Asia Pacific in the New World Politics 9781685856519

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Asia Pacific in the New World Politics

Asia Pacific in the N e w World Politics edited by

James C. Hsiung

Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Asia Pacific in the new world politics / edited by James C. Hsiung. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-323-5 (alk. paper) ISBN 1-55587-355-3 (pbk.: alk. paper) l.Asia—Politics and government—1945- . 2. Pacific Area—Politics and government. 3. World politics—1989- . I. Hsiung, James Chieh, 1935- . DS35.2.A7978 1993 950.4'29—dc20 93-12747 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

To those instrumental in ending the Cold War, and to the memory of those who grieved and perished

in it

•

Contents

List of Illustrations Preface List of Acronyms 1 Asia

Pacific

x xi xiv in the Post-Cold

War Order

1

James C. Hsiung D e f i n i n g the End of the Cold War, 1 Key Attributes of the New World Order, 3 Effects on Asia Pacific, 6 Security in P o s t - C o l d War Asia Pacific, 12 Conclusion, 16 2 R u s s i a a n d J a p a n in t h e P o s t - C o l d W a r E r a

Peter

21

Berton

The Strategic Equation in the Asia Pacific Region Before Gorbachev, 21 The End of the Cold War: W h e n , Where, and How, 22 G o r b a c h e v ' s New Policies: J a p a n ' s Response and Soviet Perceptions of Japan, 25 G o r b a c h e v ' s Policy T o w a r d Asia, 28 Soviet-Japanese Relations, 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 9 1 , 30 The New Relationship Between Japan and Russia, 32 The End of the Cold War and J a p a n ' s D e f e n s e Policy, 36 Conclusions: Political and International Security Consequences for Japan and Russia, 38 3 Japan: Searching Once Again

49

Bernard K. Gordon Fear of Rekindling J a p a n ' s Past, 50 Pride and Arrogance, 51 Uncertainty About the Future, 54 J a p a n ' s Article 9 and the PKO, 57 Finding J a p a n ' s Place: The Next Stage, 6 0 vii

viii

Contents

4 China in the Postnuclear World James

C.

71

Hsiung

China's Response to the New World Order, 71 New Chinese Policy Initiative, 75 Conclusion, 85 5 Philippine and South Korean International R e l a t i o n s in P o s t - C o l d War A s i a P a c i f i c Albert F. Celoza and Martin H. Sours

93

Historical Framework, 95 Postwar Authoritarian Rule and U.S. Relations, 98 Democratization and Anti-Americanism, 102 Political Economy and Foreign Relations, 106 Conclusions, 109 6 Taiwan in P o s t - C o l d War A s i a P a c i f i c Cal Clark

113

The Consequences of Rapid Economic Growth for T a i w a n ' s Post-Cold War Position, 115 Democratization and the Reversal of the Cold War Stereotypes in T a i w a n ' s Domestic Policy, 121 ROC-PRC (Non) Relations: Moving Beyond the Cold War Cleavage? 125 Implications, 129 7 Southeast A s i a A f t e r the C o l d War Bernard K. Gordon

135

Two Southeast Asias: ASEAN and Indochina, 137 A S E A N , the United States, and the End of the Cold War, 140 Thailand and the Cambodia Conflict, 142 Indonesia: Southeast A s i a ' s Giant, 146 Malaysia and Mahathir, 149 The Philippines and Singapore: Foreign Policy Polar Opposites, 152 8 U . S . P o w e r and Policy: C h o i c e s in the P a c i f i c R e g i o n Steve Chan Winds of Change, 161 Hegemonic Stability, 162 Lost Hegemony or Persistent Dominance? 164 Public Goods or Private Gains? 166

161

Contents

ix

Confounding Cause and Effect? 169 Partisan Mutual Adjustment, 170 Conclusion, 173 9 Alternative D i r e c t i o n s for U . S . Strategy in the C h a n g i n g P a c i f i c B a s i n David

B. H.

177

Denoon

Theoretical Context and Specific Cases, 181 Current Regionwide Problems for the United States, 184 Future Scenarios, 187 U.S. Options, 189 10 A s i a P a c i f i c E c o n o m i c Integration in Global P e r s p e c t i v e Peter C. Y. Chow

195

Interdependence Within Asia Pacific, 197 Evolution of Regional Economic Integration in Asia Pacific Countries, 202 Alternative Scenarios of Regional Economic Blocs, 205 Conclusion, 208 11 A s i a P a c i f i c in Perspective: The Impact of the End of the C o l d War James C. Hsiung

213

Identity of the Region, 213 Rise of the Region, 214 Irrelevance of Developmentalism, 216 Irrelevance of Dependencia, 217 Imagery of the " T w o Worlds": Is Balance of Power Dead? 218 Effects of the Soviet Retreat on the Asia Pacific Region, 223 Allies and Adversaries: The Blurring Lines, 224 Bonuses for the United States, 230 12 G a z i n g into the Twenty-First Century: A P a c i f i c Era? James C. Hsiung

235

Our Century's Bequests, 235 Can the Asian Experience Be Duplicated? 236 A Pacific Era? 248 Theory and International Change, 257 About the Editor and Index About the Book

Contributors

263 267 274

• • 1.1.

Illustrations

MAP S t r a t e g i c S t r a i t s a n d U.S. M i l i t a r y B a s e s in the Southeast Asian Region

• 3.1 3.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 9.1 9.2 10.1 12.1 12.2

10.1

9.2 10.1

63 64 117 118 121 185 188 201 249 250

FIGURE Japan, China, A S E A N , and the NIEs

• 9.1

TABLES U.S. and J a p a n e s e E x p o r t s to A s i a , 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 1 U . S . and J a p a n e s e I m p o r t s f r o m A s i a , 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 1 I n d i c a t o r s of D e v e l o p m e n t L e v e l , T a i w a n T a i w a n ' s T r a d e with the U n i t e d S t a t e s in the 1980s R O C T r a d e w i t h a n d I n v e s t m e n t in t h e P R C U.S. T r a d e B a l a n c e , 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 1 F u t u r e S c e n a r i o s of U . S . S t r a t e g y in t h e P a c i f i c B a s i n China's Export Similarity Index with A S E A N - 4 A v e r a g e A n n u a l G r o w t h R a t e s in G D P U.S. Merchandise Trade with Selected Countries and A r e a s , 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 7

•

17

203

APPENDIXES 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 F o r e c a s t of R e a l E c o n o m i c G r o w t h a n d I n c r e a s e of C o n s u m e r P r i c e s of F i f t e e n E c o n o m i e s P e r c e n t a g e of T o t a l I m p o r t s f r o m J a p a n a n d the United States, 1990 M a j o r E c o n o m i c I n d i c a t o r s of A s i a P a c i f i c C o u n t r i e s

x

192 193 211

• Preface Few studies on Asia Pacific approach it f r o m a global perspective. T h i s one attempts to do just that, placing the region in the context of worldwide trends. It is written with two sets of conditions in view: the end of the Cold War, and the beckoning of the twenty-first century. The reader may already be familiar with the economic clout and vast potential of the Asia Pacific region. Still, it is appropriate to offer a brief comment on its strategic relevance to the United States, drawing on the lessons that can be derived from a retrospective view of post-1945 world politics. It is often said that our century was d e f i n e d by three global w a r s — t h e two world wars and the Cold W a r — a n d that the United States, in the last half-century, fought three wars across the P a c i f i c — t h e Pacific War (1941— 1945) with Japan, and the Korean and Vietnam wars. 1 When these events are mentioned in the literature, it is typically to show how global international relations affected events in Asia Pacific. But what is not readily app a r e n t — m u c h less a p p r e c i a t e d — i s how past e v e n t s in Asia P a c i f i c likewise helped shape or reshape events e l s e w h e r e , s o m e t i m e s events of m o m e n t o u s proportions. One example is the impact of the Korean War on global politics. As one author put it, without the Korean War, many of the characteristics associated with the Cold W a r — h i g h e r d e f e n s e budgets, a militarized NATO, great Sino-U.S. hostility followed by post-1972 C h i n a card playing, and U.S. security c o m m i t m e n t s throughout the w o r l d — p r o b ably w o u l d not have developed the way they did. 2 T h e Vietnam War is another e x a m p l e in the same category. T h e r e is no need to rehash its w e l l - k n o w n e f f e c t s on d o m e s t i c politics in the United States and on the conduct of regional relations. I shall only mention its influence on international relations theory. T h e fact that the prep o n d e r a n t military p o w e r of the U n i t e d States f a i l e d to stop the North V i e t n a m e s e f r o m e n g u l f i n g South V i e t n a m r e m a i n s a p u z z l e to m a n y . From the consequent scholarly s o u l - s e a r c h i n g , h o w e v e r , have c o m e important insights that have increased our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the nature of p o w e r , and its limitations; D a v i d B a l d w i n ' s " p a r a d o x of u n r e a l i z e d p o w e r " and J e f f r e y H a r t ' s "three m e a s u r e s of p o w e r " are two e x a m p l e s . 3 T h e r e is a paradox concerning the place of Asia Pacific in U.S. strategic thinking, however. Every recent U.S. president has asserted that the United States is a "Pacific p o w e r . " It is nevertheless true that, like the former Soviet Union, the United States tended to subordinate the P a c i f i c to xi

xii

Preface

t h e A t l a n t i c in its s t r a t e g i c t h i n k i n g a b o u t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . T h e c h a p t e r s in t h i s b o o k s h o w h o w t h e k a l e i d o s c o p i c c h a n g e s in w o r l d p o l i t i c s s i n c e t h e late 1 9 8 0 s , a l o n g w i t h t h r e e d e c a d e s of p h e n o m e n a l e c o n o m i c s u c c e s s of A s i a P a c i f i c n a t i o n s , h a v e b r o u g h t a n e w a g e of g e o e c o n o m i c s . If t h i n g s s h o u l d t u r n o u t a s t h i s b o o k a n t i c i p a t e s , t h e t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y will w i t n e s s t h e rise of a n o n - W e s t e r n b l o c ( i . e . , A s i a P a c i f i c ) t o s h a r e t h e w o r l d stage with two Western blocs—one European and one

(post-European)

N o r t h A m e r i c a n — o n an e q u a l f o o t i n g a n d w i t h s i m i l a r v a l u e s . T h a t e v e n tuality will c h a n g e priorities for U.S. foreign policy thinking. M o r e imp o r t a n t , it m a y c h a n g e t h e v e r y n a t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s in t h e s t a t e - c e n t r i c W e s t p h a l i a n s y s t e m w e l i v e in. T h e t e r m " A s i a P a c i f i c " u s e d in t h i s v o l u m e r e f e r s g e n e r a l l y to J a p a n , C h i n a , the f o u r Asian N I E s (newly industrializing e c o n o m i e s : S o u t h Korea, T a i w a n , H o n g K o n g , and S i n g a p o r e ) , a n d S o u t h e a s t A s i a , i n c l u d i n g Ind o c h i n a a n d m e m b e r s of A S E A N ( t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s ) . In t h e l i t e r a t u r e , C a n a d a , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , M e x i c o , A u s t r a l i a , a n d N e w Z e a l a n d , a m o n g o t h e r s , a r e s o m e t i m e s i n c l u d e d in t h e b r o a d e r t e r m " P a c i f i c B a s i n , " b u t this v o l u m e o f f e r s n o s e p a r a t e c h a p t e r s o n t h e r o l e s of t h e s e c o u n t r i e s in t h e s e c u r i t y a n d e c o n o p o l i t i c a l l i f e of A s i a P a c i f i c . A f e w b r i e f w o r d s a b o u t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e b o o k a r e in o r d e r . C h a p t e r 1 b e g i n s w i t h a d e f i n i t i o n of w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e n d of t h e C o l d W a r a n d p r o c e e d s to i d e n t i f y t h e m a j o r a t t r i b u t e s t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e s o c a l l e d p o s t - C o l d W a r e r a o n t h e l a r g e r w o r l d s c e n e . It t h e n e x p l o r e s h o w g l o b a l c h a n g e s m a n i f e s t t h e m s e l v e s at t h e A s i a P a c i f i c r e g i o n a l l e v e l a n d w h e t h e r there are regional deviations f r o m the global n o r m . E a c h of the next eight c h a p t e r s , 2 t h r o u g h 9, f o c u s e s on a c o u n t r y or a r e a , l o o k i n g at t h e g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n of h o w n e w c i r c u m s t a n c e s b r o u g h t on by a n e w era will a f f e c t international r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the A s i a P a c i f i c r e g i o n . T h e r e are c h a p t e r s a s s e s s i n g h o w the n e w era b e a r s on J a p a n ( G o r don), C h i n a (Hsiung), and T a i w a n (Clark). T w o c h a p t e r s survey bilateral relations: b e t w e e n Russia and Japan (Berton) and b e t w e e n the Philippines and South Korea (Celoza and Sours). The chapter by Berton also evalua t e s t h e f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n ' s r o l e in t h e r e g i o n . O n e c h a p t e r ( G o r d o n ) c o v e r s m e m b e r s of A S E A N . O n e c h a p t e r ( C h o w ) e x p l o r e s t h e p r o s p e c t s of r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n in A s i a P a c i f i c , a n d d o e s s o in t h e g l o b a l

context

of t h e t r e n d s of c o m p e t i t i v e t r a d e - b l o c f o r m a t i o n . T w o c h a p t e r s d i s c u s s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' c h a n g i n g r o l e , w i t h its c h a l l e n g e f o r t h e o r y ( C h a n ) a n d possible strategic responses (Denoon). T h e b o o k ends with two c o n c l u d i n g chapters that, while drawing upon t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s , a l s o f o c u s o n t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e e n d of t h e C o l d W a r to t h e c o m i n g of t h e t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y . C h a p t e r 11 p r o v i d e s a r e t r o s p e c t i v e of Asia P a c i f i c ' s rise as a solid e c o n o m i c force, w i t h a v i e w to a s s e s s i n g h o w it w i l l f a r e in t h e p o s t - C o l d W a r e r a . T h e f i n a l c h a p t e r m e a s u r e s t h e b e q u e s t s of o u r c e n t u r y a n d s p e c u l a t e s o n t h e g l o b a l a n d r e g i o n a l b a l a n c e of p o w e r in t h e n e w c e n t u r y . It a l s o c o m p a r e s

Preface

xiii

t h e e v o l v i n g r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s of t h e t h r e e c o m p e t i n g t r a d i n g b l o c s ( E u r o p e , North A m e r i c a , a n d A s i a P a c i f i c ) o v e r t i m e , in an a t t e m p t to a n s w e r the c o m p e l l i n g q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e r e is g o i n g to b e a " P a c i f i c E r a . " E x c e p t f o r C h a p t e r 10, by P e t e r C h o w , all c h a p t e r s g r e w out of p a p e r s p r e s e n t e d on t w o c o n s e c u t i v e p a n e l s I c h a i r e d at the 1 9 9 2 a n n u a l c o n f e r e n c e of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n ( I S A ) , in A t l a n t a . T h e p a n e l s ' c o m m o n t h e m e ( " P o s t - C o l d W a r I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s in A s i a Pac i f i c " ) fit the general t h e m e of t h e I S A c o n f e r e n c e : " P r o s p e c t s f o r P r o g r e s s in a C h a n g i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t . " I w i s h to a c k n o w l e d g e t h e w a r m s u p p o r t g i v e n by t h e I S A 1 9 9 2 P r o g r a m C o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n . P r o f e s s o r J a m e s L e e R a y o f F l o r i d a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , in e n d o r s i n g t h e t w o p a n e l s for the a n n u a l c o n f e r e n c e . T h e c o n t r i b u t o r s to this v o l u m e d e m o n s t r a t e d a s u p e r b s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e a n d s e n s e of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in s u b m i t t i n g t h e i r p a n e l p a p e r s a n d t h e n the f i n a l d r a f t s of their c h a p t e r s o n t i m e a n d , in s o m e c a s e s , e v e n w e l l a h e a d of t i m e . S t e v e C h a n c o n s i s t e n t l y f i n i s h e d h i s w o r k m o n t h s b e f o r e t h e d e a d l i n e , d e s p i t e his s a b b a t i c a l s p e n t in S i n g a p o r e part of t h e y e a r . B e r n a r d G o r d o n , w h o s p e n t a t e r m v i s i t i n g at K o b e U n i v e r s i t y , J a p a n , n o n e t h e l e s s f i n i s h e d t w o c h a p t e r s on t i m e . T h i s h a r d w o r k m a d e my j o b as c o o r d i n a t o r a n d e d i t o r m u c h e a s i e r ; I w i s h to t h a n k all the c o n t r i b u t o r s . I o w e a s p e c i a l d e b t to P e t e r C h o w f o r a d d i n g a c h a p t e r o n r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n as an o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e b o o k , m e e t i n g t h e d e a d l i n e des p i t e a f a m i l y loss. In the p r e p a r a t i o n of p o r t i o n s of t h i s b o o k , I w a s a b l y a i d e d by my res e a r c h assistant, M r . Li W e i , at N e w Y o r k U n i v e r s i t y . I also r e c e i v e d g e n erous c o m m e n t s and e n c o u r a g e m e n t f r o m my colleagues, a m o n g them L e a h H a u s a n d S t e v e n B r a m s , as well a s D a v i d D e n o o n . T o t h e m , a n d o t h ers w h o have helped, I o w e my sincere thanks. —JCH

m NOTES 1. James A. Leach, "A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy," 71 Foreign Affairs 3:27 (Summer 1992). 2. Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," 24 Journal of Conflict Resolution 4:563-592 (December 1980). 3. David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics," 31 World Politics 2: 161-194 (1979), develops the point about the nonfungibility of power and finds power to be not an undifferentiated mass but situation-specific. The U.S. nuclear force may be adequate to deter a Soviet missile attack, but was inadequate for deterring the North Koreans from capturing the Pueblo. Jeffrey Hart, "Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations," 30 International Organization 2:289-305 (Spring 1976), defines power as control over resources, actors, and events. If control over resources cannot convert to control over events, he notes, then power, no matter how immense, is to no avail. Either Baldwin's or Hart's formulation would explain why, despite its vast high tech power, the United States failed in Vietnam.

• Acronyms AFTA APEC

NPT

A s i a n Free T r a d e A r e a A s i a P a c i f i c E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n f o r u m ( f o r m e d in 1 9 8 9 — m e m b e r s are the U . S . , A u s t r a l i a , N e w Z e a l a n d , Canada, Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong K o n g , a n d the A S E A N n a t i o n s ) A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t Asia A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei) C o m m o n w e a l t h of I n d e p e n d e n t S t a t e s ( f o r m e r S o v i e t Union) East A s i a n E c o n o m i c G r o u p / C a u c u s European Community G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t on T a r i f f s a n d T r a d e International Atomic Energy A g e n c y International Monetary Fund K u o m i n t a n g ( r u l i n g party of T a i w a n , a k a N a t i o n a l i s t s ) Liberal D e m o c r a t i c Party ( r u l i n g p a r t y of J a p a n ) m i s s i n g in a c t i o n / p r i s o n e r of w a r M i n i s t r y of I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e a n d I n d u s t r y ( J a p a n ) multinational corporations North American Free Trade A g r e e m e n t North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n newly industrializing country/economy (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) Nonproliferation Treaty (1968)

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PBEC PECC PKO PRC R&D ROC SEATO ZOPFAN

Pacific Basin Economic Council Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference peacekeeping operation P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a ( m a i n l a n d C h i n a ) research and development R e p u b l i c of C h i n a ( T a i w a n ) Southeast Atlantic Treaty Organization z o n e of p e a c e , f r e e d o m , a n d n e u t r a l i t y

ASA ASEAN CIS EAEG/EAEC EC GATT IAEA IMF KMT LDP MIA/POW MITI MNCs NAFTA NATO NIC/NIE

XIV

•

1

Asia Pacific in the Post-Cold War Order James C. Hsiung T h i s chapter will address how the advent of the p o s t - C o l d War era will affect the balance of power in the Asia Pacific region. At the start, it is necessary to discuss what e f f e c t s the p o s t - C o l d War era will bring to the global balance of power.

•

DEFINING THE END OF THE COLD WAR

That the Cold War has ended is now accepted as an indisputable fact. But it is neither clear exactly when was the genesis of the end of the era that had prevailed since the conclusion of World War II nor certain what the "end of the Cold War" really implies. The year 1991 is generally considered the watershed that marked the beginning of a qualitatively new era (cf. Chapter 2 below), following the tumultuous collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union two years hence. H o w e v e r , the earliest b e g i n n i n g s of the end of the Cold W a r can be traced back much earlier. O n e could probably go as far back as the late 1970s, certainly no later than the early 1980s, when, as Richard J. Krickus ( 1 9 8 7 ) put it, both s u p e r p o w e r s w e r e "in c r i s i s " as a direct result of the mutual confrontation policy that necessitated their cutthroat nuclear a r m s race. Both superpowers, Krickus concludes, had to save themselves f r o m the " c r i s i s " of the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s by reversing the Cold W a r gears. Alternatively, one could agree with Richard T h o r n t o n (1985) that m i d - 1 9 8 4 was the d e c i s i v e crisis point in Soviet strategy, f o r c i n g the hand of Mikhail G o r b a c h e v when he a s c e n d e d to the post of general secretary of the Soviet C o m m u n i s t Party the f o l l o w i n g year. Since the Cuban Missile Crisis

1

2

James

C.

Hsiung

of 1962, t w o a s s u m p t i o n s had u n d e r l i n e d the Soviet bid to a c h i e v e military superiority over the United States. T h e first w a s that military superiority w a s a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n to alter the e x i s t i n g geopolitical b a l a n c e to a d v a n t a g e . S e c o n d , the S o v i e t s had a s s u m e d that the cost of a t t a i n i n g that c o n d i t i o n could be b o r n e w i t h o u t i n f l i c t i n g u n d u e h a r d s h i p u p o n the Soviet p e o p l e . By m i d - 1 9 8 4 , h o w e v e r , it w a s c l e a r to M o s c o w that b o t h these ass u m p t i o n s had turned out to be f a l s e , as I shall explain b e l o w . In the first place, a f t e r the s u c c e s s f u l U.S. anti-ballistic m i s s i l e ( A B M ) test a b o v e K w a j a l e i n I s l a n d in t h e P a c i f i c , h e l d on J u n e 10, 1 9 8 4 ( E d w i n B l a c k 1984), it b e c a m e d e v a s t a t i n g l y c l e a r to the S o v i e t s that, b y e m p l o y ing c u r r e n t t e c h n o l o g y to c o m b i n e a h i g h l y s e n s i t i v e l o n g - w a v e l e n g t h inf r a r e d s e n s o r w i t h an o n - b o a r d o p t i c a l h o m i n g d e v i c e and s o l i d - s t a t e m i n i c o m p u t e r , the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d d e s i g n a n o n n u c l e a r A B M s y s t e m c a p a b l e of i n t e r c e p t i n g i n c o m i n g b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s o u t s i d e the e a r t h ' s atm o s p h e r e at a l t i t u d e s b e t w e e n 6 0 a n d 100 m i l e s . T h i s lesson r a i s e d the unh a p p y p r o s p e c t that M o s c o w ' s t w e n t y - y e a r i n v e s t m e n t in o f f e n s i v e ballistic m i s s i l e t e c h n o l o g y w o u l d s o o n b e r e n d e r e d o b s o l e t e a n d i r r e l e v a n t (Thornton). S e c o n d , in 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4 M o s c o w s u f f e r e d a d o u b l e s h o c k of agricultural f a i l u r e s and the p r e c i p i t o u s d e c l i n e of w o r l d p e t r o l e u m prices. T h i s d o u b l e loss, w h i c h s e v e r e l y s t r a i n e d t h e S o v i e t e c o n o m y , put M o s c o w ' s d e f e n s e b u i l d u p in j e o p a r d y . T h e s e v e r i t y of t h e s t r a i n s c a n be s e e n f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t S o v i e t b o r r o w i n g s f r o m E u r o p e a n d J a p a n a l m o s t t r i p l e d in 1 9 8 4 , to n e a r l y $ 3 b i l l i o n ( M i c h a e l S m i t h 1 9 8 5 ) . T h u s , f o r the f i r s t t i m e s i n c e t h e S o v i e t m i s s i l e b u i l d u p b e g a n in 1 9 6 2 , M o s c o w c a m e to g r i p s w i t h the s t a r k reality that t h e s t r a t e g y c o u l d n o t b e p u r s u e d w i t h o u t w r e c k i n g t h e S o v i e t e c o n o m y . W i t h i n t h r e e w e e k s of the K w a j a l e i n test, o n J u n e 29, 1 9 8 4 , M o s c o w d e c i d e d to r e t u r n to t h e n u c l e a r a r m s - r e d u c t i o n b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e in G e n e v a , f r o m w h i c h t h e y h a d w a l k e d a w a y the p r e v i o u s N o v e m b e r . T h u s , G o r b a c h e v ' s s t r a t e g i c r e t h i n k i n g , w h i c h w a s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the g e n e r a l t h a w w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s — a n d , m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , f o r the e v e n tual c o n c l u s i o n of the I N F ( I n t e r m e d i a t e R a n g e F o r c e ) r e d u c t i o n treaty of D e c e m b e r 1987, as well as f o r t h e i m p r o v e d p o s t - 1 9 8 7 S o v i e t a t t i t u d e tow a r d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ( H y l a n d ; K o z y r e v ; B i a l e r ) — w a s all a p r o d u c t o f this s o u l - s e a r c h i n g i m p o s e d o n the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p in the a f t e r m a t h of t h e m i d - 1 9 8 4 crisis p o i n t . A l t h o u g h I k n o w of n o s e r i o u s a t t e m p t t o d e f i n e w h a t t h e " e n d of the C o l d W a r " really m e a n s in e m p i r i c a l t e r m s , a p a r s i m o n i o u s d e f i n i t i o n , 1 it s e e m s to m e , w o u l d h a v e to i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g t h r e e d e s i d e r a t a : 1. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e [ f o r m e r ] S o v i e t U n i o n n o l o n g e r f a c e e a c h o t h e r o f f in a p e r p e t u a l , i d e o l o g i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n , in w h a t u s e d to b e c a l l e d t h e " b i s u p e r p o w e r c o n f l i c t " ( t h e r e is o n l y o n e s u p e r p o w e r left f o l l o w i n g S o v i e t c o l l a p s e ) .

