Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2010 9781626372870

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Global Peace Operations ANNUAL REVIEW OF

2010

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This volume is a product of the Center on International Cooperation’s (CIC) Peacekeeping and Security Sector Reform program. CIC is an independent institution housed at New York University. Project Team VOLUME EDITOR AND LEAD RESEARCHER

Benjamin C. Tortolani SERIES EDITOR

Bruce D. Jones CONTRIBUTING EDITOR

Teresa Whitfield SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER

Victoria DiDomenico CONTRIBUTORS

Tatiana Carayannis, Richard Gowan, Chris Johnson, J. Nealin Parker, Courtney Richardson, Elizabeth Sellwood, Jake Sherman, Colin Stewart, Erin Weir The project’s advisory board is composed of Lakhdar Brahimi, Jayantha Dhanapala, Rosario Green, ’Funmi Olonisakin, John Ruggie, Sir Rupert Smith, and Stephen J. Stedman. CIC is grateful for their advice and support. The Center on International Cooperation is solely responsible for the content of this publication. Any errors of fact or analysis, and any and all judgments and interpretations about missions and operations discussed herein, are those of CIC alone. This project was undertaken at the request of and with the support of the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

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Global Peace ANNUAL REVIEW OF

Operations 2010

A PROJECT OF THE

Center on International Cooperation

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Published in the United States of America in 2010 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2010 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

ISBN: 978-1-58826-737-5 (pbk) 978-1-58826-712-2 (hc) ISSN: 1932-5819

Printed and bound in Canada The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

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Contents Preface, Bruce D. Jones Mission Acronyms Map of Global Peace Operations, 2009

vii ix xii

Strategic Summary 2009

1

1 Building the Rule of Law: Security and Justice Sector Reform in Peace Operations Jake Sherman, Benjamin Tortolani, and J. Nealin Parker

11

2 Mission Reviews

25

Alphabetical order by location 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7

Afghanistan (ISAF, UNAMA, EUPOL Afghanistan) Chad and the Central African Republic (BONUCA, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, MINURCAT, MICOPAX) Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, EUFOR RD Congo, EUSEC RD Congo) Kosovo (EULEX, UNMIK, OMIK, KFOR) Somalia (AMISOM) Sudan (UNAMID, UNMIS) Timor-Leste (UNMIT, International Security Forces)

3 Mission Notes

26 35 43 50 58 66 74

81

Alphabetical order by location 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11

Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea, EUPM, OSCE) Burundi (BINUB) Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI, Operation Licorne) Cyprus (UNFICYP) Georgia (UNOMIG, EUMM, OSCE) Haiti (MINUSTAH) Iraq (MNF-I, NTM-I, UNAMI) Liberia (UNMIL) Middle East (UNIFIL, UNTSO, UNDOF, EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS, TIPH, MFO Sinai) Moldova-Transdniestra (CIS) Nepal (UNMIN) v

82 85 89 95 97 101 107 110 114 122 124

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CONTENTS

3.12 3.13

Solomon Islands (RAMSI) Western Sahara (MINURSO)

126 128

4 Global Statistics on UN-Commanded Missions

131

5 Global Statistics on Non-UN-Commanded Missions

167

6 UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics

195

Alphabetical order by mission acronym 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16 6.17 6.18 6.19 6.20

BINUB (UN Integrated Office in Burundi) MINURCAT (UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad) MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) UNAMID (AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur) UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) UNMIN (UN Mission in Nepal) UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)

Index About the Book

200 206 214 223 232 242 250 258 267 275 284 294 302 312 319 329 338 344 354 362 369 377

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Preface

operations, can contribute to that ongoing assessment. The Review is editorially independent, but produced with the support of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Section and the AU’s Peace and Security Department. The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) remains grateful to the two institutions for their continued support. Special thanks go to Alain Le Roy, the UN Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations; Susana Malcorra, Under-SecretaryGeneral for the Department of Field Support; and Ramtane Lamamra, the AU commissioner for peace and security. Our work is made possible by the continuing financial support from the governments of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Norway and the Compton Foundation. I am also grateful to the individuals and institutions that made possible our outreach efforts, especially the staff of the AU Commission for Peace and Security, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, the United Nations Association of Germany, and the Regional Peacekeeping Training Center in Harare. The 2010 edition of the Review is the output of a small, yet dynamic, editorial and research team. Benjamin Tortolani, the project’s volume editor and lead researcher, marshaled both the substantive and editorial processes. Senior program officer, Victoria DiDomenico, generated the copious amount of useful UN data found in this volume and assisted in the editing process. Guidance and support from CIC’s associate director for peacekeeping and

The 2010 edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, the fifth in the series, comes at a pivotal point for contemporary peace operations: Since 2000 global peacekeeping deployments have grown to record levels, jumping 30 percent during the decade. Peacekeepers have been sent by the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU) to address conflicts of increasing complexity, often in extremely remote operational theaters. International political support has not evolved apace. The result has been expensive and high-profile peacekeeping operations—in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Afghanistan— that are struggling to deliver on the promise of security, are strained by resource limits, weak support mechanisms, and the absence of shared strategic direction. We identified this growing gap between political and operational realities as a central challenge facing global peace operations in our 2009 edition of the Review. In our background paper prepared during the year for the UN’s Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DFS) “New Horizon Initiative,” Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty, we called for a new political consensus to undergird effective and efficient operations to meet emerging challenges. As the international community continues to examine how to improve peacekeeping operations, careful analysis will be essential. It is our intention that the operational assessments provided in this Review, rooted in data on both UN and non-UN peace vii

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PREFACE

security sector reform, Jake Sherman, was crucial at every step. This year’s edition again greatly benefited from the expertise of contributing editor Teresa Whitfield. My thanks to all of them for their diligence and professionalism. Jake, along with Benjamin and CIC research associate J. Nealin Parker, authored the thematic chapter in this edition on what we believe is a central peace operations task, building the rule of law. A decade ago, the landmark Brahimi Report suggested that multidimensional UN peace operations shift their doctrinal focus toward building the rule of law. While nearly every peace operation in the ensuing ten years has been mandated to do this through the reform of the justice and security sectors, the track record of implementation is uneven. Our thematic contribution identifies lessons still to be learned at field and headquarters levels if peace operations are to deliver on this ambitious goal. I am also grateful to Tatiana Carayannis, Richard Gowan, Chris Johnson, Courtney Richardson, Elizabeth Sellwood, Colin Stewart, and Erin Weir for their contributions to this year’s volume. The project team is also indebted to several CIC staff members—Yvonne Alonzo, Sara Batmanglich, Rahul Chandran, Lynn Denesopolis, Antonie Evans, Noah Gall, Megan Gleason, Ian Johnstone (nonresident fellow), Gigja Sorensen, and Elsina Wainwright—for their support throughout the year. Thanks also go to Ahmed Salim, Charlotte Meyer, Ben Vincente Picozzi, and Matthew Benson for their research support. This year’s Review benefited significantly from the guidance of Jean-Marie Guéhenno, senior fellow in the Brookings/CIC project on Managing Global Insecurity and former UN Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations. CIC senior fellow, A. Sarjoh Bah,

continued to provide essential insight into peacekeeping on the African continent. A number of people in the UN provided help along the way. We thank in particular Izumi Nakamitsu, David Haeri, Corinna Kuhl, Paul Keating, Rebecca Jovin, and Renata Dwan, whose support was integral in all stages of production. Special thanks also to Adrian Hills, Fernando Blasco, Tania BelisleLeclerc, Gillian Cull, Roy Doyon, David Harland, Clare Hutchinson, Dimitry Titov, Elisabeth Lothe, Ayaka Suzuki, Kristianna Powell, Adedeji Ebo, Jared Rigg, and Kevin Steves. Gratitude also goes to the many UN desk officers who reviewed drafts of the mission reviews and notes, although CIC of course remains responsible for the final content. We are also thankful for the cooperation of offices throughout DPKO, DFS, and the Department of Management for providing information and guidance. We benefited from the support of a number of officials from the AU. We are particularly grateful to Sivuyile Bam, director of the Peace and Stability Operations Department, and El-Ghassim Wane, head of the Conflict Management Division. CIC continues to profit from its ongoing partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on this project, and we thank Kirsten Soder for her support. We remain grateful to the staff at Lynne Rienner Publishers; Steve Barr’s patience and support deserve particular recognition. Finally, as we were going to press, Haiti was struck by the devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010. Amidst the massive loss of life, more UN personnel died than in any single incident in the organization’s history. Many were friends and colleagues. We wish to dedicate this volume to them, in honor of their sacrifice and the noble work they were doing in the cause of peace. Bruce D. Jones Director Center on International Cooperation, NYU

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Mission Acronyms

AMISOM BINUB EUBAM Rafah EUFOR Althea EUFOR TCHAD/RCA EULEX EUMM EUPM EUPOL Afghanistan EUPOL COPPS EUPOL RD Congo EUSEC RD Congo ISAF ISF JCC KFOR MFO Sinai MICOPAX MINURCAT MINURSO MINUSTAH MNF-I MONUC NTM-I OMIK RAMSI TIPH UNAMA UNAMI UNAMID UNDOF UNFICYP UNIFIL UNMIK UNMIN

AU Mission in Somalia UN Integrated Office in Burundi EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Police Mission in Afghanistan EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo International Security Assistance Force International Security Forces Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force NATO Kosovo Force Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai Mission de Consolidation de la Paix UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti Multinational Force in Iraq UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo NATO Training Mission in Iraq OSCE Mission in Kosovo Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands Temporary International Presence in Hebron UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UN Assistance Mission in Iraq AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur UN Disengagement Observer Force UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UN Interim Force in Lebanon UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UN Mission in Nepal ix

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ACRONYMS

UNMIS UNMIT UNOCI UNOMIG UNTSO

UN Mission in Sudan UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire UN Observer Mission in Georgia UN Truce Supervision Organization

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Global Peace Operations

ANNUAL REVIEW OF

2010

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Strategic Summary 2009

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That peacekeeping remains a vital international tool was reinforced during 2009. The nadir of 2008 saw military and political breakdowns in the most high-profile theaters and the growing impact of the global financial crisis. Fears of a large-scale withdrawal from peacekeeping abounded. But global peacekeeping levels did not contract in 2009. In fact, deployments of military personnel again surpassed record highs—rising by about 9 percent over the year— with over 200,000 military, police, and civilians in the field. Overall growth, however, does not mean that the situation facing the global peacekeeping enterprise improved. Rather, the operational and political challenges that pushed UN, NATO, AU, and EU peacekeeping operations close to their limits in 2008, became even more acute in

2009. Global peace operations proved flexible enough to avoid breaking under the pressures related to growing demand, but it became ever more clear that—as currently conceived, mandated, deployed, and supported—they are ill suited to address the dynamics of modern conflict adequately.

The Contours of Strain: Slow Deployments, Bad Politics, and Shifting Conflicts

Two peacekeeping platforms, the UN and NATO, accounted for 93 percent of all peacekeepers deployed during 2009. Whereas deployment levels as recently as 2005 showed a division of labor, with regional organizations and ad hoc arrangements accounting for about 20

Deployment of Military Peacekeepers: 1998–2009

90,000

Number of Military Peacekeepers

80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 1998

1999

2000

2001 UN

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Regional and Ad Hoc Deployments

NATO

2

2008

2009

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STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2009 • 3

percent of deployments, since then there has been a steady shift back to the UN and NATO as primary international actors. Between 2008 and 2009, deployments by regional and ad hoc arrangements dropped by 20 percent, while UN and NATO deployments grew by 9 percent and 30 percent respectively. The main driver of growth in 2009 was the spiraling situation in Afghanistan, where a discredited central government, a strengthened Taliban, and turmoil in Pakistan elicited the response of increased military deployments under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Uneven development of the Afghan National Army and Police also contributed significantly to the demand for more troops. ISAF grew about 30 percent, largely a function of the 40 percent US enhancement in its engagement. This was despite persistent, if initially halfhearted US calls for more contributions from other NATO alliance partners, several of whose militaries are stretched to their operational limits and all of which face increasing domestic scrutiny regarding the mission’s goals eight years into its operations. ISAF now dwarfs even the largest UN peace operations. As a result, for the third consecutive year, the United States remains the largest deployer of UN-mandated forces, and will continue to hold this rank in 2010 given the 30,000 additional

troops pledged by the Barack Obama administration in late 2009. This is even if troops deployed in Iraq are excluded, as they have been in this volume. Following the United States, Pakistan and Bangladesh are the second and third largest deployers of UN-mandated peacekeepers. In total, the number of peacekeepers in NATO deployments during 2009 was roughly equal to the total number of peacekeepers deployed in the nineteen field missions overseen by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The UN’s 9 percent deployment growth over the year, however, belies a significant slowing of its deployments exactly when and where they were needed the most. The operational, logistical, and political challenges of getting troops and police to the field in a timely manner continued to draw serious questions about the efficacy of the UN’s support structures and the overall available resources for UN peace operations. The violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo that overwhelmed the UN’s mission there (MONUC) during 2008 did not improve much in 2009 and served to further expose the political and operational vulnerabilities of the mission in relation to its mandates to protect the civilian population and extend the authority of the Congolese government. The Security Council did approve additional troops

Top Ten Military Contributors to UN-Mandated Operations: 2009

35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 Nepal

Nigeria

France

Germany

Italy

India

United Kingdom

Bangladesh

Pakistan

0 United States

Number of Personnel

40,000

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Largest UN-Mandated Peace Operations: 31 October 2009

80,000 70,000 Number of Personnel

•

60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 UNAMID

ISAF

MONUC

Where UN-Mandated Military Peacekeepers Go: 31 October 2009

80,000 Number of Personnel

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70,000

UN Commanded Non-UN Commanded

60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 South Asia

Africa

Europe

for the mission and reoriented MONUC’s mandate after 2008. But by year end only two-thirds of those 3,000 additional forces had arrived intheater, and additional helicopters crucial for rapid reaction were yet to be seen, as civilians continued to bear the brunt of the conflict. Meanwhile, MONUC’s main operational and political partners on the ground—the Congolese government and its armed forces (FARDC)—proved to be problematic collaborators. MONUC’s enhanced mandate provided little clarity on how and when to protect civilians, a limitation that was compounded as the MONUC-supported FARDC played a brutal role in the deterioration of human security. After ten years in the country, MONUC’s relationship with the Kinshasa government became more tense as

Middle East

South America

East Asia

President Joseph Kabila pressed the UN to wind down the mission by mid-2010, notwithstanding the still chaotic situation in the east. Tensions between troop contributors and the Security Council sharpened over the implementation of the mandate and the end of the year saw a five-month renewal of the mission’s mandate, rather than the usual practice of annual renewals for MONUC. MONUC wasn’t the only UN operation to struggle in the face of fluid conflicts, persistent lack of resources, and stalled political processes. In contrast to the sharp deterioration of security that preceded the augmentation of MONUC, the UN and its member states had a year’s notice that the EU would hand over in March 2009 its military operation on Chad and the Central

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African Republic’s borders with Sudan. Nevertheless, the UN mission (MINURCAT), with no means to impact the political situation on the ground and thus little strategic direction, remained only halfway deployed at the end of 2009. Of those troops in the field at the end of 2009, half were already in-theater, rehatted from the EU operation. Security on the Chad-Sudan border remained poor at the end of the year, with nongovernmental organizations halting their critical operations on account of rampant insecurity and conflict between the N’Djamena government and rebel groups. The joint AU-UN operation in Darfur (UNAMID) struggled to implement its mandate in the face of ongoing conflict and a continued lack of consent on the part of the Khartoum government. Some two years since being authorized, UNAMID’s military component only stood at three-quarters deployed, and the impact of those contingents in Darfur was limited by operational restrictions on conducting land and air patrols imposed by Khartoum. Banditry and kidnappings spiked, sharply impacting the delivery of humanitarian aid and overall civilian security, and also resulting in fatal consequences for UNAMID peacekeepers themselves. The situation underlined the fact that only about 65 percent of UNAMID’s mandated police were in the field at the end of the year. The stalled implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the decades-long civil war between north and south Sudan in 2005, was an area of renewed concern, as tensions between the signatories mounted in advance of national elections. In this deteriorating context, the UN mission (UNMIS) struggled to implement its protection of civilians mandate. Intercommunal violence in the south flared throughout the year, with civilian casualties and displacements outpacing those in Darfur. The situation throughout Sudan was not helped by the International Criminal Court’s indictment of President Omar al-Bashir for alleged crimes against humanity in Darfur. The announcement of the indictment split the international community along familiar lines of

“peace versus justice” and stymied political progress. Khartoum responded by expelling thirteen aid groups working in Darfur, for which the UN and the Khartoum government had to compensate to avoid humanitarian disaster. And in Somalia, the conflict deemed inappropriate for UN peacekeepers by the Security Council continued to rage. By year end, only 60 percent of the 8,000 authorized for AU’s AMISOM force—logistically supported by the UN—were in place. However, it is questionable if any military force in the country could have an impact on the situation. In the absence of a credible peace process, the internationally backed Transitional Federal Government and the AU, along with the civilian population, continued to be the object of insurgent attacks. A constellation of naval deployments had a measurable impact on piracy off Somalia’s coast, but it was increasingly clear that the solution to insecurity on the high sea could not be comprehensively addressed there. The six missions covered above account for over 62 percent of global deployments. As they demonstrated in 2009, conducting the business of peacekeeping as usual will no longer suffice. Peacekeepers have increasingly been sent to address complex and ongoing intrastate conflicts where peace agreements are weak or nonexistent, consent does not come easily, and peacekeepers are mandated to use force to protect civilians and extend the authority of fledgling or contested governments. Such operational contexts demand substantial resources, both human and logistical, and even more importantly, firm political foundations from which to operate—all things that appeared difficult to harness in 2009. It was not only the large-scale operations that faced difficulties. Division among the Security Council shut down the UN’s observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in July. Stalled reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire saw elections in that country delayed yet again, further extending the stay of the nearly 7,000 troops in the UN’s UNOCI operation. As Nepal entered a new period of political crisis, the mismatch between

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the limited mandate of the UN mission (UNMIN) and the reality on the ground became increasingly clear. Meanwhile, the EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) saw political constriction of its ability to maneuver as Kosovo further embraced independence.

The Need for Reform

Realizing the consequences that further peacekeeping failures would hold for millions of people in those hostile environments and for broader global security, the UN Secretariat, the Security Council, and individual member states once again took up reform of peacekeeping during 2009 (see table on page 7). Each initiative—in its own way—sought to address the factors that have led to peacekeeping overstretch, with an eye toward making UN peacekeeping operations both more effective and more efficient in confronting the contours of modern conflict. This, among other things, included efforts to improve planning, management, and oversight mechanisms for peacekeeping operations, to expand the base of troop, police, and civilian peacekeepers, and to bring up to standard the capacity of those willing to contribute. These sentiments were bolstered by the Obama administration’s recognition of the role of peacekeeping as a critical international tool. Be it through the president’s convening of major UN peacekeeping troop contributors or through the activities of the US mission in New York, this intention to improve peacekeeping operations to ensure that they continue to deliver stability and security was reaffirmed. Despite their differences in approach, the initiatives by the UN Secretariat, Security Council, and member states rightly recognized that the problems affecting peacekeeping were, at their center, political in nature and that the political consensus among troop and police providers, financial contributors, the UN Secretariat, and the Security Council necessary to sustain complex and ambitious multidimensional peacekeeping operations was in disrepair. The result has been increasingly complex mandates that are disassociated both from realities on the ground and from the pool of available and willing

resources necessary for implementation. The need to refresh and renew this partnership was evident. It would be unrealistic to expect reform efforts to improve peacekeeping within a year, but there was some progress in terms of the crucial relationship between the Security Council, Secretariat, and troop and police providers. In the second half of the year, consultation between troops and police providers prior to the renewal of the mandates for the UN operations in Haiti and Lebanon (MINUSTAH and UNIFIL) represent marked improvement. Nevertheless, the debate on the renewal of the MONUC mandate in December saw little in the form of consultation, demonstrating that much still needed to be done in regard to peacekeeping operations of more sensitive, operational, and political contexts. The reform initiatives, in particular the “New Horizons” process of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, also recognize that overstretch in peacekeeping is partially a function of missions being unable to withdraw despite having achieved interim stability. One contributing factor is the absence of an effective system to support the development of the rule of law in postconflict settings. While establishing the rule of law through the reform of the judiciary and security sectors is often associated with longer-term peacebuilding activities, over the course of the past decade it has emerged as a core peacekeeping task, closely tied to the eventual withdrawal of a mission. This is as true in Haiti, Timor-Leste, and Kosovo as it is in the DRC and will be in Somalia and south Sudan. NATO’s members look set to concentrate on similar challenges in Afghanistan during the year ahead. As argued in this volume’s thematic chapter, however, it is not clear that the international peacekeeping architecture is well placed to build the rule of law or that it has a complete understanding of what it takes to do so in practice. The increasing and necessary focus on establishing the rule of law through peace operations is also beginning to encounter real challenges. As building the rule of law has become more widespread, demand for specialized police and

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STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2009 • 7

civilian mission personnel—experts in short supply—has grown significantly. Quantities have largely been met, but the quality of these deployed personnel has become diluted as

demand has grown. This has become a particular concern with police deployments, especially formed police units in UN operations, which continued to grow throughout the year.

Peacekeeping Reform Initiatives Launched in 2009

Initiative (Date Started)

Main Actors

Objectives

New Horizon Initiative (January 2009)

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support

United Kingdom and France Initiative (January 2009)

Governments of France and the United Kingdom

Thematic Series on Building More Effective UN Peace Operations (May 2009)

Government of Canada

Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations (originally January 2001, but rejuvenated in 2009)

UN Security Council, under the chairmanship of the government of Japan during 2009

Improve the UN’s approach to peacekeeping in light of current and future challenges. Specific topics covered by the initiative’s non-paper published in July 2009 include enhancing the partnership necessary to meet current challenges, design, and management of missions; delivery in the field including enhanced deployment; and establishing a global support strategy on logistics to meet future needs (for more information, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ newhorizon.shtml). Develop greater flexibility in the Security Council and UN for better response to dynamic or complex peacekeeping situations with respect to the mission renewal process; as well as improved communication, especially in regard to reporting in times of crisis between the Secretary-General and the Security Council. Provide an informal forum for all UN member states to address the current challenges in peacekeeping, including overstretch, the political dimensions of peacekeeping, and creating more realistic peacekeeping mandates. Seeks to increase dialogue between the Secretariat, Security Council member states, troop-contributing countries, academics, and nongovernmental organizations (for more information, see http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/ thematicseries.html). Increase troop and police contributor input into the Security Council’s decisions for mission authorizations or changes and extension of mandates; achieve transparent three-way communications between the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the troop-contributing countries in an effort to create more realistic mandates.

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Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty Bruce D. Jones, Richard Gowan, and Jake Sherman

At the outset of the “New Horizon” process, the UN’s Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support commissioned the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) to produce a forwardlooking report to inform the reform agenda. The CIC’s independent contribution was intended to spur broader discussions within the UN and among member states looking to update peacekeeping to meet current and emerging challenges. The report, Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty, published in May 2009, forecasts a continued demand for UN peacekeeping over the next five to seven years, identifies likely future challenges, and offers potential methods for overcoming them.1 It uses as a point of departure a recognition that the difficulties experienced by peacekeeping are in part a function of the unlearned or unimplemented recommendations that were made in the landmark Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report).2 These core issues surround the current crisis of confidence in peacekeeping and the breakdown of the political coalition that had enabled

UN peacekeeping operations to function as an effective tool for conflict management and recovery. Central to Building on Brahimi is addressing the fundamental divisions that have emerged over peacekeeping and sovereignty. It posits that the majority of large-scale UN operations are deliberately designed to extend rather than limit the authority of states. This fact, often overlooked, is essential to explaining some recent successes and failures of peacekeeping—and may help guide future deployments. The evidence shows that the extension of state authority, through military means and policing as well as civilian assistance, has become a core function of UN peacekeeping. The UN’s large, multidimensional missions now frequently use force not merely to fend off direct attacks from spoilers, but as part of deliberate strategies to expand and secure the authority of a government in contested territories. In conclusion, the report offers a threepart strategy for building a new coalition of support, as well as more effective and efficient management of peacekeeping operations—in the areas of strategy, rapid

deployment, security, and command and control. To reach these ends it calls for the following: • Concerted action on the hardest cases to overcome gaps between expectations and performance—above all, addressing the dire problems in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Horn of Africa (Chad, Sudan, and Somalia). • Institutional reforms by the UN Secretariat, including engagement with the Security Council and General Assembly on reforms requiring new authorities or financing—with particular reference to the UN’s procurement and budgetary systems. • Strategic efforts by key member states to utilize their capabilities more consistently in support of UN operations, including developing a consensus among governments on the limits and possibilities of peacekeeping operations—bringing together current troop contributors with permanent members of the Security Council to expand the military resources available to the UN.

Notes: 1. To access the report, visit: http://www.cic.nyu.edu. 2. UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

Achieving a better understanding of building the rule of law in peacekeeping settings is urgent and will become a larger issue as the military deployments of the early 2000s consolidate and pressure for drawdown mounts.

Conclusion

Balancing heavy military deployments in difficult political and operational contexts while managing the transitions from heavy peacekeeping presences to longer-term peacebuilding

operations will remain a central task of the year ahead. Meanwhile, the reform initiatives taken up in 2009 will take yet on more saliency as the impacts of the global financial crisis continue to demand that the global peacekeeping architecture does its job more efficiently and with fewer resources at its disposal. Achieving the ambitious goals that they set will only be possible with shared understandings of both the purposes of peacekeeping and the necessary means to meet those ends.

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Source of Deployed Police: 31 October 2009

European Union 1,750 (13%)

Other 385 (3%)

United Nations 12,646 (85%)

Where Police Go: 31 October 2009

East Asia and the Pacific 12%

Europe 1%

Central and South America 16%

Africa 71%

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Building the Rule of Law: Security and Justice Sector Reform in Peace Operations Jake Sherman, Benjamin Tortolani, and J. Nealin Parker

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Over the past decade, promoting the rule of law has emerged as a central function of peacekeeping.1 To undertake it, missions are increasingly mandated to undertake security and justice sector reform (SSR and JSR). Every UN-mandated peacekeeping operation deployed since 2001 has been authorized to support—if not directly implement—such reforms, whether to extend state authority, bring to heel abusive security agencies, or reestablish law and order. Beyond UN peacekeeping operations, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the World Bank, the International Criminal Police Organization, and a multitude of bilateral and nongovernmental organizations are all active in some aspect of building the rule of law. These activities—conducted by a global pool of some 16,000 police and civilian peacekeepers—include restructuring security agencies; vetting, training, and mentoring security and justice sector personnel; modernizing corrections systems; redrafting legal frameworks; rebuilding courthouses, police stations, barracks, and other infrastructure; reestablishing human resource, financial, and procurement systems; and strengthening civilian oversight mechanisms. Despite this considerable attention and contribution of resources, it is acknowledged that these activities are still in their infancy,2 with much to be learned at the strategic and tactical levels. As a consequence of the relatively rapid evolution of rule of law activities in peacekeeping contexts over the past decade, best practices and lessons learned reflect a record of engagement that is largely disorganized and often poorly conceived.3 Strategic coordination remains largely elusive. Security and justice

sector reform programs, to their detriment, remain overwhelmingly technical in approach, despite the fundamentally political nature of the task—yielding slow and often unsustained progress. Understanding of how peace operations can successfully contribute to the rule of law is still emerging. This stands in direct contrast to high and growing demand. As the large—and expensive—military peacekeeping deployments of the first half of the 2000s give way to greater stability (or increasing political and financial pressure for drawdown), the need for expertise in building the rule of law for a sustainable handover to national authorities will continue to increase. This is as true for Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Timor-Leste, and Kosovo as it is for Somalia and potentially for southern Sudan in the coming years. Meanwhile, building the rule of law has taken on a new global saliency where drug trafficking and organized crime threaten to overwhelm nascent state institutions and undermine stability, or where terrorist groups operate in lawless areas. This thematic chapter identifies three sets of political, operational, and institutional challenges that may temper expectations of the reforms that peace operations can realistically deliver. At the strategic level, security and justice reform are fraught by concerns of national sovereignty among many recipient governments, as well as by an emphasis on developing state institutions despite widespread public reliance on nonstate and customary service providers. Operationally, poorly coordinated donor assistance has resulted in underaddressed areas, like corrections, that have diminished reforms in other areas, like the judiciary. Meanwhile, the relatively short time frame of peacekeeping 12

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operations necessitates handover of reform efforts to partners, but with inadequate guarantees of sustained funding. Last, institutionally, the UN and other actors are unable to meet the growing demand for SSR and JSR due to a shortage of international expertise, as well as inadequate and insufficiently flexible financing.

Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform in Peacekeeping: Conceptual Framework

The concept of rule of law is the subject of seemingly endless definitional debates,4 but for the purposes of this chapter, we use a definition that is broad in its terms and technically inclusive. To quote former Secretary-General Kofi Annan: [The rule of law] refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.5

Establishing the rule of law as so conceived is an ambitious goal, particularly for countries emerging from years of armed violence—societies where, even prior to conflict, these principles often had a weak hold if they existed at all. Building the rule of law is by necessity a multidimensional process, requiring a holistic approach across mutually reinforcing components of the security and judicial systems. In its fullest sense, establishing the rule of law includes political mediation, constitution-making, and good governance. However, with these challenges in mind, this chapter is purposely narrow in scope. Although it briefly addresses related issues of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), governance and public administrative

reform, and transitional justice, the focus is on the delivery of security and justice sector reform by multidimensional peace operations. The security and justice sectors, authorized to impose sanctions and use force, bear special responsibility for upholding—or undermining—the rule of law. The goal is neither to analyze the normative underpinnings of security and justice reform, nor to resolve conceptual boundaries— for example, between rule of law and good governance—but rather to analyze an emerging trend in peace operations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has led the emerging policy and implementation framework for security sector reform, and OECD members are among the leading providers of SSR assistance. The OECD’s definition for SSR is “those activities seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their society in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law.” Similarly, the UN defines SSR as “focus[ing] on building effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions that operate within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.” No similarly concise definition for “justice sector reform” has gained widespread usage.6 Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in postconflict environments, where weapons are plentiful and are a means of securing livelihoods and power, is often a necessary first step in asserting the rule of law over the “rule of the gun.”7 How to deal with ex-combatants has immediate implications for both SSR and postconflict justice. Indeed, there is frequently a fundamental tension between the DDR process and SSR/JSR reforms: the need to win the trust and secure the commitment of excombatants to the peace process—for example, via integration into the security sector—and the need to establish accountability for past and ongoing violations in order to instill public trust in security and justice institutions, and in government more generally. Similarly, there may be contradictions between the political benefits of

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initially maintaining oversized or officer-heavy security sectors and what the government can financially sustain.

Rule of Law in Peacekeeping Contexts: From Dearth to Ubiquity

Prior to the 1990s, the majority of peacekeeping operations were deployed to guarantee ceasefires and peace accords between states. As a result, between 1960 and 1990, UN peacekeeping missions undertook very few SSR and JSR activities.8 There were notable exceptions, however. The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which deployed in 1960, was mandated with the authority to assist the Republic of Congo’s government in establishing and maintaining an environment where law and order would prevail and to provide the government with support in strengthening its security forces.9 It would be nearly three decades before another mission was explicitly mandated to restructure the police.10 That reform of the judicial and security sectors of what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains a central priority for both the UN and the European Union in the country today, demonstrating the immense challenges that establishing the rule of law poses in practice. The Emergence of Security and Justice Sector Reform as Peacekeeping Activities: 1989–1999

At the end of the 1980s, explicit security and justice reform activities began to emerge in response to the changing nature of the conflicts in which UN missions were deployed. In contrast to traditional peacekeeping missions, the overwhelming majority of peace operations deployed since 1990 have followed internal conflicts. Most of these conflicts have occurred in weak states with minimally credible or effective state institutions. Consequently, comprehensive efforts to reestablish the rule of law rapidly expanded in scope and complexity. During the 1990s, security and justice sector reform activities evolved from novelty to convention. The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping

Operations (DPKO) deployed missions with SSR and JSR components of three types: • Passive: continued “monitoring” of the police, similar to previous mandates to monitor the military; • Active: more authoritative roles in training and restructuring police, as well as in establishing, refurbishing, and monitoring correctional systems; • Executive: most authoritative role, in which the mission holds considerable if not total operational authority for the security and justice sectors.11 In 1991, the United Nations authorized deployment of its police to mentor and train national police as part of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)—the first such mandate since the early 1960s.12 While anomalous at the time, the ONUSAL mandate set a precedent for structures and mandates that would become typical of peacekeeping missions from then on. As the decade continued, this more authoritative approach became the most common means by which the UN supported justice and security sectors.13 From 1995 to 1999, the Security Council authorized four missions in Haiti focused on police capacity building and reform.14 Recurrent efforts in Haiti demonstrated the need for holistic approaches to security and justice. Despite early UN success in recruiting, training, and mentoring the new Haitian National Police, its integrity and professionalism were gradually undermined by the absence of equivalent progress in the judiciary and correctional system. Senior police commanders were subjected to intense pressure by politicians and political elites, highlighting the risks of technical reform without concomitant political reform. By the time the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) deployed in 2004, most past progress had been lost.15 The late 1990s saw the most dramatic shifts in mandating trends, when the Security Council authorized peace operations with full executive authority, including for the provision of security and justice. It was under the two executive

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missions deployed to East Timor (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor [UNTAET]) and Kosovo (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK]) in 1999 that the extent of international responsibility and intrusiveness for establishing the rule of law reached a new height. The East Timor and Kosovo deployments alone caused a threefold increase in the total number of UN police deployed internationally, from 2,539 at the start of 1999 to nearly 8,000 at the start of 2001. In both instances, UN police were deployed not only to support local authorities and build local police forces, but also to maintain law and order. UNMIK, and later UNTAET, also deployed the first of the UN’s formed police units—teams of 140 police officers who were trained, armed, and equipped for crowd control. With these units, the UN obtained a rapid response capability for a wide range of high-risk situations and threats to public order, where a police rather than a military response is more appropriate. These deployments demonstrated the utility of formed police units in future postconflict environments, but also suggested necessary improvements in standards and training.16

Yet despite the fact that these missions deployed for over a decade (in the case of Kosovo) and redeployed following a security crisis (in Timor-Leste), reforms resulting in effective and legitimate security and justice institutions continue to face significant challenges in both mission environments. While the Kosovo Police Force is regarded by many as one of the UN’s few SSR success stories, the experience in Timor has been much less positive. As the UN handed over more responsibility to Timorese authorities in 2009, long-standing divisions among military and police security providers still remained, and police capacity was well below standard.17 These two missions, regardless of their mixed operational performance, secured the building of rule of law systems as a core peacekeeping task. Their eventual withdrawal (Kosovo) and drawdown (Timor-Leste) also underscored the need to develop the capacity of national state institutions before handing over responsibility to them, which requires additional expertise beyond the administration of security and justice, as well as the challenges of simultaneously managing both.18 These experiences formed case studies for the central message of the UN’s 2000 report on peace operations

Police Deployed in Global Peace Operations: 1995–2009

14,000

Number of Police

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 1995

1997

1999 UN

2001 EU

2003 AU

2005

2007 Ad hoc

2009

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(the Brahimi Report), which made a number of recommendations aimed at evolving the doctrinal focus of UN peace operations toward building the rule of law and suggested creating the requisite coordination and resource elements to support these goals.19 Comprehensive Security and Justice Reform Mandates, and Their Limits: 2000–Present

In the 2000s, the rule of law increasingly became an explicit goal of—and organizing principle for—peacekeeping. Among extant UN peacekeeping missions, all of those established since 2000 are mandated (some explicitly, others implicitly) with security and justice sector reform activities, compared with only 25 percent of those established between 1948 and 1999.20 But the past decade also has underscored the complexity—if not the limits—of UN and other international efforts to undertake security and justice reform in unstable environments. Multiple, extended peacekeeping engagements in TimorLeste have failed to address tensions between security forces, while reform initiatives have been gradually marginalized by the government. In Afghanistan and the DRC, where strengthening rule of law is urgently needed to

improve protection of civilians from violence and instill confidence in the state, costly security and justice reform programs have at best achieved mixed results, and have at worst contributed to insecurity. There have been some notable successes, of course. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the government of the United Kingdom initiated a farreaching security sector reform program, with operational support from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and in parallel with the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2002.21 While conflict remains a threat, a high level of engagement helped stabilize Sierra Leone and, in part, facilitated the withdrawal of UNAMSIL by the end of 2005, allowing for the insertion of a significantly lighter UN operation concentrated on longerterm peacebuilding. The Sierra Leone intervention has informed subsequent rule of law–related mission mandates elsewhere in West Africa, including Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. Evaluations, however, suggest that its successes are due more to long-term, high-level UK political and financial commitment and the absence of conflicting donor agendas, than to an overarching strategy.22 The UK effort, despite being widely held as a model of effective support, is atypical.

Appearance of Security and Justice Sector Reform in UN Peacekeeping Mandates: 1949–2009 12

Number of UN Peacekeeping Mandates

16

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8

6

4

2

0 1949

1959

1969

1979

1989

1999

2009

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Box 1.1 West Africa Coast Initiative

The West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) was launched on 9 July 2009 as part of a broader initiative by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the “Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Drug Abuse in West Africa for 2008–2011.” WACI coincided with the release of a UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,” which identified the numerous areas of illicit activities in the region and their broader impact. The report revealed that progress toward regional stability was severely undermined by smuggling of oil, arms, toxic waste, diamonds, people, and drugs, combined with rampant corruption and weak state institutions. WACI is a joint technical assistance program aimed at helping states address criminal networks and illicit activities by strengthening national and regional

capacities in rule of law. It incorporates the collective expertise of regional actors and contributing partners with the expertise of national actors as a way of mitigating and diminishing the threat of organized crime in the region and globally. The initiative is a unique collaboration between ECOWAS, UNODC, the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) through its peacekeeping operations in the region (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire [UNOCI], UN Mission in Liberia [UNMIL]), the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The broad initiative proposes to strengthen national rule of law capacities by implementing capacity-building programs in four postconflict countries— Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire—with the possibility of adding Guinea as a fifth. In these countries, WACI teams will establish

Indeed, it is in the Democratic Republic of Congo that the ability of the United Nations to assist reform, together with its many partners— Congolese authorities, the European Union, the World Bank, and an array of bilateral actors (including South Africa, the United States, France, Belgium, Angola, and China)—has been most severely tested. In October 2004, the revised mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) included establishing a joint SSR commission with the Congolese government. The 2008 mandate, moreover, clearly articulated the mentoring and training of the national police and the Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) by MONUC, thus reinforcing norms of international humanitarian law, and stressed the need for coordination with the two EU security sector reform operations in the DRC.23 This enhanced mandate

transnational crime units (TCUs), a model based on previous successes and lessons learned from the UNODC’s activities in other regions. TCUs will help build and develop national intelligence bodies, international coordination, surveillance, and investigation with five other programs operating separately yet in coordination with the TCUs. These programs will focus on specific components of the rule of law system: judiciary and prosecution, forensics, law enforcement and capacity building, border management, and money laundering. Ultimately, WACI’s effectiveness will be measured by its ability to adequately enhance state institutions in practice. The initiative is ambitious in terms of the level of coordination required from the multitude of actors involved. Nevertheless, the implications for leaving these threats to regional stability unaddressed could have severe global impacts.

established MONUC, with nearly 30,000 military and police personnel, as not only the main provider of public security in the country, but also a primary component of the effort to build the DRC’s security forces. It also called for MONUC to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law in coordination with the UN’s Country Team and Congolese authorities. But coordination among disparate international justice and security sector actors in the DRC remains limited without a common strategic vision to drive donor engagement. The SSR process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (covered in more detail in this year’s DRC Mission Review) has lacked genuine engagement by national political and military leadership, for whom reform of the security and justice sectors threatens their power and encroaches on sources of income. The result has

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been an ad hoc development of the FARDC force.24 Nor was MONUC provided with resources commensurate with its mandate; while the Security Council’s response to the 2008 Kivu crisis included authorizing an additional 2,750 troops for MONUC and 300 new members for its formed police units, there was no mention of augmenting civilian expertise.25 Furthermore, the decision authorizing MONUC to conduct joint operations with the FARDC—which continues to pose a significant threat to local populations and has served to prolong the conflict—has eroded public perceptions of the mission, and of UN peacekeeping more broadly.

Political, Operational, and Institutional Challenges

Gathering best practices and lessons learned on establishing the rule of law in peacekeeping contexts is a difficult task. On the one hand, time militates against establishing a functioning rule of law system within the life-span of a peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, the majority of peace operations mandated to support the rule of law still remain in the field. On the other hand, the sui generis contexts of peacekeeping operations militate against readily transferable practices. Nevertheless, this review of the evolving role of peace operations in building the rule of law does point to a series of recurrent political, operational, and institutional challenges that may be instructive to future efforts, particularly as demand is likely to increase. Political Challenges: Sovereignty, Consent, and the Nature of the State

As described at the outset, building the rule of law involves much more than training judges and police, updating legal codes and statutes, or downsizing the military. It involves changing how power is exercised and distributed in society, as well as the relationship that elites and the broader population have with the state and its security and justice systems. In this respect, obtaining and maintaining the consent and cooperation of stakeholders—whether ministers, judges, commanding officers, rank-and-file

soldiers or police, or citizens—is a central political challenge for peace operations engaged in building the rule of law, and complicated by the frequent presence of elites responsible for instability in transitional governments. Acquiring the consent of the host country to operate is one of the founding principles of peacekeeping. In missions where building the rule of law is the stated goal, there are two potential contextual extremes: weak states with dysfunctional—or nonexistent—formal justice and security sectors—such as Afghanistan, the DRC, Haiti, Timor-Leste, Liberia, and Sierra Leone; and on the other hand, strong states, such as Sudan and Chad, where governments have been unwilling to acquiesce to international intervention and rule of law operations have been rebuffed as an infringement of sovereignty. Across this continuum, SSR and JSR are resisted by—or manipulated to serve the needs of—relevant national elites where they are perceived to threaten core interests. Even where consent is granted, there is no guarantee that it will endure through the lifespan of a peace operation. Declining consent, combined with the weariness of local authorities that have experienced lengthy or repeated international intervention by UN operations, as in Kosovo, the DRC, and Timor-Leste, have resulted in a gradual erosion of the influence and legitimacy of peace operations. More dramatically, in the case of MONUC, these factors have led to a deterioration of the security situation. Closely related to consent is the principle of “local ownership” over a reform process. Engaging local stakeholders is a core tenet of SSR as elaborated by both the OECD and the UN. But the precise nature of this ownership has sparked considerable debate. Laurie Nathan, for one, has argued that security reform must be designed, managed, and implemented by actors from within the host society rather than from outside.26 Where elites implicated in violence remain in positions of power, however, limited channels for citizens to voice their needs and concerns may be further constrained by fear of reprisal. In such environments, there is often pressure for peace operations to bypass broad

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local ownership in order to achieve politically expedient reforms deemed necessary for shortterm stability and the withdrawal of foreign forces.27 Despite the political underpinnings of reform, the UN and other actors have demonstrated an overemphasis on the technical aspects of rule of law interventions. While strengthening the capacity of justice and security institutions allows for tangible and thus quantifiable progress—as Haiti and Timor-Leste have demonstrated—such capacity will remain superficial without commensurate political progress, strategic vision, and adequate resources. Nor are politics confined to the field; protection of sovereignty is a contentious political issue at UN headquarters, as well. As the 2008 debates by the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations demonstrated, many states remain wary of external, predominantly Western involvement in security and justice reform. The UN Secretary-General’s report on SSR, which provided a framework for UN missions, identified local ownership as a core tenet (as also identified by the OECD), but also underscored these political sensitivities.28 The challenge that SSR presents to the sovereignty of a nation should not be overstated, however. Quite deliberately, the majority of peace operations are designed to extend, rather than limit, the authority of states. Support to nonstate security and justice provision. Perhaps the greatest conceptual and operational weakness of existing reform efforts is that they tend to be informed by donors’ own institutional and administrative experiences, rather than by the political, economic, and social realities of recipient countries. Bilateral and multilateral security sector reform efforts have focused overwhelmingly on state institutions. This is not surprising given the emphasis on states in the international order. Yet at least 80 percent of security and justice provision in postconflict countries occurs through nonstate actors and traditional institutions.29 Strengthening customary or nonstatutory institutions can often provide accessible,

predictable, fair justice where states have historically had a weak hold over their territory. International support for customary or nonstatutory security and justice systems may be a step toward rectifying weak state legitimacy by explicitly enabling citizens to choose their own forms of security, but some governments, like that of the DRC, are resistant to efforts that may appear to undermine consolidation of state authority. Whether and how to approach nonstatutory systems—particularly in the context of statebuilding—is a major challenge for the UN and other actors. Operational Challenges: Coherence and Time Frame

Coherence and coordination. That multiple actors will be working in the same operational theater on mutually reinforcing elements of a given rule of law system is not a novel concept for peace operations.30 But despite heightened engagement and the development of frameworks for delivery, the operational capability of the international community to both coordinate and deliver on these ambitious goals within the time constraints of a peacekeeping context is far from certain, if not severely in question. This remains true of nearly every major operation covered in this volume, from Somalia and Afghanistan to the DRC and Kosovo. The planning process for the joint, multidimensional presence of the EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) is instructive, as separate planning processes yielded different points of concern and challenges to creating shared objectives.31 The establishment of the Justice and Security Sector Advisory Coordination Cell (JSSACC) for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) during 2009 showed some progression toward more formalized coherence of donor security and justice assistance delivery. Through the JSSACC structure, UNMIS (together with

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the UN Development Programme [UNDP]) serves as the coordinator for multiple bilateral and institutional assistance programs aimed at developing southern Sudan’s justice and security sectors. While this may create heightened alignment among diverse actors, offering a potential model for remedying a recurrent challenge, its immediate operational impact is yet to be seen. Time frame. Reestablishing the rule of law is not a quick process. It exists in direct tension with the time-bound character of peacekeeping operations. It is improbable that a comprehensive rule of law system will be developed within the duration of a peacekeeping operation. Recent rule of law–focused missions have nonetheless demonstrated the importance of initiating security and justice reform as early as possible during the immediate postconflict phase in order to gain the confidence and trust of the population and elites, to mitigate the emergence of organized crime, and to capitalize on donor attention, financing, and political will, which are greatest immediately after the signing of a peace agreement and deployment of a peace operation. This period does not last long, however, jeopardizing the sustained attention required for success.32 Inadequate time and uncertain sustained funding require missions to prioritize handing over elements of their work to more specialized groups, like European police missions, or to host governments, which will ostensibly carry on reform after a mission departs. Moreover, the absence of meaningful benchmarks and indicators has hindered transition and evaluation of progress alike. Institutional Challenges: Integration, Expertise, and Financing

Integration. The range of the DPKO’s civilian expertise at “statebuilding” tasks has grown over the past decade, bringing significant resources to bear in postconflict environments. But its mission remains confined to such environments, and under short-term mandates.

In 2007, the DPKO established the Office for Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), which brought together its police division with DDR, SSR, criminal justice and corrections, and de-mining under one Assistant Secretary-General.33 Since the establishment of OROLSI, the DPKO has been the UN lead for security sector reform. The UNDP, with its long-term country presence and development mandate, has comparatively less capacity and fewer resources. Coordination between the two at UN headquarters, and with other agencies and departments (including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], and the UN Development Fund for Women [UNIFEM]), has gradually improved through the establishment of an interagency working group. The extent of the DPKO’s own coherence and its staffing resources should not be overstated, however. Within OROLSI, overlapping mandates, at times, have strained coordination. The extent to which OROLSI’s SSR team (professional staff of six) and criminal justice and corrections office (five) are able to provide direct support to fifteen UN peacekeeping missions (let alone a growing number of peacebuilding and special political missions) is also constrained. In the field, the extent of actual integration both within the UN, and among itself, international financial institutions, and lead donors, remains inadequate, as neither the DPKO nor any other UN entity has sufficient bureaucratic leverage—or control of financial resources—to coherently orchestrate the various actors within the UN and beyond. This problem is without ready solution, and significantly weakens the leverage of the international community in a fragile environment. Expertise. As Security Council mandates for peacekeeping have grown increasingly multidimensional, the requirement for qualified civilian expertise has grown apace. Yet the dearth of qualified personnel poses a serious challenge to mounting security and justice reform–oriented missions. Moreover, the UN,

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EU, NATO, and bilateral organizations are all competing for the same limited pool of experts. In Afghanistan, for instance, a shortage of police trainers for the EU’s police mission there has resulted in an overreliance on military trainers. Some countries, including Australia, Canada, and Norway, have established models for international police deployment. Others, like the United States and United Kingdom, are in the process of developing them. The UN has begun to address rapidly deployable rule of law capacity through the development of a small standing police team, established in May 2007. OROLSI is also exploring the creation of a similar rapidly deployable team, comprising justice, corrections, and other rule of law–related expertise. A further challenge is the rule of law capacity of the South, which donors have generally failed to support, strengthen, and utilize. Expertise in SSR is not the monopoly of Northern experts. The number of countries that have undertaken different elements of rule of law is growing. Many, like Indonesia and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, or Ghana, South Africa, and Nigeria in anglophone Africa, have expertise within government and civil society that could be offered to other countries in their respective regions that have similar historical experiences and face similar problems. Financing. There are two issues regarding financing of security and justice sector reform in peace operations. First, such reform is historically underfunded, posing a fundamental challenge to the operational impact of building the rule of law. Second, the mechanisms for delivery of funds are outdated. In DPKO operations, justice and security sector assistance is funded through the assessed budget for peacekeeping—but without the flexible funds needed to deliver field-level programs. As a result, mission staff cannot quickly launch capacity-building exercises or build infrastructure without depending on unpredictable

voluntary contributions. One logical division would be to fund mission-critical tasks from assessed funds, and noncritical tasks from voluntary funds, but defining what is critical depends on an agreed definition of success— something that is still lacking.

Conclusion

Security and justice sector reform is at a crossroads. The current demand for activities to enhance the rule of law is set to expand in environments afflicted by conflict and serious crime alike. Yet despite the accumulated experience of international rule of law assistance over the past two decades, the UN, other multilateral organizations, and bilateral donors still have insufficient knowledge, capacity, and resources to deliver consistently effective and sustainable reform. The global economic downturn, moreover, will limit available donor resources for supporting security and justice sector reform, even while heightening their importance as declining citizen incomes fuel criminality and instability and declining government revenues undercut safety nets, services, and security agencies. More efficient and more effective methods and modalities—including alternatives to heavy peace operations and reliance on Western expertise— will be required if security and justice reform is to prove sustainable. At the same time, states do have legitimate security objectives beyond guaranteeing the safety of their citizens. In several regions, the threat of conflict spillover or of external aggression is real. Organized crime and terrorism pose significant challenges, particularly to weak states in which they may find a foothold. Helping states address these threats through more effective security and justice institutions, while maintaining (if not improving) their responsiveness to local needs and other competing security and fiscal priorities, is a delicate but critical balance.

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Notes 1. Since 2000, the discourse within the UN on the primacy of establishing the rule of law, including reform of the security sector in immediate postconflict settings, has been the subject of multiple landmark UN documents and reports broadly related to peacekeeping and peace operations. See generally, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000; Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, August 2004; 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005; Report of the Secretary-General—Uniting Our Strengths: Enhancing United Nations Support For the Rule of Law, UN Doc. S/2006/980, 14 December 2008; Report of the Secretary-General—Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform, UN Doc. S/2008/39, 23 January 2008; United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), 2008, http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf; Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. S/2009/304, 11 June 2005; A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, 2009, http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/ newhorizon.pdf. 2. For sixty years the UN has engaged in developing international norms and standards in regard to the rule of law, and demand continues to grow. Despite this history, and the significant progress made in operationalizing rule of law activities, engagement at the country level remains ad hoc. United Nations, Title, UN Doc. A/63/226, 6 August 2008, pp. 5–7. 3. See, for example, Scott Carlson, Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons Learned Study (New York: United Nations, DPKO, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006); Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform (SSR): Review and Recommendations (Final Report) (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, November 2007), p. 1. 4. T. Carothers, “Rule of Law Temptations,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 33, no. 1 (Winter– Spring 2009): 52. 5. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, p. 4, para. 6. 6. In fact, there is a tendency—particularly within the UN—to conflate “rule of law” with “justice reform,” as evidenced by both substantive “rule of law” units and occupational categories. 7. DDR emerged as an element of UN peacekeeping in 1989 within the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). United Nations, Report of the Secretary General—The Role of the United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, UN Doc. S/2000/101, February 2000, p. 3. 8. UN Police, Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/police/index.shtml. There are, however, some early examples. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964, was “to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order” (UN Security Council Resolution 186 [1964]). Similarly, in 1978, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established with a mandate of “assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area” (UN Security Council Resolution 425 [1978]). These missions remained the exception until the end of the Cold War. 9. “The Secretary-General [is authorized] to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until, through that Government’s efforts with United Nations technical assistance, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.” UN Security Council Resolution 143 (1960). 10. In 1991, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) authorized training and mentoring of police. 11.Of the thirty-four missions established during the decade, sixteen included SSR and JSR components: four were asked to “verify the neutrality of the police” or “monitor” the implementation of agreed reforms (passive mandates), eight included security sector or justice sector reform activities such as capacity building and restructuring (active mandates), and four were given transitional authority to establish and lead national police forces (executive mandates). The four passive missions were: UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II, UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), UNAVEM III, and UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The eight active missions were: UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), and UN Organization Mission in

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the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The four executive missions were: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 12. UN Security Council Resolution 693 (1991); UN Security Council Resolution 729 (1992). 13. The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, established in 1995, included the International Police Task Force (IPTF), which was responsible for the reform and restructuring of the local police, as well as monitoring the police and other security sector agencies. See http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/ missions/unmibh/background.html. 14. UN Security Council Resolution 975 (1995); UNMIH was originally authorized in 1993 by Resolution 867; however, the mission never deployed. Other missions were UNSMIH (Res. 1063 [1996]), UNTMIH (Res. 1123 [1997]), and MIPONUH (Res. 1141 [1997]). 15. Stromseth, p. 215. 16. A recent survey conducted by the UN found that only a third of its formed police units are fully operational, an indictment of the processes used to select and deploy them. An UNMIK formed police unit figured largely in the survey: investigations into events surrounding riots in Pristina revealed that the unit was ill equipped and poorly trained to address large-scale civil unrest. But the UN has taken steps to address rapidly deployable capacity in the areas of police and rule of law. Internal UN review of formed police units, February 2009. 17. See generally, International Crisis Group, Handing Back Responsibility to Timor-Leste’s Police, Asia Report no. 180 (Brussels, 3 December 2009). 18. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). 19. United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, S/2000/809 (2000). 20. Of the fifteen current missions operating at the end of 2009, seven were established from 2000 onward (UN Mission in Liberia [UNMIL], UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire [UNOCI], UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti [MINUSTAH], UN Mission in Sudan [UNMIS], UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste [UNMIT], UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad [MINURCAT], UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur [UNAMID]). Of the two current political missions administrated by the DPKO that were established during the same period, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is mandated implicitly rather than explicitly to undertake rule of law work, and the other, the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), is mandated explicitly to undertake both SSR and rule of law activities. Of current missions established before 2000, only the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) are mandated to undertake SSR activities. 21. A first round of UK-led reforms was initiated in 1997. See UN Security Council Resolutions 1270 (1999), 1289 (2000), 1346 (2001). 22. Paul Jackson, “SSR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Armed Wing of Statebuilding?” paper prepared for the e-conference “The Future of Security Sector Reform,” 4–8 May 2009, http://www.ssrnetwork .net/documents/publications/e-conf-may09/ssr%20and%20post%20conflict%20-%20paul%20jackson.pdf. 23. MONUC’s activities, through Security Council Resolution 1565 of 1 October 2004, were expanded significantly from its original mandate in 1999. In response to the security and humanitarian situation in the Kivus region during 2008, the Security Council, through Resolution 1856, issued a sweeping mandate for MONUC, enhancing the operation’s military components and significantly broadening its activities aimed at establishing the rule of law, especially reform of the security sector. The European Union’s two SSR operations in the DRC are the EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) and the EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo). 24. The FARDC has been cobbled together from various former rebel groups as they demobilize; disputes over representation at the command level are prevalent. Payments for FARDC soldiers have been inconsistent and are often misappropriated by commanders. The FARDC is not accountable to civilian oversight, which is largely nonexistent, and in instances where it is to pursue violations, the requisite justice and correctional systems are lacking. 25. UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (2008). 26. Laurie Nathan, No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform, rev. 2nd ed. (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2007), p. 4. 27. See Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake, “To Arrest Insecurity: Time for a Revised Security Sector Reform,” Conflict, Security and Development 5, no. 3 (2005): 295–326. 28. As the presidential statement refering to the report states: “It is the sovereign right and primary responsibility of the country concerned to determine its national approach and priorities for security sector reform.” United Nations, UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/14, 12 May 2008. But the precise nature of this ownership has sparked considerable discussion and debate. See, for example, Laurie Nathan, No Ownership, No Commitment.

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The notion that “reform” is required, and that external, largely Western actors can deliver it, is no less contentious—leading many to prefer the term “security and justice sector development.” 29. OECD, Enhancing the Delivery of Security and Justice (Paris, 2007). 30. See S. Bah and B. Jones, “Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements,” in Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2008 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008);United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General—Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law Activities, UN Doc. A/63/226, 6 August 2008. 31. Internal UN document, After Action Review: UN-EU Planning for EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, 29 April 2008. 32. A. Potter, Rule of Law as Measure of Peace, paper submitted for UNU-Wider conference on “Making Peace Work,” Helsinki, Finland, 4–5 May 2004, p. 7. 33. Within the broader UN system, the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group has an overall coordinating function, but individual departments, agencies, funds, and programs retain operational responsibility.

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2.1 Afghanistan

This is the fifth year that our Annual Review has covered the international stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Each year, the security and political situation has been worse than the year prior. The year 2009 was the deadliest in Afghanistan since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001. International military forces suffered record losses, with 520 coalition soldiers killed, compared to 295 fatalities during the whole of 2008.1 The Afghan government also faced unprecedented levels of civilian and uniformed casualties.2 According to the United Nations, 1,630 civilians had been killed. Insurgent attacks were responsible for the majority of the deaths. But international military operations—particularly air strikes—remained a major cause, as demonstrated by the death of

30 civilians in a NATO attack in Kunduz in September. President Hamid Karzai was reelected to a second five-year term in an election marked by widespread fraud. Insecurity deterred voter turnout for the 20 August presidential and provincial council elections and hindered the deployment of independent election monitors at polling stations across southern Afghanistan. The election significantly weakened public confidence in the democratic process and threatened to plunge Afghanistan into a crisis of political transition. Following an audit, the number of votes won by President Karzai dropped below the 50 percent threshold necessary to avoid a runoff against candidate Abdullah Abdullah. The second round was canceled after Abdullah withdrew, citing insufficient reform to the balloting process. An attack by the Taliban on a UN guest house in Kabul in October killed five UN staff and eight others in an effort to derail the second round of voting; the UN responded by temporarily withdrawing 600 of its 1,300 international staff from the country. The electoral crisis has further eroded international support for military deployment in Afghanistan. This comes at a time of growing skepticism among the public and political leaders in key NATO member states—while senior policymakers within the US government debated a revision of the stabilization strategy, deployment of military reinforcements, and accelerated training of the Afghan National Security Forces. The 2008 US presidential election had a significant impact on the direction of international stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. After taking office in January 2009, President Barack Obama shifted priority from Iraq to Afghanistan,

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ordering a strategy review aimed at reversing the worsening insurgency and addressing regional dimensions of the conflict. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was appointed as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In June 2009, General Stanley McChrystal was named commander of US and ISAF forces, replacing General David McKiernan; he immediately instituted tighter guidelines on air strikes, to minimize civilian casualties, and ordered a top-to-bottom review of US military strategy, finding that a failure to reverse the worsening insurgency in the next year “risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”3 The president released the new Afghanistan strategy in late 2009, committing the United States to contribute roughly 30,000 more troops.

Background

In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the US-led coalition forces of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) initiated military action in Afghanistan in October of that year, quickly sweeping the Taliban government from power. Despite OEF’s objective of killing or capturing the leaders of the al Qaeda terrorist network, destroying their training camps, and denying them safe haven in Afghanistan, the Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership escaped across the border into Pakistan. Many rank-and-file members of the Taliban reintegrated into their villages. On 5 December 2001, following the fall of the Taliban regime, participants in the UNsponsored talks on Afghanistan—including the United Front, supporters of the ancien régime of King Zahir Shah, and other Afghan constituencies—signed the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan. In March 2002 (Resolution 1401), the Security Council established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to support the political objectives identified by the Bonn Agreement for establishing a permanent Afghan government, as well as to promote aid coordination and provide mediation of disputes. The Bonn Agreement was not a peace agreement. Representatives of the former

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

20 December 2001 (UNSC Res. 1386) December 2001 General Stanley A. McChrystal (United States) $391.6 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Troops: 71,030

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Senior Military Advisor • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

28 March 2002 (UNSC Res. 1401) Kai Eide (Norway) Brigadier-General Mark Skidmore (Canada) $243.9 million (1 January 2008–31 December 2009) Military Observers: 17 Police: 8 International Civilian Staff: 339 Local Civilian Staff: 1,298 UN Volunteers: 53

For detailed mission information see p. 242

EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Police Commissioner • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

30 May 2007 (CJA 2007/369ICSFP) June 2007 Kai Vittrup (Denmark) $78.7 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Police: 173 Civilian Staff: 93

Taliban government were excluded from the new dispensation, laying the foundation for the current insurgency. The coalition forces pursued a narrow counterterrorism agenda across the breadth of Afghan

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territory. To provide security in Kabul and the surrounding areas, the Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), requested by the Bonn Agreement, under Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001). The Afghan government, the UN, and nongovernmental aid organizations repeatedly called for expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul in order to provide security for political and development assistance. In 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF (which had previously rotated among participating troop contributors on an ad hoc basis). From 2004 to 2005, ISAF gradually expanded to the provinces, taking command of existing provincial reconstruction teams in the northern and western regions. In 2006, the United Kingdom deployed to Helmand, Canada to Kandahar, and the Netherlands and Australia to Uruzgan, marking the beginning of robust combat operations by ISAF. The same year, following the integration of nearly 12,000 US troops under the NATO chain of command, ISAF replaced OEF as the main combat force on the ground. Following the 2005 Afghan parliamentary elections, the political benchmarks established by the Bonn Agreement were completed. In response to the expressed need for a follow-on framework of cooperation, the Afghan government and its international partners signed the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006, committing each to high-level benchmarks in the areas of security, governance, reconstruction, and counternarcotics. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), cochaired by UNAMA and the Afghan government, was established to oversee implementation of the compact. UNAMA’s mandate was revised in 2007 and 2008, providing additional authorities and capacity for donor coordination and aid effectiveness. Under Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Kai Eide, appointed in March 2008, the JCMB has become the main forum for strategic coordination and joint policy formation between the Afghan government and the international donor community. In 2010, UNAMA is set to further strengthen its staffing by 1,000 national and international personnel,

particularly in the area of governance support, and further increase its geographic presence through the use of seven new provincial field offices opened in 2009. Through an integrated approach, UNAMA, ISAF, key donors, and the Afghan government’s Independent Directorate for Local Governance are adapting assistance responses to better reflect variation in different regions of the country—focusing on economic development in the north and west, building security forces and linking government to communities in the south and east, and shoring up policing, justice, and governance elsewhere.

