Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam: Words from the Battlefield 9781472585806, 9781474256094, 9781472585820

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Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam

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Bloomsbury Studies in Military History Series Editor: Jeremy Black Bloomsbury Studies in Military History offers up-to-date, scholarly accounts of war and military history. Unrestricted by period or geography, the series aims to provide free-standing works that are attuned to conceptual and historiographical developments in the field while being based on original scholarship.

Published: The 56th Infantry Brigade and D-Day, Andrew Holborn The RAF’s French Foreign Legion, G. H. Bennett Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe, Brian Davies Reinventing Warfare 1914–1918, Anthony Saunders Fratricide in Battle, Charles Kirke The Army in British India, Kaushik Roy The 1711 Expedition to Quebec, Adam Lyons Britain, Germany and the Battle of the Atlantic, Dennis Haslop Military Transition in Early Modern Asia, 1400–1750, Kaushik Roy The Role of the Royal Navy in South America, Jon Wise Scotland and the British Army 1700–1750, Victoria Henshaw War and State-Building in Modern Afghanistan, edited by Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy Conflict and Soldiers’ Literature in Early Modern Europe, Paul Scannell Youth, Heroism and Naval Propaganda, Douglas Ronald William Howe and the American War of Independence, David Smith Postwar Japan as a Sea Power, Alessio Patalano The D-Day Landing on Gold Beach, Andrew Holborn Forthcoming Reassessing the British Way in Warfare, K. A. J. McLay Australasian Propaganda and the Vietnam War, Caroline Page English Landed Society and the Great War, Edward Bujak General Lord Rawlinson, Rodney Atwood The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity 1919–22, G. H. Bennett

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Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam Words from the Battlefield Effie Karageorgos

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

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Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2016 Paperback edition first published 2017 © Effie Karageorgos, 2016 Effie Karageorgos has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: PB: ePDF: ePub:

978-1-4725-8580-6 978-1-3500-4858-4 978-1-4725-8582-0 978-1-4725-8581-3

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Karageorgos, Effie. Australian soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam: words from the battlefield / Effie Karageorgos. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4725-8580-6 (hardback) 1. Vietnam War, 1961-1975–Australia. 2. Vietnam War, 1961-1975– Participation, Australian. 3. South African War, 1899-1902--Participation, Australian. 4. Australians–South Africa–History. 5. Soldiers–Australia--Attitudes. 6. Soldiers’ writings, Australian. I. Title.DS558.6.A8K37 2016 968.04’840994–dc23 2015030761 Series: Bloomsbury Studies in Military History Typeset by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India

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For Eleftheria and Vasiliki

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Contents Acknowledgements Introduction 1 The Wars in Australia 2 Initial Impressions of the War and the War Front 3 The Impact of the Military Structure 4 Morale: The Psychology of Combat 5 Morale: The Role of Diversions 6 Soldiers and the Home Front Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

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Acknowledgements Thanks are certainly due to more people than those whose names appear below. First, this study would not be possible without the words of the soldiers themselves, some of whom I have been lucky enough to meet and know, and others who are sadly no longer with us. Your efforts – and those of all Australians who have fought from the Frontier Wars till today – are valued. Thanks also to the staff of the many archival repositories that I visited. Those at the Australian War Memorial in particular, where the bulk of my research took place, often took great efforts to help me, and I appreciate it. Thanks also to the staff of the State Library of New South Wales, State Library of Victoria, State Library of South Australia, State Library of Western Australia, State Library of Queensland, National Library of Australia, Flinders University library, Tasmanian Archives and Heritage Office, National Archives of Australia, Public Records of Victoria, State Records of South Australia and State Records of Western Australia. This book would not exist in any form without the encouragement and advice of my dear friend Janet Phillips, who has continually reinvigorated my love for history over the past eighteen years. Special thanks also to Jeremy Black, Jonathan Hyslop, Eric Richards, Mauro Di Jorgi, Dominic Guerrera and Geoffrey O’Connor. My family has been a constant support, particularly my parents Chris and Vicki Karageorgos, my sister Lydia Karageorgos and my aunt and uncle Christina and John Karageorgos. Thanks also to Morgan McWaters for tolerating my incessant writing. I love you all very much.

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Introduction

Widespread changes in the perception of war marked the twentieth century far more than any other century in history. Altered views of the worth of life, caused partly by the figurative reduction in the earth’s size through technological advancement in areas such as transportation and communication, have affected how members of Western societies, in particular, have reacted to government decisions regarding combat involvement. The historian Jeremy Black believes that since the First World War, the emphasis on individualism within Western populations, progressions in technology, an increase in democratic forms of governance, as well as a general lack of jingoism have altered the willingness with which both individuals, as well as entire societies, support war. He believes that these, particularly developments in communication and transportation technology, have ‘shrunk’ the earth by increasing the speed at which human beings and information travel, naturally transforming how the earth, and therefore conflict between countries, is viewed.1 This concept is not a recent one, for as early as 1962 Marshall McLuhan asserted that ‘the new electronic interdependence recreates the world in the image of a global village’, thus acknowledging the contraction of the earth, particularly due to the impact of technological discoveries.2 However, more recent reservation towards war and its outcomes cannot be solely attributed to societal changes. Greater mutual tension exists today between Western populations and their armies than in the past. As the changing nature of society has reduced the value the public places on military endeavours, this disillusion has also had a rebound effect on the war-makers themselves. This is a consequence of the increasing mass nature of war, as well as media technology that, through its ability to connect the home and battlefronts, can both raise and decrease support for war in the general public and the fighting soldier.3 The Vietnam War, which ultimately ended in withdrawal by the United States as a result of government inability to conceal events of the war from a more technologically present population,

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Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam

demonstrates this assertion. In contrast, the South African War, fought at the turn of the nineteenth century, was physically and technologically further from the home front and, although not supported by all in society, those who did were less inclined to express ‘disloyalty’.4 However, it was not only the transformed relationship between the battlefield and the civilian front that caused the drastic change in public viewpoints between these wars. The Vietnam War occurred in the shadow of Hiroshima, in the midst of the Cold War-related panic over nuclear weapons and the ‘evil’ of communism. Citizens of both the United States and Australia had experienced the extremities of war, whether directly or through returned veterans of both the Second World War and the Korean War, the first proxy war fought during the Cold War. Also, post-colonialism had reduced public support for the subjugation of weaker nations by superpowers, prompting more opposition to western involvement in what some labelled a Vietnamese civil war. Ignatieff, writing in 1998, mentions the existence of a ‘post-imperial age’ in which greater moral responsibility by the populations of more powerful nations has appeared. He labels Vietnam the first true example of both this public morality and ‘democratic politics’ setting limits on military intervention in a less powerful country.5 On the other hand, during the South African War, when Australians first engaged in active combat within a declared war, the connections between the general public and soldiers were in their infancy, as was the relationship of the media with war itself. The conflict in South Africa also occurred in the later period of fervent British imperialism, when many Australians saw themselves, foremost, as British subjects. Thus, it is appropriate to see the differences between the South African and Vietnam Wars as not only chronological, but also the result of a significant shift in context, including a dramatic increase in public consciousness of war. Moreover, if soldiers are viewed as civilians who have decided to enlist, or have been conscripted, for armed service, it is logical to surmise that they would have preconceived notions of their roles within warfare, as well as its overall place in their own societies – based upon these changes in public attitudes towards war. In addition, Black mentions the effect of advances in military technology, particularly the reduced time it now takes armed forces to both reach the battlefront and kill the enemy, to illustrate the ways in which such changes have impacted significantly on both soldiers and civilians.6 These adjustments in combatant attitudes have inevitably affected current principles of soldiering and created new theories about the resultant behaviour of men towards war. An investigation of this attitudinal transformation presents questions regarding its origin – most importantly whether it is caused by a change in the

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emotions and actions of soldiers fighting in a war, or an actual shift in the way society views the lives of these men and even war itself. If the former is true, it can also be asked whether men react similarly irrespective of the period and location in which they are fighting, or whether these factors play a significant role in determining the effect of the combat experience on a soldier. This study will examine such questions by applying a number of contemporary theories of soldiering to the Australian commitment during the South African War (1899–1902) and the Vietnam War (1962–1972). In addition, the ‘home front’ will be examined in each case to point to the influence of external factors such as Australian public and political opinion on the stance of soldiers towards the war they were fighting. The socio-economic background of the men who enlisted for military service in the South African War was largely unlike that of many who volunteered or were conscripted to fight in Vietnam. Although the social and political circumstances surrounding the recruitment of the men examined in this study will be explored further in the next chapter, it is necessary to first provide an overview of the type of men who made the journey to South Africa or Vietnam. In the late nineteenth century, Australia experienced widespread drought, affecting the employment opportunities of the large population of men working in rural areas. Thus, when the opportunity to fight the Boers in South Africa appeared in late 1899, numerous men who had been subject to the unreliability of rural, seasonal employment gladly enlisted, comprising the bulk of Australians who eventually travelled to the war. Joining these men was a number of predominantly lower-middle-class white-collar workers from towns and cities, often dissatisfied with insufficient salaries and inferior social status. Many of those who volunteered also did so as a result of grand tales of British conflicts of past centuries and a desire to be involved in Australia’s second ever military expedition, but ultimately first experience of active combat, as men from New South Wales had been sent to aid the British in the Sudan in 1885 where they saw little, if any, fighting. During the entirety of the war, the number of volunteers exceeded the number of soldiers required, which can be contrasted to the Vietnam War where a conscription scheme was necessary to supply the required number of soldiers. In fact, official records from most Australian colonies that sent troops to the war contain numerous letters written by either prospective soldiers or their representatives pleading with military authorities to accept their services, many of whom were ultimately rejected. Whereas almost half of Australia’s population lived in rural areas or small towns in 1900, by the 1960s this had dropped to approximately 20 per cent of the

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population, following a general pattern of urbanization throughout twentiethcentury Australia.7 Thus, the men who volunteered for service in Vietnam from the early 1960s were predominantly urban residents, some having had previous experience in the military. Many of these men were prompted to enlist by the past military experiences of fellow Australians in the world wars, and the Korean War, and for some a perceived need – influenced by the Cold War tensions of the 1960s – to combat the alleged downward thrust of communism from China and North Vietnam. However, the shift in public perceptions of warfare meant that the surplus of volunteers as seen during the South African War was not possible in a society that was more aware of the horrors of war. Thus, in 1964 the Liberal Government then in power made the decision to reintroduce the National Service Scheme five years after its abandonment, which saw approximately 15,000 conscripted men from twenty years of age serve in the Vietnam War. These men lived within a period of post-Second World War economic prosperity, with an increased public emphasis on leisure and the basic enjoyment of life never before experienced in Australia that, along with changes in public attitudes towards war, contributed to the widespread opposition to the conscription scheme seen on the home front during the war. Thus both the general living conditions and expectations of warfare of these two groups of men can be dramatically contrasted, and remain important in explaining their reactions to the respective war fronts. Despite clear differences in context between the conflicts, the decision has been made to limit this examination to the two wars in question even though general understanding in Australia places both the experiences of the troops involved as well as the wars themselves at extremes. Traditionally, the South African War is viewed as a conflict that produced predominantly jingoistic responses from soldiers and the Australian public, whereas the Vietnam War evokes images of anti-war protesters, and of exasperated soldiers counting down the days to the end of their ‘tour’. Until recently, historical studies have reinforced those views and, although most have avoided such generalization, they largely demonstrate that attitudes towards these wars and war itself altered vastly in the time-lapse between the conflicts. Also, there are significant similarities between the wars that highlight the value of a comparison between the two, particularly one concentrating on the effects of combat, as well as public and parliamentary opinion, on its participants. These will be outlined in detail in the next chapter. This study will thus focus specifically on personal narratives, in the form of the publicly archived letters and diaries of Australian troops in the South African War and the Vietnam War, in order to identify and analyse their reactions,

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including emotional responses, towards going to war. Within this analysis, attitudes of a sample of soldiers in the two wars will be compared in order to suggest whether it is possible to follow general theories of soldiering, or whether each war is truly unique – not only as an experience, but also in its impact. Although past studies on each of these wars have utilized such sources, there has not yet appeared a sufficiently systematic analysis of soldiers’ personal records, particularly one taking into account both the effects of the home and war fronts on these responses. Thus, it is now necessary to discuss the existing scholarship on these wars, as well as the methods used in this examination.

Australia and the South African War The behaviour of soldiers in war, as well as the thoughts that govern their actions, is a topic that has not always attracted the interest that it does today. This is marked in Australia where very few in-depth analyses of combat soldiers exist, particularly based on those who fought during the South African War. Published works from the years of the conflict, for example, of which Frank Wilkinson’s Australia at the Front: A Colonial View of the Boer War (1901) and R. Scot Skirving’s Our Army in South Africa (1901) are most notable, illustrate well the generally jingoistic approach to war at the turn of the nineteenth century, both presenting a very one-sided view of public opinion.8 Later works on the Australian role in the South African War rarely provide such an unbalanced account. The change in attitudes towards warfare within Australia, as well as much of the rest of the world, has reduced the risk associated with speaking out against any particular war, war in general, or any action by soldiers that demonstrates a lack of ‘loyalty’ to their country and their cause. As a result, new interpretations of events in earlier wars have emerged. For example, from the mid-twentieth century new studies into Australia’s involvement in the South African War began to appear, occasionally with more controversial views on both public and soldier responses to the wars. Home front views are important within this examination, as these influenced men before their decision to enlist in the South African War, and there is significant evidence that supports their continuing effect on men on the battlefront.9 Although the broader interpretations of Australian society that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s do provide more insight on the basis of opinion among fighting soldiers in South Africa, particularly those by Barbara Penny and Chris

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Connolly, they still rely predominantly on primary sources that represent only the middle to upper classes. There is no doubt that these studies open up avenues of inquiry regarding sections of society that did not wholeheartedly approve of the war, as Penny, for example, acknowledges that the ‘jingo madness’ present in Australia in 1899 waned over the years until 1902.10 However, she still does maintain that the population’s backing of the war effort was strong throughout.11 Similarly, Connolly’s first article on the war explores parliamentary opposition before Australia’s commitment of troops, and his second discusses the class origin of the war’s supporters, thus broadening knowledge on general attitudes towards the conflict.12 However, he asserts that if common working men were opponents of the war, it was because they viewed it as ‘none of our business’, yet still concludes that any claims made about Australian civilians during the South African War are flawed, as all available documentation comes from one sector of society – and thus does not represent the entire population.13 Any such claim about the working classes is therefore not possible. Thus, these re-interpretations, although insightful, did not succeed in closing the gaps in understanding of how this war impacted on all Australians, including the soldiers who fought in South Africa. The lack of easily available documentation from socio-economically lower sectors of society has resulted in conclusions that are often intended to encapsulate Australian society in general, but the result has been an inadequate representation of the views of certain groups. However, there are positive aspects to these more recent studies into the war. Overall, their arguments have questioned the position that dominated earlytwentieth-century perceptions of the war, in which opinion was seen as being overwhelmingly in support of Australian troops aiding the British Empire. Later works on the South African War have revealed more about both the home front and soldier experiences of the war, yet remain limited in their interpretation of public attitudes. Laurie Field’s 1979 book The Forgotten War: Australian Involvement in the South African Conflict of 1899–1902, like Penny and Connolly’s contributions, presents a broader interpretation of civilian attitudes towards the war, again limited by the apparent dearth in records related to the lower classes. However, where his study differs from earlier works is in the depth with which he has analysed the soldier experience – no doubt inspired by his own military service in the Second World War – through veteran interviews as well as personal records. Yet this only comprises one chapter within his book, which focuses on both the war and home fronts. Similarly valuable is Australia’s most recent official history of the war, Craig Wilcox’s Australia’s Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899–1902 (2002), that

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utilizes the widest range of sources used in such a study to produce an extensive history of the battle and home fronts during the South African War. However, Australia’s Boer War is still affected by the lack of available records from the time, which results in some assigning of middle- and upper-class opinion on the war to the lower classes. Although his discussion of soldiers is broad and insightful, the predominant focus of his study is not soldiers themselves, resulting in limited analysis of their personal expressions. However, as a general history, Australia’s Boer War is clearly worthy of esteem, and discusses important aspects of the war in depth for the first time, including encounters between Africans and Australians on the South African war front and the consumption of alcohol by soldiers.14 Other more recent works on the war similarly present impressive collections of sources, yet lose some value through the lack of in-depth analysis of Australia’s entry into the war as well as the attitudes and behaviour of the fighting men.15 Thus, although perceptions of attitudes among Australian civilians towards the war have certainly broadened to include dissent and approval, the basis of opinion continues to be limited, particularly in comparison to studies carried out in other countries that were involved in the South African War.16 Most importantly in the context of this study, however, the experience of Australian soldiers, as well as their attitudes towards war, has not received as much attention and analysis as men who fought in South Africa from Britain, or other British colonies, such as Canada and New Zealand.17 No systematic analysis of the experiences of Australian soldiers has yet occurred, not entirely due to any fault by the relevant historians, but more so because many works that have been written on military aspects of the South African War have as their aim a narrative account, and in that they are largely successful. There is evidence within these international accounts that similarities existed between Australian and foreign troops, emphasized most strongly by Katharine McGowan’s study of Canadians’ letters and diaries written from the South African battlefield. When discussing general attitudes towards Canada’s role in the war she writes that ‘defence of the Empire was as much a Canadian responsibility as it was a British one’, mirroring Australian home front views. She also directly compares the inflated self-perception of Canadian volunteers as superior combatants with that of Australians and New Zealanders, and highlights similarities between these troops in terms of initial perceptions of the Boer enemy.18 These parallels only raise the value of a deeper analysis of Australians in the war.

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Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam

Thus, despite the clear value of the existing literature on the South African War, there remain numerous aspects of Australian involvement that require additional investigation. It is apparent that more attention needs to be paid to the Australian soldiers who fought in South Africa, in particular a more in-depth exploration of their expressions written from the battlefield, so as to understand their motivations for enlistment, emotional responses to the war front, as well as the effect of civilians on their attitudes towards the war itself.

The Vietnam War in Australia A similar pattern can be observed in the case of the Vietnam War. Despite the emergence of new ideas concerning war by the 1960s, the political and military demand for public support ensured that the official position on the war did not represent all opinion, particularly that criticizing Australian involvement. During the war, the then Liberal Government in power published numerous pamphlets on the official political and military reasons for the conflict that emphasized concepts including the ‘domino theory’, the gradual southward communist takeover by China, through South-East Asia, to Australia and the alleged guilt of the North Vietnamese in the current state of war.19 Numerous works contradicting the official viewpoint were published by both public and political figures while Australian troops were in Vietnam. These frequently contested both the responsibility of the North Vietnamese for the war as well as any decisive link between Chinese and Vietnamese communism, and shifted the blame to the United States and South Vietnam for failing to keep within the Geneva Accords agreed upon after the French defeat of 1954.20 These latter publications contrast greatly with the jingoistic publications appearing in Australia during the South African War. The years immediately after the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam were characterized by a predominant academic silence on the war. After Gough Whitlam’s 1972 election as Prime Minister, cancellation of the National Service Act and withdrawal from Vietnam, many in the anti-war movement lost interest in the cause, leading to an increased focus on other domestic issues such as Aboriginal rights and gender equality. Also, the profound effect of military service in Vietnam on soldiers made it difficult for returning veterans to speak publicly about their experiences, particularly in the years immediately after the war. Thus, few Australian examinations of Vietnam were written in the late 1970s.

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After the war, it took almost ten years for scholars to begin re-examining Australia’s Vietnam involvement, with some taking the stance of those who had actively opposed the war and others presenting new interpretations of the war, the actions of the Australian government and the role of the home front. This study focuses on the attitudes of soldiers during the wars themselves, so viewpoints on reasons for involvement in the Vietnam War that emerged both before and after the declassification of government documents in the early 1990s are not directly relevant to the actual state of opinion affecting those who were to fight in Vietnam. However, when investigating later studies, even those by official historians, it is important to note their similarities with publications written by opponents during the war, particularly when discussing the reasons for Australia’s involvement. Overall, these revisionist examinations emphasize that Australian security concerns were based on an outdated view of Asia in general, connected to ANZUS and SEATO responsibilities.21 Many criticize government attention to the ‘domino theory’ in explaining involvement, echoing wartime dissenters.22 Significant within these texts is Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in the Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965 (1992), written by Peter Edwards and Gregory Pemberton, which is the first of the nine extensive, well-researched official histories of the Australian involvement in the Vietnam War. Many of these histories focus on predominantly military operations, but extend to medical teams and the role of the Royal Australian Air Force in South East Asia. In the context of the current study, which is an investigation into human attitudes and behaviour as a result of war, more strictly military history does not entirely apply. However, the above-mentioned text, as well as three other official volumes, considers the civilian and soldier experience of the war in more depth and all four provide a broad interpretation of the effect of the war on Australia, from an official standpoint.23 Another aspect of involvement in Vietnam disputed since the 1960s is the reaction of the Australian public to the war. Press concentration on the anti-Vietnam War movement during the war years emphasized the sensational, creating lasting image of those who opposed the war as extreme and often violent. Post-war opinion of Vietnam has frequently clung to such representations, with those who opposed the war more prominent in people’s minds than its supporters. Since the war, scholarship on Australian public opinion, including the protest movement, religious opposition and the position of women, has been relatively popular.24 Although the home front has often received more attention than other aspects of the war, there is still an alarming

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lack of information, especially considering the effect the war had on Australian society. Mark Dapin’s recent account of national servicemen in the war has contributed significantly to redressing the imbalance, by both focusing on the soldiers themselves, and introducing evidence that contradicts prevalent views of public harassment or intimidation of Vietnam veterans, including the existence of ‘welcome home’ parades for returning men, most notably in Adelaide, South Australia, in December 1970, long after the Australian public began openly turning against the war.25 Late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century re-interpretations of the war have, like more recent works on the South African War, critically re-examined previous accounts and openly disputed their assertions. But, as in the earlier war, most studies have not adequately represented all groups, neglecting particularly any analysis of the opinions of soldiers themselves. This is not to say that the tale of the Vietnam ‘digger’ has not been told. As is the case with the South African War, numerous soldiers during and since the war have published personal reminiscences about their Vietnam War service, and others have written narrative retrospectives on the general Australian war experience.26 While these accounts are valuable in understanding veterans’ views towards their involvement in Vietnam, they have been written after the soldier has not only faced home front reactions but also had years to reflect on their involvement, which can affect the accuracy of lasting memory of events. As Frank Kermode maintains: ‘Writing about memories is less a way of finding out what actually occurred than what, in the fullness of time, one is capable of making of what may have done so.’27 Also, as highlighted by Carina Donaldson within her analysis of veterans’ writing on the war, these texts are often ‘consciously and unconsciously redefining Australia’s Vietnam War experience and assimilating it into the Anzac tradition’, thereby applying a veneer of respectability on the history of a morally controversial war.28 Thus, the role of cultural memory within these texts must be considered, affecting their reliability as a general history of soldiers’ experiences of the war. When compared with the number of studies from the United States, however, it is evident that Australia’s experience of the war is alarmingly under-represented, particularly regarding the attitudes and behaviour of soldiers themselves. Those investigations of the war that do focus on soldiers are either veterans’ reminiscences or factual accounts of the war’s events or the Australian Army.29 Like more recent works on the South African War, even studies containing soldiers’ reactions to the war while in Vietnam very rarely analyse their content. The historian, Jeffrey Grey, whose examination of Australian historiography of the Vietnam War reveals its deficiencies when compared with that of the United

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States, highlights this point; he mentions that reminiscences by both soldiers and journalists are predominantly narrative based.30 There are few Australian studies that analyse soldier reactions to the Vietnam War in the years of the war, taking into account government and military policies, thus raising the value in conducting such an investigation. The number of Australian soldiers sent to Vietnam comprised less than 3 per cent of the total American allied force, which partly explains the difference in output on the war between the two countries. Although Vietnam was a highly contentious issue in Australia, it was a much more visible social issue both during and after the war in the United States – for both soldiers and veterans. This explains the existence of classic texts on the experience of American soldiers such as Peter Bourne’s Men, Stress and Vietnam (1970) and Christian Appy’s Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (1993).31 These studies examine the Vietnam War soldier in terms of his background and training, so as to understand resultant behaviour during active combat, and also frequently analyse soldiers’ words in conjunction with home front views.32 In fact, Bourne’s book – written during the war – includes a chapter that analyses the psychological effect of the war on specifically Australian soldiers, which pays more attention to soldiers’ reactions to the battlefield than any similar Australian text. In most Australian studies, the emphasis has been on biography or narrative, rather than analysis. Though valuable, such a focus has still left our historical record on Vietnam lacking. In addition, in the United States there was not such a long scholarly silence on the war – a matter often influenced in Australia by the declassification of government documents – particularly on the subject of soldiers, which also explains the greater number of American Vietnam War examinations.33 Although some historical, psychological and medical investigations of veterans have surfaced in Australia, those that emerged in the 1980s are limited in number and although valuable, do not consider the reactions of soldiers to military policy at length, particularly in comparison to the attention paid in American studies.34 After restrictions on classified official documents from the war years began to be lifted from the early 1990s, more studies on the soldier did begin to appear, although more of these focus on veterans than men on the war front.35 The resultant articles on these men reveal previously undocumented reactions to military service in the conflict, and provide rare analyses of Vietnam veterans. It is unfortunate, however, that more such exploratory works on the Vietnam War have not emerged, especially studies that also involve the opinions of soldiers

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Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam

while on the war front, as well as their reactions to both a dissatisfied public and government policies over which they had no control.36 The unprecedented incidence of trauma among veterans who served in the Vietnam War, and issues of sensitivity, does partly explain the lack of non-autobiographical, nonnarrative soldier analyses based on the conflict, and the focus on veteran or civilian reactions to their return from Vietnam. Opinion on the Vietnam War has altered dramatically since the years of the war, particularly in the realm of official history. More extensive examinations have been carried out about the various facets of the home front during the war since the 1980s. This has extended to soldiers in comparatively few Australian instances, especially when analysing soldiers on the battlefront and the influence of the home front and political authorities on them. It is clear, therefore, that a deeper examination of the attitudes and behaviour of Australian soldiers in Vietnam is still required, particularly considering the existing literature on the American experience of the war. Australian scholarship on the experience of soldiers in the South African War is also lacking when compared to that from Britain and other countries that participated in the war. Although in both cases this is directly proportional to the number of soldiers who were involved in the war from each country, the fact that Australia sent fewer soldiers to each war does not make the effect on both soldiers and civilians less profound or the contribution any less significant.

Sources and method Thus, the aim of this study is to analyse the attitudes of a sample of Australian soldiers, and their resultant conduct, through close inspection of their publicly archived letters and diaries and application of these to twentieth-century research into soldiering and other contemporary reports of their conduct throughout the wars. Within this study, viewpoints of civilians on the home fronts as well as political and military policy that directed the Australian war effort in each instance will be taken into account, in an attempt to determine their relative effect on these soldiers. While documenting these factors, any similarities will be noted. In this way, it will be possible to determine whether the thoughts and actions of soldiers in these wars are comparable or to what extent we should consider the views of men fighting in each war as distinct. In searching for a basis of analysis and comparison of soldiers’ writings, a number of ‘theories of soldiering’ have been used. The work of pre-twentieth-

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century writers on war such as Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) and AntoineHenri Jomini (1779–1869) have been set aside, as they are less directly relevant to the central concern of this thesis – developing an understanding of soldiers’ own views and reactions from their wartime writing. While such ‘philosophers of war’ command considerable respect in their own right (and continue to provoke debate) much of their work deals with problems of strategy and tactics – notwithstanding the importance someone like von Clausewitz places on the role of the commander and the impact of morale. By contrast, this study, in having soldiers’ writing from the war zones as a central focus, has a different orientation – so studies of combatants that provide a framework for analysing fighting soldiers’ responses are especially useful. All these principles are based on warfare from the twentieth century, but some derive their arguments from a single war or even battle, while others develop their ideas from a wider sample. It is necessary to point out that not all those whose work is drawn on in this examination would necessarily regard themselves as invoking or developing ‘theories of soldiering’. But their common concern with how and why soldiers react as they do makes the term of great practical use in this study. Also, not all of these works deal specifically with the Australian military experience in South Africa and Vietnam, but the analysis of the letters and diaries within this study does raise parallels between these and other conflicts, such as the world wars, particularly in the similarities in soldiers’ documented reactions to military service. The works selected include Bill Gammage’s The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War (1974), Anthony Kellett’s Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (1982), Michael Roper’s The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War (2009), Richard Holmes’ Firing Line (1985 [repr. 1987]), J. G. Fuller’s Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914–1918 (1990), Tobey Herzog’s Vietnam War Stories: Innocence Lost (1992) and Joanna Bourke’s An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare (1999), among many others. Such studies give a comprehensive view of modern warfare, as they take into account specific home front factors as well as soldiers’ combat experiences. The decision has been made to limit the interpretation of soldiers’ letters and diaries to those archived in Australia. More specifically, records held in the state libraries of Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania and South Australia, the National Library of Australia, the Tasmania Archive and Heritage Office and the Australian War Memorial. Although the archived letters and diaries of soldiers provide the basis of soldier opinion, newspapers

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Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam

and other primary sources related to each war have also been used, the latter from National Archives offices in Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, State Records of South Australia and Western Australia, as well as the Public Records of Victoria. Documents found in these sources include personal letters from fighting soldiers to their respective home fronts, comprised of those to loved ones and government offices, official letters between military and political leaders from Australia, Britain and the United States, available medical records of returning soldiers, as well as other documentation which gives some indication of soldier opinion and circumstances before, during and after the wars. The bulk of the records from all parts of Australia, it must be noted, are held in the Australian War Memorial, with sizeable collections also in New South Wales and Victoria. In total, the archived records of 126 individual soldiers from the South African War, and 64 from Vietnam, were investigated. For some of these men, only one letter or diary was archived, but others wrote a daily journal of their experiences, or hundreds of letters home to Australia. This is a small number of the more than 15,000 who fought in South Africa and almost 60,000 in Vietnam, yet it is still possible to discern distinct attitudinal patterns towards both the war and home front in these collections of personal records. Although it is not possible to attribute common threads of opinion to all Australians in each war, these patterns remain significant in exploring the varied soldier experience of the wars. It should also be emphasized that despite the presence of both conscripts and regulars in the group from Vietnam, there appeared no discernable difference between their personal records. The letters and diaries used, as well as other primary sources including autobiographies, life narratives and oral histories, can all provide valuable insights into soldiers in war, but can also all be affected by factors such as bias, subjectivity and faulty, as well as failed, memory.37 In this particular examination, the decision has been made to focus on soldiers’ epistolary records between battle and home fronts, as well as personal diaries written during active service. This decision can be justified by insisting that even though the use of other varieties of primary source would, no doubt, benefit to the historical record as a whole, this particular group of sources from these two wars does represent a perspective that is unique, and can most easily be compared. Focusing on soldiers’ letters and diaries that were published in Australian newspapers during the wars emphasizes this point. Many Australian studies of these wars based on soldiers’ letters and diaries fail to analyse these sources sufficiently, and often use both those archived and those published in newspapers

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during the war years without differentiating between the two, particularly in the case of the earlier war. It can be misleading to place personal records from these two different sources in the same category, as one can be subject to much more editing than the other. It is difficult enough to generalize about soldiers based merely on archived records, as there are problems in the interpretation of personal records of all kinds. Blouin, for instance, maintains that the archive itself ‘may implicitly reinforce certain cultural and political constructs’, through the ways and reasons why it has been chosen for public view.38 However, the level of caution with which a newspaper editor, who often has a particular agenda in mind while not necessarily having a personal attachment to the content, selects a letter or diary entry can possibly affect the historical record more than those chosen by the soldiers or their families to be placed in public archives. This is not to say that each of these volumes necessarily projects and protects a particular agenda, but it is vital to acknowledge each layer of selection that could affect the way the records have been presented and, thus, potentially mislead the reader. It is hoped the unique decision to limit this study to archived sources, and analysing them as such, will come closer to disclosing soldiers’ recorded attitudes more reliably – as it ensures that comparisons between, or conclusions arising from, these particular personal records are as consistent as possible. Un-archived letters and diaries from the South African War are difficult to find, especially given the absence of living veterans, which further prompted the decision to limit the basis of this study to only publicly archived records. Further justifying this choice are reasons why veterans or their families decide not to archive personal records – namely, the desire not to tarnish opinions of wars, of the armies that fought them or of the soldier author. The resultant imbalance is further emphasized if both archived and non-archived sources are used only for Vietnam, and not for the South African War. It is also necessary to justify the use of newspapers in this study, particularly given the above comments regarding the various pressures on editors, owners and journalists, often more significant when a country is at war. These particular wars beg special attention, as in neither war was censorship formally imposed. The South African War occurred at a time when the relationship between the media, government and the military was relatively undeveloped, especially compared with today’s role of the media as an essential, but contained, part of a country’s war effort – demonstrated by the mainly post-Vietnam War practice of ‘embedding’ journalists within military contingents.39 In addition, the war in Vietnam was never formally declared by the United States, making it impossible to impose official censorship. Correspondents

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were permitted to travel to any part of Vietnam in researching their stories. However, even though the Australian Army and Federal Government officially endorsed this rule, it did not extend into full practice. Given the increasingly anti-war sentiments present in Australia, such journalistic freedom could not be allowed, so other forms of ‘informal’ censorship occurred.40 For example, on the home front the Federal Government placed similar pressure on editors and owners of commercial newspapers to publish only positive reports from Vietnam. Herman and Chomsky maintain that the dependence of major media organizations on the government is a main deciding factor affecting the content of their publications, likening this effect on content to a ‘filter’.41 They argue that the mass media’s need for government approval leads to a straining of all information they choose to display before ready to print, or in the case of television, present. The need to obtain official licenses, as well as other profit-oriented forces affected by the government, achieve this by exerting financial pressure to coerce the media organization into agreement.42 Newspaper evidence in this study is assessed with these facts in mind, as well as an acknowledgement that the use of press reports as a reliable historical resource in studying war can be particularly problematic. Thus it is only used to provide insight about home front opinion, not to reinforce soldier attitudes, especially relevant during the South African War when much of the battlefield news that reached Australia was frequently taken from the heavily censored British commercial press. Despite these issues, media publications remain an important source of information when considering the context of public support or opposition reported within them, or exhibited by journalists or correspondents. For the war in South Africa, six have been chosen – both rural and urban – and examined from September 1899 until June 1902. Those predominantly in support of the war are Mount Gambier’s Border Watch and the more widely circulated The Argus, a Victorian commercial newspaper. In addition, three newspapers and one journal have been selected which displayed less enthusiasm towards the war. These are Broken Hill’s Barrier Truth, the ‘Official Journal of the Federated Workers of Queensland’ The Worker, Adelaide’s The Herald and The Bulletin, from Sydney. For the Vietnam War, an attempt has been made to use very similar sources from Australia sixty years later. The publications used here are the Barrier Daily Truth, The Bulletin (which became significantly more conservative in the early twentieth century), the Australian Labor Party’s Workers’ Weekly Herald and the commercial Victorian newspaper The Age, which was chosen because of the concentration of anti-war activity in that state.

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Further choices made in this study regarding sources demand some explanation. The decision to use archived letters and diaries over published reminiscences and oral history has been carried out with a particular purpose in mind, and in an attempt to avoid some of the problems associated with cultural memory. Published personal narratives by soldiers can be problematic, as most are written retrospectively. Depending on time delay, issues of reliable memory recall and accurate recording arise here, well known as factors in using personal reminiscences. Historians writing on such issues place importance on the role of collective or national memory in influencing a person’s individual recollection. For instance, Peter Burke argues that, aside from an individual’s memory of a public event, there are social groups surrounding them who decide what is of vital importance in public memory, and in this way directly influence individual memory by their own interpretations of the past.43 These factors are especially valid in the case of wars that provoke enormous public interest. Thus, for each war, the attitudes of soldiers on the battlefront will be limited to those written while actually at war. This does not assume that soldiers’ reminiscences are not historically useful – they merely constitute a different project. For similar reasons, this study does not employ oral history or interviews, despite their considerable value as a primary source. There is a variety of opinion on oral history, with both sides raising convincing points for and against its use. Many of those who concentrate on the negative aspects associated with the use of oral testimony claim that societal pressures, such as those mentioned above, can affect remembrance, as can the interview process itself. John Tosh challenges the view of those who regard oral history as an invaluable way to ‘recreate’ the past and an opportunity to hear non-elite perspectives. He cites problems such as the method of interviewing; subsequent changes to a person’s impressions of the past; and the inadequacy of one person’s testimony as representative of an entire experience, all being potential hindrances to the integrity of the historical record.44 In a sensitive area such as wartime recollections, veterans could be tempted, when interviewed, to speak more generously about their actions during war, whether for personal reasons or those related to public understanding of the war. In her analysis of Second World War Bomber Command memoirs, Houghton claims that veterans’ reminiscences are influenced both by society, as well as the desire to ‘establish control over popular memories of “their” war’.45 Others could intentionally avoid any mention of events that involve painful memories. For example, Alistair Thomson observed that during his interviews with veterans of the First World War, many men would speak behind the cover of the Anzac legend – because that was the observed norm and helped them avoid struggling with potentially traumatic memories.46

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Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam

However, many scholars also point out the positive aspects of oral testimony in the study of history. Tosh mentions that, although oral sources should be ‘critically evaluated’ – as all sources should – and used in conjunction with other types of sources, they do have unique benefits in that they have the capacity to provide a new perspective on particular events or concepts. Also, their use frequently leads the scholar to undiscovered documentary evidence and has supported the popularity and success of grassroots history.47 For these reasons, future studies using records that utilize a variety of primary source material should certainly be encouraged. Although oral testimony would provide valuable insight into this topic, the intention of this study is to examine the letters and diaries written by soldiers during their military service. Thus, even if one were to discount the warnings of Burke and others, the research undertaken does not include oral history due to the fact that it is impossible to personally do so for veterans of both wars. Interviewing veterans from one war and not another could create an imbalance in the evidence used, critically affecting the reliability of any comparison between the wars. It is possible to look into past interviews conducted by other researchers to gain insights into the earlier war, but the difference in interviewer could significantly affect potential responses.48 This does support the decision to limit the examination of soldier opinion to that expressed in personal records from the battlefront, despite the acknowledged value of oral history as a source.

Contents There are numerous factors that contribute to a soldiers’ overall experience of war and determine their attitudes and behaviour while fighting, not all of which are based on the battlefield. The remainder of this examination outlines some of these aspects, highlighting predominantly twentieth-century theories on their significance to a soldier, and applying them to the publicly archived letters and diaries of Australian soldiers in the South African and Vietnam Wars, after first explaining the home front context surrounding Australian involvement in each war. The aim of this method is to discover the similarities and differences between men fighting in these wars, as well as the synonymy between their expressed viewpoints and past studies of soldiering. For each examined aspect of warfare, there are often numerous relevant examples from the personal records. Every attempt has been made to include each one in the text itself, or in footnotes, but many have been omitted due to space constraints.

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Chapter 2 outlines the events surrounding each war on the Australian home front, so as to provide context for the analysis of soldier opinion in the remaining chapters. Although the various facets of a soldier’s tour are interrelated to a large extent, these chapters have been separated into five general categories for the purposes of this study, each of which concentrates on a broader component of combat service. Chapter 3 begins with the earliest stages of military service for a soldier, including reasons for enlistment, soldiers’ outlooks between acceptance into the military and the beginning of combat duty, as well as the inevitable change in attitude upon discovering the ‘realities’ of war. Next, Chapter 4 is based on the military structure itself, including pre-war training, leadership, discipline, rotation and the role of comradeship in combat. Following this more practical assessment, the emphasis lies on the psychological aspects of warfare, particularly morale and its workings. Chapter 5 applies more recent research that emphasizes a soldier’s enjoyment of killing itself to the archived personal records, in an attempt to discover whether the words of the soldiers fighting in South Africa and Vietnam coincide with these views. In addition, the importance of fear, survival and morale as an active force in warfare will be investigated. Next, Chapter 6 continues the psychological focus by highlighting various techniques adopted by soldiers in war to sustain high morale, including humour, alcohol, drugs and sexual relations. In addition, more serious attempts at diversion from combat will be examined, such as mutiny, ‘fragging’ and desertion, as well as the tragic consequences if these are not successful, in the form of war trauma or PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder). Chapter 7 will complete the direct analysis of soldiers’ letters, by presenting evidence of the differing impact of the home front in the everyday expressions of the Australians fighting in South Africa and Vietnam. This chapter will take into account both soldiers’ views on the battlefield as well as public opinion on the home front, to determine the differences between these men fighting in two very distinct time periods. These chapters are collectively aimed at pinpointing the various factors influencing soldier attitudes and behaviour during these wars, as well as war in general, in order to provide a broader explanation of the similarities and differences between these Australians in combat in South Africa and Vietnam. Their findings will culminate in the concluding chapter of this thesis, so as to determine whether the selected soldiers reacted similarly irrespective of the war in which they were fighting, or whether individual features specific to each war were more significant in determining their stance.

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1

The Wars in Australia

The home front is always significant in an examination of soldiers, as future combatants often acquire their attitudes towards war from the societies that raised them. A major part of this study focuses on the impact of the civilian front on men while on the battlefield. However, to adequately convey both the wars’ contexts and the validity of any comparison between them, it is first necessary to outline the circumstances on the Australian home front during each war. The wars in South Africa and Vietnam each affected Australian society in unprecedented ways, although the circumstances surrounding involvement and public attitudes were vastly altered between them. Australians often viewed themselves as an essential part of the British Empire at the turn of the nineteenth century, whereas after the devastation of the world wars and the resultant redistribution of world power, Australia’s allegiance began to lie more firmly within the sphere of the United States. Today, many Australians view these wars as essential ventures within a military history that has been characterized by the alliance with more powerful nations. Whereas the South African War is often overshadowed by the great losses of the world wars, the scale and necessity of involvement of the Vietnam War is frequently debated, with some considering the conflict an error of judgement, yet still honouring the men who fought. This chapter will thus summarize attitudes towards the war on the home front at the turn of the nineteenth century while Australians fought in South Africa, and in the 1960s and early 1970s when Australia joined the United States in Vietnam, while incorporating an overview of the wars’ likenesses in the context of Australian involvement. As this study focuses specifically on the behaviours and motivations of fighting men in war, any discussion of the events of the home front will necessarily be brief, particularly when compared to the extent of activity in Australia during each war. The events of the wars themselves will

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Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam

thus not form a significant part of this discussion, as the emphasis in this chapter is to provide context for Australian involvement and the important views of battlefield soldiers. Despite the difficulty in finding conclusive similarities between any two conflicts, it is possible to see certain parallels between the hostilities in South Africa and Vietnam, as well as in their effects on soldiers and the Australian public. Significant among these is the imperialist basis of involvement, which during the earlier war consisted of the alleged British ownership of Boer-dominated southern African territory, and during Vietnam, the continuation of an imperialist war by France that sought to reoccupy Vietnam after the Allied victory in the Second World War, based around a renewed Cold War-centred justification. The position of public opponents is also similar between the wars, many of whom criticized the wars on moral grounds, specifically focusing on the injustice of a world power attacking a small, relatively defenceless enemy.1 Claims arose that questioned the relevance of both wars to Australia, despite contrary political declarations based on ties to the British Empire during the South African War and, during the Vietnam War, on the urgency of the fight against communism by a relatively new military ally, the United States. Before each war, political decisionmakers emphasized the potential threat to security if Australian involvement did not occur, through the withdrawal of British, or American, support.2 Both conflicts appear to lack any notable relationship with Australian social, political or economic aims except the perceived need for security, yet within Australia itself initial involvement began with widespread approval. This is not to say that opponents to each war did not exist – there were small, yet significant, anti-war groups active during the South African War and much of the public memory of the Vietnam War lies in its creation of a significant anti-war movement – but the majority of Australians did initially support the sending of troops to join the British in South Africa and the United States in Vietnam. Not only were the social and political backgrounds to the wars similar, but also the experiences of Australian soldiers in each war are directly comparable. The British request for aid in 1899 was presented as a general appeal, with the original Australian force a ‘moral support’ to the British Army – a means of displaying to the world that subjects of the Empire outside Britain backed the war.3 The British Army was to significantly benefit from this decision. The rigid training of British troops, upon first encounter with the highly mobile Boer forces and the unfamiliar South African climate and terrain, revealed itself vastly inadequate. Black Week confirmed this issue, with three devastating British defeats between 10 and 17 December 1899. Despite the overwhelming success

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with which Australians regarded the Kimberley, Ladysmith and Mafeking victories in the first half of 1900, as well as the occupation of Pretoria on 5 June 1900, the Boers were continually presenting themselves as an unbeatable force. British incompetence escalated from late 1900, by which time the Boer forces had resorted predominantly to the guerrilla mode of fighting. An Australian soldier, Lieutenant Patrick Lang of the Fourth Imperial Contingent, in his diary of 1900–1901, reported on the horsemanship of the British troops: ‘Many of these Yeomanry appear never to have been on a horse before, & it will be weeks before they have learnt to ride well enough to go on the trek.’4 On the other hand, the predominantly rural background of the Australian troops gave them an advantage in this mode of fighting.5 Similarly, observers originally expected that the Vietnam War would not last long, given the strength of the United States compared with the North Vietnamese. The American view of the Vietnamese communists can be likened to British perceptions of the Boers – as a weak force that would not last against the military and political might of the then most powerful nation on earth. However, like the Boers in the later stages of the conflict in South Africa, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army were guerrilla fighters – taking advantage of their knowledge and experience of the humid, often jungle, terrain to outwit the American forces. The US Army was inadequately prepared for this mode of fighting. As in South Africa, the dissimilarity in fighting styles was to extend the war further than originally expected. The similarities between the South African and Vietnam Wars thus highlight the value of a comparison between the two, particularly one concentrating on the effects of combat, as well as the nature and impact of public and parliamentary opinion, on the Australian participants. Although the degree to which these factors affected soldiers did alter between the wars – as both government structures and public attitudes to war had undergone significant changes, and there were differing levels of success between them – similar standpoints towards the conflicts existed. This chapter will analyse the home front in terms of these parallels between the wars.

Australia and the South African War The South African War was prompted by years of dissatisfaction by British settlers (uitlanders) relating to their status as residents in the two Boer republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Despite the established independence of

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the Boers by 1877, in this year Britain annexed the States as a sign of ownership. Boer opposition to this unjust claim culminated in what is frequently referred to as the First Boer War of 1880 to 1881, which ended with a British-led truce after it became clear that the war would not end quickly. The following years saw the Boers expand their territories and advance towards independence again. In 1886, the discovery of Witwatersrand, in the Transvaal, as the richest goldfield in the world turned the attention of the British Empire back to the Boer states. Wary of external influence, the Boers sought to restrict citizenship of new British settlers eager to claim a piece of goldfield profits and, thereby, political influence. Continuing disputes prompted official action in Britain, together with claims of unfair treatment of British citizens by the Boer republics, and requests for aid in taking what was, supposedly, rightfully theirs. In early July 1899, a formal request was made to the Australian colonies for troops for military aid in South Africa, which led to intense debating among politicians. British uitlanders in Newcastle, South Africa, had commenced their own appeal for help, sending a telegram in the same month to George Reid, the Premier of New South Wales: Uitlander council as representing unfranchised population earnestly praying governments & legislatures your colonies by every means in power promptly and vigorously to support appeal and not cease efforts until settlement under British guarantee effected securing for your fellow British subjects in Transvaal rights equal those enjoyed by Boer population.6

This telegram was promptly forwarded to the premiers of all other Australian colonies. Many parliamentarians were eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the Empire, despite prevalent debates between Imperialists, Federationists and Imperial Federationists about Britain’s future role in Australian affairs – a matter that appeared to be resolved when its continuing presence in Australia was cemented through Australian Federation in 1901.7 Despite the desperation conveyed in this telegram, many opposed the prospect of sending men to fight for Britain once it became a reality in September, and the war itself declared on 11 October 1899, based on the war’s irrelevance to Australia and the unwarranted nature of the British claim to any ownership of the Boer states. Illustrating these arguments, the Victorian Henry Bournes Higgins – the most fervently opposed parliamentarian of the war – claimed that, for this reason alone, the war was of ‘doubtful justice’.8 Most politicians, however, regarded the war as essential for Australian security – attitudes that are directly comparable to parliamentary views towards the Vietnam War over sixty years later. The ‘our country right or wrong’

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perspective was repeatedly expressed in political circles, which emphasized the futility in questioning the validity of the war, as Australians enjoyed a privileged position as white colonists of the British Empire.9 Rejecting any British request for aid could thus risk threatening the protective bond of Empire, particularly given Australia’s ‘Pacific isolation’ and continuing fears of German, French and Russian aggression.10 Correspondence between the colonial premiers in the early months of 1900 indicates that a united front existed among them on the matter of the war. William Lyne of New South Wales wrote to London as the representative of Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia and his own colony, in expressing their ‘overwhelming feeling here that it is undesirable peace in South Africa should be concluded other than in terms of absolute supremacy of British rule’.11 Lyne appeared particularly eager about the need to defeat the Boer enemy, perhaps due to his recent appointment as Premier of New South Wales and resultant eagerness to establish himself as a decisive leader. He wrote to the Tasmanian Premier, Elliott Lewis, on 18 January 1900 of his fears that Boer representatives were present in New South Wales, and that it was likely they would intercept Australian warships en route to South Africa. In reply to this rather peculiar claim, Lewis declined to take any action in the matter, as he ‘scarcely thought it necessary’.12 While the colonial premiers appeared united in support of involvement, other parliamentarians believed that the British prosecution of the war against the two small Boer republics was unjust. One example is William Arthur Holman, Labor politician and future Premier of New South Wales, who, when speaking of his ‘pro-Boer sentiments’ and disdain of British Secretary of State Joseph Chamberlain’s support of the war to crowds in both East and West Wyalong, New South Wales, in June 1900, was met with ‘loud hooting’ and the singing of both ‘Rule Britannia’ and the National Anthem.13 Ten days later, J. C. Stewart, Labor member for Rockhampton North, Queensland, was accused of treason during a meeting about his objections to the war, for failing to stand during the national anthem.14 It appeared that, as during the Vietnam War, a number of Labor politicians disagreed with the South African War.15 However, it is unclear how many working-class Australians – represented by these men – agreed with these views. Evidence of public opinion that emerged during the war was generally onesided, understandable given the sources available, namely, the popular press and parliamentary debates.16 The analysis of these sources makes it impossible to draw definite conclusions regarding the reactions of the lower classes, given the lack

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of their published opinion, but can still provide an indication of public attitudes towards the war. Labour newspapers such as The Barrier Truth and The Worker, and anti-imperialist journal The Bulletin – the centre of intellectual opposition to the war – often expressed dissent. But it is difficult to determine how representative these were of Australian society, or how they affected opinion.17 More conservative commercial newspapers, such as The Argus, do reveal cases of public disapproval, but so infrequently that they offer no grounds to conclude whether opposition was common or not. For example, on 4 November 1899 an article, ‘Discussion at the Trades-Hall’, reports that those meeting disagreed with the war, but that if it must occur, the sending of soldiers would not be opposed. But the extent to which press agents – generally with their own agenda in mind – exaggerated or downplayed such occurrences is unclear.18 Also, on 13 November 1899, ‘several thousands’ attended a meeting in the Domain, Sydney, organized by religious groups to protest against the war. However, when the first speaker began, one person in the crowd attacked him, abruptly ending the meeting. It is thus difficult to know whether those ‘thousands’ attended in support of or disapproval for the war.19 In addition, much of Australia’s press was reliant on Britain’s ‘New Journalism’, described by Paula Krebs as ‘cheap sensation-oriented jingoist reporting and editing’.20 Most British publications contained purely anti-Boer sentiments, which set the tone for public attitudes towards the war.21 Sydney academic and historian, and founder of the Australian Anti-War League, George Arnold Wood, commented on this issue: ‘All Australian journals get their cables from one source – a source apparently in connection with the most sensational section of the London Jingo press.’22 Although some Australian publications did present opposing views, most followed the ultra-jingoistic views present in Britain, which then filtered down to the general public.23 The fact remained that a substantial section of Australia’s population still saw Britain as their ‘home’ country, and endorsed the ‘our country right or wrong’ argument, particularly in the first six months of the war when jingoism was at its peak. Various fundraising groups were formed and concerts planned to help the troops.24 Organizations such as the Transvaal Patriotic Fund, the General War Relief Fund and the Melbourne Lord Mayor’s Empire Patriotic Fund were active within Australia. Parades were frequently organized when soldiers were departing for or returning from South Africa, events that were regarded with some importance, as demonstrated by a letter written to the South Australian Colonial Secretary by the Port Adelaide Town Clerk, who requested that soldiers re-enter Adelaide in ‘full parade dress’, as the lack of appropriate attire at another parade caused some public dissatisfaction.25

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Colonial authorities in each state often received letters from individual members of the population or community groups who wanted to demonstrate their allegiance to the British Empire. J. J. Murif of Broken Hill, New South Wales, sent £5 on behalf of a number of the town’s residents to be presented to the first man from South Australia who volunteered for South Africa. Unfortunately the military authorities found it impossible to determine who was the very first enlisted, so used the money for sports prizes on the ship en route to South Africa.26 More unusual was the suggestion by Reverend AT Boas that the relief of Mafeking of May 1900 be celebrated by an amnesty to all current South Australian prisoners, which was sadly refused.27 Public holidays were held for noteworthy military victories, causing widespread celebration in Australia. ‘Black Week’ of December 1899 was made more shocking by the extreme underestimation of the Boer forces at the beginning of the war. Thus, when the British Army achieved victory over the Boers in Ladysmith, Kimberley, Mafeking and Pretoria, in the first half of 1900, public jubilation filled the streets of Australian cities.28 Festivities did become extreme in some cases – Charlick Brothers, a store on Rundle Street, Adelaide, was attacked by a jingo mob when they decided to remain open on the Mafeking public holiday. Police were unsuccessful in restraining the riotous crowds, and many items in the store were destroyed. Charlick Brothers and other businesses in the area appealed to the government for financial compensation, which was refused.29 Volunteers were plentiful for the war, as recent drought had created widespread unemployment among rural workers, who thus made up the bulk of the force sent to South Africa. Many who applied were not accepted, but desperately attempted to find another way to South Africa. Stowaways were frequently found on ships bound for South Africa, usually men who had been rejected by military authorities in Australia.30 Trooper T. Shore wrote numerous letters to the authorities in Hobart asking when he was to be taken to South Africa after being ejected from the Manhattan en route to the war because of his extreme seasickness, which sadly led to his discharge from the army.31 Alfred Field, of Tasmania, also wrote to the Chief Secretary’s Office to outline his nine years’ experience in the military as a foundation for his enlistment in the force for South Africa, claiming, ‘I am a younger man at 58 than many are from 40 to 45.’ It is likely that the financial rewards of military employment were Field’s incentive, but he was also rejected.32 Some who were not eligible to enlist saw the war as an opportunity to improve their financial standing, whether by supplying equipment to the

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troops or obtaining some employment in South Africa.33 Numerous women wrote to colonial authorities offering their services as nurses, some of whom were successful.34 Alfred J. Taylor, an employee of Hobart Public Library, wrote unsuccessfully to the Tasmanian Chief Secretary’s Office on 3 March 1900 of the struggle by wounded soldiers to write home to family and friends, offering his services as a scribe, and masseuse, for these hapless men.35 J. B. Fitts wrote to the South Australian Premier in January 1900 offering to exhibit all photographs from an upcoming trip to Cape Town, South Africa, in Adelaide as part of his ‘Warograph’, donating some of the proceeds to the war effort.36 A little more outlandish was the offer by Victorian Chas Jones of his services as an embalmer on the war front.37 Financial concerns did not always cause eagerness for the war – in fact, in a few cases the very opposite resulted. Some parents of military age men attempted to convince authorities that their sons were not eligible to enlist, for fear of losing some extra help at home. Joseph Williams wrote to the Premier of Tasmania on 2 January 1900 to ensure that his son not be accepted for service on the grounds of his poor marksmanship and health, attaching a letter from his doctor.38 A military medical test found 26-year-old William to be in perfect health, and so despite his father’s misgivings was permitted to enlist.39 Mrs Willoughby of Cleveland wrote to the Minister for Defence for Tasmania to request that her underaged son be rejected from service, as he was required at home to care for her and her younger sons.40 Charles Brewer similarly wrote that his son could not serve in the military because of his yearly attacks of hay fever, as well as the need to care for his ill mother.41 In these cases, it is clear that family priorities outweighed the need to demonstrate loyalty to the Empire, which would have intensified for rural residents, particularly in a time of drought. Although there was no apparent disapproval expressed by authorities towards those who wrote the above letters, many who appeared unenthusiastic about the war effort were often branded disloyal, or a ‘pro-Boer’. Military and political authorities were especially suspicious of employing anyone who appeared to show anything but unwavering support for Britain. The Bulletin wrote on 20 January 1900 of ‘Loyal “Disloyalists”’, asserting that the South Australian government was destroying freedom of speech by vowing to ‘dismiss any Government . . . employees who object to Australia taking part in the South African War’.42 The Bulletin was adamantly against involvement in South Africa, which may have caused some exaggeration within this assertion; however, the experiences of some soldiers do support such eagerness to ensure that all political representatives openly supported the war.

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For example, John Daly wrote to the colonial authorities of the ‘unjust manner’ in which he had been treated by the military. Two weeks after enlisting, he had been dismissed from the army for being a Boer sympathizer, an accusation that was not withdrawn even upon Daly’s claim of loyalty.43 In another case, a noncommissioned officer was brought before his colonel for ‘using disloyal language toward the British Empire and flag’.44 Herbert Davis of Busselton, Western Australia, wrote to the colony’s Premier that his cousin, Horace Salom, had been accepted for service in South Australia while articulating ‘pro-Boer sympathies’, and insisted that he be excluded from military service.45 Whether Salom was a ‘pro-Boer’ or even opposed to the war at all is unclear, as Davis may have felt some unspoken resentment towards his cousin, but his request was successful, and Salom was dismissed from the military on medical reasons.46 German involvement in the war effort, through supply of weapons and funds to the Boers, also created an atmosphere of hostility on the Australian home front.47 The accusation of disloyalty levelled against Martin Basedow, South Australian Legislative Council member and the editor of Australische Zeitung, an Australian German language newspaper, made it necessary for him to make a public declaration of allegiance to Britain, and led to his eventual withdrawal from office.48 Other reports appeared throughout the war, such as the pursuit of a German man in Gawler, South Australia, by three young men singing ‘patriotic songs’ and calling him a Boer.49 However, Gawler’s newspaper The Bunyip criticized the actions of these men in their report of the event, thus providing evidence that at times, reason was applied over blind jingoism.

