Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object 9783110325485, 9783110324952

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Robin D. Rollinger Austrian Phenomenology Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object

PHENOMENOLOGY & MIND Herausgegeben von / Edited by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski • Wolfgang Huemer Band 12 / Volume 12

Robin D. Rollinger

Austrian Phenomenology Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object

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In memory of my teacher, Karl Schuhmann (1941-2003)

CONTENTS PREFACE .................................................................................................................................ix INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................1 1. The Subject Matter of Austrian Phenomenology...............................................................2 2. The Method of Austrian Phenomenology........................................................................11 3. Austrian Phenomenology and Philosophy .......................................................................18 4. Major Figures of Austrian Phenomenology.....................................................................22 BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON IMAGINATION ............................................................29 1. Introduction......................................................................................................................29 2. Brentano on Imagination..................................................................................................30 3. Husserl on Imagination ....................................................................................................37 3. 1. Methodological Considerations ...............................................................................38 3. 2. Presentations ............................................................................................................39 3. 3. Sensations and Phantasms .......................................................................................43 3. 4. The Phantasy Image.................................................................................................44 3. 5. Phantasy Presentations as Intuitive..........................................................................46 3.6. Critique of the Doctrine of Original Association......................................................47 4. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................48 NAMES, STATEMENTS, AND MIND-FUNCTIONS IN HUSSERL'S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS...................................................................................................................51 1. Introduction......................................................................................................................51 2. Manifestation, Meaning, and Reference ..........................................................................52 3. Positing Names and Non-Positing Statements.................................................................58 4. Excursus: Inner Perception in the Logical Investigations................................................62 5. Fulfillment of Names and Statements..............................................................................64 6. Concluding Remarks........................................................................................................72 MARTY ON LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS AND MIND-FUNCTIONS ............................73 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................73 2. Ontological Requirements ................................................................................................73 3. Mind-Functions in Correlation with Linguistic Expressions.............................................77 4. Mentalism and Introspectionism.......................................................................................82 5. Conclusion........................................................................................................................86 HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC: THE 1896 LECTURES IN THEIR NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTEXT ...........................................................................................................87 1. Introduction......................................................................................................................87 3. Logic as Theory of Science..............................................................................................89 3. Concepts...........................................................................................................................93 4. Propositions......................................................................................................................98 5. Inferences.......................................................................................................................104 6. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................107 MEINONG ON THE OBJECTS OF SENSATION..............................................................109 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................109

2. Brentano on Sensory Contents.......................................................................................112 3. From Physical Phenomena to Objects of Sensation ......................................................115 4. Sensory Objects of Higher Order...................................................................................119 5. The Nonexistence of Sensory Objects ...........................................................................120 6. A Priori Knowledge about Sensory Objects..................................................................124 7. Comparison with Stumpf ...............................................................................................130 8. Comparison with Husserl...............................................................................................134 9. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................136 STUMPF ON PHENOMENA AND PHENOMENOLOGY ................................................139 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................139 2. Phenomena.....................................................................................................................140 3. Phenomenology..............................................................................................................146 4. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................155 BRENTANO AND MEINONG ............................................................................................157 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................157 2. Points of Divergence......................................................................................................159 2.1. Theory of Relations.................................................................................................160 2.2. Intensity...................................................................................................................163 2.3. Immediate Evidence of Surmise .............................................................................163 2.4. Feeling and Desire ..................................................................................................166 2.5. Content and Object .................................................................................................167 2.6. Judgments ...............................................................................................................167 2.7. Presentations ...........................................................................................................169 2.8. Time-Consciousness ...............................................................................................170 2.9. Assumptions............................................................................................................171 2.10. Object Theory .......................................................................................................173 2.11. Value Theory ........................................................................................................179 2.12. Phenomena and Consciousness.............................................................................180 3. Philosophical Affinity....................................................................................................181 HUSSERL AND CORNELIUS: PHENOMENOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND EPISTEMOLOGY.................................................................................................................189 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................189 2. Hans Cornelius (1863-1947)..........................................................................................190 3. Husserl's Critique of Attempt at a Theory of Existential Judgments .............................192 3. 1 Various Types of Problems concerning Judgments................................................193 3. 2 Perceiving and Distinguishing ................................................................................194 3. 3 Content, Object, and Meaning ................................................................................195 3. 4 Phantasms and Sensations.......................................................................................197 3. 5 Memory Images ......................................................................................................197 3. 6. Negation.................................................................................................................198 4. Husserl's Critique of Psychology as an Experiential Science........................................199 4. 1 The Principle of Thought Economy........................................................................200 4. 2 Abstraction and General Ideas ................................................................................202 4. 3 The Experiential Origin of Universally Valid Judgments ......................................205 5. Cornelius' Reply and Correspondence with Husserl......................................................206 5. 1 Psychology and Epistemology................................................................................207

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5. 2 Correspondence.......................................................................................................209 5. 3. The Subject Matter of Phenomenology .................................................................214 6. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................219 MEINONG ON PERCEPTION AND OBJECTIVES ..........................................................221 AUSTRIAN THEORIES OF JUDGMENT: BOLZANO, BRENTANO, MEINONG, AND HUSSERL..............................................................................................................................233 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................233 2. Bolzano ..........................................................................................................................233 3. Brentano.........................................................................................................................242 4. Meinong .........................................................................................................................248 5. Husserl ...........................................................................................................................254 6. Concluding Remarks......................................................................................................261 THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY IN STUMPF'S EPISTEMOLOGY................................263 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................263 2. Stumpf’s Epistemology ..................................................................................................264 3. The Concept of Causality in British Empiricism...........................................................269 4. Inwardly Perceived Causality ........................................................................................271 5. Necessity in Natural Causal Laws .................................................................................275 6. The External World and Causality.................................................................................279 7. Causality in Inorganic Nature ........................................................................................282 8. Causality in Organic Nature...........................................................................................287 9. Psycho-Physical Causality .............................................................................................290 10. Psychical Causality ......................................................................................................296 11. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................298 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................301

PREFACE

This book consists of revised versions of papers which were previously published elsewhere. At the beginning of each one it is indicated where it originally appeared. The primary sources are German texts, but passages quoted from them have been translated into English. Unless otherwise indicated, translations from German are my own. Titles of books and essays are translated (except in cases where the title in the original language is so familiar that translation is unnecessary), whereas titles of journals are left untranslated. Quotations from unpublished material, however, are given in both English translation and the original German. In view of the fact that the present volume draws upon more unpublished material than usual, a word should be said about such sources. From Franz Brentano’s manuscripts I have made use of material from sections EL (epistemology and logic), Ps (psychology), Eth (ethics), and M (metaphysics). Where there is a published text edited from such material, I have consulted the originals whenever circumstances permitted. Wherever this was not possible, however, the results must admittedly be regarded as provisional insofar as they are concerned with Brentano’s philosophy. Studies of his philosophy, after all, are going through a transitional period, in which a shift to more reliable sources is being made. Further information about the particular manuscripts which are cited may be found in the bibliography. While the originals are located in the Houghton Library in Harvard, I have used digital facsimiles and microfilm of the originals and in a few cases typescripts (made in Prague during the 1930s) generously provided by the Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für österreichische Philosophie in Graz (Austria). From the Husserl Archives in Leuven (Belgium) I have also sometimes made use of material from sections Q (consisting of materials from lectures of Brentano and Stumpf as well as others) and section Y (notes from lectures of Brentano taken by E. Leisching). Further specifications of these manuscripts may be found in the bibliography. Wherever texts which Husserl wrote as the author are cited, however, these are taken from publications, especially from the Husserliana (the multi-volume edition of

Husserl’s writings in German). I thank the Husserl Archives and the Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für österreichische Philosophie for giving me access to unpublished material. As far as translations are concerned, an effort has naturally been made to make them consistent. Literature is in most cases cited by author (and editor wherever relevant) and date. However, certain classical texts are cited in a way that makes them accessible in almost all editions thereof. Moreover, volumes from the Husserliana are indicated as Hua (for the main series) or Hua-Mat (for the accompanying series: HusserlianaMaterialien), in each case followed by a Roman numeral to indicate the relevant volume. Unpublished manuscripts are cited according to the relevant archival signatures. In spite of revisions, an attempt has been made to leave enough of the original essays intact to the extent that each can be read on its own. While this entails a certain amount of repetition, it seems to be the best way to publish a set of essays which were not originally meant to appear in the same volume. The result is a series of interrelated sketches pertaining to the notion of Austrian phenomenology, as explained in the introduction. In my opinion this notion is not only of considerable historical interest, but also one that can very well prove viable in further philosophical investigations. If any of these sketches should serve in any way to be of use in such investigations, with either a historical or a systematic focus, this will be my greatest reward for the labor involved in their composition and publication. Since the present volume is the result of more than fifteen years of research, there are many people who should be thanked for helping me in various ways. I thank the publishers of the original papers for kindly granting me permission for republication. The following names should also be mentioned with the utmost gratitude: Liliana Albertazzi, Mark van Atten, Wilhelm Baumgartner, Arianna Betti, Johannes Brandl, Denis Fisette, Rudolf Haller, Carlo Ierna, Dale Jacquette, Sandra Lapointe, Kevin Mulligan, Roberto Poli, Maria van der Schaar, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, Richard Tieszen, and Gregory Westwood. If I have forgotten to mention anyone else whom I should thank, I apologize. Above all, the moving scholarly force behind the course of research that has resulted in x

the present volume was my dissertation advisor, the late Karl Schuhmann, to whom this book is solemnly dedicated. Robin D. Rollinger Salzburg, August 2008

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Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est. Franz Brentano

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy is not a science. Though some find nothing objectionable in this and are happy to characterize philosophy as a literary, rhetorical, or edifying endeavor, others see the necessity of fashioning it into something as scientific as physics, chemistry, and other well established sciences. Mathematics, with all its rigor and precision, has also been a model for many a philosopher. There are of course different opinions about how philosophy can reach a level that even comes close to that of such disciplines. Some have thought that this can be done by regarding philosophy as a kind of synthesis of all the sciences, while others have tried to reduce philosophy to purely logical considerations. Still others maintain that philosophy can be a science if and only if it develops methods of its own in application to problems of its own. Other options are not in principle to be excluded. However this may be, there is by no means a prevailing consensus as to how philosophy is to become a science or whether such a goal is even desirable or indeed possible. The discussion of this matter still goes on. The essays contained in this volume are concerned with the work of a group of philosophers whose aim was in fact to develop philosophy into a properly scientific discipline. Their strategy 1 for doing this is what I call “Austrian phenomenology”. In this 1

Though such writings as Eaton (1930), Haller (1979), Haller (1986), and Smith (1994) have helped to advance and spread the notion of Austrian philosophy, it is not at all common to speak of Austrian phenomenology. By no means do I wish to equate the two. Austrian phenomenology is only one part of Austrian philosophy. What it has in common with other currents of Austrian philosophy, such as that of the Vienna

introduction it will be explained what this kind of philosophy is and briefly indicated who these philosophers are.

1. The Subject Matter of Austrian Phenomenology In the German speaking world after the death of Hegel in 1831 and especially during the second half of the nineteenth century there arose a very loud outcry against philosophy as an endeavor absolutely devoid of all scientific interest. In view of the collapse of those colossal philosophical systems which had been erected earlier in that century, especially the Hegelian one, there emerged great scepticism and even 1 contempt for philosophy as such. In opposition to such scepticism and contempt, it was Franz Brentano’s aim to make a convincing case for the view that philosophy can and should and must become scientific. In his habilitation in Würzburg (1866) he defended a number of theses in support of his conception of philosophy as scientific. Perhaps the most important of these is the thesis that the true 2 method of philosophy is no different from that of the natural sciences. Some years later (1874) in his inaugural address as a professor in the University of Vienna, he attempted to explain why philosophy has not yet become a science by arguing that psychology, the basic philosophical discipline, requires greater methodological complexity than the other 3 sciences do and therefore takes a much longer time to reach maturity. In Circle, lies in the attempt to make philosophy scientific. 1 Riehl (1908), p. 1: “In about the middle of the nineteenth century whoever would have made it his task to speak openly about philosophy would have certainly failed in his plans. He would not have found an audience for his address even among the educated of his contemporaries and would have in addition exposed himself to the suspicion of wanting to praise something like alchemy in an age of the natural sciences.” 2 Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1929), p. 147. 3 Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1929), pp. 83-100. In this regard Brentano was influenced by Auguste Comte, who had presented a scale of the sciences, ranging from the simplest to the most complex in method, and sociology rather than psychology as the most

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the course of his intellectual development, especially in the late 1880s, Brentano came to formulate a distinction that was to facilitate the emergence of scientific philosophy, namely the distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology. It is this distinction that provides us with one of the first important factors in understanding Austrian phenomenology. In one of Brentano’s lecture courses on descriptive psychology we find that he also calls this discipline “descriptive phenomenology” (beschrei1 bende Phänomenologie). In his final lecture course on descriptive complex. Due to his rejection of the possibility of self-observation, Comte made no room at all for psychology in his scale. Brentano, however, was obviously less sceptical regarding psychology (based on inner perception rather than selfobservation) and therefore found room for this discipline in his scale. Sociology for Brentano is only an extension of psychology. See Brentano (1874), pp. 27 ff., 35-42. An evaluation of Comte’s “positive philosophy” can be found in Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1926), pp. 99-133. 1 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), p. 129. The lecture course in question was given in the winter semester of 1888/89. Only a small portion thereof is published in Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), p. 129-133. The manuscript of this lecture course is catalogued under signature Ps 77. Aside from the occurrence of the term Phänomenologie on the title page of this lecture, at least one other occurrence thereof can be found in Brentano’s manuscripts, namely in M 96/31730, which is hardly amenable to editing. Nonetheless, the topics listed, which include ones on both the psychical and physical sides of phenomena, may be taken as a confirmation of the concept of phenomenology put forward in this introduction. Descriptive psychology was a concern for Brentano throughout his Vienna period, in which he exerted the most influence. In a manuscript which was written as a continuation of Brentano (1874), most likely immediately before or after he took up the position of professor in Vienna, he says, “The task we have to fulfill concerning the presentations is twofold. We must describe them and establish the laws towhich they are subject in their coming-about and in the development. [Zweifach ist die Aufgabe, die wir hinsichtlich der Vorstellungen zu lösen haben. Wir müssen sie beschreiben und die Gesetze feststellen, welchen sie in ihrer Entstehung und ihrem Verlaufe unterworfen sind.]” (Ps 53/53002). This of course involves a clear-cut distinction between a psychology that describes and one that establishes laws. Perhaps Brentano did not publish this continuation or the other projected parts of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint because he was compelled to give a fuller statement of descriptive psychology, as he came to do in his Viennna lectures, not to mention the

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psychology (1889/90) he calls it “psychognosy” (Psychognosie) and characterizes it as the analysis of consciousness into its elements and the 1 specification of their modes of combination. Genetic psychology for Brentano is by contrast the discipline in which an attempt is made to give a causal account of consciousness. Such an account, according to Brentano, relies very heavily on physiology, whereas he regards descriptive psychology as “pure”, i.e. not for the most part based on physiological 2 considerations. Moreover, descriptive psychology is to be the foundation of genetic psychology. It is in addition to provide us with the elementary terms for philosophy, the characteristica universalis as envisioned by 3 Descartes and Leibniz. While Austrian phenomenology certainly involves descriptive psychology, there is yet another aspect of it that must be explained. This aspect is indeed something that comes to light when we consider the most basic thesis of Brentano’s descriptive psychology, namely the thesis that attributes intentional reference to all elements of consciousness. In view of the central importance of this thesis throughout the present book, it will now be briefly discussed. The elements of consciousness are for Brentano psychical phenomena or acts, as he called them in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. (Here I shall use the term “mind-functions”, which is more in line with 4 Brentano’s terminology during the late 1880s. ) As is well known, what fact that he investigations became increasingly refined and detailed. 1 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), pp. 1 ff. 2 By no means does Brentano wish to condemn the usage of physiology in psychological investigations, as these had been pursued since Fechner (1890), though he finds this area of research highly underdeveloped. 3 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), p. 76. 4 In Brentano (EL 80) psychisches Phänomen is often replaced with psychische Funktion, which is translated as “mind-function”. Cf. Stumpf (1907a). The former term is no longer preferred by Brentano because it suggests a contrast between phenomena and things in themselves, which is explicitly rejected in Brentano Ps 77 (typescript)/B28307, where he significantly remarks, “All phenomena are to be called inner ones, because they all belong to one reality, either as constituent parts or as correlates [Alle Phänomene sind innere zu nennen, weil sie alle zu einer Realität gehören, sei es als Bestandteile, sei es als Korrelate]”. This is an excellent indication of the subject matter of Austrian phenomenology as elaborated upon in this

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characterizes mind-functions for Brentano and sets them apart from physical phenomena, such as colors and sounds, is their intentional 1 reference (intentionale Beziehung) to objects. While Brentano thus distinguishes between two groups of phenomena, one of them differing from the other by virtue of intentional reference, he also asserts the following: If there is, as we commonly believe, an unconscious corporeal world with sensory qualities or, instead of them, with a matter consisting of whatever kind 2 of unintuitive nature filling certain spaces, it certainly has its share of many relations: of part and whole, of agreement [i.e. similarity] and difference, of cause and effect, etc., but simply not intentional relation. Thus [we also call this] 3 “psychical relation”. introduction. 1 Brentano (1874), pp. 115 f. 2 The term “unintuitive” is here a translation of unanschaulich, as it often is in the following essays, and the term “intuitive” is accordingly often used as a translation of anschaulich. When Brentano speaks of the intuitive he usually means all that we present by sensory means, but also corresponding phantasy images. In the context of the passage cited here colors and sounds, as we know them through our senses and as we imagine them are intuitive, whereas the light and sound waves as well as other hypothetical constructs of natural science are unintuitve. 3 EL 74/12660: “Gibt es, wie wir gemeiniglich glauben, eine bewusstlose Körperwelt mit sinnlichen Qualitäten oder statt ihrer mit einer Masse von was immer für einer unanschaulichen Beschaffenheit gewisse Räume erfüllend, so hat sie gewiss an mancherlei Relationen, von Teil und Ganzem, von Übereinstimmung und Verschiedenheit, von Ursache und Wirkung u. dgl., aber schlechterdings nicht an solcher intentionalen Relation Teil. Daher [sagen wir] ‘psychische Relation’.” (Cf. the version edited from the typescript in Brentano [1982], p. 22). Intentional reference, in contrast with anything that is found in the physical world, continued to be acknowledged by many of Brentano’s students and by many of their students in turn, though this term was often not used. Cf. Witasek (1908), pp. 3 f.: “My presenting, my thinking, my feeling, and my willing are always in a peculiar manner ‘directed’ at something; I present something, a something that is not the presenting, a book for instance; my thinking grasps things, which are not themselves thinking, indeed not at all something mental; it grasps them without importing them into itself; there is not and there cannot be any question of a spatial relationship, and yet our thinking ‘makes contact’ with those things. The same thing goes for feeling and willing. It is a relation which must be enigmatic, even inconceivable, if we were not so well acquainted with

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This relation is said to be one of mind (or consciousness) to an object, but “object” must not be understood in reference to a real t"hing existing outside of the mind. Whenever we think of a property, relation, a 1 boundary, state, process, etc., it is an object to which the mind is directed. Moreover, if a centaur, for instance, is imagined, it is no less an object of intentional reference than a perceived house or mountain. As long as we understand this term in such a broad sense, the most basic thesis of Brentano’s descriptive psychology is that every mind-function has an 2 object, more specifically an intentional object. It is impossible to perceive without perceiving an object, to imagine without imagining an object, to desire without desiring an object, and so forth for all other mind-functions. Most importantly, Brentano finally reached a position during his Vienna period (1874-1895) whereby he acknowledged a whole range of irrealia, such as a lack, a possibility, an impossibility, the future, and the past, just 3 to name a few. What motivated his acceptance of these nonreal objects as it from our inner experience. Yet, it is restricted completely to the psychical; if one sorts through the physical, the world of material things, however assiduously, there is not a trace of it to be found; there is a spatial togetherness and enclosure, motion towards each other, there are many kinds of relations, and yet such an inward relatedness, directedness, pointing to something else has no place there. The physical things are there, closed off alongside each other, none of them pointing beyond themselves in that peculiar manner, like the one we know from presenting and all psychical occurrence.” 1 The broad concept of an object that we find in Carnap (1979), p. 1, may be reminiscent of the one that is suggested here. However, Carnap’s definition of “object” as “everything about which a statement can be made” indicates that he is using a different concept from the one that gained prominence in Austrian phenomenology, which had in fact preceeded the linguistic turn in philosophy. An object is thus conceived as a correlate of mind-functions rather than linguistic items such as sentences or words. By no means do I wish to suggest here that the linguistic turn somehow brought greater sophistication into philosophy, as many of its defenders most certainly would. 2 Here the question must be left open as to whether the intentional object is immanent to consciousness. The differing views on this matter are discussed throughout Rollinger (1999). 3 See Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1930), p. 46. Here we are primarily concerned with Brentano’s views during his Vienna period and consequently not concerned with his

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existing lay in his theory of truth, which is crucial to understanding his 1 conception of one particular class of mind-functions, namely judgments. Truth and falsehood, according to Brentano, are to be ascribed to judgments. Moreover, what makes a judgment true is not in all cases the correspondence to something real, as one would think in accordance with the old definition of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus. If, for instance, we truly judge that someone lacks money, it is a lack and not some real thing that corresponds to the judgment in question and thereby makes it 2 true. The concept of an object is accordingly understood to be much more extensive than that of a real thing. This broad concept of an object is meant to accommodate both the characteristic of intentionality (to use Edmund Husserl’s term) and the truth of judgments in particular. When we use the phrase “mind and object”, it is first and foremost intentionality that is meant. This is indeed the dominant topic of Austrian phenomenology. Though two words are here conjoined with the word “and”, it is important to realize that the phrase in question designates a unity, but we must at the same time heed the fact that this is a complex later “reism” and its concomitant theories of truth and intentionality. While no evaluation of this later development can possibly be given here, it is certain that Brentano the Austrian phenomenologist was most influential in the Vienna period. For a discussion of Brentano’s different phases as regards ontological matters, see Chrudzimski (2003) and Chrudzimski and Smith (2004). Such a study regarding his descriptive psychology has yet to be written. 1 Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1930), pp. 3-29. 2 The lack of money could be understood as a state of affairs (Sachverhalt, in Husserl’s terminology), an objective (Objektiv, in Meinong’s terminology), or a content of judgment (Urteilsinhalt, in Marty’s terminology). (Though these concepts are touched upon in various essays in the present volume, the following ones are especially noteworthy in this regard: “Names, Statements, and Mind-Functions in Husserl’s Logical Investigations”, “Marty on Linguistic Expressions and MindFunctions”, and “Meinong on Perception and Objectives”). We may also say that the non-being of money (which exceeds a certain amount) is what makes the judgment in question true. However one wishes to construe the relevant truth-maker, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to identify it with a real thing in the world, whether this thing be mental or physical. This introduction, however, is not the place for arguing in favor irrealia, but in the present context it is only important to make it clear that there is a rational motivation for acknowledging objects outside the sphere of the real.

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unity. On one side, we have mind, which consists of mind-functions (such 2 as perceivings, judgings, imaginings, and feelings ), while on the other side we have objects, which need not at all be real. These consist of what we perceive, what we judge about, what we imagine, what we love or hate, etc.. While Austrian phenomenology is ultimately concerned with the complex unity of mind and object, it is possible for its practitioners to shift 3 their attention now to the side of mind, now to the side of objects. In other words, Austrian phenomenology swings back and forth between 4 descriptive psychology and object theory. 1

The fact that Ernst Mach took pains to work out a theory of elements which “are always the same ones, of one kind and appear now as physical, now as physical elements, depending only on their connection” (Mach [1911], p. 51) should suffice to show why he is not discussed here as one of the Austrian phenomenologists. His view in fact amounts to a denial of the phenomenal duality of mind and object which is crucial to Austrian phenomenology. His view on this matter and also similar ones in Ebbinghaus (1902) and Külpe (1893) are criticized for this reason in Witasek (1908), pp. 7 ff. Though Mach certainly acknowledged a phenomenal complexity of some kind (see Mach [1886], pp. 43 ff., 104, 128), which in fact came to be of great interest to and influence upon such Austrian phenomenologists as Christian von Ehrenfels (see von Ehrenfels [1890]) and Edmund Husserl (see Hua XII, pp. 210 f., n.), the complexity in question is, in terms of Austrian phenomenology, comparable to the complexity found completely on the side of mind or that found completely on the side of object, not the complex unity that we designate here as “mind and object”. In this respect as well as many others, the critical remarks in Brentano, (eds.) Chisholm and Marek (1988) should be considered. 2 See Mulligan (2004), p. 68. 3 In the terminology of Hua III/1, it is noema and noesis which is, as a complex unity, under consideration here. To speak in accordance with this terminology, Austrian phenomenology can have either a noemtic or noetic focus in its investigations. 4 The term “object theory” is a translation of Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie, as first elaborated on in Meinong (1904). Though few have accepted this term and the discipline which it designates was even pronounced dead by a prominent philosopher of the twentieth century who was very familiar with Austrian phenomenology (Ryle [1972], p. 7), I still find it very useful for designating an area of inquiry. Whether it can fully encompass everything that Meinong envisioned, however, is another matter. Moreover, as Meinong well aware, contributions to this discipline are much older than the name (as he insists throughout Meinong [1907]). Many of them, however, have been made under various titles, especially “logic”. While the older logics qua logics are, to be sure, of historical interest only because they have been superceded by the

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The shift to the side of objects occurs with particular salience in the case of one of Brentano’s most outstanding and at the same time wayward students, Alexius Meinong. According to Meinong, object theory constitutes an entire discipline in its own right, independently of psychology. In his final summary of his philosophical labors, however, his classification of objects is made in terms of his classification of mind1 functions. Here Meinong is speaking as an Austrian phenomenologist, for it is ultimately the complex unity of mind and object that draws his 2 attention and guides many of his inquiries. An outstanding example of the shift from descriptive psychology to object theory is explored in two of the essays contained in the present volume, namely “Meinong on the Objects of Sensation” and “Stumpf on Phenomena and Phenomenology”. While much of Brentano’s descriptive 3 psychology was devoted to investigations of sensation, such investigations finally gave way to ones that his students conducted regarding the 4 objects of sensation. Here it may be mentioned, however, that much of mathematical logic that Frege established, they may nevertheless be the source of great insights in the domain of object theory, just as much descriptive psychology (i.e. phenomenology proper) may be found in many of the older psychologies. Here it may be stressed that Austrian phenomenology is something new only in the sense that it thematized a subject matter which had previously been subordinated or marginalized due to other philosophical and perhaps non-philosophical concerns. 1 Meinong (1921), pp. 104 f. 2 Here my approach to Meinong differs from contemporary ones whereby his theory of objects is formulated on the basis of semantical rather than phenomenological considerations. See Jacquette (1996). While I am sure that my approach is the more accurate one, historically speaking, the development of Meinongian semantics nonetheless proves to be of great philosophical interest. Just as an Aristotelian need not necessarily be bound by the historical Aristotle, a Meinongian need not be bound to the historical Meinong. At the same time, Meinong the Austrian phenomenologist is as philosophically interesting as Meinong the semanticist, as can be seen from the present volume. See also Rollinger (1993b), Jacquette (2003), and Chrudzimski (2007). 3 As is evident from Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), Brentano (Ps 77), and Brentano (Q 9), Brentano did not find enough time in a semester to give attention to much more than sensation in his lecture courses on psychology. 4 In this regard Ehrenfels (1890) must also be regarded as a seminal study, which lies in the background of various essays in the present volume. As regards further

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Brentano’s investigations concerning sensations are in fact concerned with the various contents thereof, e.g. colors and tones. His theory of parts and wholes, for instance, is formulated first and foremost by using examples of 1 such contents. In this regard we may also consider his concern with such questions as the one concerning phenomenal green, namely whether this (to be distinguished from the stimulus which presumably causes us to see 2 it) consists of phenomenal blue and phenomenal yellow. Though the students of Brentano came to consider such matters as the special province of object theory or a particular branch thereof (e.g. “color geometry”), Brentano himself dealt with them only in the context of descriptive psychology. Nonetheless, object-theoretical investigations should by no means be regarded as alien to his philosophical reflections. The question remains open here to what extent such investigations should be pursued in separation from descriptive-psychological ones. In order to avoid troubling ourselves here with this question, it may thus be pointed out that what I have in mind is phenomenological object theory, i.e. the investigation of objects as phenomena. One could also speak of object phenomenology in contrast with act phenomenology, i.e. descriptive psychology, as this was 3 done in Munich phenomenology. However, I shall here simply use the term “object theory” for the sake of avoiding undue awkardness of expression. Austrian phenomenology, as understood here, is accordingly both descriptive psychology and object theory. In its description of mindfunctions it cannot avoid mentioning objects to which these mindfunctions intentionally refer. Moreover, in its investigation of objects the concept of mind-functions and often concepts of specific mind-functions are not without influence, however much such concepts recede into the background. All sciences are, to be sure, concerned with objects. Insofar as the concept of mind or those of specific mind-functions come into play in elaborations on the concept that Ehrenfels introduced therein, see Smith (ed.) (1988). The later development of Gestalt psychology, which grew out of Austrian phenomenology, may be regarded as a shift back to the concerns of descriptive psychology. 1 See Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), pp. 10-27. 2 See the two texts published in Brentano, (ed.) Chisholm (1979), pp. 44-65. 3 See Geiger (1907).

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the treatment of such objects, this treatment is of the kind that we find in Austrian phenomenology. Historically speaking, Austrian phenomenology sets out from descriptive psychology and only in its later developments arrives at object theory. In view of this fact, if not for deeper, “systematic” reasons, the description of mind-functions will sometimes be spoken of as Austrian phenomenology proper, whereas object theory will be seen as a subordinate endeavor. Here the reader may also be warned that some of the philosophers whose work is discussed in the present volume also have their own peculiar way of using the term “phenomenology”, as this is particularly conspicuous in the case of Stumpf, for whom the term in question refers to a restricted domain of object theory. Be this as it may, whenever Austrian phenomenology is mentioned without further specification in the present volume, it may be safely be regarded as that discipline which has a descriptive-psychological side on the one hand and an object-theoretical side on the other.

2. The Method of Austrian Phenomenology The question of course arises here concerning the method of the kind of phenomenology under consideration here. As already indicated, Brentano held that the true method of philosophy generally is that of the natural sciences. Yet, if we look at some of the outstanding figures of the so-called phenomenological movement, we find that they regard phenomenology first and foremost as a method. Husserl is of course the most prominent case in this regard. As he developed his own views apart from those of Brentano and at the same time became more and more sympathetic to the old inflationary German philosophy that Brentano vehemently opposed in the first place, Husserl became more and more attached to the notion of a special phenomenological method, particularly the transcendental reduction, which is not shared by any other science. Though few of his students and almost none of the outstanding ones (such as Adolf Reinach, Roman Ingarden, and Martin Heidegger) followed Husserl all the way in this regard, they still often tried to formulate their own phenomenological method and were in many cases particularly concerned with setting this 11

method apart from that of the natural sciences. In some cases, such as 1 Alexander Pfänder‘s modest version of epoché, the proposed method was still closely related to Husserl’s, while in others, such as Heidegger’s 2 hermeneutics, it was something entirely different from what Husserl had envisioned. In contrast to all such perspectives, however, Austrian phenomenology is not characterized by any method of its own apart from that of the natural sciences. It is characterized strictly in terms of its subject matter, the complex unity of mind and object. In view of this fact, much of Husserl’s later phenomenology no longer belongs to what is called Austrian phenomenology. In his early work, however, including his Logical Investigations (1900/01), he is no less an Austrian phenomenologist than Brentano or Meinong. Though it may be correct to say that Heidegger “was responsible for terminating that previously healthy scientific line [of phenomenology] which had brought forth such masterpieces as Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Husserl’s Logical Investi3 gations”, the excesses of Husserl’s later pronouncements about method 4 were already the beginning of the end. It is, however, a noteworthy feature of science that previously abandoned lines of research can undergo a revival in future generations. Be this as it may, further elaborations concerning the method of Austrian phenomenology are in order here. In Brentano’s lectures on psychognosy from the winter semester of 1889/90, the following aspects of method for this discipline are enumerated when he says of the investigator in this area: 1

Pfänder, (ed.) Herbert Spiegelberg (1973), pp. 37 f. This is of course the phenomenology that is exhibited throughout Heidegger (1927). The author of this work expresses the view that is held by many and is in fact diamentrically opposed to the conception of phenomenology in the Austrian sense when he says, “The term ‘phenomenology’ primarily means a concept of method. It characterizes the how of philosophical investigation rather than the what of the objects thereof” (Heidegger [1927], p. 27). 3 Smith (2006), pp. 19 f. 4 See Balázs and Smith (1998), pp. 37-76, where the progressive decline from Brentano and early Husserl is traced in so-called “Continental Philosophy”. The analysis there can be viewed as an update of the observations that had already been made by Paul Linke in the 1950s. See Rollinger (2005). 2

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

1

He must have lived-experience. He must notice. He must fix what he notices in order to gather. He must inductively generalize. Whenever the necessity or impossibility of the unification of certain elements is clear from the concepts themselves, he must intuitively [intuitiv] grasp these 2 general laws. 6. He must, we may finally add, deductively utilize what he has gained from general laws in one way or another, whereby he is able to settle many questions 3 concerning the elements which could hardly be answered in any other way.

None of these aspects of psychognosy, however, is meant to be anything methodologically distinct from what is done in the natural sciences. What is lived-through, noticed, and gathered, the kinds of laws which are intuitively or inductively formulated as well as that which one deductively concludes from them – all such results are no doubt different in descriptive psychology in comparison with those of the natural sciences. The procedure (or indeed the method) for Brentano, however, is in essence the same. 1

The phrase “have lived-experience” is a translation of erleben, a term that gives the translator of German considerable difficulty. While it is important to distinguish it from erfarhen, usually translated as the verb “to experience”, the two should not be completely dissociated from each other either, especially where Brentano indicates their synonymity in such passages as the following: “In diesem Erleben, Erfahren, ist zunächst kein Irrtum möglich”, which we simply translate as “In this experience no error is possible at first” (Brentano [1982], p. 29). This is by no means to say, however, that such synonymity is to be presupposed in all cases, especially in the case of other authors whose work will be under consideration in the following essays. 2 Such “intuitive grasping” is for Brentano, as is evident from the context, an act of intellect rather than one of sensation or imagination. It is epistemologically comparable to what Husserl was later to call Wesenschau, though Brentano is by no means inclined to adopt such a mystical sounding term. There will be more about this in the following essays, especially “Husserl and Cornelius”. 3 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), p. 28. In the edited text the first four points are assigned letters from a to d, whereas the other two are numbered. The enumeration of all aspects from 1 to 6 is in accordance with the lecture manuscript (EL 74/12686).

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It is important to stress here the empirical orientation of Austrian phenomenology. In the German speaking academic world such an orientation did not for the most part fare well during the nineteenth century. It was not at all unusual to see a contrast between the empirical and the philosophical. While Brentano’s teacher, Adolf Trendelenburg, 1 had proposed to bring the two into harmony in his Logical Investigations, Brentano himself did not see any other way to pursue philosophical matters other than from an empirical viewpoint. Hence, he saw no need to harmonize two apparently opposing approaches. For this reason he was dissatisfied with Gustav Fechner‘s formulation of the attempt to develop an aesthetics empirically, i.e. “from below” (von Unten) as opposed to an 2 aesthetics “from above” (von Oben), i.e. a philosophical aesthetics. Though Brentano approves of Fechner’s approach in this regard, he does not see any contrast between it and philosophy. In short, philosophy from above, as it had prevailed in the German speaking world in the first half of 3 the nineteenth century, and as it continued among the Neo-Kantians, was pseudo-philosophy as far as Brentano was concerned. There were, to be sure, attempts among German philosophers earlier in the century to resist 4 such pseudo-philosophy and to make philosophy empirical. In this regard, however, Brentano’s empirical orientation came to have greater influence on Austrian soil, where the Philosophical Propaedeutic that was read in 5 secondary schools included empirical psychology. Brentano’s greatest impact was felt precisely in this discipline. Brentano’s descriptive psychology is indeed psychology from an empirical standpoint, as indicated by the title of his most important published work and also by the above-stated requirement that the investigator in this area must have lived-experience. While it is at present 1

Trendelenburg (1870) I, p. 1. Brentano Ps 77 (typescript)/B19563 f. 3 Due to this fact, as Brentano says in the passage from Ps just cited, someone like Fechner, whose youth was spent in the time when idealist systems were rife, may be excused. 4 A German philosopher of this kind was the opponent of Hegel in Berlin, Friedrich Eduard Beneke, who failed to gain a considerable following in spite of his many publications. 5 Zimmermann (1853), Zimmermann (1860), and Zimmermann (1867). 2

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fashionable to assimilate descriptive psychology in the Brentanian sense to philosophy of mind and thus to construe it as a sort of conceptual analysis, Brentano was opposed to any kind of extreme rationalism that allowed for the concept of mind or those of the specific mind-functions to be somehow 1 a priori. That is to say, insofar as descriptive psychology involves conceptual analysis (as indeed it clearly does), it is the analysis of empirical concepts which is at stake here. As we know that colors are extended simply from the concept of color, we may, according to Brentano, have descriptive-psychological knowledge from the concepts of various mind-functions. The concepts in question are all ones that have their origin in experience. Moreover, descriptive psychology or 2 psychognosy is also to have an inductive aspect. In this sense it is empirical in a stronger sense than merely involving empirical concepts. Experience is accordingly absolutely crucial to Austrian phenomenology as it is to any empirical endeavor. The type of experience which is particularly relevant in this regard is what Brentano calls “inner perception“ (also “inner experience”), which will be thematic in much of the present book. Here we may of course be reminded of the notion of reflection, as it gained considerable prominence in the investigations of the British Empiricists. Austrian phenomenology is indeed closely related to British Empiricism, in which descriptive psychology emerged as a central 3 concern. While reflection accordingly became the experiential source for philosophical insights among the British Empiricists, Austrian pheno1

This may seem to be an obvious point. If, however, we attend to some of the neoKantian views which are criticized in Stumpf (1892), it was a point well worth making in the late nineteenth century. In view of the fact that extremely rationalistic tendencies are still by no means out of the picture, it is still a point worth making. 2 See Brentano (1874), pp. 55-84. It is clear from EL 80 that Brentano is very optimistic about what can achieved through the application of induction and probability theory. 3 Brentano quite rightly regards John Locke as the founder of analytic (i.e. descriptive) psychology (Ps 53/53032). In Stout (1896) I, p. ix, the author tells us that his twovolume work concerning analytic pyschology “follows the lines of traditional English method”. The investigations contained therein, however, draw very heavily upon Austrian phenomenology with a full recognition of the distinction between the descriptive and genetic branches of psychology and of some of the most outstanding Austrian phenomenologists.

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menology is nonetheless innovative in making intentionality thematic as 1 had never been done before. If we remember some of the strategies for making philosophy scientific which were mentioned at the outset of this introduction, it can be seen that Austrian phenomenology differs from these. On the one hand, it is meant to be a science with its own subject matter and therefore with its own problems. On the other hand, it does not involve a novel method for treating this subject matter or solving its problems. As we understand Austrian phenomenology here, it is distinct from almost everything else that has emerged in the so-called phenomenological 2 movement, from either the German or the French phase. It is, however, closely related to Munich phenomenology, which still remains quite modest in its formulation of the phenomenological method and has very 3 definite historical ties to Austrian phenomenology. 1

If, however, we understand Locke‘s “ideas” to be the same as objects in the Brentanian sense, i.e. correlates of consciousness, and we further understand his “operations of the mind” to be same as mind-functions, a fruitful reading of his Essay concerning Human Understanding in the spirit of Austrian phenomenology is suggested. Unfortunately, Kant‘s caricature of this work as a “physiology of the human understanding” (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A ix) could have had a discrediting effect on the reception of one of the outstanding masterpieces of modern philosophy. Mind and object (or in Lockean terms: operation and idea) make up a complex unity which simply has no physical, chemical, mechanical, or physiological analogue. 2 See Spiegelberg (1982). 3 See Schuhmann (1990). Besides the historical connection, it may be said that the phenomenological orientations of Austria and Munich are descriptive in character rather than transcendental, hermeneutical, or existential (all epithets which have been attached with phenomenology). An important distinguishing characteristic of Munich phenomenology, however, as already indicated, can be found in its tendency to regard phenomenological method as somehow peculiar in contrast with the method of the natural sciences. Moreover, the emphasis on the ego (Ich) or subject among the Munich phenomenologists presents us with yet another contrast between their endeavor and Austrian phenomenology. See Pfänder, (ed.) Spiegelberg (1963), pp. 27 ff., where phenomenology is characterized precisely in terms of bringing the subject into play in its descriptions. While Austrian phenomenology is first and foremost concerned with the complex “mind and object” and moreover analyzes mind into various mind-functions, Pfänder (a leading figure of Munich phenomenology) is concerned with the complex “subject – mind-function – object”. It is of course a

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Admittedly the term “phenomenology” is being used here somewhat stipulatively, for it is now normally associated with currents of thought for which Brentano is at best only a background figure. Nonetheless, since he did make use of the term, as mentioned above, and the early Husserl did so as well in the same manner, there is a historical justification for speaking of Austrian phenomenology. As far as the stipulative aspect of the usage of this term is concerned, this may simply be part of what is needed in order to advance the goal of scientific philosophy. Here we must be on guard against the impression that Austrian phenomenology, consisting primarily of descriptive psychology and secondarily of object theory, is somehow a simpler or less difficult orientation in philosophy than others such as the transcendental orientation which the later Husserl recommends. Nothing, after all, seems so simple and straightforward as a mere description without any elaborate preparatory methodological procedure whereby access to the subject 1 matter to be described is given. Though Brentano himself maintained that descriptive psychology is not as difficult as genetic psychology due to the greater complexity of the latter, he also emphasized that descriptive psychology is extremely difficult, as this is exhibited by the great divergence of views which is found in the attempts to analyze consciousness into elements and specify their modes of combination. In many of the questions concerning such matters, says Brentano, “one finds almost everywhere a struggle of all against all, if not a struggle of the same 2 people against themselves”. It must have been a great frustration to matter of dispute whether there is a phenomenal subject in addition to the complex unity of mind-functions. (For this reason it is absolutely crucial that we avoid such biased terms as “subjectivity” in investigations concerning mind and object.) Among the essays published in the present volume, “Husserl and Cornelius” has some bearing on the relation of Austrian phenomenology to the Munich school, though Cornelius was somewhat of an outcast among the Munich phenomenologists. 1 While Husserl often gives the impression that his transcendental method requires no particular effort, the vast amount of manuscripts he devoted to it, as found in Hua XXXIV, indicate that the procedure is indeed an elaborate one, performed by almost no one besides Husserl himself and his last assistant, Eugen Fink. 2 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), p. 28. This passage is preceded by a discussion of some examples of such questions, the most difficult of which, according to Brentano, are concerned with feeling and volition. This discussion is in

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Brentano that some of his most prominent students proceeded to engage in descriptive psychology with results that contradicted his own. Many of these conflicts are examined in detail in the following essays which will make it clear that Austrian phenomenology is by no means a harmonious body of doctrine, but rather an area of inquiry in which some of the most outstanding philosophers found themselves confronted with controversy. As is generally the case in philosophy, two extreme reactions are possible. Either we conclude from the controversies that the whole area of inquiry is altogether futile or we see ourselves only confronted with a host of interesting problems which still await solution. As will soon be indicated, these problems have considerable bearing on other areas of philosophical inquiry. This fact may prove to be a motivational factor in adopting one of the two attitudes mentioned. If, however, we adopt a friendly attitude rather than a hostile one towards Austrian phenomenology and even become interested in pursuing philosophical investigations in the spirit thereof, we will have no faith in forging a new method for solving the problems at hand. There is probably nothing more tedious than lengthy methodological discussions in philosophy. This is perhaps one of the reasons why those particular works of Husserl which consist of tireless (and tiring) discussions of method have received little attention among scientificminded philosophers. What has been said here concerning method may therefore suffice for now, with further consideration thereof left for the content of the following essays.

3. Austrian Phenomenology and Philosophy It is a remarkable feature of the work of the Austrian phenomenologists that it was fruitful in numerous areas of philosophical inquiry, including ontology, epistemology, philosophy of language, ethics, and aesthetics. In view of this fact a word should be said concerning Austrian phenomenology and philosophy. the manuscript of the relevant lecture course (EL 74/12681-12684), though unfortunately not reproduced in the published text.

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According to Brentano’s views concerning philosophy during the Vienna period, it is the discipline “concerned with being insofar as it falls under those concepts which are given through inner experience, whether 1 this be through it alone or through both inner and outer experience”. Since mind-functions are first and foremost what is known through inner experience, philosophy in the Brentanian sense obviously gives a prominent place to psychology and to descriptive psychology in particular (without which there could be no psychology of any other kind). Both Alexius Meinong and Anton Marty were very explicit in defining 2 philosophy by making psychology its central discipline. As we have characterized Austrian phenomenology as the empirical discipline of mind and object, it is obviously philosophical in accordance with the definition just cited. While for Brentano and for certain students of his thought the primacy of descriptive psychology in philosophy entails a certain organization of philosophical inquiries, this can only to some extent be dealt with in the following essays. Nevertheless, the following remarks concerning the relation of Austrian phenomenology to other branches of philosophy are in order in this introduction. The complex unity of mind and object is of particular relevance to two important philosophical disciplines: epistemology and philosophy of language. Regarding the former, Brentano says succinctly, “Knowledge is something that belongs to the psychical realm, and here too lie all primary 1

Brentano, (ed.) Hedwig (1987), pp. 10 f. Cf. Brentano, M 97/31724x: “It [i.e. philosophy] is an abstract science, an empirical science, which concerns itself with the laws of the psychical, both with those which are true of this area alone, and with those which reach beyond this and apply also to the physical realm [Sie ist eine abstrakte Wissenschaft, eine empirische Wissenschaft, welche sich mit den Gesetzen des Psychischen beschäftigt, sowohl mit jenen, welche für dieses Gebiet allein, als mit denen, welche darüber hinausgreifend zugleich fürs physische Gebiet gelten]”. According to both definitions, which are no doubt meant as alternative formulations of the same concept, it is the psychical realm which is the indispensable subject matter of philosophy, whereas concepts or laws pertaining only to physical reality have no place therein. Here it may be added that for Brentano our knowledge of the psychical is superior to that of the physical (Brentano, Ps 27/50338-50339), in terms of evidence as well as the dignity of the subject matter. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 402a1-5. 2 See Meinong (1885b), p. 5 and Meinong (1921), p. 11. See also Marty, (eds.) Eisenmeier et al. (1916), pp. 63-93.

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data of experience. Epistemology therefore demands a certain measure of 1 psychognosy”. In Austrian phenomenology it is accordingly not uncom2 mon to find epistemological topics cropping up again and again. Nor is it 3 uncommon to find language receiving considerable attention. Language, after all, often provides the mind with an indispensable medium that enables it to have certain objects before itself and to communicate this to other minds, thereby allowing them as well to have the objects in question before themselves. Granting therefore that the investigation of mind and object is relevant to philosophy of language, it is no surprise that this branch of philosophical inquiry no less than epistemology has a prominent place in Austrian phenomenology, as will be seen in many of the following essays. There is no doubt that Austrian phenomenology also has bearing on other philosophical disciplines such as ethics and aesthetics. These, however, are not in the foreground in this volume. Admittedly, the focus here has more to do with my own philosophical interests than it does with anything else. In some cases the Austrian phenomenologists were indeed 4 very much concerned with axiological topics. Their treatment thereof should by no means be overlooked in future evaluations of their philosophical endeavors. 1

Brentano, M 17/30121: “Erkenntnis ist etwas, was zum psychischen Gebiete gehört, und hier liegen auch alle ersten Daten der Erfahrung. Die Erkenntnistheorie verlangt also ein gewisses Maß von Psychognosie.” 2

In the present volume this aspect of Austrian phenomenological philosophy is given special attention in “Stumpf’s Concept of Causation in his Epistemology”, but it is to some degree thematic in many of the other essays. 3

See Hall (1952), p. 94: “… his [Brentano’s] psychology, though characterized by him as empirical or descriptive, very obviously tries to come to grips with questions we now designate semantical”. In the philosophical work of Marty, these questions are dealt with extensively. See “Marty on Linguistic Expressions and Mind Functions” in the present volume. It is, however, true of other Austrian phenomenologists, especially Husserl, that philosophy of language and semantics are given much attention in their work. In this connection see “Names, Statements, and their Corresponding Mind-Functions in Husserl’s Logical Investigations”. 4 See Eaton (1930).

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As far as logic is concerned, Brentano conceived of this as a practical 1 discipline which is in large part based on descriptive psychology. While logic in this sense plainly belongs within the realm of Austrian phenomenology, one of Husserl’s early philosophical endeavors, as is well known, was to argue in favor of a “pure” logic, i.e. a logic that is not dependent on psychology. The question is still left open, however, whether such a pure logic is absolutely devoid of all references to the concept of mind. An essay on Husserl’s early defense of a pure logic is included here. For even if it is true that this discipline is as free from psychology as Husserl asserts, the break which thereby occurs is a momentous event in Austrian phenomenology and therefore deserves some attention in the present volume. As regards ontology, this (especially in the broad sense, i.e. 2 metaphysics ) was no doubt Brentano’s main philosophical concern. Among the following essays, however, only one of them (“The Concept of Causality in Stumpf’s Epistemology”) makes such ontological topics focal. Throughout the volume object theory, which is not at all concerned with the being of the objects under consideration, is more prominent. However, just as future treatments of Austrian phenomenology should take into account its applicability in the domains of ethics and aesthetics, this is no less true with regard to the ontological domain of inquiry as well. The term “phenomenological philosophy” was of course one that 3 Husserl used in one of his most famous works. What he had in mind in 1

Due to its practical status Brentano speaks of logic as an art rather than a science in EL 72 (Y 2) and EL 80. For the same reason aesthetics, which is a practical discipline, cannot be defined as the science of the beautiful (Wissenschaft von dem Schönen) (Y 6/3-4), whereas there seems to be no need to say something similar regarding ethics, which Brentano simply refers to as “practical philosophy” (Y 6/1), in view of the fact that no significant philosopher denies that it is a practical discipline. While logic, aesthetics, and ethics are accordingly not viewed as sciences, Brentano wants to make philosophy scientific insofar as he aims at making descriptive psychology, which for him is a science (and indeed an exact science), the foundation of all other philosophical disciplines, including the practical ones. 2 In M 96 Brentano divides metaphysics into four parts: transcendental philosophy, ontology (in the narrower sense), cosmology, and theology. 3 Hua III/1.

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using this term was of course to be an outgrowth of his transcendental endeavor and therefore unacceptable from the standpoint of Austrian phenomenology or indeed any kind of philosophical orientation whose method is no different from that of the natural sciences. It is particularly reprehensible that Husserl concludes, on the basis of purely epistemological considerations, that “pure” or “transcendental” consciousness has absolute being (absolutes Sein), in contrast to the phenomenal or 1 relative being of transcendent things. This is by no means the kind of metaphysics which is to be recommended from a phenomenological point of view. Nonethless, there would be nothing amiss in adopting Husserl’s terminology and thus speaking of phenomenological philosophy as consisting of metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, aesthetics, ethics, and perhaps other philosophical disciplines as developments out of Austrian phenomenology. By no means is there a systematic effort in the following essays to pursue such developments. Certainly, however, suggestions will be found here and there in the work of the Austrian phenomenologists under consideration.

4. Major Figures of Austrian Phenomenology The father of Austrian phenomenology is Franz Brentano (1838-1917). Though Brentano was born in Germany and did not start to live and work in Austria until 1874, his career as a professor and lecturer at the University of Vienna until 1895 was one of the most productive and influential phases of his life. In Vienna he was the teacher of Alexius Meinong, Edmund Husserl, and Kasimir Twardowski. According to the lecture notes that one of his students took from his 1884/85 course on 1

Hua III/1, pp. 91 ff. At first the epistemological contrast in question is between the givenness of transcendent things in perspectives (Abschattungen) and such givenness as being altogether impossible for pure consciousness. As Husserl’s discussion develops in the work under consideration, however, another epistemological concern emerges, namely the possibility of doubt in connection with the being of transcendent things and the impossibility of doubt in connection with the being of pure consciousness (Hua III, pp. 96 ff.). In neither case, however, is the metaphysical distinction that Husserl makes between two kinds of being acceptable.

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ethics, Brentano openly declared, “In Austria nothing had been achieved in earlier times in the area of philosophy. This has changed in recent times. 1 German philosophy had gone astray. No unbiased person could follow it.” He was accordingly well aware that his revolution in philosophy was 2 occurring on Austrian and not German soil. Though he had been the teacher of Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty in Würzburg prior to the Vienna period, these two nonetheless continued to stay in contact with him and 3 thereby imbibed much of his Vienna teachings. It is indeed these teachings which are the focus in the treatment of Brentano in the following essays. Though Brentano is often dealt with as a background figure in the present volume, this must not be taken to suggest that his endeavors in Austrian phenomenology are somehow of secondary importance. Further elaborations on them, however, must still await more extensive explorations of his manuscripts, especially his lectures during the Vienna period, which have unfortunately been available only in unreliable editions for many decades. Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) is, aside from being the author many important contributions to Austrian phenomenology, of particular historical significance because he is an important link between Brentano and Husserl. After Husserl had attended Brentano’s lectures in Vienna (18841886), he attended Stumpf’s lectures in Halle (1886-1888) and drew much 1

Brentano (Y 4)/13: “In Österreich wurde in früherer Zeit auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie nichts geleistet. In neuerer Zeit ist das anders geworden. Die deutsche Philosophie war auf Abwege geraten; ein Unbefangener konnte ihr nicht folgen”. Following this statement, Brentano quotes from a rather sarcastic verse of Franz Grillparzer, the Austrian poet, regarding the Hegelian movement, with which Grillparzer was familiar in his encounters with followers of Hegel and with Hegel himself. 2 The fact that Otto von Bismarck’s politics had united and dominated Germany only strengthened Brentano’s attachment to Austria, which for him was actually more truly German. He continued to live in Austria for some years after his retirement. After that he moved to Florence, Italy. In the last few years of his life he lived in Zürich, Switzerland. 3 Many of the letters that Brentano wrote to Stumpf are to be found in Brentano, (ed.) Oberkofler (1989). The correspondence between Brentano and Marty is extremely extensive, much of it still unpublished. A selection of it can be found in Brentano, (ed.) Hillebrand (1966).

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from them. Though Stumpf was not an Austrian and spent most of his life in Germany, his philosophical writings are so deeply influenced by Brentano and indeed so thoroughly occupied with the complex unity of mind and object that he can hardly be ignored in a treatment of Austrian phenomenology. Moreover, it may be mentioned that Stumpf was for some years a professor in Prague (1879-1883), where he wrote the first volume of his Tone Psychology (1883) and was the colleague of Ernst Mach and Ewald Hering. At that time Prague had a large German speaking population and was in fact a prominent city within the domain of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Nonetheless, Stumpf was later to become a professor in Berlin where he continued to teach and research within the framework of Austrian phenomenology and had considerable influence in this regard. In view of the fact that the outstanding Gestalt psychologists were students of Stumpf, it may well be said that their theoretical orientation was an offshoot of Austrian phenomenology. Anton Marty (1847-1914) was born in Swyz, Switzerland. In Würzburg 2 he was a fellow student of Stumpf and a follower of Brentano. Most of Marty’s teaching and research was done as a professor in Prague, where he had his own circle of followers, some of whom (namely Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kastil) eventually became active in the edition of Brentano’s writings. Among the Austrian phenomenologists, he was certainly the closest disciple of Brentano. His writings, unlike those of Husserl and Meinong, are not marked by an attempt to strike out on his own path, but rather by an expansion of Brentano’s philosophical orientation into the domain of the philosophy of language. His efforts in this regard continued to resonate in attempts to engage in the scientific study of language, as this 3 can be found in the work of Karl Bühler. As an orthodox disciple of Brentano Marty may well have objected to being grouped together with such wayward thinkers as Husserl and Meinong. It is unlikely, however, that a historically significant individual can ever receive a treatment from future generations that is to his liking. 1

See Ierna (2005) and Ierna (2006). See Kraus (1916). 3 See Bühler (1934). 2

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Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) was born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, specifically in Lemberg (later to become Lvóv, Poland and now belonging to the Ukraine). He came under the influence of Brentano in 1874, though he was soon to find his own way as a professor in Graz where he started his own school of philosophy and psychology. Though Meinong is chiefly known for formulating the notion of object theory and engaging in investigations within in this domain, he also was very much concerned with matters of descriptive psychology. His philosophical endeavors were therefore exemplary of Austrian phenomenology, as presented above. The Graz school under the leadership of Meinong became very prominent in opposition to other movements at the time such 1 as Husserlian phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. Though Meinong became the object of some rather harsh and dismissive criticisms from Brentano and his more orthodox disciples and also from Husserl as well, Meinong’s views will be seen in a more positive light in the following essays, though certainly not uncritically. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was born in Prosnitz, again in the AustroHungarian Empire (now in the Czech Republic). He is of course widely known as the central figure of the phenomenological movement. In the present volume, however, Husserl will be treated as having no more 2 importance than any of the other Austrian phenomenologists. Like Meinong, Husserl was also on the receiving end of some rather hostile polemics from Brentano and the more orthodox Brentanists. However extensively Husserl’s views will be subject to criticism in the following essays, he will nonetheless be regarded as a significant contributor to Austrian phenomenology. The emphasis will be on his early work, prior to the development of the phenomenological reduction, which, as a method that purports to go beyond that of the natural sciences, is antithetical to Austrian phenomenology. The fact that Husserl chose Heidegger as his 1

See the accounts given of Meinong’s students in Meinong (1921), pp. 51-54. If Husserl’s views are discussed in the present volume more extensively than those of any other Austrian phenomenologist, this is because the course of my research from which this volume has resulted began with a focus on Husserl with only a dim awareness of the work of the other Austrian phenomenologists. By no means, however, should this be taken to imply that Husserl is deserving of preferential treatment.

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successor, however much he came to regret this, only strengthens the 1 tendency here to look upon the later Husserl with suspicion. In short, it is Husserl the Austrian phenomenologist, not Husserl the German Transcendentalist, whose philosophical work is under consideration in the 2 following essays. Though the above-mentioned figures are the only ones whose names occur in the titles of the following essays, other important Austrian phenomenologists are Kasimir (or Kazimierz) Twardowski (1866-1938) and Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932). By no means do I wish to downplay the significance of either one of these philosophers. Twardowski was the founder of twentieth century Polish philosophy and logic, and von Ehrenfels was the one who first explicitly formulated the concept of Gestalt which was to have great impact in psychology. These 3 “Brentanists” (as we may call the students of Brentano) illustrate very well how deep and wide the influence of their mentor was upon the intellectual landscape of the last century and will no doubt continue to be. There will be occasions to consider their views as well as other less prominent Austrian phenomenologists (e.g. various students of the Brentanists) in the present volume. An important background figure here is 4 the Austrian philosopher and logician Bernard Bolzano (1781-1847), who became a great influence among Brentano’s students in ways that compelled some of them to revise the Brentanian theories of mind and 1

See Linke (1953), p. 92. Of special importance here is the two-volume work of Husserl that was first published in 1900/01: the Logical Investigations, which could very well be the greatest work of Austrian phenomenology. In 1913, in view of the transcendental turn he had taken, Husserl made an effort to revise this work for a second edition. (The sixth “Logical Investigation”, however, did not appear in a revised edition until 1921.) In view of the fact that it is not this transcendental phase of Husserl’s philosophy that concerns us here, passages quoted in the foregoing essays are taken from the first edition unless indicated otherwise. 3 See Rollinger (1999), pp. 2 ff. As is clear from Rollinger (1999), there were many disputes among the Brentanists, some of them quite hostile in tone. After so much time has passed, however, we have a great advantage of being able to survey their accomplishments free of all bitter polemics and unproductive animosity. 4 Another extremely important background figure, though by no means an Austrian philosopher, is Hermann Lotze, whose views will be touched upon occasionally. 2

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object and accordingly arrived at results very different from those of their 1 mentor. There are of course many other philosophers who could be mentioned because of their close connection with Austrian phenomenology, whether this connection be historical or of a more systematic nature. For an introduction to the present set of essays, however, the above list should sufficiently indicate the philosophical landscape that is under consideration here. We are first and foremost concerned with the very core of Austrian phenomenology, though explorations of the periphery are to 2 some extent also to be found in the following essays. Further explorations of this sort, as well as continued penetration into the core of the philosophical orientation in question, will of course be possible in future investigations. 1

See Rollinger (1999), pp. 69-82. In this regard, see especially “Husserl and Cornelius”. The views of another negleted peripheral figure of Austrian phenomenology (one who is, like Cornelius, not himself Austrian) has recently been discussed in Rollinger (2005b).

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1

BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON IMAGINATION

1. Introduction Among the lectures of Brentano which Husserl attended in Vienna were the ones given in a course entitled Selected Questions from Psychology 2 and Aesthetics (winter semester 1885/86). In these lectures, as Husserl later recalls, Brentano “offered mainly descriptive fundamental analyses 3 concerning the essence of phantasy presentations”. In Husserl’s own lectures on imagination (Göttingen, winter semester 1904/05) credit is given to Brentano for providing a deeper understanding of this topic than 4 what was available in the literature. Nevertheless, in these lectures and related material we find views which diverge from those of Brentano. Since these lectures are allegedly phenomenological, and since phenomenology in Husserl’s later writings is claimed to involve a radical 5 methodological departure from his predecessors and contemporaries, the question arises whether the divergences between his theory of imagination and the opposing theory that we find in Brentano’s lecture notes turn on different methodological orientations. 1

This essay is a revised version of an article that was originally published under the title “Husserl and Brentano on Imagination” in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 75 (1993), pp. 195-210. 2 These lectures have been published in a revised form, along with other related texts of Brentano, (ed.) Mayer-Hillebrand (1959). The manuscript of this lecture is to be found in Brentano (Ps 78). There are also lecture notes from a student in Brentano (Y 6). 3 Hua XXIII, p. 304. In Ps 78 Brentano repeatedly distinguishes between descriptive and genetic (or “explanatory”) psychology, as he later came to do with greater emphasis in Ps 76, Ps 77, and EL 74. See Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982). 4 Hua XXIII, p. 7. Husserl adds here: “Also a nice treatment [of imagination] by Stumpf in his lectures on psychology towers far above that which the literature offers”. Unfortunately, Husserl does not explicitly discuss the particular merits and flaws of Stumpf’s theory of imagination as he does in the case of Brentano’s theory. For a discussion of Husserl’s relation to Stumpf, see Rollinger (1999), pp. 83-123. 5 See especially the programmtic statements in Hua I, Hua VII, Hua VIII, and Hua VI.

2. Brentano on Imagination Insofar as the above-mentioned lectures of Brentano are concerned with imagination, they are restricted to the determination of the concept thereof 1 via the description of inwardly perceived phenomena. Though psychology may also reach beyond such description and attempt an explanation of mind-functions (by determining their mental or physical causes), explanations of this kind must nevertheless be based on purely descriptive investigations. Moreover, descriptive investigations do not concern faculties or dispositions. It is therefore not imagination, in the sense that an artist may be said to have a good imagination, which Brentano is describing. For imagination in this sense is a faculty or disposition and not 2 an actual phenomenon. Rather, the phenomena to be described are the 3 actualizations of this faculty or disposition, i.e. instances of imagining. According to Brentanian descriptive psychology, “reference to a 4 content, the direction to an object” is to be ascribed to all mind-functions and denied of all physical phenomena. This thesis is illustrated by the following well-known examples: “In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or rejected, in love loved, in hate hated, 5 in desire desired, etc.” Another thesis which Brentano puts forth about 1

Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), pp. 40 f. The term Phantasie, which both Husserl and Brentano use for this disposition or faculty, is translated here as “imagination”. It would simply be bad English to use the term “phantasy” in this way. Nevertheless, the terms Phantasievorstellung and Phantasiebild are translated with the contrived but acceptable terms “phantasy presentation” and “phantasy image”. 3 Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 42. The term Phantasie, which both Husserl and Brentano use for this disposition or faculty, is translated here as “imagination”. It would simply be bad English to use the term “phantasy” in this way. Nevertheless, the terms Phantasievorstellung and Phantasiebild are translated with the contrived but acceptable terms “phantasy presentation” and “phantasy image”. 4 Brentano (1874), p. 115. Cf. Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), pp. 26-27. 5 Brentano (1874), p. 115. The term “presentation” and the corresponding verb “to 2

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mind-functions is “that they are either presentations or rest ... on 1 presentations as their foundations”. Among the mind-functions which are not presentations are judgments and phenomena of love and hate. In a judgment an object is either accepted or rejected, but this cannot be done unless the object is presented. Likewise, that which is not presented cannot be loved or hated. The actualizations of imagination, according to Brentano, are included among the presentations and are therefore referred to as “phantasy presentations”. Not all presentations, however, are phantasy presentations, for some presentations are foundations for perceptions. According to Brentano, perception belongs to the class of judgments (Urteile) rather 2 than presentations. For whatever is perceived is given with evidence, and judgments are the mind-functions which are characterized as evident (or 3 blind). As it turns out, not all perception is equally evident, for only the perception of mind-functions themselves, so-called “inner perception”, is 4 perception in the strict sense. The perception of physical phenomena, socalled “outer perception”, can at best have the evidence that goes with probability. In the case of both inner and outer perception, however, there must be presentations on which the evident or merely probable judgment is founded. And it is a problem for descriptive psychology to determine how such perceptual presentations (Wahrnehmungsvorstellungen) differ from phantasy presentations. Do they differ in content? Or do they rather differ in terms of their respective manners of presenting the content? present” are here used as translations of Vorstellung and vorstellen respectively. 1 Brentano (1874), p. 111. 2 Brentano complete definition of “perception” runs as follows: “... a cognition, and more particularly an immediate cognition, that something, the presented (intuited) object is. But this does not yet exhaust the essential moments of the concept. Included among them is that it is an unmotivated cognition, the cognition of something individual and real and perhaps also a simple cognition” (Brentano, [ed.] MayerHillebrand [1959], pp. 26 f.). While the term “unmotivated” may be difficult to understand here, Brentano is only indicating thereby that perception is characterized by immediate evidence, rather than the sort of evidence that is mediated by premises. 3 Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 73. 4 Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 75.