Key Developments Presidential and Provincial Council Elections

The major strategic and political development during 2009 was the 20 August presidential and provincial council elections. Providing adequate security for elections was a preoccupation of the Afghan government and international community. Several NATO members increased their deployments ahead of the election to bolster security; nonetheless, due to inadequate security presence, particularly of the Afghan National Security Forces (military and police), over 300 polling centers could not be opened on election day. Insurgents stepped up intimidation tactics and attacks in the weeks prior to the elections in an effort to deter Afghans from turning out in large numbers to vote. On 15 August, a vehicleborne suicide bomb detonated near ISAF headquarters in Kabul, killing seven people and wounding seventy; on 18 August, another suicide bomber rammed into an ISAF convoy, killing nine people and injuring more than fifty.4 Although there were few civilian casualties on polling day, 20 August had the highest number of security incidents—some 300—on a single day since 2001. The campaign of violence appears to have limited turnout to 30–40 percent of registered voters (compared with 70 percent in the 2004 presidential election).5

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Initial returns showed that President Karzai won 54.6 percent of the votes cast, clearing the 50 percent threshold necessary to avoid a runoff against his closest rival, Abdullah, a former foreign minister, who won 27.8 percent. Following “clear and convincing evidence of fraud,” the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission ordered the Independent Election Commission (IEC) to audit and recount ballots from 2,516 polling stations—nearly 10 percent—where either more than 600 ballots were cast, or more than 100 votes and 95 percent of ballots cast were for a single candidate. Following public differences between SRSG Eide and Deputy SRSG Peter Galbraith over UNAMA’s handling of electoral fraud, the UN recalled Galbraith—a rare move by the Secretary-General. On 20 October, President Karzai conceded that a runoff election was necessary, after the IEC formally certified results from the 20 August election that reduced his lead from 54.6 to 49.7 percent (from 3,093,256 to 2,283,907 votes). Abdullah subsequently withdrew from the race on 1 November, arguing that the planned runoff would also be tainted by fraud. Following the announcement by the IEC of Karzai as the winner, Western capitals appeared to accept the legitimacy of his reelection—albeit with demands, as from President Obama in the United States, to stamp out corruption. Karzai was sworn in on 19 November. Meanwhile, the outcome of the provincial council elections—an important dimension of strengthening subnational governance institutions—has gone unnoticed and unreported. The international community was concerned that insecurity risked disenfranchising many voters, especially in the volatile southern region, but holding elections on time was viewed as a necessary risk. Dissatisfaction with the government of President Karzai among Afghans and international partners grew as the corruption became more prevalent and service delivery— particularly security, justice, and good governance—fell short of public expectation. There was consensus that he was the legitimately elected president of Afghanistan, however. Any

UN PHOTO/Tim Page

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Afghan citizen goes to the polls to vote in presidential and provincial council elections. Herat, Afghanistan, 20 August 2009.

delay in the constitutionally defined electoral timeline—already postponed once, from April to August, with the sanction of the Supreme Court—risked exposing Karzai to political attack from opposition groups and signaling military weakness. The international community believed that a credible election would strengthen the authority and legitimacy of the government. Instead, it has deepened disenchantment and undermined confidence in the democratic process. This has potentially far-reaching effects on international public support for the mission in Afghanistan, particularly from NATO members, at a time when militaries are sustaining heavier casualities. For many countries, their support for continued military engagement—and tolerance for increased losses—are based on assistance to a democratically elected and legitimate government. A fraudulent electoral process risks further erosion of support, possibly leading to increased pressure for the withdrawal of troops. International Military Deployment: NATO and OEF

ISAF commander Stanley McChrystal’s initial assessment, leaked ten days after the Afghan

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election, recommended that additional US troops were required in order to prevent military failure. Estimates of the number of troops needed, provided separately, ranged from 10,000 to as many as 40,000 beyond the 68,000 US troops already deployed or en route to Afghanistan at the time. A decision by President Obama on supplemental forces was pending on the outcome of discussions with senior US officials on a new strategic course, as well as the outcome of the November runoff presidential election in Afghanistan. Earlier, in March 2009, President Obama authorized deployment of 21,000 troops, including 4,000 military trainers. Their deployment increased the total number of US troops in Afghanistan to 68,000, more than double the number of US troops in Afghanistan at the end of the George W. Bush administration.6 As of 31 October 2009, ISAF comprised 71,030 troops, including 34,800 from the United States and 36,230 from forty-two other countries. Meanwhile, the Taliban insurgency has grown fourfold since 2006, from 7,000 to 25,000 fighters, according to a US intelligence estimate.7 The new NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, began his appointment in August 2009 with a call for members of the alliance to “better balance” the deployment of military forces in Afghanistan. In October, NATO defense ministers, in an important show of commitment to Afghanistan, endorsed General McChrystal’s recommendations for a new counterinsurgency strategy. The strategy called for a major change in the focus of the military effort—from seizing terrain and destroying insurgents to protecting population centers; revisions to the ISAF command structure; and greater cooperation and synchronization with the Afghan government, UNAMA, and the international civilian effort to support local and national governance. NATO defense ministers did not explicitly include a decision on new troop deployments. Long-term support among many NATO allies remains in doubt. Canada, the fifth largest ISAF contributor (2,800 troops), has pledged to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 2011,

though it has indicated that a smaller force might remain behind. Italy, the sixth largest contributor (2,795 troops), also indicated that it was considering withdrawal, following the death of six soldiers in an attack in Kabul in September. Higher-than-expected military losses by the United Kingdom and Poland, both major ISAF contributors (respectively, second largest with 9,000 troops, and seventh largest with 2,000), have also raised discussion of possible drawdown dates amid growing popular opposition to the war.8 In October, the United Kingdom pledged 500 additional troops—but this amounts to only one-quarter of the reinforcement sought by the British military.9 The war in Afghanistan is also notable for its record use of private contractors, including private security companies. As of August 2009, the total number of US Department of Defense contractor personnel in Afghanistan (68,197) exceeded the total number of uniformed personnel (52,300). In March 2009, contractors composed 57 percent of the Defense Department’s work force in Afghanistan—the highest percentage ever used by the United States in any conflict.10 The UN Security Council unanimously renewed the ISAF mandate for a further twelve months on 12 October. In its resolution, it authorized countries participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate, called on member states to contribute personnel, equipment, and other resources to ISAF, and stressed the importance of increasing the functionality, professionalism, and accountability of Afghanistan’s security sector, to enable it to establish the rule of law.11 Strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces

There is broad consensus that reversing deteriorating security trends in Afghanistan requires more—and more effective—national security forces. The Afghan National Army has emerged as one of the most effective Afghan government institutions. By contrast, Afghanistan’s regular, uniformed police suffer from a lack of public trust, due to incompetence and corruption, as

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Box 2.1.1 The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan Jake Sherman and Victoria DiDomenico

“The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan,” published by the Center on International Cooperation at New York University in September 2009, found that overdependence on private security providers (PSPs) by international military forces in Afghanistan—particularly overdependence on local militia groups— negatively affects stabilization efforts. The authors of the report argue that lack of effective oversight of the private security sector is detrimental to the stabilization of Afghanistan and to Afghan perceptions of the Afghan government and the international military and civilian community. There are a range of PSPs currently operating in Afghanistan, including international and national private security companies, operating with or without the mandatory Afghan government licenses, as well as illegal militias or “armed support groups”—many of which are

controlled by Afghan elites and entrenched in criminal activities. Although the use of PSPs in Afghanistan is not a new phenomenon, the private security industry has grown in response to widening insecurity and the related demand from the increased presence of international military forces. Following the deployment of US military forces, the US Department of Defense— the largest employer of private security in Afghanistan—reported a 19 percent increase in the number of private security contractors as of August 2009. There are also many cases where private security services are necessary, and blanket condemnation of the use of these services would be imprudent, but those employing PSPs must undertake due diligence to ensure professionalism. Afghan government regulation has done little to militate against the power that Afghan elites have over security

services, particularly outside the capital, Kabul. The international community’s use of PSPs that serve the interests of Afghan elites has created parallel security structures that compete with state authority, undermining international efforts to strengthen Afghan governance institutions and public security forces, while at the same time increasing the costs of international reconstruction efforts. The authors of the report conclude that the long-term goal of the international presence in Afghanistan to strengthen national security services cannot currently be achieved without PSPs. However, implementing better government regulation, monitoring, and enforcement on the part of both the consumers and the providers of private security will serve to enhance rather than diminish stabilization efforts.

Note: For more information, visit http://www.cic.nyu.edu.

well as from an inability to protect themselves from insurgent attacks, due to inadequate leadership, training, and equipment. More Afghan police than soldiers die fighting insurgents. To rectify shortcomings in operational readiness of the Afghan National Police, units are now being retrained through the Focused District Development program that commenced in February 2009. Plans to generate additional Afghan combat forces—increasing the size of the Afghan National Army to 134,000 personnel and of the Afghan National Police to nearly 97,000—will require several years (at minimum) to achieve. ISAF commander Stanley McChrystal’s assessment calls for eventual further increases up to 240,000 and 160,000 army and police personnel, respectively. However, expansion faces

several constraints, including trade-offs between the speed and quality of training, shortage of international military and police trainers, a lack of depth from which to build an experienced national officer corps, high rates of illiteracy and of attrition, and overall financial unsustainability. Recurrent costs for 400,000 Afghan National Security Forces is estimated at $10 billion per annum, or more than 80 percent of Afghanistan’s current (licit) gross domestic product. The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established in June by the North Atlantic Council and commenced activities in late 2009 to oversee higher-level training for the Afghan National Army and development of the Afghan National Police.12 The NTM-A unifies the existing NATO Directorate for Afghan National Army Training and Equipment and the

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US Combined Security Transition Command– Afghanistan (CSTC-A) under a single joint command responsible for generating and training Afghanistan’s security forces—with the aim of bringing greater coherence and enforcement of standards. An ISAF joint command is being established to oversee field-based mentoring of Afghan military and police, a role previously held by the CSTC-A and NTM-A. In theory, this will reduce the political risks for non-NATO countries—China, India, Iran, Indonesia, South Korea—of contributing noncombat troops to training efforts. Alongside the NTM-A, the European Union continued to maintain its police mission in the country, EUPOL Afghanistan, which was established in June 2007. However, the mission still lacks adequate staffing, security, and transportation, and has not yet developed a uniform training program.13

such as review boards that enable detainees to challenge their detainment, as well as advocates who are assigned to detainees to explain the review process. Legal issues that would enable detainees held by the United States to be tried under Afghan law have yet to be resolved, however. In an effort to address rampant corruption, the Afghan government passed legislation in November to establish a serious-crimes task force and anticorruption unit. The latter, the country’s third such unit, is tasked to prosecute cases of corruption, among other crimes, involving high-level officials. Western governments will be keenly watching to see whether the measures will be effective. Karzai, however, as well as critics both inside and outside Afghanistan, argue that Western military and development organizations aid corruption through mismanagement and loose oversight of billions of dollars in reconstruction assistance.

Justice Sector Reform

Drug Revenue, Insurgency, and Corruption

Afghanistan’s national justice sector strategy provides the overarching blueprint for strengthening its weak justice system. According to the UN, progress is limited by resource shortages for the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court—the three main state justice sector organs—as well as by a dearth of qualified and experienced judicial personnel, including judges and prosecutors, and inadequate infrastructure. Nonetheless, there has been some notable progress, such as completion of priority reforms and restructuring by the Ministry of Justice in early 2009. Moreover, following an evolving discussion among donors on the role of traditional justice providers in Afghanistan, including tribal shuras and jirgas—groups of elders or other tribal authorities—the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is now supporting pilot justice projects in five districts. The United States has also taken steps to address detention conditions of insurgents and problems of radicalization within US- and Afghan-run prisons. In November, the United States opened a new facility at Bagram Airbase that includes procedures to increase transparency,

Drug revenue remains a major source of financing for corruption and insurgency in Afghanistan. During 2009, the production of opium declined 10 percent—from 7,700 to 6,900 metric tons—due to market forces and interdiction efforts. Home to 90 percent of global production, Afghanistan remains far and away the largest producer of opium and heroin. In addition, cannabis production is fast rising, including in areas where opium production has declined in recent years; cannabis is now grown in twenty of the country’s thirty-four provinces. Afghanistan eclipsed Morocco as the top producer of cannabis resin (hashish) in 2009. With hashish worth some $110 per kilogram, compared to $64 per kilogram for opium, the drug is a lucrative but underexploited source of revenue.14 According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), there is growing evidence of the emergence of “narco-cartels”—armed groups that, motivated by securing drug profits, are “moving up the value chain.” No longer satisfied with taxing supply and transit by criminal gangs and corrupt officials, they are now

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expanding into production, processing, stocking, and exporting.15 Regional Context

Stabilization of Afghanistan is contingent on wider regional dynamics, above all on the deteriorating security situation across the border in Pakistan. During the last quarter of 2009, Pakistan suffered a spate of attacks by insurgent groups in retaliation for military operations in Swat Valley and in South Waziristan. On 5 October, militants bombed the offices of the World Food Programme in Islamabad, killing five staff members; less than a week later, gunmen penetrated the defenses of the headquarters of the Pakistani army in Rawalpindi, killing six soldiers. Peshawar, capital of Northwest Frontier province, similarly has experienced frequent attacks against military and civilian targets. In response, Pakistani public opinion has firmly supported military operations against Pakistan’s Taliban regime, Tehrik-i-Taliban. Far more controversial is US military assistance to Pakistan, including Predator drone attacks against terrorist and militant leaders, which have increased under the Obama administration (in August, Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban, was killed in one such attack). Indeed, the Pakistani government has struggled to control military support from the United States amid concerns over its sovereignty and strong, negative public opinion of US involvement. Meanwhile, as the year closed, there were growing signs that the Pakistani army, led by General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, was becoming frustrated with the weak and unpopular civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari. Elsewhere in the region, tensions between the United States and Iran over the latter’s

nuclear program continued to overshadow possible opportunities for cooperation on Afghan stabilization, including counternarcotics and police training. In October, a suicide bomb struck the Indian embassy—a repeat of the attack in June 2008—in what was widely viewed as a response to fears of India’s growing influence in Afghanistan. China and Russia both have an interest in controlling the spread of Islamic extremism, though China’s presence on the ground—including its investment at the Aynak copper mine—has provided more immediate security concerns that may draw it further into international stabilization efforts.

Conclusion

As 2009 drew to a close, the situation in Afghanistan was dire. The swearing-in of President Karzai marked the beginning of an uphill struggle for the Afghan government to regain the trust of both the Afghan people and the international community. Whether he succeeds or fails is likely to have enormous consequences for the willingness of foreign governments and their citizens to persevere in an increasingly bloody war. Indeed, calls for withdrawal and for talks with the Taliban are on the rise, even among formerly unwavering NATO allies. Currently, strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces remains a prerequisite for drawdown despite the redoubling of the contributions to ISAF of the United States and its partners. The coming year will demonstrate whether these efforts are sufficient to reverse the downward spiral of violence that has engulfed much of Afghanistan. The looming question is whether time is running out.

Notes 1. D. Fikins, “UN Blames Taliban for Afghan Toll, New York Times, 14 January 2010. 2. The Afghan government lost 341 Afghan National Police and 114 Afghan National Army personnel by May 2009, the last date for which information is publicly available. See Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution, 23 September 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx, p. 10. 3. NATO and ISAF, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment [unclassified version],” 30 August 2009, pp. 1–2.

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4. Ibid. 5. CIGI Afghanistan SSR Monitor. 6. In fact, the actual authorization was for 34,000 troops, as it included 13,000 support troops. Ann Scott Tyson, “Support Troops Swelling U.S. Force in Afghanistan: Additional Deployments Unannounced and Rarely Noted,” Washington Post, 13 October 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2009/10/12/ar2009101203142.html. 7. Al-Jazeera, “US: Taliban Has Grown Four-Fold,” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/ 10/20091091814483962.html. 8. ISAF troop figures as of 22 October 2009. 9. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/nov/01/uk-death-toll-afghanistan-troops. 10. Moshe Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis,” Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2009, p. 8. 11. SCR 1890 (2009). 12. NATO and ISAF, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment [unclassified version],” p. G-3. 13. Judy Dempsey, “Training of Afghan Police by Europe Is Found Lacking,” New York Times, 18 November 2009, p. A16. 14. Matthew C. DuPee, “Afghanistan’s Other Narcotics Nightmare,” World Politics Review, 1 October 2009, http://www.offnews.info/verarticulo.php?contenidoid=17955. 15. UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009: Summary of Findings,” September 2009, http://www .unodc.org/unodc/en/drugs/afghan-opium-survey.html.

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2.2 Chad and the Central African Republic

International peacekeeping deployments in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) are the result of long-term instability, massive internal displacement, and regional insecurity. In spite of the UN’s partially deployed peacekeeping presence, banditry, impunity, and ongoing clashes between the Chadian armed forces and opposition groups in the east of Chad continued to threaten the safety of civilians, including humanitarian actors and over 260,000 refugees from the Darfur region of Sudan.1 In the CAR, ongoing instability throughout the country resulted in further incidence of violence and internal displacement, as well as large-scale outflows of Central African refugees into southeastern Chad. In March 2009 the European Union’s peacekeeping mission (EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic [EUFOR TCHAD/RCA]) officially transferred authority to the UN’s expanded, multidimensional mission (UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad [MINURCAT]), though the UN force was about 50 percent deployed at the end of 2009. Meanwhile the UN-trained and supported Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS) police force had reached full deployment in all twelve refugee camps throughout the area of operations, yet the shortcomings of the justice sector limited the impact of its work. In June the Secretary-General transmitted proposals to the Security Council for the structure and resources required for the new UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), which he recommended should replace the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).

Background Chad

Instability in Chad has its roots in ethnic divisions, vast disparities in levels of development from one region to another, and widespread impunity resulting from a lack of law and order— particularly in the east of the country. President Idriss Déby was brought to power in a coup in 1990; subsequent elections have failed to result in representative governance structures. The violence in eastern Chad is characterized by military clashes between the Chadian military forces and a number of rebel movements with shifting alliances. Widespread banditry, impunity, and a general lack of law and order all pose threats to civilians and have been a major impediment to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to refugees and the internally displaced. Government clashes with armed rebel groups, as well as cross-border attacks by armed militia originating in Sudan, and interethnic violence in the east have contributed to the internal displacement of over 160,000 Chadians.2 A predatory relationship between Chad and Sudan has further fueled the conflicts in both eastern Chad and Sudan’s Darfur region. The two governments have accused each other of harboring, funding, and otherwise supporting the other’s opposition groups. These accusations came to a head in 2008. In February of that year, a massive Chadian rebel offensive originating from inside Sudanese territory was launched on Chad’s capital, N’Djamena. The attack was very nearly successful, overwhelming Chadian forces and prompting intervention by the French military. 35

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Security Force” that would be drawn from Contact Group countries and tasked with monitoring and securing the Chadian-Sudanese border. The viability of the Dakar Agreement was seriously challenged in May 2008, when Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels launched an unprecedented attack on the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, advancing as close as Omdurman on the outskirts of the city. Subsequent rebel offensives on both sides of the border continue to strain the relationship between the two countries. While the end of 2009 saw renewed contacts between the parties on securing the shared border, any marked improvement in security had not been seen. EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and MINURCAT

In the aftermath, the governments signed the March 2008 Dakar Agreement, which included a commitment to “ban any activity of the armed groups and prevent the use of the territories of any of the two countries to destabilize the other, and to normalize relations between the two capitals.”3 The Dakar Agreement also provided for the formation of a Contact Group (cochaired by Libya, Eritrea, and the Republic of Congo) to monitor its implementation, and called for the creation of a “Peace and

Between 2004 and 2006, refugee inflows from Sudan, as well as thousands of internally displaced Chadians, created a humanitarian emergency in eastern Chad, but prevailing banditry and violence against civilians and aid workers alike made the delivery of aid a difficult and dangerous task. International humanitarian agencies called upon the UN to deploy peacekeepers to provide security for the delivery of aid and to protect civilians against the constant threat of violent attack. An initial proposal for a UN peacekeeping deployment in Chad and the CAR included a mandate to monitor activities on the border between Chad and Sudan, facilitate political dialogue, and protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. Although this proposal was accepted by the CAR, Chad rejected it due to fears of being used by the UN as a rear base from which to launch operations into neighboring Sudan, where the international community was, at the time, struggling to intervene in the conflict. After considerable negotiation, a compromise was struck between Chad, the United Nations, and the European Union (under pressure from France, Chad’s ally and protector). In September 2007 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1778, in which the UN committed to the deployment of 300 civilian police, 50 military

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liaison officers, and a small number of civilian personnel. The new mission, identified by its French acronym, MINURCAT, was charged with selecting, training, and mentoring a Chadian police force called the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité. Resolution 1778 simultaneously authorized the deployment of 3,307 EU soldiers (3,107 to be deployed in Chad, and 200 in northeastern CAR). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, this European force—called EUFOR— had a mandate to establish broad area security in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, protect UN staff and humanitarian personnel, and contribute to the safety and security of civilians within the zone of operation. The EU mission—which became operational on 15 March 2008—was committed to deploy for just one year, with the understanding that on 15 March 2009 the EU would transfer authority to an expanded MINURCAT operation. The expansion of MINURCAT’s mandate to include the necessary military component, however, was not a foregone conclusion, as Chad continued to resist the idea of a UN military presence on its territory. In December 2008 a report of the UN Secretary-General outlined a concept of operations for an expanded MINURCAT role and presence.4 In January 2009 the Security Council adopted the concept of operations, and authorized an increase in MINURCAT troops to a maximum strength of 5,200 military personnel, 300 UN police, 25 military officers, and sufficient civilian staff to support a full, multidimensional peacekeeping operation. In addition to the formation and monitoring of the DIS, the expanded MINURCAT mandate includes responsibility for improving security conditions in the area of operation with a view to protecting civilians and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It also includes human rights monitoring and the promotion of the rule of law through support to weak Chadian judicial and legal systems. Importantly, and controversially, the expanded MINURCAT mission does not have a mandate to initiate or engage directly in the resolution of the political roots of the conflict in

EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 15 March 2009

15 October 2007 (CJA 2007/677/CFSP), 25 September 2007 (UNSC Res. 1778) January 2008 Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash (Ireland) $65.8 million (October 2008–April 2009) Troops: 3,307

UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Force Commander • Chief Military Liaison Officer • Police Commissioner • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

25 September 2007 (UNSC Res. 1778) Victor Da Silva Angelo (Portugal) Major-General Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji (Senegal) François N’Diaye (Senegal) Major-General Geraldo Christian Chaumont (Argentina) $690.8 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 2,691 Military Observers: 23 Police: 256 International Civilian Staff: 429 Local Civilian Staff: 1,228 UN Volunteers: 134

For detailed mission information see p. 206

Mission de Consolidation de la Paix (MICOPAX)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

October 2002 January 2003 Albert Akouéndéngué (Gabon) $42.0 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Troops: 371 Civilian Police: 150

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eastern Chad. The lack of a political mandate or framework in which to situate the mission led to strong calls for the elaboration of clear benchmarks for MINURCAT success, and, by extension, of the circumstances necessary in order to consider a responsible withdrawal of MINURCAT forces.

of Central African States (ECCAS). The MICOPAX mission is more multidimensional in nature and includes civilian police, civilian staff, and gendarmes alongside combat troops.

Central African Republic

Political

The Central African Republic has been in a state of conflict for the past two decades, plagued by a history of mutinies, coup attempts, armed rebellions, and persistent intervention and interference from its neighboring countries. BONUCA, the UN’s peacebuilding support office in the CAR, was deployed in 2000 with a mandate to support and strengthen democratic institutions and national reconciliation processes, and to mobilize international support in an effort to consolidate the gains won in the 1999 elections. During 2009, BONUCA continued to work in the CAR, but with an expanded mandate to support security sector reform efforts, build rule of law, disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants, and promote and support an inclusive political dialogue among the government, rebels, and opposition leaders. However, as the UN Peacebuilding Commission intensified its involvement in the CAR, preparations were also under way for the transfer of BONUCA into a new integrated peacebuilding office, BINUCA. In 2002 the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) deployed the Force Multinational de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMUC) to address a serious deterioration in security conditions. This force, consisting of just 380 troops, was deployed with a mandate to protect critical infrastructure, monitor the border between Chad and the CAR, and support the reconstruction of CAR armed forces as well as the republic’s national process of reconciliation. In July 2008, in an effort to bring in a wider range of regional actors, the chronically underresourced FOMUC mission transferred authority to the Mission de Consolidation de la Paix (MICOPAX), led by the Economic Community

In the last quarter of 2008, Chad and Sudan exchanged ambassadors in compliance with the terms of the 2008 Dakar Agreement, and a highlevel AU delegation traveled to N’Djamena to affirm support for the process. However, meetings of the Contact Group were first delayed and then halted indefinitely, and there has been no progress toward the establishment of the security force envisioned in the Dakar Agreement. On 3 May 2009 a new agreement was signed in Doha between Chad and Sudan, in which the countries committed to refrain from providing support to armed opposition groups within each other’s borders. However, a rebel offensive launched in the Sila region of eastern Chad the day after the signing undermined the agreement, and prompted renewed accusations from Chad of Sudanese support to Chadian armed groups. It also resulted in the relocation of humanitarian staff and DIS officers in the area of Koukou Angarana. In the meantime, in March 2009 the International Criminal Court formally indicted Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity for his alleged involvement in the atrocities against civilians in the Darfur region of Sudan. The government of Sudan responded by expelling thirteen international and three national humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from Sudan, and the potential strain on the delivery of humanitarian assistance prompted fears of a renewed flow of Darfurian refugees into Chad. The international organizations and NGOs, as well as MINURCAT and the residual EUFOR forces, conducted contingency planning exercises in preparation for the expected influx. However, no significant increase in new refugee arrivals was detected.

Key Developments

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Chad, the remoteness of which has made the humanitarian response difficult. A further complicating element has been the presence of the Ugandan-based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which in August launched attacks in Guli, Nguli Nguli, and Maboussou, displacing thousands of civilians. The security situation continued to deteriorate throughout the year, causing aid groups to halt their operations in Chad during the last months of 2009. From EUFOR to MINURCAT

The EU forces in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR continued to carry out their responsibilities for establishing security and providing protection to civilians, UN staff, and humanitarian personnel until 15 March, when the UN assumed operational control of the 2,085 international peacekeepers. These included an assortment of 1,877 EUFOR soldiers from Albania, Austria, Croatia, Finland, and Russia who complemented larger EU contingents from Ireland, France, and Poland, the latter of whom committed to remain in Chad under UN command. Italian forces also remained in theater until May, when the deployment of a Norwegian level-two hospital was completed. The

PHILIPPE HUGUEN/AFP/Getty Images

In Chad, some progress was made on the 13 August 2007 agreement between the government of Chad and opposition parties as they moved forward with certain electoral reforms. A new electoral commission was also expected to be established, but opposition groups rejected the government’s proposal, asserting that the planned structure would not be sufficiently independent. The nature of Chadian government relations with armed and political opposition groups also changed slightly in 2009. In January all but one of the Chadian armed opposition groups established a new coalition, and in May consensus was reached regarding a draft law on the status of the charter for opposition and political parties. Also in May, a significant victory of the Chadian armed forces over the armed opposition in eastern Chad shifted the balance of power between the rebels and the government. In the Central African Republic, an inclusive dialogue in December 2008 between the government, the political opposition, and rebel leaders resulted in the signing of a decree by President François Bozizé establishing a new government. However, activities of armed groups renewed in the early months of 2009, as their leaders alleged that the government had failed to implement the recommendations of the dialogue and, in particular, that the new government established by President Bozizé in early 2009 was not sufficiently broad-based. Incidents of violence between government forces, rebels, and armed self-defense groups continued, and the security situation remains unpredictable throughout the country. Between April and July 2009 the security situation in the Vakaga and Haute Kotto regions in northeastern CAR—the MINURCAT area of operations—deteriorated significantly, resulting in sporadic internal and regional displacement. A number of violent incidents in June 2009 prompted the relocation of humanitarian staff, and caused roughly 1,000 civilians to gravitate toward MINURCAT’s base in search of protection. Clashes between CAR’s armed forces and armed rebel groups outside the MINURCAT area of operations also prompted the outflow of over 18,000 refugees to Daha in southeastern

A French EUFOR soldier changes his insignia to a MINURCAT badge during a hand-over ceremony, Abeche, Chad,15 March 2009.

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MINURCAT deployment benefited from the continuity and experience that the “rehatted” EU solders brought to the mission. The EU peacekeeping mission in Chad and the CAR was viewed by many as a test case for future EU engagement in international peacekeeping, and the positive results and relatively smooth transition from EU to UN authority speaks well for the possibility of similar partnerships in the future. Close cooperation between the EUFOR and UN planners at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in New York allowed for a good exchange of information and the application of lessons learned, despite only two months between the authorization of the new mission by the Security Council and the 15 March deadline for the transfer of authority imposed by the EU. In particular, the presence of mission military leadership at UN headquarters during a portion of the planning stage aided in the elaboration of an achievable concept of operations, and allowed the officers to gain an understanding of the workings of UN headquarters. This was useful when the mission was confronted with deployment challenges in the field, in that MINURCAT military leadership knew who within the UN bureaucracy could resolve issues most quickly. Nevertheless, by 31 December 2009, MINURCAT had deployed only 2,411 (46 percent) of its authorized troops. The mission also continues to suffer from a shortage of essential resources. A lack of engineering units and military helicopters is hampering the mission’s ability to fulfill its mandate. This is significant, as MINURCAT’s success is largely contingent on the ability to transport troops quickly across a vast area of operations. Coordination among the international peacekeeping and political missions throughout the region continues to be good. MINURCAT and the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) maintain liaison officers in each mission to facilitate the exchange of information, and MINURCAT’s political and military leadership are in regular contact with their counterparts in MICOPAX. Discussions are under way between

MINURCAT, MICOPAX, and BONUCA with regard to the proposed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants in the northeast (Vakanga and Haute Kotto regions) of the CAR. DIS and Justice Sector Reform

A core component of the MINURCAT mandate is the commitment to strengthening the capacity of the Chadian police and justice sector, particularly in the east. This is, in large part, a reflection of the fact that banditry and impunity represent the most common threats to civilians—including refugees and humanitarian actors—in eastern Chad. While military peacekeepers are trained and equipped to interpose themselves between civilian populations and rebel attacks, countering banditry brings with it different challenges. MINURCAT peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilians if an instance of violence or looting happens in front of them, but the right to arrest suspects and conduct criminal investigations is the sole purview of the government. In other words, international peacekeepers—military, police, or civilian—cannot perform the function of local (in this case, Chadian) police officers, and thus are limited in their ability to confront banditry. In order to circumvent the combined challenges of high levels of banditry, a weak, underresourced Chadian police force, and a nonfunctioning judiciary, the Secretary-General proposed a new way to work with the Chadian police. He proposed that the UN would train, equip, and mentor 850 Chadian police officers, who would then be deployed to conduct policing duties in the refugee camps throughout eastern Chad, while military peacekeepers (first EUFOR, and then MINURCAT) would continue to provide broad area security and protection through presence and deterrence. This UN-supported Chadian police force is called the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité. Training of DIS officers began in 2008, and deployment to key eastern towns, as well as all twelve refugee camps in eastern Chad, was completed in April 2009. Their jurisdiction extends up to ten kilometers in radius around the camps.

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The work of the DIS has been positively received by Chadian civilians, refugees, and the humanitarian community alike. The officers are posted at the entrances of refugee camps, and conduct patrols throughout the camps to maintain law and order, institute arrests, and conduct investigations. They help UN agencies and implementing partners to maintain order on distribution days, and in some circumstances provide protection to humanitarian convoys. Nevertheless, implementation of the DIS concept has faced certain challenges. Uneven levels of training and experience among the DIS candidates presented by the government, short UN training periods (initially just one month, though later increased to two), and isolated but serious violations of conduct and discipline standards have hampered the reputation and effectiveness of the DIS. In some locations DIS officers were—for reasons of expediency—deployed before proper accommodations had been prepared, and in others they were deployed ahead of their UN police mentors, leaving the new DIS officers without UN guidance and support. Furthermore, the DIS chain of command has never been clearly articulated to Chadian civilians, refugees, or the humanitarian community. The DIS is—by design—a Chadian police force, meaning that it reports directly to the Chadian government, yet its relationship to the government’s other security forces remains undefined. MINURCAT does not have command and control of DIS officers, but the UN role in training, mentoring, and equipping them has meant that most people incorrectly associate the DIS with the UN. As such, any failures or instances of indiscipline affect the reputation of MINURCAT. Finally, the ability of DIS officers to conduct investigations or to refer cases to an effective justice system has been inherently limited, both by a lack of prior investigative experience and by a nonexistent justice sector. MINURCAT civilian police were slow to train and equip DIS officers to fulfill their mandated investigative role. After several months of deployment, however, on-the-job training in criminal law,

investigative techniques, rules and procedures, and judicial organization has begun in Farchana and Goz Beida. Importantly, a system for tracking DIS investigations is also in development. Judicial Reform

Limitations in developing the capacity of the DIS were compounded by the lack of effective, accountable judicial structures in eastern Chad. In order to address this gap, and in conjunction with the development of DIS policing capacity, MINURCAT’s Judicial Advisory Unit (JAU) has been working to reform and develop the Chadian justice system. With the support of MINURCAT, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Criminal Court of Abéché completed its first six-week circuit session in Abéché, Ati, Mongo, and Am Timan, with a docket of fortytwo criminal cases ranging from murder and rape to conspiracy and infringement of constitutional order. The second session is slated to be held in November 2009 in the towns of Iriba, Biltine, Fada, and Faya. Court facilities are being rehabilitated and equipped in a number of locations, and plans for further rehabilitation as well as the development of a mobile court are in process. The JAU’s work plan for 2010 has prioritized the strengthening and clarification of the penal chain, the further development of judicial capacity, and the widening of access to institutions of justice. Rule of law working groups are slated to be established throughout the MINURCAT area of operations, and will include local traditional, judicial, and security authorities in an effort to combat impunity and strengthen the rule of law in eastern Chad.

Conclusion

MINURCAT’s ability to deliver on its mandated tasks remains in question at the end of 2009 on account of several aspects of the mission’s design. The military component of first EUFOR and now MINURCAT provided a measure of security from large-scale attacks on

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the refugee camps and for the development of the DIS, but has proven to be a force largely inappropriate to address the primary security concerns of the civilian population. Meanwhile, although development of the DIS is a step in the right direction, its impact is rather limited in the absence of commensurate judiciary and

corrections structures. Finally, without a political mandate to address the conflict in Chad, the overall direction of MINURCAT is relatively uncertain, a reality that will continue to present itself as the international community considers the significant commitment the operation represents.

Notes 1. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “Chad Statistical Snapshot,” visited 18 December 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226. 2. Ibid. 3. Dakar Agreement, 13 March 2008, para. 4. 4. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, S/2008/760, 4 December 2008.

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2.3 Democratic Republic of Congo

The year 2009 marked the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and ten years since the signing of the Lusaka Agreement, which ended the second Congo war (1998–1999). MONUC stands among the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping operations to date. Despite this considerable contribution of resources, persistent insecurity in the DRC’s eastern provinces in 2009 and the lack of clear operational guidance for MONUC’s complex mandate continued to challenge stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. Joint military operations by MONUC and the DRC’s national armed forces (Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo [FARDC]) against armed groups have yielded mixed results, raised legal and ethical questions about the mission’s partiality, and exposed operational tensions in the mission’s multiple mandates called for in Security Council Resolution 1856. Meanwhile, the living conditions for civilian populations in the eastern provinces remain dire, while the viability of the peace that has been achieved over the course of a decade remains in question. Developments in the DRC and the Great Lakes region in 2009 have significantly reshaped the political and security landscape in the country. Relations between the DRC and Rwanda have improved, and the rebellion by the Congrès National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), which led to a resumption of armed conflict in August 2008, has ended. On 23 March, CNDP troops and other smaller Congolese armed groups signed agreements with the government to integrate into the FARDC.

The continued illegal exploitation of natural resources by various armed actors, both foreign and domestic, and the weak capacity of state institutions—in particular the national armed forces, police, and justice and corrections institutions—have impeded efforts to find a lasting solution to the conflicts in the DRC. Other root causes of the violence in the east, including the rights of minorities and land tenure issues, have yet to be addressed. At the national level, the narrowing of political space and the trend toward authoritarian rule are of growing concern.

Background

MONUC entered its third, and some expect final, phase in 2009. First deployed as a modest observer mission in 1999—following the first

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UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Force Commander • Police Commissioner • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

30 November 1999 (UNSC Res. 1279) Alan Doss (United Kingdom) Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye (Senegal) Sudesh Kumar (India) $1,351.6 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 17,768 Military Observers: 692 Police: 1,210 International Civilian Staff: 1,005 Local Civilian Staff: 2,613 UN Volunteers: 628

For detailed mission information see p. 232

and second Congo wars (1996–1997 and 1998– 1999), its initial mandate was to help monitor the Lusaka Agreement, which was signed in August 1999 by most Congolese armed groups and key state actors involved in the second war. The Lusaka Agreement called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the disarming of foreign militia groups in the DRC, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country. By 2004, MONUC had grown into a substantial integrated mission with the mandate to support the Government of National Unity and the political transition begun in 2003, as well as to support the national electoral process in 2006, which resulted in Joseph Kabila’s election as president. In 2009, and in keeping with its reinforced mandate, MONUC entered a more robust peacekeeping phase, focusing largely on the unfinished business of the stabilization of eastern Congo. Despite the end of the second war and national elections, North and South Kivu and Orientale provinces continue to be the battleground for various local and foreign armed groups. These include the Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which in its earlier composition (ex–Forces Armées Rwandaises [FAR] and Interahamwe rebels) in the

aftermath of the Rwanda genocide was the principal trigger for the Rwandan-led invasion of then-Zaire and thus the start of the first Congo war; the mostly Congolese, Tutsi-led, and Rwandan-supported CNDP, headed by renegade Congolese general Laurent Nkunda; and the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Following the collapse of the FARDC and the near collapse of MONUC in the face of CNDP advances on Goma in October 2008, intense fighting broke out between the CNDP and Mayi-Mayi fighters in the North Kivu town of Kiwanja. On 4–5 November 2008, CNDP elements conducted targeted and reprisal killings of an estimated 150 villagers, mainly young men whom they suspected were Mayi-Mayi. Although MONUC had approximately 120 peacekeepers stationed in Kiwanja, they were unable to stop the killings. On 20 November, in the wake of these events and intense criticism of MONUC for the failure to implement its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, UN Security Council Resolution 1843 authorized a long-sought troop increase of 3,000. While the mission had received only two-thirds of the troop increase by the end of 2009, the sixteen authorized helicopters as well as the intelligence equipment requested to support the surge also continued to lag behind. In December 2008, UN Security Council Resolution 1856 renewed MONUC’s mandate and asked the mission to attach the highest priority to addressing the crisis in the Kivus, in particular the protection of civilians, and to progressively concentrate its action in 2009 in the eastern part of the DRC. It also tasked MONUC with coordinating operations with the FARDCintegrated brigades deployed in the eastern part of the DRC and to support their operations aimed at disarming recalcitrant local groups.

Key Developments Kinshasa-Kigali Rapprochement

A key development in early 2009 was the growing leadership struggle within the CNDP and

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administration arrangements in parts of North Kivu, and maintain parallel command structures within the national army. By year’s end, the bilateral agreement seemed to be losing steam as Kinshasa began backtracking on its commitments and as Nkunda’s future continued to be contested. Despite Congolese calls for Nkunda’s extradition to the DRC to be tried for treason, Nkunda remains under house arrest in Rwanda. Joint Military Operations Against the FDLR and LRA and Civilian Protection

Following the departure of Rwandan forces at the beginning of the year, MONUC began providing assistance to 16,000 FARDC troops in follow-up operations against the FDLR and the LRA. The joint FARDC-MONUC operations against the FDLR, known as Kimia II, have had some success: the FLDR headquarters have been destroyed and the group’s command and control, logistics, and administrative and political structures in both North and South Kivu have been disrupted. By October 2009, MONUC reported that its efforts toward disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and rehabilitation (DDRRR) had resulted in the repatriation of 1,126 FDLR combatants and

UN Photo/Marie Frechon

the increased international pressure on Kigali to rein in Nkunda, who was arrested by Rwandan authorities in January following an agreement between Kigali, Kinshasa, and Nkunda’s former chief of staff, General Bosco Ntaganda, to cease hostilities and to cooperate in pursuing the FDLR. Agreements reached in Goma on 23 March between the DRC government and the CNDP (as well as with other smaller armed groups in North and South Kivu) began a program to integrate the CNDP and other forces into the FARDC, transform the CNDP into a political party, grant amnesty to political prisoners, and prepare for the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The sudden and rapid rapprochement between the two governments and their joint military operation against the FDLR—Operation Umoja Wetu (Our Unity)—caught MONUC and the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, by surprise. By midyear, the DRC and Rwanda had exchanged ambassadors and held a presidential summit in Goma. While the cooperation was welcomed by the international community, the presence in January 2009 of an estimated 4,000 Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) troops in North Kivu was met with caution in the DRC and, in some cases, alarm that Rwandan forces had returned. Critics of President Kabila’s rapid warming to Rwanda, notably to then-president of the parliament Vital Kamerhe, were swiftly punished. Kamerhe was forcibly removed from his leadership position in parliament and then ousted from the president’s party (People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy [PPRD]). While some progress was made with respect to the implementation of the 23 March agreements, challenges remain, including on key security and governance aspects of the agreements, the promotion of community reconciliation and greater political participation, and control over mining concessions. The ad hoc and incomplete integration of Congolese armed groups into the FARDC, foremost of those the CNDP, is a particular source of concern. Former elements of the CNDP continue to operate tax barriers and control other parallel territorial

MONUC paramedics evacuate a victim of an FDLR massacre, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo, 15 May 2009.

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1,622 dependents, in addition to the repatriation of 11,383 Rwandan civilians by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). By the end of the year, an estimated 4,500 FDLR combatants remained spread throughout the east. Despite these achievements, the impact of these joint MONUC-FARDC military operations on civilians was a source of concern throughout the year. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, on concluding a mission to the DRC, called it “catastrophic.” In the face of FARDC advances, the FDLR targeted civilians in reprisal attacks, causing significant additional population displacement. Over 400,000 civilians had been forced to flee their homes since the start of these operations, and of the 2.2 million IDPs in the DRC, 1.7 million of those were estimated to be in the Kivus. Reprisal killings targeting communities suspected of collaborating with the FARDC and MONUC were often accompanied by brutal rapes, which were on the rise throughout the year. Operation Rudia II, the joint FARDCMONUC operation against the LRA in Orientale province, caused the LRA to splinter across three separate areas in the region, making it a regional force not only in composition but also in area of operation. While there was no repeat of the devastating reprisal massacres that followed joint operations Rudia I in September 2008 (the FARDC and MONUC) and Lightning Thunder in December 2008 (the FARDC, Uganda, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army [SPLA], and the United States), LRA attacks against civilians continued unabated. An estimated 1,200 civilians have been killed by the LRA since Rudia I. The civilian costs of the joint operations in the Kivus and Orientale were not limited to reprisal attacks by FDLR and LRA elements. One of the biggest security threats throughout the year was the FARDC itself, which is undisciplined and unpaid, and extorts, loots, and attacks the population with impunity. The fasttrack integration of former CNDP elements into the national army exacerbated these problems, and these elements have been particularly abusive, as they use the same scorched-earth

tactics they employed when operating as the CNDP. In the face of mounting criticism from human rights and humanitarian communities and from capitals, MONUC created Joint Protection Teams (JPTs)—multidisciplinary teams that include human rights, civil affairs, and child protection officers—with the aim to improve MONUC’s early warning and threat assessment capacity. The JPTs are supported by a rapid response and early warning cell, and have been deployed throughout North and South Kivu and parts of Orientale. By the end of 2009, it was clear that MONUC had encountered considerable difficulty in implementing its civilian protection mandate. Despite the creation of JPTs and other technical innovations to enhance protection activities, the inability to provide security to civilians had serious consequences for the mission’s public image and exposed a fundamental contradiction in its mandate, which requires MONUC to prioritize the protection of civilians (see Box 2.3.1) while supporting the military operations of the FARDC—a conglomeration of various armed groups and one of the worst violators of human rights in the country. In the face of increasing scrutiny of MONUC’s support to the FARDC, in December the mission announced that it would cease supporting operations. Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law

Progress in the area of security sector reform was limited in 2009, despite this being an obvious priority for the country. Training, the building of barracks, and the secure payment of salaries have been identified as key steps to consolidating the integration process. However, the lack of a broader national debate on security sector reform policy and the lack of political will to prioritize this issue, combined with a lack of coordination and consensus among member states engaged in bilateral security sector reform initiatives, continued to hamper progress. The pervasiveness of impunity and lack of army discipline throughout the DRC remained a source of concern, as did the slow pace of legislation

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Box 2.3.1 Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations

The operational and political challenges of protecting civilian populations in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and elsewhere have dramatically underscored the growing divide between ambitious mandates issued by the Security Council and the ability and willingness of UN peacekeepers to implement them in the field. This reality has prompted much debate among member states and the UN Secretariat. Further, the failure to deliver on protection-of-civilians mandates has had negative impacts on the broader image of the UN peacekeeping enterprise. With this in mind, during 2009 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) commissioned a study on protection of civilians in peacekeeping contexts to help enhance the ability of UN peacekeeping missions to effectively achieve this frequently mandated task. Released in November 2009, as a point of departure, the study acknowledges the severe difficulty that UN peacekeeping missions have faced in maintaining

legitimacy among host countries due to constant attacks against civilians and lack of proper protection. Similarly important is the fact that peace agreements often do not stop armed violence or widespread human rights abuses, and thus peacekeeping missions are the most visible components of the UN system for the protection of civilians in these contexts. In order for UN peacekeeping to better protect civilians, the study identified a series of challenges to be addressed: a capacity gap between mandates and available required resources; a conceptual gap between policy and strategy, given lack of clarity concerning operational concepts and rules of engagement, especially regarding the use of force; an information collection and analysis gap; a leadership gap, given lack of consistent understanding of planning and strategy for civilian protection across missions; and a readiness gap, as peacekeepers are rarely trained to protect civilians. The study was released with consensus passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1894 on 11 November 2009. The

resolution mandated UN peacekeeping and other relevant missions to assist in creating conditions conducive to safe, timely, and unimpeded humanitarian assistance and in the training of public officials, members of armed forces and armed groups, personnel associated to armed forces, civilian police, and law enforcement on civilian protection. Protecting civilians in conflict zones is a difficult task, especially with the rise of irregular warfare and insurgencies. Distinguishing between who is a civilian and who is party to a conflict is often difficult. Protection is also hindered by the current problem of perpetrators seeing the UN as a legitimate target for violence. The study and the resolution acknowledge that peacekeeping missions are limited in the extent to which they can protect, but also that improvements can be made in utilizing their capacity to do more.

Note: For more information, see Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices .unlb.org/pbps/pages/public/viewdocument.aspx?id=2&docid=1014; and UN Security Council Resolution 1894, 11 November 2009.

related to reform of the national army. The justice sector infrastructure throughout the country remained severely compromised. Due to the ongoing Kimia II operations in the Kivus, MONUC’s training program of FARDC units was suspended for a large part of the year. This was partly due to a lack of logistics and equipment and delays in the payment of salaries, but also because the FARDC did not commit units to participate in the training until late in the year. However, MONUC continued to support other partners, including a Netherlands-funded joint program that was implemented in all provinces to train military justice personnel and FARDC commanders, and

organized a joint program with the United States to train FARDC officers (of whom 400 benefited) on the rule of law and military justice in professional armed forces. The EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) continued its census of the FARDC—a key component of any security sector reform process—and focused on establishing payment procedures for newly integrated battalions, while the EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) devoted its efforts to undertaking a census of the police. Under international pressure to address the lack of discipline in the FARDC, President

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Kabila announced a zero-tolerance policy for violators and established a new operational military court for Kimia II. While the military court has had some success in prosecuting low-ranking perpetrators, it is still not adequately staffed or sufficiently independent to conduct its own investigations. To underscore its support for the zerotolerance policy, late in the year MONUC announced that it would withhold support from battalions that violate international law, though observers note that the mission has yet to impose this conditionality on units led by General Bosco Ntaganda, who was integrated into the FARDC despite the fact that the International Criminal Court had issued a warrant for his arrest. Moreover, of the “list of five” FARDC perpetrators whom the Security Council had asked the DRC government to arrest, two were in Makala prison, a third had been removed from active duty but was still in Goma, a fourth was under loose house arrest, and the fifth had gone missing. In pointing to the lack of accountability in the DRC, many argued that MONUC’s mandate to partner with the FARDC had created a conflict of interest in terms of the mission’s willingness to publicly condemn and report allegations of abuses by the FARDC, particularly during joint operations. During the year, MONUC made some modest progress in enhancing the operational capacity of the Congolese National Police. It convened a meeting of the main police reform stakeholders to strengthen coordination of bilateral efforts,

EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

2 May 2005 (EU Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP) June 2005 General Jean-Paul Michel (France) $9.1 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Staff: 43

and began training 75,000 officers in Kinshasa to provide security during local elections, should they be held. An organic law to guide the police reform process was adopted by the Council of Ministers at the end of June, and then sent to parliament for discussion and adoption. MONUC also continued its support for strengthening the prison system, with an emphasis on the creation of prison farms and other self-sufficiency programs to improve conditions in detention centers. However, the lack of trained staff and the crumbling infrastructure meant continued overcrowding and malnutrition, and provided opportunities for mutiny and escape. In prisons located in populated areas, these conditions created flashpoints for violence. Political Developments

During 2009 the DRC made little headway in tackling the pervasive corruption and reducing the growing influence of the executive over the judiciary and legislature. The security services act with relative impunity, and continue the pattern of targeting political opponents of the president, human rights defenders, and the press. The past year saw a progressive concentration of power in the hands of the president. The weak leadership of the two successive prime ministers, the dysfunction of resourcestarved provincial institutions, the effective marginalization of the National Assembly after Vitale Kamerhe’s forcible removal, and a fragmented and weak political opposition have all contributed to this. Recent instructions from the presidency curtailing the financial independence of the prime minister and the dismissal of judges and civil servants by presidential decree, as well as efforts to revisit constitutional mandates, all point to the use of state institutions in an effort to consolidate this authoritarian trend. The sustainability of the new DRC-Rwanda relationship—which is key to the success of international efforts to stabilize the east—has yet to be determined. Nevertheless, in November 2009 the UN’s Special Envoy to the Great Lakes, Olusegun Obasanjo, scaled back his mediation

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activities on account of the improved ties between the two countries. Insecurity in the region remains high and the prospect of a contested or postponed national election in the DRC, currently scheduled for 2011, is likely to heighten regional tensions. Local elections, scheduled for 2009, were repeatedly postponed and are unlikely to be held before the next national election. Some have argued that not holding local elections while the peace process remains fragile is a positive development, given the stalled process of decentralization and the proposed and hotly contested découpage of new provinces and provincial territories, not to mention the potential of local political races to deepen local cleavages.

Conclusion

It is against this backdrop, and in anticipation of a call by Kinshasa authorities for a MONUC drawdown in 2010 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Congolese independence, that MONUC and the UN Country Team began developing an overarching strategy for the UN system in the DRC. This integrated strategic framework, requested by the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee in mid-2009, follows the twofold recommendation from a UN technical assessment mission to the DRC in March 2009: first, that

EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD Congo)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

12 June 2007 (EU Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP) July 2007 Adilio Custodio (Portugal) $7.0 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Police: 30 Civilian Staff: 7

the benchmarks for drawing down outlined by the Secretary-General in 2007 should remain valid; and second, that given limited resources and relatively nonviolent conditions in the western provinces, the mission should transition all of its peacekeeping resources and activities to the east, while handing over peacebuilding activities in the west to other international partners and state authorities. The extent to which this strategy would enhance MONUC’s capacity to protect civilians, while still allowing it to build a sustainable peace in the DRC that is sufficient to permit a withdrawal of UN forces, remains unclear.

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2.4 Kosovo

On 9 December 2008, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) transferred operational responsibility for law and order to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The latter, which had maintained a core group of staff in Kosovo since spring 2008, expanded rapidly. By the third quarter of 2009, it numbered over 1,600 personnel, including 1,220 civilian police as well as judges and customs officers—not only the largest civilian operation launched by the EU, but also the largest police mission under the aegis of any international organization in the last year. The mission’s performance is a major test of the EU’s ability to sustain large-scale operations and stabilize its neighborhood.

The UNMIK-EULEX transition followed nine months of diplomatic wrangling and sporadic violence sparked by Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008. It was the result of pressure by the EU on Serbia and efforts by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to reach a compromise on Kosovo’s status that would be acceptable to Belgrade. EULEX’s first full year of operations has gone relatively smoothly. Serbs in north Kosovo protested violently early in the year, and smallerscale Serb demonstrations have continued since. There have been repeated attacks on EULEX vehicles by Kosovo Albanian radicals who would like the international presence to end altogether. But neither side has escalated the violence to levels that seriously test EULEX, and local elections in November passed off peacefully. There is growing evidence that significant elements of the Serb minority (5 percent of Kosovo’s inhabitants) want to integrate into the nascent state, although Serbs in north Kosovo retain a far stronger affiliation to Belgrade. These positive signs have raised hopes of an increased normalization of Kosovo’s politics and security situation. NATO, which has over 10,000 troops in Kosovo, is planning radical force reductions. However, normalization may not come fast enough for much of the population. EULEX is often accused of failing to break decisively from UNMIK’s legacy, and enjoyed only 40 percent public approval in September.1 Polls show that the public now holds the government responsible for Kosovo’s political and economic situation; the international presence, despite its size, has to negotiate growing political constraints. 50

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Background

The EU and other international organizations that maintain a presence in Kosovo cannot adapt freely to local political dynamics because of international differences on the province’s status. These differences set the parameters for the transition to EULEX in late 2008. Serbia’s objections aside, the main obstacle to a transition had been divisions within the international community as how to recognize Kosovo’s declaration of independence. In the EU, there were differences between the “recognizing” members and a “non-recognizing” minority (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain). EU planners had been working on how to take over from the UN in Kosovo since 2006—the European Council authorized EULEX shortly before Kosovo declared independence. But although its initial complement of staff deployed to Kosovo in the spring, European splits still had the potential to derail the mission. While EU and US officials dealt directly with Belgrade, the UN laid out a six-point plan (dealing with police, courts, customs, boundaries, infrastructure and transport, and Serb heritage sites) aimed at finding common ground with Serbia on keeping the peace in Kosovo. The immediate focus was north Kosovo, where Serbs are in the majority, and the administration of justice had ground to a halt after the declaration of independence. The plan implied that northern Kosovo would have a de facto special status within Kosovo, while remaining part of one economic and political space. While Belgrade was open to negotiations on this basis, Kosovo’s government rejected it, tabling a four-point plan of its own, focused on asserting its sovereignty. But given the compound problems at the UN, in Brussels, and in Kosovo itself, the EU was not in a position to deploy a mission without some sort of working compromise with Belgrade. All sides finally accepted a Security Council statement of 26 November 2008, approving Ban Ki-moon’s proposal that EULEX should operate “under the overall authority and within the status-neutral framework of the United Nations.”2 In legal terms, this means that the transition did

not imply recognition of Kosovo’s statehood. Although UNMIK remains in place in a much-reduced form, EULEX reports to Brussels. The EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in turn sends reports to the UN Secretary-General, who annexes them to his own reports to the Security Council. The need to balance the interests of EU members is a tricky task for the EU, and it has been reported that some of the “non-recognizing” governments frequently interfere in the mission’s activities. Partly as a result, EULEX decisions are often referred upward to Brussels. Relations between UNMIK and EULEX staff, often strained in 2008, have improved. Both have to sustain relations with three further missions. These include two long-standing elements of the international presence: NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), which remains the ultimate source of security, and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). Both retain a “status-neutral” approach. By contrast, the International Civilian Office (ICO) was set up in 2007 on the presumption that independence was coming: it supervises and supports with the government in Pristina to implement the Comprehensive Status Proposal and is “status-positive.” It answers to an International Steering Group of twenty-five states that recognize Kosovo’s independence. To complicate matters further, the ICO’s head, International Civilian Representative (ICR) Pieter Feith, is “double-hatted” as the EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo—a formula agreed before the current peacekeeping arrangements emerged. This has raised inevitable questions over whether EUSR can really be status-neutral while the ICR is not. For much of 2009, EULEX’s leadership was reportedly wary of being seen to cooperate too closely with Feith, lest this compromise the mission’s neutrality. But the need to address evidence of serious corruption in Kosovo’s government stimulated better cooperation toward the year’s end. Status-neutrality has created other challenges for EULEX. Kosovo’s government is sensitive to EULEX dealing directly with Serbia. This proved particularly problematic in the summer of 2009, when EULEX and Belgrade

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concluded an agreement on sharing information on cross-border crime. EULEX officials saw this as a technical procedure, and were surprised when the government objected on the grounds that the negotiations undercut Kosovo’s sovereignty. The memorandum of understanding was signed after delays on 11 September, in spite of public protests and continued government complaints. The situation in north Kosovo continues to be the primary test of how effectively EULEX can balance Pristina and Belgrade. Although the UN’s 2008 six-point plan is no longer the basis for active negotiations, the north remains detached from Pristina’s rule. Serb-ethnicity police officers in the region report to EULEX rather than Kosovo Police officials (Serbethnicity officers elsewhere in the country are in the normal chain of command), and the north’s courthouse at Mitrovica is staffed by EULEX judges. EULEX customs officials also have freedom of movement in the north, whereas Kosovar officials do not. EULEX’s presence in the area perpetuates an internal division of Kosovo that existed in the UNMIK period, reflected in the six-point plan. UNMIK personnel have also remained in municipalities in north Kosovo. While NATO and the OSCE also have access to the north, ICO officials have had limited freedom of action there since their first office in Mitrovica was attacked in 2008. They have, however, continued to develop contacts in the area from new offices in an Albanian area. While Kosovo’s government would struggle to impose its authority in the north, it believes the status-neutral elements of the international presence—EULEX included—are blocking it from this part of its territory. Status-neutrality, although a convenient political formula, contains contradictions that will continue to trouble the EU.

Key Developments EULEX

Although EULEX had a presence in Kosovo for much of 2008—by 6 June that year, it already

had 100 police officers in place—its full deployment was complicated by the dispute on the province’s status. Nonetheless, it expanded very rapidly in the last quarter of 2008: by 5 December, when it was declared to have reached its initial operating capacity, it already numbered 1,300 international staff (police and civilians). This permitted an “off-on” transition from UNMIK to EULEX on 9 December—at no point did the two missions have joint responsibility for security issues. EULEX’s three components—police, justice, and customs—did not all make the transition equally smoothly. The police passed their first major test by deploying in north Kosovo as well as Albanian-majority areas, although their presence sparked a series of minor incidents. From the transition on, EULEX has had two main sets of duties. The first is to monitor, mentor, and advise the Kosovo Police, a force of some 7,500 officers trained since 1999. The second is to respond directly to security incidents: the Kosovo Police is designated as first responder, with EULEX and KFOR as second and third responders. EULEX has deployed four formed police units in this response role. Two (from Italy and Poland) have been based in Pristina, with two more (from France and Romania) stationed near Mitrovica. Immediately following the transition, EULEX deployed formed police units—alongside customs officials, border police, and KFOR troops—to protect two major crossings from north Kosovo into Serbia that had been destroyed in riots in 2008. Formed police units were also put to use in April and early May in a confrontation with Kosovo Serb demonstrators (some with grenades and light weapons) protesting Albanian construction near Mitrovica. EULEX police used tear gas, and maintained control during fifteen days of demonstrations. Violence has recurred around the construction site (Kroj I Vitakut/Brdjani), and both EULEX police and KFOR have deployed to break up mobs. EULEX’s monitoring role is based on a network of field offices, although staff emphasize

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that they are less intrusive than their UNMIK predecessors. Many are former UNMIK police officers, although all have been revetted by the EU. Unusually, the mission includes roughly seventy US police officers alongside those from Europe. The missions’ mentoring work has taken the form of training programs, of which thirtyfive had been approved by September 2009 following a needs assessment carried out over the summer. A recurrent concern remains—integrating Serb and other ethnic groups into the police. At the beginning of the year, some 325 Serb-ethnicity policemen were refusing to report for work. EULEX scored an early symbolic success in January by forming a mixed unit of Serb, Bosniak, and Albanian officers to patrol in Mitrovica. It gave the absentees a deadline of 30 June to return to work or lose their jobs; 317 did so.3 EULEX has been a target for violence by Albanian as well as Serb radicals. On 25 August, a group of youths who were opposed to any foreign presence in Kosovo damaged twenty-eight EULEX vehicles in a parking lot in central Pristina. But in this and other cases, the attackers have steered clear of violence against EULEX personnel. In the first half of the year, EULEX’s overall approval ratings rose to over 50 percent, but fell again around the time of the dispute over sharing information with Serbia. A fall 2009 survey found that a third of respondents believed EULEX police to be corrupt—a far higher figure than for local police—although there is no evidence of any wrongdoing. EULEX’s second component—justice—includes judges and prosecutors who are primarily responsible for monitoring, mentoring, and advising, but they retain executive responsibilities concerning war crimes, inter-ethnic crimes, and terrorism. This component also includes a special prosecution office that deals with money laundering and organized crime; an office of missing persons and forensics; and a correctional-unit escort group. EULEX’s judges and prosecutors are distributed in regional centers and some also serve with Kosovo Albanian counterparts in the Supreme Court.

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Ethnic Albanian protesters overturn a vehicle during an anti-EULEX rally in Pristina, Kosovo, 25 August 2009.

EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

4 February 2008 9 December 2008 Yves de Kermabon (France) $153.0 million Civilian Police: 1,220 Civilian Staff: 435

The justice pillar has had a troubled history. Although justice personnel were in place from mid-2008, they had a particularly disputatious relationship with UNMIK justice staff. An official UNMIK-EULEX transfer of case-files began with the signature of two memorandums of understanding in December 2008, but the process was not completed until March 2009. The mission has also suffered from an ongoing shortage of qualified judges, legal officers, and interpreters—it was 30 percent short of legal personnel in August. EULEX lawyers have worked hard to make up the shortfall: prosecutors were involved in 467 cases in the first four months of 2009 alone.4 However, some legal staff are concerned that

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Box 2.4.1 Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan

Since the establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) a decade ago, the EU has rested its conflict management reputation on acting as the so-called global civilian power. In theory, the EU is meant to be able to deploy almost 10,000 police officers to faraway theaters, to exploit the expertise of more than 40,000 diplomats, to dip into the world’s largest development budget, and to ensure that its deployed civilians are able to work hand-in-glove with military deployments. This is an essential element of power in a world where stability in Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Somalia is seen as a direct corollary to security across EU capitals. Despite this stated power, the EU’s recent postconflict civilian interventions have struggled to find staff for its missions and have rigidly relied on operational models that are inappropriate for most modern conflict settings. Naturally, the results of the EU’s deployment of civilians have been uneven. The “Bosnia template,”

which seemed appropriate for the EU’s police-training intervention in that country nearly a decade ago, has been applied elsewhere and proved ineffectual. The EU has focused on judicial reform in places where basic security has not been properly established, like Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Congo, or in theaters where locals have no incentive to cooperate politically, like the Palestinian territories. The next generation of security challenges that will face the EU will be fluid and violent, with little to distinguish the good from bad guys. These scenarios will of course require a far stronger emphasis on crisis management skills. Yet the experience the EU has acquired over six years of ESDP missions may not leave it best placed to cope with these challenges. When the EU has deployed into hostile environments, its personnel have usually been protected by UN, US, or NATO troops; when it has managed to deploy speedily and without protection, as in Aceh and

Georgia, its civilian capacities have been put under severe strain. EU civilian missions are woefully ill prepared to deal with threats to their own security, and the EU has struggled to coordinate the activities of its civilians with military forces— even its own peacekeepers. If the EU is to effectively tap into its “civilian power” and constructively assist in the rebuilding of failed states, it will need to drastically rethink the way it designs, deploys, and maintains its foreign interventions. Crisis management situations that the EU can expect to deal with in the coming years will require it to adapt its mechanisms and staff to focus on three factors: speed, security, and self-sufficiency. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the EU’s future interventions will rely on the willingness of its member states to strengthen their own capacities to enable missions to serve a more constructive role.