Asia

Pacific

in the Post-Cold

War Order

3

2. T h e t w o o p p o s i n g a l l i a n c e s t r u c t u r e s that u n d e r s c o r e d p o s t - W o r l d W a r II w o r l d p o l i t i c s — a s r e p r e s e n t e d by the N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n ( N A T O ) a n d the W a r s a w P a c t ( W T O ) — h a v e c e a s e d to be the v e h i c l e s f o r E a s t - W e s t c o n f l i c t and h a v e lost their o w n r a i s o n d ' ê t r e . In f a c t , the W T O b e c a m e e x t i n c t as of M a r c h 31, 1 9 9 1 . T h i s d e m i s e w o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e h a p p e n e d e v e n w i t h o u t t h e c o l l a p s e of c o m m u n i s m in E a s t e r n E u r o p e . W i t h the c o n c l u s i o n of t h e C h a r t e r of Paris in N o v e m b e r 1990, the t h i r t y - f o u r p a r t i c i p a n t s w h o w e r e t h e o r i g i n a l p a r t i e s to the H e l s i n k i A c c o r d ( m i n u s East G e r m a n y , f o l l o w i n g t h e G e r m a n u n i f i c a t i o n ) o f f i c i a l l y d e c l a r e d the e n d of the C o l d W a r . 3. T h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e T h i r d W o r l d a r e n o l o n g e r t h e e x t e n d e d b a t t l e g r o u n d s in t h e W e s t ' s c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t the c o m m u n i s t w o r l d . T o b e m o r e e x a c t , t h e s e are no l o n g e r the d o m a i n s f r o m w h i c h the W e s t e n d e a v o r s to e x c l u d e the Eastern bloc. For c o n f i r m a t i o n of this c h a n g e , b e g i n n i n g as early as late 1990, o n e need only look at t w o imp o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t s : t h e e x t e n s i o n of " o b s e r v e r " s t a t u s to t h e S o v i e t U n i o n by t h e G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t on T a r i f f s a n d T r a d e ( G A T T ) , 2 and t h e U . S . - S o v i e t a l i g n m e n t o n the s a m e side o v e r the G u l f c r i s i s of 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 , in r e s p e c t of b o t h t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l v o t e s o n s a n c t i o n s a n d , e v e n t u a l l y , in t h e c o u n c i l ' s v o t e o n u s i n g f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e r e c a l c i t r a n t I r a q . L i k e M o s c o w , B e i j i n g a l s o j o i n e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s in d e n o u n c i n g the a c t s of S a d d a m H u s s e i n ' s Iraq, an i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l y a n t i - W e s t a n d anti-Israel T h i r d W o r l d s t a t e that w o u l d h a v e a u t o m a t i c a l l y w o n C h i n e s e b a c k i n g d u r i n g the Cold War.

•

KEY ATTRIBUTES OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

T h e n e w w o r l d o r d e r f o l l o w i n g t h e e n d of t h e C o l d W a r d i s t i n g u i s h e s itself in t h r e e k e y r e s p e c t s . F i r s t , a m u l t i p o l a r w o r l d will r e p l a c e the b i p o l a r i t y that d o m i n a t e d the w o r l d s y s t e m for over f o u r d e c a d e s . S e c o n d , the p o s t - C o l d W a r w o r l d will w i t n e s s the transition f r o m nuc l e a r t o c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e n c e . T h e t h i r d , a n d f i n a l , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e n e w w o r l d o r d e r is t h e r i s i n g i m p o r t a n c e of e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y t o rival, e v e n eclipse, military s e c u r i t y ( H s i u n g 1991a). A f e w w o r d s of e l a b o r a t i o n a r e in o r d e r f o r e a c h of t h e s e p r e g n a n t p o i n t s , w h i c h a r e at times counterintuitive.

•

Multipolarity

N u c l e a r b i p o l a r i t y s i n c e t h e l a t e 1 9 4 0 s h a s s e r v e d to g u a r a n t e e w h a t J o h n L e w i s G a d d i s ( 1 9 8 6 ) c a l l s E u r o p e ' s " l o n g p e a c e . " In p o s t - C o l d W a r E u r o p e , t h e c o n t i n e n t s e e s t h e r e t u r n of a f l u i d b a l a n c e a m o n g six m a j o r

4

James C. Hsiung

p o w e r s . M e a s u r e d by t h e s i z e o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s a l o n e , they are: the [ f o r m e r ] Soviet U n i o n , F r a n c e , [united] G e r m a n y ,

Great

B r i t a i n , P o l a n d , a n d H u n g a r y . In c o n t r a s t t o t h e n u c l e a r b i p o l a r s y s t e m , h o w e v e r , the p o s t - C o l d W a r m u l t i p o l a r i t y b o d e s ill f o r t h e s t a b i l i t y of t h e w o r l d system, for reasons I shall explain. M u l t i p o l a r i t y n e c e s s a r i l y m e a n s a n i n c r e a s e in t h e n u m b e r of d y a d s a n d a l l i a n c e p e r m u t a t i o n s . It a l s o m e a n s m o r e u n e v e n d i s t r i b u t i o n

of

p o w e r a c r o s s t h e s y s t e m , m a k i n g b a l a n c e o f p o w e r m o r e d i f f i c u l t . In g a m e - t h e o r e t i c l a n g u a g e , d e f e c t i o n s b y s t a t e s w i l l b e h a r d e r to d e t e c t as t h e n u m b e r of p l a y e r s in t h e g a m e e x p a n d s ; a n d t h e c o s t s of s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t d e f e c t i o n s will a l s o g o u p . T h e s e in t u r n w i l l m a k e d e t e r r e n c e c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y m o r e d i f f i c u l t . In t h e r e a l w o r l d , t h e m u l t i p o l a r s y s t e m of 1 8 1 6 t h r o u g h 1 9 4 6 w a s o n e that w a s v i s i t e d by n u m e r o u s m a j o r w a r s , inc l u d i n g t h e t w o w o r l d w a r s ( M e a r s h e i m e r 1 9 9 0 , p. 1 5 4 ) . U n l i k e o t h e r c o n t i n e n t s , E u r o p e , w i t h t h e l a r g e s t g r o u p of d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s , is t h e o n l y o n e that is not g o i n g to s e e " t i m e ' s c y c l e " ( i . e . , a r e t u r n of t h e p a s t ) . T h e p o s t - b i p o l a r " i n s t a b i l i t y " m a y not t a k e t h e s a m e f o r m s h e r e as e l s e w h e r e (Jervis 1992, 4 6 - 5 5 ) . But, for the m o m e n t , o n e can safely say that c o h e s i o n s w i t h i n N A T O w i l l b e h a r d e r to m a i n t a i n . In 1 9 9 1 , f o r e x a m p l e , d i s s e n s i o n s s u r f a c e d in t h e c o u r s e of t h e Y u g o s l a v c i v i l w a r o v e r w h e t h e r o r n o t N A T O o u g h t to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e b r e a k a w a y

re-

p u b l i c s o f C r o a t i a a n d S l o v e n i a . T h e a s s e r t i v e n e s s of ( n o w u n i t e d ) G e r m a n y , w h i c h stood firm on the issue until o t h e r N A T O m e m b e r s relented b y e a r l y J a n u a r y 1 9 9 2 , is a c a s e in p o i n t . R e s u r g e n t h y p e r n a t i o n a l i s m a n d e t h n i c d i s p u t e s a r e o t h e r s o u r c e s of c o n f l i c t in E a s t e r n E u r o p e .

•

Decline

in the Salience

of Nuclear

Deterrence

In t h e C o l d W a r e r a , t h e b a l a n c e o f t e r r o r m a d e c o n q u e s t d i f f i c u l t a n d e x p a n s i o n f u t i l e . T h e f u t i l i t y of e x p a n s i o n w a s o n l y o n e , a l b e i t a n i m p o r t a n t , f a c t o r a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e r o b u s t d e t e r r e n c e that a s s u r e d s t a b i l i t y in t h e (nuclear) bipolar world. Other reasons for robust deterrence included the futility of nuclear overkill a n d the fear that a r e v e r s e p r o x y war m i g h t escalate into a nuclear conflagration e m b r o i l i n g the s u p e r p o w e r s themselves (Hsiung 1992; Jervis 1985, pp. 193ff). As conventional deterrence returns, t h e w o r l d will h a v e t o b r a c e itself f o r g r e a t e r i n s t a b i l i t y e m a n a t i n g f r o m t h e i n h e r e n t p o w e r i m b a l a n c e . A s t h e r e is n o e q u i v a l e n t of a n o v e r k i l l r e s t r a i n t o n c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s , t h e u n c h e c k e d r a c e s in c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m a m e n t s will c r e a t e e n d l e s s i m b a l a n c e s , a f f e c t i n g s y s t e m i c s t a b i l i t y . P r o l i f e r a t i o n of b i o c h e m i c a l a n d o t h e r w e a p o n s of m a s s i v e d e s t r u c t i o n will f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e the situation. D e t e r r e n c e , w h i c h has to d e p e n d on threat m a k i n g , will be m o r e d i f f i c u l t , as threat m a k i n g will not w o r k well in c o n d i t i o n s of p o w e r i m b a l a n c e . If d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e i n f e r i o r p a r t y , t h e

Asia Pacific in the Post-Cold

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5

threats will h e i g h t e n that p a r t y ' s r e s o l v e to r e d r e s s the b a l a n c e . ( F o l l o w i n g the s e c o n d M o r o c c a n c r i s i s in 1911, G e r m a n y d e c i d e d to c a t c h u p w i t h G r e a t B r i t a i n m i l i t a r i l y , in r e s p o n s e to L l o y d G e o r g e ' s u n y i e l d i n g s t a n c e [ L a n g e r 1 9 5 2 , p. 7 5 8 ] . ) If, c o n v e r s e l y , t h r e a t s are d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the s u perior p a r t y , t h e y will o n l y e n c o u r a g e it to s t r i k e first b e f o r e the b a l a n c e is r e v e r s e d . ( T h u s , G e r m a n y d e c i d e d to s t r i k e f i r s t in 1 9 1 4 to arrest t h e incipient e r o s i o n of the superiority e n j o y e d by the D u a l A l l i a n c e of G e r m a n y and A u s t r o - H u n g a r y , v i s - à - v i s the m i l i t a r y m i g h t of t h e T r i p l e E n t e n t e , p a v i n g the w a y for W o r l d W a r 1 [ S a r b r o s k y 1 9 8 9 ] . ) E m p i r i c a l l y , the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y w a s a t y p i c a l p e r i o d of c o n v e n tional d e t e r r e n c e . If A l a n A l e x a n d r o f f ' s s t u d y ( 1 9 8 1 , p. 6 7 ) is any i n d i c a tion, c o n v e n t i o n a l d e t e r r e n c e had o n l y a 3 7 p e r c e n t c h a n c e of s u c c e s s . In t h e " n o n n u c l e a r , " m u l t i p o l a r w o r l d e m e r g i n g f r o m the a s h e s of b i p o l a r i t y , the w o r l d ' s stability is m o s t likely to be t h r e a t e n e d by local bullies, s o m e a r m e d w i t h w e a p o n s of m a s s i v e d e s t r u c t i o n , s u c h as S a d d a m H u s s e i n ' s Iraq.

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Rise of

Geoeconomics

B e c a u s e of b o t h the e n d of the C o l d W a r a n d t h e d i r e i n t e r n a l p r o b lems u n d e r s c o r i n g the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the ( f o r m e r ) S o v i e t U n i o n , the military t h r e a t o n c e o m i n o u s l y p o s e d by t h e " e v i l e m p i r e " h a s f a s t r e c e d e d . (A r e s i d u a l t h r e a t , t h o u g h , is p o s e d by t h e u n c e r t a i n c o n t r o l o v e r the nuclear a r m a m e n t s i n h e r i t e d f r o m the f o r m e r S o v i e t a u t h o r i t y by the c o m p o n e n t s of t h e s u c c e s s o r c o m m o n w e a l t h , s u c h as s u r f a c e d in t h e f e u d s b e t w e e n U k r a i n e and R u s s i a . ) In t h e p o s t n u c l e a r w o r l d , n a t i o n s w i l l rely f o r t h e i r s e c u r i t y o n t h e i r o w n m e a n s of d e f e n s e ( a s o p p o s e d to t h e n u c l e a r u m b r e l l a e x t e n d e d by a s u p e r p o w e r ) . In o t h e r w o r d s , n a t i o n a l w e a p o n s of s t a t e s w i l l r e p l a c e e x t e n d e d n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r w o r l d leadership, or h e g e m o n y , will be different. D u r i n g the Cold W a r era, U.S. h e g e m o n y w a s in l a r g e m e a s u r e f o u n d e d o n t h a t c r u c i a l p u b l i c g o o d — i . e . , the n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e u m b r e l l a — t h a t W a s h i n g t o n w a s a b l e to p r o v i d e to its allies a n d f o l l o w e r s . M o r e than e v e r b e f o r e , h o w e v e r , the h e g e m o n will n o w f i n d its l e a d e r s h i p d e p e n d e n t o n its a b i l i t y to p r o v i d e s t a b l e i n t e r n a tional m o n e t a r y , f i n a n c i a l , a n d t r a d i n g c o n d i t i o n s in t h e n e w w o r l d o r d e r . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c a n n o l o n g e r lead j u s t f r o m its n u c l e a r p r e d o m i n a n c e , a n d it w i l l b e at a d i s a d v a n t a g e as it is f o r c e d by the n e w c i r c u m s t a n c e s to c o m p e t e , in t h e e c o n o m i c d o m a i n , w i t h s u c h e c o n o m i c s u p e r p o w e r s as J a p a n a n d G e r m a n y ( M a k i n 1989, p p . 1 0 - 1 8 ) . In t e r m s of international r e lations t h e o r y , g e o e c o n o m i c s will r e p l a c e g e o p o l i t i c s in the global strategicb a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r g a m e , as e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y i n t r u d e s into o u r c o n s c i o u s ness (Dell 1987).

6

James C. Hsiung •

E F F E C T S ON ASIA PACIFIC

G i v e n the c r i t i c a l c h a n g e s in t h e p o s t - C o l d W a r w o r l d , as n o t e d a b o v e , o n e logical q u e s t i o n f o r o u r interest is: H o w w i l l all this c h a n g e a f f e c t A s i a P a c i f i c in t e r m s of its i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s ? T h e q u e s t i o n , in t u r n , s u b s u m e s t h r e e i n t e r r e l a t e d b u t s e p a r a t e s u b q u e s t i o n s , n a m e l y : ( 1 ) H o w w i l l t h e g l o b a l c h a n g e s m a n i f e s t t h e m s e l v e s at t h e A s i a P a c i f i c r e g i o n a l level? ( 2 ) Is t h e r e a n y t h i n g o n t h e Asia P a c i f i c h o r i z o n that d e v i ates f r o m the g l o b a l p a t t e r n s ? a n d , f i n a l l y , (3) H o w will all t h e s e n e w circ u m s t a n c e s a f f e c t the r e l a t i o n s a m o n g m e m b e r s of t h e A s i a P a c i f i c r e g i o n ? T h e e n s u i n g c h a p t e r s in the v o l u m e w i l l , e a c h in its o w n w a y , a t t e m p t to p r o v i d e s o m e a n s w e r s , m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y t o the third s u b q u e s t i o n . In t h e r e m a i n d e r of this c h a p t e r , I shall a t t e m p t to t a c k l e the o t h e r two subquestions.

•

Global

Changes

and Asia

Pacific

Let us first e x a m i n e h o w t h e g l o b a l c h a n g e s o u t l i n e d a b o v e will m a n ifest t h e m s e l v e s at the A s i a P a c i f i c r e g i o n a l level. T h e r i s e of m u l t i p o l a r i t y on t h e g l o b a l level is to b e r e p e a t e d on t h e A s i a P a c i f i c r e g i o n a l l e v e l . H e r e , t h e g a m e will b e p l a y e d o u t by f o u r m a j o r p o w e r s : the U n i t e d S t a t e s , C h i n a , J a p a n , a n d t h e s u c c e s s o r s t a t e t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . Of the f o u r , o n l y J a p a n is not a n u c l e a r p o w e r , a l t h o u g h it h a s t h e w h e r e w i t h a l to b e c o m e o n e s h o u l d d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c s so d i r e c t . O u t s i d e t h e f o u r m a j o r p o w e r s , t h e r e g i o n ' s a l i g n m e n t p a t t e r n s will p r o b ably revolve around two other clusters: (1) the so-called Asian N I E s (newly industrializing economies)—i.e., South Korea, Taiwan, Hong K o n g , a n d S i n g a p o r e ; a n d ( 2 ) the A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s ( A S E A N ) , w h i c h c o n s i s t s of T h a i l a n d , M a l a y s i a , S i n g a p o r e , I n d o n e s i a , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , a n d B r u n e i . N e i t h e r cluster is an alliance. T h e c o m m o n c o n c e r n a b o u t s t a b i l i t y in I n d o c h i n a s i n c e t h e V i e t n a m W a r h a s b e e n a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r to t h e relative c o h e s i o n of the A S E A N as a l o o s e p o l i c y - c o o r d i n a t i n g n e t w o r k . T h e p o s t - C o l d W a r c h a n g e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e t r u c e in C a m b o d i a , m a y or m a y n o t a f f e c t the vigil that h a s u n d e r s c o r e d t h e A S E A N c o n s e n sus. O n e interesting development w a s the signing by Vietnam, along with L a o s , of a treaty of a m i t y a n d c o o p e r a t i o n with A S E A N m e m b e r s o n J u l y 2, 1 9 9 2 . A s f o r t h e A s i a n N I E s , H o n g K o n g will revert to C h i n e s e s o v e r e i g n t y in 1 9 9 7 , p u r s u a n t to t h e S i n o - B r i t i s h t r e a t y of 1 9 8 4 . T h e r e m a i n i n g N I E s — S o u t h K o r e a , T a i w a n , a n d S i n g a p o r e — w i l l p r o b a b l y f i n d their r e s p e c t i v e f u t u r e s better s e r v e d by t h e n a s c e n t A s i a P a c i f i c E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n ( A P E C ) f o r u m t h a n b y g o i n g a l o n e ( s e e C h a p t e r 10). B a r r i n g u n f o r e s e e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e y will m o s t likely b e d r a w n into t h e J a p a n e s e e c o n o m i c o r b i t , with s o m e p o s s i b l e v a r i a t i o n s , as d e s c r i b e d b e l o w .

Asia Pacific in the Post-Cold

War Order

7

In the first place, a f t e r U.S. w i t h d r a w a l f r o m S u b i c Bay in the P h i l i p pines a f t e r 1992, S i n g a p o r e will be d r a w n closer to the U n i t e d States as it a g r e e s to s e r v e as a naval t e n d i n g a n d r e s u p p l y station f o r the U . S . S e v enth Fleet ( C o n b o y 1992, p. 8). S e c o n d , if u n i f i c a t i o n s h o u l d c o m e to the Korean p e n i n s u l a and to the t w o C h i n e s e nations s e p a r a t e d since 1 9 4 9 by the T a i w a n Strait, the s t r a t e g i c f a u l t lines of a l i g n m e n t in the area will look very d i f f e r e n t f r o m n o w . N e v e r t h e l e s s , to the extent that n u c l e a r capability will count less as an index of p o w e r in the new age, the p o w e r ratio a m o n g the f o u r m a j o r a c tors in the r e g i o n will be r e d e f i n e d . In the p o s t n u c l e a r w o r l d , J a p a n ' s present 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 - s t r o n g c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s , w h i c h e x i s t u n d e r the e u p h e m i s m of " s e l f - d e f e n s e f o r c e s " to c i r c u m v e n t the c o u n t r y ' s c o n s t i t u tional o u t l a w r y of an a r m e d f o r c e , will f i g u r e m u c h m o r e p r o m i n e n t l y on the international scales of p o w e r . It is in this c o n t e x t that o n e has to v i e w the recent Diet a p p r o v a l of P K O ( p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s ) , a u t h o r i z i n g the d i s p a t c h of J a p a n e s e f o r c e s to j o i n UN m i s s i o n s . I n v o k i n g t r a u m a t i c m e m o r i e s of the past, the p r o s p e c t of s e n d i n g J a p a n e s e f o r c e s a b r o a d brought s t r o n g r e a c t i o n s in C h i n a , Korea, and T a i w a n , a m o n g other places, i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r the Diet vote in m i d - J u n e 1992. J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e b u d g e t , at $32.9 billion in 1991, w a s m o r e than four times C h i n a ' s $ 7 . 5 billion (Int e r n a t i o n a l Institute of S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s 1991, p. 150; p. 165). By 1 9 9 0 J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e b u d g e t w a s a l r e a d y the w o r l d ' s third l a r g e s t , a f t e r the United S t a t e s ' s $ 2 9 2 billion and the S o v i e t U n i o n ' s o f f i c i a l $ 1 1 7 billion ( C r o p s e y 1991, p. 5). Earlier, w e n o t e d that a p r o b a b l e w r i n k l e to the p o s t n u c l e a r m u l t i p o l a r order is the local-bully s y n d r o m e e x e m p l i f i e d by S a d d a m H u s s e i n ' s Iraq. In Asia P a c i f i c , that p r o b l e m m a y f i n d an i n c a r n a t i o n in the last r e m a i n ing Stalinist r e g i m e , N o r t h K o r e a , w h i c h is k n o w n to h a v e n u c l e a r a s p i r a tions. In a very real s e n s e , P y o n g y a n g ' s bid to a c q u i r e a n u c l e a r c a p a b i l ity is a v e s t i g e of t h e C o l d W a r . B u t a n u c l e a r N o r t h K o r e a will o f f e r p o w e r f u l i n c e n t i v e s f o r S o u t h K o r e a to g o nuclear, with r e p e r c u s s i o n s e x t e n d i n g e v e n to J a p a n . T h a t will n o d o u b t c o m p l i c a t e the regional b a l a n c e in N o r t h e a s t A s i a . T h e f i n a l , t h o u g h r e l u c t a n t , c o n s e n t by P y o n g y a n g to o p e n its n u c l e a r s i t e s to i n s p e c t i o n s by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l A t o m i c E n e r g y A g e n c y ( I A E A ) in e a r l y 1 9 9 2 s i g n i f i e d the e n d , t h o u g h a f t e r a d e l a y , of the C o l d W a r in the K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a . 3 A s p e c k on the h o r i z o n , t h o u g h , is the reported J a p a n e s e i m p o r t a t i o n of p l u t o n i u m , an e l e m e n t i n d i s p e n s a b l e for nuclear e n e r g y g e n e r a t i o n but a l s o the s t u f f a t o m i c b o m b s are m a d e of. O n l y e i g h t k i l o g r a m s (or 1 7 . 6 p o u n d s ) of r e p r o c e s s e d p l u t o n i u m are n e e d e d to m a k e a N a g a s a k i - g r a d e b o m b . T h e first s h i p m e n t of thirty t o n s of r e p r o c e s s e d p l u t o n i u m a r r i v e d in J a p a n in J a n u a r y 1 9 9 3 . By the y e a r 2000, if the c o u n t r y ' s e n e r g y plann e r s h a v e their w a y , J a p a n will h a v e a c c u m u l a t e d at least n i n e t y t o n s of the m a t e r i a l ( E c o n o m i s t A p r i l 18, 1 9 9 2 , p. 3 2 ) . It r e m a i n s to be s e e n to

8

James

C.