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The way in which Brentano attempts to solve this problem is not meant to account for certain phenomena which might otherwise be considered to be actualizations of imagination. When imagining is spoken of, any of the following phenomena may be meant: a) presentations which are not themselves sensations but nevertheless correspond to sensations, b) hallucinations, c) after-images, d) dreams, e) memories and expectations, f) presentations which are not themselves inner perceptions but nevertheless correspond to inner perceptions, g) presentations of mind-functions in 1 other minds, and h) illusions. To this list Brentano adds two other items which are best cited rather than paraphrased: “i) There are also cases of a weaker sort, e.g. imagining a color in a painting or lines in a figure drawn on the blackboard. Good chess players present a changed situation of the figures on the chess board. j) There is yet another case of which it is questionable whether it is not something related, and in which some speak of an activity of imagination: e.g. of clouds or stars in beholding a tapestry. The forms ‘seen in the tapestry’ are sometimes called a play of 2 imagination”. The concept of phantasy presentation that Brentano attempts to 3 formulate excludes memories of either inner or outer phenomena. Likewise, hallucinations are excluded. Are memories and hallucinations excluded because these are judgments rather than presentations? If so, then it would seem that expectations, which might also be characterized as judgments, should be excluded. But such an exclusion is not made explicit by Brentano. It is also unclear whether his concept of phantasy presentations includes those presentations which occur through viewing a picture (see j above). The difference between sensations (i.e. those presentations on which outer perceptions are founded) and phantasy presentations had received considerable attention from various philosophers before Brentano. A good deal of his lectures on imagination is concerned with the exposition and 1

Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), pp. 43 f. Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 45. 3 Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 86. It will nonetheless prove to a matter of interest below to consider Brentano’s views on original association, which is indeed memory of a certain kind. 2

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criticism of attempts to formulate a criterion for drawing this distinction. The characterization of sensations as presentations which are caused by external stimuli cannot be adopted in a descriptive-psychological investigation of the subject, since such a characterization is admissible only in explanatory psychology. The attempt to make the distinction in question by characterizing sensations as more intense (more forceful and lively, as Hume says) than phantasy presentations is indeed a criterion to be considered in descriptive psychology. This criterion actually receives a sympathetic treatment from Brentano, but he insists that it is the content of sensations and not the act which is more intense than that of phantasy presentations. “The smaller intensity of presenting in the case where the force of the content of presentation is equal”, he asserts, “belongs 1 altogether in the realm of fables”. Given the greater intensity of sensuously presented contents according to Brentano’s account of phantasy presentations, it is not surprising that he comes to the following conclusion: “Sensations and phantasy presentations 2 are different in terms of their object”. Distinguishing between them in terms of different ways of referring to their respective objects is 3 emphatically rejected by Brentano. To be sure, he admits that the difference between certain classes of acts can be discovered by inner experience. In this way, according Brentano, the three main classes (presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate) and, within the class of judgments, negative and affirmative judgments can be distinguished. But he insists it is only a hypothesis, not directly confirmed by inner experience, to maintain that sensations and phantasy presentations differ in terms of their respective manners of reference. Moreover, Brentano tells us that there are reasons for rejecting this hypothesis. One of these reasons 1

Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 78. The attempt to distinguish phantasy presentations from perceptual ones by ascribing greater intensity to perceptual presenting, i.e. the act rather than the content, is attributed by Brentano to the school of Herbart. This view can also be found in Meinong (1888), pp. 497 ff.; Meinong (1889), pp. 1 ff. 2 Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 82. What is meant here by “object” is of course the immanent object or content. 3 Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 79.

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lies in the consideration that the greater the intensity of the content of phantasy presentation, the closer it approaches the content of sensation. In face of Brentano’s assertion of the difference between contents of sensations and those of phantasy presentations, he is compelled to seek an explanation of the commonsense notion that the perceived object can be identical with the imagined one. The distinction between proper and improper presentations is introduced by Brentano at this point as a means to removing this difficulty. “Phantasy presentations,” he says, “are unintuitive or improper presentations which approximate intuitive 1 presentations”. This definition presupposes that we understand the contrast between intuitive (proper) and unintuitive (improper) presentations. In the lectures under discussion Brentano tries to clarify this contrast through examples: “For intuitive presenting: I see a red square. For unintuitive presenting: I think of a round square. (Likewise, however, it is certainly a matter of unintuitive presenting if I think of a red square, 2 an equilateral rectangle, a right triangle.)” 1

Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 86. Brentano, (ed.) Franziska-Mayer Hillebrand (1959), p. 80. Cf. Brentano, EL 80/13057: “We present improperly that of which we have no precisely corresponding presentation and also often cannot have one. We name it, but we do not quite understand the name itself while we name it. a) Here belongs, for instance, the inadequate manner in which we present God by means of analogies, which we take from creaturely things. We designate with the name ‘God’ that to which our analogies refer. What that is, however, escapes our presentation. We do not properly know what ‘God’ means. God is a necessary concept. Its denial would be immediately absurd for whoever would have it. We, however, presumably speak ‘God is’ without seeing at once and from the concept the truth. In a similar manner a blind person may speak of color and we of substantial differences. b) It is, however, similar if we could name objects and presumably grasp single features, but they are due to their complication no longer presentable for us. A million, a billion, we can no longer properly present and we name them without precisely understanding the name. [Uneigentlich stellen wir solches vor, wovon wir keine genau entsprechende Vorstellung haben und oft auch haben können. Wir nennen es, verstehen aber selbst den Namen nicht recht, während wir ihn nennen. a) Hierher gehört z.B. die inadäquate Weise, wie wir Gott vorstellen durch Analogien, die wir kreatürlichen [Dingen] entnehmen. Wir bezeichnen mit dem Namen ‘Gott’ das, worauf unsere Analogien zielen. Was das aber ist, entzieht sich unserer Vorstellung. Wir wissen eigentlich nicht, was ‘Gott’ heisst. Gott ist ein notwendiger Begriff. Seine Leugnung würde für den, der ihn hätte, 2

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It may be gathered from the passages just cited that Brentano conceives of presentations as phenomena which range between two extremes. At one extreme we find presentations which can never be perceptual. At the other extreme we find perceptual presentations. Though only perceptual presentations are purely intuitive, phantasy presentations nevertheless approximate perceptual ones. Contradictory concepts or those which occur when a person born blind thinks of color are not phantasy presentations because they are too remote from perceptual presentations. Thus, it is tempting to identify objects of phantasy presentations with perceptually presented ones, for phantasy presentations resemble perceptual presentation more than any other non-perceptual presentations do. In this regard it must be mentioned that Brentano characterizes improper (unintuitive) presentations as surrogate presentations. He thereby finds justification in the claim that phantasy presentations have objects which, strictly speaking, differ from those of perceptual presentations. Thus, when we imagine a fortissimo our presentation is normally one whose content is less intense than that of the sensation which occurs in hearing a pianissimo. This presentation is for us a replacement of the sensation of the fortissimo. But if the intensity of this surrogate presentation increases it may begin to attain the status of hearing a pianissimo. We shall see below that such a characterization of phantasy presentations is far from satisfactory as far as Husserl is concerned. While phantasy presentations for Brentano are accordingly to some extent improper ones, though not to the extreme as other ones such as presentations of absurdities, it is important to note that there is yet another sense in which impropriety comes into play for him with respect to a certain class of phantasy presentations, namely presentations of past and 1 future. When we speak of a “past tone” (gewesener Ton) or a “future unmittelbar absurd sein. Wir aber sprechen wohl ‘Gott ist’, aber ohne sofort und aus dem Begriff die Wahrheit einzusehen. Ähnlich mag der Blinde von der Farbe sprechen, wir von den substantiellen Differenzen. b) Ähnlich ist es aber auch, wenn wir Gegenstände nennen, einzelne Merkmale wir wohl fassen könnten, die aber wegen ihrer Komplikation, für uns nicht mehr vorstellbar sind. Eine Million, eine Billion können wir nicht eigentlich mehr vorstellen, und nennen sie, ohne den Namen genau zu verstehen.]” 1 See Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), pp. 18 ff.

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tone” (zukünftiger Ton), for instance, we are no longer speaking of a tone in the proper sense. Though such adjectives as “high” and “low”, “loud” and “soft” give determination to our presentations when they are conjoined with “tone”, such a determination is not at all brought about when the adjectives “past” and “future” are used. When we speak of a past or future tone there is modification rather than a determination that is effected. Hence, Brentano makes the paradoxical sounding statement that a past or future tone, unlike a high or low tone and unlike a soft or loud tone, is not a tone at all. What this has to do with imagination comes into play in Brentano’s theory of original association (ursprüngliche Assoziation) which is elaborated on from the following lecture notes which a student wrote down from Elementary Logic and the Reforms Necessary Therein (a lecture that Husserl himself attended in the winter semester of 1884/85): Through a special kind of association, which has thus far been neglected in psychologies and which we can call original association in contrast with the acquired ones, the first appearances of the past arise. One might call these appearances “momentary memory appearances”, though one would of course not have to understand this as if what is thought represented only a time-point, which is per se just as unpresentable to the senses as a spatial point. What this momentary memory shows is so extended that a repeated change is unmistakable, such as in the case of a melody. People believe that they see something moving, they believe that they hear the melody; yet, they do not believe that they hear what was spoken yesterday. But when they believe that they hear the melody, they believe that they still hear what was immediately before. This is due to the vivacity and the associations. ... Upon the appearance 1 of memory imagination then further forms presentations of the future. 1

Y 2/89: “Durch eine besondere Art von Assoziation, welche bisher in den Psychologien allzusehr vernachlässigt wurde und die wir, im Unterschiede zu den erworbenen, ursprüngliche Assoziation nennen können, treten die ersten Erscheinungen der Vergangenheit auf. Man könnte diese Erscheinungen ‘momentane Gedächtniserscheinungen’ nennen, nur freilich müßte man das nicht so verstehen, als ob das Gedachte nur einen Zeitpunkt darstellte, der für sich allein ebensowenig sinnlich vorstellbar ist als ein örtlicher Punkt. Was dieses momentane Gedächtnis zeigt, ist so ausgedehnt, dass ein wiederholter Wechsel unverkennbar wird, wie z.B. bei einer Melodie. Die Leute glauben, sie sehen, dass sich etwas bewegt, sie glauben, sie hörten die Melodie; das glauben sie aber nicht, dass sie hören, was gestern gesprochen worden ist. Aber wenn sie glauben, sie hören die Melodie, so glauben sie

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Accordingly, on Brentano’s view, there are produced by means of the constant presence of original association phantasy presentations which are modifying rather determining. This theory of time-consciousness via phantasy presentation, as we shall see, was not found to be satisfactory by Husserl.

3. Husserl on Imagination In the Logical Investigations only scattered remarks on imagination are to be found. The title page of the first edition of the second volume indicates, however, that only the “first series” of investigations are published in this 1 volume. The topic of imagination was perhaps to be treated in the second 2 series. In 1898 Husserl had already written a manuscript on this topic and 3 later used this as a basis for the 1904/05 lectures. Since these lectures contain critical remarks on Brentano’s theory of imagination, they will naturally receive particular attention in what follows. But the broader theory of consciousness, more particularly of presentations, which these das unmittelbar Vorhergegangene noch zu hören. Das kommt von der Lebhaftigkeit und den Assoziationen. ... Auf diese Erscheinung des momentanen Gedächtnisses gestützt, bildet dann die Phantasie weiter noch Vorstellungen von Zukunft.” This passage corresponds to EL 72/1214 f. of Brentano’s own lecture notes. See also Stumpf’s succinct formulation of the doctrine of original association in Rollinger (1999), p. 298. It is interesting to note in addition that in a brief insert of Brentano’s lecture notes on descriptive psychology of 1889/90 (EL 74/12671) original association is regarded as no less inseparable (unablösbar) from the act in which it occurs than the inner perception of this act (this inner perception being characterized as a “secondary relation” as a opposed to the primary relation of the act to the object), but also as a result of inner perception or vice-versa. This insert is not to be found in the edition of the lecture notes in Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982). 1 Hua XIX/1, p. 3. 2 See Schuhmann (1977), p. 63f. Further details about Husserl’s manuscripts on imagination and his related publication plans can be obtained from the editor’s introduction in Hua XXIII. 3 The 1898 treatise is published in Hua XXIII as an appendix to the 1904/05 lectures.

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lectures presuppose is the one developed in the Logical Investigations. Thus, this work cannot be neglected in our attempt to establish Husserl’s early theory of imagination and its divergence from Brentano’s. At the outset we can say that throughout these texts Husserl prefers a view of imagination which allows for the identity of the imagined and the perceived object. While Brentano claimed that phantasy presentations, strictly speaking, differ from perceptual ones in terms of their respective immanent objects, Husserl would much rather say that imagining is one 1 way of presenting and perceiving is another. In Husserl’s theory of presentations, however, we encounter distinctions which were by no means present in Brentano’s theory and will have to be accommodated in Husserl’s theory of phantasy presentations in particular. Before it is shown how such accommodations are made in Husserl’s theory, we shall briefly look at some methodological parallels between Husserl’s and Brentano’s respective approaches to the topic under discussion.

3.1. Methodological Considerations While the 1898 treatise does not involve any statement about the discipline to which it belongs, the 1904/05 lectures belong to “Major Parts of Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition” and are thus meant to 2 present investigations in the phenomenology of imagination. Like Brentano’s descriptive psychology, Husserl’s phenomenology excludes 1

It is indeed accurate, on Husserl’s view, to say that a perception is a presentation. To be sure, various meanings of “presentation” are identified by him (Hua XIX/1, pp. 520 ff.). Both phantasy presentations and perceptions, however, are presentations in the sense that they are both “objectifying acts”. 2 In the summer semester of 1904 Husserl gave lectures entitled “Hauptstücke der deskriptiven Psychologie der Erkenntnis” (see Schuhmann [1977], p. 80), which were presumably an earlier version of the 1904/05 lectures. These lectures were not only concerned with imagination. The part on imagination is preceded by one on perception and attention, now published in Hua XXXVIII, pp. 3-123. The final part of the lecture course was concerned with time-consciousness. Though an extensively edited and modified version of this part of the lecture course was later published in 1929 (now available in Hua X, pp. 3-98), the original lecture notes from this part are still left unpublished.

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1

any consideration of imagination as a disposition or faculty. Husserl justifies this exclusion on the basis of the following claim: “The phenomenological sphere is that of the truly given, of the adequately 2 discovered, and that of its immanent constituents”. Dispositions and faculties are not among adequately discovered experiences (Erlebnisse), whereas phantasy presentations certainly are. Furthermore, 3 phenomenology is concerned with the essence of these. This focus on essence is of course comparable, at least as far as method is concerned, to Brentano’s exclusive occupation with the concept of phantasy presentations. 4 The exclusion of dispositions, as well as hallucination, from the enquiry likewise harmonizes with Brentano’s approach. The only difference that one might point out here lies in the restriction in Husserl’s phenomenology to the adequately perceived, while Brentano is concerned with the inwardly perceived. In Husserl’s terminology “the inwardly 5 perceived” extends beyond the adequately given. However, there is no reason why this usage of “the inwardly perceived” must be equated with Brentano’s usage of the same term. Moreover, in none of the material under consideration here does Husserl accuse Brentano of intending to expand the scope of his investigations beyond the adequately given. Rather, Brentano’s concept of phantasy presentations is found to be flawed for reasons other than methodological shortcomings. Let us now examine how Husserl’s theory of imagination does in fact diverge from Brentano’s.

3.2. Presentations Though Husserl, too, is concerned with phantasy presentations as the actualizations of imagination, he maintains that Brentano does not grasp 1

Though the terms Dispositionen and dispositionell had been used in the analyses of the 1898, they were later scratched out. See Hua XXIII, 132. 2 Hua XXIII, p. 3. 3 Hua XXIII, p. 5. 4 Hua XXIII, p. 4. 5 Hua XXIII, pp. 767 ff.

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their essence due to an inadequate understanding of the nature of 1 presentation. Before we discuss Husserl’s remarks which are specifically directed against Brentano’s theory of imagination, we shall first look at certain shortcomings which Husserl finds in Brentano’s general theory of presentations. Here it must be pointed out that since 1894 Husserl’s own understanding thereof was deeply influenced by the habilitation thesis of the Brentano disciple, Kasimir Twardowski, a very slender volume entitled On the Theory of the Content and Object of Presentations. In this work Twardowski claims that in presentations and acts in general their content and object must be distinguished. In the case of presentations he tries to 2 make this distinction clear by an analogy to painting. We can say that a painter paints a landscape, but we can also say that he or she paints a picture of a landscape. That which is presented can be analogous to the landscape, i.e. the object of the presentation. The content of the presentation, which is immanent in consciousness, is analogous to the picture of the landscape. Though Husserl has misgivings about the analogy between contents and pictures, his theory of presentation involves the distinction between contents and objects. While the former are immanent in the presentation but not identical with the entire act of presenting, the latter may exist 3 outside of consciousness or may even fail to exist altogether. The term “sensations” is used by Husserl in reference to the contents of perceptions, whereas the contents of phantasy presentations are called “phantasms”. Husserl maintains that this had been overlooked by Brentano and his school: “The content for him is usually the sensory content of perception. No clear separation, or no separation at all in the proper sense, is made between this and that which we call, purely following the sense of percep4 tion, the ‘perceptual object’, what presumably stands over against us ...”. What Brentano normally means by “object” is either the content in the sense just specified or “the external object in the absolute metaphysical 1

Hua XXIII, p. 8. Twardowski (1894), p. 12 f. 3 Hua XIX/1, p. 387. 4 Hua XXIII, p. 8. 2

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sense which he confuses with the one meant in perception, obviously overlooking the fact that only in reflection, natural scientific or metaphysical, do we come to relate to the phenomenal object, as one that merely appears, another object, or a complexion of others which do not fall in the appearance, a complexion of atoms, of ether oscillations, of 1 forces and whatever one may here assume”. In either case, the concept of an object which is needed for a theory of presentations is missing. In the perception of a sound, the perceived object is neither the auditory sensations which are constituent parts of the perception nor sound-waves which cause the perception to come about; the object in this case is simply the sound, which can also be imagined, remembered, desired, etc. According to Husserl, presentations do not consist only of sensations or phantasms. In each presentation there is also a form and a sense (or matter) 2 of apprehension to be found. In the 1904/05 lectures these, together with the contents, are considered to be inadequately distinguished in previous 3 theories of imagination. In the Logical Investigations the notions of form and matter of apprehension are explained as follows: “a) the form of apprehension: whether the object is presented merely signitively, or intuitively, or in a mixed manner. Here belong also the differences between perceptual presentation, phantasy presentation, etc; b) the matter 4 of apprehension: whether the object is presented in this or that ‘sense’ ...” The form and matter of apprehension together with the contents (also called “representatives”) make up what Husserl calls the “representation” of the act in question. This is contrasted with the quality of the act, i.e. “the 5 manners of believing, leaving in suspense, wishing, doubting, etc.” Brentano’s failure to make these distinctions, Husserl charges, makes it impossible for him to determine the difference between perceptual and phantasy presentations: 1

Hua XXIII, pp. 8 f. According to Husserl, the contents are apprehended (aufgefaßt). Hence, the talk of form and matter of apprehension. Though Husserl’s notion of apprehension or apperception (Apperzeption) is used throughout the writings under examination here, it is never defined. 3 Hua XXIII, p. 7. 4 Hua XIX/2, p. 624. 5 Hua XIX/2, p. 624. 2

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Presenting is to be something devoid of differences; it is differentiated only by contents. But then what about the differences among perceptual presentation, phantasy presentation, symbolic presentation, between intuitive and categorial presentation, etc.? How is that to be reduced to distinctions of mere content? Brentano has tried and has employed all his admirable cleverness to interpret away all essential manners of presenting, while he on occasion still almost ends up in the admission that in a certain way modes of presenting must still 1 again be assumed ...

The modes at issue here are of course those of proper and improper presenting. It will soon be seen that Husserl regards Brentano’s application of this distinction in his theory of imagination as inadequate. By the very definition of “form of apprehension” it is obvious that this is the crucial factor for Husserl in the difference between perceptual and phantasy presentations. A single object can be referred to in the very same sense by different acts, including both perceptual and phantasy presentations. It is after all the matter, not the form, of apprehension which determines the “sense and reference” of the act. On the one hand, it may seem that the form of apprehension is used by Husserl as a deus ex machina. On the other hand, one may raise the question why the distinction between perceiving and imagining, as opposed to any other distinction in mental life, had been regarded as problematic in the first place. That is to say, one may wonder whether a criterion is necessary here. Furthermore, the notion of the form of apprehension will appear less arbritrary below, when we consider why Husserl classifies imagining among intuitive presentations. Finally, it may be said on his behalf that he devotes a good deal of discussion – most of it aporiatic – to the consideration of whether sensations and phantasms exhibit some intrinsic difference, i.e. one that obtains independently of the form of apprehension. Though these considerations for the most part lie beyond the scope of our discussion, we must examine those objections against Brentano’s theory of imagination which arise in this context. 1

Hua XXIII, pp. 9 f.

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3.3. Sensations and Phantasms Brentano’s lectures on imagination, Husserl maintains, are primarily a 1 discussion - “the most detailed one familiar to me” - of the difference between sensations and phantasms. This is the problem in conjunction with which Husserl considers it appropriate to ask whether sensations are more intense than phantasms. For he maintains: “The feature of intensity 2 or vivacity obviously belongs to the contents ...”. The very notion of intensity is considered a difficult one by Husserl. Though it might be suggested that this notion may be extended to all the contents of the five 3 senses, Husserl has misgivings about this extension. And since we can both imagine and perceive mind-functions, this notion would have to apply to them as well. “In the case of some of these phenomena,” Husserl objects, “an intensity in the same sense as in the case of sensations is not even spoken of. Thus, e.g. in the case of judgment. What is a more intense judgment? Is it not a more vivacious conviction? In that case an imagined judgment would indeed be a slightly vivacious conviction. But am I, when imagining a judgment with which I do not even agree, convinced of it to a 4 slighter degree?”. This last question is of course a rhetorical one. Husserl argues that the application of the notion of intensity to imagined judgments either defeats the intensity criterion under discussion or leaves us completely in the dark as to what could be meant by “intensity”. Even if these difficulties in the notion of intensity are disregarded, Husserl considers the claim that presentations with a less intense content are surrogates for those with greater intensity to be an inadequate account of phantasy presentation. To be sure, he admits, we may use a soft melody to represent a louder one. But he continues: “It is questionable to me whether the imagining of a melody should be understood according to this 1

Hua XXIII, p. 92. Hua XXIII, p. 14. 3 Hua XXIII, p. 95. Husserl finds it difficult to say how colors and tastes can be more or less intense. The prominent example of intensity in most discussions of Husserl’s contemporaries seem to be the volume of sounds. See Meinong (1888a), pp. 497 f. 4 Hua XXIII, p. 96. 2

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scheme, especially wherever we are concerned with phantasies which are 1 at the same time clear and fully vivacious”.

3.4. The Phantasy Image Granted that sensations and phantasms differ at least extrinsically, i.e. insofar as they are united with respectively differing forms of apprehendsion, the question remains whether the difference between perceptual and phantasy presentations can be made only by appealing to this notion of form. In the 1898 treatise this difference is formulated as follows: “Perceptual presentations present their object as self-present to them; phantasy presentations, on the other hand, represent it to themselves in the phantasy image, as ordinary picture presentations do so in the physical 2 picture”. This analogy between phantasy and picture presentations is at 3 least partly maintained in the 1904/05. Though it does not imply that the proper object of a phantasy presentation is a phantasy image, it does involve the claim that in at least some cases of imagining such an image is 4 “constituted” or “objectified”. 1

Hua XXIII, p. 95. Hua XXIII, p. 109. The terms “image” and “picture” are both translations of the term Bild. This latter term can also be used in reference to figures, such as statues or busts. Moreover, it need not be restricted to the visual realm. 3 In these lectures Husserl allows for phantasy presentations which do not involve phantasy images, so-called “straigtforward” (schlicht) ones. Nevertheless, this allowance does not prevent him from characterizing other phantasy presentations by analogy to pictorial presentations. This analogy is therefore present throughout his early work on imagination. In Drost (1990) it is claimed that in the Logical Investigations imagining is not understood in terms of the analogy just mentioned. All that is shown by the author, however, is that Husserl’s theory does not involve the conception of images as items which inhere in consciousness. This is of course true, but the way in which Husserl understands the concept of a phantasy image (as a “nothing”, to be explained in the text) still allows him to use the analogy in question. Drost’s article is only an example of how hazardous it is to piece together a theory from Husserl’s published works while neglecting relevant and, in the case of the topic of this paper, more extensive material from his Nachlass. 4 Hua XXIII, pp. 16 f., 109 f. 2

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If one looks at a photograph or a painting, what is ordinarily presented is not merely a physical object lying on the table or hanging on the wall. Rather, in our perception of this object we also see a picture of a child, a horse, etc. What the picture is of is what Husserl calls the “picture subject” (Bildsujet), while he calls that which represents the picture subject the “picture object” (Bildobjekt). Suppose, for example, that the picture in question is a black-and-white photograph of a child. In this case the distinction between the picture object and the real child in full color is obvious. Furthermore, what resembles the picture subject is not the photograph as a piece of paper, or any physical part or aspect thereof, and thus we must distinguish between the picture object and the picture thing. Now the phantasy image which appears in imagining, on Husserl’s view, is analogous to the picture object. The imagined object is of course analagous to the picture subject, while no analogue of the picture thing is to be found in the case of phantasy presentations. The picture object, Husserl further explains, is neither a physical nor a mental reality of any kind. Not only is it distinct from any part or moment of the physical thing, but it is likewise distinct from the sensations which are apprehended such that it appears and from anything thing else to be found in consciousness. By analogy, the same holds good for the phantasy image. It must therefore be distinguished from phantasms and other components of our experiences. Like the picture object, it is characterized by Husserl as a “nothing”. While Husserl’s conception of phantasy presentation via the analogy with picture presentation goes beyond Brentano’s theory, it certainly shows the influence of Twardowski. In two important respects, however, Husserl’s view differs from Twardowski’s. First, the analogy in question is not extended by Husserl to all presentations, but applies only to phantasy 1 presentations. Secondly, the analogues of pictures are not regarded as immanent in consciousness.

1

See Husserl’s rejection of the picture theory of consciousness in Hua XIX/1, pp. 436f.

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3.5. Phantasy Presentations as Intuitive In the 1898 treatise Husserl divides presentations into conceptual and intuitive ones. Pictorial presentations (perhaps in a broad sense that 1 includes phantasy presentations) are regarded as intuitive. While the notion of categorial intuition in the Logical Investigations will no longer allow for the simple distinction between conceptual and intuitive 2 presentations, this work nonetheless involves the distinction between 3 significative and intuitive presentations. Phantasy presentations are moreover classified among the intuitive ones. Since Brentano had characterized phantasy presentations as improper ones which only approximate intuitive ones, it must be asked why the class of intuitive presentations is enlarged to include both perceptual and phantasy presentations. In the Logical Investigations Husserl gives two answers to this question. The first is the “indirect” answer, which relies on his characterization of perception in terms of perspectives (Abschattungen): “In one perception the object appears from this, in another from that side, near at one time, far at another, etc... . It is at once clear that parallel distinctions count for the imaginative presentation. It, too, depicts the 4 object now from this side, now from that one ...”. Whoever objects that this parallel holds good only for outer perceptions and their corresponding phantasy presentations may consider the second (“direct”) explanation of why he regards phantasy presentations as intuitive: “As an intuitive representative of an object only a content which is similar or equal to it 5 can serve”. Both perceptual and phantasy presentations, according to 6 Husserl, must meet this requirement, while the contents of significative presentations can be determined purely by convention. 1

Hua XXIII, p. 136. An attempt to establish phantasy presentations as intuitive can also be found in Meinong (1888b), pp. 200 ff. 2 Hua XIX/2, pp. 657 ff. 3 Hua XIX/2, pp. 586f. 4 Hua XIX/1, pp. 590 f. 5 Hua XIX/2, p. 623. 6 It may be added here that this requirement is stated before Husserl introduces the notion of “categorial intuition” (Hua XIX/2, pp., 657 ff.). In this case the act of

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Now we may recall that the form of apprehension determines whether the presentation is intuitive or significative. It turns out that this function is explained purely in terms of contents and matter of apprehension. Nevertheless, Husserl never uses these to explain the further distinction between perceptual and phantasy presentations. Thus, when he distinguishes the form, insofar as it determines whether the presentation is perceptual or imaginative, from the contents and matter of apprehension, 1 “it is a matter of a phenomenologically irreducible distinction”.

3.6. Critique of the Doctrine of Original Association The final part of Husserl’s 1904/05 lectures are concerned with the 2 analysis of time-consciousness. Though this topic is far too difficult to discuss at length in the present context, the lectures in question are of some interest here insofar as they contain a critique of Brentano’s doctrine of original association in which the perception of melodies, motions, and other objects whose parts cannot exist simulaneously is thought to be impossible. As we have seen, Brentano thinks that the consciousness of such objects is possible only through phantasy presentations, which bring into play a kind of impropriety or modification which are found in the terms “past” and “future”. Before Husserl attempts to tackle the problems perception or imagination is not “straightforwardly” (schlicht) directed at an object, but rather the object is “categorially formed”, e.g. when one perceives or imagines that a piece of paper is white. While it may be said that the white of the paper is equal or similar to the representative contents, it is indeed difficult to regard a state of affairs, e.g. that a piece of paper is white, as something that is equal or similar to sensations or phantasms. In this case, however, it is all the more necessary for Husserl to appeal to an irreducible form of apprehension as that which makes an act an instance of categorial intuition. 1 Hua XIX/2, p. 623. 2 These lectures were later edited by Edith Stein and later published by Heidegger, who had done little additional editoral work on them. Much of the text of the publication (as can be found in Hua X, pp. 2-95) is based on manuscripts later than 1904/05. Nor are all of the lecture notes reproduced in this publication. However, it is possible in part to reconstruct the lectures on the basis of text-critical remarks (Hua X, pp. 393-442).

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which arise in connection with time-consciousness, he finds it necessary to criticize Brentano’s account thereof as this was put forward in his Vienna 1 lectures. The doctrine of original association, as we have seen it stated above, is completely unsatisfactory for Husserl for two reasons. First of all, he cannot accept the thesis that melodies, motions, and such phenomena are actually perceived no less than ones which are fully present. Secondly, the possibility of an identity between the present object and a past one becomes an impossibility for Brentano, whereas Husserl insists that this identity is a crucial aspect of time-consciousness. While this identity could already be called into question in Brentano’s theory of imagination, it becomes all the more doubtful from his standpoint when we consider his view that “past” and “future” are modifying rather than determining terms. The tone that we remember, the presentation of which is strictly a matter of phantasy, cannot strictly and properly be identical with the one that we previously perceived. Moreover, the past tone is in fact not even a tone. The theory of time-consciousness which Husserl attempted to work out in his 1904/05 lectures does make use of the notion of “primary memory” (primäre Erinnerung), which is reminiscent of Brentano’s original association and comparable notions in the late nineteenth century. It is understandable why Husserl later changed this term to “retention”, for he wanted to avoid any doubt whether the perceptions in which this is involved are really and truly perceptions.

4. Conclusion The differences between Husserl and Brentano on imagination may briefly be summarized as follows. While Brentano is willing to characterize the contents of perceptual presentations as more intense than those of phantasy presentations, Husserl has misgivings about this characterization. Even if the various distinctions which he makes in his theory of presentations are kept in mind, the ascription of more intense contents (sensations) to perceptual presentations inadequately differentiates such presentations 1

Hua X, pp. 10-19.

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from imagining. For however intense the contents of a presentation may be, this presentation cannot be an instance of perceiving, on Husserl’s view, unless a unique form of apprehension is present. Nor does it appear to him that the concept of intensity applies to all contents without difficulty. Moreover, Brentano’s claim that phantasy presentations are improper ones which merely approximate proper presentations is subject to further doubt from Husserl. As long as “proper presentations” is a term that refers to intuitive presentations, he regards both phantasy presentations and perceptual presentations as proper. Finally, while Brentano characterizes the presentation of temporally extended objects such as melodies and motions in terms of phantasy presentation and attributes a further impropriety (i.e. modification) to presentation of this kind, Husserl rejects such a characterization and adheres to the view that temporally objects can actually be perceived and that the “primary memory” involved in such perception in no way involves modification. Without a doubt, Husserl’s early views of imagination have original aspects. Such originality is especially to be seen in his notion of phantasy images which are not contents of consciousness. In this regard Husserl’s theory of imagination could play an important role in contemporary discussions of this topic. This can be seen when we bear in mind that the analogy between images and pictures is out of fashion because, as one author aptly suggests, it “seemed to rest primarily on the evidence afforded by introspection. And today introspection is taken to reveal a good deal 1 less about the mind than was traditionally supposed”. If the phantasy image is conceived by analogy to the picture object, i.e. as something (or as Husserl says, a “nothing”) that inheres neither in the mind nor in the external world, then it is no longer to be conceived of as an object of introspection. Hence, it is not far-fetched to find in Husserl’s conception of the phantasy image a third alternative to theories which utterly reject the picture analogy and those which accept it under the assumption that what is analogous to pictures must be something mental. Though Husserl’s later writings often give the impression that his departure from previous philosophical traditions, including the school of 1

Tye (1988), p. 497.

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1

Brentano, is primarily a methodological affair, the consideration of how his theory of imagination diverges from Brentano’s gives a different impression altogether. The issues which Husserl raises in his criticisms of Brentano’s theory are matters of substance rather than method. The differences which thus arise can easily be construed as divergent theories in descriptive psychology. In view of such differences, Brentano’s observation concerning the apparent easiness of descriptive psychology is once again confirmed. “Description,” he says “seems the relatively easy task [in contrast with causal explanation]. Here too, however, philosophers diverge from each other; indeed, disagreement is so great that the existence of whole classes 2 is disputed”. When we encounter differences of the kind which have been under consideration in the foregoing discussion, it is clear that there are still many issues to be settled in the domain explored by the Austrian phenomenologists. 1

See, e.g. Hua V, p. 346.

2

Ps 53/53002: “Die Beschreibung scheint die relativ leichte Aufgabe. Dennoch weichen auch hier Philosophen weit voneinander ab; ja, die Uneinigkeit ist so groß, dass über die Existenz ganzer Klassen gestritten wird.”

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NAMES, STATEMENTS, AND MIND-FUNCTIONS IN HUSSERL’S 1 LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

1. Introduction At the outset of the second volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations (first published in 1901) it is pointed out, in agreement with John Stuart 2 3 Mill, that language is central to the concerns of logic. Among the linguistic expressions which concern Husserl in the subsequent investigations are names (Namen) and statements (Aussagen), as indeed Book I of Mill’s System of Logic was concerned with names and 4 propositions. In this regard Husserl and Mill follow a long-standing tradition, in which names and statements are indeed among the elements of logic, to be followed only by inferences. Nonetheless, the topic of names and statements, or any other class of linguistic expressions for that matter, is not Husserl’s ultimate concern in the second volume of the Logical Investigations. This volume, entitled “Investigations in the Pheno5 menology and Theory of Cognition”, culminates in the fifth and sixth “Logical Investigations”, which are respectively entitled “On Intentional Lived-Experiences (Erlebnisse) and their Contents” and “Elements of a 1

This essay is a revised version of a paper that was first published under the title “Names, Statements, and their Corrspnding Acts in Husserl’s the Logical Investigations” in The Logical Investigations Reconsidered, edited by Denis Fisette (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, 2003), pp. 133-150. 2 See A System of Logic, Bk. I, Ch. I, § 1. 3 Hua XIX/1, p. 5. 4 The term “proposition” is used by Mill to designate statements, i.e. particular linguistic expressions. The term “proposition” in this essay, however, will be used as a translation of Satz, which is used by Husserl in application to certain ideal objects which need not be expressed in language or even “thought” in the mind. 5 Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), which has many points in its favor compared to other translations of Husserl’s writings, unfortunately does not contain this title in the table of contents or in the text. Whenever I refer to this translation, I have to some extent drawn upon it.

1

Phenomenological Elucidation of Cognition (Erkenntnis)”. In both of these cases Husserl is concerned with intentional lived-experiences, i.e. mind-functions. This concern with such processes is of course explicit in the title of the fifth “Logical Investigation”. The term “cognition”, as found in the sixth one, by and large designates those acts in which 2 something is evident. In the following I shall critically examine Husserl’s views in the Logical Investigations on names and statements with particular attention to his observations concerning the corresponding 3 mind-functions. As it has been seen elsewhere, Husserl’s belonging to the school of Brentano will prove to be of great relevance here.

2. Manifestation, Meaning, and Reference In the first “Logical Investigation” Husserl is concerned with expression and meaning. As he understands the notion of expression (Ausdruck), it 4 goes together with meaning (Bedeutung), for any sign which has a 5 meaning is for Husserl an expression. When we speak of what an expression expresses, however, this need not be its meaning, for it can also be taken to indicate what the expression manifests concerning the speaker’s mind or that to which the expression refers. What the expression 1

The term Erkenntnis, which is here translated as “cognition”, is translated by Findlay as “knowledge”. Though his translation of this term is suitable for much ordinary and philosophical usage, it is better to translate it here as “cognition”, which is more appropriate for designating a class of acts than the term “knowledge” would be. It is after all quite acceptable to speak of someone having knowledge even when the person is asleep. That is to say, knowledge is a disposition rather than an act. Cognition, however, occurs only insofar as something is actually being cognized. 2 Though the term Erkenntnis normally refers only to higher intellectual acts, Husserl often uses it in references to lower acts, e.g. perception, in which something is evident. 3 Rollinger (1999). See also Rollinger (1993). 4 Though the term Bedeutung, as it is used in Frege (1892a), is usually taken to mean “reference” in contrast with “sense” (Sinn), Husserl points out plainly that he uses it as a synonym of Sinn (Hua XIX/1, p. 58). 5 Hua XIX/1, p. 37. The only case in which Husserl finds it acceptable to say that an expression is not a sign he finds in solitary speech (Hua XIX/1, pp. 41 ff.).

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manifests, what Husserl calls its Kundgabe, is always a psychical process of the one who utters it, while the expression refers to the object which this psychical process intends. If, for example, someone speaks of the Logical Investigations, his expression manifests that he is thinking of this work while it refers to the work itself. Husserl distinguishes between a narrower and a broader sense of 1 manifestation. In the narrower sense it is only a meaning-conferring act which is manifested. The term can, however, be expanded to include those cases in which one may be said to manifest a mind-function of any kind. If, for instance, one says, “I wish I understood the Logical Investigations”, the wish is not a meaning-giving act and therefore not manifested by one’s statement, as long as we understand manifestation in the narrower sense. In the broader sense, however, this wish is manifested. While any expression that functions in communication always has a manifestation in at least the narrower sense, Husserl also thinks that it is possible to use 2 expressions in solitary speech whereby nothing at all is manifested. Whenever expressions occur, whether they are restricted to solitary speech or not, there are always mind-functions which confer meaning on the expressions. Otherwise the sounds or images as such simply do not have any meaning. The meaning-conferring mind-functions, moreover, are 3 distinguished from others which perform a fulfilling function, e.g. the act of perceiving what is named (qua what is named) and not merely using the name meaningfully. The distinctions between what an expression manifests and what it means and between what it means and that to which it refers had already been acknowledged for some time particularly in the 4 case of names. Yet, it is not until the fifth “Logical Investigation” that Husserl explains that a name must “either stand for some complete simple subject of a statement (thereby expressing a complete subject-act), or at least could perform such a simple subject-function in a statement without 5 change”. In this sense it is not the noun alone which is a name, but rather 1

Hua XIX/1, pp. 39 ff. Hua XIX/1, pp. 41 ff. 3 Hua XIX/1, pp. 43 ff. 4 Hua XIX/1, p. 38. 5 Hua XIX/1, p. 481; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 625. 2

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often only in combination with the definite or indefinite article. If it is said that the president has arrived, the expression “the president” is a name whereas the mere noun “president” is not. It will soon be seen, however, that Husserl here lays down conditions for names which are perhaps not strict enough. The difference between the meaning and the object of a name is most easily seen when it is observed that two names can have only one of these 1 in common. The names “the victor of Jena” and “the vanquished of Waterloo” differ in meaning, whereas they refer to one and same individual, also known as Napoleon Bonaparte. The same can be said of the names “the equilateral triangle” and “the equiangular triangle”, although the object of reference in this case is by no means an individual. The possibility that a name can refer to different objects and retain the same meaning is illustrated, on Husserl’s view, by “a horse” in the statements “Buccephalus is a horse” and “this old nag is a horse”. It is interesting to note that in the illustration of the possibility of different objects and the same meaning the names are found in the context of whole statements, more particularly in the predicate-position. The question may be raised, however, if the expression “a horse” or any other expression in this position of a statement is actually a name. Husserl seems to be presupposing a two-term theory of propositions which has indeed 2 dominated much of the tradition in logic, but which is fraught with many 1

Hua XIX/1, p. 53.

2

Since Husserl had learned logic, most likely for the first time, from Brentano’s lectures (especially Brentano, EL 72 which he actually attended, but also other materials to which he had access), these may be the source of his lingering adherence to the two-term theory. In spite of Brentano’s rejection of much traditional logic, he also held on to regarding subject and predicate as interchangeable names. See Brentano, EL 73/12598: “In fact the subject does not contribute to the content of the judgment in a way that differs from that in which the predicate does. It remains the same if one switches subject and predicate [In der Tat trägt sich das Subjekt nicht anders als das Prädikat zum Inhalte des Urteils. Er bleibt, wenn man Subjekt und Prädikat vertauscht, derselbe]”. Accordingly one can say, for example, that a certain man committed a murder or also that a murder was committed by a certain man. The former expression is chosen under normal circumstances because it is the man and not the murder which is under scrutiny. For similar reasons, as Brentano explains in the same manuscript, one convinces oneself that some birds are black by looking among

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1

difficulties. While “a horse” may indeed function in the subject-position of a statement and is to this extent a name, it does not follow from this that it is a name when it is used in the predicate-position. If the change of position does indeed affect the status of an expression as a name, the above stated conditions for names are apparently not sufficiently strict. Be that as it may, Husserl believes that he has here found a rule for all names which have extensions (“universal names”) and appeals to the following example to illustrate his point. “‘One’ is a name whose meaning never differs, but the various ‘ones’ which occur in a sum should not, for that reason, be identified: they all mean the same, but they differ in 2 objective reference”. This example apparently avoids the problem which arises when the alleged name occurs in the predicate position of the statement, but it leaves us in the dark about what the object of the name “one” is. While Husserl makes the above claims about universal names, he says that things are different with regard to proper names. In the case of those which name individual objects, e.g. “Socrates”, a change in meaning will change the reference and vice-versa. This is likewise so in the case of expressions, e.g. “the number two” and “red”, which name general objects. It is interesting to note here that Husserl sees “one” (and presumably “two”, “three”, etc.) as a universal name, but “the number two” (and presumably “the number one”, “the number three”, etc.) as a proper name of a general object. Thus, when we say that the number two is an even number, reference is allegedly being made to one and only one object, whereas the numerals in the equation 1 + 1 = 2 all refer to different objects. The question arises whether the first two numerals refer to general objects as “the number two” allegedly does. Husserl, however, does not answer this question in the Logical Investigations. It is of course a matter of extreme difficulty that he regards general names as the names of general objects. This matter birds, not by looking among black objects. This is the context in which Brentano formulates his theory of double judgment, of which Husserl became very critical. See Ierna (2008). 1 See Peter Geach (1980), pp. pp. 44-61. 2 Hua XIX/1, p. 53; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), I, p. 288.

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will be discussed further below. Another difficult point in Husserl’s discussion of the meaning and reference of names lies in the fact that he ascribes meaning to proper names. John Stuart Mill, however, identified 1 the connotation of a name with its meaning. The connotation of a name, according to Mill, is not the attributes which it denotes, but rather the attributes which the denoted object must have in order for the name to be correctly applied to this object. Since a proper name does not require that its object have any attributes and accordingly does not have a connotation, it apparently does not have a meaning from Mill’s standpoint. Husserl, 2 however, distinguishes the connotation of a name from its meaning. In this connection it is of interest to consider how he conceives of the 3 meaning of a name or indeed any other expression. Before this is considered, however, his view of statements and their manifestations, meanings, and objects will be briefly discussed. Statements, according to Husserl, can also differ in meaning while the object to which they refer remains the same. This is obviously the case when the reference of the subject term of the statement is taken as the reference of the statement itself, for in this case the subject term can be a universal name for which the above stated observations would be applicable. However, it is also possible, according to Husserl, to treat “the whole state of affairs which corresponds to the statement as an analogue of 4 the object a name names”. In this case the statements “a is greater than b” and “b is smaller than a” refer to the very same state of affairs, but they are plainly different in meaning. Unfortunately Husserl gives no consideration as to whether it is possible for two statements which have the same meaning to refer to different states of affairs. Perhaps such a notion is to be 1

A System of Logic, I. ii.5. Hua XIX/1, pp. 63 ff. 3 Husserl is not alone in ascribing meaning to proper names. This is also done in Kneale (1962), though Kneale’s identification of the meaning of a proper name “N” as “the individual named N” certainly will not be in agreement with Husserl’s view that a proper name refers to different individuals only equivocally. While “John”, according to Husserl, has different meanings in reference to different people, this is not at all the case with respect to “the individual called John”. A name of the latter kind, as pointed out in Marty (1884), p. 82, is indeed univocal and indeed universal. 4 Hua XIX/1, p. 54; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), I, p. 288. 2

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dismissed out of hand. This would be understandable in view of the fact that Husserl’s example of two names having the same meaning and yet referring to different objects (“a horse” in the sentences “Buccephalus is a horse” and “this old nag is a horse”) was found to be unconvincing. In his attempt to account for the meaning of an expression Husserl is especially concerned in the Logical Investigations with establishing the 1 timeless character of the bearers of truth, i.e. propositions (Sätze), which are indeed taken to be meanings of statements, as opposed to the obviously temporal character of the mind-functions which expressions manifest (in either the broader or narrower sense) and, in many cases, the temporal character of the object of the expression in question. He finds the timeless 2 character in the species which the acts of meaning instantiate. Since the acts which present the objects named by proper names instantiate species, obviously such names have meaning on Husserl’s view. Though he later came to adopt another view of meaning, he did not do so with the 3 conviction that the species theory was completely without merit. The merit of this theory is dependent on whether Husserl is right in positing species as objects in the first place. In the second “Logical Investigation” Husserl takes pains to defend his view of species as objects which should not be metaphysically or psychologically hypostatized. In this context he insists that general names, e.g. “redness”, refer to general objects, e.g. redness. These general objects are moreover not like the indeterminate and non-existent ones which 4 5 Kasimir Twardowski and later Alexius Meinong accepted, but rather 6 objects which “truly exist”. It is, however, important to distinguish meanings as species from the species to which general names refer. The meaning of the name “redness”, for example, is to be distinguished from 1

See, for example, Hua XVIII, p. 178. Hua XIX/1, pp. 104 ff. 3 The text in which the shift in Husserl’s theory can be found is his 1908 lectures published in Hua, XXVVI. Further elaborations on the new theory can be found in Hua XXXX. 4 Twardowski (1894), pp. 102-111. 5 Meinong (1907), pp. 118-122. 6 Hua XIX/1, p. 130. 2

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the general object called “redness”. Though all meanings are species, not all species are meanings.

3. Positing Names and Non-Positing Statements The distinction between the sense and reference of names and statements had of course been acknowledged outside of the school of Brentano. In 1 this regard the name of Gottlob Frege looms large in the literature. The most important difference between Frege and the Brentanists, however, lies their much more concentrated focus of the latter on the mind-functions 2 which correspond to names and statements, whether these acts are manifested by the speaker or related to the relevant expressions in some other way, e.g. by being evoked by reading or hearing them. Though Husserl regards language as central to the concerns of logic, his ultimate concern in the second volume of the Logical Investigations is with cognition, which he, like the other Austrian phenomenologists, identifies as something that takes place in consciousness, i.e. as consisting of mindfunctions. In the fifth “Logical Investigation” Husserl focuses on the intentionality of consciousness in preparation for his treatment of cognition in the sixth one. In his treatment of intentionality the topic of names and statements is again discussed, but this time the mind-functions which correspond to them are more prominently under consideration than they were in previous investigations. The acts which correspond to names are called “nominal acts”, while the acts which correspond to statements are called “propositional acts”. It is tempting to regard the former as presentations (Vorstellungen) and the latter as judgments (Urteile) in the sense in which 3 Brentano spoke of these two classes of acts, but in the fifth “Logical Investigation” Husserl is in fact attempting to show that Brentano’s classification of mind-functions stands in need of considerable revision. 1

See Frege (1892a). In Frege (1918/19) the grasping of a thought as well as judging (the acceptance of a thought) are thematized, but still only in passing. 3 See Brentano (1874), pp. 266-305. 2

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Such revision is needed, argues Husserl, at least partly because positing and non-positing nominal acts (or names) are to be distinguished just as positing and non-positing propositional acts (or statements) are 1 distinguishable. This distinction can have no place in Brentano’s schema of presentations and judgments. As to Husserl’s notion of non-positing statements, his case seems to be of some merit, as this was also elaborated on by Alexius Meinong in On 2 Assumptions. It is undeniable that someone can understand or even utter a statement without belief and thus without positing the corresponding state of affairs. This is not to say that the act of understanding, so to speak, is propositional (as Husserl says) or one that belongs to a class situated 3 “between” that of presentations and that of judgments (as Meinong says). It is only to say that a statement may correspond to a non-positing act and that statements may in this sense be non-positing. Husserl’s attempt to make a convincing case for the notion of positing names, however, presents us with considerable difficulties. Examples of positing names Husserl finds in such cases as “Prince Henry”, “the statue of Roland in the market place”, “the postman hurrying by”. Of such cases he says, “Someone who uses these names in their normal sense in genuine discourse ‘knows’ that Prince Henry is a real, and not a mythic, person, that a statue of Roland does stand in the marketplace, that the postman is hurrying by etc. The objects named certainly confront him differently from imaginary objects: not only do they appear 4 to him as existent, but their expression also treats them as such”. Here Husserl does not seem to make a convincing case. To be sure, the person who applies the names in question may know that the named objects exist, but it certainly does not follow from this that the objects are posited in or by the act of naming. If the above examples are indeed positing names, it 1

Hua XIX/1, pp. 480-484. See Meinong (1902) and Meinong (1910). Though the first edition of this work was published a year after the second volume of the Logical Investigations appeared, it should not be dismissed as if it were a mere repetition of Husserl’s work. For a discussion of Husserl’s rather negative reaction to Meinong’s work, see Rollinger (1999), pp.186–199. 3 Meinong (1902), pp. 1 ff. 4 Hua XIX/1, p. 482; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 626. 2

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follows that there is a double positing that goes on when such statements as “Prince Henry exists” are uttered or understood with conviction. That is to say, the nominal act would be one instance of positing and the entire propositional act would be another instance of positing. Yet, I doubt if anyone would testify to the experience of such a double positing. The best case for positing names is perhaps to be found whenever “existing” is used to modify a noun, but such cases are for the most part, if not always, highly contrived and hardly have any application in actual linguistic usage. Other cases of positing names, according to Husserl, are to be found in “that”-clauses. Whenever someone says, for instance, “That it has finally rained pleases the farmers”, the subject term is the sort of name that he has 1 in mind here. In such cases it is a state of affairs to which the name refers. As already seen, Husserl maintains that a whole statement, e.g. “It has finally rained”, refers to a state of affairs. The question thus arises whether there is really any difference between a positing propositional act and the corresponding positing nominal act, e.g. between the act corresponding to the statement “It has finally rained” and the one corresponding to the name “that it has finally rained”. Husserl answers that there is indeed an essential difference between the two, but this is a difference in neither the reference nor the positing character of the act. The only thing that can be said is that the one act posits the state of affairs propositionally and the other does so nominally. Metaphorically, the former is said to be multi2 rayed (mehrstrahlig), the latter one-rayed (einstrahlig). It must be kept in mind that in speaking of mind-functions Husserl is thematizing phenomena which are subject to reflection or, in Brentano’s terminology, inner perception. If there is a difference between a given positing propositional act and the corresponding positing nominal act, this difference should thus be a perceivable one. In my own case I am hard put to perceive any difference here. Whether I am told, “It has finally rained. This pleases the farmers” or “That it has finally rained pleases the farmers”, I have the same experience, at least as far as the imagined examples allow me to judge this matter. There may, to be sure, be a difference in the style of writing or speech here, but Husserl has in mind 1 2

Hua XIX/1, pp. 490-495. Hua XIX/1, pp. 492, 495.

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another kind of difference which each person can verify or falsify for himself. This difference is not verified in my own case. In view of such considerations, we should be careful about too much rigidity in assigning classes of acts to classes of linguistic expressions. The precedent for doing this had of course already been set in the work of Brentano and Marty, but Marty developed considerable flexibility in this 1 regard. Though he views names as being especially tied to presentations, insofar as they normally express and evoke certain presentations and insofar as their meaning is that certain presentations are to be evoked, and though he views judgments as being especially tied to statements, insofar as they normally express and evoke certain judgments and insofar as their meaning is that certain judgments are to be evoked, he is open to exceptions to such rules. When we understand statements without believing them, for example, what occurs in our consciousness, according to Marty, is not a judgment or even an assumption (in Meinongian terms), but rather a presentation. If, for instance, I read in a dubious source that the president has been assassinated, what occurs in my consciousness is merely the presentation of the state of affairs which could also be designated by the name “that the 2 president has been shot”. Whether or not Marty’s strategy for dealing with such phenomena ultimately works, his flexibility regarding the correlation between linguistic expressions and mind-functions is certainly to be recommended. 1

See especially Anton Marty (1908), Chapters IV-VI, pp. 288-499, in which the classification of mental phenomena in relation to linguistic expressions is discussed in great detail. As regards secondary literature, see the material published in Kevin Mulligan (ed.) (1990). 2 In Marty’s terms instances of this kind are presentations of judgment-contents (Vorstellungen von Urteilsinhalten). See Marty (1905). What Marty means by “judgment-content” is approximately the same as what Husserl refers to with the term “state of affairs” (Sachverhalt or Sachlage). It may of course be asked in what sense can such an object be the content of judgment when it is only presented. Perhaps the answer for Marty lies in his view that a judgment is nonetheless presented in such a case, although it is left undetermined who or what is making the judgment. See Marty (1908), p. 306.

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Husserl’s agreement with Mill in seeing language as central to the concerns of logic is thus to be understood with great caution when the latter concerns are linked with those of phenomenology, as they indeed are in the second volume of the Logical Investigations. When we wish to identify and classify mind-functions, we must not allow ourselves to be prejudiced by thinking that language is the ultimate guide here. There is in fact no subsitute for what inner perception can achieve in this regard.

4. Excursus: Inner Perception in the Logical Investigations Appeals to inner perception are nowadays not only rare, but apparently banned by mainstream philosophy. The very suggestion that anything of interest could be known by means of introspection will be met as horrific in many quarters. Though Husserl expresses criticism of certain theses 1 about inner perception and even avoids the term, apparently because these 2 theses would otherwise be suggested, he nonetheless makes similar appeals throughout the Logical Investigations. Here I should like to point out some of these. The first instance in this regard is to be found in the first “Logical Investigation” where Husserl dismisses the view that the act of meaning is reducible to or at least requires a mental image. Though there is a tendency to produce mental images whenever one is trying to find them, Husserl insists that his own attempt to carry out the “necessary observations” makes it clear that the view in question is wrong. To report my own findings …, I see an open book which I recognize as Serret’s Algebra, I see the sensory pattern of an algebraical equation in Teubnerian type, while accompanying the word ‘root’, I see the familiar √. I have, however, read the sentence very many times and have understood it perfectly, without experiencing the slightest trace of accompanying images that have anything to 1

Hua XIX/1, pp. 751-775. Two of the theses were advocated by Brentano, namely 1) that all psychical phenomena are inwardly perceived, and 2) that inner perception can be characterized both in terms of its objects (psychical phenomena) and its evidence (immediate certainty).

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do with its presented object. The same happens when expressions like ‘culture’, 1 ‘religion’, ‘science’, ‘art’, ‘differential calculus’ etc., are intuitively illustrated.

As to whether the sought-after mental image is something that is really there and yet imperceivable, Husserl answers, “It is quite irrelevant to our 2 essentially descriptive question”. The term “descriptive” in this context means the same as “phenomenological”. It can be said in the same vein that if the difference between one-rayed and multi-rayed acts is an imperceivable one this only makes it completely irrelevant to the concerns of phenomenology. In the second “Logical Investigation” Husserl points out a type of evidence which he relates closely with inner perception and should also be mentioned in the present context. I may be deceived as to the existence of the object of perception, but not as to the fact that I do perceive it as determined in this or that way, that it is in the intention of this perception not a totally different one, e.g. a pine tree instead of a cockchafer. This evidence in characterizing description (or identification and distinction of intentional objects), has, no doubt, its understandable limits, but it is true and genuine evidence. Without it, even the much-praised evidence of 3 inner perception, with which it is usually confused, would be simply useless.

In this regard one can expand the observation in question to cover not only the objects of perception, but also those of all other mind-functions. It is evident, for example, that I am imagining a unicorn and not a pine tree. Whether or not it is inner perception that occurs here or something with which inner perception is confused, as Husserl thinks, is of course dependent on how “inner perception” is defined. Nonetheless, this evidence is plainly neither outer perception nor the grasp of universals. In the fifth “Logical Investigation” not only one of the meanings of “consciousness” is given as “the inner awareness of one’s own 1

Hua XIX/1, pp. 68 f.; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), I, p. 300. This point had already been made in Husserl’s 1894 “Intentional Objects”, which is translated as Appendix I in Rollinger (1999), pp. 251–284. The rejection of the thesis that mental images always accompany the understanding of expressions is to be found on p. 252. 2 Hua XIX/1, p. 69; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), I, p. 30. 3 Hua XIX/1, pp. 201 f.; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), I, p. 412.

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experienced psychical processes”, but Husserl appeals to this inner awareness at least three times. In one of these instances he discusses what occurs when it is suddenly realized that what was taken to be a real person 2 turns out to be a wax figure. In another case he discusses what occurs when a box is looked at from different angles, namely that the sensations 3 change while a consciousness of identity remains constant. Finally, when he discusses the pure ego, he confesses, “I am simply unable to find this 4 ego, this primitive, necessary center of relations”. The remark, later added in the second edition of the Logical Investigations, “I have since learned to 5 find it”, only indicates that the alleged findings of inner awareness differ in Husserl’s “transcendental” phase, not that the use of inner perception itself is rejected. Indeed, the defining method of this phase, the phenomenological reduction, may well be characterized as an attempt to radicalize and purify inner awareness beyond its previous usage in philosophy. Whether or not Husserl succeeded in this endeavor, along with the whole methodological issue of phenomenological reduction, lies beyond the purview of the present discussion.

5. Fulfillment of Names and Statements As it has already been seen, Husserl distinguishes between the acts which confer meaning on expressions and those which have a fulfilling function. In the sixth “Logical Investigation” Husserl turns his attention to the relation between these two types of acts. Prominent among the fulfilling acts in his reflections are perceptions (Wahrnehmungen) and intuitions (Anschauungen). As will be seen, however, he uses these terms to refer to acts which are by no means restricted to the realm of outer or even inner sense. The 1

Hua XIX/1, p. 356; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 535. Hua XIX/1, pp. 458 f. 3 Hua XIX/1, p. 396. 4 Hua XIX/1, p. 374; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 549. 5 Hua XIX/1, p. 374 n. ; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 549 n. 2

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question arises in the sixth “Logical Investigation” whether a distinction is actually to be made between meaning-conferring and fulfilling acts, namely whenever perception itself seems to confer meaning. If, for instance, one looks outside and makes the statement, “There flies a blackbird!”, it might well seem that the perception of the blackbird flying 1 in the garden confers meaning on the statement under consideration. This, however, cannot be so, Husserl argues, if it means that the perception alone suffices here to confer meaning on the statement. There are many other statements which could be made on the basis of the same perception, e.g. “That is black!”, “There flies that black bird!”, and “There it soars!” Since these statements do not have the same meaning as “There flies a blackbird!”, the perception in question alone cannot be sufficient for conferring the meaning. Moreover, it is possible for the statement to remain intact in its meaning while the perception changes from perspective to perspective and from person to person. It might of course be said here that there is something in common to all these possible perceptions, but Husserl points out that the statement retains its meaning even where the perception is missing altogether, e.g. when someone hears it and does not at all see what is going on in the garden. Accordingly, Husserl concludes, in such a case the perception does not confer meaning, though he concedes that it might in some respect contribute to conferring the meaning without 2 actually “containing it”. The case in which perception makes a contribution to the meaning of an expression Husserl finds especially in so-called “essentially occasional expressions” (i.e. indexicals in contemporary terminology), such as 3 demonstratives and personal pronouns. If one says, for example, “This blackbird is flying away”, and has at the same time the appropriate fulfilling perception of a particular blackbird flying away, it is clear that this perception plays an important role in determining what object is 1

Hua XIX/2, p. 550; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 680. Hua XIX/1, pp. 552 ff. 3 The problem of essentially occasional expressions had already been treated in the first “Logical Investigation” (Hua XIX/1, pp. 85–92 ff.), though Husserl’s account – or “interpretation” (Deutung; Hua XIX/2, p. 553) – of them in the sixth “Logical Investigation” differs from the previous one. This point, as well as many other interesting ones which cannot be discussed here, is made in Schuhmann (1993). 2

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referred to by “this blackbird”. Yet, Husserl does not maintain that the perception in such a case is essential to conferring the meaning, for the 1 same contribution on his view could be made by an act of imagining. This seems to be a difficult point, for it is implausible to say that someone who is relying on imagination in this way picks out the object in any proper 2 sense at all. Such a person can, to be sure, imagine picking out the object by presenting to himself a number of blackbirds in a garden and one of them suddenly flying away. However, such an exercise of imagination, contrary to what Husserl suggests in the Logical Investigations, is not a contribution to the conferring of meaning to “this”, as perception obviously is so for someone who actually sees one blackbird among several flying away and applies the occasional expression “this” in the way already mentioned. Since the main concern here is names, statements, and their corresponding mind-functions, it may of course be asked what occasional expressions have to do with the topic at hand. It is unclear whether Husserl regards an occasional expression such as “this” (as the sole subject of a sentence) or “I” as a name, though it would seem so in view of the abovementioned, rather loose criterion he lays down for a name. Obviously “this blackbird” and even “this” alone can function as the subject of a statement, just as “the blackbird” or “a blackbird”. The same plainly goes for personal pronouns. Moreover, among the expressions that contain occasional expressions as parts, such as “this blackbird is flying away”, are indeed statements and are accordingly worth considering in the present context. It is also of interest that Husserl says that proper names are comparable to occasional expressions with regard to the contribution that 3 perception can make to the conferring of meaning, though Husserl again does not see perception as essential in this regard. Here we must keep in mind that Husserl agrees with Mill in regarding proper names as nonconnotative. Thus a name such as “Hans”, like the demonstrative “this”, does not as such connote any properties. 1

Hua XIX/2, p. 533. Cf. Karl Schuhmann (1993), p. 118. 3 Hua XIX/2, pp. 555 ff. 2

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Leaving aside the special difficulties that occasional expressions pose for names and statements, let us now look more closely at other aspects of Husserl’s theory of fulfillment insofar as this concerns the topic at hand. There are, Husserl tells us, two types of fulfilling processes of names and statements: static and dynamic. In the former the meaning-intention and the fulfillment take place simultaneously, whereas in the latter the fulfillment occurs after the meaning-intention. In both cases, however, there is a synthesis of meaning-intention and fulfillment. In Husserl’s initial reflections on the static unity of meaning-intention and fulfillment he focuses “on a group of the simplest cases possible, thus naturally expressions or meaning-intentions which are taken from the nominal sphere”, and more particularly “expressions which relate in the most transparent way possible to ‘corresponding’ perception and other 1 types of intuition”. Accordingly he does not wish to extend such reflections to the entire area of meaning-intentions, although the 2 foundational character of nominal presentations would certainly indicate that such an extension would in some sense be acceptable. The sort of case which Husserl has in mind as a starting point for reflections on the static unity of meaning-intention and fulfillment is illustrated as follows. If, for example, Husserl’s inkpot is within his field of vision and he at the same time names this object “my inkpot”, the synthesis in question obviously occurs. What is synthesized here is not in any way to be found among connections in the objects, but rather the acts of perceiving and naming. Concerning the question of how these acts can be thus synthesized, Husserl says that they are “mediated by acts of not merely meaning, but rather of recognizing, and more particularly they are 3 here acts of classification”. The perceived object is called “inkpot” not merely by the fact that the expression is uttered or imagined, but also by the fact that this object is recognized as an inkpot. However, it is difficult, contrary to Husserl’s suggestion, to discern three different acts that occur in consciousness while naming an actually perceived object: naming, meaning-intention, and recognizing. Here, once again, Husserl allows 1

Hua XIX/2, p. 558; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 687. Hua XIX/1, p. 476 ff. 3 Hua XIX/2, p. 559; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 688. 2

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himself to be led by a priori requirements rather than a faithful consideration of what actually takes place in experience. Upon reflection, to be sure, it might seem that these requirements are actually met in consciousness. Yet, it can always be legitimately asked whether one does not thereby succumb to some version of “the psychologist’s fallacy” by reading into consciousness something that is only conjured up from the 1 outside. Now Husserl admits that he is drawing “on the dynamic fulfillment, which occurs in the form of an articulated process, for the purpose of an 2 interpretation of the static act of recognition”. Though the term “interpretation” here suggests a procedure that falls short of the 3 requirements of “presuppositionlessness”, Husserl is prepared to meet the objection that three distinct acts cannot be found in static fulfillment. More particularly, he is concerned with the objection that only naming and recognition, but not the act of meaning is identifiable when fulfillment takes place all at once. In opposition to this objection he maintains that a given expression, e.g. “tree”, is meant in precisely the same way when it is understood prior to fulfillment and again when it is understood in 4 fulfillment. The conclusion is of course that there must therefore in both cases be an act of meaning-intention. Secondly, he argues that the coincidence (Deckung) that occurs in fulfillment brings about a whole that 5 is not “a divided duality but a seamless unity”. In this regard Husserl compares the unity in question to the one of “a line set apart, perhaps on a 6 bare white background, and the same line as part of a figure”. While this comparison may well be a clever contrivance, it nonetheless gives us nothing better than a mere analogy. Moreover, the fact that Husserl’s identification of three different acts in the static fulfillment of a name in fact turns out to be appropriately called an interpretation, allowing for alternative interpretations. 1

See William James (1890) I, pp. 196 ff. Hua XIX/2, p. 570; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 698. 3 Hua XIX/1, pp. 24 ff. 4 Hua XIX/2, pp. 570 f. 5 Hua XIX/2, p. 571; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 698. 6 Hua XIX/2, p. 571; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970), II, p. 699. 2

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In his reflections on recognition Husserl makes the interesting observation that many names, even ones which are not general names in the sense of having an extension, have a certain generality to be found in 1 the various fulfilling acts which may occur. The inkpot can be recognized as an inkpot (and thus given the appropriate name) in infinitely many perceptions. Such generality, says Husserl, even obtains in the case of proper names, for the object called “Hans”, for example, can be perceived 2 and recognized also in infinitely many ways. Nonetheless, Husserl refrains from ascribing such a generality to all names, for he denies it of 3 “imaginary” names. Though he gives no example of the latter, one may of course think of the names which correspond to imaginary numbers, e.g. “•–1”, or perhaps also names such as “round square”. Though one may dispute whether the nominal presentations in question are objectless ones, it is beyond doubt that there cannot be one single fulfilling act in which the named object is actually given. Now let us look at Husserl’s account of the dynamic unity of meaningintention and fulfillment. “Where this happens,” says Husserl, “we undergo a descriptively peculiar consciousness of fulfillment: the act of pure meaning, like an aiming intention, finds its fulfillment in the act 4 which renders the matter intuitive”. It should be noted that the “undergoing” (Erleben) spoken of here need not at all imply that there is an awareness of fulfillment, for conscious processes are always undergone (erlebt) wherever they occur, whether or not they are given in inner 5 perception or reflection. It may indeed be asked in what sense we can perceive a dynamic process of fulfillment, for it is possible that the preceding meaning-intention has gone out of existence long before the fulfillment finally comes. As a child I heard the name “Eiffel Tower” many times and accordingly underwent certain meaning-intentions, but I did not actually see the Eiffel Tower till later in life. By no means did I remember all the earlier meaning-intentions when the perception finally 1

Hua XIX/2, pp. 560 –565. Hua XIX/2, p. 565. 3 Hua XIX/2, p. 564. 4 Hua XIX/2, p. 566; Husserl, (trans.) Findlay (1970) II, p. 694. 5 Hua XIX/1, pp. 361 ff. 2

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came about. Therefore, I most certainly did not perceive a unity between these forgotten acts and the present perception. Nor could I perceive a unity between the remembered meaning-intentions and perception of the Eiffel Tower, for what lies in the distant past cannot be perceived. It is, to be sure, not to be denied that the perception may be said to “fit” the earlier meaning intentions, but this fitting cannot be given in consciousness as a present or even immediately past event and is therefore apparently not a concern of descriptive psychology or phenomenology. According to Husserl, there is the possibility of a later “frustration” 1 (Enttäuschung) as well as fulfillment. Here he gives the example of a statement, e.g. “A is red”, being followed by a perception in which it becomes evident that A is green. Yet, it should be observed that there is partial fulfillment here, for the meaning-intention “A” is fulfilled by the perception of A. This is plainly a case where frustration in the domain of statements is possible only if there is fulfillment in the domain of names. While it is unclear whether Husserl here wants to state a general law, according to which frustration of propositional acts in all cases involves fulfillment of nominal acts, he nonetheless wants to state a general law that 2 frustration is possible only where there is partial fulfillment. Though this may seem to be one of the best candidates for an eidetic law in phenomenology, doubts arise when we consider the limitations on perception already mentioned. Wherever something cannot be perceived, such as a long series of events, it would be wrong to say that these can be phenomenologically described, however eidetic one’s account may be. It may be conceded, however, that frustration can occur in static fulfillment and is to this extent perceivable. If, for example, a color-blind person tells me that two colors are the same and I perceive them to be different, this is a case where a certain meaning-intention, namely the understood statement of the color-blind person, undergoes frustration. Here, too, one may observe a partial fulfillment. Before closing this discussion of Husserl’s views on the fulfillment of names and statements, we must not forget his notion of fulfillment through categorial perception. Though this is by no means restricted to statements, 1 2

Hua XIX/2, pp. 574 ff. Hua XIX/2, p. 562.