Source: EU Council on Foreign Relations. Note: For more information, visit http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/civilian_capacities_report_page.

EULEX has placed too great a priority on the quantity of cases covered and too little on the quality of the justice system. They note that many of the Kosovars who approach EULEX to discuss cases have little knowledge of the mission’s role, but are simply looking for a second opinion after losing a case in front of domestic judges. EULEX’s third component—customs— has focused on restoring a customs regime in north Kosovo. After the 2008 declaration of independence, Serb mobs burnt down crossing points into Serbia, while the Kosovo government established checkpoints to the south of the river Ibar (the internal boundary with north Kosovo). This created an excellent environment

for smuggling and trafficking, and Belgrade grew concerned that criminality in north Kosovo was infecting Serbia itself. EULEX’s decision to send customs officers to the destroyed crossing points thus met with cooperation from Serbia. It was less popular with many local Serbs who resented its political symbolism or had profited from smuggling. The customs officers were harried by demonstrators who set up ad hoc barriers and “observation posts,” and EULEX has still not devised a method for raising and distributing revenue at the Serb border. It has been able to monitor traffic reasonably consistently. But it needs to sign memorandums of understanding with both Kosovar and Serb customs officers on

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information-sharing: a tricky proposition given the previous clashes over the police. UNMIK and OMIK

While EULEX’s role expanded, UNMIK completed a process of reconfiguration that left it with a much reduced presence and profile—it is now headquartered in UNMIK’s former logistics base on the outskirts of Pristina. As of 1 July 2009, it had 510 staff, but many UN officials believe that this is surplus to requirements: the figure has been kept artificially high to satisfy the majority of UN members that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence. UNMIK’s residual duties center on facilitating dialogue between communities in Kosovo and between Pristina and Belgrade. But as Ban Ki-moon told the Security Council in September 2009, the Kosovo government “opted to maintain very limited contacts.”5 UNMIK staff members also accompany Kosovar representatives to some regional diplomatic meetings from which they would otherwise be barred, but Kosovo has attempted to limit this as far as possible. UN officials in north Kosovo continue to act as convenient interlocutors for Albanian inhabitants of the north, EULEX, and KFOR. The OSCE’s mission (OMIK) remains its largest field presence, but it is largely sidelined in political discussions—even relative to UNMIK. It has primarily focused on small-scale projects on human rights, assisting displaced persons, and increasing community access to legal information. It provided advice and planning support to Kosovo’s central election commission in preparing for November’s local elections—as did UNMIK—but did not monitor them or oversee ballot-counting. ICO

After a difficult year in 2008, during which it struggled to define its role in light of Kosovo’s disputed status, the International Civilian Office gained momentum in 2009. It played a significant role in preparing the legislature to create a Kosovo security council, civil aviation authority, and intelligence agency. ICO officials typically argue that they see themselves as part

UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

• Authorization and Start Date

• SRSG • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) (note: paragraph 19 of the resolution states that international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise) Lamberto Zannier (Italy) $46.8 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Military Observers: 9 Police: 6 International Civilian Staff: 148 Local Civilian Staff: 283 UN Volunteers: 26

For detailed mission information see p. 294

OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)

• Authorization and Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

1 July 1999 (PC.DEC/305) Ambassador Werner Almhofer (Austria) $36.0 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Staff: 172

of a governance-building project rather than a traditional peace operation. In October 2009, they facilitated the settlement of a border dispute between Kosovo and Macedonia, leading to the establishment of full diplomatic relations. The ICO’s other main activity has been to oversee the creation of five new municipalities (and enlargement of one existing one) to give Kosovo Serb communities greater autonomy. This has long been seen as necessary for equitable peace in Kosovo, and follows similar initiatives elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, such as eastern Slavonia. By November 2009, the ICO had made progress on developing all but two of the new municipalities—reflecting willingness among

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Serbs outside the north to cooperate with government and its international allies. The holdouts were north Mitrovica and Partesh. There was evidence that a good number of Serbs in the main part of Kosovo participated in the local elections, in spite of calls for a boycott from traditional Serb leaders and political parties. While the ICO maintains four regional offices, in addition to an office in Mitrovica, there have been persistent rumors that it will streamline itself and focus solely on Pristina. It has also been suggested that the post of EU Special Representative may be decoupled from the ICO to reduce the potential frictions with EULEX. The ICO has not yet confirmed any of this speculation. KFOR

KFOR remains the single largest international mission in Kosovo, and the most popular among Kosovars—although its popularity ratings have fallen from 80–90 percent to around 70 percent, possibly because it maintains statusneutrality. It also enjoys a degree of trust among Kosovo Serbs, who see it as a more reliable protector than EULEX or the Kosovo Police. But, with NATO nations committed elsewhere, there have been calls for KFOR to shrink. KFOR received an unpleasant surprise in March 2009, when Spain announced that it was withdrawing its contingent—an implicit protest

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

• Authorization and Start Date • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) Lieutenant-General Markus Bentler (Germany) $43.0 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Troops: 12,631

against Kosovo’s independence. The move was more politically than militarily significant, as Spain accounted for only 650 troops. NATO ministers have concluded that a more general drawdown is possible. In June, they announced that KFOR would shrink from its then size of 13,800 to 10,000 by January 2010—and undergo further reductions in two phases over two years. The goal is to have only 2,500 troops in Kosovo by the end of this period, providing a deterrent. There has been talk of shifting KFOR to a lighter, deterrent posture before—it remains to be seen whether the process will take place on schedule or be slowed by future shocks. In the meantime, KFOR has overseen the training of the Kosovo Security Force, meant to tackle crisis management, civil protection, and mine clearing (but not all-out war). It replaces the Kosovo Protection Corps, which initially consisted of former anti-Serb guerrillas but had little operational use. The Kosovo Security Force reached an initial operating capacity of 1,400 by September 2009, and is slated to reach a final strength of 2,500.

Conclusion

Kosovo has had a fairly quiet year, in which violence by both Albanians and Serbs has failed to disrupt the successful transition to a new peacekeeping structure. However, challenges remain. Evidence of corruption within the government is growing, and Kosovo’s leaders are willing to play on public resentment toward the ongoing international presence. Matters may come to a head in 2010, when the International Court of Justice will announce an opinion on Kosovo’s status, further to a 2008 resolution referring the issue by the UN General Assembly. A number of EU members, including Cyprus, Romania, and Spain, are set to make presentations against Kosovo’s independence before the Court in proceedings that began in December 2009.

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Notes 1. Public opinion figures in this chapter are taken from UNDP and USAID, Early Warning Report no. 26, November 2009. 2. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2008/692, 24 November 2008. 3. Of the remaining eight, one had died in the meantime. 4. For this and other very useful data on EULEX’s early performance, see Giovanni Grevi, “EULEX Kosovo,” in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, eds., European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999–2009) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), pp. 353. 5. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2009/497, 30 September 2009.

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2.5 Somalia

The situation has prompted a significant international response that, beyond immediate humanitarian and stability concerns, reflects broader regional and global security interests relating to both terrorism and piracy. Among the many foreigners within the insurgency against the TFG being waged by the extremist Al-Shabaab group are individuals identified as members of al Qaeda. Concerted international action has seen some reduction in the number of successful pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, despite a rise in the number of attacks overall. The UN Security Council effectively eschewed the immediate prospect of sending a UN-led peacekeeping operation to Somalia early in 2009; however, it did adopt an incremental approach to engagement, mandating a unique support operation through the Department of Field Support, which provides crucial logistical and resource assistance to the AMISOM operation. Meanwhile, the UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) has been active in pursuing a political solution to the crisis, while the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has engaged in police training. The range of institutional operations is matched by a constellation of regional and bilateral actors who have also pledged their support to building up nascent— if not nonexistent—Somali security and justice bodies. Considering the escalation of violence during 2009, establishing security in Somalia and pursuing political settlement to the conflict remain operational priorities. Despite this, much of the international activity surrounding Somalia rightfully recognizes that real security will only be achieved through establishing an environment where the rule of law prevails. But with the vast

Somalia remained violent and chaotic throughout 2009, with the violence reaching unprecedented levels in the second half of the year. Still only partially deployed and poorly equipped to address a crisis of this magnitude, the African Union’s peacekeeping presence, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), struggled to protect itself—let alone the Transitional Federal Goverment (TFG)—from large-scale attacks after the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. As a consequence of the intensified fighting and worsening drought, the humanitarian situation deteriorated badly. By October 2009, fighting had displaced more than 255,000 people. In total, 1.5 million Somalis have been displaced since early 2007.1 58

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amount of actors engaged—and beyond the political will of the conflict’s protagonists—the establishment of a more secure and stable Somalia will rest significantly on the ability to coordinate the international community’s broad yet mutually reinforcing peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in a strategic manner.

Background

The current crisis in Somalia has a long history, and the situation facing peacekeepers is correspondingly complex. There have been fourteen international attempts to reconstitute the Somali government over the course of the last 19 years—each has failed to bring a broadly recognized central government to the country. Ironically, this lack of central and formal governing structures has yielded an impressive level of organic sub-state structures. As a result the country can be pictured as a loose constellation of commercial city-states where local/sharia law is imposed. Between these polities there are vast expanses of pastoral lawlessness, where population levels are low and little business occurs.2 Each polity functions differently, enforcing its own norms, while largely opposing authority from outside sources. The violent unraveling of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 left Mogadishu in ruins and precipitated violent conflict among opposition movements. Fighting led to famine and by 1992 it was estimated that around 350,000 Somalis had perished from malnutrition and associated disease and a further million had fled the country. The humanitarian situation led to peacekeeping interventions by the UN (UNOSOM I and II) and the US (UNITAF). While the operations provided a measure of security for the delivery of humanitarian aid, they failed to establish widespread stability and reconciliation in Somalia. With significant casualties among their ranks, peacekeepers left Somalia in 1995, with the country as unsettled as it was when they arrived, and would not return for more than a decade. In April 1995, the Secretary-General established UNPOS, which through contacts with Somali and regional stakeholders aims to achieve a

political solution to the conflict. While the intervening years witnessed a multitude of peace processes that dissolved on factional lines, in 2004 a peace process in Nairobi, Kenya, supported by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), led to the creation of the Transitional Federal Government for Somalia. The TFG was intended to govern the country until the anticipated end of the transitional period in 2011. Parliament met in Nairobi but immediately became divided over two key issues: proposed deployment of foreign peacekeepers to pacify Mogadishu, and a proposal to locate the seat of government in a provisional capital rather than in Mogadishu. From March 2005 onward, the Mogadishu-based members of parliament refused to meet in Nairobi and insisted that parliament be convened in the national capital. It did not meet again for nearly a year. Upon taking office, TFG president Abdullahi Yusuf appealed to the international community for a 20,000-strong multidimensional peacekeeping force, to be deployed by IGAD. The mission never came to fruition and out of the ongoing anarchy emerged the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). A direct opponent of the TFG, beginning in 2005 the ICU gradually and largely peacefully established its control over large swaths of Somalia, instituting strict sharia law. By June 2006 the ICU controlled the capital, Mogadishu, and much of the country. The level of stability that the ICU imparted won it much support as unified and predictable administration appeared for the first time in eighteen years. But the period of relative calm ended in December 2006 when Ethiopia, with political backing from its allies, invaded Somalia and took the capital. What looked like an early success soon turned to fierce resistance—an estimated million people fled the fighting and humanitarian indicators plunged to 1992 levels. Peacekeepers Return

With the security situation dire, in February 2007, following indications to establish a peacekeeping operation in Somalia from the AU, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of AMISOM for an initial six-month period at

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AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

6 December 2006 (UNSC Res. 1744) March 2007 Major-General Nathan Mugisha (Uganda) $134.0 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Troops: 5,122

a strength of 8,000 troops.3 AMISOM is mandated with protecting the Transitional Federal Government, supporting political dialogue and national reconciliation, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and supporting reestablishment of the Somali security forces. AMISOM’s deployment in 2007, however, was largely predicated on the implied and future involvement of UN peacekeepers. In proposing the operation, the AU’s Peace and Security Council stressed its role as a bridging mission that would base its exit strategy on the eventual handover to a multidimensional UN presence. Despite this, and in the face of constantly rising levels of violence, AMISOM remained the only peacekeeping presence deployed in Somalia at the end of 2009. The presence of peacekeepers and the Ethiopian forces in 2007 brought about an insurgency by the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), a TFG opposition group based in Asmara and bent on ridding Somalia of foreign forces. Shaikh Sharif Ahmed, chair of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), was elected chair of the ARS. UNPOS-mediated talks between the ARS and TFG began in May 2008 in Djibouti and eventually brought about a political settlement and agreement for the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces and the deployment of an “international security presence” to replace them. But the period that followed the agreement was marked by the fragmentation of the main signatories, the ARS and the TFG. The ARS split into two factions: the so-called moderates, who signed the Djibouti Agreement, and the more

hard-line elements based in Asmara, who were not party to the agreement. Critics of the Djibouti Agreement have cited its lack of inclusivity as a harbinger of failure. Meanwhile, the TFG was also shaken by rifts between President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Nur Adde Hussien over the prime minister’s willingness to engage with Islamists, who had been labeled as terrorists by President Yusuf. This tension peaked dramatically in December 2008, when President Yusuf sacked Prime Minister Nur and replaced him with a new nominee. Yusuf’s move was met with considerable Somali and international resistance. This eventually led to the resignation of Yusuf himself at the close of the year, demonstrating the tremendous political challenges ahead.

Key Developments Political

The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in early 2009 and the subsequent election of moderate Shaikh Sharif Ahmed (formerly head of the ICU, then the ARS) as president of the TFG provided a small window of hope that some progress and reconciliation would come to Somalia. With Yusef and the Ethiopian troops gone, the rallying cry of the opposition was thought to have disappeared. The TGF returned to Mogadishu from having operated remotely in Nairobi, Kenya, for years and there were more prospects for peace than there had been for a long time. Nevertheless, Sharif and the TFG are recognized as being supported by the international community, an issue that has drawn the ire of Sharif’s former colleagues among the hard-line insurgent groups loosely aligned under the umbrella of Al-Shabaab. Thus far, Shaikh Ahmed has been unable to defeat the Islamist insurgents, but has had some limited success in enticing rebel leaders away from the insurgency and into the government. Despite this, 2009 has witnessed the worst fighting in Somalia in over a year, while the humanitarian situation has spiraled, restricting critical humanitarian aid delivery and

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Security

There were increasing attacks on the TFG throughout the year that aimed to dislodge it from the capital. The cabinet and parliament nevertheless continued to hold sessions in Mogadishu. On 18 April, in an effort to meet some of the demands of opposition groups, they unanimously voted to endorse the implementation of sharia law in the country. A cross-section of Somali society, including clan elders and scholars, welcomed the endorsement as a positive step and called upon the opposition groups to stop the fighting. The fighting, however, intensified and on 20 June Somalia’s cabinet declared a state of emergency, saying that the attacks posed a serious threat to the country and region. Humanitarian aid slowed significantly as a result. During July, insurgents came within one hundred meters of overtaking the presidential palace in Mogadishu before being repulsed by AMISOM and government forces. The AU called upon the UN to impose a sea blockade and a no-fly zone to stop the flow of weapons and other supplies to the insurgents. Al-Shabaab, meanwhile, confirmed the presence of foreign fighters within its ranks and stated openly that it had been working with al Qaeda in Mogadishu to remove the

TFG. Beyond Mogadishu, the security situation has deteriorated markedly, with government and allied militia challenging insurgent forces for control over strategically important towns. The second half of the year saw a shift toward asymmetric insurgent attacks, including suicide bombings and assassinations. Among many other attacks, a December suicide bombing at a medical school graduation saw three TFG members killed. The instability on mainland Somalia continued to breed insecurity off its coast. Pirate activity launched from Somalia’s shores—already a significant problem during 2008—rose by 30 percent during the first half of 2009, even though later in the year there was evidence of a reduction in the number of successful attacks.4 Beyond the security implications, the effect of the hijackings and hostage-taking by the pirates had a considerable financial dimension, as the insecurity cut off crucial shipping lanes between Europe and Asia and caused significant increases in insurance costs for shippers; the pirates’ ransom demands regularly reached into the millions of dollars. The international community reacted in force to the piracy issue, with multiple countries

REUTERS/Abdi Guled

leaving more than half of the population in need of assistance. In the meantime, President Sharif’s admission that he sanctioned the hunting down of suspected terrorists in Somalia by the United States caused disquiet among many Somalis— who have no love for al Qaeda but equally do not want to see others’ wars fought on their land. Similar principles also provide Al-Shabaab’s justification for the frequent attacks on AMISOM. UNPOS continued to be quite active in Somalia and the region, convening consultations between key stakeholders in Somalia and coordinating political and peacebuilding activities across the UN, AU, and IGAD, including overseeing mapping exercises for TFG security structures. However, the impact of UNPOS’s ongoing work is questionable, as violence showed no sign of abating throughout the year.

AMISOM troops on patrol in Mogadishu, Somalia, 7 May 2009.

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deploying warships to protect humanitarian and commercial cargo vessels. In late 2008 the Security Council issued a resolution that allowed willing member states to pursue pirates on Somali territory, provided they first gain the consent of the TFG.5 In February 2009, the European Union’s first maritime mission, the EU Naval Force (NAVFOR), also known as Atalanta, reached its operational capacity for protecting humanitarian and commercial vessels. Finally, in early 2009, the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was established, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008), to coordinate the extensive work of bilateral and institutional actors in their attempts to suppress piracy in Somalia. Recognizing that the piracy threat represented a manifestation of the chaos in Somalia proper, a donor conference was held in Brussels during April 2009. There, international donors pledged some $213 million to restoring Somalia’s rule of law and security sector institutions, the aim of which is to build a security force of 5,000 soldiers and a police force of 10,000 officers capable of enforcing the law.6 The influences of regional actors continued to fuel instability by supporting insurgents. In response, the Security Council in late 2009 imposed sanctions on Eritrea for its continued supporting role to Al-Shabaab. Peacekeeping

AMISOM’s ability to impact the situation remained minimal primarily on account of the ongoing conflict—violence that AMISOM frequently became the object of. On 17 September 2009, two vehicles carrying explosives drove into the AMISOM-controlled area and detonated, killing at least twenty-one people, including seventeen peacekeepers—one of whom was the deputy force commander. The vehicles used in the attack were identified as UN vehicles that had been stolen by Al-Shabaab during raids at UN compounds earlier in 2009. The September assault was the most brazen and large-scale attack on AMISOM during the year and is indicative of AMISOM’s operational context. On account

of the hostile environment, incomplete deployment, and still developing logistical suport AMISOM remained limited to operating in Mogadishu, providing security for the airport and the seat of government. In the wake of the September attack, the AU’s Special Envoy pushed for a stronger mandate, saying: “The time has come to re-examine AMISOM’s mandate so that we can have the power to act when and as necessary.” AMISOM too has called for stronger rules of engagement. But stronger mandates and rules of engagement do not necessarily defeat insurgents and can easily bring their own set of operational challenges. Similarly, the envisioned expansion of rules of engagement would also necessitate a significant amount of specialized resources and more personnel, two aspects that have only just started coming online for AMISOM. From the beginning, AMISOM has struggled to obtain enough troops, with Burundi and Uganda being the only two contributing countries. In the course of 2009, both sent new battalions, increasing deployment strength from 3,450 troops at start of year to slightly above 5,000, a considerable improvement but still short of the authorized total strength of 8,000. A number of countries have pledged to contribute, but the only pledge to have materialized to date is that of Djibouti, which is currently preparing one battalion for expected deployment in January 2010.7 Despite significant pressure from the previous US administration for a UN deployment, in February the UN sent a technical assessment mission to Somalia to determine how the organization could assist AMISOM. While the resultant report is mainly concerned with the technical and logistical aspects of UN support to AMISOM, it also sets out the basic thresholds necessary for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. These criteria are (a) the formation of a government of national unity in Somalia, inclusive beyond those represented in the Djibouti process; (b) the establishment and initial operation of a joint security force in Mogadishu; (c) the implementation of a credible cease-fire; (d) the lifting of illegal checkpoints;

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Box 2.5.1 Confronting Piracy off Somalia: The Challenge of Coordination

Piracy off Somalia’s coast has struck a chord of common security across a diverse group of international actors. By the end of 2009, nearly fifty UN member states— ranging from the United States and China to Russia and Iran—seven international organizations, and three multinational coalitions (EU-, NATO-, and US-led) were all working in some manner toward providing a measure of security from this piracy and armed robbery. This activity emerges from a range of motivations, from protecting humanitarian aid vessels and cargo ships supplying the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to providing security to the vital Gulf of Aden shipping lanes. This unprecedented level of activity has yielded some positive results. Nevertheless, piracy emerging from Somalia continues to remain a substantial concern, and coordinating the activities of this wide range of actors remains a primary operational challenge. As stipulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008), which extended the legal authority to the international

community to combat Somalia’s pirates on the high seas and Somalia’s territory, in January 2009 the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was established. The CGPCS serves as an international cooperation mechanism, a common point of contact on all aspects of combating piracy for the international community through quarterly meetings with stakeholders at UN headquarters. The CGPCS is composed of four working groups: operational coordination, chaired by the United Kingdom; legal matters, chaired by Denmark; strengthening shipping self-awareness, headed by the United States; and communications and media strategy, chaired by Egypt. Similarly, the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) group, established in 2008, is a voluntary international military group that serves as a vehicle for sharing best practices and informal discussions on combating piracy. While SHADE initially only consisted of the three multinational coalitions operating off Somalia, it rapidly expanded to involve bilateral

(e) active outreach by the parties to groups that remain outside the Djibouti process; (f) consent to the deployment by all the major parties; and (g) adequate pledges of troops and the required military capacities by UN member states. UN Support to AMISOM

With the Secretary-General’s criteria for UN peacekeeping far from being met, the UN Security Council did not authorize a UN force for Somalia. Instead the Security Council followed the recommendations of the Secretary-General, opting for a phased approach to involvement in Somalia, beginning first with logistical support and with political to further consider a peacekeeping deployment as the situation develops. In this vein, Security Council Resolution 1863 authorized and established an unprecedented logistical support package for AMISOM—the

deployments. This forum meets on a monthly basis at the expert level in Bahrain. During 2009, SHADE meetings contributed to coordinated and focused antipiracy operations and an increased sharing of command and communications assets across SHADE participants. While these innovative coordination efforts, combined with the deployment of naval vessels and aircraft, served to thwart a number of successful pirate attacks during the year, the frequency of attempted pirate activity remained high. This reality underscored the need for a further level of coordination in regard to addressing the root causes of Somalia’s piracy problem ashore. The justice and security sectors in Somalia are far from capable of both addressing the source of piracy and dealing with captured pirates. Nevertheless, a similarly diverse constellation of bilateral and multilateral actors are involved in building these structures, and their success will rest significantly on harmonizing their individual approaches.

UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA)— to help it achieve its mandated tasks in preparation for a potential UN peacekeeping mission.8 The UNSOA logistics package consists of equipment and critical mission support services normally provided for a United Nations peacekeeping operation. UNSOA is funded from UN-assessed contributions and through the trust fund established during the Somalia donor conference in Brussels in April 2009. UNSOA is headquartered near the AMISOM headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, and logistics operations are facilitated through Mombasa and Entebbe, Uganda.9 Although UNSOA did not become operational until mid-2009, it has already begun to deliver in some critical areas. However, UNSOA is still hampered by UN bureaucracy and by a lack of recognition of the need for speed in such a

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hostile environment, although it has creatively sought to overcome such obstacles. Security and Rule of Law Institutions

The transitional security arrangements established by the Somali parties under the Djibouti process comprise three key institutions: a joint security committee, a joint security force, and Somalia’s national police force. Their role is to deliver on the aims of the agreement, including promoting a peaceful environment and facilitating protection of civilians and delivery of humanitarian assistance. Yet a critical challenge in such an environment is to put in place mechanisms for civilian governance and accountability. The Security Council called upon the TFG to develop a legal and policy framework for the operation of its security forces, and the UN has pledged support in this. In July, the TFG created a commission for security and pacification of the country, tasked with reforming the security forces of Somalia and all law enforcement agencies. Meanwhile, a police advisory committee—one of the civilian oversight structures that was established and assigned to all eighteen Mogadishu police districts, following a 2008 Amnesty International report that documented gross violations of human rights allegedly committed by government forces—has continued to operate in Mogadishu, where it is monitoring the situation of detainees. The committee, whose role is to ensure that police officers respect the rule of law and human rights law, includes parliamentarians, clan elders, journalists, representatives of the business community, and representatives of the national women’s association. At present Somalia’s national police force consists of 2,770 officers trained by the UNDP, with a planned expansion to 10,000 officers. Problems with stipend payments during 2008 seem to have been resolved, but the police are also badly in need of more equipment and basic infrastructure. AMISOM’s police commissioner arrived in Mogadishu on 18 June 2008 and 615 trainers, advisers, and mentors have been provisionally selected and are on standby, although

the current security situation prevents their deployment. The security situation also makes it impossible for the UNDP, which partners with AMISOM, to undertake work in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia, although it is still able to program in Puntland and Somaliland. The police, however, can achieve little unless they are part of an effective justice system. Since the killing of several judges during 2008, the formal justice system in Somalia—always limited—has virtually broken down. Years of conflict and mismanagement combined with very poor infrastructure have also resulted in deplorable prison conditions, and there is a risk of a deepening human rights crisis within the prison system. Overall, the development of Somalia’s security sector lacks an overarching stragey and a shared understanding of immediate priorities. Donors have tended to channel development funds toward civilian police, but the most pressing security challenges presented by insurgents require military responses. In an effort to address this divide, the Joint Security Commitee was reinvigorated as a mechanism to strengthen coordination and planning among the TFG, AU, UN, and donor countries.

Conclusion

AMISOM faces a complex and dangerous environment, especially as Somalia enters the end of its transitional period in 2011. This is made more difficult by the fact that outside actors have a series of overlapping, and at times conflicting, strategic objectives in relation to Somalia, from building peace to pursuing regional interests to fighting the war against Al-Qaeda. Somalia has an unusually wide range of peacekeeping actors. In addition to UNPOS, the UN now has UNSOA. Politically, not only the UN and the AU but also IGAD and the League of Arab States have interests in what happens in Somalia. There has been progress in the past year in developing a single platform of engagement on Somalia between the UN, the AU, and IGAD, and this will continue to be vital. Important also

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is that UNPOS and UNSOA develop a single strategy, with clearly defined roles for each. Regardless of international involvement, the fate of Somalia is dependent upon the actions of

Somalia’s clan and regional structures and their willingness to both engage and respect the legitimacy of central governing structures.

Notes 1. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2009/503, 2 October 2009. 2. K. Menkhaus, “Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism,” Adelphi Papers (May 2004), p. 27. 3. UN Security Council Resolution 1744, UN RES1744, 20 February 2007. 4. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/sept/129143.htm. 5. UN Security Council Resolution 1851, 16 December 2008. 6. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ln86947.htm. 7. Interview with AMISOM, 13 October 2009. 8. UN Security Council Resolution 1863, 16 January 2009. 9. Ibid.

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2.6 Sudan

The crises in Sudan continued to present fundamental challenges to the UN’s peacekeeping deployments during 2009. Despite the presence of over one-third of the UN’s total peacekeepers in the field, the situations facing civilians and peacekeepers in both Darfur and the south remain extremely unsettled, an area of particular concern as Sudan enters a volatile period in advance of its first nationwide elections in over two decades. In the absence of a plausible peace agreement, violence and insecurity were widespread in Darfur. While open conflict between rebel groups and government forces leveled, the incidence of armed crime and banditry spiked, acutely impacting civilian populations and the

delivery of humanitarian aid. In the face of consistent operational obstruction by the conflict’s protagonists, the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)—still only partially deployed by year end—had limited impact on the ongoing insecurity and increasingly became the object of attacks, multiple kidnappings, and car-jackings throughout the year. Insecurity in Darfur was perpetuated by an overall lack of political progress. Multiple attempts aimed at negotiating a more inclusive settlement with Darfur’s rebel groups were fruitless, and relations between Sudan and regional foe Chad remained tense throughout the year. Complicating the political picture—both in Sudan and internationally—was the indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir and the government of Sudan’s subsequent expulsion of thirteen humanitarian aid nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Darfur. Flaring intercommunal violence in the south ahead of major Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation milestones—national elections in 2010 and the 2011 referendum on the south’s independence—brought international attention back to the north-south conflict. The violence in the south resulted in more than 2,000 deaths and over 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), making the conflict in the south more intense compared to that in Darfur during the year. While the decision by The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the disputed Abeyei region partially resolved one of the sticking points of implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, continued disputes on border demarcation, disputed census results, and difficulty passing electionrelated legislation plagued north-south relations, 66

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implicating the feasibility of free and fair elections. While the CPA ended the war between the north and the south, its implementation process has a substantial effect on the situation in Darfur as well as the broader region, and thus neither peacekeeping theater should be viewed in isolation. Nevertheless, by year end the viability of the CPA was deeply in question. Considering the very real potential for a relapse into conflict and the potential for broader regional implications, Sudan will remain a preoccupation for the international community for some time to come.

Darfur: Background

UNAMID emerged in part from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was deployed in June 2004, a year after the commencement of large-scale hostilities in Darfur. Initially a force of 60 observers with 300 troops to protect them, AMIS was later expanded to 6,171 personnel and given a more robust mandate, including protection of civilians. The mission lacked the capacity to implement this mandate, however, and was constrained financially and logistically. The government of Sudan, strongly resistant to a UN operation in Darfur, agreed in mid2007 to the deployment of a hybrid AU-UN force. Security Council Resolution 1769 authorized the deployment of UNAMID under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mission was to be composed of 26,000 uniformed personnel, including 19,555 military, 3,772 police, and 19 formed police units of 140 officers each, and to incorporate AMIS personnel already in the field. UNAMID is mandated to help provide security for the provision of humanitarian assistance and protect civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence, as well as to monitor compliance with cease-fire agreements, report on the security situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic, and assist with implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). However, the DPA was signed by only one of the three major rebel movements, and the security

AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Acting Joint AU-UN Special Representative • Force Commander • Police Commissioner • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

31 July 2007 (UNSC Res. 1769) Implement mandated tasks no later than 31 December 2007 General Henry Anyidoho (Ghana) Lieutenant-General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda) Michael J. Fryer (South Africa) $1,598.9 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 14,803 Military Observers: 207 Police: 4,280 International Civilian Staff: 1,093 Local Civilian Staff: 2,481 UN Volunteers: 390

For detailed mission information see p. 258

situation deteriorated in its wake as the movements fragmented. UNAMID took over from AMIS on 1 January 2008 amid ongoing hostilities and displacements and in the absence of a credible peace agreement. From the start, relations with Khartoum were a strong focus, with difficult and slow-moving negotiations ensuing over UNAMID’s use of land, air, and water rights, and over a status of forces agreement. Meanwhile, it was necessary to establish communications and support mechanisms for the hybrid AU-UN model, including the staffing of a Joint Support Coordination Mechanism in Addis Ababa, but this did not become operational until November 2008. The deployment of UNAMID—in compliance with demands by the Sudanese government and as stipulated in Resolution 1769—was to have a “predominantly African character.” However, existing African battalions in Darfur and those poised to deploy did not meet UN standards of “self-sustainability,” limiting their ability to carry out the mandate. Thus, UNAMID’s first urgent task was to help African battalions meet the required standards in order for the

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mission to reach its full deployment. Meanwhile, the security situation continued to deteriorate in Darfur, with the DPA under severe questioning and as rebel groups splintered into a complex constellation. Nevertheless and because of ongoing insecurity, immense logistical issues in reaching Darfur, and particularly the continued operational and administrative obstruction of the Sudanese government in granting visas and meeting customs requirements, by the end of 2009—almost two years since the mission had been authorized—UNAMID’s uniformed military personnel stood at about three-quarters deployed. This, however, represented a 40 percent growth in UNAMID’s military deployment during 2009. Similarly, UNAMID’s police contingents were just over 69 percent deployed at the end of 2009, with thirteen of the nineteen mandated formed police units on the ground. Furthermore, throughout 2009, UNAMID consistently lacked a number of capabilities vital to the implementation of its mandate, including eighteen medium-lift helicopters. Five Ethiopian attack helicopters were set to arrive in theater by the end of 2009, following the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding in May.

Darfur: Key Developments Security Even with increased contingents, UNAMID’s impact on the ongoing conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the various rebel groups in Darfur was limited. UNAMID’s difficulties were compounded by the persistent constraints placed on its freedom of movement imposed by the government of Sudan and the various rebel groups. By the end of November, government and other forces had barred the mission’s operations over forty times, often issuing threats of attack should UNAMID defy its land and air restrictions. This obstinacy was also extended to the NGO community operating in Darfur, whose UNAMID-funded quickimpact projects were frequently blocked.

In this contrast, UNAMID continued its military operations. In the second half of 2009 the mission instituted its first long-range patrols to monitor the security situation and to protect and build confidence among the population. Similarly, UNAMID expanded its around-the-clock patrols of IDP camps, from only one location during 2008 to seventeen by the end of the year. However, security during day-to-day activities outside the camps, such as gathering water and fuel, remained lacking. Beyond the conflict between the SAF and rebel groups, an alarming rise in attacks, kidnappings, car-jackings, and violent robberies aimed at UNAMID military and civilian staff, as well as humanitarian aid workers in Darfur, severely hampered their operations. Between August and October alone, nearly twenty UNAMID vehicles were car-jacked; in addition, the mission reported multiple instances of robbery and four kidnappings of NGO aid workers and UNAMID staff for ransom. In response, UNAMID continued to impose curfew and other restrictions on nighttime driving for civilian staff. The gravest of these attacks happened in December, when ambushes on UNAMID’s Rwanda contingents saw five peacekeepers killed. The criminality and banditry also hampered recruitment of civilian staff for the mission. At the end of October, UNAMID’s civilan staff complement stood at only 70 percent deployed. While UNAMID was initially deployed to address an ongoing, high-intensity conflict, it has become apparent that a heavy military focus is not particularly suited to addressing the evolving conflict in Darfur as it takes on a less intense but equally disruptive and violent character. The absence of a credible rule of law system in the Darfur region to address the myriad security issues facing both the civilian population and the international presence added to the instability. Ironically, what rule of law and security institutions that do exist in Darfur were frequently involved in obstructing the mission from achieving its goals via unwarranted arrests and intimidation. UNAMID continued supporting the development of the security and justice sectors in

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Darfur, training over 200 community police throughout the year and making operational 59 community policing centers. However, access to justice remained limited throughout, with multiple cases of prolonged pretrial detention reported. To address this paucity, UNAMID, in collaboration with UN partners and the government of Sudan, began work on establishing mobile courts in eight localities throughout Darfur that lack judicial services. Political

The political situation surrounding Darfur during 2009, and throughout Sudan more generally, should largely be viewed in the context of the International Criminal Court’s 4 March issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir for alleged war crimes perpetrated in Darfur. This arrest warrant—the first issued by the ICC for a sitting head of state—had a divisive impact: the UN Security Council did not use its power to stop the warrant from being issued, while there were legitimate concerns from many countries and the African Union that pursuit of justice through the ICC could block a political settlement to the Darfur conflict. Unsurprisingly, the overall political situation remained tense, and commitment toward striking an agreement absent on all sides. In response to the ICC indictment, the government of Sudan expelled thirteen NGO aid groups operating in Darfur. While UNAMID and the government instituted stopgap measures to ensure the continued delivery of critical humanitarian aid, the feasibility of extending aid provision in the absence of the NGO community remained in question. A lack of forward progress on the political front was not on account of a lack of effort put forth by the international community. The first half of 2009 saw a flurry of political activity surrounding Darfur. During February the government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—the largest and most powerful of Darfur’s rebel groups—agreed in Doha, under Qatari mediation and AU-UN Mediator Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, to a set of concessions that would hopefully lead the way for more substantive peace talks. JEM was joined in

these preliminary negotiations by the Sudan Liberation Army–Unity (SLA-Unity) and the United Resistance Front (URF) in April. Nevertheless, this initial positive sign failed to deliver tangible progress, with rebel groups again fragmenting and refusing to attend talks by the end of the year. Also, in Doha, the government of Sudan and Chad reached an agreement in early May to stop arming their militias and opposition groups in the border region, a move seen as central to establishing peace in Darfur. The parties also chose to reconvene the Dakar Contact Group, as agreed during negotiations in 2008, and develop an action plan for the deployment of a border observation force. Yet the force was not discussed further and the situation between the two showed little improvement, with Chadian armed forces and the SAF periodically engaging in attacks along the border. December, however, did see steps toward normalization of relations, with high-level visits to both capitals. For its part, the African Union attempted to find an African-led solution to the Darfur crisis in early 2009, assigning former South African president Thabo Mbeki as head of the AU Panel on Darfur (AUPD). Broadly citing the conflict in Darfur as a manifestation of the historical inequity in Sudan, the AUPD aimed to address issues of accountability and reconciliation in Darfur. In its report, the AUPD called for a “global political agreement” whereby all stakeholders would commit to peace in Darfur. Further, the AUPD called for the establishment of hybrid criminal courts—to comprise judges from Sudan as well as other African nations—to try the alleged perpetrators of the most serious crimes committed during the Darfur conflict. The AUPD’s proposition was initially rejected by the government of Sudan, which said that the creation of any such court would violate its constitution and undermine its sovereignty. The United States assigned a Special Envoy to Sudan, Major-General Scott Gration, at the start of the year, demonstrating the new US administration’s policy focus on ending the crises in Sudan. Despite the Gration-facilitated 23 August signing of a unity deal between four

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major rebel factions (the URF and three Sudan Liberation Army [SLA] splinter groups) in Addis Ababa, work toward aligning the rebel movements in Darfur into a cohesive front did not go far. Negotiations in Doha were set to resume in early 2010. Meanwhile, in August, the AU-UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Rodolphe Adada, resigned from the mission, citing that the main challenges now facing Darfur were political. Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari was chosen to replace Adada in late 2009.

joint integrated units (JIUs) to help secure contested regions, promoting rule of law (including combating impunity), supporting preparations for elections and referendums, and investigating CPA violations. UNMIS’s mandate also specifically includes coordinating humanitarian assistance, protecting and promoting human rights, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence, using force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if necessary. The CPA is time bound, with a referendum on the south’s independence scheduled for 2011.

Elections

North-South: Key Developments

Persistent insecurity and a lack of progress toward a negotiated settlement in Darfur have serious implications for the holding of planned national elections in April 2010. While voter registration supported by UNAMID began in November 2009, the process in Darfur was marked by low turnout on account of insecurity and reports of voter intimidation at registration sites. Further, the results of the 2008 census remain in dispute, especially in regard to the IDP populations in Darfur. As a result, many feel that the polls may underrepresent their views. Yet, excluding Darfur from the elections could perpetuate the conflict there, historically rooted in issues of underrepresentation.

North-South: Background

The Security Council first authorized the creation of a mission to Sudan—the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS)—on 11 July 2004, in Resolution 1547, and charged it with laying the groundwork for the UN’s role in supporting the CPA that had ended the decades-long conflict between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). On 24 March 2005, Resolution 1590 expanded and converted UNAMIS into UNMIS, a full-fledged peacekeeping operation. UNMIS was given a broad mandate, centered on helping implement the CPA. Its responsibilities include monitoring and verifying troop redeployments, assisting with formation of SPLA/SAF

Security

The year saw a precipitous deterioration of the security situation in the south. Whereas in previous years security issues emerged largely out of flashpoints along the north-south border, during 2009 it was persistent intercommunal fighting within south Sudan that served to destabilize the region. Owing to perceived personal insecurity and decades of conflict, the southern population is rife with weapons, and intercommunal violence related to cattle rustling and land and water rights is a frequent occurrence. But the nature and scale of the violence during 2009 suggest that other drivers were at play ahead of crucial CPA milestones. The violence was not contained to any one part of the south, but the spiraling situation in Jonglei state was an area of particular concern for UNMIS throughout the year. Following a series of deadly clashes in April and May, and as part of its stabilization plan for Jonglei, UNMIS deployed platoon-strength military and police contingents to temporary operating bases in Akobo and Pibor. This brought a measure of security to civilians in Jonglei state and ensured the delivery of humanitarian aid, but the temporary nature of these bases meant that their contribution to stability was short-lived. Indeed, a late September attack in Duk Padiet in Jonglei state saw more than a hundred deaths, among whom were regional leaders of the SPLA/M and the South Sudan Police Service

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(SSPS), while the southern government’s infrastructure and equipment were also targeted. Attacks launched by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Uganda in the Equatoria states also had a considerable impact on the civilian population—killing an estimated 200 and displacing nearly 50,000 people by October 2009. In response to the violence perpetrated by the LRA, the Security Council in November suggested that UNMIS, along with the other UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the region (the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo [MONUC] and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad [MINURCAT]), coordinate their strategies to protect vulnerable civilian populations from the persistent LRA threat. The contested oil-rich border region of Abyei was a continued source of concern for UNMIS throughout the year. Following a dramatic escalation of violence in Abyei during 2008 that saw the dissolution of JIUs during the battle, the two parties signed the Abyei Road Map Agreement, which referred the matter of border demarcation to The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). In advance of the PCA decision in July 2009, UNMIS undertook contingency planning and reconfigured its force to deal with any violent fallout from the decision. In the end, the PCA’s decision on the Abyei border—granting the Heglig oil fields to the north and territory to the south—was accepted by both sides and did not result in a return to violence. Yet, at the end of the year, the technical process of drawing the border line, a key CPA implementation point, was stymied by practical disputes from both sides. Overall, the persistence of violence in the south throughout the year led to an increasingly negative public perception of UNMIS in relation to its mandate to protect civilians. While UNMIS contains a significant military element, it is essentially a traditional monitoring operation. UNMIS was designed to oversee the disengagement of the parties to the conflict and their redeployment to respective sides of the border in relation to implementation of the CPA, not particularly to protect civilians from sudden

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Two members of the Indonesian formed police unit of UNAMID patrol the grounds of a health care clinic in the Zamzam IDP camp, El Fasher, Sudan, 4 June 2009.

UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Force Commander • Police Commissioner • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

24 March 2005 (UNSC Res. 1590) Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) Major-General Paban Jung Thapa (Nepal) Rajesh Dewan (India) $958.4 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 8,812 Military Observers: 476 Police: 715 International Civilian Staff: 827 Local Civilian Staff: 2,555 UN Volunteers: 310

For detailed mission information see p. 319

outbreaks of non-CPA related violence. The mission is thusly deployed to bases at the sector level, as developed by UNMIS itself, rather than at the state level, where proximity to civilian populations would be heightened. UNMIS has neither the explicit mandate nor the appropriate resources to intervene in such instances of violence. Further, the SPLA and SSPS maintain the

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primary responsibility of protecting the civilian population. Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law

While many speculated that the escalation of violence in the south during 2009 was a function of Khartoum employing destabilizing proxies in advance of CPA milestones, the widespread insecurity served to highlight the southern government’s lack of critical rule of law and security sector capacity to address these issues across the territory. This is, of course, of particular concern as the notion of an independent south draws closer. In this vein, the Justice and Security Sector Advisory Coordination Cell (JSSACC) became operational in the south during 2009. Under the JSSACC structure, UNMIS and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) aim to assist the southern government in developing an architecture for the proper role of the security sector in the south and simultaneously assist in developing the requisite governance and judicial structures to support security actors. UNDP will largely be responsible for judicial advising. UNMIS will play an advisory role directly to the southern government’s National Security Secretariat, the body that sits just below the National Security Council. There, UNMIS will help define the role of the security sector (the SPLA and SSPS) at both the federal and state levels, and create a donor platform for coordination and direction of funds. This is of crucial importance, as delineating the role of the SSPS in relation to the SPLA was a point of considerable concern during the violence of 2009, in which the SPLA served primarily as first responder and law enforcer. UNMIS continued supporting the development of the southern government’s rule of law and security structures, including providing training to an estimated 17,000 of the approximately 33,000 SSPS officers. UNMIS also served in an advisory support role to the southern government’s Ministry of Legal Affairs. Nevertheless, the mission has historically encountered difficulties in finding member states that

are willing to invest in SSPS development prior to the 2011 referendum. Further to training, UNMIS continued to support the SSPS logistically through the building of police stations, instructing on asset management, and providing uniforms. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) activities began in February, through the assistance of the UN’s first integrated DDR unit, which combines the efforts of UNMIS, UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). By the end of the year, over 15,000 former combatants had been demobilized, and it is hoped that ultimately 180,000 SAF and SPLA members will be demobilized and reintegrated. However, the extent to which DDR will continue is in question, as tensions between the north and south remain high ahead of the elections and referendum. Elections

With the end of the CPA implementation process in sight, the political commitment by both the dominant National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM has never been lower. SPLM protests in support of electoral reform in Khartoum in late November saw the arrest of SPLM leadership, sparking unrest in the south, that saw the destruction of NCP offices and a considerable rise in north/south tensions. While preparations for the twice-delayed national elections dominated the political agenda throughout the year, the feasibility of the country’s first nationwide polls in over two decades was increasingly thrown into question as negotiations on critical points of the CPA were met by stalemate. While the NCP sees the agreement’s mandated national elections as a legitimizing process and a prerequisite for the 2011 referendum, SPLM representatives see the two as separate processes, with the referendum on secession superseding all else. US Special Envoy to Sudan, Major-General Scott Gration, was able to mediate an agreement between the NCP and the SPLM in August committing the parties to working constructively toward implementing the remaining portions of the CPA. Among the outstanding CPA sticking

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points that need to be resolved prior to the 2010 elections are demarcation of the border between north and south; resolution of the 2008 census results, which the south contends misrepresent actual populations and severely hamper its ability to impact any legislation; and passage of legislation relating to democratic reforms of the central government and reform of the media and National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) laws. After months of deliberation, in late 2009 the parties agreed that the referendum on the south’s secession would be decided by a simple majority with two-thirds of the overall population participating in the vote, departing from the prior assertion that secession would be predicated on a 75 percent majority. But by this time the acrimony between north and south had grown even further, with NCP opposition parties walking out of parliament on several occasions and SPLM leader and Government of National Unity vice president Salva Kiir publicly alluding to the south’s independence as an ultimate goal. This sentiment was reinforced by Kiir’s decision not to directly challenge President Bashir in the upcoming elections. In this context, UNMIS along with other UN partners, and at the request of both north and south, supported preparations for the elections in both the north and the south, including coordinating donor funds contributed to the National Electoral Commission (NEC), facilitating dialogue between stakeholders and the NEC, and providing voter awareness programs. Beyond the issues of political will for the elections, UNMIS’s support for the process was met by dual resource and logistical challenges. This was especially true for UNMIS assistance in the south, where capacity to oversee elections remained extremely limited. According to

UNMIS estimates, facilitating elections across Sudan’s vast territory would require considerable mission electoral staff. By the end of September, UNMIS’s electoral section was mandated a maximum staff of only 248 members, though it was hoped that with additional UN volunteers, its staff would reach to 325. Meanwhile, the sheer size of Sudan, its lack of infrastructure, the scheduling of the elections during the country’s rainy season, and the complexity of the polls—choosing candidates for political office at six different levels—for a population characterized by high illiteracy and little to no institutional memory of voting, all mitigate against smooth elections. Voter registration did begin in November with UNMIS support, though it was extended for two weeks owing to logistical delays.

Conclusion

The year 2010 will be pivotal and sensitive one for Sudan’s future, and will require the concerted attention of UN peacekeepers and the broader international community. Balancing the priorities of the dual yet interrelated crises in Sudan has presented a significant difficulty for the international community over the past five years and, considering the ongoing potential for more violence, will remain crucial in the coming months. Of similar importance is considering what a future Sudan configuration may look like and what type of international peace operation will be the appropriate response to mitigate the outbreak of violence that could accompany such dramatic change. Ultimately, however, avoiding a return to conflict throughout Sudan rests on the will of the parties to constructively engage with each other, something that was elusive at the year’s end.

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2.7 Timor-Leste

With the residual problems of the 2006 crisis largely resolved by the end of 2008, Timor-Leste was finally able to devote its undivided attention to the challenges of building the foundations for a long-term, durable peace: reforming the security sector to ensure it becomes a reliable guarantor of national security; strengthening the justice system to build confidence in the rule of law; building the capacity of state institutions to effectively fulfill their roles and exercise democratic governance; and developing the country’s economy and infrastructure so that people can lead productive lives. The successive year progressed without significant security problems, and on 30 August 2009 the whole country was able to peacefully celebrate the tenth anniversary of the referendum that gave it its independence.

Progress was made in a number of areas: after a lengthy debate over a village elections law, peaceful elections were held on October 9; further initiatives were taken to strengthen democratic governance; and, after a delayed start, the process of handing back primary executive policing responsibilities to the Timorese police, bolstered by detailed assessments and new supporting roles played by the UN police, got well under way. At the same time, the young state continued to struggle with the principle of accountability before the law, both for current and for past crimes; and with defining a national security structure based on sound principles—such as a clear delineation of institutional roles—that will ensure that security institutions can help prevent, rather than cause, instability. While Timorese and their international partners faced up to these rather complex challenges, the UN Integrated Mission in TimorLeste (UNMIT), with the backing of the Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF), maintained a vital enabling security safety blanket. How long such a role must be maintained cannot be determined by the mere absence of conflict, but by the realization of resilient state institutions that can effectively manage the country’s challenges on their own. As the past decade has shown, this will be neither easy nor quick.

AINARO

Background

Timor-Leste’s declaration of independence from Portugal in 1975 was followed by its invasion and annexation by Indonesia. In August 1999, an overwhelming majority of the Timorese people rejected autonomy within Indonesia 74

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and opted for independence in a referendum organized and conducted by the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). The Indonesian military and their Timorese militia proxies, backed by the government, immediately launched a campaign of violence and demolition, leading to the deaths of approximately 1,400 Timorese, the displacement of hundreds of thousands more, and the destruction of all public records and 80 percent of the country’s homes and physical infrastructure. The Indonesian campaign of destruction elicited the emergency deployment of an Australian-led and UN-endorsed stabilization force, which cleared the way for the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Charged with the daunting task of building a state from the ground up, UNTAET administered Timor-Leste until it assumed its independence in 2002. In the process, the mission oversaw the election of resistance hero José Alexandre “Kay Rala Xanana” Gusmão as the country’s first postliberation president, and a parliamentary government led by the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN). In 2001, a new Timorese defense force, the F-FDTL (comprising the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste [FALINTIL] and the Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste [FDTL]), was created with bilateral support. UNTAET’s successor, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), was authorized to continue the provision of law enforcement, public security, and assistance in the development of the East Timor Police Service (later called the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste [PNTL]). In 2005, UNMISET was replaced by the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a considerably smaller mission designed to assist in the transition from peacekeeping to coordinated development assistance. With member states unwilling to support it financially, UNOTIL was scheduled to close in May 2006. The crisis that boiled over in April and May 2006 was sparked by a long-standing labor dispute within the F-FDTL and fueled by bitter political rivalries and the politicization of the

UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Police Commissioner • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

25 August 2006 (UNSC Res. 1704) Atul Khare (India) Luis Miguel Carrilho (Portugal) $205.9 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Military Observers: 32 Police: 1,552 International Civilian Staff: 366 Local Civilian Staff: 895 UN Volunteers: 196

For detailed mission information see p. 329

International Stabilization Force (ISF)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

20 June 2006 (UNSC Res. 1690) May 2006 Brigadier-General Bill Sowry (Australia) $142.0 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Troops: 920

various security organization. But as its origins, the crisis highlighted the immaturity and fragility of Timor-Leste’s nascent institutions. A third of the military had deserted (and became known as the “Petitioners”). Thirty-seven people died in the violence, which saw the military and police openly fighting one another. Many houses were destroyed, and 150,000 Timorese—15 percent of the population—were displaced from their homes as the conflict took on, and entrenched, a new East versus West antagonism. In mid-May 2006, the Timorese authorities requested international assistance. The Australian Defense Forces, with support from the New Zealand Defense Forces, arrived in Dili on 26 May, helping to calm the situation. A multidimensional UN assessment team recommended a return to a larger UN peacekeeping operation

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focused on reform of the security and judicial sectors. Security Council Resolution 1704 established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste in August 2006 with a broad mandate to support the government and related institutions in their efforts to consolidate stability, bring about national reconciliation, and foster social cohesion. UNMIT was staffed with 1,045 regular UN police, and another 703 in formed police units (FPUs); thirty-four military liaison officers; 459 international civilian staff; and 386 UN volunteers. Alongside 1,000 Australian and New Zealand troops operating in the International Stabilization Force, they gradually restored security to the country. By the end of March 2007 order prevailed, and national elections held in April, May, and June were essentially peaceful (after the elections, one formed police unit, comprising about eighty persons, was drawn down). In May, Nobel laureate and former prime minister and foreign minister José Ramos-Horta defeated the FRETILIN candidate in the second round of voting to become president. In the June parliamentary elections, FRETILIN again won more seats than any other single party, but its share of the seats in parliament fell from 63 percent to 32 percent. Former president Gusmão was able to form a coalition of parties that controlled a majority in parliament, thus becoming prime minister. During 2007, UNMIT and the government faced a number of serious challenges: political tensions, still high from the crisis, were further heightened by the elections; large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) required substantial humanitarian support and the politicized camps were hotbeds of instability; and the disgruntled Petitioners were rallying around the armed group led by former major Alfredo Reinado, who had deserted the FFDTL in May 2006. All of these challenges came in the context of a poor economy, high youth unemployment, weak infrastructure, low levels of education and skills, a traumatized population, and, above all, state institutions that were still too ineffectual and fragile to help address these problems.

By early 2008, with the security situation calm and political actors channeling their rivalries through the appropriate democratic institutions, UNMIT had turned its full attention to the core of its mandate: assisting with the review and reform of the security sector; supporting justice sector development; helping strengthen democratic governance; and facilitating economic and social development. In February, the country’s stability survived a major challenge when Reinado led attacks on the president and prime minister. The crisis was handled well by the government, which, respecting constitutional provisions, instituted a “state of siege” period that ultimately helped resolve the crisis but reexposed the shortcomings of the state’s security institutions.

Key Developments Security Situation

By the end of 2008, the two major security issues remaining from the 2006 crisis—the exmilitary Petitioners and the IDPs—had been largely resolved: the Petitioners and the majority of the IDPs had accepted financial packages and returned home. In a speech before the Security Council in February 2009, the UN Secretary-General declared that Timor-Leste was now facing “a new horizon”—that all national and international efforts could henceforth concentrate on the essential task at hand: building the foundations for long-term stability. Rapid progress in IDP returns continued in 2009, and by the end of August the last remaining camp had officially closed. The surviving perpetrators of the February 2008 attacks on the president and prime minister were brought to trial beginning in July. The return home of both the Petitioners and the IDPs occurred without significant incident, but both groups still contain the seeds of future instability if their solutions are not made durable. The return of IDPs has caused strains on local resources and services. Lack of clear land and property rights, despite some encouraging progress during 2009, remains another underlying

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source of tensions. About 3,000 persons remain in temporary transitional shelters, although the government has announced plans to close these. The Petitioners, even while accepting the government’s cash settlement, continued to insist that their original grievances from before 2006 had not been addressed. The peaceful conduct of the October elections suggest the mood in local communities is still optimistic, despite the cash settlements from 2008 increasingly running out. There were no major security incidents during the reporting period. While happily the ISF’s security support role response remained largely untested, it continued to play an important psychological backup role. The ISF (which includes about 150 New Zealand personnel) has been gradually reducing its presence on the ground, drawing down from about 1,100 personnel in mid-2008 to about 800 since the end of January 2009. Discussions with the government over further drawdowns, which are likely, continued in the final months of the year. Since early 2009 the ISF has gradually reoriented its focus away from pure security support activities to include more Timorese capacity building through joint training exercises in noncombat functions such as personnel protection, air crash and port fire response, paramedic first response, and engineering. In keeping with the stable security situation, the ISF in 2009 twice relaxed its posture: in February, patrolling soldiers began to carry their weapons on their backs, rather than in their hands, and all machine guns were put in armories, and in September they began carrying their weapons unloaded.

early 2009, joint UNMIT-government technical assessment teams began to examine each of the districts and specialized units in turn. An agreement on the respective post-resumption roles of the PNTL and the UN police was put in place just before the handover of the first district, Lautem, on 14 May. Two further districts were handed over in June and July, and responsibility for the police training center was taken over in mid-September. By 30 August, 92 percent of PNTL officers overall had been fully certified. The handover of policing responsibility, as UNMIT was at pains to explain, was not predicated upon any sense of completion of the task at hand, but rather upon a recognition of the limitations of UNMIT conducting mentoring and executive policing with the same, unspecialized resources; a decade of UN capacitybuilding efforts had demonstrated that the UNPOL model was not producing satisfactory results. There was also clearly waning support, from within both the Timorese police and the political leadership, for the status quo. Pre- and post-resumption assessments have confirmed that an effective and reliable police force remains

The process of handing back primary executive policing responsibilities to the PNTL, anticipated to begin in August 2008, was delayed until early 2009. The readiness of the PNTL to meet even the minimum operational requirements for resumption was found to be lacking, particularly in terms of logistics. As a result, the resumption plan was refined and the onus was put on strict new criteria, rather than deadlines. Starting in

UN Photo/Martine Perret

Security Sector Reform

Members of Pakistani and Malaysian formed police units (FPUs) of UNMIT participate in the Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste's tactics and logistics exercises in Dili, Timor-Leste, 25 September 2009.

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a distant goal. Having the PNTL resume responsibility now, well before the end of the mission, while maintaining substantial levels of UN police to monitor, advise, and—importantly—step in again if required, is intended to be a pragmatic step forward in that process. Accordingly, the Security Council agreed in February to maintain current UN police levels through to February 2010. A technical assessment mission from UN headquarters will visit Timor-Leste in early 2010 to develop medium-term recommendations for the configuration of UNMIT, including the police component, beyond that date. At the same time, Australia’s bilateral Police Development Programme continues to provide substantial long-term support for the institutional development of the PNTL. In June, the Council of Ministers approved drafts of three security laws—national security, internal security, and national defense—which are to form the backbone of a new security architecture. These draft laws, prepared with little UNMIT input, propose considerable cooperation and coordination between internal and external (defense) security functions, and allow for F-FDTL involvement in internal security in particular circumstances. They do not, in their current form, provide great clarity in the delineation of roles and responsibilities between the military and the police, nor in the mechanism for civilian oversight. UNMIT, both privately and in a presentation to the parliamentary committee reviewing the bills, has stressed the need for both. UNMIT attempts to support security sector reform have continued along much the same lines as they began, tentatively, in late 2007 and early 2008. In 2009, activities included assistance for roundtable discussions on a proposed national security policy, the drafting of a law on civil protection, and an options paper for a national defense research and training institution. Buy-in from the Timorese to UN securitysector input has remained elusive. The security sector review project managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) continued to provide support to ad hoc capacity-building initiatives, and approved funding for an international adviser for the parliamentary committee dealing with security. A public opinion survey

tendered in late 2009 was part of a longproposed but unenthusiastically received contribution to the security sector review process. Abuse of authority and human rights by the police and military continued to be reported, and accountability for such violations remains very weak. Further altercations between Timorese security forces and UN police have occurred and are another indication of weak professionalism. While to date there has been no significant physical conflict, such incidents are perilous due to the presence of firearms and potential for rapid escalation. In June, the new penal code entered into force, incorporating core international criminal law and human rights standards and making domestic violence a crime. Several new pieces of legislation were advanced in 2009 with UNMIT technical assistance. In practice, however, many disputes continue to be handled through traditional justice mechanisms. An independent comprehensive needs assessment of the justice sector, first recommended after the crisis in 2006, was conducted from 1 August to 28 September. Meanwhile, under a new prosecutor-general, the number of pending criminal cases decreased slightly from 5,400 to 5,013 in the first eight months of the year. Political and Other Developments

After considerable political debate, and a constitutional challenge to the draft legislation, a new village (“suco”) election law was promulgated in July, and 9 October was set as the date for the election of local chiefs and village councils. These one-day elections will be particularly challenging technically, as, unlike the national elections in 2007, each of the 442 villages will have its own distinct ballot. The UN deployed sixty-two volunteers and provided technical advice for the elections. FRETILIN continues to publicly deny recognition of the government and to call for early national elections, but this stance was less firm in 2009. While harsh rhetoric from both sides continues to be unhelpful, FRETILIN has remained in parliament and has calmly accepted court verdicts that do not support its legal challenges.

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Some progress was made in 2009 in strengthening democratic governance. A new position of deputy prime minister for management and public administration was created in January, and in April the inspector-general was empowered to perform internal audit functions. Parliament approved laws to establish anticorruption and civil service commissions. Progress in developing a culture of accountability and rule of law, however, was less encouraging. On 30 August, a former pro-Indonesian militia leader, arrested in Timor-Leste on a warrant for crimes against humanity committed in September 1999, was released from pretrial detention and delivered to the Indonesian embassy in Dili. The release has been acknowledged as a political response to Indonesian demands, and coinciding with the release, President RamosHorta made a national speech arguing once again that in the interest of good relations, Indonesian perpetrators of serious crimes in TimorLeste must not be pursued. The release generated widespread criticism and charges of blatant political disregard for the judicial process, including some from government members in parliament. The UN publicly questioned the decision and reiterated that according to international legal principles there can be no amnesty or impunity for serious crimes. The international community remains firmly committed to the long-term stability of TimorLeste. Australia invests heavily in security, providing the bulk of ISF troops and a large police development project, and is the single biggest bilateral aid donor. Portugal contributes significantly to support education and justice, both of which are based on a Portuguese model. Indonesia provides important access to its universities to Timorese students, but, as already illustrated, does not always use its influence in ways that further the development of democratic Timorese

institutions. The United States, the European Union, and regional neighbors such as China and Japan are also major donors. While these efforts are important, coordination between donors remains elusive. Crucial gaps, such as assistance for institutional development of the F-FDTL, while admittedly politically sensitive, go largely unaddressed. Yet as demonstrated in 2006, the F-FDTL is an important potential source of instability. Especially in the long term, after the UN peacekeeping mission winds down, the sustained and coordinated support of bilateral actors will be essential to the ongoing consolidation of peace. Since February 2009, UNMIT has, at the request of the Security Council, provided a list of benchmarks as a road map to resilient peace in Timor-Leste. What this list most clearly indicates is that the road is a long one, and that Timor-Leste will remain fragile for many years to come.