Australians against the war Despite widespread enthusiasm for the war, public opposition did exist, based predominantly on the seeming irrelevance of the imperial mission in South Africa to Australia and an objection – also present among British opponents to the war – to the mighty British Empire waging war against the two sparsely populated Boer republics, an argument echoed when the mighty United States went to war with Vietnam. Some criticized the economic gains to be made within South Africa by British capitalists as a factor in the outbreak of war.50 A petition sent to the House of Representatives by Alice Henry, journalist and supporter of women’s rights, shortly after Australia’s establishment as a constitutional monarchy tied to Britain upon Federation on 1 January 1901 spells out these objections well. In it, the signees insist on the withdrawal of Australian troops

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from the war, on the basis of the immorality of actions towards the Boers, particularly the scorched earth policy enacted in June 1900 by Lord Roberts – which sought to deny seemingly unbeatable enemy guerrillas of their supply lines through burning Boer farms – and concentration camps that were formed to house Boers who were affected by this policy. They also appeal to Australia to use its ‘autonomy’ to implore Britain to sue for peace and bring about the end of the war.51 These were not the only requests by such groups for peace in South Africa, with numerous entreaties to Australian political authorities demanding a termination of hostilities.52 One of the most significant criticisms levelled against Britain in their prosecution of the war was the formation of the concentration camp system. Emily Hobhouse, a British opponent of the war, visited the camps in order to provide financial aid to homeless Boer families on the request of the South African Conciliation Committee, an anti-war organization formed in 1899. Her findings were published in the Report of a Visit to the Camps of Women and Children in the Cape and Orange River Colonies and sent to the British government in June 1901. The furore this provoked in British and worldwide circles prompted the Imperial Government to improve conditions in the camps, saving thousands of Boer lives.53 Australian anti-war publications followed the lead of many others around the world by frequently criticizing political and military support for the concentration camp system.54 Many who opposed the war on these terms were branded ‘pro-Boer’, a label most alleged ‘pro-Boers’ found objectionable. These groups claimed that their primary issue with the war was its questionable ethics against defenceless Boer civilians, while still proclaiming their loyalty to Australia and support for fighting soldiers. The South Australian Trades and Labor Council’s official newspaper, The Herald, defended itself on these grounds in early 1900, at the peak of jingoistic fervour in Australia: ‘No pro-Boer has come to this office, and we are inclined to think that pro-Boers (as they are called) exist only in the excited imaginations of a few Ultra-Conservatives.’55 The Barrier Truth, of mining town Broken Hill, New South Wales, along with The Herald, were both frequently critical of the war, but would also honour and support soldiers, emphasizing their patriotism despite the accusations of treason frequently levelled against them for their opposition to the war. The Barrier Truth also questioned openly the patriotism of those who supported the war, which they felt threatened the respectability of the British Empire.56 It is evident that there existed a ‘very large minority’, in the words of George Arnold Wood, that opposed the war.57 Wood counted himself among this

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‘minority’, forming the Australian Anti-War League in January 1902 with William Holman, after which his actions against the war, including writing regularly for the anti-war British publication, the Manchester Guardian, almost lost him his lectureship at the University of Sydney. Another prominent organization was Melbourne’s Peace and Humanity Society, Australia’s first peace society, formed in May 1900 by clergymen Dr Charles Strong and Reverend Laurence Rentoul, as well as Henry Bournes Higgins.58 Higgins was one of the most intensely antiwar parliamentarians in Australia, which cost him the seat of Geelong, Victoria, in a 1900 election, although he was later welcomed into federal politics. Opposition to the South African War in Australia was visibly dominated by the middle to upper classes. Many labour organizations were also strident in their disapproval of the war, based on its effects on the working classes.59 Trade unions such as the AWU (Australian Workers’ Union), predominant in New South Wales, and Victoria’s AMA (Amalgamated Miners’ Union) frequently disapproved of the war, the AWU in particular having supported the creation of New South Wales’ Anti-War League in January 1902.60 There is evidence that newspapers in trade union-heavy areas began debating the war from its declaration. Two days after the war began, on 13 October 1899, The Bunyip – of Gawler, South Australia – reported: ‘The proposal to send a contingent of troops to South Africa is just the sort to cause the floodgates of public discussion to open . . . the pros and cons appear to be so evenly balanced that it depends upon who has the popular ear for the movement as to which side has the best of it.’61 Although South Australia established a Trade Union Act in 1874, documentation regarding union membership is sparse. However, active unions were present in the colony, which may have contributed towards the town’s ambivalence towards the war.62 Supporting this is the frequently low attendance of meetings held to create patriotic funds to support the war effort in Gawler, in contrast to the widespread patriotism among most Australian communities.63 Although Gawler does not represent widespread attitudes in Australia, it is likely that other industrial centres shared some of this reticence towards the war, supported by the evidence that Peace Demonstration Committees also existed in small towns such as Port Pirie and Yorketown, South Australia.64 The extent to which their views affected the general population is impossible to measure. Still, they are significant as precursors to future protest movements, from the anticonscription movement during the First World War to the widespread dissent during the Vietnam War. Despite the jingoistic fervour in the months after the South African War was declared, its final year was marked by widespread war-weariness. Public attitudes

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present at the end of the war contrast strongly with the enthusiasm displayed in 1899, because Australians were ‘heartily sick’ of the war.65 Most originally believed that the conflict would be over in a matter of months, causing extreme dissatisfaction by 1901 when a British victory did not appear imminent. Any attempt to recreate the patriotic demonstrations of late 1899 and early 1900 in the last months of the war was sadly unsuccessful. The Worker of Queensland described a February 1902 parade in Brisbane as ‘woefully destitute of thrill’ and ‘an exceedingly tame affair’.66 Soldiers departing for South Africa in the second half of the war had a very different experience to those leaving amidst the jingoistic madness of the first.67 It is difficult enough to determine why so many filled Australian streets upon the first departures of contingents, although it is likely they were motivated by support for the war or the simple desire for amusement.68 However, it is harder to ascertain why such enthusiasm subsided in the later stages of the conflict. The end of the war came after much anticipation by Britons and Australians whose husbands, brothers and sons were in South Africa. Eventually, the scorched earth policy enacted by the British caused sufficient destruction to the Boers to necessitate their surrender. Yet, their resilience is noteworthy, as despite their devastating loss of life and community, the Boer surrender came considerably later than anticipated. Nearly 30,000 Boer women and children, and over 14,000 Africans, died in the concentration camps, and 7,000 Boer soldiers (burghers) were killed during the war.69 The Australian death toll reached 606 and total British casualties 21,942.70 The Treaty of Vereeniging that officially ended the war was signed on 31 May 1902, and Australian soldiers slowly began departing for Australia, bringing joy to those waiting for them on the home front.

Australia in the Vietnam War Britain’s devastating losses during the world wars saw its supersession by the United States as the leading world power. By the official beginning of the American phase of the Vietnam War in the 1960s, nineteenth-century imperialism had given way to the Cold War battle of ideologies. The United States entered Vietnam aiming to protect South Vietnam and, presumably, the entire world against North Vietnamese, Chinese and, ultimately, Soviet communism. As Australia had followed Britain to South Africa, the decision was urgently made to join the United States on their neo-imperialist mission in Vietnam.

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Australia’s position in the world had also significantly changed by the early 1960s. The Australian government was conscious of the replacement of British by American power in the world, as well as of the increasing threat of Asia to Australian stability, demonstrated by the Japanese attacks on Darwin in February 1942 and the high drama of the Fall of Singapore in the same month. A closer menace had appeared, and Australia was conscious of the need for greater security – which the United States was best able to provide. A new alliance was formed, resulting in the ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand– United States Security) Treaty coming into force on 29 September 1951, during Australian involvement in the Korean War, which was to provide protection against the ‘Pacific threat’, namely Japan and China. In 1954, following the French-Vietnamese War, when the country was separated into North and South Vietnam, the North’s provisional takeover by Communist forces led to fears that such encroachment would spread throughout South East Asia. Another pact was thus signed on 8 September 1954, creating SEATO (the South East Asia Treaty Organization), signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States, as well as Britain and France. The aim of SEATO was to collectively prevent the spread of communism in South East Asia through a defence arrangement involving the signatories. Both agreements initiated ongoing debate in Australian parliament, with many leaders considering them a high priority for continued security against communism. However, others doubted the integrity of the United States, questioning their willingness to provide aid if Australia was attacked.71 Despite the scepticism expressed by many parliamentarians, the pacts were signed and Australia was officially allied with the United States. Australian political leaders were already conscious of the potential consequences on public opinion when the first appeal for assistance came from the United States in the early 1960s. As early as 1954, the Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, approached the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, and warned him that the Australian people should be mentally prepared for potential conflict in Vietnam.72 He referred to ‘the black cloud of communist China’ and the fear that Australian ‘children do not end up pulling rickshaws with hammer and sickle signs on their sides’.73 Again, this concern is closely related to Australian security and the fear of ‘Asian’ communist takeover, expressed in terms of the ‘domino theory’ – namely, the effect of a downward-moving communist takeover from China, through Vietnam and eventually to Australia.74 The war in Vietnam did not constitute a direct threat to the homeland security of either Australia or the United States, despite government claims that it was combating the ‘thrust by Communist China’ towards Australia.75 Thus, the decision to send Australian

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men to fight would cause public controversy unless it was introduced sensitively. The Australian role was debated widely in Federal Parliament, where in Cabinet there were ‘a couple of voices that hold that the USA is our only standby in this part of the world, and that we should follow them whatever they did’, strongly reminiscent of sentiments questioning South African War involvement in late 1899.76 However, more widely, involvement in the Vietnam War was seen as necessary for reasons of security, so preparations began to send Australian troops to Vietnam. Officially, the political decision to involve Australia in the war emphasized the centrality of the request for aid by the United States and South Vietnam, as well as the need to protect South Vietnam from communist forces, rather than more self-seeking desires.77 Such claims echo parliamentary debates before and during the South African War that highlighted the need to prove loyalty to Britain and to aid British settlers against supposedly tyrannical Boers. In both cases, these reasons were questioned, and disproved, during and after the wars’ end. Australia took its first major step towards involvement on 24 May 1962, when it was announced that an advisory group of military personnel, the AATTV (Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam) would be sent to aid the American forces.78 At this time, most Australians did not express interest in Vietnam, and it was not until after the National Service Act was renewed on 24 November 1964 that public attention to the war increased.79 Still more Australians took notice after the 29 April 1965 announcement that combat troops were to be sent to Vietnam, as well as the decision of March 1966 that many of those conscripted would eventually serve in Vietnam. During this period, ideas regarding Australia’s stance towards Asia and the emerging war in Vietnam came more prominently into public view – generated by supporters of the war, including parliamentarians, as well as opponents of Australian involvement. Australia’s participation in Vietnam produced many ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ attitudes towards the war within Australia. The DEA (Department of External Affairs), representing the conservative Liberal Government in power, published pamphlets with the intention of ‘educating’ the population on the importance of the war to Australia as an essential part of the Cold War conflict against communism. Generally, these focus on the alleged link between communism in China and Vietnam, and its potential impact on Australia through the ‘domino theory’.80 Other publications deny the claims that the United States disregarded the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement that ended the French-Vietnamese War by providing military aid to the South Vietnamese, instead transferring the blame for this on the North Vietnamese.81

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Initially, many Australian media publications followed closely the official line adopted by the United States, and thus Liberal Government, partly due to the reliance of the press on overseas news services – as there were no dedicated Australian journalists in Vietnam during the entirety of the war.82 Also, press representatives on the war front generally relied on the American military-controlled ‘Five o’clock Follies’, ensuring their reports followed official pronouncements.83 Some newspapers and journals did reveal opposition to the war in these early years of active combat, although it was not until the later years of the war that dissent was more openly expressed. The Barrier Daily Truth newspaper, of Broken Hill, New South Wales, a town well known for its high membership of trade unions, organizations that frequently expressed opposition to the war, openly espoused the cause for peace in Vietnam from 1965.84 Larger commercial newspapers such as Melbourne’s The Age did not begin to openly oppose the Liberal Party until the late 1960s, after Edwin Perkin’s 1966 appointment as editor, a move that shifted the paper considerably left from its traditional conservative stance.85 Before this date, however, articles regularly appeared that supported the views of Liberal Party Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies towards both the war and the ALP (Australian Labor Party) opposition.86 During both the South African and Vietnam Wars, politicians within the ALP constituted an important sector of opposition towards the war, but during the later war were able to extend their ideas to the Australian population to a much larger degree – due, no doubt, to differences in both communication technology and the changing importance of public disapproval associated with ‘disloyalty’ between the wars. Arthur Calwell, leader of the ALP and Federal Leader of the Opposition until 1967, supported the cause for peace in Vietnam, claiming in March 1965 that participation in Vietnam was ‘damaging to the interests of Australia and unhelpful to the cause of peace’.87 The greatest Labor opponent of the war was Jim Cairns, the Member for Yarra, then Lalor, in Victoria, who was outspoken in his disapproval of the war, publishing numerous works on the topic, and acting as chair of the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign in the early 1970s.88 Cairns was closely defeated in the 1967 ALP leadership race by the moderate Gough Whitlam, demonstrating the extent of both party support for his virulently anti-war stance, as well as disunity within the Labor Party at the time, which proved a major influence in its 1969 Federal Election defeat. Whitlam’s awareness that much of the Australian population was becoming alienated by ALP anti-war policy caused him to focus on domestic issues and adopt a less reactionary attitude towards Vietnam.89 Increased opposition to the war and the

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general appeal of the ‘It’s Time’ campaign that emphasized widespread domestic reforms saw Whitlam claim victory in December 1972.90

The anti-conscription movement One of the most controversial topics during the war was the reintroduction of the National Service Scheme by Liberal Prime Minister Robert Menzies in 1964. Conscription affected all male youths in Australia aged twenty and over, who were required to register for military service. Potential soldiers were chosen according to their date of birth through the so-called lottery of death, although not all selected were sent to Vietnam.91 Many recruited men were unwilling to fight, choosing instead to go into hiding, openly refuse and face imprisonment or plead conscientious objection through the court system.92 Even from the first call-up of 25 January 1965, before it was announced in April 1965 that Australians would assume a combat role in Vietnam and in March 1966 that selected conscripts would also fight, hundreds of drafted men attempted to defer their military service, insisting that their families would experience ‘hardship’ if they were sent away, a reason allowable under conscription regulations.93 Public debates on conscription began from 1964, with many opposing the scheme for moral reasons, while others who supported the war felt that the draft posed a threat to the ‘Australian spirit of voluntarism’.94 Whitlam himself demonstrated his anti-conscription stance shortly before his election as Prime Minister by insisting that Australia could rely on volunteers alone, thus eliminating the need for such a contentious issue in Australian society.95 Despite opposition, polls indicate that almost unwavering majority support for conscription existed between 1964 and its abolition in 1972. After 1969, when public polls began to reveal that 55 per cent of Australians supported the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam, only 17 per cent opposed all types of conscription.96 An Australian Sales Research Bureau poll of 1973 also revealed that Australians were still supportive of the National Service Scheme even after its abolition in December 1972.97 Anti-conscription groups began to appear after the November 1964 reinstatement of the National Service Scheme, including YCAC (Youth Campaign Against Conscription), SOS (Save Our Sons) and the DRU (Draft Resister’s Union). SOS was one of the most publicly influential groups, established soon after the 1965 combat announcement by a group of predominantly middle-class mothers who objected to Australian sons being forced to fight. These women were

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often found at rallies or outside draft registration offices handing out pamphlets that instructed young men on the various ways to avoid military service.98 The DRU was far more radical, and introduced Australia to public draft card burning, an act that originated in the United States. The DRU also held public ‘Don’t Register’ campaigns – leading to over 100 arrests for interference with the conscription process in 1969 – and even the concealment of draft evaders in The University of Melbourne.99 These organizations assisted conscripted men who did not wish to participate in the war in avoiding military service. There were various options available to these men, such as hiding from police for months at a time and moving regularly from safe house to safe house, often provided by university academics.100 One man who was forced to abandon his wife for eight months was Michael Matteson, who often experienced nightmares about prison while in hiding.101 Matteson was later imprisoned in Long Bay Gaol, New South Wales, and released upon the abolition of conscription by Whitlam in December 1972.102 Denis O’Connell was another man who was in hiding from police for two months after his appeal for exemption from military service on moral grounds was rejected in court.103 Many men refused to register for National Service, including DRU member Bob Scates, who was consequently incarcerated in Pentridge Prison, Victoria. While in prison he received numerous letters of support for his refusal to fight, from both fellow dissenters as well as members of the general public who disagreed with conscription.104 Men could also appeal to the court as a conscientious objector – a defence that was rarely accepted unless the men could prove some religious pretext for their refusal to fight, although some were able to convincingly argue that they were morally opposed to war.105 Many enrolled in university to avoid the draft, as military service could be delayed until after graduation from a university degree.106 Men took significant steps to avoid personal involvement in a war they disagreed with, and they were clearly supported by a substantial number of Australians – many of whom were both opposed to conscription and the war itself. Throughout the war, the number of Australians who opposed these issues significantly increased.

The Tet Offensive Australian media organizations and members of the public that were originally supportive of the war effort experienced a dramatic transformation in attitude towards the war after the Tet Offensive of 1968. In late 1967, the US government

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introduced a ‘progress campaign’ to combat increasing dissent that emphasized American victories against the communist forces, both real and invented. These positive reports increased public morale in the United States and Australia and succeeded in increasing the popularity of the war effort.107 On 30 January 1968, however, during a ceasefire to celebrate the Vietnamese Tet holiday, the enemy attacked throughout South Vietnam, including a devastating, although shortlived, occupation of the US Embassy compound in Saigon by Viet Cong forces, although they were not able to penetrate the Embassy building itself. The so-called Tet Offensive was reported widely by war correspondents, including television crews that were able to provide vivid images of the attack within hours. Many Americans realized that they had been misled into believing that a communist defeat was imminent, and their confidence in the ability of the government and military to effectively maintain security in Vietnam was undermined.108 The Tet Offensive created a similar atmosphere of hopelessness regarding victory in Vietnam among Australians.109 The ensuing futility was expressed well in The Bulletin: Beneath a cover of some good old jingoism and an undoubted display of some of the finest of military professionalism and courage, we are losing the war in Vietnam. No one warned us, it just happened. One day we were reading of a broken enemy and unbounded optimism; the next, we were faced with negotiations and an American withdrawal . . . The cause in Vietnam has proven to be bankrupt.110

It is significant that such a report appeared in The Bulletin, a publication that had supported Australian involvement in Vietnam in the early years of the war. The lack of official media censorship during the Vietnam War made possible the broad television coverage of the Tet Offensive. As the war was never officially declared, the United States and thus also Australia were unable to impose any formal censorship, giving accredited media representatives freedom to travel around Vietnam. Unofficial censorship certainly occurred, whether selfimposed by individual journalists or at the behest of editors in the United States or Australia.111 Still, the opportunity to see first-hand the disparity between the events of the war and the government perspective pushed many representatives of the media against involvement. Geoffrey Fairbairn, Lecturer in History at the Australian National University, Canberra, claimed after Tet that most Australian correspondents were opposed to the war from their arrival in Vietnam.112 Many scholars and political representatives have attributed the dramatic shift in public opinion, and thus the eventual need for withdrawal from Vietnam, on the media

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reporting on the war.113 However, such a claim can easily be contested through an examination of rising dissent in the United States before Tet.114 After the Tet Offensive, the Australian government attempted to re-introduce the D-notice system, a form of censorship, as it became clear that relying on media and government ties to ensure self-censorship by editors and journalists was no longer effective.115 Press representatives began to protest when Creighton Burns of Melbourne’s The Age reported that censorship regulations had been imposed without briefing any media organizations on their requirements.116 The covert introduction of censorship does indicate that authorities anticipated the effect of Tet on opposition to the war. In fact, Tet – added to general warweariness and a public focus on domestic issues – began to cause strains in public support for the war from March 1968. The 63 per cent approval rating for the war in Morgan polls dropped after Tet to 58 per cent, and in August 1969 it fell below 50 per cent, indicating for the first time that a majority of those polled wanted an end to Australian involvement.117

Opposition to the Vietnam War The National Service Scheme and Tet caused a shift in public opinion on the war; however, other significant events, such as the revelation of the Secret War in Laos in March 1970 and the invasion of Cambodia, announced by Richard Nixon on 30 April of the same year, also intensified anti-war activity.118 Numerous organizations, both national and state-based, actively protested against the war, including Students for a Democratic Society, Vietnam Action Campaign and High School Students against the War in Vietnam. Political groups at universities frequently made Vietnam one of their key issues, with demonstrations regularly occurring on university campuses throughout the war and, in the lead-up to the first Moratorium, also secondary schools.119 Trade unions also frequently opposed the war, but this was not universal among all union organizations, partly due to the ACTU (Australian Council of Trade Unions) decision of May 1965 not to support union strikes connected with the war, thus weakening their cause.120 Many religious groups also publicly objected to the war on moral grounds that can be directly compared to attitudes towards the South African War over sixty years earlier. John Stoward Moyes, an Anglican bishop, made his opposition public in 1965 by writing a letter on behalf of other Anglican leaders to Prime Minister Menzies to ask for his support in ending the war.121 Other clerics from

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various religions openly spoke about their own moral objection to the war.122 These groups and individual dissenters created scenes that were frequently reported in the press during the conflict, thus creating more visibility for the movement and attracting more supporters. A significant influence on the protest movement was the appearance in the 1960s of the New Left, which distanced itself ideologically from the Old Left’s conception of the political left and right. In Australia, sections of this group, particularly in Melbourne, did so by moving further towards the ALP than the Communist Party of Australia, a mainstay of the Old Left.123 Youths within this movement, of which many were university students, began expressing their political will in more visible ways, including active demonstrations against the Vietnam War. Although they did not form a majority within Australia, their belief in ‘participatory democracy’ did significantly influence the public protest movement.124 However, the minority who used more forceful protest tactics, including violence, particularly in the later years of Australian Vietnam involvement, caused some alienation among the general public.125 The press eagerly reported the frequently wild scenes at anti-Vietnam and anti-conscription demonstrations, particularly after 1968 when these increased in organization and scope.126 As a result, many works on the anti-Vietnam protest movement have overemphasized radicalism and violence even though most protests were, in fact, peaceful – throughout the entire war.127 Images of police clashing with protesters did occur, with violence on both sides, but there is evidence that most anti-Vietnam demonstrators used peaceful tactics and many cooperated with police.128 Those planning to attend the first Moratorium in May 1970, for example, were encouraged to take cameras to record any police violence towards peaceful demonstrators.129 The Moratoriums were organized by the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign, chaired by Labor’s Jim Cairns, and planned as peaceful protests with the aim of educating the public on the causes of the war and methods to effectively gain peace. These were large-scale versions of the teach-in, a type of lecture-protest that had been occurring since 1965, usually on university campuses.130 The first Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam in the United States took place on 15 October 1969, and it was after this that the Australian Vietnam Moratorium Campaign was formed. The first Australian Moratorium was held on 8 and 9 May 1970, and saw around 200,000 people march peacefully against the war, without any arrests made. The second and third smaller Moratoriums of September 1970 and June 1971 did see violence from some groups involved, and overall were not as successful as the first.131 Still, this movement did spur anti-

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war groups to more action, and impacted the majority of the population that had supported withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam since August 1969.132 One of the valuable legacies of the anti-Vietnam movement as a whole was its influence on Australians who felt similarly about other important issues, such as environmental, civil and women’s rights.133

The end of the war The ‘psychological victory’ caused by the Tet Offensive has repeatedly been labelled a catalyst for the end of the war, and the North Vietnamese communist victory.134 The betrayal felt by members of the American and Australian public over the military state of affairs in Vietnam caused opinion polls to drop in both countries. Soon afterwards, Lyndon Johnson announced that he would not run again for president of the United States, leading to Richard Nixon’s election win in November 1968, based on the promise of a ‘secret plan’ to end the war. Although this plan did not exist as promised, ‘Vietnamization’ was introduced – which was, in effect, a transferral of responsibility for the war onto the South Vietnamese, and gradual withdrawal of the United States – or as labelled by Gough Whitlam in April 1970, the ‘de-Americanisation of Vietnam’.135 In keeping with this plan, Nixon announced his first troop withdrawal in June 1969, and his second in December of the same year. In accordance with Vietnamization, on 16 December 1969 the Liberal Prime Minister John Gorton announced that Australian troops would begin to be gradually withdrawn from Vietnam, with the first group departing in April 1970.136 Despite the strength of the population against the war by the end of 1969, Australia’s decision to exit the war can be attributed more so to the American pursuit of Vietnamization and, thus, gradual withdrawal from Vietnam, which came as a reaction to growing dissent in the United States. In fact, there were concerns among Liberal parliamentarians that the American withdrawal from Vietnam would threaten Australian security, indicating the unwillingness of some for an end to the war.137 In August 1971, the new Liberal Prime Minister William McMahon announced that all remaining troops would be sent home from Vietnam by the end of the following year. In December 1972, Labor’s Gough Whitlam won the Federal Election, breaking a pattern of Australian Liberal Party rule that had lasted since 1949. Although Whitlam did not bring about the end of Australian involvement in the war, his immediate abolition of conscription compounded the joy felt by

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many who opposed the Liberal Government’s policy regarding Vietnam.138 The last troops returned to Australia in June 1973, spelling the completion of over a decade of participation in Vietnam, which saw almost 60,000 Australian men fight, approximately 15,000 of which were National Servicemen. Those who lost their lives while in Vietnam numbered 521, a total of 200 of these being conscripts. These numbers contrast greatly with American deaths during the war, which exceeded 50,000 men, and provide some context as to Australia’s contribution to the war, but in no way diminishes the impact of the war on Australian society. The war itself ended in 1975, after six years of gradual withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. The results of Vietnamization, a plan criticized worldwide for its euphemistic abandonment of the South Vietnamese forces, validated these criticisms.139 The triumphant entry of North Vietnamese tanks into Saigon on 30 April, after the final offensive of the war, saw a communist victory and cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. Sadly for many Australians the conclusion of the Vietnam War did not spell the end of its impact on their lives, or the lives of their families. The war prompted a dramatic increase in the amount of physical and psychological support needed for returned troops. The emergence of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) as a significant factor in the post-war lives of many Vietnam veterans increased the amount of attention that was paid to the effects of war on soldiers.140 The effects of the Agent Orange defoliant used to partially destroy impenetrable jungles in Vietnam – so as to reduce the ability of the communist troops to effectively use guerrilla tactics – has also profoundly affected veterans since the war’s end. This issue has been an ongoing battle between authorities and veterans eager to gain fair compensation for their suffering, more pressing since more recent research has discovered that Agent Orange also causes illness among the children of those impacted by it.141 Although Agent Orange does not form part of this broader discussion, as the examined soldiers did not refer to it at all in their personal records from Vietnam, it is another important legacy of the war.

Conclusion Australia was changed irrevocably during both the South African and Vietnam Wars. The first experience of overseas combat that involved Australia as a whole came in the late nineteenth century, when widespread debates among parliamentarians and intellectuals regarding the future of British influence

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determined the extent of involvement in South Africa and eventually led to Federation in 1901. The attitudes of the general population towards involvement in the war have been portrayed as fervently supportive, represented by vivid scenes of cheering crowds when soldiers departed for South Africa or returned after their war service was over. In contrast, representations of Australia during the Vietnam War since the war’s end have emphasized opposition to the war, although this did not become a widespread movement until the late 1960s. The Australia that emerged after over ten years of involvement in Vietnam was dramatically different from the one that had supported the sending of military advisors in 1962. Australians were becoming aware of the need for change, particularly youths, who were the main advocates of the ‘new [political] impulses’ in society.142 The influence of the Vietnam War, and the resulting anti-war movements, ‘radicalised’ thousands of Australians to extend their political involvement to more than merely voting.143 During the South African War, approximately 15,000 men departed from the same Australia that saw almost 60,000 soldiers leave for Vietnam sixty years later, but one that was also vastly different – demographically, politically, socially, militarily and attitudinally. With shifts on the home front also came changes on the battlefield. Despite the wars being fought in two very different countries under unique circumstances, there exist parallels between these war fronts, as there exist on all fields of war, formed for largely similar purposes. There were also immense differences, not only in the physical surroundings of the war front, but also in the character of those going out to fight. Each group of men had been raised in a distinctive period of Australian history, with its own traditions and lifestyle, which then went on to affect their reactions to the war – thus reciprocating any influence the conflicts had on the home front. The remaining chapters in this book will outline how both fronts impacted these men during and after their war service in these two significant Australian experiences of war.

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Initial Impressions of the War and the War Front

A soldier’s experience of war begins on the home front, long before enlistment takes place. All humans are surrounded by certain pressures since birth that contribute to their attitudes toward warfare in general and their own role within it, which then contribute to a soldier’s actual decision to enlist, as well as first impressions of battle, willingness to fight and perceptions of the enemy. They can contribute, as well, to the inevitable transition from ‘new’ to ‘seasoned’ soldier – that is, when the realities of war set in, resulting in possible disillusionment with warfare, respect for the enemy or a greater emphasis on ‘duty’ as combat motivation. This chapter will, then, analyse principles of soldiering in conjunction with the letters and diaries of Australians in South Africa and Vietnam to determine whether these soldiers reacted similarly irrespective of the war they were fighting or whether unique factors, relating to both home and battle fronts, must also be taken into account in explaining their reactions before, and during, the first phases of their combat duty.

Patriotism, adventure and ‘the cause’ Although ideology and patriotism – namely, the relationship between soldiers and their country – are often quoted as major factors in the willingness to go to war, more practical reasons can provide the critical motivation. Soldiers in the South African War rarely mentioned patriotism in their letters and diaries from the war front, instead referring to a range of more personal reasons for their decision to enlist, including the wish for ‘excitement’ or the simple need for financial stability. Among Australian First World War soldiers, expressions of patriotism frequently came from popular discourse within the societies from

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which they originated, with men more influenced by public pressure and the notion of ‘duty’, as well as the prospect of secure employment and escape from pressing problems.1 Thus, traditional concepts such as ‘love of country’ have often been disregarded when considering reasons for enlistment.2 However, to discount patriotism as a motivator for military duty does not mean that soldiers who volunteer do not support the war’s official cause. The concept of ‘cause’ is an important one when considering reasons for enlistment. Second World War Major General Frank Richardson labels ‘the cause’ as a necessary mental factor in the creation and retention of morale in a soldier, both of which become more difficult as a long war continues.3 If a soldier does not believe that the reasons for fighting a war are worthy, it is highly likely that fighting ability will be reduced. In fact, a direct link existed between positive opinion towards the war and effective combat performance among American soldiers in the Second World War.4 Supporting these findings, only one Australian of those examined from the South African War spoke openly about his belief in the justness of the cause, or the need for loyalty to Britain, as a factor in enlistment. Trooper Watson Augustus Steel, of the 1st New South Wales Mounted Rifles, referred directly to the decisions by the colonial governments in late 1899 to send troops to demonstrate his approval of Australian involvement: ‘The action of the colonies in sending them was looked upon at the time more in the light of moral assistance than anything else, proving the unity of the Empire, and as a pledge of greater help should further complications render it necessary.’5 Steel here points to the more ‘official’ reasons for entry into the war, outlined in the previous chapter. Other evidence calls into question whether all soldiers knew, or cared, about such matters. When discussing the abundance of volunteers for the war in early 1900, Queensland’s The Worker claimed that ‘patriotism would probably be a small element in the motive that prompts men into offering themselves’ for the war, instead pointing to the importance of ‘six or twelve months’ steady pay’ in enticing soldiers.6 Past studies into the Australians who volunteered for the war rarely cite patriotism as a predominant reason for the eager enlistment of men in late 1899, instead pointing to the wish for adventure or simply to leave Australia and, particularly after the devastation of Black Week in December 1899, a desire to avenge the deaths of their fellow Australians.7 These findings coincide with the contents of the examined soldiers’ personal records. The diary of Trooper John Alexander (Jack) McBean also demonstrates how the war itself was not as attractive as the employment it provided. After travelling from New South Wales, to South Australia, to Western Australia, then back to Adelaide in search of employment, he ‘decided to have a try’ at joining the 4th

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South Australian Imperial Bushmen Contingent, and was ultimately successful.8 The importance of employment is supported by the number of men who attempted to remain in South Africa after their twelve months of military service had ended, including Private James Smith of the Queensland Imperial Bushmen, who only returned to Australia when it was clear that there was no chance of finding suitable work.9 This seeming desperation for additional employment, particularly among those living in rural areas, is supported by the widespread drought in Australia in the late nineteenth century, as earlier mentioned. Trooper Alured Kelly of the 2nd Victorian Contingent felt even less motivation to fight – he ‘took no more than a passing interest’ when he heard about the war, and it was only after being questioned by his tailor about whether he would like to fight that he said he ‘did not mind’ and subsequently enlisted.10 This comment does not indicate an overwhelming urge to fight in South Africa, rather Kelly’s lack of concern for the British cause. Steel’s assertion, as well as any other patriotic justifications for enlistment that may exist, can be partly attributed to the pressure to exhibit ‘loyalty’ towards Britain. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Australian commercial newspapers were filled with opinions critical of ‘disloyalty’, particularly in the first year of the war, including Gawler’s The Bunyip, that reported an unofficial ‘boycott’ in place in Adelaide, South Australia, against ‘business people who show Boer sympathy’ in early 1900.11 Such a pervasive emphasis on ‘loyalty’ in society would certainly be pronounced in the minds of those with an existing military connection, suggesting that some men would have enlisted out of duty, particularly towards the British Empire. The soldiers’ letters and diaries reveal that not all go to war for such highminded reasons or even have a single overriding incentive for involvement. Many soldiers do not see their war service in terms of what they are able to do for their country and people, but rather for how it might enhance their own lives. In fact, the wish for companionship and freedom from ‘the confines of bourgeois life’, the desire to escape from family trouble or the longing to experience adventure were often quoted in soldiers’ letters as reasons for enlisting in the First World War.12 Escape was certainly on the mind of Albert Gilham of Stawell, Tasmania, who set off for the South African War without informing his wife Annie, nor their seven children. After Mrs Gilham discovered in a ‘Melbourne newspaper’ that her husband had enlisted, she wrote to the military authorities for some financial provision from his salary, which was not granted by Albert until eight months later, when she began receiving 10 shillings a week till his death in February 1901.13 This appeared to be a common occurrence, as Gawler’s The

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Bunyip commented on 20 October 1899, six days after the war began, that a large number of married men were enlisting because, according to one man, ‘it would be easier to fight the Boer than continue a conflict with his wife’.14 It is noteworthy, however, that as the war dragged on, more men began to refer to duty as a compelling factor rather than opportunities that the war may afford them, a shift perhaps caused by the fact that the Australian death count was increasing, thus prompting the desire for justice or revenge.15 It seems, also, that for some the concept of ‘duty’ bound up in society’s initial enthusiasm was contagious – prompting men to associate the war with excitement and, as a result, to enlist. For many soldiers the incentive for involvement can be viewed as a combination of factors – including both the desire for thrills and responsibility towards the home front.16 The concept of ‘adventure’ is an important one when considering the motivations of soldiers, as those who see war in such an idealized way often experience the deepest change in attitude when reaching the battlefield – a reaction labelled by Paul Fussell the ‘irony’ of war.17 This aspect will be later discussed more comprehensively. In the soldiers’ letters and diaries, the concept of ‘adventure’, or at least the prospect of an escape from the predictability and drudgery of monotonous, often low-paid employment, is frequently quoted as an incentive for enlistment. As mentioned earlier, Trooper Jack McBean was preoccupied with an alternative employment that military service could provide, writing in his diary: ‘Being on the White Cliff opal fields when the First Contingent left Australia, I thought how much I’d like to go too.’18 Lieutenant Douglas St. George Rich frequently compared his experience fighting in the 6th Queensland Imperial Bushmen in South Africa with his life in Australia when writing to his family: ‘But still for all the rough and ready time we have had, I wouldn’t swap it for anything and go back to banking.’19 He later wrote to his sister: Altogether the life suits me down to the ground and I often wonder was I ever a poor devil of a bank clerk and how I managed to endure that life so long . . . It’s by no means all gilt and gingerbread but such as it is it suits me better and am more happy and contented than ever before in my existence.20

Rich’s words strongly suggest that he went to war to leave a dissatisfying life, a view supported also by Private William Hamline Glasson, an Australian working on the South African railways. He wrote in a letter to his mother, less than a month before joining the Bushveldt Carbineers: ‘We got fairly sick and tired of the railways waiting until the war was over . . . stuck in an office all night in a hole like this doesn’t suit me so we have decided to see a bit of the fun’ [emphasis added].21

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The reference to ‘fun’, or at least the hope of finding diversions and enjoyment in war, can be found in several of the examined personal records.22 The South African War was Australia’s first experience of conventional warfare, so expectations were relatively innocent, particularly when compared to those of the men on their way to Vietnam, many of whom had heard tales of past wars, or seen its aftermath, in the lives of Australian veterans of the First and Second World Wars, as well as the Korean War. In addition, conscription did not exist during the South African War and volunteers were plentiful, demonstrating the expectation of many that involvement in battle would be a satisfying pursuit. Stowaways were frequently found on military ships, men either too young or unfit to be accepted for military duty but who still had a strong desire to fight. Daniel Haden Spyer, a volunteer in the NSW Army Medical Corps during the war, wrote in his diary: Forgot to mention that our little stowaway from Sydney, the same boy who stowed away on the Warrigal & received a flogging in Melbourne, was put off at Melbourne on our arrival there, but managed to stowaway again, when we sailed, he was however, put off at Albany again, poor little beggar, he cried bitterly when leaving, we were all sorry to lose him.23

The Argus reported on this same youth, named Henry Crockett, numerous times in 1900, from his first capture by police while attempting to get to South Africa on 5 January to the eventual granting of consent to enlist by his parents on 26 January despite his age (fourteen years), shortly before Spyer’s report.24 His case demonstrates the desperation with which some attempted to become soldiers, or escape from their lives in Australia. In his diary, Martin Maddern, a Chaplain with the Imperial Queensland Bushmen, also mentioned a stowaway who wanted to fight in South Africa: ‘A man named Adams who was at Lytton camp & known there as (Genl) Buller was discovered as a stowaway & set to work his passage by the Captain.’25 Arthur Hammond, of the 5th West Australian Mounted Infantry, also wrote to his parents of the discovery of twenty stowaways on the SS Devon to Durban.26 It is difficult to say exactly why these men had decided to hide on these ships leaving Australia, but their presence on troopships supports the idea that many were eager to fight in the South African War, whatever the particular motivation. In sharp contrast, the soldiers’ letters and diaries from the Vietnam War fail to reveal with any certainty their reasons for fighting. In the case of the approximately one quarter of serving Australians who were conscripted to fight in Vietnam, this finding can be explained by their simply having little choice in their involvement.

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Hiddlestone claims all in her sample of 102 interviewed Vietnam veterans went to war out of ‘duty’, or ‘a sense of debt to the past’, with many referring to the past war service of family members in the world wars as a motivation to enlist.27 In contrast, the archived letters and diaries from the Vietnam War do not refer to any direct motivation to fight, raising questions about the difference in expression between soldiers’ words from the battlefield and retrospective records by veterans who have a personal and cultural insight into both Vietnam and other past major wars, derived from family members and society at large.28 The only indication of any incentive to fight in the personal records is by Corporal Wallace Lillebo, a Medic with C Company, 2nd Field Ambulance, 5RAR, who stated in his collection of letters from Vietnam: ‘None of us ever regarded the war in Vietnam as a bringing of aid to the South Vietnamese.’29 These words could indicate that the Cold War-related fight against communism was foremost in soldiers’ minds, rather than the security of South Vietnam. However, they could also demonstrate that the ‘official’ reasons given for entry into the Vietnam War – the appeal for help from South Vietnam – was not an overriding motivation in the enlistment of any volunteers, which is consistent with earlier mentioned findings on soldiering that disregard patriotism or belief in the cause as primary reasons for soldier enlistment. The possible irrelevance of the cause may also indicate why some veterans were openly against the war after they ended their service, following the view that the insignificance of ‘the cause’ to any combat soldier will inevitably reduce their will to fight.30 Another explanation for the unwillingness of Vietnam War soldiers to reveal their reasons for enlistment is related to the large number of Australians on the home front that openly disagreed with involvement, particularly in the later years of the war. The perception by many veterans that opponents would physically or verbally attack them after their return from Vietnam may have caused soldiers to refrain from positive references to the war for fear of attracting unwanted criticism.31

Military training A critical phase of the combat experience is when the transformation from civilian to soldier occurs through military training. Reactions in every battlefront event from then on are dependent on the effectiveness of this training. In fact, the receptiveness of a soldier to military training can help determine how well the soldier will be able to avoid wounds – both physical and psychological – or even death while in battle.32 Despite the various goals

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of training – including socialization, morale building, proficiency in the use of weapons and the dehumanization of the enemy – its fundamental aim is always to give soldiers the ability to withstand battle and survive. Soldiers who are given adequate information about the conditions of war are less likely to collapse in the face of combat.33 This coincides with Fussell’s concept of war’s ‘irony’, in which he argues that soldiers with realistic expectations of war are less likely to be overcome psychologically by the realities of the battlefield.34 Thus, it is necessary to examine the techniques and desired effects of army training to better understand the behaviour of soldiers during combat. The practical usefulness of military training is in teaching a soldier how to use weapons and adapt to military formations. During the South African War, British soldiers initially employed traditional methods of fighting completely unsuited to Boer combat, as well as to the South African terrain. In fact, although battle techniques were altered to adapt to the enemy’s tactics during the war, it was not until the First World War that the British Army adopted more significant modifications to tactics and style. These included physical preparation for a country’s particular environment and battle itself, as well as psychological training focused on the element of fear. Other armies in the world also made similar changes to adjust to the transformation in warfare.35 Many Australians who enlisted in the war effort in late 1899 were barely trained, and much of their cursory education into warfare was imparted to them while travelling to South Africa by ship. Although some later contingents underwent more rigorous training before departing from Australia, particularly in the final year of the war when the situation of both the British and Boers became more desperate, there remained some dissatisfaction, particularly among officers, about the attention paid to this important aspect of military service.36 The importance of thorough and specific training was highlighted by Sergeant Arthur James Vogan, of the Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment, in his diary from South Africa. He complains repeatedly about how lack of training had impacted on fellow soldiers, revealing his desire for more adequate preparation in warfare: Things that seem wrong, somehow, in the working of our column: – Horsefeed Rifles – No training in shooting is given our troops. Many never fired out of a rifle till they did [sic] or at an enemy they could not see. I know for a fact that one at least was afraid to fire at all, as they did not know what would happen when they pulled the trigger [author’s emphasis].37

He had earlier foreshadowed the finding that one overriding purpose of training is to reduce the incidence of death or wounding: ‘My only fear is that the

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inexperience of these untrained men will cause trouble . . . when they shouldn’t, or injure themselves, their comrades.’38 During the Vietnam War, training was more strictly enforced than during the South African War. The similarities between South Africa and Australia, as well as the Boers and Australians, succeeded in concealing the insufficient training of volunteers in many cases where men were able to quickly adapt to methods of warfare on the veldt. However, the climate and terrain in Vietnam contrasted greatly with the most populated areas of Australia that, along with the increased experience of war within the Australian military, necessitated more concentrated training for both volunteers and conscripts. All men were officially required to undergo twelve months of training at various military training centres, including Puckapunyal in Victoria and Kapooka in New South Wales. Here they were schooled in basic arms practice, theoretical background training about the conflict in general and the Vietnamese – in accordance with the aims of the American military – as well as specified training that aimed to simulate conditions in Vietnam. There is some evidence, however, that some were sent to the war front before their twelve months had ended.39 In fact, Peter Groves, a Bombardier in the 105th Battery, Royal Australian Artillery, in a letter to his wife Wendy, expressed discontent at the insufficient training he and his fellow soldiers received: This will make you laugh I think. I was informed the other day that every person the Army sends out here is supposed to have at least ‘12 months’ training before leaving Australia! My training finished in December which means I had 8 months training before I came over! I know quite a few here who didn’t get that much training [author’s emphasis].40

Captain David Wilkins of 5RAR similarly wrote that the continuous rotation of soldiers in Vietnam meant that ‘too many times inexperience and lack of training has caused cock ups’.41 Such expressions demonstrate not only the psychological but also the practical importance of training to these soldiers in battle. The aim of essential weapons training has not altered in the last 200 years, despite the changing techniques used to teach it. The unpredictability of war makes it necessary for attack and defence to become almost instinctive for soldiers, to enable them to think and act swiftly during battle. Combat actions, whether related to their use of a weapon or movements, are to be automatic, so as to benefit the group as a whole and also reduce the risk of injury or death to the individual soldier.42 Traditionally frequent drill and weapons training was

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used to teach these skills to soldiers – a tedious but relatively effective method that formed a major part of the military training of Australians bound for South Africa from 1899. Private Robert Byers, of the 1st Victorian Contingent, complained about this area of military training in a letter to his mother, although his sentiments were perhaps worsened by general conditions on the troopship from which he was writing: ‘I do not like Major Eddy, in fact hardly a man on board the Medic has a good word for him; we have had nothing but unnecessary drills, marching order parades and kit inspections, while the SA, Tasmanian and WA contingents have been having a holiday, and laughing at us.’43 Most complaints about the necessity of drills were tied to dissatisfaction with the officer in charge – although soldiers understood the necessity of training for their survival in combat, there were few soldiers who enjoyed the necessarily repetitive day-to-day activities of that training.44 Trooper Charles Wentworth Turner of the 1st Victorian Bushmen similarly lamented: ‘Our Major Vialls had us out early every morning every morning in the cold, and made us do mounted drill before breakfast, which was quite unnecessary – “so we thought”.’45 Private Henry Betts of the 1st Tasmanian Mounted Rifles simply wrote in his diary: ‘Drill, Eat; Drill, Eat; Drill, Eat; Sleep’, demonstrating the monotony of training en route to South Africa.46 Despite soldier dissatisfaction, drill continued into the First World War, during which British soldiers also claimed that such repetitive training – partly employed to keep soldiers occupied and away from trouble – was pointless.47 Since the Second World War, training has also included ‘battle inoculation’, which introduces the use of visual and aural elements to familiarize the soldier with the particular war environment to be encountered.48 During the Vietnam War, men who enlisted or were conscripted were required to spend some time – varying from six weeks to three months – in the Jungle Training Centre in Canungra, Queensland, in addition to regular recruit and corps training before engaging in active combat overseas. Like drill during South African War soldier training, these prompted complaints by those about to fight in Vietnam, including Lieutenant Colonel Neil Smith of 8RAR, who labelled his training centre a ‘god forsaken hole’.49 The benefits and implicit problems with this technique were emphasized in a 2003 analysis of the Australian Defence Force that did mention its ability to reduce soldier anxiety in battle, but found that related stress during training can also decrease combat effectiveness.50 Still, repetitive drill in some form has remained; as psychologist John Thompson MacCurdy asserted: ‘No one has as yet devised any other system which will so quickly inculcate the habit of automatic obedience.’51

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Dehumanization in South Africa Few soldiers who enlist or are conscripted automatically possess the will to kill – it must be taught. One of the principal rules in modern society is the prohibition of murder, which must be reversed or altered in order for a combatant to acquire the ability to kill other human beings in battle. Thus, one of the major aims of military training is to ‘dehumanize’ the enemy, which aims to create both an ‘uncivilized’ and an ‘inhuman’ enemy in the minds of soldiers.52 This constructed differentiation between combatants is essential in encouraging soldiers to kill. The need for dehumanization was demonstrated, for example, during the Vietnam War, when the United States and its allies frequently used demeaning terms to refer both to the enemy and killing itself.53 The use of such language serves to increase both the willingness to kill and the ability to avoid any psychologically damaging guilt after killing has taken place. The personal records of South African and Vietnam War soldiers reveal that soldiers did apply dehumanization of the enemy taught during military training to fuel their eagerness to kill. However, this reliance appeared more frequently during the first phases of a soldier’s tour of duty – as soldiers became more familiar with the enemy and with the conflict itself, occasionally admiration or even pity developed. This was somewhat marked in the South African War, and to a lesser extent the Vietnam War, when in both cases Australia was allied with a world superpower and was fighting against a seemingly less formidable enemy who was proving almost impossible to defeat. An investigation into the Australian press during the South African War reveals another source of these dehumanizing attitudes towards the enemy. As discussed in the previous chapter, most Australian commercial newspapers repeated the jingoistic ideas present in Britain’s ‘New Journalism’, which began depicting the Boers in a derogatory way from the ‘First Boer War’ of 1880–1881. For example, shortly before the South African War, Algernon Charles Swinburne published a poem in The Times called ‘Transvaal’, in which he encouraged British citizens to ‘scourge these dogs, agape with jaws afoam, down out of life’, referring to the Boers.54 During the war, a transformation occurred in popular representations of the Boer enemy. The Boers were, like the British, white Europeans, so had to be portrayed as the ‘other’ on the basis of their behaviour rather than skin colour, resulting in a focus on their alleged lack of hygiene and barbaric ‘uncivilized’ nature.55 Following this lead, hawkish Australian newspapers such as The Argus and The Bunyip often described the Boers as ‘insolent’, ‘corrupt’ or demonstrating ‘inhumanity’, to illustrate their allegedly uncivilized character.56 The Border

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Watch, of Mount Gambier, South Australia, wrote that the average Boer was a ‘heavy smoker’, drank black coffee on a regular basis and that ‘his personal habits are anything but cleanly to our ideas’.57 The decidedly anti-South African War journal The Bulletin denounced these allegations of the Boers in commercial newspapers as almost always untrue.58 Thus, the propagandist techniques used to motivate soldiers to kill the enemy were also used to encourage the Australian population to support the British incursion into South Africa. It is evident that Australia’s ties with Britain overrode the many similarities between Australia and South Africa – most significantly, as outlined by Lake and Reynolds, a shared status as a traditionally black land that was transformed into a ‘white man’s country’, as well as direct adoption by South African lawmakers of Australian anti-Asiatic migration laws.59 Thus, Britain’s overt dehumanization of the Boers was shared by its Australian allies. Such views did appear to influence some Australian soldiers on the war front. Trooper Watson Augustus Steel, upon first arriving in South Africa, wrote in his diary: ‘I therefore had my first view of the fighting Boer. We kept complete silence. They are a wild, uncouth looking lot such as one might have seen in New South Wales 30 years ago, in such isolated localities as the Abercrombie . . . They were dressed in all ends of clothing and looked dirty and sullen.’60 Given the frequent complaints by Australians about their inadequate living conditions, it is likely that such a description would fit not only the Boers, but also some British and Australian troops, supported by a letter home by Private John Clinch, also in the 1st New South Wales Mounted Rifles, who claimed that he was often mistaken for a Boer due to his unkempt appearance.61 Such a description could have thus been used by Steel to justify violence against the Boers. Less than three months after arriving in South Africa, Lieutenant George Harris, of Winston Churchill’s unit – the South African Light Horse – used similarly demeaning terms in a letter to his mother: ‘A small lot of our fellows went on to another house and were fired on and a sergeant shot so we shot two Boers and burnt the whole farm down. This is the only way to treat the brutes and what is keeping on the war so long is that we are treating them too well.’62 Another facet of dehumanization is the tendency to liken enemy attributes to those of animals, often found in South African War soldiers’ letters. This dehumanization, or ‘animalization’, was so powerful during the First World War that some British soldiers exhibited astonishment on encountering a human enemy.63 Trooper Charles Cawthorn of the 4th Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen adopted the language of hunting when describing battle against the Boers in his diary, using phrases such as ‘out again this morning but have no

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luck’ when referring to being out on patrol.64 Similarly, Surgeon-Lieutenant James Harold Paterson with the 5th Victorian Rifles wrote of the Boers: ‘the birds had flown just before we got there’, and Private Arthur Hammond labelled them ‘as cunning as rabbits’.65 Sergeant Arthur James Vogan used similar terms when describing female Boers: ‘The younger women are often decidedly good looking, that the race is a healthy, animal one is beyond question.’66

Non-white participation in the war Comparing soldiers’ descriptions of the Boer enemy with those of nonwhites further demonstrates the impact of dehumanization on these men. The transformation of the Boer character in the British press necessitated a change in the way African subjects in particular were considered. The Anglo-Zulu War had been fought twenty years earlier, during which Africans were portrayed to British audiences as the enemy, but during the South African War they were depicted as an inferior group who needed both imperial headship and security from barbaric Boer colonizers who – according to John Macdonell, chairperson of the South Africa Native Races Committee during the war – didn’t have the British ‘fundamental principles’ regarding the appropriate use of imperial roles.67 In the Australian commercial press, descriptions of the Boers were often similarly derogatory, thus illustrating the need for, and use of, dehumanization. An article of 4 November 1899 in The Border Watch declared: ‘the young Boer party, like the Kaffirs they conquered, know nothing outside their own cattle kraals’.68 The closeness between Britain and Australia is demonstrated here, as well as disdain for Boers and Africans, both of whom were dehumanized before and during the war, but with different intentions and reasoning. The British and Boer forces each pledged to keep their forces white – the British fearing disapproval by non-Boer whites for breaking the ‘racial divide’ during a time when Social Darwinist ideas were prevalent, and Boers fearing danger in arming native forces, as well as having at the core of their faith a belief in the hierarchy of races.69 Indicating the general attitude towards Africans and particularly the ‘coloured’ population in the ‘white European world’, Lord Alfred Milner, High Commissioner in South Africa, as well as Governor of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, said during the war: ‘any attempt to place coloured people on an equality with whites in South Africa is wholly impracticable, and that moreover, it is in principle wrong’.70 Milner’s view was clearly influenced by the increased imperial fervour in the late nineteenth century and the necessary

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association of Social Darwinism to justify ventures in the name of ‘empire’ – creating a hierarchical structure of colour and race that cemented the allegedly rightful superiority of whites. However, this rule was not followed, and Africans were employed in a range of roles, from combatants and scouts to manservants and labourers. As Saddler Albert Marshall wrote in his diary: ‘all labouring is done by the Kaffirs’.71 In the late nineteenth century, British migrants who had been exposed to Social Darwinist ideas began arriving in Australia, resulting in altered views towards the relationship between whites and Aboriginal Australians.72 Although demeaning attitudes towards black Australians had developed long before this date, the resurgence of these beliefs in the British world was likely to have given some soldiers encountering Africans for the first time a preconceived notion of their attributes and role in South African society. It is also important to note that Aboriginal Australians did participate in the South African War, both within Australian contingents – including the 1st Australian Commonwealth Horse and the 1st Tasmanian Contingent – and as trackers for the Australian forces. Official records often omitted these men, thus creating a picture of a white Australian fighting force; however, more recent, and ongoing, research has identified some of these soldiers.73 Therefore, white Australians fighting in the South African War may have also had contact with Aboriginal Australians on the war front. There are numerous references to Africans in the personal records of Australian soldiers. Many soldiers experienced initial wonder when faced with the black inhabitants of South Africa, demonstrated by Major-General Edwin Tivey, who wrote: ‘The Australians take a great interest in them, but as there are a long way more black people than white in S. Africa we will soon get used to them.’74 Some men described Africans in respectful terms – a consequence perhaps of the support for the British among most African inhabitants eager to eject the Boers from their native lands. Many Africans felt that the British were more likely to treat them fairly and accord them voting rights if they were victorious against the Boers.75 For example, Trooper Thomas Ross of the 3rd Queensland Mounted Infantry mentioned witnessing an African religious service, during which the congregation sang ‘God Save the Queen’.76 Shoeing Smith Albert Hennett with the 2nd Victorian Mounted Rifles also wrote that upon the relief of Mafeking, ‘all the natives [were] rejoicing’, and also mentioned an African man in Cape Town who ‘wished us to kill the Boers and jump on them. Another sang out “Save the Queen”’.77 This loyalty would no doubt have been determined by each African groups’ colonial history, but it is clear that some of those that resented the Boers did openly support the British cause.

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Such experiences, added to the above-mentioned change in official attitudes towards Boers and Africans, may have softened the views of some men. For example, Private Alexander McQueen claimed of African soldiers: ‘They are very dignified & picturesque in speech.’78 Private Charles Cooper of the 1st Victorian Bushmen’s Contingent labelled the Africans he employed to run errands for him ‘very honest’.79 Trooper Herbert Conder, of the 3rd Queensland Mounted Infantry, wrote humorously, but with some esteem in his diary about an African man selling wood at great profit to the troops, and the benefits of polygamy in providing cheap labour: He has 4 or 5 wives and each brings a bundle of wood upon their head, he walks behind, of course, empty handed, what you might term ‘rear guard’. So the Kaffir would make 7/6 per day and do nothing. It’s a good line I imagine, I must consider it over after the war, and who knows I might be able to get a couple of dozen wives.80

The view here was more novel than condescending, although it was clear that Conder was speaking of the ‘other’, a person who was not like himself, yet one whose abilities in trade were to be admired. These words, as well as his later differentiation between the western clothes of African women from wealthier classes and the ‘loincloths’ of those who were ‘poorer’, do suggest that the adaptation to western culture made these Africans worthy of more respect in Conder’s view. The diary of Private James Smith of the Queensland Imperial Bushmen is similarly clear about the perceived differentiation of African groups according to their willingness to assume white traditions. On 6 January 1901 he spoke of some Africans dressed for church in Bethany, a town which was a ‘very pretty picture’: ‘It being Sunday, most of them very well dressed too, & looking as if the war had not troubled them much.’81 This observation can be directly contrasted with his entry of 16 April of the same year, in which he described some African ‘beehive villages’ near his unit’s camp at Oliphant’s Kloof: ‘Unlike those nearer civilization they are only partly clothed large numbers being almost naked.’82 Many soldiers employed African manservants to run errands for them. Trooper Arthur Clarke of the 4th Queensland Imperial Bushmen wrote often in his diary of Josiah Malosi, or Jess, an African man who travelled with him while on the war front. Although it was clear that Jess was considered an inferior, Clarke’s letters frequently mention his various escapades, including being kicked by a horse, losing rations and obtaining a new horse, thus demonstrating some closeness between the two.83 Other men saw Africans as a novel source of entertainment, such as Private John Cripps who labelled their ‘antics . . . the fun of the world’.84 Private Henry Betts also spoke of ‘amusement’ provided by some

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African youths while docked in Cape Town to whom he threw buttered bread so as to provoke arguments.85 Private James Smith, a keen artist whose diary was filled with drawings from the war front, met with a group of ‘Sekekunis’ [sic] and sketched their ‘splendidly built’ chief, causing much delight.86 However, despite occasional complimentary references, implicit discrimination is still apparent. Sergeant Arthur James Vogan wrote in his diary: ‘the Zulus are physically superior – some, as is well known being beautiful examples of perfect manhood, clean-handed, lithe, active, fearless & strong – in fact as beautiful animals superior to any human I have seen I think except among some trained athletes some sees [sic] occasionally’.87 It is clear that Vogan’s comments were closely influenced by the then popular Social Darwinism and demonstrate the newness with which many Australians saw Africans. These varied encounters do indicate that there was some ambiguity in the relationship between Australians and Africans on the war front, perhaps caused by the changing relationship in South Africa between British and Boer. Despite the respectful terms occasionally used by soldiers to describe Africans, it is clear that a more powerful and long-term dehumanization had influenced the opinion of these men. In the later period of their service, when Australians often expressed respect towards Boer combatants – a finding that will be later discussed – such views of Africans betray a retreat by soldiers to the more traditional differentiation between black and white. Yet African workers were not in short supply, as their financial hardship often made involvement in the war a necessity. Also, there is some evidence that Australians often treated Africans with more compassion than the Boers and British, demonstrated by the words of Major General Edwin Tivey: ‘they will do anything for the Australians, who treat them kindly’.88 Given the frequently demeaning ways that the soldiers’ personal records described even seemingly close relationships with African comrades or employees, it is unlikely that Tivey’s perceptions of ‘kindly’ treatment considered any possibility of equality between Australians and Africans. Still, it is noteworthy that many soldiers’ initial impressions of Boers were often similarly critical to those of Africans – despite prevalent views concerning colour – further demonstrating the power of dehumanization.

Dehumanization and the Vietnamese The tendency of the media to make openly derogatory statements about the enemy during the South African War was not as apparent during the Vietnam War, with more subtlety appearing in descriptions of the communist forces.

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Given the tremendous advances in communication technology between the two wars, there was more to report from the war front itself, even with the existing unofficial censorship.89 Also, in contrast to the South African War, much of the press was critical of the war in its later years. These factors made it less likely that the media, despite its increasingly varied formats, would have the time, space or inclination to focus in any depth on the activities of Viet Cong soldiers. In contrast, Australians fighting in Vietnam were frequently critical of enemy soldiers and South Vietnamese civilians in their personal records. Initial attitudes by Australian soldiers towards the Vietnamese allies and enemy were decidedly intolerant. This cannot be wholly attributed to military training, as during the 1960s and 1970s Australians viewed Asia in semi-archaic ways, often due to memories of the Japanese attacks during the Second World War, which caused ‘xenophobia and anti-Asian racism’.90 Melbourne’s The Age reported in January 1970 that Robert Jay Lifton, a prominent psychiatrist and author who worked closely with returned Vietnam veterans, claimed that ‘animalization’ also existed among American soldiers, who saw the Vietnamese as ‘non-human creatures’, a view that was also prevalent among Australians.91 Second Lieutenant C. Forde of 1RAR illustrated this view by writing: ‘It is hard to understand the enemy here. They don’t act like humans at all – every time they attack they drug themselves up to the eyeballs so that they won’t feel any pain.’92 Private Peter Gates of 7RAR also wrote home of a fellow soldier who likened killing Viet Cong to ‘shooting kangaroos’.93 Such views were also exacerbated by the various ways in which Australian soldiers encountered Vietnamese civilians on the battlefront, all of which will be later discussed. Australians engaged in direct combat in several areas within South Vietnam, where they relied on goods and services provided by the Vietnamese in villages and towns. However, the highly covert infiltration of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese communist forces, as well as the similarities in clothing worn by Vietnam soldiers and civilians, often meant that Australians could not distinguish between enemy Viet Cong soldiers, allied civilians or civilians who were secretly working with the Viet Cong. This situation, combined with discriminatory attitudes on the home front, created a general aversion to all Vietnamese people among many Australians. Many Australian media correspondents and soldiers in Vietnam were also openly prejudiced, which can be partly attributed to the difficulty in determining the loyalties of the South Vietnamese – specifically, whether they supported the communist forces or not. In addition, discrimination against the Vietnamese was caused by the belief in exaggerated cultural differences, which included

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the opposing ideologies of Australia and some Asian countries, particularly China and North Vietnam.94 Corporal Ron Kelly of 1RAR demonstrates this ambivalence in a letter written while in Vietnam: ‘They seem to be a very friendly sort of people, but I don’t trust any one of them.’95 As during the South African War, dehumanization of the enemy was a concern of Australian military authorities. During training, Andrew Treffry, Armourer in the 1 Field Squadron and 5RAR Light Aid Detachment, wrote in a letter home: ‘Everytime [sic] we get a lecture they make reference to the Vietnam War and the Viet Cong. It’s all brainwash but I don’t think I could pick up a weapon and kill anyone at this stage.’96 In fact, the informational booklet supplied to conscripts in Vietnam depicted the enemy as ‘cartoon Orientals in black pyjamas and conical hats’ and ‘cruel little terrorists’, demonstrating the extreme representations Treffry would have been exposed to.97 Yet, after arriving in Vietnam Treffry writes: ‘I’m afraid most of the soldiers have little respect for the Vietnamese people.’98 Numerous soldiers fighting in Vietnam referred to the South Vietnamese using derogatory terms, such as ‘nog’, ‘slope-head’ and ‘gook’. However, the frequent use of these words does not indicate that the men who used them were simply prejudiced, as such expressions could represent the strength of dehumanization, the influence of general attitudes towards Asia at that time or the sheer difficulty in distinguishing between allied and enemy Vietnamese civilians while on the war front, which caused considerable confusion and frustration to both American and Australian soldiers. It is also possible to view such expressions as a coping mechanism by soldiers facing the prospect of killing another human being for the first time, an event that would have caused some difficulty, as demonstrated by Treffry’s words above.

