

I considered that with the end of the war the United States would begin to find some o f her arms factories surplus to her needs, and would wish to dispose o f expensive machinery fairly cheaply. This was just what we needed. Our own industry had been useful in satisfying the requirements o f a Haganah meeting attacks b y local bands, and it had been all right to use a factory here and a workshop there, both in town and in kibbutzim, to manufacture hand grenades, rifle grenades, mortars — u p to three inch — explosives, and small arms ammunition. But to equip an army, we now had to manufacture not only ammunition and explosives of a type and on a scale hitherto unknown in the country, but also actual weapons, even though

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limited to small arms. We were now able to acquire the means to d o

this, still secretly o f course. Yaacov Dori, Haganah’s Chief

of Staff, was also in the United States at the time, and he got a line on some surplus arms machinery that was available. I immediately signalled Hayim Slavin, head o f our underground arms industry in Palestine, to come over and join us and

inspect the equipment before buying. He, after all, would be responsible for setting it u p and working with it. H e and Dori saw it, found it suited our needs admirably, and bought it. Machines and equipment were dismantled, the parts shipped separately to Palestine as industrial machinery, and despite the strict watch kept on imports b y the Mandatory authorities, and the frequent searches they carried out in Jewish settlements and urban quarters, every part reached its destination. None fell into the wrong hands. But locally manufactured materials could supply only part o f a n army’s needs. Such military items as tanks, heavy artillery,

planes and naval vessels had t o be bought abroad. Not only could they not be produced locally, but even if they could, Mandatory vigilance would have made it impossible. You cannot hide a plane i n a basement, nor a tank i n a n attic closet. W h a t w e h a d to d o therefore was to try to b u y them overseas,

which was also not an easy task, and hold them until the British troops would leave. This meant facing the enemy on the day o f independence with a grave arms disadvantage, but we would hope to hold on until the supplies came in. This is in fact what happened, and the first month o f fighting in our War o f Independence was indeed an uncertain month, verging at times on the catastrophic. But then the preparations we had made before bore fruit, and after that our men were able to meet attack with greater fire-power, even though they were still outnumbered and out-armed. From then on, they advanced from victory to victory. The two men whom I charged with securing heavy equipment before 1948 were Yehuda Arazzi and Ehud Avriel, both veteran commanders of our ‘illegal’ immigration operations. Avriel’s mission in Czechoslovakia was particularly successful, for apart from the heavy weapons he secured which came in after the proclamation of the State, he managed to ship in 1 0 , 0 0 0 rifles and 4 , 5 0 0 light machine-guns with large quanti140

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ties of ammunition in April 1948 at one of the most critical moments for the Haganah. They were shipped secretly, landed at a secret point on the coast at night, were quickly off-loaded, the boxes opened, and the arms and ammunition distributed within about twenty-four hours. They were used in action immediately. While war was upon us, throughout 1948 and the beginning of 1949, we had no time for full-scale planning of the ideal overall defence system. This was a time for much improvisation. With danger at all sections o f the many fronts, with few men and insufficient equipment, we had rapidly to work out a rough list o f priorities and fling part of whatever we could muster to each of the more urgent sectors, leaving a good deal to the ingenuity of local commanders. With victory, however, we had to start building the country. That, after all, was the purpose o f fighting for our statehood. But while building, we also had to ensure the safety of the State, b y which I mean we had to be

in a position t o repel a renewed attack a t a moment’s notice. For though we had won our war, our neighbours made it clear that they would attack us again as soon as they felt themselves strong enough to do so. I accordingly ordered the General Staff of the army to prepare a n overall defence system which would give protection at all

times but which would not drain the economy o f the manpower needed to develop the land. The problem I was really giving them was how to eat our cake and have it. For man-

power was our big problem. We needed manpower to build houses for the new immigrants, roads, hospitals, schools, ports. We needed to open u p the Negev desert and establish farm settlements all over the country to grow food. Yet none of this development would be o f any value if it were not protected. O n the other hand, if all our men and women were used for its protection, there would be no one to do the work o f development. What we needed was a defence arrangement which

would both give us foolproof protection and allow us t o advance our economy. The system the General Staff came up with followed precisely those lines. It comprised four main elements: a small regular army, consisting almost exclusively of officers; national 141

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service conscription for both boys and girls from the age of eighteen ; reserves; and frontier farm settlements. After a good

deal of discussion on detail, I accepted this broad scheme and subsequent large-scale mobilization manceuvres proved its efficiency. This basic structural pattern remains to this day. The regular army consists b y and large of cadres o f officers who command the national conscription units and the reserve divisions and who run the training schools. National service conscription has recently been cut down from two and a half years for young men to two years and two months, and from two years for young women to one year and eight months. Reserve service is obligatory for men u p to the age of forty-nine, though they serve in active units only u p to the age of thirty-

nine and thereafter in civil defence, and up to thirty-five for childless women. The frontier settlements, comprising ‘sword in one hand, spade in the other’ farmers, are integrated into regional defence schemes. The most spectacular feature of this scheme, offering the possibility o f national security and development, is the organization and mobilization procedures of the reserves. I n Israel, a reservist is not someone who just knows that he is liable to callu p in time of emergency without knowing to what unit he will

be sent. He is posted to a unit the moment he ends his conscription service and goes on the reserves. H e knows his comrades, knows his officers, trains with them during the year. Certain personal equipment is kept at home, to be brought on call-up. H e is given two secret items of information : one is his mobiliza-

tion code-word; the other is the special assembly centre for his unit on call-up. The moment the reservist has been called, he takes his personal equipment and proceeds to his assembly centre. T h e emphasis is o n speed. I n the Sinai Campaign, some

units were in the front line ready for action within forty-eight hours of the mobilization call. This speedy mobilization means that our reservists — the bulk o f our able-bodied population — can remain at their jobs in field and workshop until the moment o f attack. For should there be sudden invasion at any time of the day or night, the enemy can be held by the regular army, the conscripts and the frontier settlements during the comparatively brief period it takes for the reserves to be moved into action. 142

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O f course, the smallness of our country makes it easier than is the case with most other countries to reach any front within a matter of hours. But still, these mobilization procedures have a lot o f merit whatever a country’s size. They have certainly proved themselves for us since they were devised. The fact that most of our fighting men are trained reservists, which makes them really a people’s army, has led to the observation that our army is like an iceberg, having only a small part visible above the surface, the bulk below. That is true. Incidentally, this reserve system aids our security in another way. By keeping most of our fighters at their jobs instead o f in uniform during periods without war — I wish I could say peace — i t helps the country’s economy, puts a developed industrial power behind our army machine, expands our food production, offers a modern network o f communications, and increases our resources to enable us to manufacture or acquire modern equipment and armaments. I mentioned earlier that there were two additional qualities of the Israel Army which are novel: its pioneering and educational functions in peace time. There is a special corps o f volunteers who fight, pioneer and farm. The corps is called Nahal, an acronymic form of the Hebrew for ‘Fighting and Pioneer Youth’. I t consists of both young men and women. When they join the army, they do their basic training like any other recruit, but they then proceed to a kibbutz where they learn both farming and the organization o f a kibbutz. After a year, they return for advanced army training, which is longer for the men and includes comprehensive paratroop training. Then they go out as a group to establish their own kibbutz in some dangerous and isolated spot o n the frontier. When this corps was established I confess that, while I had faith i n our young people, I could not have prophesied that we

would have enough volunteers year after year to make i t a success. Nahal is now an established part of life in Israel and I have the highest admiration for these young people. Incidentally, many o f them are the children of kibbutznicks, and know all about living in a kibbutz. But very many come from wellto-do urban families, also drawn b y a sense of duty. Most o f them make first-class farmers and first-class fighters, and their 143

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fighting record in the Sinai and other operations is excellent. I regard Nahal volunteers as the supreme example of publicspirited youth. Any nation would be proud o f such people. They, more than any other single element in the country, sustain m y faith in Israel’s pioneering future. As to its educational function in peacetime, the army is in fact the largest adult education institution in the land. One of

the problems unique to the Israel Defence Forces is the large number o f comparatively new immigrants in their ranks. Since Israel is a country o f mass immigration, any monthly intake o f recruits is bound to include many newcomers. Immigrants o f eligible age are given a year’s postponement before being called up. Many may not b y then have acquired the Hebrew tongue. They are therefore given special instruction in the language as part o f their army course. But that is not all. Many may have come from primitive lands where they had no opportunity o f receiving formal schooling. This they now get in the army.

Moreover, many of them who entered the army without any special skills get the chance t o learn a trade which is useful to them when they are released into civilian life. I would say that national service in the Defence Forces does more to integrate the newcomer into the life of the country than any other institution in Israel. A feature o f our army which may not be unique but which is not too common is the integration o f all three services — land forces, air force and navy — under a single command. Indeed, I have spoken all along o f ‘the army’ while having in mind the three services. Since we had to create our army, it was easier for us than it has been for old-established countries to decide, as I decided, that we would have one Chief o f Staff who would be in overall command o f all forces. The regional commanders o f the land forces, the commander o f the air force and the commander o f the navy were all subordinate to the Chief o f Staff, and the Chief o f Staff was subordinate to the civilian authority — that was me, as Minister o f Defence. This chain o f command continues to this day. I must say that we have none o f the bickerings or rivalry between the services that is found in countries where the services are virtually autonomous. Friendly rivalry — yes. We get that. And of course after each battle, each

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service claims to have made the decisive contribution. That is

natural and quite healthy. But the co-operation between the services is very good indeed, and I can add that the members of all of them are trained to be what may be called tripleservice-minded, that is being aware o f the functions and possibilities o f the others. Officer-cadets o f the three services all do the same basic officers’ course, an infantry course, in which the services are mixed, and only thereafter d o they proceed to

their specialist officer school. Incidentally, the names o f the ranks in all services are the same, and all are taken from the Bible.

I can tell you that, time and again, distinguished visitors from the United States and Britain have told me how much they envied our system and how fortunate we were to have been able to start from scratch, and to start off right. Their systems were the product of their history, and were now too strong and entrenched to be reorganized radically. But I must say both have made big advances in service integration since the

war. You have asked me and I have spoken here of the army, of which I a m understandably proud. But this does not mean that I regard our armed forces as the be-all and end-all o f Israel’s security. Apart from the strengthening o f our economy, the settling o f our immigrants and the development o f our empty spaces, which are worthy ends in themselves and which also add to our security, the defence of Israel also depends very much on enhancing our position in the international arena. Military and foreign affairs are intertwined, and neither the one nor the other can be the single decisive factor affecting a country’s security. For one thing, whether or not you can get appropriate heavy arms to equip your army depends o n your international relations. As I have already indicated, equipment like tanks, planes and naval vessels are beyond the production capacity of small countries. They have to be acquired from bigger and more developed States. But even then, you cannot put your money on the counter and get what arms you need, as you would in a supermarket. You need the goodwill of the producing countries. Without ties o f political friendship, even the immediate instrument

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o f a small country’s defence — its army — becomes a weak weapon. * There is another aspect of international friendship, apart from easing arms supplies, which also has a bearing on a country’s security, and is the reason why every State, big and small, seeks to gain as many friends as possible. The modern world is an interdependent world. There are international services. There is international trade. There is the United Nations. Few national economies are self-sufficient. A friendless country would find i t hard going, and i t would be difficult for a small country, particularly one threatened b y its neighbours, to sustain itself if the whole world were against it. As a matter of fact, it would not be so easy even for a big power. There is indeed a fairly recent example of two big powers who were unable to

pursue measures they felt were essential t o the defence of their interests when they found themselves isolated. The example is the British and French withdrawal after the Suez Campaign, which incidentally underlines the truth that the military factor is not always decisive. These two countries, rich and powerful,

faced the solid condemnation o f almost all the members of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council and felt themselves compelled to give way, even though to do so gravely damaged their interests. Whatever military successes they may have registered were lost on the field of international relations. You may say that this argument is not conclusive, for Israel was in a similar position and yet held out against international pressures. I t is true that Israel, small as i t is, refused t o withdraw

her forces the moment she was ordered to by the United Nations immediately after the Sinai Campaign. I t is true that we held out for four months, from the beginning of November 1956 to the beginning of March 1957, despite tremendous pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union and the other members of the United Nations. But it meant following u p our victory in the field with an intensive political struggle to secure the aims for which the campaign had been fought — neutraliza-

* B e n Gurion went o n t o develop this p o i n t w h i c h h e elaborated w h e n w e talked about Israel and Germany. His additional remarks o n this subject are therefore given i n that chapter, Chapter 1 3 . Author.

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tion of the fedayun bases in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, and freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. Only when this was achieved did I give the order for our forces to withdraw.

And as a matter o f fact I had this well i n mind when I decided o n the Sinai Campaign. Let me read you a quotation from the minutes o f the Cabinet meeting held a day before that operation. Explaining to m y colleagues that our two aims were

the destruction and neutralization of enemy fedayun bases, and lifting the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, I said: ‘ I do not know what will be the fate of Sinai. What we are

primarily interested in is the coast round Eilat and the Gulf. I imagine that there will be powers who will force us to withdraw. There is America, there is Russia, there are the United Nations, Nehru, Asia, Africa; and I must say that I fear America most o f all. America may compel us to withdraw from positions we will occupy — but the important point is freedom o f shipping. I know we have emotional feelings about Biblical Yotveta (at the southern entrance to the Gulf), but I am prepared to give u p its occupation. This is not essential. What is vital to us is that there shall be freedom

of shipping even if we are not there.’ And indeed we struggled hard and secured our aims, moving out only after receiving assurances from the United States and all the other maritime powers at the United Nations Assembly (except the Soviet Union) that we would enjoy freedom o f shipping in the Gulf, and the acknowledgement o f our right to defend this freedom b y force, as part o f the right o f self-defence, if anyone should hamper this freedom b y force. Since then, the port of Eilat has blossomed, served b y our own and foreign ships which sail freely through the Gulf; there is a pipe-line from Eilat to Haifa; and the Beersheba-Eilat highways are a kind o f overland Suez Canal, for apart from Egypt, Israel is the only Middle Eastern State with outlets both to the Mediterranean and to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. These achievements would not have been possible without the army; but nor would they have been possible without the political fight o n the foreign affairs front. A n d the political results, i n their

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turn, would not have been preserved without the continuous strengthening and vigilance of the army.

An important aspect of international relations and their impact on our national security is o f course the cold war. N o w I am one o f those who does not believe in the imminent danger o f the cold war’s erupting into the third world war, with all its implications in an age o f nuclear weapons. I a m confident that the United States and western Europe have no intention o f

attacking the Soviet Union, and it is not reasonable t o suppose that the Soviet Union wishes to start a nuclear war with its dangers not only to other countries but also to her own. I t 1s neither in the Soviet interest nor is it necessary for the Soviets to take such a grave risk, particularly as in a nuclear engagement the West is b y no means at a disadvantage. Each has the

capacity t o destroy the other, but only at the price of its own destruction. This serves as a deterrent to both. Moreover, the

principles and tactics of world Communism reflect the conviction that the Communist conquest can be effected without the use o f armed force. The Soviet Union believes that since this system will anyway dominate the world sooner or later there is no need for her to resort to nuclear force and thereby risk her o w n existence.

I t follows from this that the cold war is not only a technological and military struggle but basically a war o f ideas. I n the concrete terms o f the modern world, it is a struggle for the souls o f the African and Asian nations who comprise the majority o f the human race. Something like a billion and a quarter o f the inhabitants of these two continents have not yet committed themselves, and most of these nations are suspicious o f all the great powers, that is both of China and the Soviet Union as well as the western powers. I f Israel is a negligible factor in the political, military and technological race between the rival blocs, she can exercise a more than negligible influence in the realm o f ideas and ideals. She has not been endowed with vast natural resources; her territory and population are small; but in her cultural heritage and in her spiritual qualities she can hold her own with any other nation. Her achievements in the comparatively short period o f statehood have won the respect not only o f Europe 148

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and America but also o f many peoples in Asia and Africa. I think they have been impressed b y Israel’s creative drive, her spiritual strength, her scientific advances, and b y such original social forms as the kibbutz and co-operative farm settlements and the unique pattern o f labour organization o f the Histadruth. These, let me say, were fashioned in the years before the State — the kibbutz, moshav, Histadruth, and the manybranched co-operative system reached out to building, roadlaying, transport, housing, health services, banking, buying and marketing. They have been greatly extended since statehood, so that today they touch the bulk of our population. These new and original — some o f them unique — social forms have attracted many o f the new countries of Africa and Asia who sought, and seek, to introduce them in their own States. I shall have more to say about this when we talk o f the newly emergent States (Chapter 14), but let me add here, in this sequence on the army, that we came to the notice o f some o f these countries through our military exploits, first in our War of Independence but more particularly in the 1956 Sinai

Campaign. When their representatives visited us

to

see what

sort of a people we were who could hold out, militarily, against such heavy odds, they found that the spirit in the army reflected the spirit o f our builders, the very sense of dedication, service and pioneering that had given rise to our novel forms o f social and economic organization. I t is m y conviction that this spirit will continue to inform m y people. It is a spirit I tried to foster in our troops throughout the period when I was Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. There are some nations who glory in war, who see warfare as an end in itself, the aim of superior man, the crowning goal of a superior race. This is the Nazi philosophy in its various manifestations throughout history from the days of Cain to the days o f Hitler and his disciples. Judaism rejects this philosophy as an abomination. I t was the Prophets of Israel who called upon nations not to ‘lift u p sword against nation’, nor to ‘learn war any more’, but to ‘beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruninghooks’. They taught that it was man’s mission to labour creatively and live at peace with his fellow. But they also taught the importance o f defence and military

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preparedness when threatened by hostile forces. Indeed, the greatest o f our Prophets, Moses, was also the first military commander in the history of our nation, when, shortly after the exodus from Egypt, ‘came Amalek, and fought with Israel i n Rephidim’. I used to tell this to our troops o n m y frequent visits to army units, adding that we fight only when we must; but when we do, we must mobilize our total physical and spiritual strength t o gain victory; and in peacetime, the army must be wellprepared and vigilant, serving as a deterrent to our foes.

I mention this because I remember very well the fears expressed b y a few members of the opposition parties when 1 introduced the bill in the Knesset after our War ofIndependence establishing the Israel Defence Forces as they exist today. Having in mind perhaps the armies of the dictatorial régimes in the countries from which they had come, some Knesset members took exception to the idea of a regular army, even as a nucleus o f the IDF, fearing that it would become °‘careerist,

reactionary and fascist’. No one can doubt that the hopes I expressed in m y reply to these fears have been well fulfilled. The army has a fine military record. I t has also proved itself as an educational force. I t has played a formidable part in welding together the different immigrant groups into a homogeneous community: in the army, children of immigrants from scores o f lands meet each other and also meet Israeli-born youngsters in conditions of equality. Clan and communal barriers are broken down, and the army is free from those disruptive and factional tendencies which are our unfortunate

legacy from our history in the Diaspora. Parents who have emigrated from countries of persecution and degradation take pride in the straight backs of their soldier-children who walk with heads erect, with self-respect and without fear. The army has proved itselfin the field ofpioneering, introducing thousands of young men and women to a life ofpioneer farm settlement and establishing frontier kibbutzim along the Gaza strip, the Jerusalem corridor, the Lachish area, the Negev and Galilee. And in a land not noted for internal harmony, the Army o f Israel is the one institution which enjoys the unanimous respect and high regard o f the people. Moreover, Israel is almost the 150

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only country in the region, both the smaller region o f the Middle East and the wider region o f western Asia and North Africa, where the army plays no role in politics. As they live in a democratic State, every Israeli soldier has the right to vote and the right to be a member of a political party and any other legal organization. But the army itself, as the defence force of the country, sees itself only as an executive instrument of the elected representatives o f the people, and they alone can tell the army what to do and what not to do. I n this respect it is o f course the same as any old-established democratic country in

the world, but this, like democracy, is quite a n achievement for a new State.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

ISRAEL A N D T H E A R A B STATES

I have three broad questions on the subject of Arab hostility to Israel. What has been the impact of this hostility on the development

of Israel? What steps didyou take as Prime Minister to promote peace with your neighbours? What do you think are the prospects of an

accommodation with them in thefuture?

O n your first question, I would say that the effects have been wholly bad for the Arabs themselves, and partly bad but partly also very good for Israel. I say this even though i t has always been and it remains Israel’s desire to substitute peaceful co-operation for the current hostility. But the fact is that Arab hostility has not proved an unrelieved curse for us. There have been many blessings. The persistent antagonism o f the Arabs before the establishment of the State led to a more cohesive Jewish community in the country, strengthened its spirit, fostered its ingenuity to overcome military assault and

economic boycott. These qualities stood us in good stead during our War of Independence. Since then, continued Arab enmity has been a stimulant to the development o f Israel. I can point to specific Jewish achievements which may be laid directly at the door o f Arab hostility. One, for example, is the phenomenal growth of Tel-Aviv — today the largest city in Israel. The massacre o f Jews in neighbouring Jaffa in 1 9 2 1 gave the community the overpowering urge to turn the TelAviv suburb into an independent township. I t grew rapidly and eventually topped Jaffa in size and importance. Another example is the building of the Tel-Aviv port in 1936 — a direct response to the prolonged strike o f Arab stevedores at 152

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the port ofJaffa. I t had been organized by the former Mufti of Jerusalem to strangle the Jewish economy, and its immediate

effects were certainly serious. [The Mufti, Haj Amin el Hussein, found refuge in Cairo, where he still lives, after serving Hitler in Germany during the Second World War.] We decided to build our own lighterage port, since Tel-Aviv has no natural harbour, and when our jetty was well under way the Jaffa strike was called off, no doubt because the Arabs quickly realized that their own economic interests would suffer — as they did. Strangely enough, as I recall, some of m y colleagues in the Jewish Agency, considering themselves ‘practical men’, now wanted us to stop work o n the jetty and resume the use of the Jaffa port, even though there was not a single Jewish labourer or stevedore there. I am glad to say that they were in the minority and were outvoted b y what they called the ‘obstinate and impractical visionaries’. These insisted on going ahead with our own port, creating our own corps ofJewish stevedores and handling our own imports and exports without being dependent on a Jaffa that could always be closed in our faces. I do not say that we would never have built a port in Tel-Aviv nor developed a body o f port workers. But we certainly would not have done either as quickly as we did. Indeed, I doubt whether we would have fulfilled our aims o f revolutionizing the Jewish sociological and economic pattern and creating a Jewish labour force and labour movement if i t had not been for the outbreaks of Arab violence particularly in the years 1 9 2 1 , 1929, 1933 and during the three years o f ‘disturbances’ from 1936 to 1939. I have already mentioned that many of us came to this country with the definite intention o f labouring with our hands; we wanted to build our own home ourselves; we wanted to normalize the Jewish economy; and we wanted to change the traditional attitude o f ghetto Jews towards manual work, which had been forced upon them b y political and economic restriction and persecution. But there were a number o f Jews here who had no such ideological purpose and who were perfectly content to let the Arabs do the physical work. With the hostility o f the Arab leadership, however, Jewish farms and workshops and public utilities could no longer be dependent on Arab labour, and so Jews found

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openings in all branches o f work, from ditch-digging and road building to farming. This was most beneficial to the shaping o f a healthy society. Again, I do not say that we would not eventually have achieved this. But the transformation of a community o f shopkeepers and intellectuals into a normal community based o n a preponderance o f manual workers would not have been as rapid if it had not been for Arab hostility.

Take also the effect of the sharpest expression of Arab hatred — their attack on the State soon after it was established. H a d the Arab States accepted the U N Partition Plan instead o f

rejecting it and trying to destroy us, the size o f Israel today would have been much smaller, as the present frontiers have been negotiated in the armistice talks which followed the fighting. Similarly, the effect of the Arab boycott has been to cause us some economic loss but also to give us benefits which far outweigh the loss. Its immediate consequence was to stimulate our agriculture and our industry so that we could be economically independent if the boycott succeeded in sealing us off from the economic world. Then what happened? The tremendous spurt to our economy made us a highly attractive market for foreign producers. They began to pay less and less attention to Arab boycott appeals and started trading with us. And as they exported to us, their countries opened their markets to our products. There are still some timid overseas firms who respect the boycott, fearing to lose their Arab trade. But most companies o f good standing have spurned the Arab threat to close their markets should they continue to trade with Israel, and most have found that this policy has paid off: they trade with us and they continue to trade with the Arabs, for the Arabs need them as much as they need the Arabs. I would say that today we have the most dynamic economy in the Middle East, and that the Arab boycott has been a major contributory cause. Moreover, the boycott has also meant closing Israel as a market for the Arab States themselves. I f they had not waged war on us in 1948, they would have been the natural suppliers o f most o f our agricultural needs. This would have boosted their own economies and it would at the same time have reduced farm settlement in Israel. There would not have been 154

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the economic urgency to settle so many o f our people on the land in order to grow our own food, and without the economic stimulus it would have been far more difficult to develop a large agricultural community, which is so essential to us also for sociological and political reasons. Much o f our desert would have remained desert, and we might have developed as an urban people, just as we were in the Diaspora. We would have built a Jewish Carthage, and this would have dimmed our hopes of a healthy national revival. I n historical terms, therefore, it may well be that Arab hostility has proved, in a way, to be a good thing for Israel. I did not want war. But when war was thrust upon us, we emerged a stronger nation than we would otherwise have been. I did not welcome the Arab boycott. But when it went into operation, we were compelled to lay firm and healthy foundations for our economy and our society. I believe a good test o f the power and integrity of a liberation movement, as of the spirit o f a country, is the measure o f its capacity to extract advantage from adversity, transforming difficulty and suffering into sources o f greater strength and constructive drive. I think the Jewish pioneering movement before the establishment of the State stood this test, and so did the nation after it achieved statehood. But I would have settled for peace and friendship every time, even though it would have taken us much longer to gain what we have gained in a comparatively few years. And peace today would benefit the Arab States as much as, and probably more than, it would benefit Israel.