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it is the categorial perception that fulfills them which is of outstanding interest to Husserl in the sixth “Logical Investigation”. If someone makes the statement “This paper is white”, for example, the perception which 1 fulfills the relevant meaning-intention is a categorial perception. One does not merely see this white paper, but one in fact sees that this paper is white. A state of affairs, which can be named by a “that”-clause, is accordingly the object of perception. Of course, as Husserl had maintained that there is a difference between the intention that gives meaning to a statement and the one that gives meaning to the corresponding “that”clause (functioning as a name), one would expect the same distinction to be made among the acts which fulfill these two types of meaningintention. Be this as it may, another question that arises here concerns whether there is a distinction to be made between the perception of a state of affairs and the perceptions of an event. As I can see, for example, that a blackbird is flying away, I can also see a blackbird flying away. In the latter case it is an event, namely the flying away of a blackbird, which I see. Do we have here two different perceptions (at least one of which is categorial) or merely different descriptions of the same perception? The more one takes a standpoint beyond experience, as Husserl often does in his reflections, the more difficult it becomes to see where the difference lies in experience itself or in the description thereof. Such considerations lead me to suspect here, as in so many instances of Husserlian analyses, that there is a temptation to approach experience from a much too lofty position and impose on it all sorts of distinctions that are not really there. Here again the psychologist’s fallacy seems to be at work. While Husserl was perhaps aware of James‘ warning against this fallacy, it seems that no fallacy has been more difficult to overcome in phenomenology as well as psychology. In light of the above criticisms it is even tempting to speak of the phenomenologist’s fallacy.

1

Hua XIX/2, p. 660.

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6. Concluding Remarks In the foregoing I have examined how Husserl takes language as a starting point and persistently reads its structures into consciousness. Though I have been highly critical of this enterprise on his part, my intention is by no means to suggest that the Logical Investigations are without any value at all. Indeed, I would boldly venture to say that a philosophical work of such magnitude and significance has not appeared since its publication, now more than a hundred years ago. This magnitude and significance, however, does not as such lie in particular positive results, though these may no doubt be found in the work under consideration. Through a close and critical reading of the Logical Investigations one can encounter the fundamental problem of the description of consciousness. While many of Husserl’s descriptions are unacceptable, this is because the difficulties lie in the matters at hand. It still remains a most extraordinary and perplexing fact that consciousness is so difficult, if not impossible, to describe. And thus there arises one new “interpretation” after another. An interpretation, however, cannot replace a description. The fact that such interpretations tend to arise where descriptions are needed only shows us that phenomenology is an area of philosophical inquiry that confronts us with great challenges.

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MARTY ON LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS 1 AND MIND-FUNCTIONS

1. Introduction For roughly a century now language has been among the central themes – and indeed often the central theme – of philosophical investigations. This theme was by no means neglected in Austrian phenomenology. Anton Marty in particular spent his entire philosophical career working in precisely this area of inquiry. Here I shall discuss Marty’s philosophy of language in connection with three issues. The first concerns the ontological requirements of language. Secondly, attention will be given to Marty’s peculiar application of Brentanian descriptive psychology to the philosophy of language. The third issue under consideration is the so-called “mentalism” which prevails in Marty’s thought.

2. Ontological Requirements When we ask what the ontological requirements of language are, we essentially want to know what there must be if there is such a thing as language. Marty’s answer to this question is very close to the one given by Aristotle and again by Locke, namely that language ontologically requires more than just linguistic expressions or the entities which execute them, for he maintains that there must also be certain mind-functions which give 2 these expressions meaning. Now there are some who maintain that there are more ontological requirements which must be met in order for language to exist. Philosophers such 1

This essay is a revised version of a paper that was originally published under the title “Linguistic Expressions and Acts of Meaning: Comments on Marty’s Philosophy of Language” in The Brentano Puzzle, edited by Roberto Poli (Aldershot / Brookfield USA / Singapore / Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 215-226. 2 Marty (1884), pp. 58 ff.

as Bolzano, Husserl, and Frege, not to mention many contemporary ones who are usually inspired by at least one of these three, are convinced that language cannot exist unless there are also meanings regarded as entities in their right, and indeed ones which are said to exist outside the temporal order wherein linguistic expressions and mind-functions occur. While Marty is willing to allow for entities which in some sense exist outside the causal order, he nonetheless insists on the temporal character of 1 all that exists. He therefore finds it impossible to allow for meanings as timeless entities. In this regard, I maintain, his more “nominalistic” philosophy of language is preferable to the more “Platonistic” ones just 2 mentioned. There are good reasons for this preference. I shall indicate these with a brief consideration of the views which were put forward by Bolzano, Husserl, and Frege, particularly as these are concerned with a theme which is inevitably closely tied with meaning, namely the notion of truth. According to Bolzano, our spoken and written sentences correspond not only with our acts of judging, but also with timeless entities called 3 “propositions in themselves”. Moreover, those parts of spoken and written sentences which are not themselves sentences are said to correspond with 4 so-called presentations in themselves. As long as we are given the concept of propositions in themselves, and as long these (or at least some of them) are construed as complex entities, the concept of presentations in themselves is in no particular need of justification. The crucial question is then how Bolzano argues that sentences in themselves should be posited. This is argued by him in his Theory of Science in his explanation of why logic is 5 not first and foremost concerned with laws of thought. It is concerned with these, according to Bolzano, only insofar as it is concerned with truth. The law of contradition, for example, is a law of thought only insofar as it is a 1

Marty (1908), pp. 337 ff. Here “nominalism” is meant in a purely ontological sense. This does not entail that Marty is a nominalist in the sense that he attributes general ideas to a peculiar kind of naming. This distinction is elaborated on in Rollinger (1993b). Moreover, as pointed out in Mulligan (1990), p. 15, Marty also avoids the “error of the nominalist” in the peculiar sense indicated in Wittgenstein (1984), § 383. 3 Bolzano (1837) I, § 19. 4 Bolzano (1837) I, § 48. 5 Bolzano (1837) I, § 16. 2

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law of truth or, as he prefers to say, truths in themselves. Yet, we may ask why truth cannot be ascribed only to acts of judging. Here it may be granted that the law of contradiction and other laws of logic are concerned with truth, but what Bolzano fails to show is that truth must be ascribed to propositions in themselves, which are accordingly referred to by him as 1 “truths in themselves” whenever they are true. In Husserl’s Logical Investigations we find an argument which is meant to show why truth must be ascribed primarily to propositions in themselves 2 or simply propositions. There are obvious cases, according to him, where no judgment occurs and yet we are compelled to speak of truth. Before Newton discovered the law of gravity, for instance, it was true that things behaved in accordance with this law. If, however, we were to conceive of truth only as a property of judgments (i.e. acts of judging), we would, according to Husserl, have to say that before the judgment in question occurred it was not true and therefore false. While Husserl concludes that, in order to avoid such a dreadful consequence, truth is to be ascribed to timeless propositions, there are two considerations which show just how weak his argument is. First of all, it must be observed that “not true” and “false” are by no means equivalent, for there are many objects, e.g. the White House and the French Revolution, which are clearly neither true nor false. Secondly, even if the argument under consideration showed that judgments could not be the proper bearers of truth, it would not follow that timeless propositions served this function. For if we ask whether the proposition in which the law of gravity is asserted was true before Newton‘s time, one can only insist that there is no question of “before” and “after” where the entity under consideration is timeless. Otherwise it would be better to say that the proposition is eternal and not timeless. When we come to Frege‘s Platonism, it is even more perplexing than what we have found in the cases of Bolzano and Husserl. In Frege’s first attempt to illuminate the distinction between sense and reference there is little Platonism, except perhaps in the suggestion that the sense of a name 1 2

Bolzano (1837), § 25. Husserliana XVIII, pp. 140 ff.

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1

might be construed as a set of properties. This view of sense, however, will hardly suffice, for it does not do justice to the fact that whole sentences and not only names have sense as well as reference. The ontological turn in Frege’s account of sense is nonetheless clearly taken in a later work where 2 the requirements for language are undeniably Platonistic in character. When he speaks of a thought (Gedanke), he means the sense of a sentence and this is moreover construed both as a bearer of truth or falsehood and as timeless. It is difficult, however, to see why Frege insists on conceiving of the sense of a sentence in this way. Some of his commentators seem to think 3 that this is intended as a means to avoid psychologism, but it still remains unclear why psychologism is such a dreadful alternative. It is, to be sure, dreadful if Husserl was right in thinking that it involves relativism. But Husserl’s attempt to show that this is the case turns on the argument which had just been dismissed above. Since Frege essentially adds nothing to this argument, we apparently run no risk in rejecting his Platonism together with Bolzano’s and Husserl’s peculiar versions thereof. Now as already indicated, though Marty rightly avoids Platonism, the ontological requirements for language which are put forward by him nonetheless include more than just linguistic expressions and mindfunctions, for he does maintain that language requires entities which, 4 though not timeless, are non-real. These are the contents of judgment and the contents of emotions and volitions. The content of the judgment that there are virtuous human beings, for instance, is the existence of virtuous human beings. This entity (which is perhaps better referred to as a state of affairs rather than a content of judgment), unlike the virtuous human beings which are real, is regarded as non-real because it does not fit into the causal order. It has no effect at all on objects and is brought about only insofar as 1

Frege (1892), p. 42 n. Frege (1918/19), pp. 58-77. 3 See Kenny (1995), pp. 178 ff. 4 Marty (1908), pp. 307 ff., 313 ff., 316 ff., 360 ff., 369 f., 401f., 445 ff. Besides the non-real objects under consideration in the text, others are also taken into account by Marty. Among these are relations of similarity, equality, and difference and collections. Moreover, by characterizing these entities as temporal, he avoids the problem which arises for Meinong and Husserl, pointed out in “Meinong on Perception and Objectives” in the present volume. 2

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virtuous human beings are brought into existence. (In this context Marty usually speaks of Mitwerden.) Here we may ask whether Marty’s ontology is already too inflationary, for the allowance for non-real entities of the kind under consideration apparently leads to an infinite regress. If we must view the existence of virtuous human beings as an entity in addition to virtuous human beings, then we may by the same token regard the existence of the existence of virtuous human beings as yet another entity and so on ad infinitum. Now Marty sees the danger of an infinite regress in connection with real entities. A collective, e.g. a pair of apples, is not to be regarded as something real. “It is true beyond doubt,” says Marty, “that an apple and a second apple together form a pair. But this cannot possibly be a new reality, or else we 1 would be inevitably led to an infinite multiplication of realities”. That is to say, if we regard the pair as a new reality, then there is a yet a fourth reality, namely the collective made up of the first apple, the second apple, and the pair of apples. While this argument compells us to avoid regarding the pair as a real entity, it is difficult to see how this danger is eliminated by declaring that the pair is a non-real entity. As long as this danger is not eliminated, it is best to work out a philosophy of language strictly within the boundaries of the real, provided that this is characterized as belonging to both the temporal and causal order of nature.

3. Mind-Functions in Correlation with Linguistic Expressions Now let us turn our attention to Marty’s application of Brentanian descriptive psychology to the philosophy of language. This involves more than just the observation that linguistic expressions are given meaning by certain mind-functions. It also involves a correlation between certain types of autosemantic expressions, i.e. those which have meaning in separation from others, with certain types of acts of meaning. In Brentanian descriptive psychology mind-functions are divided into three classes: presentations, 1

Marty (1908), p. 331.

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1

judgments, and phenomena of love and hate. Marty adopts this classification and accordingly divides autosemantic expressions into three types. Before examining possible criticisms of this view, let us briefly look at this classification and its application to the philosophy of language. Statements (Aussagen) are the autosemantic expressions which are typically correlated with judgments in the speaker and meant to evoke like 2 judgments in the hearer. The acts of meaning in question are peculiar in that they are affirmative or negative, true or false, and evident or blind. Moreover, Marty follows Brentano in regarding all judgments as existential and accordingly maintains that all assertions which are not apparently about the existence or non-existence of something can nonetheless be expressed in statements to show that they really are about this. In a series of articles on 3 impersonals or “subjectless sentences” (e.g. “it is raining”), long before his Investigations concerning the Foundations of Universal Grammar and Philosophy of Language were published, he had maintained that the Brentanian theory of judgment accomodates impersonals much better than theories which require both a subject and a predicate in an assertion. While we may leave it undecided here whether Marty is right in defending the Brentanian theory of judgment, we may of course be warned against construing the existence or non-existence of something as an entity in its own right to which an assertion refers. This is indeed a consequence which he must accept given both his view that all judgments are existential and that they moreover have contents in the sense explained above, i.e. states of affairs. As already argued, however, it is better to forgo positing states of affairs. Emotives are the autosemantic expressions which are typically correlated with emotions and volitions in the speaker and meant to evoke like acts in 4 the hearer. Though, properly speaking, they share none of the properties peculiar to judgments, Marty nonetheless follows Brentano in ascribing analogous properties to them which insure the objectivity of values. By analogy they are not only in some sense affirmative or negative, true or 1

Brentano (1874), pp. 256-265. Marty (1908), pp. 288 ff. 3 Marty (1884), Marty (1894), Marty (1895). 4 Marty (1908), pp. 363 ff. 2

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false, and evident or blind, but they are also said to have contents which are analogous to the contents of judgments. The infinite regress argument which had been put forward against the notion of contents of judgments can accordingly be used against the notion of contents of emotions and volitions. There are finally certain autosemantic expressions, most notably names, which Marty regards as correlative with presentations in the speaker and 1 meant to evoke equal acts in the hearer. While these acts of meaning have none of the properties peculiar to judgments, nor even analogues of these properties, they are given the special role of functioning as the founding acts for the others. This psychological theory that presentations are fundamental is accordingly the basis for the received opinion that autosemantic expressions which are not themselves names must nonetheless have names among their parts. Just as Brentanian descriptive psychology has not been without critics, the application of it to the philosophy of language can likewise be subjected to criticism. One of the early critics of the attempts in the school of Brentano to classify the mind-functions was Moritz Schlick, who says the following in opposition against Husserl in particular: It is a great error if one believes that the solution of all epistemological problems first requires the distinction of all different modes of consciousness and ‘acts’ from each other. If that were necessary, we could answer no questions of this kind, for the number of modes of consciousness is simply infinite and inexhaustable. Strictly speaking, after all, no single lived experience is precisely like another. The method of ‘phenomenological analysis’, so greatly esteemed and practiced at present, whose task is no less than making those distinctions, therefore leads all the more into something boundless, the more rigorously it is conducted, without conveying actual instances of cognition. It only prepares for them. For it nowhere reduces one thing to another, but rather seeks, on the contrary, to separate and keep apart everything from each other as much as 2 possible.

1 2

Marty (1908), pp. 383 ff. Schlick (1979), pp. 40 f.

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A similar criticism of attempts to classify linguistic expressions is made by Wittgenstein, who insists that these will never be able to do justice to the 1 extremely diverse language games which are played. Both Schlick and Wittgenstein fail to appreciate the success which classification has had in other sciences besides psychology. While the current classification of flora and fauna, for instance, may not be definitive, biology would have gotten nowhere if the extreme diversity of them had discouraged investigators from trying to classify them. Indeed, just as no single lived experience is just like another one, no single animal is just like another. But this has fortunately not prevented us from distinguishing birds, fish, reptiles, and mammals and from making further divisions within these classes. Within nature there is never exact likeness. Since mind-functions are no less natural occurrences than the subject matter of biology and other natural sciences, the lack of exact likeness by no means precludes classification as one of the tasks to be fulfilled. As for the charge that, instead of classification, the reduction of one thing to another is the task of science, one may again call attention to those sciences in which classification has proved so successful. Though we accordingly should not reject Marty’s classification of autosemantic expressions simply on the grounds that it is classification, this does not mean that we have to accept his way of classifying them. The most serious charge is perhaps that it fails because it is based on a psychology which leaves certain psychical phenomena out of consideration. Such a charge can be made from the perspective of another pupil of Brentano, namely Alexius Meinong, who maintained that, besides presentations, 2 judgments, and acts of love and hate, there is yet a fourth class. The psychical phenomena which belong in this fourth class are called “assumptions” (Annahmen) by Meinong and are charactized as either affirmative or negative, like judgments, but also as lacking the conviction which is to be found in all judgments. Examples of assumptions, according to Meinong, are to be found when we grant certain premises merely for the sake of argument, but also in cases where we understand sentences without judging in accordance with them, not to mention our psychical activity 1 2

Wittgensein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, §§ 23 ff. Meinong (1902) and Meinong (1910).

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which accompanies games and art. This theory of assumptions evoked a hostile reaction from Marty which we may now briefly consider. One of the arguments which Marty uses against Meinong is based on the Aristotelian principle of classification, according to which a generic class cannot be differentiated into specific classes by differentiae which are 1 ascribable to another generic class. Red, for instance, can be differentiated from blue only by something peculiar to color. Since the generic class of judgments is differentiated into two specific classes, namely affirmations and negations, there cannot also be a specific class of assumptions differentiated into affirmative and negative ones. Yet, Meinong’s very formulation of the notion of assumptions requires such a differentiation. This criticism is however ineffective, since the Aristotelian principle in question is, as Meinong had already replied, by no means universally 2 accepted in science. Marty also attempts to account for the alleged instances of assumptions by finding their place within the classification which had been put forward 3 in Brentanian descriptive psychology. Some of them are regarded as judgments. While we watch a play being performed, for instance, we actually judge accordingly, albeit for a very short time. If, however, we understand sentences without believing, or if we grant something merely for the sake of argument, the resulting psychical phenomena are mere presentations. These, however, are different from other presentations, according to Marty, by the fact that they are concerned with what is otherwise a content of judgment. Thus, if someone says that God exists and I understand this without judging that God exists, my act of consciousness in this instance is a mere presentation; what I present in this case, however, is not merely God, but rather the existence of God. Now it seems plausible that at least some of the phenomena which Meinong classifies as assumptions are really ephemeral judgments, but the classification of others as mere presentations of the existence or nonexistence of certain objects is acceptable only if we allow for contents of judgment, or states of affairs, as entities in their own right. It has been 1

Marty (1908), 249 ff. Meinong (1910), pp. 372 ff. 3 Marty (1908), pp. 267 ff. 2

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argued above that the introduction of such entities leads to an infinite regress. In this case Marty’s characterization of the phenomena under consideration is unacceptable. It would indeed be better to introduce a 1 fourth class of mind-functions than to allow for an infinite regress.

4. Mentalism and Introspectionism Thus far we have observed in Marty’s philosophy of language its ontological economy and its attempt to classify acts of meaning, though in both respects criticisms can be made. His ontology is too inflationary, for it involves the notion of contents of judgments. His classification of acts of meaning, however, is too poor, for it does not allow for assumptions. Now the objection might be raised that this classification, not to mention Marty’s whole program of applying Brentanian descriptive psychology to the philosophy of language, is to be rejected because it presupposes a dubious mentalism which has been dismissed by Wittgenstein and his followers. This mentalism is not only ontologically abominable, the objection may continue, but also involves the epistemologically dreadful and highly unfashionable notion of introspection. Let us now consider this objection. The mentalism which prevails in the school of Brentano is distinct from other varieties of mentalism insofar as its criterion for separating the mental or, as we prefer to say, the psychical from all else lies in the concept of intentionality. The phenomena of presenting, judging, and feeling are said to be psychical because something is presented, something is judged about, and something is felt (or felt about). Each of these phenomena, unlike physical ones such as colors and sounds, has an object and is in this sense called “intentional”. While some may wish to ascribe such phenomena to a peculiar mental entity – a soul, a pure ego, or whatever else – this entity can be characterized as mental only insofar as it is the bearer of such 1

As it turns out, however, Meinong allows for this fourth class and also for objects which are comparable to Marty’s contents, namely “objectives”. See Meinong (1910), pp. 42-105. A consideration of Meinongian “objectives” in connection with his theory of perception can be found in “Meinong on Perception and Objectives” in the present volume.

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phenomena. These phenomena as such are moreover acts, at best comparable with sounds and motions in the physical realm, i.e. temporally extended objects rather than thing-like entities. Marty’s philosophy of language, however, remains purely in the sphere of the phenomena in question and is therefore not subject to the criticisms which can obviously be made against the varieties of mentalism that adhere to the notion of peculiar mental things. Perhaps this is still unsatisfactory to some because they find it difficult to distinguish the various acts within a short period of time which give linguistic expressions their meaning. While I am talking, it may thus be asked, is there an act which gives each word its meaning? Marty would of course answer that there is an act for each autosemantic expression. Words such as ‘and’, ‘the,’ and ‘of,’ all of which are of course synsemantic, are accordingly given meaning only as parts of larger linguistic expressions which are of course autosemantic. It must be conceded, however, that counting acts of meaning is such a bewildering task that it could easily cause us to abandon the Brentanian theory of language. If indeed we did not perceive these acts as they were taking place, this theory would altogether lose its palatability. It is nonetheless a consolation to note that acts of meaning and mind-functions in general are no different from other temporally extended objects in this regard. There are many instances where it would be arbitrary to establish the events which have occurred in a certain time and place. Yet, the fact that physical events, such as the falling of snow or the passing by of a car, can be divided up in alternative ways and accordingly remain indeterminate in their amount would not in the least prevent us from speaking of such events. The same should be said about mind-functions, as long as it is granted that they are actually given. In precisely this context we must consider whether Marty’s philosophy of language falls prey to an all too dubious introspectionism, for it is indeed tempting to say that mind-functions are given through introspection. As a precaution against this temptation we may be reminded of Wittgenstein‘s attempts to attend to what goes on while words are being used. Though he fails to find acts of meaning in these attempts, this is no surprise to the advocate of Brentanian descriptive psychology. Brentano tells us, for instance, that our anger disappears when we try to attend to it. The reason why it disappears lies in the fact that an attentive perception (i.e. 83

observation) of psychical phenomena is impossible. He maintains that we nevertheless perceive these phenomena while they are present, but we do so only insofar as they are given as secondary objects. If I am angry, then the primary object of consciousness is the person with whom I am angry. Though I am indeed aware that I am angry, as evident from the fact that I can readily answer anyone who asks me whether I am angry, my anger is not the focus of consciousness. Likewise, when I use linguistic expressions meaningfully and do not merely parrot them, I do so by virtue of acts of meaning. But what primarily concerns me is what I mean and not the acts of meaning. If I try to focus on them, they vanish from consciousness (though this unsuccessful volition remains as a secondary object). Therefore, as long as we keep in mind that Brentanian introspectionism will not allow for the notion of introspection as inner observation, the frustrated attempts at such observation are to no avail in the critical evaluation of Marty’s philosophy of language. When Wittgenstein bids us not to think but to look, the Brentanist can reply that we cannot look because we already see. Perhaps the greatest fear of the opponents of mentalism and introspectionism is that such views can easily lead to solipsism. Such fear in connection with the school of Brentano may of course be enhanced by observing that Husserl, by far Brentano’s most influential pupil, maintained already in his Logical Investigations (hence years before he left the school) 1 that language could be a purely private matter. While Husserl distinguishes between the manifestation of a linguistic expression, e.g. the speaker’s judgment in the utterance of an assertion, from both its object and its sense, he nonetheless construes the sense as something which the expression can have without manifesting any psychical phenomenon. 2 The distinctions in question were in fact drawn from Marty’s early work, though Marty had construed the sense of a linguistic expression as dependent on its manifestation, or at least the possibility of its 3 manifestation, and continued to adhere to this view in his mature work. While the manifestation of a linguistic expression occurs when the hearer 1

Hua XIX/1, pp. 41 ff. Marty (1884), pp. 300 ff. 3 Marty (1908), pp. 288 ff. 2

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regards it as an indication of the psychical life of the speaker, the meaning is regarded as the function whereby the expression is to produce a psychical phenomenon of the same kind in the hearer. If I assert that it is raining, the meaning is not only to be found in the manifestation of my act of judging, but in the function of the assertion to produce in the hearer the judgment that it is raining. From Marty’s standpoint Husserl’s model of solitary speech, even imaginary speech, for language in general becomes a very dubious one indeed. Granted that the mentalism of Marty has the advantages which have thus far been considered, one final point to be made here concerns Quine‘s complaint about the positing of meanings which often, on his view, goes hand in hand with mentalistic theories of language. This criticism is directed against the view that meanings in any sense at all, and not just in the Platonist sense, must be posited. In the words of Quine: People persist in talking thus of knowing the meaning, and of giving the meaning, and of sameness of meaning, where they could omit mention of meaning and merely talk of understanding an expression, or talk of the equivalence of expressions and the paraphrasing of expressions. They do so because the notion of meaning is felt somehow to explain the understanding and equivalence of expressions. We understand expressions by knowing or grasping meanings; and one expression serves as a translation or paraphrase of another because they mean the same. It is of course spurious explanation, mentalistic explanation at its 1 worst.

Now it must be observed that Marty’s theory of language is the very reverse of what Quine is complaining about, for Marty maintains that meaning is nothing but a function of communication and must in no sense be taken as something which explains how communication takes place. In short, by avoiding the spurious explanation just mentioned, Marty does not fall prey to Quine’s criticism. If indeed we take into account everything which has been said here about Marty’s view of language, it turns out to be mentalism at its best. 1

Quine (1993), p. 83.

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5. Conclusion Let us now sum up the above remarks. Though Marty’s philosophy of language is not ontologically minimal, it requires less than many of the more Platonistic views of language which have unfortunately proved to be quite prominent in the twentieth century. While it is preferable to these, its psychological foundations are in need of correction from Meinong’s theory of assumptions. If, moreover, one doubts this psychological approach to the philosophy of language because it is infected by mentalism, introspectionism, and perhaps even solipsism, there are at least four important points to be made. 1) This mentalism can suffice with the notion of mind-functions, regarded as intentionally directed acts, and is not as such in need of the notion of a mental thing. 2) While it allows for introspection, or inner perception, this is conceived as non-attentive and therefore not to be dismissed because of vain attempts to attend to psychical phenomena. 3) Marty conceives of meaning in such a way that he avoids the solipsistic leanings of Husserl. 4) By adopting this conception, he avoids any spurious explanation of communication or equivalence of expressions in terms of sameness of meaning. In the overall forgoing comments it is striking that, among the criticisms of Marty’s philosophy of language which have been considered, the most effective one comes from within the school of Brentano, namely from Meinong. This is of course not to say that there can never be effective criticisms from outside the school. But one fruitful way of evaluating the various philosophical stances taken by the Austrian phenomenologists is to be found in examining their mutual criticisms. Only time will tell whether studies carried out in this fashion will yield enduring philosophical results.

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HUSSERL’S ELEMENTARY LOGIC: THE 1896 LECTURES IN THEIR NINETEENTH CENTURY 1 CONTEXT

1. Introduction Among Franz Brentano’s ambitious philosophical enterprises was his attempt at a reform of logic. In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint he formulates the theory of judgment which was to be the basis 2 for the reforms, though he never published a logic in which the details of the reform might have been presented. Nevertheless, he lectured on the 3 reforms. In spite of their awareness thereof, Brentano’s two most prominent students, Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl, rejected it in 4 the 1890s. Already in 1890 Meinong collaborated with his student, Alois 5 Höfler, on a logic textbook for the gymnasia of Austria. The theory of judgment that is formulated in this textbook diverges from Brentano’s considerably and therefore seems to have met with extreme disapproval 1

This essay is a revised version of a paper that was originally published under the same title in Studia Phaenomenologica: Romanian Journal of Phenomenology (2003) 3, pp. 195-214. 2 See Brentano (1925), pp. 38-82. For discussions of some of these reforms in terms of contemporary logic, see Simons (1987) and Simons (2004). 3 There are two full sets of lecture notes in Brentano’s unpublished manuscripts, namely EL 72 and EL 80. A very inadequate edition based on EL 80 is published in Brentano, (ed.) Hillebrand (1956). 4 In the summer semester of 1875 Meinong attended Brentano’s lecture course Old and New Logic. In the winter semester of 1884/85, when Husserl embarked on his career in philosophy, he attended Brentano’s lecture course Elementary Logic and the Necessary Reforms in It (EL 72) (a course that continued to be taught in the summer semester of 1885, though no longer attended by Husserl). In Halle Husserl was again exposed to the Brentanian reform of logic in the lectures of Carl Stumpf (Q 14). The syllabus for Stumpf’s lecture course on logic has been translated into English as Appendix Three in Rollinger (1999), pp. 311-337. Stumpf was among the students of Brentano who kept much closer to orthodoxy than did the wayward Meinong and Husserl. 5 See Höfler (1890).

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from Anton Marty. A decade later (in the year 1900) Husserl’s 2 Prolegomena to Pure Logic, the first volume of his Logical lnvestigations, was published. In this volume Husserl altogether rejected the Brentanian view that elementary logic is concerned with judgments, understood in the 3 sense of mind-functions which come into being and pass away. Husserl’s elementary logic, in which timeless propositions were to take the place of time-bound judgments, had in fact already been presented in lectures in 4 1896, which were by no means fully taken up in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic. In the following an attempt will be made to examine some of the essential points of these lectures. Insofar as the present framework allows, they will be discussed here in their historical context, including considerations of influences on Husserl as well has his criticisms of other positions. Before entering into this discussion, the question will no doubt arise why the 1896 lectures are of any interest at all. Since lectures on logic as weIl as ones on related matters that Husserl presented to his students at later dates, when his views were presumably much more “mature”, are 5 already available, it may seem that the lectures to be discussed here belong to a very immature and perhaps even negligible phase of his philosophical development. However, the presumption that Husserl’s development is one of progressive improvement may be challenged, 1

Lindenfeld (1980), p. 66. About a year after Höfler‘s textbook appeared, Hillebrand (1891) was published, in which Brentano’s poposed reforms of logic are briefly presented. 2 Hua XVIII. 3 See Hua XVIII, pp 177 ff. Though Brentano is never explicitly attacked as a proponent of psychologism and reports later that Husserl even “exonerated” (Brentano, [ed.] Bergmann [1946/47], p. 93) him from the charge, he rightly felt that he was by implication under attack. See the defense against this charge in Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1925), pp. 179-182. 4 Hua-Mat I. 5 The following lecture courses are published: the one from 1902/03 in Hua-Mat II, the one from 1906/1907 in Hua XXI, the theory of meaning (closely related to logic) in Hua XXVI, the lecture course on logic from 1908/09 in Hua-Mat VI, and the one from 1917/18 in Hua XXX. If one is interested in the transcendental phase of Husserl’s conception of logic, essential reading is of course Hua XVII, which is a book rather than a lecture.

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certainly from the perspective of Austrian phenomenology, for already in the early years of the twentieth century he was advocating German 1 Transcendentalism. Moreover, even if one leaves this presumption unchallenged, the 1896 lectures are of great interest because they are considerably less programmatic than Husserl’s later attempts to circumscribe the concerns of logic. In these lectures he offers us a logic, not merely a philosophy of logic. In this regard they are highly exceptional among Husserl’s writings.

3. Logic as Theory of Science The most important influence on Husserl’s conception of logic in the lectures under consideration is Bernard Bolzano “from whose Theory of Science there is more to learn in matters of descriptive foundation-Iaying of formal logic than from all other logical works of old and modern 2 times”. It is noteworthy that Husserl here speaks only of the descriptive foundation-laying of formal logic, for Bolzano’s enterprise in the Theory of Science is much vaster than this. What Husserl has in mind here is the elementary logic that is presented in the first two volumes of Bolzano’s 3 massive four-volume masterpiece. This is of course not to say that Husserl simply adopts all of Bolzano’s views in elementary logic. Nor is it to say that Husserl did not see the entire Theory of Science as a model for logic. 1

See Hua II. Hua-Mat I, p. 96. The terms “formal logic” and “pure logic”, as they are used in the 1896 lectures, are meant to designate the same discipline. However, they certainly indicate different aspects of the discipline in question. While “formal logic” conveys the notion that it is concerned with form, the term “pure logic” (at least for Husserl) indicates that it is not dependent on any other discipline, especially psychology. 3 Bolzano (1837) I-IV. In a letter to Brentano (3 January 1905) Husserl wrote, “Extraodinarily fruitful approaches in the treatment of a pure logic are offered by Bolzano’s Theory of Science, very much admired by me, in its first two (and only significant) volumes” (Schuhmann [ed.] [1994] I, p. 29). Husserl’s relation to Bolzano, insofar as it has bearing on his relation to other Austrian phenomenologists, has been discussed in Rollinger (1999), pp. 69-82. See also Beyer (1996). There is, however, still a need for a full-length study of Husserl and Bolzano that takes all the relevant material, both published and unpublished, into account. 2

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As it turns out, much of Husserl’s elementary logic diverges from Bolzano’s; nonetheless, Husserl conceives of logic as a whole very much in terms of the work just mentioned. Though the divergences from Bolzano cannot fully be treated here, Husserl’s conception of logic and how it relates to Bolzano’s can be briefly discussed. According to Husserl, elementary logic is pure logic. That is to say, it is independent from psychology. “The first and main foundation of all logic”, says Husserl, “is the objective, i.e. non-psychological theory of the 1 condition-relations among propositions”. These relations are for him the basis for the laws of inference which have been the central concern of 2 elementary logic since its beginnings in Aristotle. It will soon be seen that for Husserl this branch of logic is concerned not only with propositions and inferences, but also with concepts. Important to us here is Husserl’s view that elementary logic is to be followed by another part of logic, the doctrine of method (Methodenlehre), which does in fact include psychology. Thus, in answer to the question whether logic is an independent science, Husserl says: If logic is understood as the theory of science or method of cognition, there is of course nothing to be said of its independence. On the one hand, logic presupposes the objective science that we have briefly designated as the science of inferences, on the other hand, psychology, since the methodical arrangements, which we use in order to make the cognition of the peculiarities and laws of the objective useful for the progress of human cognition, are obviously based on the 3 psychology of intellectual activities.

The same point can be found in Bolzano’s Theory of Science. In answer to the question whether logic is an independent discipline, he says: Logic is to teach us in what way our knowledge can be unified in a genuinely scientific whole; it is for this very reason also to teach us how truth is found and error discovered, and so forth. It cannot do all this without also precisely taking into account the way in which the human mind arrives at its presentations and knowledge. It must therefore necessarily adopt propositions which treat, for 1

Hua-Mat I, p. 23. Hua-Mat I, p. 221. 3 Hua-Mat I, p. 32. 2

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example, our faculty of presentation, memory, the ability to associate ideas, the faculty of imagination, etc. in order to prove theories and rules it provides. However, we have a special self-sufficient science, empirical psychology, in which the object of concern in these propositioos, namely the human soul with its faculties, is considered. This entails that logic is dependent on psychology at least, if not on any other science, and must consequently once and for all forego 1 any boast of being a completely independent science. 2

While psychology cannot be found in Bolzano‘s elementary logic, which is restricted to non-real and hence non-psychical subject matters, namely objective presentations, propositions, and inferences, this part of logic is 3 followed by an epistemology (Erkenntnislehre), art of invention 4 (Erfindungskunst), and theory of science proper (eigentliche Wissen5 schaftslehre), all of which are very much concerned with presentations, judgments, and inferences as real actions of mental entities. When one speaks of Bolzano’s logic as if this were to be found first and foremost in the first two volumes of the Theory of Science, the term “logic” is simply 6 not being used in the Bolzanian sense. The conception of logic that Husserl advocates, in accordance with the Bolzanian model, is thus contrary to the Brentanian model, in which psychology is present in both elementary logic and other branches of the discipline, just like many of the prominent logics of the late nineteenth 7 century, e.g. Christoph Sigwart’s, which receive little attention nowadays 1

Bolzano (1837) I, § 13, pp. 53 ff. This part of logic is found in Bolzano (1837) I, §§ 46-120 and in Bolzano (1837) II in its entirety. Elementary logic, however, is prefaced by a “fundamental doctrine” (Fundamentallehre), whereby the existence of truth and knowledge is established, in Bolzano (1837) I, §§17-45. 3 Bolzano (1837) III, §§ 269-321. 4 Bolzano (1837) III, §§ 322-391. 5 See Bolzano (1837) IV in its entirety. 6 This is a statement of historical fact and is not to be taken as a criticism of attempts systematically to formulate or develop a Bolzanian logic in the contemporary sense. 7 Sigwart published a two-volume work on logic that went through three editions in his life-time. The first volume is concerned with elementary logic and the second one with the doctrine of method. In Husserl’s library there is a copy of the second edition of this work, Sigwart (1889) and Sigwart (1893). His copy of the first volume is 2

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even from a historical perspective due to the triumph of Gottlob Frege. However, Husserl’s view of logic also stands in contrast with the one found in Frege’s work, for Frege wishes “to separate the psychological 1 from the logical”, not just from one part of the logical. Husserl’s point of view on this matter, in spite of his deep appreciation for objectivity in logic, is thus as different from Frege’s as it is from Brentano’s. Though one might see this issue as a merely verbal one, it makes all the difference in how an entire discipline is sectioned off from others. The upshot of the acceptance of the Fregean conception of logic in the twentieth century is that logic is no longer intimately tied together with epistemological and methodological concerns as it was in the nineteenth century. Before we proceed to discuss the particulars of Husserl’s elementary logic of 1896, it may be noted that the Bolzanian model was to be adopted in his later writings on the topic as well, albeit with at least two important alterations. First of all, on the later view pure logic was not to be limited to 2 elementary logic, but also to be expanded to include formal ontology. Secondly, theory of science in the full sense, according to Husserl’s later programmatic statements, is to find its fulfillment in transcendental 3 phenomenology rather than psychology. Be that is as it may, Husserl’s early conception of a theory of science, as consisting of pure logic and a psychologically oriented theory of method, can be appreciated on its own heavily marked and annotated. In his 1896 lectures Sigwart is criticized for his application of psychology to elementary logic (Hua-Mat I, p. 136). By no means is it possible here to discuss all the numerous remarks and criticisms which Husserl makes in these lectures concerning Sigwart’s logic. A study of Husserl and Sigwart is still very much needed, for Husserl is right in his assessment of Sigwart as “the most influential logician of the present” (Hua-Mat I, p. 175). This influence extended beyond the German speaking world, as evinced by the fact that both volumes of the second edition appeared in English translation in Sigwart, (trans.) Dendy (1895). 1 Frege (1884), p. x. Frege’s name occurs only once in the 1896 lecture course on logic (Hua-Mat I, p. 134), namely in a reference to Frege (1892a). It will be seen below, however, that Frege’s influence on Husserl is detectable, though certainly not pervasive in the lectures under consideration here. 2 Hua XVII, pp. 80 ff. This distinction was already made in Hua XVIII. While the 1896 lectures represent what was later to be called “apophantic logic”, they do contain some assertions which would properly belong to formal ontology. 3 See Hua XVII, pp. 155-298, i.e. the entire second section of that work.

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terms. It would cenainly be amiss to say, along with one of the most prominent commentators on Husserl’s work in logic, that the later motifs of his transcendentalism, such as the view that “scientific objectivities are 1 idealization of the life-world”, were already present in his early logic. Such an ahistorical bias in favor of the later Husserl is painstakingly avoided here.

3. Concepts The distinction between concepts and propositions is introduced by Husserl in terms of the distinction between two classes of linguistic 2 expressions: names and statements. Corresponding to names and statements are two distinct types of objective presentations: those in which objects in the narrower sense are presented and those in which states of affairs are presented. When the name “Socrates, the wisest of the Athenians”, for example, is used, the object that is thereby presented is quite different from the one presented in the statement “Socrates is the 3 wisest of the Athenians”. The latter object is a state of affairs, whereas the former is not. When Husserl speaks of concepts in the narrow sense he means all those objective presentations whose objects are not states of affairs. Such presentations are often referred to as “presentations” without further qualification or “presentations in the narrow sense”, whereas the objective presentations of states of affairs are called “propositions” (Sätze). Though the distinction between names and statements may be of use in distinguishing between presentations and propositions, Husserl regards “this distinction between object and state of affairs, between 4 presentation and proposition as an ultimate and undefinable one”. Such a remark should discourage attempts to find the so-called “linguistic turn” in 1

Mohanty (1999), p. 7. Hua-Mat I, pp. 50 ff. 3 Husserl took the technical term that is here translated as “state of affairs” (Sachverhalt) from Stumpf, who introduced it in order to distinguish the content of a judgment from its object. See Rollinger (1999), p. 313. 4 Hua-Mat I, p. 133. 2

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early Husserl. Presentations are also called “concepts”, not to be confused with concepts in the narrow sense that will be discussed below. There is a distinction to be made, says Husserl, between the matter and the object of 1 a concept. The distinction corresponds to that between the sense and the reference of a name. It is, however, confusing to speak of a concept having a matter, since there is in fact no distinction between a concept and its matter. That is to say, a concept and its matter are one and the same. Nonetheless, the distinction between a concept and the corresponding object is of course a crucial one, for one can say things of a concept that are not true of the corresponding object and vice-versa. This is already to be seen in the fact that the parts of a concept do not correspond to the parts of its object. The concept of a country without mountains, for example, includes the concepts “country” and “mountains” as parts, whereas the 2 object obviously does not have mountains. Granted that there is a distinction between a concept in the broad sense and its object, and further that this distinction is a highly significant one, the question remains how concepts in the narrow sense are to be understood. In order to understand Husserl’s views on this matter, it is necessary to make clear his notion of an abstractum and an attribute (Beschaffenheit). An abstractum, according to Husserl, inheres in an object, as red inheres 3 in a red thing or virtue in a virtuous person. As such it is dependent on the object in which it inheres. While he makes no objection to calling the presentations of abstracta “abstract presentations” as a distinct class of individual presentations, he also says that attributes are not to be identified with abstracta. An abstractum is in each case a dependent part of the 4 object in which it inheres and can actually be noticed in the object. One 1

Hua-Mat I, pp. 55 ff. Hua-Mat I, pp. 58 ff. The example of “country without mountains” is taken from Bolzano (1837) I, § 63, p. 268. 3 Hua-Mat I, pp. 59 f. 4 Though an abstractum, as Husserl uses the term, is apparently the same as certain tropes (i.e. individualized qualities), to use the term of contemporary philosophers, he limits the class of abstracta to a range of tropes within a certain epistemic context, as indicated by his statement that they can be noticed. The concept of such abstracta was 2

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can, for example, see a red thing and at once notice the abstractum “red” in the thing. “If, however, we designate the house smaller than the church”, Husserl continues, “what was said [of abstracta] is not true of the attribute ‘smaller than the church’, which is nothing inherent in the house, to be grasped as a constituent part thereof, and yet it is something that 1 belongs to the house”. While attributes are accordingly not to be identified with abstracta, it may seem plausible to assert that there is in each case a 2 one-to-one correspondence between the two. Thus, the abstractum called “red” corresponds to the attribute “being red”, the abstractum “virtue” to “being virtuous”. Yet, this correspondence cannot be found in the example of the house being smaller than the church. However much one focuses on the house, one cannot grasp in it an abstractum corresponding to being 3 smaller than the church as one can grasp red in the red thing. One can, to be sure, see the house and the church together and grasp therein the abstractum corresponding to the house being smaller than the church, but this abstractum inheres in the house and the church as a unity, not in the house as such. An attribute of this kind may be called an “external” or “relative” one, also simply a relation (Verhältnis), whereas attributes such as red can be called “internal” ones or “properties” (Eigenschaften). “Attributes,” Husserl explains further, “are in our sense objects no less than abstracta or individuals are. But they have the peculiarity that they, different from the latter, are merely objectivizations of predicates, so to 4 speak”. In this regard Husserl emphasizes that attributes are not as such predicates. While it may sometimes be said that coloredness, for example, in fact already explicitly formulated by Brentano under the heading “distinctional parts” (distinktionelle Teile) in his lectures. See, for instance, Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), pp. 14 ff. Husserl’s concept of the abstract had already been put forward in his “Psychological Studies in Elementary Logic” (Hua XXII, pp. 92-123, especially 92-100), first published in 1894, and further elaborated on in his theory of parts and wholes in the third “Logical Investigation”, which are explicitly inspired by Stumpf. 1 Hua-Mat I, pp. 60 f. The word included in angular brackets is an insertion made by the editor, whereas square brackets indicate my own insertion. 2 Hua-Mat I, pp. 61 f. 3 Hua-Mat I, p. 62. 4 Hua-Mat I, p. 64.

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is a predicate, it is more accurate to say that “colored” is the predicate of 1 which coloredness is the objectivization. In the following passage Husserl faces a vexing issue concerning concepts in light of what has been said of abstracta and attributes: One says, for instance: In the categorical proposition “Socrates is wise” there is as subject an object, as predicate a concept. One also speaks of the concept of being-wise, of wisdom. What is harmful in the equivocation disappears as soon as we have clarified the situation and distinguished: [1)] predicate in the proper sense, [2)] objectivizing predicate or property, and [3)] the inherent abstractum. If we want to define the concept as object, we must call the property “concept”. The predicate in the proper sense would thus not be a concept, but there corresponds a concept as objectivization to it. If, however, we identify concept and predicate, the presentation of the concept is not a full presentation, but rather a constituent part of one, namely a constituent part of a presentation of a state of affairs. I shall prefer the latter manner of speaking, since the predicate is without a doubt to be seen as something primary in contrast to the property, as this 2 makes clear that the predicate is part in the property.

This very difficult passage seems to indicate that concepts in the narrow sense are those objective presentations which correspond to predicate terms. Accordingly, they are neither properties nor abstracta. The resulting notion of concepts is strikingly comparable to the one advocated by Frege, though Husserl makes no explicit reference to his writings in the 3 present context. Moreover, as Frege had contrasted concepts with objects, Husserl does so as well and thereby uses a notion of an object that is yet narrower than the one that he had introduced by contrasting objects with states of affairs. An object in this sense is neither a state of affairs nor a concept. Given Husserl’s characterization of concepts in the broad sense as objective presentations corresponding to names and his characterization of concepts in the narrow sense as objective presentations corresponding to predicate terms, there arises a problem that he does not confront in his 1

Hua-Mat I, p. 65. Hua-Mat I, pp. 65 f. 3 See Frege (1892a). Though Husserl does not cite this article in the 1896 lectures, a copy of it is to be found in his private library and bears markings from his hand. 2

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elementary logic. The implication here is that whatever can be said of concepts in the broad sense can be said of concepts in the narrow sense, though not vice-versa. If, however, this is the case, it follows that predicates correspond to names as do other concepts. This would mean that in a statement such as “This man is virtuous”, the term “virtuous” in fact functions as a name. The proposition in question would thus consist of two names “this man” and “virtuous”. This two-term theory of predication poses great difficulties which can hardly be 1 discussed here, though it is already evident that this theory is called into question by observing that one cannot simply use the predicate term 2 “virtuous” as a subject. To be sure, the mere fact that Husserl finds that predicates are peculiar enough to mark them off as concepts in the narrow sense indicates that he was on his way to rejecting the two-term theory of propositions. A complete rejection, however, would of course consist in not only marking them off, but also in abandoning any talk here of a broad 3 and narrow sense of “concept”. Husserl’s reflections in his elementary logic on abstracta, attributes, and concepts in the narrow sense are in fact an attempt to find a place for notions which come from three distinct sources. As already suggested, his notion of concepts in the narrow sense is very Fregean and may very weIl have been taken from Frege. The notion of an abstractum, however, is to be found in Brentano under the heading “metaphysical part” and in Stumpf 4 under the heading “psychological part”. Moreover, Bolzano‘s Theory of Science appears to be the source for Husserl’s notion of attribute and also 5 for his distinction between internal and external attributes. While Husserl’s utilization of three distinct historical sources may make his view look rather eclectic, his ability to bring the three notions in question into a synthesis may also be regarded as a feature of his genius. 1

See Geach (1980), pp. 44-61. The theory seems more plausible, however, for cases such as “Cicero is Tully”. 3 Unless otherwise specified, the term “concept” will henceforth be used in reference to that which corresponds to predicates as distinct from attributes and abstracta. 4 See Rollinger (1999), pp. 43 & 106 f. 5 Bolzano (1837) I, § 80, pp. 378-389, §§ 110-113, pp. 517-530. 2

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4. Propositions While concepts in the broad sense correspond to names and are all those presentations which refer to objects in the narrow sense, namely objects that are not states of affairs, propositions correspond to statements and 1 refer to states of affairs. The division between concepts and propositions is, once again, emphatically regarded by Husserl as an ultimate and undefinable one, no less so than the division between objects and states of affairs. Though Husserl regards all propositions as complex, he distinguishes between those which have more than one proposition as parts (complex 2 propositions), and those which do not (simple propositions). Among the complex ones, a distinction is to be made between the ones of the form “S is a proposition” and others that would nowadays be acknowledged as complex, e.g. conjunctions. It is to be noted that in the former case it is a proposition, not a state of affairs, that is named by “S”. In some cases, however, the proposition is part of a presentation in the narrow sense. In the statement “Berlin, which was a minor city two hundred years ago, is the largest major German city” the relative clause corresponds to a proposition just as well as the whole statement does. Yet, the proposition indicated in the relative clause is dependent on the presentation of Berlin in this case. In hypothetical statements the proposition indicated in each clause is indeed dependent, although each one implies an independent proposition. In other instances, however, propositions obviously obtain as independent parts of a single proposition. This is the case, for example, in 1

While it is widely known that in the Logical Investigations Husserl came to view propositions are not only ideal objects and more particularly species which are instaniated in propositional acts (or certain parts of such acts), his 1896 lectures on logic do not involve any explicit attempt to discern the ontological status of propositions. The years which intervened between these lectures and the Logical Investigations, however, involved considerable development in the formulation of the concept of propositions and their relations to judgments, to other propositional acts (“assumptions”), and to states of affairs. See the texts and appendices published in Hua XXXX, pp. 82-139. 2 Hua-Mat I, pp. 133 f.

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“Socrates died a hero’s death, but his noble thoughts live on”. If we disregard the cases of propositions which are dependent parts of a presentation in the narrow sense as weIl as named propositions, Husserl 1 2 allows for three types of complex propositions: conjunctive, disjunctive, 3 and hypothetical. As regards the elementary forms of simple propositions (of which complex ones ultimately consist), Husserl was confronted with at least four outstanding alternatives: 1) On the basis of Brentano’s theory of judgment, according to which all judgments are existential, propositions can likewise be interpreted as existential (e.g. “All men are mortal” = 4 “There is no man who is not mortal”). 2) Bolzano‘s view that the elementary form of a proposition is “A has b”, in which “b” indicates (or corresponds to) an attribute (including existence as well as redness, roundness, etc.) would be another approach. 3) Herbart‘s view that there is a fundamental distinction between categorical (predicative) and existential judgments was also vividly present in Husserl’s situation and thus an 5 alternative way of approaching propositional form. 4) Frege‘s analysis of propositions by means of the argument-function structure would be yet another alternative, though Husserl, in spite of his familiarity with Frege’s Begriffsschrift and other related writings, also in spite of his aformentioned adoption of a Fregean notion of concept in the narrow sense, does not take this alternative into account in his attempt to examine propositional form. 1

Hua-Mat I, pp. 135-138. Hua-Mat I, pp. 138-141. 3 Hua-Mat I, pp. 140 f. 4 When Brentano speaks of Existentialsätze he actually means existential sentences or statements, not propositions in the Bolzanian or Husserlian sense. 5 See Drobish (1875), in which an attempt was made to develop this concept of the logical form of propositions and apply it systematically throughout logic. Husserl himself speaks of this book as the “solid work of Drobish” and (Hua-Mat I,) and repeatedly discusses the views of Herbart in numerous passages. See Hua-Mat I, pp. 18, 24, 65, 183, 185, 211, 228 & 268. A study of Husserl’s relationship to Herbart and the Herbartians would indeed be a welcome contribution to the literature on Husserl. For an informative discussion of the views of Herbart and Drobisch in the context of nineteenth century theories of judgment (between the times of Kant and Brentano), see Martin (2006), pp. 55-62. 2

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Insofar as Husserl accepts the view that predicative (categorical) propositions are ultimate and not to be explained or defined, he is more closely allied to Bolzano and Herbart than he is to Brentano. Another opponent of Husserl in this regard is John Stuart Mill, who attempted to explain the predicative form by means of classifying the various types of 1 predication. Such an attempt, according to Husserl, fails to give us any understanding of what must already be understood at the outset. In the same spirit Husserl rejects the “subsumption theory” of predication and all 2 other extension theories of propositions. Likewise, he rejects those 3 intension theories, which are also attempts to explain the predicative form. According to Husserl, there are two fundamental and irreducible classes 4 of categorical propositions: affirmation and negation. In his defense of this view he criticizes three others: 1) the view that negative propositions are affirmative ones with negative predicates (“S is non-p”, as in the example of “The soul is immortal”), 2) the view that a negative proposition is the rejection of an affirmative one, and 3) the view that in affirmation a proposition is affirmed and in negation a proposition is 5 negated. The third view, which is attributed to Lotze, is rejected by 1

Hua-Mat I, pp. 145 ff. See Mill, A System of Logic, I.v.1. Husserl refers to this work in German translation. In his private library a copy this work can be found in the first two volumes of Mill, (trans.) Gomperz (1872). There are numerous markings and annotations in this copy. 2 Hua-Mat I, pp. 147-151. 3 Hua-Mat I, pp. 151-154. See Erdmann (1892), pp. 246-251. Though Husserl’s 1896 lectures contain only a few references to this work (Hua-Mat I, pp. 75, 158 & 208), his copy of it is heavily marked and annotated. Already in a letter (3 October 1891) he wrote to Brentano, apparently with some enthusiasm, “Perhaps it will interest you that the first volume of logic by Benno Erdmann (Elementary Doctrine) has been published with Niemeyer in Halle” (Schuhman [ed.] [1994] I, p. 7). This work is of particular interest in connection with Husserl because it contains numerous references to Bolzano (Erdmann [1892], pp. 102, 109, 181, 191 & 276). 4 Hua-Mat I, pp. 155-163. 5 See Lotze (1880), p. 61. The relevant passage is marked in Husserl’s copy of the work. In the margin there is also a reference to Brentano’s lectures on Elementary Logic and the Reforms Necessary in It (i.e. the notes contained in EL 72). Though Husserl refers to Lotze in his 1896 lectures rather frequently (Hua-Mat I, pp. 152, 153, 155-157, 211, 247 & 271), it is difficult to detect any direct influence of Lotze on

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Husserl for various reasons, the most important of which is that this view 1 involves an infinite regress. If, for example, the proposition “Gold is yellow” is affirmed, this affirmation is to be formulated as “lt is valid that gold is yellow”, while the corresponding negation would be formulated as “It is not valid that gold is yellow”. Yet, “lt is valid” is again an affirmation that must again be formulated as “lt is valid that it is valid”, and so on into infinity. Likewise, “It is not valid” must be formulated as “lt is valid that it is not valid”, as so on into infinity. The view that negative propositions are affirmative propositions with negative predicates, which 2 is attributed to Bolzano, is rejected by Husserl because if “S is non-p “ is true it is also true that S has the property that it is not p. Accordingly, negative predicates, Husserl maintains, always involve negative 3 4 propositions. Finally, the view (which Husserl attributes to Sigwart ) that it is a whole proposition that is negated in negation allegedly succumbs to 5 an infinite regress just as Lotze’s view does. It is, however, highly questionable that Husserl effectively criticizes Sigwart‘s view of negation. “The sense of ‘S is not P”‘, says Husserl, “would be ‘S is P is not valid’, whose sense [is] again ‘It is not valid that S 6 is P is not valid’, and thus in infinitum”. Here Husserl is plainly wrong in his charge of an infinite regress. The regress of negations stops with “‘S is P’ is not valid”. To be sure, one can go on with “It is valid that ‘S is P’ is not valid”, but this is not another negation. Since Husserl accordingly fails to refute the view that a whole proposition, not the predicate or the copula, is that which is negated in negation, he does not successfully argue for the view “that there are two coordinate forms of a categorical proposition, the affirmative and negative, and that the concept of denying and assenting, of these lectures, contrary to what one might expect. There is still a need for a detailed study of Husserl’s relation to Lotze, who was of course one of the most prominent philosophers in Husserl’s formative years. For a discussion of one important aspect of Lotze’s logic, see Rollinger (2004b). 1 Hua-Mat I, pp. 156 f. 2 See Bolzano (1837) II, § 136.2. 3 Hua-Mat I, p. 159. 4 See Sigwart (1889), p. 154. 5 Hua-Mat I, pp. 159 f. 6 Hua-Mat I, p. 159.

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affirming and negating, or whatever one calls it, are coordinate with each 1 other”. While a third class of categorical propositions, alongside affirmative and negative ones, has been sometimes also identified and designated as 2 “limitative” (“S is non-P”), Husserl does not find this threefold classification acceptable, for the limitative ones have for him as weIl as others “the character of affirmative propositions with special, namely 3 negative predicates”. However, against Lotze, who brands them as 4 “absurd products of scholastic cleverness”, Husserl maintains that there are indeed such propositions as well as the concepts which are found in their predicates (e.g. “non-human”). The question still remains how Husserl wishes to deal with existential propositions, especially in view of the fact that Brentano had taught him that all judgments can be regarded as existential. In his considerations of universal affirmative propositions (“All S is P”) Husserl is confronted with three views: 1) the traditional one, according to which such propositions imply the existence of the subject, 2) Herbart‘s view that such propositions 5 are not existential, and 3) Brentano’s view that they are in fact negative existential propositions (“There is no S which is not P”). It is the traditional view that Husserl adopts here. The counter-examples which may be pointed out in defense of Herbart’s position (“AIl triangles have three sides” and “All centaurs have cloven hooves”), says Husserl, “do not 6 pose the slightest difficulty when they are correctly interpreted”. In such cases the propositions imply existence “under assumption”, e.g. the existence of triangles under the assumption that space is defined as the geometer defines it and the existence of centaurs under the assumption of 1

Hua-Mat I, p. 161. Such a view may in fact be regarded as one that Husserl inherited from Brentano’s theory of judgment and transferred to this own theory of propositions. 2 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 70 ff. / B 95 ff. 3 Hua-Mat I, p. 162. 4 Lotze (1880), p. 61. 5 Husserl only mentions Herbart in this context (Hua-Mat I, p. 183) without referring to a particular work of his or anyone from his school. 6 Hua-Mat I, p. 183.

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Greek mythology. It is unfortunate, however, that Husserl does not respond to the Brentanian view on this matter. Though Brentano did not have the technical device of quantification, as Frege had developed it in his Begriffsschrift, at his disposal, his view is easily stated by using this device and indeed turns out to be more amenable to modern logic than the 2 others under consideration. While Husserl takes a traditional view of categorical propositions and of universal affirmative ones in particular, his view of particular affirmative propositions diverges considerably from the tradition, according to which “Some S are P” is compatible with “All S are P” and with “Only one S is 3 P”. Husserl maintains that this aIleged compatibility does not obtain. Yet, he does not reject the tradition insofar as he maintains that particular 4 affirmative propositions imply the existence of their subject. As regards particular negative propositions, Husserl adopts the same position as he 5 does with regard to the affirmative ones. Mention should be made here also of another class of categorical propositions, namely general ones, e.g. “Gold is yellow”. While Husserl maintains mat these are not identical with universal propositions, e.g. “AIl gold is yellow”, he nonetheless concedes that there obtains an equivalence 6 here as weIl as an equivalence with certain hypothetical propositions. In spite of the peculiar mind-function involved in the presentations which accompany the relevant judgments, the equivalence with corresponding universal and hypothetical propositions allows us to avoid “the misleading 7 doctrine of general objects in logic”. Gold as such, for example, is thus not regarded by Husserl as an object in addition to particular instances of gold. 1

Hua-Mat I, p. 182 f. This view had already been developed by Husserl in his 1894 manuscript on intentional objects. An English translation of this text is published as Appendex One in Rollinger (1999), pp. 251-284. 2 See Simons (2004). 3 Hua-Mat I, pp. 187. 4 Hua-Mat I, p. 189. 5 Hua-Mat I, pp. 189 ff. 6 Hua-Mat I, pp. 197-201. 7 Hua-Mat I, p. 202. Though Husserl does not mention anyone who advocates this doctrine, he is most likely referring to Twardowski (1894), pp. 102-111.

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In view of Husserl’s results regarding the various classes of categorical propositions it is indeed understandable that he says “that the concept of existence is not a logically irrelevant one, as the concept of a color or of a horse is, for example, but is one of the basic logical concepts, analogous to 1 the concept of truth”. Along with Brentano, he rejects various attempts to 2 analyze the concept of existence, especially Sigwart’s, and reaches a view 3 that is, on his view, “extraordinarily close to the Brentanian one”. As Brentano had aIlowed for not only the existence of real things, but also for that of “a past and a future, an empty space and a lack as such, a 4 possibility, an impossibility, and so on and so forth”, Husserl does so as well. Moreover, he adopts the Brentanian view that subjectless propositions (or “impersonals”), such as “It is raining”, are equivalent to 5 existential ones. While Husserl certainly cannot allow for existence to be seen in terms of correct acceptance (and non-existence to be seen in terms of correct rejection), he nonetheless rejects any conception of existential propositions as predications. In this respect his view is indeed close to Brentano’s, but also very close to Herbart‘s, for Husserl regards existential 6 and predicative propositions as two fundamental classes of propositions. He differs from Herbart, however, insofar as he maintains that existence is implied in all forms of predication.