Hsiung

what use the Japanese will put their imported p l u t o n i u m . But in the p o s t - C o l d War era, whether Japan will b e c o m e a nuclear w e a p o n s state is immaterial for its status as an e c o n o m i c superpower. As military confrontation at the global level phases out, calculations regarding the power configuration of states will increasingly have to weigh in each nation's economic prowess. This observation takes us to the third, and last, characteristic of the new world order noted above: the rise of geoeconomics, wherein economic security will likely outweigh military security. Future competition in Asia Pacific, as elsewhere, will be primarily in the e c o n o m i c sphere. More than ever, a c o u n t r y ' s claim to being a major power will be based on its e c o n o m i c might. In order to assess the future of g e o e c o n o m i c interests in this region, we have to place it in the larger context of the global political e c o n o m y . As a result of the rising importance of e c o n o m i c security and the potential of regional p r o t e c t i o n i s m , the world by the year 2 0 0 0 is likely to face a multiplication of e c o n o m i c power centers. Western Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific are each likely to b e c o m e a mammoth free trade s u p e r b l o c unto itself (Garten 1989). From this a s s u m p t i o n , we will proceed to make a few general propositions regarding the macropolitical situation likely to emerge in the c o m i n g century. First, by virtue of its phenomenal e c o n o m i c success and rapid growth rates, which are expected to c o n t i n u e well into the twenty-first century, Asia Pacific will stand out as the most crucial region for the United States in comparison with other groupings of nations. By 2000, according to the Asian Wall Street Journal, the Asia Pacific r e g i o n ' s combined G N P of $13 trillion will be double that of the integrated E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y (EC). If that figure seems overly upbeat, a more sober U.S. government estimate puts the combined G N P of Northeast Asia ( c o m p r i s i n g just Japan, China, T a i w a n , and South Korea) at $8.5 trillion by the year 2010 (Rand 1989). This figure tops the estimated $7.9 trillion for the United States or the estimate of comparable size for Western Europe by the same year. T w o indices will factor into any c o m p a r a t i v e forecasts for the future. O n e is Asia P a c i f i c ' s aggregate population, which at 1.7 billion (1991) is almost three times the c o m b i n e d total of North A m e r i c a ' s ( 2 7 9 million) and Western E u r o p e ' s (345 million). T h e Western rim of the Pacific, f r o m Japan in the north to Australia in the south, contains about 40 percent of the w o r l d ' s population. T h e other, and m o r e important, index is Asia Pac i f i c ' s sustained high e c o n o m i c growth rate for the last decade, which has averaged over 6 percent annually, as c o m p a r e d with North A m e r i c a ' s 2.7 percent and Western E u r o p e ' s 2.3 percent during the same period (International Financial Statistics 1990). E v e n in the f a c e of the slow g r o w t h rates of the w o r l d ' s major e c o n o m i c p o w e r s in the early 1990s, the Asian N I E s (South Korea, T a i w a n , H o n g K o n g , a n d S i n g a p o r e ) , plus T h a i l a n d and Malaysia, were e x p e c t e d to s h o w annual g r o w t h of 7 percent or

Asia Pacific in the Post-Cold

War Order

9

h i g h e r , a c c o r d i n g to t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t a n d C o o p e r a t i o n ( O E C D ) . 4 B e t w e e n 1 9 6 0 a n d 1 9 8 2 , t h e r a t i o of A s i a P a c i f i c g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t ( G D P ) to U . S . G D P g r e w f r o m 18 p e r c e n t to 5 3 . 2 p e r c e n t ( L i n d e r 1 9 8 6 , p. 11). B y 2 0 0 0 , t h e w h o l e P a c i f i c r e g i o n w i l l a c c o u n t f o r 5 0 p e r c e n t of t h e w o r l d ' s g r o s s n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t ( G N P ) , w i t h t h e w e s t e r n P a c i f i c a l o n e p o s t i n g a 2 5 p e r c e n t s h a r e of w o r l d G N P . A v a i l a b l e s t a t i s t i c s a l s o s h o w that t h e e c o n o m i e s in t h e A s i a P a c i f i c b a s i n will c o n t i n u e t o g r o w f a s t e r t h a n t h o s e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o r W e s t e r n

Europe

( L i n d e r 1 9 8 6 , p. 13; D r y s d a l e 1 9 8 6 , p. 1 I f ) - L o o k i n g t o t h e t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y , m a n y e x p e c t t h e w o r l d ' s e c o p o l i t i c a l g r a v i t y to s h i f t to A s i a P a c i f i c , a n d o n e of t h e r e a s o n s is t h a t t h i s is t h e o n l y r e g i o n that c a n p r o v i d e a c o u n t e r b a l a n c e to W e s t e r n E u r o p e . S e c o n d , a s t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y is p o i s e d to m o v e i n t o a f u l l y int e g r a t e d " s i n g l e m a r k e t , " t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is to c o n f r o n t a c o n d i t i o n of uncertainty

utterly

unparalleled

in h i s t o r y

(U.S. Department

of

State

1988). T h e stakes are high. T h e E C has 345 million p e o p l e and a c o m b i n e d G N P o f o v e r $ 5 . 9 t r i l l i o n . T h e E C ' s t r a d e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is s e c o n d , as a region, only to U.S. trade with Asia P a c i f i c (Statistical A b s t r a c t 1 9 9 0 ) . 5 D e s p i t e t h e E C ' s a s s u r a n c e s that m a r k e t i n t e g r a t i o n will n o t r e s u l t in " F o r t r e s s E u r o p e , " t h e r e is a r i s k , n o n e t h e l e s s , t h a t i n t r a - E u r o p e a n d e a l s w i l l b e m a d e a n d a E u r o c e n t r i c r e g i m e i n a u g u r a t e d at t h e e x p e n s e of o u t s i d e t r a d i n g p a r t n e r s . F o r o n e t h i n g , t h e r e is m o r e i n t r a r e g i o n a l t r a d e w i t h i n t h e E C t h a n in a n y o t h e r r e g i o n . T h e t r e n d m a y o n l y e x p a n d a f t e r t h e c o n s u m m a t i o n o f t h e E C s i n g l e - m a r k e t i n i t i a t i v e . If s o , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l b e i m p e l l e d b y c i r c u m s t a n c e s to m o v e e v e n c l o s e r t o A s i a P a c i f i c in m e e t i n g its e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y n e e d s ( m o r e o n t h i s p o i n t in C h a p t e r 12). T h i r d , t h e e c o n o m i c m i g h t of A s i a P a c i f i c w i l l h a v e a p e c u l i a r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r w o r l d p o l i t i c s in t h e n e x t c e n t u r y , a s t h e s u c c e s s o r s t a t e to t h e f o r m e r Soviet Union recedes f r o m the position as the w o r l d ' s third-largest e c o n o m i c p o w e r , w h i c h the U S S R had o c c u p i e d . T h i s retreat w o u l d happ e n e v e n if t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a d n o t c o m e a p a r t a n d t h e C o l d W a r h a d n o t e n d e d ( C o m m i s s i o n o n I n t e g r a t e d L o n g - T e r m S t r a t e g y 1 9 8 8 , p. 2 0 ) . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , h o w e v e r , is l i k e l y t o f a c e a n u n u s u a l s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h t h e f a d i n g m i l i t a r y t h r e a t of a l o n g t i m e a d v e r s a r y ( t h e U S S R ) w i l l b e r e p l a c e d b y t h e p o t e n t e c o n o m i c t h r e a t of a l o n g t i m e c l i e n t a n d p a r t n e r ( J a p a n ) . As e c o n o m i c security b e c o m e s more important than military security in t h e n e w e r a , t h e J a p a n e s e t h r e a t w i l l b e e v e n m o r e a c u t e . M a n y f e a r t h a t J a p a n w i l l p o s e a s t h e p r i m a r y t h r e a t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s in t h e r e g i o n . T h i s t h r e a t w i l l h e i g h t e n a s t h e J a p a n e s e l e a d in t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d e c o n o m i c e x p a n s i o n c o n t i n u e s t o g r o w . T h e i n c r e a s e in J a p a n e s e i n f l u e n c e in t h e r e g i o n m e a n s a r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e in U . S . i n f l u e n c e ( H u n t i n g t o n 1 9 9 1 , p . 10). N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is a l r e a d y o b s e s s e d w i t h J a p a n " f o r t h e s a m e r e a s o n s that it w a s o b s e s s e d w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n " b e f o r e . 6

i0

James C. Hsiung

These fears may or may not be justified, but they typify the centrality of economic security concerns in the p o s t - C o l d War world. The geoeconomic preoccupation will shape much of international relations in Asia Pacific as elsewhere. For instance, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 taught the Japanese a crucial lesson about economic security. It drove home the vulnerability of J a p a n ' s economy resulting from its dependency on extraregional supplies of vital resources. Access to these supplies could be in jeopardy at any flare-up of a crisis in a far-off place. Japan, therefore, learned to appreciate, even more than before, the value of a closer-to-home sourcing of strategic resources. Thus, while other industrial nations still stuck to their post-Tiananmen sanctions, Japan began quietly in the fall of 1990—i.e., during the course of the Gulf crisis—to switch gears and upgrade its relations with China. 7

•

Any Deviations

from

the Global

Pattern?

The above discussion shows that the global patterns characteristic of the post-Cold War world order hold true for Asia Pacific, by and large. Our next question is whether there is anything that marks the region off as distinct from other areas. For one thing, Asia Pacific, in the 1990s, is the only region in the world where not just one but a group of communist regimes has survived the death of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Besides in China, Communist regimes exist in North Korea and Indochina. Furthermore, the residual Communists in the former Communistruled Mongolia reconstituted themselves as the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and still retain control, having won 95 percent of the seats in Parliament in the June 28, 1992, election. This situation stands in stark contrast to the lone existence of Cuba in Latin America. One other possible variation from the global norm seems to be in the area of nuclear proliferation. On closer examination, however, the a r e a ' s only open challenge to the worldwide nuclear nonproliferation r e g i m e is North K o r e a ' s attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. That exception alone does not make Asia Pacific much different from either South Asia or the Middle East. In the former, India and Pakistan vie with each other in a conscious nuclear arms race. (In July 1992, New Delhi made it k n o w n that India would not become party to the Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] before 1995, when the pact is up for review and renewal, and even a f t e r that would ratify only with severe conditions.) 8 In the Middle East, Saddam Hussein is trying to develop Iraq into a nuclear-armed power in competition with Israel. One other wrinkle on the proliferation score is C h i n a ' s reported assistance to Syria and Algeria in their respective bids to develop nuclear armaments. Beijing has persistently denied these allegations. But, even if the reports are true, the instances simply add to the massive

Asia Pacific in the Post-Cold

War Order

11

evidence of what Jennifer Scarlott (1991, p. 691 ff) calls the "weakness of the nonproliferation regime." The lack of any effective enforcement of the nonproliferation regime allowed significant transfers of nuclear-bomb material and technology in past decades. The United States assisted France with its nuclear program; the United States, Canada, and Great Britain assisted India; Germany, Great Britain, the United States, and Israel assisted South Africa; France and the United States assisted Israel; France, West Germany, and the United States assisted Iran; and the Soviet Union assisted Libya, Syria, and Cuba (Scarlott 1991, p. 690). As John Mearsheimer (1990, p. 228) suggests, a consequence of the withdrawal of the superpower nuclear umbrella in the post-Cold War era is likely to be regional nuclear proliferation. The race to acquire nuclear weapons by North Korea, Syria, and Libya, not to mention Iraq and others, may well be indications of this phenomenon. One heartening turn of events, nevertheless, is China's acceptance of the Nonproliteration Treaty at the close of 1991. 9 This move will allow inspections by the IAEA for the safeguarding of both material and technology. It is an indication that China's leaders have come to the realization that nonproliferation is in China's interest in the postnuclear world. For in the new era, security in Asia Pacific, as in other areas, will not depend on nuclear deterrence, at least not to the same extent as before. On another score, Asia Pacific has been spared the sort of ethnonational strifes that has plagued post-Cold War Europe. True, there are memories of multicommunal schisms in Malaysia, insurrections in the Philippines, and ethnic fights in Sri Lanka and (former) Burma. But there has not been any large-scale conflict approximating the civil war in Yugoslavia or the ethnic disputes in post-Soviet republics and bicommunal Cyprus. If the post-Cold War order is going to bring greater instability to the Asia Pacific region, it will probably take the form of tensions across national boundaries rather than within them. Although Asia Pacific has been spared the kind of hypernationalism that has surfaced in post-Cold War Europe, the region has seen an occasional rise in nationalist sentiments, such as in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and even New Zealand. With few exceptions, these upsurges of nationalism were largely anti-United States in nature. In Japan, the former Soviet Union has been the target of part of the resurgent Japanese nationalism when the issue is the disputed northern islands. At other times, when trade is the focus, the target may shift to the United States. The most virulent anti-U.S. sentiments probably surged in street riots in such places as Kwangju and Seoul, South Korea; but these instances took place before 1991 and were quite unrelated to the Cold War issue. The important thing, it remains true, is that there has been no significant flare-up of conflicts fueled by Asian nationalism to date.

12

James C.

•

Hsiung

SECURITY IN POST-COLD WAR ASIA PACIFIC

T h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e n e w w o r l d o r d e r as it b e a r s o n A s i a P a c i f i c w o u l d not b e c o m p l e t e if it s a i d n o t h i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y a b o u t t h e r e g i o n ' s s e c u r i t y in t e r m s of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s of n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e ( a s o p p o s e d to g e o e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s ) . T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t , f o r t h e h a l f - c e n t u r y s i n c e t h e e n d of t h e P a c i f i c W a r in 1 9 4 5 , r e g i o n w i d e s e c u r i t y in A s i a P a c i f i c h a s b e e n l a r g e l y d e p e n d e n t o n t h e h e g e m o n i c r o l e p l a y e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . U . S . s e c u r i t y p o l i c y in this r e g i o n , as in t h e rest of t h e w o r l d , w a s b a s e d o n t w o d e s i d e r a t a : ( 1 ) C o l d W a r c o m m i t m e n t to c o n t a i n i n g S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n i s m , a n d ( 2 ) U . S . s e l f - r e l i a n c e o n its o w n p r e p o n d e r a n t p o w e r ( B o s w o r t h 1992, p. 1 1 3 ) . O n e m i g h t a d d a q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t , f o r l a c k of a b e t t e r t e r m , m a y b e c a l l e d " E u r o c e n t r i c i t y " ( H a r r i s 1 9 9 1 , p. 2), in t h a t

Washington

t e n d e d to s e e A s i a n i s s u e s b a s i c a l l y in light of their E u r o p e a n c o n s e q u e n c e s as p a r t of t h e b i p o l a r i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t in t h e w o r l d . By n o w , b o t h the C o l d W a r c o m m i t m e n t and the a s s u m e d s u f f i c i e n c y of U . S . p r e p o n d e r a n c e a r e in d o u b t . T h e a t t r i b u t e of E u r o c e n t r i c i t y is a l s o in q u e s t i o n . In v i e w o f o u r d i s c u s s i o n s a b o v e a b o u t t h e

paramountcy

of e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s a n d t h e w e i g h t of A s i a P a c i f i c ' s e c o n o m i c

dy-

n a m i s m , o n e m a y r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s will h e n c e f o r t h h a v e t o c o n s i d e r A s i a P a c i f i c ' s s e c u r i t y in its o w n r i g h t , in t e r m s of its s t r a t e g i c v a l u e t o U . S . i n t e r e s t s , w i t h o u t r e g a r d to E u r o p e o r e v e n at Europe's expense. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e is a d i s t i n c t g e o p o l i t i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in

the

E u r a s i a n l a n d m a s s r e q u i r i n g s o m e s e r i o u s r e t h i n k i n g of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' g l o b a l s t r a t e g i c d e s i g n . In c o n t r a s t to t h e s t a t e of a f f a i r s p r e v a i l i n g at t h e c l o s e o f W o r l d W a r II, w h e n t h e E u r a s i a n h e a r t l a n d w a s s t r o n g a n d its p e r i p h e r i e s w e a k , t h e s i t u a t i o n t o d a y is s i m p l y r e v e r s e d : t h e h e a r t l a n d p o w e r ( i . e . , t h e f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n ) is in t h e t h r o e s of c r i s i s , a n d t h e E u r a s i a n p e r i p h e r i e s a r e g e n e r a l l y s t r o n g ( S c a l a p i n o 1 9 9 1 ) . N o w h e r e is t h i s s t r e n g t h m o r e e v i d e n t t h a n in t h e o u t r e a c h e s o f t h e w e s t e r n P a c i f i c R i m . W e s h a l l r e s e r v e t h e c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r a s t h e p l a c e f o r d o i n g a b i t of " h o r i z o n g a z i n g " into the next century. A m o n g other things, w e shall then speculate o n w h a t is l i k e l y t o b e a s e n s i b l e U . S . s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y b e f i t t i n g t h e n e w era. At this juncture, h o w e v e r , w e shall do no m o r e than take a brief g l a n c e at t h e r e g i o n ' s s e c u r i t y l a n d s c a p e . T h i s w e w i l l d o b y b r i e f l y a s sessing w h a t has h a p p e n e d to the p o s t - 1 9 4 5 "security theaters," n o w that t h e C o l d W a r h a s e n d e d a n d t h e E u r a s i a n h e a r t l a n d p o w e r is u n d e r g o i n g t h e c r i s i s of d i s m e m b e r m e n t .

•

State of the Traditional

Security

Theaters

B e f o r e t h e d a w n of t h e n e w a g e , f o u r s e c u r i t y t h e a t e r s w e r e u s u a l l y identified ( M o r l e y 1986, p. 11), as f o l l o w s :

Asia Pacific in the Post-Cold

War Order

13

1. T h e Sea of O k h o t s k — w h e r e J a p a n , s u p p o r t e d by the United States, w a s in d i s p u t e with the Soviet U n i o n over the o w n e r s h i p of f o u r islands to the north of H o k k a i d o ; 2. T h e Korean P e n i n s u l a — w h e r e N o r t h Korea, b a c k e d by the S o v i e t s a n d the m a i n l a n d C h i n e s e , w a s l o c k e d w i t h a U . S . - b a c k e d S o u t h Korea in a struggle for survival a n d for the control of the p e n i n s u l a ; 3. T h e T a i w a n S t r a i t — w h e r e m a i n l a n d C h i n a ' s bid to r e u n i f y w i t h T a i w a n w a s s u r r o u n d e d by u n c e r t a i n t y ; and 4. T h e S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r — w h e r e C h i n a , O u t e r M o n g o l i a , and the Soviet Union had heavy f o r c e s d e p l o y e d in a potentially c o n f r o n t a tional posture. Until 1991, these w e r e the f o u r potential flash points w h e r e a s e r i o u s a r m e d c o n f l i c t could e r u p t in any crisis. But as the global and r e g i o n a l security m a p has drastically c h a n g e d , the nature of the p r o b l e m s s u r r o u n d i n g the f o u r security theaters has c h a n g e d a c c o r d i n g l y . Of the f o u r s e c u r i t y t h e a t e r s n a m e d a b o v e , the first o n e , the Sea of O k h o t s k , h a s lost m u c h of its p r e v i o u s s t r a t e g i c v a l u e as a h a v e n f o r a n c h o r i n g 3 0 p e r c e n t of the S o v i e t s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e ( S L B M ) f o r c e . T h i s f o r c e w o u l d h a v e b e e n an i m p o r t a n t part of the S o viet s e c o n d - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y s h o u l d a n u c l e a r w a r b r e a k out w i t h the United States at the height of the C o l d W a r . T o the S o v i e t s in the 1980s, the O k h o t s k S L B M f o r c e w a s s e c o n d in i m p o r t a n c e only to the S o v i e t S L B M f o r c e s s h i e l d e d u n d e r the B a r e n t s Sea a n d the a d j a c e n t A r c t i c w a ters ( J a c o b s o n 1982, C h a p t e r 3). But as the a g e of n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e rec e d e s to the b a c k g r o u n d , the r e l e v a n c e of the Sea of O k h o t s k to R u s s i a is largely limited to the l a t t e r ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h J a p a n , m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y with r e g a r d to the f o u r d i s p u t e d i s l a n d s . A s an e c o n o m i c s u p e r p o w e r , J a p a n c o m m a n d s t r e m e n d o u s r e s o u r c e s a n d is in a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n to deal w i t h the d i s p u t e s w i t h o u t i n v o l v i n g any e x t e r n a l p o w e r . T h u s , in the n e w international milieu, the O k h o t s k s e e m s n o longer a trouble spot t h r e a t e n i n g the r e g i o n ' s security as b e f o r e . A n o t h e r potential t r o u b l e spot, the S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r , w a s first m o l lified by the S i n o - S o v i e t n o r m a l i z a t i o n of M a y 1989, then r e n d e r e d m o r i b u n d by the S o v i e t c o l l a p s e a f t e r 1 9 9 1 . T h a t l e a v e s us o n l y the K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a a n d the T a i w a n Strait r e m a i n i n g as potential s o r e p o i n t s . T w o i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t s on the K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a u n f o l d e d in the c o u r s e of 1991: (1) N o r t h K o r e a a g r e e d to accept I A E A i n s p e c t i o n s of its n u c l e a r plants; and ( 2 ) the t w o K o r e a s c o n c l u d e d a historic a g r e e m e n t of m u t u a l n o n a g g r e s s i o n o n D e c e m b e r 12, 1 9 9 1 . T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s s e e m to h a v e g r e a t l y r e d u c e d the s e c u r i t y liability of the K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a f o r the i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e . T h e last r e m a i n i n g s p o t o n o u r list of p o t e n t i a l s e c u r i t y t h e a t e r s is, t h e r e f o r e , the T a i w a n Strait, to w h i c h w e shall n o w turn. For the first time,

14

James C.

Hsiung

the interests of m a i n l a n d China and T a i w a n began to m o v e t o w a r d convergence after 1987. At the time, T a i w a n , under the late President Chiang Ching-kuo, was facing severe pressure f r o m Washington to reduce its reliance on the U.S. market and to d e m o c r a t i z e . In order to support both moves, Chiang decided to explore o v e r t u r e s with mainland China across the T a i w a n Strait in search of alternative markets. The first step was to open the f l o o d g a t e s for visits to relatives on the mainland by the surviving veterans of the Nationalist military personnel w h o had evacuated with the K u o m i n t a n g ( K M T ) to T a i w a n in 1949 ( H s i u n g 1991b, p. 376). This move, begun in late 1987, was received and reciprocated by B e i j i n g with great e n t h u s i a s m . Later, the right to visit the m a i n l a n d was e x t e n d e d to other constituents in Taiwan and, by 1992, even to faculty and university presidents in the state-run sector of the higher education system, plus some lower echelons of g o v e r n m e n t b u r e a u c r a c y , up to the subcabinet levels. O n e thing led to another. By the end of 1991, three million p e o p l e f r o m T a i w a n had visited the mainland, including many on business trips. Indirect trade (via Hong Kong) had topped $5.8 billion (Fang Sheng 1992). In the first half of 1992, this trade increased by 34 percent over the same period of the previous year, to a total of $3.4 billion. 1 , 1 Taiwan investments in 2 , 0 0 0 - s o m e p r o j e c t s on the m a i n l a n d in 1990 a g g r e g a t e d $ 1 . 6 billion (Silk 1990; N. T. W a n g 1991). M a i n l a n d C h i n a b e c a m e T a i w a n ' s f i f t h largest trade market, w h e r e a s T a i w a n w a s the m a i n l a n d ' s sixth-largest trading partner ( F a n g S h e n g 1992, p. 30). In early 1991, a National U n i f i c a t i o n C o m m i s s i o n ( N U C ) under the direct supervision of the president sprang into being in Taipei. T o help implement its policy directives, a new cabinet-level action arm known as the M a i n l a n d A f f a i r s Council w a s created. In addition, a s e m i o f f i c i a l Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was set up to run errands for the council on a contractual basis. It sent its first delegation on an exploratory mission to Beijing, where it met with officials in the T a i w a n Relations O f f i c e under the State Council in A p r i l - M a y 1991. T h e S E F has since developed into a conduit for routine liaisons with the m a i n l a n d . M o r e important, a "historic" National U n i f i c a t i o n P r o g r a m w a s a d o p t e d , a f t e r much debate, by the N U C in March 1991 as the ultimate directive g u i d i n g T a i w a n ' s approach to its relations with the mainland ( H s i u n g 1992). On May 1, 1991, the Nationalist g o v e r n m e n t in Taipei officially e n d e d its hostility toward the C o m m u n i s t regime on the mainland by ending the so-called period of Mobilization for the Suppression of C o m m u n i s t Rebellion after m o r e than forty years. T a i w a n did condition its further o p e n i n g to the mainland on B e i j i n g ' s pursuing internal democratization, r e n o u n c i n g the use of force in dealing with Taiwan on unification, and agreeing not to isolate T a i w a n diplomatically. A l t h o u g h it r e m a i n s to be seen w h e r e all these d e v e l o p m e n t s will lead, one thing is clear: Contacts between the two sides across the T a i w a n

Asia Pacific in the Post-Cold

War Order

15

Strait are no longer illegal. Besides, exchanges are now institutionalized and coordinated at the operating level between the SEF and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits inaugurated on the mainland in 1991. The latter serves as a counterpart to Taiwan's SEF, coordinating all routine liaisons from Beijing's end. This cursory account of the developments since 1987 is enough to illustrate the drastic transformation of relations across the Taiwan Strait. It is questionable whether the Taiwan Strait should remain on the list of potential trouble spots posing security threats for the Asia Pacific region. All the above events demonstrate the extent to which the end of the Cold War has affected Asia Pacific in terms of regional security. •

Territorial

Disputes

Earlier we said that future conflicts in Asia Pacific will probably not follow the ethnic and ethnonational lines that have characterized turmoils engulfing Yugoslavia and the post-Soviet republics. Instead, we believe future conflicts in this region will be across national boundaries, not within them. Now that we have eliminated one by one the four so-called security theaters, the only instances of instability will most likely be territorial disputes. We can think of three broad areas where these can happen: 1. Russian-Japanese disputes over the four northern islands off Hokkaido and at the fringe of the Sea of Okhotsk; 2. Sino-Russian boundary disputes, particularly over the vast tracts of land lying north of the Amur River and east of the Ussouri River, totaling 600,000 square miles (or twelve times the size of New York state), which Manchu China lost under duress to czarist Russians per the Tientsin Treaty of 1858; and 3. Offshore islands in the Yellow Sea (the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Island), with China and Japan as the contending claimants, and in the South China Sea, over the Paracels and Spratlys. At least seven parties, including China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan, have laid claims to the latter islands, which are rich in oil and other resources (Harris 1991, p. 17). I will return to this question in Chapter 4. One related issue is the fate of the geostrategic straits and channels in Southeast Asia, where Malaysia and the Indonesia archipelago intersect (see Map 1.1). Only a few of the myriad channels through the Indonesia archipelago are wide and deep enough to permit the safe passage of submerged submarines. Control over these channels could be used to monitor or interdict the passage of warships or merchant vessels moving between the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The channels are: (1) the Sunda