You ask what steps I took to promote peace with our neigh-

bours during the time I was Prime Minister. I have my critics — I know they are many — but none I think would claim that I was ever hesitant on this score. A t every opportune moment, I proclaimed m y readiness to meet with any or all o f the Arab leaders at any time and in any place to negotiate a peace treaty or, if that was too much for them, a non-aggression pact. Every appeal o f mine was turned down, at least publicly. A few o f our Arab neighbours indicated to intermediaries that they would be prepared to negotiate with us if some other State started first; they would follow. A n d the indications also

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showed that the State they had in mind to start the ball rolling was Egypt. If Egypt talked to us, they would, just as they did in early 1949 when hostilities ended and Egypt was the first to sign an Armistice Agreement with us. Lebanon, Jordan and

Syria followed. I understand their problems. Conflict within the Arab world is such that each government feels it has to show that it hates Israel as much as any other. Negotiating with Israel would be tantamount to a recognition o f Israel’s existence. This would bring down the wrath, either genuine or artificially worked up, o f the other Arab States, who would exploit the opportunity to undermine the authority of the negotiating government and increase their own influence among its people. These governments feel they just cannot afford to take the chance, even if

they wish to. But I had long felt that Egypt was the one State that might have considered itself strong enough to break through. When Naguib seized power and crushed the corrupt régime o f King Farouk, I extended m y hand, publicly welcoming the hope o f ‘a free, independent, progressive Egypt’. I stated that ‘there was not at any time, nor is there now, any reason for strife between Egypt and Israel . . . no occasion for political, economic or territorial conflict between the two neighbours.” Naguib’s response was to show that Egypt’s face was turned to war and not to peace. When Naguib was deposed b y his fellow revolutionary, Nasser, m y immediate reaction was again to offer Israel’s friendship. I t was again rejected. Since then, Nasser has directed his hostility not only towards

Israel but to several Arab States, and each has been deeply concerned over his attempts to undermine them and put them under his influence. I n these circumstances, they have been more reluctant than ever to give even the faintest signs o f a readiness to come to terms with Israel. Indeed they have seen that hatred o f Israel is the one issue on which the Arab States can proclaim themselves united, the one issue round which Nasser could convene a summit conference, a n d some have

thought i t expedient to step u p their campaign against Israel. ‘This in turn makes i t additionally difficult for them to respond to a peace offer, even i f their leaders should come round to

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thinking that it would be wise and in their interests to do so. If they ‘educate’ — I don’t think that’s the right word — their people to a belief that Israel is a cancer that must be wiped out, as they have been doing ever since Israel was established, they

inevitably become prisoners of their own propaganda. Any effort to negotiate with this ‘cancer’ would naturally be considered treason by their own people. Only a strong and courageous Arab leader would brave popular revulsion, which he had himself helped to foster, should he reverse his policy towards Israel and negotiate with her. I once thought that Nasser might have been strong enough to do so, and might have had the courage. I am afraid that I was wrong. A man who did have the courage was King Abdullah o f Jordan, grandfather of the present king. I respected him for his political sagacity and for his pluck. H e knew that the interests o f his people would be enhanced if peace were established between us. We conducted secret negotiations towards this aim. They ended with an assassin’s bullet in the forecourt o f a mosque. Abdullah was shot down b y a gunman who was in league with members o f Abdullah’s own staff. I have no doubt that this assassination has also served to increase the reluctance o f other Arab leaders to substitute overtures of peace for threats o f war. If there has been no public diplomacy in the field of promoting friendship between Israel and her neighbours, there has been a certain amount of private diplomacy. As long ago as the summer of 1950, I proposed to the Ambassador o f the Soviet Union - the country which preaches peace and led the world ‘Peace Movement’ — to initiate peace talks between representatives o f Israel and of Egypt. M y proposal was forwarded to Moscow. I never got a reply. The late Dag Hammarskjold tried his hand on the occasions when he came to the Middle East to discuss the settlement o f specific differences between us and the Arab States which had become acute. I used to tell him, when he left me to visit the heads o f Arab governments, that he could tell them I was ready to meet them for peace talks. I would then either receive no further word from him or a message that there had been no response to m y offer. I had similar experiences with others who tried their hand 157

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a t mediation, notably with the United States Government when President Eisenhower was in office. A special representative of

the President came over to conduct talks with me and with Nasser. O n m y side, there was a readiness to negotiate. Nasser refused. American hopes were based on their generosity. They were prepared to undertake a considerable part o f the financing

required to rehabilitate the bulk of the Arab refugees in the Arab States, while expecting us to settle some o f them in Israel. They were prepared to give further financial assistance to develop the economies of these States. They were already

footing a huge share of the UNRWA bill on which the refugees subsist and could not be expected to go on doing so for ever when such monies could be used to put the refugees on their feet, make them self-reliant and a valued working element in the local economies. Unfortunately, they were viewing the situation in the context of American mores. But the Arabs were less interested in the fate o f the refugees, their own kith and kin, than they were

in the value of these poor people as a political instrument. If they had been really concerned about the refugees as human beings, as people moreover who had fled Palestine at their instigation to make it easier for them to crush the Jews quickly, they would have done what we did with our Jewish refugees: welcomed them, rehabilitated them, made them part o f our society. Instead, they kept the bulk of them in camps or reserved areas, refusing to integrate all but a few into the life of their own countries. Their rejection of the American offers was predictable.

Had they been willing to negotiate, there could have been mutual bargaining over the straightening out o f parts o f the border, some in their favour, some in ours. We could have discussed special port facilities for Jordan, which has no access to the Mediterranean, and customs-free transport of her goods across our territory. We could have worked out joint exploita-

tion of common water resources for the benefit of all. They could have raised the whole problem of the refugees. I would have been prepared to take back some, since during m y Premiership we took back scores o f thousands in a unilateral

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gesture to allow the reunion o f broken families, though I would have insisted that the major solution was not repatriation but settlement in the Arab lands. I would have proposed means whereby we could co-operate economically to our mutual

advantage, pool our experience in developing the land and advancing the health and social welfare o f our peoples. You now have the answer to your third question on the prospects of a future accommodation with the Arab States. As I indicated, it could happen only if a courageous leader emerged who had the wisdom to see that we could all benefit b y peaceful co-operation and who was strong enough to sway his own people and to persuade his fellow Arab leaders that he

was promoting, not betraying, Arab interests. I see no such leader on the current Middle Eastern scene, and no political movement or party with these aims. Nor do I see one emerging very quickly, what with the dictatorial and backward systems prevailing in most Arab States, coupled with the bitter interArab conflicts. I think that, to our mutual misfortune, we shall

continue to live under an armed truce, both sides spending heavily on armaments when this money could be better directed towards raising the living standards of our peoples. Let me add that while I do not see peace on the horizon I think tensions in the Middle East would be much reduced if there were an easing of cold-war tensions and a real accommodation between the United States and Russia. A trump card in

the Arab pack is their ‘neutrality’, which enables them to play off one big power against the other, receiving some aid from America and Britain and all-out military and political aid from the Soviet bloc. A n accommodation between East and West on the preservation of peace in the Middle East would do much to bring about improved relations between the Arab States themselves and, if not an accommodation with Israel, at least an acceptance of Israel’s existence. So much for the prospects in the immediate future. I n the long run, however, strange as it may sound amidst the outpourings of hate from the Arab lands, I see an Israel-Arab alliance. I t is not only that I believe political, economic and cultural co-operation between the Jews and the Arab peoples to be a vital necessity for both. The facts of geography and 159

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history make it inevitable, however long it may take to come about. Geography has put us close to each other in this corner o f the world. We shall not move from our land, nor will the Arabs move from their lands. A n d in addition to a common

geography, there is also much that we share in our culture, our language, our history. Co-operation between Jews and Arabs can turn the Middle East into one o f the great cultural centres o f the world, as it was once. A n d only they can achieve it. N o outside power, however strong, whether from the East or the West, can do what the Arabs and Jews can do for each other, to their mutual advantage. The most urgent current need o f the Arabs is not arms but economic development, health services, education, and the raising o f the Arab peasant and worker from his present squalor to a life o f dignity. Israel can contribute more towards these goals than any other outside element, because she is achieving them in her own land under the same conditions. Israel on her part needs peace and co-operation with her neighbours so that she can pursue her constructive struggle with nature — conquering the desert, exploiting the resources o f land and sea, rehabilitating her immigrants, developing a society which fosters the spirit o f human brotherhood. Obviously, this can come about only when both sides face each other o n a basis o f equality, in a mood of mutual respect and with the common desire for reciprocal help. The pre-

requisite of this is the liberalization of the Arab régimes and the introduction of democracy. T h e nature o f these régimes today rules out peaceful co-

operation at the present time. With the possible exception o f Lebanon and Tunisia, every Arab country is under totalitarian rule, be it that o f a military dictator or o f a medieval dynasty which still allows traffic in slaves. These rulers are less concerned with meeting the true needs of their people than they are in preserving their power and competing with each other in the expansion o f their spheres of domination. The competition is nourished by the competition between the two world blocs; but its roots lie in the internal condition o f the Arab people, the heritage o f generations o f servitude, poverty, backwardness, both spiritual and material. 160

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Why then do I think that eventually there will be a change? Because of m y reading o f history and because o f faith in m y fellow man. History has shown us the absurdity o f regarding patterns prevailing at any particular moment o f time as fixed and immutable. Nations which have been at each other’s throats one moment have fallen on each other’s necks as peaceful partners a moment later, or five, ten, fifty or one hundred years later. This has happened at the dictate o f history, geography or common need — or, as i n our case, all three. A n d it has happened when the pace o f the world was much slower. Today, with the pace of change so rapid, and change itself so revolutionary, hopeful advances in the Arab-Jewish relationship may come even sooner than I think. A n d faith in m y fellow man makes me confident that the wretched and degrading effect of the Arab heritage will not last for ever. They must ultimately give way to the growing aspiration throughout the human race for educational and economic progress, for more freedom, for the full expression o f the individual personality. Liberal governments will replace the current dictatorships and their concern for the interests of their people will bring them to co-operate with their likeminded Israeli neighbour. The change, I am sure, is inevitable. But the process is likely to be slow and painful; and in the meantime Israel will continue to b e subjected to siege, pressure a n d threat — a n d will

continue to take the appropriate safeguards.

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Any list of the boldest decisions taken by the Government when you were Prime Minister must surely include those governing Israel’s relations with Germany. I can recall no debates in the Knesset which were more acrimonious and aroused deeper passions than those sparked by this issue. Could you give us the reasoning behind your revolutionary decision on Israel’s policy towards Germany? I f you want the overall reason in a single sentence, i t was the final injunction of the inarticulate six million, the victims o f Nazism whose very murder was a ringing cry for Israel to rise, to be strong and prosperous, to safeguard her

peace and security, and so prevent such a disaster from ever again overwhelming the Jewish people. This was m y key criterion when I faced the problem of Israel’s relations with Germany. I t was a massive problem. Here was a country which had destroyed six million Jews in our generation, and if it had won the war there is no doubt that it would have gained world domination and destroyed the entire Jewish people. Jewish history, which is replete with acts o f slaughter against Jews, knows no parallel to the crimes of Nazi Germany. Deeds like hers can never be forgotten nor forgiven — certainly not b y our generation, whose brothers and sisters, parents and children were murdered a t Auschwitz, Treblinka, Chelmno and Belsen,

Sobibor and Maidanek and many other places of dread. And I was proposing neither forgiveness nor wiping the slate clean when I presented the demand for reparations from West Germany a t the Knesset session in January 1 9 5 2 . (Incidentally, 162

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Eastern Germany has to this day refused any demand for the restoration of the spoils o f those who were murdered b y the Nazis in their region.) But I knew that the debate would be tempestuous and charged with emotion, and that this would be the mood both of the demagogues and also o f the sincere opponents o f contact with Germany. The demagogues did indeed seek to exploit the blood of the martyrs and rouse popular emotion against us — as if m y feelings about the Nazi slaughter were less passionate than theirs — and they even tried to obstruct the Knesset during the debate. The sincere opponents thought quite simply that it was wrong to have anything to do with Germany and that even reparations from them were too loathsome to touch. I am glad that the majority o f the Knesset

members, and I think even the majority of the Jewish people both in Israel and abroad, did not take this attitude. They were in favour of negotiations with Adenauer’s Germany which had

recognized the moral responsibility of the entire German people for the crimes of the Nazis and accepted the duty o f compensating the surviving sufferers.

Many people find it difficult t o free themselves from emotional moods of the past. They do not see the changes that take place in the world, the new relationships and the new needs. I f we can do nothing about the disasters of the past, we can at least take steps to keep the future free o f such happenings. A n d this we can do b y examining the realities not with the eyes of yesterday but with an insight into the patterns of change. The discussion on reparations centred largely round the question of whether or not the Germany o f today is the same Nazi Germany and whether there was any difference between Adenauer and Hitler. Some o f m y extreme opponents even held that you could go back to Imperial Germany and find no

change in all the systems that followed; the German people had been and would always remain a Nazi people. The debate was renewed when our Defence Ministry conducted negotiations with the German Defence Ministry. Actually, m y opponents did not now oppose negotiations, but they argued that these should not be conducted b y a ‘high ranking personality’, implying that i t was permissible for them to be handled b y lower level representatives. This is the kind

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o f absurdity which can result if emotions are allowed to becloud

the analysis of a problem. There was a third great flare-up when the German paper Der Spiegel in July 1959 reported the sale of arms from Israel to the West German Ministry of Defence. As a matter o f fact, in December 1958 I brought to the Cabinet the proposal that we sell Germany a quantity o f small arms which we manufactured in Israel, and I got Cabinet approval. The contract was signed some three months later. The idea o f Israel’s supplying arms to Germany was bound to provoke a good deal o f interest in the world, for here was a country which had been known for generations as the military State par excellence now buying arms from the very State whose blood brothers she had killed. O n the face of it, it would seem a shameful and unpopular thing to do. But not on deeper analysis. A n d again I a m glad to say that most of the newspapers in the world, both Jewish and non-Jewish, joined with the majority in the Knesset in recognizing the soundness and political maturity of the Government’s action. After thinking through a problem and determining policy in accordance with what I believed to be the basic interests o f Israel, it was always m y rule, as Prime Minister, to try and put it into effect no matter how unpopular it might seem at first glance. This is one o f the functions of leadership. N o leader can advance the interests o f his country if he is concerned only with courting popularity. I think that is one o f the major weaknesses of the Arab leadership. But you asked for m y reasoning, and I have given you so far mostly the immediate reactions to m y German policy. I said a moment ago that deeper

analysis o f this policy would lead to a

recognition of its soundness. Let me offer m y analysis. I have spoken o f our six million victims of Nazism whom no mortal power can bring back, and of our need, as an independent people in our own land, to be able to stand u p to our foes with our own strength so that the holocaust can never recur. A spurning o f idle lament and a call to constructive deeds are implicit in this course of action. This in fact has been the approach of three generations of Israeli pioneers — the people who laid the foundations of statehood. This was the lesson they

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had learned from Jewish history in exile, the almost continuous chain of disaster, with the butcheries b y the Crusaders, the expulsions from England and later from Spain and Portugal, the atrocities of the Russian Tsars, of Petlura, o f Hitler. The Zionist pioneers spent no time in weeping. Instead they resolved to devote all their energies to the revival o f their homeland, t o

build Jewish villages, to accumulate Jewish strength, to arm, to intensify immigration, and eventually to establish a State and become a sovereign people, an equal member in the family o f nations. Having achieved this, we had to safeguard our security. This is still threatened b y our neighbours, who maintain a state o f war against us and seek to isolate us politically and economically. Moreover, their military strength is expanding constantly and they have ready sources o f armaments, mostly from the Soviet bloc but also from the West. What must our answer be? Clearly both to maintain a military force skilled and wellequipped to serve as a deterrent, and to develop friendly relations with as many States as possible in Europe and America, Africa and Asia. This is important politically, since such friendship can eventually bring about a weakening o f the Arab wall o f hatred and pave the way to regional peace, and also militarily, since it guarantees sources of supply o f needed armaments. I n developing relations with other countries, Germany in-

cluded - I put my mind t o the problem of Germany soon after the establishment o f the State — I had to examine the realities o f the world in which we lived and try to foresee the trends o f international groupings. This was a very different world from the world o f August 1897 when Theodore Herzl wrote in his diary at the first Zionist Congress in Basle: “Today I have founded the Jewish State.” H a d the State been set u p then, a Jewish Army would not have been an urgent need. For at that time, the Jewish people had not suffered the loss o f more than one-third o f their numbers, all the gates were open, and Euro-

pean Jewry could have streamed into Israel. This Jewish State would have been regarded with favour b y the whole o f Europe, which then dominated the world, and there would have been not a single hostile neighbour o n its borders, for in those days there were no Arab States in existence; the Middle East,

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including Egypt, was part of the Ottoman Empire. Israel, however, came into being not at the end of the nineteenth century but in 1948, and the Jewish people, the Middle East and the rest o f the world had now undergone fundamental changes. Britain, France, Germany, powers of the first magnitude in the nineteenth and early part o f the twentieth centuries, had

now declined. A t the head of the world stood two mighty nations, the United States and Soviet Russia. And soon, despite their own strength, each sought alliance with other countries to extend the defensive fringe beyond their own borders and

improve their strategic positions. The United States initiated N A T O and Russia formed the Warsaw Pact. Thus almost all countries in the world today are linked to others b y military and political pacts and alliances, or b y bonds o f religion, language, tradition or geography. Israel is almost the only country in the world which lives alone, having membership in no military or political alliance — though she is b y no means morally neutral — sharing her religion and language and customs with n o other State, and being cut off, through hostility, from her geographic neighbours. Her task o f developing international relationships is therefore that much harder, though i t must be

said that because of it the friendships that are established are also more solidly based. I think you can begin to see the reasoning process which led to our German policy. Because o f the international groupings o f

which I have spoken, the aims o f foreign policy must be to develop friendship not only with a particular country but if possible also with the group of which i t is a part, promoting ties with the friends o f friends. N o w I do not hold, as do some o f m y opponents, that Germany today is the Germany o f the Kaiser or o f Hitler. I believe she will never again command her former influence; her days of hegemony in Europe have gone. But her international position grows in importance. She is a member o f N A T O and holds an important position in that alliance. Her relationship with the United States grows more friendly. Moreover — and this is o f great moment for Israel — there is an increasing drive for unity among the nations o f western Europe, and France, Israel’s great friend, has started drawing closer to Germany. Just think o f that for a moment.

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France, after suffering grievously o n three outstanding occasions from assaults b y Imperial and Hitlerite Germany — in the 1870’s and in the two world wars — took the initiative to promote a special relationship between the two countries. General de

Gaulle, that great French statesman, went to meet D r Adenauer in Bonn, addressed the German people in their own language, urged the importance o f a rapprochement between the two historic rivals, and concluded an alliance of friendship. Does anyone doubt de Gaulle’s patriotism? Does anyone conceive that he was acting out of weakness? I do not think the alliance was concluded because the French love the Germans or because the Germans love the French. I a m sure that France, particularly the France of de Gaulle, has not forgotten what Imperial and Nazi Germany did to her. Yet they started to draw closer to each other. This was prompted not b y mutual love but b y mutual need. Mutual interest — that is the basis of political friendship. A n d so there is an attempt at closer co-operation between the two countries, particularly o n economic and military affairs. I do not know how long it will last, but at least the trend is there, even under Erhard. N o w if it is imperative that we maintain our warm relations with France — and I imagine everyone in Israel would agree that it is — then i t would seem to be equally imperative that we develop friendly relations with France’s friends, including Germany. I n determining foreign policy when I was Prime Minister, m y obvious criterion, as is that of any leader o f a

State, was the degree to which a particular course would advance the interests o f Israel. O n this criterion, I initiated a

policy of friendship t o Germany. Moreover, it is vital to Israel’s interests that her Defence Forces should be strong. I have already told you that I do not think the security of a country rests only upon its military strength; in our case, land settlement, immigration and education are also o f great importance. But it is certainly true that we can have no security without an army, and an army’s power is dependent on two basic elements — the spirit and skill of its fighting men, and the weapons at their disposal. I n the modern world, there are some types o f armament which only a few countries can and do produce. O f these few, not all are prepared

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to sell them to us, even for payment in full. The Soviet bloc, which sends vast quantities o f modern arms to the Arab countries, knowing well the purpose for which they are intended, refuses to supply Israel. This may also be the policy even of a country most friendly to Israel, the United States, for example. The U S is one o f the principal manufacturers o f arms in the world and a country with close bonds of friendship with Israel. Yet for various reasons, u p to only a comparatively short time ago, she refused to send us arms, even against payment. Only recently has she changed her policy and sanctioned our purchase o f anti-aircraft missiles. There has been a similar change in British policy. For a long time, Britain, both in the days o f Bevin and later under Eden, was unsympathetic to Israel. Though she had signed the Tripartite Declaration in 1 9 5 0 — the other two were France and the U S - undertaking to preserve the balance o f forces between Israel and the Arab States, she refused to sell arms to Israel though she supplied them free o f charge to Jordan and Iraq and sold them to Egypt. However, the British Foreign Office became disenchanted with the Arabs in the Middle East after the revolution in Iraq in July 1958, recognized that they were a broken reed and that Nasser was a grave danger both to the free world and to the liberties o f the other Arab countries.

Her relations with Israel improved after that, and she began t o appreciate Israel’s democratic régime, her achievements and her growing importance in the international arena. This

improvement in our relations expressed itself, among other things, in her readiness to supply our Defence Forces with

tanks and submarines. After the Czech arms deal with Egypt in the middle Fifties, Canada too was prepared — though after m u c h hesitation — to

sell us jet planes, so vital to us then. But b y the time we received the Canadian answer, we were already receiving the much needed aircraft from France, Israel’s loyal ally in Europe, first under the government o f Edgar Faure and especially during the premiership o f Guy Mollet. I t was not worth while using different models, which would have necessitated different spare parts

and maintenance methods, and so we turned down the Cana-

dian planes. Since then, France has been Israel’s major source 168

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of supply o f those types o f weapons which Israel does not herself

produce. Britain and America, as I have said, are now also sources. A factor to be remembered when considering the problem of arms, is that we must always think of the future. Equipping an army is not a one-time job. I t is a continuous process. Mili-

tary equipment becomes obsolete, today more quickly than ever before, and today more particularly with the more

important weapons, the ones that can be decisive. And each new model is more and more complicated than the last. If our army is to be a true deterrent, the prime need for our defence and our survival, we must ensure that it is equipped and reequipped every few years. For the enemies threatening our very existence can always be certain of receiving the finest and most

modern equipment all the time. If Germany can be a

source for the strengthening o f Israel, then surely we must do what we can to keep that source open. I do not suppose there is anyone in Israel who would not welcome closer friendship with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania. But this does not depend o n Israel. And I do not see it as a possibility in the near future. A t the moment, there is not the slightest prospect o f our being able to arm our forces with Soviet equipment like the armies o f

Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Yemen. Israel would therefore be in mortal danger if she did not make an effort in good time to promote cordial relations with all the countries able and willing t o strengthen her security.

This does not mean that our attitude to Germany is blindly uncritical. We have been most outspoken over the German Government’s relative inactivity over the German scientists who are in Cairo helping Nasser to destroy Israel. And o f course we must be alive to the dangers o f German submission to Arab blackmail in the economic and political field. I a m

quite aware of the fact that there are still Nazis and anti-Semites in West Germany — just as there are in East Germany. (Nor can I say that w e have n o enemies i n other countries — even i n

the United States and France.) But only those who live completely i n the past a n d fail t o see the changes that have taken

place in the world can believe that Hitler's Germany may

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be resurrected. This is not only because the German régime has changed but mainly because the geopolitical configuration o f

Europe and the world has changed. Germany, like Britain, can no longer lead the world and think that she can do exactly as she pleases. Not even the two giant powers who head the rival blocs can do as they please. Each needs and strives to secure the support of other peoples in the new world that came into being after the last war, and each is dependent to a great extent o n

world public opinion. Indeed, as I have said, the desire t o gain sympathetic world opinion is a basic feature of the cold war. Germany, then, to m y mind, will never again be the kind o f world power she was at the beginning of this century. But she is

definitely a rising power. And it is clear that the great majority o f the German people prefer to remain in the democratic camp

despite — or because of — Soviet influence in the eastern part of the country and her desire for all Germany to be a Soviet

satellite. To us, it cannot be unimportant whether West Germany is for or against Israel. Germany could well be a force hostile to Israel, since this is possible even without Nazis; there are no Nazis in India, yet the Indian Government shows n o particular friendship for Israel. A hostile Germany might endanger the friendship with Israel o f other peoples o f western

Europe, and could also have a n undesirable influence o n the United States. I t is therefore doubly important for Israel to promote closer relations with Germany. You met Adenauer when you were Prime Minister. What didyou think of him? Yes, I m e t him in New York in 1 9 6 0 , but m y estimate o fhim is based not only on m y impressions o f that meeting. I had followed his policies and achievements, and I had also had exchanges o f correspondence with him. From all this I felt

and feel that he will be remembered in German and in European history as one of the great statesmen of our time. T o him must go the principal credit for the economic, political and moral revival o f his country after the disaster and disgrace of the Nazi régime. 170

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How do you account for the markedfriendship in Israels relations with most of the newly independent States in Africa and some in Asia, andfor her extensive aid activities in these countries? There are several reasons, all, I think, adding u p to a conviction that we can be more helpful to them in their development than many other countries. We are small; even if we wished to, we could attach no strings to any help we extended, which is the cause of the great fear, rightly or wrongly, o f receiving aid from one o f the big powers; all we seek in return is their friendship. We have faced and tackled many o f the problems o f development which face them; our experience with such problems is recent; and we have registered major successes with comparatively meagre resources. Our people are energetic and this spirit o f pioneering impresses leaders o f other new States eager t o instil the same spirit into their people. We are a stable democracy which has fashioned new values o f human cooperation which they find attractive. We are surrounded b y enemies and yet have managed to preserve our integrity and give a good account of ourselves in military action; this too has impressed them. These are some o f the things told me b y some o f the African and Asian leaders themselves. I t all started round about the middle of the 1 9 5 0 ’ s when Burma heard something o f our development projects and thought some o f our solutions would fit their problems. We sent experts on water conservation and 171

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land settlement, and Burma sent over to Israel scores o f army officers with their families to spend a year in kibbutzim and moshavim. The idea was that o n their return they would start settling the large empty areas in their country, particularly

along its borders, creating model farm estates based on individual labour and mutual assistance, and at the same time strengthening the country’s security against hostile bands. While they were here they saw other features o f our life which they thought might well be introduced in their own country. A year or so later, when some o f the African States were about to gain independence, they too thought we might be helpful, and sent over some o f their representatives to have a look for themselves. Some of these leaders well understood that the task o f nation building and land development would only

begin with the achievement of independence, and that in many ways this would prove more arduous than the struggle for national liberation. These words sound trite today when we see how grave are the problems confronting the newly inde-

pendent States. But

at

the beginning of the process of African

liberation, in the final years o f the 1 9 5 0 ’ s , there was a glamour about independence which tended to put in the shade the tough

problems which independence would bring, and it showed foresight for some o f their leaders to realize that they had to

prepare themselves for the task of statehood that lay ahead. They sent over high level delegations to see how we had organized our administration, expanded our primary education and health facilities so quickly, tackled our water problem, established in farm settlements new immigrants who had never worked on the land before, developed our co-operative movement, created and trained an army, air force, navy and merchant marine with speed and efficiency. They asked for our help; and soon we were sending them experts to train their people o n the spot and they were sending us executive-level trainees to attend specially-run courses in Israel. With the first successes o f this relationship, other countries turned to us as soon as they gained their independence. A n d so the process has continued, with aid programmes now in operation with no less than

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ranean and Iran in the Middle East. More than 2 , 0 0 0 of their trainees a year undergo courses in Israel and more than 4 0 0 Israeli experts a year are at work i n their countries.