The first stages of service Eagerness to kill is not found in all soldiers, despite the aim of military training to override cultural restraints and human instincts against murder. There is evidence in the personal records from the South African War that this objective of training may have been partly successful, with men exhibiting what Bartlett describes as ‘exhilaration’ towards battle both before reaching the front and in the first few months of their military service.99 Lieutenant George Harris demonstrated such feelings when writing to his mother before arriving in South Africa: ‘We will have some fun with the Boer soon again and I don’t want to miss it.’100 Private

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Samuel Hedley Jones, of the 2nd Commonwealth Contingent SA, expressed his disappointment when arriving in South Africa after the war had ended: ‘I don’t know what they are going to do with us now peace is declared. I wish they had held out a big longer so we could have had a cut at them.’101 Jones’ frustration is especially acute, as he had followed his brother Stan to battle, and had hoped to share in his experience. Private Robert Byers expressed similar enthusiasm in letters sent home while on board the SS Medic to South Africa. When speaking of British victories during the siege of Mafeking, he wrote: ‘If they go on like this, it will be all over before we get near South Africa.’ He later reported: ‘All our Chaps are very anxious to get to the front.’102 These examples do not demonstrate direct fervour for killing itself – rather, an almost romanticized zest for battle. The South African War was the first time Australians from numerous colonies saw direct combat in a declared war, which may have inspired such enthusiasm. In 1899, Australia’s military tradition was in its infancy. Naturally, soldiers would have heard British tales of war either through books, newspapers or possibly from veterans of war. Humans form their often flawed impressions of war through stories told to them by older generations, as well as exposure to ‘popular notions of war’, such as those conveyed in literature and film.103 Janet and Peter Phillips, in Victorians at Home and Away (1978), attribute the unrealistic image of war in the minds of British future soldiers before the First World War to both literary accounts of the ‘day-dream world of war’ as well as public dialogue on ‘patriotism’ in late-nineteenth-century periodicals and newspapers.104 Compared with soldiers on their way to Vietnam, however – most of whom would have been frequently exposed to cultural interpretations of the First or Second World Wars, or the Korean War – South African War soldiers were more openly eager about combat. The lack of widespread enthusiasm observed among the examined Vietnam War soldiers could be due to their increased awareness of what they were to encounter on the war front. However, their expressed eagerness could also have been influenced by the distinction between the closeness of the Australian relationship with Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century and the more complex link with the United States in the 1960s.

‘The shock of war’ The sights and sounds a soldier encounters while fighting, including fear itself, is now frequently included (by simulation or role playing, for example) as part of military training, yet many new recruits still experience shock or surprise once

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on the battlefield. Despite closer similarities between modern training techniques and real-life battle, a soldier’s preconceived notions of battle still deviate from the actual experience.105 As a result, the war front can appear surreal, or at least unreal, with many soldiers, on first facing the battlefield, seeing ‘a unique land with logic, rules and values all of its own’.106 Philip Caputo, American Vietnam veteran and author of the well-regarded A Rumor of War (1977), said of his initial encounter with the battlefield: ‘My first reaction, rooted in the illusion that anyone trying to kill me must have a personal motive, was: “Why does he want to kill me? What did I ever do to him?”’107 The soldiers’ letter and diaries from South Africa and Vietnam reveal that such feelings of amazement did occur, even for the later war – despite the advances by the 1960s that increased the realism of military training. After first reaching South Africa, Lieutenant Douglas St. George Rich expressed wonder at the sight of the battlefront in a letter to his mother: ‘I have yet to realise that I’m where I am. It seems just as if we were on a small outing.’108 Private Alexander McQueen wrote to his family: ‘It is queer how adaptable a thing man is, nothing seems strange now [author’s emphasis]’, referring to the initial peculiarity of the battlefield.109 Lance Corporal Frederick Farley of the 4th Imperial Bushmen Contingent similarly wrote of his first combat encounter: ‘this is my first time under fire it seemed very queer’.110 Those newly arrived in Vietnam were much more open about the ‘otherworldliness’ of the war front, no doubt due to the dramatic contrast between the Australian bush and the humid jungles of Vietnam in comparison with the similarities between the Australian and South African terrain. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray wrote of his first combat encounter: ‘So the whole affair had a pantomime atmosphere – fighters diving, anti-malarial measures, troop lifts and bus runs all merrily proceeding together. Strange and unreal yet not a joke. Just a very strange war and a fascinating introduction to it all.’111 In a later letter he wrote: ‘You feel strange at times here because noises are very different.’112 Similarly, in a letter to his parents on his first night in South Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel Neil Smith wrote: ‘There’s so much I could tell you. This is a totally different world in every way’ [emphasis added].113 Private Len McCosker, also in a letter to his family, expressed his disbelief at actually being on the battlefront: ‘Gee it’s hard to realise that we’re at War. So far it seems like its just another exercise. I suppose that’ll change though the first time we get fired on by the VC. The only thing different seems to be the planes going over all the time and the mortars dropping about ½ mile away.’114 There is no doubt that this fascination was due to the journey to Vietnam being, for most soldiers, their first time out of

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Australia. However, it is clear from these soldiers’ words that the unfamiliarity of their new surroundings was noteworthy within their war experience. The contrast between a soldier’s often idealistic views of combat before reaching the battlefield can also lead to extreme discontent or ‘nightmarish horror’ when faced with the realities of combat.115 Janet and Peter Phillips write that ‘the shock of war was probably greatest to those who came to the battlefields filled with a romantic and make-believe view of war, and of death in war’.116 Also, Fussell argues that not only is the act of war very distinct from its aims, but so are soldiers’ expectations of war and its reality – and as such all wars can be labelled ‘ironic’.117 Such a discrepancy can adversely affect the soldier’s opinion of the worth of the war he is fighting, initially caused by ‘disbelief ’ when first entering a war zone.118 Fuller outlines this shift by describing an experience of a rank and file soldier on leave during the First World War who felt a strong urge to strike a relative who claimed he ‘was dying to go out and see the fun’ of war.119 Private James Smith wrote in his diary of the journey from exhilaration to discontent, as well as the effect of the war front on soldiers: People at home are inclined to look at this soldiering business through coloured glasses and with romantic ideas of VCs [Victoria Crosses] and DSOs [Distinguished Service Orders] etc. Not a few of our men had these romantic notions implanted in their ‘manly buzzers’, but a few months in the veldt has knocked all that out of them. Romance indeed ha ha ha – it is the most matter of fact business they ever entered into.120

This was also strongly implied by 5RAR Private Doug Bishop, fighting in Vietnam, who wrote to his mother: ‘Not much longer to go now, only 18 days before we are non-operational, it was terrific to see the advance party of 7RAR arrive, they are a good bunch of guys and seem very keen about everything, I know how they will feel in 10–11 months time about Vietnam though’ [emphasis added].121 Such disillusionment does not affect all soldiers, however, as some do feel constant exhilaration throughout their war service.122 However, this can be frequently attributed to the increased health that comes from active service, and will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

The changing relationship with the enemy The dissatisfaction experienced by some soldiers is often accompanied by feelings of sympathy or respect towards the enemy. In fact, when Australians

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fighting in the First World War began to comprehend their similarities with the German rank and file, they began to see them as human beings.123 Similarly, many American soldiers in Vietnam began to respect the Viet Cong after they realized how important their cause – namely, Vietnamese independence – was to them.124 As mentioned earlier, one of the aims of military training is to ensure that soldiers feel enough hatred towards the enemy to enable them to kill. If instead soldiers begin to feel an affinity with their opponents, their role may become intolerable, possibly causing resentment towards the war and their place within it. Numerous soldiers from both wars expressed less resentment against enemy combatants and civilians after their first few months of military service, indicating that a relationship between negative feelings towards service and closeness towards the enemy did exist. Eight months into his service, Private Stan Jones wrote to his brother Hedley (who would later enlist in the South African War): ‘The Boers are scattered nearly all over the country now . . . in fact the Boer army was very much underestimated at first.’125 It had seemed unthinkable at the beginning of the war that the small Boer forces would overrun the British Empire’s military forces, but many changed their opinion when the Boers proved themselves resilient fighters. Similarly, when British First World War soldiers encountered the fighting ability of the Germans, they were ‘forced to respect’ them.126 Private James Smith penned a poem entitled ‘Ode to De Wet’ while on the war front that demonstrated clear respect for the fighting abilities of the infamous Boer general Christiaan De Wet, in which he claimed: Most people have read of, although they’ve not met The Boer Commander Christian [sic] De Wet For he’s made his name famous thru country & town And earned for himself undying renown The smartest of British generals have made Strenuous efforts to catch him but yet I’m afraid He’ll get thru their fingers, & slip them up yet He’s a slippery customer – Christian [sic] De Wet.127

Five months after arriving in South Africa, Private Arthur Hammond accorded the Boers similar respect, labelling them ‘brave men fighting against great odds’, demonstrating sympathy for their plight in the desperate final year of the war.128

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Four months later, Hammond engaged in a conversation with a Boer prisoner of war, noting that he ‘spoke perfect English’ and ‘seems to know a lot about what is going on in the outside world’, commenting also that he gave the ‘Boers credit for resisting it [defeat] so long – longer than I thought they would’.129 Others commented on the contrast between their original impressions of the Boers and those they met on the front. Trooper Thomas Theobald of the 2nd Kitchener’s Fighting Scouts wrote to his wife of a prisoner: ‘you would be surprise [sic] to see him he is quite a gentleman both in manners and talk’.130 Trooper Watson Augustus Steel wrote of a similar experience: After enquiring about my health, and asking my nationality he told me he had served in the field against us, had guarded Australian prisoners, and had drunk their health in his tent, that he was against the war, was intermarried and connected with Dutch and English families, but being a burgher was compelled to fight . . . I found him educated, tolerant and kindly.131

Trooper John Jennings of the Victorian Rifles became acquainted with the Boer owner of a farm five months after his military service began: ‘had a conversation with a Boer (a nice young fellow about 18 years) who fought against us at Colesberg. He told me he had a Martini Henri rifle but was not allowed to shoot at long range as the black powder he had would give away their position to us’.132 The disclosure of combat details by the Boer man demonstrates the level of familiarity between the two men, although Jennings later revealed that the man was reluctant to continue fighting in the war, which may explain why such a conversation was possible. A group of Boer men, termed hendsoppers, surrendered to the British during the war, with some – also labelled joiners – offering their services to the British from June 1900, officially as guides and unofficially as informers about Boer army movements, thus establishing themselves as traitors to the Boers.133 Private William Hamline Glasson of the Bushveldt Carbineers wrote of these men: ‘Our corps is made up principally of Australians & strange to say a few Boers, who the early part of the war were fighting against us, of course we keep our eyes on the gentlemen, one fellow has already been shot for opening his mouth too wide.’134 Wilcox claims that hendsoppers in the Bushveldt Carbineers – the unit of the notorious war criminal Harry ‘Breaker’ Morant – were often also despised by Australian volunteers for being ‘traitors’ or ‘cowards’.135 Still, personal contact with Boers may have prompted Australians to describe enemy soldiers in a more generous way, demonstrated by Glasson’s later words to ‘Dolph’ (perhaps a reference to the property ‘Godolphin’, at which he once worked with Morant)

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in his fifteenth month of military service: ‘I have seen enough to satisfy me that the Boers are not so bad as they are painted when you take into consideration some of our actions.’136 This letter was written in early 1902, over a year after Roberts and Kitchener’s ‘scorched earth policy’ began, perhaps provoking more sympathy than during earlier phases of the war. Many soldiers expressed pity for Boer civilians whose homes they were ordered to burn as part of this policy, demonstrated later in this chapter. These findings are supported by the written questionnaires given to South African War veterans by Laurence Field, in the course of his Masters of Arts research, which was later published as the earlier mentioned The Forgotten War: Australian Involvement in the South African Conflict of 1899–1902 (1979). These men were asked from the late 1960s to recount their opinion of the Boers – of the fifteen who commented on this matter, only three expressed negativity, with six commenting specifically on their superior fighting abilities and another six on their general good nature.137 Although it is impossible to determine whether these opinions changed from enlistment or whether cultural memory had any effect on these responses, it remains significant that such a large number were reluctant to speak derisively about the Boer enemy. The late-nineteenth-century drought in parts of Australia prompted many rural workers to enlist in the South African War for economic reasons. After spending some time on the battlefield, it became clear to some of these Australians that their background and fighting style was more similar to that of the Boer forces than the British. During the guerrilla phase of the war from late 1900, the British Army specifically requested Australian mounted infantry troops, as they were better able to traverse the South African terrain and prove a match for Boer combatants, as expressed by Trooper Watson Augustus Steel: ‘The pastoral Boer has shown what he can do and has been best met by Irish and Scotch farmers [sic] sons, Canadian cowboys and, Australian yeomen and bushmen.’138 Eventually, the British were compelled to adapt their own fighting so as to prove a more effective force against the guerrilla Boers. Thus, the positive terms with which Australians described their Boer foes would certainly have been influenced by their similarities, as workers and fighters. Another possible explanation for the identification of some Australian soldiers with the enemy could be their religious background. A group that actively opposed the imperialism of the British within Australia at the turn of the century was the sizeable Irish Catholic community.139 Upon the outbreak of the war, Irish Australians constituted a large part of the Labor opposition to the war.140 It is possible that any ingrained suspicion of the British among

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these groups filtered down to the men who enlisted in the South African War. However, an examination of the religious affiliations recorded by the military upon enlistment of the men who expressed some affinity with the Boers reveals that there was no common faith or ethnicity. It is evident that lifestyle and background impacted on the views of these men far more than religious belief. On the other hand, soldiers in Vietnam were fighting an enemy with whom they felt less connected. As mentioned earlier, Australian attitudes towards Asia remained generally prejudiced in the 1960s, despite some signs of change. This was intensified particularly by memories of the Japanese attack on Darwin and surrounding towns, as well as the Australian POW experiences at the hands of the Japanese during the Second World War and the Cold War, and the alleged links between Chinese and North Vietnamese communism as an instigator of the war. Australians in Vietnam were raised within this atmosphere, which was exacerbated on the war front by the difficulty in distinguishing the Viet Cong from South Vietnamese civilians. Also, fewer Vietnamese spoke English when compared with the Boers in South Africa at the turn of the nineteenth century, making it more difficult for soldiers to bond with both enemy Vietnamese soldiers as well as South Vietnamese allies. The occupations and socio-economic status of most Australians who enlisted to fight in South Africa were directly comparable to those of the Boer farmers; however, 1960s Australia was vastly different from Vietnam. As a result, Australian soldiers’ attitudes towards the Vietnamese were much less generous than those towards the Boers around sixty years earlier. Still, some soldiers did feel empathy or admiration towards enemy soldiers, in accordance with Bourke’s words. Armourer Andrew Treffry, of 5RAR, wrote of the Viet Cong: ‘I pity the enemy and there [sic] in their bunkers & foxholes.’141 Treffry’s words are the only expression of direct sympathy in the archived letters and diaries from the Vietnam War, and the only positive reaction by a common soldier towards the Viet Cong. Any other respect accorded by Australians to the communist forces is due to their aptitude for fighting. For example, Major Donald Campbell of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) demonstrated ambiguity towards the Viet Cong while describing their actions in a letter to his ‘dear Jeanette’: ‘I have always had a grudging admiration for the VC in view of what they have accomplished in the face of what was against them but any respect that I had had now gone.’142 Campbell here clearly reveals his admiration for the Viet Cong persistence in fighting a seemingly unwinnable war but encountering their atrocities first-hand altered his perception. Lieutenant Colonel Neil Smith also held Viet Cong combat skills in high regard: ‘You must

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give the VC their due, they are tough little fighters. Little is the word, all the natives here are tiny people.’143 Although the soldiers who did express some opinion of the Viet Cong are not as empathetic as the Australians who described Boers during the war in South Africa, given the fervour with which the United States, and Australia as its ally, were fighting against communism as a world ‘evil’, any degree of identification with the enemy is significant.

Soldiers and enemy civilians Attitudes towards civilians also changed between the two wars. Australian soldiers frequently encountered Boer civilians on the South African veldt, and generally did not act maliciously towards them despite frequently ‘commandeering’ any supplies from their homes that they may have found useful. However, after the introduction of the ‘scorched earth policy’ by the British in June 1900, Australians were ordered to burn Boer farmhouses and move their former inhabitants to concentration camps after their establishment. Many soldiers expressed pity for civilians whose homes were destroyed; however, some openly sympathized with them before this time, including Private Stan Jones, who wrote of Boer women: Of course some of them are pleasant enough to look at but at present they all seem to carry a sad and troubled look, as they are very much concerned about the War. If you enter into conversation with them you find that they have had their husbands, brothers or sons shot in the War and this the cause of their trouble. Although they are the wives and daughters of our enemies, one can’t help but sympathise with them.144

Trooper Watson Augustus Steel similarly wrote: ‘The saddest incident in the war was that these women and children should suffer, even though they sought, and forced the conflict.’145 Other soldiers were more closely affected by the uncertainty that accompanied any interaction with Boer civilians, given their ultimate loyalty to the enemy forces. Saddler Albert Marshall spoke frequently in letters home of his ‘little Dutch girl’, who he considered taking back to Australia after the war. While camped at Newcastle, South Africa, he was frequently able to ‘dodge the Military Police’ and drink tea with her family in the Boer refugee camp where they resided, likely Volksrust. However, there is evidence in his letters that his sweetheart may have had some ulterior motive, as on 8 December 1901 he wrote: ‘I have to be very careful when I go there because they often try and pump me and want to

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know where all the British columns are but I am too cunning for them. I always say I don’t know. I don’t tell them anything.’ This experience did not appear to deter Marshall, who wrote after leaving his sweetheart and moving to another camp – upon which his ‘Dutch Girl . . . nearly broke her heart’ – ‘there is a refugee camp here also and I suppose I will have another girl before long’.146 Marshall is one of the only men who wrote openly about his relationship with a Boer civilian, which is significant in the context of the war and may have been an extension of the kinship that many felt towards Boer combatants. Supporting this are the words of Private Ronald Douglas of Tasmania, another South African War veteran interviewed by Laurence Field, who claimed that the thing he remembered most from his war service – which at this time would have been approximately sixty years earlier – was the kindness of Boer women who helped him while he was wounded.147 Trooper Harold Harnett of the 1st Australian Horse, New South Wales Contingent, described a kindly meeting with the Boers that did not result as fortuitously. He and six others descended on a farmhouse to find ammunition, where ‘an old Dutch woman’ who ‘seemed very kind’ offered them coffee, soon after which some Boer commandos arrived and shot at them, killing one Australian. Harnett surmised: ‘all of us who went to that farm house think the old Boer women wanted to detain us there and get us either shot or captured’, thus demonstrating frequently necessary suspicion regarding the motives of Boer civilians.148 The letters and diaries from Vietnam tend to express less concern for civilians. Some soldiers spoke of the South Vietnamese in fond terms, but less effort was made to relate to or openly sympathize with them, due to factors such as the language barrier and the difficulty in differentiating confidently between South Vietnamese allies and those who had sided with the North Vietnamese communists. Corporal Ron Kelly revealed his distrust towards the South Vietnamese in a letter to his wife Dianne: ‘I tried to buy you a postcard, but they could not cash a 5 dollar bill. Boy what rogues they are, they try and con money out of you all the time.’149 Similarly, Corporal Wallace Lillebo wrote: Many of the VC were the ‘non-combatant’ peasants whom you saw working daily in the paddy fields; or such people who inhabited the towns and villages . . . Time and again we captured documents which revealed the true identities of the farmer peasants and townspeople to us – our own ‘Noggie’ barber at Binh Ba, who used to merrily cut our hair . . . later became unmasked as a VC.150

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Still, some soldiers expressed affection for the Vietnamese civilians they encountered on a day-to-day basis, particularly children. Lieutenant Colonel Neil Smith wrote to his parents: ‘Some of the natives are friendly, but many choose to ignore or even hide from us. The . . . kids are friendly as a rule. It must be terrible to be born in a war and grow up as they are.’151 Lieutenant Barry Smith of the Australian Civil Affairs Unit wrote: ‘Most women I like too, they are polite (in their way) and the kids, of course, I think they are terrific.’152 Lieutenant Bernard O’Sullivan, who served on the Australian Army ship Clive Steele, wrote in a letter to his parents: ‘The people are lovely, for the most part, but their lot is miserable.’153 Despite these kindly words, the level of familiarity occasionally expressed by Australian soldiers towards Boer civilians rarely occurred towards the Vietnamese. Some soldiers did feel clear affection for Vietnamese children, but caution was still deemed necessary, as demonstrated by the diary of Captain David Wilkins, in which he wrote that children in Vung Tau had been ‘trained in the Oliver Twist tradition’, where frequently one would pick his pocket while another tried to sell him goods.154

Changing attitudes towards war The link between identification with the enemy and increasing dissatisfaction with combat can be observed among soldiers of both wars. It is noteworthy that more negative expressions towards the war itself can be found in the personal records from the South African War, especially significant in comparison to Vietnam – one of the most unpopular wars in Australian history. This theme will repeat itself when considering other aspects of soldiering, beginning at this stage for both groups of soldiers – when the original thrill of combat disappears. Trooper Alured Kelly displays this change in attitude in his diary, demonstrating also that a soldier must believe in a war’s ‘cause’ to fight wholeheartedly: When I joined the Second Victorian Contingent in December 1899 I honestly felt proud to be a soldier fighting for my Queen and Country against the ignorant, deceitful, bible-punching Boers who demanded taxes from the British and other foreign citizens but refused to give them any franchise and, generally speaking, made life difficult for them in every way. After spending a few days in Johannesburg I realised that there were two sides to the story of the British versus Boers. I came to the conclusion that if there had been no diamonds in Kimberley or gold in Johannesburg, there would not have been a South African War.155

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In this case, Kelly had come to a specific conclusion about the justness of the war, although it can be argued that despite this claim of loyalty to Britain, his expressed indifference towards enlistment mentioned earlier in this chapter raises some questions regarding his sincerity. Some men fighting in Vietnam experienced a similar change of heart. Private Shayne O’Brien of 5RAR wrote a long letter to his family about a book he was reading by an ‘American Marine Colonel’ that opposed the methods employed in fighting against the Vietnamese. O’Brien agreed with what he had read, writing: So far the book has given me a logical truthful answer to what I have seen, thought about and encountered. After one has been out here, one gets the feeling something is ‘phony’ and this book answers this feeling very clearly and simply . . . I am discovering more of the fine print in this conflict and I’m afraid it does little to raise the dignity & purpose of the people involved.156

Bombardier Peter Groves expressed similar sentiments in less complex terms regarding the difference between what he was taught in training and later discovered on the war front. When discussing his role in the war in a letter to his wife Wendy, he wrote: ‘God they had us on back home.’157 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray, of the 547 Signal Troop, also demonstrated his altered perception of the war in a letter home to his wife: ‘I am less sure of my ideas in this country than I ever was before I came! Now I just know the war is wrong – but it would be worse if we were not here.’158 Many men on their way to Vietnam or on the Vietnamese battlefront were aware of opposition to the war, but few engaged with anti-war arguments. Although some did change their attitudes towards the war during their military service, most continued to fight until the end of their ‘tour’. A major reason for this, judging from the archived letters and diaries of men in both wars, and particularly the above words of Murray, is closely related to the soldiers’ sense of duty and determination to complete their assignment, despite their dissatisfaction.

Soldiers and duty The concept of duty is an important one when considering the will of a soldier to continue fighting. If an army experiences numerous defeats, morale drops, as does the belief of soldiers in the cause for which they are fighting.159 Any decrease in morale is exaggerated when combatants have entered a war convinced that

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they will be victorious – the case in both the South African and Vietnam Wars, as each was fought between a world power and a small, seemingly powerless enemy. Such feelings among troops can be directly linked to their duty, which can lead to guilt if a soldier’s comrades experience defeat.160 Some symptoms of shellshock among British troops in the First World War were found to coincide with the self-perception that they had not fulfilled their duty, thus suggesting that shellshock could be avoided if military leaders ‘internalise the notion of duty in the rank and file soldier’.161 In fact, those at risk of experiencing anxiety neuroses often focus on their duty so as to rid themselves of ‘the dishonourable thoughts of an easy way to safety’ – namely, ceasing to fight.162 However, this usually occurs after a soldier’s initial phase of fighting, when ‘depression’, ‘strain’ or final resignation to the task sets in.163 Thus, a soldier’s emphasis on duty may result from any dissatisfaction associated with fighting a war. In accordance with these findings, the letters and diaries of both groups of soldiers contain frequent references to duty, often tied in with soldiers’ unwillingness to perform disagreeable tasks. Many soldiers fighting in South Africa expressed reluctance when ordered to burn Boer homes and move civilians to concentration camps as part of the ‘scorched earth policy’ initiated by Lord Roberts in June 1900. In line with the scholars mentioned, some soldiers explained their compliance by falling back on the concept of duty – perhaps to motivate themselves to carry out such atrocities, or lessen any guilt associated with having to commit them against innocent women and children. A letter written by Private Alan Wellington to his friend Philip Teer demonstrates this emphasis: We even burn the farms down now, beside taking the cattle etc & we burn the veldt down as we go. We take the women and children out of the houses & burn the farms in their faces. I had a horrible experience one day, I had to go in a house & carry an old lady that couldn’t walk out & help to put her in a wagon, she cried like a child. It was hard for me to have to do it but Phil it was my duty I had to do it [emphasis added].164

Similarly, Trooper Herbert Conder of the 3rd Queensland Mounted Infantry wrote in his diary: ‘Came across another valley and burnt all the farms, some of the Boer women abusing us in a terrible manner, telling us we only fight women and destroy their homes. I’m very sorry to see the women turned out but there is nothing else for it.’165 Saddler Albert Marshall almost mirrored Conder’s expressions in his diary: ‘we got 6 families today such a pitiful sight to take them away from their homes and put them on wagons then burn their

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houses, but it is the only way to finish the war’.166 These three men, among others, adopted the ‘duty’ justification when committing violence that they clearly did not agree with. Other soldiers focused on their dedication to duty in explaining their ability to withstand difficult conditions on the war front. Such expressions were usually found in the personal records of the rank and file, who were required to do the most emotionally and physically challenging work, potentially creating a greater need to justify potential actions. Trooper Fred Stocks of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry wrote to his parents of the severe conditions in South Africa: ‘You ought to see some of us sometimes coming into camp leading a bag of bones behind us a beard a month old knees out and elbows and black with dust; but anyway no one can say that I have ever shown the white feather.’167 Private Alexander McQueen similarly wrote in a letter to his family: ‘I will be glad when the war is over, but would not like to go before.’168 Private Stan Jones wrote: ‘War is a cruel affair and it is terrible to think that so many valuable lives should be lost, but I suppose it cannot be helped as the Boers are a bad lot.’169 Jones is justifying his own actions in a ‘cruel’ war by painting the Boers as a ‘bad lot’. Some soldiers fighting in South Africa frequently expressed their disdain for psychologically difficult tasks on the war front, but also explained their readiness to carry them out in terms of their duty, thereby suggesting they did not have a choice. Trooper Jack Cock of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry demonstrated this well by writing: ‘We must go through this time at any price whatever the loss is.’170 Vietnam War soldiers referred less directly to compulsory obligations – namely, to a sense of duty – when describing day-to-day tasks they did not wish to carry out, indicating that reduced public support for warfare by the second half of the twentieth century may have had some impact on soldiers on the war front. Fuller emphasizes that even vastly dissimilar attitudes between the military and home fronts during the First World War did not deter the effect of civilians on soldiers: ‘For all the progressive sundering of civilian and military worlds, the soldiers still cared passionately what the Home Front thought of them.’171 Such pressure may have influenced the determination of Armourer Andrew Treffry, who wrote to ‘Eileen’ about a mission he was about to embark on: ‘I don’t like the idea very much but there’s not much we can do about it.’172 Also, Corporal Ron Kelly of 1RAR wrote to his wife: ‘Old Fitzie is going crook about it all here. Hell he is funny always going crook about something. The subject today is, we should not even be here. Of course I agree with him, but we can’t do anything about it.’173 Although these men have not directly referred to ‘duty’ as a concept, or as an incentive to continue fighting, it is clear that they do feel some

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responsibility attached to their role – so even though they may not agree with their position in the war, they will not give up. However, only two men within the sample of Vietnam War soldiers wrote of their sense of obligation, which may indicate that the divergent expectations of combatants in Australia and on the battlefront, particularly in the later years of the war, may have had some effect on the fighting men.

Conclusion One of the main findings in this study is that there are fewer declarations of discontent by Australian soldiers fighting in the Vietnam War. At first sight, such a result is unexpected, as there was far more dissent on the home front during this war, but it is not entirely reflected in the words of the soldiers themselves. This can be partly explained by the earlier mentioned finding that soldiers are more negatively affected by war if they have an idealistic picture in their minds before they encounter actual battle, which generates shock and, often, dissatisfaction for the remainder of their military service.174 It is possible that the increased disapproval in personal records from the earlier war is due to the place of the South African War as Australia’s first actual combat experience, whereas by the Vietnam War, Australians had fought in the world wars, as well as the Korean War. Soldiers thus came to Vietnam with a more realistic picture of warfare and, as a result, may have experienced less shock upon first encounter with the enemy and battlefield. Such an explanation may not be decisive in the case of the Vietnam War, however, as there is significant evidence that the combined effect of the Vietnamese jungle, humidity and guerrilla tactics of the communist troops did produce some disbelief among Australians, as highlighted earlier in this chapter. There are other explanations for this difference in expressed satisfaction among soldiers in the two wars. It is possible also that the widespread dissent against the Vietnam War by Australian civilians, particularly after 1968, prompted self-censorship within the soldier community. Such a connection with the home front will be discussed in further chapters, but it is important that the decreased negativity towards the war within the Vietnam War soldiers’ personal records could demonstrate that there was less of a perceived need to discuss the unpleasant aspects of the war they were fighting. This is not to say that many of these soldiers were not dissatisfied with their situation, but they simply were not inclined to let those on the home front know this, whether to

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avoid worrying them, or as a defensive reaction to their position as soldiers in an unpopular war. When considering the first phases of soldiers’ experience of war, the archived letters and diaries of men who fought in the South African and Vietnam Wars tend to correspond to past findings on soldiering. It is noteworthy that when soldiers’ expressions deviated from these findings, it was often due to events and attitudes on the home front, thus indicating a clear link between Australia and these men. For instance, when comparing reasons for enlistment between the two wars, there are significantly fewer references to Australia itself by those in Vietnam. As mentioned above, this can be partly attributed to widespread home front opposition to the war, which could have compelled soldiers to speak less candidly about why they chose to fight an unpopular war. Another reason may be that around one quarter of Australians who fought in Vietnam were drafted through the National Service Scheme, and as such did not directly choose to fight. Vietnam soldiers also less frequently referred to their ‘duty’ in explaining their actions, whereas those in South Africa often justified more brutal actions by looking to their notion of obligation in war. The soldiers in Vietnam did mention their sense of responsibility in carrying out certain tasks, but expressed much more unwillingness than those in the South African War. This, again, can be seen as a reflection of home front opinion towards war in general, as public and military attitudes towards a soldier’s obligations in war had changed dramatically since the turn of the nineteenth century.175 It is now necessary to investigate the ways in which the physical composition of the army affected soldiers’ attitudes towards the war they were fighting, combat in general and their resultant behaviour. Differences between each group of men will also be noted, so as to understand more clearly whether these soldiers behaved similarly despite the time period in which they fought, or whether the effects of the military structure on combatants remained largely unchanged in the sixty years between the wars.

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3

The Impact of the Military Structure

Whereas military training is the initial step towards transforming a civilian into a willing combatant, obedience to the rules and a commitment to be engaged in combat must follow during a soldier’s period of service. Intensive training alone will not maintain morale throughout an entire tour of duty, but merely provides the necessary foundation for soldiers’ initial fervour for battle.1 It must therefore be supplemented at the front by further development of group morale (or esprit de corps), which is vital both in active combat as well as periods of rest. There are various means used to carry out this goal, all of which begin before a soldier reaches the war front and last for the duration of service. First, the group environment is utilized to ensure that soldiers become dependent on their comrades, which aims to increase fighting ability and reduces the chance of disillusionment or reluctance for battle. Morale can also be fostered through effective leadership, as combat motivation is significantly affected by troop attitudes towards commanding officers, the ability of military leaders to impose appropriate disciplinary procedures, as well as the extent to which regimental spirit is established. The concept of morale will be more closely examined in the next two chapters, but it is important to note that morale, comradeship and the leadership used to sustain regimental spirit, as well as impose discipline, are all intrinsically linked when considering a soldier’s motivation to fight. Thus, the effect of the military structure itself on South African and Vietnam War soldiers will now be analysed to determine the extent to which this affected the overall attitudes towards the wars they were fighting. Within this exploration the position of soldiers towards not only their superiors, but also allied troops, will be examined, revealing why soldiers felt the way they did about Britain and the United States, as well as their armies.

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Comradeship A major tool used by most militaries to encourage soldiers to engage in battle without harmful psychological effects is group solidarity. A sense of inclusion in a cohesive group is essential from the beginning of military training until a soldier has left the war zone. During the Second World War, the three key aspects of the British military structure were ‘discipline, team spirit and endurance’, with ‘team spirit’ the most important.2 Such emphasis on the group environment can prove itself a stress reduction technique for soldiers, as the resultant camaraderie can also improve combat skills.3 There are various reasons proposed by military theorists for the psychological benefits of comradeship. If soldiers encounter danger they want their companions as close to them as possible.4 As a result, the close relationship between soldiers in war has been nurtured for centuries, as militaries were eager to exploit the emotional advantages of soldiers’ physical closeness during the use of square battle formations in wars fought before the nineteenth century.5 The close group environment can also fill the emotional gap previously satisfied by loved ones on the home front. The loneliness experienced by soldiers separated from their family and friends increases the bond felt between groups of similarly dislocated soldiers.6 Retreating into close relationships on the front thus allows soldiers to make sense of their surroundings and provides the mental strength to continue fighting, a tendency which was particularly true of British First World War soldiers.7 Along with an increase in morale and willingness to fight is the importance of developing loyalty through the strategic grouping of soldiers within militaries. Copeland claims that this loyalty is so powerful that ‘even the most depraved and selfish person can be convinced to do for the group what he could never be persuaded to do for himself ’.8 Buss and Portnoy demonstrated Copeland’s finding through an experiment carried out during the Vietnam War that administered electric shocks to men in order to determine how a supportive group environment affected the ability to withstand pain. It was found that the pain threshold of these men increased in proportion to the attachment between group members.9 Thus, cultivating a close group environment during war can produce positive soldier reactions to combat. During the South African and Vietnam Wars, closeness did exist between soldiers, particularly when comrades were wounded or killed. The sentimental references to other men in the examined letters and diaries support the above theories that emphasize the strength of the connection between soldiers. For instance, Private Alan Wellington wrote to his friend Philip Teer from South Africa: ‘Clem left the column on

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14th October, going to have a spell until his arm gets alright. I can tell you that I miss him very much.’10 The distance between Australia and South Africa may have been a factor in Wellington’s feelings of loneliness, following the finding that Australians in the First World War formed more cohesive group bonds than other soldiers, as they were further away from home and thus their unit became like ‘family’.11 Soldiers fighting in Vietnam were closer to Australia, both in distance and time – as soldiers travelled to and from Vietnam by air – yet comradeship remained strong. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray of the 547 Signal Troop wrote of the relationship between soldiers, claiming that ‘most blokes are quick to help their friends’.12 Captain David Wilkins of 5RAR wrote at length in his diary about an attack during which one man was presumed missing: ‘The immediate reaction was for his mates to immediately charge straight back to the bush towards the enemy to find him. Fortunately “P.J.” emerged from the scrub before they had gone far and were able to be recalled. Comradeship to the ultimate.’13 Some men experienced retaliatory thoughts when fellow soldiers were injured or killed. Saddler Albert Marshall with the 5th Victorian Mounted Rifles in South Africa wrote after an attack by the Boers during which weapons were stolen and some men were killed: ‘It was a terrible sight to see the dead and wounded and all the dead horses, It was fair murder shooting men as they lay in bed. We are going to capture the guns if it means the life of every man.’14 Marshall’s desire to avenge the death of his comrades was more pressing given the seeming lack of honour exhibited by the Boers. Lieutenant Thomas Kidd of the 5th West Australian Mounted Infantry wrote after the capture and deaths of several of his fellow soldiers: ‘Our men necessarily felt savage and felt like avenging our comrades.’15 Private Garry Heffernan of 3RAR also linked the death of a close friend and the need for revenge, writing from Vietnam in 1971: ‘Patto was a good friend of mine . . . He was a devout Catholic and had only been married about 2 years, with a 6 month old baby daughter. It suddenly hit me what war was that day and I declared war. I only hope we don’t lose any platoon blokes.’16 The desire for retaliation can be connected to the concept of ‘survivor guilt’, namely, irrepressible feelings of guilt that are often felt when a soldier witnesses the death of a comrade. American soldiers in the Vietnam War saw the need to repay the enemy for killing fellow soldiers as a way to ‘purge’ themselves of the guilt associated with surviving a particular action or the entire war while others died in battle.17 Damousi, among many others, supports the prevalence of ‘survivor guilt’, insisting that it can cause feelings of ‘self-blame and self-condemnation’ among soldiers.18 Such feelings may explain the extreme reactions described by Lieutenant Douglas St George Rich of the 6th Queensland Imperial Bushmen:

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Australian Soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam A sad thing took place when we arrived at camp. One of the New Zealanders who had been sub with us, was shewing [sic] another a Mauser he had got and the other chap picked it up and pointed it, never dreaming it was loaded. Off it went and shot him through the lungs and he died this morning. The other poor chap who was his bosom friend has gone mad and had to be tied up to prevent him committing suicide.19

Most references to the death of a comrade in the personal records from both wars are purely sorrowful rather than vengeful. One reason soldiers feel such sadness upon the death of a comrade is because it diminishes their defences, possibly also increasing their fear of battle. It is the threat of losing their basis of security, their comrades, which controls the much larger menace – the terror of warfare itself.20 The diary of Bombardier Andrew Forsdike of the 1st Australian Task Force, Vietnam supports the existence of such anxiety after the wounding of a comrade, Gunner Mal Hundt, during the Battle at Fire Support Base Coral: ‘Spent rest of night lying out in grass to [sic] scared to move.’21 Most other soldiers, however, expressed sheer grief in their personal records. Lieutenant John Bisdee of the 2nd Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen’s Contingent in South Africa – also the first Tasmanian to be awarded a Victoria Cross for bravery in a battle on 1 September 1900 while serving as Trooper with the 1st Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen – wrote on 20 November 1901 of the death of a comrade: The last few days have been the saddest that I have yet experienced . . . This . . . has cast quite a gloom over everyone . . . I feel as tho’ I had lost a personal friend . . . I am afraid I have not told you much news, but my mind has been so fully taken up by the sad mishap to Corporal Orr that it has driven out all other thoughts.22

Bisdee’s intense sorrow prompted a similar desire for reprisal as described above. He wrote the next day: ‘I hope to shoot a few of these rebels who did for my best man.’23 Similarly, Alan O’Connor, a supply officer serving in Vietnam, wrote when confronted by the death of a comrade: ‘All the girls & blokes were very upset & this knocked us for the rest of the day.’24 Private Geoffrey Jones of 3RAR wrote: The news that the two killed are the machine gunner and his mate makes my stomach turn. It could so easily have been my mate on the gun and myself had we gone on patrol in correct order. The usual big booze up on return to Nui Dat is somewhat subdued as the blokes killed were our mates and not some other unknown name from another company or battalion.25

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In these cases, the discovery that a fellow soldier had been killed was so stressful that it revealed a negative feature of such close companionship between troops in war – a degree of extreme grief, which could affect the ability to engage in combat. Despite the many advantages of the group environment, researchers have identified these less desirable aspects of such close companionship – as although closeness between soldiers can reduce fear, it can also lead to enhanced anxiety.26 In the case of First World War AIF (Australian Imperial Force) soldiers, concern at being separated from their comrades led to outright refusal to fight, resulting in their own appointment of temporary officers and causing problems for the Allied war effort.27 Such worry can also be observed in the above cases of Rich, Forsdike and O’Connor, where close relationships shared between fellow soldiers caused extreme distress, and potential inefficiency in combat.

Rotation After the widespread mental injury among soldiers fighting in the world wars, the rotation system was introduced by the United States. Its implementation during the Korean and Vietnam Wars imposed a limited set tour on soldiers and aimed to reduce the number of psychologically wounded troops on the war front.28 Within the Australian Army, the Royal Australian Regiments (RAR) were also rotated, with soldiers required to remain in Vietnam for twelve months unless they decided to extend their service. Many of these men were conscripts, most of whom served with the same battalion for their year of duty, although some changed units throughout the year.29 The replacement of men with fresh troops every twelve months aimed to ensure that morale would remain high, making it less likely that soldiers will experience significant disillusion with the war.30 Evidence from the South African War suggests that such a system would have been well-received in this instance, as enlisting soldiers were often asked to select whether they wanted to stay in South Africa for twelve months, or until the end of the war.31 A substantial majority of volunteers opted for the latter – a result accounted for not only by the desire to exhibit ‘loyalty’, but also by the general expectation that the war would be over in a matter of months. When it became apparent that the war could last longer than a year, some soldiers became impatient – as disclosed in a telegram sent to the South Australian Chief Secretary’s Office from the Premier of New South Wales, William Lyne, on 19 February 1901: ‘Have recd private telegram from South Africa that discontent exists amongst Australian troops being kept there over twelve months and suggesting that

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Imperial Govt should give definite assurance to the men as to their early return.’32 The problem was sufficiently widespread to prompt official action, as the Premier of South Australia, Frederick Holder, replied on the same day that all men who wished could leave the front after twelve months of service.33 Although group solidarity within a military unit has positive psychological value, studies have found that when soldiers spend only a short period of time together on the battlefront, and more so when individual soldiers join contingents at different times, reliance on group solidarity to promote combat efficiency may not be possible.34 5RAR Private Douglas Bishop’s letter to his mother that discusses the arrival of fresh troops, previously mentioned when discussing soldier disillusionment in battle, illustrates the ‘us and them’ attitude that arises out of rotation: ‘Only 18 days until we are non-operational, it was terrific to see the advance party of 7RAR arrive, they are a good bunch of guys and seem very keen about everything, I know how they will feel in 10–11 months time about Vietnam though.’35 Bishop is illustrating both the detachment with which he viewed the new troops, as well as relief at leaving the war front and returning home. Trooper Charles Turner of the 1st Victorian Bushmen similarly wrote of a contingent of men that arrived in South Africa near the middle of his period of service: ‘It is a treat to look upon the new boys with their new clothes, they look as if they had just come from the tailor’s shop. But they will not be clean very long, in a few months they will be as dirty and ragged as we are.’36 Such attitudes are worsened when rotated soldiers experience ‘short-timer’s fever’, isolating themselves during their final month of service and becoming less willing to engage in dangerous combat.37 Captain David Wilkins of 5RAR provided an example of ‘short-timer’s fever’ among his men less than a month before returning to Australia: ‘It is very difficult not to think of Australia and some leave. The obvious problem of preventing the diggers from switching off is a big one. People getting a bit nervous with such a short time to go. On the whole, however they are still performing bloody well.’38 Such attitudes can be observed among men fighting in Vietnam who counted down to the end of their service, and stated adamantly that they wanted to go home.39 Captain David Wilkins highlighted another problem associated with the relatively frequent turnover of soldiers: ‘I am convinced that with the constant change of personnel that occurs as a result of casualties, but more so from national service change over, you cannot maintain the same standard of professional soldiering needed during a war.’40 Australian casualty figures may support Wilkins’ view to an extent, as although conscripts made up just over one third of the Australian forces in Vietnam, they numbered 42 per cent of those

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who died during the war.41 Thus, although research carried out since the Second World War does indicate that rotation can increase the willingness of soldiers to fight and reduce the risk of psychological damage, there are some less desirable effects of such a system.

Leadership and discipline One of the most important sources of morale in an army lies in the quality of its leadership. For an officer to be an effective leader, they must gain their soldiers’ respect both as a human being and as a combatant. Their influence must be a constant presence during battle, to infuse both confidence and the spirit of camaraderie in their troops, as well as ensure that soldiers will obey their commands even when they are left unsupervised.42 The importance of leadership during both the South African and Vietnam Wars is apparent in the soldiers’ personal records, as attitudes towards officers are expressed freely and frequently. However, there were differences in both the composition and quality of leadership between the wars. During the war in South Africa, soldiers served predominantly in Australian contingents with often ill-trained Australian officers. However, some chose to remain in South Africa and pursue additional employment after their service had ended, with many joining British or other units, thus their immediate superiors were often British officers. Some who were rejected by Australian military authorities attempted to make their way to South Africa independently and were able to join non-Australian contingents once arrived. Even those who fought within Australian units frequently encountered non-Australian soldiers, as ultimately all senior leadership of the British and allied forces were British commanders. Also, Australian units often found themselves fighting alongside non-Australians in larger battles, which led to some resentment, as will be later discussed. In contrast, the Australian forces in Vietnam were frequently fighting in areas where they were unlikely to encounter American troops or superiors, which may explain why these men were less likely to refer, both positively and negatively, to the US military in their personal records. An important part of a leader’s role on the battlefront has traditionally been the imposition of discipline on soldiers. Effective discipline has several critical functions, the most important being the maintenance of morale and increased combat effectiveness. The latter is the ultimate objective of discipline, and so punishments are often designed with that end in mind.43 In fact, good discipline is a morale-booster in battle, resulting in lower rates of psychological damage among

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soldiers.44 The intention of discipline is similar to that of general military training – to encourage soldiers to act in line with military objectives during both combat and rest periods without constant supervision by superiors. In the latter stages of the First World War officers would often use discipline until soldiers instinctively followed orders, so as to ensure that efficiency increases.45 Similarly, during the South African War the British Army held discipline to be one of the most important roles of a leader.46 However, its intensity has decreased since the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly after the First World War when armies realized that soldiers will develop essential self-discipline if the incidence and severity of punishments is reduced.47 Thus, acts such as desertion and ‘cowardice’, for example, were no longer punishable by death by the British Army after 1930. The letters and diaries of Australians in the South African War do refer to the use of discipline even for relatively minor crimes such as sleeping on duty and stealing porridge.48 For example, Lieutenant Robert Gartside of the 3rd Victorian Bushmen’s Contingent wrote of a New Zealander who fell asleep on his post and was punished with fourteen days hard labour.49 Even an unfortunate sentry who alarmed the rest of his unit by accidentally setting off his rifle was punished by ‘seven days heavy marching order’, as recounted by Private Henry Betts of the Tasmanian Mounted Rifles.50 Major Joseph Dallimore of the 4th Victorian Imperial Bushmen also describes punishment for various crimes while en route to South Africa: ‘The colonel keeps very strict discipline, & everything has to be done to the minute, there is a cell on the ship & any man misbehaving himself in any way is at once put in by the guard . . . drunkenness and insubordination is the general crime . . . it is only when they are violent that the irons are put on.’51 Trooper Watson Augustus Steel, of the 1st New South Wales Mounted Rifles, referred to discipline for more serious crimes: ‘Selling horses off the lines to civilian dealers by some of our worst characters has become a common practice . . . a man has just been arrested. Besides it gives Australians a bad name. To take another man’s horse & fight on is inexcusable, but to see it and make money out of it, is a grave breach of the ethics of war.’52 The famous case of Harry ‘Breaker’ Morant and his fellow soldiers Peter Handcock and George Witten, court-martialled for murder, is one of the most serious cases of crime on the South African war front, resulting in the execution of Morant and Handcock, and the life imprisonment of Witten.53 Of all soldiers on the South African war front, Australians were subject to the least severe discipline, and were ‘often prone to speak their minds and consider themselves their officers’ equals’.54 Private Charles Turner wrote of such attitudes in his diary, recounting clear disobedience when his unit was awoken at 2 am on Christmas Eve of 1900 for patrol duty. They collectively refused to go – even

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when threatened with court-martial: ‘So after arguing for some time we all point blank refused to move, some of the men saying they would be shot first. We slept on till sunrise and nothing further came of it. Some of the men chaffed the S. M. [Sergeant-Major], asking when we were to be shot.’55 In the letters and diaries from the Vietnam War, however, only two references to the use of discipline can be found, which could be a reflection of its lesser importance and perceived effectiveness as a motivator or morale-booster for soldiers. Another important factor is that Australian troops in Vietnam maintained discipline far more than their American counterparts. In fact, the American forces almost experienced a breakdown during the Vietnam War, as their men were often subjected to more intense battlefront conditions, leading to increased disobedience.56 Captain Reginald Dittmar of the 102 Field Workshop included one example of Australian indiscipline in his diary, writing that he was chosen as a prosecutor in the court-martial of a soldier who was arrested for ‘willfully inflicting bodily harm with intent to become unfit for military service’.57 The Vietnam War was noted for its incidence of ‘fragging’ or other violence towards officers by common soldiers, an issue that will be further discussed in Chapter 6. Lieutenant Colonel Neil Smith of 8RAR also wrote to his parents of a discipline case he encountered while serving as Duty Officer: ‘A drunk soldier I have to throw in the “can” for the night. I subsequently released him and didn’t charge him as he was a decent type.’58 During Vietnam, crimes that resulted in military discipline were more serious than in the South African War, during which drunkenness had been a much more serious offence, thus again suggesting why fewer references to discipline appear from the later war, and why those who do mention discipline are more often those who impose it – officers, rather than common soldiers. The soldiers writing from South Africa and Vietnam frequently expressed annoyance at officers themselves more than the discipline they enforced. Men in the South African War, however, were more likely than those in Vietnam to speak negatively of their superiors – whether Australian or not – which can be partly attributed to the harsher living conditions during the earlier war. Evidence from the war in South Africa indicates that much of the irritation directed at officers can be related to the degree of the soldier’s own physical discomfort, which is linked to a soldier’s perception of their treatment – an issue that will be expanded upon in the next chapter. Soldiers must feel as though their officers are treating them with respect and value their contribution.59 Most references to officers in the personal records are negative in tone, extending also to ‘Tommy Atkins’ – the British rank and filer. In fact, the admiration and praise of the Boers discussed in the previous chapter occurred far more than towards their allied British troops.

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Although men in Vietnam did not mention officers as often as those fighting in South Africa, their comments emerged from clear disapproval. They also made negative comments towards allied troops, but directed more towards the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) than American soldiers. Criticism of British headship in South Africa was commonly directed at the British military in general, or officers of any rank, including army commanders such as Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts – then Field Marshal Roberts – the second Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in South Africa, as well as his predecessor General Redvers Henry Buller, and came from various levels of the military hierarchy. Lieutenant Douglas St George Rich wrote to his mother of the disdain with which he viewed the British forces: Upon my soul the more I see of the British Arms the more contempt you have for them. Not that I don’t say their men are as good or even better than ours, but it is their officers who are to say the least of it, incompetent. You would scarcely believe the contempt in which the Colonials hold regiments like the Hussars and Dragoons whom heretofor [sic] we used to revere as all that was brave. The more I see of them the more the feeling grows and [I] don’t wonder at the scorn in which the Boers hold them. It’s the Colonials who are doing all the work and these English johnnies know it and aren’t they just jealous of us, for it’s made so evident in any special work – the Colonials are taken to do it.60

Lieutenant George Harris of the South African Light Horse expressed similar sentiments towards British military headship in a letter to his mother on 25 October 1900: ‘I can tell you something now that is not known at home and it is this that Roberts is not at all the popular man with the troops that he is supposed to be.’61 He then described a speech given by Lord Roberts that aimed to convince soldiers to remain longer in South Africa: ‘It seemed so funny after his speech in comparison to when Buller spoke to us as there was not a single cheer . . . I heard a lot of fellows say that they would stop if “Old Buller” would have asked them but not for Roberts, so our Regiment is just half its size now.’62 Harris’ words are notable, as Lord Roberts was far more successful than General Buller in commanding the army in South Africa. Roberts had replaced Buller shortly after the Black Week disaster of 10–16 December and, for at least the first six months, led the army through successive victories, including the reliefs of Kimberley, Ladysmith and Mafeking. When it proved impossible for him to continue this success and quickly end the war, the soldiers soon tired of him – despite his popularity remaining high among the British and Australian public. Private Alexander McQueen wrote to his parents of Roberts on 12 January 1901, after he had handed over South African

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command to Lord Herbert Horatio Kitchener: ‘I may say, although it may seem almost disloyal, that universal satisfaction is felt among the troops that Bobs has given over command as the men are heartsick of the shocking easy way he played with the Boers . . . Buller is the only man that has really done much here.’63 These words confirm scholarly findings that military superiors must prove themselves gallant fighters and wise decision makers to gain the respect of subordinates. A major part of the respect an officer must pay to his soldiers seems, by the records examined, to include the ability to prevent any needless danger, as well as exhibit proficiency in battle command. Numerous records by soldiers in both wars demonstrate that dissatisfaction was expressed at not only the commanding officers of entire armies, but also those leading single individual contingents or units. In these cases, it is more likely that a sole encounter had inspired their frustration, rather their general situation within the war. Sergeant Andrew Warden of the 2nd Victorian Contingent wrote in his diary of his lieutenant: ‘Oh for a decent officer – our divisions had to stay behind & guard camp while all the rest went out and fought the Boers. This is most discouraging and annoying. May the Boers soon catch him’ [author’s emphasis]. He later wrote to his mother: ‘We all hope he will be detained there until the war is over, as he is almost out of his mind with excitement and nervousness when in action, or near the enemy; & so risks our lives unnecessarily; at present I am in charge of the whole division.’64 Trooper Charles Cawthorn of the 4th Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen echoes this concern by praising an officer because he did not behave impulsively during combat, specifically in scouting operations, writing that he: Believed that our business was only to watch the enemy & supply the column with information regarding their movements. Was not popular as it was generally believed that he had ‘cold feet’. During the whole time he was in charge of us we did not lose one man & we were continually in touch with the Boers. I believe a coldfooted [sic] officer makes the best scout officer provided he is competent in other ways. He is always on his guard & never risks his men unnecessarily.65

Here Cawthorn’s opinion was directly related to the ability of his superior to preserve the lives of his soldiers. Lieutenant Douglas St George Rich similarly expressed frustration at incompetent leadership during a Boer encounter: Our party should have had a go to cut them off but our chief seems to have been suffering from some mental aberration for we could not get him to shift till it was too late. We were all mad at his behaviour but I suppose all of us are liable to make a mistake and he may have seen the movement in a different light. He was a NZ officer which made us all the more disgusted.66

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During the Vietnam War, soldiers were similarly negative when discussing the actions of their immediate superiors, who were usually fellow Australians, although disapproval was expressed less frequently. However, there do exist some records that criticize the US military forces. Lieutenant Bernard O’Sullivan of the 32 Small Ship Squadron, Clive Steele made no secret of his disapproval of the American handling of the war: If we (meaning the allies) ever win this war, it won’t be through efficient logistics. The waste of stores, men and time is just too fantastic to comprehend. I always thought the Yanks were masters of organisation, but the more I see of them, nice as they are, I become convinced that they couldn’t organise a kiddies Christmas party to go properly.67

It seems, however, that many soldiers were simply frustrated with their overall position in the war, as Private Frank Denley of the 1 Field Squadron wrote to his parents: I’m sorry about telling you my trobles [sic] but I was just fed up with the system & I’m glad I’m going out tomorrow. I’m not the only bloke this way all the rest of the fellers in the Troops feel the same way. What started this we got a new Boss & he is a propper [sic] NUT (would not have a clue).68

Denley’s words indicate another similarity with soldiers fighting in the South African War – their absolute intolerance for superiors whom they did not trust, frequently heightened when a soldier was close to completing his one-year tour in Vietnam. Signaller Andrew Clyne of the 110th Signal Squadron demonstrated this fear, as well as the concern that an officer was placing his men in avoidable danger: ‘Monday night we went out on patrol. There were seven off [sic] us and a dickhead lieutenant led us and got us lost it ended up we were only about 400–500 yards from camp . . . were meant to be at least a mile but we walked around in a circle and nearly ended up back in camp.’69 These words suggest that such expressions were symptomatic of a general discontent with their current position, rather than direct objection to particular officers in command. In general, there were fewer expressions of disdain or disgust directed at superiors by soldiers fighting in Vietnam, yet in both wars negative statements far exceeded positive references to leadership – which may have been caused by the simple need to vent while writing, thus making it more likely that soldiers would articulate any frustration. Still, given the vast difference in living conditions between the wars, the altered emphasis between the two groups of soldiers suggests that if men were not contented with their current state of physical

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comfort, security or place in the war, their unhappiness could have been conveyed in their letters and diaries as dissatisfaction with military headship.70

Australians and allied troops Negative views were also extended to the allied troops – the British soldiers (‘Tommies’) fighting in South Africa, as well as the American and ARVN forces fighting against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Australia’s entry into each war, as well as its eventual role, may have contributed to the feelings of disapproval for allied rank and file soldiers. Australia was expected by both Britain in South Africa and United States in Vietnam to serve as a ‘token’ force, not influencing the overall course of the war. Australian authorities were willing to accept this role, as it would ensure further security from these powerful nations. Despite these expectations of the Australians, they were soon considered a valuable fighting force, particularly during the South African War when they proved themselves more able than the British to tackle the South African climate, terrain and, in the second half of the war, Boer guerrilla combat, due to their predominantly rural background and frequently fine horsemanship. Lord Kitchener, third Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South Africa, wrote to the British Secretary of State for War St John Brodrick of the Australians: ‘I shall be very glad indeed to have the Colonials they are splendid men and most useful.’71 Australians were conscious of their perceived superiority to the British troops in South Africa, maintaining a strong sense of regimental spirit throughout their involvement. Regimental spirit is vital on the battlefield, as it – like comradeship – produces morale through inclusion in a prestigious military group, thus inspiring maximum battle motivation and willingness to sacrifice. The pride that results from strong regimental spirit, as well as the fear of betraying comrades, can urge soldiers to continue fighting despite challenges to their morale, such as defeat in battle.72 In fact, ‘regimental membership’ is considered more important than comradeship as an instigator of loyalty, due to the potentially harmful effects of losing close companions in a smaller group situation.73 Although a sense of pride was apparent in the Australians’ personal records from the South African War, among Vietnam War soldiers these feelings seem to have been muted. Around one quarter of Australian troops in Vietnam were conscripted, thus not soldiers by choice, which may have affected their self-perceptions. Men in Vietnam were not fighting as closely with non-Australian troops, which would not have allowed for considerable comparison between themselves and the US troops.