Conclusion

The absence of significant security problems over the past year has allowed progress to be made on some of the underlying challenges of peace consolidation. Things are moving slowly forward in some areas of justice, security sector reform, and democratic governance, but not so much in others. This halting pace, even in such a relatively simple fragile state as TimorLeste, underlines both the degree of difficulty and the long-term nature of these challenges. The international community will therefore need to stay the course for the long term, while constantly seeking ways to improve the effectiveness of their support; and Timorese leaders must try to look beyond short-term priorities to ensure that proper foundations are laid, primarily in terms of resilient institutions with entrenched principles, for long-term ongoing progress.

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3.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina

the signing of the Dayton Accords, yet BiH remained precipitously close to its conflict past, with ethnic and nationalist rhetoric on the rise. Beyond providing for an inhospitable operational climate, the rancorous political environment had a distinct impact on the peace operations in the country, which as a result delayed prospects for alteration or withdrawal. Bosnia remains host to a complex peacekeeping architecture that evolved out of the Dayton Accords of 1995. Originally intended to be a short-lived international presence, the late 1990s saw the entrenchment of the roles of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF), an Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission, and the ad hoc Office of the High Representative (OHR) in maintaining postconflict stability. The European Union has since taken on the bulk of security responsibilities, with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) replacing the IPTF in January 2003, and the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) taking over militarily from SFOR in December 2004. These transitions took place under the administration of Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, head of the OHR, who was appointed in 2002 and also “doublehatted” as the EU’s Special Representative. He took a highly assertive approach to his mandate as High Representative, using his so-called “Bonn powers” to intervene in domestic politics and dismiss a number of elected politicians. Christian Schwarz-Schilling replaced Ashdown during 2006, promising a more hands-off approach, while maintaining emphasis on BiH’s EU accession aims. With little progress made, Schwarz-Schilling was replaced by Miroslav Lajcˇák in July 2007, who pledged a moderate

The political stalemate in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) deepened severely during 2009, paralyzing progress on the reforms necessary for autonomous rule. This was a significant cause for concern for the international community; fourteen years had passed since

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hand in administering Bosnia. While BiH made some strides in its peace process and toward both EU and NATO membership under the guidance of Lajcˇák, the political situation continued to deteriorate throughout 2008, with the OHR’s presence a focus of disdain among Republika Srpska local authorities. Lajcˇák left office in early 2009 amid a growing stalemate on fundamental issues of decentralization and transfer of authorities to central institutions. It was within this context that Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko took office as the High Representative in March 2009, hoping to change the political paradigm in BiH. Nevertheless, the situation continued to sour and Inzko was almost immediately tested in May when a declaration adopted by the National Assembly of Bosnia’s Serb-dominated Republika Srpska called for the return of responsibilities to local authorities that the OHR had transferred to the state level—a move that would have marginalized the OHR and undermined the Dayton peace agreement. In response, Inzko invoked the “Bonn powers” for the first time since Lord Ashdown’s tenure, effectively abolishing the Bosnian Serb legislation and further heightening tensions, with Republika Srpska threatening its withdrawal from the government. Nevertheless, during the year the Peace Implementation Council—the supra-OHR body— outlined five broad objectives that BiH must deliver on for the OHR to be drawn down and hand over to the less intrusive EU Special Representative: sustainable resolution of the issue of apportionment of property between the state and other levels of government; sustainable resolution of defense property; completion of the Brcko final award; fiscal sustainability; and entrenchment of the rule of law. While the notion of drawing down the OHR has been on the table for nearly three years, it has been annually pushed aside on account of a lack of reform progress. Similarly, the Council of the European Union approved a tentative concept of operations for the transformation of EUFOR Althea into a nonexecutive capacity-building and

EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)

• Authorization Date

• Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

12 July 2004 (EU Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP), 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575) December 2004 Major-General Stefano Castagnotto (Italy) $28.9 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Troops: 2,014

EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

11 March 2002 (EU Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP) January 2003 Brigadier-General Stefan Feller (Germany) $17.6 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Police: 125 Civilian Staff: 27

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

8 December 1995 (Fifth Meeting of the Ministerial Council) December 1995 Ambassador Gary D. Robbins (United States) $20.0 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Staff: 16

training operation. However, with the progress on reform stalled and tensions high throughout the year, EUFOR maintained its authorized force strength and posture to ensure that it had the capacity to perform its twofold mandate: providing security in BiH as its priority, and serving as a

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NATO Headquarters Sarajevo

• Authorization Date

• Start Date • Head of Mission

28 June 2004 (Communiqué of NATO Istanbul Summit), 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575) December 2004 Brigadier-General Sabato Errico (Italy)

rapid reaction reinforcement to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) if the need for its engagement should arise. EUFOR continued to assist the BiH armed forces in management and disposal of surplus weapons and continued to monitor and advise on the implementation of tasks already handed over to those forces. EU troops also continued to cooperate with US forces under the command of a residual NATO headquarters in Sarajevo. Considering the situation, the UN Security Council renewed EUFOR Althea’s mandate for another year in November 2009. The EUPM’s efforts to assist in the reform of the BiH police force and build its capacity remained constrained. Even so, the EUPM’s mandate was extended for another two years in

the second half of 2009 and a provisional work plan for the operation showed a significant shift toward addressing the main threats to security in BiH—organized crime, smuggling, and corruption. However, the shift in focus will require the continued deployment of international judges in BiH, as the local authorities have not invested in developing the judiciary or the corrections systems necessary to process criminals. Meanwhile, the OSCE mission to BiH continued to work—with only limited progress—on its broad assistance programs supporting democratization, education, human rights, and security cooperation aimed toward BiH’s hopedfor Euro-Atlantic integration. The stark political situation in BiH at the end of the year drew realistic fears regarding the possible effects of the dissolution of BiH and the potential for a return to violence. In response to the growing instability, the European Union and United States deployed representatives for talks with political leaders on all sides aimed at breaking the political deadlock on reform. Unsurprisingly, the talks failed to achieve much progress, and at the end of the year the notion of a more unified BiH seemed distant.

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3.2 Burundi

Peace in Burundi was given a boost at the end of 2008 when the rebel group Peuple Hutu– Forces Nationales de Libération (PalipehutuFNL), agreed to enter into the national political process and disarm its forces. The declaration set off a chain of positive events in early 2009 and gave hope that after decades of violent conflict Burundi would finally be on the path toward stability. Nevertheless, the immediate post-agreement momentum quickly gave way to the difficult realities of implementing an ambitious peacebuilding agenda in the context of a still fragile Burundi, especially as the country prepares for elections in 2010. An assortment of actors, including the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Peace Building Commission, the African Union, the World Bank, and the International Facilitator to the Burundi Peace Process, continued to assist the country in its recovery during the year. While Burundi did make progress in several areas with this assistance, the prospects for conflict are still present and the creation of an inclusive government and addressing the status of rebels and the national security forces present considerable hurdles for the country moving forward.

the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the Palipehutu-FNL. Regional mediation efforts led to the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 2000, creating a new power-sharing transitional government, but fighting continued as the CNDD-FDD and FNL refused to accept the agreement. The CNDD-FDD eventually declared a cease-fire and joined the transitional administration in November 2003; the FNL, the remaining rebel group, only reached a peace agreement with the government in September 2006. In June 2004, the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was deployed to take over for the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB). Following the FNL’s cease-fire agreement, ONUB was brought to an end in December 2006 and replaced by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi. BINUB is mandated to support the government’s peace consolidation efforts; provide assistance in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • ERSG • Budget

Background

Burundi experienced decades of ethnic-based conflict that set Hutus against Tutsis in violent outbursts that often extended beyond its borders. The most recent round of conflict was triggered by the assassination of the country’s first democratically elected Hutu president in 1993. This was followed by nearly a decade of bloody civil war between the Tutsi-dominated military and various Hutu rebel movements, including

• Strength as of 31 October 2009

25 October 2006 (UNSC Res. 1719) 1 January 2007 Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia) $70.2 million (1 January 2008–31 December 2009) Military Observers: 6 Police: 11 International Civilian Staff: 125 Local Civilian Staff: 239 UN Volunteers: 50

For detailed mission information see p. 200

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(DDR) as well as security sector reform (SSR); promote human rights; and facilitate donor and UN agency coordination. During 2007, BINUB provided close support to the government’s interactions with the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which had chosen Burundi as one of the first two countries to include on its agenda. The AU Special Task Force was deployed during 2007 to provide close protection for leaders and assist in the DDR processes. Meanwhile, the International Facilitation to the Burundi Peace Process, headed by South Africa, continued to mediate between the parties. The Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) was established in November 2006 to monitor implementation of the cease-fire. In June 2008 and in the context of the progress made, the Peacebuilding Commission released a review of the implementation of the peacebuilding framework. The review cited the need for continued cooperation of all parties, called for DDR efforts to conclude by December 2008, and called for a functioning electoral commission to be established by the first half of 2009 in preparation for the elections to be held in 2010. Burundi saw a steep deterioration in the political, security, and humanitarian situation in the latter part of 2007 and throughout most of 2008, while the 2006 cease-fire appeared to be dissolving. Bearing in mind the consequences that a return to conflict in Burundi could have on the historically volatile Great Lakes region, regional leaders convened a summit of the Great Lakes’ heads of state in Bujumbura during December 2008. There, President Pierre Nkurunziza and FNL chairperson Agaton Rwasa signed a declaration committing the FNL to becoming a political party and to begin the commensurate processes of demobilization and disarmament of its forces. Meanwhile, President Nkurunziza agreed to reserve thirty-three civil service posts for FNL leadership and release all FNL-related political prisoners.

Key Developments

The first half of 2009 saw brisk implementation of several elements of the December 2008

summit declaration. By the end of January 2009 the FNL had officially dropped the “Palipehutu” ethnic prefix from its name, a point that had previously held up the peace process and barred the FNL from becoming an official political party. The government also made good—if only partially—on its pledge to release FNLrelated political prisoners. By 15 January the government had approved the release of 247 prisoners, 118 of whom were released under JVMM supervision. By April the FNL had officially registered as a political party and was committed to running in elections planned for 2010, instilling optimism that Burundi had seen its last war. FNL’s acceptance as a political party was contingent on the complete separation of its political and military components. By mid-March, 3,475 FNL personnel had voluntarily disarmed while FNL chairperson Rwasa, along with other FNL leadership, had also publicly disarmed and registered for demobilization. Despite demobilization progress, an alarmingly small amount of weapons were turned over during the DDR process. The parties agreed to the terms of the FNL disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process in April, whereby 3,500 FNL elements would be integrated into the national security and defense forces, while 5,000 would be demobilized. Meanwhile, 11,000 elements, including 1,000 women, would be treated as adults associated with the movement and would not receive the full complement of DDR compensation. It was also agreed that the AU Special Task Force would oversee the handover of FNL weapons. Following the closure of the World Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme on 31 December 2008, a range of institutional actors collaborated to create a new three-part configuration to support DDR in Burundi. Under the new arrangement the JVMM oversees the disarmament and verification of former combatants with the support of the Facilitator, the African Union, the Burundi government, and BINUB. Meanwhile, demobilization and reintegration is led by the Technical Coordination Team of the National Commission for Demobilization, Reintegration, and

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Reinsertion and is supported by the World Bank. Finally, strategy for long-term reintegration of ex-combatants at the community level is developed under the leadership of the Burundi government with the support of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other international partners. The post of International Facilitator to the Burundi Peace Process, held by South African Charles Nqakula, was closed in June 2009 and was followed by the creation of the Partnership for Peace in Burundi (PPB). Similar to the role of the Facilitator, the PPB structure was created to monitor the consolidation of the peace process, making sure it remained on track while assisting the FNL’s transformation into a political party in advance of 2010 elections. The PPB comprises representatives from regional stakeholders Uganda and Tanzania, the AU, the International Conference of the Great Lakes, and BINUB. The latter was responsible for logistical support and providing the secretariat for the PPB. Despite these efforts, gaps in the DDR process highlighted a series of broader threats facing the peace process in Burundi. Along with the 11,000 elements formerly “associated” with FLN, the DDR processes over the years have created a population of former combatants in Burundi who remain disassociated from the benefits of the peace. Burundi is rife with weapons, and economic circumstances are bleak. Unsurprisingly, the resort to criminal activity has become an increasingly frequented option. During 2009 this resulted in an environment of uncertainty and insecurity characterized by a persistence of criminal activities throughout Burundi, ranging from armed robberies and looting to rape, abductions, and ambushes. With these security concerns in mind, BINUB continued to support Burundi in addressing insecurity through reform of the security sector. The mission assisted the government in establishing civilian oversight of the security sector, while providing logistical and technical support to the national police. BINUB also supported the establishment of the National Commission for Civilian Disarmament, which seeks to address major public concerns

regarding the high presence of weapons among the population. The establishment of transitional justice mechanisms to try alleged transgressors of crimes during Burundi’s conflict, however, remained unformed throughout the year. Meanwhile, BINUB continued to support building the rule of law with direct technical and logistical support to the justice sector, yet access to justice among the population remained limited. Preparations for the 2010 elections began during 2009, but a consistent level of political hostility served to hamper progress. An atmosphere of mistrust between the opposition parties and the incumbent CNDD-FDD gradually heightened throughout the year. Parliament’s April 2009 establishment of a national independent electoral commission, which aims to prepare the country for the upcoming elections and oversee the voter registration process, was initially a good indicator of progress. Nevertheless, from its inception, the commission was fraught by disagreement regarding its composition. This tension reached an apex in September when its funding was cut by the government on account of overrepresentation by opposition groups. In a positive development, after months of political wrangling, Burundi’s parliament adopted a bill on an electoral code. Limited political freedom throughout Burundi during 2009 was a source of considerable concern and holds implications for the prospects of holding free and fair elections in 2010. In the second half of the year, there were numerous crackdowns on opposition-party gatherings and it appeared that both the government and the opposition were increasingly using intimidation and violence as a political tools. During the year the PBC continued to follow the situation in Burundi and pledged its support for upcoming elections and the broader peace consolidation process.

Conclusion

The elections planned for 2010 will present a significant test to the resiliency of both the peace process and Burundi’s nascent governing structures. In December 2009, the Security Council

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renewed BINUB’s mandate for another year. While the constellation of international and regional actors in Burundi will remain necessary components to guide this process, the adherence

to an inclusive and fair political process on all sides of the conflict will be the determining factor in the longevity of peace.

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3.3 Côte d’Ivoire

Sustained stability in Côte d’Ivoire during 2009 contributed to the alteration of the peacekeeping operations in the country. The Frenchled Operation Licorne halved its presence, and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) began to consider the factors on the ground that would allow the UN to reduce its presence. The calm environment, however, should be cause for only measured optimism, as peace in Côte d’Ivoire remained extremely tenuous throughout the year. The implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement, which governs the peace process between the government of Côte d’Ivoire and the Forces Nouvelles, stalled. In particular, key areas of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, as well as extending the reach of the central government throughout Côte d’Ivoire and preparing for long delayed presidential elections, saw very limited progress. These difficulties reflected broader questions regarding the political commitment of the parties to reconciliation and the continued need for security guarantees. Unsurprisingly, elections were again postponed, and with poverty among the Ivorian people on the rise as a consequence of years of inadequate governance, the potential for renewed conflict remains.

West African States (ECOWAS), the UN, and French-led peace operations. Established in April 2004, UNOCI has a mandate to support implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords, signed in 2003. Since then, the mission has supported the implementation of several follow-on peace deals, most recently, the Ouagadougou Agreement, signed on 4 March 2007 under the auspices of President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, chairman of ECOWAS. French Operation Licorne forces—initially deployed to operate alongside the earlier ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI)—continue to complement the UN mission by providing additional rapid reaction capabilities. The Ouagadougou Agreement establishes a road map for the feuding parties and UNOCI. The agreement addresses, among other things, issues of identification and voter registration, holding of elections, DDR, reestablishment of state administration throughout the country, and removal of the zone of confidence. Perhaps most important, the agreement calls for the merging of rebel and government forces through the formation of a joint integrated command center. It also establishes clear implementation timelines, and creates two follow-up mechanisms. One is a standing consultative mechanism composed of President Laurent Gbagbo, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, former president Konan Bedie, and former prime minister Alassane Ouattara. President Compaoré remains in his capacity as the facilitator to the Ouagadougou Agreement. The second follow-up mechanism is the Evaluation

Background

Côte d’Ivoire plunged into conflict in September 2002 after a failed coup attempt by the country’s armed forces. The country has since played host to the Economic Community of 89

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and Monitoring Committee (EMC). The EMC comprises the facilitator, as the chair, and three representatives from the signatories to the agreement. While the consultative mechanism is mandated to address all issues pertaining to the agreement, the EMC is charged with assessing and recommending ways to enhance the peace process. Despite being a bilateral agreement between Gbagbo and Soro, the Ouagadougou Agreement enjoys broad political support from Ivorian opposition parties and civil society. This support is based in part on a popular sentiment that the agreement is a homegrown initiative, in contrast to previous efforts to secure peace. Following the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement, the zone of confidence that had divided Côte d’Ivoire since 2002 was dismantled and replaced by a green line patrolled by new mixed police units, consisting of the national police and those from the Forces Nouvelles, and overseen by seventeen UNOCI observation posts. UNOCI had dismantled all of its observation posts along the green line by July 2008, reflecting improvements in the security situation. Though the removal of observation posts demonstrated significant progress in the reunification process, the security situation remained fragile, mainly as a consequence of the stalled DDR of former combatants. Technical and logistical hurdles, slow progress on reunification of the territory, and a failure to extend the state’s authority to northern Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 2008 contributed to the postponement of presidential elections for another year. In late December 2008, the parties to the Ouagadougou Agreement signed a fourth supplementary agreement that effectively changed the priority of the peace process from presidential elections to reunification as the primary driver. This dramatic shift predicated the holding of elections on the completion of politically sensitive reunification tasks at the heart of Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict-prone past. These tasks, which must be resolved two months prior to the elections, include the transfer of authority from zone commanders to prefects; centralization of the treasury; completion of the profiling and integration of Force Nouvelles elements (military,

UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Force Commander • Police Commissioner • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

27 February 2004 (UNSC Res. 1528) 4 April 2004 Major-General Fernand Marcel Amoussou (Benin) Major-General Gerardo Cristian Chaumont (Argentina) $491.8 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 7,028 Military Observers: 19 Police: 1,158 International Civilian Staff: 400 Local Civilian Staff: 682 UN Volunteers: 303

For detailed mission information see p. 344

Operation Licorne

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

24 January 2006 (UNSC Res. 1652) February 2004 Brigadier General Jean-François Hogard (France) $108.0 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Troops: 923

police, gendarmerie) into the integrated command center; and the payment of $1,000 to all demobilized ex-combatants and militiamen.

Key Developments

The shift in focus from elections as a driving force for the Ouagadougou Agreement to the centrality of reunification presented a significant challenge for UNOCI and the broader international community, which had focused largely on the electoral process. Nevertheless, in early 2009 the Secretary-General, at the request of the Security Council, outlined the milestones necessary for ultimate withdrawal of UNOCI: (1) DDR and dismantling of militias; (2) the

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holding of presidential elections in November 2009; (3) the restoration of state authority throughout the country; and (4) the commencement of a security sector reform process for the whole of the country. In 2009, UNOCI was reconfigured to provide the support necessary to reach the Secretary-General’s benchmarks. The force configuration at the end of the year reflected an emphasis on flexibility in movement and capacity for rapid reaction in the event of the outbreak of violence and to support the integrated command center. UNOCI includes a battalionsized force reserve, two company-sized sector reserves, and increased mobility through airlift capacities. UNOCI’s military concept of operations and rules of engagement were commensurately updated to reflect the new posture of the force. Furthermore, UNOCI conducted several multiple-day military exercises throughout the year, code-named Umbrella I and II, to test the readiness of its rapid response capability. UNOCI’s police component continued to provide guidance and training to the national police and gendarmerie in the governmentcontrolled south and to the 600 security auxiliaries deployed in the north in the former zone of confidence. UNOCI’s formed police units also continued to conduct training and joint patrols with its national counterparts throughout the year, while protecting UN personnel and maintaining a safe and secure environment. Though the identification of benchmarks is a reflection of the relative stability in Côte d’Ivoire, the presence of crime and banditry continues to remain high. Indeed, a state of fear beyond open conflict has the potential to derail the peace process even further, especially since Operation Licorne has cut its deployment in half. The indication of benchmarks also reflects a general desire of the international community for the peace process to move forward, as UNOCI remains one of the UN’s larger deployments. Reunification, Extension of State Authority, and DDR

Reunification of Côte d’Ivoire saw some progress through UNOCI’s assistance, but any

advances fell far short of those necessary to trigger elections during 2009. The issues of reunification relate not only to the extension of the state’s authority throughout Côte d’Ivoire, but also to the establishment of the integrated command center and the reintegration of former combatants. As of October 2009, only 600 of the expected 8,000 elements of the mixed Forces Nouvelles and Ivorian national police and gendarmerie officers had been deployed to Abidjan and Bouake. Meanwhile, those brigades that were deployed suffered from an acute lack of both capacity and resources to execute their tasks. The legal framework necessary to integrate the 5,000 Forces Nouvelles elements into the national army is still absent, as are the logistical facilities to conduct their cantonment. UNOCI provided logistical support to the establishment of the integrated command center, as well as technical support to local authorities in this process, but a lack of financial resources necessary to fulfill this mandate served as a significant operational obstacle. In October 2009, elements of the Forces Nouvelles already operating in mixed brigades had yet to be paid for their work, and the $1,000 demobilization allowance promised to ex-combatants for reintegration was lagging. These setbacks in the DDR process yielded frequent protest, an area of particular concern given the military source of Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict. As a stopgap measure, UNOCI, alongside the UN Development Programme (UNDP), employed resources from the Peacebuilding Fund to provide short-term reinsertion assistance to some 3,000 ex-combatants. The initiative utilized 525 micro-projects in twenty-three locations in Côte d’Ivoire. While this was recognized as having a positive impact on reintegration, it is expected that more than 25,000 ex-combatants will need to be reintegrated, which will require further contributions to the reintegration process. Compounding the slow DDR of the 5,000 Forces Nouvelles and 20,000 militiamen loyal to President Gbago is an apparent lack of commitment on both sides to demobilize; in addition, military equipment continues to be imported, in violation of the UN arms embargo.

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Box 3.3.1 UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone

The first fully integrated mission of the UN Department of Political Affairs, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), completed its initial year of operation in September 2009. UNIPSIL works with the UN Country Team, the Peacebuilding Commission, and the Peacebuilding Fund to help consolidate the peace and restore democracy in Sierra Leone by providing support to national and local efforts for identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict. In helping Sierra Leone further consolidate its postconflict recovery, UNIPSIL serves to implement the UN’s “Joint Vision” integrated peacebuilding strategy under the consolidated leadership of an Executive Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, Michael von der Schulenburg, who also serves as the UN Country Team resident coordinator and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) resident representative. UNIPSIL has a light footprint, with a staff ceiling limited to seventy-three individuals, thirty-two of whom are locally recruited, and with about 75 percent of staff devoted to programmatic rather than administrative tasks. UNIPSIL had eight

regional field offices at the end of 2009— three in the provincial centers of Makeni, Bo, and Kenema, and five in the local district centers of Koidu, Kabala, Kailahun, Pujehun, and Port Loko. Following politically motivated violence in March 2009, the two main political parties in Sierra Leone issued a joint communiqué on 2 April, pledging their commitment to strengthening the peace consolidation process. The UN’s Joint Vision was developed as its contribution to the government of Sierra Leone’s strategic framework for 2009–2012, known as the Agenda for Change. The initiative was endorsed by the UN Peacebuilding Commission on 10 June at a high-level special session. Ultimately, the Joint Vision serves to streamline the various UN and international peace consolidation and development efforts through joint planning, implementation, and coordination mechanisms. The UN has identified the following four programmatic priorities: economic integration of rural areas, economic and social integration of youth, equitable access to health services, and accessible and credible public service.

Delays in implementing the DDR components of the Ouagadougou Agreement had a deleterious impact on the extension of the state’s authority. Despite the deployment of corps prefectoral (administrators) to areas in the north controlled by the Force Nouvelles, their authority to enforce administrative decisions was severely limited on account of delays in the deploying of the integrated command center. Similarly, a lack of resources dedicated to tax officials deployed to the north meant that Force Nouvelles elements, rather than the central government, continued to collect taxes there. The deployment of the judiciary to the north also remained limited, and corrections facilities continued to be closed, even though UNOCI trained over a hundred prison officers during 2009.

The total resources required for implementing the Joint Vision for the fouryear period is estimated to be $345 million, which would require $204 million in new funding. The Joint Vision has established a multidonor trust fund to address this financing gap, with the UNDP administering the fund for all UN agencies. The trust fund is designed to attract donors that have no representation in Sierra Leone and that intend to channel funds through the UN’s infrastructure. On 15 September 2009, the Security Council passed a resolution to extend UNIPSIL’s mandate another year. The resolution authorizes the mission to assist the government with the 2012 election process, constitutional reform, building police capacity, tackling corruption, illicit drug trafficking, and organized crime, and addressing youth unemployment. It is anticipated that, following the 2012 presidential election, the UN presence in Sierra Leone will be able to begin its transition into a UNDPled Country Team. Until then, UNIPSIL will continue to play its crucial supporting and coordinating role.

Preparation for Elections

Despite slow, if not debilitating, progress toward the establishment of an adequate electoral environment, in May 2009 the Ivorian government announced plans to hold the long delayed presidential polls on 29 November 2009. The voter registration process was launched in the final months of 2008 and completed on 30 June 2009. A total of 6.5 million Ivorians registered to vote. Subsequent to the completion of voter registration, the Ivorian government’s independent electoral council adopted several pieces of legislation that detailed the electoral timeline, including publication of a provisional electoral list by 29 August, publication of the final electoral list between 15 and 21 October, distribution of voter cards by 26 November, and commencement of electoral campaigns from 13

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to 27 November. From the onset, Ivorian authorities announced the lapsed deadlines in regard to this election timeline, causing concern as to whether the elections would be held at all during the year. The deadline for the publication of the provisional electoral list was delayed by nearly one month, until 26 September 2009. Complicating matters, one month before the planned elections, UNOCI began an investigation into 2.75 million cases of suspected voter fraud. UNOCI worked with national authorities throughout the year to identify and address the obstacles to the deployment of the mixed brigades charged with providing security to election coordination centers. While related to the resource and capacity issues outlined here, the integrated command center was able to provide security to only half of the seventy election coordination centers throughout the country. With this reality in mind, UNOCI devised plans with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) for the redeployment of an UNMIL infantry company and two helicopters to help support security for the planned elections.

Conclusion

Despite this significant amount of activity, it was announced at the end of November 2009 that elections would once again be delayed until 2010. The decision was met with considerable concern by the international community, who called for the holding of elections at the earliest possible date.

UN Photo/Ky Chung

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UNOCI staff load boxes containing provisional voter lists onto a helicopter for transport to polling stations, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 12 November 2009.

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3.4 Cyprus

By late 2009, Cyprus was heading toward a critical turning point, with the possibilities of reunification or partition both very much alive and the path to be taken likely to be determined within a very short time frame. During the course of the year the two community leaders—Demetris Christofias, president of the Republic of Cyprus, and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat—made significant progress in negotiations that started in September 2008, but faced dwindling support among their own communities. Uncertainty regarding Cyprus’s political future extends to the future of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which has been deployed for forty-five years. Either reunification or a decided shift toward partition would have a profound impact on this longdeployed operation. UNFICYP was established in 1964 with a mandate to prevent violence between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. In 1974, renewed fighting led to a-UN-brokered cease-fire and an expansion of the UNFICYP mandate to include cease-fire monitoring and administration of the buffer zone between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot forces. Since that time, UNFICYP’s mandate has consistently been renewed on a six-month basis. Over the decades, negotiations between the leaders of the two sides have had limited success. A large-scale effort launched by then– Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 led to the resumption of face-to-face peace talks in December 2001. But the process came to an abrupt end in April 2004 when an ambitious UN reunification plan was rejected in a referendum by the Greek Cypriot population, even as the Turkish Cypriot population gave it their support.

In 2003, the first crossing point between the north and south was opened. Since then, seven more have followed, including, in April 2008, the crossing point at Ledra Street, Nicosia’s main thoroughfare. The opening of the Ledra Street crossing represented a significant breakthrough: after four decades of closure it is currently used by thousands of people on a daily basis. During 2009, UNFICYP continued to support day-to-day issues in the buffer zone such as education; medical services, including evacuations and transfers of the deceased; and clearing of minefields. It also conducted sociocultural gatherings. While there were some tense exchanges between UNFYCIP and Turkish military forces, which frequently restricted peacekeeper movements, these incidents were generally quickly resolved. Parliamentary elections within the Turkish Cypriot community in April 2009 saw the defeat of Talat’s Republican Turkish Party by the

UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

4 March 1964 (UNSC Res. 186) Tayé-Brook Zerihoun (Ethiopia) Rear Admiral Mario César Sánchez Debernardi (Peru) $55.9 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 858 Police: 68 International Civilian Staff: 40 Local Civilian Staff: 112

For detailed mission information see p. 275

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National Unity Party, led by hard-liner Dervis Orogulu. Orogulu favors a two-state solution and does not aspire to membership in the European Union—a position that represents a clear change in Turkish Cypriot politics. Mounting opposition from nationalist parties has intensified the pressure on Talat to reach an agreement on reunification before he seeks candidacy for a second term in elections slated for April 2010. Negotiations between President Talat and Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias continued throughout 2009, but their slow pace was a concern. Disagreements remain between the two leaders, on a range of difficult issues. At the center of these is the difficulty of constructing a reunified federal state on the basis of bicommunality and bizonality, which have yet to be defined. Other difficulties also persist. The reopening of the crossing point at Liminitis,

a village in northwestern Cyprus, has not been achieved. Even more telling, as of October 2009, the two parties have yet to discuss the divisive issue of property disputes related to Turkey’s 1974 invasion of the island after a Greek coup that sought to reunite Cyprus with Greece. Optimism surrounding the prospects for a reunification agreement remained cautious in the final months of 2009 as the two leaders continued negotiations and the Security Council renewed UNICYP for a further six months. Yet it has become increasingly clear that the status quo is unlikely to persist. The negotiations so far have relied significantly on the two leaders’ shared vision for reunification. If a deal is not struck in the early months of 2010, a significant opportunity will have been lost— perhaps irreversibly.

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3.5 Georgia

After more than sixteen years in the field, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the OSCE Mission to Georgia saw their mandates expire during 2009. Reflecting the international political tensions that have endured since the brief Georgia-Russia conflict of 2008, decisionmaking bodies at both the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stalemated on the role of the missions in light of a changed operational environment. This left the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) as the only peace operation deployed in the country during 2009. While the region remained relatively calm throughout the year, relations between Georgia and the disputed regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain hostile, and it is questionable whether this limited conflict resolution architecture can prevent violence from returning to Georgia.

Georgia has widened to include confidence building within the Ossetian crisis zone and providing assistance to UNOMIG as the latter oversees the peace process in Abkhazia. Upon Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Abkhazia, a region in the northwest of the country on the Black Sea coast, also sought its separation. Fighting broke out in August 1992 and, despite three cease-fires brokered by Russia, continued until another ceasefire was reached in September. The United Nations established UNOMIG in 1993 to verify compliance with the cease-fire. In early 1994, the two sides negotiated a cease-fire and separation of forces agreement, known as the Moscow Agreement, which mandated the presence of a CIS peacekeeping force (CISPKF) in Abkhazia. The CISPKF was to promote the safe return of refugees, provide a “security zone,” and supervise implementation of the agreement. In July of the same year, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 937, expanding UNOMIG’s mandate to include monitoring of the CISPKF, the ceasefire agreement, and Georgian troop withdrawal from the Kodori Valley in northeastern Abkhazia. Despite the considerable peace operations presence in Georgia, over the course of the ensuing decade the situation remained consistently tense along both disputed regions, with occasional outbreaks of violence. Conflict flared again on the South Ossetia–Georgia border in 2004 when newly elected Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili pursued Georgian reunification policies. While an August 2004 ceasefire agreement ended the direct military confrontation in South Ossetia in the short term, the conflict zone remained volatile. Persistent hostility reached an apex on 7 August 2008, when Georgian forces launched

Background

Georgia has been host to multiple peace operations aimed at addressing the conflicts that emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union. War over the autonomy of the South Ossetia region in northern Georgia ended in 1992 with a Russia-Georgia cease-fire that established the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which was tasked with, among other things, coordinating the efforts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)–South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), a peacekeeping battalion of 1,500 troops led by Russia. In the same year, the OSCE established a mission to Georgia to assist the government with conflict settlement, democratization, respect for human rights, and establishing the rule of law. Since this initial deployment, the OSCE’s mandate in 97

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UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Chief Military Observer • Senior Police Advisor • Budget • Strength as of 31 May 2009

24 August 1993 (UNSC Res. 858) Johan Verbeke (Belgium) Major-General Anwar Hussain (Bangladesh) Oleksiy Telychkin (Ukraine) $15.0 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Military Observers: 132 Police: 14 International Civilian Staff: 98 Local Civilian Staff: 204

For detailed mission information see p. 354

EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

15 September 2008 (CJA 2008/736/CFSP) October 2008 Ambassador Hansjörg Haber (Germany) $32.1 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Police: 193 Civilian Staff: 102

OSCE Mission to Georgia

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 June 2009

6 November 1992 December 1992 Ambassador Terhi Hakala (Finland) $8.8 million (1 October 2008–30 June 2009) 32 Staff

attacks on South Ossetia designed to stamp out rocket fire from Ossetian militias. In response to Georgia’s actions, and voicing its need to protect its peacekeepers and citizens in South

Ossetia, Russia retaliated robustly, repulsing the Georgians and expanding military operations into Georgia. The conflict quickly expanded beyond South Ossetia and the surrounding region, as Russian forces pushed into Georgia’s northwest from Abkhazia and Abkhaz forces moved quickly to regain control of the upper Kodori Valley. The fighting lasted only five days, but caused hundreds of casualties and the displacement, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), of 30,000 ethnic Ossetians and 85,000 ethnic Georgians as well as the devastation of the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, and the destruction of several key Georgian military installations. Negotiations led by the French presidency of the European Union yielded a six-point cease-fire and peace agreement. This, among other things, called for the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian forces to their positions prior to the hostilities and the opening of international discussion on the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It was immediately evident that there could be no return to the status quo. The CIS peacekeeping forces had effectively ceased to exist once the conflict began. After it ended, Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and a unanimous resolution by the Georgian parliament declaring Abkhazia and South Ossetia as territories occupied by the Russian Federation only underlined the depth of the transformation that had taken place. The European Union swiftly deployed its monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM) in September and began operations on 1 October 2008. Its 200 observers monitor the stabilization process, centering on full compliance with the six-point agreement, the normalization process of civil governance, and the return of displaced persons, and contributed to reducing tensions through facilitating contacts between parties and other confidence-building measures. The mission established four field offices, in Kashuri, Zugdidi, Gori, and Tbilisi, and deployed patrols to the areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia—not within them. By 10 October the EUMM confirmed Russian compliance with

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the withdrawal of its forces from Georgia, yet some Russian and South Ossetian military elements remained in disputed border areas.

Key Developments

UNOMIG was left in a state of uncertainty in regard to its mandated tasks and future following the conflict. When the Security Council met in mid-October 2008, it decided to extend UNOMIG’s mandate for four months, pending greater clarity in the situation on the ground, especially in respect to the status of the militaryfree security zone between Georgia and Abkhazia overseen by UNOMIG. The mission’s mandate was renewed for another four months in February 2009, at the end of which the Security Council intended to outline the contours of a future United Nations presence. As stipulated in the August 2008 peace agreement, the intervening months saw several rounds of deliberations on security and humanitarian issues in Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, where among other things representatives considered the future of a UN presence. The talks brought together both Georgian and Russian delegations along with representatives from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the EU, the OSCE, and the United States. The main concrete result of the discussions, which were held in Geneva and cochaired by the UN and EU, was the 18 February 2009 establishment of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, which provides a framework for regular meetings in the conflict theaters between all those involved in maintaining security. Nevertheless, the Geneva discussions were tense throughout, broke down on one occasion, and yielded no clarity on the UN’s future role. Consequently, when the Security Council met in June, modalities for a future operation could not be agreed upon and proposals for a fifteen-day extension for UNOMIG that would allow for further negotiations were rejected. The mission’s mandate failed to be renewed on account of a Russian veto claiming that UNOMIG was “built on old realities.” The OSCE’s mission in Georgia followed a similar

progression, pulling its observers out of Georgia in July after Russia refused its mandate renewal on account of the OSCE’s failure to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Meanwhile, relations between Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia remained acrimonious throughout 2009, with both sides accusing the other of defying the terms of the August 2008 agreement and building up military elements in the conflict zones. Russia deepened its engagement with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, signing bilateral deals to provide executive border protection and establishing military bases in both regions. For its part, Georgia withdrew its membership from the CIS and continued to heighten its engagement with Western countries, mainly through military aid and training. A Georgian maritime blockade in the Black Sea was accused of seizing cargo ships headed for Abkhazia and elicited the deployment of Russian coast guard vessels to address the situation. Similarly, the year saw frequent violations in the border area, including the October arrest of sixteen Georgians by South Ossetian authorities. Tensions were further stoked in September 2009 when the European Union published the first authoritative analysis of the 2008 conflict. The report, produced by the International FactFinding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, found that Georgia had acted in violation of international law when it triggered the 2008 war by shelling South Ossetia’s capital, Tskhinavali. The fact-finding mission also rebuked Russia for its history of provocation in the region and its disproportionate reaction to the Georgian offensive. Within this highly politicized context the EUMM operation remained the only external presence focused on preserving what stability has been achieved on Georgia’s borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. With the primary task of its mandate—monitoring the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia—largely complete in the first months of its deployment, during 2009 the EUMM turned its focus toward the tasks of normalizing civil governance and

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reducing tension through confidence-building measures. However, the limits inherent in the EUMM’s mandate surfaced. Unlike UNOMIG and the OSCE, the EUMM is only authorized to access areas under Georgia’s control and is not given access to the border conflict zones. Along with its monitoring duties, the EUMM maintained a high level of contact with Georgian authorities throughout the year, signing memorandums of understanding on the movement of Georgian police and military elements and establishing efficient lines of communications through co-location of liaison officers in Georgia’s ministries. Conversely, beyond periodic consultations under the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism framework, as established in the Geneva discussions, EUMM contact with

Abkhaz and Ossetian authorities was severely limited, if not wholly absent. This has significant implications for the EUMM’s work, as monitoring only half of the protagonists to the conflict does not ensure progress or future security.

Conclusion

More than a year has passed since the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia, yet the chances for renewed violence remain high. The EUMM’s presence and monitoring activities continue to provide an important early warning function for the international community, but without the ability to address the situation on the ground resolution of the conflict in Georgia will remain a distant reality.

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3.6 Haiti

After a difficult year that saw significant reversal in Haiti’s postconflict recovery in 2008, the country regained in 2009 a degree of forward momentum with the continued support of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and an influx of assistance from the broader international community. Progress made during 2009 is reason for optimism, but this should be tempered by a realistic assessment of the challenges facing Haiti’s still-developing institutions. Partial senatorial elections held during the year are indicative of the task ahead. While the polls presented a significant step in reconstituting Haitian democratic governance, the voter turnout was alarmingly low and the elections themselves would not have been possible without the logistical, technical, and security support provided by MINUSTAH. Overall, Haiti remained stable throughout the year, a situation that allowed for the reorientation of MINUSTAH’s composition to address threats outside the capital city center and a heightened focus on core activities such as building Haitian police and justice sector capacity. An international donor conference in April yielded over $350 million in pledges for development aid to Haiti, and the appointment of former US president Bill Clinton as UN Special Envoy helped bring the plight of the Haitian people to a broader international audience. Nevertheless, five years after MINUSTAH’s deployment and with 80 percent of Haiti’s population living in poverty with limited access to education, medical attention, and justice, the triggers for renewed instability remain present. The risk of future reversals will be mitigated only through the continued development of an equitable system of government and the sustained support of the international community.

Background

The complex situation in Haiti stems from the 1991 military coup that overthrew former president Jean Bertrand Aristide. The coup precipitated years of political upheaval, violence, economic breakdown, and massive international intervention. As a response to persistent unrest and the incapacity of Haitian security institutions to provide an adequate response, the UN Security Council authorized a succession of peacekeeping operations for Haiti between 1993 and 2004.1 Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2000 saw President Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party victorious despite low voter turnout; the opposition protested the results, called for President Aristide’s resignation, and largely

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UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • SRSG • Force Commander • Police Commissioner • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

30 April 2004 (UNSC Res. 1542) 1 June 2004 Hédi Annabi (Tunisia) Major-General Floriano Peizoto Vieira Neto (Brazil) Mamadou Mountaga Diallo (Guinea) $611.7 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 7,041 Police: 2,032 International Civilian Staff: 482 Local Civilian Staff: 1,228 UN Volunteers: 211

For detailed mission information see p. 223

refused to recognize the government. Widespread violence and more sporadic armed conflict broke out during 2004, with opposition forces quickly taking control of the northern part of the country, forcing Aristide to flee once again. In response the Security Council authorized the deployment of a US-led multinational interim force (MIF) to support local police, facilitate humanitarian aid, and promote the protection of human rights and rule of law. During June 2004, the MIF handed over to MINUSTAH, which was mandated to maintain security, facilitate the creation of a stable government, disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate all armed groups, and assist in the reform of the police and judiciary. Addressing the security situation in Haiti was the overriding preoccupation of MINUSTAH during its first three years of deployment. This required the augmentation and reorientation of the mission’s military and police components to address spoilers on several occasions. Despite steady gang violence, MINUSTAH oversaw presidential elections in February 2006, which brought former prime minister and Aristide ally René Préval to office. Shortly after his election and in the face of rampant gang violence in and around the

capital, Port-au-Prince, President Préval asked MINUSTAH to deploy alongside the developing Haitian National Police (HNP) to counter the gangs in the slums directly. Joint MINUSTAHHNP operations throughout 2006 and 2007 effectively removed gang leadership and any influence the gangs had across Port-au-Prince. The semblances of stability began to emerge in the second half of 2007, allowing MINUSTAH to gradually switch focus from purely security operations to assisting Haitian authorities in building the components of a resilient peace, and in particular the justice and security sectors. In early 2008 and at the request of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, in consultation with Haitian authorities, laid out a consolidation plan with five benchmarks that would allow for the tracking of Haiti’s progress, with an ultimate goal of MINUSTAH’s drawdown. The Secretary-General’s five benchmarks are the resolution of political differences through nonviolent means and completion of the elections; extension of state authority; establishment of reliable security structures; development of credible judicial and penal institutions; and improvement in socioeconomic conditions. While work progressed toward the benchmark goals in the first half of 2008, the combined effects of a political stalemate, the global food and financial crises, and the devastating impact of three successive hurricanes all but obviated any gains made. Ultimately, the experience underscored a lack of resilience in Haiti’s governing structures and their relative inability to address any threats to the peace, whether human-made or natural. At the end of 2008, MINUSTAH and the support of the international community appeared as critical as ever.

Key Developments

Recognizing the humanitarian emergency confronting the Haitian people, in April 2009 international donors pledged $350 million in aid toward Haiti’s economic recovery. The funds are designed to develop 150,000 new jobs. While their pledging and subsequent debt relief boosted

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optimism in the possibility of progress, a positive impact will be realized only if the funds are properly coordinated and equitably and transparently distributed, a task that currently lies beyond the capacity of Haiti’s governing structures. In follow-up to the April conference the UN Secretary-General appointed former US president Bill Clinton as his Special Envoy to assist Haiti in its efforts to create jobs, improve service delivery, attract private sector investment, and foster greater international support. In an effort to attract investment, a trade mission of private investors was organized in October. The political situation in Haiti remained tenuous and prone to conflict. Progress in implementing the legislative agenda was slow, with only nine of the thirty-one laws in the pipeline being passed by parliament. While important pieces of legislation were passed, including the law on public procurement and amendments to the electoral code, which extended the mandate of the “collectivites territoriales,” progress in implementing the legislative agenda was limited. The annual budget was passed only after considerable delays and prolonged debates, and critical laws, such as those concerning the customs code and financing of political parties, have yet to be approved by both chambers. Amid this situation, in October the Senate voted out Prime Minister PierreLouis on account of her inability to ease economic hardship. President Préval quickly chose economist Jean-Max Bellerive as a replacement. Elections

The election process to fill twelve Senate seats began in April 2009. No clear winner emerged from the April poll, which led to a runoff on 21 June. In the runoff, the Lespwa party, affiliated with President Préval, won six of the eleven Senate seats, with individual parties and an independent candidate winning the remainder. While largely peaceful, protests and violent incidents around the April elections elicited joint MINUSTAH-HNP operations to return order. The experience proved useful in preparing MINUSTAH and the HNP to take preventive

measures prior to the runoff in June. Despite the low levels of election-related violence, Haiti’s chronic low voter turnout reflects a disassociation from the political process among much of the Haitian population, a situation that has been a major factor in Haiti’s troubles in the past. The barring of candidates from the Fanmi Lavalas party—the party of former president Aristide— from running in the elections, caused some to question the legitimacy of the process. Security

The security situation in Haiti has considerably improved over the course of the past two years. Violent gangs no longer control any part of the Port-au-Prince capital, as joint MINUSTAHHNP operations continue to target the remnants of gang leadership. Similarly, kidnappings— once a major factor in the country’s insecurity— decreased from thirty per month in the first half of 2008 to eight per month in the first half of 2009 as a consequence of MINUSTAH and HNP operations. Nevertheless, the potential for renewed gang activity and associated criminal activities of corruption, kidnapping, and drug trafficking continues to represent a considerable risk to the fragile stability. While gang violence represents a diminished threat to Haiti in the short term, disquiet among the population rooted in concerns regarding living conditions and equitable representation issues has resulted in an increase in the frequency and intensity of civil unrest. These protests frequently emerge out of a conflation of unrelated grievances, yet are subject to infiltration by manipulative and violent elements with ulterior political objectives. Throughout the year, MINUSTAH supported the HNP in addressing these threats to the peace. Their joint activities once again served to demonstrate the HNP’s limited ability to address situations demanding large-scale crowd control without UN support. The improved security in Haiti led to the Secretary-General’s suggestion to alter MINUSTAH’s composition to reflect the changed situation. In October, the Security Council, while maintaining the mission’s overall

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REUTERS/St. Felix Evens

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MINUSTAH peacekeepers fire tear gas during clashes with protesters, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 4 June 2009.

strength, authorized the reconfiguration of MINUSTAH to allow the operational focus of the military and police components to move from the center of Port-au-Prince to address the increasing threats to peace emanating from Haiti’s border and coastline. The mission would be endowed with the resources necessary for rapid reaction to developments throughout the country. Establishing the rule of law through the reform of the judiciary, security, and corrections sectors is a central element of the SecretaryGeneral’s consolidation plan for MINUSTAH. While progress in these areas demonstrated measured forward movement throughout the year, Haitian capacity to arrest, prosecute, and imprison criminals remains limited. Of the 14,000 HNP officers to be active by 2011, nearly 10,000 were deployed by the end of 2009 as a result of MINUSTAH’s training programs. This included a group of 468 new officers, 121 of whom are women. Bilateral partners, working alongside MINUSTAH, continued to build important policing infrastructure. They provided thirty-two new police vehicles and supported the building, expansion, and renova-

tion of police stations throughout the country, significantly enhancing the HNP’s operational capacity as well as its ability to train new recruits. The HNP has not yet been able to conduct autonomous operations to confront smuggling, drug trafficking, and mass violence, necessitating MINUSTAH’s continuous presence and accompaniment. In the meantime, the role of the police relative to other security actors in Haiti has yet to be defined. Achieving such a definition would represent a milestone in Haiti’s transition and eventual handover by MINUSTAH. Nevertheless, debate continues regarding the establishment of a military component within the security service. Closely related to the development of the HNP is the state of Haiti’s justice sector. Haiti’s criminal laws are holdovers from the colonial period. They are wholly unsuited to address the criminal demands of twenty-first century Haiti and ignore the basic tenets of international human rights norms.2 While the Haitian government’s continued development of new criminal laws through its Working Group on the Modernization of the Criminal and Criminal Procedures Codes is a step in the right direction, this will be a long process. Until effective laws are adopted, the majority of Haiti’s population will continue to approach legal institutions with circumspection. Progress was nevertheless made in training and vetting the judiciary. With only 135 out of a total of 470 judges active nationwide, the inauguration of a school for magistrates in March provided hope for expedited training, an essential prerequisite for the reform of the security sector overall (as well as for the trial of those arrested by MINUSTAH-HNP operations). Finally, the state of the corrections system remained dire, with prison conditions falling well below international standards and more than three-quarters of detainees being held on pretrial detention. While the development of new jails and rehabilitation of standing facilities was under way with bilateral and MINUSTAH assistance, the limited progress in implementing the prison administration reform plan and the inhumane conditions of the corrections system

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Box 3.6.1 China’s Growing Involvement in Global Peacekeeping Courtney Richardson*

The People’s Republic of China is an increasingly active contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations. As of 31 October 2009, China had 2,148 military and police personnel participating in ten of the nineteen missions under the supervision of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Chinese participation is found across a variety of peacekeeping missions, including classical, multidimensional, and robust operations, with the Chinese ranking 15th out of the 116 troopcontributing countries. For much of 2008, China was the largest contributor among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, with the majority of its peacekeepers sent to Africa-based missions. These developments look more interesting when one understands that Chinese participation in the UN peacekeeping regime was minimal through the early 1990s, but has increased twentyfold since 2000 at a time when the overall UN peacekeeping system is severely overstretched. To some extent, Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping has remained consistent over the past decade. For example, the Chinese contribute military observers, police, and mission support units—specialists in medical care, transportation, and engineering. The Chinese have yet to send

“blue-helmeted” peacekeepers. These contributions are indicative of China’s commitment to a traditional rather than a robust peacekeeping agenda and its focus on more development-oriented activities of paving roads, removing landmines, and treating patients. Moreover, Beijing will only participate in UN peacekeeping missions, and not in peacekeeping missions led by regional organizations or coalitions of the willing. For example, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs previously dismissed questions of Beijing’s interest in participating in a coalition with the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as “groundless.” However, there have been qualitative changes in Chinese engagement in UN peacekeeping missions. Beijing is increasingly willing to send its peacekeepers to missions that have more interventionist mandates—perhaps indicating more flexibility on China’s long-standing opposition to external interference in the internal affairs of states, especially on the grounds of human rights or humanitarian concerns. For example, the deployment of formed police units to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) perhaps signals a willingness to execute more robust

mandates. Moreover, Beijing also contributes peacekeepers to states that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan—a significant shift from Beijing’s prior vetoing of such “Taiwan-related” missions. Furthermore, China is seeking more leadership positions within UN peacekeeping. Major-General Zhao Jingmin of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was appointed force commander of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in 2007; he is the first Chinese military official to serve in such a high-ranked capacity. China also remains active in offering candidates for openings at the UN Secretariat. At home, there is now a dedicated office for peacekeeping affairs within the PLA; and between the Ministry of Public Security and the PLA, China now maintains three regional peacekeeping training centers, having opened its third in June 2009. These developments in Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping are indeed significant. Beijing’s growing interest in understanding and shaping UN peacekeeping indicates the possibility of increased engagement in the near future. However, whether Beijing will continue to pursue a more conservative peacekeeping agenda remains to be seen.

Note: *Courtney Richardson is a visiting fellow at CIC and a Ph.D. candidate at the Fletcher School, Tufts University. Her doctorate concerns Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping. For more information, contact her at [email protected].

remained sources of much concern and potential flashpoints for violent outburst. During October, MINUSTAH suffered a tragedy when eleven peacekeepers died in a plane crash while patrolling Haiti’s border with the Domin-ican Republic. The Secretary-General expressed his condolences for the fallen peacekeepers while acknowledging the significant contributions they had made in Haiti over the course

of the past five years. Indeed, Haiti has reached a turning point in its slow process of peace consolidation—a reality that was reaffirmed by the international community’s heightened engagement throughout 2009. Vast quantities of assistance likely to come online during 2010 will present managerial and coordination issues of their own. A significant effort of the international community will be required to ensure that

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pledges made in good faith are first realized and then effectively channeled into implementation. In the longer term, establishing an environment in which stability can be maintained through the autonomous actions of legitimate Haitian security and judicial sectors will be the main indicator for handover from MINUSTAH to other lighter peacebuilding presences. The outcome will remain dependent on the continued collaboration of Haitian authorities and the international community.

massive loss of life. While at the time of writing the extent of the impact was still unfolding, it is certain that this catastrophy will have tremendous impact on Haiti’s future development and the international community’s engagement. Already the international response has been robust, with the Security Council mandating increased MINUSTAH contingents. Sustained international attention on Haiti will be crucial in the coming year.

Conclusion

On 12 January 2010, as this edition went to press, Haiti was struck by a devastating earthquake, causing immense destruction and a Notes 1. Between 1993 and 2004 the UN Security Council mandated the following missions in attempts to stabilize Haiti: UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), 1993; the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), 1996–1997; the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), 1997; and the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), 1997–2000. 2. See, generally, Hans Jeorg Albrecht, Luis Aucoin, and Vivienne O’Connor, “Building the Rule of Law in Haiti: New Laws for a New Era,” US Institute of Peace briefing, August 2009.

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3.7 Iraq

Iraq made progress toward regaining full responsibility over its territory during 2009. At the end of June, Iraqi military and police took over as the primary providers of security across the country as US forces in the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) redeployed from cities and villages to bases. While it was anticipated that the handover would be tested by a surge in violence, the overall security situation in Iraq continued to show improvement. Despite continued and often large-scale bomb attacks, by November civilian casualties had dropped to under 300 per month, down from a height of over 3,000 per month in 2006, and attacks on Iraqi security forces had reached new lows. Nevertheless, Iraq remains extremely fragile, as political reconciliation among ethnic Kurd, Sunni, and Shi‘a parties has been slow-moving. This is an area of particular concern for the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), with gains in security highlighting the need for more progress in the political arena especially as preparations for national elections planned for March 2010 proceeded. The Coalition Provisional Authority, led by the United States, began governing Iraq following the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime. Iraq’s sovereignty was partially restored with the establishment of an interim government on 28 June 2004. The Multinational Force in Iraq, which succeeded the coalition forces, was initially deployed at the request of the Iraqi government and authorized by Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004). In November 2008—and in advance of the MNF-I’s mandate expiration—Iraq and the United States negotiated a security agreement detailing the terms of continued US presence, the gradual transfer of

Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

16 October 2003 (UNSC Res. 1511), 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546) November 2003 General Raymond Odierno $93,525.1 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Troops: 130,000

NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)

• Authorization Date

• Start Date • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546), 30 July 2004 (establishment of NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq [NTM-I]), 16 December 2004 (modified into full-fledged training mission) August 2004 Lt. General Frank Helmick (United States) $24.8 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Troops: 200

security responsibilities to Iraqi authorities, and the withdrawal of US forces by the end of 2011. Under the agreement, the MNF-I’s primary objectives are to support Iraqi security structures in maintaining stability and combating terrorist groups—including through military operations— and to continue training and equipping Iraqi

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UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)

• Authorization and Start Date • Head of Mission • Strength as of 31 October 2009

14 August 2003 (UNSC Res. 1500), expanded 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546) Ad Melkert (Netherlands) Troops: 221 Military Observers: 10 International Civilian Staff: 321 Local Civilian Staff: 456

For detailed mission information see p. 250

security forces. Australian, British, and Romanian contingents withdrew from Iraq in July 2009, leaving the United States, with 130,000 troops, as the sole foreign military presence. To reflect this change, the US command was renamed the US Force in Iraq (USF-I) as of 1 January 2010. The UN Assistance Mission in Iraq was established in 2003. Following an August 2003 bomb attack on its headquarters that killed Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello and twenty-one staff members, the remaining staff relocated to Amman, Jordan, until 2004, after which it returned to Baghdad headquarters to resume its mandated task of supporting the Iraqi people in the formation of new governing structures. During 2007, the Security Council enhanced UNAMI’s mandate to involve greater advisement and assistance in political facilitation, and the promotion of regional cooperation between Iraq and the countries of the region. Elections in 2005 led to the selection of Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister. While it was hoped that consensus around an agenda for national reconciliation would follow, such hopes were dashed as security deteriorated. In the face of a dire situation in early 2007, then-US president George W. Bush announced a change in the MNF-I’s approach. Otherwise known as “the surge,” the plan enlarged the US military commitment by approximately 40,000 troops, bringing the total number of US forces to a

height of over 170,000 and allowing for increases in counterinsurgency operations and an overall heightened presence in and around Baghdad. This enlargement, combined with the development of Iraqi security forces, political reconciliation with insurgent leaders, and the alignment of “awakening councils” with MNFI operational priorities, yielded positive security results in 2008 that continued into 2009. Improved security allowed the MNF-I to gradually hand over security operations to the Iraqi army and police. At the end of 2009, over 660,000 Iraqi forces had reached operational readiness through training provided by the MNF-I and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Gains in security, however, will be sustained only with genuine progress in political reconciliation between Iraq’s Kurd, Sunni, and Shi‘a communities. With this in mind, UNAMI has continued to assist Iraqi authorities in building their capacity for governing and assisting negotiations. UNAMI supported successful provincial elections in January 2009 and then turned its operational focus to two priorities: preparing for national elections planned for the first months of 2010, and resolving disputes over ethnically contested internal border areas. Preparations for the national elections did see some progress. Electoral legislation, essential to the holding of polls in 2010, proved to be a divisive issue that threatened the unity of the Iraqi government on multiple occasions. Nevertheless, through UNAMI’s assistance, and with added pressure from the US administration, the legislation finally passed in December. The election law authorizes the creation of a 325-seat Iraqi parliament; voters are to cast ballots for individual candidates rather than voting only for a political party, as was the case for the previous two elections in 2005. Further, the Iraqi diaspora will be able to cast absentee ballots that will be counted in their home provinces. Resolving the disputed internal border areas remained an impediment to political reconciliation throughout the year, and more broadly

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reflects the challenges facing both Iraq and the international presences there. As tensions between Kurds, Sunni, and Shi‘a regarding these issues heightened, the importance of achieving a political solution that capitalizes on the security

gains became ever more apparent. Iraq is at a critical point in its postconflict recovery and much could be lost if the country’s leaders are unable to overcome differences and take on the full responsibilities of sovereignty.

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3.8 Liberia

UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Force Commander • Police Commissioner • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

19 September 2003 (UNSC Res. 1509) Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark) Lieutenant-General Sikander Afzal (Pakistan) Henrik Stiernblad (Sweden) $561.0 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 10,033 Military Observers: 122 Police: 1,343 International Civilian Staff: 455 Local Civilian Staff: 984 UN Volunteers: 225

For detailed mission information see p. 302

During the six years since the deployment of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the country has registered significant progress in its postconflict recovery. Nevertheless, and despite the absence of large-scale violence, the need for UNMIL’s presence is clear to be seen: Liberian state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, are far from self-sustaining, and criminality is widespread. Meanwhile, a variety of domestic and regional threats to Liberia’s stability remain, including frequent violent disputes over land rights, high unemployment rates, illicit trafficking of narcotics, exploitation of natural resources, and a lack of social services. Further, Liberia is preparing for presidential elections in 2011, a complex process that will require UNMIL’s support in areas of both logistics and security. Bearing these factors in mind, the Security Council renewed UNMIL’s mandate in September 2009 for an additional twelve months and authorized implementation of the third phase of the scaled mission drawdown, which began in October 2007. Background

Fourteen years of brutal war in Liberia ended in August 2003 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana. The war killed an estimated 270,000 people, displaced one-third of the population, and left the country in ruins physically, institutionally, and economically. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brokered the 2003 peace talks and was subsequently authorized by the Security Council to establish a multinational force, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). This mission paved the way for the deployment in October 2003 of UNMIL. 110

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Key Developments

In early 2009, and in the context of a relatively stable security situation, the second phase of UNMIL’s incremental drawdown process concluded. While the withdrawal of troops represented a 10 percent decrease of the mission’s military strength, UNMIL police numbers jumped by 20 percent in the same period. Before embarking on the third phase of the mission’s drawdown, a technical assessment mission by the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support visited Liberia to assess the situation on the ground. Central to the mission’s findings was the still-developing and extremely limited capacity of Liberia’s state institutions, namely the justice and security sectors. During the year, the capacity of Liberia to arrest, detain, and adjudicate criminals was extremely low and UNMIL remained as the main guarantor of security throughout the country. Nevertheless, development of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) saw some progress. At year end, US contractors implementing the reform of the AFL handed over responsibility to Liberia’s Ministry of Defense. The United States will deploy sixty military personnel to continue the mentoring process of the AFL in early 2010. However, the disengagement of US contractors will present new and significant managerial and financial challenges for Liberia’s Ministry

of Defense. For its part, UNMIL began a mentoring program that supported AFL training exercises. Beginning in January 2010, UNMIL offered more enhanced training and mentoring in line with the government’s national defense strategy, which aims for independent operability of the AFL by 2012. In July 2009, President Sirleaf announced the closure of the Liberian disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration program. The program was one of the key outcomes of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and its conclusion represents a significant milestone for the Sirleaf administration, UNMIL, and its international partners. While the program boasted over 101,000 disarmed and demobilized and 90,000 assisted, difficulties with reintegration, high youth unemployment, and easy access to illegal economic activities have had a deleterious impact on the process. Efforts toward strengthening the Liberian National Police (LNP) continued. Despite improvements in the areas of criminal investigation, weapons handling, and building of infrastructure, capacity development remained slow, with the LNP operationally dependent on

UN Photo/Christopher Herwig

UNMIL has a multidimensional mandate that authorizes it to provide security while assisting in laying the foundations for a lasting peace. UNMIL is mandated to support the implementation of the cease-fire agreement; develop and implement a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program; protect UN personnel as well as civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; facilitate humanitarian assistance; support security sector reform, in particular police reform; assist in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country; and assist in national elections, which were held in 2005 and placed President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in office.

An UNMIL sergeant briefs members of the Ghanaian battalion during a daily patrol of the city, Buchanan, Liberia, 17 April 2009.

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Box 3.8.1 The Security Council: Women, Peace, and Security

During September 2009, the UN SecretaryGeneral submitted his first report on the implementation of landmark Security Council Resolution 1325, concerning women, peace, and security. The resolution, adopted in 2000, called upon member states, the United Nations system, parties to conflict, and all other relevant actors to adopt a gender perspective that prioritizes the protection needs of female populations during and after conflict. In his 2009 report, the Secretary-General observed that while much had been done to protect women in conflict settings during the nine years since adoption of Resolution 1325, overall implementation has been uneven and conflict continues to have devastating and disproportionate impact on women and girls in conflict areas. In response to the Secretary-General’s report and in recognizing the continued use of sexual violence as a conflict tool, on 30 September 2009 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1888, identifying sexual violence as a continued scourge of conflict and outlining decisive action that the UN and its member states can take to prevent sexual violence in conflict settings. Resolution 1888 represents the most extensive evolution of gender issues in peace operations contexts and builds on the similarly focused Resolution 1820 (2008), which urged increased inclusion of female perspectives into all peace and security activities. Taking

into account several recommendations from the Secretary-General’s report, Resolution 1888 codifies the incorporation of protection of women and prevention of conflict-related sexual violence against women as integral to peace operations, and exhibits a stronger commitment from the Security Council than ever before. Among the most significant aspects of Resolution 1888 is the appointment of several posts dedicated specifically to ensure a more comprehensive approach to supporting the role of women in areas of conflict. The resolution calls for the creation of a Special Representative post to provide leadership for and strengthening of the existing UN coordination mechanisms as well as advocacy for ending sexual violence against women from all relevant stakeholders. Additionally, the resolution calls for the creation of a team of experts that can be rapidly deployed to contexts where the issue of sexual violence in armed conflict is of concern. The team is to comprise specialists in rule of law, civilian and military judicial systems, mediation, criminal investigation, security sector reform, witness protection, fair trial standards, and public outreach, and will support national efforts to enhance rule of law. Resolution 1888 also calls for the appointment of women’s protection advisers to be included in the mandates of peacekeeping operations where appropriate.