I remember asking a Minister in one o f the first African Government delegations to visit us what had drawn them to Israel and what he thought they could learn from us. The date was some months after the Sinai Campaign. H e said: ‘Your military exploits show that your people have courage and

organizing ability. Your kibbutzim and labour movement show that you have the spirit o f idealism and at the same time you

are practical. These are qualities we would like to develop in our own people.’ The impact made on him and his people b y our Sinai victory interested me particularly. For several o f m y colleagues had been apprehensive lest the campaign should arouse widespread antagonisms overseas, and I must say that in the first few months after the fighting their fears seemed justified. There were some who even contended that the political effects might well nullify our military success. I did not share their pessimism. A n d indeed Israel soon became one o f the most respected nations, thanks in no small measure to the heroism o f our troops and to our political stubbornness in refusing to withdraw from

our cease-fire positions until we had obtained certain vital guarantees. What was told me b y the first visitors from Africa has been repeated since then b y many heads of State and Prime Ministers who paid official visits to Israel. How, they wondered, had i t been possible for this small nation to resist, ever since 1948, enemies who outnumbered it many times and who had n o difficulties, as had Israel, in securing armaments both from the West and in infinitely larger measure from the Communist States? Some had come to find the answer, and they found it in the spirit o f our people and in their creative initiative. Many o f these leaders were astonished to find more than they had expected.

Less dramatic than the army but something of more permanent significance which impressed our visitors were our labour farm settlements, both the kibbutzim and the moshavim. Representatives o f the new States o f Africa and Asia with

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whom 1 have spoken may respect the Soviet Union but have no desire to adopt the Communist order; they may respect the United States b u t find capitalism not appropriate to their con-

ditions and their aspirations. They are, however, attracted b y the new social forms being created in Israel, not through com-

pulsion but through free pioneering initiative, because these seem to them to express human freedom; there is an absence o f

exploitation and discrimination and there is a maximum of social and economic co-operation. This is the pattern they seek for their own countries and they believe i t is in their power to

establish similar co-operative farm settlements. They would also like to introduce some o f the elements they found here in the Histadruth, our general federation of labour, which they could find in no other labour or trade union movement in the

world, because, as I have explained, it was born under a special set o f circumstances to meet needs which were specific to the Jewish community of this country during the Mandatory period. I t was thus, from the beginning, not only a trade union organization, not only a co-operative movement, but a league o f

persons who were building their homeland and building anew their nation. M e n from Asia and Africa also about to begin the

rebuilding of their homeland and their lives rightly believed that they could learn from such institutions how to transform themselves into a progressive working nation. There is another aspect to the preference o f newly inde-

pendent States for technical co-operation with a small country which had managed to overcome problems which they themselves faced, and which had done so, moreover, with comparatively small resources. There is always the fear that an expert from a wealthy country may recommend to a new State a solution to a development problem which is either very costly or demands high technical skills, or both, for these may be the solutions with which he is familiar in his own country. The suspicion may be unjustified, but it is there. With Israel, however, they know that our limited resources have stimulated ingenuity where costly solutions were beyond our budget, and we also spend much time and patient effort in training our unskilled immigrants in the use of advanced techniques. They are confident therefore that our experts will suit

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their recommendations to the context o f local conditions — and

indeed they have. O r take the random case o f our establishment of the Nautical School in Ghana, which illustrates another feature of preference for our help over that of a big power. When Ghana became independent in the spring o f 1957, she had no merchant marine, n o ships and not a single Ghanaian naval officer. All the ships

serving her ports were foreign owned. She decided to create her own merchant navy. The natural people to turn to were the British; British advisers were still in the country; and Britain’s naval tradition was unrivalled. Yet Ghana turned to us. Why? Because they wanted their people trained quickly in the essentials of seamanship, and the one country they knew which had created both a navy and a merchant marine almost in a matter o f months was Israel. The British will tell you, they said, that i t takes anything from ten to twenty years to train a captain. ‘ I t takes ten years for a sailor to get his sea-legs,” they had been told. This may be true, but they could not wait that long. They wanted ships’ officers trained in a year or two, as we had done.

We agreed to help. W e set u p the Nautical School, sent out instructors and were proud t o see the first Israeli-trained Ghanaians m a n their o w n ships. We also helped Ghana t o establish the Black Star Line

and managed it until we trained local personnel to take over. We did the same with several other countries shortly after they

gained their independence. I think that Israel’s experience of helping our own immigrants gives a special quality to our training of others. I n the brief period of our statehood, we have had to acquire and pass on

quickly a variety of skills with which w e were unfamiliar. This had given us a special faith i n the capacity o f our fellow men. We know that you can train people who have never held a hoe to become good farmers, for we have done it with tens o f thousands o f our own people. We know you can train an intelligent youngster t o fly a plane i n a matter o f months, for w e d o

this

in our own Air Force. I remember one o f the African States asked us, i n 1958, to set u p a flying school, and w e did so. Some

time later, our ambassador to that country who was here for consultations came in to see me. H e told me that a few days

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earlier, a distinguished flying ace in the war had visited the flying school and was present when the first African cadets went up on their first solo flight, only five months after the course had begun. H e had talked to the Israeli commandant of the school and been surprised to learn that the curriculum was exactly the same as that o f the Israel Air Force. “We would never have done that in m y country,’ he said. ‘We would have assumed that it takes twice as long to train an African as our own cadet.’ I do not say this is a general attitude. All I say is that our people consider that anyone can be trained to do what we have

trained ourselves t o do. The attitude of our experts serving in the new States of Asia and Africa also has the same ingredients o f sincerity and dedication that marks their work at home. Many o f them,

indeed, are kibbutznicks and moshavnicks. And whether they are working in Nepal or Chad, Iran or Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ecuador or Venezuela, they put heart and soul into the job,

and local trainees sense immediately that they care. They get no inflated salaries. They put o n no airs. They do not sit behind an office desk and give bureaucratic instructions o n what needs to be done. They take off their jackets, roll u p their sleeves and go out in the field to work with the trainees. Their sense of mission is apparent and contagious, and they succeed, b y their example, i n instilling something o f their own spirit into the

people they work with. While the new States do not share Israel’s problem of settling immigrants, they have much respect for Israel’s achievements in integrating newcomers from many countries o f different

cultural standards, and they feel we can guide them in doing the same for some o f their peoples where there are internal divisions prompted b y differences in language, culture, customs and tribal allegiances. Scientific achievement in Israel is another feature that interests the leaders o f the newly liberated States. Most o f them are deeply concerned over the fact that they are living in a world o f high scientific activity, with science advancing with giant strides, while they, because o f their colonial background, lag far behind. Some o f them, indeed, are still non-starters in the

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people were given the chance of higher study, and often some who were given the opportunity o f university training abroad failed to return on graduation. Now, with independence, they are desperately in need o f their own scientists both for the physical development of their countries and for raising the living standards o f their peoples. They see that Israel has reached quite high levels in both pure and applied science, notably in physics, medicine, geology and agriculture, and these have contributed much to Israel’s achievements. The African and Asian leaders feel that they can learn more from Israel, a small and new country, about how to embark on the road to scientific knowledge than they can from the richer and more established powers. They are also impressed b y the scene they picture o f Israel as a kind of David surrounded by Goliaths, yet unperturbed, and by Israel’s remarkable stability while the countries around her are torn b y revolt, political assassination and military coups.

These, I would say, are the major reasons why we have managed to develop a special relationship with most of the newly independent States. But this does not mean that we take this relationship for granted. I t is being heavily assailed b y the

Arab States. Our neighbours do not confine the expression of their hostility to us to threats o f attack or to denunciation from the United Nations forum. They are active in every country which is friendly to Israel, and particularly in the new States of Africa and Asia where they seek to sow distrust o f us b y calling us ‘a bridgehead o fimperialism’. One of our ambassadors to an African country sent me an illustrated paper a few years ago, printed in Cairo, which was being circulated among the Africans b y the local Egyptian embassy. I t showed a picture o f the United States Cabinet and next to it a picture of the ‘secret Jewish government’ to which it was subordinate, headed b y Senator Herbert Lehman and including Professor Robert Oppenheimer, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and Admiral Hyman Rickover. The captain added that these ‘Elders o f Zion’ had already imposed their domination o n

Europe and America and were n o w plotting to dominate the States of Asia and Africa, using Israel as their tool. We have been happy to find that Israel’s deeds i n these States are the

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best refutation of such libels, the best reply to Arab subversion; our friendship is as strong as ever and our technical aid activities are expanding all the time. Some o f the Government leaders I have spoken to resent the Arab attempts to ‘take them in’, regarding them as ‘simpleminded primitives’ who will fall for crude propaganda devices which they would not dare circulate in sophisticated countries

like America, Britain or France, although such propaganda has been supported in the Press of the Soviet Union and several o f her satellites (not Poland). The leaders o f the new States

also resent the Arab demand that to gain their friendship they should cut their ties with Israel. Several have said to me: ‘No country can be allowed to choose our friends for us.” W e have

never demanded that the price of our friendship must be a break with the Arab States. We say ‘You can be friendly with both of us,” and most o f them are. Strangely enough, the one country which has succumbed to Arab pressure is not one o f the newest States and not one of the smallest or least powerful. I t is India, one o f the largest, most populated and most pro-

gressive of the new States. I t was headed by one of the most eminent statesmen in the world, Nehru, until his death. H e did great things for India, although he also left a number o f important things undone, and despite his immense problems he managed to achieve a large measure of democracy in his vast land. H e showed imagination, ability and courage; and his whole background should have led him naturally to a sympathetic appreciation of what Israel had done since her statehood. Yet he remained aloof and consistently refused to establish

diplomatic relations with us. We did not

resent

his preference

for the neighbouring Arab States, even the more backward o f them, even the feudal, even the dictatorships. That was his right. But it was strange that a man of his qualities, his pro-

gressive ideals and his vision, should have submitted to Arab pressure. Other countries follow normal diplomatic procedures b y an exchange o f representatives, for example the Soviet Union. But not India. Mind you, it is o f n o great importance

for Israel. Her basic interests remain unaffected b y not being fully recognized b y India. But it was a source of personal disappointment for m e ; I was disappointed in Nehru. I thought well 178

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o f h i m ; I followed his career closely; and I was saddened that o n this issue he should have proved so weak. I a m happy that many of his friends and colleagues show no such weakness, and

several of them have visited Israel and shown profound interest particularly in our labour farm settlements. Many Indian students have attended our development courses, and regional settlement directors have taken back to India valuable ideas o n village development which they picked u p here. I am sure that friendship between India and Israel will grow, for we can learn much from each other. I t is a pity only that the beginning has been delayed. Cynics have occasionally asked me what we ‘get out of’ our relationship with the new States. I t is true that there are material advantages — for both. We are a good market for their raw materials; they are a market for our industrial products, though in terms of Israeli exports Asia takes third place, Africa fourth; both are behind Europe, which is first, and America,

which 1s second. I t is true that their political friendship is of importance. But these are subsidiary to the basic spirit o f our relationship. Israel, because of its special conditions and circumstances, has had to find solutions to problems o f nation-building similar to theirs and it is therefore in a position to pass them on. Israel regards i t as a historic privilege — and therefore a duty — to assist newly freed peoples who have been kept backward b y colonialism, to improve themselves, develop and advance. I n doing so, we also feel that we are helping to solve the gravest problem of humanity in our time, the dangerous gap between the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa and the advanced societies of Europe and America. The one group enjoys abundance, high living standards, intensive development and technological skills; the other suffers poverty, hunger, illiteracy and widespread disease. Yet the countries of Asia and Africa comprise the majority of the human race — one and a half billion i n Asia and more than 2 2 0 million i n Africa out o f a

world population of some three billion. Only two countries in Asia, at opposite extremities of the continent, are as developed as some o f the countries of Europe: Japan and Israel. I n the rest, the standard of living is appallingly low, and in some, like India and Egypt, masses of their rural populations live 179

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permanently on the edge of starvation. A usetul index of living levels is a comparison o f the consumption o f power. I remember looking at the figures for the year 1 9 5 0 , and the comparison was staggering. I t was calculated that the total annual con-

sumption of energy by the world’s population was the equivalent o f that generated b y burning 2.7 billion tons o f coal. That makes it roughly an average o f one ton per person per year. That 1s the average for the world. N o w look at the breakdown showing where the power was actually used: in America, the average was eight tons per person; in Europe two and a half tons; in Asia, only one tenth o f a ton. (Only in Japan did the average reach slightly more than one ton.) Pretty revealing figures, are they not? True fraternity and international co-operation can never come about so long as there are such vast differences in standards

of living, health and education between the various nations.

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On the international scene, what do you think are the major steps that should be taken to strengthen worldpeace, apart of coursefrom universal disarmament and the beating of swords into plough-shares? I am thinking of measures which are practical andpossible. Undoubtedly the single major step would be recognition o f Communist China b y the United States and acceptance o f China into the United Nations. I well understand American hesitation on this issue and the emotional resistance to such a step. But America has overcome

such resistance in the past when faced with similar, though admittedly less acute, issues involving other countries. W h y not with China, where recognition and the establishment of relations would certainly not hinder and might well advance the cause o f peace? What lies behind America’s attitude? I s it that China is Communist? So is the Soviet Union. This does not stop the United States from recognizing her, exchanging ambassadors, selling her wheat, sitting round the conference table with her. Is it that China is a dictatorship? So are many countries in the western camp with whom the United States maintains friendly relations and even joins in regional alliances. She sits with

Portugal in NATO and with Pakistan in CENTO. Indeed, there are more non-Communist countries with dictatorial régimes than there are Communist countries. Is it that the United States has a loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek w h o was ousted

b y M a o Tse-tung? But the U S today maintains diplomatic relations with numerous governments who overthrew régimes 181

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with whom she had been most friendly: Nasser who overthrew

Naguib who overthrew the Egyptian monarch Farouk; Arif who overthrew Kassem who murdered the Iraqi Regent and that great friend of the west, Nuri as-Said; the various régimes i n Saigon which followed the murder of South Viet N a m President Ngo Dinh Diem. I s i t that America expects Chiang Kai-shek to reconquer the mainland? But there has been no change in the American view as expressed in the statement of March 29th 1 9 6 2 b y the late President Kennedy discouraging any belief that the United States would support a Nationalist China attempt to land forces on the mainland.

Diplomatic recognition has never meant identification with or condonation o f another country’s political system. I f it did, the diplomatic list in Washington would be cut b y almost half.

Nor is membership of the United Nations confined to those countries which have democratic régimes and which respect the

rights of the individual. It is open to all sovereign States, whether they be monarchies or republics, feudal or democratic, Communist or fascist, powerful or weak, advanced or backward, peace-loving or war-like, and all are to be found in today’s United Nations Organization, based as i t is, in the words o f the Charter, ‘on the principle o f the sovereign equality o f all its members’. So on what grounds is China excluded?

Strategic reasons are no doubt at the core of America’s

China policy. Probably, and I agree that they cannot be lightly dismissed. America has no wish to fall out with Formosa which she regards as a key island in her defence network in south-east Asia. But it does not seem to me that the development o f a policy towards the two Chinas is beyond the diplomatic

ingenuity of the United States Government. I t may be, too, that America is very sensitive to the dangers o f political instability in several o f the countries o f south-east Asia which form part o f her strategic system o f defence. She may feel that these countries are not strong enough to stand u p to Chinese pressure

and that her own recognition o f Peking may be interpreted b y them as an acknowledgement o f Chinese strength with 182

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which it would be preferable to come to terms now. The fear may be valid; but if it is, is such a network of defence likely to

prove solid and reliable in a critical emergency? I t is my feeling that American efforts to strengthen the friendship o f these countries to the point where they will remain unswayed

by America’s recognition of China are possible. Much wisdom will be required, much aid and much hard work. But they will

be well rewarded. For it is always rewarding to face realities, however much a country may think them unpalatable, and I do not underrate the shock that would be felt b y a great number o f Americans if they woke u p one day to find that their Government had recognized Peking. But m y faith in the American public persuades me

that an awareness of the current world situation and of China’s fairly recent history will prompt them to support a change in America’s policy towards China in the interests of all countries, America’s included. And I say this as a citizen o f a State which maintains relations of the warmest friendship with the United States and which has been cold-shouldered by China, although we recognized China fourteen years ago.

The political conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is deep, bitter and dangerous. Would the world be a better place and the hopes o f peace stronger if America

spurned recognition of Russia? Communist China is as much of a reality as Communist Russia.

I have heard it said that recognition o f China would be interpreted as American weakness. Why? Recognition does not mean surrender. I t does not mean an abandonment o f America’s interest in Asia. I t does not mean the giving u p o f a single position that would not otherwise be given up. I t does not mean a weakening o f the struggle against Chinese influence in Asia if the United States is determined to continue that struggle. I t does not seem to me that the United States, in recognizing and maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, is thereby any less vigilant over the possible expansion of Soviet influence in the world. W h y then should i t be difficult with China? There is nothing that China or the United States can do with China unrecognized that both cannot do with recognition. But recognition can offer one opportunity which is not

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available today — the opportunity to talk to each other. A n d that, in a push-button-nuclear world, is no small thing. Remember, moreover, that as in Russia the Communist régime in China emerged as a result of internal causes and the operation o f purely internal forces. Whether one likes it or not, this means that she possesses a special strength, and this must never be ignored. China is not like Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, countries which were liberated from Tsarist Russia

after the First World War, handed to the Soviet ‘sphere o f influence’ b y the Stalin-Hitler 1939 agreement, and ‘granted admission’ to the Soviet Union in 1 9 4 0 . China was never a Russian satellite, like some East European States, which went Communist under the pressure o f Soviet occupation after the Second World War. Like Yugoslavia, she established a Communist régime b y her own forces and, like Yugoslavia, she has remained completely independent o f the Soviet Union. She is the largest and most important country in the world to have

done so. As to why China went Communist — and to understand this is to help understand why she should be recognized — an excellent one-paragraph exposition was written b y an anti-

Communist American expert, Doak Barnet, whose views were published under the unexceptionable aegis of the Council for Foreign Relations. Its members include Allen Dulles and Arthur Dean. Let me read you what Barnet wrote: ‘The Chinese Communists did not suddenly appear out of nowhere in 1949; their victory in China came after a century

of revolutionary upheaval. And although the Chinese revolution o f the past century was caused, in a fundamental sense, b y the impact o f the West upon China, it has been too vast a force to be subject to over-all direction or control b y any power. From the middle o f the 19th century onward, overpopulation, agrarian crises, the decline o f effective government and administration, and m a n y other domestic problems

tended to undermine China’s internal stability at a time when China was also subject to increasing pressure from the West and Japan. During the early years of the 20th century the momentum o f revolution increased greatly, and the Chinese

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The Kuomintang, the Nationalist party, emerged first as the focus o f the Chinese desire to modernize, to reform, and to achieve national power. But ultimately the Nationalists proved unable either to satisfy existing urges for change among the Chinese people or to provide China with a new basis of unity and stability at home, and prestige abroad.’ Where the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek failed, M a o Tse-tung and his friends succeeded. They liberated China from foreign tutelage, expropriated the few landowners who had kept in thrall hundreds of millions o f peasants, and provided the Chinese people with a régime which, though authoritarian, is stable. I a m sure the bulk of the Chinese people do not dislike their régime as, for example, the people o f the European Communist satellite States or the absorbed Baltic States do. If these were given freedom of choice, they would almost certainly choose a very different form o f society. I n China, as in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the régime commands popular support, and it would be idle for a country to base its policy on the wishful thought that the Chinese Government rests o n the power o f a minority.

China must be proud of the feeling that, for the first time in more than

150

years, she is ruler i n her o w n house and master

of her own destiny. One of the most civilized and progressive countries for more than 3 , 0 0 0 years, China was left untouched b y the cultural and scientific renaissance that gradually raised Europe to new heights during the last four centuries. China’s superior civilization became petrified, her political strength waned. Throughout the nineteenth century, she suffered increasing encroachment upon her economy and administration b y the foreign powers of Russia, Britain, France, Germany, Japan. Ports, railroads and some o f her chief towns came under alien rule. With foreign concessions, bases and special taxation and trading privileges, whole areas o f China became virtual colonies.

There were occasional reactions o f violence b y the Chinese people, but they were too weak and disorganized to be successful. The 1 8 5 0 Peasants’ Revolt of Tai-P’ing failed. The 1900 Boxer rebellion was followed b y brutal European oppression. Then came the Sun Yat-Sen revolution i n 1 9 1 1 . For the first 185

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time, the signs were unmistakable that the Chinese people were on the march. The movement was to be accompanied b y a lot of bloodshed and a fierce internal struggle for power before liberation was to be achieved. I t is not only in the 1 9 6 0 ’ s that there are ‘two Chinas’. A t the Peace Conference after the First World War, China was represented b y two rival governments, the Progressive Government based on Canton and the Japanese-influenced Government based o n Peking. T h e Versailles Treaty, as you will recall, refused t o restore the former German Concession in Shantung to

the Chinese and transferred it to Japan — a move, incidentally, opposed b y the United States but supported b y the European powers. I am convinced that this was one o f the chief factors

which led the progressive forces both of the ‘left’ and ‘right’ t o recognize that liberation would come only b y the efforts o f the

Chinese people themselves. Sun Yat-Sen, head of the Canton Government, putting his trust in the peasants and workers, was the first to win over the masses in the struggle. After his death

in 1925, the ‘right-left’ struggle grew more acute and erupted into fierce civil war in

1927.

The ‘right’ was led b y Chiang

Kai-shek and he routed the Communist forces. The surviving Communist units fled to distant provinces and there began the grass-roots organization o f agricultural labourers and landless peasants. This was to become the broad solid base from which

they were t o spring, a t the end of the Second World War, to conquer the whole of China in the four years from 1945 t o 1949. Chiang Kai-shek was forced to flee and he and his followers established themselves in Formosa.

I n determining today’s policy towards China, it is well t o remember that the Communists won their victory without the aid o f outside forces. Indeed, it was the loser, Chiang Kai-shek, who received outside aid — from the United States. After that war, early in 1 9 5 0 , China signed a treaty of friendship with Moscow, although the two powers were wary o f each other from the very start. Russia, I fancy, was more pleased at the discomfiture of the United States than she was over the emer-

gence of a powerful China, self-confident and independent in spirit both because o f the size o f her territory and population and because she had achieved power b y her own resources. 186

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This is her mood today, and it stems from the realities of her recent history. These realities, and China herself, have been recognized b y the major countries of Asia — India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma; b y little Israel, although China has so far refused to exchange ambassadors; and, in Europe, b y several countries including Britain, the Scandinavian States, Switzerland, Poland, and now b y France. But the United States rejects recognition and the United Nations refuses to accept China as a member o f the U N., Peking cannot be the only capital which finds it strange that the delegate o f Formosa should still serve as the representative o f the whole o f China. Formosa has a population o f just under eleven million and an area o f 13,952 square miles. The mainland o f China covers 3,691,502 square miles and has a population o f some 7 0 0 million. Quite apart from the question o f justice, can it make sense to leave almost one quarter of the human race unrepresented in the international organization which was specially created to promote the peace and security o f all

peoples? When the Charter of the United Nations was signed, it was understood very well that the nature o f the régimes o f some members would not be to the taste o f others. One o f the

Articles states that the aim of the U N shall be ‘to develop friendly relations among all nations, based on respect for the principle o f equal rights and self-determination of peoples. . . ’ I t may be a matter of regret for the United States that Chinese self-determination expressed itself in a Communist order. But

that is the political fact, just as Communism in the Soviet Union is a fact. T h e one is a member o f U N , the other is not. I believe it to be in the interests of world peace and a factor which would strengthen the U N if Communist China were represented there. This is the only world we’ve got, and China is part of it. Moreover, the United States is today making determined

efforts to reduce cold-war tensions and to thaw out the frosty relations between herself and Russia. Both countries realize that this process is vital if the world is to be saved from destruction. The limited ban o n atomic testing was an encouraging beginning to a relaxation o f tensions. But I find it hard to believe that such efforts can succeed so long as the Chinese

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giant is blackballed. For one thing, keeping China out in the

diplomatic cold frees her from any agreements signed by Russia and America; for instance she carried out her atomic bomb tests

with impunity. For another, it must stiffen the attitude ofRussia whether she wishes it or not. For despite the huge cracks in the Sino-Russian facade, the Soviet Union has a guarded respect for China, and although they are in ideological conflict, Russia cannot appear to be more friendly to the very capitalist country that is most hostile to a fellow Communist nation. She is unlikely therefore to dare promote a true rapprochement with America so long as America shuns China and does everything possible to keep her out of the U N . Paradoxically enough, Russia may feel freer to ease her conflicts with America once China is respectably seated at the U N . The Chinese have been a civilized people for close on 4,000 years. They may have lagged behind Europe in the last few centuries but they are catching u p fast. They are not inferior in diligence, skill and intellect to any other peoples. Since their independence in 1949, they have made great efforts to advance in the scientific, technological and economic fields. Their resources are rich and vast. They have had their setbacks and crises, but they have already gone far. I have no doubt that in the course o f a generation they will overtake not only the Soviet Union but other advanced nations o f our day. There

may be profound historical reasons for their conflict with Russia, even though both are Communist. There is none for conflict with the United States, even though their régimes are different. China should be recognized as soon as possible as a member o f the family o f nations.