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Also, many Australians in South Africa were specifically requested due to their rural background and riding abilities, which is likely to have been a significant factor in this difference between the two groups of men. During the South African War, men frequently compared the fighting ability of the Australian and British troops. Australians believed they were more skilful than the British during the war in South Africa, due to ‘the rigours of life in the bush’, which had ‘refined the [Anglo-Saxon] race’, according to Gammage.74 Often these reactions emerged as a result of the gap between the Australians’ expectation of the famed British trooper and the seemingly weak and ineffective fighters that they encountered on the battlefront.75 Australians fighting in the First World War over a decade later, among troops of other nations, similarly ridiculed the ‘Tommy’ for being self-righteous yet lacking the resourcefulness of Dominion and Scottish soldiers.76 Trooper Watson Augustus Steel was frank about the alleged superiority of the Australians over the British while in military hospital in South Africa: ‘the Jewish nurse rated me and told me that I was soon to die. On telling her I was an Australian, I think she altered her opinion.’77 Some competitiveness between the Australians and the prestigious British Imperial Yeomanry, known for the high social status of many of its members, did appear to exist in South Africa. Private William Hamline Glasson of the Bushveldt Carbineers wrote in a letter to his mother: ‘A lot of Imperial Yeomanry have been going up lately, they seem a very ordinary crowd, not to be compared with the Australian troops.’78 Trooper Charles Turner recounted a fight that broke out between the two groups of soldiers: ‘One night about 100 of each side was fighting . . . the Australians managed to get the best of it, and cleared every I.Y. out of the town. The officers suggested sending the men back to the front where they could get plenty of fighting as they were so anxious about it.’79 Misbehaviour among troops occurred more frequently when their official military service was over – in this case, the Australians were set to leave South Africa in three weeks, thus contributing to the clash with the British. Lieutenant Patrick Lang of the 4th Imperial Contingent supports the rivalry between Australians and Yeomanry in his diary: My private opinion is that the Australians here are getting more than their share. Of course it is a compliment in a way, & we undoubtedly . . . are more capable than the Yeomanry, but we never get any credit. The Australians here don’t growl at being given a larger share of any danger going – but in addition to getting this, we get a great deal more than our share of night work, such as outposts and convoy duty, & our men are often run very short as regards sleep.80

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Lang later wrote, as mentioned in an earlier chapter: ‘Many of these Yeomanry appear never to have been on a horse before, & it will be weeks before they have learnt to ride well enough to go on the trek.’81 Australians would frequently criticize British troops in humorous ways, with Trooper Herbert Conder of the 3rd Queensland Mounted Infantry portraying them as nervous figures compared with the Australians: ‘The tent mates here “the Tommies” are terrible afraid of lightening [sic], cover over the steel and hide the looking glass. Some of them even cover their heads over. I told them they ought to live in Australia, “thunderstorms” there, are what you might call “thunderstorms”.’82 Trooper Charles Cawthorn also criticized the British inability to fight: ‘Our horses . . . are likely to carry the next lot of Tommies, who don’t know a horse from a bar of soap to the front. I hope the first Tommy who mounts mine gets planted on his head in the nearest mud-hole.’83 Private James Smith of the Queensland Imperial Bushmen exhibited a comical view of British ineptitude, writing in October 1900: ‘Some of our men were accused by a Tommy Atkins of burning a house, asked by the general how he knew they were Queenslanders the Tommy sagely remarked that he knew them by the kangaroo feathers in their hats. Needless to say this evidence was indisputable.’84 Private Arthur Hammond of the 5th West Australian Mounted Infantry commented on the accuracy of Rudyard Kipling’s gallant assessment of the British mounted infantry troops in his poem ‘M.I.’: ‘Some of them have never seen a saddle until they came to Africa . . . Some of them do cut sorry figures whilst in the saddle, but the best of the laugh comes when they want to dismount – no, not dismount, fall off the best way they can.’85 Australian attitudes towards British combat skills were thus unflattering, summarized well by Trooper Watson Augustus Steel in his diary: ‘He was brave, with a great sense of discipline and duty, dogged and humane, but he has no initiative and want of ambition explains the want of individual initiative he has so frequently shown in this conflict.’86 During the First World War, men in the First Australian Division, First Battalion mutinied when under heavy, sustained fire when they realized they were doing ‘other people’s work’, namely, that of the British.87 Similarly, Australians in the South African War began to feel resentful when they realized they were being chosen above the British for more dangerous military operations on account of their skills in fighting the Boers. Lieutenant Colonel Percy Ralph Ricardo of the 1st Queensland Mounted Infantry wrote of a recent defeat: ‘The whole show does not reflect much credit on the British arms, we lost 5 guns & a lot of prisoners and all because the British tommy will not scout.’88 Private James Smith complained about the seeming overreliance on Australian troops in

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a letter to his sister: ‘From the way they bustle us about the country, one would think the Q.I.B. [Queensland Imperial Bushmen] was England’s last hope.’89 Ricardo and Smith were more generous than Private Robert Byers, of the 1st Victorian Contingent, who wrote to his mother after a conversation with a Boer prisoner: The Boers can generally tell when they are fighting Australians, as the bullets whistle ever so much closer than the Tommie’s [sic] bullets do. And also when our troops are advancing, he says that the Australians ride like wildfire . . . the Boers reckon they would rather meet 100 Tommies than 20 Australians. One wanted to know why the Horsetralians were called Horsetralians; and the only conclusion they could come to, was, that it was because they were all so used to horses. I do not know what part they are came [sic] from, but they did not know very much . . . It seems they can’t do without the Australians and Canadians, who have already done most of the dirty & most dangerous work.90

Although the British Army was then considered among the most powerful on earth, it is evident that the Australian troops did not always share this opinion. When British traditional cavalrymen proved an inadequate force against Boer stealth in the South African environment, the need for mounted infantry was emphasized. The predominantly country-based Australians satisfied this requirement well, which does partly explain the above comments. However, they can also be attributed to the need for pride in one’s unit or cultural group, as demonstrated by the frequent references to their distinctly separate identity as Australians within the overall British force, which could also account for the closeness between some Australians and Boer soldiers discussed in the previous chapter. It is noteworthy, however, that although the overall stance of Australians towards allied troops was predominantly negative, there does exist some approval for Britain in the examined letters and diaries. Evidence of soldier support for the British Empire itself is directly expressed in several different ways including references to pride, loyalty and confidence in the British cause. Trooper Watson Augustus Steel wrote in his diary on 15 May 1900: ‘Those who doubt the military strength of Britain should see it here, and this is only a portion of it. It is open to doubt whether any nation in the world could have done the same.’91 Similarly, Private Alfred Gillespie of the New South Wales Imperial Bushmen wrote on 3 March 1901: ‘the Empire is in no way imperilled now, it’s only a matter of time.’92 Although Steel’s positive reports can, in part, be explained by when they were written (as the first half of 1900 was notable for its consecutive British victories), the words of both soldiers still reflect the body of personal records found, which rarely, if ever, mention the possibility of overall British

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defeat – throughout the entire war. The clear connection with Britain expressed by some soldiers also reflected the widespread loyalty to the Empire in Australia at the turn of the nineteenth century. Before Federation in 1901, Australian political and intellectual circles disagreed about the future of the relationship between Britain and Australia. Although most agreed that the Australian position within the world needed new definition by way of Federation, the degree of control to be retained by Britain was a bitter point of debate.93 Although such ideas did not make their way into the everyday rhetoric of the Australians in South Africa, some soldiers did clearly express the assumption that they were fighting as British subjects. For example, when speaking of some stamps he’d ‘commandeered’, a common offense committed by Australian troops, Private Alexander McQueen referred to: ‘the stock belonging to the Orange Free State, taken over by our Government’ [emphasis added].94 The words of Private Robert Byers are also significant: ‘There is a lot of talk of us going home to England to parade before the Queen, after the campaign is over; I hope we do’ [emphasis added].95 These men were Australians fighting in Australian contingents; however, their choice of words indicates that they were fighting above all for their mother country, Britain. Byers, in particular, could be a noteworthy example of the ‘ambiguous’ dual British and Australian identity also experienced by soldiers during the Second World War, who were men fighting under the British flag but felt the need to define themselves separately as Australians, a result of increased affinity with the combat abilities of the German enemy than the ‘feeble’ British troops.96 Byers’ later military records indicate that upon his 1910 enlistment into the Permanent Forces, before his service in the First World War, he had an Australian coat of arms tattoo on his right forearm, demonstrating that his loyalty to Britain at this time and possibly also during his South African War service may have been matched, if not surpassed, by his allegiance to Australia.97 It is difficult to find so many clear comparisons between Australians and Americans in the letters and diaries from Vietnam, as Australians did not fight as closely with the US forces as they did the British Army during the South African War. Psychiatrist Peter Bourne, when interviewing Australian soldiers in Vietnam, found that they often found it difficult to see the entire war effort as a whole, due to their isolation from the American force, thus producing a spirit of competitiveness against the allied troops.98 However, the examined Australians appeared to be quite ambivalent about their American counterparts, and expressed their frustration more towards the ARVN, which was considered an inadequate force by American and Australian soldiers alike. One positive remark was found in the records with regard to American troops – Lieutenant Colonel

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Peter Murray wrote in a letter home of their ‘interesting’ and ‘hospitable’ nature.99 Murray’s view, however, could have been affected by his position as an officer in the Australian military, in Vietnam as a supporting force for the United States. Reinforcing this point, negative opinions of the US troops are more commonly found in the soldiers’ personal records – illustrated by Lieutenant Colonel Neil Smith of 8RAR when writing to his parents: ‘The Yanks aren’t very popular here really, except when we want some of their good gear.’100 Corporal Warren Wilson of 8RAR complained in his diary when ‘Cleaning up after Filthy Yanks’ at Fire Support Base Le-Loi, although this could have been affected by the illness he was experiencing on that particular day.101 Added to this is the joke common among the Australian troops during the war that there were only two ‘good’ groups of soldiers in Vietnam – the Australians and the Viet Cong, illustrating the lack of respect felt towards American fighting abilities.102 Soldiers were less likely to speak negatively about allied troops, as well as officers, during the Vietnam conflict, which may be due to the improved living arrangements experienced by soldiers in this war, as well as additional everyday provisions and the possibility of regular R&C (Rest and Convalescence) leave from active duty. During the South African War, soldiers were more often critical of the British when it somehow affected their own physical comfort, which will be further discussed in the next chapter. More common are expressions of open disapproval for the fighting techniques and attitudes of the South Vietnamese ARVN troops, within which there existed vast issues with morale, causing reluctance to fight and a high desertion rate of 113 per 1,000, particularly after the Tet Offensive in 1968.103 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray wrote to his wife Barbara: ‘Saw an ARVN patrol last week . . . Our boys say their tactics are slightly different to ours – the ARVN version of a “Search and Destroy patrol” is called “Search and Avoid”. Not too far wrong either.’104 Lieutenant Barry Smith, serving with the Australian Civil Affairs Unit, similarly wrote of the South Vietnamese troops: ‘THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO HELP THEMSELVES OR US NOW, INCLUDING A LARGE PORTION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS (of whom, in my opinion, the larger portion are bums)’ [author’s emphasis].105 South Vietnamese troops were commonly labelled as cowards by their American and Australian allies. On 29 February 1968, one month after the Tet Offensive disaster, the Australian Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Thomas Daly wrote to Major General Arthur McDonald, Commander of the Australian Force Vietnam, with some concern about the Australian media portrayal of allied and enemy Vietnamese troops. He claimed that ‘the general effect is that the Viet Cong are wonderfully brave,

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tough chaps and the South Vietnamese [ARVN] are a cowardly and incompetent collection of brutal torturers’.106 The poor opinion of South Vietnamese troops was more pressing after 1969, when Richard Nixon announced that the United States would withdraw from Vietnam, leaving the war to the ARVN, who were to be further trained so as to be able to fight the entire communist Vietnamese force – a task that the United States and their allies were together unable to successfully achieve. The United States was criticized around the world for this seemingly immoral decision, despite efforts to convince the world that the ARVN were adequate troops. The diary of Major Gregory Tommasi of the 106 Field Battery, 4th Field Regiment demonstrates that this claim was not universally accepted within the military forces, and displays the incredulity with which Australians viewed the ARVN as late as June 1970: ‘I watched a parade this afternoon of the AVRN gunners. The Officers walks around with a large stick and clobbers them with it. I could imagine me trying to do that to our fellas. End up with a broken arm!’107 Corporal Wallace Lillebo of 5RAR expressed similar disdain, in this case for the South Vietnamese in general, in a letter home to his parents about a particular military operation: ‘This again illustrates how the South Vietnamese are not concerned with a war they themselves are not personally fighting; and how they don’t give a hoot for anybody outside themselves.’108 These opinions may have emerged from the awareness of racial difference exhibited by many Australian troops towards both the communist and non-communist Vietnamese. More likely, however, these men simply disapproved of the apparent lack of regimental spirit, or battle readiness, exhibited by the South Vietnamese troops, particularly as Australian men felt as though they were taking more risks with their lives. The relatively recent association of Australia with the United States in the 1960s and 1970s cannot be compared with the historical bond between Australia and Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century. Such a difference could explain why only one positive comment about the American role in Vietnam can be found in the examined letters and diaries, by Corporal Wallace Lillebo of 5RAR, who wrote: ‘The Americans have my wholehearted admiration . . . Their professionalism and maturity comes from hundreds of years in constant combat experience.’109 It is impossible to determine whether other soldiers shared this opinion and whether statements like these, as well as those directed at Britain from the South African War, can be labelled as uncritical adulation of their allies, as the effect of propaganda both before enlistment and during military training is impossible to determine conclusively. However, Australians fighting in both wars did express more negative than positive opinion about allied troops, yet praise for both Britain and the United States can be found in their personal records, which does give more credence to the suggestion

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that day-to-day physical comfort and safety was foremost in soldiers’ minds, and directly affected attitudes towards allied troops. During Vietnam, soldiers lived in better conditions than during the South African War, and subsequently criticized their allies less frequently – which could have also been influenced by the distance between Australian and allied troops within Vietnam compared with the closeness with which some Australians fought with the British in South Africa.

Conclusion The overall aim of the military structure is to train soldiers who will be able to fight effectively, with minimal chance of psychological damage, and maintain a high level of morale throughout their period of service. When focusing on the effect of the army itself on the Australians in the South African and Vietnam Wars, it is possible to see that these aims were met, but only to a certain extent. The effect of the small group environment on these men did appear to bring them closer together, thus encouraging stronger group morale, but in both wars also caused some grief at comrades’ deaths, which may have reduced combat ability. The rotation system in place during the Vietnam War reduced this possibility, and ensured that soldiers would only be on the war front for twelve months. However, occasionally this produced an ‘us and them’ attitude, preventing close companionship between experienced soldiers and those new to the battlefield, as well as ‘short-timer’s fever’. The imposed leadership did incite respect in many soldiers, but only when they felt that their basic needs – namely, adequate food, shelter and safety – were being met. This did not seem to be an overwhelming issue for those fighting in Vietnam, as living conditions had improved significantly by this time. However, during the South African War, frustration at particularly the lack of physical safety appeared to provoke annoyance and resentment towards not only officers, but also allied troops, even while some soldiers felt predominantly positive about Britain and the United States themselves. Thus, it is possible to discern similarities between the ways these two groups of soldiers reacted to the military environment imposed upon them. However, changes in army life – such as in the imposition of discipline and perceived need for periods of rest – itself caused significant differences between the two wars. The military structure is organized in a certain way to ensure that soldiers can psychologically withstand combat; however, there are other factors within war that act as a counterweight to this. The next two chapters will highlight the psychological pressures during war on soldiers and morale, as well as their potential consequences.

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Morale: The Psychology of Combat

One of the most difficult obstacles facing modern militaries is the incidence of serious psychological damage resulting from combat service. This is not to say that soldiers fighting in wars that took place in earlier centuries did not exhibit signs of mental strain, but that the limited understanding of the psychological effects of warfare made it impossible to both recognize and correctly diagnose such trauma. The mass incidence of recognized psychological injury resulting from combat did not occur until the First World War, when it was named ‘shell shock’. Given the infancy of military psychiatry at the time, militaries involved in this war were baffled as to its deeper cause, and eager to prevent any recurrence. Despite increased focus on the causes of shell shock in both Europe and the United States, the Second World War – more widespread and mechanized than the first – did not produce fewer soldiers with mental injury. Rather, the number of soldiers exhibiting its signs and severity has been escalating until today. The Vietnam War was singular as an example of this increase, after which new and more pronounced signs of psychological damage were labelled ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ (PTSD). The increased focus on the emotional world of the soldier since the beginning of the twentieth century has also had an effect on military training, increasing soldier knowledge of such issues as fear, morale and the psychological impact of killing. This chapter will thus compare the Australians fighting in the South African and Vietnam Wars in terms of their attitudes towards combat itself, as well as the killing within it, so as to determine whether the sixty years between the wars reflect the transformation in popular understanding of the relationship between a soldier and war. The next chapter will then follow on from this discussion to examine soldiers’ ‘escapes’ from the battlefield, including alcohol, sexual relations, mutiny and desertion, as well as the potentially damaging psychological consequences if morale is lost.

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Boredom on the battlefield The transition of a soldier from an initial state of enthusiasm to one of disillusionment earlier discussed can lead to a third phase of military duty – during which some men spend the majority of their time with persistent thoughts of their loved ones on the home front or, alternatively, the chance of being injured or killed. Others avoid such fixation, instead living a more detached life of constant alternation between extreme boredom and periods of intensive action. The vast difference between these states can heighten the anxiety involved, thus soldiers who are affected by the constant rotation of duties frequently experience the greatest mental injury.1 Those fighting in Vietnam seemed to be more concerned with this latter reaction – that is, unease caused by the constant transition between dangerous combat movements and normal day-to-day activities. Boredom was a problem during the Vietnam War, with many Australians commenting on the more tedious episodes of their tour, including Andrew Clyne, a Signaller in the 110 Signal Squadron, who wrote: ‘Ask dad what soldiering on is Mum. I reckon he would have more idea than me, this place is so slack it’s a wonder they even know what a soldier is.’2 Private Len McCosker of 6RAR was more direct: ‘Hope you are all well over there as I’m not too bad, but naturally the morale isn’t real high at the moment. Boredom seems to be the main trouble.’3 It is evident that when these men were not out on patrol, they were allowed longer rest periods than those in the South African War, who were constantly occupied with various tasks, including drill and general camp work, an intentional technique to reduce the risk of misbehaviour among soldiers.4 When comparing McCosker’s words with those of Major Donald Campbell in the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), however, it is possible to see that these complaints about the dullness of army life could be an example of self-censorship. After describing his everyday activities, Campbell wrote in a letter to his wife: ‘It’s all the normal type of life that we got to crave for instead of this artificial existence when you go from having fear of death to utter boredom.’5 Campbell’s description echoes past findings concerning shell shock among First World War soldiers. The trench warfare that encompassed the Western Front similarly involved periods of inactivity frequently intertwined with exhausting military actions – and brought a new form of psychological strain to soldiers.6 Major Gregory Tommasi of the 106 Field Battery, 4 Field Regiment, also exhibited this anxiety in his diary: ‘The days at Dat Do are very boring but the nights are tense and sometimes frightening.’7 Due to the

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guerrilla nature of warfare employed by the Viet Cong, who relied on the elements of ambush and surprise to inflict many defeats on the United States and their allies, much of the active combat that took place during the Vietnam War was during the night, hence Tommasi’s words, leaving soldiers frequently unoccupied during the long, hot days. Clyne and McCosker did not mention the other half of their war service in the same way as Campbell and Tommasi – although it undoubtedly occurred – which suggests that they had consciously chosen not to mention it. Also important is that Clyne and McCosker were both writing to their parents, which may have highlighted the need for reticence more so than for Campbell, whose words were intended for his wife, or Tommasi, who was writing in his personal diary. The Vietnam War was more public than the war in South Africa, predominantly due to the prevalence of television news reportage, so every day civilians encountered visual images of war. Soldiers were often conscious of this fact, causing them to limit the potentially distressing content of their correspondence so as to protect their loved ones – particularly mothers – from worry.8 Thus, it is possible that Clyne and McCosker were similarly affected by the shift between boredom and active combat as Campbell and Tommasi, but were reluctant to articulate their true feelings. Soldiers in the South African War also complained about boredom on the war front, although less frequently than those in Vietnam. Australians in the 1960s was far removed culturally and technologically from the Federation era at the turn of the nineteenth century, with a great emphasis on youth and the enjoyment of life during a period of post-Second World War prosperity.9 Thus, young men fighting at the turn of the nineteenth century may have simply been more accustomed to traditional conceptions of boredom, and it is probable that the definition of boredom in this context had experienced a transformation in the sixty years between the wars, in line with the changes in the average life of an Australian young adult. However, it is evident that despite the heavy workload often inflicted on men fighting in South Africa, there were some periods of rest, during which Australian officers were often waiting for orders from British command. Private Stan Jones revealed to his sister: ‘We have been expecting the Boers to give in for a long time now, but it seems they have made up their minds to hang out as long as ever they can. We are still following the Boers, but it has become a very stale game now.’10 Similarly, Trooper Herbert Conder of the 3rd Queensland Mounted Infantry, wrote in his diary: ‘This is a terribly dull life, nothing to do and nothing to see, only black . . . This life here is getting very monotonous, I walk down to the beach daily and take a stroll for a mile or so along the sea side.’11 It is possible that both groups of soldiers did feel, to differing extents,

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elements of the third phase of military duty, although they could also simply have been frustrated by delays in the opportunity to experience active combat in the war they had chosen to fight. It does appear, however, that men fighting in Vietnam were more likely to mention the occasional tediousness of military duty when compared with those in South Africa, perhaps because South African War soldiers simply had more to do on the war front – demonstrated by the sheer number of complaints about day-to-day activities on the battlefront.12

Soldiers and killing There were some men, however, who expressed pleasure associated with soldiering in their letters and diaries, which some theorists believe is a demonstration of the enjoyment soldiers often feel in a killing role. Joanna Bourke considers a range of individual soldiers’ accounts and the impact of popular culture to claim that killing itself is an enjoyable act for soldiers, based partly on the stories of warfare told to men and women from childhood that paint a picture of combat itself as an exciting undertaking. She does not attribute such feelings to physical killing alone, but also to its psychological benefits within the military structure. While focusing on American soldiers in Vietnam she finds that any remorse felt from combat duties was instinctively disregarded for fear of losing possible admiration from fellow soldiers, who frequently treated men with greater esteem after they had made successful kills, as well as the chance of career advancement in the military. She also highlights the function of killing during war, claiming that it helps soldiers cope with combat by distracting them from the guilt and stress associated with their role.13 Numerous theorists do not agree that killing in warfare is enjoyable in a traditional sense. The gratification expressed by some soldiers can be more appropriately connected to the rules dictating behaviour in warfare that allow them to ignore the morals concerning murder in the societies from which they come. Thus, killing with the permission of their military and home government rids them of any possible associated guilt. The resulting feeling can be interpreted as pleasure when, actually, it is merely the absence of guilt.14 Also, there is no proof that the act of going to war, or battle itself, is an instinctive urge. In the 1980s and 1990s, experiments were carried out that attempted to locate a ‘war gland’ or ‘aggressive gene’ in human beings. No conclusive result was ever found, as humans react in a variety of ways when alone or placed in a group.15 In fact, one of the most significant theories of soldiering that has emerged is that human

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beings intuitively defy orders or expectations that involve the killing of other human beings. Thus, humans are not natural killers by their frequent incapacity to carry out violent acts against other human beings without the influence of military leaders or comrades.16 Militaries have attempted and often succeeded to reverse any soldier unwillingness to kill by using ‘conditioning techniques’ that place a soldier in a more realistic setting during training to reduce shock while on the actual battlefield.17 These points, added to the partial reliance of Bourke’s view on the connection of killing with other associated positive rewards, such as respect or promotion, suggest that pure love for carnage itself rarely exists in soldiers. Soldiers do experience pleasure in intense combat roles, but this can be more closely associated with its more general psychological and physical benefits. It is rare that soldiers will not find at least one positive aspect to war and, even though most soldiers will eventually become disillusioned with warfare, some will retain high spirits throughout their entire tour. Such a reaction can be caused by various factors, including excitement at the riskiness of battle, feelings of security from membership of a close military group, as well as pleasure deriving from the simple contrast of active duty and comparatively dull lives on the home front.18 The love of war can also be connected to concepts such as ‘romance’ and ‘high excitement’, with some soldiers avoiding any discontent during their military service and even after they have returned home.19 Australians fighting in both South Africa and Vietnam did express considerable satisfaction in their combat role; however, it is possible to attribute this reaction to factors other than the single act of killing itself. Soldiers were candid in their letters about the physical benefits of soldiering, often compared with their lives in Australia. Enjoyment from killing itself was rarely communicated; instead most positive comments regarding combat can be connected to the general thrill to be gained through active service. For example, Trooper Ernest Magor from the 4th Imperial Bushmen Contingent demonstrated the duality of warfare by writing: ‘War isent [sic] a very nice game there are better games than war but still I don’t mind it[.] I like it alright I could shoot Boers all day its good sport.’20 Lieutenant George Harris of the South African Light Horse similarly wrote: ‘I like this life before anything there is so much excitement in it.’21 Lieutenant Douglas St. George Rich of the 6th Queensland Imperial Bushmen wrote to his parents: ‘But the day before yesterday our Squadron . . . had the luck to be the first to have regular action and to come under gun fire and it was about the liveliest thing you could possibly wish for.’22 Private Arthur Murray of the

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Western Australian Mounted Infantry suggests that it is the thrill of the chase rather than killing itself that caused him ‘excitement’: ‘They numbered about 50. We chase and charge them for miles and return to camp. No casualties.’23 These soldiers’ words appear to support the finding that it is not killing, but the exhilaration of warfare itself, that is pleasurable. Rich demonstrates aversion to the physical act of killing in a later letter to his mother: ‘Fighting is alright when the actual fight is on and you are excited, but it is the afterwards that knocks me kite high, seeing the poor beggars lying dead and mutilated who were but a moment before alive.’24 Trooper Charles Turner of the 1st Victorian Bushmen writes similarly when recounting that during a battle of 8 April 1901 a ‘German schoolmaster’ was discovered shooting at them while concealed by some long grass nearby: The moment the German saw that he was discovered he threw up his hands, but the men would not spare the life of a man that had done such a cowardly thing. We poured a volley at him and he fell dead. It was one of the worst sights a person could witness to see the state of the German, for nearly every shot had found its marks and he was riddled with bullets.25

It is clear, then, that these men did not gain any overall pleasure from the slaughter itself – in fact, the opposite. Many soldiers in South Africa contrasted their army lives with comparably dull home occupations in their letters and diaries. Although most Australians who volunteered in the South African War were rural workers and, as such, accustomed to working outdoors, some were lower- to lower-middle-class whitecollar workers. When faced with the life of a soldier, many men realized how dissatisfied they were with their home front lives and how physically beneficial they found outdoor employment. Some thus wrote positively about their war roles, including Lieutenant St. George Rich, who was frequently enthusiastic when comparing his life in South Africa with his civilian employment as a banker in Queensland: You never know what a day might bring forth at this game, so I’m never despondent as to the future and never felt happier in my life, and thank goodness every day that I cut the bank for ever. One thing I’m quite determined on and that is to come back again here when we are ordered home. Q’land is all very well but it is not the country this is. You do feel as if there’s room to stretch your limbs here, whereas in Q’land there is always a cramped sort of feeling. At least so it strikes me, but then I’m afraid I’m a born rover and could never sit still anywhere.26

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Other soldiers felt the same way, so decided to remain in South Africa to seek employment when their military service was over. Private Alexander McQueen of Victoria, for example, on hearing false rumours that the war would soon be over after the successive British victories in Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking, told his family that he had decided to stay in South Africa for another six months after the end of the war, despite complaining in earlier letters home about the war and his place within it.27 McQueen did not enjoy being at war and away from home but still expressed a desire to remain in South Africa, revealing that he did see some positive benefits in warfare itself, also demonstrated by his letter of 6 April 1900: ‘Camp life is hard, healthy & hot, but to me is agreeable, active & attractive – some of our fellows growl like anything about the food . . . the officers and the work: I like it’ [author’s emphasis].28 The words of these men indicate that the outdoor life itself was the principal attraction, rather than actual combat. In fact, many men fighting in South Africa mention the physical benefits of soldiering in positive terms, with some claiming that being at war increased their physical well-being. Private William Hamline Glasson of the Bushveldt Carbineers echoed the sentiments of McQueen in a letter to his mother: ‘Stu and myself are in the best of health & are having a good time of it, & we intend to see a bit of Africa before we are finished.’29 Less than a month earlier, Glasson had written home of the longing of many Australian soldiers for an end to the war, again demonstrating that, in such cases, soldiers were fascinated by South Africa itself, not combat.30 In addition, Private J. C. J. McBeth of the 1st South Australian Mounted Rifles wrote to his mother and ‘Bertha’: ‘Although we will get a pretty rough time I’m quite prepared for it . . . I’m thankful to say I’m enjoying perfect health, & hope to get through alright.’31 These are only a few of the numerous references to health in the examined letters and diaries. Although these comments could be partly attributed to self-censorship, namely, the simple desire to avoid causing any distress to their loved ones in Australia, it is apparent by their words, as well as the fact that many chose to remain in South Africa after the war, that the life of a soldier was not abhorrent to these men. Therefore, it is likely that these soldiers were not expressing enjoyment at combat itself, but at the everyday life of a soldier – often in comparison with their own less interesting civilian lives. The Australians in Vietnam appeared less eager about their position on the battlefield. Soldiers did mention the advantages to their physical and psychological health to be gained from soldiering, and the desire to return to Vietnam after their military service had ended – but evidently caused by other

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factors, such as promotion. This may have been influenced by the differences between the ‘hard, healthy and hot’ everyday lives of the men in South Africa, in the words of McQueen, and those in Vietnam, who were often left to amuse themselves when not on patrol duty. However, one soldier did express similar ambiguity regarding his place in the war as those from the South African War. Private Reg Yates of 1RAR wrote in a letter to his parents: ‘It’s funny that although none of us like this place we still are happy here. We’ll probably change but we’ll still be happy. I know that.’32 Other soldiers expressed satisfaction in military life, but their enthusiasm cannot be attributed solely to killing itself. In fact, Captain David Wilkins of 5RAR wrote in his diary of his first experience of killing a man: ‘Today I learn how hard it is to kill a man. Even though he would have killed me if he had the chance, it doesn’t make it any easier on one’s mind after the action is complete.’33 Private Peter Gates of 7RAR wrote of his ‘first operation in enemy country’ soon after arriving in Vietnam, labelling it ‘magic’. His later change of opinion is clear, as he wrote in his final letter home of 20 March 1968: ‘They pay good money over here, I might come back again (like HELL)’ [author’s emphasis].34 Even generous pay would not convince Gates to volunteer for another twelve months in Vietnam, despite his having enlisted freely for combat service before his first tour. However, reluctance to re-enlist can be observed among conscripts far more than volunteers. For example, only 27 National Servicemen of the 2,145 in the first intake of conscripts that returned to Australia in 1967 volunteered for further military service.35 Financial rewards appear to have been a priority for some soldiers who did decide to extend their duty and continue fighting. Immediately after being promoted to Sergeant, Richard Yielding of the Army Aviation Corps wrote to his family: ‘at this stage of the game, I would not swap for anything’.36 Similarly, Wallace Lillebo wrote to his family near the end of his twelve-month tour – after being promoted to Corporal: ‘I’ve been toying with the idea of applying to do another tour in Vietnam when 5RAR returns to UC Dai Loi.’37 Some men saw positive psychological advantages to active military service. Private Manfred Wilhelm Bohn of 2RAR wrote to his fiancée Lyn: ‘I have changed love I have matured the hard way. Very quickly I have learnt a lot in 2 years 3 mth[.] I have learned more in the last 7 mths than I have in the 22 yrs I have been alive.’38 Similarly, Sergeant Richard Yielding wrote: ‘I do feel a lot older and wiser and so I should. If I didn’t, I would have gained nothing.’39 It is noteworthy, however, that both Bohn and Yielding were volunteers, indicating that their entry into the army would have taken place with much more consideration of

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the expected results of service. Generally, however, soldiers in Vietnam seldom referred to the war in positive terms, and when they did their remarks can often be connected with other factors affecting their lives on the war front. These findings are significant in terms of this study as a whole. Although it is not possible with the limited archives available to come to definite conclusions about whether soldiers from either war felt greater happiness or displeasure on the battlefield, it is clear that men in Vietnam were less likely than those in South Africa to openly express their feelings towards their current position in their letters and diaries. There are reasons for this, including self-censorship to protect their loved ones from worry or even a form of defensiveness so as to guard themselves against criticism from the increasingly dissenting civilian population. Chapter 6 will highlight these differences in more detail. Another point of significance is that there are no instances when this group of soldiers referred to killing itself as a pleasurable activity. The exhilaration that was clearly experienced by some men fighting in both wars was usually associated with other aspects of soldiering, including financial rewards, increased health from outdoor living and an escape from mundane employment in Australia.

Fear in battle The frequent references to fear in the soldiers’ personal records, particularly those from the Vietnam War, also suggest that men did not always relish the experience of combat itself. Fear is an inevitable emotion before, during and after battle, and in the average soldier, combat without fear is impossible. Often this can produce quite dramatic physical reactions in soldiers, from sweating and rapid heartbeat to loss of bladder control, frequently heightened in officers who have to not only prove their own battle readiness, but also protect the lives of their rank and file soldiers.40 In fact, 74 per cent of American soldiers fighting in the Second World War admitted to feelings of fear, which usually appeared before battle.41 However, after a soldier’s first combat experience, the conception of fear alters, and often decreases in intensity.42 Australians in both South Africa in the latter half of the war and Vietnam were fighting a guerrilla enemy, who relied on the element of surprise to attack effectively. Thus, the unexpected nature of most confrontations with the Boers or the Viet Cong served to intensify any fear, essentially, of the unknown. Soldiers in South Africa seldom mentioned any fear of battle, which appears unusual given the observed tendency of these men to be far more expressive in their personal

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records than those in Vietnam. Occasionally soldiers in the South African War did allude to apprehension before or during battle, but were not as candid as Vietnam War soldiers when discussing such matters. For example, Trooper Herbert Conder wrote about scouting in his diary: ‘It’s a dangerous game, you have to be constantly on the alert. You do not know what rock has a lurking foe behind waiting to get a shot at you.’43 Here Conder articulates feelings of dread at the thought of wounding or death, but has not explicitly referred to fear in doing so. A letter written by Stan Jones to his mother was similarly ambiguous about his anxiety at the prospect of being killed: You do not think so much of home while the battle is raging, or as you may imagine there are many other things require your attention and you are anxious to get as many good shots at the Boers as you can, for a fellow does not know when he is having his last shot . . . you can’t help but wonder how you will get on the next day or the next time that you have a set to with the Boers.44

Sergeant Charles Pegler of the Natal Field Force was also vague about his nervousness while fighting the Boers: ‘I often wonder if I shall get spliced.’45 This, again, merely hints at his feelings of trepidation before engaging in battle. Pegler later writes to his parents immediately after a period of heavy fighting: ‘I can tell you all that I thought of you all during the charge, and thanked God that he had spared me.’46 These words suggest that Pegler did experience fear during active combat but, again, he does not directly declare that this is so. Private Arthur Hammond of the 5th West Australian Mounted Infantry similarly referred to the experience of being under rifle fire as ‘not nice’, and Private James Smith of the Queensland Imperial Bushmen labelled it ‘uncomfortable’.47 One reason why these men may have been reticent concerning fear could be that they were faced with a greater terror – that of being branded a coward by their fellow soldiers or officers.48 The need to conceal any unease would have been more pressing during the South African War, when ‘cowardice’ was still punishable by death in the British Army. Any sign of trepidation or unwillingness to fight could be interpreted as ‘malingering’ or ‘shirking’, terms that only began to be rejected for those experiencing genuine negative psychological effects from combat during the First World War.49 Australian soldiers in particular could have experienced added pressure to exhibit loyalty or bravery given their origin – namely, a country that had never fought a conventional, declared war, excluding the short contribution from New South Wales to the war in the Sudan in 1885. Such an expectation could have caused some men to hesitate before

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communicating their fears, as many will conceal fear to avoid setting a poor pattern for both fellow and future soldiers to follow.50 When comparing the rate and intensity at which the soldiers referred to fear in the Vietnam War with those in South Africa, aspects of either the war itself, the time period in which it took place or the character of the soldiers themselves allowed freer expression. Added to this was the difference in perceptions and understanding of the enemy in the wars. During the South African War, Australians felt a sense of kinship with the Boer enemy that did not exist between men fighting in Vietnam with the Viet Cong, who remained more of a perplexing, and thus possibly more feared, enemy. Most soldiers felt, and communicated, fear most keenly before encountering battle. For example, Private Gerry Lavery of 9RAR wrote: ‘It’s alright sitting here in a harbour but when you have to move that’s when you get a bit worried.’51 Private Raymond Ravenscroft of 7RAR was more open about his misgivings during a recent encounter with the enemy: ‘Arty was called in on his escape route until 2000, and boy did it come close to us, and it really came in only 150m from us. It sounded good, but we were still shitting ourselves.’52 Corporal Ron Kelly of 1RAR wrote in a letter home: ‘Then when you do sleep of a night, you don’t sleep soundly, always thinking someone might come in.’53 He had expressed a similar sentiment in an earlier letter: ‘When we are in camp I do not feel nervous or jumpy on this side of the river. But when we go out over the other side, you get a bit nervous and tensed up. Everyone feels the same.’54 Private Shayne O’Brien of 5RAR commented on collective fear within his unit upon their discovering that the current operation was to last longer than expected: ‘As you can imagine we were reluctant to go out in the bush in the first place & when they extended our stay out there, we became very belligerent. We were so persistent in fact with our enquiries, anxiety etc that we were warned to keep quiet.’55 For many others, fear came as a result of military action, rather than merely in their expectation of it. Corporal Ron Kelly of 1RAR wrote to his ‘darling Dianne’: ‘Well my first patrol is over thank god, I did not think the nerves would put up with it.’56 He later wrote after being hit by a booby trap: ‘You will have to excuse the writing, as I still have the shakes and I don’t feel the best.’57 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray mentioned a long-term effect of direct combat in a letter to his wife Barbara: ‘When I see one or two casualties come in here I thank God that I am whole. There is no doubt that an experience like this has an effect on all here which stays for the rest of our lives.’58 These are only several of many Vietnam War soldiers who openly described their fear in the face of battle.

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Since the First World War, the definitions of ‘cowardice’ and ‘courage’ have significantly changed, which can explain this difference in the admission of fear on the war front. Since it was discovered that firstly, all soldiers experience fear and, secondly, cowardice is not a shameful offence, attitudes towards soldiers who show apprehension during war have altered dramatically.59 The new form of realistic training that places soldiers in situations they are likely to encounter during combat, thus decreasing overall stress on active duty, teaches soldiers that fear is a common emotion and cannot be linked with dishonourable behaviour.60 Thus, soldiers in the later war may have been more candid about their own fear because much of the shame that accompanied such feelings had been considerably reduced.

Survival on the war front Another significant shift between the soldiers fighting in South Africa and Vietnam was in the relative importance of survival over concepts such as ‘heroism’ or ‘duty’ in battle. Most soldiers instinctively place the conservation of their lives above anything else on the war front, and consequently armies will take advantage of this reaction to encourage others to kill – as by eliminating the enemy, soldiers feel closer to their own survival.61 However, the men in South Africa did not articulate this desire as clearly as those fighting in the Vietnam War. Trooper Jack Cock of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry mentions his wish to survive the war in a letter home: ‘If I get through this I shall be fortunate. Of course . . . we all hope to get through it safely.’62 Also, Private Alan Wellington wrote to his friend Philip Teer: ‘You will see old boy we are having it very hot indeed. I pray to god that I should be spared to see it all through.’63 Private Stan Jones explained his attitude in a little more detail, writing to his brother: ‘We know we won’t all get through, but still we hope to . . . with the exception of a few men, we have got through alright, and we hope to do so again and there is nothing like hope.’64 It is apparent that these men were concerned about their survival, but men in Vietnam were far more direct about their preoccupation with living through the war. American soldiers fighting in Vietnam were also generally more focused on merely surviving the war than those who fought in earlier wars, during which patriotism or courage were emphasized to a larger extent.65 Numerous Vietnam War scholars have noted this change in attitude, with some labelling it a rejection of a ‘John Wayne’ mentality that stressed heroism above all other factors, and provided American soldiers with a role model to follow in combat.66 One man interviewed by Hiddlestone in her study of Australian Vietnam War veterans revealed some

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synonymy with American soldiers, saying of his enlistment: ‘Sounds crazy now, but it seemed like a good idea at the time . . . I’d seen all the John Wayne movies, and I thought it was the thing to do.’67 Although the veteran was interviewed some years after the end of the war, when his own recollections would doubtless have been influenced by cultural memory of the war, it is significant that John Wayne still appears in post-Vietnam Australian rhetoric. Many researchers have noted the influence of war literature and film in guiding future soldiers in the ways of heroic combat, particularly in early-twentieth-century wars.68 However, American soldiers in Vietnam appeared to disown this tradition. In fact, seasoned soldiers would often advise those first entering Vietnam: ‘Don’t try and be John Wayne.’69 American veterans of the war have since claimed that one of their main concerns on the war front was the meaninglessness of being killed in Vietnam and of the entire ‘John Wayne’ concept.70 The words of the Australians in Vietnam demonstrate the reduced pressure on them to exhibit heroism in combat compared with soldiers in earlier wars. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray of the 547 Signal Corps was honest about the fact that survival was his priority in a letter to his wife: ‘Don’t worry about me, I am not exposed to serious danger and will be alright. I keep my eyes and ears open and am not looking for an MC [Military Cross]!’71 Although Murray’s words could also be attributed to self-censorship, so as to ensure his wife does not become uneasy about his situation, he is also clearly rejecting traditional perceptions of bravery. Private Geoffrey Jones of 3RAR similarly wrote: ‘our time is getting short and no one wants to chance his luck any further’, indicating that soldiers were reluctant to attempt any courageous acts in battle, instead preferring to stay safely in camp until their tour had ended.72 This increased emphasis by men fighting in Vietnam on survival and their fear of battle suggests that the increase in military knowledge of the effects of warfare on soldiers between the wars may have reduced the pressure on these men to conceal any apprehension towards combat or their position within the war. In comparison, those fighting in the South African War, when ‘cowardice’ or ‘shirking’ was a recognized crime, were less likely to speak openly about these aspects of their emotional experience of the war for fear of any potentially shameful implications.73

The importance of morale ‘Morale’ is a term that has been used by numerous theorists of war to describe the will of a soldier to engage in battle. Most studies that deeply analyse the formation

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and maintenance of morale emerged in the first half of the twentieth century, made necessary by the unprecedented intensity of warfare and the rising unwillingness of soldiers to fight during the world wars. More recently, examinations of soldiers do consider morale but concentrate more on the avoidance of psychological injury. The reduction in compulsory periods of military service introduced after the Second World War can partly explain this change of emphasis – it is now less necessary to sustain morale in soldiers for a number of years, as most now only fight for up to twelve months at a time. Although there are varied definitions of morale, most agree that it is a psychological state, even though its intention is to sustain a soldier during physical combat. However, Norman Copeland maintains that morale is more powerful than a ‘mental’ state, labelling it ‘spiritual’.74 Morale’s effects on the mind can be compared with the impact of fitness on the body, but it is important to distinguish morale from the fervour for combat among soldiers new to the battlefield – which, as demonstrated in an earlier chapter, can often disappear after fighting commences.75 Morale is far more important, as it will withstand battle. All who have analyzed its role attest to its importance, with some – including British Second World War Field Marshal Bernard ‘Monty’ Montgomery – claiming it is the most important element in warfare.76 Although most agree on the intended outcome of morale, there are differing opinions on whether physical conditions, appropriate leadership, the group dynamic or success in battle is its most important contributing factor. During nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century wars, military service was frequently marked by extended fatigue, hunger and a lack of hygiene, which had the greatest impact on morale. For example, fatigue can directly cause low morale, reduction in fighting ability and an increase in negligence on the battlefield. However, the creation and maintenance of high morale can also inspire a soldier to withstand extreme exhaustion in combat.77 Similarly, physical exhaustion has been directly connected to the incidence of ‘demoralization’ and psychological damage among British soldiers in the First World War, although if strong morale had already been established in these men, particularly through solid relationships with superiors, it would not be tarnished by exhaustion.78 The letters and diaries of the South African War soldiers demonstrate the importance of the surrounding environment on morale. Life on ships such as the Medic while soldiers were travelling to South Africa, as well as on the war front itself, was difficult and food was scarce. Private Charles Holme of the Queensland Mounted Infantry was one of many who wrote of their discomfort before reaching South Africa: ‘You cannot imagine what life is aboard a troopship. We are packed like herrings in a tin & we are kept going from 6am until 8:30pm.’79

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However, most complaints occurred after arriving on the South African war front, which appeared harsh and unfamiliar. An application to the Empire’s Patriotic Fund of Melbourne by South African War veteran William Hewitt confirms that soldiers were subjected to severe conditions during the war. Hewitt’s worsened lung disease six years after the war’s end was partially attributed by the Fund’s Board of Health to ‘back tents, not sufficient blankets, damp ground’ in South Africa.80 Trooper Fred Stocks of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry was one of many men who wrote of this same problem: ‘I am heartily sick of the war in the wet weather, it is horribly miserable. It is very pleasant to feel the water soaking up through your blankets’ [author’s emphasis].81 Others were dissatisfied with their general lack of hygiene, often leading to resentment towards military authorities. Private Arthur Hammond mentioned his incompatibility with soldiering numerous times when writing to his loved ones in Australia: ‘At present there is a lot of talk about all Colonials being sent home to Australia before Christmas. I hope it is quite true as I am really tired of being dirty.’ A fortnight later he wrote: ‘This is the first tent I have slept in since I have been in Africa. I don’t think that it is doing me any good, but only makes me more dissatisfied with the open air life of a private soldier . . . a grand rest it is not.’82 Saddler John Wadham of the South Australian Imperial Bushmen wrote in his diary during his trip back to Australia from the war: ‘We did not get clean clothes served out & are all dirty & think they have treated us badly.’83 Lieutenant Douglas St. George Rich focused on hunger and his unwillingness to fight while expressing similar sentiments: ‘It’s a case now of hard work and no grub and no mistake, the weather is miserable too, drizzling every day. Today the fog was so thick we couldn’t go out which came as a blessing.’84 Here, food is quoted as a problem as well as fatigue from hard work, which recalls the words of British Second World War Brigadier Bernard Fergusson, who said: ‘I would say without hesitation that lack of food constitutes the single biggest assault upon morale.’85 A majority of the examined South African War soldiers directly complained about their day-to-day living conditions, most of whom were rank and file soldiers from a rural lower-class background. During the First World War, soldiers from the lower classes were more likely to openly express grievances in their correspondence, as opposed to those from a higher social class who were more likely to follow the ‘conversational dictums’ that curbed candidness in war letters.86 Such reticence has been connected with the ‘genteel’ nature that most middle-class men strived for in the early twentieth century.87 However, for lower-middle-class white-collar workers such as Douglas Rich, who left reliable

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employment as a banker in Queensland to serve as an officer in the South African War, the conditions to which he was exposed were so objectionable as to cause blatant disapproval in letters home, despite the tenets of letter writing at the turn of the nineteenth century. If morale is not maintained, soldiers will behave badly and cause disorder while on the battlefront.88 Among the South African War soldiers examined, bad conditions did not merely inspire general objections but were tied with the poor headship of officers and occasionally resulted in soldier indiscipline. Lieutenant Douglas St. George Rich directly connected his own discontent and that of his men with criticism of the British Commander-in-Chief: ‘I can tell you the men love the sound of Kitchener’s name – they would stand anything if he would only take them on to the Boers, but he won’t and sits still to starve and perish us.’89 Food was also a preoccupation of Private John Cripps, who wrote of the refusal by a group of men to eat unsavoury morning porridge en route to South Africa, and who later made a ‘fuss over the meat that was served out to tea’, prompting disciplinary action: ‘The mess orderlies that complained were paraded before the Colonel. He was asked to taste the stew. He declined and said the smell was enough.’90 Trooper Jack McBean also complained about hunger en route to South Africa with the 4th South Australian Imperial Bushmen: ‘Of the time I spent in the troopship I have little to say, suffice to say, that we were starved from the day we put foot on the boat till the day we left her. Complaints were of no use, & I say that Col Rowell, the O.C. ought to be [long blank line inserted] for allowing his men to be treated as they were.’ In McBean’s case, this grievance prompted him to disobey orders to stay on board while docked. He wrote: Been starving for 24 hours, no rations, so I decided to get some by dodging ashore. Orders had come out that no one was to leave the boat, as it was not known the minute we would sail . . . I got on board again by going on board the boat that was lying near to us, & dropping from her bows onto the stern of the ‘Manhattan’. All the others who had taken French leave were caught by the guard stationed at the gangways of the ship.91

In this case, it was not only McBean who directly flouted orders, but widespread hunger on the ship forced more to do the same. These personal records show that the confidence of soldiers in their superiors decreased as a result of poor conditions on the war front, prompting criticism and occasionally defiance of military orders. Some soldiers took their frustration further by directly harming their officers, an issue that will be discussed in the following chapter.

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The men fighting in Vietnam were similarly dissatisfied with their immediate surroundings; however, their complaints are predominantly focused on the humidity, made worse by the requirement that soldiers fight in uniform, carrying supplies and weapons. The emphasis on the weather above other dayto-day grievances can be attributed to the improved living conditions accorded these soldiers while on the battlefield, the result of research into the importance of personal comfort to morale, that also meant that these men enjoyed increased access to direct leisure time. Camp pubs, often called ‘boozers’, were accessible almost every night to soldiers not out on patrol.92 In addition, regular R&C trips were available for soldiers, to various locations within Vietnam. Complaints did, however, still occur. Corporal Ron Kelly spoke about the weather in a letter to his wife: ‘Boy what a hole of a place this is, boy it is stinking hot.’93 Like McBean, he later connected soldier grievances with misbehaviour: ‘All the blokes are grumbling around the place. I can see there will be a big blow up here shortly. Everyone is sick and tired of the place. Nearly everyone is complaining about [being] tired.’94 Private Geoffrey Jones also demonstrated the relationship between poor conditions, low morale and bad behaviour: ‘This is real “going troppo” weather. Everyone goes down with prickly heat rashes, tempers become frayed and heavy boozing by some doesn’t help the situation.’95 Corporal Warren Wilson of 8RAR, whose Vietnam diary was filled with brief, yet miserably honest, entries about his girlfriend Suzy and his general loneliness on the war front demonstrated the effect of harsh physical conditions after an ambush operation: ‘Bloody freezing. Cold. Wet. Miserable. Cold . . . Several bunkers. Nite [sic] to remember. Didn’t write. No mail from Suzy.’96 Some did object to their general position to the war, but this was a rare occurrence. Armourer Andrew Treffry, with the 1st Field Squadron Workshop, compared life in the army to imprisonment in a letter home: ‘You mentioned that being over here is like or sounds like I’m in prison. I can assure you that its not far from being just that.’97 Signaller Andrew Clyne similarly compared his existence at war with his life in Australia: ‘It’s ridiculous the way they treat you here. You’re not a human being, you’re a dumb animal.’98 Personal circumstances thus had a similar impact on soldiers in both wars, although the vast difference in everyday living conditions did appear to increase the number of complaints during the South African War. Common to soldiers with low morale is a general disenchantment with the war being fought. Field Marshal William Slim, who fought in both the First and Second World Wars, wrote that high morale ‘means that every individual in a group will work – or fight – and, if needed, will give his last ounce of effort in

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its service’.99 Some men fighting in both wars connected their discomfort with a general unwillingness to continue fighting, more so when they felt they had been overworked. In 1900, after being caught under heavy rain for days on end, Lieutenant Patrick Lang of the 4th Imperial Contingent wrote in his diary: ‘War under these conditions is not the game it is cracked up to be.’100 Trooper Charles Cawthorn, with the 4th Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen, described the conditions of his comrades: ‘Some of our men on outpost had a still worse time & one of them lost a toe from frostbite. Who wouldn’t be a soldier.’101 Cawthorn’s sarcasm demonstrates his disillusionment resulting from the situation he had found himself in on the battlefield. In some cases, sheer exhaustion prompted dissatisfaction. Lieutenant James Tedder of the 2nd New South Wales Mounted Rifles spoke of his unit’s return to camp after difficult patrol duty and action with the Boers: ‘returned to camp at . . . 12 noon . . . received orders at around 5.30pm that the Australian mounted men and Canadian scouts would again march off at 10.30pm (much to our disgust)’.102 The words of Lord Kitchener, the last Commander-in-Chief of the British Army during the South African War, to the British Secretary of State for War, St. John Brodrick, demonstrate the awareness that military officers needed to take action to reduce existing soldier disenchantment with the war: Considering the stale and jaded state of the troops I think it would be a very good thing if I could at once reward any exceptional good service in the field . . . The men are getting indifferent – the Boers treat them very well as prisoners and I believe they are not always very pleased when they are released. The power of giving an immediate reward, used very sparingly, would I believe have a startling effect . . . I have no doubt that if it were done that you would get better service out of the men in the field.103

Corporal Ron Kelly, writing from Vietnam sixty years later, exhibited similar dissatisfaction with the war, caused by his longing to return home and exhaustion due to extended combat operations: ‘Well we have been out here in the jungle for 23 days and still no sign of going back to camp. Oh! Hell I hope it soon comes to an end, because it is killing all the blokes.’104 Less than two months later, he wrote: ‘You feel bad about not knowing when we will come home. I can tell you if we don’t find out shortly, all the blokes will go bonkers. These rumours about coming home are the only thing keeping us together. Oh! Well they must bring us home sometime.’105 Inadequate surroundings were not the only influence on morale, and subsequent enthusiasm for battle. Other disappointments clearly tarnished the

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opinion of some soldiers towards the war, such as the lack of mail from home. Communication between the home and war fronts was constant during both wars, although technology advancement over the course of the twentieth century increased its speed and effectiveness. In fact, after realizing that Vietnam was known for its affordable electronics, some soldiers bought cassette recorders and started sending spoken tape correspondence in place of written letters. Armies have long understood the relationship between mail and morale, including the Boers who, on numerous occasions, destroyed mail belonging to the British forces.106 While fighting in the South African War, Lieutenant Colonel Percy Ricardo of the 1st Queensland Mounted Infantry wrote of this to his son: ‘The first news we got when we returned was that all our mails had been burnt, we have not heard from home since the beginning of March so you can fancy what a loss this means. We are all heartily sick of the war, and this mail burning business has made us very sore.’107 Lack of money also affected soldiers’ spirits during the South African War when long delays often occurred in paying soldiers in some colonies, particularly in the early months of the war. Private Robert Byers complained to his mother at great length about having £50 owed to him by both the British and Victorian governments.108 Trooper Herbert Conder clearly expressed the importance of money in his diary: ‘I don’t know what they mean by keeping us here so long . . . It would not be so bad if they would only give us some pay to go on with. Of course, as per usual, the Officers are having a high time of it. Women and Wine.’109 In this case, Conder’s discontent with his financial situation was tied to frustration at military superiors. For those fighting in the Vietnam War, however, conditions were markedly better than in South Africa over sixty years earlier. It is clear, from the personal records, that these soldiers clearly expected more from the military authorities. ‘Culture and upbringing’ are essential factors in the determination of morale levels. For example, the respective home lives of British working-class soldiers in the First World War and Americans fighting in Vietnam determined their reaction to the war fronts that they encountered, resulting in greater resilience among those in the earlier war who already experienced severe conditions in their day-to-day lives and demonstrating the changing demands of morale over time.110 Comparing the basis of employment between South African and Vietnam War soldiers demonstrates this point further. Men who enlisted for service in South Africa were mostly rural workers, more familiar with the rigour and vagaries of outdoor living, whereas those who fought in Vietnam were predominantly urban lower-class workers whose everyday life would, in

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general, be less physically demanding. In addition, a general shift had occurred within Australian society between the wars. Post-Second World War financial prosperity transformed the pursuit of leisure into a ‘mass phenomenon’. Whereas before this time, extended recreation was only possible among the middle and upper classes, for the first time this became a normal part of working-class life.111 This may also explain why most complaints by Vietnam War soldiers focused on their desire for leisure, as opposed to basic complaints about hunger or fatigue. Private Len McCosker and Peter Murray, for whom contentment on the battlefield was reliant on less modest demands than those by men in South Africa, demonstrate this change in emphasis. McCosker wrote to his family: ‘We got proper beds last week, so things are really looking up over here now. They’re showing movies quite regularly now too, which is a good thing for the troops as everyone’s nerves are getting on edge, plenty of arguments raging between everyone.’112 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray similarly wrote of the lack of women on the war front: Our daily shower is a relief but I do need a good hot bath. Can smell my own BO almost immediately after stepping out of the shower but doesn’t matter much. We all have it and there are no ladies to worry about. Saw two US Red Cross girls at about 300 yd range early in the week – had to be reminded what women looked like! . . . Even Playboy bunnies are not very interesting after a while [author’s emphasis].113

These complaints – films and women – are hardly comparable to the more physical grievances expressed by those in the South African War. The examined soldiers in Vietnam also directly referred to morale itself when discussing their need for leisure or rest, whereas the word ‘morale’ was not mentioned at all by South African War soldiers. Post-Second World War research into the importance of recreation in everyday life has been matched with increased consideration of its military role and its general value as a morale booster for soldiers.114 These changes would certainly have been reflected in military training, demonstrated by the words of Captain Reginald Dittmar in his diary: ‘Everyone here is well at the moment and I think quite happy as morale is fairly high and we still have our sense of Humour’ [author’s emphasis].115 Similarly, Signaller Andrew Clyne wrote to his parents: ‘The guitar comes in handy we have a few singalong’s [sic] and they help build your morale and boy! do we need that.’116 Clyne’s words here demonstrate the finding by militaries that games, music or other pursuits that allow soldiers to express their personality

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are important to morale – as compensation, of sorts, for losing some individual freedom as subordinates in an army.117 Some soldiers in Vietnam were frank when their morale was low. Corporal Ron Kelly wrote to his wife Dianne about his need for mail from home: ‘I really need a big moral [sic] booster now, I am that far down in the dumps. I am really sick of this place, I will soon have to get home or I will go off my head.’118 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray similarly mentioned the positive morale that came from the simple installation of a shower: ‘We have a tank mounted overhead for water . . . and kitchen sink inside. Cold water of course but a splendid device and good for morale.’119 It is noteworthy, however, that most of these men were officers, thus would have been better trained on the importance of their own morale and that of their soldiers. According to some scholars, the most effective aspect of warfare that increases morale is victory in combat.120 In fact, the relationship between success in battle and morale is reciprocal, as war’s triumphs can also be caused by high morale.121 Private Garry Heffernan, fighting in Vietnam with 3RAR, was the only soldier who indicated that success in battle had the power to improve his morale: I’m fighting fit but, like the rest of the fighting blokes over here, I’m starting to go stale. When you train for 18 months how to fight as a unit and come over here and just ‘scrub bash’ and sit around in bases it really buggers you up. The battalion score is only 4 VC killed, 1 VC wounded after 3 months patrolling and my section got 3 of the killed and the wounded. That’s official kills of course, there are a lot of unofficial[.] But I’m starting to get sickened by the set up you can imagine how blokes in other platoons and companies feel who haven’t even seen one of the VC dead or alive.122

Heffernan here is expressing annoyance at not seeing enough fighting, a rare finding in the personal records of soldiers from the Vietnam War, but – as discussed earlier in this chapter – his attitudes may have been affected by boredom as well as the desire for combat action.

Conclusion It is evident that similar factors affected soldier morale during the South African and Vietnam Wars. Personal comfort was a high priority for men fighting in both wars, but complaints about poor living conditions were significantly less frequent during the later war. Increased knowledge by military leadership of soldiers’

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needs and the workings of morale itself after the First and Second World Wars directly led to better general living conditions during Vietnam, which aimed to ensure that combat ability was not tarnished by low morale. Moreover, soldiers’ expectations differed between the wars, caused by shifts in Australian society. Men in South Africa had more practical objections than those in Vietnam, who were fighting after the post-Second World War economic boom that increased the general importance of leisure. Essentially, however, the workings of morale in the two groups of soldiers appear to be largely synonymous – grievances of any kind did create some reluctance to fight and occasionally affected combat potential in soldiers and their units. A loss in morale is not only a danger to militaries through its ability to cause soldier disenchantment – and disengagement – with battle, it can also impel a soldier to seek various forms of psychological escape from the realities of war. The next chapter will continue the discussion of morale, focusing on its sustenance during military service through the use of diversions, including humour, alcohol and sexual relations. In addition, the possible consequences when such diversions prove ineffective, such as mutiny, ‘fragging’, desertion and the psychological effects of combat, including PTSD, will be considered.

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Morale: The Role of Diversions

A reduction in battlefront morale can affect soldiers in several common ways. Anthony Kellett focuses on the role of ‘diversion’ in the life of a soldier, claiming that men at war will often take active steps to avoid the reality of their situation in an attempt to ensure that morale remains high, with some concentrating on everyday tasks or their relationships with fellow soldiers and others emphasizing complaints or frequently using humour. These techniques will ensure that a soldier does not focus too deeply on his own emotions, as such introspection can encourage fear.1 During the First World War, British working-class rank and filers would often utilize humour in an attempt to reduce their suffering on the harsh war front, a practice that had been originally developed as a reaction to their difficult civilian lives.2 This also extended to Australians in the war, who were frequently known for their humour.3 Some men fighting in South Africa and Vietnam did actively use or seek out humour in their everyday interactions on the war front, and appeared to be frequently caused by their circumstances on the war front, with some projecting humour onto potentially frightening or distressing situations, and others using humour to make light of grievances against their allies.4 For most soldiers, however, humour alone is not able to provide an adequate escape from the psychological pressures of war. Some react by partaking in alcohol or drugs, engaging in extramarital sex with civilians or even resorting to mutiny, ‘fragging’ or desertion. The appearance of these more serious ‘diversions’ during the South African and Vietnam Wars was frequently governed by the corresponding military regulations during each war, which had been influenced by changing attitudes between the turn of the nineteenth century and the 1960s regarding soldier requirements on the war front. If these avenues do not succeed in providing an escape for these men, the disillusionment characteristic

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of a drop in combat morale can develop into long-term psychological damage, named neurasthenia or shell shock in the early twentieth century, combat fatigue during the Second World War and then redefined and relabelled as PTSD (posttraumatic stress disorder) during Vietnam. Such conditions can continue for years or even decades after a soldier completes their military service.