As cited in the Secretary-General’s report, the lack of information and reporting on sexual violence remains a key issue. In this vein, Resolution 1888 calls for a systematic reporting system on genderbased violence to be implemented, and for data to be shared regularly with the Security Council. Furthermore, the resolution requests that an annual report on the progress of Resolution 1820 be submitted to the Security Council by the SecretaryGeneral. For the first time, sanctions now contain language regarding women and security. The Council has agreed that when adopting or renewing targeted sanctions in situations of armed conflict, it should consider special criteria pertaining to acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence. The possibility of sanctions sends a strong message to countries facing violent upheaval by both governments and rebels at the expense of the safety of women. The Secretary-General stressed that in order for Resolution 1888 to be a positive force in the protection of female populations, it must be implemented in the global frameworks provided by its predecessor resolutions. In addition, on 5 October 2009, Resolution 1889 was adopted, calling for both a review of Resolution 1325 and the inclusion of gender issues as the Peacebuilding Commission reviews the UN’s postconflict efforts.

Note: For more information see: UNSC Res. 1325 (2000); UNSC Res. 1820 (2008); UNSC Res. 1888 (2009); UNSC Res. 1889 (2009); UN Document S/2009/465.

UNMIL police contingents. In September, senior LNP and UNMIL staff identified eighteen priority projects as part of a strategic plan for 2009– 2013, and presented the plan to partners. Meanwhile, the requisite justice and corrections structures necessary to support the developing police remained wholly inadequate on account of capacity, infrastructure, and equipment deficits.

In political terms, during July the final report of the 2003 Truth and Reconciliation Commission was released. The commission outlined the root causes of Liberia’s conflict, recognized that all parties involved in the conflict committed grave violations of human rights, and recommended that those who were complicit with the abuses be barred from public office for thirty

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years, and that those currently serving office be barred from reelection. While President Sirleaf was cited in the report for having openly admitted association with former president Charles Taylor prior to her election, legislation enforcing the report’s recommendations has yet to be passed, leaving Sirleaf’s legal right to reelection unresolved. Nevertheless, international support for the Sirleaf government remained strong throughout the year.

Conclusion

At the close of the year, Liberia’s postconflict progress was reflected in the government’s assumption of more financial responsibility. During the year, the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), a multidonor partnership with Liberia that was initiated in 2005 to develop national financial management capacity and accountability and to control corruption, ceased international oversight of and support for four of Liberia’s national

entities (forests, airports, marine ports, and petroleum refineries). However, technical assistance and training for these supported institutions will continue through the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the US Agency for International Development. The year ahead will present new obstacles to the maintenance of peace in Liberia. Preparations for the 2011 presidential elections will challenge the developing Liberian institutions. Meanwhile, broader regional instability in Guinea and planned elections in both Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone in the coming year, coupled with the growth of the narcotics trade in West Africa, all could have destabilizing impacts on Liberia, as they have in the past. UNMIL’s presence will remain crucial in the year ahead, but as the mission considers further drawdown, that process must be tied to the development of competent Liberian justice and security institutions.

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3.9 Middle East

On 27 December 2008, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip. This assault was a response to rocket attacks from Palestinian militants in Gaza, which had increased following the failure of Egyptian mediation efforts to renew the tahdiya (“calming” in Arabic) between Hamas and Israel. The government of Israel’s stated objective was to bring “an improvement in the security reality for the residents” of southern Israel.1 Over 1,300 Palestinians were killed during the conflict, which also resulted in substantial destruction of infrastructure.2 Ten Israeli soldiers and three civilians were killed. Although violence was mainly confined to Gaza, the conflict threatened to destabilize the broader Middle East: demonstrators clashed with police across the region, and rockets were fired from Lebanese territory toward Israel. The war attracted huge diplomatic and media attention. At midnight on 17 January, Hamas and Israel declared unilateral cease-fires. Since then, the region has been calmer but there has been little progress toward resolution of various interconnected conflicts. Negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians have not resumed. The Palestinian territory remains divided between the West Bank, ruled by President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority, and Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israeli government refuses to freeze settlement construction. Arab states have not implemented confidence-building measures as requested by the United States. In Lebanon, the 14 March coalition enjoyed unexpected success in national elections in June. Saad Hariri is expected to head the next Lebanese government, but there has been a long delay in its formation. Meanwhile, a series of

incidents has increased tensions between Lebanon and Israel. In May the government of Lebanon uncovered a network of spies working for Israel, and in July an explosion at an arms cache provided evidence of Hezbollah rearmament in south Lebanon. Israel continued to conduct surveillance overflights of Lebanese territory and to occupy the northern part of Ghajar. In Iraq, provincial elections in January proceeded successfully. The country nonetheless remained highly unstable and bomb attacks killed hundreds of civilians. Tension remains high as the United States proceeds with its military pullout, and internal and regional issues remain unresolved in the run-up to national elections. In Iran, presidential elections were contested and security forces responded violently, causing hundreds of deaths and injuries. Tensions persist, though President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remains in power. Political change in Iran would have regional repercussions, as will ongoing negotiations relating to Iran’s nuclear program. The Gaza conflict had grave humanitarian consequences. Palestinian civilians were unable to flee fighting, and hospitals in Gaza were scarcely able to address the needs of the injured. During the conflict, the Security Council met at the ministerial level and on 8 January adopted a resolution calling for, among other things, “an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire, leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza” and for “unimpeded provision and distribution throughout Gaza of humanitarian assistance.” Israel ceased its operation on 18 January, and withdrew its forces two days later. Despite the physical and human devastation, the overall political and security impacts of the conflict were limited. Hamas remained

114

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in power in Gaza. The assault did not pressure Hamas into freeing captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, or prompt a breakthrough in Egyptianmediated talks between the divided Palestinian factions. Official crossings into Gaza remain mainly closed, while large-scale illicit trafficking

in goods, including arms and munitions, continues via tunnels from Egypt. No cease-fire has been established and Palestinian militants continue to fire rockets into Israel. The international boycott of the Hamas leadership in the Strip remains in place, so two

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UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

• Authorization and Start Date • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

19 March 1978 (UNSC Res. 425/426) Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy) $589.8 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 12,341 International Civilian Staff: 324 Local Civilian Staff: 663

For detailed mission information see p. 284

international security assistance missions that are deployed to train Palestinian security and police services—the US Security Coordinator and the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)—have been unable to resume their work there. The EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) has remained on standby. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was affected by tension during the Gaza conflict. During January, rockets were fired twice from UNIFIL’s area of operations toward Israel. Israel responded with artillery shells. UNIFIL engaged in daily dialogue with Israeli and Lebanese interlocutors during this period, both bilaterally and via the Tripartite Committee. UNIFIL also intensified its reconnaissance activities with the Lebanese Armed Forces. This period was, according to a senior UNIFIL official, the “biggest test yet” of the security mechanisms established since 2006 to prevent escalation of tensions between Israel and Lebanon. The violence was largely controlled and no “second front” opened along the Blue Line. The UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) was affected by increased tension during this period. Two other peace operations—the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO Sinai)—were slightly affected: UNTSO increased its patrolling of villages in south Lebanon, and the MFO (which is located close to Gaza) intensified its focus on staff security.

Background

UNIFIL is the largest UN peace operation in the region. First established in 1978 by Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426, UNIFIL was tasked with confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces and helping the government of Lebanon to reestablish control over the south. In May 2000, UNIFIL assisted in the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind a Blue Line identified by the UN. Conditions remained unstable, however, as the Lebanese government was unable to deploy forces in the south. In 2004, the Security Council again demanded extension of Lebanese government authority throughout Lebanon, and called for withdrawal of Syrian troops (accomplished in 2005) and “the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.”3 War erupted in Lebanon in July 2006 when Hezbollah attacked an Israeli patrol and abducted two soldiers. Israel bombed Lebanon, including Beirut, and invaded Lebanese territory; Hezbollah fired hundreds of rockets into Israel. Over a thousand Lebanese and 161 Israelis were killed, and thousands were displaced on both sides. The war ended with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701. This resolution established a new mandate for UNIFIL, adding to its original responsibilities the tasks of monitoring the cessation of hostilities, ensuring that no foreign forces would be present in Lebanon without government consent, assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in preserving an area free of unauthorized armed personnel between the Blue Line and the Litani River, and fully implementing the Taif Accords. Resolution 1701 allowed for the expansion of UNIFIL up to 15,000 troops. UNIFIL and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are currently undertaking a technical review of the operation.

Key Developments Security

UNIFIL can claim significant successes in the three years since its mandate was enhanced at the conclusion of the 2006 war. A long period

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of relative stability was maintained in 2009, despite continuing regional tensions. Significant security challenges nonetheless remain. The government of Lebanon has so far not established, between the Blue Line and the Litani River, “an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL,” as called for in Resolution 1701. Rockets were fired from south Lebanon into Israel in January, February, and September 2009, to which Israel responded with artillery shells. On 14 July, a large explosion occurred at an arms cache in Khirbit Silim, a few kilometers north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL peacekeepers seeking to investigate the site were blocked by local residents, and fourteen peacekeepers were injured. Subsequent investigations found that this cache was being actively maintained. UNIFIL force commander, Major-General Graziano described this as a “tough incident” but not unique, citing similar findings in 2006.4 The incident appeared to prove what Israel has long been arguing, that Hezbollah has been rearming south of the Litani. Further suspicions were aroused by a fire possibly caused by another explosion in the village of Tay Falsay on 12 October; this incident is under investigation by UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces. Beyond Hezbollah, other serious challenges face UNIFIL. Tensions have escalated following several violations of the Blue Line, particularly when on 17 July a group of Lebanese civilians deliberately crossed into Israel in protest at the erection of an Israeli watchtower. The activities of what UNIFIL describes as terrorist organizations linked to Palestinian camps continue to threaten Lebanese and regional security. Some camps, especially Ein alHilweh, “continue to provide safe haven for those who seek to escape the authority of the state.”5 Such organizations were probably responsible for rockets fired across the Blue Line in 2009. In September, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested members of a non-Lebanese group linked to Fatah al-Islam who were accused of planning attacks on UNIFIL. Serious security incidents have also occurred in and around Tripoli. Reconstruction of the Nahr el-Bared

refugee camp has been suspended pending archaeological investigations, and this will likely exacerbate tensions between Palestinians and Lebanese citizens in the north. It is not clear how these tensions might affect the situation in the south. Progress toward the establishment of an arms-free area south of the Litani continues to be impeded by lack of effective border controls between Syria and Lebanon. UNIFIL has, to date, been asked only to assist the government of Lebanon in securing Lebanon’s maritime borders. Despite broader international efforts to secure the land borders, parts of the SyriaLebanon border remain easily penetrable and Palestinian militias maintain de facto control in some areas.6 Smuggling of arms and munitions continues and some weapons inevitably end up south of the Litani. UN officials in Lebanon argue that stemming the flow of weapons depends on both enhanced technical border controls and a further transformation in the political relationship between Syria and Lebanon. The parties have taken some steps toward implementation of Resolution 1701. In May, Israel provided technical data on the location of cluster bombs, which helped the UN and Lebanese parties to proceed with removal of unexploded ordnance—though funding shortages continue to affect this work. Delineation of the Blue Line has proceeded gradually. Overall, there has been little progress toward resolving the most difficult outstanding Israeli-Lebanese issues. Israel continues to conduct overflights and to occupy northern Ghajar, and UN efforts to secure Israeli withdrawal from the village have so far failed. There has also been no visible progress in broader UN efforts to resolve the dispute over the Shebaa farms area,7 or to establish permanent cease-fire arrangements. Maintaining security for UNIFIL peacekeepers remains a serious concern. When the government of Lebanon uncovered a network of Israeli spies in May and June, some local media alleged that UNIFIL had helped spies across the Blue Line. Hezbollah also accused UNIFIL of bias in its investigation of Israeli spying devices that were discovered in south Lebanon in October. UNIFIL is authorized to

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REUTERS/Ali Hashisho

Political

Italian UNIFIL contingents inspect the site of an explosion between the villages of Meis al-Jabal and Houla in south Lebanon, 18 October 2009.

investigate claims regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel or weapons within its area of operations if specific information is received, and to “resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties.” In deciding how forcefully to resist efforts to impede its operations, UNIFIL must weigh benefits against the potential costs, which include casualties and damaged community relations. After the Khirbit Silim incident there were calls from the US Congress and elsewhere for UNIFIL to intervene more robustly. However, UNIFIL’s mandate was renewed without changes in August 2009, reflecting troop contributors’ preferences and UNIFIL’s assessment of what is feasible. UNIFIL continues to make substantial efforts to minimize the disruption caused by the presence of a large force with an intrusive mandate. It maintains that community relations have not worsened since 2006. According to some UN officials, however, many Lebanese perceive that UNIFIL is present to “protect Israel.” If this is the case, hostility to UNIFIL may rise despite the force’s historically good relationship with the local population.

Despite appalling violence in Gaza at the beginning of 2009, the Middle East experienced moments of optimism during the year. The success of Iraqi and Lebanese elections offered hope of peaceful political change. President Barack Obama brought a new tone to US policy in the Middle East, and his administration engaged promptly and energetically in the region. Genuine political progress has remained elusive, however. At the time of writing, Prime Minister–designate Saad Hariri had not formed a government, despite the passage of almost five months since the elections. Hariri is obliged, given Lebanon’s complex internal and regional relationships, to include opposition members in his government and to satisfy key regional states. Hariri’s efforts to balance these various interests have not yet borne fruit, despite a Syrian-Saudi summit in early October that was expected to ease political tensions in Lebanon. Lebanon remains in the hands of a caretaker government, which has been able to move forward on some issues relating to Resolution 1701 implementation, including borders and de-mining. The political deadlock is nonetheless potentially dangerous: without a legitimate government in place, Lebanon’s internal national dialogue remains on hold and the state is ill positioned to deal with potential crises or to negotiate key regional issues. The deadlock also erodes faith in Lebanon’s political system, indicating that regional interests and those of elites in Lebanon carry more weight than the popular vote. Israel’s political situation has not encouraged resolution of regional political issues. In February, Kadima won national elections by a narrow margin, but party leader Tzipi Livni proved unable to form a government. Benjamin Netanyahu took power at the head of a coalition that includes his Likud party, the rightwing Yisrael Beiteinu, and Labor, headed by Ehud Barak. This Israeli government’s approach to Resolution 1701 has not differed substantially from that of its predecessor. However, Prime Minister Netanyahu has taken a hard line on issues relating to the Palestinians—notably

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settlements. This has brought him into conflict with the United States as it seeks to restart the peace process. Palestinian disunity has also impeded US efforts toward peace. Violence has continued gradually to drop in many parts of Iraq. Fighting between Arabs and Kurds in the north threatens to spiral upward, however, highlighting the need for resolution of the Kurdish question.

Other Missions UNTSO

The UN Truce Supervision Organization was established in 1948 to monitor observance of cease-fires negotiated between Israel and its neighbors. UNTSO provides observers and logistical and financial support to UNIFIL and UNDOF, as well as a small observer group in Egypt at the request of its government. A new chief of staff was appointed in 2009, and there was a reorganization of the military staff in UNTSO headquarters, including establishment of a joint operations center. UNTSO did not undergo any formal changes to its mandate or authorized strength during the year. UNDOF

The UN Disengagement Observer Force was established in May 1974 to supervise the ceasefire and disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. During 2009, the cease-fire was maintained and UNDOF’s area of operation remained generally quiet. The force faces several challenges, including a “substantial increase” in the Syrian civilian population (which enhances risk of incidents adjacent to the technical fence) and increasing smuggling in the area. During the Gaza conflict, shots were fired at an Israeli Defense Forces patrol. The patrol did not retaliate but asked the UNDOF force commander to mediate. UNDOF maintained trusting relationships with both parties during the year, and liaison activities improved. The mission was renewed by the Security Council for an additional six months in December.

EUBAM Rafah

The EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah was established in 2005 to help implement the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access by providing a third-party presence at the Rafah crossing. When Hamas forces took control of Gaza in June 2007, EUBAM suspended its operations. The mission has not carried out any training or other work with Palestinian partners since, although the preparation of training programs for Palestinian Authority customs and border police personnel has continued. Increased security measures were introduced during the Gaza conflict. EUPOL COPPS

The EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Po-

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

• Authorization and Start Date • Chief of Staff • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

29 May 1948 (UNSC Res. 50) Major-General Robert Mood (Norway) $69.8 million (1 January 2008–31 December 2009) Military Observers: 151 International Civilian Staff: 96 Local Civilian Staff: 129

For detailed mission information see p. 362

UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

• Authorization and Start Date • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

31 May 1974 (UNSC Res. 350) Major-General Wolfgang Jilke (Austria) $45.0 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 1,039 International Civilian Staff: 40 Local Civilian Staff: 103

For detailed mission information see p. 267

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EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah)

• Authorization Date

• Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

5 November 2005 (Agreement on Movement and Access), 12 December 2005 (Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP) October 2005 Colonel Alain Faugeras (France) $3.9 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Police: 11 International Civilian Staff: 12

EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

14 November 2005 (Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP) January 2006 Chief Constable Paul Robert Kernaghan (United Kingdom) $8.3 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Police: 21

began operating in January 2006 with the aim of enhancing EU support. The operation trains Palestinian police in a number of areas, including traffic control, drugs interdiction, and public order. EUPOL COPPS has also improved police infrastructure, and fosters cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian police services. In October 2008 a rule of law section was inaugurated. EUPOL COPPS did not participate in the city-by-city security campaigns that took place throughout the West Bank in 2008–2009. The Palestinian Civil Police played a major role, alongside the Palestinian National Security Forces, which are trained by the US security coordinator. The capacities of the civilian police in public order, reduction of violence, and proportionate use of force were also tested during demonstrations in the West Bank during the Gaza conflict. According to EUPOL COPPS, the civilian police “did well in maintaining order in the West Bank and avoiding major disturbances and loss of lives.” EUPOL COPPS is not active in Gaza, but maintains low-level contacts with civilian police members there. TIPH

Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

• Authorization and Start Date

• Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2007

15 January 1997 (Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron), 21 January 1997 (Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron) Brigadier General Britt Brestrup (Norway) $3.5 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Civilian Police: 27 International Civilian Staff: 37

Established by an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in 1994, TIPH is mandated with providing security for Hebron residents and promoting stability through monitoring, reporting, and assistance. TIPH is coordinated by Norway and staffed by personnel from Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. TIPH’s mandate, pending approval from the Israeli and Palestinian parties, is renewed at six-month intervals. Palestinian demonstrations took place in Hebron during the war in Gaza. TIPH plays no direct role in controlling such demonstrations, though it intervened to advocate against use of specific riot control measures. MFO Sinai

lice Support (EU COPPS) was established in 2005 to support and advise the Palestinian Civil Police. A follow-up mission, EUPOL COPPS,

MFO Sinai was established in 1981 following withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force II and conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

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The MFO supervises implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. On 1 September 2005, the MFO took on responsibility for monitoring the deployment of guards along the Egyptian side of the Egypt-Gaza border. The force verifies that this deployment is consistent with the terms agreed between Egypt and Israel. A new director-general, David Satterfield, was appointed to the MFO in 2009. The mandate and mission of the MFO remained unchanged. The force is not mandated to monitor the area of the Sinai immediately adjacent to Gaza, and was not directly affected by breaches at the Rafah crossing.

Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO Sinai)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

3 August 1981 (Protocol to the Treaty of Peace) April 1982 Ambassador David M. Satterfield (United States) $68.6 million (1 October 2008–30 September 2009) Military Observers: 1,660 Civilian Staff: 16

Notes 1. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, press briefing on Israeli Defense Forces operation in the Gaza Strip, 27 December 2008. 2. According to the Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/12/48, 23 September 2009), most nongovernmental organizations place the overall number of persons killed at between 1,387 and 1,417, and the Gaza authorities report 1,444 fatalities. The government of Israel provides a figure of 1,166. The mission concluded that “data provided by non-governmental sources on the percentage of civilians among those killed are generally consistent and raise very serious concerns about the way Israel conducted the military operations.” 3. UN Security Council Resolution 1559, 2 September 2004. 4. 28 September 2009, www.saidaonline.com/en/new.php?go=fullnews&newsid=14820. 5. United Nations, Tenth Report of the Secretary-General on Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559, 2 September 2004, para. 33 (advance copy distributed to members of the Council). 6. Ibid., para. 21 (advance copy distributed to members of the Council). 7. In Resolution 1701, the Security Council “requests the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area.” UN Security Council Resolution 1701, UN Doc. S/RES/1701, August 2006.

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3.10 Moldova-Transdniestria

The dispute between Moldova and Transdniestria remained frozen during 2009 despite the formation of a pro–EU membership government in Moldova after eight years of communist rule. With negotiations on Transdniestria’s status at a standstill, the new Moldovan government called for the dissolution of the military peacekeeping operation on the disputed border and its replacement with civilian observers under the auspice of an international mandate. Meanwhile, Transdniestrian authorities called on ally Russia to redouble its commitment of peacekeepers to protect Transdniestria’s unilateral independence. Divisions over the future role of peacekeepers were indicative of the deeper differences stymieing progress toward resolution. Geographically isolated within Moldova by the Dnestr River, and historically and linguistically tied to Ukraine and Russia, Transdniestria declared its independence from Moldova in September 1990 in response to fears that Moldova would merge with Romania upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. A full-scale conflict ensued between Dniestrian militias and the Moldovan government that lasted until a cease-fire was reached in July 1992 with Russian oversight. The Moscow-Chisinau peace agreement mandated a

Joint Control Commission (JCC) Peacekeeping Force

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Strength as of 30 September 2009

21 July 1992 July 1992 Colonel Aleksey Tumashov (Russia) Troops: 1,278

cease-fire, Russian recognition of Moldova’s territorial integrity, and provisions for Dniestrian independence should Moldova join Romania. The agreement also established a 140mile security zone along the Dnestr River, to be patrolled by a joint peacekeeping force composed of Russian, Transdniestrian, and Moldovan units. Operations of the joint peacekeeping force have been overseen by the Joint Control Commission (JCC), consisting of representatives from Russia, Moldova, Transdniestria, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since September 2005, the JCC has also included representatives from the United States as well as EU observers. In addition to monitoring the activities of the peacekeeping force, the JCC is responsible for overseeing the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and for undertaking confidence-building measures. An EU border assistance mission, in place since December 2005, is mandated to monitor the Transdniestrian section of the common border with Ukraine and Moldova. The first meeting of the “5 + 2” JCC arrangement (Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, the United States, the European Union, Moldova, and Transdniestrian authorities) was halted when Transdniestria suspended its participation in the negotiations in March 2006 in response to more stringent customs regulations imposed by Ukraine and Moldova. In April 2008, then-president Vladimir Voronin met the leader of the breakaway Transdniestrian region for the first time in seven years. Seeking to build on the momentum from the summit, the EU declared in May that it was ready to do “absolutely everything” to support the conflict resolution process with Transdniestria.

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However, the outbreak of war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 over South Ossetia slowed progress significantly, and with both sides sticking to their positions, 2009 saw no movement toward resolution. As of 30 September 2009, peacekeeping contingents in and around the separatist territory numbered 1,278, where they served as peacekeepers as well as guardians of 20,000 tons of ammunition. With the EU-aspiring government in place after Moldova’s contested 2009 election cycle,

it was hoped that resolving the dispute with Transdniestria would take on a new salience in relation to closer ties to the West. But at the end of 2009, the parties remained as divided as ever, with Moldovan prime minister Vlad Filat stating that settling the Transdniestria dispute was at best a medium-term task and perhaps even a long-term task.

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3.11 Nepal

UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

23 January 2007 (UNSC Res. 1740) Karin Landgren (Sweden) $66.9 million (1 January 2008–31 December 2009) Military Observers: 73 International Civilian Staff: 48 Local Civilian Staff: 119 UN Volunteers: 18

For detailed mission information see p. 312

The stalled peace process in Nepal presented serious challenges to the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) during 2009. In the course of the year, UNMIN had its mandate extended for two six-month periods (to January 2010) beyond its completion of aspects relevant to the election of the Constituent Assembly in April 2008. This reflected both a lack of progress in addressing the status of the country’s two armies—in particular the failure to move ahead with the reintegration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants—as well as the breakdown of reconciliation between the country’s primary political forces. As an unstable political stalemate set in during the latter months of 2009, UNMIN’s situation became more complex. Initially conceived as a “focused mission of limited duration,” it was neither mandated nor resourced to address the increasingly volatile situation in which it found itself. UNMIN was established in January 2007 to assist in the implementation of specific elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the decade-long conflict between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the government in November 2006. Given

UNMIN’s status as a special political mission, its presence was predicated on the government’s request. It was mandated to monitor the parties’ management of arms and armed personnel, provide technical support for the election of a Constituent Assembly, and assist in monitoring nonmilitary aspects of cease-fire arrangements. A twice-delayed election of Nepal’s first Constituent Assembly was held in April 2008 with UN assistance. It saw the emergence of the Communist Party of Nepal as the country’s largest political party and led to the installation of Ram Baran Yadav (of the Nepali Congress Party) as the country’s first president and Pushpa Kumal Dahal, the Maoist leader known as Prachanda, as prime minister. With the elections complete, UNMIN initiated downsizing. In May 2008, UNMIN electoral staff were withdrawn from the districts and region, its electoral assistance and civil affairs offices were closed, and the number of arms monitors was reduced from 155 to 85. The new government then turned to further consolidating the peace process and creating a new constitution for release in May 2010. But neither negotiations on the constitution nor efforts to address the sensitive issue of reintegration of Maoist combatants progressed. Overall, an atmosphere of deep mistrust prevailed among the political parties of the Constituent Assembly throughout the year, stymieing any forward progress. Protracted disagreement on issues relating to the future of Nepal’s two armies underpinned the political crisis that developed in May 2009. This saw the resignation of Prime Minister Prachanda after President Yadav overturned Prachanda’s attempt to sack the head of the army. The Maoist-led government dissolved and was replaced by an unwieldy twenty-two-party ruling coalition. Negotiations on the constitution

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and army became mired in stalemate while the Maoists actively blocked—often through mass protests and strikes—the functioning of parliament for most of the rest of the year. With no explicit mandate to influence the political proceedings in the Constituent Assembly and the future status of the 19,000 cantoned combatants still undetermined, UNMIN continued to monitor the management of military equipment and personnel throughout the year. Yet the mission’s staffing profile was reduced to only seventy-three unarmed arms monitors in 2009 and appeared increasingly at odds with the challenges of addressing rising unrest among the idle combatants and the lack of appropriate measures to resolve the political deadlock.

The reversals in Nepal’s peace process seen during 2009 are worrying not only for the future stability of Nepal, but also for the UN’s credibility. While UNMIN was widely praised for the assistance it provided in creating the conditions that allowed the April 2008 election to be held, it is bound by a mandate that reflects a very different operational reality from the one in which it found itself by the end of 2009. Moving forward with implementation of the core aspects of the CPA has never been more urgent as a means to avoid further instability in the country. However, the scope for the UN to play a political role in this process appears limited.

Box 3.11.1 UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

In 2009, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) continued to monitor a very intense and fragile situation in Kashmir. With instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Kashmir remains at risk of conflict. The intensified military operations in Jammu and Kashmir following the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 continued in the first two months of 2009 and aimed to disrupt the haven for the militant group Lahar-e-Toiba who perpetrated the attacks. UNMOGIP was deployed by the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949 to supervise the cease-fire in Kashmir between India and Pakistan; however, compromise over the mission’s mandate negated any operational role. Significant revisions to the mission have not occurred since 1949 and it continues to monitor the line of control. In 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement, which established the line of control separating the two armies. Increased prospects of nuclear confrontation in 2003 influenced a positive turn in political relations in January 2004, when an agreement was reached to commence a bilateral “composite dialogue” on a range of issues, including Jammu-Kashmir. As a result of confidence-building measures,

a mini-summit was initiated in April 2005 to discuss the fate of Jammu-Kashmir. Pakistan proposed a four-point plan for resolution of the disputed areas in December 2006; however, talks in 2007 were stalled by internal political turmoil in Pakistan. Pakistan attempted to take up the issue again in 2008, but talks were disrupted by terrorist bombings in Mumbai by Pakistani extremists. The year 2009 saw increased tensions and various violations of the 2003 IndiaPakistan cease-fire agreement, with instances of Pakistani border troops opening fire on their Indian counterparts. However, India came under increased pressure, particularly from the United States, to withdraw troops from its side of the line of control, while Pakistan cited a need to draw down and divert its troops in order to battle the Taliban elsewhere. In February 2009, Major-General Kim Moon Hwa, chief military observer for UNMOGIP, met with Pakistan’s acting permanent representative, Farukh Amil, who reaffirmed Pakistan’s support for and cooperation with UNMOGIP in promoting confidencebuilding and maintaining peace and stability in Jammu and Kashmir. SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon visited Pakistan that

same month to observe the signing of a comprehensive program between the UN Country Team and the Pakistani government to address poverty reduction, rural development, job creation, education, health, and the environment. On 16 June 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India and President Asif Ali Zardari held their first face-toface meeting in Russia since the attacks in Mumbai, yet little substantive progress on the Kashmir question resulted. Dialogue was stunted again in September as India called for Pakistan to take a harder line on domestic terrorism. India adjusted its preconditions for talks, and during a meeting in the Anantnag district of Jammu and Kashmir on 28 October 2009, Prime Minister Singh indicated willingness to engage with the parties to find meaningful and sustainable routes to peace. He claimed that the era of violence had come to an end in Kashmir and that people were ready for peace. The security situation remained stable throughout the rest of 2009, but limited progress toward a viable solution leaves the peace process ever-vulnerable to opportunistic extremists, as demonstrated in years past.

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3.12 Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands continued in 2009 to pull away from its conflict-ridden past and build efficient and legitimate state structures, largely on account of continued cooperation with the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The Solomon Islands government undertook a greater responsibility in administering the country in 2009, but support from RAMSI was recognized as remaining crucial. RAMSI was established in 2003 under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) at the request of then–Solomon Islands prime minister Sir Alan Kemakeza acting with the approval of his parliament. The request was made in response to a five-year conflict between the Malatian and Guale ethnic groups. RAMSI deployed on 24 July 2003 and successfully secured the surrender of both parties and worked toward further demobilization and disarmament. Beyond establishing a secure environment, RAMSI’s mandate focuses its assistance activities into three pillars: law and justice, economic governance, and machinery of government. Accordingly, RAMSI is organized into

Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

• Authorization Date • Start Date • Head of Mission • Budget • Strength as of 30 September 2009

23 October 2000 (Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué) 24 July 2003 Graeme Wilson (Australia) $26.1 million (1 July 2008–30 June 2009) Troops: 160 Civilian Police: 268 Civilian Staff: 106

three branches under the direction of a special coordinator: a military branch, the Combined Task Force; a civilian police branch, the Participating Police Force; and an additional branch consisting of civilian advisers for governance, economic, and justice issues. After achieving stabilization in 2003, the civilian police branch set out to train the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, while the civilian branch worked closely with the Solomon Islands government to improve capacity building. During the first years of the mission, cooperation between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands government was often strained, with government leadership questioning the motives and influence of the heavily Australian-staffed RAMSI. These tensions reached a highpoint in 2006 during the anti-RAMSI administration of then–prime minister Mannasseh Sogavare. However, relations improved significantly and have remained positive since Sogarve was voted out of office and replaced by Prime Minister Derek Sikua in December 2007. During 2009, Graeme Wilson was appointed special coordinator for RAMSI. Upon taking up his position, Wilson stressed the importance of moving beyond working in Honiara with the national government, to coordinating with the provincial governments. In early 2009, Wilson and his staff met with leaders from Malaita, Guadalcanal, and other islands. At its annual meeting, the PIF Regional Security Committee expressed its approval with the ongoing cooperation between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands governments. RAMSI’s assistance to the Solomon Islands government over the course of the past six years has yielded a 30 percent growth in government revenue and a 28 percent drop in government debt. Similarly, RAMSI’s

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technical and infrastructure assistance to the justice sector allowed for the adjudication of crimes perpetrated during the 1998–2003 conflict and the establishment of a judiciary and corrections system capable of processing and imprisoning criminals arrested by the Royal Police Force (RSIPF). Despite significant development in capacity and professionalism of the RSIPF, the institution still suffers from a deficit of trust from the civilian population. In December 2008, villagers attacked a group of police comprising both RSIPF officers and members of the Participating Police Force. Two RSIPF and five Participating officers were injured. Then–police chief Denis McDermott urged Solomon Islands residents to view police officers as legitimate agents of the state rather than as potential threats. The legitimacy of both police forces was also damaged by the publishing of a report concerned with the riots that hit Honiara during 2006. The report blamed confusion between the respective roles of the two police forces as central to the

failure to stop the escalation of hostilities. Participating Police Force representatives maintain that these issues have since been addressed and no longer present an operational challenge. Despite negative perceptions, the Participating Police Force continued to effectively interface with RSIPF officers, with the latter taking on more patrols and community policing activities and with the former acting in an advisory role. Nevertheless, RAMSI’s advisory role for the RSIPF remains a crucial element to ensuring that the Solomon Islands remains stable and secure. In the second half of 2009, the Solomon Islands government and RAMSI agreed to a jointly developed partnership framework that outlines their future goals. The document identifies the achievements made through the government-RAMSI partnership over the course of the past six years, but also recognizes that significant work remains before the Solomon Islands can stand on its own.

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3.13 Western Sahara

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established in 1991 to verify the cease-fire between the government of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (POLISARIO), and to organize and conduct a referendum that would allow the people of Western Sahara to decide upon the future status of the territory. Western Sahara was claimed by Morocco in 1975 after attaining independence from Spain. POLISARIO, however, contends that Western Sahara has the right to self-determination and supports independence for the territory. It had originally been envisaged that a referendum would take place in January 1992. However, despite a series of efforts to promote an agreement on the terms of the referendum and reach a political settlement, the status quo has been preserved since 1991, as has MINURSO’s deployment.

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

• Authorization and Start Date • SRSG • Force Commander • Budget • Strength as of 31 October 2009

29 April 1991 (UNSC Res. 690) Hany Abdel-Aziz (Egypt) Major-General Zhao Jingmin (China) $56.6 million (1 July 2009–30 June 2010) Troops: 27 Military Observers: 209 Police: 6 International Civilian Staff: 97 Local Civilian Staff: 157 UN Volunteers: 20

For detailed mission information see p. 214

In 2003, then–Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, former US secretary of state James Baker, presented a peace plan that would allow for some elements of governance sharing, while providing for a referendum that would include the option of independence. POLISARIO accepted the plan in 2003. Morocco rejected it on the grounds that it could not agree to any plan that might lead to independence. Baker resigned shortly afterward and was succeeded by Dutch diplomat Peter van Walsum, who in an effort to overcome the political deadlock pursued direct and unconditional negotiations. Four rounds of talks, convened by van Walsum, took place in Manhasset, New York, in 2007 and 2008, during which the parties considered a number of proposals to expand confidence-building measures, mainly through expanding the MINURSO-supported family visits program. However, little progress was made in narrowing the gulf between an autonomy proposal put forward by Morocco and POLISARIO’s adherence to a referendum including the option for independence. In April 2008, van Walsum was deemed proMoroccan by POLISARIO after telling the Security Council that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition. In January 2009, US diplomat Christopher Ross was appointed as the new Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General to Western Sahara. Upon taking office, Ross immediately began consulting broadly with the conflict protagonists and regional stakeholders Algeria and Mauritania on bringing some resolution to the dispute, but also reasserted Western Sahara’s right to self-determination. MINURSO continued to perform its duties in regard to its mandate. The mission conducted regular ground and air reconnaissance

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patrols, visiting units of the Royal Moroccan Army and the forces of POLISARIO in order to monitor their adherence to the military agreements. The mission enjoyed enhanced freedom of movement, with fewer restrictions imposed by the two parties on MINURSO. An increased use of air assets allowed MINURSO to expand its patrols and monitoring functions; it completed 609 air patrols between April 2008 and March 2009. The overall situation in MINURSO’s area of responsibility remained generally calm during the year, and MINURSO continued to support the confidence-building activities of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. In October 2009, the Secretary-General appointed Hany Abdel-Aziz of Egypt as his Special Representative to head MINURSO. In May 2009, the Security Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for the thirty-seventh

time, calling on the parties to enter into a more substantial and intense phase of negotiations. During August and under the coordination of Special Envoy Ross, the parties met privately in Austria to elaborate on their positions and pledged to reconvene in a fifth round of formal negotiations, but by the end of the year no such negotiations had materialized. Meanwhile, tensions on both sides increased as several Western Saharan activists were detained for an extended period in the final months of 2009. Despite the continued engagement of MINURSO and the international community, political progress on both sides of the cease-fire line will be the determining factor for resolving one of Africa’s longest-standing territorial feuds.

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Global Statistics on UN-Commanded Missions

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The data in this chapter covers all UN missions in the period running from 1 July 2008 to the third quarter of 2009. While a number of exceptions are noted, the coverage reflects the UN’s 2008/2009 budgetary year (which concluded on 30 June 2009) in addition to information available on later months. In almost all cases, the data presented here is aggregated from the

mission-by-mission material in Chapter 6. Where other sources have been used, they are indicated in the footnotes. Data for missions whose mandates have been terminated are included up the month of termination as follows: UNMEE data included through 30 July 2008; UNIOSIL data included through 30 September 2008; UNOMIG data included through 31 May 2009.

4.1 Total UN Troops: 1 July 2008–31 October 2009

Total Number of Troops

100,000

90,000

80,000

70,000

60,000

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

50,000

Auth. Troops Troops

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DFS-supported political mission (UNAMI).

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4.2 Top Twenty Troop Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October 2009

10,000 9,779 8,681 7,941

Number of Troops

8,000

6,000 4,971 3,913

4,000

3,490 3,451 2,815

2,639 2,601 2,455 2,003 1,970 1,895 1,762 1,611 1,557

2,000

1,327 1,288 1,178

Benin

Brazil

Indonesia

Morocco

France

Senegal

China

South Africa

Jordan

Uruguay

Ethiopia

Italy

Nepal

Ghana

Rwanda

Egypt

Nigeria

India

Bangladesh

Pakistan

0

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DFS-supported political mission (UNAMI).

4.3 Troops Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October 2009

20,000 17,768

14,803

Number of Troops

15,000

12.341

10,033

10,000

8,812 7,041 7,028

5,000 2,691

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

UNAMA

UNMIK

UNMIN

UNMIT

UNMOGIP

UNTSO

UNAMI

UNFICYP

UNDOF

MINURCAT

UNOCI

MINUSTAH

UNMIS

UNMIL

UNIFIL

UNAMID

MONUC

Source: DPKO FGS.

27

BINJUB

221 0

MINURSO

1,039 858

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4.4 Top Twenty Increased UN Military Contributors: 31 October 2008–31 October 2009

Egypt Rwanda Togo Ethiopia Ireland Nepal Bangladesh Nigeria Philippines Tanzania Burkina Faso Indonesia Senegal Ghana South Africa Norway Germany Malaysia Austria Russia

2,343 659 455 449 414 404 314 304 299 276 273 269 268 194 185 171 153 150 140 110 Number of Military Personnel

Source: DPKO FGS. Notes: This is a year on year comparison of troop and military observer figures. Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DFS-supported political mission (UNAMI).

4.5 Variance in UN Military Contributions by Region: 31 October 2008–31 October 2009

North America

–7

Central and South America

122

293

Europe

Middle East

–10

Central and South Asia

658

East Asia and the Pacific

662

Africa

5,425 Number of Military Personnel

Source: DPKO FGS. Notes: This is a year on year comparison of actual troop and military observer figures. Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DFS-supported political mission (UNAMI).

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4.6 Total UN Military Observers: 1 July 2008–31 October 2009

4,000

Number of Military Observers

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

1,000

Oct. ’08

1,500

Auth. Military Obs. Military Obs.

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN).

4.7 Top Twenty Military Observer Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October 2009

120

90 76

80

73

71 59

60

58

58

57

55

55

54

50

48

47

43

42

42

Senegal

92

Paraguay

100

Tunisia

Number of Military Observers

109

40

39

20

Canada

Brazil

Zambia

Romania

Malaysia

China

Jordan

Uruguay

Yemen

Nepal

Ghana

Nigeria

Russia

India

Egypt

Bangladesh

Pakistan

0

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN).

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4.8 Military Observers Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October 2009

800

692

600

476

400

207 199 192

200

151 122

9

6

UNAMI

UNAMA

MINURCAT

UNMIS

UNMIL

UNMIT

UNMIK

UNTSO

UNMOGIP

UNAMID

MINURSO

UNMIN

Source: DPKO FGS.

0

0

0

0 UNOCI

10

UNFICYP

17

UNDOF

23

0

MINUSTAH

32

BINUB

43

UNIFIL

73

MONUC

•

Number of Military Observers

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4.9 Total UN Police: 1 July 2008–31 October 2009

20,000

Total Number of Police

17,500

15,000

12,500

10,000

7,500

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

5,000

Auth. Police Police

Source: DPKO PD. Notes: Formed police units included. Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and DFS-supported political missions (UNMIN).

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4.10 Top Twenty Police Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October 2009

1,800 1,611

Number of Police

1,509

1,300

863

839

800

742 717 587 524

Yemen

South Africa

Benin

Indonesia

Rwanda

178 175 158 155 154

Turkey

Uganda

China

202 198 198 184

Portugal

Zambia

244

Malaysia

Ghana

Senegal

Pakistan

India

Nepal

Nigeria

Bangladesh

Jordan

0

Philippines

324 302

300

Source: DPKO PD. Notes: Formed police units included. Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA) and DFS-supported political missions (UNMIN).

4.11 Police Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October 2009

4,500

4,280

4,000

3,000 2,500 2,032

2,000 1,552 1,343

1,500

1,210 1,158

1,000

715

500

8

6

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

UNMIK

UNAMI

UNDOF

UNIFIL

UNMIN

UNMOGIP

UNTSO

UNFICYP

MINURCAT

UNMIS

UNOCI

MONUC

UNMIL

UNMIT

MINUSTAH

UNAMID

Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

11

MINURSO

68

UNAMA

256

0

BINUB

Number of Police

3,5000

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4.12 Top Twenty Increased UN Police Contributors: 31 October 2008–31 October 2009

Jordan Bangladesh Zambia Nigeria India Uganda Yemen Rwanda Tanzania Senegal Burundi Sierra Leone Gambia Philippines Chad Vanuatu Malawi Nepal Indonesia Colombia

600 358 208 206 72 72 65 58 57 49 45 44 43 41 32 32 29 29 28 27 Number of Police Personnel

Source: DPKO PD. Notes: This is a year on year comparison of actual police figures. Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA).

4.13 Variance in UN Police Contributions by Region: 31 October 2008–31 October 2009

North America

–205

Central and South America

Europe

44

–1,015

664

Middle East

366

Central and South Asia

East Asia and the Pacific

70

Africa

596 Number of Police Personnel

Source: DPKO FGS. Notes: This is a year on year comparison of actual police figures. Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA).

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4.14 Formed Police by UN Mission: 31 October 2008–31 October 2009

2,000 1,819

Oct. 2008 Oct. 2009

Number of Police

1,500

1,135 1,131 1,000

886

841

747

750 749 609

500

558 555

609

418

0 UNAMID

MINUSTAH

MONUC

UNMIL

UNOCI

UNMIT

UNMIK

Source: DPKO PD. Note: This is a year on year comparison of actual formed police figures.

4.15 Formed Police Contributions by UN Mission: 31 October 2009

MINUSTAH Bangladesh Jordan Pakistan India Nigeria Nepal Senegal Egypt Indonesia Malaysia Portugal China Total

Source: DPKO PD.

— 287 247 140 124 124 84 — — — — 125 1,131

MONUC 389 — — 250 — — 247 — — — — — 886

UNAMID 560 280 139 — 280 140 140 140 140 — — — 1,819

UNMIL

UNMIT

UNOCI

Total

— 240 — 243 119 239 — — — — — — 841

140 — 139 — — — — — — 138 138 — 555

250 374 125 — — — — — — — — — 749

1,339 1,181 650 633 523 503 471 140 140 138 138 125 5,981

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4.16 Origin of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2009

Central and South America 7.6%

North America 0.1%

Europe 12.5%

Africa 33.8%

Middle East 2.5%

Central and South Asia 36.7%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

East Asia and the Pacific 6.9%

Troops/Military Observers

Percentage of Total

28,663 5,864 31,167 2,139 10,602 6,415 74 84,924

33.8% 6.9% 36.7% 2.5% 12.5% 7.6% 0.1%

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: The regions used here and in the charts below are defined as follows: Africa: all members of the African Union and Morocco (but see Middle East below.) Central and South Asia: all members of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (including Afghanistan) and all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to the east of the Caspian Sea, other than Russia. East Asia and the Pacific: all states in or bordering on the Pacific, the states of South-East Asia and Mongolia. Central and South America: all members of the Organization of American States other than Canada, the United States and Mexico. Europe: all states to the north of the Mediterranean, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Malta, Russia and Turkey. Middle East: all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen. (While Egypt is included under Africa as a member of the AU, the contingent of UNTSO stationed on the Suez Canal is counted under the Middle East deployment section to reflect its line of command.) North America: Canada, the United States, and Mexico.

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4.17 Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2009

Central and South America East Asia and the Pacific 8.3% 0.0% Europe 1.0% Middle East 16.2%

Central and South Asia 0.2%

Africa 74.3%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops/Military Observers

Percentage of Total

63,089 32 133 13,762 867 7,041 — 84,924

74.3% 0.0% 0.2% 16.2% 1.0% 8.3% —

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4.18 Origin of UN Police Personnel by Region: 31 October 2009

Central and South America 1.4% North America 1.5% Europe 6.7%

Middle East 14.0%

Africa 36.0%

Central and South Asia 30.9%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

East Asia and the Pacific 9.5%

Police

Percentage of Total

4,556 1,200 3,907 1,766 851 179 186 12,645

36.0% 9.5% 30.9% 14.0% 6.7% 1.4% 1.5%

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4.19 Deployment of UN Police Personnel by Region: 31 October 2009

Central and South America 16.1% Europe 0.6% East Asia and the Pacific 12.3% Central and South Asia 0.1% Africa 71.0%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

Police

Percentage of Total

8,979 1,552 8 — 74 2,032 — 12,645

71.0% 12.3% 0.1% — 0.6% 16.1% —

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4.20 Origin of UN Military Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2009

Central and South America 3.0% Middle East North America 2.2% Europe 0.1% 3.8%

Central and South Asia 43.0%

Africa 43.9%

East Asia and the Pacific 3.9%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops/Military Observers 27,694 2,439 27,157 1,405 2,428 1,915 51 63,089

Percentage of Total 43.9% 3.9% 43.0% 2.2% 3.8% 3.0% 0.1%

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4.21 Origin of UN Police Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2009

Central and South America 0.6% Europe North America 4.3% 0.5% Middle East 15.4%

Africa 42.4%

Central and South Asia 31.4% East Asia and the Pacific 5.4%

Region

Police

Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

3,810 488 2,818 1,379 385 56 43 8,979

Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

Percentage of Total 42.4% 5.4% 31.4% 15.4% 4.3% 0.6% 0.5%

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4.22 Origin of UN Military Personnel in the Middle East by Region: 31 October 2009

Central and South America 0.5%

North America 0.1% Africa 6.9%

East Asia and the Pacific 23.4% Europe 54.8%

Central and South Asia 14.3% Middle East 0.0%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops/Military Observers 951 3,218 1,963 5 7,548 64 13 13,762

Percentage of Total 6.9% 23.4% 14.3% 0.0% 54.8% 0.5% 0.1%

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4.23 Total UN Civilian Personnel (international, local and UNV): 1 July 2008–31 October 2009 50,000 45,000

Total Civilian Personnel

40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

Auth. Civilian Staff Civilian Staff

Sources: DFS FPD; UNV Programme. Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. Figures do not include staff from UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes.

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4.24 UN Mission International Civilian and Peacekeeping Headquarters Staff Occupational Groups: 31 October 2009

Occupation

International Percentage Percentage Percentage Civilian International DFS DFS DPKO DPKO Staff Staff HQ Staff HQ Staff HQ Staff HQ Staff

Administration Aviation Cartography Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Financial Management Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Program Analysis Medical Services Military Police Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Relations and Liaison Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Training Transport Other

Total

857 227 — 203 2 83 353 270 299 204 91 53

12.9% 3.4% — 3.0% 0.0% 1.2% 5.3% 4.1% 4.5% 3.1% 1.4% 0.8%

94 17 10 — — — 14 56 100 — — —

24.7% 4.5% 2.6% — — — 3.7% 14.7% 26.3% — — —

116 — — — — — — 5 12 — — 8

31.8% — — — — — — 1.4% 3.3% — — 2.2%

599 65 917

9.0% 1.0% 13.8%

23 — 31

6.1% — 8.2%

5 5 1

1.4% 1.4% 0.3%

7 93 — — 404 142 150 171 — 188 926 62 — 290 4

0.1% 1.4% — — 6.1% 2.1% 2.3% 2.6% — 2.8% 13.9% 0.9% — 4.4% 0.1%

— 2 — 1 — — 7 5 — — — — 2 18 —

— 0.5% — 0.3% — — 1.8% 1.3% — — — — 0.5% 4.7% —

— — 65 22 68 — 23 1 9 — 4 4 17 — —

— — 17.8% 6.0% 18.6% — 6.3% 0.3% 2.5% — 1.1% 1.1% 4.7% — —

6,660

380

365

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO EO. Notes: Mission occupations includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. DPKO HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year. The “other” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

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4.25 UN Mission International Civilian Staff Occupations: 31 October 2009

1,000 13.9%13.8%

900

12.9%

700 9.0%

600 500

6.1%

400

5.3% 4.6% 4.4%

300

4.1% 3.4%

200

3.1% 3.0%

2.8% 2.6%

2.3% 2.1% 1.4% 1.4% 1.2%

100

1.0%

0.9% 0.8%

Economic Affairs

Social Affairs

Information Mgmt.

Legal Affairs

Electoral Affairs

Medical Services

Humanitarian Affairs

Procurement

Program Mgmt.

Public Info.

Rule of Law

Civil Affairs

Human Rights

Aviation

Transport

Financial Mgmt.

Human Resources

Engineering

Political Affairs

Info. Systems & Tech.

Administration

Logistics

Security

Other

0.1% 0.1% 0.0%

0

Mgmt. & Program Analysis

Number of International Staff

800

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO EO. Notes: Mission occupations includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not represented. The “Other” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

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4.26 DFS and DPKO Headquarters Staff Occupations: 31 October 2009

120 116

100

100 94

DFS HQ Staff DPKO HQ Staff

80 68

65

60 56

40 31 23

22 18

12 1

5

Financial Mgmt.

Transportation

Aviation

1

Logistics

5

Cartography

2

5

Public Info.

4

Medical Support

4

Security

5

Social Affaris

Info. Mgmt.

Training

2

Relations and Liaison

Program Mgmt.

Military

Administration

Police

1

8

17

10

Legal

7 0

14 9

Human Resources Mgmt.

17

Engineering

20

Info. Systems & Tech.

23

Political Affairs

•

Number of Headquarters Personnel

154

2/2/10

Source: DPKO EO. Note: HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year.

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4.27 Highest National Representation in UN Missions: 31 October 2009

UN Missions – International Professional and General Service Staff Total International Staff in Missions = 7,015

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Country

Number of Percentage of Total International Staff International Staff

United States Kenya Philippines India Canada United Kingdom Ghana Sierra Leone France Ethiopia Nigeria Serbia Pakistan Uganda Cameroon Australia Tanzania Côte d’Ivoire Russia Iraq

369 339 258 231 221 206 202 188 166 162 151 142 125 118 112 110 103 94 92 89

5.3% 4.8% 3.7% 3.3% 3.2% 2.9% 2.9% 2.7% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% 2.0% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%

DPKO Missions – Local Professional and General Service Staff Total Local Staff in Missions = 15,442

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Mission

Number of Local Staff

Percentage of Total Local Staff

2,613 2,555 2,481 1,298 1,228 984 895 682 663 456 398 283 239 157 129 119 112 103 47

16.9% 16.5% 16.1% 8.4% 8.0% 6.4% 5.8% 4.4% 4.3% 3.0% 2.6% 1.8% 1.5% 1.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.3%

MONUC UNMIS UNAMID UNAMA MINUSTAH UNMIL UNMIT UNOCI UNIFIL UNAMI MINURCAT UNMIK BINUB MINURSO UNTSO UNMIN UNFICYP UNDOF UNMOGIP

Source: DFS FPD. Notes: Includes all UN missions and the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi unless otherwise specified.

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4.28 Highest National Representation in UN Peace Operations Headquarters: 31 October 2009 Total DPKO and DFS Headquarters Staff: 745 468 Professional Staff and 277 General Service Staff

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Country

DFS

DFS and DPKO

United States Philippines Canada France United Kingdom India Germany Nigeria Australia Italy Pakistan Ghana China Ireland Japan Myanmar Russian Uruguay Brazil Kenya

84 22 18 8 9 11 7 5 9 3 6 3 5 11 7 10 8 7 4 6

70 19 10 15 12 9 12 11 6 12 9 11 8 2 6 3 5 5 6 4

Total DPKO

Percentage of DPKO and DFS HQ Staff

154 41 28 23 21 20 19 16 15 15 15 14 13 13 13 13 13 12 10 10

22.0% 5.8% 4.0% 3.3% 3.0% 2.9% 2.7% 2.3% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.7% 1.4% 1.4%

Source: DPKO EO. Note: HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year.

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4.29 Total Personnel in UN Missions: 31 October 2009

Mission

Troops

Military Observers

Police

International Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Total

MONUC UNAMID UNMIS UNIFIL UNMIL MINUSTAH UNOCI MINURCAT UNMIT UNAMA UNDOF UNFICYP UNAMI MINURSO UNMIK BINUB UNTSO UNMIN UNMOGIP

17,768 14,803 8,812 12,341 10,033 7,041 7,028 2,691 — — 1,039 858 221 27 — — — — —

692 207 476 — 122 — 192 23 32 17 — — 10 209 9 6 151 73 43

1,210 4,280 715 — 1,343 2,032 1,158 256 1,552 8 — 68 — 6 6 11 — — —

1,005 1,093 827 324 455 482 400 429 366 339 40 40 321 97 148 125 96 48 25

2,613 2,481 2,555 663 984 1,228 682 398 895 1,298 103 112 456 157 283 239 129 119 47

628 390 310 — 225 211 303 134 196 53 — — — 20 26 50 — 18 —

23,916 23,254 13,695 13,328 13,162 10,994 9,763 3,931 3,041 1,715 1,182 1,078 1,008 516 472 431 376 258 115

Total

82,662

2,262

12,645

6,660

15,442

2,564

122,235

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Note: Police figures include formed police units.

4.30 UN Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 October 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff DFS HQ Professional DFS HQ General Service DPKO HQ Professional DPKO HQ General Service UN Logistics Base in Brindisi Total

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

80,585 2,167 11,765 4,696 12,902 130 50 191 28 178 112,692

2,077 95 880 1,964 2,540 78 122 69 77 90 7,992

97.5% 95.8% 93.0% 70.5% 83.6% 62.5% 29.1% 73.5% 26.7% 66.4% 93.4%

2.5% 4.2% 7.0% 29.5% 16.4% 37.5% 70.9% 26.5% 73.3% 33.6% 6.6%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO EO. Notes: International and local civilian staff includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). Police figures include formed police units. HQ staff includes all general service staff and all professional staff with contracts of one year or more.

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4.31 Total Monthly Fatalities in UN Missions: 1 July 2008–31 October 2009

25

20

15

10

5

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ‘08

0 July ‘08

•

Number of Personnel

158

1/26/10

Source: DPKO Situation Center. Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included.

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4.32 Fatalities by UN Missions: 1 July 2008–31 October 2009

UNAMID UNMIL MONUC MINUSTAH UNOCI UNMIS UNIFIL UNAMA UNMIT MINURCAT UNAMI UNFICYP UNMIK UNOMIG BINUB MINURSO UNDOF UNMIN UNMOGIP UNTSO Total

Number of Fatalities

Percentage of Fatalities

43 30 24 21 18 13 7 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 — — — — — — 168

32.8% 22.9% 18.3% 16.0% 13.7% 9.9% 5.3% 3.8% 1.5% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% — — — — — —

Source: DPKO Situation Center. Note: Includes fatalities in all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN).

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4.33 Fatalities in UN Missions by Incident Type: 1 July 2008–31 October 2009

Other 10.7% Malicious Act 14.3% Accident 28.6%

Illness 46.4%

Source: DPKO Situation Center. Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. Malicious acts include both what were previously referred to as hostile acts and crime. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

4.34 Fatalities in UN Missions by Personnel Type: 1 July 2008–31 October 2009

Police 10.1%

Military Observers 1.8%

International Staff 7.7%

Local Staff 17.9%

Troops 62.5%

Source: DPKO Situation Center. Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL) and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included.

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4.35 UN Peacekeeping Budgets: 1 July 2008–30 June 2010

2,000,000

Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

1 July ‘08–30 June ’09 1 July ‘09–30 June ’10 1,500,000

1,000,000

500,000

UNLB

Support Account

Support of AMISOM

UNOMIG

UNDOF

UNMEE

MINURSO

UNFICYP

UNMIK

UNOCI

UNMIT

MINURCAT

UNMIL

MINUSTAH

UNIFIL

UNMIS

MONUC

UNAMID

0

Sources: UN Documents A/C.5/62/31 and A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Notes: Figures above include only peacekeeping operations funded out of the peacekeeping budget; see table below for missions funded from the regular UN budget.

4.36 Other Peace Operations Budgets: 1 January–31 December 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Appropriations DFS DPKO BINUB UNAMA UNAMI UNMIN UNMOGIP UNTSO Total

4,225.9 5,690.9 46,258.0 241,944.3 158,989.3 16,742.9 8,073.0 30,352.4 512,276.6

Sources: UN Documents A/62/6/Add.1, A/63/346, A/64/349/Add.3, A/64/349/Add.4, A/64/349/Add.5, A/64/6 (Sect.5) and A/64/7; DFS FBFD. Notes: DPKO and DFS budget lines are for peacekeeping operations executive direction and management costs, programme of work and programme support. The budgets for DPKO, DFS, UNTSO and UNMOGIP are estimates based on one-half of proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010–2011.

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4.37 2009 Top Twenty Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping

Percentage of Assessed Contribution

26.0%

16.6%

8.6%

7.8% 7.4% 5.1%

Greece

Denmark

Austria

0.8% 0.7% 0.6%

Norway

Sweden

Belgium

Switzerland

1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9%

Russia

Australia

Netherlands

2.2% 1.9% 1.8%

Republic of Korea

Spain

Canada

China

Italy

France

United Kingdom

Germany

Japan

United States

3.1% 3.0% 3.0%

Sources: UN Documents A/C.5/62/31 and A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Notes: Figures above include only peacekeeping operations funded out of the peacekeeping budget; see table below for missions funded from the regular UN budget.

4.38 2009 Top Twenty Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Regular Budget

Percentage of Assessed Contribution

22.0%

16.6%

8.6% 6.6% 6.3% 5.1%

Source: DM OPPBA.

Norway

Brazil

Austria

Sweden

Belgium

Russia

1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8%

Switzerland

Australia

Netherlands

Republic of Korea

2.3% 2.2%1.9% 1.8%

Mexico

China

Spain

Canada

Italy

France

United Kingdom

Germany

Japan

United States

3.0% 3.0% 2.7%

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4.39 Top Twenty Assessed Financial Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations: 30 September 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

Member State United States Japan Germany United Kingdom France Italy China Canada Spain Republic of Korea Netherlands Australia Russia Switzerland Belgium Sweden Austria Norway Denmark Greece

2008 Effective Assessment Rate 26.0% 16.6% 8.6% 7.8% 7.4% 5.1% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6%

Outstanding Contributions as at 31 December 2008 86,0042.7 1,096,546.3 0.0 81,125.8 79,859.5 0.0 44,418.7 0.0 224,544.7 69,090.9 2,453.4 0.0 14,656.9 0.0 11,590.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 47,966.2

Assessments Issued in 2009

Collections and Credits Received in 2009

Oustanding Contributions as at 30 September 2009

1,449,289.6 907,441.6 468,186.1 427,863.4 405,896.9 277,243.5 171,802.4 162,503.2 162,011.9 118,611.2 102,240.0 97,545.6 77,301.4 66,376.9 60,154.0 58,461.9 48,418.0 42,686.4 40,339.2 32,533.4

1,807,446.5 1,368,359.0 468,186.1 425,750.2 223,273.8 228,674.5 124,048.4 162,503.2 217,094.3 55,861.1 103,441.6 94,873.9 77,222.0 54,748.6 40,564.8 47,317.0 39,366.1 35,208.8 39,234.1 19,233.0

501,885.9 635,628.9 0.0 83,239.1 262,482.6 48,569.0 92,172.8 0.0 169,462.3 131,841.0 1,251.8 2,671.7 14,736.3 11,628.2 31,179.4 11,144.9 9,051.9 7,477.8 1,105.1 61,266.5

Source: DM OPPBA. Note: Credits utilized are derived from unencumbered balance of appropriations and other income for peacekeeping operations utilized at the time that assessments for the same operations were issued.

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4.40 UN Mandate Renewals: 1 July 2008–30 December 2009

MINURCAT UNAMID

14 months

6 months 12 months

12 mos. 12 mos.

12 months

12 months

6 mos. 6 months

6 months

6 months

UNMIN

12 mos. BINUB

months 12months 12

UNMIT

12 months

UNMIS MINUSTAH UNOCI

9 months 12 months 12 months

12 months

8 months

12 months 12 months

12 months 6 mos. 6 months 6 months

12 months 6 months 12 months

6 months

UNMIL 12 months 12 mos.

12 months

UNAMI

months 12months 12 12 months

12 months

UNAMA

12 months

12 months 5 mos.

MONUC UNMIK

Ongoing until the Security Council decides otherwise

UNOMIG

6 months

4 months

MINURSO

4 months

12 months

12 months 6 mos.

UNDOF UNIFIL

12 12months months

12 months

6 months

6 months 12 mos.

6 months

12 months

12 months 6 mos.

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ‘08

Nov. ’08

Oct. ‘08

Ongoing until the Security Council decides otherwise Sept.’08

UNTSO Aug. ’08

Ongoing until the Security Council decides otherwise

July ‘08

UNMOGIP

Dec. ’09

6 months

Nov. ‘09

6 months

Oct. ’09

6 months

Sept. ‘09

UNFICYP

Source: UN Security Council Resolutions. Notes: Mandate duration noted is mission authorization as per initial Security Council resolution. In some cases, mission authorization was renewed prior to the end of the previous mandate; in such cases the mandate duration may not match the timeline on the graph.