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BUDDHISM

What promptedyour interest in Buddhism? Asia interested me. I t was a part of the world which I had not visited i n the years before the State was founded and

about which I had not known very much. When 1 became Prime Minister I wanted to know more. T o get to know the moods and patterns of thought o f the peoples of Asia, I sought to acquaint myself more intimately with the works of the man who had left the greatest imprint upon their minds. A n d so I began studying the writings o f the Buddha, and I was quickly impressed with the extraordinary greatness of the man, a man o f immense wisdom and immense courage. Just think o fit. Here is a man who could preach, five hundred years before Jesus, that hatred cannot be defeated b y hatred, only b y love. I n an age o f superstition, when all around him

the people were worshipping idols, up stands Gautama Siddhartha, the Buddha, to deny their gods. With his society based on the caste system, and himself of high caste, the Buddha rose to denounce it. H e was undoubtedly the greatest personality India ever produced, a tremendous historic personality. Strange that in India, its country o f origin, Buddhism should have disappeared almost entirely, yet have spread over the whole o f the Far East, from Ceylon to Japan, and have more than 5 0 0 million

followers. For a closer understanding o f these people, a study o f Buddhist teaching is essential. O f the broad division o f the various sects, into the Hinayana (the Lesser Vehicle) and the Mahayana (the Greater Vehicle), I would put the Hinayana as being closer to the original teachings o f the Buddha, and i t is

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prevalent in Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, Cambodia and Viet-

nam. The Mahayana is more widespread in Japan and China. Didyou learn most about Buddhism from private reading orfromyour talks in Burma whenyou visited that country in 1961?

Most from private reading in Jerusalem, though I got some new insights in m y talks with U Nu, Prime Minister o f Burma at the time, who is a most scholarly and devout follower o f Buddhist moral teachings, and also from two Buddhist monks with whom I spent two full days on Buddhist discussions. Strictly speaking, o f course, Buddhism is not a religion — not

in the Oxford Dictionary sense o f the term which defines religion as the ‘human recognition of a superhuman controlling power and especially of a personal God entitled to obedience’. Unlike Judaism, Christianity or Islam, Buddhism is not based on divine revelation. The Buddha denied the existence of God — and even o f the human soul. His teachings were all on the rational and moral plane: what path should a man choose in life, for the

good of himself and of all living creatures? True, in the course o f time, legends sprang u p of miracles accompanying the birth and upbringing of the Buddha, turning him almost into a God. But all this was foreign to the doctrines of the Buddha, who believed in nothing supernatural — neither in spirits nor demons nor gods nor miracles. His teachings were in fact a revolt against the beliefs and customs prevalent in India during his lifetime — the end o f the sixth and most o f the fifth century B.c. H e regarded the whole o f existence as an endless chain o f

causation. One of the fundamental concepts of his philosophy was anicca, non-permanence, b y which h e meant that everything

is in a constant state of change and constantly renews itself. N o man can step twice into the same river — for the second time it is not exactly the river i t was. According to Buddha, he cannot even do it once, for the river flows; i t never stands still; and so the moment of stepping into it, the foot encounters a new body o f water. M a n today is not what he was yesterday, not what he was a minute ago. Like man, so is nature. A second principle in Buddha’s teaching was anatta, non-self, 190

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which is a consequence o f non-permanence. Buddha deliberately avoided metaphysical problems as far as possible, for his doctrine in the main is a teaching of life, and concerns itself with the relationship and behaviour o f m a n to his fellow m a n

and to all living things, for his own happiness and the happiness o f all other living beings. But though the Buddha denied the existence of God, was not hus doctrine on moral behaviour similar to that of the Hebrew Prophets — some of whom by the way were saying the same things in a much earlier age? Some of them, yes. The preaching of love of fellow man, for example, was very much the doctrine of the Hebrew Sages o f old — and of the Prophets who lived i n the ninth and eighth centuries B . c . ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself,’ indeed, appears in Leviticus (19:18). The Prophets Elijah and Elisha lived i n the ninth century Bc, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah in the eighth — that is, more than eight hundred years before Jesus, and more than two hundred years before the Buddha. But I made the special point earlier that the utterances of the Buddha were made five centuries before Jesus because of the popular belief that the doctrine o f love h a d b e e n launched u p o n

the world b y Jesus, and because the form in which the Buddha said it was so like the form which appears in the New Testament.

The Dhammapada is one of the collections of the sayings o f

the Buddha and I like his one on love, so central a principle in his teachings: ‘““He abused me, he defeated me, he robbed m e ’ — in those who harbour such thoughts, hatred will never cease. Nor ever does hatred cease b y hatred. . . . Hatred ceases b y love.

This is an eternal law.’ A n d one on the conquest o f the instincts: ‘ I f one man conquers in battle a thousand times a thousand men, and if another conquers himself, he is the greatest of conquerors.’ Incidentally, this is very like one of the ‘Sayings of the Fathers’, the collection o f aphorisms b y the Jewish Sages: ‘Who is a 191

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hero? H e who conquers his own passions.” Buddha urged the

pursuit of truth and the shaping of one’s life in accordance with the ideals o f truth in a characteristic saying: ‘Like a beautiful flower, full o f colour, but without scent,

are the fair but fruitless words of him who does not

act

accordingly.’ H e preached that avoidance o f evil was the best way to counter

evil: ‘He who has no wound on his hand may touch poison with his hand ; poison does not affect one who has no wound; nor is there evil for one who does not commit evil. Let us live i n happiness, then, not hating those who hate us; among men

who hate us let us dwell free from hatred.’ Nehru tried hard in his day to eliminate the caste system i n India, but it still exists, though it is less rigid than i t was

before India became independent. Then, it was much as it was in the days of the Buddha, and the Buddha was the first man to rise u p in outcry against it. There were four castes: the Brahmans — the priests o f the gods, learned in the Indian holy scriptures, the Vedas, the Brahammanas and the Upanishads; the Kshatriya — the military ruling caste, to which the Buddha belonged (his aristocratic family came from northern India, on the Nepalese border); then came the merchants, the Vaisya; and the fourth caste, the Sudra, comprised the craftsmen and

agricultural labourers. When the British established their rule in India, caste distinctions were carefully preserved, and, as I say, they still exist today as they did under Nehru, even though he proclaimed his faith in socialism. I n the course o f time, another caste was added, the Untouchables, for whose equality

and purification Gandhi fought. I n the times o f the Buddha, the Brahmans regarded themselves as the spiritual aristocracy o f the Indian people, though it was the Kshatriya who were the effective rulers. I t was the Brahmans who offered sacrifices to the gods, and they who held the key to the Scriptures which, according to Indian belief, came from Heaven and were not the work o f man. The Brahmans avoided physical contact with lower castes; however, this was permitted with a low-caste concubine, but food touched or

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All this infuriated the Buddha. With great courage — since he was a lone struggler against an overwhelming tide — he denounced caste distinctions and he denied the superiority o f the Brahmans. H e used to say: ‘Him I call a Brahman from whom lust and hatred, pride and envy, have dropped like a mustard seed from the point of a needle.’ I n denying the existence o f gods in general, though polytheism was prevalent in India, and even o f a supreme God, he offers us the following discourse. The Buddha asks a young Brahman named Vasettha: ‘Vasettha, is there a single one o f the Brahmans versed in the three Vedas who has ever seen Brahma face to face?’ ‘No, indeed, Gautama,’ answered the youth; and Buddha asked further: ‘But is there, then, Vasettha, a single one o f the teachers of the Brahmans versed in the three Vedas who has seen Brahma face to face?’ ‘No, indeed, Gautama.’ ‘But is there, then Vasettha, a single one o f the Brahmans u p to the seventh generation who has ever seen Brahma face to face?’ ‘No, indeed, Gautama.’ ‘Well then, Vasettha, those ancient authors o f the three Vedas — did even they speak saying ‘“We know it, we have seen it, where Brahma 1s, whence Brahma is, whither Brahma 15°



‘Not so, Gautama.’ Then said Buddha to Vasettha: ‘Just so, as when a string o f blind men are clinging to the other, neither can the foremost see, nor can the middle one see, nor can the hindmost see — just even so, methinks, is the talk o f the Brahmans; the

first sees not, the middle one sees not, nor can the latest see. The talk, then, of these Brahmans turns out to be ridiculous, mere words, a vain and empty thing.’

Some years ago, the late E d Murrow arranged a three-way television interview between U Nu, Burmese Premier at the time, who was then in Hong Kong, and myself in Jerusalem. Murrow 193

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spoke to us both from New York. One o f the first questions he asked was the difference between Judaism and Buddhism. I answered that the essence of Judaism to m y mind was contained in the first o f the Ten Commandments: ‘ I am the Lord thy God’, and i n the precept ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour as

thyself’. U N u answered that Buddha was a n atheist, but he agreed with the Judaic precept and went even further by preaching not only love towards m a n b u t also mercy to all

living creatures. I n 1 9 6 1 , when I visited Burma as U Nu’s guest, he gave a dinner in m y honour, and set before me was a dish of fish and meats. Remembering what he had said about ‘mercy to all living creatures’, I asked U N u how he explained the food on the table. H e reassured me. I t was a Chinese dish with the look and something o f the taste o f fish and meat, but i t was made entirely o f vegetables!

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN pp—

SCIENCE AND E T H I C S (The session which started with Ben Gurion’s observations on Buddhism ended with his comments on science and ethics, and what he hoped would be their impact on the future of Israel. This is how we got there: He said that through Buddhism, India had been one of the three ancient peoples who had bequeathed immortal values to humanity, the other two being Greece and Israel. I asked him how he would sum up the essence o f these contributions, and he said: ‘There are elements common to all three. But by and large I would say that the main theme in Buddhist teaching was how to free the individual from suffering; with the Prophets of Israel it was the supremacy of religious and moral consciousness; and the centre ofgravity of the Greek genius was in the realm of art, science and philosophy.” What follows 1s a continuation of this

reply.) The foundations of systematized philosophic and scientific research which became the heritage o f the West, and now the entire world, were laid b y the leaders of Greek philosophy who lived at the time o f the Buddha and a little later: Thales o f Miletus and his disciples with their theories on the principles o f nature; Heraclitus, Pythagoras and Parmenides on cosmic being and its evolution; Hippocrates on the effect of climatic factors o n man’s health ; Plato and his dialogues o n justice, sanctity, courage, love, education, the state, the laws, the government, a n d those highest axioms w e call ideas; Aristotle and his trea-

tises on logic, science, metaphysics, poetry and ethics; the works of Theophrastus on plants and the natural sciences; the mathe-

matical essays of Euclid, Archimedes, Aristarchus of Samos and others. This is not to say that the conquests of science in the last

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three or four centuries are exclusively the legacy of classical Greece. I n some ways it may be said that modern science was born out o f a revolt against the Greek scientific tradition, as witness Galileo’s struggle with the followers o f Aristotle in his day, or, even earlier, the refusal of ancient Greece to accept the teachings o f Aristarchus. Long before Copernicus’ disproof o f the Ptolemaic theory that the earth was the stationary centre round which sun and stars revolved, Aristarchus already knew o f the rotation of the earth on its axis and its revolution round the sun; but he was spurned b y his contemporaries. (Incidentally, Aristarchus is not mentioned in Copernicus’ great work.) However, despite these phenomena, we cannot conceive o f the Renaissance, which laid the foundations of modern science, without the rediscovery of ancient Greek literature, brought to Europe in the fifteenth century from declining Byzantium. And even today, the works o f the great ones of Greece, with Plato at their head, are a source o f inspiration to the human spirit i n

its search for an understanding of the order of nature and of the universe, and of itself. Today, the accomplishments of science are the possession, in large o r small measure, o fmost people in most parts o f the world.

Indeed, I think this is the most universal spiritual triumph of our era. I n one basic sense, contemporary science differs from what it was in ancient Greece. For the Greek thinkers of old, intellectual contemplation, theoria, was the main thing, and few were concerned with praxis, the practical side. Today, however, with the tremendous emphasis on applied science, science is integrated into everyday life, and the jobs we do, the homes we dwell in, the food we eat, the way we move and communicate, our health, our security, are all based on what science has achieved. Inevitably, the application of the atomic theory to the fashioning o f weapons o f unprecedented destruction underlines the problem o f science and ethics. N o w of course science, b y its very essence, 1s beyond good and evil. Science can help us explain the phenomena of nature — including man, who is part o f n a t u r e ; b u t i t cannot tell m a n what course o f behaviour h e

must follow. Through science, blessings may be bestowed on humanity, and through science humanity may be destroyed.

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But the tree o f knowledge of good and evil does not blossom on the soil of science. Science can help to lay bare the secrets o f nature; it cannot counsel man what he shall do. From this it follows that while we must strive continuously to

extend the bounds of pure scientific knowledge, w e must with equal vigour foster the moral values on which relations between man and man and nation and nation must rest. Knowledge o f good and evil must be part of the consciousness of every man if

the creative activity of the men of science 1s to be a blessing for mankind. What I am saying is that we must not separate the exploits o f

science from ethical values, from the imperatives of the human conscience, which is the divine element in man. The secret o f man’s intelligence, which is capable o f understanding the structure o f the cosmos, has never been penetrated, and I doubt whether it ever will be. Similarly with the human conscience, which prompts man o n occasion to give u p his life for values dearer to him than life itself. Paradoxically enough there are two things — intelligence and conscience, the one making possible scientific discovery, the other telling us what to do with it — which science cannot explain. But we know that both

exist, and it is only by the integration of the two that the blessings of both can flourish. Let me tell you that I did a good deal of thinking on this problem not only outside office hours but as part o f m y general concerns as Prime Minister. For the character o f Israel’s resur-

gence in our day is not merely political or physical, though we cannot endure unless w e are physically strong. W e

still

hold

fast to the faith that accompanied our people for thousands o f years, faith in the supremacy o f the spirit. I don’t mean the spirit as something divorced from matter; this was foreign to the Jewish outlook in Biblical times, as it is to us today. We believed, and still believe, in the supremacy of the spirit that pervades matter a n d rules it.

This supremacy implies not only the supremacy o f science and intelligence but also o f conscience and morality; and the authentic and practical expression of this in our lives in Israel is what I have talked of earlier — halutziut, the quality o f pioneering and personal dedication to man’s mission in life. For Jews

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as a community, although obviously there have been individual

cases elsewhere, this has been possible only when they lived on their own soil. The great Book, or rather the collection o f great Books, which has given us the honour to be known as the People of the Book, was created at a time when we lived and enjoyed sovereignty in our own land. Though we were a small and poor

people, small in number and the size of our territory, we were second to no nation in creativeness, giving t o ourselves and the world these Books of the highest spiritual values, of an enduring expression o f poetry, thought, morality and religion. What happened when we went into exile? We continued to live in our hearts and our minds within the bounds o f this Biblical heritage. But we did not continue our creative process, except for multiplying our interpretations o f interpretations and explanations of the explanations o f our sacred writings.

Our spiritual lives, like our material lives, were impoverished. They were shrivelled. And if we did produce some creative genius, we were quick to condemn him. I n the seventeenth century, a t the beginning of the modern renaissance period, a

great eagle, Baruch Spinoza, emerged from our midst and in his lofty thought rose to the skies. What did we do? We cast him out. H e gave his wisdom to others, uttering his profound words in a foreign tongue. We lived in a political, an economic and also a spiritual ghetto. This was not because our creative power had atrophied - if it had, we could never have maintained our identity under the terrible hardships we suffered — but because we had been torn from the source o f our people’s vitality, their independent homeland. The new period that began with the renewed steps to build our homeland ninety years ago also saw renewed scope for that creative power. O f course, in this first phase of the third restoration o f our independence, a phase which will last many years, we shall have to spend most o f our physical and spiritual re-

sources on strengthening our security, developing the country, settling our immigrants, consolidating the foundations o f a free, independent and sovereign nation. We are still in danger. We are still beleaguered. W e

still

need to advance the levels o f our

people. Our deserts still await development. But our efforts to

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move ahead in these fields cannot succeed unless they are

sustained by a great spiritual dedication. Integral to the nature of the spirit we need are the conquests

of science. I n the unique obstacles we face, internal and external, we must summon scientific achievements to our aid. And I tried,

when I was in office, to impress this upon all who were concerned with our education, our economy and our security. We must never be satisfied with what has been achieved so far; if you like, we must constantly recharge our intellectual batteries. New scientific attainments will help us more effectively and

speedily t o build our country and defend it. But the value o f science lies not merely in its practical uses but in enhancing the distinctive qualities o f man and enriching

his spirit. We in Israel are few, and few we shall remain; our country is small and it will remain small, though its economic capacity expands constantly. The only realm in which we can be great is that o f the spirit. Through science and a knowledge o f the world and all it contains, we shall rise ever higher. All the great men of Israel, i n days gone b y and i n our own day, whether through religious intuition or scientific insight, recognized what I mentioned earlier, the all-embracing unity

of existence, the oneness of matter and mind. We never accepted the discredited theory that the world is composed of blind and crude matter, nor the theory that everything we see, feel or hear is only the disembodied creation o f the imagination and spirit. Man is part of the marvel of existence which in all its unity has many manifestations, both material and spiritual; and i n

this existence, man has the gift of seeing and of comprehending the nature o f the universe, through inner and external contem-

plation. I a m quite certain that the high points which science has gained in our day are only the bottom rungs o f a ladder which reaches for and to the sky. I want m y people in Israel to be on that scientific ladder. But science, as I said earlier, needs moral force to direct it. A n d so an equally important spiritual imperative is the eternal ethical values o f Judaism. Other ancient peoples also gave utterance to sublime moral truths. But I doubt if any o f them

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did so with more power, holier passion or greater insight

than did the Prophets of Israel, and none could match their ideas that man was created in the image o f God, that all men are the children of God and therefore brothers, or their injunction to love thy neighbour, or their vision of peace and

justice. Our Prophets demanded justice in the life of man and envisaged justice in the cosmos. Isaiah, one of the greatest o f our Prophets, said ‘Drop down, ye heavens, from above, and let the skies pour down righteousness; let the earth open, and let them bring forth salvation, and let righteousness spring u p together’ (45:8). And when the Psalmist seeks in one short verse to catalogue supreme moral values, he says: ‘Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each

other.” And he adds: ‘Truth shall spring out of the earth; and righteousness shall look down from heaven’ (85:10, 1 1 ) . I n the words o f our Prophets, the moral content is inherent not only in man but in the whole of nature. And I say that only by the guidance o f prophetic ethics can we direct the tremendous

power of science along fruitful paths, so that it becomes a blessing to mankind. Science unguided b y moral values can lead to catastrophe. But, as I indicated when we talked about the kibbutz and pioneering, the very term ‘moral values’ has an empty ring when it is used solely as what I might call ‘a preaching phrase’, no matter how elegantly expounded. I t is not enough to respect morality in theory; it must be lived in practice. A n d I am convinced that moral values can be transformed into a creative revolutionary force that repairs the imperfections of society and enhances the life o f the individual, only through the experience of personal pioneering. We in Israel have seen this happen in our land from the beginning o f our settlement ninety years ago right to our own day. The ancient Chinese sage Kung Fu- tse — Confucius — who lived at the time o f our own Jeremiah and remained the teacher o f the Chinese people for 2,500 years, put the doctrine o f pioneering in a single incisive sentence. One o f his disciples asked h i m : ‘Master, who is the higher man?’ Kung Fu-tse answered : ‘He who first carries out himself what he demands o f 200

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others, and then demands of others only what he does himself.’

The three generations of pioneers who rebuilt our country and thereby were the major force which established the State o f Israel did not spend their time preaching the return to and building u p o f Zion. They did i t themselves.

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ON READING PLATO IN THE ORIGINAL

You once told me that you had decided to learn Greek so that you could read Plato in the original. Why, when there are so many good translations? I had long been interested in Plato, and had read him in various translations, in Russian, French and English. I found that in several important passages, the translations differed, each offering a different meaning. I t was therefore clear that to find the true Plato, I had to read him in the

original. So I decided that I had to learn Greek. I t was not, however, until 1 9 4 0 that I found the time to do so. I was in London during the Battle of Britain and so had many hours o f enforced idleness during the nightly bombing raids. D r Weizmann’s secretary, Miss Doris May, who was a Classics scholar, cheerfully undertook to be m y tutor, and m y ‘homework’ I did mostly in the bomb shelter. Since the raids lasted quite a time, I managed to learn quite a lot o f Greek, enough, anyway,

to be able to continue on m y own when I left London and to embark on m y reading o f the Greek classics. What a difference there is between the Plato original and the translation! Plato was a most profound thinker — unrivalled, to

m y mind; and he was also a master of literary style. A poet. H e is complicated — Jowett’s formidable translation makes him too smooth — b u t wonderful. I n his central work, The Republic,

every sentence is a gem, full o f wisdom and insight. It’s silly for some people to have called him a fascist because of what he says about philosopher-kings. Plato’s point was not that the ideal 202

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ruler was the philosopher-king who sought power. Plato set out the qualities o f the ideal ruler, but added specifically that he would be a man who shied away from power, but who would, however, be forced b y the people to rule. As for Plato’s general works, I don’t think anyone ever wrote quite like him. Both for content and style, what he said and the way he said it, he is matchless. And who could sketch a man’s character, as he does

so brilliantly, in a couple of lines? ON LANGUAGES

(When we spoke about Ben Gurion’s studying Turkish in Salonika before proceeding to the University of Constantinople, I asked him in passing what languages he knew.) Russian, o f course, for that was the language spoken in the country of m y birth. Hebrew, which I started learning from m y grandfather when I was an infant and which I never really

stopped learning. German, which I learned in school. Latin, also at school. Greek, in London, as I have told you, during the blitz. Turkish, a t the universities in Salonika and Constanti-

nople. French I also learned when I was a student in Constantinople, for there were no legal textbooks in Turkish at the time, only in French. So I had to learn French. Spanish I learnt only in the 1 9 5 0 ’ s . I had a secretary at the time who knew Spanish, and since I had long wanted to read Don Quixote in the original, I got this secretary to teach me the language. These languages I know after having studied them. But, curiously enough, apart from Hebrew, the one language in which I feel freest of all to express myself is the one language I never studied systematically — English.

— AND THE OFFER TO HIM OF THE PRESIDENCY After the death of D r Weizmann, Israel’s first President, you as Prime Minister asked Albert Einstein to accept nomination as his successor. Why didyou do this when Einstein, though very friendly to the State, was not a resident of Israel? ON EINSTEIN

The Presidency in Israel is a symbol. I t carries with i t n o power. I thought to myself: if we are looking for a symbol, 203

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why not have the most illustrious Jew in the world, and possibly the greatest man alive — Einstein? That’s all there was to it. H a d he accepted, I would have submitted his name to the Knesset — in Israel the Knesset elects the President — and I a m quite sure that the motion for his election would have been carried b y acclamation. ON STANDING ON ONE’S HEAD

You were never interested inyour body andyou never made a

daily practice of doing any exercise. Why the sudden interest a few

years ago, an interest whichyou have sustained, in standing onyour head and walking six and a half kilometres every day?

U p to about ten years ago, I suffered from bad attacks of lumbago. Each attack would leave me almost immobilized for days. I remember that on one of m y American trips in the early years of the war — 1 9 4 1 or 1 9 4 2 — I came down with a sudden bout of lumbago in New York, and it couldn’t have happened at a worse time, for I was due to leave for Washington next day for a series o f appointments — I remember I was due to have meetings with Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff, Britain’s General Dill (he may have been FieldMarshal b y then) who was in Washington at the time, William Bullitt and others. And there I was unable to move. The doctors who had been called in said m y meetings would have to be cancelled and I had to rest. O f course I could not accept this and, with the aid of sticks, I got to the airport, flew to Washington and kept all m y appointments. I had a bad time and was in considerable agony, but there was nothing to be done. A similar thing happened on m y 1 9 5 1 visit, though the attack had become less severe when I reached Washington. Nevertheless, I remember entering the White House on sticks when I went to call on President Truman. A year or two later, when I was in Sde Boker, I was again forced to bed b y lumbago. News of m y ailment had been reported in the Press and one day I received a letter from an Israeli, who signed himself Moshe Feldenkreis, telling me that he could cure me. I showed the letter to doctor friends who 204

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pooh-poohed his suggestions and dismissed him as a quack. I did not reply to the letter. Then, just at the start o f the Sinai Campaign in 1956, I had

another attack. While resting, I was visited by a young friend, Professor Aharon Katzir o f the Weizmann Institute. H e advised me to see a friend of his, a physicist and judo expert, who, though not a medical man, had some original ideas on osteopathy which he had tested with good results. The name o f his friend was Feldenkreis. This struck a familiar chord in m y mind and I told Katzir that he had in fact written to me, but I had ignored his letter after hearing what the doctors had said about him. Katzir pressed me to see him, and because o f m y high regard for Katzir both as a scientist and as a man, I took his advice. Feldenkreis came to see me. H e watched m y movements, studied m y posture, and then suggested exercises to correct them. H e also urged me to stand on m y head for a few minutes each day — the heart pump, he explained, works more sluggishly as you grow older, and standing on the head gets more oxygen to the brain quickly. I n addition, he counselled me to walk a lot. I started doing both, though I now stand o n m y head for only two o r three minutes, and not every day.

But walking I do every day, over a distance of not less than six kilometres. All I can say is that I began this ‘treatment’ ten years ago and I have never had a recurrence o f m y back ailment.

I was once visited by Nehru’s youngest sister. She had heard about m y standing on m y head, and she told me that she was opposed to almost everything her brother espoused, but on one thing they were in agreement: the value of standing on one’s head. She does so for several minutes each morning. ON SMOKING

You once told me how you had given up smoking, and I'd like our readers to hear.