16

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S t r a i t , w i t h a g o v e r n i n g d e p t h of 1 2 0 f e e t a n d a m i n i m u m w i d t h of t w e l v e n a u t i c a l m i l e s ; ( 2 ) t h e L o m b o k S t r a i t s , w i t h a d e p t h of 6 0 0 f e e t a n d a w i d t h of e l e v e n n a u t i c a l m i l e s ; ( 3 ) t h e O m b a i - W e t a r S t r a i t s , w i t h a d e p t h of 6 0 0 f e e t a n d a w i d t h of t w e l v e n a u t i c a l m i l e s ; a n d ( 4 ) t h e S t r a i t s of M a l a c c a , w i t h a d e p t h of 7 5 f e e t a n d a m i n i m u m w i d t h of e i g h t n a u t i c a l m i l e s . 1 1 D u r i n g t h e C o l d W a r e r a , c o n t r o l of t h e s e s t r a i t s in f r i e n d l y h a n d s w a s essential to thwarting Soviet a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e ( A S W ) m e a s u r e s a n d m a i n t a i n i n g e f f e c t i v e U . S . A S W s y s t e m s ( G a r v e r 1 9 8 3 , p. 8 9 f ) - U n t i l 1 9 9 2 , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s d e t e r m i n e d , at all c o s t s , to r e t a i n its S u b i c B a y a n d C l a r k F i e l d b a s e s in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s l a r g e l y f o r t h e s a k e of c o n t r o l o v e r t h e s e c h o k e p o i n t s . In t h e n e w e r a , it is u n l i k e l y that t h e R u s s i a n s will p o s e s i m i l a r t h r e a t s in t h e s e w a t e r s , a l t h o u g h t h e P a c i f i c F l e e t i n h e r i t e d f r o m t h e f o r m e r S o v i e t n a v y r e m a i n s t h e l a r g e s t of t h e R u s s i a n f l e e t s . It g o e s w i t h o u t s a y i n g that it is in U . S . i n t e r e s t s that t h e s e c h a n n e l s n o t fall into u n f r i e n d l y h a n d s , w h o m e v e r they m a y b e , in t h e f u t u r e . T h e l o s s of U . S . b a s e s in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , n o n e t h e l e s s , will m e a n t h a t U . S . s u r v e i l l a n c e o v e r t h e s t r a t e g i c s t r a i t s will w e a k e n . B u t it a l s o s i g n i f i e s t h e a d v e n t of the n e w e r a . Under a joint border committee, Malaysia and Indonesia have exc h a n g e d i n t e l l i g e n c e on s o m e m a r i t i m e security issues. S i m i l a r

intelli-

g e n c e - s h a r i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s a r e k n o w n to e x i s t w i t h S i n g a p o r e ( R i c h a r d S t u b b s 1 9 9 2 , p. 4 0 4 ) . P r e s u m a b l y , t h e t h r e e A S E A N n a t i o n s w i l l b e t h e g u a r d i a n s of t h e s t r a t e g i c c h a n n e l s j u s t m e n t i o n e d if t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e s h o u l d d w i n d l e in w e s t e r n P a c i f i c a f t e r 1 9 9 2 . T h e r e c e n t r e v i v a l o f the Five P o w e r D e f e n s e A r r a n g e m e n t ( F P D A ) , w h i c h ties the n o n r e g i o n a l c o u n t r i e s of A u s t r a l i a , G r e a t B r i t a i n , a n d N e w Z e a l a n d i n t o t h e d e f e n s e o f S i n g a p o r e a n d M a l a y s i a , will p r o v i d e a n a d d i t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k f o r s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n . G r e a t e r c o o r d i n a t i o n is e x p e c t e d f o r t h e f u t u r e in t h e a r e a s of defense policy,

military

training,

and

armament

procurement

among

A S E A N c o u n t r i e s ( S t u b b s , p. 4 0 5 f ) . It is l i k e l y t h a t a r e s u l t o f t h e e n d o f t h e C o l d W a r , a s it a f f e c t s A s i a P a c i f i c , is t h a t t h e A S E A N w i l l i n c r e a s i n g l y a s s u m e c o m m o n d e f e n s e f u n c t i o n s f o r its m e m b e r s , q u i t e c o n t r a r y t o its p r i m a r y f o c u s o n t r a d e c o o p e r a t i o n t h u s f a r . A g a i n , f o r s t a t e s a n d r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( s u c h a s A S E A N ) to a s s u m e a g r e a t e r s h a r e of t h e d e f e n s e b u r d e n is a n a t u r a l o u t g r o w t h of t h e d e m i s e o f n u c l e a r b i p o l a r i t y , w h i c h n e c e s s a r i l y r e m o v e d t h e f o r t u i t o u s b e n e f i t s of t h e n u c l e a r u m b r e l l a s u c h as a s u p e r p o w e r w a s a b l e t o p r o v i d e .

•

CONCLUSION

W e h a v e seen h o w the m a j o r global e f f e c t s s t e m m i n g f r o m the end of t h e C o l d W a r w i l l l i k e w i s e a p p e a r o n t h e A s i a P a c i f i c r e g i o n a l s c e n e in t h e n e w e r a . T h e s e i n c l u d e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e n e w e r a : m u l t i p o l a r ity, t h e r e c e d i n g s a l i e n c e of n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e , a n d t h e r i s i n g i m p o r t a n c e

Asia Pacific in the Post-Cold

M a p 1.1

War Order

17

Strategic Straits and U.S. Military Bases in the Southeast A s i a n R e g i o n

Source: U.S.-Asian Relations, ed., James C. Hsiung. New York: Praeger, 1983; p. 90. An mprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Westport, CT. Reprinted with permission.

18

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of e c o n o m i c security ( a s distinct f r o m military security). W h a t e v e r d e v i a tions are d i s c e r n i b l e at the m o m e n t are m a i n l y variations o f the e s s e n t i a l l y similar patterns, s u c h as in h o w postbipolar instability m a n i f e s t s itself. Ins t e a d o f e t h n i c and e t h n o n a t i o n a l strifes, s u c h as have i n f e s t e d p o s t - C o l d War Europe, the n e w instability in A s i a P a c i f i c will take the f o r m o f territorial disputes, or c o n f l i c t s across, rather than within, national b o u n d a r i e s . But it bears reiterating that future security c o n c e r n s , here as e l s e w h e r e , will b e largely o f a g e o e c o n o m i c sort. S o f u n d a m e n t a l has b e e n the transformation o f the structure o f international relations that all nations in the P a c i f i c Basin, as e l s e w h e r e , will have to rethink their security strategy a c c o r d i n g l y .

•

NOTES

1. I am relying on my own formulation in Hsiung 1991a. 2. The United States, in a shift of approach to aid to Moscow, called on the International Monetary Fund to ease d e m a n d s for harsh reform and not to delay aid agreement once M o s c o w c o m m i t s itself to e c o n o m i c changes. See New York Times, June 19, 1992, p. 1. 3. North Korea agreed to these inspections in early 1992. See New York Times, January 7, 1992. 4. As reported by the Reuters in a dispatch from Paris, dated June 25, 1992. See QiaoBao (The China Press) (New York), June 26, 1992, p. 1. 5. U.S. trade with Asia P a c i f i c (Japan, South Korea, T a i w a n , H o n g Kong, and Singapore) is the largest share of U.S. global trade. It totaled $229.9 billion in 1988, which was $35.4 billion higher than U.S. trade with Western E u r o p e (including O E C D ) , or $47.1 billion over U.S. trade with EEC the same year. Figures compiled from Statistical Abstract 1990, p. 808f, Table 1406. 6. Interview with Samuel Huntington, New York Times, D e c e m b e r 9, 1991. 1991. 7. "Japan to Mend China Ties W h i l e World Eyes the G u l f , " Japan Times Weekly, September 2 4 - 3 0 , 1991, p. 1. 8. Associated Press dispatch from New Delhi, dated June 30, 1992. 9. Renmin Ribao [People's Daily] (Overseas Edition), December 30, 1991, p. 1. 10. According to statistics released by the trade office, Ministry of E c o n o m i c Affairs (Taipei), reported in a dispatch from Taipei, carried by the Qiao Bao (The China Press) (New York), August 27, 1992, p. 2. 11. Michael Richardson, " M i s s i l e M a n e u v e r s , " Far Eastern Economic Review, April 30, 1982, pp. 3 2 - 3 3 ; cited in John Garver 1983, p. 89.

•

REFERENCES

A l e x a n d r o f f , Allan. 1981. The Logic of Diplomacy. Beverly Hills, C A : Sage Publications. Bialer, Seweryn, and Michael M a n d e l b a u m . 1988. Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Black, E d w i n . 1984. " W h y the Soviets Sought the T a l k s , " Washington Times, August 2, 1984, p. l c .

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Bosworth, Stephen. 1992. "The U.S. and Asia," 71 Foreign Affairs 1 (Winter 1991-1992). Chan, Steve, and Cal Clark. 1992. The Evolving Pacific Community. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. 1988. Discriminate Deterrence. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Conboy, Kenneth J. 1992. "The U.S.-Singapore Relationship: A Model for Southeast Asia," Asian Studies Center, Backgrounder 120 (March 12, 1992). Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation. Cropsey, Seth. 1991. "The Washington-Tokyo Defense Relationship: Where NowV' Backgrounder 116 (September 20, 1991). Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation. Dell, Edmund. 1987. Politics of Economic Interdependence. New York: St. Martin's Press. Drysdale, Peter. 1986. "The Pacific Basin and Its Economic Vitality." In The Pacific Basin, ed. James W. Morley. New York: Academy of Political Science. Fang Sheng. 1992. "Prospects for Mainland-Taiwan Relations," Beijing Review, April 27-May 3, 1992, pp. 30-32. Gaddis, John Lewis. 1986. "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," 10 International Security 4:99-142. Garten, Jeffrey E. 1989. "Trading Blocs and the Evolving World Economy," Current History (January 1989). Garvcr, John. 1983. "The Reagan Administration's Southeast Asian Policy." In U.S.-Asian Relations: The National Security Paradox, ed. James C. Hsiung. New York: Praeger. Harris, Stuart. 1991. "The Political and Strategic Framework in Northeast Asia." In The End of the Cold War in Northeast Asia, eds. Stuart Harris and James Cotton. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Hsiung, James. 1991a. "The Post-Cold War World Order and the Gulf Crisis," 18 Asian Affairs 1:31-42 (Spring 1991). Hsiung, James. 1991b. "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Democratization." In Distribution of Power and Rewards, eds. James C. Hsiung and Chung-ying Cheng. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Hsiung, James. 1992. "China in the Twenty-First Century Global Balance: Challenge and Policy Response." In The Evolving Pacific Community, eds. Steve Chan and Cal Clark. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. " A m e r i c a ' s Changing Strategic Interests," 33 Survival 1:3—Í 7. Hyland, William. 1990. The Cold War Is Over. New York: Knopf. International Financial Statistics Yearbook: 1991. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. International Institute of Strategic Studies. 1991. The Military Balance: 1991-1992. London: IISS. Jacobsen, C. G. 1982. The Nuclear Era: Its History; Its Implications. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlage, Gunn and Hain. Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Jervis, Robert. 1992. "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" 16 International Security 3 : 3 9 - 7 3 (Winter 1991-1992). Kozyrev, Andrei V. 1990. "The New Soviet Attitude Toward the U.N.," 13 Washington Quarterly, 3 : 4 1 - 5 3 (Summer 1990). Krickus, Richard J. 1987. The Superpowers in Crisis: Implications of Domestic Discord. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's.

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L a n g e r , W i l l i a m . 1952. An Encyclopedia of World History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Linder, S t a f f a n . 1986. The Pacific Century: Economic and Political Consequences of Asian-Pacific Dynamism. S t a n f o r d , C A : Stanford University Press. M a k i n , J o h n . 1989. " A m e r i c a n E c o n o m i c and Military L e a d e r s h i p . . ." In Sharing World Leadership? A New Era for America and Japan, eds. John H. Makin and Donald C. Hellman. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: A m e r i c a n Enterprise Institute. M e a r s h e i m e r , John. 1990. " B a c k to the Future," 15 International Security, 1:6-56. Morley, James W. 1986. Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region. Lexington, M A : D.C. Heath. R a n d . 1989. Long-Term Economic and Military Trends: 1950-2010. Santa M o n ica, C A : Rand. S a r b r o s k y , Alan Ned. 1989. " F r o m B o s n i a to S a r a j e v o . " In Choices in World Politics, e d s . B r u c e R u s s e t , H a r v e y Starr, and Richard Stoll. New Y o r k : W . H. Freeman. S c a l a p i n o , Robert. 1991. " T h e U.S. and Asia: Future P r o s p e c t s , " 70 Foreign Affairs 5 : 1 9 - 4 0 (Winter 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 ) . Scarlott, J e n n i f e r . 1991. " N u c l e a r Proliferation After the Cold W a r , " World Political Journal (Fall 1991), pp. 6 8 7 - 7 1 0 . Silk, M i t c h e l l A. 1990. " S i l e n t P a r t n e r s : T a i w a n B u s i n e s s m e n Are Bullish in C h i n a , " China Business Review ( S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1990), pp. 3 2 - 4 1 . Smith, Michael. 1985. "Soviet Bloc Returns to Capital M a r k e t s , " Journal of Commerce, January 18, 1985. Statistical A b s t r a c t . 1990. The Statistical Abstract of the United States, 11th ed. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e . S t u b b s , R i c h a r d . 1992. " S u b r e g i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o o p e r a t i o n in A S E A N : Military and E c o n o m i c Imperatives and Political Obstacles," 32 Asian Survey 5 : 3 0 7 - 4 1 0 (May 1992). T a b a t a , M a s a n o r i . 1992. " G r o u n d S e l f - D e f e n s e Force: P l a n n e r s Study M a j o r Res t r u c t u r i n g , " J a p a n Times Weekly (international edition), J u n e 2 4 - 3 0 , 1991, pp. 1 and 4. T h o r n t o n , Richard C. 1985. Is Detente Inevitable? W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: W a s h i n g t o n Institute for Values in Public Policy. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State. 1988. " T h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y ' s P r o g r a m to C o m plete a Single Market by 1 9 9 2 " ( p a m p h l e t ) . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: D e p a r t m e n t of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. W a n g , N. T . 1991. " T a i w a n ' s E c o n o m i c Relations with Mainland China," 18 Asian Affairs 2 : 9 9 - 1 2 0 ( S u m m e r 1991).

• 2 Russia and Japan in the Post-Cold War Era Peter Berton B e f o r e I c a n m e a n i n g f u l l y d i s c u s s the p o s t - C o l d W a r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n R u s s i a a n d J a p a n , 1 m u s t a d d r e s s t w o i n t e r r e l a t e d s u b j e c t s . First, I will b r i e f l y t o u c h u p o n t h e s t r a t e g i c e q u a t i o n in the A s i a P a c i f i c r e g i o n b e f o r e the a d v e n t of M i k h a i l G o r b a c h e v . S e c o n d , I w i l l i n q u i r e i n t o the c o n c e p t of " t h e e n d of t h e C o l d W a r , " p a r t i c u l a r l y as it r e l a t e s to t h e A s i a Pacific. I can then deal with the G o r b a c h e v p h e n o m e n o n : the transition f r o m t h e i n h e r i t e d C o l d W a r , t h e e v o l u t i o n of his n e w p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g a n d g l a s n o s t , and the e n d of the C o l d W a r . At the s a m e t i m e , I will a t t e m p t to a n a l y z e h o w e a c h s t a g e a f f e c t e d J a p a n and S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s w i t h J a p a n . I shall then d e l v e into t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n J a p a n a n d B o r i s Y e l t s i n ' s n e w R u s s i a a n d d i s c u s s t h e i m p a c t of t h e C o l d W a r o n J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e p o l i c y . F i n a l l y , I will a n a l y z e t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i m plications for both Russia and Japan.

•

THE STRATEGIC EQUATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION BEFORE GORBACHEV

T h e legacy of L e o n i d B r e z h n e v ' s rule ( 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 8 2 ) is that he s u c c e s s fully built up the Soviet a r m e d forces, particularly the strategic nuclear c o m p o n e n t , to r e l a t i v e p a r i t y w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h i s p o l i c y w a s , n o d o u b t , a r e a c t i o n to t h e C u b a n M i s s i l e C r i s i s of 1 9 6 2 , w h e n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n f o u n d itself s t a r i n g at a U . S . u l t i m a t u m in a c o n d i t i o n of d e f i n i t e s t r a t e g i c i n f e r i o r i t y . T h e S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e also c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e m a s s i v e i n c r e a s e of S o v i e t g r o u n d f o r c e s in t h e Far East f r o m s o m e t h i r t e e n or f o u r t e e n d i v i s i o n s to o v e r f i f t y . H e n r y K i s s i n g e r ' s s e c r e t t r i p to B e i j i n g in

21

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m i d - 1 9 7 1 , l e a d i n g to a S i n o - U . S . r a p p r o c h e m e n t , f u r t h e r s t i m u l a t e d the g r o w t h of S o v i e t a r m e d f o r c e s in the A s i a P a c i f i c r e g i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e steady increase in the size a n d quality of the S o v i e t P a c i f i c Fleet. Of c o u r s e , o n e c o u l d a r g u e that R i c h a r d N i x o n a n d K i s s i n g e r e m b r a c e d a d é t e n t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the S o v i e t U n i o n a n d a n n o u n c e d a n e q u i d i s t a n t treatment of M o s c o w and B e i j i n g . T h i s policy included n e g o tiating a S t r a t e g i c A r m s L i m i t a t i o n T r e a t y ( S A L T ) with the S o v i e t s and a w i t h d r a w a l f r o m V i e t n a m . B u t d é t e n t e did not m e a n s e l f - r e s t r a i n t for the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . I n s t e a d of u s i n g the d é t e n t e to cut d o w n on w a s t e f u l military s p e n d i n g , B r e z h n e v a n d c o m p a n y p u r s u e d their military b u i l d u p and took a d v a n t a g e of the p o s t - V i e t n a m s y n d r o m e in the U n i t e d States in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s to e n g a g e in a g g r e s s i v e a d v e n t u r e s in the T h i r d W o r l d . T h e s e policies, a l o n g w i t h the invasion of A f g h a n i s t a n in the w a n i n g d a y s of 1979, led to the f o r m a t i o n of an i n f o r m a l a n t i - S o v i e t c o a l i t i o n that inc l u d e d not only the U n i t e d S t a t e s and its N A T O allies, p l u s J a p a n a n d o t h e r Asian allies, but also C h i n a . T h e c o n t i n u o u s b u i l d u p of the Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet, the s t a t i o n i n g of l o n g - r a n g e b o m b e r s a n d i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e m i s s i l e s n e a r J a p a n e s e territory, and the militarization of the d i s p u t e d n o r t h e r n islands g r a d u a l l y created p u b l i c s u p p o r t in J a p a n f o r its s e l f - d e f e n s e f o r c e s a n d for an a l l i a n c e w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h i s s e n t i m e n t , in turn, s t r e n g t h e n e d the p r o d e f e n s e f o r c e s in the J a p a n e s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t , a n d J a p a n b e g a n to p l a y a m o r e active military role. For e x a m p l e , in 1 9 8 0 the J a p a n e s e navy (literally the m a r i t i m e s e l f - d e f e n s e f o r c e ) j o i n e d in R I M P A C n a v a l e x e r c i s e s s p o n s o r e d by the U.S. P a c i f i c C o m m a n d , w h i c h b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r the n a v i e s of several U.S. allies. T h e J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t also developed a quite sophisticated electronic intelligence-gathering capability, w h i c h w a s d e m o n s t r a t e d in t h e a f t e r m a t h of the S o v i e t s ' s h o o t i n g d o w n of a K o r e a n airliner w i t h m a n y J a p a n e s e p a s s e n g e r s a b o a r d . In s h o r t , by the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s the J a p a n e s e s e l f - d e f e n s e f o r c e s w e r e a s i g n i f i c a n t c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o m p o n e n t in the U . S . - l e d anti-Soviet c o a l i t i o n .

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THE END OF THE COLD WAR: WHEN, WHERE, AND HOW

I will a r g u e that it is u n c l e a r w h e n and h o w the C o l d W a r e n d e d a n d w h e t h e r it e n d e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y in all r e g i o n s . T h e e n d of the C o l d W a r c o n n o t e s s e v e r a l d r a m a t i c e v e n t s that o c c u r r e d b e f o r e , and s o m e international d e v e l o p m e n t s that h a v e arisen a f t e r , the e n d of that era. T h e first of these d r a m a t i c e v e n t s w a s the i n a u g u r a t i o n of G o r b a c h e v ' s new political t h i n k i n g in Soviet f o r e i g n policy, w h i c h w a s an important ingredient in his policy of perestroika. T h i s reorientation took p l a c e shortly a f t e r he had a s s u m e d p o w e r in M a r c h 1 9 8 5 . T h e r e v o l u t i o n s

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in Eastern E u r o p e in late 1989, which led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and C o m e c o n and the unification of G e r m a n y on Western terms, certainly qualify as another e p o c h - m a k i n g event. T h e failed c o u p d'état in Moscow in mid-August 1991, resulting in the destruction of the C o m m u nist Party apparatus, guaranteed that there would be no Soviet attempt to reverse these strategic setbacks and restore the status q u o ante. T h e dissolution of the Soviet Union in late D e c e m b e r 1991, with Russia emerging as the successor state (inheriting the permanent m e m b e r s h i p with veto p o w ers in the UN Security Council), was perhaps most symbolic of the end of the Cold War. A l m o s t all the constituent Soviet republics (except the Baltic states and G e o r g i a ) banded together in a C o m m o n w e a l t h ( S o d r u z h e s t v o ) of Independent States on the territory of the f o r m e r U S S R . In theory, the c o m monwealth w a s supposed to inherit all Soviet armed forces, including their gigantic nuclear arsenal. In reality, however, we saw the fragmentation of this gigantic military m a c h i n e . T h e r e is a c h a n c e , h o w e v e r , that strategic nuclear w e a p o n s will continue to remain under single Russian control. T h e collapse of the Soviet Union has for all practical p u r p o s e s ended the nuclear c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the two s u p e r p o w e r s . A l t h o u g h the w e a p o n s of mass destruction are still largely in place, Presidents George Bush and Yeltsin r e a c h e d an a g r e e m e n t in 1992 to r e d u c e them drastically, albeit over a relatively long period of time. The question is, when in this sequence of events did the Cold W a r really end? Did it happen w h e n President G o r b a c h e v and Foreign Minister Eduard S h e v a r d n a d z e announced it? Or w h e n both s u p e r p o w e r s — t h e Soviet Union and the United S t a t e s — a g r e e d that it had e n d e d ? Or w h e n N A T O officially declared the end of the Soviet threat? I would argue that it is impossible to date precisely the end of the Cold W a r because of the fact that these m o m e n t o u s events took place largely in E u r o p e and w e r e p e r c e i v e d d i f f e r e n t l y by the leaderships in d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s . M o r e important f r o m the standpoint of the topic of this chapter, Japan lagged behind all other Western powers in c o m i n g to grips with these developments and recognizing the new reality. Although the leadership of the new Russia is proclaiming the end of Cold War relationships everywhere, including those with Japan, it is difficult to pinpoint when, or whether, the Japanese leadership perceived that the Cold War had ended in the Asia Pacific region. To determine what is at stake as the Cold War winds down, perhaps we should briefly look at Japan's policy at the beginning of the Cold War. Because Japan w a s occupied by the United States (technically it was an Allied occupation) after World War II and Japan was not a sovereign state when the Cold W a r broke out in the 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 4 8 period, we should first examine U.S. policy toward Japan. T h e collapse of the Grand Coalition of World War II and the onset of the Cold W a r had a p r o f o u n d e f f e c t on U . S . policy t o w a r d J a p a n . In the

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i m m e d i a t e p o s t - W o r l d W a r II period, the United States began to treat Japan as an enemy that had to be defanged and controlled. In fact, preparations were underway to dismantle s o m e of the r e m a i n i n g industrial plants and ship them as reparations to the victims of J a p a n ' s aggression. But as the c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the Soviet Union grew, U.S. policy toward J a p a n c h a n g e d 180 degrees: Japan w a s increasingly seen in W a s h i n g t o n as a potential ally in the emerging anticommunist coalition. Thus, Japanese industry was not to be dismantled but s t r e n g t h e n e d instead. T h e United States also insisted that the Japanese rearm (first a police reserve and then self-defense forces) to strengthen the U.S.-led alliance system in Asia, in spite of the original plans to keep Japan thoroughly disarmed under the socalled Peace Constitution. 1 The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, of course, hastened U.S. policy on Japanese rearmament. T h e Japanese conservative leadership went along with these ideas in order to speed an end to the occupation and b e c o m e a sovereign state once again. But there w a s a good deal of opposition to J a p a n ' s rearmament not only f r o m the p u b l i c and the leftist parties but also f r o m inside the conservative e s t a b l i s h m e n t . Under the Y o s h i d a doctrine ( n a m e d after longserving Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida), Japan would concentrate on rebuilding its e c o n o m y , leaving its d e f e n s e (including the nuclear deterrent) to the United States. Given the antimilitary and pacifist sentiments a m o n g the J a p a n e s e public, the restrictions i m p o s e d by the Peace Constitution, and the opposition of the leftist political parties, the Japanese government maintained a fine line in defense matters between what the United States d e m a n d e d and w h a t w a s politically possible. In the 1960s, the J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t proclaimed the three n o n n u c l e a r principles (not to m a n u f a c ture, acquire, or allow the stationing of nuclear weapons), for which Prime M i n i s t e r Eisaku Sato received the Nobel P e a c e Prize. In the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , dovish P r i m e Minister T a k e o Miki imposed a limit on d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g of 1 percent of G N P . All along, the J a p a n e s e have s c r u p u l o u s l y tried to distinguish between defensive and o f f e n s i v e w e a p o n s . Thus, the origins of J a p a n ' s participation in the Cold War and its gradual evolution as a military partner of the United States are important factors in assessing its response to the international developments that one associates with the ending of the Cold W a r . As mentioned above, Japan lagged behind all the other Western p o w ers in recognizing these new realities. I will try to explain why Japan was the odd man out as I try to assess the impact of all these events on J a p a n e s e relations with Russia, m o r e broadly on its relations with the United States, and on J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e policy. Likewise, I will look at Soviet policy toward Japan in the final months of the U S S R ' s existence and the new R u s s i a ' s c o m p l e x relationship with this n e i g h b o r i n g e c o n o m i c power, an ally of the United States that w a s clearly on the opposite side d u r i n g the long Cold W a r . Soviet/Russian relations with Japan will be