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•

4.41 UN Operations Timeline: 1945–2009

MINURCAT (Chad, CAR) UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan) UNMIN (Nepal) BINUB (Burundi) UNMIT (Timor-Leste) UNIOSIL (Sierra Leone) UNOTIL (Timor-Leste) UNMIS (Sudan) ONUB (Burundi) UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire) MINUSTAH (Haiti) UNMIL (Liberia) UNAMI (Iraq) UNMISET (Timor-Leste ) UNAMA (Afghanistan) UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea) MONUC (Dem. Republic of Congo) UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) UNTAET (East Timor) Current missions UNMIK (Kosovo) UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone) MINURCA (Central African Republic) Closed missions UNPSG (Croatia) UNTMIH (Haiti) MONUA (Angola) MIPONUH (Haiti) MINUGUA (Guatemala) UNSMIH (Haiti) UNMOP (Previaka) UNTAES (E.Slavonia, Baranja, W. Sirmium) UNMIBH (Bosnia and Herzegovina) UNPREDEP (Macedonia) UNCRO (Croatia) UNAVEM III (Angola) UNMOT (Tajikistan) UNASOG (Chad/Libya) UNAMIR (Rwanda) UNOMIL (Liberia) UNMIH (Haiti) UNOMIG (Georgia) UNOMOR (Uganda/Rwanda) UNOSOM II (Somalia) ONUMOZ (Mozambique) UNOSOM I (Somalia) UNPROFOR (Balkans) UNTAC (Cambodia) UNAMIC (Cambodia) MINURSO (Western Sahara) ONUSAL (El Salvador) UNAVEM II (Angola) UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) ONUCA (Central America) UNTAG (Namibia) UNAVEM I (Angola) UNIMOG (Iran/Iraq) UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan) UNIFIL (Lebanon) UNDOF (Golan Heights) UNEF II (Egypt) UNIPOM (India/Pakistan) DOMREP (Dominican Republic) UNFICYP (Cyprus) UNYOM (Yemen) UNSF (West New Guinea) ONUC (Congo) UNOGIL (Lebanon) UNEF (Egypt)

UN Mission and Location

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UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan) UNTSO (Middle East)

1945

1950

1955

1960

Source: UNSC resolutions

Source: UN Security Council Resolutions.

1965

1970

1975

1980

Duration

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

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Global Statistics on Non-UN-Commanded Missions

167

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This chapter presents data on peace operations conducted under the authority of regional organizations and nonstanding coalitions of states; these data are compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). * * * Listed are 27 non-UN multilateral peace operations that started, were ongoing, or terminated during 2009. Figures provided in this chapter are from September 2009 or in the case of operations that were terminated in 2009, the date of closure. The chapter covers a broad range of peace operations, reflecting the growing complexity of operation mandates and the potential for operations to change over time. The chapter does not include good offices, fact-finding, or electoral assistance missions. The operations provided in this chapter are specifically compiled for the Center on International Cooperation and do not reproduce the operations included in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.* The operations are presented in two loosely defined categories: those including military and observer functions (Table 5.10) and those focusing on policing and other civilian functions (Table 5.11). The operations are grouped by the entity conducting them and listed chronologically within these groups. The tables provide information on the legal instruments underlying the establishment of an operation—UN Security Council resolutions or formal decisions by regional organizations, the missions’ locations, the start dates, the principal contributors,

and the personnel fatalities. The start dates for the operations refer to dates of first deployments. The list of contributing countries presented does not necessarily refer to the total number of contributing countries: in case of missions including contributions by more than ten countries the principle contributors are stated, in the case of smaller missions the full list of contributors is provided. For a complete list of countries’ participation in each mission, see the SIPRI database or the SIPRI Yearbook. The actual missions’ strengths represent international personnel located in theater. Due to constant rotation of mission personnel, the numbers provided are estimates. Mission fatalities are recorded as a total since the beginning of an operation and as a total for October 2008 until September 2009. Causes of death—whether by hostile act, accidental, or through illness—are recorded for fatalities in 2009. As some deaths were the result of other causes, the breakdown of the causes of death does not always add up to the total number of fatalities. Table 5.12 lists the estimated declared costs of the operations underway in 2009. Budget figures are given for the period 1 October 2008 until 30 September 2009. The figures are given in millions of US dollars. Conversions from budgets set in other currencies are based on the International Monetary Fund’s aggregated market exchange rates for October 2008 to September 2009. The way in which various regional organizations finance peace operations is different. Unlike UN budgets, figures of operations conducted by regional organization such as NATO refer only

*For detailed explanations and further information on SIPRI’s multilateral peace operations’ dataset, consult the SIPRI website [http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/pko] or the SIPRI Yearbook.

168

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 169

to common costs. This includes mainly the running costs of the headquarters (i.e. costs for civilian personnel and costs for operation and maintenance) and investments in the infrastructure necessary to support the operation. The costs of deploying personnel are borne by individual contributing states and are not reflected in the figures given here. Most EU operations are financed in one of two ways: civilian missions are funded through the Community budget, while military operations or operations with a military component are funded by contributions by the participating member states through the Athena mechanism. In missions by other organizations—and generally the ad hoc missions—budget figures may include program implementation. There are certain limitations to the budget data. The main problems of reliability are due to varying definitions of what constitutes the total cost of an operation. The coverage of official

data varies significantly between operations; sometimes a budget is an estimate while in other cases it is an actual expenditure. For all these reasons, budget figures presented in Table 5.12 are best viewed as estimates, and the budgets for different operations should not be compared. Data on multilateral peace operations are obtained from the following categories of open source: (1) official information provided by the secretariat of the authorizing organization; (2) official information provided by the mission on the ground, either in official publications or in written responses to annual SIPRI questionnaires; and (3) information from national governments contributing to the operation in question. These primary sources are supplemented with a wide selection of publicly available secondary sources consisting of specialist journals; research reports; news agencies; and international, regional, and local newspapers.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

5.1 Top Twenty Troop Contributors to Non-UN-Commanded Missions: 30 September 2009

40,000 36,275

35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 9,000

10,000

6,983 5,312 4,911 541

Austria

570

Finland

580

Bulgaria

733 690

Greece

873

Denmark

Romania

990

Czech Republic

Spain

2,080 1,5021,316

Turkey

Poland

Netherlands

Uganda

Burundi

Italy

France

Germany

United Kingdom

0

United States

0

2,830 2,565 2,557 2,535 2,099

Australia

5,000

Canada

Total Number of Troops

Notes: These Figures represent the number of personnel deployed in large-scale units and may exclude some additional personnel deployed individually or in small scale units. For scaling reasons, MNFIraq figures are not included in this ranking.

5.2 Top Twenty Police Contributors to Non-UN-Commanded Missions: 30 September 2009

250 231 206 198

200

183

147

150

143

100 75

75

75

67

66

57

21

16

13

13

12

Greece

25

Canada

32

United Kingdom

49

50

Spain

Netherlands

Denmark

Hungary

New Zealand

Turkey

Finland

Sweden

United States

Gabon

Equatorial Guinea

Poland

Australia

Germany

Italy

Romania

0 France

•

Total Number of Police

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Note: As the figures for largest contributors represent personnel deployed in large scale units, there may be variations with actual field strength.

United States United Kingdom Germany France Italy

36,275 9,000 6,983 5,312 4,911

Number of Troops 6. Canada 7. Burundi 8. Uganda 9. Netherlands 10. Poland

2,830 2,565 2,557 2,535 2,099

5

3 15 20

10

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16

14 18

8

Australia Turkey Spain Romania Czech Republic

7

12

2,080 1,502 1,316 990 873

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Greece Denmark Bulgaria Finland Austria

Map No. 4288 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS November 2009

Department of Field Support Cartographic Section

733 690 580 570 541 Total 84,942

*Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

11

The numbers in this listing correspond to the numbered circles in the above map. Source: SIPRI, September 2009. These figures represent the number of personnel deployed in large units and may exclude some additional personnel deployed individually or in small-scale units.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

4

9

19

12:26 PM

Country/Region

13

2

17

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1

6

2009 Top Twenty Troop Contributors to Non-UN Missions

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 171

France Italy Romania Australia Germany

231 206 198 183 147

Number of Police 6. Poland 7. Equatorial Guinea 8. Gabon 9. Sweden 10. United States

2

143 75 75 75 67

8

7

5

15

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

20

13

6

11

Turkey Finland Hungary New Zealand Denmark

3

66 57 49 32 25

Map No. 4299 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS November 2009

4

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Spain Netherlands Canada United Kingdom Greece

14

Department of Field Support Cartographic Section

21 16 13 13 12 Total 1,703

*Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

The numbers in this listing correspond to the numbered circles in the above map. Source: SIPRI, September 2009. As the figures for largest contributors represent the personnel deployed in large-scale units, there may be a small variation with actual field strength.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

1

17

12:26 PM

Country

16

19

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The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

10

18

12

•

9

172

2009 Top Twenty Police Contributors to Non-UN Missions

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 173

5.3 Contributions of Military Personnel to Non-UN-Commanded Missions by Organization: 30 September 2009

Coalition/ Ad hoc 5% African Union

European Union 2%

5%

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 88%

Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization African Union Coalition/Ad hoc European Union Economic Community of Central African States Total

Troops/Military Observers

Percentage of Total

83,861 5,122 4,821 2,014

88% 5% 5% 2%

371 96,189

—

Note: For scaling reasons, MNF-Iraq figures are not included in this ranking.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

5.4 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Military Personnel to Regions: 30 September 2009

Europe 17%

Africa 7%

East Asia and the Pacific 1%

Middle East 2%

Central and South Asia 73%

Organization Central and South Asia Europe Africa Middle East East Asia and the Pacific Total

Troops/Military Observers

Percentage of Total

71,030 15,933 6,416 1,860 950 96,189

73% 17% 7% 2% 1%

Note: For scaling reasons, MNF-Iraq figures are not included in this ranking.

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 175

5.5 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Police by Organization: 30 September 2009

Economic Community of Central African States 7% Coalition/ Ad hoc 13%

European Union 80%

Organization

Police

Percentage of Total

European Union Coalition/Ad hoc Economic Community of Central African States African Union Total

1,764 295

80% 13%

150 6 2,215

7% —

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

5.6 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Police to Regions: 30 September 2009 Africa 8% East Asia and the Pacific 12%

Central and South Asia 8% Middle East 3%

Europe 69%

Region Europe East Asia and the Pacific Africa Central and South Asia Middle East Total

Civilian Police

Percentage of Total

1,538 268 177 173 59 2,215

69% 12% 8% 8% 3%

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 177

5.7 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Troops to Africa by Organization: 30 September 2009 Economic Community of Central African States 6%

Coalition/Ad hoc 14%

African Union 80%

Organization African Union Coalition/Ad hoc Economic Community of Central African States Total

Troops

Percentage of Total

5,122 923

80% 14%

371 6,416

6%

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

5.8 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Troops in Europe by Organization: 30 September 2009

Coalition/Ad hoc 8%

European Union 13%

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 79%

Organization

Troops

Percentage of Total

North Atlantic Treaty Organization European Union Coalition/Ad Hoc Total

12,631 2,014 1,288 15,933

79% 13% 8%

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 179

5.9 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Police in Africa by Organization: 30 September 2009 European Union 12%

African Union 3%

Economic Community of Central African States 85%

Organization Economic Community of Central African States European Union African Union Total

Police

Percentage of Total

150 21 6 177

85% 12% 3%

Authorization Date

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Somalia1

PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX) (19 Jan. 2007) and UN SCR 1744 (21 Feb. 2007)2

March 2007

Burundi (2,565), Uganda (2,557)3

—

Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX)

Central African Republic

Libreville Summit (2 Oct. 2002)4

December 2002

Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon

—

Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC)

MoldovaTransdniester

Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniester Region (21 July 1992)5

July 1992

Moldova (453), Russia (335), Transdniester (490)

EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)

Bosnia and Herzegovina6

CJA 2004/570/ CFSP (12 July 2004) and UN SCR 1575 (22 Nov. 2004)7

December 2004

Austria (90), Bulgaria (120), Germany (132), Greece (44), Hungary (166), Italy (297), Netherlands (75), Poland (189), Spain (316), Turkey (273)

—

Equatorial Guinea, Gabon

—

Troops: 5,122 Civilian Police: 6 Civilian Staff: 46

151/..

—

Troops: 371 Civilian Police: 150

../..

Ukraine (10)

—

—

Troops: 1,278 Military Observers: 10

../..

—

—

—

Troops: 2,014

21/–

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Location

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Name

Principal Civilian Police Contributors

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Start Date

Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Total Deaths Troops, Military to Date/in Observers, 2009 (due to: Principal Civilian Police, hostilities, Civilian Staff Civilian Staff accidents, Contributors (Actual) illness)

2010_CIC_5.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd

5.10 2009 Non-UN-Commanded Military and Observer Missions

Chad and Central African Republic8

CJA 2007/677/ CFSP (15 Oct. 2007) and UN SCR 1778 (25 Sep. 2007)9

January 200810

Austria (33), Belgium (26), France (633), Ireland (26), Italy (109), Netherlands (6), Poland (62), Spain (85)

—

—

—

Troops: 1,009

1/–

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1. The mission’s headquarters are based in Nairobi, Kenya. The operation is currently deployed to secure the air and sea ports, Villa Somalia, the old university, the military academy and other strategic sites in Mogadishu. 2. AMISOM was established by AU PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX) on 19 January 2007 and endorsed by UN SCR 1744 (21 February 2007) under UN Charter Chapter VII. The operation was mandated to support the dialogue and reconciliation process in Somalia by supporting the Transitional Federal Institutions, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and to contribute to overall security. On 29 June 2008 the operation’s mandate was expanded to include assisting the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement (19 August 2008), including training of Somalian security forces to promote security in the area of Mogadishu. During 2009 the security situation deteriorated, the AU mission increasingly became direct targets of the insurgency. The AU Communiqué on the Situation in Somalia (15 June 2009) extended the mandate to 16 January 2010. UN SCR 1872 (26 May 2009) renewed UN endorsement for the operation until 31 January 2010. 3. Logistical, technical, financial and personnel support are provided by the EU, IGAD, NATO, League of Arab States, the UN and a number of individual countries such as Algeria, Angola, China, Djibouti, France, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sweden and the USA. 4. MICOPAX was established by a decision of the CEMAC Libreville Summit (2 October 2002) to secure the border between Chad and CAR and to guarantee the safety of former CAR President Patassé. In 2003, following the 15 March coup, its mandate was expanded by a decision of the Libreville Summit (3 June 2003) to include contributing to the overall security environment, assisting in the restructuring of CAR’s armed forces and supporting the transition process. The latest decision of 12 July 2008 expanded the operation’s mandate to include promoting political dialogue and human rights. In 2009 the launch of a DDR programme was authorized. The operation is mandated for 6 months, renewable up to 2013. 5. The JCC Peacekeeping Force was established pursuant to the Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniester region, signed in Moscow by the presidents of Moldova and Russia (21 July 1992). The JCC—a monitoring commission comprising representatives of Moldova, Russia and Transdniester—was established to coordinate the activities of the joint force. 6. A multinational manoeuvre battalion (made up of Hungarian, Polish, Spanish and Turkish troops) is stationed in Sarajevo. An integrated police unit and liaison and observer teams are also deployed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUFOR ALTHEA can be reinforced by KFOR and by EU Operational and Strategic Reserve Forces. 7. EUFOR ALTHEA was established by CJA 2004/570/CFSP (12 July 2004) and endorsed by UN SCR 1575 (22 November 2004) under UN Charter Chapter VII. It is mandated to maintain a secure environment for the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Agreement, to assist in the strengthening of local capacity, and to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards EU integration. UN SCR 1845 (20 November 2008) extended the mandate for a further 12 months. 8. Operational headquarters were at Mont Valérien, France. Rear headquarters are located at N’Djamena, Force headquarters at Abéché; three multinational battalions are stationed in Iriba, Forchana and Goz Beïda. The operation was supported by a detachment in Birao (CAR). 9. EUFOR Tchad/RCA was established by CJA 2007/677/CFSP (15 October 2007) and endorsed by SCR 1778 (25 September 2007) under UN Charter Chapter VII. It is mandated to support MINURCAT, contribute to the protection of civilians and UN personnel, and facilitate humanitarian aid efforts. EUFOR operated in close cooperation with MINURCAT. The mission closed on 15 March 2009. MINURCAT assumed responsibility for the security and protection of civilians and UN personnel. 10. The first troops arrived in late Jan. 2008. The operation reached its initial operational capacity on 15 March 2008, the official start date, and reached full operational capacity in mid-September. continues

2010_CIC_5.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd

EU Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)

Location

Authorization Date

EU Naval Force against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia)

Somalia (Gulf of Aden)

CJA 2008/851/CFSP (10 November 2008)

December 2008

Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Spain

—

—

—

Troops: 1,900

–/–

12:27 PM

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

Kosovo11

UN SCR 1244 (10 June 1999)12

June 1999

Austria (447), Czech Republic (393), Finland (405), France (1,294), Germany (2,486), Greece (588), Italy (1,819), Slovenia (389), Turkey (509), USA (1,475)

—

—

—

Troops: 12,631

127/–

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Principal Civilian Police Contributors

Name

UN SCR 1386 (20 December 2001)14

December 2001

Australia (1,350), Canada (2,830), France (3,095), Germany (4,365), Italy (2,795), Netherlands (2,160), Poland (1,910), Spain (1,000), UK (9,000), USA (34,800)

—

—

—

Troops: 71,030

843/351 (329,–,–)15

International Afghanistan13 Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

Start Date

Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Total Deaths Troops, Military to Date/in Observers, 2009 (due to: Principal Civilian Police, hostilities, Civilian Staff Civilian Staff accidents, Contributors (Actual) illness)

2010_CIC_5.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd

5.10 Continued

UN SCR 1546 (8 June 2004)16

August 2004

Multinational Observer Force (MFO)

Sinai (Egypt)

Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel (26 March 1979)17

April 1982

—

—

—

—

Australia (25), Canada (28), Colombia (358), Fiji (338), Hungary (39), Italy (78), New Zealand (26), Uruguay (58), USA (687)

—

USA (16)

Troops: 200

Military Observers: 1,660 Civilian Staff: 16

–/–

65/5 (–, 4, 1)

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11. Along with KFOR headquarters in Pristina, KFOR contingents are grouped into several task forces: MNTF Centre (Lipljan) led by Finland; MNTF North (Mitrovica), led by France; MNTF South (Prizren), led by Germany; MNTF West (Pec), led by Italy; and MNTF East (Urosevac), led by the USA. A Multinational Specialized Unit (Pristina) is led by Italy. A Tactical Reserve Manoeuvre Battalion (KTM) and a Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) are also stationed in Pristina. 12. KFOR was established by SCR 1244 (10 June 1999). Its mandated tasks include deterring renewed hostilities, establishing a secure environment, supporting UNMIK and monitoring borders. In 2008 NATO expanded the operation’s tasks to include efforts to develop a professional, democratic and multi-ethnic security structures in Kosovo. A positive decision of the UN Security Council is required to terminate the operation. 13. The territory of Afghanistan is divided into 5 areas of responsibility: Regional Command (RC) Centre (Kabul), led by France; RC North (Mazar-e Sharif), led by Germany; RC West (Herat), led by Italy; RC South (Kandahar), led by the Netherlands; and RC East (Bagram), led by the USA. 14. ISAF was established by UN SCR 1386 (20 December 2001) under UN Charter Chapter VII as a multinational force mandated to assist the Afghan Government to maintain security, as envisaged in Annex I of the 2001 Bonn Agreement. NATO took over command and control of ISAF in Aug. 2003. UN SCR 1890 (8 October 2009) extended the mandate to 12 October 2010. 15. No distinction between non-hostile causes of death is available. 16. NTM-I—earlier known as NATO Training Implementation Mission (NTIM-I)—was established pursuant to UN SCR 1546 (8 June 2004) and approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 November 2004. It is mandated to assist in the development of Iraq’s security institutions through training and equipment of, in particular, middle- and senior-level personnel from the Iraqi security forces. In 2007 the mandate was revised to focus on mentoring and advising an Iraqi-led institutional training programme. 17. MFO was established on 3 August 1981 by the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, signed 26 March 1979. Deployment began on 20 March 1982 following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai but the mission did not become operational until 25 April 1982, the day that Israel returned the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. The mission is mandated to observe the implementation of the peace treaty and to contribute to security. continues

12:27 PM

Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, USA

1/26/10

Iraq

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NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)

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5.10 Continued

Operation Licorne Côte d’Ivoire18

Authorization Date

February 2003

France (923)20

—

—

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

Solomon Islands Biketawa Declaration (2000)21

July 2003

Australia (80), New Zealand (44), Papua New Guinea, Tonga

—

Australia (183), Fiji (10), Kiribati (3), Nauru (3), New Zealand (32), Papua New Guinea (7), Samoa (8), Tonga (8), Vanuatu (4)

Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I)

Iraq 23

October 2003

USA (130,000)

—

—

UN SCR 1511 (16 Oct. 2003)22

—

Troops: 923

24/–

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UN SCR 1464 (4 February 2003)19

Start Date

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Location

Principal Civilian Police Contributors

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Name

Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Total Deaths Troops, Military to Date/in Observers, 2009 (due to: Principal Civilian Police, hostilities, Civilian Staff Civilian Staff accidents, Contributors (Actual) illness)

Australia Troops: 160 (74), Canada, Civilian Police: 268 Fiji (3), New Civilian Staff: 106 Zealand (16), Papua New Guinea (2)

—

—

6/2 (–, 1, 1)

4,290/174 (92,–,–)24

Timor-Leste

UN SCR 1690 (20 June 2006)25

May 2006

Australia (650), New Zealand (140)

—

—

—

Troops: 790

1/–

(ISF)

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18. The troops are based in Abidjan. In 2009 during the drawdown process, Licorne troops withdrew from Bouke. 19. Operation Licorne was deployed under the authority of UN SCR 1464 (4 February 2003) and given UN Charter Chapter VII powers to support the ECOWAS mission in contributing to a secure environment and, in particular, to facilitate implementation of the 2003 Linas—Marcoussis Agreement. UN SCR 1528 (27 February 2004) provides its current authorization and revised the mandate to working in support of UNOCI. UN SCR 1795 (15 January 2008) expanded the mandate to support implementing the Ouagadougou political Agreement (4 March 2007) and the Supplementary Agreements (28 November 2007), in particular assisting in preparations for free and fair elections scheduled for November 2009. UN SCR 1880 (30 July 2009) extended the mandate to 31 Jan. 2010.21. The mission is supported by a naval attachment in the Gulf of Guinea (Mission Corymbe, 150 personnel). 20. The mission is supported by a naval attachment in the Gulf of Guinea (Mission Corymbe, 150 personnel). 21. RAMSI was established under the framework of the 2000 Biketawa Declaration, in which members of the Pacific Islands Forum agreed to mount a collective response to crises, usually at the request of the host government. It is mandated to assist the Solomon Islands Government in restoring law and order and in building up the capacity of the police force. 22. The MNF-I was authorized by UN SCR 1511 (16 Oct. 2003) to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of UNAMI’s mandated tasks. The mandate of MNF-I was reaffirmed by UN SCR 1546 (8 June 2004) following the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the subsequent transfer of sovereignty to the Interim Government of Iraq. UN SCR 1790 (18 December 2007) extended the mandate until 31 December 2008, when the UN mandate ended. On 17 Nov. 2008, the US and the Iraqi government signed the Status of Force Agreement establishing the legal framework for US forces in Iraq. Bilateral agreements with other coalition parties were rejected by the Iraqi parliament leading to the withdrawal of the remaining non-US forces in 2008 and 2009. 23. The territory of Iraq is divided into 4 areas: Multi-National Division (MND) Baghdad, MND North, MN Force West and MND South. 24. Only fatalities that occurred after the SC authorization are included. No distinction between non-hostile causes of death is available. 25. ISF was deployed at the request of the Government of Timor-Leste to assist in stabilizing the security environment in the county and endorsed by UN SCR 1690 (20 June 2006). The operation cooperates closely with UNMIT.

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International Security Forces

Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Principal Civilian Police Contributors

Principal Civilian Staff Contributors

Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)

Total Deaths to Date/in 2009 (due to: hostilities, accidents, illness)

Location

Authorization Date

Start Date

EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)

Bosnia and Herzegovina

CJA 2002/210/CFSP1 (11 March 2002)

January 2003

—

—

Austria (5), Czech Republic (5), Finland (6), France (8), Germany (12), Italy (17), Netherlands (8), Romania (10), Slovakia (5), Turkey (7), Ukraine (5)

Bulgaria (2), France (2), Germany (2), Ireland (3), Italy (4), Spain (2), Turkey (2), UK (6)

Civilian Police: 125 Civilian Staff: 27

3/–

EU Advisory and Democratic Assistance Mission Republic of for DRC Security the Congo Reform (EUSEC RD Congo)

CJA 2005/355/CFSP2 (2 May 2005)

June 2005

—

—

—

Belgium (6), France (11), Germany (3), Hungary (2), Netherlands (3), Portugal (2), Sweden (3), UK (7)

Civilian Staff: 473

2/–

EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah)

CJA 2005/889/CFSP4 (12 December 2005)

November 2005

—

—

Finland (2), France (5), Germany (2), Hungary, Italy (1), Sweden (1)

France (1), Hungary (1), Italy (5), Spain (2), Sweden (2), UK (1)

Civilian Police: 11 Civilian Staff: 12

–/–

CJA 2005/797/CFSP5 (14 November 2005)

January 2006

—

—

Canada (2), Czech Republic (2), Denmark (2), Finland (2), Germany (4), Sweden (4)

Estonia (2), Civilian Police: 21 Finland (3), Civilian Staff: 20 Netherlands (2), Spain (2), Sweden (3), UK (3)

–/–

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EU Police Mission Palestinian for the Palestinian territories Territories (EUPOL COPPS)

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Name

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June 2007

—

—

Canada (11), Denmark (16), Finland (10), France (10), Germany (31), Italy (21), Netherlands (8), Norway (11), Spain (11), UK (13)

Finland (15), Civilian Police: France (4), 173 Germany Civilian Staff: 96 (18), Ireland (7), Italy (10), Netherlands (5), Sweden (12), UK (8)

–/–

EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo)

Democratic Republic of Congo

CJA 2007/405/CFSP7 (12 June 2007)

July 2007

—

—

Angola (4), Belgium (4), France (4), Germany (1), Italy (2), Portugal (5), Sweden (1)

France (5), Italy (1), Portugal (1)

–/–

Civilian Police: 21 Civilian Staff: 7

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1. EUPM was established by CJA 2002/210/CFSP (11 March 2002) and tasked with the establishment of a sustainable professional and multi-ethnic police service in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Bosnian ownership through monitoring, mentoring and inspection. At the request of the Bosnian authorities, the mandate was modified to focus on the police reform process, strengthening of police accountability and efforts to fight organised crime. CJA 2007/749/CFSP (19 November 2007) extended the mandate to 31 December 2009. 2. EUSEC RD Congo was established by CJA 2005/355/CFSP (2 May 2005). The mission’s initial mandate was to advise and assist the authorities of the DRC, specifically the Ministry of Defence, on security matters, ensuring that policies are congruent with international humanitarian law, the standards of democratic governance and the principles of rule of law. In 2009 the mission’s mandate was broadened to include facilitating the implementation of the guidelines adopted by the Congolese authorities in the revised plan for reform of the armed forces of DR Congo. In carrying out its activities, EUSEC operates in close coordination with MONUC and EUPOL DR Congo. CJA 2009/709/CFSP (15 September 2009) extended the mandate to 30 September 2010. 3. The majority of the deployed personnel are military advisers. Of those 37, 25 are based in Kinshasa while 12 are located in the eastern parts of the DR Congo. 4. EU BAM Rafah was established pursuant to CJA 2005/889/CFSP (12 December 2005) and on the basis of the Agreement on Movement and Access between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (15 November 2005). It is mandated to monitor, verify and evaluate the performance of Palestinian Authority border control, security and customs officials at the Rafah Crossing Point with regard to the 2005 Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing; and to support the Palestinian Authority’s capacity building in the field of border control. Although the crossing point has not been in operation since 9 June 2007, the mission retains an operational capability. CJA 2008/862/CFSP (10 November 2008) extended the mandate to 24 November 2009. 5. EUPOL COPPS was established by CJA 2005/797/CFSP (14 November 2005). It is mandated to provide a framework for and advise Palestinian criminal justice and police officials, and coordinate EU aid to the Palestinian Authority. CJA 2008/958/CFSP (16 December 2008) extended the mandate to 31 December 2010. 6. EUPOL Afghanistan was established by CJA 2007/369/CFSP (30 May 2007) at the invitation of the Afghan Government. The operation is tasked to contribute to the establishment of civilian policing arrangements and law enforcement under Afghan ownership. The mandate runs until 30 May 2010. 7. EUPOL RD Congo was established by CJA 2007/405/CFSP (12 June 2007), succeeding EUPOL Kinshasa. The operation, supporting overall reforms of the security sector in the DRC, is tasked with assisting the Congolese authorities in reforming the Congolese Police and in improving the functioning of the criminal justice system. EUPOL DR Congo cooperates closely with EUSEC DR Congo and MONUC. CJA 2009/466/CFSP (15 June 2009) extended the mandate to 30 June 2010. continues

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EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)

Name

Location

Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Principal Civilian Police Contributors

Principal Civilian Staff Contributors

Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)

Total Deaths to Date/in 2009 (due to: hostilities, accidents, illness)

Start Date

EU Rule of Law Kosovo Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)

CJA 2008/124/CFSP8 (4 February 2008)

February 2008

—

—

Finland (37), France (170), Germany (73), Hungary (49), Italy (154), Poland (118), Romania (172), Sweden (57), Turkey (59), USA (67)

Belgium (15), Civilian Police: Bulgaria (29), 1,220 Denmark (30), Civilian Staff: 435 Finland (37), France (26), Germany (34), Poland (14), Romania (19), Sweden (34), UK (55)

1/1 (–,1,–)

EU Monitoring Georgia Mission in Georgia (EUMM)

CJA 2008/736/ CFSP9 (15 September 2008)

October 2008

—

—

Bulgaria (7), Denmark (7), France (34), Germany (24), Greece (11), Italy (11), Poland (25), Romania (16), Spain (10), Sweden (12)

Finland (14), Civilian Police: 193 Germany Civilian Staff: 102 (19), Ireland (4), Italy (8), Lithuania (4), Netherlands (9), Poland (3), Romania (4), Sweden (14), UK (7)

–/–

OSCE Mission to Georgia

17th OSCE Committee of Senior Officials meeting10 (6 November 1992)

December 1992

—

—

—

Finland (2), France (2), Germany (2), Hungary (5), Sweden (3), Turkey (2), UK (2), Ukraine (3), USA (2)

–/–

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Civilian Staff: 32

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Georgia

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—

—

—

Bulgaria (1), Civilian Staff: 12 Estonia (2), Finland (1), France (1), Germany (1), Latvia (1), Poland (2), Tajikistan (1), UK (1), USA (1)

–/–

Bosnia and Herzegovina

5th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council12 (MC(5).DEC/1, 8 December 1995)

December 1995

—

—

—

Austria (4), France (7), Germany (3), Greece (4), Ireland (5), Italy (7), Russia (5), Spain (6), Sweden (3), USA (11)

–/–

Civilian Staff: 16

8. EULEX Kosovo was established by CJA 2008/124/CFSP (4 February 2008). With certain executive responsibilities–in terms of investigating and prosecuting serious and sensitive crimes–the operation is tasked to monitor, mentor and advise Kosovo rule of law institutions. It cooperates closely with UNMIK and OMIK. The mandate runs until 14 June 2010. 9. The EUMM was established by CJA 2008/736/CFSP (15 September 2008) in accordance with the agreement on 8 September 2008, following the conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008. The operation is tasked with monitoring and analysing progress in the stabilization process, focusing on compliance with the 6-point peace plan of 12 August 2008, and in the normalization of civil governance; monitoring infrastructure security and the political and security aspects of the return of internally displaced persons and refugees; and supporting confidence-building measures. CJA 2009/572/CFSP (27 July 2009) extended the mandate to 14 September 2010. 10. The OSCE Mission to Georgia was established at the 17th CSO meeting (6 November 1992). It was authorized by the Georgian Government through an MOU on 23 January 1993 and by South Ossetia’s leaders through an exchange of letters on 1 March 1993. Its initial objective was to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties. The mandate was expanded at the 14th PC Meeting (29 March 1994) to include monitoring the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, ensure liaison with UNOMIG in Abkhazia and promote human rights and institutional development throughout Georgia. From December 1999 until December 2004 the mission was additionally mandated to observe and report on crossborder movement between Georgia and the Russian Federation. In August 2008 additional unarmed military observers were authorized. At the end of 2008 Russia vetoed the extension of the operation, asking for a separate mandate for the office in South Ossetia. PC.DEC/883 (12 February 2009) extended the mandate of the additional monitors until 30 June 2009, when they withdrew. 11. The OSCE Mission to Moldova was established at the 19th CSO meeting (4 February 1993) and authorized by the Moldovan Government through an MOU (7 May 1993). Its tasks include assisting the conflict parties in pursuing negotiations on a lasting political settlement and gathering and providing information on the situation. PC.DEC/875 (27 November 2008) extended the mandate to 31 December 2009. 12. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was established by a decision of the 5th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council (MC(5).DEC/1, 8 December 1995), in accordance with Annex 6 of the 1995 Dayton Agreement. The operation is mandated to assist the parties in regional stabilization measures and democratisation. PC.DEC/866 (27 November 2008) extended the mandate to 31 December 2009. continues

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April 1993

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19th OSCE Committee of Senior Officials meeting11 (4 February 1993)

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OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

Moldova

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OSCE Mission to Moldova

Principal Civilian Police Contributors

Authorization Date

OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)

Kosovo

PC.DEC/30513 (1 July 1999)

July 1999

—

—

—

Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

Hebron (Palestinian territories)

Hebron Protocol (17 January 1997) and the Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (21 January 1997)14

February 1997

—

—

Denmark (4), Italy (12), Norway (4), Turkey (7)

Austria (15), Civilian Staff: 172 Bosnia and Herzegovina (7), Croatia (7), France (14), Germany (16), Ireland (6), Italy (15), Spain (11), Turkey (10), USA (11)

9/–

Denmark (6), Norway (16), Sweden (10), Switzerland (5)

2/–

Civilian Police: 27 Civilian Staff: 37

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Location

Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)

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Name

Principal Civilian Staff Contributors

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Start Date

Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Total Deaths to Date/in 2009 (due to: hostilities, accidents, illness)

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5.11 Continued

13. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo was established by PC.DEC/305 (1 July 1999). Its mandate includes training police, judicial personnel and civil administrators and monitoring and promoting human rights. The missoin is a component of UNMIK. Since PC.DEC/835 (21 Dec. 2007) the mission’s mandate is extended a monthly base unless one of the participating states objects. 14. TIPH 2 was established by the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (17 January 1997) and the Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (21 January 1997). It is mandated to provide, by its presence, a secure and stable environment and monitor and report breaches of international humanitarian law. The mandate is renewed every 6 months pending approval from both the Palestinian and Israeli parties.

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 191

5.12 Cost of Non-UN-Commanded Military, Observer, Civilian Police and Civilian Missions: 1 October 2008–30 September 2009 Name Non-UN-Commanded Military and Observer Missions African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX) Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC) EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) EU Military Operations in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) EU Naval Force against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia) NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) Multinational Observer Force (MFO) Operation Licorne Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) International Security Forces (ISF)

Non-UN-Commanded Civilian Police and Civilian Missions EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for DRC Security Reform (EUSEC RD Congo) EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) OSCE Mission to Georgia OSCE Mission to Moldova OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

Location

Cost ($US Millions)

Somalia Central African Republic

134.011 42.0

Moldova-Transdniester Bosnia and Herzegovina

— 28.9

Chad and Central African Republic

65.8

Somalia (Gulf of Aden) Kosovo Afghanistan Iraq Sinai (Egypt) Côte d’Ivoire Solomon Islands Iraq Timor-Leste

Bosnia and Herzegovina

8.9 42.7 391.6 24.8 68.6 108.0 26.1 (July–June)2 93,525.1 142.0 (July–June)

17.6

Democratic Republic of the Congo

9.1

Rafah Crossing Point

3.9

Palestinian territories

8.3

Afghanistan Democratic Republic of the Congo Kosovo Georgia Georgia Moldova Bosnia and Herzegovina Kosovo Hebron (Palestinian territories)

78.7 7.0 153.3 32.1 8.8 2.6 20.0 36.3 3.5

1. The figure reflects the total requirements for a force of 4300 troops for a period of 12 months. 2. The figure reflects only the cost for Australia’s and New Zealand’s military forces deployed in the framework of RAMSI.

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5.13 Heads and Force Commanders of Non-UN-Commanded Military, Observer, Civilian Police, and Civilian Missions: 30 September 2009 Name

Location

Non-UN-Commanded Military and Observer Missions African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Somalia

Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX)

Central African Republic

Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC) EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)

Moldova-Transdniester

EU Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)

Chad and Central African Republic

EU Naval Force against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia)

Somalia (Gulf of Aden)

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

Kosovo

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)

Afghanistan Iraq

Multinational Observer Force (MFO)

Sinai (Egypt)

Operation Licorne

Côte d’Ivoire

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

Solomon Islands

Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) International Security Forces (ISF)

Iraq Timor-Leste

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Head of Mission

Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission: Nicolas Bwakira (Burundi) Force Commander: Major-General Nathan Mugisha (Uganda) Special Representative: Ambassador Albert Akendengue (Gabon) Force Commander: General Hector Marie Tchemo (Cameroon) Unified Military Commander: Colonel Aleksey Tumashov (Russia) Unified Military Commander: General Sir John McColl (UK) Force Commander: Major-General Stefano Castagnotto (Italy) Operation Commander: Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash (Ireland) Force Commander: Brigadier-General Jean-Philippe Ganascia (France) Operation Commander: Rear Admiral Peter Hudson (UK) Force Commander: Commodore Pieter Bindt (Netherlands) Lieutenant-General Markus Bentler (Germany) General Stanley A. McChrystal (USA) Lieutenant-General Frank G. Helmick (USA) Ambassador David M. Satterfield (USA) Force Commander: Major-General Kjell Narve Ludvigsen (Norway) Brigadier-General Jean-François Hogard (France) Director: Special Coordinator Graeme Wilson (Australia) Force Commander: Lieutenant-Colonel David Thompson (Australia) General Ray Odierno (USA) Brigadier Bill Sowry (Australia)

continues

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5.13 Continued

Name

Location

Non-UN-Commanded Civilian Police and Civilian Missions EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) EU Advisory and Assistance mission for Democratic Republic DRC Security Reform (EUSEC RD Congo) of the Congo EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) EU Police Mission in Afghanistan Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) of the Congo EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) Georgia OSCE Mission to Georgia Georgia OSCE Mission to Moldova Moldova OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Kosovo Temporary International Presence Hebron in Hebron (TIPH) (Palestinian Territories)

Head of Mission

Brigadier-General Stefan Feller (Germany) General Jean-Paul Michel (France) Colonel Alain Faugeras (France) Chief Constable Paul Robert Kernaghan (UK) Police Commissioner Kai Vittrup (Denmark) Superintendent Adilio Custodio (Portugal) Yves de Kermabon (Fance) Ambassador Hansjörg Haber (Germany) Ambassador Terhi Hakala (Finland) Ambassador Philip N. Remler (USA) Ambassador Gary D. Robbins (USA) Ambassador Werner Almhofer (Austria) Brigadier-General Britt T. B. Brestrup (Norway)

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UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics

195

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Page 196

This chapter contains data on all current missions of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Department of Field Support (DFS), as well as some Department of Political Affairs (DPA) missions supported by DFS. It is based on public UN documents and sources, combined with data provided by DPKO and DFS, and in some cases by the UN Department of Management (DM) and the United Nations Volunteer (UNV) Programme in Bonn. Variations in types of data sources and reporting dates between missions are often a result of differences in the structure, reporting, and funding mechanisms for different types of UN peace operations: • Peacekeeping missions funded by the General Assembly on the basis of a financial period running from 1 July to 30 June of the following year. • New or newly expanded peacekeeping missions initially funded through shortterm commitment authority (MINURCAT, UNAMID). • Peacekeeping missions funded by the biennial UN budget, which runs from January in even years to December of odd years (UNMOGIP and UNTSO). • Integrated missions and DPA political missions and special political missions with a peacekeeping component either DPKO-led (BINUB, UNAMA) or DPAled and supported by DFS (UNAMI, UNMIN) and funded through extrabudgetary resources, running on a single calendar-year basis.

The features of our dataset are as follows: Key Facts

Notes on mandates and key personnel. Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

These graphs cover personnel trends through the last UN peacekeeping financial year and through the first quarter of the 2008–2009 financial year on a month-by-month basis. For missions whose mandates became authorized as of January 2008 (MINURCAT, UNAMID) data prior to July 2008 is included. UNOMIG figures are only represented up until 31 May 2009, the last full month of authorized mandate. Authorized military and police personnel strengths are based on authorized strengths in Security Council resolutions, relevant budgetary documentation, or were provided directly by the DPKO Force Generation Service (FGS) and the DPKO Police Division (PD). Actual military and personnel strengths were provided by the FGS and PD. Actual and authorized strengths for international staff and local staff were provided by the DFS Field Personnel Division (FPD). UNV Actual and authorized strengths (based on exchange of letters and mission-specific agreements between the UNV Programme and DFS) were provided by the UNV Programme in Bonn. Personnel: Since 2000

These graphs show average annual number of personnel and average annual number of authorized personnel since 2000 (up to June 2009 for missions funded by the peacekeeping budget and through September 2009 for other missions).

196

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UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS • 197

UNOMIG figures are only represented up until 31 May 2009, the last full month of authorized mandate. For the July 2006–September 2009 periods, actual military and police personnel figures were calculated based on information provided by the DPKO FGS or PD. Authorized military and police personnel figures were derived from Security Council Resolutions or obtained from DPKO FGS and PD in cases where Security Council resolutions did not specify authorized strengths. International and local civilian staff actual and authorized strengths were calculated based on information provided by DFS FPD. UNV actual and authorized figures were provided by the UNV Programme. Average actual and authorized figures for the January–June 2006 period were obtained from official budgetary and financial performance reports covering that year, or from data collected directly from the relevant UN Departments for past editions of the Review. Exceptions include UNMOGIP and UNTSO, for which historical and actual personnel figures were derived from the UN’s Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium. Historical figures for UNAMA were obtained from the reports of the Secretary-General on the estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or Security Council. Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

These data show all contributors to the mission on 30 September 2009, and were provided by the DPKO FGS and PD. UNOMIG figures are represented for 31 May 2009, the last full month of authorized mandate. The categories “Troops” and “Military Observers” are used to classify military staff where: “Troops” refer to both Troops and Staff Officers and “Military Observers” refer to Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers and Military Advisors unless otherwise noted. Military Units: 30 September 2009

These data show units in the field on the day in question by their type and country of origin,

based on information provided by DPKO FGS. UNOMIG figures are represented for 31 May 2009, the last full month of authorized mandate. Military staff are not formed into traditional units in observer missions, political missions, and in the observer elements of larger missions; therefore, these personnel are not recorded in this section. The categories “Troops” and “Military Observers” are used to classify military staff where: “Troops” refer to both Troops and Staff Officers and “Military Observers” refer to Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers and Military Advisors unless otherwise noted. International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

These data, provided by DFS FPD, break down international civilian staff into occupational groups, as assigned by DFS FPD. UNOMIG figures are represented for 31 May 2009, the last full month of authorized mandate. Gender Statistics: 30 September 2008

These data show the total number of male and female troops, military observers, police, international staff, and local staff as of that date. UNOMIG figures are represented for 31 May 2009, the last full month of authorized mandate. Military data were provided by DPKO FGS, police data were provided by DPKO PD, and international and local staff data were provided by DFS FPD. Data for UNVs were not available. The categories “Troops” and “Military Observers” are used to classify military staff where: “Troops” refer to both Troops and Staff Officers and “Military Observers” refer to Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers and Military Advisors unless otherwise noted. Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

These data were provided by the DPKO Situation Center. Differences may exist between the historical data shown here and fatality data shown in last year’s edition of the Review due to investigations and reviews of fatality reports undertaken by the Situation Center over the course of the year. UNOMIG figures are only

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represented up until 31 May 2009, the last full month of authorized mandate. Fatality incident types previously categorized as “hostile act” and “criminal act” have henceforth been combined into a single category–“malicious act”. Fatality incident types previously categorized as “self-inflicted” have henceforth been combined into the “other” category. The categories “Military” and “Military Observers” are used to classify military staff where: “Military” refer to both Troops and Staff Officers and “Military Observers” refer to Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers and Military Advisors unless otherwise noted. Vehicles: 30 September 2009

These data cover both UN-owned vehicles and those vehicles owned by national contingents serving in the field under a Memorandum of Agreement and for which usage is reimbursed by the UN. Data on contingent-owned vehicles were obtained from a database managed by the DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; data for UNowned vehicles were provided by the DFS Surface Transport Section. Categorization of vehicles varies between the two sections and do not necessarily correlate. UNOMIG figures are represented for 31 May 2009, the last full month of authorized mandate. The following missions do not have Contingent Owned Equipment vehicles: BINUB, MINURSO, UNAMA, UNMIK, UNMIN, UNMOGIP and UNTSO. Aircraft: 30 September 2009

These data have been provided by the DFS Air Transport Section and identify aircraft by their type (transport fixed-wing, transport helicopter or attack helicopter) and supplier (commercial contractor or government contingent). UNOMIG figures are represented for 31 May 2009, the last full month of authorized mandate. The following missions do not have aircraft: UNDOF, UNMIK, UNMOGIP and UNTSO. Budget and Expenditures: 2008–2010

All 2008–2010 data were obtained from official budgetary and financial performance reports covering that year, or provided by the

DFS Field Budget and Finance Division (FBFD). Peacekeeping missions funded by the peacekeeping budget show the budget and expenditures for the 2008–09 financial year as well as the budget for the 2009–10 financial year. Peacekeeping missions funded from the regular biennial budget (UNTSO and UNMOGIP): these data show both the appropriations and estimated expenditures for the January 2008– December 2009. Political/Special Political/Integrated Missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNAMI, UNMIN): these data show the January 2008–December 2009 appropriations and estimated expenditures as well as requirements for the 2010 calendar year. Mission Expenditures: 2000–2008

Covering the financial years since 2000, this overview of expenditures has been derived from mission financing reports, financial performance reports, and reports on mission budgets. Information on BINUB, UNTSO, UNAMA, UNMIN, UNMOGIP and UNOTIL has been provided by DFS FBFD. For these missions final expenditures for the 2008–2009 budgets are not included. Some discrepancies may appear between the 2004–2005 data provided here, which is derived from official performance reports on the budget, and those data provided in last year’s edition of the Review, which were provided by the DFS FBFD prior to the publication of official performance reports. The mission expenditure tables for peacekeeping missions funded by the peacekeeping budget are broken down into the three following categories (although there was some variation in subcategories in 2000–20011): Military and police personnel. Includes missions’ subsistence allowance, travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation, death and disability compensation, rations and clothing allowances for military observers and police. This section also includes expenditures on major contingent-owned equipment and freight and deployment of contingentowned equipment.

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UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS • 199

Civilian personnel. Covers salaries, staff assessment, common staff costs, hazardous duty stations allowances and overtime for international and local staff, as well as covers costs associated with United Nations Volunteers. Operational requirements. Costs associated with general temporary assistance (salaries, common staff costs, staff assessment), government-provided personnel and civilian electoral observers (allowances and travel), consultants, official travel of civilian personnel, facilities and infrastructure, as well as self-sustainment costs of contingent-owned equipment. Also included are costs associated with ground, air, and naval transportation in mission, communications, IT, medical, special equipment, other supplies, services and equipment and quick impact projects. Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009

which they can be reimbursed by the UN as well as self-sustainment (rations, etc) for those missions financed by the peacekeeping budget. The following missions do not have Contingent Owned Equipment: BINUB, UNAMA, UNMIN, and UNTSO. Data for UNAMI and UNMOGIP Contingent Owned Equipment expenditures are not available. Voluntary Contributions: July 2008–June 2009

These data cover those countries and organizations providing financial support to missions other than through assessed contributions. They are provided by the UN Department of Management’s Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts (OPPBA). The following missions do not have voluntary contributions: BINUB, MINURCAT, UNAMA, UNAMI, UNAMID, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNMIK, UNMIN, UNMIS, UNMIT, UNMOGIP, UNOCI, UNOMIG and UNTSO.

These data, supplied by DFS FBFD, cover contingents’ expenditures on major equipment for

Notes 1. Prior to the July 2001–June 2002 financial year, “Staff Assessment” was reported as an additional line item in “Gross Expenditures” for each mission. Since then, staff assessment has been included as part of the “Civilian Personnel” line item. Figures for the 2000–2001 financial years are shown using the current financial reporting method and include staff assessment expenditures as part of the civilian personnel expenditures. For those years, civilian personnel expenditures will thus appear to be higher than in the official UN financial reports.

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6.1 BINUB (UN Integrated Office in Burundi) BINUB Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

17 December 2009 (date of issue); 1 January 2010 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1902 (twelve month duration) 25 October 2006 (date of issue); 1 January 2007 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1719 (twelve month duration) Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia) SG letter of appointment 18 December 2006 Entry on duty 1 January 2007

First Mandate

ERSG

BINUB Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

300

Number of Personnel

250

200

150

100

50

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

200

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BINUB (BURUNDI) • 201

BINUB Personnel: Since 2007

250

Average Number of Personnel

200

150

100

50

0

Jan.–Dec. ’07

Jan.–Dec. ’08

Jan.–Sept. ’09

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Document S/RES/1719; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

BINUB Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Benin Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria Bangladesh Burkina Faso Niger Pakistan Senegal Switzerland Turkey Yemen Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — 1 — 1 1 1 1 — — 5

2 2 2 2 — 1 — — — — 1 2 12

2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 17

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

BINUB International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

21 — — — — 5 7 5 12 — 2 6 — 8 1 3 14 3 5 4 2 24 2 3 — 127

16.5% — — — — 3.9% 5.5% 3.9% 9.4% — 1.6% 4.7% — 6.3% 0.8% 2.4% 11.0% 2.4% 3.9% 3.1% 1.6% 18.9% 1.6% 2.4% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

BINUB Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type

Male

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

— 5 12 81 155 253

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Female — — — 46 85 131

Percentage Male — 100.0% 100.0% 63.8% 64.6% 65.9%

Percentage Female — — — 36.2% 35.4% 34.1%

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BINUB (BURUNDI) • 203

BINUB Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

Incident Type

Time Period 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — — — — — — — — — — —

Illness — — — — — — — — — — —

Accident

Otherb

Total

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

BINUB Aircraft: 30 September 2009

BINUB Vehicles: 30 September 2009

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

135 4 4 21 2 5 27 4 202

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

— — —

1 — 1

— — —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

BINUB Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Costs Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Appropriations Jan. ’08–Dec. ’09

Estimated Expenditures Jan. ’08–Dec. ’09

Requirements for Jan.–Dec. ’10

1,809.6 45,216.8 23,141.1 70,167.5 — 70,167.5 — 70,167.5

1,547.4 47,468.7 21,151.4 70,167.5 — 70,167.5 — 70,167.5

955.9 29,072.4 16,229.7 46,258.0 — 46,258.0 — 46,258.0

Sources: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3; DFS FBFD. Note: January 2008–December 2009 expenditures and January–December 2010 requirements are preliminary and subject to change.

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BINUB (BURUNDI) • 205

BINUB Mission Expenditures: January 2006–December 2007 (in thousands of US dollars) 30,000

Expenditures

25,000 8,970.3

20,000

15,000

10,000

15,898.6

5,000 772.2

0 Jan. ‘06–Dec. ’07 Operational Costs

Civilian Personnel

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Costs Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Source: DFS FBFD.

Military and Police Personnel

Jan. ’06–Dec. ’07 772.2 15,898.6 8,970.3 25,641.1 — 25,641.1 — 25,641.1

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6.2 MINURCAT (UN Mission in the Central

African Republic and Chad) MINURCAT Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate SRSG Force Commander

Police Commissioner Chief Military Liaison Officer

14 January 2009 (date of issue); 15 January 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1861 (fourteen month duration and authorization of the deployment of a military component of MINURCAT to follow up EUFOR in both Chad and the Central African Republic at the end of its mandate on 15 March 2009) 25 September 2007 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1778 (twelve month duration) Victor Da Silva Angelo (Portugal) SG letter of appointment 25 January 2008 Major-General Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji (Senegal) SG letter of appointment 27 February 2009 Entry on duty 15 March 2009 Major-General Geraldo Christian Chaumont (Argentina) François N’Diaye (Senegal)

206

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MINURCAT (CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD) • 207

MINURCAT Personnel: January 2008–September 2009

Number of Personnel

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1000 900

800

Number of Personnel

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Sept. ‘09

July ‘09

Aug. ’09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ‘08

July ‘08

June ‘08

May ‘08

Apr. ‘08

Feb. ‘08

Mar. ‘08

Jan. ‘08

0

Auth. Troops

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Troops

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Document S/RES/1861; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURCAT Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Togo Ireland France Poland Nepal Ghana Norway Austria Russia Finland Albania Côte d’Ivoire Benin Senegal Yemen Egypt Burkina Faso Croatia Madagascar Nigeria Ethiopia Niger

457 427 308 311 302 219 177 131 117 74 63 — — 13 — 1 — 17 — 15 13 —

— — — — 1 1 — — — — — — — 1 2 2 — — — 2 — —

8 — 16 — — — — — — — — 37 27 12 22 16 17 — 17 — — 12

465 427 324 311 303 220 177 131 117 74 63 37 27 26 24 19 17 17 17 17 13 12

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — 1 — 2 — — — — — — 1 3 — — — — —

11 11 10 10 — 7 — — 5 — — — — 3 3 2 2 —

11 11 11 10 7 7 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2

— 1 — 17

— — — 248

1 1 1 2,940

Cameroon — Jordan — Rwanda — Burundi — Bangladesh 5 Mali — Malawi 5 Pakistan 5 Portugal — Kenya 4 Namibia 4 Tunisia 3 Brazil — Guinea — Libya — Sweden — Turkey — United States 2 Democratic Republic of Congo 1 Gabon — Mongolia 1 Total 2,675

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

MINURCAT Military Units: 30 September 2009 Number

Unit Type

Country

1 2 5

Force Reserve Battalion Headquarters Guard Companies Infantry Battalions

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Infantry Detachment Level II Hospital Military Police Multi Logistics Unit Support Detachment Transport Unit Utility Helicopter Unit Water Drill Unit

Nepal Albania, Togo Croatia, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Poland Togo Norway Nepal France France Austria Russia Norway

Source: DPKO FGS.

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MINURCAT (CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD) • 209

MINURCAT International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

51 46 7 — — 14 14 13 15 4 6 36 1 54 1 4 15 9 — 6 17 93 5 13 — 424

12.0% 10.8% 1.7% — — 3.3% 3.3% 3.1% 3.5% 0.9% 1.4% 8.5% 0.2% 12.7% 0.2% 0.9% 3.5% 2.1% — 1.4% 4.0% 21.9% 1.2% 3.1% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

MINURCAT Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

2,559 17 222 304 319 3,421

116 — 26 120 41 303

95.7% 100.0% 89.5% 71.7% 88.6% 91.9%

4.3% — 10.5% 28.3% 11.4% 8.1%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURCAT Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — — — — — 1 — 1 — 1

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — 1 — 1 — 1

Incident Type

Time Period 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — — — — — — 1 — 1 — 1

Illness — — — — — — — — — — —

Accident

Otherb

Total

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — 1 — 1 — 1

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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MINURCAT (CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD) • 211

MINURCAT Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 4 Combat Vehicles 53 Communications Vehicles 3 Engineering Vehicles 52 Material Handling Equipment 25 Support Vehicles (Commerical Pattern) 47 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 405 589 Total

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Vehicles Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 553 10 5 10 53 37 41 81 17 807

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section. Note: 103 4x4 vehicles, 10 automobiles and 4 vans of the UN owned vehicles were funded through a separate Member State driven budgetary process.

MINURCAT Aircraft: 30 September 2009

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

9 — 9

10 4 (Russia) 14

— — —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURCAT Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

3,147.0 67,431.3 17,301.6 — 63,031.4 4,339.6 5,035.3 1,601.7 893.4 — 72.8 2,322.2 159,002.3 20,040.9 58,314.5 — 14,671.1 22,590.4 1,000.0 440,795.5 — 440,795.5 — 440,795.5

3,066.4 60,897.8 17,000.5 — 62,651.5 3,830.7 4,481.9 1,070.3 611.6 — 71.6 2,100.8 157,788.3 18,952.2 54,870.9 — 14,392.4 21,615.3 670.9 424,073.0 — 424,073.0 — 424,073.0

1,732.6 173,049.2 19,395.7 — 76,777.2 5,760.5 5,441.2 131.8 1,427.6 — 185.6 1,250.0 201,673.4 23,330.2 131,025.2 — 17,526.3 31,046.6 1,000.0 690,753.1 7,298.6 683,454.5 — 690,753.1

Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

MINURCAT Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD. Note: Expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

5,745.7 1,942.1 746.6 562.1 272.1 9,268.6

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MINURCAT (CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD) • 213

MINURCAT Mission Expenditures: July 2007–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

Expenditures

200,000

150,000

100,000 143,722.8

50,000

16,009.6

5,451.3

0 July ‘07–June ‘08 Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

July ’07–June ’08 5,451.3 16,009.6 143,722.8 — 165,183.7 999.2 164,184.5 — 165,183.7

Sources: UN Document A/63/565; DFS FBFD. Note: Preliminary funding was provided for MINUTAC from March–June 2007 in advance of the MINURCAT mandate.

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6.3 MINURSO (UN Mission for the

Referendum in Western Sahara) MINURSO Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander

First Force Commander

30 April 2009 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1871 (twelve month duration) 29 April 1991 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 690 (no determined duration) Hany Abdel-Aziz (Egypt) SG letter of appointment 6 October 2009 Johannes Manz (Switzerland) Major-General Zhao Jingmin (China) SG letter of appointment 22 August 2007 Entry on duty 27 August 2007 Major-General Armand Roy (Canada)

214

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MINURSO (WESTERN SAHARA) • 215

MINURSO Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

250

Number of Personnel

200

150

100

50

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

Auth. Troops

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Troops

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURSO Personnel: Since 2000

350

Average Number of Personnel

216

1/26/10

300

250

200

150

100

50

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Troops

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Troops

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents A/56/818, A/57/674, A/58/642, A/59/619, A/60/634 and A/61/683; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS ; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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MINURSO (WESTERN SAHARA) • 217

MINURSO Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country Malaysia Egypt Ghana Russia France China Honduras Pakistan Brazil Yemen Nigeria Bangladesh Croatia Hungary El Salvador

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

20 — 7 — — — — — — — — — — — —

12 21 10 15 13 12 12 11 10 10 9 8 7 7 3

— 3 — — — — — — — — — — — — 3

32 24 17 15 13 12 12 11 10 10 9 8 7 7 6

Contributing Country Paraguay Italy Mongolia Argentina Guinea Ireland Sri Lanka Uruguay Austria Djibouti Jordan Republic of Korea Greece Poland Total

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

MINURSO Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number 1

Unit Type Advanced Level I Medical Unit

Source: DPKO FGS.

Country Malaysia

Troops — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 27

Military Observers 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 198

Police — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 6

Total 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 231

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURSO International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

10 5 — — — 13 5 5 — — 1 12 1 10 — — 5 3 — 1 1 9 — 16 — 97

10.3% 5.2% — — — 13.4% 5.2% 5.2% — — 1.0% 12.4% 1.0% 10.3% — — 5.2% 3.1% — 1.0% 1.0% 9.3% — 16.5% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

MINURSO Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

18 194 3 80 128 423

9 4 3 17 28 61

66.7% 98.0% 50.0% 82.5% 82.1% 87.4%

33.3% 2.0% 50.0% 17.5% 17.9% 12.6%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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MINURSO (WESTERN SAHARA) • 219

MINURSO Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 1992–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

5 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 5

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

2 — — — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 3

2 — 1 — — 1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 5

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

11 — 1 — — 1 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 15

Incident Type

Time Period 1992–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Illness 3 — — — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 4

Accident

Otherb

Total

8 — — — — 1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 10

— — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

11 — 1 — — 1 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 15

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURSO Vehicles: 30 September 2009

MINURSO Aircraft: 30 September 2009

UN Owned Vehicles Vehicle Type

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

3 — 3

3 — 3

— — —

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Total

318 9 4 10 22 11 15 27 416

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

MINURSO Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ’08–June ’09

Estimated Expenditures July ’08–June ’09

Budgeted July ’09–June ’10

6,686.6 1,005.0 190.9 — 12,291.0 2,996.6 680.4 40.2 42.4 — 25.8 559.2 3,774.9 1,453.5 13,113.5 — 2,484.6 3,030.8 — 48,375.3 — 48,375.3 — 48,375.3

6,194.9 1,154.3 200.2 — 12,261.3 2,973.0 651.6 42.9 39.1 — 25.1 543.0 3,724.3 1,458.8 12,797.4 — 2,457.8 3,441.6 — 47,965.2 — 47,965.2 — 47,965.2

5,368.9 761.5 147.9 — 14,434.3 3,237.0 733.8 42.0 43.6 — 13.5 707.6 4,555.8 5,284.5 13,692.5 — 2,610.0 1,894.7 — 53,527.6 2,188.7 51,338.9 3,048.9 56,576.5

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

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MINURSO (WESTERN SAHARA) • 221

MINURSO Voluntary Contributions: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor Morocco Algeria Frente Polisario Total

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

Total

2,495.0 352.0 57.0 2,904.0

— — — —

— — — —

2,495.0 352.0 57.0 2,904.0

Source: DM OPPBA. Note: July 2008–June 2009 voluntary contributions are preliminary, subject to change, and vary from expenditure figures provided by DFS FBFD for the same period.

MINURSO Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Medical Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

125.1 1.5 60.4 187.0

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURSO Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars) 50,000 45,000 40,000

Expenditures

222

2/2/10

2,309.1

35,000 30000

10,239.6

13,025.0

14,002.7

14,882.6

18,861.9

20,323.6

20,587.7

23,471.6

22,523.2

19,720.8

18,191.5

17,472.9

16,162.6

15,807.2

14,851.2

15,599.0

7,144.0

6,344.7

6,214.8

6,495.8

6,373.5

6,217.5

6,265.7

6,449.7

July ‘00– June ‘01

July ‘01– June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

July ‘03– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Other

July ’00– June ’01

Jul ’01– June ’02

July ’02– June ’03

July ’03– June ’04

July ’04– June ’05

July ’05– June ’06

July ’06– June ’07

July ’07– June ’08

7,144.0 22,523.2 10,239.6 2,309.1 42,215.9 3,773.4 38,442.5

6,344.7 19,720.8 13,025.0 — 39,090.5 2,751.3 36,339.2

6,214.8 18,191.5 14,002.7 — 38,409.0 2,636.2 35,772.8

6,495.3 17,472.9 14,882.6 — 38,850.8 2,442.8 36,408.0

6,373.5 16,162.6 18,861.9 — 41,398.0 2,311.9 39,086.1

6,217.6 15,807.2 20,323.6 — 42,348.4 2,191.5 40,156.9

6,265.7 14,851.2 20,585.7 — 41,702.6 1,860.7 39,841.9

6,449.7 15,599.0 23,471.6 — 45,520.3 2,017.0 43,503.3

3,670.7 45,886.6

1,806.1 40,896.6

2,567.4 40,976.4

3,084.0 41,934.8

3,885.2 45,283.2

3,761.3 46,109.7

2,775.9 44,478.5

2,945.2 48,465.5

Sources: UN Documents A/56/818, A/57/674, A/58/642, A/59/619, A/60/634, A/61/683 A/62/679, and A/63/608; DFS FBFD.