I was a very heavy smoker right u p to m y early fifties, going through two and sometimes three packs a day. One morning m y son Amos came into m y study, and there was a cigarette between his fingers. H e was about nineteen at the time. ‘What,’ said I , ‘smoking? Why?’ 205

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‘Why do you?’ was his rejoinder. ‘You mean,’ said I , ‘that if I stop, you will too?’ ‘Yes,’ said he. ‘Very well,’ I said, ‘we’ll make a pact. I ’ l l stop and you do too.’ ‘But you are going off to London for a few months,’ he said. I t was in 1 9 4 0 , and this was on the eve of m y departure to help m y London colleagues in their efforts with the British Government to allow us to raise a Jewish Army. ‘How will I know that you are sticking to our pact?’ I promised that if I took a cigarette I would cable him from London and this would give him the right to smoke too. H e agreed. I went to London. I kept m y part of the bargain and had no cause to send him a cable. I have not smoked since, though I remember well that for as long as the first eight months I found it difficult not to have a cigarette in m y mouth. I think today, after the various medical tests have proved that cigarettes can lead to lung cancer, even if the percentage o f danger were small — a n d i t seems not to h e — that should b e

enough for people to cut out smoking. But I don’t think most o f them will, THE ‘SECURITY-MISHAP’

AFFAIR

The Background: In 1954, there was a mishap in a security action for which the then Minister of Defence, M r Pinhas Lavon, denied that

he had given the order, while a senior officer claimed that he had. (At the time M r Ben Gurion was in Sde Boker, in voluntary — and temporary — retirement.) A private investigation ordered by the then Prime Minister, M r Moshe Sharett, failed to establish whether in fact the officer had acted on his own or on instructionsfrom his Minister. In the political crisis which followed, Lavon resigned, and Sharett and his colleagues in the Mapai leadership strongly urged Ben Gurion to return to the Government as Defence Minister. Ben Gurion agreed and he

resumed office in this Ministry in February 1955. (He became Prime Munister again later in the year, after the elections.) Lavon, out of government but not ofpolitics, became Secretary-General of the powerful Histadruth some months later.

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In September 1960, as a result of what had transpired at an inquiry held that year by the Defence Minister into the behaviour of two officers, Lavon turned to Prime Minister Ben Gurion with the request that he be rehabilitated. Ben Gurion replied that only a judge could do that. Lavon was not satisfied with this and he was instrumental in bringing the issue before the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security of the Knesset, which comprises members of the opposition as well as of the government parties. This Commuttee generally operates in closed session and its proceedings are not published. But its sessions on ‘the affair’, as this issue came to be known, were ‘leaked’ and made sensational headlines in the daily Press. Included in such publication were Lavon’s charges against members of the Defence establishment. The ‘Senior Officer’, who felt victimized by this commuttee’s pro-

ceedings, then wrote to the Chief of Staff requesting a judicial inquiry. The Chief of Staff passed the request to the Prime Minister and Ben Gurion brought theproposal to the Cabinet. The majority of the Ministers, however, decided instead to set up a ‘Commuttee of Seven’, ostensibly to determine what steps if any should be taken. But in the course of the meetings of this Ministerial Commattee, they undertook the substantive inquiry themselves, even though they were not constituted to do so, did not take evidence on oath, and did not agree to hear all the witnesses who offered to give evidence. They could not therefore be in possession of all the facts. The Committee reported to the Government on the 25th of December 1960, exoneratedLavon andheld the ‘Senior Officer’ responsible. The Cabinet endorsed their report. Ben Gurion considered that there had been a miscarriage ofjustice — for the Cabinet Commuttee was not a court of law, had not conducted — and had not been authorized to conduct — its inquiry as a court of law, and had therefore no right to issue a verdict in a conflict between two contestants, exonerating Lavon and holding the ‘Senior Officer’ guilty. Only a full-scale judicial inquiry could do that. It was for this reason that Ben Gurion resigned some days later (in January 1961). Efforts were made over the next few months to form a new coalition government, and when these failed, general elections were held. Before the elections, members of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset introduced a motion that the Knesset endorse the Cabinet decisions on the Committee of Seven. Mapai members of the Knesset abstained, but all the other parties supported the motion and it was carried. 207

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Following the elections, Ben Gurion was again asked toform a government. Before taking his oath o f office as Prime Minister, he declared that

there was no foundation for the findings of the Committee of Seven, and that the Knesset had no authority to make a decision on what were the facts in the events of 1954 which it had not even investigated. Despite this declaration, he and his Government received a vote of confidence from the Knesset. Meanwhile, in February 1961, Mapai, taking no stand on the issue of whether Lavon had been responsible for the 1954 affair, but angered at his behaviour before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Com-

mittee, ousted him from his post in the Histadruth. For the next three years he remained silent. In the last year or so, however, he has been trying to stage a political come-back. He had a small following in Mapai, and at the end of 1964 he led them out of the party andformed a new political group. Ben Gurion continued to be concerned over the injustice of the Committee of Seven, and set someone to gather all the material available on ‘the affair’ to bolster his demand that a judicial body be appointed to make a thorough investigation and reach a decisive conclusion. This work had not been completed by the time he retiredfrom the premiership in June 1963. Thereafter, he applied himself more vigorously to the case, aided by two lawyers who volunteered their services. The report was completed in October 1964 and Ben Gurion submitted it to the Minister of Justice, D r Dov Yosef, who handed it to the Attorney General for hus opinion. This opinion and the Minister's report were presented to the Cabinet on the 6th of December 1964. Among other conclusions, it cast grave doubts on the methods and findings of the Committee of Seven. This strengthened Ben Gurion’s demand that a

Judicial inquiry should now be held. Prime Mumster Levi Eshkol refused. He was supported by the majority of his Mapai colleagues in the Cabinet and by his coalition partners. They had no wish to reopen the ‘Lavon affair’. Opposition parties in the Knesset, many of them welcoming the opportunity o f opposing Ben Gurion, sided with Eshkol. Ben Gurion took the issue to the Party. There were stormy meetings within the Central Council of Mapai, held the same month, December 1964. When it became clear that a sizeable group — though not the majority — supported Ben Gurion’s demand for an inquiry, Eshkol resigned. Ben Gurion had no intention of returning to public office, and 208

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Eshkol was asked to form a new government. He said he would do so only if his party desisted from deciding on a directive which would compel him to launch a judicial inquiry. The party submitted. A week later, he resumed the premiership with theformer government unchanged. Ben Gurion continued — and, at the time of writing, still continues— to pressfor an inquiry. Moshe Pearlman. I am interested in the motivation behindyour stand, and in the political aspects. It seems clear today that no government committed to an inquiry can command a Knesset majority. It seems

clear that not even a government coalition can be formed on the basis of such a commitment. For even if you can secure endorsement ofyour view byyour party, Mapa, the other coalition partners will not agree. And the opposition parties are againstyou. You can precipitate elections, but even then, and even if Mapai is returned again as the strongest party, it will still be unable to form a government commutted to opening ‘the affair’. Why, then, doyou continue to insist on a judicial inquiry? Ben Gurion. Because I believe in truth and justice, and because I believe that the State comes before any political party, even m y own. The future is dim for any State that is not rooted in

justice, and I consider it of the highest importance that our people should be educated, b y example, to respect the principle that the pursuit of justice takes precedence over the quest for

political power. If I a m confronted with the choice of closing m y eye to injustice but thereby gaining the seat o f power, or crying out against injustice and being driven into the political wilderness, I choose the wilderness. After reading all the old and the new material on the subject of ‘the affair’, I became convinced that there had been a distortion of justice — committed b y the highest bodies o f the State. I felt it m y duty to put i t right. Most of those who sought to put a fullstop to ‘the affair’, close the files, refuse any further inquiry,

did so — as they themselves declared — for political reasons. Many came to me — and keep coming to me — urging me to stop pressing for further investigation for fear of a split in Mapai and the fall of the Government. T o each one I put the question: ‘What would you do if you were convinced — as I am — that an injustice has been done? Would you remain silent?’ Most of 209

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them do not reply to this. Some say: ‘Ah, but there are the

higher interests of the Party and the Government to consider.’ This I reject outright. I believe there can be no higher

interest of the State — although not the only one —- than the pursuit o f truth and justice; even if it leads to a split in m y own party, the party which I helped to found, the party which put me in power; even if it leads to the fall of a government dominated b y m y own party colleagues. Political parties may be ephemeral and Governments come and go: but the State continues, and i t cannot continue and educate its people to become a model society if it turns a blind eye to injustice.

There, quite simply, is the reason I pursue m y demand for an inquiry n o matter what the political cost. I believe that the con-

sequences o f hushing u p ‘the affair’ will prove more dangerous to

the State than the political consequences of pressing for a

judicial inquiry and seeking to establish the truth.

O f course I know what the immediate political results are likely to be if m y party endorses m y stand. But even if we assume

that the Government will fall and Mapai will be unable to form a new government — and I am not at all certain o f this — should justice be smothered for political ends? Just in order t o remain in power, should m y party forsake principle? A n d what if the opposition parties group together to form their own coalition — which I doubt, but let us assume that they might — leaving

Mapai in opposition? Although I feel strongly that this would be a bad thing for the country, it would be even worse if Mapai insisted on retaining power b y condoning a miscarriage of justice. Let the other parties form a government if they can. I think they will make a mess o f things, and before long the electorate will come round to recognizing that the interests o f the country are better served b y a Mapai-based government. I am sure that the electorate will respect Mapai more if it voluntarily gives u p its authority because it values truth more than

power. Let me make it clear that I am more concerned with righting the wrongs of the Committee of Seven in 1 9 6 0 than with anything associated with ‘the affair’ which occurred before. For it is what happened in 1 9 6 0 — the whitewashing act b y some of m y Cabinet colleagues, prompted b y what they thought was 210

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political expediency — that strikes at the roots of justice in the State. T o m y mind the Committee o f Seven committed four grievous errors. The first was their unjustified refusal to accede to the request o f the ‘Senior Officer’ to subject his dispute with Lavon to judicial inquiry. There was no moral or political justification for this refusal. The officer’s request was sent through the proper channels to the Chief of Staff and from him to me, and I submitted it to the then Minister o fJustice, M r Pinhas Rosen, at a Cabinet meeting on the 23rd of October 1 9 6 0 . Rosen said that

only two Ministers had the power to appoint a committee of inquiry — he and the Minister of the Interior — but that he would not do so without a government decision. (Three months later, after I had resigned, he wrote me that I too had had the authority to appoint such a committee.) This was not taken u p at

that Cabinet meeting but postponed to the next one the

following week, the goth of October. Between the two meetings, I subsequently learned, M r Levi Eshkol, Finance Minister in m y government, tried to persuade both Mapai and non-Mapai members o f the coalition to press for a Ministerial committee and not a committee o f inquiry. And, indeed, this is what was decided upon on the goth o f October. When we reached this item on the agenda, I said that there was only one question that needed to be established: had an order been given or n o t ; and if it had, who had given i t ? This, I said, could be established only b y judicial process undertaken b y impartial men with legal power to interrogate witnesses under oath. ‘To m y surprise, Minister of Justice Rosen now said that he did not think the ‘Senior Officer’ had any new evidence (how could he have known this?) and there was therefore no reason to accede to his request. H e suggested instead the setting u p of a Ministerial committee. (He told me later that he had been given to understand b y ‘friends’ that I would not object to this.) This was strongly supported b y Eshkol and a non-Mapai Minister. They were most anxious to bring ‘the affair’ to a n end. I observed that: ‘there will not be an end until a legal commission o f inquiry makes its judgement. Even if the ‘Senior Officer’s” request is rejected, there is another citizen in the 211

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State who will continue to press for an inquiry. Our society must uphold the principle of the due process of law. I do not

think the Government can set itself up as judge.’ I had a definite impression at this Cabinet meeting that some o f m y colleagues were prejudiced, and already ‘knew’ that Lavon had not given the order. The second error lay in having the investigation conducted by members of the Government, which is a political not a judicial body. A conflict between two people should be resolved b y a judicial, not a political, institution. The third grave error of the Committee of Seven was their procedure. I t was neither thorough nor judicial, nor calculated to ferret out the truth. They accepted as fact, without bothering to check, rumours which — after they h a d submitted their

report — were found to be false. Moreover, they did not stick to their terms of reference. Rosen, the chairman, opened the first session on the grd of November 1960 b y stating that their terms were: “To review

the material and recommend to the Government what in their view should be done in the future.’ H e repeated this at the Committee’s session on the 5th of November, adding: “The

Cabinet directive spoke specifically ofprocedural conclusions. . . not material conclusions.” Whereupon Eshkol asked ‘What are we?’ ‘ A study-commission,” Rosen answered. I n a letter sent to m e b y Rosen o n the

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o f November, he

stated categorically that the Committee would n o t make a n y

decision on ‘the affair’ itself, but would only advise the Government whether to set u p a commission of inquiry or a ‘clarification committee’ — he listed four types of inquiry commissions. Yet at the Cabinet meeting on the 25th ofDecember 1 9 6 0 , when he submitted the report, Rosen presented material conclusions, exonerating Lavon. H e had opened b y stating that: ‘ O n 30.10. 60, the Government appointed a sub-committee consisting o f seven Ministers to consider all the material relating to ‘the affair’ and to present its conclusions to the Government.’ Who changed the terms of reference? And when? Why, when the Committee was told on 3rd of November that they had powers to make procedural recommendations only, did they come to the Government on the 25th of December with a 212

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substantive judgement? They ended their conclusions with the words ‘The investigation of ‘the affair’ is to be regarded as closed.’ The Committee’s fourth error lay in their findings. These were not based on the truth. The Committee stated in their report that they: ‘did not hear witnesses, for the majority were of the view that hearing witnesses was outside the scope o f their authority’. But this is not true. The Committee refused to hear certain witnesses, whom Rosen wished to hear, because apparently it was feared that their evidence would not be advantageous to Lavon. But other witnesses were heard — through the intermediary o f a special representative o f the Committee — and these were per-

sons whose evidence could be expected to favour Lavon. A lawyer friend of Lavon submitted certain material at the request o f a Committee member, even though Rosen had declared it to

be irrelevant. When I heard of this, I

wrote to

Rosen pro-

testing, and he replied with the reassurance that he had told the

Committee: ‘not to be influenced by this material’. Yet after the Committee had reported, one o f its members, Minister Behor Shitreet, told me that in fact this material had been decisive in influencing him in favour o f Lavon and against the

‘Senior Officer’. There is another point. The Committee had before it the full stenographic record of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security

Committee sessions a t which ‘the affair’ had been reviewed. I t included the charges made b y Lavon when he appeared there, and it must be presumed that some members of the Committee may have been influenced b y them. Yet most o f them were unfounded. But when one o f the Committee members suggested that these charges b y Lavon against the ‘Senior Officer’ be sent to this officer and that he be invited to appear before them to hear what he had to say, this justifiable sugges-

tion was rejected by the Committee. This shocked me when I read o f i t . I remember telling the seven Ministers when Rosen presented it at our Cabinet meeting that I assumed they had acted as they had in good faith and in the interests of domestic peace, but that good intentions were not enough. I t was the truth which counted, and their 213

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procedures were not suited to discovering the truth. They should have heard both sides, and treated both parties to the conflict with equal respect and equal reserve. Some members had clearly come to the investigation with their minds already made up. There was neither a factual nor a legal basis to their findings. The result was a discriminatory and distorted judgement. I told m y colleagues that we were bound by the law of col-

lective Cabinet responsibility. I could not, however, accept any share of responsibility for the Committee’s findings, and must therefore resign. With this I left the meeting, and shortly afterwards 1 resigned. When, after the 1 9 6 1 elections, I appeared before the Knesset to present m y new government and receive a vote of confidence, I stated categorically that there was no basis for the findings o f the Committee of Seven nor for the previous government’s decision endorsing them; and the vote o f confidence was carried. M y demand for a judicial inquiry and the correction of the

distortions of the Committee was also in line with the decision o f m y Party, taken on the 19th of October 1960, which stated that: ‘“‘the affair’ which is associated with the resignation of Lavon must be exhaustively subjected to the demands o f law and justice b y the legal institutions of the State.” This decision was ignored b y the present Mapai leadership. But I can tell you that if I were faced with the alternative — which I cannot imagine m y party will put to me — o f obeying the party if i t changes its line or following the path of justice, I would not hesitate for an instant. What is the situation now? O n the 22nd of October 1964, I

presented fully documented new material on ‘the affair’ to the Minister o fJustice and the Attorney General, with the request that: ‘a judicial inquiry commission be appointed, consisting o f Supreme Court judges, to investigate whether the refusal o f the “Senior Officer’s’’ call in October 1 9 6 0 for an inquiry commission, the appointment of a Ministerial committee instead o f a judicial body, and the procedures and conclusions o f the Committee, accord with the truth, with justice and with the laws of the State.’

Both the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General, after 214

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reading the new dossier, found serious defects in the procedures and findings of the Committee of Seven. The gravest criticism o f the Attorney General is this : ‘ I t is m y opinion t h a t the method

of determining facts adopted b y the Committee of Seven would not stand the scrutiny o f an Israeli court of law.’ I will continue m y struggle because I believe in truth. And I believe in the sense of justice of our nation.

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CHAPTER N I N E T E E N

R E L I G I O N AND THE STATE

Before proceeding to the main question — religion in Israel — I wonder whether I can ask a personal question. The answer would be of general interest even though it is no one’s business but your own.

Do you believe in God? You are right. This is o f concern only to the individual. But I d o not mind answering you. I do believe in the

existence of a spiritual, eternal, all-embracing superior being, but I cannot say that I share the belief of most of m y orthodox friends. Is it not curious that even institutionalized religion nowhere describes God in any positive or recognizable way? We know what God is N o T — H e is not a man, H e has no ears, no eyes. For easier common comprehension and to make H i m familiar to people, H e is often evoked in human form, and we even use the personal pronoun, with a capital H ; but when it comes to scholarly definition as for instance b y Maimonides, H e is defined more b y what H e is not than b y what H e is. Nevertheless, as I say, I do believe that there must be a being, intangible, indefinable, even unimaginable, but something infinitely superior to all we know and are capable o f conceiving. Without such a being, there are certain phenomena which just cannot be explained. What is it, for example, that enables man to think? His brain is matter, just like a table. But a table does not think. T h e brain is part o f a living organ-

ism, like m y finger-nail, but m y finger-nail cannot think. Nor can the brain think when removed from the body. But the whole o f the living body taken together becomes a thinking being. 216

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I once talked about this to Einstein. Even he, with his great formula about energy and mass, agreed that there must be something behind the energy. And when I spoke o f this to Niels Bohr, he too agreed, and thought it was probably true of the entire cosmos, that behind it there must be some superior being. This is also what Spinoza may have meant. If, then, b y ‘God’ is meant such a superior being, which is neither material nor tangible, I say that I believe in God. From this it follows that, while I respect the faith o f those who believe that everything written in the Bible is divinely inspired, m y own approach is that I accept what is written in the Bible except the passages where God is given material form, for example where H e is represented as speaking, and being spoken t o ; except for the textual contradictions; and except for the sections which run counter to the laws of nature. If I believe that the world was created b y the Lord, I believe that H e has more sense than all of us put together, and H e instituted specific laws in accordance with which nature exists. Flinging a staff and turning i t into a snake, as Moses is said to have done in Pharaoh’s court, is against the laws o f nature; therefore I cannot accept i t as a true record of what happened, for I cannot accept that God would deviate from His carefully conceived laws governing nature. But I respect those who do accept it,

just as I respect their belief in a conception of God different from mine. Thankyou. Now to the question ofreligion and the State : 1 should like to open by touching on ome aspect of it which concernedyou when you were Prime Minister. With your liberal-minded approach, how is it that you did not initiate legislation removing the issue of personal status from religious authority, so that, for example, couples who were not religious or who belonged to different faiths could wed by

cil marriage? There are two reasons why I did not undertake such legislation, though I hope i t will eventually reach the Statute Book. One is that the governments over which I presided were all coalition governments in which the religious parties were represented, and I had to offer them some 217

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concessions in some spheres in order to get their backing in others which I considered o f more immediate urgency. From this flows m y second reason: any government leader must

prescribe for himself priorities, must decide on first things first, and I did not consider questions o f personal status to be a first priority. What was the background? Under the British Mandate, and before that the Ottoman régime, the rites involved in births, marriages and deaths in this country were conducted b y the Moslem, Jewish and Christian religious authorities. When we established the State of Israel, Mandatory statutes which were obnoxious to us were immediately abrogated, such as the ban on free Jewish immigration, the ban o n the sale to Jews o f certain areas of land, and so on. But the State had to act with legal authority in a variety of other fields and it could not, in the very first hour of its birth, enact legislation covering all phases o f life in the country. Remember, too, that we were engaged in a grim war. What we did, therefore, was to take over much o f the Mandatory Statute Book and simply pass an enabling Act. This gave the new sovereign government legal authority t o conduct normal government business until we would have the time to examine each law and change it in accordance with the new needs and outlook of the State. One set of laws left untouched was that relating to personal status. When I conducted negotiations on the formation o f our first coalition government, following our first parliamentary elections in January 1949, I was most anxious to include as many parties as possible. For I knew that we required the widest possible political backing to carry out the gigantic tasks that I envisaged — the absorption and settlement of hundreds o f thousands o f immigrants, and the large scale development o f the country. I knew very well that the wider the coalition, the narrower would be the list of policy-items o n which I would get general agreement. I was prepared to limit m y programme to the basic urgencies and offer concessions o n what I regarded as subsidiary issues; this would smooth the entry of parties to whom such issues were of first rank. T o have done otherwise would have put these parties into opposition, and once in opposition they would have taken a negative stand not only on the 218

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subsidiary but also on the central issues which, inside the Government, they would have supported. This indeed was the policy I adopted in negotiations I conducted prior to the formation o f every government I headed. I refused to compromise on items which I had put at the top of m y list of priorities, and parties which could not go along with me on these were of course not included in the coalition. But where there was agreement on what was urgent to me, I was prepared to make concessions on what was urgent to others. A n example about the army will make clear the pattern o f m y approach. When I wanted to introduce national service conscription, the religious parties said they would o f course support it but they insisted that all army kitchens be kosher. Kosher kitchens to them were of paramount importance; to me they were o f subsidiary interest. I t was a price I was prepared to pay for their full-fledged support on a vital defence measure. If I had refused them, they would still have voted for the national service bill but there would have been constant bickering and a feeling of resentment among the religious

section of the population. Moreover, serving soldiers who were religious had the right to kosher food, and it was more expedient to arrange that all food in the army would be kosher than to run two sets of kitchens. As a matter of fact I was attacked in Parliament b y several left wing parties for having ‘submitted to religious coercion’, but I thought I was right to have agreed i n the overall interests of national security. I n the same way I agreed not to change the status quo on religious authority for matters of personal status. I know i t is hard o n some individuals. But I felt, again in the national interest, that i t was wise to retain the support of the religious parties for measures of vital concern to the new State and to pay the comparatively small price of religious status quo. I t is u p to those who oppose the status quo — myself included — to do what they can to make their impact on public opinion so that a parliamentary majority can be secured for, let us say, a measure to take the grant of marriage licences out of the hands of the clerics. Remember, too, that with the passage o f time, a new scale o f priorities emerges, and while civil marriage facilities are not the country’s foremost need, more members o f the public 219

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may feel more strongly now that they should be introduced than they did seventeen years ago.

Was not the policy you adopted in your pre-coalition negotiations calculated to whet the appetite of the religious parties? Knowing your approach, did they not always seek greater concessions in return for supporting you on matters which they knew were closest to vour heart?

While I had the most amiable relations with my religious party colleagues, I do not think any of them are likely to claim that they left the negotiating table with the warmest feelings towards me. O f course they sought to extract as many concessions as possible, as indeed did all m y coalition partners. That was their right. But I was determined that Israel should be a secular State, ruled by a secular government and not a religious authority, and I tried to keep religion out of government and out of politics as far as possible. As far as the State is concerned, we were successful. Israel is a secular State. Unfortunately we could not keep religion completely out o f politics, for religious parties existed, as a hangover from the

pre-State Zionist Congresses. I a m sorry about this, for I feel, and I used to tell this to m y religious party colleagues, that they should do what they can to spread their religious beliefs through the accepted channels in most (though not all) democratic States — through the synagogue, parochial schools, religious youth movements, newspapers and magazines, lectures and so on. They could also try to influence the secular political parties. After all, there are many members o f m y own party, Mapai, who are as orthodox as members o f a religious party. But I have no feelings o f optimism that religious parties will become religious movements. I hope the State will some day adopt the electoral system o f single member constituency in place o f the present proportional representation. Smaller parties would then merge with one or other of the large parties, and the religious elements would try to bring their persuasive power to bear o n

those large parties, as happens in most other lands. Does your tolerance of religious demands cover those 220

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of the small but highly vocal and effervescent ultra-orthodox group, the

Natorer Karta? I am tolerant of any religious activity in the State which comes within the scope o f legality. I a m adamantly opposed to any illegality, even when performed b y the most extreme o f religious zealots, like Natorei Karta. Taking the

law into their own hands and molesting people who fail to observe the Sabbath according to their traditions are the acts o f a group which refuses to recognize the sovereignty o f Israel. Measures must be taken to stop them, but they cannot be normal measures. There are special reasons why they must be handled with kid gloves. I believe the Natorei Karta to be a thoroughly misguided group; but I also believe they are utterly sincere. I t is a consolation they are so few. The social revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century passed them by and they remained equally untouched b y the Zionist movement’s

revolutionary approach to Jewish salvation. They believe that salvation will come with the coming of the Messiah, and his coming will be ordained b y the Lord. They think it sacrilegious o f us to have taken it upon ourselves to proclaim, fight for and revive our State. We should, like them, have waited passively for a divine act. ( I should add here that most religious Jews throughout the world do believe that our act was divinely

inspired.) Because of this, they regard the Government as profane interlopers and refuse to co-operate with it or to consider themselves bound b y the laws of the State. Why then do we not deal with them as we should any other lawbreaker? For one thing, it is always more difficult when acts

are prompted b y a deep religious belief. They are not common law-breakers. For another, they represent a world most of us came from, a world we knew as infants, the world of our grandfathers — they have the same beliefs, the same outlook, the same dress, the same beards; they look like our grandfathers. H o w can you slap your grandfather into jail, even if he throws stones at you? Moreover, they claim that they are upholding the same tenets for which our forebears were prepared to give their lives.

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to use the big stick against them. I have spoken o f the religious parties in the coalition. They are Zionist, completely identified with the national interests of the State, thoroughly responsible. But on religious issues, they are in agreement with some of the demands of Natorei Karta. They too would like to see fraffic halted on the Sabbath, though they are opposed to its being forced on the public b y violence. However, they would find it hard to remain as partners in a government that took strong action against a group that fought, even illegally, for Sabbath observance. These are the main reasons why the problem has to b e handled delicately.