5. Inferences Husserl’s treatment of inferences starts from the consideration of a class of complex propositions which he had left unmentioned in the part of his 7 lectures that was especially concerned with propositions. The propositions 1

Hua-Mat I, p. 215. Hua-Mat I, pp. 216 ff. 3 Hua-Mat I, p. 227. 4 Brentano (1889), p. 62. 5 This view had been worked out in detail in Marty (1884), Marty (1894), and Marty (1895). Husserl cites these articles extensively in the 1896 lectures. A discussion of his relation to Marty can be found in Rollinger (1999), pp. 209-244. 6 Hua-Mat I, pp. 229 ff. 7 Hua-Mat I, pp. 232 ff. 2

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in question are called “causal propositions” and have the form “Because A, B”. Such propositions are obviously closely related to hypothetical ones. In this regard it is understandable why “most logicians seem to interpret the causal proposition as the corresponding hypothetical one, merely linked with a further proposition; namely, they seem to believe that the proposition ‘Because A, B’ is identical with the combination of the two 1 propositions ‘If A, then B’ and ‘A is’”, although he says that this is a case of equivalence rather than identity. The causal propositions accordingly make up “a special class of propositions”, in which there occurs “a completely peculiar form of interweaving of actual or presented truths, and 2 precisely the one that constitutes the objective content of all inferences”. This form of interweaving, moreover, is no less objective than any proposition and is not to be construed as a psychical process of believing 3 one proposition on the basis of believing another one. Yet, Husserl does not simply say that inferences are to be identified with causal propositions, for he regards “Caius is mortal because he is a man” as a complete causal 4 proposition, but not as a complete inference. Nonetheless, he sees causal propositions as the right starting point in the reflection on inferences. Here Husserl seems to go astray by not considering other uses of “because” besides the inferential one. If it is said, for instance, that Socrates is mortal because he is a man and all men are mortal, the usage of “because” in this statement does, to be sure, indicate an inference. Yet, if it is said, “The glass broke because someone knocked it off the table”, the term “because” in this case indicates a causal relation between two real events rather than a logical one between two propositions. However “ideally” Husserl wishes to regard inferences, the term in question obviously concerns such relations in the sphere of the real. Since these 1

Hua-Mat I, p. 232. Though Husserl speaks of “most logicians” here, he does not give a single example of a logician who holds the view in question. In his treatment of inferences in the 1896 lectures there is indeed hardly any mention of particular predecessors or contemporaries, except for a passing reference to Leibniz and Lotze, regarding the conception of number theory as part of general logic (Hua-Mat I, p. 241). 2 Hua-Mat I, p. 233. 3 Hua-Mat I, pp. 233 f. 4 Hua-Mat I, p. 234.

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relations are indeed causal ones, it would be correct to say that the propositions about them are indeed the properIy causal ones. Another respect in which Husserl’s theory of inference is questionable is to be found in the alleged correspondence between incomplete inferences and complete propositions. The inference from “Caius is a man” to “Caius is mortal” is, to be sure, in need of an additional premise, namely “Every man is mortal” or a proposition equivalent to this, in order to be valid. Nonetheless, it cannot be correctly regarded as incomplete. There is simply no distinction to be drawn between complete and incomplete inferences any more than there is between complete and incomplete propositions. An inference is either valid or invalid, not complete or incomplete. Likewise, a proposition is true or false, not complete or incomplete. It would accordingly be preferable to say that the proposition “Caius is mortal because he is a man” is an example of an invalid (rather than incomplete) inference, but at the same time an example of a true (rather than complete) proposition. It is obviously not the job of logic to make note of all inferences. “The single causal judgments”, says Husserl, “belong in the single areas of science. What belongs in logic can obviously only be the laws which govern the causal judgments, independently of the particularity of the area, 1 provided that here there are such things as laws”. These laws (Gesetzlichkeit) are to be found in the connection between various truths insofar as these connections are in fact ones between the forms of the propositions which make up the premises and the conclusion of an inference. With this conception of laws of inference in mind, Husserl maintains that such a law has the following form: “It is universally the case that a causal proposition ‘Because A, B’ is a truth if A in it has the internal attributes F1 and B has the corresponding attributes F2 or if there obtains between them a certain relation F (AB) grounded by these internal 2 properties”. The upshot of this consideration is that the laws of inference are to be formulated in hypothetical propositions in which the attributes in question are to be clearly designated. Yet, not all such laws are properly 1 2

Hua-Mat I, p. 235. Hua-Mat I, p. 237.

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logical ones. The hypothetical proposition “If A is larger than B and if B is larger than C, then A is larger than C”, for example, is such a law, but it is not a logical one, since the variables in question (A, B, C) can only be replaced by symbols which represent magnitudes. In the case of the inference “If every man is mortal and if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal” there is indeed a logical law of inference at work, for the terms “man”, “mortal”, and “Socrates” can be replaced with absolutely any other symbols and the inference will remain valid. Inferences of this latter kind, says Husserl, “are possible for the objects of the highest logical categories, thus objects, concepts, propositions as such, and are grounded in these 2 categories”. Since Husserl sees the notions of objects, concepts, and propositions as the three areas in which logical laws of inference are to be identified, it is only natural that he divides up the tasks of theory of inference 3 accordingly. The logical laws of inference are first to be sought within the category of propositions. This investigation is to be followed by one regarding those laws which are found in the category of concepts, though Husserl leaves it unclear whether the investigation of the laws that are grounded in the category of objects is to be sharply distinguished from the second step. Husserl’s lectures close with an attempt to formalize some of 4 the propositional and conceptual rules of inference, though his results are hardly to be regarded as novel. In this respect it is indeed understandabIe why Husserl chose to publish the Prolegomena to Pure Logic instead of the 1896 lectures in their entirety.

6. Conclusion Husserl’s early logic is of great interest because it is an attempt to address fundamental issues in response to theories from various sources that were seldom considered in conjunction. Not only is Brentano in the background 1

Hua-Mat I, pp. 238-241. Hua-Mat I, p. 240. 3 Hua-Mat I, pp. 241 f. 4 Hua-Mat I, pp. 254-264 f. 2

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and sometimes even in the foreground of the 1896 lectures, but Bolzano is as well. The resulting combination of Brentano and Bolzano alone is a fascinating one. The fact that Husserl also makes an effort to respond in detail to various positions that were taken in psychologistic logics from the nineteenth century adds yet another dimension to his logical reflections that is hardly found in his later work. An examination of the 1896 lectures accordingly gives us an instructive look into many aspects of nineteenth century logic and philosophy which are unfortunately often overlooked due to the triumph of Frege. While there very well may be progress in logic, it would be a serious error to take this as a license for ignoring the logic of the past. At the same time, it may well be a mistake to view the logic that has been discussed here merely as a museum piece. Much of what Husserl has to say about concepts, e.g. his reflections on such matters as abstracta, attributes, and concepts as such, seems to be worthy of consideration as contributions to object theory. In this sense his elementary logic of 1896 is of interest in the present volume not only because it is a milestone in divorcing elementary logic from psychology, but also because it does have some bearing on the object-theoretical side of Austrian phenomenology.

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MEINONG ON THE OBJECTS OF SENSATION

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1. Introduction Object theory is among the most interesting and most important philosophical conceptions to be found in the work of Alexius Meinong. The question of course remains whether this conception or some aspect of it should be adopted in current philosophical endeavors. There are, however, certain aspects thereof which are yet to be explored before this question can be adequately answered. What Meinong had in mind under the heading “object theory” was a discipline which would treat objects as 2 such, insofar as anything a priori can be discerned about them. Such a discipline, on his view, divides into a general one and various special 3 branches. Without going into the question what the general one without the special branches would look like or whether mathematics should be engulfed in one of these, and also leaving aside the more controversial question whether it is legitimate to speak of impossible (contradictory) objects and thus to treat them in object theory in spite of objections from a 4 traditional standpoint, I would like to focus here on Meinong’s rather 1

This essay a revised version of a paper that was originally published under the same title in The School of Alexius Meinong, edited by Liliana Albertazzi, Dale Jacquette, and Roberto Poli (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 291-314. 2 Meinong (1904), pp. 41 f. Whatever can be said a posteriori about reality in general Meinong leaves to metaphysics and thus arrives at the view that metaphysics is an empirical enterprise. This view may indeed seem peculiar, but it is also advocated in Stumpf (1907b), p. 43. While it is no surprise that Meinong and Stumpf, both students of Franz Brentano, are in agreement in their characterization of metaphysics and in other important respects as well, it will be seen below that Stumpf is by no means sympathetic with Meinong’s notion of object theory. 3 Meinong (1904), pp. 29 ff. 4 See Meinong (1907), pp. 14 ff. The topic of impossible objects is of particular interest to those who wish to understand the exchange between Meinong and Russell, for Russell was indeed opposed to Meinong’s acceptance of such objects as suitable for scientific enquiry. In the work just mentioned Meinong also goes to great lengths,

neglected views concerning objects of sensation as a subject matter of a special branch of object theory. In his most elaborate defense of object theory, On the Place of Object Theory in the System of Sciences, Meinong makes an attempt at the outset to show the need for this discipline by indicating that certain objects have been left “homeless” by the sciences as they have been traditionally conceived. The very first class of homeless objects he discusses in this defense is not that of contradictory objects or that of incomplete objects, 1 but rather the class which consists of the objects of sensation. Unfortunately there has been little attention given to this class in the 2 literature on Meinong. To anyone familiar with the German and Austrian literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century on psychological and philosophical topics, it will at once be obvious that the very term which Meinong uses in reference to the objects under 3 consideration, namely Empfindungsgegenstände, is striking. At that time there was, to be sure, a good deal of discussion about sensations with special attention to Euclidean geometry, to argue that mathematics is to be regarded as a branch of object theory. See Meinong (1907), pp. 61-99. 1 Meinong (1907), pp. 8-14. Mention has already been made of impossible objects, which make up another class of homeless objects. See Meinong (1907), pp. 14-20. The third class consists of what Meinong calls “objectives” (Objektive). See Meinong (1907), pp. 20-27. These are the objects which uniquely correspond to judgments and assumptions. One always judges or assumes that something is the case. What is indicated by a “that” clause is an objective. See Meinong (1902), pp. 150-211. 2 In Chisholm (1982), there is no mention at all of sensory objects as homeless, though this is understandable since Chisholm’s concept of homelessness, on his own admission (see p. 37), differs from Meinong’s concept thereof. Exceptional among works on Meinong in rececent decades is Grossmann (1974), p. 157 f. insofar as the author does take into account the Meinongian conception of homeless objects. Unfortunately, there is no particular discussion of this conception in Findlay (1963). While this work remains outstanding in comparison to other secondary literature on Meinong, it will hopefully be seen that the topic under consideration here is not as minor as it might seem at first glance. 3 In his (1904) p. 31, Meinong gives credit to his pupil Stefan Witasek for coining this term. In this connection he also refers to Witasek (1904), pp. 36 ff., where the term had already been used, perhaps for the first time. It is important to note, however, that

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(Empfindungen) and the contents of sensation (Empfindungsinhalte), including controversies about whether a distinction is to be made between 1 sensations and their contents. However, Meinong and his school were unusual in the development of the notion of sensory objects as distinct from both the acts and the contents of sensation. In spite of this oddity, it is nonetheless clear that Meinong was deeply influenced by the philosophy which he learned from Franz Brentano. Hence, he formulates and defends theories which can be fruitfully compared with those of his mentor and those of other members of the school of Brentano. Especially what Meinong has to say about the objects under consideration here can hardly be understood without first considering those views on sensory contents which he learned from his mentor. For this reason, the next section will be briefly concerned with Brentano’s conception of sensory contents. After this, Meinong’s distinction between sensory contents and sensory objects will be discussed. This discussion will be followed by a brief examination of 2 Meinong’s concept of objects of higher order, since this concept will Witasek only speaks of “simple” sensory objects and not of ones of higher order. The latter will be discussed below. 1 It was Ernst Mach‘s view, for instance, that no distinction is to be drawn here, whereas Brentano and many of his pupils, especially Stumpf who explicitly opposed Mach on this point, insisted that the contents of sensation are indeed distinct from sensations themselves. Not all pupils of Brentano were however inclined to make this distinction, for Husserl came to reject it. The term Empfindung of course occurred in other combinations, e.g. Empfindungsqualität and Emfpindungsintensität, but none of these are particularly relevant to the discussion at hand. The terms “sensory objects” and “sensory contents” will henceforth be used as translations of Emfpindungsgegenstände and Empfindungsinhalte respectively. 2 Credit must be given Stumpf for formulating a notion which seems to be in the background of Meinong’s theory of objects of higher order: “It is not only possible to notice a plurality of sensations, but also to notice a plurality of similarity of two increases, an increase among similarities, indeed a similarity of increase among any two similarities. In short, there are everywhere relations and correspondingly judgments of first and higher order. The judgments of first order concern relations of sensations, while those of higher order concern relations of these relations” (Stumpf [1883], p. 98). Though this passage may be regarded as a step towards forging the Meinongian concept under consideration, it must be pointed out that relations for Meinong, even ones of “first order”, are objects of higher order and that he makes

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likewise prove relevant to the general topic in this study. Then attention will be given to Meinong’s view that sensory objects (of higher or lower order) do not actually exist and are nonetheless subjects of true 1 predication. Since he also thinks that such predications can be subject to a priori cognition, it will then be of interest to say a few words about how Meinong regards the role of such cognition in the scientific treatment of sensory objects. Finally, comparisons will be made between Meinong’s views under consideration in the present study with those of two other pupils of Brentano, namely Carl Stumpf and Edmund Husserl. Here it will hopefully be seen inter alia that the scientific treatment of sensory objects is distinguished by Meinong from the science of consciousness, i.e. descriptive psychology, much more sharply than it is by Stumpf or Husserl.

2. Brentano on Sensory Contents 2

Meinong attended lectures of Brentano in Vienna from 1874 to 1882. While he later developed philosophical positions which were anathema to 3 his mentor, the stamp of Brentano is clearly to be seen in the Meinongian views to be examined below. Just before Brentano himself became professor in Vienna in 1874, he had published Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. In this work Brentano puts forward various criteria whereby psychical phenomena are to be distinguished from physical ones. Most notably, says Brentano, psychical phenomena, such as presenting, room for other objects higher order besides relations, namely complexes and possibly others. Here it should also be mentioned that Stumpf (1883) was reviewed in Meinong (1885a) and the concept of relations and corresponding judgments of higher order are therein noticed (p. 131). 1 The principle at stake here, namely “that whatever is in no way external to the object and rather makes up its proper essence consists in its being-thus, whether it is or is not”, is called the “principle of independence” (Prinzip von der Unabhängigkeit) in Meinong (1904), p. 13. 2 See Rollinger (1999), pp. 155 f. 3 See, for example, Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1986), pp. 78 ff.

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judging, loving and hating, refer to certain contents. If, for example, I am thinking, I must be thinking of something, and this is the content to which my thought or presentation refers. The object of the presentation, Brentano also says, exists intentionally in the presentation, but he insists that this intentional existence must not be confused with real existence or existence simpliciter. Something can, after all, exist in a psychical phenomenon without really existing at all. We can imagine a unicorn, for instance, although there is no object in reality which corresponds to the act of imagining. Now physical phenomena, such as colors and tones, according to Brentano, do not intentionally contain objects (or refer to them) as psychical ones do. Nothing can intentionally exist in a tone, for instance, as the tone itself can be said to exist intentionally in an auditory sensation (i.e. an act of hearing). Moreover, the contents of sensations are in all 2 cases physical phenomena. Besides intentional inexistence, other criteria can be used to distinguish between psychical and physical phenomena. These may be enumerated as follows: 1) While psychical phenomena are in all cases presentations or have presentations as their foundations, this is not so in the case of 3 physical phenomena. 2) Physical phenomena are spatially located and 4 extended, whereas psychical phenomena are not. 3) Psychical phenomena 5 are the only ones which are perceivable in the strict and proper sense. 4) Though physical phenomena exist only phenomenally, psychical ones 6 exist in reality. Important to us here is especially the fourth criterion, but the third is of some importance too as a corollary of the fourth. 1

Brentano (1874), pp. 115 f. It should be pointed out, however, that not all physical phenomena, on Brentano’s view, are sensory contents. For he is careful throughout the work under consideration to regard the imagined color or tone as no less a physical phenomenon than the color which is seen or the tone which is heard. Cf. the distinction between primary and secondary phenomena mentioned below in “Stumpf on Phenomena and Phenomenology”. 3 Brentano (1874), pp. 104-111. 4 Brentano (1874), pp. 111-115. 5 Brentano, (1874), pp. 118 f. 6 Brentano (1874), pp. 120 ff. An additional criterion, according to which “of psychical phenomena only one-after-another exists and many of the physical ones at 2

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When Brentano says that physical phenomena exist only phenomenally, 1 he means that they exist only insofar as they are presented. That is to say, their existence is only an intentional existence, which is as such not real existence at all. In this regard, Brentano flatly rejects naive realism, for he maintains that the colors we see do not exist outside of the act of seeing and the tones we hear do not exist outside of the act of hearing. This rejection of naive realism is even more thorough-going than the one we find in Locke, according to which there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. While Locke maintains that at least primary qualities, such as extension and shape, are copied by our ideas, Brentano maintains that all physical phenomena are to be characterized as at best 2 signs of things beyond the senses. This is to be seen in the fact that Brentano speaks of such things as having only a semblance of time and space. That is to say, corresponding to space and time as they appear to our senses – intuitively (anschaulich), so to speak – are realities which are in some way analogous to them. The fact that Brentano speaks of a relation of analogy between physical phenomena and real things existing outside of the mind obviously indicates that he is a realist and not an idealist or a solipsist, as he may indeed be taken to be at first glance. Rather, his position is a very extreme representational realism. The things which exist outside of our sensations, he maintains, are in fact to be identified with the ones we find posited in the hypotheses of natural science. Instead of colors, there are really only waves of light. Instead of tones, there are really only vibrations of air. the same time” is not whole-heartedly endorsed in Brentano (1874), pp. 122-126. 1 To appear and to be presented, says Brentano, are the very same thing. See Brentano (1874), p. 106. The objects may, to be sure, be objects of other acts besides presentations, e.g. judgments or acts of love and hate. If, however, they are objects of other mind-functions, they are still objects of presentations, since other acts are possible only on the foundation of presentations. 2 On this point Brentano apparently accepts Berkeley‘s argument for rejecting the Lockean theory of primary and secondary properties. Yet, Brentano clearly does not go all the way with Berkeley in the rejection of the external world. In this regard, see Brentano (1874), pp. 131 ff., were he criticizes Bain’s assertion (which obviously falls in line with the phenomenalism of Berkeley and Mill) that it is contradictory to posit physical phenomena outside of consciousness.

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Given Brentano’s realism, the parallel between psychology and physics which might be suggested by the division between psychical and physical phenomena is not as it might initially appear to be. While psychology can be characterized as the science of psychical phenomena (whether or not it can identify any substantial bearer of these), physics and the other sciences are not to be characterized simply as the sciences which concern themselves with physical phenomena. Since these phenomena are at best only signs for the natural sciences (for they indicate by analogy what the things in reality are), they are not of intrinsic interest to the natural sciences. In light of these considerations the question naturally rises whether there is to be any science which is to treat physical phenomena as such (and thus the contents of sensation), totally unconcerned with such things as waves of light and vibrations of air. In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint this question was not addressed. One might of course argue that since physical phenomena do not exist in reality, there need not or even should not be any science that is especially concerned with them. We shall see that Meinong is not impressed with such an argument and insists upon the need for such a science, even though its objects do not exist.

3. From Physical Phenomena to Objects of Sensation Thus far we have been speaking the language of Brentano and referring to physical phenomena. As he conceived of such phenomena as distinct from events beyond consciousness, we find a similar perspective expressed in Meinong’s early work. In his review of Stumpf’s Tone Psychology, for example, he says the following: “Tones are not occurrences in the so1 called external world”. Moroever, in much of Meinong’s early writings we find no effort to distinguish between content and object. An early and important work on sensation can be included among these writings as one 2 in which the content-object distinction played no role. Meinong was 1

Meinong (1885a), p. 127. Meinong (1888a) and Meinong (1889). In these articles the distinction between the act of sensation and its content, however, plays an important role in the attempt to 2

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however prompted by Twardowski to distinguish between the content and 1 object of a presentation. Whenever different acts of presentation have different objects, according to Meinong, the difference in question must be determined by the content, which “exists and is therefore real and present, of course also psychical, even though the object presented by means of it, so to speak, is 2 nonexistent, nonreal, nonpresent, nonpsychical”. Accordingly, if a golden mountain, a geometrical figure, something from the past, or a physical object is presented, the content whereby these presentations occur are all existent, real, present, and psychical, in spite of the fact that a golden mountain is nonexistent, a geometrical figure ideal, something from the past nonpresent, and a physical thing nonpsychical. Meinong is, to be sure, speaking of presentations here and not acts of other kinds when he 3 distinguishes between content and object in the passage just cited. This fact need not disturb us, however, for he classifies sensations among distinguish sensations from acts of phantasy-presentations (Phantasievorstellungen). The conception of sensations as acts, which had already been found in Brentano, is moreover one that remains crucial to the topic under consideration here. Otherwise it would be out of the question to speak of the objects of sensations, as this is indeed out of the question for Husserl, who does not conceive of sensations as acts. The question of course remains how sensations are related to outer perceptions. According to Meinong, they are the presentations (Vorstellungen) on which the outer perceptions, themselves judgments, are founded. 1 Meinong (1899), pp. 185-189. Though Meinong cites Twardowski here (p. 185) as providing the impetus for the distinction in question, see his misgivings about Twardowski on this matter which are expressed in a letter to Hans Cornelius (6 October 1899), as quoted in Rollinger (1993b), p. 70. In (1894), p. 4, Twardowski himself had appealed to the textbook on logic of Alois Höfler, written in collaboration with Meinong. See Höfler (1890), § 6, where a content-object distinction is made. Given Meinong’s later characterization of objects of sensation as nonexistent and nonsubsistent, it is obvious that his and Höfler’s early conception of the object as “that which subsists in itself” (dasjenige an sich Bestehende), not to mention their comparison with the Kantian thing-in-itself, will not suffice. 2 Meinong (1899), p. 187. 3 See Meinong (1906a), especially pp. 40 f., where Meinong develops a concept of the content of a judgment as distinct from that of a presentation.

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presentations. Thus, while Meinong maintains that a sensation has a content, which is genuinely a part of it and determines what object it refers to, he maintains that the object as such is in no sense to be construed as part of the sensation. Moreover, the science which is to treat the contents of consciousness is the very same one that is concerned with the mindfunctions. This science, according to Meinong, is quite simply psychology. The content-object distinction is absolutely crucial to understanding Meinong’s notion of object theory, for prior to this distinction he and many others had the tendency to regard a good many nonpsychical objects 2 as belonging to the domain of psychology. Since such confusion is 3 promoted by calling the objects of consciousness “contents”, what is under consideration here is not merely a terminological divergence from the doctrines of Brentano. The distinction in question allows for certain objects to be completely depsychologized, making the question all the more pressing what discipline is to deal with those objects which can no longer properly belong to the domain of psychology or any other 4 traditional science. Meinong’s strategy for dealing with such objects is to include them in the domain of object theory, as long as he sees the possibility of grasping a priori truths about the objects in question. This is precisely what he proposes with regard to sensory objects. In this regard he 5 goes far beyond a mere revision in Brentano’s descriptive psychology. 1

It is however rather unusual that Meinong, like Brentano, refers to sensations as presentations, for many others restrict the class of presentations to occurrences of imagination and memory in contrast with sensations. 2 Such a confusion is of course the ontological side of the metabasis eis allo genos (cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 459/B 487) which Husserl complained about in his celebrated critique of psychologism in the Logical Investigations I (Hua XVIII). 3 Meinong (1907), p. 146. Because contents are inevitably taken by some to be pieces of mind-functions, Meinong feels compelled to speak of objectives rather than contents of judgments. 4 Not all objects are thereby depsychologized, for the psychical events are obviously objects of inner perception whenever this takes place. 5 Here one must be on guard, however, against underestimating revisions in descriptive psychology, for this discipline remained crucial to Meinong’s philosophical concerns, as indicated by his final statement of his philosophy in Meinong (1921). There Meinong says of the philosophical disciplines “that what ties these sciences together and thus makes them philosophical sciences is the fact that

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It is not as though Meinong insisted that every single object should be subjected to a scientific account. This would of course be an unrealistic demand. There are simply too many objects which will never even be presented and can thus never be singled out for scientific treatment. What is unacceptable to him, however, is that entire classes of objects should be 1 regarded as unworthy of scientific consideration. Since sensory objects make up a class of objects, they are not to be left homeless. Unlike the contents of sensation, they do not belong to psychology. Moreover, Meinong agrees with Brentano that physics is not as such concerned with sensory objects. “Since colors and tones, strictly speaking, do not exist”, says Meinong, “the physicist is not in the least concerned with them for their own sake. Of course, neither is the physiologist, and mention could hardly be made of any of the old authorized sciences in whose sphere of 2 labor these objects would fall.” The differentiation between the contents and objects of sensation is particularly accomplished by Meinong through 3 the consideration of the range of tones as examples. While our sensations and therefore their contents are limited in the tones which we can present, the tones themselves can extend infinitely beyond the normal range of hearing. Our sensations are also limited in the distinctions which can be discerned between two different tones. Just as the range extends infinitely 4 outwards, the same goes for the inward direction as well. That is to say, they all have inner lived-through processes either exclusively or at least also inner lived-through processes as their subject matter” (Meinong [1921], p. 101). It is accordingly their “reference to mind” (Meinong [1921], p. 102) which makes them philosophical. This can be taken as a concession to the Brentanian conception of philosophy as characterized in terms of the central place of psychology in its inquiries. In addition to the content-object distinction, another crucial and more innovative revision which Meinong introduced into his descriptive psychology is to be found in the concept of assumptions (Annahmen), which lies beyond the purview of the present essay. See Meinong (1901) and Meinong (1902). 1 Meinong (1907), p. 10. 2 Meinong (1907), p. 9. 3 Meinong (1907), p. 10. 4 Cf. Stumpf (1883), pp. 178: “We can ascribe to the tonal series both outer and inner infinity. Outer infinity is the possibility of increasingly lower as well as increasingly higher tones; inner infinity is the possibility of increasingly smaller distances.”

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between any two tones there is an infinite range of possible tones, whether or not we can actually “sense” (empfinden) these intermittent tones. It is therefore a priori evident, Meinong concludes, that the tones beyond our auditory capacity are possible objects. The infinity of tones between any two tones and also that of tones extending outwardly in either 1 direction, he insists, are analogous to the infinity of space. As we have no trouble in accepting an objective infinite space as the object of geometry and not of psychology, we should likewise accept an objective range of tones as the subject matter of a special branch of object theory.

4. Sensory Objects of Higher Order It is of considerable interest here to point out an additional development in Meinong’s thinking, namely the development from his notion of founded contents to that of objects of higher order. The notion of founded contents was accepted by him in light of Christian von Ehrenfels’ pioneering essay 2 “On ‘Gestalt Qualities’”. Long before the publication of this essay Meinong had given considerable attention to the rather neglected topic of 3 relations. Under the heading “founded contents”, however, Meinong classified not only relations, such as equality and similarity, but also 4 collectives, such as melodies. It was moreover in the sensory realm where he found the primary examples of the contents in question. Once he came to see the need for the distinction between contents and objects, it was only one short step to formulate the concept of the correlates of founded 5 contents on the object-side, namely objects of higher order. It is moreover a short step further to acknowledge that among the objects of higher order there are sensory objects. 1

Meinong (1907), p. 11. Ehrenfels (1890). Von Ehrenfels was a pupil of both Brentano and Meinong. 3 Meinong (1882). 4 The notion of founded contents was discussed at length in Meinong (1891) and Meinong (1894b). 5 Meinong (1899). 2

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Now Meinong holds the view that objects of higher order always have a foundation. A melody, for instance, has tones as its foundation. Whenever Meinong speaks of objects as “absolute”, he means that they themselves are without foundation. He is moreover convinced that all objects of 1 higher order are ultimately founded on absolutes. While it is accordingly easily suggested that the branch of object theory which concerns itself with the absolute sensory objects should likewise be concerned with those of higher order, Meinong apparently thinks that the absolute sensory objects are at least de facto dealt with first and perhaps even that this is the correct order of proceeding. Of colors he says, for example, that the relevant special branch of object theory “still sticks entirely to what is absolute, and the time in which it considers relations between color-relations or color2 lines and inquires into their laws has hardly begun”. In any case, this statement of the situation in 1907 seems to indicate that it would not be amiss to examine sensory objects of higher order in the same discipline which is concerned with the absolute sensory objects. To be sure, one must be on guard against ascribing to the former whatever one ascribes to the latter. Nonetheless, much of what he says about absolute sensory objects, certainly the two assertions to be highlighted now (namely that they do not actually exist and are nonetheless subject to a priori knowledge), will also apply to sensory objects of higher order.

5. The Nonexistence of Sensory Objects, Given that tones and other objects of sensations are not to be identified with the contents of sensation, the only obstacle which might remain in the attempt to give them a home lies in their nonexistence, which Meinong asserts in an above-cited passage from On the Place of Object Theory in 1

Cf. Meinong (1882), p. 46: “A relation without absolute foundations would be a comparison in which nothing is compared”. Meinong’s application of this principle to all sensory objects of higher order was an important point of disagreement between his school and the Gestalt psychology which came to be advocated by certain pupils of Stumpf, though not by Stumpf himself. 2 Meinong (1907), p. 13.

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the System of Sciences. Meinong never tires of telling us, however, that mathematics already provides an example of a discipline which is concerned with nonexistent objects. In reality there are no triangles, and yet it is true that an equiangular triangle is equilateral. Some may propose ingenious attempts to construe a statement such as this in terms which would preclude allowing for the nonexistent. The attempt might be made, for instance, to view this statement as a conditional “if there were 2 equilateral triangles in reality, these would be equiangular”. In opposition to such attempts, Meinong raises the question what would be the case if there were not any such triangles in reality, for this is indeed the state of 3 affairs that actually obtains. If the answer is that these would not be equiangular, geometers should say either that equilateral triangles are not equiangular or that they are concerned with nonexistent objects. If, however, the answer is that they would be equiangular, then geometers can safely make the categorical claim that equilateral triangles are equiangular. It is important to note that Meinong is inclined to think that sensory objects, unlike the objects of mathematics, do not exist and indeed have no kind of being at all. From Brentano he had learned that colors, tones, and the like do not exist in reality, but this assertion was no doubt made more palatable with the addition that they exist intentionally. Meinong does, to be sure, preserve the notion of intentional reference, but he avoids speaking of the intentional existence of objects as if it were some special 4 kind of existence. Moreover, he says absolutely nothing about the subsistence (Bestand, Bestehen) of sensory objects. While he clearly maintains that certain objects, e.g. objectives and certain objects of higher 5 order, subsist and yet do not exist, it must be kept in mind that he also 1

Meinong (1907), p. 9. In this regard Meinong regards such attempts which might be made on the basis of suggestions found in Mach (1905), pp. 359 f., 402, 410 & 189. 3 Meinong (1907), pp. 42 f. 4 In 1894 Husserl came to the conclusion that the notion of intentional existence is misleading. The essay in which he argued thus is translated in Rollinger (1999), pp. 251-284. See also Rollinger (1999), p. 187, where it is explained why Meinong refused to read this essay after receiving the manuscript from Husserl. 5 Meinong (1899), pp. 197-203. It is important to note here that for Meinong not all objects of higher order are ideal. See Meinong (1899), pp. 190 f. 2

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allows for cases of being-thus (Sosein) without any kind of being at all, whether this be existence or subsistence. The golden mountain, for instance, is such an object. Its being-thus consists of being-golden, and yet it neither exists nor subsists. It is especially important to emphasize Meinong’s acceptance of objects without any kind of being at all, for there is a long-standing misconception among analytic philosophers that he 1 classifies absolutely any case of nonexistence as a case of subsistence. Since Meinong identifies timelessness as the distinguishing feature of 2 subsistence, it would seem to follow that sensory objects do not subsist. It is, after all, obvious that colors and tones are temporally determined and even subject to change. Moreover, Meinong is willing to list colors and 3 tones, and presumably other sensory objects, among the real objects. Since the classes of ideal and real objects are presented as mutually exclusive and only the ideal ones are said to subsist, it is clear that the sensory objects qua real objects could not subsist. There is, moreover, no inconsistency in Meinong’s position on sensory objects, namely that they are real on the one hand and nonexistent on the other, for he characterizes real objects as ones “which, in case they do not actually exist, could by 4 their nature nonetheless exist”. Meinong’s view that sensory objects in particular are among the objects without being could have implications concerning whether it is acceptable to ascribe properties to objects without positing them as existent or subsistent. It has been argued by at least one commentator that this notion becomes dubious in light of the “limited nature of the evidential base”, 1

For an excellent discussion of the need to dispell this misconception, see Jacquette (1996). 2 Meinong (1899), p. 184. See also Meinong (1904), pp. 1 ff. Though objectives are clearly regarded as ideal in Meinong’s later writings on them, it remains uncertain whether he wanted to classify them as objects of higher order. 3 Meinong (1899), p. 197. At the same time, however, Meinong insists that similarities and differences are ideal objects of higher order. Cf. Meinong (1907), p. 30. Accordingly, he seems to have no other choice but to say that similarities and differences among sensory objects are ideal rather than real. 4 Meinong (1899), p. 197. It had already been argued by Brentano (1874), pp. 20 ff., that there is nothing contradictory in allowing for the independent existence of physical phenomena.

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which allegedly consists of “fictional discourse and thought”. While one may seriously doubt whether this objection has any weight at all in the first place (since the limitations of the evidential base need not prevent it from being sufficient for Meinong’s purposes), the limitations in question must give way somewhat once our sensations are admitted as evidence for a certain class of objects without being. Moreover, in the present connection one may attend to the objection that objects without being are indeterminate (i.e. not always subject to the law of the excluded middle) and thereby require a “more and more ingenious construction of 2 epicycles”. Here again the opponent of Meinong is primarily thinking of fictions. Yet, sensory objects seem to be fully determinate or in any case considerably more determinate than fictional ones. Moreover, suppose that such objects are in fact to some extent indeterminate, as Wolfgang Köhler, Max Wertheimer, and August Messer tried to argue on an experimental 3 basis. This will only be to the advantage of the Meinongian. If sensory objects are indeterminate and nonexistent, this will give a precedent for bringing other indeterminate objects, namely fictional ones, into the fold of the nonexistent. If, however, one wishes to assert that the indeterminate sensory objects really do exist, it will follow that the indeterminacy of fictional objects is not such an objectionable feature of them after all. Such considerations seem to indicate that sensory objects should indeed become more focal in attempts to decide whether Meinong’s notion of nonexistent 4 objects is acceptable. Let us now sum up what has thus far been said concerning Meinong’s concept of sensory objects. While Brentano had characterized physical 1

Armstrong (1995), p. 620. Armstrong (1995), p. 621. 3 Messer (1922), pp. 168 f., 194. Wertheimer (1912). Köhler (1912), pp. 259 ff. Here it may be pointed out that Köhler also tries to psychologize the objects and thereby to avoid ascribing indeterminacy to objects rather than contents. Objections to Messer and Köhler on this point can be found in Linke (1929), pp. 8-32, where no allowance is made for indeterminacy. 4 By no means are all the arguments against Meinong’s notion of nonexistent objects discussed here. It is only meant that a further consideration of sensory objects could have bearing on the acceptance or rejection of this notion. It seems to me that it should rather support the acceptance thereof. 2

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phenomena as contents of sensations and of related mind-functions and failed to provide them definitively with any sort of home among the various scientific disciplines, Meinong distinguishes sensory objects from sensory contents on the basis of possibilities among sensory objects, such as an infinite range of tones, which are not to be found among the obviously limited contents. As the sensory contents can be founded, the sensory objects can moreover be ones of higher order. Since Meinong agrees with Brentano that tones, colors, and the like do not exist in reality and are not as such the concern of natural science, he seeks a home for them elsewhere. This home, however, is not to be found in psychology, for the objects of sensations are in no way parts of consciousness. The only option left is to find a home for these objects in object theory, provided that a priori knowledge about them is possible.

6. A Priori Knowledge about Sensory Objects One year before the programatic statement in favor of object theory in 1 “Über Gegenstandstheorie”, Meinong had already explored the notion of a 2 particular subdivision of the a priori science of sensory objects. The essay consists only of remarks, because it turns out to be only an incidental publication. It is concerned with questions which arose in the course of certain lectures on experimental psychology and which Meinong tried to 3 answer insofar as it was necessary for clarity in these lectures. The a priori science of color, what Meinong calls “geometry of colors” 4 (Farbengeometrie), is to be understood in contrast with “psychology of 1

The promptings towards object theory, however, are to be found in many of his earlier writings. 2 Meinong (1903). 3 Meinong (1903), p. 2. 4 As we have already seen, Meinong makes use of the example of tones rather than colors in his attempt to bring home the distinction between the object and content of sensation. As regards a geometry of tones, however, he says that it has not yet joined the geometry of space. But he further says, “By contrast, in the sphere of colors, which presents itself at once in a much more complicated way due to its immediately

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color”. This distinction is based on yet another one, namely between the 1 color-body (Farbenkörper) and color-space (Farbenraum). The two distinctions are explained succinctly by Meinong as follows: It is recommended that a contrast be made between the color-body and colorspace. The latter is the sum total of all possible colors, while the former is the sum total of all psychologically actual colors, of color-presentations, or better, presented colors. The color-body is in color-space and participates to this extent in its properties. Our knowledge of color-space is by nature as a priori as our knowledge of space proper. It is geometry of colors. Our knowlege of the colorbody is by nature empirical and to this extent psychology of color. Nonetheless, a priori working through what is empirically obtained is not ruled out here any 2 more than it is otherwise in the empirical sciences.

Thus, if we consider all the empirically given colors, the ones actually seen by every human being and every other seeing individual, all of these together make up the color-body. There is only one color-body which exists in color-space, i.e. within the sum total of all possible colors. It is obvious that color-space need not be limited to the color-body. Moreover, even though psychology can investigate what colors are given under what circumstances, e.g. physiological conditions, this does not exclude the possibility of various a priori items of knowledge about them and thus a whole “geometry” of colors. This geometry of colors is obviously to be a special branch of the object-theoretical investigation of sensory objects. One of the outstanding instances of such knowledge, we are told, is to be found regarding complementary colors. Contrast in the sense of opposition can be seen a priori, to be sure, also in the case of color-tones: that a certain red stands over against a certain green, a certain yellow over against a certain blue as the color of the greatest distance, so that all remaining color-tones exhibit less difference, is something which, within obvious multidimensionality, there is no longer any need to coin the term ‘geometry of colors’” (Meinong [1907], p. 11). 1 For further considerations of these concepts and a comparison with Wittgenstein‘s views on color, see Mulligan (1991). 2 Meinong (1903), p. 29.

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sufficiently modest boundaries of permissibility, I can securely see from the 1 nature of the different color-tones and, to that extent, a priori.

It can accordingly be seen to be impossible that in color-space the contrast between red and green is greater than that between red and orange. Likewise, it is obvious, without any experimentation and strictly from the nature of the objects in question, that the contrast between blue and violet could not be greater than that between blue and yellow or orange. To be sure, there might be some vagueness about determinate cases of contrast. Nonetheless, these do not prove to be counter-examples of the insights just mentioned. Granted that a geometry of colors is possible, Meinong was fully aware that there was no such discipline, certainly not on the level of the geometry of space proper. The lack of geometry of colors, on his view, was to be seen “not in too little interest in the realm of colors, also hardly in too little complexity of the peculiar factualities of this area, but rather simply in our inability to grasp similarities, distances, and directions here with the same 2 ease and certainty as in the case of the spatial”. There are advantages to be drawn from experiments concerning the perception and presentation of colors, for such experiments, according to Meinong, can indeed bring about “circumstances that are especially favorable for the emergence of 3 the required insights, which can thus be ever so a priori in nature”. The fact that such artificial aids are less necessary for the geometry of space is only to be explained by our deficient ability to obtain a priori insights about color. Of course, the alternative explanation of the need for experiments is to be found in the view that the subject matter is amenable only to purely empirical knowledge, e.g. inductive generalization from particular instances. Nonetheless, Meinong insists that there are clear-cut instances where we have a priori knowledge about colors, a knowledge that no argument in favor of the opposing view can deny. Such an instance is on his view the insight into the already mentioned complementary relations between certain colors. 1

Meinong (1903), p. 6. Meinong (1903), p. 4. Cf. Meinong (1907), p. 13. 3 Meinong (1903), p. 5. 2

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What was no doubt, at least potentially, an obstacle to Meinong’s con1 temporaries, many of whom had an orientation in the empiricist tradition, was his statement in favor of not only a priori knowledge as such, but also knowledge of this kind where the relevant concepts are clearly of empirical origin. Our concepts of red, green, etc., as indeed the concept of color in general, are after all as empirical as concepts can possibly be. The same goes for our concept of tone. To be sure, the presentations of the tones which exceed the range of audible ones are not directly derived from experience. Nor is this the case with regard to the presentation of the difference between two tones which is so small that it cannot be discerned in actual hearing. Nevertheless, one who had no experience of tones at all 2 could hardly be said to have any conception, even an “improper” one, of tones which lie beyond the audible range. In view of the empirical origin of concepts such as those of color and tone, Meinong had to be careful to dissociate himself from a rationalist tradition, according to which the a priori, as its etymology clearly indicates, is restricted to innate ideas, i.e. ideas which are prior to experience. When he speaks of a priori knowledge he means only that it is to be obtained strictly from a consideration of the 3 nature of the known object. This obviously does not rule out the 4 possibility that the concept of what is known has its origin in experience. 1

While it is the tendency nowadays to associate a very robust and often downright pompous rationalist tradition with German philosophy, the truth is that this tradition had been in large measure overshadowed by an empiricism, positivism, and inductivism for the second half of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. To be sure, the Neo-Kantian movement, which was of considerable influence during this time, was rationalistic in a broad sense. Nonetheless, Meinong’s concerns about a one-sided empiricism were clearly a response to some highly influential contemporaries, e.g. Ernst Mach, but also to less known figures who are referred to throughout Meinong (1907). 2 The notion of such concepts, namely ones which are improper (uneigentlich), was a central theme in the school of Brentano and finds its place in Meinong (1882) and other writings under the heading of “indirect presentations” (indirekte Vorstellungen). 3 Meinong (1907), pp. 28 ff. 4 Meinong (1906a), pp. 383-391. Cf. Meinong (1907), pp. 60 ff. In this connection it may prove instructive to consider Stumpf’s insistence that the extension of a color is necessarily one of its parts in his (1873), pp. 112 f. See also Rollinger (1999), pp. 104 ff. During the late nineteenth century Hans Cornelius, who came under the

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Thus, while the concepts of red and green are derived from experience, the knowledge that they are contrary is based strictly on a grasp of the nature of red and green and is for this reason a priori. Moreover, Meinong insists that “a priori instances of cognition are objectively grounded, that they are 1 necessary, evidently certain, and existence-free”. To be sure, he does not deny that it is possible to have such knowledge about objects which happen to exist or subsist. The knowledge in question, however, on Meinong’s view, is in no way dependent on the acceptance of the being of what is known. Thus, sensory objects are in no way excluded from the realm of the a priori by the fact that they lack being. The claim that we can have a priori knowledge about colors will of course raise the question whether such knowledge is analytic or synthetic. The distinction between the synthetic and the analytic a priori had been introduced by Kant, though, like so many other aspects of Kantian 2 philosophy, not particularly welcomed by Brentano. As is well known, analytic judgments for Kant are ones in which the predicate is included in the subject, whereas the predicate of a synthetic judgment is not included influence of Carl Stumpf in Munich and later corresponded with Meinong, Husserl, and also Anton Marty, also argued that a priori, or in his terms universally valid (allgemeingültig), knowledge could be obtained about the immediate objects of perception. See “Husserl and Cornelius” in the present volume. 1 Meinong (1907), p. 51. The expression ‘freedom from existence‘ (Daseinsfreiheit) and related terms are used throughout Meinong’s discussion of the point under consideration. This term also emerges in Husserl’s writings in a very similar context. See, for instance, his lectures on logic and general epistemology (1917/18) in Hua XXX, pp. 24 ff. Husserl, however, does not acknowledge Meinong as the one who coined it, at least in its connection with the a priori. The four items which Meinong attributes to the a priori are comparable with the Kantian characterization thereof in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 3 f., only in one respect, namely necessity. Nonetheless, Meinong also tells us (Meinong [1907], p. 90) that ‘unrestricted universality’ (unbeschränkte Allgemeinheit) is entailed by necessity and thus comes closer to the notion of the a priori as Kant had conceived of it. 2

Brentano, EL 38/10352: “Kant’s synthetic cognitions a priori, which, according to him, [are] blind, whether they exist or not, are for this very reason not cognitions and unable to become the basis of a branch of knowledge [Kants synthetische Erkenntnisse a priori, welche nach ihm blind, sind ebendarum, mögen sie nun sein oder nicht sein, keine Erkenntnisse und unfähig, die Basis eines Wissenszweig zu werden].”

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in its subject. Kant further held that some synthetic judgments are a posteriori and others, e.g. “5 + 7 = 12” and “every change has a cause”, 1 are a priori. Brentano was not only opposed to the Kantian notion of a priori concepts, but he also was willing to say that all a priori judgments 2 are analytic. Furthermore, in opposition to Kant’s claim that analytic judgments are not “expansive judgments” (Erweiterungsurteile), Brentano 3 insists that they do expand something, namely our knowledge. In On the Experiential Foundations of our Knowledge Meinong expresses the view that there are indeed instances of apriority which are not tautological and 4 therefore not analytic. While it is unclear whether he wants to regard the insights of the geometry of colors in particular as among these nontautological a priori judgments, it would be much more plausible for him to do this than to assert his extremely peculiar claim that “the 5 meadows before me are green” is one of these judgments. 1

Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 1-16 / B 1-30. See Rollinger (1999), pp. 39 f. 3 See Rollinger (1999), p. 40. See also Brentano, EL 63/10854: “Whoever did not have an analytic cognition would, it is evident, be one cognition poorer. Whoever, like animals, hat no analytic cogntion at all, would be deprived of a vast, essential part of his cognition. Kant also contradicts himself, since in one breath he accepts analytic judgments as eludidating judgments and rejects them as expensive judgments. Whoever elucidates for someone something that was unclear to him gives him in the clarity he gives to him an insight that he did not possess previously. Thus he expands his cognition [Wer eine analytische Erkenntis nicht hätte, wäre evidentermaßen um eine Erkenntnis ärmer. Wer wie die Tiere gar keine analytische Erkenntnis hätte, wäre eines weiten, wesentlichen Teils seiner Erkenntnis beraubt. Auch widerspricht sich Kant, da er in einem Atem die analytischen Urteile als Erläuterungsurteile anerkennt und als Erweiterungsurteile verwirft. Wer jemandem etwas, was ihm unklar war, erläutert, der gibt ihm in der Klarheit, die er ihm gibt, eine Einsicht, die er vorher nicht besaß. Er vermehrt also seine Erkenntnis].” From a contemporary perspective, this insistence can be seen as Brentano’s attempt to avoid regarding a priori judgments as trivial. 4 Meinong (1906a), p. 398. Meinong equates tautologies with analytic judgments in Meinong (1906a), p. 48. Cf. Meinong (1907), pp. 57 ff. 5 In this judgment, says Meinong (1906a), p. 399, “a part is put in contrast with a whole, from which a part is picked out, and it is ascribed to it the whole”. Thus, it seems to be the result of some sort of analysis, but not in the same sense as a tautology, in which “the analysis arises as performed already in the subject, i.e. prior 2

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7. Comparison with Stumpf Much of what Meinong says about the a priori science of sensory objects and its particular subdivision, the geometry of colors, suggests a comparison with this science and the discipline which Stumpf called “phenomenonlogy” in his 1907 paper on the division of the sciences. According to Stumpf, this discipline is indeed concerned with phenomena 1 (Erscheinungen), understood primarily as the contents of sensation and secondarily as those contents of other acts, especially imagination, which 2 correspond to sensory contents. To be sure, Stumpf continues to speak in the older Brentanian jargon here, though this is in large measure due to the fact that he restricts the usage of the term “object” (Gegenstand) for those 3 contents which are conceptually apprehended. Thus, while in some sense any science is concerned with objects, insofar as science is not possible without the conceptual apprehension of whatever it treats, the subject matter of phenomenology does not as such consist of objects. The colors we see may be objects when we concern ourselves with them scientifically, but otherwise they need not be. The point that Stumpf has in common with Meinong, however, is to be found in the notion of laws of structure, which are the main concern of phenomenology and some of which are regarded as a priori. Nonetheless, Stumpf hesitates to allow for such a discipline as one that could be pursued independently of psychology and physiology, where he finds most of the de facto to making the relevant judgment” (Meinong [1906], p. 399). See “Meinong on Perception and Objectives” in the present volume. 1 Stumpf (1907b), pp. 26-32. 2 Stumpf (1907a), pp. 2 f. Both this work and Stumpf (1907b) were read by Meinong, as indicated by his literary remains published in Fabian and Haller (1978), pp. 129144, 169, 178f. 3 Stumpf (1907b), pp. 32 f. This usage of Gegenstand certainly was not taken from Brentano, who quite explicitly said, “An ‘object’ we call anything towards which a psychical activity is directed [Einen ‘Gegenstand’ (Objekt) nennen wir jegliches, worauf eine psychische Tätigkeit sich richtet]” (Brentano, EL 87/14180).

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phenomenological results. Above all, he sees no reason to make object theory the proper home for the phenomena under consideration together with other objects, e.g. relations, for he “cannot discover in the definition 2 of this science the common feature which would justify the subsumption”. Morover, as already mentioned, Meinong allows for nontautological cases of the a priori, whereas we find in Stumpf’s posthumously published Epistemology the Brentanian view expressed, especially in opposition to 3 Husserl, that there are no synthetic a priori judgments. Nonetheless, if we consider the fact that in 1907 Stumpf characterized the laws of logic and 4 their applications as both a priori and nontautological, it turns out that he experienced at least as much ambivalence about this whole issue as Meinong did. As regards Stumpf’s objection that no common feature can be found 5 between phenomena and other objects, e.g. relations and formations, which would unite them in object theory, Meinong asks rhetorically in a 6 posthumously published note, “But are they not in fact all objects?” If, however, the answer that phenomena, relations, and formations are all objects justifies their inclusion in the domain of object theory, it must be asked why physics and chemistry, for instance, do not make up special branches of object theory as phenomenology, theory of relations, and 1

Stumpf (1907b), pp. 26 f. In Stumpf (1907b), p. 26, Stumpf mentions some of the pioneers of phenomenology in his sense. H. Grassmann, whose work is also acknowledged by Meinong in his (1903), p. 44 n., is named as one of them. 2 Stumpf (1907b), p. 41. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 201-206 ff. 4 Stumpf (1907b), p 49. Stumpf here maintains that when a valid argument is formulated as a single conditional proposition, with the conjunction of all the premises as the antecedent and the conclusion as the consequent, the result is “a complex judgment which no one can view as a tautology or mere definition”. Yet, in contemporary formal logic such a conditional proposition would be an outstanding instance of a tautology: a truth-function which is true under all conditions, i.e. whatever the truth-values of the constituent propositions are. 5 The term “formations” here is a translation of Gebilde, which Stumpf uses in application to various objects, e.g. collectives and states of affairs, which are in some sense formed by mind-functions and thereby differ from phenomena and relations which are simply given. See Stumpf (1907a), pp. 28-33. 6 Meinong, (eds.) Fabian and Haller (1978), p. 141.

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eidology (i.e. theory of formations) would on Meinong’s account. Atoms, molecules, and chemical compounds, after all, are objects no less than phenomena, relations, and formations. In answer to this objection Meinong’s only recourse seems to be his emphasis on the apriority of object theory, as he understands it. Phenomena, formations, and relations would therefore be subject matters of object theory due to their amenability to a priori treatment. Since physics and chemistry are concerned with other aspects of their objects, namely ones which are amenable to empirical observation and cognition, albeit on the highest levels and certainly mixed with a priori elements, these sciences are not branches of object theory. Given the emphasis on apriority as the distinguishing feature of object theory, however, Meinong needs to confront the problem already discussed above, namely concerning the nature of this a priori cognition, more particularly whether it is to be synthetic or analytic. While we may be left unsettled by the insistence of some, including Brentano, that apriority is to be identified with analyticity, Meinong’s position is in need of considerable development beyond his understated rejection of this identification. This is especially the case at a time when the very concept of analyticity has for a good many decades now been called into question by leading philosophers. Against the appeal to apriority as the ultimate distinguishing feature of object theory, it might also be said that Meinong or his defenders would thereby run the risk of allowing for objects which escape object theory altogether. Here I mean objects regarding which there are no a priori truths and therefore no a priori knowledge. It might, to be sure, be argued that objects which subsist or exist or even objects which possibly exist or subsist are at least subject to the law of noncontradition and to this extent matters of a priori truth and knowledge. Since Meinong allows for impossible objects, which are of course not subject to this law, there is a need for his defenders to deal with the class of impossible objects which are not subject to any a priori laws at all. It obviously will not help to argue that there cannot be objects of this kind, for such an argument is otherwise no objection against including a given class of objects within the scope of object theory. Of course, the objects of sensation as such are not candidates for the class of impossible objects under consideration. 132

Nonetheless, such a class is mentioned here, for it obviously can be appealed to in order to show that at least one class of objects would be excluded from object theory as the sum total of all a priori disciplines. In Meinong’s favor it might be pointed out here that his conception of the a priori discipline of sensory objects rightly does not leave the ones of higher order to be dealt with in another discipline. Stumpf, on the other hand, proposes to do precisely this by allocating many of the latter to a distinct discipline, namely eidology, which concerns formations in 1 general. Hence, theory of tones is for him a branch of phenomenology, 2 while theory of melodies is more properly developed in eidology. Moreover, Stumpf maintains that relations generally, thus including sensory relations, are the subject matter of theory of relations, conceived 3 of as a discipline distinct from both phenomenology and eidology. At least prima facie Meinong’s arrangement, whereby ultimately only one discipline is to deal with sensory objects and involve a priori knowledge about them, seems to be a much more convenient one than Stumpf’s allocation of such knowledge to phenomenology, eidology, and theory of 4 relations, the three so-called “pre-sciences” (Vorwissenschaften). Before proceeding to the comparison of Meinong and Husserl on the topic under discussion, a few words are in order regarding terminology. It is of course obvious that phenomenology in the Stumpfian sense is not at all what would be understood by this term today, for it has taken on a different meaning from Husserl’s more influential usage of it and also additional meanings, often extremely obscure and imprecise, from its usage in the works of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and many others whose concerns are very remote from those of Meinong and his fellow Brentanists. If, however, we made a revision of Stumpf’s terminology and 1

Stumpf (1907b), pp. 32-37. Melodies were in fact among Christian von Ehrenfels‘ primary examples of Gestalt qualities, to which Stumpf explicitly appeals in his introduction of the notion of formations in Stumpf (1907a), p. 28. 3 Stumpf (1907b), pp. 37-42. The refusal to include relations among the formations is already suspect. Stumpf’s motivation for this refusal apparently lies in his conviction that the relations are among the immediately given data of consciousness while the formations are in some sense products of forming mental activity. 4 Stumpf (1907b), p. 39. 2

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spoke of the phenomenology of sensory objects, rather than phenomenology simpliciter, in reference to the discipline in question, this would seem to be highly recommendable. The phenomenology of sensory objects could thereby be subdivided into a phenomenology of colors, a phenomenology of tones, etc., and likewise phenomenologies of objects of 1 higher order in each of these areas. Such a terminology certainly seems preferable to the one suggested by Meinong’s “geometry of colors”, which of course implies a rigorous axiomatization, such as what we find in geometry proper and might thus make demands that cannot be met.

8. Comparison with Husserl Now let us compare Meinong’s view on sensory objects with what Husserl wrote in manuscripts in which the geometry of colors and the geometry of 2 tones come into consideration, though without any mention of Meinong. It is well known that Husserl came to conceive of phenomenology as a priori discipline, but the subject matter of phenomenology for him is ultimately consciousness. Since it is difficult to construe colors and tones as belonging to this subject matter, it would seem that Husserlian phenomenology could not engulf the scientific treatment of such objects. Nevertheless, the question whether these can be scientifically treated at all is answered affirmatively by Husserl in the following passage. Concerning the singular tones nothing scientific can be asserted when we are restricted to this sphere. No “scientific” assertions are made by saying that one tone was before, another was after, the one lasted longer, the other shorter, etc. By contrast, the consideration of the ideal species, namely the identification of species time-filling “quality”…, of their order and relevant laws pertaining to their essences, including the ones of order. The laws pertaining to essence are therefore species-laws (relation-laws of species) of matters (time-fillers) and not 1

The possibility of objects of higher order founded on sensory objects from different domains, e.g. colors and tones, must also be kept in mind in the pursuit of the phenomenologies in question. 2 The manuscripts in question have been transcribed and published in Melle (1984), pp. 405-424. In September 1907, when Husserl wrote these, he was also reading other materials by Meinong, but by this time Meinong had fallen out of favor with him.

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laws pertaining to the essence of what could be exhibited in the flux [of consciousness]: not laws of sensation, and thus in all cases. The same goes for colors, not understood as colors of things, but as colors, as they are “immanently 1 given”.

While Husserl’s terminology diverges from Meinong’s in different ways, there is a very important point of agreement to be found in the passage just cited. The laws pertaining to essence (Wesensgesetze) are no less than a priori laws. Accordingly, Husserl maintains that such laws of colors and tones can be identified and these are not reducible to laws of sensation. Nonetheless, there still remains the question whether the laws pertaining to the essence of colors, tones, and the like belong to phenomenology, which is, according to Husserl, concerned not only with mind-functions, but also with whatever is immanent in them. Though the manuscripts under consideration are, like so many of Husserl’s manuscripts, attempts to wrestle with the questions at hand and are hardly conclusive, his tendency is to regard the geometries of colors, tones, etc. as properly 2 phenomenological. In this regard he differs from Meinong, who sees very sharp distinctions between the objects of sensation and sensory consciousness and correspondingly between the discipline that treats the former and the one that treats the latter. Moreover, in Husserl’s discussions of the objects in question there is something which is missing in the works of Meinong considered thus far. It is of course a commonplace that Meinong uses the term Gegenstand (which we translate as “object”) in an unusually broad sense, for when we speak of objects we normally have in mind physical things. There is something peculiar about calling colors and tones “objects”. Though we can learn to live with this peculiarity, as we so often do in philosophy, we may nonetheless ask whether sensory objects in the ordinary sense, i.e. the things which are colored and which make sounds by being banged against each other, deserve any consideration at all in object theory. Under the title “phenomenology” sensory objects in this sense, in contrast with the hypothetical constructs of physics, do receive considerable attention from Husserl. Yet, in defense of Meinong it should be said that in On the 1 2

Hua XXIV, p. 413. Cf. the assessment of Stumpfian phenomenology in Hua III/1, p. 199.

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Experiential Foundations of our Knowledge he shows an appreciation of 1 the distinction between green (Grün) and something green (Grünes). Moreover, he explicitly avoids any attempt to view this distinction as one to be made in terms of simplicity and complexity. That is to say, something green, e.g. a green plant, is not regarded merely as something more complex (namely by the addition of other qualities) than green. While Meinong is to be lauded for seeing the irreducibility of the concept of a sensory thing, it nonetheless remains unclear if and how this concept is to come into play in the phenomenology of sensory objects. For it is obvious, after all, that a green thing no less than green is an object and should accordingly not be left homeless. Here we come upon a domain of inquiry where the two sides of Austrian phenomenology, i.e. descriptive psychology and object theory, are very closely intertwined. Both Meinong and Husserl are to be given credit for their pioneering investigations in this domain.

9. Conclusion The above discussion of Meinong’s view of sensory objects can be summed up as follows. According to him, these are objects which are not to be identified with either the acts or contents of sensation, and as such not properly dealt with in psychology. Though these objects, on his view, do not even exist or subsist, this does not prevent him from considering them, as well as other objects without being, as a subject matter for scientific investigation. In this regard Meinong’s conception of sensory objects could contribute something of considerable interest in the endeavor to deal with objects without being, for they differ significantly from other such objects. Moreover, it appears that the science of sensory objects and its subdivisions, such as the geometry of colors, would apparently result in synthetic rather than analytic a priori insights. In his delineation of an a priori science of sensory objects, Meinong also takes a position which 1

Meinong (1906a), p. 405. Unfortunately, English does not have the grammar which allows for a perfect translation of Grünes. Depending on the context, it can be translated as “something green”, “anything green”, “green things”, or “what is green”.

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differs considerably from, in spite of certain parallels with, those of other pupils of Brentano, notably Stumpf and Husserl. It is above all to be hoped that the forgoing discussion advances the ongoing evaluation of object theory beyond the focus on the contradictory and fictitional objects which is the wont among analytic philosophers who have anything at all to do with Meinong. Even if these objects ultimately turn out to be illegitimate as a subject matter for scientific reflection, the phenomenology of sensory objects may well still survive as one of the genuine fruits of Meinong’s attempt to defend the rights of object theory.

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1

STUMPF ON PHENOMENA AND PHENOMENOLOGY

1. Introduction Carl Stumpf is perhaps best known for his significant work in psychology. Yet, as a student of Franz Brentano and Hermann Lotze and as a teacher of Edmund Husserl, he unsurprisingly also conceived of a discipline which he chose to call “phenomenology”. The importance of phenomenology for Husserl is too familiar to require elaboration here. It is also well known that this phenomenology was developed from the descriptive psychology which Brentano was teaching in Vienna and at one time (WS 1888/89) even called “descriptive phenomenology”. Lotze also had a conception of a phenomenology, more particularly a “phenomenology of feeling” (Phänomenologie des Gemüts), as opposed to the “phenomenology of mind” (Phänomenologie des Geistes) which had of course been promul2 gated by Hegel in the early nineteenth century. While we can in some cases find parallels of these notions, especially Brentanian descriptive psychology, in the work of Stumpf, what he means by “phenomenology” is emphatically different from them. What he has in mind under this heading is the discipline which has the special task of investigating phenomena in a rather strict sense to be examined here. Both his conception of phenomena or “appearances” (Erscheinungen) and that of 3 phenomenology were clarified by him in two important papers. In the following I shall discuss his views on phenomena and phenomenology primarily as they are found in these papers, but I shall also feel free to draw upon other writings of Stumpf insofar as these prove relevant. Wherever I see parallels and contrasts between Stumpf’s views on the 1

This essay is a revised version of a paper that was first published as a paper under the same title in Brentano Studien 9 (2000/01), pp. 149-165. 2 Orth (1986), p. 17. In the system of metaphysics which Lotze was developing in the 1860s (when Stumpf was studying under him) and into the 1870s, the third part of this system was designated as “phenomenology“ (Ibid., p. 24). This part was finally called “psychology“ in the published version of this system in 1879. Accordingly, there is an overlap between the Brentanian and the Lotzean notion of phenomenology. 3 Stumpf (1907a) and Stumpf (1907b). The first of these papers was presented on 19 January 1905 and the second on 18 January 1906.

matters under consideration and those of Brentano or other Austrian phenomenologists, I shall point them out.

2. Phenomena Phenomena, says Stumpf, are first and foremost “the contents of sensa1 tions”. Obvious examples of these are to be found by considering the colors we see, the tones we hear, the odors we smell, the flavors we taste, not to mention the tactile data of warmth and coldness, roughness and smoothness. The list of sensory contents, according to Stumpf, is however to be expanded as follows: Among them modern psychology rightly includes spatial extension and distribution of visual and tactile impressions, for the qualitative aspect of these contents of sensations is given just as much as the quantitative aspect is. Usually temporal duration is regarded as a sensory content. Although there are still difficulties with respect to time, we shall here classify it among the sensory contents, since all following considerations show themselves to be applicable to 2 temporal properties just as much as they are applicable to sensory contents.