Soldiers and alcohol Alcohol was mentioned numerous times by both groups of men, not only in general terms but also when it was being used specifically as a morale booster, in keeping with John Keegan’s claim that the consumption of alcohol during war is ‘therapeutic’.5 Alcohol can help a soldier withstand the psychological pressures of battle and aids in creating and sustaining comradeship between soldiers, which increases the will to fight.6 Men in both South Africa and Vietnam were allowed prescribed amounts of alcohol, both officially and unofficially, so it is difficult to determine whether it was intentionally used by men to cope with the hardships of battle. It is evident, however, that soldiers often used alcohol in excess – a more effective indication that it was used with a specific purpose in mind. The differences in public attitudes towards alcohol between the turn of the nineteenth century and the 1960s are significant in explaining the reasons for the demand for alcohol in both South Africa and Vietnam. Australia in the late nineteenth century was significantly influenced by Britain, with conservative laws in the colonies, and states from 1901, often directly modelled on regulations already in place in Victorian England.7 Although the adoption of these laws varied within Australia – South Australia was much more socially traditionalist than New South Wales, for example – much of the intensified Victorian conservatism that appeared in the last decades of the nineteenth century did influence Australian society. In fact, it was not until the First World War that Australians on the home front began openly complaining about the parochialism of Victorian attitudes.8 This resentment was echoed among First World War soldiers, including Australians, who disagreed with the limitations placed on alcohol that they considered crucial.9 In early-twentieth-century Australia, drinking was an ‘inescapable part of working class culture’, the presence of which may have contributed to the rate at which Australian troops were punished for drunkenness and any resultant inability to fight during the First World War.10 The social impact of Britain within Australia is demonstrated by the distribution and popularity of alcohol during the latter half of the nineteenth

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century. In 1860 the average yearly consumption of alcohol was eleven to twelve litres per capita in both Victoria and New South Wales, whereas by 1890 this had dropped to five litres in New South Wales and just over seven in Victoria.11 Monitoring this reduction in the use of alcohol was the Temperance movement, another offshoot of British conservatism, more prominently the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), who campaigned around Australia for both teetotalism and women’s rights. Soon after the declaration of war in South Africa, the Chief Secretary’s Office of South Australia received a letter from the local chapter of the WCTU that spoke of the ‘open secret’ that ‘some of the men have found . . . drinks a source of injury’, and insisting that the colonial governments control the distribution of alcohol on troopships bound for South Africa.12 Nevertheless, men were both officially and unofficially allowed prescribed amounts of alcohol beverages, and even civilians eager to do their patriotic duty would frequently include liquor in provisions for soldiers on the war front.13 For example, Private John Cripps wrote of his contingent’s train journey from Cape Town upon first embarking in South Africa, when beer was distributed among the men, and his pride that they ‘secured seven bottles for our carriage’.14 Private James Lawn wrote in his diary that the men in his unit, the 1st Victorian Infantry Contingent, were each allocated two pints of beer a day.15 Although men did consume alcohol on the war front, drunkenness was strictly forbidden, and severe punishments often followed when men indulged in alcohol, or even when the rules regarding the distribution of alcohol were disobeyed. A Corporal within the 1st NSW Mounted Rifles – the contingent with which Private John Cripps was fighting – was court-martialled and ‘reduced to the ranks’ after he was found taking beer to the cook while on the ship to South Africa.16 Major General Edwin Tivey recounted another instance of intoxication, when Farrier McLelland was ‘absent from camp without leave and . . . drunk’, so was ordered to trek on foot throughout the harsh South African terrain rather than on horseback.17 Despite the threat of punishment, soldiers’ personal records indicate that drunkenness was a common occurrence in South Africa, confirmed by Quartermaster Sergeant W. E. L. Lilley of Brabant’s Horse in his diary: ‘A lot of our men get very drunk, although nobody is supposed to sell liquor to the troops, they get it somehow or another[,] nobody seems to know where or how only you see them drunk and that is all anybody knows about it.’18 Although Brabant’s Horse was a South African contingent, accounts of intoxication by soldiers and officers fighting in Australian contingents support Lilley’s observation.

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Corporal William Kelman of the New South Wales Bushmen Contingent wrote in his diary of a train journey in South Africa: Last night was one continual nightmare. Nearly all the men on the train got drunk on whisky given them at Massekessa and Umtali, and many of them were sick all over the carriage . . . One dirty brute was sick in my helmet last night, but I put it under the hot water tap of the Engine, and so cleaned it again, but at the expense of its appearance. An experience like this ought to keep a man sober all his life.19

Lieutenant Douglas St. George Rich of the 6th Queensland Imperial Bushmen confirms in a letter home that his personal alcohol consumption had increased as a result of being in South Africa: ‘If you could only see the quantity of whisky I can get through now, you would never call me light headed again. I suppose it’s the exposure that does it, and you can’t feel it, but I sometimes think I’ll develop into a confirmed toper!’20 Kelman and Rich’s words suggest that soldiers used alcohol as a direct reaction to their position on the war front. Lieutenant Patrick Lang wrote comically of common soldiers indulging in alcohol, suggesting that a more permissive attitude existed towards intoxication in comparison with other forbidden practices on the war front: One of our men was missing – on the loose. The colour-sergeant found him, & putting him on his own horse behind the saddle, the two galloped through the street to rejoin the column. The ‘drunk’ though pretty well screwed, sitting on the rump of the horse behind the sergeant without holding on, smiling & waving his hand fatuously to the crowd, who were greatly impressed by his horsemanship.21

Lang later wrote of another instance of public drunkenness by the rank and file: Capt O’Farrell started to fall in the men & horses about 1pm. The men were most willing & anxious to fall in, but the greater number of them were most woefully drunk . . . Then all over the place men would be coming bumping off onto the ground, to be picked up by sympathizing mates & given drinks out of sundry bottles . . . The scene reached a climax though when the drunken rabble were crossing the market square in a . . . column (like a drunken snake, if that were possible). What order there was before reaching the Market Square immediately vanished – three or four men would leave the column & meander across the square towards a pub in one direction, others would go across to another pub & an occasional man would come off onto the metal road with an awful thump . . . In a very short time the square presented a most animated

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appearance. In the middle of the square an inebriated bushman was rounding up a group of screaming natives, who had the misfortune to be crossing the road at that moment, in the same way that he would round up a mob of cattle.22

It is noteworthy that there were no instances when South African War soldiers wrote of their own inebriation, suggesting that the military regulations against drunkenness in South Africa, as well as social trends on the home front at the turn of the nineteenth century, impacted on the personal records of these men. Soldiers did mention experiences with alcohol, but never directly referred to their own drunkenness, even when it evidently occurred. For example, Private Thomas Bray of the Third Queensland Contingent wrote of a long trek across South Africa that took a more interesting turn in May 1900: ‘A rather generous solid lengthsman [sic] gave us three bottles of brandy which greatly helped to break the monotony of the journey.’23 Bray’s reticence, despite clearly partaking of the brandy, was mirrored in other Australians who were more likely to either deny or downplay the effects of any alcohol they consumed, even when writing in personal diaries. When discussing official military Christmas rations to soldiers, Private Arthur Hammond of the 5th West Australian Mounted Infantry emphasized his disinterest in the alcohol ration: ‘It was read out in Orders that all soldiers in South Africa were to get a pound of plum pudding, 1/4 pound of tobacco, a pint of beer (which somebody will drink for me).’24 Similarly, Trooper Herbert Conder of the 3rd Queensland Mounted Infantry wrote in his diary from hospital: ‘The Drs asked me this morning if I would like a couple of bottles of stout a day. I told him “No” that I had not drank in my life.’25 Also, Trooper Charles Cawthorn of the 4th Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen wrote in his diary: ‘The publicans are not allowed to serve us with liquor so you need not be afraid of us taking to drink.’26 Although the above examples do indicate that attitudes in Australia at the time may have impacted on the willingness of these men to speak openly about the consumption of alcohol, the existence of religious references in the personal records of all three does also point to faith as the source of conservatism in these men. Still, it is apparent that alcohol was being consumed in South Africa, yet it is difficult to determine the extent to which it was being used intentionally to reduce the strain of battle. Research into the curative effects of alcohol on soldiers did not occur until after the First and Second World Wars – as such, it would be unlikely that a soldier in the South African War would openly confess his need to drink as an escape from the pressure he was under. During Vietnam, however, soldiers

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mentioned the use and overuse of alcohol far more frequently and seemed more aware of its fundamental place within warfare. Men were more willing to describe their own drunkenness in both letters and diaries, as overindulgence in alcohol was no longer a crime. Also, soldiers were allowed more rest periods during which alcohol appeared to be a welcome comfort, of which soldiers were officially allowed certain amounts, however were frequently able to access more if they desired. The average consumption of alcohol within Australia had not increased significantly from rates in the 1890s.27 However, the general shift in civilian society towards a greater emphasis on the necessity and pursuit of leisure in the decades after the Second World War, as discussed in the previous chapter, did appear to increase tolerance towards alcohol within the military. Still, there was apparent need to limit access to alcohol in Vietnam after it began creating problems for the Australian Army. When Major General Sandy Pearson was appointed Commander of the 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam in 1968, he recognized that soldiers were drinking far too much, and often placing themselves or their fellow troops in unnecessary danger. He limited the soldiers’ daily allowance of beer to two cans per day in an attempt to prevent excessive intoxication, yet soldiers still sought and were able to find additional alcohol, particularly when they had just returned from combat operations or on R&C leave. This was one of the greatest issues that the Australian Army had to face in Vietnam.28 There are numerous references to drinking and intoxication by soldiers in Vietnam, confirming that alcohol was an essential part of their war front lives, particularly after returning from the stresses of active combat. For example, the diary of Sergeant Rex Fadden of the Land Clearing Team contains a photograph of his fellow soldiers that is captioned: ‘Returning from Nui Dat from Operation “Cooktown Orchid” . . . and into the grog.’29 Corporal Warren Wilson of 8RAR repeatedly wrote of drinking and being ‘drunk’ on days when he was not out on patrol.30 Major Gregory Tommasi of the 106 Field Battery, 4th Field Regiment wrote of an August 1970 break from patrol in Vung Tau: ‘At 1300 hrs the troops were let loose on the town and most were not seen again for two days. Consumed much grog and visited many bars and an enjoyable time was had by all.’31 David Keating showed a less pleasant side to drinking in Vietnam in a letter to his family: ‘We had a barbecue that night & I drank plenty of piss & got into bed at 11.30 and tried to make the tiolet [sic] but was to [sic] crook, bloody booze.’32 Although overindulgence in alcohol appeared to reduce the strain of battle in these cases, the connection was not explicitly made in their writing. Other soldiers in Vietnam made it clear that alcohol was an essential requirement to

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cope with the stresses of combat. Corporal Wallace Lillebo of 5RAR confirms its role in a letter written home to his parents while on R&C in Thailand: ‘Everybody is still unwound and drunk. That is, everybody would be drunk if we didn’t have the soldier’s unlimited capacity for grog, without which no army could function’ [author’s emphasis].33 Here Lillebo is labelling alcohol a necessity, rather than just a desire of soldiers – thus supporting the connection of alcohol with morale. Similarly, Corporal Ron Kelly of 1RAR wrote to his wife: ‘The boys are out in the scrub again, they left this morning for 3 days. You should hear them, hell I have never heard blokes so sick of it. The blokes got as drunk as hell last night, and were fighting each other. They are all very sick of this place, I think they need a rest real bad.’34 Kelly’s words indicate that his men were drinking as a form of relief after being unwillingly sent out on another mission. Signaller Andrew Clyne of the 110 Signal Squadron described a soldier seemingly doing the same thing in a letter home: ‘Things are pretty edgy over here at the moment with the [South Vietnamese Presidential] elections on. Silly bloody Pete Howards went out on an all-night patrol last Saturday night and he took two water bottles full of Bacardi and Coke and by morning was as drunk as an owl.’35 Clyne discusses the increased tension at the time immediately before mentioning Howards’ drunken antics on patrol, which does indicate that there is some connection between the two. When comparing soldiers’ words from both wars, it is apparent that research conducted between the wars into the relationship between alcohol and soldiers, as well as civilian attitudes towards drinking, did affect these men. It is difficult to determine the extent to which men used alcohol as an escape from the tension of war, or as a means by which they could continue fighting when their morale was low, particularly during the South African War when drunkenness was punished and social mores on the home front discouraged excessive drinking. However, both soldiers and officers in Vietnam were candid about the consumption of alcohol and their words indicate that they often chose to drink for a specific purpose that can be directly linked with combat itself.

Drug use in Vietnam Unlike alcohol, narcotics were forbidden in Vietnam, but research has revealed that their use was extensive among American soldiers.36 In fact, by 1971, 50.9 per cent of soldiers had used marijuana and 28.5 per cent had tried heroin or opium while in Vietnam.37 Little investigation has been carried out on the use

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of narcotics within the Australian Army; however, it has been claimed that the popularity of drinking among Australian troops, particularly when compared with Americans, prevented any excessive drug use.38 Within the examined personal records, three direct references to drug use were found, which appears to indicate that there was some use of narcotics by Australians. However, it is impossible to be conclusive about the extent to which these were being used, as – like men in South Africa who were not open about illegal intoxication – Vietnam War soldiers would certainly avoid mentioning the use of prohibited drugs, for which harsh punishments applied. Armourer Andrew Treffry of 5RAR indicated in a letter home that Australians were partaking in illegal substances, writing that packages sent from Vietnam were being opened and checked for narcotics.39 Corporal Warren Wilson briefly wrote in his diary on 13 October 1970 of one case of a fellow soldier, Baker, found with marijuana.40 Major J. G. Hughes, a Senior Australian Advisor in the AATTV, wrote of a widespread drug search in the Mekong Delta, where he was stationed, although this predominantly focused on American units: ‘Nothing new except drug search is really in large scale – right across Delta & they are having a lot of success (including one Aust civilian band group).’ The next day he wrote: ‘the drug business is a big thing – will be on until 29th’.41 These cases do indicate that there was some drug use among Australian soldiers in Vietnam, but its frequency is impossible to determine, and there is no evidence at all that hard drugs, such as heroin, were used within the Australian units. Also, very few Vietnam veterans have used drugs since their return home, supporting the view that Australians were preoccupied above all with alcohol on the war front.42 Still, the effects of its illegality on the willingness of soldiers and veterans to disclose personal use should be considered in conjunction with this evidence.

Sex and the soldier Sexual relations between soldiers and civilians have occurred on the war front for centuries, both consensually and also frequently not. The connection between combat and sex is often heightened on the battlefield, and soldiers can often increase their fervour for fighting through sexual relations.43 Some combatants link their increased sexuality with the killing of the enemy, and as a result violence becomes in some way sexualized, occasionally causing direct enjoyment from combat.44 On the South African and Vietnamese war fronts, sex did take place, yet can be attributed more to the need among soldiers for

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distraction or relaxation. Between the wars, however, there was a significant shift in the candidness with which men spoke of their sexual activity, which is reflected in the examined soldiers’ personal records. Public attitudes towards sex relaxed considerably between the beginning of the twentieth century and the 1960s. Late-nineteenth-century Britain saw a rise in the influence of social purists, who emphasized sexual restraint and the use of human bodies for reproduction above pleasure.45 Even sexual relations within marriage were discouraged except for procreation, and as a result any expression of sexual desire outside these boundaries was viewed as immoral or impure.46 Australian colonial governments adopted this emphasis on purity and enacted laws regarding sex based on the British example as well as the various agendas of concerned groups within the colonies. In South Australia, for example, laws passed in 1885 that changed the age of consent from thirteen to sixteen and generally limited sexual freedom closely mirrored the British Criminal Law Amendment Act.47 Restrictions on ‘sexuality helped to define colonial society’s sense of social order’, and for the most part they were successful.48 However, not all sections of Australia followed British morality as closely as others. Sydney, in the colony of New South Wales, was known for its liberal attitudes towards sex, as one in four men were unmarried, compared with one in six in South Australia. Men married later, and premarital sex was more common, particularly in highly populated areas such as the docklands.49 Men living in rural areas were also drawn to premarital relations from necessity. The hunt for gold from the mid-nineteenth century over-populated outback Australia with single men eager to make their fortune, creating a general shortage of ‘marriageable’ white women, and increased both relationships and marriages between white men and Aboriginal women.50 In 1901, there were approximately 10 per cent more men than women in Australia, and this imbalance also reached into urban centres.51 It appears that men travelling to South Africa were thus caught between prominent Victorian attitudes on the home front, and their own sexual desire, which did certainly exist – confirmed by biological necessity, as well as the personal records of these men. Traditional perceptions of female innocence still remained, as demonstrated by the words of Trooper Herbert Conder in his diary: ‘. . . the men are behaving very well, considering of course, there is plenty of bad language used. Sometimes it’s enough to turn your hair gray [sic]. But there are no females on board to be shocked.’52 Sergeant Harris Woode of the 1st Australian Horse also referred to the necessary restraint around women on a visit to Cape Town: ‘Some very pretty women about – it’s a treat once more to

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look upon them – but of course we can’t speak as we have to remember one is only a Tommy Atkins & behave accordingly.’53 Not all men exhibited the same self-control as Woode, however, when they were in the vicinity of attractive members of the opposite sex – whether British, Boer or African. Lance Corporal William Hazelwood of the New South Wales Bushmen, for example, wrote in his diary: ‘Travelled through town saw some very pretty dutch girls were seen camped just outside the town for dinner.’54 Trooper Herbert Conder also wrote in his diary of the beauty of some African women he encountered in South Africa.55 Others, however, took their engagement with women to another level. The available medical records of returning soldiers from the South African War confirm that sex itself did occur between Australians and women in South Africa. One Private with the Third Queensland Mounted Infantry Contingent returned to Brisbane on 14 June 1901 suffering from ‘secondary syphilis’, caused while on active duty.56 Another man with the 5th Queensland Mounted Infantry Contingent also returned with syphilis, and one of his comrades from the same contingent was found to suffer from gleet and orchitis, both caused by the sexually transmitted infection gonorrhoea.57 There is also evidence that Australians were regularly admitted to hospital with such ailments while in South Africa, again confirming that sex did occur frequently on the war front.58 However, it is unclear whether these relations were the product of romantic connections, prostitution or rape. Intimacy did evidently occur between Australians and women in South Africa. Trooper Alured Kelly of the 2nd Victorian Contingent wrote of a night spent with a ‘rather youngish woman’, although it is unclear whether she was British, Boer or African. He wrote: ‘She got quite friendly with me and she invited me to go along some evening and share her bed,’ which Kelly gladly did, leaving at midnight to return to camp, where his absence had remained unnoticed.59 The relationship of Saddler Albert Marshall of the 5th Victorian Mounted Rifles with his ‘little Dutch girl’ mentioned earlier was not his only foray into the world of romantic encounters. His earlier hospitalization after an unfortunate kick in the leg by a horse led to a short-lived infatuation with his Australian nurse whom he claimed to be ‘fairly stuck on’. He wrote home shortly before his discharge: ‘I was very sorry indeed to leave my dear old nurse I was fairly in love with her. Before going I had such a nice kiss from her behind the door (no one looking of course) . . . I made her a present of a kaffir bead bangle for her kindness to me she treated me just like a mother would.’60 Just before leaving Cape Town for Australia, he attended a concert after which he coyly wrote home to his family – who less than a month earlier were expecting Marshall to return

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home with a Boer bride, his ‘little Dutch girl’: ‘There was about 50 ladies there . . . some very nice girls too and I think that some of them was kissed also but I don’t know I am very innocent in that way I know nothing about making love. All I know is what I read in books’ [author’s emphasis].61 Instances of sexual relations between soldiers and civilians in past wars have often been considered mutually beneficial arrangements, including women during the Second World War who saw German invaders as a way to access desirable employment or provisions, particularly food.62 Some cases of sexual relations between Australian men and African women during the South African War may have involved a similar understanding, especially as many Africans whose homes or places of employment were burned through the scorched earth policy were left destitute on the harsh South African veldt.63 Also, inhabitants of the black concentration camps that were established were often required to pay for their provisions from extremely low earnings, unlike in white camps, which may have made their situation more desperate.64 However, given the similar circumstances of many British and Boer civilians in South Africa, such an explanation may have also explained Kelly’s sexual encounter, the attachment of Marshall’s ‘little Dutch girl’, as well as the relationship reported in the diary of Trooper John Jennings of his comrade Trooper May, who ‘disappeared from troop at Colesberg and afterwards [was] found living with a kaffir woman’.65 Despite dominant attitudes regarding the alleged distinction between black and white at the turn of the nineteenth century, Trooper May established a relationship with an African woman, which may have been a mutually beneficial situation, but also – like the cases described above – may also have resulted from genuine affection. In this case, the permissiveness with which marriages between white men and Aboriginal women were frequently viewed in rural Australia may have influenced May’s decision, despite prevalent racial beliefs.66 The role of sex on the war front was not openly acknowledged by the military during the South African War, affecting the frequency with which soldiers spoke of it in their personal records. By the First World War, however, soldiers were given clear instructions from above to abstain from sex, as demonstrated by Lord Kitchener’s warning to the British Expeditionary Forces: ‘In this new experience you may find temptations, both in wine and women. You must entirely resist both temptations, and while treating all women with perfect courtesy, you should avoid any intimacy.’67 By the Second World War, military authorities acknowledged that preventing hundreds of thousands of soldiers from engaging in sex on the war front was impossible. Soldiers were educated about the need

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for protection if sexual intercourse was likely to occur, and taught about the specific dangers of venereal diseases.68 By the years of the Vietnam War, sexual freedom had significantly increased and soldiers were more aware of the need to avoid sexually transmitted infections than ever before, both through military training and the increase in sex education in Australia.69 It was also more likely that men travelling to Vietnam were sexually experienced, as figures surrounding the use of the oral contraceptive for women in the 1960s, first released in Australia in January 1961, reveal that more Australians used the contraceptive pill than Americans or Britons, meaning that sex was more accessible and seemingly less risky.70 The increasingly permissive attitudes towards sex in the 1960s and 1970s also partly prepared Vietnam War soldiers for the South Vietnamese war front, which was influenced by the existing high demand for prostitution in South East Asia.71 These changes were reflected in the personal records of the examined soldiers. Captain Reginald Dittmar of the 102 Field Workshop confirmed in his diary that sexual partners were readily available, writing that men can ‘go behind the hills’ and find Vietnamese girls who could be employed for two dollars, but that none of the ‘boys’ had yet been brave enough to try: ‘The soldiers are learning about the country and its people by virtue of contact. Unfortunately they get the wrong concept from these camp followers,’ referring to prostitutes.72 Other men expressed similar reticence, including Private Andrew Treffry, who wrote to ‘Eileen’ while on R&C of the ambivalence with which many saw Vietnamese prostitutes: The bar girls were there but they didn’t push themselves onto us like at the other we went to. They give you the eye now and then but if you ignore them, they keep away . . . Some of the girls in Vung Tau are very good looking and they’re very tempting . . . You get a bit of a roasting when you come back as to weather [sic] you had a naughty or not. YOU get called a chicken when you say ‘no’ as I did, but at least I’ve got nothing to hide as some of the others have, besides most of them say they wouldn’t do it again . . . Maybe I’ve missed an experience but I’ll catch up later.73

Treffry’s willingness to share these thoughts with an Australian woman also demonstrates the transformation in male and female interactions between the South African and Vietnam Wars, as there is little chance that the existence of prostitution would be mentioned in soldiers’ letters home from the earlier war. Several personal accounts of sexual relations between men and Vietnamese prostitutes do exist in the archival records, with some more willing to speak

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openly about their longing for intimacy. It is clear that the desire of men for sex did not significantly change between the wars, but that the society from which each group of soldiers originated influenced their willingness to both speak about it, and perhaps also engage in it. There is evidence that relations between men did also occur in Vietnam; however, given the illegality of homosexuality within the military as well as prevailing social attitudes towards same-sex relationships during both wars, it is unlikely that any homosexual soldiers would have spoken openly about their orientation. Dapin’s recent study of national servicemen during the Vietnam War does reveal that homosexual men did enter the armed forces, with two in particular forming a relationship while in Vietnam, despite one of the expressed aims of the screening of conscripts being to ensure that homosexual men were not accepted for military service.74 Lieutenant Colonel Neil Smith of 8RAR wrote to his parents of ‘a sodomy case with one of our diggers’ he encountered while serving as Duty Officer in the Singleton, New South Wales, training camp for national servicemen, another confirmation that homosexual relations did occur among Vietnam War soldiers, although this may have not been consensual.75 However, social beliefs of the time, and any resultant reticence, means that it is impossible to determine what proportion of Australians in Vietnam would consider themselves homosexual, although it is important to acknowledge the presence of homosexual soldiers on the Vietnamese war front.

Disobedience, mutiny and fragging Humour, alcohol, drugs or sex are often only temporary avenues taken by soldiers who are having difficulty dealing with the strains of battle. Some, in their desperation to avoid combat, sought more extreme or permanent solutions to dissatisfaction with their position, sometimes resulting in bad behaviour, which has frequently been re-interpreted as ‘larrikinism’ among Australian soldiers in early-twentieth-century wars.76 However, misconduct on the war front often became more severe, to include general unwillingness or even direct refusal to fight, as well as violence against officers who were seen to be putting lives in danger. The Vietnam War in particular was noteworthy for ‘fragging’, an act of direct defiance to authority that involved violence towards superiors with the fragmentation grenade, a weapon that released several thousand miniscule steel balls so as to force the enemy to withdraw from cover in the jungles of Vietnam.

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The use of this weapon by men on their own officers was often accompanied by the outright refusal to obey orders, as fragging frequently resulted when leaders were unable to effectively foster battlefront morale.77 Some who were required to continue fighting for longer than expected, or were subjected to ‘unnecessary harassment’ during the Vietnam War, were also occasionally drawn to such acts of outright violence against unpopular officers.78 However, fragging has occurred for many years in various forms – it was merely the use of the fragmentation grenade that was specific to Vietnam. Violence against superiors in earlier wars, however, was often associated with mutiny, or direct disobedience against orders from above. Others feigned illness or self-wounded in order to avoid combat. During the First World War, soldiers began ‘chewing cordite or sleeping in wet towels’ so as to become too ill to engage in combat, despite the risk of being punished by death.79 During Vietnam, the wish for ‘million dollar wounds’, injuries that were serious enough to allow men to return home, but not so severe that they would cause permanent harm, demonstrates a similar desire by fighting men.80 Despite the frequent exaggeration found in accounts of ‘larrikinism’ among Australians in early-twentieth-century wars, there is evidence that this stereotype does partly ring true. In July 1901, three men from the 5th Victorian Contingent in South Africa, Troopers James Steele, Arthur Richard and Herbert Parry, were court-martialled and sentenced to death for alleged mutiny. The dissatisfaction felt by these men for their commanding officer, Major General S. B. Beatson, began on the night of 12 June when nineteen Australian soldiers and officers were killed and forty-one wounded after a surprise attack by the Boers. The general disdain with which Beatson treated his troops for failing to prevent these casualties prompted Steele to respond to a patrol order on 7 July with: ‘it will be better for the men to be shot than to go out with a man who called them white-livered curs’ leading to the three men being arrested for mutiny. Although Lord Kitchener muted the sentences to ten years imprisonment for Steele and one each for Richard and Parry, Australian authorities were concerned. Major General Downes, Military Commandant of Victoria, soon afterwards ordered officers on the war front to send him regular reports of Australian soldiers who had been court-martialled for disobedience. The ensuing report revealed that between April and June 1901, twenty-seven men were court-martialled for various offences, including disobedience, impersonating an officer, threatening language, stealing, absence, drunkenness and desertion. However, the men included in the report were only from four of Australia’s six states that had sent

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contingents to South Africa, which suggests that additional offenses occurred both during that time and throughout Australian involvement.81 The words of Private Stan Jones of the 1st South Australian Contingent suggest that this was also the case during the early months of the war, while on the Medic bound for South Africa: ‘There is a court-martial nearly every two or three days, men being had up for breaking some rule or other, or disobeying some order, the Victorians I think have been the most unruly so far. One of the West. Aus. Men was had up for striking his Sergeant, and he got 5 days imprisonment.’82 Corporal Oscar King of the 1st Victorian Contingent described the same incident in a letter to his mother: ‘One of the West Aust men hit a sgt & corporal and got five days solitary confinement which as the boat is rolling and he was in a bathroom was a pretty rough sentence.’83 Not all offences were so severe, however, as most cases in the personal records refer to mere insubordination towards superiors. Private John Cripps described his own punishment of five days imprisonment in South Africa for ‘what they are pleased to call insolence’, after ‘not running in one of our men when I was told’.84 Private Henry Betts of the Tasmanian Mounted Rifles also wrote of punishments for relatively minor offences: ‘After lights out this evening a couple of men getting pillow fighting with the result that their names are taken down. Another man abuses a Sergeant in the mess room in rather warm language with like result (reported).’85 Many cases of misbehaviour in the examined records involve physical acts against officers, at varying degrees of brutality. Private Henry Betts later recounted a visit by his unit to a South African public bath, when a rank and file soldier pushed his Sergeant into the water: ‘Splash! He is in. What an expression on his face. He seems undecided whether to get angry or to laugh. But at least he enters into the spirit of the game and now there is splashes on all sides till at least the officer in charge threatens to take the names of those in the water.’86 Not all cases of seeming misconduct were received so well, as is demonstrated by the earlier words of Jones and King, as well as the diary of Trooper Herbert Conder, who wrote of soldiers returning from South Africa: Our Major Tunbridge inspects the vessel every morning, and he is making far too much fuss, altogether. Falling in the men and making them stand to attention, he is not very well liked by the men, and this morning he got hit with a potato thrown at him by a Victorian (behind the ear) and I am afraid he will get worse yet, if he goes making the men play tin soldiers. The men have had 14 months of it and we want a spell now.

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Only four days later, he wrote again of troops from New South Wales who kept releasing their imprisoned fellow soldiers without authorization: Major Tunbridge interviewed the NSW and told them that the men would have to do their time ‘if not on the ship – they would have to do so on land’. He was greatly cut up the way the men were behaving, ‘and if you don’t kill me’ he said ‘Before I reach shore and do away with me, I’m not frightened of you . . . for you can kill me and it will only make matters worse for you when you land, which you will have to do sooner or later.’87

Although Conder only specifically mentioned the throwing of a potato, the words of Major Tunbridge do indicate that he genuinely feared for his safety. Conder’s diary also supports the finding that men are more likely to mutiny when combat service officially ends, but they are still employed by the military.88 Some men openly refused to carry out their duty, as revealed by Corporal William Kelman en route to South Africa: ‘We had some trouble with a few of the sailors, who showed mutinous conduct, but the mate and two others having been placed in irons, the trouble blew over.’89 However, such behaviour did not always lead to punishment, even when it involved direct refusal to fight. In his diary, Private Charles Turner recounted an incident when his unit – the 1st Victorian Bushmen – refused to arise after being woken at 2.00 am on Christmas Eve of 1900 for patrol duty. Despite their clear violation of orders, they escaped punishment, suggesting that some compassion from above was possible, particularly during the festive season.90 The case of the 1st Victorian Bushmen illustrates the finding that mutiny can often result when men feel that demands placed on them by superiors are unreasonable, or they are overworked, as was also demonstrated by the AIF (Australian Imperial Force) 1st Battalion during the First World War, who refused to fight when they began to believe that they were doing ‘other people’s work’.91 A similar case is that of an unnamed man fighting in the 1st South Australian contingent who was brought into camp and disciplined for also refusing to do his duty on Christmas Eve of 1899, only one month after his arrival in South Africa.92 Refusal to fight also took other, less dramatic, forms. Private Watson Augustus Steel of the 1st New South Wales Mounted Rifles wrote in his diary: One fellow has ‘bluffed’ the doctor he has rheumatism, an ailment difficult to diagnose. When the electric light goes out at 8:30 he usually dances a hornpipe in front of the stove before turning in, and then tells some very original yarns for another two hours. He has marched from the Modder to here, and has been in all the fighting, and thinks he has walked far enough. Perhaps he has as he has no socks.93

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While Steel employs humour in relaying this story, it is clear that the man in question is expressing his refusal to continue fighting by inventing an illness. This is not an isolated example, however, as Trooper Herbert Conder reports similar cases he encountered while in hospital: Lots of the chaps here are not sick at all, it would make a cat laugh to hear them schemeing [sic] how to get invalided or how to stop in the hospital. Some say they have Rheumatic pains, others pains in the head, and most of them fat as whales, but although some here are only shams, others of the poor chaps are really sick and wounded.94

Private James Smith of the Queensland Imperial Bushmen spoke of his own desire for some respite from combat: ‘I am in the best of health, so have not much to complain about, I cannot get sick enough to make it necessary to see “Quinine Bill” much less go for a rest in hospital.’95 Quinine is a drug that had then been used for over a century, particularly among adventurers in Africa, to treat malaria. Although Smith was apparently not willing to go to the lengths described by Steel and Conder, it is clear that he did realize the advantages of an illness and resultant hospital visit. These instances do suggest that although Australian volunteers for the South African force were plentiful, this initial enthusiasm did evaporate in some cases. It is important to note that not all men felt this way. Saddler Albert Marshall was called to a Board of Enquiry after hospitalization for a leg injury and asked whether he believed that his wound would interfere with any future employment. Hammond could thus have almost certainly guaranteed that he would be invalided home with pay, meaning that he could leave the war front without economic consequences, but he told the Board that his leg would be fine. He was subsequently released from hospital, upon which he wrote in a letter home: ‘Hurrah I can get a few shots more at Johnny Boer.’96 Although it is apparent that some men had objections to fighting at various points of their military service, not all men were so eager to escape the South African battlefield. Unwillingness to fight can also be observed in the soldiers’ letters and diaries from Vietnam, although cases of fragging and outright refusal to fight were less frequently mentioned even though there is evidence that they occurred within Australian units. One of the more serious cases is that of 23-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Robert Birse of 106 Battery, 4th Field Regiment, who was killed by a fragmentation grenade in Phuoc Tuy at the hands of one of his men, Gunner Newman, on 10 December 1967. Although the arrested soldier was originally sentenced to five years in prison, his conviction was overturned on

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appeal. Official concern was expressed by the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Thomas Daly, who wrote early in 1968 to the Commander, Australian Force Vietnam (COMAFV) Major General Arthur McDonald asking for more details of the incident. He wrote: ‘Descriptions of gunners drinking for long periods outside the wire at FSB [Fire Support Base] and apparent bomb happy reactions in battery area when the grenade exploded in Birse’s shelter fill me with an uneasiness that is not dispelled by explanations so far received.’97 McDonald himself had also expressed concern at the amount of alcohol being consumed by Australians in Vietnam.98 Another case of fragging occurred within 9RAR, of which Lieutenant Colonel Neil Smith wrote: ‘We have got rid of 9RAR completely. They have a rather poor name, and the murder of that young officer just put the led [sic] on for them. Enquiries are still going on about it, I can’t see the young swine getting off.’99 Fragging was more common among US troops, with 800 cases reported between 1968 and 1972.100 Although a much higher number of American soldiers served in Vietnam – approximately 2.7 million compared with around 60,000 Australians – the high incidence of such a serious crime among the American forces is alarming. The higher discipline and tightly knit comradeship among Australian units meant that there were few incidences of fragging in comparison to the astronomical American figures; however, during Gunner Newman’s trial, it was revealed that Australian officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were frequently threatened by their men.101 Thus, the above evidence and other findings do suggest that Australian rank and filers were subjected to similar pressures, and occasionally reacted in comparable ways to the American troops. Although most others did not take such drastic steps to convey their dissatisfaction, the letters and diaries suggest that some men were just as, if not more, unwilling to fight as those in South Africa. Private Geoffrey Jones of 3RAR indicated that this was often heightened when men were approaching the end of their tour: ‘There are now a lot of good excuses being invented to avoid going out on operations or patrol, especially when a digger is killed by a sniper just outside the perimeter wire in the last few weeks before he’s due to return home.’102 Signaller Andrew Clyne wrote to his parents: I reckon I will take up smoking, because they’re always having 120 minute smoko’s [sic] and if you’re not smoking they nab you to do little jobs and you’ve gotta have them done quickly or they bawl you out and the poor old non-smokers get nabbed every time. You get tired enough without having to run around in you’re [sic] smoko breaks.103

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Clyne’s words indicate a sense of disillusionment with his overall position in the military, and a longing to escape the everyday tasks he is asked to perform. Corporal Ron Kelly related his own longing for a ‘million dollar wound’, which were often intentionally inflicted when soldiers became desperate to end their war service. He wrote to his wife: ‘You felt only a tiny bit sorry I did not break my leg. Boy it would be heaven to do that, at least I would get a spell.’104 It is significant that there are men reporting personal unwillingness, as well as the reluctance of fellow soldiers, to engage in combat during both wars, particularly given the dramatic shift in popular attitudes towards combat between the wars. These records demonstrate that despite the widespread fervour and abundance of volunteers for the South African War from 1899, particularly in comparison with the Vietnam War, when around one quarter of men on the battlefield were conscripts and there was unprecedented public opposition to the war, combat service can have a similar effect, resulting in often dramatic acts to avoid military duty.

Desertion Some soldiers found the battlefield intolerable, and became willing to risk severe punishment through desertion. Soldiers who desert often find it difficult to cope with the group environment in war, and thus experience fewer advantages from comradeship. Some scholars believe that it is most likely inadequate training that does not foster morale, or difficulty fitting into everyday army life that causes soldiers to flee the war front.105 Helmer, a psychiatrist who worked with American Vietnam veterans after the war, claimed that between 1964 and 1970, desertion increased in the US Army by 235 per cent, and exceeded cases seen during the Second World War and Korea.106 This finding suggests that perhaps desertion was not caused by soldier unsuitability to military life, as suggested by the Pentagon, but is more so related to the conditions on the war front. Desertion rates among Australian troops in both the South African and Vietnam Wars are difficult to establish, due to the lack of existing available official records on the matter. In fact, even official histories of both wars either do not mention desertion or, in the case of the Vietnam War, claim that it was not a significant issue during the war. However, the incidence of desertion among British troops in South Africa and Americans in Vietnam – despite the harsher conditions to which the latter were subjected – does suggest that some Australians did escape the battlefield during both wars.107 There is also

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evidence that desertion occurred among Australian troops in the First World War, although some scholars claim that soldiers of the AIF did not desert in large numbers.108 However, in the latter stages of the war, many Australians abandoned their units because they were aware that desertion was punishable by death within the British Army, but not the AIF.109 Although desertion did occur within the Australian forces during the South African War, it is difficult to determine the extent to which this occurred.110 It is clear, however, from the limited military archives available that two Australian men were court-martialled for desertion between April and June 1901 and they were not sentenced to death, which is unusual, as the standard punishment for desertion within the British Army was execution until after the First World War. One of the men who deserted had his crime expunged and the other was given forty-eight days of imprisonment, which was later reduced.111 The personal records of soldiers reveal some additional cases, in particular the diary of Martin Maddern, a chaplain with the Queensland Imperial Bushmen, who reported several cases of stowaways being found on the Manchester Port on its way to South Africa by way of Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. However, it is important to differentiate the men who were unwilling to fight from those who were eager to participate in the war. For example, Maddern mentions that on 25 April 1900, two men – possibly deserters – were missing during roll call. Also, three stowaways were found, but only one was labelled a ‘naval deserter’ – the other two were ‘old camp men’ wishing to fight.112 A month later, while still at sea, he reported that another stowaway had been found, ‘a trumpeter from Artillery’, who did wish to avoid military duty.113 Thus, the existence of stowaways is not always evidence of desertion or reluctance to fight – whereas it is apparent that some did not want to serve in South Africa, others wanted to represent their country so earnestly that they were willing to hide on troopships at sea for months. Supporting this finding, a similar report appeared in The Argus on 2 November 1899: ‘The lance-corporal who was taken aboard the Medic under arrest as a deserter yesterday was sent ashore before the vessel sailed, as it was felt that this course would prove a greater punishment for his offence than simply giving him “cells” aboard.’114 In this case, the military authorities saw that not being allowed to fight in South Africa was a greater penalty than being forced onto the ship, perhaps due to the shame he would experience on the seemingly jingoistic Australian home front. Although desertion was far more common among American troops during the Vietnam War, Australians on the battlefield did not often mention its occurrence in the personal records. Major E. M. McCormick of 3RAR received

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a letter about a particular unit during the war from Warrant Officer Geoff Scott that claimed: ‘I visited SPECIAL FORCES GROUP HQ at NHA TRANG today, and I was informed that since the ASHUA business, the desertion rate of the NUNG FORCE has skyrocketed’ [author’s emphasis].115 Here Scott is referring to the desertion of South Vietnamese troops, which was consistently higher than those of both American and Australian soldiers in Vietnam. There is evidence that the Tet Offensive in particular had a significant effect on desertion among Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops, who deserted at a rate of 113 per 1,000, and South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force troops, who reached thirty-eight and fifty-four per 1,000, respectively, by early 1968.116 The conditions under which the American and South Vietnamese forces fought were often more severe than those experienced by the Australian troops, and there were also differences in enlistment processes as well as unit distribution in each case, which suggests that Australian desertion rates cannot be compared with those of their allies. However, there are also similarities in the pressures and experiences that affected each group in Vietnam, which allows for some comparison, thus suggesting that desertion would have also occurred among Australians, despite the lack of available records on the matter.117 It is impossible to determine exact figures from each war of men who were reluctant to fight, or who escaped from the battlefield. The above examples do indicate that there were soldiers in both South Africa and Vietnam who did not want to engage in active duty at all, or continue fighting after they had been on the battlefront for an extended period of time, findings that are supported by both primary and secondary sources. However, the relationship between soldiers and combat is too complex and varied to assign set conclusions that apply to all, particularly when also considering the changing nature of war. Each of these wars created new issues and circumstances that altered both soldiers’ perceptions and enthusiasm towards combat. However, despite the changes in warfare over the sixty years between the South African and Vietnam Wars, it is apparent that some men – even those who have willingly enlisted – simply do not want to fight, and will go to extreme lengths to avoid combat.

The psychological effects of combat Not all soldiers who experience disillusionment on the battlefield are able to find an adequate physical or psychological escape from the combat experience, which can trigger mental injury in some men. The connection between warfare and its

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psychological effects was not researched on a grand scale until after the First World War and the ‘shell shock’ phenomenon. Before this time, psychology or psychiatry was rarely employed when dealing with soldiers whose wounds from war were not merely physical. In fact, the British Army was not as responsive as other nations in recognizing that this was a problem that required some sort of psychological therapy.118 The Second World War brought new, more intensive modes of warfare that, despite efforts by military psychiatrists, increased the incidence of psychological trauma in soldiers. Studies carried out by the US military found that 50 per cent of their Second World War soldiers suffered mental collapse and could not continue fighting. Subsequent research found that within thirty days on the battlefront, 98 per cent of soldiers were exhibiting signs of psychological damage.119 Also, 98 per cent of American soldiers who fought sixty continuous days without any respite in Normandy developed psychological ailments.120 The Vietnam War produced even more recognized cases of psychological injury in Australian fighting soldiers than those in the Second World War, but with new characteristics that justified its re-classification as PTSD, which, like shell shock, was commonly caused by a significant event that created severe anxiety.121 Although this study focuses on the attitudes and behaviours of soldiers while on the war front itself, it remains necessary to investigate the after-effects of military service, as they arise as a result of the elements of warfare discussed throughout this book and often first appear when soldiers are still on the battlefield. Some only experience the psychological effects of combat throughout their military service, whereas certain soldiers feel it most keenly after returning to the home front, and others more fortunate do not experience any change at all between the beginning and end of their tours. Those who do suffer, however, experience varying levels of severity, which means that some can carry out a normal life after returning from the battlefield. However, other veterans require psychological support for the rest of their lives as a result of their military service. Some men fighting in Vietnam were aware that their war service would cause their civilian lives to change, a result of twentieth-century research into the soldiers’ period of adaptation between battle and war fronts that did not exist when Australian men departed for South Africa.122 However, in all wars, soldiers are thrust into an environment where the value system does not accord with the one they were raised with on the Australian home front that, for example, warns against the slaughter of other human beings. In many cases, soldiers experience trouble separating themselves from this environment after their military service is over, which can then affect them psychologically.123

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Corporal Ron Kelly of 1RAR demonstrated awareness of his own personal transformation when he wrote: ‘It is going to be nice and peaceful away from all the guns, planes etc when I get home, I probably will not be able to sleep[.] Oh! Well if I can’t, I will have to make love.’124 Others more openly exhibited fear at the prospect of returning home. Bombardier Peter Groves of the 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, wrote to his wife: ‘I think I will be a bit speechless for a few days after I get home. I won’t know what to say to anyone.’125 Similarly, 5RAR Private Doug Bishop wrote to his mother: ‘I hope that being in a war zone for so long won’t inspire me to build a huge bunker in the front lawn and put up a barbed wire fence all round the house, walk up Meadow Crescent with a rifle shooting the first thing that moves etc.’126 Corporal Wallace Lillebo articulately conveyed the same sentiment to his parents: I don’t think any of us realize that we are seasoned as old teak and tough as nails. For a year we have lived in that Other World of the front line soldier, cut off from what is classed as normal, accepting this existence of ours as the way life is. We have created our own standards, and anything outside of them are stupidly superfluous.127

These fears were not ill-founded, as unprecedented numbers of Australian soldiers did have difficulty adjusting to home life after Vietnam. In fact, the 1996 Australian Vietnam Veterans Health Study carried out interviews with a random sample of 641 living veterans, and found that 21 per cent of these men suffered from PTSD at some point in their lives and 12 per cent were experiencing it at the time of the study.128 Australian figures of PTSD among Vietnam veterans were found to be similar to American figures – 31 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, among male sufferers – and much higher than incidences of PTSD in both American and Australian civilians.129 The psychological effects of the South African War were not measured in such a sophisticated manner, as the link between warfare and trauma was not widely accepted at the turn of the nineteenth century. However, archival material such as military correspondence and returning soldiers’ medical reports do indicate that Australians did experience psychological ill effects as a result of combat in South Africa. Even the Border Watch newspaper of Mount Gambier, South Australia, included an article in January 1900 – when the fervour for war was at its peak on the home front – that addressed mental injury among British soldiers, claiming: A private letter received from a lady at Pietermaritzburg states that Major General Yule, who brought the British column from Dundee to Ladysmith, started laughing one day in a terrible manner, and quite went out of his mind.

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He had to be placed in the asylum at Pietermaritzburg. He has since left for England. The bugler boy who shot three Boers with a revolver is also mentally deranged.130

Although this article mentions an act of war in connection with the bugler boy, it does not give any direct indication that his alleged psychological damage was caused by combat, following prevalent beliefs of the time. Still, it is unusual that such an article would appear at a time when the Australian public was overwhelmingly supportive of the war. An analysis of archival records does suggest that the war service of Australians in South Africa did have some psychological effects, although their diagnosis was often not connected with combat itself. In September 1901, the South Australian Chief Secretary’s Office received a letter concerning Private L. Osborne of the 6th New South Wales Imperial Bushmen, who was to be given free passage on a train from South Australia to New South Wales: ‘A sleeping berth should be provided for him as he is suffering from traumatic paralysis which is aggravated by the ship’s motion. The man is accompanied by Sergeant Hawkins of the NSW Army Medical Corps as an attendant as he is unable to get about without assistance.’131 Although military psychiatry was then in its infancy, it is possible that Osborne was suffering from combat-related psychological injury. Private Stan Jones also wrote in a letter home: Three or four lads have not been well since we started on the war-path. I think if one or two of them could get back to Adelaide, it would take more than 35/- a week to induce them to leave South Australia, but it is only one or two who feel like that, but I think everyone will have enough of it before the war is over.132

It is likely that if these men were suffering from physical ailments, they would have been moved to a military hospital. Jones’ words more strongly suggest that these soldiers were emotionally affected by the war. An anonymous South African War soldier also wrote of his own illness while in Springfontein: ‘Here I went into hospital. I had been having very violent palpitations of the heart and could get very little sleep at night when the attacks seemed worse.’133 The soldier was not diagnosed with any condition, nor did he remain in hospital for an extended period of time, despite the severity of his symptoms. It is possible, therefore, that anxiety was a factor in his ailment. Analyses of the various characteristics of war trauma since the early twentieth century have outlined symptoms that are generally common to veterans of modern wars, although the extent to which each man suffers from each of these varies widely. General symptoms of shell shock during the First World

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War were ‘persistent headache, amnesia, inability to concentrate, difficulty sleeping and mood disturbance’, although at this time the connection between these symptoms and warfare was not as clear as it is today.134 Bartlett notes in his 1927 study of soldier psychology that combat often causes extreme responses such as ‘hallucination, nightmares and tremors’. He also maintains that soldiers will be unusually tired and ‘jumpy’ for a long period after a war ends.135 Baker et al., in analysing PTSD in Gulf War veterans, list fatigue, nausea, muscle aches, dizziness, back pain, stomach ache and numbness as general symptoms.136 A recent study of Australian Vietnam War veterans that has taken into account factors such as levels of alcohol consumption, smoking and exercise claims that PTSD among soldiers has caused increased need for stomach medications, as well as treatment for rashes, eczema, musculoskeletal conditions, including arthritis, asthma and hypertension.137 These examinations focus on soldiers who fought in three different wars during the twentieth century, and find some shared symptoms between them. This does suggest that psychological effects from battle do have some common side effects, some of which were observed in returning South African War soldiers at the turn of the nineteenth century. The medical reports of men returning from South Africa mention some of the above symptoms, although these can occasionally be attributed to the incidence of other conditions, for example Private Bryce of the 5th Queensland Imperial Bushmen who returned to Australia complaining of ‘weakness and giddiness’, but further research reveals that he suffered from enteric fever, otherwise known as typhoid, while in South Africa.138 Other men from the same contingent, however, presented with symptoms that can be related more to mental rather than physical injury. These include Private Taylor who suffered from ‘insomnia and pains in head’, Corporal Smith who suffered from ‘heart irregularity and palpitation’, Private Wilmot who was ‘sound and in good health but complains of feeling nervous’ and Sergeant Little who was reported to be ‘slightly tremulous’.139 In the case of Little, further investigation reveals that he was a former stock rider, so accustomed to active outdoor life, but after being in South Africa a little over three months he started experiencing loss of appetite, and ‘did not feel fit to do his work’. Medical authorities did not supply a firm diagnosis other than occasional conjunctivitis, yet he was discharged for medical reasons and sent back to Australia.140 This evidence does suggest that the cause of Little’s debility was not merely physical. The applications for the Empire’s Patriotic Fund of Victoria also provide some indications that men suffered psychologically after active service in South Africa. Trooper George William Robinson, a miner who fought in the 2nd Scottish

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Horse and the 6th Australian Commonwealth Horse for eighteen months in total, received some financial aid in the years after his return from South Africa.141 A note in his file shortly after his return claims: ‘Miss Michaels of Bourke Street states applicant is utterly destitute & is without food except what she provides him with – also in need of medical treatment.’ He was re-examined by a medical professional after admission to the Melbourne Hospital on 7 November 1907 suffering from abdominal pains, vomiting and diarrhoea. After continued medical attention, a letter of 9 March 1908 written by his doctor claimed that Robinson was suffering from ‘neurasthenia’, which he confirmed was caused by his military service in South Africa.142 Neurasthenia is defined as ‘characterized by mental and physical fatigue . . . often accompanied by headaches, dizziness, sleep disturbances, irritability and intestinal distress’.143 The psychological diagnosis of shell shock during the First World War connected it with neurasthenia, thus confirming it as a possible psychological effect of combat.144 It is significant that this early diagnosis occurred, as at this time connections were rarely made between warfare and psychological damage. Other cases exist, including Private Henry Hughes, who was attached to the Cape Medical Corps while in South Africa. His wife Martha wrote to the Empire’s Patriotic Fund on 27 March 1901, three months after his discharge: ‘I regret to state that my husband Henry Hughes has lost his reason and is now an inmate of the Yarra Bend Lunatic Asylum . . . the Dr says he is of the opinion that my husband will not be fitted to work anymore.’145 An investigation of the Yarra Bend Lunatic Asylum admissions for late 1900 and all of 1901 do not name a Henry Hughes. However, there is one record of an Agnes Hewitt brought to the Asylum in early 1901 by her brother-in-law Henry Hughes, which does raise the possibility that Martha’s financial difficulty caused her to exaggerate her circumstances accordingly.146 More plausible was the case of Trooper James Melrose Mailer of the 3rd Victorian Contingent, who was discharged less than four months after enlistment. He claimed in his application to the Empire’s Patriotic Fund that he was invalided, but his military records read ‘services no longer required’, which was commonly written on the discharge papers of those who had completed their entire term of military service, not a mere four months. His application was rejected, with the note ‘No proof that invalided on discharge. Does not appear application that can be granted. Infirmed verbally.’147 These last two words do indicate that Mailer suffered from a medical condition but his military records did not give any specific indication, which raises questions about his true physical and psychological state that prompted an

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early discharge. Little additional documentation exists for Mailer, including some evidence that he later returned to South Africa, fighting with the Marquis of Tullabardine’s 2nd Scottish Regiment, which may indicate that if he had suffered from any condition, he had recovered or that this was a necessary solution to his destitute state.148 Similar confusion surrounds the case of Trooper William Thomas Egan of the Imperial Australian Regiment (Victorian Imperial Bushmen), who was discharged as ‘mentally unfit’ and was later assessed by a medical officer at the Commonwealth Military Forces of Victoria Headquarters in Melbourne on 19 July 1905 after continuing to experience ill-effects, supposedly from his war service. His doctor appears perplexed in his report, writing: ‘He states that he suffers severely from giddiness. This is of course purely subjective . . . still I have no reason to doubt his mind – he seems to me to be quite unfit for labourer work, at any rate. It has been a question whether he is fit to do anything at all. I am suspicious that he is suffering from incipient brain disease.’149 The uncertain nature of this assessment does correspond to the lack of any direct link between any psychological condition and military service at the time, perhaps heightened in this case by the location of his assessment – a military medical clinic – where medical professionals may be more reluctant to make such a connection. Since the First World War, researchers have been much more careful to acknowledge the varied effects that warfare has on soldiers, as noted above. By the Vietnam War, war trauma was a recognized side effect of combat that had affected soldiers both during and after the First and Second World Wars, as well as the Korean War. The number of Vietnam War soldiers who mentioned symptoms of PTSD on the war front in comparison to those fighting in the South African War is notable, and a likely consequence of twentieth-century research into this aspect of combat. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray of the 547 Signal Troop wrote to his wife about an Australian military adviser: Quite a showman and a walking arsenal . . . Had plenty of old soldier stories too. Don’t doubt that he saw a bit of action but he did like to magnify events and like many Advisers he was slightly around the bend by the time his tour was due to end. He probably needs hospital – quiet, peaceful surroundings – as much as prison. I think this will terminate his military service – he forgot where ‘normality’ is. This place could certainly do that to anyone.150

Murray does not speak of the adviser’s possible mental illness as an unusual, or even shameful, occurrence – rather, he brands it something quite typical of men in his position.

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Morale, and mental stability, among soldiers can be threatened when their comrades are wounded or killed, as outlined in the previous chapter. Captain David Wilkins of 5RAR addressed this matter after one of his men, Zeke, was blown up by a M16 ‘jumping jack’ mine, a common cause of death among Australian soldiers. He wrote in his diary: A vast difference can be seen on the effect of the digger’s morale, depending on the behaviour of the casualty. Zeke joked and abused the men as normal, despite the loss of a foot and extremely severe shrapnel wounds to the back and shoulders. His section and the platoon had no real ill effects. In comparison when D Coy had its heavy contact in the Long Binh area, a couple of the badly wounded soldiers, both very young, became hysterical from shock, screamed and raved, and consequently severely affected the morale of others soldiers in contact. Three or four soldiers have subsequently been suffering from war neurosis and are a mass of nerves. These people of course had to be rested.151

Armourer Andrew Treffry wrote of his own potential for mental injury: ‘No shots yet anyway but I’m sitting on the floor not 3 yards from my rifle. It’s no wonder the majority of guys in the unit “jibber” a bit and appear to have bad nerves. I guess I’ll be like that before too long.’152 Treffry seems resigned to the possibility that he will exhibit the same nervousness as his fellow soldiers who had been in Vietnam for a longer period of time. Such an admission would be unlikely during the South African War, as dominant ideas surrounding war circulating at the time stressed honour, loyalty and courage. Also, any sign of weakness could easily have been interpreted as ‘cowardice’, for which punishments were severe. In fact, First World War psychiatrists often told soldiers suffering from shell shock to ‘put it out of your mind, old boy, and try and forget all about it’, which often worsened their condition.153 Thus, it is apparent why there are fewer instances of soldiers openly addressing the existence of psychological disturbances on the South African battlefield. However, archival records do suggest that although investigation into mental injury from combat did not occur on a large scale until after the First World War, soldiers did suffer from war trauma before this time, including during the South African War.

Conclusion When considering the psychological responses of soldiers to war, a significant factor in the difference between men in the South African and Vietnam

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Wars appears to be the time period in which the war was fought. One of the predominant findings of this study is that the writing of men fighting in the South African War was more openly expressive than those in Vietnam. However, this consideration of morale has frequently discovered that the opposite is true. Vietnam War soldiers were more aware of morale and the psychological effects of combat, a result of the increase in psychological casualties of war during the twentieth century and subsequent research. The years between the wars saw scholars discover the universality of fear among soldiers and establish more complex reasons for low morale, which increased available knowledge within many world societies of the potentially adverse effects of war. It is less likely that a soldier living in Australia at a time when courage and heroism in war was prized above all else would write home expressing apprehension about combat, for fear of suffering shame on the home front or among fellow soldiers. On the other hand, men fighting in Vietnam had a more complex view of their own probable reactions to war, through military training, as well as cultural memory of the world wars. Thus, their knowledge of factors such as fear, survival and the importance of morale reflect the altered value system in the time period in which they were living. Military regulations on the war front were a reflection of these changes and also had an effect on the words of the fighting soldiers. For example, men writing during the South African War, where intoxication was a punishable crime, mentioned their own consumption of alcohol far less than Vietnam War soldiers, for whom alcohol was often considered an essential facet of the war front. In addition, references to methods used by soldiers to escape combat, such as fragging, mutiny or desertion – forbidden in both South Africa and Vietnam – are more difficult to find, and more often discuss the crimes of others, rather than their own dissatisfaction at the life of a soldier. The Australian home front also had a significant impact on the personal expressions of these soldiers. The years between the wars saw seismic shifts in attitudes towards war as well as in the character of war itself. The impact of such factors as the peace movements of the inter-war years and the anti-nuclear demonstrations of the post-Second World War years caused by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the increased role of the media – particularly radio and television – in publicizing such movements, resulted in the increased psychological involvement of the home front in these issues, continued by the active campaigning for an end to the Vietnam War.154 Thus, by the 1960s, the interrelationship between the home and war fronts had increased, and attitudes towards warfare had significantly changed.155

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The home front, however, served not only to inform soldier opinion on warfare in general, but also had a more personal influence on men’s attitudes on the battlefield. The content of the letters and diaries thus far has frequently revealed some elements of self-censorship, used to reduce any possibility of chastisement from the home front or unnecessary worry among loved ones in Australia. The following chapter will examine in more detail the overall effect of the home front on the two groups of soldiers, discussing the comparative influences on future soldiers’ perceptions of war, the existence of self-censorship, the effect on morale of news from family and friends, as well as frequency of open expressions of dissatisfaction with the wars and the desire to return home to Australia.

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Soldiers and the Home Front

Scholars of war have long acknowledged the importance of the link between fighting soldiers and the home front.1 Each war occurs within a specific social and political background in a soldier’s country of origin, which can alter combatant’s relationships with civilians and with the war itself. It is important to note, however, that although the focus in this chapter is the effect of the home front on fighting soldiers, this relationship is reciprocal, as each front affects the other. With this interdependence in mind, this chapter will examine the letters and diaries of Australian soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam, to establish, first, the nature of the interaction and, secondly, the extent – and limit – of the influence of the respective home fronts on these men. Although often reluctant to directly address general public attitudes towards each war, as well as the governments that sent them into battle, the examined soldiers’ reactions suggest that these did have an impact on the content of their letters and diaries. The South African War was fought in a time when war was largely supported, yet soldiers were more likely to express negativity towards both the war itself and their place within it. On the other hand, men fighting in the more unpopular Vietnam War generally articulated any dissatisfaction in terms of a desire to return home to Australia and their families rather than declaring any support or opposition in relation to the war. Several reasons can be identified for this unexpected shift in sentiment between the wars – notably, self-censorship to protect family and friends from potential worry; defensiveness at their position in the war; changes in the epistolary tradition; the changing impact of individualism; and also the impact of soldiers’ terms of service. Although factors on the battlefield significantly affected the soldiers’ attitudes and behaviours, as demonstrated in earlier chapters, the differences between the two groups of soldiers can also be traced to Australia itself, through

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both prevalent beliefs towards war in their home societies, as well as shifting government and public opinion towards the specific wars being fought.