I call Natorei Karta misguided because they place undue emphasis on subsidiary customs evolved by Judaism and ignore completely what is to me the supreme basis o f the Jewish religion — its association with the Land of Israel and the repeated call for the return to Zion. T o the ultra-orthodox, a Jew in America who prays every morning is a better Jew than the one who comes to Israel and does not attend synagogue. I believe that any Jew who lives in Israel, the Land of Zion, is a more religious Jew than the most pious Jew who can come to Israel and does not. I laud the Natorei Karta for being in Israel, even though they are irresponsible. What I cannot understand, and resent most deeply, is the Natorei Karta supporter overseas who pickets the Israel Consulate and rages at the lack o f religion in Israel. Let him come to Israel and fight for more religion here. I f he can gain a majority in democratic Israel, he can get his Sabbath laws passed. But to fight against the State overseas in the name o f the Jewish religion — that is the real sacrilege, the ultimate in desecration.

Do you see the religious conflict in the country sharpening or waning?

Like many problems that face Israel — though not all — I think it is likely to become less acute with time. I think we shall always have our extremists, both religious and atheistic. But as the country develops, the people become more mature and more tolerant o f each other. The longer we live, the more exposed does each section o f the population become to the 222

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others, and reciprocal influences begin to operate. And one finds, with time, that the extremists have the least impact on their adversaries. I am convinced, for example, that the religious kibbutzim do more to encourage a religious feeling among the non-devout than do the Natorei Karta, and an orthodox paratrooper has a greater influence on his fellow soldiers than does a Sabbath stone-thrower of Mea She’arim.

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W H Y T H E JEWS H A V E S U R V I V E D

As the first Prime Minister of the modern State of Israel, you often spoke of beingfaced with two major long-term tasks — moulding the nation and developing the land. In addressing yourself to these basic tasks, you presented the new State in the context of the Fewish past andyou projected its future in terms of the ‘mission of Israel’. In speaking of the past you havefrequently referred to the Jewish identity’, or the ‘integrity of the Jewish people’, which was preserved through some 1,900 years of exile. In your reading of Jewish history, what do you think it was that kept alive this ‘Jewish identity’ throughout the centuries? ©

Well, first a few words about that history — for it is true that modern Israel must be viewed in the context of the Jewish past. This is crucial. I n no other terms can one begin to understand how the State came into being in 1948, or why, or what we have been trying to accomplish since. Consider our fortunes — or misfortunes — throughout the ages. Exiled from the land in which our nation was formed, where we first achieved sovereignty, and where we lived for some thirteen centuries, we wandered over the face of the earth, living in all five continents. Yet in every age, and in every place where we dwelt, however remote, we never forgot our attachment to Israel. Every nation rooted in its soil enjoys a natural continuity. The Jews are the only example known to history of a people’s maintaining its continuity though divorced from its land. This fact is even more extraordinary when it is recognized that i t was not as a petrified group that we managed to remain

in continuous being. Our people underwent changes just like 224

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nations living in their own homes, and still we preserved our integrity. Indeed, those changes were frequent and often revolutionary. The Israelites who went out o f Egypt and wandered in the wilderness were different from those who conquered a n d settled i n Canaan i n the thirteenth century B c ;

these were different from those who lived under a tribal system in the days of the Judges; these were in their turn different from those who were unified under a single king, first Saul and then

David and Solomon in the tenth century

Bc.

And change

followed change, the character of the people changing with the change of régime and the movement of time: the people under the first kings of Judah and Israel when the kingdom was divided; those under the two great kings, Uzziah ofJudah and Jeroboam I I of Israel, in the eighth century B c , when the giant literary prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah made their appearance; the Jews who returned from Babylonian exile in the sixth and fifth centuries B c in the days of Zerubbabel, Ezra and Nehemiah and built the Second Temple. And there are considerable differences between them and their descendants who lived during the Greek, Hasmonean, Herodian and Roman periods.

The changes in the Jewish people after the destruction of the Second Temple in A D 7 0 and their exile from Judea were more far-reaching. We wandered through country after country, and at times conversion, either forced o r voluntary, at the hands of Islamic and Christian rulers. I n these countries we came under the impact of new cultures, new languages, new political and economic systems. We were the object o f new pressures, political, economic, spiritual. A n d yet, and yet we never lost our specific Jewish integrity. The Jews remained Jews. How, you ask, was this special identity preserved? I am convinced that its preservation was due to the constant and all-pervasive awareness ofJews throughout the centuries o f suffering persecution

something I can only express i n a seemingly archaic phrase —

the vision of Messianic redemption, national and all-human. By this I mean their own redemption, their restoration as a sovereign people in their old land and their moral elevation to model nationhood, and the redemption of all humanity, the 225

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triumph of peace, righteousness and equality in the world and the conquest of tyranny and wickedness. This twin idea of the Messianic vision informs the whole of Jewish history and the Jewish faith. I t is the core o f the religious, moral and national

consciousness of the Jewish people. Are you saying, then, that it is basically

the Jewish

religion which kept alive the special identity of the Jewish people? Very largely so; but I a m stating what I believe to be the full content of that religion, and I am insisting that only b y recognizing all its features can one understand the power of its impact on the Jewish people throughout history. The Jewish faith is not only monotheism. Intrinsic to it is the national and territorial motif, which led to the profound spiritual allegiance o f the Jews to their ancient land even while they livedi n exile. Intrinsic to it is the body o f moral principles, proclaiming the supreme values of righteousness, mercy and love. A n d equally intrinsic to it is the idea o f redemption, both

of the Jewish people and of all the peoples of the world. But do you not think that it was the revelation of mono-

theism to the Jews that made them unique? I t was a revelation of immeasurable significance, with a timeless influence on the major part o f the human race. And for many centuries, this alone was enough to make them unique, this Jewish faith in one God as opposed to the prevailing belief in 1dols or several gods. But if this were the only feature of

the Jewish faith, it would not explain why the unique quality of the Jewish people and their specific identity should have been preserved for so long after faith in one God had spread to other nations. I t spread through Islam, through the various Christian sects who do not accept the divinity of Jesus, and through the adherents of the Vedanta in India according to the interpretations of Badarayana, Shankara and Ramanuja. I do not say that the nature o f the monotheism was the same in each case. The conception ofIsrael is different from that o f the Vedanta, for example, where, in the teachings of Shankara, the 226

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only God, Brahma, is a purely metaphysical entity beyond good and evil and imposes no obligations o f righteous action. The God o f Israel, on the other hand, personifies love, justice and mercy, and only persons who aspire to these qualities ‘come near to God’ and can be considered truly religious. But despite such differences, these other religions were monotheistic. Yet the basic consciousness of the Jews continued to be unique. The reasons are to be found in the other features of the Jewish faith which I mentioned earlier. I said that the attachment of the Jews to their ancient land even in exile springs from the national and territorial motif o f their religion. This motif finds clear expression in all the books of the Bible, and i t appears in the very first tales of the monotheistic revelation, in the first ‘meeting’ of Abraham, the Father of the Jewish people, with God. I t is not important whether the story is a true record of an historic event or not. What is of importance is that this is what

the Jews believed as far back as the period of the First Temple (tenth to sixth centuries Bc). This is what we read i n Genesis (12:1-2) : ‘Now the Lord said unto Abram: Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred and from thy father’s house, unto a land that I will show thee: and I will make o f thee a great nation.” There you have the first statement o f the national and territorial theme. Again, when Abram came to Shechem, we r e a d : °. . . the

Lord appeared unto Abram and said: Unto thy seed will I give this land.” (Genesis 12:7) When Abram grew old, God made a covenant with h i m and promised: ‘. . . I will give unto

thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God.” (Genesis 17:8) Incidentally, the covenant laid down then that ‘Every m a n child among you shall b e

circumcised’ when he ‘is eight days old’. T o this very day, all Jews throughout the world, whether they are religious or not, respect this covenant, and male babies are circumcised eight days after their birth. Has it ever occurred t o you, b y the way, how closely the life of Abraham, the first Hebrew, symbolizes the life o f our nation? H e was distinguished from the rest o f his family b y his religion.

O n settling in the land promised to him and his descendants, 227

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he changed his name (from Abram to Abraham). He went into exile (when ‘the famine was heavy in the land’). H e met with hostility from his neighbours when he returned home. H e came to the assistance o f his family and friends when they were in trouble. When he defeated his enemies he refused the booty. H e always demanded justice — even from God. (‘Wilt thou even

sweep away the righteous with the wicked?’). And when he settled in the Negev he ‘planted a grove in Beer-sheba, and called there on the name of the Lord, the everlasting God’. The first revelation of God was thus associated with the land, and this theme recurs throughout Genesis. The second revelation occurs in Exodus and i t is perhaps the central story in the Bible. This is the encounter of Moses with the Burning Bush. God’s first mission to Moses was the redemption of Israel from slavery and their restoration to the Promised L a n d : ‘ I have surely seen the affliction o f m y people which are i n Egypt, and have heard their cry b y reason of their taskmasters; for I know their sorrows; And I am come down to deliver them out o f the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them u p out o f that land unto a good land. . . . Come n o w

therefore, and I will send thee unto Pharaoh, that thou mayest bring forth m y people the children of Israel out of Egypt.’ (Exodus g:7-10.) These tidings of redemption and salvation that Moses heard from the midst o f the Burning Bush were followed b y three major events at the beginning of our history: the Exodus from Egypt, the Revelation on Mount Sinai, and the settlement of the Promised Land. The memory and the impact of these events continued throughout the ages. We find therefore that already in the testimony of the Scriptures — and there is no other testimony on the beginnings o f the Jewish faith — not only the ‘religious idea’ but the attachment to the Promised Land (as well as, of course, to the laws and the commandments) was an organic part of that faith and part o f the essence ofJudaism. I mentioned earlier the vision of Messianic redemption as basic to Judaism. I t was implanted in the hearts of the Jewish people, as indicated in the Moses story, probably before their departure from Egypt. I t was given mighty expression i n the 228

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mouths of the literary prophets — in the eighth century Bc. And from then right down to our own times it became the central feature of Judaism, inspiring what has happened in our generation — the renewal of the Jewish State and the immigration o f hundreds of thousands of Jews who had never heard o f

Herzl and who had not even heard the name ‘Zionism’, yet who were moved to leave the lands where they dwelt in order to rebuild Israel. This idea of redemption was nourished through the ages b y the Jewish attachment to their ancient l a n d ; to the Hebrew language ; to the Book o f Books; to the great body o f literature deriving from the Bible — the Apocrypha, the Talmud, medieval Hebrew poetry, the prayers; to the Halacha — the religious law that governed the Jew’s way o f life for as long as religion remained the dominant force in Jewish society; and it was nourished b y the prevailing Jewish feeling right u p to the last century (and for some even to this day) that residence outside Israel was residence in exile, in temporary asylum. These were the deep sources from which the Jews during nearly 1 , 9 0 0 years of exile drew the moral and spiritual strength to face their sufferings in foreign lands and to survive until the achievement of national salvation. These, to m y mind, were the

major ingredients which enabled them to preserve their special identity. You say that the immigration of many Jews to Israel was prompted by the vision of redemption. Could this not have been due to conditions of hardship in the countries in which they lived? Hardship was certainly one o f the causes which impelled many o f them {fo leave these countries — economic, political, religious and cultural restrictions of varying degree and intensity. A n d it is indeed for this reason that the migration ofJews from one country to another is a recurring characteristic

of Jewish history in exile. The most extensive migration began in the eighties of the nineteenth century, and in the years that followed millions o fJews left Europe and went overseas, notably to the United States. A t that time immigration into Palestine was not easy; nor was the acquisition o f land. Nevertheless a 229

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small number of immigrants did reach Palestine, and they were

followed by larger and larger numbers. I f hardship drove them out of Europe, why should they have chosen a country where they knew they would face fresh hardship? What awaited them in Palestine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were economic suffering in an impoverished country, the hostility of Arab neighbours, malignant disease, and a malicious administration. A n d

still

they

came. The same is true of most of those who arrived here since Palestine became independent Israel, knowing that life is not easy, that a war had to be fought, that military security is a constant problem, and that the revival of the land means hard and often dangerous work. Hardship, as I say, may have caused them to leave their former lands. But what I might call the inarticulate major impulse that moved them to come to Israel was the historic vision of Messianic redemption. You use the term ‘Messianic’, but it is clear that you have in mind something vastly different from the concept of the ‘coming of the Messiak’ of fewry’s extreme orthodox section.

Very different. The ‘coming of the Messiah’ concept is a passive faith. The vision of which I speak, on the other hand, has had in i t the power to stir the Jewish people to revolutionary and creative action at various times in their history, and, in our own day, to achieve statehood i n the land

of their forefathers. This vision encompasses the fulfilment of the aspiration of our prophets and teachers for the restoration of

Jewish national life o n its own soil and for the establishment there o f a model society which will become a ‘light unto the nations’. Through i t will come universal redemption, the reign of righteousness and human brotherhood and the elimination o f wickedness. If, as you say, the idea of redemption covered both the Jews and all nations of the world, how do you equate it with the Biblical andpost-Biblical conception of the Jews as the ‘chosen people’ ?

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before dealing with the conception. I am convinced that the truth is that the Jews were the ‘choosing’ people rather than the ‘chosen’, that it is they who chose God rather than the reverse. There is a story, you know, that God went to various peoples in ancient times offering them the Ten Commandments. Some rejected all ten. Others were not prepared to accept the “Thou shalt not kill’ prohibition. Some thought that ban was all right but not ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery’. And so it went on until H e came to the Jews. They alone accepted all ten. They therefore chose Him, not H e them. But seriously, I do not base myself on this story but on the evidence in the Bible. You will find it in Joshua, Chapter 24, verses 14 and 16 and 2 1

and 2 2 : ‘Now therefore . . . put away the gods which your fathers served on the other side of the flood, and in Egypt; and serve ye the Lord. And if it seem evil unto you to serve the Lord, choose you this day whom ye will serve; whether the gods which your fathers served that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of the Amorites, in whose land ye dwell: but as for me and m y house, we will serve the Lord. A n d the people answered and said, God forbid that we should forsake the Lord, to serve other gods;. . . . . Nay but we will serve the Lord. And Joshua said unto the people, Ye are witnesses against yourselves that ye have chosen the Lord, to serve him. And they said, We are witnesses.’ (‘The italics are mine. MP) But o f course despite the fact that they chose God, the Jews were spoken of as the ‘chosen people’, and to get back to the core of your question as to how this can be equated with the idea of redemption covering all nations of the world, you must understand the meaning of the term. The prophets never sought or foretold the domination o f Israel over the world. They believed, however, in the spiritual supremacy of Israel. They constantly demanded that it should become a ‘chosen people’ in the sense that it should prize righteousness above all things and fight evil, and that its mission was to spread these ideas throughout the universe. They prophesied that other nations would learn from Israel’s ways and follow in its footsteps. I n «

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the national consciousness and literature of the Jewish people, these two ideals were bound u p with each other — the ideal of moral perfection which would make Israel a ‘chosen people’ and the exertion of its moral influence upon other nations. This

is how I read the prophetic expression ‘the vision of the Latter Days’ or the ‘vision of Messianic redemption’. The idea of a ‘chosen people’, then, could be expressed in modern terms as a ‘model state’ which would be an example to others?

‘Model society’, perhaps; but not state. Our forefathers never spoke o f a ‘state’, for the word was foreign to them. Even we in Israel today use the word ‘medina’ which is Hebrew not for ‘state’ but for a province or a region. The modern concept of state derives from Greece. Polis and politeia in Greek refer not to a nation but to a governmental framework. The difference is not one of expression but o f content and principle.

The ideal sought b y our prophets was not a ‘model state’, not a desired governmental framework, but a perfect people. The ancient Hebrew term they used was ‘am segula’, o f which ‘chosen people’ is a literal translation. The target o f their preaching was not the régime but the individual, the group of individuals, the community, the nation. The people must serve

as a model; they must be the chosen. Nowhere do the prophets describe the ideal state. They talk only o f people and nations.

As Isaiah puts it in his ‘vision of the Latter Days’, expressing the theme o f redemption both ofJews and of all humanity: ‘And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain of the Lord’s house shall be established in the top o f the mountains, and shall b e exalted above the h i l l s ; and all

nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go u p to the mountain of the Lord, to the House of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us o f his ways, and we will walk in his paths: for out o f Zion shall go forth the law, and the word o f the Lord from Jerusalem. A n d he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift u p 232

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sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.’ (Isaiah 2:2-4.) The concern of the prophets with people rather than with a régime may perhaps be better understood b y contrast with the Platonic approach. Plato, greatest of the Greek teachers, centred his thoughts o n the ideal state, and he described the attributes of such a state in his greatest work, The Republic. This immortal book, a treasury of ideas in philosophy and education, addresses itself to an inquiry into justice among men and in the state.

Its main thesis is that evil will not vanish from states and from mankind until philosophers rule the state or until the rulers become philosophers; political and philosophical authority must become one. A philosopher, in Plato’s meaning, is a man perfect in wisdom, understanding and knowledge, and enjoying the virtues of justice, truth, humility, love of the good, and distaste for power. I t is true that Plato believed it to be the aim of the statesman to make the citizens good; but the outstanding quality o f the ideal or model state, as he understood it, was the rule of the superior

man. The political ideal was the superior régime, maintained by the authority and wisdom of the philosopher-king. Quite different was the ideal of the prophets of Israel. The ideal of goodness, justice and mercy would be realized not through the rule of the superior man but through the people’s becoming a ‘chosen people’. I t was not outstanding individuals who would bring redemption, but the righteousness of the people. ‘Open ye the gates,” declared Isaiah, ‘that the righteous nation, which keepeth the truth, may enter in.” (Isaiah 26:2.) It is 2,500 years since the age of the prophets and 2 , 3 4 0 years since the death of Plato. We now live in another world, far

different from the world of Israel’s prophets and that of the sages o f classical Greece. Those worlds are no more. Our generation and those who come after us will mould their lives in conditions of which the ancients never dreamed, with access to new resources of knowledge and scholarship, new scientific techniques and equipment, new means o f power and production. The development of science in the last three hundred years and the revolutionary discoveries in physics in the first half of this century have wrought massive changes i n our way of life.

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But human values have not changed. The values of truth and rightousness, mercy and peace, and the love of fellow man continue to be upheld, at least as ideals. These are the heritage o f Israel and Greece. The old worlds may have gone; but the contribution of their spiritual giants has left an ineffaceable imprint o n all who have come later and, whether we are aware o f it or not, we are nourished b y it. The transmutation of these abstract values into human and social realities in our own time can no longer be effected in ways

which would have been appropriate in the days of Uzziah and Josiah, Solon and Pericles. But the ancient heritage merges and becomes renewed with the new achievements of the spirit

of man. I t lives on in the stream of life and historical change, whose flow never ceases. I n the centuries in which we have played a part on the world’s stage, we have learned from many nations. We have done so without losing sight of our heritage. A t the same time, though we are bound to the past of our people, we are also the sons o f our own era. Just as we are a link in the chain of the generations o f Israel, so are we members o f today’s family of nations. I n the years when I was Prime Minister of Israel, I sought always to tell m y people that in our lives, and in the society we wish to build in our regained homeland, we must make use o f everything noble, useful, true and beautiful that we can find both in the treasury of the past and in human accomplishment in our own day.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

ISRAEL A N D T H E J E W I S H PEOPLE

You have explained the preservation of Jewry in terms of attachment to their land, to their faith, to the Bible and the language of the Bible, and to the vision of redemption. And you have shown that this attachment was very strong indeed. How then do you account for the re-establishment of sovereign Israel only now, in this generation? Why did it not happen earlier, at any time during the last 1,900 years?

Because throughout most o f that period, the Jews felt that the redemption for which they yearned would come about b y supernatural forces without any special action on their part. True, there were scattered waves o f emigration to the land o f Israel from several countries and there were periodic Messianic movements which aroused the Jews from time to time, I t is also the fact that u p to the beginning of the last century,

all Jews felt that the place where they lived was no more than a temporary exile. They never considered themselves a part o f the nations among whom they dwelt — neither did those nations. The Jewish lot in most countries throughout most o f the generations was one of torment, persecution and often, for many, death. Their capacity to endure these sufferings, through

their faith, Messianic hope and moral contempt for their persecutors, reflected considerable moral heroism. But it was a passive heroism, a submission to fate, accompanied b y a feeling o f human helplessness. Their lot would be altered only through

divine redemption. This attitude changed radically in the nineteenth century under the impact of the revolutionary events, the national 235

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revival movements for unity and independence in Italy, Germany, Poland and the Balkans, the uprisings of the working classes and their struggle for a new social system, the mass migrations from Europe to countries overseas. Within European Jewry itself, there were the Emancipation and Enlightenment movements

which infused freshness into tradition and liberated

some Jews, not all, from the bonds o f the petrified forms of

that tradition. And there was the new Hebrew literature which was inspired both b y the spirit o f the Bible and b y the spirit o f awakening o f the times.

All these developments made the Jews more conscious of their ancient glory and of their current plight — and o f their

capacity t o change it. They opened a new horizon t o their vision of redemption — deliverance not in the distant future o r in the world to come but here and now. Young Jews began

asking themselves, in the midst of mass migrations westwards, why their people should continue the trek from exile to exile instead of moving eastwards, back to the land of Israel. They began to be convinced that the Jew must change his fate through his own efforts, liberate himself from the chains of exile by his own energies, achieve redemption b y natural means instead o f waiting for an act o f the supernatural. They would emigrate to

Israel and undertake with their own hands the rebuilding

of their long neglected land. From the hidden recesses of the nation there leapt forth a powerful will, a pioneering will,

moving young men and women t o brave obstacle and danger in the pursuit of what they believed to be their historic mission, the redemption o f their people and the redemption o f their

land. They were few at first, these young Jews who were fired to creative and revolutionary action. But they were a living

example of what had t o be done if the historic ideal of Jewry were to be gained. They led the way, and hundreds followed. Soon the hundreds became thousands, then tens of thousands, and, in our own day, hundreds o f thousands. I t was their pioneering impetus which transformed Hibbat Zion (Love o f Zion) and the Zionist movement from windmills grinding out

words into a constructive force undertaking the practical tasks o f redemption.

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Is 1t not the case, though, that these early pioneersfollowed a special brand of iomism and were not only moved by the ideal of returning to their land but also had very definite ideas as to what kind o f society they wanted to see built up in this land? They certainly had such ideas, but I would not say that this made them adherents o f a ‘special brand o f Zionism’. I t made them adherents o f Zionism, for theirs was the true Zionism. As I said earlier, redemption meant a return to the

land and the creation there of a model society. This is precisely what these young pioneers tried to achieve. They were guided by the social ideal, which was also largely a product o f the nineteenth century, that physical labour must be the foundation o f a healthy and independent national life. Without such

guidance, their pioneering impetus would have lost its way and spent its strength. With it, they revolutionized a nation. For remember, wherever the Jews lived in exile, apart from suffering the patterns o f minority existence, their economic structure was different from the prevailing one. I n most countries in Europe, Jews were not allowed to own land, so farming was out. A n d herded in ghettoes and pales of settlement, far from centres o f industry, often prohibited from living in the

towns, Jews were hardly t o be found in the basic branches of the country’s economy. This enforced separation of the exiled Jews from agriculture and industry produced the natural psychological reaction. They tended to scorn manual labour.

The early Zionist pioneers had to change fundamentally this exilic attitude towards manual labour. They did it b y personal

example. Young men and women who had never before worked with their hands came to Palestine and became farm labourers,

road builders, artisans in workshops, and drainers of swamps. They it was who laid the physical foundations for the renewal o f Israel’s independence, they who carried out the first stage in the fulfilment o f the vision o f our people’s redemption, as Jews and as human beings. I n their wake came others, not only students and scholars but

tailors and peddlers and shopkeepers and traders, and they took to the pick and the hoe and the scythe. Violating all the sociological principles and against all precedent — the move is usually

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from labourer to professional man,

not

the reverse — they

changed their economic and social way of life. Without this mass return o fJews to the soil and to manual labour, we should never have achieved statehood. A moment ago you used the phrase ‘windmills grinding out words’, suggesting that many in the ionist movement failed to act

in accordance with their slogans. I know that when you were Prime Minister, you were frequently at odds with Sionist leaders overseas when you insisted that, for Sionists, the first duty was immigration to Israel. A n d you give major credit to the early ionist pioneers who did

come and labour with their hands. Is it your point that Israel is not the achievement of many Jews in many lands but only those who came to

Israel? I believe that the creation of the potentiality of an independent Israel was the work of the entire Jewish people, not only those living but o f all generations i n our history; for

it was only the faith, vision and spiritual heroism o f past

generations that made possible the achievements in our own day. I believe that Israel would not have come into existence when it did if i t were not for the tremendous financial, political and moral help of overseas Jewry, notably the communities in the United States and Great Britain but also in other countries. But I believe with equal insistence that only those who came to Israel can be called the actual builders and founders of the State.

M y quarrel with the Zionist leaders was — and is — over the content o f Zionism. I t is a frequent phenomenon i n history that

concepts and names are stubbornly retained long after they have lost their meaning. I t is like a wine bottle that has been drained and refilled with water, but owing to inertia no one has bothered to remove the old label. This is what has happened to the term ‘Zionist’ in our generation. The word ‘Zionism’ was coined before the establishment of the Zionist Organization in 1898, and its meaning was clear: the longing for Zion and the establishment there o f a model people. The movement which came into being through the visionary and energetic initiative of Theodor Herzl aimed a t

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assembling the scattered sons of Israel in its homeland. I do not say that all the members of Hibbat Zion and later of the Zionist Organization were themselves immediate personal candidates for immigration. But implicit in their ideology was that the Jews were a foreign element in the countries where they lived — this was particularly pronounced in eastern Europe and the Balkans — and that they would not find peace and freedom until they returned to their ancient home. Many began to come, and they were joined, through the Zionist idea, b y Jews from the more emancipated Germany and France and Italy who

uprooted themselves from their non-Jewish environment and declared themselves an organic part of the Jewish people whose independent future lay in the Land of Israel. From this movement emerged the immigrants who built u p the Jewish community in Palestine before statehood and who ultimately established the State. Part of this EuropeanJewry has now been cut off from us, and a good part has been destroyed. The principal overseas Jewish community of our days are the Jews of the United States, and

the bulk of them do not consider that they are living in exile; America is their home and they have no intention o f leaving it. That is their right, and it has b y no means reduced their will to help Israel in every way they are able. But American Jews who call themselves Zionists feel the same way, namely that they have no desire to leave America and emigrate to Israel. And here I say that it is absurd o f them to retain the term ‘Zionist’ when they show that they do not personally accept the ideological and practical content o f Zionism. I t is extraordinary that they should demand special rights as ‘Zionists’ and object to being placed on the same level as all other Jews who support Israel and seek its welfare.