Though Stumpf recommends that sensory pleasures and pains be left aside in his reflections on phenomena and phenomenology, he maintains that these too could be added to the list “not as attributes, but as a special 3 class”. In all of these cases it is the qualitative aspect which makes something a sensory content, though this by no means rules out the possibility of applying notions of quantity to such a content. We shall see later that he stresses this point in his views of phenomenal space. While the phrase “contents of sensations” may at first glance seem clear enough, especially in light of the above examples, it nevertheless stands in need of considerable clarification. Three questions in particular must be asked in order to understand what Stumpf has in mind here. 1) One of these questions concerns whether any distinction at all is to be 1

Stumpf (1907a), p. 4. Stumpf (1907a), p. 4. 3 Stumpf (1907a), p. 4. 2

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drawn between the contents of sensations and the sensations themselves. In Husserl’s Logical Investigations (published in 1900/01 and thus several years prior to 1907), for instance, there is no distinction at all to be made 1 here. Does Stumpf hold the same view? 2) Another question is this: If there is a distinction between the sensation and its content, we would further like to know whether the content is somehow to be distinguished from the object. The distinction between the content and the object of a presentation (Vorstellung), and indeed of any act of consciousness, became a matter of great concern for at least some Brentanists, particularly for Meinong and Husserl, in the wake of the habilitation thesis (1894) of the 2 Brentanist Kasimir Twardowski. If Stumpf wishes to speak of the objects of sensations at all, are they to be characterized as phenomena no less than the contents of sensations are? 3) Finally, yet another question arises when we consider Brentano’s view, as espoused in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, regarding the contents of sensations. According to 3 Brentano, these (which he calls “physical phenomena”) are not even real. For this reason, he maintains, it is improper to say that they are perceived. Does Stumpf therefore wish to follow his mentor by saying that sensory contents, the primary examples of phenomena, are not real and hence not perceivable in the proper sense? Let us take up the first question which has been raised: whether Stumpf wishes to distinguish between the contents of sensations and the sensations themselves. Here it may be pointed out that Stumpf, unlike Meinong and Husserl, continued to use the term “content”, as it had been used by Brentano, in order to designate that to which an act of consciousness refers. Accordingly, when Stumpf speaks of contents of sensations, he clearly implies that the sensations (Empfundungen) are acts of consciousness and their contents are “sensed” (empfunden) in the sensations. Since the sensations are obviously not instances of inner perception, i.e. the only acts which coincide with their contents, it follows 1

See especially Hua XIX/1, pp. 406-401. Twardowski (1894). The whole issue which was raised by Twardowski in the work cited here and was dealt with by various Brentanists is treated in detail throughout Rollinger (1999). 3 Brentano, (1874), pp. 120 ff. 2

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that the contents of sensations are distinct from the sensations themselves. This view is obviously different from the one espoused by Husserl in the Logical Investigations, according to which sensations are by no means acts of consciousness, but rather parts of consciousness whose apprehension results in the perception of external objects. Granted that the contents of sensations are not identified by Stumpf with the sensations themselves, the next question is whether they are to be distinguished from the objects of sensation. That to which an act of consciousness refers is, in the terminology of both Meinong and Husserl, the object of the act. While Husserl, who does not regard sensations as acts, accordingly cannot allow for any notion of objects of sensations, we 1 do find Meinong speaking of such objects. Among the objects which have been left homeless by traditional divisions of science and which are to find a home in his theory of objects are precisely the objects of sensations (Empfindungsgegenstände), which he moreover explicitly contrasts with 2 the contents of sensations. Since Meinong views the contents of sensations as belonging to consciousness, he sees no need for them to be dealt with in any science but psychology, just as the other parts of consciousness, namely acts, are also to be dealt with in psychology. The colors we see, the tones we hear, and many other examples which could easily be enumerated are however the objects of sensations which lie beyond the purview of psychology. Now when we consider Stumpf’s characterization of phenomenology as the discipline which is concerned first and foremost with the contents of sensations, we may ask where this leaves the objects of sensations for him. As it turns out, Stumpf is willing to make a distinction between the contents and objects of consciousness, but only in such a way that the contents and objects would in certain cases coincide. Something is an object, he maintains, only insofar as it is 3 subsumed under a general concept or is itself a general concept. Strictly speaking, this would mean that there are no objects of sensations as such, 1

See also “Meinong on the Objects of Sensation” in the present volume. Meinong (1907), pp. 8 ff. 3 Stumpf (1907b), p. 6-10. A manuscript in which Husserl criticizes Stumpf’s view of the content-object distinction is cited and commented on in Rollinger (1999), pp. 96 ff.). 2

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only objects of conceptualizing acts. However, the object of a conceptualizing act may coincide with the content of a sensation and indeed must do so whenever this content becomes the subject matter of scientific inquiry. Now let us turn to yet another question which has been raised: namely whether the contents of sensations are regarded by Stumpf as real. We have seen that he learned from Brentano that they are not so. Moreover, even if Stumpf is willing to say that those contents of consciousness which are conceptualized are objects, it does not follow from this that they are to be viewed as real. Something can be an object without being real. In this regard the so-called “psychical formations” (psychische Gebilde), such as concepts (Begriffe), collections (Inbegriffe), states of affairs (Sachverhalte), and values (Werte), which do not count as real from Stumpf’s point 1 of view, may be considered. At least concepts are as such objects and yet not real. The other psychical formations are likewise objects whenever they are subsumed under concepts, though these objects are not to be regarded as real. While Stumpf therefore allows for objects which are not real, he also insists that phenomena are immediately given no less than acts of consciousness, which he calls “mind-functions” (psychische Funktionen), and also no less than certain relations, namely those between phenomena, between mind-functions, or between phenomena and mind-functions, are 2 given. Stumpf further asserts: The totality of the immediately given is real. For it is that from which we obtain the concept of the real in the first place. The phenomena are real as contents to which [mind-]functions refer, the [mind-]functions are real as functions which operate on phenomena, the relations as relations between phenomena or between functions etc. Of “mere phenomena” we cannot speak as if they would be a complete nothing if they did not refer to an external actuality. The phenomena just do not belong to that actuality to which naive thinking ascribes them, 3 namely to an actuality independent of consciousness. 1

Stumpf (1907a), pp. 28-34. Stumpf (1907a), 6 f. Stumpf (1907b), p. 5 f. 3 Stumpf (1907a), p. 10. 2

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Here Stumpf is very cautious to preserve at least one aspect of Brentano’s doctrine of sensory contents. While he opposes Brentano’s view that these are not at all real, he concedes that naive thinking, as it normally operates in perception, is incorrect in positing these contents as things or properties of things which exist apart from consciousness. Yet, he says that it is in principle possible to expand the concept of the real beyond the immediately given, for he also agrees with Brentano that the success of natural science is a result of precisely such expansion. What is perhaps striking in Stumpf’s view of phenomena is to be found in the implication that something can be real without being an object. To be sure, all of those phenomena which are subsumed under concepts, e.g. classified as colors or tones, are objects. However, those phenomena which are not subsumed under concepts are not objects in the Stumpfian sense, although he tells us that they are immediately given and therefore real. When we turn to the views of Meinong, we see that he is willing to 1 say that absolutely anything which we are able to present is an object. As far as Husserl is concerned, anything which can be the subject of true 2 affirmation is an object. From the standpoint of either Meinong or Husserl it would be contadictory to say of certain realities that they are not objects. The difference between their views and Stumpf’s is clearly at least in part a verbal one, but it does indicate that there is perhaps something missing in his whole division of the sciences. While Meinong and Husserl at times speak of objects in a sense in which these need not be correlated with any actually occurring act of consciousness, Stumpf restricts the usage to a purely correlative one. By avoiding this restriction Meinong conceives of object theory, especially a general one, and Husserl envisions a formal ontology. Given Stumpf’s failure to speak of objects in a sense which does not require an actual correlation with consciousness, the notion of a formal ontology or a general object theory in the Meinongian sense has no place in his constellation of the sciences. The advantages or disadvantages of this aspect of Stumpf’s philosophy, however, are matters which would 1 2

Meinong (1904), 1 ff. Husserliana XIX/1, pp. 129 f.

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take us too far afield in our examination of his concepts of phenomena and phenomenology. We have thus far considered how Stumpf conceives of the most outstanding examples of phenomena, namely sensory contents. The question now naturally arises whether there are any other phenomena on his view. In fact he maintains that there are, namely the contents of imagination which correspond to the contents of sensation. Hence, not only the colors we actually see are phenomena, but also the colors we imagine and remember are phenomena as well. The contents of sensation are however called “phenomena of first order” and the others are called 1 “phenomena of second order”. Stumpf’s choice of terminology here has of course much to do with the empiricism which he had inherited from Brentano and later defended in considerable detail in his posthumously 2 published Epistemology. That is to say, since Stumpf maintains that there would be no imagined or remembered colors and sounds, for instance, if there were no perceived colors and sounds, it is only natural that he refers to the contents of sensations as “phenomena of first order” and all other phenomenona as ones “of second order”. While it is perhaps tempting to add here that the phenomena of second order, unlike the sensory contents, are not given in the proper sense, Stumpf gives another impression entirely when he says, “The mere presenting of colors or tones is also a kind of seeing or hearing, a noticing of the emerging phenomena of this group (perhaps also emerging under 3 volitional influences)”. It is important to note that what Stumpf here means by “presenting” (Vorstellen) is very different from what Brentano 4 had meant. To present something, says Stumpf, is simply to notice something. A presentation is accordingly thought of as a mind-function which has epistemic status, unlike a presentation for Brentano, which finds its expression in a mere name. Stumpf’s usage of the term in question is moreover not to be regarded as a purely verbal divergence from his mentor, for presentations on his view are said to be the founding acts of 1

Stumpf (1907a), p. 4. See especially Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 9-123. 3 Stumpf (1907a), p. 16. 4 Brentano (1874), pp. 266-305. 2

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consciousness. Brentano, by contrast, had said that presentations, as acts which cannot even be properly called veridical, were the acts on which all others are founded. In view of Stumpf’s theory of presentations, as this was developed in 1907, he therefore has little choice but to say that anything presented, even imagined, is noticed and therefore given at least as a phenomenon (provided of course that it is something which could have originally been a content of sensation). Accordingly, when Stumpf says that the contents of sensations are phenomena of first order and all others are phenomena of second order, this can hardly be anything else but a result of his empiricist stance regarding the contents of consciousness and has nothing to do with any notion of sensation as epistemologically prior to other mind-functions.

3. Phenomenology Now that we have some understanding of how Stumpf conceives of phenomena of first and second order, let us turn our attention to what he has to say about phenomenology, i.e. the discipline which investigates them. After defending the distinction between sciences of nature and 1 sciences of mind (Geisteswissenschaften), which had indeed been a commonplace distinction in the German speaking world for a good part of the nineteenth century, Stumpf proceeds to indicate various “neutral” 2 disciplines, namely phenomenology, eidology (concerned with the above3 4 5 mentioned mind-functions), theory of relations, and metaphysics. Let us first say a few words about how he conceives of the old division between the sciences of nature and the sciences of mind, for this will help us to understand Stumpfian phenomenology. 1

Stumpf (1907b), pp. 10-26. Though it would normally be appropriate to translate Geisteswissenschaften as “humanities”, I shall here translate the term as “sciences of mind” since Stumpf holds the view that these disciplines are in fact ultimately concerned with the mind, i.e. consciousness. 2 Stumpf (1907b), pp. 26-32. 3 Stumpf (1907b), pp. 32-37. 4 Stumpf (1907b), pp. 37-42. 5 Stumpf (1907b), pp. 42 ff.

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Physics, according to Stumpf, is the basic science of nature. Moreover, as we have already seen, he maintains that the subject matter of phyiscs is not to be identified with phenomena, but rather with objects (e.g. atoms) which are inferred from phenomena. In opposition to Mach, who wishes to reduce the objects of physics to phenomena and moreover equates these with sensations, but often refers to them with the neutral term “elements”, Stumpf argues that not even the simplest description of physical objects and their relations, let alone the laws of physics, can successfully be formulated in such a way that nothing at all is posited beyond the 2 phenomena. As is well known, there were later followers of Mach (in the Vienna Circle, which was at first called the “Ernst Mach Society”) who tried very hard to defend and promote the phenomenalistic conception of 3 natural science. This view has however succumbed to criticisms which were already suggested by Stumpf. Hence, if Stumpf is right in saying that physics and other sciences of nature at best only start from phenomena and are not ultimately about them, we should still be able to make room for his concept of phenomenology as the investigation of phenomena as such, i.e. a discipline to be distinguished from the sciences of nature. Psychology, Stumpf tells us, is to the basic discipline belonging to the 4 sciences of mind. It is of course well known that for Brentano and many of his pupils, including Stumpf, psychology was to be absolutely crucial for all philosophical endeavors. The exclusion of psychology from the natural sciences, as this is clearly endorsed in Stumpf’s division of the sciences of 1907, is in no way a rejection of thesis which Brentano had put forward in his habilitation at Würzburg and inspired both Stumpf and his 5 fellow student Anton Marty to follow in Brentano’s footsteps, namely thesis that the method of philosophy is none other than the method of the 6 natural sciences. When Stumpf tells us that psychology is the basic science of mind and therefore distinguishable from the sciences of nature, 1

Stumpf (1907b), pp. 17 ff. Stumpf (1907b), pp. 14 ff. 3 See Haller (1993), pp. 37-41. 4 Stumpf (1907b), pp. 24 ff. 5 Stumpf (1924), p. 208. 6 Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1929), pp. 136 f. 2

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he is dividing these sciences strictly in terms of their subject matter and not in terms of their methods. Yet, neither the sciences of nature nor the sciences of mind can make progress while leaving phenomena completely out of consideration, for in some sense they both start from phenomena. Obviously, physics does so in the sense that its objects are inferred from phenomena. Waves of light are, for instance, inferred from colors. Yet, many of the mind-functions to be treated in psychology are given only insofar as their contents are phenomena. In this sense psychology, too, must start from phenomena. The investigation of phenomena as such is accordingly of interest to both the sciences of nature and the sciences of mind. Therefore, among the neutral sciences, phenomenology is designated as a pre-science (Vorwissenschaft) along with eidology and theory of relations, leaving metaphysics as the only post-science 1 (Nachwissenschaft) among the neutral ones. Now that we know roughly how phenomenology is situated among the sciences from Stumpf’s standpoint, let us inquire further into the nature of this discipline. What sort of method does it use? Does it involve the discovery of laws? If so, what sorts of laws are these? Are they a priori or to be reached through induction from empirically given particulars? Can this discipline be an area for special practicianers or is it to be the work of those who labor in the sciences of nature or mind? These are some of the questions which will have to be answered in order to understand Stumpfian phenomenology. The view that phenomenology is primarily a method was of course 2 advanced by Husserl and again affirmed by some of his followers. Moreover, the phenomenological method, as Husserl began conceiving of 3 it by 1907, though not in his Logical Investigations (1900/01), was indeed thought of as peculiar to this discipline, by no means shared by the sciences of nature and mind, which are allegedly rooted in the natural attitude. We are of course familiar with Husserl’s view that phenomenology cannot be done without bracketing the general thesis of the natural attitude, namely thesis that there is a world which transcends 1

Stumpf (1907b), pp. 42 ff. See Heidegger (1927), pp. 27-39. 3 Rollinger (1999), pp. pp. 114-122. 2

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consciousness. It is interesting to note that this whole vision of a pure or transcendental phenomenology as defined by a peculiar method, stated in the Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913), came under attack in Stumpf’s posthumously 1 published Epistemology. The details of this critique need not detain us 2 here. The point here is simply that phenomenology, just like the sciences of nature and mind, is characterized strictly in terms of its subject matter. As far as the method of phenomenology is concerned, Stumpf only indicates this to the extent that he tells that phenomenology is to discover laws (Gesetze). As John Stuart Mill had distinguished between laws of 3 coexistence and laws of succession, Stumpf makes a similar contrast, namely between laws of structure and laws of causation. The former he 4 describes as concerned with “relations between the parts of a whole”. Relations of dependence, which may or may not involve causation, can be describable in terms of laws of structure. While the laws of structure which are found in the sciences of nature, e.g. regarding the structure of the organism, are not completely separable from causal relations, Stumpf tells 5 us that phenomena do not enter into causal relations with each other. To be sure, he concedes that a phenomenon can be caused by a mind-function, 6 especially by an attentively directed one. This is however a matter to be investigated in psychology. For this reason phenomenology is not concerned with the discovery of causal laws. Rather, this science, says Stumpf, “strictly within its boundaries leads only to laws of structure. The sum of general relations of tones to each other, of colors to each other, of the simultaneously given phenomena of all senses among each other, etc. 7 is the structure of the realm of phenomena”. Moreover, the laws of 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939) I (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1940), pp. 186-199. For further discussion of Stumpf’s epistemology see “The Concept of Causality in Stumpf’s Epistemology” in the present volume. 2 See Rollinger (1999), pp. pp. 114-122. 3 A System of Logic, III.xxii.1. 4 Stumpf (1907b), p. 61. 5 Stumpf (1907b), p. 28. 6 Stumpf (1907b), p. 30. 7 Stumpf (1907b), p. 64.

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structure under consideration in phenomenology, as we shall soon see, need not be a priori. What is perhaps most vexing in discussions of phenomenology, whether it be transcendental, hermeneutical, or whatever other kind, is the lack of concrete examples of the results of this discipline. According to Stumpf, many of the results of what he calls “phenomenology”, by contrast, are already to be found in psychology and physiology, even to 1 some extent in physics. Much of what we already know regarding the mixing of sounds and the mixing of colors, for instance, is attributed by 2 Stumpf to phenomenology. But we would of course like to know what Stumpf himself has done or elaborated on in his phenomenological investigations. What he has to say about space in the two papers of 1907 is of interest in this regard, but we must not fail to overlook an important observation which had already been made in his early work On the 3 Psychological Origin of Space-Presentation. Let us first consider the phenomenological remarks in the papers of 1907. In Stumpf’s attempt to fix the place of mathematics in general he raises the question whether at least one branch of mathematics, namely geometry, is phenomenological in character. This question is no different from the following one: Is the space which is investigated in geometry a phenomenon? If we now recall that laws of structure are of particular interest to phenomenology, and if it is noted that geometrical laws could well be characterized in this way (as indeed Mill had regarded them as outstanding examples of laws of coexistence), it might be tempting to identify the subject matter of geometry with phenomenal space. Stumpf emphatically says, however, that this is not the case. He explains as follows: Otherwise it would especially have to investigate the phenomenal spaces of the tactile sense and the visual sense separately, then the spatialities of other senses insofar as something analogous is found there too. It would have to determine 1

Stumpf (1907b), pp. 26 ff. Stumpf (1907b), pp. 28 ff. In this regard one should also consider the footnote in Stumpf (1907b), p. 30, where Stumpf endorses the “color geometry” proposed by Meinong. See “Meinong on the Objects of Sensation” in present volume. 3 Stumpf (1873). 2

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the relation of these spaces to each other and would have to check whether phenomenal spaces have only two dimensions or also depth, perhaps whether the third dimension is completely on a par with the first two, whether we can, for instance, intuitively present the density of a body, or whether the expressions used in reference to it only mean something unintuitive, conceptual, etc. These 1 are all questions of the phenomenology of space.

Phenomenal space, in short, does not have the obvious homogeneity which the subject matter of geometry has. Stumpf was well aware that others before him had made this observation. Here is important to point out a difference between him and Ernst Mach, who also thematized the notion of phenomenal space under 2 the heading “physiological space” and contrasted it with metric space. Stumpf, however, makes it clear that he does not find it necessary to go this far in contrasting phenomenal space with geometrical space. Nor is Mach fully consistent in making this contrast, for he, says Stumpf, “does, after all, allow for certain quantitative comparisons of stretches, albeit not 3 mathematically exact ones”. Hence, it is possible to speak meaningfully of being nearer or farther in phenomenal space, but once we start measuring distances precisely it is no longer phenomenal space under consideration. While the sun, as it appears to me from the earth under normal circumstances, may look much smaller than one of my hands, for example, 1

Stumpf (1907b), pp. 71 f. Mach (1905), pp. 331 f. Mach and Stumpf were at one time colleagues in Prague, together with Ewald Hering, who also thematized the concept of phenomenal space as well as other important aspects of sensations. In Brentano, Ps 53/53042-53043 Hering is regarded as “a man who has gained merit to a high degree through investigations concerning physiological-psychological boundary questions [ein Mann, der sich durch Untersuchungen über physiologisch-psychologische Grenzfragen in hohem Grade verdient hat]”. In the discussion that follows this quotation Brentano shows his appreciation for the problematization of the concept of intensity in connection with sensations, especially visual ones, in Hering (1878), though Brentano ultimately finds this concept acceptable in such a connection, as discussed in “Brentano and Husserl on Imagination” in the present volume. Hering’s relation to Brentano as well as Stumpf is most certainly worthy of further examination, albeit beyond the scope of the present study. 3 Stumpf (1907b), p. 72 n. 2

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it is impossible to assess this difference in size in any kind of metric units, as such an assessment can be made in minute fractions of such units with regard to the corresponding physical objects. Phenomenal space, on this view, is accordingly in some way metric, albeit not exactly metric. Here, then, are some definite results regarding Stumpfian phenomenology, namely that it is, unlike the subject of geometry, neither obviously homogeneous nor precisely measurable (though not altogether inacessible to quantitative considerations). Now let us consider another example of a phenomenological result which can be found in Stumpf’s 1 work of 1873, namely that a color is always spatially extended. At first glance this result does not look stunning, but let us look into it a bit more thoroughly for the sake of illuminating Stumpf’s conception of phenomenology. Soon we shall see that results like the one just mentioned are more important than they seem at first glance. The law that a color must be extended is obviously not a causal law, for it does not tell us what events must precede what other events. It is a prime example of what Stumpf designates as a law of structure. A color and its extension are given together as parts of a unitary whole. One of these parts, namely the color-quality as such (however precisely it is described, e.g. as red, as bright red, and so forth), cannot be given without the other part, the extension. As we recall, laws of structure are laws concerning parts and wholes. The particular law in question is moreover obviously a strictly a priori law. In this light the question arises whether structural laws and hence the laws which concern phenomenology are all a priori. As it turns out, Stumpf says emphatically that phenomenology is not only concerned with a priori laws. At least one of the previously considered laws of phenomenal space, namely that it is not homogeneous, may be viewed as one which is not a priori. It may well be possible, after all, that space appears to certain entities through only one sense and is thereby homogeneous. It just happens that it does not appear to us in that way. Now let us look at the significance of the phenomenological result in On the Psychological Origin of Space-Presentation. As already mentioned, this was meant to be a work in psychology. Though it is doubtful that Stumpf had conceived of phenomenology in this early work, 1

Stumpf (1873), pp. 112 f.

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there is no reason to think that he ever came to regard it as anything else but a work in psychology. In 1907 we are moreover told, as already mentioned, that phenomenology has primarily been the concern of physiologists and psychologists. Hence, it should not surprise us to find a phenomenological law stated in a psychological investigation. Moreover, if we consider the context in which Stumpf states this law, we see why it has its place there. For in this work he is defending a nativist theory of space-presentation, according to which the presentation of space does not require local signs for the sake of localizing sensory impressions, such as 1 might be conveyed through eye-motion and posited by Lotze. It is accordingly necessary to acknowledge the inherent spatiality of certain phenomena in order to block off superfulous psychological investigations, however ingenious the investigator may be. Moreover, the law that colors are extended and similar laws regarding 2 dependent parts are of considerable interest to metaphysics. For two thousand years metaphysicians were for the most part comfortable with speaking of substances on the one hand and of the attributes (or accidents) which inhere in them. Even John Locke, the father of modern empiricism, was willing to go on speaking in these terms. When David Hume however came along and insisted that there was no impression from which our ideas 3 of inhesion of attributes in a substance could originate, the old metaphysics was destabilized. While Kant decided not to throw out the concept of substances and their attributes, he retained it only at the expense of regarding it as a category in his peculiar sense, i.e. a concept which is applied to experience, though not derived from experience and not applicable to anything beyond experience. By identifying certain parts of a whole, e.g. the extension of a color, as attributes and finding this partwhole relation in experience, namely in phenomena, Stumpf provides us with an empiricist defense of the old metaphysics. The extension of a color and the volume of a sound as well as its pitch and timbre are examples of attributes which belong to certain substances. To be sure, when a physical 1

Lotze (1852), pp. 324-452. For a recently published discussion of the theory of local signs, see Rollinger (2001). 2 See Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 22-30. 3 A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Section IV, Section 3.

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thing, such as a table or a chair, is regarded as a substance in which certain attributes inhere, one is going beyond the phenomena. Nonetheless, Stumpf says that one is thereby doing this by way of analogy from concepts which have their origin in experience and not altogether without any empirical foundation. Here we must be careful, however, not to overestimate Stumpf’s views regarding the metaphysical significance of phenomenology, for descriptive-psychology investigations (the other and more prominent side of Austrian phenomenology) also play a very important role here. It is commonplace knowledge that among the old metaphysical concepts under seige by Humean empricism is the concept of causation. Like Brentano, Stumpf maintains that causal relations can be inwardly perceived, e.g. in the case of motivation, but also wherever a judgment is seen to follow 1 from another one. While an inference in the logical sense, which is, after all, concerned with the contents of judgment and not with the acts of judgment, is certainly not regarded by Stumpf as a causal relation, it is nonetheless possible on his view to perceive such a relation among the acts of judgment when an inference is made. Hence, an empirical origin of the concept of causation which had gone unnoticed by Hume is identified by both Brentano and Stumpf. While this move may further free metaphysics from the suspicions it suffers from Humean empiricism and thereby prevent Kantian theories of causation from arising, it is nonetheless 2 descriptive psychology which is at work here. Here we may be reminded that Stumpf denies that causal relations occur among the phenomena. From this it follows that any extension of this concept into the realms of natural science or metaphysics is to be receive its empiricist justification from descriptive psychology and not from phenomenology.

1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 43-46. Here I must disagree with the view that this is an instance of Stumpfian phenomenology at work, as this is found in Spiegelberg (1982), p. 59.

2

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4. Conclusion Let us now sum up this discussion of phenomena and phenomenology as understood by Stumpf. A phenomenon is characterized by him as a content of sensation or a corresponding content of imagination or memory. These contents are distinct from the mind-functions in which they are given. They may or may not be objects, depending on whether they are conceptualized or not. Insofar as they are immediately given, they are real. Phenomenology is characterized as the discipline which investigates phenomena. Together with certain other disciplines, namely eidology and theory of relations, it is a pre-science, i.e. concerned with the material from which both the sciences of nature and those of mind must start. The laws of phenomenology are moreover laws of structure rather than laws of causation. Some of these laws of structure are a priori, while others are empirical. In some cases the laws of phenomenology can be of use to other sciences, such as those of nature or mind, and even to metaphysics, as can be seen in the phenomenological defense of the concept of substance. Nevertheless, descriptive psychology also makes an important contribution to metaphysics from an empirical standpoint. As a discipline concerned with phenomena in the above sense, neither with a method of its own nor to be the practice of specialists with a university department of their own, Stumpfian phenomenology may at first glance look like a rather humble endeavor, especially when compared with the transcendental heights and depths which Husserl allegedly reached through the application of his peculiar method. Nonetheless, Stumpf’s suggestion that metaphysical concepts can be revived through phenomenology turns out to be a rather ambitious one. Moreover, even though phenomenology on his view is to be interspersed among various disciplines, this does not preclude the possibility of a phenomenological textbook, which could have a chapter on color, one on sound, and so forth. Especially for philosophers with an empiricist orientation such a textbook would be of considerable interest. Perhaps more than one metaphysical concept could find a phenomenological defense therein. If we only consider some of the elaborate, yet unfulfilled programs which philosophers have proposed, Stumpfian phenomenology could turn out to 155

be an area which allows for solid work to be done and therefore of some value to the future of philosophy.

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BRENTANO AND MEINONG

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1. Introduction When Brentano arrived in Vienna in 1874 to take the position of professor in philosophy, Meinong had already finished his studies in history with a doctorate from the same university. It was nonetheless philosophy that attracted the young Meinong. Thus he sought guidance from the new professor who had already been extremely influential as a 2 teacher in Würzburg. Meinong immediately began attending Brentano’s 3 lectures and seminars. The two also took long walks together, immersed 4 in “scientific discussions”. It was moreover Brentano’s suggestion that Meinong should write a “habiltation thesis” on Hume, which was published in 1877 as Hume Studies I. This fact is significant not only because it illustrates how important Hume and British empiricism in general were in the school of Brentano or because Meinong’s occupation with Hume resulted in a second contribution in 1882, namely Hume 5 Studies II, which was the basis for the object theory that he was to 6 develop later more fully, but also because Brentano may have had his 7 eye on Meinong as a potential historian of philosophy for his school. After Meinong had joined the philosophical faculty in Vienna, he and 8 Brentano were colleagues. Though Brentano continued to exert 1

This essay is a revised version of a paper that was originally published under the title “Meinong and Brentano” in Meinong Studies 1 (2005), pp. 159-197. 2 Stumpf (1919). 3 See Rollinger (1999), pp. 155 f. 4 Dölling (1994), p. 30. 5 For a discussion of both of Meinong (1877) and Meinong (1882) and their connections with British empiricism, see Rollinger (1993b), pp. 34-64. 6 Meinong (1907), p. 3. 7 In much the same way Anton Marty became the Brentanian philosopher of language and Edmund Husserl was to become the Brentanian philosopher of mathematics, though the latter eventually took a very different direction. 8 In 1880 Brentano got married and for this reason could not, as an ex-priest, keep

considerable influence on students, Meinong’s influence as a teacher in 1 Vienna was in some cases, e.g. in those of Christian von Ehrenfels and 2 Alois Höfler, equal or even greater. In 1882 Meinong left Vienna for Graz, where he took the position of professor extraordinarius. In 1889 he was promoted to the position of professor ordinarius and was thereby enabled to have considerable impact, especially in the establishment of the first psychological laboratory in Austria in 1894. In this regard he achieved something that Brentano, in spite of his persuasive talent, was unable to do in Vienna. By the early twentieth century there was indeed a “Graz School”, of which Meinong was the leader. Though Meinong thus founded a school in a stricter sense than Brentano or any of the other Brentanists had done, he nonetheless remained remarkably open to the accomplishments and innovations of both his male and female students and stands in contrast in this regard to other Austrian philosophers, such as Husserl and Brentano 3 himself. The psychology and “object theory” that were advocated in this school competed with the most prominent psychological and philosophical movements in Germany and Austria, including the school of Wilhelm Wundt, Neo-Kantianism, the school of Würzburg (under the direction of Oswald Külpe), phenomenology (as primarily represented by Husserl), and orthodox Brentanism, the most outstanding academic representative of which was Anton Marty in Prague together with his circle of students, including Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kastil. It is moreover a well known fact that Meinong received considerable attention in the English speaking world during his lifetime. Though his influence and originality could hardly be doubted, he found it vexing that he was often identified 4 as little more than a student of Brentano.

his professorship. Thus he took the position of Privatdozent and was an academic equal of Meinong in Vienna. 1 See von Ehrenfels, (ed.) Fabian (1990), pp. 426–429, and Zimmer (2001). 2 See Blackmore (2001). 3 See Simons (2004), pp. 20 f. In the preface of Meinong (1902), p. vii, Meinong gives credit to Mila Radakoviç for being the one who first drew his attention to assumptions. The book is also dedicated to her. 4 See Meinong (1902), pp. xi ff.

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While other Brentanists – even Husserl, whose Logical Investigations 1 were regarded by Brentano as highly objectionable – maintained contact with their mentor on some level of cordiality, Meinong and Brentano lost contact with each other after the student had conspicuously begun to develop his own philosophical views. Moreover, Meinong was convinced, apparently with justification, that Brentano discouraged others 2 from referring to him in their writings. Shortly before Meinong died, however, he wrote the following about Brentano: “... before the inner eye of my memory, there stands once again, as a treasure I shall never lose, my admired teacher, a figure of spiritual beauty, bathed in the golden 3 sunshine of the summer of his own and my youth”. The conciliatory nature of these words is most appropriate particularly when one considers that, in spite of all the points of divergence to be considered here, there is a highly significant undercurrent of affinity between Brentano and Meinong which established itself at the outset of the latter’s philosophical career and endured to the end. This affinity will be emphasized in the closing section, after the points of divergence are discussed.

2. Points of Divergence The matters under consideration in this section are in many cases ones that involve extremely complex arguments on both sides, especially in those cases where others have entered into the discussion on either Brentano’s or Meinong’s behalf. Accordingly, a full-length study of such arguments would require at least an entire monograph. Here, however, a sketch of the issues which divided Brentano and Meinong should suffice. Especially the attempts of others to defend the position of either Brentano or Meinong cannot be examined in detail, but only mentioned in passing.

1

See Rollinger (1999), pp. 13–67. See also Rollinger (2004a). For this reason Meinong was displeased by the fact that in Husserl (1891) Meinongian influences can be found without reference to the relevant writings. See Ierna (2005) and Ierna (2006). 3 As translated in Grossmann (1974), p. 231. 2

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2.1. Theory of Relations In Hume Studies I Meinong defended the attention theory of abstraction, 1 as he continued to do for some decades to come. While this theory is one that Meinong had in common with Stumpf and indeed was by no means unusual during the nineteenth century, in Hume Studies II Meinong began to strike out on a path that was much more original. Though this work was by no means left unappreciated by other students of Brentano, most notably by Husserl, Brentano himself found it to be highly objectionable in many respects. This is indicated in his unpublished manuscripts, especially one of eight pages devoted to the theory of relations that was 2 stated in Hume Studies II. First of all, Brentano does not accept Meinong’s view that relations (at least in some cases) come about through an act of comparing the related 3 contents and that there are consequently only subjective relations. According to Brentano, this is simply a confusion between presentations of relations on the one hand and the relations themselves. That is to say, as far as Brentano is concerned, what results from comparing two contents (or objects), A and B, is only the presentation of certain relations between A and B (e.g. similarity). Thus he allows for the relation to exist before it is presented. Among the relations which Meinong comes to acknowledge as one that is not in any way the result of comparison is causality. Nonetheless, 4 Brentano finds difficulties in Meinong’s views on causal relations. Most importantly, it was Brentano’s view that our concept of causality and 5 other closely related concepts are derived from inner perception, as 1

See Meinong (1900), as translated as Appendix II in Rollinger (1993b), pp. 137-182. The manuscript in question is Brentano, M 33. Unfortunately, no date is indicated in this manuscript, though it was most likely written shortly after Meinong (1882) appeared. 3 Brentano M 33/30288. See Meinong (1877), p. 44. The inspiration behind this view that Meinong espouses is in fact Hermann Lotze. 4 Brentano M 33/30293. 5 Brentano (1889), p. 51; Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1968), p. 13. 2

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1

Locke had maintained. Meinong, however, was more Humean in this regard in that he maintained that such relations were altogether 2 imperceivable. To be sure, in his later writings Meinong did not fully succumb to Humean scepticism concerning causality, for he did attempt 3 to prove the universal law of causality. Such an attempt, however, does not amount to a concession that instances of causality can actually be experienced. Another relation that Meinong discusses in Hume Studies II is that of compatibility (Verträglichkeit) as well as its opposite, incompatibility (Unverträglichkeit). According to Brentano, Meinong encounters a grave difficulty when he asserts that the presentations of incompatible contents are themselves incompatible, for Meinong also makes it a condition for incompatibity that the presentation is not merely “indicated” (angezeigt), 4 but “executed” (ausgeführt). Here it may be said that the execution of a presentation for Meinong is the same as intuition, as exemplified in perception and imagination. If the incompatibility of two contents must actually be intuited, it may not at the same time be laid down that the presentations of these contents are themselves incompatible and therefore impossible in unison. The distinction between indicated and executed presentations is for Meinong more or less the same as that between indirect and direct presentations. On his view, something is indirectly presented when it is determined strictly in its relation to something else, such as the presentation of a color as “chestnut brown”. To execute or carry out a presentation for Meinong is thus to make the transition from indirectly presenting something to directly presenting it. Brentano saw Meinong’s concept of indirect presentation as an attempt to elaborate on his own notion of 1

Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, II.xxi.4: “… Bodies, by our Senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an Idea of active Power, as we have from reflection on the Operation of our Mind”. 2 Meinong (1882), p. 117; Meinong (1918), p. 11. Closer to Brentano in this connection was Stumpf, though other aspects of the theory of causality in Stumpf (1939/40) diverge from Brentano’s. See Rollinger (2001b). 3 It would take us too far afield to discuss the details of this proof as this is found in Meinong (1918). 4 Brentano M 33/30292. See Meinong (1882), pp. 98 f.

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improper or symbolic presentation. In his 1884/85 lecture, entitled Selected Questions of Psychology and Aesthetics, Brentano says that this attempt on Meinong’s part is a misunderstanding. “‘Indirect’ seeing, beyond the focus of attention, presenting in obliquo, inclusive presenting, 1 etc. are not the same as improper presenting”. Though Brentano is of course correct in pointing out that “indirect” could easily be understood in more than one way, this criticism leaves something to be desired. It remains to be seen why improper presentations cannot be characterized as indirect ones in the Meinongian sense, which are certainly distinct from 2 indirect seeing or being outside the focus of one’s attention. Aside from compatibility, incompatibility, and causality, identity is yet another relation that Meinong explicity distinguishes from relations of comparison. In order to establish identity it is, according to him, 3 necessary to engage in activities which come into play through memory. 4 While Brentano expresses alarm at this treatment of identity, he is more explicit in his rejection of Meinong’s appeal to this concept in the discussion of relations between wholes and parts. On Meinong’s view, one object (A) is part of another (B) when A is identitcal with something 5 that is in B, but not identical with B. Brentano maintains that Meinong thereby fails to illuminate the whole-part relation, for the mention of A being in B actually “says everything” without applying the concept of 6 identity at all. Thus we see that Meinong’s first great original work was subject to considerable criticism from his mentor. The manuscript that Brentano wrote on this work is in fact scattered with doubts concerning Meinong’s early treatment of relations, though these doubts are often only indicated 1

Brentano, Ps 78, typescript)/B19908: ”‘Indirektes’ Sehen, außer dem Blickpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit, Vorstellen in obliquo, einschließliches Vorstellen u.dgl. sind nicht dasselbe mit uneigentlichen Vorstellen”. 2 It is somewhat more difficult to assess the relationship between indirectly presenting and in obliquo presenting. 3 Meinong (1886), p. 57. 4 Brentano M 33/30288. 5 Meinong (1882), pp. 144 f. 6 Brentano M 33/30295.

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by exclamation marks. For our purposes here, however, the above remarks will suffice.

2.2. Intensity 1

Among Meinong’s early works was a pair of articles on sensations, 2 followed up by another one on imagination, in which he put forward the thesis that sensation and imagination differ from each other in terms of intensity of the respective acts of consciousness. The act of sensing (Empfinden), according to Meinong, is thus more intense than the act of imagining (Vorstellen in the narrower sense), while he at the same allows for the intensity of the content to remain the same as that of the act varies. As is known from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, however, Brentano found it acceptable distinguish presentations (including sensations) only in terms of their content and never in terms of the mode of the act. In his lectures on psychology he continued to defend this thesis and explicitly refers to Meinong as someone who fails to accept it.

2.3. Immediate Evidence of Surmise In 1886 Meinong published On the Epistemological Evaluation of 3 Memory, which was to drive yet another wedge between him and Brentano. The point of contention here is whether there is such a thing as immediate evidence of surmise (unmittelbare Vermutungsevidenz). Meinong argued in the article on memory that there is indeed such evidence. Brentano vehemently contended in opposition to Meinong that there is not. Before we elaborate on Meinong’s position on this matter

1

Meinong (1888a) and Meinong (1889). Meinong (1888b). 3 Meinong (1886). 2

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and Brentano’s opposition to it, let us consider what Brentano’s view of evidence was. According to Brentano, there is a distinction to be drawn between two types of judgments: the blind and the evident. Evidence is for him thus a 1 property that belongs to some judgments, though certainly not to all. 2 Moreover, he maintains, “Every cognition is immediate or mediate”. While the evidence of our judgments that are made through inference from immediately evident ones is mediate, there are cases in which no such inference is made and yet the judgment in question is evident. In such cases the evidence is immediate. Furthermore, Brentano maintains that there are two classes of immediate evidence. One of these classes consists of our inner perceptions. In this case the judgments in question are factual and affirmative. The other class consists of judgments in which axiomatic truths are given. The relevant judgments in this case are conceptual rather than factual, and they are negative rather than 3 affirmative. Whether or not axiomatic judgments are fallible or not, it is clear that Brentano thinks that the other instances of immediate evidence involves 4 infallibility. If, for instance, the judgment under consideration is my perception of a feeling that I now have, this cannot be erroneous. While Meinong did not raise any doubts about the infallibility of inner 1

Brentano (1889), p. 79. Brentano, EL 38/10345: “Jede Erkenntnis ist unmittelbar oder mittelbar”. The term “cognition” (Erkenntnis) here is used to indicate “a simple or a complex evident judgment (or a multiplicity of them), which is made with conviction [ein einfaches oder zusammengesetztes Urteil (oder eine Vielheit von ihnen), welches mit Überzeugung gefällt wird]” (EL 38/10352). Brentano’s logic in EL 72 and especially EL 80 was developed in order to provide a means of testing both immediate and mediate evidence of a judgment, contrary to those conceptions of logic which were restricted to the art of inference. Metaphysically speaking, however, Brentano holds the view, as put forward in EL 38 and other manuscripts, that immediate truths are in some cases mediately known and mediate ones are immediately known. This view is developed from the Aristotelian distinction between what is evident in itself and what is evident to us. 3 All universal judgments, according to Brentano, are negative. See the subsection below on judgment. 4 Brentano (1874), pp. 118 ff. 2

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perception in his 1886 article on memory, he did call into question the view that all immediate evidence that is factual and affirmative is also infallible. A surmise (Vermutung) is a judgment that is not fully certain. A memory, according to Meinong, is a surmise and as such lacks the infallibility that Brentano attributes to inner perception. Yet, a memory is not merely a judgment devoid of evidence. Nor does this evidence, on Meinong’s view, lie in an inference from immediate judgment. A memory is, to be sure, based on an earlier experience or perception, but it is certainly not inferred from this earlier experience or perception. Accordingly, Meinong sees no other option but to conclude that the evidence of memories is immediate evidence of surmise. In a letter of 15 February 1886 to Meinong Brentano expresses his misgivings about ascribing immediate evidence of surmise to memory as follows: I certainly do not ignore the fact that the justification of our trust in memory has its special difficulties. I have thought about it much, but I don’t recall ever having discussed the question in detail in a lecture. The history of philosophy shows that man has a tendency in such cases to assume a special mode of cognition in order to cut the knot he cannot untie with the given means. In this way Reid arrived at common sense and Kant at his synthetic a priori. You will be convinced with me that everyone must say of himself nil humani a me alienum puto, and you will not take it as mean-spirited when my initial view (for certainly I shall take a more careful look) is that something similar has 1 happened to you.

Though Brentano expresses his disagreement here in a rather friendly manner, the association of Meinong with Reid and Kant is a grave 2 criticism from Brentano’s perspective. Moreover, he later conveys his rejection of the Meinongian concept of immediate evidence of surmise 1

Kindinger (ed.) (1965), p. 23. Brentano (1889), p. 84. Cf. Brentano (1930), p. 69. See Textor (2004). Brentano also says that “lectures of mine from the time when I still regarded degrees of conviction as intensities of judgment seem to have given rise to such errors [as Meinong’s theory of immediate evidence of surmise]” (Brentano (1962), p. 69). This remark is apparently related to the criticism of Meinong (1890) expressed in Brentano, (eds.) Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrand (1970), p. 251. 2

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with an apparent willingness to embrace scepticism with regard to 1 memory.

2.4. Feeling and Desire According to Brentano, mind functions are to be divided into three basic 2 classes: presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. Brentano did 3 not see feelings and volitions as belonging to two distinct classes. Rather, he maintained that they both belong to the third class, namely acts of love and hate. One of Meinong’s earliest philosophical developments, however, was his rejection of this point and the affirmation of the view 4 that feelings and volitions do in fact make up two distinct classes. Meinong developed his early value theory precisely under the 5 presupposition that there is a distinction between two classes. Interestingly his ethics puts the weight on the class of feeling, whereas von Ehrenfels, who also adopted the same distinction and applied it in 6 value theory, puts the weight on volition, more particularly on desire. There will be more about value theory below.

1

See Brentano, (ed.) Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrand (1970), pp. 167 f., 176 f.; Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1968), pp. 4 f. 2 Brentano (1874), pp. 256–265. 3 Brentano (1874), pp. 306–311. 4 This distinction can be found in Meinong (1888a), pp. 479 ff. It had already been treated at length, however, in Ehrenfels (1887). It should of course be remembered that von Ehrenfels had attended Meinong’s lectures on value theory by the time he wrote this article. 5 Meinong (1894a). 6 Urban (1909), pp. 35 ff. See also Schuhmann (2001).

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2.5. Content and Object In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano used the terms 1 “content” and “object” interchangeably. Though he later came to characterize intentional reference (intentionale Beziehung) in a different 2 way, Meinong had certainly learned from Brentano that every mental phenomenon has an object in the sense that it somehow “contains” this object (the so-called “immanent object” in contrast with the “real object”) and for more than two decades spoke of objects as if they were contents. In 1899, however, Meinong published On Objects of Higher Order and their Relation to Inner Perception, in which he opens his discussion with 3 a distinction between content and object. Very briefly, the content is that part of the act whereby it refers to this or that object, whereas the object itself need not at all be part of the act. While the content is in all cases something real and mental, the object can be physical or even something that has no place at all in reality. Though Brentano had made a distinction between the content and object of a presentation as well as a distinction between the content and object of a judgment (as is clear from his lectures on logic), Meinong was apparently moved to make his contentobject distinction by Twardowski.

2.6. Judgments 4

It was Brentano’s view that all judgments are existential. Those judgments which have traditionally been regarded as predicative, e.g. “All men are mortal”, can be expressed more accurately as judgments about the existence or non-existence of their subject, e.g. “There are no 1

Brentano (1874), pp. 115 f. Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1971), pp. 133–138. 3 Meinong (1899), pp. 185 ff. A similar distinction had already been made in Höfler and Meinong (1890), p. 7, and again in Twardowski (1894). 4 Brentano (1874), pp. 283–289. 2

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men who are not mortal” or “No men who are not mortal exist”. As all universal judgments are thus conceived of as negative existential ones, particular judgments are conceived of as affirmative existential ones, e.g. “Some men are mortal” as “There is a man which is mortal”. Meinong, however, maintained that a distinction is to be made between existential and relational judgments. This distinction is to be found in the 1 logic textbook that Alois Höfler wrote in collaboration with Meinong. The disagreement here is of great importance, for Brentano had proposed a reform in logic that was based on his thesis that all judgments are 2 concerned with existence or non-existence. Meinong’s advancement of an opposing theory of judgment in a widely used logic textbook was not merely an instance of a student going his own way, but an action that 3 thwarted one of Brentano’s greatest ambitions. Moreover, the Meinongian theory of judgment was having impact within Brentano’s own circle, as this can be seen from the lectures that Twardowski held in 4 Vienna (1894/95) on logic. In these lectures relational judgments are distinguished from existential ones, just as this had been done in the logic textbook of Höfler and Meinong. It is accordingly understandable why this textbook received disapproval on Brentano’s behalf from Marty, 5 aptly described as “one of the most stubborn opponents of Meinong”. Marty’s sharp disapproval was not the only reaction on Brentano’s behalf to Meinong’s alternative theory of judgment and concomitant logic. In 1891 Brentano’s reform of logic was presented by one of his students, Franz Hillebrand, in The New Theories of Categorical 6 1 Inferences, a small book which Meinong himself reviewed. Since this 1

Höfler and Meinong (1890), pp. 103 ff. See Rollinger (2004b), pp. 270 ff. In Brentano (1874), pp. 302–305, a brief indication of this reform is to be found. This was first met with criticism from outside of the school of Brentano in Land (1876a) and Land (1876b). 3 Brentano met with further disappointment in Husserl’s approach to logic, which was very heavily influenced by Bernard Bolzano. See Rollinger (2003). See “Husserl’s Elementary Logic” in the present volume. 4 Betti and van der Schaar (2004). 5 Dölling (1994), p. 27. 6 Hillebrand (1891). Hillebrand’s notes from lectures of Brentano on logic were utilized in Brentano (1956), though mixed in with Brentano’s own notes. Concerning 2

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book was no doubt written as a reaction to the logic textbook of Höfler and Meinong, and particularly since Hillebrand most likely wrote his logic book under the supervision of Brentano, Meinong’s review of it was an indirect confrontation with his mentor. From what has already been said, it is no surprise that Meinong’s review of Hillebrand’s was by no means a positive one, particularly regarding the theory of judgment, which was central in Hillebrand’s exposition of Brentanian logic. If we look at later developments of Meinong’s theory of judgment, his principle of independence (Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit), first suggested 2 to him by one of his students, namely Ernst Mally, is also relevant here. According to this principle, being-thus (Sosein) can obtain independently of being (Sein) or, in terms of the theory of judgment, a predicative judgment, e.g. “The golden mountain is golden”, can be true without requiring the existence of the subject. Here again, Meinong contradicts Brentano’s theory of judgment. Moreover, this principle is crucial to Meinong’s object theory, which is plainly at odds with Brentano’s later ontology and will be further discussed below.

2.7. Presentations Thus far we have considered Meinong’s divergence from Brentano regarding two of the main classes of mind-functions according to the Brentanian schema, namely judgments and acts of love and hate. Yet to be considered is Meinong’s viewpoint with respect to presentations (Vorstellungen), which Brentano held to be the most fundamental class of 3 mind-functions. In the occurrence of any other mind-functions, according to Brentano, there must be a presentation on which this is founded. Thus one cannot judge unless one presents what one accepts or rejects in the judgment. Nor can one love or hate unless one presents what one loves or hates. Meinong comes to the view that presentations Brentano (1956), see Simons (2004), p. 48. 1 Meinong (1892). 2 Meinong (1904), pp. 7 ff. 3 Brentano (1874), pp. 104–111.

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only actually have objects when other acts are founded on them and that 1 otherwise their reference to objects is merely potential. Not only this aspect of Meinong’s theory of presentations diverges from Brentano’s, but also developments in Meinong’s views on assumptions and emotions as well as inner perceptions culminated in the conclusion that not every 2 mind-function requires a presentation as its foundation. 2.8. Time-Consciousness Though Brentano put forward different theories of time-consciousness 3 during different phases of his philosophical development, the one that he favored in his years in Vienna and thus the one that Meinong was taught was the doctrine of “original association”. According to this doctrine, changes and other temporally extended objects (e.g. melodies) are not perceived, but are presented by means of both perception and 4 imagination. On this view a melody, for instance, is presented insofar as the content of perception at each moment is “originally associated” with 5 what has preceded it, as the latter is presented in imagination. Though in 1894 Meinong offered a theory that is very similar to the 6 7 doctrine of original association, he returned to the same topic in 1899, only to advocate a theory that calls into question Brentano’s thesis that only the present can be perceived. The present is indeed only an ideal limit for Meinong. The perception of the present therefore becomes an ideal that can only be approached and never fully realized, whereas any concrete perception must to some extent encompass the past within its object. If we bear in mind that for Meinong memory has immediate evidence of surmise, it is no wonder that he also ascribes this type of 1

Meinong (1910), pp. 285 f. Meinong (1912), pp. 10 ff. In this connection Meinong introduces the notion of Präsentation which is further elaborated on in Meinong (1916). 3 See Kraus (1930). See also Huemer (2002/2003). 4 See Rollinger (1999), pp. 29 f. 5 See “Brentano and Husserl on Imagination” in the present volume. 6 Meinong (1894b), pp. 435–444. 7 Meinong (1899), pp. 243–266. 2

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evidence to perception, even to inner perception. In this regard Meinong cannot accept the Brentanian theory of the infallibility of inner perception, without of course retracting the view that inner perception has 2 immediate evidence.

2.9. Assumptions As we have seen, Meinong challenged the Brentanian division of mental phenomena in various ways. In On Assumptions, first published in 1902 and extensively revised for a second edition in 1910, Meinong posed the greatest challenge of all to this division by making room for a whole new class of such phenomena. This class is one that he found situated “between” the class of presentations and that of judgments and consists of assumptions (Annahmen), which are like judgments insofar as they are either affirmative or negative and like presentations insofar as they are 3 devoid of conviction. If, for example, one hears or reads a statement with understanding and does not believe what is thereby said, the mindfunction in question is an assumption. There are, however, other instances in which Meinong speaks of assumptions. Sometimes something is 4 assumed, for example, in order to see what consequences follow from it. 5 Also, playing and art involve assumptions. Though Meinong’s theory of assumptions resonated among some of his non-Brentanian contemporaries, such as James Baldwin and Wilbur 6 Urban, it was not at all well received in the school of Brentano. Husserl, to be sure, was willing to concede that some of the phenomena that 1

Meinong (1906a), pp. 64–75. A response on Brentano’s behalf to Meinong’s theory of inner perception can be found in Bergmann (1908), pp. 73–82. Bergmann, however, was not working directly under Brentano’s supervision as Hillebrand was. Marty, to whom Bergmann (1908) is dedicated, was the key figure behind this work. 3 Meinong (1910), pp. 1 ff. 4 Meinong (1910), pp. 191 ff. 5 Meinong (1910), pp. 110–116. 6 Meinong (1910), pp. xii f. 2

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Meinong classifies as assumptions are propositional in nature and also devoid of conviction. Such “mere presentations”, however, had already been explored to some extent in his Logical Investigations and earlier 1 unpublished writings. In his Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (1913) Husserl even bluntly says that On Assumptions in fact did not make any progress at all in terms of substance or method beyond the Logical Investigations, though it is the 2 first edition of On Assumptions that he cites in this regard. Yet, of greater interest to us here is the fact that Meinong’s theory of assumptions was 3 vehemently rejected by Marty. Marty upholds the Brentanian view that there are three distinct classes of mind-functions and makes use of this classification in order to 4 distinguish the “autosemantic” expressions from the “synsemantic” ones. He thus sees no room for a new class of such phenomena situated “between” presentations and judgments. The very notion of one class being between two others is unacceptable to Marty. Moreover, he argues that Meinong’s view of assumptions breaks the rules of classification, whether assumptions are conceived of as a genus that shares affirmation and negation with another species, i.e. judgments, or they are conceived as a species that belongs to the same genus, i.e. thinking, to which judgments also belong. The alleged examples of assumptions, according 1

See Rollinger (1999), pp. 186–199. In Rollinger (1999), Appendix One (pp. 251– 284) there is an English translation of one of Husserl’s early attempts to work out a theory of assumptions. Husserl sent this manuscript together with another one, now published as Text Nr. 1 in Hua XXXX, to Meinong in 1902, but Meinong sent these manuscripts back due to Husserl’s apparent hyper-anxiety about plagiarism. See the exchange between Meinong and Husserl in Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) I, pp. 139–147. 2 Hua III/1, p. 254 n. Cf. Meinong (1915), pp. xix f. Husserl’s copy of Meinong (1902) is heavily marked and annotated, whereas his copy of Meinong (1910) shows almost no signs of being touched. Both copies are to be found in the HusserlArchives, Leuven. 3 See Marty (1905). See also “Marty on Linguistic Expressions and Mind-Functions” in the present volume. The rejection of Meinongian assumptions is also expressed in Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1971), p. 149. 4 Marty’s final project, only the first volume of which appeared as Marty (1908), was meant to develop this Brentanian philosophy of language in great detail. See “Marty on Linguistic Expressions and Mind Functions”.

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to Marty, could easily be seen as instances of presentations or judgments, depending of course on the particular case. Needless to say, Meinong found none of Marty’s arguments against the theory of assumptions convincing, as is evident from the article Meinong published in response 1 to Marty. Meinong thought that the identification of assumptions as distinct from other mind-functions, especially judgments and presentations, was simply a matter of sound empirical investigation. If the results of such an empirical approach broke any rules of classification, so much the worse for these rules. 2.10. Object Theory In Vienna Brentano went through a phase in which non-real objects, socalled irrealia, became inceasingly central to his philosophical position 2 due to his conception of “immanent objects”. This went on until he began early in the twentieth century to formulate his celebrated reism, according to which we can only present real objects (or, more simply, things) and all our talk about states of affairs, propositions, possibilities, impossibilities, and other candidates of non-real objectivities belongs to 3 the realm of linguistic fiction. Like other students of Brentano, Meinong made his start with Brentano’s Viennese ontology, though he tended to go much farther into the jungle of irrealia than Marty, Stumpf, Twardowski, or Husserl. Accordingly Meinong (sometimes together with Husserl) becomes a target of criticism in Brentano’s attempt to formulate and 4 defend his later reism. 1

Meinong (1906b). Here I mean the “ontology of intentionality“ as this is described in Chrudzismski and Smith (2004), pp. 204–211. For a more elaborate treatment of this phase of Brentanian ontology, see Chrudzismski (2004), pp. 123–175. 3 The most thorough-going philosophical discussion of Meinong’s object theory in comparison with Brentano’s later ontology is to be found in Bergmann (1962). Bergmann’s concerns, however, are strictly limited to ontology and primarily of a systematic nature, whereas the present study is a historical one concerned with a much fuller range of issues. 4 Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1968), p. 29. 2

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In 1904 Meinong published his article On Object Theory in which he attempted to formulate his notion of a discipline that is concerned with objects purely as such, whether they be real or non-real, whether they exist or not. Again, in 1907 he defended this notion more elaborately in On Object Theory and its Place in the System of the Sciences against 1 certain critics. In this latter work he begins by giving us examples of objects which would be left “homeless” if there were no theory of objects in which they would receive the scientific attention they deserve. Here 2 3 Meinong gives the examples of objects of sensation, objectives, and 4 impossible objects as such objects in danger of being left without a home among the sciences. First of all, he regards the objects of sensation, such as colors and sounds, as belonging to the domain of a special branch of object theory, for there is much that can be said a priori of such objects and yet they have no place in natural science (which is concerned with light waves or particles, for example, rather than colors as such) and psychology (which is concerned with mental acts rather than their 5 objects). Secondly, Meinong identifies a class of objects as “objectives” and contrasts them with objects in the narrow sense (Objekte) or what can be called “objecta”. Objectives, on his view, are particularly conspicuous as the correlates of judgments and assumptions and are comparable to the 6 states of affairs (Sachverhalte) which Stumpf and Husserl had discussed. Finally, impossible objects, such as round squares, are to find their home in object theory. It is important to note very emphatically that impossible objects, as well as other non-existent ones, such as the golden mountain, 7 are never assigned a “subsistence” or indeed a being of any kind. What Meinong meant by “object” must thus be radically dissociated from the ordinary usage of the term. This is made especially clear in his posthumously published On Content and Object of 1908, where he says: 1

Meinong (1907). Meinong (1907), pp. 8–14. 3 Meinong (1907), pp. 14–20. 4 Meinong (1907), pp. 20–27. 5 See “Meinong on the Objects of Sensation” in the present volume. 6 Yet, Meinong prefers not to refer to objectives as “states of affairs”, as he explains in Meinong (1910), pp. 101 f. 7 Findlay (1963), pp. 42–50. 2

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Only in its very broadest sense can the word “object” satisfy the intentions underlying object theory. It is recommended that this sense be determined by the sphere of application of the word or by the extension of the concept “object” because starting from the meaning of the word closest at hand here, however close at hand it is, leads, according to experience, to a restriction of the realm of application which cannot be brought into harmony with those intentions. Let us thus at first remember that already in everyday life there is talk, for example, of objects of “furnishing” or objects of “use”. It will of course presumably always be things which one calls “objects” in this sense; mere properties, such as color or shape, will not easily be counted among objects. And though one may, on the other hand, regard a tree, a church tower, or a hill as an object, this will no longer go for a golden mountain or a perptuum mobile insofar as these are not in reality. For us the consideration of the thing-character or existence is not to be the standard. But [there is] also no other restrictive consideration: a constitution of state and a church community, happiness and fatality, a boundary and infinity, wooden iron, and absolute relativism, being and becoming, something and nothing are also objects, and even “something that is not an object” will ultimately in fact also have to be an 1 object, albeit one to which an intrinsic contradiction adheres by its nature.

What became particularly objectionable to Brentano was not the disregard of existence in the formulation of the concept of an object, but rather the disregard of the “thing-character”. In this respect his rejection of Meinongian object theory was very different from those put forward 2 3 4 by Husserl, Stumpf, Russell, and a host of others whose rejection thereof had more to do with the doubts concerning the concept of a nonexistent object. It is indeed for good reasons that the notion of non-existent objects is not the focus of Brentano’s attack against Meinong’s object theory, for Brentano is apparently left with this notion in his view of sensory things. In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint he had maintained that physical phenomena, e.g. colors and sounds, exist phenomenally, but not 1

Meinong, (eds.) Fabian and Haller (1978), p. 147. Rollinger (1999), pp. 200–206. 3 Stumpf (1907b), pp. 40 ff.; Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 184 f. 4 Russell, (ed.) Marsh (1956), pp. 41–56. This is no doubt the most widely received critique of Meinong’s object theory. For an excellent defence of Meinong against Russell’s attack see Chisholm (1982), pp. 53–67. 2

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in reality. These phenomena, it must be stressed, are not sensations (Empfundungen). Sensations for Brentano are mind-functions which have physical phenomena as their contents. If, for instance, one sees a color, 2 the sensation is the act of seeing and the content or indeed the object is the color itself. While he later altered his way of referring to such phenomena, in order to accommodate his reism, by speaking, for instance, of something red (Rotes) instead of red or redness (Röte) or of 3 something extended (Ausgedehntes) instead of extension (Ausdehnung), he did not abandon his view that such things have only a phenomenal existence. To say that something exists phenomenally, however, only means that the thing in question appears. Accordingly Brentano thought that the objects of sensation as such do not exist at all. This of course does not involve the acceptance of their non-being as an additional object which itself has being. Such an acceptance, according to Brentano, would 4 involve an infinite regress. From Brentano’s viewpoint there is only one proper way in which something can be said to be. Meinong, by contrast, made a distinction between those objects which exist temporally and those which obtain in a 5 non-temporal way. While the objects of sensation, for example, have being in the former sense (“existence”), a non-temporal being (“subsistence”) is ascribed to various relations, complexes, objectives, and other objects of higher order. Just as Brentano was opposed to the concept of non-things, he was also opposed to the distinction between 6 these two types of being. His strategy for dealing with the verb “to be” is 1

Brentano (1874), pp. 120 ff. Brentano (1907), p. 5: “The matter of concern is green in the proper sense, in which it is grasped only as an object of our visual intuition, not as obtaining in reality”. This quotation is taken from a lecture that Brentano held in 1893 at a meeting of the Viennese Philosophical Association. 3 Brentano, (ed.) Mayer-Hillebrand (1966), p. 317. 4 Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1925), p. 160. 5 Meinong (1902), pp. 189. 6 Brentano, (ed.) Bergmann (1946/47), pp. 125 f. Brentano’s suggestion that Meinong’s distinction between “being” in two different senses stems from Bolzano, just like his inclination generally to ascribe heresies of his rebellious students to Bolzano is altogether without support. In Brentano, (ed.) Kastil (1978), p. 29, the 2

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rather to identify various meanings, which are either proper (eigentlich) 1 or improper (uneigentlich). The proper meaning of “to be”, according to Brentano, is to be found in the temporal mode of the present as this pertains to things, such as physical bodies as well as mental (i.e. presenting, hating, loving and hating) things, whereas he maintains that all the others, such as possibilities or impossibilities, are somehow derived from the proper one. This approach to the concept of being is of course related to the thesis that only a thing can be presented. It is nonetheless to be distinguished from that thesis. In sum, it can be said that Brentano rejects Meinong’s object theory for two reasons: 1) because it allows for objects of presentation which are not things, and 2) because it distinguishes between two types of being, whereas only things can be said to be in the strict and proper sense. Before closing this discussion of Meinong’s object theory and Brentano’s rejection thereof, two more points should be made. One of these is that for Brentano ontology belongs to metaphysics in the traditional sense, whereas this cannot be said of Meinong’s object theory. Brentano’s metaphysics indeed remains Aristotelian in the sense that it is concerned with being qua being (or what can as such be said to be), 2 identifies substance as what is as such, and even culminates in theistic distinction in question is again attributed to Bolzano, but this is historically inaccurate. Bolzano speaks of presentations in themselves (Vorstellungen an sich) and propositions in themselves (Sätze an sich) and maintains that these do not have existence. Yet, he does not say that they have another kind of being. See Bolzano (1837) I, p. 78. Of course, it is understandable why Brentano and others attribute this view to him, especially in view of Husserl’s assimilation of the Bolzanian notion of a proposition. 1 Here I speak of Brentano dealing with the verb “to be” rather than with being because what concerns him in this regard and indeed throughout his efforts to argue in favor of reism is first and foremost (though not exclusively) a type of linguistic analysis which has unfortunately been under-appreciated among analytic philosophers. The results of Brentano’s analysis of “to be”, moreover, will not allow for any sort of “ontological difference” between Being and beings such as the one that has gained notoriety through Heidegger‘s writings. 2 Brentano’s later concept of a substance is of course different from the Aristotelian one in important respects. On this point, see Smith (1994), pp. 61–82. There is indeed almost no aspect of Aristotelianism which Brentano adopts without somehow

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proofs. There is almost none of this in Meinong’s object theory or any other aspect of his philosophical orientation. Yet, Meinong also finds a place for metaphysics as distinct from object theory. While he characterizes object theory as the a priori discipline concerning objects as such, he maintains that metaphysics is concerned particularly with reality (Wirklichkeit), characterized in terms of temporality and 2 determinable a posteriori. The resulting notion of a metaphysics is certainly comparable to others that can be found in the school of 3 Brentano. In this regard Meinong welcomes Stumpf’s notion of 4 “experiential metaphysics” (Erfahrungsmetaphysik) in particular. The remaining point concerns Brentano’s tendency to sweep aside Meinong’s object theory together with Husserl’s “pure logic”, as if they were essentially the same. This is not entirely justified. While Meinong and Husserl were well aware of their affinity in this regard, the fact that Husserl’s pure logic involves the Bolzanian notion of propositions in themselves (Sätze an sich), as bearers of truth and falsehood and as 5 distinct from states of affairs that make propositions true or false, stands in contrast with Meinong’s view of objectives as both truth bearers and 6 truth makers. As far as Meinong is concerned, a proposition is to be 7 understood as nothing else but a grammatical sentence. To be sure, besides Husserl’s pure logic in the sense of a theory of propositions and revising it. See George (2004). 1 Brentano, (ed.) Kastil (1929). The fact that Meinong shows little or no interest in theism indicates a fundamental difference in both philosophy and temperament. In this regard Meinong differs again from other students of Brentano, particularly Husserl, who had lectured on the existence of God in Halle and continued to have theological interests. 2 Meinong (1904), pp. 40 ff. 3 In Hua XVIII, p. 27. metaphysics is characterized as a discipline concerning reality without any consideration of ideal objects. Husserl was apparently under the influence of Hermann Lotze, either directly or via Stumpf (who had written his dissertation under Lotze), in his conception of metaphysics. See Lotze (1879), pp. 3 ff. 4 Meinong, (eds.) Fabian and Haller (1978), p. 142. See Stumpf (1907b), pp. 42 ff. 5 See Rollinger (2003). 6 Simons (1986), p. 103. 7 Meinong (1904), pp. 21 ff.

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the other “elements” of logic (i.e. concepts and inferences), there is also Husserl’s general theory of objects which runs parallel to elementary 1 logic and is equated with formal ontology. Meinong, however, has misgivings about Husserl’s distinction between the material and the formal and was not inclined to characterize his general theory of objects 2 as formal. Moreover, Husserl’s formal ontology lacks not only the above-mentioned principle of independence of being-thus from being, but also the closely related and more fundamental notion of Außersein as well. 2.11. Value Theory Though we have already touched on value theory, it must be stressed that Meinong insisted that his value theory “set out on a path that has nothing 3 at all in common with Brentano’s conception of related matters”. The differences are not only that Meinong distinguished between feeling and desire in his value theory and also that Brentano makes the notion of good rather than value thematic in his ethics, but also that Meinong’s early value theory is not objectivistic whereas Brentano’s is. According to Brentano, it is possible to distinguish between correct and incorrect love 4 or hate. There is no such distinction in Meinong’s early views on feeling and desire, which are thus subjectivistic in character. Though Meinong later developed a rather objectivistic value theory, this was done by introducing special classes of objects. For quite a few years Meinong was content to divide objects in the broadest sense conceivable into two distinct main classes: objecta and objectives. As he continued to develop his object theory, particularly in the domain of value theory, he arrived at a fourfold division: objecta, objectives, 1

Husserl (1984), p. 228. Meinong, (eds.) Fabian and Haller (1978), pp. 291 ff. 3 Kindinger (ed.) (1965), p. 141. The letter quoted in the text (dated 17 November 1899) is from Meinong to Max Heinze, the editor of Friedrich Überweg’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Meinong protests in general that in Heinze’s entry on him he is much too closely associated with Brentano and other Brentanists. 4 Brentano (1889), pp. 20 ff. 2

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dignitatives, and disideratives. He regards the latter two as the correlates of feeling and desire respectively. Thus, he set himself apart from Brentano not only by regarding feeling and desire as two basic classes of mental phenomena, but also by acknowledging two corresponding classes 2 of non-thinglike objects. In this regard it can be said that Brentano and Meinong moved in opposite ontological directions. While Meinong found it necessary to expand the number of classes of objects more and more, Brentano was compelled in the final phase of his philosophical development to narrow them down to a single class, the class of things or substances. Brentano found it necessary, to be sure, to distinguish between mental and physical things (though not in the Cartesian sense). However, he still maintained that both the mental and the physical belong to the class of things, whereas the highest genus “object” in the Meinongian sense encompasses qualities, properties, relations, possibilities, impossibilities, boundaries, and absolutely any thing or non-thing that one could dream of or not dream of, all of which can be subdivided into the four classes mentioned above. 2.12. Phenomena and Consciousness Though Meinong comfortably spoke the language of Brentano in his early writings, he came to develop his own peculiar and often difficult terminology, which may well have stood in the way of his reception. In his posthumously published glossary for logic and epistemology (1888– 3 1903) he takes issue with Brentano on various points, most notably regarding the terms “consciousness” (Bewusstsein) and “phenomenon” (Phänomen). Regarding consciousness, the only meaning that Meinong indicates is the Kantian “I think” and notes, “Brentano calls the mental facts themselves ‘consciousness’. Certainly [it is] a task of epistemology 4 to fight against such an unnatural conception”. The entry, however, is 1

Grossmann (1974), p. 225. See Meinong, (eds.) Haller and Fabian (1978), pp. 398 ff. 3 Meinong, (eds.) Haller and Fabian (1978), pp. 25–159. 4 Meinong, (eds.) Haller and Fabian (1978), p. 39. 2

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incomplete. It is therefore difficult to say why anything other than a terminological matter is at stake here. As regards phenomena, Meinong is again attached to a Kantian meaning and therefore sees the usage of the term justified only in cases where there is an opposition between phenomena and noumena, i.e. the appearances and that of which they are appearances. Concerning Brentano’s contrast between mental and physical phenomena Meinong notes that it “is for the main matter, the so1 called mental phenomena, unnatural and misleading”. All phenomena, according to Meinong, are actually mental, though one can speak of phenomena of the physical as well as of the mental.