The impact of society on a soldier Soldiers who both willingly enlist in war and are conscripted have preconceptions of military duty, whether realistic or not, that originate in the society to which they belong. Factors such as family tradition, education and cultural values play an immense part in the pre-training adjustment of a man to war, and then continue to affect their impressions of war while on the battlefield. During the South African War, adventurous ideas about the defence of Empire, tied to soldiers’ connection with their Mother Country, England, prompted Australians to volunteer for military service.2 Men enlisting in the South African War did not have a specifically Australian military tradition to inspire their zest for battle, so their perceptions of warfare were predominantly taken from British tales of war. Literary narratives played an important role in highlighting the importance of Empire before the First World War, and succeeded in giving many young men splendid views of war.3 Such ‘romantic’ conceptions of warfare within the British Empire, among other European nations, can be traced back to the reactions of writers such as Shelley and Byron to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century wars, the latter of whom was killed while fighting during Greece’s revolutionary war against the Ottoman Empire. The power of such unrealistic views of warfare significantly decreased after the irrevocable transformation in warfare and subsequent exposure of, first, soldiers and, secondly, civilian populations to the harsh realities of combat during the First World War.4 Similarly, American soldiers on their way to Vietnam gained their initial attitudes to war from three main bodies – the media, their families and the military – all of which idealized concepts of war.5 However, the romanticization that affected men travelling to war in the late nineteenth century was muted in the later war, as by the 1960s Australians were more aware of the intensity of modern warfare, through returning veterans, as well as the advent of television reportage, meaning that most men recruited during the war had seen vivid details from the war front before reaching Vietnam. Despite these factors, men in both conflicts often entered war with an exaggerated ideal of military service, which both instilled a spirit of adventure into them and produced initial enjoyment on the battlefield for some. Another factor in the often unrealistic image of war in the minds of future soldiers is cultural understanding of returned veterans’ war experiences, or

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‘collective remembrance’, the product of individual communities that group various facets of their history for public dissemination.6 Memory of the First World War in particular within Australian society is a collection of the events within the overall war experience that has been formed using ‘public language and meaning’.7 A common belief system, the cultural memory of war, informs the values instilled into the population regarding warfare and then goes on to affect the ideas with which young men go to war.8 This study, however, primarily analyses influences on soldiers during their military service, thus an extended discussion of the home front factors that affected these men before they reached the battlefield is not necessary. Rather, this chapter will examine the impact of soldiers’ friends, family and community to determine the changing effect of Australian society as a whole on these men between enlistment and the end of their war service. Public perceptions of soldiers and war changed immensely in the years between the South African and Vietnam Wars, caused primarily by the staggering loss of life and lasting ill effects of the First and Second World Wars. During these wars, Western populations generally honoured fighting men.9 However, by the Vietnam War, soldiering was not as prized an occupation, demonstrated by the large number of conscripted men who refused to carry out their military service, the sheer existence and impact of the Draft Resisters’ Union and other anti-conscription groups in Australia, as well as the general increase in desertion levels among western armies. The soldiers’ personal records from the South African and Vietnam Wars illustrate this sea change well. Australians who had enlisted to fight in South Africa were aware of the overwhelming public support for their efforts and frequently mentioned demonstrations of encouragement when they were departing for the battlefield. Corporal William Kelman of the New South Wales Bushmen’s Contingent wrote in his diary from Sydney: Today was a holiday in camp, in consequence of the second contingent embarking . . . All the streets along the route of the procession to the vessels were thronged, and unbounded enthusiasm everywhere prevailed. Many of the men held in their hands bottles of beer and spirits given by their friends as they passed along, while their sisters and mothers hung on their arms.10

Private Stan Jones reported similar scenes when the 1st South Australian Contingent set off for South Africa: The public seemed to take a great interest in the soldiers for the Transvaal, and many that are well-to-do sent in all sorts of things for the men . . . The march in the streets was rather hot as people were crushing in on all sides to get a look

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and give a cheer to their brave warriors as some called us. The police had great difficulty in keeping the crowd back from flocking in on top of us, so eager were some of them to shake hands with us and wish us good-bye.11

Trooper Alured Kelly of the 2nd Victorian Contingent became a little more involved in the celebrations: After two weeks training we marched from Victoria Barracks through the principal streets of the city with full kit, new uniforms and new boots. We received a right royal reception from the cheering citizens along the entire route of about six miles. The day was on the hot side but our admirers in the city handed us glasses of drinks of all kinds, beer, whiskey and sometimes soft drinks. At that time I was a member of the Amateur Sports Club and a few of the boys had arranged a strong post at the corner of Collins and Elizabeth Streets and presented me with a small bottle of champagne, which I drank without any ill-effects. It is rather amazing what one can consume without ill-effects even when mixing drinks, in the excitement of a march of would-be heroes.12

Reports such as these, however, only appeared during the early years of the war. War-weariness appears to have overtaken Australia after it was realized that the conflict would not end quickly as had been predicted by British and Australian political and military authorities, who underestimated the combat abilities and tenacity of the Boers.13 The experience of soldiers leaving for South Africa from late 1900 was far different from those who enlisted amid the initial jingoistic madness of the war’s commencement. Newspaper articles from the time describe desolate dockside scenes later in the war, illustrated by an account in The Argus on 16 February 1901: Never has Melbourne given her troops a send-off that was more picturesque and more lukewarm. Each of the previous contingents to leave Victoria was accorded a demonstration pulsing with spontaneous enthusiasm and unpardonable pride . . . Yet the Fifth Contingent walked yesterday through a city that gave it scarcely a cheer, and which seemed unable to realise the grandeur of the spectacle . . . the novelty has worn off the departure of contingents, and while Melbourne formerly gratified its patriotic instincts by cheering departing troops, it has of late grown familiar with what are hedged with far more importance and romance – troops who have passed through the valley of the shadow of death, and returned with their laurels thick among them.14

There are no references in the soldiers’ personal records to this apparent shift in public eagerness for the war.

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During the Vietnam War, a conflict that experienced unprecedented public opposition, men writing from the battlefield were similarly disinterested in Australian popular opinion on the war, with few soldiers demonstrating any awareness of home front attitudes. Chief Radio Supervisor Leonard Francis Moriarty wrote in his diary in April 1969: ‘Old thingummy in Cambodia is even getting easier to live with, so things are looking up quite nicely regardless of what the anti’s may try to put over our gullible public.’15 Moriarty’s recognition of civilian opposition to the war may be explained by the date on which he was writing. After the Tet Offensive of 1968, support for the war notably declined in both the United States and Australia, as the South Vietnam-wide attack on US Allied forces proved false proclamations made by the American and Australian militaries about steadily approaching victory. Also, soldiers entering the army from 1969 were more affected by dissent on the home front, as many who had been conscripted and given a leave of absence to attend university – centres of anti-war protest in both the United States and Australia – were now bringing those ideas to Vietnam.16 As a result, many American soldiers exhibited knowledge of public attitudes towards the war.17 Other Australians stationed in Vietnam were similarly aware of the home front influence of the anti-war movement. A soldier who was identified only as ‘Holmberg’ bluntly wrote to his father in June 1969: ‘If the bastards, politicians and journalists, do gooders, humanitarians would only get kicked out and get someone to bomb North Vietnam. We are in a lot of trouble over here.’18 Private Geoffrey Jones of 3RAR, writing after his military service had ended and he had returned to Australia, revealed that the protest movement did have some effect on his behaviour when he returned to Australia in 1968: ‘Back home you don’t publisize [sic] the fact that you were in Vietnam, as, in discussing the war you could either be praised for keeping the “commies” at bay or accused of being a baby killer. It’s a lot easier to avoid the subject.’19 These words suggest that dissent towards the war did affect some soldiers, and that some interdependence did exist between the war and home fronts during the Vietnam War. Those who were fighting in Vietnam, whether as conscripts or regular soldiers, were also unlikely to make any comments about the governments that sent them to war. American soldiers in Vietnam can be distinguished from earlier fighting men, as instead of directing their frustration and rage towards a common enemy, the focus of their dissatisfaction was more often politicians who had made the ultimate decision to enter and continue to prosecute the war. The difference between the truth about actions on the front line and the official version – an issue that also affected Australian coverage of the war – caused many soldiers to lose faith in their leaders.20

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However, resentment towards Australian political authorities can only be found from the South African war front, in the diary of Private Watson Augustus Steel, of the 1st New South Wales Mounted Rifles: Officers can always get spirits, privates can get nothing in the way of [liquor], and I suppose, if we ever live to get back to Australia, we will be told we have been ‘having a good time of it’. I would fine 5 [pounds] a head to some of our fat political gas-bags who are always airing their loyalty, over here for a months [sic] march on Argentine horses, and ‘bully beef ’ with a little fatigue work.21

Steel’s apparent discontent with the lack of both alcohol and acceptable food appears to have inspired his discontent, rather than more ideological factors. The reluctance of the examined soldiers in Vietnam to express a direct opinion of the Australian government does not necessarily suggest that these men approved of their role in the war. It merely reveals that they were less likely to write about political authorities in their correspondence or personal diaries, for a range of reasons. It is possible that soldiers were simply not interested in, or did not spend their time thinking about politics. The lack of emphasis of patriotism or political factors as a motivator for enlistment earlier discussed suggests that this may have been the case. Hiddlestone’s interviews with Vietnam veterans reveal another potential reason. Several volunteer soldiers in her study claim that they did not particularly want to fight in Vietnam, but the lack of an alternative assignment created a sense of obligation or ‘duty’.22 Thus, soldiers in Vietnam may have avoided complaining about the government in their letters and diaries because they simply thought that it was not useful while they were in a position they could not control. Soldiers’ correspondence from Vietnam was not subject to the official scrutiny by censors seen in earlier wars; however, self-censorship was apparent in letters to loved ones, highlighted in more detail later in this chapter. Thus, self-censorship in soldier correspondence to loved ones in an Australia that, by the late 1960s, was predominantly opposed to the war they were engaged in could have also affected soldier candidness about political authorities, a finding which coincides with the pattern of reaction by soldiers to both wars that continues throughout this chapter. It would be difficult for men to comment on public criticism of a war that they were risking their lives to fight, or themselves criticize the war and their own government. Thus, the reticence of the above soldiers could be affected by their own position within a seemingly unpopular war.

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Mail, censorship and the press Soldier morale originates not only from the battlefield, but also from the home front, where loved ones are located.23 Thus, the connection between the war and home fronts is crucial, a concept realized by military authorities in all twentiethcentury wars, most notably during the protracted stalemate of the First World War that contributed greatly to the more than 8 million letters transported weekly by the British Army during the war.24 Correspondence between soldiers and their loved ones is essential in keeping them as figuratively close to the home front as possible, demonstrated by the attention with which the men fighting in both the South African and Vietnam Wars paid any direct link with Australia. Mail from home was frequently and fervently mentioned in letters and diaries. Similarly, soldiers commented on the press – which communicated official news from the war to loved ones, and ideally also from home to the battlefield – although rarely with as much pleasure. The comfort that communication from home brought to fighting soldiers during both wars is apparent. During the South African War, soldiers eagerly awaited the delivery of mail, expressing deep disappointment when it was delayed for any reason. Private Frederick Farley of the 4th Imperial Bushmen’s Contingent wrote frequently in his diary of his desire for correspondence, with statements such as: ‘It is time that we got another mail’ and ‘a convoy came in today & we expected a mail, but got none, everyone was disappointed’.25 The diary of the well-renowned military officer Captain Horace William Danger, a Special Services Officer in South Africa, in which he kept an ordered account of all letters he both sent and received while he was on the war front, also demonstrates the importance of regular mail from home.26 Some men were more candid in their explanation of the importance of mail to their emotional health while in South Africa. Private Arthur Hammond of the 5th West Australian Mounted Infantry wrote to his family of his despondency when he did not receive any mail: I was very miserable the day before yesterday when a mail arrived and not a letter or paper for me to read. I felt as though I was alone in the world but of course I know better than that. I almost felt like those terrible words in Chaminade’s song ‘Alone’. Read them and you will understand. I will be patient until the next mail arrives.27

It is doubtful that after such a description his family would ever miss sending another letter. Saddler Albert Marshall of the 5th Victorian Mounted Rifles was

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similarly frank in his diary, clearly outlining the benefits news from home can have on morale: I got 3 letters from Mother, 1 from Auntie Kate & 1 from Florrie . . . I tell you I did not waste a minute in reading it put new life in me when I was read them you would not believe the life it puts into a soldier to get a letter from the Dear ones at home. I read them over and over again untill [sic] I can almost read them off by heart.28

As communication technology became faster and more accessible over the decades of the twentieth century, the relevance of home increased in the minds of soldiers on the battlefield.29 Although men in Vietnam frequently mentioned their need for correspondence from home, they were not visibly more or less preoccupied with mail than the men in South Africa, which may have been affected by the relative distance between the respective war fronts and Australia. This was also the case for many Australians fighting in Europe during the First World War, whose connection with home and thus ability to cope with the pressures of combat suffered as a result of their physical distance from Australia, particularly in comparison to British troops.30 Similar feelings may have increased the demand for news and comfort from home among Australians in South Africa, who were further away in both distance and time from their loved ones than men in Vietnam. Thus, it appears reasonable that similar concern existed between the two groups of soldiers. The diary of Corporal Warren Wilson of 8RAR makes this most apparent, in which he frequently mentioned the lack of correspondence from home in connection with his loneliness and desire to be with his girlfriend Suzy, demonstrating the link between mail and satisfaction on the war front.31 Major J. G. Hughes, a Senior Australian Advisor in the AATTV, like Dangar fighting in South Africa, kept a running tally of the letters he received while in Vietnam in the form of an almost daily sub-heading entitled ‘Mail’ in his diary. Most notable was his entry of 11 May 1972, when he wrote: ‘Mail tonight was only 1 newspaper – no letter. Incredible as it may seem tonight was the first time I really needed a letter or espec a tape but none for the first time came’ [author’s emphasis].32 Australians in Vietnam eagerly awaited correspondence from the home front, with some viewing it as vital for survival on the miserable battlefront.33 The necessity of mail of which Hughes speaks denotes some awareness of the positive morale caused by news from the home front, an understanding that is also apparent among other men in Vietnam. For example, 5RAR Private

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Shayne O’Brien wrote to his parents: ‘Thanks a lot for them much appreciated keep them up won’t you, they are the only things keeping us going over here.’34 Similarly, Private Doug Bishop, also of 5RAR, encouraged his mother to keep writing: ‘It is a great help to get your letters regularly even though I can’t write to you sometimes.’35 The extent of the relationship between mail and morale is revealed by the frank words of Armourer Andrew Treffry of the 1st Field Squadron Workshop to ‘Eileen’: Sorry this isn’t a nice loving letter that you asked for, but I’m not very good at mushy ones; I avoid them as they’re not good for my morale as I get homesick very easily when I write to you like that. I long to be with you too but it doesn’t do me any good to write about it all the time. If that’s what you want to hear I can accommodate you quite easily, but you won’t enjoy them and I won’t enjoy writing them.36

Soldiers fighting in the Vietnam War were often more aware of the concept of morale and its workings, which may explain Treffry’s reluctance to write intensely emotive letters home. In refusing to articulate any true feelings concerning his absence from Australia and the loved ones he had left behind, he is exhibiting awareness that constant thoughts of the home front can be detrimental to his own personal morale. Soldiers in both wars thus treasured closeness with home; however, any disruptions to their link to Australia were treated with frustration. During the South African War, the enemy would often seize and destroy letters written by or for the British and their allies in combat, as mentioned by Private Robert Byers of the 1st Victorian Contingent: ‘The Boers used to open and read all our letters, & cut out any news concerning themselves of the war.’37 The soldiers affected by these intrusions were evidently irritated when they occurred, including Captain Frederick Howland of the 1st South Australian Contingent, who wrote in his diary: ‘the convoy containing our mails has been captured by De Wet [a Boer leader] and burnt, as we have had no letters for nearly 2 months there must have been a lot of letters for us and many curses were uttered for De Wet’.38 Only three days earlier, Private Alexander McQueen wrote to his parents about the same event: ‘I hear all our mails were destroyed by De Wett [sic], we will give him hot beans when he is nailed.’39 The disappearance of mail did not appear to be an issue during the Vietnam War, although both groups of soldiers did experience the effects of battlefield censorship. Many soldiers fighting in South Africa expressed concern about the

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contrast between the war’s events and news of the conflict on the home front. Press correspondents on the war front commented frequently on the mercilessness of the British censors that also limited the amount of news reaching Australia. An article in The Argus on 4 April 1900 wrote that the censor ‘is absolutely merciless with the blue pencil’, and only three days later printed a letter from a British correspondent in South Africa that was revealed to be half its original length due to censorship.40 The author of the letter, Donald McDonald, wrote: ‘My reason for abandoning the despatch of letters by runner was that everything that was interesting, sensational and true was cut out by the censor . . . it was a very costly means of getting through a very lame and insufficient account.’41 An article of 26 January 1901 in The Bulletin similarly criticized the concealment of truths concerning the war, writing that ‘the horrors of the Boer War find no place in the well-censored British cables’.42 Soldiers on the South African front were also subject to stringent censorship, with officers occasionally opening and reading soldiers’ letters to ensure that they didn’t contain information that could benefit the Boers. Soldiers occasionally mentioned this emphasis on tactical security, including Sergeant William Barham of the Mounted Rifles, who wrote to his father: ‘You must not expect to hear any war news from any of us, as all intelligence here seems to be suppressed.’43 Trooper Jack Cock from Bethune’s Mounted Infantry also directly mentioned censorship when writing home of a fellow soldier: ‘He says volunteering is no joke . . . (he says cannot go into full particulars as there is strict censorship over all correspondence leaving camp) . . . We are right in front here . . . I cannot say how many thousand we are as it would not be allowed but we are a strong force.’44 Private Charles Holme of the 1st Queensland Mounted Infantry also justified the restriction of news on the war front to his mother: ‘We know nothing whatever of the war. You in Australia know far & away more. The authorities tell us nothing – we are simply told to go. And go. I suppose it would not do to tell soldiers too much. The land is full of traitors.’45 Thus soldiers, who keenly felt the gap between themselves and Australia, frequently mentioned the effect of censorship on home front perceptions of the war. Australian authorities did not enforce formal military censorship during Vietnam, and soldiers’ correspondence was not subjected to the official scrutiny seen in earlier wars. However, press censorship did exist, both publicly on the home front through the rarely enforced D-notice system, as well as covertly through a ‘climate of control’ in both Vietnam and Australia that aimed to prevent subversive media reports.46 The ‘climate of control’ extended also to discourage soldiers from speaking openly to press representatives in Vietnam

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about combat actions, which may have also unofficially influenced tactical selfcensorship in correspondence sent to the home front. Soldiers on the war front were also affected by military control that restricted their access to media reports on the war, censored or not, an issue that was addressed by Armourer Andrew Treffry, who wrote in a letter home: ‘I don’t mean to be harsh but we don’t get many newspapers over here and if there are any they’re selected for morale I’m sure . . . I’ve only seen the Melbourne Sun about twice.’47 Private Garry Heffernan of 3RAR also wrote to his parents about an encounter with the enemy: ‘Information is so tight that it was only today I found out who the injured bloke was. We don’t know the names of the blokes to work out the codes.’48 Heffernan is directly referring to the use of codes, as well as military-imposed restrictions on information to soldiers, both intended to conceal intelligence from the enemy. Private Gerry Lavery of 9RAR demonstrated his desire to received classified news about the war in a letter to his mother: ‘We aren’t receiving any news from home yet & while we are out here we don’t get any newspapers only letters, so send any interesting news cuttings out in a letter.’49 As during the South African War, there was essential war front censorship firmly in place during Vietnam that caused complaints by soldiers who resented any disconnection with the home front. The commercial press also appeared to be a prime concern of soldiers who were mindful of the effect of battlefield news in Australia. One of the roles of the press during war is to ensure that morale is high on both fronts, which is accomplished in part by fostering a connection between them.50 The effectiveness of this aim can decrease when soldiers realize that there is a wide discrepancy between what has occurred on the battlefield and what is being reported on the home front. This was likewise true of British First World War soldiers, whose disapproval of the media was based on exaggerated public broadcasts on the war.51 Soldiers openly expressed contempt towards the press during both the South African and Vietnam Wars, due to perceptions of journalist dishonesty, as well as – for Vietnam in particular – its ability to turn the home front against the war. It was common for soldiers’ letters from South Africa to be published in local Australian newspapers, resulting in open criticism by men who disagreed with the publication of inaccurate accounts of the war. Private Charles Sabine of the 4th South Australian Imperial Bushmen demonstrated the general disdain with which soldiers viewed this practice, perhaps for reasons of self-censorship to protect those to whom he was writing from unnecessary worry: ‘It is amusing to read the letters in the papers some fellows sent to the other side. Many of them

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are written by fellows who havn’t [sic] seen a bit of the fun but were left in depots . . . or were no good. War is not such a fearful thing as they make out at all.’52 Other men instructed loved ones not to allow any of their own letters to be published. Lieutenant Douglas St. George Rich of the 6th Queensland Imperial Bushmen wrote to his mother: ‘Never on your hopes of happiness expose extracts from my letters to the Public Press. Nothing shames a man more out here than those stirring tales of war then [sic] those entitled “Our Boys at the Front” and hears he is the author. I think if one of mine appeared I should die of shame.’53 He later wrote: I heard from Jack Alexander who enclosed a cutting from the Courier re my being Mentioned in Despatches. I wonder who put it in for it’s simply sickening . . . I only hope to goodness you haven’t been making my letters public property but that I know you would never do. You were quite right when you thought I wouldn’t like them to go to print, for if you did I would simply buck out of my skin in annoyance.54

Private Robert Byers reacted with clear frustration when he realized his letters had already been made public, writing to his sister: ‘I wish you would not allow any more to be published, as I have a decided objection to it. In fact, if I thought you were going to publish any letters of mine, I would not have written them.’55 British soldiers during the First World War expressed similar concern, as they ‘cared passionately what the Home Front thought of them’, suggesting that such reactions are not only applicable to men writing from South Africa.56 Any dissatisfaction expressed when private correspondence was published suggests that these men wanted to avoid exposing their loved ones to inaccurate or jingoistic combat stories that could cause anxiety. Thus, after mentioning the unreliability of press reports, Sabine explicitly stated that war was not ‘fearful’. Also, soon after sending the above letter to his mother, Rich wrote to his father: ‘By the way tell Mother she needn’t be anxious about me getting a bullet through me.’57 Thus, the wider context of press disapproval among these men connects it more closely with self-censorship, a common characteristic of soldiers’ correspondence during these wars that will be examined later in this chapter. Men fighting in South Africa communicated their suspicion and disapproval of the press in other ways. Trooper Alured Kelly wrote in his diary: When the Third Contingent arrived at Capetown the daily paper unnecessarily published a leading article expressing their apprizement [sic] of the conduct of the Australian volunteer soldiers. When the Third Contingent heard of this rather stupid article a few of them marched to the publisher’s premises and did

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sufficient damage in the machine-room to prevent the publication of the journal for a day or two.58

Lieutenant Colonel Percy Ralph Ricardo of the 1st Queensland Mounted Infantry also wrote candidly to his son about a recent encounter: ‘I don’t know how it will be reported but I do know that all the press correspondents are misled’ [author’s emphasis].59 It is apparent that these men were not aware of the often merciless censorship of journalistic interpretations of the war, causing them to misdirect their frustration. More attention was paid to the role of media organizations during the Vietnam War, as the experiences of the world wars and the Korean War educated political and military authorities on the potential dangers of media access to the realities of warfare. However, knowledge of the effect of television reporting on public opinion was still in its infancy, and caused the governments of the United States and their allies much anxiety during Vietnam – since been labelled the ‘first television war’. Official emphasis on the success of the US military, often in place of the truth, has been identified as one of the reasons why the Tet Offensive has been considered a ‘psychological victory’ for the North Vietnamese forces, as communist attacks and subsequent media – particularly television – reports were able to quickly prove false American claims of victory in the early months of 1968. Australian soldiers in Vietnam frequently accused the media of untruthful reporting, in an attempt to reduce home front concern about their safety and disapproval of the war they were fighting. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray of the 547 Signal Troop acknowledged soldier contempt for the press in a letter to his wife: ‘Smouldering dislike and mistrust for press practically impregnated throughout the force now, as a result of the rubbish they persist in printing.’60 It is significant that Murray is writing only a few months after the Tet Offensive, which massively increased press and public opposition in both Australia and the United States. Signaller Andrew Clyne of the 110 Signal Squadron was more frank in a letter to his parents: ‘One of the guys got a newspaper over here from Australia that said Nui Dat had now closed down and everyone had moved to the coastal resort town of Vung Tau, what a laugh, love to get my hands on that reporter.’61 Similarly, Bombadier Peter Groves of the 105th Battery wrote in a letter home: ‘I never want to tell you about these sort of things, but its better for me to tell you than for you to read about it in the papers and boy do they exaggerate! You can usually cut their story or stories in half & it’s still highly exaggerated. That’s a fact’ [author’s emphasis].62

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Groves’ words, as well as those of 1RAR Corporal Ron Kelly to his wife, suggest that a chief desire of these men was to reduce concern: I am sorry to hear you are upset with everything, do me a favour honey, get a smile on your face and cheer up a bit. I do not blame you for being upset, but I do not like to see you that way . . . You don’t want to take too much notice of what you read and hear, because we are not doing a great deal. We are pretty well protected by the Yanks.63

Kelly’s awareness that his position within the war was causing his wife distress indicates that any criticism of press reports was intended to produce calm. This is one example of self-censorship, among many others, within the soldiers’ personal records from both wars that resulted from a deep concern for loved ones in Australia.

Self-censorship from the war front Historians of both nineteenth- and twentieth-century wars have acknowledged the existence of self-censorship among soldiers. British soldiers fighting in the South African War actively utilized self-censorship to conceal subjects considered indecent in the late nineteenth century, including sexual relations.64 There is also evidence that self-censorship occurred during the First World War, as Irish soldiers concealed from their loved ones ‘the true nature of war’ in correspondence, in order to protect them from worry.65 Demonstrating its prevalence, Fuller writes of British First World War correspondence: ‘letters in particular were written, through the filter of censorship, for a home audience, which might lead to the truth being softened or alternatively dramatized’.66 The letters written by Australians fighting in South Africa contain selfcensorship clearly intended to avoid discomfort on the home front, particularly among mothers, sisters and wives. Major General Edwin Tivey was one of many who made his concern for his mother apparent in a letter home: In your last letter you say you are always thinking of the war, that it is never out of your mind day or night, I hope, my dear mother you are not worrying too much about me, there is really no occasion for you to do so. I am quite well although war is a game which there is a certain amount of danger, it is not nearly as bad as you imagine.67

Saddler Albert Marshall also wrote with a specific intention, particularly in the early months of his war service from January 1902 when statements such as

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‘I never felt better in health in my life’ appeared in almost every letter. As his time in South Africa grew longer and seemingly more difficult, contradictions began to appear. In April he claimed: ‘we are not being fed very well’, yet insisted in the same letter that he was eating sufficiently and in June wrote ‘I am just about full up now I am getting home sick no place like home where you can sleep in a bed and plenty of blankets to keep you warm but through it all I am in splendid health.’ Less than a month later, he wrote of a visit to a doctor for a headache and excessive fatigue, still being sure to end his letter with ‘otherwise I am splendid’.68 Lieutenant George Harris of the South African Light Horse similarly wrote to his ‘darling mother’ after being wounded: ‘I sent you both heaps of love and don’t worry about me as I am nearly well now.’ He wrote again less than a fortnight later: ‘I feel tip top again so you need not worry about me.’69 Lieutenant Douglas St George Rich wrote to his mother: ‘Fond love to Father and don’t worry about me for I’m as happy and as dirty as a sandboy.’70 Private Stan Jones also wrote home to his family: ‘Although we have a lot to put up with here, we have a good time now and again, and I can assure you that I have been getting on great so far.’71 Expressions such as these are common in the examined letters from South Africa. Lieutenant Herbert Embling of the Victorian Mounted Rifles identified a reason for restraint when discussing his role in the war with his parents: ‘I don’t like talking on paper about fighting but I don’t think I told you .. . .’72 Embling’s words here suggest that his unwillingness to speak openly about this aspect of active duty was not accidental and that self-censorship was employed, whether for his own benefit or that of his family – or both. Supporting Embling’s words is a letter from Private Alan Wellington to his friend Philip Teer, in which he writes about his family: ‘I guess they will be surprised to hear of me being sick, yes & I guess they will be in a great state.’73 Wellington was evidently aware that his actions could cause anxiety on the home front. Supporting these examples of self-censorship are letters that deliberately lie about both battlefield conditions, as well as the strength of the enemy, in order to reassure loved ones in Australia. For example, Private Robert Byers wrote to his mother: ‘Do not be afraid as we are being looked after so well, in fact they could not treat us better.’74 Trumpeter C. George Davis wrote to his brother Alfred: ‘You will know by the letters home that I have been here just a month & I can promise you it is a good place, plenty to eat & sleep & nothing to do.’75 The frequent complaints about gruelling day-to-day conditions discussed in Chapter 5 suggest that Davis’ words here are untrue. Soldiers in South Africa were forced to endure very poor conditions, including frequent hunger.76

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Private JCJ McBeth of the 1st South Australian Contingent also wrote with care to his mother and sister in December 1899: I have had many good talks with soldiers who have been in several engagements with the Boers & they say that the chances of getting popped over are not very great . . . The Boers . . . have the appearance of rough farmers, & are a very mixed lot, ranging from mere boys to old white headed men. The general opinion is that they will not last long . . . Hoping you are both well not worrying about me.77

McBeth is intentionally underplaying Boer combat skills, as the month in which he was writing was significant for its overwhelming defeats. In fact, 10–17 December 1899 was labelled ‘Black Week’ and resulted in thousands of British deaths. Numerous personal records earlier discussed from the South African War also reveal the high esteem with which Australian soldiers generally regarded Boer combat skills. Although it is possible that McBeth believed his sentiments about Boer incompetence, Byers and Davis also appear to be downplaying the negative aspects of soldiering, as a form of self-censorship, in order to guard their loved ones from excessive worry. It is important to acknowledge the influence of Victorian epistolary conventions in the letters of these men before comparing them with Vietnam War correspondence. Middle-class Britons at the turn of the nineteenth century necessarily exhibited ‘extreme emotional reticence’, and insisting on maintaining a ‘stiff upper lip’, which then went on to influence the next generation of British men.78 Thus, Edwardian First World War soldiers utilized less severe ‘stereotypes’ to convey even very deep emotions in letters home.79 As earlier discussed, Australia’s political and military links with the Empire at the turn of the nineteenth century were matched by the mirroring of British social traditions within Australian colonies at the turn of the nineteenth century, which suggests that some – but not all – of these customs can be applied to Australians. Supporting the connection between Britain and Australia is the presence within Australians’ letters from South Africa of terms seemingly exhibiting refinement and politeness. For example, Trooper Percy Foale regularly wrote in his letters phrases such as: ‘hoping that this will find you in the best of health, as it leaves me at present’ and ‘In answer to your very welcome letter of the 8th May I received it last Sunday.’80 Soldiers often used these terms despite their education or class level, as in the case of Trooper John Dear of the 5th Victorian Contingent, who clumsily wrote to his wife: ‘I write this few laens hoping to find you all well as it levs me at present.’81 The frequent presence of nineteenth-

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century idioms within the letters home from South Africa suggests that soldiers were concerned that their correspondence appeared cultured – particularly in contrast with their often undignified surroundings – which may have impacted on the candidness with which they wrote to their loved ones and possibly also the extent to which they employed self-censorship in letters home. Soldiers fighting in the Vietnam War were more explicit about their desire to prevent anxiety among loved ones in Australia. This may be due to the reduced prominence of letter writing in society by the Vietnam War, as advances in technology had seen the telephone become the primary mode of communication in most western homes.82 The optimism men often expressed regarding their conditions and position can be compared to Embling’s words above, which reveal an awareness of the potentially damaging effects of negative news from the war front. When compared with soldiers from the South African War, men in Vietnam were more likely to use language that was specifically intended to comfort their friends and family rather than follow common idioms. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray, after describing his immediate surroundings to his wife, added: ‘Don’t be distressed by this description. I am quite safe and happy, not in any immediate danger and will look after myself with the utmost respect.’83 One week later he wrote: ‘So much has happened since I last wrote that it is hard to know just where to begin. I have been perfectly safe of course.’84 Murray’s preoccupation with reassuring his wife about his safety is more evident than among his counterparts in the South African War. Similarly, 6RAR Private Len McCosker wrote to his family about an impending relocation to Vung Tau: ‘Exactly what we’re doing I don’t know, but please don’t worry too much about me or the others from home.’85 Private Shayne O’Brien wrote about some recent mortar attacks: ‘Don’t worry too much about me for the present . . . don’t get me wrong it’s not always like this only some of the time, unfortunately.’86 Some soldiers were a little more forthright in their concern for those at home. Private Reg Yates of 1RAR wrote to his parents after mentioning the deaths of his comrades: ‘Please don’t worry. I’m O.K. and I’ll stay that way.’87 Army Aviation Corps Sergeant Richard Yielding wrote to his grandmother, aunt and uncle: ‘Nanna is not to worry when she hears Radio Broadcasts. The only war I am fighting is a paper one’ [author’s emphasis].88 Chief Radio Supervisor Leonard Moriarty wrote to his ‘darling Margaret’: Ref things like being shot, we are pretty safe all things considered, and I usually don’t even know about that sort of thing until next time I go to the mess for a

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brew, so it’s not very exciting or dangerous. Don’t worry overmuch about me my love, I’ll be there on 13th October with all my bits and pieces and rarin’ to go.89

Yates, Yielding and Moriarty were combat soldiers fighting in Vietnam who clearly placed consolatory words in their letters with the same intentions as those by Byers, Davis and McBeth from the South African War. Their aim in writing was more explicitly identified by Armourer Andrew Treffry, who wrote to ‘Eileen’: ‘This is a real rush letter so don’t expect much, at least I’m thinking of you, and trying to write occasionally so that you’ll not worry.’90 It is evident that, for Treffry at least, letter writing was a deliberate method used to reduce concern among loved ones on the home front. It is noteworthy also that although soldiers in Vietnam often assured loved ones of their safety, those fighting in South Africa were more likely to deliberately make conditions on the battlefield appear more comfortable than they were. This may be explained by the poor conditions on the South African war front repeatedly mentioned by soldiers. Also, the wellpublicized First and Second World Wars, as well as the Korean War, had been fought between the two conflicts, so men were less able to exaggerate in their correspondence home because civilians were more aware of what day-to-day battlefront life entailed. Self-censorship can also occur as a reaction to home front perceptions of war. In fact, some forms of self-censorship can appear when a ‘non-alignment between one’s private and public attitudes’ occurs.91 Also, those writing to family and friends from another country can never be completely certain that letters written will not be made public.92 Soldiers may thus be reluctant to reveal opposition to a war they are fighting if they know the war is popular at home. On the other hand, soldiers who support a war that they know is unpopular may not willingly reveal their approval, or even opinion, of the war. Any reticence in expression by soldiers fighting in Vietnam could therefore be caused not only by soldier concern for the home front, but also public attitudes towards an unpopular war. A comparison of the letters and diaries of soldiers from the South African and Vietnam Wars reveals that, despite changes in epistolary practices that caused more blatant self-censorship during the later war, there are more negative reactions expressed by men fighting in the South African conflict. In contrast, men in Vietnam were less likely to express any direct reaction at all to their position in the war, either positive or negative. This is unexpected for a variety of reasons, most particularly the widespread dissent in Australian society in the years after 1968, of which many soldiers in Vietnam were aware. Also, all men fighting in South Africa had volunteered for service, whereas the National

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Service Scheme during the Vietnam War meant that approximately one quarter of men in military service did not choose to enter the army. General attitudes to combat had also changed between the wars. The war in Vietnam was fought at a time when notions of heroism and sacrifice in war had altered irrevocably, and the concept of ‘loyalty’ was not as socially binding as it was during the war in South Africa. Also, as discussed earlier, men in the nineteenth century were urged to keep a ‘stiff upper lip’, never betraying their true emotions but instead emphasizing control, particularly in their written correspondence. Therefore, it is significant that during the South African War, when the general population was predominantly jingoistic and there was no lack of combat volunteers, men were more likely to communicate open dissatisfaction when writing home, and write with more emotion and sentimentality – whereas, for soldiers in Vietnam, such expressions were muted to a greater extent. It is possible, however, that changes in society between the two wars could have contributed to this unexpected difference between the two groups of soldiers. Members of the Australian public who opposed the war were often scathing towards veterans, both during and after the war. Streimer and Tennant write that the public support of draft evaders and public abuse towards the war is significant in explaining feelings of rejection and depression in Australian Vietnam War veterans that filtered back to soldiers still in Vietnam.93 The words of Lieutenant Colonel Neil Smith of 8RAR reveal soldiers’ dread of anti-war protesters: ‘I have to get up at three in the morning to fly to Brisbane . . . knowing my luck I’ll probably land in the middle of a demonstration against NS [National Service].’94 Chief Radio Supervisor Leonard Moriarty displayed similar resentment by his words raised earlier in this chapter that referred to ‘what the anti’s may try to put over our gullible public’.95 Soldiers’ wishes upon their return from Vietnam were in direct opposition to the treatment they expected to receive on the dissenting home front, as Private Douglas Bishop demonstrated to his parents on the last day of his tour: ‘When I get home I don’t expect to be treated like a hero, but if I’m not there’ll be trouble.’96 Soldiers’ reactions to the public perception of the war can be connected with their personal expressions written from the battlefield. Carroll, in his analysis of wartime letters, contends that those in combat are intensely defensive when it comes to their military service.97 Perhaps, then, these soldiers in Vietnam were attempting to legitimize their position in Vietnam, both to themselves, and to those whom they were writing, by limiting direct negativity about the war itself in their letters. Also, perhaps they also feared that their actions would be criticized by the increasingly anti-war home front, thus reducing positive comments about the war in any correspondence.

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Comparing the letters written by soldiers in Vietnam with those from South Africa strengthens this point. In contrast to the later Vietnam years, the situation on the Australian home front during the South African War ranged more evenly between public support for the war, indifference and small, but significant, anti-war groups. Thus soldiers were often freely able to express satisfaction in fighting and still command respect, as they did not have a malicious population to fear at home. For example, Lieutenant George Harris wrote to his mother: ‘This is a fine life and the best of it is there is always some excitement each day.’98 It is unlikely that a soldier in Vietnam would include mention of the ‘excitement’ of the possibility of killing or being killed in battle. In fact, the personal records of Australians in Vietnam generally contain significantly fewer favourable references to combat, and the environment on the home front was one in which the morality of the war was constantly being questioned. By implication this further illustrates the defensive impulse by soldiers writing from Vietnam. It is likely that these men wished to avoid being associated with the aggressive image of Vietnam soldiers existing in the minds of many anti-war Australians. The close interrelation between the civilian and battle fronts during the Vietnam War intensified this effect, as increased technology and the media in the late twentieth century brought civilians closer than ever to the front lines. The finding that advancements in communication technology over the twentieth century increased the presence of home in soldiers’ minds supports this point.99 During the South African War, soldiers were further away from the home front, both physically and figuratively, and news took a significant amount of time to move between the two fronts, which meant that the relationship between soldiers and Australia was far less powerful. Thus there existed less pressure on soldiers to prevent unnecessary worry in their families, as they did not have to consider the plethora of additional news services that may be providing their families with potentially distressing news. Of course, the above findings have demonstrated that South African War soldiers were still concerned about issues of press unreliability. However, the intense media saturation on the Australian home front during the Vietnam War, which encompassed newspapers, radio and television, did not exist during the earlier war. Thus the perceived need by Vietnam soldiers to avoid revealing confidential strategic information, and also prove their worth by limiting pessimism about the war in their correspondence would have been more powerful, as the loved ones with whom they communicated were living in a markedly anti-war society from which they had little chance of concealing war front actions.

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In keeping with this finding, the letters written by Australians in the South African War contained more candid articulations of dissatisfaction with the war than those in Vietnam, and often openly expressed their longing for home. For example, Sergeant Charles Frederick Pegler of the Natal Field Force confided to his sister: ‘I have seen a good deal of the horrors of war this time and shall be glad to see the finish of this.’100 Similarly, Trooper Fred Stocks, of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, wrote to his parents: ‘I expect you will wonder how I like soldering [sic] well to tell you the truth. Never again my boy never again; no one that has not been in it knows what it is.’101 Private William Hamline Glasson of the Bushveldt Carbineers wrote to his mother: ‘I have only got three weeks more to serve and then my time will be up & I can’t say I’m sorry as I don’t like soldiering too much.’102 Private Harry Victor Roberts of the Scottish Horse F Squadron also expressed his disenchantment by discouraging his friend ‘Chas’ to enlist: ‘Col. Craigh left us at Machododorp and has gone back to Victoria to raise another 250 men I suppose he will not have much trouble but my advice to you is DON’T COME’ [author’s emphasis].103 More of the expressed frustration by soldiers in South Africa is related to the character of the physical conflict itself. Private Stan Jones wrote to his sister: Of course nearly everybody is wishing that the war was ended . . . The Australians are just about used to soldiering by this time, but some of them found things a bit unpleasant at first . . . The washing of clothes puzzled us as our clothes got so dirty before we had an opportunity to wash them, and no doubt it would have made some of Australia’s fair creatures smile if they had seen the unsuccessful attempts that some of them made.104

Jones wrote in a later letter to his sister: ‘We are rather tired of South Africa.’105 Thus, his desire to return to Australia can be related to conditions on the battlefront. Similarly, Lieutenant Douglas St. George Rich wrote: We have now been seven months in South Africa so there will be another five months good to go and you know I think the time will be hailed with joy, for there’s no doubt about it this sort of game uses up men and I can quite understand them now saying that at the end of twelve months men are used up . . . If I could get a staff billet inside I would jump at it for this trekking and fighting nearly every day does kind of get on the nerves.106

It is significant that in the examined correspondence from South Africa, most men expressed disapproval with the war in terms of the desire for an end to the war itself, no doubt compounded by the original underestimation of the

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Boers by the British and Australian military forces. For example, Private Edward Windeyer of the 1st New South Wales Mounted Rifles wrote in a letter to his mother: ‘Here we are still chasing Boers, and wishing one and all that the War was over.’107 Private Stan Jones also writes: ‘I am not going to write you much about the War and the fighting this time, everybody is sick of the war here and you must be sick of reading about it by now . . . but the worst of it is that it is not over yet.’108 ‘Warring William Watson’, a Gunner in the 2nd New South Wales Contingent, wrote to the Beale family: ‘You no doubt expected that I would at all events have been at least under orders for home by now but no such luck. The country and our friends the enemy are so adapted to the present guerrilla warfare that God only knows when the affair will really end. Tis not war now but murder.’109 Lieutenant Colonel Percy Ralph Ricardo adopts a slightly more desperate tone in a letter to his son: ‘We have almost given up all hope of the war ever being ended.’110 These do not appear to be isolated cases, as Private Charles Cooper recounted a similar case of widespread discontent within the Victorian Bushmen’s Contingent. Six months after their arrival in South Africa, on 11 October 1900, the men in his contingent, joined by units from New South Wales and Queensland, demanded to be told when they would be sent home and, as a result, labelled as a ‘disgrace’ by a superior officer. Their pleas were ignored, so they re-addressed the issue on 18 October, when they were told their request would be forwarded to Lord Roberts, the British Commander-in-Chief. His reply came on 23 October, and the men were told that they were required to stay in South Africa.111 The soldiers’ seeming desperation to leave the war front could have been influenced by the time at which Cooper was writing, several months after the successive British victories in Kimberley, Ladysmith and Mafeking in the first half of 1900, when many soldiers expected they would be permitted to return home. The above examples, as well as numerous others, thus suggest that the traditional view of soldiers eagerly taking part in battle to support the cause of the British Empire espoused by the press of the time and in studies since the war’s end can clearly be questioned, even if in the case of these soldiers alone. Frequent references also appear in the personal records from South Africa to rumours or hearsay that the war was almost over, particularly in comparison to Vietnam. One reason these may have been included is that many who enlisted in the South African War elected to serve until the end of the war, whereas soldiers in Vietnam had a set twelve-month-long tour. Many men, after realizing that the war in South Africa would not be won swiftly by the British, insisted that they be permitted to return to Australia after twelve months, which was granted in many

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cases. However, the frequency with which soldiers still mentioned the possibility of the war’s conclusion does indicate a keen desire to leave South Africa. Private Stan Jones demonstrated this eagerness in a letter to his brother: ‘Most of them think that the war won’t last much longer and that we will soon be able to pull old Kruger’s whiskers.’112 Major Frank Valentine Weir of the New South Wales Bushmen Contingent wrote in his diary: ‘The latest news is that us troops are to go home . . . we are all to leave here in November for Australia.’113 Similarly, Private Alexander McQueen reported to his parents: ‘There is a rumour here, that the war will soon be over.’114 He wrote again almost a month later: ‘We hear all sorts of rumours about going home early, hope they are true, but then there are all sorts of rumours flying about.’115 It is noteworthy that these comments were also made in the months of and following the British successes in Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking, when the war was thought all but won by both British and Australian soldiers, as well as by the general public. On the other hand, the examined letters from the Vietnam War were more stoic, rather than overwhelmingly positive or negative. This is not altogether synonymous with the obvious disapproval for the war conveyed by many of the Australian public, particularly in the years after 1968. Soldiers usually expressed any despair connected with the war in terms of a longing to see loved ones they had left back in Australia. Infantryman David Keating, in his fifth month of service, related his emotions in letters home to the desire to see his girlfriend and family: ‘I wrote home to Sue, I miss her more than anything. I will be glad to get home to see her & get engaged & settle down for good. Be good to see the rest of my mates to [sic] & especially my family.’116 Similarly, Lance Corporal Dallas Lyle Burrage wrote less than three months into his service with the 3rd Cavalry Regiment: ‘I miss Mary so terribly much, and it seems so bloody futile at the moment, she is still 231 days away, and it seems so darned long.’117 Private Len McCosker was particularly blunt: ‘I’m not too bad, missing home like buggary [sic].’118 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murray, too, clearly missed the normality of Australia: ‘Ah . . . how I long for peace, burning toast and a casserole!’119 Other letters by men fighting in Vietnam echo this desire for home, with men revealing discomfort with their current position, while not directly blaming the war itself for their uneasiness. In summary, the distinct differences between the words of Australian soldiers in South Africa and Vietnam are unexpected, especially because popular opinion during each war conflicts significantly with the contents of the relevant personal records. A comparison of the examined letters and diaries from each war reveals that there are many more direct expressions of emotion, of dissent and approval,

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by soldiers in South Africa than by those in Vietnam. Although both groups of men spoke longingly of returning home from the war, soldiers in Vietnam expressed this more in terms of a simple yearning for loved ones they had left at home. Those in South Africa often demonstrated the same feelings, but their desire to return home was more commonly related to their surroundings and the conditions they were living under – namely, the war itself. These findings do not necessarily indicate that soldiers approved of conditions in Vietnam, as many personal reminiscences written since the war have argued the opposite. Pat Searson, a Qantas Chief Steward on the Sydney to Saigon route from 1968 to 1969, demonstrates this by saying: ‘I never met anybody who would say they had a great time in Saigon . . . The ordinary boy never spoke to me in those terms about how proud he was.’120 Articulation of feelings about the Vietnam War, particularly disapproval, was thus merely differently based, and less frequently expressed, than among men in South Africa. Lieutenant Barry Smith, working in the Civil Affairs Unit, wrote in his diary: ‘If the war were to finish tomorrow I would be very happy.’121 Similarly, Signaller Andrew Clyne wrote to his father: ‘I can’t think of much to say other [than] “Dad you can come and take my place any time”.’122 Expressions such as these are rare in the records from the later war, as most negative comments about the war itself are tied in with open longing for Australia, and loved ones. Much of this reticence can be attributed to the knowledge that men in Vietnam possessed regarding the length of their tour, thus they had less cause to speculate about the war’s end or their departure from Vietnam. It could also be attributable to the more deliberate self-censorship used to protect loved ones from worry found in the letters from Vietnam, as well as a defensive reaction to the fact that they were fighting an unprecedentedly unpopular war. Also important is the existence of self-censorship in soldiers’ letters home that was mentioned earlier in connection with both wars, but with increased importance during Vietnam, when less publicly appealing news from the battlefront was harder to conceal as a result of the transformation in the role and freedom of the press. Thus, correspondence from Vietnam contained increased self-censorship in comparison with South Africa, which would then likely reduce soldiers’ expressions of dissatisfaction with the war and the desire to return home. Added to these factors are additional possible reasons why men in Vietnam appeared much less preoccupied with their feelings about war than those in South Africa, despite the prevalence of open civilian dissent. In the sixty years between the South African and Vietnam Wars, Australia had marked itself

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militarily through involvement in the First and Second World Wars. Anzac Day had been established over the years as a momentous day that honoured earlier generations who had fought in war, thus ensuring a continuing emphasis on Australia’s military history.123 Thus, the preconceptions of war among men on their way to Vietnam were more defined than those who had enlisted in the South African War, through the nation-wide celebration of the Australian military tradition or direct contact with veterans. Older generations who go to war create a legend of war based on their own battle experiences which, in turn, fuels the sense of adventure experienced by those newly going to war.124 Thus, men on their way to Vietnam would often have the weight of decades of Australian military history on their shoulders, which would motivate them to maintain this tradition and avoid disappointing their friends, family and country. As a result, their letters written from the battlefield would communicate this desire by limiting complaints about the war and the soldier’s position within it, so as to project a more assured, positive impression of circumstances in Vietnam. Thus, the focus on homesickness or yearning for loved ones at home when soldiers in Vietnam articulated their dissatisfaction can be assigned greater significance. Ideological understanding of the wars was also broadcast much more readily to Australians during the Vietnam War. Although some men serving in Vietnam openly admitted they were unsure of the reasons for the war, explanations within letters to family members about the military and political situation in Vietnam frequently repeated many of the inaccurate ideas the Australian government and military were transmitting to the Australian public and to soldiers through military training. For example, HMAS Brisbane Chief Radio Supervisor Leonard Francis Moriarty constantly referred to the ‘fact’ that the United States was winning the war when explaining the current military situation to his partner in 1969, a ‘fact’ that the Tet Offensive proved wrong in early 1968.125 The power of military training during Vietnam is also demonstrated by the effectiveness of the official dehumanization of the enemy, which caused soldiers to see all Vietnamese, not only Vietnamese communists, as a deadly threat.126 Although dehumanization also occurred during the South African War, the Australian colonial armies were too inexperienced to concentrate officially on such matters. Also, during the war in South Africa, dehumanization was not linked with the ‘ultimate’ evil of communism, as part of the dreaded Cold War. Rather, the British Empire was threatened. The tendency of soldiers to follow official accounts of the war communicated in military training thus also suggests that those who were interested in political affairs were likely to have accepted the alleged reasons for involvement in the war, the fight against international communism. The limited

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concentration on ideological factors included in pre-Vietnam military training as opposed to its almost complete absence before South Africa would certainly have influenced the level of approval for the war in soldiers, which may have then been communicated in letters to loved ones in Australia. The differences in expression in the letters and diaries from South Africa and Vietnam can also be connected with the concept of individualism within war, particularly in relation to changes in both the composition of the army and military training. As discussed in Chapter 3, comradeship has been fostered within western armies for centuries, so as to ensure that soldiers remain loyal to the cause of the war they are fighting. However, in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century wars, and even at the beginning of the First World War, the ‘romanticisation of the individual fighter’ was emphasized more so than during later wars.127 Throughout the twentieth century social psychology became a more prominent issue within militaries, when individual soldiers were defined more so in relation to the groups in which they operated, a technique that aimed at reducing the ever-increasing psychiatric casualties of war.128 Australians in Vietnam proved a challenge due to their fierce individuality, but unit-centric training, which aimed to instil the self-perception that they were one specifically within a group, did contribute to reducing the incidence of psychological damage.129 Given also the increasingly high frequency of mutiny or desertion in twentieth-century wars, this form of training also aimed to convince men to continue fighting, as military psychologists had found that fear in war was often muted by a soldiers’ perception of the group as protection.130 Decreased individualism in war can also be connected to twentieth-century advances in weaponry. As war became more mechanized, the individual acts of a soldier became less significant within the wider conflict and an individual weapon was capable of killing more men at one time, thus contributing to soldiers’ awareness of the group environment.131 The changes in public attitudes towards war could have also contributed to the shift from the emphasis on individual soldiers to members of a military unit, in line with the earlier discussion of the ‘defensive impulse’ among troops in Vietnam. American soldiers in Vietnam were aware of the widespread opposition on the home front, which was a factor in creating a sense of kinship within military groups, or an ‘us versus them’ attitude, due to the perception that the increasingly anti-war home front despised the troops in Vietnam not as individuals, but as a collective unit.132 Such an issue would have similarly affected Australian Vietnam War soldiers, whereas during the South African War the population were predominantly in favour of the war, reducing the possibility

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that combatants would react in this way. In fact, Lord Roberts, the second Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South Africa, said that Australian soldiers possessed ‘more individuality’, which the British Army had attempted to instil in its own troops.133 Roberts’ words can be supported by looking to the regimental spirit among Australians in South Africa that was earlier discussed, which saw men identifying themselves as distinctly Australian rather than merely a member of the British allied forces. Such soldier individualism can have an effect on wartime epistolarity, as soldiers’ letters convey the sense of familiarity essential for ‘fragile and vulnerable individuals’ fighting among strangers, with the prospect of death looming over them.134 Also, individualism encourages greater introspection, which then may increase candidness when writing about the extremes of human experience, as is observed among the men in South Africa. However, if soldiers have instead had ingrained into them the sense of pride and loyalty in one’s unit over working merely for the individual, which was increasingly impressed upon soldiers over the twentieth century and particularly during the Vietnam War, as demonstrated above, it is likely that the need for familiarity is reduced, and the soldier relies more on the group understanding to comprehend the war experience themselves. The largely increased self-censorship during the later war – when it was more difficult to conceal the harsh realities of war from home due to technological advancements in communication and transportation – would compound any reticence by these men. Thus despite the effect of cultural restraint in epistolarity at the turn of the nineteenth century, these additional factors – namely, the changing nature of war and the role of the soldier – appear to have affected soldier correspondence far more profoundly. There are, in addition, less significant factors that may explain the differences between correspondence between the wars, including the contrast in physical conditions between the two wars, and the length of the imposed ‘tour’ on soldiers. Many South African War soldiers’ personal records contain complaints about the harsh conditions in South Africa, which could cause even the most fervent fighter to experience some disenchantment with their surroundings and the war. The examined soldiers in Vietnam rarely complained about this issue, as they experienced generally superior living conditions, including access to ‘boozers’ and regular R&C trips. Soldiers fighting in Vietnam were required to serve at least twelve months on the front, whereas those who enlisted in the South African War were originally intended to remain in South Africa until the end of the war, until numerous complaints by soldiers reduced their length of service to twelve months. Thus,

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many of the letters from South Africa that express repulsion towards the war itself, the hope that it will end soon, a desire to return home – or any combination of these – may be the result of their facing an extended stay in South Africa. By contrast, soldiers in Vietnam knew exactly when they were due to return home. In fact, a large number of the archived soldiers’ letters from this war contain a record of the time remaining until their tour ends.

Conclusion It is noteworthy that the factors that determined a soldier’s form of expression in correspondence from South Africa and Vietnam appeared to be based markedly on their impressions of the home front, where their loved ones were located. Public support or opposition to the war in question, cultural traditions connected to military performance, as well as the personal desire not to worry their family and friends, or the desire to protect their own reputations, seemed to alter the content of this first-hand contact between battle and home fronts. The Vietnam War experienced significant home opposition, while the war in South Africa was predominantly supported, despite growing indifference. The evidence presented in the examined personal records suggests that a highly anti-war population can cause defensiveness in soldiers concerning their combat activities, and make them less likely to express opinions on the war they are fighting. Alternatively, a predominantly supportive population, as seen during the South African War, can reduce soldier concern about public criticism for openly conveying a desire for an end to the war and the chance to return home. The Vietnam War period altered the content of the soldiers’ personal records in a singular way, due to the closer technological proximity of the war and home fronts, as well as the existence of a specifically Australian military tradition that was absent during the earlier war. The former increased criticism of press accounts of the war in letters home, whereas the latter caused soldiers to become more defensive of their military service, particularly given the significant antiwar movement that existed during the Vietnam War. The reduced importance on individualism within warfare, and military emphasis on the group environment was also a significant factor in the transformation in epistolarity between the wars. Also, elements such as soldiers’ tactical self-censorship, present during both wars in the absence of official war front censorship, did impact correspondence. It is also likely that during the Vietnam War, where press freedom reduced the ability of the military to conceal events that could cause controversy on the

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home front, tactical self-censorship increased among soldiers eager to ensure that battlefield news did not cause their loved ones to worry. Thus, the result is a notable difference in the personal expressions of the examined soldiers in each war. Those fighting in Vietnam were less likely to openly communicate a desire for the war’s end – not necessarily because they felt more satisfaction on the war front than South African War soldiers, but because the above-mentioned factors on the home front meant they were less inclined to speak negatively about their position. Instead, those who did experience discontent on the war front were more likely to express their yearning for home in terms of what Australia offered them, such as family, friends and comfort, rather than the specific failing of the war front to satisfy their personal needs. Naturally, other factors such as the level of pre-war ideological training, as well as the difference in physical conditions between the two war fronts, did also appear to affect the examined soldiers’ sentiments in this study. Still, it is apparent that any examination of the influences on a fighting soldier must consider the home front alongside an analysis of the military situation on the battlefield.