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considered within the context of the former nation's bioader policy toward the Asia Pacific region. 2

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GORBACHEV'S NEW POLICIES: JAPAN'S RESPONSE AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN

Long before the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership became aware that the country and its empire (both internal and external) were in deep economic trouble, if not in a crisis situation. General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Yuri Andropov's moves to reform and rejuvenate the Soviet system in 19821983 were clear proof of economic and social malaise. Of course, when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary in March 1985, his calls for perestroika were even clearer proof of a deep crisis in the Soviet system. First Soviet economic growth had slowed down; negative economic growth followed, leading in later years to the disintegration of the Soviet economic system. One of the most far-reaching elements in Gorbachev's perestroika was his new political thinking (note the word political). Foremost in it was the repudiation of Brezhnev's policies striving for absolute security based on an offensive posture. Instead, Gorbachev advocated deep mutual arms cuts and a military doctrine of reasonable sufficiency, based on a defensive posture. The 1980s saw Japan's sudden emergence as a major financial power and the largest creditor nation in the world. This transformation came on top of Japan's long record of remarkable economic growth, industrial achievements, and technological sophistication. How did Gorbachev's perestroika affect Soviet policy toward Asia as a whole and Japan in particular? How did this rising power respond to the problems of the Soviet superpower in decline? 3 Just as Gorbachev wanted to fix the Soviet system rather than radically transform it, in the beginning of his tenure he probably wanted to improve relations with Japan rather than resolve the lingering territorial dispute that was the stumbling block to a rapprochement between the two neighbors. In August-September 1945, the Red Army occupied the Kurile Islands and some adjoining islands near Hokkaido. This maneuver was sanctioned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill at their meeting with Joseph Stalin at Yalta in February 1945. Japan subsequently relinquished all right and title to the Kurile Islands at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. The problem is that the Japanese government does not consider the two southernmost islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, nor Shikotan and the Habomai group of islets as belonging to the Kurile chain. In 1956 the Soviet Union promised to return

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Shikotan and the Habomais upon conclusion of a peace treaty in which the Japanese would relinquish their claim to Kunashiri and Etorofu. This the Japanese were not prepared to do; moreover, in 1960 the Soviets unilaterally withdrew even their offer to return Shikotan and the Habomais. 4 Generally speaking, during the six and a half years between Gorbachev's assumption of power in March 1985 and the August 1991 aborted coup, negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union were getting nowhere. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze targeted Japan as one of the first Western countries he would visit in January 1986 and implied recognition of the territorial issue. In some ways this was progress, because for a quarter-century before that, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had never even acknowledged the existence of a territorial dispute. 5 But that was as far as it went: Gorbachev's projected visit to Japan in 1987 was postponed, and Shevardnadze did not again visit Tokyo until almost three years later (despite an agreement to hold annual foreign ministerial talks). How did Japan respond to Gorbachev's bold new policies and foreign policy initiatives? As I have written elsewhere, 6 Japan was the only major Western power that did not respond positively, and the Japanese public lagged behind the people of Western Europe and the United States in perceiving the significance of reforms in the Soviet Union and the changing nature of Soviet foreign policy. The Japanese continued to perceive a greater Soviet threat than citizens of any of the other Western allies. Thus, in 1986, a year after the advent of Gorbachev, the Japanese (together with their U.S. counterparts) topped the West Europeans, especially the West Germans, in a five-nation Soviet-threat-perception poll. 7 In fact, the Japanese perception of the Soviet threat was a tiny fraction higher in 1986 than in 1983, 1984, or 1985. These Japanese attitudes toward the Soviet Union did not change with the announcement of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) accord between the Soviet Union and the United States in late 1987. Thus, in December 1987, in a similar five-nation survey, the Japanese were the most skeptical about the decrease in East-West tensions. The Japanese were also last among all polled countries in believing that the Soviets had become a trustworthy country. 8 Perhaps this skepticism is why it took Gorbachev six years after his assumption of the top position in the Soviet hierarchy to visit Japan in April 1991, the first Soviet or Russian head of state to do so. Another poll, commissioned by the Japanese prime minister's office and conducted for over a decade, began by asking questions on how the respondents felt toward a number of countries: (a) friendly, (b) more or less friendly, (c) more or less unfriendly, or (d) unfriendly. The latest available data are for October 1991 (published in March 1992).? Although the number of nations in the "friendly" category showed a steady increase, punctuated by a near 50 percent jump from 1987 to 1988, the main break-

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through c a m e in O c t o b e r 1990, w h e n the n u m b e r s almost d o u b l e d c o m p a r e d to 1 9 8 9 and tripled c o m p a r e d to 1 9 8 5 . O n the o t h e r h a n d , the n u m b e r of " u n f r i e n d l i e s " r e m a i n e d r o u g h l y the s a m e f r o m 1 9 8 5 t h r o u g h 1989, a n d then d r o p p e d only by a little over 10 p e r c e n t in 1 9 9 0 and 1991. N e x t , let us take a look at J a p a n e s e p u b l i c o p i n i o n polls o n a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d d i f f e r e n t f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s . H o w d o e s the S o v i e t U n i o n c o m p a r e in p o p u l a r i t y (or u n p o p u l a r i t y ) w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s ? H e r e , a g a i n , let us take the p r i m e m i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e polls, w h i c h p r o v i d e c o n t i n u o u s c o m p a r a tive c o v e r a g e since I 9 6 0 . 1 0 Until a f e w years a g o , these polls s h o w e d the Soviet U n i o n as the m o s t d i s l i k e d c o u n t r y ( e x c e p t f o r C o m m u n i s t C h i n a during the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n ) . N o w this d u b i o u s h o n o r b e l o n g s to N o r t h Korea, w h i c h used to be the r u n n e r - u p . T h e Soviet invasion of A f g h a n i s t a n in D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 9 a n d the s h o o t i n g d o w n of the K o r e a n a i r l i n e r in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 3 r a i s e d the n e g a t i v e o p i n i o n of the S o v i e t s to a l m o s t 6 0 p e r c e n t (in a m u l t i p l e - c h o i c e q u e s t i o n n a i r e ) . 1 1 G o r b a c h e v ' s r e f o r m s brought this negative r a t i n g steadily d o w n to the low f o r t i e s . A f t e r G o r b a chev let the Eastern E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s s h e d their c o m m u n i s t s y s t e m s , the n e g a t i v e rating f u r t h e r d e c l i n e d to the mid-thirties, b o t t o m i n g out at 28.5 percent in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 0 . By w a y of c o m p a r i s o n , N o r t h K o r e a ' s n e g a tive rating is almost 5 0 percent, S o u t h K o r e a ' s a r o u n d 20, C h i n a ' s b e t w e e n 10 and 20, and the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' b e t w e e n 5 and 10 p e r c e n t . W h y w e r e the J a p a n e s e the m o s t s u s p i c i o u s a m o n g the W e s t e r n allies about G o r b a c h e v ' s d o m e s t i c r e f o r m s and his new f o r e i g n policies? T h e o f ficials of the J a p a n e s e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , especially those c h a r g e d with S o viet a f f a i r s , have for a l o n g time had the r e p u t a t i o n of b e i n g the most h a r d line a n t i c o m m u n i s t s in the J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t . M o r e o v e r , the J a p a n e s e h a v e l o n g felt an a n i m o s i t y t o w a r d their n o r t h e r n n e i g h b o r s . R u s s i a w a s long a potential e n e m y , starting w i t h raids on J a p a n e s e s e t t l e m e n t s in the north in the early n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . R i v a l r y o v e r K o r e a a n d later o v e r M a n c h u r i a in the last d e c a d e of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y led directly to the R u s s o - J a p a n e s e W a r of 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 0 5 . A f t e r the R u s s i a n r e v o l u t i o n , a n t i R u s s i a n f e e l i n g s w e r e r e i n f o r c e d by a n t i c o m m u n i s t s e n t i m e n t as the B o l s h e v i k s c r e a t e d the T h i r d I n t e r n a t i o n a l , w h o s e J a p a n e s e a r m — t h e J a p a n ese C o m m u n i s t P a r t y — c o n s p i r e d to o v e r t h r o w the imperial s y s t e m . T h e n there w a s the S o v i e t d e c l a r a t i o n of w a r o n J a p a n a w e e k b e f o r e J a p a n ' s s u r r e n d e r in A u g u s t 1 9 4 5 , s e e n by t h e J a p a n e s e as a s t a b in the b a c k in v i e w of the e x i s t e n c e of a neutrality p a c t b e t w e e n the t w o c o u n t r i e s . O v e r half a m i l l i o n J a p a n e s e ( m i l i t a r y a n d c i v i l i a n ) w e r e c a p t u r e d by the R e d A r m y in M a n c h u r i a and North K o r e a in A u g u s t 1945, sent to Siberia, a n d w e r e held in f o r c e d - l a b o r c a m p s f o r s e v e r a l years, in c o n t r a v e n t i o n of international treaties that o b l i g a t e the c o m b a t a n t s to return their p r i s o n e r s of w a r p r o m p t l y . In the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II p e r i o d , e s p e c i a l l y in the 1 9 7 0 s a n d 1980s, the J a p a n e s e felt that the S o v i e t U n i o n p o s e d a military threat to the security of their c o u n t r y . Finally, a n d p r o b a b l y m o s t i m p o r t a n t , the

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Soviets continued to occupy four Japanese islands and until very recently even refused to acknowledge the existence of a territorial dispute. Compared with these rather negative images of the Soviet Union in Japan, Soviet respondents paint a totally different picture of Japan and its people. Some years ago, a startling 88 percent of Soviet citizens expressed "good f e e l i n g s " toward Japan; 98 percent characterized Japan as "economically developed" (compared to only 35 percent of the Japanese viewing the Soviet Union this way); 96.5 percent wanted to increase economic and trade relations (including joint ventures) with Japan; and 99 percent wanted an improvement of relations with Japan. 1 2 A joint Japanese-Soviet poll found 77 percent of the Soviet respondents feeling "very friendly" and " f r i e n d l y " toward its neighbor (compared to only 25 percent of the Japanese) and only 9.5 percent "not friendly" and "antipathetic" (the Japanese figure about the Soviet Union and its people was 67 percent). Not only are these figures grossly asymmetrical, but the images of the people projected most startling contrasts. The S o v i e t ' s considered the Japanese "diligent," "neat," "creative," "cultural," "kind," and "patient" (only 2.2 percent rated the Japanese as "insincere"). On the Japanese side, the Soviets were "closed," "dark and cold," "self-centered," and "secretive," although some responded with "patient," "open-minded," and "serious." 1 3

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GORBACHEV'S POLICY TOWARD ASIA

Given the fact that Gorbachev badly needed to create a favorable international environment in order to reduce military spending and tinker with the economy, it is understandable that he targeted the United States as his first foreign policy priority. Nonetheless, by July 1986 he also turned his attention to Asia. In a well-publicized visit to Vladivostok, the headquarters of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, he outlined his plans for the Asia Pacific region and his policy toward the major Asian powers. 1 4 In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev singled out China for a good deal of c o m m e n t . He stressed the importance of Soviet relations with China, noted improvement in that regard, and offered the hope that the border between the two countries would become "a zone of peace and friendship." He pointed out the complementary nature of the Soviet and Chinese economies and called for the expansion of economic ties. In the most important Soviet concession in the entire speech, Gorbachev accepted the Chinese formula for delineating the Sino-Soviet border in the Amur River basin. Gorbachev then paid homage to Japan for having "turned into a power of front-ranking significance," and he called for "deeply intensified cooperation on a healthy and realistic basis . . . in an atmosphere of calm unburdened by the problems of the past" (emphasis added). This was a clear

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hint that the Japanese should forget about their territorial demands. Gorbachev also o f f e r e d to c o o p e r a t e in space research, one of very few areas where the Soviet Union was technologically ahead of Japan. O n e of G o r b a c h e v ' s major proposals at Vladivostok was to apply the Helsinki process to Asia. The Helsinki a g r e e m e n t e f f e c t i v e l y f r o z e the p o s t - W o r l d War II territorial status quo in Europe. This proposal, as many of his other proposals, was basically self-serving; it would have frozen the territorial status quo, much to the dismay of China and Japan, w h o had territorial disputes with the Soviet Union and with each other. Moreover, the other n u m e r o u s territorial conflicts in the Asia P a c i f i c region w o u l d remain unresolved. Counting the Helsinki proposal in the politico-diplomatic sphere, Gorbachev seems to have had a fourfold strategy vis-a-vis the Asia Pacific region as a w h o l e . In the military-strategic sphere, G o r b a c h e v w a n t e d to maintain the Soviet position in the region while attempting to weaken the position of the United States and its allies, primarily Japan and South Korea. Third, in the nuclear w e a p o n s arena, he tried to e n c o u r a g e the forces working for the establishment of nuclear-free zones, especially in Southeast Asia, Australasia, and Japan. Such antinuclear m o v e m e n t s had the potential to destabilize relations between the United States and its allies, in the process w e a k e n i n g the position of the U.S. Navy. Finally, his fourth proposal dealt with e c o n o m i c matters. Here he w a s trying to dev e l o p Siberia and the Soviet Far East by integrating them with the dynamic e c o n o m i e s of the Asia Pacific region. Of course, at that time both the United States and Japan were opposed to the admission of the Soviet Union to the Pacific E c o n o m i c Cooperation C o n f e r e n c e ( P E C C ) . A little over two years a f t e r the Vladivostok speech, in S e p t e m b e r 1988, G o r b a c h e v delivered another major address on the Asia Pacific region in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk. 1 5 This time he paid more attention to Japan than to C h i n a and specifically brought up relations with South Korea. As in the V l a d i v o s t o k speech, G o r b a c h e v e n d e d with concrete proposals, many of which were carryovers f r o m Vladivostok. These included reduction of nuclear w e a p o n s (he did not specifically call for the establishment of nuclear-free zones) and a f r e e z e followed by reduction in naval and air forces, c o u p l e d with a restriction on their activity in areas w h e r e the seaboards of the U S S R , China, Japan, and North and South Korea w e r e in proximity to one a n o t h e r — a n o b v i o u s attempt to limit the activity of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. G o r b a c h e v proposed s o m e "negotiating m e c h a n i s m " (starting with d i s c u s s i o n s a m o n g the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, as p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of the UN Security C o u n cil) to discuss Soviet or other proposals relating to the security of the Asia P a c i f i c region. W h e r e a s in V l a d i v o s t o k G o r b a c h e v called f o r the United States to abandon its bases in the Philippines and promised an appropriate Soviet response, in Krasnoyarsk he offered to exchange the U.S. bases in the Philippines for Soviet bases in Vietnam, a strikingly asymmetrical proposal.

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On the whole, both of these policy speeches were quite one-sided and contained much Soviet rhetoric (propaganda might be a more appropriate term) addressed to world opinion rather than to the leaders of the United States, Japan, and other Asia Pacific powers. Nonetheless, the speeches signaled the eventual Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Also, Gorbachev offered concrete concessions to China on the territorial issue, albeit none to Japan. Evaluating in another publication 16 the record of Gorbachev's diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region during the 1985-1991 period (leaving aside Soviet relations with the United States, which are of a global character), 1 gave him an "A" for dramatically improving relations with South Korea, a "B" for achieving a breakthrough in normalizing relations with China, a "C" for modestly improving relations with the members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and Australasia, and a "D" for his inability to come to some sort of an understanding with Japan, unquestionably the most important neighbor in that region.

•

SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1988-1991

As discussed earlier, Soviet-Japanese relations were in a state of suspended animation from mid-1986 to the end of 1988. During his second visit to Tokyo in December 1988, Shevardnadze and Japanese Foreign Minister Sousuke Uno agreed to set up a working group at the viceministerial level to settle the problems associated with the conclusion of a peace treaty. During the remaining three years of Gorbachev's tenure, there were eight such meetings. Yet no real breakthrough on the territorial question occurred, although some issues were clarified and the islands can be now visited by the Japanese without Soviet visas. Thus, it might be said that, preoccupied with more important issues (such as arms control negotiations with the United States), Gorbachev did not put enough energy nor attention into relations with Japan. I might also add in retrospect that Gorbachev in his early years in power could have made some concessions on the territorial issue when his policy of glasnost had not yet created a strong public opinion in the Soviet Union. But he missed the opportunity. In discussing Japan's policy toward the Soviet Union, scholars have identified two basic approaches, known in Japanese as iriguchi ron (entrance theory) and deguchi ron (exit theory). The entrance theory calls for the solution of the territorial issue as a prerequisite for expanding ties with the Soviet Union; the exit theory calls for improving relations with the northern neighbor as a means of solving the territorial issue. Needless to say, whereas Japan stuck to the entrance theory, the Soviet Union clearly preferred the exit theory. Another way to conceptualize the two Japanese approaches toward the Soviet Union is to distinguish between seikei bunri

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(separation of politics from economics) and seikci fukabun (indivisibility of politics and economics), with Japan advocating the latter policy that the political (territorial) issues are inseparable from economic issues and that an increase in economic cooperation depends upon the solution of the territorial issue. In trying to break the deadlock, Foreign Minister Sousuke Uno on a visit to Moscow in May 1989 advanced a new policy of "balanced expansion" (kakudai kinko), which on the surface looked like a policy somewhere between the entrance and exit theories. Uno proposed that, pending the conclusion of a peace treaty that would successfully resolve the territorial dispute, Japan and the Soviet Union should nevertheless proceed with negotiations over other matters, such as fishing rights, environmental protection, and visits by former Japanese inhabitants of the disputed islands to their ancestors' graves. 1 7 Although Japanese scholars like to describe this "expanded equilibrium" policy as falling between the entrance and exit theories, in reality it offers concessions on what, in the context of Sino-Soviet relations, l x I have called "low politics" relations (distinguishing them from "high politics," which would definitely include territorial issues). Gorbachev finally visited Japan in mid-April 1991, the first Soviet or Russian supreme leader to do so. He spent four days in Tokyo, holding almost constant meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. 1 9 His visit, however, did not lead to any breakthrough either on the territorial issue or on Japanese economic assistance to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Gorbachev made a couple of major diplomatic blunders, combining his visit to Japan with a stopover in South Korea and proposing a five-power conference with the participation of India. The Japanese would have preferred a special trip only to Japan, and they do not consider India a major player on the international scene. The general consensus of scholars and political observers was that the visit would have been a total failure if not for its symbolic value as an historic first. 2 0 Some fifteen agreements were signed during this visit, but none was very important and all could have been quietly signed by lower-level officials. Above all, Gorbachev did not make any of the spectacular proposals that we were led to believe was his diplomatic forte. Partly because of the failure of the Gorbachev visit and partly because of the relative rise of Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Republic, the Japanese Foreign Ministry began to practice a two-track diplomacy at the Soviet Union (Gorbachev) and the Russian Republic (Yeltsin) levels. Significantly, this decision was made before the August 1991 coup, and contacts on both levels intensified after the aborted coup. Japan is not geared to respond quickly to foreign crises. Just as in its response to the Gulf crisis, the Japanese government temporized when it heard about the coup against Gorbachev. It looked to the United States and

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W e s t e r n E u r o p e f o r g u i d a n c e , but in spite of U.S. " g u i d a n c e " it hesitated to act. In the e n d , w h e n it w a s clear that the c o u p had failed, J a p a n m a d e all the right g e s t u r e s , albeit too little and too late. B e t w e e n the t i m e of the a b o r t e d c o u p in A u g u s t 1991 and G o r b a c h e v ' s r e s i g n a t i o n at the end of D e c e m b e r , the J a p a n e s e Foreign Ministry c o n t i n u e d its two-track d i p l o m a c y . At the end of S e p t e m b e r , this a p p r o a c h w a s o f f i c i a l l y c o d i f i e d in the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s of J a p a n ' s Soviet policy, the first t w o p r o m i s i n g to " s t e p u p aid for Soviet r e f o r m " and to " s t r e n g t h e n c o o p e r a t i o n with the Russian F e d e r a t i o n " [ e m p h a s i s a d d e d ] . 2 1 T h e diplomatic pattern saw largely Russian visitors to T o k y o and J a p a n e s e visits to M o s c o w , w h e r e c o n t a c t s w e r e m a d e w i t h b o t h the Soviet and Russian leaders. P r o m i n e n t Soviet leaders did not or c o u l d not c o m e to J a p a n , but a d d i t i o n a l m e e t i n g s w i t h the J a p a n e s e w e r e held at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s h e a d q u a r t e r s in N e w York as part of the annual m e e t i n g s of the UN G e n eral A s s e m b l y .