3. Philosophical Affinity In spite of the disagreements between Brentano and Meinong, one must not lose sight of the fact that these arose from a context of very important agreements. The most important of these is their view that philosophy is to be scientific. In order to secure the scientific status of philosophy they were very much concerned with the rejection of scepticism. This is particularly evident in their respective attempts to come to grips with 2 Hume on the issues of induction, probability, and the already-mentioned universal law of causality. In this connection one is of course reminded of Brentano’s famous thesis that the true method of philosophy is no 3 different than that of natural science. While Husserl eventually took a different route by advocating a novum organum beyond the method of natural science, this can hardly be said of Meinong. In this regard Meinong and Brentano of course have something in common with the Vienna Circle as well as many subsequent positivistically inclined 1

Meinong, (eds.) Haller and Fabian (1978), p. 94. According to Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 539, Brentano based the theory of induction on calculation of probability in lectures since 1868 “from which, however, only fragments were later published”). There is still very much a need to have this material available in a properly edited form. Meinong’s concern with probability and induction is of course to be found in Meinong (1915). 3 Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1929), p. 135. 2

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philosophers. Meinong and Brentano, however, differ from most others who believe that philosophy should be scientific insofar as these two, as well other students of Brentano, regard the most prominent subject matter of philosophy as mind-functions, whereas the positivists and their successors are as a rule unwilling to assign any special subject matter to philosophy at all. In one of his early writings Meinong expressed the Brentanian conception of philosophy in the following way: Philosophy is not psychology, for its name, upon closer inspection, does not designate one science, but rather a whole group of sciences; what keeps these together, however, is the fact that they share the realm of mental phenomena, as this comes to light in the circumstance that either only mental phenomena are the object under investigation in these disciplines or the latter have posed such far-reaching problems that both mental and physical facts are included 2 within the purview of these problems.

Such a formulation fits Brentano’s view of the division of labor in philosophy, in which psychology is the theoretical tool in practical philosophy (logic, ethics, and aesthetics) whereas metaphysics encompasses both the mental and the physical within its subject matter. There is, however, something troubling about attaching such “psychologism” to Meinong when we consider that he was the one who advocated object theory which was to be no more psychological than 3 Husserl’s pure logic. Yet, one must bear in mind that in Meinong’s attempt to defend the rights of object theory and to give it a place in the system of the sciences, he also insists that the rejection of psychologism 4 by no means entails the rejection of psychology. Moreover, the philosophical significance of psychology is again asserted in his final summary statement of his conception of what the philosophical 1

See, for instance, Reichenbach (1951). Meinong (1885), p. 5. Cf. Brentano (1887), p. 77: “If we look at the common feature [of the various philosophical disciplines], the philosopher treats either very general questions or ones concerned with mental phenomena”. 3 Meinong (1904), pp 13–17. 4 Meinong (1907), p. v. 2

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disciplines have in common: “that they all have inner experiences 1 exclusively or inner experiences in addition as their subject matter”. In view of the development of object theory as well as that of experimental psychology as a science in its own right, independently of philosophy, Meinong concedes that it is desirable to characterize philosophy in a new way. Nonetheless, until this can be done, he insists that his old 2 formulation will have to suffice. Here one may of course reply that, if it is indeed the case that all such disciplines are somehow concerned with inner experiences, Meinong’s overriding concern in his later years, i.e. object theory, cannot be construed as a philosophical discipline. Yet, it must be stressed that Meinong classifies objects into four classes on the basis of a fourfold division in the domain of the mental: presenting, thinking (which includes both judging and assuming), feeling, and 3 desiring. The objecta are thus the correlates of presenting, the objectives the correlates of thinking, the dignitatives the correlates of feeling, and the desideratives the correlates of desire. The objects under consideration in object theory, in spite of their alleged independence from 4 consciousness, remain intentional objects (though not immanent ones). As regards Brentano’s later philosophical views, it is not at all problematic to see their relation to psychology. Among the things to be accounted for his reistic metaphysics are mental ones, which are simply

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Meinong (1921), p. 11. The term “inner lived-experiences” (innere Erlebnisse) is merely Meinong’s replacement of Brentano’s “mental phenomena” and must not be taken to mean the same as “inner perception“. What Meinong means here certainly includes outer perceptions as well as inner ones and indeed all presentations, judgments, assumptions, desires, and feelings. 2 Meinong (1921), p. 12. 3 Grossmann (1974), p. 225. 4 While Chisholm is no doubt right in asserting, “Whatever is unthinkable, after all, at least has the property of being unthinkable” (Chisholm (1982), p. 55), we may add that by grasping this sentence one is thinking of such objects. Hence, thinkable objects are thinkable and therefore impossible just as round squares are. This of course does not in any way deprive them of their status as objects from a Meinongian perspective.

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things which present, judge, and love or hate various objects (which are 1 of course also things). Though the conception of philosophy as psychological in character was no doubt shared by many in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Brentanist version thereof is distinguished from the others primarily by the emphasis it puts on intentionality. In this regard Meinong is again a Brentanian. Though Meinong hardly finds it necessary even to assert that mental phenomena refer to objects, this is mainly because this is obvious to him. Nonetheless, he does make it very clear at the outset of On Object Theory, in which he plainly says that judgments, assumptions, feelings, and desires are all directed towards 2 objects. The only class of mental phenomena that is missing from this list is that of presentations. As we have seen, Meinong came to the think that these in isolation from other acts have objects only potentially. While this view of presentations may be seen as a qualification regarding the role of intentionality in mental life, it is clearly only a minor one. In short, intentionality remains indispensable in Meinong’s analysis of 3 consciousness. The psychology which unites the philosophical disciplines for Brentano and Meinong is different from others not only insofar as its subject matter consists of intentional phenomena, but also insofar as its method is a purely descriptive one. Brentano contrasts this descriptive psychology with genetic psychology, in which one attempts to explain the 4 phenomena under consideration by discerning their causes. In descriptive 1

In Kastil (1951), pp. 45–99 one can find the main points of Brentano’s descriptive descriptive psychology reformulated in accordance with reism. 2 Meinong (1904), pp. 1 f. 3 What is argued here stands in opposition to the following remark in Spiegelberg (1982), p. 91: “There is in Meinong a decided preference for ontological questions, and less interest in the ‘presentations‘ through which such entities are given. Specifically, Meinong shows no interest in the key phenomenon of intentionality, which remained the the main link between Brentano and Husserl”. In spite of this failure to appreciate the phenomenological aspect of Meinong’s philosophy, Spiegelberg (1982) nonetheless remains by far the best treatment of the phenomenological movement as a whole. 4 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Kraus (1982), pp. 1 ff.

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psychology, however, one forgoes explanatory endeavors and restricts oneself to the analysis of consciousness into its elements and a characterization of their various connections with each other. Though Brentano had not made the distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology as explicitly at the time when Meinong was his student as he did in later years, the psychology that Meinong learned from him was a descriptive one, just as the psychological investigations that Meinong himself conducted throughout his career were descriptive. To be sure, there is a difference between their two views regarding what the elements of consciousness are, as is evident in their divergent classification of mental phenomena. Nonetheless, they were in agreement about the type of psychological investigations which were necessary for the various philosophical disciplines. At present it is of course very difficult to defend such a conception of philosophy, even if we stress the nature of the subject matter as intentional phenomena and the method of investigating them as descriptive. This is of course in large measure because the prevailing fashions in philosophy are, at least prima facie, opposed to this 1 conception, in spite of the many parallels that can be found in matters of substance between the concerns of analytic philosophy and Brentanism. Analytic philosophers who see philosophy as essentially semantics or logic and certainly those of a materialistic persuasion will not be sympathetic to characterizing philosophy as a science in which mind2 functions are the central subject matter. Nor will most “continental” philosophers, who are more inclined to see philosophy as an interpretation of “texts”. Yet another reason why the Brentanian conception of philosophy is unlikely to be accepted nowadays lies in the fact that the term “psychology” is now much more remote from anything that involves the traditional concerns of philosophy. With very few exceptions, mind-functions are no longer regarded as the subject matter of psychology. For a good part of the twentieth century it was, after all, 1

This is no doubt one of the main reasons why Brentano remains “invisible”. As regards this invisibility in the sphere of analytic philosophy, see Willard (1998). 2 Perhaps the growth of cognitive science in recent decades constitutes a noteworthy exception in this regard.

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far more fashionable to say that psychology is concerned with behavior. Moreover, the use of the term “psychology” in philosophical contexts 2 easily suggests psychologism, which many have seen as pernicious since the publication of the first volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900). Though neither Brentano nor Meinong succumbed to psychologism in the sense in which Husserl rejected it, with relativism as 3 its consequence, the power of association nevertheless remains almost insurmountable. Hence, many will dismiss a psychologically oriented philosophy as psychologism without the slightest hesitation. Philosophers and scholars, after all, are no less prone to clichés and stereotypes than the rest of mankind is. It is thus to be recommended to anyone who wishes to defend the Brentanian conception of philosophy that another term besides “psychology” should be introduced in order to characterize the common concern of philosophical disciplines. It seems to me that “phenomenology” is the best candidate in this regard. This term is of course not without its problems. One such problem is to be found in the fact that the later Husserl made every effort to advocate a “transcendental” phenomenology which was for him both the properly philosophical endeavor and distinguished sharply from psychology. Moreover, many of the phenomenologists who have rejected Husserl’s transcendental orientation still do not see mind-functions as the subject matter of their discipline and, more alarmingly, become dangerously antiscientific in their musings. Nonetheless, there is still enough flexibility in the understanding of the term to allow for it to be used to designate descriptive psychology in the Brentanian sense, as long as one bears in 1

Even a psychologist who stands as close to the school of Brentano as Kurt Koffka, a pupil of Stumpf, says, “Although psychology was reared as the science of consciousness or mind, we shall choose behaviour as our keystone” (Koffka [1935], p. 25). 2 Poli (2004), pp. 285 f.: “Unfortunately, he [Brentano] presented his theories from a viewpoint that most contemporary philosophers, especially those of an analytic bent, are unable to recognize as any different from psychologism”. While this is no doubt true, this situation would best be rectified if contemporary philosophers learned to distinguish between the psychology in the school of Brentano and psychologism. 3 Hua XVIII, pp. 118-158.

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mind that the phenomenology in question is no less “analytic” than much of the non-phenomenological philosophy that is widespread today in English speaking countries, but also in others. Finally, there is the problem that “phenomenology” suggests a discipline in which all phenomena, not only intentional ones, but also colors, sounds, and the 1 like, are to be investigated. In this regard Gilbert Ryle recommended the unsightly “psycho-phenomenology” in order to designate the inquiry into 2 mental phenomena. I myself would recommend that we rather speak of phenomenology in the narrow sense to designate the science of consciousness and in a broader one to include object theory, giving the priority to the latter. Another reason why “phenomenology” may seem unacceptable for the descriptive psychology practiced in the school of Brentano may be found in the fact that this term may easily be associated with a grotesquely ambitious rationalism which simply will not fit together with “psychology from an empirical standpoint”. Though Husserl’s preference 3 for such terms as Wesenserschauung certainly encourages such an association, it must be borne in mind that Husserl spoke in this manner only after he had broken away from the descriptive psychological 4 orientation and embraced transcendentalism. Moreover, it must be made clear that the phenomenology of the school of Brentano is empirical in a 5 sense that does not preclude a sort of “ideal intuition”. The thesis that mental phenomena are intentionally directed, for instance, is corroborated 1

In Stumpf (1907a) the term “phenomena” is restricted to the physical ones. Hence, in Stumpf (1907a) the term “phenomenology“ is restricted to the discipline that is concerned with physical phenomena, i.e. sensory contents and their correlates in imagination. See “Stumpf on Phenomena and Phenomenology” in the present volume. 2 Ryle (1971), p. 201. 3 Husserl (1976), pp. 13–17. 4 In order to dissociate the phenomenology that we find in Brentano, Meinong, and the early Husserl from transcendental as well “hermeneutic” and “existential” phenomenology, it is perhaps advisable to speak of the former as “descriptive phenomenology”, in accordance with Brentano’s lecture of 1888/89. See Brentano (1982), pp. 129–33. 5 Brentano (1874), p. v.

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by precisely such an intuition. By virtue of having the concept of mental phenomena and being able to identify examples of it, one knows that this is the case. Nonetheless, the thesis remains an empirical one in the sense 1 that the relevant concepts are drawn from experience. Here we must be cautious about saying that all the theses of phenomenology are known via an ideal intuition. The point is rather that even the ones that are known in this manner are empirical in the sense just indicated. While there thus seems to be no insurmountable terminological objection to calling the descriptive psychology of the school of Brentano “phenomenology” in this narrow sense, the question of course remains whether philosophy is best characterized as the descriptive investigation of mind-functions. It lies outside the scope of the present discussion to provide a systematic defense of such a conception of philosophy. Yet, it should be pointed out in conclusion that the issue of the subject matter of philosophy is by no means settled, certainly not as much as philosophers who work in the mainstream would like to think. There was a time when many thought that logic was something of the past, and yet logic has since then emerged as one of the greatest concerns of philosophy. It seems that the prevalence of certain conceptions of philosophy at different times is indeed more a matter of fashion than anything else. There is thus no reason why the current fashions could not give way to others. However, philosophy as the science of consciousness, if it can be established in the way that Brentano and his students had envisioned it, should ultimately prove to be more than a fashion.

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See Meinong (1906a), pp. 5–13, where an argument is made in defense the possibility of a priori knowledge based on empirical concepts. Cf. the view of Hans Cornelius on this matter, as discussed in “Husserl and Cornelius” in the present volume.

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HUSSERL AND CORNELIUS: 1 PHENOMENOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND EPISTEMOLOGY

1. Introduction A philosopher who does not join contemporary movements and likewise fails to get one of his own started is likely to be forgotten by future generations. This is more or less what happened to Hans Cornelius, who could not penetrate beyond the periphery of a variety of philosophical movements of his time. In the late nineteenth century he had close connections with the early positivism of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius, but in the early twentieth century he tried to dissociate himself from this movement and assert his philosophical affinity with Edmund 2 Husserl. And when he later moved to Frankfurt he was the mentor of the founding members of the Frankfurt School, though little of his influence 3 on their thought can be detected. Moreover, in 1931 Cornelius published a 4 paper in Erkenntnis (the journal for the Vienna Circle), but by this time he was almost seventy years old. Finally, throughout his career he expressed 5 considerable sympathy with Kantian thought, but he never stayed in close contact with any of the Neo-Kantians. Whether or not the philosophy of Cornelius is of interest in its own right, it is certainly of interest in connection with the various movements 1

This essay is a revised version of a paper that was originally published under the title “Husserl and Cornelius“ in Husserl Studies 8 (1991), pp. 33-56. 2 The relations between Husserl and early positivism have been examined by Sommer (1985), albeit with a restriction to the positivism of Mach and Avenarius. In Holenstein (1972), pp. 250 f., 279 f., and 283, the relation between Husserl and Cornelius receives some attention, but this discussion is not nearly as extensive as that of the present essay. 3 See Jay (1973), pp. 44f., where an accurate account of Cornelius‘ relation to the Frankfurt School is given. The author, however, overestimates Cornelius’ dissociation from Mach and Avenarius as though it were an actual change in philosophical stance. I would argue that the substance of Cornelius’ philosophy changed very little after 1897. 4 See Cornelius (1931). 5 See Cornelius (1926).

just mentioned, but most notably with Austrian phenomenology. ln the following I should like to discuss the relation between him and Husserl. Given Cornelius’ insistence that what he had been doing philosophically 1 since the publication of Psychology as an Experiential Science was in essence the same as the phenomenology practiced in the fiist edition of the Logical Investigations, we should like to establish just how close his position was to Husserl’s. ln order to establish this, I shall examine the critical interchange which took place between Husserl and Cornelius in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

2. Hans Cornelius (1863-1947) Since the name of Cornelius seldom occurs in recent literature, it will be 2 helpful to say a bit more about who he was. Though he was born into a family with an artistic background, Cornelius pursued his studies in chemistry, which he finished in 1886, and then decided to write his Habilitationsschrift on the axioms and hypotheses of the exact sciences. This work, however, was not accepted by the philosophical faculty in Munich. In spite of this disappointment, Cornelius followed the advice of Carl Stumpf, who was then professor in this faculty, to make a thorough study of modem and contemporary philosophical literature in German and 3 English. This study resulted in two articles, and in February of 1894 Cornelius’ second attempt at a Habilitationsschrift, entitled Attempt at a 4 Theory of Existential Judgments, was accepted and thus he became a lecturer in philosophy in Munich. The early contact which Cornelius had with Stumpf is important for our study here, because Husserl had also studied under the guidance of Stumpf in Halle. The philosophical literature with which Cornelius occupied 1

Cornelius (1897). Unless otherwise indicated, the biographical infomation on Cornelius is taken from Cornelius (1921). 3 See Cornelius (1892) and Cornelius (1893). The topic of these articles is fusion (Verschmelzung) which was given particular attention in Stumpf (1883), but also in the work of Austrian phenomenologists in general. 4 See Cornelius (1894). 2

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himself in preparation of his Habilitationsschrift includes not only writings by Stumpf, but also writings by Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong. And in his Psychology as an Experiential Science, his main work, Cornelius continued to concern himself with issues which arise in Austrian 1 phenomenology. Consequently he and Huserl shared the same concerns during their critical interchange. The fact that Cornelius taught philosophy in Munich until 1910 is also of importance to us here, for this means that he was present at Munich in the days of Munich phenomenology. In the winter semester of 1898/99 Cornelius and Theodor Lipps, who had become professor on the same faculty in 1894, were made honorary members of the Psychological Assoication (Psychologischer Verein), in which the pupils of Lipps were to 2 develop their phenomenology (in large measure under the influence of Husserl and in some respects in opposition to the teachings of Lipps). It appears that Cornelius did not for the most part take a very active role in 3 this club, but in 1909, when Lipps took leave because of failing health, Cornelius apparently was trying to take Lipps’ place as mentor but managed only to make himself an object of antipathy among the 4 members. Moreover, the relation between Lipps and Cornelius had not been a harmonious one, but Cornelius maintains that Lipps misinterpreted 1

Cornelius‘ interest in the psychological work of Meinong is particularly conspicuous. Here it should be noted that Meinong also took an interest in Cornelius’ work. As regards Meinong’s response to Cornelius, see Meinong (1894a) and Meinong (1900). The latter article is discussed in Rollinger (1993b), pp. 74-80 and translated as Appendix I in Rollinger (1993b), pp. 137-182. While Meinong and Husserl both find Cornelius’ theory of general presentations objectionable, Meinong’s “abstraction theory” (as contrasted with Cornelius’ “comparison theory”) regarding this issue is very different from Husserl’s, which is likewise examined in Rollinger (1993b), pp. 84-132. 2 See Smid (1981). 3 In the lectures given in the Verein from 1899 to 1901, Cornelius held only one, “Über letzte Erklarungen” (summer semester of 1899). Lipps, on the other hand, lectured in the Verein every semester during this period, as indicated in the anonymously published reports in Zeitschrtft ftür pädagogische Psychologie und Pathologie 1 (1899): 209-210,372-373; 2 (1900): 312 3 (1901): 407-408. 4 See the letter from Geiger to Husserl (28 December 1909) in Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, pp. 98 f.

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philosophical disagreement as personal animosity. In view of this unpleasant atmosphere, Cornelius decided to accept a position in Frankfurt in 1910, where he was later to direct the dissertations of Theodor Adomo and Max Horkheimer, who were later to establish the Frankfurt School from a philosophical perspective that diverged from that of Cornelius considerably. By the time Cornelius had gone to Frankfurt, he and Husserl lost interest in each others’ philosophical work. But in earlier days Cornelius’ work did receive critical attention from Husserl. At the end of 1896 Husserl wrote 1 an extensive review of Cornelius’ Attempt. A shorter version of this review was published in 1897 together with reviews of other writings on 2 logic which appeared in 1894. Cornelius’ Psychology as an Experiential Science was read by Husserl and his personal copy of this work bears extensive annotations. In both volumes of the Logical Investigations we find critical remarks on this work. Moreover, Cornelius made a study of the Logical Investigations and in 1906 published two articles in reply to Husserl. In the same year Husserl and Cornelius also exchanged letters with each other. In the following sections I shall discuss the content of these critical interchanges.

3. Husserl’s Critique of Attempt at a Theory of Existential Judgments Though the Attempt is primarily concerned with existential judgments, i.e. judgments which concern the existence or nonexistence of something, this work also involves a theory of judgment in general. In a very broad sense of the word “judgment”, i.e. “not only the declarative sentences and generally those judgments which somehow come to expression, but also 1

This review is published posthumously in Hua XXII, pp. 357-380. It was shortened by Husserl for publication in Archiv für systematische Philosophie 3 (1897), pp. 216244. Husserl explains in a letter to Paul Natorp (16 January 1897) that the first draft of the review in question was so long because many of Cornelius‘ mistakes are “typical” (Schuhmann [ed.] [1994] V, pp. 39 f.). (Natorp was the editor of the journal in which the review was published.) 2 Hua XXII, pp. 136-142.

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the founding elementary acts of cognition,” Cornelius identifies three distinct types of (existential) judgment: perception, memory, and expectation. Here it is obvious that for Cornelius a judgment is nothing but a mind-function of a certain kind, however broadly he understands this class. Some of the details of this theory will be exposited as we now discuss the various objections which Husserl raises against it.

3.1. Various Types of Problems concerning Judgments According to Husserl, problems concerning judgment fall into three 2 distinct classes. “Judgment” may of course be taken as a term that refers to mind-functions of a particular kind. Accordingly one may attempt to describe such mind-functions regardless of whatever causes or conditions they may have. Problems which are encountered in such descriptions can be called “descriptive-psychological”. Another set of problems, which may be called “genetic-psychological”, has to do with precisely the causes and conditions which are disregarded in descriptive psychology. While both sets of problems are concerned with judgments as mental occurrences, a third set of problems has to do with judgments in the sense in which logicians speak of them. In this sense “judgment” refers to meanings or ideal unities, as “2 x 2 = 4” expresses only one judgment, though many numerically distinct mind-functions may occur, at different times and even in different minds, in which this judgment is meant. Whenever we are concerned with what a judgment means, we are concerned with problems of this third kind. Husserl maintains that mistakes occur in the Attempt due to a failure to 3 keep these classes of problems separate. If we consider the definition of “judgment” in the Attempt quoted above, it becomes apparent that this definition is suited for psychological considerations. What Husserl finds objectionable is not that Cornelius attempts a psychological theory of judgment, but that he uses such a theory in order to analyze the meaning of 1

Cornelius (1894), p. 6. Hua XXII, pp. 370 ff. 3 Hua XXII, p. 372 ff. 2

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statements. For example, perception is characterized in the Attempt as the distinguishing of the present content of consciousness, e.g. a sensation, 1 from the previous one. From this psychological theory Cornelius concludes that every “elementary perceptual judgment” has the meaning: “this is other than before”. This conclusion, according to Husserl, involves a confusion of the mental process of judging with what the judgment means.

3.2. Perceiving and Distinguishing Husserl maintains that Cornelius‘ characterization of perception involves “the confusion of two fundamentally distinct meanings of the word 2 ‘distinguishing’, namely relational and analytical distinguishing”. In the latter the elements distinguished are simply noticed separately and not confused with each other, while in the former the relation between the elements, i.e. their difference, is made thematic. Though Husserl does not seem to be troubled by the thesis that perception involves analytical distinguishing, he maintains that Cornelius mistakes this claim with the objectionable view that perception is in all cases a relational distinguishing. By identifying perception with relational distinguishing, Husserl argues, Cornelius commits the following infinite regress: “For the straightforward noticing of a content the author [Cornelius] obviously substitutes the noticing of its relation to what has occurred before. For this noticing itself he would consequently have to substitute again the noticing 3 of the relation of this relation to a previous one and so forth”. Furthermore, Husserl charges that Cornelius’ alleged confusion between analytical and relational distinguishing results from the fallacy of mistaking that which is found in consciousness upon reflection with that 4 which occurs in unreflective consciousness.

1

Cornelius (1894), p. 13. Hua XXII, p. 140. 3 Hua XXII, p. 141. 4 Hua XXII, p. 372. 2

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3.3. Content, Object, and Meaning 1

What we perceive, on Cornelius‘ view, is a phenomenon. Such a phenomenon, or content of consciousness, may be mental or physical. A physical phenomenon, however, must not be confused with the stimulus which causes this phenomenon. For example: “The physical phenomenon ‘sound’ is only the sensuously experienced sound as such, not the air wave 2 which causes this phenomenon”. A physical phenomenon can also be the content of consciousness which is perceivable in imagination and memory, a so-called “phantasm”. The perception of a physical phenomenon, whether it be a sensation or a phantasm, is called “outer perception”, while all other phenomena besides sensations and phantasms are called 3 “psychical phenomena” and the perception of them “inner perception”. Now in this account of perception Husserl sees a confusion between content and object: “Perceiving an object sensuously, according to the author [Cornelius], is [identical with] noticing a sensory content. But is the tree which I now apprehend with a wandering gaze identical with the 4 manifold and diverse contents which I notice?”. This is a rhetorical question. Here we see that outer perception for Husserl is not the noticing of a sensory content or a phantasm which inheres in consciousness, as it is for Cornelius. When one sees a tree one does not, on Husserl’s view, perceive one’s own sensory contents. Rather, he maintains that the object of perception in this case is nothing but the free itself. Furthermore, the additional confusion between meaning and content, according to Husserl, is to be seen in Cornelius’ account of so-called naming perceptual judgments (e.g. “this is red”), which are characterized in the Attempt as a comparison between the named (and perceived) content and the accompanying phantasm. On Husserl’s interpretation of the Attempt, the

1

Cornelius (1894), p. 7. Cornelius (1894), p. 8. 3 From the other essay in this volume is should be clear that Cornelius here draws very heavily upon the work of Brentano and Stumpf. 4 Hua XII, p. 374. 2

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accompanying phantasm is taken by Cornelius to be the meaning of the judgment of the sort in question. Cornelius makes a distinction between perceptual and symbolic existential judgments, i.e. those in which the judged subject is not a 1 perceived content of consciousness. For example, memory and expectation are different kinds of symbolic existential judgments. To this extent he makes the distinction between the content and the object, for he insists that the judgment is not about the content. The memory image which is the content of remembering, for instance, is not to be identified with the remembered object. Nevertheless, Husserl maintains that the confusions of content, object, and meaning are not thereby eliminated, for the content-object distinction which Cornelius applies in his discussion of symbolic existential judgments is not used in his characterization of outer perception and is, moreover, inadequate for describing the nature of the predicates of judgments, whether these predicates occur in perceptual or symbolic judgments. Husserl insists that the meaning of a predicate must always be 2 purely conceptual. Thus, if one judges “this is red”, the predicate term “red” is symbolic for the concept of red. It does not represent a content of consciousness or even the moment of red which this content may have. For the content and its moments are always individuals. A concept, by contrast, is a universal which may extend to various individuals which are subsumed under it. Hence, however much one may attend to a given phantasm and focus on its moment of red, one does not thereby grasp the concept of red. Even the claim that phantasms must accompany judgments, says Husserl, “contradicts every unbiased experience”, while he further attempts to refute the claim that these are the meanings of judgments by asking us “whether the phantasm of the ruins of a temple which serves me precisely in the case of the word ‘culture’ constitutes the 3 meaning of this word”. For Husserl the answer is obviously a negative one. 1

Cornelius (1894), pp. 45 f. Hua XII, pp. 375 f. 3 Hua XII, p. 141. Here one must be careful not to confuse the concept of a phantasm here with the one that Husserl later developed, as discussed in “Brentano and Husserl 2

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3.4. Phantasms and Sensations According to Cornelius, “language makes no distinction between the object which I perceive at present by means of my senses and the 1 phantasm of this object which appears to me in my memory of it”. “If I want to speak of my phantasm”, Husserl replies, “then I say, as I just did, 2 ‘my phantasm’”. In this case it should be clear that what is referred to is not a sensation. What Husserl especially objects to in Cornelius’ discussion of sensations and phantasms is the assertion that, in spite of the alleged failure of language to distinguish them, they are in fact toto genere 3 distinct from each other. Cornelius’ theory that sensations are always accompanied by phantasms, e.g. the hearing of a sound by the memory images of the sound just past, is not regarded by Husserl as a successful attempt to establish a correspondence which had already been denied in 4 the claim that sensations and phantasms are toto genere different.

3.5. Memory Images According to some (e.g. Hume), phantasms acquire the status of memory images (as well as those involved in other beliefs, e.g. expectation) when they are accompanied by certain “feelings of belief”. Such an account of 5 memory images is regarded as unsatisfactory by Cornelius. One argument which he uses against the view that they differ from other phantasms in being accompanied by feelings of belief runs as follows: Since any feeling which may accompany an image is no guarantee of what we remember, feelings of belief are inadequate as a criterion for distinguishing memory on Imagination” in the present volume. 1 Cornelius (1894), p. 44. 2 Hua XXII, p. 379. 3 Cornelius (1894), pp. 33 f. 4 Hua XXII, pp. 378 f. Cf. Rollinger (1999), pp. 252 f. 5 Cornelius (1894), pp. 61 f.

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images from other phantasms. In objection to this argument Husserl maintains that, however unsatisfactory the view here criticized may be, the failure of a criterion to provide the guarantee demanded by Cornelius is no reason for rejecting this criterion. Since memory is indeed fallible, whatever differentiates it from mere imagination must allow for the 1 possibility of incorrect memories.

3.6. Negation Cornelius reduces the negation of a judgment to the noticing of a 2 qualitative difference between contents. Hence, the negation of “A is B” is for him the same as noticing that A is not like B. Against this view Husserl objects “that considerable difference constantly passes over into similarity – hence denial into affirmation. Moreover, the two assertions are analytically equivalent, and since it is senseless, according to an utterance of the author [Cornelius], to make a separation where one thing is given with the other, e.g. ‘A is red’ and ‘A is different from blue’, one would 3 also have to give up the distinction between affirmation and denial”.

3.7. Closing remarks Husserl’s review of the Attempt is by no means favorable. The criticisms which are most important here are those exposited under subsections 3.1 and 3.3 above. The objections which Husserl raises against Psychology as an Experiential Science are very much made in the same spirit. And whatever agreements we shall find between Husserl and Cornelius, they will never agree on the identity or difference of content and object in outer perception and the status of meanings in relation to the contents of consciousness.

1

Hua XXII, p. 379. Cornelius (1894), p. 28. 3 Hua XXII, pp. 379 f. 2

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4. Husserl’s Critique of Psychology as an Experiential Science In Cornelius’ Psychology as Experiential Science we find a detailed treatment of a wide range of philosophical and psychological topics from an empirical standpoint. This attempt to make psychology “experiential science” is by no means the same as the efforts of many of Cornelius’ contemporaries to make psychology an experimental science. The investigations in Psychology as Experiential Science should rather be compared with the empirical analyses of Hume and those inspired by his work, but also in large measure with various investigations that arose in Austrian phenomenology. Nevertheless, Cornelius was later to regret the full title of Psychology and suggested that “Pure Phenomenology” (Reine Phänomenologie) or “Basic Philosophical Science” (Philosophische 1 Grundwissenschaft) would have been better titles. For he wanted to make clear that he was trying to lay the foundations for a discipline consisting solely of universally valid judgments. From Cornelius’ perspective there is no incompatibility in the notion of a science which consists of judgments of this kind and is at the same time empirical. In the Logical Investigations Husserl calls Psychology as an Experiential Science “an attempt to execute, as extremely as it had been only meant before, a thorough-going psychologistic epistemology on the 2 basis of modern psychology”. In addition to such general remarks, others are to be found in the Logical Investigations concerning particular theories which are advocated in Psychology as an Experiential Science: namely Cornelius’ version of the principle of thought economy and his theories of abstraction and general presentations. I shall now examine these theories and the objections Husserl raises against them in the Logical Investigations.

1 2

Cornelius (1921), p. 86. Hua XIX/1, p. 211.

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4.1. The Principle of Thought Economy The principle of thought economy, or what Cornelius prefers to call the “principle of unity”, is “a universal psychological principle … that everywhere in mental life there is the manifest desire to include diverse experiences under common symbols insofar as these experiences are similar, or - what means the same - in all cases to designate as much as possible what is common among diverse items by means of an inclusive 1 symbol”. This principle has application, according to Cornelius, in our 2 descriptions or explanations of phenomena. That is to say, whenever we try to explain certain facts which at first seem unfamiliar, we describe them in such a way that they are classified together with other familiar occurrences. Explanation in this sense is to be found not only in everyday life, but in empirical science as well. Newton, for example, explained planetary motion by subsuming it under the same law as that under which terrestrial motions, e.g. falling, are subsumed. Now Cornelius does not take full credit for the discovery or formulation of the principle of thought economy. Not only is it accredited to Ernst 3 Mach, but also to Richard Avenarius. In Chapter IX of the first volume of the Logical Investigations Husserl turns his attention to the so-called “biological grounding” of logic and epistemology which, on his interpretation, is to be found in the writings of Mach, Avenarius, and Cornelius. “That this new direction ultimately culminates again in psychologism”, adds Husserl, “comes to light most clearly in the 4 Psychology [as an Experiential Science] of Cornelius”. After asserting 1

Cornelius (1897), p. 82. It is this statement of the principle under discussion which Husserl cites (Hua XVII, p. 197). 2 Cornelius (1897), p. 4. 3 Cornelius (1897), p. 85. See Avenarius (1876), p. iii. As regards Mach, see the following footnote. 4 Hua XVIII, p. 196. In a letter to Mach (18 June 1901), however, Husserl says, “I cannot ward off the conviction that the differences which hover between us are fundamentally not quite as profound as they seem at first glance. Nothing is more remote from me thank to think that your investigations, so abundantly fruitful for experiential-scientific research, should be or ever could be rendered somehow ‘invalid’ by my efforts aiming at the clarification of ‘pure’ logic. I do not want in any

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that neither pure logic nor pure epistemology can be executed on the basis of considerations of the principle of thought economy, Husserl continues: “In the case of Cornelius the obvious defects accumulate [a] since he endeavors to derive, from a teleological principle of mental anthropology, elementary facts of psychology which are as such already presupposed for the derivation of this principle itself, and [b] since he further strives for an 1 epistemological grounding of philosophy by means of psychology”. In the passage just cited we see two reasons for rejecting Cornelius’ principle of thought economy. According to the first objection, this principle is simply bad psychology, for the explanations which it provides are allegedly simply vacuous. Consider, for example, the use that Cornelius makes of this principle in order to explain why we expect to 2 have experiences in the future. Since our past experiences have always been followed by more experiences, we regard our present experiences as similar to previous experiences in this respect and therefore expect other experiences to follow. In Husserl’s annotations in his copy of Psychology as an Experiential Science this attempt to apply the principle of thought economy is considered to be a clear example of a pseudo-explanation.

way to call into question the legitimacy of the genetic-psychological and biological considerations of the sciences: what I defend against is the subordination of epistemological clarification of the purely logical in science from the viewpoint of psychological genesis and biological adaption. I fight against the skeptical ‘psychologism’ of our time, which both here and everywhere eliminates the principal boundary between the relations of ideas and matters of fact, as Mill already does. … My chapter on thought economy is chiefly directed at the school of Avenarius and quite especially against Cornelius: against his analysis of the basic logical ideas and principles, against his distinction between natural and logical theories, etc. My reproach that the thought-economical explanation of the purely logical would ‘level’ the distinction between blind and logical thinking was meant for him. The fact that he believed that it was permissible for him in his guiding viewpoints to appeal to you, highly honored sir, prompted me to bring your name as well into the critique.” (Schuhmann [ed.] [1994] VI, pp. 255 f.). Husserl’s debt to Mach had already been stated in his first book, the first volume of Philosophy of Arithmetik (1890). See Hua XII, pp. 210-211 n. 1 Hua XVIII, p. 207. 2 Cornelius (1897), p. 87.

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According to the second objection which Husserl raises against Cornelius’ application of the principle in question, it is wrong for Cornelius to use it for epistemological purposes. However, it must be pointed out that, in spite of the explicit attempt in Psychology as an Experiential Science to subsume epistemology and philosophy in general under psychology, the claim that this work contains a psychologistic view of logic is contradicted by Cornelius’ assertion that the principle of 1 thought economy is “a psychological, but not a logical principle”. Nevertheless, the psychologistic tendency in epistemology and the psychologistic understanding of meanings, i.e. the notion that they are real contents of consciousness rather than ideal unities, are clearly present in 2 Psychology as an Experiential Science. Before we turn to Cornelius’ theory of abstraction and Husserl’s criticism thereof, it should be mentioned that Cornelius’ usage of the principle of thought economy is inappropriately labelled a “biological grounding” of epistemology and logic. In this respect, Cornelius is justified in his later complaint that Husserl unfairly conflates his views with those of Avenarius.

4.2. Abstraction and General Ideas According to Cornelius, a particular feature of a content, e.g. the high pitch of a sound, can be abstracted from other features only in the sense that this content is perceived as similar to other contents in some respect, 3 e.g. in the respect of high-pitchedness. Since a content may be seen as similar to other ones in different respects, i.e. included in different similarity groups, different features may be distinguished in one single content. For example, a sound is regarded as high-pitched and loud because it is perceived to be similar to another sound which is high1

Cornelius (1897), p. 90. Concerning the relation between psychology and philosophy, see Cornelius (1897), p. 7. 2 See, for instance, Cornelius (1897), p. 102: “We cannot understand a word unless we have those very data of consciousness which make up the meaning of the word”. 3 Cornelius (1897), pp. 50 f. The same theory of abstraction is defended again in Cornelius (1900a) and Cornelius (1900b).

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pitched and soft, but also similar to yet another which is low-pitched and loud. According to some, abstraction involves the attention to certain 1 features of a content or object and the disregard of others. Cornelius does not mind this characterization of abstraction, as long as attending to certain properties is reduced to perceiving similarities of the content in question with other contents and failing to attend is reduced to failing to perceive certain similarities. In Husserl’s objection to this theory of abstraction he takes it to be an attempt to identify the meanings of certain statements with each other, as indicated by the following passage: “... can one even assert, for only a single moment, that the sense of the statement ‘this sound is faint’ is the same as the sense of the statement ‘it belongs to a similarity group’, however this is to be designated?... Of course the expressions ‘a sound is faint’ and ‘it belongs to the collection of objects which resemble each other with respect to faintness’ are equivalent in meaning. But equivalence 2 is not identity”. In response to Cornelius’ assertion that regarding contents as similar with respect to color “amounts to nothing more ... than the assertion of the similarity of both contents to other contents known from 3 before”, Husserl objects further: “The sense of this specification would even imply that the claim of equivalence would have a different sense for each person and at different times. It would depend on the ‘other known’ contents, i.e. those experienced earlier, which change from person to 4 person, and from one time to the other”. The most that Husserl can concede to Cornelius’ theory of abstraction is that perhaps the ascription of a feature to a content is impossible without also imagining contents which are similar in the relevant respect. But if this is the case, it is a matter for 1

See Rollinger (1993b). Hua XIX/1, p. 212. This quotation is taken from an appendix in small print (pp. 211217), which is entitled “modern Humeanism”, in view of the fact that Cornelius’ theory of general presentations is no doubt inspired by Hume’s attempt, in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part I, Section VI, to deal with the scholastic notion of “distinctions of reason”. Cornelius was most likely put in contact with Hume’s theory of abstraction through a reading of Meinong (1877). It will be seen below that Cornelius was quite willing to see the work of British empiricism as phenomenology. 3 Cornelius (1900a), p. 104. 4 Hua XIX/1, p. 213. 2

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genetic psychology, which is totally irrelevant to the meaning of those statements in which features are predicated of contents. Judging from Cornelius’ theory of abstraction, it may seem that he adopts a nominalist position regarding general ideas. He tells us, however, that his position is rather a compromise between nominalism and conceptualism: “We do indeed think that not only words but also ideas can be (and, within certain limits, even always are) general in the sense in which conceptualism asserts generality; but this generality always remains enclosed in certain limits determined by the acquired subtlety of discrimination, while the generality of the word is by no means restricted 1 by the limits of the generality of the associated phantasm”. Cornelius explains this remark further by alluding to Locke’s controversial example of a general idea, namely the idea of a triangle which is not equilateral, scalene, or isosceles and yet all three of these at the same time. According to Cornelius, our idea of a triangle can be general insofar as the triangle need not be presented as equilateral, scalene, or isosceles; but he concedes to the nominalists that we cannot have an idea of a triangle with all three of these features. A triangle of the latter kind can be represented only by purely linguistic means. 2 Such an account of general ideas is still unsatisfactory to Husserl. First, he argues that the general idea for Cornelius acquires a kind of indeterminacy which cannot be distinguished from mere vagueness. A memory image may be vague, but such vagueness cannot be equated with the generality which is found when we concern ourselves with universals. That is to say, though we may remember a triangle without being able to specify whether it was scalene, isosceles, or equilateral, we do not thereby have the general idea of a triangle as the geometer does, for example, when he asserts that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles. Secondly, Husserl argues: “According to Cornelius, it is possible that a sensory triangle-idea unites contradictory properties, and indeed infinitely many, in itself; only it must not allow for such abrasive 3 ones as the properties of obtuseness and acuteness”. Unfortunately, 1

Cornelius (1897), p. 66. Hua XIX/1, pp. 213 ff. 3 Hua XIX/1, p. 217. 2

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however, Husserl does not give us any examples of the less obvious contradictory properties which may, on Cornelius’ view, be united in a sensory triangle-idea. Thirdly, Husserl maintains that Cornelius fails to account for general ideas because he lacks a notion of “act-character”. An act-character, according to Husserl, is what all mind-functions have in common. It will soon be seen that Cornelius insists that his investigations are not devoid of such a notion.

4.3. The Experiential Origin of Universally Valid Judgments Now we turn our attention to a claim which Cornelius makes in Psychology as an Experiential Science and later raises in objection to Husserl: the claim that judgments which are usually held to be universally valid and necessary are derived from empirical facts. Such judgments are not thereby given a lower epistemic status than that which is usually assigned to them. On the contrary, Cornelius challenges the assumption which both empiricists and anti-empiricists have left unquestioned, namely the assumption that empirical knowledge is somehow inferior. As long as the concepts in an inductively derived judgment are purely perceptual ones, this judgment, as far as Cornelius is concerned, can be universally 1 valid. Cornelius uses the term “perceptual concepts” in reference to those concepts which “designate only the properties of encountered contents as 2 such”. Such concepts, e.g. the concept of redness or loudness, are to be contrasted with so-called “empirical” ones, whose application implies that, under certain conditions, other contents are expected. A physical thing, on Cornelius’ view, is to be understood in terms of concepts of the latter kind. Here it may be pointed out that Cornelius would be better served if he had spoken of hypothetical constructs instead of employing the term “empirical concepts” as he does, for this term easily suggests for the most of us the same as “perceptual concepts”. According to Cornelius, there cannot be a thing-in-itself which is irreducible to a lawlike cohesion of sensations. The concepts which we use 1 2

Cornelius (1897), pp. 348 f. Cornelius (1897), p. 92.

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to describe physical things, however, do not merely tell us what the perceived content as such is like. Only perceptual concepts have no further implications about what is to be expected in the course of experience. The concepts of pitch and volume may be regarded as perceptual ones. According to Cornelius, our judgment that every sound has pitch and 1 volume is a universally valid one. But insofar as this judgment is derived 2 from particular “facts” (Tatsachen), it is an empirical (or experiential) one. The facts in question need not be sensations, for mere soundphantasms will sufficiently allow us to know that a sound must have pitch and volume. Whatever disagreements there may be between Husserl and Cornelius, their accounts of how we can know certain universally valid judgments to be true have one important feature in common: that such judgments can be known through means of purely imaginary examples. Moreover, Cornelius’ view that we can have certain knowledge on the basis of perceptual concepts is one that he shares with other outstanding Austrian phenomenologists.

5. Cornelius’ Reply and Correspondence with Husserl In 1906, after a laborious study of the Logical Investigations, Cornelius 3 was ready to publish two articles in reply to Husserl. In the first article, “Psychological Questions of Principle I”, Cornelius says “that Husserl, among the contemporary epistemologists in Germany, is the one who is closest to me in the principal questions – however little he himself sees

1

See Cornelius (1903), pp. 248. This term is used here in an epistemic sense, as it was among many other contemporaries of Cornelius, and should not be understood in terms of states of affairs (or the “obtaining” of them). Anything that is immediately known is a “fact”. There is of course no doubt that this notion and indeed much of Austrian phenomenology go against the grain of certain truisms of later twentieth century philosophy, whether this be “continental” or “analytic”. Such truisms, however, must not taken as the measure of truth. 3 Cornelius (1906a) and Cornelius (1906b). 2

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this agreement”. Nevertheless, Cornelius sees crucial differences between himself and Husserl, which are elaborated on in his reply.

5.1. Psychology and Epistemology After dissociating himself from Avenarius, Cornelius proceeds to argue the following theses in “Psychological Questions of Principle I”: 1) Epistemology can be subsumed under psychology. 2) Universally valid judgments can be derived from experience. 3) The investigations in the Logical Investigations are, contrary to Husserl’s claim, not free of presuppositions. 4) Phenomenology, which for Cornelius is that area of psychology concerned with epistemological grounding and clarification, should encompass genetic as well as purely descriptive investigations. We have already seen how Cornelius tries to defend the second thesis in Psychology as an Experiential Science. In defense of the first thesis Cornelius simply argues that this is so because knowing is a mental fact and as such can be the subject matter only of the science of mental facts as 2 such, i.e. psychology. He stresses here that epistemology is only concerned with knowing, while in those cases where the known is not a mental fact, e.g. the known in logic and mathematics, this is not to be the subject matter of psychology. In this case, Cornelius makes a break with a psychologistic understanding of logic without forgoing his psychologistic conception of epistemology. In addition, he maintains that the psychology of knowing is not to presuppose certain concepts which are to be clarified through its own investigations. One such concept is that of causation. Hence, the psychology of knowing must not be a psychology in which causal explanations of knowing experiences are proffered. Causation is to be illuminated through psychological description. Thus, Cornelius is willing to say that his epistemology is “psychologistic”, provided that this is not understood in terms of a psychological orientation that is concerned with causal explanations. To this he significantly adds that the investigations which Husserl conducts in 1 2

Cornelius (1906a), p. 401. Cornelius (1906a), pp. 402 f.

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the second volume of the Logical Unteruchungen under the title “phenomenology” are no less psychologistic than those which occur in Psychology as an Experiential Science. Thus he says the following: Psychology has (at least in England) always from the very start been “phenomenology” in the Husserlian sense and I do not see why one should want to withhold the name “psychology” from those investigations concerning mental facts, which must be the basis for all exact psychological science, and reserve it only for a modern misconception [i.e. the confusion between psychology as such 1 and causal-explanatory psychology].

We shall soon see that Husserl still does not think that the identification between psychology and phenomenology (and likewise epistemology) is justified, even if causal explanations are utterly purged from the psychology in question. In light of Cornelius’ rejection of causal explanations in epistemology, the question naturally arises: Does he equate epistemology with descriptive psychology in contrast to genetic psychology? As it turns out, the psychology of knowing which Cornelius defends as the basic philosophical science is meant to include genetic as 2 well as descriptive investigations. By “genetic phenomenology” Cornelius does not mean the same as “causal-explanatory psychology”. There are two cases in which this genetic phenomenology is to be applied. First, we cannot describe memories without referring to the past experience remembered. In this context Cornelius also claims that the “representative function” of memories which thereby comes to light is to take the place of the so-called “act-character” which Husserl finds missing in Psychology as 3 an Experiential Science. The second application of genetic phenomenology for Cornelius is to be found in the investigation into the original experiences in which concepts and words are learned. By identifying these origins we are to discover the meanings of such words. From the preceding Sections 3 and 4 above, it is clear that this enterprise is emphatically condemned by Husserl.

1

Cornelius (1906a), pp. 405 f. Cornelius (1906a), pp. 408 f. 3 Cornelius (1906a), p. 410 n. 2

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It remains to be seen why Cornelius thinks that Husserl’s investigations in the second volume of the Logical Investigations are not free of presuppositions. Cornelius specifies two presuppositions which are impermissible in epistemology, namely that universally valid judgments cannot be derived from empirical facts and that genetic investigations are necessarily causal-explanatory ones. Moreover, he accuses Husserl of adopting “concepts and claims from Brentanian psychology among his 1 presuppositions without first testing them”. We shall soon see that the Brentanian characterization of perception as intentional, which is adopted in the second volume of the Logical Investigations, constitutes a third presupposition which Cornelius likewise banishes from genuinely epistemological investigations.

5.2. Correspondence Upon the publication of “Psychological Questions of Principle I” Cornelius sent Husserl an offprint of this article. Husserl responded with a 2 letter to Cornelius, a draft of which has been published. Cornelius responded to this letter immediately and then received a response from 3 Husserl. The philosophical correspondence between Husserl and 4 Cornelius thereafter came to an end. In Husserl’s draft of the letter to Cornelius he says that a full response must await a closer reading of Psychologie as Experiential Science. Cornelius’ dissociation from Avenarius and his remark that he and Husserl have much in common, however, are found to be surprising. Husserl points out that he had already been using the notion of representation in his “Psychological Studies concerning Elementary Logic” (1894). Furthermore, Husserl maintains that this early work of his “should already contain 1

Cornelius (1906a), p. 408. This draft (28 September 1906) is published in Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, pp. 25-29. 3 The letter from Cornelius (1 October 1906) and the response from Husserl (4 October 1906) are published in Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, pp. 29-31. 4 The postcard from Husserl to Cornelius (19 November 1922) in Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, p. 31 is of no philosophical interest. 2

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as much as we generally have in common”. But he also adds that his views are now quite different. In this early work we find a distinction between “intuition” and “represention” which indeed resembles Cornelius’ sharp division between “perception“ and “symbolic function”, but in the second volume of the Logical Investigations Husserl holds a very different theory of perception which is criticized in “Psychological Questions of Principle II”. Husserl also discusses the distinction between causal-explanatory and genetic phenomenology. He claims that he would like to see more on this topic since it is much in line with some of his more recent work. In this work he had already come to see that genetic investigations which do not involve causal explanations can be found in ‘empirical-descriptive’ disciplines, such as natural and cultural history. As long as the investigation is restricted to the phenomenal sphere and does not posit transcendents, such as atoms, ions, energy, and the like, it is possible to examine the developments of the subject matter without any consideration of causes. But Husserl says further that these investigations do not belong 2 to phenomenology. In this connection he stresses that the phenomenologist is not concerned with himself and his inwardly perceived experiences, as can be seen from the following passage: Phenomenological investigation is not at all interested in egos and states, livedexperiences, developments of or in egos. Nor in “my” ego and its acts, no more than it is interested in plants, stones, and their developments. I crudely 1

Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, p. 26. In Husserl’s later work a notion of genetic phenomenology, in contrast to static phenomenology, is adopted, However, this notion exhibits absolutely no influence from Cornelius. Husserl obviously found the notion of a genetic investigation in Cornelius (1906a) very obscure, for he expresses his desire for ‘the closer discussion of the difference between causal explanatory and genetic psychology‘ (Hua XXIV, 440). It is unlikely that he ever changed his mind about the inadequacy of Cornelius’ account of this difference. Another verbal agreement between Husserl and Cornelius is to be found in their mutual advocacy of transcendental philosophy and even transcendental phenomenology. (See Cornelius [1926].) In this respect, both of them are influenced by Kant, but certainly not by each other. Whatever agreement in substance is indicated in this verbal agreement can be subsumed under the methodological parallels which are discussed in the conclusion of this essay. 2

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misunderstood myself when I identified phenomenology and descriptive (immanent) psychology. For four or five years I have constantly been warning my students about this error. All empirical existence, also that of one’s own ego, is suspended in phenomenological investigation. It provides only analyses of sense or essence. What belongs to the “essence” of experience, memory, etc., what belongs to the “sense” of the relation between “presentation” and “object”? This does not mean: how does such and such mechanism from which those fringes, characters, etc. come about on the basis of our intellectual organization? I am the one who is now (at six o’clock in the evening) analyzing the essence of perception, for instance, in my consciousness, while such and such perceptions, my psychical lived-experiences, come to mind, and I state: I find this and that. But the existence of the ego (of the person in space and time who simply designates himself as “I”) is not something posited in the investigation, the results of which remain the same if I regard myself also as a centaur or a hippopotamus or whatever else. The lived-experiences also, meant in the psychological sense, simply as lived-experiences of a human being, of a hippopotamus, of an ego, of this ego, do not come into question in terms of their 1 existence, but rather purely in terms of their content or essence.

Hence, it appears that for Husserl the “eidetic” concern of phenomenology, i.e. its concern with essence rather than fact, precludes its occupation with genesis. We may notice in this last sentence of the passage just cited a hint at the role which Husserl assigns to imagination in phenomenological method. As already pointed out, Husserl and Cornelius in fact have something in common on this point. After stressing the eidetic aspect of phenomenology, another aspect of phenomenological inquiry which had not been mentioned at all in the Logical Investigations, i.e. phenomenological reduction, is briefly referred to: “A slight change of apperceptive and existential positing, and all results acquire descriptive-psychological value... . Conversely, a good deal of descriptive psychology passes over into phenomenology (useful for the critique of reason), once the ‘phenomenological reduction’ is taken up or 2 insofar as it can be taken up”. Hence, it is clear that for Husserl the abstention from existential positing sets phenomenology apart from descriptive psychology. Moreover, in the very same context Husserl 1 2

Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, pp. 27 f. Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, p. 28.

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stresses the epistemological ends of phenomenology. Thus, we see how he answers to the claim in “Psychological Questions of Principle I” that epistemology is to be subsumed under psychology. Epistemology, as an endeavor that is possible only on the basis of the phenomenological reduction, begins by abstaining from the positing of those mental facts which are posited in psychology. Husserl then turns his attention to his relation to British empiricism and stresses that their epistemology is psychologistic. “But in Locke and Hume”, he adds, “there lie, without their being aware of it, fragments, beginnings of genuine phenomenology, insofar as they offer discussions which can very easily be liberated purely and radically from all natural 1 scientific habitus, from empirical-existential associations”. As far as Husserl can see, this liberation from existential positing is not to be found 2 in Psychology as an Experiential Science. From Cornelius‘ letter to Husserl, it can be seen that the letter whose draft we have just considered was sent to Cornelius along with at least one offprint, namely of the third “Report on German Writings on Logic in the 3 years 1895-1897”, where Husserl again stresses the distinction between psychology and phenomenology. In this report Cornelius claims to have found additional evidence for the alleged agreement between him and Husserl. “Both sciences [physics and psychology]”, says Husserl, “start from the world in the ordinary sense, which precedes all critique, with its 4 division of facts into corporeal and mental ones”. Cornelius cites this statement from the above-mentioned report and adds:

1

Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, p. 29. Here it may be explained that in his letter to Cornelius Husserl does not explain how phenomenological reduction adds to phenomenological investigation anything that had not already been applied in the eidetic method, which in fact already involved an abstention from positing existence. While Husserl’s transcendental philosophy in relation to Austrian phenomenology is not the subject matter of the present essay, it may be said here that in a certain sense the eidetic method is not at all alien to the method of the natural sciences and can therefore be adopted in descriptive psychology. 3 Hua XXII, pp. 201-215. 4 Hua XXII, p. 206. 2

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If I understand you rightly, however, this is the starting point which differentiates “psychology” from “phenomenology”, “from which all naturalscientific or metaphysical objectivations are completely excluded”. Well, precisely such an exclusion of those objectivations, this disregard of all regularly presupposed divisions of corporeal and mental facts (also the existence of appearances in a subjective time) is what my psychology everywhere values 1 primarily. My psychology therefore agrees in principle with your phenomenology. If you want to take up my Psychology [as an Experiential Science] again, I may therefore ask you to bear in mind my intention wherever the univocal statement of my thoughts is not achieved and doubts arise 2 concerning the meaning of what is said.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, Cornelius recommends a reading of 3 his Introduction to Philosophy. Among possible misunderstandings of the certain aspects of Psychology as an Experiential Science, Cornleius warns against the following: I especially ask you in that reading [of this work] not to interpret my attempts at genetic explanation causally. Also, wherever my manner of speaking might lead to the suspicion that I presuppose an empirical ego as given, I request an interpretation of this manner of speaking in the same sense in which you in your letter allow for the statement “I find such and such”, “my psychical livedexperiences are under consideration” as a starting point of phenomenological investigations – in which the “ego” is simply not a presupposition of the 4 investigation.

This understanding of statements about the investigator is of course a response to Husserl’s assertion that being human as well as other accidental features of his consciousness are irrelevant to phenomenology. As regards Cornelius‘ warning against construing his attempts at genetic explanation as causal, there will be more about this below.

1

“At least according to intention”, Cornelius remarks at the end of the letter and continues, “I am well aware of the fact that I was not in all cases able to carry out this intention completely” (Schuhmann [ed.] [1994] II, p. 31). 2 Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, p. 30. 3 See Cornelius (1903). 4 Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, p. 30.

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Finally, he tells Husserl that his characterization of British Empiricism as phenomenology is only a consequence of his habit of focusing on the viable philosophical aspects of this philosophy while overlooking 1 historical details. Husserl apparently took Cornelius’ recommendation of Introduction to Philosophy seriously, for his copy of this latter work bears some underlinings and a few annotations. But for the most part these annotations indicate the same dissatisfactions with Cornelius’ views. Husserl seems to have quickly lost interest in his discussions with Cornelius, for his copy of “Psychological Questions of Principle II” bears no marks at all. In the above-mentioned postcard, in which he responds to Cornelius’ letter, Husserl says that he now has the material necessary to decide his position vis-à-vis Cornelius and that both of them could benefit from a critical exchange. No further exchange, however, resulted. Husserl obviously viewed himself as moving on far beyond anything that Cornelius even remotely conceived of, but also far beyond anything that his fellow Austrian phenomenologists conceived of.

5.3. The Subject Matter of Phenomenology Now we shall consider the objections in “Psychological Questions of Principle II” which Cornelius raises against the Logical Investigations. According to Cornelius, the subject matter of phenomenology is to be 2 found in our immediately given experiences. But he insists upon the cohesion of these experiences in a single stream of consciousnessis given just as immediately as they are. Thus he stresses that they must not be conceived of atomistically. In addition, the following points concerning experiences are enumerated by Cornelius: 1) Not all of them are immediately given now, for some of them are aheady past. 2) Sensations, which are experiences of a certain kind, are not to be confused with physical objects or aspects of such objects. For example, the immediately given patch of red is not to be confused with the red of a physical object. 1 2

Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) II, p. 30 f. Cornelius (1906b), pp. 19 f.

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3) The concept of the object is no more immediately given than the object itself. 4) While an experience is present it is as such immediately given (perceived). In the second volume of the Logical Investigations, however, he finds the claim that experiences may occur without being given 1 (perceived) at all. As far as Cornelius is concerned, this claim can be made only if perception is regarded as an intentional phenomenon or an act, as it is indeed regarded in the second volume of the Logical Investigations. Let us now briefly look at Husserl’s theory of perception in this work, in order to understand Cornelius‘ arguments in “Psychological Questions of Principle II”. An act for Husserl is any experience, such as remembering, judging, or desiring, which is directed at some object. Unlike Brentano, Husserl does not regard every experience as an act. Sensations, for example, are for Husserl only parts of acts but do not as such refer to 2 objects as do the experiences just mentioned. If, however, it is the case that not every experience is an act, how does Husserl meet the challenge from someone who asks what differentiates acts from other experiences? Is there a criterion for drawing this distinction? The closest that Husserl comes to offering such a criterion in the Logical Investigations occurs when he considers the absolute refusal to regard any experience at all as an 3 act. In this case Husserl says that one can discern an act-character which is distinct from the other parts of the experience. For example, if someone sees a box from various angles, the visual sensations which thus inhere in this person’s consciousness must be accompanied by an act-character which allows the whole experience in question to be a perception of the box. Hence, we see that outer perception is the primary example that Husserl appeals to in order to persuade his opponents that some experiences must be characterized as acts. The act-character which is thereby introduced in his discussion of acts is also sometimes called “interpretation” (Interpretation, Deutung) or “apprehension” (Auffassung). What is then “interpreted” or “apprehended’“? According to Husserl, the non1

Hua XIX/1, p. 357. Hua XIX/1, pp. 358 f. 3 Hua XIX/1, pp. 394 f. 2

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intentional parts of an experience, e.g. the sensations in the case of outer perception, are interpreted. While the non-intentional parts of an experience are on Husserl view interpreted, this does not mean that the act is directed at these parts. For him it is better to say that, by virtue of the interpretation of them, the whole act of outer perception is directed at the box, the tree, etc. Although outer perception need not be accompanied by a perception of its parts or of the whole experience, Husserl allows for the possibility of turning inward and perceiving these. In some cases a perception of an experience, a socalled “inner perception”, is adequuate. In these cases it is a perception “which attributes to its objects nothing that is not intuitively presented and immanently given in the perception itself, and – conversely – which presents and posits them just as intuitively as they are experienced in and 1 with the perception”. The class of inadequate perceptions includes all outer perceptions and also certain inner perceptions as well. For the objects of inner perception are often experiences which are given as parts of the individual’s temporally extended consciousness, and these parts can 2 furthermore be localized in the body (e.g. a toothache). In these cases the inner perception is fused with other acts, e.g. outer perceptions and memories. But whenever the intended object perfectly coincides with a present content of consciousness the act of perception is an adequate one. In “Psychological Questions of Principle I” two major lines of argument seem to be used against the theory of perception just exposited. First, Cornelius attempts to show that this theory entails an undesirable 3 conclusion. Secondly, he proposes a certain criterion for deciding whether an experience is intentional and argues that adequate perception must 4 accordingly be classified as non-intentional. The first argument must be understood in response to Husserl’s claim that by denying the perceptual givenness of every experience he avoids an infinite regress (which is

1

Hua XIX/1, p. 365. Hua XIX/2, p. 761. 3 Cornelius (1906b), pp. 28 f. 4 Cornelius (1906b), pp. 32-37. 2

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otherwise implied, since each perception is an experience which must in 1 turn be perceived). According to Cornelius, Husserl avoids an infinite regress only at the price of implying that certain experiences, namely our inner perceptions, can be known only in the following moment. That is to say, Husserl’s acceptance of the infinite regress argument rests on the assumption that a perception of an experience is an additional experience. This assumption implies that some present experience must occur without being perceived. For example, if a sensation is perceived, then the perception of this sensation, the perception of this perception, or some perception of a higher order must occur without being perceived. But in this case, Cornelius argues, there must be certain experiences which can be known only by being remembered in a subsequent moment. This consequence of Husserl’s view of perception, however, seems absurd to Cornelius, since a memory image and an original experience are in all cases distinguishable. It is worth noting that Husserl’s theory of perception, according to Cornelius, is more appropriate as a description of judgment. Beginning with Psychology as an Experiential Science, Cornelius no longer includes perceptions among judgments, but restricts the reference of the term “judgment” to those cognitions which can occur only subsequently to the cognized content. Since he argues that the cognition of certain experiences, on Husserl’s view, can occur only as subsequent presentations, he concludes that what counts as inner perception for Husserl is in many cases judgment. In the second volume of the Logical Investigations, however, we find an explicit rejection of the view that perception as such 2 is a kind of judgment. According to Husserl, an object of perception need not be a state of affairs, i.e. something to be referred to by expressions of the form “ that such and such is the case”, while a judgment must in all cases be directed towards a state of affairs. On the one hand, it may appear that Cornelius argues not only that Husserl’s theory of perception entails an intrinsically undesirable proposition (that certain inner perceptions must be judgments of previously existing contents), but also that this theory involves both the denial and affmation of this proposition and is therefore 1 2

Hua XIX/1, pp. 366 f. Hua XIX/1, pp. 461 f.; Hua XIX/2, p. 660.

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internally inconsistent. On the other hand, one must keep in mind that Husserl and Cornelius characterize judgment in strikingly different ways. This was indeed the area of their disagreement in the first place and most likely stood in the way of further correspondence. Now we turn to Cornelius’ other major argument against Husserl’s theory of perception. Cornelius introduces his criterion for deciding whether an experience is intentional or not by considering those experiences which are obviously not intentionally directed at what they are said to be “of”. For example, someone whose hand is burnt by fire has a feeling of pain, but this feeling of pain is not to be compared with the memory of pain; the “of” in the latter case indicates intentional reference, 1 but the “of” in the former case does not. Hence, we cannot simply say that acts are those experiences which are of this or that. There must be some additional criterion. “As far as I can see,” says Cornelius, “the missing criterion for delimiting the class of experiences under discussion can be based on only one fact: on the merely intentional givenness of the object in 2 the intentional experience”. Such givenness is to be contrasted with real givenness, as the pain is really given in the feeling of pain. If, for example, I remember something that occurred yesterday, the object of this memory is by contrast not really given in the act of remembering. Since adequate perception precisely coincides with real givenness and is therefore anything but the intentional givenness of what is adequately perceived, it follows that adequate perception is not an act. In addition to these major arguments for Cornelius’ theory of perception, another one occurs to him upon considering his own preoccupation with art and artpedagogy. For the sake of completeness this argument may simply be cited: “Whoever is used to attending to not only the objects, but especially to the appearances and their distinctions – as everyone does in the visual realm who draws or paints according to nature – will be struck oddly by Husserl’s manner of speaking which always allows only the object and 3 never the appearance to be perceived”.