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Conclusion

The experiences of the Australians fighting in the South African and Vietnam Wars have emphasized the ties between battle and home fronts during war. Looking to a combination of official policy and changing home front views of warfare can largely explain the similarities and differences in sentiment found in the letters and diaries of soldiers during these wars. Political and military decisions regarding the wars, including terms of service, training techniques and the conditions under which soldiers fought, did significantly affect the words of these men, yet the civilian population on the home front, and society’s attitudes towards warfare also had a profound effect on soldiers’ personal expressions of support or disapproval of the war and their place within it. However, the extent to which soldiers were influenced by individual factors on the home front varied, due to the inevitable changes within Australian society in the decades between the wars. Thus, it can be concluded that although the examined soldiers reacted to various aspects of military service in South Africa and Vietnam in similar ways, there are also noteworthy differences, of which many originate in some way from the Australian home front. The methods employed in this study – namely, the analysis of archived personal records written by soldiers while actually on the war front, and the application of these to twentieth-century research carried out on soldiering – were chosen to gain as close as possible a representation of soldier feeling at the time of each war. However, this analysis has highlighted the need for additional research on other facets of each war so as to gain a more complete awareness of the Australian soldier experience of these wars. The first concerns the Australian home front during the South African War. Since the Australians in South Africa appeared to make the decision to enlist based on what had influenced them from within their own country, it is also possible to attribute some of their attitudes to civilians on the Australian home front. Also, their letters home contain frequent declarations of dissatisfaction with the war,

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suggesting that negative opinion did reach the loved ones of the predominantly lower- to lower-middle-class soldiers fighting in South Africa. Numerous past studies on the war acknowledge that the war met, predominantly, with approval in Australia, yet few have fully charted the extent to which all sectors of society supported the war. Both Chris Connolly and Barbara Penny, in their revisionist accounts of Australian reactions to the war, openly state that the war’s later stages were marked by a lack of interest among civilians, demonstrating that the public eagerness of 1899 and 1900 did not continue until 1902.1 However, the extent to which this is attributable to war-weariness or a general dissatisfaction with the war is unclear. Examinations of anti-South African War groups – or pro-Boers – acknowledge that the protest movement during the conflict was the domain of the middle to upper classes, of which a minority openly opposed the war. However, Australian lower-class attitudes towards the war have not been systematically investigated, although a similar examination of British workingclass opinion has been successfully carried out. Richard Price’s study on British home front attitudes towards the South African War has broadened knowledge of the social history of the war, encompassing attitudes from the working classes, as well as from those with a higher social standing.2 The broad attitudinal basis of the mainly lower-class Australians fighting in the South African War does raise questions regarding their contemporaries on the home front. Although clearly beyond the scope of this study, the necessity of an in-depth study of workingclass attitudes on the Australian home front is now more apparent. The second relates specifically to the range of examinations that exist on the topic of Australian Vietnam War soldiers. There are numerous analyses of the Australian home front during the later war, largely due to the high level of antiwar sentiment it provoked. However, the perspective of specifically Australian soldiers fighting in this war requires further attention, particularly given the high prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among its veterans and in comparison with similar studies on American soldiers who fought in Vietnam. It is evident that additional, more varied research into the men that actually fought in the war must be carried out, using a range of primary sources – namely, letters and diaries in concert with oral interviews, the latter being impossible in this particular study, as living veterans do not exist for both wars. Further exploration will provide wider knowledge of the soldiers themselves, as well as give a stronger sense of civilian feeling at the time since, after all, the fighting men originated from – and survivors returned to – civilian society. In general, the soldiers fighting in the South African War were more candid in their opinions about the war they were fighting. When men encountered

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difficulties, it was likely that they would express negativity towards their place in the war, yet they also openly communicated their support for the war and its cause, albeit to a far lesser extent. On the other hand, those fighting in Vietnam were more reticent in their correspondence and diaries written while on the front, particularly concerning the war itself. Although the men examined are only a very small percentage of the approximately 15,000 Australians who fought in South Africa and 60,000 in Vietnam, the differences in this sample cannot be discounted, and must be acknowledged. The shift in expression can be explained in several different ways, and expressed views appeared to change with individual facets of war. Generally, the difference between Australians in each war can be partly attributed to the concepts of self-censorship and defensiveness. The findings in this study, as well as scholarly opinion on soldiering, suggest that if a civilian population is predominantly supportive of a war their country is engaged in, it is more likely that soldiers fighting in that war will not feel reluctant about expressing their attitudes towards it, whether positive or negative. Thus, if a war is not supported on the home front it then appears to follow that a soldier will become intensely defensive of his war service, so as to legitimize the sacrifice he is making both to himself and to his civilian counterparts. Soldiers’ positive comments about the war also appeared to decrease as civilian populations turned against the war being fought, so as to prevent public criticism of their personal actions. Self-censorship then frequently occurs, by which a soldier will restrict negativity about the war he is fighting so as to protect loved ones on the home front from unnecessary distress. However, this distinction between the South African and Vietnam War soldiers did not apply to all facets of the wars, although it can be seen as a general pattern of expression for the men fighting in both conflicts, but particularly those in Vietnam. The appearance of clear defensiveness in the soldiers’ personal records from Vietnam occurred throughout their tours, beginning with a reluctance to mention reasons for volunteering for military service. Although this can be attributed to the National Service Scheme in existence from late 1964, meaning that about a quarter of those who fought in Vietnam did not enlist by choice, it is also possible to view unwillingness to speak about motivations for enlistment as a consequence of fighting in an unpopular war. As such, it appears less likely that a soldier will freely admit to enlisting in war if they will be denounced for their decision. Defensiveness was also a factor when comparing the number of negative expressions towards the war in the letters and diaries of soldiers from both wars. Those fighting in South Africa were more likely to criticize the war,

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and openly wish for its conclusion, despite the seemingly overt support for the conflict within the Australian population. On the other hand, Vietnam War soldiers’ letters and diaries contain significantly less evidence of disapproval for the war, despite the predominant opposition to the war within Australian society – where these soldiers had been born and raised – after 1968. The shock of the Tet Offensive, after US and Australian government claims of near victory, caused a gradual conversion in Australia from a largely hawkish society to one that saw opposition from not only those disposed against war in general, but also increasing numbers of the general public.3 The observed disparity suggests that a defensive impulse by these soldiers reduced expressions of disapproval for the war, supported by past analyses of wartime correspondence that emphasize such a reaction by soldiers concerning their military service.4 The increased capability of weapons to kill humans, predominantly from the First World War, and the resultant reduction in individualism among combatants, can also explain, to a significant extent, the difference in candidness between the two groups of soldiers. Western soldiers fighting in the late nineteenth century would certainly have been affected predominantly by notions of heroism and romanticism from past centuries, which emphasized the actions of each individual fighter as a direct influence on the results of both battles, and entire wars. However, the increased brutality of weaponry from the First World War, that were able to kill groups of soldiers, forced individual soldiers to think about their actions in terms of the group. This was also stressed by militaries, which were eager to avoid any negative psychological effects of warfare on fighting soldiers as a result of these transformations in warfare. Thus, by the Vietnam War, military training highlighted the importance of the group and comradeship to each individual soldier. Such changes, added to the increased incidence of self-censorship in later wars as a result of advances in technology which took the war to the home front, thus making it more difficult to conceal the realities of combat, explain the observed reticence among Australians in Vietnam compared with those in South Africa. These findings can also be tied to the shifting norms of society and resulting changes in attitudes towards war, both of which caused the content of soldiers’ personal records to alter considerably between the two conflicts. Between the turn of the nineteenth century and the Vietnam years, from the early 1960s, a significant sea change occurred in the relationship between the civilian front and battlefield during war. The interdependence between these two locations increased in both its sheer intensity, as well as its strength of flow in both directions, partly caused by the impact of the ‘new’ media – a result aided

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by the increase in literacy, prompting readership of a wider kind, as well as by technology, especially television. Television has had a dramatic impact on war, particularly on Vietnam, during which civilians saw with their own eyes atrocities being committed, thus increasing the public revulsion towards warfare.5 Changes in popular viewpoints on war were also accentuated by post-Second World War thinking, influenced by both the mass nature of war, as well as the exposure to the use of nuclear weapons which, combined with the technological closeness of the home and war fronts, brought the human race closer to the extremities of warfare, thus truly globalizing warfare.6 These factors contributed directly to the vast difference in public reactions to the South African and Vietnam Wars. It is noteworthy, however, that although opposition to the Vietnam War was much more apparent on the home front, and Australian discussions during the South African War often emphasized ‘loyalty’ and criticized those who failed to exhibit it, some soldiers in both wars did question their morality. It is also important that, although this occurred far more during the earlier war, the soldiers fighting in South Africa seemed more likely to revert to what they termed their ‘duty’ in explaining their actions, whereas those fighting in Vietnam – who were from a society with a wider range of opinion towards the justness of war – did not appear to have such an ingrained notion of duty as a primary instigator in war. However, admissions of fear in combat, as well as the importance of mere survival over heroism in war, were much more apparent in the personal records from the later war, undoubtedly caused by an altered awareness of duty, as well as sacrifice. Men fighting in Vietnam were much more open about their genuine fear of combat, as well as their evident attitude that merely surviving the war was a clear priority over any display of courage. Public perspectives on warfare and its effects were not the only factor that altered so markedly between the two wars. Military understanding of the effect of combat duty on soldiers also increased as a result of the two world wars that occurred between Australian involvement in the South African and Vietnam Wars, evidence of which visibly filtered down to the soldiers fighting in Vietnam. The personal records from this war do reveal that soldiers possessed knowledge of the factors that contribute to morale. Both positive and negative aspects of soldiering were often related by soldiers in Vietnam to their resultant effect on morale, an effect of advancements in military training. Specific factors affecting them on the war front, including poor conditions and regular mail from home, were all directly tied to morale, whether positive or negative, in the personal records of those fighting in Vietnam.

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Although the examined South African War soldiers mentioned these aspects of warfare, it seems that their understanding of the relationship between warfare and morale was not as well developed as for those in the later war. In addition, the unprecedented amount of psychological damage resulting from the First and Second World Wars became more evident after 1945, alerting future soldiers to this possibility in warfare. As a result, increased research into the psychological consequences of combat during and after the world wars reduced the level of shame in soldiers who experienced such ill effects. The soldiers from the South African War never mentioned intense psychological stress from battle, whereas, during Vietnam, some men were more likely to mention its occurrence in other soldiers and admit that it was also a possibility for themselves. Such expressions were likely influenced by changes in attitudes towards warfare that originated on the home front, both in wider society and within the military itself. Military research into soldiering during the twentieth century also confirmed that strong ties exist between morale and soldiers’ physical conditions. During the South African War, soldiers had to endure very poor standards of living while on active combat duty and were often unofficially granted access to alcohol, whereas men in Vietnam were allowed more home comforts such as leisure time (in the form of regular R&C), as well as an official alcohol allowance among all units, to maintain morale and reduce the possibility of mutiny, ‘fragging’ or desertion. The personal records, particularly from the South African War, reveal that living conditions did frequently appear to determine men’s attitudes towards the wider military structure, both officers in command and allied troops. Dissatisfaction with decisions made by military leaders concerning their lives was more evident when these soldiers were not satisfied with their everyday living arrangements. In contrast, the personal records of men in Vietnam contain less dissatisfaction with leadership, and fewer complaints about standards of living. Still, these soldiers did appear to have higher expectations of their day-to-day conditions, demonstrated by the connections made between physical comfort and the preservation of morale. The improved state of physical conditions in war, and their effect on soldiers’ opinion of the military, can again be possibly attributed to decisions made on the home front by both the military and governments, as a result of the increased knowledge of warfare’s severity and the desire of those in power to ensure that soldiers remain on the battlefield for their entire period of service. Thus, forces on the home front, at least in the case of this particular group of soldiers, can have a serious influence on their attitudes towards the particular war being fought. It does appear, however, that one of the most significant factors affecting the content of the soldiers’ letters and diaries from both wars was their concern for

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family and friends on the home front – expressed in the form of self-censorship. Personal records from both wars reveal omissions or untruths, with the intended aim likely to have been the desire to ensure that those to whom they were writing did not unnecessarily worry about their welfare. In addition, many soldiers from both wars expressed animosity towards the press and openly told their families to disregard newspaper and television reports from the war, because they believed that their families were being lied to and, particularly during Vietnam when the media gave more candid, graphic reports from the war front, also because of the fear that these would cause their families to become anxious for their safety. These concerns may have also been emphasized during the Vietnam War as a result of the rapidly expanding anti-war movement throughout the years. However, although the war’s protesters did appear to cause some men to become overly defensive of their military service and, thus, limit negativity towards the war in their personal records, as discussed earlier, others were reluctant to express any approval of the war in their letters and diaries, likely for fear of home front criticism. It is also possible to attribute the reduction in open disapproval towards war in the letters and diaries from Vietnam to other factors. For example, the Australian military tradition established in the years since the South African War, which would have reduced soldier willingness to tarnish the public image of Australian soldiers in war, the perceived need by men for tactical self-censorship in the absence of official war front censorship, and even the increased intensity of ideological training before Vietnam War service, particularly given the focus of the Cold War emphasis on communism as a world evil, did appear to discourage open criticism by some of these soldiers. Finally, it is important to note that the heightened pessimism that appears in the letters and diaries from the South African War does not indicate conclusively that soldiers in Vietnam approved of the war they were fighting and their role within it more than those in South Africa. Although those fighting in the later war appeared more guarded in expressing their precise feelings, both positive and negative, towards the war in their letters and diaries, the reasons above – namely, the desire to protect loved ones from worry, avoid criticism from home front opponents of the war and ensure that wider opinion of Australian soldiers was not tainted by their words – did seem to considerably affect what they wrote. The findings of this study thus suggest that the connection between the home and war fronts is significant when focusing on the impact of Australia itself on the men who fought in South Africa and Vietnam. It is apparent that any assessment of soldier attitudes and behaviour during any conflict must also take into account individual influences deriving from the civilian front.

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Notes

Introduction 1 Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military History (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 226–227. For similar ideas expressed by other researchers, see Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Chatto & Windus, 2000). 2 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 31. 3 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 2, 5. 4 The South African War is otherwise known as the Boer War, and the Anglo-Boer War. The decision to use the name South African War is intentional, so as not to imply that the war only included British and Boer, and thereby exclude the contributions of non-white participants in the war. 5 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (London: Vintage, 1999), p. 100. 6 Black, Rethinking Military History, p. 225. 7 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends, 2000, 4102.0 (2006), viewed 8 June 2015, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/7d12b0f6763c78c aca257061001cc588/db7193812e1efc92ca2570ec000e215a!OpenDocument; Kuldeep Bhatia and Michael de Looper, International Health – How Australia Compares, cat no. PHE 8 (Canberra: AIHW, 1999), viewed 8 June 2015, http://www.aihw.gov.au/publication-detail/?id=6442467014. 8 Frank Wilkinson, Australia at the Front: A Colonial View of the Boer War (London: John Long, 1901); R. Scot Skirving, Our Army in South Africa (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1901). 9 See, for example, William E. Hocking, Morale and Its Enemies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918), p. 151; Michael Roper, The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 50. 10 Barbara Penny, ‘Australia’s Reactions to the Boer War – A Study in Colonial Imperialism’, The Journal of British Studies, 7, 1 (1967), p. 127.

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11 Penny, ‘Australia’s Reactions to the Boer War’, p. 127. See also Barbara Penny, ‘The Australian Debate on the Boer War’, Historical Studies, 14, 56 (1971), pp. 526–544. Penny’s view is supported by Anthony P. Haydon, ‘South Australia’s First War’, Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand, 11 (1964), p. 229. For other views of the Australian home front during the South African War period, see Charles S. Blackton, ‘Australian Nationality and Nationalism: The Imperial Federationist Interlude, 1885–1901’, Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand, 7, 25 (1955), pp. 351–367; Charles Grimshaw, ‘Australian Nationalism and the Imperial Connection 1900–1914’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 3, 2 (1958), pp. 161–182; D. H. Johnson, Volunteers at Heart: The Queensland Defence Forces, 1860–1901 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1974). 12 Chris Connolly, ‘Manufacturing “Spontaneity”: The Australian Offers of Troops for the Boer War’, Historical Studies, 18, 70 (1978), p. 115. 13 Chris Connolly, ‘Clan, Birthplace, Loyalty: Australian Attitudes to the Boer War’, Historical Studies, 18, 71 (1978), pp. 220, 226. 14 See Craig Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899–1902 (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 83, 226, 233–234, 240, 306–309. 15 See Max Chamberlain and Robin Droogleever (eds), The War with Johnny Boer: Australians in the Boer War, 1899–1902 (Sydney: Australian Military History Publications, 2003); R. L. Wallace, The Australians at the Boer War (Canberra: Australian War Memorial & Australia Government Publishing Service, 1976). Local accounts have also appeared, such as Rod Gow and Wendy Gow, Boer War 1899–1902: Mafeking to the Manning: Letters from the Front (Cundletown: Self-Published, 1999); Roslyn Maddrell, Letters from the Front: Boer War to WWII Through Letters Sent by Servicemen to their Families in Braidwood (Braidwood: Self-Published, 2004); Dorothy Durrant, Letters from the Front: Quirindi Servicemen Write Home from the Boer War, 1899–1902 (Quirindi: SelfPublished, 2010). 16 Most noteworthy is Richard Price’s An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working Class Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War, 1899–1902 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), which is an analysis of working-class attitudes towards the war that separates opinions found in the Labour movement with those of the working class to determine the most likely views of the latter and incorporates records that represent a larger cross-section of the population, in class terms, than Australian examinations. For valuable Australian works that use similar methods but with a more limited scope, see Bobbie Oliver, ‘“A Wanton Deed of Blood and Rapine”: Opposition to Australian participation in the Boer War’, in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire: The 1999 Chief of Army/Australian War Memorial Military History Conference (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2000), pp. 191–199; Connolly, ‘Clan, Birthplace, Loyalty’, pp. 210–232.

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17 See Carman Miller, ‘Loyalty, Patriotism and Resistance: Canada’s Response to the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902’, South African Historical Journal, 41 (1999), pp. 341–352; Stephen M. Miller, Volunteers on the Veld: Britain’s Citizen-Soldiers and the South African War, 1899–1902 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); Katharine McGowan, ‘“A Finger in the Fire”: Canadian Volunteer Soldiers and their Perceptions of Canadian National Identity through their experience of the Boer War’, War and Society, 28, 1 (2009), pp. 61–87; Lachy Paterson, ‘Identity and Discourse: Te Pipiwharauroa and the South African War, 1899–1902’, South African Historical Journal, 65, 3 (2013), pp. 444–462. 18 McGowan, ‘“A Finger in the Fire”’, pp. 67, 89. 19 The most significant of these are Department of External Affairs, Viet Nam: Current Statements of Australian Policy (Canberra: DEA, 1965) and Department of External Affairs, Vietnam: Questions and Answers (Canberra: DEA, 1966). 20 See Harold Levien, Vietnam, Myth and Reality (Rose Bay: H. Levien, 1967); Alex Carey, Australian Atrocities in Vietnam (Sydney: RS Gould, Convenor, Vietnam Action Campaign, 1968); Alan Watt, Vietnam: An Australian Analysis (Melbourne: FW Cheshire, 1968); Monash University Labor Club, The Vietnam Tragedy (Melbourne: MULC, 1965); Jim F. Cairns, Living with Asia (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1965); Jim F. Cairns, The Eagle and the Lotus: Western Intervention in Vietnam 1847–1971 (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1971). 21 The Australian–New Zealand–United States Security Treaty and the South East Asian Treaty Organisation, which will be discussed further in the next chapter. 22 See, for example, Peter Pierce, Jeffrey Grey and Jeff Doyle (eds), Vietnam Days: Australia and the Impact of Vietnam: A Bold Reassessment of the Myths, History and Culture of Australia’s Longest War (Ringwood: Penguin, 1991); John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia’s Vietnam War (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993); Terry Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993); Joseph M. Siracusa and Yeong-Han Cheong, America’s Australia, Australia’s America: A Guide to Issues and References (California: Regina Books, 1997); Garry Woodard, Asian Alternatives: Australia’s Vietnam Decision and Lessons on Going to War (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2004). 23 Peter Edwards, with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in the Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1992); Peter Edwards, A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965–1975 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1997); Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War 1967–1968 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 2003); and Ashley Ekins, with Ian McNeill, Fighting to the Finish: the Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968– 1975 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 2012) all provide unique perspectives on the war.

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24 See, for example, Max Charlesworth, ‘Australian Catholics and Conscription’, in Roy Forward and Bob Reece (eds), Conscription in Australia (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1968), pp. 242–259; Max Charlesworth and Val Noone, ‘Christians, Vietnam and the Theory of the Just War: The Response of the “Pax” Group’, in Kenneth Maddock and Barry Wright (eds), War: Australia and Vietnam (Sydney: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 148–159; Charlotte Clutterbuck, ‘Protests and Peace Marches: From Vietnam to Palm Sunday’ in Maddock and Wright (eds), War: Australia and Vietnam (Sydney: Harper and Row Publishers, 1987), pp. 135– 147; Ann Curthoys, ‘The Anti-War Movements’, in Jeffrey Grey and Jeff Doyle (eds), Vietnam: War, Myth and Memory: Comparative Perspectives on Australia’s War in Vietnam (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 90–104; Ann Curthoys, ‘“Shut up, you bourgeois bitch”: Sexual Identity and Political Action in the AntiVietnam War Movement’, in Joy Damousi and Marilyn Lake(eds), Gender and War: Australians at War in the Twentieth Century (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 311–341; Lynn Hemmings, ‘Vietnam Memories: Australian Army Nurses, the Vietnam War and Oral History’, Nursing Inquiry, 3 (1996), pp. 138–145; Narelle Biedermann, Kim Usher, Ann Williams and Barbara Hayes, ‘The Wartime Experience of Australian Army Nurses in Vietnam, 1967–1971’, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 35, 9 (2001), pp. 543–549. 25 Mark Dapin, The Nasho’s War: Australia’s National Servicemen and Vietnam (Melbourne: Viking, 2014), pp. 100–101, 336–337. Chris Dixon’s recent article ‘Redeeming the Warrior: Myth-Making and Australia’s Vietnam Veterans’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 60, 2 (2014), pp. 214–228 also presents a valuable discussion of the role of cultural memory and ties to the United States in popular, yet often misguided, views of malice towards Vietnam veterans in Australia. 26 See Barry Heard, Well Done, Those Men: Memoirs of a Vietnam Veteran (Scribe: Carlton North, 2007); Noel Giblett (ed.), Homecomings: Stories from Australian Vietnam Veterans and their Wives (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987, reprinted 1990); Stuart Rintoul, Ashes of Vietnam: Australian Voices (Richmond: William Heinemann, 1989); Gary McKay, Going Back: Australian Veterans Return to Vietnam (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2007); Dave Morgan, My Vietnam War: Scarred Forever (Newport: Big Sky Publishing, 2014); David Millie, Team 19 in Vietnam: An Australian Soldier in War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013). 27 Frank Kermode in Samuel Hynes, ‘Personal Narratives and Commemoration’, in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds), War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 205. 28 Carina Donaldson, ‘“The Book is Inspired by the Australian Soldier”: The Wounds of War and the Literary Rehabilitation of the Australian Soldier in Vietnam War Writing’, Journal of Australian Studies, 36, 4 (2012), p. 474.

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29 See, for example, Gary McKay, Bullets, Beans and Bandages: Australians at War in Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1999); Ted Mertens (ed.), ‘Dear Mrs Casey’: The Letters of Jim Houston . . . Just an Ordinary Anzac (South Australia: Self-Published, 2000); Bruce Davies, with Gary McKay, Vietnam: The Complete Story of the Australian War (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012); Paul Ham, Vietnam: the Australian War (Pymble: HarperCollins, 2007). 30 See Jeffrey Grey, ‘Getting into the Books: Vietnam as History in Australia’, in Jeff Doyle, Jeffrey Grey and Peter Pierce (eds), Australia’s Vietnam War (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), p. 100. 31 Peter G. Bourne, Men, Stress and Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970); Christian G. Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). 32 See, for example, Lloyd B. Lewis, The Tainted War: Culture and Identity in Vietnam War Narratives (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985). 33 See Robert J. Lifton, Home from the War: Vietnam Veterans: Neither Victims nor Executioners (London: Wildwood House, 1973); John Helmer, Bringing the War Home: The American Soldier in Vietnam and After (New York: The Free Press, 1974). 34 This is with the exception of Jane Ross, ‘Australian Soldiers in Vietnam: Product and Performance’, in Peter King (ed.), Australia’s Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War’ (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 72–99 which delves into the feelings of Australians in Vietnam more than any other study before it and compares their attitudes and experiences with those of American soldiers. This is, however, only a chapter within an edited book, so its scope is therefore limited. See also Jan Green, ‘A Soldier’s Wife’s Story’, in Maddock and Wright (eds), War: Australia and Vietnam (Sydney: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 118–131; Peter Rothwell, ‘The Attack at Chin Duch/Duc Hanh’ in Maddock and Wright (eds), War: Australia and Vietnam, pp. 67–75. 35 Notable among these are Jeffrey Grey, ‘Vietnam, Anzac and the Veteran’ in Pierce, Doyle and Grey (eds), Vietnam Days, p. 65. See also Jeffrey Grey, ‘Memory and Public Myth’ in Grey and Doyle (eds), Vietnam: War, Myth and Memory, pp. 141– 143; Janine Hiddlestone, ‘Voices from the Battlefield: Personal Narratives as a Historical Tool in Studying the Place of the Vietnam War in Australian Society’, Journal of Australian History, 73 (2002), pp. 57–70; Janine Hiddlestone, ‘Continuing the Great Adventure? Australian Servicemen and the Vietnam War’, Linq, 31, 1 (2004), pp. 13–25. In addition to the above-mentioned article, Chris Dixon, ‘Australian Vietnam Veterans and the Legacies of a Lost War’, in Martin Crotty and Marina Larsson (eds), Anzac Legacies: Australians and the Aftermath of War (North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2010), pp. 126–144 is a valuable examination of Vietnam veterans, as is Ambrose Crowe, The Battle After the War: The Story of Australia’s Vietnam Veterans (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999).

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36 Important also, but not directly relevant to this study, are gendered analyses of Australian soldiers, such as Robin Gerster, ‘Occidental Tourists: the “Ugly” Australian in Vietnam War Narrative’, in Pierce, Doyle and Grey (eds), Vietnam Days: Australia and the Impact of Vietnam: A Bold Reassessment of the Myths, History and Culture of Australia’s Longest War (Ringwood: Penguin, 1991), pp. 201– 235; Robin Gerster, ‘A Bit of the Other: Touring Vietnam’, in Damousi and Lake (eds), Gender and War: Australians at War in the Twentieth Century (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 223–235; Joseph Pugliese, ‘The Gendered Figuring of the Dysfunctional Serviceman in the Discourses of Military Psychiatry’, in Pierce, Doyle and Grey, Vietnam Days, pp. 162–177. 37 See Trevor Lummis, Listening to History: The Authenticity of Oral Evidence (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1987), pp. 11–12. It should be noted that there are some collections of letters and diaries that have been edited in size, but not specific content, after the respective wars by their authors. These have been used with this fact in mind. 38 Francis X. Blouin Jr, ‘History and Memory: The Problem of the Archive’, PMLA, 119, 2 (2004), p. 298. 39 See Knightley, The First Casualty, pp. 531–534. 40 See Prue Torney-Parlicki, Somewhere in Asia: War, Journalism and Australia’s Neighbours 1941–75 (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2000), pp. 196, 202. This will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 41 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 23. 42 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, p. 13. 43 Peter Burke, Varieties of Cultural History (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 44. See also Grey, ‘Memory and Public Myth’, p. 137. 44 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History, 4th edn (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2006), pp. 316–320. See also Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition as History (London: James Currey, 1985), p. 196. 45 Frances Houghton, ‘The “Missing Chapter”: Bomber Command Aircrew Memoirs in the 1990s and 2000s’, in Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson (eds), British Cultural Memory and the Second World War (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 156. 46 Alistair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 4–10. 47 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, pp. 323, 325. See also Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2006), p. 1; Lummis, Listening to History, p. 13; Megan Hutching, Talking History: A Short Guide to Oral History (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1993), p. 60. 48 See Tosh, The Pursuit of History, p. 319 for a discussion of ways in which each party affects the other during an interview.

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Chapter 1 1 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 324; Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. 197. 2 Connolly, ‘Clan, Birthplace, Loyalty’, p. 213; Michael Sexton, War for the Asking: How Australia Invited itself to Vietnam (Sydney: New Holland Publishers, 2002), pp. 20, 26. 3 Robert Murray, ‘Australia’s Boer War’, Quadrant, 54, 5 (1999), p. 54. 4 Australian War Memorial (hereafter AWM), PR85/40, Diary of Patrick H. Lang, 15 April 1901. 5 See, for example, Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 32; Wallace, The Australians at the Boer War, p. 84. 6 State Records of South Australia (hereafter SRSA), GRG24/6/469/813/1899, Uitlander Council, Telegram to CSO, 31 July 1899. 7 Blackton, ‘Australian Nationality and Nationalism’, pp. 1–2; See also Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 16. 8 Henry B. Higgins, Victorian Parliamentary Debates, vol. 92 (1899), p. 1777. 9 Henry B. Higgins, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 7, 1902, p. 9854; Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 316. 10 Haydon, ‘South Australia’s First War’, p. 225. 11 SRSA, GRG24/6/471/1900, Letter by William Lyne to CSO, 24 March 1900; SRSA, GRG24/6/473/1900, Letter from William Lyne to CSO, 26 March 1900. 12 Tasmanian Archive and Heritage Office (hereafter TAHO), CSD26/1/2, Colonial Secretary’s Office, Letter to CSO, 18 January 1900. 13 ‘A Pro-Boer Member of Parliament’, The Argus, 5 June 1900, p. 6. 14 ‘A Pro-Boer MLA. Hostile Demonstration in North Rockhampton’, The Argus, 15 June 1900, p. 5. For more discussion of Stewart, see Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, What’s Wrong with Anzac? The Militarisation of Australian History (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2010), pp. 55, 67. 15 Malcolm Saunders and Ralph Summy, The Australian Peace Movement: A Short History (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, 1986), p. 13. 16 See, for example, Wilkinson, Australia at the Front; Skirving, Our Army in South. 17 For an analysis of labour newspapers in relation to the South African War, see Connolly, ‘Clan, Birthplace, Loyalty’, pp. 210–232. For another more recent analysis of public opinion, see Penny, ‘Australia’s Reactions to the Boer War’, pp. 97–130. 18 See Haydon, ‘South Australia’s First War’, p. 226 for an example of editorial influence on content. 19 ‘A Meeting in Sydney; Broken Up By A Crowd’, The Argus, 13 November 1899, p. 5. 20 Paula M. Krebs, Gender, Race and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse and the Boer War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 9. 21 Simon Popple, ‘From “Brother Boer” to “Dirty Boers”: Colonizing the Colonizers through the Popular Representations of the Boer in the British Illustrated Journal, 1899–1902’, Journal of War and Culture Studies, 5, 2 (2012), p. 137.

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22 Quoted in Ken S. Inglis, ‘The Imperial Connection: Telegraphic Communication between England and Australia, 1872–1902’, in Albert F. Madden and Wyndraeth H. Morris-Jones (eds), Australia and Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship (London: Frank Cass, 1980), p. 34. 23 For information about Australia’s security fears, see Field, The Forgotten War: Australian Involvement in the South African Conflict of 1899–1902 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1979), pp. 2–3, 8. 24 For examples of donations, see: SRSA, GRG24/4/77/1899, Letter to Barr Smith from CSO, 30 December 1899; SRSA, GRG24/4/77/1900, Letter to Mrs CA Horn from CSO, 5 January 1900. 25 SRSA, GRG24/6/479/1901, Letter from Town Clerk, Port Adelaide, to CSO, 11 February 1901. 26 SRSA, GRG24/4/76/1899, Letter from CSO to JJ Murif, 8 November 1899. 27 SRSA, GRG24/4/77/1900, Letter from CSO to Reverend AT Boas, 30 May 1900. 28 Wallace, The Australians at the Boer War, p. 246. See SRSA, GRG24/6/474/1900, Letter to CSO, 29 March 1900. 29 See SRSA, GRG24/6/474/1900, Letter from Charlick Brothers to CSO, 23 May 1900. 30 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 49. The existence of stowaways will be further discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. 31 TAHO, CSD26/1/2, Chief Secretary’s Office, Letters from T. Shore to CSO, 20 May 1900; 30 May 1900; 18 June 1900. 32 TAHO, CSD26/1/2, Chief Secretary’s Office, Letters from Alfred Field to CSO, 16 December 1899. 33 See Public Records Office of Victoria (hereafter PROV), VPRS1411/P/0000 Chief Secretary’s Office Inward Correspondence Register, Unit 53, K11698, Ferguson F re: supply of wines and spirits to the Victorian Contingent, 22 December 1899; SRSA, GRG24/4/77/1900, Letters to CSO, 2 January 1900; 3 January 1900. 34 See PROV, VPRS1411/P/0000 Chief Secretary’s Office Inward Correspondence Register, Unit 53, Burns MU, re: volunteering as Boer War nurse, 30 September 1900; TAHO, CSD26/1/1, Letter to CSO, 13 October 1899; 15 October 1899; SRSA, GRG24/4/77/1900, Letters from CSO, 16 January 1900; 24 January 1900; 2 February 1900; 15 February 1900. 35 TAHO, CSD26/1/2, Chief Secretary’s Office, Letter to CSO from Alfred J. Taylor, 3 March 1900; TAHO CSD26/1/2, Chief Secretary’s Office, Letter from CSO from Alfred J. Taylor, 9 March 1900. 36 SRSA, GRG24/6/472/1900, Letter from JB Fitts to CSO, 29 January 1900. 37 SRSA, GRG24/4/77/1900, Letter to Chas Jones from CSO, 5 January 1900. 38 TAHO, CSD26/1/4, Chief Secretary’s Office, Letter from Joseph Williams to CSO, 17 January 1901. 39 TAHO, CSD26/1/2, Chief Secretary’s Office, Letter from Dr Haines to Colonel Legge, 6 January 1900; TAHO, CSD26/1/2, Chief Secretary’s Office, Letter from Colonel Legge to Hon GT Collins, 8 January 1900.

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40 TAHO, CSD26/1/2, Chief Secretary’s Office, Letter to from Mrs Willoughby to GT Collins, 22 January 1901. 41 TAHO, CSD26/1/2, Chief Secretary’s Office, Letter to from Charles E Brewer to GT Collins, 18 January 1900. 42 ‘Loyal “Disloyalists”’, The Bulletin, 21, 1040 (30 January 1900), p. 7. 43 SRSA, GRG24/6/473/1900, Letter from John W. Daly to CSO, 29 March 1900. 44 ‘Military Inspection of the Mounted Rifles; Colonel Stuart on Disloyalty’, Border Watch, 25 November 1899, p. 3. 45 State Records Office of Western Australia (hereafter SROWA). Acc 949/1175/77, Premier’s Department, Letter from Herbert Davis, 17 March 1900, 46 SROWA, Acc 949/1175/77, Premier’s Department, Letter to Lippendall, 24 March 1900. 47 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 36. 48 ‘A Legislator’s Loyalty’, The Border Watch, 23 February 1900, p. 4. 49 ‘Demonstrative Patriotism’, The Bunyip, 19 January 1900, p. 2. 50 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 324. 51 Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales (hereafter Mitchell Library, SLNSW), MLDOC 662, Petition to the Honorable, The House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia, regarding the South African War, Papers of Alice Henry, 1901. 52 See, for example, ‘Stop the War! An Appeal to the People’, The Worker, 10, 463, 17 March 1900, p. 2. ‘Essence of the Week’, The Bunyip, 13 October 1899, p. 1; Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 324. 53 Elizabeth Van Heyningen, The Concentration Camps of the Anglo-Boer War: A Social History (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2013), pp. 183–185. 54 See ‘Concentration Camp Lies’, The Worker, 12, 552, 30 November 1901, p. 2. 55 ‘Pro-Boers’, The Herald, 10 February 1900, p. 6. 56 See ‘Word from the War’, The Barrier Truth, 15 March 1901, p. 2. 57 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 334. 58 Oliver, ‘“A Wanton Deed of Blood and Rapine”’, p. 198. 59 Connolly, ‘Clan, Birthplace, Loyalty’, pp. 216–217, 220. 60 See Oliver, ‘“A Wanton Deed of Blood and Rapine”’, p. 198; Saunders and Summy, The Australian Peace Movement, p. 15. 61 ‘Editor’s Notes’, The Bunyip, 13 October 1899, p. 2. 62 Raymond A. Markey, ‘Explaining Union Mobilisation in the 1880s and Early 1900s’, Labour History: A Journal of Labour and Social History, 83 (2002), pp. 20, 26. 63 See ‘The Patriotic Fund’, The Bunyip, 29 December 1899, p. 1; ‘Current Talk’ and ‘A Public Meeting’, The Bunyip, 5 January 1900, p. 2. 64 See SRSA, GRG24/4/77/1900, Letters from CSO, 9 July 1900; 17 October 1900; 18 October 1900; 22 November 1900. 65 Len Harvey, Letters from the Veldt: An Account of the Involvement of Volunteers from Queensland at the War in South Africa (Boer War) 1899–1902 (Queensland: R & J McTaggart, 1994), p. 126.

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66 ‘Bystanders Notebook; “Patriotic” Demonstration’, The Worker, 12, 564, 22 February 1902, p. 3. 67 See ‘Departure of the Fifth Contingent’, The Argus, 16 February 1901, p. 1. 68 Connolly, ‘Clan, Birthplace, Loyalty’, pp. 213, 231. 69 Bill Nasson, The Boer War: The Struggle for South Africa (Gloucestershire: Spellmount, 2011), p. 308; Van Heyningen, The Concentration Camps of the AngloBoer War, p. 169. 70 Fransjohan Pretorius, The A to Z of the Boer War (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2010), p. 80. 71 Siracusa and Cheong, America’s Australia, Australia’s America, p. 32. See also Doyle, Grey and Pierce (eds), Australia’s Vietnam War, p. xvi. 72 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. 68. 73 Richard Casey, in Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. xviii. 74 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. xxii. 75 Sir Robert Menzies, in Department of External Affairs, Viet Nam: Recent Statements of Australian Policy, p. 3. 76 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. 70. 77 Sexton, War for the Asking, p. 52. 78 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. 111. 79 Ian Mackay, Australians in Vietnam (Adelaide: Rigby, 1968), p. 200. 80 See DEA, Viet Nam: Recent Statements of Australian Policy (Canberra: DEA, 1965). 81 See Department of External Affairs, Vietnam: Questions and Answers (Canberra: DEA, 1966). 82 Trish Payne, War and Words: The Australian Press and the Vietnam War (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2007), pp. 17, 126. 83 Torney-Parlicki, Somewhere in Asia, pp. 184–185. 84 Siracusa and Cheong, America’s Australia, Australia’s America, p. 60. 85 Creighton Burns, ‘Perkin, Edwin Graham (1929–1975)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography (Canberra: National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, 2000), viewed 29 December 2014, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ perkin-edwin-graham-11370/text20313. 86 See, for example, ‘Great Moral Courage Shown by US; PM on Viet Action’, The Age, 5 April 1965, p. 5; ‘P.M. Denies Grouping A.L.P as Pro-Communist’, The Age, 8 April 1965, p. 6. 87 ‘Vietnam Not the Same War, Says Calwell’, Barrier Daily Truth, 57, 18581, 26 March 1965, p. 5. 88 See, for example, Cairns, Living with Asia. 89 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. 207. See also Alan Reid, ‘Fighting the Next Election’, The Bulletin, 90, 4607, 22 June 1968, p. 4. 90 ‘Vic Labor Backs Viet Cong’, The Age, 17 April 1972, p. 1. For more evidence of Labor’s disunity, see Saunders and Summy, The Australian Peace Movement, p. 37.

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91 Henry S. Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia: The Impact of Vietnam and Conscription (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), p. 40. 92 For first-hand accounts of these, see Greg Langley, A Decade of Dissent: Vietnam and the Conflict on the Australian Home Front (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992). 93 ‘Many Want to Dodge N.S.T.’, Barrier Daily Truth, 57, 18575, 20 March 1965, p. 5. See also Gordon Chesterman, ‘The Good Member; Working for Peace’, The Bulletin, 87, 4457, 13 July 1965, p. 20; Roy Forward, ‘Conscription, 1964–1968’, in Forward and Reece (eds), Conscription in Australia (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1968), p. 103. 94 T. B. Millar, ‘Military Considerations’, in Forward and Reece (eds), Conscription in Australia, p. 151; James McAuley, ‘For Volunteers Only?’, in James M. Main, Conscription: The Australian Debate, 1901–1970 (Stanmore: Cassell, 1970), p. 150. 95 See ‘Whitlam Urges All-Volunteer Defence Force’, Barrier Daily Truth, 64, 20780, 20 May 1972, p. 2. 96 Curthoys, ‘The Anti-War Movements’, p. 95; Murray Goot and Rodney Tiffen, ‘Public Opinion and the Politics of the Polls’, in King (ed.), Australia’s Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 144. 97 National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), M3787–4, Papers of Prime Minister Gorton, 10 June 1971; Goot and Tiffen, ‘Public Opinion’, p. 144. 98 Chris Guyatt, ‘The Anti-Conscription Movement, 1964–66’, in Forward and Reece (eds), Conscription in Australia, p. 181. 99 See Curthoys, ‘The Anti-War Movements’, pp. 94–95. 100 Langley, A Decade of Dissent, p. 191. 101 Peter Samuel, ‘Making a Monkey out of Canberra’s Cops’, The Bulletin, 6 May 1972, pp. 17–19. 102 ‘Draft Dodgers Released by Government Directive’, Barrier Daily Truth, 65, 20940, 7 December 1972, p. 1. 103 John Dickie, ‘On-the-run NS Man in Court Plea’, The Age, 20 February 1968, p. 7. 104 See AWM, PR88/61, Letters to Bob Scates. Scates later wrote a book about the draft resistance movement, see Bob Scates, Draftmen Go Free: A History of the Anti-Conscription Movement (Richmond: B. Scates, 1988). 105 See ‘Wrong to Kill’, Barrier Daily Truth, 64, 20805, 30 June 1972, p. 2. 106 Dapin, The Nasho’s War, p. 45. 107 Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (New York: Doubleday, 1971), p. 246. For Australian figures, see Goot and Tiffen, ‘Public Opinion’, p. 138; ‘All eyes on the United States – it will be a good year’, The Bulletin, 89, 4583, 6 January 1968, p. 31. 108 Oberdorfer, Tet!, p. 332. 109 Langley, A Decade of Dissent, pp. 92–93. 110 Peter Young, ‘Vietnam: The Debate Reopened’, The Bulletin, 92, 4685, 3 January 1970, p. 27.

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111 See, for example, ‘Viet News Readers were Right’, The Age, 8 January 1970, p. 4. Torney-Parlicki, Somewhere in Asia, p. 194; Payne, War and Words, p. 5. 112 Geoffrey Fairbairn, in Torney-Parlicki, Somewhere in Asia, p. 199. 113 ‘Unrest Blamed on News Media’, The Age, 7 May 1970, p. 8. See also Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York: WW Norton, 1989). 114 Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 506; ‘Planning to Get away from LBJ’, The Bulletin, 89, 4572, 21 October 1967. 115 Torney-Parlicki, Somewhere in Asia, pp. 201, 203. 116 Creighton Burns, ‘War Censors Get Tough’, The Age, 1 October 1968, p. 1; ‘Vietnam Censorship “Unreasonable”’, The Bulletin, 90, 4623, 12 October 1968, p. 10; Adrian Deamer, ‘Adrian Deamer on Self-censorship’, New Journalist, 5, November–December 1972, pp. 3–5. 117 Goot and Tiffen, ‘Public Opinion’, p. 140. 118 T. D. Allman, ‘Laos: How Far has Nixon Distorted the Truth?’ The Bulletin, 92, 4696, 21 March 1970, p. 42; ‘US Sweeps into Cambodia; Nixon Widens War’, The Age, 2 May 1970, p. 1. 119 Ian Baker, ‘Anti-war Campaign Hits Schools’, The Age, 18 April 1970, p. 3. See also Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS6614, Papers of Nick Origlass related to the anti-Vietnam War movement. 120 See Mitchell Library, SLNSW, Seamen’s Union of Australia, Victoria Branch, Letter to John S Moyes, 4 May 1965; ‘Letters to the Editor; Union View on Troops Decision’, The Age, 4 May 1965, p. 2; Curthoys, ‘The Anti-War Movements’, p. 100. 121 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS2319/5, Papers of John Stoward Moyes; ‘Leading Churchmen ask P.M. to act on Vietnam’, The Age, 15 March 1965, p. 7. 122 Charlesworth and Noone, ‘Christians, Vietnam and the Theory of the Just War’, p. 148. See also ‘Church Will Campaign for Vietnam Peace’, The Age, 23 October 1965, p. 6; Don Whitington, ‘Cleric Speaks Out About Evils of War’, Barrier Daily Truth, 61, 19731, 28 December 1968, p. 3. 123 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. 124. 124 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. 248. 125 Peter Pierce, ‘“Never Glad Confident Morning Again”: Australia, the Sixties, and the Vietnam War’, in Doyle, Grey and Pierce (eds), Australia’s Vietnam War (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), p. 64. See also Sean Scalmer, Dissent Events: Protest, the Media and the Political Gimmick in Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), p. 7. 126 Peter O’Brien, cited in Langley, A Decade of Dissent, p. 116. 127 Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia, p. 110.

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128 See, for example, ‘Protester Beaten by Five People, Student tells Court’, The Age, 1 June 1972, p. 1; Irene Miller, cited in Langley, A Decade of Dissent, p. 114; TAHO, NS668/1/2, Vietnam Moratorium Campaign, Letter to Mr. A. Lincoln, 9 June 1971. 129 ‘Marchers will be Paid’, The Barrier Daily Truth, 62, 20145, 5 May 1970, p. 6. 130 See SLNSW, MLMSS6614, Papers of Nick Origlass related to the anti-Vietnam War movement; ‘The Canberra Teach-in; Who Won? Who Knows?’ The Bulletin, 87, 4457, 31 July 1965, p. 17. 131 Saunders and Summy, The Australian Peace Movement, p. 43. 132 See Jeffrey Grey, ‘Protest and Dissent: Anti-Vietnam War Activism in Australia’, in Doyle, Grey and Pierce (eds), Australia’s Vietnam War, p. 60. 133 Saunders and Summy, The Australian Peace Movement, p. 45. 134 Braestrup, Big Story, p. 132. 135 Gough Whitlam, cited in ‘Troops to be Withdrawn – Govt Decides’, Barrier Daily Truth, 62, 20133, 23 April 1970, p. 1. 136 Sexton, War for the Asking, p. 12. 137 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, p. 243. 138 See ‘Civilian Life Again for Australia’s N. Servicemen’, Barrier Daily Truth, 65, 20944, 12 December 1972, p. 1; ‘NS Resisters Free This Week’, The Age, 4 December 1972, p. 5; Gough Whitlam, Press Statement no. 1, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, 6 December 1972. 139 See ‘US told of “Serious Risk” in Quick Vietnamization Plan’, Barrier Daily Truth, 62, 20067, 3 February 1970, p. 1. 140 This issue is addressed in relation to both wars in Chapter 6. 141 There is a large body of research on this issue in Australia, such as Crowe, The Battle after the War; Graham Walker, ‘The Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia’, in Maddock and Wright (eds), War: Australia and Vietnam, pp. 206–224; Jeff Doyle, ‘Other Contingents: Australian Veterans Beyond Vietnam’, in Doyle, Grey and Pierce (eds), Australia’s Vietnam War, pp. 76–97; Peter Edwards, ‘Agent Orange’, in Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris and Robin Prior, with Jean Bou (eds), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, 2nd edn (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2008). 142 ‘Those easy days are over for Mr. Holt’, The Bulletin, 89, 4578, 2 December 1967, p. 15. 143 Saunders and Summy, The Australian Peace Movement, p. 43.

Chapter 2 1 Bill Gammage, The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War (Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 8, 10. 2 Richard Holmes, Firing Line (Middlesex: Penguin, 1987), pp. 274–275.

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3 Frank M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological Factors in War (London: Leo Cooper, 1978), p. 46. 4 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 277. 5 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 892, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 1900. 6 ‘Stray Notes; Volunteers’, The Worker, 10, 404, 13 January 1900, p. 3. 7 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 32. 8 State Library of South Australia (hereafter SLSA), D6338, Diary of Jack A. McBean, n.d. 9 AWM, PR85/170, Letter by James Smith, 8 May 1901. See also the example of William Glasson, mentioned below. 10 AWM, 3DRL/1915, Diary of Alured Kelly, n.d. 11 ‘Interesting Items’, The Bunyip, 26 January 1900, p. 4. 12 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 27. 13 TAHO, CSD26/1/1, Letter by Annie Gilham to Chief Secretary’s Office, 13 November 1899. 14 ‘The South Australian Army; Town Tattle’, The Bunyip, 20 October 1899, p. 2. 15 Gammage, The Broken Years, pp. 10, 119. 16 Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. 51. 17 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 18. 18 SLSA, D6338, Diary of Jack A. McBean, 1899. 19 AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. G. Rich, 19 May 1901. 20 AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. G. Rich, 5 July 1901. 21 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 10 April 1901. 22 See Chapter 4 for more expressions of enjoyment while on active service. 23 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS2032, Diary of Daniel H. Spyer, 6 February 1900. 24 See ‘A Warrigal Stowaway’, The Argus, 5 January 1900, p. 5; The Argus, 26 January 1900, p. 6. 25 SLSA, D4860(L), Diary of Martin Maddern, 25 May 1900. Maddern also mentioned deserters hiding on ships, but this is an issue that will be discussed in Chapter 5. 26 State Library of Western Australia (hereafter SLWA), ACC4759A, Letter by Arthur Hammond, 24 March 1901. See also Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 21 January 1900. 27 Hiddlestone, ‘Continuing the Great Adventure?’, p. 16. 28 See the Introduction for a discussion of the impact of cultural memory on soldiers. 29 SLSA, PRG 1363/4, Wallace A. Lillebo, Chopper in the Sky, n.d.; RAR is a commonly used abbreviation for Royal Australian Regiment.

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30 Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: KluwerNijhoff Publishing, 1982), p. 171. 31 The effect of the home front on soldiers and self-censorship is discussed in Chapter 6. 32 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 36. 33 Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 225. 34 Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, p. 7. 35 Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 81. 36 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 41, 52, 329–330. 37 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MS 113, Diary of Arthur J. Vogan, 30 October 1901. 38 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MS 113, Diary of Arthur J. Vogan, June 1901. 39 Michael O’brien, Conscripts and Regulars with the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1995), pp. 8–9. 40 AWM, PR86/248, Letter by Peter Groves, 25 May 1969. 41 AWM, PR82/089, Diary of David S. Wilkins, 7 January 1970. 42 Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 37–38. 43 State Library of Victoria (hereafter SLV), MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 25 October 1900. 44 The link between soldiers’ physical discomfort and resentment towards leaders is discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 45 AWM, PR01357, Diary of Charles W. Turner, 28 June 1900. See also Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 30 June 1900. 46 AWM, PR82/91, Diary of Henry A. Betts, 14 November 1899. 47 J. G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914–1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 78. 48 Kellett, Combat Motivation, pp. 84–85. 49 AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, July 1969. 50 Carlene Wilson, Helen Braithwaite and Peter J. Murphy, ‘Psychological Preparation for the Battlefield’, in George E. Kearney, Mark Creamer, Ric Marshall and Anne Goyne (eds), Military Stress and Performance: The Australian Defence Force Experience (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003), p. 27. 51 John T. MacCurdy in Holmes, Firing Line, p. 40. 52 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare (London: Granta Books, 1999), p. 231. 53 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 364. 54 Algernon C. Swinburne, cited in Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, The Boer War: A History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), p. 259. 55 Popple, ‘From “Brother Boer” to “Dirty Boers”’, pp. 147–148. 56 See ‘Boer Inhumanity’, The Argus, 15 March 1900, p. 5; ‘Canting, Hypocritical and Insolent’, The Argus, 16 March 1900, p. 6; ‘Town Tattle’, The Bunyip, 6 October 1899, p. 2.

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57 ‘The Boers and the War’, The Border Watch, 28 March 1900, p. 3. 58 ‘War Literature and Other Matters’, The Bulletin, 20, 1029 (4 November 1899), p. 8. 59 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing a Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 6–7, 125–126. 60 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, dated 29 February 1900 (presumably 1 March 1900). 61 AWM, PR00971, Letter by John Clinch, 26 July 1900. Also, see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the effect of poor living conditions on soldiers. 62 AWM, 3DRL 7472, Letter by George Harris, 15 July 1900. 63 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 368. 64 AWM, PR85/056, Diary of Charles Cawthorn, 11 May 1901. 65 National Library of Australia (hereafter NLA), MS3663, Diary of James H. Paterson, 6 December 1901; SLWA, ACC43759A, Letter by Arthur Hammond, 22 July 1901. 66 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MS 113, Diary of Arthur J. Vogan, June 1901. 67 John Macdonell, cited in Krebs, Gender, Race and the Writing of Empire, p. 123. 68 ‘Kruger and Krugerites’, The Border Watch, 4 November 1899, p. 4. 69 Peter Warwick, Black People and the South African War, 1899–1902 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 16, 18, 25–26; Nosipho Nkuna, ‘Black Involvement in the Anglo-Boer War, 1899–1902’, Military History Journal, 11, 3/4 (1999), viewed 23 March 2011, http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol113nn.html. 70 Alfred Milner, in Robert A. Huttenback, Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies 1830–1910 (London: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 212; ‘coloured’ is a word used in South Africa to generally refer to those with both white and black heritage. 71 AWM, PR04034, Diary of Albert H. Marshall, 8 March 1901. 72 Jeffrey R. Dafler, ‘Social Darwinism and the Language of Racial Oppression: Australia’s Stolen Generations’, ETC, 62, 2 (2005), p. 144. 73 This impressive research is partly documented in Dale Kerwin, ‘The Lost Trackers: Aboriginal Servicemen in the 2nd Boer War’, Sabretache, 54, 1 (2013), pp. 4–14. 74 AWM, 3DRL 3058, Letter by Edwin Tivey, 25 May 1900. 75 Pretorius, The A to Z of the Anglo-Boer War, p. 42. 76 AWM, PR85/035, Diary of Thomas B. Ross, 6 January 1901. 77 AWM, PR83/112, Diary of Albert H. J. Hennett, 19 May 1900; 2 December 1900. 78 SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 15 March 1900. 79 AWM, PR01703, Diary of Charles H. Cooper, 15 April 1900. 80 AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, n.d. 81 AWM, PR85/170, Diary of James Smith, 6 January 1901. 82 AWM, PR85/170, Diary of James Smith, 16 April 1901. 83 AWM, PR00326, Diary of Arthur H. Clarke, 15 December 1901; 4 January 1901; 7 January 1901.

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84 AWM, PR00971, Diary of John C. Cripps, 1 June 1900. 85 AWM, PR82/91, Diary of Henry A. Betts, 26 November 1899. 86 AWM, PR85/170, Diary of James Smith, 24 April 1901. ‘Sekekunis’ were so named by Smith and other whites after their leader Sekhukhune. However, they were the Pedi originating from eastern Transvaal, and who had been in conflict with the Boers for many years. 87 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MS 113, Diary of Arthur J. Vogan, 24 October 1901. 88 AWM, 3DRL 3058, Letter by Edwin Tivey, 6 June 1900. Also see Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 307–308. 89 Carruthers, The Media at War, p. 108. 90 Curthoys, ‘The Anti-War Movements’, p. 97. 91 ‘Troops see Viets as “non-human”’, The Age, 29 January 1970, p. 5. 92 AWM, PR92/087, Letter by C. Forde, 23 May 1968; AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 10 August 1965. 93 AWM< PR83/218, Letter by Peter K. Gates, 10 December 1967. 94 Torney-Parlicki, Somewhere in Asia, p. 190. 95 AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 22 June 1965. 96 AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 12 February 1969. 97 Dapin, The Nasho’s War, p. 33. 98 AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 8 April 1969. 99 Frederic C. Bartlett, Psychology and the Soldier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), p. 178. 100 AWM, 3DRL 7472, Letter by George Harris, 15 May 1900. 101 SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Samuel H. Jones, 6 June 1902. 102 SLV, MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 18 September 1900; 29 October 1900. See also SLSA, D4869(L), Diary of Martin Maddern, 4 June 1900; Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 2 May 1901. 103 Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 217. 104 Janet Phillips and Peter Phillips, Victorians at Home and Away (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 166, 175–176. 105 Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 229. 106 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 149. 107 Philip Caputo in Holmes, Firing Line, p. 148. 108 AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. G. Rich, 25 April 1901. 109 SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 17 April 1900. 110 AWM, PR00775, Diary of Frederick H. Farley, 26 June 1900. 111 AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 27 February 1968. 112 AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, n.d. 113 AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, 19 November 1969. 114 AWM, PR86/362, Letter by Len McCosker, 20 June 1966.

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115 Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 56. 116 Phillips and Phillips, Victorians at Home and Away, p. 175. 117 Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, p. 7. 118 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 146. 119 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 17. 120 AWM, PR85/170, Diary of James Smith, 2 October 1900. 121 AWM, PR91/018, Letter by Doug Bishop, n.d. 122 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 271. 123 Gammage, The Broken Years, p. 223. 124 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, p. 217. 125 SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 18 July 1900. 126 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 57. 127 AWM, PR85/170, James Smith, ‘Ode to De Wet’, 28 October 1900; Martin Bossenbroek, The Boer War (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2015), p. 323. 128 SLWA, ACC4759A, Letter by Arthur Hammond, 1 August 1901. 129 SLWA, ACC4759A, Letter by Arthur Hammond, 11 December 1901. 130 PROV, VPRS16930/P0001/2, Letter from Thomas Theobald, The Empire’s Patriotic Fund, 30 October 1901. 131 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS892, Diary of Watson A. Steel, n.d. 132 AWM, PR87/65, Diary of John T. Jennings, 21 March 1900. 133 Albert M. Grundlingh, The Dynamics of Treason: Boer Collaboration in the South African War of 1899–1902 (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2006), pp. 221–223. 134 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 8 August 1901. 135 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 280. 136 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 19 January 1902. 137 AWM, PR84/369, Papers of Laurence M. Field. 138 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 30 June 1900. 139 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 10–11. 140 Connolly, ‘Clan, Birthplace, Loyalty’, p. 218. 141 AWM, PR00032, Diary of Andrew Treffry, 12 April 1969. 142 AWM, PR86/267, Letter by Donald H. Campbell, 4 March 1967. 143 AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, 28 November 1969. 144 SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 19 May 1900. 145 Mitchell Library, MLMSS 892, Diary of Watson A. Steel, n.d. 146 AWM, PR04034, Letters by Albert H. Marshall, 3–12 December 1901. 147 AWM, PR84/369, Papers of Laurence M. Field. 148 AWM, 3DRL/2507, Diary of Harold L. Harnett, 29 July 1900. 149 AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 10 June 1965.

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Notes 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161

162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175

205

SLSA, PRG1363/4, Wallace A. Lillebo, Chopper in the Sky, n.d. AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, 22 November 1969. AWM, PR00331, Diary of Barry L. Smith, 7 August 1969. AWM, PR86/285, Letter by Bernard O’Sullivan, 25 December 1967. AWM, PR82/069, Diary of David S. Wilkins, 18–20 April 1969. AWM, 3DRL 1915, Diary of Alured Kelly, n.d. AWM, PR86/131, Letter by Shayne O’Brien, n.d. AWM, PR86/248, Letter by Peter Groves, 16 March 1969. AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 3 September 1968. Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 260. Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 263. Martin Stone, ‘Shellshock and the Psychologists’, in William F. Bynum, Roy Porter and Michael Shepherd (eds), The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry: Volume II: Institutions and Society (London: Tavistock, 1985), p. 262. Bartlett, Psychology and the Soldier, p. 190. Bartlett, Psychology and the Soldier, p. 178. SLSA, D7334(L), Letter by Alan Wellington, 17 February 1902. AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, n.d. AWM, PR04034, Diary of Albert H. Marshall, 26 May 1901. SLV, MS11729, Letter by Fred Stocks, 14 June 1901. SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 17 April 1900. SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 24 December 1899. SLV, MS13385, Letter by Jack Cock, 1 January 1900. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 16. AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 10 May 1969. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 17 August 1965. Dawson, Soldier Heroes, p. 56; Phillips and Phillips, Victorians at Home and Away, pp. 166, 175–176; Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, p. 7. Chapter 4 discusses the perceptible shift in soldiers’ outlook from reliance on the ‘hero mentality’ to viewing their military service in terms of survival.

Chapter 3 1 Kellett, Combat Motivation, pp. 73, 79. 2 Norman Copeland, Psychology and the Soldier: The Art of Leadership (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1944), p. 59. 3 Wilson, Braithwaite and Murphy, ‘Psychological Preparation for the Battlefield’, p. 27. 4 Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 159, 293, 295–296.

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5 Carolyn Steedman, The Radical Soldier’s Tale: John Pearman 1819–1908 (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 48. 6 Elmar Dinter, Hero or Coward: Pressures Facing the Soldier in Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1985), pp. 7–8. 7 Martin Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme, 1 July 1916 (London: Penguin, 1971), p. 299. 8 Copeland, Psychology and the Soldier, p. 59. 9 Arnold H. Buss and Norman W. Portnoy, ‘Pain Tolerance and Group Identification’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 1 (1967), pp. 106–108. 10 SLSA, D7334(L), Letter by Alan Wellington, 21–22 October 1901. 11 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 23. 12 AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 3 May 1968. 13 AWM, PR82/089, Diary by David S. Wilkins, 5 July 1969. 14 AWM, PR04034, Diary of Albert H. Marshall, 13 June 1901. 15 AWM, 3DRL/3525, Diary of Thomas A. Kidd, 16 May 1901. 16 AWM, PR86/363, Letter by Garry M. Heffernan, 26 March 1971. 17 Appy, Working-Class War, p. 311. 18 Joy Damousi, Living with the Aftermath: Trauma, Nostalgia and Grief in Post-War Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 115. 19 AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St George Rich, 24 October 1901. 20 Dinter, Hero or Coward, p. 42. 21 AWM, PR87/219, Diary of Andrew J. Forsdike, 13 May 1968. 22 TAHO, NS2342/1/4, Letter by John H. Bisdee, 20 November 1901. 23 TAHO, NS2342/1/4, Letter by John H. Bisdee, 21 November 1901. 24 SLSA, PRG843, Diary of Alan D. O’Connor, 9 February 1971. 25 AWM, PR87/196, Diary of Geoffrey R. Jones, n.d. 26 Wilson, Braithwaite and Murphy, ‘Psychological Preparation for the Battlefield’, p. 24. 27 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 23. 28 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 263. 29 Grey, ‘Vietnam, Anzac and the Veteran’, p. 87. 30 See Chapter 3. 31 See National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), AP613/7, Attestation declarations, 5th South Australian Contingent, 1–31 January 1900. 32 SRSA, GRG24/6/480/1901, Letter by William J. Lyne to CSO, 19 February 1901. 33 SRSA, GRG24/6/480/1901, Letter by Frederick W. Holder to Sir William J. Lyne, 19 February 1901. 34 Wilson, Braithwaite and Murphy, ‘Psychological Preparation for the Battlefield’, p. 25. 35 AWM, PR91/018, Letter by Doug Bishop, 1966. See also Chapter 3. 36 AWM, PR01357, Diary of Charles W. Turner, February 1901.