What does it matter what people call themselves? Why did you think the point was sufficiently important for you, as Prime Minister, to come out with open attacks on the Siomist leaders? I thought it o f supreme importance — and I

still

d o — to educate the Jewish youth o f the world to a n understand-

ing of what is true Zionism. The point would not be worth 239

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arguing if the State of Israel were already fully established and its historic mission already fulfilled. But we are still very much at the beginning, and the road ahead is long and difficult. I f names have become meaningless, it is our task to make clear, particularly to Jewish youth, what is the true content of the ideal o f redemption, so that they may be inspired to join in its realization. They should know that the prime forces that have built and will continue to build the State are those who have come to Zion. These are the immigrants, those who came earlier and those who came later, irrespective of whether o r not they called themselves Zionists. Most o f those who came before the establishment o f the State were in fact Zionists. Most o f those who have come since were not. They were unlabelled Jews. A n d I say that the ordinary Jew, without a Zionist background, who came here has done more to build the State than an individual who calls himself a Zionist but who has not come. I must make clear that the assistance given to Israel b y overseas Zionists has been massive. But it must also be clear that the part played b y the man who lives in Israel, bears its burdens, defends it in time o f need, works, builds and maintains it day by day is o f a different order from the part played b y the wellintentionedJew who lives in the Diaspora, loves Israel from afar, and contributes to its assistance some of his time, money, oratorical talents and political influence. Whoever ignores this fundamental truth ignores not only the brief history o f the State, which is not so important, but its future. For that future is not yet automatically guaranteed. Those who seek the welfare o f the State and are concerned about its future and its mission should not assume that we have already reached our goal. Even our successful beginnings have not yet become sufficiently consolidated to enable us to face any trial with equanimity. The State cannot be firmly based, its mission will not be fulfilled and the vision o f redemption will not b e realized except through immigration.

That is why I was so insistent when I was Prime Minister in exposing what I consider to be an act o f distortion when a movement claiming to be Zionist erases from its teaching the major principle o f Zionism — immigration — even though it 240

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assists the State ofIsrael. I should like young Jews everywhere to look to Israel for the true meaning o f Zionism rather than to their local Zionist leaders. What is, and what do you think should be, the relationship

between Israel and the Jews of the world, large numbers of whom will clearly continue to live outside Israel? The two groups are interdependent. The future of Israel — its security, its welfare, and its capacity to fulfil its historic mission — depends on world Jewry. And the future of world Jewry depends on the survival of Israel. As I have indicated, today there is no difference in attitude towards the State of Israel between Jews who call themselves Zionists but who remain in the Diaspora and most other overseasJews who wear no such label. Except for small groups on the extreme right and the extreme left, the whole ofJewry supports the State and 1s proud ofits achievements and its victories. They realize, consciously or instinctively, that their future 1s bound u p also with the future o f Israel. The State has done what that great Czech leader, Edouard Benes, forecast long ago that it would d o : it has straightened the back o f the Jew everywhere. I n the course of only a few years, it redeemed hundreds o f thousands ofJews from poverty and degradation in exile and has transformed them into the proud builders and defenders o f their own country. I t injected new hope into the hearts o f the helpless and muzzled Jews o f the Soviet bloc. I t showed that the Jews are capable o f undertaking all forms of creative labour. I t revived Jewish heroism. I t offered the opportunity to every Diaspora Jew who enjoys freedom of movement in his present country to come and live in his independent homeland if he chooses to do so. I t thus ensures, potentially if not yet in practice, a life o f sovereign freedom for the entire Jewish people. O n the international scene, a free Jewish nation has appeared, equal in rights with all other members o f the family of nations. Small wonder that Jews living overseas, whether they called themselves Zionists or not, orthodox and free-thinkers, citizens of free countries and those living in lands of restriction, all welcomed the rise of the State with 241

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love and pride. The State has become the central pillar on which the unity of Diaspora Jewry now rests. The State is also the product of that unity, a unity produced b y a common historical heritage, a common fate and the

Messianic aspiration. These have bound the Jewish people together, consciously or unconsciously, in all generations and in all countries.

But having said that, I must make clear that there is a profound difference in principle between the life o f the people in Israel and the life o f the Jews in the Diaspora. But so are there differences between different overseas

communities themselves. Yes, but I was careful to stress ‘difference in

principle’. The quality of Jewish life outside Israel is different from that inside Israel. O f course not all Jewish communities overseas are alike. Each is influenced b y the nation among whom it lives, and acquires a character of its own. The differences between them may be physical, spiritual, political o r social — o r all four. Good examples

of such differences are the two largest Jewish centres in the

Diaspora today — in the United States and the Soviet Union. Together they comprise some nine million Jews, more than 8o per cent o f all the Jews in the Diaspora. American Jewry is young; at the beginning of the nineteenth century there were only some 2 , 0 0 0 Jews in the United States. Russian Jewry is relatively o l d ; at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were already some 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 Jews in Russia (including Russian Poland) out of the then Jewish population in the world o f two and a half million. A t the end of the nineteenth century, the number ofJews within the borders of old Russia had grown to 5,200,000 — about half o f the world’s Jewish population. To-

day there are almost six million Jews in the United States and some three and a half million in the Soviet bloc. But the numerical disparity is the least of the differences between them. The United States, in spite of its federal structure, is a unitary State linguistically and culturally. English is the language of the country and of its culture. Yet its Jewish 242

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community is at perfect liberty to maintain Jewish educational, research and scientific institutions, and there are no restrictions on the study ofHebrew and Yiddish. AmericanJews are allowed to maintain close ties with Israel and they have thus been able to play a part of immeasurable importance in helping to build the new State. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is, in theory, not a unitary State but a federation of nominally free peoples, each at liberty to develop its own language and culture. Self-determination is laid down and guaranteed in the country’s constitution. Yet in so far as self-determination exists, it does not apply to the Jews, for the Soviet régime has condemned its Jews to

spiritual extinction. The Jews have n o schools and no new books being published in their own language. Soviet ‘science’ disseminates among the Russian people false and slanderous information on the nature of Judaism, the Bible, the Jewish

faith and the State of Israel. No scholar is permitted publicly to question and correct these lies and distortions, for even science in the Soviet Union has been and still is to a large degree subordinated to the dictates of the régime. Just as there are these radical differences between the two largest Jewish communities, so are there considerable differences between the other, the small and medium sized, communities in the world. The position of the Jews in Morocco, for example, is not the same as that of the Jews in France or in Britain. Some communities live in squalor and under oppression. Others enjoy prosperity and equality of rights, are ‘emancipated’

and attached to the dominant culture. Yes, there are differences between the various communities i n

the Diaspora. But all have certain characteristics in common, and this makes them all different in principle from the community in Israel. These features are common to the rich communities and the poor, the free and the oppressed. They find expression in four basic facts, unalterable under Diaspora conditions, which are not to be found in Jewish life in Israel. These facts are the reason why all Diaspora Jewish communities live in what I call a condition of exile, whether or not they are aware of it or recognize it as such. What are these ‘facts of exile’?

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First, outside Israel, wherever they live, Jews are a minority. ‘They are thus to a greater or lesser extent dependent upon the will o f the majority. The majority may grant or withhold from them equal rights. The minority is helpless to make its own decision in the matter. Whatever status is enjoyed or suffered b y the Jewish minority rests upon the will and decision o f others,

and not upon its own will. Second, the economic and social structure o f such com-

munities is on the whole different from that of the peoples among whom they live. I a m not here concerned with the reasons for this phenomenon — though I touched on them in an earlier answer. I a m stating the fact. The majority in every

country consists of farmers and industrial workers. Their status may not be the same in all countries; in some they are downtrodden, in others they live a life o f dignity. But in every nation they form the majority, and upon them rests the economy o f the country. I n the Diaspora, very few Jews are to be found among their ranks, few among the labourers o n the land and not many in the working ranks of industry. Moreover, most o f the Jews live in towns. I n backward countries, this intensifies Jewish poverty and overcrowding; in the rich countries, it raises the cultural and material standing of the Jews above that of the majority. I n either case, it removes them from the primary source o f the vitality o f every people and leaves them without solid ground under their feet. Third, Jews in the Diaspora who wish to preserve their Jewishness find themselves caught between two contending

spheres of influence. As a citizen, the Jew derives both his material and cultural sustenance from the non-Jews among

whom he lives. Wherever he moves he finds himself in a nonJewish environment, the environment o f the all-powerful majority. I t controls the government, the economy, the law, the political parties and the dominant culture. The Jew is influenced b y it, whether he wishes to be or not, whether he knows it or not. Jewish life is set apart, having n o roots i n the all-pervading

majority environment. T o remain Jews, Jews can draw only on their past and on Jewish tradition. This produces a constant duality in the life o f the Jew who wishes to preserve his Jewishness. There is a gap between the

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Jewish sphere and the civic sphere, and, in some countries, often a contradiction. After all, the culture of a people is not merely its language, its storehouse o f memories of the past, or even its ‘religious idea’ or religious custom. The culture o f a people is

the totality of the human and social experience of the entire community, a n experience deriving from nature, tradition, the economic, legal and social systems, and from free public controversy. I n this sense, there can be no such thing as Jewish culture in the Diaspora. A t the most there can be a cultural ghetto. I t may have a religious, social and spiritual character, but it is a ghetto none the less, limited and separate, with no

source of nourishment in the experiences and conditions of the majority people. Even religious Jewry cannot completely

observe in the Diaspora all the laws of traditional Judaism. The Jewish religion, unlike all other religions, is rooted in the soil of the Land of Israel, and its survival is bound u p with the land o f its origin. Many o f the Jewish religious precepts can be observed only in Israel. Indeed, according to the ancient sages, residence outside Israel, when this is not unavoidable, is a grave religious offence, and any Jew who lives abroad when he can come to Israel is considered b y the Talmud as having forsaken God.

Fourth — and this follows from the third point — there can be no such thing in the Diaspora as life within an all-Jewish framework. The Jews are there subordinate to the sovereign framework o f the general community. True, the Jews wherever they are are a ‘stiff-necked’ people,

and their attachment to the Jewish heritage is incomparably strong, whether it is religious or linguistic, or whether it is an attachment out o f solidarity to the Jewish fraternity. Hence, in every country where they are allowed to d o so, Jews create

their own voluntary framework and organizations for Jewish activity and self-expression. But it is m y point that such a framework cannot be all-embracing, comprehensive in scope, or vital in content. Only in sovereign Israel is there the full opportunity for moulding the life of the Jewish people according to its own

needs and values, faithful to its own character and spirit, to its heritage of the past and its vision of the future. I n Israel, the barrier between the Jew and the individual as a

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person has been abolished. One can be a complete person and a complete Jew, for the prevailing environment is one created by Jews. Our life in Israel has become once again, as in Biblical days, a complete and comprehensive experience, comprising within a state framework that is Jewish all the living values of the individual and the nation. I n addition to the Jewish book, the Jewish laboratory and scientific research inquiring into the earth and all that is therein, there have been created in Israel the Jewish field, the Jewish road, the Jewish factory, the Jewish mine, the Jewish Army. Our way o f life has been transformed. Economically and socially, we are like any other independent

people living in its o w n land, for w e do all the physical and mental work that the nation requires. I n Israel the Jews are a nation like all other nations. A t the same time they are Jews in every fibre of their body and every feeling in their heart — whether they be religious or not — as no

Jew can possibly be abroad. This is a product of the special revolution which has been taking place in the land of Israel in the last three generations, reaching its peak with the establishment of the State. This was more than a revolution involving simply a change o f régime. I t involved the personal revolution o f every individual Jew who came to the land, a revolution in his way o f life, vocation, language, status, in all that is meant b y the Hebrew term ‘geulah’ which has no parallel in any other language but to which ‘redemption’ comes nearest. From all you say, it seems evident that the profound differencesyou have enumerated between the Jews ofIsrael and the Jews overseas are likely to become deeper with time. I think that is true. They will become deeper as the State advances towards the consolidation of its independence. But let us be clear about our use of the word ‘differences’. I do not mean it i n the sense o f conflict but o f differences i n char-

acter, for the reasons I have just given. But such differences do not mean that the one can live without the other. I do not think they can. I believe that each needs to sustain the other, though the respective needs are not o f the same order. Jewry in the Diaspora, notably in the two great centres, the United States

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and the Soviet Union, has travelled far along the path to assimilation; and even though its Jewish consciousness is still alive, it is doubtful whether, without Israel, it may not perish

by euthanasia or suffocation. Similarly, without strong bonds with Diaspora Jewry, it is doubtful whether Israel can survive or fulfil its mission of redemption. D o not forget that although Israel enjoys the friendship o f many nations it is the only country which has no self-governing ‘relatives’ from the point o f view of religion, language, origin or culture, as have, for example, the Scandinavians, the English-

speaking peoples, the Arabs or the Buddhists. Our nearest neighbours are our bitterest foes, and they will not speedily be reconciled to our existence and our growth. The only permanent loyal ‘relatives’ we have is the Jewish people. I am sure that many more elements of scattered Jewry will join us in the near future, as more than a million have in the recent past, both from countries o f suffering and from the free and prosperous lands. We welcome the Jews who can be rescued from the lands o f distress and we welcome the Jews who live in the lands o f

freedom. Israel needs the co-operation of the latter not only for their material assistance essential for the settlement o f penniless refugees and the development o f the country, but also for their physical participation with us in building the State. They have the spiritual resources, the capacity for action, the cultural standards, the scientific and other knowledge that can contribute vitally to the shaping of a well-ordered progressive State capable o f being a ‘light unto the nations’. We in Israel, for our part, must see to it that we create the moral, cultural and political inspiration that can act as a magnet which will automatically attract the best o f Jewish youth from all countries. Not since the return from Babylon in the sixth and fifth centuries B c have the Jews been given so noble a n opportunity of joining in the tasks of national revival and

redemption.

And what of the Jews who will not come? The bulk of them, as you say, have the warmest feelings towards Israel. That is the case today. But what of the future, the next generation and the next? You spoke of the characteristics in which they differ from the Jews in

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Israel and which are likely to become more marked as the State develops. Moreover, as time moves on, and as we getfarther awayfrom the ‘heroic’ periods of Israel’s rebirth, Jews overseas are likely to be influenced more and more by the prevailingforces of their local environment. Are not these tendencies likely to weaken the attachment to Israel of overseas fewry?

Yes, and because of this possible trend we in Israel and those outside must take active measures to preserve the unity of the Jewish people, for the future of both is at stake. This unity, to be effective, must be rooted in a Jewish consciousness which can be felt b y all sections ofJewry, Israeli and nonIsraeli, religious and non-religious. This consciousness must draw its sustenance from the ancient springs of the Jewish people, must be guided by the noblest aspirations of the Jewish people, and must be linked to the mission of modern Israel. Unity can therefore be guaranteed b y a three-pronged effort. The first must be the spread ofHebrew education. A language

common t o all sections ofJewry, t o Israel and the Diaspora, can be the single most important factor in achieving and preserving a common Jewish consciousness. Consider what the revival of our ancient language, Hebrew, as the common tongue o f Israel, has done for our people here, unifying the heterogeneous communities. What has been done here can also be done by the Jews overseas with the same unifying effect. I agree that it is more difficult for them, for they live in lands which have their own official languages. But we here, too, faced serious difficulties, yet we achieved it. We succeeded in bringing to life, in our time, the language o f our people which had been abandoned as a living language for almost nineteen hundred years. I t is a unique act, with no parallel in history. I remember that some years ago we were visited b y the Irish leader, de Valera, and the thing that impressed him more than anything was what he called our miraculous revival of Hebrew. H e told me o f the determined efforts which had been made in Eire over decades to revive the Gaelic tongue, efforts which had failed even though the nation had been living in its own land all the time. I a m convinced that the experience o f overseas Jewry in seeking to acquire their ancient tongue can be that o f the Jews

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of Israel rather than of the nationals of Eire. Hebrew today is n o longer a n embalmed language, preserved only i n old books

and musty parchments. It is now a living and developing tongue,

rich with the modern idiom but even richer with the spiritual treasures of old. (Incidentally, the finest modern Hebrew prose style harks back occasionally t o the idiom of the Bible and of the early sages, without being archaic.) U p to the First World War, the language spoken b y and uniting most Jewish communities in

the world was either Yiddish or Ladino. These are now dying out, but while they lived it meant that most Jews were bilingual,

speaking both Ladino or Yiddish and the language o f their country of residence. There is no reason why they should not now again become bilingual, the Jewish language this time being Hebrew, thereby maintaining a cultural bond with Israel and with other Jewish communities. But Hebrew education involves not only the teaching of the language. I t also means the transmission of the greatest of the

Jewish classics of all generations. Foremost, of course, is the Bible, crowning glory o f the Jewish creative genius and well-

spring of the faith and moral teachings of Israel. I t is the Bible which was the source of all the creative thinking and writing of the generations of Jews who followed, the Bible which was the prized certificate of identity of the Jewish people, the Bible which accompanied them in all their wanderings, what someone

once called their ‘portable homeland’. I t is the most widely known and longest-living book in the world. I t is still the greatest and most precious creation o f the Jewish

people, from the national, historical, religious and cultural points o f view and from the point of view o f universal ethics. I n the Bible, every Jew whether orthodox or atheist will find his origins, his historical and moral roots. But Jewish creative powers were not exhausted with the completion o f the Bible. I n the best Jewish literature o f the

post-Biblical periods expressive of the Jewish genius, every Jew can find insights enabling him to know himself better. This is what I mean b y a comprehensive Hebrew education which must be undertaken b y world Jewry as the prime effort in the accomplishment o f unity. The second is an increased awareness on the part o f all Jews 249

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of what I earlier called the vision of Messianic redemption. Like the Torah of Israel, which preached the national ideal for the Jewish people but which also uttered ideals embracing

mankind, so the Messianic vision was bothJewish and universal. The redemption o f Israel was bound u p with the redemption of the world. This Jewish national ideal combined with a universal human ideal, one of the outstanding themes o fJewish

prophecy and most of the books of the Bible, was never more topical than today. The hope of the world for deliverance from the dangers of total destruction lies in a régime of justice and peace, loving kindness and mercy, and respect for man who was created in the image of God. A three-word Hebrew sentence in

the Bible says it all: “The world shall be built in mercy.’ The new Jewish State integrated the Jewish people with its

distant past and with the modern history of man. I t is dedicated to developing the latent qualities of the Jewish people so that they may be a ‘light unto the nations’ and mark out the path to a new world order which shall not be false to the vision of redemption. Diaspora Jewry must join faithfully with Israel to bring about the fulfilment o f its Messianic mission to become a model people and help the world advance towards a system of righteousness as foreseen b y Israel’s prophets. Third, the needs o f both demand that there shall be a strengthening o f the bonds between Diaspora Jewry and the State of Israel. The most urgent call is for the youth o f overseas Jewry and for the young professional class, graduates in the humanities and the natural sciences, to join the builders and defenders o f Israel and thus play a personal part in the creative work o f redemption. For those who wish to remain in the lands in which they live, the ties can be strengthened b y visiting Israel, sending their children to undertake a period o f study here, participating in Israel’s economic development. This will give a deeper meaning to their Jewish consciousness and at the same time it will heighten the effectiveness o f Israel as the major instrument for the preservation o f Jewish integrity. We, for our part, must do all we can in this country to mould a society of righteousness so that overseas Jewry will be willing to make the efforts I have outlined, and so that, above all, we can attract Jewish youth as immigrants. 250

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So before Israel can become what you call a ‘light unto the nations’, it has to become a light unto the Jews, particularly the young Jews, overseas? The two are really one. If we become a model society, able to exert a moral influence among the peoples o f the world, that influence will inevitably be felt more immediately and more strongly b y the Jews. A n d while we are still far from achieving that exalted position, I think we have already created forces which carry within them the seeds o f a model society. I a m thinking in particular o f our labour settlements, the educational functions o f Israel’s Defence Forces, and our scientific and cultural accomplishments. I think I can say that we have made a start towards becoming a model people. But there are still many shadows darkening the purity o f our lives. Long years o f exile have taken their toll. Many o f our immigrants have come from poor and primitive lands, lacking in civic tradition. There is over-fragmentation. There is an exaggerated partisanship. Often the customs and traditions brought with them b y the newcomers are undermined before new values have had time to take root, and this causes social bewilderment. For some immigrants, integration into the life o f the country is difficult and takes longer than with others. We, too, like other countries, are plagued with inferior

books and periodicals, both home produced and imported, but we feel it more keenly because we are still in the initial

stage of shaping a nation. We have also carried over from exile as an organizational heritage the deplorable system o f proportional representation under which our parliamentary elections are conducted, fostering the growth o f small parties and breeding in them political irresponsibility. These are grave blemishes on the face o f our young State. Nevertheless, they do not and cannot dim the brightness of our accomplishments. Though young and small and with slender natural resources, our State has been able to stand u p against its many enemies, to open wide its doors to immigrants, to provide free primary education for all, to conquer the desert, to revive towns and villages which had been dead for some two millennia, and to create a comprehensive system o f social 251

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services o f a very high standard. This has been achieved in the

face of tough difficulties and limited means. I t surely reflects unusual qualities in our citizens. We have always been a small people numerically and we shall

remain a small people, unable to compete with our rivals in the size o f population, extent o f territory, richness o f natural resources and strength and equipment o f the armed forces. But

our place is in the history of humanity and the place of our country in the world cannot be measured in quantitative terms. Few peoples have had so profound an influence upon so large a part o f the human race. A n d there are few countries which have played so central a role in world history as the Land o f Israel. I t must be our aim to achieve a future that can be worthy o f our past.

252

INDEX

Abdullah, King ofJordan, 15%

46-17; riots of 1929, 56, 71; terrorism,

Abraham, 227-8

6 3 , 76-81,

Adenauer, D r Konrad, 163, 167, 1 7 0 African nations, 148, 149; friendly relations with, 1 7 1 - 8 0 . See also Asian

with, 83, 85, 86, 94, 97-8; Special

states 40,

55; and

Histadruth, 5 1 - 2

exile in, 47-9; Jewish freedom in,

48-9, 239, 243; and Zionism, 108-19; and Israel arms, 139-40, 168; and cold war, 148, 1 5 9 , 183, 187-8; attempt to mediate with Arabs, 158;

and Germany, 166; Arab propaganda against, 177; and China, 1 8 1 — 4 , 187-8; Jewry in, compared with Russian, 242-3; Jewry assimilated in, 246-7 Amery, Leopold, 93 Amos, 1 9 1 , 2 2 5 Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry (1945), 117

Apocrypha, 2 2 9 Aqaba, Gulf of,

1 1 5 , 147 Arab States, 46, 86; war on Israel, g-10,

138, 1 5 4 ; armies of,

sympathies

Arazzi, Yehuda, 140

Alexander, Field Marshal, 1 0 5 All-Zionist Conference (1942), 1 1 2 America, 1 4 7 , 1 7 0 , 174; Ben Gurion in

11-13,

British

Night Squads against, 8g, go; claim t o Galilee and Haifa, 92, 9 3 ; object t o Jewish Army, 1 0 2 , 1 0 5 ; effect of hostility on Israel development, 1 5 2 - 5 ; refugees, 158—9

Ahdut, 42, 43, 47, 5 1

Ahdut Avodah party,

89;

12,

136,

Archimedes, 195 Aristarchus of Samos, 1 9 5 , 196 Aristotle, 195, 196 arms traffic, 139-41, 1 6 7 9 Ashkenasi Jews, 45 Asia, and Buddhism, 189—go Asian states, 148, 149; friendly relations with, 171-80; help with development, 1 7 1 - 3 , 174-6, 179-80; impressed by military exploits, 173, and labour farm settlements, 173-4, and scientific achievement, 176-7; Arab propaganda in, 177-8; low living standard, 1 7 9 - 8 0 Attlee, Lord, 96, 113, 116-17 Auckland, 1 1 0 - 1 1 Avigur, Shaul, 5 6 Avriel, Ehud, 140

Balfour, Earl, 84 Balfour Declaration, 47%, 5 3 , 55, 61, 66,

1 3 7 , 1 3 9 ; relations with, 1 5 2 - 6 1 ; rejection of U N Partition Plan, 1 5 4 ;

6%, 68, 71, 83, 85 86, 96, 100, 101,

unwilling to negotiate, 155-9; con-

Bankover (kibbutznick), 73 Barker, General, 1 0 3 , 1 0 4 Barnet, Doak, 184-5 Basle, first Zionist Congress (1897), 165

flict within, 156-7; prospects for alliance with Israel, 159-61; ‘neutrality’ of, 159; totalitarian rule i n , 160; Russian arms for, 168 Arabs: attacks o n Jews, 16, 26, 28-9,

57, 58; students in Constantinople,

109

Bedell Smith, General, 113-14 Beer-sheba, 228

Beirut, 93

253

INDEX

Ben Gurion, Amos, 2 0 5 - 6

ship, 181-4, 189-8; reasons for

Ben Shemen, 28

Communism of, 184-6; and Russia, 186, 188; atomic bomb tests, 188

Ben Zvi, Itzhak, 42, 4 3 , 47 Benes, Edouard, 2 4 1

‘chosen people’ concept, 230-2

Bevin, Ernest, 67, 71, 81, 108; and

Churchill, Sir Winston, 8 5 , 94, 99-106,

immigration, 81, 98, 1 1 3 , 1 1 7 ; as Foreign Secretary, 83, 96-8; hostility t o Zionism, g6-8, 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 168

107;

13,

army, 1 4 , 1 0 2 - 5 ; a friend of Zionism, 1 0 1 , 102; failure to act against 1939 White Paper, 101-2

Bible, 198, 228, 229, 235, 236, 249

Bidault, Georges, 1 0 8 Biltmore Programme,

112

Bohr, Niels, 2 1 7 Brandeis, Supreme Court Justice Louis, 109-10

Britain: Weizmann let down by, 6 4 ;