1

See Künne (1986), pp. 180 ff. Cornelius (1906b), pp. 33 f. 3 Cornelius (1906b), p. 31. 2

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Before closing this discussion of Cornelius‘ reply to Husserl, mention should be made concerning remarks about Husserl which are to be found in Cornelius’ work subsequent to the publication of “Psychological 1 Questions of Principle”. These are little more than passing contemptuous references to Husserl’s notion of Wesensschau. Though Cornelius brands this notion as “mysticism”, it nevertheless turns out that the method recommended by Husserl for the “seeing of essences”, i.e. free variation of imagined examples, is very similar to the method that Cornelius recommends for obtaining universally valid knowledge about perceptual concepts.

6. Conclusion In view of all the disagreements between Husserl and Cornelius, it may seem strange that Cornelius insists upon their fundamental affinity. While Cornelius dismisses the possibility of perceiving anything other than a present content of consciousness, Husserl maintains that outer perception can only be construed as the givenness of a physical thing or its properties, relations, etc. While Cornelius agrees with Brentano that every experience is as such perceived, Husserl rejects this thesis in order to avoid an infinite regress of inner perceptions. And while the fundamental philosophical science which Cornelius advocates is to consist of investigations which are both empirical and genetic (though genetic in a sense which precludes causal explanations), the phenomenology in the first edition of the Logical Investigations is allegedly neither empirical nor genetic. Why, then, does Cornelius insist on the closeness between his views and Husserl’s? From Cornelius’ standpoint, he and Husserl both advocate a fundamental philosophical discipline which is to be 1) presuppositionless, 2) not causal-explanatory, and 3) prior to any distinction between mental and physical. And even though Cornelius is committed to a thorough-going empiricism, he diverges from the empiricist tradition by claiming that 1

See Cornelius (1926), p. 49. Though Husserl is not mentioned by name here, he is clearly under attack in this passage. See also Cornelius (1921), p. 94 and Cornelius (1931).

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empirically derived knowledge can be universally valid. Insofar as his fundamental philosophical science aims at such knowledge about experiences (to be reached by imagining examples) and is not to consist of mere probabilities, this aim is a fourth point on which Cornelius and Husserl agree. Nevertheless, such agreements are of rather limited interest unless we can find overlaps in the results of their respective investigations. In their characterization of sensations they do appear to reach the same result. For both Husserl and Cornelius, sensations are non-intentional components of consciousness rather than acts. Hence, they both reject the unqualified Brentanian characterization of all consciousness as intentional. Besides this result and the above-mentioned methodological ones, it is difficult to find any important agreements between Husserl and Cornelius. Historically speaking, however, Husserl and Cornelius have a very similar background. Whether or not we should add Cornelius’ name to the canonical list of phenomenologists, many of whom have much less in common with Husserl than he does, the foregoing consideration of his relation to one of the outstanding Brentanists does indicate that he is deserving of some attention as one of the philosophers on the periphery of Austrian phenomenology.

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MEINONG ON PERCEPTION AND OBJECTIVES

The topic of propositional attitudes, including propositional seeing, has been one of considerable interest for some time now. However, it is too frequently left unnoticed that this topic was pioneered in Austrian phenomenology. The two Austrian phenomenologists who can be given most credit for their pioneering investigations concerning such matters are Husserl and Meinong. The focus here is Meinong’s attempt to investigate them, but some consideration of connections with Husserl will prove illuminating. What is meant by “propositional seeing” is of course that seeing (or perhaps perception of any kind) which is described by joining a “that” clause to the relevant verb. If, for instance, I look out the window and say, “I see that the meadows are green”, this appears to be a report of an instance of propositional seeing. There are various questions which can be raised about this notion. Here I shall be concerned with two of them. First of all, it must be asked how propositional seeing is related to other types of perception, or whether all perception is in some fundamental way propositional in character. Let us now examine Meinong’s answers to these questions, especially drawing from his work in which the topic of perception is most single-mindedly treated, namely On the Experiential 2 Foundations of our Knowledge. By no means is propositional seeing the only propositional attitude imaginable. Without actually seeing that the meadows are green, I can believe that this is the case, perhaps merely because some reliable person has told me so. Moreover, without seeing or believing that the meadows are green, I can “suppose” that this is the case, perhaps for the sake of some thought-experiment or in the context of a story. Believing and supposing in the sense just indicated are both acknowledged by Meinong respectively under the headings of “judgments” (Urteile) and 1

This essay is a revised version of a paper that was originally published under the title “Meinong on Perception: Two Questions concerning Propositional Seeing” in Grazer philosophische Studien 50 (1995), pp. 445-455. 2 Meinong (1906).

“assumptions” (Annahmen). Both propositional attitudes are characterized by the fact that they can be either affirmative or negative, whereas judgments also have the additional characteristic of conviction 1 (Überzeugtheit) which is lacking in assumptions. While the class of assumptions is alien to the teachings of Brentano, Meinong follows his 2 mentor in classifying all perceptions among judgments. We can, to be sure, believe without seeing, and therefore not all judgments are perceptions. But we cannot see without believing, and therefore all perceptions are judgments. Moreover, since one always judges that this or that is the case, i.e. since the objects of judgments are always objectives (objects indicated by “that” clauses), it follows that all perceptions have 3 objectives as their objects. Thus we see how Meinong answers the first of the above questions, namely how propositional seeing relates to other types of perception. The answer is that all perception is fundamentally propositional in character. But now the second question arises, namely whether the range of objectives accessible to perception is somehow restricted. This is no easy matter for Meinong, since he regards objectives as falling into two classes: 4 being (Sein) and being-thus (Sosein). The objective which we have already encountered, namely that the meadows are green, is an instance of being-thus. But the fact that the green meadows exist is an instance of being. Since seeing that the meadows are green is accordingly an apparent case where perception has an instance of being-thus as its objective, the question arises whether the range of perceptual objectives is restricted to instances of being-thus. As it turns out, Meinong answers this question in a way that could be surprising to many, for he maintains that the act called “seeing that the meadows are green” is in its entirety no genuine instance of perception. The perceptual objective, according to him, is always an instance of being, 1

Meinong (1902), pp. 1 ff. Meinong (1906), pp. 16 ff. See Brentano (1974), pp. 276 ff. 3 The term “object” is used in this paper as a translation of Gegenstand, not of Objekt. I would recommend that Objekt be translated as “non-propositional object”. 4 Meinong (1902), p. 191. 2

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more particularly an instance of existence. The class of objectives called “being” divides into existences and subsistences (Bestände). The former are characterized by the temporality the object which has being, whereas 2 objects which have being in the sense that they subsist are timeless. The meadows which are seen to be green exist, whereas the difference between red and blue is an example of an object which subsists. But a perception, Meinong insists, is a judgment which can never have a subsistence or a being-thus as its object. Thus, if we were to describe a perception in accordance with Meinong’s recommendation, it would always take the form “I perceive that X exists”. If someone says, for instance, that he sees a tree, he would more accurately describe his perceptual experience if he said, “I see that a tree exists”. In opposition to Meinong one may insist, simply from the standpoint of common sense, that seeing that the meadows are green is a genuine perception. Indeed, it seems that instances of being-thus are more often claimed to be seen than instances of existence. Only under exceptional circumstances does one report a perception in the form “I see that X exists”. But it is rather commonplace to say that one sees that the meadows are green, that the sky is blue, that one building is taller than another, and the like. In reply to such an appeal to ordinary language and common sense, however, Meinong makes the two following points: 1) that the alleged instances of perceiving that an object has being-thus (e.g. that the meadows are green) are also cases where one judges that the object under consideration exists and may therefore at least contain perceptions; 2) that what is left over in the objective when this existence is, as it were, subtracted is a pure instance of being-thus which can be known only by an a priori judgment, not a perception. The first point, namely that the alleged perception that the meadows are green involves the judgment that the meadows exist, and indeed, Meinong adds, that the green meadows exist, is unlikely to meet with disapproval. As Meinong himself maintains, we have a prejudice in favor of the actual,

1 2

Meinong (1906), pp. 19 ff. Meinong (1902), p. 189.

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i.e. in favor of that which exists. Under normal circumstances we would not be interested in whether the meadows are green, for instance, if we did not believe that they existed. We must of course note here that Meinong is not claiming that a judgment concerned with a being-thus cannot occur in separation from a judgment concerned with existence, but only that in cases of the kind under consideration, i.e. alleged cases of perceiving that a certain object has being-thus, one judges that the object in question exists. The second point is that it can be known a priori that the object has being-thus. This of course presupposes that it is indeed not absurd to judge that an object has being-thus without judging that this object exists. At stake here is Meinong’s celebrated principle of independence: that a being-thus can obtain independently of existence and, in some cases, 2 independently of any being whatsoever. But even if we accept this principle, it may still be asked whether being-thus is a priori knowable independently of existence. Let us look at Meinong’s argument for this claim. There are two ways, he tells us, in which we can construe the judgment that the meadows are green if we leave aside the judgment that they exist. “The presentational complex which the sight of the meadows offers can, first of all, be analyzed, while special attention is given to the color as a property ofthe 3 meadows”. Here is the first way in which the judgment of being-thus under consideration can be construed. In this case, Meinong maintains, the judgment is in some sense analytic. It is of course not a blatent tautology, 4 such as “the golden mountain is golden”. “But this does not change the fact”, he continues, “that one juxtaposes a part with a whole, from which 5 one picks out this part, and ascribes it to the whole”. That is to say, the property of greenness is analyzed out of the presented complex and also ascribed to this complex. Such a judgment is analytic and therefore a priori. The other way in which the judgment of being-thus can be 1

Meinong, (1904), pp. 4 ff. Meinong (1904), pp. 10 ff. 3 Meinong (1906), p. 20. 4 Meinong’s view of analyticity is peculiar insofar as it apparently allows for analytic judgments which are not tautologies. 5 Meinong (1906), p. 21. 2

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construed is as “a juxtaposition of that which is seen and that which is customarily thought in the case of the word ‘green’. Our judgment thus claims or implies nothing but agreement. Now whether two things agree, i.e. are 1 equal, or not, is again decided only from the nature of these things ...” Whenever we decide something about objects from their nature, the judgment in question is a priori. Thus, in whatever way one construes the purely predicative judgment that the meadows are green, this judgment turns out to be a priori. Since perceptions are never a priori, it follows that the judgment in question and indeed all purely predicative judgments are not perceptions. Let us now consider the strength of this argument. It would take us much too far afield here to challenge the principle of independence. We shall grant for the sake of argument that there is nothing absurd in a judgment of being-thus without any additional judgment of being and correspondingly nothing absurd in an objective of being-thus without the being of that which has being-thus. Let us also grant that Meinong has exhaustively enumerated the ways in which purely predicative judgments can be construed. We now ask: How strong is his argument that the act called “seeing that the meadows are green” and similar acts are not genuine cases of perception? First of all, consider the second way in which he construes the purely predicative judgment, namely as a judgment about “agreement”. According to some philosophers, all cases of predication are to be construed in this manner. Against this view, especially as put forward by Hans Cornelius, Meinong had already argued extensively in 1900 that this theory of predication, the so-called “comparison theory”, involves an unacceptable 2 infinite regress. If we judge that the greenness of the meadows, for instance, is equal or similar to another greenness which somehow functions as paradigmatic, we thereby ascribe an equality or similarity, a so-called “agreement”, to the two objects. In order to do this, however, we must again compare this agreement with another agreement, i.e. another case of 1

Meinong (1906), p. 21. Meinong (1969), pp. 476 ff. The article which is cited here has been discussed in detail in R. D. Rollinger, (1993b), pp. 74-80. It is also translated into English as an appendix of this book (pp. 137-182; see pp. 167 ff. for the passage cited in the text). 2

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similarity or equality, and so on ad infinitum. This argument against the comparison theory is quite sound. Therefore, it must be admitted that somewhere along the line another manner of predicating besides comparing comes into play. Meinong of course identifies this other manner of predicating as an analysis of the presentational complex and concludes that the resulting judgment would be analytic. But let us look at his example, namely “the meadows are green”, more closely and consider it not from the standpoint of the speaker, but rather from that of the listener. It is very easy to conceive of a situation where the speaker tells me something new about the meadows when he says that they are green. Perhaps he tells me so on the telephone. I am thus in a situtation in which I cannot look for myself and see that the meadows are green. But I surely cannot come to know that this is the case by analysis, as I can come to know, for instance, that a square is a rectangle. In addition to this, there are obviously other difficulties in Meinong’s claim that the purely predicative judgment that the meadows are green is analytic and therefore a priori. He tells us that necessity is one 1 of the features of a priori judgments. In this case greenness would have to belong to the meadows by necessity. How then could the meadows change? How, for example, could they become brown? Another difficulty is to be found in Meinong’s description of a judgment as an act which is founded on a presentation. Already in On Assumptions the role of the presentation had become minimal in his psychology, not to mention the fact that in On the Experiential Foundations of our Knowledge he maintains that for an inner perception an underlying presentation is not 2 necessary. It may also be pointed out here that, according to Meinong himself, greenness (Grün) and something green (Grünes) do not stand in relation to each other as part and whole, but rather as property and 3 substance. These objections need not be further discussed here. Enough has been said to show that his conception of purely predicative judgments as analytic, or as a priori in any other way, is highly problematic. 1

Meinong (1906), p. 10. Meinong (1906), pp. 72 f. 3 Meinong (1906), pp. 26 ff. 2

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Since Meinong has failed to demonstrate that purely predicative judgments are a priori, the question still remains whether cases such as the alleged seeing that the meadows are green are genuine cases of perception. While Meinong’s attempt to show that they are not is by no means successful, it does not follow from this that his conclusion is false. In order to defend the claim that perceptions can be predicative, we may of course resort to our previously made appeal to ordinary language. As Meinong 1 himself admits, our actual statements about perceived objects are commonly formulated predicatively and seldom formulated existentially. There are of course cases in which we make statements about the existence of certain objects, but it is difficult to find ones which can be construed as reports of perception. The closest cases which Meinong can find are exclamations such as “land!” and “fire!”. These of course are not particularly conducive to Meinong’s thesis that all perceptions are existential judgments, not only because such exclamations are not formulated propositionally, but also because the closest propositional approximations to them would not be purely existential. If, for instance, I yell “fire!”, I am not manifesting my perception that fire exists, but rather that fire is here, e.g. in this building or in this room. In face of the difficulty that our statements about perceived objects are seldom formulated existentially, Meinong takes comfort in the observation: “The pure perception is fundamentally always inexpressible. This is why the statments which are as a rule attached to perceptions are fundamentally 2 not perceptual statements at all”. The inability of language to report our perceptions can be found in an example as simple as “I see a tree”. The usage of the indefinite article indicates that the speaker regards the object as one that belongs within a certain class-collective (Klassenkollektiv). Insofar as the speaker conveys this, he conveys more about himself than his current perceptual experience. We can add to Meinong’s observation here that the situation is not much better when we use a definite article. If I see the tree, the question naturally arises: “Which tree?”. I thereby convey

1 2

Meinong (1906), p. 23. Meinong (1906), p. 24.

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that I have picked out the object of perception from among others, usually involving all sorts of judgments which are by no means perceptual. We could of course go on here, with grammar as our guide, observing the difficulties and perhaps the impossibility of making purely percepetual reports. But let us grant Meinong’s point that the pure perception is fundamentally always inexpressible and ask whether this gives his theory of perception more plausibility than what one would otherwise expect in view of the fact that our perceptual statements are seldom formulated existentially. I would argue that it does not, because we must at least admit that some statements about perceived objects come closer to conveying pure perceptions than others. If, for instance, I say that I see the tree which I planted a year ago, this statement is farther removed from the pure perception “I see the tree in front of me”. Granted that some statements are more restricted to reporting perceptions than others, we must expect that a theory of perception should come as close as possible to the form which such statements must have. According to Meinong, they must have the form “I perceive that X exists”. Thus he assumes that language is, after all, of some value in identifying certain judgments as perceptions. His claim that perceptions are ultimately inexpressible should therefore give him no consolation in his peculiar theory of perception. While ordinary language would thus lead us to think that the propositional form which perceptual reports should take need not be restricted to the one which Meinong suggests, we are still left with the question whether perception in all cases has an objective as its object, regardless as to whether this objective be construed existentially or predicatively. Meinong’s view is of course that it does, but this view is likewise not free of difficulties. It must first of all be decided how to deal with those instances of perception which are not formulated propositionally, e.g. seeing a tree, hearing a sound, or smelling an odor. According to Meinong, the closest we can come to an accurate report of such perceptions is by saying that we see that a tree exists and the like. It would of course be most peculiar if someone actually adopted such a practice, for as already remarked, it is unusual to formulate statements about perceived objects existentially in the first place. But even if we disregard this difficulty, another one remains for Meinong, but also for

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others who maintain that there are any cases at all where perception refers to an objective. The difficulty which I have in mind here lies in the fact that objectives, according to Meinong, can themselves have being only in the sense that they can subsist. This is true even if the objective in question is an existential one. While a chair or table is an object which can exist, a so-called real object, the existence of a table or a chair is an ideal object, i.e. one which can only subsist. This is not to say that all objectives subsist, for some of them, e.g. the existence of unicorns, neither exist nor subsist. It is only to say that, if an objective has being, this being is subsistence and not existence. This of course means that the objectives which have being are timeless. Since Meinong also holds that perceptions always refer to objectives and indeed ones which have being, it follows that the objects of perception are ultimately timeless objects. Yet, if this is so, then it is peculiar that these objects are available to perception only at certain times. I can perceive a table, i.e. that a table exists, only while the table exists. Yet, since the existence of the table has no temporal determination, why is it not possible at any time to perceive that the table exists? The same problem arises in Husserl’s theory of perception. While Husserl does not maintain that perception is in all cases an act which refers to objectives, he nonetheless claims that in some cases they do. According to Husserl, one 1 can see this white paper, but also that this paper is white. We may note that he feels no need to construe propositional seeing here as existential rather than predicative. But the important point at this juncture is not only that he allows for states of affairs as objects of perception, but that he also classifies propositional seeing as a type of categorial perception and contrasts it with straightforward perception (schlichte Wahrnehmung) or, as he also says, sensory perception (sinnliche Wahrnehmung). One way in which Husserl tries to illuminate this contrast is in terms of the objects of perception: while the object of sensory perception is real, the object of categorial perception is ideal. Moreover, as is well known, Husserl tells us little about the real and the ideal, except that the former is temporal and the

1

Hua XIX/2, pp. 659 ff.

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latter is not. Thus, we see the same problem which Meinong faces in his theory of perception cropping up in Husserl’s as well. A perception as mundane and innocent as seeing that this paper is white suddenly has the status of an act whose object is ideal and therefore timeless. But we ask again: If the being-white of the paper is timeless, then why is it accessible to perception only while the paper is white? If this question really poses a problem for Meinong and Husserl, it seems that there are only two ways in which their theories of perception can be revised. One way is to forgo the notion of propositional seeing. Such a step of course would be a very extreme revision for Meinong, for he would also have to forgo one of two claims which are indeed fundamental for him: 1) that perceiving is judging, and 2) that the object of judging is always an objective. The only other way to circumvent the problem just pointed out would be to construe objectives, or at least the perceivable ones, as temporally determined objects. Perhaps both Meinong and Husserl regard them as timeless because they labor under the presupposition that only the mental or physical is temporally determined. Adolf Reinach (to some degree a pupil of Husserl), however, reached the conclusion that there are non-mental and non-physical objects, e.g. 2 obligations, which come into and go out of existence. Perhaps we should seriously entertain the notion that objectives or states of affairs, which ever term one prefers here, are likewise temporally determined, in spite of their being neither mental nor physical. We have raised two questions about Meinong’s theory of perception. We have seen how he answers these by claiming that all perception is propositional in character and that the objective of perception is in each case an existence rather than a subsistence or a being-thus. We have also seen that there are difficulties in these claims. The second claim is argued for by Meinong in a way that is unacceptable and also stands in conflict with our normal linguistic practices. The claim that all perception is propositional in character, or even the more modest thesis of Husserl that

1 2

Hua XIX/1, p. 129. See Reinach, (eds.) Schuhmann and Smith (1989), pp. 141-278.

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only some perceptions are propositional, is still difficult to accept as long as the objective of perception is regarded as timeless. Thus we see that Meinong’s theory of perception is flawed as it stands. There are problems in both of the answers to the questions which have been raised. Nevertheless, these problems are not easily swept aside as mere peculiarities of an antiquated theory. This is particularly the case regarding the claim that all perceptions are propositional in character. As we have seen, this claim is entailed by the characterization of perceptions as judgments and of judgments as acts which refer to states of affairs. It is not implausible to characterize perceptions as judgments, for it is difficult to dispell any notion of conviction in connection with perceptions, as of course we may do in connection with acts of imagining. It is furthermore tempting to construe states of affairs as the objects, since ordinary language always permits us to append “that” clauses to “I judge”. However, as long as we adopt these positions, we are faced with the difficulty of reporting perceptions such as seeing a tree or hearing a sound in propositional form. This difficulty and others which troubled Meinong in his theory of perception are still with us today.

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AUSTRIAN THEORIES OF JUDGMENT: 1 BOLZANO, BRENTANO, MEINONG, AND HUSSERL

1. Introduction In nineteenth century German philosophy it was among the prevailing views that mind-functions were to be divided into three classes: thinking, feeling, and willing. In Austria, however, two of the towering philosophers, Bernard Bolzano and Franz Brentano, held that presentations (Vorstellungen) and judgments (Urteile) make up two distinct classes of mindfunctions. Moreover, both of these philosophers saw it as an important task to work out a theory of judgment in particular. It is accordingly no surprise that Brentano’s most outstanding pupils, Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl, developed theories of judgment, though with results that were markedly different from those of their predecessors and from each other’s. In the following the Austrian theories of judgment from Bolzano to Husserl will be examined. The topic under consideration in these theories, though apparently little more than a chapter in descriptive psychology, is of great significance because it gives us access to an interesting intersection for issues in epistemology, ontology, and philosophy of logic. 2. Bolzano In §143 of the second volume of Theory of Science Bolzano includes judgments among the various classes of “psychical phenomena” (psychische Erscheinungen), which are characterized as “effects which a soul (any 2 simple entity as such) brings about”. In the third volume of this four1

This essay is a revised version of a paper that was originally published in Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays in Central European Philosophy, edited by Wolfgang Huemer and Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos-Verlag, 2004), pp. 257-284. 2 Bolzano (1837) II, §143, 67. It will later be seen that for the other Austrian philosophers whose theories of judgment will be examined here judgments are psychical phenomena in a different sense.

volume work he enters into a more focused investigation concerning the 1 nature of judgment as part of his “theory of cognition” or “epistemology“ 2 (Erkenntnislehre). In §291 of the third volume he presents five 3 characteristics which he ascribes to judgments. The first of these characteristics is described as follows: “As we assume for every subjective presentation a certain objective one that makes up its material, we shall also have to assume for every judgment a proposition in whose appearance it consists, and which we consequently call the material 4 of this judgment”. What Bolzano means by “proposition” (Satz) had already been characterized early in the work as “any statement that something is or is not, regardless whether this statement is true or false, whether it is put into words by anyone or not, or even thought in the mind 5 6 or not”. A proposition is, in addition, regarded as non-real. An objective presentation (objektive Vorstellung) had also been characterized, namely as “anything that can occur as a constituent part in a proposition but is as such 7 8 not a proposition” and as non-real. In the proposition “Caius has cleverness” objective presentations can be found corresponding to the words “Caius”, “has”, and “cleverness”. When Bolzano speaks of a subjective presentation (subjektive Vorstellung) he means “anything that can occur as a consituent part in a judgment without itself being a whole 1

Bolzano (1837) III, §§290–321. Bolzano (1837) IIII, §§269–321. 3 Already in Bolzano (1837) I, §34 Bolzano enumerates ten properties which he ascribes to judgments. Most of these, however, are accounted for in the list discussed in the text. Moreover, some of the properties in question prove to be of little importance in the comparison of Bolzano’s theory of judgment with the other ones to be discussed later on. 4 Bolzano (1837) III, §291, 108. 5 Bolzano (1837) I, §19, 77. 6 Bolzano (1837) I, §19, 78. In order to distinguish the proposition from its linguistic expression as well as any occurrence in the mind, Bolzano often uses the term “ proposition in itself “ (Satz an sich). Here the term “ proposition “ will suffice for these non-mental, non-linguistic, and non-real bearers of truth which Bolzano calls Sätze an sich. 7 Bolzano (1837) I, §48, 216. 8 Bolzano (1837) I, §48, 217. 2

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judgment”. Thus when I judge, for example, that Caius has cleverness, the effects of my soul that are expressed by the words “Caius”, “has”, and “cleverness” are subjective presentations. The corresponding objective 2 presentation in each case makes up the material of the subjective one. Likewise, the proposition that corresponds to a judgment, according to Bolzano, is the material of the judgment in question. This material, however, is not to be confused with the parts or the object of the judgment. Granted that the material is not related to the relevant judgment as the object of this judgment, the question naturally arises as to what sort of relationship obtains between the judgment and the corresponding proposition. The only other instance of such a relationship that Bolzano indicates is the one between a subjective presentation and the corresponding presentation in itself. Real objects cannot have other real objects as their material, nor can non-real objects be the material of other non-real objects. Though Bolzano sometimes says that a judgment contains a proposi3 tion, his stated preference is to speak in the manner just indicated, namely to designate the proposition as the material rather than the content of a judgment. Bolzano explains that he prefers the term “material” in reference to objective presentations because the term “content” (Inhalt) is used for 4 other purposes. Moreover, it is desirable to stress that the relation of propositions to judgments is the same as that of objective presentations to 1

Bolzano (1837) III, §270, 5ff. Bolzano (1837) I, §48, 217; Bolzano (1837) III, §271, 8f. 3 See, e.g. Bolzano (1837) I, §19, 78: “ Only the proposition thought-of or asserted, i.e. only the thought of a proposition, likewise the judgment which contains a certain proposition has existence in the mind of the entity that thinks the thought or passes the judgment, whereas the proposition, which makes up the content of the thought or judgment, is non-existent”. 4 Bolzano (1837) III, §271, 9. See Bolzano (1837) I, §56, 243–6, where Bolzano elaborates on his concept of the content of a presentation. Bolzano also says, “Every proposition necessarily contains several presentations “ (Bolzano (1837) II, §122, 4). In this case, however, the content is simply the parts, whereas the proposition is not taken to be a part of a judgment. This is one more reason why Bolzano’s preference to speak of the proposition as the material rather than the content of a judgment is understandable. The judgment does not relate to the corresponding proposition as the proposition does to its constituent objective presentations. 2

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subjective ones. To this extent he is justified in calling the proposition that corresponds to a judgment its material. In discussions of the relation of a judgment to the corresponding proposition Bolzano also characterizes judgment “as the appearance of a propo1 sition”. This may well suggest that the material of a judgment is the same as its object. This consequence would introduce difficulties into Bolzano’s theory of judgment far too complex to discuss here. However, such difficulties are avoidable if the characterization of judgment as the appearance of a proposition is understood in a different way. To say that a proposition appears in a judgment need not mean that the proposition appears to the entity who passes the judgment whenever it does so, for it can also mean that the proposition appears whenever one reflects on the judgment. This matter, however, is left undecided by Bolzano. It is important to note that Bolzano regards propositions as essentially predicative. More particularly, each one has the structure of subject2 copula-predicate. Each element in this structure is an objective presentation, which may in many cases be analyzed into further presentations in themselves. The structure in question, according to Bolzano, is more distinctly expressed when the copula “is” (or “are”) is replaced with “has” (or “have”) and the predicate term is correspondingly expressed by a noun. The proposition normally expressed by “Caius is clever” is accordingly better expressed for purposes of logic by “Caius has cleverness”. Even existential propositions, contrary to Kant and (later) 3 Brentano, are regarded by Bolzano as instances of such predication. In view of such considerations it is accurate to say that he views judgments as predicative. Under the heading “proposition” Bolzano treats most of the logical topics many other philosophers, including Kant and Brentano, treat under the heading “judgment”. In his elementary logic propositions in fact take the place (alongside objective presentations and inferences) that was assigned to judgments (alongside concepts and inferences) by most other nine1

Bolzano (1837) III, §291, 109. Bolzano (1837) II, §126. 3 Bolzano (1837) II, §142. 2

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teenth century logicians. It would take us too far afield to discuss Bolzano’s in-depth treatment of these topics. However, since they have received far more attention for the last few decades than any other aspect of his philosophy, one may consult some of the more outstanding efforts in secondary literature regarding propositions and their place in Bolzano’s 1 logic. The second characteristic Bolzano ascribes to judgments is the following: “As actuality is ascribed to every subjective presentation as such, we must also ascribe to every judgment as such actuality; namely, actuality in the mind of that entity which passes it, and for the time in 2 which this entity passes it”. Accordingly he thinks that judgments not only come and go, just as so many other actual things do, but belong to particular minds, whether these be human or not. Bolzano states the third characteristic as follows: “If every proposition is composed of parts which ultimately dissolve into presentations, every judgment as the appearance of a proposition must also be composed of parts; and more particularly there are as many objective presentations in the proposition which is the judgment’s material as the judgment must 3 contain subjective presentations corresponding to them”. To this selfexplanatory statement Bolzano adds that the simultaneous occurrence of these subjective presentations is not a sufficient condition for having the judgment. Moreover, in this regard it should be considered that there are for him instances in which a proposition is merely presented and is not the material of a judgment. These mere presentations of propositions are comparable to the phenomena which Meinong calls “assumptions” (Annahmen) and are also taken into account by Husserl. The fourth characteristic which Bolzano attributes to judgments is the following: “In order for presentations a, b, c, d..., from which the judgment can be composed, to be able to form this judgment, they must all at least appear simultaneously insofar as before one of them has completely 1

The following works are recommended in this regard: Berg (1962), Morscher (1973) und Textor (1996). 2 Bolzano (1837) III, §291, 108f. 3 Bolzano (1837) III, §291, 109.

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vanished the other must have already begun”. Here Bolzano shows some appreciation for the difficult issue of time-consciousness in relation to judgments, but he still leaves open the question regarding judgments which involve a long series of presentations. Apparently he finds it satisfactory if only two members of each link in the chain, so to speak, exist simultaneously. Yet, it is difficult to conceive of how the initial presentation in a judgment could be completely non-existent while the final one exists. In view of the third and fourth characteristics, it may of course be asked what it is that distinguishes a judgment from a mere presentation, provided that this presentation has the same material and thus has the same presentational parts in the same temporal order. Bolzano answers that, in order for a judgment to come about, such parts must be combined in a peculiar way. The combination, he says, is “a kind of interaction among these presentations. Of what nature, however, this interaction must be in order to produce a judgment, I am unable to determine; and maybe it is even incapable of any other determination than the one via the concept of the 2 effect that is to be brought about”. In view of the fact that Brentano, as will be seen below, insists that a judgment cannot merely be a combination of presentations, it is important to see that Bolzano likewise does not wish to say that just any combination of presentations is a judgment. On his view, there must be a causal relation among the presentations. Yet, when Bolzano speaks of the effect that is to be brought about by a judgment, this easily suggests that what distinguishes the judgment is its influence on willing and action. It will be seen that Brentano emphatically rejects this characterization of judgments. The fifth and final characteristic which belongs to judgments, on Bolzano‘s view, is the following one: “ However great the influence exercized by our will on the origin and nature of our judgments insofar as we... voluntarily direct our attention to certain presentations and away from others and thus can change our whole object, it is nonetheless never dependent solely on our will whether we pass a judgment or not; rather, this 1 2

Bolzano (1837) III, §291, 109. Bolzano (1837) III, §291, 110.

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[judgment] results in accordance with a certain law of necessity merely due to the nature of all the presentations which have just been present in our 1 soul”. Here Bolzano embraces a determinism regarding judgments. Though the above characteristics are stated by Bolzano in order to indicate the nature of judgments, he has a good deal more to say about them. Only some of his additional remarks can be considered here. Confidence (Zuversicht) is identified as a property that belongs to judgments and distinguished most emphatically from the vivacity (Lebhaftig2 keit) of the constituent presentations. The distinction between these is made especially clear in instances where presentations are highly vivid and yet confidence is not great or vice-versa. If, for instance, a voluptuary is told that his pursuit of pleasure will end in pain, his presentation of the pain may be extremely vivid while he does not with any significant degree of confidence judge that his pursuit of pleasure will have pain as a consequence. Someone may, by contrast, hold to religious beliefs with great confidence, but little vivacity of presentations. In both cases, Bolzano remarks, the judgment is not particularly effective. Like subjective presentations, judgments come into being and pass away, on Bolzano‘s view. Moreover, he says that they leave traces of 3 themselves behind. In some cases the traces can be intuited (angeschaut) and thus the judgment is made clear, while in others it is left in obscurity. If the intuition of the judgment is itself intuited and there further arises the judgment that the past judgment did occur, it is permissible to say that the 4 past judgment is remembered. Yet, the mere memory of a judgment is by no means a sufficient condition for an actual repetition of the judgment, as is made clear in the case in which one remembers a judgment one no 5 longer regards as correct. As mental occurrences that come and go, judgments can stand in causal relations to other judgments as well as other realities, on Bolzano‘s view. 1

Bolzano (1837) III, §291, 110. Bolzano (1837) III, §292, 112 f. 3 Bolzano (1837) III, §297, 118 ff. 4 Bolzano (1837) III, §297, 121 f. 5 Bolzano (1837) III, §297, 122. 2

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In this regard he distinguishes between mediate and immediate judgments and characterizes the former as ones caused by other judgments and the 1 latter as ones not caused by other judgments. Bolzano conceives of inference in terms of such causal relations among judgments. Yet, in order for a judgment M to be mediated by judgments A, B, C, D,..., these must 2 make up the complete cause (die vollständige Ursache) of judgment M. Here Bolzano leaves out of account physical causes as well as mental ones which are not judgments, e.g. presentations, emotions, and volitions. It is very hard for us nowadays to accept the suggestion that there are judgments whose complete cause consists of judgments and absolutely nothing physical (e.g. occurrences in the brain). Moreover, this assertion was made by Bolzano before experimental psychology arose in the later nineteenth century. Yet, however out-dated and implausible the above characterization of inference seems to be, philosophers still go on speaking of causes without providing justification, whether these be construed as mental or physical. According to Bolzano, there are also immediate judgments, since “the existence of the mediate ones is, after all, ultimately conceivable only by 3 means of the immediate ones”. Among immediate judgments he acknowledges two distinct possibilities which are to be found in the following forms: a) “I – have – the appearance A”, b) “This (which I am 4 intuiting right now) – is – an A”. Though he does not wish to say every judgment of such forms is itself immediate, he insists that one cannot be made unless an immediate judgment of the form in question is also made. In both cases the immediate judgment is called a “perceptual judgment” (Wahrnehmungsurteil) by Bolzano. In the case of judgments of type b) it is the subject that is an intuitive presentation, whereas the predicate is so in the case of judgments of type a). In addition to these, he also maintains that there are immediate conceptual judgments, for otherwise all mediate

1

Bolzano (1837) III, §300, 123. Bolzano (1837) III, §300, 124. 3 Bolzano (1837) III, §300, 125. 4 Bolzano (1837) III, §300, 131. 2

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judgments would ultimately have to arise from perceptual ones and this is 1 clearly impossible. Since Bolzano speaks of perceptual judgments, the question naturally arises as to whether these are distinguishable from the perceptions themselves. As it turns out, he maintains that there is no distinction to be drawn here, for the ascription of the faculty of perception to animals already entails the ascription of the faculty of judgment to them, though he cautions that they do not remember their judgments and thereby lack a distinct 2 awareness (deutliches Bewusstsein) of them. While this point may seem to be a digression here, it proves to be of some interest in light of the fact that, as will be seen below, the issue whether there is a distinction between perception and perceptual judgment is of great importance for the Austrian phenomenologists under consideration here. While it may seem discouraging that Bolzano simply defines “cogni3 tion” as “ any judgment that contains a true proposition” and often seems to neglect the distinction between knowledge and merely true judgment, this distinction comes into play in his treatment of objective or proper 4 grounds (eigentliche Gründe) as opposed to merely subjective grounds. Though the latter produce conviction, they do not produce knowledge of the truth for which they are reasons. For instance, one may be convinced that it is summer because of the high temperature indicated by thermometer. The thermometer reading, however, is not the proper ground for the truth of the proposition that it is summer. On the contrary, the proposition that it is summer is the proper ground for the proposition that thermometer indicates a high temperature. According to Bolzano, a judgment is an instance of knowledge or insight if the proper ground of a proposition is known. If, however, the distinction between merely true judgment and knowledge is given strictly in terms of the contrast between subjective and objective reasons, it will hardly be of use in application to cases where one knows without reasons, e.g. with respect to one’s own 1

Bolzano (1837) III, § 300, 132. Bolzano (1837) I, §35, 161 n. 3 Bolzano (1837) I, §36, 163. 4 Bolzano (1837) II, §162, 191-194. 2

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mental states. While Bolzano accordingly does not fully come to grips with one of the most difficult epistemological problems, he does not overlook the distinction between knowledge and truth, as it might seem in his characterization of cognition as judgment that contains a true proposition.

3. Brentano The notion of judgment is already present early in Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. In his attempt to identify a criterion for distinguishing between physical phenomena (such as tones and colors) and psychical ones, the first suggestion he considers is that the latter are “presentations as well as those phenomena for which presentations are the 1 foundations”. “As we use the word ‘present’”, he elaborates, “‘being 2 presented’ is the same appearing’“. While physical phenomena certainly appear and are thus presented, they are certainly neither acts of presentations nor phenomena which have such acts as their foundation. Judgments and certain other phenomena, however, are identified as phenomena founded on presentations. “Nothing can be judged, nor can 3 anything be desired, hoped, or feared unless it is presented”. The thesis that a judgment is based on a presentation remains a principle throughout Brentano theory of judgment. Yet, Brentano’s first attempt to discern a criterion for distinguishing the two classes of phenomena is not the one he prefers in his Psychology. As is well known, he would rather distinguish them by making note of “the refe4 rence to a content, the direction towards an object” to be found in all psychical phenomena and in none of the physical ones. This characteristic 5 aspect of psychical phenomenon is also called “intentional inexistence”, understood in the sense that the object “exists in” the psychical phe1

Brentano (1874), p. 104. Brentano (1874), p. 106. 3 Brentano (1874), p. 104. 4 Brentano (1874), p. 115. 5 Brentano (1874), p. 116. 2

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nomenon. It is not only “that feature which most of all characterizes psy1 chical phenomena”. The advantage of intentional inexistence as the criterion for the distinction between the two classes of phenomena (physical and psychical), according to Brentano, is to be found in the ability it gives us to differentiate the classes of psychical phenomena. “The psychical phenomena”, says Brentano, “are distinguished from all physical ones by nothing as much as the fact that something inheres in them objectively. And for this reason it is quite understandable if the most profound differences in the manner in which something is objective to them are 2 again the most outstanding class-distinctions between themselves”. A presentation refers to an object in one way, whereas a judgment does so in another way and an act of love or hate does so in yet a third way. When he comes to elaborate on the difference between presentations and judgments, he says at the outset that a judging consciousness refers to its object in two ways at the same time, for it presents this object and 3 simultaneously passes a judgment about it. This complexity does not in any way alarm Brentano, because he finds that the simplicity which Her4 bart and his followers attribute to consciousness is confused with unity. While Brentano insists that there is a unity among the various phenomena in the same consciousness, he also insists that this is indeed a complex unity. The question remains of course how presentations and judgments differ. Brentano insists that whatever is added in the judgment is to be found in the mental activity and not in the influence it has on our willing or 5 in some sort of disposition. Though some may believe that the difference between presentation and judgment is to be found in the degree of intensity, Brentano replies, “a being-presented, however clear and distinct and vivid, is not a being-judged, and a judgment that is passed, with 6 however little confidence, is not a mere presentation”. Here we are of 1

Brentano (1874), p. 127. Brentano (1874), p. 260. 3 Brentano (1874), p. 266. 4 Brentano (1874), pp. 215 f. 5 Brentano (1874), pp. 267-270. 6 Brentano (1874), p. 270. 2

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course reminded of Bolzano‘s distinction between the vivacity of presentations and the confidence of judgments. Above all, however, Brentano makes an effort to argue that the difference between presenting and judging cannot be found in their object, as this has been done by characterizing judgment in terms of combination 1 and separation. Even if it is granted that combination takes place in the case of a judgment expressed by the predicative form “some tree is green”, the judgment is obviously not brought about by presenting a tree and its property of greenness in combination. According to Brentano, if I am asked if a tree is red and I do not know about trees changing color in the autumn, I do not thereby judge that a tree is red, though I certainly present a tree combined with the property of redness in the very understanding of the question. Therefore, combination of presentations (or presented objects) is not a sufficient condition for judgment. Brentano obviously thinks that the same kind of argument is applicable to separation and thus rejects this too as a sufficient condition for judgment. The case of existential statements, moreover, provides Brentano with grounds for rejecting combination and separation as a necessary condition 2 for judgment. When we judge that A exists, we do not ascribe the predicate “existence” to A, we simply accept A. Likewise, when we judge that A does not exist, we do not deny A the predicate “existence”. We simply reject A. Moreover, Brentano maintains that both inner and outer perceptions are instances of judgment which cannot be construed as 3 predications. Though Brentano clearly differs from Bolzano by characterizing existential judgments as non-predicative, both do maintain that perceptions are judgments of a certain kind. The distinction between predicative (or categorical) judgments (“S is P”) and existential ones (“S is” or “S exists”) is in fact altogether dis4 missed by Brentano, for he holds that all judgments are in fact existential. For him this means that what a judgment adds to a presentation is only the 1

Brentano (1874), pp. 271–276. Brentano (1874), pp. 276 ff. 3 Brentano (1874), pp. 277 ff. 4 Brentano (1874), pp. 279–89. 2

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acceptance or rejection of the object that is presented. If, for example, someone judges that God exists, nothing at all is added to the content of the presentation. The only thing that the judgment introduces in this case is the acceptance of God. Likewise, when someone judges that God does not exist, the only thing this judgment introduces is a rejection of God. Due to his characterization of judgments as acceptance and rejection, Brentano sought ways of reformulating those judgments which have traditionally been regarded as predicative. In this regard he attempts to reform logic with the result that universal judgments (“All S is P” and “No S is P”) are regarded as instances of rejection (“There is no S which is not P” and “There is no S which is P”). Consequently there is no inference by subalternation (in which the conclusion from the universal affirmative is “Some S is P” and that of the universal negative is “Some S is not P”). Accordingly Brentano maintains that reform of logic, for him the art of correct judgment, is to be pursued on the basis of his theory of judgment. Obviously he thought that the traditional square of opposition stood in need of considerable revision. In a footnote in Psychology from an empirical Standpoint Brentano states his purpose of publishing his Würzburg lectures on logic (winter semester 1870/71) in which his revisions of the old logic were fully 1 presented. Though Brentano continued to lecture on logic in Vienna, he never published a detailed account of his proposed reform. A small volume by his follower, Franz Hillebrand, was published under the title The New Theories of Categorical Inferences in which the main lines of Brentano’s theory of judgment and the concomitant reform of logic were exposited. Nevertheless, it would be of great interest if his lectures on logic were published in their original form. In order to strengthen his case for the sharp division between presentations and judgments, Brentano points out a number of analogies which judgments exhibit in relation to acts of love and hate, but not to presenta2 tions. The first of these is to be found in the fact that the love of a given object and the hate thereof stand opposition, whereas no such oppositions 1 2

Brentano (1874), p. 302. Brentano (1874), pp. 290-5.

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are to be found among presentations. To be sure, there are oppositions among the objects we present, e.g. hot and cold, light and dark, but these are not to be construed as oppositions between presentations. As love and hate stand in opposition, so do acceptance and rejection, the two types of 1 judgment. Secondly, as love and hate exhibit degrees of intensity the analogy of which is not to be found among presentations, judgments occur 2 in varying degrees of intensity. This is not to deny that degrees of intensity cannot be found in the presented object. Heat, for instance, can be more or less intense. But this difference occurs in the physical phenomena and not in the presentations (more particularly the sensations) in which they 3 appear. Thirdly, as love and hate can be correct or erroneous and presentations cannot, it turns out that judgments are analogous to the former acts as well in this respect. “As love and hate are virtue or badness, accep4 tance and denial are cognition or error”. Finally, certain laws of the succession and development of love and hate are of interest as a psychological foundation for ethics, whereas laws of the course of presentation do not provide the foundation for a philosophical discipline. “Also in this respect”, Brentano explains, “we find a completely analogous fact in the case of judgments. Also in their case there are, in addition to the general laws of the course of presentation whose influence on the area of judgment is undeniable, also special laws which are especially valid for judgments and are related to logic as the laws of love and hate are to 5 ethics”. As already mentioned, Brentano distinguishes between cognition (or knowledge) and error. In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano touched on this topic in connection with perception. Those judgments in which one’s own present mind-functions are accepted are inner perception; this has “that immediate, infallible evidence, which of all 1

Brentano (1874), p. 291. Brentano (1874), p. 292. 3 The difference in intensity among the contents of presentations is used by Brentano to distinguish between imagination and sensation, as this is discussed in “Brentano and Husserl on Imagination” in the present volume. 4 Brentano (1874), p. 293. 5 Brentano (1874), p. 293. 2

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instances of cognition of experiential objects belongs to it alone” and “is properly the only perception in the proper sense of the word”, whereas 1 outer perception “is thus, strictly speaking, not a perception”. In this connection we should consider Brentano’s view that psychical phenomena 2 exist in reality and physical phenomena exist only phenomenally. That is to say, the colors we see and the tones we hear, for instance, do not exactly correspond to anything in the physical world. Moreover, while the topic of other cases of evident judgment besides perception is not of any concern in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, it is clear from Brentano’s students and from his posthumously published writings that he also 3 maintained that axioms can be known. He did, however, express great 4 antipathy regarding the notion of the synthetic a priori. Though no distinction between content and object of a judgment was made in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, he did make such a 5 distinction in his lectures in Vienna and, according to Anton Marty, already prior to this (and thus prior to the publication of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint) in his lectures in Würzburg. At least one of the contexts in which Brentano introduces the notion of the content of a judgment is to be found in his attempt to defend the correspondence theory of 6 truth. Such judgment-contents are among the various irrealia which Brentano found unacceptable during his final years in Vienna, but were abandoned in later years in favor of reism, i.e. his contention that only things can be presented. Another context in which Brentano introduces the notion of the content 7 of a judgment is to be found in his lectures on logic from the late 1880s. The content of a judgment, “the judged as such” (das Geurteilte als 1

Brentano (1874), p. 119. Brentano (1874), pp. 120 ff. 3 See, e.g. Hillebrand (1891), p. 6. 4 Brentano, (1889), p. 23. 5 Marty (1908), p. 292. 6 Brentano (1930). For an excellent discussion of this lecture as well as the unpublished logic lecture of the late 1880s, in which Brentano elaborates on his notion of judgment-contents, see Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2001), pp. 58–67. 7 Brentano, EL 80. 2

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solches), is characterized as what the relevant statement means (bedeutet) as opposed to what the statement designates (bezeichnet). An analogous distinction is made between what a name designates and what it means. While “the son of Phaenerete” and “the wisest of the Athenians” both designate Socrates, they have different meanings. According to Brentano, a statement that expresses a judgment in which an object is accepted and the name of this object designate one and the same thing, though he the meaning of the statement and the meaning of the name differ. The latter is moreover characterized as an immanent object and therefore as a concept and thus the contents of judgments are analogues of concepts. The notion of a concept of a judgment turns out to be of great consequence in theories of judgment that we find in the work of Marty and Stumpf. In Brentano’s later years he no longer adhered to the doctrine of immanent objects which he had developed in his Vienna years. Not only were the contents of judgments, which included such irrealia as possibilities and impossibilities, were regarded as fictions, but the acts of judging themselves were no longer given the privileged status that they had in his earlier theory. According to Brentano’s later view, only things can be presented and only things can exist. There are accordingly things that judge, judgers so to speak, which exist whenever we are correctly talking about judging. The truth of a judgment, moreover, is no longer regarded as a correspondence as it was when Brentano had allowed for irrealia, but rather merely in terms of judging as one who knows judges. Truth therefore does not require that the judger judges evidently, but rather that he accepts what someone who would judge with evidence would accept or that he rejects what someone who would judge with evidence would reject. None of Brentano’s students whose theories of judgment are under consideration here, however, adopted his later views. As an Austrian phenomenologist he was primarily influential through his lectures.

4. Meinong The topic of judgment is treated in various writings of Meinong which span over about four decades. His early theory of judgment can be found in

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the logic textbook written by his follower, Alois Höfler, in collaboration with Meinong, for the purpose of introducing logic to students in 1 secondary school. It contains numerous references to Psychology from an 2 Empirical Standpoint and other works by Brentano. Yet, it also expresses various views of the early Meinong which were by no means in step with the teachings of Brentano. For this reason the book met with great disapproval from Brentano’s most loyal follower, Marty, who served as 3 referee for the ministry of education and culture in Austria. It is not unlikely that the above mentioned work by Hillebrand, published one year after Höfler’s, was published in reaction to Höfler and Meinong. In Höfler‘s logic textbook judgment is characterized as a psychical process. “As regards its act”, says Höfler, “this process is completely different from the act of mere presenting (and likewise from that of feeling and desiring...). Its object..., however, is necessarily always at the same time also 4 the object of a presentation...”. Though a distinction is made between 5 object and content of a presentation this distinction is not applied in the sphere of judgments. As far as the relation of judgments to language is concerned, Höfler says, “As the linguistic sign of presentation is the name..., that of judgment 6 is, as a rule, the proposition, more particularly the indicative”. Accordingly no distinction is made between proposition and statement (Aussage), as this is found in Husserl (to be discussed below). The rejection of this distinction is upheld in Meinong’s later theory of judgment as well, though it will be seen that this theory is also in some sense a propositional one. Judgments are divided by Höfler into four classes as regards their “psychological characteristics”: “1. affirmative and negative ones, 2. particular and general ones, 3. judgments concerning existence and 1

Höfler (1890). See Höfler (1890), pp. 11, 33, 69, 97, 110, 114, 156, & 208. 3 Cf. Lindenfeld (1980), p. 66. 4 Höfler (1890), p. 97. 5 Höfler (1890), p. 7. 6 Höfler (1890), p. 98. 2

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judgments concerning a relation, 4. certain and probable ones”. The third division is of special interest here, for this is a clear-cut instance in which the early Meinong diverged from the teachings of Brentano. Höfler says the following: Judgments such as “God is”, “There are no ghosts”, have no other sense and purpose than affirming or negating the “existence” of that which is judged. Judgments such as “All diameters of a circle are equal”, “No part of a circumference is straight”, do not at all take a position concerning the question whether there is in reality something like circles in the strict geometrical sense; indeed, the judging person need not even retract them even if he were convinced that such a thing does not exist or cannot exist at all. The thought which such judgments are meant to give expression is merely the affirming or negating of a 2 “relation” between contents of presentation.

In this regard Meinong is obviously influenced by Hume, who 3 distinguished between matters of fact and relations of ideas, far more than he is by Brentano, who insisted that all judgments are concerned with existence. For Brentano a judgment such as “All diameters of a circle are equal” would indeed be an existential one, e.g. “There is no diameter which is not equal to the other diameters of a circle” or perhaps “There is no circle in which the diameters are not equal to each other”. It is of course clear why Marty (on Brentano’s behalf) would be hostile towards Meinong’s allowance for non-existential judgments, for Brentano’s efforts to reform logic were based on his view that all judgments were existential. The publication of Höfler‘s logic textbook meant not only that Brentano’s reform was rejected by someone, but more importantly that a nonBrentanian logic was to be taught in the public schools. Accordingly Brentano’s reform would have little effect. Höfler also distinguished between evident and non-evident judgments. The being evident or non-evident of a judgment is listed among the “logical” rather than the “psychological” characteristics of judgments. 1

Höfler (1890), p. 99. Höfler (1890), pp. 103 f. 3 See the remark in Höfler (1890), 103 n. 2

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While Brentano had also distinguished between evident and non-evident judgments, Höfler opposes Brentano by making the following division among evident judgments: “I. immediately certain ones, II. mediately certain ones, III. immediately probable ones, IV. mediately probable 1 ones”. The third class of evident judgments is one that Meinong had first defended in an article on memory in 1886 and was met with rejection from 2 Brentano. The gist of Meinong’s argument in this article is that memories cannot in any way be construed as inferences and yet they do have some degree of evidence; otherwise it would be altogether senseless to rely on them. After the first edition of his work On Assumptions was published in 1902, Meinong’s theory of judgment underwent yet further revisions. According to Meinong, there is a class of psychical phenomena which lies between presentations and judgments. This is the class of assumptions, which 3 is to be found by acknowledging two distinct features of judgments. One of these features is their character of being either affirmative or negative. The other is their conviction (Überzeugtheit). Assumptions are mindfunctions which are like judgments and not like presentations insofar as they are either affirmative or negative, while they are like presentations and not like judgments insofar as they lack conviction. If, for instance, one reads a report from an unreliable source, there occurs a phenomenon, the “understanding” of the report, which is either affirmative or negative but devoid of all conviction. In On Assumptions Meinong also takes a step into his infamous jungle by allowing for a class of objects which are in all cases regarded as the correlates of judgments and assumptions. Such objects are called “objectives” 4 and are contrasted with objects in the narrow sense. According to Mei1

Höfler (1890), p. 127. See Meinong (1886). In (1889, 84) Brentano swiftly dismisses thesis of conjectural evidence as absurd and suggests that it must have been taken from his lectures in which degrees of conviction were regarded as degrees of the intensity of judgment. 3 Meinong (1910), pp. 1–8. 4 See Meinong (1910), pp. 42–105. Cf. Meinong (1907), pp. 20–27. Objects in the narrow sense, called Objekte by Meinong, are not only real objects, e.g. the earth, but also ideal ones, e.g. equilateral triangles, and also ones that have no being at all. 2

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nong, objectives are more properly the bearers of truth than judgments or 1 assumptions which are directed towards them. Moreover, he maintains 2 that they are timeless and therefore not real. Hence, they are reminiscent of Bolzano‘s propositions. Yet, he does not wish to call them “propositions” because he wants to dissociate them from linguistic expressions 3 as much as possible. Nor does he call them “states of affairs” (Sachver4 halte), for such a term does not allow for the falsity of some of them. As far as Meinong is concerned, that unicorns exist and that horses exist are both objectives, though the former objective is false and the latter one is true. An important distinction between objectives for Meinong is moreover that between instances of being (Sein) and instances of being-thus (Sosein). That a horse exists, for instance, is an instance of being, whereas the fact that a horse is a mammal is an instance of being-thus. In 1904 Meinong edited a volume in which his own contribution was “On Object Theory”. Though the domain of research designated as “object theory” is not as such concerned with theory of judgment, Meinong asserts the so-called “principle of independence”, which has great implications for 5 how judgments are conceived of. According to this principle, the beingthus of an object may obtain independently of the being of an object. The being-golden of the golden mountain, for instance, obtains, although the golden mountain has no being at all. It is accordingly fully acceptable and indeed correct to judge that the golden mountain is golden without in the least judging that the golden mountain exists. Brentano’s view that all judgments are existential is accordingly rejected by the later Meinong, the proponent of object theory, as plainly as it was by the early Meinong, the psychologist. In 1906 Meinong published The Experiential Foundations of our Knowledge, which contains further elaborations of his theory of judgment. According to Meinong, some of our judgments are a priori in the sense Objects of the last-mentioned class include both possible and impossible ones. 1 Meinong (1910), pp. 82 ff. 2 Meinong (1910), pp. 64 f. 3 Meinong (1910), p. 100. 4 Meinong (1910), pp. 101 ff. 5 Cf. Rollinger (1993b), pp. 64 ff..

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that they are in some sense independent from experience, namely in the sense that the judgment is not itself an experience (a perception) or derived 1 from experience by way of induction. The presentations, on which these judgments are founded, however, need not at all be independent of experience. The judgment that red and green are different, for instance, is not itself an experience or an inductively derived judgment. To this extent it is a priori, whereas the presentations of red and green, on which this judgment is founded, are clearly taken from experience. The judgment in question is nonetheless necessarily true, and indeed certain rather than conjectural. It is moreover highly significant that in the work under consideration Meinong regards perceptions as judgments and in this respect stays in step 2 with what he had learned from Brentano. For Meinong this means that the 3 object of perception is in every case an objective. The objective in each case, he further asserts, is an instance of existence. Thus it is his view that perceptions are not only judgments, but more particularly existential judgments. Meinong’s theory of judgment in The Experiential Foundations of our Knowledge diverges from Brentano’s, however, in the characterization of the evidence of perception. While Brentano had regarded the judgments of outer perception as lacking in evidence and even as false, Meinong brings into play his notion of conjectural evidence in his 4 consideration of such judgments. Accordingly he sees no difficulty in saying that the objects of perception are given immediately, but this immediacy is not to be confused with the certainty that accompanies a priori judgments. Like the evidence of memories, that of outer perception is presumptive evidence. This is even the case for judgments of inner perception, on Meinong’s view, though he maintains that these approach certainty 5 the more they are limited to the currently given.

1

Meinong (1906), pp. 5–13. Meinong (1906), 16 ff. 3 This view has been discussed in Rollinger (1995). 4 Meinong (1906), pp. 34ff. 5 Meinong (1906), pp. 70 ff. 2

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One more point regarding Meinong’s theory of judgment should be mentioned here. In his The Place of Object Theory in the System of Sciences he maintains that experience teaches us that a judgment of the form “All A is B” is affirmative and not negative. He thereby raises further doubts about the Brentanian strategy for construing such judgments as existential. The universal affirmative, Meinong maintains, may be treated as a negative existential, “There is no A which is not B”, only because the 1 two judgments are equivalent. Equivalence, however, is not identity. It is to be noted here that this assertion is not quite the same as the one cited above from Höfler‘s logic textbook, according to which judgments such as “All diameters of a circle are equal” are not construed as existential ones. Nor does Meinong here have in mind the principle of independence. In his The Place of Object Theory in the System of Sciences Meinong asserts that the universal affirmatives are indeed true under the same conditions as the corresponding existential judgments are. This would mean that Brentano’s proposed reform of logic could in some cases work, though it does not provide us with an understanding of what goes on in the various types of judgment.

5. Husserl While Husserl’s earliest philosophical writings were not concerned with theory of judgment, he shifted his attention more and more towards this 2 topic as his interest in logic grew during the 1890’s. “What is today called ‘the problem of judgment’”, says Husserl in an unpublished review that 3 was written in 1896, “is a whole bundle of problems which, though often connected, are nonetheless to be separated out of methodological and 4 substantive interest”. The three groups of problems which Husserl identifies here belong to the three respective disciplines: logic, descriptive 1

Meinong (1907), pp. 43 f. Cf. Hua XXII, pp. 124–51, 162–258, & 349–80. 3 In 1896 Husserl also presented his elementary logic in lectures. For a discussion of these lectures see “Husserl’s Elementary Logic” in the present volume. 4 Hua XXII, pp. 370 f. 2

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psychology, and genetic psychology. While Husserl was certainly concerned with the former two groups, it was not his inclination to enter into genetic-psychological problems. A theory such as the one that Bolzano offers in his discussion of mediate and immediate judgments, in which the notion of causation plays a central role, is not a matter for 1 Husserl’s reflections. These reflections on problems of judgment in the sphere of logic and descriptive psychology developed in the 1890s were finally published in the Logical Investigations (1900/01). The descriptive psychological aspects especially found their expression in the fifth Investigation, in which “a fundamental piece of theory of judgment was 2 worked out”, and in the sixth one. Here we shall be primarily concerned with this “pre-transcendental” theory of judgment in Husserl, which is to a 3 large extent a critical response to Brentano’s. According to Husserl, pure logic is concerned with propositions rather 4 than judgments. Propositions, however, are characterized by him as objective contents of judgments. His notion of the objective content of judgments, as he himself admitted, was heavily influenced by the 5 Bolzanian notion of propositions. While we have seen similar notions in Brentano and Meinong, it must be noted that in the case of Husserl the proposition which makes up the objective content of a given judgment is not to be identified with the object of the judgment. Yet, he does not characterize the relation of a judgment to the corresponding proposition as Bolzano had done, namely as a relation the like of which occurs in only 1

As we have seen, Bolzano‘s theory of judgment was formulated in the third volume of Wissenschaftslehre. In a letter to Brentano (3 January 1905), Husserl says that the first two volumes of the Wissenschaftslehre were the “only significant” ones (Schuhmann (ed.) (1994) I, p. 29). Nonetheless, Husserl’s copy of the third volume of this work bears markings and annotations. 2 Hua XIX/1, p. 538. 3 This theory is again stated in Husserl’s 1905 lecture course on theory of judgment, now published Husserl (2002). While this text is worth reading as a summary statement of theory of judgment that had been found inthe Logical Investigations, it does not add anything of significance to what had been written in the latter work. 4 Cf. Hua XVIII, 164, 178, 185, 240, & 245. 5 Hua XVIII, 227 ff.

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one other case, namely between subjective presentations and their corresponding objective presentations. Husserl maintains that a proposition 1 is a species which judgments instantiate as the corresponding particulars. If such a relation does occur, it is plainly one that is to be found in many other cases. The particular red-moments which are seen in different strips 2 of paper, for instance, bear the same sort of relationship to redness. According to Husserl, the propositions, which are non-temporal by nature, are more properly characterized as the bearers of truth than timebound judgments are. For this reason he engages in polemics throughout the first volume of the Logical Investigations against “psychologistic” logic in which judgments are seen as the bearers of truth. Yet, he makes a sharp distinction between these truth-bearers and the objects which make them true. The latter are states of affairs. “In judgment”, says Husserl, “a 3 state of affairs appears to us”. This statement is clearly an allusion to Bolzano‘s characterization of judgment as the appearance of the proposition. What Husserl wishes to emphasize here is that the state of affairs, not the proposition, is the object of the judgment. Accordingly, whenever we judge, the whole object of our judgment is a state of affairs. If, for instance, one judges that this paper is white, the state of affairs that can be named “that this paper is white” appears in the judgment. The proposition “this paper is white”, however, is a species of the judgment, more particularly of a part of the judgment. It had been said above that Bolzano‘s characterization of the judgment as the appearance of the proposition could be taken in two ways, namely to mean either that simply by virtue of judging a proposition appears or that a proposition appears by means of some sort of reflection on the judgment. On Husserl’s view the state of affairs is the appearance of the judgment in the first on these ways, whereas the proposition is indeed something that appears by means of an abstracting reflection on its particular instantiations. This abstracting reflection is certainly not to be understood in a Lockean sense, according to which various aspects of a particular idea are 1

Hua XIX/1, pp. 97 ff. Hua XIX, pp. 111 ff. 3 Hua XIX/1, p. 461. 2

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removed, or in any of the senses in which abstraction had been understood by Locke‘s empiricist successors, e.g. Berkeley, Hume, Mill, and 1 Cornelius. Abstraction for Husserl is rather a basic feature of mental life, not to be “explained” by some other feature, such as association or attention. The universal can, as it were, be “seen” in the particular simply by regarding the particular as an exemplification. This is precisely how propositions are to be seen in judgments, just as other meanings can be seen in the relevant instantiating mind-functions. Now that it is clear that for Husserl each judgment has a state of affairs as its object and a proposition as its species, let us now see how he views the structure of the act of judging, particularly in his response to the Brentanian thesis that every judgment is founded on a presentation. These views are developed on the basis of a distinction between two 2 moments Husserl identifies in every act, namely matter and quality. The matter of an act is that moment whereby the act refers to an object under a particular conception. If someone asks, for instance, whether there is intelligent life on Mars, and if someone says that there is indeed intelligent life on Mars, the two acts which are thus manifested in speech have the same matter, for they are both concerned with the same object under the same conception. It is important that conception (Auffassung) be taken into account here, for it is possible that two acts, e.g. the presentation of the equilateral triangle and the presentation of the equiangular triangle, are directed at the same object but under different conceptions. In this case the acts differ in matter. Now Husserl maintains that there is no sense of “presentation” in which this term can refer to an act which does not include both matter and qua3 lity. If indeed one wishes to use the term in relation to the matter, it is of course true that every act is founded on a presentation. In this sense, however, no presentation is an act that can occur independently. If, however, one insists on speaking of presentations as full and independently existing 1

For a discussion of Husserl’s theory of abstraction and his rejection of empiricist theories of abstraction, see “Husserl and Cornelius“ (in this volume) and Rollinger (1993a), pp. 103–19. 2 Hua XIX/1, pp. 441 ff. 3 . Hua XIX/1, pp. 447 ff .

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acts, only two options are left open: 1) one means “mere presentations”, such as those which are found in phantasy acts as well as the ones that Meinong had called “assumptions”, or 2) one means nominal acts, such as those which occur in naming an object, but also in certain acts of percep1 tion, memory, and expectation. In either case the difference between matter and quality must be acknowledged. In order to make his case against Brentano’s thesis that every act is or is based on a mere presentation, Husserl considers what goes on in both 2 3 perception and judgment. If, for instance, one is in a wax museum and perceives what is taken to be a young lady and then comes to a realization that results in a mere presentation of the young lady, there occurs a change from one qualitatively different act to another, but not the stripping away of a founded act and then the left-over founding act. The mere presentation of the young lady simply was not present in the preceding perception. Likewise, if we consider what goes on in an assertion which one at first merely understands (e.g. in reading) and to which one then, upon further consideration, assents, the mere presentation that occurred in the first act no longer exists in the act of assenting, which is indeed a judging. The two acts, to be sure, have something in common, namely the matter. Yet, they are qualitatively different acts, just as the mere presentation of the young lady and the perception of her are. As regards the case of presentations in the sense of nominal acts, it is indeed understandable why it is desirable to say that every judgment is based on a presentation in this sense. Just as every sentence must include or at least imply a name it may seem that every corresponding act of judgment is founded on a nominal act. Yet, Husserl finds that this is not acceptable because acts are classified as nominal on the basis of their matter rather than their quality. This is made clear once we realize that there is a 4 distinction between positing and non-positing nominal acts. Such acts are manifested by certain names, e.g. “Prince Heinrich”, “the statue of Roland 1

Hua XIX/1, p. 521. Hua XIX/1, pp. 455–61. 3 Hua XIX/1, pp. 461 ff. 4 Hua XIX/1, pp. 481 ff. 2

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in the market place”, “the postman rushing by”. When these and similar names are used, an act in which the object in question is posited occurs. Likewise, in straightforward perception the perceived object is posited. Here it is noteworthy that Husserl regards perceptions of this kind as positing nominal acts, not as judgments. As regards non-positing acts, these can be found whenever a name is used in a consideration as to whether the named object exists, but also in the case of imagination. Now if the difference between nominal acts and judgments is to lie in their quality, positing and non-positing nominal acts must nonetheless have some quality in common which make them nominal. Husserl insists, however, that there is 1 no such quality to be found. Accordingly an act is nominal simply because it refers to an object under a certain conception and not because it exhibits any additional qualitative feature. That is to say, it is the matter of the act which decides whether it is nominal or not. The question naturally arises as to what makes the matter of a nominal act different from that of others, particularly that of judging acts. In Husserl’s reflection on this topic his answer is that a nominal act is one-rayed (einstrahlig) or one-membered (eingliedrig), whereas a judgment is multirayed (mehrstrahlig) or multi-membered (mehrgliedrig). This is particular2 ly to be seen when a “that” clause functions as a name. One can say, for instance, “That it has rained will please the farmers”. In this case “That it has rained” is a name, though on Husserl’s view it does not manifest a judgment, unlike the statement “It has rained”. In the former case the relevant act is one-membered, whereas it is multi-membered in the latter. In both cases the acts are qualitatively alike insofar as they are positing and also to some extent alike in their matter. Yet, the difference between them lies in a different conception of the object. Here the question must be asked whether the distinction between onemembered and multi-membered acts, as aspects of the matter, is one that Husserl actually identifies in experience or merely a theoretical construction in order to circumvent certain difficulties that arise in his theory. Whether or not he found this distinction in his own experience, I must admit 1 2

Hua XIX/1, pp. 485 ff. Hua XIX/1, pp. 490-495.