•

THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA

E v e n b e f o r e the d e m i s e of the Soviet U n i o n , Russian leaders stressed to the J a p a n e s e the centrality of R u s s i a in the solution of the territorial dispute. T h e islands b e l o n g e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y to the Russian F e d e r a t i o n , and its o f f i c i a l s d r o p p e d hints that they w o u l d be m o r e f l e x i b l e than G o r b a c h e v . At the s a m e time, they w e r e c a r e f u l to note that the islands could not be t r a n s f e r r e d to J a p a n w i t h o u t a p o p u l a r r e f e r e n d u m . T h e Soviet leaders w e r e m o r e i n t e r e s t e d in J a p a n ' s e c o n o m i c aid, a l t h o u g h they t o o m a d e v a g u e r e f e r e n c e s to the territorial issue. By early O c t o b e r 1991, J a p a n finally a g r e e d to m a t c h the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y ( E C ) and the U n i t e d States to the relief a n d stability of the Soviet U n i o n at the $ 2 . 5 b i l l i o n l e v e l . 2 2 W i t h the e x c e p t i o n of s o m e h u m a n i t a r i a n aid, h o w ever, m o s t of the J a p a n e s e " a s s i s t a n c e " w a s e a r m a r k e d to insure J a p a n e s e f i r m s d o i n g b u s i n e s s with R u s s i a . H o w did R u s s i a n P r e s i d e n t Y e l t s i n feel a b o u t the territorial d i s p u t e w i t h J a p a n ? A c t u a l l y , he v i s i t e d J a p a n in J a n u a r y 1990, a h e a d of G o r b a c h e v , a n d p r e s e n t e d a f i v e - s t a g e p l a n f o r the s o l u t i o n of the S o v i e t J a p a n e s e territorial d i s p u t e that w o u l d t a k e f i f t e e n to t w e n t y y e a r s . First, the Soviet U n i o n w o u l d a c k n o w l e d g e the e x i s t e n c e of the territorial disp u t e w i t h J a p a n . ( G o r b a c h e v a c k n o w l e d g e d it only in April 1991 d u r i n g his visit to J a p a n . ) S e c o n d , t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d e s t a b l i s h a f r e e e c o n o m i c z o n e on the f o u r islands and, third, w o u l d d e m i l i t a r i z e the islands. Fourth, the t w o c o u n t r i e s w o u l d sign a p e a c e t r e a t y , and in the f i f t h a n d final stage, the question of the o w n e r s h i p of the islands w o u l d be left to the next g e n e r a t i o n of S o v i e t s a n d J a p a n e s e . 2 3 T h e f i f t h point, p o s t p o n i n g the

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s o l u t i o n of t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i s s u e , w a s p r o b a b l y t a k e n f r o m D e n g X i a o p i n g ' s " S e n k a k u Island Formula": W h e n China and Japan were negotiating a p e a c e t r e a t y in t h e late 1 9 7 0 s , D e n g s u g g e s t e d that t h e f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t of their territorial dispute o v e r the D i a o y u t a i - S e n k a k u island be p o s t p o n e d until the next generation. T o p r e p a r e t h e r e s i d e n t s of t h e d i s p u t e d i s l a n d s ( i n i t i a l l y t h o s e o n t h e s m a l l e r i s l a n d s of S h i k o t a n a n d t h e H a b o m a i s p r o m i s e d to J a p a n in 1 9 5 6 ) , Y e l t s i n in l a t e S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 1 s e n t h i s d e p u t y f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , G e o r g y K u n a d z e , a n d t w o R u s s i a n P e o p l e ' s D e p u t i e s to S a k h a l i n a n d t h e i s l a n d s . T h e i r m i s s i o n w a s to e x p l a i n R u s s i a ' s o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w , at t h e s a m e t i m e r e a s s u r i n g t h e r e s i d e n t s t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s w o u l d n o t b e n e g l e c t e d . T h e h e a d of t h e S a k h a l i n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( w h i c h h a d j u r i s d i c t i o n over the Kurile Islands), f o r m e r e c o n o m i c s professor Valentin Fyodorov, d i d his b e s t t o u n d e r m i n e t h e visit a n d to stir u p l o c a l o p p o s i t i o n . H e e v e n s t o o p e d to m a k i n g e t h n i c s l u r s a b o u t t h e G e o r g i a n b a c k g r o u n d of t h e m i n ister, d e c l a r i n g that a p e r s o n w i t h a n a m e s u c h as K u n a d z e h a d " a b s o l u t e l y n o m o r a l o r e t h i c a l r i g h t to d e c i d e t h e f a t e of R u s s i a n t e r r i t o r y . " 2 4 Y e l t s i n d i d n o t w a n t to r e p u d i a t e a l o y a l s u p p o r t e r ; in f a c t h e a p pointed F y o d o r o v " g o v e r n o r " shortly after the visit. This w a s an astute s t e p , as c o n s e r v a t i v e P e o p l e ' s D e p u t i e s in t h e R u s s i a n p a r l i a m e n t t o o k u p t h e c a u s e of t h e K u r i l e i s l a n d e r s . T w o s u c h d e p u t i e s t r a v e l e d to S a k h a l i n and the disputed islands, s u p p o r t e d F y o d o r o v ' s position, and reassured the r e s i d e n t s that no territorial c o n c e s s i o n s w e r e g o i n g to be m a d e . 2 5 Y e l t s i n ' s Vice President, General Aleksandr Rutskoi (who has been openly attacking a n d u n d e r m i n i n g Y e l t s i n ' s e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s ) , j o i n e d t h e d e f e n d e r s of the Kurile Islands, c o m p l i c a t i n g the already c o m p l e x situation. B y t h e e n d of D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 1 , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n c e a s e d to e x i s t , a n d a f t e r t h e r e s i g n a t i o n of P r e s i d e n t G o r b a c h e v , J a p a n o f f i c i a l l y r e c o g n i z e d R u s s i a n o t o n l y as a s o v e r e i g n s t a t e b u t a l s o a s t h e s u c c e s s o r s t a t e t o t h e U n i o n o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s . J a p a n e s e d i p l o m a c y is t h u s b a c k t o a s i n g l e t r a c k , b u t n o w w i t h R u s s i a i n s t e a d of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d Y e l t s i n i n s t e a d of G o r b a c h e v . In o n e of his f i r s t a c t s a s t h e f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r o f R u s s i a w i t h o u t h a v ing a Soviet foreign minister with authority o v e r him, Andrei K o z y r e v ass u r e d all t h e p o w e r s , i n c l u d i n g J a p a n , t h a t R u s s i a w o u l d h o n o r all t h e treaties and a g r e e m e n t s s i g n e d by the f o r m e r Soviet Union. W i t h respect to J a p a n ,

and

in a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e

from Gorbachev's

position,

K o z y r e v s p e c i f i c a l l y c o n f i r m e d the legality of the 1956 S o v i e t - J a p a n e s e Joint D e c l a r a t i o n . N e e d l e s s to say, this reversal w a s a signal that R u s s i a w a s o f f i c i a l l y ready to c o n c e d e the validity of d o c u m e n t s that explicitly m e n t i o n e d t h e r e t u r n to J a p a n of S h i k o t a n a n d t h e H a b o m a i i s l e t s u p o n t h e c o n c l u s i o n of a p e a c e t r e a t y . K o z y r e v a d d e d , h o w e v e r , that t h i s a c k n o w l e d g m e n t w o u l d n o t l e a d t o a n a u t o m a t i c a n d i m m e d i a t e c o n c e s s i o n of t h e islands; this o u t c o m e w a s subject to negotiations.26

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Yeltsin briefly met with the new J a p a n e s e prime minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, in New York at the end of January 1992, 2 7 and the meetings of the vice-ministerial working g r o u p on the peace treaty resumed in February. T h e Japanese government w a s much impressed by a personal message f r o m Yeltsin to M i y a z a w a , w h i c h e n d e d with the statement that he considered Japan to be R u s s i a ' s partner and potential ally, one that shares with Russia the same human values. 2 8 M i y a z a w a replied that he w o u l d like to build a "new age in Japan-Russia relations." 2 9 While the peace treaty w o r k i n g g r o u p continued its negotiations, alternating between T o k y o and M o s c o w , the two foreign ministers were also e x c h a n g i n g visits. Kozyrev went to T o k y o for two d a y s at the end of March, and Michio Watanabe traveled to Moscow in early May. K o z y r e v ' s visit to T o k y o was the first by a Russian foreign minister fully in charge of relations with Japan, and the topics discussed ranged f r o m the territorial issue and the peace treaty to e c o n o m i c matters and international security concerns. On another occasion, Kozyrev reassured the Japanese that Russia would no longer target Japan. During W a t a n a b e ' s visit to M o s c o w in early May 1992, the w o r k i n g g r o u p w a s charged to "exert utmost e f f o r t s " to c o m e up with an acceptable draft of a peace treaty in time for Y e l t s i n ' s visit to T o k y o . For his part, W a t a n a b e said that, should Russia a c k n o w l e d g e J a p a n ' s residual sovereignty over the disputed islands, the Japanese government would be quite flexible " a b o u t the time f r a m e and the modality of their r e t u r n . " Practically, this meant that the Japanese would be prepared to sign a peace treaty on the basis of a R u s s i a n p l e d g e to return first Shikotan and the H a b o m a i s and eventually the t w o larger islands, which would continue for a certain period to remain under Russian administration. 3 0 A new, disturbing element in the Kurile equation is the growing Cossack movement in Russia. Although the newly organized Cossacks in the Don River area are genuine d e s c e n d a n t s of the Cossacks w h o were mercilessly persecuted by Stalin, the m o v e m e n t also attracts a bunch of adventurers w h o have no hereditary connection. In Sakhalin they are being supported by Fyodorov, w h o h e l p e d o r g a n i z e a national c o n g r e s s of all the Cossacks. One of the topics discussed at the congress was the problem of development and revival of the Kurile Islands, and the final resolution of the congress stressed opposition to the return of the islands to Japan. 3 1 T h e second recent development complicating the quiet diplomacy between Russia and Japan to settle the territorial issue is the inauguration of an annual "Southern Kuriles D a y , " 3 2 which took a leaf f r o m the Japanese. (The J a p a n e s e parliament i n a u g u r a t e d " N o r t h e r n Territories D a y " in 1981.) T h e r e c o n t i n u e s to be o p p o s i t i o n to the return of the southern Kuriles to Japan, especially in the Russian Far East, and it is not restricted to the e l e m e n t s on the right. P e r h a p s the persistence of these f e e l i n g s is the reason f o r a recent statement K o z y r e v m a d e on a trip to K a m c h a t k a that "nobody intends to give away the southern Kuriles." 3 3

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T r a d e b e t w e e n the two countries was a l w a y s more important for the Soviet Union than for Japan, which is one of the w o r l d ' s greatest trading nations. Bilateral trade peaked in 1989 at a little over $6 billion (1.3 percent of J a p a n ' s trade) compared to J a p a n ' s trade of some $30 billion with South Korea and close to $ 1 5 0 billion with the United States. Since 1989 Soviet-Japanese trade has fallen off because of economic difficulties and a shortage of foreign exchange in the Soviet Union. Trade v o l u m e dropped to $5.9 billion in 1990 and $5.4 billion in 1991. 3 4 More recently, Soviet f i r m s could not pay their bilis, one reason for J a p a n ' s $2.5 billion aid package, discussed above. As I have written elsewhere, 3 5 proximity and complementarity are no longer relevant in this bilateral e c o n o m i c relationship, which is getting more and more asymmetrical. Furthermore, Japan has handsome investment opportunities in politically stable areas such as Western Europe and Southern California, not to mention the dynamic economies of South Korea, Taiwan, and the A S E A N countries. Thus, the development of Siberia has lost most of its attractiveness, even b e f o r e the recent e c o n o m i c dislocations. T h e net effect of the dissolution of the Soviet Union is that Japan will have to provide credits and aid in the near term. Long-range economic relations will depend upon the stabilization of the Russian economy. M e e t i n g s of h i g h - r a n k i n g R u s s i a n and J a p a n e s e o f f i c i a l s c o n t i n u e d through the s u m m e r of 1992, but no b r e a k t h r o u g h has occurred. Foreign Minister W a t a n a b e ' s visit to Moscow in late A u g u s t - e a r l y S e p t e m b e r was the last o f f i c i a l m e e t i n g prior to President Y e l t s i n ' s s c h e d u l e d trip to J a p a n in m i d - S e p t e m b e r , and it probably r e i n f o r c e d the p e r c e p t i o n in M o s c o w that the J a p a n e s e w e r e pushing their agenda without regard for the political realities in R u s s i a . 3 6 On S e p t e m b e r 9, f o u r d a y s b e f o r e his s c h e d u l e d d e p a r t u r e for T o k y o , Yeltsin abruptly c a n c e l e d his visit to Japan and Korea. T h e Korean visit was rescheduled, but the trip to Japan w a s not. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Yeltsin visited China in D e c e m b e r and India in J a n u a r y 1993. G i v e n the political d e v e l o p m e n t s in Russia in A u g u s t and early S e p t e m b e r , it s e e m s clear that Yeltsin w a s torn b e t w e e n his desire to go to J a p a n and m o v e R u s s o - J a p a n e s e relations f o r w a r d , with all a c c o m p a n y i n g e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s , and his political instincts, which c a u t i o n e d against the t r i p — m a k i n g even the smallest territorial concessions to Japan could destabilize his position at home. By r e f u s i n g to budge on the residual sovereignty issue for all four islands, the Japanese tipped the scale in f a v o r of cancellation. In retrospect, Yeltsin should have m a d e his decision earlier so as not to insult his Japanese hosts. T h e abrupt cancellation was p o r t r a y e d in the J a p a n e s e media as a s n u b of the e m p e r o r , w h o s e c o o k s must have prepared everything for the banquet at the Imperial Palace. In public opinion polls taken in Japan a couple of weeks after Y e l t s i n ' s canc e l l a t i o n , u n f a v o r a b l e attitudes toward Russia shot up 50 percent to the 1988 levels, 3 7 erasing all the positive images arising f r o m the end of the

36

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C o l d W a r , the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e of a new Russian neighbor. In e a r l y O c t o b e r , Y e l t s i n b e g a n to t a l k a b o u t r e s c h e d u l i n g his v i s i t to J a p a n a n d b r o u g h t u p a g a i n t h e p o s s i b l e r e t u r n of t h e t w o s m a l l e r i s l a n d s to J a p a n . G o r b a c h e v ' s April 1991 visit did n o t h i n g to c o n s i d e r a b l y

im-

p r o v e S o v i e t - J a p a n e s e r e l a t i o n s . Y e l t s i n ' s S e p t e m b e r 1992 n o n v i s i t set R u s s o - J a p a n e s e r e l a t i o n s b a c k . If Y e l t s i n e r r e d o n t h e t a c t i c a l i s s u e of t i m i n g , t h e J a p a n e s e s h o u l d s h o u l d e r t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r l a c k of s t r a t e gic considerations.

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THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY

P e r h a p s t h e g r e a t e s t i m p a c t of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d t h e d i m i n u t i o n , if not d i s a p p e a r a n c e , of t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t is b o u n d t o b e in t h e a r e a of J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e a n d t h e c o u n t r y ' s a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e

United

States. During the 1980s, d e f e n s e outlays and international e c o n o m i c aid w e r e t h e o n l y a r e a s of t h e n a t i o n a l b u d g e t that w e r e s t e a d i l y r i s i n g . In t h e c a s e of d e f e n s e , t h e a n n u a l i n c r e a s e s w e r e a r o u n d 6 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m . T h e 1 9 9 2 f i s c a l y e a r b u d g e t ( w h i c h b e g i n s o n A p r i l 1, 1 9 9 2 ) o n l y a l l o c a t e s 4 5 5 billion yen, or a 3.8 percent increase, for d e f e n s e . 3 8 T h e dollar f i g u r e , of c o u r s e , d e p e n d s o n t h e y e n / d o l l a r r a t e of e x c h a n g e , w h i c h c o n s t a n t l y f l u c t u a t e s ( w i t h s w i n g s of u p to t w e n t y p e r c e n t in t h e e a r l y 1 9 9 0 s ) . B u t in r o u g h t e r m s t h e J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e b u d g e t is a r o u n d $ 3 5 b i l l i o n ,

which

m a k e s it t h e t h i r d - l a r g e s t in t h e w o r l d , a l t h o u g h a d i s t a n t t h i r d a f t e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n . (It m a y w e l l b e t h a t in t i m e J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e b u d g e t w i l l s u r p a s s t h a t of R u s s i a a n d b e c o m e t h e w o r l d ' s second largest.) Although the J a p a n e s e defense budget broke through the s e l f - i m p o s e d l i m i t o f 1 p e r c e n t of t h e G N P in t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , b e c a u s e o f t h e g r o w t h of t h e J a p a n e s e e c o n o m y t h e p r o p o s e d 1 9 9 2 d e f e n s e b u d g e t represents only 0.941 percent. T h e J a p a n e s e D e f e n s e A g e n c y e a c h s u m m e r p u b l i s h e s an a n n u a l w h i t e paper on security matters. Since 1980 the publication has m a d e references to "a potential t h r e a t " f r o m the Soviet U n i o n . T h e original d r a f t of the 1 9 9 0 e d i t i o n c o n t a i n e d t h i s p h r a s e , b u t it w a s d r o p p e d at t h e i n s i s t e n c e o f P r i m e M i n i s t e r K a i f u , w h o w a n t e d to m a k e a p o l i t i c a l p o i n t . P e r h a p s t h i s g e s t u r e w a s m a d e in a n t i c i p a t i o n of F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r

Shevardnadze's

f o r t h c o m i n g v i s i t to T o k y o . S h e v a r d n a d z e c a m e to J a p a n f o r t h e t h i r d t i m e in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 0 to p r e p a r e f o r G o r b a c h e v ' s v i s i t . O n t h i s o c c a s i o n , h e a n d h i s J a p a n e s e c o u n t e r p a r t i s s u e d a j o i n t s t a t e m e n t o n t h e s i t u a t i o n in t h e P e r s i a n G u l f , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e b r o a d e n i n g t h e s c o p e of S o v i e t - J a p a n e s e i n t e r a c t i o n s to i n c l u d e s e c u r i t y m a t t e r s . T h e 1 9 9 1 D e f e n s e of J a p a n w h i t e p a p e r , w h i c h w a s i s s u e d in l a t e J u l y b e f o r e the Soviet c o u p d ' é t a t , a g a i n did not m e n t i o n " t h e Soviet t h r e a t " but

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implicitly argued that the end of the Cold War did little to bring a significant relaxation of tensions in the area around Japan. International Situation The military situation i n c l u d e s uncertain e l e m e n t s in A s i a . T h e S o v i e t Union is facing crises. The military and political situation in A s i a and the Pacific is much more c o m p l i c a t e d than in Europe. The military situation in the Far East remains s e v e r e despite the end of the cold war, as the S o v i e t U n i o n has reduced its forces quantitatively in the region but b o o s t e d them qualitatively [emphasis added]. Asian Military Situation The military situation in the region remains severe despite S o v i e t President Mikhail G o r b a c h e v ' s pledge during his April visit to Japan to reduce Soviet forces in the northern territories. 3 9

At the end of N o v e m b e r 1991, well after the f a i l u r e of the A u g u s t c o u p d ' é t a t and the gradual s o f t e n i n g of Soviet f o r e i g n policy, a report prepared for a g o v e r n m e n t - s p o n s o r e d think tank in T o k y o by a J a p a n e s e defense-establishment analyst described in detail the Soviet military assets in the area and urged a cautious attitude. T h e Soviet threat was analyzed in terms of intent, capabilities, and the strategic e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e author c o n c e d e d that, at least f o r the present, the Soviet Union did not have an aggressive intent either on the European front or on the Far Eastern front. But as far as capabilities were concerned, the situation in the Far East was seen as different f r o m that of Europe. Here Soviet capabilities were being substantively upgraded, and this trend was likely to continue. T h e reduction of military assets w a s largely restricted to obsolete or near-obsolete e q u i p m e n t . Moreover, one could notice a significant modernization of the remaining military assets. One reason for these developments w a s that reductions were limited by the decision to maintain the Sea of Okhotsk sanctuary for Soviet S S B N s . As for the strategic environment, it had not changed in the Far East, in contrast to that of Central Europe. T r a i n i n g and m a n e u v e r s in the Sea of O k h o t s k sanctuary w e r e brisk, and o n e could not e s c a p e the c o n c l u s i o n that the structure b e h i n d the Soviet potential threat to Japan had not c h a n g e d . T h e author f u r t h e r speculated that only the r e m o v a l of the Soviet S S B N s to the Arctic Ocean, away f r o m Japan, w o u l d create a strategic environment less threatening to Japan. A r o u n d the s a m e time, G e n . Colin Powell, the c h a i r m a n of the U.S. Joint C h i e f s of Staff, m a d e a visit to T o k y o and met with his J a p a n e s e c o u n t e r p a r t , Admiral M a k o t o S a k u m a . T h i s top J a p a n e s e o f f i c e r in the s e l f - d e f e n s e forces said that the Soviet units stationed in the Far East were still a threat to Japan despite overall reductions in the Soviet military. He a n d General Powell a g r e e d that a m o d e r n i z e d Soviet military r e m a i n s a potential threat to East Asia. 4 0

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Has there been a change in the J a p a n e s e perception of the Soviet/Russian threat since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in D e c e m b e r 1991? Certainly, this event has given the opportunity for some J a p a n e s e opposition parties to argue for cuts in the d e f e n s e budget, but it is still the Liberal Democratic Party ( L D P ) that calls the shots. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the J a p a n e s e p u b l i c ' s perception of the S o v i e t / R u s s i a n threat has not c h a n g e d drastically e n o u g h to f o r c e the ruling party to reexamine its d e f e n s e priorities, aside f r o m 1 imiting the i n c r e a s e in the defense budget to 3.8 percent. M o r e o v e r , if the J a p a n e s e were t o initiate drastic cuts in d e f e n s e spending, they would have to c o n s i d e r possible U.S. objections. The Japanese d e f e n s e establishment, likewise, has not drastically revised its estimates of Soviet capabilities in the area. A senior J a p a n e s e defense analyst writing in The Journal of National Defense in J u n e 1992 pointed out that in the Asia Pacific region there are several u n r e s o l v e d problems carried over f r o m the period of the Cold War and that there remain important causes of regional conflict. A m o n g the legacies of the Cold War he cites the northern territories problem and the division of the Korean Peninsula. 4 1 The 1992 defense white paper issued in August 1992 4 2 toned down the appraisal of the situation around J a p a n , noting that the military situation w a s " u n s t a b l e " rather than " s e v e r e , " as characterized in the 1991 w h i t e paper. Of course, instability is also a cause for c o n c e r n , but it is not as t r o u b l e s o m e as deliberate Russian policies directed against J a p a n . T h e prognosis, thus, is for a cautious wait-and-see attitude.

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CONCLUSIONS: POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES FOR JAPAN AND RUSSIA

T h e Cold W a r started shortly after the end of World War II as an accumulation of policies, statements, and actions initiated primarily, though not exclusively, by the Soviet Union. This c o n f l i c t — w h i c h saw serious crises, p r o l o n g e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n , and phony d é t e n t e s — l a s t e d o v e r forty years, and it is also appropriate to call this period, as s o m e a n a l y s t s do, " T h e Long P e a c e . " Everyone now talks about the end of the Cold War, but there is no a g r e e m e n t on precisely w h e n or how it e n d e d . T h e r e are d i f ferent p e r c e p t i o n s in d i f f e r e n t countries; I argue that Japan w a s the last country a m o n g the Western powers to evaluate favorably G o r b a c h e v ' s perestroika and new political thinking. As a result, Japan lagged behind Western Europe and the United States in perceiving increased trustworthiness on the part of the Soviet Union and a lessened Soviet threat.

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T h e collapse of the Warsaw Pact e f f e c t i v e l y r e m o v e d the threat of a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe on the central front; there is nothing c o m p a r a b l e in the Soviet Far East. O n e can even argue that the Russian war machine in Northeast Asia is leaner but meaner, with the Pacific Fleet now concentrated in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk rather than being dispersed over a large area of the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, although no rational military planner would i m p u t e hostile intent to the Russians, their j o b also calls for coping with capabilities. What is the e f f e c t on Japan of the collapse of the Soviet empire, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the discrediting of c o m m u n i s m , socialism, and central e c o n o m i c planning, b e y o n d the narrow f o c u s on J a p a n ' s relations with its northern neighbor? In terms of domestic politics, these d e v e l o p m e n t s greatly strengthen the L D P and the g o v e r n m e n t and vindicate its privatization policy (national railroads, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , etc.). T h o u g h the L D P is s o m e w h a t in disarray b e c a u s e of continuously b r e a k i n g news of bribery scandals, the w e a k n e s s of J a p a n e s e opposition parties allowed it to register important gains in the House of Councillors (the " U p p e r H o u s e " ) elections that took place in late July 1992. T h e opposition parties, traditionally seduced by M a r x i s m and social ism, are obviously much more affected by the fall of the U S S R . The main opposition group, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), in contrast to the West G e r m a n Socialist Party or the British Labor Party, has never repudiated its devotion to doctrinaire Marxism. In 1960 the party's right-wing moderates seceded to f o r m the D e m o c r a t i c Socialist Party ( D S P ) . A f t e r the exodus of the moderates, the remaining JSP leadership was split b e t w e e n left and right, the l e f t - w i n g curiously f o l l o w i n g policies to the left of the Japan C o m m u n i s t Party (JCP). In recent years, the leadership was in the hands of right-wing " m o d e r a t e s " w h o used to f r e q u e n t Beijing, M o s c o w , and especially P y o n g y a n g . In response to the d r a m a t i c d e v e l o p m e n t s in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the J S P for s o m e reason changed its English n a m e to the Social D e m o c r a t i c Party of Japan but retained its J a p a n e s e n a m e (Nihon Shakai To). The socialists also have their o w n share of bribery scandals, although on a m u c h smaller scale than the business-oriented and more p o w e r f u l LDP. T h e three r e m a i n i n g o p p o s i t i o n parties (the B u d d h i s t - a f f i l i a t e d Komeito, or Clean G o v e r n m e n t Party, the D e m o c r a t i c Socialists, and the C o m m u n i s t s ) have in recent elections lost parliamentary seats to the JSP. T h e D e m o c r a t i c Socialists are truly a party of the center: T h e y have supported the s e l f - d e f e n s e forces and the security alliance with the United States, and on certain issues they vote with the government party, such as the recent important vote on s e n d i n g the J a p a n e s e s e l f - d e f e n s e f o r c e s abroad for United Nations peacekeeping operations. But as often happens (as, for e x a m p l e , with the British Social D e m o c r a t s ) , the centrist parties

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get squeezed from both the left and the right. The Komeito is probably less affected than the others by the collapse of communism and central planning, although this party also espouses socialism, albeit "humanitarian." 4 3 This party will probably be more weakened by the excommunication of its parent Soka Gakkai organization by Buddhist authorities. We now come to the Japan Communist Party. Some fifteen years ago, the JCP dropped all references to dictatorship of the proletariat and Marxism-Leninism (calling it now "scientific socialism"). Over the years, it also opposed Soviet (and Chinese) expansionism and interference in the affairs of other communist parties (including the JCP) and could note with satisfaction the collapse of the Soviet empire. In the fall of 1988, it launched a strident critique (on pure Marxist grounds) of Gorbachev's perestroika 4 4 and now could say "we told you so." But the party has yet to feel the full backlash of the Japanese electorate. In the February 1990 elections to the powerful House of Representatives (only two months after the total rejection of communism in one Eastern European country after another), the JCP polled over five million votes, losing only 200,000 votes compared to the previous election in 1986. In a more recent gubernatorial election in Osaka in November 1991, the party amazingly garnered almost a quarter of the vote. As I wrote in a recently published book, 4 5 the JCP may well become the last remaining nonruling Communist Party in the world. I have followed Japan's policy toward the Soviet Union/Russia during the recent period of momentous change in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself. The Japanese have been the most cautious of all the Western powers in their approach, partly because of the inability of the Japanese system to react quickly and partly because of the long-lasting territorial dispute with Moscow and the resultant anti-Sovietism. There is also the U.S. angle: Japan was a partner, if not an equal ally, in the antiSoviet coalition. The Japanese government now has to adjust its Russian policy, taking into account U.S. policy toward Russia and other dimensions of the Japan-U.S. relationship, such as continuous friction in economic matters. During the Cold War era, when Japan's bases and military cooperation were vital to the U.S. position in the western Pacific, the Pentagon could be counted upon to counteract anti-Japanese policies emanating from the economic agencies of the U.S. government, such as the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Agriculture, and the Office of the Trade Representative. Now the pro-Japanese leverage by the Pentagon would be much weaker. If the Japanese and the United States have long perceived the Soviet Union as a military threat to their security, they increasingly see each other as their greatest economic threat. Some years ago, the prestigious Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the Japanese counterpart of The Wall Street Journal, tried to assess both military and economic threats. In this poll, conducted in