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37 Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 130. 38 AWM, PR82/089, Diary of David S. Wilkins, 27 January 1970. 39 See Chapter 6 for further discussion of soldiers counting down to the end of their military service. 40 AWM, PR82/089, Diary of David S. Wilkins, 7 January 1970. 41 Dapin, The Nasho’s War, p. 420. 42 Copeland, Psychology and the Soldier, pp. 37–38, 79. 43 Copeland, Psychology and the Soldier, p. 88. 44 Richardson, Fighting Spirit, pp. 89–90. 45 Hocking, Morale and Its Enemies, p. 124. 46 Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 133. 47 Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 92. 48 See AWM, PR86/234, Diary of Sydney R. Coulter, 4 March 1901; AWM, PR87/65, Diary of John T. Jennings, 1 November 1899. 49 AWM, 3DRL/7274, Diary of Robert Gartside, 19 September 1900. 50 AWM, PR82/91, Diary of Henry A. Betts, 22 December 1899. 51 SLV, PA99/75, Letter by Joseph Dallimore, 6 May 1900. 52 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 29 March 1900. 53 For a primary account of the Breaker Morant affair, see Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 19 January 1902. 54 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 301. 55 AWM, PR01357, Diary of Charles W. Turner, 24 December 1900. 56 Grey, ‘Vietnam, Anzac and the Veteran’, p. 81. 57 AWM, PR91/191, Diary of Reginald B. Dittmar, 22 July 1968. 58 AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, 19 February 1968. 59 Copeland, Psychology and the Soldier, pp. 42, 57. 60 AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. George Rich, 16 November 1901. 61 AWM, 3DRL 7472, Letter by George Harris, 25 October 1900. 62 AWM, 3DRL 7472, Letter by George Harris, 25 October 1900. 63 SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 12 January 1901. Bossenbroek, The Boer War, p. 206 also discusses the lasting respect for Buller among British troops after his replacement by Roberts. 64 SLV, MS10459, Letters by Andrew D. Warden, 23 February 1900; 14 March 1900. 65 AWM, PR86/056, Letter by Charles F. R. Cawthorn, 4 August 1901. 66 AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. George Rich, 26 November 1901. See also his letter of 19 August 1901. 67 AWM, PR86/285, Letter by Bernard O’Sullivan, 27 February 1968. 68 AWM, PR01533, Letter by Frank Denley, 8 March 1970. 69 AWM, PR84/166, Letter by Andrew P. Clyne, 1 June 1971. 70 The importance of physical conditions on soldiers will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

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71 MLSLNSW,PR7055, Letter by Lord Herbert H. Kitchener, 4 January 1901. 72 Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 311–312. 73 Peter Leese, Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First World War, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 29–30. 74 Bill Gammage, ‘The Crucible: The Establishment of the Anzac Tradition’, in Michael McKernan and Margaret Browne (eds), Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace (Canberra: Australian War Memorial in association with Allen & Unwin Australia, 1988), p. 150. 75 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 304. 76 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, pp. 164, 167. 77 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 6 June 1900. 78 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 10 April 1901. 79 AWM, PR01357, Diary of Charles W. Turner, April 1901. 80 AWM, PR85/40, Diary of Patrick H. Lang, 9 February 1901. 81 AWM, PR85/40, Diary of Patrick H. Lang, 15 April 1901. 82 AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, n.d. 83 AWM, PR86/056, Diary of Charles F. R. Cawthorn, 21 April 1901. 84 AWM, PR85/170, Diary of James Smith, 2 October 1900. 85 SLWA, ACC4759A, Diary of Arthur Hammond, 8 November 1901. 86 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 892, Diary of Watson A. Steel, n.d. 87 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, pp. 28–29. 88 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 1561, Letter by Percy R. Ricardo, 5 May 1900. 89 AWM, PR85/170, Letter by James Smith, 18 December 1900. 90 SLV, MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 18 August 1901. 91 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 15 May 1900. 92 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLDOC 3084, Letter by Alfred S. Gillespie, 3 March 1901. 93 Penny, ‘The Australian Debate on the Boer War’, p. 526; Donald Lowry, ‘When the World Loved the Boers’, History Today, 49, 5 (1999), p. 44. 94 SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 18/19 May 1900. 95 SLV, MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 29 October 1899. 96 Mark Johnston, Anzacs in the Middle East: Australian Soldiers, their Allies and the Local People in World War II (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 131–132. 97 NAA, B4717, Robert J. Byers, Boer War Dossier, Canberra. 98 Bourne, Men, Stress and Vietnam, pp. 174–175. 99 AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 5 June 1968. 100 AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, 13 December 1969. 101 AWM, 3DRL 8037, Diary of Warren J. Wilson, 8 May 1969. 102 Torney-Parlicki, Somewhere in Asia, p. 217.

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103 104 105 106

McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 586. AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 7 April 1968. AWM, PR00331, Diary by Barry L. Smith, 17 December 1969. NAA, A6835, Letter by Thomas J. Daly to Arthur L. McDonald, Canberra, 29 February 1968. 107 AWM, PR86/021, Diary of Gregory C. Tommasi, 25 June 1970. 108 SLSA, PRG1363/4, Wallace A. Lillebo, Chopper in the Sky, 14 February 1967. 109 SLSA, PRG1363/4, Wallace A. Lillebo, Chopper in the Sky, n.d.

Chapter 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Bartlett, Psychology and the Soldier, pp. 177–178. AWM, PR84/166, Letter by Andrew P. Clyne, 8 March 1971. AWM, PR86/362, Letter by Len McCosker, 16 January 1967. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 78. AWM, PR86/267, Letter by Donald H. Campbell, 15 November 1967. Leese, Shell Shock, p. 27. AWM, PR86/021, Diary of Gregory C. Tommasi, 2 September 1970. Self-censorship is further discussed in Chapter 6. Amanda Laugesen, ‘Boredom is the Enemy’: The Intellectual and Imaginative Lives of Australian Soldiers in the Great War and Beyond (Farnham: Ashgate 2011), p. 245. SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 10 August 1900. AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, n.d. This issue is further discussed later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 3. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp. 27, 31, 33, 41, 199. Dinter, Hero or Coward, p. 22. Martin Van Creveld, ‘Why Men Fight’ in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 85. Dave Grossman, ‘Human Factors in War: The Psychology and Physiology of Close Combat’, in Martin Evans and Alan Ryan (eds), The Human Face of Warfare: Killing, Fear and Chaos in Battle (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2000), p. 17. Grossman, ‘Human Factors in War’, p. 18. Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 271–273. Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale, pp. 27–29. SLSA, D4010, Letter by Ernest H. Magor, 6 September 1900. AWM, 3DRL 7472, Letter by George Harris, 27 June 1900. AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. George Rich, 29 June 1901. SLWA, ACC5988A, Diary of Arthur C. Murray, 15 June 1901. AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. George Rich, 18 January 1902.

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210 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Notes AWM, PR01357, Diary of Charles W. Turner, 8 April 1901. AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. George Rich, 11 September 1901. SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 13 July 1900. SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 6 April 1900. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 20 August 1900. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 29 July 1900. AWM, PR00743, Letter by J.C.J. McBeth, 29 November 1899. AWM, PR91/187, Letter by Reg Yates, 23 April 1968. AWM, PR82/089, Diary of David S. Wilkins, 10 July 1969. AWM, PR83/218, Letters by Peter K. Gates, 10 May 1967; 20 March 1968. Dapin, The Nasho’s War, p. 175. AWM, PR00334, Letter by Richard A. Yielding, 31 May 1970. SLSA, PRG1363/4, Wallace A. Lillebo, Chopper in the Sky, 25 January 1967. AWM, PR00745, Letter by Manfred W. Bohn, 24 December 1970. AWM, PR00334, Letter by Richard A. Yielding, 4 April 1971. John Keegan and Richard Holmes, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985), p. 17. John Dollard, Fear in Battle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), pp. 12, 16. Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 138–139, 182. AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, n.d. SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 27 February 1900. SLSA, PRG1108, Letter by Charles F. Pegler, 23 July 1900. SLSA, PRG1108, Letter by Charles F. Pegler, 4 September 1900. SLWA, ACC4759A, Letters of Arthur Hammond, 12 July 1901; AWM, PR85/170, Diary of James Smith, 23 September 1900. Holmes, Firing Line, p. 141. For rejection of such views, see R. T. Williamson, ‘The Treatment of Neurasthenia and Psychasthenia following Shell Shock’, British Medical Journal, 2, 2970 (1917), p. 714. Holmes, Firing Line, p. 206. AWM, PR01487/12, Letter by Gerry Lavery, 21–22 January 1969. AWM, PR01289, Diary of Raymond B. Ravenscroft, 13 March 1970. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 10 October 1965. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 25 July 1965. AWM, PR86/361, Letter by Shayne O’Brien, n.d. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 13 June 1965. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 18 October 1965. AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 3 May 1968. Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale, p. 60.

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Notes 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

87 88 89 90 91 92

211

Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 283. Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 302. SLV, MS13385, Letter by Jack Cock, 3 December 1899. SLSA, D7334(L), Letter by Alan Wellington, 21–22 October 1901. SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 26 April 1900. Holmes, Firing Line, p. 281. Lewis, The Tainted War, p. 26. Hiddlestone, ‘Continuing the Great Adventure’, p. 15. Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 69–71; See also Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp. 20–23; cultural influences on soldiers will be further discussed in Chapter 6. Appy, Working-Class War, p. 140. Lifton, Home from the War, p. 219. AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 16 March 1968. AWM, PR87/196, Letter by Geoffrey R. Jones, n.d. More information about ‘shorttimer’s fever’ can be found in Chapter 3. See Sir Arthur C. Doyle, The Great Boer War (London: Smith, Elder, 1900), pp. 85, 161 for references to ‘shirking’ during the war. Copeland, Psychology and the Soldier, p. 64. Hocking, Morale and its Enemies, p. 14. Bernard L. Montgomery in Richardson, Fighting Spirit, p. 1. Kellett, Combat Motivation, pp. 233, 236. Leese, Shell Shock, p. 28. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, FM4/2210, Letter by Charles B. Holme, 26 January 1900. PROV, VPRS 16930/P0001/3, The Empire’s Patriotic Fund, Application no. 381, 20 October 1908. SLV, MS11729, Letter by Fred Stocks, 25 September 1901. SLWA, ACC4759A, Letters of Arthur Hammond, 22 August 1901; 8 September 1901. SLSA, D5425, Diary of John H. Wadham, 6 July 1901. AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. George Rich, 22 October 1901. Bernard Fergusson in Holmes, Firing Line, p. 126. Christa Hammerle, ‘“You let a weeping woman call you home?” Private Correspondences during the First World War in Australia and Germany’, in Robert Earle (ed.), Epistolary Selves: Letters and Letter-Writers, 1600–1945 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 166–167. Roper, The Secret Battle, p. 174. Hocking, Morale and its Enemies, p. 19. AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. George Rich, 13 October 1901. AWM, PR00971, Diary of John C. Cripps, 7 February 1900. SLSA, D6338, Diary of Jack A. McBean, 30 April 1902; 14–15 June 1902. McKay, Bullets, Beans and Bandages, p. 28.

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212 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122

Notes AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 10 June 1965. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 6 October 1965. AWM, PR87/196, Diary of Geoffrey R. Jones, n.d. AWM, 3DRL 8037, Diary of Warren J. Wilson, 13 December 1969. AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 12 April 1969. AWM, PR84/166, Letter by Andrew P. Clyne, 12 July 1970. William J. Slim in Richardson, Fighting Spirit, p. 3. AWM, PR85/040, Diary of Patrick H. Lang, 24 October 1900. AWM, PR86/056, Diary of Charles F.E. Cawthorn, 8 June 1901. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 7729, Diary of James G. Tedder, 26 October 1901. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, PR7055, Letter by Herbert H. Kitchener, 1 February 1901. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 13 December 1965. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 30 January 1966. Holmes, Firing Line, p. 88. The importance of mail will be further discussed in Chapter 6. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 1561, Letter by Percy R. Ricardo, 20 June 1900. SLV, MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 9 July 1901. AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, 4 May 1901. Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 133, 221. Richard White, On Holidays: A History of Getting Away in Australia (Melbourne: Pluto Press, 2005), pp. 118–121. AWM, PR86/362, Letter by Len McCosker, 1 November 1966. AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 28 March 1968. Holmes, Firing Line, p. 246. AWM, PR91/191, Diary of Reginald B. Dittmar, 23 March 1968. AWM, PR84/166, Letter by Andrew P. Clyne, 19 July 1970. Copeland, Psychology and the Soldier, p. 70. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 13 August 1965. AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, n.d. Kellett, Combat Motivation, pp. 257–258. Hocking, Morale and Its Enemies, p. 9. AWM, PR86/363, Letter by Garry M. Heffernan, 20 May 1971.

Chapter 5 1 Kellett, Combat Motivation, pp. 285–286. 2 Roper, The Secret Battle, p. 186.

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Notes

213

3 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 172. 4 For example, see SLV, MS9882, Letter by Harry V. Roberts, n.d.; AWM, PR00775, Diary of Frederick H. Farley, 16 September 1900; AWM, PR87/65, Diary of John T. Jennings, 3 March 1900; AWM, PR85/30, Diary of Patrick H. Lang, 4 September 1900; AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, 24 December 1969. 5 John Keegan in Holmes, Firing Line, p. 244. 6 Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 244–245. 7 Richard Phillips, Sex, Politics and Empire: A Postcolonial Geography (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 86. 8 Frank Bongiorno, The Sex Lives of Australians: A History (Collingwood: Black Inc., 2012), p. 145. 9 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 74. 10 Paul Stanley, Bad Characters: Sex, Crime, Mutiny, Murder and the Australian Imperial Force (Millers Point: Pier 9, 2010), pp. 85, 86, 90. 11 Milton Lewis, A Rum State: Alcohol and State Policy in Australia 1788–1988 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992), p. 10. 12 SRSA, GRG24/6/372/1900, no. 248, Letter by Woman’s Christian Temperance Union of South Australia to CSO, 20 February 1900. 13 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 226. 14 AWM, PR00971, Diary of John C. Cripps, 20 February–4 March 1900. 15 AWM, PR88/1227, Diary of James E. Lawn, 28 October 1900. 16 AWM, PR00971, Diary of John C. Cripps, 2 February 1900. 17 AWM, 3DRL/3058, Diary of Edwin Tivey, 31 August 1900. 18 AWM, PR00874, Diary of W.E.L. Lilley, 30 August 1900. 19 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLDOC 2279, Diary of William N. Kelman, 18 April 1900. 20 AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. George Rich, 11 September 1901. 21 AWM, PR85/40, Diary of Patrick H. Lang, 29 July 1900. 22 AWM, PR85/40, Diary of Patrick H. Lang, 19 November 1900. 23 State Library of Queensland (hereafter SLQ), SLQ 3275, Diary of Thomas W. Bray, 14 May 1900. 24 SLWA, ACC4759A, Diary of Arthur Hammond, 2 November 1901. 25 AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, n.d. 26 AWM, PR86/056, Diary of Charles F. E. Cawthorn, 30 April 1901. 27 Lewis, The Rum State, p. 9. 28 Ashley Ekins, with Ian McNeill, Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968–1975 (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2012), pp. 75–77. 29 AWM, 3DRL 3718, Diary of Rex M. Fadden, n.d. ‘Grog’ and ‘piss’ are colloquial words for alcohol in Australian society. 30 AWM, 3DRL 8037, Diary of Warren J. Wilson, 10 January 1970; 21 January 1970; 22 January 1970; 23 April 1970; 31 August 1970.

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Notes

31 AWM, PR86/021, Diary of Gregory C. Tommasi, 8 August 1970; 18–20 August 1970. 32 AWM, PR00330, Letter by David Keating, 8 April 1969. 33 SLSA, PR1363/4, Wallace A. Lillebo, Chopper in the Sky, 23–27 February 1967. 34 AWM, PR87/165, Letter by Ron Kelly, 16 October 1965. 35 AWM, PR84/166, Letter by Andrew Clyne, 13 August 1971. 36 See Helmer, Bringing the War Home, p. 40; Keegan and Holmes, Soldiers, p. 54; Tobey C. Herzog, Vietnam War Stories: Innocence Lost (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 45. 37 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 251. 38 Ekins, with McNeill, Fighting to the Finish, p. 77. 39 AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 20 April 1969. 40 AWM, 3DRL 8037, Diary of Warren J. Wilson, 13 October 1970. 41 AWM, PR82/105, Diary of J. G. Hughes, 23 June 1972; 24 June 1972. 42 Jeffrey Streimer and Christopher Tennant, ‘Psychiatric Effects of the Vietnam War: The Effect on Combatants’, in Kenneth Maddock and Barry Wright, War: Australia and Vietnam (Sydney: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 245–246. 43 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 93. 44 Theodore Nadelson, Trained to Kill: Soldiers at War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 124, 134. 45 Lesley A. Hall, Sex, Gender and Social Change in Britain since 1880, 2nd edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 30. 46 John V. H. Dippel, War and Sex: A Brief History of Men’s Urge for Battle (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2010), pp. 75–76. 47 Phillips, Sex, Politics and Empire, pp. 89, 91. 48 Bongiorno, The Sex Lives of Australians, p. 47. 49 Phillips, Sex, Politics and Empire, pp. 101, 104. 50 Bongiorno, The Sex Lives of Australians, p. 24. 51 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Historical Population Statistics, 3105.0.65.001, 18 September 2014. 52 AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, 16 May 1901. 53 AWM, PR83/212, Diary of Harris Woode, 4 October 1900. 54 AWM, PR05168, Diary of William S. Hazelwood, 3 July 1900. 55 AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, n.d. 56 NAA, B5166, Soldiers’ discharge medical records, 3rd Queensland Contingent, no. 178. 57 NAA, B5163, Soldiers’ discharge medical records, 5th Queensland Contingent, nos. 516; 21. 58 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 175. See also p. 82 of Wilcox for evidence of sexual violence by an Australian-born British officer. 59 AWM, 3DRL 1915, Diary of Alured Kelly, n.d.

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60 AWM, PR04034, Letters by Albert H. Marshall, 24 September 1901; 28 September 1901. 61 AWM, PR04034, Letter by Albert H. Marshall, 30 December 1901. 62 Sean Kennedy, The Shock of War: Civilian Experiences, 1937–1945 (Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 2011), pp. 55, 62. 63 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 308. 64 Van Heyningen, The Concentration Camps of the Anglo-Boer War, pp. 164–165. 65 AWM, PR87/65, Diary of John T. Jennings, n.d. 66 Bongiorno, The Sex Lives of Australians, pp. 26–27. 67 AWM, 3DRL 3058, Lord Herbert H. Kitchener, Papers of Edwin Tivey. 68 Bongiorno, The Sex Lives of Australians, p. 186. 69 Bongiorno, The Sex Lives of Australians, p. 224. 70 Christabel M. Young and Helen Ware, ‘Contraceptive Use in Australia’, The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 19, 1 (1979), p. 3. 71 Gerster, ‘A Bit of the Other: Touring Vietnam’, p. 228. 72 AWM, PR91/191, Diary of Reginald B. Dittmar, 4 January 1968. 73 AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 30 May 1969. 74 Dapin, The Nasho’s War, pp. 48, 208–209. 75 AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, 19 February 1968. 76 See Mark Johnston, Anzacs in the Middle East for one analysis among many of the Australian ‘larrikin’ soldier. 77 Kellett, Combat Motivation, pp. 108–109. 78 Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 329–330. 79 Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme, pp. 299–300. 80 Appy, Working-Class War, p. 244. 81 NAA, B168 1902/919, Papers re members of 5th Victorian Contingent being sentenced [Court martial] for insubordination in South Africa, 1901–1902. 82 SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, n.d. 83 AWM, PR83/188, Letter by Oscar D. King, 25 November 1899. 84 AWM, PR00971, Diary of John C. Cripps, 21 September 1900. 85 AWM, PR82/91, Diary of Henry A. Betts, 19 November 1899. 86 AWM, PR82/91, Diary of Henry A. Betts, 30 November 1899. 87 AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, 12 May 1901; 16 May 1901. 88 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 328. 89 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLDOC 2279, Diary of William N. Kelman, 6–30 March 1900. 90 AWM, PR01357, Diary of Charles W. Turner, 24 December 1900. 91 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 321; Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 28. 92 AWM, PR82/91, Diary of Henry A. Betts, 24 December 1899. 93 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 29 June 1900.

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216 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101

102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

118 119 120 121

Notes AWM, PR84/131, Diary of Herbert S. Conder, n.d. AWM, PR85/170, Letter by James Smith, 18 December 1900. AWM, PR04034, Letter by Albert H. Marshall, 4 November 1901. NAA, B6835, Letter from T. Daly to A. L. McDonald, Chief of General Staff Minutes, 30 January 1968. Davies, with McKay, Vietnam: The Complete Story of the Australian War (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2012), p. 365. AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, 28 November 1969. Streimer and Tennant, ‘Psychiatric Effects of the Vietnam War’, p. 233. Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War, January 1967-June 1968 (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, in association with the Australian War Memorial, 2003), p. 368. AWM, PR87/196, Diary of Geoffrey R. Jones, n.d. AWM, PR84/166, Letter by Andrew P. Clyne, 12 July 1970. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 11 August 1965. Kellett, Combat Motivation, pp. 100, 107. Helmer, Bringing the War Home, pp. 36, 38. For evidence of British desertion during the South African War, see Miller, Volunteers on the Veldt, pp. 51, 143. Gammage, The Broken Years, p. 219. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 170. See Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 329. NAA, B168 1902/919, Papers re members of 5th Victorian Contingent being sentenced [Courts martial] for insubordination in South Africa, 1901–1902. SLSA, D4860(L), Diary of Martin Maddern, 25 April 1900. SLSA, D4860(L), Diary of Martin Maddern, 26 May 1900. Untitled, The Argus, 2 November 1899, p. 2. AWM, PR83/227, Letter by Geoff Scott in Papers of E.M. McCormick, 14 April 1966. McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 586. See Streimer and Tennant, ‘Psychiatric Effects of the Vietnam War’, p. 230 for information about the comparability of American and Australian troops in Vietnam. Stone, ‘Shellshock and the Psychologists’, p. 251. Richard A. Gabriel, The Painful Field: The Psychiatric Dimension of Modern War (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 3. Roy L. Swank and Walter E. Marchand, in Grossman, ‘Human Factors in War’, p. 7. Mark Creamer and David Forbes, ‘Long-term Effects of Traumatic Stress’, in George E. Kearney, Mark Creamer, Ric Marshall and Anne Goyne (eds), Military Stress and Performance: The Australian Defence Force Experience (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2003), pp. 176, 178.

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Notes 122 123 124 125 126 127 128

129 130 131 132 133 134

135 136

137

138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147

217

Holmes, Firing Line, p. 394. Bartlett, Psychology and the Soldier, pp. 195–196. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 9 February 1966. AWM, PR86/248, Letter by Peter Groves, 16 March 1969. AWM, PR91/108, Letter by Doug Bishop, n.d. SLSA, PRG1363/4, Wallace A. Lillebo, Chopper in the Sky, 3 April 1967. Brian I. O’Toole, Richard P. Marshall, David A. Grayson, Ralph J. Schureck, Matthew Dobson, Margot Ffrench, Belinda Pulvertaft, Lenore Meldrum, James Bolton and Julienne Vennard, ‘The Australian Vietnam Veterans Health Study: III. Psychological Health of Australian Vietnam Veterans and its Relationship to Combat’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 25, 2 (1996), pp. 335–336. Creamer and Forbes, ‘Long-term Effects of Traumatic Stress’, p. 179. Untitled, The Border Watch, 17 January 1900, p. 4. SRSA, GRG24/6/484/1901, Letter to CSO, no. 1361, 9 September 1901. SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 24 December 1899. SLQ, OM84–25, Anonymous Boer War Diary, n.d. Sharon B. Shively and Daniel P. Perl, ‘Traumatic Brain Injury, Shell Shock and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Military – Past, Present and Future’, Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, 27, 3 (2012), p. 235. Bartlett, Psychology and the Soldier, pp. 194–195. Dewleen G. Baker, Charles L. Mendenhall, Loretta A. Simbartl, Laura K. Magan and Jonathan L. Steinberg, ‘Relationship Between Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Self-Reported Physical Symptoms in Persian Gulf War Veterans’, Archives of Internal Medicine, 157, 18 (1997), p. 2076. Brian I. O’Toole and Stanley V. Catts, ‘Trauma, PTSD, and Physical Health: An Epidemiological Study of Australian Vietnam Veterans’, Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 64, 1 (2008), p. 38. NAA, B5163, Soldiers’ discharge medical records, C. G. Bryce, no. 479. NAA, B5163, Soldiers’ discharge medical records, H. T. Taylor, no. 339; D. J. Smith, no. 112; M. Wilmot, no. 277, J. K. Little, no. 377. NAA, B4418, Boer War Dossier, J. K. Little, no. 377. NAA, B4418, Boer War Dossier, George W. Robinson, no. 63. PROV, VPRS16930/P0001/3, The Empire’s Patriotic Fund, George W. Robinson, no. 379. ‘Neurasthenia’, in The Penguin dictionary of psychology (London: Penguin, 2009). Stone, ‘Shellshock and the Psychologists’, p. 251. PROV, VPRS16930/P0001/2, The Empire’s Patriotic Fund, Henry Hughes, no. 165, Letter from Martha M. Hughes, 27 March 1901. PROV, VPRS7456, Admissions, Yarra Bend Lunatic Asylum. PROV, VPRS16930/P0001/2, The Empire’s Patriotic Fund, James M. Mailer, no. 209.

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218

Notes

148 Brian Membrey, Darebin’s Boer War: The South African Conflict, 1899–1902 (Darebin: Darebin Heritage, n.d.), p. 37. 149 PROV, VPRS16930/P0001/2, The Empire’s Patriotic Fund, William T. Egan, no. 375. 150 AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 28 March 1968. 151 AWM, PR82/089, Diary of David S. Wilkins, 25 April 1969. 152 AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 27 March 1969. 153 Stone, ‘Shellshock and the Psychologists’, p. 263. 154 See, for example, Ann Curthoys, ‘“Shut up, you bourgeois bitch”’, pp. 317–18. 155 See Martin Shaw, Dialectics of War: An Essay in the Social Theory of Total War and Peace (London: Pluto Press, 1988), p. 96; Tarak Barkawi, Globalisation and War (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p. 28.

Chapter 6 1 See, for example, Hocking, Morale and Its Enemies, p. 151; Kellett, Combat Motivation, pp. 178, 186. 2 Wallace, The Australians at the Boer War, p. 1. 3 Dawson, Soldier Heroes, p. 59. See also Michael Paris, Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850–2000 (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), particularly Chapter Four – ‘Paths of Glory 1914–18’. 4 See John R. Watson, Romanticism and War: A Study of British Romantic Period Writers and the Napoleonic Wars (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); and Mary A. Favret, War at a Distance: Romanticism and the Making of Modern Wartime (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) for more discussion of this point. 5 Lewis, The Tainted War, p. 20. 6 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, ‘Setting the Framework’ in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds), War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 6, 9. 7 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 8. 8 Lewis, The Tainted War, p. 10. See also Burke, Varieties of Cultural History, p. 44. 9 Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, pp. 18–19. 10 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLDOC 2279, Diary of William N. Kelman, 17 January 1900. 11 SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 3 November 1899. 12 AWM, 3DRL 1915, Diary of Alured Kelly, n.d. 13 Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 310–311. 14 ‘Departure of the Fifth Contingent’, The Argus, 16 February 1901, p. 4. 15 AWM, PR01545, Diary of Leonard F. Moriarty, 30 April 1969.

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Notes 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

219

Neil Sheehan in Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 183. Holmes, Firing Line, p. 282. AWM, PR03186, Letter by ‘Holmberg’, 4 June 1969. AWM, PR87/196, Diary of Geoffrey Jones, n.d. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp. 157, 165. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 27 September 1900. Hiddlestone, ‘Continuing the Great Adventure?’ p. 17. Hocking, Morale and Its Enemies, p. 151. Roper, The Secret Battle, p. 50. AWM, PR00775, Diary of Frederick H. Farley, 4 September 1900; 13 December 1900. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 6430, Diary of Horace W. Dangar, 1899–1900. SLWA, ACC4759A, Letter by Arthur Hammond, 22 August 1901. AWM, PR04034, Diary of Albert H. Marshall, 25 June 1901. Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 178. Roper, The Secret Battle, pp. 52–53. See also Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 23. AWM, 3DRL 8037, Diary of Warren J. Wilson, 22 November 1969–27 October 1970. AWM, PR82/105, Diary of J. G. Hughes, 11 May 1972. Soldiers in Vietnam would often take advantage of the well-priced electronics in Vietnam, and begin sending spoken tape recordings to their families in place of letters, and frequently received the same in return. Laugesen, ‘Boredom is the Enemy’, p. 250. AWM, PR86/131, Letter by Shayne O’Brien, 1 December 1968. AWM, PR91/018, Letter by Doug Bishop, n.d. AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 28 June 1969. SLV, MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 12 June 1900. SLSA, PRG248, Diary of Frederick H. Howland, 16 June 1900. SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 13 June 1900. ‘The Agreeable Censor’, The Argus, 4 April 1900, p. 5. ‘Censored! Mutilating Correspondents’ Letters’, The Argus, 7 April 1900, p. 5. ‘The S’African War’, The Bulletin, 22, 1092, 26 January 1901, p. 7. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, CY3423, Letter by W. H. Barham, 17 January 1900. SLV, MS 13385, Letter by Jack Cock, 3 December 1899. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, FM4/2210, Letter by Charles B. Holme, 26 March 1900. For similar sentiments, see also Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 18 July 1901; SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 2 May 1900, 15 May 1900; SLV, MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 17 July 1900; AWM, PR00743, Letter by J. C. J. McBeth, 24 November 1899; AWM, PR01964,

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220

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66 67 68 69 70 71

72 73

Notes Letter by Douglas St. G. Rich, 19 August 1901; SLSA, PRG1108, Letter by Charles F. Pegler, 1 July 1900; AWM, PR85/40, Diary of Patrick H. Lang, 1 April 1901; AWM, PR86/056, Diary of Charles F. E. Cawthorn, 20 April 1901; Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 8162, Letter from Michael J. J. Bandewig, 27 March 1901. Torney-Parlicki, Somewhere in Asia, pp. 195, 202. AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 26 June 1969. AWM, PR86/363, Letter by Garry Heffernan, 26 March 1970. AWM, PR01487/12, Letter by Gerard F. Lavery, 21–22 January 1969. Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 186. Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (London: Penguin, 1998), pp. 237–238. SLSA, PRG57/10, Letter by Charles Sabine, 25 August 1900. AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. G. Rich, 22 July 1901. AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. G. Rich, 1 March 1902. SLV, MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 21 August 1900. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 16. AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. G. Rich, 19 August 1901. AWM, 3DRL19195, Diary of Alured Kelly, n.d. Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 1561, Letter by Percy R. Ricardo, 5 May 1900. AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 9 June 1968. AWM, PR84/166, Letter by Andrew P. Clyne, 13 November 1971. AWM, PR86/248, Letter by Peter Groves, 8 June 1969. AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 6 July 1965. Edward M. Spiers, The Victorian Soldier in Africa (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 11. Thomas P. Dooley, Irishmen or English soldiers? The Times and World of a Southern Catholic Irish Man (1876–1916) Enlisting in the British Army during the First World War (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1995), p. 136. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 3. AWM, 3DRL 3058, Letter by Edwin Tivey, 1 February 1901. AWM, PR04034, Letters by Albert H. Marshall, 9 March 1901; 13 April 1901; 9 June 1901; 23 June 1901. AWM, 3DRL 7472, Letter by George Harris, 2 May 1900; 15 May 1900. AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. G. Rich, 22 July 1901. SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 18 May 1900. See also SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 18 July 1900; SLV, MS10459, Letter by Andrew Warden, 11 March 1900; AWM, PR00743, Letter by J. C. J. McBeth, 22 January 1900, 25 January 1900, 19 February, 1900; AWM, PR01124, Letter by Frederick Wentworth, 1 January 1901, 20 February 1901; AWM, PR86/056, Letter by Charles F. E. Cawthorn, 8 June 1901. AWM, PR90/012, Letter by Herbert A. A. Embling, 5 April 1901. SLSA, D7334(L), Letter by Alan Wellington, 17 February 1902.

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Notes 74 75 76 77 78

79 80 81 82

83 84 85 86

87 88 89 90 91 92

93 94 95 96

97

98 99

221

SLV, MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 26 February 1900. SLSA, D5511, Letter by C. George Davis, 30 September 1900. Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 79, 93, 182. AWM, PR00743, Letter by J. C. J. McBeth, December 1899. John Tosh, ‘Domesticity and Manliness in the Victorian Middle Class: The family of Edward White Benson’ in Michael Roper and John Tosh (eds), Manful Assertions: Masculinities in Britain since 1800 (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 65. Roper, The Secret Battle, p. 23. SLWA, ACC3573A, Letters by Percy Foale, 8 March 1901; 19 June 1901. PROV, VPRS 16930/P0001/2, The Empire’s Patriotic Fund Applications, no. 170. William M. Decker, Epistolary Practices: Letter Writing in America before Telecommunications (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. 3. AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 27 February 1968. AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 2 March 1968. AWM, PR86/362, Letter by Len McCosker, 12 June 1966. AWM, PR86/361, Letter by Shayne O’Brien, n.d. See also AWM, PR86/285, Letter by Bernard O’Sullivan, 28 January 1968; AWM, PR01545, Letter by Leonard F. Moriarty, 13 April 1969, 9 July 1969. AWM, PR91/187, Letter by Reg Yates, R, 16 May 1968. AWM, PR00334, Letter by Richard Yielding, 20 September 1970. See also AWM, PR00334, Letter by Richard Yielding, 31 May 1970. AWM, PR01545, Letter by Leonard F. Moriarty, 9 July 1969. AWM, PR00032, Letter by Andrew Treffry, 3 May 1969. Philip Cook and Conrad Heilmann, ‘Two Types of Self-Censorship: Public and Private’, Political Studies, 61, 1 (2013), p. 183. David Gerber, Authors of their Lives: Personal Correspondence in the Experience of Nineteenth Century British Immigrants to North America (New York: New York University Press, 2005), p. 189. Streimer and Tennant, ‘Psychiatric Effects of the Vietnam War’, p. 238. AWM, PR87/157, Letter by Neil Smith, 5 January 1968. AWM, PR01545, Letter by Leonard F. Moriarty, 30 April 1969. AWM, PR91/018, Letter by Doug Bishop, 25 April 1967. Dapin, The Nasho’s War, p. 58 also discusses soldier misconceptions concerning public treatment of Vietnam veterans. Andrew Carroll (ed.), Behind the Lines: Powerful and Revealing American and Foreign War Letters – and One Man’s Search to Find Them (New York: Scribner, 2005), p. 16. AWM, 3DRL 7472, Letter by George Harris, 25 April 1900. Kellett, Combat Motivation, p. 178; see also Henry Durant, ‘Morale and Its Measurement’, The American Journal of Sociology, 47, 3 (1941), pp. 406–407.

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Notes

100 SLSA, PRG1108, Letter by Charles F. Pegler, 18 March 1900. 101 SLV, MS11729, Letter by Fred W. Stocks, 14 June 1901. 102 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 10 October 1901. 103 SLV, MS9882, Letter by Harry V. Roberts, n.d. 104 SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 27 January 1900. See Chapter 4 for further discussion of soldier preoccupation with the physical conditions on the South African war front. 105 SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 10 August 1900. 106 AWM, PR01964, Letter by Douglas St. G. Rich, 26 November 1901. 107 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, AW 77/16, Letter by Edward Windeyer, 3 July 1900. 108 SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 18 July 1900. 109 AWM, PR01087, Letter by William Watson, 12 December 1900. See also Mitchell Library, SLNSW, Letter by Charles B. Holme, 18 November 1900; SLSA, D5511, Letter by C. George Davis, 30 September 1900; SLSA, D7334(L), Letter by Alan Wellington, 22 December 1901, 19 January 1902; Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 1561, Letter by Percy R. Ricardo, 29 August 1900, 23 October 1900; SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 27 April 1900; SLV, MS9691, Letter by Robert J. Byers, 6 May 1900; AWM, PR01124, Letter by Frederick Wentworth, 1 January 1901, 8 February 1901; SLSA, PRG1108, Letter by Charles F. Pegler, 1 July 1900. 110 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 1561, Letter by Percy R. Ricardo, 18 August 1900. 111 AWM, PR01703, Diary of Charles H. Cooper, 11 October 1900; 18 October 1900; 23 October 1900. 112 SLSA, D6427(L), Letter by Stan Jones, 12 May 1900. 113 Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 1024, Diary of Frank V. Weir, 10 October 1900. 114 SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 18–19 May 1900. 115 SLV, MS9662, Letter by Alexander McQueen, 13 June 1900. See also SLSA, D7334(L), Letter by Alan Wellington, 21 March 1901; Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 2105, Diary of Watson A. Steel, 2 June 1900; Mitchell Library, SLNSW, MLMSS 3858, Letter by William H. Glasson, 14 February 1902; SLSA, PRG1108, Letter by Charles F. Pegler, 23 July 1900; SLSA, PRG248, Diary of Frederick H. Howland, 23 October 1900. 116 AWM, PR0030, Letter by David Keating, 27 June 1969. 117 AWM, PR91/177, Letter by Dallas L. Burrage, 14 April 1971. 118 AWM, PR86/362, Letter by Len McCosker, 21 December 1966. See also AWM, PR86/362, Letter by Len McCosker, 28 April 1967. 119 AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 9 June 1968. See also AWM, PR89/104, Letter by Peter Murray, 23 June 1968. See also AWM, PR86/248, Letter by Peter Groves, 16 February 1969, 1 March 1969, 11 March 1969; AWM, PR87/157, Letter

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Notes

120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131

132 133 134

223

by Neil Smith, 24 December 1969; AWM, PR87/195, Letter by Ron Kelly, 12 June 1965, 7 August 1965, 14 October 1965, 9 February 1966, 12 February 1966; AWM, PR00334, Letter by Richard A. Yielding, 25 October 1970; AWM, PR00745, Letter by M.W. Bohn, 7 June 1970; AWM, PR84/166, Letter by Andrew Clyne, 13 August 1971. Pat Searson, in McKay, Bullets, Beans and Bandages, p. 69. AWM, PR00331, Diary of Barry L. Smith, 7 August 1969. AWM, PR84/166, Letter by Andrew Clyne, 12 July 1970. An excellent history of Anzac Day can be found in Lake and Reynolds, What’s Wrong with Anzac. Herzog, Vietnam War Stories, p. 4. AWM, PR01545, Letter by Leonard F. Moriarty, 3 August 1969. Streimer and Tennant, ‘Psychiatric Effects of the Vietnam War’, p. 234. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp. 62, 65, 70. F. C. Bartlett, Psychology and the Soldier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), p. 92; Bourne, Men, Stress and Vietnam, p. 40. Bourne, Men, Stress and Vietnam, pp. 184–185. Dinter, Hero or Coward, p. 42. Ted Bogacz, ‘War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England, 1914–1922: The Work of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into “Shell-Shock”’, Journal of Contemporary History, 24, 2 (1989), p. 233. Frank Friedel, in Charles R. Figley and Seymour Leventman (eds), Strangers at Home: Vietnam Veterans Since the War (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. xxvii. Frederick S. Roberts, in Peter Firkins, The Australians in Nine Wars: Waikato to Long Tan (Adelaide: Rigby, 1971), p. 9. Jenny Hartley, ‘“Letters are everything these days”: Mothers and Letters in the Second World War’ in Rebecca Earle (ed.), Epistolary Selves: Letters and Letter Writers, 1600–1945 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 185.

Conclusion 1 Connolly, ‘Clan, Birthplace, Loyalty’, p. 232; Penny, ‘Australia’s Reactions to the Boer War’, p. 127. 2 Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class. 3 Goot and Tiffen, ‘Public Opinion and the Politics of the Polls’, p. 138. 4 Carroll, Behind the Lines, p. 16. 5 Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War, Volume 1: The Western Hemisphere [1972] (London: Penguin, 1989), p. xli. 6 See, for example, Barkawi, Globalization and War.

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Index Aboriginal Australians 57, 127, 129 adventure 45–9, 149, 150 Africans 56–9 dehumanization 56, 59 female 128, 129 Age, The (Melbourne) 16, 35, 39, 60 Agent Orange 42 alcohol 119, 120–5, 126, 136, 147, 184 availability on war front 121, 124 changing candidness regarding 123–4, 125 importance of 120, 124–5 intoxication 85, 121–3, 124–5, 132 public attitudes towards 120–1, 124 see also Women’s Christian Temperance Union Anglo-Zulu War 56 Anti-War League 26, 31 anti-war movement see Vietnam War Anzac Day 173 Argus, The (Melbourne) 16, 26, 54, 138, 152, 158 Army Aviation Corps 104, 165 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 85, 94–5, 139 Asia, attitudes towards 33, 60, 68 Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (AATTV) 34, 68, 98, 126, 156 Australian Civil Affairs Unit 71, 94, 172 Australian Commonwealth Horse Contingent, 6th 144 Australian Horse Contingent, 1st 70 Australian Labor Party (ALP) 25, 35 Australia–New Zealand–United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) 33 Australische Zeitung 29 Barham, (Sergeant) William Henry 158 Barrier Daily Truth (Broken Hill) 16, 35 Barrier Truth, The (Broken Hill) 16, 26, 30 Basedow, Martin 29 Bethune’s Mounted Infantry 74, 108, 111, 158, 169

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Betts, (Private) Henry 53, 58, 84, 133 Birse, (Lieutenant Colonel) Robert 135 Bisdee (VC), (Lieutenant) John 80 Bishop, (Private) Douglas 64, 82, 141, 157, 167 Black Week 22, 27, 46, 86, 164 Boers 3, 23–4, 25, 26, 27, 32, 34, 51, 52, 54–6, 65–8, 114, 115, 132, 152 death toll 32 dehumanization of 54–5 female 56, 69–70, 73, 127–9 guerrilla combat 30, 89 and mail 157 views of 55–6, 65–8, 69–70, 107, 164 Bohn, (Private) Manfred Wilhelm 104 ‘boozers’ 113, 175 Border Watch, The (Mount Gambier) 16, 54–5, 56, 141–2 boredom 98–100, 117 Brabant’s Horse 121 Bray, (Private) Thomas 123 Britain adoption of social mores 120–1, 127 loyalty to 2, 24, 28–9, 35, 47, 71–2, 81, 167, 183 soldier connections with 92–3 British Army 23, 140 see also ‘Tommy Atkins’ Imperial Yeomanry 90–1 Brodrick, William St John Fremantle 114 Buller, (General) Redvers Henry 86, 87 Bulletin, The (Sydney) 16, 26, 28, 38, 55, 158 Bunyip, The (Gawler) 29, 31, 47, 48, 54 Burns, Creighton 39 Burrage, (Lance Corporal) Dallas Lyle 171 Bushveldt Carbineers 48, 66, 90, 103, 169 Byers, (Private) Robert 53, 62, 92, 93, 115, 157, 160, 163, 166 Byron, Lord (George Gordon) 150

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Cairns, James Ford (Jim) 35 Calwell, Arthur 35 Cambodia 39, 153 Campbell, (Major) Donald 68, 98 Canadians 7, 67, 92, 114 Canungra Jungle Training Centre 53 Casey, Richard 33 Cawthorn, (Trooper) Charles 55–6, 87, 91, 113, 123 censorship 15–16, 38–9, 60, 154, 157–9, 161, 176 see also self-censorship Clarke, (Trooper) Arthur 58 Clinch, (Private) John 55 Clyne, (Signaller) Andrew 98, 113, 116, 125, 136–7, 161, 172 Cock, (Trooper) Jack 74, 108, 158 Cold War 2, 4, 22, 32, 34, 50, 185 communication technology 1, 2, 35, 60, 115, 156, 168, 176 communism 32–3, 173, 185 comradeship 78–81, 89, 176, 182 death of comrade 80–1 concentration camps, South Africa 30, 32, 69, 129 Conder, (Trooper) Herbert 58, 73, 91, 99, 106, 123, 127, 128, 133–4, 135 conscription, Vietnam War see National Service Scheme Cooper, (Private) Charles 58, 170 correspondence see epistolarity cowardice 84, 106, 108, 109, 146 Cripps, (Private) John 58, 112, 121, 133 cultural memory 10, 17, 147, 150–1 Dallimore, (Major) Joseph 84 Daly, (Lieutenant General) Thomas 94–5, 136 Dangar, (Captain) Horace William 155 Davis, (Trumpeter) C. George 163, 166 De Wet, (General) Christiaan Rudolf 65, 157 Dear, (Trooper) John 164 dehumanization 54–6, 59–61, 173 Department of External Affairs (DEA) 34 desertion 84, 94, 119, 132, 137–9, 147, 184 discipline 83–5, 121, 132–4, 138 Dittmar, (Captain) Reginald 85, 116, 130 diversion, importance of 119

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D-notice system 39, 158 see also censorship domino theory 33 Downes, (Major General) Major Francis 132 Draft Resister’s Union (DRU) 36, 37, 151 drug use 125–6 duty 72–5, 183 on the battlefield 72–5, 108 and enlistment 46, 47, 48, 50, 154 Egan, (Trooper) William Thomas 145 Embling, (Lieutenant) Herbert 163, 165 Empire’s Patriotic Fund, The 26, 47, 111, 143–5 enteric fever 143 epistolarity 111–12, 149, 162, 164–5, 166, 175, 176 Fadden, (Sergeant) Rex 124 Farley, (Lance Corporal) Frederick 63, 155 fear 80, 105–8, 109, 119, 147 Federation, Australian 24, 29, 43, 92 Fire Support Base Le-Loi 94 First Boer War 24 ‘first television war’ 161 Five o’clock Follies 35 Foale, (Trooper) Percy 164 food see morale Forde, (Second Lieutenant) C. 60 Forsdike, (Bombardier) Andrew 80 fragging 85, 119, 131–2, 135–6, 147, 184 fragmentation grenade see fragging ‘fun’, war as 48–9 Gartside (Lieutenant) Robert 84 Gates, (Private) Peter 60, 104 General War Relief Fund 26 Geneva Agreement (1954) 8, 34 German-Australians 29 Gillespie (Private) Alfred 92 Glasson, (Private) William Hamline 48, 66–7, 90, 103, 169 Godolphin 66 Gorton, John 41 government, soldiers’ views of 153–4 Groves (Bombadier) Peter 52, 72, 141, 161–2 guerrilla warfare 23, 99, 105

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Index Hammond, (Private) Arthur 49, 56, 65–6, 91, 106, 111, 123, 155 Handcock, Peter 84 Harnett, (Trooper) Harold 70 Harris, (Lieutenant) George 55, 61, 86, 101, 163, 168 Hazelwood, (Lance Corporal) William 128 Heffernan, (Private) Garry 79, 117, 159 hendsoppers 66 Hennett, (Shoeing Smith) Albert 57 Henry, Alice 29 Herald, The (Adelaide) 16, 30 heroism, importance of 108–9, 147, 167 Higgins, Henry Bournes 24, 31 High School Students Against the War in Vietnam 39 Hobhouse, Emily 30 Holder, Frederick 82 Holman, William Arthur 25, 31 Holme, (Private) Charles 110, 158 home front 149–77, 179, 184–5 impact on soldiers 74, 160, 179, 184–5 relationship with war front 147–8, 182–3 soldiers affected by distance from 79 homesickness 171, 173 homosexuality 131 Howland, (Captain) Frederick 157 Hughes, (Major) J. G. 126, 156 Hughes, (Private) Henry 144 humour, battlefield 116, 119, 134–5 identity 93 see also regimental spirit idioms, nineteenth century 164–5 Imperial Contingent (or Imperial Bushmen’s Contingent), 4th 23, 63, 90, 101, 114 imperialism 22, 32 individualism 1, 149, 174–5, 176, 182 ‘irony’ of war 48, 64 ‘It’s Time’ campaign 36 Jennings, (Trooper) John Thomas 66, 129 jingoism 27, 138, 152, 160, 167 Johnson, (President) Lyndon Baines 41 joiners 66 Jones, (Private) Geoffrey 80–1, 109, 113, 136, 153

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Jones, (Private) Samuel Hedley 62, 65 Jones, (Private) Stan 65, 69, 74, 99, 106, 108, 133, 142, 151–2, 163, 169, 170, 171 Kapooka Training Centre 52 Keating, (Lance Corporal) David 124, 171 Kelly, (Corporal) Ron 61, 70, 74, 107, 113, 114, 117, 125, 137, 141, 162 Kelly, (Trooper) Alured 47, 71–2, 128, 152, 160–1 Kelman, (Corporal) William 122, 134, 151 Kidd, (Lieutenant) Thomas 79 killing, eagerness for 61, 100–5 Kimberley, relief of 23, 27, 86, 170, 171 King, (Corporal) Oscar 133 Kipling, Rudyard 91 Kitchener, (Lord) Herbert Horatio 67, 87, 112, 114, 132 Kitchener’s Fighting Scouts, 2nd 66 Kruger, Stephanus Johannes Paulus (Paul) 171 Ladysmith, relief of 23, 27, 86, 170, 171 Land Clearing Team, Vietnam 124 Lang, (Lieutenant) Patrick H. 23, 90–1, 114, 122–3 Laos 39 ‘larrikinism’ 131, 132 Lavery (Private) Gerry 107, 159 Lawn (Private) James 121 leadership 83–9, 184 soldier dissatisfaction with 85–8, 112, 115, 154, 184 leisure, increasing importance of 115–16, 124 letter-writing see epistolarity Lewis, Elliott 25 Liberal Party of Australia 4, 8, 34–5, 41–2 Lillebo, (Corporal) Wallace 70, 95, 104, 125, 141 Lilley, (Quartermaster Sergeant) W.E.L. 121 literary narratives, role of 150 living conditions 85, 88–9, 175, 177, 183 Lyne, William 25, 81 M16 ‘jumping jack’ mine 146 McBean, (Trooper) John Alexander (Jack) 46–7, 48, 112

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McBeth, (Private) J.C.J. 103, 164, 166 McCormick, (Major) E. M. 138–9 McCosker, (Private) Len 63, 98, 116, 165, 171 McDonald, Donald 158 McDonald (Major General) Arthur 94–5, 136 Macdonell, John 56 McMahon, William 41 McQueen, (Private) Alexander 58, 74, 86–7, 93, 103, 157, 171 Maddern, Martin 49, 138 Mafeking, relief of 23, 27, 57, 86, 170, 171 Magor, (Trooper) Ernest 101 mail, importance of 115, 155–7, 183 see also epistolarity Mailer, (Trooper) James Melrose 144 Manchester Guardian 31 marijuana 125, 126 Marshall, (Saddler) Albert 57, 69–70, 73–4, 79, 128–9, 135, 155–6, 162–3 Matteson, Michael 37 mechanization of war 174, 183 Mekong Delta 126 Menzies, Robert 33, 35, 36 military tradition, Australian 150, 172–3, 176, 185 ‘million dollar wound’ 132, 137 Milner, (Lord) Alfred 56–7 misbehaviour 90, 112, 131–7 money, importance of 115 Montgomery, (Field Marshal) Bernard ‘Monty’ 110 morale 73, 77, 81, 83, 85, 89, 109–18, 119, 146, 147, 148, 157, 159, 183, 184 changing understanding of 115–17 definition 110 drop in 112, 119–20 fatigue 113, 114 hunger 111 physical conditions 110–11, 113–14, 183, 184 victory 117 Morant, Harry ‘Breaker’ 66, 84 Moratoriums (Vietnam War) 39, 40–1 Moriarty, (Chief Radio Supervisor) Leonard Francis 153, 165–6, 167, 173 Murray, (Lieutenant Colonel) Peter 63, 72, 79, 94, 107, 109, 116, 117, 145, 161, 165, 171

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Murray, (Private) Arthur 101–2 mutiny 119, 133–4, 135–6, 147, 184 see also ‘short-timer’s fever’ 5th Victorian Contingent 132 feigning illness 134–5 narcotics see drug use Natal Field Force 106, 169 National Service Act 4, 34, 36–7, 166–7, 181 national servicemen (Vietnam War) 14, 36, 42, 52, 61, 81, 82–3, 89, 104, 131, 137, 151, 153 opposition to 36–7, 151 National Service Scheme see National Service Act neurasthenia 120, 144 see also war trauma New Left 40 New South Wales Army Medical Corps 49, 142 New South Wales Imperial Bushmen 92, 122, 128, 142, 151, 171 New South Wales (Mounted Rifles) Contingent, 1st 46, 55, 121, 135, 154, 158, 170 New South Wales (Mounted Rifles) Contingent, 2nd 114, 170 New Zealanders 7, 80, 84 Nha Trang 139 Nixon, Richard 39, 41, 95 Nui Dat 80, 124, 161 O’Brien, (Private) Shayne 72, 107, 157, 165 O’Connell, Denis 37 O’Connor, (Supply Officer) Alan Desmond 80 oral history 17–18, 180 Orange Free State 23 Orange River Colony 56 O’Sullivan, (Lieutenant) Bernard 71, 88 Parry, (Private) Herbert 132 Paterson, (Surgeon-Lieutenant) James Harold 56 patriotism 45–6, 50, 154 Peace and Humanity Society (Melbourne) 31 Pearson, (Major General) Cedric Maudsley Ingram ‘Sandy’ 124

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Index Pegler, (Sergeant) Charles Frederick 106, 169 Perkins, Edwin 35 Phuoc Tuy 135 physical benefits of soldiering 101, 102, 103 post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 42, 97, 120, 140, 141, 143, 145–6, 180 see also war trauma press 157–61, 168, 176–7 see also censorship Australian (South African War) 25–6, 54 Australian (Vietnam War) 35, 59–61, 150, 153, 159 British 26 changing role of 147, 168, 182–3 publication of soldiers’ letters 159–60 soldier mistrust of 153, 155, 159–61 United States 35 Pretoria, occupation of 23, 27 Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment 51 Pro-Boers 28–31, 180 ‘progress campaign’, United States 38 promotion, appeal of 104 prostitution see sexual relations psychology, combat 104–5, 174, 184 see also war trauma Puckapunyal Training Centre 52 Queensland (Imperial Bushmen’s) Contingent, 4th 49, 58, 91, 106, 135, 138 Queensland (Imperial Bushmen’s) Contingent, 5th 143 Queensland (Imperial Bushmen’s) Contingent, 6th 47, 48, 79–80, 101, 122, 160 Queensland (Mounted Infantry) Contingent, 1st 91, 110, 115, 158, 161 Queensland (Mounted Infantry) Contingent, 3rd 57, 58, 73, 91, 99, 123 quinine 135 racism 59, 60–1 Ravenscroft, (Private) Raymond 107 regimental spirit 89–92, 95 Reid, George 24 religion, soldiers’ 123

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Rentoul, Reverend Laurence 31 Rest and Convalescence (R&C) 94, 113, 124, 125, 130, 175, 184 Ricardo, (Lieutenant Colonel) Percy Ralph 91, 115, 161, 170 Rich, (Lieutenant) Douglas St. George 48, 63, 79–80, 87, 101, 102, 111–12, 122, 160, 163, 169 Richard, (Private) Arthur 132 Roberts, (Lord) Frederick Sleigh 30, 67, 73, 86, 170, 175 Roberts, (Private) Harry Victor 169 Robinson, (Trooper) George William 143–4 romanticization of warfare 62, 101, 150, 174 Ross, (Trooper) Thomas 57 rotation 81–3 Royal Australian Artillery (RAA), 1st Field Regiment 141 105th Battery 52, 161 106th Field Battery 95, 98, 124, 135 Royal Australian Engineers (RAE), 1st Field Squadron 61, 113, 157 Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) 81 1st Battalion (1 RAR) 60, 61, 74, 104, 107, 125, 162, 165 2nd Battalion (2 RAR) 104 3rd Battalion (3 RAR) 79, 80–1, 109, 136, 138, 153, 159 5th Battalion (5 RAR) 52, 61, 64, 68, 72, 79, 82, 95, 104, 107, 125, 126, 141, 156–7 6th Battalion (6 RAR) 98, 165 7th Battalion (7 RAR) 60, 64, 82, 104, 107 8th Battalion (8 RAR) 53, 85, 94, 113, 124, 131, 156, 167 9th Battalion (9 RAR) 107, 136, 159 rumours, battlefield 111, 170–1 Sabine, (Private) Charles 159–60 Save Our Sons (SOS) 36, 37 Scates, (Robert Jeffrey) Bob 37 scorched earth policy, British 30, 67, 69, 73 Scott, (Warrant Officer) Geoff 139 Scottish Horse, 1st and 2nd (Marquis of Tullabardine’s) 143–4, 145, 169 Searson, Pat 172

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self-censorship 98, 99, 103, 105, 109, 148, 149, 154, 159, 160, 162–77, 181, 185 self-wounding 132 sexual relations 126–31, 162 see also homosexuality changing candidness regarding 129–30 and civilians 119, 128–9, 130 contraceptive pill 129 and killing 126 as mutually beneficial arrangement 129 prostitution 130 public attitudes towards 127, 129 sexually transmitted infections 128, 130 shell shock 97, 98, 120, 140, 143, 146 see also war trauma Shelley, Percy Bysshe 150 ‘shirking’ see cowardice ‘short timer’s fever’ 82, 136–7 Slim, (Field Marshal) William Joseph 113–14 Smith, (Lieutenant) Barry 71, 94, 172 Smith, (Lieutenant Colonel) Neil 53, 63, 68–9, 71, 85, 94, 131, 136, 167 Smith, (Private) James 47, 58, 59, 64, 65, 91–2, 106, 135 Social Darwinism 56–7, 59, 129 soldiering, changing public view of 1–3, 151 South African Light Horse Regiment 55, 86, 101, 163 South African Native Races Committee 56 South African War 23–32 Australian fighting ability 67, 89, 90, 92 see also regimental spirit contrast between war and civilian life 103 death toll 32 enlistment 3, 27, 45–50, 67, 179 initial reactions to battlefield 62–4 link between physical conditions and dissatisfaction 85, 94, 95–6, 99 see also morale opposition see Pro-Boers public attitudes in Australia 2, 151–2 religious groups 9, 67 socio-economic background of volunteers 3, 23, 27, 47, 67, 89, 90, 102, 115, 180 soldier dissatisfaction 81–2, 149, 169–71, 179

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soldiers remaining in South Africa after conflict 83, 103 volunteer nurses 28 South Australian (Imperial Bushmen’s) Contingent, 4th 46–7, 111, 112, 159–60 South Australian (Mounted Rifles) Contingent, 1st 103, 134, 151, 157, 164 South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 33 South Vietnam 34, 153 attitudes towards civilians 60, 61, 68, 70–1, 95 Springfontein 142 Spyer, Daniel Haden 49 Steel, (Trooper) Watson Augustus 46, 55, 66, 67, 69, 84, 90, 91, 92, 135, 154 Steele, (Private) James 132 Stewart, J.C. 25 ‘stiff upper lip’ 164, 167 Stocks, (Trooper) Fred 74, 111, 169 stowaways 27, 49, 138 Strong, (Reverend) Charles 31 Students for a Democratic Society 39 Sudan War 3, 106 survival, importance of 108–9, 147, 183 survivor guilt 79–80, 100 Swinburne, Algernon Charles 54 Tasmanian (Bushmen’s) Contingent, 2nd 80 Tasmanian (Imperial Bushmen’s) Contingent, 4th 55, 87, 114, 123 Tasmanian (Mounted Rifles) Contingent, 1st 53, 80, 84, 133 Tedder, (Lieutenant) James 114 television, role of 99, 183 see also ‘first television war’ Temperance movement see Women’s Christian Temperance Union Tet Offensive 37–9, 41, 94, 139, 153, 161, 173, 182 Theobald, (Trooper) Thomas 66 Times, The (London) 54 Tivey, (Major-General) Edwin 57, 59, 121, 162 Tommasi, (Major) Gregory 95, 98, 124 ‘Tommy Atkins’ (or ‘Tommies’) 85–7, 89–92, 128

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Index trade unions 31, 39 training 50–3, 173–4, 179, 182, 183 aim 50–1 battle inoculation 53, 108 drill 52–3, 98 ideological 173–4, 177, 185 insufficient 51–2 Transvaal 23 Transvaal Patriotic Fund 26 Treaty of Vereeniging 32 Treffry, (Armourer) Andrew 61, 68, 74, 113, 126, 130, 146, 157, 159, 166 Tunbridge, (Major) W.H. 133–4 Turner, (Trooper) Charles Wentworth 53, 82, 84–5, 90, 102, 134 typhoid see enteric fever uitlanders 23–4 United States Army 11, 88, 94, 95 Victorian (Bushmen’s) Contingent, 3rd 84, 144, 170 Victorian Contingent, 2nd 47 Victorian (Imperial) Contingent, 4th 84 Victorian (Infantry and Mounted Infantry) Contingent, 1st 53, 58, 66, 82, 92, 102, 121, 133, 134, 157 Victorian (Mounted Rifles) Contingent, 2nd 57, 87, 128, 163 Victorian (Mounted Rifles) Contingent, 5th 56, 79, 128, 132, 155, 164 Viet Cong (VC) 117 attitudes towards 61, 68, 107 difficulties in identifying 60, 70 respect for 65, 68–9, 94–5 and Tet Offensive 38 Vietnam Action Campaign 39 Vietnam Moratorium Campaign 40 Vietnam War Australian entry into the war 33 conscription see National Service Act death toll 42 defensive impulse 105, 149, 167–8, 181–2, 185 enlistment 49–50 opposition to 36–7, 39–41, 153, 183 polls 39 public attitudes towards 2

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religious opposition 39–40 security concerns 34 socio-economic background of soldiers 115–16 soldier attitudes towards anti-war movement 167–8 soldier dissatisfaction 88–9, 149, 171 see also morale stoicism 171 withdrawal 41–2 Vietnamization 41, 42, 95 Vogan, (Sergeant) Arthur James 51, 56 Volksrust, concentration camp 69 Vung Tau 71, 124, 130, 161 Wadham, (Saddler) John 111 war trauma 139–46 see also neurasthenia; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); psychology, combat; shell shock war-weariness, South African War 32, 152, 180 Warden, (Sergeant) Andrew 87 Watson, (Gunner) William 170 Wayne, John 108–9 Weir, (Major) Frank Valentine 171 Wellington, (Private) Alan 73, 78–9, 108, 163 Western Australian (Mounted Infantry) Contingent, 5th 49, 79, 101–2, 106, 123, 155 Whitlam, Gough 35, 41 Wilkins, (Captain) David 52, 71, 79, 82, 104, 146 Wilson, (Corporal) Warren 94, 113, 124, 126, 156 Windeyer, (Private) Edward 170 Witten, George 84 Witwatersrand 24 Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) 121 Wood, George Arnold 26, 30 Woode, (Sergeant) Harris 127 Worker, The (Brisbane) 26, 32, 46 Workers’ Weekly Herald (Adelaide) 16 Yates, (Private) Reg 104, 165 Yielding, (Sergeant) Richard 104–5, 165 Youth Campaign Against Conscription (YCAC) 36

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