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that it is one I do not find. Furthermore, we are left in the dark as to whether the multi-memberedness which Husserl allegedly finds in judgments is to be found in their subject-predicate structure. In his 1905 lectures on theory of judgments he indeed says of predications, that it is 2 “essential to them to be multi-membered acts”. In this regard it must also be noted that when Husserl speaks of judgment it is indeed usually this structure that he has in mind, under the formula “S is p”. To this extent he rebels against Brentano. Nonetheless, if we look at a nominal act that is expressed in a “that” clause we see that at least the linguistic form is no less predicative than that of the corresponding statement. On this basis it would seem that the nominal acts in question are no less multi-membered than the corresponding judgments. Perhaps this is not what Husserl has in mind when he speaks of the multi-memberedness of judgments. However, the quote from his 1905 lectures certainly suggests that it is. Moreover, if it is not, his theory stands in need of considerable revision. In any case it is clear that Husserl rejects the theory of Brentano not only insofar as he cannot allow for thesis that judgments are based on presentations, but also insofar as he rejects what Brentano as well as Bolzano and Meinong had assumed all along, namely that presentation and judgment are two fundamental classes of mind-functions. Husserl proposes 3 instead to classify them into objectifying and non-objectifying acts. Any act that is either positing and has a non-positing correlative or vice-versa is for him an objectifying act, whereas all other acts (wishing, feeling, desiring, etc.) are classified as non-objectifying. The objectifying acts are held to be foundations of non-objectifying acts. While Husserl thus rejects Brentano’s thesis of the founding relation of presentations and judgments, he does not reject the Brentanian notion of founding altogether. In spite of the criticisms of Brentano’s theory of judgment, as found in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, it is interesting to note that in the next book that he published, namely Ideas I, Husserl apparently returns in a very important respect to the view that Brentano put forward concerning 1

See “Husserl’s Elementary Logic” in the present volume. Hua-Mat V, p. 21. 3 Hua XIX/1, pp. 496–508. 2

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judgments in his lectures. As we may recall from above, in Brentano’s lectures on logic that he held in the late 1880s he formulated the notion of a content as distinct from the object of a judgment. The content is characterized as the “judged as such”. In Ideas I Husserl likewise formulates such a notion under the widely discussed heading “noema”. According to him, the noema of a judgment, as distinct from the object 1 simpliciter, is indeed the judged as such. It is also evident from Husserl’s theory of meaning and the many research manuscripts that he devoted to this topic prior to the publication of Ideas I that the noema (to which he 2 refers with various terms) functions as a meaning. Just as Brentano had characterized the meaning of a statement as the judged as such, Husserl arrives at a position that is strikingly similar. Thus it can be said that, though Husserl shifted to a transcendental position in Ideas I, the influence of Brentano and indeed a remaining tie to Austrian phenomenology can be found in this phase of his intellectual development.

6. Concluding Remarks From this discussion of Austrian theories of judgment one outstanding aspect of these theories becomes evident, namely that they are in most cases as much concerned with the objective correlates of acts of judging as they are with the acts of judging themselves. With Bolzano we come across propositions in themselves, with Brentano contents of judgment, with Meinong objectives, and with Husserl states of affairs (as well as propositions). The one who seems to be the least concerned with the objective side of judging is no doubt Brentano. In this regard the common ground between various Austrian phenomenologists – in this case Meinong and Husserl – and Bolzano especially comes into the focus.

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Hua III/1, p. 216. See Hua XXVI and Hua XXXX.

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THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY IN STUMPF’S EPISTEMOLOGY

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1. Introduction In the history of philosophy the concept of causality has played an extremely important role and has likewise been a source of considerable controversy. In modern philosophy such controversy was prompted by the empiricism of John Locke, according to which all ideas have their origin in experience. This empiricism was adopted by David Hume in his examination of various traditional philosophical ideas, including the idea of causality. All Hume could find, apart from the temporal priority of the cause in relation to the effect and the spatial contiguity of the two, was a regular succession and a custom to expect the effect whenever the cause is 2 observed, but certainly not a necessary connection between the two. The unsettling results of Hume’s investigation of the idea of causality were found to be less than satisfactory by Thomas Reid, Immanuel Kant, and other later philosophers who rejected Lockean empiricism, which could apparently have no other consequence but Humean scepticism. It is only natural that the occupation with the concept of causality became prominent in the school of Franz Brentano, for Brentano was very much concerned with doing two things which might seem incompatible to many, namely with pursuing philosophy from an empirical standpoint and with developing a metaphysical system in which causality was to play an 3 important role, with theism as the pinacle. As one of Brentano’s students, 1

The present version of this essay has never been published before. An earlier version was published in Italian under the title “La causalità nella Erkenntnislehre di Stumpf”, in Carl Stumpf e la fenomenologica dell’esperienza immediata, edited by Stefano Besoli and Riccardo Martinelli (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2001), pp. 163-199. 2 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section II. 3 All other matters, including ones of descriptive psychology, came to take a back seat to metaphysics in Brentano’s philosophy, as reported in Stumpf (1919), p. 98. Thus, it is highly misleading to say that Brentano “shared with the logical positivists ... a certain anti-metaphysical orientation” (Smith [1994], p. 98). Of course, if the term “metaphysical” is restricted to the speculations in the style of the German Idealists,

Carl Stumpf shared his concerns in both of these respects. Hence, in 1 Stumpf’s posthumously published Epistemology the concept of causality receives very detailed treatment. In the following Stumpf’s attempt to discern the empirical origin of this concept and to apply it to various areas of philosophical and scientific concern will be critically examined.

2. Stumpf’s Epistemology It will be helpful to begin with a few remarks about the work which is to provide the main source for the present discussion. The two volumes of Stumpf’s Epistemology together consist of more than 850 pages of text, in 2 which solutions to a wide range of problems are put forward. Unfortunately, this work and many others by Stumpf, in spite of the great 3 influence he exerted in his own lifetime, most notably on Husserl and the 4 Berlin Gestalt psychologists, are for the most part disregarded in contemporary discussions. His Epistemology, however, deserves far more attention than it has thus far received. Unlike Husserl, Stumpf proposes no new method for approaching philosophical problems. While this fact may indicate to some a deficiency in Stumpf’s approach, it should be pointed out that, given Husserl’s own dissatisfaction with his attempts to state the phenomenological method, particularly the phenomenological reduction, Brentano’s orientation is decidedly anti-metaphysical. It is, however, unjustifiably arbitrary to restrict the term in question in this way. The metaphysical side of Brentano’s early philosophical work has recently discussed in detail in Antonelli (2001). 1 This work, Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939) and Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), was published in two volumes, edited by the author’s son, Felix Stumpf. 2 Much of the Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939) and Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940) consist of results from lectures, books, and articles which Stumpf had been writing for more than six decades. 3 This influence is discussed at length in Rollinger (1999), pp. 83-123. As regards Stumpf’s critical assessment of Husserl’s Ideen I, see Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 189-22 and the discussion thereof in Rollinger (1999), pp. 114-122. Stumpf does not take into consideration anything that Husserl published after the Ideen I. 4 Their work is also critically discussed in Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 241-255.

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not to mention his failure to convince his students of the soundness of this method, Stumpf’s approach by contrast can be seen as refreshing rather than outdated. Besides Husserl’s tedious sharpening of the methodological knife, the obscurity and pretentiousness which have arisen in the subsequent self-styled “phenomenologies” after Husserl can only make Stumpf’s clear-headed and unpretentious orientation in philosophy all the 1 more welcome. Stumpf’s Epistemology was unfortunately published in the Third Reich, where scientific philosophy had been overshadowed by Heidegger and generally by outspoken proponents of the National Socialist ideology. Nothing in the contents of the Epistemology, however, indicates the catastrophic turn of events which were taking place in Germany while it was being written. Nor is there any reference at all to Heidegger, who had already, through the help of Husserl, risen to fame prior to Stumpf’s death. In light of the deep and wide influence of Heidegger and the concomitant change in the philosophical climate, it is of course no wonder why Stumpf’s Epistemology did not receive nearly as much attention upon its publication as it deserves. Though this work will now, more than half a century later, hardly be read by those who have continued in the vein of Heidegger, Stumpf’s concerns are by no means alien to those of the scientifically oriented philosophers of our time. There are at least two German terms which can be translated as “epistemology”: Erkenntnistheorie and Erkenntnislehre. The former term has come to be more prevalent. One of the twentieth century philosophers who has played an important role in promoting Erkenntnistheorie as the primary concern of philosophy is Stumpf’s most ouststanding student, namely Husserl. Seldom does Husserl ever speak of his enterprise as Erkenntnislehre. According to the editor of Stumpf’s Epistemology, the author chose the title Erkenntnislehre rather than Erkenntnistheorie because he considered both the empirical and the a priori sources of 2 knowledge as equally valuable. In this regard it is quite possible that 1

Though Stumpf does conceive of a discipline under the title “phenomenology“, he does not ascribe a new method to it. See “Stumpf on Phenomena and Phenomenology” in the present volume. 2 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. v.

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Stumpf’s title was meant in opposition to Husserl’s epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie), as found in the Ideas I, in which both the a priori and the transcendental sources of knowledge clearly have precedence over the empirical one. Besides the appreciation for the empirical as well as the a priori, the complete disregard of the transcendental is what would be expected from Stumpf, whose philosophical direction was already determined by Brentano’s habilitation in Würzburg, where the thesis that the method of philosophy is none other than that of natural science was defended. Another way in which the term Erkenntnislehre may be appreciated is by considering that he used this term in his lectures of 1887, 1 where he characterized logic as praktische Erkenntnislehre. While logic as a psychological discipline was no longer possible decades later when Epistemology was written, this discipline could in many respects survive under a different name. Caution must be advised here, however, in the understanding of Stumpf’s terminology, for he often refers to his endeavor throughout the Erkenntnislehre as Erkenntnistheorie, in spite of the fact that the former term is used for the title of the work under consideration. The problems which Stumpf examines in his Epistemology will be familiar to any student of modern philosophy. One of the embracing issues for him is the dispute between rationalism and empiricism. The distinction between concepts on the one hand and processes of cognitions on the other 2 is crucial to his way of dealing with this issue. “Processes of cognition”, says Stumpf, “are always judgments, i.e. assertions or denials, whereas concepts are mere presentations with which nothing yet is asserted and 3 nothing is denied”. The words “change” and “cause”, for instance, express concepts, while the entire sentence “every change has a cause” expresses a judgment. If someone is an empiricist regarding concepts, this means that the person in question maintains that all general presentations come from experience. An empiricist regarding processes of cogntion, however, 1

Stumpf Q 14/1. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), 6 ff. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 6. The concept is accordingly identified with the mind-function (or act) of presenting itself, not with the mind-formation (Gebilde) which is correlated with an act of conceptual thinking, as a state of affairs is correlated with a an act of judging. See Stumpf (1907a), pp. 29 f. 2

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would say that these processes all belong to experience, including perhaps memory and induction as well as sensations and reflection. It is possible to be an empiricist in theory of concepts and a rationalist in theory of cognition. Both Locke and Hume, for example, are identified by Stumpf as advocates of such a position. That is to say, both maintain that our concepts (in their terms “ideas”) originate in experience, whether this be sensation or reflection, but also that there are nonetheless truths which, in the words of Hume, are “discoverable by the mere operation of thought” and that the knowledge thus obtained “is either intuitively or 1 demonstratively certain”. In the Epistemology Stumpf himself defends the empirical origin of various basic concepts (“categories”) and is to this extent an empiricist, but he is also convinced that there is purely rational 2 knowledge in the strict and proper sense and is to this extent a rationalist. In his attempt to identify the empirical origins of concepts, he operates with notions comparable to those of sensation and reflection, though he prefers to speak, as Brentano had spoken, of inner and outer perception (or experience). Stumpf’s treatment of the concept of causality is to be seen in the context of the moderate empiricist orientation which he learned from his mentor. Another important distinction that Stumpf applies throughout his Epistemology is that between immediate and mediate knowledge. This distinction is also by no means alien to the empiricist tradition. What can be known immediately, on his view, is that which is inwardly perceived, 3 e.g. one’s own acts of presenting, judging, and feeling. While Stumpf also maintains that there are instances of immediate a priori knowledge, e.g. in

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Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part I, Section VII. Cf. Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, IV.ii.2-3. The more radical empiricist, who viewed all general knowledge in terms of induction from experienced particulars, would of course be John Stuart Mill. 2 See Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 124 ff. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 343 ff. For the most part Stumpf prefers to speak of mind-functions (rather than acts or states), in contrast with phenomena (Erscheinungen), i.e. contents of sensation as well as imagined colors, sounds, etc. Nonetheless, he sometimes refers to mind-functions as acts or states.

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mathematics and logic, his theory of inner perception and its immediacy proves to be of great relevance in his view of the origin of the concept of causality. On the whole, it may be said that Stumpf’s Epistemology is an attempt to work with the tools of classical empiricism and at the same time to arrive 2 at results which do not fall prey to sceptical conclusions. These results, like many of the conclusions of Brentano, are closer to the philosophy of Locke than that of Hume, though Stumpf, again like Brentano, does not 3 share Lockes contempt for scholasticism. The most salient point of difference between Stumpf on the one hand and Locke and Brentano on the other, at least as far as the topic of the present study is concerned, has to do with the existence of God, for Stumpf is convinced that the problem of evil cannot allow for their optimistic theism, however much he concedes that it is necessary to infer that there is a transcendent cause of teleological order. Stumpf’s views on causality are to be discussed here in the following way. First, it will be important to consider his identification of the origin of this concept in inner perception. It will then be seen how he deals with the concept of necessity, which he regards as a requirement in the extension of the concept of causality beyond the sphere of the immediately perceived to the subject matters of natural science. His examination of causality in the realms of the inorganic, the organic, the psychophysical, and the psychical will then be discussed. Before pursuing the line of discussion just indicated, however, it will be helpful to take a brief look at how the concept of causality was dealt with by the three great representatives of British Empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume), for Stumpf not only 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 127-206. See Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 1-4, where Stumpf opens up his work with a critique of the three “main arguments” against scepticism. 3 See Locke‘s polemics on this topic in An Essay concerning Human Understanding, III. x. 6-13. The charge of “scholasticism” was commonly made against Brentano and his pupils. Stumpf himself spent a good part of his education studying the scholastics when he was preparing for the priesthood. In response to the charge in question, as it might be raised against his “subtle” treatment of causality, he says, “In the difficult questions of causality only extreme logical precision avails” (Stumpf, [ed.] Stumpf [1939], p. 721). 2

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shares their concern about the empirical origin of this concept, but also 1 begins his consideration of it with a brief overview of their positions.

3. The Concept of Causality in British Empiricism John Locke was confident that the idea of causality had its origin in 2 experience, both in sensation and in reflection. In the case of the closely related idea of power, however, he is more inclined to find its origin in reflection. Moreover, he thought that it was also possible to infer causes beyond what is directly accessible to experience. The most outstanding 3 case of this is of course his argument for the existence of God. The immediately given from which this argument starts is the existence of oneself, as given in reflection. On Locke’s view, the only thing that could have caused the existence of such a being as himself, namely a rational one, is God. Thus, we see in his philosophical approach to causality both a belief in the empirical origin of the concept thereof and a belief in the usage of this concept in the argument for theism. In opposition to Locke, George Berkeley asserts that causality is not at 4 all to be found among our ideas. Nonetheless, he says it is “certain and grounded on experience” that ideas can be brought about and obliterated 5 by willing. Since Berkeley is of the opinion that it is a spiritual substance that wills and finds no other instance of causality besides willing, he is prepared to say that only a spiritual substance is “active”, i.e. the only real cause. Moreover, the spiritual substance which causes ideas is not always the one that has them, for the ideas which we have by sensation are not caused by us. Nor are these ideas caused by matter, which is not a spiritual substance and does not even exist on Berkeley’s view. In view of these circumstances he sees no other choice but to conclude that God is the cause 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 41 f. An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II. 26. 2. 3 An Essay concerning Human Understanding, IV. 1-19. 4 A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 25. 5 A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 28. 2

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of the ideas in question. Accordingly, both the empirical origin of the concept of causality and its relevance to theism remain upheld by Berkeley. In the system of David Hume the empirical origin of this concept and hence its relevance to theism are called into question. Though it would take us much too far afield here to enter into a discussion of Hume’s critique of 1 theism, it will be of considerable interest to see how he regards the origin of the concept of causality and the closely related notions of power, energy, and necessary connection. From Hume we are long familiar with the example of one billiard ball striking another as a means of illustrating causation. It is also well known that he finds in this example the temporal priority of the cause and the spatial contiguity of the objects in the causal relation and that he cannot find in it a necessary connection between the cause and the effect. Nor can he find anything that may be called power or energy in that which would supposedly have it, namely the cause. While Hume accordingly uses this example to make his case that the concept of causality, understood as a necessary connection, does not have its origin in experience, it is obvious that it is does not suffice to show that causality in this sense is not immediately experienced in willing (or more accurately, in the perception of willing). Yet, Hume does take into account both the instances where willing produces something which is perceivable by sensation and where the effect is itself an object of reflection. Here his discussion of the latter case will prove of particular relevance to our consideration of Stumpf’s view of the matter, especially since Hume’s arguments in this connection are not taken into account by Stumpf. In An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding Hume presents three arguments for the conclusion “that even this command of the will gives us 2 no real idea of force or energy”. First, Hume argues that if we were directly acquainted with causality in this case we would know and therefore comprehend the power in our will that brought about the effect. Yet, there is nothing more incomprehensible to us than this power. 1

See Hume‘s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (available in various editions) which Stumpf regards as one of “the greatest masterpieces of acute analyses” (Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 794 n.). 2 Hume (1975), VII. i., p. 67.

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Secondly, he points out that it is only by repeated experience that we know the extent of the power of our will over our ideas. In this regard the will is no different from external causes, which must also have to be experienced repeatedly if we are to know anything of their power. Thirdly, due to the fact that the will varies in its effects at different times, this indicates once again that it alone cannot provide us with a sufficient idea of causality. It will be argued below that all these arguments, which might be put forward in opposition to the Stumpfian view of causality, involve presuppositions which can be called into question.

4. Inwardly Perceived Causality Stumpf fully agrees with Berkeley and Hume in their assertion that sensation is not the source of our idea of causality and thus disagrees not only with Locke, but also with those phenomenologists, such as Wilhelm 1 Schapp (a pupil of Husserl), who assert, for example, that we perceive causality whenever we see one billiard ball strike another. Rather, he follows the lead of Berkeley, Leibniz, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Beneke, many nineteenth century French philosophers, James, but ultimately Brentano by turning his attention to the workings of consciousness. Such workings, he finds, are not a mere association of ideas, but rather an 2 activity. When one reads a book, for example: 1

Schapp (1925), pp. 46 f., 116. This work was originally a dissertation which had been written in Göttingen in 1910. See Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 319, where Stumpf explicitly rejects Schapp’s view of causality and other ones which Schapp presents in the name of phenomenology. It is interesting to note that Schapp (1925) is referred to often and with approval in Merleau-Ponty (1945) (see pp. 265, 348, 357, 367). From Stumpf’s standpoint, much of what Merleau-Ponty says in the name of phenomenology would be as objectionable as what Schapp says about causality. 2 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 43. James‘ “discussions of the origin of the concept of cause”, says Stumpf, “are an essential and the best part of his epistemology [James, dessen Ausführungen über den Ursprung des Kausalbegriffes einen wesentlichen und den besten Teil seiner Erkenntnistheorie bilden]”. Though Stumpf does not tell us precisely what investigations in James he has in mind here, it is pointed out in Köhler

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it was certainly not a mere succession of words, nor one of mere images or concepts, but rather it was a temporally flowing unitary state, reshaping and further developing itself with every word and yet continually connected, in which all those elements arose, but which was guided and dominated by close attention; we can also say: by the enduring will to understand and to judge. Voluntary attention does not merely come before, but rather it endures during the entire 1 flow and forms with its effects a unitary whole.

Hence, by inner perception instances of causality can be the object of immediate cognition. Just as I can know that I am judging, I can likewise know that my judging is being caused by voluntary attention. It is interesting to note that the causality which Stumpf identifies in the operation of voluntary attention involves a simultaneity of cause and effect. In this regard he already implicitly rejects one aspect of the Humean analysis, namely the temporal priority of the cause. Here one may of course raise the question how Stumpf can characterize causal laws as laws 2 of succession as opposed to laws of coexistence (or laws of structure). The succession which causality involves, however, need not be one of first the cause and then the effect. Rather, it is much more plausible to say that causal laws are laws of succession in the sense that they are applicable only to the successive, whereas the laws of structure are applicable to 3 objects which are in some sense free of temporal succession. Consider, for example, one of Stumpf’s favorite examples of a law of structure, namely that color is necessarily extended. A color is not a temporally extended object as a mind-function is. While it would be impossible for the latter to exist in instantaneously, a color could indeed exist in an instant. For those who are uncomfortable with the notion of an instant, suffice it to say that there is nothing in the concept of color as such which involves the concept of succession as there obviously is in the concept of a mind-function. In (1959), pp. 198 ff., that at times James seems to allow for the perception of causality among things. 1 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 43. 2 Stumpf (1907b), p. 61. 3 See the discussion of such objects in Meinong (1899), pp. 247 ff.

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spite of these considerations, however, it will be seen that Stumpf takes a different perspective in his discussion of causality in inorganic nature. There is, Stumpf adds in his examination of the concept of causality, a one-sided conditionality here. This is precisely what distinguishes the relation of cause and effect from that of accidents to each other in a single substantial whole. It is voluntary attention that is the condition for the acts of judging and not vice-versa. This case is obviously different from one such as the relation of color and extension in a colored extended whole. Given Stumpf’s conviction that causality can be inwardly perceived, the question naturally arises how this fact could have been overlooked so long. Stumpf answers as follows: It was possible only because the doctrine of the soul wanted to emulate the aspiring science of nature, and the schema of elements and processes wanted to conform with that of physical atomism. It is important here, however, not merely to make the analogies of the two realms useful, but also sharply to keep the differences in mind. And the most fundamental difference is that the physicist only infers his atoms (like the entire external world) and cannot therefore directly perceive the relations between the things, whereas the psychologist at least perceives his own inner life and can therefore also directly grasp manifold 1 relations therein.

While this answer may be satisfactory in the explanation of why inner causation was overlooked in much of modern philosophy, it leaves us in the dark about this oversight prior to the time when mechanistic models began to prevail. It is however hardly an obligation of the philosopher to explain why previous philosophers did not arrive at his insight. In Stumpf’s identification of inner perception as the source of the concept of causality there are three other points worth noting here. First of all, he points out that the designation of voluntary attention as the cause of certain mental states does not entail that there cannot also be other 2 concomitant conditions for the states in question. Secondly, he does not wish to say that voluntary attention and the resulting mental states are the 1 2

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 44. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 44 f.

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only perceivable instances of causality in mental life. Thirdly, he maintains that his view of causality explains why animism is such a 2 prominent way of looking at things. Now let us briefly consider how Stumpf may respond to the above arguments from Hume against the view that the concept of causality cannot have its origin in reflection. We may be reminded that Hume argued that the power in willing is not at all comprehended by us and therefore cannot be directly known through reflection. If we thus suppose that someone wills to remember a name and the memory results, Hume would say in this case that no power can be known in this willing whereby the result in question comes about. While there is no doubt much that tends to mystify us about such a creative operation, this fact does not entail the conclusion that we are thereby not at all directly acquainted with an instance of causality here. By his focus on the concept of power, Hume apparently overlooks that the acquaintance in question is one with a certain relation. The power is, after all, attributed to the cause, in this case the will, whereas the usage of the term “causality” brings to mind the relation. However, we cannot know the power in the cause without knowing the whole relation, just as we cannot know that someone is a spouse without knowing that he is related to a certain other person in a certain way. However mystifying the relation of efficacy of volition might be, we can nonetheless know it as a relation in a single instance of successful willing. The two other arguments of Hume, namely the ones based on the observation that the will is more effective in certain cases and also requires repetition in order to be discovered, can be dismissed because it again fails to take into account the fact that causality is a relation. Moreover, Hume presupposes here that if we could be acquainted with causality by reflection we would be able to infer, without experience, what would result from any given instance. It is relevant here, however, that other empirically derived concepts do not allow us to make such inferences. Our concept of colors, for example, are empirically derived, but we need further experience in order to know about how colors will look in various 1 2

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 45. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 46.

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combinations. Likewise, in order to know how certain combinations of tones will sound, we cannot rely on our reasoning powers, as any musician well knows.

5. Necessity in Natural Causal Laws Though the objections which have just been raised against Hume‘s view of causality may be convincing, they still will not suffice to refute the assertion that it is impossible to identify a necessary connection between cause and effect. Such connections may indeed be inaccessible in direct experience. Nevertheless, Stumpf sees the notion of necessity as crucial in the scientific formulation of natural laws. For this reason it will be of interest now to consider how he adopts this notion in his view of causality. Now Stumpf tells us that Hume does not dismiss the concept of necessity altogether, for “he concedes that the relations between our ideas, if we completely disregard actuality, often result with compelling evidence 1 from the ideas themselves”. On this point Stumpf is in full agreement with Hume, as he understands him. Without referring to any particular passage in Hume’s writings, he gives the example of 2 x 2 = 4 as an instance of such a relation of ideas. The judgment in question does not merely happen to be true. Rather, it is true “with absolute necessity, and more particularly it is certainly not only a psychological necessity to judge in this way, for even a false judgment can be psychologically necessary, such as every 2 superstition which has become second nature”. Such a purely “objective” 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 48. The term Vorstellungen is here translated as “ideas”, for this is of course the term that Hume uses. For the most part, however, it is recommended that this term should be translated as “presentations“, which of course has the advantage of a corresponding verb (“to present”) as does the German term (vorstellen). 2 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 48 f. Here Stumpf is asserting his opposition to a nineteenth century tendency to equate the evidence of a judgment with some sort of compulsion to make it. Husserl’s rejection of psychologism involves precisely the same opposition, which he, like Stumpf, learned from Brentano. See Brentano (1889), pp. 80 ff.

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or “substantive” necessity (sachliche Notwendigkeit) can also be found outside of arithmetic and indeed outside of mathematics altogether. Among three different tones, for instance, it is necessary that one of them lies between the two others in terms of pitch. Necessities can also be found simply by presenting states of affairs, as such necessities are indeed identified in logic. Granting that such absolute and purely objective necessities obtain, it is moreover clear that such propositions as “here lives my friend Maier” and “the center of the sun is 149. 5 million kilometers from the earth” are contingent (not necessarily true). “Nothing in the least”, says Stumpf, “keeps us from presenting friend Maier’s appartment or the distance of the 1 sun as different from what they are”. While he is no doubt right on this point, we may note that the possibility in question is indeed a psychological one. Accordingly, it seems that, while the objective necessity of relations of ideas for Stumpf is not reducible to psychological necessity, he thinks that the possibility of presenting a certain state of affairs, hence a psychological possibility, is a sufficient condition for the 2 contingency of the state of affairs in question. In any case Stumpf, as many before him, is content to allow for a division between necessary and contingent states of affairs (or, correspondingly, between necessarily true propositions and contingently true propositions). Yet, when we consider natural laws, it is difficult to see how they are necessary, for, just as we can imagine that Maier does not live in a given appartment, we can also imagine that the law of gravity does not obtain. We can imagine, for instance, a stone not falling to the ground when we let it go. Here is thus an additional argument for the Humean thesis that there is no necessary connection between cause and effect. Not only is it impossible to perceive a necessary connection between cause and effect, e.g. between letting the stone go and its falling to the ground, but it is also possible to imagine circumstances in which the relation of cause and effect fails to occur. Nonetheless, Stumpf maintains that the necessity which is to be found among relations of ideas can be drawn upon in order to rescue the thesis 1 2

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 49. The issue at stake here had already been encountered in Stumpf (1873), pp. 112 ff.

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that natural laws and thus causal relations are necessary. In this regard, he says, “It must be a transference, a hypothetical application of the concept of rational necessity or an analogy to it. If we have any reason at all to apply the concept of laws in the strict sense, i.e. of necessary connections, to nature, nothing else can be meant by this than modes of operation which we would recognize as rationally necessary if, instead of mere sensory phenomena, the essence of the natural things would be graspable for us in 1 conceptual form, if we had ‘adequate concepts’ of the essence of things”. Thus, when we imagine, for example, that we let go of a stone and it remains hovering in the air, we are imagining certain phenomena. Stumpf concedes that the concept of necessity does not apply to these. Nonetheless, the law of gravity, he maintains, can be viewed as necessary insofar as it applies to the things in the external world for which the phenomena are merely signs. Our concepts of these things, however, are constructed only in terms of signs and symbols and are not adequate. If we could actually grasp these things adquately, as we can grasp the phenomena or mind-functions, we would see that the law of gravity is absolutely necessary just as the axioms and theorems of mathematics are. It thus becomes clear that Stumpf does not allow for the causal laws of nature to be reduced to mere matters of fact, as opposed to empiricists like John Stuart Mill. The causal laws, he says, are most appropriately formulated in conditional propositions, while the latter are rather to be formulated categorically. Moreover, matters of fact, e.g. the distance of the earth from the sun, are not even to be construed as mere consequences of natural laws. Whenever a matter of fact can be legitimately inferred from a natural law, there must also be another matter of fact that can be stated among the premises. At the same time, however, Stumpf wishes to emphasize the pecularity of natural laws in contrast with logical ones, as opposed to rationalists like Leibniz. It is only by hypothesis, transference, or analogy that natural laws are to be conceived as necessary, whereas this is not required for the axioms of logic and other a priori disciplines in which necessity can be known in the strict and proper sense.

1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 50.

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There are therefore two senses in which we speak of necessity on Stumpf’s view, one of them being the proper one and the other being derivative. When we conceive of the causal relation as a necessary connection, it is the second sense that we have in mind. Yet, a third sense of “necessity”, namely one “which would then embrace the mere matters of fact, but which might be defined under the presupposition of definite, 1 metaphysical views”, is not ruled out by Stumpf. Here he has in mind a view such as the one that Leibniz espouses when he says that things are as they are because God could only create the best of all possible worlds. Besides this allowance, however, there is only an admission of how difficult it would be to define “necessity” in this sense, which would apparently be even more derived than the sense in which natural laws and thus causal laws are necessary. Such metaphysical flights are of course often condemned by empiricists, especially by positivists. Stumpf, however, makes room for expanding 2 concepts beyond the empirically given, just as Brentano and a whole tradition before him going back to Aristotle had done, by distinguishing between concepts in the strict and proper sense and their analogical derivatives. While such a distinction is in principle acceptable, it can nonetheless still be asked how the concept of necessity is derived in the first place. It will hardly suffice to say that this concept can be found in Hume and then to affirm what Hume says on the matter, for it can still be asked what justified Hume empirically to speak of necessity even in the strict and proper sense, e.g. the necessity of mathematical axioms. If it is true that concepts must ultimately have their origin in inner or outer perception, the necessity of mathematical axioms will not be a satisfactory starting point for the empiricist. Obviously we do not discover such necessity by outer perception. Nor do we discover it by inner perception, as is particularly implied by Stumpf’s insistence that it is not a psychological necessity under consideration here. The question concerning the empirical 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 53. This is already clear in his discussion of the concept of substance and its expansion beyond the empirical realm, e.g. where the extended colored whole is given as a substance, to the Spinozian concept of substance. See Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 13-41.

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origin of the concept of necessity thus turns out to be one which both Hume and Stumpf fail to answer and could indeed motivate a rationalism that is not only restricted to a view of processes of cognition, but also to the origin of concepts. The rationalist (including the followers of Kant) can, after all, say that the concept of necessity is simply innate. Stumpf does not show us how to answer to such an assertion of rationalism. Another problem which arises in Stumpf’s view of necessity and causal laws of nature concerns causal relations among mind-functions. If these relations also instantiate laws, it needs to be explained why there is an apparent lack of necessity among the mind-functions which are thus related. Sometimes our efforts to produce certain mind-functions are successful, but sometimes they are not. This can be affirmed by anyone who has unsuccessfully tried to remember something as simple as a name. The way in which Stumpf deals with the apparent lack of necessity in causal relations among outwardly perceived things cannot be taken in dealing with this lack thereof among mind-functions, for the latter are not merely phenomena, but rather realities as such. Perhaps the only answer which can be given here is that causality need not involve a necessary connection or the instantiation of natural laws. Concerning Stumpf’s approach to the issue of necessary connections among those causal relations formulated in certain natural laws, it can finally be said that it turns out to be opposed to a line of argument found in Kant, according to which the concept of causality is to be restricted to the phenomena. Nonetheless, he has in common with Kant the very notion that beyond the phenomena there are things in themselves or an external world. This realism which Stumpf accepts, as will now be seen, includes a general law of causality.

6. The External World and Causality Since Descartes the existence and knowledge of the external world has been a matter of great dipute, though certain twentieth century philosophers have tried to describe the world in a way in which this dispute, as well as other traditional ones, would become obsolete. This has

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been done either by highly verbose and obscure applications of the “phenomenological method” or by arguments against the possibility of a private language. There is, however, widespread disagreement about precisely why this dispute is to be forgone. Moreover, it is not at all clear what has been gained by forgoing traditional approaches in philosophy. The resulting bankruptcy in various strains of philosophy is perhaps an indication that it is high time to return to the problems which have occupied philosophers prior to the alleged novelties of the phenomenological method or the linguistic turn and try to solve them by more traditional means, such as the empirical analysis of concepts and the expansion of them by means of analogy or hypothesis. Accordingly, Stumpf’s occupation with the dispute between realism and idealism is not to be dismissed out of hand as somehow outmoded. In philosophy the fashions come and go, but time is the ultimate test of what is worthy of serious consideration. It is the view of the common man, says Stumpf, that there are things beyond himself, but these are thought to be the everyday objects we 1 perceive by our senses. Such objects may be warm or cold, colored in different ways, and generally have any of the properties which are given through sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. They are not the idealized and mathematized objects of physics. Unlike some nineteenth century philosophers, e.g. Eduard von Hartmann and Eduard Zeller, Stumpf does not think that there is an “unconscious inference” from the sensory 2 phenomena to the external things. Rather, he agrees with Brentano that there is simply an instinct to believe in the external reality of sensory contents. Though Stumpf regards this instinctive belief as one of “the very understandable teleological or biological arrangements of our nature”, he 3 says, “it has nothing to do with a cognition”. As already noted, Stumpf takes the side of realism in the dispute about the knowledge of the external world. The view that he opposes is, he tells us, actually better called “phenomenalism” than “idealism”. He rejects the 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 578. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 579. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 580. 2

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Berkeleyan argument in favor of phenomenalism because he thinks that this inevitably leads to solipsism and that it is based on a confusion 1 between the presenting act and the content of presentation. Moreover, he regards other attempts to support phenomenalism, such as the ones which are found in the works of John Stuart Mill and Ernst Mach, as no better than Berkeley‘s attempt to do so. Our sensations, according to Stumpf, occur only with a degree of regularity, but also with considerable 2 irregularity, unlike the world as conceived of in natural science. Stumpf maintains that the hypothesis of the external world is confirmed by natural science, but for him this confirmation, unlike the proof demanded and 3 allegedly adduced by Kant, is also a matter of probability rather than 4 apodictic certainty. The hypothesis of the external world is stated as follows in Epistemology: There is, existing independently from my consciousness, a world of things, which stand among each other in spatio-temporal relations and in lawlike interaction, and a part of which (my own body) is constantly connected with my consciousness, while other parts are analogously connected with other unities of 5 consciousness.

There are three ways in which causality comes into play in the conception of the external world as stated. First there is a “thorough-going 6 lawlike interaction [... ] for the whole material world”. Secondly, there is a connection that Stumpf posits between one’s own consciousness and one’s own body. It is indeed difficult to understand how this connection could not at least in part be a causal one. Thirdly, Stumpf sees an analogous connection between other bodies and other consciousnesses. While a discussion of this analogous connection would take us much too far afield, 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 582-586. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 590 ff. 3 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B xxxix, 274 ff. 4 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 589 ff. 5 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 595. 6 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 596. 2

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Stumpf’s view of mind-body interaction will be examined after his conception of causality in inorganic and organic nature is taken into account.

7. Causality in Inorganic Nature Though Stumpf identifies the origin of the concept of causality in inner rather than outer perception, his preference for discussing the application of this concept in special areas is to begin with the inorganic (especially as this is conceived of in physics), and then proceed to the organic, the psychophysical, and the psychical respectively. The present section is concerned with Stumpf’s approach to causality in the inorganic. Though Stumpf makes a sharp distinction between concepts and judgments (the latter including both blind and evident ones), he says that one can, “in the case of concepts, which have gradually developed out of scientific needs, draw the content of the concepts from that of judgments 1 and propositions in which they occur”. For this reason he finds it convenient to examine the concept of causality in physics by considering the law of causality, under the assumption of course that a law is indeed a content of a judgment. While some dispute whether it is appropriate to speak of such a law, Stumpf is prepared to formulate it as follows: “Every physical occurrence is preceded by another which stands in a lawlike 2 relation with it”. Since the preceding occurrence in question is the cause and the one that follows the effect, an alternative formulation of the law of causality is as follows: “Every physical occurrence is the effect of a 3 4 cause”, or more briefly: “Every physical occurrence has a cause”. Two features are identified as crucial here: 1) succession, and 2) lawlikeness (Gesetzlichkeit) or necessity.

1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 714. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940),p. 715. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 715. 4 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 715. 2

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The notion of necessity, as already seen, is difficult to accept from a strictly empirical point of view. Among those who adhered to such a viewpoint during Stumpf’s time were positivists such as Ernst Mach. Though Mach thought that the concept of causality could be replaced by 1 that of functional relation, Stumpf maintains, in explicit opposition to Mach and other positivists, that the mathematical formula “y = f(x)” used to express functional relations is only a reminder “that the strict concept of 2 necessity is inseparable from that of causality”. Here we may take issue with Stumpf for gratuitously importing the notion of necessity where a consistent empiricist could never find it acceptable. Though a philosopher may consistently allow for necessary truths in mathematics or elsewhere, he can only do regard causal relations by cutting the Gordian knot and embracing a doctrine like that of innate ideas, Kantian categories, or something equally abominable to empiricism. Aside from this criticism, Stumpf faces the question whether he should make the following addition to the law of causality: “and every physical 3 occurrence is followed by another one, of which the same is true”. This addition, called the “law of effect” (Effektgesetz), is regarded by him, however, as a corollary of the law of causality. A corollary of this 4 corollary, moreover, he finds in the doctrine of “like cause - like effect”. As understood in everyday life, this merely means that causes of a given qualitative determination will produce effects of a given qualitative determination. If a match is struck, for instance, a flame will result. It is unacceptable that now a flame results, now something totally different from a flame results. To be sure, it is possible under certain circumstances that a flame will not be the effect, e.g. if the surface against which the match is struck is wet. Such exceptions, however, are taken into account in everyday life without mathematical precision. This precision comes into play in physics, where “like cause – like effect” is understood in a quantitative way. 1

See Mach (1922), pp. 74-78. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 715 f. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 716. 4 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940),pp. 718 ff. 2

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Both temporal and spatial contact are regarded by Stumpf as a requirement for causal relations. He rejects the view that there can be an actio distans because of the conspicuous fact that “spatial distance plays 1 some role in the law of distant effects”. That is to say, it is hardly even conceivable to him that the strength of attaction depends on greater or less distance unless there is some medium through which the attraction is effected. The view that cause and effect are in temporal contact with each other is of course so widely accepted that Stumpf sees little need to defend it. The only controversial question in this matter is whether the temporal contact is one of simultaneity or successiveness. Though Brentano had maintained that cause and effect are simultaneous with each other, Stumpf is rather inclined to say that, in application to inorganic nature, they are 2 successive, however paradoxical this may seem. The fact that causality as it is originally given in inner perception does not involve a succession of the cause and effect does not trouble Stumpf, for he realizes that physics 3 has little use for inner perception anyway. The concept of force (Kraft) in physics, according to Stumpf, is to be understood purely in terms of causal laws, and thus one is to avoid thinking of force as a cause. We say, to stay with the often used simple example, “The stone that is thrown falls to earth because of the earth’s force of attraction”. When all unjustified ingredients of the imagination are disposed of, nothing can be expressed by this statement but the law that all unsupported bodies must fall to earth. The emphasis is on “all” and “must”. In other words, it is the law which the word “force” indicates. The conduct is not grounded in the individual, accidental nature of the single body, but rather in the nature of bodies which are in this situation. Our knowledge, as it is laid down in the general law of causality or in the special law of falling, is not expanded by means of the word “force”; only our manner of expression is abbreviated. “Force of attraction” is only a synonym for “law of attraction”, and the phrase “because of” is not to be understood causally, but rather logically; as far as sober thinking is concerned, it does not mean that the

1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 728. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 729 f. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 730. 2

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conduct in question is brought about by force, but only that it is logically 1 derivable and predictable from the law.

On this point Stumpf of course has much in common with the positivists. It must be noted, however, that sometimes causes themselves are referred to as force in a perfectly legitimate way. One may speak of the forces of nature, for example, and mean such things as floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes. This point as well as Stumpf’s proposal to restrict the usage of “force” to law will be discussed further in the section on causality in organic nature. As far as the epistemological character of the law of causality is concerned, Stumpf says that it is by no means comparable to a formal or material axiom and anything deductively derived therefrom and can 2 accordingly only be known by induction and probability. He is of course well aware that there have been some, especially Leibniz, who see this matter quite differently and thus construe the law of causality as the law of sufficient reason, which is allegedly a priori as the law of noncontradiction. On this latter view, the occurrence which is the cause provides an explanation of the effect. When we know the cause, we know, according to the a priori conception of Leibniz and others, exactly why the effect and not some other occurrence followed it. “This conception”, Stumpf replies, [... ] is based on an overestimation of physical causality. [... ] Here we are never able to see that and why this and no other effect must follow. We never understand the connection in the manner and in the sense in which we understand 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 734. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 735 ff. Here the problem of induction and the charge of circularity may be raised against Stumpf, but he thinks that advances in probability theory provide a solution to this problem and also allow this charge to be effectively swept aside. Stumpf’s theory of induction and probability, as this is worked out in Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 476-577, is better discussed at length in another paper, where Stumpf’s critique of Brentano’s attempt to prove the a priori knowability of the law of causality (Stumpf [1940], pp. 742-746) and also doubts about this law from the standpoint of quantum mechanics (Stumpf [1940], pp. 746758) should be examined. 2

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the connection of the premises with the conclusion of an evident syllogism. When we claim to understand a fact from a preceding one as its “reason”, it is, when looked at more precisely, not the preceding fact itself, but rather the law of its connection with the following one from which we understand these [facts]; that is to say, the law is that under which we subsume their temporal succession as a single case. The facts themselves, both the preceding one and the succeeding one, remain as intrinsically unintelligible as the law that combines them. But the subsumption produces a feeling of intellectual satisfaction which is expressed in the word “understanding”. This view we share with Hume and his reviver Mach, although they have thrown out the baby with the bath water by denying the strict 1 concept of law and necessity.

It has already been seen above how Stumpf attempts to salvage this strict concept of law and necessity. It has also been argued that he cannot do so without forgoing his empiricism. The epistemological assessment of the law of causality just cited only confirms the difficulty in which Stumpf finds himself by defending this empiricism on the one hand and avoiding scepticism on the other. Here some may demand a response from Stumpf to Kant‘s attempt to defend the a priori character of the law of causality, according to which there is a synthetic judgment a priori that every event has a cause and this judgment is just as evident as synthetic judgments a priori are in mathematics. Without the synthetic judgment a priori of the law of causality natural science, according to Kant, would simply not be possible. This view of causality, however, is found totally unacceptable by Stumpf, who cannot allow for the synthetic a priori in mathematics or anywhere 2 else. It would be wrong, says Stumpf, “to think in a judgment, meant to be cognition, two concepts which are completely alien to each other in content and still to require that we should agree to their unification in the judgment 3 with great conviction, indeed with evidence”. Such a requirement is precisely what he sees in the notion of synthetic judgments a priori, which he accordingly rejects. 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 737 f. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 739 f. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 205. 2

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8. Causality in Organic Nature In Stumpf’s discussion of causality in organic nature he is at first concerned with the question “whether there are not certain differences 1 between what the biologist and what the physicist calls ‘causality’”. This question is in essence raised whenever there is discussion about vital force, i.e. a force that is unique to life. Though Lotze had played a prominent role in discrediting vitalism in the nineteenth century, there were neo-vitalistic movements at the end of that century and early in the twentieth century, as 2 promoted by Hans Driesch and Henri Bergson. As we have seen, Stumpf regards force not as something that causes, but rather as something to be understood purely in terms of causal laws. If there is a vital force, this can accordingly be nothing other than a certain causal law or set of laws 3 peculiar to life. There is, however, no such law to be found, says Stumpf. Yet, it may here be remembered that causes are sometimes legitimately designated as forces. In this regard it is possible that the vitalist is at least sometimes thinking not so much of special laws for the organic as something called “life”, which is absolutely unreducible to inorganic 4 causes and is itself a cause in nature. In this regard vitalism is closely allied with the view that there is interaction between the physical and psychical, a view which Stumpf, as will soon be seen, attempts to defend. What is peculiar about organic nature, says Stumpf, is not that it has its own causal laws, but rather that it apparently requires a type of explanation which differs very much from causal explanation. This other type is teleological in character and is thus concerned with identifying purposes. 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 759. See Stumpf’s historical discussion in small print in Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 762 ff. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 764 ff. 4 If this cause is identified as psychical, the result will be psycho-vitalism, as described in Eisler (1922), p. 360. The position described there is very similar, if not the same, as the one that Stumpf adopts on the question of psychophysical causality. Stumpf even praises the psycho-vitalist Busse in Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 304 f., for his “excellent elaborations”, but also criticizes him for weak arguments. 2

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Though scienticists have tried to avoid the notion of purpose (Zweck) in nature altogether for about two centuries, at least two purposes “appear to be primarily actualized in organic nature: the preservation of the indivudal 1 and of the species (reproduction)”. “The preservation of the species, however”, continues Stumpf, “is, according to the current state of knowledge, to be thought of as modified and supplemented by a slowly 2 advancing transformation of species in a determinate direction”. Such transformation, according to him, can be regarded as yet a third purpose to be found in organic nature. This apparent teleology is so pervasive on Stumpf’s view that it is permissable to “speak of a need for teleological explanation as well as a 3 need for a causal one”. Whenever it is unclear what the purpose of a certain organ is, for instance, one does not rest in the conviction that the organ in question simply has no purpose. Rather, until the purpose is found, the organ in question is considered to be unexplained or not understood. According to Stumpf, even predictions can be made from the teleological standpoint and not only on the basis of the law of causality. “As is well known, Cuvier, who put the teleological principle alongside the causal one, succeeded in inferring from a bone of a prehistoric animal its whole form in its essentials, and the predication was confirmed by the 4 discovery of other parts”. Certain aspects of organisms may be called “dysteleologies”, “as unavoidable and unharmful by-products or rudiments 5 of teleological arrangements”. It is important here that Stumpf stresses the above-mentioned purposes, for he fails to see such purposes as pleasure or happiness, not to mention some sort of ethical perfection, as exhibited in inorganic nature. The question arises whether the apparent teleology in organic nature requires the hypothesis of an entity which has ordered the organic to fulfill the purposes under discussion. The Darwinistic theory of evolution is of 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 783. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 783. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 784. 4 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 785. 5 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 785. 2

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course often appealed to in this regard as a means for making such a hypothesis unnecessary. Stumpf, however, maintains that Darwinism does not have any bearing on the matter at hand, for he finds the probability that life as such would develop in the first place without being arranged to be 1 negligibly low. Accordingly Stumpf reaches a conclusion which is to this day a matter of controversy: “There must exist a common factor of order, a world soul or a transcendent power, whose nature and mode of effect could be more 2 closely determined if our wisdom were not almost at an end here already”. As already mentioned, Stumpf rejects the optimistic theism which he had 3 learned from Brentano’s metaphysics. The mere fact that there is any evil at all in the world, according to Stumpf, indicates that a theodicy along the lines proposed by Leibniz, Lotze, Brentano, or other theists is doomed to failure. The only way in which such evil is understandable is by embracing determinism, which would have the result, says Stumpf, of pantheism 4 rather than theism. 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 788 ff. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 791. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 794-798. See Brentano, M 15/30109: „Metaphysics is the the science of that reality which is necessary through itself. It grasps this as spirit (presenting, judging, loving and hating), as perfect, as one, as omniscient, as holy, as blessed, as omnipotent, as eternal and endless, as eternal and endless infinitesimal change, as ground of the world, as creator, as all-determiner, as realizing the best possible world. It [i.e. metaphysics] removes appearance that contradicts such optimism [Die Metaphysik ist die Wissenschaft von dem durch sich selbst notwendigen Realen. Sie erkennt es als Geist (vorstellend, urteilend, liebend und hassend), als vollkommen, als eines, als allwissend, als heilig, als selig, als allmächtig, als ewig und endlos, als ewigen und endlosen infinitesimalen Wechsel, als ersten Grund der Welt, als Schöpfer, als Allbestimmer, als die bestmögliche Welt realisierend. Sie beseitigt dem solchen Optismus widerstrebenden Schein].“ Stumpf says that he had differed with Brentano on the point in question as early as 1876 (Stumpf [1940], p. 796 n.). As pointed out in Schuhmann (1996), p. 128, the same year was also when Stumpf first lectured in metaphysics (Stumpf [1940], p. 700) and thus “it is more than likely that the opposition to Brentano and his personal coming to grips with metaphysics were two sides of the same coin”. 4 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 796. 2

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9. Psycho-Physical Causality As already indicated, Stumpf maintains that there is an immediate knowledge of one’s own mental states. The external world, i.e. the reality which exists outside of such states, is knowable, according to him, only in a mediate way, namely as a hypothesis which natural science confirms. Thus he finds it impossible to accept any sort of “vulgar materialism” in 1 which only the physical is regarded as real. The question arises, however, whether the physical and the psychical are aspects of one single reality or whether they are two distinct realities which interact with each other. Stumpf adopts the latter view and accordingly finds it necessary to defend the notion of psychophysical interaction. For two reasons Stumpf thinks that the opposing view, i.e. parallelism, has the burden of proof: 1) because interactionism is the commonly held view, 2) because the fruitfulness of the concept of causality in application to the physical indicates that it should also be fruitful in application to the 2 psychophysical. What has nonetheless historically motivated parallelism is the apparent heterogeneity of the pychical and physical, for there is a widespread assumption that causality is possible only when there is homogeneity between cause and effect. Another, closely related reason why interactionism has been rejected, according to Stumpf, is the failure to identify any spatial point of contact between mind-functions and physical occurrences. If the former are altogether nonspatial, it seems to be a hopeless task to find any such point anywhere at all in space. Nonetheless, Descartes, who of course denied that the res cogitans had any extension, was still convinced that it interacted with the body in the pineal gland. Stumpf says that this conviction could not be shared by subsequent interactionists, for it was soon found that psychical life does not stop upon 3 the removal of this gland.

1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 802 f. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 805. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 806. 2

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In spite of the fact that no locus of interaction comparable to the pineal gland has been found, Stumpf maintains that this is not a problem for interaction. In this regard he adopts a position inspired by Augustine, which is stated as follows: The contact takes place not in a point, not in a surface, but rather in the entire three-dimensional extension of the neural substance which stands in interaction with the psychical states and which we therefore also call “psychophysical substance”. There takes place spatial interpenetration, though such a thing is ruled out between material things among each other; but this is, in turn, not such that there is a point-by-point correspondence, but rather in such a way that in every point of the material substance the entire psychical one is fully present. This assumption is necessary because otherwise the psychical itself, the complex 1 of conscious states, would have to have spatial parts, which is obviously not the 2 case.

It is, however, very strange to say this, when it is considered that certain psychical states interact with certain body parts in very special ways. Upon being stuck with a pin in the right index finger, for example, there is a pain felt in this part of the body and not the same pain felt elsewhere. Yet, if the entire complex of psychical states which makes up a given soul is given in its full presence in every point of the “material substance” which is the body, the pain that is felt in the right index finger is everywhere else in body as much as it is in that particular part. It is unfortunate that Stumpf adopts such a counter-intuitive view of the matter at hand, when it seems much more promising for the defender of interactionism simply to challenge the requirement of spatial contact for causality in the first place. Even if this requirement is to be accepted in purely physical causality, it does not at all follow that it must be accepted as an absolute necessity in all other spheres.

1

It is very important that Stumpf conceives of the psychical (the “soul”) as a “complex of conscious states” and not as a substantial bearer of such states. In this regard, however, his view is very modern and therefore very different from Augustine’s. There will be more discussion of Stumpf’s view of the psychical below. 2 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 809 f.

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As to the heterogeneity between the physical and the psychical, Stumpf insists that the emergence of the psychical from something as utterly different as the physical is just one of the leaps in nature which science has to accept along with mutations of organism and quantum leaps. “It is an old, but false saying”, he says, that nature makes no leaps. No effect is fully equal to the cause, or else the world as such would remain the same. How great the difference can be, however, is taught only by experience. One has now become accustomed in biology to the notion of mutations, in physics to that of quantum leaps. But however definitive this may be, for the psychologist there was for a long time no other possibility but to conclude that with every new class of sensations alone something new, never having been before, came into the world. The first weak sound, the first tone, however pitiful it might have sounded, was a new world, to which no purely gradual transition from the sensations of touch, sensations of vibration, etc. is conceivable, even though intermediate members can be thought of as 1 inserted.

What is perhaps most legitimately feared in interactionism is that it is opposed to the law of the conservation of energy. If the psychical causes the physical, e.g. if my volition causes my arm to move, then it seems that new energy has been brought into the physical world. Stumpf sees two possible ways of overcoming this difficulty. The first would be to be to insist that the law in question is about energy and not about causes. This strategy, however, would result in a position which is dangerously close to parallelism. “According to the second manner of presentation”, says Stumpf, “the pychical states, processes, acts must themselves be regarded as a special type of energy which fits into the working of the physical types 2 and subjected to the law of the conservation of energy”. As long as a “mechanical equivalence” is maintained whenever one type of energy is transformed into another, it is permissable to speak of a mechnical, generally: a physical equivalent of psychical processes and to interpret the processes in the cerebral cortex in such a 1 2

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 810 f. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 813.

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way that transformations of neural energy into psychical energy and back again constantly take place, as long as the psycho-physical organism as such, as a 1 mental corporeal whole exists.

Here it may be remembered that vitalism is sometimes considered to be the view that nature has more forces, i.e. causes, than the purely physical ones. Stumpf’s suggestion for maintaining both interactionism and the law of the conservation of energy therefore seems to come close to some version of vitalism. While this suggestion might be satisfactory to a few – and nowadays very few – philosophers, it will hardly be so for the investigators in the biological sciences who will have about as much use for psychical energy, which will not only smack of vitalism but will also be 2 branded as “unempirical”, as physics does for inner perception. Of course, this does not mean that Stumpf is wrong in his attempt to reconcile interactionism with the law of the conservation of energy. It is, however, unfortunate that he does not explore other ways of such a reconciliation, e.g. by denying that any physical energy is lost or gained in psychophysical causality. Against what Stumpf sees as the competing theory of the mind-body relationship, i.e. parallelism, he argues that this theory is indefensible. A difference between the physical and the psychical has always been acknowledged by its defenders, though they regard them “not as different substances, but merely as different attributes, aspects, or modes of 3 apprehension of one and the same substance”. For this reason Schelling referred to his system as the “system of identity”, while Haeckel called his particular version of parallelism “monism”. Yet, it has been disputed for a long time among the proponents of this view whether the physical and the psychical are merely two different ways of viewing the same thing, or whether they are already differentiated in the essence of the one substance. 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 814. As Stumpf speaks of a vulgar materialism, it should be kept in mind that there is also a vulgar empiricism, which, unlike the empiricism of Locke, Hume, Brentano, and Stumpf, is fixated on observation, testing, and measuring. As it turns out, both vulgar materialism and vulgar empiricism are often closely allied. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 816. 2

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Be this as it may, Stumpf says that it is unclear what is meant by “attribute” or “aspect”. This concept, he says, has its origin partly in outer perception, as each tone is found to have a pitch and a volume, each visual datum to have a color and an extension, etc., but it also partly originates from inner perception. To presenting, judging, and feeling various attributes can be ascribed with evidence. Since one can extend the concept by analogy and speak of greater unities, e.g. the physical thing, parallelism can be taken as yet a further extension of the concept of attributes. “The world, one would say, has several aspects in a sense like the one in which a 1 tone or a psychical act does”. If, however, the psychical and physical events are related to each other as the pitch and volume of a single tone are, the distinction between such events makes it very difficult to understand in what sense they are “parallel”. The pitch and volume of a single tone are by no means parallel insofar insofar as one of them can change (either increase or decrease) 2 while the other remains exactly the same. Consequently, it is necessary for the parallelist to construe the relationship between the psychical and the physical by means of a comparison better suited to his metaphor. The comparisons which had been made by Fechner, namely the convcave and convex sides of a dome or the mirror image and the original, are rejected by Stumpf as unhelpful. “How should something unextended”, he asks rhetorically, “be the concave side of something extended? The mirror image, however, is not another side of the original, but rather brought about causally by it in unision with the mirror surface, and thus leads 3 directly to interactionism”. It may be pointed out that Stumpf is here a bit hasty, for the analogy of the mirror image and the original does not directly lead to interactionism since this analogy suggests a only one-way causality. Nonetheless, as we shall soon see, he attacks theories which allow for a one-way causality (from the physical to the psychical or vice-versa) as alternative versions of parallelism. 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 817. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 818. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 818 f. What Stumpf means by the unextended is of course the psyhical. 2

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The only way in which Stumpf finds it conceivable to give meaning to parallelism is by appealing to the distinction between inner and outer perception. Those parallelists “who accept this distinction”, he says, can explain the apparent duality of worlds by considering the same world, the same things and events, now from without, now from within. “For what is within is without” (Goethe). The world of thinking and feeling appears to me when I look into myself; the world of spatial forms and motions arises when I turn my gaze outwards. It is, however, one and the same world. I myself cannot of course perceive my brain, but I can imagine it according to the model of other brains: and in that case I perceive, as it were, the same thing that I, when my gaze is 1 directed inwards, designated as the life of my soul.

Though Stumpf finds it intelligible to speak of a parallel in the manner suggested, he also insists that this parallel is not a thorough-going one, due to relations which obtain among psychical occurrences and not among physical ones. From Brentano he had learned that all mind-functions which are not themselves presentations have presentations as their foundation, but he finds among outwardly perceived phenomena nothing at all that exhibits 2 the founding relation of presentations to other types of mind-functions. Finally, Stumpf attacks parallelism by considering what causal relations would be possible on this view. Unless the parallelist concedes to interactionism by allowing for causality from the physical to the psychical and vice-versa, only three possibilties are open to him: 1) that there is a one-way causality from the physical to the psychical, 2) that there is a oneway causality from the psychical to the physical, and 3) that the psychical and the physical are not causally related at all. Stumpf rejects both the first two possibilities because he is convinced that both the phyiscal and psychical are both real and accordingly occurrences which have an effect 3 on others. The first of the above-mentioned possibilities, namely the one 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 819. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 819 f. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 821. Cf. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), pp. 75 ff. Stumpf’s view that phenomena, such as colors and sounds, are real, though not causally related, as discussed in “Stumpf’s on Phenomena and Phenomenology”, stands in need of revision in light of his conception of reality as that which has effects. 2

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embraced in epiphenomenalism or materialistic parallelism, is rejected by Stumpf for the additional reason that the very concept of causality, already discussed, is derived from what we inwardly perceive, which is of course 1 the psychical. The only option left open for the defender of parallelism is thus to say that there may be a causal chain among psychical occurrences and another such chain among physical ones, but no causal relation at all between the physical and the psychical. It is of course obvious that the resulting version of parallelism is extremely unacceptable. While this view was originally meant to promote monism, it turns out that it is a much more extreme dualism than interactionism, for it ends in the conclusion that there are two worlds, a physical one and a psychical one, which are 2 totally separate from each other.

10. Psychical Causality In his consideration of psychical causality Stumpf speaks of the soul as distinct from the ego. “We define the soul (or a soul) as a whole of mental states, the ego (an ego) as a whole of corporeal states and those mental states which are connected with the corporeal ones by the psychophysical 3 (causal) relation”. While there is a natural temptation to regard the resulting conceptions of soul and ego as Humean, Stumpf cautions, “The concept of whole, however, is in both cases to be stressed most sharply, again in contrast to Hume‘s talk of a ‘bundle’, a sum, a mere collective. Yet, we agree with the great critic in the elimination of the old concept of 4 substance in the sense of an unknown bearer of states”. The question accordingly arises how the whole, particularly in the case of the soul, differs from a mere collective. The unity of consciousness, says Stumpf, is a fact that is given in the present. While one may speak of different mind-functions occurring in one 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 821. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 821 f. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 826. 4 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 826. 2

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single consciousness, these “are only products of theoretical considerations, though they are unavoidable in the interest of description 1 and required by nature of consciousness”. While this unity in the present is an absolute given among the facts of consciousness, the question arises how the soul can be identical through time. What there is from the past in consciousness consists of memories. Stumpf is not content to say that a memory of a given process of 2 consciousness suffices as a criterion of identify or unity, because: “There appear to me, after all, also numerous, wildly changing memory images which we relate to other bodies and other mental beings and regard as their 3 properties or mind-functions”. The criterion is rather found by appealing to a causal chain in the following way: The memory images of one’s own life and one’s own person are mainly marked off (alongside other less decisive properties) by the fact that it is in principle possible to think of them as causally fitted into a chain of mind-functions which extend to the present. They appear to our retrospective reflection as fragmentary members of a psychophysical developmental process, in itself uninterrupted, and can be located more or less precisely at certain positions of this process and 4 understood causally from this context.

It should be easy enough to think of examples which would be used to verify Stumpf’s theory of personal identity. I remember, for example, having made a decision to write about Stumpf’s views on causality. This decision is mine because it has caused me to engage in my present reflections of the topic at hand. The understanding which is brought about by considering this causal chain, says Stumpf, is by no means the sort which normally enbables us to make predictions. It is rather “an understanding in the broader sense, as one speaks also of an understanding of actions of historical persons from

1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1939), p. 25. See Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II. xxvii. 8-27. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 827. 4 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), pp. 827 f. 2

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their abilities and their character in connection with external effects”. Naturally, a consideration of innate and acquired dispositions play an important role in the reconstruction of the causal chain. Moreover, as Stumpf insists on necessity of causal relations, he does so in the case of the causal chain which makes up the soul and the ego. As far as the purely psychical events in the chain are concerned, however, these are, he maintains contrary to Herbart and Beneke, interrupted “in dreamless sleep, 2 in deep coma, and similar states”. If, however, philosophers insist upon an “intelligible ego” “besides all empirically exhibitable or strictly inferrable 3 states and dispositions of the ego” , they may of course do so. Stumpf says only that such an assumption does not serve in any way in the explanation of the facts. As it turns out, the soul and the ego are for Stumpf “not intuitions (objects of intuitions), neither inner ones nor outer ones, but rather concepts (objects of concepts), which are, to be sure, rooted in intuitions, 4 but cannot be given adequately in any intuition”. It is even acceptable to him to speak of them as hypotheses, just as one speaks of the external world. As such, however, they are not mere fictions, for they are by no means false or absurd. The intuition in which the hypotheses of ego and soul are ultimately grounded is of course one’s own present states. From such intuitions they are constructed by means of the laws of causality, as the hypothesis of the external world is constructed from sensory phenomena.

11. Conclusion It has been seen that Stumpf defends a concept of causality derived from inner perception and applies it to various areas with results which are plainly metaphysical in character. Moreover, this metaphysics occupies a 1

Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 828. Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 829. 3 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 830. 4 Stumpf, (ed.) Stumpf (1940), p. 830. 2

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peculiar place in the history of philosophy. Stumpf is an empiricist, but he is at the same time no sceptic about the necessity of causal relations and the external world. He prefers a mechanistic view over a vitalistic one, but he does not exclude either psychophysical interaction or teleological explanations. He allows for the concepts of ego and soul, but only as hypotheses based on intuition and the principle of causality. He is theistic, but he does not see how evil in the world could justify the ways of God as Christians traditionally conceive of the deity. Though Stumpf’s Epistemology will thus be met with dissatisfaction among the orthodox in religious matters, this work (as well as many other works of Austrian phenomenologists for that matter) will likewise be emphatically rejected by those who have convinced themselves that they have overcome the Cartesian Paradigm, the Myth of the Given, or the métaphysique de présence (just to mention a few of the fashionable derogatory labels from the last few decades of the twentieth century). Only the future can decide, however, if the style of philosophy we find among the British Empricists and later developed further by the Austrian phenomenologists is viable.

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