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Japan and the United States well before G o r b a c h e v ' s policies began to change the Western perception of the Soviet threat, each saw the greatest economic threat emanating f r o m the other. This perception was held by surprisingly similar numbers of over 70 percent, a remarkable trans-Pacific mirror image. 4 6 If the United States is J a p a n ' s greatest economic threat, what do the Japanese people think about p o s t - C o l d War relations with the United States and the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance? After the disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, the United States Information Agency began commissioning periodic polls on the subject. The interviewees were asked to choose between two policy options: 1. The Cold War has ended and the security alliance with the U.S. is no longer needed to ensure continued peace and prosperity in Asia and the Pacific; or 2. Tensions remain despite improved East-West relations. The J a p a n U.S. security alliance is still essential for continued peace and prosperity in Asia and the Pacific. The results are fairly consistent (the latest poll was taken in May 1992), with roughly two-thirds of the respondents choosing the second statement, 11 to 16 percent feeling that the alliance with the United States has outlived its usefulness, and the rest in the " d o n ' t know" category. 4 7 As for the question of how Japan should deal with world problems, 1 percent want a partnership with Western Europe alone, a quarter would like to see Japan as a leader in Asia, and about half of the Japanese want a global partnership either with the United States alone or with the United States and Western Europe. At the same time, almost 60 percent think Japan's foreign policy is too closely tied to that of the United States, and about a quarter think Japan has an independent policy and simply shares many policy goals with the United States. 4 8 As the Cold War is relegated to history books and the Soviet Union is split into a dozen quarrelling republics, the international security system has become unipolar. The nuclear terror is gone, but we still worry about the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union. We also have new concerns about the potential sale of latest model fighter planes, missiles, and nuclear technology to the Third World and China. There is also fear that Russian nuclear scientists and technicians might find lucrative job opportunities in Iran, Libya, and other dangerous terrorist states. Although the international security system has b e c o m e unipolar, the international economic system has become decidedly multipolar, with the relative weight of the United States gradually reduced. Furthermore, analysts are now writing about the decline of geopolitics and the emerging

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importance of geoeconomics. In this new world, Russia is a middle power (although in the long term a potential superpower) and Japan is a superpower. But J a p a n ' s position is paradoxical. On the one hand, its relative weight in this new economic system is greatly enhanced. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War has weakened its position in the international security system. On balance, J a p a n ' s rise in the geoeconomic world is bound to lead to greater friction with the United States. The creation of a single North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is also of considerable concern for the Japanese. Given the undeniable fact that the U.S. market is of utmost importance for Japan, Japan is likely to be worse off in the post-Cold War era. Having lost its empire, Russia is obviously much weaker in the post-Cold War period. It was said that the eagle of the Romanov dynasty had two heads to look west and east. Where is the new Russia facing in the 1990s? Foreign Minister Kozyrev is reported to have said that " W e have an unprecedented opportunity to be Asians in Asia and Europeans in Europe." 4 9 That may be wishful thinking, as few, if any, Chinese, Koreans, or Japanese consider the Russians to be Asians. (In 1941 Stalin also talked about "Us, Asians" to Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke M a t s u o k a — b u t then Stalin was an Asian.) But although the bulk of Russia's population and industry remains in Europe and its trade with Europe is three times the size of its trade with Asian countries, the Asia Pacific region has assumed an added importance for the country. Vladimir Lukin, a prominent Russian specialist on the Asia Pacific region and the current ambassador to Washington, in a recent contribution to the journal Foreign Policy wrote that "[a]side from Europe, relations with countries of the Asian-Pacific region continue to be of critical significance to Russia." He also felt that because the Russian Far East remains largely underdeveloped and underpopulated, "Russia is additionally sensitive to security concerns emanating from the Asian-Pacific region." 5 0 Another prominent Russian scholar stresses the importance of the Asia Pacific region and Russia's relations with Japan and the United States: In terms of economic interests, sources of capital investments and market opportunities, the importance of the Asia Pacific region goes far beyond the interests of the Russian Far East. The future of Russia's economic reforms, the accesses to global markets, technologies and investment, as well as the security of the country, depend not only upon stable and friendly relations with the U.S. and Japan, but also on the stability of these two powers' long term relationship. 51 A high-ranking Russian diplomat agrees with this evaluation: "Due to the logic of circumstances, relations with Japan should become one of the priorities of the foreign policy of sovereign Russia." 5 2 In other words, rela-

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tions with Japan transcend the Asia P a c i f i c region and a s s u m e critical importance for the f u t u r e of Russia. T o be sure, in the past the Soviet Union could not join the various o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the Asia P a c i f i c (such as P E C C ) without the c o n c u r r e n c e of Japan and the United States. Good relations with Japan were a prerequisite for the economic integration of the Soviet Union in the region. A l t h o u g h Russia is now a m e m b e r of P E C C and is treated quite differently than was the Soviet Union, Japan is still the key to the economic future of Russia in the Asia Pacific. The Russian scholar cited above goes on to c o m m e n t on the discontinuity between the foreign and d e f e n s e policies of the f o r m e r Soviet Union and Russia in the Asia P a c i f i c region: " T h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of the role the former Soviet Union played in the region is neither possible nor desirable. It is also a problem of entirely new strategic thinking and new priorities both in Russian foreign policy and d e f e n s e posture." 5 3 Ambassador Lukin rather optimistically sees R u s s i a ' s new role "as the most important pillar of equilibrium, in concord with other leading powers that have vital stakes in Eurasian stability, rather than to disturb the equilibrium." In the Far East, Lukin says, Russia, "by maintaining constructive relations with China, Japan, and other states in the region, . . . can b e c o m e an important balancer, preventing any one of them f r o m dominating others without itself posing a threat to the region." 5 4 He a s s u m e s that the BushYeltsin declaration in June 1992 has created a new partnership between the two erstwhile antagonists, which will have a positive impact on R u s s i a ' s relations with Japan and South Korea: " W e e x p e c t to d e v e l o p f r i e n d l y , mutually useful relations with such U.S. allies as Japan and the Republic of Korea. W e see those c o u n t r i e s as allies of our partner, and hope that they see us as a partner of their ally." 5 5 Although this may be an unduly optimistic assessment of the role Russia can realistically play in the Asia P a c i f i c region, we need to c o n s i d e r R u s s i a ' s new strategic thinking and new priorities in the region. Much will depend not only on the policies of the other powers in Asia Pacific vis-àvis Russia but also on the political evolution and economic development of the Russian Far East. In mid-August 1990 the leaders of the Yakut Autono m o u s Soviet Republic, the K h a b a r o v s k and Primorskii ( M a r i t i m e ) territories, and the Jewish A u t o n o m o u s , A m u r , K a m c h a t k a , M a g a d a n , and Sakhalin regions formed the Far Eastern Association to promote social and e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n . In May 1991 a regional f o r u m w a s held in Khabarovsk to organize a P e o p l e ' s M o v e m e n t for the Formation of a Far Eastern Republic. The idea was to raise the constitutional status of the area to give it better control over its natural resources and a stronger voice visà-vis M o s c o w . 5 6 So far, centrifugal forces have not led to an independent far eastern republic, but m u c h d e p e n d s on the d e g r e e to w h i c h M o s c o w will grant a u t o n o m o u s status to the area, so f a r f r o m the Russian capital

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Berton

and E u r o p e and s o c l o s e to C h i n a , K o r e a , and J a p a n . But i r r e s p e c t i v e o f M o s c o w ' s relations w i t h the Far East, the latter three c o u n t r i e s are b o u n d to exert a strong pull, at least e c o n o m i c a l l y . In the national security d i m e n s i o n , future r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n R u s s i a o n the o n e hand and Japan and the U n i t e d States o n the other w i l l to a large e x t e n t b e d e t e r m i n e d by R u s s i a n d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the f u t u r e o f its s t r a t e g i c s u b m a r i n e nuclear f o r c e in the S e a o f O k h o t s k s a n c t u a r y . If the s u b m a r i n e s remain, the attendant n e e d to d e v i s e a p r o t e c t i v e s h i e l d for t h e m w i l l c a u s e m u c h o f the p r e s e n t t e n s i o n to r e m a i n . But if the s u b m a r i n e s are m o v e d e l s e w h e r e ( s u c h as to the A r c t i c O c e a n ) a n d s o m e security r e g i m e is f o u n d for the S e a o f O k h o t s k , then w e h a v e a d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n w i t h p r o f o u n d i m p l i c a t i o n s for the U . S . P a c i f i c F l e e t and e s p e c i a l l y for the overall d e f e n s e strategy o f Japan. T h u s , in the economic

sphere future d e v e l o p m e n t s in the A s i a P a c i f i c

d e p e n d in large m e a s u r e on Japan (and the U n i t e d S t a t e s ) , but in the

secu-

rity s p h e r e it is R u s s i a , w e a k e n e d t h o u g h it is, that w i l l play the d o m i n a n t role in d e t e r m i n i n g the strategic b a l a n c e in the p o s t - C o l d W a r era.

•

NOTES

I wish to thank the Center for International Studies, School of International Relations, University of Southern California for their support; the School of International Relations for a travel grant; and Minoru Koide and Elizabeth Knowlton of the University of Southern California for research and editorial assistance, respectively. I am very grateful to Paul Langer and Michael Blaker, w h o have read the manuscript and offered very helpful suggestions. In addition, I am indebted to Michael Blaker, Ronald Hinckley, T o s h i h i k o Ikura, J a m e s Marshall, Shigeki Nishimura, and Yakov Zinberg for providing me with research materials. I would also like to thank the c o m p i l e r s and editors of the SUPAR Report put out by the Center for the Soviet Union in the Pacific and Asian Region, University of Hawaii (Patricia Polansky, John Stephan, and Robert Valliant) for making this outstanding research tool available. As is customary to add, final responsibility is mine. 1. T h e text of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution reads: A s p i r i n g s i n c e r e l y to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e b a s e d on j u s t i c e a n d o r d e r , t h e J a p a n e s e p e o p l e f o r e v e r r e n o u n c e w a r as a s o v e r e i g n right of the n a t i o n and the threat or u s e of f o r c e as m e a n s of settling i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s . In o r d e r to a c c o m p l i s h the a i m of the p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h , l a n d , s e a , a n d a i r f o r c e s , as well as o t h e r w a r p o t e n t i a l , will n e v e r b e m a i n t a i n e d . T h e r i g h t of b e l l i g e r e n c y of the state will not be r e c o g n i z e d .

2. This chapter logically f o l l o w s two of my most recent 1992 publications, and the reader might profitably be referred to: Peter Berton, "The Impact of the 1989 Revolutions on Soviet-Japanese Relations," Chapter 8 in Y o u n g C. Kim and Gaston J. S i g u r (eds.), Asia and the Decline of Communism ( N e w B r u n s w i c k , NJ and L o n d o n : T r a n s a c t i o n Publishers, 1992), pp. 1 3 3 - 1 5 3 ; and idem., " G o r b a c h e v ' s Policy in the Asia P a c i f i c R e g i o n with Particular Reference to Soviet Relations with J a p a n , " Osaka Gakuin Daigaku Kokusaigaku Ronso—International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (March 1992), pp. 195-234.

Russia & Japan in the Post-Cold

War Era

45

3. See also Gilbert Rozman, Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985-1991: A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 4. For a detailed account of the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute, see Peter Berton, "The Japanese-Russian Territorial Dilemma: Historical Background, Disputes, Issues, Questions, Solution Scenarios—A Thousand Scenarios for the Thousand Islands Dispute," white paper prepared for the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 17, 1992. 5. Peter Berton, "Soviet-Japanese Relations: Perceptions, Goals, Interactions," Asian Survey, Vol. XXVI, No. 12 (December 1986), pp. 1259-1283. 6. See the section on "Gorbachev's Reforms and Opening to the West: The Impact on Japan and Japanese Public Opinion," in my chapter "The Impact of the 1989 Revolutions on Soviet-Japanese Relations" in Kim and Sigur, Asia and the Decline of Communism. 7. See Table 8.1 in ibid., p. 135. 8. See Tables 8.2 and 8.3 in ibid., pp. 136-137. 9. Gaiko ni kansuru Yoron Chosa [Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy], conducted annually in October and published in pamphlet form by the Prime Minister's Office (Tokyo: Naikaku Sori Daijin Kambo Koho Shitsu [Public Information Office, Prime Minister's Secretariat]) in March or April of the following year. 10. For charts showing nations liked and disliked by the Japanese during the 1960s and 1970s, see Peter Berton, Paul F. Langer, and George O. Totten (translators, contributors, and editors); and Nobori Shomu and Akamatsu Katsumro, The Russian Impact on Japan: Literature and Social Thought: Two essays (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1981). Supplemented by Jiji Yoron Chosa Tokuho [Jiji Public Opinion Survey: Special Report] (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin Sha, three times a month). Updated through October 1992. 11. The respondents have to name three countries they like and three countries they dislike. 12. Joint Soviet-Japanese poll conducted by telephone in February 1988 in both countries (250 localities in Japan and in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok). Tokyo Shimbun, March 6, 1988, p. 1. 13. Joint Soviet-Japanese poll conducted in March 1988 by the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Soviet Institute of Sociology. Yomiuri Shimbun, May 25, 1988, pp. 1, 14, and 15. 14. Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech on July 28, 1986, FB1S, July 29, 1986, pp. R 1 - R 2 0 . See also Security in the Asia Pacific Region: The Soviet Approach—Documents and Materials (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988), pp. 16-28. 15. Mikhail Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech, Pravda, September 18, 1988, 2nd edition, pp. 1 - 3 : translated in FB1S, September 20, 1988, pp. 29-41. 16. Berton, "Gorbachev's Policy in the Asia Pacific Region," p. 214. 17. Peggy Levine Falkenheim, "Moscow and Tokyo: Slow Thaw in Northeast Asia," World Policy Journal (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 159-179. 18. Peter Berton, "A Turn in Sino-Soviet Relations?" Chapter 2 in James C. Hsiung (ed.), Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy: Challenge for the U.S. and Its Asian Allies (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 2 4 - 5 4 . 19. Shinjukai (comp.), Go Daitoryo Rai-Nichi to Kongo no Nisso Kankei [President Gorbachev's Visit to Japan and Future Japanese-Soviet Relations] (Tokyo: Compiler, July 1991); Hiroshi Kimura, " G o r b a c h e v ' s Japan Policy: The Northern Territories Issue," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXI, No. 9 (September 1991), pp. 7 9 8 - 8 1 5 ; and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, " G o r b a c h e v ' s Visit to Japan and Soviet-

46

Peter Berton

Japanese Relations," Acta Slavica laponica (Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University), Tomus X (1992), pp. 6 5 - 9 2 . 20. For more details, see the section " G o r b a c h e v ' s Visit to Japan, April 1991," in Berton, "Gorbachev's Policy in the Asia Pacific Region," pp. 226-229. 21. Tokyo, Kyodo, September 24, 1991 in FBIS-EAS-91-185 (September 24, 1991), p. 6. 22. More specifically, $500 million was earmarked for humanitarian aid (food and medicine), $200 million for project loan, and the remaining $1.8 billion for insurance. Yomiuri Shimbun, October 9, 1991. 23. "Yeltsin Hastens Isle Solution: Offers To Settle Territorial Dispute Ahead of Schedule," Daily Yomiuri, October 1991, p. 1. 24. "Attitude in Sakhalin 'Seething,'" Moscow Russian Television Network, October 8, 1991 in F B I S - S O V - 9 1 - 2 0 3 , Internationa] Affairs, October 21, 1991, p. 18. 25. Moscow Interfax, October 10, 1991 in F B I S - S O V - 9 1 - 1 9 8 (October 11, 1991), p. 59. 26. "Russia Recognizes Legality of 1956 Joint Declaration," Daily Yomiuri, December 29, 1991. 21. Japan Times, February 2, 1992, p. 1. 28. Yomiuri Shimbun, February 29, 1992, p. 1. 29. Yomiuri Shimbun, March 18, 1992. 30. John-Thor Dahlburg, "Russia, Japan Set Target Date for Drafting World War II Peace Pact," Los Angeles Times, May 5, 1992, p. A39. 31. "Sovet Soiuza Kazakov Rossii" [Council of the Cossack Union of Russia], Kommercheskii vestnik [Commercial Bulletin] (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), No. 9 (February 1992). 32. " D e n ' Iuzhnykh Kuril" [Southern Kuriles Day], Gubernskie vedomosti, June 12, 1992, p. 2. 33. Argumenty i fakty [Arguments and Facts] (Moscow), No. 72 (1992), p. 4. 34. "1991 Nen no Nisso Boeki" [Japan-Soviet Trade in 1991], Soren Too Keizai Sokuho [Soviet and East European Economic Bulletin], No. 881 (March 15, 1992). 35. Berton, "The Impact of the 1989 Revolutions on Soviet-Japanese Relations." See also Shinichiro Tabata, "The Japanese-Soviet Economic Future," Acta Slavica laponica, Tomus IX (1991), pp. 189-205. 36. For a detailed account of Russo-Japanese relations through September 1992, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Russo-Japanese Relations in the Post-Perestroika Period," chapter in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, eds., Regional Conflicts in the Asia Pacific Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming in 1993). For a critique of Japanese policy in the territorial dispute with Russia, see Professor Hasegawa's '"Hoppo Ryodo shokogun' ni ochiitta Nihon" [Japan that Is Afflicted with the "Northern Territories Syndrome"], Chuo Koron [Central Review], No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 8 6 - 9 7 . 37. Jiji Yoron Chosa Tokuho, October 1, 1992. 38. Yomiuri Shimbun, December 28 and 29, 1991. 39. Yomiuri Shimbun, July 27, 1991. 40. Kyodo, November 18, 1991, in FBIS-EAS-91-222 (November 18, 1991), p. 1. 41. Shigekatsu Kondo, "Reisen-go no Ajia Taiheiyo Chiiki no Anzen Hosho wo ika ni Kakuho suru ka" [How Can We Assure the Security of the Asia Pacific Region in the Post-Cold War Era], Shin Boei Ronshu—The Journal of National Defense, Vol. 20, No. 1 (June 1992), p. 64. 42. Yomiuri Shimbun, August 8, 1992.

Russia >

—

•

•

o

o Od * JO tfl

13

t: « O £

T cg

o a.

3 O u c/j

o

•

~; gross domestic product, 211 lab; imports, 21 \tab; industrialization, 198; trade with United States, 185(afc

Taiwan Straits, 15, 128, 209«3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, xiv, 137-138, 150, 151, 154; aid from

267

"Bandwagoning," 222 Berton, Peter, 21^14 Bigemony, 191n26 Brezhnev, Leonid, 21, 25 Brunei: economic growth, 192fai>; in regional alignment, 6; trade with United States, 185 tab Bush, George, 23, 43, 52, 71, 72, 119, 227 Cambodia, 139, 142-145; civil war, 80; independence, 137; United Nations peacekeeping operation in, 144—145, 182, 184, 247 Capital: accumulation, 115; flight, 115; investment, 42; markets, 109 Carter, Jimmy, 108 Celoza, Albert, 9 3 - 1 1 0 Chan, Steve, 161-175 Charter of Paris, 3 Cheney, Richard, 179 Chiang Ching-kuo, 14, 114, 122, 123, 127 Chiang Kai-shek, 114, 122 China: in Asia Pacific, 76-80; and Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 80; benefit from Cold War, 7 3 - 7 4 ; communism in, 10; Cultural Revolution, 120; defense budget, 74, 228; defense policy, 8 2 - 8 5 , 8 9 n l 5 ; economic growth, \92tab, 242, 249tab; economic liberalization, 162; economic reform, 86, 8 9 n l 3 , 198, 240, 241; export drive, 120; exports, 200, 2Utab; first triad, 7 6 - 7 8 ; foreign debt, 84; foreign policy, 75; "Greater China" policy, 8 1 - 8 2 , 206, 207; gross domestic product, 211 tab; gross national

268

Index

p r o d u c t , 8 , 7 7 , 2 4 0 ; i m p o r t s , 2 1 1 lab-,

Developmentalism,

Indochina policy, 8 0 ;

D o d g e Plan, 2 2 5

Japanese

i n v e s t m e n t in, 6 6 , 6 8 « / 0 ;

Japanese

r e l a t i o n s with, 10, 5 6 , 7 9 - 8 0 ; i n v e s t m e n t in, 7 8 , 1 9 9 :

216-217

Dutch East Indies, 147, 148,

214

Korean

modernization,

E A E G . See

East Asia E c o n o m i c Group

77, 84, 199; nuclear armaments, 73, 85;

East Asia E c o n o m i c Group, 65, 151,

in P e r s i a n G u l f W a r , 3 ; P h i l i p p i n e

E C . See

relations with, 98, 1 0 7 ; policy

Economic: cooperation, 70n/2, 87,

7 5 - 8 5 ; in p o s t - C o l d W a r e r a ,

iniatives, 71-88;

125-129;

\85lab,

s u b s t i t u t i o n , 1 1 6 , 2 1 5 ; i n t e r n a t i o n a l , 3, 169; market, 2 2 3 ; newly industrialized, 6,

unification with T a i w a n , 7 9 , 8 1 - 8 2 ,

122;

71-73;

Entrance theory,

195-209

30

European C o m m u n i t y , 179, 195, 2 0 5 , 2 0 8 ,

Chun D o o Hwan, 101,

105

2 4 9 , 2 5 3 ; aid to S o v i e t U n i o n , 3 2 ; g r o s s

Churchill, Winston, 25 Clark, Cal,

6 4 ; p l a n n e d , 2 1 9 ; s o c i a l i s t , 6 4 ; in S o v i e t Union, 2

zhoubian diplomacy, 77, 87 C h o w , Peter,

national product, 8; single market, 9

113-130

European Economic Area,

Cojuangco, Eduardo,

197

g e e s e pattern, 6 4 , 70/i/2, 2 0 2 ; i m p o r t

199;

United States relations with,

8, 10; territories, 2 4 7 ; union,

E c o n o m y : "center of gravity," 198; flying

Territorial W a t e r s L a w , 8 4 ; trade patterns, 14, 6 6 , 8 7 ,

208;

86, 89«/.?, 183, 198, 2 4 0 , 2 4 1 ; security,

Union

relations with, xiv, 2 8 ; T a i w a n e s e relations with, 113, 120,

180

Community

integration, 181, 1 9 5 - 2 0 9 ; reform, 42,

s e c o n d triad, 7 8 - 8 0 ; S o u t h e a s t A s i a n relations with, 136—137; S o v i e t

European

106

C o l d W a r , end of, xiii; A s i a P a c i f i c in, 1 - 1 8 , 2 1 3 - 2 3 0 ; and China,

249

European Free Trade Association,

249

E x c h a n g e rates: floating, 119; yen/dollar,

71-88;

36, 63

d e f i n i n g , 1 - 3 , 2 2 - 2 5 ; J a p a n in, 2 1 — 4 4 ;

Exit theory,

30

m u l t i p o l a r i t y in, 3 - 4 ; P h i l i p p i n e s a n d , 9 3 - 1 1 0 ; R u s s i a in, 2 1 - 4 4 ; S o u t h e a s t

Asia

Five Power Defense Arrangement,

in, 1 3 5 - 1 5 6 ; S o u t h K o r e a a n d , 9 3 - 1 1 0 ;

F l y i n g g e e s e pattern, 6 4 , 7 0 « 7 2 ,

T a i w a n in,

Fyodorov, Valentin, 33, 3 4

113-130

16

202

Commonwealth of Independent States, 23; e c o n o m i c aid to, 5 3

G A T T . See

C o m m u n i s m , 9 4 , 1 4 1 , 2 1 9 ; in A s i a P a c i f i c , 10; C h i n e s e , 7 6 , 2 2 4 ; Indonesian,

146,

G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t on T a r i f f s

and Trade G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t on T a r i f f s and T r a d e ,

1 4 7 ; in J a p a n , 2 7 , 3 9 , 4 0 , 5 9 ; N o r t h

55, 76, 126, 163, 166, 182, 205,

Korean, 2 2 4 ; Philippine, 99, 100,

2 2 6 ; S o v i e t U n i o n in, 3 ; U r u g u a y round,

107;

r o l e o f m i l i t a r y , 1 4 6 , 1 4 7 ; in S o u t h e a s t A s i a , 1 3 8 ; in S o v i e t U n i o n , 2 3

195 Geneva Conference,

Conflicts: bipolar, 73; Eastern European, 4; e t h n i c , 4, 1 1 , 1 7 7 ; future, 1 5 - 1 6 ;

racial,

5 2 ; regional, 3 8 , 8 5 ; religious, 1 7 7 ; on

206,

148

G e o e c o n o m i c s , xiv, 4 2 , 7 4 , 8 8 ; rise of, 5, 8 G e r m a n y : exports, 1 6 5 ; and g e o e c o n o m i c s ,

S i n o - S o v i e t border, 13, 15; territorial, 29,

5 ; m u l t i p o l a r i t y in, 4 ; p a r t i c i p a t i o n in

31, 32, 40, 53, 54, 6 7

Persian Gulf War, 5 8 ; unification,

Coordination Council for North Affairs,

American

126

Glasnost,

G o r b a c h e v , M i k h a i l , 1, 2 , 2 1 - 2 2 , 2 2 , 2 3 ,

Core-periphery relationship,

217-223

Currency: appreciation, 119; c o m m o n , revaluations, 196,

2 5 - 3 2 , 142, 197;

198

206, burden sharing, 2 2 6 ; individual

reliance

o n , 5 ; r e l i a n c e o n U n i t e d S t a t e s , 5 , 11 Deng Xiaoping, 33, 72, 82, 87, 8 9 « 2 7 , 1 9 9 , 209/iZ, 2 4 1 Denoon, David,