High Commissioners, 66-82; restricts immigration to Palestine, 67, 68, 98, 113;

and Balfour Declaration, 83, 84,

86, 109; promises t o Arabs, 8 6 ; Jewish ties with, 87-8; needs Palestine as base, 9 2 ; Brandeis’ disillusion over, 100-10;

and Suez, 146; improved

relations with, 168

Colonial Office: opposed to Jewish Army, 1 3 - 1 4 , 9 4 ; immigration policy, 70, 7 1 - 2 , 81; generally

Clausewitz, Karl von, 12 Cohen, Ben, 1 1 1

cold war, 148 159, 1 7 0 , 187 collectives, 3 0 - 1 Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security, 2 0 7 , 2 0 8 , 2 1 3 Committee of Seven, and security mishap, 2 0 7 - 1 5 Confucius, 2 0 0 Constantinople, 4 3 , 46-7, 2 0 3

Copernicus, 196 Cranborne, Lord, g5

Creech-Jones, Arthur, 83 Cunliffe-Lister, Philip, 84 Cunningham, General Sir Alan, as High Commissioner, 81-2 Czechoslovakia, 86, 168; arms from,

pro-Arab, 83, 91, 95, 9 7

Foreign Office, 1 1 4 1 1 7 , 168; not friendly to Zionism, 83—4

Britain, Battle of, 1 5 - 1 6 ,

202

Buddhism, 189-94; sects of, 18g-go;

teachings of, 190-3, 1 9 5 ; caste system, 192—3; difference from Judaism, 194 Bulganin, Marshal, 1 1 5 Bulgaria, Jewish community in, 74-5 Bullitt, William, 2 0 4

Bundist movement, 1g—20, 48 Burma, 1 7 1 - 2 , 1 9 0 , 1 9 4

Bussel, Yosef, 32 Cabinets, choosing of,

140-1

David, 2 2 5 Dayan, Moshe, 1 0 3 De Valera, Eamonn, 248 Dead Sea Works, 138 Dean, Arthur, 184

death camps, 98, 1 1 3 , 1 6 2 Defence Ministry, 1 2 4 , 1 2 5 , 126, 163-4; and ‘Security mishap’, 206, 2 0 7 - 1 5 Deganiah, first kibbutz, 30-3, 39 development projects, 1 7 1 - 3 , 1 7 9 Dhammapada (sayings ofBuddha), 1 9 1 Diaspora, 44, 54, 63, 100, 150, 155, 240, 2 4 1 - 5 , 2 5 0 Diem, N g o Dinh, 182

123-5

Canaan, 225, 227 Canada, 168

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, 74, 76, 89,

Carmel, Moshe, 1 0 3 caste system,

rouses Britain to supreme effort, 9 9 ; support for Jewish

15-16,

90, 204

Displaced Persons camps, 1 1 2 - 1 3

192

Chamberlain, Joseph, g5 Chamberlain, Neville, 13, 14, 85-6,

Dori, Yaacov, 57, Dulles, Allen, 184

140

100, 101, 102, 103, 104

Chiang Kai-shek,

181,

182, 185, 186

China, 148, 181-8; question o f American recognition and U N member-

East Prussia, suggested Jewish State, g 5 Eden, Anthony (now Lord Avon), 84, 168

254

INDEX

education, 1 2 2 ,

248-9

Egypt, 115, 166, 182; and Sinai cam-

reparations, 162-3; and arms from Israel, 164; policy towards, 164-70;

paign, 147; hostility t o Israel and

not the Germany o f old, 166, 169—

128-30,

144,

Arab States, 156; Czech arms 168; exodus from, 225, 228

deal,

70; increasing international importance, 166-7,

Eichmann bureau, 74 Eilat, 1 4 7

Ein Harod kibbutz, go Einstein, Albert, 21%; offer of Presidency, 2 0 3 — 4 Eisenhower, President, 1 1 2 - 1 5 , 158 electoral system, 1 2 3 - 4 , 128, 131-5,

170

geulah (‘redemption’), 246 Ghana, Nautical School in, 175 God, belief in, 2 1 6 - 1 7 Golomb, Eliyahu, 56, 57 Gort, Field Marshal Lord, one o f best High Commissioners, 70, 74-5 Greek language, 202, 203

Greek philosophy, 195-6; and concept

204

‘Eretz Yisrael’, 60-1, 62 Eshkol, Levi,

208-9,

o f state, 232, 233—4

211, 212

Esthonia, 184 ethics and science, 1 9 5 - 2 0 1 Etzel terrorists, 76-81 Euclid, 195 ‘European’ immigrants, 1 3 0

Hadari, Venia, 75 Hadera farm village, 2 2 - 3 Haganah,

12,

17,

establishment of,

89, 1 0 7 , 136, 137; 2 7 , 55-6; affiliated

Exodus, 228

t o Histadruth, 55, 56; development of, 56-7; aims of, 57-8; policy of

Exodus (Haganah ship), g8

restraint,

76,

97,

78;

arrest

of

‘Forty-three’, 103-4; in Syria and Lebanon, 107-8; changeover to Israel Army, 138-9; arming of,

farm villages, 22, 23, 24-30, 51, 122, 172,

173-4

Faure, Edgar, 168 Feldenkreis, Moshe, 204-5

138-41

Haifa, 36-7, 79, 81, 89, go; Arab claim to, 93

First Temple, 2 2 7 Foreign Ministry, 127-8

Haining, General, 80

Formosa, 182, 186, 187

Halacha (religious law), 229 Halifax, Lord, 1 0 0 halutziut (personal dedication), 1 9 7 Hammarskjold, Dag, 1 1 9 , 1 5 7 Hanita, 78

‘Forty-three’ Haganah group, 1 0 3 - 4 France, 243; Zionist sympathies, 108;

and Suez, 146; alliance with Germany, 166-7; arms from, 168-9 Frankfurt, 1 1 2 - 1 4

Hankin, Joshua, 3 0

Frankfurter, Supreme Court Justice

Hapoel Hazair labour party, 52

Felix, 1 0 9 , 1 1 1 - 1 2 , Fraser, Peter, 1 1 0 French language, 2 0 3 Fuchs, Shmuel, 2 0 - 2 1

Hashomer, 27, 55, 57, 136, 137

Harrison, Earl G., 117%

177

head, standing on, 2 0 4 - 5 Health Ministry, 1 2 5 Hebrew education, 248-9

Galilee, 28, 42, 89, 1 5 0 ; Arab claim to,

Hebrew language, 18, 44-5, 144, 203,

92, 93 Galilee, Israel, 57

229; revival of, 45, 248-9 Hechalutz (pioneers) movement, 48 Hecht, Yosef, 56 Henderson, Arthur, 72, 84, 94

Galileo, 196 Gandhi, Mahatma,

192

Gaulle, President de, 107-8, 167

Heraclitus, 1 9 5

Gaza Strip, 1 1 5 , 1 4 7 , 1 5 0 Gefen, Dov, 56 German language, 2 0 3 Germany, 1 6 2 - 7 0 ; Displaced Persons camps in, 1 1 2 - 1 3 ; discussion on

Herzl, Theodore, 165, 229, 238; compared t o Weizmann, 59-61, 62 Hibbat Zion (Love of Zion), 236, 237 Hippocrates, 195 Hirsch, Baron Maurice, 25

255

INDEX

Histadruth (labour federation), 1 4 9 , 1 7 4 , 206, 208; creation of, 50-2, 5 3 ; Ben Gurion as secretary-general, 5 0 , 5 2 , 55; social services, 55; and Haganah, 55-6

of, 136-8, 1 4 3 ; sense of destiny, 136-7, 149-50; changeover from Haganah, 138; acquisition of arms, 139—41, 167-9; overall defence sys-

Hitler, Adolf, 14, 15, 63, 68, 70, 95, 100, 1 0 2 , 1 1 0 , 149, 163

pioneering corps, 143—4, 1 5 0 ; educational function, 143, 144, 150; new immigrants in, 144, 150; service integration, 144-5; and international relations, 145-9; achievement of,

tem,

Hope-Simpson, Sir John, 94

Hos, Dov, 56, 71, 97 Hosea, 1 9 1 , 2 2 5

150-1,

141-2;

reserve system, 142-3;

173; n o political role,

151

idealism, 35-6, 37-8, 54

immigration: mass, in new State, 34-5, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 2 1 - 2 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 9 , 144,

175-6,

218; illegal, 57, 98; British restrictions on, 67, 68, 71-2, 84-5, 97-8; peak year o f (1935),

policy, 96, 97-8,

113;

70,

94; Bevin’s

recommended

100,000, 1 1 7 ; ‘European’ a n d ‘Orien-

tal’, 1 3 0 ; prompted by vision of redemption, 229-30, 235-6, 237-9; major principle of Zionism, 2 4 0 Independence, War of, 78, 9 1 , 1 0 0 , 137,

Jabotinsky,

caste system, 192

Iraq, 93, 168, 169, 1 8 2 Ironside, General, 1 0 4 Isaiah, 1 9 1 , 2 0 0 , 225, 232-3

educationalworkin, 4 2 - 3 , 4 7 ;Hebrew

University of, 65; blowingu p of King David Hotel, 67-8; Etzel terrorism in, 78 Jerusalem, Haj A m i n el Husseini, Mufti

of, 69, 74, 153 Jewish Agency, 13, 69, 70, 75, 76, 80, go, 9 I , 1 1 3 , 1 2 0 , 1 5 3 Jewish Army, 165; Ben Gurion’s efforts for, 13-15,

108, 111; Colonial

Office opposes, 14, 94; Churchill

Israel, State of, 100; reflections o n

independence of, g-17; Arab war on, 9-10, 11-13, 138, 1 5 4 ; Truman

to

Jerusalem from, 36; terrorism in, 48, 81 Japan, 1 7 9 , 1 8 0 , 186 Jeroboam II of Israel, 225 Jerusalem: Ben Gurion’s political and

140, 149, 152

India, 1 7 0 ; lack of diplomatic relations, 178-9; and Buddhism, 189, 1 9 5 , 226;

Vladimir, 77-8, 79, 8 0 walk

Jaffa, 1 6 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 8 , 1 5 2 - 3 ;

support for, 14,

102-5

1 2 2 , 128-30; choice o f Cabinets, 1 2 3 - 5 ; defence budget, 125-6; need

Jewish Brigade Group, 1 5 , 1 0 5 Jewish Colonization Association (JCA), 25-6, 31, 32 Jewish Legion, 50, 77 Jewish National Fund, 26, 30, 32 Jewish National Home, passim; Peel Report on, 54-5, 64; Herzl’s idea of,

for change i n electoral system, 1 3 1 - 5 ; and Arab States, 152-61; effect o f

60-1, 62—3; Balfour Declaration and

recognizes,

11,

116; influence o f

kibbutz, 34-5; effect o f affluence,

35-8; Weizmann first President of, 65; aims of, 120-3; free education,

Arab hostility on, 1 5 2 - 5 ; prospect of alliance with Arabs, 159-61; and Germany, 162-70; and security, 165, 167—9; and new African and Asian states, 171-80; aid activities, 1 7 1 - 3 , 175, 179; scientific achievements, 176-7; and religion, 217-23; and Jewish people, 2 3 5 - 5 2 ; relationship with Jewry outside, 2 4 1 - 7 Israel Air Force, 175-6 Israel Army, 27, g1, 136-51; qualities

60, 62, 165; Weizmann’s idea of, Mandate on, 67, 68, 84, 85, 8 6 ; Lloyd’s attitude to, 86—9, g2—-3; a ‘Vatican City’ offered, 86-7, 9 2 ; minority

status

rejected,

87,

92;

Jewish State a necessity, 87, 92-3;

East Prussia suggested, 9 5 ; Churchill support for, 1 0 0 ; Ben Gurion’s 1942 memorandum on, 111-12. See also Israel; Zionism

Johnson, President Lyndon B., Jordan, 156, 157, 158, 168

256

118-19

INDEX

Locker, Berl, g 1 Lodge, Cabot, 1 1 5

Jowett, Benjamin, 202

Judaism, 60, 194, 199, 228-9, 245

Judea, 2 2 5

Lovers o f Zion, 18, 236

Kafr Kana, 28

MacArthur, General, 116

Kalia, 1 1

MacDonald, Malcolm, %1, %2, 101, 102; opposes Jewish Army, 1 4 ; duplicity of, 1 4 , 84-5; heavy penalties on armed Jews, 1 0 3 — 4 MacDonald, Ramsay, 7 1 - 2 , 84, 94

Kaplan, Eleazar, 56 Kassem, General, 182

Katzir, Professor Aharon,

205

Kennedy,President John F . , 117-18, 182 kibbutzim, 48, 54, 72, 90, 124, 137, 149, 150, 200; starting of, 3 0 - 3 , 3 9 ; influence of, 34-5, 37; work on, 39-

40; political feeling in, 40-1; Arab attacks on, 57-8; Nahal corps and, 143; emergent nations impressed by, 1 7 2 , 173-4 kibush avodah (conquest of labour), 25, 2 6 ,32 Knesset, 1 2 4 , 1 3 0 , 131-2,

134, 135, 1 5 0 ,

2 0 4 ; debate on German reparations, 162-3; and ‘Security mishap’, 207-9, 213-14

Kung-Tze (Confucius), 2 0 0 Kupath Cholim (workers’ health ser-

labour movement, 30-3, 50-2, 53, 55-5, 1 7 3 , 1 7 4 , 237-8. See also Histadruth; kibbutzim Lachish area, 1 5 0 Ladino tongue, 44, 45, 249

languages, 44, 45, 2 0 3

Latin, 2 0 3 ‘Latter Days, vision of’, 2 3 2 Latvia, 184 Lavon, Pinhas, 206-7,

208, 211, 212-13,

124

Maimonides, 216

Mandatory Administration, 16; Ben Gurion seeks change in, 1 3 ; pressure on, 5 3 , 5 4 ; the High Commissioners, 2

manual labour, attitude to, 237-8 M a o Tse-tung, 181, 185 Mapai party, 40-1, 52, 133, 135;

majority party, affair’, 2 0 7 , 2 0 8 , Mapam, 4 0

123—4;

and ‘Lavon

209-10,

214

Messianic redemption, 225-6, 228-9, 230, 232,

235, 2 4 2 , 2 5 0

Micah, 1 9 1 , 2 2 5 model society, 2 3 2 - 4 ,

251

Mollet, Guy, 1 6 8

monotheism, 226-7 Montgomery, Field Marshal Viscount, 13 Moses, 1 5 0 , 2 1 7 , 2 2 8 moshavim, 38, 57, 1 2 4 , 149, 172, 173

Murrow, Ed, 193-4

177

Naguib, General Mohammed, 156,

191

Lithuania, 184 Litvinov, Maxim, 2 0 4 Lloyd, Lord: opposes Jewish Army, 1 4 , 14,

85, 96, 106; as

Colonial Secretary, 85-9, 92-4, 1 0 3 — 4 ; attitude t o Jewish National Home, 86—9, 9 2 - 3 ; Churchill’s notes 103—4, 106

8o-1 Maimon, Rabbi,

Moyne, Lord, 94-5; 9 6

68, 71, 83, 85, 96, 1 0 1 Lebanon, 92, 108, 156, 160

to,

104;

Montor, Henry, 139

League ofNations Mandate, 53, 66, 67,

9 4 ; anti-Zionist,

103,

Morocco, 243

214

Leviticus,

13,

worst High Commissioner, 7 0 , 75, 76,

Marshall, General George, 10, 11-13 May, Miss Doris, 202

vice), 55

Lehman, Herbert,

McMichael, Sir Harold,

182

Nahal (volunteer corps), 143-4 Nasser, President, 75, 156, 158, 168, 169, 1 8 2 N A T O , 166, 181

Natorei Karta group,

221-2,

223

Nazareth, 28

Nazi persecution, 9, 63-4, 67, 68—9, 7 0 , 74-5, 96, 1 0 5 , 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 6 2 , 164

257

INDEX

proportional representation,

Negev: kibbutzim in, 3g—40, 150; ex-

123,

131,

cluded in Peel Report, 54-5; opening u p of, 138, 1 4 1 , 1 5 0 Nehru, Pandit, 178-9, 1 9 2 , 205

Pythagoras, 195

N e w York, 11, 48, 116, 204 N e w Zealand, 1 1 0 - 1 1

Ratner, Professor Yochanan, 57 redemption, vision of, 225-6, 2 2 9 - 3 0 ,

1 3 2 - 3 , 134

Northcliffe, Lord, 69-70

232, 235-6, 237, 240, 246, 250 Rehovoth, Weizmann Institute

Odessa, 22

Science in, 65 religion and the State,

Oppenheimer, Professor Robert, 177 ‘Oriental’ immigrants, 1 3 0 Ormsby-Gore, William (later Lord Harlech), 74, 84 Ottoman Government, 43, 46, 47

216-23

Remez, David, 47

Republic, The (Plato), 2 0 2 - 3 , 2 3 3 Revisionist movement, 76-81 Rickover, Admiral Hyman, 177 Rishon LeZion farm village, 2 2

Palestine: ending of mandate, 1 1 ; as a supply base, 1 3 ; early determination

Roosevelt, President Franklin D . , 108-

g,

t o g o to, 1 8 , 19-20, 3 1 ; Zemach’s

letters from, 2 1 - 2 ; Ben Gurion’s work on farm villages, 2 2 - 3 3 , 43; Ben Gurion expelled from, 47-8; return to, 5 0 et seq.; as the only Jewish State, 62, 86-7, 92-3, 95,

Russia,

94, 1 0 9 ; eighteenth-century immigration to, 229-30, 239

Parmenides, 1 9 5 partition, 54, 64, 101, 109, 154 Passfield, Lord, 71-2, 9 4 ; White Paper,

96-7 Peel Report, 54-5, 63-4, 1 0 1 , 1 0 9 Petach Tikvah farm village, 2 2 , 2 3 , 2475, 42, 51 pioneering, 2 2 , 2 3 , 24-30, 3 4 - 4 1 , 5 4 , 109, 111, 1 1 4 , 137, 149, 1 5 0 , 164-5,

147, 157, 174,

181,

185;

dis-

crimination against Jews, 2 0 , 9 5 , 2 4 3 ; Ben Gurion’s military service in, 31, 4 2 ; and cold war, 148, 1509,

Peel partition report, 63-4, High Commissioners for, 66— 82; restricted immigration, 71-2, 94, partition of, 93, 1 0 9 ; considered too small for National Home,

211, 212, 213

Rosh Pinna, 78 Ruppin, D r Arthur, 32

101;

113, 117;

111

Rosen, Pinhas,

111;

183, 187-8; and Warsaw Pact, 166; arms Arab states, 168; and East

Germany, 1 7 0 ; supports Arab propaganda, 178; satellites, 184; and China, 186, 188; Jewry in, compared with American, 2 4 2 - 3 ; assimilation of Jewry in, 246-7 Russian language, 19, 2 0 3 Rutberg,

Meir, 5 6

Sabbath observance, 221, 222 Said, Nuri As-, 182

Saigon, 1 8 2 St James’s Palace Conference (1939),

85, 93

173-4, 197, 200-1, 237-8 Plato, 195, 196, 2 0 2 - 3 , 233

Plonsk, 44; Ben Gurion’s birth and early years in, 18-21, 2 5 , 48; brief return to, 3 1 Plumer, Lord, a first-class High Commissioner, 6g—70 Poalei Zion party, 42, 43, 48, 5 1 - 2

Poland, 178; early years in, 18-21; revolutionary movements, 1 9 - 2 0

Promised Land,

of

228

Salonika, 43-6, 2 0 3 Samuel, Viscount, 5 3 , 70; as High Commissioner, 66—9

Sasson, Eliyahu,

130

Saudi Arabia, g3 Saul, 2 2 5 ‘Sayings of the Fathers’, 1 9 1 - 2 Science and ethics, 1 9 4 - 2 0 1 scientific achievement, 1 7 6 - 7 Sde Boker, 2 4 , 1 2 8 , 2 0 4 , 206; reason for

Prophets of Israel, 1 9 1 - 2 , 195, 200, 225,

retiring to, 38—9; work o n kibbutz,

39-40; and Mapai, 4 0 - 1

229, 231

258

INDEX

Second Temple, 2 2 5 ‘Security mishap’ affair, 2 0 6 - 1 5 Sejera farm village, 2 5 - 3 0 , 3 1 , 36, 4 1 , 51; the first collective, 26-7, 30; Arab attacks on, 26-7, 28-30 Sephardi Jews, 44-5 Shantung, 186 Shapiro, Chaim Moshe, 1 2 4

United Jewish Appeal, 1 3 9 United Nations, 1 1 5 , 1 1 9 , 146-7, 177; Partition Resolution, 1 0 , 1 1 , 64, 1 5 4 ; and Communist China, 181, 182,

187, 188; Charter of, Uzziah ofJudah, 2 2 5

182,

187

Vaad Leumi (Jewish National Assem-

Sharett, Moshe, 15, 47, 56, 105, 127%,

Versailles Treaty, 186

128, 206

Shefer, Zeev, 57 Shein, Avraham, 79-80

Shitreet, Behor,

213

Shoshani, Saadia, 5 6 Sinai, Revelation on, 228 Sinai campaign, 78, 1 1 5 , 137, 149, 205;

speedy mobilization in, 1 4 2 ; aims of 146-7; impact on African states, 173 Sitkoff, Issachar, 56 Slavin, Hayim, 140

72-4, 7 6 , 9 4

Wavell, Lord, g o , 102

Weizmann, D r Chaim, 84, 87, 100,

smoking, 2 0 5 - 6 Sneh, D r

Wailing Wall riots (1929), 7 1 Warsaw, 1 9 , 48, 50; Pact, 166 Washington, 1 0 9 , 2 0 4 Washington, George, 1 2 Wauchope, General Sir Arthur, 75; one of best High Commissioners, 70-1,

105,

Moshe, 57

Special Night Squads, 78, 89, 90-1,

202,

203;

103,

urges

let down b y Britain, 64, 8 5 ; Israel's

138 Spinoza, Baruch, 198, 2 1 7 Stanley, Oliver, g 5

first President, 65; and Passfield Commission, 7 1 - 2 ; talks with Lloyd o n Jewish State, 88, 89, 9 1 - 3 ; and Biltmore, 1 1 2

Dr, 2 3 , 2 5 Suez campaign, 146 Stein,

White Paper (1939), 84, 85, 9 3 , 101-2, 1 1 0 , 1 1 3 ; Land Regulations of, 101,

Sun Yat-Sen, 185, 186 Syria, 93, 1 0 8 , 156

102

Wilson, President Woodrow, 1 0 9 Wingate, General Orde, 78, 89—93; his Special Night Squads, 78, 8g, go—1; andJewish State, 92-3 World Zionist Organization, 54, 56, 7 0 , 72, 76, 238-9

Talmud, 229, 245 Tel-Aviv, 16; growth of, 152-3

Ten Commandments, 2 3 1 Thales o f Miletus, 1 9 5 Theophrastus, 1 9 5

Tirath Zvi, 78 Truman, President Harry S., 204; rec-

ognizes Israel, 1 1 , 116; and request for 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 immigrants, 98, 1 1 6 - 1 7

Tunisia, 1 6 0 Turkey, 9 3 ; Ben Gurion’s studies in,

Turkish language, 45, 2 0 3

109,

Jewish Army, 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 0 5 ; compared with Herzl, 59-61, 62; ‘a Jewish Jew’, 60-1; his greatness, 61-5; address t o Peel Commission, 63-4;

Solomon, 2 2 5 Sonnenborn, Rudolph, 1 3 9 Spanish language, 45, 203

43-7, 2 0 3

106,

Yavniel, 2 g — 3 0 Yema, 29

Yiddish, 44, 45, 60, 249 Yosef, Shlomo Ben, 76, 78-80 Yosef, D r Dov, 208

Yotveta, 1 4 7 Yugoslavia, 184, 185 Zemach, Shlomo, 20-22

U Nu, 1 9 0 , 1 9 3 4 Uganda, 61, g 5

Zionism: labour work of,

19-20,

42-3,

47-9, 51, 5 3 ; principle o f emigration

259

INDEX

24-

aim ofJewish statehood first officially stated, 1 1 2 ; belief in Messianic salvation, 2 2 1 ; early revolutionaries, 236-8; changed attitude t o manual

30, 51, 122; significance o f Sde

labour. 237-8; quarrel over content

Boker in, 39; in America, 47-9, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 2 3 9 ; world 108-10, leaders of, more concerned with political activity, 53, 59; in Diaspora, 54, 63, 2 4 1 - 2 4 5 ; Weizmann’s and Herzl’s differing ideas on, 59-65; Revisionists in, 76-81; Colonial and Foreign Offices unfriendly to, 83-5,

of, 238-41; distinction between Jews in Israel and outside, 238-48 Zionist Congresses, 54, 61, 2 2 0 ; (1933)

Zionism :—continued t o build model state,

19—20,

45, 48,

54, 59, 236, 237-9, 240; and estab-

lishment of farm villages,

91,

97,

117;

22-3,

56; (1929) 7 2 ; (1937) 109; system of election to, 133; first (Basle 1897), 165 Zionist Organization, 32, 5 I , 5 4 ; Ben

Gurion chairman of, 70; Weizmann resigns Presidency, 72; established,

Bevin’s hostility to, gb,

97-8, 116; Churchill support for, 1 0 1 - 2 , 106; French sympathy, 108;

238-9

Zurabin (terrorist), 79-80

260

David Ben Gurion is one of the great figures of his century. A founder of the new state o f Israel, h e was its Prime

Minister from the beginning, one of its

foremost military strategists in the War

of Independence, an authority o n all the complex development problems of young nations. Yet after he resigned in June 1963, to return to Sde Boker in the Negev desert and tend sheep with the other members o f his kibbutz, what

he said and thought about philosophy, about being a Jew, about politics, about war and peace, has continued to move and to excite men’s minds all over the world. (Continued on back flap)

(Continued from front flap)

Here is an intimate self-portrait of this extraordinary leader. Talking with an old friend and former colleague he has recalled the story of his own life and

the story of Israel. The talk ranges from his boyhood in Russia to his daily life in retirement. It includes his estimates of other world leaders including Weizmann, Churchill, D e Gaulle, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. Other

subjects in this relaxed, highly personal

and readable book are religion, languages, the advantages of standing on your head, science and ethics, what the world can d o about China, the future

of Africa, and how he stopped smoking

three packs of cigarettes a day.

Jacket design by Lawrence Ratzkin JACKET PHOTOGRAPH B Y W I D E WORLD PHOTOS