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6.4 MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)

MINUSTAH Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate SRSG

First SRSG Force Commander

First Force Commander Police Commissioner

13 October 2009 (date of issue); 15 October 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1892 (twelve month duration and increase of authorized military and police strength) 30 April 2004 (date of issue); 1 June 2004 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1542 (six month duration) Hédi Annabi (Tunisia) SG letter of appointment 26 July 2007 Entry on duty 1 September 2007 Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile) Major-General Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto (Brazil) SG letter of appointment 26 March 2009 Entry on duty 9 April 2009 Lieutenant-General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira (Brazil) Mamadou Mountaga Diallo (Guinea)

223

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINUSTAH Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

8,000

7,000

6,000

Number of Personnel

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

Police

June ’09

Auth. Police

June ’09

Auth. Troops Troops

May ‘09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

0 July ‘08

•

Number of Personnel

224

1/26/10

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1702 and S/RES/1780; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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MINUSTAH (HAITI) • 225

MINUSTAH Personnel: Since 2004

8,000

Average Number of Personnel

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

May– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Troops Troops

2,400

Average Number of Personnel

2,000

1,600

1,200

800

400

0 May– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Int’l Staff

Police

Local Staff

UNVs

July ‘08– June ’09

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1542, S/RES/1608, S/RES/1702, A/60/646 and A/61/741; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINUSTAH Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

Brazil 1,282 Nepal 1,076 Uruguay 1,146 Jordan 727 Sri Lanka 959 Argentina 560 Chile 500 Pakistan — Bolivia 208 Peru 207 Philippines 157 India — China — Nigeria — Senegal — Guatemala 118 Canada 5 Ecuador 67 Côte d’Ivoire — France 2 Guinea — United States 4 Niger —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

3 180 5 326 2 17 15 246 — — 22 150 143 123 121 — 90 — 65 56 55 46 49

1,285 1,256 1,151 1,053 961 577 515 246 208 207 179 150 143 123 121 118 95 67 65 58 55 50 49

Turkey — Spain — Mali — Paraguay 31 Benin — Egypt — Colombia — Burkina Faso — Romania — Chad — Cameroon — El Salvador — Russia — Rwanda — Madagascar — Croatia 2 Jamaica — Serbia — Togo — Central African Republic — Yemen — Switzerland — Total 7,051

Troops

Military Observers — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Police 46 43 42 — 30 28 27 21 20 14 13 13 11 10 9 3 5 5 5 3 3 1 2,066

Total 46 43 42 31 30 28 27 21 20 14 13 13 11 10 9 5 5 5 5 3 3 1 9,117

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD. Note: Police figures include formed police provided by China (125), India (140), Jordan (287), Nepal (124), Nigeria (124), Pakistan (247) and Senegal (84).

MINUSTAH Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number

Unit Type

Country

3 2 1 9

Aviation Units Engineering Companies Headquarters Company Infantry Battalions

2 1 1 1

Infantry Companies Level II Hospital Military Police Company Platoon

Argentina, Chile, Uruguay Brazil, Chile-Ecuador Composite Philippines Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Jordan, Nepal (2), Sri Lanka, Uruguay (2) Bolivia, Peru Argentina Guatemala Paraguay

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military Field Headquarters Staff Officers not included.

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MINUSTAH (HAITI) • 227

MINUSTAH International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

67 15 32 — 3 24 23 22 17 6 1 28 5 88 1 3 21 13 7 16 24 49 3 17 — 485

13.8% 3.1% 6.6% — 0.6% 4.9% 4.7% 4.5% 3.5% 1.2% 0.2% 5.8% 1.0% 18.1% 0.2% 0.6% 4.3% 2.7% 1.4% 3.3% 4.9% 10.1% 0.6% 3.5% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

MINUSTAH Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

6,927 — 1,972 327 997 10,223

124 — 94 158 238 614

98.2% — 95.5% 67.4% 80.7% 94.3%

1.8% — 4.5% 32.6% 19.3% 5.7%

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINUSTAH Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— 9 6 5 2 — 1 — 1 3 3 — — 25

— — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— 3 — 1 3 — 1 1 1 — — — — 7

— 1 3 3 — — — — — 1 — 1 — 8

— — 3 — — — — — — 2 2 — — 5

— — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— 13 12 9 5 — 2 1 2 6 5 1 — 45

Incident Type

Time Period 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — 6 5 — 1 — 1 — — 1 1 — — 13

Illness — 3 4 6 2 — 1 1 — 1 — 1 — 16

Accident

Otherb

Total

— 3 2 3 2 — — — 2 2 2 — — 12

— 1 1 — — — — — — 2 2 — — 4

— 13 12 9 5 — 2 1 2 6 5 1 — 45

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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MINUSTAH (HAITI) • 229

MINUSTAH Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 17 Combat Vehicles 220 Engineering Vehicles 114 Material Handling Equipment 27 Naval Vessels 24 Support Vehicles (Commerical Pattern) 591 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 573 1,566 Total

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles 889 Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 10 Ambulances 9 Buses 51 Engineering Vehicles 2 Material Handling Equipment 25 Trucks 84 Vans 10 Total 1,080

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

MINUSTAH Aircraft: 30 September 2009

Transport Fixed Wing Commercial Contingent Owned

Total

1 1 (Uruguay) 2

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Transport Helicopter 4 6 (2 Argentina, 4 Chile) 10

Attack Helicopter — —

—

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINUSTAH Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category

Budgeted July ’08–June ’09

Estimated Expenditures July ’08–June ’09

Budgeted July ’09–June ’10

— 192,868.9 54,152.0 33,530.3 87,656.5 27,373.3 9,919.6 3,492.0 888.4 — 207.2 1,475.0 76,914.7 12,187.2 25,796.5 466.6 31,116.8 14,871.5 2,000.0 574,916.5 — 574,916.5 — 574,916.5

— 192,795.8 54,145.2 33,530.2 87,639.5 27,372.8 9,919.5 3,477.5 885.1 — 207.2 1,474.8 76,879.2 12,159.7 25,595.7 466.5 31,116.2 14,738.7 1,998.2 574,401.7 — 574,401.7 — 574,401.7

— 196,036.7 57,961.6 32,690.7 92,418.4 30,772.9 12,313.0 4,770.5 1,451.1 — 214.9 1,829.1 84,991.9 13,247.2 30,648.6 1,316.4 32,009.0 16,079.2 3,000.0 611,751.2 14,067.3 597,683.9 — 611,751.2

Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

MINUSTAH Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

35,016.1 6,243.5 16,387.2 7,157.8 4,650.0 2,870.3 72,325.0

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MINUSTAH (HAITI) • 231

MINUSTAH Voluntary Contributions: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

Total

— —

135.0 135.0

— —

135.0 135.0

United States Total

Source: DM OPPBA. Note: July 2008–June 2009 voluntary contributions are preliminary, subject to change, and vary from expenditure figures provided by DFS FBFD for the same period.

MINUSTAH Mission Expenditures: May 2004–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

Expenditures

600,000 500,000 151,288.5

400,000 300,000

128,334.7

192,850.1

100,000

July ‘04– June ‘05

Operational Requirements

Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

88,831.9

94,542.4

239,674.5

246,371.2

120,091.9

262,687.8

26,150.3 1,246.5 7,159.3

May– June ‘04

Category

143,106.5

56,050.5

200,000

0

151,130.2

July ‘05– June ‘06 Civilian Personnel

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

Military and Police Personnel

May– June ’04

July ’04– June ’05

July ’05– June ’06

July ’06– June ’07

July ’07– June ’08

7,159.3 1,246.5 26,150.3 — 34,556.1 60.7 34,495.4

192,850.1 56,050.5 128,334.7 — 377,235.3 5,347.3 371,888.0

239,674.5 88,831.9 151,130.2 — 479,636.6 8,664.8 470,971.8

246,371.2 94,542.4 143,106.5 — 484,020.1 9,313.5 474,706.6

262,687.8 120,091.9 151,288.5 — 534,068.2 12,171.2 521,897.0

— 34,556.1

— 377,235.3

— 479,636.6

— 484,020.1

— 534,068.2

Sources: UN Documents A/59/745, A/60/646, A/61/741 A/62/720 and A/63/549/Corr.1.

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6.5 MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) MONUC Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander First Force Commander Police Commissioner

23 December 2009 (date of issue); 31 December 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1906 (five month duration) 30 November 1999 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1279 (three month duration) Alan Doss (United Kingdom) SG letter of appointment 17 October 2007 Kamel Morjane (Tunisia) Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye (Senegal) SG letter of appointment 31 October 2008 Major-General Mountaga Diallo (Senegal) Sudesh Kumar (India) Entry on duty 9 December 2007

232

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MONUC (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 233

MONUC Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

25,000

Number of Personnel

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

Auth. Troops Troops

3,200

2,800

2,000

1,600

1,200

800

400

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

0 July ‘08

Number of Personnel

2,400

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1756 and S/RES/1843; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Note: Military observers figures include staff officers.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MONUC Personnel: Since 2000 20,000 18,000

Average Number of Personnel

•

16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Troops Troops

3,500

3,000

Average Number of Personnel

234

1/26/10

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents A/56/825, A/57/682, A/58/684, A/59/657, A/60/669, A/61/672, A/61/852 Add.11, S/RES/1258, S/RES/1279, S/RES/1291, S/RES/1355, S/RES/1445, S/RES/1493, S/RES/1565, S/RES/1621, S/RES/1635, S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, S/RES/1711, S/RES/1742, S/RES/1751, S/RES/1756 and S/RES/1843; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Note: Military observers figures for July 2007–June 2009 include staff officers.

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MONUC (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 235

MONUC Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

India Pakistan Bangladesh Uruguay South Africa Nepal Morocco Benin Senegal Tunisia Ghana China Bolivia Indonesia Guatemala Malawi Jordan Niger Côte d’Ivoire Romania Cameroon Russia Burkina Faso Egypt Belgium Mali Guinea Kenya Zambia

4,249 3,589 1,520 1,324 1,205 1,030 831 749 460 461 462 218 200 174 150 111 65 — — — — — — — 22 — — — —

52 51 26 47 17 24 5 10 23 26 23 15 7 16 4 19 24 11 — 22 5 28 2 26 6 19 — 23 23

249 1 250 1 — — — 42 253 — — — — — — — 3 32 42 15 29 6 30 6 — 9 23 — —

4,550 3,641 1,796 1,372 1,222 1,054 836 801 736 487 485 233 207 190 154 130 92 43 42 37 34 34 32 32 28 28 23 23 23

Nigeria — Togo — Malaysia — Paraguay — Sweden — Chad — Ukraine — France — Canada — Turkey — Central African Republic — Yemen — Madagascar — Peru — Serbia 6 United Kingdom — Algeria — Bosnia and Herzegovina — Ireland — Norway — Spain — Switzerland — Czech Republic — Denmark — Mongolia — Mozambique — Poland — Sri Lanka — Total 16,826

Troops

Military Observers 22 — 17 17 4 — 13 5 11 — — 5 — 7 — 6 5 5 3 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 692

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD. Note: Police figures include formed police provided by Bangladesh (389), India (250) and Senegal (247).

Police — 18 — — 13 16 3 10 1 12 11 3 7 — — — — — — 2 1 — — — — — — — 1,088

Total 22 18 17 17 17 16 16 15 12 12 11 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 18,606

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MONUC Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number 5 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 5 1 16

2 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1

Unit Type

Country

Air Medical Evacuation Teams Air Service Units Air Transportation Unit Airfield Crash Rescue Unit Airfield Service Unit Airfield Support Unit Attack Aviation Units Aviation Unit Brigade Headquarters and Training Teams Cargo Handling Unit Engineering Units Headquarters Support & Signal Company Infantry Battalions

Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Serbia, South Africa India Belgium South Africa Bangladesh Uruguay India South Africa India, Pakistan

Infantry Mechanized Units Level II Hospitals Level III Hospital Military Police Units Observation Aviation Unit Riverine Units Special Forces Company Support Company Utility Aviation Units Water Treatment Plant

Source: DPKO FGS.

South Africa China, Indonesia, Nepal, South Africa, Uruguay Bangladesh Bangladesh, Benin, India (4), Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan (4), Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay Bolivia, Ghana China, Jordan, Morocco India Bangladesh, South Africa India Uruguay Guatemala Malawi Bangladesh, India (2) Uruguay

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MONUC (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 237

MONUC International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

135 53 20 — 44 50 47 34 29 3 3 87 4 176 1 14 62 22 28 41 16 95 14 27 — 1,005

13.4% 5.3% 2.0% — 4.4% 5.0% 4.7% 3.4% 2.9% 0.3% 0.3% 8.7% 0.4% 17.5% 0.1% 1.4% 6.2% 2.2% 2.8% 4.1% 1.6% 9.5% 1.4% 2.7% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

MONUC Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Male 16,443 663 1,044 715 2,256 21,121

Female 383 29 44 290 359 1,105

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD. Note: Military observers figures include staff officers.

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

97.7% 95.8% 96.0% 71.1% 86.3% 95.0%

2.3% 4.2% 4.0% 28.9% 13.7% 5.0%

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MONUC Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — 4 3 8 18 20 18 6 12 3 2 2 5 5 1 1 3 94

— — 1 2 3 2 — 1 — — — — — — 1 — 1 — 10

— — — — — — 1 1 — 3 — 1 — 2 1 1 — — 6

— — 1 2 3 — 2 1 1 1 — 1 — — — — — — 11

— — 2 1 — 2 2 7 6 6 3 — — 3 2 1 1 — 28

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — 8 8 14 22 25 28 13 22 6 4 2 10 9 3 — — 149

Incident Type

Time Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — — 1 — 3 3 13 9 1 2 — — — 2 — — — — 32

Illness — — 4 5 7 8 8 17 10 14 4 3 — 7 6 1 3 2 79

Accident

Otherb

Total

— — 1 3 4 11 4 2 2 3 — 1 2 — 1 1 — — 31

— — 2 — — — — — — 3 2 — — 1 2 1 — 1 7

— — 8 8 14 22 25 28 13 22 6 4 2 10 9 3 3 3 149

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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MONUC (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 239

MONUC Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 72 Combat Vehicles 364 Communications Vehicles 5 Engineering Vehicles 185 Material Handling Equipment 52 Naval Vessels 30 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 380 1,552 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) Total 2,640

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Boats Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 1,539 64 26 3 2 393 28 111 275 41 2,482

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

MONUC Aircraft: 30 September 2009

Transport Fixed Wing Commercial Contingent Owned

25 —

Total

25

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

16 — 23 8 (Belgium, 5 (India) Bangladesh, 15 India, 2 South Africa) 39 8

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MONUC Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category

Budgeted July ’08–June ’09

Estimated Expenditures July ’08–June ’09

Budgeted July ’09–June ’10

47,510.8 399,967.2 21,397.5 18,126.2 159,297.6 51,506.0 27,539.6 6,748.9 — — 672.6 10,261.2 101,137.6 29,651.7 229,178.5 1,734.4 42,885.6 42,487.9 1,000.0 1,191,103.3 — 1,191,103.3 — 1,191,103.3

47,497.5 398,152.8 21,023.0 17,575.9 158,403.7 52,178.2 27,526.1 4,785.0 — — 615.7 10,269.5 100,061.0 28,974.0 217,054.6 1,194.5 42,134.0 39,341.6 799.6 1,167,586.7 — 1,167,586.7 — 1,167,586.7

47,846.7 455,972.0 20,243.5 26,527.2 167,258.6 63,181.4 26,285.0 7,162.2 841.0 — 434.2 9,980.8 125,151.7 36,498.6 255,035.8 1,445.2 55,557.8 46,162.9 1,000.0 1,346,584.6 26,236.3 1,320,348.3 4,953.9 1,351,538.5

Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

MONUC Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

63,257.9 3,450.8 36,839.3 17,014.9 15,241.0 4,685.5 140,489.4

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MONUC (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 241

MONUC Voluntary Contributions: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributor Foundation Hirondelle Total

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

4,245.0 4,245.0

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

— —

— —

Total 4,245.0 4,245.0

Source: DM OPPBA. Note: July 2008–June 2009 voluntary contributions are preliminary, subject to change, and vary from expenditure figures provided by DFS FBFD for the same period.

MONUC Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

Expenditures

1,200,000 1,000,000 385,307.4 442,586.2 443,265.2 380,258.6 215,371.3 203,018.5 163,232.0 261,188.0 140,862.5

800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0

229,456.9 112,562.7 448,543.1 470.810.1 474.6 223,159.0 439,523.2 379,763.4 93,521.5 185,247.6 68,491.0 262,734.7 28,080.0 97,177.0156.973.6 29,656.1 July‘00–

July‘01–

July‘02–

July‘03– July ‘04– July ‘05– July ‘06– July ‘07–

June ‘01 June ‘02 June ‘03 June ‘04 June ‘05 June ‘06 June ‘07 June ‘08

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

July ’00– June ‘01

Civilian Personnel

July ’01– July ’02– June ‘02 June ‘03

Military and Police Personnel

July ’03– June ‘04

29,656.1 97,177.0 156,973.6 262,734.7 28,080.0 68,491.0 93,521.5 112,562.7 185,247.6 223,159.0 229,456.9 261,188.0 474.6 — — — 243,458.3 388,827.0 479,952.0 636,485.4 3,013.7 6,777.6 10,037.6 12,114.2 240,444.6 382,049.4 469,914.4 624,371.2

July ’04– June ‘05

July ’05– June ‘06

Other

July ’06– June ‘07

July ’07– June ‘08

379,763.4 448,543.1 439,523.2 470,810.1 140,862.5 163,232.0 203,018.5 215,371.3 380,258.6 443,265.2 442,586.2 385,307.4 — — — — 900,884.5 1,055,040.3 1,085,127.9 1,071,488.8 14,882.7 17,035.5 19,985.5 20,659.0 886,001.8 1,038,004.8 1,065,142.4 1,050,829.8

— — 1,780.2 2,345.8 3,112.6 3,237.5 2,858.0 4,153.4 243,458.3 388,827.0 481,732.2 638,831.2 903,997.1 1,058,277.8 1,087,985.9 1,075,642.2

Sources: UN Documents A/56/825, A/57/682, A/58/684, A/59/657, A/60/669, A/61/672, A/62/737 and A/63/563.

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6.6 UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) UNAMA Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution First Mandate SRSG

First SRSG Senior Military Advisor

23 March 2009 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1868 (twelve month duration) 28 March 2002 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1401 (twelve month duration) Kai Eide (Norway) SG letter of appointment 6 March 2008 Entry on duty 10 March 2008 Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) Brigadier-General Mark Skidmore (Canada)

242

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UNAMA Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

70

Number of Personnel

60

50

40

30

20

10

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

UNVs

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

1,800 1,600

Number of Personnel

1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

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UNAMA Personnel: Since 2002

60 50 45

Average Number of Personnel

•

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Apr.– Dec. ’02

Jan.– Dec. ’03

Jan.– Dec. ’04

Jan.– Dec. ’05

Jan.– Dec. ’06

Jan.– Dec. ’07

Jan.– Dec. ’08

Auth. Military Liaison/Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. UNV

Military Liaison/Obs.

Police

UNV

Jan.– Sept. ’09

1,600

1,400

Average Number of Personnel

244

2/2/10

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

Apr.– Dec. ’02

Jan.– Dec. ’03

Jan.– Dec. ’04

Jan.– Dec. ’05

Jan.– Dec. ’06

Jan.– Dec. ’07

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Jan.– Sept. ’08

Jan.– Sept. ’09

Sources: UN Documents A/C.5/56/25/Add.4, A/C.5/57/23, A/C.5/58/20 and A/59/534/Add.1; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNAMA (AFGHANISTAN) • 245

UNAMA Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country Bangladesh Norway Nepal Australia Canada Czech Republic Denmark Germany Ghana New Zealand Paraguay Philippines Portugal Republic of Korea Romania Sweden United Kingdom Uruguay Total

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 2 — 1 — 1 1 1 — 1 1 — 1 1 1 1 1 1 15

2 1 2 — 1 — — — 1 — — 1 — — — — — — 8

3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 23

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UNAMA International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

30 5 24 — 2 2 14 11 24 4 2 15 4 7 1 1 73 5 17 12 14 58 3 13 — 341

8.8% 1.5% 7.0% — 0.6% 0.6% 4.1% 3.2% 7.0% 1.2% 0.6% 4.4% 1.2% 2.1% 0.3% 0.3% 21.4% 1.5% 5.0% 3.5% 4.1% 17.0% 0.9% 3.8% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNAMA Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Male — 14 8 224 1,199 1,445

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

— 1 — 117 70 188

— 93.3% 100.0% 65.7% 94.5% 88.5%

— 6.7% — 34.3% 5.5% 11.5%

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UNAMA (AFGHANISTAN) • 247

UNAMA Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 1

1 1 2 — 1 4 1 — — 1 — 2 — — 2 12

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 1 2 — 1 5 1 — — 1 — 2 — — 2 13

Incident Type

Time Period 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — — — — — — 1 — — 1 — 2 — — 2 3

Illness — 1 2 — — 2 — — — — — — — — — 5

Accident

Otherb

Total

1 — — — — 2 — — — — — — — — — 3

— — — — 1 1 — — — — — — — — — 2

1 1 2 — 1 5 1 — — 1 — 2 — — 2 13

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNAMA Vehicles: 30 September 2009

UNAMA Aircraft: 30 September 2009

UN Owned Vehicles Vehicle Type

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

3 — 3

3 — 3

— — —

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Ambulances Automobiles Buses Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

336 2 4 39 9 19 12 421

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNAMA Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Civilian Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers Consultants and Experts Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Operations Communications and IT Medical Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick Impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Appropriations Jan. ‘08–Dec. ‘09 1,734.8 531.3 86,508.8 37,852.3 4,327.7 427.4 2,688.3 26,430.7 31,586.7 37,525.8 11,389.3 787.7 2,103.9 — 243,894.7 — 243,894.7 — 243,894.7

Estimated Expenditures Jan. ‘08–Dec. ‘09

Requirements for Jan.–Dec. ‘10

1,605.0 531.3 88,375.5 40,337.4 4,243.0 427.4 3,132.8 28,056.2 31,294.7 44,717.1 11,038.9 730.5 2,103.9 — 256,593.7 — 256,593.7 — 256,593.7

1,218.1 360.4 74,171.6 28,532.2 3,074.5 1,261.2 3,015.8 40,509.8 21,810.3 50,586.0 12,461.4 819.2 2,423.8 1,700.0 241,944.3 — 241,944.3 — 241,944.3

Sources: UN Document A/64/349/Add.4; DFS FBFD. Note: January 2008–December 2009 expenditures and requirements for January–December 2010 are preliminary and subject to change.

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UNAMA Mission Expenditures: April 2002–December 2007 (in thousands of US dollars)

140,000

Expenditures

120,000 1,179.9

100,000 80,000 60,000

45,915.2 210.4

39,551.6

38,848.4 77,656.5

40,000 20,000 0

65,851.9 40,497.0 504.8

1,260.4

820.8

Apr. ‘02–

Jan. ‘04–

Jan. ‘06–

Dec. ’03

Dec. ’05

Dec. ’07

Operational Requirements

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Costs Other Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

Other

Apr. ‘02–Dec. ‘03 504.8 40,497.0 38,848.4 210.4 80,060.5

Jan. ‘04–Dec. ‘05

Jan. ‘06–Dec. ‘07

820.8 65,851.9 39,551.6 1,179.9 107,404.2

1,260.4 77,656.5 45,915.2 — 124,832.1

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6.7 UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) UNAMI Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

7 August 2009 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1883 (twelve month duration) 14 August 2003 (date of issue and effect) UNSC. Res 1500 (twelve month duration) Ad Melkert (Netherlands) SG letter of appointment 6 July 2009 Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil) Colonel Peter Jeffrey (Australia) Date of appointment 7 July 2006

First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Senior Military Advisor

UNAMI Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

700

Number of Personnel

600

500

400

300

200

Auth. Troops

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Troops

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

250

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

0

July ‘08

100

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UNAMI (IRAQ) • 251

UNAMI Personnel: Since 2006

700

Average Number of Personnel

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 Jan.– Dec. ’06

Jan.– Dec. ’07

Jan.– Dec. ’08

Jan.– Sept. ’09

Auth. Troops

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Troops

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS. Note: Historical military personnel figures for UNAMI are only available from DPKO on a regular monthly basis as of January 2006.

UNAMI Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009 Contributing Country Fiji Jordan Nepal United States Australia Denmark New Zealand United Kingdom Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

221 — — — — — — — 221

— 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 10

— — — — — — — — —

221 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 231

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UNAMI Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number 3

Unit Type

Country

Guard Units

Fiji

Source: DPKO FGS.

UNAMI International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

International Staff 26 8 — — 5 11 12 16 9 15 2 17 6 33 — 4 20 7 7 5 — 109 — 7 — 319

Percentage International Staff 8.2% 2.5% — — 1.6% 3.4% 3.8% 5.0% 2.8% 4.7% 0.6% 5.3% 1.9% 10.3% — 1.3% 6.3% 2.2% 2.2% 1.6% — 34.2% — 2.2% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

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UNAMI (IRAQ) • 253

UNAMI Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type

Male

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

221 10 — 248 354 833

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Female — — — 71 99 170

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

100.0% 100.0% — 77.7% 78.1% 83.1%

— 0.0% — 22.3% 21.9% 16.9%

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UNOHCI/UNAMI Fatalities: January 2003–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — — 1 1 1 1 — — — — — — — 3

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

11 — 2 — 1 1 — 1 — — 1 1 — — 16

8 — — 1 1 1 — 1 — — — — — — 11

5 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 5

24 — 2 2 3 3 1 2 — — 1 1 — — 35

Incident Type

Time Period 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — 23 — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 24

Illness — 1 — 1 2 1 2 — 2 — — — — — — 7

Accident

Otherb

Total

1 — — — — 1 1 1 — — — — — — — 2

— — — 1 — — — — — — — 1 1 — — 2

1 24 — 2 2 3 3 1 2 — — 1 1 — — 35

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: UNAMI was incepted in August 2003. Prior to this, the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOHCI) was the lead presence in Iraq. a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNAMI (IRAQ) • 255

UNAMI Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Support Vehicle (Commercial Pattern) Total

1 1

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 206 1 3 3 13 5 6 10 4 251

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNAMI Aircaft: 30 September 2009

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

1 — 1

— — —

— — —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

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UNAMI Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents International Staff Local Staff Consultants and Experts Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Operations Communications and IT Medical Supplies, Services and Equipment Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Appropriations Jan. ‘08–Dec. ‘09

Estimated Expenditures Jan. ‘08–Dec. ‘09

Requirements for Jan.–Dec. ‘10

2,604.6 23,700.5 125,372.6 22,766.4 679.0 4,426.6 24,450.4 17,240.1 21,817.3 16,915.3 1,011.3 4,855.0 265,839.1 — 265,839.1 — 265,839.1

2,188.2 20,820.9 122,481.5 22,773.1 990.3 5,855.0 20,797.3 14,909.0 17,646.7 20,342.6 878.7 5,931.9 255,615.2 — 255,615.2 — 255,615.2

1,727.1 12,416.5 69,614.5 11,280.3 518.5 1,143.3 17,452.1 2,530.7 18,761.4 9,604.1 656.3 3,227.0 148,931.8 — 148,931.8 — 148,931.8

Sources: UN Document A/64/349/Add.5; DFS FBFD. Note: January 2008–December 2009 expenditures and requirements for January–December 2010 are preliminary and subject to change.

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UNAMI (IRAQ) • 257

UNAMI Mission Expenditures: August 2003–December 2007 (in thousands of US dollars)

250,000

Expenditures

200,000 86,396.7

150,000

100,000

544.5 98,292.5

50,000

85,741.0 1,367.0 395.6 12,318.8

5,218.7

0 Aug.–

Jan. ‘04–

Jan. ‘06–

Dec. ’03

Dec. ’05

Dec. ’07

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Costs Other Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Aug.–Dec. ‘03 — — 5,218.7 — 5,218.7

Other

Jan. ‘04–Dec. ‘05

Jan. ‘06–Dec. ‘07

395.6 1,367.0 85,741.0 544.5 88,048.1

12,318.8 98,292.5 86,396.7 — 197,008.0

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6.8 UNAMID (AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur)

UNAMID Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate

30 July 2009 (date of issue); 31 July 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1881 (twelve month duration) 31 July 2007 (date of issue); Implement mandated tasks no later than 31 December 2007 UNSC Res. 1769 (twelve month duration) General Henry Anyidoho (Ghana)

Acting Joint AU/UN Special Representative First Joint AU/UN Special Representative Rodolphe Adada (Republic of the Congo) Force Commander Lieutenant-General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda) SG letter of appointment 22 July 2009 First Force Commander General Martin Luther Agwai (Nigeria) Police Commissioner Michael J. Fryer (South Africa)

258

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UNAMID (DARFUR) • 259

UNAMID Personnel: January 2008–September 2009

Number of Personnel

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

Auth. Troops

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Troops

Police

Local Staff

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

June ’08

May ‘08

Apr. ’08

Mar. ‘08

Feb. ’08

0

Jan. ‘08

5,000

1,800

Number of Personnel

1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Document S/RES/1769; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

June ’08

May ‘08

Apr. ’08

Mar. ‘08

Feb. ’08

Jan. ‘08

0

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNAMID Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

Nigeria Rwanda Egypt Ethiopia Bangladesh Senegal South Africa Pakistan Jordan Tanzania China Nepal Gambia Burkina Faso Zambia Ghana Uganda Indonesia Yemen Philippines Kenya Sierra Leone Cameroon Malawi Burundi Malaysia Vanuatu

3,331 3,228 2,420 1,763 591 811 642 507 12 287 325 23 201 279 15 10 — 3 14 — 84 11 — 5 4 14 —

8 7 12 9 7 13 14 3 4 7 — 16 1 6 12 3 2 — 12 — 2 4 5 6 7 2 —

567 54 71 — 635 161 217 99 441 60 1 271 96 — 247 205 151 138 79 89 — 64 63 50 39 20 29

3,906 3,289 2,503 1,772 1,233 985 873 609 457 354 326 310 298 285 274 218 153 141 105 89 86 79 68 61 50 36 29

Namibia Thailand Mali Zimbabwe Fiji Madagascar Germany Samoa Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Côte d'Ivoire Jamaica Mozambique Turkey El Salvador Finland Guatemala Palau Republic of Korea Bolivia France Italy Netherlands Switzerland Togo United Kingdom Total

Troops 12 15 7 8 — — 7 — — — — — — 1 — — 2 — 2 1 — 1 1 — — 1 14,638

Military Observers 5 6 9 6 — — — — — — — — 7 — — — — — — — — — — — 1 — 196

Police 9 — — — 13 13 5 9 9 8 7 7 — 4 3 3 — 2 — — 1 — — 1 — — 3,941

Total 26 21 16 14 13 13 12 9 9 8 7 7 7 5 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18,775

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD. Note: Police figures include formed police units provided by Bangladesh (560), Egypt (140), Indonesia (140), Jordan (280), Nepal (140), Nigeria (280), and Senegal (140).

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UNAMID (DARFUR) • 261

UNAMID Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number

Unit Type

Country

1 1 16

Headquarters Company Heavy Transport Company Infantry Battalions

1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 1

Level II Hospital Level III Hospital Medical Transport Company Military Police Company Movement Control Platoon Multi-Role Engineering Companies Multi-Role Logistics Companies Sector Reconnaissance Company Sector Reserve Infantry Company Signals Unit Special Forces Company

Gambia Egypt Burkina Faso, Egypt (2), Ethiopia (2), Nigeria (4), Rwanda (4), Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania Nigeria Pakistan Ethiopia Kenya Bangladesh China, Egypt, Pakistan Bangladesh, Ethiopia Ethiopia, Sierra Leone Bangladesh, Nepal Egypt Nepal

Source: DPKO FGS.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNAMID International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

130 33 31 1 — 62 38 62 37 16 18 129 14 159 1 28 56 18 14 18 30 121 11 56 — 1,083

12.0% 3.0% 2.9% 0.1% — 5.7% 3.5% 5.7% 3.4% 1.5% 1.7% 11.9% 1.3% 14.7% 0.1% 2.6% 5.2% 1.7% 1.3% 1.7% 2.8% 11.2% 1.0% 5.2% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNAMID Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Male 14,310 186 3,584 781 2,090 20,951

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Female 328 10 357 302 295 1,292

Percentage Male 97.8% 94.9% 90.9% 72.1% 87.6% 94.2%

Percentage Female 2.2% 5.1% 9.1% 27.9% 12.4% 5.8%

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UNAMID (DARFUR) • 263

UNAMID Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

16 1 1 10 4 9 3 5 1 25

1 — — — 1 — — — — 1

9 — 3 3 3 1 — — 1 10

— — — — — 2 1 — 1 2

3 — — 2 1 5 1 2 2 8

— — — — — — — — — —

29 1 4 15 9 17 5 7 5 46

Incident Type

Time Period 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act 11 — 1 8 2 3 1 1 1 14

Illness 11 1 3 4 3 13 4 3 6 24

Accident

Otherb

Total

5 — — 2 3 1 — 1 — 6

2 — — 1 1 — — — — 2

29 1 4 15 9 17 5 5 7 46

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNAMID Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Combat Vehicles 399 Engineering Vehicles 168 Material Handling Equipment 63 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 421 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 1,052 Total 2,103

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

2,023 14 17 13 159 74 73 223 4 2,600

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section. Note: Ten 4x4 vehicles of the UN owned vehicles were funded through a separate budgetary process and serve both UNAMID and AMISOM.

UNAMID Aircraft: 30 September 2009

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

9 —

13 8 (Ukraine) 21

— —

9

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

—

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UNAMID (DARFUR) • 265

UNAMID Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

8,773.5 443,526.9 130,415.4 35,761.4 132,077.4 41,576.4 12,699.7 5,628.9 43.6 — 47.9 6,701.2 368,854.6 46,604.2 164,954.3 — 55,333.2 70,439.8 3,000.0 1,526,438.2 — 1,526,438.2

8,713.8 439,132.8 103,029.8 35,740.4 134,770.5 36,883.1 12,699.4 5,574.9 43.6 — 47,785.0 6,607.3 368,840.9 46,518.2 163,990.1 — 55,274.7 70,422.0 2,989.9 1,539,016.4 — 1,539,016.4

11,731.7 511,188.1 146,178.1 70,336.6 161,616.1 56,131.7 19,568.4 4,299.3 243.8 — 480.2 4,563.2 241,268.6 31,425.7 207,415.2 — 83,550.3 44,945.2 4,000.0 1,598,942.2 25,060.3 1,573,881.9

— 1,526,438.2

— 1,539,016.4

— 1,598,942.2

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNAMID Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

64,448.8 7,141.2 19,695.2 9,776.0 3,509.0 4,022.9 108,593.1

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNAMID Mission Expenditures: July 2007–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

1,200,000 1,000,000

Expenditures

266

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800,000 754,238.6

600,000 400,000 64,373.3

200,000 237,866.7

0 July ‘07–June ’08 Operational Costs

Civilian Personnel

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Sources: UN Document A/63/535; DFS FBFD.

Military and Police Personnel

July ‘07–June ‘08 237,866.7 64,373.3 754,238.6 — 1,056,478.6 6,692.3 1,049,786.3 — 1,056,478.6

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6.9 UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) UNDOF Key Facts

Latest Key Resolutions

First Mandate Force Commander

First Force Commander

6 December 2009 (date of issue); 1 January 2010 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1899 (six month duration) 23 June 2009 (date of issue); 1 July 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1875 (six month duration) 31 May 1974 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 350 (six month duration) Major-General Wolfgang Jilke (Austria) SG letter of appointment 16 January 2007 Entry on duty 17 January 2007 Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos (Peru)

267

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNDOF Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

1,500 1,400 1,300

Number of Personnel

1,200 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 600

June ’09

July ‘0\9

Aug. ’09

June ’09

July ‘0\9

Aug. ’09

Sept. ‘09

May ‘09 May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

500

Auth. Troops Troops

150

125

100

70

50

25

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sept. ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

0 July ‘08

•

Number of Personnel

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UNDOF (MIDDLE EAST) • 269

UNDOF Personnel: Since 2000

1,200

Average Number of Personnel

1,150

1,100

1,050

1,000

950

900

850

800 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Troops Troops

120

Average Number of Personnel

100

80

60

40

20

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Sources: UN Documents A/56/813, A/57/668, A/58/641, A/59/625, A/60/628, and A/61/662; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNDOF Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009 Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Austria Poland India Croatia Japan Philippines Canada Total

378 333 195 94 31 12 2 1,045

— — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — —

Total 378 333 195 94 31 12 2 1,045

Source: DPKO FGS.

UNDOF Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number 3 1 1 1

Unit Type

Country

Infantry Battalions Infantry Company Logistics Battalion Transport Company

Australia, Philippines, Poland Croatia India Japan

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military field headquarters staff officers not included.

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UNDOF (MIDDLE EAST) • 271

UNDOF International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

8 — — — — 4 4 1 — — 1 8 — 3 — — — 4 — — 1 3 — 3 — 40

20.0% — — — — 10.0% 10.0% 2.5% — — 2.5% 20.0% — 7.5% — — — 10.0% — — 2.5% 7.5% — 7.5% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNDOF Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

1,020 — — 29 84 1,133

25 — — 11 21 57

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Percentage Male 97.6% — — 72.5% 80.0% 95.2%

Percentage Female 2.4% — — 27.5% 20.0% 4.8%

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNDOF Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 1974–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

38 — — — — — 2 1 — 1 1 — — — — — — — 42

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

39 — — — — — 2 1 — 1 1 — — — — — — — 43

Incident Type

Time Period 1974–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act 7 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 7

Illness 6 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 6

Accident

Otherb

Total

19 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 19

7 — — — — — 2 1 — 1 1 — — — — — — — 11

39 — — — — — 2 1 — 1 1 — — – — – – – 43

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNDOF (MIDDLE EAST) • 273

UNDOF Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Engineering Vehicles 2 Material Handling Equipment 1 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 5 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 5 Total 13

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Ambulances Armoured Personnel Carriers Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 255 11 18 2 50 7 11 67 4 425

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNDOF Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

— 21,453.1 — — 6,522.7 3,082.0 — 37.4 — — 23.4 308.6 6,854.6 4,282.3 — — 2,157.9 1,004.1 — 45,726.0 — 45,726.0 — 45,726.0

— 21,446.4 — — 6,522.4 3,081.9 — 37.4 — — 23.3 308.6 6,854.5 4,282.2 — — 2,157.7 997.4 — 45,711.8 — 45,711.8 — 45,711.8

— 21,489.0 — — 6,774.3 3,400.7 — 40.0 — — 14.0 378.5 5,536.8 3,768.8 — — 2,284.2 1,343.4 — 45,029.7 1,338.0 43,691.7 — 45,029.7

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNDOF Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Medical Special Equipment Total

343.4 252.2 143.8 4.3 743.8

Source: DFS FPD.

UNDOF Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

45,000 40,000

Expenditures

274

2/2/10

35,000 30,000

1,798.7 9,046.8

11,470.1

7,867.5

8,555.6

19,397.8

20,223.8

19,523.8

20,616.4

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

13,401.0

14,256.0

6,892.7

7,597.2

7,166.1

11,114.8

25,000 20,000

5,088.0

13,035.1

12,025.6

12,773.7

8,528.2

6,348.7

15,000 10,000

19,309.3 19,335.2

16,959.4

July ‘00– June ‘01

July ‘01– June ‘02

18,745.6

5,000 0

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

July ‘02– June ‘03

July ‘03– June ‘04

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Other

July ’00– June ‘01

July ’01– June ‘02

July ’02– June ‘03

July ’03– June ‘04

July ’04– June ‘05

July ’05– June ‘06

July ’06– June ‘07

July ’07– June ‘08

19,335.2 5,088.0 9,046.8 1,798.7 35,268.7 1,131.6 34,137.1

16,959.4 6,348.7 11,114.8 — 34,422.9 958.2 33,464.7

19,309.3 6,892.7 12,773.7 — 38,975.7 1,006.4 37,969.3

18,745.6 7,597.2 13,401.0 — 39,743.8 1,087.2 38,656.6

19,397.8 7,166.1 14,256.0 — 40,819.9 1,073.9 39,746.0

20,223.8 7,867.5 12,025.6 — 40,116.9 1,126.2 38,990.7

19,523.3 8,555.6 11,470.1 — 39,549.0 1,139.2 38,409.8

20,616.4 8,528.2 13,035.1 — 42,179.7 1,189.6 40,990.1

— 35,268.7

— 34,422.9

— 38,975.7

— 39,743.8

— 40,819.9

— 40,116.9

— 39,549.0

— 42,179.7

Sources: UN Documents A/56/813, A/57/668, A/58/641, A/59/625, A/60/628, A/61/662, A/62/719 and A/63/521.

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6.10 UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)

UNFICYP Key Facts

Latest Key Resolutions

First Mandate SRSG

First SRSG Force Commander First Force Commander

14 December 2009 (date of issue); 15 December 2009 (date of effect) UNSC. Res. 1898 (six month duration) 29 May 2009 (date of issue); 15 June 2009 (date of effect) UNSC. Res. 1873 (six month duration) 4 March 1964 (date of issue and effect) UNSC. Res. 186 (three month duration) Tayé-Brook Zerihoun (Ethiopia) SG letter of appointment 9 April 2008 Entry on duty 1 May 2008 Carlos Alfredo Bernardes (Brazil) Rear Admiral Mario Sánchez Debernardi (Peru) SG letter of appointment 9 April 2008 Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani (India)

275

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UNFICYP Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

1,000

Number of Personnel

900

800

700

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

500

July ‘08

600

Auth. Troops Troops

120

100

80

60

40

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Police

Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Police

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

0

Aug. ’08

20

July ‘08

•

Number of Personnel

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UNFICYP Personnel: Since 2000

1,400

Average Number of Personnel

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Troops Troops

200

Average Number of Personnel

180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

July ‘08– June ’09

Sources: UN Documents A/56/782, A/57/667, A/58/631, A/59/620, A/60/584 and A/61/724; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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UNFICYP Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country Argentina United Kingdom Slovakia Hungary Ireland Australia Croatia El Salvador India Netherlands Austria Italy Bosnia and Herzegovina Peru Canada Montenegro Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

294 257 196 84 — — 4 — — — 4 — — 2 1 — 842

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — 18 15 4 8 7 7 — 4 3 — — 1 67

294 257 196 84 18 15 8 8 7 7 4 4 3 2 1 1 909

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNFICYP Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number

Unit Type

Country

1 1 1 1

Aviation Unit Force Engineers Platoon Force Medical Unit Force Military Police Unit

3

Infantry Units

1

Mobile Force Reserve Unit

Argentina Slovakia Argentina Argentina-Hungary-Slovakia-United Kingdom Composite Argentina, Hungary-Slovakia Composite, United Kingdom Argentina-Hungary-Slovakia-United Kingdom Composite

Source: DPKO FGS.

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UNFICYP (CYPRUS) • 279

UNFICYP International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

10 — 3 — — 2 2 1 — — 1 5 1 2 — — 5 2 — 1 2 2 — — — 39

25.6% — 7.7% — — 5.1% 5.1% 2.6% — — 2.6% 12.8% 2.6% 5.1% — — 12.8% 5.1% — 2.6% 5.1% 5.1% — — —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNFICYP Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Male

Female

805 — 53 28 71 957

37 — 14 11 43 105

Percentage Male 95.6% — 79.1% 71.8% 62.3% 90.1%

Percentage Female 4.4% — 20.9% 28.2% 37.7% 9.9%

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UNFICYP Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 1963–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

163 1 — — 2 1 — — 1 1 — — — 1 — — — — 169

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

3 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 3

3 — — — — — 1 — — 1 1 — — — — — — — 5

— — — — — 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 2

Othera

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

169 1 — — 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 — — 1 — — — — 179

Incident Type

Time Period 1963–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act 15 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 15

Illness 41 — — — — — 1 1 — 1 1 — — — — — — — 44

Accident

Otherb

Total

91 — — — 2 2 — — 1 1 — — — 1 — — — — 97

22 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 23

169 1 — — 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 — — 1 — — — — 179

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNFICYP (CYPRUS) • 281

UNFICYP Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Combat Vehicles 9 Engineering Vehicles 4 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 4 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 19 36 Total

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Bus Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Total

Quantity 29 2 2 11 12 10 27 93

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNFICYP Aircraft: 30 September 2009

Transport Fixed Wing Commercial Contingent Owned

— —

Total

—

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Transport Helicopter — 3 (Argentina) 3

Attack Helicopter — — —

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UNFICYP Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Budgeted July ’08–June ’09

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

— 20,119.5 2,954.5 — 6,744.5 7,926.6 — 140.0 — — — 337.3 9,933.7 3,863.8 1,637.0 — 1,932.0 1,246.2 — 56,835.1 — 56,835.1 — 56,835.1

Estimated Expenditures July ’08–June ’09 — 19,934.5 2,886.0 — 6,689.7 7,924.4 — 133.3 — — — 334.0 9,939.5 3,786.5 1,595.5 — 1,910.3 1,171.7 — 56,305.6 — 56,305.6 — 56,305.6

Budgeted July ’09–June ’10 — 20,927.1 2,916.4 — 6,588.0 7,662.2 — 192.0 — — — 506.8 7,713.9 3,530.1 1,547.4 — 1,817.7 1,011.1 — 54,412.7 2,217.7 52,195.0 1,484.3 55,897.0

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNFICYP Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

1,190.4 163.2 1,353.6

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UNFICYP Voluntary Contributions: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

Total

1,577.0 — 1,577.0

— — —

18,264.0 6,500.0 24,764.0

19,841.0 6,500.0 26,341.0

Cyprus Greece Total

Source: DM OPPBA. Note: July 2008–June 2009 voluntary contributions are preliminary, subject to change, and vary from expenditure figures provided by DFS FBFD for the same period.

UNFICYP Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

50,000

2,090.0

Expenditures

40,000

11,045.0 7,887.2

13,466.7

14,917.4

11,440.8

30,000 8,318.4

14,102.4

14,777.0

11,073.5

11,410.4

10,016.0

12,162.6 12,228.3

8,678.4

12,920.6

14,646.6

20,000

10,000

0

22,980.3

22,150.2

20,169.2

22,583.1

July ‘00– June ‘01

July ‘01– June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

July ‘03– June ‘04

Civilian Personnel

21,685.5

18,131.3

19,509.9

21,483.0

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

Military and Police Personnel

Other

July ’00– June ‘01

July ’01– June ‘02

July ’02– June ‘03

July ’03– June ‘04

July ’04– June ‘05

July ’05– June ‘06

July ’06– June ‘07

July ’07– June ‘08

22,150.2 8,318.4 7,887.2 2,090.0 40,445.8 1,914.7 38,531.1

20,169.2 8,678.4 11,440.8 — 40,288.4 1,489.0 38,799.4

22,583.1 10,016.0 11,045.0 — 43,644.1 1,721.7 41,922.4

22,980.3 11,410.4 11,073.5 — 45,464.2 1,865.3 43,598.9

21,685.5 12,162.6 14,777.0 — 48,625.1 1,984.7 46,640.4

18,131.3 12,228.3 13,466.7 — 43,826.3 2,001.0 41,825.3

19,509.9 12,920.6 14,917.4 — 47,347.9 2,110.7 45,237.2

21,483.0 14,646.6 14,102.4 — 50,232.0 2,358.6 47,873.4

— 40,445.8

1,356.1 41,644.5

1,271.2 44,915.3

1,707.1 47,171.3

1,355.8 49,980.9

1,278.4 45,104.7

1,474.4 48,822.3

1,504.3 51,736.3

Sources: UN Documents A/56/782, A/57/667, A/58/631, A/59/620, A/60/584, A/61/724, A/62/718 and A/63/536.

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6.11 UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) UNIFIL Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate Force Commander

First Force Commander

27 August 2009 (date of issue); 31 August 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1884 (twelve month duration) 19 March 1978 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 425/426 (six month duration) Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy) SG letter of appointment 16 January 2007 Entry on duty 17 February 2007 Lieutenant-General Emmanuel A. Erskine (Ghana)

284

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UNIFIL Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

20,000

Number of Personnel

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

10,000

Auth. Troops Troops

900 800

Number of Personnel

700 600 500 400 300 200

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

0

July ‘08

100

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UNIFIL Personnel: Since 2000

16,000

14,000

Average Number of Personnel

•

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Troops Troops

1,000 900

Average Number of Personnel

286

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800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Int’l Staff

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Sources: UN Documents A/56/822, A/57/662, A/58/637, A/59/626, A/60/629, and A/61/829; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

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UNIFIL (LEBANON) • 287

UNIFIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country Italy France Indonesia Spain India Ghana Nepal Malaysia Poland Germany Republic of Korea Turkey China Belgium Portugal

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

2,576 1,585 1,248 1,045 898 874 868 742 461 459 367 366 344 229 146

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

2,576 1,585 1,248 1,045 898 874 868 742 461 459 367 366 344 229 146

Contributing Country Tanzania El Salvador Greece Slovenia Ireland Brunei Hungary Luxembourg Qatar Cyprus Guatemala Sierra Leone Croatia FYR of Macedonia New Zealand Total

Troops 72 52 45 14 8 7 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 12,425

Military Observers

Police

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Total 72 52 45 14 8 7 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 12,425

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UNIFIL Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number 3 1 3 3 5 1 3 3 16

2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 3 2 1

Unit Type

Country

Aviation Units Civil Military Cooperation Unit Combat Support Service Units Engineering Companies Fast Patrol Boats Field Artillery Unit Force Protection Companies Frigates Infantry Battalions

France, Italy, Spain Italy France, Italy, Spain France, Italy, Poland Germany (3), Greece, Turkey France Indonesia (2), Italy Germany, Italy (2) China, El Salvador, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy (3), Malaysia, Malaysia-Brunei Composite, Nepal, Poland, Republic of Korea, Spain, Turkey Italy, Spain

Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Companies Level II Hospital Logistics Battalion Mechanized Infantry Battalion Medical Company Military Community Outreach Units Military Police Companies Multi-Role Engineering Companies Quick Reaction Force Sector Headquarters Companies Signal Companies Special Investigation Section

China Poland Italy India France, Italy Indonesia, Italy, Tanzania Belgium, Italy France Italy (2), Spain Italy, Spain Italy

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military headquarters and national support elements staff and staff officers not included.

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UNIFIL International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

35 5 6 — — 30 12 16 — — — 52 2 63 1 5 16 10 2 6 3 35 3 29 — 331

10.6% 1.5% 1.8% — — 9.1% 3.6% 4.8% — — — 15.7% 0.6% 19.0% 0.3% 1.5% 4.8% 3.0% 0.6% 1.8% 0.9% 10.6% 0.9% 8.8% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNIFIL Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Male

Female

11,970 — — 240 492 12,702

455 — — 91 170 716

Percentage Male 96.3% — — 72.5% 74.3% 94.7%

Percentage Female 3.7% — — 27.5% 25.7% 5.3%

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UNIFIL Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 1978–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

233 6 3 3 1 3 — — 11 6 1 3 1 1 2 — — 2 268

1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

2 — — — — — — 1 1 1 1 — — — — — — — 5

1 — — 3 — — — — — 2 — — 2 — — — — — 6

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

237 6 4 6 1 3 — 1 12 9 2 3 3 1 2 — — 2 281

Incident Type

Time Period 1978–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act 84 1 — — — — — 1 6 — — — — — — — — — 92

Illness 46 — 2 3 1 — — — 1 5 1 1 2 1 — — — — 58

Accident 95 5 2 3 — 3 — — 5 4 1 2 1 — 1 — — 1 118

Otherb

Total

12 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1 — — 1 13

237 6 4 6 1 3 — 1 12 9 2 3 3 1 2 — — 2 281

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNIFIL Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 12 Combat Vehicles 574 Communications Vehicles 47 Engineering Vehicles 208 Material Handling Equipment 44 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 263 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 1,349 2,497 Total

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Armoured Personnel Carriers Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 524 3 25 45 73 74 25 44 154 18 985

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section. Note: Contingent owned maritime task force elements not included.

UNIFIL Aircraft: 30 September 2009

Transport Fixed Wing Commercial Contingent Owned

— —

Total

—

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Transport Helicopter 1 10 (Indonesia, 7 Italy, 2 Spain) 10

Attack Helicopter — —

—

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UNIFIL Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

— 341,337.0 — — 58,402.2 33,633.9 — 930.2 — — 276.5 1,370.4 71,903.8 19,488.4 10,171.8 67,295.3 27,133.7 18,312.4 500.0 650,755.6 — 650,755.6 — 650,755.6

— 296,179.5 — — 55,743.5 33,013.2 — 857.4 — — 6.3 1,142.7 66,388.1 19,122.9 9,000.4 53,517.2 24,530.6 15,535.6 499.1 575,536.2 — 575,536.2 — 575,536.2

— 319,579.7 — — 58,943.8 37,041.7 — 1,000.9 — — 309.0 1,296.3 64,121.3 14,213.8 8,524.6 42,130.1 24,843.2 17,294.8 500.0 589,799.2 10,898.4 578,900.8 — 589,799.2

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNIFIL Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

70,029.7 24,856.7 8,729.1 5,074.8 4,541.0 113,231.2

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UNIFIL (LEBANON) • 293

UNIFIL Mission Expenditures: July 2000-June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

600,000

Expenditures

500,000

214,669.5

400,000

209,603.6 78.731.2

300,000 50,317.1

200,000

100,000

6,938.5 33,855.3 25,321.1 112,944.0

32,067.0 29,647.0

21,663.0 34,835.0

69,170.0

51,098.7

18,757.4 30,673.5 40,465.1

July ‘01– June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

July ‘03– June ‘04

0 July ‘00– June ‘01

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

July ’00– June ‘01

Civilian Personnel

July ’01– June ‘02

18,293.3 30,441.7 40,509.1

20,145.6 30,340.8 40,777.8

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

235,814.9

298,188.3

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

Military and Police Personnel

Other

July ’02– June ‘03

July ’03– June ‘04

July ’04– June ‘05

July ’05– June ‘06

July ’06– June ‘07

July ’07– June ‘08

112,944.0 69,170.0 51,098.7 25,321.1 29,674.0 34,835.0 33,855.3 32,067.0 21,663.0 6,938.5 — — 179,058.9 130,911.0 107,596.7 4,752.1 4,231.8 4,520.2 174,306.8 126,679.2 103,076.5

40,465.1 30,673.5 18,757.4 — 89,896.0 4,340.3 85,555.7

40,509.1 30,441.7 18,293.3 — 89,244.1 4,164.1 85,080.0

40,777.8 30,340.8 20,145.6 — 91,264.2 4,078.5 87,185.7

235,814.9 50,317.1 209,603.6 — 495,735.6 5,261.2 490,474.4

298,188.3 78,731.2 214,669.5 — 591,589.0 9,168.3 582,420.7

180.0 201.2 — 179,238.9 131,112.2 107,596.7

— 89,896.0

— 89,244.1

— — — 91,264.2 495,735.6 591,589.0

Sources: UN Documents A/56/822, A/57/662, A/58/637, A/59/626, A/60/629, A/61/829, A/62/751 and A/63/520.

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6.12 UNMIK (UN Interim Administration in Kosovo)

UNMIK Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

SRSG First SRSG

10 June 1999 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1244 (paragraph 19 of the Resolution states that international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise.) Lamberto Zannier (Italy) Bernard Kouchner (France)

294

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UNMIK (KOSOVO) • 295

UNMIK Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

2,500

Number of Personnel

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Police

Local Staff

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

700

Number of Personnel

600

500

400

300

200

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

0

July ‘08

100

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UNMIK Personnel: Since 2000

5,000 4,500

Average Number of Personnel

•

4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

July ‘08– June ’09

250

Average Number of Personnel

296

1/26/10

200

150

100

50

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

UNVs

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Sources: UN Documents A/55/724, A/56/763, A/57/678, A/58/634, A/59/623, A/60/637, and A/61/675; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIK (KOSOVO) • 297

UNMIK Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine Denmark Germany Ghana Italy Norway Pakistan Poland Slovenia Spain Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — —

2 1 1 1 1 — — — 1 — 1 — 1 9

— 1 1 1 — 1 1 1 — 1 — 1 — 8

2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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UNMIK International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

19 — 13 — — 4 6 7 — — 1 12 12 9 — 3 20 5 1 2 7 24 — 3 — 148

12.8% — 8.8% — — 2.7% 4.1% 4.7% — — 0.7% 8.1% 8.1% 6.1% — 2.0% 13.5% 3.4% 0.7% 1.4% 4.7% 16.2% — 2.0% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNMIK Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Male

Female

Percentage Male

— 9 8 104 186 307

— — — 44 97 141

— 100.0% 100.0% 70.3% 65.7% 68.5%

Percentage Female — — — 29.7% 34.3% 31.5%

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UNMIK (KOSOVO) • 299

UNMIK Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — 1 — — 1 — — — — — 1

5 2 1 3 4 5 4 — 1 1 1 — — — — — — — 26

2 1 1 — 1 1 — — — 1 1 — — — — — — — 7

— 3 — 4 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 — — — — — — — 18

1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2

8 7 2 7 7 8 6 1 3 5 4 — 1 — — — — — 54

Incident Type

Time Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act 1 1 — 1 3 4 1 — — 1 1 — — — — — — — 12

Illness — 4 2 3 3 2 3 1 3 2 1 — 1 — — — — — 23

Accident

Otherb

Total

7 1 — — — 1 1 — — 1 1 — — — — — — — 11

— 1 — 3 1 1 1 — — 1 1 — — — — — — — 8

8 7 2 7 7 8 6 1 3 5 4 — 1 — — — — — 54

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMIK Vehicles: 30 September 2009

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

581 2 8 4 54 17 22 44 34 766

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMIK Budgets and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09 1,455.5 — 40,213.3 9,617.3 59,605.3 53,859.7 5,286.6 693.5 — — 188.0 1,046.9 13,022.1 4,207.2 525.0 — 5,966.9 2,324.7 — 198,012.0 — 198,012.0 — 198,012.0

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09 1,032.2 — 30,137.9 7,088.7 52,425.5 47,776.4 4,807.2 552.5 — — 186.3 1,046.8 12,549.7 3,687.5 10.1 — 5,103.8 2,118.5 — 168,523.3 — 168,523.3 — 168,523.3

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10 355.1 — 349.8 — 26,307.6 6,531.0 1,067.6 23.0 — — 134.5 661.6 5,556.1 443.7 — — 4,313.0 1,066.0 — 46,809.0 3,992.4 42,816.6 — 46,809.0

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UNMIK (KOSOVO) • 301

UNMIK Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

1,305.6 141.7 101.1 57.3 43.5 1,649.1

Source: DFS FBFD.

UNMIK Mission Expenditures: July 2000– June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

400,000 839.1

Expenditures

350,000

73,816.0

49,941.0 44,164.1

300,000

45,452.2

32,081.5

250,000

150,000

27,707.9

184,775.0

200,000

170,595.0

163,458.9

25,217.0

156,162.2

280,113.5

135,815.5

120,802.7

24,164.1

123,048.4

100,000 125,532.0

50,000

115,208.7

106,598.1

106,253.3

5,918.4

0

July ‘00– June ‘01

July ‘01– June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

July ‘03– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

Civilian Personnel

70,230.2

64,172.3

73,254.1

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

Military and Police Personnel

July ’00– June ‘01

July ’01– June ‘02

July ’02– June ‘03

July ’03– June ‘04

5,918.4 280,113.5 73,816.0 839.1 360,687.0 22,775.0 337,912.0

125,532.0 184,775.0 49,941.0 — 360,248.0 25,989.0 334,259.0

115,208.7 170,595.0 44,164.1 — 329,967.8 25,082.5 304,885.3

106,598.1 163,458.9 45,452.2 — 315,509.2 23,467.6 292,041.6

July ’04– June ‘05

July ’05– June ‘06

Other

July ’06– June ‘07

July ’07– June ‘08

106,253.3 70,230.2 64,172.3 73,254.1 156,162.2 135,815.5 120,802.7 123,048.4 32,081.5 27,707.9 25,217.0 24,164.1 — — — — 294,497.0 233,753.6 210,192.0 220,466.6 22,720.5 19,321.3 16,365.3 16,720.4 271,776.5 214,432.3 193,826.7 203,746.2

— — — — — — — — 360,687.0 360,248.0 329,967.8 315,509.2 294,497.0 233,753.6 210,192.0 220,466.6

Sources: UN Documents A/56/763, A/57/678, A/58/634, A/59/623, A/60/637, A/61/675, A/62/687, and A/63/569.

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6.13 UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) UNMIL Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander First Force Commander Police Commissioner

15 September 2009 (date of issue); 1 October 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1885 (twelve month duration and reduction of military personnel and equipment from October 2009 to May 2010) 19 September 2003 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1509 (twelve month duration) Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark) SG letter of appointment 22 October 2007 Jacques Klein (United States) Lieutenant-General Sikander Afzal (Pakistan) SG letter of appointment 22 October 2009 Lieutenant-General Daniel Ishmael Opande (Kenya) Henrik Stiernblad (Sweden) Date of appointment 1 August 2008

302

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UNMIL Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

15,500

Number of Personnel

14,500

13,500

12,500

11,500

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

9,500

July ‘08

10,500

Auth. Troops Troops

1,600

1,400

1,000

800

600

400

200

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

0 July ‘08

Number of Personnel

1,200

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIL Personnel: Since 2003

20,000

18,000

Average Number of Personnel

•

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

Aug.‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Troops Troops

1,600

1,400

Average Number of Personnel

304

1/26/10

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 Aug.‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Police

Auth. UNVs

Auth. Military Obs.

Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Police

UNVs

Military Obs.

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1509, S/RES/1626, S/RES/1667, S/RES/1694, A/59/624, A/60/645 and A/61/715; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 305

UNMIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country

Troops

Pakistan 3,072 Bangladesh 2,340 1,626 Nigeria Ethiopia 872 Ghana 707 China 564 Jordan 119 Ukraine 302 Nepal 18 Mongolia 250 India — Philippines 136 Zimbabwe — Fiji — Turkey — Gambia — Kenya — Uganda — United States 5 Zambia — Russia — Sweden — Namibia 3 Bosnia & Herzegovina — Serbia — Norway — Egypt — Yemen 1 El Salvador — Malaysia — Sri Lanka —

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

9 11 13 12 8 2 4 1 2 — — 2 2 — — 2 — — 4 3 4 — 1 — 4 — 5 — 2 6 —

20 17 161 — 32 16 261 20 257 — 248 26 31 29 28 20 22 21 12 17 13 16 8 11 6 9 3 7 4 — 6

3,101 2,368 1,800 884 747 582 384 323 277 250 248 164 33 29 28 22 22 21 21 20 17 16 12 11 10 9 8 8 6 6 6

Argentina Czech Republic Germany Kyrgyzstan Poland Rwanda Peru Benin Bolivia Croatia Ecuador Paraguay Senegal Togo Uruguay Brazil Bulgaria Denmark Finland Iceland Indonesia Malawi Mali Moldova Montenegro Niger Republic of Korea Romania France Jamaica Total

Troops — — — — — — 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 — 2 — 2 — — — — — — — 1 — 1 — 10,033

Military Observers — — — 2 2 — 2 2 2 — 2 2 1 2 — — 2 2 — — 2 — 2 2 2 2 1 2 — — 131

Police

Total

5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 5 — 4 — 3 — 3 — 3 — 3 — 3 — 3 — 3 3 3 — 2 — 2 — 2 — 2 2 2 — 2 2 2 — 2 — 2 — 2 — 2 — 2 — 2 — 1 1 1 1,355 11,519

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD. Note: Police figures include formed police units provided by India (243), Jordan (240), Nepal (239) and Nigeria (119).