178

Gordon, Bernard, 4 9 - 6 8 , Greater China E c o n o m i c

D e f e n s e : budgets, xiv, 7, 2 4 , 2 8 , 3 6 , 3 8 , 5 9 ;

Dependencia,

23

30

177-190

217-218

Deterrence: conventional, 5, 74, 8 6 ; nuclear, 4 - 5 , 11, 13, 24, 7 3 , 74, 8 6

120,

135-156 Community,

207

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 62, 7 0 « 7 2, 2 0 7 Gromyko, Andrei, 2 6 Gross domestic product: Asia Pacific, 9; North Korea, 7 9 ; South Korea, 79; United States, 9 Gross national product, 61; Asia Pacific, 8, 9, 195; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 8 0 ; China, 8, 7 7 , 2 4 0 ;

European

Index

Community, 8; Hong Kong, 81. 8?; Indonesia, 80, 138; Japan, 8, 49, 51, 59, 68n4; Malaysia, 138; Singapore, 82, 138; South Korea, 8, 82; Taiwan, 8, 82, 115, 116, 1 \ltab; Thailand, 80, 138 Guam, 96 Habomais Island, 33, 34 Hegemony: decline of, 169; economic leadership in, 5; private gain in, 166-169; public goods in, 166-169; regional, 251; requirements for, 5; stability theory, 161-169, 171, 245 Helsinki Accord, 3, 29 Ho Chi Minh, 141 Hong Kong: economic growth, 8, 192rat; exports, 199, 21 Itab; gross domestic product, 211(afc; gross national product, 81, 82; imports, 211 lab; Japanese investment in, 62; offshore production in, 64, 199; Philippine relations with, 107; in regional alignment, 6; reversion to China, 6, 79, 81-82, 122, 199, 252; trade with United States, 185fafe. See also Asia Pacific Hsiung, James, 1-18, 71-88, 2 1 3 - 2 3 0 , 235-259 Huk rebellion, 98 Hussein, Saddam, 5, 7, 10, 54, 162, 179 IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency Income, per capita, \Sln4; Japanese, 49; Malaysian, 151; Taiwanese, 115 Indochina, 138-140; and China, 80; communism in, 10; socialist economy, 64 Indochina Federation, 137, 148 Indonesia, 146-149; communism in, 146, 147; defense budget, 228; economic growth, 64, 138, 146, I92tab; exports, 63, 64tab, 200, 2 0 \ t a b , 211 tab; foreign policy, 147-149; gross domestic product, 211 tab; gross national product, 80; imports, 63rab, 194tab, 2\\tab; independence, 141; military forces, 85, 158n/3; in regional alignment, 6; relations with China, 80; Taiwanese investment in, 196; trade with United States, 185tab Intermediate-range Nuclear Force accord, 26 International Atomic Energy Agency, 7, 11, 13, 78, 79, 181-182, 229 International Monetary Fund, 18n2, 54 Investment: capital, 42; direct foreign, 196, 197, 199, 202, 238 Ishihara, Shintaro, 5 1 - 5 2 Japan: aid to Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 62; aid to Soviet Union,

269

31; Chinese relations with, 10, 56, 76, 77, 78, 79—80; class gap in, 49; closed market in, 56, 186; Communist Party, 27; Constitution (Article 9), 5 7 - 6 0 ; defense budget, 7, 24, 36, 38, 59, 68n4, 228; Democratic Socialist Party, 39; economic growth, 192iafc, 249raf>; as economic threat to United States, 9; export restraints, 56; exports, 55, 62, 63tab, 165, 194iafc, 211 tab; fear of the past, 50-51, 66; financial speculation, 49; foreign aid, 167; foreign policy, 54-57, 61, 62, 67, 68; and geoeconomics, 5; gross domestic product, 211 tab; gross national product, 8, 49, 51, 59, 61, 6Hn4; in Gulf War, 10, 52-53, 57-58; imports, 63, Mtab, 2\\tab; international "role," 49-68, 69n3; investment in Asia, 62, 63; investment in China, 66, 68nlO; Japan Communist Party, 39, 40, 59; Japan Socialist Party, 39; Liberal Democratic Party, 38, 39, 52, 59, 67, 68n7; loans to Soviet Union, 2; militarist revival, 59; nationalism in, 11, 162; need for military protection, 55; occupation by U.S., 50; opposition parties, 39; pacifism in, 24; Peace Constitution, 24; peacekeeping forces, 7, 57—60, 68; Philippine relations with, 107, 108; in post-Cold War era, 21^14; public opinion polls, 27, 35-36; recognition of ending of Cold War, 23, 24, 26; in regional alignment, 6; role in Asia, 65-66, 145; role in balance of power, 7; self-defense forces, 7, 22, 24, 39, 57-60; Southeast Asian relations with, 136; South Korean relations with, 101; Soviet Union relations with, 24, 25-36; and Taiwan, 56; trade with China, 66; trade with South Korea, 35; trade with Soviet Union, 35; trade with United States, 35, 185rafc; United Nations role, 66, 67-68; United States relations with, 23-25, 55-57, 61-62. See also Asia Pacific The Japan That Can Say No (Ishihara), 51 Jiang Zemin, 76, 88 Johnson, Lyndon, 169 Kaifu, Toshiki, 31, 36, 75 Kanemaru, Shin, 52 Khmer Rouge, 139, 140, 144, 148, 157n5, 158 nlO, 184 Kim Dae Jung, 105 Kim II Sung, 78 Kim Jong Pil, 106 Kim Young Sam, 105, 106 Kissinger, Henry, 21-22, 113, 125 Korean War, xiii, 141; effect on global politics, xiii

270

Index

Kozyrev, Andrei, 33, 34, 42 Kunadze, Georgy, 33 Kuomintang, 14, 1 14, 122, 123, 124, 125, 129 Kurile Islands, 25, 29, 31, 32, 34, 67, 68, 70/1/5 Laurel, Salvador, 106 Lee Kwan Yew, 67, 138, 154-155 Lee Teng-hui, 89/1/.?, 114, 123, 124 Li Peng, 75, 76, 80, 87 Lombok Straits, 16, 17// Lukin, Vladimir, 42, 43 Maastricht Treaty, 178, 249 Mac-Arthur, Douglas, 50 Magsaysay, Ramon, 98 Mahathir bin Mohammed, 149-152 The Malay Dilemma (Mahathir), 150 Malaysia: defense budget, 228; economic growth, 8, 64, 138, 192tab; exports, 64lab, 156, 200, 201 (aft, 211/afc; foreign policy, 149-152; gross domestic product, 211/ob; imports, 194tab, 211 tab-, military forces, 85; offshore production in, 64; per capita income, 151; in regional alignment, 6; Taiwanese investment in, 196; trade with United States, 185tab; Z O P F A N proposal, 150, 159/i2/, 228 Manglapuz, Raul, 103 Marcos, Ferdinand, 98, 99, 100, 102, 108, 153 Marcos, Imelda, 106 Markets: access to, 42, 208; alternative, 200; arms, 186; capital, 109; common, 196-197; core, 237; global, 42; open, 55, 186; reciprocity in, 183. See also European Community Matsuoka, Yosuke, 42 Miki, Takeo, 24 Mitra, Ramon, 106 Mitterrand, François, 72 Miyazawa, Kiichi, 34, 68, 70/i74, 7 0 n / 5 Mongolia, 78, 223, 224; communism in, 10 Morita, Akio, 51, 62 Multilateralism, 2 4 5 - 2 4 7 Multipolarity: in Asia Pacific, 6 - 7 ; in post-Cold War era, 3 - 4 NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement Nationalism, 11, 103, 110, 153, 163, 207, 223; Japanese, 162; Korean, 162; Philippine, 95, 96, 103, 153, 162; resurgence of, 4 National Unification Commission, 14 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization

New Zealand: economic growth, 192fab; exports, 211 tab; gross domestic product, 211 lab; imports, 211rafa; industrialization, 198; nationalism in, 11; trade with United States, 185tab Nixon, Richard, 22, 74, 99, 1 13, 125, 157/i2, 162 Nonalignment, 137, 146, 180 Nonproliferation Treaty, 10, 11 North American Free Trade Agreement, 42, 65, 70/1/2, 156, 182-183, 187, 195, 206, 208, 239, 253 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, xiii, 3, 4, 141, 166, 179, 223, 249 "Northern Territories Day," 34 North Korea: communism in, 10; gross domestic product, 79; nuclear armaments, 7, 10, 13, 18/1.?, 181-182, 229; relations with China, 76; treaty of nonagression with South Korea, 13 OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Ombai-Wetar Straits, 16, 17;/ Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 225 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 9, 18/i5, 55, 167, 249, 251 Pacific Basin Economic Council, 204 Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, 29, 42, 180 Paracel Islands, 15, 80, 83, 84 Paris Agreement, 144, 147 Park Chung Hee, 100, 101, 102 Partisan mutual adjustment, 170-173 PBEC. See Pacific Basin Economic Council PECC. See Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference People's Movement for the Formation of a Far Eastern Republic, 43 People's Republic of China. See China Perestroika, 22, 25, 38, 40 Persian Gulf War: German role in, 58; Japanese role in, 10, 52-53, 5 7 - 5 8 ; U.S.Soviet Union accord on, 3 Pham Van Dong, 144 Philippines: anti-Americanism, 102-105; Chinese relations with, 98, 107; Clark Air Force Base, 16, 17//, 103, 104, 153, 154; as client state, 9 3 - 9 4 ; communism in, 99, 100, 107; democratization in, 102-105, 229; economic growth, 64, 192tab; economic policies, 96; economic reforms, 183; energy crisis, 107; exports, 64tab, 200, 201 tab, 211 tab; foreign policy, 96, 106-108, 152-154; gross domestic product, 211 tab; historical aspects, 9 5 - 9 6 ; Hong Kong relations

Index

with, 107: imports, 62, 63ta/>, 194tab, 211 tab; independence, 9 6 ; J a p a n e s e relations with, 107, 108; nationalism in, 11, 95, 96, 103, 153, 162; People Power Revolution, 100, 103, 107, 154; population, 107; post-Cold War international relations, 93-110; in regional alignment, 6; security concerns, 152-154; Singapore relations with, 107; Subic Bay naval base, 16, 17//, 103, 104, 153, 154, 227; Taiwanese relations with, 107; trade with United States, 185/a/>; United States military bases, 16, 17//, 102-104, 152, 154; United States' relations with, 98— 100; United Stales' withdrawal from, 7, 16, 29, 228 Plaza Accords, 63, 196, 198 Powell, Colin, 37 Power: bargaining, 166; distribution of, 4; monopoly of, 72; nonfungibility, xvi/ij; regional rivalry, 189; structural, 165; transition theory, 164; vacuum, 228 Power, balance of, 170, 171, 218-223, 252; in Asia Pacific, 1; global, 1; instability of conventional deterrence in, 4—5; Japanese role in, 7; in post-Cold War era, 3 - 4 Prisoners' dilemma, 172 Production: offshore, 64, 120, 165, 199; underinvestment in, 164 Protectionism, 198, 254; global, 169; regional, 8, 116, 119, 163 Qian Qichen, 71, 73, 75, 76, 86, 88,

S9nl5

Ramos, Fidel, 106, 107, 154 Reagan, Ronald, 99, 100, 102, 118, 169 Reform: agrarian, 104; economic, 42, 86, 89n7 J , 183, 198, 240, 241; land, 104, 116, 122 Rent-seeking, 218 Republic of China. See Taiwan Rights: human, 71, 72, 86, 98, 99, 104, 110, 150, 152, 229, 240; individual, 186; intellectual property, 119, 226; of subsistence, 72, 86 Roh Tae Woo, 105, 110 Roosevelt, Franklin, 25 Russia: Cossack movement, 34; economic reform, 42; in post-Cold War era, 2 1 - 4 4 ; Southeast Asian relations with, 136; as successor to Soviet Union, 23. See also Soviet Union Rutskoi, Aleksandr, 33 Salonga, Jovito, 106 SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty San Francisco Peace Conference, 25 Sato, Eisaku, 24

271

Sea of Okhotsk, 15, 37, 44; Japan-Soviet Union dispute in, 13, 15; relevance to Russia, 13, 37 SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Security: Asian Pacific post-Cold War, 12-16; bilateral, 179, 214; cooperation in, 178; dilemma, 253, 254; economic, 8, 10, 224; international system, 41, 42, 72; military, 8, 224; multilateral approaches, 247; regional, 157/i6; resource allocation to, 219; traditional theaters, 12-15 Senkaku Islands, 33, 84 Shanghai Communique, 113, 125 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 23, 26, 30, 36 Shikotan Island, 33, 34 Siberia, 29, 35 Simmel, Georg, 74 Sin, Cardinal Jaime, 100 Singapore: economic growth, 8, 64, 138, 192tab-, exports, 64tab, 156, 21 Ira/); foreign policy, 154—156; gross domestic product, 211 tab; gross national product, 82; imports, 63tab, 194tab, 211 tab; Japanese relations with, 155; multinational corporations in, 177; offshore production in, 64; Philippine relations with, 107; in regional alignment, 6; relations with China, 80; security concerns, 154-156, trade with United States, 185tab. See also Asia Pacific Singapore-U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, 227 Single European Act, 178 Sino-British Treaty of 1984, 6 Sours, Martin, 9 3 - 1 1 0 South China Economic Zone, 207 Southeast Asia: Chinese relations with, 136-137; Japanese relations with, 136-137; in post-Cold War era, 135-156; Russian relations with, 136-137; United States relations with, 136-137. See also Asia Pacific; individual countries Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 98, 143, 153, 214, 224 "Southern Kuriles Day," 34 South Korea: anti-Americanism in, 105-106; as client state, 9 3 - 9 4 ; Democratic Liberal Party, 106, 109; democratization, 105-106, 216, 229; economic growth, 8, 64, 101, \92tab; economic liberalization, 162; export-led growth, 109, 110; exports, 64tab, 199, 211 tab; foreign policy, 101, 108-109; gross domestic product, 79, 2lltab; gross national product, 8, 82; historical aspects, 96-97; imports, 62, 63tab, 194tab.

272

Index

21 lííji»; industrialization, 101, 109; investment in China, 78; Japanese relations with, 101; multinational corporations in, 101, 102; nationalism in, 11, 162; o f f s h o r e production in, 199; p o s t - C o l d War international relations, 9 3 - 1 1 0 ; in regional alignment, 6; relations with China, 76, 86; trade relations, 109; trade with China, 199; trade with Japan, 35; trade with United States, 185lafc; treaty of nonagression with North Korea, 13; United States relations with, 1 0 0 - 1 0 2 . See also Asia Pacific Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, 33 Soviet Union: aid from Japan, 31; armed forces, 21, 22; d e f e n s e budget, 7, 28; detente with United States, 2, 22; dissolution of, 23; e c o n o m i c growth, 25; economic strains, 2; foreign policy, 28; loans from Japan, 2; multipolarity in, 4; nuclear arms, 2; public opinion polls, 28; relations with China, 28, 30; relations with Japan, 24, 2 5 - 3 6 ; trade with Japan, 35. See also C o m m o n w e a l t h of Independent States Spanish-American War, 93, 94, 153, 214 Spratly Islands, 15, 83, 84, 137, 149, 156 Stalin, Joseph, 25 Straits Exchange Foundation, 14, 15, 128, 209»:? Straits of Malacca, 16, 17/7 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, 22 Sunda Strait, 1 5 - 1 6 , 17// Superpowers, 42, 55, 72, 93, 164, 181; confrontation policy, 1, 2; economic, 5; and nuclear umbrella, 5, 11; relations with Third World, 3 T a f t - K a t s u r a A g r e e m e n t , 94 T a i w a n : Chinese relations with, 13, 14—15, 79, 113, 120, 1 2 5 - 1 2 9 ; d e f e n s e budget, 228; Democratic Progressive Party, 123, 124; democratization, 1 2 1 - 1 2 5 , 216, 229; domestic policy, 1 2 1 - 1 2 5 ; e c o n o m i c growth, 8, 64, 114, 1 1 5 - 1 2 1 ; e c o n o m i c liberalization, 122, 162; export-led growth, 115; exports, 64tab, 114, 117(afc, 118, 199, 21 l i o 6 ; foreign e x c h a n g e reserves, 227; gross d o m e s t i c product, 211 tab-, gross national product, 8, 82, 115, 116, 1 \ ltab\ imports, 62, 63tab, I94tab, 211 tab\ import substitution program, 116; industrialization, 115, 122; investment rates, 115, 117(a£>; Japanese investment in, 62; military modernization, 126; Mobilization for the Suppres-

sion of C o m m u n i s t Rebellion, 14; multinational c o r p o r a t i o n s in, 116; nationalism in, 11; o f f s h o r e production in, 64, 120, 199; opposition parties in, 123; per capita income, 115; Philippinerelations with, 107; political liberalization, 114; population, 1 1 7 r a b ; i n p o s t - C o l d War era, 1 1 3 - 1 3 0 ; protectionism, 116, 119; in regional alignment, 6; relations with Japan, 56; trade with China, 14; trade with United States, 185fa/>; unification with China, 8 1 - 8 2 ; United States relations with, 116, 118, 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 . See also Asia Pacific T a i w a n Relations Act, 126 T e c h n o l o g y transfers, 202 Territorial Waters L a w , 84 T h a i l a n d : d e f e n s e budget. 228; e c o n o m i c growth, 8, 64, 138, \92tab; e c o n o m i c liberalization, 162; exports, 64tab, 156, 200, 201/afc, 21 \tab\ foreign policy, 1 4 2 - 1 4 5 ; gross d o m e s t i c product, 211 lab, gross national product, 80; imports, 6 3 t a b , 194tab, 211 tab; military forces, 85, 158/i/Z, 158/1/2; o f f s h o r e production in, 64; in regional alignment, 6; trade with United States, 185rot> T h e o r i e s : of d e p e n d e n c y , 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 ; developmentalist, 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 ; entrance, 30; exit, 30; h e g e m o n i c stability, 1 6 1 - 1 6 9 , 171, 245; h e g e m o n i c wars, 257; longcycle, 257; p o w e r transition, 1 6 1 - 1 6 9 ; t w o f o l d process of c h a n g e , 257 T h i r d World countries: a r m s acquisitions, 2 2 0 - 2 2 1 ; d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n , 73, 8 6 - 8 7 ; relations with s u p e r p o w e r s , 3 T i a n a n m e n Square, 66, 75, 78, 87, 120, 127, 129, 240 T i a o y u t a i Islands, 84 T i e n t s i n Treaty, 15 T o y n b e e , Arnold, 257 T r a d e : barriers, 196, 206, 237; bilateral, 208; blocs, 2 4 8 - 2 5 1 ; China, 94; c o m m o n markets, 1 9 6 - 1 9 7 ; creation, 201; customs unions, 196; diversification, 198; diversion, 201; e c o n o m i c unions, 197; galleon, 95; indirect, 127; informal, 1 8 2 - 1 8 3 , 189, 200; interregional, 205; intraregional, 9, 196, 198, 205, 208, 215; liberalization, 206, 208; multilateral system, 197; preferential arrangements, 196; unfair practices, 2 2 5 - 2 2 6 ; U.S.-Asia Pacific, 9; U . S . - E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y , 9, 18«5; wars, 254 T r a d e blocs, 8, 182, 195, 206, 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 ; Asia Pacific E c o n o m i c Cooperation, 6, 65, 66, 127, 151, 180, 197, 204, 205, 208, 215, 253; c o m p e t i t i o n in, xv;

Index

E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y , 8, 9, 1 7 8 , 1 7 9 , 195, 2 0 8 , 2 4 9 , 2 5 3 ; N o r t h A m e r i c a n F r e e T r a d e A g r e e m e n t , 42, 65, 7 0 n / 2 , 156, 1 8 2 - 1 8 3 , 187, 195, 208, 239, 2 5 3 T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p and C o o p e r a t i o n , 107, 142 Treaty of Paris, 9 5 - 9 6 Turnen River economic zone, 78 Unipolarity, 72, 73, 8 6 U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 5 5 , 6 6 , 8 0 , 125, 162, 2 4 9 ; C o n f e r e n c e on D e v e l o p m e n t and the E n v i r o n m e n t , 151, 2 4 2 ; D e c l a r a t i o n on t h e R i g h t to D e v e l o p m e n t , 7 3 ; D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m , 78; G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , 3 2 , 7 3 ; in n e w w o r l d o r d e r , 7 2 ; p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e s , 7, 3 9 , 5 7 - 6 0 , 1 4 4 , 145, 182, 1 8 4 ; S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , 3, 3 0 , 6 7 - 6 8 , 76, 2 2 2 ; S o v i e t U n i o n in, 2 U n i t e d S t a t e s : aid t o S o v i e t U n i o n , 3 2 ; d e f e n s e b u d g e t , 7, 1 6 7 ; d e f e n s e p o l i c y , 1 0 3 ; d e t e n t e w i t h S o v i e t U n i o n , 2, 2 2 ; e c o n o m i c d i s a d v a n t a g e s of, 5; e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , 2 4 9 l a b ' , e f f e c t s of V i e t n a m W a r in; e x p o r t s , 6 2 , 6 3 t a b , 1 9 4 t a b ; f a i l u r e in V i e t n a m , xvi/i.?; f o r e i g n p o l i c y , x i v , 7 4 ; future relations with Asia Pacific, 1 8 7 - 1 9 0 ; g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t , 9, 211/ab; gross national product, 61; h e g e m o n y o f , 5, 12; i m p o r t a n c e of A s i a P a c i f i c to, 8 ; i m p o r t s , 6 3 , 6 4 l a b , 2 1 1 tab; a n d J a p a n e s e e c o n o m i c t h r e a t , 9, 6 1 ; l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n , 164—165; m i l i t a r y p r e p o n d e r a n c e , xiv; national debt, 170; n u c l e a r a r m s , 2; o f f s h o r e p r o d u c t i o n , 1 6 5 ; o p e n m a r k e t s in, 5 5 , 5 7 ; P a c i f i c B a s i n c o n c e r n s , 1 8 1 - 1 8 7 ; p e r c e p t i o n of decline, 52, 161, 162, 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 ; Philippine relations with, 9 5 - 9 6 , 9 8 - 1 0 0 ; policy toward Japan, 2 3 - 2 5 , 5 4 - 5 7 ,

273

6 1 - 6 2 ; productivity decline, 238; p r o t e c t i o n i s m in, 1 9 8 ; r e g i o n a l p r o b l e m s with Asia Pacific, 184-187; relations with C h i n a , 7 1 - 7 3 , 77, 78; s e c u r i t y c o m m i t m e n t s , xiv, 179; S o u t h e a s t A s i a n r e l a t i o n s w i t h , 136, 1 4 0 - 1 4 2 ; S o u t h Korean relations with, 100-102; Special 3 0 1 list, 1 1 9 , 2 2 5 ; s t r a t e g y d i r e c t i o n s , 1 7 7 - 1 9 0 ; T a i w a n e s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h , 116, 118, 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 ; trade d e f i c i t , 55, 61, 114, 1 1 6 , 162. 1 6 5 , 1 8 5 , 190, 1 9 8 ; t r a d e w i t h A s i a P a c i f i c , 9, 1 8 « 5 , 1 8 4 - 1 8 6 ; t r a d e with E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y , 9; trade with Japan, 35; withdrawal from Philippines, 7, 16, 2 9 , 2 2 8 U n o . S o u s u k e , 3 0 , 31 Victor's inheritance, 74 V i e t n a m : n a t i o n a l i s m in, 11; r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, 76, 8 0 V i e t n a m W a r , x i i i , 141, 1 4 3 , 1 6 9 , 2 1 5 ; e f f e c t on U n i t e d States, xiv; and i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h e o r y , x i v ; as s e c o n d I n d o c h i n a w a r , 137; s u p p o r t for, 138 W a n Li, 7 6 W a r s a w P a c t , 3, 1 6 8 , 2 2 4 ; d i s s o l u t i o n o f , 23, 3 9 W a t a n a b e , M i c h i o , 34, 35 World Bank, 139 W o r l d W a r II, xiii Y a n g S h a n g k u n , 75, 76, 80, 87 Yasakuni Shrine, 7 0 n / 2 Yeltsin, Boris, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 4 3 Yen bloc, 64, 207 Yoshida, Shigeru, 24 Zhu Rongji, 76

• About the Book In t o d a y ' s p o s t - C o l d W a r w o r l d — w i t h e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y a p a r a m o u n t c o n c e r n — A s i a P a c i f i c is e s t a b l i s h i n g an i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t r o l e in g l o b a l politics. T h i s b o o k a s s e s s e s the p o t e n t i a l p o w e r c o n f i g u r a t i o n of the r e g i o n , e x p l o r i n g not o n l y its n e w s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n , but e q u a l l y t h e p a r t s p l a y e d by its m a j o r a c t o r s : J a p a n , C h i n a , S o u t h K o r e a , T a i w a n , t h e A S E A N members, Russia, and the United States. I n t r a r e g i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , the p r o s p e c t s f o r r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n , and t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of A s i a P a c i f i c ' s n e w s t r e n g t h f o r U . S . p o l i c y are also i n v e s t i g a t e d . A n d , p e r h a p s m o s t i m p o r t a n t f o r IR t h e o r y , t h e b o o k o f f e r s a c o h e r e n t v i e w of A s i a P a c i f i c ' s l i k e l y r o l e in t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y w o r l d politics.

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