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UNMIL Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number

Unit Type

Country

1 1 5 1 1 3 8

Aviation Unit Communications Squadron Engineering Companies Quick Reaction Force Guard Company Heaquarters Companies Infantry Battalions

3 1 1 2 1 1 1

Level II Medical Hospitals Level III Medical Hospital Logistics Company Military Police Units Road and Airfield Maintanence Company Singal Company Transport Company

Ukraine Nigeria Bangladesh (2), China, Pakistan (2) Pakistan Mongolia Bangladesh, Nigeria, Philippines Bangladesh (2), Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria (2), Pakistan (2) Bangladesh, China, Pakistan Jordan Bangladesh Bangladesh, Nepal Pakistan Bangladesh China

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

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UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 307

UNMIL International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

Percentage International Staff

74 11 29 — — 25 17 18 20 2 2 28 5 66 — 4 22 12 6 12 9 71 4 17 3 457

16.2% 2.4% 6.3% — — 5.5% 3.7% 3.9% 4.4% 0.4% 0.4% 6.1% 1.1% 14.4% — 0.9% 4.8% 2.6% 1.3% 2.6% 2.0% 15.5% 0.9% 3.7% 0.7%

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNMIL Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civlian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

9,801 120 1,164 300 802 12,187

232 11 191 157 187 778

97.7% 91.6% 85.9% 65.6% 81.1% 94.0%

2.3% 8.4% 14.1% 34.4% 18.9% 6.0%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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UNMIL Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

5 23 26 13 9 12 1 2 2 7 12 2 2 8 100

— 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

— 3 3 2 2 5 3 — 1 1 1 — — 1 16

— 1 3 1 — 1 1 — — — 1 — — 1 7

— 1 4 2 3 3 2 — — 1 3 1 1 1 16

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

5 29 36 18 14 21 7 2 3 9 17 3 3 11 140

Incident Type

Time Period 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Illness 1 22 28 16 12 15 5 1 2 7 10 1 3 6 104

Accident

Otherb

Total

4 6 7 1 1 5 2 1 — 2 5 2 — 3 29

— 1 1 1 1 1 — — 1 — 2 — — 2 7

5 29 36 18 14 21 7 2 3 9 17 3 3 11 140

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 309

UNMIL Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 4 Combat Vehicles 216 Communications Vehicles 2 Engineering Vehicles 137 Material Handling Equipment 25 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 443 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 941 1,768 Total

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 1,161 17 12 3 123 9 41 206 3 1,575

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMIL Aircraft: 30 September 2009

Transport Fixed Wing Commercial Contingent Owned Total

3 — 2

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

5 8 (Ukraine) 13

— 6 (Ukraine) 6

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UNMIL Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

9,577.0 244,778.5 26,576.4 16,353.4 86,065.6 18,896.1 11,455.8 578.4 — — 1,010.4 2,598.1 59,111.4 18,090.5 65,863.9 3,259.0 21,605.1 16,941.2 1,000.0 603,760.8 — 603,760.8 — 603,760.8

9,531.0 242,075.8 26,515.0 15,046.2 86,164.8 16,737.8 11,452.2 570.6 — — 961.2 2,588.6 58,524.9 17,850.6 64,502.6 3,031.3 21,193.3 15,787.2 988.7 593,521.7 — 593,521.7 — 593,521.7

6,968.1 230,908.4 24,619.0 20,005.0 89,325.0 18,343.7 11,936.8 474.4 1,651.8 — 997.5 2,579.9 47,830.4 12,096.0 53,454.7 2,805.6 18,805.4 17,177.0 1,000.0 560,978.7 11,129.8 549,848.9 52.8 561,031.5

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNMIL Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

43,023.3 2,510.4 22,613.6 8,306.9 9,191.9 2,217.4 87,863.4

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UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 311

UNMIL Voluntary Contributions: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

Total

53.0 53.0

— —

— —

53.0 53.0

Germany Total

Source: DM OPPBA. Note: July 2008–June 2009 voluntary contributions are preliminary, subject to change, and vary from expenditure figures provided by DFS FBFD for the same period.

UNMIL Mission Expenditures: August 2003–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

800,000

Expenditures

700,000 249,078.2

600,000

220,064.8

197,227.5

192,983.5

98,618.9

109,620.6

112,817.8

112,961.8

393,267.7

377,419.5

366,156.7

343,523.8

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

500,000 400,000

245,146.3

300,000

33,596.3

200,000 100,000

269,436.1

0 Aug. ‘03– June ‘04 Operational Requirements

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Category

Aug. ‘03– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

269,436.1 33,596.3 245,146.3 — 548,178.7 3,113.1 545,065.6 100.0 548,278.7

393,267.7 98,618.9 249,078.2 — 740,964.8 9,768.1 731,196.7 120.0 741,084.8

377,419.5 109,620.6 220,064.8 — 707,104.9 10,877.6 696,227.3 264.0 707,368.9

366,156.7 112,817.8 197,227.5 — 676,202.0 11,050.3 665,151.7 52.8 676,254.8

343,523.8 112,961.8 192,983.5 — 649,469.1 11,222.1 638,247.0 52.8 649,521.9

Sources: UN Documents A/59/745, A/60/646, A/61/741, A/62/720, and A/63/549/Corr.1.

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6.14 UNMIN (UN Mission in Nepal) UNMIN Key Facts

Latest Key Resolutions

First Mandate SRSG First SRSG

23 July 2009 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1879 (six month duration) 23 January 2009 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1864 (six month duration and authorization of a phased, gradual drawdown and withdrawal of UNMIN staff) 23 January 2007 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1740 (twelve month duration) Karin Landgren (Sweden) SG letter of appointment 27 January 2009 Ian Martin (United Kingdom)

312

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UNMIN (NEPAL) • 313

UNMIN Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

450

Number of Personnel

400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

UNMIN Personnel: Since 2007

400

Average Number of Personnel

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0 Jan.–Dec. ’07

Jan.–Dec. ’08

Jan.–Sept. ’09

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Document S/RES/1719; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Note: Police Advisor figures not included.

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNMIK Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country Malaysia Romania Brazil Japan Paraguay Egypt Indonesia Nigeria Jordan Republic of Korea Switzerland Uruguay Austria Sierra Leone Sweden Zimbabwe Guatemala Zambia Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Military Observers 7 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 71

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

7 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 71

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UNMIN (NEPAL) • 315

UNMIN International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

5 2 1 — — 1 3 2 — — 1 6 1 10 — 1 7 1 1 1 — 3 1 1 — 48

10.4% 4.2% 2.1% — — 2.1% 6.3% 4.2% — — 2.1% 12.5% 2.1% 20.8% — 2.1% 14.6% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% — 6.3% 2.1% 2.1% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNMIN Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Male — 68 — 31 86 185

Female — 3 — 17 32 52

Percentage Male — 95.8% — 64.6% 72.9% 78.1%

Percentage Female — 4.2% — 35.4% 27.1% 21.9%

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UNMIN Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— 2 2 — — — — — — — 2

— 2 2 — — — — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — —

— 2 2 — — — — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — —

— 6 6 — — — — — — — 6

Incident Type

Time Period 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — — — — — — — — — — —

Illness — — — — — — — — — — —

Accident

Otherb

Total

— 6 6 — — — — — — — 6

— — — — — — — — — — —

— 6 6 — — — — — — — 6

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMIN (NEPAL) • 317

UNMIN Aircraft: 30 September 2009

UNMIN Vehicles: 30 September 2009

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

Transport Fixed Wing Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Ambulance Buses Material Handling Equipment Total

74 1 9 2 86

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Helicopter

— — —

1 — 1

Attack Helicopter — — —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMIN Budget and Expenditure (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Costs Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Appropriations Jan. ‘08–Dec. ‘09

Estimated Expenditures Jan. ‘08–Dec. ‘09

Requirements for Jan.–Dec. ‘10

5,530.5 33,278.5 28,048.8 66,857.8 — 66,857.8 — 66,857.8

6,350.7 36,195.8 31,115.5 73,662.0 — 73,662.0 — 73,662.0

1,271.0 6,166.7 9,305.2 16,742.9 — 16,742.9 — 16,742.9

Sources: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3; DFS FBFD. Note: January 2008–December 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

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UNMIN Mission Expenditures: January 2006–December 2007 (in thousands of US dollars)

80,000 70,000

Expenditures

318

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60,000 50,000 47,084.6

40,000 30,000 20,000 21,099.1

10,000 3,951.2

0

Jan. ‘06–Dec. ’07 Operational Costs

Civilian Personnel

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Costs Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Source: DFS FBFD.

Military and Police Personnel

Jan. ‘06–Dec. ‘07 3,951.2 21,099.1 47,084.6 72,134.9 — 72,134.9 — 72,134.9

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6.15 UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) UNMIS Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander First Force Commander Police Commissioner First Police Commissioner

30 April 2009 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1870 (twelve month duration) 24 March 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1590 (six month duration) Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) SG letter of appointment 3 September 2007 Jan Pronk (Netherlands) Major-General Paban Jung Thapa (Nepal) Major-General Fazle Elahi Akbar (Bangladesh) Rajesh Dewan (India) Kai Vittrup (Denmark)

319

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UNMIS Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

10,000 9,000

Number of Personnel

8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000

Sept. ‘09 Sept. ‘09

Local Staff

Aug. ’09

Auth. Local Staff

Police

Aug. ’09

Auth. Police

Troops

July ‘09

Auth. Troops

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

0 July ‘08

•

Number of Personnel

320

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Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIS (SUDAN) • 321

UNMIS Personnel: Since 2005

10,000

Average Number of Personnel

9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 Mar.– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

Auth. Troops

Auth. Local Staff

Troops

Local Staff

July ‘08– June ’09

1,400

Average Number of Personnel

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 Mar.– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents A/61/689, S/RES/1590 and S/RES/1706; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIS Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country India Pakistan Bangladesh Egypt Kenya China Zambia Rwanda Russia Cambodia Nepal Jordan Philippines Canada Nigeria Turkey Zimbabwe Germany Yemen Ukraine Norway Ghana Netherlands Australia Brazil Uganda Indonesia Gambia Ecuador Ethiopia Fiji Malaysia Namibia

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

17 14 19 20 4 12 14 10 12 5 9 10 11 21 9 — 12 26 21 11 14 — 12 6 20 5 6 — 17 — 6 8 7

61 26 30 14 18 11 23 11 19 — 39 37 40 20 36 35 25 3 10 21 8 28 13 10 3 20 18 20 — 15 8 3 6

2,678 1,521 1,500 1,269 748 467 386 277 153 58 56 52 51 49 47 38 37 34 33 32 29 28 27 25 25 25 24 20 17 15 14 13 13

2,600 1,481 1,451 1,235 726 444 349 256 122 53 8 5 — 8 2 3 — 5 2 — 7 — 2 9 2 — — — — — — 2 —

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Contributing Country

Troops

Peru — Sweden 2 Denmark 4 Bolivia — Romania 1 Sri Lanka — Tanzania — Thailand — El Salvador — Jamaica — Paraguay — Bosnia and Herzegovina — Kyrgyzstan — Republic of Korea 1 United States — Guinea — Croatia 5 Belgium — Benin — Mali — Samoa — Greece 1 Guatemala 1 Sierra Leone — Iran — Japan 2 Moldova — Mongolia — New Zealand 1 Poland — United Kingdom 2 Uruguay — Finland 1 Total 8,793

Military Observers 13 1 8 11 10 6 11 10 4 — 9 — 6 6 — 6 — 4 4 3 — 2 2 3 2 — 2 2 1 2 — — — 486

Police — 10 — — — 5 — — 5 9 — 7 1 — 7 — — — — 1 4 — — — — — — — — — — 2 — 682

Total 13 13 12 11 11 11 11 10 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 6 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 9,961

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UNMIS (SUDAN) • 323

UNMIS Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number

Unit Type

Country

3 5

Aviation Units De-mining Companies

1 5

Engineering Platoon Engineering Construction Companies

1 1 4 3 5

Force Reserve Unit Headquarters Company Infantry Battalions Infantry Companies Level II Hospitals

1 1 1 1 1 4 2

Level III Hospital Military Police Unit Force Riverine Unit Petroleum Unit Signals Company Transport Companies Transport Platoons

India, Pakistan, Russia Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya, Pakistan Zambia Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Pakistan India Rwanda Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Pakistan Egypt, Pakistan, Zambia Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan, Zambia Egypt Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh India Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan Egypt, Zambia

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

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UNMIS International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

97 25 22 — 9 67 30 48 22 36 5 66 3 106 — 6 32 10 31 18 21 108 11 41 1 815

11.9% 3.1% 2.7% — 1.1% 8.2% 3.7% 5.9% 2.7% 4.4% 0.6% 8.1% 0.4% 13.0% — 0.7% 3.9% 1.2% 3.8% 2.2% 2.6% 13.3% 1.3% 5.0% 0.1%

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNMIS Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Male

Female

8,670 474 595 577 2,114 12,430

123 12 87 238 405 865

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Percentage Male 98.6% 97.5% 87.2% 70.8% 83.9% 93.5%

Percentage Female 1.4% 2.5% 12.8% 29.2% 16.1% 6.5%

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UNMIS (SUDAN) • 325

UNMIS Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

1 5 3 4 2 — 2 — 3 1 — 2 16

— 1 2 — — — — — — — — — 3

— 1 1 — — — — — — — — — 2

— 4 1 2 — — 1 1 — — — — 7

1 4 8 4 1 1 1 1 3 3 — — 20

— — — — — — — — — — — — —

2 15 15 10 3 1 4 2 6 4 — 2 48

Incident Type

Time Period 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — 1 2 — — — — — — — — — 3

Illness 1 13 9 7 3 1 2 1 2 2 — — 32

Accident

Otherb

Total

1 1 2 3 — — 2 1 2 1 — 1 9

— — 2 — — — — — 2 1 — 1 4

2 15 15 10 3 1 4 2 6 4 — 2 48

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNMIS Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 34 Combat Vehicles 117 Communications Vehicles 2 Engineering Vehicles 217 Material Handling Equipment 38 Naval Vessels 25 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 210 957 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) Total 1,600

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

1,505 21 12 4 166 111 126 273 20 2,238

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMIS Aircraft: 30 September 2008

Transport Fixed Wing Commercial Contingent Owned

Total

8 —

8

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

8 16 (6 India, 6 Pakistan, 4 Russia) 24

— —

—

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UNMIS (SUDAN) • 327

UNMIS Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

31,994.8 231,369.5 35,944.3 — 128,679.9 51,206.3 11,602.6 3,628.2 1,637.8 — 509.9 667.7 91,650.3 21,590.5 146,232.1 67.3 28,564.2 84,588.2 1,000.0 870,933.7 — 870,933.7 — 870,933.7

31,719.4 230,932.6 35,542.9 — 126,822.1 51,180.1 11,602.4 3,471.0 1,159.8 — 265.3 6,591.0 91,439.0 21,558.4 145,122.3 67.0 28,492.6 74,344.2 177.9 860,488.1 — 860,488.1 — 860,488.1

26,430.9 248,359.8 35,036.9 — 147,362.5 57,336.7 12,306.6 7,117.4 1,743.4 — 486.1 5,220.2 106,148.8 24,713.8 156,880.7 107.4 43,264.8 84,834.2 1,000.0 958,350.2 22,217.2 936,133.0 — 958,350.2

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNMIS Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

46,726.3 17,779.3 7,572.6 7,540.5 2,025.8 81,644.5

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UNMIS Mission Expenditures: March 2005–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

1,200,000 1,000,000

Expenditures

328

2/2/10

800,000 556,380.2

600,000

361,746.3

478,372.5

400,000

152,929.9

179,121.8

91,086.9

200,000 186,343.7

0

17,353.4 231,665.0 15,168.6

Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

279.591.4

Mar.–

July ‘05–

July ‘06–

July ‘07–

June ’05

June ’06

June ’07

June ’08

Operational Requirements

Category

280,966.1

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Mar.– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

15,168.6 17,353.4 186,343.7 — 218,865.7 2,090.2 216,775.5 — 218,865.7

231,665.0 91,086.9 478,372.5 — 801,124.4 10,968.4 790,156.0 — 801,124.4

280,966.1 152,929.9 556,380.2 — 990,276.2 18,593.6 971,682.6 — 990,276.2

279,591.4 179,121.8 361,746.3 — 820,459.5 20,399.0 800,060.5 — 820,459.5

Sources: UN Documents A/60/626, A/61/689, A/62/785 and A/63/604.

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6.16 UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) UNMIT Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution First Mandate SRSG

First SRSG Police Commissioner First Police Commissioner

26 February 2009 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1867 (twelve month duration) 25 August 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1704 (six month duration) Atul Khare (India) SG letter of appointment 30 October 2006, effective immediately Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan) Luis Miguel Carrilho (Portugal) Entry on duty 23 February 2009 Rodolfo Aser Tor (Philippines)

329

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UNMIT Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

1,800 1,600 1,400

Number of Personnel

1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Police

Local Staff

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Note: Military observer figures include staff officers.

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

0

Aug. ’08

50

July ‘08

•

Number of Personnel

330

2/2/10

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UNMIT (TIMOR-LESTE) • 331

UNMIT Personnel: Since 2006

1,800

Average Number of Personnel

1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 Aug. ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Police

Local Staff

500

Average Number of Personnel

450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Aug. ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Document S/RES/1704; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Note: Military observer figures include staff officers.

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UNMIT Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Malaysia Portugal Bangladesh Pakistan Philippines Nepal Sri Lanka Australia Nigeria Zimbabwe Jordan China New Zealand Singapore Thailand Yemen India Turkey Zambia Namibia Uganda Vanuatu

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

2 3 4 4 3 1 — 3 — — — 2 1 2 — — 1 — — — — —

211 197 192 165 153 75 56 50 47 47 35 27 25 21 21 21 17 18 18 17 17 17

213 200 196 169 156 76 56 53 47 47 35 29 26 23 21 21 18 18 18 17 17 17

Contributing Country El Salvador Brazil Romania Ukraine Senegal Spain Gambia Canada Egypt Samoa Croatia Russia Republic of Korea Sweden Jamaica Fiji Kyrgyzstan Uruguay Ecuador Italy Sierra Leone Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— 4 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2 — — — — 1 33

16 6 10 10 8 8 7 6 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 — 2 2 1 1 — 1,557

Total 16 10 10 10 8 8 7 6 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1,590

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD. Notes: Military observer figures include staff officers. Police figures include formed police units provided by Bangladesh (140), Malaysia (138), Pakistan (139), and Portugal (138).

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UNMIT (TIMOR-LESTE) • 333

UNMIT International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

66 7 11 1 1 20 13 15 9 2 3 26 4 44 — 10 15 6 21 9 23 44 2 11 — 363

18.2% 1.9% 3.0% 0.3% 0.3% 5.5% 3.6% 4.1% 2.5% 0.6% 0.8% 7.2% 1.1% 12.1% — 2.8% 4.1% 1.7% 5.8% 2.5% 6.3% 12.1% 0.6% 3.0% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “other/na” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNMIT Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

— 33 1,498 237 718 2,486

— — 59 126 176 361

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD. Note: Military Observer figures include staff officers.

Percentage Male — 100.0% 96.2% 65.3% 80.3% 87.3%

Percentage Female — — 3.8% 34.7% 19.7% 12.7%

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UNMIT Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalilties

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — —

— 1 1 — 1 — — — — — — 2

— — 1 — — 1 — — — — — 1

1 — 1 1 — — — — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — — —

1 1 3 1 1 1 — — — — — 5

Incident Type

Time Period 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalilties

Malicious Act 1 — — — — — — — — — — 1

Illness — 1 2 — 1 1 — — — — — 3

Accident

Otherb

Total

— — 1 1 — — — — — — — 1

— — — — — — — — — — — —

1 1 3 1 1 1 — — — — — 5

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMIT Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Combat Vehicles Communications Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) Total

18 2 3 83 42 148

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Boats Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 804 2 7 2 2 69 4 19 35 8 952

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMIT Aircraft: 30 September 2009

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

2 — 2

5 — 5

— — —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

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UNMIT Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

1,529.1 — 44,212.5 17,144.4 51,959.2 6,886.9 4,840.6 552.3 — — 209.3 3,065.1 14,102.8 4,881.3 10,903.7 — 10,642.1 2,998.5 250.0 174,177.8 — 174,177.8 — 174,177.8

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09 1,528.6 — 44,194.6 17,121.0 51,957.7 6,885.5 4,829.8 551.8 — — 203.7 3,040.9 13,562.1 4,866.7 10,859.0 — 9,998.7 2,967.0 247.5 172,814.5 — 172,814.5 — 172,814.5

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10 1,477.8 — 45,123.2 17,453.9 61,288.7 6,722.5 8,110.0 1,621.8 — — 668.4 6,023.2 15,990.4 2,739.3 19,805.3 — 13,668.2 5,246.7 — 205,939.4 7,760.7 198,178.7 — 205,939.4

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNMIT Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

3,514.5 1,212.9 519.7 164.3 232.5 5,643.8

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UNMIT Mission Expenditures: August 2006–June 2007 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category

Aug 06–Jun 07

Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

38,909.8 30,980.8 76,958.2 — 146,848.8 3,009.2 143,839.6 — 146,848.8

Source: UN Document A/62/753.

UNMIT Mission Expenditures: August 2006–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars) 180,000

Expenditures

160,000 140,000

45,435.7

120,000 100,000

76,958.2 57,972.7

80,000 60,000

30,980.8

40,000 20,000

59,225.0 38,909.8

0

Operational Requirements

Category

Aug. ‘06–

July ‘07–

June ’07

June ’08

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Aug. ‘06–June ‘07

July ‘07–June ‘08

38,909.8 30,980.8 76,958.2 — 146,848.8 3,009.2 143,839.6

59,225.0 57,972.7 45,435.7 — 162,633.4 6,729.7 155,903.7

— 146,848.8

— 162,633.4

Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Sources: UN Documents A/62/753 and A/63/607.

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6.17 UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) UNMOGIP Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

21 December 1971 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 307 (to continue thereafter until the Security Council decides otherwise) 21 April 1948 (date of issue); 1 January 1949 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 47 (no determined duration) Major-General Kim Moon Hwa (Republic of Korea) SG letter of appointment 16 October 2008 Brigadier H.H. Angle (Canada)

First Mandate

Chief Military Observer First Chief Military Observer

UNMOGIP Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

70

Number of Personnel

60

50

40

30

20

10

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

338

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

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UNMOGIP (INDIA AND PAKISTAN) • 339

UNMOGIP Personnel: Since 2000

60

Average Number of Personnel

50

40

30

20

10

0 Jan.– Dec. ’00

Jan.– Dec. ’01

Jan.– Dec. ’02

Jan.– Dec. ’03

Jan.– Dec. ’04

Jan.– Dec. ’05

Jan.– Dec. ’06

Jan– Dec. ’07

Jan.– Sept. ’08

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Jan.– Sept. ’09

Sources: UN Documents A/56/6 (Sect.5), A/58/6 (Sect.5) and A/60/6 (Sect.5); DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

UNMOGIP Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country Croatia Republic of Korea Italy Finland Sweden Philippines Chile Uruguay Denmark Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — —

9 9 7 5 5 3 2 2 1 43

— — — — — — — — — —

9 9 7 5 5 3 2 2 1 43

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UNMOGIP International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

4 — — — — 2 2 2 — — 1 8 — — — — — 2 — — 1 2 — 2 — 26

15.4% — — — — 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% — — 3.8% 30.8% — — — — — 7.7% — — 3.8% 7.7% — 7.7% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “Other/NA” category contains staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNMOGIP Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Male — 42 — 19 44 105

Female — 1 — 7 3 11

Percentage Male — 97.7% — 73.1% 93.6% 90.5%

Percentage Female — 2.3% — 26.9% 6.4% 9.5%

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UNMOGIP Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 1949–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

5 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 5

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 2

2 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 3

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

9 — — 1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 11

Incident Type

Time Period 1949–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Illness 1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2

Accident

Otherb

Total

8 — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 9

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

9 — — 1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 11

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMOGIP Vehicles: 30 September 2009 UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Ambulance Automobiles Buses Trucks Total

41 1 3 19 3 67

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMOGIP Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Posts Other Staff Costs Hospitality Other Expenditures Total

Appropriation Jan 08–Dec 09

Estimated Expenditures Jan 08–Dec 09

8,662.7 2,732.1 2.9 5,010.4 16,408.1

9,193.4 3,300.8 2.9 5,116.2 17,613.3

Sources: UN Document A/64/6 (Sect.5); DFS FBFD. Note: January 2008–December 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

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UNMOGIP (INDIA AND PAKISTAN) • 343

UNMOGIP Mission Expenditures: January 2000–December 2007 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Posts Other Staff Costs Travel of Staff Contractual Services General Operating Expenses Hospitality Supplies and Materials Furniture and Equipment Total Requirements

Source: DFS FBFD.

Jan. ‘00–Dec. ‘01

Jan. ‘02–Dec. ‘03

Jan. ‘04–Dec. ‘05

Jan. ‘06–Dec. ‘07

5,574.1 1,593.5 865.9 — 1,772.6 2.3 1,022.4 1,332.0 12,162.8

6,370.9 1,983.8 1,247.5 38.9 1,174.3 2.5 800.1 1,107.6 12,725.6

6,482.6 2,038.7 1,309.6 21.5 1,995.9 2.3 355.7 2,527.5 14,733.8

4,293.4 5,504.9 193.2 — 3,435.2 2.4 769.5 1,023.3 15,221.9

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6.18 UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) UNOCI Key Facts

Latest Key Resolutions

First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander

First Force Commander Police Commissioner First Police Commissioner

30 July 2009 (date of issue); 31 July 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1880 (six month duration) 27 January 2009 (date of issue); 31 January 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1865 (six month duration) 27 February 2004 (date of issue); 4 April 2004 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1528 (twelve month duration) Choi Young-Jin (Republic of Korea) Albert Tevoedjre (Benin) Major-General Fernand Marcel Amoussou (Benin) SG letter of appointment 30 August 2006 Entry on duty 24 August 2005 Major-General Abdoulaye Fall (Senegal) Major-General Gerardo Cristian Chaumont (Argentina) Date of appointment 4 April 2006 Yves Bouchard (Canada)

344

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UNOCI (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) • 345

UNOCI Personnel: July 2008–September 2009

8,000

7,800

Number of Personnel

7,600

7,400

7,200

7,000

6,800

6,600

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

6,400

Auth. Troops Troops

1,400

Number of Personnel

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNOCI Personnel: Since 2004

9,000

8,000

Average Number of Personnel

•

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0 Apr.– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Troops Troops

1,400

1,200

Average Number of Personnel

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1,000

800

600

400

200

0 Apr.– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1528, S/RES/1609, S/RES/1682, S/RES/1739, A/59/750, A/60/630 and A/61/673; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNOCI (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) • 347

UNOCI Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country

Troops

Bangladesh 2,082 Jordan 1,057 Pakistan 1,137 Morocco 726 Ghana 542 Benin 428 Niger 386 Senegal 327 Togo 313 Cameroon — Djibouti — Chad 1 France 8 Burundi — Democratic Republic — of Congo Turkey — Yemen 1 Tunisia 4 Paraguay 2 Central African Republic — India — Brazil 3 China — Nigeria — Philippines 3 Romania — Russia — Switzerland —

Military Observers

Police

Total

15 7 12 — 6 8 6 9 7 — — 1 2 — —

249 389 126 — 15 57 60 51 18 49 39 26 12 20 20

2,346 1,453 1,275 726 563 493 452 387 338 49 39 28 22 20 20

— 8 7 8 — 8 4 7 7 4 7 7 —

14 4 — — 9 — — — — — — — 7

14 13 11 10 9 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

Contributing Country

Troops

Canada — Guatemala — Uganda 2 Uruguay — Nepal 1 Poland — Argentina — Bolivia — El Salvador — Gambia — Guinea — Moldova — Peru — Rwanda — Serbia — Tanzania 2 Ecuador — Ethiopia — Ireland — Libya — Namibia — Republic of Korea — Zambia — Egypt 1 Finland — Hungary — Sweden — Zimbabwe — Total 7,026

Military Observers — 5 3 2 3 4 — 3 3 3 3 3 3 — 3 1 2 2 2 — 2 2 2 — — — — 1 192

Police 5 — — 3 — — 3 — — — — — — 3 — — — — — 2 — — — — 1 1 1 — 1,184

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD. Note: Police figures include formed police units provided by Bangladesh (250), Jordan (374), and Pakistan (125).

Total 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 8,402

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UNOCI Military Units: 30 September 2009

Number

Unit Type

Country

1 1 2 1 1

Aviation Unit Communications Company Engineering Companies Guard and Administration Company Gendarme Security Company

8

Infantry Battalions

2 2 1 1

Infantry Companies Level II Hospitals Special Forces Company Transport Company

Ghana Bangladesh Bangladesh, Pakistan Bangladesh Benin-Ghana-Niger-Senegal-Togo Composite Bangladesh (2), Benin, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan Senegal, Togo Bangladesh, Ghana Jordan Pakistan

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

UNOCI International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

International Staff 44 9 3 — 20 14 15 13 12 — — 44 2 73 — 3 19 7 11 17 14 61 3 17 1 402

Percentage International Staff 10.9% 2.2% 0.7% — 5.0% 3.5% 3.7% 3.2% 3.0% — — 10.9% 0.5% 18.2% — 0.7% 4.7% 1.7% 2.7% 4.2% 3.5% 15.2% 0.7% 4.2% 0.2%

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “Other/NA” category contains staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

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UNOCI (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) • 349

UNOCI Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

6,942 181 1,161 279 518 9,081

84 11 23 123 159 400

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Percentage Male 98.8% 94.3% 98.1% 69.4% 76.5% 95.8%

Percentage Female 1.2% 5.7% 1.9% 30.6% 23.5% 4.2%

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UNOCI Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop — 10 11 4 13 1 3 7 2 7 2 2 3 45

Military Obs. — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 1

Int’l. Staff

Police — 1 1 2 2 2 — — — 1 — — 1 7

— 1 — 2 1 — — 1 — — — — — 4

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— 15 13 8 18 4 4 8 2 8 2 2 4 62

— 2 1 — 2 1 1 — — — — — — 5

Incident Type

Time Period 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

— 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 2

— 10 5 2 6 1 3 2 — 5 1 2 2 28

— 3 8 4 11 3 1 5 2 3 1 — 2 29

— 1 — 1 1 — — 1 — — — — — 3

Total — 15 13 8 18 4 4 8 2 8 2 2 4 62

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNOCI (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) • 351

UNOCI Vehicles: 30 September 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 4 Combat Vehicles 174 Engineering Vehicles 38 Material Handling Equipment 17 Naval Vessels 2 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 353 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 847 1,435 Total

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles 882 Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 12 Ambulances 8 Automobiles 6 Buses 76 Engineering Vehicles 16 Material Handling Equipment 16 Trucks 96 Vans 13 Total 1,125

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNOCI Aircraft: 30 September 2009

Transport Fixed Wing Commercial Contingent Owned Total

3 — 3

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Transport Helicopter 6 3 (Ghana) 9

Attack Helicopter — — —

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UNOCI Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

10,396.8 186,537.4 20,708.6 18,992.5 65,226.9 17,650.5 11,821.1 993.1 382.4 — 256.0 4,661.0 43,609.8 13,311.0 48,235.1 60.7 20,682.8 15,012.7 1,000.0 479,538.5 — 479,538.5 — 479,538.5

10,381.6 186,373.0 19,949.5 18,714.6 65,177.5 15,267.3 11,817.2 977.7 373.5 — 250.4 4,659.3 43,476.3 13,233.3 48,227.7 4.0 20,665.1 14,826.1 999.3 475,373.3 — 475,373.3 — 475,373.3

10,544.5 181,982.9 21,659.6 18,391.8 75,916.8 17,485.0 11,884.0 1,067.9 395.3 — 111.0 4,649.2 46,559.7 13,149.4 44,668.1 35.4 26,949.9 15,323.6 1,000.0 491,774.1 9,647.9 482,126.2 — 491,774.1

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNOCI Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

36,247.2 5,020.5 16,407.3 7,733.1 4,791.0 3,541.4 73,740.4

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UNOCI (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) • 353

UNOCI Mission Expenditures: April 2004– June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars)

500,000

Expenditures

450,000 400,000

138,151.8

138,587.7

350,000 129,599.7

300,000 138,326.6

250,000

80,324.9

87,650.2

231,857.0

239,470.0

66,985.2

200,000

45,790.7

150,000 100,000 50,000 0

152,773.2 48,708.4 5,000.1 29,354.7

Apr.– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

185,684.0

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

Civilian Personnel

July ‘07– June ‘08

Military and Police Personnel

Apr.– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

29,354.7 5,000.1 48,708.4 — 83,063.2 547.3 82,515.9

152,773.2 45,790.7 138,326.6 — 336,890.5 4,906.3 331,984.2

185,684.0 66,985.2 129,599.7 — 382,268.9 6,878.8 375,390.1

231,857.0 80,324.9 138,587.7 — 450,769.6 7,597.9 443,171.7

239,470.0 87,650.2 138,151.8 — 465,272.0 9,009.1 456,262.9

— 83,063.2

— 336,890.5

— 382,268.9

— 450,769.6

— 465,272.0

Sources: UN Documents A/59/750, A/60/643, A/61/673, A/62/750 and A/63/610.

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UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia)

UNOMIG Key Facts

Latest Key Resolutions

First Mandate SRSG First Special Envoy Chief Military Observer First Chief Military Observer Senior Police Advisor

15 June 2009 (mandate falied to be renewed resulting in termination of the mission) 13 February 2009 (date of issue); 15 February 2009 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1808 (four month duration) 24 August 1993 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 858 (six month duration) Johan Verbeke (Belgium) SG letter of appointment 30 July 2008 Edouard Brunner (Switzerland) Major-General Anwar Hussain (Bangladesh) Entry on duty 8 August 2005 Brigadier-General John Hviedergaard (Denmark) Oleksiy Telychkin (Ukraine) Date of appointment 23 October 2006

354

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UNOMIG (GEORGIA) • 355

UNOMIG Personnel: July 2007–May 2009

350

300

Number of Personnel

250

200

150

100

50

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

0

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

UNOMIG Personnel: Since 2000

250

Average Number of Personnel

200

150

100

50

0 July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– May ’09

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents A/56/721, A/57/676, A/58/639, A/59/622, A/60/643, A/61/700, S/RES/937 and S/RES/1494; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNOMIG Military and Police Contributors: 31 May 2009

Contributing Country Germany Bangladesh Czech Republic Hungary Jordan Pakistan Poland Republic of Korea Egypt Russia Denmark Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

Troops

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

12 10 5 7 7 7 5 7 6 4 5 3 4 5 5 5

2 — 2 — — — 2 — — 2 — 2 1 — — —

14 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5

Greece Indonesia Uruguay Albania Croatia France Yemen Austria Ghana Lithuania Philippines Romania United States Moldova Mongolia Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Military Observers

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNOMIG Military Units: 31 May 2009

Number 1

Unit Type

Country

Level 1 Medical Unit

Germany

Source: DPKO FGS.

4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 1 2 — 2 2 1 1 132

Police — — — — — — — — 1 — 2 — — — — 14

Total 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 146

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UNOMIG (GEORGIA) • 357

UNOMIG International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 31 May 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

11 3 2 — — 4 6 4 3 — — 8 1 6 — — 8 3 — — 3 29 — 7 — 98

11.2% 3.1% 2.0% — — 4.1% 6.1% 4.1% 3.1% — — 8.2% 1.0% 6.1% — — 8.2% 3.1% — — 3.1% 29.6% — 7.1% —

Source: DFS FPD. Note: The “Other/NA” category contains staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNOMIG Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 May 2009

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

— 127 13 80 134 354

— 5 1 18 70 94

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Percentage Male — 96.2% 92.9% 81.6% 65.7% 79.0%

Percentage Female — 3.8% 7.1% 18.4% 34.3% 21.0%

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNOMIG Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 1995–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

1 — 4 — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 6

2 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1 — — 1 2

— — — — — — 1 1 — — — — — — — — — — 2

Othera

Total

— — — — — —

4 — 4 — 1 — 1 1 — — — — — — 1 — — 1 12

— — — — — — — — — — — —

Incident Type

Time Period 1995–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act 3 — 4 — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 8

Illness — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

Accident

Otherb

Total

1 — — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1 — — 1 1

4 — 4 — 1 — 1 1 — — — — — — 1 — — 1 12

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNOMIG (GEORGIA) • 359

UNOMIG Vehicles: 31 May 2009

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) Total

2 2

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 195 3 3 12 2 8 12 3 238

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section. Note: UN Vehicles totals are as of 10 July 2009.

UNOMIG Aircraft: 31 May 2009

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

1 — 1

1 — 1

— — —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNOMIG Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘08–June ‘09

Estimated Expenditures July ‘08–June ‘09

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

4,082.2 64.7 503.0 — 15,437.3 4,775.1 41.6 49.3 — — 8.6 456.8 2,382.4 1,918.1 2,214.2 — 1,943.6 607.3 — 34,484.2 — 34,484.2 — 34,484.2

3,999.0 64.2 442.4 — 15,356.2 4,692.6 29.9 37.6 — — — 456.3 2,361.1 1,915.2 2,124.4 — 1,918.0 585.4 — 33,982.2 — 33,982.2 — 33,982.2

553.5 43.2 74.0 — 7,617.8 2,560.2 — 96.0 — — 11.3 103.3 1,019.5 233.1 1,049.5 — 632.2 1,006.4 — 15,000.0 — 15,000.0 — 15,000.0

Sources: UN Document A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD. Note: July 2008–June 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNOMIG Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2008–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Medical Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

64.2 24.8 89.1

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UNOMIG (GEORGIA) • 361

UNOMIG Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2008 (in thousands of US dollars) 35,000

Expenditures

30,000 25,000 20,000

1,491.5

10,881.6

10,284.1

9,839.2

17,601.0

17,876.8

18,536.3

10,529.8

9,595.4

16,653.1

10,866.3

8,236.6 8,285.7

15,000 10,000

15,941.0

13,581.4

14,595.1

3,466.6

3,345.0

3,670.6

3,887.7

3,953.6

4,137.0

4,401.8

July ‘01– June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

July ‘03– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

10,770.0

5,000 0

3,701.8

July ‘00– June ‘01

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Other

July ‘00– June ‘01

July ‘01– July ‘02– July ‘03– July ‘04– July ‘05– July ‘06– June ‘02 June ‘03 June ‘04 June ‘05 June ‘06 June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

3,701.8 10,770.0 8,285.7 1,491.5 24,249.0 1,752.0 22,497.0

3,466.6 13,581.4 8,236.6 — 25,284.6 1,749.1 23,535.5

3,345.0 14,595.1 10,881.6 — 28,821.7 1,920.3 26,901.4

3,670.6 15,941.0 10,866.3 — 30,477.9 2,139.8 28,338.1

3,887.7 16,653.1 10,529.8 — 31,070.6 2,161.6 28,909.0

3,953.6 17,601.0 9,595.4 — 31,150.0 2,191.3 28,958.7

4,137.0 17,876.8 10,284.1 — 32,297.9 2,141.5 30,156.4

4,401.8 18,536.3 9,839.2 — 32,777.3 2208.4 30,568.9

— 24,249.0

— 25,284.6

— 28,821.7

— 30,477.9

— 31,070.6

— 31,150.0

— 32,297.9

— 32,777.3

Sources: UN Documents A/56/721, A/57/676, A/58/639, A/59/622, A/60/643, A/61/700, A/62/680 and A/63/517.

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UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)

UNTSO Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate Chief of Staff

First Chief of Staff

23 October 1973 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 339 (to continue thereafter, until the Security Council decides otherwise) 29 May 1948 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 50 (no duration determined) Major-General Robert Mood (Norway) SG letter of appointment 9 January 2009 Entry on duty 15 January 2009 Colonel Count Thord Bonde (Sweden)

362

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UNTSO (MIDDLE EAST) • 363

UNTSO Personnel: July 2008–September 2008

200

180

Number of Personnel

160

140

120

100

80

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

June ’09

May ‘09

Apr. ’09

Mar. ‘09

Feb. ’09

Jan. ‘09

Dec. ’08

Nov. ‘08

Oct. ’08

Sept. ‘08

Aug. ’08

July ‘08

60

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UNTSO Personnel: Since 2000

180

160

Average Number of Personnel

364

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140

120

100

80

60 Jan.– Dec. ‘00

Jan.– Dec. ‘01

Jan.– Dec. ‘02

Jan.– Dec. ‘03

Jan.– Dec. ‘04

Jan.– Dec. ‘05

Jan.– Dec. ‘06

Jan.– Jan.– Dec. ‘07 Sept. ’08

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Jan.– Sept. ’09

Sources: UN Documents A/54/6(Sect.5), A/56/6(Sect.5), A/58/6(Sect.5), A/60/6(Sect.5) and A/60/9(Sect.5); DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

UNTSO Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2009

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Finland Ireland Netherlands Australia Denmark Norway Switzerland Italy Austria Canada New Zealand Sweden

— — — — — — — — — — — —

15 12 12 11 11 11 10 8 7 7 7 7

— — — — — — — — — — — —

15 12 12 11 11 11 10 8 7 7 7 7

Argentina Russia Chile China Nepal Belgium France Slovakia Slovenia United States Estonia Total

— — — — — — — — — — — —

6 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 151

— — — — — — — — — — — —

6 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 151

Source: DPKO FGS.

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UNTSO (MIDDLE EAST) • 365

UNTSO International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2009

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Other/NA Total

20 — — — — 3 6 6 — — 2 12 1 8 — 2 2 2 — — 1 22 — 10 — 97

20.6% — — — — 3.1% 6.2% 6.2% — — 2.1% 12.4% 1.0% 8.2% — 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% — — 1.0% 22.7% — 10.3% —

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS. Note: The “Other/NA” category contains staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

UNTSO Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2009

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

— 142 — 78 110 330

— 9 — 19 20 48

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Percentage Male — 94.0% — 80.4% 84.6% 87.3%

Percentage Female — 6.0% — 19.6% 15.4% 12.7%

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNTSO Fatalities: Inception–September 2009

Personnel Type

Time Period 1948–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

18 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 18

12 — — — — 1 1 4 — — — — — — — — — — 18

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

6 — — — — 1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 8

3 — — — 1 — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 5

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

39 — — — 1 2 2 4 1 — — — — — — — — — 49

Incident Type

Time Period 1948–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2009 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act 25 — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 26

Illness 5 — — — 1 1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 8

Accident

Otherb

Total

8 — — — — 1 — 4 1 — — — — — — — — — 14

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

39 — — — 1 2 2 4 1 — — — — — — — — — 49

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNTSO (MIDDLE EAST) • 367

UNTSO Vehicles: 30 September 2009

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Ambulance Automobile Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

74 1 1 12 2 6 8 3 107

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNTSO Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category

Appropriation Jan. ‘08–Dec. ‘09

Estimated Expenditures Jan. ‘08–Dec. ‘09

49,071.5 10,414.6 12.5 10,297.0 69,795.6

41,833.9 12,103.3 12.5 10,186.7 64,136.3

Posts Other Staff Costs Hospitality Other Expenditures Total

Sources: UN Document A/64/6 (Sect.5); DFS FBFD. Note: January 2008–December 2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

UNTSO Mission Expenditures: January 2000–December 2007 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Posts Other Staff Costs Hospitality Travel of Staff Contractual Services General Operating Expenses Supplies and Materials Furniture and Equipment Total Requirements

Jan. ‘00–Dec. ‘01

Jan. ‘02–Dec. ‘03

Jan. ‘04–Dec. ‘05

Jan. ‘06–Dec. ‘07

30,532.2 8,547.1 — 1,793.3 — 2,538.2 1,117.1 1,614.5 46,142.4

31,679.1 9,588.0 7.8 2,658.2 49.5 3,422.8 982.0 1,498.4 49,885.8

33,215.7 10,443.2 7.6 2,763.5 39.7 5,010.0 1,035.3 3,214.7 55,729.7

21,993.1 26,726.5 9.5 234.5 12.9 6,433.8 1,447.4 2,362.1 59,219.8

Sources: UN Documents A/58/6(Sect.5) and A/60/6(Sect.5); DFS FBFD.

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Index

Abbas, Mahmoud, 114 Afghan National Army and Police, 3 Afghanistan: addressing rampant corruption, 32; Agreement on Provisional Arrangements, 27; audit and recount of ballots, 29; calls for withdrawal and talks with the Taliban, 33; civilian and uniformed casualties of 2009, 26; counterinsurgency strategy in, 30; drug revenue and evidence of narco-cartels in, 32–33; electoral crisis and eroded deployment, 26; impact of 2008 US presidential election on, 26; international concerns about disenfranchisement, 29; international military deployment of NATO and OEF, 27, 29–30; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 27–28; Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) of Afghan government and UNAMA, 28; justice sector strategy and reform in, 32; narrow counterterrorism agenda, 27–28; NATO Training Mission in, 31–32; Obama’s authorization of troop deployment and Predator drone attacks, 30, 33; Operation Enduring Freedom, 26, 27; overreliance on military trainers, 21; presidential and provincial council elections, 28–29; private security providers, 31; signing of Afghanistan Compact, 28; stabilization contingent on deteriorating security in Pakistan, 33; strengthening of Afghan National Security Forces in, 30–32; support among NATO allies, 30; use of private contractors in, 30 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 114 Al-Qaeda, 58, 60–61 Annan, Kofi, 13, 95 Aristide, Jean Bertrand, 101–102

Ashdown, Paddy, 82 AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 40, 258–266 Bangladesh, as third largest deployer of UN peacekeeping, 3 Barak, Ehud, 118 al-Bashir, Omar, 5, 66, 69 BINUB. See UN Integrated Office in Burundi Bonn Agreement, 27–29 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH): Bonn Powers invoked in, 83; and Dayton Accords of 1995, 82, 83; entrenchment of international community roles in, 82; EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), 82–84; fears of dissolution of BiH and return to violence in, 84; main threats to security in, 84; NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, 83; NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), 84; OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 83; Peace Implementation Council’s objectives for drawing down OHR, 83 Bozizé, François, 39 Burundi: Arusha Accords of 2000 in, 85, 87; criminal activity in, 87; difficulties of implementing peacebuilding agenda in, 85; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) in, 85–87; ethnic-based conflict in, 85; FNL’s disarmament and acceptance as political party, 86; international actors assistance to, 85; Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) in, 86; limited political freedom in, 87; Partnership for Peace in Burundi (PPB), 87; Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales

369

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INDEX

de Libération (Palipehutu-FNL), 85; rule of law and justice sector in, 87; Tutsi-Hutu civil war in, 85; UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), 85–87; UN Peacebuilding Commission, 86 Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), FOMUC Forces deployed by, 38 Central African Republic (CAR): and BINUCA as new integrated peacebuilding office, 38; BONUCA’s mandate in, 38; and Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006, 67–69; establishment of new government in, 39; EU military operation on, 4–5; EU peacekeeping mission as test case for international peacekeeping, 39–40; ongoing conflict in, 37; proposal for UN peacekeeping deployment in, 36; unpredictable 2009 security situation in, 39 Chad: banditry and threats to civilian safety in, 35; conflicts in eastern Darfur region, 36; Dakar Agreement of March 2008, 36; Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006, 67–69; DEU military operation on, 4–5; EU peacekeeping mission as test case for international peacekeeping, 39–40; EUFOR forces’ commitment to remain, 39–41; EUFOR mandate for broad area security, 36; government relations with armed and political opposition groups, 38–39; humanitarian assistance for refuges, 36–37; judicial reform in, 41; MINURCAT’s missions/mandate and Judicial Advisory Unit, 36–37, 39–41; nature of violence, 35–36; proposal for UN peacekeeping deployment, 36; refugee inflows from Sudan (2004 and 2006), 36 Christofias, Demetris, 95–96 Clinton, Bill, 101, 103 Compaoré, Blaise, 89 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 5 Côte d’Ivoire, 16; background of conflict in, 89–91; crime and banditry in, 92; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) IN, 89, 91–93; election preparations in, 93–94; follow-on peace deals in, 89; Forces Nouvelles, 89–93;

formed police units in, 92; and Operation Licorne, 89, 90, 91, 93, 92; Ouagadougou Agreement in, 89; reunification in, 91, 92; security situation in, 91; short-term reinsertion assistance to ex-combatants, 92–93; tenuous peace in, 89; UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 94; UNOCI operations in, 5, 89–94 Cyrus: optimistic prospects for reunification agreement, 96; parliamentary elections of 2009 in Turkish Cypriot community, 95–96; possibilities of reunification or partition in, 95; UN Peacekeeping Force in, 95 Dahal, Pushpa Kumal (Prachanda), 124 Dakar Agreement, 38 Deby, Idriss, 35 Democratic Republic of Congo: EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD Congo), 48–49; Forces Armés du République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in, 4, 43, 44–48; joint military operations against FDLR and LRA in, 46; Kinshasa-Kigali rapprochement, 45; mandate of UN Organization Mission, 17; mentoring and training of national police and FARDC, 17; MONUC mission and mandate, 3–4, 6, 17–18, 43–49; MONUC’s Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) in, 46; overview of, 44; People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), 45; political developments in, 48–49; relations with Rwanda and end of CNDP rebellion, 43; rule of law in, 17; Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF), 44; sustainability of new DRC-Rwanda relationship, 49; SSR process/reform, 16–18, 47–48 Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS), 40–41 East Timor, and UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 15 East Timor. See Timor-Leste Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 38 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 16 EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR

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TCHAD/RDA), 19–20, 36–37. See also Central African Republic; Chad EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), 27 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), 63 European Union (EU): police mission EUPOL Afghanistan, 32; rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX), 5–6 Feith, Pieter, 51 Georgia: casualties and displacement, 98; chances for renewed violence, 100; CIS peacekeeping force (CISPKF), 97; deliberations on security and humanitarian issues, 99; EU analysis of 2008 conflict, 99; EU deployment of monitoring mission, 98; Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism framework, 99; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Georgia, 97–99; persistent hostility with disputed regions, 97–98; Russian relations with, 97–99; UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), 5, 97–100; withdrawal from CIS and heightened engagement with Western countries, 99 Gration, Scott, 70, 73 Hairi, Saad, 118 Haiti: election process, 103; humanitarian aid for economic recovery, 102–103; Haitian National Police, 14, 102–104; peacekeeping operations between 1993–2004, 101; process of peace consolidation, 105–106; renewed mandates for UN operations, 6; rule of law, 104; security situation improvements, 101, 103–104; tenuous political situation in, 103; UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 101–104; US-led multinational interim force (MIF), 102 India, UN Military Observer Group in, 125 International Criminal Court, formal indictment of President al-Bashir, 38 Iraq: capacity building for governing and assisting negotiations, 108; Coalition

Provisional Authority’s governing of, 107; contested elections, 114; development of security forces and reconciliation with insurgents, 108; disputed internal border areas as impediment to political reconciliation, 108–109; instability in, 114; enlargement of US military commitment, 108; military and police as primary providers of security in, 107; Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I), 107–108; NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), 107– 108; provincial elections, 108, 114; UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), 107–108 Justice: resisted by national elites as threat, 18; slow and unsustained progress in, 12 Kabila, Joseph, 4, 44 Karzai, Hamid, 26, 32, 33 Kemakeza, Alan, 126 Ki-moon, Ban, 50, 51, 55 Kosovo: calls to shrink KFOR, 56; customs component, 54–55; deployment of police officers, 52–53; EU civilian missions, 54; EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), 5–6, 50–56; EU Special Representative (EUSR), 51; justice component of, 53–54; Kosovo Police Force as SSR success story, 15; monitoring and mentoring role of EULEX, 53; NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), 51, 53; and north’s detachment from Pristina’s rule, 52; OSCE Mission (OMIK), 55; recognition of independence, 51; role of International Civilian Office (ICO), 55–56; Russia’s refusal to recognize independence, 51; security issues, 52–53; UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 15, 50–56 Lebanon, renewed mandates for UN operations in, 6 Liberia: closure of disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration program, 111; development of Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), 111; domestic and regional threats to, 110; ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL),

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110; establishment of multinational force (ECOWAS) in, 110; Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), 113; presidential elections in, 110, 113; progress in postconflict recovery, 110; strengthening of Liberian National Police (LNP), 111–112; training and mentoring in, 111; Truth and Reconciliation Commission on, 112–113; UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 110–112 Lusaka Agreement, 44 Mbeki, Thabo, 69 McChrystal, Stanley, 31 Middle East: EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah, 119–120; EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS), 120; EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), 116; fighting between Arabs and Kurds in north Iraq, 119; grave humanitarian consequences of Gaza conflict, 114; international efforts to secure land borders of Syria-Lebanon borders, 117; international security training assistance missions, 115–116; Iraq’s gradual drop of violence, 119; Israeli Cast Lead operation, 114; Lebanon’s election success, 114; Lebanon’s caretaker government and Resolution 1701 issues, 118; MFO Sinai and security provisions of Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, 121; Netanyahu’s hard line on Palestinian issues, 118–119; Palestinian Civil Police, 120; political situations and hope for political change in, 118–119; political and security impacts of Gaza conflict, 114–115; security challenges and war in Lebanon, 116–117; success of Iraqi and Lebanese elections, 118; “terrorist organizations” as threat to Lebanese and regional security, 117; Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), 120; threat to destabilization of broader Middle East, 114; UN Disengagement Observer Force, 119; UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL), 116–118; UN Truce Supervision Organization, 119 MINURCAT. See UN Mission in Chad and Central African Republic

MINURCAT. See UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad MINURSO. See UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara MINUSTAH. See UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti Mission de Consolidation de la Paix (MICOPAX), 37, 38, 40 Moldova-Transdniestria: EU support for conflict resolution process, 122–123; formation of pro-EU membership government, 122; Joint Control Commission (JFF) Peacekeeping Force, 122; Moscow-Chisinau peace agreement and cease-fire, 122; new Moldovan government’s call for dissolution of peacekeeping operation, 122; Transdniestrian authorities’ call on Russian allies, 122 MONUC. See UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo NATO: deployment growth of, 3; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of, 3 Nepal: downsizing initiated, 124; emergence of Communist Party of Nepal, 124; future of Nepal’s two armies, 124–125; issue of reintegration of Maoist combatants, 124– 125; peace process, 124, 125; political crisis of May 2009, 124; UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), 124 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 114, 118 Nkurunziza, Pierre, 86 Non-UN-Commanded missions, global statistics on: in Africa by organization, troops/police deployed, 177–179; contributors, top twenty, 171–173; costs of missions, 191; in Europe by organization, troops, 180; heads of missions, 192–193; military and observer missions, 180–185; by organization, contributors of military personnel, 175; by organization, deployment of police, 175–176; overview, 168–169; police and civilian missions, 186–190; regions, deployment to, 174–177. See also individual countries Nqakula, Charles, 87 Ntaganda, Bosco, 48 Nur, Adde Hussien, 60

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Obama, Barack, 26–27, 117 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 49 Office for Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), 20, 21 Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights (OHCHR), 20 Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 85 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (0ECD), 13 Orogula, Dervis, 96 Pakistan: as second largest deployer of UN peacekeeping, 3; support for military operations against Taliban, 33; US military assistance to, 33; UN Military Observer Group, 125 Peacekeeping operations: challenges to building reforms in, 12–13; China’s growing involvement in, 105; consent and cooperation of stakeholders in, 18; financing of security and justice sector reform, 21; institutional challenge in, 20–21; mandate for security and justice sector reform, 12; and New Horizons process, 6; 1998–2009 deployments, 2–3; operational contexts and challenges in, 5; political challenges to, 18; protecting civilians in context of, 47; reform initiatives of 2009, 7; role of peace as international tool, 6; and rule of law in postconflict setting, 6; security and justice sector reform as, 14–16 Police deployment: in global peace operations, 1995–2009, 15; sources of, 8; and understanding of rule of law in peacekeeping, 7–9. See also specific country Al-Qaeda, 58, 60–61 Ramos-Horta, José, 76 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, 30 Reinado, Alfredo, 76 Ross, Christopher, 128 Rule of law: as central function of peacekeeping, 12; challenges of establishing, 13; defined, 13; deployment capacity in the South, 21; and drug trafficking and organized crime threats, 12; engagement at the country level, 22n.1; as goal and

organizing principle for peacekeeping, 16; organization activities and resources for building, 12; in peacebuilding operations, 14–18; political challenge to establishing, 18–19; in postconflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, 13; in postconflict setting, 6; and principle of local ownership, 18–19; role of peace operations in building, 18–21; and security sector reform in peacekeeping, 13–14; technical aspects of interventions into, 19; time frame for reestablishing, 20 Schwarz-Schilling, Christian, 82 Security and justice sector reform: occurring through nonstate actors and traditional institutions, 19; resisted by national elites, 18; slow and unsustained progress in, 12; Western involvement in, 19 Security Council Resolution 1325, for women, peace, and security, 112 al-Shabaab insurgent group, 60, 62 Sierra Leone: rule of law-related mission mandates, 16; UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in, 93; UN mission (UNAMSIL) in, 16 Sikua, Derek, 126 Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson, 111–113 Solomon Islands: cooperation with Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI), 126; deficit of trust from civilian population, 127; establishment and mandate of RAMSI, 126; Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Regional Security Committee, 126; Participating Police Force’s interface with RSIPF, 127; Royal Police Force (RSIPF), 127; support as crucial for, 126; three branches of, 126 Somalia: Alliance for the Reliberation of, 60; AMISOM force in, 5; Amnesty International report on human rights violations (2008), 64; AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 58–64; AU Peace and Security Council, 60; criteria for deploying UN peacekeeping force, 62; development of single platform of engagement, 64; emergence of Islamic Courts Union (ICU), 59–60; establishing security and pursuing conflict settlement in, 58; EU’s first maritime mission (NAVFOR), 61; formal

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justice system, 64; history of current crisis, 59; International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 61–62; key political developments, 60–61; national police force, 64; peacekeeping in, 59–60, 62–63; police training under UNDP, 58; response to piracy issue in, 61–62; rule of law and security sector institutions in, 62, 63–64; sharia law in, 59, 61; Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for, 58, 60; and UN humanitarian situations and peacekeeping interventions, 59; UN Political Office (UNPOS) in, 58–59, 61; UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), 63–64 Statistics on UN-Commanded missions, global: budgets and financial contributions, 160–163; civilian personnel, 151–153; fatalities, 158–159; gender statistics, 157; mandate renewals, 164; military observers, 136–138; occupations, staff, 154; personnel, headquarters, 155–156; personnel, total: 157; police, 139–143; region, personnel by, 144–150; timeline, operations (1945–2009), 165; troops, total UN, 132–135. See also individual countries and individual missions Sudan/Darfur: absence of credible rule of law system in Darfur, 68–69; assistance programs aimed at developing southern sectors, 20; atrocities against civilians in Darfur regions of, 38; AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 67; AU Panel on Darfur (AUPD0, 69; AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 67; contested oil-rich border region of Abyei, 71; deployment of hybrid AU-UN force in Darfur, 67; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) activities in, 72; election feasibility and parties in, 72–73; expulsion of NGO aid groups in Darfur, 69; conflict between SAF and rebel groups in Darfur, 68; and Dakar Contact Group, 69; Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), 71, 72; humanitarian aid in Darfur, 66; Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 66; indictment by International Criminal Court (ICC), 66, 69; Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 69; limited access to justice in Darfur, 69; Lord’s

Resistance Army, 71; neglect of north-south conflict in, 66–67; patrols of IDP camps in, 68; planned elections in April 2010, 70; political situation surrounding Darfur, 69; rule of law and security sector reform in, 72; security deterioration in the south, 70–72; UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), 70–73; UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 66–67; UN self-sustainability for African battalions, 67–68; unsettled situations facing civilians and peacekeepers in Darfur and the south, 66; US Special Envoy to Sudan, 70; violence aimed at staff and aid workers in Darfur, 68 Talat, Mehmet Ali, 95–96 Timor-Leste: abuse of authority and human rights by police and military, 78; approved security laws, 76–77; F-FDTL defense force, 76, 78–79; Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente, 75; Indonesian military campaign of violence and demolition, 75; International Stabilization Force (ISF), 75; policing and elections as progress, 74; political developments, 78–79; responsibilities in, 77; return of Petitioners and IDPs, 76; security issues and reforms, 74–78; UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), 75; UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), 75; UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 74–78; UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNAMET), 75 UNAMA. See UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMI. See UN Assistance Mission for Iraq UNAMID. See AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 108, 250–257 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 27, 242–249 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO): expertise and mission of, 20; mission with SSR and JSR components, 14 UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 20

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UN Development Programme (UNDP), 20, 41 UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 119, 267–274 UNDOF. See UN Disengagement Observer Force UNFICYP. See UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 41 UNIFIL. See UN Interim Force in Lebanon UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 75, 329–337 UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), 85, 200–205 UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), 35 UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 55, 294–301 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 116, 284–293 United Nations: Brahimi Report on peace operations (2000), 15–16; definition of security sector reform, 13; increased military deployments of, 3; rapid deployable rule of law capacity, 21; 2009 top ten contributors to, 3 UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 338–343 UNMIL. See UN Mission in Liberia UNMIK. See UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNMIN. See UN Mission in Nepal UNMIS. See UN Mission in the Sudan UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 128, 214–222 UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 110, 302–311 UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), 124, 312–318 UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT): 37, official transfer of authority to, 35–37; provision of security and protection for, 40; 206–213 UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), 71, Justice and Security Sector Advisory Coordination Cell (JSSACC) for, 19–20; 319–328 UNMIT. See UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNMOGIP. See UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), mandate to mentor and train national police, 14 UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), 98, 354–361 UNOCI. See UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 20 UNOMIG. See UN Observer Mission in Georgia UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), 91, 344–353 UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 232–241 UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 95, 275–283 UN police, international deployment of 1999–2001, 15 UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 14, 102, 223–231 UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 119, 362–368 UNTSO. See UN Truce Supervision Organization US Agency for International Development, pilot justice projects of, 32 van Walsum, Peter, 128 Voronin, Vladimir, 122 West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), and capacity building programs in postconflict countries, 8 Western Sahara: extended mandate of MINURSO in, 129; extended patrols and monitoring functions in, 129; proposals to expand confidence-building measures in, 128; and MINURSO-supported family visits program, 128; UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 128–129 Wilson, Graeme, 126 Yadav, Ram Baran, 124–125 Yusuf, Abdullahi, 59 Zardari, Asif Ali, 33

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About the Book

Unique in its breadth of coverage, the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations presents the most detailed collection of data on peace operations—those launched by the UN, by regional organizations, by coalitions, and by individual nations—that is available. Features of the 2010 volume include: • a thematic focus on establishing the rule of law, now a core function of global peace operations • a summary analysis of trends and developments in peace operations through 2009 • concise analyses of all peacekeeping missions on the ground in 2009 • a review of the reform initiatives enacted during 2009 • in-depth explorations of key missions, focusing on those that faced significant challenges or underwent major developments • extensive, full-color maps, figures, and photographs The editorially independent Review is a project of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

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